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LORD COCHRANE AND THE CHILEAN NAVY, 1818-1823,
WITH AN INVENTORY OF THE DUNDONALD PAPERS
RELATING TO HIS SERVICE WITH THE CHILEAN NAVY.

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Lord Cochrane and the Chilean Navy, 1818-1823
SUMMARY

In the late 18th century and the first two decades of the 19th, Spanish seapower in the Pacific was in a state of decline, though it remained strong enough to contribute to the overthrow of the first attempt of the Chileans to liberate their colony from Spain, in 1814. By the time of the second, successful, emancipation of Chile in 1817, the patriots had realised the need for seapower. In that year they took into their service Lord Cochrane, a noted British naval officer then unemployed.

Lord Cochrane arrived in Chile at the end of 1818. The squadron at that time is described. With this squadron Lord Cochrane made his first cruise, a reconnaissance in force of the royalist-held Peruvian coast during which Callao was attacked without success. Arising from this reconnaissance, the physical environment of the Mar del Sur is reviewed, together with the state of navigational knowledge.

The intention of Lord Cochrane's second cruise, which began in September 1819, was to stage a major attack on Callao. This object was not achieved because of the squadron's inadequate means and the viceroy's defensive measures, so in December 1819 Lord Cochrane sailed to Valdivia, a fortified city in the south of Chile still in Spanish hands, and captured it by assault in February 1820. There has been some debate about his intentions when he sailed for Valdivia.

By early 1820 some of the basic social characteristics of the Chilean navy had emerged and these are examined, firstly from the point of view of the manning of the ships and secondly from the point of view of the problems of discipline and morale that arose. At
the same time, the system of naval administration should be examined as its defects and malfunctioning had serious effects on the operating of the squadron, and its efficiency.

This data forms the background to the squadron's participation in the liberation of Peru. Initially it played a significant role, firstly by shipping the expedition to Peru and secondly by boarding and taking out of Callao harbour the principal Spanish warship there. These successes were in 1820; in 1821 the squadron's role became less important as the relations between Lord Cochrane and San Martín, the commander-in-chief, deteriorated as a result of the refusal or inability of the latter to pay the squadron. In September 1821 Lord Cochrane seized the Peruvian public funds, allegedly to indemnify the expenses of the squadron, and left Peru.

His last cruise, from October 1821 to May 1822, had the object of hunting down the remaining Spanish warships in the Pacific. This cruise here receives its first full account. The cruise completed, though not as successfully as he had hoped, Lord Cochrane returned to Chile. His brief remaining stay in that country was disturbed by difficulties in paying off the ships, disputes with San Martín, and the deteriorating political position of the government. When he received an invitation in November 1822 to take command of the Brazilian navy he accepted, resigned from the Chilean service, and left the country at the beginning of 1823.

The dissertation is supplemented by the inventory of the papers in the Dundonald collection which relate to the period of Lord Cochrane's service with Chile. These amount to 2286 items.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST CHILEAN NAVY

In the second half of the 18th century, profound tensions began to develop in the empire which Spain had ruled in America for two and a half centuries. Some of the tensions were economic, the increasing desire of the creoles to eliminate the commercial and mercantile restrictions imposed upon the colonies from Madrid, and to liberalise the trade regulations in such a way as to permit them to export their agricultural produce to the most profitable markets, and to import those finished products and goods which they wanted from the cheapest and most efficient source. They increasingly resented the monopolistic powers concentrated in the hands of the great consulados or merchant guilds of Lima and Mexico City, which enabled the rich Spanish merchants to exploit the colonial markets for fat profits. Some of the tensions were political, arising from the desires of the creoles to enjoy a larger participation than they were so far allowed in the government of their colonies, and their hostility to the programme of increasing and strengthening imperial control over the colonies which the Spanish Bourbon kings were carrying out in America after 1760. Some were social, the resentment the creoles felt towards the peninsular Spaniards who, it seemed to them, monopolised all the positions of prestige, privilege and power in colonial society and treated the creoles with a condescending and contemptuous arrogance, a feeling which stimulated the development of an increasingly explicit sense of Americanism.

At the same time that these interests, hopes, fears and aspirations of the colonials intensified, a political crisis occurred in Spain the effect of which was to break the links which bound metropolis and
colonies together. As the dominant creole groups increasingly felt that their interests and those of the mother country were not compatible, the separation which the logic of their position implied was brought about by the external impact of war in Europe.

In 1789 the French Revolution broke out and led in turn to a series of wars in Europe in which Spain was involved, with only brief exceptions, continuously and on the French side. Spain held to the French alliance partly because of the overwhelming diplomatic and military preponderance of France, particularly once Napoleon emerged as Emperor of the French, and partly because of Spanish fears that alliance with France's enemy, Britain, would lead to irresistible pressures from the British government and mercantile community for trade liberalisation and economic concessions in America. War with Britain, however, aggravated and intensified the problem of colonial centrifugalism as Spain was more and more cut off from her colonies where the creoles increasingly asserted themselves against the official colonial governments, and where in and from the 1790's foreign economic penetration progressively weakened economic ties with Spain.

The explosion came at length in 1808. In that year a popular tumult forced the king, Charles IV, to abdicate in favour of his son Ferdinand. Ferdinand, however, was shortly afterwards forced to resign his rights to Napoleon, who then bestowed the Spanish kingdom on his brother Joseph and took Ferdinand a prisoner back to France. Meanwhile a popular revolt begun in Spain against the French army of occupation which had been poured into the country, and the long and bitter Peninsular War commenced. For America, the collapse of the government in Spain meant that the colonies from the end of 1808 were in effect independent, albeit still
ruled by Spanish officials according to the habits and
precepts of colonial laws and regulations. The bases
of royal government were quickly eroded between 1808
and 1810 as the creoles moved towards independence.
By 1810 it was becoming clear that an impassable gulf
was opening between the conservatives and royalists
on the one hand and the radicals and separatists on
the other. In or soon after 1810 a series of civil
wars broke out in Spanish America: between the differ­
ent factions. One of these wars of independence was
between the different factions within the Spanish col­
ony of Chile, and it was followed, on the consummation
of Chilean independence, by a naval war against Peru
where royalist power remained ensconced.

1 Seapower in the Pacific at the end of the
Spanish colonial period

What will be remarkable about the events to be
narrated will be that considering the importance of
seapower in the Pacific during the wars of independ­
ce, few naval or maritime engagements actually occ­
curred. Though naval operations were carried on by the
Chilean patriots, the Spanish made almost no attempt
to counter them. This inability was not an immediate
or accidental one but the result of factors which had
come into play during the 18th and early 19th centur­
ies and which made it impossible for the Spanish, even
if they had wished it, to maintain a reasonable naval
force in the Pacific, far less one adequate to the ex­
ceptional circumstances of the early 19th century.
Some of these factors were underlying ones over which
they had no control, for example the geographical re­
alities and configuration of the Mar del Sur and the
economic evolution of the colonies along its shores.
Other factors were administrative and technical or
 technological in nature. Still others were strategic
and were drawn from an appreciation of the foregoing ones.

The first group of factors were those of the geography of the Mar del Sur and its adjacent coasts. This will not be discussed in detail here as it is intended to do so in another and more appropriate context. Here it is necessary only to make the general point that the coasts of the Mar del Sur stretched for several thousand miles through 65 degrees of latitude, from 10 degrees north to about 55 degrees south, that is from Panama to Cape Horn. Along this coast, much of which was and is an inhospitable one, were scattered literally dozens of harbours and inlets of varying size, quality and utility for ships. The broad implication for maritime defence is twofold. Firstly the sheer immensity and extension of coasts and number of harbours meant that a maritime force capable of policing it all would have to be a substantial one, perhaps divided into two or three squadrons based at different points along the coast. Secondly, and on the other hand, while there were a multiplicity of bays and harbours and inlets at which a corsair or privateer could touch or an invader disembark for a

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1 At the time of writing this section (summer 1973), a work due to appear from a distinguished Peruvian historian, de la Puente Candamo's Historia Maritima del Perú en la época de la República 1780-1825, a volume in the collective maritime history of Peru sponsored by the Peruvian Navy, had not appeared although scheduled for late 1972. This work, when it appears, will probably contain a full exposition of the matters discussed in this section as well as a general account of the subject of this thesis, viewed from a Peruvian standpoint.

2 See below, Chapter 3, section i.
moderate period of time or in a fair season, almost every one of these bays, harbours and inlets and all the ports had one or more disadvantages which made it impracticable for royal ships to be permanently stationed in them.

On the administrative level, the marine department of the viceroyalty of Peru, which was responsible for the defence of this whole area, functioned throughout the period up to the wars of independence in a confused and inefficient manner. In the first place, it was topo-heavy, with an excessive number of functionaries in shore administrative posts relative to the number of ships to be managed. When Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa drew up their famous secret report on the viceroyalty in the 1740's there were in the Callao arsenal, in the Callao marine armament storehouse, in the Callao naval dockyard, in superior posts in Lima, in Guayaquil, Valparaíso, Concepción and Valdivia somewhere between 45 and 56 functionaries. Yet at this time the viceregal government had only one or two ships at its disposal at any one time. This topo-heavyness remained a persistent feature of the marine department, and after the turn of the century, we still find viceroy Abascal, when noting the insufficiency of the marine budget of the viceroyalty, complaining specifically that this is due to the high rank of the senior officers of the department and the excessive number of both sea and shore officers.

Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa: Noticias secretas de América (1746) (Madrid, 1918), vol I, pp 92-105. The total I have given is a combination of the figures which they give and an educated guess at the remainder.

Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Jose Antonio Calderon Quijano (eds): Memoria de gobierno del virrey Abascal (2 volumes, Seville, 1944), vol I, p 380.
His complaint was echoed with more asperity by his successor Pezuela who observed that the inflated number of officials and functionaries in Callao served little purpose considering that the brig Potrillo was the only warship in the harbour.

The second major weakness of the naval administration was the lack of definition of functions or the overlapping of rights and duties which led to confusion and divided authority both ashore and afloat. A typical case is that of the Escribano Mayor de la Mar del Sur, a kind of secretary-cum-purser general of maritime affairs, who was based in Lima and enjoyed the right of appointing the Escribano in all ships that navigated the coast, whether merchantmen or warships, whether based on the coast or from Europe. Escribanos on ships from Europe had to be confirmed in their office before they could exercise it on this coast. For all these appointments and confirmations the Escribano Mayor levied fees and perquisites, but more seriously from our point of view it led to potentially conflicting loyalties and dangerous assertions of independence on shipboard. In the same way, the overseer general and the purveyor general each put a lieutenant aboard ships when they were commissioned, in theory to see that their dispositions and the regulations governing their area of activity were carried out. In fact great scope for fraudulent activity was given them and their superiors could be expected to protect them against attempts to control them by the captains.

Fraudulent practices by marine department officials

5Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Guillermo Lohmann Villena (eds): Memoria de gobierno del virrey Joaquin de la Pezuela (Seville, 1947), p 87.

6Noticias secretas, I, 98-99.
was the third major failing of the marine department. The Callao and other arsenals of the Mar del Sur were not unique in this - the same frauds were practised in Spanish and foreign arsenals - but in Callao it reached an extreme in scale, so hallowed by custom that it was carried on practically openly, and particip­ipated in by almost everybody in the marine depart­ment. Stores removed from ships when they were laid up disappeared from the storehouses in which they were deposited, so that recommissioning a ship required the purchase at new prices of nearly all her stores and equipment. When ships were supplied, funds were claimed for larger values of goods than were purchased, and the goods invoiced at higher prices than they were worth, or inferior goods substituted. Thus, tarred rigging would be paid for, but untarred rigging supplied, which would not last for one cruise, much less the two or three it should be serviceable for. The occasional attempts by viceroys to check frauds would take the form of deciding not to keep stores and materials in stock but to buy them with careful supervision only when they were specifically needed. But this was a self-defeating policy because many stores and materials could not be supplied at short notice, and because necessity meant that excessive prices could be demanded and had to be paid for materials. The only real solution was careful and honest supervision and as viceroy Amat remarked in 1776, the viceroy could not be everywhere at once to ensure that fraud, wastage and inefficiency were restrained.  

Noticias secretas, I, 94-98, 106; Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Perez Embid (eds): Memoria de gobierno del virrey Amat (Seville, 1947), pp 776-77.
obsolete methods of operations, lack of clear lines of bureaucratic definition and dishonesty were the major weaknesses of the administration. Viceroyalty struggled with the problem of reform among their other preoccupations, though the only major attempt at reform seems to have been that initiated under viceroy Amat, who in the mid-1760's put through a series of measures which resulted in the creation of a central records office in the Lima government, while subsequently in a series of real cédulas and órdenes between 1772 and 1774 the imperial government sought to remodel the administrative basis of the marine department of the Mar del Sur and bring it into line with the reformed systems being imposed in the Spanish seaports. In fact, the new imperial instructions, by describing the duties of existing functionaries wrongly and by attributing non-existent duties or duties they had never performed, to others, only increased the confusion in the marine department. Moreover, existing officials who felt they were being unfairly treated disputed the new dispositions. In the end the whole rather feeble attempt at reform seems to have petered out after this as more important issues rose to overshadow it — for example, the creation of the viceroyalty of Buenos Aires in 1776, the revolt of Tupac Amaru in 1781-82 and the reform of the territorial administration under the intendants from 1782.

Spanish ships in the Mar del Sur were of two kinds, those built locally and those which had come from Europe. The great majority of course were locally-built, and if a permanent squadron were to exist in the Mar del Sur, it would be logical for its ships to be constructed on this coast, while the considerable repair, refitting and maintenance work would always have to be

Memoria de Amat, 204-210, 769-71.
done on this coast. But this question of shipbuilding introduces questions of a technical or technological order.

During the 18th century ships were built at several places along the coast but there were only two dockyards of importance, Callao and Guayaquil. Callao, as the viceregal port and the base of whatever ships the government had, had a major dockyard for repair and maintenance work but was not a shipbuilding port as all the timber used by the marine had to be imported. By far the most important shipbuilding and repair yards were those at Guayaquil, within reach of excellent stands of shipbuilding timber. Here the industry was second only to the cacao trade in importance. The shipyards were large enough to build several ships at once and most of the 50 to 100 ships navigating this coast at any one time originated from here. But except for the timber, most naval stores used here and in Callao had to be imported, often from considerable distances. Iron, an essential but always expensive commodity in Peru, came from Spain or, when Spanish iron was too expensive or unavailable, from Mexico, though this was a brittle and inferior kind. Pitch and tar came from Mexico and ropework, rigging and copper from Chile, mostly through Coquimbo9. The fact that many essential materials had to be imported made the shipbuilding industry particularly vulnerable to disruptions like the wars of 1761-63 and 1793 onwards, and the revolutionising of the supplying colonies after 1810.

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Moreover, while the quality of some materials was good, the quality of others, like rigging, was poor and the standard of craftsmanship was dismal. The proportions customary in Europe were not applied and ships were built by rule of thumb without plans. Though the standard of technical proficiency improved during the century local ships were, in terms of craftsmanship, inferior to European ships to the very end of the colony.\textsuperscript{10}

Nature conspired with bad craftsmanship to reduce the efficiency, shorten the life and increase the expense of naval stores and weaponry and ships. North of Guayaquil and increasingly so in the warm waters off the coast of Central America and Mexico, teredo (shipworm) was a major problem for wooden ships, while to the south the heat, humidity and dampness rusted and rotted naval stores rapidly. A review of equipment in Callao in December 1775, for example, shows that a third of the 209 bronze guns, a quarter of the 100 iron guns, more than a third of the 294 gun carriages or mountings, and three-quarters of the 1300 metres of rigging was unserviceable, mostly through the effects of the climate.\textsuperscript{11}

As for European-built ships, while they did not suffer from the construction faults of local ships, the two or three months' voyage from Europe invariably damaged them as much in other ways. Almost every royal ship that arrived at Callao in the late 18th century had to undergo substantial repairs and reconstruction to make her fit for sea again, and of course the standard of maintenance work and quality of materials was noticas secretas, I, 85, and for illustrations of this, see also pp 100-102, 137-38; Hamerly:op.cit.pl65.

\textsuperscript{10}Noticias secretas, I, 111; Memoria de Amat, 755-58.
of the local level.

Associated with the question of the standards of shipbuilding and maintenance is that of manning, and here there seems to have been a developing problem of manning ships and availability of seamen. Seamen could be found amongst the fishing populations of most coastal towns and villages, though depending upon the season the fishermen might also be labourers, herdsmen or muleteers. Populations devoted full-time to the sea were rare outside the large ports. Just before the middle of the 18th century seamen on the royal ships in the Pacific were all volunteers and recruiting in Callao presented no difficulties, partly because the wages paid were comparatively good and were paid fairly promptly. By the 1770's this situation was not so favourable. Seamen's pay was beginning to lag behind, for example, soldiers' pay, and the viceroy in 1776 warned his successor that "here it is not easy to find seamen nor to recruit them, nor would the seamen available in the merchant ships be sufficient." By the beginning of the 19th century the viceroy was sufficiently alarmed to propose remedial measures in the form of encouraging and protecting fishing activities along the coast, controlling foreign whaling operations and setting up a Spanish whaling company, and drawing up rosters of skilled artificers available for sea duty on the lines of the matrícula del mar in coastal areas of Spain.

The major obstacle facing the vicerregal government


13 Memoria de Amat, 772. See also pp 378-79.

at a time when the overall economic situation of the viceroyalty was deteriorating was the huge and rising costs of commissioning and maintaining ships. In the 1740's the viceroy could reasonably entertain the idea of having two 60-gun warships built for and based on Callao, and even a small port like Valdivia could operate a small ship to carry supplies in from Concepción. By the 1770's the government was complaining that to sustain the maritime forces demanded large sums every year, and over and above the regular expenditures there were the extraordinary expenditures which had to be made on visiting royal ships. The government of the Captaincy-General of Chile could not afford any ships of its own and could not maintain regular communication with and defence of Chiloé which in 1768 had to be detached from it and put directly under the viceregal government for its security while Valdivia's ship had long since disappeared and its supplies had to be shipped in by merchant ships chartered as and when necessary or by royal ships that happened to be on that coast. Where previously the government could entertain the idea of keeping two ships of the line in Callao, now the costs, in its view, prohibited it from keeping a regular squadron. Instead, it should rely on the periodic cruises of royal ships from Spain to fulfil the maritime requirements of the viceroyalty. In fact, such cruises seem to have taken place at intervals of about one and a half to two years.

By the opening years of the 19th century, with the rising costs of maritime operations, the deteriorating economic position of the viceroyalty, the war in Europe and then the revolutions in America, the

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15 Noticias secretas, I, 86-87, 102-103, 176; Memoria de Amat, 228-29, 270n, 328-29, 344-45, 381, 657, 660, 678-79, 772-73.
position became worse, with funds budgeted for the marine regularly being exceeded as a result of extraordinary expenditures. Despite an extremely modest naval programme, viceroy Abascal was never able to carry into effect his project for commissioning coastguard vessels for the suppression of contraband and after 1808 new expenditures appeared in the form of the maritime correo to replace the overland post to the Atlantic coast which had been interrupted by the revolutionising of Buenos Aires, a more intensive use of the ships available to the viceregal government in activities such as convoy duties, message and supply carrying, corsair hunting and blockade, which used the ships harder and obliged them to go into dock for repairs and refitting more frequently, more frequent arrivals of royal ships from Spain which after the voyage required substantial refits, and the refitting of British warships on the coast which was a by-product of the alliance created by the Spanish revolt against Napoleon16.

These pressures compelled Abascal to retrench rigorously. Ships were disarmed and laid up immediately they had concluded a cruise and smaller vessels sold off, so that by 1815 the four ships and seven gunboats in Callao on his arrival had been reduced to a small galley, a falucho and the 18-gun brig Potrillo in service off the Chilean coast. By dint of these and other economies he was able to bequeath to his successor a marine department the ordinary expenditure for which had been reduced to the level of 40 years earlier, but only at the cost of leaving the coast of the Mar del Sur wholly vulnerable to predators, as he himself realised: "The coasts lie abandoned, the doors open to clandestine commerce and the attacks of the enemy, as the Royal Marine given the present state to which it

16 Memoria de Abascal, I, 147, 199, 378-412.
is reduced and the great expense which it demands for its enlargement can in no way be employed in the service of cruising along them with these objects.\textsuperscript{17}

All these factors flowed together to mould the strategic thinking of the directors of policy of the colonies along the coasts of the Mar del Sur. And though variations might be found from policymaker to policymaker, there is nevertheless a broad common strand running through strategic conceptions, a basic formulation which can best be described as the shore-based defensive mentality. All planners agreed that because of the extension of coast, the number of harbours and the expense of keeping ships in commission, it was not practicable to try and defend the coast of the Mar del Sur at sea, but rather on land. This policy was exemplified and received its classic formulation at the highest level in the official policy recommendations of a junta of senior officers in Madrid in 1793. Viceroy Gil in 1790 had argued that rather than concentrate on fortbuilding and recruiting as many colonials as possible into the army, fewer forts should be constructed and only the inhabitants of the coast formed into a militia. The money thus saved could be employed in building up a marine capable of policing the sea and controlling the ambitions of Spain's rivals. The junta agreed that Gil had a good case but, observing that the Spanish navy, even if it were larger than it actually was, would still be insufficient to maintain surveillance of so great an area, firmly recommended continuing the policy of relying on land fortifications and troops to defend the colonies from assault. In conformity with this policy,

\textsuperscript{17}Memoria de Abascal, I, 384-85, 389, 411-412; Memoria de Pezuela, 19-31, 78, 87. A falucho was a single-masted vessel which carried a lateen sail. It was not unlike the modern Egyptian felucca.
therefore, viceregal governments concentrated on constructing forts and batteries at the half dozen or so key points on the coast, and on building up regular and militia forces on land, at the expense of the marine. Vital points like Guayaquil, Callao and Valdivia should be fortified to prevent a disembarkation, and for the rest of the coast it was expected that the rapid concentration of troops would resist an invader once he had landed. In Chile, the policy reached a nadir of negativity - even under as active and energetic Captain General as Ambrosio O'Higgins - of relying on the very poverty of the colony to make it unattractive to potential enemies.\textsuperscript{18}

What was the role of the marine in such an overall conception? It was at best a limited one, confined largely to corsair-hunting and commerce protection and by Abascal's time even this was being reduced in favour of a self-defeating policy of, when raiders were at large, closing the ports so that with no merchant sailings the raiders would be deprived of their prey and depart. Even this very limited role, it was assumed, would not be carried out by viceregal ships but by ships sent out from the Peninsula from time to time, a policy which meant that the viceroyalty's maritime defences were dependent on the vagaries of war in Europe. When the Spanish government became involved in the French wars of 1792-1815 and with naval setbacks like Trafalgar, its ability to discharge the commerce-

\textsuperscript{18}Noticias secretas, I, 76-77; Memoria de Amat, 701-705; Memoria de Abascal, I, 346-47; Servicio Historico Militar, Madrid, 2-I-7-4, Consulta que hace la Junta de Generals sobre la Fortificacion y Defensa de los Puertos de la Mar del Sur en el Reyno del Peru, 1793; Archivo General de Indias, Chile 201, Ambrosio O'Higgins, Marques de Osorno, to the Marques de Aviles, 18 May 1797.
protection requirements of the Mar del Sur were correspondingly reduced. Where a particular maritime effort had to be made, for example in the case of the formation of a squadron to resist the raid of the Argentine privateer William Brown in 1814, and in the frequent convoying of funds, troops and supplies to various points of the coast which became necessary after 1810, the viceregal government depended heavily upon the Consulado or merchant guild of Lima. The drawback of this association of Consulado and government was that by relying on this external source of revenue, the marine department became peculiarly vulnerable to the ups and downs in the fortunes of the rich Lima merchants. And as the economic depression of the late 18th century became more acute and was joined by the financial difficulties of the revolutionary period, their effects were transmitted to the defence system and a vicious cycle was created: declining prosperity meant a weakening ability to maintain sea defences and commerce protection. Decreasing security of legal commerce and decreasing ability to patrol sea lanes and keep corsairs and contrabandists out of them in turn contributed to financial and economic difficulties.

Thus by 1815, from which time the viceregal government had to face a maritime threat from Chile of a magnitude unequalled in those seas, it had by a maritime policy evolved over several decades in the light of geographical, technical and financial realities as it saw them, placed itself in the worst possible posture to counter that threat.

ii. The Chilean Navy before Lord Cochrane, 1810-1818

When the movement for independence began in Chile, the patriots gave little thought to the naval side of their revolution. As the previous section has shown, by the end of the first decade of the 19th century,
planners and policymakers of the colonies of these coasts had lost the habit or inclination of thinking in maritime terms and their notions of defence centred on land fortifications. The main military policy document of the early years of the Chilean republic, the Plan de Defensa of 27 November 1810, made no mention of the possible formation of a Chilean naval force. It recognised the danger of Chiloé being seized by an enemy naval force and being used as a base against Chile, but contained no proposal to prevent this possibility occurring and considered that once an enemy were established there, he could not be dislodged. The plan also recognised that seaborne expeditionary forces could land with relative ease on the Chilean coast, but to cope with this eventuality it fell back on the old viceregal policy of recommending the building or strengthening of coastal fortifications and the formation of a defensive militia.

Although the royalists were in an extraordinarily feeble condition with respect to their naval power, the Chilean patriots were still weaker, and the command of the sea - if such a term can be used - fell by default into the hands of the royalists who used it to mount a series of attacks on Chile that eventually succeeded in overthrowing the patriot regime. On 12 December 1812 the first of these expeditions sailed from Callao, five requisitioned merchant ships carrying mainly funds, military stores and weapons, and under the command of Antonio Pareja. He arrived at Chiloé in January 1813, moved down to Valdivia in March, and on 27 March sailed into San Vicente (Talcahuano) with rather more than 2000 men before the

19 The Plan de Defensa is printed in Coleccion de Historiadores y de Documentos relativos a la Independencia de Chile (30 volumes, Santiago, 1900-1937), vol XIX.
patriots had even realised an invasion was under way. His landing was undisputed and by 15 April the royalists had conquered Talcahuano and Concepción and had entered Chillán, on the road to Santiago.

This was the first, and effective, demonstration of the value of superiority at sea, and it stirred the alarmed patriot government into looking for appropriate countermeasures. Francisco de la Lastra, the governor of Valparaíso, who had seen service with the Spanish navy, on the instructions of the cabildo of Santiago, acquired two North American merchantmen in the port which were named Perla and Potrillo and armed with cannon and small arms requisitioned from a Portuguese merchantman in the port. These two ships were designed to break the blockade on Valparaíso which had been established by the royalist privateer Warren, impose a counter-blockade on Talcahuano; and prevent the royalists being reinforced from either Lima or Chiloé. On 2 May 1813 the Perla and Potrillo weighed anchor out of Valparaíso to engage the Warren before a number of citizens who took up positions on the hills behind the port to witness the fight.

Unfortunately, the crew of the Perla had been suborned by the royalists in Valparaíso and when the engagement began, the Warren and the Perla both attacked the Potrillo and in a running battle the three ships disappeared from sight. The patriots later learned that both their ships had been incorporated into the royalist forces. The setback that this represented to the Chilean cause in both a material and a moral sense was not compensated for by the capture of the royalist San José and the Tomas in Talcahuano in May and June after the patriot reconquest of the place.

The second royalist expedition sailed from Callao almost exactly a year later to reinforce the previous
one and bring the Chilean revolutionary movement to an end. This consisted of the Sebastiana and Potrillo carrying troops, arms, funds and supplies and the new commander-in-chief, General Gabino Gainza. This force reached Arauco at the end of January 1814 where it united with a battalion of infantry and an artillery piece shipped up from Chiloé by the Trinidad and the Mercedes, and began to move up northwards towards Santiago. A shortlived treaty was arranged at Lircay on 3 May 1814, but when it was reported to Viceroy Abascal he discountenanced it and sent down his third expedition, a veteran Spanish regiment, the Talavera, recently arrived from Europe, and some colonial militia, under a new commander-in-chief, General Mariano Osorio, in the Asia, Sebastiana and Potrillo. This force landed at Talcahuano at the beginning of August, joined with the royalist forces already in the country and on 2 October 1814 overthrew the patriot army at Rancagua. O'Higgins and the other patriot leaders were compelled to flee across the cordillera to the safety of Mendoza while royalist government was once more established in Chile.

For the next two and a half years in the absence of a patriot government on the Pacific coast, patriot experiments with a national marine were terminated. However, maritime operations did not cease as the Buenos Aires government sought, while San Martín was preparing his counterblow in Mendoza, to assist the Chilenos and harass the royalists. The assistance took the form of a privateering raid into the Pacific in 1815 and 1816.

At first the Buenos Aires government proposed to send a state squadron, however their financial situation forbade this, and instead a private ring expedition was decided upon under the leadership of an Irish

20 Memoria de Abascal, I, 373-374.
seamen serving the Argentine patriots, William Brown. In June 1815 the schooner Hércules, Brown's own ship; the brig Trinidad, on loan from the government; and the schooners Constitución, captain Russell, and Halcón, captain Bouchard, were fitted out and shortly afterwards sailed for the Pacific. The Constitución was lost with all hands off Cape Horn, but the others after a rendezvous at Mocha island off southern Chile, sailed down to Callao. They arrived here on 10 January 1816 having taken a number of prizes on the way, and on 11 January captured and incorporated into their squadron the merchantman Gobernadora. With this force, on 21 January Brown sailed into Callao harbour and bombarded the shipping and the town. At the end of January the blockade was lifted and Brown's force sailed north to Guayaquil where, they had been assured by prisoners among whom was the governor of Guayaquil, the weakly-defended town would be an easy conquest. The attack on Guayaquil, however, was a failure. The Trinidad ran aground under the forts and Brown was obliged to surrender before she sank. Fortunately the privateers still held the governor and were able to arrange an exchange of prisoners. Brown was released and the privateers were paid a ransom of 140,000 pesos for two of their prizes. With this, Brown's cruise more or less ended. The privateers sailed to the

Galapagos islands to divide their prizes and eventually made their way back to Buenos Aires.

Soon after the end of Brown's raid, the Army of the Andes was ready and in February 1817 San Martín led it over the Andes, liberated Chile and set up a patriot government under Bernardo O'Higgins. With the creation of this and the organisation of the new state, maritime affairs move to a higher plane than that of the days of the petty squadron of two politically unreliable state's ships or that of privateering raids. From this time a much more solid awareness of the place of seapower emerges and a much greater concern with creating a national naval force of real significance. This development was the result of an elaboration of strategic ideas which took place during the enforced leisure in Argentine exile of the Chilean patriots.

The strategic ideas were implicit in San Martín's plan for the conclusion of the war of emancipation in the southern part of America. It was a plan which had that luminous simplicity characteristic of all ideas of great genius. For years the patriots of Buenos Aires had sought to attack the royalists of Peru through the bleak highlands of Upper Peru and for years they had failed. But as long as the royalists remained undefeated in Upper Peru, they could menace the Platine provinces and threaten to subvert the independence of Buenos Aires. From Peru, too, the royalists could intervene decisively in Chile to overthrow

San Martín's strategic plan was perhaps his greatest contribution to Latin American independence and as such is treated in the numerous works on him. A good account of the plan and its context is Gonzalo Bulnes: Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú (1817-1822) (2 vols., Santiago, 1887-88), vol. I.
a patriot regime there, and as long as the royalists held Chile the provinces of western Argentina could not be tranquil. San Martín knew from personal experience that an Argentine army could not break through in the northwest. The plan he devised as an alternative was therefore to lead an army across the Andes, surprise and overthrow the royalists in Chile, thus securing western Argentina, then to lead his army to Peru, to the very heart of imperial power in Lima and with one stroke achieve three objects — the security of Chile from new royalist invasions, the elimination of the threat to northwestern Argentina by cutting off the rear of the Army of Upper Peru, and the final destruction of royalist power in Peru. Once Lima fell, the royalist armies whose base it was would crumble.

So it was that in one of history's classic campaigns he took the Army of the Andes across the cordillera and decisively destroyed royalist power in Chile. With the liberation of Chile, the second stage of his plan began. For this he needed a maritime power. An army could cross the cordillera into Chile, but it could not traverse the burning and waterless immensity of the desert that lies between Chile and Peru and hope to emerge in southern Peru in a condition to face a veteran royal army. It could not live off the country and no supply line could feed it across such distances. To get an army intact to Peru, San Martín had to ship it there, and do so with reasonable security that it would not be destroyed on the way.

The implications of this for the Chilean navy are obvious. In the first place it was necessary to capture command of the sea. Whether this was done by destroying the royalist warships at sea or by simply blocking them up somewhere without opportunity to get out was not important from the point of view of the plan. It would be sufficient if the Chileans could demonstrate
that off the Peruvian coast they enjoyed undisputed command of the sea. In the second place, the Chileans had to produce the capability of transporting the invading army in a single wave swiftly to the Peruvian coast. Thirdly the Chilean navy had to be able to prevent royalist reinforcements in the form either of ships or of troops, from teaching the beleaguered viceroyalty.

In conformity with their policy of forming a proper national squadron, the new patriot government set about acquiring ships. In a good omen their first was secured by capture from the royalists. On 26 February 1817 the royalist brig Agüila entered the port of Valparaíso unaware that the patriots had taken it a few days before and deceived by the Spanish colours which had been left flying on O'Higgins' orders against such a possibility. The ship was seized, armed with 16 guns and with a crew of 25 foreign seamen and 18 Chilean soldiers under the Irishman Raymond Morris, despatched to rescue the Chilean patriots held prisoners on Juan Fernández island.23

The next acquisition was the armed merchantman Rambler, pierced for 18 guns and mounting four carronades. The two ships were placed under the command of a Frenchman, Juan Jose Tortel, who had served as port

23A summary account of much of this material may be found in Donald Worcester: Seapower and Chilean Independence (Gainesville, 1962). This book should be treated with reserve, however, for while adequate within the limits of a monograph based on secondary works and a few of the better-known contemporary memoirs, it is not sufficiently well-researched and the material not well enough reflected upon to make Worcester's judgements as discriminating and valuable as the title of the work suggests they should be.
In August the royal ships *Venganza* and *Pezuela* appeared off Valparaíso to impose the blockade on Chile declared by the viceroy. Tortel ordered his ships out, but a gust of wind carried away the fores'l yard of the *Rambler* and the Spaniards escaped unharmed.

While the royalist blockade was being imposed, the viceroy also prepared his counterblow against the patriots. Royalist forces still held Talcahuano and Chiloé and in October 1817 the frigate *Esmeralda* arrived at Callao with several transports of troops, a convoy which had been despatched from Cadiz in the previous May. Once again a royalist expedition was sent up from Callao to arrive at Talcahuano in January 1818. It consisted of 10 merchantmen containing one cavalry and three infantry regiments, mostly veterans of the Peninsular war, and 12 pieces of artillery. The whole was under the command of Osorio again. The *Venganza* and *Veloz Pasejera* were sent back to Callao and the Esmeralda joined the *Potrillo* and *Pezuela* in the blockade of Valparaíso. This blockade was unable to prevent ships from getting through from time to time, and one ship which did come in on 5 March 1818 was the ex-East India Company frigate *Windham*, sent out from England by the Chilean agent Jose Alvarez Condarco. The Windham was pierced for 50 guns and carried 34. Purchased at a cost of 180,000 pesos by the hard-pressed government, she was renamed *Lautaro*, her officers and crew taken into Chilean service, and she was prepared for an engagement. Though Osorio had been defeated at Maipu the royalist blockade remained and it was essential to break it.

An ex-Royal Navy officer, George O'Brien, who had served in the *Phoebe*, was appointed to command *Lautaro*, and the English soldier of fortune William Miller -
destined to play a large role in the subsequent history of the first Chilean navy - put in command of the soldiers embarked as marines on the ship. A crew was hastily scrambled together of 100 foreign and 250 Chilean seamen under British officers, and on 26 April 1818 the Lautaro sailed out to do battle. To the student of naval history, she does not present an impressive or menacing appearance. The artificers' work necessary to make her operational had only been able to be done thanks to the assistance of an American naval officer in the port at the time, captain James Biddle. The men were clothed in improvised uniforms purchased from a British vessel. And as the foreign seamen had been given a bounty to encourage them to enlist, most of them were intoxicated when the ship sailed, while hardly an order could be given in Spanish by the officers. The Aguila remained in port as there were insufficient men to man her as well.

O'Brien was ordered to cruise on the coast for a while to train his crew, but in his impatience he determined to close with the enemy as early as possible. He planned to achieve his object by a ruse de guerre. The Lautaro sailed out in the paint of a British ship of war and flying British colours. The ruse succeeded. The Esmeralda lay to, supposing her to be a British ship wishing to communicate with her. The Lautaro came up on the weather quarter, ran up a Chilean flag,


25Luis Uribe Orrego: Los orígenes de nuestra marina militar (Santiago, 1892), vol I, p 67.

discharged her foremost guns, and ran upon the Esmeralda's quarters. Her bowsprit tangled in the Esmeralda's mizzen rigging. Though a difficult position to board from, O'Brien and 30 others leaped across the gap while the Lautaro's marines kept up a brisk musketry, and cleared the Esmeralda's deck. A Chilean hauled down the Spanish colours and the Pezuela also struck.

This dashing and so far successful attack failed, however. The two ships, though tangled together, were not grappled, and the Esmeralda's steering gear was not disabled. A swell of the sea separated them and the Lautaro, after lowering boats to take reinforcements across, turned to take possession of the Pezuela which was trying to steal away from the area. On the Esmeralda the royalists rallied and O'Brien was killed. The demoralized remnants of the boarding party leaped into the sea and the Esmeralda and the Pezuela reunited and made their escape.

Though this operation failed to capture either the Esmeralda or the Pezuela, it nevertheless achieved several objects. Firstly, it broke the royalist blockade. After this engagement royalist ships did not venture to try to reimpose it. Secondly, the undistinguished motley of seamen conducted themselves well in the face of superior force and put the patriots in high hopes for their marine, while O'Brien's death gave the republic its first naval martyr-hero. Thirdly, it demonstrated that though Spanish ships might blockade a port and interrupt patriot commerce, they were not prepared to face patriot warships even on advantageous terms. Fourthly, as a compensation for not taking the Esmeralda, the Lautaro on her way back to port intercepted the Spanish brig San Miguel out of

27 Worcester: Seapower, 24 wrongly considers that it accomplished little.
Talcahuano: bound for Callao with a number of wealthy Spaniards whose ransom nearly paid the cost of the Lautaro.

In the next few months several more ships were added to the Chilean squadron. On 22 May 1818 the ex-East India Company Cumberland arrived in Valparaiso. She had been acquired by Alvarez Condarco in England and sailed out to Chile with a skeleton crew by William Wilkinson. Mounting 64 guns, she was by far the most powerful ship of war to appear in the Pacific up to that time. On 23 May the ex-Argentine privateer Santa Rosa, subsequently the Chilean privateer Coquimbo, was acquired by the government and renamed Chacabuco. On 6 August the North American brig Columbus, mounting 16 guns, came in under the command of Charles Whiting Wooster, a veteran of the war of 1812 who had been persuaded to enter the Chilean service by the Argentine agent in the United States, Manuel Aguirre. The Columbus was renamed Araucano and placed under the command of Raymond Morris while Wooster was given the Lautaro.

With this force, the patriots now had to face a new threat, or rather an old threat which they had hitherto been unable to face. On 21 May 1818 a new Spanish expedition sailed for the Pacific from Cadiz. This consisted of 12 transports carrying more than 2000 troops and escorted by the frigate María Isabel. News of this


29 AOH, vol VI, p 53. Irisarri to Zanartu, 27 May 1818.

30 Especulación, Atocha, Esmeralda, Todos Santos, Jerezana, Elena, Magdalena, Santa María, Trinidad, San Fernando, Xaviera and Carlota. See Memoria de Pezuela. 373.
expedition came to the patriots when the troops on one of the transports, the Trinidad, mutinied and forced her to put into Buenos Aires. All her papers, giving details of the convoy, its signals and its rendezvous, fell into the hands of the Argentine patriots and were communicated to Santiago.

Measures were taken to prevent this new Spanish force from entering the Pacific undisturbed. A trustworthy patriot of distinguished family, Manuel Blanco Encalada, who had seen service with the Spanish navy for a short period and was an experienced artillery officer, was appointed to command the squadron where his tact and talents were employed chiefly in tranquillising the discontents, rivalries and ambitions which surfaced in the officers who had hoped for the command themselves. With the Minister of Marine, José Ignacio Zenteno, he worked diligently to put the ships into commission, acquire the necessary stores and material, recruit sufficient men and work out rules of service, signal codes and a plan of campaign. William Miller, now promoted to major, was appointed to the command of the marines, a battalion of which together with a brigade of naval artillerymen was created.

On 9 October 1818 the Chilean squadron sailed from Valparaíso. This is an important date and rightly signalised by most historians of Chilean naval history of the period. It represented a beginning of a new phase in Chile's naval history, a development beyond the improvised encounters of semi-private ships within easy reach of their home port and cruising singly or

31 There is some dispute about the exact date of sailing. See J.A. Rodriguez: "¿Cuando salió la primera escuadra nacional?" and Indalecio Téllez: "¿Cuando salió la primera escuadra nacional?" in RChHG, vol LXXXIX, no 87 (1936).
in pairs. In a sense the transition from a navy composed of freebooting corsairs to one organised and directed by the state both occurred and was symbolised by the government order in August 1818 for all the corsairs in Valparaíso to be embargoed and their crews to be transferred to the state's ships\(^\text{32}\). It was a step, though, which the government only took with reluctance. Their inclination was for maritime operations to be carried on by private enterprise in the form of the privateers or by state-licenced companies as was done in the case of the liberating expedition and as they considered doing for the proposed assault on the Philippines. However, the state was compelled to assume the responsibility for the navy, as Zenteno later explained to Lord Cochrane, because the enormous costs of nine years' war and the decay of private fortunes which the revolution had brought about had obliged the state "to take upon itself the balance of costs... down to their very least part"\(^\text{33}\). Implicit in his letter was also the consideration that while privateers might harass enemy mercantile shipping and drive it from the sea, both by equipment and strength of armament and by interest they were not suitable for and would not attempt to engage proper ships of war, while the needs of Chilean maritime strategy had shifted away from the financially rewarding pursuit and emprizement of merchant ships and towards the expensive and financially unrewarding task of seeking out and destroying the enemy fleet. Blanco's was the first full cruise of a naval force committed to an extended campaign against a substantial force in distant waters from which it would be difficult for a damaged or defeated ship to limp back to the safety of a friendly port. This is the measure of the achievement of this

\(^{32}\text{MM vol 15. Government decree, 3 August 1818.}\)

\(^{33}\text{CP 51. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 8 July 1819.}\)
first cruise. That Blanco’s expedition was able to achieve its objects speedily and successfully in no way detracts from this point.

The squadron consisted of five ships of war: flagship San Martín (ex-Cumberland), 64 guns and 492 men, captain Wilkinson, with Blanco aboard; frigate Lautaro, 50 guns and 353 men, captain Wooster; brig Chacabuco, 20 guns and 151 men, captain Francisco Díaz; brig Araucano, 18 guns and 110 men, captain Morris; and brig Pueyrredón, 16 guns and 100 men, captain Fernández Vazquez. They must have made a brave sight to the crowds on the hills behind Valparaíso who watched them sail out of the bay, though many commentators had serious doubts about their efficacy. A British naval officer, Captain Shirreff, doubted in August even that they would be able to sail for want of men. According to Miller “The anticipations of public opinion were various, and generally unfavourable. Some foretold a mutiny; others that the ships would founder in the first gale of wind, on account of the insufficiency of seamen to work them; whilst many considered that a single Spanish frigate would be able to capture the whole squadron. Nor were these forebodings altogether without the appearance of being well grounded.”

Blanco’s sealed orders, opened the first night out, were to take up station off Mocha Island and intercept the María Isabel and the transports as they came up from the Horn. San Martín and Lautaro made Santa María island, off Concepción, on 26 October—the Chacabuco, Araucano and Pueyrredón parted company

34 AOH, XI, 210, Gazeta Ministerial de Chile, 10 Aug. 1818.

35 NSA, 250, Bowles to Croker, 10 October 1818.

as they beat up against the wind and current — and on the following day Blanco learned from a British whaler that the María Isabel had already passed the island and sailed for Talcahuano with two of the transports. This information was confirmed by a boat from the island which, deceived by the Spanish colours being flown by the squadron, brought sealed instructions left by the María Isabel for the transports, ordering them to rendezvous at Talcahuano. San Martín and Lautaro sailed at once for the place and came in on 28 October under British colours to find the María Isabel, in poor condition after her five months' voyage out from Cadiz, landing her sickly crew "as if in a period of profound peace."\(^{37}\)

As they came within musket range, the Chileans raised their own colours. The María Isabel fired a scattered broadside, then slipped her cables and tried to run onto the beach but was boarded by the Chileans, taken almost immediately and cleared out of the bay the next day with a favourable wind. The Chilean ships returned to Santa María island on 1 November. The Chacabuco appeared and was sent to cruise off Talcahuano, and the Galvarino joined from Buenos Aires. During the next week seven transports arrived and were taken, each time by the same ruse. Spanish colours flew on the Chileans. The transport, in obedience to a signal from the María Isabel, anchored astern of her, at which moment a musket was fired from the flagship and the Chilean flag run up on every ship, and the transport surrendered.

It was a signal triumph. A fine Spanish warship had been taken. Of the 12 transports which sailed with her, seven were captured\(^ {38}\). One had surrendered to the

\(^{37}\) NSA, 254, Bowles to Croker, 6 December 1818.

\(^{38}\) Esmeralda, Todos Santos, Jerezana, Elena, Magdalena, Xaviera, Carlota.
patriots at Buenos Aires and only four finally reached Callao, the first of which, Especulación, had sailed direct without pausing at Talcahuano and arrived at Callao on 25 October "in the most lamentable state, diseased, without medicines, on short rations..." The Chileans showed that they now had a force capable of preventing Spain from reinforcing her Pacific colonies by sea unless she was prepared to make an exceptional effort. Chile was definitely secured from counter-invasion and the balance began to swing slowly but quite clearly against the viceroy, who noted in his diary when the news of the disaster was brought in on 28 November, that "This misfortune compelled a change of all my plans, for if (the María Isabel) had joined our maritime forces in Callao, we would dominate this South Sea..."

The squadron sailed back into Valparaiso on 17 November 1818, 13 ships counting warships and prizes, to an enthusiastic reception from the Chilean government and people and a medal was ordered to be struck to honour this first triumph. Eleven days later, at the height of this enthusiasm, Lord Thomas Cochrane arrived in Valparaiso to assume command of what was by now the most powerful maritime force in the Pacific although it had not yet reached its full potential.

39. Memoria de Pezuela, 372. The remaining three, San Fernando, Atocha and Santa María, discharged their 529 troops at Talcahuano on 20 October, were missed by Blanco's squadron, and arrived at Callao on 5 November. See Memoria de Pezuela, 376.

40. Memoria de Pezuela, 383. The news was brought by the British ship Catalina.

The career of Lord Cochrane before his Chilean commission

Thomas Alexander, Lord Cochrane, was born on 14 December 1775 at Annesfield, Lanarkshire, the first of seven children born to the ninth Earl of Dundonald, a Scottish peer the injudicious political sympathies of whose ancestors in the 17th and 18th centuries, the mortgaging of the family estates thereafter, and his own scientific experiments and interests, and attempts to finance their commercial exploitation, had combined to reduce to a position of relative poverty by the 1780's and 1790's. Lord Cochrane's mother, Anna Gilchrist, died in 1784, and he and his brothers, then living at Culross on the north bank of the Firth of Forth, were brought up erratically with little of formal education or good society to form their judgement or prepare them for the world.

There are a number of biographies of Lord Cochrane, of varying quality, to which reference has been made in the preparation of this section and generally throughout this thesis. Three of these are basic. They are his own Autobiography of a Seaman (2 volumes, London, 1859-60) which gives a good but naturally self-justifying account of his life up to 1817; his Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil (2 volumes, London 1858) which, though reference must be made to it, is a disappointing work, being mainly a string of peevish complaints of his ill-usage at the hands of the South American governments he served and bitter attacks on his supposed enemies; and Christopher Lloyd: Lord Cochrane. Seaman-radical-liberator (London, 1947) which, though not the most recent biography, is still the best short account. A work of filial piety exists in the 11th Earl of Dundonald and H.R. Fox Bourne: Life of Thomas Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald (2 volumes,
He was originally destined for the army, as the ninth Earl disapproved of the naval services and had an interest with the Horse Guards. However, his own London, 1869). Other biographies in English before Lloyd's tend to be of the class of exemplary lives for the benefit of British schoolboys: J. Allen: A Life of the Earl of Dundonald (London, 1861); J.W. Fortescue: Dundonald: A Life (London 1895); E.G. Twitchett: Life of a Seaman (London, 1931). Accounts later than Lloyd's are J.P.W. Mallalieu: Extraordinary Seaman: an account of Captain Cochrane (London, 1957), which is interesting but not of value, and Warren Tute: Cochrane, a life of Admiral the Earl of Dundonald (London, 1965). This, the most recent book, has pretensions to being a scholarly advance on previous accounts and the author claims to be using unpublished documents. It is however unsatisfactory. It appears to rely heavily on the 1861 biography and on Lord Cochrane's own memoirs, the hitherto unused documents do not seem to have been used in the South American section, there are no footnotes and no bibliography, quotations are edited without notice being given, and there are occasional gross errors of fact. The South American section of all the English biographies is unsatisfactory. The obstacle of language and the relatively peripheral nature of Lord Cochrane's South American adventures in the context of his career as a whole, combined with the unavailability of his papers until recently, has meant that this period of his life has not been well-researched nor well-interpreted by English-speaking historians. This period has, not surprisingly, received more attention from Latin American historians, though they labour under the same difficulties as English-speaking historians in reverse. However, what has been produced, has tended to reflect the fact that Lord Cochrane's
strong wish and the encouragement of his uncle, Captain Sir Alexander Cochrane, eventually succeeded in changing the Earl's mind, and on 27 June 1793 "at the mature age, for a midshipman, of seventeen years and a half" Lord Cochrane joined his uncle's ship, the frigate Hind. They were posted to the North America station, and spent five "dreary" years "ingloriously employed" cruising in the fogs of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia while reports flowed in of brilliant naval victories in European waters. He served in the Thetis, Africa and Resolution, returning to Britain in 1798 as lieutenant in the first.

achievement in Chile is viewed more as a historical monument than as a historical issue. The two biographies properly so called are Ricardo Valenzuela: Cochrane, marino y libertador (Valparaíso, 1961) a centenary homage with frequent mistakes in dates and names and no footnotes, index nor bibliography; and Enrique Bunster: Lord Cochrane, un estudio con variaciones (3rd edition, Santiago, 1966), which must be viewed more as an exercise in whimsey than as an exercise in history. The best biographies and general accounts of Lord Cochrane's career in Chile and Peru are to be found in the appropriate volumes of the two great monuments of Chilean historical writing, Diego Barros Arana: Historia jeneral de Chile, volumes XII (Santiago, 1893) and XIII (Santiago, 1898), and Francisco Antonio Encina: Historia de Chile, volume VIII (Santiago, 1953).

43Autobiography, I, 49.

44Autobiography, I, 69.

45Autobiography, I, 75.
In 1798 he was appointed to the Barfleur, Lord Keith's flagship in the blockade of Cadiz, and spent the next two years in the Mediterranean. It was at this time that he had his first brush with authority, when he was courtmartialed and reprimanded for flippancy and insulting behaviour towards a superior officer. However, in 1800 after only seven years' service, he received his first command, "the least efficient craft on the station", the 158-ton brig Speedy armed with a laughable 14 four-pounder guns, and with timbers too weak to bear heavier guns. But although an unremarkable vessel, for rather more than a year she cruised with extraordinary success in the Mediterranean, along the Spanish and Italian coasts where Lord Cochrane demonstrated for the first time his talents for prize-taking, coastal operations and ruses de guerre to give an inferior force an advantage in combat. The high point of this cruise was on 6 May 1801 when Speedy, having 54 men aboard, met the Spanish xebec frigate Gamo carrying 319 men and 32 heavy guns, and took her by boarding after an hourlong fight at close quarters. The cruise was terminated on 3 July, when Speedy ran into three French ships of the line near Alicante and was compelled to surrender to the Dessaix. But in her cruise she had taken more than 50 prizes and 500 prisoners. More important, however, the Speedy's cruise led to new clashes with the Admiralty whose tardiness and delay in promoting Lord Cochrane to post-captain he ascribed to malevolence, corruption and nepotism on the Board, and his efforts to procure a promotion for his first lieutenant at the taking of the Gamo led him to write an illjudged letter to Lord St Vincent reflecting on the circumstances leading up to his receiving his earldom.

Liberated from parole by the peace of Amiens, Lord

46 Autobiography, I, 92.
Cochrane found himself without a ship, and spent his leisure in a short attendance at Edinburgh University and in preparation for a sally into politics, for which he began to accumulate information on naval abuses, his chosen field of competence.

On the renewal of the French war, he only with difficulty was able to procure a ship, and that the ex-collier Arab in which he was despatched to the bleak exile of a cruise off Greenland to protect the fisheries, a posting which - like others not to his taste - he put down to a policy of deliberate vengefulness by the Admiralty. But in 1804 Arab returned to England, and he was appointed to a proper ship, the new 32-gun frigate Pallas. He commanded the Pallas for two years, until 1806, cruising off the Azores and taking four opulent Spanish prizes in as many weeks, escorting convoys across the Atlantic and back, and operating on the French coast in company with Admiral Thornborough's squadron or, more frequently, on his own. One event which he recollected as among his most singular impressions from this period was a chase of four French sloops when the Pallas had only a skeleton crew aboard, having sent the greater part on a cutting-out expedition up the river Garonne. Three of the sloops, any one of which could easily have taken the Pallas in her weakly-manned state, were panicked by the bold and aggressive chase she gave and ran deliberately on shore, where the crews abandoned the ships to become wrecks. Lord Cochrane was to remember thereafter the value of a bold front combined with incipient panic by the enemy. Like the cruise of the Speedy, the cruise of the Pallas led to new squabbles with the Admiralty over their refusal, until he threatened to raise the matter in Parliament, to comply with his request for the promotion of his lieutenant.

His next ship was the frigate Imperieuse, to which he was appointed in August 1806. After a tour of duty with the blockading squadron in the Basque Roads, he was sent to join Collingwood's fleet in the Mediterranean in 1807, and there he was ordered to take command of the small squadron blockading the Adriatic. Unfortunately, Lord Cochrane outraged his predecessor by seizing local shipping which was carrying his licence to trade despite the blockade, before the arrangements for the transfer of command had taken place. The result was that despatches complaining that he was not fit to be entrusted with the Adriatic squadron were sent to Collingwood, who recalled Lord Cochrane to the fleet. This "shameless proceeding had deprived me of the only chance I ever had to command more than a single ship" 48. In compensation for this withdrawn commission, Collingwood in 1808 sent him back to harassing the French and Spanish coasts. The first part of 1808 was spent harassing the coastal shipping of Mediterranean Spain, then, with the rebellion against Napoleon which brought Spain into alliance with England, he changed to supporting the Spanish patriots and guerrilleros - whom he found worthy of admiration for their courage and endurance - in disrupting French communications and roads and attacking their isolated forts and outposts in the coastal regions of Catalonia. In August he shifted his operations to the French coast, raiding signal and lookout posts and batteries in dawn raids 49, then in November was back on the Spanish coast, this time to participate in the defence of the fort and citadel of Rosas against a regular siege by the French. The town finally fell in December,

48 Autobiography, I, 239.

49 Darkness was "my favourite time for attacks of any kind" (Autobiography, I, 272).
but not before Lord Cochrane's ingenuity in devising means of defence and stratagems for harassing the enemy had cost them heavy losses. The year ended with the seizure of a French victualling convoy of 13 ships and two escorts, and in the new year, 1809, he went back to England on leave after two active years.

So far his naval career had been a delicate balance between success as a fighting captain and trouble with his superiors. Now his leave was to start the chain of events that ultimately were to wreck his career.

In February 1809 the French squadron in Brest slipped out past the blockade, liberated the ships at L'Orient and joined up with the ships in the Basque Roads. The British blockade was able to be reimposed by Lord Gambier, but as the French fleet in the Basque Roads was now a substantial one it became a matter of urgency for the Admiralty not merely to blockade it but to encompass its destruction by an attack up the harbour. For this Lord Cochrane's experience in these waters and known talent for specialised operations led to his being taken into consideration. On the Admiralty's urgings he presented his proposals for an attack which included explosion vessels and Congreve rockets as well as fireships, but on discovering that Lord Gambier was opposed to any attempt to break into the Basque Roads and had declined to accept responsibility for such an operation and realising that upon him, a junior officer, would be thrown the whole onus for making the attack, failure in which would be blamed upon him while success would be credited to others,

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50 The French fleet was 10 ships of the line and four frigates (Autobiography, I, 372n) and the British 11 ships of the line, seven frigates and 11 brigs or sloops (Autobiography, I, 375n).
Lord Cochrane declined to have any part in the execution of his plans. Only the pressure of the Admiralty at length led him to agree to take charge of the operations for which he produced plans.

The Channel fleet, he found on his arrival, was riven with discord between the officers who were divided into camps over Lord Gambier's religious zeal and his attempts to distribute methodist tracts, and over the operations they thought should be conducted by the fleet which was wasting its time to no purpose in the blockade. However, he worked at preparing his explosion vessels and the attack commenced on 11 April, Lord Cochrane himself taking in and setting off the first explosion vessel which broke the defensive boom before the French lines. The remaining fireships were sent in but most were fired too early and drifted off too soon to reach the French lines. Still, they had an effect. Afraid they might be explosion vessels, too, the French made no attempt to board and divert them, but cut their cables and tried to escape. When daylight came on 12 April all but two of them were discovered to be helplessly aground and keeled over uselessly on their sides. This was the moment for the Channel fleet to come inshore and totally destroy the helpless target. But Lord Gambier made no sign of intention to attack, the tide turned and began to rise and by mid-morning it was becoming clear that if action were not begun, within a few hours the French could lighten their ships and float off the shoals and escape up the river Charente. At length, at 1 p.m. Lord Cochrane ordered the Imperieuse to be drifted in without making sail for fear of eliciting a recall signal from the flagship anchored some miles off the shore. Once within range of the French he signalled for assistance and opened fire on the three nearest ships. Now, several hours later than they should have been, seven ships were sent in from the fleet to join
the Imperieuse and during the afternoon and evening three French ships struck and were later burned by the British and a fourth was burned by her own crew as they abandoned her. The British ships remained in the anchorage overnight, but were recalled early the next morning, although the two remaining French ships had meanwhile gone aground. Lord Cochrane evaded complying with Lord Gambier's order and remained in the Basque Roads until 14 April when he was preempitarily ordered back to the fleet and then sent back to England with dispatches.

The matter might perhaps have ended there with Lord Cochrane discontented at the way the attack was mismanaged but mollified by being awarded a KB on 26 April, had not the government decided to propose a vote of thanks in Parliament to Lord Gambier. This proved too much to stomach, Lord Cochrane declared that he would oppose such a motion and Lord Gambier in response demanded a court martial upon himself. It duly took place in July and August 1809 and Lord Gambier was exonerated, though not without recourse to some highly dubious evidence and underhand methods of conducting the trial. The effect of this full-scale confrontation with authority were immediate. Lord Cochrane was refused permission to rejoin the Imperieuse now at the Scheldt, and subsequently manipulated into resigning the command. His plans and proposals for an attack on the French fleet and dockyards of the Scheldt were summarily rejected and he was not to command another British ship-of-war for more than three decades. He turned therefore, in the years after 1809, more warmly to the political career that he had already started but in which he failed to display those talents of prudent planning and tactical sense which made him so effective a naval officer.

His first essay into politics was for the borough
of Honiton, said to be notoriously rotten, in the elections for the spring and autumn of 1806, the first of which he lost through refusing to offer a bribe to electors and standing on "patriotic principles", the second of which he won by hoodwinking the electorate into thinking he would pay a bribe without being inconsistent with his principles. The importance of this election was that through it he met William Cobbett the radical politician and pamphleteer and editor of the Political Register, and he himself was led to shift his politics from the respectable Whig camp to the less respectable Radical camp. The Honiton election was a prelude to political life. It began in earnest in 1807 when he returned from his first cruise in the Imperieuse to find Parliament had again been dissolved (on the death of Fox). This time, he determined to stand for the City of Westminster, the most radical constituency in the country, election for which must inevitably throw him into the very centre of Radical politics at a time when the Tory ascendancy was moving into a period of extreme reaction. Conducting his own campaign in sympathy but not in alliance with Francis Place's radical movement, he came second in the poll to Sir Francis Burdett and duly went into Parliament. He disclosed himself here as a radical who would not hesitate even to attack the First Lord himself, Lord St. Vincent, and who made naval abuses his peculiar province. Almost his first speech, on 10 July 1807, was to demand an inquiry into the methods of fitting-out and dispatching ships to sea, into the provisioning of ships engaged in the blockade of Brest and the effects of their long tours of duty on the health of the crews, and into the state of naval hospitals and the condition of this branch of the service.

The amusing stratagem by which he turned the tables on the money-grubbing Honiton electors is detailed in Autobiography, I, 179-81, 202-204.
in general, and during his speech he animadverted upon St. Vincent's "unworthy" economies at the expense of seagoing officers and men. He failed to have his motion passed, winning only the enmity of the government and naval establishment.

His service in the Mediterranean in the Imperieuse and then his involvement in the Basque Roads operations and their aftermath kept him out of Parliament for some time, but he returned unrepentant to political life in 1810, beginning by moving on 29 January for production of the minutes of Lord Gambier's court martial with a view to defeating the proposed motion of thanks and reopening the case. The ensuing angry debate ended in the defeat of Lord Cochrane and the other radicals who supported him. He then turned his attention to the Admiralty Court, moving on 19 February for papers which would expose the abuses being carried on in the prize courts. During the rest of the year, he kept up a running fire of debates on naval affairs, covering the unjust and corrupt system of promotions in March and the giving out of pensions to the undeserving relatives of undeserving functionaries and pittances to officers and their dependents in May, while outside Parliament he continued to associate himself with the political agitation conducted from the Crown and Anchor Inn, the meeting place of London's radicals, and with the barely legal activities that resulted in the imprisonment of Sir Francis Burdett in the spring for breach of parliamentary privilege and of Cobbett in the autumn for an allegedly subversive pamphlet on flogging in the militia.

In 1811 he travelled to Malta to collect evidence there of abuses, illegality and corruption in the Admiralty Court and returned with it to initiate a further debate in June 1811. This was followed by motions of

debates on the conditions of French prisoners-of-war, on naval policy generally in January and February 1812, on flogging, discipline and the selection of naval officers in March, on the misapplication of funds of the naval hospital at Greenwich in March 1813, and on the pay and conditions of service of seamen in July 1813.

By these means, Lord Cochrane built up a solid core of powerful and influential enemies in the Admiralty and in the government who would inevitably fall mercilessly upon him if he should ever put himself in a vulnerable position. This he did in 1814.

At the beginning of that year he succeeded in getting a new seagoing appointment, as flag-captain to his uncle, now Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, with the task of supervising the fitting-out of the Tonnant, Sir Alexander's flagship, and taking it out to the North America station. This he never discharged, for in February a fraud was practised on the Stock Exchange to put up the price of certain funds at a favourable moment: some of Lord Cochrane's relatives and some of his associates were involved in the fraud and Lord Cochrane himself was apparently implicated, though his part remains to this day obscure. His enemies were quick to seize the opportunity afforded by this, he and his supposed accomplices were put on trial on 8 June and on 21 June he received the crippling and humiliating sentence of £1000 fine, a year's imprisonment in the Marshalsea prison, and public display.

53 Besides the volumes already cited which deal with the Stock Exchange Trial generally from a point of view sympathetic to Lord Cochrane, there are works dealing with it from a hostile point of view. See J.B. Atlay: The Trial of Lord Cochrane before Lord Ellenborough (London, 1897) and E.D. Law: The Guilt of Lord Cochrane (London, 1914).
in the stocks for an hour each day. Though the last part of this sentence was remitted, the government fearing the popular reaction to such an action, his professional and political career was ruined. Within a week of the sentence the Admiralty, moving with almost indecent haste, had expelled him from the Navy and expunged his name from the Navy List. On 5 July he was expelled from the House of Commons. Though he subsequently got back into Parliament, the next few years were the nadir of his life, as the Tory reaction forced the radicals into ever more ineffective isolation or exile, lawsuits and fines reduced his assets sharply and loss of profession left him without a firm aim to direct his activities and without respect or influence in naval circles.

Picking out the central threads of this brief survey of his life up to 1818, there are five points which can be made about him at the time he joined the Chilean service and were to influence his actions while in it.

In the first place, he had never commanded a fleet or squadron in action or at sea. His first opportunity, in 1807, had been spoiled by his rash and ill-advised action. He may therefore be assumed to lack the specific experience of fleet or squadron command which is important in an Admiral and distinct from the kind of skills required for a captain to run a single ship.

The second point, and associated with the above, is that his experience and inclination both led him to favour independent commands with single ships where his talents might be employed as his own discretion dictated, rather than the dull day-to-day business of most fleet work, under the supervision and direction of an Admiral. His forte was dashing work with a fast and efficient frigate. In this context, it is relevant
to draw attention to the fact that throughout his Chilean commission, except when the availability of the ship forbade it, he used as his flagship the fast frigate O'Higgins, comparatively small and uncomfortable, when the kind of larger vessel appropriate to the dignity of an Admiral was available in the shape of the ex-East Indiaman San Martín, with dimensions approximating to a ship of the line, and ample cabin space.

The third point is his interest in and imaginative use of technical aids to more effective warfare. The scientific bent he inherited from his father led him to devise various aids to naval operations. In 1805 he had invented an improved and superior convoy lamp for use at sea, and had experimented with kites to add to the speed of ships.\(^{54}\) In the plans for the Basque Roads operations he had planned to employ in addition to the well-known device of the fire-ships, Congreve rockets and an invention of his own, the explosion ship.\(^{55}\) He had even elaborated a horrendous

\(^{54}\)Autobiography, I, 183-86.

\(^{55}\)He describes an explosion ship in Autobiography, I, 368-69. "The floor of the vessel was rendered as firm as possible, by means of logs placed in close contact, into every crevice of which other substances were firmly wedged, so as to form the greatest amount of resistance to the explosion. On this foundation were placed a large number of spirit and water casks, into which 1500 barrels of powder were emptied. These casks were set on end, and the whole bound round with hempen cables, so as to resemble a gigantic mortar, thus causing the explosion to take an upward course. In addition to the powder casks were placed several hundred shells, and over these again nearly three thousand hand grenades; the whole, by means of wedges and sand, being compressed as nearly as possible into a solid mass... The explosion vessels were simply naval mines, the effect of which depended quite as much on their novelty as engines of war, as upon their destructiveness."
secret weapon, to which reference will be made below\textsuperscript{56}.

The first three points are relative to his naval skills. The last two are more political and financial. The fourth is that by 1818 he was a man whose frequent clashes with authority and his superiors, especially with shore administrations, had given him a deep distrust and suspicion of administrators and politicians and a bitter sense of his grievances against them. And fifthly, and finally, he was by 1817 relatively poor as a result of the events of the previous few years, and concerned to restore his financial position to a more favourable footing.

\textsuperscript{56} See Chapter 4, section i.
CHAPTER TWO

LORD COCHRANE, VICE-ADMIRAL OF CHILE

Within a short time of their having re-established the independence of Chile in 1817 the new patriot government, as has been shown, turned their attention to the task of building up a naval force to enable them to carry out the next stage of San Martín's grand strategy. Their achievements in this field were by the end of 1818 quite respectable, but limited by the scarcity of resources, equipment and expertise of every kind. To overcome these limitations, in 1817 and 1818 they sent agents to the United States and Great Britain, without diplomatic status but with instructions to buy or commission and despatch ships, naval stores, war material and expert seamen to Chile. The agent to Great Britain was José Alvarez Condarco, and it was he who was responsible for Lord Cochrane's transferring his activities to Chile and beginning the career of professional liberator which in the next 10 years was to lead him to play a central role in the emancipation of Chile, Peru, Brazil and Greece. His participation in the emancipation of the first two countries was to be as Vice-Admiral of the Chilean squadron.

1 Lord Cochrane comes to Chile

Lord Cochrane met Alvarez Condarco in London in May of 1817, in one of the intervals in his active political life and brushes with the law, for the Chilean agent secured an immediate entry into the radical circle of Sir Francis Burdett and his friends. Alvarez offered Lord Cochrane the command of the nascent Chilean squadron, as was the tenor of his instructions, and by the end of the month Lord Cochrane was already giving it his serious consideration, though he does not seem actually to have accepted until early in November of
that year, and he did not expect to be away for long on this service, perhaps to be back in England in a year and a half.

Having recruited Lord Cochrane, Alvarez experienced a certain amount of difficulty in getting him to depart for Chile. Not that his Lordship was reluctant to contribute his efforts to the emancipation of that country, but he was at this time engaged in the construction and testing of his latest interest, the steam-powered ship Rising Star, in which he proposed to travel to the Pacific. Half a year after agreeing to take command of the Chilean navy, Alvarez was still writing with increasing insistency and urgency that "it is much more interesting to my Gov...that you should immediately embark with your family in the Ship Rose..." Lord Cochrane begged for more time. His enemies, he averred, would force the suspension of work on the Rising Star if he was not on the spot to supervise it. Even if the work on this ship were delayed, however, he could still reach Valparaiso in it before the Rose. He should at least be given time to complete the trials of the steamship. At length it became clear that the Rising Star would not be ready in the visible future, Alvarez' urgings became sharper, the Rose was ready to sail, and Lord Cochrane agreed to go in her.

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1Dundonald and Fox Bourne: Life of...Cochrane, I, 129; CP doc 7. Jackson to Mrs. Parnham, 7 November 1817; CP doc 7. Jackson to Mrs. Parnham, 19 June 1818.


3MM vol 4. Lord Cochrane to Alvarez, 1 August 1818; MM vol 4. Alvarez to Lord Cochrane, 2 August 1818 "...the mighty convenience of your Lordship's going to Chile as soon as possible."
In an attempt to maintain some secrecy about his activities and objects, he travelled to Boulogne and there embarked on 15 August on the Rose, captain John Illingworth, together with his wife and their two children, Antonio Alvarez Jonte, a leading Chilean patriot who was returning to Chile after several years in exile during the Spanish reconquest, his friend and client Thomas Crosbie, and others. His secret departure was something of an open secret, however. 'The Times' reported his departure to enter the service of the patriots a few days after his sailing, and bade him a friendly farewell from Britain, remarking that he "will, no doubt, make a very gallant, able, and enterprising officer in any service to which he may attach himself..."

He was reported from Madeira at the beginning of September, and the rumours spreading of his intentions reported him to be in the region of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello in November. In fact he reached Valparaiso on 28 November 4.

Immediately he arrived, he expressed an urgent desire to travel straight on up to the capital, but in the whole of Valparaiso the port authorities could not procure a carriage to transport him and his immediate suite of five people. Urgent dispatches had to be sent up to Santiago for transport to be sent down to Valparaiso. The news of his arrival reached Santiago on 1 December, and he himself came up to the capital on 4 December, arriving unobtrusively at about 9 p.m. with only a small cavalry escort in attendance. The news of his arrival reached the viceroy barely a month later, on 2 January 1819, brought by the North American Two Catalinas, which for good measure also brought a rumour

4 MM vol 14. Tortel's report, 28 November 1818; Miller: Memoirs, I, 105n; Life of...Cochrane, I, 149; The Times, 24 August 1818 and 1 January 1819; NSA, 253, Bowles to Croker, 19 November 1818.
that in two months Lord Cochrane would appear before Lima at the head of 9000 men.5

What sort of man was Lord Cochrane when he arrived in Chile? How did he strike observers? He was at the commencement of his Chilean commission in his early forties, in the prime of life. His forty-third birthday fell on 14 December, two weeks after his arrival. The American agent George Worthington called on him on 6 December in Santiago. He stayed only a short time, as the house was thronged with officers of the government, but he came away with a positive impression: "His first appearance is not prepossessing. He is about 40 years old, very tall and not corpulent, rather of a stripling appearance; not courtly in his address, but very plain and bold in his remarks and opinions; Yet not authoritative nor pompous..." The American met Lord Cochrane again on 11 December at a dinner party given in his honour by San Martín, and Lord Cochrane talked flatteringly of the United States so that Worthington was "very much pleased with him as a man of no ordinary talents, of great frankness and an advocate of Civil Liberty..."6. His countryman John B. Prevost, who had several opportunities of observing Lord Cochrane while he was in the Pacific, admired his "address firmness and perseverance" as a commander, but had reservations otherwise:"...take him out of a profession in which he is without Rival and all is Inconstancy", he was to write in 1823, and he considered him "implacable

5MM vol 14. Tortel to Zenteno, 28 November 1818; Manning: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1027-29. Worthington to Adams, 26 January 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 392.

6Manning: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1027-29. Worthington to Adams, 26 January 1819.
in his resentments." Finally, John Thomas, O'Higgins' private secretary, has left a substantial, if rather floridly written, recollection or personal sketch. Lord Cochrane, wrote Thomas, was "one of the most extraordinary men that has ever appeared on the great stage of human life". "To pronounce an accurate opinion on a character full of inconsistencies and under the greatest extremes of all that is good, and all that is bad, is no easy task... his Lordship combined in his character the qualities of the highland laird or feudal chief with those of the Jew broker of the Stock Exchange. He is brave to an excess, kind and indulgent to his followers or clan... most fertile in Snares and plans for entrapping and defeating his enemy... With these extraordinary talents he possesses those of the keenest calculator in money matters, and pecuniary speculations maintain so decided an ascendancy in his thoughts, that his sword is at all times and on all occasions subservient to his purse..."  

One of Lord Cochrane's more attractive traits, which these accounts do not draw attention to, is his dry and sardonic wit, which unfortunately did not last into his old age and is entirely absent from his Narrative of Services, a peevish and ill-tempered book. One sample of his sense of humour will suffice, though several exist. Stevenson reports an exchange in 1822 when an unnamed gentleman in Guayaquil asked Lord Cochrane if he would engage the Prueba should he meet her. "Yes", he answered, "I will lay the O'Higgins alongside the


8 Archivo de don Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna vol 104. Thomas: "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy."
Prueba, and tell our crew that on board the enemy there are no pumps; this will be quite sufficient to secure the victory...9

This brief sketch of Lord Cochrane's personality and qualities is not presented from idle or novelettish motives, but because the actual functioning of the Chileen navy in this period owed as much to matters of personality and individual flair amongst the ships' commanders as it did to the smooth running of any bureaucracy, and perhaps more. By the same token, therefore, as it is relevant to examine briefly Lord Cochrane's personal qualities, it is also appropriate to look at those of the group of captains who were to be associated with him during the war of independence in the Pacific. In the case of some of these men, at least, it is possible to gather as detailed and useful insights as can be gathered for the commander himself.

Robert Forster was designed by Lord Cochrane to fill the key role of Captain of the Fleet, that is, its chief executive officer. He had joined the Royal Navy in 1795, got his lieutenancy in July 1802 and was promoted commander in June 1815. He had served on the Home and Mediterranean stations during the French wars, and had been a Lieutenant under Lord Cochrane in the Tonnant in 1814. He was a loyal and devoted friend of Lord Cochrane, according to Thomas, and was related to him through his marriage to Jane Frith Cochrane, who had come out to Chile with Lord Cochrane. He came to

9William Bennet Stevenson: Historical and Descriptive narrative of twenty years' residence in South America (3 volumes, London, 1825), III, 398. The point of the equip being that his crew would fight at any odds and win if it meant they got a ship in which they did not have the backbreaking, dirty and unremitting toil of perpetually manning the pumps.
the country ahead of his patron, bringing the Buenos Aires brig Maipu from La Plata in October 1818 and bearing a commission to assume command of the Chilean squadron in Lord Cochrane's absence. He was considered to be a good officer and competent in his profession. His talents, though, were better displayed in organising and disciplining men than in leading dashing or desperate enterprises. In Thomas' view, he had come to Chile "for the purpose of catching some of the golden fish with which (the Pacific) was supposed to abound, but at the same time to avoid as much as possible any circumstance which might cause his precious body to be thrown overboard...".

Thomas Sackville Crosbie, like Forster, came to Chile as a friend and client of Lord Cochrane, though a much more junior one. He was also a former officer in the British Navy, having received his lieutenancy in February 1815. He was a man of unquestionable personal courage, but "seemed to entertain the mistaken opinion that an abundant stock of bravery would supply every other deficiency" and, at the time that he commenced service for Chile, had not much practical

10 AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Characteristic Sketches" and "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy"; NSA, 250. Bowles to Croker, 31 October 1818; An Alphabetical List of the Post-Captains, Commanders and Lieutenants of His Majesty's Fleet (London, 1815); A List of the Flag-Officers of His Majesty's Fleet (London, 1817). I have used these last two to get the dates of the commissions of the ex-Royal Navy officers in the Chilean service. It is not clear exactly who Jane Frith Cochrane was; she does not seem to be the Vice-Admiral's sister. I have not been able to establish their relationship, but presumably she was some kind of poor cousin. She married Robert Forster on Tuesday 6 July 1819 in Valparaiso.
experience. However, once he had learned in the Chilean service that courage alone gave no particular merit, he applied himself to learn the business of his trade and became a quite competent seaman.\textsuperscript{11}

Thomas Wren Carter was another British naval officer. He had passed for Lieutenant in April 1806 and was promoted to commander in July 1815, a month after Forster. He had been offered the command of a frigate in the Spanish fleet by the Spanish ambassador in London, but had declined it, preferring to put his talents at the service of the patriots. Carter was an Irishman and inclined to be touchy and hot-tempered, but could be quickly and easily cooled down if he was treated with tact and kindness. He was gay and sociable and tended to be feeble ashore, but in practical seamanship and in all the details of naval discipline was considered by Thomas to have the advantage of Lord Cochrane. On the quarter deck of a man of war, he was "a most diligent and careful as well as a most experienced and brave officer."\textsuperscript{12}

Martin George Guise was also ex-British Navy and was the senior of the naval officers who joined the Chilean service. He had passed for Lieutenant in November 1802, and was promoted to commander in March 1815, ahead of both Forster and Carter. He had learned his trade under Lord St. Vincent and was an excellent all-round ship's commander. His virtues were professional, an excellent disciplinarian and a good seaman. His faults were personal, he was proud, ambitious and

\textsuperscript{11} AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy" and "Characteristic Sketches."

\textsuperscript{12} MM vol 13. Carter to O'Higgins, 30 April 1820; AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy."
susceptible to flattery. But against this, he was firm in his friendships and generous to a fault. His manners, the "civility and respect" with which he conducted himself, were admired by all who met him.\(^3\)

The last of this group of British naval officers who were captains in the Chilean fleet was John Tooker Spry, the most junior of them, whose lieutenancy dated from July 1813. He had served under Guise in the British navy and was his protégé. Though he cannot have had anything like the experience that the other naval men had, he was nevertheless considered to be "a very skilful naval officer; and brave and zealous in an eminent degree." He showed himself to the best advantage when acting under the command of a superior. On his own he was fearful of responsibility and was excessively cautious. He knew his trade well and put his knowledge into effect, so that his ship, the Galvarino, was notable for the orderliness in which she was maintained and the good discipline of the crew.\(^4\)

William Wilkinson was very much an odd man out in this group of officers, not merely because he was not a navy man by background but because he was that extremely rare phenomenon, a man who had made his way up to the quarter-deck from the forecastle. He had started his service with the sea as a ship's carpenter in the East India Company. He seems to have made the transition to quarter-deck in 1807, when he appears as third officer of the East India Company's General Stuart, and was made up to first officer in 1813. He had made the round trip to the East four times as an officer by the


\(^4\)AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy" and "Characteristic Sketches".
time he joined the Chilean fleet, and it was his "hon­-
est John Bull face" which obtained him his captaincy. According to Thomas, he was a diligent and industrious man who in his enthusiasm during the fitting-out of his ships was hard put to it not to take up his tools and take a hand in the labour. 'He had not seen much fighting service, which led Worthington to depreciate his value, but in a marine such as the Chilean, with its acute scarcity of skilled artificers, a man like Wilkinson who knew the artificer's crafts must have been worth his weight in gold, and though he lacked the warlike experience of his naval colleagues, he had talents that compensated for this in the form of an ability to devise solutions to difficult problems of ship or boat management. Miller gives an example of his ingenuity in improvising means to get a party of patriot troops stranded on an enclosed beach near Arica back to their boats through a surf which would have broken them up if they approached too close to the shore.\footnote{AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Characteristic Sketches"; Charles Hardy: A Register of Ships employed in the service of the Hon. the United East India Company from the year 1760 to the conclusion of the Commercial Charter (Lon­don, 1835), 258, 276, 316, 328; Manning: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 944-945. Worthington to Adams, 22 October 1818; Miller: Memoirs, I, 293-295.}

An American naval officer, Charles Whiting Wooster, was to participate in the history of the first Chilean navy, arriving before Lord Cochrane, and continuing after his departure, though he served for only a short period under Lord Cochrane, at the beginning and again at the end of his commission. Born in 1780, he was the grandson of a distinguished officer of the American revolutionary war, General David Wooster. He went to
sea at the age of 11, and at the age of 21 was in com-
mand of his own trading ship. In the war of 1812, he
commanded the American privateer Saratoga. Subsequently,
in response to the urgings of the Chilean agent Aguirre,
he purchased and outfitted the brig Columbus and sailed
her to Valparaíso, at which he arrived on 25 April 1817.
He commanded the Lautaro in Blanco Encalada's cruise
and is claimed to have been the first man to board the
María Isabel in Talcahuano bay. Worthington wrote of
him with patriotic pride that "He is a regular bred
seaman, in the prime of life - fitted for the station
he now fills and will I think give a good account of
his enemy..."16 It is perhaps unfortunate that Lord
Cochrane did not make an effort to keep Wooster in the
Chilean navy while he was in command of it.

This is not an exhaustive list of the captains who
served under Lord Cochrane in the Pacific, though it
does include those who played by far the greatest part
in the operations of the first Chilean navy. For the
captains other than these, and for the officers of the
Chilean ships, nothing is known besides their names and
occasionally a scrap of information which throws a glim-
mer of light upon them. Paul Delano, a merchant who
originated from Fairhaven, Massachusetts, and sailed
the Curiaco to Chile from Buenos Aires, was evidently
a man with wide interests like Lord Cochrane himself.
During 1819 he tried to interest the Chilean government
in a semaphore system, or "Mathematical Telegraph" of
his own devise, which would speed up communication
between the capital and the port and ships. Though the
project was accepted by the government in October, shor-
tage of funds prevented work being started until January

16 Dictionary of American Biography, vol X (New York,
1936), p 524; Manning: Diplomatic Correspondence,
II, 944-945. Worthington to Adams, 22 October 1818.
1820 and it was abandoned uncompleted when Delano left with the Liberating Expedition in August 1820. Henry Cobbett was the nephew of the English radical politician and pamphleteer William Cobbett. He had served under Lord Cochrane in the Imperieuse — presumably as a gentleman volunteer, for he was not a naval officer — and had a reputation in the Chilean navy for being "a great swearer and irascible." James Ramsay was inclined to drink heavily and on at least one occasion was incapaibly drunk during naval operations. Foord Morgell was in trouble at various times for being a gamester and for being insolent. William Prunier was a Jerseyman. Robert Casey had been a midshipman in HMS Alceste. Edward Brown was an American.

The motives of the foreign officers in joining the Chilean service are not obscure. They hoped to combine serving the cause of American liberty with handsome personal profit. Wilkinson had come to Chile because like his countrymen he hoped for wealth. William Jackson was invited to accompany Lord Cochrane out to South America and though he was not able to go immediately,

he was keen to go whenever he could because "it seems to be the shortest as well as the most honourable method of acquiring an Independence." Forster probably echoed the thoughts of most of the officers most accurately when he wrote to his relative the Earl of Dundonald that "It is a generally received opinion in England that large fortunes will be made here, I do not think so, tho' I am honest enough to confess, I hope so - we all expect to be rewarded for our patriotism..." Lord Cochrane himself, though, expressed the matter with the greatest clarity and directness in a letter to his brother William"...I have every prospect of making the largest fortune which has been made in our days, save that of the Duke of Wellington."

Such were the officers of the Chilean fleet. What were the ships of which the republic disposed while Lord Cochrane was its Admiral? The number of ships serving as ships of war at any one time varied because of new acquisitions, losses, changes of service, or laying-up, but there was a core of nine warships which served during the greater part of the period under review and which may be regarded as the backbone of the fleet. A brief description will be given here of these, and other ships which were incorporated into the squadron from time to time will be mentioned in their due place.

Though not the largest of the Chilean ships, the O'Higgins was the pride of the fleet. She was a frigate constructed at St Petersburg as the Patrikii in 1813 specifically for the Spanish Navy, and as the María Isabel was captured in Talcahuano bay by Blanco Encalada. She excited the admiration of observers. Hickey called

her "a very handsome frigate" and Bowles considered that she was "likely to prove a most important acquisition to the naval force of Chile." For Thomas, the ship "is allowed by all good judges of naval architecture to be a perfect model as to form, and her sailing fully justifies the high expectation excited by the beauty of her appearance..." Her dimensions confirm these views. The O'Higgins measured 177 feet on the main deck and 168 feet at the keel. She was 49 feet in the waist and weighed 1287 tons. This made her large for a frigate, as large as many third-rate British battleships except in the weight of metal she carried. She was pierced for 44 guns and by British ratings would carry a complement of 31 officers and petty officers, 219 men and 50 marines, a total of 360. Her value soon after her capture was between 160 and 180,000 dollars

The largest of the Chilean ships was the San Martin. She was an ex-East India Company ship, the Cumberland, built in 1802. Between 1803 and 1817 she made six round trips to the Indies. In the Company's service she was rated at 1200 tons, but with modifications as a warship in the Chilean service was rated at 1300. She was pierced or modified to carry 64 guns and was the only ship in the Chilean service with two gun decks. Her normal complement is not certain, but was between 400 and 500 men – Lord Cochrane rated her as 400, and she carried 492 in Blanco's cruise. Assuming that she

19 NSA, 269. Hickey to Bowles, 24 May 1819; NSA, 254. Bowles to Croker, 6 December 1818; AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy"; MM vol 10. Review of the O'Higgins, 12 July 1824; MM vol 8. Cobbett, Manning List, 6 October 1825; MM vol 6. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 12 July 1819. That a ship is pierced for a given number of guns is not of course to say that she actually carried them. The Chilean ships as a rule seem to have carried between two and six guns fewer than they should have.
usually carried about 50 or 54 guns, a reasonable estimate of her complement would be in the region of 440 or 460. The ship was in a poor state of repair when she was incorporated into the Chilean service, although her value on acquisition was 140,000 pesos, about the same as the María Isabel, and reflects the fact that necessity compelled the Chileans to purchase her in a seller's market.20

The Lautaro, frigate, was also an ex-East India Company ship. She was built in 1800 as the Windham, and between 1801 and 1817 made six round trips to the East, during one of which she was captured by and recaptured from the French. In the Company's service she was rated at 823 tons, and in the Chilean service at 850 tons, so that few modifications can have had to be made to her. Her complement was 25 officers and petty officers, 245 seamen and 40 marines, a total of 310 men. She was pierced for 50 guns and carried 34 when she arrived at Valparaíso. Her condition on her acquisition by Chile was good. Her masts, spars, riggings, sails and anchors were adequate for a year's service and this is reflected in her value of 180,000 pesos, higher than that of the San Martin.21

20 East India Company Register, 223, 245, 260, 276, 291, 312, 332; AOH, VIII, 70. O’Higgins to San Martin, 12 June 1818. I have estimated that her complement would be made up of 45 officers and petty officers, 150 first-class and 150 second-class seamen, and 100 marines.

The last of the substantial ships of the Chilean squadron, which did not join the fleet until after Lord Cochrane's first cruise but which it is convenient to mention here, was the corvette or frigate Independencia. She was one of two ships, the Horatio and the Curiacio, which the agent to the United States, Aguirre, commissioned in 1817. The two arrived at Buenos Aires in the middle of 1818 but were kept there against the possibility that the Platine republic would shortly have to face a Spanish expedition rumoured to be preparing at Cadiz for the Argentine coast. As the dangers of the Platine expedition receded, the Chileans sought to have the ships sent round to the Pacific, and Lord Cochrane counted on their joining the fleet within a month of his departure from Valparaíso in January 1819. The Curiacio eventually sailed from Buenos Aires on 12 May 1819 under the American Paul Delano with 297 seamen contracted for a year's service, and arrived at Valparaíso on 23 July. The Horatio was never sent in the end as, the Buenos Aires government being unable to raise her purchase, her American captain Skinner took the ship to Rio de Janeiro and sold her to the Portuguese there. The Independencia was rated at 830 tons, almost the same size as the Lautero. She carried 14 guns each side on the main deck and three on "a sort of poop" as Bowles put it. The New York-built ship sounds as if it was a little unfamiliar in construction to an Englishman, though he did consider her and her sister ship to be fine vessels. Her complement was 25 officers and petty officers, 195 seamen, and 40 marines, a total of 260 men\(^2\).

\(^2\) AOH, VI, 75. Echeverria to Zañartu, 21 April 1819; AOH, VI, 78. Echeverria to Zañartu, 26 April 1819; NSA, 253. Bowles to Croker, 19 November 1818; MM vol 8. Cobbett, Manning List, 6 October 1825. The corvette was a comparatively new development in shipbuilding, an intermediate class between frigates and brigs and as a rule distinguished for their fine lines and good sailing qualities,
The Galvarino was a brig-sloop formerly the Royal Navy's Cruiser-class Hecate. The class must have been a good one, for 110 of the ships were laid down between 1797 and 1826. In the Royal Navy the Hecate was rated at 384 tons and carried 18 guns. She was built by King at Upnor and commissioned into the Royal Navy on 30 May 1809. On 30 October 1817 she was sold off to a Mr. Parker, who was either acting for Guise or subsequently sold her to him. Guise brought her out speculatively to Buenos Aires as the Lucy. The Chilean agent in Buenos Aires, who was responsible for her purchase into the Chilean service, claimed that the Galvarino was "the best of her class to have arrived in these waters." At the time of her acquisition in Buenos Aires, she was rated at 398 tons but in the Chilean service her rating was 420 tons. She measured 100' 6" from stem to stern and 30' 6" in the beam. She carried 16 24-pounder cannon and two 12-pounder long guns, a lighter armament than her British one of 32-pounders and 6-pounders respectively. According to Guise when he sold her, her normal complement was 140 men, but in fact it was less, 21 officers and petty officers, 81 seamen and 25 marines, a total of 127 men. Her value was 70,000 pesos.

superior to the rather more broad and snub-nosed classes either side of them. In the Chilean service as in others, the larger corvettes tended to be called frigates and the smaller brigs indiscriminately with their own category.

The Chacabuco was at 450 tons, about the same size as the Galvarino, and she carried a complement also of 21 officers and petty officers, 81 seamen and 25 marines, totalling 127 men. She was originally a North American vessel, the Avon, which operated as a Chilean privateer in the Pacific as the Coquimbo before her acquisition by the state. She was pierced for 20 guns and was described by Worthington as "a beautiful corvette..." The value of the brig on acquisition was 35,000 pesos, which suggests that her condition or equipment was not as satisfactory as that of the Galvarino.24

The Araucano brig was formerly the North American Columbus, acquired by Wooster who sailed her to Chile, arriving at Valparaíso on 6 August 1818. She was pierced for 18 guns and rated at 280 tons in the Chilean service. Her complement according to Lord Cochrane was 90 men, but she carried 110 in Blanco's cruise and a pay list of February 1820 gives her complement as 83 officers and seamen and 26 marines, which seems to be an appropriate figure. Her value on acquisition was 33,000 pesos, nearly as much as the Chacabuco25.

The Pueyrredón had started life in the Pacific as the British contrabandist Eagle and had been seized by the Spanish and operated as the merchantman Aguila. Under this latter name, she was captured in Valparaíso harbour on 26 February 1817 and renamed in honour of the then Supreme Director of the Platine provinces. She was rated at 220 tons, pierced for 16 guns and carried a complement of 100 men in Blanco's first cruise. I estimate that her complement should be about 5 officers, 80 petty officers and seamen, and 20 marines, a total of 105 men.

24 MM vol 8. Cobbett, Manning List, 6 October 1825; Menning: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 944-945. Worthington to Adams, 22 October 1818.

Finally, the smallest of the ships which did regular service in the Chilean squadron, the Montezuma was a schooner captured in March 1819 off Callao, bound from Rio de Janeiro with a cargo of arms and munitions for the royal government. She could carry seven guns and was 200 tons. Her complement was 17 officers and petty officers, 36 seamen and 10 marines, a total of 63 men.

Before Lord Cochrane could actually assume his command of these officers and ships, some formal and informal preliminaries had to be gone through. Formally, he had to be issued with a letter of citizenship by the Supreme Director, which was done on 9 December, and on 11 December he was enrolled as a freeman of the city of Santiago. This done, his commission as a Vice-Admiral of Chile with the rank equivalent to lieutenant-general in the army was drawn up on 12 December and his appointment to command the Chilean squadron was issued at the same time. Informally, his supreme authority in naval matters had to be asserted. In the squadron, some of the foreign officers had been candidates for the command of the navy during 1818, but their demands and pretensions had been so exorbitant and they had been so much divided amongst themselves that the government had been unable to select a suitable leader from amongst them. This led to the appointment

26 MM vol 8. Cobbett, Manning List, 6 October 1825.

of Blanco Encalada to command the expedition against the María Isabel. With the arrival of Lord Cochrane, the cabal continued, this time to have the command divided between Cochrane and Blanco to give greater independence to the other officers. Popular feeling, too, in the enthusiasm which followed Blanco's success, was not entirely in favour of confiding the command to a foreigner. However O'Higgins himself was determined to put Lord Cochrane at the head, and Blanco professed himself honoured to serve under him, and the manoeuvres against Lord Cochrane subsided, for the time being at least. He left Santiago on 21 December and assumed command of the squadron in Valparaíso on 23 December at 12 o'clock.

When he took command of the fleet he found the ships in a sad state of equipment, lacking armament of various descriptions as well as other stores. The Lautaro had only one ship's boat, which made it impossible for the duty lieutenant to send to the flagship every morning for orders and at the same time carry on the daily provisioning of the ship. The charts, signal books and navigation aids sent by Alvarez Condarco from London had been lost. It rapidly became apparent that if Lord Cochrane himself did not immediately supervise the work of fitting-out, it was unlikely to be done with the proper despatch. As it was, the work took longer that anticipated. The government had hoped to get the squadron to sea by the end of December, but the whole of the first half of January was passed in the struggle to fit it out. On 4 January Zenteno anticipated that the squadron would sail within two days if Lord Cochrane would order

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Blanco to send on anything that he required but could not get in time. This going to sea without equipment Lord Cochrane could not or would not do. On 7 January he suggested as an alternative to the Governor of Valparaíso, in whose charge the work was, that the stores needed for the squadron should be purchased on credit. He had asked the commissary of marine for the "articles of the most urgent necessity" but they would not act until they received authorisation from the Treasurer's office, which was not forthcoming, and it was this that led to Lord Cochrane's appealing to de la Cruz to intervene to speed up the work. The Minister of Marine, Zenteno, on 9 January sent down explicit orders to de la Cruz to ensure that the squadron was supplied without delay with its requirements or at least such as could be obtained in the port, and with this impulse the work proceeded. Manning the ships was less of a problem, because the ships already had partial complements remaining from Blanco's cruise, mostly inexperienced Chilean seamen, and because Lord Cochrane's fame and the prospects of booty attracted great numbers of experienced British seamen to desert from their merchant ships in Valparaiso to the Chilean flag. By 2 January Lord Cochrane was able to report that though the squadron was not able to get up to a full complement on all ships, seamen were enrolling fast and sufficient would be aboard for the ships to be able to be worked.


As far as appointments were concerned, if not a clean sweep of the officers in the navy before Lord Cochrane's arrival, at least a substantial change of personnel occurred, and several of them left at this time or shortly afterwards. Wooster remained for the moment in command of the Lautaro and was promised the command of the new American frigate when it should arrive. However he shortly afterwards resigned and in April was given leave of absence from the service. Francisco Diaz was not re-employed and rejoined the army in February. Raymond Morris left in rather obscure circumstances. This "active brave intelligent (sic) Irishman" as Worthington described him, had discharged his duties sufficiently as captain of the Araucano in Blanco's cruise. According to Thomas, however, Lord Cochrane got rid of him on the frivolous grounds that as a former lieutenant in the navy, he could not hold a captaincy in the Chilean service, to make way for Crosbie. What in fact happened was that the government ordered Lord Cochrane to investigate reports that the Venganza and Esmeralda had sailed to Talcahuano, that this order was transmitted to the Araucano, at which the unpaid and discontented crew abetted by the officers refused to weigh anchor. The ship was seized and the crew redistributed onto other ships. Morris was discharged or left the service and joined the privateer Rosa as captain Illingworth's second in command. Fernando Vazquez also left the service at this time. Wilkinson remained in command.

of the San Martin, Spry of the Gelvarino and Prunier of the Pueyrredón. Forster was appointed as captain of the O'Higgins and captain of the fleet. Carter was appointed to the Chacabuco for the time being, and Crosbie, at first appointed to be flag officer to the Vice Admiral, received the Arauceno. Guise was intended to receive one of the American ships due from Buenos Aires, though in the event he received the Leuteno. At a lower level, a number of appointments were made by Lord Cochrane during January of lieutenants, surgeons, surgeons' mates, masters, masters' mates and gunners on various ships.\textsuperscript{32}

In the midst of these activities, he had his first brush with a ship of a neutral power. When captain James Biddle of the USS Ontario, stationed in the Pacific at that time, came into Valparaíso, he had not saluted the Chilean flag over the port. On 27 December Lord Cochrane now demanded that he do so. Biddle refused on the grounds that when he had last entered the port he had undertaken to fire a salute if it was returned from the shore with an equal number of guns. As this offer was declined then, he affirmed that he would not do so now. Lord Cochrane agreed to his condition, but Biddle now changed his ground and attempted to evade the issue by asserting that the firing of a salute was anyway a matter of pure courtesy. This skirmishing over points of etiquette had a deeper purpose than merely establishing how many guns each side should fire in salute. The Chilean government hoped that by

forcing Biddle to salute the Chilean flag, a propaganda victory would be won and the United States be seen to have given tacit recognition to the new republic. Lord Cochrane was concerned to put Biddle in the wrong and weaken his moral position with respect to the considerable quantity of royalist funds, said by deserters to amount to 920,000 dollars, and the royalist officers, which the Ontario was believed to be carrying and which Lord Cochrane was anxious to examine. Having embarrassed Biddle in the matter of the salute, Lord Cochrane now sought to immobilise him in the port for examination at leisure, by requesting that he undertake not to sail until the squadron had left Valparaíso. This request, or some unrecorded movement of the Chileans, gave the alarm to Biddle and on 31 December, suddenly slipping his cables and abandoning an anchor, he sailed hastily out of the port.

On 6 January 1819 Lord Cochrane received his orders for the coming campaign. The government had received reports that the Venganza and several other royalist ships were cruising in the region of Talcahuano during December of 1818. As long as royalist communications with the south of Chile remained uninterrupted, that region could not be properly pacified and the survival of the republic remained in doubt. At one time, the government seems to have designed to send the whole fleet to the south to be employed in supporting Balcarce's army, and went so far as to draw up plans for signals for use in communications between the army and the ships. Whether this was a serious project or not, the

33 CP doc 1. Lord Cochrane to Biddle, 27 December 1818; Biddle to Lord Cochrane, 28 December 1818; Lord Cochrane to Biddle, 28 December 1818; Biddle to Lord Cochrane, 28 December 1818; Lord Cochrane to Biddle, 30 December 1818; MM vol 5. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 31 December 1818.
orders when they were issued contemplated a cruise to Peru. Lord Cochrane was to blockade the viceregal coast but not to hazard an attack on the Callao forts themselves. Six hundred muskets were put aboard the ships and these were to be distributed amongst the inhabitants of Peru in the event that local uprisings occurred. Finally, he was to seek exchanges of prisoners with the viceroy.

Naval operations. Lord Cochrane's first campaign

The first division, consisting of O'Higgins (50), Admiral Lord Cochrane, captain Forster; San Martin (56), captain Wilkinson; Lautaro (44), captain Wooster; and Chacabuco (20), captain Carter, was ready for sea by the middle of January. Lord Cochrane went aboard on 14 January and gave orders to weigh immediately. At this Wooster protested that he could not weigh as his ship was unready and his unpaid and disaffected crew refused to raise the anchor. He announced his decision to resign because of this and it was necessary to replace him with Guise and order the ship to follow the squadron out the next day, which the Lautaro did only after a mutiny had had to be suppressed by Blanco Encalada in person.


35MM vol 29. Wooster to O'Higgins, 14 January 1819; CP doc 544. Wooster to Lord Cochrane, 14 January 1819; Barros Arana: Historia, vol XII, pp 203-204. Lord Cochrane's papers for this first cruise are extremely scanty and it appears that most of them have been lost or destroyed by time, perhaps by the effect of the great earthquake in Valparaiso in 1822 to which he makes reference in his Autobiography, I, xiv.
This was not the only ship to have difficulty commencing the campaign. The Chacabuco was sent back to Valparaíso on 15 January, one day out, to collect some forgotten items. On her way back to the squadron, on 18 January, she lost her mizzen-mast and main yard in a squall, then on 23 January a mutiny led by the Chilean master's mate broke out, the ship was seized and the officers imprisoned. The officers succeeded in repossessing her with the aid of loyal crew members after a bloody affray on 27 January and took her into Coquimbo where the leaders of the mutiny were shot or despatched in chains to Valparaíso. Only on 15 February was the Chacabuco able to make sail after the rest of the squadron.

In the other ships, Lord Cochrane took the opportunity, besides applying himself to learning Spanish, to exercise his raw and unruly crews constantly and instil in them the elements of seamanship. A month out, on 15 February, the squadron met the British warships Andromache and Blossom whose commanders were favourably impressed by them. The Chileans, preceded by the Lautaro as lookout, came up to them in fine style at battle stations, and Hickey noticed particularly how well-prepared and well-handled the San Juan was. Lord Cochrane went aboard Andromache for a conference with Shirreff and confided to him that his plan was to go into Callao roads with his ships disguised as Americans and attempt to cut out the Vengeance.


37 MM vol 29. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 14 January 1819.

38 NSA, 269-70. Hickey to Bowles, 24 May 1819. Barros Arana's account of this encounter in Historia, XII, 207, seems to be quite incorrect.
By 22 February the Chileans were cruising out of sight off Callao, with the intention of going into the harbour after the royal ships the next day. Guise came aboard the O'Higgins for a conference and while he was aboard a dense fog came down, preventing him from returning to Lautaro which had parted company, and making the attack impossible. By the time the fog began to thin out, the element of surprise had been lost. The royalist lookouts sighted the Chilean ships off Morro Solar (Chorrillos) on 26 February and were able to keep them in sight the following day, despite the obscurity of the weather. The attack when it came took place largely by mistake. On 26 February the viceroy reviewed the royal squadron which had been put on the alert when the Chileans came into sight, although the fog was so thick that he could see hardly anything from the Maipu in which he was embarked. Out at sea the Chileans heard the gunfire of the salutes and each thought that the others had gone into the port, so in turn made for Callao to support, as they supposed, each other. In the port a royalist gunboat with an officer and 30 men aboard lost its way in the fog and suddenly found itself in the midst of the squadron, which captured it and learned what the gunfire was. Notwithstanding the royal squadron was on the alert, Lord Cochrane pressed on in the O'Higgins and Guise who had returned to the Lautaro on 26 February followed him in. At about 1.30 p.m. the royalists saw "a big frigate", presumably the O'Higgins, backing up her sails and a smaller one, the Lautaro, under all canvas for the port. At about 3 p.m. the ships had come within range and both sides opened fire on each other. On the Lautaro things did not go well. Guise had come aboard in a bad temper and swore at his officer of the watch. When they went into Callao, the marines refused to do their duty and lay down on the deck. Guise

was wounded and taken below, thought to be dead, and
the command devolved upon his first lieutenant Kelly,
who stood out of the bay and began to fall down to lee-
ward. The O'Higgins remained in the bay for about four
hours exchanging fire with the defences, until the fog
and darkness compelled the attack to be lifted at about
6 p.m. The O'Higgins weighed anchor and joined the
other ships at San Lorenzo island. The Chacabuco had
joined the fleet on 26 February but neither she nor
the San Martin had taken part in the abortive attack.\textsuperscript{40}

Major operations ceased for a month while the Chil-
leans made their preparations for a renewed attack on
Callao and the royalists took the defensive measures
dictated by the presence of the patriot squadron. On
1 March, Lord Cochrane promulgated the decree of block-
ade incorporated into his instructions. All neutral
shipping in Callao was to have sailed by 9 March, on
pain of being seized for blockade-running and engaging
in illegal commerce with the enemy. The blockade was
to apply to the whole coast of the viceroyalty, with
the exception of Paita which was to remain open for
the use of whaling vessels refitting and provisioning
after their cruises in preparation for the voyage back
to Europe.\textsuperscript{41} On the night of 2 March, a patriot de-
tachment under Forster seized San Lorenzo island and
liberated 29 Chilean prisoners of war being held there.

\textsuperscript{40} MM vol 23, Kelly to Lord Cochrane, 25 June 1819;
Memoria de Pezuela, 411; The Times, 5 August 1819
(Report from Lima, 8 March 1819); Barros Arana:
Historia, XII, 227-30.

\textsuperscript{41} The Times, 5 August 1819 (Report from Lima, 8 March
1819); The Times, 6 September 1819 (Report from Val-
paraíso, 4 May 1819).
The garrison of 13 men were captured or put to flight, and a manufactory established on the island under Miller's supervision to prepare two of the prizes which the squadron had made of the various royal ships arriving at Callao ignorant of their presence, as fireships, while a third was to be prepared as an explosion vessel. A setback occurred when some of the materials being carelessly handled exploded on 19 March, wounding Miller and several other men.

In the meantime the Chacabuco executed another part of the commission, landing a number of spies and revolutionary agents at Chancay and other small inlets along the adjacent coast and harassing the local coastal shipping. Finally, Lord Cochrane himself undertook the negotiations for exchanges of prisoners stipulated in his instructions. On 4 March he protested against the treatment of prisoners of the royalists and offered an exchange to the viceroy for the more than 70 he was holding. Pezuela agreed to the proposals, but his denials of ill-treatment of prisoners, his affirmations that the patriots were at fault in this, and his animadversions upon Lord Cochrane's actions as a citizen of an allied state giving aid and help to Spain's enemies led to counter-charges by the Vice-Admiral and assertions of the right of Chile to employ foreigners. Pezuela retorted with a disquisition on the rights of individuals to serve under foreign flags and on the justice of the royal cause. He declined to entertain the exchange of the crew of the captured patriot privateer

42MM vol 29. Forster to Lord Cochrane, 2 March 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 412-13.

43AOH, XIII, 26-29. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 23 March 1819.

44Memoria de Pezuela, 413, 420.
Maipó who were, he said, pirates. With this, and in an atmosphere of mutual irritation, Lord Cochrane broke off the negotiations on 17 March.\footnote{CP doc 1. Lord Cochrane to Pezuela, 4 March 1819; Pezuela to Lord Cochrane, 5 March 1819; Lord Cochrane to Pezuela, 7 March 1819; Pezuela to Lord Cochrane, 13 March 1819; Lord Cochrane to Pezuela, 17 March 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 413.}

The viceregal government was taking measures against the Chileans at the same time. On 6 March the American brig Flying Fish was sent out at night, slipping past the squadron to take supplies up to Valdivia now that the patriots' whereabouts were known. More important, on 9 March another American, the Canton, was able to get past the blockade to warn a convoy that was coming from Guayaquil with arms and supplies for the capital, of the enemy squadron's presence. Lastly, against the probability of another patriot attack on Callao, a defensive boom was constructed before the royal lines in the bay. No operations against the Chileans could be attempted by the gunboats on account of the fresh wind that blew off the sea against the bay.\footnote{AOH, XIII, 26-29. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 23 March 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 414-15, 421.}

The patriot attack commenced at midnight on 22 March. Carter of the Chacabuco and Lieutenant Armstrong of the San Martin took in the two fireships, Barbara and Victoria, respectively, while Lieutenant Lawson of the Lautaro took in the Lucero explosion vessel. Forster was in command of the bomb ketch Veloz and Lieutenant Wynter of the gunboat which were to accompany the fire-and explosion-ships in. It was a set-piece Cochrane attack reproducing on a smaller scale his operations at the Basque Roads, but it was almost a complete failure. The O'Higgins followed the vessels in closely to give them cover and support,
but the San Martin and the Leutero lagged behind. One of his officers was later to claim that Wilkinson was afraid and took in the topgallant sails of the San Martin when going into the bay. At any rate, at a critical moment the wind, which had been quite fresh in the patriots' favour, suddenly dropped and Lord Cochrane was compelled to signal a general retirement of his now vulnerable ships. This was safely effected despite the royalist fire, with the exception of the explosion vessel which Lawson had to abandon. During the attack, a number of the prisoners being held by the patriots on San Lorenzo island succeeded in escaping to the mainland.

47 CP doc 548. Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane, 27 June 1819; AOH, XIII, 26-29, Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 23 March 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 417. The fate of the explosion vessel is not entirely clear. The royalist account claims that it was destroyed by gunfire, while Lord Cochrane's dispatch claims that it was abandoned after having been fired by Lawson. Pezuela's record does not mention any explosion of the order that might be expected from an explosion vessel but suggests that it was completely destroyed ("fue hecho pedazos"), while Lord Cochrane's dispatch and Miller: Memoirs, I, 209, suggest that after being fired it struck on or near the shore and sank. In the darkness such confusion is understandable. It also seems that the explosion vessel and the bomb vessel are named in the wrong order in Lord Cochrane's dispatch. The Lucero and the Victoria were both sent back to Chile, though the Lucero had trouble on the way, and the Barbara was burned in Chancay by her captors some time in April. Unless we hypothesise another and hitherto unheard-of Lucero, the remaining vessel, the Veloz, must therefore be the explosion vessel.

48 Memoria de Pezuela, 418-20.
The squadron was by now beginning to experience increasing difficulty in maintaining the blockade in the apparent absence of any help and support from Chile and because its provisions were becoming scarce, not least because the dishonesty of suppliers had led to less provision than contracted for being actually put aboard the ships, the weight of provision casks being made up with rubbish, bones and other detritus. Though the schooner Montezuma was captured off Callao with a cargo which included 500 barrels of flour which were promptly taken off her and distributed to the ships, provisions were still short and the need for water had become critical. At the same time, the wind which had dropped during the second attack on the bay now favoured the royalists with a calm, and at first light on 25 March some 28 gunboats passed through the Boqueron and exchanged a brisk fire with the Chileans for an hour before retiring. Lord Cochrane therefore determined to go along the coast to collect supplies. The prisoners who were left on San Lorenzo were offered the choice of joining the squadron or returning to Callao, and on 27 March the Chileans leaving the Chacabuco off San Lorenzo disappeared from before Callao towards las Hormigas, followed at a discreet distance for some of the way by royalist observers, and from thence to Huacho, where they arrived on 28 March.


50 Memoria de Pezuela, 421; AOH, XIII, 40-41. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 26 March 1819.

51 Memoria de Pezuela, 422, 424; AOH, XIII, 40-41. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 26 March 1819.
In Valparaíso, Blanco Encalada had remained to try and get the second division of the squadron to sea, although in the view of one observer, Worthington, this was an unlikely prospect. At the end of January he considered that the second division "is and ever will be in embryo". The rice and biscuit for the ships did not arrive until the middle of March, not before Blanco had been reduced to trying unsuccessfully to borrow biscuit from the recently arrived Andromache against bills on the government, and on the eve of departure the Pueyrredón sprang a leak and started taking water fast. At length, however, the ships were completed sufficiently for the voyage and on 17 March the Galvarino (18), rear-Admiral Blanco Encalada, captain Spry, and Pueyrredon (16), captain Prunier, weighed out of Valparaíso for Peru. The two ships made an uneventful voyage north, met the Chacabuco off San Lorenzo on 28 March and reached the rest of the squadron at Huacho at the end of the month. Here the squadron was rearranged. Blanco shifted his flag to the San Martin and was sent with that ship, the Lautaro, Chacabuco and Pueyrredón to resume the blockade of Callao, while Lord Cochrane in the O'Higgins and with the Galvarino and the ships they had captured was to go along the coast collecting provisions and trying to intercept royalist funds reported to be in transit along the coast.

Lord Cochrane's cruise along the coast to the north of Callao during April was a good deal more successful than his blockade and attacks had been in March.

52 Manning: Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1027-29. Worthington to Adams, 26 January 1819.

53 MM vol 5. Blanco to Zenteno, 4 March 1819; Blanco to Zenteno, 8 March 1819; Prunier to Blanco, 14 March 1819; Blanco to Zenteno, 17 March 1819; Barros Arana: Historia, XII, 197.
When he arrived at Huacho on 28 March he found the local Indian inhabitants friendly. He intimated to the royalist officer in the village, Pedro Ruiz, that he had come to water and get victuals, that he had no wish to fight the populace and would resort to arms only if he were attacked, a proposal with which Ruiz had no choice but to comply with in the absence of any force adequate to resist the patriots. A watering party from the O'Higgins went ashore, and on 30 March a species of public market was set up on the beach at Huacho, to which the inhabitants of the district resorted to sell their provisions. The commandant of the local area, however, based in Huaura, prohibited all traffic with the patriots and collected together some 500 militia to resist them, so Forster was landed with 400 seamen and marines and two guns on 31 March to disperse the royalists and make a show of strength. Forster's detachment attacked the royalist militia and dispersed them quite easily, the only real resistance coming from a party of free zambos and Guise distinguishing himself by his hot pursuit of the fugitives at the head of a party of mounted marines. At midnight Forster was obliged to withdraw his detachment as the seamen were getting out of hand and beginning to sack some of the houses, an enterprise in which a number of the inhabitants participated.

From Huacho, the squadron having been divided as stated above, O'Higgins and Galverino with the prizes sailed to Supe, where they arrived on 5 April to an even more cordial welcome than they had had at Huacho and Huaura. The inhabitants held a form of cabildo abierto and declared for the revolution. More concretely,

54AOH, XIII, 41-43. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 4 April 1819; Ibid., 45-46. Forster to Lord Cochrane, 31 March 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 424, 427, 433-35; Barras Arana: Historia; XII, 250-251.
they helped to intercept a treasure convoy for the patriots. The treasure, about 60,000 pesos worth, was the property of Lima merchants and was being convoyed to Huarmey with false papers by the American captain Smith for embarkation on his ship, the Macedonia, to the Philippines Company in Manila. A small force under Forster was landed and, guided by the local Indians, intercepted the convoy and dispersed the escort. With the money Forster also captured Smith's papers proving the fraud, and after some resistance, Smith was persuaded to sign an affidavit certifying that the money was indeed not his property and he and his ship liberated. For good measure, a nearby royalist hacienda was sacked and the sugar and aguardiente from it carried down to the ships by the inhabitants.

The Indians warned Cochrane of the approach of a royalist force and also of the fact that other royalist funds were being loaded at Huarmey into the French ship Gazelle, so on 7 April he weighed from Supe for Huarmey. He arrived a few hours too late on 8 April to learn that the Gazelle had sailed hastily the previous night, but acting on local reports he received he followed the Frenchman to Huambacho and surprised him there on 10 April with 60,000 pesos' worth of funds aboard. Though Roussel, the captain, did not have incriminating documents, the threat of taking his ship for the expensive time-consuming and untrustworthy process of prize adjudication was sufficient to persuade him to sign a document similar to Smith's affidavit, that the money was indeed the property of royalists, and he and the Gazelle were liberated.

55 AOH, XIII, 54-56. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 8 April 1819; Ibid., 56-58. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 8 April 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 430, 433-35.

56 AOH, XIII, 56-58. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 8 April 1819; Ibid., 59-61. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 13 April, 1819.
Now Cochrane turned his attention to the Guayaquil convoy. The Canton had found this convoy and warned it of the presence of the patriots in Peruvian waters, and the convoy put back to Paita. Lord Cochrane learned that it was in that port and sailed from Huambacho with O'Higgins, Galvarino and Gazelle, the last converted temporarily to Chilean use, to find it. But when the Chileans arrived there on 13 April, the convoy had gone, returned to Guayaquil, and in the bay there were only some foreign whaling vessels and the Spanish schooner Sacramento which lay under the shelter of the Paita battery mounting five guns and garrisoned by 94 men. An attempt to board the schooner from boats during the night was beaten back by the batteries, so the next day, 14 April, while Spry in the Galvarino engaged the batteries from the bay, Forster landed with a detachment of marines and seamen and assaulted them from the rear. The Spaniards put up a stiff resistance, refusing to comply with Forster's demand for their surrender, firing on his parley and when the attack reached them, spiking their guns before abandoning the fort. The obstinacy of the resistance irritated the patriots to the extent that serious disorders occurred in the troops. On 15 April the seamen started to sack and loot the churches and order had to be reimposed by the public lashing of the guilty parties on the Vice-Admiral's order on 16 April. The fort and the barracks were burned and many of the inhabitants of the place fled into the interior. The booty from Paita was rapidly embarked in the Sacramento to join her cargo of powder and shot, and sugar, cotton and spirits, and on 18 April the ships weighed for Callao to rejoin Blanco and the blockade.

57 AOH, XIII, 70-73. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 7 May 1819; Ibid., 73-74. Forster to Lord Cochrane, 14 April 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 428, 442-43, 471.
When he arrived off Las Hormigas islands on 5 May, there was no sign of Blanco and the rest of the blockading squadron. In fact, Lord Cochrane had just missed Blanco by two days. After seeing him at Huacho, Blanco returned to the blockade of Callao and hung on there for a month but finally lack of provisions obliged him to abandon it. His division cruised for three days off Cañete and Cerro Azul and tried at both places to get water and provisions under the pretence of being the American Macedonia, but the local royalist officers were on the alert and suspicious of strange ships, and prepared to ambush the Chileans if they attempted to land, which they did not venture to do. Both Guise and Wilkinson agreed with him that Pisco was too strong for them to attack with a view to securing supplies, and to leave the Lautaro alone to maintain the blockade until Lord Cochrane's return was too risky. The San Martin and Lautaro each had about three weeks' provisions on board, only just sufficient to get the ships back to Valparaiso, while the Chacabuco had supplies for only a week and had to receive some from the others in order to make the voyage. Blanco therefore took his division back up to Valparaiso, where the San Martin arrived on 25 May, followed shortly afterwards by the other ships, the Chacabuco in poor shape. Blanco's return provoked considerable anger in the government in whose view he had abandoned the Vice-Admiral with the weaker part of the squadron without adequate cause. Blanco was arrested and his division ordered to be sent back immediately to join the Vice-Admiral, but at once the rivalries and tensions of the officers surfaced. Wilkinson, on the grounds of antiquity of service and participation in the capture of the María Isabel, and Guise, on the grounds of having commanded a British ship of war, both claiming the right to command this division. Besides this, the ships required refitting and the crews demanded their pay and bounties for re-enlisting, before they could go to sea again. In this
condition the major part of the squadron remained while the first cruise terminated.

Lord Cochrane's division cruised off Las Hormigas islands for three days looking for Blanco before moving north again to see if the other ships had gone down the coast for provisions and water. His position was, however, beginning to become untenable on the Peruvian coast. The royalist defences were beginning to build up against the Chileans. When Lord Cochrane had first landed at Huacho and Huaura the government in Lima, alarmed because Huaura was the centre for a number of slaveholding haciendas where the patriots were liberating the slaves and because the local militia and population were showing their unreliability and disloyalty, urgently despatched a punitive column of 700 regular troops to Huaura. The squadron quite easily avoided these by sailing on to Supe and when the royalist column approached that place, moved on to Huarmey and Santa. The difficulty of the terrain which slowed the movements of troops, particularly as some of the rivers were in flood and on one, the Chancay, the only bridge had been swept away, and the unreliability of the populace meant that the royalists were unable to keep up with the squadron on this occasion. But on the departure of the patriots, the royalists put on trial the inhabitants of the towns who had aided them. In Huacho four people were executed, five more imprisoned and several others condemned to serve in the marine. In Supe nine were condemned to death in their absence with various crimes related to aiding the Chileans and 10 were imprisoned, exiled or reprimanded.

58 MM vol 30. Courtmartial of rear-Admiral Blanco, 3 July 1819; AOH, IX, 147. Zenteno to San Martin, 3 June 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 441, 445, 453, 486.

59 Memoria de Pezuela, 425, 427, 429, 430-33, 446-48. One of those who embarked with the squadron at Supe was William Bennett Stevenson.
The stern punishments meted out, and the flight or imprisonment of the most militant sympathisers of the patriots, clearly made the inhabitants of this coast less inclined to welcome and support the patriots on their return. Lord Cochrane cruised in the area a little while longer. Four royalist gunboats were making down the coast to Trujillo with arms and ammunition, and took refuge in Huarmey on the approach of the Chileans. The Galverino put into the bay and disembarked some men to seize the arms, but they had been taken out of the boats and hidden inland. One of the gunboats was seized, however, and two more burned, and some royalist haciendas nearby raided. On 8 May the Chileans anchored at Supe and raided a royalist hacienda nearby with 300 men. A small royalist detachment which attacked them there was driven off after half an hours' skirmishing and the raids continued, numbers of negroes being taken and armed with lances and given mounts as auxiliaries. But royalist reinforcements arrived from Huaura on 13 May and the embarkation had to be hastily concluded and some of the sugar and livestock abandoned on the beach, while in the early hours of that day the political agent Cayetano Requena and a negro carrying secret correspondence of Alvarez Jonte to various agents and sympathisers in Lima fell into the hands of the royalsim 60.

The squadron had been losing men by desertion from the time that it watered at Huacho. The viceregal government recorded receiving 67 deserters, mainly royalist prisoners from Maipu compelled to serve in the squadron, and more must have simply disappeared into the countryside, notwithstanding the help that the local inhabitants gave by hunting down and returning deserters for a bounty of a silver piece (onza) a head 61.

60 Memoria de Pezuela, 454-56, 464-65, 469.
61 Memoria de Pezuela, 426-29, 433, 437-38.
More of his crews were away on prizes or sick, there was nothing more he could do against Callao for the time being, and Blanco's division had left the Peruvian coast. On 17 May therefore he wrote to O'Higgins that he was getting under way for Valparaíso, though if he had had rockets and 1000 men he would have been able to "cause the flame of liberty to blaze forth in every quarter." His ships anchored in Valparaíso on 18 June, the crew of the O'Higgins in poor health, 52 of them very sick, and Lord Cochrane himself indisposed.

What had this cruise achieved? The American agent, John B. Prevost, felt that the cruise had showed more potential for the future than actual achievement: "Notwithstanding public expectations has by no means been satisfied yet the dismay caused by the presence of the Fleet on the Coast of Peru together with the security it offers to the Commerce of his Country has given it great favor..." he wrote to Adams, adding that Lord Cochrane "must do something more in his next cruise than gather Prize money from Neutrals or he will not sustain his Situation..." Viceroy Pezuela was rather more alarmed. Although the blockade was a feeble one and only sustained with some difficulty, it nevertheless had an effect, particularly on the local coasting trade upon which Lima depended for its food supplies, and by the beginning of June the capital was "very short because the blockade which this port and viceroyal coast suffers prevents our ships bringing (provisions) from the provinces." If future raids like this one were to be prevented, much depended on the arrival of new ships from Spain and a frigate were at various times in 1819 rumoured to be on

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62 MM vol 29. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 17 May 1819.

their way: "...the defensive plan of operations dictated to me by circumstances since...the domination of the sea which the capture in Talcahuano (of the María Isabel and her convoy) gave to the enemy, could pass over to the offensive very advantageously from the time that the reported ship and frigate of war arrive at Callao..." With this force "united to that which I presently have at my disposition, we would dominate the South Sea, the enemy ships would be defeated or blockaded in their ports..."64

In retrospect, Lord Cochrane considered that the objects of this expedition had been fully accomplished. These he defined as "to reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should be rendered efficient, but more especially to ascertain the inclinations of the Peruvians with regard to their desire for emancipation...To the accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no inconsiderable amount of treasure."65 At the time, however, he was less satisfied and felt that the cruise had not fulfilled its objects. Different methods would have to be pursued against Callao. The royalists' "passive system of defence", their refusal to send ships out against the Chileans but, simply, to bar themselves in Callao under the shelter of the guns of the forts, made ordinary naval operations against them impossible. If Callao was to be attacked with any probability of success, it would have to be with more cunning and sophisticated equipment than the squadron at present disposed of.66

64 Memoria de Pezuela, 472-76.

65 Narrative of Services, I, 19-20.

66 CP doc l. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 21 June 1819.
He had however, identified one important aspect of naval operations which is often taken for granted and not examined, and that was the geographical and oceanographic environment in which these take place. To a consideration of this it is now appropriate to turn.
CHAPTER THREE

THE MAR DEL SUR IN THE EARLY 19th CENTURY

This chapter has two parts. In the first section, a summary account will be given of the geographical environment within which the maritime operations of the war of independence took place. The boundaries of the theatre of war will be delimited. The principal weather and navigational features of the region will be indicated. The coasts along which the opposing forces had to operate and which were their bases will be described. Finally, the ports and harbours of the coast will be briefly surveyed. These elements are discussed with reference to their effect on the nature of seapower and naval warfare at this time and are designed to throw into relief the possibilities afforded to and the limitations placed upon each side by the physical environment. In the second section, the state of navigational knowledge about the waters of the Mar del Sur will be reviewed, and a description given of the principal means by which the Chilean fleet acquired a knowledge of this navigation.

The Geographical Locale

Panama lies about 9° north of the Equator and

79° west of Greenwich\(^2\). This may be taken as the approximate northern limit of the theatre of war, although ships of both sides at one time or another sailed north of this boundary and up to Mexico. Looking firstly at the landward boundary of this locale, the coast from Panama curves east then west through Buenaventura (6°S, 77°W) down to the Gulf of Guayaquil and the city of the same name (2°S, 80°W). From here the coast runs west then south round the promontory of Paita (5°S, 81°W) and turning southeast, runs through Trujillo (8°S, 79°W), Callao (12°S, 77°W), Mollendo (17°S, 72°W) to Arica (18°S, just over 70°W). This is approximately the easternmost point of the main coastline\(^3\). At this point the coastline changes direction and begins to run south and very slightly to the west, through Caldera (27°S, 71°W), Coquimbo (30°S, just under 72°W), Valparaíso (33°S, 72°W), Talcahuano (37°S, 73°W), around the promontory of Arauco, to Valdivia (40°S, about 74°W). So far the coast is an easy one to follow and almost without major coastal islands. A few degrees beyond Valdivia, however, at about 42°S, the coast breaks up into an increasingly complex patchwork of islands, channels, archipelagos and inlets which curves gradually towards the south and at about


\(^3\)To be precise, the easternmost point lies four degrees further south at the mouth of the Loa river.
the latitude of Wellington Island (49°S, 75°W) turns slightly to the east and runs down past the opening of the Magellan Strait to Cape Horn (56°S, about 68°W).

On the seaward side the boundary is more indeterminate and yet easier to describe. It is the vast space of the Pacific Ocean stretching westwards from the American continent to the Philippine Islands, 9000 miles from Panama, and beyond to Japan and China in the north, and to the islands of Polynesia and Melanesia in the south. But early 19th century ships did not often sail such spaces, and for the purposes of this dissertation an imaginary line can be drawn to mark the western boundary, which runs from Panama southwestwards to the Galapagos Islands (on the Equator and 90°W), rather more than 500 miles from the Ecuadorian coast, then south and east to Juan Fernandez (34°S, 61°W), and from there to the Horn. This gives a locale stretching through nearly 65 degrees of latitude and 20 degrees of longitude at the Equator, or about 4000 miles in length and approximately 500 miles in breadth, and occupying an area of somewhat less than two million square miles. Space, a large sea area, then, is the first and by far the dominant feature of this locale.

In the southern Pacific ocean, the hemispheric high pressure belt lies along latitude 30°S, that is, on the parallel of Coquimbo, and the low pressure belt along latitude 60°S, that is, just south of the Horn. The area under consideration therefore lies within the regions of the South East Trades and the Westerlies wind systems.

The SE Trades are the prevailing winds along the Chilean coast from Coquimbo and blow northwards towards the thermal Equator (which lies a little to the north of the actual Equator) and off the land in general. As
they reach the Equator, they join the NE Trades to blow westwards towards Asia. The part of the equatorial zone where the tradewinds converge is the doldrums, a region about 200 or 300 miles wide of calms and light variable winds accompanied by thunderstorms and squalls. Coming from the south, the trades bring cool air to interact with the relatively warm ocean. They generally blow at about 13 knots and are strongest at the end of winter, around September or October. Although they are characterised by great regularity and uniformity, they can blow up occasionally into storms of considerable violence.

The Westerlies are the winds of the belt to the south of 35 degrees. The term "Westerlies" is something of a misnomer as the prevailing wind is rather northwesterly and is extremely variable in both force and direction. It generally blows strongly, often as a succession of gales whence the name Roaring Forties given to these latitudes by mariners, and raise a very heavy swell. At their southern limit they meet the cold polar Easterlies to form a belt of dense cloud and high rainfall level. In the northern hemisphere, the corresponding westerlies blowing north of Hawaii provide the winds of Urdaneta's Passage - the route used by the ships of the Philippine Company to sail east to Mexico.

Distinct wind systems, then, is the second natural feature - calms or light winds and occasional squalls northwards of Guayaquil, a steady fresh wind down the Peruvian coast from Coquimbo with clear bright weather at sea but periodic fogs, and erratic winds, frequent gales and thundery storms south of Talcahuano. Between Coquimbo and Talcahuano, that is, for Valparaíso port; in the region sometimes called the horse latitudes, erratic weather, generally fine like that to the north but occasionally backing round to stormy westerlies,
is the rule.

The major current of this coast is the Southern Ocean Current, also called the West Wind Drift, which flows eastwards from Australasia. In the vicinity of 45 degrees, that is, a little to the south of Chiloe, as it approaches the South American continent it bifurcates. One branch swings southwards to go parallel with the coast and eventually through Drake's Passage and into the Atlantic. The other branch turns northwards and joins with the Humboldt or Peru Current which flows northwards along the coast of the continent. This Peru Current is very broad, about 300 miles, and flows only slowly. The prevailing south and southeasterly winds blowing with it cause upwelling of water from the moderate depths which in turn creates a tendency for a kind of damp fog or mist, the garua, to form along the Peruvian coast especially in the early mornings between June and November. This upwelling occurs along the eastern flank of the main current and is called the Peru Coastal Current. In the vicinity of the Gulf of Guayaquil, the Peru Current turns westward to become the South Equatorial Current, and immediately to its north (about the latitude of Buenaventura or Panama) runs the Equatorial counter current. During the southern winter, particularly from April to June, the Peru Coastal Current flows well to the north of the Equator. However, during the southern summer and particularly from January to April, the equatorial counter current shifts southwards with the name of el Niño (the Christ child, so called because it appears about Christmas time) to meet the Peru Coastal Current south of the Equator and sets up particular navigational problems in the form of strong coastal swirling or counter currents and sudden if infrequent rainstorms alternating with bright weather.

The effects of these oceanic flows, combined with
the airflows already mentioned, present certain features of importance in an age of sailing ships. Shipping entering the Pacific had a long, hard struggle beating against unfavourable winds and currents right up to Chiloe. In the archipelago south of Chiloe strong and erratic winds, treacherous currents and races, and generally bad weather with northwesterly blows of over 100 miles an hour on occasion, made Chiloe itself the first feasible stopping place on this coast. From Chiloe down to Valparaiso the sea ran favourably for north-bound ships, though wind and weather conditions might be changeable. From Valparaiso down to Guayaquil both wind and sea helped northbound shipping to make good speed and the weather was generally clear. The hazards were comparatively slight, though they existed — the sudden coming down of fog along the northern Chilean and Peruvian coast, and odd currents which changed with the seasons off Peru. For ships sailing southwards, on the other hand, the run of both sea and wind presented considerable obstacles, and it was necessary to beat well out to sea westwards, well clear of the land to make a long, slow, tedious tack back to the coast once the right latitude had been reached, and making the right landfall in those circumstances could be an erratic business. In October and November of 1819, to give an illustration, the Chilean squadron took three weeks to get from Callao to Pisco, a voyage of only a few days in the other direction, because of adverse winds, and, a more serious case in the same year, the prize ship Victoria, taken in the first cruise, took no less than 56 days to beat up from Huambacho to Coquimbo and arrived at the latter port without water and with most of the crew ravaged by hunger and disease. North of Guayaquil, the currents also changed according.

to the seasons and the winds could be very unreliable and the weather changeable.

There are several distinct zones along the coasts of the South Sea. In the north, along the New Granadan coast, there is a warm, well-watered, occasionally marshy plain, the dominant climate of which is derived from the warm equatorial countercurrent. The level of rainfall here is the heaviest on the continent. However, Choco, as it was called, was almost wholly unpopulated and cut off from the rest of the viceroyalty of New Granada by the coastal range of the Colombian Andes, except for some passes which gave access to Buenaventura, the only settlement of any size on the coast. The Ecuadorean coast down to the Guayas basin is similar to Choco in its physical configuration, weather conditions, difficulty of access and scarcity of population. It is crossed by one large river system, the Esmeraldas, in the north. The Guayas basin marks the limit of this zone. Here the land was fertile, heavily populated, productive and prosperous. Communications inland were on the whole good, so good in fact, that access from central Colombia to southern Colombia was easier by sea from Buenaventura to Guayaquil and thence to Quito and Pasto than it was overland. The great city of Guayaquil lay at the hub of a network of tributary rivers and streams where they met the ocean.

An abrupt change occurs south of the Guayas basin where the cold north-flowing Peru Current becomes the major climatic determinant. For 1500 miles stretches the semi-desert of the coastal belt of Peru. Its shifting sand dunes and bleak cliffs offer no welcome to the visitor and the 50 or so streams which flow from the Andes provided limited means to sustain life. Each of these streams permitted the existence of a narrow strip of oasis of cultivation and vegetation with the aid of freshwater irrigation. Generally the rivers
flood during the summer while between August and October they shrink and many cease flowing altogether. In these oases was concentrated a modest population engaged mainly in subsistence agriculture while in the valleys nearer Lima commercial agriculture for the capital's food supply existed and towards the south there were a number of stockraising haciendas. This dry region, with its oases at more or less regular intervals turned into true desert further south, in the north of modern Chile. Here a barren and waterless waste stretched for 600 miles along the coast from Arica, the last of the well-watered oases serviced by the river Lluta and giving access to Upper Peru, to Caldera. For much of this region the coast consists of steep cliffs broken now and then by a dry river channel and the shore plunges steeply into the sea. At Caldera it began to become a transitional region not unlike the Peruvian coast, dry semi-desert punctuated by occasional streams and modest towns, the most important of which was Coquimbo, centre of a thriving agricultural community and with an excellent harbour. Chile proper, that is the centre of population and economic activity, lies from a little south of the Choapa river to the Bio Bio. The coast is characterised by a plateau of between 1500 and 2000 feet, pierced transversely by a number of rivers, few of which were navigable however. Access from the coast to the fertile central valley was easy, particularly from the ports of Valparaiso and Talcahuano. The Bio Bio marked the frontier between Europeans and Araucanians, the as yet unsubdued prehispanic occupants of Chile. The coast south of this river was not therefore open to any kind of landing by Europeans as a rule. The solitary exceptions to this were the fortress-town of Valdivia and the fertile but poverty-stricken island
of Chiloé. The region from Concepción southwards to Chiloé in its physical configuration, climate and vegetation, is not unlike southern Scotland or Ireland. South of Chiloé, the coast became bleak, barren, cold, rainy and windswept, a region shunned by all but a handful of aboriginal Indians and affording nothing of the necessities of life to the travellers but water.

Apart from the continental coast and its adjacent islands, were the Galapagos Islands and Juan Fernandez Islands. The Galapagos Islands consist of a group of six large islands, nine smaller ones and various islets and rocks of volcanic origin. There are known eruptions for 1814 and 1825, just bracketing the period under review. As the lava-based surface is pervious, the scanty rainfall sinks below ground immediately at the lower levels, though the vegetation and clayey soils above 1000 feet hold springs and pools of water. The prevailing SE Trades are cold and dry and rainfall occurs mostly between January and April, with slight rains at higher levels during the summer. Rainless years are known even on the larger islands. The islands are known for their abundant and scientifically

Up to the time of writing, I have not been able to procure a copy of Carlos Olguin: Instituciones políticas, sociales y económicas de Chile en el siglo xviii (Santiago, 1972) which I understand from Chilean colleagues has an excellent account of the Chilean aspects of the matter covered here.

remarkable plant and animal life and particularly for the giant Galapagos turtles which grow up to 400 pounds and played a vital part in the food supply of early 19th century Pacific shipping. They were an ideal source of fresh meat in the days before refrigeration or packaging in tins. They were easily captured by visiting mariners who after keeping them on deck for a few days to empty their bowels, stacked them below decks like so many casks and brought them up for slaughter as and when required. The turtles would keep for up to seven months without sustenance in these conditions 7.

Juan Fernández consists of two islands, Mas-a-Tierra and Mas-Afuera, about 360 miles from Valparaiso. Both islands are characterised by rocky and precipitous cliffs and other hazards which made landing difficult and dangerous. Mas-Afuera has no harbours or safe anchorages but Mas-a-Tierra had two poor harbours on the south side and a better one, the main one, on the north side, though the anchorage was poor holding ground for ships and the currents sharp 8. The rainfall occurs mainly between April and September and both islands have a damp and humid climate at the upper levels and to windward, but are generally stony, poorly covered with vegetation and unsuitable for occupation except by colonists of considerable determination or - as in part of this period, when they were used as a penal settlement - colonists brought there involuntarily.

The major ports along this coast are, from north to south, Guayaquil, Callao, Valparaíso, Concepción and Valdivia. However, several of the smaller ports and harbours on the coast figure in the maritime history of the war of independence, and these will also be

8 Thaddeus Haenke: Descripción del Reyno de Chile (1793) (Santiago, 1942), pp 67-77 gives an excellent account of the Juan Fernandez islands.
described with the main ones\(^9\).

The city of Guayaquil lies about 65 miles upstream from Puna island in the mouth of the Gulf of Guayaquil. The approach is wide but encumbered by shoals and tide rips and eddies in the channel with currents of up to six knots in the outer reaches and foul ground and shoals for about six miles out on the seaward side of Puna. The main channel runs to the south of the island and has a depth of three fathoms or less up to four miles offshore. The times of the tides are not regular, because of the effect of winds and the velocity of the river current. Going upstream the depths are constantly changing because of silting. The river narrows to about a mile and is bordered by low mangrove-covered islands with adjacent mudbanks. In the channel itself, numerous shoal patches and sandbanks are constantly changing their location and shape. A particular hazard is the debris which is washed down the river especially after heavy rains inland, which is liable to foul anchors and can seriously damage small craft. The anchorage itself is about four fathoms. In the late 18th and early 19th

\(^9\)I have used as the main source of data on the ports and harbours described in the next few paragraphs the relevant sections of the United States Naval Oceanographic Office: *Sailing Directions, South America*, volume II, *East and West Coasts between Rio de la Plata and Cabo Tres Montes* (Publication number 24, 1965) and *United States Naval Oceanographic Office: Sailing Directions, South America*, volume III, *West Coast between Gulf of Panama and Cabo Tres Montes* (Publication number 25, 1964). They are cited as *Sailing Directions*. I have preferred to use these as they are more up-to-date and accessible than the Ecuadorean, Peruvian and Chilean navies' derroteros and somewhat fuller than the otherwise excellent British Admiralty sailing directions, from which they abstract much material.
centuries ships generally entered and left the port with the high tide, and large ships went no further up than the outer anchorage off Puna island. Good pilots were essential.

Salaverry is the port for Trujillo, which is about seven miles away. The approaches, harbour and anchorage range from about three and a half to six fathoms. The coast here is mainly sandy beaches with some cliffs. The heavy rollers that break on the shore can be heard up to eight miles out to sea and between May and October the heavy swells and high seas prevent communication between ship and shore for from three to six days at a time. Between January and March there is often a thick fog in the early morning. The anchorage itself is sand and mud. Water is scarce.

Huarmey is a bay or cove about three-quarters of a mile back from the shoreline. There are inshore shallows, rock fringes on the south side and an islet in the middle of the cove. The anchorage is about seven or eight fathoms. The town, about one and three-quarter miles away, was described in 1824 as "one wide long street of Indian huts, with two or three mud-houses."

Supe is a sheltered north-facing bay with a prominent point on its western side. Both water and vegetables are scarce.

Huacho is a bay set about half a mile

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10 Sailing Directions, vol III, pp 118-126; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 31-32; Memoria de Amat, 777-78.

11 Sailing Directions, III, 148, 158-160.

12 Ibid., III, 167; Robert Procter: Narrative of a journey across the Cordillera of the Andes and a Residence in Lima...in the years 1823 and 1824 (London, 1825), p 182.

13 Sailing Directions, III, 168-169.
back from the shoreline. There is foul ground and both above- and below-water rocks on the northern approach. The east shore has a sandy beach backed by a brown cliff and the town is on the cliff, about three-quarters of a mile away. The anchorage, of six or seven fathoms depth, is sand. Ancon, a few miles north of Callao, is a large bay about a mile and a half back from the coast, and very sheltered except from northwesterlies. In the 18th and early 19th centuries it was considered for its size and security to be one of the best ports in the region of the viceregal capital. The anchorage is about five to seven fathoms and good. The bay lies in the shadow of the massive Loma de Ancon, 2769 feet high and a conspicuous landmark. Miller echoes Procter's description of Huarmey when he describes Ancon as "a few fishermen's huts, half buried in drifted sand..." and indeed, the same description could be applied to nearly all the coastal villages of Peru in the early 1820's.

Callao, though one of the major ports of the coast, had a difficult and hazardous approach. Several groups of islands lie off the coast, the Hormigas de Afuera about 30 miles to the northwest, though their position has still not been fixed beyond dispute, the Grupo de Huaura to the southwest of these and west of San Lorenzo, the Islas Pescadores about five miles off Ancon and San Lorenzo. These groups, each several miles long, numbered dozens of islets, rocks, reefs and shoals. They are steep-to and give almost no warning of approaching danger in conditions of poor visibility. On the other hand, they did help to reduce the swell of the sea

14Ibid., III, 169-170.

15Ibid., III, 172; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 47; Miller: Memoirs, I, 270.
somewhat. The roads and harbour itself consist of a shallow north-facing bay sheltered by the island of San Lorenzo off its southern tip. The approach to the bay from the south is either round to the west of San Lorenzo or between it and the shore. This latter passage is the Boqueron, dangerous without a pilot or without local knowledge. There are several islets and reefs southwards of San Lorenzo at the entrance of the Boquerón and the currents through it are inclined to be unexpectedly strong. In the 18th century ships invariably came round the island from the westward quarter and when on 3 November 1820 Lord Cochrane passed the Boqueron in the frigate O'Higgins the local population were astonished. In the harbour, the prevailing winds are generally light. The anchorage is usually smooth and protected, though there are westerly swells. The bottom, between five and 20 fathoms, is mud, and is firm and provides a good holding. Even large sailing ships could anchor quite close to the shore. Fog is frequent between December and April - the effect of this has been seen in the first cruise. The northern end of the anchorage has a series of sandbanks created by the estuary of the Rimac river and this, the Bocanegra, constituted a hazard for ships beating up leeward of the harbour. In the 18th century numbers of ships went aground here. Finally, in the harbour, jellyfish are very prevalent in April and July, while the gases which ooze from the submarine mud of the bay have a nauseous odour and cause discoloration of the water.

Chorrillos lies a little to the south of Callao,

16 CP doc 1886. Log of (William Jackson?)

17 Sailing Directions, III, 171, 173-176; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 43-44. The Castillo Real Felipe, the centre of old Callao harbour, lies at the southern end of modern Callao.
and was a subsidiary port for Lima, which is about equidistant from the two. Its drawbacks, however, are that it is clifffy and the bay is fringed with reefs up to 400 yards offshore, and the bay as a whole is exposed to the southerly winds, which made it a risky harbour for sailing ships. In 1821 the Chilean fleet was to lose its largest ship, the San Martín when she ran aground on an uncharted bank and was broken up within a few days by the heavy surf.\(^\text{18}\)

South of Chorrillos and along the great stretch of coast down to Chile were many inlets, bays and coves designated by the general name of puertos intermedios, most of them unused except by the fishing vessels of their own inhabitants if they had them and considered to be of little value by the governments and seagoing shipping for the unimportance of their hinterland and for the lack of provisions and scarcity and badness of the water available at them.\(^\text{19}\) There were some exceptions to this characterisation and some of them had or acquired for a time during the wars of independence, a more than local importance and must be examined.

Pisco was the town of a fertile and productive area around the Paracas peninsula, with a population in 1819, counting both the town and its region, of about 7000, a large proportion of whom were the slaves on haciendas. The approaches to the bay are interrupted by several islets and rocks, the Islas de Chincha, Las Ballestas, Tres Marias and Isla San Gallan, which extend in a chain off the coast and make its southern approach especially hazardous. Like the outcrops off Callao, these are steep-to and give no warning of their proximity. The bay is sheltered from southerly winds by the Paracas

\(^{18}\)Sailing Directions, III, 178; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 45.

\(^{19}\)Ibid., I, 51-52; Memoria de Amat, 777-778.
peninsula with sandy beaches and cliffs. The anchorage between four and a half and eight fathoms is mud, good holding ground. However, the air currents in the bay are erratic and can be troublesome, and water is scarce.

Mollendo, the port for Arequipa and southern Peru, had few virtues. There are several rocks and shoals in the southern and south western approaches. The anchorage, between 12 and 15 fathoms, is coarse sand, and exposed to the current and sea swell, which is particularly strong between July and September. Food and water are both limited in availability.

Ilo - or Ylo, as it was generally spelled in the 18th and early 19th centuries - is set on a barren coast like Mollendo. The roadstead is immediately off the town. The bay is shallow, with a sandy clay bottom affording a good anchorage partly sheltered from southerlies. There is a heavy swell and strong waves on the beach made small boat operations difficult. It was used a good deal by the French in the early 18th century but by mid-century had declined into insignificance. Food was scarce and the fresh water stream dried up in the summer.

Arica was the most important of the puertos intermedios, as it was the port of access for Upper Peru. It lies in the shadow of the Morro de Arica, a granite bluff which rises straight out of the sea for 452 feet. The fogs, here called camanchacas, are prevalent between May and September, but are partial and occur in the mornings. The sea is usually calm but exposed to

20 Seiling Directions, III, 181-184; Memoria de Amat, 777-778; Miller: Memoires, I, 225.

21 Seiling Directions, III, 192.

22 Ibid., III, 193-194; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 49-50.
the south west and between June and August occasional southerly storms close the harbour for between three and six days at a time. Except for the exposed position and the heavy swells or breakers on the beach, it is a shallow bay with a good anchorage, though food and water were scarce."}

Coquimbo was the first major port on the Chilean coast and effectively marked the northern boundary of the colony. It lies on the southern curve of the bay of Coquimbo. Two groups of islets, Farallones de Coquimbo and Pajaros de Afuera, and assorted rocks lie off the approaches and the prevailing swell, current and winds are likely to drive ships to the north as they approach. However, once inside the bay, the rugged yellow hills of the peninsula shelter the anchorage from southerlies. The bottom, of sand and mud, is good holding. Provisions and water were both abundant and easily accessible. In winter, though, the bay did experience very dense fogs and it is easy to get lost even inside the bay.

Valparaiso was the chief port of Chile and the entrepot for Santiago. It is a very large semicircular bay with some shallows and rocks on its western side. It is well sheltered from the south, but exposed to northerlies and northwesterlies, which begin to occur with some force in this latitude. In the summer, the seabreeze called the virazón blows regularly in the afternoons and is often so strong as completely to prevent ship to shore communications, while the heavy

23 Sailing Directions, III, 201-205; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 50.

24 Sailing Directions, III, 262-64; Memoria de Amat, 777-778; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 52-54.
swell in the winter similarly makes small boat operations dangerous or impossible. The bottom is good and allowed ships to anchor quite close to the shore. The hazards of the port to sailing ships were the approach, which southerlies made difficult. Ships were easily blown to leeward of the bay, the very light air within the bay in the mornings left ships becalmed and vulnerable to the drift of the current, and the seabreezes and still more the northerly gales which if ships were not carefully located or if their cables parted would blow them onto the rocks. In the 18th century, the port was busy in the summer but relatively little used in the winter for fear of the hazards.

Concepcion is one of the best and most protected harbours on the Chilean coast. Isla Quiriquina, about three by three-quarters of a mile, and its associated rocks and banks, lie in the approach to the bay. Between May and August the winds cause heavy seas but otherwise there is little swell. The bottom, about four to 11 fathoms, is mud and provides a good holding. There are several small ports in the coves or inlets or river mouths around the bay, of which the principal ones were Tomé to the north which was used as an overnight anchorage by ships working into the bay, ready to shift further in at daylight, Penco, the original capital of the region before it was destroyed by earthquake and inundation in 1751, and Talcahuano, the chief port. On the south side of the peninsula was the small port of San Vicente, without water in which the others were abundant, but sheltered from northerlies in winter which made it a convenient place for ships.

25 Sailing Directions, III, 286-288; Memoria de Amat, 777-778; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 56-58. Haenke: Descripcion del Reyno de Chile, 79-83, also has a good description of Valparaíso bay.
to winter and careen. Valdivia was a fortress-port which fulfilled several roles. It was the first substantial port and refuge for ships at the end of the long hard voyage round the Horn, it was a penal colony, and it was a Spanish bastion in the territory of the hostile indigenes of southern Chile. The coast here is a deep indentation, the bay of Corral, into the eastern and south eastern sides of which empty the rivers Valdivia and Torna Galeones. The small port of Corral on the western side of the bay provides the first anchorage, but access to it as to the bay as a whole is difficult by reason of the strong winds from north and northwest, the frequent fogs at Corral which those winds bring, the numerous above- and below-water rocks in the bay, the poor holding ground and the extremely irregular currents formed by the action of the tides, the swell of the sea, the winds, and the flow of the rivers. The city of Valdivia and its anchorage lie about eight miles upstream, a twisting and turning river with many shallows, between the high pine-covered banks of which thick fogs form between May and August. The ebb tide combines with the river flow to create an extremely fast current. Ships navigating the river had - and have - to do so taking soundings as frequently as possible and with an anchor permanently ready to let go. In 1820 the river was not navigable right up to the port except for boats, and where Dutch battleships had been able to anchor in 1598 and 1603 there was now only six feet of water by reason of the constantly shifting configuration of the earth. In the winter access was at best difficult and sometimes impossible because of the northerlies and voyages were not generally made there in that season.

26 Sailing Directions, III, 300-305; Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 59-62.

Finally, as far south as sailing ships would navigate with any frequency, lay Chiloe and the Gulf of Ancud, the extreme southerly point of European settlement on the coast. The island of Chiloe is separated from the mainland by the Canal de Chacao, through which the small port of Chacao is reached. Most of the northern coast of Chiloe is steep to with occasional sandy beaches. The Gulf of Coronados (joining the Canal de Chacao and the sea) contains many shoals, rocks and sandbanks which are still uncharted. In the approaches to San Carlos round the pale yellow cliffs of Punta Corona, anchorage may be had in about seven fathoms of gravel and coarse sand. Strong winds from the north, northeast and northwest create a heavy sea at this anchorage. Beyond Corona lies Punta Ahui and then Ancud bay. This bay is encumbered with numerous dangers which reduce the navigable channel to a width of about threequarters of a mile. The anchorage however is quite sheltered from wind and sea and the bottom sand and mud. The town of San Carlos de Ancud is situated on its southern shore, at the head of a small valley and surrounded by wooded hills.

The Canal de Chacao is some 14 miles long and about one and a half wide, lined with a high shore or cliffs. The currents in the channel are very dangerous, running at up to nine knots, with rips, whirls, eddies and races, islets and submerged rocks, sandbanks and reefs. The modest port of Chacao lay in a sandy inlet at the eastern end of the channel where it debouches into the Gulf of Ancud. The anchorage was about five and a half to six and a half fathoms in coarse sand and gravel and afforded a poor holding. Within the gulf itself and amongst the islands, the channels are safer to navigate inasmuch as they are sheltered from the sea, though there are still dangers in the form of the tides which with a

28 Sailing Directions, III, 335-37, 340, 342-43.
range of 18 feet are the greatest on the coast, hidden rocks and shoals and winter ice. Only very experienced pilots could navigate these waters. 

Such was the physical environment within which the maritime operations of the independence war took place. It was a hostile environment of harsh coasts, difficult and unpredictable seas, and great variations of climatic conditions. A ship with food and water for only a week or two on a coast where provisions and water might be non-existent for many miles around, or where landing was made impossible for days on end by weather, was on the very margin of disaster. Navigational knowledge and navigational aids were of vital importance for safe voyages. What was the state of navigational knowledge and how available and reliable were navigational aids? 

Navigational knowledge and navigational aids

In the period under review, knowledge of the oceanic geography and the development of navigational aids in the form of accurate charts, was just on the eve of a period of expansion after a long drawn out infancy. Knowledge of and charting of the coasts which was slight in 1815 began to develop with great rapidity from about 1825, ten years later, under the influence of various factors. The years of the war of independence fall, therefore, just before this period of expansion, and what development of knowledge can be seen to have occurred must be viewed more as precursory strews in the wind than evidence of real systematic achievements. Moreover, even though the sketchy beginnings of scientific mapping and accurate charting 

of coasts can be identified in this period, the primitiveness of the state of knowledge must be emphasised. Even today the Pacific coasts of Spanish America are in many cases hardly charted at all, charted only in a provisional way, or much less well charted than the coasts of almost every other continent. The reader of the current United States Navy Sailing Directions will meet time after time in the descriptions of harbours, bays, stretches of coast, islands and rocks, the formulas "the actual coastal configuration does not agree with the charted delineation", "soundings are sparse and of a reconnaissance nature", "unknown dangers may exist", "should be approached with caution" and "not yet accurately charted". 30

30 The broad generalisations made in these paragraphs are based, apart from other references which are given below, on a comparative examination with the current Admiralty charts noted in the previous section, of the following charts and plans: (i) Chart of the South Sea drawn by Jorge Juan, 1744; (ii) Nautical Chart of the Pacific drawn by Tomas Lopez and Juan de la Cruz, 1756, a copy of (iii) French Navy Chart of the Pacific, 1756; (iv) General Chart of the Pacific prepared from the voyage of la Perouse, 1785-88; (v) Plan of Concepcion bay prepared for the voyage of la Perouse; (vi) Plan of Valdivia harbour. Plan of San Juan Bautista (Juan Fernandez) harbour, prepared by Jose Moraleda, 1788; (vii) Plan of the port of San Carlos, prepared by Malespina's expedition, 1790; (viii) Chart of the Pacific ocean prepared by de Laborde, 1791; (ix) Chart of the Pacific American coast from 36°30'S to Cape Horn, prepared by Malespina's expedition, 1798; (x) Chart of the Peruvian coast from 7°S to 21°45'S, prepared by Malespina's expedition, 1798; (xi) Chart of the Chilean coast from 22°S to 38°S, prepared by Malespina's expedition, 1798; (xii) Chart of the Pacific American coast from 9°N to 7°S, prepared by Malespina's expedition, 1800; (xiii) Chart of the Antilles Sea and the Coasts of Tierra Firme, Spanish Navy, 1805.
In colonial times, the usual shipping routes used by the Spanish in the Pacific lay well to the north of the area under consideration. Only one of them was a truly international route for deep-sea navigation. This was the track of the Philippine Company's ships from the Philippine Islands and Asia to the Mexican coast at Acapulco. As noted in the previous section, it lay well to the north of the coasts of the Peruvian vice-royalty. The other was the heavily-used but comparatively short-distance coastal route of the Indies fleets between Panama and Callao. South of this, only hazy notions of the geography of the ocean and its adjacent coasts existed. Although in the first expansion of empire in the 16th century, Spanish explorers had pushed westwards into the great ocean, their scattered discoveries were neglected, often forgotten and had to wait until the 18th century and after to be rediscovered.

Foreigners, the Dutch in the early and middle 17th century and the corsairs and privateers of various nationalities in the late 17th and early 18th centuries who came round the Horn tended either to strike directly across the ocean towards the Spice Islands or to make for the seas along the Central American coasts to intercept the Philippine ships and to prey on Spanish shipping to and from Panama. Incidents such as the Dutch descents on the Chilean and Peruvian coasts in the late 16th and 17th centuries were exceptional cases and of only temporary importance. The foreign mariners and explorers of the middle 18th century - Anson, Byron, Bougainville and Cook - tended to concentrate on the areas lying far to the west, towards Polynesia and Melanesia, and north, towards the modern Canadian coast where the northwest passage might exist, of the South American continent. Southwards from Callao, therefore, as far as Talcahuano knowledge can only have been slight and unsystematised, existing in the form of accumulated experience of local fishermen and a very few occasional
navigators. It was not formally recorded and taught. South of Talcahuano, knowledge of the coastal waters must have been almost non-existent except for the waters fished by the chilotes, the inhabitants of Chiloé, renowned as good mariners, and the immediate area of the Magellan straits and Drake's Passage. An example of the state of knowledge in the early 18th century is given by Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa. One of the entrances to Concepción harbour is through a narrow channel which looks shallow but is in fact deep water. The fact that it was perfectly suitable and safe for the passage of ships was only demonstrated by accident shortly before 1740 when a ship from Peru running before a northerly gale was blown through it. Until that time, it was not attempted and was believed to be impassable "this being the opinion of all the masters..." As late as this, in other words, no proper attempt had been made to chart the waters of this important port, and the way the channel was discovered smacks more of 16th century charting and navigation techniques than of 18th century.

From the middle of the 18th century the imperial government made some attempts to improve the state of knowledge about the coasts. In the 1760's the viceroy Amat, following Juan and Ulloa's work, had the coast immediately to the north and south of Callao surveyed and mapped, and at the same time the Irishman Juan or John Garland surveyed the fortifications of Valdivia and also prepared some maps and charts of the bay of Corral with its islands. Later during his viceroyalty,

31 This point is made by Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa: Relación Histórica del Viage hecho de orden de S Mag a la América Meridional (Madrid, 1748), part II, volume IV, p 469.

32 Juan and Ulloa: Noticias secretas, I, 59-60.
though his major efforts were directed towards surveying, exploring and establishing Spanish settlements on Tahiti and its adjacent islands, Amat instructed the governor of Chile to commence surveying and reconnaissances of the coasts between Chiloé and Magallanes, though whether this programme was actually carried out is uncertain. Then in 1788 the imperial government despatched a scientific expedition under the naval officer Alejandro de Malespina, with two sloops, the Atriveda and Descubierta to the Pacific to explore the American coast up to Alaska and across the ocean to the Philippines. Malespina's expedition was modelled on the elaborate scientific and exploring expeditions set up by other European powers. It lasted from 1789 to 1794 and amongst its productions were a number of maps and charts of the coasts under consideration, and at least one derrotero of the navigation between Callao and Chilean ports, prepared by the Czech scientist Thaddeus Haenke who travelled with the expedition. Then after the turn of the new century, viceroy Abascal determined to put into effect a programme for the drawing up of accurate charts and hydrographic maps of the ports and coasts of his viceroyalty, though this, like other of his projects for the expansion of the role of the viceregal marine, seems to have come to nothing except in the case of the river of Guayaquil, to which the brig Alaves was despatched in 1806 at the request of the President of Quito to carry out explorations.

The scientific mapping of the Pacific coasts by expeditions sent out with precise instructions and objectives, unlike the objectives of Malespina's and previous expeditions, in which surveying and charting was not the only nor even necessarily the major goal of the

33 Memoria de Amat, 747-748; Memoria de Abascal, I, 379, 382; Thaddeus Haenke: Descripcion del Reyno de Chile.
expedition, got under way only after the middle of the 1820's. King and Fitzroy mapped the Magellan Straits between 1827 and 1830 and between 1831 and 1835 Fitzroy continued mapping up the coast from there. King, when preparing his expedition, had to use as his basic chart one drawn up in 1670 with only a few additions from the mid-18th century while the main charts he knew of were not available outside Spain. The north Americans, though in their whaling activities they had as large a stake in the Pacific as the British had through their traders and merchants, were still later on the scene. The United States Navy Department did not begin to collect and systematically record the information received from its seamen in the Pacific until 1828, and the first United States Navy full-scale expedition of scientific exploration into the Pacific was not mounted until 1838. The precursors of this activity cannot at present be put much earlier than the activities of Captain Basil Hall, who was on the Pacific coast at the same time as Lord Cochrane. Though not himself a Surveying Officer, Hall was a firm believer in the need to develop extensive and accurate charts of the seas in which the Royal Navy sailed, and was familiar with the most up-to-date mapping techniques of the time. His published journal shows evidence of this enthusiasm. Other Royal Navy officers also on this coast at the time, Shirreff, Searle and Hardy, engaged in mapping activities - in which John Miers, Lord Cochrane's friend and associate in Chile, participated - of the South Shetland Islands. While much of their energy was expended on this area, they also worked on the main coasts of the continent.34

34G.S. Ritchie: The Admiralty Chart. British Naval Hydrography in the Nineteenth Century (London 1967); P.P. King: The Voyages of Adventure and Beagle (2 volumes, London, 1839); R. Fitzroy: Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of HM Ships Adventure and Beagle 1826-36 (2
What aids, then, and what sources of knowledge did the Chilean fleet of 1819 and 1820 have? They could in fact derive their information from five sources, of varying utility and reliability.

Amongst his various activities on behalf of the Chilean marine during his residence in England, Alvarez Condarco purchased a number of charts and signal and navigation books for use on the South American coast, which were apparently shipped out to Chile in the Rosa with Lord Cochrane in 1818. In the bustle and confusion of the preparations for Lord Cochrane's first cruise, these aids, which had been sent up to Santiago by mistake, were left behind. However, they were sent down to the fleet in August 1819 in time for the second cruise. This collection consisted of three charts each of Cocos Island, Feliz and Ambrose Islands (San Felix and San Ambrosio), Revillagigedo Islands, the anchorage of Guivo Island (Hiva Oa?), the Galapagos Islands, the Marquesas Islands, the Oregano (i.e. Oregon) river, the (Fesfee?) Islands, and the western island of the Falklands group. Of these, only the Galapagos and the San Felix and San Ambrosio charts can be described as likely to be of considerable or continuous utility. The shipment also included three copies of a view of the bay of Panama, again likely to be of occasional special rather than of sustained general use. There was a single copy of a chart of the East Indies, not of utility. The only plans approaching general purpose utility in this collection were three copies of a chart of the Pacific ocean, the scale of which is unlikely

volumes, London, 1839); R.T. Gould: "The Charting of the South Shetlands 1819-1828" Mariner's Mirror vol. 27 (1941); Basil Hall: Extracts from a Journal written on the coasts of Chili, Peru and Mexico in the years 1820, 1821 and 1822 (2 volumes, Edinburgh, 1824).

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to make them helpful for inshore navigation on the American coast. Finally, and probably of greater value than any of these charts, were three copies of a volume of navigation and astronomical tables and 12 copies of a Nautical Almanac for 1810, 1819 and 1820. This first group of aids, those which could be purchased abroad, suffered from the drawback that they did not offer proper coverage of the coast itself, mainly as a result of the colonial policy of the Spanish empire which prevented foreign ships from sailing these seas as far as possible.

The second group of aids were those produced by the Spanish, which obviously could not be acquired by purchase, but rather by capture. Spanish ships of war would carry the official Spanish charts, the latest versions being those produced by Malespina's expedition, which fell into patriot hands with the capture of the ships, such as the María Isabel and the Esmeralda. It was by the capture of the Potrillo off Valdivia that Lord Cochrane acquired the official Spanish chart, which gives soundings and a description of the bottom as it was in 1788, for the bay of Corral. Unfortunately, inventories or records of such captures do not generally include detailed specifications of charts and maps, but by such means the Chileans could have acquired a very valuable set of three charts from the Malespina expedition which covered the whole coast from 9 degrees north to 7 degrees south, 7 degrees south to 21 degrees south, and 22 degrees south to 38 degrees south, respectively, and a less satisfactory map from 36 degrees south down to the Horn.

Charts acquired by purchase or capture constituted the first two groups. However, it is doubtful if these were the major aids upon which the Chileans relied, the first because they did not cover the right areas and the second because their reliability could not be counted on. More reliance could be placed upon two further, informal, sources of information. The first of these was local knowledge and experiences. Blanco Encalada served for several years before the revolution and during its early stages in the marine department of the viceregal administration in Callao, with access to whatever charts and nautical knowledge were held there and with opportunities to gain first-hand knowledge of the viceregal ports, harbours and coasts, particularly Callao. He is the best example, but not necessarily the most typical, of this kind of source. Interrogations of local fishermen and the knowledge of the native seamen on the Chilean ships who had been recruited from coastal populations or who had seagoing experience prior to recruitment - for example in privateering or royal ships before 1818 - would all be of utility in gathering information. The second informal source paralleled the first. This was the collective experience of other, foreign ships and mariners in these seas. Though the immensity of the Pacific has been emphasised, and though it felt an empty ocean to sail in, it should not be assumed that it was in fact an empty ocean. West of about 100 degrees of longitude it was almost empty but east of this line there was a considerable concourse of shipping by about 1820. The On-Shore Grounds of Chile and Peru, as they were called by whaling men, supported a fleet of about 120 north American whalers by 1818. In 1820 I estimate that there were between 60 and 100 neutral trading and merchant vessels of various flags, mainly British, on the Chilean, Peruvian and New Granadan coasts. At any one time in this period there might be as many as 10 foreign warships, British, North American, French and
Russian. Finally, the native trading or merchant vessels must have numbered between 60 and 70 at least, excluding the numerous tiny craft that carried on their minute trade at river mouths and across bays and estuaries. Altogether there were probably between 250 and 300 vessels of all descriptions in the Pacific besides the Chilean fleet. From all these ships news about the coasts, currents, weather and hazards could be exchanged. By the early 1820's for example, the frequency of voyages round the Horn to the Pacific republics - historically one of the epics of seafaring life - was beginning to make observers blasé about its dangers. In 1822 the Scottish traveller Mathison observed that the "once-dreaded" passage round the Horn had been made even by a 30-ton pilot boat which he saw in Valparaiso bay, and in 1826 the British consul to Peru considered that "the dangers of a voyage round Cape Horn are much exaggerated." These remarks are, of course, too sanguine. The fate of the Spanish San Telmo and the Chilean O'Higgins, both lost with all hands off the Horn, serve as a reminder that it was not as safe and predictable as it seemed in fair weather. The point, however, remains that the concourse of shipping was such that much information was being accumulated and could be gathered. It is the sort of information, though, which does not get recorded for the benefit of historians, but is the natural and obvious conversational exchange of men engaged in the same occupation or profession.

The last, and perhaps the most important of the sources of nautical and navigational information was

their own experience and the work which they did on surveying and mapping, for the officers of the Chilean fleet. Three miles west of the westernmost point of the island of Santa Maria are sunken rocks which did not appear on any chart available in 1820. In February of that year Lord Cochrane was returning to Valparaíso in the Montezuma from Valdivia, and the ship passed between the rocks and the island which was abreast of them, driving along at eight knots, before the breakers at the rocks were seen. If the ship had piled up on the rocks, it is unlikely that anyone aboard her would have escaped. This kind of personal experience was the best teacher for the Chilean captains. As for Lord Cochrane's and his captains' surveying activities, we have some scattered information. In June 1820 the coast immediately to the north of Valparaíso was surveyed with a view to establishing a naval base in the bay of Herradura rather than leaving the ships of war in the bay of Valparaíso. Callao is also known definitely to have been surveyed by Lord Cochrane in person, who, according to Caldecleugh "frequently rowed about the bay in his gig with the lead in his hand, sounding with the greatest nonchalance, while shot of all shapes and sizes were directed at him from the batteries and gunboats". During one of the

37 Miller: Memoirs, I, 256.


O'Higgins' visits to Guayaquil, apparently that of March 1822, some maps and sailing directions for the river of Guayaquil were sketched out, and there is also a map and sailing directions for Ylo bay prepared on 1 July 1821, during the campaign with Miller in the puertos intermedios. Though scattered and incomplete, this evidence indicates quite clearly the ranges of surveying activities and the importance that was attached to them, of the Chilean captains, though the standard of technical proficiency was not particularly high - the Guayaquil and Ylo maps are of a very crude and provisional nature. For the most part, however, the Chileans had to carry on their navigation and pilotage without adequate aids or from their own resources. Most reliance would have had to be placed on having leadsmen out in the bows throughout the day and night when conducting inshore operations and keeping sharp-eyed lookouts aloft at sea.

CHAPTER FOUR

FAILURE AT CALLAO, SUCCESS AT VALDIVIA

Lord Cochrane's second cruise, from September 1819 to March 1820, was in some respects his most satisfactory and successful. The cruise which had preceded it at the beginning of the year was more in the nature of a reconnaissance in force than a proper campaign. The cruises which succeeded it were, except for the taking of the Esmeralda in November 1820, dogged by dispute, misfortune or failure. Moreover, for the second cruise the basis of discipline, order and organisation had been laid which had not existed previously and which came under increasing stress subsequently. The second cruise, in short, was probably the best equipped and best organised of all that Lord Cochrane commanded under the Chilean flag. And though its opening operations against Callao were not successful, its closing phases in the operations at Valdivia were to enhance vastly Lord Cochrane's reputation for boldness, daring and dash.

Naval operations on the Peruvian coast

The squadron sailed out in stages, to rendezvous at Coquimbo. The Independencia (28), captain Forster, and Puyrredón (14), captain Prunier, weighed from Valparaiso on 11 September. The O'Higgins (48), vice-Admiral Lord Cochrane, the Lautaro (46), captain Guise, and the Galvarino (18), captain Spry, with two frigates, went out on 12 September. The San Martín (60), rear-Admiral Blanco, captain Wilkinson, went out on 13 September. Finally, the Araucano (16), captain Crosbie, went out on 14 September. The squadron carried nearly the full strength of the marine battalion, 460 out of 482 men, under Colonel James Charles who was also in charge of a supply of rockets which had been
manufactured for the use of the squadron. Between 14 and 16 September, they came into Coquimbo. Here they collected the prize ship Victoria which had been brought to the place after the first cruise and was now, once some necessary repairs had been done to make her seaworthy, designed to be used as a fireship. They also took aboard some troops from the local battalion, 100 men and an officer in place of the 180 men supposed to be available, for whom the merchants of the place patriotically raised a subscription of 400 dollars to provide them with clothing and equipment. And the intendant of the place also supplied some linen and wool for clothing and mattresses. On 18 September the squadron sailed out in a body bound for Peru.

1 CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Miller: Memoirs, I, 220-221; WM vol 13. Charles to Zenteno, 9 September 1819; ACH, XIII, 155. Bustamente to O'Higgins, 17 September 1819; CP doc 1330. Vicuna to Lord Cochrane, 6 August 1819; CP doc 1336. Bustamente to Lord Cochrane, 15 September 1819. The rockets which were taken by the squadron down to Callao were Congreve rockets. They were constructed by an English expert, Steven Goldsack, who had worked under Sir William Congreve and was a trained pyrotechnic engineer. He was contracted to work for the Chilean government at the same time as Lord Cochrane, and served them from January 1819 until December 1821. His trials and tribulations as a result of patriot fecklessness, incompetence and inefficiency are eloquently documented in his "Extract from the Log and Journal" (CP doc 1063). During the time that he was Director of the Laboratory and Powder House, he built 972 rockets for the Chilean armed forces, including 289 "cavalry" rockets and 114 signal rockets. The only recorded use of rockets by the squadron was in the second cruise, for which 232 rockets were supplied (CP doc 1064. Statement of work done in the Laboratory of Chile; CP doc 92. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 18 August 1819; CP doc 108. List of military stores, 25 August 1819).
Lord Cochrane was optimistic as to the state of the squadron and his chances of accomplishing some striking deed. To Zenteno he wrote that the soldiers embarked at Coquimbo were "robust and capable" and a general air of cheerfulness reigned in the ships thanks to the distribution of clothing and the elimination from the crews of the criminal and troublemaking element. He had written to his brother shortly before sailing that there was "not a shadow of doubt" that with the rockets he would annihilate the enemy force in Callao, and he wrote now from Coquimbo to the Supreme Director that his squadron could beat all the Spanish ships together. His optimism was shared by others. Echeverria, the Minister of State, wrote to the agent in Buenos Aires that the squadron left "in the admirable state indicated by the public papers, in whose descriptions I can assure Your Excellency there is not the least exaggeration..." while the American agent Prevost reported that Lord Cochrane was "determined upon the destruction of the Spanish Fleet lying at Callao at whatever hazard - He...will I am persuaded on this occasion perform some act worthy of the reputation of a great Captain".

The news of the squadron's sailing was not long in reaching the viceroy. He learned on 23 September, only 12 days after the first ships weighed out of Valparaiso, that the squadron was on its way and he learned too that Lord Cochrane had an attack with rockets and launches in contemplation and was expecting to intercept the Spanish ships from Europe. The next day he issued orders for the Spanish and licenced foreign

trading ships to ship in foodstuffs and other necessary supplies before the presence of the Chileans on the viceroyal coast was reported, plainly with a view to avoiding the shortages and difficulties which had embarrassed the government when the blockade had been imposed earlier in the year. On 27 September he sent the north American Pallas, on charter to the Spanish government, out to watch for the Chileans and warn him of their appearance and to cruise off San Gallan to meet the expected Spanish warships, give them a description of the numbers and strength of the Chilean squadron and its objects, and warn them to take all precautions when approaching Callao. The Chilean fleet came into view and was reported by the Callao lookouts in the evening of 27 September. They were clearly visible the next day concentrating off San Lorenzo island and 400 troops were sent down from Lima to go aboard the Spanish warships. The same night a levy of seamen was carried out in Callao to raise mariners to man the ships, and supplementary defensive measures were undertaken. The merchants along the coasts were warned of the enemy's presence so that in the event of the Chileans raiding to the north towards Paita, their goods could be moved inland out of reach of the raiders. The garrisons of Pisco and the towns north of Callao were put on the alert, and a copy of the report sent in the Pallas was sent to the commandant at Pisco for transmission to the Spanish ships should the Pallas miss them.

At first light on 29 September all the captains went on board the O'Higgins to receive their orders for the planned attack on the port, and at 6 o'clock in the morning the squadron came to anchor in Callao roads. The O'Higgins had already looked in on 27 September and

3CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Memoria de Pezuela, 526-527, 531-534.
detained the Pallas on her way out, though the royalists were not to learn of this until 3 October. Now Lord Cochrane sent a boat ashore to offer a challenge to the viceroy to send out his fleet to do battle with the Chileans, the prize being Callao. If the ships of the viceroy did not come out within four hours, he threatened, the patriots would consume everything in the bay and the town of Callao with fire and rockets. This "bold and perhaps unexampled warning" as the viceroy described it, "of very questionable propriety" in Miller's opinion, was declined by the viceroy, while a rocket sent in the boat to show to the royalists failed to impress them. While these transactions were taking place, work was commenced on the construction of rafts from which to fire rockets and mortars and, watched tranquilly by the Spanish who made no attempt to interrupt these proceedings, some rockets were fired experimentally but with disappointing results, for their casings showed a tendency to burst when fired.

Shortly after nightfall on Friday 1 October the attack began. On the left of the patriot line, the Galverino towed in Miller's mortar raft and placed it about 800 yards off the batteries of the Boca Negra against which it was to operate. To their right Pueyrredón towed in a magazine raft to supply them. To their right again the Araucano towed Hind's rocket raft, and at the end of the line the Independencia towed in Charles' rocket raft. The Independencia was supposed to stay in support of the brigs and rafts but instead

4CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 28 September 1819; CP doc 1. Lord Cochrane to Pezuela, 29 September 1819; Pezuela to Lord Cochrane, 29 September 1819; Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 2 October 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 532-534; Miller: Memoire, I, 221.
retired and anchored some eight miles off near the other large ships. A bombardment with the rockets began but the full scope of their uselessness now appeared. Of every six fired, hardly one reached its range. Some burst in their cylinders, others fell short into the water and still others flew off through the air in the wrong direction. A furious cannonade began from the shore and after 10 minutes Hind's raft, near the boom, caught fire and exploded. Hind and 13 of his men were thrown overboard wounded and some killed, and the rockets were sent shooting irregularly through the air.

On Miller's raft Nathanial Baillie, first lieutenant of the Galvarino, was killed although Miller succeeded in sinking a Spanish gunboat with his mortar fire. Soon after this the Chileans retired. The royalists fired some grenades after them but the range was too great.

A smaller attack was mounted the next day. The Araucano and Guise with two rafts went into the harbour in the evening and fired several rockets, one of which fell on the town but was extinguished almost immediately, while another fell on the armed merchantman Cleopatra and broke through her deck before being put out. The Araucano received two shots through her hull and retired, but returned to the attack at half past midnight and again at 2.30 a.m., this time exchanging fire with the gunboats before retiring. These attacks went some way towards repairing the declining opinion that was held ashore of the rockets. After the attack on Friday, the viceroy characterised the rockets as "of reduced range and ridiculous effect..." Following the Araucano and Guise's attack, however, he changed his view: "It was observed that the rockets are not as contemptible

5CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Miller: Memoirs, I, 221-222; CP doc 1. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 2 October 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 534-535.
as was believed, and that should the enemy make a general attack, using their larger ships and firing many of them, there must be considerable damage."

A renewed and general attack was in fact what Lord Cochrane was now planning. He was reluctant to lose faith in the potentialities of the rockets and proposed to add other destructive devices to them. Sunday and Monday, 3 and 4 October, were passed in the construction under the supervision of Forster, Guise and Wilkinson of new frames modelled on those used for rockets in England. At the same time Cobbett, the first lieutenant of the O'Higgins, and Morgell, lieutenant of the Galvarino, worked on the preparation of the two fire-ships Victoria and Jerezana which they had volunteered to take into the port. Minor attacks were staged from time to time by single brigs and rafts to keep the defenders in alarm. On Sunday night the Spanish warships unfurled their sails, apparently in readiness to try and slip out of the port past the Chileans. They remained in this state throughout the Monday but furled their sails again that night. The Chilean squadron remained tranquilly at anchor all this time in a line from the Boquerón to the head of San Lorenzo, in the lee of the island.

In this situation, the Prueba at length arrived from Europe. She was seen by the royalist lookouts during Monday night and a pilot was alerted at 1 a.m. to be ready to go up to Chorrillos and go out in a canoe to the ship to give her details of the blockading force.

6 CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Memoria de Pezuela, 535.

7 CP doc 1. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 3 October 1819; Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 6 October 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 535-537.
The ship was still visible the next morning and the pilot was sent out, returning late in the afternoon with a boat he had met from the Prueba with an officer and dispatches from the captain, advising that he would make for Paita to provision and repair his ship. The viceroy at once issued instructions for him to make for Pisco instead where, being to windward of the Chileans, he would be better able to elude them and slip into Callao at some convenient moment if they should leave it unwatched. Lord Cochrane had also seen the ship on Tuesday morning, 5 October, but not taking her for a ship of war and being in the midst of the final preparations for a general assault on Callao sent out Crosbie in the Araucano to look at her. By 6 p.m., just before nightfall, the Araucano had got within two leagues of the frigate and some time after that identified her as a warship.

While the Araucano was investigating and returning, the Chileans made their most determined attack upon the port and defences. In the evening the brigs once more towed in mortar and rocket rafts. Morgell and two seamen with the explosion ship Victoria were to take her in once the rocket attack had commenced and at the same time the larger ships were to move across to the western side of the bay, to windward, to intercept the expected attempt of the Spanish ships to escape. The rockets once again failed to work effectively and the cannonade from the shore was very heavy, the gunners using red-hot shot. It rose to a crescendo as the Victoria moved in. Near the protective boom the ship was holed and started to take water fast. The fuse trains were broken and extinguished and Morgell at great risk to his life set a slow match to the mixture and left the ship. The wind was too light, however, to

8 CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Memoria de Pezuela, 537-539.
drive the ship forward and the Victoria too far from the Spanish lines to disrupt them when she exploded 10 minutes later. At this point the wind dropped completely, the rockets were continuing to go off erratically or not at all, and falling into the water, there was no purpose in using the other fireship, the Jerezana, and at 2 a.m. the attack was called off. Though in terms of material destruction it was no more successful than the attack of 1 October, it had a moral effect in impressing the royalists. "The Fireship," wrote the viceroy, "was well-directed and exploded only a few varas from the gunboats which were bombardin; it, and was so charged with matter and grenades that it caused a great noise and threw an abundance of timbers, spars and grenades into the air, and of the rockets he wrote: "There is no doubt that they are a fearful enough weapon against ships or against the kind of town which is adjacent to the place, for having a sufficiently long range they came to fall on the houses themselves, breaking down a thick wall although built of adobe and another breaking through the deck of a frigate and passing as far as the second deck where it was put out."9

The Araucano rejoined the fleet on Wednesday 6 October and reported that she had identified the strange sail as a ship of war. The four large Chilean ships at once got under way in pursuit, leaving the smaller ships at San Lorenzo. The Prueba had disappeared, however, and the chase had to be abandoned the same day. It is possible, too, that a fog came down to complicate the pursuit - there was certainly a fog the next morning when the Chileans had come back to anchor leeward of the port. The stay on 7 October was only a short one. Lord Cochrane on this day decided

9CP doc 1. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 6 October 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 539, 544-545.
to change his tactics. For a week he had hammered on the doors of the viceroyalty. The attacks on Callao had failed and the Spaniards were strengthening the defences. In the Chilean squadron morale had fallen as a result of the reverse. He decided now to try and intercept the Spanish warships at Arica, for which point he anticipated they would make. The mortar rafts were unrigged and in the early hours of Friday 8 October the squadron weighed out of Callao roads.

When the morning fog lifted, the defenders of Callao could see no sign of them. A falucho was sent out from the port to look for them and find out where they had gone, if possible. At the same time an express was sent down to Pisco to warn the Prueba to be ready to sail for Callao as soon as the whereabouts of the enemy should be known. The falucho came back in at 6 p.m. the next day, having reconnoitred as far as the Hormigas islands without seeing any sign of the Chilean ships. The blockade seemed to have been lifted and the viceroy felt able to go down to Callao early on Sunday morning to congratulate the garrison on their work in the defence. Effective proof that the blockade was raised arrived in the form of the Spanish trading frigate Primorosa Mariana, which had been seen on 6 October out at sea beyond the Chileans, and came in on 9 October. She was bound from Cadiz which she had left with a valuable cargo in company with the San Telmo, news of the separation of which at Cape Horn she now brought.

10 CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Memoria de Pezuela, 540-541; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 7 October 1819.

The viceroy was anxious to get the Prueba into Callao as soon as possible "as without them (i.e. the Prueba and San Telmo) and the enemy being superior in these waters, the Viceroyalty runs great risks, while on the contrary...it would be possible to give perhaps a final impulse to this war putting into practice the large plans which I had with everything prepared and the orders issued which remain suspended and paralysed by such a chance accident as that of no ship having reached me." Early on Sunday morning an express was sent to Pisco with orders for the Prueba to tack to and fro off the port in anticipation of positive orders to make for Callao, and the final orders to make instantly for Callao were sent just before midnight. The Prueba had, however, alarmingly disappeared. She did not arrive when she might have been expected to, about 13 October, and on 19 October the schooner Alcance came in from Pisco with the news that the Prueba had not touched there at all. The Prueba had in fact ignored the orders for Pisco and on 6 October sailed for Paita, arriving there on 14 October. The news of the frigate's whereabouts only reached Lima on 21 October and all the government there could do was send the Alcance on 23 October towards Guayaquil to find her, supply her with provisions for two months and convey instructions to the captain to repair the damage and make for Callao as quickly as he could. In the viceroy's view the Prueba's going north had upset and imperilled his plans. The frigate could not join the ships in Callao within two or three months, and he dared not send the Esmeralda and Venganza out to escort her back for fear of leaving the port vulnerable to a new Chilean attack. The Prueba's action was probably justified in fact, firstly as the winds were evidently blowing very strong against southbound shipping at that moment, and secondly because the movements of the Chilean squadron subsequently showed that had the Spanish frigate made for Pisco and from there for Callao, she would have run into the middle
of the Chilean squadron.\textsuperscript{12}

The Chileans when they left Callao began to work up against the winds towards Arica. The \textit{Araucano} was sent to cruise off Cerro Azul on 18 October to intercept Spanish shipping which generally made for that point to run into Callao, and on 24 October the \textit{Pallas} was sent back to Valparaiso with dispatches. By the end of the month, three weeks after leaving Callao, the squadron had made almost no headway against strong contrary winds and was only at about the latitude of Pisco, while food supplies were beginning to run low. On 1 November, Blanco and Forster came aboard the \textit{O'Higgins} and a change in plan was agreed. Guise was to take the \textit{Lautaro}, \textit{Galvarino} and \textit{Jerezana} transport ship to go to get provisions and liquor for the squadron at Pisco and then rejoin the other ships. Sufficient small arms for the marines assigned to the operation were transhipped from the \textit{San Martin} on 5 November. Lord Cochrane with the \textit{O'Higgins}, \textit{San Martin}, \textit{Araucano} which rejoined on 2 November, and \textit{Pueyrredón} was to make back for Callao.\textsuperscript{13}

Spry was sent to reconnoitre Pisco on 2 November and off the bay he captured a canoe with three Indian fishermen in it, who gave information about the place. Guise's instructions were to capture the fort and embark the provisions and alcohol in the \textit{Jerezana}. Nobody was to stray off the beach, but the Chilean proclamations to the Peruvians were to be distributed.

\textsuperscript{12}Memoria de Pezuela, 543-546, 548-550.

\textsuperscript{13}AOH, XIII, 235. "Noticias de la Escuadra", 18 December 1819; CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, November 1819; Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, November 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 579; Miller: Memoirs, I, 225.
Charles was to command the marines in the assault. The landing had been intended to be made at night but the wind failed and the Leutaro was unable to reach the bay during the hours of darkness. The landing had to be made in broad daylight on 7 November. The ships were seen in the morning from the fort and ample time afforded the defenders to make preparations to receive a landing force. But though he had several hundred men available, the defence offered by the commandant, General Manuel Gonzalez, was enfeebled by the fact that he himself was disliked and resented by the inhabitants of the place and the surrounding hacendados and his militia unreliable. Nevertheless they put up a stiff resistance, killing or wounding 24 patriots including both Charles and Miller before retreating to Caucato, about a league away, at 2 p.m. The patriots captured two guns of Gonzalez' force, and the fort, though the viceroy sent reinforcements to the towns near Pisco, the royalists did not attempt to interfere with the patriots, who spent three days embarking provisions and aguardiente and on 10 November weighed out of the bay northwards to rejoin the main body of the squadron, abandoning the captured guns on the beach and wrecking the fort.

While Guise's division was assaulting Pisco, Lord Cochrane's was returning to the blockade. Before resuming it, though, the vice-Admiral tried another plot to draw out the Spanish ships of war. The Pueyrredon under Spanish colours was to precede the other ships.

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14CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Spry, 2 November 1819; Lord Cochrane to Guise, 4 November 1819; Lord Cochrane to Charles, 4 November 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 553-556, 558-559, 563-564; Miller: Memoirs, I, 226-228; MM vol 29. List of killed, wounded and sick at Pisco, 10 November 1819; AOH, XIII, 235. "Noticias de la Escuadra", 18 December 1819.
to Callao and off the port would be apparently pursued
and captured by the Araucano acting as if she was the
only Chilean ship in the area. The object was to tempt
the Spanish ships out of the port and then intercept
them on their return. In case this stratagem failed
the San Martín was to be disguised as a Spanish ship
and stage a fight with the smaller Chilean ships off
the port and appear to be damaged. The plot did not
work. The royalist brig Maipú saw the Araucano suppos-
edly attacking the Pueyrredón at 4 p.m. about seven
miles from the seaward side of San Lorenzo island and
saw the Pueyrredón strike her colours after eight or
nine broadsides. The royalists suspected a trick and
their suspicions were confirmed when in the evening
they saw the two ships at San Lorenzo and another a
little to windward. Lord Cochrane's division there-
fore came in on 8 November just after midday and an-
chored in their accustomed position in the lee of San
Lorenzo, though not without having to beat off an at-
tack by 27 gunboats which sallied out to irritate them.
A new alert was sent along the coast to warn that the
blockade had been reimposed and that no ships should
sail for Callao until further notice, by the Lima gov-
ernment.\(^\text{15}\).

The blockade remained on 10 November with Lord
Cochrane taking the O'Higgins and Independencia into
the harbour to try to tempt out the frigates again.
But about this time he heard from a passing ship that
the frigate he had seen was the Prueba and that she
had gone to Guayaquil. His ships were short of provi-
sions, though this would be repaired when Guise rejoined.
\(^\text{15}\)CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Crosbie, 5 November 1819;
Lord Cochrane to Prunier, 6 November 1819; Lord Coch-
ranE to Blanco, 6 November 1819; Memoria de Pezue1a,
553-554; CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile".
They were also short of water, however. He determined therefore to follow the Prueba after watering, reprovisioning and regrouping the squadron north of Callao. On 11 November, leaving the Araucano to cruise between Chancay and Cerro Azul, his division slipped away and when daylight came on 12 November there was no sign of them. Guise's division from Pisco was sighted passing San Lorenzo island on 13 November, heading northwards.

Lord Cochrane's division looked into Samanco on Monday, 15 November and the Pueyrredon checked Huarmey on Monday evening but the water was brackish or had dried out so the ships shifted to Santa that night. Guise's division joined them on 16 November just off the place. A party of 200 marines was landed to seize it, which they did without difficulty, the inhabitants having fled, and for four days the squadron remained there. The inhabitants of Santa had been chastened by the re-establishment of viceregal authority on the coast after the first cruise and the Chileans had no success in persuading the alcalde to co-operate in finding captured sailors and providing or acquiring cattle, horses, mules and rice, but detachments of marines went up the Santa valley to seize livestock and provisions anyway, for which notes on the Chilean government were given to the owners where they were not notorious royalists. The nearest royalist commander, in Huaura, saw no point in marching against the patriots, he subsequently explained to Lima, because the road was long and difficult and the Chileans could sail before he reached the place. Only a small local militia force appeared in the environs on 16 November.

and retired after a brief skirmish to the shelter of nearby haciendas, while the Chileans raided Nepéña with 50 men. The Chileans were left largely to their own devices.  

The problem of desertion does not seem to have been serious in this cruise, presumably because of the superior quality of the seamen as compared with the first cruise. However, an epidemic of chavalongo (ship fever) had broken out in the squadron. It was thought to have come aboard with the men embarked at Coquimbo and it was to be aggravated by the unhealthy climate of the Peruvian coast and the inevitable privations of shipboard life. Guise had had 22 men down sick within a day or two of landing at Pisco and by the time the ships anchored at Santa five or six men a day were dying of fever. The San Martín and Independencia were worst affected and the large number of sick were camped in tents on the shore.  

This situation dictated the next change of plans. Blanco was instructed to take the San Martín and Independencia back to Valparaíso with the sick in the Jerézana when they should be in a sufficiently convalescent state to be able to be transported. The remaining ships, O'Higgins, Lautaro, Galvarino and Pueyrredón,  


18 Miller: Memoirs, I, 228-229; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 19 November 1819; MM vol 29. List of killed, wounded and sick at Pisco, 10 November 1819.
sailed on 21 November for the Guayaquil river\(^{19}\).

Lord Cochrane's division arrived off the mouth of the Guayaquil river on Thursday 25 November and tried to work up the river during the following night but the absence of any wind forced them to come back down and during the following day they lay off Tumbez. The Prueba, they learned from local informants, had not stayed downstream at the outer anchorage but had gone immediately up to the port without even pausing to disembark her guns, the usual precaution to lighten ships. Two other ships were within reach, however, 40 miles up the river and during the night of 27 November, the Vice-Admiral took the O'Higgins crowding on all sail up the river after them although, as a correspondent wrote back to England "The entrance into Guayaquil river, on account of its difficult navigation, was never attempted except in broad daylight, and then with a pilot." The O'Higgins came up to the ships at dawn, just as the tide turned and the wind dropped to prevent them from moving on up the river, just under Puna island. A brief exchange of fire took place for 20 minutes and the Spaniards struck, the crews taking to the boats. The two ships were the merchantmen Aguila of 900 tons, pierced for 26 guns and mounting 20, and the Begoña of 600 tons, pierced for 20 and mounting 16, with cargoes of timber. They were taken back down the river and the Begoña's fine bronze 15-pounder guns were transhipped to the Lautaro\(^{20}\).

\(^{19}\)CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Miller: Memoirs, I, 228-229; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 19 November 1819; Lord Cochrane to Blanco, 19 November 1819; Memoria de Pezuela, 570.

\(^{20}\)CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 28 November 1819; CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; The Times, 30 May 1820. Report from Valparaiso of 22 February 1820 (the style suggests that the author is Miers); AOH, XIII, 270. Tortel to Cruz, 19 January 1820; Miller: Memoirs, I, 229.
From 28 November to 13 December the Chileans remained in the area of the mouth of the Guayaquil river to embark the cargoes of the prizes, collect firewood, and water. Parties were landed on Puna on 30 November and at Balao on 7 December under white flags to requisition or collect fresh meat, vegetables and fruit, with strong detachments of marines assigned to ensure rather than to compel obedience to the patriots' demands or deal with resistance. Spry in the Galvarino cruised meanwhile off Santa Clara island to frighten off enemy boats trying to observe the squadron. The cruise was now over and the ships began to receive their orders back to Valparaíso. The Aguila was sent back on 12 December. Miller was sufficiently recovered from the wounds he had sustained at Pisco to be transferred back onto the O'Higgins on 13 December. At that time Spry in the Galvarino was ordered to cruise off the north coast of Peru for two months to induce the enemy to believe the squadron was still in the area. Prunier received the same orders for the mouth of the Guayaquil river. They were then to return to Valparaíso. The O'Higgins and Lautaro weighed out of the gulf of Guayaquil on 17 December bound southwards and on 9 January 1820 in latitude 23 degrees south, that is a little to the south of Arica; Lautaro separated from the O'Higgins with orders back to Valparaíso.

The Chilean ships came back into Valparaíso by ones and twos. The San Martín, Independencia and the transport

21 CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 17 December 1819; Lord Cochrane to Carson, 7 December 1819; Lord Cochrane to Carson, 28 November 1819; Lord Cochrane to Spry, 30 November 1819; Lord Cochrane to Spry, December 1819; Lord Cochrane to Prunier, December 1819; CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; Miller: Mémoirs, I 229-230; ACH, XIII, 270. Tortel to Cruz, 19 January 1819.
Jerezana arrived on 19 December under Blanco with the convalescent sick. They also carried the body of Colonel Charles, killed at Pisco, for burial with military honours. The Araucano came in shortly afterwards, just before the end of the year 1819. The Lautaro arrived on 19 January 1820. Lastly the Galvarino and Pueyrredón arrived on 24 February 1820, 32 days out from the Guayaquil river where they had captured the armed merchant frigate Peruana with 16 12-pounder bronze guns aboard. Their prize followed them in on 6 March.

How successful had this cruise been? The second blockade of Callao was in fact less effective than the first, partly because the royalists learned from the experience of the first and made preparations in the way of building up food supplies and reinforcing the coastal garrisons, but partly also because it was not consistently imposed and maintained. Several ships got through it because the blockading ships did not watch the port continuously and it was raised too soon to have a really damaging effect. Lord Cochrane, his officers and crews, and the Chilean government were united in the desire to see a great and dramatic blow struck, nor was the vice-Admiral the kind of man to relish the dull tedium of blockading duties. But in a broad view the argument is strong that the blockade should have been imposed more rigorously and, still more importantly, should have been maintained as long as possible. As it was the Lima government had been caused trouble by the blockade because of the cutting off of trading ships and the consequent customs revenues they brought, which in normal years might amount to between one-fifth and one-third of the government's

revenues. The appearance of the Chilean ships at Guayaquil caused a commotion there, provoking fears of an imminent invasion and causing an unpopular forced contribution of 150,000 pesos to be levied by the governor of that unstable province at the point of the bayonet. It was time that told against the Lima government. A continuance of the blockade would have eventually had the same or greater effect on the provisioning of the capital as the first blockade and would have prevented the Prueba from joining the royal squadron. Lord Cochrane tried to anticipate events and gambled on being able to seize the Prueba in Guayaquil and the gamble failed. The failure of the Callao attacks had disappointed expectations. When the prize Pallas brought the dispatches recounting the squadron's failure before Callao in early October, according to captain Gaymore of the British trader Will, the news "caused much disgust and destroyed the hopes conceived on the departure of the expedition..." The Supreme Director, writing to acknowledge the dispatches, remarked that "The news... of the failure of the rockets in your attacks upon Callao have been much lamented here..." The cost of this expensive failure, in the view of the government, meant that it was unlikely that a similar venture would be able to be mounted. Each stroke that Lord Cochrane had tried to make to justify his not keeping to the blockade, when it failed, made his position more exposed and more vulnerable. It was essential therefore that the last and greatest of these strokes should be successful.

The last and greatest stroke of Lord Cochrane's second cruise was to be the conquest of the royalist stronghold at Valdivia, in southern Chile. When the ships of the Chilean squadron dispersed from the Ecuadorian coast in conformity with their various orders, the Vice-Admiral with the O'Higgins and the Lautaro worked westwards to make the wide offing necessary when sailing south. He was reluctant to return to Chile without having achieved something notable and some time before the end of the first week in January.

A slight change of method is necessary in this section. For the greater part of the account being presented of the history of the first Chilean navy, the availability of a substantial but hitherto unexplored manuscript collection, the desirability of examining existing papers in the light of this, and the lack of good up-to-date published studies, have meant that it has been necessary to get back to the sources and write the history of the first Chilean navy afresh. In the case of the capture of Valdivia, however, what is probably the definitive account has been quite recently published. This is Gabriel Guarda: La Toma de Valdivia (Santiago, 1970), a work which makes all previous studies of the topic superfluous and which for the breadth of vision, range of sources and rigour of analysis displayed by the author, is a distinguished contribution to Chilean historiography. Guarda has examined or re-examined all the important source material and the only large collection which he has not used, the Dun-donald Papers, can contribute very little about Valdivia. Such light as material from this collection can throw on the operations there will be incorporated into the account that follows, but in general Guarda's account will be followed quite closely.
1820, he made up his mind to look into Valdivia in the hope of intercepting a Spanish ship of war there. The Lautaro was ordered back to Valparaiso and the O'Higgins, at 110° west, wore round to pick up the wind for Valdivia

The coast at Punta Galera came into view on 17 January and the Spanish ensign was run up on the O'Higgins. The next morning the Vice-Admiral reconnoitred the bay at first light in a launch. There was no sign of the expected Spanish warship. There were, however, the merchant vessel Dolores and another smaller ship lying at anchor, and at half past six a boat was sent out from the shore to the frigate, which was supposed to be the Prueba. This party, a lieutenant, a corporal and three soldiers, was seized without difficulty when they came over the side and predictably one of them, the corporal Ramon Monasterio of the local infantry battalion, was the pilot. Interrogations of the party - who seem to have been persuaded without difficulty to co-operate - combined with further reconnaissances of the bay provided Lord Cochrane with extensive and accurate information about the channels and harbour and about the state of the forts and the garrisons

The O'Higgins lay quietly at anchor during Tuesday 18 January and during that night. On shore, the garrisons

25 Miller: Memoirs, I, 231, 234; ACH, XIII, 270. Tortel to Cruz, 19 January 1820; Cochrane: Narrative of Services, I, 33–34; G. Feliú·Cruz (ed): Memorias militares para servir a la historia de la Independencia de Chile del Coronel Jorge Beauchef (1817–1829) y Epistolario (1815–1840) (Santiago, 1964), p 127; and, for discussion of the original decision to attack Valdivia, see Appendix to this Chapter.

26 Guarda: Toma, 15; Memoria de Pezuela, 687–688.
were becoming nervous and suspicious of the ship the boats of which were examining the bay and in which the pilot and his party had remained overnight without communicating with the shore. At length, on Wednesday morning, the forts fired some shots at the frigate. Undamaged and without returning their fire, Lord Cochrane shifted the O'Higgins out of range and hove to four miles off the bay.

He was waiting for the Potrillo which his prisoners had told him was due from Callao via Chiloe with supplies and money for the royal garrisons. The brig came into view later that day from the south and the O'Higgins gave chase for a few hours until the Potrillo lost her foretopmast and foremainyard in a gust, and the frigate came up with her. The brig's guns had been taken out of her to make room for the cargo, and resistance was out of the question. The O'Higgins boarded, and while the seamen gave themselves up to robbery and drunkenness, the brig and her contents were rapidly inventoried. The Potrillo had been built in New York in 1809 and acquired in 1811 by the Chilean patriots, but had subsequently fallen into the hands of the royalists. Measuring 96 feet on the main deck, 89 at the keel and 25 in the waist, she generally carried eight 12-pounders and eight 8-pounder guns. Her cargo amounted to 20,000 pesos in silver, and 40,000 pesos' worth of military stores and supplies, 29 chests of shot and 49 quintals of powder as well as timber and 25 chests of assorted merchandise. There were 25 passengers, mostly military personnel and their families, in addition to the crew of 36. The master managed to throw the correspondence and dispatches being carried by the brig overboard into the sea. Her navigation charts,

27 Guarda: Toma, 15-16; CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile" where the date is wrongly given as 20 January 1820.
however, fell into the hands of the Chileans and these included an excellent chart of the harbour, on a good scale and showing soundings.28.

Lord Cochrane now had information about the bay based on the official Spanish charts, the interrogation of the Valdivia pilot and the prisoners of the Potrillo, and his own reconnaissances. He had information about the forts and their condition and their garrisons. He had established that the Spanish ship of the line was not in the harbour. It is most likely that it was at this point, on about 19 January, that he decided that an assault on Valdivia was practicable if he could get some assistance from the nearest Chilean garrisons at Concepción. With the Potrillo in company, he set a course northwards for Talcahuano. Off the bay he met and ignored the French trader Hauteley from Montevideo and Bordeaux, which took the news of the loss of the Potrillo into Valdivia and of which the Spanish passengers raised a loan of 26,000 pesos for the governor, before going on to Callao.29.

What were the circumstances of Valdivia in 1620 which might have influenced Lord Cochrane to consider that the project of an assault was practicable? At first view, it seemed that art had been joined to nature to make Valdivia and its approaches virtually impregnable to attack. For more than 200 years the defensive system had been growing and had been modified to take account of changing circumstances and evolving strategic needs, and at the beginning of 1820 it contained a

28Guarda: Toma, 16; AOH, XIII, 282. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 21 January 1820; Memorias de Beauchef, 127.

29Memoria de Pezuela, 654-656.
total of 17 forts and batteries, of which 15 were in actual military use\textsuperscript{30}.

On the northeastern side of the bay and inlet were the battery of El Molino, the Niebla fort and the battery of El Piojo. El Molino, built in 1779, was designed to guard the outer approaches and dominate a large beach beneath it. It could mount between four and five guns and required 100 men to garrison it. Niebla fort had been built in 1671 and reconstructed in and after 1767. It dominated the narrowest part of the passage to the Valdivia river and the entire width of the channel lay within range of its guns. In 1820 it had 14 24-pounders and a mortar overlooking the channel and another two 24-pounders covered the small beach below the fort. It required a garrison of between 150 and 240 men. Round the point from Niebla, the battery of El Piojo overlooked the entrance to the Valdivia river itself. Dating like El Molino from 1779, it mounted two 24-pounders.

Opposite El Piojo, on the Isla del Rey, which constitutes the south bank of the Valdivia river, the battery of Carboneros, with three 24-pounders, also overlooked the entrance to the river. In the middle of the bay the island of Mancera had at one time or another three batteries on it, but by 1820 these had all been taken out of service, and there was only a small detachment of troops to occupy the chief of these, the fort of San Pedro de Alcántara, and guard the governor's lodge on the island.

The deepest water and the channels through which ships made into the bay is to be found along its southwestern shore. Along here were concentrated the main\textsuperscript{30}.
Spanish forts and defences.

Furthest in, and protecting the entrance to the Ensenada de San Juan, an inlet on the southern side, was the small battery of Santa Rosa. The largest defensive point in the whole system lay next to the north. This was the fortress of Corral, which commanded the anchorage and had originally been designed to cross its fires with Mancera to afford mutual protection. It consisted of two circular batteries joined by a thick curtain wall and crowned with 21 24-pounder guns with facilities for preparing red-hot shot. Inside the fortress there were stone-built storehouses and barracks for 200 men, while immediately to its north lay its associated redoubt, the battery of Bolsón or Corral Viejo, whose nine guns similarly overlooked the anchorage.

Chorocamayo Alto lay on the high ground overlooking the other batteries and its 17 guns commanded the channel from Amargos to the anchorage. On the water's edge below it the battery of Chorocamayo Bajo mounted six guns. The fort of Amargos lay next in the line. Dating from 1677, it occupied a key position opposite Niebla and its 12 24-pounders commanded the narrowest part of the channel. Beyond it, the small redoubt of El Barro, dating from 1686 and reconstructed in 1779 with room for 80 men and 10 guns lay in the expected path of any advance against Amargos on foot along the shore.

At the outer end of the channel, on a small artificial peninsula at the point where the coast curves away towards the south, the fort of San Carlos overlooked the channel with its six 24-pounders and room for 100 men. Just round the point from San Carlos a wide beach, the Aguada del Inglés, offered a good landing place, and here the last fort in the defensive
chain, the Aguada del Inglés, was established. Constructed in 1779 with three guns and room for 80 men, it was expressly designed to impede hostile landings on the beach. In 1820 it mounted two 24-pounders. Finally, beyond the beach, the lookout point of Morro Gonzalo had one small four-pounder, presumably intended more as a signal gun than as a defensive weapon.

From the seaward side, any attack would indeed have been suicidal. Following the only practicable channels, ships making for the anchorage at Corral would have to run the gauntlet of nine forts or batteries firing red-hot shot at close range. The only alternative was to attack by land having disembarked beyond the reach of the main forts. On the northeastern bank the only feasible landing place was on the beach at El Molino, overlooked by a battery and separated by several miles of almost trackless pine forest from any other point in the defence. Rocks, sandbanks and currents prohibited a landing anywhere else on this side of the bay. Finally, even if a force were able to take control of the northeastern side of the bay, its ships could still not get into the anchorage. A landing, in short, only made tactical sense if it took place on the southwestern side of the bay, end the obvious point at which it might be made was the Aguada del Inglés, which the Spanish planners had taken measures to defend.

Such was the apparent — and, as far as a seaward assault is concerned, real — strength of the Valdivia defences. But on the landward side, they suffered from two fatal weaknesses. The first was the technical deficiencies of the strongpoints themselves and their system of communications. The second was the shortage of manpower to provide sufficient garrisons.

San Carlos, squeezed onto its small peninsula, was
so narrow that the guns could only be served with difficulty and it was impossible to turn them around. Amargos, notwithstanding its importance, had not been reconstructed since it was built in the 17th century. By the late 18th century, its walls were rickety and its parapets crumbling. It was too small for the guns to be served comfortably and it had no defences on the landward side. The dismantling of the guns on the island of Mancera meant that the anchorage at Corral was free from gunnery from that point. The land communications were weak between the various forts and batteries and the royal garrison itself invariably preferred to move between one and another by sea. Thick pine forests and rocky terrain made movement from one place to another difficult and tedious. Difficult but not impossible, however, for meandering paths did run through the woods. On land, in effect, the royalists faced the same obstacles as the patriots would have to face. Where by judicious scarping and emplacements they could have made movement on land easy for themselves and impossible for enemies, they left the paths in their natural state and placed themselves at no greater advantage than potential enemies. And finally, most of the forts on the southwestern bank were open on the landward side and all of them, being low down close to the shore, were overlooked by higher ground within pistol shot. The Plan de Defensa of 1810 had foreseen almost exactly what happened in 1820, when it warned that if an enemy were to disembark four or five hundred men behind San Carlos or on the beach at Aguada del Inglés, he would be able to march on the port at Corral along the high ground and take the forts and batteries in detail.

The nature of the ground was such that no single large fortress could be established on this bank, but necessarily a number of small ones, which meant that a proportionately larger number of men were required
to garrison them. Here again, the defences suffered from a flaw: insufficiency of men.

Ever since the mid-18th century reconstructions and enlargements of the defences, imperial strategists had emphasised that an adequate garrison had to exist if they were to be of any utility. They had variously set between 900 and 4000 men as the necessary force, the lower figures up to about 1500 being sufficient just to keep the eight or nine principal forts on a proper footing. In fact, in 1820, the garrison was very much less than this. Besides the 219 artillery-men available, the regular forces consisted of 790 men of the criollo Valdivia battalion and the peninsular Dragones and Cantabria battalions. These regulars were considered to be well-trained and well-equipped. The same could not be said of the Valdivia militia companies which from a military point of view were of little value, untrained, undisciplined, insubordinate and unreliable. Their numbers were probably in the region of 800 men. But though the royal governor of Valdivia and its province, Manuel Montoya, and the senior military officer, Colonel Fausto del Hoyo of the Cantabria, had perhaps 1700 men at their disposition, their responsibilities were sufficiently wide-ranging as to prevent many of these being placed in the harbour forts. Though the numbers cannot be ascertained precisely, Guarda considers\(^{31}\) that the militia forces were not available for the harbour defences. The majority of them were in Osorno, 30 leagues to the south. Of the regular troops, strong detachments had been posted to the forts in and on the road to Osorno with the militia, and others were in the city of Valdivia, 14 miles from the harbour. The total number of men garrisoning the defensive system, that is, both sides of the bay and the islands in it, was probably

\(^{31}\)Guarda: *Toma*, 57-58.
not much above 400, and on the southwestern side of
the bay there were probably between two and three
hundred altogether scattered in forts and batteries
over several miles of the shore.

In addition to these two flaws of technical de-
ficiency of the system and shortage of men to garrison
it, Guarda also\footnote{Guarda: \textit{Toma}, 59-61.} attributes an important role in the
enfeebling of the royal defences to the royal command.
The senior military officer, Colonel Fausto del Hoyo,
he absolves from blame for the loss of Valdivia, given
that he did not enjoy sufficient authority and was cap-
tured comparatively early in the fighting. In the
royal governor, Montoya, he sees the fatal weakness
by reason of, on the one hand, his advanced age of 70
years with its accompanying loss of mental alertness
and physical capacity, and on the other hand the ex-
tensive and supreme authority with which the post of
governor of Valdivia was invested but which he was in-
capable of discharging properly.

Such were the weaknesses of Valdivia of which Lord
Cochrane proposed to take advantage. With the \textit{Potrillo},
he made a quick passage down to Talcahuano where the
\textit{O'Higgins} anchored in the night of Thursday 20 January,
Two other patriot ships were there, the \textit{Montezuma}, cap-
tain Forster, and the brig \textit{Intrepido}, captain Carter.
This was a Buenos Aires ship of 380 tons, mounting 18
guns and carrying a crew of 75 officers and men, which
had been sent at the end of 1818 to assist the Chileans
but had not got to sea until the end of 1819. These
two ships were incorporated into the Vice-Admiral's
project. The next morning Cobbett, the \textit{O'Higgins'}
first lieutenant, was given dispatches to be taken to
Valparaíso in the \textit{Potrillo}. While concealing from
Zenteno, the Minister of Marine, the plan that he now
had projected, Lord Cochrane wrote privately to O'Higgins disclosing his intention, if he could procure reinforcements from Concepción, of undertaking an assault on Valdivia and Chiloé.\(^{33}\)

When he went up to Concepción, a few miles inland, the intendent, Ramon Freire, embraced the project he put forward with enthusiasm and put his forces at the Vice-Admiral’s disposition. He selected 350 men of the Concepción battalions and they were embarked on the O'Higgins under the command of a veteran of the French wars, Major Jorge Beauchef.

The Montezuma and the Intrépido sailed from Talcahuano on 25 January, and the O'Higgins with 600 men aboard followed them out on 28 January. The expedition, though, nearly came to grief at the outset. The smaller ships had got out without difficulty, but when the O'Higgins sailed the wind had shifted to the north and she made slow headway leaving the bay. Lord Cochrane, tired, withdrew from the quarter-deck to his cabin. In the absence of his usual first lieutenant, Gobbett, who was with the Potrillo, a junior lieutenant was left in command to supervise the tricky navigation out of the bay. He in turn retired and left the ship in the care of a midshipman. At about 3.30 a.m. the O'Higgins struck a bank off Quiriquina island, in the mouth of the bay. Confusion reigned in the overloaded frigate until the officers quelled it by pointing out that there were only boats for 150 men and that to abandon ship for the icy sea and the hostile shore would be fatal. The ship was got off the bank and an inspection showed that the damage was not mortal. It was nevertheless extensive along the keel and the planking and coppering of the forward part of the hull. The frigate was holed and making eight inches of water an

\(^{33}\)Guarda: Toma, 17.
hour and much of her powder had been inundated and was unusable. A hurried council of war was held between the Vice-Admiral and Miller and Beauchef and they agreed to continue the operation. Miller was charged to take every precaution against the officers and men finding out the true state of the ship, the pumps were set to work, not before the Vice-Admiral had personally to intervene to make them operational, and the O'Higgins continued the voyage\textsuperscript{34}.

The three ships made their rendezvous on Wednesday 2 February 30 miles south west of Punta Galera and made their final preparations. At first Lord Cochrane had contemplated sailing boldly into the bay and making his landing at Corral, but on Beauchef's urgings this was altered to making for the Aguada del Inglés. The landing parties were transhipped into the smaller ships as the O'Higgins was by now known from the shore, and the Vice-Admiral shifted his flag into the Montezuma\textsuperscript{35}.

The Montezuma and Intrépido were sighted by the lookout at Morro Gonzalo at about 3.30 p.m. on Thursday 3 February under Spanish colours, but made cautious by the appearance of the O'Higgins two weeks earlier the lookouts sent a warning down the line of forts. The two ships had worked their way through a brisk sea to within hailing distance of the Aguada fort by about 4.30 p.m. and in reply to questions declared that they were royal ships from Cadiz and had lost their boats rounding the Horn. They asked for a pilot to be sent out to them. The commander of the Aguada battery was suspicious. He sent 70 men down to the

\textsuperscript{34}Guarda: Toma, 80; CP doc 1060. Miller's summary of services, 1817-1839.

\textsuperscript{35}Guarda: Toma, 83; AOH, XIII, 303. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 4 February 1820.
beach and insisted that the Montezuma send a boat ashore. The ships' boats were being held out of sight on the seaward side, however at this moment one of them slipped, fell into the water and drifted into view of those in the battery. At once the guns of the Aguada opened fire, and at the same moment Miller with the first 44 marines tumbled into the first launch and made as fast as they could through the choppy water and seaweed which tangled in the oars, for the beach, while the Montezuma gave them covering fire. The royalist detachment on the beach was dispersed by the Montezuma's fire and retired into the Aguada, and by 6.00 p.m. the boats had brought the whole landing force, 325 men, onto the beach. Lord Cochrane came ashore briefly to harangue them and they were arranged into detachments. Miller with 75 marines formed the right, Major Jose Maria Vicente with 100 men of the number 1 (Concepción) battalion the centre and Captain Manuel Valdivinos with 150 men of the number 3 (Arauco) battalion formed the rear. With Beauchef in overall command, the column left the beach shortly after 6.00 p.m. guided by one of the men captured from the pilot boat on 18 January and another from the Potrillo.

The royalists hurried up detachments from San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocamayo and Corral to stiffen the defence at Aguada but when the patriots arrived behind the battery at about 9.00 p.m., helped by the darkness and confusion they were able to break into the place almost immediately though the battle for control of the fort lasted for fully half an hour before the royalists broke and abandoned it. The strongpoints inland of the Aguada had been denuded of men. As a result, no proper resistance could be organised

in them and the patriots at a headlong run on the heels of the royalists from Aguada gave them no time to rally and concentrate for defence. San Carlos was abandoned without a fight by its defenders and was occupied by the patriots at about 9.30 p.m. At 9.50 p.m. they stormed Amargos and at 10.15 p.m. the two batteries at Chorocamayo fell simultaneously. On the shore below Chorocamayo Miller saw 100 fugitives take to boats and head for the other side of the bay. So precipitate was the patriot rush once Aguada fell that the defenders of the successive forts and batteries did not have time even to spike their guns or destroy their munitions.

A little after midnight the patriot column crossed the rivulet Aguada del Coral, and arrived at the walls of the Corral fort. After a pause for his column to close up and the men to catch their breath, a few minutes before 1 a.m. on Friday 4 February Beauchef led the assault on this fort. The disorganised and outnumbered royalists put up a stiff but brief resistance, then Fausto del Hoyo, four other officers and 30 men surrendered, with the colours of the four corps stationed at Valdivia. Another 30 royalists came in in groups to surrender soon after, and about the same numbers were killed and wounded or escaped. Beauchef's detachment had lost five dead and 14 wounded and Miller's two dead and 11 wounded.

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When daylight came, the entire southwestern bank was in the hands of the patriots. The Montezuma and Intrépido came up the channel saluted by the captured forts and at 8 a.m. dropped anchor opposite Corral. The battery at Niebla fired a few rounds at them as they passed without doing more than superficial damage. In the anchorage the Chileans took possession of the Dolores. The other vessel there had been burned during the night\footnote{Guarda: Toma, 92; CP doc 1913. Lord Cochrane to Zen-teno, 4 February 1820.}.

In this first phase of the attack, the southwestern shore had been seized and the commander of the royal forces captured. Valdivia was gravely imperilled but had not yet been lost and might have been maintained by the royalists but for two things; firstly, the panicky state of the garrison in Niebla who if they had stayed at their posts could still have barred access to the anchorage to ships and were in the only fort secure from attack on its landward side, and secondly the timidity, vacillation and hesitation of Montoya, now, with Fausto del Hoyo captured, in operational command of the royal troops. With determination, these could have controlled the northeastern bank of the bay and river of Valdivia long enough for the scattered royalists to concentrate their superior numbers and isolate the patriots on the southwestern bank.

With daylight the defenders of Niebla and Piojo saw the patriots at Corral making obvious preparations to cross the bay against them. They also saw the O'Higgins standing into the bay. Supposing her to be carrying still more troops, the demoralised defenders abandoned Niebla and Piojo. The patriots at Corral started to be ferried across to that shore to wait for the tide.
to turn so that they could travel easily up to the city. With the abandonment of Niebla, as Miller put it with characteristic modesty, "The patriots, not less surprised than pleased, found themselves without further opposition, masters of what may be called the Gibraltar of South America" 40.

In Valdivia itself, the news of the patriot successes and the arrival of the O'Higgins in the anchorage was brought by successive fugitives up the river during the morning of Friday 4 February. In circumstances of increasing confusion and panic, a meeting of the governor and the officers of the royal army decided to abandon the city and retreat into the interior, heading for the safety of Chiloé and taking with them such funds and equipment as they could. The royalist rearguard, before it left, sacked some of the warehouses, destroying them or plundering them to the value of 200,000 pesos in supplies and money, and some houses of known patriot sympathisers were also sacked. After they had gone, it was the turn of the populace who under colour of patriotic enthusiasm sacked a number of houses of royalists and some churches, and assassinated several officials of the now-defunct royal government. As much from fear as the popular tumult became increasingly unruly as in acknowledgement of the reality of defeat, the leading citizens of the place sent an urgent embassy to the port to offer the city's surrender to Lord Cochrane. He accepted the surrender and sent Beauchef up the river with 100 men to restore order and distribute proclamations promising no reprisals and guaranteeing private property. On 5

February Beauchef brought the city under control41.

Lord Cochrane's own official entry into the city was made in the Montezuma on Sunday 6 February when, with a fine sense of the dramatic, with his own hand he planted the Chilean flag in the plaza mayor. Less dramatically but more important, it was necessary to gather the booty of the conquest. It was immense. Two ships, the Potrillo and the Dolores, had been taken, and the latter when she was sold fetched 10,000 pesos for the ship and 3,546 for other effects. The military effects amounted to 10,000 rounds of cannon shot, 170,000 rounds of musket shot, 128 cannons of various calibres, a large quantity of small arms, 1000 quintals of powder, tents, clothing and beds. The fortifications were valued at a million pesos. Apart from the military booty, the captors also seized 50,000 twists of tobacco which brought in 9005 pesos when sold in Valparaíso, the medical supplies and equipment of the hospital, and the governor's palace was looted of its contents. The royalists' official correspondence was captured and shipped with many other papers from the city's archives to Valparaíso where two mule loads were needed to take them from the harbour. From the city's churches more than 16,000 pesos' worth of ornaments and plate were confiscated, though a later estimate placed these confiscations at more than 100,000 pesos' worth. On his own account, Lord Cochrane took possession of 20,000 pesos and a chest of church crockery.42

41Guarda: Toma, 98-100; Memoria de Pezuela, 699; AOH, XIII, 308-309. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 6 February 1820.

42The Times, 30 May 1820. Report from Valparaíso of 22 February 1820, probably by Miers; Guarda: Toma, 111-115; MM vol 6. Proceeds of sale of the Dolores and other effects from Valdivia, 30 May 1820; MM vol 35. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 8 March 1820; Guarda justifies the sacking of Valdivia by patriots with the complaisance of the Vice-
His intention was to continue the operations against Chiloé, which he was actively planning as soon as Valdivia had fallen, but he was held up for 10 days in the city, working on the creation of a municipal and provincial government and reorganising the forces at his disposition. On Tuesday 8 February a cabildo abierto was held under his supervision and a new civil administration set up, with the initial task of pacifying the Indians in the region who hitherto had supported the royalists, with the aid of Beauchef, who was put in charge of the province's military forces.

His naval forces were in a poor state. The O'Higgins had to be run aground at Corral to prevent her from sinking, so bad was her condition. Twenty feet of the forefoot and stem had been driven into the planking of the hull, 50 feet of the main keel was shattered in the midships section up to the garboard strakes, 20 feet of the false keel was destroyed, much of the copper had been lost, and all her upper works required caulking. She was to be left in Valdivia and repaired there under the supervision of Stevenson, who also had to be left convalescent in the port after suffering from the privations of the cruise so far. The Intrépido went aground on Mancera on 6 February carried by the erratic currents of the bay. In her decayed and rotten condition, it was not possible to

42 Admiral on the grounds that the failure of the government to pay and maintain the squadron compelled Lord Cochrane to go beyond what was normally classed as booty of war in making his confiscations in Valdivia. The fault, says Guarda, lay not with the Vice-Admiral but with the government.

43 CP doc 1917. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 9 February 1820; Guarda: Toma, 105-109; CP doc 1916. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 6 February 1820.
save the ship, however her guns were saved and mounted in the Dolores.

On 16 February the delayed expedition against Chiloé, 200 men in the Montezuma and Dolores, at length sailed from Valdivia. But the governor of Chiloé, Quintanilla, was made of sterner stuff than the governor of Valdivia, and he had 10 days advance warning of an impending attack. He had between 720 and 750 men of all arms available, of whom over half belonged to the veteran regular battalion and were well-armed and well-trained, and another 97 artillerymen were well-equipped with good guns and ample munitions. He called up the militia and formed three more grenadier companies. San Carlos de Ancud, the capital of the island, was evacuated of its civilians, and the public funds and papers were taken into the interior.

The Montezuma and the Dolores arrived off the northwest corner of the island on Thursday 17 February and late that afternoon the landing party, 170 men under Miller, was disembarked in the Ensenada de Huechucucuy while a boat with some Congreve rockets distracted the attention of the defending batteries. The main battery, Corona, exchanged fire with the patriot force for a time then in conformity with their orders the 80 defenders retired under cover of darkness after spiking their single 4-pounder gun. The patriots took possession of Corona and at 8 p.m. began their advance.

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44 Guarda: Toma, 109; CP doc 568. Forster to Zenteno, 29 March 1820; NM vol 35. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 10 February 1820; CP doc 1883 "Naval affairs of Chile"; AOH, XIII, 327-328. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 19 February 1820; Memoria de Pezuela, 683.

45 CP doc 1060. Miller's summary of services, 1817-1839; Memoria de Pezuela, 694-696.
to the next strongpoint, the fort of Agui. In the darkness, however, they lost the path and were compelled to wait for daylight before moving on, which gave Quintanilla time to reinforce Agui. The fort, set on a point commanding the channel into San Carlos, mounted 12 guns overlooking both the sea and the path through the woods around the place. When Miller's force arrived, there were 300 chilote militiamen inside the fort and a gunboat mounting an 8-pounder culverin and a 12-pounder howitzer in the water by it. When Miller and his force, hoping to repeat in broad daylight their exploit against Valdivia, charged the fort, they ran into "one of the hottest fires of grape and musketry I ever witnessed" in Miller's own words. They fell back with heavy losses, including Miller wounded, and retreated with difficulty to the beach, having to fight off three attacks by the pursuing royalists in rearguard actions. The force was quickly re-embarked in the two ships and on Saturday 19 February weighed anchor back to Valdivia. But though their losses had been heavy - 30 killed and wounded, 17 captured by the royalists and some others who had been separated from the main column during the retreat from Agui and left behind by the ships, and whose fate is uncertain - Lord Cochrane felt that with 500 men the island could be taken quite easily.46

Lord Cochrane's second stay at Valdivia island lasted for a week, from 20 February to 28 February. The organisation of the conquest was concluded, the work of pacification of the province pushed ahead, Beauchef's operations against the royalists of Osorno intensified, the captured was material and salvage

from the *Intrepido* embarked in the *Dolores*, and on 28 February the Vice-Admiral departed. The *Montezuma* arrived at Valparaíso on 6 March.\(^47\)

The official news of the fall of Valdivia had arrived and been printed in an Extraordinary Gazette on 17 February in Santiago, with an enthusiastic editorial commentary: "The happy outcome of so brilliant an enterprise supremely enhances the name of our illustrious admiral and of his brave and worthy comrades, above all if one considers the difficulty presented by the fortifications of Valdivia, hitherto taken to be impregnable, and the inadequacy of the means with which so heroic and important a conquest was undertaken." Lord Cochrane's credit was restored.\(^48\)

For the viceregal government, the first intimation that patriot operations were taking place in the environs of Valdivia was brought by the *Hauteloy* which left Valdivia on 2 February and arrived in Callao on 17 February, with the report of the capture of the *Potrillo* by the *O'Higgins*. The news of the main disaster arrived almost exactly a month later, on 18 March, brought by the North American *Pallas*, 12 days out from Valparaíso with the master of the *Potrillo* who had succeeded in escaping from the Chileans, on board. The news which had arrived on 4 April, that the Chileans had

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47 *AOH*, XIII, 328-329. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 15 February 1820; *AOH*, XIII, 345. Tortel, Account of ships entering and leaving Valparaíso, 7 March 1820; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 26 February 1820; Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 28 February 1820; Lord Cochrane to Beauchef, 28 February 1820; Lord Cochrane to Carter, 28 February 1820.

48 *AOH*, XIII, 300. "Toma de Valdivia".
been repulsed from Chiloé, did little to compensate for the "ignominous" and "indecent" loss of the city. Rather, it gave the viceroy cause for bitter reflection, that with superior forces and stronger defences than Chiloé, Valdivia had not been able to be defended.\footnote{Memoria de Pezuela, 654-656, 680-684, 694-696.}

What was the significance of the conquest of Valdivia? Lord Cochrane himself had little doubt about the measure of his achievement. It had accomplished three things, the capture of the arsenal and a huge quantity of military stores which were to be a very welcome addition to the Chilean war effort, the achievement of the complete independence of Chile at a low cost, for it would not now be necessary to mount a full-scale expedition against Valdivia, and the freeing of the Chilean government to turn its undivided attention to the organisation of the expedition to be despatched to liberate Peru.\footnote{Cochrane: Narrative of Services, I, 54-56.}

It had certainly achieved its initial object, to restore Lord Cochrane's own damaged prestige. The conquest of Valdivia, together with the boarding of the Esmeralda, were henceforth to be the corner stone of his fame, both in Chile and abroad. Its darker side was that his success here was to give him a perhaps exaggerated idea of his own importance in the higher, political, reaches of the Chilean war of independence and make him an increasingly obstreperous and unmanageable subordinate. He gave notice of forthcoming conflict when he wrote to O'Higgins that the conquest of Valdivia was a blow "more felt by the enemy... than had the rockets succeeded in burning the ships at Callao" and added "I hope your Excellency will approve of what I have done without orders; if so, I care very
little about the opinions of those who gave me the
last orders with a view to prevent my doing anything.\textsuperscript{51}

Besides the moral effect the victory had on public
opinion in Chile and abroad, it gave a much-needed
boost to the credit and trade of the new republic. Sir
Thomas Hardy, senior British naval officer on the South
American station, received the news of the victory in
Buenos Aires in March and forwarded it to London in
April, noting in his dispatch that the English merchants
in Buenos Aires had received letters from their colle-
agues in Chile giving the most encouraging reports of
the state of the trade on the Pacific coast. The Bri-
tish merchant house McNeile Price & Co of Valparaíso
sent a full report to London for publication in The
Times, expressing the opinion that the fall of Valdivia
would have direct consequences for those engaged in the
Chile trade and remarking that the affairs in general
of Chile had taken on a more flourishing aspect\textsuperscript{52}.

In a military sense, the conquest of Valdivia
meant the expulsion of Spanish power from continental
Chile and the corresponding reduction of any threat
from that quarter. The operation had not been wholly
successful inasmuch as Chiloé still remained unsubdued,
but a Spanish foothold in Chiloé was a comparatively
minor threat. It was unlikely that any expedition
could be mounted from the island against the mainland;
rather the island was put on the defensive. Chiloé
was reduced to being an irritant rather than a threat.
The pressure was taken off the patriot army of the

\textsuperscript{51}AVM vol 89. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 10 February 1820.

\textsuperscript{52}NSA, 296–297. Hardy to Croker, 24 March 1820; NSA, 297–
298. Hardy to Croker, 12 April 1820; The Times, 30 May
1820. Letter of 18 February 1820 from McNeile Price &
Co of Valparaíso.
south as royalist guerrillas wound now have no convenient base from which to operate, and the task of pacifying the Indian population of the south, hitherto inclined towards the royalist cause, made correspondingly more easy. Within a short time of the fall of Valdivia, according to Lord Cochrane, 800 Indians in the surrounding region had declared for the patriots, while Freire, with the Indians of Angol brought to heel by the victory, saw the pacification of all the southern provinces as simply a matter of time.53

Finally, and in the broadest sense, the fall of Valdivia permitted the Liberating Expedition to Peru to be put in train by the Chilean government without a major threat in their rear. The action did not cause, but it did help, the Chileans to go over onto the offensive in the war of independence.

APPENDIX

When did Lord Cochrane decide to attack Valdivia?

The question of precisely when Lord Cochrane decided to undertake an attack on Valdivia is a more than purely minor one of chronology as it contains important implications about Lord Cochrane's relationship with the Chilean government and with the other officers of the Chilean fleet. It is therefore desirable to devote a quite extensive note to it, taking as a starting point the study of Guarda which has already been cited, and another study which was published at the same time by Rojas.54 This

53 The Times, 29 September 1820. Report from Valparaíso of 2 May 1820 by Miller; MM vol 27. Lord Cochrane to Cruz, 6 March 1820; CP doc 1338. Freire to Lord Cochrane, 10 March 1820.

54 Guarda: Toma; Rojas Valdes: Lord Cochrane y la liberación de Valdivia, febrero de 1820 (Santiago, 1970)
latter is a much slighter work than Guarda's and inferior to it in scholarship, accuracy and comprehensiveness, but it must be mentioned as representing with Guarda the current statement of the matter in Chilean historiography.

As Guarda has shown, the desire to reincorporate Valdivia and Chiloé into the republic had been expressed by O'Higgins in May 1818 following the patriot victory at Maipu. The possibility of such a reincorporation was being widely discussed in mid-1819 and there was some speculation when the squadron left for Lord Cochrane's second cruise in September of that year that its destination might not be northwards towards Callao and the Peruvian coast, but to the south, towards Cape Horn or to Valdivia where, it was thought, the Spanish squadron reported to be on its way from the Peninsula might touch.

According to Guarda's interpretation, Lord Cochrane had the idea of expelling the royalists from Valdivia from the very outset of his Chilean commission and an assault on that place and on Chiloé was fully integrated into his plans simply waiting for a favourable opportunity to be put into effect. Up to 7 October 1819 he did not view the seizure of these two places as an urgent priority nor was he alarmed at the thought that the Spanish squadron might make its landfall there. A Spanish squadron in Valdivia would be of little use either to the fortress or to itself if the Spanish fleet in Callao and perhaps the town itself were destroyed and the Peruvian viceroyalty in a state of insurrection.

55 Guarda: *Toma*, 12.
By about 16 December 1819 or only a few days later, he had made up his mind to attack Valdivia. This decision arose from the changed circumstances following the failure of the campaign on the Peruvian coast. It was necessary to compensate for this failure by depriving the royalists of their port of arrival in the Pacific; by dealing a grave blow to their morale through such an act; by giving a corresponding boost to Chilean morale; and by restoring his own injured credit in the eyes of the Chileans.

Rojas' account is more vague and general than Guarda's and as her description of the movements of the Chilean ships after the attack on Callao of 5 October 1819 is inaccurate and confusing, it is not possible to date exactly when in her view Lord Cochrane came to his decision. According to her account, after the operations in the Guayaquil river during which he captured the Aguila and the Begoña, while on his voyage back to Chile Lord Cochrane came to the conclusion that it was indispensable for his personal prestige that he should win a victory which would demonstrate his capacity to destroy Spanish naval power in the Pacific. If he could not win such a victory he had no alternative but to resign his command of the Chilean fleet. He therefore sent the Independencia and the Araucano to Valparaíso and continued his voyage in the O'Higgins.

As has been shown in section (i) of this chapter, the Independencia received her orders back to Valparaíso on 21 November 1819 with Blanco Encalada, and took no further part in the campaign, arriving at the base on 19 December 1819. The Araucano's movements

Guarda: Toma, 15. "A setenta y tantos días de...(7 October 1819)...estaba per fin decidido."

Rojas: Lord Cochrane, 12.
are not entirely clear after 11 November, but she definitely did not accompany the ships that Lord Cochrane took down to the Guayaquil river on 21 November, and seems to have gone back to Valparaíso about the same time as the Independencia. The movements of these two ships were other than those given by Rojas and so cannot be used to give a clue for the exact date of the decision. In a general way, however, it is clear from her account that the decision to attack Valdivia was taken at least by the end of December 1819, long before he reached the place.

These accounts cite three pieces of evidence which might confirm the interpretation. The first, mentioned by Guarda, is a letter of Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno of 7 October 1819. In this letter, Lord Cochrane advises that he is making for Arica to look for the Spanish ships. With reference to the operations against Valdivia and Chiloé, he remarks that these would be problematical but could be undertaken as any maritime place of inferior force must be at the mercy of a maritime force which is superior. This shows that though he had not made any decision at this time, the project was in his mind.

Guarda next adduces the fact that Major William Miller, who had been wounded in the attack on Pisco, was on 13 December 1819 transhipped from the Lautaro in which he was convalescing, into the O'Higgins. The inference is that Lord Cochrane had decided on the attack, wished Miller — with whom he was friendly and who was a reliable colleague and a good marine officer — to be available for it, and had determined

61 Guarda: Toma, 15; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 7 October 1819.

62 Guarda: Toma, 15.
to carry out this operation with the O'Higgins alone, excluding the other ships of the fleet.

The third piece of evidence, which both Guarda and Rojas mention, is Lord Cochrane's dialogue with Miller which the latter records in his memoirs, when Lord Cochrane asked Miller what he thought the reaction would be to a proposal to assault Valdivia with only the O'Higgins and, when Miller expressed his surprise at such an operation, remarked that the Spanish would consider it equally improbable and hence such an attack would take them by surprise and would have good hope of success.

Such is the evidence supporting the interpretation that the Vice-Admiral made an early decision to attack Valdivia. Its importance is that it helps to sustain Lord Cochrane's own account and, by extension, the claim which the memoirs were concerned to develop, that he was systematically obstructed by the Chilean authorities and was only able to achieve what he did by acting on his initiative, against their wishes, and by maintaining the deepest secrecy vis-a-vis both the government and other officers of the fleet who were his enemies. It also sustains the traditional account which takes a sympathetic view of his tribulations at the hands of government and other officers of the fleet.

Neither Guarda nor Rojas accept the claim that the whole Valdivia expedition was kept secret from the government and the other officers right up to the moment of the assault, and both produce evidence to show that


64Cochrane: *Narrative of Services*, I, 33-34.

65See, for example, Encina: *Historia*, VIII, 76-77.
the government was informed of Lord Cochrane's intentions. Rojas cites a letter of Lord Cochrane of 28 January 1820, and an earlier one of Ramon Freire, intendant of Concepción, to O'Higgins of 21 January 1820, in which the Director was informed of the proposed expedition. Guarda cites an important letter which he has recently discovered which puts the date when Lord Cochran wrote to O'Higgins of his project a day earlier, on 20 January 1820.

A date of 20 January 1820 for the first official intimation to Santiago of the project, while it modifies Lord Cochrane's account and the traditional interpretation, does not fundamentally invalidate them. Firstly, the fact still remains that for at least a month, from 21 December 1819 to 20 January 1820, Lord Cochrane concealed his intention to assault Valdivia. Secondly, when he did on 20 January 1820 eventually write to Santiago of his intention, the report could not have been delayed any longer because it had been disclosed in Concepción and would be reported shortly to Santiago anyway. Thirdly, a dispatch sent on 20 January would take at least three days and probably four or five to reach the capital, so that by the time any reply could be sent to Concepción to stop the expedition, or any warning sent to Valdivia and Chiloé by royalist spies, the expedition would already have sailed from Talcahuano. But how solid is the evidence upon which this interpretation rests?

In Lord Cochrane's letter of 7 October 1819, while he mentions the possibility of attacking Valdivia and Chiloé, at this date he had certainly not decided to do so and in fact did not seem to be entertaining this project as one to be actively pursued in the


67 Guarda: Toma, 17.
immediate future, although this was written after the failure of the Callao attacks. The letter is a wide-ranging discussion of overall strategic problems in the Pacific rather than a specific tactical programme, and devotes more time to discussing the merits of trying to acquire Guayaquil as a naval base for Chile than to advocating the capture of Valdivia and Chiloé.

The chief evidence adduced in favour of a decision in mid-December 1819 is the circumstantial inference drawn from the trans-shipment of Miller to the O'Higgins on 13 December 1819. An examination of Miller's record of his services, however, quickly calls this argument in question. On 7 November at Pisco he received a musket ball through the liver, another permanently shattered his left hand, and a third passed through his right arm. He was very sick for many days and still in danger of dying on 30 November. He was most likely to have been moved to the O'Higgins because it was a larger, more comfortable ship than the Lautaro, with better medical services. He was not sufficiently recovered even to come up on deck until 18 January 1820, and he did not feel fit enough to return to duty until 26 January. In the light of this, it is hardly likely that as early as mid-December the Vice-Admiral would feel able to count on his services.

The next piece of evidence is the dialogue between Miller and the Vice-Admiral. Miller does not give a date for this exchange, however, the Memoirs follow a CP doc 1060. Miller's summary of services, 1817-1839.

69 I have translated as "sick" the word "dessauciado" which I cannot find in the Royal Spanish Academy's Diccionario de la Lengua Española but take to be a variant of or misprint for "desazonado".

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chronological plan quite closely and this appears after Miller's description of Lord Cochrane's discussions with Freire about attacking Valdivia, so that it is almost certain that the exchange did not take place until after Lord Cochrane had examined the port.

If this is the weakness of the specific pieces of evidence, there is a general point which may be made. While his exploits in the Royal Navy show that Lord Cochrane liked an independent command and while he gave reasons 40 years later why he had no other ships with him, nevertheless a decision to attack Valdivia without ever having seen it seems a singularly rash and ill-calculated enterprise. There were no arrangements even for other ships to be in the general sea area in case of a setback or need for reinforcements, and after four months at sea, the O'Higgins and her crew cannot have been in the fittest condition. The whole project - if he decided upon it in advance - sounds wholly uncharacteristic of Lord Cochrane as a seaman and naval tactician.

In summary, it is clear that Lord Cochrane did not decide to assault Valdivia until he had examined it in mid-January 1820. In this case, interpretations that postulate secrecy and devious dealing on his part in relation to the Chilean government may be set aside. The only question that remains, therefore, is why he went to Valdivia in the first place. Here the evidence seems conclusive and no speculative explanation needs to be propounded in the absence of documentation. He went to intercept the Spanish ship or ships on the way from Europe.

Concern at the threat of Spanish ships of war coming from Europe was, as Guarda points out, quite widespread in the Chilean government in mid-1819. This is reflected in Lord Cochrane's instructions for his second
cruise which differed from those of the first in that, on the supposition that the object of the campaign was to secure the dominion of the Pacific and enable the expeditionary army to proceed to Peru, special emphasis was laid on the need to seek out and destroy the Spanish ships of war in the Pacific.\(^7^0\).

At the same time his instructions were sent to the Vice-Admiral, Zenteno from the Ministry of Marine sent him notification and copies of reports from official and unofficial sources in Buenos Aires about the sailing of Spanish ships from Cadiz.\(^7^1\) The Supreme Director had already written to him a few days before that the squadron must lose no time sailing from Valparaíso as the Spanish warships might reach Callao in the near future and much depended on a successful naval engagement.\(^7^2\) He wrote again just after the squadron had sailed with more information that he had received, that the reports he had from Buenos Aires were that two 74-gun ships, the Alejandro and the San Telmo, and the frigate Prueba, had sailed from Cadiz. It seemed unlikely, he wrote, that the Alejandro would be able to make the voyage round the Cape by reason of her condition, and it was possible that the frigate would be unable to do so, either. At any rate all three ships were manned by unreliable and disaffected crews.\(^7^3\)

\(^7^0\)CP doc 132. O'Higgins, instructions to Lord Cochrane, 6 September 1819.

\(^7^1\)CP doc 133. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 6 September 1819; CP doc 134. Arana to his sister, 9 August 1819; CP doc 135. Zañartu to O'Higgins, 6 August 1819.

\(^7^2\)CP doc 1280. O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, 2 September 1819.

\(^7^3\)CP doc 1281. O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, 19 September 1819.
In his letter of 7 October to Zenteno, which has already been cited several times, while discussing the various strategies suited to the war in the Pacific, Lord Cochrane advised specifically that he would be looking out for the Spanish warships coming from Europe, at Arica\textsuperscript{74}. He asked for general instructions in the light of the failure of the Callao attacks, and in reply, on 26 November, Zenteno urged that a return of the ships to Valparaíso was to be avoided if possible, and stressed that the government's strategy was to concentrate on clearing the sea to make way for the Peruvian expedition\textsuperscript{75}. The Supreme Director wrote three days later to make the same point about the need to dominate the sea\textsuperscript{76}.

The general line of strategy pursued by the government was quite clear, and Lord Cochrane quite familiar with it and inclined anyway to fall in with it.

After he had arrived in the south of Chile, on 21 January 1820, when he wrote to Zenteno to report the capture of the royalist brig Potrillo, off Valdivia, Lord Cochrane advised that he had come to this place in order to check reports he had received in Peru that a Spanish warship was there\textsuperscript{77}. While this letter does not reveal everything that he had in mind at that time, there is no reason why it should be other than the truth in regard to his motives in coming. Finally, in his summary of his services, Miller recorded quite

\textsuperscript{74}CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 7 October 1819.

\textsuperscript{75}Cp doc 148. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 26 November 1819.

\textsuperscript{76}CP doc 1282. O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, 29 November 1819.

\textsuperscript{77}CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 21 January 1820.
specifically against the date 13 December 1819 that Lord Cochrane, having sent the other ships of the squadron to Valparaiso, made sail to the south in search of a Spanish ship which was expected round Cape Horn.\textsuperscript{78}

In conclusion, Lord Cochrane knew that the Prueba had come round the Horn but there was no news of any other Spanish ship of war having arrived in the Pacific unless it had gone to Valdivia. There was reason to believe that only one of the other two ships despatched from Cadiz would actually arrive in the Mar del Sur. Though a ship of the line as against his frigate, if he came upon it in the waters round Valdivia he could count on the element of surprise and the probable condition of the ship after the voyage out to favour him. Even if he could not engage it along - and the reluctance of the Prueba to face the O'Higgins suggested that even a 74-gun ship of the line might not be as overwhelmingly superior an opponent as the number of guns implied - he could, having located it, call out the Chileans from Valparaíso and intercept it on the way to Callao. If it took refuge in Corral bay, he could hope to board it from boats, burn it with rockets, or frighten it out to sea. All in all, to make for Valdivia in search of the Spanish ship or ships was a logical line of action.

\textsuperscript{78}CP doc 1060. Miller's summary of services, 1817-1839.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHILEAN NAVY UNDER LORD COCHRANE 1818-1823

By the second quarter of the year 1820, following the capture of Valdivia, the Chilean navy had undertaken three campaigns, two of them under Lord Cochrane. It had established its normal mode of functioning and at this point, a few months prior to the departure of the Liberating Expedition to Peru, it was probably operating as smoothly as it ever was to. This is therefore a convenient point to take a general view of this navy over the period when Lord Cochrane commanded it, under two aspects: firstly, in this chapter, to examine how it functioned as a body of men engaged in a particular occupation, then, in the succeeding chapter, to examine its organisational framework.

I. The manning of the Chilean navy

The formation of the officer corps of the navy has already been reviewed, at least at the level of the captains. Below these the junior officers, the lieutenants, seem to be drawn from similar sources, mostly British with some North Americans and the occasional European or Latin American. The proportion of junior officers with a background in merchant shipping only rather than a naval one, is probably distinctly higher than amongst the captains. Most of them presumably officered the ships that were brought out to Chile as a speculation from Europe or North America with the intention of

1 See above, Chapter 2.
transferring to the Chilean navy when they arrived.² Initially, Lord Cochrane was given a free hand in the appointment of his officers.

When he recruited him in London, Alvarez Condarco promised him command of all naval forces and undertook that "your Lordship may be able to appoint all the Navy officers... all the appointments of officers made by your Lordship shall be confirmed by the Chile Government..."³

The procedure was that Lord Cochrane recommended candidates for commissions or appointments and these were then confirmed by the government⁴ even though on occasion it was not their wish to confirm a particular appointment. The Independencia, for example, had been promised to Guise before Lord Cochrane's arrival in Chile, but when the ship came to the Pacific the government gave in to Lord Cochrane's demand that Forster should receive the command of her. Guise was now

²See CP doc. 557. Macfarlane to Lord Cochrane, 4 September 1819; The Times, 24 December 1838; for samples of the sources of officer recruitment.


promised the command of the other North American frigate due to come to the Pacific, the *Horacio*, by the embarrassed government, who emphasised to Lord Cochrane that this undertaking must be fulfilled. In the event, the *Horacio* never reached the Chilean navy and Guise was compelled to remain with the *Lautaro* for nearly two years before he received a superior ship. This may have been a contributory factor in the ill-feeling that existed between Guise and Lord Cochrane.

After every cruise or expedition a cloud of petitions, relations of services and solicitations for promotion went up to the Vice-Admiral or the Supreme Director from the officers of the ships. As far as possible Lord Cochrane sought to have these petitions channelled through himself and made difficulties about accepting any commissions which he had not recommended or approved. The Surgeon Major of the Squadron, John Greene, for example, is found in March 1819 complaining to the Supreme Director that Lord Cochrane "has refused to recognise the commission I hold from Your Excellency..." As a rule, Lord Cochrane

5 CP doc. 44. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 26 June 1819; CP doc. 46 Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 1 July 1819.

was successful in establishing his prerogative in this matter without resistance from the government which by mid-1819 had come round to the position, in the case of the newly-arrived Independencia for example, of requesting Lord Cochrane to give his recommendations as to what commissions and what postings were to be given to the officers who had come to Chile in the ship. His control over appointments was further strengthened a year later, in a decree issued shortly before the sailing of the Liberating Expedition but reflecting the existing practice, to the effect that all appointments of officers and midshipmen in the ships were to be proposed to and approved by the Vice-Admiral before taking effect.7

On the principal occasion when the government did try to make their own appointment and a confrontation occurred, they suffered a defeat. In the middle of March 1820 Spry, then commanding the Galvarino, petitioned directly to the Supreme Director for promotion on the grounds of length of service, he being at that time a Capitán de Corbeta, the most junior of the captains' ranks. His petition was successful and a month later he was promoted to the rank of Capitán de Fragata. When Lord Cochrane heard of this, he immediately sent off a complaint to Zenteno, the Minister of Marine, about Spry's promotion about which he had not been consulted and which was transmitted by an unusual and secret route he said. Next, at the beginning of July, the government appointed Spry to the captaincy of the O'Higgins. Forster had been given the Independencia a week earlier instead of Guise and it is possible that the appointment of Spry was made in compensation to Guise.

whose client he was, though, as Zenteno said, Spry was also the only frigate captain in the squadron by that time without a ship. Lord Cochrane did not see the matter in this light however, and complained to the Minister that as a commander-in-chief he enjoyed the right to nominate the captain of his flagship according to the British rules which were applicable in the case. The Supreme Director himself was compelled to intervene to observe that while it might be true that the commander-in-chief had the right to appoint the captain of his flagship, it was also true that the appointment must be given to an officer of the appropriate rank, which Spry was and which Crosbie, Lord Cochrane's candidate and client, was not. Lord Cochrane persisted in his view and tried to circumvent the unwelcome appointment by posting Spry instead to the Lautaro. This vacancy arose because Guise had just been put under arrest and was waiting for a courtmartial. The dispute shifted to Lord Cochrane's demand that Guise be courtmartialed, an incident which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, and on 19 July the government - possibly as part of a tacit understanding for the charges against Guise being dropped - conceded the point, agreed to restore Spry to the Galvarino and offered to let Lord Cochrane appoint Crosbie to whatever ship he liked, in other words, to the O'Higgins, as was done 11 days later.8

Apart from this incident, which had the double effect of establishing Lord Cochrane's control over appointments and of souring the relations between the Vice Admiral, Guise and Spry with dire subsequent effects, little attempt was made by the government to intervene in appointments and postings. This was particularly the case once the squadron had departed to Peruvian waters in August 1820, from which time until the return of the Vice Admiral in the middle of 1822, he was effectively making his own appointments of officers in the fleet. The government simply approved these in a block when it was informed of them, once in November 1821 and again in June 1822.9

But what of the common men who made up the crews of the ships of the Chilean navy? While in the case of the officer corps it is possible to collect a certain amount of biographical data for the senior members and identify the junior members by name and see them individually acting their parts in naval operations from time to time, the inarticulate words of the many hundreds of common men who served the guns, scrubbed the decks, took in or let out the sails and slept 'tween decks hardly ever filter through to historical record, yet these seamen, deckhands, marines and gunners constitute the basic human material of this navy. As single individuals they are not visible, but in a collective sense it is possible to build up some information about them.

There were a variety of sources from which the complements of the Chilean ships were drawn. The first possible source was Chilean volunteers. The majority of the men in the Chilean ships were Chileans. Their approximate numbers and proportions of the totals will be noted

9 CP doc. 388. Echeverría to Lord Cochrane, 13 November 1821;
CP doc. 397. Echeverría to Lord Cochrane, 17 June 1822.
presently. The country did not have a substantial mercantile marine at the time of independence and comparatively few Chileans can have had seagoing experience. Those who did and who were prepared to volunteer for anything approaching military service were more likely to go into privateering ships than into the state's marine. Chileans without seagoing experience were hardly likely to find service in a marine commanded by foreigners an attractive prospect. On the other hand some figures to be mentioned below do imply that a surprising number of Chileans did find enlistment in a state's ship attractive, at least in 1819 and 1820, though whether they were attracted by hope of booty or were trying to live some kind of life in the midst of the uncertainties of war is not clear. As, during 1820 and 1821, privateering became less profitable and more hazardous it is probable that a certain number of seamen from privateers thought it either necessary or desirable to enlist in the state's marine. Some volunteers did come from the army or from the Military College in Santiago from people seeking "a more active appointment", though it is infrequently that such formal requests are found and they appear mostly in late 1818 and mid-1819, when recruiting was under way for Blanco's campaign and for Lord Cochrane's second campaign respectively. 10

10 MM vol 14. Colegio Militar petitions, 3 August 1818. There are other examples of these petitions, corresponding to those cited above from the Cochrane Papers, in MM vol 10. See also Gonzalo Bulnes: Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú (1817-1822) 2 volumes, (Santiago, 1887-1888), and Federico Tomas Cavieres: "Primera Escuadra Nacional" Revista de Marina, vol 85. (1968).
Another source of men was amongst foreign volunteers, who as experienced professional seamen probably accustomed, many of them, to service in a warship from Napoleonic times, were to form the backbone of the complements of the Chilean ships for the earlier part of Lord Cochrane's commission. Some of these were contracted specifically by Chilean agents like Zaffartu in Buenos Aires who in mid-1818 was instructed from Santiago to raise 500 British and North American seamen in Buenos Aires and despatch them to Chile, a charge which he succeeded in carrying out notwithstanding he had no funds to pay them bounty money. Others came in the various ships that were brought to Chile from Europe and North America, and on much the same basis, as a speculation. Like their ships, the crews were also taken into the Chilean service. The Galvarino, for example, brought 111 officers, petty officers and seamen recruited in England. Earlier, the Lautaro (as the Windham) and the San Martín (as the Cumberland) had brought 192 and 100 foreign seamen respectively. The Araucano, when Wooster brought her to Chile as the Columbus, was fully equipped and manned. Still other foreign seamen came into the Chilean service by the simple expedient of deserting from their own ships when they arrived in the Pacific. This was sufficiently extensive for the British commander of the South American station to report to London with some alarm that "great numbers of English merchant seamen had deserted and joined (Lord Cochrane)" in February 1819, though the peak for foreign volunteer recruitment seems to have been reached in mid-1819, after which foreigners became less inclined to enlist in the Chilean service. 11

A substantial part of the complements came in the form of impressed men and criminals. Many of the seamen who served in Blanco's campaign came from the privateers, for in a decree of 11 August 1818 the government declared that the activities of the privateers were inconsistent with the interests of the state's marine since they caused a shortage of seamen, and ordered that all privateer crews be transferred to the state's ships. While recruitment for Lord Cochrane's first cruise was satisfactory, for the second cruise an acute shortage of seamen held up the sailing of the ships and the government was obliged to authorise a general impressment. It was not a success however, since news of it leaked out before it came into effect and the seamen ashore in Valparaiso where it was to take place heard of it and disappeared into hiding or took refuge out of the port. In February 1820, when the times of the foreign seamen on board the Lautaro expired and the unpaid, unclothed and disillusioned men wanted only to leave, they were immediately impressed back into service. Apart from general impressments such as these, many men must have come from casual impressments. In July 1820, for example, a band of 78 men and boys rounded up in Santiago were sent down to the port to go aboard the O'Higgins. Through the carelessness of the officer in charge of them, a number escaped on the way. The officer therefore made up the shortfall by simply seizing anyone he met along the Valparaíso road, including the official courier between the capital and the port, a soldier on the way to join his regiment, and a young boy. This sounds like a fairly typical example of the way that men were recruited. On another occasion a sentence of two years' service in the state's ships can be found as a specific punishment imposed in an attempted murder case and while it is not possible to say how widespread the practice of condemnation to naval service might have been as a criminal punishment, it is probable that this measure was resorted to...
quite frequently, at least in Valparaíso. Finally, occasional attempts were made to impress foreign seamen directly off foreign trading ships into the service. This did not represent a significant source of recruits however, as they brought on disputes about the rights of neutral shipping.

Transfers from the army accounted also for some of the complements of the ships. At first the infantry and the artillery who were transferred were incorporated into the navy on a temporary basis. In August 1819, for example, to make up the complements for the ships for the second cruise of Lord Cochrane, 62 artillerymen and 186 infantrymen were ordered to be transferred from the army to the squadron for the duration of the campaign. Besides direct transfers such as these, the troops of the garrison of Valparaíso were considered to be under the command of the maritime governor of the place and were looked on as the general source for troops to go aboard the ships for each campaign. This force expanded rapidly from the 43 officers, non-commissioned officers and men of July 1818 to the 102 men it had in September of the same year. A year later, in September 1819, it had reached 482 officers and men, of whom 460 were embarked in the ships and 22 remained at the disposition of the Arsenal. While the Valparaíso garrison constituted a regular supply of marine infantrymen, the periodical supply of artillerymen as temporary naval gunners who went aboard their ships for each campaign and then returned to their


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units was obviously an unsatisfactory arrangement, and in April 1820 the government decreed the formation of a regular corps of marine artillerymen. This was to be under the command of William Miller and all the existing artillerymen in the fleet were automatically to be incorporated into it. The marine corps, both infantry and artillery sections, continued to be kept up to strength by transfers from the army. In June 1820, for example, 96 noncommissioned officers and men were transferred from the army into the marine infantry, and in September the same year, just after the arrival of the Liberating Expedition on the coast of Peru, 120 artillerymen were transferred from the army to be incorporated into the naval gunners' corps. Most transfers from the army went into the marine corps rather than into the general body of seamen; however, in the Chilean service marines did seamen's duty as well as their own.13

A further source of men was from slaves or ex-slaves. Some of these, though not very many, were provided in the form of offerings by patriotic Chileans to the service. An early one appears in January 1819: "Doña Josefa Avendano, inhabitant of the Town of los Andes... has donated to the State, for the service of the marine, a slave in

her particular possession named Manuel Palma..." and Guarda notes the
presence of three slaves or ex-slaves among the crew of the Intrépido
at the time of the attack on Valdivia. Rather more slaves were
acquired for the service of the ships from amongst those taken during
the squadron's descents on the Peruvian coast. In May 1819, for
example, 150 liberated slaves were taken on board the ships at the
harbour of Supe. Later, as the manning problems of the squadron
worsened in 1821, more slaves were taken from royalist haciendas in
the region around Paracas. The need to get some hands by this means
may have been a subsidiary consideration in the mobilisation of the
squadron to undertake the campaign in the puertos intermedios that
year. Certainly among the earliest booty - they were classified as
"stores" along with provisions, liquor, timber and the like - to be
sent to the ships were negroes. In March 1821 two batches of 153 and
89 negroes were sent onto the O'Higgins from Pisco. At the same time
78 were sent to the San Martin. In March 66 men and boys were sent
onto the Valdivia, and a further 42 were sent in April. A number
of the negroes collected at Pisco were destined for service with the
patriot army before Lima, and were shipped down the coast from Pisco
in the Potrillo to be incorporated in it, but evidently a proportion
of them were kept in the squadron. They were recruited by being
promised their liberty if they would serve the patriot cause, though
it may be doubted how much of a choice this really represented.14

14 AOH, XII, 17. Report of 16 January 1819; Guarda: Toma, 70; Miller:
Memoirs, I, 212; CP doc. 745. Morgell, List of stores received, March
1821; CP doc. 730 Croebie, List of stores sent in Pisco bay from the
shore, 23 March 1821; CP doc. 744. Cobbett. List of stores received,
March 1821; CP doc. 2015 Lord Cochrane to Brown, 3 April 1821;
CP doc. 2123, Lord Cochrane to Miller, 1821.
Finally, troops supplied by a friendly state provided a small source of supply, the friendly state being Buenos Aires. When the Galvarino came to the Pacific in October 1818 she carried 27 Argentine soldiers as her marine complement and these were incorporated into the marine corps on arrival at Valparaiso. Ten months later when the Independencia came to the Pacific to be incorporated into the Chilean fleet, she carried 45 Argentinian soldiers amongst the crew, of whom 28 were posted to the Intrépido as her regular marine complement.¹⁵

The complements of the Chilean ships, then, came from a variety of sources. But what kinds of proportions obtained between these various groups? In particular, is it possible to answer the three central questions about the manning of the Chilean navy, which are, firstly, what were the relative proportions of foreign to native seamen amongst the crews; secondly, what were the proportions between volunteers and pressed men amongst the crews; thirdly, how complete were the complements of the ships? The answers to the first two questions would give an indication of the part played by the Chileans in the manning of their own navy and the willingness with which they enlisted in the ships. The answer to the third question would give an indication of how able the squadron was at any time to discharge the operations required of it.

Unfortunately, because of the maladministration of the naval department and the failures to keep proper ship's books, it is not possible to construct runs of data which will show relative proportions of foreign to native seamen, or of volunteers and pressed men, for the

fleet as a whole at any one moment or for the fleet or its units over the period as a whole. If such data could be collected, it would be possible to give a quantitative basis for what, in default of such data, must necessarily be educated generalisations. Having made this preliminary caveat, it does seem that there are some patterns detectable in the manning and recruitment of the Chilean ships and that it is possible to give tentative answers to the questions which have been posed.

Of the 1106 men aboard the four ships which formed the first division in Lord Cochrane's first campaign, 828 were Chileans, including seven officers, 331 seamen, 137 grummet, 128 gunners and 225 soldiers. There were 24 foreign officers and 254 foreign seamen. The proportion of native to foreign seamen was therefore two-thirds to one-third looking at the complements as a whole, or rather less than two-thirds to one-third (468 seamen and grummet to 254 seamen) if only the seamen are compared. Later in the same year, in June, paylists for the O'Higgins and Araucano give rather different proportions. In the O'Higgins, 151 of the complement are foreign including all the officers, petty officers and first-class seamen and all but two of the second-class seamen, while 228 are Chilean (or of Spanish extraction) including all the grummet, all but four of the artillerymen and all the marines. The foreign seamen constitute well over a third of the complement as a whole, and if the artillerymen and marines are discounted, the foreigners become the majority of the seamen (147 foreign to 117 native). In the Araucano, on the other hand, there were only five foreigners altogether, the captain, three first-class seamen and one second-class seaman. The 64 Chileans including all the grummet and marines and the majority of the first-class (eight out of 11) and second-class (five out of six) seamen, made the Araucano
truly Chilean in her complement at this time.16

In the next year, 1820, the O'Higgins when she participated in the attack on Valdivia carried, according to Guarda, 96 British and North American and European seamen, and 164 seamen of Spanish extraction, all but 10 of them Chileans. More than a third of the seamen, about two-fifths, were foreign. In the Intrépido, on the other hand, the foreign seamen were in the majority, being 40 Europeans as against 35 Chileans, though in this case there are special circumstances to account for the disproportionately high number of foreigners, namely that the Intrépido had come from Buenos Aires with a crew recruited there in late 1818 and the levies carried on for the cruise she made to Valdivia were made when the rest of the squadron was absent from Valparaiso. The Montezuma had a complement of 87 seamen, but the proportions between them are unknown. Guarda infers that the foreigners probably outnumbered the Chileans on this ship, but without presenting any convincing evidence to support the view. At the same time that these three ships were operating against Valdivia, some of the other ships were drawing up paylists in Valparaiso. According to that of the Lautaro, of the first and second-class seamen and grummers a little under one-third were foreign and a little over two-thirds Chilean, 41 as against 88. In the complement as a whole, taking officers, petty officers, seamen, artillerymen and marines, a little under two-thirds,

16 MM vol 21. Review of the O'Higgins, 30 June 1819; Review of the Araucano, 26 June 1819; Barros Arana: Historia, XII, 200. The Times 17 September 1819 (Report from Santiago of 25 April 1819), confirms the proportions in a roundabout way by reporting that there were 850 British seamen on this cruise, apparently having got the numbers of British and Chilean seamen the wrong way round.
182 out of 293, seem to be Chileans. In the Independencia at the same time the 41 foreign seamen formed nearly half (two-fifths, in fact) of all seamen and grummets, the Chileans numbering 57, but in the complement as a whole the Chileans accounted for two-thirds, 137 out of 210. In the Araucano a little more than two thirds of the first and second-class seamen were Chileans, 34 out of 48, while they constituted a little under two-thirds of the complement as a whole (about 60 out of 95). In the San Martín, finally, the great majority of the first and second-class seamen were Chileans. Out of 212 men, just 42, or one-fifth, were foreign.17

The Lautaro on sailing with the Liberating Expedition carried 63 British officers and men as against 108 Chilean seamen and grummets and 71 marines. The foreigners - in this instance including officers and petty officers as well as seamen - constituted a little over one-third of the seamen on the ship, but barely more than a quarter of the whole complement. The Independencia at the same time had 56 British seamen who constituted a quarter of her total complement of 225 men.18

As the squadron's difficulties grew in 1821 on the Peruvian coast and particularly following the break between Lord Cochrane and General San Martín which resulted from the former's seizure of the public funds

17 Guarda: Tomo, 68-70; MM vol 7. Paylist of the Lautaro, 3 February 1820; Paylist of the Independencia, 3 February 1820; Paylist of the Araucano, 3 February 1820; Paylist of the San Martín, 4 February 1820.

at Ancon, when the time came for the squadron to depart from Peru, there were very few foreign seamen in the ships. The Lautaro in mid-September 1821 had, apart from the quartermaster, only "a few sick and worthless" amongst foreign seamen. By the end of that month Lord Cochrane wrote to the Supreme Director that there were almost no foreign seamen left in the squadron as a whole, while on the O'Higgins when it sailed from Callao in October 1821, there were only three foreign seamen on board. On the other hand the Chilean government, in response to Lord Cochrane's warnings of shorthandedness in 1821, in November sent the Aransasu from Valparaiso with recruits for the fleet. These numbered 54 seamen, of whom 23 were British and 31 Chileans. 19

With regard to the proportions between foreign and native seamen, then, the pattern seems to be that as a general rule the proportion of foreign, that is trained, seamen was higher on the major ships like the O'Higgins than on the minor ones. The foreign seamen tend to be most numerous, or at least the larger proportion, in the early part of the period, chiefly in the year 1819. Already by mid-1820 the proportions tend to start falling from about one-third to about one-quarter and this decline continues increasingly sharply in 1821, so that by the time of Lord Cochrane's final cruise, the foreign seamen are an insignificant minority. Increasingly from the opening months of 1821 the Chilean seamen come to be the main constituent of the Chilean navy's crews. It was a generally-accepted view, or convenient

formula, that the Chilean navy was manned by one-third British or North Americans, one-third Chilean seamen and one-third (Chilean) marines. This was probably true in 1819 but in and from 1820 gradually ceased to be the case. 20

As far as the proportions between volunteers and pressed men is concerned, it has not been possible to collect sufficient data to enable patterns to be detected over time, or to arrive at relative proportions which might be considered reasonably plausible and reasonably applicable to the squadron as a whole. Except in occasional instances such as that mentioned above when the crew of the Lautaro were impressed back into service in February 1820 at the expiry of their engagements, it may be assumed that the foreign seamen were nearly all volunteers, at least in a notional sense since it is a matter for doubt whether they had very much liberty of choice about re-enlisting at the ends of their terms. The foreign volunteers were most numerous in Lord Cochrane's first cruise - the Vice Admiral himself remarked on the enthusiasm with which foreign seamen were enrolling in January 1819 and the corresponding expression of alarm at the way they were deserting their own ships to join the Chilean service has been noted above in the case of the British commodore of the South American station. This willingness was shortlived, however, as the navy was obliged with the authorisation of the government to resort to the press in national merchant ships to make up the crews for Lord Cochrane's second campaign in 1819. By the time that recruiting began for the Liberating Expedition, so disillusioned had seamen in

20 See, for example, The Times, 21 November 1820 (Report from Santiago of 7 August 1820) and CP doc 637. Forster to the Earl of Dundonald, 28 September 1820.
Valparaiso became about their prospects of receiving any pay or prize-money and about the conditions they had to endure, that when in July 1820 the recruiting officers opened enlistment stations in the port, not a single seaman presented himself to be enrolled. Much the same pattern may be supposed to apply to the Chileans, a comparative willingness to enlist in early 1819, which rapidly disappeared thereafter. The disagreeable conditions which the Chilean seamen had to endure in the ships — to be discussed in the succeeding section — makes it likely that even less incentive existed for them to enlist than for foreigners. On the other hand, a few figures which seem to contradict this assumption may be mentioned. From Quillota on 16 August 1819 seven men were sent to the squadron of whom two were volunteers, one a recaptured deserter from the Lautaro, and the remainder apprehended as "known thieves." On 21 August 43 men were sent of whom 34 were volunteers, four were recaptured navy deserters, two were recaptured army deserters and the other three pressed men. On 25 August 58 men were sent of whom 50 were volunteers and eight pressed men. In other words, from this area at this time nearly four-fifths of the recruits were volunteers and a little over one-fifth pressed men, of whom a third were recaptured deserters. These figures if generalised, would imply that a substantial portion of the Chilean seamen of the navy were volunteers. Their weakness is, however, that they apply to only one small part of the country at one particular time. How representative they are it is not possible to say, though it may be added that a year later, in August 1820, Coquimbo supplied 50 seamen and boys, apparently all volunteers, to the squadron. For the present, it must be supposed that the greater part of the squadron's complements of foreign seamen were volunteers but probably increasingly reluctant ones, while of the Chilean members the greater part were probably
pressed men, though there is a possibility that the number of volunteers was substantially higher than generally assumed.  

Lastly, how sufficient were the complements of the Chilean ships? The problem of numbers arose quite early; by September 1818, Irisarri in Santiago had to write to Zañartu in Buenos Aires that the Chilean republic disposed of sufficient ships for its purposes, but had too few men to man them. The means resorted to to procure sufficient men for the ships in Blanco's cruise have already been noted above, and on the whole they were not unsuccessful. When his squadron sailed the complement of the San Martín was 492 (as against a normal complement of 460), the Lautaro's was 353 (310), the Chacabuco's was 151 (127), the Araucano's was 110 (110) and the Puyrredón's was 100 (105). There were in fact rather more men on board the ships than necessary for a normal complement, a total of 1206 instead of 1112. Some of the additional numbers are accounted for by an excess of troops. Assuming that the normal complement of marines and artillerymen on the San Martín was in the region of 80 men, then in the squadron as a whole there should have been 191 of them, but in fact there were 228 including 150 marines and 78 artillerymen. The main reason why the complements were over the standard was that the greater part of the crews, because of the scarcity of foreign seamen at that time, before Lord Cochrane's arrival and before the Chilean navy had scored any dramatic success,

were Chileans who were unpractised in the ways of seamanship. The intent of the state was that what the squadron lacked in experience, skill and quality it should make up for in numbers.\textsuperscript{22}

The problem of recruiting was not acute at the beginning of 1819, thanks to Blanco’s success in seizing the \textit{María Isabel} and most of her convoy, and the lure of Lord Cochrane’s name. But on the other hand, it was more difficult to get men to enlist voluntarily and there were more ships to be manned and there were competing agencies (the army). In Lord Cochrane’s division in his first cruise, he had 881 seamen, including officers, seamen, grumets and gunners, and 225 marines, a total of 1106 men. His complements should have been 1062 seamen and 195 marines, a total of 1257 men altogether. The marines were again being used to fill up the complements, but on this occasion the squadron was 151 men, or approximately one-eighth, short as a whole, a proportion which rises to one-sixth short if the marines are excluded from the calculation. Certainly the \textit{O'Higgins} herself, according to Lord Cochrane, sailed 100 men, more than a quarter, short of her complement.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{23} \textit{AH} vol 29. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 2 January 1819; Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 14 January 1819; Barros Arana: \textit{Historia}, XII, 200. It has not been possible to get figures for gunners for this cruise, so they have been included with seamen in the calculations, but it is probable that the one-sixth shorthandedness that appears if marines are excluded.
When the ships came back to Valparaíso after this cruise, and as the discontents of the seamen over pay began to develop, they would leave their ships by tens and scores, so that by May 1819 the Vice-Admiral was obliged to warn the Marine Department that the ships of the squadron were at hazard for their shorthandedness and "are now driving almost in an abandoned state about the Bay." Enlistment of men for the second campaign, as has been shown, proved extraordinarily difficult with the government, besides authorising the press, trying to reduce the permitted number of foreign seamen on Chilean trading vessels to force them to enlist in the state's ships. Basically, the problem of manning for Lord Cochrane's second cruise was a financial one, that the government lacked funds to pay off men for enlistments completed and give them a bounty on re-enlisting. Another factor which affected enlistments, however, was that higher standards of recruitment were imposed. The result was that while seamen do seem on the one hand to be relatively reluctant to enlist, it is also true that recruitment was carried out among a smaller pool of men. Though this policy presented manning difficulties, it did have some justification in Lord Cochrane's eyes: "Since we have got rid of the condemned people," he wrote just after sailing, "there appears to reign good humour and cheerfulness amongst the Chileneans..." 24

In the later stages of Lord Cochrane's second cruise, after the calculation would rise further if the gunners could be excluded too, and the calculation made only on the basis of the seamen.

24 MM vol 21. Lord Cochrane to de la Cruz, 6 May 1819; MM vol 2. Decreto de Gobierno, 4 August 1819; MM vol 29. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 21 July 1819; Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 18 September 1819.
return from Peruvian to Chilean waters and after four and a half months' cruising, during which a number of men had been lost from a typhus epidemic on the Peruvian coast, the complements of the Chilean ships are available. The O'Higgins at the beginning of February 1820 had 260 seamen aboard instead of the 310 she should carry. What proportion of the 50 marines she should carry were actually aboard is unknown. At the same time, the San Martín had 379 men aboard instead of 460, making her between one-fifth and one-quarter short of her complement as a whole. As her actual complement included 104 marines instead of 80, this meant that the proportion of seamen is slightly lower, nearer to one-quarter than to one-fifth short. The Lautaro's complement stood at 293 men, not far short of her standard of 310, though she was carrying more than twice her complement of marines, 99 instead of 40. The Independencia had 210 men on board instead of 260, and was one-fifth short of complement as a whole. Like the Lautaro, her complement of marines, at 79 men, was almost twice the standard of 40, so that she was carrying barely more than half her proper complement of seamen, 131 instead of 220. The Araucano had 95 men on board, not far short of her complement of 110. She was carrying the correct number of marines, and her seamen were about one-sixth short, 69 instead of 83 men.25

With the expiry of their times again in February 1820 and the consequent exodus of seamen, especially foreign seamen, from their ships, the squadron once more faced the problems of manning. The Lautaro and the Independencia, for example, could not be got under

25 Guarda: Toma, 68-70; MM vol 7. Paylist of the San Martín, 4 February 1820; Paylist of the Lautaro, 3 February 1820; Paylist of the Independencia, 3 February 1820; Paylist of the Araucano, 3 February 1820.
Way from Valparaiso at the end of that month for lack of hands to work them, while at a more specialist level, Spry, when in compliance with orders received he discharged the first lieutenant of the ship. Recruitment was carried on quite energetically for the Liberating Expedition notwithstanding the competing claims of the army and the transport ships contracted to carry it, so that when the squadron sailed in August 1820, the ships were not too far short of their full complements. The O'Higgins carried 300 men (normal complement 300), the San Martin 450 (460), the Lautaro 242 (310) - this seems to be the only ship seriously under strength - the Independencia 225 (260), the Chacabuco 150 (127), the Galvarino 140 (127), the Araucano 90 (110), the Pueyrredón 60 (105) and the Montezuma 65 (63). The total number of men on the ships should be 1861 and was in fact 1722. How far the pattern hitherto noticed, of an excess of marines making up the numbers, so that the seamen are fewer in reality than in appearance, might obtain in this case is difficult to establish, as the only list of marine complements for all the ships which has been found refers to 30 June 1820, a little under two months before the sailing. In that intervening period the numbers of marines on the ships could have changed quite significantly. In the case of the Lautaro, for example, which is the only ship for which a full manning list at the time of sailing has been found, the list of June 1820 gives the ship 40 marines and the manning list at the time of sailing gives 71. Given then, that inferences about the number of marines on the ships in August 1820 based on the list of June 1820 are likely to err on the side of too few marines, so that the following figure is a plausible approximation rather than an exact number, the number of marines at the time of sailing was not less than 406 where it should have been 316. There were consequently 1316 seamen in the ships on the Liberating Expedition,
which was 229 men short, about one-sixth, of the complement of 1545. 26

There is a substantial gap of a year before the next indications can be found of the strength of the squadron. In the intervening period the maladministration and disputes which bedevilled the Chilean squadron during the Peruvian campaign were such as to prevent any possibility of detecting the evolution of the manning from the relatively favourable position of August 1820 to the grave position of September and October 1821. By that time, however, almost all the foreign seamen had abandoned the squadron in disgust over the pay and conditions they endured in this campaign. When the O'Higgins sailed from Callao at the beginning of October, she had only three foreign seamen on board. The gradual depletion of the marine complement by desertion, death and disease left only 100 effective troops available throughout the whole squadron at the beginning of September. Cobbett, who had by then become captain of the Valdivia, gives the number of men in the squadron, in round numbers, as 1200. At this time, the strength of the squadron, taking it to consist of the O'Higgins, Valdivia, Lautaro, Independencia, Galvarino, Araucano and Mercedes, should have been 1500 men. In other words, it was 300 men, nearly a quarter, under strength, although at that time the crews of the San Martin and Pueyrredón, after the loss of their ships had been redistributed around the fleet. This shorthandedness was

able to be remedied before the squadron left Callao for Lord Cochrane's last cruise, for political reasons, and though attempts were made to recruit more seamen in Guayaquil in November, they do not seem to have been successful. When the O'Higgins entered Callao for the last time in May 1822, an officer who went aboard the ship reported that the crew numbered barely more than 200 men, including only five Chilean artillerymen.27

As far as a pattern is detectable, then, in the adequacy of the manning, it seems to be the case that with the exception of Blanco's campaign, the Chilean ships suffered from perennial undermanning of between one-sixth and one-quarter. They were usually sufficiently well-manned during campaigns to execute their duties, and a particular effort, largely successful, was made to give them sufficient crews for the Liberating Expedition. Outside the period of formal cruising, they tended to be reduced to a condition approaching complete ineffectiveness. The principal ships tended to be manned up to the middle of 1820, with a superior quality of seaman (the foreigners), while the smaller ships tended to carry a more complete complement and mainly Chileans. In and from the end of 1820, the manning problem tended to deteriorate sharply as the foreign seamen abandoned the service. By late 1821, there were barely sufficient men to keep the ships working. The role of the Chilean seamen, finally, though perhaps relatively small in 1819, in the period as a whole was perhaps

27AVM vol 89. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 30 September 1821; Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 5 October 1821; CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to Monteagudo, 4 September 1821; CP doc 805. Cobbett to Lord Cochrane 4 September 1821; ACH, IX, 91. De la Cruz to San Martin, 7 May 1822.
larger than has often been assumed.

ii Discipline, morale and relations on shipboard

In the previous section an attempt was made to express in numerical terms the social structure of the Chilean squadron under Lord Cochrane. In this section an attempt will be made to explore the patterns of this social milieu at the formal level of discipline, the semi-formal level of morale and the informal level of shipboard relations, with a view to clarifying the questions of how and how successfully discipline was imposed and maintained; what particular difficulties influenced the establishment of efficient discipline; what peculiarities of social relationships existed in the ships given the unusual nature of the complements, especially from the Chilean point of view where the Chilean fleet was officered and in large part crewed by foreigners; and how these affected the development of good morale in the fleet.

At the outset of Lord Cochrane's commission, responsibility for the imposition and maintainance of discipline lay in the hands of the Captain of the Fleet, a post for which training and experience were indispensable and to which Lord Cochrane's client Robert Forster was appointed as long as the post lasted, which was only until the conclusion of the first cruise. After this cruise the responsibility for discipline shifted to the captains under the general supervision of the Vice-Admiral. An early problem was that of which disciplinary code should be adopted in the squadron, the British one with which the officers were most familiar or the Spanish one which conformed more to the habits and expectations of the greater part of the seamen. This urgent question was raised by Lord Cochrane, in the context of calling courts martial, on his first full day in command of the fleet,
though the government proved dilatory in coming to any conclusion on the matter, he had to raise it again in July and a decision was not made until August of 1819. The recommendation of Zenteno, the Minister of Marine, was that the squadron should operate two disciplinary ordinances, the British code being applied to the British and North American seamen and the Spanish code to the Chilean seamen. Zenteno's recommendation was in fact accepted and decreed by the government soon afterwards. Subsequently, in September 1819, a further decree laid down that all foreign seamen should come under the British naval rules except for Spaniards, who were to come under the old Spanish ordinance with the Chileans. Whether these dispositions were actually carried out in this form is doubtful, however. By August 1819 the squadron and its officers had had eight months and a cruise to Peruvian waters to establish on an ad hoc basis the disciplinary procedures they proposed to adopt in their ships, and some incidents of discipline to be noticed below suggest that the general tendency of the British officers was simply to apply the British ordinances universally in their ships. It would be as logical to do this as it was to enforce the practice of carrying on "The whole of the duty in the squadron..." in the English language.

Discipline then was concentrated in the hands of the ships' captains. This necessarily makes it difficult to generalise about the

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29 NSA, 332. Hardy to Croker, 17 May 1821.
level and nature of discipline because it became so much a reflection of the attitudes and training and experience and ability of each individual ship's commander. What were they individually like? John Thomas has left on record his views about some of them. Of Lord Cochrane's capacities in this field, he had some doubt: "(his) extraordinary mind does not appear formed for those small details, a strict attention to which is indispensably necessary for the maintenance of good discipline..." he wrote, and later remarked in almost identical words that from the state of the Admiral's ship one would suppose "that the grasp of Lord Cochrane's mind was too large to be able to lay hold of those minutiae which constitute the very essence of discipline." Of Carter, he wrote: "in all the details of naval discipline he probably has the advantage of his Lordship..." and of Guise: "as a disciplinarian he ranks much beyond Lord Cochrane..." while he considered Forster to be a competent officer in matters of discipline. Spry, finally, received Thomas' approbation. In consequence of his ability: "...there was no Ship in the Chile navy in better order or in a higher State of Discipline than the Galvarino ..." In fact Spry has left his own credo on discipline: "I have been taught to esteem it of no small importance in the character and usefulness of an officer an ambition to gain by humane treatment officer-like conduct and good discipline the confidence, respect and attachment of his officers and men And that haughtiness and pride... severe and brutal treatment whether in words or actions are sure to lose the confidence and be despised by both..."30

The Vice-Admiral and his captains might aspire to impose a regular and orderly discipline in the fleet, but it was with variable success depending on the element - officers, foreign seamen and native seamen - to which it was applied. The documentation suggests that in fact the most ill-disciplined and insubordinate group in the navy was the officer corps, by comparison with whom the seamen were relatively docile and amenable to discipline. The ill-discipline of the officers took several forms, going ashore contrary to orders, assertions of independence from the Vice-Admiral, unreliability when not directly under him, and squabbling with each other.

There were prohibitions on officers going ashore and on their travelling up to Santiago, prohibitions not regularly but frequently broken. In November 1819 for example Ramsay was arrested for going up to the capital from Valparaíso, apparently to solicit promotion, leaving his ship the Chacabuco without a captain. On the night of 10 June 1820 three unnamed English officers of the squadron landed from a boat without lights at the Arsenal landing beach of Valparaíso. This was contrary to the regulations to control contraband, which stipulated that boats must carry lights after dark and could land only at the Resguardo, as well as to the regulations about officers of the squadron going ashore. An army patrol therefore challenged the officers, who then assaulted the soldiers and inflicted a severe bayonet wound on one of them. This incident led the commander of the National Guard battalion in Valparaíso, Colonel Mariano Palacios, to complain to the Governor next morning that "the manner of the English towards the soldiers of this Nation is contemptible, and

they seek to use their authority to disregard the Governor's orders. In August 1821, Prunier - under arrest and waiting for a court martial after a dispute with Lord Cochrane - left the squadron and went up to Lima. Because by this time the antipathy between Lord Cochrane and San Martín was deepening and their break imminent, it proved impossible for the Vice-Admiral to have him re-arrested and sent back to the squadron.

From time to time officers attempted to assert their independence of the Vice-Admiral. Robert Casey did so when in command of the Chacabuco in October 1820 for a while, though on this occasion it was with the government's support in a decree appointing the ship to operate independently of the squadron. Carter in December 1818 made difficulties about sending men from the Intrépido to help with the work of putting the O'Higgins into seagoing condition. He resisted Lord Cochrane's commands on the grounds that he and his ship and crew were dependent upon the Buenos Aires government and though attached to the Chilean fleet to give it naval assistance, were not obliged to assist in the commissioning and maintenance of the Chilean ships. In July 1821 Prunier of the Pueyrredón claimed that he was dependent directly upon the orders of the Chilean government and not subject to those of Lord Cochrane. It was this claim that led to his being put under an arrest for insubordination.

32 CP doc 479. De la Cruz to Lord Cochrane, 11 June 1820.
33 CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to Monteagudo, 15 August 1821.
34 MM vol 2. Decreto de gobierno, 14 October 1820.
35 MM vol 5. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, December 1818.
36 CP doc 260. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 12 July 1821.
When not under the immediate command of the Vice-Admiral, the captains became laxer and inclined to treat their orders in a cavalier fashion. Ramsay in the Chacabuco, for example, was sent at the end of 1819 to take despatches down to the fleet supposed still to be at Callao. Instead of directly prosecuting his mission, he turned aside to attempt an attack on 5 January 1820 on Ylo, with the object of plundering the place, and lost valuable time. In April 1821 Carter in the Araucano was supposed to be maintaining the blockade on Callao, but instead went off on an unauthorised chase of a strange sail with the result that several vessels were able to slip into or out of Callao harbour. A report from Callao to London, probably by a British naval officer, a few days later observed that "The blockade is badly kept when Lord Cochrane goes away for any business along the coast... He does not appear to be well-supported by his Captains."  

Finally, the officers were inclined to spend as much time in squabbles amongst themselves as in working together. Lieutenant Bailey was arrested in 1819 for letting men go ashore from the San Martin contrary to orders and also for alleging in public that his captain, Wilkinson, was afraid to meet the enemy. Lieutenant Foord Morgell was an inveterate troublemaker. In September 1819 he

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37MM vol 35. Charles to Lord Cochrane, 19 May 1820

38CP doc 2017. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 6 April 1821; CP doc 2054. Lord Cochrane to Carter, April 1821.

39The Times, 7 September 1821. Report from Callao of 8 April 1821.

publicly charged that Carter of the *Intrepido* was a coward and a defrauder of the public treasury. What is notable is that Morgell was not courtmartialed for this astonishing piece of insolence but instructed by Lord Cochrane to make an apology to Carter. A few months later, in April 1820, the first lieutenant of the *O'Higgins*, Cobbett, complained to Lord Cochrane about Morgell's insubordination and insolence, and a year after this Crosbie complained again of Morgell's insubordinate behaviour towards himself and Cobbett. Ramsay in February 1820 was accused by his captain of marines, Charles, of drunkenness in the face of the enemy. In fact Ramsay and Charles twice had a stand-up argument on the quarterdeck of the *Chacabuco* in front of the ship's company, which resulted in Charles challenging Ramsay to a duel and Ramsay putting Charles under close arrest. So far as can be established, neither of these were court martialed though serious charges could be made against both for drunkenness on duty and for insubordination. In October 1820, when Delano as commandant of transports sent orders through the captain of the *Argentina* to Woolridge of the *Aquila* for him to help in watering the *Argentina*, Woolridge told the captain of the latter that, as Delano reported indignantly to Lord Cochrane, "he might go to hell, "

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41CP doc 559. Carter to Lord Cochrane, 8 September 1819; CP doc 577.
Cobbett to Lord Cochrane, 18 April 1820; CP doc 584. Cobbett to Lord Cochrane, 4 May 1820; CP doc 758. Crosbie to Lord Cochrane, 18 April 1821.

42CP doc 563. Charles to Lord Cochrane, 28 February 1820; CP doc 565
Charles to Bennett, 6 March 1820 and 20 March 1820; CP doc 572.
Ramsay to Lord Cochrane, 14 April 1820; CP doc 573. Charles to Ramsay 18 March 1820; CP doc 574. Charles to Lord Cochrane, 16 April 1820.
with my orders, and directed the Capt of the Argentina to Say that I myself might go there. Also... instead of his Attending to my Order (in person) Spent the most of the day in Sailing about the bay for pleasure..." Woolridge does not seem to have suffered for this offence, and he next appears in August 1821 as a Lieutenant in the Lautaro newly under arrest for taking boats into Callao without orders, and then moved on to the Valdivia as an officer in early 1822, once more under arrest, though not courtmartialled, for some unspecified misdemeanour. 43

In a general way the flaws in the standard of discipline of the officers was the result of the inferior quality of this necessarily improvised and adventurist group of men. The quality was recognised tacitly in 1820 by the government when the Minister of Marine issued orders that the captains and other officers were to remain aboard their ships and sleep there, to ensure that discipline was sustained and adequate supervision existed. 44 It was recognised overtly by Cobbett in April of the same year when he summed up the disciplinary problem as he saw it: "Since I have perceived the materials of which the Chilean Navy is composed, and known your wish as to the conduct to be pursued: I have invariably made it my study to avoid disputes as much as possible with my inferior officers and have in many instances given in to their errors..." 45


44 CP doc 240. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 8 June 1820.

45 CP doc 577. Cobbett to Lord Cochrane, 18 April 1820.
Undoubtedly a major contributory factor in the general indiscipline in the officer corps and periodic restlessness in the fleet was the long drawn out struggle between Lord Cochrane and Captain Guise between 1819 and 1821. The progress of this dispute carries large implications for the fleet in general and throws a good deal of light on its functioning, and therefore deserves examination in detail. Its origins lay in real or imagined grievances on the part of Guise, and in Lord Cochrane's response to these, mainly in 1819 and early 1820. In the first place Guise had hoped to secure the command of the squadron for himself before Lord Cochrane's arrival in Chile and Lord Cochrane was suspicious and resentful of this, and discriminated against Guise in the making of appointments. Robert Forster thus got the appointment of second-in-command of the squadron. Guise accused the Vice-Admiral of showing partiality to a relative, Lord Cochrane in reply affirmed that he had promised the appointment to Forster before ever they left England and before they knew of Guise's being in Chile. In the second place Guise resented the treatment accorded him in the matter of the Independencia, the command of which he had been promised by the government, but which he did not receive when she arrived in Chile in mid-1819 because of Lord Cochrane's wish that the ship should go to his protege Forster. In the third place Guise resented what he considered to be the unfair distribution of prize monies in 1819 and discrimination against him in the matter of paying the ships' crews. He charged Lord Cochrane with impropriety in doing double duty in the second cruise as Admiral of the squadron and captain of the O'Higgins and thus both taking larger shares of the prize money available and depriving other deserving officers of the opportunity of holding a post of
honour and profit in the fleet. 46

These tensions emerged in 1819. In the middle of 1820 they burst out into the open. In June of this year, said Miller, "The squadron was divided and agitated by the conflicting parties of Cochrane and Guise. These originated in bickerings on some unimportant points of etiquette and were carried to a length which proved highly detrimental to the service." Nor, he felt, did the dispute reflect credit upon either of the principal parties. 47

The trouble began on 9 July when the paymaster was ordered to pay the crews of the ships in order of seniority. For reasons which are unclear - possibly he understood seniority of ships to mean antiquity of service under the Chilean flag rather than rank in the fleet - instead of starting with the flagship O'Higgins, he went aboard the Lautaro and began to pay the crew there. Lord Cochrane at once sent orders to Guise to stop the payment of the Lautaro's crew until Lord Cochrane's orders were complied with to pay the O'Higgins. Guise however did not receive this order until payment was under way and as there were signs of sharp discontent amongst the crew he judged that it would be best to finish paying the 21 foreign seamen, all whom the funds available would be sufficient for. 48

46AVM vol 104. Lord Cochrane to Guise, 19 December 1819; CP doc 900.
Guise's statement of complaints, 1819; CP doc 1912. Lord Cochrane to Guise, 19 December 1819.


Two days later the Vice-Admiral formally laid charges against Guise before the Minister of Marine. It was a formidable list. Guise, he charged, had failed to carry out his duties of controlling ships approaching the port when the Lautaro was doing her tour of duty; he had ignored signals to go to the assistance of a Chilean vessel in distress; he had given false reports of the appointments and dismissals he had made on the Lautaro; he had ignored the Vice-Admiral's instructions regarding the order of payment of the crews; he had failed to comply with the general orders for the captains to send in reports on the states of their ships; and he had allowed his officers to go off the ship and even leave the port. Guise, he affirmed in a covering letter, was a complete example of insubordination and neglect of duty. If he was not courtmartialled, threatened Lord Cochrane, he himself might have to resign. At the same time that he laid his charges against Guise, moving with great promptitude he ordered Spry to take charge of the Lautaro as acting captain. While there is no reason to doubt the truth of the charges against Guise - Guise himself never actually denied them and Lord Cochrane gave chapter and verse for each one - it appears very much as though the Vice-Admiral was using the charges to get Guise out of the captaincy of the Lautaro so that he could appoint Spry in his place and thus keep him from the O'Higgins, the captaincy of which he was disputing with the Government at that moment. ⁴⁹

The government were reluctant to countenance such a proceeding. A public airing of personal disputes in the squadron would only serve to accentuate the differences that existed, and a court martial would be bound to lead to a delay in the work of fitting out the expedition against the royalists in Peru. On the latter ground, and evidently not taking seriously Lord Cochrane’s threat of resignation, Zenteno ordered the release of Guise, his restoration to the command of his ship and the appointment of Spry to the O’Higgins. He præemptorily required this order to be carried out within three hours. In subsequent orders he disposed that the papers relative to the charges should be sent to the Auditor of Marine’s office – in other words, allowed to gather dust. As soon as Lord Cochrane received these instructions, he carried out his threat. On 12 July he wrote, first privately to O’Higgins then officially to the Minister of Marine, returning his commission and charter of citizenship and disclaiming his rights to the hacienda he had been given in gratitude for the conquest of Valdivia. The tactic had its desired effect. Zenteno wrote on 14 July in a more mollifying tone that the Vice-Admiral’s return of his commission, citizenship and hacienda had deeply affected the Supreme Director, to whom the act seem “inappropriate.” Guise however had in turn demanded a court martial, so proceedings would continue. In the meantime, Zenteno hoped that Lord Cochrane would withdraw his resignation.


The government remained reluctant to initiate proceedings against Guise, however, and after a few days worked out a possible settlement. On 19 July Zenteno wrote again to the Vice Admiral. The dictates of policy and the interests of the nation, he affirmed, must sometimes override the strict rule of justice. A court martial would delay the preparations of the squadron and jeopardise the expedition to Peru. The needs of discipline had been satisfied by Guise's having been held under arrest, and he could be relied upon to do his best once back at sea. In a second letter to accompany his defence of the order to suspend Guise's court martial he offered a quid pro quo, the withdrawal of Spry's appointment to the O'Higgins. In yet a third letter he invited Lord Cochrane to come up to the Palacio Directorial - O'Higgins was at this time in Valparaíso participating in the preparations of the expedition - to discuss privately with the Supreme Director this matter. O'Higgins' smooth and tactful manner achieved what was necessary, in combination with the proffered compromise, and the next morning Lord Cochrane advised Guise of the suspension of his court martial and his restoration to the Lautaro. Guise, though, succeeded in wresting more than his return to the status quo from the embarrassed government. He complained vigorously on 21 July that he had been made the victim of "a few frivolous and vexatious charges, preferred at a particular time to serve the private views, and gratify the personal resentment of the Commander in Chief," and he demanded that the matter of his court

martial be properly settled. In response to his pressure the government on 26 July officially decreed the suspension of his court martial, and - to compensate him for his tribulations - promoted him to the rank of Capitán de Navío.\textsuperscript{53}

The collective work of getting the liberating expedition off to Peru and the needs of naval operations for the first few months pushed the dispute between Lord Cochrane and Guise into the background. Indeed there was even a short-lived reconciliation between them on the occasion of the taking of the Esmeralda in November 1820. By an irony, however, the cause of their reconciliation was also the origin of the last and most bitter phase of their dispute.

This last phase began on 2 February 1821 when five of Guise's officers in the Lautaro, Lieutenants Robert Bell and Henry Freeman, Surgeon James Michael, Assistant Surgeon Hugh Kernan and Purser James Frew, wrote to Lord Cochrane to object to the renaming of the Esmeralda as the Valdivia. The new name was to commemorate Lord Cochrane's conquest of that place, however the Lautaro officers complained that the name was inappropriate as it brought to mind the conquistador of Chile, Pedro de Valdivia, and the yoke of Spanish colonialism he imposed upon the country rather than ideas consonant with the struggle for independence and liberty.\textsuperscript{54}

What the motives of these officers were in signing the letter is obscure. Did they realise that Lord Cochrane would see this as an

\textsuperscript{53}GM vol 30. Guise to Zenteno, 21 July 1820; CP doc 279. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 26 July 1820; CP doc 280 Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 26 July 1820;

\textsuperscript{54}CP doc 688. Bell and others to Guise, 2 February 1821.
act of gross insolence and insubordination? Were they egged on by Guise in the hope that Lord Cochrane's prestige and authority could be weakened by such an attack? Or did they sincerely believe that the renaming of the captured ship Valdivia was a matter of political importance and a betrayal of their liberal ideals? Whether they expected it or not, the effect of the letter was farreaching. When Lord Cochrane read it, he became "much agitated" and, on 18 February sent orders to Guise to put the offending officers under arrest for contempt and insubordination. At this point Guise intervened to support his officers' right to express their opinions, opinions, he considered, which were not subversive of the Vice-Admiral's authority. Lord Cochrane's reply was to order Guise to send the officers to the Potrillo under arrest and prepare to receive new officers appointed by Lord Cochrane. Guise at once offered to resign his command, asserting that he could not work with strange officers.55

Lord Cochrane was evidently taken aback by this and reluctant to lose Guise from the fleet. He would be "hurt and grieved," he said with evident sincerity, if Guise gave up the Valdivia. But on the other hand, he was determined to put an end to "cowardly malevolent insinuation and illveiled insolence" from the officers who signed the letter. Guise, though, would not agree to resume his command without his officers: "After having tendered to your Lordship my hand" he told Lord Cochrane on 20 February, "and that you had declared every-

thing to be buried in oblivion I did not expect a repulse in the matter in question..." For two days Lord Cochrane tried to persuade him to resume his command, four times sending a letter of appointment to the command to him, Guise as often returning it, first declaring that he would put the whole matter in the hands of San Martín, the commander-in-chief, then on 22 February claiming he had been superseded, refusing to weigh anchor and finally turning the ship over to his first lieutenant, Shepherd.56

Spry now entered the affair. On 22 February Lord Cochrane ordered him to rendezvous with him off Chorrillos. Spry however, failed to get his ship under way and shortly afterwards sent in his resignation from the Galvarino on the grounds that Guise was his patron with whom he had come out from England and entered the Chilean service to serve for such time as Guise might.57


In contradistinction to his treatment of Guise, Lord Cochrane moved at once to make Spry's exclusion from command effective. Crosbie was ordered to take charge of the Galvarino and when Esmond, acting on his instructions, tried to take over the brig and was met with a blank refusal of the foreign seamen to weigh anchor - a refusal which Esmond believed resulted from Spry's having roused the men against him - Lord Cochrane sent Crosbie to arrest Spry and, because he said the men were disaffected, to clear the guns of the O'Higgins for action and bring the Galvarino up under her starboard beam. The foreign seamen were swiftly redistributed, the starboard watch into the O'Higgins, the larboard into the San Martín. Throughout these operations Spry defended himself boldly. As for himself, he said, Lord Cochrane's threat to courtmartial him had no force. Since he had been superseded by Crosbie, he was automatically on half pay and therefore not subject to martial law. As for his ship, "there is not a vessel at the moment under Your Lordship's orders in a higher state of discipline or more ready for service than the brig was" he affirmed. Crosbie confirmed the truth of this claim; when he went aboard the Galvarino, he said, contrary to his expectations of a disaffected crew, he found all "in perfect good order and obedient."58

The trial of the Valdivia officers was held on 1 and 2 March 1821. Lord Cochrane refused to see the accused men before the court martial, despite their request for an interview to express their respects to him, on the grounds that "I have seen too much of the


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world not to see their Intentions," and affected to find even their reported conversations in the gunroom of the *O'Higgins* seditious. The court martial, in the *San Martín*, was for three charges of disrespect and unofficerlike behaviour; in fact, it quickly degenerated into an absurd quarrel about whether Pedro de Valdivia was a scoundrel or not. In the night after the first session of the court Michael and Kernan escaped from custody but were recaptured. Michael's explanation of their reluctance to continue attending the court was that the trial "is one of the most extraordinary examples of the Obstinity of passion and its triumph over the most solemn duties of a public character..." To Lord Cochrane he attributed "a Rancour of mind unpardonable in ordinary antipathies..." After this the verdicts were not surprising; Michael and Frew were ordered to be dismissed the service, and Bell, Freeman and Kernan were ordered to be dismissed their ships, reprimanded and recommended for reappointment. Spry was court martialed immediately afterwards, on 3 and 5 March, for insubordination and ordered to be expelled - "I could have had him shot!" Lord Cochrane declared vengefully afterwards.59

Lord Cochrane believed that he had now separated Guise and his clan from each other and tried to reincorporate Guise into the fleet, either by bullying him - when Guise requested on 4 March that he and Spry be allowed to leave for Huacho, Lord Cochrane forbade their departure on the grounds that the royalists might hear of new operations he was contemplating against Callao if anyone went ashore at this time, or by dangling the bait of prizes before him - on 12 March he offered his ship back to Guise with the news that he was preparing an attack.

59 CP doc 711. Courtmartial of Bell and others, 1/2 March 1821; CP doc 712. Courtmartial of Spry, 3/5 March 1821.
on the Spanish 74-gunners expected in the Pacific. Guise offered to resume service under him. Even San Martín was induced to intervene to write to the Vice-Admiral on 16 March that Guise and his officers had agreed to resume their service and he hoped that Lord Cochrane would consider reappointing them for the good of the service and because of the shortage of officers in the squadron. Lord Cochrane agreed to reappoint them, provided that they went to other ships than Guise's. Guise and the officers remained adamant that they would serve only with each other, and San Martin's intervention came to nought, succeeding only in adding another point of discord in the already delicate relations between Lord Cochrane and the generalissimo.

At length, on 3 April, Lord Cochrane ordered Guise to be taken ashore to Huacho in conformity with his wishes. A British officer of the Owen Glendower summed up the events in a letter to London: "there is a party against (Lord Cochrane) in the squadron, under a captain Guise, who has been trying to undermine him, and has at length received his deserts by being got rid of, though a brave officer." 60

Establishing the rights and wrongs of the Cochrane-Cuise dispute and apportioning blame is almost impossible. On the one hand Lord Cochrane could, once his command of the squadron was established in 1818, have treated Guise more fairly than he did. Guise had legitimate grounds for grievance. On the other hand, Guise himself cannot be acquitted of the charge of inflexibility and prideful obstinacy. From an inauspicious start, matters went from bad to worse. Each new collision exacerbated personal antipathy and became grounds for further dispute. The real significance of the dispute, though, is that what began as personal antipathy was allowed to grow until it had larger consequences, in poisoning the relations between Lord Cochrane and the Minister of Marine, Ignacio Zenteno, and in contributing to the deterioration of relations between Lord Cochrane and San Martín. Its effects in creating a general restlessness and indiscipline within the officer corps have been noticed already.

Disciplinary problems amongst the crews arose from other causes and were different in the cases of foreign and native seamen. The basic problem was summarised by Lord Cochrane in April 1820: "Nothing can be more difficult than to manage materials as heterogeneous as those which compose the Squadron; men of different countries, customs and religions; men whose suspicions are easily alarmed, and whose interests cannot be ignored with impunity; but, they will be able to be reconciled (with the service) if they are properly directed..." On the whole, he had high hopes for the standard of discipline which might be able to be imposed, though they were hopes not entirely fulfilled, for a year later he expressed the view that: "I have had in truth a disagreeable office to perform and in many cases have found my inability to reconcile persons with a service
composed of such discordant materials and contending interests."

Up until the departure of the fleet for Peruvian waters with the liberating expedition in 1820, the foreign seamen were less inclined to acts of indiscipline and more likely to be reliable than the native seamen. Where acts of indiscipline occurred, they tended to be simply concerned with matters of pay, as for example in February 1820 when the Minister of Marine tried to get Blanco's division back to sea to go down to the Peruvian coast. The foreign seamen whose times had expired refused to work their ships and demanded a re-enlistment bounty, and the sailing had to be suspended. Later, in May, the petty officers and master seamen, that is the foreign, of the San Martín petitioned collectively to be paid and with the covert support of their officers refused to weigh anchor for Coquimbo. The embarrassed government first coincided with the Vice-Admiral in deciding to courtmartial the inciters but then, realising that they were faced with the threat that the ships would be immobilised for lack of skilled hands to work them, backed down and produced sufficient funds to persuade the seamen to return to duty. Such a policy was ruinous. If the seamen, especially the foreign seamen, only received their pay when they threatened to become unmanageably insubordinate, then insubordination would perpetually threaten the squadron. Lack of pay was also a standing temptation to plunder.


Indiscipline in fact became more evident after August 1820 when the squadron was in Peruvian waters, and especially as the year's engagements drew to an end in August 1821. Discontent among the foreign seamen at this time reached such a pitch that the officers found it difficult or impossible to get the men to perform even routine tasks necessary to keep the ships in seaworthy condition. By September, so enfeebled had the resorts of discipline become, that the mutinous crew of the Lautaro simply abandoned their ship in a body. In the Valdivia the foreign seamen mutinied and Cobbett had to put them ashore to prevent bloodshed in the ship. The O'Higgins' crew were only prevailed upon to work the ship at the point of the bayonet, and the Calvarino was immobilised by the refusal of her crew to work the ship. It was during 1821, too, that the tendency to resort to plunder was accentuated. The seamen, primarily the foreign seamen, had engaged in plunder before, in November 1819 when they sacked Santa and Nepeña, and at Valdivia in 1820, but in 1821 it became normal for them to sack all towns and villages they got possession of.63 At the same time the officers made less effort to control these propensities. In March and November 1819 during patriot descents on the Peruvian coast, troops were landed expressly to prevent plundering by the seamen, and in April of that year, when seamen of the O'Higgins plundered the church in Paíta, the

culprits were publicly lashed and financial reparations made to local priest. As for the Chilean seamen who made up a substantial part of the ships' complement, the state of their discipline and morale in the earlier part of the period under review was conditioned by the strong resentment of the foreign officers and seamen that many of them felt. The case of the Chacabuco when her crew mutinied in early 1819 is indicative. The ringleader of the mutineers, the Chilean boatswain Miguel Gallardo, told the officers that "we will not serve under your Command nor with any squadron commanded by foreigners; we were much better off under the King, than under the English Government, which we have now in all our Ships"; and to shouts of "viva la patria" - not, significantly, "viva el rey" - and "death to the English" the crew took over the vessel. Nor was the navy popular with the people of Valparaíso in 1819 and 1820. When Lieutenant Drinot of the San Martín had his hat stolen in September 1819, he experienced much hostility and obstruction from the populace in his attempt to recover it. A few months later in early 1820 the naval officers in Valparaíso found themselves obliged to send a formal letter to Blanco Encalada about the hostile attitude of the Governor of Valparaíso, de la Cruz, and the soldiery in general to the naval men. Round about the same time, Lieutenant Robertson of the Valdivia found when he went ashore in pursuit of some deserters from the ship that the soldiers in the port openly assisted the deserters to find a place of safety and obstructed his search party. Officers of the squadron who wandered the streets...
of Valparaíso at night were liable to be assaulted. 65

There seem to be three motives for the resentment the Chileans felt towards the foreigners. In the first place, they disliked the air of superiority which the British assumed towards them, an air of superiority exemplified in Lord Cochrane's condescending observation in a private letter that "the military service on shore is almost a guerrilla, though it is tolerable afloat, the officers being almost all Englishmen..." It was this sort of attitude, though Lord Cochrane was not the worst offender in this, which led the crew of the Chacabuco to complain that Carter, the captain, thought they were stupid and treated them with contempt. And it was this sort of attitude which led to Grenfell's insolence in May 1820 when he was ordered to get some wood from the naval warehouse. He tried to seize it without showing any authority and when the Governor, de la Cruz, went to remonstrate with him, snapped his fingers at de la Cruz' authority and in the ensuing altercation twice knocked the Governor's hat out of his hands. 66


66 MM vol 9. Carter's preliminary report on the Chacabuco mutiny, 29 January 1819; CP doc 469. De la Cruz to Lord Cochrane, 3 June 1820; CP doc 470. De la Cruz to Lord Cochrane, 6 June 1820; CP doc 471. Tortel to de la Cruz, 6 June 1820; CP doc 472. De la Cruz to Tortel, 3 June 1820; CP doc 1918. Lord Cochrane to Cochrane, 10 April 1820.
Religious antipathies added to Chilean hostility. The foreign seamen showed an obvious disrespect for the Catholic persuasion. In November 1819 when the patriots were in Santa, the foreign seamen sacked the local church, not merely plundering it for valuables but throwing down sacred images from their niches and cooking their food on the principal altar. In the priest's house adjoining, they wrecked the furniture and tore up the papal bulls of indulgence they found. The Chileans showed a corresponding contempt for the protestants.

Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna relates a story which was still in circulation in the Quintero area in the 1870's, of a ship which was wrecked on the coast at Ritoque "when Lord Cochrane was lord of the Pacific and of Quintero", on which occasion an English mariner, a protestant, was drowned. The seaman's companions were able to save their lives and buried the washed-up body of their shipmate just off the beach by some rocks close to the path along the shore used by the changos and arrieros, the itinerant peddlers and muleteers, of the district. It soon became the habit of many of the local people, when travelling that path, to pause to urinate over the place where the anonymous seaman reposed, a custom locally described as "doing one's devotions with the Englishman..."\(^7\)

Mostly, however, Chilean resentment was provoked by the harsh and brutal discipline introduced into the ships by the British. The Sergeant Major of the marine battalion, Juan Ramón Gormaz, complained

\(^7\) Documentos inéditos, 18-19. De la Puerta to Las Heras, 30 November 1819; Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna: La edad de oro en Chile (1881, 2nd edition, Santiago, 1968), pp 276-277. Vicuña Mackenna, who mentions Wooster as having witnessed this, considers the whole affair to be an example of the "barbarous fanaticism" of "those remote times."
bitterly in February 1820 of the brutal treatment accorded his marines who were lashed against the guns for trivial misdemeanours. When he remonstrated, he was told by the captains that English naval rules applied on board ship, "laws which have been unknown to us up till now." Not long after this racial antipathy and British attitudes to discipline caused trouble on the San Martín. The first lieutenant of the ship was maltreating a Chilean marine, "dragging him about the deck and beating him as if he was a servant," for some unknown offence. In the absence of his superior officer, the Chilean sublieutenant of marines in temporary command demanded the return of his marine and a brawl broke out between the English seamen and the Chilean marines. Only the firmness and presence of mind of another officer prevented a really bloody affray taking place and the incident gave rise to bitter complaint about the attitudes of the officers and men to the marines. Following this brawl, the Governor of Valparaíso wrote confidentially to the Minister of Marine that notwithstanding the San Martín was the best served and best disciplined ship in the fleet at the moment, discipline in the ship was so bad that it was not safe to have her in the port.

The brutality of the discipline led to attempts by the Chileans to circumvent it and in turn to further disciplinary difficulties. On 21 May 1820 the ship's cook of the Lautaro was drunk and insolent to the duty lieutenant, William Mathews. Mathews ordered the cook up on deck and told a Chilean boatswain's mate to "start him with a rope's end." The boatswain's mate asked him instead to pardon the cook.

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68 MM vol 27. Fuensalida's report, 24 March 1820; MM vol 27. De la Cruz to Zenteno, 4 April 1820; MM vol 35. Gormaz to O'Higgins, 11 February 1820; CP doc 187. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 10 April 1820.
Mathews repeated his order, and the boatswain's mate carried it out, but without using any force, so Mathews seized the rope's end and struck the boatswain's mate. At this point Guise intervened to reprimand Mathews for unofficerlike conduct, subsequently arresting him and ordering him to leave the ship. 69

Brutality of discipline sometimes became outright cruelty. The prize captain John Jarvis, charged with the Victoria prize to be taken to Chile in the middle of 1819, so savagely mistreated his crew, which included several negroes, that a number of them died and most of the rest had to be hospitalised on arrival at Coquimbo. In October 1822 the crew of the Lautaro, then under the command of Wooster, mutinied against the discipline to which they were subjected and the harshness of their treatment by the officers. Transito Hernández, the mutineers claimed, had received four dozen lashes with the end of the main sheet. Félix Palacios had had his face, neck and throat cut open with a rope's end and had been knocked down the main hatchway. Fifteen men had been hospitalised with similar injuries. The acting first lieutenant, Williamson, was notorious for his cruelty, especially when drunk, and had been responsible for the death of one man by keelhauling - a savage and barbarous punishment long out of use in civilised countries. Two seamen, a marine and a boy, claimed the mutineers, had died from the ill-treatment they received on the Lautaro. 70

69 CP doc 606. Mathews to Lord Cochrane, 3 July 1820.

The effect of factors like these was that the creation of discipline and morale amongst the Chilean seamen took some time. At first their role in the ships was not distinguished. When the Lautaro went into Callao during Lord Cochrane's first cruise in 1819 to board a Spanish ship, the marines refused to do their duty, laid down on the deck and would not move. Desertion lists of 1819 tend to consist almost exclusively of native seamen and in August of that year Lord Cochrane wrote that in his view the Chilean seamen on the San Martín were not "of good faith." He considered this, though, to be mainly the result of having criminals and convicts included in the ships' complements. It should also be pointed out in justice, that in the case of the Chacabuco mutiny of January 1819, it was a group of eight or 10 Chilean marines who supported and made possible the officers' attempt to recover control of the ship.71

The improvement in the morale and general quality of the Chilean seamen began to be noticed in late 1819. The change is exemplified by the action of the disgusted Chilean ensign of marines of the Chacabuco in January 1820, when Ramsay in a state of drunken timidity hesitated to take his ship into Callao Bay to reconnoitre, who told the other officers that if Ramsay would not do his duty then they would take command of the ship and sail into the bay "for the honour of their country." And as the foreign seamen became less numerous and less

reliable once the squadron went down to Peru in 1820, there was an increasing reliance on the increasingly reliable Chileans. When desertions from the Squadron reached epidemic proportions in September 1821, it was the Chilean seamen who remained faithful to their duty, Lord Cochrane reported to Santiago. Earlier he had told Monteagudo that he must keep the Chileans aboard the ships as they were "the only element in which I can place any confidence." This was in the warships, of course - in the transport San Fernando, at the same time, all the Chilean seamen mutinied, sacked the ship and then abandoned it. 72

In a general way, though the pattern of discipline varied from element to element in the squadron and from time to time, a sufficiently effective rough-and-ready discipline and morale was able to be maintained in the ships during most of the period under review. If it has seemed from the foregoing that there has been too much stress on factors tending to erode discipline, then to adjust the balance it is worth quoting the views and judgements of some observers. Commodore Bowles at the end of 1819 described the Chilean squadron to his successor, Hardy, as "tolerably respectable." In April 1821 an unnamed naval officer reported that Lord Cochrane's "ships are clean and in good fighting order, but in no great discipline..." However, the officers

of the *Andromache* at the same time considered that "His Lordships force was in a most efficient state..." Finally, the American agent Prevost summed up the achievement of discipline in 1819 in words that can stand for the period as a whole: "when I take into view the materials with which he had to operate, I think he deserves infinite praise for having maintained the Sovereignty of the Ocean. He had difficulties to encounter in the organisation of the marine and in the discipline of the Crews that would have appalled a less determined character - Men of every grade and description assembled from different Parts of the Globe for the purpose as much of plunder as of promoting the cause of freedom have by his address firmness and perseverance been subdued into perfect order and now enable him to assume an attitude that awes all resistance at Sea..." His assessment lays perhaps too exclusive an emphasis upon the Vice-Admiral and not enough on his subordinate officers, though on the other hand it is clear that their contribution to the disciplining of the fleet was less than it should have been. Prevost also sees more the success of the process of disciplining, the "perfect order", and perhaps would be more restrained in his judgement had he been writing in late 1821 or 1822 when discipline was suffering acute strains in the squadron. Yet his judgement is not essentially incorrect.

73 *NSA*, 286. Bowles to Hardy, 25 December 1819; *The Times*, 7 September 1821 (Report from Callao of 8 April 1821); *The Times*, 3 September 1821; Manning: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, II, 1040. Prevost to Adams, 13 September 1819.
CHAPTER SIX

CHILEAN NAVAL ADMINISTRATION 1818-1823

The social structure and social evolution of the Chilean navy have been examined in the preceding chapter, and it is necessary now to turn to its institutional structure and examine the workings of the general administration of naval affairs in Chile. The starting point is the fact that a naval squadron was, even more than an army, dependent upon its base administration if it was to work at the peak of its capability. If the naval administration is functioning well, if it is able to carry on the orderly and long term management of the human and technical resources required, then the squadron may function well in its turn. If on the other hand the naval administration is functioning badly, then the efficiency of the squadron is impaired and it must supply by improvised and haphazard means those elements of organisation which it lacks. No amount of improvisation, however, can really correct the damage thus done to a mechanism as complex and delicately-balanced as a squadron of early 19th century sailing warships. If then a sound naval administration can be said to be of central importance to the operations of the Chilean navy, it is pertinent to ask how sound it was. In this chapter, therefore, it is intended to describe the structure of Chilean naval administration and point out some structural weaknesses in it; and to examine the way in which the naval administration functioned in the period under review, showing that it suffered from serious defects and malfunctioning; and finally to indicate some of the effects that this malfunctioning had on naval affairs.

Under the overall authority of the Minister of Marine, José Ignacio Zenteno, the naval organisation of the Chilean state was divided
in a rough and ready fashion into four main sectors: that of the Commandant General of the Marine Department, that of the Governor of Valparaíso, that of the Auditor of Marine, and that of the Vice-Admiral of Chile. The last of these sectors was concerned with seagoing matters and naval operations, and does not lie within the province of this chapter. The other three constitute the matter to be examined.¹

The Chief branch of these was that of the Commandant General of the Marine Department, a post which was not officially created until July 1819 though it existed in an empirical form by the time of Lord Cochrane's arrival in Chile. As the title implies, the Commandant General enjoyed the general executive authority in naval affairs on shore where it pertained to the supervision of the state's arsenals and dockyards, and to the administrative branches of the navy department. In practice, the post of Commandant General was joined to that of Governor of Valparaíso and both exercised by the same official, so that the Commandant thereby enjoyed the authority of the Governor of Valparaíso as well. Given that the post was not properly created until the middle of 1819 and that there was not a proper definition of the functions of the Commandant General when it was formally set up, it is evident that how the tasks of this office would be carried out depended very much on what they were considered to be by the occupant.²

¹The description of the formal structure of the navy department which follows is based, besides the documents which are cited, on a general review of the work which the various sections have been noticed as undertaking, and which has been described in other parts of this thesis.

²NM vol 25. Senate decree, 29 July 1819.
Under his authority, the Commandant General had two sub-divisions of the marine department. The first was the Commissary General of Marine, for which we are fortunate enough to have an organising ordinance. This ordinance was not actually drawn up until late in 1823 to come into effect in 1824, after the period under review, nevertheless it is relevant to the earlier period as it formalises what existed then and serves as a guide to the pattern of organisation which officials had in their minds and were working towards. According to this ordinance, there were to be two commissioners of the marine, the Commissary Accountant and the Commissary Treasurer, who were together to be responsible for budgeting, supplies, payments and hospitals. They were to be appointed by the supreme government and were to depend on it. This is a modification, in the earlier period they depended on the Commandant General, though with some responsibility to the Ministry of Finance. They would have the equivalent rank of Capitan de Fragata and would execute their office with the assistance of four subordinate officials and a clerk. In the middle of each month, they were to review the arsenals and the ships to take account of the number of men in them, and on the 20th of the month draw up review lists of naval and auxiliary personnel. They were to keep the warehouses stocked and properly guarded and provide victuals for the ships of the state.

Together with and under the presidency of the Commandant General of the Marine Department, the Commandant of the Arsenal, and an officer of the marine they were to form a committee, the Junta Económica, charged with the arrangement of all contracts and purchases for supply and provision of the navy.3

3NM vol 8. Garrido's naval ordinance, 6 November 1823.
Just as attention has been drawn to the fact that the Commandant General's post was created in the middle of July 1819 and then not properly defined, so it may be remarked that this ordinance for the Commissary department was not drawn up until 1823, and that up to then the department functioned without a full and adequate form of organisation. Three other points should also be noted. Firstly, the Commissary department had not one but two heads with authority divided equally between them. Secondly, the wide range of duties allocated to the Commissioners and the fact that this department held the purse strings of the navy department as a whole and was the section through which the funds were channelled, meant that although technically equal to other departments, such as the arsenal, it was in reality the senior of the sub-divisions of the navy department and necessarily the pacemaker for the others. Thirdly, the Junta Económica is an innovation, up until 1823 there was apparently no committee of department heads on these lines, departments being left to deal independently and perhaps at cross-purposes with the problem of contracts and supplies.

The second sub-division of the Commandant General's department was that of the Commandant of the Arsenal. This department was charged with the organisation of the arsenal and dockyard, responsible for the construction and repair of ships, the procuring of naval stores and supplies, their warehousing and storage, and the provision and maintenance of port facilities for the port captain and the ships. Like other departments, the arsenal existed as a practical reality, at least in an exiguous form as will be seen, but without receiving a formal definition of its range of functions and modes of operation. When the Commandant of the Arsenal was asked for a note on the working of his department in March 1819, he responded tartly that "I have been told that I am commandant of Arsenalas, the organisation of this vast
Body has not yet been laid down..."4

The remaining two sections of the navy department were much less significant than the Commandancy General and its sub-divisions. The Governorship of Valparaiso, as has been seen above, was subsumed under the functions of the Commandant General. As far as the naval service was concerned, the Governor's relevant functions were those of port captain of Valparaiso and general supervisor of Chilean ports. His other functions as a political and administrative officer of the state did not concern the naval service directly, though it is worth noting here that the time the Governor of Valparaiso spent on his non-naval duties was time taken away from the Commandant General of the Marine Department and from naval administration. The Auditor of Marine, finally, represented the judicial department of the naval service, responsible for the legal constitution of courts martial, for provision of documentation on behalf of the fleet to the prize courts, and for legal matters arising from relations with the shipping of other nations where it concerned the state's ships. The post when Lord Cochrane arrived in Chile did not exist in the form of an ordinance, nor were its duties anywhere properly and fully defined.5 The department of the Auditor of Marine would normally, as a judicial department, be of some importance but in fact was relatively unimportant, partly because with the practical application of British naval rules to the running of the fleet the specialised Spanish legal knowledge and training which the Auditor had was of little relevance, and partly because there was a deliberate attempt in the fleet to reduce the Auditor's role in naval affairs, as will be seen below.

4NM vol 18. Tortel to Vergara, 5 March 1819.

5NM vol 10. Alvarez to O'Higgins, 20 February 1819.
Such was the formal structure of the naval department. Before going on to examine the workings of the departments mentioned, the general point may here be made that the naval department suffered from a major structural defect, that it was not formed prior to and as a basis for the organisation of a fleet, but concurrently and even in a sense after the fleet. When the fleet was already in existence, in other words, the naval administration upon which it depended was still in process of emergence. The full strain of naval administration in wartime was placed upon the naval departments before they were ready to take it, and the result was extensive malfunctioning of the navy department bureaucracy.

The Commandant General of the Marine Department, Luis de la Cruz, was in a position to ensure that the offices under his supervision functioned efficiently by active and frequent intervention. In fact, he was reluctant to act on his own initiative or authority and viewed his office simply as a bureau through which orders were channelled down from the Minister of Marine, and requests and papers were channelled up or across from the two departments beneath him and from the Vice-Admiral. It was characteristic of him that when Lord Cochrane complained that the Commissary of Marine had been asked for stores "of the most urgent necessity" repeatedly, but had not provided them, and asked de la Cruz to intervene and do something, his only action was to forward the letter to the Commissary. As for his talents as an administrator, the notable confusion and disorganisation that prevailed in the Valparaíso custom house which was directly under his authority gives a clear indication that these were not large.6

6 EM vol 26. Lord Cochrane to de la Cruz, 7 January 1819; EM vol 5. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 30 December 1818.
Given the slackness of the grip at the top, it is not surprising that inefficiency, disorder, delay and dishonesty prevailed at lower levels. This was especially the case in the Commissary department, and unfortunate in view of the key position it occupied in the edifice of naval administration. The complaints about the malfunctioning of this department are numerous. Before Lord Cochrane's arrival, Zenteno told the Vice-Admiral in the middle of 1819, funds placed in the hands of the Commissioners were not applied to the needs of the ships but to finance and pay themselves and to pay debts owed to individuals. With the arrival of Lord Cochrane it was the government's intention that a tightening-up of the financial administration should take place to prevent money destined for the squadron from being diverted to other uses. For this reason the government emphasised the need for the Commissary to keep accurate and up-to-date budgets and reviews. There is no evidence that such a laudable reform was able to be instituted, and rather that it was subverted by continuing inefficiency and the hostility of the foreign captains. Of the day to day workings of the Commissary, de la Cruz wrote curtly in November 1819 that "up till now nothing has been done in order" and he amplified this a month later: the department, he warned Zenteno, was in a state of utter disorganisation. The books were not kept properly so that the movement of funds could be inspected and controlled. The officers of the department did not attend the office regularly and it was often closed when it should be open, or the officials who the naval people wanted to see were not in attendance. The correspondence files were not properly kept and there was confusion about what letters were sent and received and on what

7CP doc 51. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 8 July 1819.
subjects. The department's officers in the ships of the squadron, the _contadores_, were equally lax: they might not be present in the ships to carry on the duties, and if they were the monthly reviews of the ships and crews they were supposed to take were not taken, the accounts were not made up and submitted, they failed in their duty to inspect all supplies as they were brought aboard ships, they were untrained so that even if they did make up their books, it took the commissioners of accounts weeks to put them in order. In fairness to the _contadores_, though, it should be pointed out that they were working under particular difficulties, which will be discussed below, from which the officials actually in Valparaíso were exempt. For the latter's part, the government itself contributed to the disorder it deplored by issuing preemptory orders for a task to be carried out or a ship to be provisioned for a special mission, and instructing the Commissary to apply whatever funds might be available regardless of what they might have been budgeted for.

A major contribution to the disorder in the Commissary department was a power struggle that occurred in it in 1819. The joint chiefs of the department were Santiago Campino, a bureaucrat from colonial times who claimed to have worked for eight years in marine administration, as Commissary Accountant, and Mateo Arnaldo Haeve, an ex-mayor of Santiago, as Commissary Treasurer. In mid-1819 these two expended

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8 NM vol 26. De la Cruz to Zenteno, 19 November 1819; De la Cruz to Zenteno, 12 December 1819.


10 CP doc 213. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 13 May 1820.
their energies, precisely at the time when the squadron's first cruise under Lord Cochrane was being concluded and when the second cruise was in active preparation, in a bitter dispute about their authority vis-à-vis one another and denunciatory letters to higher authority. "This arrogant man", Campiño complained of Haeve to the government, "executes everything as he sees fit, he puts no value on my judgement, he claims to enjoy the protection of the Vice-Admiral..." and Haeve countered with accusations that Campiño was not doing his job and did not even come to the office. Both demanded that the government confirm their authority and determine which of them was the subordinate officer. The government in fact avoided coming to a decision and the dispute might have continued indefinitely had not Haeve abruptly sickened and died on 12 August 1819. When Felipe O'Reilly, Haeve's successor as Commissary Treasurer, arrived to take up his post after a two months' delay he found a "total disarray (in) the books and other papers of the different branches which the Commissary of Marine embraces." But with Haeve's death Campiño was left as chief of the department and O'Reilly seems to have accepted that the Treasurer's was a junior post to the Accountant's. This was a tacit personal arrangement, however, between the two men, and Campiño continued to press upon the government his proposals for an ordinance for the department, the greater part of which he devoted to affirming that there must be one supreme functionary in the department and to defining and delimiting the duties and prerogatives of the Treasurer as closely as possible. The effects of such a dispute upon administration may be readily imagined.

11NM vol 18. Campiño to O'Higgins, 14 June 1818; Campiño to O'Higgins, 16 July 1819; Haeve to O'Higgins, 29 July 1819; O'Reilly to O'Higgins 7 October 1819; Campiño to Zenteno, 3 December 1819.
The commissioners' office was in the same state of disorganisation at the end of the year 1819 as it was at the beginning, and it was not until 1820 that some sort of order and system began to appear in its work, but by then it was too little and too late, work was so behindhand that it could never be properly made up and a fixed antipathy established between the naval officers and the navy administration.

The immediate effect of such disorder and conflict in the Commissary department, and the most visible, was the delays which occurred in the workings of the navy department. Campiño himself admitted when he took charge of the Commissary's office in February 1819 that the work of the department was already behindhand; he contributed to the delay by - instead of settling to work through the backlog which at this date was not large and could have been disposed of reasonably quickly without harm to the current work in the office - spending his first two weeks in office preparing a discussion paper of his observations on the navy department. From then on the delays became perpetual, so that in mid-1819 Campiño was still writing to the Minister attempting to clarify who was entitled to what pay for the expedition against the María Isabel and regretting that his department's work was falling seriously behind. In July 1820 when the government had a set of formularies printed for the use of contadores when preparing their states of the ships, having sent them to the Commissary for distribution to the ships, it was subsequently necessary for Zenteno to write sharply to them expressing the Director's displeasure for their "lack of attention" in distributing the papers as instructed.

On another matter, in March 1820 the government had decreed that all solicitudes and petitions from the marine were to be dealt with in the first instance by the Commandant General of the Marine Department - which meant by the Commissary since de la Cruz would simply transmit
the papers there - instead of going up to Santiago and wasting time there. In August of the same year, however, a further decree had to be issued, this time an order that documents passed to the Commissary of Marine should be returned at once without delay to the office of the Commandant General for further action. It was such lack of diligence and promptness that provoked Lord Cochrane's outburst to Zenteno: "Away with Siestas, and Godsfeast and fast days. Let all attend to their duty, without the monstrous interruptions and delays that take place, especially in the public departments."12

The Commissary of Marine functioned slowly and inefficiently, but at least it functioned; the Department of the Arsenal can hardly be said to have had more than a notional existence. It was in the charge of the Frenchman Juan José Tortel who was formally commissioned as Commandant in March 1819, though he had been carrying on the duties of the post for some time already. Essentially these duties consisted of creating the department of which he was the head, and for most of 1819 he struggled to do this without success. In fact, he was grossly overworked. De la Cruz wrote confidentially to Zenteno in November 1819 that Tortel was discharging the duties of port captain and those of commandant of marine as well as his own work as commandant of the Arsenal. This was too much for a single official, and Tortel was unable personally to oversee all his duties which had to be left to untrained subordinates. De la Cruz recommended the appointment of extra

officers, and himself took over officially the post of Commandant General. 13

On paper the Arsenal was a substantial department. In July 1819 it had a list of 52 clerks, officers and marines and seamen for the Valparaiso gunboats which came under its authority. A year later, in July 1820, it was listed as 45 officers, clerks and men. 14 In fact its resources and facilities were exiguous. When in March 1819 Tortel was ordered to arm the vessels Elena and Dolores for the service of the port he replied that it was out of the question. The ships had only skeleton crews on board and these had seen no pay for seven months. Without money it was impossible to man the ships. At the end of the first quarter of 1819 none of the work teams - carpenters, sailmakers and ironsmiths - had been formed because of the absence of skilled men and the absence of money to pay them. Some key items of equipment were unobtainable: because telescopes could not be got in Valparaiso and the Arsenal had none, the signals of the lookout posts on the hills behind Valparaiso were unreadable down in the port. On the other hand, for the equipment which the Arsenal did have its storage facilities were inadequate. The largest warehouse available in Valparaiso had been requisitioned for the Arsenal, but it was still too small and much of naval stores had to be left outside at the mercy of the weather. Among the booty from the María Isabel was more than 1000 good European muskets. Because there were no storage racks and no grease in the

13 MM vol 26. Tortel to Zapiola, 5 April 1819; De la Cruz to Zenteno, 19 November 1819, MM vol 2. Decreto de gobierno, 5 December 1819.

14 MM vol 7. List of employees of the arsenal, 28 July 1819; Wages list for the arsenal, 15 July 1820.
Arsenal they were left lying ungreased on the floor and within a few months were beginning to rust and threatened to become unusable.\textsuperscript{15}

For several months Tortel struggled against these difficulties, but by the middle of September 1819 the want of funds, men, equipment and facilities had paralysed the work of the Arsenal. The workmen were eight months in arrears of wages in the Arsenal itself. The lookout posts had been abandoned as their occupants sought other means to live. In the dockyard the workmen had stopped reporting for work and work had to be suspended. Many of the skilled artificers and workmen had been taken by the squadron to make up the complements of the ships of war. After this time the Arsenal seems to have lapsed into inactivity, with a few modest tasks able to be carried on by unskilled labourers constituting the extent of its work apart from the simple maintenance of the storehouses themselves by a small staff of those who remained with the department. Cruz reported to Zenteno in June 1820 that he could not go to the Arsenal without feeling ashamed at the manner in which he had to persuade the men who were still coming to their work at the Arsenal to continue coming with what he knew were empty promises that they would soon be paid their desperately-needed wages.\textsuperscript{16}

An inefficient bureaucracy, lack of wages or money, inadequate secure facilities, all invited theft and dishonesty. Lord Cochrane himself affirmed that "The sad result of all this (lack of pay and

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{MM} vol 26. Tortel to O'Higgins, 26 March 1819; Tortel to Zapiola, 5 April 1819; Tortel to Zenteno, 7 May 1819; \textit{MM} vol 15. Tortel's report, 22 December 1818.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{MM} vol 26. Tortel to Zenteno, 19 September 1819; \textit{MM} vol 27. De la Cruz to Zenteno, 6 June 1820.
administrative incompetence) is, even now, that not only the seamen, and soldiers, but the officers themselves take advantage of all the opportunities that are offered to steal the contents of the prize vessels, and even to plunder the provisions of the ships of war..." Some officers went even further, according to Cruz, and working in collusion with officials on shore succeeded in stealing sails from the ships and selling them in the port. At the Arsenal there was no wall around the area so that stores left outside the warehouse, which was too small to accommodate them all, were too easily the objects of thefts and pilfering and could not be made secure. This in fact led Lord Cochrane to propose that the smaller and more valuable naval stores might be kept in the cellars under his Valparaiso house for safe keeping. Frauds in the supply of provisions and medicaments were constant. In Talcahuano in early 1820 Lord Cochrane ordered three boats to be built but subsequently, he reported to Zenteno, in the port the government supplies and stores were used to build boats for private sale. Bad management and dishonesty foiled too the government’s plans to stimulate boatbuilding at the mouth of the Maule river southwards of Valparaiso with a view to building up a proper shipyard there. Small boats had been built there for a long time, and in December 1818 an American by the name of John Norrell arrived under contract to build steam launches as well as other boats for the state’s service. His ignorance of the Spanish language and consequent inability to make himself understood was only one of the difficulties under which

the Maule yard laboured. The shortage of funds to buy shipbuilding materials and pay the workmen, and the untrained nature of the workers, meant that after six months work neither of the two steam launches had been built and only eight of the 32 ordinary boats ordered existed. In July 1819 Lord Cochrane wrote to Zenteno to complain about the lack of progress of the work, and Zenteno in reply authorised the Vice-Admiral to take himself the necessary measures to forward the work. The boats which did exist were ordered to be sent down to Valparaíso for use in the coming campaign. One of the English artificers from the fleet, Joseph Mosser, was sent by the Vice-Admiral to the Maule to report on the progress of the boatbuilding and supervise it where necessary. He found when he arrived at the end of August that Morrell now had one of the projected steam launches actively under construction, but only the keel and stem-and stern-posts of the other had been laid down. Some smaller boats were in a half-finished state. Morrell however refused to acknowledge Mosser’s commission from Lord Cochrane to intervene the work. Shortly after this, Ignacio Barrigan took charge of the Maule boatbuilding and he too refused to accept Mosser’s commission, saying that a commission from Lord Cochrane was of no consequence against one from the Director, such as he held. All that Barrigan did, in fact, was to finish the four most nearly completed boats. Besides this, according to Mosser, he sold off iron from the government stock and used the government-employed labourers to build small boats which he sold privately. At length the government decided that it was hopeless to continue trying to run a properly-supervised yard at the Maule in the face of continued and irrepressible inefficiency, theft and embezzlement, and on 28 December 1819, exactly a year after Morrell’s arrival, ordered the naval yard to be closed down and its activities transferred to Valparaíso for better supervision. No enquiry
was held into Barrigan's activities while in charge, and he was subsequently appointed to command the launches being sent to Peru with the Liberating Expedition in August 1820, for use in bays and harbours. Work ceased on the two projected steamboats and they were still notionally under construction two years later in the Valparaiso yard, in June 1822. 18

The boatbuilding programme at the Maule gives one illustration of the effects of the malfunctioning of the bureaucracy. The case of the fitting-out of the Intrépido offers further illustration of this effect and throws light as well on some of the personal tensions which affected the fleet. The Intrépido was an 18-gun brig of 380 tons sent from Buenos Aires to assist the Chilean squadron. The crew, picked Irish and English seamen recruited by Thomas Carter in Buenos Aires, were paid up to the time of her sailing on 21 September 1818. 19 The ship did not participate in Blanco's cruise against the María Isabel but was in Valparaiso during the preparation of Lord Cochrane's first cruise. The brig, however, had sustained considerable damage in the passage from Buenos Aires and by early January it was evident that she would not be


19 WM vol 4. Carter to Guido, 3 October 1819.
able to sail with the rest of the squadron when it left. Lord Cochrane therefore ordered the brig's crew to be transhipped to the O'éigí, which gave rise to an altercation between Carter and the Vice-Admiral, the latter remarking that Carter had learned his logic "in the bogs of Ireland" and Carter retorting "not in the most gracious manner" that "he had understanding and firmness enough not to be made dupe of a Stock Exchange hoax, that any attempt to take away his crew wd. be resisted by force" and putting his hand to his sword. The Supreme Director himself was obliged to intervene to smooth over the two officers' ruffled tempers. Carter was persuaded to accept the transfer of his crew on the Buenos Aires agent's approving it, a skeleton crew was left in the ship and Carter himself first attached in an undefined capacity to the Marine Department, then on 9 January 1819 given command of the Chacabuco with its untrustworthy and ill-disciplined crew. With this ship and crew Carter participated in Lord Cochrane's first cruise.

After the departure of the first division of the squadron, Blanco had the Intrépido surveyed in February. Between repairs and refitting, provisioning and arming, and levying a crew, it was estimated that between eight and nine thousand pesos would be necessary to get her ready for sea. Because the ship was a Buenos Aires vessel it was not possible to buy what was needed on credit, and the ship had brought no funds of her own to pay for outfitting. The Chilean government had to raise the money and deposit it with the Commissary of Marine on behalf

20 AVM vol 104. Thomas: "Historical Sketch of the Chilean Navy."

of the Buenos Aires government. Blanco was trying to fit out his own national ships at the same time, so that though the Intrépido was made seaworthy by early March it was impossible to supply her with provisions as what there was was taken for the national ships. Blanco's division therefore sailed on 17 March without the Intrépido.22

The brig lay deteriorating in Valparaíso until the end of May when Carter returned from the first cruise with Blanco's division and resumed command of her. For the next few months he struggled to get her equipped for sea to participate in the operations of the fleet. When Zenteno himself was in Valparaíso in the month of June 1819 and easily accessible to Carter and the Marine Department, work on the ship was able to go ahead. But when the Minister went back up to Santiago at the end of that month work came to a halt again. "I have never" wrote Carter early in July, "received any assistance in the equipment of this Vessel either from The Officers or The Commandante de Marina or The Comissary, as they say they have not yet received any written orders from you."23 After a week's delay the Minister's orders came down to the port and as it now seemed possible that the Intrépido might soon be ready for sea, her officers or other Buenos Aires officers, were ordered to rejoin her, and 28 of the Argentine troops who had just arrived in Independencia were transferred to her.24 But notwithstanding Zenteno had issued orders to proceed with the fitting out, the Intrépido could

22 AM vol 5. Blanco to Zenteno, 12 February 1819; Blanco to Zenteno, 4 March 1819.

23 AM vol 13. Carter to Zenteno, 8 July 1819.

24 CP docs 54, 55. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 17 July 1819; CP doc. 66 Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 20 July 1819.
not sail with only officers and marines aboard, and Carter had to appeal to the Supreme Director to intervene and order the money to be made available to him to raise 50 seamen "as I have not one sailor on board". If the seamen could be raised, he affirmed, he would be able to sail within three weeks. At almost the same time, however, Lord Cochrane was recommending to the government that the Intrépido should be sold to raise funds to pay off her crew, and between the conflicting appeals and requests the government did nothing. Three weeks after Carter's letter to the Director, the ship was still not ready for sea, and he began to fear that Lord Cochrane was going to have to sail for a second time without her. In an attempt to make the government assume a more urgent responsibility for the ship, he now asked that she be incorporated by the Chilean state into its own squadron. If O'Higgins would give the appropriate instructions to the Commissary, Carter promised, he would man the Intrépido immediately.

Another month went by and the squadron sailed for its second cruise to Callao, but the Intrépido was not among the ships. Carter was still trying to get her ready for sea. By 3 October he had the brig manned and armed, but the Commissary had not yet received the orders for provisions to be supplied, orders without which they would not act, and Carter wrote plaintively to the Minister that "as an officer who has served constantly in the English marine since the year 1797 the long delay of four months which I have suffered in Valparaiso has been truly lamentable to my way of thinking..."


26MM vol 13. Carter to O'Higgins, 14 August 1819.

27MM vol 13. Carter to Zenteno, 3 October 1819; Carter to Zenteno, 8 October 1819.
Part of the problem of fitting out was the lack of supplies and provisions and part the slow-moving caution of the Marine Department. The stores and equipment asked for were simply not to be found in the storehouses of the Arsenal. They could not supply ship's boats, of which the Intrepido required two. They could not supply capstan spikes for raising the anchor. They could not supply handpumps for clearing the bilges. They could not supply sailcloth. They could not even supply national flags. There were no shakoess and no shoes for the 30 marines. They could supply only three bluejackets instead of 30. They could, though supply 30 pairs of trousers, provided that black serge was acceptable in place of blue linen.28

In late November Carter complained again to O'Higgins that notwithstanding his orders for the despatch of the brig, it was still without stores, provisions or medicines and all his attempts to get the Commissary and Commandancy to do something to put the fitting-out forward were met by the answer that they were waiting for replies to their letters to Santiago. As soon as the stores, provisions and medicines should arrive, declared Carter, the Intrepido "will be ready in every respect, to proceed to Sea, at an hour's Notice!" In the meantime, however, the enforced delay in the port meant that he was beginning to lose seamen by desertion from the cramped inactivity of the vessel.29 The government was making a final effort to get the ship

28 MM vol 4. Correspondence between Forster and various members of the marine department between 14 September and 23 November 1819; MM vol 7. Requisition for the marines of the Intrepido, 28 October 1819.

to sea. When the Commandant General wrote to Santiago that the supplies demanded by Carter did not exist in the warehouses, Zenteno asked whether they were of such absolute and indispensable necessity that the Intrépido could not put to sea without them. Tortel in the Arsenal confirmed that everything asked for was indispensable and at length, on 27 November, the government ordered the supplies to be transferred to the Marine from the artillery park. By this means about a third of the supplies were got, and about a half were able to be purchased privately in Valparaíso. The remainder were not to be procured anywhere, but sufficient provisions had been scraped together for the Intrépido to be sent to sea, though with a crew five months in arrears of wages, totally destitute and inadequately clothed.30

After a fitting out which had lasted for a year, the Intrépido with 75 officers and men aboard31 at length sailed out of Valparaíso on 28 December 1819 bound for Concepción. The real irony of her protracted fitting out lies in the fact that the cruise so painfully prepared was destined to last barely more than a month, for the brig joined Lord Cochrane in Talcahuano in January 1820 and participated in the attack on the forts of Valdivia of 4 February, but on 5 February ran aground in Corral bay and was totally wrecked.

Different commentators attributed the disorganisation of the marine department to different causes. Campiño in February 1819 drew up a


31. MM vol 7. Review of the Intrépido, 1820

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paper of his observations on the functioning of the navy department,
in which he identified the first difficulty with which he had to contend
as the lack of monthly reviews or reports from the ships of supplies
and provisions. This arose because of the failure of the British offi-
cers concerned to draw them up, and he complained that "the commanders
of the Ships have not taken care to observe the regulations by the
arbitrariness with which they dispose of the interests of the State at
their pleasure..." Besides this recalcitrance of the foreign officers
his work was hampered by the shortage of trained personnel in the
offices, Campiño affirmed. The work of the department was already
behind schedule and as all the orders he received seemed to be urgent,
it was difficult to determine priorities and plan ahead.\textsuperscript{32} In retros-
pect from 1823 Campiño was inclined to emphasise the role of the Vice-
Admiral rather more: "When the squadron was formed," he wrote then,
"this commissary presented... regulations adequate for the security of
the branch of finance in all its parts these were approved by the
Supreme Government and put into effect in the time of rear-Admiral
Blanco. With the arrival of vice-Admiral Cochrane all these measures
were thrown out of order notwithstanding the multitudes of requests I
issued for good order (to be kept): such that they have remained till
now is the state of which I write and of which Your Excellency has
yourself been ocular witness to."\textsuperscript{33} Campiño's loyal subordinate,
Bernardo Vergara, was inclined to stress the problem of expertise in
the maladministration: Campiño "took charge of the weighty and diffuse

\textsuperscript{32}vol 18. Campiño: "Observations relative to the circumstances of
the Ministry of Marine of Valparaiso and its associated dependencies",
16 February 1819.

\textsuperscript{33}vol 15. Campiño to Zenteno, 6 June 1823.
tasks of his office" he reported, "entirely lacking assistants on whom he could rely. All the officials in the diverse branches which This Commissary embraces lack if not all at least a great part of the expertise which they require..."34

From the office of the Governor of Valparaíso the view was a different one. The basic faults of the arsenal and the commissary were seen as shortages of the proper personnel and defective administrative structure, particularly the latter. From this, said Zenteno in 1823, when as Governor he reviewed the work of the department, "proceeds the absolute disorder in which the warehouses are to be found, which need now more than ever a methodical and regulated management..." In the commissary master books for the ships were not kept, the ships' inventories were most of them lacking, the monthly reviews of ships and crews were not taken. "In short, there is and has been the same disorder in this branch..." De la Cruz when Governor in 1819 had suggested that there be one commissioner of marine rather than two and had seen administrative reconstruction of the department as the key to the solution of its difficulties. His suggestions had not been put into execution in the intervening time, but in 1823 Zenteno still agreed with this view. His main recommendation for reform was that a central headship should be established for the department under a marine officer with the authority to direct and instruct the commissary department. "He is the kingpin (muelle real) of all the machinery of the Department... Let us imagine an army without a general staff... without a General, without a Quartermaster etc, and you will have an idea of the actual state of our Squadron..."35

34MM vol 18. Vergara to Zenteno, 27 November 1818.
35MM vol 26. De la Cruz to Zenteno, 19 November 1819; MM vol 41. Zenteno to Echeverría, 29 October 1823.
There was a difference of nuance here. De la Cruz wanted to enhance the authority of the Commandant General. But at bottom both recommendations aimed at the same end, of eliminating weak and divided authority.

Lastly, from the fleet Lord Cochrane saw the problem, characteristically, as one of incompetence in the shore bureaucracy as a whole. He wrote to the Supreme Director in 1822 that "...in the charge of the stores & Naval Department there must be some one who knows what he is about - Cruz'es Brother (i.e. Luis de la Cruz whose brother Anselmo de la Cruz was in the Ministry of Hacienda), and such like people, it would be better to pay two fold to do nothing, and keep themselves out of the way... Never-never-never will your service go on, without ruinous expense and risk, if people like these have the control in Maritime affairs. With all respect too for Zenteno, he knows no more of what is wanting for the ships, and is no more judge of the propriety of any demand, than the Bishop of Santiago." 36

Different people attributed the disorganisation of the navy department, then, to different causes. Campillo was inclined to see it in the recalcitrance of the foreign officers. Zenteno saw it in the lack of properly defined authority. Lord Cochrane saw it as the incompetence of the functionaries. And, as has been shown above, other factors also intervened: the lack of funds and lack of every kind of equipment to which Tortel drew attention, and the struggle for power in the Commissary department which led to irrecoverable delay in the naval business at a critical time. The government was unable to relieve these problems of bureaucratic malfunctioning and apparently

36 AVM vol 89. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 1 July 1822.
did not even try to do so, except once and in a small way by making an appointment for the execution of a single task by a single officer without regard to bureaucratic niceties: this occurred when in May 1820 Lord Cochrane complained about the slowness and incompetence with which the supplying of the ships for the Liberating Expedition was being conducted. The government's response, on the recommendation of de la Cruz, who wished also that Lord Cochrane should discover for himself that the supplies he demanded really did not exist in Valparaíso, was to put the supplying of the ships for the expedition directly into his hands, so that the Vice-Admiral had to concern himself even with the trivia of administration. Lord Cochrane's subsequent complaint that the state's probeador or checker was failing to check and certify the weight of supplies as they were brought to the squadron, led to an extension of this solution. In July, in an attempt to correct the "scandalous disorder" of the procedures for supplying the squadron, the government ordered Victorino Garrido, the official mayor of the commissary, himself to attend daily to the provision of supplies, to check the quality and quantity going aboard against contractors' notes and to impose efficiency and economy.\(^{37}\) These two moves represented an effort by the government to circumvent rather than confront existing administrative difficulties by appointing an officer to carry out a specific task with an overriding authority over the organs which were supposed to do the job. While this, however, might enable a specific task to be carried out as a short term measure with possibilities of success, in the longer term it made no contribution to improving general

bureaucratic efficiency and in fact probably exacerbated existing problems of inefficiency, delay, demoralisation and confusion. These half-hearted attempts at solutions are understandable while the state was in the midst of the bustle of war and preparation for the invasion of Peru; what is less understandable is the failure to seize the breathing-space offered by the departure of the expedition to Peru in 1820, to undertake a proper reorganisation of the navy department. The department in fact relaxed into a sleepy inactivity once the squadron had been dispatched to Peruvian waters. The opportunities to put its operations onto a proper footing both to support the squadron when it was in distant waters and to meet it with an efficient bureaucracy when it returned, were not taken. The papers of the Commandancia General de Marina for 1821 show that during this year it confined itself to the most trivial and unavoidable business - the checking of ships into and out of Valparaíso, the collecting of the news of foreign captains, the day to day petty business of the harbour and port, occasional despatches of supplies to Peru, the receipt of occasional news from the squadron. The indolence of the department is perfectly illustrated by the arrival of the Sacramento bringing San Martin's diplomatic agents from Peru, on 1 November. A diplomatic incident nearly occurred because the Valparaíso forts failed to answer the ship's salutes. The Sacramento came in at half past three in the afternoon when the whole of the garrison were in the middle of their afternoon siesta. The decline of work on the naval side, in fact, was such that on 8 October 1821 the hitherto independent portfolio of Minister of Marine was taken over and included in that of State. Joaquín Echeverría became the new Minister of Marine and Zenteno moved to the Governorship of
Valparaíso. 38

The malfunctioning of the navy department on shore had repercussions in the squadron in the form of growing hostility and antipathy from the officers towards the bureaucracy, confrontations between the squadron and the department on specific issues, and an increasing tendency for the squadron to manage itself without reference to the department. Indications have already been given in other contexts of the degree of antipathy and the complaints levelled from the squadron at the navy department, complaints that arose from the conviction of Lord Cochrane that the "practical intelligent & active" men the squadron should be able to rely on were not to be found in the department. The incompetence, he felt, began at the top. In early July 1820 Zenteno wrote to express the government's surprise and anger that, having long before given the most explicit orders for the readying and provisioning and equipping of the ships, when orders were now given for the Araucano to put to sea, it transpired that she could not and subsequently that the other ships were unprepared for sea as well. Zenteno demanded sternly to know why these delays had occurred. His letter provoked a sharp reply from the Vice-Admiral. The fault, he affirmed, lay with the administration of de la Cruz. The Commandant General claimed to have supplied what was asked for, said

38 AM vol 36. Tortel to de la Cruz, 29 November 1821; CP doc 379.
Echeverría to Lord Cochrane, 10 November 1821. This change may represent an attempt to economise and reform and was an improvement with Zenteno, who by this time had acquired some knowledge of naval administration at a practical level, moving to the functionally important post of Governor from which he could oversee the marine department more directly than as Minister in Santiago.
Lord Cochrane, but this was not so—supplies which he had requested the previous November he had still not received from de la Cruz' department. He declared that he was unable to get on with or work with the Commandant General mainly because of de la Cruz' inability to discharge his duties either through lack of time or through ignorance. De la Cruz was supposed to ensure that the supplies asked for were actually collected, but failed to do so. The ships were not properly provisioned and he himself lacked the authority and means to direct this work himself; the government, he concluded, should nominate people who could do their duty, or repose their trust in the Vice-Admiral. De la Cruz naturally resented such criticisms: this latest accusation from the Vice-Admiral followed a stream of demands for stores and complaints that he was not being given them. De la Cruz replied to this that the warehouses were ordered to supply whatever they were asked for if they had it, but that they had very little, and added tartly that "Whoever complains that I do not supply what there is, is saying what they like but it is not the truth. When something is not supplied, it is because stores and money are lacking." To such direct criticisms and counter-criticisms, petty vexations could be added by the department ranging from not advising the Vice-Admiral of the issuance of a special licence to some ships in Valparaiso to trade with royalist-held Callao, so that he had to learn of it embarrassingly enough from the captain of a neutral ship in the port, to rejecting papers and lists from the ships, even simple lists of names, for not being written in Spanish.39

More important than antipathies and complaints and vexations were the points of confrontation between the squadron and the department. These were on the question of the Auditor of Marine and the question of the role of the contadores. In both these struggles the issues involved were partly personal antipathies and partly the result of the attempt being made in the squadron to fuse British naval practice which gave the captains of the ships wide authority on board, with Spanish tradition which tended to divide authority and responsibilities in the ships.

The Auditor of Marine was a mixture of Judge and Accountant-General of the fleet, as has been indicated above, with the general responsibility for supervising the judicial business of the squadron, chiefly in matters of prizes and courts martial. He seems also to have had a subsidiary responsibility for acting in liaison with the financial sections of the commissary of marine and overseeing the keeping of financial records at sea. He was also personal secretary to the Vice-Admiral. Though officially subordinate to the Vice-Admiral, his independent responsibility and access to the Minister obviously gave him considerable potential influence. Antonio Alvarez Jonte was the first appointment to this post. He was a patriot who met Lord Cochrane while in exile in England, and sailed out to Chile in company with him. His legal qualifications and fluency in English led the government to appoint him Auditor of Marine and secretary to the Vice-Admiral early in 1819.40

The two men were unable to reach the modus vivendi necessary for

them to collaborate fruitfully in such a relationship. Alvarez Jonte complained to the government during the first cruise he went on with Lord Cochrane, in the event the only cruise, that the Vice-Admiral and the other British officers would not treat him with the consideration to which his post entitled him. Evidently the foreign officers resented his, to them, anomalous and independent position and claims to status. Personal tensions shortly acquired political complications.

On 23 June 1819, to regularise Alvarez' position, the government decreed that the Auditor of Marine should be considered as having the rank of Capitán de Navío or Colonel in the army, which was the equivalent. The Vice-Admiral, however, immediately and energetically complained that giving the Auditor the rank of Colonel/Capitán de Navío was inconsistent with the authority which the ships' captains ought to enjoy. He demanded, moreover, a new secretary approved by himself rather than foisted upon him. Zenteno attempted to smooth things over: when Alvarez' rank was made equivalent to that of Capitán de Navío, he said, there was no intention to detract from the authority of the naval officers, his rank was to be one of dignity, not executive authority in naval matters. As for his appointment as Lord Cochrane's secretary, the government's intentions were not to detract from Lord Cochrane's prerogatives but simply to help him with some one familiar with the language and customs of the country.41

The matter appeared to rest here; in fact Lord Cochrane was now determined to get his way in the matter of getting rid of Alvarez, and waiting only for an opportunity. This came within a fortnight when the


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Veloz arrived from Peruvian waters with delayed dispatches of Lord Cochrane's from his first cruise. Alvarez received the box containing the dispatches and withdrew those addressed to O'Higgins and San Martin, an action which Lord Cochrane, when he learned of it, viewed with deep suspicion and claimed did not arise from any zeal for the public service. On 4 July he put Alvarez under arrest and demanded that his behaviour and motives be investigated. Alvarez of course denied that his motives were improper or his actions wrong and affirmed that he was simply transmitting the documents to their intended recipients. He offered his resignation, thus fulfilling Lord Cochrane's wishes.42

The government declined to put Alvarez Jonte on trial, nor did Lord Cochrane press for it, but they did accept his resignation from the post of secretary, which it was now impossible for him to discharge. Further, to prevent future tensions between the two men, Alvarez was now stationed ashore on the pretexts that his health was not good and would be adversely affected by his being on ship, and that he could carry out his functions as easily on shore as he could on board ship. The first point was probably true - Alvarez in fact died soon after landing in Peru with the liberating expedition the following year - but the second was not. His work could not be effectively carried out except through his being with the squadron, and the work of administration of judicial and prize business was sharply slowed. Lord Cochrane ignored him: when in August Alvarez Jonte asked what share of prize money he would be entitled to as Auditor, and Zenteno requested the Vice-Admiral's opinion on the matter, he refused.

42CP doc 1900, Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 4 July 1819; CP doc 1901 Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 4 July 1819; AVM vol 86, Alvarez to O'Higgins, 4 July 1819.
to offer any view at all on the grounds that there was no corresponding post in the Royal Navy. In the event, the government dared not make his share any larger than a lieutenant's. Alvarez continued in the post of Auditor until the liberating expedition, when Bernardo Monteagudo was appointed to act as his deputy when necessary, that is, took over his work. In the event, though, political developments in Peru meant that Monteagudo did not carry out the duties of Auditor of Marine either. While the post of Auditor was allowed to lapse into inanition, that of secretary survived. On 4 August 1819 William Bennett Stevenson was appointed to it, and for the rest of Lord Cochrane's commission in the Chilean Navy discharged its duties. He evidently enjoyed Lord Cochrane's confidence and by virtue of his long experience of South American affairs must have had considerable influence with the commander-in-chief of the navy. But though he was entrusted from time to time with special missions, he never seems to have tried to build up his post into one of power and influence in the squadron and on the whole seems to have acted with an unpretentious competence in his post. Lord Cochrane at one time tried to have him appointed as Auditor of Marine, thus recombining the two posts and perhaps restoring that of Auditor to some kind of efficacy, however Stevenson's lack of legal qualifications prevented him from receiving the appointment. 43

In the case of the contadores the question was whether they were to be simple provision masters in the ships with the appropriate and not elevated rank and clearly subject to the captains' authority, or whether they were special representatives of the navy department,

responsible to the Commissary and enjoying an authority in the ships quite independent of the captains. The Commissary saw the role of the contadores as a wide-ranging one: Campiño and Vergara sent their instructions to these as they saw them direct subordinates, on 30 December 1818. They were the subalterns of the ministers, declared Campiño and Vergara, and as such should sign the requisitions; check the daily records of supplies, countersigned by the captains and the seconds-in-command; attend when officers of sections (for example, master gunner, master carpenter, master sailmaker...) collect their supplies at the warehouse; and oversee and check the work of the provisions master, but not do this themselves. A few days later, prompted by complaints from the contador of the O'Higgins about the treatment accorded him, they wrote sternly to instruct Lord Cochrane as to the respect he and his officers should show towards the contadores. The officers or petty officers in charge of each section, the chaplain, masters, surgeons, boatswains, master gunners, carpenters, caulkers, master-at-arms, armourers, yeomen of signals and the rest, had the express duty of presenting their papers to the contador to show the daily consumption on board ship. He was the senior officer (oficial mayor) of all these. Besides his military rank as an officer, added the commissaries, the contador "is reputed in his Ship as a Minister of Hacienda" and was responsible for reviewing all papers of promotions and demotions, of employment and paying off of officers and men, and should receive such documents daily. As the commissaries' representative, he must be treated with respect.44

Such was the notional role of the contadores. In fact they did not carry out all these tasks nor exercise the power that these duties imply, partly because of their own inability but mainly because of the opposition of the foreign officers. In June 1819 Zenteno attributed their failings to their bad training: the squadron was hurriedly formed, he told Lord Cochrane at that time, and things were overlooked or not properly organised which would normally have been seen to in a well-regulated marine. The mistakes which had occurred in the organising of the Chilean squadron had resulted from the fact that many of the men in subordinate posts were employed because they were needed, although they lacked expertise and knowledge of their tasks. He picked out the contadores from among these as being largely ignorant of book keeping and hence unable to do their job properly.

Zenteno's error here was to suppose that Lord Cochrane would agree with him that the solution was to concentrate on training the contadores up to the required standard of competence, and he enclosed instructions to be circulated to the contadores, for them to keep up-to-date reviews of the men and supplies received on board the ships, so as to form new master books when they should have returned from cruises. In fact Lord Cochrane and the other officers had a quite distinct solution to this difficulty. From the start the foreign officers insisted on treating the contadores as provision masters and not permitting them to carry out any other duties. The commissary complained justifiably that if the contador was excluded from the enlistment and discharging of the crew then it would be impossible for them to calculate pay due. The contadores and the commissaries themselves, they said, lacked the authority to instruct the captains to forward their ships' books to them. The Vice-Admiral, in fact, did not let pass opportunities of attacking and eroding the authority and position of the contadores as
for instance in January 1820 when a shipment of supplies being taken
down to the squadron at Callao by the Chacabuco went mysteriously astray
and had obviously been embezzled. Zenteno wanted to have Ramsay, who
as captain he held responsible, courtsmartialed; Lord Cochrane, however,
quashed this and put the blame for the loss of the contador. Later,
in August 1822 the Vice-Admiral tried to have the post of contador
suppressed altogether to effect some saving on the wages payable; a
request which was however turned down by Zenteno on the grounds that
the government felt it gained more saving by having the contadores
than it would save on their wages by suppressing the post. The
predictable result of the harassment of them by the foreign officers
was that the contadores tended to desert their ships or withdrew on
any pretext, leaving even before a cruise started, like the contador
of the Araucano who was courtsmartialed for desertion in 1820, or
during a cruise like those of the Independencia, Araucano, San Martín
and Galvarino, all of whom abandoned their ships during 1821. Of the
contadores who sailed with the squadron in August 1820 all but one had
left their ships, in fact, by August 1822.46

45GP doc 38. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 21 June 1819; CP doc 428, Campiño,
Vergara to Lord Cochrane, 3 January 1819; CP doc 546. Campiño, Hoeve
to Zenteno, 18 June 1819; CP doc 545. Zenteno to Forster, 21 June 1819;
CP doc 203. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 2 May 1820; CP doc 2. Lord
Cochrane to Zenteno, 4 May 1820; CP doc 530. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane,
21 August 1822.

46LM vol 30. Araucano courtsmartials, August/September 1820; CP doc 2156.
Lord Cochrane to NR, 29 July 1822; CP doc 2159. Lord Cochrane to
Correa de Sa, 22 August 1822.
The consequence of bureaucratic malfunctioning ashore and its extensions into the fleet in the form of disputes over the posts of the Auditor of Marine and the contadores, was that the squadron tended to administer itself as far as possible, ignoring the appropriate bureaucratic organisms and referring directly to the suppliers of whatever it was which it needed. This tendency became effectively the norm after August 1820 when the squadron was operating in Peruvian waters on a permanent basis. As early as October 1820 within weeks of arriving in Peru, San Martín had occasion to complain to Lord Cochrane of the way the captains administered their ships directly without reference to what rules or regulations might apply. Monteagudo was placed in charge of the Ministry of War of the revolutionary army at the end of November 1820, which had the effect of withdrawing him from close co-operation with the squadron. Later, with the establishment of the Protectorship of Peru by San Martín in August 1821, Monteagudo now being a minister of government, he resigned in the middle of August from the office of Auditor, breaking the last formal link with the squadron directly. The commissary, a necessary contact with the shore, operated in a haphazard and improvised way. Up until August 1821 the squadron depended for its supplies partly on the navy department in Valparaíso which as has been shown above did little to fulfil its duties after August 1820, and partly on the commissary of the revolutionary army camped on the Peruvian coast. This improvised administration did not function well. Lord Cochrane described the squadron in August 1821 as being "in a more destitute and abandoned state than it ever was under the bad management of Bentenol" and in the middle of that month he asked for the new Peruvian government to appoint a provisioner for the fleet. As a result of this, on about 21 August 1821 Salvador Soyer, one of the army commissaries, was
appointed Interim Commissary of the Squadron. This was an ad hoc arrangement and Soyer was responsible only for provisions, anything other than food-stuffs being the responsibility and at the charge of the Vice-Admiral to secure. Soyer discharged the duties of provisioner until the separation of the squadron from Peru in October 1821. Lord Cochrane also appointed his own commissary officers ashore on two occasions in Peru. The first was for the southern division between May and July 1821 when the squadron was operating separately from the revolutionary army's main administration. On this occasion Santiago Millet, normally the contador of the San Martín, was transferred ashore to take charge of the provisioning. The other appointment by Lord Cochrane directly was that of the contador of the O'Higgins, Alejo Ruiz or Alex Ross, who was commissary provisioner of the squadron from the time it left Callao in October 1821 in pursuit of the remaining Spanish frigates, until it returned to Valparaíso in 1822. Both of these were evidently ad hoc appointments and confined to the tasks of acquiring and transshipping foodstuffs from the shore to the ships.


Apart from these limited delegations, the whole weight of naval administration increasingly fell on the shoulders of the Vice-Admiral: in early October 1821 he wrote to Zenteno that he could not produce a detailed review of the fleet at that time as his time was wholly taken up with the numerous tasks surrounding him in running the squadron, and with the large correspondence had had to sustain, and he had no commissary nor provisioner (this was in the period between the retiral of Soyer and the appointment of Ruiz) nor any person experienced in the duties of these posts. As has already been shown in the previous chapter, the other officers in his squadron were not greatly to be relied upon to take some of the burden from him. It should be added though that the necessity for the commander of the squadron to concern himself with minutiae of administration and organisation was a problem by no means confined to the Chilean navy, or even to the revolutionary government: on one occasion the Peruvian vicerey Pezuela, noting the different manner in which army officers had to work in the colonies as compared with Europe, observed that the colonial general "has to lower himself and concern himself with the mechanical tasks proper to subordinates...."49

The navy department of the nascent patriot government, in short, failed to operate effectively for structural reasons, the division of authority, the fact that its organs were still being created even after the fleet had come into existence; and because of the inefficiency or incompetence of the officials staffing it, and the rivalries between them which delayed the execution of the business at a critical moment;

49CP doc 2085. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 7 October 1821; Memoria de Pezuela, 205.
and because of the poverty of the state which meant that it was unable to fulfil its role in the provision of dockyard and arsenal facilities. The effect was that the administrative work for which it was responsible was done at best slowly and inefficiently and at worst not at all, and that the antipathies which would exist anyway between men of action and bureaucrats and between European officers and Latin officials were exacerbated and took the form of contests over the status of naval functionaries, and that increasingly the squadron would improvise such minimal administration as was absolutely indispensable for itself. This latter resort, which might seem laudably resourceful, in fact had the effects of reducing the efficiency of the squadron sharply, inhibiting the development of long-term organisation and planning, and making the squadron dependent for its continued existence on the drive and will of the Vice-Admiral, so that with the departure of Lord Cochrane in 1822 the republic's naval effort virtually collapsed. Conversely, it can of course be argued that the inadequacy of the naval administration up to August 1820 and its virtual ceasing to function after the squadron had left for Peru, compelled it to depend upon the Vice-Admiral if it was even to continue in existence; the fact that the squadron not merely continued to exist between August 1820 and May 1822 but scored some notable successes is to be placed to the credit of Lord Cochrane.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CHILEAN NAVY AND THE LIBERATION OF PERU

By the end of the first quarter of the year 1820 the basis had been laid for the next stage of San Martín's grand strategy, to carry the war of independence to Peru. A tolerably stable patriot government had been formed in Chile, and the threat to the new republic's security and integrity posed by the continued existence of strong Spanish forces on the southern mainland had been eliminated by the conquest of Valdivia. A naval force of respectable dimensions had been created and had shown that it was capable of dominating the Spanish Pacific. Nothing seemed to stand in the way of the invasion of Peru.¹

¹ The organisation of the liberating expedition

The intended seaborne invasion of Peru did not take place at the beginning of 1820 as had been planned, but only in August, more than

¹ Besides the works already referred to, by Barros Arana, Bulnes, Encina and de la Fuente Cándamo on the Liberating Expedition, see also C. Dellepiane: Historia militar del Perú (Lima, 1941), the chief military account; Fritz C. Hoffman: "The financing of San Martín's expeditions", HAHR, vol XXXII (1952), for financial aspects; R.A. Humphreys: "James Paroissien's notes on the liberating expedition to Peru", HAHR, vol XXXI (1951) and R.A. Humphreys: Liberation in South America, 1806-1827: The career of James Paroissien (London, 1952) for a complementary account; and B. Mitre: Historia de San Martín (Buenos Aires, 1946 in the edition which I have used), for a general account from San Martín's point of view.
half way through the year. Some of the reasons for this long delay can be found in the realm of marine affairs, but the principal factor was political. This was the collapse of the Argentine-Chilean alliance on the basis of which the invasion of Peru was to be carried out. The comparatively swift and painless achievement of independence by the provinces of La Plata in and after 1810, formalised by the Congress of Tucuman in 1816, was followed by a period of increasing internal strife, firstly between radical, moderate and conservative factions within Buenos Aires itself, and secondly between Buenos Aires and the regionalist or federalist - or merely caudillist - factions in the various provinces which resented the efforts of Buenos Airean politicians to establish an exclusive political and economic control centred in the capital. Up until 1819 the government in Buenos Aires maintained some degree of control over the region, and was in the hands of San Martín's friends and allies Juan Martín Pueyrredón and José Rondeaux. Pueyrredón's government had assisted San Martín to undertake the liberation of Chile in 1817. Rondeaux's government which replaced it was to assist San Martín and the new Chilean government to undertake the liberation of Peru. At the end of 1819, however, the domestic strife in the Platine provinces burst out into a civil war between the contending factions, and on 1 February 1820 at the battle of Cepeda, Rondeaux was overthrown. The government of the United Provinces totally dissolved, and the period called the "Anarchy of 1820" commenced, characterised by the emergence of regional caudillos in the Argentine provinces, who were at best indifferent to San Martín's plans, at worst positively hostile to them.

San Martín's strategy was based on the promise that Chile was too poor to conduct the Peruvian campaign herself, and that the Argentine alliance was indispensable. The collapse of government in La Plata in
1819, therefore, seemed to call his project into question. In the event the Chilean government, driven primarily by O'Higgins, decided that the plan should be carried out with San Martín in command of the expeditionary army but relying upon Chile's resources alone. This decision was not finally arrived at until late in March 1820. The significance of these events was twofold. In the first place, because there was widespread uncertainty until March 1820 about whether an expedition would be sent at all, no orders could be given and no work done on its preparation until then. The organisation of the expedition was not put in hand until then. In the second place the decision to depend upon Chilean resources, and the exiguousness of these resources, meant that what work was done in preparing the expedition was done only with difficulty and delay.

Besides these general political factors there were also problems within the realm of naval affairs which contributed to the delay of the liberating expedition. These arose from disputes over strategy, difficulties over naval pay, and problems of preparation of the fleet.

By early 1820 Lord Cochrane had developed his own view of the strategy which the revolutionary forces should pursue and was thrusting his proposals energetically upon the attention of San Martín and O'Higgins. His views began to take shape as early as July 1819 when he had been asked to give an opinion on the operations to be pursued; he argued then that the war could most effectively be prosecuted by carrying it to the enemy camp and giving him too much occupation in Peru to be able to harass Chile. He advocated that at least 800 picked men should be immediately embarked to engage in mobile seaborne operations against the Peruvian coast. At the time, he viewed this force as a preliminary to the main expedition. By October 1819,
however, the strategy he proposed was becoming more elaborate and the need for a main expedition was receding into the background. The viceroy could not defend all the Peruvian coast together, he argued, therefore the squadron should operate near the capital and engage all the royalists' attention, leaving the extremes of the viceroyalty vulnerable to attack. This attack could be directed either towards Guayaquil or to Arica. If Guayaquil were taken and the royalists deprived of the use of this most important naval base and dockyard, while Callao remained blockaded, the royal squadron would be rendered quite ineffective in these seas, Spanish commerce along the coast would be annihilated, and the viceregal capital would be strangled to death. If on the other hand Arica were seized, the patriots could attack the royal army of Upper Peru in the rear and revolutionise that province; at the same time the southern provinces of Peru proper could be occupied and the viceregal capital again cut off from its food supplies, as it was in 1819. The plan in fact envisaged both military and economic warfare.  

San Martín's strategy, on the other hand, emphasised not military or economic operations against the royalists, but psychological. His basic objective was for the patriot army simply to establish its presence in Peru. The mere fact of its presence would visibly call in question the legitimacy and authority of the royal government. In addition, this same presence would encourage those Peruvians sympathetic to emancipation to rise and declare themselves. It would incite a general disaffection towards the royalists, and the revolutionary army would be the physical centre around which the revolution of opinions.

2 CP doc 1902. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 23 July 1819; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 7 October 1819.
would occur which San Martín trusted would lead the Peruvians as a whole to encompass their own emancipation. As is clear the military strategy dictated by these objectives was minimal and largely passive, in marked contrast to that advocated by Lord Cochrane. For San Martín the liberating army had to be large enough to discourage attack from the royalists, and to show the Peruvians that it intended and was able to remain on Peruvian soil as long as it wished. But it did not need to engage in basic military operations of the risky kind envisaged by Lord Cochrane, and indeed it was desirable that it should avoid such operations; it did not have to run the risk involved in trying to prove it could defeat the viceroy's army in battle, it simply had to stay on Peruvian soil. For the purposes of this sort of warfare, it was not of great importance whereabouts in Peru the army should situate itself, and in fact the movements of the army in the opening weeks of the campaign show that San Martín had not fixed firmly on a specific point. O'Higgins agreed with this view when he refused in November 1819 Lord Cochrane's suggestions for a 2000-man expedition of harassment, pointing out that the Peruvians were unlikely to rise unless they were protected by a respectable force; and that sending a 2000-man expedition would be if anything counterproductive as it was too small and vulnerable a number in the face of the viceroy's army, and as the only kind of warfare it could make, one of hit-and-run harassment "could only alienate from us the cold affection of the Peruvians."³

Though the government declined Lord Cochrane's suggestions in late 1819, the deteriorating political position in the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata and the collapse of the Argentine

³CP doc 1282. O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, 29 November 1819; CP doc 1070. San Martín to Lord Cochrane, 6 January 1819.
alliance which has been referred to above, which made the principal expedition seem unlikely to be put into execution, and the prestige and popularity of Lord Cochrane on his return from the operations around Valdivia and Chiloé at the beginning of March 1820, led to his proposals being taken up again. A secret meeting was held sometime in March, attended by Lord Cochrane, San Martin, O'Higgins and Zenteno. At this meeting, according to Lord Cochrane, he put forward proposals to equip the prizes Aquila, Becerra, Dolores and Jerezana as transports for an expedition of 2000 men under his command, proposals which were discussed and agreed to. However, within a short time of being agreed, this plan was countermanded in favour of the original one of 4,000 men. Lord Cochrane attributed this change to the malevolence of Zenteno who, he believed, had deliberately leaked the contents of the secret meeting so as to ensure that the arrangements there made would have to be cancelled. While of course it is possible that Zenteno may have leaked the results of the secret meeting, it is also true, as has been seen, that larger political issues were at work influencing the decisions that were made. Whatever the details of the affair are - and lack of documentation about the secret meeting prevents its being fully cleared up - the reversion to the original plan was announced to Lord Cochrane by Zenteno on 14 April. As everything was prepared for the 4,000-man expedition, he told Lord Cochrane, except for the funds, which were now being actively collected, it had been felt preferable to undertake the main expedition after all. Two days later he sent orders for the Montesuma to sail for Peru to examine the war and merchant-ships in Callao and find out exactly what the military position was in the viceroyalty.4

This advice and orders provoked an angry response. On May 4, having seen his proposals either turned down or apparently accepted and then ignored, the Vice-Admiral wrote to complain to the Supreme Director. Everything proposed became public, he told O’Higgins, and today’s decision was contradicted tomorrow; the 2000-man expedition which was agreed on and was on no account to be held up, had now been cancelled and replaced by one of 4000 men, which was being delayed so as to ascertain the enemy’s position and strength about which, he affirmed, “we know as much now, as we would know on the return of the Montezuma.” Sending the ship to Peru was simply a pretext to hide the delays in the expedition. He concluded by offering to resign and promised that if he could take the O’Higgins, the four prizes, and 1000 picked men he could immediately and successfully undertake the Peruvian campaign. As on previous occasions his ruffled temper was able to be smoothed over, apparently chiefly through the intervention of O’Higgins personally, though he was still forwarding his proposals for a 2000-man expedition in late May. But though this dispute was in the end able to be settled satisfactorily, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Lord Cochrane indulged his pique at not having his own way by resorting to petty vexations of Zenteno and the government. Thus for example the case of Fausto del Hoyo. This was the colonel of the Cantabria regiment whom Lord Cochrane captured at Corral Castle in the assault on Valdivia. He was brought down to Valparaíso by Lord Cochrane as a prisoner but kept on board the ships in some comfort and on amiable terms with the Vice-Admiral. In the middle of May the government ordered him to be sent up to Santiago from the fleet, to join the other prisoners, but Lord Cochrane refused to send him, alleging that he was afraid for his personal safety at the hands of the Chileans.

Zenteno replied tartly that the Chileans were not in the habit of slaughtering their prisoners and Fausto del Hoyo need not expect to be maltreated. He was anyway not entitled to preferential treatment. It was not in fact until the middle of June that Lord Cochrane did surrender his prisoner. In another case, when Zenteno issued orders that the Montezuma was to be put at the disposition of San Martin who was to appoint its captain, and the ship to be used independently of the squadron for the secret correspondence with the Peruvian patriots, Lord Cochrane took exception to what he claimed was a derogation of his authority and prerogatives as chief of the marine service. Those samples of vexations were in May. By July Lord Cochrane seems to have got over resorting to such vexations, although there is no doubt that he made no attempt to avoid embarrassing the government in July during the dispute over the appointment of Spry to the captaincy of the O'Higgins and over his demand to have Guise courtmartialed.

Disagreements over the strategy to be pursued and the personal antipathies and difficulties that arose from them constitute one of the factors which delayed the expedition's departure. Another was the discords and difficulties that broke out over pay within the squadron during the first half of 1820. By February many of the foreign seamen


8 See Chapter 5 sections i and ii above for the Guise/Spry disputes.
had served past the term of their one-year engagement and were becoming increasingly unmanageable. When Guise and Forster were given orders to sail for Guayaquil in the middle of that month, their crews refused to weigh anchor and the sailing had to be cancelled. Soon afterwards, when the Lautaro was ordered to Talcahuano her unpaid crew mutinied and had to be pacified by Lord Cochrane personally. Subsequently the Peruana transport was despatched with a naval crew to Talcahuano to collect recruits for the army; and the brig Pueyrredón had to be sent with her with strict instructions not to let the transport out of sight, to prevent a mutiny occurring. Their discontents were stimulated by the failure of the government to produce their pay, and by the way the government or the prize tribunal dragged their feet over payment of prize-money; in the case of the Montezuma, for example, which had been captured in March 1819, though the vessel was condemned in August 1819 the work of inventoring her had not started when the squadron left for its September 1819 cruise, was not done during the squadron's absence, and was only begun after Lord Cochrane had returned and begun to complain that the prize had to be valued and paid in order that the promises made to the seamen and without which they would not serve, might be kept. In the same way the government ordered the sugar in the cargo of the prize Peruana to be sent up to Santiago in the middle of March before it had been valued and paid; in this instance, Lord Cochrane embargoed the despatch until he received explicit orders to permit its transference, and again complained so energetically that the crews

must see that the prizes were being valued and that there was an apparent intention to pay their value, that again the government was obliged to begin prize valuation proceedings.\(^\text{10}\)

The recalcitrance of the seamen and the complaints of the Vice-Admiral at length seemed to have an effect; at the beginning of April Zenteno advised Lord Cochrane that the Commissary of Marine's finance department had been ordered to prepare the pay lists for the time-expired seamen, and he promised to send the money down to the port in spite of "almost insurmountable difficulties" within a week. Prize-money was a different matter, however, and Zenteno was more evasive about this. On 18 April he notified Lord Cochrane that as the Director did not wish to injure the interests of shareholders of captured ships, he had ordered the suspension of the sale of the ships until such time as their value might have improved. This of course was no more than a rather flimsy pretext to avoid having to pay out prize money on the ships.\(^\text{11}\) In the meantime the money to pay the wages had not yet appeared, and the end of the month of April saw further dangerous signs of discontent in the squadron when petitions went up to the Vice-Admiral collectively from the lieutenants, surgeons and masters and from the masters' mates, petty and warrant officers, and midshipmen of the fleet, for arrears of pay. According to the latter, "we have

\(^\text{10}\)CP doc 94. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 19 August 1819; CP doc 139. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 9 September 1819; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 10 March 1820; CP doc 2. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 14 March 1820; CP doc 166. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 14 March 1820.

hitherto been supplied with almost the whole of the necessaries of life by our several friends whose resources are now in general nearly exhausted and consequently we cannot consistently call upon them for any further assistance..." They had engaged in the cause, they added, "from pure and Patriotic Motives but sensible at the same time that Patriotism cannot be supported without pecuniary means." Once more Zenteno acknowledged receipt of the representations and notified Lord Cochrane that he had issued orders for the Commissary to prepare pay lists for the men concerned, on 3 May. On 4 May he again declined to raise the prize-money, pointing out this time that prize on some of the ships, including the María Isabel, had already been paid to their captors. These though were ships captured before Lord Cochrane's arrival in Chile, and belonged mainly to the María Isabel's convoy; of the other ships concerned in Lord Cochrane's complaints, to the number of six, the Jerezana, Aguila, Bagoma, Peruana and Potrillo inventories had not yet been received by the government from the agents charged with drawing them up, and consequently the government could not value the ships nor pay out prize on them; while though the Montezuma had by now been inventoried, the government had not yet been able to settle the account with the agent William Henderson, a British merchant who was apparently charged with this inventory. The funds captured in Peru in 1819 had likewise not yet been inventoried. But, Zenteno concluded, the interests which had really suffered from these delays were those of the government itself.13


The wages money still had not arrived, and finally in the second week of May the patience of the squadron was exhausted. On 8 May the officers of the San Martín refused to get the ship under way when they were ordered on a mission to Coquimbo. They ignored the orders of Guise and Wilkinson to return to duty, reminded them of their earlier requests for pay, and refused to obey orders until their arrears should have been settled. They were put under arrest, but the news spread swiftly around the squadron and 24 hours later all work had ceased in the San Martín, Lautaro, Chacabuco, Araucano, O'Higgins, Galvarino, and the Montezuma. Thirty-three officers, almost the entire corps, from these ships signed a round robin supporting the officers of the San Martín and demanding their arrears. In the face of this massive and complete insubordination the government was unable to evade the demand for wages any longer; in the middle of the month Zenteno promised to raise 70,000 pesos for the payment of wages, and by 30 May was able to send the first 20,000 pesos of this sum. Another 40,000 pesos was sent a few days later and these sums, together with the funds already in the hands of the Commissary, were sufficient to pay the officers and men arrears of wages up to the previous December. The court martial of the San Martín officers was suspended at the end of May. The payments thus made were sufficient to secure the return

14CP doc 585. Officers' resolution, 8 May 1820; CP doc 586. Officers of the squadron, resolution, 8 May 1820; CP doc 587. Guise to Lord Cochrane, 9 May 1820; CP doc 588. Wilkinson to Guise, 9 May 1820.

to duty of the officers and men, but the government had no further funds to pay the seamen whose times expired in August 1820, and the minister, while agreeing that it would be desirable to pay them to keep them in the service, frankly admitted his utter inability to do so and coolly expressed his confidence that Lord Cochrane would be able to devise means to keep them in service. The number of seamen involved however was apparently quite small so that their discontents at not being paid did not cause wider difficulties, while the fact that the officers had now been paid meant that they were able once more to devote themselves to disciplining the crews and suppressing complaints from them. The dissatisfactions of mariners with the Chilean marine because of the absence of pay did mean, though, that there were difficulties in recruiting more seamen when the order was issued at the end of June to enlist men for the ships for the expedition. A week after the recruiting had begun Lord Cochrane was obliged to report that despite the bounty being offered for enlistment, not a single seaman had come forward in Valparaiso. He attributed this absence of men to the alternative attractions of the drinking dens of Valparaiso and on his urgings the government imposed a tax of two pesos a day on them either to drive them out of business or to push up their prices to a level where the seamen who patronised them would be forced to enlist. By such shifts, and by sending to Coquimbo, the squadron was able to recruit sufficient seamen to man the ships for the expedition.

16 CP doc 305. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 14 August 1820.

17 CP doc 253. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 28 June 1820; CP doc 263. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 6 July 1820; CP doc 303. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 14 August 1820; and see Chapter 5 section 1 above.
A final cause of delay was the difficulties that were experienced in getting the convoy ready. The state lacked sufficient resources of its own to transport the army of invasion to Peru, and therefore contracted with a company set up for the purpose to undertake this transportation. The company consisted of three leading Chilean merchants, Felipe del Solar, Nicolas Rodríguez Peña and Juan José de Sarratea. By the terms of the original contract, signed on 2 September 1819, the shipping for the expedition was to be ready by or in December of that year. The company would provide five months' supplies, and would clothe the troops. They would ship the army back to Chile in the event of its suffering a reverse. The government in turn agreed to transfer to the company all their own ships except for the warships of the squadron. Payment to the company was to be made in three instalments of 130,000 pesos each. The first instalment would be paid in three parts during September and October 1819. The second instalment would be paid in the value of the ships and supplies provided by the government for the company's use, and by pagares against the customs revenue. The third and last instalment would be paid out of the revenues or income received by the liberating army in the first hostile country, that is Peru, in which it might land. 18 The contract was optimistic both about the term within which the invasion fleet could be prepared and about the cost. Work dragged and expenses escalated; when San Martín in March 1820 enquired what progress had been made, though the state had paid over 118,134 pesos to the contractors, the company's expenses had reached 202,066 pesos and they were unable to set a definite date when the expedition would be ready. The government was 151,865 pesos in arrears. Four ships were at that time collected

18 MM vol 3 Contract between O'Higgins and del Solar, Rodríguez, Sarratea, 2 September 1819.
by the company for use; but of these one, the Cazadora, was still at
the Haule and one, the Perla, required her masts and yards to be
replaced to make her seaworthy. Six state's ships were available in
Valparaiso, but would take two months to be outfitted from the time
that the company received them. The remaining nine national ships
being considered for use by the company were currently at sea.¹⁹

Not all the fault for this slowness lies with the company; in
part, any work of preparation on the ships suffered from the lack of
expertise and facilities in Valparaiso for putting ships into a sea-
worthy condition. Cable, rigging, all kinds of naval stores could not
be manufactured locally to the same standard and quality as the
foreign equipment. If it was not manufactured locally, that is waste-
fully, inefficiently and shoddily, then it had to be imported at great
expense and with long delays from abroad, or else done without, as
Zenteno pointed out to the Vice-Admiral in February 1820. In part
delays arose from the inefficiency and poverty of the navy department,
to which reference has already been made. In part they were due to
the uncertainty about what policy to pursue and about whether the
expedition would even take place, that followed the collapse of the
Argentine alliance. And even the weather contributed to the delays;
a heavy storm blew up on 23 May and damaged some of the shipping in
Valparaiso harbour, including the transport Begoña and the two war-
ships San Martín, which lost her bowsprit, and Lautaro, which lost both

¹⁹ ADM vol 3. Solar and others to San Martin, 1 April 1820; ADM vol 3.
Extract of debt of the Supreme Director, 1 April 1820; ADM vol 3.
List of ships being collected, 1 April 1820.
Once the firm decision had been made at the beginning of April by
the government to go ahead with the expedition, however, the work of
preparation of the ships was put into more active execution. To try
and make up stores and supplies that were needed, the government sent
to their agent in Buenos Aires, or resorted to the expedient of
commandeering what was needed but could not be paid for. Thus, for
example, there being sufficient watercasks in the ships for only 120
men on the voyage to Peru, the number was made up by seizing the
entire stock possessed by Wooster, who at this time was making a living
by servicing the whaling trade. This incidentally had the effect of
ruining his business and compelling him to rejoin the navy a few months
later. 21 The convoy contractors had been authorised if necessary to
acquire ships by requisitioning them against promissory notes, but as
there were sufficient prize ships available, the government decided that
these were to be sold to the company or, if sold to anyone else, done
so on the understanding that they would be made available on hire to
the company. The *Aquila*, *Jerezana*, *Dolores*, *Peruana* and *Potrillo* were
ordered to be valued by the navy department on 7 April. To obviate
difficulties from the squadron, the government sought as far as possible
to keep the negotiations for valuation and sale of ships out of the

20 CP doc 158. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 22 February 1820; CP doc 1921.

Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 30 May 1820; MM vol 27. De la Cruz to
Zenteno, 24 May 1820.

21 CP doc 183. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 4 April 1820; MM vol 35. Lord
Cochrane to O'Higgins, 18 April 1820; CP doc 2211. Dundonald to
Caldecleugh, July 1839.
hands of the seamen; where transports belonged to the state or the squadron alone, the contractors were to negotiate with the appropriate organisation, but where they belonged jointly to the state and the squadron, they were to negotiate only with the government. The arrangements for the transfer of the squadron's ships to the contractors were concluded on 4 May. 22

To speed up and make more efficient the work of preparation of the transports, the American Delano was sent down to the port on 18 April to supervise this activity. On 2 August this appointment was put on an official basis when Delano received the appointment of Commandant of Transports for the expedition. 23 The squadron received its formal mobilisation orders on 6 June when the San Martín, O'Higgins, Lautaro, Independencia, Chacabuco, Galvarino and Araucano were instructed to be got ready for the voyage to Peru. During this and the following month all the dockyard facilities were mobilised; all launches in the port were embargoed from sailing and ordered to be used for the preparation of the transports; the captains and officers of the ships of war were instructed to remain in their ships at all times and to sleep on board, to ensure that work was not held up and discipline not impaired; all the artificers, carpenters and caulkers were ordered to be employed solely in the work of readying the ships of the expedition; Lord Cochrane himself was mobilised on 21 July after de la Cruz had complained to Zenteno that the squadron would never be ready for sea


23 CP doc 197. Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 18 April 1820; CP doc 287.

Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, 2 August 1820.
as long as the Vice-Admiral demanded supplies which the navy department could not produce, and suggested that the preparation of the ships should be put in Lord Cochrane's hands, that he might convince himself that what was lacking for the ships was not being withheld but did not exist.24

By these means the expedition was gradually prepared and finally ready, though the departure date had several times to be changed; on 21 May Zenteno expected the expedition to leave in a month, and on 2 June San Martín still trusted that the ships would be ready by 19 June. On 17 June Echeverría wrote to Zañartu in Buenos Aires that the expedition would set sail on 6 or 7 July "at the latest." But by 22 July it had not departed, and San Martín was still urging the contractors to have the transports ready by the end of the month. On 25 July the government fixed 3 August as the positive final date for the departure of the expedition. In the event the transports were ready for boarding on 10 August. The army, which had been camped for some weeks outside Valparaíso, went aboard the ships from 18 August, amidst scenes of public emotion in the port, and on 21 August, in the unemotional words of the squadron's naval diary "Squadron and transports sailed."25


The invasion of Peru and the capture of the Esmeralda

Between 20 August, when the first two ships of the invasion fleet weighed anchor, and 22 August, when the last ones got out after having had some difficulty with contrary breezes, more than 20 ships sailed from Valparaíso for the invasion of Peru. Seven warships escorted the fleet. The flagship was the O'Higgins (48 guns), Admiral Lord Cochrane, Captain Crosbie, with a cabin for general San Martín. The commander-in-chief sailed however in the larger and more comfortable San Martín (60), Captain Wilkinson. Guise commanded the Lautaro (36), Forster the Independencia (28), Spry the Galvarino (18), and Carter the Araucano (14). Prunier with the Pueyrredón (12) had sailed on 16 August to Valdivia and the Chocó coast with political exiles from Chile and would join the squadron in Peru. The Chacabuco (20), captain Ramsay, was supposed to constitute part of the escorting squadron, but sprang a leak as she was working out of the port and had to put back for repairs. Of the 12 transports in the fleet, three were big frigates of over 500 tons: Consecuencia, number 11, of 550 tons, carried 813 troops; Aguila, number 14, at 800 tons the largest transport carried 828 men; Maguena or Mackenna, number 15, of 500 tons, carried 443 men. Seven other ships were frigates of between 250 tons and 400 tons: the 325-ton Minerva, number 8, carried 500 officers and men who were collected at Coquimbo; the 400-ton Dolores, number 9, carried 418 men; the 250 ton Gaitana, number 10, carried 307 men; the 325-ton Emprendedora, number 12, and the 340-ton Santa Rosa, number 13, carried 815 troops between them; the 350-ton Perla, number 16, carried 321 troops, and the 350-ton Gerezana, number 17, 570 officers and men.

Two of the transports were below 250 tons: *Peruana*, number 18, was a 250-ton sloop fitted out as a hospital ship; and the 180-ton *Golondrina*, number 19, carried 92 men, nearly all officers, the cadres for the regiments to be raised in Peru. Finally, the fleet was accompanied by the *Potrillo*, 259 tons, carrying powder and munitions, and the *Montezuma* (10 guns), captain Young, sailing as San Martín's despatch vessel and under his command.27

Their voyage down the Chilean and Peruvian coasts was tedious but not uneventful. Most of the first three days out of Valparaiso were spent trying to collect the convoy together in rendezvous off Coquimbo. The rendezvous was achieved by 24 August, but then the wind which had been changeable turned northerly so that the *Araucano* and *Minerva*, which had been embarking troops in Coquimbo and were to join the convoy as it passed going north, and the *O'Higgins* and *Montezuma*, which went into the port to speed up their departure, were trapped in the bay unable to get out. Not until after midday on 26 August did the wind come back round to the south so that the ships in Coquimbo could join or rejoin the rest of the fleet. The whole convoy got under way again that afternoon. For the next three days the wind blew steadily northwards and the skies were clear, so that the only inhibition on speedy progress was the need periodically, at least once a day, for the convoy to heave to to allow the slower and less handy or less handily-managed ships to catch up to the rest. The *Aguila* was a particularly clumsy ship: on 27 August the *Independencia* had to take her in tow to bring her up to the rest of the ships, and during the...

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night of 29 August she parted company with them. The next night, 30 August, a mist came down in the evening and the warships had to sail that night with lights and firing guns every quarter of an hour to keep the convoy together. Despite this precaution, though, another ship, the Santa Rosa, parted company during the night. The Araucano had been sent ahead, on 28 August, to notify neutral shipping of the imposition of a blockade on the royalist-held coast coincidently with the sailing of the expedition and to make a rendezvous with the fleet at Pisco. Now the Independencia was despatched to round up the Aguila and Santa Rosa, and the reduced convoy resumed its northwards voyage when the mist lifted on 31 August. Almost immediately, however, a calm settled, with only slight occasional breezes, and for four days the convoy lay barely moving except as the northward current carried it, while the Independencia made wide sweeps in its rear in search of the two missing frigates. At length on 4 September at dawn a good southerly breeze got up, and carried the convoy quickly to its destination. At about 10.30 in the morning of 6 September the Morro de Sama was sighted, and at 3.00 in the afternoon of the following day the convoy arrived at the entrance to Pisco bay. The Montezuma entered the bay to reconnoitre under United States colours. Only three ships, none of them warships, lay in Pisco roads: the neutral traders Canton and Rebecca and the guano carrier San Antonio. Preceded by the Independencia, which went in to take charge of the traders, the convoy shifted into Pisco bay and at 6.30 that evening dropped anchor. The Araucano arrived in the port the following evening, and the Aguila appeared at the entrance to the bay 12 hours later, still so clumsy that all the available boats had to be sent from the shore to tow her in. The Santa Rosa was still missing and on 11 September the Araucano was sent out to look for her. She did not find the Santa Rosa, but she did meet
the royalist armed merchant vessel Cleopatra. This ship had served as an auxiliary in the royal squadron since the middle of 1818, and could carry up to 32 12-pounders and a crew of 204 officers and men, though at the end of 1819 and in 1820 she carried only 130 officers and men. The two ships met on 13 September and a brief skirmish took place until the Araucano lost her topmast. The Cleopatra was able to make her escape, and Carter, prevented by the damage to his ship and by calms from renewing the action, returned to Pisco on 14 September. Not in fact until 16 September did the Santa Rosa arrive in Pisco roads.28

The invasion fleet had arrived on the shores of Peru without mishap, a notable achievement for Lord Cochrane and the navy officers whose work of organisation had been met with such success. But part of the reason for the safe and successful voyage of the invasion fleet was that the royalist squadron made no attempt to intercept the Chilean expedition. The viceroy received regular, accurate and detailed reports of the preparation of the invasion from neutral ships that touched at Chilean ports on their way to Callao; he knew when it was at sea to within a few days; and by 10 September he had detailed reports of its arrival on the Peruvian coast and of what its military and naval force was.29 But the royal ships did not attempt to harass the expedition while it was getting ready in Valparaíso, nor to intercept it while it was at sea, nor to cut it off after it had reached


29 Memoria de Pezuela 755-757; and see Documentos inéditos, 24-29, for an account of the arrival of the expedition.
The slow decay of Spanish seapower in the years preceding the wars of emancipation on the Pacific coast has already been recounted. When Joaquín de la Pezuela succeeded Abascal as viceroy of Peru in 1816 the viceroyalty's maritime forces in Callao consisted of one ship, the 18-gun brig Potrillo, manned by 96 officers and men, serviceable and ready for sea. Besides this brig the sloop Peruana was anchored in the port but disarmed and unserviceable, was merely a hulk. Finally, there were four gunboats drawn up on the beach. By dint of stern economy in other departments of viceroyal defence, however, Pezuela succeeded over the next two and a half years in building up a modest royal squadron. The core of this force consisted of two regular warships, the frigates Venganza (42 guns) with a crew of 335 officers and men, and Esmeralda (40) with 313 officers and men. These were supplemented by the brigs Pezuela (20) with 103 officers and men, Potrillo (12) with 102 officers and men; and the two small frigates Sebastiana (30) and Cleopatra (32) with 204 officers and men. The viceroy could also if necessary incorporate Spanish trading ships, armed from the Callao arsenal, into this squadron. By this means he was able to form a squadron as large as eight or nine ships in February and March 1819, and consisting of seven ships in February 1820. 30

This squadron was able to score occasional small successes such as the capture of the privateer Maipú in October 1818 and the Chilean supply ship Elena María in May 1819. These were not patriot warships however, against which the royal squadron dared not venture while it had only two regular frigates-of-war, neither of them very large and

together having only four cannon heavier than 12-pounders. To face
the Chilean fleet the viceregal government needed more or bigger
warships. It could not afford these itself - by early 1819 the
vicerey estimated that current defence expenditures were running at
200,000 pesos a month - and depended on reinforcements coming from
Spain. These, however, were dogged by ill-fortune and disaster. The
fate of the María Isabel and her convoy in 1818 has already been noted;
throughout 1819 the viceregal government waited anxiously for the
effects of this setback to be reversed by the arrival of new ships
from the Peninsula. In April official news came that a ship of the
two and a frigate were being despatched to the Pacific from Spain,
and four months later new information arrived, that two more ships of
the line would accompany these. This encouraging news was spoiled only
by the gloomy prediction of the commandant of marine that these ships
would not be able to be got to sea once they had arrived without
expenditures of up to 300,000 pesos. Finally, in the middle of Sept-
ember 1819, the vicerey had the glad news of the imminent departure
from Cadiz of the San Telmo, Fernando Séptimo, Alejandro and Prueba.
Their arrival, in the Pacific would dramatically restore the fortunes
of the hard-pressed royalists.31

The powerful peninsular squadron never came. The arrival of the
Prueba, her failure to get into Callao, and her making for Guayaquil
instead, has been related above. The accidents that befell the rest
of the squadron amounted to a major defeat for the viceregal govern-
ment. The Fernando Séptimo never left Cadiz. The Alejandro was
so leaky that she had to put back to Cadiz after only a few days. The
San Telmo was lost with all hands rounding Cape Horn. Only the frigate,

24-pounders had, however, been installed in the Esmeralda by November
1820.
the smallest ship, reached the Pacific and she sailed to the wrong port so that the viceregal government still lacking the indispensable maritime forces it required. It concentrated on uniting the maritime forces it did have. Alcance sailed for Guayaquil on 30 December 1819 with essential stores and supplies and 30,000 pesos for the Prueba. Then on 9 February 1820 both Venganza and Esmeralda sailed for Paita and Guayaquil to meet the Prueba and bring her back to Callao. Coig, the commandant of this squadron, was authorised by the distrustful viceregal government to relieve Perez del Camino, the captain of the Prueba, if he showed any reluctance to obey the order to sail for Callao. He also carried 99 extra men to replace the "scandalous" number of deserters from the Prueba. At length, on 16 April 1820, the three frigates were finally concentrated together in Callao.32

Troubles continued to plague this squadron, however, The three frigates were now supposed to ship reinforcements urgently needed in Guayaquil, but the Esmeralda and Venganza could not put to sea, and the Prueba had to go with the Maipú and Mexicana in their place. This, Pezuela noted bitterly, "happens with every Spanish Ship of War, which does not go to sea, but it returns with damage... nothing can be done promptly if we have to rely on ships of war which seem to have some evil spell placed on them."33 As if to confirm his words, when the Maipú left Guayaquil in mid-May for the return voyage she had to turn back to port three days out having lost a mast "as generally

32 Memoria de Pezuela 589-590, 647-648, 696.

33 Ibid., 696, 701.
happens to all the Spanish Warships, which seem to have been conceived in Mortal sin." 34 In Callao meanwhile, the commandant of marine reported on 24 April that the royal dockyard and arsenal owed more than 100,000 pesos for arrears of wages and due on naval stores and supplies, and that the Venganza and Esmeralda could not be fully commissioned for lack of stores. Work on these two frigates, in fact, could not be commenced until June, when the Portuguese charter Ana de Rios arrived from Rio with 28,000 pesos' worth of naval stores despatched by the Spanish ambassador there. 35

While two frigates lay uselessly in Callao, the Prueba was being diverted along the Choco coast by the privateer Rosa de los Andes. The Prueba learned of her presence when she arrived at Guayaquil on 1 May, and sailed in pursuit five days later. The Rosa, however, took refuge in the river Iscuandé and the Prueba by reason of her deeper draught was unable to follow her in. Though the privateer ran aground and later broke up, the royalists made no attempt to attack the vessel or the crew from the Prueba's boats. The frigate made her way back to Callao, arriving there on 17 July, in her turn in need of repairs to make her seaworthy again. The other two frigates were by now seaworthy and were immediately despatched to ferry troops between Quilca and Lima, on which task they were occupied from 21 July until 11 August. 36

Fruitless privateer-hunting to the north, and tedious troop-convoys about Lima, took up the time of the Spanish warships at precisely the moment when they should have been at least watching and if possible harrying the Chileans in Valparaíso. Not until 20 August,

34Memoria de Pezuela, 722.
36Ibid., 719-720, 727-728, 734-735, 744.
the eve of the sailing of the Liberating Expedition, did the viceroy go down to Callao to review the royal squadron and arrange tactics with the captains. His plan was that as soon as the Prueba should be seaworthy, the three frigates and the Maipú would put to sea to observe the patriot expedition, take station to windward, and harry it, depending on their superior sailing to keep them clear of the Chilean warships. He found, though, that there was little inclination among the captains to applaud this plan. He feared that they would seek pretexts to delay sailing on the grounds that they were not yet provisioned and equipped for sea. Pezuela, who had just raised 72,000 pesos to make them ready, in fact considered seriously the possibility of laying up all the ships if they would not put to sea and justify the two millions of pesos he had spent on the marine in his four years of office so far.

The slow process of getting ready for sea continued; at length, on 9 September, imperious orders were given for the frigates to sail, partly to carry out the plan set by Pezuela, partly for fear that they would be caught in Callao harbour and burned by patriot boats as was reported to be planned by the Chileans. The Prueba was still not ready for sea and did not sail; the other two frigates, however, under the command of Coig of the Esmeralda, weighed anchor and sailed out of Callao. The Chilean army of invasion had already been on Peruvian soil for more than 24 hours.

The viceroy, distrustful of the marine's courage, competence and loyalty, expected little of them. A week after the departure of the

37 Memoria de Pezuela, 749-750.
38 Ibid., 754-755.
two frigates, he noted in his diary that in four years the royal warships had accomplished nothing except for the capture of the Maipu, and added bleakly "...all has been lost at Sea."³⁹ His expectations were fulfilled. The Esmeralda and Venganza worked their way up to San Gallan island off Pisco and there, on 18 September, a council of war of the two Spanish captains and seven other officers agreed unanimously to ignore the orders given them and prosecute other operations instead. From Quilca a few days later Coig wrote back to the commandant of marine and the viceroy to justify his action: the condition of his ships and the reliability of his crews could not be confided in, he affirmed; the superiority at sea of the patriots meant that the result of any encounter would be a foregone conclusion; if Peru could be saved, then the loss of the frigates would not be important, however such a sacrifice would not aid Peru; it was more desirable that access should be kept open for reinforcements from Europe. On 26 September the two ships dropped anchor again inside San Lorenzo island.⁴⁰ With this, a little cruise and too late, the only effort the viceroyalty made to resist the Chilean invasion at sea flickered out.

The Liberating Expedition did not establish itself permanently at Pisco. For nearly two months the army camped here, taking possession of the district, encouraging slaves to desert to the patriots, and collecting supplies. A division under General Arenales was sent off on a foray into the interior, and subsequently San Martin agreed a

³⁹ Memoria de Pezuela, 764.

⁴⁰ CP doc 1507. Correspondence to Luis Coig, 9 September 1820 and after; Memoria de Pezuela, 770.
brief truce with the Viceroy. The naval force remained largely inactive as the warships were obliged to remain near to Pisoo to protect the transports from the threat of an enemy descent. On 22 September the Prueba and Venganza were seen out to sea and the O'Higgins, Lautaro and Independencia went out hastily in pursuit at sunset. However they could not come up with them and were compelled at length to give up the pursuit and return to the rest of the expedition. Finally, on 28 October the army re-embarked in the transports and preceded by the Galvarino and Araucano which had gone ahead on 23 October to cruise off the Hormigas to watch the port and intercept any ships trying to escape, sailed northwards for Ancon. They were sighted from Callao on 28 October and the next day anchored in a double line across the bay at Callao, evidently as a propaganda measure to impress the people of Callao and its garrison. The following day the convoy moved on to Ancon, a few miles north along the coast, which had been selected as the base of operations. The O'Higgins, Lautaro and Independencia remained cruising in the mouth of Callao to initiate the blockade of the port. They had just missed the Prueba and Venganza. These two ships sailed again from Callao on 10 October, bound for Arica to collect troops from the Army of Upper Peru. The imposition of the blockade 20 days later cut them off from Callao and the marine department. A galley succeeded in slipping out of Callao.

41 CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile"; CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to San Martin, 25 September 1820; CP doc 1507. Correspondence of Luis Coig, 9 September 1820 and after.

42 CP doc 1951. Lord Cochrane to Spry, 23 October 1820; CP doc 1952. Lord Cochrane to Carter, 23 October 1820; Memoria de Pazuela, 787; AOH, XIV, 316. San Martin to Zenteno, 29 November 1820.
on 11 November to warn them of the blockade and on 27 November they arrived at Cerro Azul, to the south of Callao. There was no possibility of getting past the blockading force so after a few days they disembarked the troops they had brought from Arica, to make their way by land into Lima, and under the command of Villegas of the Venganza, the two frigates left the Peruvian coast and made for the north towards the more friendly coast of New Spain. The remainder of the viceroy's ineffectual Pacific squadron was shut up inescapably in Callao harbour. Its flagship was the only remaining royal frigate on the Peruvian coast, the Esmeralda.

Lord Cochrane was anxious to signalise the arrival of the liberating expedition and fleet in Peru and on or shortly before 29 October 1820 he decided on the basis of his own information and that of Carter of the Araucano, that it was feasible to enter Callao harbour in ships' boats and cut out the Esmeralda, and possibly other ships as well although the Spanish frigate was strongly entrenched behind the defensive chain or boom that extended most of the way across the harbour, leaving only a modest gap on the northern or leeward side of the bay. The Esmeralda lay at the head of a line of 11 of the larger Spanish ships, near this opening. Nearby she had the two brigs Maipú and Pezuela, one of which - the record does not show which one - had facilities for firing red-hot shot from her eight 16-pounder guns. This mode of warfare the viceroy looked upon as contrary to the fair rules of war but justified it as a necessary measure in view of Lord Cochrane's resort to similar methods. Apart from these there were the 24 state and private gunboats which maintained a day and night...

43 Memoria de Pezuela, 779-780, 798-799, 805; CP doc 1123. San Martín to Lord Cochrane, 6 December 1820.
watch along the boom and at its entrance. 44

When Lord Cochrane gave the order for Forster and Guise to prepare the boats of their respective ships, the word travelled swiftly around the ships that an attack was in contemplation, and within a short time sufficient volunteers had come forward for the planning to begin in detail. Guise and Forster came aboard the O'Higgins on 1 November to hear the plan. The attacking force was to advance in two divisions, the first under Crosbie consisting of the seven boats of the O'Higgins, the second under Guise consisting of the same number of boats drawn from the Lautaro and Independencia. Forster's offer to take part in the enterprise was refused as he was required to maintain the blockade while this attack was in progress. The principal object of the attack was the Esmeralda, therefore the whole force was to attack that ship first. If and when captured, the patriots were to fire from her at the Maipú and Pezuela and Morgell and Esmond's boats take possession of them and run them out of the bay. The boats of the Independencia were at the same time to seize and turn adrift the merchantmen at the outer end of the line, while Bell and Robertson in the Lautaro's boats were to set fire to one or more of the vessels at the other, windward, end of the line to add to the confusion. 45 It was a bold and ambitious plan.


A trial run was held on the night of 4 November to test the arrangements and exercise the volunteers. These numbered 240 men, 92 from the O'Higgins; 99, of whom nearly half, 43 were Chileans, from the Lautaro; and 49, of whom 15 were Chileans, from the Independencia. Of the 32 officers, petty officers, midshipmen and marine and regular army officers on the enterprise, all but five were British or North American. A proclamation was issued on the morning of 5 November reminding the crews of their past achievements at Valdivia and to stiffen their resolve offering the value of any ships captured to the captors thereof. 46

The attack commenced at 10 o'clock that night when the 14 boats pulled away from the side of the O'Higgins and with muffled oars made their way two lengths apart for the boom, two miles away. They reached and crossed it at about midnight and almost immediately ran into a gunboat, with a lieutenant and 14 men aboard; but taken by surprise, they were overpowered from Lord Cochrane's leading launch before they could give any warning to the anchorage. The two lines of boats came up to the Esmeralda at about 12.30 a.m. on 6 November. As soon as they were seen and challenged from the ship, Lord Cochrane gave the order "Give way" and abandoning their formation, all the boats pulled for the ship as fast as they were able. Several reached the ship and boarded from all sides simultaneously - Lord Cochrane with the O'Higgins launch at the starboard gangway, Robertson with the Lautaro's barge and Grenfell

with the *Independencia*'s cutter at the larboard chains, Gardner with the *Laureto*'s launch at the starboard, and Guise at the larboard fore-chains.\footnote{47}

Grenfell has left a vivid personal memoir of the struggle for possession of the ship. He got on board over the *Esmeralda*'s quarter and onto her poop, where he was joined by Bell and the *Independencia*'s boatswain "and firing our pistoils before us, we sprang down on to the quarter deck into a heap of Spaniards whom Lord Cochrane's party had driven aft. Here struggling for sword room, my foot slipped in a pool of blood and I fell with several Spaniards on the deck - Lord Cochrane, although one of the first alive on board was not wounded in boarding nor in carrying the quarter deck, when I saw his exchange pistol shots at arm's length with a Spanish officer, and then cutting right and left, cleared his way to the middle of the deck where he kept his station..." The quarter deck had in fact been the scene of a sharp struggle according to other accounts, with a hot musketry from the defenders which lasted for quarter of an hour before it was taken. Lord Cochrane and Guise met on the quarterdeck and supported each other during the fight, according to Miller, a circumstance which gave rise to a reconciliation between them for the time being.\footnote{48} Other defenders of the vessel were in the forecastle and repulsed the initial patriot assault here. At the same time a musket ball passed through Lord Cochrane's right thigh, though without doing severe damage.

\footnote{47}CP doc 1355. Bulletin of the Liberating Army, 6 November 1820; CP doc 894. Grenfell, Memoir of the cutting-out of the *Esmeralda*.

Sitting down on the larboard netting, he called on Guise and some of the other officers to clear the forecastle. Grenfell was one of them, and nearly received his quietus: "Guise, Bell, Robertson, self, Morgill and Gilbert, rushed along the starboard gangway, when a musket ball passing through my right groin I was borne down by the rush of men behind; I lay some moments on the deck, and when I raised myself to ascertain the extent of my hurt, one of my own men, exclaiming "Here's a fellow not dead yet," raised his sword for the "coup de grace" but recognised me just in time to check the blow..." Grenfell was carried to the small cabin under the poop where he was laid down beside his boatswain and with his head on the breast of a dying Spaniard by way of a pillow. Here he spent the rest of the night.49

Though the upper deck was thus carried, it took some minutes more for Guise, now leading the fight, to clear the lower deck, from where the royalist soldiers who had been asleep when the patriots boarded, had been firing up the hatchways at them; and shots were even fired from the hold after that. Nevertheless, a little before 1 a.m. the patriots found themselves in possession of the ship. Lord Cochrane now attempted to have the rest of his plan put into effect, but without success as he could not get the boats remanned. Hiers, who presumably got the story from Lord Cochrane, affirms that the English seamen had become too unfit due to their having plundered the ship's spirit store and caroused, to continue the attack. Grenfell, more plausibly, says that the men had had enough fighting for the moment and were reluctant to quit their dearly-bought prize. As fast as the officers got them over the side into the boats, they climbed back into the ship through the main deck ports. Either Morgell or Esmond, though, seems to have

49CP doo 894. Grenfell, Memoir of the cutting-out of the Esmeralda.
managed to get a boat manned, for Perez del Camino, who had been on
the Esmeralda when it was boarded, "by a miracle" escaped over the
side to his boat and returned to his ship, the Maipu, against which
an attempt to board was shortly afterwards made from the Esmeralda,
but beaten off.  

Since the rest of the plan could not be effected, Lord Cochrane
ordered the ship to be got under way and taken out of the bay. Some
half an hour had now elapsed since the boarding party reached the
ship and the signal rockets, bugles and drums from the shore showed
that the Callao batteries were fully alerted. As soon as the sails
were let out and the ship started to move towards the sea, and it
was clear that the attackers had succeeded in taking her, the
batteries in the Callao forts opened fire on the vessel, as did the
nearest gunboats. Several shots struck the ship and one fired
through the stern windows at close range tore up the quarterdeck,
killed a number of men and wounded Coig, the captured Spanish
captain, in the foot. For security's sake, the foreign warships in
the bay nearby, the British Hyperion and the North American Macedonian,
hoisted previously-agreed signal lamps at the mastheads so that those
on shore would know that they were neutrals. Lord Cochrane perceiving
this ordered identical lamps to be raised on the Esmeralda. In the
darkness the gunners in the Callao batteries could not tell which ship

50 Memoria de Pezuela, 795; CP doc. 894. Grenfell, Memoir of the cutting-
out of the Esmeralda; CP doc 1355. Bulletin of the Liberating Army,
6 November 1820; J. Miers: Travels in Chile and the Plate (2 volumes,
London, 1826), vol II, pp 39-42. Lord Cochrane gave the story
currency in his Narrative of Service, I, 88.
was which of the three carrying lamps and were reluctant to fire upon foreigners, so that at about 1.15 a.m. the firing began to die away. The *Esmeralda* made good way and at about 2.30 a.m. anchored out of range of the batteries near to the *O'Higgins*.51

A mark of how hardly the ship had been fought for and won and lost by the respective sides is in their dead and wounded. On the patriot side, Lord Cochrane in his dispatch to *O'Higgins* just after the action gave his losses as 15 dead and 50 wounded; a British naval officer who observed the action reported the patriot dead as 25; the *Bulletin* of the liberating forces reported the patriot overall loss as 50, that is both dead and wounded; but Grenfell agreed with Lord Cochrane quite closely, giving the patriot loss as 17 dead and rather more than 50 wounded.52

The losses of the royalists were dramatically more heavy. Grenfell estimated that upwards of 160 were killed, wounded or driven overboard and 150 were taken prisoner. The actual number of Spanish wounded found in the ship he placed at 60. Searle gave the number of Spanish dead as 56. The *Bulletin* of the Liberating army gave the number of Spanish dead and wounded as in excess of 150. Lord Cochrane's first report of the action to *O'Higgins* on 9 November 1820 gave the number of prisoners as about 180; subsequently, on 14 November, he reported


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that 204 of the *Esmeralda*’s crew were alive and prisoners. About 126
had been killed or had escaped over the side.\textsuperscript{53} Besides the losses of
men, two gunboats were captured during the operations and taken out of
the bay. The flag of the Spanish Pacific fleet was captured and was
flown the next morning beneath Lord Cochrane's pendant at the masthead
of the *Esmeralda* for all the world to see. The ship itself was a fine
fast frigate, almost as large as the O'Higgins: she measured 152
Castilian feet on the main deck, 146 at the keel, and 39 in the waist.
At the time of her capture she was armed with 28 iron or bronze 12-
pounder guns and 12 iron 24-pounders, with over 2000 rounds of grape-,
canister- and round-shot, and grenades. She was in an excellent state
of repair and had three month's provisions and two years' naval stores
on board, though a large part of the provisions, as the captors soon
discovered were rotten and unfit for consumption. She was valued by
Delano six weeks after capture at 125,000 dollars.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{53}CP doc 894. Grenfell, Memoir of the cutting-out of the *Esmeralda*;
\textsuperscript{54}AOH, XIV, 249. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 9 November 1820; CP doc 1355. Bulletin
of the Liberating Army, 6 November 1820; AOH, XIV, 319-21. Lord Cochrane
to San Martin, 14 November, 1820.
The immediate consequence of the loss of the Esmeralda was to arouse the populace of Callao to a fury against the foreign ships in the port, which they believed had secretly assisted the patriots. A riot broke out and the troops of the garrison had to be called out to quell the mob, though not before they had killed or wounded 24 or 26 foreigners, including a midshipman and five seamen of the North American Macedonian who came ashore in a boat on the morning of 6 November. Another 27 foreigners had to be rescued from the rioters and taken into protective custody by the troops, and the remainder of the 91 registered foreigners needed no urging from the viceregal government to flee the city and make secretly for Chorrillos and the safety of the neutral ships.55

This was the immediate consequence, but the loss of the Esmeralda also had a larger and graver effect on Spanish seapower in the Pacific. The capture of this ship, in Hall's words, was a death blow to Spanish gunboat. The Bulletin of the Liberating Army reports the Esmeralda as anchoring with two captured gunboats. Lord Cochrane's dispatch of 14 November to San Martín refers to a launch mounting four guns which lay in the path of the boats and was taken. Was this the gunboat they ran into on their way in to the anchorage, or did they encounter it on the way out, having already captured the gunboat that challenged them at the boom?

55 Memoria de Pezuela, 797; NSA, 321-22. Searle to Hardy, 8 November 1820. Hardy (NSA, 322. Hardy to Croker, 22 December 1820) picked up and transmitted a report that Downes of the USS Macedonian, who was ashore at the time of the riot, had to seek refuge in the Viceroy's palace. Pezuela, however, says nothing of this.
power "for, although there were two Spanish frigates and some smaller vessels in the Pacific, they never afterwards ventured to show themselves, but left Lord Cochrane undisputed master of the coast."\(^6\) The Chilean squadron had already demonstrated that it could sustain a blockade on Callao and prevent the ships in the port from getting out most of the time; now they demonstrated that royalist vessels were not secure even inside the port. Crosbie in fact showed this even more effectively a few months later when he led the boats of the squadron into the port across the boom and in spite of continuous musketry supported by the guns of the Callao batteries, during the night of 24 and 25 July 1821 succeeded in bringing out three ships, the merchant San Fernando and the armed merchants of the Pacific squadron Milagro and Resolución, several of the launches and gunboats, and burned two other ships in the bay.\(^7\) The taking of the Esmeralda showed that the Spanish warships had been deprived of Callao as a secure naval base. The only other large naval base on the coast of the viceroyalty was that of Guayaquil, and this place was revolutionised by an internal uprising on 9 October 1820.\(^8\) The Spanish warships had been deprived of this as a base, too, so that as the year 1820 drew to its close it was evident that without bases anywhere on the Peruvian coast, the time that the remaining two Spanish warships could continue to operate was limited by the tolerance of their existence by the Chilean squadron. Once the squadron should turn its attention to them, it would sooner or later hunt them down and overwhelm them.

\(^{56}\) Hall: Extracts, I, 76.

\(^{57}\) CP doc 785. Crosbie to Lord Cochrane, 25 July 1821; The Times, 23 January 1822.

\(^{58}\) J. Villamil: Reseña de los acontecimientos políticos y militares de la provincia de Guayaquil, desde 1813 hasta 1824 inclusive (Lima, 1863), pp 11-12.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: THE END OF LORD COCHRANE'S COMMISSION

The naval service was responsible for the opening movements of the campaign for the liberation of Peru, the safe transport of the army of invasion to the Peruvian coast, the imposition of the blockade on Callao, and the boarding of the Esmeralda. After this last operation however, the focus of activity shifted to the military operations on land and to the political and diplomatic issues raised by the war of independence. The role of the naval service became less important in the context of the war as a whole, and it became less active. Not in fact for some months did the squadron resume major naval operations by undertaking the pursuit of the escaped Prueba and Venganza, the last Spanish warships on the coast.

The squadron was not entirely inactive, of course, between November 1820 and October 1821, its operations were merely on a less large and important scale than hitherto. They were intended to harass the defenders of Callao and keep them alarmed. On 2 December 1820 the O'Higgins and Esmeralda, the latter not yet renamed in the Chilean service, were keeping a close blockade on Callao bay and engaged some 16 of the port's gunboats which sallied out against them. An exchange of fire took place "pretty smartly" for an hour before the gunboats retired. Three weeks later, on 25 December, the Independencia and Potrillo were sent into Callao to annoy the enemy and on 26 December exchanged a lively fire with the gunboats until the San Martín stood into the bay to disperse them. On 14 January 1821 the O'Higgins cruised into the bay towards the batteries; they and the gunboats commenced a heavy fire before the frigate retired without, apparently, damage. A few miles up the coast, at Chorrillos, the boats of the
**Emeralda** attempted to cut out a Spanish schooner from the shelter of the battery the following day but without success. At the beginning of February 1821 the royal armed packet *Aransauro*, of 110 tons with a crew of 63 men and armed with one long brass 12-pounder and four 4-pounders, was captured by the *Araucano* off San Lorenzo island. The *Aransauro* was sighted and the chase began at sunset on 8 February. Not until after midday the next day did the *Araucano* come close enough to engage, and the action was a hard-fought one lasting an hour within pistol range before the *Aransauro* struck. By Carter's own admission the Spaniard put up a sturdy resistance, the *Araucano* suffered a good deal of damage about the masts and rigging and had to put into Huacho for repairs. The *Aransauro* was incorporated into the Chilean squadron on 6 March. On 4 March Lord Cochrane entered Callao bay in the *Galvarino* to reconnoitre and take soundings, and was attacked without result by the gunboats. These were in turn attacked by the *San Martín* on 6 April. The *San Martín*, which was at this time acting as Lord Cochrane's flagship in the absence of the *O'Higgins* to undergo repairs, subsequently shifted to the *puertos intermedios* where on 1 May it commenced a bombardment of Arica for five days to cover the landings of William Miller's southern division on that part of the coast. Callao was entered again on 24 and 25 July by ships' boats under Crosbie who cut out three vessels and burned two others, as has been described in the previous chapter. The boats entered again on 15 August and succeeded in cutting out another two ships and a brig from the port. This in fact was the last attack on the port, which a month later, on 19 September, surrendered to San Martín.¹

¹CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile."; CP doc 691. Carter to Lord Cochrane, 19 February 1821; CP doc 692. Note of the dimensions of the *Aransauro*; CP doc 717. San Martín to Robinson, 6 March 1821; CP doc
These operations against Callao, other royalist-held harbours, and royalist shipping, were the occasional relief from the otherwise tedious labour which took up most of the time of the Chilean ships, of transporting troops along the coast as the exigencies of the war on land demanded it, supervising the expeditionary army's convoy of transports which were based in Huacho bay, surveying the coast and collecting information about its navigation, provisioning and watering - which by virtue of the dry, poor, inhospitable nature of much of the coast made it difficult to collect more than a few weeks' supplies at a time so that much time had to be spent by the ships in getting these - and detaining neutral and friendly trading vessels along the coast to examine their papers and cargoes and check smuggling and blockade-running. 2 This last aspect of the work of the Chilean squadron during 1821 involved the Vice-Admiral, General San Martín, the Chilean government, and the captains of the ships of war of neutral nations, the United States and Great Britain, who were charged with protecting the interests of their commerce, in several disputes over the status of neutral trading vessels, their rights to trade with the royalists, and the legitimacy of Lord Cochrane's levying duties on them, as he did on the grounds that the squadron's funds were not being replenished by San Martín and that duties had to be levied if the fleet was to be kept in being and supplied with the necessities of existence. With the campaign of Miller's southern division in the puertos inter-


2 These activities have their basic documentation in CP doc 1883. "Naval affairs of Chile" and CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations.
medios between March and July 1821 and the fall of Callao to the patriots in September, the result of which was to bring effectively the entire Peruvian coast under patriot control and to push the royalists inland, the problems of the status of the blockade and blockade-running disappeared.³

The principal development during 1821, which was to have the effect of withdrawing the Chilean squadron from participation in the campaign of liberation, was the growing antipathy between San Martín and Lord Cochrane. It was a dispute of which the grounds may be found in differences over strategy, in personal and political antipathies, and in disputes over money. On a strategic level, the two chiefs had quite distinct views on how the war in Peru should be conducted. San Martín's view was that the war was one of opinion and of political ideas, not of military operations. Battles might destroy the viceroy's army — though they might as easily destroy his own — but only a revolution in opinion would shift the Peruvians away from royalism and the Spanish crown. He replied on the effect of disseminating the principles of freedom throughout the country."⁴

Lord Cochrane on the other hand, in keeping with his character and

³On the question of neutral rights, see besides works already cited for this chapter, Edward Billingsley: In Defense of Neutral Rights (Chapel Hill, 1967); Ricardo Montane Bello: Historia diplomática de la independencia de Chile (Santiago, 1961); Sir Charles Webster: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822 (London, 1934); and Arthur Whitaker: The United States and the Independence of Latin America 1800-1830 (Baltimore, 1941).

⁴Hall: Extracts, I, 85.
temperament, favoured a rapid and overwhelming assault as early as possible while the royalists were confused, alarmed and despondent about the patriot invasion. If San Martín would give him 500 men he undertook in February and March 1821 that he could keep half the viceroy's army fruitlessly occupied pursuing him; while if 4,000 men were thrown ashore on the beach beneath the heights of Chorrillos they could be in Lima four hours later. San Martín wished to coax the Peruvians towards emancipating themselves; Lord Cochrane preferred to stampede them into it. These views were the results of basic habits of mind and character, so that the flatly opposed strategic conceptions were paralleled by personal dislike: San Martín, for example, spoke of Lord Cochrane shortly before the departure of the Liberating Expedition as "an overgrown child (un niño grande) who will cause us many anxieties, but whose services could be priceless..." Lord Cochrane displayed a similar contempt: when, during a council of war early in the Peruvian campaign, San Martín suggested that in the event of his being attacked and beaten, all the transports should be burned to save them from falling into the hands of the Spanish, Lord Cochrane delivered a crushing snub in response, "that if he were ever reduced to so desperate a situation, the transports might as well sail away under protection of the ships of war."  

The main ground of the dispute between San Martín and Lord Cochrane


6Quoted in Barros Arana: Historia, XII, 641.

7Miers: Travels, II, 45. Miers was a zealous partisan of Lord Cochrane, and was not present in Peru. This story may therefore not be strictly accurate.
and the cause of the break between them, was money - or rather the lack of it. Peru had long been thought of as an opulent country, the source of much of the wealth of the Spanish crown, and the officers and men of the Chilean squadron, when they sailed to invade the viceroyalty, had little doubt that once the country was liberated the rewards for all who participated would be ample and unstinting. Certainly, they expected at the least to be fully and promptly paid what they were entitled to in the way of wages and prize-money. In this however, they were to be disappointed, not least because by 1820 and 1821, after a generation of depression followed by the physical destruction consequent upon 10 years of warfare, the near-bankruptcy of the viceregal government which had had to sustain the cost of the war, the crushing taxation it levied in order to do so, and the flight of capital from Lima as the future of the viceroyalty became darker, the available booty was not great. As long as the liberating army was an army campaigning in the field, the naval service was prepared to forego complete settlement of their claims; but at first light on 6 July 1821 the royal army under the new viceroy La Serna marched out of Lima, abandoning it to the patriots. The city surrendered to San Martín on 8 July and the patriot chief entered two days later. On 28 July the independence of Peru was proclaimed, and on 3 August San Martín took the title of Protector of Peru and set up a government for the new state. These acts, the fall of Lima and the formation of a patriot government, raised the naval service's expectations of being paid.

San Martín had confirmed Lord Cochrane's promise to the attackers of the Esmeralda that her captors would receive her value as prize and helped the Vice-Admiral to calm murmurings of discontent by undertaking

8CP doo 637. Forster to Dundonald, 28 September 1821.
that it would be paid when a government should have been established in Peru. 9 Subsequently, during March, April and May of 1821, four months' pay was issued to the foreign and some native seamen who were most in arrears in the O'Higgins, San Martín, Valdivia and Independencia. The remaining ships received no pay. 10 The modest and incomplete payments that were made at this time were not sufficient to quiet the growing discontent of the seamen for very long, however.

Two months later, Lord Cochrane was constrained to write to San Martín that it was becoming urgent to pay the ships; none of the officers were less than a year in arrears of pay, he warned on 29 July, and he feared they might become unmanageable if they were not either paid or sent back to Chile. The seamen's times would expire on 20 August and the foreign seamen on whom he depended would not stay at their duty if they were not paid. 11

When San Martín assumed the Protectorship of Peru and formed a government, Lord Cochrane at once demanded that the squadron be paid its arrears and the prize on the Esmeralda, now due, with a mixture of threats that the squadron was in serious difficulties and flattery of San Martín as the "Napoleon of South America" to enforce his claims. The commander-in-chief now declared that while he would pay a 12 months' bounty to the crews and while he recognised the debt of

9CP doc 1106. San Martín to Lord Cochrane, 10 November 1820; CP doc 1109. San Martín to Lord Cochrane, 22 November 1820.

10CP doc 767. Crosbie, receipt, 21 April 1821; CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to Monteagudo, 14 April 1821; Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 19 May 1821.

11CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 29 July 1821; Lord Cochrane to San Martín, July 1821.
50,000 dollars due on the Esmeralda, he could not pay these obligations for lack of funds. As for the wages of the crews, he denied that the Peruvian government was responsible for this. This refusal led to a sharp correspondence between the Vice-Admiral and the new Peruvian government. Lord Cochrane complained to Monteagudo, the new Minister of War, at finding himself situated between two governments with apparently incompatible interests. San Martín reaffirmed his friendship towards him, while Monteagudo officially reiterated the new government's policy, though he promised that their obligations would be fulfilled a month and a half after the fall of Callao. Lord Cochrane declined to be satisfied with this new promise, threatened that the total dissolution of the squadron was imminent and affirmed that whether the debt was Peru's or Chile's was a matter to be decided between the two governments while the important point at the moment was the payment of the crews. Monteagudo again declined to change the government's standpoint and coldly informed Lord Cochrane that San Martín considered he had acted quite honourably despite Lord Cochrane's assertions to the contrary.

Shortages of provisions now threatened to effect the dissolution

12 CP doo 4. Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 4 August 1821; CP doo 2067. Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 7 August 1821; CP doo 1184. San Martín to Lord Cochrane, 9 August 1821.

13 CP doo 4. Lord Cochrane to Monteagudo, 10 August 1821; CP doo 1186. San Martín to Lord Cochrane, 13 August 1821; CP doo 1209. Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane, 13 August 1821; CP doo 2073. Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 19 August 1821; CP doo 4. Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 23 August 1821.
of the squadron even more quickly than absence of pay. Lord Cochrane
had complained as early as 10 March to O'Higgins that the squadron
was in great want of all necessities. In April he told San Martín
from Pisco that the Valdivia was destitute in Huacho bay and could
not leave it, while the O'Higgins and the San Martín were so short
of supplies that if the Spanish frigates should appear, as was
expected, it would be impossible to follow them without the risk of
his crews dying of hunger at sea. A few days later he wrote from
Callao that as a result of the lack of fresh food signs of scurvy
had appeared amongst the crews of the ships. The Vice-Admiral
was still asking for fruit and vegetables, which the squadron had gone
without for 11 months by now, at the end of July. During August his
requests for food became increasingly urgent and though at length
Monteagudo issued orders for the military commandant of Chorrillos
to supply the ships, on 23 August Lord Cochrane reported that the
Independencia had salt meat, jerky and bread sufficient for almost
two weeks, the Lautaro had a little bread and meat and the O'Higgins
had only three days' supply of salt meat and nothing else. By dividing
the available provisions evenly, about three days' provisions could be
supplied to all the ships, and the larger vessels were forced to
abandon the blockade and make for Ancon in search of food. Monteagudo
would only promise that he hoped to be able to raise funds eventually
and the neutral traders would only sell to the squadron for hard

Lord Cochrane to San Martín, April 1821; Lord Cochrane to San Martín,
14 April 1821.
The inevitable explosion in the squadron occurred on 7 September. The O'Higgins crew refused to work the ship on that day and the Galvarino's crew, when they learned of this action, followed suit. The crew of the Lautaro, starving and unpaid, abandoned the ship in a body on 8 September and went ashore at Ancon to look for food; Delano, now the captain, dared not even attempt to bring them back under control. The crews knew that amongst the vessels in Ancon bay was the Sacramento which had come into San Martín's possession in April 1821 when her crew mutinied at Paita and joined the patriots; in this vessel the government had embarked the Peruvian public funds, amounting to approximately 135,000 pesos, during an alarm occasioned by the approach to Lima of the royal army. Besides these funds were other public and private funds, in all totalling about 200,000 pesos. These funds Lord Cochrane seized on 16 September to pay the crews and buy stores and provisions. This action provoked the final break with San Martín. Lord Cochrane said he had taken possession of the funds to prevent his seamen from doing so and thus becoming pirates; but he refused to return the funds on Monteagudo's demand as the crews would not tolerate it. Even San


16 CP doc 806. Esmond to Lord Cochrane, 7 September 1821; CP doc 807. Delano to Lord Cochrane, 8 September 1821.
Martín's imperious and explicit order to return the money was ignored. As Lord Cochrane pointed out on 20 September, the crews were still in a state of mutiny, were suspicious that the Vice-Admiral was conspiring with the government against them, and were far past being pacified by promises. He acknowledged that he had acted illegally, but affirmed that he had been compelled to do so by the higher necessity of keeping the squadron in existence in the absence of any effort to do so on the part of the government, about whose motives in refusing to pay the crews he wondered darkly. Monteagudo in reply claimed that the government had done everything within their power to succour the squadron; that the army was suffering from the poverty of the new government just as much as the squadron; that the government had undertaken to pay the debts due to the squadron and had taken practical measures to collect the necessary funds; and on San Martín's behalf he ordered the intransigent Vice-Admiral to leave Peru and return with his squadron to Chile. Ten days later the Chilean squadron left the liberating expedition, but not bound for Chile. Lord Cochrane proposed to undertake one more campaign, to capture or destroy the two remaining Spanish warships in the Pacific and bring the naval war to a conclusion.

The pursuit of the Spanish frigates

The squadron sailed out of Callao bay on Saturday 6 October for the final campaign of Lord Cochrane's commission as Vice-Admiral of Chile. It was a much diminished one: it had lost its largest ship, the San Martín, wrecked at Chorrillos on 16 July when she ran onto a rock, and it had also lost the Pueyrredón which sank when her rotten timbers gave way in Ancon bay in August and could not be raised again. As for the available ships, Stevenson recalled that "no expedition ever left port under such peculiarly disadvantageous circumstances. The flagship was as rickety as an old basket... Scarcely a bolt could be found that was not loose, her foremast and bowsprit were both rotten in the step, the dry rot had taken possession of the greater part of her timbers... her crew was composed of everything but sailors..."

The remainder of the squadron were in little better condition than the

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18. CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations. As Carlos López Urrutia: La Escuadra Chilena en Mexico 1822 (Buenos Aires, 1971) points out in his prologue, this campaign has received almost no attention at all from historians due to the lack of source material. His own, the first proper study of the campaign, depends on Mexican documentary and historical material, and on Richard L. Vowell: Campaigns and cruises in Venezuela and New Grenada, and in the Pacific Ocean from 1817 to 1820 (3 volumes, London, 1831). By combining López Urrutia's excellent but still only partial study with the materials available in the Cochrane Papers, it is possible here to present for the first time a reasonably complete account of this expedition.

flagship and all were badly manned. Their morale, however, was tolerable, not least thanks to a satirical poem upon San Martin composed by Lord Cochrane and either circulated around the wardrooms of the squadron or, more probably, recited by its author to the officers gathered to dine in the O'Higgins, to relieve their feelings.

The ships made a rendezvous at Ancon two days out from Callao, and were there divided into two divisions. The Lautaro, captain Delano, and the Galvarino, captain Brown, under his orders, had already received their orders on 4 October to water at Pisco or Huacho and then sail for Valparaiso. The O'Higgins, captain Crosbie, Valdivia, captain Cobbett, Independencia, captain Wilkinson, Araucano, captain Simpson, and Mercedes, captain Shepherd, with the prize San Fernando, sailed northwards for Guayaquil.

Behind them in Peru they left a cloud of rumours about their destination and about Lord Cochrane's ultimate intentions. Hardy reported home in late November that the Admiral's plans were said to be to proceed northwards to Mexico, but to what end was unclear. San Martin, he said, had no doubt that the Chilean government would order Lord Cochrane to resign his command. Prevost reported at the beginning of December from Lima that it was widely believed in Peru that Lord Cochrane in Guayaquil would ignore the orders of the Chilean government just as he had ignored those of San Martin, a view which Prevost himself did not share, not because he had any confidence in Lord Cochrane's

20 Stevenson: Narrative, III, 398; NSA, 352. Hardy to Croker, 30 November 1821.

21 CP doc 2099. Lord Cochrane, poem, 8 October 1821.

22 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations.
rectitude but because he felt that the Vice-Admiral was anxious to keep
the favour of the Chilean government to support his vendetta against
San Martin. When the news came that the Chilean ships had sailed from
Guayaquil, it was reported in Lima that he was intending to attack
and capture Panama. Reports also circulated in Guayaquil in the
middle of November that Lord Cochrane proposed to employ the squadron
in looking for prize money to feed his avarice, and that he was
intending to make for the Philippines, and by the end of that month
these reports had reached Lima and attributed to him the firm determ-
ination to raise five or six hundred men and sail to the conquest of
Manila. Some of these rumours were not indeed as far-fetched and
unfounded as they appear. A plan was aired at various times for a
maritime empire to be established in the Pacific by Chile, and Lord
Cochrane was its keenest proponent. The first evidence of the plan
can be found as early as February 1819, when it was being said in

23 NSA, 352-353. Hardy to Croker, 30 November 1821; Manning: Diplomatic
Correspondence, III, 1730. Prevost to Adams, 7 December 1821;
Ibid., III, 1733. Prevost to Adams, 6 February 1822; AVM vol 88.
O'Reilly to O'Higgins, 10 November 1821; AOH, VIII, 203. San Martin
to O'Higgins, 30 November 1821; and according to Francisco Mariátegui:
Anotaciones de la Historia del Perú independiente de Mariano Paz
Soldán (Lima, 1869), p 78, Lord Cochrane devised a formal plan to
borrow 200,000 pesos and sail with the squadron and such troops as
he needed to conquer the Philippines, partly to liberate them from
Spain, partly to win glory for Chile, and partly to recoup at their
expense the cost of the squadron. It seems that Mariátegui was
letting his imagination run away with him, however the kernel of
the rumour remains.
the San Martín participating in the blockade of Callao, that when he had concluded the blockade Lord Cochrane intended to attack and conquer Guayaquil to provide himself with a port and dockyard for his squadron and to open communications with the Colombian liberator Simón Bolívar. The plan to attack Guayaquil was also being formally discussed in Chile in March 1819 and San Martín’s aide Tomas Guido went so far as to calculate the force, 1500 men, which would be necessary to surprise the place. Lord Cochrane’s first formal presentation of the idea came in October 1819 when he wrote secretly to Zenteno in connexion with the proposed attack on Peru to recommend that Chile should acquire Guayaquil because of its importance as a naval base, and he reiterated the recommendation in November of that year from the port of Guayaquil itself. In the midst of his other preoccupations, the plan thereafter fell into abeyance for a time, while the self-emancipation of Guayaquil on the arrival of the liberating expedition in Peru seemed to make it unnecessary. The establishment of the Protectorate in Peru and the break between Lord Cochrane and San Martín, however, caused the plan to resurface: in August the Vice-Admiral wrote confidentially to O’Higgins warning him against San Martín and his alleged project to build up a powerful Peruvian navy in rivalry to that of Chile, and noting that the two axes of Chilean seapower would be Chiloé and Guayaquil, possession of which would prevent Peru from developing a respectable marine. The Chilean government, he urged in September, should make sure of possession of Chiloé

against Peruvian designs. He himself formally notified Santiago on
7 October from Ancon of his intention to seize Guayaquil for Chile. These proposals briefly caught O'Higgins' fancy. He had already, on
12 November, written to expatiate on the future greatness of Chile,
especially at sea, and to reflect that her power might one day reach
as far as the Philippines "of which benefit I wish to speak privately
with you." Now he replied to Lord Cochrane's suggestion "...if you
consider that (Guayaquil) can be captured, it would be convenient to
seize Puna or some equivalent point to raise the Chilean flag on, and
on your advice, I could send you 500 men or more, if there are some
people of fortune who would advance us 60 (i.e. 60,000) pesos or assist
us with supplies for the expedition..." and he went on to wonder about
the feasibility of seizing the Galapagos islands, after which Chile
might give the laws to the South American continent. In fact, these
ideas were no more than an impracticable fancy in the mind of O'Higgins,
and there is no sign that Lord Cochrane, when he sailed for Guayaquil
in October 1821, seriously contemplated assaulting the town. His
squadron was not so much a conquering fleet as one in need of assistance

25 AVM vol 89. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 10 August 1821; AVM vol 89.
Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 12 September 1821; AVM vol 89. Lord
Cochrane to O'Higgins, 7 October 1821. Lord Cochrane even suggested
that O'Higgins should seize Peru itself: "for Godsake come and make
yourself Emperor, King, Protector, President or Chief, by whatever title
you please..." (AVM vol 89. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 27 September
1821), more out of vexation than in earnest.

26 Epistolario de O'Higgins, I, 283. O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, 12
November 1821; Ibid., I, 296. O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, 15 November
1821.
to keep it in being.

The Chilean ships were off Tumbes on 14 October. Three days later, leaving the Valdivia stationed off Puna to look out for the Spanish frigates in case they should come to this coast, the squadron worked up the river and on 18 October dropped anchor in the port and exchanged salutes with the batteries and the seven gunboats there. There were also seven merchantmen in the port, but no sign of the Spanish. In Guayaquil, José Joaquin Olmedo, the president of the ruling junta, was friendly but cautious: he readily assented to Lord Cochrane's requests that the squadron be allowed to make repairs, but made it clear that his government could not raise any money for a loan for the squadron and that the work to be done on the ships was expected to be paid for in currency and not with dubious promissory notes. The squadron was permitted to recruit more men, except from amongst the military, the marine or the artisans of the place. The port captain was instructed to help in any way he could with the repairs. Small arms were made available, and the junta helped to round up deserters from the ships. 27

The O'Higgins had to be discharged of all her contents and careened so that the workmen could get at the leaks in her hull, and Lord Cochrane took a house in the town during this time, participating in its social life and proving with his officers to be popular figures.

He met Major Manby, an Englishman serving with the British volunteers in the Colombian army, whom he treated to an exposition of his quarrel with San Martín but who after noting the fact added dryly "He recounted the origins of this dispute to me; but at such length, that I cannot write them down." A similar account was sent to Chile in what may be termed Lord Cochrane's resignation from the liberating expedition and instructions to himself for his next campaign: on 24 November he advised O'Higgins that San Martín's assumption of power in Peru, his injustice to the squadron, and his tyranny made it impossible for the Vice-Admiral to continue supporting him. He proposed, therefore, to go immediately in pursuit of the Prueba and Venganza "in order to conclude with this blow, if it is possible, the naval war in the Pacific..." His stay ashore and work on the squadron was punctuated also by a clash with two supposed agents of the Chilean government. These were Arturo Wavell and Felipe O'Reilly, two adventurers who in November 1821 were in Guayaquil on a mission, according to their claim, from Chile to Mexico, though in reality they had no accreditation from the Chilean government to the Mexican but that which they arrogated to themselves. Lord Cochrane refused to permit them to sail for Acapulco until the squadron had left Guayaquil, on the grounds that the Spanish ships might otherwise learn of the whereabouts and destination of the Chilean squadron, and ignored their demands to be allowed to go freely and the supposed copy of his


29 CP doc 2104. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 24 November 1821.
instructions from O'Higgins which O'Reilly showed the Vice-Admiral.30

By 30 November the squadron was ready to depart. The O'Higgins had been careened and though not all the leaks had been found and stopped up, the hull had been restored to an apparently satisfactory condition. The Valdivia, Independencia and Araucano had been recaulked. The squadron had provisions for three months, and the Spanish ships had been reported to be in Realejo. The Chilean ships shifted down to the mouth of the river, joined the Valdivia off Puno and on 3 December moved northwards to Salangos, their watering place. They arrived here on 5 December and remained for two days. On 6 December Lord Cochrane issued them their orders for the next stage of the campaign. Simpson with Araucano was to sail direct to Acapulco to look for the Spanish frigates. He was also to intercept Spanish shipping from Manila. He was to show a neutral flag and avoid hostile acts towards Mexico if he found it to be independent. At the same time Shepherd with the Mercedes was to look into Panama and its environs in search of the frigates, and then join Simpson off Acapulco. The other ships would make their way up the coast and reach Acapulco in six weeks or two months.31


The O'Higgins, Valdivia and Independencia made first for Cocos Island. There was no sign of the Spanish, but on 11 December the Valdivia caught a small vessel, the Retaliación, manned by five Englishmen under one Blair who claimed to be a Peruvian privateer but did not carry any papers to prove it. The following day the O'Higgins ran down a falucho outward bound from Callao in the hands of a group of seamen who had mutinied against the Peruvian service and were presumably intending to turn to piracy. The imperfectly-repaired O'Higgins was still, however, making three inches of water an hour and the pumps had to be kept constantly going. Partly because of her condition and partly to water, the squadron shifted in towards the mainland and on 19 December put in to the bay of Fonseca on the central American coast. The ships remained here for more than a week while two new after pumps were built and fitted in the O'Higgins; while they were being installed on 22 and 23 December men had to be kept bailing at the hatchways: even so the water level rose to flood the ship's breadroom and afterhold and parties had to be brought across from the Independencia and Valdivia to assist in pumping out the stricken flagship. At length both fore and after pumps were sufficiently repaired to keep the leak down, though the ship's provisions had to be transferred to the hammock nettings for safety. Water had meanwhile been found about eight miles away, that near the beach being too brackish, and the woods fired to make an easy access. The ships watered and on 28

32 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to Monteagudo, 25 April 1822. Presumably the falucho was the coastguard vessel which San Martín in November reported had mutinied and gone off to join the Chileans, AOH, VIII, 203. San Martín to O'Higgins, 30 November 1821.
December sailed from the gulf of Fonseca. They made their way slowly northwards, putting in for three days at Tehuantepec from 6 to 9 January 1822 to water, and for four days from 15 to 19 January off "a white island," again to water. On or shortly before 27 January they came to off Acapulco and met the Araucano and Mercedes.33

The Araucano had had a not uneventful cruise, the Vice-Admiral learned, although Simpson had not found the Spanish ships. He had arrived off the port on 24 December 1821 and cruised for three days while he tried to find out whether it was likely to be a hostile or a friendly port, and if the Spanish frigates were there. He made reconnaissances by night into the anchorage in a small boat. The Spanish warships were not there, however among the merchantmen there were at least two Spanish ships, the Luisa and the Espina, preparing to sail. When Simpson went covertly ashore to get more information, however, he was discovered and seized and on 28 December taken before a junta of the Ayuntamiento of the place and the masters and owners of the Spanish ships. He affirmed that he was a member of the Chilean squadron and that the remainder of the ships would arrive very soon with the Vice-Admiral. The junta, however, chose to disbelieve him because— as they later declared—he had been reported to have spoken against San Martín which seemed inconsistent with a claim to be part of the fleet which so far as they knew was under the supreme command of San Martín. This was disingenuous: there was at least one person, Felipe O'Reilly, not only in Acapulco but at the meeting of the junta, who could have explained to them that the Chilean fleet and San Martín had parted company. It suited the convenience of the

33CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations. It is impossible to identify the "white island."
junta to pretend that Simpson was a pirate or at least someone not to be trusted. He was ordered to have the Araucano anchor under the fort of the port and, reluctantly, complied. No sooner had his ship been brought under the batteries, than he was locked up on the urging of the Spanish owners, until the Espina and the Luisa had sailed on 29 and 30 December respectively. Only late on 30 December was he released and allowed back onto the Araucano, still immobilised under the guns of the fort, and only on 4 January 1822 was he given permission to sail from the port, by which time the Spanish merchantmen had long since disappeared over the western horizon. The Araucano took up station outside the harbour and it was thus that she was joined in the next three weeks by the Mercedes and then the main part of the squadron.\(^{34}\)

The Spanish ships were known not to be in Acapulco, and the Chilean squadron was not in great need of provisions, of which anyway Acapulco was not a particularly good place of supply. There was therefore no compelling reason for Lord Cochrane to enter the port when he arrived; he nevertheless decided to do so, partly to get news of the enemy warships but mainly to show the Chilean flag, impress the power of the Chilean squadron on the minds of the inhabitants of Mexico, and counteract the ill-effects which the high-handed and bullying treatment of Simpson might have had. On 27 January he sent in a flag of truce with an advice to the governor that he wished only to procure water and provisions and came as a friend, but would meet resistance by force if necessary, and the ships followed it in each

\(^{34}\)CP doc 1481. Act of the ayuntamiento, 28 December 1821; CP doc 1482. Marin to de la Gandara, 29 December 1821; CP doc 843. Simpson to Lord Cochrane, 28 January 1822.
one cleared for action. This measure proved unnecessary in the event. The governor, Juan de la Gandara, sent immediately to welcome the Chilean squadron, assuring the Vice-Admiral that his ships would be unharmed and subsequently being effusively apologetic about the affair of the Araucano which had arisen, he assured Lord Cochrane, out of a misunderstanding.35

The Vice-Admiral maintained a position of reserve, however: he gratefully took advantage of the opportunity to replenish his ships' provisions by purchase from the English trader Snipe, but declined an invitation to visit the capital and kept his visit to the port as short as possible, less than a week. Of the 12 merchant ships in the port when he arrived, nine were British, one North American, one Guayaquil and only one, the El Toche, Spanish. This, on the night the squadron anchored, was drawn up as close as possible to the mole and her tiller carried ashore to prevent her from being sailed out by force; and it was clear that the political situation in Acapulco was favourable to the Spanish rather than to the Chilean squadron. Lord Cochrane therefore confined himself to collecting news about the Spanish frigates. The Prueba and Venganza had come to Acapulco from the Peruvian coast whence they had been chased by the Chilean squadron, on 27 February 1821. At that time the regime that had just taken form in Mexico was the conservative alliance of creole aristocracy, church, colonial army, and peninsular office-holders which saw in Agustín de Iturbide and his Plan de Iguala their strongest bulwark against the menace of Indian social revolution in Mexico and anticlerical liberalism in Spain. Even the limited alterations to the status quo proposed

by the Plan of Iguala had, however, proved too much for the then staunchly royalist region around Acapulco and three weeks after their arrival a royalist counterrevolution to restore the colonial regime had taken place, and the commander of the Spanish frigates, José Villegas, had played an important part in it. On 28 September 1821 under the aegis of Iturbide Mexico had formally become an independent empire ruled by a regency council until such time as an Emperor might be elected. On 15 October the troops of the imperial regime had succeeded in reoccupying Acapulco. By reason of the conciliatory policies stemming from the Plan of Iguala, the two Spanish frigates in Acapulco were left unmolested. But though tolerated by the Mexicans, the Prueba and Venganza were not assisted by them, and in October and November 1821 Villegas was experiencing increasing difficulty in raising funds to pay and provision his two ships. The crews, mostly Peruvians and chilotas who had no desire to spend the rest of their days in Mexico, were verging on the mutinous. In these circumstances, the two frigates had weighed anchor and sailed from Acapulco on 13 November 1821. It was rumoured that their intention was to find the Chilean squadron and give themselves up. 36

Such was the information that Lord Cochrane could procure about the Prueba and Venganza. Of their movements since sailing from Acapulco he had less sure information: according to the Mercedes a ship which might have been one of them was sighted in the lee of the island of Taboga, but Shepherd was over-cautious about approaching the anchorage and did not establish whether they were both there or not. It was also

36 CP doc 847. Ruiz, promissory note, 1 February 1822; López Urrutia: La Escuadrilla Chilena, 47 et seqq; CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations.

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reported in Acapulco that the **Prueba** was making for the Peruvian coast at Arica. Though their precise movements were uncertain, it was clear that the Spanish frigates were generally moving southwards, and on the basis of this information Lord Cochrane issued his next orders for the cruise. Wilkinson in the **Independencia** with Simpson in the **Araucano** was to go northward to the gulf of California to purchase flour and meat, which provisions were to be sent back to the squadron in the latter ship as speedily as possible without turning aside for any reason. The **Independencia** was then to cruise off San Blas for two months to look out for Spanish shipping from the Philippines. As for the Spanish ships, the **Mercedes** was put under the command of Grenfell, a bolder and more resolute spirit than Shepherd, and sent back towards Panama to see if the frigates were in that place or not and to reconnoitre carefully the intermediate ports. In the meantime the principal part of the squadron was to sail direct for Guayaquil. In conformity with this new plan, the ships made their way out of Acapulco bay between 1 and 3 February. The **Independencia** and **Araucano** turned northwards and the remainder began the tedious voyage back towards the Ecuadorean coast. 37 The pursuit in fact was nearing its conclusion, for the squadron was to find the first of the Spanish ships in Guayaquil. How had they come to put in to that port?

When the **Prueba** and **Venganza** sailed from Acapulco on 13 November 1821, it was in response to orders from the new Captain General of New Granada, Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon, who came out from Spain in that year to take charge of the war in that viceroyalty, and carried orders

37 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; CP doc 2125. Lord Cochrane to Wilkinson, 1 February 1822.
for the two frigates to come under his command. He arrived at Panama in August 1821 and from the isthmus sent to San Blas and Acapulco for the two frigates to join him there. The serious situation in Quito compelled his attention, however - Bolívar, having liberated the greater part of Colombia, was pressing southwards towards Quito through Pasto, and the Guayaquil patriot junta with the support of Antonio José Sucre was pressing northwards towards Quito from the coast - and on 22 October he sailed for the Ecuadorean coast with royalist reinforcements. It was his good fortune that the Chilean ships were repairing in Guayaquil at that time. Not long after his departure with the greater part of the royalist garrison of the isthmus, that region declared its independence on 28 November 1821. Consequently, when the frigates arrived late because of the difficulties they had had in fitting-out at Acapulco, they found on anchoring at Taboga island - where the Mercedes saw one of them - that de la Cruz Mourgeon was gone and Panama in unsympathetic hands. On 4 December, therefore, Villegas and Soroa agreed on a truce with the isthmian patriots: the frigates would not carry on hostile operations against Panama or any part of the Colombian coast, nor would they comply with any orders that de la Cruz Mourgeon might give them. However, a few days after signing this treaty, for unknown reasons Villegas changed his mind about it and gave orders for the two frigates to weigh anchor again and head south. He apparently hoped that somehow they might get past the Peruvian and Chilean coast, into the Atlantic, and make for the security of Rio de Janeiro. He had indeed just had a stroke of good fortune: it was precisely during the few days the frigates spent at Panama that the Chilean squadron sweeping northwards missed them, which

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otherwise they must have run into.  

The stroke of good fortune, though, they were unable to take great advantage of. As they moved south off the Ecuadorean coast they met and incorporated the Alejandro into their little squadron. This vessel, originally a Colombian patriot-chartered troop transport, had been seized by royalist mutineers and taken out of Guayaquil harbour in July 1821. She was subsequently used to carry de la Cruz Mougeon's troops from Panama to the Ecuadorean coast in October 1821. By January 1822 she was stationed off the Chocó coast to interrupt Colombian communications between Buenaventura and Guayaquil. The three royal ships were unable to procure sufficient supplies and provisions on the desert coasts of northern Peru and conditions on board deteriorated quickly. By early February the Prueba and Venganza were "in a Deplorable State, afflicted with all the Diseases incident to Filth and wholly destitute." For a few days they imposed a blockade on the mouth of the Guayaquil river and made an appearance of keeping it up, then entered into negotiations with the junta and the Peruvian agent Francisco Salazar, which resulted in a treaty on 15 February 1822. By its terms, the two frigates and the sloop would surrender to the Peruvian government which in exchange would pay the officers' arrears and the bounty of the crews, totalling 80,000 pesos. The Prueba left at once for Callao where she surrendered on 31 March; the Venganza and Alejandro remained in Guayaquil, the former because 


she needed repairs before she could get to sea again, the latter because the matter of her contract of charter to Colombia had to be settled before her surrender could be completed.\textsuperscript{40} Surrender for the Spanish frigates was inevitable by now: hunted out of the Mexican ports, with all the principal ports from Panama southwards in patriot hands, without provisions nor stores and in poor repair, they could not maintain themselves in the Mar del Sur and could not get out of it.

The Chilean squadron made its slow way southwards from Acapulco, its voyage delayed by a dangerous leak which the \textit{Valdivia} sprang on 10 February; by the following day she was making three feet of water an hour, and a sail had to be slung about the hull on 13 February to inhibit the leak sufficiently for the carpenters to get at it and plug it, which took three days. On 5 March the ships anchored in the bay of Tacames near the Esmeraldas river and landed marines to collect provisions. On 9 March the \textit{O'Higgins} chased the \textit{Good Hope}, outward bound from Acapulco. On 11 March the \textit{O'Higgins} dropped anchor off Puna island; he believed, Lord Cochrane had just written to the Minister of Marine, that the Spanish frigates might be there, and even if they were not there, he was confident that he would find them soon as they were said to be in a poor state of repair and short of provisions. The ships worked up the river on 12 March, arrived in the port the next morning, saluted, and dropped anchor. Partly because the \textit{Araucano} had not appeared from the gulf of California with provisions, the squadron when it arrived in Guayaquil was destitute and incapable of carrying on the pursuit further, according to Lord Cochrane. He did not tell the junta this, however, and moved carefully in the harbour so as not to arouse suspicion; he had come, he told Olmedo, to help

\textsuperscript{40}Restrepo: \textit{Historia}, IV, 327.
with the expedition being planned to liberate Panama, which so far as he knew was still under royalist control; he was glad, he added, to see the Venganza and Alejandro; and he asked to be assisted with supplies and news of the Prueba. Showing no other sign of interest than this in the Venganza, he turned to another business. Among the rumours which had circulated in Peru after the departure of the squadron was one to the effect that Lord Cochrane had offered to the commander of the Callao forts, José de la Mar, to supply the garrison of the forts with provisions rather than see them surrender, as in the end they did, to San Martín. This rumour had been started or was believed by no less than San Martín himself, who told it to Hardy as a fact at the end of November. La Mar, after the surrender of the Callao forts in September 1821, had gone over to the patriot side and was despatched by San Martín to Guayaquil as an unofficial agent. Lord Cochrane now took advantage of his presence in the port to request his formal denial of the allegations that Lord Cochrane had supplied Callao with provisions, and this written denial La Mar readily supplied.

Lord Cochrane had bigger game than this in view, however: following his instructions, early on 14 March Crosbie with a single boat's crew crossed to the Venganza and declared the authority of the Vice-Admiral on the quarter deck. There was no resistance. The Chilean and Peruvian
flags were run up to the masthead and sentries posted at the gangways. The Alejandro was occupied at the same time. The whole operation was conducted with swift efficiency. It elicited immediate protest. La Mar and Salazar formally protested and demanded explanations, and Olmedo demanded the immediate evacuation of the two Spanish vessels. The harbour gunboats were seen taking up a warlike posture and the shore batteries were prepared for action. Lord Cochrane temporised. The next morning, 15 March, he sent ashore to Olmedo to acknowledge his threatening letter and responded to it with an offer to negotiate a treaty on the matter. Olmedo answered this in a conciliatory fashion, agreed to the proposal for negotiations, and withdrew the gunboats back to their anchorage. The work being done on the Venganza by the Chilean fitters and artisans did not stop, though, and later in the same day Olmedo took alarm at this. He wrote again to insist that work on the ship be stopped, that the Guayaquil flag be raised on her, and that Lord Cochrane's formal propositions be expedited on the basis that the frigate belonged to Guayaquil. The harbour defences were alerted again, and from further down the river the Valdivia reported next day seeing more active military preparations on the shore.

43 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; CP doc 2130. Lord Cochrane to Crosbie, 13 March 1822; CP doc 2130. Lord Cochrane to Olmedo, 16 March 1822.


In this tense situation Crosbie, Cobbett and Bennett at length went ashore on 17 March to meet the junta's representatives and agree on the terms of the treaty, which was signed that day. The port captain, Luzuriaga, accompanied them back to the O'Higgins as a gesture of goodwill. The sequence of events, in fact, suggests strongly that Lord Cochrane's offer to open negotiations about the Venganza was a blind and that his real intention was to delay and procrastinate in getting down to discussions while work went ahead to get the Spanish frigate seaworthy enough to slip suddenly out of the port before anybody on shore could do anything about it; and that he only gave up this plan when he learned that he had been cut off by the batteries lower down the river. This hypothesis would explain the facts that Olmedo had to write several times asking for negotiations to begin before Lord Cochrane would appoint his representatives, and that negotiations took place only on 17 March after the Valdivia had reported the shore defences being mobilised down the river. This hypothesis would also account for the terms of the treaty, according to which the Venganza was to become the possession of the state of Guayaquil and was not to be sold or given away without the approval of both the Peruvian and the Chilean governments. The Alejandro was to be restored to her owner or his agents. Nothing was said of Lord Cochrane's well-founded claim that having caused the ships to give themselves up, he was their legitimate captor. And though the Chilean ships politely saluted the Guayaquil flag when it was run up to the masthead of the Venganza on 18 March, Lord Cochrane must have been fully aware that the treaty was a worthless scrap of paper which - backed by no sanction - would be disregarded as soon as it suited the junta to do so. It was in fact only a face-saving device to enable the Vice-Admiral to extricate himself with some dignity from the trap.
he was caught in.46

The question of the two Spanish ships in Guayaquil having been thus resolved, on 18 March the Chilean ships were provisioned and on 19 March the O'Higgins began to move down the river. The Chileans made their rendezvous and sailed from the mouth of the river on 27 March. Olmedo sent a farewell letter down the river after Lord Cochrane, sensitively regretting that he was leaving the place less contentedly than after his former visit; while the Vice-Admiral wrote to Chile a few days out that the Guayaquil junta now looked upon Chile with distrust. He wondered whether it would not be good policy, to prevent Guayaquil from falling into the hands of Peru, to facilitate the conveyance there of Bolívar's troops from Chocó and thus ensure that it would become a part of Colombia.47 In the event, however, assistance from Chile was not necessary for Bolívar to seize control of Guayaquil, which he did in July 1822.

The Chilean squadron sailed southwards from the mouth of the Guayaquil river. The leaks in the Valdivia were still troublesome, and from 12 to 16 April the squadron put in at Huambacho for the ship to be careened on the beach and the leaks plugged. Lord Cochrane took advantage of this pause to put in to Nepeña on 12 April and send ashore to ask the governor of the place for news of the Prueba and for assistance in reprovisioning the ships. He received a disagreeable surprise:

46 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; CP doc 1495. Agreement on the Spanish ships, 17 March 1822.

the governor replied that the *Prueba* had surrendered at Callao and advised him that after his departure the previous October orders had been sent along the coast from Lima that the Chilean squadron was not to be supplied or given any assistance. He added pointedly though to Lord Cochrane's messenger, the commissary Alejo Ruiz, that he would of course aid the squadron "if he was forced to." Some provisions were got and the ships continued to Callao.48

On 25 April the *O'Higgins* and *Valdivia* entered Callao roads, cautiously, with their guns double-shotted, and anchored. The leak in the *O'Higgins* had become troublesome again and though the pumps were kept constantly going through the night, the water level in the hold flooded the fresh water barrels. The carpenters and caulkers were engaged most of the day in stemming the leak. On shore the parlous condition of the *O'Higgins* was not known of, however, and consternation reigned when the Chilean vessels entered the harbour. Anxious preparations were made to defend the *Prueba*, upon which the Peruvian flag had been formally raised on 2 April, but as one observer put it: "The terror inspired on this occasion by the presence of Lord Cochrane was positively ludicrous, and the whole Castle of Callao was in commotion..."49 However, Lord Cochrane was apparently not prepared to


49CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; AOH, IX, 91. De la Cruz to San Martin, 7 May 1822; Gordon F Mathison: *Narrative of a visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru and the Sandwich Islands during the years 1821 and 1822* (London, 1825), p 284.
attempt forceful measures to recover the Prueba and replied to Monteaudo's nervous request that he respect the flag of Peru with a sardonic affirmative. His intentions were twofold: to strike a final propaganda blow against San Martín's government, and to procure sufficient supplies to enable him to get back to Chile. 50

His propaganda blow consisted of a formal letter to Monteaudo on 29 April, complaining firstly of the order not to reprovision his ships which he had learned of at Nepena. This order, he affirmed, was against the usages normal between friendly nations, and he asked for it to be rescinded. Secondly, he complained of the actions of the Peruvian legate in Guayaquil in assisting the Prueba to reprovision and escape before the arrival there of the squadron. He added a second letter on the same day, charging that the Peruvian government was pursuing a policy of building up a squadron of their own upon the ruins of the Chilean fleet; and that the ideals of the liberating expedition and the promises made by San Martín had been betrayed or left unfulfilled: These facts, he affirmed, justified his action in seizing the Peruvian funds at Ancon. Monteaudo declined to take up the gages here offered and debate them, and when on 3 May Lord Cochrane demanded for the last time that the Peruvian government honour their obligations to the Chilean squadron, and Monteaudo again declined to do so, the Vice-Admiral closed the correspondence between them "with all possible personal respect, believing that that bitter line of conduct is the necessary consequence of the Situation which obtains under a Govt erected, by a military Chief, working in direct violation of the instructions, and in contempt of the Proclamation, and Solemn

50 CP doc 4. Lord Cochrane to Monteaudo, 28 April 1822.
wishes of HE the Supreme Director of Chile." Lord Cochrane's attempts to involve Guido, San Martin's lieutenant and now Governor of Callao, in the same sort of debate were rebuffed similarly.

The other part of Lord Cochrane's programme went better. Guido agreed to supply provisions to the squadron, and this was put in hand under the charge of Luis de la Cruz, who had just taken over the post of commandant general of marine that he had discharged earlier in Chile. There was a brief argument between them as to how the supplies should be got to the ships, Lord Cochrane demanding that they be brought alongside the O'Higgins by the Callao boats, and de la Cruz insisting that the commissary from the flagship be sent ashore to collect them. It was settled in favour of de la Cruz. But the Chilean ships had got their provisions, 6500 rations, sufficient to see them to Valparaiso. As Lord Cochrane reported to Chile, only the feeble and humble situation to which the Lima government had been reduced had made it possible for the Vice-Admiral to bully them into giving the squadron provisions. If the government had been stronger they would assuredly have denied his requests.

From Callao he wrote to O'Higgins for instructions on 2 May and gave his elegantly cutting view of public affairs in Peru: "San Martin


has now laid down the external pomp of Protector, & like Cincinnatus, has withdrawn to retirement but not with the same view. This modesty is to captivate the crowd, who are to call on him to convert "the ploughshare" into an Imperial Sceptre... Great hopes are now entertained... that the Squadron will be withdrawn, and, that when the Sun of Peru shall rise on the ocean, the stars which hitherto has (sic) shone, will be eclipsed for ever! ..." He correctly predicted the imminent collapse of San Martín's regime in Peru.⁵⁴ He wrote also to the Minister of Marine to announce that the enemy's naval power in the Pacific had been eliminated, nine warships captured or destroyed, his campaign now concluded, and to request his orders back to Chile.⁵⁵

One last piece of business remained to be completed. On 8 May at about 5 pm the Montezuma appeared in the anchorage. This was the schooner assigned to the service of San Martín at the outset of the liberating expedition over Lord Cochrane's protest, and which he had not ceased to consider as a part of the Chilean squadron. In October 1821, her then captain, John Young, had refused to continue in the Chilean service and the Montezuma remained in Peruvian waters while the squadron sailed after the Spanish frigates. The schooner was now under the command of John Robinson, an ex-Lieutenant of the Chilean service who had also left in October 1821. Now the Montezuma in Callao anchorage commenced to pass by the Chilean ships with no salute nor sign of recognition. The O'Higgins, however, fired a shot across her bow. She hove to and was brought alongside the frigate. Four of her crew volunteered to join Lord Cochrane's ship; the remainder chose to go ashore on the morning of 9 May, a replacement crew was put into

⁵⁴CP doc 2137. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 2 May 1822.
the vessel and, watched by the Peruvian brigs Belgrano and Limeña, both then in the anchorage but which made no sign of opposing this action, the Chilean squadron, now raised to four ships, sailed out of Callao. They made a quick an uneventful voyage, and dropped anchor in Valparaiso roads on 2 June.56

The Independencia and Araucano, under Wilkinson's pennant as commodore, had as previously noted been despatched to California to procure supplies and look out for Spanish ships. They sailed from Acapulco on 1 February 1822, making for Loreto, the capital of the California missions, where they anticipated getting the formal permission of the Superior of the Missions to buy supplies on that coast. They paused at the Tres Marias group of islands, off the coast opposite San Blas, where they separated, the Araucano to continue up the Gulf of California to Loreto and the Independencia to take up station at the Cape of San Lucas, the southern tip of the peninsula of Baja California. On his way there, however, Wilkinson learned from Indian fishermen that a Spanish warship was lying in the harbour of San José, the small port and mission-station immediately behind Cape San Lucas. He made therefore for this place and entered the anchorage on 17 February with his gun ports masked and flying British colours. The Spanish vessel proved to be the brig San Francisco Javier, of 14 guns, a Mexican merchant vessel which also carried Spanish letters of marque. The privateer ordered the Independencia, which she took for a British East India Company ship, to send across a boat with her papers. Instead Wilkinson sent a boatful of

56 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; AOH, IX, 90. De la Cruz to San Martín, 8 May 1822; AOH, IX, 92. De la Cruz to San Martín, 9 May 1822.
marines, simultaneously running up the Chilean ensign in place of the British on his ship; and the privateer, taken by surprise, surrendered without a fight.\(^{57}\)

This incident had taken place a good two miles from the shore and the inhabitants of San José had not witnessed or been alarmed by it. That night, therefore, Wilkinson sent a boatload of seamen to the shore, who were able to land unchallenged at midnight and within a few minutes had taken possession of the village. Here he discovered that the populace of Baja California had not yet learned that Mexico had become independent, and that they viewed the visiting Chilean warship as either an enemy or a pirate. He also learned from the Spanish ex-governor of San Blas, who by chance was in the village, that a small brig was preparing to sail from a nearby bay for San Blas. To prevent it from carrying the news that the Chilean ships were in the Gulf of California, Wilkinson sent one of his lieutenants, Campbell, with a party of seamen and marines, to scuttle the vessel. This they did, but on the way back to San José on 5 March were attacked by the local population. Campbell and four of his men were killed, and several more taken prisoner and sent to the governor of Baja California at San Antonio, up the peninsula.\(^{58}\)

Wilkinson's position in San José began to become dangerous. There was no sign of the Araucano and though in conformity with Lord Cochrane's orders he had released his prisoners and the privateer San Francisco Javier, the local population of the peninsula were becoming restive.

\(^{57}\)CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; López Urrutia: La Escuadra Chilena, 59-61.

\(^{58}\)CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; López Urrutia: La Escuadra Chilena, 72.
The clash which threatened to take place did not occur, however, thanks to the appearance of the Superior of the Missions, who was investigating reports he had received of the landing of the Chileans. Indeed, not only did he tranquilize the local inhabitants, but he also determined to declare the independence of Baja California, partly out of the conviction that the Spanish cause could not be sustained there any longer and partly because he hoped by such means to get rid of the Chilean ships. In the middle of March, consequently, in the plaza of San José del Cabo and to a salute from the Independencia in the harbour, the independence of Baja California was proclaimed.59

The Araucano meanwhile had made her way to Loreto and here and at Guaymas on the opposite shore of the Gulf of California had purchased beef cattle, flour and other provisions. An abattoir was established on the shore at Loreto for the preparation of charqui. Most of the Chilean seamen of the Araucano were put ashore to carry on this work; at the same time Simpson and most of the marines were ashore to guard the abattoir from the danger of attack by the local Spanish garrison. In these circumstances, the English seamen still on the Araucano in early March mutinied, and abandoning Simpson, the marines and the Chilean seamen to their fate, carried the vessel off. Simpson still had a boat, however, and with a small crew made the risky and difficult 200-mile voyage from Loreto to San José del Cabo to get help. He arrived on 29 March and was picked up by the Independencia which immediately sailed to rescue his crew. Wilkinson found on his arrival at Loreto on 4 April that Simpson's crew had taken refuge in the mission-building where they were practically under siege from the

59 Ibid., 65-66
The arrival of the Independencia at once turned the tables in favour of the patriots; negotiations were opened with the garrison commander, the ensign José María Mata, and on 7 March under Wilkinson's auspices, he formally declared the independence of California. 60

The Independencia had now cruised for two months in the Gulf of California as ordered by the Vice-Admiral, and Wilkinson, after a brief final visit of two days to Guaymas from 7 to 9 April, during which he purchased flour, surveyed the port, and courteously declined to stay and help fight the Colorado Indians, who generally went on the warpath at this time of year, turned southwards. On 13 May the Independencia anchored off Puna, but only long enough to find out that the main part of the squadron had left more than two months earlier, and 47 days after this, on 29 June, she dropped anchor in Valparaíso. 61

ii Lord Cochrane leaves Chile

Although his return to Valparaíso on 2 June 1822 brought to an end a campaign that had lasted for very nearly two years in the most trying conditions, and he might be expected to have looked forward with some pleasure to a period of rest on his estate at Quintero, a few miles north of Valparaíso, Lord Cochrane's stay in Chile lasted for only a few months before he resumed his wanderings under another flag. Nor was his brief stay of seven months a tranquil one, for


61 CP doc 1889. Diary of naval operations; López Urrutia: La Escuadra Chilena, 72.
new difficulties and disputes compelled his participation. The most urgent problem was to settle his accounts for the squadron while it was in Peru and during the last cruise, and have the crews of the ships paid their wages and prize-money due; and within a few days of his arrival at Valparaíso the Vice-Admiral sent his accounts to the Marine Ministry for submission to the Finance Ministry's Upper Tribunal of Accounts (tribunal mayor de cuentas), the chamber responsible for auditing the accounts and issuing instruction for them to be paid. The official dealing with the squadron, Rafael Correa de Saa, declined however to pass these until the Vice-Admiral should have supplied the originals of his accounts and receipts relative to his expenditures. Some at least of this supporting documentation was stored rather haphazardly in the O'Higgins, and was able to be collected and forwarded to Correa in the middle of June.62 As for the pay due to the officers and men, Campiño in the Commissary of Marine took charge of this in July. On 4 August he was appointed Accountant General of the squadron, to concentrate the work of drawing up paylists under his supervision, though he did not start work before 10 August when the documents which he, like Correa, demanded before he would commence work, were delivered to him by Stevenson.63

Neither Correa nor Campiño showed evidence of any desire to


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settle their respective accounts in a hurry. A month after receiving
the available documents, Correa sent a new batch of questions on 13
August about the precise arrangements for the costs of shipping the
liberating army to Peru, how its message was provided and paid, and
what merchandise was embarked in the ships. Most of these questions,
Lord Cochrane pointed out, he could not answer either because they were
the concern of the contractors and not himself or because the required
information should have been recorded by the ships' contadores, of
whom all but one had by now deserted from the squadron. Undeterred
by this frosty reply, Correa forwarded a further detailed list of
questions to be answered and documents to be furnished, on 2 September,
and suggested that Stevenson be instructed to appear in person at the
tribunal to give information. 64

Campiño worked in the same leisurely style during August and
the earlier part of September, and moved down to Valparaíso in the
middle of the month. However, in the last few days of this month
and during October discontent in the squadron became acute among the
unpaid, ill-fed and shivering crews – for this was now the winter
season, most of the seamen had spent the last two years in the hot
climate of coastal Peru, and had not received new clothing for many
months. In the middle of October, according to Zenteno, a pamphlet
prepared by the seamen began to circulate, in which they threatened
mutiny if they were not paid. There were rumours that the ships
might even be seized and used to blockade the port, rumours which
the government took so seriously that they sent 250 extra troops down

64CP doc 1698. Correa to Lord Cochrane, 13 August 1822; CP doc 2159.
Lord Cochrane to Correa, 22 August 1822; CP doc 1699. Correa to
Lord Cochrane, 2 September 1822.
from Santiago to reinforce the garrison of the port. These signs of ebullition had some effect on the government: a commission was set up on 6 November consisting of Blanco Encalada, Correa de Saa, Felipe O'Reilly of the Commissary of Marine, and Colonel Arturo Wavell, to expedite the process of drawing up the pay lists. Though these were not completed until 10 December, and though there was still not enough money then to pay the wages due, amounting to more than 75,000 pesos, from the middle of October such small sums of money that could be scraped together from week to week were disbursed to the crews. It was not enough to pay their arrears, but it was sufficient to prevent their threats being carried out and the squadron being destroyed by desertion. Meanwhile the government promised to sell off the Galvarino and Chacabuco as an earnest of their intentions to raise money.

Much of the discontent of the crews in September was exacerbated by reports that began to be circulated that Lord Cochrane, ignoring the sufferings of his crews, had embarked 9000 ounces of gold clandestinely on a British ship on his own account to be shipped back


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to England. Cobbett and Wilkinson first reported these rumours to the Vice-Admiral on 25 September, giving them no credence and promoting a collective letter to him from the captains and lieutenants of the squadron expressing their indignation at such attempts to blacken Lord Cochrane's character. On 30 September he wrote to the Governor of Valparaíso, Zenteno, to denounce the rumours and demanded that Zenteno or his nominee go aboard the Doris, the ship in question, to prove the truth or falsehood of the report. Zenteno naturally declined to examine the Doris and took Lord Cochrane's word that the reports were without foundation. In fact, the reports were not untrue: the money was not actually in the ship on 30 September when Lord Cochrane denied that there was any "on board" the Doris, but it was secretly put aboard a few days later and consisted of two consignments, one of 4500 dollars and the other of 3997 dollars. 67 It is understandable - though not creditable - that Lord Cochrane should have concealed this shipment at the time; it is less understandable, and much less creditable, that he should have persisted thereafter in denying the facts as he did 37 years later in his memoirs. 68

Besides being involved in the problems of the squadron's accounts and the payment of wages, Lord Cochrane pursued his feud with San Martín. The seizure of the Peruvian funds, coming after the previous

Wilkinson and others to Lord Cochrane, 30 September 1822; CP doc 2167. Lord Cochrane to Zenteno, 30 September 1822; CP doc 1641.
Vernon's receipt, 12 October 1822; CP doc 1642. Vernon's receipt, 12 October, 1822.

68 Cochrane: Narrative of Services, I, 206-212.
tensions between the two men, had thrown San Martín into a towering rage. Losing his customary self-discipline and coolness, he had written a long letter of denunciation to O'Higgins at the end of September 1821, affirming that it was impossible to enumerate all the crimes of the Vice-Admiral, whom he termed a "pirate," a "crook" (ratero), a "footpad" (salteador), a "rogue" (picaro), "wicked" and a "devil." Following this, he sent two agents, James Paroissien and Juan García del Río, to Chile with instructions which included a demand that Lord Cochrane be brought to account for his acts of piracy and other crimes while in Peru. This, "the most delicate part" of their mission, they presented to the Chilean government in March 1822 in a long list of charges against Lord Cochrane. The Chilean government, however, preferred not to have to consider the charges but rather by ignoring them, bury them. Two motives impelled them towards this response: In the first place, Echeverría officially as Minister of Marine had on 13 November when Lord Cochrane's dispatches reporting his actions at Ancon arrived in Santiago, written back to him that the Chilean government approved his action in seizing the Peruvian funds; and a day earlier the Supreme Director himself had written confidentially to the Vice-Admiral to give him his personal approval, and had added that he considered that from the moment the independence of Peru was declared the Chilean squadron ceased to be subordinate to San Martín's authority. In the second place, Lord Cochrane's action was loudly applauded in Chile, where it was seen as a brave and necessary measure to preserve the squadron which had already won so much glory for Chile, from the dissolution that threatened it at the hands of meager spirits. His prestige had risen considerably in the public estimation, while that of San Martín was, by early 1822, falling. It would obviously be impolitic for the increasingly unstable Chilean government to counten-
once any attack on him. 69

Lord Cochrane learned of San Martín's moves against him when he returned to Valparaíso, and at once counterattacked. He first informed the government in June that he proposed to present an account of the expenses of the squadron during the time it was employed in the service of Peru, including hire of warships and transports, other services, and indemnity for the Venganza according to the treaty signed at Guayaquil. This account came to the enormous sum of 1.374.620 pesos. 70 Next, on 30 September, he formally requested permission to publish his correspondence with San Martín, to counteract what he claimed were Peruvian machinations against his authority and character. This, however, Echeverría requested him not to do on the grounds that it would damage the prestige and credit of the new government if foreign countries, especially Great Britain, received more news than it already had about the dissensions between two such important military chiefs. He left unsaid that such publication would be as embarrassing to Chile as it would to San Martín. 71


70 CP doc 2143. Lord Cochrane to NR, 20 June 1822; CP doc 2144. Statement of the debt due by Peru.

71 CP doc 2162. Lord Cochrane to Echeverría, 30 September 1822; CP doc 416. Echeverría to Lord Cochrane, 1 October 1822.
Lord Cochrane's third move against San Martín was the obverse of his. On 25 July 1822, while San Martín was absent from Lima engaged in his celebrated interview with Bolivar in Guayaquil, his government in Peru was overthrown and his principal lieutenant Monteagudo sent into exile. When he returned from Guayaquil, San Martín himself offered his irreversible resignation of his authority to the Peruvian Congress and on 21 September sailed from Callao into retirement. On 12 October he arrived at Valparaíso in the Peruvian brig Belgrano; at once Lord Cochrane announced his arrival to the Chilean government and declared that if they wished to open an enquiry into San Martín's conduct in Peru, he was ready to prove forcible usurpation of authority, attempted seduction of the navy, incitement to desert and illegitimate possession of the Prueba and Venganza against him. This met as little enthusiasm from the government as had the charges levelled by San Martín's agents, so at length Lord Cochrane was compelled to content himself with writing and privately circulating his own statement of his defence against the charges made by the Peruvian agents, which he produced in November. 72

By the time he produced this defence, Lord Cochrane had already decided to leave the Chilean service. His decision to do so was stimulated by the deteriorating political situation in the country. By the latter part of 1822 the regime of O'Higgins was becoming increasingly unpopular in Chile as a result of the Supreme Director's growing dictatorial tendencies, his imposition of an unpopular constitution, the heavy taxation his government levied on the prostrate country, and his social policies which alienated the most powerful

72 CP doc 2173. Lord Cochrane to Echeverría, 12 October 1822; CP doc 2177. Lord Cochrane to San Martín, 19 November 1822.
groups in Chilean society. Opposition was centred in the southern province of Concepción and its intendent Ramon Freire, Lord Cochrane's friend and ally in the conquest of Valdivia. Lord Cochrane was placed in a difficult situation: he felt a sense of loyalty and obligation towards O'Higgins, whom he accounted a personal friend, but at the same time he agreed with some of the criticisms made of his government by his other friend Freire, who made several efforts in October, November and December to win him over to join the insurrection that was being prepared. The Vice-Admiral had, however, been offered the command of the navy of the newly-independent Brazil on 4 November 1822; he revolved the invitation in his mind for three weeks, then on 28 November offered his resignation to Echeverría. He wrote privately at the same time to O'Higgins that he wished to retire before the troubles he foresaw came to pass, that he had served O'Higgins to the best of his ability, and that he still felt the greatest friendship and respect for him.

The government, characteristically, did not accept nor refuse his request for a discharge, but on 18 December issued a decree declaring that as all the ships of the marine were being laid up and disarmed, the officers were to go on leave at half-pay; but as a token of gratitude Lord Cochrane, Crosbie, Cobbett and other officers who had distinguished themselves would receive full pay. The government's wishes, however, were expressed clearly in other ways. In the next few

73 CP doc 1399. Freire to Lord Cochrane, 31 October 1822; CP doc 1401.
Freire to Lord Cochrane, 20 November 1822; CP doc 1408. Freire to Lord Cochrane, 11 December 1822.

74 CP doc 2179. Lord Cochrane to Echeverría, 28 November 1822; CP doc 2178. Lord Cochrane to O'Higgins, 28 November 1822.
days, the ships of the squadron were withdrawn from his command, Calvarino first on 18 December to go on a secret mission supervised by the marine department, the remainder on 23 December to be careened, like the O'Higgins and Valdivia, or laid up, like the Lautaro, or sold off, like the Chacabuco. Only the small brig Montezuma was left for Lord Cochrane to use while he might remain in the country. This was not for long. His commission was concluded: He had cleared the Pacific of Spanish warships and carried an army of invasion to Peru. The government which had employed him was on the eve of disappearance. Much unfinished and never-to-be-finished business remained in the way of claims on Chile. He had made a significant contribution to the independence of Chile, and had greatly enhanced his own reputation. The year 1820, which opened with the capture of Valdivia and closed with the capture of the Esmeralda, was the high point in his whole career. There were, in short, items on both the debit and the credit side of his participation in these four years of Chilean history which came to an end on 18 January 1823 when at 6 p.m. the Montezuma fired a gun and struck Lord Cochrane's flag, which he received with no apparent emotion as he went aboard the charter Colonel Allen to commence the voyage to Brazil.  

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76 CP doc 1894. Log of the Colonel Allen, 1823.
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LORD COCHRANE AND THE CHILEAN NAVY, 1818-1823,
WITH AN INVENTORY OF THE DUNDONALD PAPERS
RELATING TO HIS SERVICE WITH THE CHILEAN NAVY.

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VOLUME TWO

Inventory of papers in the Scottish Record Office, General Deposit 233 (Dundonald Muniments), relative to Lord Cochrane's service as Vice-Admiral of the Chilean navy.
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PART ONE

(Documents 1 - 7)

LETTERBOOKS
Letterbook marked "Correspondence which took place between Lord Cochrane and Captain Biddle of the United States corvette Ontario from the Chilean gazette January 1819". Also containing correspondence of Lord Cochrane with the Viceroy of Peru, dispatches of Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno and royalist letters and papers captured in the Maria Isabel. 16 May 1817 to 6 February 1820.

Valparaíso, 27 December 1818, Lord Cochrane to James Biddle, Captain of USS Ontario: stating that it is customary to fire a salute to the Chilean flag.

USS Ontario, Valparaíso, 28 December 1818, James Biddle to Lord Cochrane: stating that when he last entered the port, he undertook to fire a salute if it was returned from the shore by an equal number of guns; that this was declined, so he will not do so now.

Valparaíso, 28 December 1818, Lord Cochrane to James Biddle: stating that he will answer Biddle's salute with an equal number of guns if this is American practice, though the normal response is two guns less.

USS Ontario, Valparaíso, 28 December 1818, James Biddle to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will not fire a salute; that it is a pure courtesy not an inflexible rule, sometimes done and sometimes not.

Valparaíso, 28 December 1818, Lord Cochrane to James Biddle: requesting that he will inform Lord Cochrane how he can reconcile stating that it is pure courtesy.

Valparaíso, 30 December 1818, Lord Cochrane to
James Biddle: requesting that he will not sail until after the squadron leaves.

USS Ontario, Valparaiso, 30 December 1818, James Biddle to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will stay in the port this day, but that he must leave tomorrow.

ND: Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating he is enclosing his correspondence with the Viceroy.

O'Higgins, before Callao, 4 March 1819, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin de la Pezuela: stating his protest against the treatment of prisoners, especially those of the Maypu; that he will take reprisals; that he offers an exchange.

Lima, 5 March 1819, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: stating that the prisoners of the royalists are well treated, unlike the prisoners of the patriots; that he agrees to an exchange; complaining of Lord Cochrane, as a citizen of an allied country, giving aid to Spain's enemies.

Lima, 10 November 1818, Colonel Antonio Seoanz to Joaquin de la Pezuela: complaining of the treatment of royalist prisoners in the depot of Las Bruscas, Buenos Aires.

O'Higgins, before Callao, 7 March 1819, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin de la Pezuela: stating that the prisoners of the patriots are humanely treated; that he has personal knowledge of the conditions in which the prisoners of the royalists are kept on San Lorenzo; asserting the right of Chile to employ foreigners in her navy and to treating with royalists; stating that he has more than 70 prisoners of the rank of ensign and below.
James Biddle: requesting that he will not sail until after the squadron leaves.

_USS Ontario_, Valparaiso, 30 December 1818, James Biddle to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will stay in the port this day, but that he must leave tomorrow.

_ND: Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno:_ stating he is enclosing his correspondence with the Viceroy.

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Lima, 13 March 1819, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: stating his disagreement over the rights of peoples to serve under foreign flags; the justice of the royalist cause; that he will exchange prisoners of the Buenos Aires army but not the crew of the Maypu, who are pirates.

O'Higgins, before Callao, 17 March 1819, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin de la Pezuela: reasserting the rights of the patriot governments and breaking off negotiations.

Valparaiso, 21 June 1819, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: account of the enemy's passive system of defence; that the government may employ his share of the captured money in the manufacture of rockets.

Valparaiso, 21 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating he has received Lord Cochrane's letter of the same date.

O'Higgins, 29 September 1819 Lord Cochrane to Joaquin de la Pezuela, Viceroy of Peru: challenging him to send out his fleet to fight, the prize being Callao; that if his fleet does not come out in four hours, Lord Cochrane will consume everything in the bay and the town of Callao with fire and rockets.

Lima, 29 September 1819, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: declining to accept Lord Cochrane's challenge.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 2 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: report of his attack on Callao.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 3 October 1819, Lord Cochrane
to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting his preparations for a further attack on Callao.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 6 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting his second attack on Callao.

1819, Lord Cochrane to the Peruvians: proclamation promising their imminent liberation.

Montezuma, Valdivia, 4 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting the capture of the southern forts of Valdivia.

Corral, 4 February 1820, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: report of the capture of the southern forts of Valdivia.

Valdivia, 5 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: report of the capture of the remaining forts of Valdivia.

Headquarters, Valdivia, 6 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting the capture of the town.

O'Higgins, Valdivia, 6 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: report on the state of Valdivia.

Lima, 4 December 1817, Joaquin de la Pezuela: instructions of the viceroy of Lima issued to Brigadier General Osorio commanding the expedition against Chile.

Lima, 7 December 1817, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Col. Jose Ordoñez: stating that an auxiliary expedition is being sent to Chile.
Lima, 5 December 1817, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Mariano Osorio: statement of the naval aid supplied to his expedition.

San Lucar, 16 May 1817, Antonio Martinez to Tomas Blanco Cabrera: extract of a letter giving general information of the progress of the war on the royalist side.

Madrid, 22 April 1818, Egeria, Minister of War, to Viceroy of Peru, most secret: giving instructions for political manoeuvres against the patriots.

Letterbook. Correspondence of Lord Cochrane with the captains of British warships, the Viceroy of Peru, Ignacio Zenteno, Bernardo O'Higgins, Simon Bolivar and officers of the Chilean squadron and marine department. 28 September 1819 to 4 June 1820.

O'Higgins, Callao, 28 September 1819, Lord Cochrane to Donat O'Brien, captain of the Slaney: stating his intention to investigate the circumstances of neutral ships in the port.

HMS Slaney, 29 September 1819, Donat O'Brien to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Inspector, Merope and Catalina are under his protection; that Lord Cochrane knows that the first and last belong to English merchants in Chile; that he is here to protect British property.

O'Higgins, 29 September 1819, Lord Cochrane to the Viceroy of Peru: challenging him to send out his fleet to fight, the prize being Callao; that if his fleet does not come out in four hours, Lord Cochrane will consume everything in the bay and the town of Callao with fire and rockets.

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Lima, 29 September 1819, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: declining to accept Lord Cochrane's challenge.

HMS Slaney, Callao bay, 29 September 1819, Donat O'Brien to Lord Cochrane: stating his surprise that English ships under his protection have been seized by the Chilean fleet; protesting that Lord Cochrane will have to destroy his ship to carry out his designs.

HMS Slaney, Ancon bay, 2 October 1819, Donat O'Brien to Lord Cochrane: stating his formal protest at Lord Cochrane's having taken possession of British ships on the pretext that they are breaking the blockade, although on O'Brien's orders they were already making for Ancon; that the ships are now in convoy with him as a result of Lord Cochrane's verbal message that he would seize them whenever he found them without British protection.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 2 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Donat O'Brien: defending his right to inspect and search ships.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 28 September 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: dispatch that he left Valparaiso on 12 September and collected his marines from Coquimbo on 16 September; that the O'Higgins entered Callao on 27 September and detained the north American brig Pallas; that the whole squadron went in on 28 September; that the Venganza and Esmeralda seemed to be preparing to sail; that the Slaney was in Callao; that he sent the enclosed notes to the Slaney and the Viceroy; that the Slaney made sail with several ships in train; that the squadron anchored off San Lorenzo.
O'Higgins, 2 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has built three rafts under the command of Charles, Miller and Hinds; that he carried out an attack on 1 October; account of the failure of the rockets; the explosion of Hinds' raft; the death of Lieutenant Bailley.

O'Higgins, 3 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is improving the rocket Launches for another attack; that he is constructing fireships under the command of Cobbett and Morgell; that the enemy have paid their crews to stimulate them; that the captain of the Slaney has promulgated a new code of mercantile law.

O'Higgins, 6 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the enemy ships prepared to run out on the night of 3 October; that they were detected, and desisted from the attempt; that their defence line consists of warships Esmeralda, Venganza, Sebastiana, Pezuela, Maipu, armed merchantmen Resolucion, Cleopatra, Trujillana; account of the failure of the second attack on Callao, that the Victoria blew up early and the Xerezana was consequently no used; that the rockets are still failing; that Spry, Crosbie and Prunier of the Galvarino, Araucano and Pueyrredon bore themselves very well as did Morgell and two seamen in the Victoria.

O'Higgins, 7 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno, secret: stating that with regard to the failure of their attacks, he will adopt a new tactic of looking out for Spanish ships coming from Europe; that Valdivia is too far and Pisco too near to Callao, he believes that they will make for Arica, so he will wait for them there; that morale has fallen; that the enemy are strengthening
their defences; that Callao and Lima could not be successfully attacked by a force from Chile and a new line of policy is necessary; that regarding the taking of Valdivia and Chiloé, this would be problematical, but could be done as any maritime place of inferior force must be at the mercy of a maritime force which is superior; that with regard to Peru there are two possible tactics, to cooperate with the Buenos Aires army to capture Potosí and revolutionise the southern provinces, or to secure bases at sympathetic points i.e. Arica and Guayaquil; that Guayaquil is very important as in the event of a serious naval engagement, badly damaged ships could not make their way back to Chile; that these plans are feasible and the squadron could occupy the Viceroy's whole attention near the capital, leaving the extremes vulnerable; that a single individual or minister should be put in charge of the military side of the state to ensure efficiency and secrecy.

O'Higgins, 2 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order, to go to Pisco and collect intelligence of the enemy forces.

O'Higgins, 4 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: order, that as food and drink is exhausted, he is to go and capture the fort at Pisco and embark the provisions, arms and boats he finds, in the Xerezana; that nobody is to go into the town or the nearby haciendas but to stay on the beach; that he is to distribute the proclamations of the Chilean government.

O'Higgins, 4 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Claudius Charles: order, that he is to take command of the marine detachment assigned to capture the fort at Pisco.
O'Higgins, 4 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Crosbie: order, that he is in the Araucano to look for a watering place for the squadron between 16 and 14 degrees of latitude.

O'Higgins, 5 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Crosbie: order, that he is to reconnoitre Callao acting as if the squadron were not nearby; that tomorrow he will stage the capture of the Pueyrredon disguised as a Spanish ship, to try to tempt the Spanish ships out of the port, and he is to sail WNW with his supposed capture.

6 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to William Prunier: order, that disguised as a Spanish ship, he is to allow himself to appear to be captured by the Araucano off Callao to tempt the Spanish warships out; that the squadron will then take up post off San Lorenzo under cover of night and intercept the enemy on their return to the port.

6 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Blanco Encalada: order, that in case the Araucano plot fails, soon afterwards the San Martin, which will be well disguised, will appear as a Spanish ship, stage a fight with the smaller Chilean ships off the port and appearing damaged will tempt out help; that the San Martin is to sail out of sight of the enemy lookouts and alter her appearance.

O'Higgins, November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that strong contrary winds prevented him from sailing to Arica as planned; that shortage of supplies obliged him to violate his instructions; that he has sent the Lautaro and the Galvarino with 220 marines under Charles to seize provisions in Pisco fort; that his is enclosing a general survey of the remaining provisions; that
the government will see the need to appoint a practical intelligent and active man as provisioner.

November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno:
account of the failure of his attempt to induce the enemy to pursue the Araucano; that one enemy ship which came round the Cape touched at Chorrillos and then made for Payta; that another merchantman slipped into Callao when the squadron was away; that the enemy shipping always makes for Cerro Azul to go into Callao, so he will place the Araucano there.

November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno:
stating that he has been cruising in Callao bay with the O'Higgins and Independencia to shame the enemy into making a move, without success; that it is impossible to accomplish anything against them as they will not come out and the nights are too calm for operations; that he is enclosing letters exchanged with Captain Downes of the Macedonia.

November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno:
stating that the Prueba passed more than a month ago; that it is reported that one Spanish warship has returned to Europe and another is damaged and with the frigate in Puna; that he is going to Puna to capture them and will leave the Araucano to cruise between Chancay and Cerro Azul.

November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Crosbie:
order, that he is to cruise off Callao in the region of Cerro Azul and up to Huaura; that captured ships are to be sent to Huambacho; that he is to look out for the Chacabuco.

Santa, 19 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that Huambacho is dried out, but
he has found a good watering place here and has
captured livestock from the haciendas of notorious
royalists nearby; that a large number of sick have
had to be camped on shore, especially from the San
Martin and Independencia; that a contagious fever
was apparently brought aboard by the men embarked
at Coquimbo; that he has given notes on the Chilean
government for goods taken from the people of Santa;
that he is sending Blanco back with the San Martin
and Independencia so that the expedition may be
carried through as quickly as possible; that the
sick will be put aboard the Xerezana, hospital
ship, when they are in a condition to travel with
Blanco; that he is going with the Lautaro, Galvarino
and Pueyrredon to Guayaquil.

19 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno:
stating that he was unable to intercept the enemy
naval reinforcements; that Pisco was captured with
Gutiker in command of the marines on the death of
Charles.

Santa, 17 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Gutiker:
order, that he is to take 200 soldiers and seize
livestock and provisions from the royalist haciendas
in the Santa valley.

Santa, 19 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Manuel
Blanco: order, that when the sick are in fit state
to travel, Blanco will sail to Valparaiso; that
Forster is to go by Callao to advise Crosbie of the
disposition of the squadron.

O'Higgins, 28 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Lt.
Carson: order, that he is to land with the marines
on Puna to ensure that no robbery and outrages are
committed by the crews against the inhabitants.
O'Higgins, 30 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order, that he is to make for Santa Clara island to intercept enemy boats which may be keeping a lookout for the Chilean squadron so as to warn Spanish shipping.

O'Higgins, 7 December 1819, Lord Cochrane to Lt. Carson: order, that due to the need for fruit and vegetables, he is to land with a detachment and under a white flag to requisition supplies, paying the natives of the country for what he takes; that he is not to enter Balao, and no private acquisitions of the soldiers are to be embarked.

Puna, 28 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the Prueba has escaped up-river to Guayaquil, but he has captured the Aguila, 30 guns, the Begoña, 20 guns, though the crews of 100 on each ship have escaped; that the excellent bronze 15-pounders of the Begoña have been trans­shipped to the Lautaro; that both ships would be suitable for transports.

Puna, 28 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno, secret: stating that he had hoped to cap­ture the Prueba in Guayaquil with the boats, but the noise of gunfire and the escape of the crews of the Aguila and Begoña have put the ship on the alert.

Puna, 29 November 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: account of the progress of the war in Santa Fe; stating that Guayaquil is ready to revolt; that it would be very beneficial to Chile to be able to control the province, especially for its ship­building.

Guayaquil river, 17 December 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that from 28 November to
13 December he has been embarking the cargoes of the prize ships, collecting firewood and watering.

Mouth of the Guayaquil river, December 1819, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order, that he is to cruise between the isla Santa Clara and Huambacho for two months to induce the enemy to believe that the squadron is still in the area, then to sail for Valparaiso.

Mouth of the Guayaquil river, December 1819, Lord Cochrane to William Prunier, secret: order, that he is to cruise off the Guayaquil river for two months to induce the enemy to believe that the squadron is still in the area, then to sail for Valparaiso.

21 January 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has examined Valdivia to check on reports in Peru that a Spanish warship was in the place; that he has captured the Potrillo.

21 January 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno, secret: stating that due to the speed of his passage, which took 30 days, the Minister will not have had the despatches from Guayaquil in the Beoga, so he is sending copies by the Potrillo; that he will take on provisions at Talcahuano, explore the anchorage and be in Valparaiso 48 hours after the Potrillo.

Talcahuano, 22 January 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing a copy of the log of the Beoga, by which the Minister will see that the Canton is implicated in illegal trading activities; that other ships are probably also sailing fraudulently under neutral flags.

Talcahuano, 22 January 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio
Zenteno: stating that Miller has recovered from the wounds sustained during the attack on Pisco; recommending Miller and Carson for promotion.

Before Valdivia, 19 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to the commandant of Marine: stating that the sinking of the Intrepido due to its being so rotten, presented difficulties for the expedition against Chiloe; account of the failure of the expedition; stating that 500 men could take it.

Valdivia, 26 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: account of the pacification of Valdivia province.

Valdivia, 28 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing a report from Beauchef in Osorno.

Valdivia, 28 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jorge Beauchef: order for him to take command of the patriot forces in Valdivia.

Valdivia, 28 February, 1820 Lord Cochrane to Thomas Carter: order, that he is to embark all the bronze guns in the forts and town on the Dolores with 3500 rounds of shot and other munitions, and salvage what is possible from the wreck of the Intrépido.

Valparaiso, 10 March 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that to keep faith with the crews, he must distribute their share of the prize of the Montezuma.

Valparaiso, 14 March 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the irregularity in dealing with matters relative to prizes is evidently being continued regarding the Peruana, as the sugar from her has been ordered to be sent to Santiago; that
it is important to keep faith with the crews; that he has ordered the sugar to be detained here pending orders from the Supreme government; that if these kinds of dealings continue, it will be impossible to maintain command.

Valparaíso, 4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has not received a copy of the orders given to Ramsay, so cannot say how far he has failed to obey them; that the contador is anyway the one responsible for provisions; that he is enclosing the log of the Chacabuco.

4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that everything proposed becomes public, today's decisions are contradicted tomorrow, no rule is followed in naval matters; that the expedition of 2000 men is being held up on flimsy pretexts; that he wishes to give up command of the squadron to whoever enjoys the government's confidence; that with the O'Higgins' four prizes and 1000 picked men he will do the job for which 4000 men have been collected; that only inviolable secrecy and rapidity of such operations can be relied upon to preserve Chile and free Peru.

Valparaíso, 7 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: requesting that an exact account of the matters relating to Biddle of the Ontario and Searle of the Hyperion be published in the government gazette to counter hostile propaganda; account of his dispute with Searle respecting the government's right to embargo sailings from the port.

Valparaíso, 1 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Searle, Captain of HMS Hyperion: stating that his orders are to forbid any ship to sail from the port for Callao.
1 May 1820, Thomas Searle to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has stated that British ships are permitted to sail for Callao.

2 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Searle: stating that his measure stands; that it is allowed in Britain; that the government has a right to impose an embargo.

Valparaíso, 4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster, very secret: stating that the Inspector does not have correct papers, has engaged in blockade running, and belongs to the enemy; that if it attempts to sail Forster will board it and send its papers to Lord Cochrane; that Forster will take similar action if the Tiber attempts to sail.

4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Searle: stating that his policy towards the English ships is founded more on the nature of their cargoes than on his concern that they should give intelligence to the enemy.

4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Valparaíso: enclosing the order of embargo which he has received from the government.

4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that Searle has informed him that the government has given permission for various ships to sail to Callao; that this is gravely damaging to Chile's interests as they carry supplies for the enemy squadron; that the government should give him advance notice when ships receive permission to sail.

5 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has received the advice of the promotion of Spry and the appointment of Elfrew; that he did not know of Spry's commission before as it was trans-
mitted by an unusual and secret route.

5 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is returning the documents; that he does not wish to clash with the officers of the state which he will do if Sergeant Major Gormaz argues in Lord Cochrane's presence the scandalous assertions of his note, arising from his officious ignorance; that his assertions should be examined by a tribunal.

14 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: requesting that he be excused the journey to Santiago on the grounds of palpitations of the heart; that he will write his recommendation; that it is necessary to win the confidence of the seamen by paying them; that frauds in the provisioning department should be prevented; account of the difficulties experienced in the first cruise; the leakages of the secret plan; the advantages of the 2000-man expedition.

Valparaiso, 22 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: recommending the establishment of a naval port at Quillota.

30 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: pointing out that the ships in Quillota alias Bernardo harbour rode out the recent storm well.

Valparaiso, 1 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Simon Bolivar: sending his compliments.

Valparaiso, 1 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to NR: expressing his extraordinary delight at his letter.

4 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that as he does not know what Ramsay's orders were, he is not able to make a judgement.
4 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that everything proposed becomes public, today's decisions are contradicted tomorrow, no rule is followed in naval matters; that the expedition of 2000 men if being held up on flimsy pretexts; that he wishes to give up command of the squadron to whoever enjoys the government's confidence; that with the O'Higgins four prizes and 1000 picked men he will do the job for which 4000 men have been collected; that only inviolable secrecy and rapidity of such operations can be relied upon to preserve Chile and free Peru.

20 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: excusing himself from coming to Santiago on the grounds of ill-health; stating the necessity of paying the mariners to fulfil promises made to them; account of the discontent and poverty in the squadron; of the countermanding of arrangements to send an expedition of 2000 men for combined operations against the Peruvian coast; stating that though he has sent in his commission he is still prepared to serve the state.

Valparaiso, 22 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that with regard to the establishment of a naval dockyard outside Valparaiso, a good anchorage is necessary in view of the bad state of the ships' cables; and that he has found an excellent harbour, of which he encloses a plan.

30 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: pointing out the ease with which the ships in Bahia Bernardo rode out the recent storm.

1 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Simon Bolivar; conveying
his compliments and offering the help of the squadron.

1 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Francisco de Pala: stating that the Peru expedition has been an obstacle to the mission of Muñoz.

4 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting on Captain Ramsay of the Chacabuco and his failure to discharge his duties properly; enclosing the log of the Chacabuco.

4 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Valparaiso: referring him to the enclosure and asking if he intended to insinuate that his transference to la Heradura was for the purposes of engaging in contraband.

8 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Valparaiso: stating that he denies reports that he said that the captors of the Valdivia were not entitled to the prizemoney thereof.

8 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing Captain Forster's representation in protest at the promotion of Spry.

20 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Valparaiso: informing him of the arrival and secret departure of the ship Warrior.

28 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to NR: enclosing Captain Gilles' account for cordage obtained from the Princesa Carlota.

Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing a letter from Captain Ramsay respecting Crosbie's rank in the service.

11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that it is his unpleasant duty to present accusa-
tions against his second in command.

Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing Ramsay's letter, which he forgot to enclose before.

9 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he enjoys the right as commander-in-chief to nominate his own captain.

Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane: note of charges exhibited against Captain Guise.

July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the delay to the squadron is due to Guise's courtmartial; that Guise is a complete example of insubordination and negligence; that if the courtmartial is not held he will resign.

Valparaiso, 8 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Comandante General del Departamento: requesting to be advised if the provisions he has asked for are ready to be embarked.

Valparaiso, July 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Commandant General of the Marine Department: repeating his request of the previous item.

Valparaiso, July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: giving information on how a courtmartial should be established and offering to resign.

Aboard the O'Higgins, 12 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that having received the order that Guise is to be put at liberty, he is sending in his commission, his charter of citizenship and that he disclaims his rights to his hacienda.

Brief extract about the unchangeableness of men's opinions.
Letterbook. Letters sent by Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin, Bernardo Monteagudo and the Governor of Callao. 9 September 1820 to 4 May 1822.

9 September 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he has transmitted the orders to the other ships that Pisco is to be the meeting place.

17 September 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he understands the enemy galley Aransasu reconnoitred the bay on the previous day; that two courses lie open, either to build a battery across the bay to protect the transports while the warships sail south in search of the enemy, or for the convoy under protection to make immediately for its destination.

Pisco, 25 September 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that in the afternoon of the day of his departure from Pisco, at sunset he saw two frigates and another small ship; that he pursued them for some time, their probable object being either to interrupt Chilean shipping or to embark part of the army of Upper Peru at Arica; that he had to give up the chase as his orders forbade his absence, and returned to the anchorage.

Callao, 4 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: acknowledging receipt of his letter and hoping to see him next day.

Callao, 20 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he did not arrive till yesterday due to the contrary winds; that he was told by officers captured on the Esmeralda that the Prueba and Venganza could have provisioned at Talcahuano; that he believes that they have gone to Chile, and one of them is in a bad state; that the neutrals, including Captain Searle, continue to embark enemy funds and persons.
Callao, 20 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he has intimated that the officers and men of the Lautaro should transfer to the Esmeralda and the Lautaro undertake guard of the transports; that the crew are discontented as their prize money is not yet paid; that he proposes that the Esmeralda be valued now before it suffers deterioration and half the payment be made to the captors immediately; that it is necessary for him to preserve the confidence of his men.

Huacho, 12 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to NR: expressing his extreme gratification at the flattering remarks of the Chilean government.

Huache, 12 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing a list of the brandy and wine embarked at Pisco for the squadron.

Callao, 30 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that having learned that San Martin intends to give Spry a post in the army, he wishes to acquaint him with Spry's character; that Spry was convicted at a courtmartial of delinquency and insubordination; that he trusts that San Martin will not give Spry or any other officer discharged the service an army post as this would be subversive of naval discipline.

Under sail off Callao, ND, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: acknowledging his note relative to the officers formerly of the Valdivia; stating that he has nother to fear while he believes he is working under the British naval regulations adopted for the Chilean service.

Pisco, ND, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: account of the disembarkation of the force designed
to cut off the southern road, its entry into Pisco and its collection of negro slaves for the patriot forces.

Pisco, ND, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing the reviews of the San Martin and O'Higgins to show the shortages due to supplies not being remitted from Chile; that the Valdivia is in Huacho destitute of provisions; that if the enemy frigates appeared it would be impossible to follow them without the risk of dying of hunger.

Callao, 14 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he has come from Pisco as quickly as possible to investigate why some ships have escaped and others entered Callao; that he is enclosing various documents showing how it happened and designed to have the Chilean government provide more small ships for the blockade.

Callao, ND, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing two letters from Crosbie to the effect that Miller and 80 of his men have fallen sick of terciana.

Callao, 14 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing lists of the payments made; that the San Martin, O'Higgins and Valdivia have been paid; that the money is inadequate to pay all the amount due.

Callao, 14 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is satisfied with his expressions regarding Spry.

Callao, 14 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: requesting that firewood be collected on Huacho beach for the ships; that the Galvarino
had to make two voyages, there not being enough
the first time, and was compelled to abandon its
part in the blockade; that the crews are suffering
from the lack of fresh food and scurvy is in evi­
dence, and have little clothing.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: stating that the sick are on the beach of
Pisco where they seem likely to perish for lack of
medicaments; that he has decided to leave the
O'Higgins to guard them and put to sea in the San
Martin with the rest of the force to escape the
pestilential vapours of the land.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: stating that he has examined various neu­
tral ships, has notified them of the blockade and
permitted them to anchor in ports protected by
the Liberating Army.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: recommending Crosbie for promotion.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: stating that he is enclosing lists for
four months' pay for the seamen of the O'Higgins,
San Martin and Valdivia.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: requesting his guidance on the plans of the
Chilean government respecting a tribunal to invest­
igate ships detained by the fleet.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: stating that the insubordinate officers of
the Valdivia must be discharged the service.

Pisco, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San
Martin: stating that some time past the Pueyrredon seized and sold a brig without notifying him; requesting that San Martin prohibit such proceedings and order the surrender of the money.

Arica, 11 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: account of the capture of Arica, having sailed there and found neutral ships destined for enemy commerce; military operations of Soler and Miller in Arica and Tacna.

Arica, 19 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he has paid 8072 pesos to the various crews and the troops; that the Galvarino, Araucano, Potrillo, Pueyrredon have not been paid.

Arica, 19 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: requesting 120 guns to replace those transferred to the artillerymen of the O'Higgins.

Arica, 24 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: account of military operations around Arica, Tacna and Moquegua, and the state of patriot feeling.

Arica, 29 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: account of Miller's military operations.

Arica, 29 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing Miller's despatch reporting the defeat of the Spanish forces sent against him.

Arica, 29 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing details of the American schooner Macedonia belonging to Smith, which has engaged in blockade-running; that the documents should be preserved against Smith's making claims.
Ylo, 15 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: account of Miller's military operations, and the effects of terciana; of ships collecting wheat for Lima along this coast.

Mollendo, 24 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he has been embarking the wheat intended for Lima; account of his efforts to revolutionise these provinces.

Ylo, 25 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: accounts of his attempts to detain the blockade-running brig Colonel Allen.

Ylo, 2 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing further account for sums expended on various items amounting to 2525 pesos.

Ylo, 2 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing copy of a letter from the governor of Arequipa; account of the activities of the patriot division.

Ylo, 3 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: acknowledging notification of the prolongation of the armistice; account of the ease with which these provinces may be revolutionised.

Callao, 10 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that Captain Forster came aboard after receiving his orders and accused him of trying to keep him away from Callao at the moment that it surrenders, so as to deprive Forster of prize-money after he had been carrying on the blockade; that he has put Forster under arrest.

Callao, 12 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de
San Martin: requesting that San Martin will give permission for the disembarkation without imposts of the emprized property of the Spaniard Aguirre.

Callao, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that since the Pueyrredon sailed from Valparaiso under his command, he has received no orders that it be withdrawn from his authority; that it has never been his intention to detract from San Martin's authority; that San Martin's letter of 23 July was the first intimation of an alteration in the ship's status; that his letter arrived after he put Captain Prunier under arrest; that Prunier must therefore be tried according to the maritime rules of Chile i.e. by English naval court martial; that he is enclosing the reports of three captains and three carpenters regarding the condition of the Pueyrredon.

Lima, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: reporting the total loss by shipwreck of the San Martin in Chorrillos bay due to its having only one anchor and that damaged; stating that he has asked innumerable times for adequate equipment from the Minister of Marine and considers himself not at all responsible for the loss in view of these requests.

Lima, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he never insinuated that San Martin's interposition into the affairs of the squadron sprang from any other cause than his desire to see all disputes settled amicably.

Lima, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that the squadron having gone 11 months without fruit or vegetables, he requests that a quantity of lemons, oranges and vegetables
be brought to Boca Negra for distribution.

Lima, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: requesting that the squadron's sick may be put ashore where they will be better off than in the ships.

Callao, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing a request for pay from various officers of the squadron; that some have gone for two years without pay and none have less than a year in arrears; that if they are not either paid or ordered back to Chile they may become unmanageable.

Callao, 29 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that the defensive ring around the enemy ships being temporarily open, Crosbie went in with the small boats; that he is enclosing Crosbie's report and draws attention to the actions of Esmonde and Simpson.

Lima, ND, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that in addition to his earlier note enumerating the sums due as 420,000 pesos, the foreign seamen will have served their time on 20 of the next month and should be paid or sent back to Chile; account of the discontent and suspicions of the seamen.

Lima, 4 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that he has found great reluctance to carry out even routine tasks aboard and implores San Martin to take all measures to avoid a crisis; that if the sailors mutiny for their pay, they will lose all confidence and respect for the government; that it will be impossible to force the foreign seamen who are the most able, to continue the service; that it is his duty to tell the truth.
Lima, 4 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that the artillerymen are very diminished by death, desertion and sickness; that they are very necessary to the service; that he requests San Martin's decision on the matter.

Lima, 4 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that the detained ships must be sent to Chile or a prize court established in Peru at once, very urgently.

Lima, 10 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that the Protector having denied his obligation to pay the crews, it is necessary that they be paid either by Peru or Chile; that he is perplexed at finding himself situated between two governments with apparently incompatible interests.

Lima, 15 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: acknowledging receipt of a note including a representation by Prunier; stating that he has transmitted reports of the affair to the government of Chile; that Prunier violated his arrest and is in Lima; that it will have a bad effect on the service if it is believed that naval men will be secure from punishment ashore.

Lima, 15 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that if he is too busy to attend Lord Cochrane's requests for provisions, he requests that San Martin appoint an official to see to this matter.

ND, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: note, that he has requested salt meat and aguardiente.

Lima, 16 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo
Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing an account of the sums expended by him in the service of Chile and Peru.

Callao, 19 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that no grain or help of any kind has entered Callao by sea through the vigilance of the squadron.

Callao, 19 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that everything aboard the frigate Laura was transhipped to the ships of the fleet and that if there was anything destined for the army, it must have gone down with the San Martin.

Callao, 19 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that the brig Colonel Allen has been detained in Ancon.

Callao, 19 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that regarding the packet Mercedes, it anchored between Ancon and Callao on the way to the latter and was boarded by a boat from the Independencia; that he denies that possession of the ship's papers gives the right to possession of the ship; that it belongs to its captors.

Callao, 19 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: acknowledging receipt of the gazette relating to the decisions about payment of the ships.

Callao, 20 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing part of a letter from the governor of Callao regarding some prisoners belonging to the fleet.
Callao, 20 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: note of provisions asked for urgently.

Callao, 20 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that the neutral ships will sail tomorrow for Ancon.

Callao, 23 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: requesting that his two notes about payment of the crews be acknowledged; stating that he foresees the total dissolution of the squadron; that whether the debt is Chile's or Peru's should be settled between the two governments, the important thing is that the crews be paid.

Callao, 23 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that his repeated requests for provisions have had no response; that the Valdivia is the only ship with provisions and has gone to Pisco to buy brandy; that the O'Higgins has three days' salt meat and nothing else, the Lautaro a little bread and meat, the Independencia 10 days' bread, 12 days' meat and 14 days' jerky.

Callao, 24 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has divided the Independencia's provisions with the O'Higgins and Lautaro; that they have three days' supplies; that tomorrow he is going to Ancon or elsewhere to look for provisions; that he will leave the Galvarino, Araucano and Aransasu to maintain the blockade; that the officers, though totally destitute, have shown a fine example to the men in enduring their privations, but will not go on much longer.

Callao, 24 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has sent the Aransasu to Ancon, where the neutral ships have also been sent.
Callao, 24 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he denies that launches have passed or can pass the blockade by night; that the condition of the squadron is at a low point.

Callao, 27 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of his difficulties in getting provisions at Ancon and of the difficulty of maintaining the blockade.

Ancon, 28 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that the government's orders as to the provisioning of the ships have been so effective as to permit the Independencia to resume the blockade; that the Lautaro would have gone too had not the men from the San Martin who were aboard her refused to serve past their time.

Callao, 4 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has had to put down some trouble with the soldiers and the native seamen who are to only ones he can rely on; that he cannot spare the soldiers and does not wish them to disembark; that there are only 100 effectives which is too few to serve any other object; that they are needed to preserve order in the squadron and indeed preserve its very existence.

Callao, 4 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has landed the firearms because of the government's urgent need, but they are required in the squadron and he hopes that San Martin will return them soon.

Ancon, 16 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of the destitution of the squadron; stating that the Lautaro's crew has abandoned
the ship to look for food; that unless some ships are sent soon to Chile, the blockade will have to be raised.

Ancon, 17 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that his frequent notes and letters about the destitution of the squadron have had no effect and the crews have refused to continue the blockade; that the crews learned that large sums of money was in ships in the bay and determined to take it; that he was obliged to take charge of the commandeering of the government funds to prevent the seamen themselves becoming pirates; that he accepts the responsibilities for his action.

Callao, 20 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing letters from Ancon showing that the crews are still in a state of mutiny despite the payments already made to them and believe that Lord Cochrane and the government are conspiring to compel them to continue their service; that promises are useless to pacify them.

Callao, 23 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has learned that various men who deserted the O'Higgins for lack of pay are now serving in Peruvian ships and were paid ashore; requesting that orders be given that no seaman who abandons his ship be paid until the men afloat have been paid.

Callao, 24 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of the arrival of the O'Higgins, Valdivia and Lautaro after the crews refused to weigh anchor at Ancon; his difficulties in preventing the total dismemberment of the squadron and incurring the disapproval of the Peruvian government;
the destitution of the ships; the pleasure this will give to those who have caused this for their personal interests.

Callao, 25 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that all his letters have received no reply or excuse from the government of Peru, upon whom rests the whole responsibility for the ills and illegalities in which he and the squadron have had to engage; requesting to know what the government's motives are in refusing to pay when it has the funds and in trying to destroy one of its most important departments.

Callao, 26 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he wished the letter ordering him to leave had given reasons; account of the discontent of the seamen; stating that it is impossible to depart immediately as ordered because of the destitution of the squadron and the lack of men; that his zeal in San Martin's service did not diminish until 5 August and their subsequent disagreement over the squadron.

Callao, 5 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that his total lack of supplies compelled him to buy jerky and flour at elevated prices and that any discrepancy between the price paid and the standard price will be paid by the Peruvian or Chilean government.

Callao, 3 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of desertions from the Independencia and San Fernando and the sacking of the latter; requesting that orders be given to apprehend the deserters.

Callao, 2 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo
Monteagudo: account of the desertions of various officers including lieutenant Gull of the Galvarino and pilot Aguirre of the San Martin; requesting that they be apprehended.

Callao, 2 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that as San Martin wishes the Artillery of the Andes to be disembarked, he requests that 150 Chilean soldiers be sent aboard to make up the complements of the O'Higgins, Valdivia and Independencia, and that the muskets lent to him also be returned.

Callao, 2 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that some officers of the O'Higgins and Valdivia who were ordered ashore were arrested, which is an offence to Chile, and told that they were considered to be foreigners; that he requests an explanation; that the Montezuma was lent by her captors to Chile and her value has not yet been paid.

Callao, 2 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that with regard to the Mercedes, he has sent a report on her to the Chilean government and would have sent the ship itself but he was too short of officers and men to man her.

3 October 1821, Lord Cochrane: promissory note, that the government will pay the bearer for a quantity of brandy supplied.

5 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is surprised that such an order to leave Peru should be sent, given the impossibility of obeying; that he will order to Chile the ships that can sail there, and the others to Guayaquil for repairs; that he considers that San Martin since
5 August is the chief of a distinct government whose interest are incompatible with those of Chile.

Callao, 26 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing the ships' lists showing the shortages; that only the Montezuma has come from Chile with provisions and these were landed, perhaps on government orders; that he hopes to provision a small ship to carry dispatches to Chile.

Callao, 27 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: note of payments for prizes and San Martin's demand that all monies go into the war chest.

Callao, 27 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: enclosing various requisitions for provisions, arms and equipment.

Callao, 29 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that on returning from Guayaquil he proposed to buy provisions in Tumbes but was told that the ships were not to be provisioned; that this is against the usages between friendly nations; account of the action of the Peruvian legate in Guayaquil in helping the Prueba to reprovision and escape the squadron; requesting that the orders against supplying the squadron be rescinded.

Callao, 25 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of his pursuit of the enemy ships to Guayaquil; of the Peruvian agent's arrangement for them to surrender to Peru; of his treaty with the Guayaquil government regarding the Venganza.

Callao, 29 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of the destitution of the squadron, his letters to the government on the subject,
its refusal to assist and apparent intention to erect a naval power on the ruins of the squadron, the dangers arising therefrom, San Martin's bad faith and failure to fulfil his promises, and the justification of Lord Cochrane's seizure of the funds at Ancon.

Callao, 25 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that off Cocos island he captured an armed ship the Retaliación claiming to be Peruvian but certainly not commissioned by the legitimate government.

Callao, 28 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has paid 9918 pesos to Henderson for clothing surrendered by him for the service; that San Martin not having fulfilled his promise to pay, Lord Cochrane has himself paid for this and requests to be reimbursed.

Callao, 28 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: requesting that various items of clothing be supplied for the seamen.

Callao, 3 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that the Peruvian government's promises about paying the crews are falsified for the fourth time; that he has not told the crews and gives the government a last opportunity to re-establish its good name; that he will publish the truth to the world.

Callao, 30 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Callao: requesting that the supplies for the fleet
be brought alongside the frigate for embarkation.

Callao, 30 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Callao: requesting for the second time that the supplies from Chile be surrendered.

O'Higgins, 30 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing a requisition for supplies.

Callao, 3 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: acknowledging receipt of his letter declining to supply the squadron; stating that he takes this opportunity of closing the correspondence with all personal respect; that this situation is the result of the erection of a government by a military chief.

4 May 1822: copy of the previous item.

Lima, 2 July 1821, James Goldie to Basil Hall, Captain of the Conway: requesting that Hall will secure him permission to sail to California, as has done the General Brown.

HMS Conway, 4 July 1821, Basil Hall to James Goldie: stating that Forster gives his permission but requires an undertaking that he will not carry military or civil officers from Callao or anywhere else in Peru; that he will not embark cargo; that he agrees to be searched and to furnish a list of passengers; that though Forster is not commander-in-chief, he supposes him authorised to grant the permission.

Lima, 5 July 1821, Robert Martin to James Goldie: stating that he agrees to take half of the ship to
Panama, thence to Manila, the ship being valued at 60,000 dollars; that he will put 30,000 dollars aboard the Conway and also 50,000 dollars representing a half share of the cargo to be got at Manila.

Lima, 7 July 1821, José Arizmendi, his agent, to James Goldie: stating that four merchants have offered 25,000 dollars for five merchants to sail to Panama in the ship; that he recommends acceptance of this proposal.

**HMS Conway, Callao roads, 10 July 1821, Basil Hall to James Goldie:** stating that Lord Cochrane told him on his arrival yesterday that the Lord Lyndoch could not sail, and that it had broken the blockade and must go to Valparaiso for trial; that a discussion between San Martin, Cochrane and Hall took place and San Martin agreed that the ship should not be allowed to put to sea; that Hall subsequently conferred privately with San Martin but was unable to persuade him to agree to its sailing; that he will try to persuade him again when he enters Lima as is expected daily.

Lima, 12 July 1821, James Goldie to Basil Hall: stating that he will suffer great loss if the ship is not allowed to proceed; requesting that he will show the enclosed letters to San Martin and Lord Cochrane, who would surely grant permission in such circumstances; that if this still has no effect, he hopes Hall will take such steps as are necessary to protect the British flag, and will draw up a formal protest.

**Lord Lyndoch, Callao, 17 July 1821, A.B. Clapperton to James Goldie:** stating his anxiety as communications with Lima are cut off; that it is dangerous in Callao because of grape shot from the castles;
that Lord Cochrane refuses to let him shift and the Governor of the Castle declines to accept responsibility for damage done by stray shot; that he is unable to secure the Conway's protection as she has sailed for Ancon; that he has many passengers on board, including General O'Reilly on parole; requesting instructions.

Lima, 26 July 1821, James Goldie to Basil Hall: stating that it is necessary for the Lord Lyndoch, which is between two fires in Callao, to be allowed out of the port under Hall's protection; that Lord Cochrane agreed to her going out near his squadron provided an officer and some men came aboard, which he has refused; that he has told Clapperton to remain where he is as long as possible and to go out if necessary and go to Hall for protection; that Hardy should be here soon.

Lima, 20 July 1821, James Goldie to Thomas Carter: requesting him to confirm that when he fired a shot across his bows last January, Captain Shirriff sent aboard to tell him that he did not recognise the blockade and had already told Carter of this; that he was already entering the port when Carter have in sight.

Lima, 23 July 1821, Thomas Carter to James Goldie: stating that Captain Shirriff did notify him that the British government did not recognise the blockade on the stated occasion and that he had previously told this to Lord Cochrane.

Lima, 25 July 1821, James Goldie to Basil Hall: stating that the Lord Lyndoch went out of Callao last night, but whether out by Lord Cochrane or forced out by the fort's guns, he does not know; requesting that Hall send a boat to transfer funds of about
15,000 dollars to the Conway for safety.

Lord Lyndoch, 26 July 1821, A.B. Clapperton to James Goldie: stating that a Chilean cutting-out party on 24 July set fire to ships near the Lord Lyndoch, compelling her to cut her cables and run out of the port for safety; that they were boarded by an officer of the squadron and anchored by the O'Higgins; that they have been damaged by gunfire; that the Potrillo suffered considerable damage and her captain is crippled; that Forster, Wilkinson, Esmonde, Crosbie and others searched the ship and the passengers very thoroughly for Spanish property; that Goldie's money has been put aside for his collection; requesting instructions; stating that Lord Cochrane will not allow him to send a boat ashore.

Lord Lyndoch, 3 August 1821, A.B. Clapperton to James Goldie: stating that he cannot get his money onto the Conway, since their officers refuse to take it as they are searched when they leave this ship; that the ship cannot use its own boat; that Forster has now taken it aboard the Independencia; that Lord Cochrane has had the sails unbent and the t'gallant mast struck and demanded the log book and invoices of cargo; requesting instructions.

Lord Lyndoch, 2 August 1821, A.B. Clapperton to Lord Cochrane: formal protest against the removal from the ship of 15890 dollars, the property of Mr. Goldie.

O'Higgins, 3 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to A.B. Clapperton: requesting that he will send the log book and the invoice of cargo; stating that he will send him a passport for going ashore; that the money taken out into the Independencia has been removed for its better security.

Lima, 7 August 1821, James Goldie to Basil Hall: stat-
ing that since he left Ancon for Huacho, 15890 dollars of Goldie's money has been removed to the Independencia; that Lord Cochrane has also demanded his log book and invoices.

Letterbook. Letters of Lord Cochrane to Joaquin de Echeverria and the Government of Peru. 2 April 1822 to 5 May 1822.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that he is enclosing copies of printed materials sent by Joaquin Mosquera, Colombian envoy to Chile and Peru.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that Crobie was promoted to Capitan de Fragata on 19 April 1821 for his part in cutting out the Esmeralda; that he commanded further cutting out expeditions on 14 July and 15 August; requesting that he be promoted.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: certificate that he promoted Thomas Craig on (ND) to Surgeon Major of the Squadron at a pay of 100 Pesos.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: certificate that on Guise's resignation, he promoted Cobbett, then 1st Lieutenant of the O'Higgins, to command the Valdivia with the rank of Captain de Fragata.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: certificate that on (ND) he nominated Alexo Ruiz, contador of the O'Higgins, to act as commissary provisioner of the squadron.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: certificate that Carter received permission to go ashore to convalesce for one month on 20 April 1821; that he appointed Lt. Simpson interim commander of Carter's ship; that Carter declined to reassume command; that
he therefore appointed Simpson Captain de Corbeta; requesting that this be confirmed.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: certifying that as a result of Lt. Morgell's valour in the attack on Callao in September 1820, and the capture of the Esmeralda, he has been promoted Captain de Corbeta on (ND) commanding the Aransaú; requesting that this be confirmed.

1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that as he wished to reward the services of Luis Benito Benet to the American cause in his three cruises with the squadron, on 25 August 1821 he promoted Benet to the rank of Captain de Corbeta.

3 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that his enemies in Callao, seeing their plans for the squadron frustrated by the fidelity of the officers and men to the Chilean flag, asserted that Lord Cochrane provisioned or attempted to provision the Callao forts against the Peruvian patriots; that one of the officers who deserted from the squadron claimed to have confirmation of the allegation under La Mar's signature; that Lord Cochrane secured La Mar's written denial of these allegations when he saw him in Guayaquil.

April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that having pursued the enemy ships to Guayaquil, he found the so-called Peruvian agent had agreed with them for their surrender; that he trusts that this act of ill-faith will be disowned by Peru and the ships surrendered to Chile; that he hoisted the Chilean flag on the Venganza and left her under the guarantee of the Guayaquil government; that at Guambacho he was told that they had positive orders not to provision the Chilean ships; that he trusts that this order will be revoked.
O'Higgins, at sea, 2 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: reporting the treaty of the Peruvian agent in Guayaquil with the Spanish ships; of the co-operation of the Guayaquil government which has changed its views entirely since his visit there last November when they assured him of their determination to be independent and their proposal to send an agent to Chile to propose a federal union; that this change of opinion is now due to the fact that they look upon Chile as the naval rival of Peru; that the Chilean government should think whether it might not be better to throw Guayaquil into the power of Colombia, a primarily Atlantic state with little Pacific interest; that this could be done by facilitating the conveyance of Bolivar's troops to Guayaquil; that at present they arrive in small parties and the Guayaquil government keep them on the other side of the river; that the union of Guayaquil is a political question, so he has not taken action on his own account.

18 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that at Huambacho he asked to be able to buy 20 bullocks and 50 sheep; that he encloses the governor's refusal of this request; that the governor also refused permission for the ships to collect firewood or water.

Off Callao, 23 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that he has learned that the Prueba has put into Callao and surrendered; that he encloses the letters he proposes to send to the government in Lima, of which Torretagle is in charge.

1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that his actions respecting the squadron have been aimed only to preserve it for Chile and
liberty and to prevent a mutiny by the seamen; that he warns again of the designs of Peru to erect its power on the ruins of the Chilean fleet; account of the dishonesty and unscrupulousness of the Lima government with its dealings with him; requesting that the officers and seamen receive their pay.

5 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: reporting the successful destruction of the enemy’s naval power in the Pacific; that nine warships have been captured or destroyed; requesting he receive his orders back to Chile.

3 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that only the feeble and humble situation to which the Lima government has been reduced enabled him to press them into giving the squadron provisions; that if stronger, they would assuredly have denied the request; requesting instructions.

5 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that he is enclosing his correspondence with Brigadier Wavell; that he will send an account of the scandalous behaviour of Colonel O'Reilly in Acapulco.

May 1822, Lord Cochrane to the Peruvian government: stating that in reply to their letter of 30 April, he is prepared to take any steps necessary to preserve the squadron from mutiny; that his actions would be approved by public opinion; requesting for the last time to be informed if they will fulfil the engagements made regarding the paying and provisioning of the squadron.
II Riding House Lane, 7 November 1817, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: stating his opinion that Lord Cochrane will accept command of the "South American squadron".

South Street, 13 March 1818, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: stating that Lord Cochrane has invited him to accompany him to South America.

South Street, 19 June 1818, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: stating that he has decided to go with Lord Cochrane to South America; that Lord Cochrane expects to be back in a year and a half.

Mary Street, 26 February 1819, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: stating that he has decided to go in the Rising Star; that Lord Cochrane's arrival in South America and having command of several ships is reported.

Mary Street, 14 May 1819, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: stating that none of Lord Cochrane's friends have heard from him yet.

London, 30 June 1821, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: stating that he intends to go to Lord Cochrane when the ship is ready in about a fortnight.

Cork, 21 December 1821, William Jackson to Mrs. Parnham: announcing his sailing.
PART TWO

(Documents 8 - 148)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE CHILEAN MINISTER OF MARINE TO LORD COCHRANE. 1818 AND 1819.
8 Santiago, 12 December 1818, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing his commission as Vice-Admiral.

9 Santiago, 12 December 1818, Bernardo O'Higgins: commission of Lord Cochrane as Vice-Admiral of Chile.

10 Santiago, 12 December 1818, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transcribing the government decree appointing Lord Cochrane to the command of the squadron.

11 Santiago, 24 December 1818, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Buenos Aires agent has agreed that, the Intrepid being unfit for sea at the moment, her crew should be transferred to other ships; that a skeleton crew of seamen and marines are to remain aboard to look after the ship until it is repaired.

12 Santiago, 28 December 1818, Ignacio Zenteno, confidential: plan of signals to be observed by the squadron to communicate with the army of operations of the south in the present campaign.

13 Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a government decree appointing Robert Forster captain of the O'Higgins.

14 Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's request to commission Alexander Walsh as surgeon.

15 Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Captain General has been requested to send him two mortars, a howitzer, grenades and four 4 pounder field guns as requested; and the governor is to send the four 4 pounder iron guns.
Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging that the squadron will not be able to effect its remaining preparations in time to sail on Sunday, and hoping that they will be carried on as quickly as possible; stating that Lord Cochrane’s powers and prerogatives under the ordinance are those of a lieutenant-general.

Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving his conduct in the affair of Captain Raymond Morris and the Araucano and requesting he will supply further details.

Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane’s suggestion to have the British rules governing prizes adopted; stating that the constitution lays down that the Spanish ordinance of marine must be followed, so his suggestions have been submitted to the senate.

Santiago, 1 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government approves of his communications with Captain Biddle of the Ontario.

Santiago, 4 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane’s order to the Araucano to cruise off the port; stating that in future ships should only leave the port on the Director’s order.

Santiago, 4 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that the Venganza and Potrillo were in Talcahuano on 19 December, and five other ships have been reported from Arauca; that Lord Cochrane should leave as soon as possible for Callao, at most within two days; that he should order Blanco to despatch anything he requires but
cannot get in time; that Antonio Alvarez Jonte is on his way to join the squadron as Auditor de Guerra and secretary.

22 Santiago, 7 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, confidential: enclosing Lord Cochrane's orders for the coming campaign against Callao.

23 Santiago, 6 January 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins: Confidential instructions to be observed by vice-Admiral Lord Cochrane, commander-in-chief of the Chilean national squadron, in the coming campaign; that he is to blockade but not to attack Callao; that 600 muskets are to be given to the patriots if there is a local uprising; that he is to seek exchanges of prisoners with the viceregal government.

24 Santiago, 9 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is searching diligently for the trunk containing hydrographic books and maps, and will send them as soon as possible.

25 Santiago, 9 January 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that corvette captain Carter of the Buenos Aires brig Intrepido, appointed interim to the Mayoria of the general marine department, has been appointed to take over the Chacabuco interim.

26 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 29 February 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that Rafael Garfias in the Constancia has been commissioned to reconnoitre the puertos intermedios; enclosing a plan of signals for the ship when meeting the squadron.

27 Santiago, 2 March 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government had intended to publish the decree of blockade as was the tenor
of article four of Lord Cochrane's instructions; that Chile's policy toward foreign nations is to encourage them to maintain their neutrality in the wars of independence, since they will not support the patriots directly; that the government hopes that towards foreign ships, especially warships, entering or leaving Callao, Lord Cochrane will act with the delicacy due to the insecurity of the patriot government's position; that the government has decided not to declare the blockade; that when dealing with foreign, especially warships, Lord Cochrane should avoid any questions which are likely to lead to force; that contrabandists should on the other hand be firmly dealt with.

28 Santiago, 2 March 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Captain Forster's report on the occurrences on the Chacabuco off Coquimbo; stating that the government had intended to have the leaders of the mutiny shot and their bodies hung from the yardarms, but the slowness of communications made this ineffective as punishment has already been meted out.

29 Chacabuco, port of Coquimbo, 29 January 1819, Thomas Carter: report of the mutiny on board the ship on 23 January and its successful suppression.

30 Santiago, 2 March 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing papers from Buenos Aires relative to the Trinidad; stating that O'Higgins has decided that the ship shall be lawful prize if captured.

31 Buenos Aires, 8 January 1819, José Rondeau to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that the captain of the Trinidad, the Maria Isabel's convoy, was allowed to sail for Callao on certain conditions, which he broke, and he should therefore be pursued and punished.
32 Santiago, 2 March 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that there are reports that three Spanish frigates are being despatched to the Pacific; that he believes that the Venganza and Esmeralda will rendezvous with them off Mocha; that Lord Cochrane should come to Valparaiso at once with all his forces for his own protection; that the failure of the Horacio and Curiacio to arrive leaves the patriots short of ships.

33 Santiago, 3 March 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Cochrane’s of 10 January with plan of signals to be used by ships coming up to the squadron from Chile.

34 Santiago, 8 March 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the frigates Horacio and Curiacio are not coming but staying at Rio de la Plata to aid the resistance to the expected Spanish expedition.

35 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 May 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the correspondence of Captain Shirreff of the Andromache with the Director; stating that in view of this, Lord Cochrane should conduct the blockade in as conciliatory a manner as possible towards British warships.

36 Santiago, 16 May 1819, William Shirreff to Bernardo O’Higgins: stating that without prejudice to the policy of subsequent senior British naval officers, he requests to be advised of the ports in Peru that are actually blockaded; that otherwise there will be difficulties for British merchantment; that British warships will still need to touch at the principal ports of Peru; that neutral warships always have had the right to pass through the blockade.
Santiago, 19 May 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to William Shirreff: stating that, regarding the ports in Peru which are blockaded, the Chile government cannot from this distance specify which are blockaded; that Lord Cochrane has full powers in the matter; that respecting the entry of neutral warships into Callao, while the government is not prepared to make an absolute statement on the question, Captain Shirreff or his nominee may go into Callao provided that such entry and passage have been concerted with Lord Cochrane.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 21 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that as the marine was hurriedly formed, some things were overlooked or not properly organised; that amongst these was the duty of the contadores who for lack of training were not able to do their job properly; requesting that Lord Cochrane circulate the enclosed instructions to the contadores, ordering them to keep reviews up to date of the men and supplies received on board their ships so as to form new master books when they return from the campaign.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 23 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree that the Auditor de la Marina should be considered as having the rank of Capitan de Navio.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 24 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree declaring as good prize the money captured on 8 April, of the Filipinas Company, in Peru when being escorted by Captain Smith of the Macedonian.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 24 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the capture of 20 boxes of money on the Gazelle, he is transmitting a government decree declaring it good prize.
42 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 25 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's request for Crosbie to be appointed to the command of the Araucano.

43 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 25 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that when it was specified that Antonio Alvarez Jonte's rank as Auditor de Guerra would be equivalent to Capitan de Navio, there was no intention to detract from the authority of naval officers; his rank is one of dignity, not of executive authority in naval operations; that as for his appointment as Lord Cochrane's secretary, the government equally had no thought of detracting from Lord Cochrane's prerogatives, simply of helping him with someone familiar with the language and customs of the place.

44 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 26 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's request that Forster should be appointed to command the Independencia and his proposal to assume the captaincy of the O'Higgins as well as the commandancy-in-chief, for reasons of economy.

45 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 29 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane give an estimate of the value of the O'Higgins (former Maria Isabel) as her captors are due to receive their prize money for her.

46 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Guise had been promised the command of the Independencia before it had arrived; that as it was given instead to Forster, Guise must definitely receive command of the Horacio when it arrives and was now to be considered its commander.
47 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 5 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for Lt. Foord Morgell to go to Valparaiso under arrest on word of honour, to await trial.

48 Ministry of Marine, 6 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a communication received from the Chilean agent in Buenos Aires.

49 Buenos Aires, 3 June 1819, Miguel Zañartu to Bernardo O'Higgins: reporting news from London that a 70-gun ship and three frigates are to be sent to the Pacific from Spain.

50 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's measures in the matter of Jonte opening his correspondence to O'Higgins; stating that it arose, though, through O'Higgins telling Jonte that he might as well send letters destined for San Martin direct to Mendoza, which led Jonte thoughtlessly to overstep his authority; that as he has now resigned as secretary and his health has suffered at sea, he can stay ashore where he can quite easily execute the office of Auditor.

51 Santiago, 8 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the cost of nine years' war, the decay of private fortunes as a result of the revolution, and the shortage of funds, have placed the government in the necessity, to maintain the squadron and carry out the expedition to Peru, of taking upon itself all the costs of these; that rigid economy is necessary if the state is not to become bankrupt; that this is why the government demands detailed budgets and reviews from the comissary of marine, though it is vexatious; that before Lord Cochrane's arrival, funds placed in the hands of the comisaries
was not applied to the needs of the squadron, but to finance themselves and pay the debts of individuals; that the government's measures seek to ensure that funds destined for the squadron are not diverted to other uses.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 12 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that great virtues and services always attract envy, but it can come to nothing against Lord Cochrane, as the government supports him wholeheartedly; that a sign of this confidence is that the government has put in his hands the main support of its political existence; that regarding the replacement of Antonio Alvarez Jonte, he should select someone of his confidence.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 12 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: notifying him of a government order for them jointly to appoint a cemetery for the non-Catholic members of the Army and Navy.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 17 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the officers on the enclosed list, being in the service of Buenos Aires, be transhipped to the Intrépido to continue their service.

List of naval officers of the United Provinces to be transhipped to the Intrépido:
Lt. Geo. Young, O'Higgins

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 17 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the lowness of funds and the instances of the British merchants have persuaded O'Higgins to defer to Shirreff's
request; that the Isarue is to sail to Peru and bring back some of the funds there; that as the English capitalists have supported the government's enterprises, they should not be angered or opposed; that the government cannot guarantee foreign property in Lima if it should be conquered by the patriots.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a copy of Alvarez Jonte's enquiry as to his share of money from prizes made by the squadron, as the regulation does not cover this; requesting that until the Senate decides on the matter, Lord Cochrane will withhold a certain portion of prize money from those who are in the same class of shareholders as Jonte.

Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Ministry of Hacienda has been instructed to deposit 2000 pesos in the Commissary to distribute in bounties for the squadron.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government have approved Captain Shirreff's request to review the crews of the squadron for deserters from the British Pacific squadron, he offering to allow the Chile squadron to do the same.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government have ordered the operations of adjudication and valuation of prizes to be commenced.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding Lord Cochrane's objections to establishing the arsenal in Valparaiso the government have raised and will levy energetically the tax on pulperías; that
the presence of all the shipping merchants in Valparaiso makes it necessary for the arsenal to be there where its purchases are made; but that Lord Cochrane should suggest if there is anywhere suitable near to Valparaiso.

62 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that it is dangerous to leave the Independencia, Lautaro and Araucano alone to re-establish the blockade; that it will be of public utility to allow the Icarus to sail to Callao; that he is enclosing news from Rio de la Plata regarding the Spanish squadron; that the government's favoured plan is to concentrate all its forces, equip them with rockets and whatever provisions are available and send them to destroy the squadron in Callao; that the land forces will then be able to be transported in the shelter of a respectable maritime force.

63 Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing a note of the Buenos Aires envoy to O'Higgins.

64 Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: repeating his request to have Alvarez Jonte's arrest lifted.

65 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the question of a secretary for the squadron, don Juan Garcia cannot leave his present post to take this up, so someone else must be looked for.

66 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 20 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that of the 45 men who came as garrison of the Independencia, who are Buenos Aires soldiers, 28 be passed to the
...Intrepido and the rest go ashore.

67 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 20 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that a special commission of Ignacio Godoy, Bernardo Vera and Carlos Correa de Saa has been appointed to hear the case of the Argentina.

68 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 20 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the printed ordinances sent by Lord Cochrane have been forwarded to O'Higgins; that they cannot be fully adopted as law until they have been adapted to our circumstances.

69 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that in order that the Independencia could sail from Buenos Aires to Valparaiso under the Chilean flag, commissions were sent there for her officers; that now they will require new commissions if they are to stay in the Chilean marine; requesting that Lord Cochrane will recommend what rank and post they should be awarded.

70 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: advising him that Captain Francisco Erescano will be called to give evidence in the case of the Argentina.

71 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: referring to an earlier consultation with Lord Cochrane on two points, firstly the concordance of certain classes in the Chilean marine with those of the expediente on prizes, secondly how the Galvarino and the Intrepido should be rated in the division of prize money; stating that Lord Cochrane's statement will not be considered a fixed rule to be followed but rather an opinion on that particular case; requesting that he will send his opinion.
72 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 27 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will come up to the capital to give further information on the project submitted as a plan for the coming expedition.

73 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 29 July 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that O'Higgins is vexed at the paralysis of the construction of steam boats under Juan Morrell; that Lord Cochrane is authorised to take all necessary measures to forward the work; that regarding the method of payment of labourers by don Juan Castro, these labourers prefer to be paid in kind rather than cash.

74 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 2 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's letter of 31 July about, firstly, preparing the squadron and secondly, realising the plan of an 800-man expedition to assist in levying contributions in royalist territory, to distract the viceroy and aid the patriots, and to prepare for the main expedition; that orders have been given for the continued supplying by the comissary; that the request to replace the condemned and useless men in the marines with good soldiers is approved; that most of the marines are from the battalion Infantes de la Patria and are good soldiers; that the Comandante General has been ordered to see to the repair of all the boats belonging to the squadron; that the boats at the Maule are to be brought to Valparaiso; that the request to set a maximum wage payable in merchant ships to prevent seduction of the naval seamen is not approved as it would be impossible to enforce; that there is no reply yet from the Senate regarding the projected 800-man expedition.
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 4 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is transmitting a government decree that crews of merchant ships should be three-quarters native seamen and one quarter foreign in order that the squadron might have more sufficient seamen.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging his communication of 8 August recommending various Peruvians for their patriotism in joining the cause of Chile.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the papers relating to the expenditures in England on the steam engines have been transmitted to the Ministry of Hacienda for reimbursement.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 11 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing papers of the American consul regarding prizes made by the squadron in Peru. Marginal note by Lord Cochrane: that Hill's claims should not be recognised as the United States have not recognised Chile yet.

United States Consulate, Santiago, 11 August 1819, Henry Hill to the Government of Chile: stating questions which should be asked at the adjudication of prizes taken from the Macedonia.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: notifying him of the government order to the officers of the comissary that 3000 pesos is being sent by the Ministry of Hacienda to be expended as Lord Cochrane sees fit and only on his order.
81 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that two mounted 4-pounders are being sent to him, for which he should disembark two of his unmounted 4-pounders.

82 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his approval at the compilation of signals drawn up by Lord Cochrane for the use of the squadron; that they will be printed.

83 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that to fill the complement of artillerymen and marines, 62 men of the Corps of Artillery are to be sent to Lord Cochrane in Valparaiso, and six officers and 180 men of the Infantry battalion no. 2 will be ready to be collected in Coquimbo by the squadron; that all these troops are to return to their units on the conclusion of the campaign.

84 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will inform the Governor of the arms, and the comissary of the clothing, which is needed for his artillerymen and marines.

85 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with the officer bringing the two guns, he is sending nautical charts and books, also books for Lord Cochrane's relaxation.

86 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the letter on the merit of the Victoria's captors throwing out 30,000 staves when the ship was destined as a fireship, the government have ordered the rest
of the staves in the cargo to be distributed among them and the crew of the San Martin are to get the government's share.

87 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the Auditor de Guerra's share of the prize, the Senate has asked for a report by Lord Cochrane on how much it should be.

Lord Cochrane: draft reply; that he cannot give an opinion as there is no corresponding post in the Royal Navy.

88 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the list of punishments is being printed as quickly as possible; that he advises that English and North American seamen should be judged by the British ordinances, the native seamen by the Spanish.

89 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree honourably acquitting Ramsey, late of the Araucano, in his trial, and appointing him to the Chacabuco.

90 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 17 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of books and plans being sent to Lord Cochrane by means of an officer travelling to Valparaiso.

91 Relation of the Plans, Nautical works and other books being carried by Sub-lieutenant Avila to Lord Cochrane.

Nautical tables, almanacs, charts of various parts of the South American coast, Pacific ocean and islands; Mariana's Historia de España; Solis' Historia de Mexico; Garcilaso's Comentarios Reales del Peru.
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of military stores being escorted to Valparaiso by Sub-lieutenant Avila.
Relation of materials carried from the laboratory for the marine; 52 rockets and minor sundry other items.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree that the Maria Isabel being bought by the state for 120,000 pesos, two-thirds of her valuation; that half this sum is due to her captors.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the prize tribunal has condemned the Montezuma as good prize; that she is to be sold.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing papers for his attention.
Lord Cochrane: note that the guns are useless and 16 have already been bought at 80 pesos each, paid out of his 3000 pesos.

Santiago, 19 August 1819, McNeile Price and Co. to Bernardo O'Higgins: offering 15 cannon of different calibre in complete condition at 120 pesos each.
Santiago, 19 August 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins: note that the vice-Admiral is to examine them and advise on their suitability.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered Guise with the Lautaro and the Pueyrredon to rejoin the squadron and avoid meeting the enemy at Talcahuano; that the squadron should be got
ready as quickly as possible.

98 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting the government decree closing the port of Valparaíso until the squadron sails.

99 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, confidential: stating that there is no doubt that the Spanish squadron has sailed from Cadiz and will shortly double the Cape; that the Montezuma being good prize, it is to be armed and equipped to cruise off Mocha to capture or destroy the Alcance, to capture or destroy the Congreso sailing under the Chilean flag with J.M. Carrera aboard, and to watch for and warn of the appearance of the Spanish squadron.

100 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 23 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane; stating that Dr. Cayetano Requena has been appointed as First Chaplain of the Fleet.

101 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's report that Captain José Maria Mora has overstayed his leave, in fact he is detained in Santiago on government business by government order.

102 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lt. John Robinson has been appointed adjutant to rear Admiral Blanco.

103 Ministry of Marine, Santiago 24 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Ministry of Hacienda has been ordered to supply a
further 1000 pesos necessary to complete the levies.

104 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the signs of discontent among the native seamen of the San Martin, it is to be supposed that the prisoners mixed with the seamen are the source of trouble; that if necessary Lord Cochrane should disembark them; that the government would like to pay all the seamen, but is unable to do so.

105 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Blanco being honourably acquitted, the government wish him to take part in the next campaign.

106 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane; confidential: stating that marine captain Henry Rosa is a well-known partisan of Carrera and Lord Cochrane should avoid giving him a position where he could do any harm.

107 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 25 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of military stores being brought to Valparaiso by Captain Barrueto.

108 List of military stores being transported to Valparaiso by Captain Barrueto for the squadron. Includes 114 1st class rockets, 66 other rockets, 5 boxes shoes, from the laboratory supervised by James Charles.

109 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 25 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, confidential: stating that Captain Shirreff has been warned that J.M. Carrera in the Congreso is coming to these coasts as a pirate.
110 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to complaints by the senior British naval officer about the detention of the Lord Lyndoch in Valparaiso when she was due to sail to Coquimbo, the government have decided to allow her to sail.

111 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 27 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the case of the Victoria, as Jarvis' cruelty is beyond doubt, he will be detained in Santiago until he can be sent out of the country.

112 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 27 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Perla being unserviceable as her mast was taken out for the Chacabuco, the Jerezana should be taken over in her place.

113 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 27 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that orders are being sent to the Ministry of Hacienda not to claim duty on prize goods entering the port as these are exempt.

114 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 28 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: notifying him of a government decree respecting the distribution of diplomas and medals; stating that 1000 pesos are for distribution.

115 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 31 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's having bought 16 long car- ronades, the cost (3000 pesos) of which is due by the government, the financial situation compels the government to make such purchases normally by stages.
116 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 31 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that since he is not able to take the lugger captured by the corsair Consecuencia, he should choose the gunboats that are most suitable as rocket carriers.

117 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 31 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Ministry of Hacienda has been ordered to buy 800 varas of woollen cloth or canvas to make 18- and 12-pound charges.

118 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 31 August 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that if in the next campaign he finds the Macedonia in or about to enter Callao, he should not embarrass her as she has received permission to make a stop there on the way back to Chile.

119 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a decree of the government that in future captured vessels of war are to belong to the captors.

120 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Ministry of Hacienda has been ordered to buy seamen's clothing for sale by Carlos Callow, and also 300 varas of sailcloth for hammocks is being bought, but canvas is unobtainable.

121 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: recommending Lieutenant José Agustín Soto, and Sub-lieutenant Antonio Yorcin, of the marine battalion, for postings as men of great trustworthiness.

122 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 September 1819,
Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, confidential: authorising him if he is short of seamen, to take such as he needs out of the national merchantmen.

123 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 2 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: refusing Lord Cochrane's request that 10 cannon of the Lautaro be replaced from the Argentina.

124 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 2 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that 800 varas of canvas which has been got with difficulty is now being sent to Lord Cochrane for charges.

125 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 4 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the British ordinance is to govern all foreign seamen except the Spanish, who will come under the same ordinance as the Chileans.

126 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will leave a secret plan of signals with the Commandant General of the Department before he sails.

127 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the artillery officer Bernardo Berrueto is bringing him some rockets, 6-700 varas of woollen cloth for charges, and public papers.

128 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Ministry of Hacienda has been ordered to supply 1500 pesos to complete the levy, and will reimburse Hoseason what he has lent to Lord Cochrane.

129 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord
Cochrane's purchase of the carronades at 80 pesos each.

Ministry of War, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he agrees that the only way of controlling discontent among the native seamen is by paying them, but few of the Chilean seamen have as much as nine months' service and six months' pay is to be withheld from them as is English practice; that they should be persuaded that they will be paid on their return from the campaign; that they have been partly paid by the supply of 3000 pesos' worth of clothing; that financial shortage prevents the share of the Maria Isabel prize being paid by the Treasury, but the government solemnly undertakes to pay them.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Lord Cochrane's orders for the coming campaign.

Santiago, 6 September 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins: Confidential instructions to be observed by the Honorable Lord Cochrane, Admiral of the Chilean squadron, in the coming campaign; that the object of the expedition is to secure the dominion of the Pacific and allow the expeditionary army to proceed; that Lord Cochrane should therefore seek to destroy the Spanish ships of war.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing papers giving information about the Spanish squadron, which by now must have entered the Pacific.

Buenos Aires, 9 August 1819, Felipe Arana to his sister: stating that there are reports of Spanish warships having sailed past the Cape Verde islands.
135 Buenos Aires, 6 August 1819, Miguel Zañartu to Bernardo O'Higgins: giving information about the Spanish warships sailing for the Pacific.

136 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 7 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government have agreed to Shirreff's request to have Royal Navy deserters on the Chilean ships returned.

137 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 9 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a report of the Governor of Concepcion and other documents relative to a court martial ordered by the captain of the Lautaro, and the despatch of the criminals to Santiago.

138 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 9 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders to allow an interventor to represent the attorney of the fitters of the Argentina at the prize tribunal.

139 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 9 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that before the Montezuma is put on public sale, the cargo should be valued at current prices.

140 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's arrangements to sell the bar silver on board the Independencia.

141 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's proposal to pension off the seaman Jorge Miers.

142 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 September 1819,
Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that for the purposes of the division of prize, Lt. Col. Charles of the marine battalion is to enjoy the rank of a captain in the navy.

143 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 September 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's suggestion about the composition of crews of merchant ships, they should be one third foreign seamen and two thirds native.

144 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 November 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's dispatch number 2 from Callao respecting the rocket attack, the death of Lt. Baillie, and Captain Hind's injury.

145 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 November 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's dispatch number 3 respecting his preparations for a further attack on Callao.

146 Santiago, 26 November 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's report of 28 September from Callao; stating that the North American brig Pallas' papers are being sent to the commission of prizes.

147 Santiago, 26 November 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating the disappointment of the government at the lack of success of the rockets and fire-ships at Callao; that he is confident of better success in the future; that the rockets were constructed too rapidly; that Mr. Goldsack is working to improve them; that the courage of the officers and men has achieved a high place in the opinion of the public.
Santiago, 26 November 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that the government approves of Lord Cochrane's dispositions in withdrawing from Callao; that a long-drawn-out campaign may be necessary; that the ships of the squadron should be reunited; that disadvantageous naval combat should be avoided, as should a return to Valparaíso; that Lord Cochrane is at liberty to operate at his discretion, except that the time is inappropriate for a campaign in the puertos intermedios, as the government's strategy is to concentrate on clearing the sea to make way for the Peruvian expedition; that if such an expedition is destroyed at sea by the Spanish, or cut off in Peru by a Spanish victory at sea, a counter-invasion of Chile may be expected to follow immediately.
PART THREE

(Document 149 - 330)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE CHILEAN MINISTER OF MARINE TO LORD COCHRANE. 1820.
Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: agreeing to promote William Miller for his courage and loyalty to the cause.

Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's report of 28 November 1819 explaining why he is taking a different course to the ships heading for Guayaquil.

Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's dispatch of 29 November 1819 containing general information about Santa Fé and Portobello.

Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his approval of Lord Cochrane's generosity to the guayaquileños.

Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his approval of Lord Cochrane's dispositions for the Galvarino and Pueyrredon to cruise.

Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: agreeing to put into execution Lord Cochrane's suggestion that no ship be allowed to weigh anchor from Valparaíso, to maintain secrecy respecting the withdrawal from Callao.

Santiago, 12 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: promising to promote Lieutenant Carson as soon as possible.

Santiago, 16 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that being informed of the forthcoming attack on Valdivia and Chiloé, he hopes it is successful; and that Blanco's division is being prepared to give assistance.
157 Santiago, 22 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the comandant of the marine department to send his fastest ship with equipment and materials necessary for careening the O'Higgins; that he did not send the Independencia as Blanco's division is about to sail.

158 Santiago, 22 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that although it is impossible exactly to copy the samples of cable and rigging, due to lack of expertise and materials, efforts are being made to make these items.

159 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 22 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his congratulations on the capture of Valdivia.

160 Framed copy of the previous item.

161 Santiago, 23 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that marine 1st sergeant Diego Febreros is being promoted to Sublieutenant for valour.

162 Santiago, 24 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: complimenting him on the capture of Valdivia and stating that it has put an end to the long drawn out war which has for so long devastated Chile; account of his difficulties with the English seamen, of rumours of an expedition from Peru and the concentration of the Chilean fleet to prevent it; account of the arrangements for garrisoning Valdivia.

163 Santiago, 25 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that on weighing anchor for Guayaquil, Blanco received notes from Forster and Guise regarding discontent among their crews; and that the government has received reports that the Spanish
fleet in Callao is preparing to sally out for a cruise southwards; that for these reasons, Blanco's sailing has been suspended, and Lord Cochrane should return to Valparaiso with all the ships as urgently as possible.

164 Santiago, 14 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the San Martin to sail to Juan Fernandez island with certain prisoners, and thence to Coquimbo to tranship troops; and for the Lautaro to ship 1000 recruits from Talcahuano to Valparaiso.

165 Santiago, 14 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that papers from Valdivia of interest to the government be transmitted to Santiago, and the remainder put in charge of the Governor of Valparaiso.

166 Santiago, 14 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the papers relative to the Peruana have been transmitted to the prize tribunal.

167 Santiago, 14 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Carlos Delegal's captious proceedings, the government wish to know if he offered to pay the cargo duties of the Inspector; that he is presently under arrest; and that he owes 40,000 pesos or more.

168 Santiago, 16 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that as there is no evidence of Richard Casey's complicity in the plot on the Montezuma, he is to be restored to his command of the ship.

169 Santiago, 18 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, secret: ordering the San Martin to sail with reinforcements and the new governor, Cayetano
Letelier, to Valdivia; stating that its destination is to be rumoured to be Callao, in order to alarm the viceroy.

170 Santiago, 18 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the public execution of Juan Manuel Leon, alias el paiteno, who led the seizure of the Dolores in Talcahuano bay, and has now been captured.

171 Santiago, 18 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that the Lautaro is not to sail to Talcahuano as ordered, but to Coquimbo to collect the battalion number 2 and transport it to Valparaiso.

172 Santiago, 20 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating the approval of the Director at the way Lord Cochrane pacified the crew of the Lautaro.

173 Santiago, 20 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the Lautaro to transport to Coquimbo 45 convicts who are being sent to don Carlos St. Lamber, general administrator of mines.

174 Santiago, 20 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: giving permission for Lord Cochrane to come to the capital.

175 Santiago, 20 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his approval of Lord Cochrane's disposition for a 14 day cruise off San Carlos.

176 Santiago, 20 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Richard Casey is to be put in command of the Montezuma again.
177 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 20 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that it was impossible to supervise the boatbuilding in the shipyard at Maule; that it has suffered from corruption, theft and embezzlement; that on 28 December 1819 it was decided to transfer its activities to Valparaiso for better supervision.

178 Santiago, 21 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that his earlier order for the Lautaro to sail to Coquimbo is to be cancelled.

179 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 23 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: advising him of the government's decision to re-enforce the controls of 26 October 1818 on corsairs.

180 Ministry of Marine, Santiago 23 March 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government does not wish to buy the Potrillo; that the adjudication of the Aguila will shortly be completed.

181 Santiago, 4 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the ministers of the marine department have been ordered to prepare budgets to pay the time-expired and other seamen; requesting that Lord Cochrane will supply details of the clothing that is required; stating that despite the difficulties, money will be sent at the end of the week.

182 Santiago, 4 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane; secret: stating that all the warships except the Pueyrredon are to equip and prepare with the utmost promptitude for a destination which will be told Lord Cochrane later; that the commandant of the department has been ordered to give the squadron whatever may be needed.
183 Santiago, 4 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has written to their agent in Buenos Aires ordering him to procure the naval supplies being requested by Lord Cochrane.

184 Santiago, 4 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the marine department has been ordered to repair and equip the Aguila, under the surveillance of Captain Delano.

185 Santiago, 4 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has done everything possible to collect the money needed for the squadron; that he will have it or some of it by the end of the week.

186 Santiago, 7 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the company to transport the expedition to Peru is obliged to provide ships, if necessary by requisitioning them against promissory notes; that as there are enough prizes to provide the contractors with shipping, the government has decided that they are to be sold to the company, and if to anyone else, that it be on the understanding that they be available for the expedition; that he has written to the commandancy general instructing them to value the Aguila, Jerezana, Dolores, Peruana, Potrillo.

187 Santiago, 10 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that a long period in the anchorage produces ill effects on the crews' discipline, between drinking dens, desertion and idleness; that the San Martin is to cruise off the harbour, and the other ships are to join it as soon as they are ready.

188 Santiago, 11 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane:
Cochrane: stating that due to the confusion which arises from army artillerymen serving in the ships, the Director has decreed that a naval artillery brigade be established under Lieutenant Colonel Miller, to which all the present artillerymen will be automatically transferred.

189 Santiago, 13 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the Pueyrredon and Peruana to take the new governor to Valdivia, and collect 1000 recruits at Talcahuano on the way back; that the warship is not to lose sight of the frigate to prevent any mutiny.

190 Santiago, 14 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, very secret: since everything is prepared for the expedition of 4000 men except for the finance, which is being collected at the moment, the San Martin is to be sent to Coquimbo to ship the battalion number 2 and the artillery company.

191 Santiago, 14 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that as the money and supplies for an expedition of 4000 men have been collected, it has been considered preferable to undertake this rather than the expedition of 2000 men; that the government have given Lord Cochrane an hacienda.

192 Santiago, 16 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, very secret: stating that, as the Peru expedition is approaching, it is necessary to send a trustworthy officer in the Montezuma to Callao to examine the war- and merchant-ships in the harbour, and discover its true situation, how many veteran troops there are in and around Lima and Callao; and return within 40 days without touching at any other port.

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Santiago, 17 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the Pueyrredon and Peruana to sail at once for Valdivia, the Peruana being navigated by a crew of sailors from other ships in the squadron.

Santiago, 18 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 14 April regarding the return to port of the Chacabuco.

Santiago, 18 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that as the Director does not wish to injure the interests of shareholders of captured ships, he has suspended their sale until their value improves.

Santiago, 18 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order to cancel the instructions for the ships to cruise off the port; stating that since their seamen are working on them and not idle, they may remain anchored in the port.

Santiago, 18 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Delano has been ordered to Valparaiso to take in hand the reconstruction of the transports; that money and supplies are being dispatched.

Santiago, 20 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that the issues involved in Lord Cochrane's letter are such as cannot be discussed by letter; requesting that he come to Santiago so that the matter can be discussed fully, and in the meantime the resignation be considered as suspended.

Santiago, 20 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he realises the justice of
Lord Cochrane's complaints of alteration of agreements, but he should be confident that what has now been agreed will infallibly be carried out.

Santiago, 27 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: notifying him of John Spry's promotion to the rank of Capitan de Fragata, and that of Diego Elfrew to the rank of contador, second class.

Santiago, 28 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: respecting the note of the contractors for the expeditionary transports regarding the Begona, Dolores, Aguila, Peruana, Jerezana, Potrillo; stating that as some of these ships are owned by the government, some belong to the government and the squadron, and some belong to the squadron, the contractors will negotiate with the government for the first two classes, and with the squadron for the third.

Santiago, 29 April 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to Lord Cochrane's note, the Director will wait for further information from both Lord Cochrane and General San Martin.

Santiago, 2 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that as Captain Ramsay has failed in his duty when transporting supplies to the squadron, and has given no explanation for their disappearance, he is to be court martialled.

Santiago, 3 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the dispatches of promotion of Captain Spry and appointment of Diego Elfrew have been sent to the department for records, and will be forwarded to Lord Cochrane shortly.
Santiago, 3 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of representations by the lieutenants, surgeons, contramaestres, pilots, petty officers and midshipmen respecting payments due; stating that the ministers of the comissary of marine are to calculate the sums due to each signatory; recommending that Lord Cochrane agitate the commissioners.

Santiago, 4 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 1 May; stating that his conduct has been conformable to good sense; that since the government has given the ships licences to sail, it cannot now prevent their departure; that it is impossible to hide from the viceroy the fact that an expedition is in preparation, so rather opportunities should be taken to give him misleading information; that any opportunity to finance the war should be taken.

Santiago, 4 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: respecting 24 hours notice being given by ships sailing from the port.

Santiago, 4 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: agreeing to give Charles the rank of Capitan de Corveta dated from his assumption of command of the Rising Star.

Santiago, 4 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to the prices which the captains agree should be asked for the Bogoña, Aguila, Dolores, Potrillo, posters have been put up in the capital to publicise the sale of the ships and the contractors are leaving today for the port to hire or purchase them.

Santiago, 4 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane,
secret: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's resignation of 19 April and explanations of 24 April, and his rejoining his command, the complaint of captors that they have not received a share of the prize money are unfair; that the proceeds of the Maria Isabel, Magdalena, Helena, Dolores, Carlota, Rosalia, have been paid; that regarding the Jerezana, Aguila, Begoña, Peruana, Potrillo, the government has not yet received inventories of the ships and cannot therefore value them; 'that regarding the Montezuma, it has not yet been able to settle accounts with the agent William Hoseason; that regarding the money captured in Peru, much of it has not yet been inventoried for the government; that in fact the interests which have most gravely suffered have been those of the government itself; that regarding defects in the provisions, the fault lies with the captors who have failed to do their jobs properly; that they are supposed by the regulations to inspect all supplies when they are brought aboard ship; that the rockets were built by people brought to the country expressly to that purpose; that regarding Lord Cochrane's complaints that he orders are too limiting, his instructions of 16 September 1819 give him ample discretionary authority; that he encloses his commission herewith.

211 Santiago, 6 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 5 May enclosing Captain Searle's remonstrances regarding the detention of ships; order that the licensed ships should be allowed to go to sea; and that the port should only be closed 20 days before the departure of the expedition.

212 Santiago, 8 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving an application for a warrant for retirement as an invalid for Sergeant Pedro Foro.
Santiago, 13 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Coch­rane: order for the best of the captured transports to go with a small warship to Talcahuano to collect 600 recruits; stating that to provision the ships, the commandant of the department has been ordered to use whatever money is available, including the 19,000 pesos recently sent, whatever it may have been budgeted for.

Santiago, 15 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Coch­rane: order for the Montezuma to be put at the dis­position of the commander-in-chief, who is to appoint its captain; the ship is to operate independently of the squadron, for the secret correspondence with the Peruvian patriots.

Santiago, 19 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Coch­rane: stating that, while Captain Ramsay has not strictly disobeyed his instructions, his imprudent attack on Ylo is blameworthy; that the inhabitants of those parts should be treated gently to win them to the cause; that Captain Ramsay should be court martialed.

Santiago, 20 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Coch­rane: stating that he has forwarded Lord Cochrane's plan of 10 May respecting the possibility of establishing a naval dockyard at Quintero to the Director, and it is now being considered by the Senate.

Santiago, 20 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Coch­rane: requesting that Colonel Fausto del Hoyo, at present with the squadron, be given up to the governor of Valparaiso, to be sent to the capital.

Santiago, 20 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Coch­rane: stating that with respect to Lord Cochrane's letter of 19 May regarding the Montezuma's being
put at General San Martin's disposition, this does not imply any derogation of the prerogatives of Lord Cochrane as commander-in-chief of the marine.

219 Santiago, 20 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's report of 10 May on the refusal of the officers and men of the San Martin to weigh anchor for Coquimbo; stating his approval of a court martial on the inciters; and that every effort is being made to raise money to pay the squadron.

220 Santiago, 21 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that despite financial difficulties, he expects to collect 70,000 pesos in 10 days which will pay off most of the squadron; that he expects the expedition to Peru to be finalised within a month.

221 Santiago, 23 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his approval of Lord Cochrane's disposition for the captured ships to be moved to Quintero.

222 Santiago, 24 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Captain Sowersby's request for a transfer from the marine to the expeditionary army.

223 Santiago, 24 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the HMS Hyperion is to be permitted to sail from the port, notwithstanding its closure.

224 Santiago, 24 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with the approach of the expedition, it is important to prevent the enemy from acquiring sure news of patriot movements; that as the date is not yet fixed, the port should not be completely closed or trade will suffer; that only northbound shipping should be forbidden to sail.
Santiago, 24 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for Sublieutenant of marines Francisco Vidal to be placed temporarily at the disposition of the commander-in-chief.

Santiago, 29 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree of 26 May, that as it is very easy for the state's and other ships touching on the coast to carry on contraband, the governor of Valparaiso is empowered to dictate such measures as may be necessary to prevent it.

Santiago, 30 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to Lord Cochrane's reasons for keeping Colonel Fausto del Hoyo aboard the O'Higgins and the latter's fear for his safety, the Chileans are not in the habit of slaughtering their prisoners; that Fausto del Hoyo is not entitled to preferential treatment; that he need not expect to be maltreated; requesting that he be put ashore at the disposition of the governor of Valparaiso.

Santiago, 30 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has approved the suspension of the court martial on the officers of the San Martin; that being aware of the need to dispel the discontents of the squadron it has sent today 20,000 pesos to be paid to the officers and petty officers.

Santiago, 31 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating he has given orders to the Comandant general of the department to allow the brig Quillotano to sail to Coquimbo and Huasco.

Santiago, 31 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has written again to the
comandant general of the department to speed the work of preparation of the squadron.

231 Santiago, 31 May 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: advising him of a government order to the commissary of marine that 20,000 pesos are being sent towards the payment of the squadron's officers; stating that a further 40,000 pesos will be sent, as promised on 13 April, as soon as possible to pay the crews.

232 Santiago, 5 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a decree declaring William Prunier's lieutenancy dating from 9 March 1819.

233 Santiago, 5 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he furnish a list of the names and ranks of those who are entitled to prize for the capture of Valdivia.

234 Santiago, 6 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order that no launches are to be allowed to leave the port; that they are all to be employed for the transports.

235 Santiago, 6 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the San Martin, O'Higgins, Lautaro, Independencia, Chacabuco, Galvarino, Araucano to be prepared for the convoy of the expedition to Peru.

236 Santiago, 6 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Sublieutenant Vidal has been sufficiently recompensed by his promotion for his part in the capture of Valdivia.

237 Santiago, 6 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting order of the government of 24 May that memorials and petitions should carry a marginal
summary and should be sent through the secretaries of departments.

238 Santiago, 6 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he furnish a list of the names and ranks of those who took part in the capture of Valdivia, as they will all be promoted a grade.

239 Note of 12 army and marine regiment officers who took part in the capture of Valdivia.

240 Santiago, 8 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the captains and officers of the squadron are not to sleep ashore, nor to leave their ships, in order to prevent the lack of supervision which holds up work and is bad for discipline.

241 Santiago, 8 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Manuel Blanco Encalada is transferred to the army from the marine as of 7 June.

242 Santiago, 8 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that marine Lieutenant Adolfo Graver has received an extension of leave.

243 Santiago, 9 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for 220 quintals of powder on board the O'Higgins to be given up to Paulino Campbell.

244 Santiago, 12 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving the appointment of Thomas Godfrey to lieutenant and John Coulthard to pilot.

245 Valparaiso, 14 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane's return of his commission, charter of citizenship and hacienda, have affected the Director deeply; that the act seems inappropriate at this juncture; that Guise has also
demanded a court martial and that the government has therefore agreed to continue it; that he hopes Lord Cochrane will withdraw his resignation.

246 Santiago, 17 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Charles Sowersby of the marine battalion has been transferred to battalion number 2 of the army.

247 Valparaiso, 19 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing his papers, which are being returned to him.

248 Valparaiso, 23 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to the suspicious arrival and departure of the north American brig Warrior, he approves of Lord Cochrane's measures.

249 Valparaiso, 23 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Vidal has been transferred from the marine battalion to the army.

250 Santiago, 23 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Captain Charles' request that Ramsay be courtmartialed.

251 Valparaiso, 24 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the Aguila be made available on hire to the contractors.

252 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a decree that naval officers of the rank of Capitan de Corveta and above are to wear a gold stripe in the hat.

253 Valparaiso, 28 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will supply a note of the number of sailors needed to be recruited;
and that he will appoint an officer to collect the funds and start paying the recruitment bounty.

254 Valparaiso, 28 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the decree of 3 August 1818 laying down the naval uniform.

255 Santiago, 3 August 1818: Decree specifying the dress uniforms for naval personnel.

256 Valparaiso, 29 June 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order to proceed as possible with the construction of a mole for the embarkation of the army, as suggested by Lord Cochrane to the Director.

257 Valparaiso, 1 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the Aguila to be manned and supplied under Captain Carter, to be hired to the transport contractors.

258 Valparaiso, 3 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: authorising a court martial on Lieutenant John Pascoe Grenfell.

259 Valparaiso, 3 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing appointment of Hugh Kernan as second surgeon of the Pueyrredon.

260 Valparaiso, 4 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the court martial on Ramsay must be suspended until an Auditor is appointed; that Mr. Bennett cannot occupy this post as the law stipulates that it must be occupied by a qualified advocate.

261 Valparaiso, 5 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's measures in connexion with Lieutenant Thomas Godfrey; stating
that his commission has been suspended until further notice.

262 Valparaíso, 5 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochran: approving Lord Cochran's proposed formula for contadores to draw up the state of their ships; stating that he has ordered an appropriate number to be printed.

263 Valparaíso, 6 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochran: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochran's note of 5 July, stating that not a single seaman has presented himself for enlistment and attributing this to the liquor houses; stating that a tax of two pesos daily is being laid on drinking houses, to help compel seamen to enlist.

264 Valparaíso, 6 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochran: stating that with respect to the list of requirements of the Araucano, either the rest of the ships, excepting the O'Higgins, are completely equipped and ready for sea, needing only provisions, or there is a serious delay in the equipping of them; that the government is concerned that, having long ago given the most explicit orders for the squadron to be made ready, when now it orders the Araucano to sea, it transpires that she cannot; requesting Lord Cochran will state categorically whether the other ships have or have not their full complement of military and naval stores.

265 Valparaíso, 7 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochran: stating that the government has appointed Capitan de Fragata Spry to command the O'Higgins, Capitan de Corveta Thomas Carter to the Chacabuco, Lieutenant Thomas Crosbie to the Galvarino; that in all justice the government had to appoint Spry to the O'Higgins as he was the only frigate captain without a ship.
266 Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting he will send Captain Ramsay’s letter, which he forgot to enclose in his report.

267 Valparaiso, 12 July 1820, 4.15 p.m., Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Ramsay’s appeal against his sentence on the grounds of the ineligibility of Captain Crosbie to act as a vocal, is to be passed to the Auditor of marine; that Captain Carter is to take command of the Chacabuco; requesting that Lord Cochrane will advise him within three hours that this order has been carried out.

268 Valparaiso, 12 July 1820, 4.15 p.m. Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the arrest of Captain Guise, transmitting a government decree, that in order not to delay the preparation of the squadron, Guise is to be liberated and restored to his command of the Lautaro, and Spry to be placed in command of the O’Higgins; that this is to be done within three hours.

269 Valparaiso, 13 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the suspension of the court martial on Captain Guise.

270 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 14 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the court martial on Guise is to be suspended and the papers passed to the Auditor of marine.

271 Valparaiso, 15 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a copy of the printed estado; stating that 500 are being printed for the fleet; that 100 have been sent to the comissary of marine to be distributed to the ships; that the contadores should fill them in weekly.

Printed State of Ship.

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272 Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane's request for a court martial on Captain Guise would have been carried out but for the fact that the dictates of policy and the interests of the nation must sometimes override the strict rule of justice; that such a court martial will delay the preparation of the squadron to the prejudice of the military situation; that discipline and justice, already partly satisfied by the arrest of Guise, may be wholly satisfied once the expedition is concluded; that once he is back at sea, Guise may be relied upon to do his best for the service; that therefore Guise should be put at liberty and his court martial suspended.

273 Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will come and see the Director, who wishes to speak personally with him.

274 Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the comissary of marine to distribute the Director's displeasure to them for their lack of attention.

275 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Director has decided that Spry is to return to the command of the Galvarino; that Lord Cochrane is to decide on the posting of Lieutenant Crosbie.

276 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 21 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: request that the two mortars from the Begona be brought from Herradura.

277 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 21 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: advising him of the
appointment of Lieutenant Casey to command the Araucano.

278 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 25 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that 3 August has been fixed as the positive final date for the departure of the expedition.

279 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 26 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Guise's appointment to the rank of Capitan de Navio.

280 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 26 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree ordering the suspension of the court martial on Captain Guise, and his restitution to the command of his ship.

281 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 26 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order that the carpenters and caulkers are not to undertake any work but that of preparing the transports with all speed.

282 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 31 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Casey's appointment to command the Araucano is purely a temporary measure.

283 Valparaiso, 1 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: granting a discharge to Lieutenant Nicholas Lawson and John Lee.

284 Valparaiso, 1 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the appointment of Capitan de Corveta Thomas Crosbie to command the O'Higgins.

285 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 2 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with
respect to Lieutenant Cobbett's objections to Casey's command, Lord Cochrane is to appoint the most senior lieutenant to the command.

286 Valparaiso, 2 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing appointment of Robert Forster as Capitan de Navio.

287 Valparaiso, 2 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Capitan de Corveta Delano's appointment as comandant of transports.

288 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 8 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree, that captains may not appoint midshipmen and other officers, but only propose their appointment to the vice-Admiral.

289 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 8 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of officers for whom commissions are being drawn up and will be forwarded shortly.

290 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 8 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the Governor to purchase 320 oars from Talcahuano, as requested by Lord Cochrane.


292 Valparaiso, 2 August 1820, Robert Forster to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he held the rank of Captain of the squadron from 23 December 1818 to 27 June 1819; requesting that he be paid the sums due for that period.

293 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 9 August 1820, Ignacio
Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant James Ramsay is granted six months' leave.

294 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 9 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that surgeon James Michael's antiquity of service is recognised from 20 July 1818.

295 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 10 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Presidenta sailed from Callao with money and war material for the royalists in Chiloé, on 7 June; order for the Chacabuco to sail in pursuit.

296 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 11 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Armstrong has been paid, like the other officers, up to the end of December last.

297 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 11 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the ornaments taken at Valdivia are to go for the service of the votive temple of Maipu, on condition that they be returned to their original churches if they are asked for.

298 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 11 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree of 10 August, that documents passed to the comissary of marine must be returned at once to the commandancy general for their further transmission.

299 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 12 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that, the Chacabuco being unable to make her voyage, Captain Carter with his officers, men and supplies is to tranship to the Araucano to carry out the mission.
Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 12 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Shepherd and Addison have been paid up to the end of the previous December, and are in the same position as the other naval officers.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 12 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for Lieutenant Grenfell to be released from arrest on the Independencia.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 14 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for the arrest of lieutenant of marines Adolfo Graver.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 14 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: order for Captain Carter to transfer to the Araucano, with his officers men and supplies, and to sail to Coquimbo to recruit seamen.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 14 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Ignacio Barragan is appointed comandant of launches, and Manuel Lopez constable.

Valparaiso, 14 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that it would be desirable to pay the seamen of the O'Higgins whose times are nearly expired, to keep them in service; but that the treasury being empty, he relies upon Lord Cochrane to devise means to keep the seamen in service.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 15 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the medal for the liberators of Valdivia is to have a tricolour ribbon.
Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 15 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has ordered the comissary to pay arrears of wages due to Thomas Leighton to bring him into a situation equivalent to the other officers.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 18 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving his expedition of five discharges to members of the marine battalion.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 18 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government order, that the Auditor of marine is to have the rights of a lieutenant in the division of prize money.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 20 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a decree of the government, declaring the coasts of Peru in blockade.

Valparaiso, 20 August 1820, Bernardo O'Higgins: decree of blockade of the coast of Peru, from 25 August, from 21 degrees 48 Iquique to 2 degrees 12 Guayaquil; stating that entry to this coast is prohibited to all shipping; that any ship attempting to run the blockade or neutral ships carrying enemy goods, persons or money, to be sent for adjudication to Valparaiso; that Lord Cochrane is to appoint an anchorage at which neutrals wishing to remove their property from Peru may embark it; that the blockade will not apply to the liberated portions of the coast.

Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 20 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the Governor of Coquimbo to recruit as many sailors as possible for the squadron.
313 Ministry of Marine, Valparaíso, 20 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: advising him that General San Martin has been appointed Captain-General of the armies of Chile.

314 Ministry of Marine, Valparaíso, 20 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's secret plan of signals for the state's ships, drawn up on 18 August.

315 Ministry of Marine, Valparaíso, 20 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating the Director's disapproval of Sargento Ramon Gormaz arresting the marines who have been discharged.

316 Ministry of Marine, Valparaíso, 20 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a decree of the Supreme Director granting Lord Cochrane the Rio Claro estate of the Spanish fugitive Pablo Hurtado for services in the restoration of Valdivia to Chile.

317 Ministry of Marine, Valparaíso, 21 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that as Antonio Alvarez Jonte for health reasons cannot always act as Auditor of war, Monteagudo has been appointed to deputise for him when necessary.

318 Santiago, 29 August 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Searle protested yesterday against the blockade, and that to avoid trouble, Lord Cochrane should act consonant with the law of nations and the custom of Great Britain.

319 Santiago, 4 September 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving the disembarkation of the sick from the Lautaro; requesting more information before men are taken from the hospital.
320 Santiago, 4 September 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's dispatch of 23 August, the government has ordered his report of 6 May to be forwarded to Captain Shirreff.

321 Santiago, 4 September 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving his actions respecting the captain of the Warrior; stating that infractors of the blockade will be judged with the full rigour of the law.

322 Santiago, 4 September 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving his measures described in his dispatch of 23 August.

323 Santiago, 18 November 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating his congratulations for the safe arrival of the expedition at Pisco.

324 Santiago, 18 November 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving dispositions outlined in Lord Cochrane's of 8 October respecting attempts to take out the Esmeralda and Venganza.

325 Santiago, 21 November 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting government decree confirming royal dispositions of 17 February 1787, 6 May and 23 October 1788, 16 March 1789 regarding leave for military and naval officers.

326 Palacio El Pardo, 17 February 1787, Carlos III, King of Spain; decree, that officers on temporary leave should receive half pay except in case of those compelled to take the waters or change climate for health reasons.

327 Santiago, 22 November 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging Lord Cochrane's of 24 October;
stating that he has high hopes for the expedition; that Chile has been recognised by the United States; that the war in the south is not going well.

328 Santiago, 23 November 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will supply more information regarding the Warrior, detained by the squadron in Coquimbo when carrying arms and money to the royalists in Arauco.

329 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 23 November 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane, very secret: enclosing a communication regarding Spanish merchant ships in Rio preparing to sail to Callao, and the warships Asia and San Julian preparing to sail from Cadiz.

330 Rio de Janeiro, 18 September 1820, extract reporting that Spanish merchant ships have purchased one million pesos' worth of merchandise for Callao. Rio de Janeiro, 23 September 1820; extract reporting that the Nancy, the Indian, the Joseph and the Olive Branch have been chartered for Lima by Spaniards.
PART FOUR

(Documents 331-426)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE CHILEAN MINISTER OF MARINE TO LORD COCHRANE. 1821, 1822 & 1823.
Ministry of War, Santiago, 22 January 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing an account of the prisoners of war of the royalist army; requesting that Lord Cochrane will forward it to General San Martín and detain the Miantinomo, bringing it, until he receives the reply, then send her to Callao; stating that the ship should be allowed to trade with Lima to cover the cost of the mission.

Santiago, 20 February 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has heard from Concepción that the brig built on Vicente Benavides' order at Raque has sailed for Peru to seek aid for the royalist party; that the schooner Fortunata did not find her.

Santiago, 22 February 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a statement of the provisions embarked in the Pacifico for the army and the squadron, on 3 February.

Account of supplies being shipped by the Pacifico to the liberating army of Peru; 2412 quintals of assorted foodstuffs.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 23 March 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the vice-Admiral is equivalent in rank to a lieutenant-General and is entitled to be addressed as Excellency.

Santiago, 23 March 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a representation from the commercial agent of the United States in Buenos Aires, claiming moneys taken by Lord Cochrane from the Macedonian and the Gazelle; requesting Lord Cochrane's opinion.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane:
acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 6 April reporting the court martial of Guise and Spry.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the same procedure for satisfying the sums due to the captors of the Esmeralda should be adopted as for those of the Aransasu.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of his note that the Aransasu, captured by the Araucano, has been valued at 100,000 pesos; stating that the value should be covered by funds raised in the war by the army, in other words, added to the cost which Chile has a right to reclaim, of expenses of the expedition.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of his note of 6 April, that the Spanish ships which are talked of have not appeared, and do not seem likely to appear, in the Pacific.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the Commissary of Marine to satisfy Lord Cochrane's request for a list of all members of the squadron who were paid, how much they received, and their ships.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's account of 6 April of shortages and requirements, especially of sails for the O'Higgins and the San Martin, the government has ordered more to be purchased and dispatched as soon as possible.

Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's report of the criminal negligence of Captain Spry in
not keeping his ship supplied with water and firewood; stating the Director's displeasure at this negligence.

344 Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the flag of the Esmeralda be sent as soon as possible to join that of the Maria Isabel in the cathedral.

345 Santiago, 2 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging the delicacy with which Lord Cochrane has always obeyed his orders; stating that the instructions of 19 August 1820 are only for his subordination in military questions to General San Martin; that in other matters he depends directly on the Ministry of Marine of Chile with whom he should deal.

346 Santiago, 8 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: noting the good fortune which led to the capture of the Aransasu; that the enemy are afraid to meet the squadron and the Prueba and Venganza may soon be added to it.

347 Santiago, 12 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a statement of the masts being remitted by the marine department to Lord Cochrane.

348 Santiago, 28 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Sir Thomas Hardy is claiming five men from the British ships Lord Suffield, Edward Ellice, Indian; that he claimed them from Captain Crosbie, who refused to return them; requesting that Lord Cochrane will have them given up to prevent trouble.

349 Santiago, 6 June 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating the government's pleasure at the
capture of Arica on 13 May; that while its permanent occupation would be desirable, the government cannot raise the 500 men Lord Cochrane asks for, because of the military situation in Concepción province; that General Ramírez is based in Arequipa with powerful forces; that General San Martín's operations round Ancon will require naval co-operation; that therefore the occupation of Arica is probably not militarily feasible.

350 Santiago, 6 June 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's measures to procure cable, rope and canvas; stating that the chain and anchors requested by Lord Cochrane are being ordered from London.

351 Santiago, 6 June 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the poverty of the public funds makes it impossible for him to comply with Lord Cochrane's request for 2000 muskets.

352 Santiago, 6 June 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that on 17 May he sent a note of the medicaments being despatched; that he was unable to send them at that time, but that he is doing so now.

353 Account of medicines being remitted to the squadron by order of the ministers of the general treasury.

354 Santiago, 9 June 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: regarding the acrimony with which Commodore Hardy expresses himself respecting the British ships detained as a result of the decrees of blockade; enclosing a note of Hardy's to the Director in order that Lord Cochrane may order his conduct conformably with the attitude of Hardy; stating that it is necessary to avoid a clash, which both policy and convenience recommend to avoid.
Copy of the previous item.

HMS Creale, Valparaíso, 2 June 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that with respect to the arrival of the English brig Colombia, the Ministry of Marine advised him last 6 December that the blockade would only be maintained against Callao; that subsequent detentions compelled him to go to investigate personally in April; that Captain Forster of the Independencia told him that the general blockade was still in force; that Lieutenant Morgell's detention of the Colombia is illegal; that he is aware that some officers of the squadron are determined to obstruct British trade; that he is determined in his turn to dispense any necessary protection to British ships.

Santiago, 2 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that papers necessary for drawing up the discharge of Lieutenant Freeman and Surgeon Kernan be forwarded.

Santiago, 2 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that orders have been given to the Commandant General of the Department to despatch 300 lbs of cotton to the squadron.

Santiago, 2 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that serious disputes are occurring with Hardy concerning the blockade; that Hardy has threatened to employ force and has warned British traders here to prepare to withdraw themselves and their business from Chile; to prevent an open breach with Hardy, the government has had to agree to modify the decree of blockade; enclosing a decree of 22 June.

Palacio Directorial, Santiago, 22 June 1821, Bernardo
O'Higgins: decree, that the greater part of Perus having been liberated, the area of the blockade is revised to apply between Ancon and Pisco, 11 degrees 48 south and 13 degrees 51 south; that a sufficient force of ships will be permanently stationed on this coast to make the blockade de facto.

361 3 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to his request for a garrison for Arica, the government has sought to persuade the traders to set up a company to finance a 500-man expedition, but without success; that lights sufficient for three months are being sent to the squadron.

362 Santiago, 3 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 29 May regarding the cargo on board of the Macedonian.

363 Santiago, 3 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting information that a brig armed by Benavides with a 12 pounder and two 9 pounder guns, and 80 men, captured the British whaler Perseverance; order to notify warships and merchant ships of the danger.

364 Santiago, Ministry of Marine, 21 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: asking if certain assertions in the enclosed note are true regarding Cochrane's actions, requesting his prompt reply.

365 HMS Superb, Valparaiso, 19 July 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Bernardo O'Higgins: requesting the response of the government of Chile to the news he has received that Lord Cochrane has been levying duties and selling licences to trade with the Spanish merchant ships.
Santiago, 22 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 30 May regarding the sale of three prizes and one other unauthorised sale.

Santiago, 22 July 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's dispatches to General San Martin regarding the campaign of Lieutenant General Miller in southern Peru.

Santiago, 7 September 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Prunier is to be reprimanded for selling his prize to Sarratea, without its having been formally condemned by the tribunal of prizes; and should be asked to produce account; that Sarratea should also be compelled to pay the hire of the _Aguila_, which he has not yet done.

Santiago, 7 September 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's reports of his exchanges with Sir Thomas Hardy regarding alleged ill-treatment of sailors from the _Lord Suffield, Edward Ellice, Indian_; and regarding the general blockade.

Santiago, 7 September 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's reports on the loss of the _San Martin_, and his proposal to courtmartial Captain Wilkinson.

Santiago, 7 September 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the report of the deterioration of the hull of the _Pueyrredon_, the Director wishes the ship to be preserved at all costs; that regarding the goods aboard her, Captain Prunier had permission to carry some merchandise as recompense for his mission to Cundinamarca.
Santiago, 17 October 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a statement of medicines being remitted, adequate for 1000 men for six months.

Account of medicines necessary for the squadron, to serve for 1000 men for six months,

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 9 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane’s request of 1 October, seamen will be enlisted and sent as soon as possible.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 9 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: approving the sentence of the court martial on Captain Wilkinson and his officers for the loss of the San Martin.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 9 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: approving his purchase of 200 bags of charqui and 200 sacks of flour for the squadron.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that as Lord Cochrane’s answers seem to have satisfied Sir Thomas Hardy, no further discussion of the matter need be entered into.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that Sir Thomas Hardy’s questions will be satisfied, though full explanations are proper only between governments.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that as from 8 October he has taken on the portfolio of Minister of Marine, which has been reassumed by his ministry.
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 13 September regarding monies received and expended by the squadron during the expedition.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 1 October regarding the weight of money taken from Juan José Sarratea.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 10 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging Lord Cochrane's of 28 September regarding money and bar silver taken on board the Perla; stating that as Nicholas Ruiz Peña has started proceedings against this, the government has opened a legal process on the matter.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government proposes to give the medal of the Legion to the officers who refused to desert the squadron.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 7 October regarding claims for deserters made to the Peruvian government.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of 13 September regarding the failure of the Peruvian government to pay the wages due to the officers and men of the squadron.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of the insignia of the ex-commandant general of marine of Callao, which was captured in the Esmeralda.
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's of 29 September respecting his scarcity of provisions, the governor of Valparaiso has been ordered to dispatch urgently all the provisions he can find on the Aransasu, which should come to about 100 tons.


Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received the documents relating to the seizure of the funds at Ancon; that O'Higgins approves of Lord Cochrane's action.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's list of the officers who have deserted.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 13 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's of 7 October accounting for his use of the funds, and that the Director approves of his actions.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 15 November 1821, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Director has sent a letter to the Guayaquil junta informing them that Lord Cochrane is going to Guayaquil in case his support is needed in view of General Sucre's recent defeat, and to careen the O'Higgins and make such repairs to the other ships as may be necessary.
393 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 4 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating the pleasure of the government at Lord Cochrane's return to Valparaíso, and their determination to reward the officers who remained faithful to their duty.

394 Santiago, 14 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating that his request for the discharge of Lieutenant Thomas Woolridge has been approved.

395 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 14 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating that the accounts of the sums expended on the repairs to the warships in Guayaquil have been passed to the Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas.

396 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 15 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has given orders for the Ministry of Hacienda to purchase 400 blue jackets and trousers, 800 shirts and material for caps.

397 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 17 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: approving his request that William Wynter be promoted to Captain and Stephen Clewley and Richard Morris to Lieutenants.

398 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating that the officers who have deserted during the Peru campaign have been expelled from the service; requesting to know if there are any others.

399 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 18 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government being persuaded that a maritime state must develop a strong merchant marine if it is to have an adequate maritime power, Lord Cochrane's
observations are appreciated and will be discussed at the convention; that regarding the need to keep craftsmen in the country, he requests Lord Cochrane will suggest the level of wages which should be paid to the workers on the two steamboats.

400 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's dispatches between 3 February and 3 June.

401 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government wishes to have built the two small steamships for which the machinery is in Valparaiso, at a cost of 6000 pesos each; requesting that Lord Cochrane will draw up a list of the materials needed.

402 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to Lord Cochrane's suggestion that all the lieutenants receive a bonus which would make their salary during the expedition equivalent to 90 pesos a month, this can only be decided by the legislative power at its next meeting.

403 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has decided to strike a medal in honour of the naval element of the Republic's armed services.

404 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 20 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government agrees on the desirability of establishing a copper and bronze foundry to cast guns superior to the existing iron cannon, and of setting up a factory for the manufacture of cable and rigging; that these will be suggested to the convention.
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 20 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the marine department has been ordered to buy the naval stores requested by Lord Cochrane for the O'Higgins; that the two naval comissary posts and one warehouseman post exist, it is necessary to make sure their occupants do their job.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will communicate the thanks of the government to the officers for their conduct.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: enclosing account of iron cable offered for sale by Richard Price; requesting Lord Cochrane's opinion on its value.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of officers who have been discharged as requested by Lord Cochrane.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria: list of officers of the squadron who have been discharged.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 26 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane's report regarding the costs of the service of the squadron in Peru has been passed to the Ministry of Hacienda to open an upper tribunal of accounts.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 28 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that only the O'Higgins will be careened at present; that materials will be made available in the department; that the careen will be carried out in Coquimbo; requesting Lord Cochrane will prepare a budget of the building.
of the steamboats; that with regard to paying the captors of the Esmeralda, requesting Lord Cochrane will form an account of her present value; stating that the captors may dispose of the Aransasu as they wish as it is a merchant ship; approving Lord Cochrane's request for four months' leave.

412 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 30 July 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: offering his congratulations to Lord Cochrane.

413 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 2 September 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has decided that the repairs to the Valdivia should be carried out in Valdivia.

414 Santiago, Ministry of Marine, 1 October 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: assuring him that O'Higgins sympathises with his unease over the calumnies made on him; the authors will not go unpunished.

415 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 October 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: approving his arrest of Captain Foord Morgell for his degrading conduct.

416 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 1 October 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that it would be undesirable to publish his correspondence with San Martin as it would damage the prestige and credit of the new governments; that when news of Lord Cochrane's dissensions with San Martin reached Britain, there was an immediate cooling in the diplomatic negotiations being carried on with Irisarri; that he recommends Lord Cochrane not to publish.

417 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 12 October 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating he has received Lord Cochrane's notes of yesterday; that
the shortage of funds has prevented the punctual payment of wages, which will be paid as soon as possible; that the Commissary of Marine has been ordered to draw up the account of wages due; that the Chacabuco and Galvarino will be sold off to raise money for payment; that a medal is being designed for the officers and men to honour their achievements.

418 Santiago, 26 October 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: inviting him to attend at 10 a.m. on 28 October in the Palacio Directorial, the installation of the court of representatives of the new constitution.

419 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 28 November 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to his letter of 25 November, the crew of the O'Higgins will be paid immediately.

420 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 28 November 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will return the note from the deputies of Peru.

421 Santiago, 18 December 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree, that due to the inaction of the marine resulting from the disarming of the ships, and due to the need for economy, all officers are put on leave at half-pay; that as a token of gratitude, Lord Cochrane will receive full pay, as will Captains Crosbie and Cobbett and other junior officers who have distinguished themselves in the last campaign.

422 List of officers serving on board a detachment of the Chile squadron, which left Callao in chase of the Prueba and Venganza; 16 officers of the O'Higgins, Independencia, Valdivia.
423 Santiago, 20 December 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane was not told of the Galvarino's order to go to sea for the reason that there was no time as the ship was ordered to sea instantly on a secret mission.

424 Santiago, 23 December 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree, that the O'Higgins and Valdivia are to be careened, the Lautaro is to become a storeship; that the job has been contracted with Pedro Olver on 12 December.

425 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 30 December 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the Mercedes be put at the disposition of the Commandant General of the Department for a government mission.

426 Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 16 January 1823, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: promising to reply to him in connection with San Martin's charges as soon as possible.
PART FIVE

(Documents 427-543)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER OFFICERS OF THE MARINE DEPARTMENT

1818 - 1823
Ministry General of Marine, Valparaiso, 30 December 1818, Santiago Campino, Bernardo Vergara to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the accountants' repeated claims that they are impeded in their functions, they have been sent the following instructions: that they are the subalterns of the ministers, they should sign the requisitions, check the daily records of supplies, countersigned by the captains and seconds-in-command; attend when officers of sections collect their supplies at the warehouse, oversee and check the provisions master, and not do that job themselves; stating that these instructions were sent to the Lautaro on 29 December.

Valparaiso, 3 January 1819, Santiago Campino, Bernardo Vergara to Lord Cochrane: stating that the instructions relative to the contadores were sent out on 30 December 1818; account of the duties and obligations of the contadores in the ships.

Valparaiso, 29 June 1819, Luis de la Cruz, Commandant General of the marine department, to Lord Cochrane: stating that the ships' boats are to collect water in the quebrada San Juan de Dios.

Valparaiso, 29 June 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he recommends the point Quinta de Villa Urritia as a suitable place for the five metal foundries of the squadron.

Valparaiso, 29 June 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the space between the quebrada el Arrayan and the Castillo San Antonio has been appointed for the arsenal and mole for the squadron.

Valparaiso, 30 June 1819, Antonio Alvarez Jonte:
statement of points for the notice of Lord Cochrane, that the paylist of the O'Higgins should be reviewed by the vice-Admiral bearing in mind the scarcity of funds; that the men recruited for the Independencia for a year should have a paylist formed, as should those of the Araucano; that all the levied men will get three pesos advance shortly before sailing, and the clothing given to the commissary is to be destined for them; that they may no go ashore until after six months' service; that the salt meat, pork, rum and gin are only to be embarked in ships crewed by foreigners; that the native seamen are to have aguardiente.

433 Valparaiso, 14 July 1819, Anselmo de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that in conformity with his orders from O'Higgins at his departure, he requests that Lord Cochrane will order the division of the bar silver on the O'Higgins.

434 Valparaiso, 19 July 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: advising him of an order of 12 July received from the Minister of Marine, instructing him in consultation with Lord Cochrane to appoint a cemetary for non-Catholic members of the army and navy.

435 Valparaiso, 24 July 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: approving Lord Cochrane's request to have carried out some work in the square in front of his house.

436 Valparaiso, 16 August 1819, Juan Jose Tortel to Lord Cochrane: advising him that he has been ordered by the government to put the Perla, Gaditana and Victoria (when she arrives), at Lord Cochrane's disposition.
437 Valparaiso, 16 August 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: advising him of the order received from Zenteno to provide arms needed for the artillerymen and marines.

438 Valparaiso, 30 August 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting the sentence of the prize tribunal on the Montezuma and ordering an inventory of the ship.

439 Valparaiso, 30 August 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the report of the prize tribunal; requesting that Lord Cochrane will appoint someone to participate in the inventorying of the ship.

440 Valparaiso, 2 September 1819, Pedro Antonio de la Fuente, provisioner general of the marine, to Lord Cochrane: note regarding supplies for the squadron.

441 Valparaiso, 2 September 1819, Juan José Tortel to Lord Cochrane: enclosing 35 certificates, 19 gold-edged escudos and 500 other escudos for distribution to veterans of the first campaign.

442 Valparaiso, 3 September 1819, Anselmo de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: requesting a list of the seamen for whom he is to purchase clothing.

443 Valparaiso, 4 September 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of a note advising him that the lieutenant of the San Martin has been arrested.

444 Valparaiso, 11 September 1819, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Captain Guise under arrest and will keep him until he receives orders from O'Higgins.

445 Valparaiso, 10 December 1819, Luis de la Cruz:
instructions to the commandant of the Chacabuco for the voyage to join the squadron.

Valparaíso, 7 March 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a decree that hereafter all solicitudes from the marine, are to be dealt with in the first instance by the commandant general of the marine department, rather that waste time in Santiago.

Valparaíso, 9 March 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree of 6 March, that regarding the effects taken out of prizes, the share belonging to the marine should be deposited in the comissary of the customs.

Valparaíso, 10 March 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing documents relative to prize money and pay due on the Montezuma.

Valparaíso, 22 March 1820, Luis de la Cruz, to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders from Zenteno cancelling the privateer's letters of marque of José Joaquín Larrain.

Valparaíso, 23 March 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Potrillo's boat, lent to the Araucano as she had no boat, had its prow stove in by the storm, but is being repaired; that the ingots taken from the ship are still in Valparaíso.

Valparaíso, 2 April 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that, with respect to the rigging needed for the Pueyrredón, Peruana, Begoña, Aguila, he has written on the subject to the Minister of Marine, as also regarding the shortage of clothing for the troops and seamen, and the lack of pay.
Valparaiso, 13 April 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: noting, with respect to supplies required by the Peruana, what he is able to procure; stating that there is a shortage of pilots, and that a captain should be nominated.

Valparaiso, 19 April 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders from Zenteno that two months' provisions be supplied for the Montezuma; stating that he has requested them, and wishes to know when they should be embarked.

Valparaiso, 26 April 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a note from Zenteno stating that José Manuel Leon has been established as the author, with 11 other seamen, of the theft of the Dolores; stating that if these men are on any of the ships they should be arrested.

Valparaiso, 30 April 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders from Zenteno that Colonel Fausto del Hoyo is to be sent up to Santiago.

Valparaiso, 30 April 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders of the prize tribunal declaring the Potrillo good prize and ordering her to be sold.

Valparaiso, 2 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to the Argentina, which has been detained, another ship should be contracted for the operation; that Bouchard has made reasonable representations to the government.

Valparaiso, 2 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received warrants for retirement for Joaquin Acebedo, official of the comissary general, and Salvador Soyer, contador of the Lautaro.
459 Valparaiso, 3 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders from Joaquin Echaverria, Minister of State, that to aid the state's finances, licences to trade on the Peru coast have been sold to the Tiber, Inspector and Libonia; that these ships should not therefore be stopped; nor should the port be closed; that it would be useful if members of the squadron wrote to Lima rumouring that the squadron will not be able to sail for some time; that in consideration of the trouble caused by the captain of the Hyperion, it would be convenient to keep the port open longer.

460 Valparaiso, 10 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a decree of the Director respecting Lord Cochrane's complaints about the quality of the salt meat; order for the provisioners to the marine to give the Admiral satisfaction within 15 days.

461 Valparaiso, 17 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that, the Araucano and the Jerezana having been selected to go to Talcahuano, he has ordered the comissary to pay the crew of the Araucano, and will order that both ships be provisioned.

462 Valparaiso, 24 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting orders from the war ministry that copper balls in the port batteries and brought from Valdivia are to be sent up to the capital for refounding; requesting that the balls on board the Dolores be disembarked.

463 Valparaiso, 28 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to the survey undertaken of the salt meat, it has proved to be of good quality and in good condition; that he has ordered it to be given over to the contador of the O'Higgins.
Valparaiso, 28 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the warehouse guard informs him he has received 159 boxes of 20 muskets and 48 sabres from the San Martin.

Valparaiso, 2 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the masts of the Intrepido cannon be used to repair the Lautaro; suggesting that those of the Beaga will serve.

Valparaiso, 2 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he wrote to the government, asking how security should be strengthened with regard to ships anchoring elsewhere that Valparaiso (e.g. Wintero); that contraband is difficult enough to control in Valparaiso itself; that he never has believed that Lord Cochrane wishes to prejudice the state's interest; but that as Lord Cochrane cannot be in all places at once to keep check on the ships, the security regulations must be strengthened.

Valparaiso, 2 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Dolores is to be sold to William Henderson tomorrow; requesting that her cargo be disembarked, and work started to prepare her for the expedition straight away, as the commander-in-chief wants all the ships ready by 19 June.

Valparaiso, 2 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating with respect to orders for the Pueyrredon to escort ships to Talcahuano, the frigate Emprendedora and the brig Carmen are ready to sail; that he awaits Lord Cochrane's order for the comissary to provision the Pueyrredon.

Valparaiso, 3 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lieutenant Grenfell should be court-martialled or discharged for insubordination.
Valparaiso, 6 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing papers relative to the San Martin and Lieutenant Grenfell's insubordination.

Valparaiso, 6 June 1820, Juan José Tortel to Luis de la Cruz: enclosing declarations taken in the arsenal respecting Lieutenant Grenfell.

Valparaiso, 6 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz: order to pass the papers to Lord Cochrane.

Valparaiso, 3 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Juan José Tortel, captain of the port and comandant of the arsenal: stating that on 23 May, Lieutenant Grenfell appeared in the arsenal to take wood without orders, and seized it violently from the functionaries; that when Cruz went to remonstrate, Grenfell snapped his fingers at his authority; order to take declarations from the functionaries present, for a court martial.

Valparaiso, 5 June 1820, Juan José Tortel: order for John Young to take declarations.

Valparaiso, 5 June 1820, John Young: order for José Alexo Montaneda to act as Secretary.

Valparaiso, 5 June 1820, John Young, José Montaneda: examination of Thomas Gomez, carpenter, and Pedro Gonzalez, master carpenter, noting that Grenfell twice knocked the Governor's hat out of his hands.

Valparaiso, 8 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he told the Minister of Marine only what Lord Cochrane told him about the Dolores, that the whole of her belonged to the captors.

Valparaiso, 8 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that, with respect to the midshipmen who were assaulted last night, he will double the patrols as from tonight; but that it is very difficult to police all areas of the port at once.
Valparaiso, 9 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that with respect to the request for supplies for the O'Higgins, some are unobtainable in the port, but that he will try to secure the remainder and will write to the capital for what is short.

Valparaiso, 9 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will not come aboard for the Colonel of the Cantabria Regiment until the question has been settled with O'Higgins.

Valparaiso, 10 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the officers and men be paraded for review by the commissaries next Monday, to be paid.

Valparaiso, 10 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered a specialist to repair the pumps in the O'Higgins; that there is no glass strong enough to make windows for the ship.

Valparaiso, 11 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that to prevent contraband, boats were ordered to carry lights after dark and to land only at the Resguardo; that last night three English officers of the squadron landed from a boat without lights at the Arsenal; that when challenged by an army patrol, the officers attacked them, and one officer received a bayonet wound; that Colonel Mariano Palacios of the battalion of National Guards has complained that the manners of the English towards the soldiers of Chile is contemptible, and they seek to use their authority to disregard the Governor's order; requesting that Lord Cochrane will circularise the fleet firmly about the light and landing rule.
Valparaiso, 17 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a decree that the criminal Martin Marin be put back into his ship with his pay cut by one-third.

Valparaiso, 19 June 1820, Juan José Tortel to Lord Cochrane: stating that the launch for the Aguila is ready, but that there is no 7 or 8 quintal anchor and no hawser in the Arsenal.

Valparaiso, 20 June 1820, Santiago Campiño, Felipe O'Reilly to Lord Cochrane: respecting Estanislao Lynch's right as the prize agent of the San Martin to the cargo of the Victoria, which was offloaded at San Lorenzo in order that the ship could be used as a fireship, requesting that Lord Cochrane supply any further information he is able.

Valparaiso, 27 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree of 26 June that naval officers from the rank of Captain de Corbeta upwards are to wear a gold stripe in the hat.

Valparaiso, 27 June 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the large anchor in the arsenal has been put aboard the O'Higgins.

Valparaiso, 5 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the launch requested to be supplied to the Aguila; that there are no small craft in the arsenal except one, and the gunboats designed to accompany the expedition.

Valparaiso, 10 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that all the items asked for by the contadores have been supplied to them and should be aboard the ships.
Valparaiso, 12 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the contadores supply him soon with lists of armaments and military stores required, so as to give time to bring them from the capital.

Valparaiso, 13 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the arsenals have been ordered to supply whatever they are asked for, if they have it, but they have very little, money being short; that the place only received a little over 1000 pesos a month and must finance the hospital as well; that people who allege that he does not provide what there is, are not telling the truth; that what is not supplied is not supplied because it or the money to buy it does not exist.

Valparaiso, 14 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: advising him that Bernardo Monteagudo has been appointed Auditor of war and marine.

Valparaiso, 14 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the Arsenal to supply Lord Cochrane the launch he has requested.

Valparaiso, 18 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that 78 men and boys have just arrived from Santiago, many of them very good; that he is sending them aboard the O'Higgins.

Valparaiso, 18 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the officer in charge of the recruits was careless; that many escaped on the road, which he made up for with people he came across; these include Mateo Vasquez, who carries a government safe conduct; Francisco Turra, a sambo destined for battalion number 4; and the son of a 1st sergeant of marines, whose mother's only comfort he is; requesting that these three will be released.
Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, Santiago Campiño to Lord Cochrane: enclosing printed materials which he has not had time to forward until now.

Valparaiso, 20 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing John Esmond's commission as lieutenant.

Valparaiso, 24 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that number 3 gunboat, damaged in the last gale, will take eight or ten days to repair; that there are mostly apprentices in the dockyard; requesting that carpenters from the fleet will help.

Valparaiso, 25 July 1820, Santiago Campiño to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the formalities of consumption of provisions, the new ones constitute a single batch.

Valparaiso, 26 July 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of the tools disembarked from the San Martín.

Valparaiso, 19 August 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that due to the embarkation of troops, he has no boat free to send an officer to take the inventory of the Checabuco; that he will do so as soon as possible.

Valparaiso, 9 September 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a sentence of 2 September on Pablo Navarro, that he is condemned to two years service for attempted murder of Antonio Martínez, second in command at Valparaiso.

Valparaiso, 5 December 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he learned from the capital on the previous day, where news arrived from Coquimbo,
at which place the Telegrafo touched, that Lord Cochrane has captured the Esmeralda in Callao, together with six gunboats; that Colonel Arenales entered Guamanga; that Guayaquil has been revolutionised.

**501** Valparaiso, 15 January 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: transcribing a letter to General San Martin reporting the arrival on 13 January of the French warships Colosse and Galatea, commanded by rear-Admiral de Graviere, allegedly to collect exact information about South America to assist the formation of French policy; stating that a favourable report has been sent back from Rio de Janeiro, where information about the expedition was current in June and July of 1820; that they touched at Talcahuano; that they will be leaving Valparaiso soon.

**502** Valparaiso, 3 February 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of the supplies despatched for the army in the Pacifico; stating that anything apart from the listed items is to be given to the squadron, together with salt meat being sent separately.

**503** Valparaiso, 3 February, 1821, William Taylor: statement of supplies embarked in the brig Pacifico for the army of liberation of Peru.

**504** Valparaiso, 3 February 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending the pilot Frederick Picot and five seamen, who brought the Rebecca prize down, on the Pacifico to rejoin the squadron.

**505** Valparaiso, 23 February 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: advising him that the Olmedo, captain Robinett, is sailing with supplies for the squadron and the army.
Valparaiso, 23 February 1821, Guillermo Robinett: receipt for biscuit and flour for the army and squadron.

Valparaiso, 9 June 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the rigging and canvas he had ready as requested for sending, was ordered to be suspended by the Ministry of Marine on hearing that Lord Cochrane was in Arica; that he is sending in the Laura, three anchors, of which the big one is for the San Martin; that the others are all there were in this port, and that chain is not to be found anywhere.

Valparaiso, 9 June 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that although the prizes are not yet adjudicated, the lieutenant of the Independencia with his prize crew is sailing in the Olmedo, and the lieutenant of the Lautaro in the Chacabuco, which is carrying people and provisions for the repopulation of Juan Fernandez island; that on its return, this ship will be sent up to Lord Cochrane.

Valparaiso, 11 June 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that 500 carbines and 200 sabres are being sent in the Laura, on the war ministry's order, to the commander-in-chief.

Valparaiso, 12 June 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that 16 days have been contracted for the Laura to discharge, and an indemnity of 50 pesos a day is to be paid if this time is exceeded; requesting that Lord Cochrane will have her unloaded rapidly.

Valparaiso, 12 June 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing an account of the wood being shipped to the squadron in the Laura; stating that
the captain refused to accept the larger poles in his ship.

512 Valparaiso, 12 June 1821: account of timber embarked in the frigate Laura for shipment to the vice-Admiral.

513 Valparaiso, 5 August 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that the English brig Libonia sailed clandestinely on 30 June, leaving her papers, and is therefore legitimate prize.

514 Valparaiso, 26 November 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing lists of goods despatched to the squadron in the Aransasu, and of 54 mariners enlisted in the ship; stating that further supplies will be sent as soon as possible.

515 Valparaiso, 26 November 1821: List of mariners in the schooner Aransasu.

516 Valparaiso, 26 November 1821, Ignacio Zenteno: List of provisions and bitumen embarked in the schooner Aransasu.

517 Valparaiso, 26 November 1821, Ignacio Zenteno: Account of provisions needed by the squadron for four months active service: 700 quintals salt meat or charqui, 1000 of biscuit, 700 of flour, 20 of tallow, 300 botijas of fat.

518 Valparaiso, 16 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of officers who deserted from the fleet in Peru; requesting to know if there are any omissions.

519 List of officers who deserted in Peru: Captains Martin Guise, Robert Forster, John Spry, John Esmond, Guillermo Prunier; Lieutenants John Robinson, E. Headen, G. Price, H. Freeman; Pilots
J. Gull, J. Fyvie; Surgeon J. Hannack; Contadores V. del Rio, R. Naranjo.

520 Valparaiso, 27 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the list of the crew of the Valdivia will be made available in Spanish, not in English.

521 Valparaiso, 27 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: enclosing statement of information required by the commissary of marine for the settlement of the officers' wages.

522 Ministry General of Marine, Valparaiso, 24 July 1822, Santiago Campino: statement of enquiries necessary to be made to settle the accounts of the officers and seamen of the squadron.

523 Valparaiso, 30 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that in order for the settlement of accounts to begin, he requests Lord Cochrane to advise the comissary of marine of the dates of the officers' commissions, and how much the crews have already received in Peru.

524 Valparaiso, 30 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting a government decree, that because of the weather in Valparaiso, the O'Higgins and Valdivia are to sail to Coquimbo with supplies and materials to undergo repair.

525 Valparaiso, 31 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received an order from the Ministry of Marine to arrange the supply of materials requested for the repair of the O'Higgins and Valdivia; that there may be some difficulty getting timber.
526 Valparaiso, 4 August 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: informing him of the nomination of Jose Santiago de Campiño as Accountant General of the squadron.

527 Valparaiso, 8 August 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: transmitting an order, that men are not to be taken on the strength without telling the comissary of marine their names, parents, country and rank.

528 Accountant General of Marine Office, Valparaiso, 10 August 1822, Jose Santiago de Campiño; list of documents relative to the expenses of the squadron delivered to him by Lord Cochrane's secretary.

529 Valparaiso, 13 August 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Timoteo Reyes and Juan Saldes were imprisoned on Lord Cochrane's order; requesting that he will forward charges so that the case can be tried.

530 Valparaiso, 21 August 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered four months' supplies to be put into the Montezuma; that regarding Lord Cochrane's request that the post of contador be suppressed, the government considers that it gains more saving by having the contador, than it would save on his salary by suppressing the post.

531 Valparaiso, 4 September 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that Timoteo Reyes and Juan Sanders are in prison on his order; requesting to be informed whether they are being tried, or if they have been charged.

NP ND, Lord Cochrane: stating that John Sanders is one of those guilty of robbing the government of 8000 dollars; that he is expecting further proof o
from Guayaquil shortly; that the officer is guilty of having left his ship, the Independencia, with all the guard when on watch.

532 Valparaiso, 30 September 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the commissary today to distribute 400 sets of clothing to the seamen.

533 Valparaiso, 5 November 1822, Santiago Campino to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Commissions of the fleet's officers have not yet been returned from Santiago where they were sent on 4 April.

534 Valparaiso, 6 November 1822, Juan Miguel de la Fuente, Victoriano Garcia to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed whether promotions made were for effective employment, as salaries are calculated only on this.

Valparaiso, 6 November 1822, Lord Cochrane: stating that as the officers are under English rules, only effective grades are recognised, and that therefore these officers are due their salaries.

535 Valparaiso, 16 December 1822, Santiago Campino to Lord Cochrane: stating that if the money had come from the capital, he would have paid days ago, the seamen of the Montezuma, part of the foreign and all of the native seamen of the Leutaro, all the soldiers, officers and seamen of the Chacabuco; the Montezuma and Mercedes, and all the disembarked officers.

536 Valparaiso, 18 December 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Godomar has reported that Lord Cochrane forbade him to set sail until he receives his order; that the ship has been transferred to the marine department and therefore takes its orders from him.
Valparaiso, 18 December 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that some squadrons depend on their Admiral, but some ships on the marine department; that he does not seek disputes and is ready to cede provided that there are no obstacles to the sailing of the ship.

Valparaiso, 18 December 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the departure of the Galvarino, Lord Cochrane must ask for official explanations from him.

Valparaiso, 18 December 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government has ordered that the Galvarino be armed and put to sea.

Valparaiso, 19 December 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will answer him officially.

Valparaiso, 19 December 1822, 9 a.m. Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Galvarino was re­armed on the orders of the government, to go to sea; that he informed Lord Cochrane last night; requesting that he will give him an answer.

Valparaiso, 26 December 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is returning his answer and that he enjoyed reading it.

Valparaiso, 7 January 1823, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has no objection to Lord Cochrane keeping the Montezuma while the accounts are being settled; that he assumes that Lord Cochrane makes no objection to the Mercedes sailing on a govern­ment mission.
PART SIX

(Documents 544 - 679)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE CAPTAINS, OFFICERS AND
MEN OF THE CHILEAN FLEET. 1819 AND 1820.
544 Valparaiso, 14 January 1819, Charles Wooster to Lord Cochrane: stating that his action was motivated by a disaffected crew and other causes, but that he would have been honoured to have served under Lord Cochrane.

545 Ministry of Marine, Valparaiso, 21 June 1819, Ignacio Zenteno to Robert Forster, captain of the O'Higgins: enclosing a motion made by the minister of the commissary of marine regarding the office of contador on the O'Higgins.

546 Valparaiso, 18 June 1819, Santiago Campiño, Mateo Arnaldo Haeve to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing a report of the contador of the O'Higgins that he has had nothing to do with the enlisting and discharging of the crew; stating that the pay cannot be calculated if the state and dates of enlistment of the men is unknown; that while they cannot order Forster, Zenteno can, to forward the ship's books so that proper records may be made; that if the accountants in the ships are not to discharge the functions laid down for them in the ordinance, then this department remains ignorant of what procedure it is to follow.

547 O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 17 June 1819, Francisco Antonio Oliva, contador, to minister contador of marine: stating that he is only allowed to deal in the branch of provisions and cannot draw up a list of enlistments and discharges, nor of general consumption.

548 San Martin, Valparaiso bay, 27 June 1819, William Wilkinson, captain into Lord Cochrane: complaining that Lieutenant Bailey has been allowing men ashore contrary to orders; and that he has said that Wilkinson is afraid to meet the enemy, that he took in the topgallant sails when going into Callao; requesting a court of inquiry.
Valparaiso, 19 July 1819, Lieutenant Morgell to 
Lord Cochrane: stating the facts of the mutiny of 
23 January on the Chacabuco.

Valparaiso, 20 July 1819, William Wilkinson: depo­
sition stating Lieutenant Bailey's insubordination.

San Martin, Valparaiso, 20 July 1819, Nathaniel Bai­
ley: deposition stating his account of the story of 
his insubordination.

San Martin, Valparaiso bay, 21 July 1819; Depositions 
of a midshipman and the second bosun's mate regarding 
four soldiers caught attempting to leave the ship; 
depositions by the contador and maestre that the four 
soldiers claim they were only going ashore to get 
clothes and see their families.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 3 August 1819, Ignacio 
Zenteno to Robert Forster: stating that he is trans­mitting an order from the Government to the General 
Department of Marine that the squadron should sail 
as soon as possible; that ships' companies should be 
reviewed and all old, infirm and incapable men with­
drawn; that the government should be advised how 
many men are needed to make up the complements; that 
all ships' boats are to be put in order; that all 
the master artificers in the port are to be ordered 
to work exclusively upon the squadron; that the boats 
constructed on the Maule are to be brought to Val­ 
paraiso.

NP, 4 August 1819: note of ranks and salaries of 
certain naval officers.

Chacabuco, Valparaiso, 20 August 1819, James Ramsay, 
captain, to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of stores 
on the ship when he took command of her; requesting
further naval equipment, and reporting the condition of the ship.

556  **San Martin**, Valparaiso bay, 1 September 1819, Lieutenant Drinot to Lord Cochrane: reporting on his stolen hat.

557  Valparaiso, 4 September 1819, Andrew Macfarlane to Lord Cochrane: requesting an appointment in the Chilean service.

558  Valparaiso, 7 September 1819, Richard Crawford, ensign, to Lord Cochrane: requesting either his discharge from the service or transfer from the Pueyrredon to another ship; stating that he has received four months pay in 14 months service.

559  **Intrepido**, Valparaiso, 8 September 1819, Thomas Carter, Captain, to Lord Cochrane: complaining about Morgell, that he has grossly outraged the laws of decorum; that he has alleged that Carter is a coward and a defrauder of the public treasury; that Morgell if a gamester; demanding that Morgell be expelled the country unless he makes a written apology. Lord Cochrane: note, that Morgell be asked to make such an apology.

560  **San Martin**, 28 October 1819, Manuel Blanco Encalada to Lord Cochrane: informing him that he has arrested Captain Wilkinson for insubordination.

561  **San Martin**, at sea, 29 October 1819, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane: stating that a difference of opinion has arisen between him and Blanco, he saying British maritime law should govern the ship's working the latter saying Spanish maritime law should operate; that he has been arrested and requests a court martial.
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 24 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Robert Forster: instructing him to take command at Valdivia, to careen and repair the O'Higgins.

Chacabuco, at sea, 28 February 1820, Claudius Charles, captain of marines, to William Bennett: stating that having been put under arrest by Captain Ramsay, he wishes to make a statement of the proceedings on board the ship since leaving Valparaiso; account of the activities of the ship, its near engagement with the Esmeralda, the drunkenness of Captain Ramsay, and movements of ships in 1819 and 1820; requesting a court of inquiry.

Montezuma, Talcahuano, 3 March 1820, Calisto Martinez: receipt for 10 pesos from Lord Cochrane for the succour of two seamen disembarked sick.

Chacabuco, at sea, 6 March 1820, Claudius Charles to William Bennett: stating that he had sought a reconciliation with Captain Ramsay, but refused to apologise on the quarterdeck before the officers and company; that he is under close arrest.

Chacabuco, at sea, 20 March 1820, Claudius Charles to William Bennett: stating that, the close confinement affecting him, on 9 March he agreed to make an apology; that Ramsay not choosing to make an apology in his turn, he challenged him; that Ramsay put him back under arrest.

10 March 1820, Joseph Mosser to Lord Cochrane: stating that when he arrived at Maule in August 1819, Morrell refused to accept his commission although given by Lord Cochrane, and that Ignacio Barragan also refused to accept it. When he took over the Maule and Barragan's defrauding activities against the government's interests.
567 Galvarino, 16 March 1820, John Spry, captain, to Bernardo O'Higgins: requesting that he be considered for promotion on the grounds of length of service.

568 Independencia, Valdivia, 29 March 1820, Robert Fors ter, captain, to Ignacio Zenteno: report of the ship's movements around Valdivia; report of the Araucano, that her crew are very sickly from want of clothing; report of repairs to the O'Higgins and note of damage to the ship.

569 Independencia, Valdivia, 2 April 1820, Robert Fors ter to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the O'Higgins is repaired and will be ready for sea in a few days.

570 Chacabuco, Valparaiso, 7 April 1820, Martin Guise, captain, to Lord Cochrane: requesting a court martial for four marines for desertion and neglect of duty.

571 Galvarino, Valparaiso, 13 April 1820, John Spry, captain, to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lieutenant Shepherd, acting first lieutenant of the ship since the death of his predecessor, be confirmed in the post.

572 Chacabuco, Valparaiso bay, 14 April 1820, James Ramsay, captain, to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a paper from Captain Charles; stating that Charles read the paper in the gunroom; and that Charles has lately had to apologise on the quarterdeck for his conduct.

573 Chacabuco, at sea, 18 March 1820, Claudius Charles to James Ramsay: challenging him to meet him as soon as they reach Valparaiso.

574 San Martin, Valparaiso, 16 April 1820, Claudius Charles to Lord Cochrane: requesting an inquiry into Captain Ramsay's drunkenness at sea, and his arrest of Captain Charles.
Chacabuco, 17 April 1820, John Coulthard, master, to James Ramsay: enclos[ing] a letter found on shore in a very public place containing slurs on Ramsay.

NP ND, R.W. Cox to Captain Charles: a secret note stating that Ramsay was drunk before Callao; that when standing out of the bay the ensign of marines told him that if Ramsay refused to stand in again, they would take command of the ship from him for the benefit of their country.

O'Higgins, 18 April 1820, Henry Cobbett, captain, to Lord Cochrane: complaining about insubordination on the part of one of his officers.

Pueyrredon, 22 April 1820, William Prunier, captain, to Lord Cochrane: requesting he will appoint a new assistant surgeon; stating that the ship's company are to get 2 dollars each before sailing but he fears it will be too trifling to men who have been so long without pay.

Valparaiso, 27 April 1820, Egbert van Beuren to Lord Cochrane: stating that he was ashore through being sick; that he joined the service on 8 May 1818 and should have a commission as well as the officers who came out in the Independencia; that he cannot afford to lose 400 dollars but that he will not be paid until he produces his commission, which was left in the office of the Chilean deputy to Buenos Aires.

Independencia, Valparaiso, 27 April 1820, John Pascoe Grenfell to Lord Cochrane: requesting an appointment to the vacant lieutenancy of the O'Higgins.

Valparaiso, 1 May 1820, José Ramon Gormaz to Lord Cochrane: stating that, regarding the battalion of marines, he has embarked the marines of the O'Higgins
as ordered; that those on the other ships will have
to be transhipped by the Admiral's order.

582 Lautaro, Valparaiso, 2 May 1820, Martin Guise to
Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter from Lieutenant
Robertson, and stating that unless the culprits are
punished, it will be impossible to enforce orders.

583 Valparaiso bay, 1 May 1820, Lieutenant Robertson to
Captain Guise: reporting on his difficulties in re-
capturing deserters, and the obstacles present by
the soldiers ashore.

584 O'Higgins, 4 May 1820, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane:
complaining of Morgell's insolence, and requesting
an investigation.

585 Valparaiso, 8 May 1820; Resolution of a meeting of
commissioned officers that the government have had
time to consider and respond to their earlier ad-
dress; that the officers of the San Martin are justi-
ified in refusing to go to sea; that this resolution
should be forwarded to the government.

586 Valparaiso, 8 May 1820, 33 officers of the San Martin,
Lautaro, Chacabuco, Araucano, O'Higgins, Galvarino,
Montezuma and Intrepido to Martin Guise: reminding
him of their earlier address and reiterating their
refusal to put to sea.

587 Lautaro, Valparaiso, 9 May 1820, Martin Guise to
Lord Cochrane: stating that he could not persuade
the officers of the San Martin to rescind their
decision not to go to sea until their resolution is
answered.

588 San Martin, 9 May 1820, William Wilkinson to Martin
Guise: stating that he has read Guise's letter to
the lieutenants but they still refuse to go to sea.

589 **San Martin, Valparaiso, 11 May 1820, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane:** a note of the officers who refuse to go to sea until their grievances are redressed.

590 **Independencia, Valparaiso, 12 May 1820, Robert Forsster to Lord Cochrane:** enclosing a letter from members of the crew of the *Araucano* to Captain Crosbie and stating that he has put them under arrest pending orders from Lord Cochrane.

591 **Araucano, Valparaiso, 12 May 1820, First Lieutenant John Robinson, Surgeon Mimms to Thomas Crosbie, captain:** refusing to get the brig under way.

592 **San Martin, Valparaiso, 29 May 1820, George Armstrong, Thomas Drinot, Eugene Reader, William Granville to Lord Cochrane:** stating that they have been under arrest for 20 days and requesting a courtmartial as soon as possible.

593 **Valparaiso, 30 May 1820, Luis de la Cruz to Robert Forster, captain of the **Independencia**, captain of the fleet:** requesting that he will supply a statement of the quantity of muskets existing in the fleet.

594 **Santiago, 8 June 1820, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane:** soliciting promotion, and enclosing a certificate of services to be signed by Lord Cochrane.

595 **Independencia, Valparaiso, 14 June 1820, Robert Forsster to Lord Cochrane:** stating that Lieutenant Wynter was justified in taking a person off the *Alexander* as he was not a British subject; that in fact it is doubtful if the *Alexander* is a British ship and hence entitled to British protection.
596 Independencia, 15 June 1820, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: recommending the port of Herradura for the squadron.

597 Lautaro, 16 June 1820; state of the ship, showing complement of men, repairs required, and commissions of the officers.

598 Independencia, 20 June 1820, Lieutenant Grenfell to Lord Cochrane: stating that a long arrest being uncomfortable, he requests an early court martial.

599 San Martin, Valparaiso bay, 23 June 1820, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane: recommending the port of Herradura for the squadron.

600 Araucano, Valparaiso bay, 28 June 1820, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: recommending the port of Herradura for the squadron.

601 Valparaiso, 30 June 1820, José Ramon Gormaz to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the State of the marine battalion.

602 Valparaiso, 30 June 1820, José Ramon Gormaz: State of marine battalion; total of 488 officers and men.

603 Galvarino, Valparaiso bay, June 1820, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: recommending the port of Herradura, now Bernardo, as superior to Valparaiso for the squadron.

604 Valparaiso, 1 July 1820, Thomas Craig to Lord Cochrane: stating that promotion for medical men in the naval service is always slow; that he believes he is entitled to promotion for length of service and for services rendered.

605 Lautaro, 2 July 1820, Martin Guise: state of the ship: showing complement of men and commissions
of the officers.

606 Lautaro, 3 July 1820, William Mathews, lieutenant, to Lord Cochrane: account of events leading to his reprimand by Captain Guise; that he was subsequently arrested, then told to leave the ship; requesting a court martial and his discharge from the service.

607 Valparaiso, 5 July 1820, Thomas Craig to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has just learned that the Governor of Valparaiso has ordered the quantity of medicines to be supplied to the O'Higgins to be cut; and protesting at this.

608 O'Higgins, 7 July 1820, Lieutenant Foord Morgell to Lord Cochrane: supporting the claims of three men to the government's fulfilment of promises made to them.

609 Lautaro, 8 July 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that as payment had already started when Lord Cochrane's order arrived, he wishes to know whether to continue or not; that the comissary only has enough funds to pay the 21 Europeans.

610 Lautaro, Valparaiso bay, 9 July 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he did not receive the letter with the order not to start paying until it had already begun and as there were signs of discontent he judged it best to finish paying the 21 foreign seamen.

611 Valparaiso, 13 July 1820, William Mathews to Lord Cochrane: requesting his discharge from the service.

612 Valparaiso, 18 July 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Luis de la Cruz, Governor of Valparaiso: order to release Mateo Vasquez, postillon of Goyacan, from the enlistment.
Valparaiso, 18 July 1820, Robert Forster, William Wilkinson, Claudius Charles, James Ramsay, Thomas Crosbie, to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed if it is true that Lord Cochrane is going to resign.

Valparaiso, 18 July 1820, Robert Forster, William Wilkinson, Claudius Charles, Thomas Crosbie, James Ramsay to Lord Cochrane: stating that it is their intention to resign with him.

Lautaro, Valparaiso, 29 July 1820, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has discharged Lieutenant Robertson as ordered, but that now he has no lieutenant.

O'Higgins, 19 July 1820: Notice that a meeting is to be held on board the Independencia to consider Lord Cochrane's resignation.

Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, 13 officers of the squadron to Lord Cochrane: stating that as Lord Cochrane has resigned, they propose to do the same.

Independencia, 19 July 1820: Resolution of 23 officers of the fleet that they will resign with Lord Cochrane.

Lautaro, Valparaiso, 21 July 1820, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing the order for him to take charge of the ship.

Valparaiso, 21 July 1820, Bernardo O'Higgins to Robert Casey: order for him to take command of the Araucano.

Lautaro, Valparaiso, 25 July 1820, Martin Guise to Ignacio Zenteno: stating his protest at his ship being omitted from the payment of prize money for the Montezuma, and the unfairness of Lord Cochrane.
in paying the other ships in full.

622 Valparaiso, 26 July 1820, Juan Balaguer: Receipt for tools received from the San Martin.

623 Lautaro, 28 July 1820, Martin Guise to Ignacio Zenteno: acknowledging receipt of a decree suspending his trial and restoring him to his command, which he proposes to take up.

624 Lautaro, Valparaiso, 28 July 1820; statement of daily progress of fitting out the ship; that work began 28 May; that Lieutenant Mathews is absent without leave; that it depends on circumstances when the ship will be ready for sea.

625 Lautaro, Valparaiso, 29 July 1820: statement of daily progress in fitting out the ship; that there is a shortage of carpenters.

626 Independencia, Valparaiso, 10 August 1820, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging Lord Cochrane's orders; stating that his boats are embarking coals; that he is confined to bed at the moment. NP, ND, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster: order, that he is to cruise off Chiloé for 20 days to intercept a ship from Lima with arms and money for the royalists.

627 Lautaro, 11 August 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will not put to sea until the unfair and partial distribution of the Montezuma prize money to the other ships has been remedied.

628 Valparaiso, 14 August 1820, Paul Delano, captain of transports, and William Mackay, agent for the contractors: certificate that the Potrillo measures 259 tons.
629 Valparaiso, 19 August 1820, José Ramon Gormaz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the individuals he was holding to be freed according to his orders.

630 Lautero, Coquimbo, 20 August 1820: List of officers, men and boys on board the ship.

631 Valparaiso, 20 August 1820, Robert Forster: List of the crew of the Independencia on her sailing from Valparaiso.

632 O'Higgins, Pisco bay, 9 September 1820, Thomas Craig to Lord Cochrane: enclosing lists of medicines asked for and furnished to the ship; drawing attention to the dishonesty of the apothecaries; referring to the case of the Independencia, where clearly marked packages were supplied which, on being examined later when the ship had put to sea, it was found that two-thirds of the medicines had not been supplied; attacking the swindling of the government by the contractors.

633 Araucano, off Sangallan, 14 September 1820, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: regretting his inability due to calms and the damage to his ship, to renew his action of the previous day against the enemy ship.

634 San Martin, Pisco bay, 17 September 1820, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane: stating that 1st Lieutenant Robinson is under arrest for insulting and mutinous language.


636 San Martin, Pisco bay, 20 September 1820, John Robinson, Lieutenant, to Lord Cochrane: requesting a
transfer to another ship.

637 **Independencia, Pisco bay, 28 September 1820, Robert Forster to the Earl of Dundonald:** stating that his wife Jane has recovered from her illness, has preferred to cruise with him to staying in Valparaíso and has even been under enemy fire; account of the sailing of the liberating expedition; of the capture of Pisco; of the military and naval strength of the viceroy; of his hopes of being well rewarded for his patriotism.

638 **O'Higgins, Pisco, 2 October 1820, Alejo Ruiz:** receipt for 70 jars of aguardiente, and eight jars of wine.

639 **Lautaro, Pisco roads, 7 October 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane:** requesting a supply of lime.

640 **O'Higgins, 7 October 1820, Alejo Ruiz:** receipt for 30 jars of aguardiente.

641 **O'Higgins, Pisco, 7 October 1820, Alejo Ruiz:** receipt for 48 jars of aguardiente.

642 **Pisco, 9 October 1820, John Spry:** List of supplies needed for the **Galvarino**.

643 **Lautaro, Pisco roads, 9 October 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane:** stating that, having only two lieutenants aboard, he cannot mount all the watches; requesting the appointment of the master's mate of the **Galvarino** to the **Lautaro**.

644 **Independencia, Pisco, 9 October 1820; Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane:** enclosing a letter from Lieutenant Wynter.

645 **Independencia, Pisco, 9 October 1820, Lieutenant Wynter**

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to Lord Cochrane: requesting a court of inquiry into his behaviour.

646 Araucano: Extract from ship's log from Tuesday 10 October 1820 to Thursday 19 October 1820.

647 Araucano, 10 October 1820, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: reporting on a reconnaissance of Callao harbour and the shipping in it.

648 Aguila, Pisco bay, 10 October 1820, Thomas Woolridge, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that the ship is an untidy mess, as equipment is not stowed away, baggage is everywhere, and officers of the army are aboard.

649 Independencia, Pisco, 10 October 1820, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter from Lieutenant Wynter.

650 Independencia, Pisco, 10 October 1820, Lieutenant Wynter to Lord Cochrane: requesting an interview regarding his disagreement with Captain Forster.

651 Independencia, Pisco, 10 October 1820, Lieutenant Wynter to Robert Forster: requesting his discharge from the ship.

652 Pearl, 11 October 1820, Paul Delano, captain, to Lord Cochrane: reminding of his promise to punish Wooldridge of the Aguila for insulting and disobeying him.

653 14 October 1820, John Spry: note of provisions which have been embarked and provisions which are lacking to complete the supplying of the Galvarino.

654 Pisco bay, 14 October 1820, Martin Guise: note, that
flour is needed for the Lautaro.

655 Pisco bay, 14 October 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: Listing spirit and wine embarked at Pisco on board the Lautaro.

656 Pisco, 14 October 1820, William Wilkinson: note, that flour and water are needed aboard the San Martin.


658 Lautaro, Pisco bay, 14 October 1820, James Elfrew, contador, to Martin Guise: account of the spirits and wine embarked on the ship at Pisco.

659 Galvarino, 19 October 1820, Juan de Dios Loric, contador, John Spry: receipt for 70 jars of aguardiente, 30 loaves of sugar, four jars of wine and 4000 bars of soap.

660 Independencia, 21 October 1820, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: requesting some sail from the O'Higgins, to replace his sail split in the breeze, and some clothing; stating that the surf has prevented successful fishing, but that they have captured a number of seals.

661 Minute of Court Martial on board the Lautaro, 23 October 1820, Martin Guise, president, William Wilkinson, Thomas Crosbie, Lieutenant Cobbett, Morgell: Court martial of Forster on the order of Lord Cochrane; no prosecutor appearing and no charges being exhibited, the court was dissolved with the resolution that the reports in circulation about Forster are unfounded.
Pisco bay, 24 October 1820, John Spry, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: reporting on the condition of the sails on board the Araucano.

O'Higgins, Paracas, 24 October 1820, Alejo Ruiz: receipt for 1000 bars of soap.

Lautaro, Pisco bay, 25 October 1820, Diego Elfrew to Martin Guise: Account of the aguardiente, wine and soap embarked on the ship at Pisco.


Independencia, at sea, 31 October 1820, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter from lieutenants Gilbert and Grenfell.

Independencia, off Callao, 29 October 1820, 1st Lieutenant Gilbert, 2nd Lieutenant Grenfell: stating that as there may be an action, they wish to volunteer for any service.

Independencia, at sea, 31 October 1820, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that having been told of Lord Cochrane's intention to attack Callao in boats, he wishes to volunteer together with his officers and men.

Lautaro, off Callao, 31 October 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he can provide four boats and 70 men for an attack on the Venganza, and volunteering to command, as he wishes to have another ship.

Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: accepting his offer; stating that he proposes to command himself; and that he intends far more than the capture of the Esmeralda.

Montezuma, off Callao, 8 November 1820: receipt for four officers and three soldiers received in exchange for prisoners.

O'Higgins, 10 November 1820, Alejo Ruiz: Inventory of provisions on the ship.

Lima, 19 November 1820, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Robert Forster: requesting to know if the wounded to whom he refers in his request for provisions are the Spaniards captured with the Esmeralda; stating that notwithstanding such generosity would greatly irritate the people, who already are vexed at foreigners who have come to foment discord, he will treat the request on its merits on receipt of further information.

NP, 20 November 1820, Martin Guise: request for the transfer of his property and other supplies from the Lautaro to the Esmeralda.

O'Higgins, Callao, November 1820: list of ship's killed and wounded, in the attack on the Esmeralda; stating that there are four dead and fourteen wounded; that Lord Cochrane is severely wounded.

Esmeralda, off Callao, 7 December 1820, Martin Guise, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that there are 25 bales of charqui on board the ship.

Esmeralda, at sea, 7 December 1820, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that the charqui on board is rotten and unfit; requesting it be surveyed.
Lord Cochrane: order to survey the charqui.
7 December 1820, O'Higgins and San Martin pursers, masters of the Independencia, purser of the Esmeralda, certifying that the charqui on board is rotten and unfit for consumption.

Valparaiso, 10 December 1820, Ignacio Zenteno: order for the Chacabuco to make her way to join the fleet.

Lautaro, Huacho bay, 20 December 1820, Paul Delano: certificate, that having taken a survey of the prize Esmeralda, he values it at 125,000 dollars.
PART SEVEN

(Documents 680 - 842)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE CAPTAINS, OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE CHILEAN FLEET 1821.
Araucano, Callao bay, 15 January 1821, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: requesting more clothing for his ship's company.

Galvarino, Chancay bay, 18 January 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: enclosing sick list and state of the brig.

Huacho bay, 20 January 1821, Thomas Craig, ship's doctor of the O'Higgins, to Surgeon General of the army: enclosing a list of medicines required and complaining that an insufficient quantity is supplied.

Valparaiso, 23 January 1821, Luis de la Cruz to Robert Forster: acknowledging receipt of Forster's of 13 December regarding dispositions of the fleet and the capture of the Esmeralda; stating that there is an acute shortage of barrels for salt meat, that there are none in Valparaiso nor Santiago, nor even materials with which to make them; requesting he will collect all the barrels he can from the squadron and send them, together with hide bags.

Galvarino, Chancay, 25 January 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is returning a deserter from the O'Higgins captured in Chancay.

Headquarters, Huaura, 10 February 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Commander of the Callao blockade: stating that if the Miantinomo arrives before Lord Cochrane receives his despatches, it is to be sent to Huacho and not allowed to anchor in Callao.

Cañete bay, 11 February 1821, William Wilkinson, Thomas Crosbie: report that the crew of the Independencia is 74 men short of the complement, and that the ship is in no state to engage the enemy frigate.
Valdivia, Vallao bay, 16 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter from some of his officers regarding the naming of the Esmeralda, requesting that it be forwarded to General San Martin.

Esmeralda, at sea, 2 February 1821, Robert Bell and others to Martin Guise: stating their objections to the proposal to rename the ship the Valdivia.

Huaura, 16 February 1821, Garcia del Rio: Note of things requested and ordered to be supplied today to the contador of the frigate Independencia.

Callao bay, 19 February 1821, Martin Guise: request for powder and shot for the Valdivia.

Araucano, in Huacho, 19 February 1821, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: report of the capture of the Aransasu off San Lorenzo after midday on 9 February, having chased her since the previous sunset and after an hour long action within pistol range; the Araucano lost one man killed and suffered much damage to masts and rigging; with officers and men absent in a detained ship and the prize, he was forced to put in for repairs; the Aransasu was 24 days out from Panama, in good condition; her armament one long brass gun (12-pdr), four 4-pdrs and small arms; she rows 30 sweeps and is a fast sailer.

Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: Note of the measurements of the Aransasu: 110 tons, 74 feet in length, 26 feet in breadth, 14 foot deep, drawing 10 to 12 feet of water.

Valdivia, 20 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating his defence of his officers against the imputation of disrespect in their letter; that he cannot work with strange officers and will have to give up his ship.
Valdivia, Callao, 20 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating his determination to give up the ship; that he is putting the matter into General San Martin's hands.

Valdivia, 21 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is determined to leave his ship because his officers have been taken away from him and others forced upon him, and because of the enclosed letter from the petty officers, and because he does not have an appointment to the ship.

Valdivia, 21 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating again his determination to give up his ship, expressing his regret, requesting he may still take part in the attack.

Huacho, 22 February 1821, William Brown, William Mowatt, George Tolmad (master carpenters of the Araucano, Pueyrredon and Montezuma): certificate of survey of the schooner Aransasu stating that the hull is perfectly sound and as good as new, as are the masts and spars.

Galvarino, Callao bay, 22 February 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: requesting that since Captain Guise has resigned, his own resignation be accepted.

Valdivia, 22 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he considers himself to have been superseded and that he is waiting only until his replacement arrives.

Valdivia, 22 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating again that he has been superseded by Esmonde; requesting that as the ship has been ordered to weigh anchor, the new captain will be sent on board.
O'Higgins, Callao bay, 22 February 1821, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: stating that as the letter of Lord Cochrane enclosed to him from Guise was only to be delivered to Esmonde at Guise's discretion, Crosbie considered it proper to return the letter to Lord Cochrane.

Valdivia, 22 February 1821, Petty officers of the ship to Martin Guise: stating their unease at the officers being ordered out of the ship, and reminding him that most of the ship's company's times have expired.

Valdivia, 22 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating his view continues to be that he has been superseded; that the ship has been under Lt. Shepherd's command since this morning.

Valdivia, 22 February 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he cannot serve with officers he does not know; that he has given up charge of the ship to the 1st Lieutenant.

Galvarino, Callao bay, 23 February 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: stating that he entered the Chilean service under the patronage of Captain Guise, to serve for such time as he does.

Huacho, 24 February 1821, Thomas Carter: Inventory of the Aransasu; complete equipment, 1260 rounds of shot, mostly round shot.

San Martin, Callao bay, 25 February 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's order of arrest; stating that as he has been superseded by Captain Crosbie, he is therefore on half pay and hence not liable to the jurisdiction of martial law.

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San Martin, Callao bay, 26 February 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Crosbie had an order to take command of the brig; that as Spry was not then under arrest, he had been superseded; that he cannot be arrested when he had been on half pay for several days; that as for the state of the ship there is not a vessel at this moment in a higher state of discipline or more ready for service than the brig was.

Araucano, Huacho, 27 February 1821, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the Aransasu be valued; stating that he has had offers to buy it, but that General San Martin wants it for the government service, although he cannot pay for it; enclosing instructions from San Martin.

Department of Marine, Huacho, Bernardo Monteagudo to Thomas Carter: instructing him to remain in the port until the arrival of the Montezuma.

Callao bay, 1 and 2 March 1821; Minutes of proceedings at a court martial held on board the Chilean State's Ship San Martin; Lts Robert Bell, Henry Freeman, Surgeon James Michael, Purser James Frew, Assistant Surgeon Hugh Kernan; of the Valdivia.

O'Higgins, 1 March 1821, John Spry to Lord Cochrane: requesting that as he has been called as a witness in another court martial, his own will be postponed for a few days.

Callao bay, 3 March 1821: Minutes of proceedings at a court martial held on board the San Martin: Captain Spry.

Copy of the previous item.
NP ND: Receipt for five sailors received on board the San Martin from the O'Higgins.

NP ND: Receipt for two sailors received on board the Chacabuco from the O'Higgins.

NP ND: Receipt for four sailors received on board the Lautaro from the O'Higgins.

NP ND: Receipt for four sailors received on board the Independencia from the O'Higgins.

O'Higgins, 4 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that Spry's court martial having terminated, he presumes Lord Cochrane has no objection to their departing tomorrow for Huacho.

Headquarters, Huaura, 6 March 1821, José de San Martín to J.F. Robinson: appointing him to command the Aransasu until Lord Cochrane returns.

O'Higgins, 6 March 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: stating that Assistant Surgeon Kernan refused to receive or to read Lord Cochrane's orders conveyed to him by Cobbett.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 6 March 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: stating that since 26 February, though captain of the ship, he has slept in a lieutenant's cabin, Guise being in the after cabin and the officers late of the Valdivia in the fore cabin; that he decided that as captain he was entitled to a decent cabin, and moved into the fore cabin.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 6 March 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: stating that Kernan refused to accept Lord Cochrane's order for him to join the Pueyrredon unless it was transmitted through Captain Guise.
721 7 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that since Cobbett has ordered his things out of his cabin in the O'Higgins and otherwise seeks to annoy him, he requests he be appointed to accommodation on another ship.

722 Huacho, 8 March 1821, Thomas Crosbie: List of stores needed aboard the Valdivia.

723 Huacho, 9 March 1821, William Wilkinson: List of stores needed aboard the San Martin.


725 Huacho, 13 March 1821, Santiago Millet, contador: List of supplies embarked on the San Martin from the Pacifico, the Peruana, and the Guayaquil schooner.

726 Huacho, 13 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating his determination to place himself under Lord Cochrane's orders again; his surprise at Lord Cochrane's remarks about Captain Spry in a letter supposedly conciliatory.

727 Araucano, 20 March 1821, Adolphe Klinger to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he be discharged or transferred to another ship.

728 At sea, 22 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that on General San Martin's request, he is prepared to resume his duty in the squadron and that he has the officers of the Valdivia with him.

729 Potrillo, at sea, 22 March 1821, Robert Bell, Henry Freeman, James Michael, James Frew, Hugh Kernan to Lord Cochrane: stating that they are anxious to return to their duty.
Pisco, 23 March 1821, Thomas Crosbie: List of stores sent in Pisco bay from the shore; 153 negroes and sundry supplies to the O'Higgins; on 28 March 78 negroes to the San Martin; on 10 April 32 men and 10 boys to the Valdivia.

List of stores received from the shore at Pisco bay, including 45 negro men and 21 boys.

Copy of the previous item.

Potrillo, at sea, 23 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has mislaid Lord Cochrane's letter, but will send a copy as soon as possible.

Potrillo, at sea, 23 March 1821, Robert Bell, Henry Freeman, James Michael, James Frew, Hugh Kernan to Lord Cochrane: stating that they dispute whether Lord Cochrane has the authority to appoint them to another ship against their choice; that General San Martin has expressly reappointed them to Captain Guise's ship.

San Martin, Pisco bay, 24 March 1821, William Wilkinson: receipt for 2060 pesos and 228 pesos to pay off seamen whose times have expired.

O'Higgins, 24 March 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: reporting on activities in Pisco, after he had landed Miller.

Potrillo, off Pisco, 24 March 1821, Robert Bell, Henry Freeman, James Michael, James Frew, Hugh Kernan to Lord Cochrane: stating that they wish to serve only under Captain Guise; requesting that if Lord Cochrane does not agree, then he will send them to General San Martin's headquarters or to Chile.
737 Potrillo, Pisco bay, 24 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he declines the appointment on the terms offered; requesting transport back to headquarters for himself and his officers.

738 Potrillo, Pisco bay, 24 March 1821, Robert Bell, Henry Freeman to Lord Cochrane: stating that General San Martin assured them that they could serve with Captain Guise's ship; enclosing their letters of appointment.

739 San Martin, Pisco bay, 25 March 1821: List of men paid an advance on wages due, at 2288 pesos.

740 Pisco, 25 March 1821, José de Santa Staza to the Captain of the O'Higgins: stating that he is sending prisoners.

741 25 March 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that Lord Cochrane has ordered some of his men to be discharged; that as he and they are returning on General San Martin's express instructions in the Potrillo, this would be inconvenient if not reconsidered.

742 San Martin, Pisco bay, 28 March 1821, Robert Bell, Henry Freeman, Hugh Kernan to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed why they have been taken by force out of the Potrillo and put under arrest on the San Martin.

743 Pisco, 30 March 1821, and 10 April 1821, William Wilkinson: Account of stores received aboard the San Martin.

744 March 1821, Henry Cobbett: List of stores including 45 negro men and 21 boys received from the shore onto the Valdivia.
March 1821, Foord Morgell, first Lieutenant: List of aguardiente, vinegar and effects, including 89 negros, received on board the O'Higgins at Pisco.

O'Higgins, March 1821, Henry Cobbett: receipt for 1208 pesos to pay off seamen whose times are expired.

Valdivia, March 1821, Thomas Crosbie: List of men paid.

Valdivia, March 1821, Thomas Crosbie: List of men paid.

O'Higgins, March 1821, Henry Cobbett: List of men paid.

Valdivia, at sea, March 1821, Thomas Crosbie: receipt for 1660 dollars received from Lord Cochrane for four months' wages for time-expired seamen.

March 1821, Henry Hinde: affidavit, that on Sunday 11 March at Lt. Col. Miller's house in Huacho, when Lord Cochrane arrived, Miller and Hinde rose, and Spry remained seated with his hat on looking at Lord Cochrane in a pointed manner; that Lord Cochrane told him to take his hat off and Spry refused.

Potrillo, Chilca bay, 1 April 1821, Martin Guise to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he be allowed to leave the ship.

Headquarters, Huaura, 2 April 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Robert Forster: stating that merchant ships have been eluding the blockade, and that no ships of the squadron may be permitted to leave the blockade without orders, whatever the pretext.

Independencia, Callao, 7 April 1821, Robert Forster
to Lord Cochrane: stating that the sum due to the 14 men of this ship according to Lord Cochrane's scale is 916 dollars.

755 Independencia, 8 April 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: listing the sails on board the ship.

756 Valdivia, 17 April 1821, John Robinson to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has been suspended from duty by Captain Carter for two months now; requesting that either he be appointed to another ship or have a court of inquiry or be discharged.

757 San Martin, 18 April 1821, Surgeons John Logan, Thomas Craig, Owens (of the San Martin, O'Higgins, Valdivia) to Lord Cochrane: stating that the sick on shore need a permanent medical officer with them; recommending the supply of tents and arrangements for ventilation.

758 O'Higgins, Pisco bay, 18 April 1821, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: reciting Lieutenant Morgell's insubordinate behaviour towards Captain Cobbett and himself.

759 San Martin, Pisco bay, 18 April 1821, William Wilkinson, Thomas Crosbie, Henry Cobbett, Eugene Reader, Granville, John Logan, William Bennett: affidavit that Bell and Freeman declined to accept the appointments in ships made out to them by Lord Cochrane and declined to sign a declaration to that effect.

760 Araucano, Pisco bay, 18 April 1821, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: stating that he did not plan to carry off the 1st Lieutenant of the San Martin; that because of the freshness of the wind and because he was under orders for Pisco, he could not beat up to the San Martin in less than some hours.
Lautaro, Salinas, 18 April 1821, Paul Delano to Lord Cochrane: stating that his family have arrived in Valparaiso and are quite destitute; that the government of Chile acknowledged a debt to him of 5000 pesos but refuses to pay his agent 500 pesos without him being present; that he has served now two years and 10 months and all he has received is 750 pesos; that he had to sell his sextant to help outfit for the Expedition; requesting that if Lord Cochrane needs to send anyone on mission to Chile, he will appoint him so that he may go and settle his family.

O'Higgins, Pisco bay, 20 April 1821, Thomas Crosbie: request for 912 pesos to pay the former Valdivia crew and 1008 pesos to pay the crew of the Araucano.


Araucano, Pisco bay, 20 April 1821, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: requesting sick leave from his ship.

NP ND Araucano: List of officers and men now on board the ship and those absent in prizes belonging to her.

Pisco bay, 21 April 1821, Thomas Crosbie: receipt for 912 pesos for payment of the crew of the Valdivia and 864 pesos for payment of the crew of the Independencia.

San Martin, Pisco bay, 21 April 1821, Surgeon Thomas Craig, Surgeon John Logan to Lord Cochrane: certifying that they have examined Captain Carter; that he
is ill; that he should have sick leave ashore.

769 Pueyrredon, Huacho, 26 April 1821, Guillermo Prunier to Lord Cochrane: advising him that he has appointed a commissioner to deal with his share of the prize money due on the ship which was not sold but taken over by the commander-in-chief for his use.

770 O'Higgins, 26 April 1821, Thomas Crosbie and Alejo Ruiz: list of seamen on the ship who have received four months' pay; 680 dollars paid to 10 men and a further 120 on 14 August to two men.

771 San Martin, 23 May 1821: Inventory of the cables, hawser and rigging received from the English frigate Admiral Cockburn for the service of the Squadron of Chile.

772 San Martin, 23 May 1821: Inventory of sailcloth of best quality received from the English frigate Admiral Cockburn for the service of the Squadron of Chile.

773 NP, ND: List of naval stores on board the O'Higgins, San Martin, Valdivia, Independencia, Galvarino.

774 Valparaiso, 13 June 1821, Luis de la Cruz to commandant of the Callao blockade: stating that the Laura is bringing provisions for the squadron and papers for Lord Cochrane from the government.

775 Independencia, Callao bay, 1 July 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that on San Martin's order, the Aransasu has been refitted and sent in search of the San Martin; that he detained but liberated after a few days the American Galen and the Englishmen Robert and Walsingham; that the only ship to enter or leave Callao since Lord Cochrane's departure is the American General Brown in ballast.
with civilians, women and children, which later furtively embarked Pezuela and other officers from Chorrillos on 29 June contrary to agreement, and is now bound for Rio; that the ships and crews are healthy, but in a most distressed state for want of stores and provisions.

Valdivia, 9 July 1821, John Robinson to Lord Cochrane: stating that since Carter has left the squadron and it seems unlikely he will rejoin it, he requests Lord Cochrane to bring his arrest to a speedy conclusion, either reinstating him or allowing him to depart.

NP, ND, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will transmit the accompanying letters and enclosures to the government of Chile.

San Martin, 10 July 1821, 11 p.m. Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: referring to a letter just sent and requesting permission to go aboard, his wife being ill.

San Martin, 10 July 1821, 11.15 p.m. Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that for the safety of his wife and child, he requests leave to return to his ship.

Independencia, Callao bay, 10 July 1821, midnight, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed whether he should proceed to Ancon as ordered earlier in the evening.

Independencia, bay of Callao, 11 July 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing a letter received from the crew of the ship.

Independencia, bay of Callao, 11 July 1821, George
Davidson, John Clark, Francis Alcory, Go. Cowards, Thomas Alford, A. Miller to Robert Forster: six petty officers requesting on behalf of the crew to be informed whether Forster is taking command of the ship, and expressing their intention of protesting at the appointment of Captain Simpson to command the ship.

783 Independencia, bay of Callao, 11 July 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: referring to his previous proposals to leave the service of Chile; stating that his wife's health now demands her removal to shore; that he proposes to go ashore with her and await the convening of the court martial.

784 Independencia, Callao bay, 21 July 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that he does not wish to reassume his post of second-in-command of the squadron.

785 O'Higgins, Callao bay, 25 July 1821, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: reporting on a cutting-out expedition the previous night; that three ships were brought out and two others burned.

786 List of ships taken and destroyed in the attack on Callao harbour on 24 July 1821.

787 List of officers engaged in the attack on Callao harbour on 24 July 1821.

788 Araucano, off Chorrillos, 27 July 1821, Herbert Simpson, commander: receipt for one anchor, some cable and rope, blocks, copper fish kettle, from off the San Martin, wreck.

789 Araucano, 27 July 1821, William Marsh: receipt for seven bales of dry goods received from the Valdivia.
Valdivia, 3 August 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: Report that he anchored near the wrecked San Martin at Chorrillos between 20 July and 2 August, being ordered to salvage; but heavy seas only allowed work on seven days, at the end of which the San Martin was totally broken up and the wreckage floated ashore on 2 August; that he is enclosing lists of what has been salvaged; that active boats might still salvage material afloat or cast up on the beach.

22 July 1821, Henry Cobbett: Account of stores sent aboard the Dolores from the wrecked San Martin; most of the rigging, 14 guns, 96 rounds of shot, and sundry other items.

List of gunner's stores received on board the Valdivia from the San Martin, William Burcher: 61 muskets and other firearms, 113 cutlasses and bayonets, 14 guns, 250 rounds of shot, other items.

James Wilson, List of carpenter's stores taken aboard the Valdivia from the San Martin: three yards, other items.

John Eastgate, list of boatswain's stores taken aboard the Valdivia from the San Martin: remnants of sails, one new sail, 100 blocks, assorted rope, some cable and hawser.

List of articles remaining in the Valdivia's hold from the wreck of the San Martin.

Independencia, Callao bay, 4 August 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has put Lieutenant Woolridge of the Lautaro under arrest for taking boats into Callao without orders in an attempt to cut out some ships.

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Lima, 7 August 1821, Thomas Carter to Lord Cochrane: stating that considering Robinson's long confinement under arrest and his good conduct, he hopes that Lord Cochrane will cancel his court martial.

Calleo bay, 8 August 1821, William Wilkinson: receipt for 100 dollars from the commander-in-chief for the San Fernando and Resolution. Second receipt for 313 dollars prize money received.

Colonel Allen, Callao bay, 21 August 1821, Lieutenant Nixon, of the Araucano, to Lord Cochrane: stating that a boat manned by volunteers of the Araucano and under his command which took part in Crosbie's cutting out expedition was not mentioned in the Gazette's list of officers and boats.

Colonel Allen, 21 August 1821, Archibald Murray, 2nd mate to Lord Cochrane: stating that the jollyboat manned by him and volunteers from the Araucano has not received justice for its part in Crosbie's expedition, when it cut the cables of one ship and shared in the cutting of the cables of another.

Callao bay, 24 August 1821, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane: valuation of the spars, rigging and sails of the Pueyrredon at 1000 dollars.

O'Higgins, 26 August 1821, Paul Delano: receipt for 500 pesos prize money for the Justiniano taken from Callao on 15 August.

O'Higgins, 26 August 1821, Paul Delano: receipt for 1000 pesos for supplies belonging to the Pueyrredon.

Independencia, Ancon, 26 August 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that the only ships which have the supplies the squadron needs are neutral
ships; that they will only sell for hard dollars and cannot be forced; that the American vessel Tea Plant has a supply of provisions for sale, but requires 1700 dollars to pay for it and will not accept ounces.

803 Lima, 27 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Robert Forster: stating that orders have been given to supply him, and that he hopes that once supplied, he will return to the blockade.

804 Galvarino, Callao bay, 3 September 1821, John Esmonde to Lord Cochrane: stating that as the ship is to be towed to sea with a contagious fever aboard, he requests to be superseded.

805 Pisco, 4 September 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: account of his measures to collect aguardiente and wine for the squadron for three months at half a pint a day for 1200 men.

806 Galvarino, Callao bay, 7 September 1821, John Esmonde to Lord Cochrane: stating that when he turned up the hands to weigh anchor this afternoon, the petty officers and crew refused to work the ship until arrears of pay are made up; that they have done so because the O'Higgins crew has done so.

807 Lautaro, 8 September 1821, Paul Delano to Lord Cochrane: report that the ship is totally destitute, there are no boats except a pinnace out of repair, no canvas to mend the sails, and no stores; that the crew have had no meat or spirits for a long time and without pay are unable to buy any; that they have refused duty; that the last jerky received was rotten, verminous and unfit for consumption; that this day the crew went ashore and de does not hold himself responsible for anything that may happen to the ship.
808 **Galvarino, Callao bay, 8 September 1821, John Esmonde to Lord Cochrane:** stating that he has read Lord Cochrane's letter to the crew but they still refuse service.

809 **Valdivia, at sea, 12 September 1821, Henry Cobbett, captain, Adolfo Klinger, contador:** note of supplies received aboard the ship.

810 **Independencia, Callao bay, 13 September 1821, Robert Forster:** receipt for 122 pesos claimed for carpenters, caulkers and a sailmaker for work done on various ships.

811 **Valdivia, 13 September 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane:** stating that he has embarked the aguardiente, wine, vinegar and sugar that he was able to get at Pisco; that he is enclosing account for the same; that he is enclosing a list of the prisoners and passengers for Lima.

812 **Independencia, Callao bay, 14 September 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane:** stating that the Colonel Allen was caught sending a letter to Canterac in Callao; that she has been ordered to quit the bay; that if he could have proved the master implicated, he would have detained the ship, but it appears that the master was not cognisant of the business.

813 **O'Higgins, 15 September 1821, Lieutenant Gilbert:** note of silver received from the Luisa and the Saracen.

814 **Fortaleza de la Independencia, Callao, September 1821, Lieutenant Wynter to Lord Cochrane:** stating that he has been arrested by Guise for recruiting men for the O'Higgins and that he has had an exchange of words with him.
815 Ancon, 16 September 1821, John Robinson: receipt for 6762.2 dollars for stores supplied.

816 O'Higgins, 18 September 1821, Ship's Company to Thomas Crosbie: stating that General San Martin promised them a bounty of 50,000 dollars and the value of the Esmeralda on its capture; complaining that this should be paid.

817 O'Higgins, 18 September 1821, Ship's Company to Thomas Crosbie: complaining that General San Martin's promises regarding the capture of the Esmeralda have not been fulfilled.

818 O'Higgins, Ancon bay, 19 September 1821, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: stating that the foreign seamen refused duty this morning and were joined by many of the native seamen; the foreign seamen ashore are of the same opinion as those aboard.

819 19 September 1821; List of 27 men who have refused their duty.

820 Valdivia, 19 September 1821, Ship's Company to Henry Cobbett: refusing to weigh anchor and demanding back pay and discharge for those who have done their time.

821 O'Higgins, Ancon bay, 19 September 1821, Thomas Crosbie to Lord Cochrane: stating that he knew before that neither this ship nor the Valdivia would leave the anchorage; that the crew knew that the money was on board the O'Higgins and Sacramento; that he and the other officers would have had to put the crew ashore by force for they would have mutinied when he tried to put them ashore; that they would then have seized the Sacramento; that it is a general determination of the squadron not to leave the port until their arrears are paid, and the crews
have been in communication with each other for some time.

822 Valdivia, 19 September 1821, Ship's Company to Henry Cobbett: defending their conduct and stating that they prefer death to slavery and their liberty to patriot gold.

823 Independencia, 21 September 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's order to haul down the pendant and run up the commander-in-chief's flag; and of a letter regarding Fernando Maza communicating with Callao without Forster being informed.

824 O'Higgins, 25 September 1821, Hipolito Crella to Lord Cochrane: reporting an exchange of insults with Lieutenant Freeman of the Pezuela after which he was seized and taken to the Governor's house ashore, whence he was ordered back to his ship.

825 Montezuma, 26 September 1821, George Young to Lord Cochrane: stating that as he is immediately dependent upon San Martin's express orders, he cannot comply without them to Lord Cochrane's orders regarding arms and provisions.

826 Valdivia, 27 September 1821, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a copy of his letter to Montegudo; stating that as doubts remain as to the part to be adopted, he suggests that Lord Cochrane point out his authority to the captains; that he has received rice today, but still no beef and bread; that the officers are not yet paid and he is afraid of some disaffection in the event of being ordered to sea without it; suggesting that money be put aboard but not paid out till the ship is at sea.
Valdivia, 27 September 1821, Henry Cobbett to Bernardo Monteagudo: acknowledging receipt of a letter of 26 September from Monteagudo regretting the misunderstanding between San Martin and Lord Cochrane at a time when the war seemed about to be concluded.

Araucano, 27 September 1821, C.G.L. Lockell, master's mate: receipt for four bags of rice from the prize schooner Mercedes.

Independencia, 27 September 1821, J. Ross, master's mate: receipt for 10 bags of rice from the prize schooner Mercedes.

Galvarino, 27 September 1821, James Simon: receipt for six bags of rice from the prize schooner Mercedes.

Lautaro, 27 September 1821, Antonio Martinez, constable: receipt for 10 bags of rice from the prize schooner Mercedes.

Valdivia, 27 September 1821, Thomas Harvey, master's mate: receipt for 11 bags of rice from the prize schooner Mercedes.

Lima, 28 September 1821, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is forwarding a statement of the arrears due to him; that he is indisposed and his share should be given to Wilkinson for him; that he also wishes to claim for slops supplied to 86 marines of the Independencia in 1819.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 2 October 1821, Foord Morge11: receipt for silver received on board the ship.

O'Higgins, Callao, 2 October 1821, Lieutenant Addison to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane has been misinformed as to his intentions in leaving
the *Galvarino*; that he would not have left clandestinely if he desired to leave the Chilean service; requesting his discharge due to the change on board the *Galvarino*.

836 **Aransaú**, 2 October 1821, Poord Morgell, captain: note of the effects now on board the *Aransaú* received from the *Mercedes*.

Jose Mariano Reyes: Inventory of the cargo carried by the packet *Mercedes* under his command from the port of Realejo to the port of Callao.

837 **O'Higgins**, 6 October 1821, Thomas Craig, surgeon: receipt for 24 bars of silver, total weight 173 marks @ six and a half dollars the mark, as one year's pay to Mr. Welsh, deceased, and 502 dollars prize due on the *Potrillo* and the *Arica* expedition.

838 London, 17 October 1821, Margaret Brown to Robert Forster: requesting information about the reported death of her son William Brown, quartermaster of the *Independencia*; that she is a distressed widow.

London, 26 October 1821, Francis Place to William Jackson: requesting that he will look into the matter; that the man in question was killed at the cutting out of the *Esmeralda*.

William Jackson: marginal note, that Brown's pay and prize money due are to be sent to his mother through Place; that enquiry is to be made whether James Gardner, sailing master of the *Lautaro*, killed at the cutting out of the *Esmeralda*, left a will.

839 October 1821: List of ships' officers in the squadron.
Guayaquil, 13 November 1821, Henry Cobbett: statement of account from 5 November to 13 November and receipt for 159 dollars.

Araucano, off Balao, 30 November 1821, Robert Simpson, captain: receipt for a ship's chronometer.

Valparaiso, 26 December 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to the officers and men of the fleet: promising that on their return from the expedition which will terminate within two or three months they will be promptly paid all their due.
PART EIGHT

(Documents 843 - 907)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE CAPTAINS, OFFICERS AND MEN
OF THE CHILEAN FLEET 1822 - 1857 AND UNDATED.

Note: Documents 896 to 907 inclusive are late and/or
undated entries under the general classification
of Letters and Papers of the Captains, Officers
and Men of the Chilean Fleet.

i. Documents 896 and 902 were correctly described
only after the series of which they should form
part had been prepared, numbered and typed.
Their correct placing should be between docu-
ments 561 and 562.

ii. Documents 897 to 901 and 903 to 907 inclusive
have been grouped by year, calculated by ref-
ERENCE TO (a) internal evidence (b) dates of
documents with which they were grouped in the
uninventorial collection. Within each year
the items are placed in their probable chron-
ological order.
Araucano, 28 January 1822, Robert Simpson, Captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he arrived at Acapulco on 24 December 1821; that he went ashore to get information from Haig of the Snipe, but was discovered and arrested; that on 28 December he was taken before the junta, including the masters and owners of the ships in port, who wanted them to sail; that when the Araucano was anchored under the guns of the fort, as agreed, he was suddenly seized and flung into gaol in the castle; that the Espina sailed on 29 December and the Luisa on 30 December; that he was not allowed aboard his ship until late on 30 December and not allowed to leave the port until 4 January 1822.

Acapulco, 28 December 1821, Nicolas de la Gandara to Robert Simpson: stating that by treaty Mexico and Spain are friendly powers, and that Spanish ships are permitted to trade.

Copy of the previous item.

Araucano, Robert Simpson, captain: account of monies received and expended between October 1821 and January 1822 by him on behalf of Chile.

Acapulco, 1 February 1822, Alejo Ruiz, comissary: promissory note for 362 pesos - 4 reales to the captain of the brig Snipe.

Acapulco, 2 February 1822, William Adam, captain of the Snipe: receipt for 362 pesos - 4 reales for sugar purchased for the Chilean squadron.

Copy of the previous item.

Nepiña, 13 March 1822, Alejo Ruiz to Lord Cochrane: stating that though the governor is officially
forbidden to aid the squadron, he will supply provisions if he is compelled forcibly to do so.

851 Valdivia, 16 March 1822, Thomas Woolridge to Lord Cochrane: requesting he be transferred into another ship as he is incompatible with Cobbett, who is a great swearer and irascible.

852 Mollendo, March 1822, Blanco Encalda to Juan Robinson, captain of the Montezuma: giving him instructions respecting the maintenance of the blockade of Callao.

853 Copy of the previous item.

854 28 April 1822, William Hoseason to William Jackson: requesting that he will come ashore from the Rising Star, regretting that he cannot accommodate him in his house; suggesting that he go to Concepcion until Lord Cochrane returns.

855 Valdivia, 7 May 1822, Thomas Woolridge to Henry Cobbett, captain: enclosing a letter to be forwarded to Lord Cochrane.

856 Valdivia, Callao, 7 May 1822, Thomas Woolridge to Lord Cochrane: requesting he be given a court of inquiry or a court martial so that he does not have to spend a further three months under arrest.

857 Valparaiso, 4 July 1822, James Stuart to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is glad that Lord Cochrane discharged him as he was sick of his appointment in the marines; requesting that he be recommended to the Guard of Honour or to the port governor's staff.

858 Valparaiso, 8 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that Captain Wooster was compelled
to discharge Lieutenant Edward Brown for the reasons
given in the enclosed papers.

Santiago, 16 July 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins: order
to call a court martial under the presidency of
Mr. Bennett.

859 Valdivia, 16 June, 1822, Jorge Beauchef to Charles
Wooster, commandant of naval forces: stating that
he will hold him responsible for the Chacabuco which
must be available fully manned and provisioned to
carry important dispatches and prisoners of war to
Valparaiso in a few days time.

860 Corral bay, 19 June 1822, Charles Wooster to Ignacio
Zenteno: stating that Captain Brown caused nothing
but trouble; requesting that he be court martialed
on his arrival; stating that he is now under arrest;
that Kelly of the Lautaro is in charge of the ship.

861 Chacabuco, Valdivia bay, 15 June 1822, Edward Brown
to Jorge Beauchef: stating that Wooster has interfered with his ship, taking his provisions although
he will have a long voyage to Valparaiso, and taking
the six best seamen of the ship to serve in his own.

862 Chacabuco, Valdivia bay, 14 June 1822, Edward Brown
to Charles Wooster: stating that the ship is ready
to sail for Valparaiso.

863 Chacabuco, Valparaiso, 13 July 1822, Lieutenant Daniel Kelly: request for a ship's boat.

Valparaiso, 15 July 1822, Paul Delano: stating that
there are no boats in the arsenals.

Valparaiso, 15 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno: order to
enquire why there are no boats on the ship.

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Valparaiso, 15 July 1822, Daniel Kelly: stating that the ship had no boats when he took command of her.

Valparaiso, 15 July 1822, Ignacio Zenteno: order to enquire of the contador about the ship's boats.

Valparaiso, 16 July 1822, Pablo Zorrilla: stating that one boat was lost in a gale and the other lost because Lieutenant Brown had sold the anchor and small anchor to the merchant ship Wigtown in Valdivia.

864 O'Higgins, Ancon, 3 September 1822, Alejo Ruiz: receipt for 49 pesos 4 reales from Lord Cochrane to pay for barrels bought from trading ships.

865 NP, ND: List of items and prices for goods supplied to the squadron.

866 Valparaiso, 5 September 1822, William Wilkinson, Thomas Crosbie, Henry Cobbett: statement that as Lord Cochrane will not appeal for a further condemnation of the prize Columbia, they request that the government will intervene to protect their interests.

867 Valparaiso, 25 September 1822, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane: stating that there are reports that Lord Cochrane has left with 9000 ounces of gold.

868 Valparaiso, 25 September 1822, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: stating that there are rumours going about that Lord Cochrane has 9000 ounces of gold and silver on board a British warship; that he has been active to scotch the rumours, but the want of pay and prize money encourages the officers generally to entertain bad opinions; that they are in very
great need and much censure falls on Mr. Bennett for neglecting to prosecute their interests in the matter of their prize money.

869 **Galverino**, 29 September 1822, Gordon Robertson to Lord Cochrane: stating that the marines in his ship are in a state of insubordination, and that he has no power to prevent it.

870 **Independencia**, 29 September 1822, William Chrisp to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed whether he is due to receive any prize money on the **Vitoria**, and requesting a certificate of fidelity.

871 **Mercedes**, 30 September 1822, F. Scott to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he be promoted from his lieutenancy, which he has held since July 1820.

872 **Independencia**, Valparaiso, 30 September 1822, Colin Campbell to Lord Cochrane: requesting confirmation of his commission to act as lieutenant on this ship, ordered by Captain Wilkinson.

873 **Independencia**, Valparaiso, 30 September 1822, R.R. Sadler to Lord Cochrane: requesting confirmation of his appointment to lieutenant by Captain Wilkinson.

874 **Port of Valparaiso**, 30 September 1822, Captains Wilkinson, Crosbie, Cobbett, Wynter to Lord Cochrane: stating that they have heard with regret and indignation vile reports tending to bring Lord Cochrane's character into disrepute; their congratulations on Lord Cochrane's quashing the conspiracy; that he should make an example of someone.

**Valparaiso**, 30 September 1822, Lieutenants Grenfell, Addison, Shepherd, Morris, Granville, Scrymgeour, Campbell, Clewley, George and other officers to Lord
Cochrane: stating their anger and the reports against Lord Cochrane's character and applauding his countermeasures.

875 Lautaro, at sea, 26 October 1822, Ship's company to Lord Cochrane: stating that Captain Wooster and the officers have embezzled provisions and grog; that they treat the crew harshly; that they delayed at Valdivia instead of sailing to attack Chiloé; that acting 1st Lieutenant Williamson is particularly cruel, especially when drunk; that he keelhauled one of the soldiers to death; that they have now mutinied and beg that Lord Cochrane will intercede for them.

876 Valparaiso, 1 November 1822, E. Brown, A. Nowell, Alex Ross to Lord Cochrane: transmitting complaints made to them by seamen of the Lautaro, in hospital; stating that Transito Hernandez received four dozen lashes with the end of the main sheet; that Feliz Palacios was cut in the face, neck and throat by a rope's end, and knocked down the main hatchway; that 15 men in all are in hospital for this cause; that two seamen, a marine and a boy are known to have died from ill-treatment received on board the Lautaro.

877 O'Higgins, 2 November 1822, B. Wilson to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will order a courtmartial on Captain Wooster for his actions and for his cruelty to his men.

878 Valparaiso, 6 November 1822, John Logan M.D., William Chrisp: stating that following the Admiral's order, they inspected the hospital; that there were seven persons, six marines whose complaints are chiefly venereal, and a seaman with face and neck injuries; that the sick are not comfortable for lack of cleanliness and ventilation.
Valparaiso, 6 November 1822, William Wilkinson, captain of the Independencia, Thomas Crosbie, captain of the O'Higgins, to Lord Cochrane: confirming the statement made by Logan and Chrisp respecting the hospital.

Valparaiso, 6 November 1822, Feliz Palacios: deposition that he was beaten with a rope's end by Lieutenant Williamson of the Lautaro and now suffers from inflammation and swelling of the face and neck, difficulty of digestion, and external ulceration.

Valparaiso, 12 November 1822, Edward Brown to Charles Wooster: requesting that his court martial be called.

Lautaro, 13 November 1822, Charles Wooster to Edward Brown: refusing his request and recommending that when he has received his pay, he should take himself back to the United States without delay.

Talcahuano, 14 November 1822, William Wynter, captain of the Montezuma, to Ramon Freire: disputing the share of a bill for coal he is liable to pay.

Valparaiso, 15 November 1822, Edward Brown to Lord Cochrane: stating that he was arrested by Captain Wooster who has refused to hold a court martial on him for four months.

Galverino, at anchor, Valparaiso, 19 December 1822, Matias Godomar to Lord Cochrane: stating that he was ordered to sea, Lord Cochrane not being here; that he understands that he is only to obey orders transmitted by the government through Lord Cochrane.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 4 January 1823, Joaquin Echeverria to Charles Wooster: stating that Lord Cochrane being on leave at present, Captain Wooster
should communicate directly with the government regarding his current mission.

Santiago, 6 February 1823, Henry Cobbett to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's of 10 January; that only Correa who bows to everybody has survived the change of regime in office; that Zenteno's case is doubtful; that Freire has not arrived yet; that O'Higgins died a natural political death having solicited Morgell and Cobbett to aid him, as Englishmen of honour and integrity, and attempting to rescue his position; that he has now gone to Valparaiso; that San Martin has escaped to Mendoza.

Independencia, Valparaiso bay, February 1823, William Wilkinson to Lord Cochrane: stating that he learned of Lord Cochrane's departure for Rio on his arrival from Chiloé; that he brought Freire and 1600 men to establish a new government; that Rodriguez and O'Higgins are prisoners; that he is enclosing justificatory letters between O'Higgins and himself; that Wooster sought to be made Admiral when he learned of Lord Cochrane's departure.

NP, ND, William Wilkinson to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that with regard to the recent disturbances in Chile and the general hostility towards Rodriguez, he determined to carry Beauchef to Concepcion from Valdivia, but was prevented from sailing from Valdivia as the batteries were prepared to dispute his passage.

Edinburgh, University Printing Office, 14 February 1824, Robert Hardie to Lord Cochrane: requesting Lord Cochrane will assist in locating his brother Walter who left for South America in 1818, was reported in 1822 to be serving in the San Martin, and
subsequently reported to be wounded; that Lord Cochrane will inform them if he is dead, and if alive, will send on the enclosed.

Helen Hardie to Walter Hardie: hoping that her son is alive and well and asking him to write; giving some family news.

890 Valparaiso, 11 May 1824: extract of a letter by William Wynter reporting on the campaign in Chiloé.

891 Valparaiso, 13 May 1824, Paul Delano to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has just returned after an unsuccessful expedition against Chiloé; that Freire was the commander of the land forces and Forster of the squadron; that he has received only three months' pay; that if he could raise enough money he would leave the country; and the O'Higgins has been overhauled and is sound.

892 Paper said to be drawn up by H.A. Dibbin noting John Pascoe Grenfell's part in the cutting out of the Esmeralda.

893 Red Hackle, April 1928: paper said to be an extract from the diary of Grenfell describing the cutting out of the Esmeralda.

894 1848, John Pascoe Grenfell: memoir of the expedition to cut out the Esmeralda.

895 Santiago, 15 August 1857, Robert Simpson to Lord Cochrane: congratulating him on the successful outcome of the law, which he claims to have brought about, and requesting a biographical sketch and picture.

896 Town of Santa, 17 November 1819, Edward Gutiker to
Lord Cochrane: reporting on his unsuccessful attempt to persuade the alcalde to co-operate in finding captured sailors and providing or acquiring cattle, horses, mules, rice.

897 1819: Note of flags to be used by ships approaching the squadron.

898 1819: Note giving details of the flags of recognition and the ways of maintaining communication.

899 1819, Wednesday morning, Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: reporting on communications with the captain of an English merchantman; ship movements; that his sicklist is still increasing and is now 41, 40 of whom are fever cases.

900 1819, Martin Guise: statement of reasons why he did not believe that Lord Cochrane would claim the right of sharing prize money both as Admiral of the squadron and captain of the O'Higgins; that it is wrong for an officer to undertake two duties in order to get more money; that it is bad for the dignity of the state; that deserving officers are thereby deprived of the opportunity for promotion.

901 1819: Note of the marine officers' duties, the relations between marines and seamen, the giving of orders and the maintenance of discipline.

902 Santiago, 24 February 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to Robert Forster: stating that the news from Peru demands rapid action if the enemy is not to take advantage of the divided strength of the navy; that the Independencia and the Araucano are to embark Captain Charles, Lieutenant Cobbett and 40 artillerymen and go to the assistance of the vice-Admiral; that malcontents are to be assured of being paid on the return of their ships.
1820, Richard Lindsay to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the Chilean trading brig *Concordia*, detained at San Lorenzo, be freed.

14 March, William Bennett: order to free the *Concordia*.

1820, Officers of the squadron to Rear-Admiral Blanco: complaining about the attitude of the Governor of Valparaiso and the soldiery in general to the naval men.

1820, Thomas Crosbie: List of seamen taken aboard at Coquimbo.

1821, Monday, 7 a.m. Robert Forster to Lord Cochrane: stating that the enemy army is marching for Ancon, but he cannot see the patriot army for the haze; that the Spanish came out of the forts at 2 p.m. yesterday; that they are close to the beach and he has sent the Araucano to harass them.

1822, Carmen Zamora, widow of Lieutenant Juan Hawel: petition that the arrears of wages due to be paid.
PART NINE

/Documents 908 - 1068/

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF WILLIAM MILLER TO LORD COCHRANE
1821 - 1860

LETTERS AND PAPERS TO WILLIAM MILLER AND LORD COCHRANE
RELATIVE TO THE CAMPAIGN IN THE PUERTOS INTERMEDIOS
1821

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF STEVEN GOLDSACK
1818 - 1822
Pisco, 21 March 1821, 10 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has entered Pisco; that the enemy fled; that one regidor was arrested for lack of zeal; reporting on administrative arrangements.

Pisco, 21 March 1821, 1 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: reporting on his military operations.

Pisco, 21 March 1821, 5 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: reporting on military operations.

Pisco, 21 March 1821, William Miller to Ramon Soler: instructing him to land up the coast and seize all the livestock and slaves fit for soldiering; ordering him to keep discipline and not to alienate the natives.

Morro de Arica, 23 March 1821, Juan Loriga to Manuel Vidal: requesting that he will give him information about the operations.

Pisco, 26 March 1821, 7 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: reporting on the pacification of liberated areas; stating that some are made to believe by the friars that all who take up arms are damned; reporting on desertions from the enemy, and on enemy movements; that any number under 1200 godos ought not to intimidate him; stating that his forces are in a good state; requesting that Mr. Bennett will prepare some proclamations; reporting on his arrangements for the sick.

Pisco, 26 March 1821, William Miller: affidavit, that about 14 March, Lord Cochrane called at his lodgings in Huacho where he was sitting with Captain Hind and Captain Spry; that Spry refused to take off his hat in the presence of a superior officer and that Lord
Cochrane threatened to call him to account.

915 Cancato, 26 March 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Captain Vidal's report; reporting on the constancy and perseverance of the troops of the 2nd and 11th; stating that wherever the patriot troops present themselves, they are received with open arms.

916 Cancato, 26 March 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: reporting a skirmish with enemy troops; reporting on the courage of the patriot troops; that the town of Chincha baja was in an uproar of enthusiasm at the entry of the patriot troops.

27 March, 3 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: reporting that the enemy were reported to be in Chincha.

917 Cancato, 27 March 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is proposing to seize money and goods in the interior, and giving his plans if the enemy attacks in superior force.

918 Campamento General en Marcha, 16 April 1821, José Miguel Lanza to William Miller: affirming his patriotic fervour.

919 HQ Moquegua, 6 May 1821, William Miller to General Juan Ramirez, Comandant of the Army of Upper Peru: stating that Captain Latapia is authorised to treat with him on certain subjects.

HQ Arequipa, 10 June 1821, Juan Ramirez to William Miller: stating that with regard to the armistice which has been agreed, he has ordered his troops to prepare to suspend hostilities as soon as Miller agrees.
HQ Sama, 13 June 1821, William Miller to Juan Ramirez: stating that his advance guards intercepted papers about the armistice addressed to the Subinspector General of the Army, who has not reached Tacna; that they have been redirected towards La Paz; that he has ordered his troops to suspend hostilities.

HQ Tacna, 17 June 1821, William Miller to Juan Ramirez: stating that his forwarding of intercepted dispatches to La Hera is a token of his good faith; that to keep the armistice most precisely, he is sending Lieutenant Dominguez to Ramirez' disposal.

HQ Arequipa, 22 June 1821, Juan Ramirez to William Miller: stating that Colonel José Santos de la Hera has received the order for the armistice; that he has appointed his ADC Benito Miranda to act in liaison with Dominguez.

Yalata, valle de Sama, 12 May 1821, 8 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of his landing at Morro de Sama, the exhaustion of the white soldiers, his advance on Tacna.

Tacna, 13 May 1821, 6 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the occupation of Tacna.

Tacna, 14 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of his plan of operations and the contributions he is levying.

Arica, 14 May 1821, Juan Jacinto Ayala: receipt for two sacred vessels and other worked silver received from Lord Cochrane.

Tacna, 15 May 1821, Tomas Landa to Lord Cochrane: stating the vital necessity for the patriot troops to stress their role of liberators of the populace;
giving details of military operations.

925 Tacna, 15 May 1821, William Miller to the inhabitants: proclamation that the patriot troops will not interfere with the local administration; that disorders are to be kept down and they should remain tranquil.

926 Tacna, 15 May 1821, William Miller: proclamation to the inhabitants of the place announcing the dawn of liberty.

927 Azapa Grande, 16 May 1821, Juares to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations.

928 Azapa Grande, 16 May 1821, Juares to Lord Cochrane: informing him that picket's of the Arica battalion have been joining the patriots; giving details of military operations.

929 16 May 1821, Tomas Landa to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations to capture Moquegua, Ylo, Mollendo and Quilca.

930 Tacna, 16 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the organisation and pacification of Tacna, the unreliability of the local patriots.

931 Tacna, 16 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of his plans to recruit, and confiscations of goods.

932 Arica, 16 May 1821, 11 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of his plans to heighten patriotic feeling; his preparations to depart; his proposal to march on Arequipa.

933 Arica, 16 May 1821, Jose Santiago de la Llosa: receipt for 15 pieces of plate of the frigate Mateus received from the Secretary.
Tacna, 17 May 1821, William Miller: proclamation that all deserters from the royalist army are to present themselves to the patriot troops in 24 hours for enlistment in the patriot division or the battalion being formed here; that any citizen who shelters a deserter is to be fined 200 pesos or one month on Arica island; that citizens are invited to enlist in the battalion no. 1 of Tacna.

Tacna, 17 May 1821, William Miller: proclamation that 58 men and four officers have deserted to the patriots from the royalist army; that the officers have been promoted a grade and the soldiers rewarded.

Tacna, 17 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the collection of military intelligence and his readiness to march on Moquegua.

Tacna, 18 May 1821, Tomas Landa to Lord Cochrane: enclosing information received from Moquegua; warning that the populace lacks confidence that the liberators are going to stay, and need to be reassured.

Tacna, 19 May 1821, Santiago Millet, Commissary of the southern division, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending various cargoes, and that he has 44 sick.

Tacna, 19 May 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: informing him of military operations and requesting reinforcements.

Tacna, 19 May 1821, Nicolas Buteler to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a representation respecting some of his goods.

Tacna, 19 May 1821, Nicolas Buteler to Lord Cochrane: reclaiming some bars of tin that were seized when the patriots took Arica.
942 Arica, 19 May 1821, Tomas Landa to Lord Cochrane: stating that there is a need for open dignified patriotism; and for the Peruvians to contribute towards the costs of the liberating forces.

943 Tacna, 19 May 1821, William Miller: proclamation that a list of Spanish property in the hands of the local people is to be given in 24 hours on pain of total confiscation.

944 Tacna, 19 May 1821, 7 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the approach of enemy forces.

945 Tacna, 19 May 1821, 7 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the march of his troops and of the reported approach of 500 enemy troops.

946 Tacna, 19 May 1821, Henry Hind, captain, to Lord Cochrane: account of the coming engagement with the enemy; stating that the strength of the Army of Southern Peru and Upper Peru is 3900.


948 Arica, 20 May 1821, Lord Cochrane: confirmation of don Jose Galvez as civil governor of Arica.


950 Bella vista de Sama, 20 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of manoeuvres around Moquegua and difficulties with the local patriots.

951 Navaja, 21 May 1821, Isidro del Alcascura to General of the Liberating Army: regarding captured supplies.

952 Tacna, 21 May 1821, Santiago Millet to Lord Cochrane:
stating that he is forwarding money and supplies, and awaits Lord Cochrane's orders.

953 Tacna, 21 May 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations.

954 Buena vista Sama, 21 May 1821, 6 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the evasiveness of the enemy.

955 Buena Vista, 21 May 1821, 6 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of manoeuvres around Moquegua and unreliability of local patriots.

956 Mirabé, 21 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the skirmish at Mirabé in which Dr. Welsh was killed; official dispatch.

957 Tacna, 22 May 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: enclosing information about the military operations.

958 Ticapampa, 22 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of military operations and the skirmish at Mirabé; stating that the marines of the San Martin behaved better than any of the soldiers.

959 Ticapampa, 22 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the military operations which led up to the occupation of this place.

960 Locomba, 22 May 1821, 9 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is advancing on Moquegua.

961 Tacna, 23 May 1821, Pedro Gil to William Miller: giving details of military movements and asking for news of the army.

962 Tacna, 23 May 1821, Santiago Millet to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending various supplies to Lord
Cochrane, and that the warehouses suffer from breakings-in and thefts of supplies.

963 Moquegua, 23 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the occupation of Moquegua.

964 Copy of the previous item.

965 Moquegua, 23 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the occupation of Moquegua and his recruitment of a new battalion.

966 Tacna, 24 May 1821, Jose Amas and Lorenzo Palza e Infantas to Lord Cochrane: stating that Miller has left them in their posts but they request Lord Cochrane's instructions regarding a ship from Valparaiso in Arica, which desires to trade.

967 Tacna, 24 May 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: enclosing information.

968 Tacna, 24 May 1821, Pedro Gil to William Miller: giving details of military operations.

969 Tacna, 24 May 1821, Pedro Gil to William Miller: requesting assistance with the discipline of his force.

970 Moquegua, 24 May 1821, William Miller: order for all arms and horses to be surrendered to captain Hinds within 24 hours with a two-peso reward for each; that anyone who produces a captured enemy soldier will receive four pesos, and an enemy officer 10 pesos.

971 Moquegua, 24 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of reports of enemy forces, his recruiting, and military incompetence of the patriots.

972 Tacna, 25 May 1821, Jose Galvez to Lord Cochrane:
requesting not to be made governor of Arica.

973 Moquegua, 25 May 1821, Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a report from Gil on the current state of affairs.

974 Moquegua, 25 May 1821, Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations.

975 Moquegua, 25 May 1821, 11 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating reports of an Indian rising in the sierra; that he is about to attack enemy troops nearby.

976 Tacna, 26 May 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: requesting his decision on the application of William Cochrane for a licence to sell goods from a ship anchored at Arica.

977 Moquegua, 26 May 1821, Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochrane: enclosing reports from Gil.

978 La Calera, 14 leagues east of Moquegua, 26 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: official report of the pursuit and dispersal of an enemy force.

979 Ylo, 27 May 1821, Marco Quadzal to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging orders to join Miller in Moquegua.

980 Moquegua, 27 May 1821, 10 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the dispersal of an enemy force in La Calera, the need to pay for everything the patriots take to promote good feeling, his levying contributions on the godos, setting up local administrations, his proposed operations.

981 Tacna, 29 May 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: expressing his desire to show his friendship towards Lord Cochrane.
29 May 1821, Juan Sitaro to Pedro Gil: giving details of military movements.

Tacna, 29 May 1821, Pedro Gil to William Miller: giving details of military movements.

Hu, Moquegua, 29 May 1821, William Miller to the Arequipenos: proclamation predicting their imminent liberation.

Hu, Moquegua, 29 May 1821, William Miller to the patriot troops: proclamation regarding the passage of part of the Arica battalion to the patriot cause, and the victories of the southern division of the liberating army.

Moquegua, 29 May 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochran: account of his hopes of attacking Arequipa; the enemy positions and strength; the usefulness of Portocarrero to the cause; a small (10,000 pesos) contribution that he has levied on the godos; the disposition of his prisoners.

Comandancia militar, Tacna, 30 May 1821, Pedro Gil to William Miller: giving details of military operations.

Campamento General, Inquisibi, 30 May 1821, José Miguel Lanza to William Miller: stating his pleasure at hearing of Miller's arrival; that he has had 750 Spanish before him for two months; that there are 250 in Sicasica, 250 in Oruro, 200 in La Paz, towards which Ramirez has marched with his 3000 men.

Ylo, 31 May 1821, Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochran: hoping to meet him personally the following day.
990 Campamento General, Inquisibi, 31 May 1821, José Miguel Lanza to William Miller: recommending don Sebastian Comas to Miller's consideration.

991 Moquegua, 31 May 1821, 5 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of enemy movements; his plan of operations; his difficulties with the patriots.

992 Moquegua, 31 May 1821, 11 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the reported approach of 800 veterans; that an English ship is loading wheat for Lima at Quilca.

993 May 1821, Landa to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations; the enemy forces are marching from Arequipa.

994 Moquegua, 1 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that the enemy are more fearful of the patriots attacking them in Arequipa than advancing upon them.

995 Sitana, 1 June 1821, Pedro Gil to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations.

996 Moquegua, 1 June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military operations and his appointment as military commandant of the place.

997 Moquegua, 1 June 1821, noon, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of contradictory intelligence and news of military operations elsewhere.

998 Moquegua, 2 June 1821, 6 a.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of the military hazards of the patriot position; his collection of 8000 pesos in contributions; the need for the patriots to pay their expenses promptly; that his comissary is a much
better one than Campino's for the vales are paid at sight and no delay takes place to keep people out of their due.

Moquegua, 3 June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: sending him two trunks for safekeeping which, if he is unlucky in the coming action, should be surrendered to his wife.

Ylo, 3 June 1821, Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochrane: giving details of military movements and expressing a desire to meet him.

Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochrane: expressing his burning desire to continue in the patriot cause.

Hacienda de Santo Domingo, 4 leagues from Moquegua, 3 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of General Ramirez' forces; his proposal to cut the enemy supply line.

Ylo, 4 June 1821, Mariano Portocarrero to Lord Cochrane: advising him of the retirement of the royalist troops toward Arequipa from Tacna.

HQ Arequipa, 7 June 1821, Juan Ramirez to Lord Cochrane: enclosing pliegos respecting the cessation of hostilities.

7 June 1821, Juan Ramirez: Passport issued to Captain Urban to inform Lord Cochrane of the truce.

7 June 1821, Juan Ramirez: Statement to his lieutenant La Hera regarding the truce.

24 May 1821, extraordinary gazette of Lima containing the text of the treaty of Punchauca.
June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is going to see Portocarrero and Miller to find out the state of things; enclosing a copy of the 'noticias de Arequipa' for Lord Cochrane's information.

Moquegua, 9 June 1821: Report of a patriot agent in Arequipa between 3 and 7 June, giving information about military movements, and news from Lima; that the people are in a state of alarm and are calling for peace and that San Martin is expected to enter the place within a few days.

Ilo, 9 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: account of his visit here to reconnoitre; the movements of the enemy; reports of a victory near Jujuy.

Mollendo, 10 June 1821, Correa de Saá to Lord Cochrane: advising that official notes have gone to Lord Cochrane at Quilca; stating that he knows positively that there has been a suspension of arms.

Comandancia militar, Mollendo, 11 June 1821, Correa de Saá to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the extraordinary gazette from Lima regarding the treaties made between La Serna and San Martin.

Comandancia militar, Moquegua, 11 June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: informing him that he has learned of the truce but believes it is a trick as the royalists under Ramirez are marching from Arequipa.

Sama, 11 June 1821, William Miller to Peter Tyrie, master of the San Martin: order for him to take two large brigs and a small one immediately to Arica, looking into Sama; that if the enemy are in possession of Arica, he is to go to the next port to windward.
1013 Tacna, 12 June 1821, William Miller to Peter Tyrie: order to rescind his previous order as an armistice has been concerted.

1014 Orno, 17 June 1821, Ramon Soler to Bernardo Landa: stating that he is enclosing pliegos although he was ordered to carry them personally to Lord Cochrane if possible; requesting a receipt.

Moquegua, 27 June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Ramon Soler: stating that the pliegos have been forwarded to their destinations, two for Lord Cochrane and one for Colonel Miller; that he has advised the natives of Caraquen that they may collect the 46 riding animals erroneously confiscated.

1015 Mollendo, 17 June 1821, Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: regarding Lord Cochrane's decision to liberate the brig San Francisco in view of the armistice, stating that he has been told that in fact the barquito Tumble has been released.

1016 Tacna, 18 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is despatching an escort for the stores being sent by Lord Cochrane; that he is enclosing correspondence from General Ramirez; that he has 126 cavalry sick, nearly his whole complement; account of the activities of the patriot administrators; of the patriot sallies against the enemy; of the need for rice.

1017 Hu Arequipa, 10 June 1821, Juan Ramirez to William Miller: stating that he is ordering his men to suspend hostilities in conformity with the armistice.

NP, ND, William Miller to Juan Ramirez: stating that he will respect the armistice on his side.
1018 Tacna, 19 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: enclosing copies of his communications with La Hera; stating that La Hera's force is about 500 men; account of their morale; that an escort for the stores is being sent; of the godos in Moquegua.

1019 Sama, 13 June 1821, William Miller to José Santos de La Hera: stating that he has ordered his parties to stop hostilities toward the royalists.

HQ, 16 June 1821, José Santos de La Hera to William Miller: stating his agreement to the proposal to carry out a suspension of arms.

1020 Tacna, 19 June 1821, William Miller to the Auditor de Guerra and Gobernador Político of Tacna: acknowledging receipt of administrative orders from the Ministry of Hacienda; request about the quantity of money in the chest.

1021 Arequipa, 20 June 1821, Juan Bautista Lavalle, Gefe Político Comandante General de la Provincia, to Lord Cochrane: stating that the grain found in Mollendo was destined for Lima for the armistice, but not having been moved at that time, should enjoy the guarantee of the armistice.

1022 Arequipa, 20 June 1821, Juan Bautista Lavalle to Lord Cochrane: expressing his thanks for Lord Cochrane's generosity in liberating the prisoners Colonel Sierra and Ensign Ramirez.

1023 HQ Arequipa, 24 June 1821, Juan Ramirez to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a copy of his correspondence with Miller about the armistice; stating that the day before yesterday a party entered Caraquen and seized 200 riding animal which it carried off to Cocachacra; requesting if this means that Lord Cochrane does not recognise the truce.

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Hq Arequipa, 27 June 1821, Juan Ramirez to Lord Cochran: enclosing a pliego of San Martin sent by the viceroy and regarding extension of the armistice.

Carumos, 27 June 1821, Tomas de Quintanilla to Bernardo Landa: giving details of military operations.

Moquegua, 27 June 1821, Agustin Sapato to Lord Cochran: stating his activities in the pacification of his area, and requesting Lord Cochrane's instructions in the matter.

Moquegua, 27 June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: enclosing documents from the moqueguanos regarding the arrest of two of their number.

Moquegua, 27 June 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: enclosing two pliegos and other documents brought from the royalist advance guard; requesting that justice be done to some muleteers of the place, from whom La Hera confiscated 2000 pesos and their mules during the armistice.
Military Commandant of Moquegua: stating that he had already issued the order to free don Blas Antonio Mendoza before he received the representation of the people.

Tacna, 29 June 1821, William Miller: decree to the inhabitants of Moquegua, confirming his order of two days earlier for the liberation of Mendoza.

Tacna, 29 June 1821, William Miller: decree to the clergy of Moquegua confirming his order for the liberation of Mendoza.

Tacna, 30 June 1821, Laso de la Vega to William Miller: requesting his instructions regarding equipment for Gil.

Tacna, 30 June 1821, William Miller to Laso de la Vega: stating that the question is not his responsibility and that Gil cannot have the equipment anyway.

Tacna, 30 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that the bearer is to escort the troops' clothing from the San Martin; account of the discipline and appearance of his force; the activities of the patriot administrations; the measures against the godos.

Tacna, 30 June 1821, William Miller: order for 30 head of cattle from Sitana to be made available to Lord Cochrane.

14 May or June 1821: Unsigned letter from a sympathiser in a royalist-held town, to Landa, giving details of their activities.

May or June 1821, Julian Gandarillas: request for instructions.
1037 Ylo, May or June 1821, Juan de Montespada: offer of the use of the goleta San Blas.

1038 June 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: enclosing letters relative to Mendoza, a great godo.

1039 Tacna, 1 July 1821, José Benito Lazo de la Vega to Lord Cochrane: apprising him of his appointment as Auditor of the liberating division and civil governor of the area.

1040 Tacna, 1 July 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that Dr. José Benito Lazo de la Vega has been appointed as Auditor de Guerra and Gobernador Político: requesting that Lord Cochrane will send rice for the troops; he is sending Lord Cochrane dulces and fresh butter.

1041 Moquegua, 2 July 1821, Bernardo Landa to Lord Cochrane: giving information about the pacification of the country and details of military operations.

1042 Tacna, 4 July 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that long coats would be preferable for the troops to jackets; account of the bad conditions of the sick at Ilo; request that the troops' equipment on the San Martin be sent ashore; stating that if the seamen get some prize money on account, the soldiers are entitled to some too.

1043 Tacna, 4 July 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: requesting whether the owners of the cargos of the Admiral Cockburn and other ships which have paid dues also have to pay duties in the interior as in Spanish times.

1044 5 July 1821, José Santos de La Hera to William Miller: stating that the occupation of Moquegua was not a
hostile act but Miller's of Tacna was, as were other acts of his; so he (La Hera) is entitled to act accordingly.

Tacna, 9 July 1821, William Miller to José Santos de La Hera: stating that he has not engaged in a hostile act, that all his acts are justifiable.

Arequipa, 12 July 1821, Juan Ramirez to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging his communication of 2 July.

Tacna, 12 July 1821, William Miller to Juan Ramirez: stating his protest at La Hera's occupation of Moquegua; that his occupation of Tacna was defensible.

Aboard the Macedonian, 24 July 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he could not prevent La Hera with 700 men from entering Moquegua; that as Ramirez had three times his strength, his best men were sick and the local levies were beginning to desert, he prepared to retreat; that on 16 July 1000 infantry and 100 cavalry marched from Moquegua and forced the patriots out of Tacna; that Tyrie and his ships had not arrived at Arica, so he had to take forcible possession of the Rebeca and the Macedonian; that they got on board only a few hours before the enemy arrived in Arica; that he will land at Quilca.

Ica, 27 August 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: enclosing interim accounts of the southern division, and stating his wish that the division should not be forgotten when the dividing-up of the prize money takes place.

Ica, 27 August 1821, William Miller: Outline accounts of the southern division of the Liberating Army.
Ica, 27 August 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending six jars of prime aguardiente by the Guayaquil brig Caupolican.

Ica, 27 August 1821, 8 p.m. William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is making arrangements to have aguardiente and other supplies provided for the squadron; account of military and civil activities; his personal poverty.

Callao bay, 3 October 1821, William Miller: receipt for 7438 pesos for prize money received from Arica, and 379 pesos prize money taken at Pisco.

Lima, 6 October 1821, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is unwell; that he has heard that Lord Cochrane is leaving but that he has not heard about the prize money due to the troops of the southern division, who rely on Lord Cochrane's promises; that the seamen have been paid but not the men who were ashore; requesting an account of the prize money due for the Valdivia expedition.

Lodge Road, Regents Park, 29 April 1829, William Miller to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will supply engravings of himself and Lady Cochrane for future editions of his memoirs and requesting Lord Cochrane's comments on the book.

Honolulu, 8 November 1854, William Miller to Lord Dundonald: account of the oscillations of his fortunes since 1838; and noting that he met the Hon. Arthur Cochrane in Tahiti some years earlier.

Honolulu, 8 November 1854, William Miller to Lord Dundonald: requesting that Lord Dundonald will give him a certificate of services which he can present to the Chilean government when claiming rewards for his services; stating that his health is not now good.
Valparaiso, 29 September 1859, William Miller: open letter to El Comercio (Valparaiso), stating that soon after his arrival he was induced to apply to the government for recompense for the wounds he suffered in the war for Chilean independence; for pay and pension which he has not received; for the Valdivia prize money he has not received; his complaints at Balmaceda's report recommending that the government refuse his petition; his denial of the allegation that he fought against Chile in 1833; stating that the medal promised to the visitors of Mirabé was never given.

Lima, 28 May 1860, William Miller to Lord Dundonald: stating his thanks for Lord Dundonald's kind remarks about him in his memoirs; the ingratitude of the Chilean government to the veterans of the war of independence; enclosing a newspaper cutting; that he received 15 months' pay for three years' service from 1818 to 1821; that his military rank in Peru is precarious due to the ill-will of General Castilla; that he has not had his claims on Peru satisfied; that he is enclosing his printed Summary of Services; that he is proposing to return to the Sandwich Islands, though he would lose his income from Peru is he left that country; that he would like to visit Europe but is too poor.

Lima, 12 June 1860: Copy of the previous item.

William Miller: Printed Summary of the Services of General William Miller in South America 1817 - 1839; with list of promotions made, wounds suffered, and decorations awarded to him.

Thus, in December 1821, the laboratory of Mixtures of Chile under his direction.

Laboratory of Chile, Santiago, 14 July 1821, Steven Goldsack: proposal for a contract with the state to govern his operations.

Laboratory of Chile, 30 January 1821, Steven Goldsack to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that although he was told last July that he would be appointed curator of the laboratory and manufactory of gunpowder, nothing further has taken place; that he had expected to be caressed by the Chilean government; that his salary is in arrears and to support his wife and six children he has had to resort to borrowing; that the government should inform him, since no work has taken place in the laboratory since 16 December, if his services are no longer required.

Powder House, 24 May 1822, Steven Goldsack: statement of debt due to him by the state: 1582 pesos for 19 months' salary; 32 pesos expended for the maestranza; 156 pesos for work done in the laboratories by his three sons; 879 pesos received from the comissary and 891 pesos for balance due to him.

Powder House, 31 May 1822, Steven Goldsack: note that his contract stipulated that he would not be making powder, but that he is making it and not receiving

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any more salary for it; that 1000 pesos is not worth £200 but only £193; that his salary in pesos should be 83p.2½ reales a month.

Camp of Santiago, 14 November 1822, Steven Goldsack to Lord Cochrane: stating he has been compelled to quit his quarters; that his salary is grossly in arrears; that he and his family are in great want.
PART TEN.

(Documents 1069 - 1198)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF GENERAL SAN MARTIN TO LORD COCHRANE 1819 - 1821.
1069 Headquarters, Santiago, 1 January 1819, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he will ensure that the royalist officer Nicomedes Martinez, who is in Chile to negotiate exchanges of prisoners and who missed his ship back to Peru, is put on the next northbound boat.

1070 Santiago, 6 January, 1819, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that there is a need for the passions excited in the Peruvians by the squadron to be supported by the army; that he is looking forward to receiving Lord Cochrane's plans for a new system of administration of the storehouses for the squadron.

1071 Valparaiso, 30 May 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting that with regard to the supplies recovered from the wreck of the Intrépido and now distributed to the other ships, he be given a note of what was recovered for the information of the government of the United Provinces.

1072 Valparaiso, 7 July 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting that an officer be appointed to be in charge of the water supplies of the transports.

1073 Valparaiso, 19 July 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has given orders for five carpenters to go aboard the O'Higgins as requested.

1074 Headquarters, Valparaiso, 22 July 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the contractors have been told that they must have the transports ready by next Saturday.

1075 Headquarters, Valparaiso, 15 August 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of staff officers for whom berths will be required.
1076 Valparaiso, 15 August 1820, José de San Martin: list of 15 officers of the general staff of the army.

1077 Montezuma, 9 September 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting him to remit four days' rations for 1500 men to Pisco.

1078 Pisco, 11 September 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the watering can be done with the empty pisco barrels; that Lord Cochrane should send him some jerky and biscuit as this hamlet has no supplies; that he will replace them from Army stocks; that the Araucano will sail today.

1079 Aboard Montezuma, 11 September 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane, 7.15 p.m: stating that he is going to disembark; that watering the ships should be the first object.

1080 Headquarters, Pisco, 18 September 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane may cruise as arranged, for four days; that signals should be concerted for use between Delano and the shore.

1081 Headquarters, Pisco, 19 September 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that, as he has learned that enemy forces are approaching, it would be inadvisable for the squadron to depart.

1082 Pisco, 19 September 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane should advise him if he cannot get ashore, in which case he will come aboard the O'Higgins, as they must have a conference; that 120 artillerymen are coming down for distribution in the squadron; that 200 sheep have been sent.

1083 Headquarters, Pisco, 6 October 1820, José de San Martin
to Lord Cochrane: stating that, in view of the armistice of 26 September, he wishes to know the day and the hour that the Galvarino captured the schooner brought to Pisco.

1084 Fortaleza de Pisco, 6 October 1820, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will give him 400 three-inch nails for the repair of launches on this beach, and also a small anchor and a heavy cable.

1085 Headquarters, Pisco, 7 October 1820, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has returned 14 sailors to the squadron, and that he will give orders that no seamen will be admitted to the army.

1086 Pisco, 7 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he will make sure that the two launches abandoned on the beach at Paracas are not totally lost.

1087 Headquarters, Pisco, 8 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Potrillo having been put at his disposal until the arrival of the other transports, he supposes Chile's having sold it to Mr. Henderson will not take effect until that event; that he needs the ship, nor can the contents be transhipped to other smaller ships; that he hopes that Lord Cochrane will persuade Mr. Henderson to allow the army to use it in the meantime.

1088 Headquarters, 8 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is going to see Delano to have the transports sail west to the port of Paracas to embark the army if necessary; requesting that Lord Cochrane will sail there.

1089 Headquarters, Pisco, 9 October 1820, José de San
Martin to Lord Cochrane: notifying him of the resumption of hostilities after the truce.

1090 Pisco, 10 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the ships should anchor in line in the anchorage with the Aguila and the Consecuencia on the flanks; that he congratulates Lord Cochrane on the speed with which the helm of the Aguila was repaired; that the despatch of the Araucano to reconnoitre Callao should be suspended until they have had a conference; that Lord Cochrane will agree that it is impossible to give up the Potrillo, so if the Chilean government declines to pay the charter then he (San Martin) will pay it to Mr. Henderson; that he has high hopes of Arenales' expedition.

1091 Headquarters, Pisco, 11 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a representation from José de Sarratea; stating that it is necessary to repair the ills of which it talks, and that he hopes that Lord Cochrane will do his utmost.

1092 Headquarters, Pisco, 11 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has offered to pay Mr. Henderson in goods for the clothing purchased for the squadron.

1093 Pisco, 11 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he did not realise the circumstances relating to the Potrillo being used to transport the artillery park; that he cannot give it up now; that he believes that an agreeable arrangement can be reached; that due to an attack of rheumatism last night, he cannot see Lord Cochrane today; that the enemy are concentrating in Canete.

1094 Headquarters, Pisco, 12 October 1820, José de San
Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that since the schooner captured by the Galvarino comes under the armistice, it should be given up to him; that he is sending Sarratea's representation.

Pisco, 12 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating his desire to be frank and open with Lord Cochrane.

Pisco, 14 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that Paroissien is taking correspondence to Chile; that he trusts that every measure has been taken to ensure that the Rebecca, carrying dispatches, reaches Chile safely; that he has only given a passport for Chile to Guzman; that officers going to Chile should not travel on the Rebecca for security reasons; that there are reports of 3500 Spanish between Lurín and Cañete; reporting military operations around Ica; approving Lord Cochrane's measures for disciplining the squadron.

Secret note: that the army will embark in three days' time.

Pisco, 17 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: announcing a success from Arenales.

Nazca, 15 October 1820, Colonel Rojas to General Arenales: dispatch announcing a victory at Nazca.
Arenales: advising him of his arrangements for the organisation of a civil administration.

1101 Headquarters, Pisco, 17 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that the Prueba and the Venganza sailed from Callao on 10 October; and that the Rebecca, carrying important correspondence to Chile, must be protected.

1102 Headquarters, Pisco, 22 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the three officers appointed for Forster's case will not be able to give evidence until embarked.

1103 San Martin, 29 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the officers for Forster's trial have been ordered to be ready; and that he does not wish Forster's conduct to be investigated until departure.

1104 Aboard the San Martin, Ancon, 31 October 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Prueba and Esmeralda being out of Callao, Lord Cochrane should continue the blockade and try to intercept them on their return; that the San Martin, Galvarino, Araucano and Montezuma here should be sufficient to deflect any attempt by the enemy ships; that Lord Cochrane should send his spare launches and boats for San Martin's disembarkation.

1105 San Martin, Ancon, 1 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane, urgent: ordering him, on receipt of this, to come to Ancon with three ships to unload their supplies and have an important conference with San Martin.

1106 San Martin, Huacho, 10 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating his congratulations
on the capture of the Esmeralda; that the same should be conveyed to the officers and men, to whom Lord Cochrane's undertakings will be fulfilled.

1107 Copy of the previous item.

1108 San Martin, Huacho, 13 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting he will supply some of the rigging from the Esmeralda; and that he make sure the Aguila's cable is secure.

Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that the rigging can be paid for with brandy, and that the Aguila is quite safe.

1109 Supe, 22 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: agreeing to his request to have the Esmeralda valued immediately; with regard to the hire, stating that he will try to persuade whatever government be established in Peru to undertake the payment.

1110 Supe, 23 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing his note to Captain Searle and Captain Downes' note to him; stating that the news from Lima is encouraging; that rich ships are reported in Callao; that he hopes Lord Cochrane's health is restored.

1111 Headquarters, Supe, 23 November 1820, José de San Martin to Captain Searle: making a solemn protest at his taking aboard immense sums of money for Spanish merchants, and stating that this is against all the laws of neutrality.

1112 Headquarters, Supe, 24 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the basis for an exchange of prisoners.
Headquarters, Supe, 29 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered that Lord Cochrane's very just exposition on Captain Searle's conduct be printed.

Headquarters, Supe, 29 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered the San Martin to rejoin Lord Cochrane; that the departure of this and shortages of the Lautaro leave the convoy in Huacho exposed should the enemy frigates appear; that he hopes that Lord Cochrane will dispatch another warship as soon as possible.

Supe, 29 November 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that they cannot suffer Searle's conduct in silence; that in the absence of the San Martin and the shortage of crew for the Lautaro, the convoy is very exposed in Huacho; requesting that Lord Cochrane will send a ship to protect it.

Headquarters, Supe, 4 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing copies of various reports of military successes and the desertion of the Numancia batallion; stating that he hopes the campaign will soon end; that the prime need is to give the final blow to the enemy naval forces; that he knows that a ship has left Cadiz for Callao and that Lord Cochrane should sail to intercept it, leaving one ship, all that is necessary, to blockade Callao; that the most important object is the destruction of the enemy's maritime forces.

3 December 1820, Colonel Heres to José de San Martin: reporting on the movements of the Numancia batallion.

Jauja, 24 November 1820, General Arenales to General Alvarado: reporting on his military operations.
1119 ND: Extract from the dispatch reporting the entry of Colonel Campiño's division into Huaura.

1120 Headquarters, Supe, 4 December 1820: Order of the Day, regarding the Numancia battalion's defection to the patriot cause.

1121 Headquarters, Supe, 4 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that, regarding the Edward Ellice, Luisa, and other ships, he regrets that they cannot be condemned by an authority established for that purpose, for reasons previously given, and because of the consulta to the government of Chile which is still pending; that the inconvenience of sending the prizes to Chile is balanced by the difficulty of defining prize in Peru; that he does not see distant the day when Lima will fall and a Peruvian government set up, through which such obstacles will be able to be overcome; but that he wishes to be in accord with Lord Cochrane until such a time, and offers to have the Auditor General of Marine receive the information on which the final judgement is to be based.

1122 Supe, 4 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he hopes that a blow will be able to be struck against the ships which are expected; that all the local administrators have been ordered to do their utmost to gather supplies for the squadron; that captain Searle should by now have received the protest he sent regarding his taking Spanish property aboard his ship.

1123 Headquarters, Huaura, 6 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that the Prueba and Venganza disembarked 1000 men at Cerro Azul.
Huaura, 6 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is about to march to Vilcahuara to exercise the troops.

Headquarters, Huaura, 7 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: informing him of the movements of the Prueba and Venganza.

Headquarters, Huaura, 8 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: informing him of military operations along the coast near Pisco; and of the movements of the Prueba and Venganza.

Huaura, 9 December 1820, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending 200 cargas of wood; that he regrets that he cannot send everything the squadron needs; that it is unlikely that Lord Cochrane will be able to get the Spanish warships to meet him.

Department of Marine, Huacho, 26 January 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Esmeralda is to be renamed the Valdivia in Lord Cochrane's honour.

Copy of the previous item.

Headquarters, Huaura, 26 January 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting he will send in his report of the latest cruise.

Headquarters, Huaura, 26 January 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that although the Spanish government must be sending ships, they are bound to arrive scattered and in a poor state after the voyage; that the San Martin and the frigates in the squadron should therefore cruise near to Callao in case the need arises for combined land and sea operations.
Headquarters, Huaura, 29 January 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that the Andromache aided an English merchantman to enter Callao when under the Araucano's blockade, and requesting Lord Cochrane will demand an explanation from Captain Shirriff.

Huaura, 7 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Araucano, Captain Carter, arrived last night having abandoned the blockade for lack of food; that this seemed an insufficient pretext and he has sent her back; that the deposition of Pezuela offers much hope; that Lady Cochrane is quite happy in Huayto.

Headquarters, Huaura, 9 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: informing him of the movement of prisoners.

Headquarters, Huaura, 9 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that the frigate Miantinomo has provisions aboard and a permit to pass the blockade and trade with Lima; that notwithstanding any orders he has from Chile regarding the ship, Lord Cochrane should on no account let it into Callao; that he will accept the responsibility for any consequences.

Headquarters, Huaura, 9 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that he has learned that Pezuela and his family are aboard the Maipo bound for Europe; that they should not be allowed to escape the port; if Lord Cochrane finds them, the family is to be put aboard a neutral ship with sufficient possessions for a decent voyage.

Huaura, 10 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: informing him that the Miantinomo sailed
from Valparaíso intending to deliver corn to Callao and must be stopped.

1138 Headquarters, Huaura, 10 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that, notwithstanding his instructions before his departure, on receipt of this order, if nothing has been achieved or seems likely to be achieved, the force despatched should be immediately sent back and the squadron united in the area of Callao.

1139 Huaura, 10 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Miantinomo has come from Valparaíso with a government license to ship grain into Callao; that it is necessary to prevent her from doing so; that the Andromache arrived at Huaura on 8 February.

1140 21 February 1821: copy of the previous item.

1141 Headquarters, Huaura, 10 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing copies of communications from the marquis of Torretagle.

1142 Headquarters, Huaura, 17 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: regarding the failure of the Valdivia and the Argentina to join the squadron; if the project has been impeded, the squadron is to be reunited at Callao to maintain the blockade, and the Argentina is to be ordered to Huacho to join the troops she carries to the army.

1143 Huaura, 17 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he does not know anything about the Montezuma; that some of the funds on the schooner will be needed here soon; that the Araucano captured the Aransasu; that captain Carter abandoned the blockade; that though he said his ship was in a
bad state, it was not so bad as to have to come to Huacho; that while the mouth of the port was free, the Spanish sent nine gunboats to Ancon and forced our gunboat there to be run ashore and destroyed; that the Galvarino has been sent to resume the blockade; that the Aransasu can be chartered for the service, and he recommends Prunier, whose ship can be used as a supply ship; that he is enclosing an invitation from La Serna, which he will attend though he does not expect much from it; that Lady Cochrane and his (San Martin's) daughter - the latter very sick - have left Huayto, which is too hot, and gone to live on the Andromache; that Carter left the Aransasu's 63 excellent seamen on isla San Lorenzo, whence they were rescued by the Spanish.

1144 Huaura, 17 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of supplies provided to Forster of the Independencia; stating that he is sailing to join the squadron.

1145 Department of Marine, Headquarters, Huaura, 18 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a note of the supplies brought by the Pacifico; stating that the 70 barrels of salt meat have been put at Forster's disposition; that the Montezuma and Pueyrredon being detached at Huacho, he will provision them separately.

1146 Inventory of cargo, brig Pacifico, carrying supplies for the Liberating Army.

1147 Department of Marine, Headquarters, Huaura, 18 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he should leave the other ships on blockade and come to Huacho for a conference on the final plan of operations; that the Argentina is to follow the O'Higgins which should also bring the troops at present on the Valdivia.
1148 Headquarters, Huaura, 28 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting he will come to Huacho to concert further plans of operations.

1149 Huaura, 29 February 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is anxious to see him to concert plans for the campaign which is about to open; that he is not very well at the present.

1150 NP ND, Lieutenant James Robinson to José de San Martin: reciting his services in the Chilean fleet; his differences with Carter in the Pueyrredon; requesting to be transferred to another ship or to be given leave to return to Chile.

Headquarters, Huaura, 1 March 1821, José de San Martin: order to transmit the paper to Lord Cochrane for his decision.

1151 Headquarters, Huaura, 3 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Pacifico will give up to him provisions as listed, including some for the army which he is nevertheless sending in consideration of the squadron's needs.

1152 Headquarters, Huaura, 3 March 1821: Note of supplies being provided for the squadron.

1153 Ingenio, 13 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that Tomas Landa, Lorenzo Valderrama and Pedro José Gil are to go on the expedition to the puertos intermedios and be put ashore where they indicate to send back information; that they should be given every assistance.

1154 Huaura, 16 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that Guise has agreed to resume his service with his officers; requesting that Lord Cochrane will consider them, for the good of the
cause and because of the shortage of officers in the squadron.

1155 Headquarters, Huaura, 19 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: informing him of the arrangements for looking after the squadron's sick in Dr. Welsh's care.

1156 Headquarters, Huaura, 19 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that in order that the squadron may water more easily without risk, he has ordered Captain Delano to see to the construction of a canal.

1157 Headquarters, Huaura, 19 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will remit the inventory of aguardiente to the Supreme Director.

1158 Headquarters, Huaura, 19 March 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has given orders for Captain Charles to have lodgings and assistance in Huacho.

1159 Headquarters, Huaura, 2 April 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that various merchant ships have taken supplies into Callao despite Forster's blockade; that he hopes that Lord Cochrane will take the strictest measures to prevent this from happening again.

1160 Headquarters, Huaura, 6 April 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he appointed Spry before Lord Cochrane's report reached him; that he needed a naval adjutant to oversee the convoy and knew that Spry had left the service, but not the facts that Lord Cochrane relates; that he will look for a way to resolve everything to the greatest benefit of the public service.
1161 Huaura, 6 April 1821, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: stating that he believes it would be better to keep Spry here than to send him to Chile; that as Lord Cochrane refused to have him as captain of transports, he agreed to allow San Martín to appoint him to another post; requesting that Guise be accepted, with his officers, back into the squadron.

1162 Headquarters, Huaura, 7 April 1821, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: expressing his pleasure at the good news from the southern division, and hoping there will be more soon.

1163 Headquarters, Huaura, 7 April 1821, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that the Prueba and Venganza were looking for troops at Chiloé.

1164 Headquarters, Huaura, 7 April 1821, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: stating his regret at the unfortunate happenings in the squadron; that he has forwarded the documents sent by Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine; and that he hopes Lord Cochrane will give the arrested officers passports to Valparaiso or to Huacho.

1165 Huaura, 10 April 1821, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: stating that the bishop of Trujillo has claimed his staff and other ornaments; that Lord Cochrane should advise him if he has them; that he is hoping to get enough mules to transport a strong division to the highlands.

1166 Headquarters, Añon, 25 May 1821, José de San Martín to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a copy of the armistice of Punchauca.

1167 23 May 1821: Copy of the armistice of Punchauca.
Montezuma, off Chorrillos, 13 June 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enlcosing a copy of the armistice of Miraflores.

12 June 1821: Copy of the armistice of Miraflores.

Montezuma, Callao bay, 26 June 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he proposes to disembark the army at Ancon and take the capital; that the Spanish commander has represented to him that Lord Cochrane, despite the armistice, has sacked Molendo; that knowing his interest in the good of the country, San Martin has given no credit to this allegation; and requesting information regarding allegations by the United States frigate's captain, that patriot forces seized 70,000 dollars of his countrymen's money.

Callao bay, 28 June 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the armistice has been ended; that opinion is favourable to the patriots; that the Spanish army is unreliable and suffering from desertion and hunger; that it is going to retreat to Cuzco; that in the sierra they will be lost; that in a month and a half the patriots will be in Lima; that Lord Cochrane should advise him about the sending of the Valdivia or the O'Higgins in case the division suffers a setback; that he will give Lord Cochrane's brother an appointment when he arrives; that 1200 patriot guerrillas are blockading Lima.

Schooner Sacramento, 11 July 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: transmitting the news of the patriot success in Carratala; requesting Lord Cochrane will inform his deputies and the ships' captains.

Lancón, 11 July 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating his approval of Lord Cochrane's measures.
to prevent royalist funds being embarked on neutral ships; that the army will be at Callao this afternoon; that he has rheumatism in the right leg.

Lima, 22 July 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: expressing his surprise at Lord Cochrane's despatch of 20 July; stating that he has never intervened in the finances of the squadron, nor in its operations; that Lord Cochrane has operated practically independently; that San Martin allowed this to happen, confiding in Lord Cochrane's desire for a successful outcome to the campaign, but that this does not affect his supreme authority; that Captain Prunier is under his direct orders by decree of 28 August 1820, and that this does not detract from Lord Cochrane's authority.

Lima, 23 July 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Prunier's representation.

Lima, Ministry of War and Marine, 9 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing Prunier's original reports reclaiming tallow taken out of the Pueyrredon.

Lima, 27 July 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that as he needs arms for the guerrillas in the sierra, he requests that the Lautaro anchor at Ancon and disembark the arms and ammunition she is carrying without delay; that the Galvarino do likewise; that he will replace any of the squadron's arms lent him.

Lima, 27 July 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that there is a shortage of arms; requesting that those of the Galvarino and Lautaro be sent ashore; hoping that Lord Cochrane will attend the act of independence tomorrow.
Lima, 1 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: giving permission for him to disembark the sick from the warships for hospitalisation in Lima.

Lima, 1 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that 10 loads of oranges and lemons will be supplied today to the squadron, in the charge of don Pedro de los Rios.

Lima, 1 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that 83 artillerymen are left of the 353 who came with the expedition; because of this, and as the San Martin's crew will have to be divided up among the other ships, he requests that Lord Cochrane will disembark all the Artillery of the Andes to join the army.

Lima, Department of War and Marine, 2 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting that one of the prize ships in Callao bay be set aside as a prison ship for the Spaniards taken from the Saint Patrick and the Lord Lyndoch, and other prisoners.

Lima, 2 August 1821, José de San Martin, Protector, to Lord Cochrane: stating his friendship for Lord Cochrane; that his lot will be the same as his own; that he trusts Lord Cochrane will come to a satisfactory agreement with Hardy.

Lima, 3 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the captain of the Laura is coming to see him to collect the effects despatched for the transports and the medicine sent for the army; that there is an urgent need to build a battery at Ancon.

Lima, 9 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's
letter on his assumption of the Protectorship of Peru; that he cannot say why the government of Chile has fallen into decay; that it suffers from a failure of foresight and financial probity; that the circumstances compelled him to assume the chieftaincy of Peru and it would be folly to defer servilely to foreign (Chilean) counsels; that the squadron has played an important part in the liberation of Peru and if the press of business had allowed time this would have been acknowledged in the inscription on the coins struck to celebrate the oath; that he has offered a year's wages as bounty to the Chilean seamen; that he recognises the debt of 50,000 pesos for the capture of the Esmeralda; but that he is not responsible for the seamen's wages, the Chilean government is; that he is always ready to hear Lord Cochrane's advice; that Miller has occupied Ica.

Lima, 12 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane, secret: stating that he has learned that rice has been disembarked at Callao notwithstanding the guard boats of the squadron; and that boats have left Callao for Cañete to establish communication with La Serna.

Lima, 13 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: regarding his inability to do anything more over the disagreeable affair of the squadron's pay, expressing his friendship for Lord Cochrane and his hopes that they will be able to go on together in the great cause.

Lima, 13 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has answered officially on the matter of the payment of the squadron; that he repeats his promise that Lord Cochrane's fortune will be the same as his own; that if in spite of this, Lord Cochrane determines on the step which he
implied in the interview a few days before, it will be a difficulty for San Martin from which he will not be able to extract himself.

Lima, 20 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he seconds and applauds Lord Cochrane's glorious deeds; that much is still to be done; that the circumstances demand a certain slowness of pace; that Lord Cochrane's fortune will be the same as his own.

Lima, 24 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is confident that Lord Cochrane will be able to resolve the problems with the neutrals satisfactorily on both sides; that all the biscuit in Ancon has been ordered to be purchased and that Lord Cochrane should prepare a ship to collect aguardiente from Samanco.

Lima, 25 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating his regret that Lord Cochrane is ill; that he has ordered comissary Soyer to supply the necessary provisions to the squadron at Boca Negra and will give further orders that are necessary to buy rum; that Lord Cochrane should come as soon as possible to discuss future plans.

Palacio de Lima, 30 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane, secret: giving an urgent order as commander-in-chief, that as it is likely that he will have to give battle within four days, he demands the 200 muskets taken out of the Aransasu.

Palacio de Lima, 1 September 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: requesting him urgently to land at Ancon the 200 sabres taken from the Laura into the Galvarino.
Headquarters, Chacra de Mendoza, 7 September 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that it is necessary to keep the garrisons of the Callao forts in continual alarm to prevent their being useful to the enemy army.

Headquarters, Mirones, 15 September 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that the enemy army decided yesterday to abandon Callao and since then eight officers and 200 men have deserted to the patriots; that they tried to withdraw last night, and will try again tonight; that by tomorrow Callao will be in the hands of the patriots; that Lord Cochrane should come and see him.

Headquarters, Mirones, 15 September 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has just learned that Lord Cochrane has taken out of national and neutral ships properties which belong to the state and to other persons; that none of the money which has been seized is contraband and he orders Lord Cochrane imperiously as Protector of Peru and commander-in-chief to restore the money to the various ships, and will hold him answerable before the Chilean and Peruvian governments and before public opinion; that this note is being brought by Thomas Guido, to whom the enclosures should be returned.

Casa de Moneda, Lima, 15 September 1821, José de Boqui, Director, to José de San Martin: enclosing a list of the funds transferred to Ancon on 3 September by Jose Meneses, Jose Ollague, and Francisco Lizarsaburu.

Casa de Moneda, Lima, 15 September 1821: List of funds by weight in the Casa de Moneda and transferred to Ancon.
Baquijano, 20 September 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: advising him that Callao is due to surrender tomorrow at 10 a.m. to the patriots; that the ships at Ancon should be told that thereafter they might anchor in Callao.
PART ELEVEN

(Document 1199 - 1274)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF THE PERUVIAN MINISTER OF MARINE
AND OTHER OFFICERS OF THE PERUVIAN MARINE DEPARTMENT
TO LORD COCHRANE 1820 - 1822.
Pisco, 22 October 1820, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that no decision need be taken nor the government of Chile informed on the present business until the latest moment; that he hopes that Lord Cochrane will not leave them until the enterprise is completed; that the manifesto should be got to the printer as soon as possible.

Supe, 22 November 1820, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating his acceptance of Lord Cochrane's objections to the name proposed for the Esmeralda; requesting a suggestion from Lord Cochrane; stating that 2000 Spanish are advancing on Payan; that the project for Callao is a good one but he has doubts about the resolution of the patriots; that he trusts Lord Cochrane's health is restored.

Supe, 29 November 1820, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that Searle's conduct is such that Lord Cochrane's exposition is to be printed; that the official dispatch of the taking of the Esmeralda is in the press at the moment; that Garcia is now in charge of the Ministry of Hacienda, and himself of War; that this campaign might last a long time; that operations are going ahead slowly; that Panama has been revolutionised.

Supe, 4 December 1820, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of documents from the captured ships; stating that he has suggested establishing a tribunal of prizes in Lima to the General; that it is reported that the Numancia battalion has defected to the patriots.

Huaura, 7 April 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that Valdez' division has occupied part of Tarma province; that the Sacramento, after the insurrection of the crew, has arrived at Payta with royalist correspondence from Lima.
Huaura, 24 April 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing the secret plan of signals established by the Commandant of Callao and captured by the patriots in the Sacramento; and instructions from the Commandant of Callao to the Commandant of the Prueba and Venganza.

Callao, 19 November 1820: Plan of signals of recognition for royal ships coming from the Peninsula.

Callao, 9 March 1821, Antônio Vacaino, Commandant of Callao, to José Villegas: stating that he has evaded previous orders on various pretexts, and on the advice of a junta; ordering him to dispense with the aid of juntas, and keep his instructions secret; the ships once fitted out are to come to these seas, being careful on the coast between Guayaquil and Callao under patriot control; are to make for Pisco if it is safe to do so, there obtain information, and meet the forces coming to the assistance of the royal government in Peru; they are not to delay on the coast of New Spain.

Lima, 4 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing a decree announcing the establishment of the Protectorship of Peru.

Lima, 3 August 1821, José de San Martín: proclamation assuming the Protectorship of Peru.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 13 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging Lord Cochrane's letters of 30 July, 4 August and 12 August regarding the claims of the officers and men of the squadron; stating that despite the pressure of business, San Martín has kept the squadron in mind and regrets being unable to fulfil his undertakings;
that the captors of the *Esmeralda* must already have been recompensed by seeing the results of their actions; that the maritime practice of England is not to pay wages until ships return to their home ports; that San Martín does not consider himself responsible for paying the arrears of wages of the squadron; that as far as his other obligations, which he does recognise, he cannot raise enough money even to clothe the army and dare not burden the impoverished populace with more imposts; that he will fulfil his obligations to the fleet a month and a half after the fall of Callao.

**1210** Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 13 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing receipt for 4000 pesos.

**1211** Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 13 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that, being a minister of Peru, he cannot continue in the office of Auditor of the Squadron; requesting that Lord Cochrane will appoint a deputy to discharge the office.

**1212** Lima, 13 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: apologising for his delay; stating that the General is occupied with trying to satisfy the squadron, but this cannot be done now.

**1213** Lima, 16 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: advising him of a decree of the government placing the *Proserpina* under the government's protection.

**1214** Lima, 16 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: notifying him that the *Mercedàs* has received permission to sail to Ancon.
1215 Lima, 17 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: requesting information regarding the taking out of the Colonel Allen from Ancon by the Araucano.

1216 Lima, 17 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: requesting a note of medicines and rigging brought by the Laura from the Chilean government; and that Lord Cochrane transfer them at Ancon to the Commandant of Transports.

1217 Lima, 18 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane, very secret: stating that San Martin learned the night before last that a boat took wheat and flour into Callao; and requesting that Lord Cochrane will order the merchant ships in Callao to Ancon.

1218 Lima, 19 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a decree in the government gazette regarding bounties conceded to the squadron.

1219 Lima, 19 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: requesting that an agent of the squadron be sent to discuss the question of the grain being landed at Boca Negra.

1220 Ministry of Marine, Lima, 20 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has requested Hardy to instruct the English ships to leave Callao, now being placed under embargo, for Ancon; that this has been agreed to and he requests Lord Cochrane will ensure the departure of all other ships.

1221 Lima, 21 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the commandant of Chorrillos has been ordered to supply the commissary of the squadron with 25 sheep daily.
Lima, 21 August 1821, Salvador Soyer, Commissary of the Squadron, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has presented his indent for provisions; and that they have been ordered to be supplied from the commandant of Chorrillos and the intendant of the army.

Lima, 21 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing orders sent to Chorrillos for 25 sheep and to the intendente of the army for 15 pesos a day for vegetables; stating that he hopes this will be sufficient to prevent the blockade having to be raised.

Lima, 21 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Comman-dant of Chorrillos: ordering him to supply 25 sheep daily as of tomorrow to the squadron.

Lima, 22 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Juan de Pardo Zela: stating that Pardo should ensure that good fat sheep are sent to the squadron.

Lima, 22 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that 30 sheep or three head of cattle a day have been ordered to be stocked at Boca Negra for the squadron.

Lima, 22 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating he is enclosing documents to show that Soyer will provide supplies requested for the squadron.

Lima, 23 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: notifying him that the Aransasu has received permission to pass to Ancon.

Lima, 23 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that launches from Callao have been getting supplies from Bufama; requesting that
Lord Cochrane will station a ship off the Boqueron to prevent this from happening again.

Lima, 23 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the case of the Mercedes, the captain of which surrendered to the state 17 hours before the ship was captured by the squadron, is quite different from the case of the Luisa; and requesting that Lord Cochrane will give up the ship at Ancon.

Lima, 25 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: regarding Lord Cochrane's latest complaint of shortage of supplies; referring him to previous letters; hoping that the public funds will soon be on a footing to supply the squadron with all it needs.

Lima, 25 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that notwithstanding the shortage of supplies, the commandant of transports has been ordered to purchase 500 gallons of rum for the squadron; requesting that Lord Cochrane will draw up a relation of all respecting the squadron to prevent a repetition of reports.

Lima, 26 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing documents showing the enemy's means of getting supplies, and requesting that Lord Cochrane will take steps to prevent boats from leaving Callao henceforth.

Canete, 24 August 1821, Leon Febres Cordero, Commandant of the South Coast, to Bernardo Monteagudo: reporting on the activities of royalists slipping out of Callao in small boats to collect supplies along the coast.

Canete, 24 August 1821, Leon Febres Cordero to Bernardo Monteagudo: reporting on the activities of
boats and the **Galvarino** along the coast.

**1236** Lima, 26 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Protector's friendship towards Lord Cochrane continues; that, for example, Spry is leaving tomorrow on a mission to Guayaquil, and this is partly to remove the causes of discord between Lord Cochrane and San Martin.

**1237** Ministry of Marine, Lima, 27 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: note regarding the transmission of ships' books from the comissary of marine in Valparaiso.

**1238** Lima, 27 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that orders have been given to the commandant of transports, to supply the squadron for a month from merchant ships, giving them notes on the government; that any merchantmen that decline to comply with this are to be expelled the port and forbidden to trade on this coast.

**1239** Lima, 27 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: giving instructions that the prisoners on board of the **San Fernando** are to be transferred to the commandant of transports.

**1240** Lima, 27 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that as Lord Cochrane is not likely to be fighting in the near future, and the army being in urgent need of arms, he requests that Lord Cochrane will surrender the weapons and supplies taken out of the **Aransasu**.

**1241** Interim Commissary of the Squadron, Lima, 27 August 1821, Salvador Soyer to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has given the contador of the **O'Higgins** 150 peses to buy 15 pesos of vegetables a day for the ships;
that 25 sheep a day have been ordered to be supplied; that this will hardly be sufficient for two ships; that he is going to request San Martin will appoint a provisioner to supply the rations.

Lima, 29 August 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned that Lord Cochrane took 20 boxes of muskets and 20 barrels of pouches out of the Aransas; that as these are very important, he hopes that Lord Cochrane will have them delivered over to the bearer.

Ministry of Marine, Lima, 1 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is aware of the discontent on board the Lautaro and O'Higgins; that San Martin is unable to provide for his own army, much less the Chilean navy, but conceives that he has acted honourably.

Lima, 1 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Protector has told the defenders of Callao that they must surrender the place on the terms agreed before or the negotiation is null; that the Protector is proposing to send the squadron to Panama with troops but nothing can be done until Callao falls.

Ministry of Marine, Lima, 2 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: reporting that Valdez and 4000 men marching on the capital; that the Protector has decided to fight a battle; and he requests all the soldiers aboard be sent to the army and asks for volunteers among the officers of the navy.

Office of the Marine, Lima, 2 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that in anticipation of an imminent battle outside Lima, all troops on the ships are to join the army and volunteers
from the naval arm should be called for.

Ministry of Marine, Lima, 5 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that, as a battle is imminent, he requests Lord Cochrane will have two boats near Boca Negra against events.

Baguifacio, 20 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has told San Martin of Lord Cochrane's communication and it has been decided that Monteagudo should go aboard the Araucano to deal with the matter; requests the officers and crews be called out to receive their dues.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 20 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will present Lord Cochrane's letters and notes respecting the situation of the squadron to San Martin.

Lima, 21 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the payment to the ships' companies of the money seized at Ancon, the intendant of the army and the commissary of marine are to come on board to remit the silver bar to the shore; that this temporary return of the silver is intended only to save the dignity of the government; that the actual paying-out will be made from the Mint.

Lima, 24 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Protector is prepared to make any sacrifice to bring the conflict to an end; that the blockade of Arequipa will require ships on the coast; that he will send the Protector's proclamation to Lord Cochrane tomorrow; that Guido has orders to supply all the livestock Lord Cochrane asks for.
Lima, 24 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the contadors of the ships should prepare pay lists for all but the Lautaro; that the money is to be disembarked and will be disbursed by the comissary of the army and the paymaster of the marine.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 25 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: informing him of confirmed reports of the fall of Mexico City to Iturbide and requesting a salvo in honour of this event.

Lima, 25 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter received in the correspondence from Chile.

Gobierno del Callao, 25 September 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: transmitting news of the capture of Mexico City by Iturbide and the swearing of Mexican independence.

Lima, 26 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he will send an extract from the trial of the Carreras.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 26 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane's refusal to agree to the temporary return of the Ancon money has destroyed all hopes of a happy conclusion to this affair; that the government have done everything possible to succour the squadron; that Lord Cochrane should consider how much the army is suffering; that only 20 days ago the Comissary of Transports was ordered to supply everything that Lord Cochrane asked for that he could find; that notwithstanding Lord Cochrane's notes about the dangers to the squadron, he is still
responsible for it; that the government has promised
to pay the debts legitimately due to the squadron;
that Lord Cochrane's demand for 200,000 pesos imme-
diately, in the circumstances, seems more like a
measure to prepare the government for the worst
than a reason for seizing the Ancon funds; that the
Casa de Moneda had been ordered to mint 150,000 pesos
to pay the squadron, and the customs administrator
to apply all receipts from import duties to the squad-
ron; that the loss of these funds has been a mortal
blow to the financially hardpressed new government;
that Lord Cochrane will answer to the government of
Chile and to public opinion; that in view of San
Martin's instructions authorising him to dispose of
the squadron as he sees fit, and of the campaign
being largely concluded, Lord Cochrane is ordered
to leave at once for Chile, restoring the funds of
private persons to them; that the provisions in the
schooner Montezuma have been ordered to be given to
him.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 27 September 1821,
Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: requesting
the surrender to the officer bearing this of that
part of the funds due to the military division of
the Liberating Expedition.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 28 September 1821,
Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that
officers will be sent aboard tomorrow to collect
the money left over from the paying of the ships'
companies, as the Government has no funds at all
and needs the money to purchase the supplies re-
quested for the squadron.

Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 28 September 1821,
Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: reminding him
that he has not yet replied to the note of 23 August
stating the difference between seizing the **Luisa** after her flight from Huacho, and seizing the **Mercedes**, a packet boat of the state of Peru; and reiterating the order to allow the latter to pass to Callao.

1261 Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 28 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: ordering the squadron away but requesting that the Artillery of the Andes be ordered ashore.

1262 **Gobierno del Callao**, 29 September 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: stating that the interim commandant of marine, Guise, found Lieutenant Wynter recruiting without permission; that he then behaved insultingly and has been detained.

1263 **Gobierno del Callao**, 30 September 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has detained Lieutenant Wynter of the **O'Higgins** for insulting and indecorous behaviour towards the interim commandant general of Marine and for subsequent dishonourable allusions to the supreme government of Peru; that whatever the status of the squadron in relation to the Peruvian government, its officers cannot exercise the right to levy ashore without the permission of the authorities; that no irregularities have been committed against other **O'Higgins** officers.

1264 Lima, 3 October 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be advised if Lord Cochrane intends to obey San Martin's order to leave Peru.

1265 **Gobierno del Callao**, 3 October 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered Lieutenant James Gull of the **Galvarino** and Peter Tyrie, pilot of the **San Martin**, to be apprehended as requested.
1266 Lima, 4 October 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will visit Lord Cochrane tomorrow either for the last time or to open a new stage in their relations.

1267 Gobierno del Callao, Fortaleza de la Independencia, 4 October 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the desertion of the contramaestre, the condestable and others, he has taken measures to apprehend them.

1268 Gobierno del Callao, 6 October 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: transmitting news of the victory of Carabobo.

1269 Gobierno del Callao, 6 October 1821, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: stating that since for several days no agent of the squadron has come ashore to collect supplies and it appears that Lord Cochrane has cut communications with the shore, consequently he must cut communication between the squadron and the ships anchored in the roadstead until he hears from Lord Cochrane.

1270 Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 26 April 1822, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: note regarding the armed ship taken by Lord Cochrane off the Cocos isles.

1271 Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 26 April 1822, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: expressing the desire of the Peruvian government to strengthen its friendship with Chile, and settle the disputes over the Prueba, Venganza and Alejandro between Peru and the squadron.

1272 Ministry of War and Marine, Lima, 30 April 1822, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: declining to settle claims for the squadron in default of negotiations between Chile and Peru by properly authorised agents.
NP, ND, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: noting a list of prisoners in Callao.

NP, ND, Bernardo Monteagudo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Agüila was put out of service on 29 November and has no stores or provisions aboard.
PART TWELVE

(Documents 1275 - 1310)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF BERNARDO O'HIGGINS TO LORD AND LADY COCHRANE 1818 - 1823
Palacio Directorial, Santiago, 9 December 1818, Bernardo O'Higgins: letter of citizenship in favour of Lord Cochrane.

Palacio Directorial, Santiago, 28 December 1818, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, confidential: stating that there are reports that the Venganza and Esmeralda sailed from Callao for the coast of Arauco; order, to check on the truth of the report and sail if necessary to Arauco with the squadron.

Santiago, 3 March 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: complimenting him and noting that the arguments of the Pacific are attracting the attention of the world.

Santiago, 18 March 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: congratulating him and requesting that he should come to the capital as General San Martin is in Santiago.

Palacio Directorial, 30 August 1819, 9 p.m. Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Governor of Concepcion reports that the Dolores fled from Talcahuano on 23 August, first heading for the Arauco coast, then subsequently turning north to escape our gunboats; that she has 100,000 pesos worth of cargo aboard.

Santiago, 2 September 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating his satisfaction that the manning of the ships is complete; that there is not much time as the Spanish warships may reach Callao in the course of this month; that the liberty of the whole of South America depends upon a successful naval engagement and he hopes that Lord Cochrane will sail as soon as possible; enclosing papers to be distributed in Peru.
Santiago, 19 September 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: sending news from Buenos Aires that the Alejandro and San Telmo, of 74 guns, and the Prueba of 44, left Cadiz bound for Callao; that he doubts whether the Alejandro and perhaps the Prueba will be able to round the Horn by reason of their condition; that the crews are not reliable.

Santiago, 29 November 1819, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that the news of failure of the rocket attacks at Callao has been much lamented in Chile, the more so as no expedition can be sent against Peru until mastery of the sea is obtained; that it would be imprudent to send any troops who would be exposed to the issue of a naval engagement, either during the passage or after they had landed, when they might find themselves cut off in enemy territory; that the character of the Peruvians is such that their patriotic professions cannot be trusted as long as they do not feel themselves protected by a respectable force; that it is undesirable to send a small force of about 2000 men to Peru as the only kind of warfare they could wage, without attaining any great object, would alienate Peruvian opinion; that if the fleet received a check, it is evident that the Viceroy would launch a counter-attack against Chile.

Santiago, 21 April 1820, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating his regret that Lord Cochrane considers that it is impossible to send an expedition of 4,000 men to Peru; and that it is advisable that he come to Santiago so that it may be discussed.

Santiago, 9 June 1820, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that he proposes to deal leniently with his prisoners.
Palacio Directorial, Valparaíso, 10 July 1820, Bernardo O’Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that if it is true that the commander-in-chief has the privilege of appointing the captain to his flagship, it is also true that an appointment to a frigate of 30 guns or more must be made to an officer who holds the correct rank; that Captain Crosbie is not qualified to take the command, and that Captain Spry is so qualified.

3 August 1820, Bernardo O’Higgins to the Peruvians: proclamation announcing their imminent emancipation by the Liberating Expedition, and promising them the liberty to choose their own government.

3 August 1820: Extract copy of the previous item.

Valparaíso, 7 August 1820, Bernardo O’Higgins to Lord Cochrane: order for the Pueyrredon under Captain Prunier to be prepared to sail immediately for Chocó on a special mission.

Palacio Directorial, 19 August 1820, Bernardo O’Higgins: general instructions to Lord Cochrane for the liberating expedition, stating that San Martin is the commander-in-chief of land and sea forces and that Lord Cochrane is to operate under his orders.

Copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item.

Santiago, 4 September 1820, Bernardo O’Higgins to Lord Cochrane: expressing his hopes that the free men of Chile will successfully liberate their Peruvian brothers from the Spanish tyranny.
1294 Santiago, 22 November 1820, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: referring to the satisfactory news received from Peru, mentioning the fortification of Valdivia and the activities of foreign ships at Rio de la Plata.

1295 Santiago, 8 June 1821, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is expediting the despatch of supplies to the liberating expedition.

1296 Santiago, 7 November 1821, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, most secret and confidential: stating that he is more tranquil after receiving Lord Cochrane's last letters; that while he is surprised at Lord Cochrane's actions, he gives his approbation to all that Lord Cochrane has done in the difficult circumstances; that he hopes that Guayaquil will not be lost and that if Lord Cochrane should find it convenient to seize Puna or some equivalent point to raise the Chilean flag, he could send 500 men or more depending on whether he is able to get some men of property to raise the money; that with Guayaquil, Chile could take possession of the Galapagos Islands and by adding the Prueba and Venganza to the fleet, would be able to give the law in the Pacific; that at the moment, he is engaged in getting the expedition against Chiloe with the Lautaro under way.

1297 Santiago, 12 November 1821, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane, most secret and confidential: stating that while the Chilean squadron commands the Pacific, Chile may be master of America; that uniting Guayaquil and Chile closely will allow the latter to march rapidly to greatness; that an enterprise against the Philippines might be attempted, of which he wishes to talk privately to Lord Cochrane; that the Minister of Finance has
been sent to Lima to present Chilean claims on Peru for the costs of the Liberating Expedition; that he gives his approbation of the seizure of the funds at Ancon; that it is necessary to preserve friendly relations with Sir Thomas Hardy and with England; that from the moment that the independence of Peru was declared, the Chilean squadron ceased to be subordinate to San Martin's authority; that it is important that Chiloé be liberated, as it would be a good nursery for seamen.

1298 Santiago, 4 June 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating his pleasure at Lord Cochrane's return.

1299 Santiago, 10 June 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: giving family news and referring to Lord Cochrane's impending visit to Santiago.

1300 Santiago, 17 June 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has requested clarifications from Peru in the matter of the brig Europa.

1301 Santiago, 3 July 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the Valdivia and the Aransasu, he would have liked to augment the naval force of Chile but poverty and the costs of the expedition dictate another course; requesting that Lord Cochrane will draw up an official note of debts due by Peru to the fleet; stating that he believes that Chiloé is no longer under the rule of and sustained by the royalists of Peru.

1302 Santiago, 10 July 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating the problems involved in raising a loan.
Santiago, 5 September 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating the difficulties of raising money, referring to the reluctance of the Chileans to foresee danger, the ingratitude of the Guayaquil government, that he is sending 200 men to the Chilean forces in Peru, and that he has requested the comissary of marine to pay the foreign seamen.

Santiago, 1 October 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: referring to the stupidity and sullenness of Blanco Encalada, the heavy losses of the Chileans in Peru, his determination to send thither the criminals abounding in the prisons of Chile, and that clothing for the fleet has been dispatched to Valparaíso.

Santiago, 3 October 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: stating his irritation at the calumnies spread by Captain Morgell; that arrangements are being made to pay the crews; referring to the bandits infesting Chile and attacking villages and his determination to dispatch them to Peru.

Santiago, 23 October 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: arranging for a meeting the next day.


Santiago, 2 December 1822, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: protesting his friendship and defending Monteagudo; stating that where a minister of hacienda is ill-loved, it is probably because he is discharging his duties faithfully, where well-liked, probably because he is not; stating that
clerical dislike was a cause of Monteagudo's expulsion, and drawing attention to his labours for the cause at the beginning of the revolution.

1309 Valparaiso, 22 March 1823, Bernardo O'Higgins to Lady Cochrane: personal letter and account of his fall from power and his hopes of visiting Europe.

1310 NP, ND, O'Higgins to Lord Cochrane: incomplete letter, containing only farewell and signature.
PART THIRTEEN

(Documents 1311 - 1460)

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHILEAN AND PERUVIAN PUBLIC OFFICERS, AND LETTERS AND PAPERS OF INDIVIDUALS, 1818 - 1922 AND UNDATED
1311 Ministry of State, Santiago, 1 December 1818, Joaquín Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: welcoming him to Chile and hoping that he will come to Santiago soon.

1312 Santiago, 2 December 1818; Decree appointing a decoration to be given to all participants in the expedition against the Maria Isabel.

1313 Santiago, 2 December 1818; Proclamation regarding medals for veterans of the first campaign of the Chilean navy.

1314 Ministry of State, 9 December 1818, Joaquín Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: stating that as posts can only be given to citizens, he is enclosing a certificate of citizenship.

1315 Sala Capitular, Santiago, 11 December 1818, Ayuntamiento to Lord Cochrane: enclosing his certificate of citizenship; stating that his name has already been enrolled.

1316 Headquarters, Santiago, 17 December 1818, Francisco Calderón: List of promotions made in the national marine, with their equivalent military ranks.

1317 HQ Army of the South, Chillán, 31 December 1818, Antonio Gonzalez Balcarce to José de San Martín: stating that the Venganza and Potrillo entered Talcahuano on 29 December.

1318 Newssheet of informations received on various occasions about the progress of patriot arms: Guayaquil, 21 January 1819: information about reinforcements and shipping movements Guayaquil, 6 February 1819: information about shipping movements, military movements, death of the
regents of Guayaquil
Santa Fé: reporting Morillo's capture of Apure
Quito: reporting the Numancia batallion in march for upper Peru
Panama: reporting on shipping movements
Payta: reporting on shipping movements
Guayaquil, 18 May 1819: reporting on shipping movements
Lima, 18 June 1819: reporting on military movements, the Guayaquil convoy's fear of Lord Cochrane, other shipping movements.

1319. London, 9 June 1819, Jose Antonio Alvarez to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's of 10 December brought by Irisarri; that Captain Charles and Lieutenant Godfrey are on their way to join Lord Cochrane; that the Rising Star has been delayed as Mr Ellice demands payment of all expenses incurred before she sails; that he has had to put her up for sale to raise money for the creditors; account of Spanish shipping movements.

1320. Valparaiso, 1 July 1819, Juan José Tortel to Ignacio Zenteno: Reporting that the Italian ship Tiburtino met a boat from a Spanish prize Luzero in which boat the prizemaster had set adrift Cayetano Requena, Lt. Col. Bernaldez, Andres de los Reyes, Juan Franco and others near Juan Fernandez, and had disappeared westwards; Lord Cochrane's correspondence to the Minister of Marine was in this boat.

1321. Santiago, 15 July 1819, Tomas Guido to Lord Cochrane: stating that as the patents and documents relative to the Argentina have been sent to Santiago, he will consult them there; that he hopes that Lord Cochrane's precautionary measures will preserve the ships and their cargoes until the business is resolved.
Santiago, 16 July 1819, Tomas Guido to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that he has been informed that Lord Cochrane has detained the Buenos Aires privateer Argentina, and her prizes, for piracy by another ship under the same flag; that Captain Bouchard of the Argentina now complains of irregularities against his flag; that he hopes this will deteriorate if they are not kept in order by Bouchard, he requests that he be allowed to resume the command while the case is being examined.

Ministry of State, Santiago, 19 July 1819, Joaquin Echeverria to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing copies of official informations received from Buenos Aires.

Buenos Aires, 16 June 1819, Miguel Zañartu to Bernardo O'Higgins: describing the state of relations between the United Provinces and Brazil.

1 April 1819: Translation from the Publick Ledger stating that of the Cadiz expedition, four ships of the line, six frigates, 12 brigs and schooners, and 26 gunboats are ready in the harbour; that there is transport for 20,000 men; that France has given one and a half million pounds' worth of aid to Spain.

Buenos Aires, 26 June 1819, José Rondeau to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that the fate of the May 1818 expedition is known in Spain; that the San Telmo (74) and frigate Diana (40) will be joined by the Alejandro (74) and San Fernando (74) and will probably make for Portobello or Panama.

Buenos Aires, 26 June 1819, Miguel Zañartu to Bernardo O'Higgins: reporting news from Cadiz; stating that the Recurso is sailing from Rio with arms and powder for Lima; reporting the news of the Spanish warships due to sail for the Pacific.
1328 Extract copy of the previous item.

1329 Serena, 30 July 1819, Joaquín Vicuña to Lord Coch­rane: describing the fortunes of the prize Victoria from Huambacho to this port due to the conduct of Juan Yabes (John Jarvis), the prizemaster; that he has suspended him from his command and is sending the ship on under the pilot; that the crew would not sail under Yabes for his notorious cruelty; that the unhappy condition of the negroes compelled him to hospitalise them except for six who have been incorporated into his garrison.

1330 Serena, 6 August 1819, Joaquín Vicuña to Lord Coch­rane: stating that the Victoria has returned to the port having broken her spars and lacking rig­ging; that she cannot be repaired at this port; that he will wait for instructions from the govern­ment.

1331 Serena, 6 August 1819, Joaquín Vicuña to Lord Coch­rane: stating that he is sending Yabes by the Teodocio to Lord Cochrane for judgement.

1332 Quillota, 29 August 1819, Diego Guzman to Lord Cochrane: reporting on the collection of recruits at Quillota.

1333 Santiago, 6 September 1819, Jose Maria Guzman to Lord Cochrane: stating that he expects shortly to find the maid who disappeared from Lady Cochrane's household, taking some valuable ornaments with her.

1334 Santiago, 9 September 1819, Tomas Guido to Bernardo O'Higgins: transcribing an unofficial notification of the Buenos Aires government that Spanish war­ships have been seen off the Cape Verde islands.

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Coquimbo, 15 September 1819, José Antonio Bustamente to Lord Cochrane: stating that of the 180 men ordered to be available here, only 100 are ready as the rest of the battalion is recruiting at various points in the interior out of reach.

Coquimbo, 16 September 1819, José Antonio Bustamente to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending 300 varas of bayeta and 15½ quintals of lana.

Aboard the Constancia, Ylo, 24 January 1820, Anonymous to Bernardo O'Higgins: reporting on the state of Peru; movements of royalist shipping; rumours that an expedition is on foot for Chile.

Concepcion, 10 March 1820, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: approving his arrangements for the garrisoning and preservation of the Valdivia forts; asserting that the inhabitants of Chiloe will have to be brought to reason with bayonets; that the conquest of Valdivia is encouraging the Indians of Angol to adhere to the patriot cause; that this province will be pacified soon.

Concepcion, 10 March 1820, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: stating that it is necessary for the whole south to be pacified if this province is to be tranquil.

Osorno, 11 March 1820, Jorge Beauchef to the Governor of Valdivia: reporting on his operations against royalists in the area since 3 March.

Santiago, 21 March 1820, Garcia del Rio to Lord Cochrane: congratulating him on the birth of a child; noting that Lord Cochrane is coming to town; stating that San Martin is in Santiago.
Santiago, 30 March 1820, José Manuel Borgoño: request that six 4-pounder pieces ordered by the commander-in-chief be disembarked for Juan Bulayra.

Lord Cochrane: note that three have been disembarked from the San Martin, one from the Lautaro, one un-serviceable one from the O'Higgins, and one is in Valdivia.

21 April 1820: Ordinance respecting cargo manifests, customs inspection, and the carrying of lights in Valparaiso roads, to prevent contraband trade.

Valparaiso, 9 May 1820, Salvador de Andrade to Lord Cochrane: as archdeacon of the church of Concepción and ecclesiastical governor of the bishopric, he requests that the ornaments, sacred vessels and books taken to Valdivia by the Spaniards and now recovered be given to him for transmission to Manuel Salas in Santiago.

Santiago, 23 May 1820, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the ships will sail to Talcahuano to collect the 500 recruits waiting at Concepción, as they are in the way, and eating up all the supplies intended for the army.

Valdivia, 26 May 1820, Cayetano Letelier to Lord Cochrane: stating that the populace is still not won over to the patriot cause; that the royalists are strong in Chiloé and may attempt to reconquer the place; requesting that Lord Cochrane will use his influence to have more forces despatched to hold Valdivia.

Santiago, 16 June 1820, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: stating that his friend Ramon Villalon wishes to purchase a state ship and hoping that Lord Cochrane will smooth the way.
Montezuma, 9 August 1820, José de San Martin to Colonel Juan Paz del Castillo: order to take Pisco.

San Martin, Pisco, 7 September 1820, Gregorio de las Heras to Lord Cochrane: Informing him of the general instructions to the expedition for the landing at Pisco.

Aboard San Martin, off Pisco, 7 September 1820, Gregorio de las Heras to Lord Cochrane: enclosing an order to the army by the General.

San Martin, 11 September 1820, Toribio de Luzurriaga to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has made the arrangements for the troops ashore to water.

San Martin, 11 September 1820, Toribio de Luzurriaga to Lord Cochrane: notifying him that the artificers are to tranship from the Perla to the Minerva.

San Martin, 11 September 1820, Toribio de Luzurriaga to Lord Cochrane: stating that, on Lord Cochrane's orders, fishermen's canoes are being thrown into the sea and their nets destroyed.

San Martin, 11 September 1820, Toribio de Luzurriaga to Lord Cochrane: stating that the 50 men asked for by Lord Cochrane are at the disembarkation point.

Ancon bay, 6 November 1820: Bulletin Number 3 of the United Forces for the Liberation of Peru, account of the cutting-out of the Esmeralda.

Huaura, 21 January 1821, Santiago Deblin to José de San Martin: stating that the general medical stores are too scarce for there to be much provision for the squadron.

Huaura, 21 January 1821, Santiago Deblin to José de San Martin: listing the medicaments which can be supplied to the squadron.

Santiago, 20 February 1821, Joaquín Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: transmitting information of 4 September 1820 from Irisarri in London that Spain is preparing to send two warships to Callao.

Ministry of State, Santiago, 23 March 1821, Joaquín Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: transmitting news from Rio de Janeiro that the Lord Cathcart and the Columbia are preparing to sail for Callao, secretly on Spanish accounts.

Ingenio, 7 April 1821, Garcia del Rio to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging Lord Cochrane's of 5 April; stating that the correspondence has been sent by the Theodosius; that the crew of the Sacramento rebelled between Callao and Panama and took the ship into Payta; that there is a report here that at sunset on 5 April Lord Cochrane was engaged with a large ship.

Huaura, 10 April 1821, James Paroissien to Lord Cochrane: stating that he thinks it unlikely that the patriots will be in Lima in three weeks, but will have to stay in Huaura; that nearly all the officers and men are sick; that more could be done, particularly by the cavalry; that San Martin seems to wish to strike a blow against Valdez though he (Paroissien) would prefer an attack on the capital; that if Valdez could be defeated the campaign would be over.
Ministry of State, Santiago, 17 April 1821, Joaquín Echeverría to Lord Cochrane, secret: enclosing documents from Irisarri in London proving that Spanish merchant expeditions are sailing to Peru under foreign colours; stating that measures should be taken to apprehend these ships; that he is also enclosing papers regarding another Spanish military expedition to America.

London, 6 November 1820, Antonio José de Irisarri to Joaquín Echeverría: dispatch number 87, stating that the viceroy being heavily indebted to various Spanish merchants, and needing arms, he has given licences to various of them to introduce goods duty free at Callao and Arica.

List of ships sailing from England with the viceroy's licence: Klimbeng Jattie, Dutch, Captain MacLean, despatched by Paxton Cockerell Trale and Co, agents of the Windham and owners of the Lautaro; Lord Cathcart, 494 ton frigate, Captain Watson; Admiral Cockburn, 390 ton frigate, Captain Briggs; Colonel Allen, 339 ton brig, Captain Bond.

London, 7 November 1820, Antonio José de Irisarri to Minister of State for Foreign Relations: dispatch number 88, stating that it is reported from France that Spain has bought all the canvas in Germany at a cost of half a million pesos; that the Spanish government has also raised a 10 million peso loan; that the Spanish Minister of Marine has announced that he can not reconquer the dissident provinces without a naval squadron.

London, 22 November 1820: duplicates of the above.

Santiago, 8 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to José de San Martín: stating that the Chilean government
undertakes to credit to the liberating expedition the 130,000 dollars due to the captors of the Esmeralda and the Aransas.

Lord Cochrane: note of the sums paid by him on account of the state.

1366 Santiago, 18 May 1821, Ignacio Zenteno to José de San Martín: copy letter specifying that the 130,000 pesos due to the squadron for the capture of the Esmeralda and Aransas should be paid out of the military chest.

1367 Copy of the previous item.

1368 Ministry of State, Santiago, 9 June 1821, Joaquín Echeverría to Lord Cochrane, secret: transmitting information from Rio de Janeiro, that the Nancy, Indian, Joseph, Olive Branch have been hired by Spaniards to ship goods to Lima; that up to a million pesos worth of goods have been purchased in Rio for shipment to Lima.

1369 Santiago, 19 June 1821, Joaquín Echeverría to Lord Cochrane: transcribing a letter to de Gravierre, expressing surprise that he has not given full explanations in relation to the government warning of the blockade of Callao, and his hope that the French warships will not attempt to run it.

1370 Peruana, 28 August 1821, Manuel Loro to Lord Cochrane: stating that the articles requested for the O'Higgins have been brought and await Lord Cochrane's collection on the Peruana.

1371 Peruana, Ancon, 31 August 1821, Manuel Loro to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received two lists, of supplies which are needed, and of prisoners on the San Fernando; that he has been able
to get rice, jerky and flour; that he is awaiting orders from the Protector to send to Chancay for firewood; that the prisoners should be dispersed among the transport ships.

1372 **Peruana, Ancon bay, 15 September 1821, Manuel Loro to Lord Cochrane**: stating that Lord Cochrane's officer forbade the passing of the daily pipe of water to the officers, men and prisoners on the prison hulk **Truxillana**; that they have no water otherwise.

1373 **Peruana, Ancon bay, 16 September 1821, Manuel Loro to Lord Cochrane**: stating that he has requested the Protector's permission to supply the squadron, which he expects to get in two days' time.

1374 **Callao, Fortaleza de la Independencia, 6 October 1821, Jose Santiago Aldunate and Colonel Sanchez to Lord Cochrane**: thanking him for his compliments.

1375 **Guayaquil, 15 October 1821, Arturo Wavell to Lord Cochrane**: enclosing his official permission from the Guayaquil government to sail.

1376 **NP, ND, Arturo Wavell to Lord Cochrane**: requesting permission to sail, and a maritime pass from Lord Cochrane.

1377 **Guayaquil, 12 November 1821, Arturo Wavell to Lord Cochrane**: stating that he will not declare his ultimate destination by virtue of his instructions; that there is no danger that information will leak to the Spanish warships by the **San Antonio**'s sailing.

Guayaquil, 12 November 1821, Arturo Wavell to Lord Cochrane: stating that as he is going on a mission from the Supreme Director to Mexico, it is incorrect
that he will be touching at enemy-held ports.

1378 Bernardo O'Higgins to Brigadier Felipe O'Reilly: passport for him to travel as the agent of Chile to Mexico.

1379 Guayaquil, 13 November 1821, Arturo Wavell to Lord Cochrane: stating his official protest at being detained by Lord Cochrane, particularly as the Spanish frigates are reported to have sailed from Acapulco; stating that his is contrary to the interests of Chile and the law of nations.

1380 Truxillo, 14 November 1821, Tomas Heres to Lord Cochrane: stating that he (Heres) has been discharged from Peru by San Martin; that he will see Lord Cochrane shortly to explain the business personally.

1381 Guayaquil, 15 November 1821, Brigadier Felipe O'Reilly to Lord Cochrane: stating that he was travelling with Wavell to Mexico, but that their ship, the San Antonio, was forbidden to sail from Guayaquil to Acapulco by Lord Cochrane on the grounds that they would give news of his movements to the Prueba and Venganza; that he hereby protests.

1382 Lima, 1821, Esteban Luca: poem entitled "El triunfo del vice-Almirante Lord Cochrane sobre el Callao, el 6 de Diciembre de 1820".

1383 Santiago, Peruvian legation, 11 March 1822, J. Garcia del Rio and James Paroissien: List of charges made by General San Martin against Lord Cochrane relative to his conduct as Vice-Admiral of the Chilean fleet.

1384 Peruvian Legation, Santiago, 11 March 1822, J.
García del Rio and James Paroissien to Joaquín Echeverría: translation of the charges preferred by General San Martin against Lord Cochrane relative to his conduct as Vice-Admiral of the Chilean squadron.

Lima, 27 September 1822, Congress of Peru: Resolution of thanks to Lord Cochrane for his contribution to the liberation of Peru.

Valparaiso, 1 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to the people of Peru: address of thanks for the vote of the Congress to him.

Valparaiso, 19 November 1822, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: defending himself against the accusations made against him in Document number 5 of the Peruvian Legation.

Lima, 13 August 1821, José de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating his inability to do any more about paying the squadron and stating that he hopes he and Lord Cochrane will be able to continue friends.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 4 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating the determination of the Chilean government to reward the officers who stayed faithful to their duty.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: no text.

Quintero, 4 January 1823, Lord Cochrane: proclamation to the merchants of England trading in these seas.

Guayaquil, 13 March 1822, José de la Mar to Lord
Cochrane: stating that he has never said that Lord Cochrane supplied or tried to supply provisions to Callao while he commanded it.

1386 Guayaquil, 14 March 1822, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will give an explanation for his seizure of the Venganza.

1387 Legation of Peru, Guayaquil, 14 March 1822, Francisco Salazar to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has learned of the seizure of the Venganza and Alejandro by Chilean officers and men, although the ships belong to Peru; that the relations between Chile and Peru are very intimate and Lord Cochrane has no reason to carry out this act; that he makes his protest and demands the evacuation of the said ships.

1388 Nepiña, 13 April 1822, Julian Lozarto to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Prueba is reported to have surrendered in Callao; that he is not allowed to give any assistance to the squadron.

1389 Nepiña, 14 April 1822, Julian Lozarto to Lord Cochrane: stating again that his orders are to refuse supplies to the squadron.

1390 Callao, 30 April 1822, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the provisions which have come in the Oceano, he cannot vary the commands of his government; that he is the interim representative of Chile in Peru and Lord Cochrane should direct requests for provisions through him as he has powers to obtain them.

1391 Callao, 4 May 1822, Luis de la Cruz to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has managed to secure some of the supplies that Lord Cochrane asked for; requesting
that he will send his contador ashore to receive them.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 16 July 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Ignacio Zenteno: enclosing documents relative to the charges against Lieutenant Edward Brown.

Ministry of Hacienda and War, Santiago, 6 August 1822, Jose Antonio Rodriguez to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will give an approximate valuation of the Independencia for the information of the commissioners dealing with the purchase of the ship in the United States.

Lord Cochrane: note stating that he cannot give a valuation as he does not know what shipbuilding costs in the United States are.

Santiago, 23 September 1822, Miguel Valdes Bravo and Joaquin Tocornal to the Government: petition advocating the establishment of a port at Topocalma between Talcahuano and Valparaiso.

Santiago, 19 October 1822, Gonzalez, Agent of the Fiscal: note approving and recommending the petition.

Lima, 27 September 1822, Congress of Peru: Resolution of thanks to Lord Cochrane for his contribution to the liberation of Peru.

Valparaiso, 1 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to the people of Peru: address of thanks for the vote of the Congress to him.

Valparaiso, 19 November 1822, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: defending himself from the accusations
made against him in Document number 5 of the Peruvian legation.

Lima, 13 August 1821, Jose de San Martin to Lord Cochrane: stating his inability to do anything more about paying the squadron, but that he hopes that he and Lord Cochrane will be able to continue friends.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 4 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: stating the determination of the Chilean government to reward the officers who stayed faithful to their duty.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 19 June 1822, Joaquin Echeverria to Lord Cochrane: no text.

Quintero, 4 January 1823, Lord Cochrane: proclamation to the British and other merchants trading in these seas.

Lima, 27 September 1822, Congress of Peru: Resolution of thanks to Lord Cochrane for his contribution to the liberation of Peru.

Lima, 30 September 1822, Manuel Jose Soler to Lord Cochrane: reporting on the appointment of an attorney for Lord Cochrane in Lima.

Santiago, 28 October 1822, Patrick Burke O'Maddin to Lord Cochrane: poem in Latin entitled "De Felice Reditu".

Concepcion, 31 October 1822, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane, confidential: account of the corruption, greed and illiberality of the administration; of San Martin's dubious motives in returning to Chile; his wish that Cochrane should help to save the
Republic; stating that the squadron can operate from this province.

1400 Concepcion, 14 November 1822, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter from Captain Wynter and his pagaré to Rafael Prats for 441 pesos.

1401 Concepcion, 20 November 1822, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: account of the corrupt manner in which the government have organised the appointment of delegates to the constituent assembly; the ambitions of O'Higgins; the corruptness of his ministers; Lord Cochrane's distinction and liberality; stating that Concepcion has reached the limit of its endurance; that Lord Cochrane should join in their projected coup, using the squadron to control the ports of Valparaiso and Concepcion; that San Martin will be expelled from the country.


1403 Assembly of the free people of the Province of Concepcion, 4 December 1822, Esteban Manzanos and others to Jose de San Martin: account of the discontent of the province with the government; request that San Martin will intervene and use his influence with the Director.

1404 Assembly of the free people of the Province of Concepcion, 10 December 1822, Esteban Manzanos and others: declaration of the assembly of the free people of the Republic, stating the troubles and oppressions suffered by the province and refusing to accept the new constitution.

1405 Concepcion, 11 December 1822, Provincial Assembly
to Lord Cochrane: complimenting him on his defeat of the Spanish maritime forces which has given Chile mastery of the Pacific.

1406 Assembly of the Peoples of the Province of Concepcion, 11 December 1822, Esteban Manzanos and others to Lord Cochrane: stating their belief that the government's dispatch of a warship south is to blockade Concepcion and seize the funds expected from Lima; that they hope that Lord Cochrane will prevent this from occurring.

1407 Assembly of the Peoples of the Province of Concepcion, 11 December 1822, Esteban Manzanos to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he will hold the funds of the British loan, which have arrived in Valparaiso, in security until the doubts of Concepcion regarding the government have been satisfactorily resolved.

1408 Concepcion, 11 December 1822, Ramon Freire to Lord Cochrane: stating his wishes that Lord Cochrane should throw in his lot with the revolution.

1409 Assembly of the Peoples of the Province of Concepcion, 11 December 1822, Esteban Manzanos and others to Lord Cochrane: account of their sufferings and their determinations for the future and recommending that Lord Cochrane throw in his lot with them.

1410 Santiago, 20 January 1823, Gaceta Ministerial Extraordinaria de Chile; number 61: printing documents relative to the departure of O'Higgins from the Directorship.

1411 Santiago, Wednesday, 29 January 1823, Gaceta Ministerial Extraordinaria, number 62: reporting the abdication of O'Higgins.
30 January 1823; Articles of the organic ordinance drawn up by the committee appointed by the deputies elected to appoint a government to replace that of Bernardo O'Higgins, now abdicated.

Santiago, 6 February 1823, Mercurio de Chile: printing accounts of O'Higgins' abdication; Lord Cochrane to Echeverría, 16 January 1823, returning his insignia; proclamation of Lord Cochrane to the Chilean people.

Santiago, 23 February 1823; Documents relative to the abdication and exile of O'Higgins.

Santiago, 28 February 1823, José Gregorio Argomédo, Salvador de la Cavereda, José María Astorga: account of the work and activities of the conciliating deputation of the government towards the province of Concepción.

Santiago, 30 March 1823: Constitution of Chile.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, 11 April 1823, Juan Egaña to Lord Cochrane: stating that the government have felt the absence of Lord Cochrane in its maritime affairs; account of Canterac's defeat of the allies at Moquegua and the danger that Lima will fall; stating that two warships are reported to be leaving Cadiz for Peru and requesting that Lord Cochrane will return at least until the period of danger is passed.

Copy of the previous item.

Santiago, April 1823, Juan Egaña, Manuel Novoa, Manuel Antonio Gonzalez: report of the congress of plenipotentiaries to the Supreme Director, Ramon Freire.
Santiago, 1823, Accord of the Congress of Plenipotentiaries nominating a provisional Director and Senate.

Valparaiso, 2 May 1821, (1824), Thomas Clark to Lord Cochrane: account of the failure of Freire's Chiloé expedition; of the progress of operations in Peru; of the incompetence and venality of the present government; of Freire's unstable political position; of the new constitution.

Valparaiso, 18 September 1844: extract from El Mercurio newspaper describing Lord Cochrane's feats in the war of independence.

Valparaiso, 23 Upper Baker Street, 28 November 1825, Mariano Egaña to Lord Cochrane: stating his refusal again to pay Lord Cochrane the sums claimed on the grounds that he does not hold his government's authority to do so; reproving him for his intemperate language.

Valparaiso, 23 Upper Baker Street, 14 July 1825, Mariano Egaña to Lord Cochrane: stating that as he was in the Ministry of State, he has not sufficient knowledge to deal with Lord Cochrane's case; that in this post he does not have the powers authorising him to engage in such negotiations as are raised by Lord Cochrane's proposals; reproving Lord Cochrane for his undiplomatic language.

Valparaiso, 15 October 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional, in El Mercurio number 5672.

Valparaiso, 16 October 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional (continued) in El Mercurio number 5673.
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Valparaiso, 17 November 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional (continued), in El Mercurio number 5700.

Valparaiso, 18 November 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional (continued), in El Mercurio number 5701.

Valparaiso, 10 December 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional (continued), in El Mercurio number 5720.

Valparaiso, 11 December 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional (continued), in El Mercurio number 5721.

Valparaiso, 17 December 1846, Garcia Reyes: Memoria sobre la primera escuadra nacional (continued), in El Mercurio number 5726.

Paris, 16 May 1852, J. Rosales, Chilean charge d'affaires, to Lord Dundonald: stating that he is enclosing a copy of the decree of the Chilean government.

Santiago, 18 February 1852: Decree of the Chilean government noting Lord Dundonald's acceptance of the offer of £6000, to be set against the loan in London, and rejecting his claim to interest on this sum.

Santiago, 16 February 1852: Copy of the previous item.

Paris, 21 May 1852, J. Rosales to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has instructed Baring Brothers to make the payment.
Santiago, 30 March 1855, John O'Brien to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has heard that Lord Dundonald is in good health and rumoured to be named to clear the Russians from the sea; that his own health is declining; account of the prosperity of Chile; that he has arranged for a statue of Freire to be erected on the Alameda; that there is talk of statues of O'Higgins, San Martin and Lord Cochrane being erected.

Ministry of Foreign Relations, Santiago, 2 December 1856, Javier Ovalle to Lord Dundonald: acknowledging receipt of three letters regarding prize money due for the capture of the Esmeralda and money due to Crosbie's heirs and to Major Cochrane.

Santiago, 28 July 1857: Copy of a proposition signed by Manuel Montt and José Francisco Gana to give Lord Dundonald Admiral's pay for life.

Cutting from a Chilean gazette of the projected law concerning Lord Dundonald's salary.

Copy of the previous item.

Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 22 August 1857, José Gana to Lord Dundonald: advising him of the decision to offer him Admiral's pay for life and a medal.

Santiago, 28 August 1857, Javier Ovalle to the British chargé d'affaires: notifying him of the Chilean law of 20 August offering the Earl of Dundonald Admiral's pay for life.

Paris, 4 October 1857, Manuel Blanco Encalada to Lord Dundonald: informing him of the decision of the Chilean Congress, and hoping to meet him soon.
1453  Sabloniere Hotel, Leicester Square, 4 July 1859, Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna to Lord Dundonald: offering to translate his Narrative of Services into Spanish, and hoping to meet him.

1454  Copy of the previous item.

1455  1 Royal Crescent, 17 January 1860, Joaquin Benítez to Lord Dundonald: note of sundry errors and shortcomings in the Spanish translation of Lord Dundonald's Narrative of Services.

1456  36 Osnabourg Street, Regents Park, 30 January 1860, Joaquin Benítez to Lord Dundonald: stating he is enclosing translations of incidents from the Naval Services into Spanish.

1457  Jorge M. Corbacho: pamphlet entitled El 28 de Julio de 1821 (Lima, 1911).

1458  Lima, 12 January 1922, Camara de Diputados to Comision de Marina: Sala de la Comision de Marina, Lima, 25 January 1922: stating that the commission is not competent to determine whether Frederick Augustus Elmore, English mariner, is entitled to be declared procérr of independence, this being a matter for the constitutional commission.

1459  "Friday morning", Joh O'Brien to Lord Dundonald: acknowledging receipt of a copy of the memorial to the Chilean president and government and stating that San Martin has on very few occasions shown himself to be a great general.

1460  NP, ND, Diego Almeyda, alcalde of Copiapó, to the Government: account of his mineralogical explorations
in the area; stating the hazards and possibilities of promoting mining activity and requesting franchises to do so.
PART FOURTEEN

(Documents 1461 - 1501)

ECUADORIAN, COLOMBIAN AND MEXICAN PAPERS
1820 - 1822
1461 Guayaquil, 10 October 1820, Gregorio Escobedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that Guayaquil has been revolutionised and a patriot government established.

1462 Guayaquil, 3 October 1821, Diego Ibarra, lst aide-de-camp to the Liberator, to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will order a ship to transport Colombian troops between Panama and this coast.

1463 Guayaquil, 20 October 1821, José Joaquín Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he agrees to do what he can to help repair the squadron, but commerce being paralysed and the customs dues non-existent, the government has had to resort to public loans and cannot spare any money; that General San Martin did not ratify the agreement to careen the O'Higgins; that supplies from Chile have been used to liquidate accounts due to Guayaquil.

1464 Guayaquil, 20 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the province has had already to supply military expeditions, that it must supply itself and cannot supply the Pueyrredon.

1465 Guayaquil, 20 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: giving him permission to recruit sailors except amongst the military, the marine or artisans.

1466 Guayaquil, 20 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: giving him permission to disembark baggage and stores.

1467 Guayaquil, 20 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the port captain
has been ordered to give assistance to the re-
pairs of the squadron.

1468 Babahoyo, 21 October 1821; Antonio José Sucre to
Lord Cochrane: regretting the state of military
operations will prevent him from meeting with
Lord Cochrane.

1469 Guayaquil, 24 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo
to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sending to
nearby towns for nitrate for the squadron.

1470 Guayaquil, 30 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo
to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has ordered
the departure of the San Juan Bautista to be
held up.

1471 Guayaquil, 30 October 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo
to Lord Cochrane: stating that despite the short-
age of muskets and the threat of invasion, he
will supply the squadron with 200 of them.

1472 Comandancia General, Guayaquil, 8 November 1821,
Antonio Morales: to Lord Cochrane: requesting that
he return deserters from the battalion Albion
who have gone aboard the ships.

1473 Guayaquil, 11 November 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo
to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has given or-
ders for the 18 small bales of prize effects to
be passed freely.

1474 Guayaquil, 11 November 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo
to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has given or-
ders for the deserters from the squadron to be
apprehended.

1475 Guayaquil, 5 December 1821, José Joaquin Olmedo
to Lord Cochrane: giving news of royalist activities
along this coast and up to Panama.

1476 Headquarters, Guayaquil, 17 December 1821, Antonio José Sucre to Lord Cochrane: reporting enemy shipping movements; the patriot seizure of Panama; that communications and supplies are threatened by ships in the Pacific; expressing his hope that Lord Cochrane will dispatch some ships to clear the isthmus coast.


1478 Tuesday, 29 January 1822, Nicolas de la Gandara to Lord Cochrane: stating that Adolph Klinger, second-in-command of the marines of the O'Higgins, has been arrested for a criminal and scandalous delinquency in the town.

1479 Acapulco, February 1822, Nicolas de la Gandara to Lord Cochrane: stating that captains Manuel Concha and José María Sierra are visiting Lord Cochrane with documents relative to the affair of the captain of the Araucano.

1480 Acapulco, 1 January 1822, José Bracho, president of the junta, to Nicolas de la Gandara: enclosing Acta of the Ayuntamiento relative to Captain Simpson.

1481 Acapulco, 28 December 1821, Acta of the Ayuntamiento: stating that the representation of the captains of the Atocha, Espina and Luisa was read, that Captain Simpson of the Araucano blockaded the port for three days and made night reconnaissances ashore into the town; that he has been heard to talk against General San Martín, although claiming to be a member of the Chilean fleet;
that the junta summoned Simpson to appear, and he did so with his second, Henry Good; that he was ordered to anchor his ship under the fort so that the ships in the bay could leave if they wished; that Simpson responded in improper terms; that the diplomat Felipe Oreille then persuaded him to conform to the junta's requests and moderate his attitude.

Acapulco, 29 December 1821, Manuel Marin to Nicolas de la Gandara: stating that he hopes that Captain Simpson will be restrained from hostile acts as the Spanish frigate Espina is about to sail for Manila.

Acapulco, 30 December 1821, José de Barcaiztegui, Manuel Marin, José María de Ageo, Horatio Roger to Nicolas de la Gandara: stating that in view of Captain Simpson's evil intentions, it is necessary for Gandara to dictate strong measures to compel him to observe the stipulation to remain in the port while the other ships sail.

Acapulco, 30 December 1821, Nicolas de la Gandara to Barcaiztegui, Marin and Ageo: justifying his allowing Captain Simpson to return to his ship.

Acapulco, 3 February 1822, Nicolas de la Gandara to Lord Cochrane: reporting that the orders of the Generalisimo Almirante of the Empire are that Lord Cochrane should be treated with every courtesy.

Acapulco, 3 February 1822, Nicolas de la Gandara to Lord Cochrane: requesting that he will not believe the rumours about the Araucano, and trust in the sincerity of his friendship.
1487 Guayaquil, 14 March 1822, Manuel Luzuriaga to Lord Cochrane: stating that his defensive dispositions of the batteries should not worry Lord Cochrane.

1488 Guayaquil, 14 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has read the Gaceta Extraordinaria from Lima, and promising to give whatever help he can.

1489 Guayaquil, 14 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating his protest at the occupation of the ships and requesting that they be evacuated.

1490 Guayaquil, 15 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: thanking him for his document: stating that the business can be settled amicably; and that the launches have been withdrawn.

1491 Guayaquil, 15 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the populace continue to be uneasy at the continuing work on the Venganza; requesting that Lord Cochrane will expedite the formal notification of his propositions on the basis that the Venganza belongs to Guayaquil, cease work on the ship, and raise the Guayaquil flag.

1492 Guayaquil, 15 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane has no right to seize ships under the protection of Guayaquil; that the junta does not wish to become involved in the question between Chile and Peru of the debts due to the squadron; that the squadron's sacrifices for the liberty of Peru do not justify the offence to the honour of a friendly government; requesting that the ships
be surrendered and negotiations entered into.

Guayaquil, 16 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the re-establishment of harmony has calmed the people; that he thanks Lord Cochrane for undertaking to salute the Guayaquil flag when it is raised on the Venganza.

Guayaquil, 16 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: undertaking to declare valid article I of the agreement upon the abandoning of work on the Venganza; stating that there is no difficulty with the articles respecting the Alejandro; that the preparations being made are to defend the honour of Guayaquil; requesting that Lord Cochrane will appoint negotiators.

Guayaquil, 17 March 1822, Manuel Antonio Luzuriaga, Bernabe Cornejo y Aviles, Jose Maria Indaburu, commissioners of the Guayaquil government, and Thomas Crosbie, Henry Cobbett, Luis Benito Benet, appointed by Lord Cochrane: agreement regarding the claims of Lord Cochrane over the Venganza and the Emperador Alejandro, viz, 1 that the Venganza is to belong to the state of Guayaquil; 2 that the ship is not be sold or given to any government without the approval of Chile and Peru; 3 that the Alejandro is to be surrendered to her owners or their agents; ratified by Olmedo, Ximena, Roca, and Lord Cochrane.

Guayaquil, 18 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the occupation of the Spanish ships has alarmed the people; that he thanks Lord Cochrane for his pacific expressions and hopes the whole question may be amicably settled.
1497 Guayaquil, 20 March 1822, José Joaquin Olmedo to Lord Cochrane: stating that he regrets that Lord Cochrane is leaving less contented than after his previous stay.

1498 Guayaquil, 24 August 1822, José Villamil to Lord Cochrane: reporting that the province was annexed by Bolivar on 13 July.

1499 Quito, 6 December 1822, Colin Ross to Lord Cochrane: stating that William Henderson died in Quito on 3 December through illness caused by Bolivar's continual harassment of him; that Bolivar has acknowledged a debt of 141,000 dollars due by Colombia but refuses to acknowledge the claim for the value of the cargo in the Emperador Alejandro at its capture by the Guayaquil gunboats, of 53,000 dollars.

1500 Guayaquil, 28 December 1822, José Villamil to Lord Cochrane: reporting the death in Quito of Mr. Henderson and discussing the movements of, taxes on, and cost of repairs to the San Fernando.

Guayaquil, 15 January 1823, José Villamil to Lord Cochrane: stating that the above is a copy of an earlier letter; that the country is in great need of a dock and the San Fernando could be sold and her price applied to this job which would attract all the shipping in the Pacific Ocean.

1501 Guayaquil, 28 December 1822, José Villamil to Lord Cochrane: stating that Henderson has died in Quito and that the Republic still owes him 12000 pesos.
PART FIFTEEN

(Documents 1502 - 1530)

ROYALIST LETTERS AND PAPERS 1819-1823 AND UNDATED.
San Carlos, Chiloé, 20 July 1819, Antonio de Quintanilla to Hipolito Romero, principal officer of the Royal Treasury: order, to enquire into various properties of patriots.

San Carlos, 20 July 1819, Hipolito Romero to Antonio de Quintanilla: Report of his interrogation of Juan Andres Oyarzun, Juan Quadros, Cipriano Eusquiza, Manuel Quadros regarding patriot properties.

San Carlos, 29 July 1819, Antonio de Quintanilla: decree ordering the seizure of patriot properties.

San Carlos, ND, Hipolito Romero: notarised account of goods, obligations, credits and account of Luis Munoz.

Callao, 23 November 1819, Antonio Vacaro, commandant of the apostadero of Callao: Signals of recognition between the ships of His Majesty of this apostadero which must be made wherever they meet in this sea.

José Julian Gómez: Pilot's log of the Esmeralda, Tuesday 8 February 1820 to Tuesday 18 April 1820.

Puna, 23 February 1820, Meliton Perez de Camino, captain: state of the frigate Prueba, 44 guns, 342 officers and men, 1400 tons and carrying 40 men of the batallion Cargadores de Callao.

Madrid, 1 June 1820, Juan Tabate: General signals of recognition for the vessels of the Royal fleet in whatever seas they navigate.

Correspondence exchanged between Luis Coig, Captain of the Esmeralda, and officers of the royal government of Peru
9 September 1820, Luis Goig to Antonio Vacaro, commissary general of the apostadero of Callao: acknowledging receipt of his instructions.

Esmeralda, under sail at the parallel of San Gallan, 17 September 1820, Luis Coig to Joaquin Soroa: stating that because of the difficulties of carrying out his orders, he ordered the holding of a council of officers of this ship and the Venganza.

Esmeralda, Quilca, 23 September 1820, Luis Coig to Antonio Vacaro: account of the condition of his ships and crews and the superiority of the patriots; that the result of any clash would be inevitable; that he has called a council of war of which the unanimous conclusion was against attacking the enemy; that he will do what he can to reconnoitre and shadow them and see what operations they propose.

Esmeralda, 23 September 1820, Luis Coig to Antonio Vacaro: account of the movements of his ships in the last few days and his meetings with other ships; stating that he has been pursued by patriot warships.

Esmeralda, 23 September 1820, Luis Coig to Joaquin de la Pezuela: stating that he is unable to carry out his instructions; that the loss of the frigates would not be important if by that Peru could be saved, but this is not the case; that the patriots must be stopped from pacifying the country and the access for reinforcements from Europe preserved.

Esmeralda, in the anchorage of San Lorenzo island, 26 September 1820, Luis Coig to Antonio Vacaro:
stating that the council of war was held; that his health is poor; that he requests an inquiry which will justify his conduct.

Esmeralda, San Lorenzo, 28 September 1820, Luis Coig to Antonio Vacaro: acknowledging receipt of his letters.

Esmeralda, San Lorenzo, 28 September 1820, Luis Coig to Antonio Vacaro: stating that he has publicly read the king's proclamation.

Esmeralda, San Lorenzo, 28 September 1820, Luis Coig to Antonio Vacaro: no text.

Esmeralda, 18 September 1820; Minutes of the Council of War held on board the ship and attended by the captains of the Esmeralda and Venganza and seven other officers, to examine the difficulties of carrying into effect the secret instructions given to them, and voting against carrying out these instructions and in favour of undertaking other operations instead.

1508 Lima, 9 October 1820, Tribunal del Consulado: proclamation offering rewards for the destruction of the whole or part of the patriot forces 50,000 pesos for one, 150,000 pesos for two, and 200,000 pesos for all three of the Isabel, San Martin, Lautaro.

1509 Real Felipe del Callao, 30 October 1820, Joaquin de la Pezuela: relation of prisoners in Casasmatas.

1510 October 1820, frigate Esmeralda: crew list.

1511 State of the frigate Esmeralda in Callao, with list of arms and munitions.
Lima, 6 November 1820, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: respecting the exchange of prisoners, stating that the prisoners from the Maipu have been set at liberty.

Lima, 8 November 1820, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: stating that he does not know the details of the Esmeralda's officers and men.

Lima, 8 November 1820, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: relation of prisoners exchanged for those of the Esmeralda.

Callao, 11 November 1820: Receipt for prisoners taken in the Esmeralda and returned at Callao.

Esmeralda, 18 November 1820, Luis Coig to Lord Cochrane: expressing his gratitude for his good treatment at the hands of his captors; requesting the return of his private papers which were captured.

Lima, 2 December 1820, Joaquin de la Pezuela to Lord Cochrane: complaining at the lack of generosity of the patriot leaders in the matter of liberating the prisoners.

Lima, 9 February 1821, José de la Serna to José de San Martin: stating his offer of an interview at Chancay between two officers of each side to seek a solution to the conflict.

Madrid, 15 May 1821, Francisco de Paula Escudero: General signals of recognition for the vessels of the Royal fleet in whatever seas they navigate.

Real Felipe del Callao, 13 July 1821, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: stating that the tighter
measures being adopted due to the fall of Lima are not being extended to private ships in the bay to maintain the moderation which has so far governed operations.

1521 Real Felipe del Callao, 13 August 1821, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: stating that in none of the correspondence between General San Martin and the royalists is there anything which could refer to Lord Cochrane’s proposal of 9 August.

1522 Callao, 14 August 1821, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will give his friend Antonio Caspe, a royal official now unemployed, his good offices to travel to Rio, whence he can get a ship back to Spain.

1523 Real Felipe del Callao, 19 August 1821, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: discussing the question of an exchange of prisoners.

1524 Real Felipe del Callao, 9 September 1821, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: expressing his thanks to Lord Cochrane for giving permission to Toribio de Acebal and Carlos Maria Ortiz to pass out to Rio and Europe.

1525 Aboard the Creole, 10 September 1821, General Mariano Ricafort to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is convalescing on this ship; that he presents his compliments to Lord Cochrane.

1526 Callao, 14 September 1821, José de la Mar to Lord Cochrane: thanking him for granting passports to Manuel Gorbea and Cayetano Dilis y Rubio; requesting that he will do the same favour to Josefa Sierra de Ramirez and Isabel Cabero de Ramirez.
Real Felipe del Callao, 13 September 1821, Josefa Sierra de Ramírez to Lord Cochrane: requesting his benevolence for her to secure a passage.

Cuzco, 16 February 1823, Boletín Extraordinario del Ejército Nacional de Operaciones al sur de Arequipa: printing captured royalist correspondence concerning military operations in the area in the month of January 1823.

Brest, 7 July 1823, Fausto del Hoyo to Lord Cochrane: stating that the ship made for Brest and not Gibraltar due to the outbreak of war between France and Spain; that therefore he cannot yet repay the 200 pesos.

Rio de Janeiro, 22 March 1823, Fausto del Hoyo; receipt for 200 pesos lent to him by Lord Cochrane for his passage.

7 Allsops Place, New Road, 5 August 1823, Thomas Cochrane to Lord Cochrane: stating that the Rising Star is causing him financial difficulties and his only source of income, street lamps, is about to be cut off by the introduction of gas; that a letter of O'Higgins of 29 March had mentioned the government's intention of buying the Rising Star and he hopes that the succeeding government would also decide to buy it.

ND: Valuation of the effects disembarked from the French brig Hauteloy and sold to the Real Hacienda.
PART SIXTEEN

(Documents 1531 - 1646)

LETTERS AND PAPERS RELATIVE TO FOREIGN MERCHANTS
AND TRADERS IN THE PACIFIC 1819 - 1823.
1531 Lord Lyndoch, Valparaiso, 11 January 1819, J.T. Hoagy and Samuel Langdale, first and second officers, to Lord Cochrane: stating their desire to join the Chilean squadron; that the ship brought 1500 barrels of gunpowder and cannon, arms and ammunition from Buenos Aires.

1532 Santiago, 13 May 1819, Joseph Andrews, Geoffrey Good, John Barnard, Paulino Campbell, John Doig, Carlos Delegal, William Hodgson, Samuel Haigh, McNeile Price & Co, MacNab Orr & Co, John Begg & Co, Geoffrey Parkins, Higginson O'Brien & Co to Captain Shirriff: stating that as British merchants, they are complaining that because of the blockade of Peruvian ports, British interests have suffered; that ships are not allowed to collect return cargoes; that British property in Lima is in danger of detention; requesting that Captain Shirriff will intervene.

1533 Santiago, 11 August 1819, Henry Hill, United States agent, to the Chilean government: discussion of Lord Cochrane's activities with respect to neutral shipping, the law of nations with respect to prize taking, the validity of certificates or depositions given to Lord Cochrane by Captain Smith or George Lewis, the mate, of the Macedonian, Lord Cochrane's defence of his seizure of funds being carried in the Gazelle; stating that the United States government expects this demand for an indemnity to be met.

1534 HMS Slaney, 29 September 1819, Donat O'Brien, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has put the Inspector and Catalina under his protection.

1535 HMS Slaney, 29 September 1819, Donat O'Brien,
captain, to Lord Cochrane, private: stating that British commerce and interests have suffered greatly in consequence of the absence of British ships of war, and that Lord Cochrane must bear in mind the dignity to which the British flag is entitled.

1536 **HMS Slaney**, under way in the Bay of Lima, 29 September 1819, Donat O'Brien, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating his surprise that the Chilean ships have seized British ships under his protection and carrying his written orders; that the movement was ordered before Lord Cochrane had notified him of his intention; that he will not withdraw his protection and it will be necessary for the Chilean ships to annihilate him first.

1537 **HMS Slaney**, bay of Ancon, 2 October 1819, Donat O'Brien, captain, to Lord Cochrane: officially remonstrating for Lord Cochrane's having forcibly possessed on 29 September in the bay of Callao British vessels varying his written orders and under his protection; stating that he is convoying the ships in Ancon in consequence of Lord Cochrane's reported intention to seize any unprotected British ship.

1538 **USS Macedonian**, Callao bay, 9 November 1819, John Downes, captain, to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of his letter.

1539 **USS Macedonian**, Callao bay, 9 November 1819, John Downes to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's observations on the law of nations; stating that he does not wish to engage Chile and the United States in a dispute; that he has not received instructions which cover this case; enclosing extracts from Sir William Scott.
Extract from Sir William Scott: stating that accused parties must have had notice of a blockade; that the absence of cruisers implies the non-existence of a blockade; that blockade implies the ability to apply power to every point of the blockaded state; that a blockade should be publicly declared and not permitted to develop.

Santiago de Chile, 26 January 1820, Charles Delegal to Lord Cochrane: complaining that Captain Bruce of his ship, the Inspector, has been compelled to pay duties in specie, not in government bills, which is unjust to him in being discriminated against out of the whole British merchant community, and bad for the soundness of government paper.

Santiago, 11 March 1820, Antonio Urrutia Mendiburu to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a copy of his memorial to the Supreme Government respecting the Begona; stating that but for the haste with which the process is being gone through to declare good or bad prize, he would have presented the memorial to Lord Cochrane first.

Antonio Mendiburu, for Maria Luisa Mansano and others, to the Government: requesting the return of the ship Begona, captured with its cargo in Guayaquil; stating that it belongs to the Urrutia family; that the family has been reduced by the wars from a fortune of 1,200,000 pesos in 1810 to beggary; that it has performed many patriotic acts; that the trade of the Begona is now its only livelihood; requesting that the ship is not turned over to the prize tribunal for adjudication, which would cause a costly legal process.

Gibraltar, 28 June 1820: Invoice of cargo of the
Lord Suffield, captain Stephen Brown, bound for Lima with goods to the value of 164,040 pesos consigned to the captain, Martin Aramburo and Faustino del Campo.

Gibraltar, 22 July 1820, Gibbs Casson and Company: bill of lading for the Edward Ellice sailing to Lima with goods consigned to Xavier Iscue and John Moens.

Abstract of the manifest of the Edward Ellice, consignees Xavier Iscue and John Moens.

USS Macedonian, 24 July 1820, John Downes to Lord Cochrane: enclosing his reply to Lord Cochrane's letter of 8 November 1819.

USS Macedonian, Valparaiso, 5 August 1820, John Downes, to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be advised if the English, American and Spanish ensigns hoisted on the Chacabuco are a signal.

Valparaiso, 19 August 1820, John Downes to Lord Cochrane: undertaking to search for and return a seaman of the O'Higgins believed to be aboard the Macedonian.

Valparaiso, 24 August 1820, William Henderson and others to Captain Shirriff: denying reports in the English newspapers about Lord Cochrane's scandalous activities.

Valparaiso, 26 August 1820, William Orr, M. Reynolds, H. Bunster, Jos. Waddington, H.O. Burdon, Thos. Davies, George Forbes, Arthur Donnelly, British merchants, to W.H. Shirriff, captain of the Andromache: deploiring the existence of two groups of Britons, each seeking signatures to a letter, one in praise and one in blame of Lord
Cochrane's activities and their influence on British commerce; stating that British merchants in Chile should keep out of the affairs of a naval officer serving under the Chilean flag.

1552 Pisco, 10 October 1820, Francis Coffin, supercargo of the Canton, to Lord Cochrane: reciting the movements of the ship; that it was captured by the Spanish in Talcahuano in August 1817 and sent to Lima, where it was fitted as a cruiser; that in company with the Resolucion, captured the Maipu; that all this was over his protest; that it was eventually restored to him in poor condition without its cargo; that its subsequent cargo was commandeered in Valdivia; that it was attacked by the Aguila; that it is not carrying any Spanish property; requesting that it be released from detention.

1553 HMS Hyperion, Callao, 18 October 1820, Thomas Searle, captain, to Lord Cochrane: enclosing an affidavit of dePeyster claiming the Rebecca; and warning Lord Cochrane against putting the blockade into effect.

1554 HMS Hyperion, Callao, 10 October 1820, dePeyster: affidavit that the Rebecca and her contents are bonafide British property.

1555 HMS Hyperion, off Callao, 20 November 1820, Thomas Searle to Lord Cochrane: stating that regarding the Pacific, she has been in port since October and he cannot prevent her from landing cargo.

1556 Headquarters, Supe, 29 November 1820, José de San Martin to Thomas Searle: stating that he has been informed by Lord Cochrane that Captain Searle
refused to accept a paper on the frigate Pacifico, dealing with the enemy; and that when it was offered a second time threw it into the sea; that this is contrary to the law of nations and to neutrality; drawing attention to Lord Cochrane's moderation in seeking his aid to prevent a ship from violating the blockade; and requesting explanations.

1557  
HMS Hyperion, off Callao, 30 November 1820, Thomas Searle to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of the Chilean captains' orders; stating that he does not propose to use force to protect merchant vessels.

1558  
HMS Hyperion, off Callao, 30 November 1820, Thomas Searle to Lord Cochrane: stating that he cannot when in a friendly port receive communications from a blockading squadron.

1559  
HMS Andromache, off Callao, 20 December 1820, William Shirriff to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter from the Chilean government to Sir Thomas Hardy to show that the blockade has been raised except for Callao; requesting that Lord Cochrane will inform the officers of his squadron.

1560  
Ministry of Marine, Santiago, 6 December 1820, Ignacio Zenteno to William Shirriff: stating that Sir Thomas Hardy has been told that Lord Cochrane has been repeatedly told to treat neutral vessels and property strictly according to the laws of nations; that further, due to a shortage of ships, he cannot sustain a blockade of the whole coast, and that much of it has been liberated.

1561  
USS Macedonian, Huacho, 21 December 1820, John
Downes to José de San Martín: acknowledging receipt of his letter giving assurances about the Luisa; disputing the conditions laid down by him.

USS Macedonian, Huacho, 21 December 1820, John Downes to José de San Martín: stating that in default of written assurances that the Luisa will be freed, he is determined to take the task upon himself.

Headquarters, Huacho, 27 December 1820, José de San Martín to John Downes: stating that he will free the Luisa if her papers do not suggest the possibility of condemning her.

Headquarters, Retes, 4 January 1821, José de San Martín to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting on his exchange with Downes respecting the Luisa; stating that Downes finally took the ship out with him, her cables having been cut.

Huaura, 26 December 1820, José de San Martín to J. Worthy, captain of the Luisa: proposing that the captain and the bearer Diego Paroissien, drive a bargain; stating that then General San Martín will do his best to have the ship freed.

NP, ND: Note that the Luisa has now escaped and that the ship's papers are being forwarded (to Lord Cochrane).

HMS Hyperion, Tuesday evening (1820), Thomas Searle to Lord Cochrane, private: stating that no communication can be received by day under the present circumstances; but that Lord Cochrane may send a boat over at night if he wishes.
HMS Andromache, Callao, 7 January 1821, William Shirriff to Robert Forster: disputing his right to detain the Pacific; stating that until the Chilean government disavowed any blockade excepting that of Callao, none was acknowledged by Sir Thomas Hardy that could affect British trade; and that while he will not use force to prevent the detention of the Pacific, he warns against such a step.

Lima, 8 January 1821, Faustino del Campo, Martin Aramburu to Stephen Brown, master of the trader Lord Suffield: stating that as Callao is blockaded by Lord Cochrane who does not respect any flag, he is directed to land his cargo at Cusasana, near Chilca, where they will come to collect it.

HMS Andromache, Callao, 9 January 1821, William Shirriff to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a letter regarding the Chilean squadron's treatment of the neutrals Lord Suffield, Edward Ellice, Indian, and protesting at their detention.

Huacho bay, 29 December 1820, Captains of the Edward Ellice, Lord Suffield, Indian, Speculator to Captain Shirriff: complaining of their detention, the wounding of a sailor by a Chilean officer, the requisitioning of supplies and equipment.

San Pedro, 17 January 1821, José Hurtado to Torretagle: stating that he has seized the Especulador which attempted to slip away with a cargo for Lima.

Trujillo, 25 January 1821, Torretagle to José de San Martin: stating that he has embargoed
Edward Ellice, off Huacho, 26 January 1821, R.J. Heath to Lord Cochrane: enclosing a list of stores and equipment lost or destroyed during the possession of the ship by Chile; requesting that they be replaced and that two boys now on the O'Higgins be returned.

List of articles lost, broken or destroyed while the Edward Ellice was in the possession of the Chilean fleet 5 December 1820 to 14 January 1821.

HMS Andromache, Callao, 26 February 1821, William Shirriff to Lord Cochrane: requesting that the Diadem, taken into Huacho by the Montezuma despite the Chilean government's breaking of the blockade by a licence to trade with Callao for a Spanish ship, be released.

Indian Oak, 5 March 1821, Pearson to William Shirriff: stating that he has seized the Mexicana in payment of his claims; that it is now his ship; requesting that Lord Cochrane be asked for a safe-conduct for it.

San Martin, Pisco bay, 19 April 1821, William Haskill: undertaking not to attempt to run the blockade not to pass within 30 miles of the blockaded coast.

HMS Creole, off the bay of Salinas, 30 April, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing copy of an affidavit alleging ill-treatment of the mate and part of the crew of the Lord Suffield and requesting that Lord Cochrane will enquire into this; instructing him to send the British crews of the Lord Suffield,
Edward Ellice, and Indian aboard the Owen Glendower or back to Valparaiso; noting that though his objections to the decree of blockade of 20 August 1820 has resulted in the Supreme Director agreeing that only Callao should be blocked, the Chilean ships seem to be unaware of this; requesting that the illegal general blockade be raised.

Valparaiso, 11 April 1821, Charles Constable, mate of the Lord Suffield and John Bancroft, seaman, before Sir Thomas Hardy: affidavit that Constable and 13 men were taken off the Lord Suffield and onto the O'Higgins on 4 December 1820 and kept on short allowance; that he and six men were moved to the Esmeralda on 7 December where he was offered a master's commission by Guise on 8 December, threatened with flogging and ordered to serve in the Chilean squadron; that they were finally taken aboard the Andromache on 16 January 1821.

Arica, Saturday 5 May 1821, C. Mitchell, master: Log of the merchant vessel Joseph recording the ship's having received a shot from the San Martin and slipping her cable.

21 May 1821, C. Mitchell: recording a meeting with Lord Cochrane, when he received orders to proceed to Ylo although many of his crew were sick and it was difficult to work the ship.


Arica, 17 May 1821, John Heyman: receipt for 4670 pesos from Lord Cochrane in payment for supplies.
Arica, 17 May 1821, John Heyman: receipt in full for the value of naval stores delivered.

17 May 1821; Specifications of cordage and canvas delivered from the Admiral Cockburn.

Copy of the previous item.

NP, ND: A.S. Cremond under guarantee of Messrs. Heyman Walter and Co, list of cordage and cable on the Admiral Cockburn.

Arica, 17 May 1821, John Heyman: receipt for stores supplied as per list.

Ylo, 31 May 1821, Thomas Crompton, supercargo, to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed in writing whether the Robert Fuge is to be allowed to trade on the same terms as other British ships or if her detention is continuing.

HMS Creole, Valparaiso, 2 June 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating his gratification at having the general blockade withdrawn in favour of the blockade of Callao; his surprise at finding the Chilean ships still operating the general blockade except along the Guayaquil-Callao coast; that he wishes now to make a second official protest at the general blockade and will take appropriate measures to protect British trading vessels.

Ylo, 3 June 1821, Thomas Crompton to Lord Cochrane: stating that as supercargo of the Robert Fuge, he abandons all responsibility for the ship to Lord Cochrane.

San Martin, Ylo, 3 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to
Thomas Crompton: stating that he has no right to abandon responsibility for the ship to Lord Cochrane, who was acting quite correctly in intervening as the ship was attempting to run the blockade, and ordering him to sail for Chile.

Receipt for 26,544 pesos duties taken from the Robert Fuge.

1588 Ylo, 5 June 1821, Thomas Crompton: account of goods deposited on board the San Martin agreeable to an arrangement with Lord Cochrane; assorted textiles to the value of 19368 dollars and 1000 dollars in cash.

1589 6 June 1821, Elias Ford: affidavit that after being seized, his ship the Edward Ellice was restored to him and he was given compensation for his ill-treatment and assistance by the San Martin in getting his ship ready again.

1590 HMS Owen Glendower, off Callao, 7 June 1821, Robert Spencer, captain, to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's advice that he is releasing the captain of the British ship Mary from confinement at Arica.

1591 Rebecca, Morro de Sama, 12 June 1821, William Cochrane to Sir Thomas Hardy: stating that the nature of his transactions with Lord Cochrane was that he deposited 18 per cent of his cargo's invoiced value with Lord Cochrane and will recover whatever percentage he does not sell; that he is enclosing his licence from Lord Cochrane.

1592 Ylo, 12 June 1821, Thomas Crompton to Sir Thomas Hardy: stating that the Robert Fuge arrived at Arica on 25 April, was welcomed by the Spanish
authorities and started unloading; that this stopped on the appearance of the Chilean squadron; that on 20 May Lord Cochrane told him that he would probably send the ship to Valparaiso for adjudication as he suspected that there was Spanish property aboard; that Lord Cochrane then said he might pay a duty as the Admiral Cockburn and the Rebecca had done, which he agreed to; that Lord Cochrane subsequently sent an officer and eight men to take the crew of the ship; that he finally gave up goods to the value of 20,386 pesos; that Lord Cochrane refused to give receipts for the duty paid or licences to trade to leeward of Lima; that with death or illness among the crew and shortage of provisions, the ship is now in a dangerous state.

1593 Ylo, 13 June 1821, Pierre Mounier: receipt that the Tumbel, captured by the San Martin during the armistice, has been returned intact to him.

1594 Admiral Cockburn, Ylo, 15 June 1821, John Heyman to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will tell the customs officers that the duties on the Admiral Cockburn have already been paid; regretting Lord Cochrane's indisposition.

1595 HMS Conway, Mollendo, 17 June 1821, Basil Hall, captain, to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's letter enclosing duplicates of his correspondence with Sir Thomas Hardy.

1596 HMS Conway, Mollendo, 18 June 1821, Basil Hall to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's notification of the limits of the blockade; stating that he will forward this to Sir Thomas Hardy.
1597  **HMS Conway**, Mollendo, 18 June 1821, Basil Hall to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is not moving inshore but taking up an inshore anchor.

1598  **Colonel Young**, Callao, 12 July 1821, Anderson to Peter Scott of the Lord Lyndoch: requesting to see him with regard to being able to communicate with La Serna through Ancon; stating that he will start for that place soon.

1599  **USS Constellation**, Callao bay, 13 July 1821, Charles Ridgely, captain, to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's notification of the blockade of the port.

1600  **USS Constellation**, Callao bay, 13 July 1821, Charles Ridgely to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's letter of welcome on his arrival.

1601  **USS Constellation**, Callao, 13 July 1821, Charles Ridgely to Lord Cochrane: complaining of the Valdivia's actions; stating that he secured the release of the Galen after 50 days' detention by Forster; that her crew being on board the Valdivia at Salinas, a scratch crew sailed the ship there to collect the original one on Forster's orders; that the Valdivia not only refused to restore the original crew, but took the scratch crew off as well; requesting that Lord Cochrane will order the crew to be returned.

1602  **USS Constellation**, Callao, 14 July 1821, Charles Ridgely to Lord Cochrane: demanding an explanation for the O'Higgins firing a shot at a boat from his ship, although it was carrying an American flag; reminding him of his previous letter regarding the crew of the Galen.
HMS Conway, Callao roads, 15 July 1821, Basil Hall to Lord Cochrane: confirming Lord Cochrane's request that communication between British ships and Callao cease during the investment of that place.

HMS Conway, Ancon, 28 July 1821, Basil Hall to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will give explanations for the detention of the Lord Lyndoch and the Saint Patrick.

Chorrillos, 1 August 1821, Richard Trevithick: receipt for diminity and casks received from the Valdivia.

1 August 1821, Thomas Jennings, chief officer: receipt for various goods received on board the Rebecca.

1 August 1821, A.S. Cramond: receipt for various goods received on board the Rebecca.

Aboard Lord Lyndoch, 2 August 1821, Nineteen Spaniards to Lord Cochrane: regarding Lord Cochrane's order for them to tranship to the prizes Milagro and Resolucion, they invoke the protection of the British flag and request that assurances be given of safe-conduct for those who wish to go to Europe.

List of passengers on board the frigate Saint Patrick.

Lord Lyndoch, Callao bay, 2 August 1821, A.B. Clapperton, master, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he solemnly protests against the taking out of the ship of 15890 dollars belonging to Mr. Goldie, the owner, on Lord Cochrane's orders.
Callao, 3 August 1821, A.S. Cramond to Lord Cochrane: receipt for various textiles which he has received onto the Rebecca and will dispose of as soon as possible.

List of quantities and prices of textiles sold.

Inventory of goods received onto the Rebecca.

NP, ND: request for the amount of the proceeds from the goods; requesting to be informed whether May or Lukin or Haydon had the authority to settle the amount; requesting to know what is the amount of Lord Cochrane's claim on this particular account and whether he would not have to give credit for the 5000 dollars freight.

Colonel Allen, Callao bay, 15 August 1821, J. Bond, master, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he will surrender the Spanish wheat in his ship to Lord Cochrane but requests indemnification for at least half the freight.

NP, 26 April 1821, J. Bond, master of the Colonel Allen, and Robert Page: agreement to charter the ship for a voyage between Callao and Mollendo.

Lima, 16 August 1821, A.S. Cramond to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received from Rebosado 5000 pesos less 360 already paid, being the value of the brig; that he has also sold him the crates of earthenware for which he holds 2450 pesos on Lord Cochrane's account; that Sarratea has embargoed all the mules in the place for Ancon, but that he will discharge the ship at Boca Negra and the wheat will fetch a good price.

Lord Lyndoch, Callao bay, 20 August 1821, A.B.
Clapperton, master, to Lord Cochrane: stating that in reply to Lord Cochrane's of the same date, the owners will provide evidence regarding the money taken out of the ship.

1619  **HMS Creole, Callao bay, 21 August 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane:** stating that he is enclosing Waddington's letter which he thinks is worthy of Lord Cochrane's consideration.

1620  **Lima, 21 August 1821, G.A. Waddington to Lord Cochrane:** stating that in consequence of the conversation of the previous day, he proposes to pay Lord Cochrane a gratification of 5000 pesos to discharge the Wellington instead of sending her to Valparaiso for adjudication.

1621  **HMS Creole, Callao bay, 21 August 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane:** stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's of 18 August, with its documents; that in reply to his remonstrance, both the Chilean government and General San Martin denied that any authority was given to Lord Cochrane to levy duties from British merchant ships; that the masters and supercargos are to be reprehended for entering into such engagements with Lord Cochrane, but they did it to prevent the greater evil of being sent to Chile for adjudication; that regarding Lord Cochrane's assertions about trading with the enemy, the British government was quite aware of the situation when he received his orders; that the Spanish government encourage trade and the patriots may only complain if contraband of war is carried; that the only blockade which he recognises is that from Pisco to Ancon; that he will therefore continue to demand that all British ships detained in Chile on the grounds that they have traded to Peru or broken the blockade,
be freed; that he demands now the return of property on board the *San Martin* taken as deposits for duties, and the freeing of the *Lord Lyndoch*, the *Saint Patrick*, both in Callao, and the *Robert* and the *Walsingham*, in Ancon; that Lord Cochrane's refusal to allow Forster's agreement to permit the first two to quit Callao, being in the crossfire of guns, to be carried out appears as a breach of faith by Chile and probably caused the death of Mr. Fairbairn, the master of the *Saint Patrick*; that the detention of the *Colonel Allen* is justified; that the seizure of the *Wellington* is unjustified; that he was sent to protect British traders; that he hoped that he would not have to take undue measures, but may have to do so; that Lord Cochrane should also liberate the British subjects being held against their will on the *O'Higgins* as seamen.

1622 Lima, 21 August 1821, G.A. Waddington to Lord Cochrane: stating that as he has bought the *Wellington* in Callao, which ship was detained by Lord Cochrane who was proposing to send her to Valparaiso, he hereby offers Lord Cochrane a gratification of 5000 dollars to release the ship to him.

1623 HM* Creole*, Callao bay, 23 August 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: thanking him for the confidence shown in him by Lord Cochrane's letting him see the letter he has received from the Chilean government, which he now returns; stating that he will not reply officially until he receives Lord Cochrane's letter; his thanks for the release of the *Saint Patrick*.

1624 HM* Creole*, 25 August 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: thanking him for all he has
done; requesting that he will release the Lord Lyndoch and Goldie's money on the Independencia.

HMS Creole, 27 August 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: thanking him for his information about the Lord Lyndoch; stating that the Laura at Ancon is in a state of mutiny and he will proceed there.

HMS Creole, Ancon, 29 August 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing documents relative to the money found on the Lord Lyndoch; that he is satisfied that it is the property of Goldie; requesting that an order for it be given to the Independencia.

HMS Creole, Callao bay, 7 September 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: noting that Lord Cochrane has complied with his request to liberate the detained ships and seamen; stating that he found Clapperton's affidavit convincing regarding the ownership of the money in the Lord Lyndoch and that he recommends Lord Cochrane either to send it to Valparaiso for adjudication or to give it up.

HMS Creole, Ancon, 12 September 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is sailing for Chile on the following day, Thursday, having stayed longer than he intended; that the Owen Glendower will sail from Valparaiso to Rio and England soon after his arrival and will take any letters Lord Cochrane might wish to send.

HMS Creole, Ancon bay, 13 September 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane: stating that his complaint is that several British vessels sent to Valparaiso for adjudication had not been adequately proven to be carrying enemy cargoes, and
that Lord Cochrane has been receiving deposits of goods in payment of illegal duties, when his superior force gave the merchantmen no choice; until the ships are released and the duties reimbursed, he will not comply with Lord Cochrane's requests.

1630 **HMS Superb**, Ancon, 14 September 1821, Adam Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that Mr. Worthy, the master of the Louisa, has claimed that the money in Lord Cochrane's keeping belongs to Mr. Thwaites, an English merchant; that in his view it should be kept on board until Thwaites provides documents.

1631 **HMS Superb**, Ancon, 14 September 1821, Adam Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that in reply to Lord Cochrane's of this date, in which Lord Cochrane proposes to put the Louisa under guard as he believes that she is clandestinely exporting Spanish specie, he finds this an extraordinary proceeding in view of the existence of a custom house.

1632 **HMS Superb**, Ancon, 14 September 1821, Adam Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of the same date, with documents regarding the Lord Lyndoch, with the money less the duties deducted by Lord Cochrane; stating that he proposes to put the money under his charge without prejudice to the rights of either party in subsequent proceedings.

1633 **HMS Superb**, Ancon, 14 September 1821, Adam Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane: receipt for 13,507 pesos received from Lord Cochrane.

1634 **HMS Superb**, Ancon, 15 September 1821, Adam Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane:
Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging receipt of Lord Cochrane's of the previous day's date and stating that it is irrelevant to the question of the *Louisa*.

1635 2 October 1821, Captain Hayden, brig *Colonel Allen*, in account with A.S. Cramond.

1636 HMS *Superb*, Callao bay, 5 October 1821, Adam Mackenzie, captain, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing a letter and account.


1638 HMS *Creole*, Callao bay, 13 December 1821, Sir Thomas Hardy to Lord Cochrane, private; noting that he has received information of a French ship of the line and two frigates having entered La Plata; that this note is being brought by Captain Hall; that the British mercantile interest is going on tolerably smoothly here and he trusts that there will be no obstruction from the Chilean squadron.

1639 London, 15 April 1822, John Biggs, master of the *Admiral Cockburn*: deposition that between 5 and 20 May 1820, the ship was seized in Arica harbour and relieved of part of the cargo by Lord Cochrane.

1640 HMS *Alacrity*, Valparaiso, 8 July 1822, Captain Spencer: receipt for two boxes said to contain 8500 dollars put aboard by Lord Cochrane.

1641 HMS *Doris*, Valparaiso, 12 October 1822, J.S. Vernon, Captain: receipt for 4500 dollars put aboard
the ship by Lord Cochrane consigned to James Guthrie.

1642 HVS Doris, Valparaiso, 12 October 1822, J.S Vernon, captain: receipt for 3997 dollars put aboard the ship by Lord Cochrane consigned to Lady Cochrane.

1643 Lime House, 19 April 1823, John Hayman to Lady Cochrane: denying his authorship and the truth of complaints that Lord Cochrane illegally took goods out of the Admiral Cockburn.

Lady Cochrane: subscription, that she thought it prudent to keep the original in England.

1644 NP, ND: Note of money and paper at the custom house from the ships Guari, Ceres, Viper and one.

1645 NP, ND: Review of effects received to discharge the duties on the respective cargoes due to the Government.

1646 NP, ND: Note of sums that a 100-ton ship would pay on average in ports and customs duties and calculating the income of the state for a number of such ships.
PART SEVENTEEN

(Documents 1647 - 1693)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF JOHN MIERS, WILLIAM EDWARDS AND OTHERS RELATIVE TO LORD COCHRANE'S ESTATES IN CHILE 1819 - 1825
Valparaiso, 30 May 1819, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he arrived in Santiago on 27 May; that he brought from England three pairs of large cylinders, carefully disguised to escape detection, and other machinery, and the tools necessary for repairs and for making replacements; that he plans to establish his operations on the Quillots river where there is a good supply of water and wood; that he also brought five men; that at Buenos Aires he was asked to establish a factory at Cordoba; that the coining presses will arrive soon; that he had some sample dies made in England, which are not perfect but are good; that he has brought letters from England for Lord Cochrane.

NP, 1819, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that Lord Cochrane is aware of his adventure in buying four presses before leaving London; that this machinery will soon be all here; that the profits from the presses are to be equally divided; that eight pairs of the larger size of the Spanish stamps will arrive shortly; that Lord Cochrane will understand him; that there is a double machine for preparing the blank materials; that profits are 25 per cent to be divided between them and the supplier of the material; requesting whether it should be an open or a private venture; that if it is open, there must be an understanding with the Big Wigs but that they will grasp at all the profit, or that their jealousy will totally restrict all his activity; that if private, he would not want to engage in clandestine activity without Lord Cochrane's consent as it would implicate Lord Cochrane's honour; that in fact, he believes that only the transportation of material, in which they have no part, is breaking the law; that the gentleman he
mentioned before is still interested in the project and he has it in his power to command more material than any other man in the country; that the machinery can easily be converted between this work and other work of a completely different nature.

Valparaiso, 26 March 1820, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: account of the arrangements to ship the machinery brought by the Anna, to Concon; that the Anna also brought an immense state carriage, the most splendid affair ever brought to South America, shipped by Adams who is reputed to expect to be able to sell it to Lord Cochrane; that Hoseason is awaiting the condemnation of the Pisco; for the money.

Valparaiso, 12 August 1820, Carlos José Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: stating that on 4 August he wrote requesting the price of the haciendas at Quintero and Valle Alegre; that he has received no answer; that respect is due to the judiciary.

Concon, 8 November 1820, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that the mill is nearly completed, notwithstanding labour difficulties and the difficulties and delays in obtaining a firm grant of possession; account of the loss of iron being shipped from England when the Achilles sank in the Rio de la Plata; that public opinion in Santiago is disappointed by the relatively slight achievements of the expedition; requesting he will send some agave cloth of Peru.

Concon, 16 November 1820, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that the most valuable parts of the machinery have now arrived from England.
HMS Andromache, 9 December 1820, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating his congratulations on the capture of the Esmeralda; that he is aboard this ship to say goodbye to Lady Cochrane; that he went to Santiago about the titles of possession, that Zenteno offered to mediate but in fact procrastinated; that the mill is nearly finished; that the iron lost in the Achilles has been recovered.

Concon, 27 December 1820, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: account of his delays and difficulties in fitting out the mill; the high cost of skilled labour; that carpenters earn more than three pesos a day in Valparaiso; that he has not yet secured the title; the duties on the transportation of flour; the desirability of buying some corn now.

Santiago, 24 January 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is pursuing the title of possession; that Mrs. Garcia refuses to give possession; the vexation and disappointments caused by the legal system; that the flour mill is operating well and there are good prospects of sales along the coast; that the goods lost in the River Plate have been recovered and are being shipped to Chile; but that insurance of £900 has been recovered by his friends in London; that previously he described the offers made to him to use the coining machinery, but that the laws are too severe in penalties even for the possession of bullion and it would not be prudent to engage in the speculation; that from the confident style of Lord Cochrane's letters, no-one doubts that he is in Lima by now.

Santiago, 26 January 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: account of his lack of progress in trying to get title of possession; that he must
now depend on the Director; that it is impossible
to obtain justice through the ordinary channels,
due to corruption, the government's lack of in-
terest, and dislike of foreigners.

1657
Concon, 27 February 1821, John Miers to Lord Co-
chrane: stating that all means of securing the
title having failed, he has thrown the affair
into the hands of the government though he has
little trust in their assurances; account of the
fruitless session of the Intendencia; that nothing
will be settled until Lord Cochrane himself appeals
to the government; that he is anticipating the
arrival of more machinery.

1658
Concon, March 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane,
private: stating that he has received an order
for 100 quintals of flour to be shipped to Bot-
any Bay, but otherwise nothing; that everyone
is waiting for the fall of Lima; that the govern-
ment have placed prohibitive duties on the expe-
orts of corn and flour to the Peruvian coast;
account of the operational difficulties of the
mill; of the arrival of new machinery smuggled
from England; that the machinery recovered from
the river Plate has now arrived; that there is
a shortage of storerooms; that there are finan-
cial shortages arising from Hoseason's inability
to supply capital, especially as the merchants
here buy only at a time of need at a few days'
otice, so that it is necessary to have a stock
always ready for them; that he has been left in
the lurch by Hoseason; that he is afraid that he
may be called to raise 2356 pesos in debts.

1659
Concon, 14 April 1821, John Miers to Lord Coch-
rane: stating that he is unable to get any more
money from Hoseason; that his friends can no
longer lend him money; that he has had to draw £500 from friends in London; that Hoseason should have advised him of his financial situation, which turns out to be poor; that he relies on Lord Cochrane to provide the funds so necessary for their concerns; that he obtained from Hoseason on Lord Cochrane’s account 3000 dollars; account of the operations of the mill.

1660 Concon, 15 April 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received a preremptory summons from Valparaiso to present himself without delay to the Supreme Director or the Finance Minister; that it is necessary to buy a troop of mules to carry flour.

1661 Concon, 10 May 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: account of Lady Cochrane’s departure in the Andremache; that captain Shirriff is trustworthy; that Lord Cochrane’s advice in his letters of 13 March and 8 April, to quit Concon and come with the machinery to Peru to establish a mint, is impracticable and not advisable; that he would have to procure special accessories for the present machinery, that it would take a long time to set up, that it would require heavy capital investment, that the future political outlook of Peru is unpredictable, that the alleged profit of the concession would give no profit but rather loss; that the summons from the government was to discuss the possibility of Miers minting copper coins under government licence; that he declined to discuss terms until the ownership of the estate was settled; that the government agreed to settle this; that the division of profit on the minting of copper at 50 dollars the quintal purchase price should be 10 dollars cost of copper, 10 dollars profit to the government,
30 dollars to Miers costs and profits, that
100,000 dollars worth of copper currency is re-
quired; that nothing is settled yet; that regard-
ings a copper mill, no individual could raise
the immense capital required to start and operate
such a mill; that a company of leading Chilean
merchants should be set up to which the estate
should be sold for an appropriate quantity of
shares; that captain Shirriff is very interested
in buying 10,000 dollars worth of shares in John
Miers' name as he does not wish it generally known
he has them; that Lady Cochrane is wild for the
scheme.

1662
Concon, 17 May 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane:
stating his regret at rumours which are circula-
ting that Lord Cochrane is dissatisfied with his
management, rumours caused by Lord Cochrane's own
lack of candour; that he has done all he could
to develop and make profitable the estate; that
Lord Cochrane left 33,000 pesos in government
paper with Hoseason which Lord Cochrane said he
could draw on if necessary; that he has drawn
3000 pesos; that since Hoseason's assistance
stopped, he has had great difficulty in raising
money even for running expenses; that Lord Coch-
rane's allegations to Adams that the delays at
Concon were the cause of Hoseason's difficulties,
are unjust; requesting that Lord Cochrane should
give him open explanations of his attitude and
intentions towards him.

1663
Concon, 20 May 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane:
stating that his bills from England have been
exchanged to the amount of 2400 pesos; that he
is confident that Lord Cochrane will assist him
to redeem these debts; account of the packing and
marketing of flour; that he has purchased mules;
of a meeting of 12 British merchants of Santiago and Valparaiso with Hardy in the Creole about the protection of British trade and property; that Hardy returned from Peru in a great rage with the Chilean government, which deceived him about the orders said to have been sent to Lord Cochrane, and attempting to throw the blame and responsibility onto Lord Cochrane; that Hardy is very amicably disposed to Lord Cochrane; that he is being misled grossly by interested parties in Chile.

1664 Valparaiso, 26 May 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received the documents relative to the minting of copper coinage; that the governor is anxious that it should commence; that he is refusing to settle terms until the title of possession is settled, although the government Mint is threatening that such machinery should not be in the possession of a private person.

1665 Concon, 6 July 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he intends to visit Peru as soon as possible; recommending captain Robson of the Thais, the bearer of this; that there are good prospects for flour sales now that the Peruvian ports are open, but there is a shortage of capital.

7 July: that he has had an offer for 170 barrels of flour; that trade is beginning to pick up; that our flour is the best in the country; that the mill is functioning smoothly, though it is not at full production; that his wife has had a son; that the British merchants here are in a frenzy of activity assailing Hardy against the detention of British ships, the detention of
seamen, and the blockade.

11 July: that our flour is reckoned to be better than the American and there are good prospects for sales.

1666 Concon, 8 September 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received letters announcing the fall of Lima; the receipt of 5000 pesos sent by Lord Cochrane in the Montezuma in the care of Mr. Dean; that the price of corn has started to rise fast; account of stormy weather in the valley, and floods; that he has heard nothing more from the government regarding the title of possession to the estate; that it might be helpful if Lord Cochrane were to write on this matter; noting the dates of letters with Lord Cochrane and the government on this matter, and the difficulties of buying from the proprietor.

1667 Concon, 31 October 1821, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has received Lord Cochrane's of 30 September; that all the Chileans and British in Valparaiso approve of Lord Cochrane's conduct; that he cannot say whether the government will support Lord Cochrane; that while they will be prejudiced against a foreigner, it will be in their self-interest to support Lord Cochrane.

9 November: stating that he is glad to learn that Lord Cochrane's measures have received the unqualified approbation of the government; that Lord Cochrane is now more popular than he ever was in Chile; that he has started shipping flour to the Peruvian coast.

18 November: stating that he has heard of his
father's death; that the summer floods are forcing the mill to stand idle.

1668 Concon, 1822, John Miers to Lord Cochrane, at Quintero: stating that he is sending the nails requested by Lord Cochrane; that he requests Lord Cochrane's permission to cut timber at Quintero; account of his building operations on the dam; that he will come over to Quintero on Sunday or Monday with a general statement of the financial position.

1669 Valparaiso, 31 October 1822, Lord Cochrane: accounts with Concon.

1670 Copy of the previous item.

1671 Copy of the previous item.

1672 Copy of the previous item.

1673 Concon, John Miers: accounts for the estate from August 1818 to October 1822.

1674 Quintero, 9 October 1822, William Adams to Lord Cochrane: stating his denial that the deficiency of cattle cannot be made up; that it is no more that 700 head; that he will not pay for a third of the alleged loss; requesting that Lord Cochrane will inform him of his intentions regarding the carriage shipped out on Lord Cochrane's and Mier's request; requesting that he be given 12 months' tenure of the estate.

Quintero, October 1822, Lord Cochrane to William Adams: stating that he will not continue corresponding on these matters; requesting that Adams will vacate the estate without delay.

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Valparaiso, 1 November 1822, Lord Cochrane and John Miers, witnessed by Henry Dean and Thomas Crosbie: agreement that for political considerations, it being undesirable that Lord Cochrane should appear to have an interest in the estate at Concon, he shall apparently sell his share to Miers, who shall appear officially as the owner, for 25,000 dollars, which bills Lord Cochrane undertakes not to present while the arrangement operates.

Valparaiso, 1 November 1822, Lord Cochrane and John Miers, witnessed by Henry Dean and Thomas Crosbie: agreement dissolving their partnership for the Concon estate, Miers becoming sole proprietor and Lord Cochrane being paid 25,000 dollars, 5,000 dollars being drawn on Begg Barnard and Company, Santiago, the remainder being drawn on John Miers' father-in-law Francis Place.

Concon, 1 November 1822, John Miers: order to Francis Place to pay Lord Cochrane the sum of 5,000 dollars in four bills of payment.

Santiago, 16 March 1823, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating his difficulties and the legal complexities of obtaining a power of attorney; that the Tribunal of Accounts allege errors to the value of 300,000 pesos in Lord Cochrane's accounts; that there is no proper government; that Dean, who is a notorious swindler, has left Chile for Buenos Aires; account of his attempts to smuggle through Lord Cochrane's estate, and other underhand dealings; the execution of Henderson's estate;
the state of the market for beef, wheat and corn; the severe labour shortage; that he has rebuilt the mill, which is now running; that he is taking off the timber of the Vigonias; the political troubles of Chile.

1681 Quintero, 23 March 1823, Robert McFarlane to Lord Cochrane: stating that he does not believe Ovalle's assertions about the estate; that everything is going on quite well at present; account of the stock and estate, tenants' rents, and a stranded whale.

1682 Concon, 25 March 1823, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: stating that Ovalle came to embargo the Quintero estate but will have to deal with Bunster and Miers; that the embargo is being hastened due to rumours that the cattle were being removed wholesale; account of beef marketing problems in competition with British and American shipped beef; statement of account for his dealings so far on Lord Cochrane's behalf; account of the difficulties of getting workmen.

1683 Concepcion, 26 May 1823, William Edwards to Lord Cochrane: stating that he needs more money to set up the estate, and requesting instructions.

1684 Concon, 15 September 1823, John Miers to Lord Cochrane: account of his arrangements to sell the estate to Ovalle; details of the estate and its value; stating the desirability of this proceeding as otherwise Ovalle may start a law suit, in which he would have strong advantages; the badness of winter; the difficulties of selling salt beef; that the confusion of government affairs has paralysed the settlement of the accounts; his dam-building activities on the estate; the murder of
servants and the death of friends; offers made
to him to establish a lead-rolling mill in Coq-
iumbo.

1685 Rio Claro, 12 April 1824, William Edwards to Lord
Cochrane: account of the harassments and troubles
he has suffered on the estate.

1686 Rio Claro, 12 May 1824, William Edwards to Lord
Cochrane: acknowledging his letter reporting his
belief that the estate is about to be seized,
stating that he was robbed and harassed.

1687 Concon, 4 June 1824, John Miers to Lord Cochrane:
stating that Lord Cochrane's return to Chile is
eagerly hoped for and would be the signal for a
general rising, as discontent is widespread; the
jealousy in Santiago of Freire's favouritism to-
wards southerners; the discontent in Coquimbo;
the operations of the dam and the mill; the com-
petition of American flour; robbery and losses
of property from the Quintero estate; note of the
deficiency of livestock in the haciendas of Quin-
tero and Valle Alegre when they were transferred
to Ovalle by Onofre Bunster and John Miers -
10,852 pesos; that Macfarlane has set up in bus-
iness in Valparaiso; that by Henderson's accounts,
Lord Cochrane will be a debtor and not a creditor
to his estate on account of slops purchased from
him; the operations of the flour mill, competition
from American flour; that shortage of capital in-
hibit progress; his financial difficulties and fear
of imminent ruin; his reluctance to engage in new
operations to build gunpowder mills for the gov-
ernment; the instability of the government; that
the Spanish warships at Chiloé are not being in-
terfered with; that Blanco has his flag in the
O'Higgins; that the Independencia has been ordered
to be refitted, her upper works being entirely rotten; that the Rising Star has been sold off by her agent to Mackie and Olver for 10,000 pesos.

1688 Lautaro, 4 May 1825, William Edwards to the Congress of Chile: stating that he was expelled from his post of mayordomo of the Río Claro estate on 15 March, on the order of the Governor of Concepción in favour of the agent of the previous owner.

1689 Rio de Janeiro, 12 July 1825, William Edwards to Lord Cochrane: account of his expulsion from Lord Cochrane's estate at Río Clara.

1690 Rio de Janeiro, 31 August 1825, William Edwards to Lord Cochrane: account of his unsuccessful dealings with the government to recover the Río Claro estate; that there is such confusion in the Chilean government that it is not possible to do any business with them; that Concepción and Coquimbo have declared themselves independent of Santiago, it is said that Freire is the author of this.

1691 NP, ND, William Edwards to the Supreme Director: petition stating that he came from England at Lord Cochrane's request to act as manager of the estate at Río Claro; that after three years he was expelled and the previous owner José Hurtado took back the estate; that he requests the government documents justifying this act for him to forward to Lord Cochrane.

1692 NP, ND, List of documents and other papers relative to the estate of Quintero given to don Andrés Blest, concerning the government taking over the estate at a time when they wished to detach Lord
Cochrane from the public service; and list of expenses incurred between September 1820 and July 1822.

NP, ND: Calculation of the cost and produce of 100 fanegas of corn made into flour, by experiment, yielding a profit of two dollars a fanega.
PART EIGHTEEN

(Document 1694 - 1775)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF RAFAEL CORREA DE SAA AND ALEXANDER CALDECLEUGH RELATIVE TO LORD DUNDONALD'S CLAIMS ON THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT 1822 - 1857
Tribunal de la Contaduría General, Santiago, 21 March 1822, Rafael Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will supply the documents relative to his claim of 66.171 pesos on the government.

Copy of the previous item.

Valparaiso, 8 August 1822, Santiago Campiño: inventory of the documents delivered by Lord Cochrane's secretary relative to Lord Cochrane's third cruise.

Marine Department, Valparaiso, 4 August 1822, Ignacio Zenteno to Lord Cochrane: stating that Campiño has been appointed Minister for the squadron.

Copy of item 417 above.

Santiago, Sala del tribunal de cuentas, 18 June 1822, Rafael Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: requesting that Lord Cochrane will supply the originals of the accounts, documents and receipts relative to his expenditures.

Lord Cochrane: marginal note that the relevant documents are on board the O'Higgins.

Sala del Tribunal de la Contaduría Gral de Cuentas, Santiago, 18 June 1822, Rafael Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: stating that Pedro Truxillo and Juan Agustín Jofre have been appointed to receive the papers being submitted by Lord Cochrane.

Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas, Santiago, 13 August 1822, Rafael Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: requesting to be informed how many of the officers
and soldiers of the Liberating army travelled on board Chilean warships, whether they were fed by the state or by the contractors, if any stores and munitions went on the ships of war, whether merchandise was disembarked from the transports on arrival.

1699 Sala del Tribunal de Cuentas, Santiago, 2 September 1822, Rafael Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing a list of the documents which are lacking for the accounts; other questions about Lord Cochrane's accounts; and that it would be convenient if Lord Cochrane's secretary could appear personally at the tribunal.

1700 2 September 1822, Rafael Correa de Saa: note of documents lacking for the accounts.

1701 Contaduría General, Santiago, 21 March 1823, Rafael Correa de Saa to Lord Cochrane: stating that the accounts presented by Lord Cochrane for the last cruise of the Chilean squadron are about to be completed; that Lord Cochrane should appoint an attorney to make the clarifications where necessary and supply such documents as are requested.

1702 Santiago, 16 December 1837, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received the power of attorney made out for him and for Green Nelson; that the Board of Accounts continues to procrastinate; that the Bio Bio estate was restored to its original owner by the government but that he will attempt to recover the value of it; that 10,000 dollars was paid into the commissary's office on Lord Cochrane's account for the capture of Valdivia; account of the state of government stocks and that good land is available cheaply in Concepcion.

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35 New Broad Street, 7 March 1838, Hullett Brothers to Lord Dundonald: enclosing extract of a letter received from Green Nelson.

Valparaiso, 18 November 1837, Green Nelson to Hullett Brothers: extract of a letter acknowledging receipt of documents relative to Lord Dundonald's claims; stating that there is a probability of recovering 10,000 dollars for the capture of Valdivia.

Valparaiso, 25 January 1838, Robert MacFarlane to Lord Dundonald: stating that he called on Caldecleugh and Neilson with information about Lord Dundonald's affairs in Chile; that if they wish to act they can recover the greater part of his claim.

Santiago, 29 June 1838, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: account of the procrastination of the tribunal of accounts; their allegations that Lord Cochrane never answered their objections to his accounts; that he has got a copy of the objections and will try to collect the relevant documents.

Santiago, 9 October 1838, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: enclosing a decree of the government relative to his representation of Lord Dundonald's claims.

Santiago, 17 October 1838, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he is enclosing copies of the observations of the audit office on Lord Cochrane’s accounts; that a company with a capital of £50,000 would be suitable to extract ore in Coquimbo and smelt it in Concepcion; that large profits might be able to be got from this.
1709 Comision General de Cuentas, 28 June 1838, Rafael Correa de Saa to Minister of War and Marine: stating that he did his utmost to settle the accounts at the time that Lord Cochrane was in Chile; that his subsequent attempts to communicate with him about them were unsuccessful until now that he has appointed Caldecleugh as his attorney; that nothing can be done until the answer to Correa's queries is received, and this Caldecleugh's powers do not authorise him to give; that Caldecleugh's powers are not extensive enough and there is some doubt about their correctness; that Lord Dundonald should be requested to supply a correct power of attorney.

1710 Copy of the previous item.

Lord Dundonald's observations on Correa de Saa's letter and defence of his actions regarding the satisfying of his claims in 1822 and 1823.

Lord Dundonald's notes on the accounts for monies or goods received or dispensed and for the various actions he took in connection with these while commander of the Chilean navy.

1711 24 December 1838, Thos Widder to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has heard from Caldecleugh that he is to be allowed to see the objections to the accounts of Lord Cochrane.


1713 Santiago, 23 August 1840, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received Lord Dundonald's tin case containing copies of
1714 Santiago, 28 August 1840, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald, confidential: requesting that Lord Dundonald will tell him what sum of money he is disposed to spend on expenses in carrying through his claims.

1715 Copy of the previous item.

1716 9 Austin Friars, 30 December 1840, J.W. Welch, of Hullett Brothers, to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received Lord Dundonald's notes, and that he is enclosing duplicates of letters received from Caldecleugh.

1717 Santiago, 29 July 1840, Alexander Caldecleugh to Hullett Brothers: extract of a letter stating that though the money was in the comissary's office in Valparaiso to Dundonald's account, when he tried to retire it, a lien was put on it until Dundonald's accounts should have been passed.

Santiago, 7 August 1840, Alexander Caldecleugh to Hullett Brothers: extract of a letter acknowledging receipt of Lord Dundonald's despatches, his memorial and other documents.

1718 Copy of the previous item.

Copy of item 1713 above.

Lord Dundonald: marginal note that with interest the sum due is now above £33000 besides the value of an estate.
9 Austin Friars, 12 January 1841, J.W. Welch to Lord Dundonald: enclosing an extract of a letter from Caldecleugh stating that Lord Cochrane's paper has been copied and translated for the Accountant General; that if this has no success, he will try a memorandum to the President; that he has secured the co-operation of his friend Colonel Walpole.

Copy of the previous item.

Foreign Office, 16 January 1841, J. Backhouse to Lord Dundonald: acknowledging receipt of his letters.

9 Austin Friars, 20 February 1841, J.W. Welch to Lord Dundonald: stating that Colonel Sutcliffe has asked for a portrait of Lord Dundonald.

Santiago, 13 April 1841, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that no progress has been achieved on Lord Dundonald's claim; that he is corresponding with Correa; that Colonel Walpole cannot officially present the memorial to the President and Congress.

Santiago, 14 June 1841, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that it is undesirable to present Lord Dundonald's petition until after the election of the President, which is presently absorbing everybody's interest; that if Lord Cochrane does not come out, a power of attorney in Spanish should be sent to Caldecleugh.

Santiago, 14 June 1841, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald, private: stating that Rafael Correa de Saa has assumed the finance portfolio; that it is above his capacity; that he will lose it after the present elections; that Caldecleugh
will not present Lord Dundonald's petition until after the elections; that it is necessary to send out another power of attorney, in Spanish with three notaries' certificates; that he suggests employing Abraham de Pinna for this.

1726 9 Austin Friars, 29 July 1841, Hullett Brothers to Lord Dundonald: enclosing a letter from Alexander Caldecleugh.

1727 Santiago, 2 August 1841, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that just when he believed that the matter of the claim was near resolution, the Brazilian minister intervened to request the Chilean government not to pay any money to Dundonald as his own government has large claims against Dundonald; that he is contemplating a legal action against the Brazilian minister for his interference; that the British government should be got to instruct Colonel Walpole to act in a semi-official capacity.


Santiago, 2 June 1841, Alexander Caldecleugh to Hullett Brothers: stating that he is arranging to meet an influential member of the newly-assembled Congress regarding prosecution of Lord Dundonald's claim; that the expense will be very great but that none of the parties will live long enough to see the tribunal of accounts make its decision.

1729 Santiago, 27 October 1841: Excerpt from a private letter from Chile to Mr. Welch remarking on the paralysis of business due to the elections in Chile.
1730 Bartholomew Land, Bank, 30 October 1841, Abraham de Pinna to Lord Dundonald: stating that for legal authentication of documents giving power of attorney for use in Chile, that country having no representative in Britain, the notary's signature must be authenticated by the Lord Mayor, his by the Under Secretary of the Home Office, his by the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his by the resident Buenos Aires agent.

1731 30 October 1841, J.W.Welch to Captain George Brown: requesting that he will give an enclosure to Lord Dundonald.

1732 Santiago, 4 March 1842, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: acknowledging receipt of his letter of 21 October 1841 enclosing power of attorney; stating that Correa de Saa admits that money is due to Lord Dundonald.

1733 Santiago, 25 May 1842, Alexander Caldecleugh to Hullett Brothers: extract from a letter stating that Colonel Walpole will try to speak to Correa de Saa again.

9 Austin Friars, 13 September 1842, Hullett Brothers to Lord Dundonald: enclosing extract of a letter from Alexander Caldecleugh.

1734 Santiago, 27 July 1842, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: account of his difficulties in seeing Correa de Saa to arrange negotiations; stating that the Brazilian envoy has withdrawn his embargo on the sums due to Lord Dundonald.

1735 Austin Friars, 7 September 1842, J.W. Welch to Lord Dundonald: noting the efforts being made by Caldecleugh and Walpole to secure Lord Dundonald's
claims, and the difficulties encountered.

Copy of item 1734 above.

1736 Valparaiso, 8 March 1843, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has met Lord Cochrane; that there is no progress on the claim but he expects to be able to arrange the business at the next session of the Congress; that he hopes that Lord Cochrane's presence might excite more interest in satisfying the claims.

1737 Santiago, 13 July 1843, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that Walpole is being very helpful with the claims; that he expects the help or goodwill of Aldunate, the new Minister of War; that he has interested various influential people; but that the probability of success is not high.

Santiago, 11 August 1843, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he is enclosing a vista fiscal; that he and Walpole are bringing all their influence to bear on the ministers; that Correa has died and Benavente has taken his place.

1738 Santiago, 28 July 1843, Santiago Aldunate: Order to view to the Fiscal de Hacienda.

Santiago, 3 August 1843, Fiscal de Hacienda: opinion, that without detailed information, it is impossible to form an opinion on the petition presented by Caldecleugh.

1739 Copy of letter of 13 July 1843 of item 1737 above.

1740 Copy of letter of 11 August 1843 of item 1737 above.

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Santiago, 20 August 1843, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has looked into the strength of his legal position on the claims; that in law it is impossible to sustain a claim to interest on the sum claimed; that if the claim for 80,400 dollars succeeds, the salary, 10,000 dollars, will be paid in cash, but by law the remainder must be converted to three per cent stocks; that the value of the estate at 4000 dollars and its usufruct at 4600 dollars would be paid in cash; that their endeavours to arrange a compromise have been fruitless; that when he asked why the government would not honour the claim, he was told that if Lord Cochrane were a debtor to the country, he would not be molested for payment; requesting instructions.

1741 NP, ND, Alexander Caldecleugh to the Chilean Government: petition on behalf of Lord Dundonald for the decoration of the Legion of Merit; for the surrender of 14,300 pesos at Valparaiso, his share of the prize money for the Esmeralda; for compensation for the estate at Rio Claro; for 66161 pesos due to him on his accounts.

1742 Coquimbo, 26 November 1843, Alexander Caldeoleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that Colonel Walpole has agreed to assist in pressing the claims; that Benavente has promised to give his attention to the matter; that the government cannot plead poverty; that the growth in numbers of British and French steam warships has stimulated the Concepcion coal mining industry, though the coal is of poor quality.

1743 Foreign Office, 2 January 1844, Lord Aberdeen to Sir Francis Burdett: stating that he will write again to Colonel Walpole regarding Lord Dundonald's claims.
1744 Santiago, 4 January 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: account of the delays in the passage of the government bill settling Lord Dundonald's claims.

1745 Coquimbo, 24 March 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that the claims are meeting much difficulty in being put before the government; that he will go to the capital to prosecute the matter; that the government was only liberal to O'Higgins when it was sure that he could only live another two months.

1746 Coquimbo, 3 May 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he hopes in consultation with the Accountant-General to effect a compromise on Lord Dundonald's claim and advising him to accept whatever sum is offered by the Chilean government, however small.

1747 Santiago, 22 July 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that it is unlikely that any periodical would print the memorial except for a large sum, for fear of losing the government subscription which they all need; that he has had interviews with Diego Benavente, the new Accountant General; that he cannot easily sustain some of the points of the claim; that he will make further efforts to press it.

1748 Santiago, 7 August 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: account of Lord Dundonald's claims travels through various branches of the government; that the Accountant General has reduced Lord Dundonald's claim on his private account from 66,000 dollars to 22,000 dollars; that the government will probably vote him between 25 and 30,000 pesos; that he is gathering
information about the 14,300 dollars in the com­
issary in Valparaiso.

1749 Santiago, 16 September 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that the Council of State has offered £6000 in settlement of the claims and he recommends acceptance of it.

Santiago, 19 September 1844, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he is enclosing the above and sending various documents relative to the claim.

1750 Copy of the previous item.


1752 Enclosure B: Abstract of accounts between Lord Cochrane and the state of Chile.

1753 Enclosure C: Letter of Santiago Aldunate, Minister of War, to Alexander Caldecleugh, 2 September 1844.

1754 Enclosure D: Letter of Alexander Caldecleugh to Santiago Aldunate, 3 September 1844.

1755 Copy of the previous item.

1756 Foreign Office, London, 31 March 1845, H.N. Add­
ington to Lord Dundonald: enclosing copy of a dispatch from the chargé d'affaires in Chile re­
garding Lord Dundonald's claims.

1757 Valparaiso, 2 December 1844, Colonel John Walpole to the Foreign Office: dispatch number 52 regard­
ing Lord Dundonald's claims, stating that Wal­
pole and Caldecleugh discussed these with the

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Chilean government which has offered £6000 in settlement, a reasonable amount considering the weakness of some of the claims, but exhibiting no gratitude or remembrance for the services rendered.

1758 Copy of the previous item.

1759 Santiago, 12 June 1845, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he requires expenses of 400 dollars.

1760 Santiago, 12 June 1845, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received his letters; that the expenses are mounting up; that Lord Dundonald should permit him to draw up to 400 dollars on him.

Santiago, 10 August 1845, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received the box of 59 copies of Lord Dundonald's memorial which have been distributed to the Council of State, the senators, the president and the ministers.

1761 Copy of the letter of 10 August 1845, of the previous item.

Coquimbo, 24 September 1845, Alexander Caldecleugh: note, that the Minister of War will submit the memorial to the consideration of the President; that he has seen severe comment on the memorial from a newspaper published under government auspices; that he has received the documents respecting Lord Dundonald's payments of damages in regard to the Edward Ellice and other ships.

1762 Santiago, 11 February 1846, Alexander Caldecleugh
to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received and distributed the second box of memorials according to his instructions but much against his inclination as he believes that the effect will be prejudicial to Lord Dundonald's interest; that Lord Dundonald's son is in Chile; that he has pressed General Aldunate about the claim, but this is certain to be in vain; that Colonel Walpole recommends that Lord Dundonald take the £6000 offered; that the vote was passed in the Chamber of Deputies by 23 votes to 16.

1763 Copy of the previous item.

1764 Santiago, 18 February 1846, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that Mr. Cochrane has arrived; that he is enclosing the official reply from General Aldunate, the Minister of War; that the Chilean government is reluctant to pay the claims of foreigners; that they are being pressed by the United States over the Macedonia; that he strongly recommends accepting the £6000.

1765 Copy of the previous item.

1766 Santiago, 6 February 1846, Santiago Aldunate to Alexander Caldecleugh: stating that the government cannot respond affirmatively to Lord Dundonald's request, as by the law of 25 October 1845, they cannot vary the terms stated.

1767 Copy of the letter of 6 February 1846 of the previous item.
1768 Santiago, 2 March 1846, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he has received the further memorials; that Mr. Cochrane has gone to see General Aldunate again; that he recommends prompt action if Lord Dundonald is going to accept the £6000.

1769 Santiago, 22 August 1846, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that he is making no progress in Lord Dundonald's claim.

1770 Coquimbo, 24 June 1848, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that it is unlikely that his claims on Chile will be satisfied because of the financial shortage caused by the recession; that it is unlikely that Lord Dundonald's coming personally to Chile would achieve much.

1771 Valparaiso, 24 February 1852, Alexander Caldecleugh to Lord Dundonald: stating that with regard to Lord Dundonald's decision to accept the £6000, while it is a poor recompense, he did not expect to get anything more; that he has never had such trouble and difficulty in an affair of this sort; that the government will pay Lord Dundonald in London and might pay him interest for the six years; that his own charge is 10 per cent of the amount, that is £600.

1772 London, 22 May 1852, Baring Brothers to Lord Dundonald: stating that they have received instructions to pay him £6000 and noting that Caldecleugh has put in a claim for £600.

1773 Foreign Office, 22 October 1857, Lord Shelburne to Lord Dundonald: enclosing copy of a letter relative to the settlement of his claims.
1774  British legation, Santiago, 29 August 1857, Captain E.A.J. Harris to Lord Clarendon: informing him of the government's decision to make a settlement upon Lord Dundonald in recognition of his services.

PART NINETEEN

(Documents 1776 - 1882)

LETTERS AND PAPERS RELATIVE TO LORD COCHRANE'S PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
9 September 1820: Inventory of liquor and furniture in the warehouses of the castillo of the port of Pisco.

31 July 1820, William Hoseason: Lord Cochrane's private account as at this date since 28 November 1818, showing expenditure at 71.052 dollars, income at 43.391 and balance against at 43.391 dollars.

Valparaiso, 28 August 1820, William Hoseason to Lord Cochrane: stating that when he considers the sums owing on the Quintero and Concon estates, not included in the account, and the expenses due for Lady Cochrane's travel to England, Lord Cochrane will see the need to send him prize money from Peru.

ND: Note of prize money received for the account of Lord Cochrane.

ND, William Hoseason: note of monies received by him on account of Lord Cochrane between January 1819 and August 1821.

ND: Inventory of the expenses incurred in the house conceded by the Supreme Government of Chile for the residence of Lord Cochrane, between 20 January 1819 and 28 August 1820, totalling 79.661 dollars.

Valparaiso, 26 May 1821, George Cood to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is enclosing a bill drawn on Lord Cochrane by Hoseason for 6200 dollars; that he advanced 3825 to Lady Cochrane and will send the 2375 to England by the next boat.

Rebecca, Ylo, 31 May 1821, William Cochrane to
Lord Cochrane: requesting to know what the conditions are for trading in Arica and other ports under Lord Cochrane's control.

1782 Callao, 1 August 1821, William Barnard: Note of purchase from Lord Cochrane, six bars of silver at seven pesos the mark, 8.596 pesos.

1783 Callao, 1 August 1821, William Barnard: Note of purchase from Lord Cochrane, four bars of silver at seven pesos the mark, 6.027 pesos.

1784 Lima, 2 August 1821: Statement of accounts between Lord Cochrane and Mr. William Cochrane; showing balance in William Cochrane's favour of 9.078 dollars.

1785 Lima, 8 August 1821, William Cochrane to Lord Cochrane: offer to sell some coined and bar gold.

1786 O'Higgins, Ancon, 3 September 1821: note of the valuation of the gold and silver received on board according to a statement handed over by the Mint of Lima, as 135.977 pesos in gold dust and bars, silver bars and piñas, and gold and silver coin.

1787 3 September 1821: Inventory of public and private funds by weight, sent to the port of Ancon from the Mint of Lima.

1788 4 September 1821, Lord Cochrane in account with A.S. Cramond for the brig Monarch: showing that 4.727 dollars have been paid to Lord Cochrane.

1789 Outline account between Lord Cochrane and A.S. Cramond between June 1821 and August 1821.
1790 Ancon, 5 September 1821, Manuel Loro to the captain of the Xeresana: order, that he is to receive and look after the funds of the state and the three officers accompanying the said funds.

1791 Louisa, 15 September 1821, J. Worthy: affidavit witnessed by Paul Delano, Henry Cobbett and Luis Benet, of questions asked by Lord Cochrane about unlicensed shipments of royalist funds and about funds on board of the Louisa, and of his answer that he gives to Lord Cochrane a paper he has received from Monteagudo dated 5 September 1821, which is the only document he has relative to packages deposited in his ship.

1792 Lima, 5 September 1821, Bernardo Monteagudo to J. Worthy: requesting him to receive aboard the funds of the state from Juan Alguero.

1793 Aboard Peruana, bay of Ancon, 14 September 1821, Manuel Loro to Lord Cochrane: stating positively that no money has been embarked in this port.

1794 Louisa, Ancon, 15 September 1821, J. Worthy: Inventory of sundry bags and boxes said to contain bar silver and coins, and delivered in presence of Paul Delano, Henry Cobbett and Luis Benet.

1795 Ancon, 15 September 1821, Jose Meneses, Francisco Lisarzaburu: note that 70 items have been sent aboard the Jerezana by the Casa de Moneda of Lima.

1796 Peruana, 15 September 1821, Carlos Fournier, master of the ship: declaration that he has no knowledge whether there is money aboard the ship, but that the Commandant of Transports, Manuel Loro, has said that there is not.
Lima, 16 September 1821, Juan de Bezindoaga to Lord Cochrane: claiming a carpet bag with some of the money and papers taken out of the Luisa.

Lima, 16 September 1821, Francisco de Jaramona, senior official of the Ministry of Hacienda: letter of authentication of claim of Juan de Bezindoaga for possessions taken out of the Luisa.

Jeresana, 16 September 1821, A. Mionsiwhy, master of the ship, witnessed by Paul Delano, Henry Cobbett and Luis Benet: affidavit that he has received only the monies ordered into his charge by Manuel Loro.

Bay of Ancon, 16 September 1821, William Turner: certifying receipt of 13,876 pesos from the Perla of monies brought from Lima.

Lima, 16 September 1821, Juan Jose de Sarratea to Lord Cochrane: requesting the return of various monies taken out of the Perla and belonging to various members of the merchant community.

16 September 1821: note of silver belonging to Juan Jose de Sarratea, as 63 boxes of stamped or piña metal.

Perla, 15 September 1821: notes of possessions aboard the ship of Lemos, José Joaquín Ramirez, and Manuel de Sousa Duarfe, shewing that they are the owners of 43,000 dollars and other uncoined sums which came from Lima with Sarratea's money.

Lima, 25 September 1821, Hipolito Unanue to Lord Cochrane: requesting him to return 8,000 pesos of his own money seized with the government funds at Ancon.
Lima, 29 September 1821, Jose de Boqui to Lord Cochrane: informing him that Jose Meneses and Jose Ollague have been appointed to take charge of the items which Lord Cochrane is to surrender to the government.

Lima, 30 September 1821, Hipolito Unanue to Lord Cochrane: requesting that 8,000 pesos of his money, seized with the state's funds, be returned to his agent.

Lima, 1 October 1821, Juan Jose de Sarratea to Lord Cochrane: requesting a reply to his earlier letter and arguing his need for the return of the money.

1 October 1821, Mandes and Company: Lord Cochrane in account with...from 21 January 1818 to 30 September 1820, shewing that, with interest on unpaid account Lord Cochrane on 1 October 1821 owes £1489.17s.4d.

Mandes and Company: Lord Cochrane in account with...from 10 March 1820 to 26 July 1821, shewing balance against Lord Cochrane on 26 July 1821 of £1477.5s.9d.

Mandes and Company: Lord Cochrane in account with...from 10 March 1820 to 6 March 1821, shewing balance against Lord Cochrane on 6 March 1821 of £1434.2s.8d.

Westminster, 9 August 1821, Mandes and Company: Lord Cochrane in account with...from 28 February 1821 to 30 July 1821, shewing balance against Lord Cochrane on 30 July 1821 of £1477.5s.9d.

Callao, 2 October 1821: Note of payment received
for passports for various passengers in the San Fernando, 14,925 pesos paid to Lord Cochrane on account of the Chilean squadron.

1813
Brig Columbia, Callao, 2 October 1821, A.S. Cramond to Lord Cochrane: stating that he is holding to Lord Cochrane's account two-third shares of the Colonel Allen, Potrillo, Emilia; that he engages to keep his accounts for the ships and to dispose of goods received from the O'Higgins on Lord Cochrane's account.

1814
Copy of the previous item.

1815
4 October 1821: Lord Cochrane in account with A.S. Cramond for sundry enterprises and a share in a voyage of the Colonel Allen on which his profit was 3,338 pesos 4 reales on 20 August 1821; shewing balance due to Lord Cochrane on 4 October 1821 of 1,717 pesos 4 reales and settled on this date.

1816
Callao, 6 October 1821, A.S. Cramond to Lord Cochrane: stating that notwithstanding the certificate of sale of wood to the Mercedes, he is holding it on account of the captors.

1817
Account of silver disposed of on board the O'Higgins between 2 and 6 October 1821, totaling 104,834 pesos and 2 reales.

1818
Note of various monies expended and received in connection with the acquisition and distribution of the Ancon silver.

1819
Guayaquil, 22 October 1821, Henry Robinson: receipt for 1,412 pesos for naval stores, provisions, and a boat.

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Guayaquil, 24 October 1821, William Henderson: receipt for 9,918 pesos for slops supplied in September to the squadron.

Guayaquil, 14 November 1821, Merino: receipt for 778 pesos for Russia cordage supplied.

November 1821: Inventory of the expenses incurred in Guayaquil for the repair and revictualing of the warships of the Chilan squadron.

March 1822: Inventory of the costs of the squadron in Guayaquil.

Alexis Sonmostre: receipt for 360 pesos for 30 crates of wine at 12 bottles the crate.

O'Higgins, 1821: receipt of Luis Bennett to G. Ord 505 pesos for naval supplies, rope and canvas.

Callao, "Sunday afternoon", 1821, A.S. Cramond to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has sent his second mate to take charge of the Truxillane and arranged with the Superb to bring her up here; that he is sending 180 pesos down to Lord Cochrane at Ancon; that Robinett's schooner is loading arms for Guayaquil; that the Truxillane should be ready for sea in 14 days.

Acapulco, 1 February 1822, D. Proudfoot: receipt for 2,074 pesos for rum for the squadron.
1829 Copy of the previous item.

1830 Acapulco, 2 February 1822, Andrew Wilson: receipt for 54 pesos for water casks.

1831 Copy of the previous item.

1832 Acapulco, 2 February 1822, Jose Bonavides: receipt for 1075 pesos for supplies provided.

1833 Acapulco, 2 February 1822, Miguel Bic: receipt for 2000 pesos for provisions supplied to the squadron.

1834 Copy of the previous item.

1835 Guayaquil, 2 March 1822, Alexis Sonmostre: receipt for 360 pesos from the contador of the O'Higgins for 30 crates of wine.

1836 O'Higgins, Guayaquil, 18 March 1822, Lord Cochrane: promissory note on Chile to Winstanley, Villamil y Cia for 4,000 pesos fuertes.

1837 Copy of the previous item.

1838 Copy of the previous item.

1839 Copy of the previous item.

1840 ND: Note of prize money due for the capture of the Potrillo, two prize distributions at Arica, silver captured at Pisco, captures made in Callao, totalling 17,500 pesos.

5 April 1822, Luis Benet: Note of prize money distributed, as 12,246 pesos for the Potrillo; 23,521 for the first distribution at Arica, and
3.430 for the second; 2.222 for the Potrillo's prize and 1.688 for Lieutenant Kittmer's prize; 2.958 for the Pisco silver; 1.756 for the Victoria; and 9.367 for the captures made in Callao.


1842 22 September 1822, William Hoseason: receipt for 116 ounces of gold and 5000 dollars from Lord Cochrane for accounts rendered.

1843 17 October 1822, William Lace: receipt for 63 dollars received from Lord Cochrane for food and drink.

17 October 1822, Ann Lace: receipt for 250 dollars, equal to £50, for wages as servant to Lady Cochrane.

1844 1822: List of receipts from captains in the Chilian service for monies received between 24 March 1821 and 4 May 1822, with a note stating that the list of receipts will show that the squadron supported itself during that time.

1845 1822: Note of receipts for money paid out by Lord Cochrane for prize claims and for supplies and provisions.

1846 1822: Account of sums due to Lord Cochrane for operations during the Liberating Expedition, as shares in the capture of the Esmeralda, shares in other captures made by the squadron, pay due during 12 months' blockade of Peru and eight months' pursuit of the Spanish frigates, totalling 54,311 pesos.
1847 1822: Drafts for accounts relative to captures and prize money taken or distributed in Peru.

1848 1822: Drafts for accounts relative to captures and prize money taken or distributed in Peru.

1849 1822: Drafts for accounts relative to captures and prize money taken or distributed in Peru.

1850 1822: Account of the sums owed to the crown of the Chilean squadron by the governments of Chile or Peru, totalling 75,392 pesos.

1851 1822: Note of the prize money of 20,400 pesos and of other monies due to Lord Cochrane, totalling 40,006 pesos.

1852 1822, account number 1: Inventory of the expenses of the squadron incurred in Arica, Ilo, Callao and elsewhere between 13 May 1821 and 6 October 1821, totalling 82,253 pesos 2 reales.

1853 1822, account number 3: Inventory of sums paid to the crews of the squadron of Chile for arrears of pay due, totalling 157,704 pesos.

1854 1822, account number 4: Inventory of the sums reclaimed by its owners and returned to them in Callao, totalling 36,680 pesos 6 reales.

1855 1822, account number 5: Note that 1,000 pesos has been paid over to don Manuel Sousa Duarte.

1856 1822, account number 6: Note that stamped and pine silver to the value of 25,000 pesos was sent to Chile by the schooner Aransasu for adjudication.
1857 1822, account number 7: Inventory of the costs of repairs to the warships of Chile in the dockyard of Guayaquil between 27 October 1821 and 25 November 1821, totalling 6,745 pesos 3 reales.

1858 1822, account number 8: Inventory of the costs incurred for the repair and revictualling of the warships of the Chilean squadron in Guayaquil between 22 October 1821 and 29 November 1821, totalling 10,428 pesos 2 reales.

1859 1822, account number 9: Continuation of account of costs incurred in Guayaquil between 25 November 1821 and 1 December 1821, totalling 15,658 pesos 2 reales.

1860 1822, account number 10: Inventory of the expenses of the Chilean squadron in Acapulco between 1 and 2 February 1822, totalling 10,509 pesos.

1861 1822, account number 11: Note of the expenses of the squadron in Taceney, as 432 pesos.

1862 1822, account number 12: Inventory of the expenses of the squadron of Chile in Guayaquil between 17 March 1822 and 24 March 1822, totalling 8,792 pesos 5 reales.

1863 1822, account number 13: Inventory of the expenses of the Chilean squadron in Callao between 1 May 1822 and 8 May 1822, totalling 6,567 pesos 7½ reales.

1864 1822, account number 14: Note that the schooner Dos Amigos which was returned to don Mariano Portocarrero, was valued at 8,000 pesos.

1865 1822, account number 15: Inventory of expenses of the squadron in pay for the officers and including
thefts by the seamen, totalling 10,334 pesos.

1866
1822, account number 17: Inventory of bounties paid for enlistments between 1 October 1820 and 6 May 1821, totalling 2,059 pesos.

1867
Valparaiso, 8 January 1823, William Hoseason to Lord Cochrane: account of how the 10 bills at 1000 dollars each, received by Lord Cochrane from the government, were applied; that they were cashed at discounts of between 10 per cent and 25 per cent, to raise 8100 dollars.

1868
Quintero, 16 January 1823, Henry Dean: Receipt of Lord Cochrane's order for 17,683 dollars on the government, for Mr. Hoseason.

1869
Clorinda, Valparaiso, 3 February 1823, William Mackay to Lord Cochrane: acknowledging the receipt of letters from Lord Cochrane and memorials from Dean and Hoseason.

1870
London, 25 April 1823, W.D. Dawson to William Shirriff: stating that, respecting Lord Cochrane's attack on Callao when the master of the Saint Patrick was killed and the ship damaged, having enquired into the affair and determined that Lord Cochrane's motives were free from malevolence and the fatal shot was fired from the battery, he will withdraw his charges and claims.

1871
Catete, 9 June 1824, H. Chamberlain, H.M. Consul-General, to Lord Cochrane: stating that he has talked with Mr. May about the question of the Colonel Allen; that a lawsuit in England would be very expensive and he is prepared to arbitrate if both sides request it.

1872
Fredericks Place, 18 February 1828, Olverson,
Denby and Lavie: service of a writ on Lord Cochrane on behalf of John Heyman to recover cargo seized from the Admiral Cockburn.

Coulsons Hall, 20 February 1828, Lord Cochrane to Olversons, Denby and Lavie: stating that he has letters of Heyman's proving that he asked for that of which he now complains; and that he has put the whole affair of the Admiral Cockburn in the hands of his solicitor.

Fredericks Place, 23 February 1828, Olverson, Denby and Lavie to Thomas Metcalfe: requesting to see the letters of Heyman alluded to by Lord Cochrane as having been written on 11 May and 15 June 1821.

Fredericks Place, 28 April 1828, Germain Lavie to Thomas Metcalfe: stating that Heyman denies that he ever wrote a letter to Lady Cochrane.

See item 1594 above, John Heyman to Lord Cochrane, 15 June 1821.

19 November 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: extract of a letter regarding the rights of neutrals.

Temple, 28 August 1822, Samuel Marryat: Solicitor's brief on the loss of the cargo of the Admiral Cockburn and description of the case to establish whether the underwriters will indemnify the owners for the loss suffered on the voyage, which amounts to £4 per cent of the sum insured of £80,000.

17 May 1828, Edmund Walker, plaintiff Clerk in Court: Account of the sums sued for by the executors of Mr. Hoseason from Lord Cochrane, totaling £3767.8s.4d.
1876

London, Exchequer of Pleas, ND, William Hoseason and other executors, plaintiffs, and Lord Cochrane, defendant: Account of Lord Cochrane's in reply to Hoseason's claim; shewing the sums claimed and already paid by Lord Cochrane, and alleging that the Chilean government paid Hoseason 130,000 dollars for the Esmeralda.

1877

Copy of the previous item.

1878

5 Elizabeth Terrace, Islington, 23 December 1828, William Jackson to Lord Cochrane: stating that with regard to the judgement going against Lord Cochrane in the lawsuit with Hoseason for Lord Cochrane's bill on the Chilean government, it would be better to spend a little time in prison than to make over £4000 to Hoseason and Dean.

1879

Court of King's Bench, Wednesday 29 April 1829, Hobson Adams and others, plaintiffs, and Lord Cochrane, defendant: case regarding the payment for a carriage alleged to have been built on Lord Cochrane's instructions and shipped out to Chile for him, but which he thereafter declined to pay for; with Lord Cochrane's defence against the allegations; and the verdict acquitting Lord Cochrane of the charges.

1880

ND, "Monday morning", Charles Black to William Jackson: stating that he has looked through the correspondence for 1820, 1821 and 1822 but there is nothing further regarding the chariot.

1881

10 August 1830, Geo. Brown to the Hon. Arthur Cochrane: Note that Heyman was bankrupted and is now a clerk in an insurance office; note that the letter was received from Jackson on 15 June 1832.
London, 26 February 1841, Robert Crichton Wyllie, member of the Committee of South American Bondholders, to Holders of Chilean Bonds: circular abstract of the revenue and expenditure of Chile between 1833 and 1839.
1883  Diary of the naval operations of the Chilean squadron between 27 April 1818 and 29 June 1821.

1884  Summary of naval operations from Lord Cochrane's arrival at Valparaíso on 28 November 1818 until 29 March 1821.

1885  Notes on the operations of the Chilean squadron between 28 November 1818 and 23 May 1821.

1886  ND, Note of various dates between 1818 and 1822.

1887  Summary of naval operations between 16 January 1819 and 10 March 1822.

1888  Summary of the main activities of San Martín and of the Chilean squadron between 9 August 1820 and 15 September 1821.

1889  Diary of naval operations of the Chilean squadron between 2 July 1821 and 2 July 1823.

1890  Summary of events in Peru and activities of the Chilean squadron between 4 August 1821 and 29 July 1822, extracted from William Bennett Stevenson's account of his residence in South America.

1891  Copy of the previous item.

1892  Note of sundry dates of events in Peru, extracted from Alexander Caldecleugh's account of his travels in South America.

1893  Diary of William Jackson from 17 January 1823 when Lord Cochrane embarked on the Colonel Allen at Quintero in company with captain Crosbie and Lieutenants Grenfell, Shepherd and Clewley, bound for Rio de Janeiro, to 1826.
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<td>1894</td>
<td>Log of the voyage of the brig Colonel Allen from Quintero on Saturday, 16 January 1823, to Rio de Janeiro on 12 March 1823.</td>
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<td>1895</td>
<td>Map of the Guayaquil river with notes of O'Higgins' movements between 12 March 1822 and 23 March 1822.</td>
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<td>1896</td>
<td>Ylo bay, 1 July 1821: map and sailing instructions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Guayaquil river, ND: map and sailing instructions for part of the river.</td>
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<td>1898</td>
<td>Guayaquil river, ND: map and sailing instructions for part of the river.</td>
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<td>1899</td>
<td>Guayaquil river, ND: map and sailing instructions for part of the river.</td>
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PART TWENTY-ONE

(Document 1900 - 1964)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF LORD COCHRANE
1818 - 1820
Valparaiso, 4 July 1819, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that he has learned that don Antonio Alvarez Jonte, his confidential secretary, has opened a sealed box of despatches addressed to the Minister of Marine and extracted some letters; that he requests a public investigation as he does not believe that this arose from a zeal for the public service; that he has put Alvarez under arrest.

Valparaiso, 4 July 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has put Alvarez Jonte under arrest for opening a sealed despatch box and withdrawing some letters.

Lord Cochrane to Antonio Alvarez Jonte: note, that he is under arrest for opening a sealed despatch box and withdrawing some letters to O'Higgins and San Martin.

Valparaiso, 23 July 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that in response to Zenteno's request for his view of the military and naval position of Chile, on the supposition that Spain cannot send a force to this area, every soldier ought to be embarked for Peru; that operations should consist of movements of 800 troops along the shore of Peru to keep the royalists in a continual state of alarm and uncertainty, as a preliminary to the great expedition; that if her were given the means, the naval part of the war might soon be finished.

Valparaiso, 24 July 1819, Lord Cochrane to Captains Forster, Spry and Crosbie and Major Miller: memorandum, that they are to assemble on board of the San Martin to try Lieutenant Nathaniel Bailey the following morning.
Santiago, 7 August 1819, Lord Cochrane to William Cochrane, his brother: stating that the rockets, which are the finest ever made, are nearly ready and that he will depart to cruise against Callao shortly; having destroyed the enemy forces there he will prosecute further operations and has every prospect of making the largest fortune ever made in these days except for that of the Duke of Wellington; that he is obliged to conserve his funds at the moment as he has undertaken heavy advance obligations; that William Cochrane should try to assist William Jackson to travel out to South America as his secretary.

Santiago, 9 August 1819, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that he accepted the naval command without stipulation assuming that he would get the same as he got in England; that he has no wish to take Chilean money but is prepared to serve without pay and get this from his enemies; that he has heavy expenses as commander and needs a share in prize money equal to British levels.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 3 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Donat O'Brien: stating that he dislikes losing the acquaintance of one he respects, so he takes this opportunity of assuring O'Brien that no personal feelings may enter questions arising from his public capacity.

O'Higgins, off Callao, 8 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating the unexpected result of the rocket attempt on Callao; that he is extremely vexed at the loss of time incurred by the failure; that whilst the squadron exists in its present condition, there is nothing to fear provided that it is employed in aiding a military force, sent at once to revolutionise
Peru; that even with the force he has, it may be kept in a constant uproar.

1908 Copy of the previous item.

1909 Copy of the previous item.

1910 O'Higgins, at sea, lat. 20 deg., long. 82.30 deg., 23 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: reporting on his movements; that the Araucano has been sent to reconnoitre Callao; that training of the sailors proceeds, but since most of the men are newly embarked, the same work as in the previous cruise is having to be done again; that he be given new instructions in the light of the unexpected circumstances in which the ill-success of the rockets placed him.

1911 October 1819, Lord Cochrane to Donat O'Brien: stating that he did not know that the ships in Callao were under O'Brien's protection until he boarded them; that he had said publicly that he would not return O'Brien's fire, should he attack; that he is fully justified in imposing a blockade.

1912 O'Higgins, 19 December 1819, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating his disagreement with Captain Guise on the subject of his doing double duty.

1913 Montezuma, Valdivia harbour, 4 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: dispatch reporting the capture of the forts on the southern bank of the Valdivia inlet; stating that he communicated with Freire on the means most likely to accomplish the expulsion of the enemy; that supplies and troops were ready on 23 January; that on 2 February they anchored off the aguada del Ingles, disembarked
at sunset and captured the various batteries; that about 70 guns and the *Dolores* have been captured.

1914 Copy of the previous item.

1915 Valdivia harbour, 5 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: dispatch reporting the capture of the eastern forts of Valdivia.

1916 Headquarters, Valdivia, 6 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: dispatch reporting the fall of the town of Valdivia, and Lord Cochrane's measures to set up an administration and pacify the Indians.

1917 O'Higgins, harbour of Valdivia, 9 February 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: dispatch reporting the quality of the harbour, the supplies captured in the forts, his intention of proceeding south to give the coup de grace to the Spanish power in Chiloé.

1918 Valparaiso, 10 April 1820, Lord Cochrane to Major William Cochrane, private: stating that he prospects for the future are now very good; that the invasion of Peru is being actively prepared; account of the Chilean military and naval service; that he recently captured Valdivia with 350 men, to the considerable satisfaction of the government.

1919 April 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: acknowledging receipt of instructions for the sailing of a transport and a small warship; requesting that the crews of these be paid before departure.

1920 April 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: requesting that a regular marine battalion of marine
artillery be established to serve the great guns.

1921 Quintero, 30 May 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: account of a recent storm in Bahia Bernardo; that the ships rode out the storm but the *Begona* and the *Laautaro* suffered some damage; that though the storm was so great in Valparaiso, in Bahia Bernardo he was able to embark and disembark many times in a small boat without risk.

1922 Quintero, May 1820, Lord Cochrane: proposal that the Chilean state should establish a naval dockyard at Quillota.

1923 Copy of the previous item.

1924 1 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Francisco Santander: stating that the coming expedition to Peru has been an obstacle to Muñoz' mission as the Chilean government has needed all the arms it could procure.

4 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Simon Bolivar: stating his admiration for the Liberator and offering the help of his squadron.

1925 4 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Luis de la Cruz, Governor of Valparaiso: requesting to be informed if it was his intention to insinuate to the Government that Lord Cochrane's departure for Herreria was for the purpose of contraband; stating that he denies this allegation.

8 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Luis de la Cruz: stating that the Minister of Marine has told him that de la Cruz told him (the Minister) that Lord Cochrane had opined that the captors of Valdivia were not due any of the value of the
booty of the said conquest; that he has replied denying this, and believes that de la Cruz must have been under a mistaken impression.

8 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing a complaint, which he supports, from Captain Forster, regarding Spry's promotion and increase in pay; that Forster has sacrificed rank and pay in the English service; that if Lord Cochrane had been consulted, he would have recommended promotion for Spry but not making his pay equal to that of senior officers.

20 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Luis de la Cruz: stating that on Saturday the north American brig *Warrior* entered the port on the grounds that she was short of water; that she remained all day, but disappeared during the night; that he has been informed that she was carrying arms and making for Callao, having discovered the situation of that port and the absence of a blockading force; that he has sent the *Araucano* in pursuit and had no time to consult as to what he should have done.

28 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing captain Gilles' account of the frigate *Princesa Carlota* and requesting that the account be sent to London to preserve the most perfect harmony with the neutrals in this port.

11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing a letter from captain Ramsay, protesting because Crosbie does not have the rank of captain yet is a member of the forthcoming court martial.
11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he must make charges against one of his officers, Guise; that arrangements have been made to replace him in command of the Lautaro; that he hopes that Zenteno will give orders to carry out a courtmartial.

Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: apologising for having forgotten to include Ramsay’s letter earlier.

Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane: Charges exhibited against Martin Guise for court martial for dereliction of duty and insubordination; alleging that Guise did not inform his commander of the nationality, cargo and destination of a ship before the port when his ship was undertaking guard duty, refused to answer a marine guard of the Admiral’s boat, and permitted the stranger ship to escape; that he did not obey the Admiral’s signals for ships’ boats to be sent to the aid of the Aguila when she went aground at Valparaiso; that he boarded a ship in or around Valparaiso when the Lautaro was not on guard duty, and thereafter let the ship leave the port without giving an official report on the affair; that he failed to discharge Lieutenant Robertson on the Admiral’s orders, discharged another Lieutenant without the Admiral’s order, and thereafter gave a false report about this to the Admiral; that he disobeyed the Admiral’s orders regarding the reception and incorporation of marines into the ships’ crews; that he disobeyed the Admiral’s orders regarding the method and order of payment of the ships’ crews; that between 5 and 10 July he failed to comply with a general order to report deficiencies in the supply and equipment of the ships; that he proceeded in the above in derogation of the authority of the commander-in-chief and in
violation of the articles of war; that he permitted his officers to absent themselves from the ship and from the port to the injury of the service.

Note, by Lord Cochrane, that it is necessary to hold a court martial if discipline is to be preserved in the fleet, and that he warns against any attempt to obstruct his wishes in this matter.

8 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing requisitions for the San Martin, Independencia and Chacabuco; noting that the captains of the Lautaro and Galvarino have not yet complied with his order for information and may have to be courtmartialed; his inability to work with the newly-appointed Commissary General of Marine and the shortcomings of the same; that the ships are not provisioned and he lacks the authority and means to equip them; that the government should nominate people who can do their duty, or repose their trust in Lord Cochrane; that otherwise he cannot be held responsible for what happens ashore.

20 June 1820, Lord Cochrane: order for the captains of the warships to report on the strengths of their complements.

20 June 1820, Lord Cochrane: order for the captains of warships to report on deficiencies in their provisions.

1927 Valparaiso, 21 June 1820, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: repeating his order for Lieutenant Robertson to be discharged from the ship to join the gunboat.
1928 Valparaiso, 8 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Commandant General of the Marine Department: stating that not having been informed until now if the articles asked for existed, he requests to be advised if they are ready to be embarked.

Valparaiso, 10 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Commandant General of the Marine Department: stating that he has received no answer to his earlier letter, and now repeats his request.

1929 9 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the naval department being managed on English rules, he enjoys the right to appoint the captain of his flagship.

1930 9 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that the paymaster was ordered to pay the ships in order of seniority starting with the O'Higgins; that as instead he went aboard the Lautaro, he is to be stopped from paying out until Lord Cochrane's orders are executed.

1931 9 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: requesting to know if the order not to pay the seamen of the Lautaro has been obeyed.

1932 Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane: Charges exhibited against Martin Guise for court martial.

1933 Copy of the previous item.

1934 Copy of the previous item.

1935 Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order to execute the enclosed orders.

Valparaiso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to John

- 373 -
Spry: order to take command of the Lautaro.

Valparaíso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order, that immediately on receipt of this he will have the log and other books of the Lautaro sealed up on the quarterdeck before the other officers and transmit the same to Lord Cochrane.

Valparaíso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he is under arrest for neglect of duty, disobedience of orders and contempt of the commander-in-chief's authority.

1936 Copy of the previous item.

1937 Valparaíso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order, that the master or pursers of any two of the Chacabuco, San Martín or Galvarino are to accompany him to the Lautaro and be present when he opens the enclosed order.

1938 Valparaíso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: memorandum respecting the officers who are to accompany him.

1939 Valparaíso, 11 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: commissioning him to take charge of the Lautaro as acting captain.

1940 Valparaíso, 12 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins, private: stating that he has received an official note from the Minister of Marine that the trial of Captain Guise is suspended; that in such circumstances it will be impossible for him to maintain his authority and command even in his own ship; that he therefore offers his commission up.
Valparaiso, 13 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: offering his resignation of his citizenship, command and hacienda in protest at the refusal to hold an enquiry into the activities of certain of his officers.

Valparaiso, 20 July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: informing him that the government has ordered the suspension of the court martial upon him.

July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has put Guise at liberty in response to the request from the Supreme Government.

July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing a letter of Guise's showing him to be at fault, and referring to his disobedience of orders.

July 1820, Lord Cochrane: order, that the court martial on Guise is to be suspended, that he is to be restored to command of the Lautaro, that he is to be deemed innocent of the charges until such a court martial takes place.

July 1820, Lord Cochrane to the Senior Lieutenant of the Lautaro: order, that in the absence of his superior officer he is to bring his ship to readiness by 3 August.

July 1820, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: enclosing his authority to resume command of the Lautaro.

9 August 1820, Lord Cochrane: note, that Lieutenant Prunier has been ordered to cruise for two months between Montecristi and Payta.
1948 O'Higgins, at sea, 28 August 1820, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Carter: order, that he is to deliver to Searle at Arica or Ylo the enclosed letters notifying him of the blockade; that he is to avoid all communication by which the destination of the squadron might be known; that he is to proceed for further orders to Pisco; that he is to detain the Sesostris or the Midas if he meets them.

1949 August 1820, Lord Cochrane to Carlos José Correa de Saa: stating that he has been too busy to attend earlier to personal matters; that regarding Quintero, he only specified that the price be not more than 50,000 dollars; that the transfer was effected from Ovalle by Henderson and an agent of his.

1950 Pisco, 27 September 1820, Lord Cochrane to Senior American Naval Officer: defending the seizure of the brig Columbia in Pisco, for carrying on commerce with the enemy.

1951 O'Higgins, 23 October 1820, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order, that he is to cruise down toward San Lorenzo to intercept vessels attempting to escape while the troops are being embarked; that he is to leave the Araucano to cruise off Hormigas while he cruises off Salina Pelado and Hormigas.

1952 O'Higgins, 23 October 1820, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Carter: order, that he is to cruise off Hormigas to intercept ships attempting to escape from Callao; that on 30 October he is to join the blockade off Callao.

1953 25 October 1820, Lord Cochrane to Jose de San Martin: stating that to avoid being treated like
the petty states of Barbary by the great powers it is necessary to operate strictly in accord with the law of nations; that by levying duties they will be persuaded that our friendship is worth seeking; that this should be made officially known to Searle and published in the army gazette.

1954 O'Higgins, 30 October 1820, Lord Cochrane to Paul Delano: order, that he is to sail with the convoy and the Galverino to Ancon or other port appointed by San Martin.

1955 4 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Captain Searle and Captain Downes: advising them that the blockade of Guayaquil has been raised.

1956 Callao, 6 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin de Pezuela: proposing an exchange of prisoners.

1957 7 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: despatch reporting the capture of the Esmeralda.

1958 O'Higgins, Callao bay, 8 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster: giving instructions about his course of action if neutral warships escort vessels carrying enemy goods shipped since the start of the blockade; that the captains are to be told to go to the commander-in-chief or to Valparaiso for examination; that Captain Forster is not to resort to arms to have his order obeyed; that if fired upon, he is to report to Lord Cochrane.

1959 Copy of the previous item.

1960 9 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster: order, that he is to continue in the blockade with the Lautaro, Arauceno and Galverino.
Callao, 28 November 1820, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that the Edward Ellice, Luisa and other ships would suffer delay and damage if they were sent to Chile for adjudication, nor can the warships spare officers and men to navigate them; and requesting that San Martin will set up a court of adjudication at Headquarters.

Copy of the previous item.

1 December 1820, Lord Cochrane to Luis Coig, captain of the Esmeralda: stating his admiration of his and his officers' courageous defence of the Esmeralda, and returning his insignia and sword.

December 1820, Lord Cochrane: List of the documents of the Luisa; claiming that there are irregularities in the log; that the captain's claim that the ship was putting in for water and wood, which is an old American pretence, is unfounded as there was plenty of time to ship both wood and water before leaving Rio; that there is too much and the wrong sort of cargo for the Columbia river settlement which the captain claims is his destination.
PART TWENTY-TWO

(Documents 1965 - 2124)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF LORD COCHRANE 1821
1965  O'Higgins, 31 January 1821, Lord Cochrane to William Shirriff: acknowledging receipt of Shirriff's of 20 December 1820 regarding the blockade on Peru; stating that the principles laid down are contrary to British practice; that neutrals are forbidden to carry on the trade which the belligerent formerly carried on for himself to the exclusion of the neutral; that those who gave Hardy his instructions overlooked this fact.

1966  O'Higgins, off Cerro Azul, 9 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: enclosing a letter from Captain Forster who was left with the San Martin to cruise to windward to intercept ships bound for Callao, which always touch at the southern ports for intelligence as to how to avoid the blockade; that San Martin will also see the need to cut off the southern road by which the enemy supply Lima so that the blockade is of little value.

1967  O'Higgins at anchor, Cerro Azul, 10 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that because of contrary winds, it took him eight days to beat down the length of San Lorenzo; that he has learned from the Araucano of the arrival of two French warships from Valparaiso where they refused to salute the flag; that he was unable to make enquiries personally; that the Valdivia and Consequencia have still not arrived; that in the meantime, he has disembarked the marines of the O'Higgins and San Martin and put them under Colonel Heres; that they are in Cañete 150 strong, distracting the enemy until the Valdivia comes; that it is vital to block up this road, but not within his instructions; that this letter comes by the Montezuma, which has disembarked its stores.
and is returning to San Martin.

1968  O'Higgins at anchor, Cerro Azul, ND, Lord Cochrane, memorandum: order to put the accompanying person aboard the Montezuma to carry communications for San Martin; and to try to intercept the Mainu, believed to be about to try and make a run out of Callao.

1969  O'Higgins, Callao bay, 16 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that the Valdivia and Conscuencia joined the squadron on 11 February; that adverse winds forced the O'Higgins to take four days reaching here; that when the other two ships arrive, he will order them to Huacho.

1970  Callao, 17 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that the plan against the Callao forts failed through too much gossip which the enemy overheard; that the enemy should be tired out with marches after our supposed point of disembarkation; that if San Martin will give him 500 men, he will occupy half the viceroy's army at least; that at the moment he is wasting health and honour with no profit to the fatherland in a blockade; that he is thinking of coming ashore to consult personally with San Martin.

1971  O'Higgins, Callao bay, 18 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he has placed the signatories of the letter respecting the name of the Valdivia under arrest.

1972  O'Higgins, 20 February 1821, Lord Cochrane: proclamation that as Callao cannot be destroyed by the guns of the squadron, he offers all ships and gunboats in the harbour to those who will
accompany him in seizing them and turning their guns on the forts; that if they capture any forts, their value will be paid as prize, on the patriot army’s entering Lima.

1973 Copy of the previous item.

1974 O’Higgins, 20 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: order to send the officers named in the margin onto the Potrillo to ship to the Lautaro, to which they have been appointed.

1975 O’Higgins, 20 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he is sending lieutenants Shepherd and Armstrong and Surgeon Welsh to replace the arrested officers.

1976 20 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he will be hurt and grieved if Guise gives up his ship but that he is determined to put an end to cowardly malevolent insinuation and illveiled insolence from the officers.

1977 O’Higgins, 20 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating again his previous sentiments; stating that he has had a disagreeable office to perform in a service composed of such discordant materials and contending interests.

1978 O’Higgins, Callao bay, 21 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he has delayed the proposed expedition; that he has only taken the insubordinate officers from Guise’s ship; that he has not forced replacement officers upon him; that he is sending him an appointment.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 21 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he declines to accept his resignation.

O'Higgins, 22 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order for him to rendezvous off Chorrillos.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 22 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: stating that he will not accept his resignation without his giving good reasons.

O'Higgins, 22 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Crosbie: order for him to take charge of the Galvarino and anchor her in a convenient situation.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 22 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: order that he is to consider himself under arrest.

O'Higgins, 22 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that Esmonde's appointment to the Valdivia is only conditional and has not yet been delivered; that Captain Guise is to continue in command until the wish of the Chilean government be known.

O'Higgins, 22 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he is enclosing Captain Crosbie's explanation on the question of the delivery or non-delivery of Lord Cochrane's order for Esmonde to take command of the ship; and, for the third time, Captain Guise's appointment as commander.

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 22 February 1821, Lord
Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that as he has been captain of the ship for some time, he cannot now refuse to accept the appointment; requesting he will state categorically whether he will weigh anchor; stating that he encloses his appointment for the fourth time.

1988

O'Higgins, 24 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he has opened the packages brought from Chile to General San Martin, as they were printed proclamations for distribution on this coast.

1989

O'Higgins, Callao bay, 25 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: stating that Captain Crosbie was not ordered to supersede him, but to anchor the Galvarino by the O'Higgins in view of the conditions aboard her.

1990

O'Higgins, 26 February 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: stating that he understands the law and his duty to the service, and will be guided by them.

1991

Valdivia, 2 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Spry: stating that he cannot delay the squadron here any longer as Spry consistently refuses to command the Galvarino and obey orders.

1992

3 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin, secret: stating that all the troops except the Concordia have left Lima and there are only 1500 in Callao; that Lima is in ferment due to the news from Cadiz that no Spanish warships will be coming; that this is the moment to strike with 4000 men; that if he disembarks in Chorrillos, San Martin would be in Lima four hours later; that the heights of Chorrillos are a defensible
beach-head; apologising for his Spanish but this is a secret letter.

1993 Valdivia, Callao bay, 4 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that he is enclosing his correspondence with Captain Guise, the minutes of the court martial of Guise's officers and Captain Spry, and his correspondence with Captain Spry.

1994 Valdivia, 5 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he cannot permit his and Spry's departure on the grounds that the royalists may hear of the impending attack if anyone goes ashore now.

1995 Valdivia, Callao bay, 6 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: account of the difficulties of the fleet; of the insubordinate activities of Spry and Guise; the court martial of Spry and the Valdivia's officers; that he is sending the O'Higgins to Guayaquil for repairs; that his enclosed plan A is to be kept secret.

1996 Valdivia, off Callao, 6 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to NR: attacking Spry for his interfering and troublemaking.

1997 Valdivia, Callao bay, 6 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Hugh Kernan: order to transfer to the Pueyrredon until further notice.

1998 Valdivia, 6 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that Guise cannot be in discomfort as he has the after cabin on the O'Higgins which is Lord Cochrane's own.

1999 Valdivia, Huacho, 9 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to
the captains of the Chilean ships; order, that they are to send to him a six-monthly book of their respective ships' companies.

2000

HQ, Huaura, 10 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that he hopes Lima may be reduced before the Spanish ships arrive, as he has received 500 troops from San Martin to block up the southern road to the city; that besides this he has a plan for stopping the bay of Callao which would have been carried into effect some weeks ago but for the discord in the fleet caused by Guise and Spry; that the squadron is in great want; that the Esmeralda has been valued at 120000 dollars; that he dislikes Peru, which could be easily conquered by the Chileans; that Chile will need patriotic and competent seamen; that sailors should be given land grants around Valdivia.

2001

Valdivia, Huacho, 11 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to the captains of the Chilean warships in the port: order, that they are to send their empty bread bags on board the Pacifico.

2002

Valdivia, 12 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he offers him the command of the O'Higgins; that he will never accept Spry back, but that he would be very pleased to have Guise back.

2003

Valdivia, 13 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he received a letter last night from the officers of the Valdivia aboard the Potrillo; requesting Guise will return an earlier letter that he sent, in order that he may refresh his memory.
Huacho, 13 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he will not have the Valdivia officers back at all; his surprise at Guise's determination; that if he finds the Valdivia officers he will have them arrested as deserters.

Valdivia, 23 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Robert Bell, Henry Freeman, James Michael, James Frew, Hugh Kernan: stating his regret at the occurrence which led to their separation from the service; that they fled or otherwise refused to accept his appointments of them to other ships; requesting to be told if it is their intention to obey his orders in the future.

Valdivia, 23 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bell, Freeman, Michael, Frew, Kernan: stating that he has acted quite correctly; requesting to know their answer to his earlier question.

23 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that as he wishes to shift his flag from the Valdivia to the O'Higgins, he offers the command of the ship back to Guise, with its present officers; that the previous officers are to receive other appointments as before stated; enclosing Guise's appointment.

Valdivia, 23 March 1821, Lord Cochrane: appointment of Captain Guise to command the ship.

24 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bell, Freeman, Michael, Frew, Kernan: stating that as a result of General San Martin's intercessions, he is enclosing their appointments to other ships.

Valdivia, Pisco bay, 24 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Henry Freeman: appointment as lieutenant on the Araucano.

2012

26 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that while he regrets any inconvenience, the measures he must take for the security of the squadron must override private considerations; that he has left Captain Guise as much of his boat's crew as possible.

Pisco bay, 27 March 1821, Lord Cochrane to William Miller: stating that he is sending reinforcements, that Miller is to avoid a pitched battle if outnumbered and retire on the ships; that the plan he would prefer would be to land all the troops and 300 horses between the enemy and Lima, devastate Lima valley, breaking down the bridges to cut them off, then sail to Ancon or Chancay and get the army into Lima; that he can supply 100 marines who will fight like devils.

San Martin, 1 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Martin Guise: stating that he is sending the Potrillo to Huacho as soon as possible; that the ship has a larger cabin than the ship he came from England in.

O'Higgins, 3 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Edward Brown, captain of the Potrillo; order, that he is to disembark Guise and the other passengers with their luggage at Huacho; to deliver the negroes for the army to the governor; and deliver a letter to San Martin.

San Martin, 4 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster: order, that he will continue in close blockade of Callao with the Araucano and Galvarino.
6 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that the Aransasu, captured by the Araucano, is valued at 10,000 pesos.

6 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that there is desperation in Lima for lack of news about the arrival of the Spanish warships from Cadiz.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that the San Martin, O'Higgins, and Valdivia are ordered to Pisco, the Independencia, Galvarino, and Araucano are blockading Callao; although the Galvarino was without water due to the criminal negligence of Captain Spry; he had to go to Huacho to water, then the Araucano went in chase of a schooner, leaving only the Independencia in blockade, so that when a fog came down for three days, three ships got into and one got out of Callao.

6 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the Esmeralda has been valued at 120,000 pesos fuertes; requesting that the prize money due on her, or at least the bounty money, be paid.

6 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: reporting the continued insubordination of Captains Guise and Spry; reporting their court-martial in March 1821; and General San Martin's failure to discountenance them.

6 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: requesting that the costs of the Rising Star, now on its way to Chile, be satisfied according to the agreement; stating that this ship at the blockade would be more effective than all the other ships put together.
6 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that the Independencia lost an anchor and has only one, and that the San Martin is in the same state, having lost an anchor through its cable being rotted; that new anchors must be ordered, and also cable; that the cable made with the white cordage of Quillota has no pitch; that without more stores the ships will be unable to get back to Valparaiso and will probably have to be laid up at Guayaquil until made seaworthy again.

7 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that due to Captain Wilkinson's indefatigable and praiseworthy work, the San Martin has received a catwalk like other ships, which increases its value.

7 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that the sails of the O'Higgins and San Martin are completely rotted, and that the ships could not sail back to Chile with them; that they can remain here for three months; that they have not had new sails for three years; requesting they be supplied will sail.

San Martin, off Callao, 11 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Edward Brown, captain of the Potrillo: order, that he is to wait in Pacusano to seize or pursue ships coming into or past the port; that he is not to damage the inhabitants' property; that he is to clean the bottom of his ship.

Copy of the previous item.

11 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster: order, that he is to cruise for five days 20 miles northwest of Las Hormigas to intercept
two Spanish ships which are preparing to sail from Callao with money and stores for Panama and the enemy frigates.

2027 San Martin, off Callao, 11 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Esmonde, in the Galvarino: order, that he is to cruise about Chorrillos to intercept ships carrying Spanish property or trying to run the blockade; that he will prevent the fishermen from fishing.

2028 San Martin, Pisco bay, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Carter of the Araucano: order, that he is to equip his ship and place himself under the orders of Crosbie, promoted to Capitán de Navío for his part in the capture of the Esmeralda.

2029 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Henry Cobbett, in the Valdivia: order, that he is to sail to Huacho, sending 16 jars of wine with the Potrillo, at Pacusano, but without entering the port; that he is to deliver a boat, despatches and 20 jars of wine to Forster; that he is to land his sick at Huacho, take on firewood, and get two months' provisions if possible.

2030 Pisco bay, 19 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Crosbie: order, that he is to take the sick aboard the O'Higgins and sail to Huacho for provisions; that he is to return to cruise between Chorrillos and Pisco; that if enemy ships in superior force come out, he is to recall the Potrillo, Galvarino, Independencia and Valdivia to rejoin him and intercept them; that if necessary he will display Lord Cochrane's flag; that he is now to take the Araucano under his command, water her, and have her ready to chase any sail for up to 15 leagues.
Arica, ND, Lord Cochrane: Licence to trade for the *Rebecca* between Morro de Sama and Quilca, provided that she supplies certain provisions to the *San Martin* in lieu of duties.

Arica, ND, Lord Cochrane: Licence for the *Robert Fuge* to trade between Morro de Sama and Nazca.

Arica, ND, Lord Cochrane: Licence for the *Admiral Cockburn* to trade from Chancay southwards, and a special licence to pass the blockade into Callao, as the ship has provided much provision for the squadron.

Pisco, 20 April 1821, Lord Cochrane: Licence for the American brig *Ambarga* to trade from Huacho northwards on payment of duties.

21 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to the surgeons of the *O'Higgins* and *San Martin*: order to examine Captain Carter.

25 April 1821, Lord Cochrane to John Esmonde: order, that he is to leave the brig under Mr. Reading's command in Chorrillos to continue the salvage of the *San Martin*, and come to the Callao blockade.

*O'Higgins*, April 1821, Lord Cochrane to Thomas Carter: stating that Lieutenant Reading took command of the *Araucano* on Lord Cochrane's orders during Carter's unpermitted absence on a chase; that Carter subsequently came aboard and took his ship to Pisco despite Reading's request to be returned to the *O'Higgins* and in contempt of Lord Cochrane's authority; requesting he will give explanations of his action.
2035 San Martin, off Arica, 1 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to William Miller: memorandum, that the sea air having re-established the health of Miller and his men, they are to prepare to land and revolutionise the provinces of Arica and Arequipa.

2036 San Martin, 4 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to the Governor of Arica: stating that he has sufficient force to reduce the place to dust but invites the Governor to co-operate by raising a white flag within half an hour; that if a single shot is fired, then the Governor will be responsible for the consequences.

2037 11 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he had to re-embark the troops of the southern division due to terciana; that he attacked Arica through the Morro de Sama and captured the place.

2038 San Martin, Arica, 22 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that he has acquired cables, rigging and cloth here from the Admiral Cockburn and saved Chile more than 20,000 pesos and given the Admiral Cockburn a licence to trade.

2039 29 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that he is returning the United States minister's memorial; that the money taken had a certificate at risk of shippers before it was delivered to the Macedonian; that the question of the confiscation of contraband goods will be taken up later.

2040 Ylo, 30 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that since the departure of the squadron, three prizes have been sold, at 1000,
1800, and 1100 pesos respectively.

2041 30 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he had intended to keep the papers of the Edward Ellice, the Lord Suffield and others, to prove their fraudulent commerce to Hardy; that he is now enclosing the Spanish manifest of the Joseph and also the fraudulent English one, by which it is clear that the principal English merchants in Rio de Janeiro are implicated in the commerce; that all the papers should go to the Admiralty Judge and His Excellency's attention drawn to the matter; that the Robert Fuge is in the same circumstances and the supercargo Crompton playing the same part as Dr. Johnson of the Joseph and Dr. Thorn of the Columbia; that he does not know what he should do about the ship; that up until now he has been very careful with neutral ships and has not sent any which would not have been condemned in England; that the papers should be carefully kept as it is important to convince Hardy.

2042 May 1821, Lord Cochrane to the Minister of Marine: stating that he had intended to keep the Spanish manifests of the Joseph, Edward Ellice and Lord Suffield to prove their fraudulent commerce to Hardy, but he now encloses them to the Minister on account of the prize court's delay in its adjudication.

2043 9 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Juan Bautista Levalle, Governor of Arequipa: stating that to show his goodwill toward Spain, he has freed the prisoners of war Colonel Pablo de la Sierra and Ensign Ramirez.

2044 15 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to NR: acknowledging
receipt of the notification of the suspension of hostilities and transcript of the agreement; stating that he proposes to liberate the ships taken at Mollendo and Ylo.

San Martin, 17 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Sir Thomas Hardy: account of his actions with regard to commerce under the blockade; of the fraudulent Gibraltar papers of the Edward Ellice and Lord Suffield; of the blockade-running of the Indian with flour and Spanish officers aboard; of the Rebecca engaged in coasting trade and carrying enemy property claimed to be Deoyster's; of the finding of the real papers of the Columbia at Tacna; stating that he has let pass the Admiral Cockburn, Robert Fuge, Joseph and two others.

San Martin, 17 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Sir Thomas Hardy: stating that though he has replied to Hardy's of 30 April, and though he is simply obeying his government's orders, he will nevertheless explain his actions; that the question of the precise extent of coast which a given number of vessels may be considered able to blockade is nowhere ascertained; that anyway it is generally accepted that the commerce of neutrals should not be more extensive in time of blockade than previously and that they should not carry on a trade which they were not permitted to undertake before the war; that this is the law of nations which Britain has maintained; that he hopes the British government is not trying to establish one law for the strong and another for the weak.

San Martin, 17 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Sir Thomas Hardy: stating that he denies accusations made about the treatment offered to British
seamen on the O'Higgins; account of the rations
given to British seamen on board of the Chilean
ships and the troubles arising therefrom.

Partial copy of the previous item.

San Martin, 18 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Correa
de Saa, military commandant of Mollendo: stating
that having learned that some contraband is being
embarked at Mollendo for Lima, he is going to
seize it, and if there is any resistance by the
government or inhabitants, he will consider them
part of the attempted smuggling and leave of
Mollendo only its name.

Copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item.

18 June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Basil Hall: stat­
ing that Arica and Ylo are now liberated and
open to commerce; that the blockade now applies
to the coast between Huacho and Ylo.

June 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Landa and
the inhabitants of Moquegua: stating that he is
impressed by the representation and will command
Miller to explain his motives in imprisoning
Sres Llora and Mendoza.

1 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to NH: stating that
on receipt of his letter he ordered the embark­
ation of the timber now claimed as patriot pro­
perty; that the timber was interned as being in
violation of the blockade, and brought in by a
foreigner not allowed to trade anyway; that as
for the theft of other timbers during Lord Coch­
rane's absence, he should refer to the Alcalde of
Ylo on this matter.
2 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to the General Juan Ramírez: note of the news of the truce between San Martín and La Serna at Punchanca; note that in the case of the Colonel Allen, if the ship itself were seized as well as the wheat, it would have been condemned for blockade-running.

2 July 1821, 1½ p.m., Lord Cochrane to General Juan Ramírez: stating that with regard to the armistice between La Serna and San Martín, he has scrupulously adhered to his instructions.

San Martín, 2 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to William Miller: note of duties to be levied on ships, at 18 percent of cargo, 3½ per cent on disuso acunado, 5 per cent on plate; that on the first item, Chilean ships are to pay half the rate.

11 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Basil Hall, captain of HMS Conway: notifying him of the close blockade of Callao; requesting that he will order British vessels not to attempt to communicate with the place; that if he wishes to communicate with the capital he may do so through Ancon.

San Martín, 12 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing a copy of a letter of Hardy's which will show a contrast with his violent language in Valparaíso; that he is persuaded that Hardy knows he is too well versed in English practice and the law of nations to be taken in by assertions or frightened by his threats.

12 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that as a result of Captain Prunier's representation about the Pueyrredon making two feet of water an hour, he has had it examined; that he
will have it dismantled and the crew redistributed around the fleet; that he is enclosing a piece of timber from the framework of the poop to show its state; that Captain Prunier has been refusing to take orders from him, alleging that he is directly under the Chilean government's orders.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: enclosing letters from Sir Thomas Hardy.

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2061 San Martin, 12 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to William Prunier, in the Pueyrredon: order, to place himself under arrest for contempt of Lord Cochrane's authority in claiming to be accountable only to the Chilean government; for refusal to give account of the cargo and the proceeds of sale of the ship captured by the Pueyrredon; and for carrying merchandise on his ship.

2062 12 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Basil Hall: stating that he has detained the Cleopatra for holding a secret correspondence with the shore and for supplying provisions to Callao with her boats, in contempt of the blockade.

2063 13 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that by the enclosed documents it will be seen that the brig Columbia, though nominally under English ownership, was engaged in blockade-running in 1820.

2064 San Martin, Callao bay, 14 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Charles Ridgely, Captain of the USS Constitution: stating that he should not consider the bringing to of a boat flying the American flag as an insult to that flag; that the hoisting of a neutral flag does not cover illegal acts, as the communication with the shore which was being attempted would be in view of the blockade;
that he is enclosing a copy of his orders to the ships of war regarding their conduct towards neutral vessels.

15 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: reporting Captain Ridgely's contempt of his orders in sending a boat ashore in contravention of the blockade; stating that he fired upon it; and that he is enclosing his correspondence with Captain Ridgely on the matter.

28 July 1821, Lord Cochrane to Basil Hall: stating that the Saint Patrick and the Lord Lyndoch were detained when sailing from the inner anchorage of Callao on 25 July; that he is not aware that they sailed, as Hall asserts, because of the burning of various ships of the enemy in the anchorage.

O'Higgins, 7 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that he addresses San Martin for the last time under his late designation and not that of Protector; that he will speak the truth in repayment for San Martin's support at critical moments; that San Martin has it in his power to be the Napoleon of South America; that the strength of governments is public opinion; that San Martin, to secure his place in public opinion, should make sure that the squadron is paid.

Copy of the previous item.

Callao, 9 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de La Mar, commandant of the Callao forts: stating that he is instructed by San Martin to offer transport to any country except Peru or Chile, if La Mar surrenders the forts to him.
18 August 1821, Lord Cochrane: letter explaining his actions with regard to neutral commerce.

O'Higgins, 18 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de la Mar: stating that he is enclosing a passport for Señor Caspe; requesting to have the Spanish naval prisoners sent on board; stating that in his official note, he has explained his motives.

NP, ND, Lord Cochrane: note, that prisoners' letters are enclosed.

19 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that his promises only give slight satisfaction; that San Martin's views have been influenced by unscrupulous persons; that he has successfully explained to Hardy the communication of Zenteno; that his conduct is justifiable by the law of nations and 30 years' service in Britain.

21 August 1821, Lord Cochrane: draft of a letter rebutting accusations and documents regarding the seizure of the Admiral Cockburn and the Rebecca.

24 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that the squadron is in a more destitute and abandoned state than it ever was under Zenteno's bad management; that he has served in a navy with more officers than San Martin has soldiers in his army and of all these he (Lord Cochrane) was the only one apart from the Earl of St. Vincent never honoured for his achievements; that if Sir Thomas Hardy will way that any of San Martin's officers are better than he, he will gladly surrender command of the squadron to him.
2076 25 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Robert Forster, in the Independencia: order, that he is to sail to Ancon to get 14 days' provisions against notes on the government, and return to the blockade.

2077 O'Higgins, Callao, 26 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to A.B. Clapperton, master of the Lord Lyndoch: stating that on the request of Sir Thomas Hardy, he is withdrawing the guard from the Lord Lyndoch, provided that all evidence asked for is given.

2078 Copy of the previous item.

ND, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that as the squadron gave its arms to the southern division, and loaned the remainder temporarily to the Protector, it does not have this essential element of equipment, and the return of the arms lent to the army is now requested.

2079 Callao, 27 August 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that it is indispensable to remove the large ships of the squadron; that he is holding the reports of the provisions and state of the ships for his public justification.

2080 Copy of the previous item.

2081 Callao, 9 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he is enclosing his correspondence with Sir Thomas Hardy regarding neutral ships trading with Spain and Callao.

NP, ND, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: reporting the shifts he has had to resort to, to procure supplies.

11 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of
Marine: stating that the Lord Lyndoch has been detained; that on board her was General O'Reilly, 19 other Spaniards, much property, and 15,890 pesos; that he is enclosing documents proving her actions against the blockade; that the Admiralty Court must decide this and the other cases, and that Lord Cochrane's personal property should be safeguarded against lawsuits for carrying out his duty.

10 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Sir Thomas Hardy: requesting that as it appears by his letter of 19 July to the Minister of Marine that Hardy has referred to the Supreme Director of Chile complaints of interference in British shipping, and as he has now professed himself satisfied in his last letter to Lord Cochrane, he will kindly withdraw the complaints to the Chilean government.

O'Higgins, 14 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Adam Mackenzie, captain of HMS Superb: defending his actions regarding neutral commerce, by reference to British naval practice.

O'Higgins, 14 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Adam Mackenzie: stating that he is enclosing documents relative to the money concealed in the Lord Lyndoch and the money itself with the duties deducted, by which he has no doubt that Mackenzie will see that public and not private motives have dictated his proceedings.

29 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing the states of the warships, by which Zenteno will see that on 24 September he had four days' rations; that if the men were not to die of hunger or abandon their
ships, he was obliged to resort to any measure according to his duty to his government.

ND, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that after the examination of the Pueyrredon, he ordered the hulk to be anchored in Ancon, but due to the entire deterioration of her timbers and the very large number of rats, she sank and it is impracticable to raise her.

28 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing papers relative to his negotiations with the contractor Sarratea.

1 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: account of the disputes and difficulties between his officer Lieutenant Woolridge, and Captain Guise.

1 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has purchased jerky and flour from the merchant ship Carlota because of his shortages.

7 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that because of the numerous tasks which surround him in running the squadron, the large correspondence he has to maintain, the fact that he has no commissary or provisioner, he is unable to prepare a detailed review; that up to now he has paid out 154735 pesos in wages and his recent purchases of food raise this figure to 167840 pesos.

ND, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he is enclosing a list of the officers who have deserted the service; that Captain Esmonde, when he left the command of the Araucano, took with
him the signal books and the secret signal codes, thus obliging him to compose new secret signals.

2086 O'Higgins, 29 September 1821, Lord Cochrane to Tomas Guido: stating that if Wynter was recruiting Peruvians, then he was exceeding his instructions but if he was recruiting foreigners then only Guise's grossest ignorance could have led him to interfere with him; that this is not the first indignity offered to an officer of the O'Higgins; that he will tell the senior British officer here that there are British subjects being forced to serve Peru.

2087 Between June and September 1821; Paper marked "4" apparently notes by Lord Cochrane regarding commerce and referring to the Lord Lyndoch, Saint Patrick, Colonel Allen, Rebecca, Robert Fuge, Cleopatra.

2088 Between June and September 1821: Paper apparently notes by Lord Cochrane regarding neutral commerce and the singularity of the case of the Spanish ship Cleopatra, purchased by a British merchant as the Wellington.

2089 Between June and September 1821: Paper apparently notes by Lord Cochrane on neutral commerce.

2090 Between June and September 1821: Paper marked "3" apparently notes by Lord Cochrane regarding neutral commerce and fabricated clearances and stating that the duties levied were intended to aid the payment of the squadron.

2091 Between June and September 1821: Paper apparently notes by Lord Cochrane, stating that he does not know of one vessel illegally detained; that if he
cannot justify any of his detentions, then the epithets heaped on him by the North American and British papers may be considered as true; that he is hopeful of doing away with the unfavourable impressions in the mind of the British government and people.

2092 2 October 1821, Lord Cochrane: memorial that the destitute condition of the squadron, the delay in paying the seamen, and their consequent mutinous state, compelled him to seize the funds at Ancon; that don Pedro Abadia having produced his documents of ownership of 4233 pesos thereof, this portion is restored to him.

2093 4 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Paul Delano and Edward Brown, secret: order, that they are to take the Galverino and Lautaro to water at Pisco or Huacho, then sail to Valparaiso.

ND, Lord Cochrane: order, to keep company with the O'Higgins, Valdivia and Independencia or to rendezvous with them at Santa.

2094 5 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Colonel Sanchez: stating that the present circumstances prevent him saying goodbye personally to the commanders, officers and men; that he hopes Colonel Sanchez will do so in his name; offering his wishes for the success of the Chileans.

2095 5 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Adam Mackenzie: stating that the duties of the Rebecca delivered to him in his public capacity are to be applied to the liquidation of the debts of the government of Peru to the officers and seamen; that that government is liable for the loss by wreck of property deposited in their ships.
O'Higgins, 6 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to William Miller: stating his surprise that he presume to rest the blame for non-distribution of the prize-money upon him; requesting that he will produce cases where Lord Cochrane has refused to pay the monies due; and that he will explain the whereabouts of the 2000 dollars taken from the Admiral Cockburn, a part of which was deposited by him in the Rebecca on account of the division; stating that with respect to the prize money claimed on the capture of Valdivia, it was applied to the arrears of the whole squadron.

7 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he is enclosing the flag of the Esmeralda, which he has been unable to send up until now, which he requests him to place at the feet of the Director.

Ancon, 7 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Lady Cochrane, in code: stating that San Martin's conduct is so rascally that it is impossible to describe; that he has seized 99,000 dollars and expects this month to get 200,000.

Lord Cochrane: satirical poem entitled "Letter of the Dove which was sung in praise of our Protector and Emperor of Peru on Monday 8 October 1821".

19 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: with reference to arrangements to carry out repairs to the squadron, in the event of money not being available from San Martin for repairs to the O'Higgins, he requests to be informed if notes on the Chilean government would be admissible.
19 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: requesting to be informed if the fleet can be supplied with fresh meat and vegetables through bills on the state.

19 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: requesting permission to recruit sailors.

19 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: requesting permission to disembark stores and possessions during repairs.

20 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: stating his thanks for the help of the guayaquileños.

20 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: stating his thanks for permission to recruit sailors.

30 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: requesting that the port authorities will delay the sailing of the brig San Juan for Mexico until he has examined it.

30 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: requesting that the Guayaquil government will surrender to him the 250 guns sent to the place on account of the Chilean government.

Guayaquil, 30 October 1821, Lord Cochrane to Antonio Jose Sucre: stating that if his duty to Chile permitted it, he would have been very happy to send a ship as requested to carry the Liberator to Guayaquil.

Guayaquil, 8 November 1821, Lord Cochrane to Simon Bolivar: stating that he hopes to meet...
Bolivar in San Buenaventura or Cascajal if his search for the Prueba and the Vengenza permits.

2103 Guayaquil, 10 November 1821, Lord Cochrane to Antonio Jose Sucre: stating that he is desirous of helping in whatever way he can in the defence of Guayaquil, but that he will have to put his major objects first.

2104 Guayaquil, 24 November 1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that San Martin's assumption of power in Peru, his injustice to the squadron, and his tyranny make it impossible to continue supporting him; that he will now proceed in search of the Prueba and bring the naval war in the Pacific to an end; account of the machinations of O'Higgins's underlings, the consequent shortages in the squadron, the interference of British naval forces in his operations.

2105 Guayaquil river, 30 November 1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that the O'Higgins has been careened and repaired; that the Valdivia, Independencia and Araucano have been caulked; that three months' food has been purchased; that the Spanish frigates are reported to be in Realejo.

2106 6 December 1821, Lord Cochrane to Robert Simpson, in the Araucano: order, that he is to sail to Acapulco to discover if the enemy ships have left the port and intercept the Spanish ships from Manila; that he is to show a neutral flag at Acapulco and avoid hostile acts towards Mexico should it have declared its independence; that he will buy provisions if necessary at the promontory of the gulf of California; that the squadron, after examining other ports, will come to Acapulco in six weeks or two months.
1821, Lord Cochrane to Governor of Callao: stating that he has observed that properties are being destroyed and ships sunk in the anchorage without benefit to the Spanish cause; that if these activities continue to be pursued in the anchorage he will forget the conduct he has hitherto observed towards the Spanish.

1821: List of officers who joined the service of Peru, without permission: Captains Forster, Guise, Spry, Carter, Prunier, Esmond; Lieutenants J. Robinson, H. Freeman, Eugene Reydon, Geo. Price; masters Tyre, James Gull; surgeon John Hannah; contadores Pablo del Rio, Rafael Naranco.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he has been unable to get anchors and cable from the Admiral Cockburn in Arica.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: requesting that he be sent one or two thousand muskets and their ammunition, for distribution to the revolutionaries in Tacna.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he is sending Lieutenant Freeman, one of the officers condemned by the court martial; that his behaviour is intolerable; that he is unfit for the Chilean marine; that things he has done have been overlooked which would have led to his court martial in any other marine; that he is also sending Lieutenant Kernan.

1821, Lord Cochrane: notes respecting the blockade and the prize tribunal.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he has been obliged to buy cloth from
the *Admiral Cockburn* in order to clothe his men.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: acknowledging receipt of his communications respecting ships leaving Rio de Janeiro for the Pacific on Spanish accounts.

1821, Lord Cochrane: Exposition of the activities of the English brig *Colonel Allen* in embarking wheat at Mollendo for Lima.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: note of the ships captured since he wrote from Arica; stating that they have been sold here for lack of prize crews to take them to Chile, and because some cannot be sailed that distance; that the prize-money has been distributed amongst the captors.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo Monteagudo: stating that the seamen of this ship refused duty at Ancon, and he had to send 20 of the ringleaders ashore; that this meant that they could not raise the anchor and hence could not reassert the blockade of Callao; requesting that he will tell the Protector that there are not enough hands to serve the ship at the moment.

1821, Lord Cochrane: Memorandum, that a glorious blow having failed to be struck at the time of the capture of the *Esmeralda*, by the seamen looting instead of cutting out the other ships, Lord Cochrane cannot undertake any similar enterprise outside the normal course of service, unless the seamen and marines will strictly engage to carry out his instructions; that if such undertakings are forthcoming, then he will offer them a still more glorious and profitable enterprise.
1821, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that no sooner has Captain Spry joined the squadron than plotting against Lord Cochrane commenced; that he is placed by him in a situation where he must either assert his authority or tender his resignation from the command.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins, secret: stating that he has learned that a deputation has arrived from Chiloé to confirm the news of the fall of Lima; that he should beware of Peruvian plans to seize Chiloé for their empire; that Chiloé should be captured as soon as possible by Chile.

1821, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that the ships are destitute on these shores, requesting that he will send provisions and naval stores.

1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: acknowledging his communication regarding the Maipu; stating that there would be a shortage of small ships to blockade the ports to windward if he detached ships; requesting to be advised what course to adopt; stating that the Potrillo has been armed and put under Lieutenant Cobbett's command.

1821, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: stating that he is enclosing a letter from Guermev; that he has sent a report to Monteagudo; that he hopes San Martin will discover how Spry and others heard of his (San Martin's) plan for Callao; that he fears that the arrival of the Mientinomo with provisions for Lima by Chilean government licence will raise the blockade de jure for all neutrals.
1821, Lord Cochrane to William Miller: stating that the chief object of the expedition is to cut off food supplies from the southern provinces to Lima; that therefore, they are to seize mules and beasts of burden; that they are to recruit blacks with the promise of their liberty; that Spaniards and royalists are to be seized and sent to the ships; that the mules and slaves are to be employed in transporting vegetables, spirits and wine to the squadron; that Miller may go as far as Ica; that 100 infantry and 50 cavalry are to be left on the San Martin for landing at Cerre Azul.

San Martin, off Callao, 1821, Lord Cochrane to Henry Cobbett, in the Valdivia: order, that he is to cruise in blockade off Callao, taking particular care not to expose the masts and yards of the ship to the attack of the gunboats, now much increased.
PART TWENTY-THREE

(Documents 2125 - 2210)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF LORD COCHRANE 1822 - 1825
2125 Acapulco, 1 February 1822, Lord Cochrane to William Wilkinson: order, that the squadron needing provisions, he is to go in his ship and the Araucano to the gulf of California, buy such provisions as he can get reasonably rapidly, and send them back in the Araucano, which is not to turn aside for any reason; that he will then cruise off San Blas for two months to capture the Spanish ships from the Philippines or in any port provided it is not protected by a battery.

2126 Acapulco, 3 February 1822, Lord Cochrane to Nicolas de la Gandara: thanking him for his assistance, and regretting that he cannot wait for letters from the capital.

2127 25 February 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: enclosing a certified copy of San Martin's supreme authority over the navy as well as the army in the general orders of 19 August 1820; and denying his own responsibility in the case of the Edward Ellice.

2128 7 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that he informed him from Acapulco that he did not find the Spanish frigates there; that he is now off the mouth of the Guayaquil river, where he believes they are; that if they are not there, he will find them soon, for they are in disrepair and short of food.

2129 O'Higgins, Guayaquil river, 11 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to Jose Joaquin Olmedo: stating that he has come to Guayaquil to help with the Panama expedition; that he is glad to see the Venganza and the Alejandro; requesting that he will be assisted with supplies and news of the Prueba.
Guayaquil, 13 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to Jose de la Mar: stating that he has heard that La Mar has affirmed that he, Lord Cochrane, reprovisioned the enemy forts at Callao; that he now requests that La Mar officially deny such reports.

O'Higgins, Guayaquil, 13 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: order, that the Venganza being in better condition than the O'Higgins and Vaidivia and the Prueba having put to sea, he is to take command of the Venganza.

14 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that having brought about the surrender of Callao through hunger and counteracted the operations of the enemy frigates, he is surprised that the government of Peru should have denied his crews their wages; that he would not wish his crews to have to sell their ships to recover their arrears, or to wonder whether it would be preferable to serve the enemy, or resort to piracy as one of San Martin's ships has done; that he was surprised to learn from the gazette of the government's expenditures when the squadron was not in its pay and the gratuities offered under San Martin's hand at Valparaiso and the prize money from the Esmeralda, Montezuma and Aranseau had not been paid; account of the squadron's sufferings and shortages which resulted in the abandoning of the Lautaro; of his pursuit of the enemy ships after San Martin in the presence of Montesagudo and Garcia refused to make payment until the squadron was transferred to Peru; of the mission of Paroissien and Spry to excite discontent and desertion in the squadron; that he rejects the assumption by the Guayaquil government of the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the squadron; that he requests that this letter be published.
16 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating his
denial that he took the Venganza by force; that
he sent an unarmed boat with his own captain to
declare his authority of the quarterdeck; that
he has since put up sentries to guard against
irregularities; that article 1 of the treaty
can be declared valid and article 4 declared
null; that the Guayaquil government can then
take the ship and pay the squadron three months'
pay for the pursuit of the Venganza.

16 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that
he observes that military preparations are continuing;
that the honour of Guayaquil is safe with Chile, nor should they bother to defend some other state's rights.

17 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that
he has no objects beyond assuring American liberties.

Anchorage of Guayaquil, 10 March 1822, Lord Coch-\nran to NR: stating that he received his letter in Acapulco and hopes to be of use if the exped-\ition to Panama is put into effect; his satisfac-\tion at the return of the Alejandro; requesting that orders be given to facilitate reprovisioning and requesting news of the Prueba.

Guayaquil, 13 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to José de La Mar: stating that he has learned of reports circulating in Peru that he supplied or tried to supply Callao with provisions when it was under seige, for his own ends; requesting to be informed whether La Mar has heard the rumours, and if he denies having put it into circulation.

14 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that
he feels himself solely entitled to appoint
his officers while recipient is an officer of
a foreign (the Guayaquil) government.

2133 15 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to José Joaquin
de Olmedo: acknowledging receipt of his letter
threatenting hostilities if the Venganza is not
evacuated; requesting to know whether Olmedo
would be agreeable to receiving an official
note from him regarding the articles of the
treaty to govern the situation of the ships.

2134 March 1822, Lord Cochrane to José Joaquin Olmedo:
stating that he is enclosing copy of the Gaceta
de Lima regarding the causes between himself and
the representative of Peru, which relates to
the affairs of Guayaquil.

2135 Nepiña, 12 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Julian
Lozarto, Governor: stating that he is still pur­
suing the remaining enemy ship and has come for
news of her; that the ships will stay for two
days and he hopes for the Governor's assistance
in resting the crews and reprovisioning the
ships.

2136 Nepiña, 13 April 1822, Lord Cochrane to Julian
Lozarto, Governor: stating his thanks for news
of the Prueba; account of the value of the Chil­
ean squadron in protecting the liberties of Peru;
of the proclamation on the eve of the invasion
and the promise to establish a freely-elected
government; requesting to be informed if the
order communicated to him came from such a gov­
ernment or from one raised to authority by the
Chilean forces.

2137 O'Higgings, Callao, 2 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to
Bernardo O'Higgins, private and confidential: stating that the Venganza and Prueba are embargoed at Guayaquil and Callao pending O'Higgins' orders either to give up the squadron or to bring all down to Valparaiso; that San Martin has retired to captivate the crowd by his modesty and return to power as Emperor; that hopes are currently entertained that the mission to Chile will result in the withdrawal of the squadron; account of the disintegration of the patriot cause in Peru.

2138 Copy of the previous item.

2139 4 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: complaining that his solicitudes to the Ministry of Marine are not being attended to, and referring to consistent breaking of their promises by the government of Peru.

2140 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: referring to correspondence regarding the seizure of the Prueba and Venganza by Peru.

10 May 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that he hurried back to Valparaiso from Callao because the safety of Chile was threatened by the government of Peru; complaining of the dealings of Peru in the matter of the Prueba and Venganza, and of the disrespectful attitude of Blanco to the Chilean flag.

1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that he has just anchored in Valparaiso; that he is gratified at having been able to bring back the squadron in spite of the difficulties presented to him; that this was thanks to the integrity and honour of the squadron's officers; enclosing an
abstract of sums collected and applied to naval purposes.

2141 Valparaíso, 8 June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that the discontent of the officers arises from the meanness of their reward and recognition rather than their privations on service; that the Chilean squadron is being weakened and his command eroded; that Chile could have been in the first rank of maritime powers of half the globe; that he has received offers from Mexico, Brazil and elsewhere; that until now, he has not bothered to answer San Martin's accusations.

2142 Copy of the previous item.

2143 20 June 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that the Protector having decided to charge certain provisions to Chile's account, he proposes to present an account of the expenses of the squadron during the time it was employed in the service of Peru at the rate of 12 pesos per month per ton for warships and 8 pesos per month per ton for transports, with other expenses including the indemnity for the Venganza under the Guayaquil treaty.

2144 Statement of debt due by Peru to Chile for the expeditionary vessels, at 1,374,620 pesos.

2145 Copy of the previous item.

2146 Santiago, 20 June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverría: stating that Guido refused to negotiate with him on the question of the claims of the squadron on the government of Peru; and that Peru owes to the squadron for hire of the squadron
at transport rates from November 1820 to September 1821 - 39,200 dollars, for hire of the Potrillo - 12,832, for hire of the Aransasu - 8,600, and for bounty due on the Esmeralda - 50,000, a total of 110,632 dollars; that he requests that action be taken.

2147 Copy of the previous item.

2148 Santiago, 25 June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O‘Higgins: stating that he is enclosing a note of the sums due to him for public services; stating that the sum might be got from General Bolivar once the Esmeralda and Aransasu are repaired.

2149 28 June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: requesting to be told if the O‘Higgins and the Valdivia are to be repaired, by whom, at what cost, in what port, to be paid for with what funds; and regarding the steam galleys who is to decide their dimensions and who to build them; and regarding the Esmeralda, there is 205,200 pesos hire due to Chile by Peru; and whether her value is to be paid to her captors or whether they are able to sell her themselves as with the Potrillo; and whether this arrangement also applies to the Aransasu on which a hire of 28,800 pesos is due by Peru; that he be given authority to purchase clothing for the native seamen and marines; stating that if these matters are put in the hands of persons unacquainted with maritime affairs he cannot be responsible for the efficiency of the ships or the discipline of the men.

2150 28 June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that his communications are motivated only by his concern for the good of the service.
June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that the government should interest itself in various branches of manufacture of great benefit to the marine, for example a brass and copper foundry for founding guns to replace the present iron guns, and a cables and cordage factory.

June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: recommending the building of two steam galleys of which the complete engines exist in Valparaiso; that they will be useful for carrying dispatches, coastguard patrol or as survey ships; that 6000 dollars would be sufficient to complete each of these.

June 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating his suggestions for enhancing the maritime power of Chile; that an extensive merchant marine is necessary for the formation of a reserve of seamen; that every port, bay and inlet should be equipped to transport goods; that all obstruction to navigation should be abolished; that exports should be encouraged, as should shipbuilding; that Britain's economic greatness is due to her maritime activity; that special encouragement should be given to naval architects and artificers; that many foreign experts have come to Chile lately and should be encouraged to stay; that Mr. Oliver, who was trained in Plymouth Dockyard as a naval architect, is in Valparaiso, as is maestro mayor Mr. Brent, who built the Estrella Naciente; that the foreign shipbuilders in Valparaiso could build a ship like the O'Higgins in six months; that these artificers should be employed now to careen the O'Higgins and the Valdivia; that the cost of 5,500 pesos is little enough to pay for the naval
domination of the Pacific.

2154 Santiago, June 1822: List of the persons who visited Lord Cochrane on his return from Peru.

2155 Valparaiso, 10 July 1822, Lord Cochrane to Andrew Blest: order to pay Hill 69 dollars for blankets supplied.

2156 29 July 1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: account of activities in the fleet; the problems of paying off the crews; and the desertions of the contradores of the ships.

2157 Quinterno, 31 July 1822, Lord Cochrane to Andrew Blest: order for him to pay William Jackson 250 dollars.

2158 Valparaiso, 3 August 1822, Lord Cochrane to Andrew Blest: order to pay 78½ dollars to captain Simpson.

2159 22 August 1822, Lord Cochrane to Rafael Correa de Saa: stating that he understood that the government gave leave for the transports to carry down merchandise and it was not within his duty to regulate this; that the ships of war received whatever officers the commander-in-chief assigned to them, and the contractors paid something for their mess on the passage; that military stores were also carried in the warships; that the contradores of the warships ought to have lists of the officers embarked but as all but one have left the squadron, he cannot order them to deliver such documents.

2160 15 September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Rafael Correa de Saa: statement of his replies to various questions relative to the settlement of the accounts.
September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: requesting he be given permission to publish his correspondence with San Martin.

Valparaiso, 28 September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquín Echeverria: stating that he has come to the port to refute the calumnies of his character and prevent troubles in the squadron; that he has hoisted his flag and will take it down when the crews are clothed and paid or when ordered to do so.

Valparaiso, 30 September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquín Echeverria: stating that with reference to the Peruvian machinations against him, he requests permission to publish his correspondence with San Martin.

Partial copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item.

O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 30 September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that Foord Morgell and William Kennedy were active in spreading aspersions on his character.

Valparaiso, 30 September 1822, Same day, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that Captain Morgell not having explained the loss of the Aransasu, having attempted to seduce officers into going to Peru, and having spread aspersions about Lord Cochrane, is now put under arrest.

30 September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that with regard to rumours being circulated by people in Zenteno's department that Lord Cochrane has embarked 9400 ounces of gold in
the *Doris* to Lady Cochrane, he demand that Zenteno or his nominee go aboard to recognise the money if they can.

30 September 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that, aroused by attacks on his character and attempts to cause a mutiny in the fleet, he has hoisted his flag and will lower it when the crews are paid or when the Government order him to lower it for ever.

1 October, 1822, Lord Cochrane to JR: warning of the destitute state of the seamen who have gone through the winter without any clothing; requesting that any clothing in Valparaiso be dispatched to the fleet.

O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 2 October 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that he is enclosing translations of the letters he has received from his officers and men which give the lie to the opinions prompted by San Martin.

2 October 1822, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that as a court martial of Morgell would necessitate the officers of the squadron being both judges and witnesses, he proposes to proceed against Morgell and Kennedy for stirring up mutiny, by civil law, and requests that Zenteno will commence a suit for him.

O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 4 October 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that in obedience to Echeverria's request, he will not publish his correspondence with San Martin.

Flagship O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 12 October 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that
San Martin having arrived in Chile, if the government wish to open an enquiry, Lord Cochrane is ready to prove forcible usurpation of authority, attempted seduction of the navy, incitement to desert, and illegitimate possession of the Prueba and Venganza.

superscription: that on 23 December 1822, the command was taken from Lord Cochrane; and that on 26 December 1822, all the ships were taken from his command.

2174 Copy of the previous item.

2175 Santiago, 31 October 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: giving advice concerning a building project near Valparaiso, and the need for development.

2176 4 November 1822, Lord Cochrane: note in French with English translation, of a paragraph from a letter of the Brazilian envoy in Buenos Aires offering him command of the Brazilian Navy.

2177 Valparaiso, 19 November 1822, Lord Cochrane to José de San Martin: statement of his defence against the charges made to the Chilean government by General San Martin's legates.

2178 Valparaiso, 28 November 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins, private: stating his regret that O'Higgins once honoured him with his friendship but now seems to have withdrawn his confidence; that he wishes to retire before the troubles he foresees come to pass; that it is necessary to dismiss a servant to distract attention from the ills of the ruler, as San Martin should have done; requesting his discharge.
Valparaiso, 28 November 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverría: requesting he be given his discharge; stating that he has written privately to the Director giving his reasons.

Valparaiso, 12 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to the President of the Congress of Peru: stating that he is enclosing papers relative to San Martín which he is proposing to have published in the European and North American papers; requesting that these and San Martin's charges to the government of Chile be deposited in the Peruvian archives.

Valparaiso, 12 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to the President and Congress of Peru: enclosing a copy of a letter of his to San Martin and requesting that it be deposited in the archives.

Valparaiso, 12 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to the President of the Peruvian Congress: requesting that the enclosed documents be deposited in the Peruvian archives.

Copy of item 1384 above.

Valparaiso, 13 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating that as he does not wish to become involved in the disturbances that are now taking place, he requests O'Higgins will send his final discharge by return of post; that he hopes the contract with his brother will be honoured; that he has served O'Higgins to the best of his ability.

O'Higgins, 19 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverría: stating that he is enclosing a letter he is sending to Zenteno regarding the
Galvarino; that the government never authorised this line of conduct; that he is also enclosing a letter regarding the seamen's pay from the comissary.

O'Higgins, 19 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to Ignacio Zenteno: stating that he has complained to the government; that if the Galvarino attempts to put to sea, he will bring her back; that he will not suffer his authority to be interfered with.

O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 26 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: acknowledging his order to transfer the O'Higgins, Valdivia and Lautaro to the commandant general of the department; stating that he has hoisted his flag in the Montezuma, the only warship left in the port.

O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 26 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: enclosing accounts of monies due to him.

O'Higgins, Valparaiso, 26 December 1822, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that he is prepared to buy the schooner Mercedes at her valuation, and to buy back the small high-pressure steam engines brought out in the Rising Star at the price he was given for them.

Copy of the previous item.

1822, Lord Cochrane to NR: account of his difficulties with the commissary over methods of paying the crews, and his disputes with San Martin and his representatives.
1822, Lord Cochrane: copies of a libel presented by order of don José de San Martin to the Government of Chile; the answer of Lord Cochrane and other documents relative thereto;

Copy of item 1395 above.

1822, Lord Cochrane: partial copy of the previous item.

1822, Lord Cochrane: account of the monies due to him or received by him as his share of the prizes and captures since the Arica campaign, 47,434 dollars; personal property brought from England 19,500 dollars, total 66,934 dollars; on board the Doris 45,137 dollars.

5 January 1823, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverria: stating that the Mercedes is a prize ship and the government has not yet undertaken to pay her valuation of 5000 dollars; that he declines to accept the responsibility for her to the captors.

7 January 1823, Lord Cochrane: proclamation to the officers of the Chilean fleet, thanking them for their services in such bad conditions, and pointing out the extent of their naval achievements.

Copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item.

Montezuma, 8 January 1823, Lord Cochrane to Charles Wooster: order, that he is to hoist Lord Cochrane's flag and obey his orders, in violation of which he appears to be making the Lautaro ready for sea.
14 January 1823, Lord Cochrane to NR: referring to his imminent departure and his difficulties with Ovalle over the estate at Quintero; affirming that though he bought the Quintero estate from Ovalle three years ago, because Ovalle has not fulfilled all the legal requirements the sale has not been completed, and he fears that in his absence Ovalle will attempt to recover the estate on technical grounds; that he has the funds to pay the cost of the estate, which can be subtracted from what the state owes to him.

16 January 1823, Lord Cochrane to Joaquin Echeverría: stating that he is sending the insignia of his command and his compliments to the Supreme Director.

Copy of the previous item, 14 January 1823.

off Bahia, 21 June 1823, Lord Cochrane to Ramon Freire: stating that he left Chile as a result of the treatment he received from the government but he applauds Freire's determination to rescue his country; that whoever possesses the public authority in Chile until the present generation, educated under the Spanish yoke, have passed away, will have to contend with error and prejudice.

off Bahia, June 1823, Lord Cochrane to Mariano Sgana: Acknowledging receipt of his letter of 11 April about Freire becoming Supreme Director; stating that Freire should have been put in charge of the expedition to Peru; that he left Chile in despair at ever seeing a proper government formed; that all his measures for the good of the squadron were subverted; that he will not return to Chile; that he is well-treated by the Brazilian government.
Copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item; and note that the section on the Rising Star and his claims was left out of the final copy.

12 July 1823, Lord Cochrane to Bernardo O'Higgins: stating his sense of O'Higgins' kindness and trust over four years.

Copy of the previous item; with addition, that he made numerous applications to leave Chile before the present troubles and so cannot be accused of having abandoned O'Higgins in the hour of danger; that nothing can be done until time shall have removed all those in high office who were brought up under the Spanish colonial system.

Pedro Primeiro, 10 November 1823, Lord Cochrane to Henry Dean: stating that he declines to have anything more to do with Dean; referring to Hos­eason's foolish and thriftless behaviour in Chile; that he would be pleased if Dean left for another quarter of the world; that he declines to continue any correspondence in the matter.

Rio de Janeiro, 14 December 1823, Lord Cochrane to Ramon Freire: account of the political situation in Brazil, and the probability that the war with Portugal will be concluded in six months; stating that things would have gone better in Peru if Freire's planned expedition to the puertos intermedios in 1820 had not been frustrated by San Martin's designs; that he wishes O'Higgins well but doubts if he will achieve anything in Peru; account of alleged French designs in South America; noting his claim for the Rising Star and the pursuit of the Spanish frigates.
Rio de Janeiro, 1823, Lord Cochrane to Rafael Correa de Sa: stating that with regard to his claims for 66,171 dollars, he would be surprised by Correa’s request for further proof if he did not know how administrators of affairs seek every pretext for eluding the payment of debts; that most of this claim is for the shares of prize money due to him; that he has produced all the proofs necessary; that any further documents that are needed are in the Ministry of Marine in Chile; that the premium due to the captors of the Esmeralda ought to be paid to them by Chile since that country actually has the ship; that it is notorious that the government never intended to pay the squadron on its return to Chile, and that it was forced to by the attitude of the seamen; that if he is forced to come round the Cape, he will not merely press his claims, but destroy the system which allows them to be thus dishonourably treated; attacking the dishonesty and autocracy of the new governments; that Lady Cochrane has received £2000 from the Chilean government agent in Britain, and this sum should be deducted from his claim.

Catete, 8 June 1824, Lord Cochrane to H. Chamberlain, H.M. Consul-General: requesting his advice on the best mode of getting from Mr. May the sums due to him from the sale of the brig Colonel Allen in Valparaiso, sums which Mr. May refuses to surrender until all claims against the ship are satisfied, and even declines to lodge in a bank in England.

Brazil, 1824, Lord Cochrane to William Hoseason: stating that Hoseason’s letter to his agent May, has been forwarded to him, in which Hoseason asks for 17683 dollars, for which Lord Cochrane gave
him a note drawn on the Chilean government; that
it is not for him to pay Hoseason; that he also
learned that Hoseason received back from San Mar-
tin the bill for 120,000 dollars for the Esmeralda
given by O'Higgins; that he has therefore drawn
upon Hoseason the sum of 25781 dollars which is
his share of the same.

7 November 1825, Lord Cochrane to Mariano Egana:
stating his determination to take steps to compel
the satisfaction of his claims on the Chilean
government; that he expects that Egana will imm-
ediately satisfy the bill of the engineer Mauds-
lay, enclosed, for the work the payment of which
he gave collateral security to assist the Chilean agent; that he has long anticipated the illegal
seizure of the estate given to him in Chile.
PART TWENTY-FOUR

(Documents 2211 - 2270)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF LORD COCHRANE 1825 - 1860
AND UNDATED

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF LADY COCHRANE, COLONEL
WILLIAM COCHRANE AND 11th EARL OF DUNDONALD
1820 - 1874 RELATIVE TO CHILEAN AFFAIRS
Hanover Lodge, Regents Park, London, July 1839, Lord Dundonald to Alexander Caldecleugh: thanking him for the trouble he has taken and referring to the dilatoriness of the accountant general in settling his claim; requesting that his memorial be presented to the Congress and if not acted upon, then published in Santiago and Lima; stating that he expects to get the South American command and will be able to come to Chile; that he advises against Caldecleugh's proposed speculative venture.

Copy of the previous item.

Copy of the previous item.


London, 19 December 1840, Lord Dundonald to Alexander Caldecleugh: stating his expectations for the good fortune of the memorial, aided by Caldecleugh's experience and the consul's influence; that he is prepared to accept payment by instalments by the Chilean government; that his floating custom house was necessary to get food and supplies for the squadron; that the seizure of the Ancon funds was necessary to prevent the wholesale abandonment of the ships; that he used the funds to repair the squadron at Guayaquil when he could have liquidated his claims.

Santiago, 6 September 1844: Decree of the Chilean government that they acknowledge their debt to Lord Dundonald and offer him £6000 in settlement of all mutual claims.
Pimlico, 21 January 1845, Lord Dundonald to William Jackson: stating that he encloses a copy of the Chilean government's decree; that he would accept it if it did not preclude subsequent claims.

1844, Lord Dundonald: paper criticising the Chilean government for refusing to settle his claims.

3 February 1845, Lord Dundonald: Memorial to the President and Government of the Republic of Chile, showing his claims on Chile as commander of their navy and subsequently; that his claims are as commander of the squadron 66,000 pesos; for the capture of Valdivia 50,000 pesos; for the capture of the Esmeralda 30,000 pesos; for his share of 200,000 pesos captured in Peru 20,000 pesos; for compensation for lawsuits arising from dealings with neutral ships 15,000 pesos; for driving the Prueba and Venganza from the ocean 50,000 pesos; for Admiral's half-pay from 1823 to 1844 66,000 pesos; totalling 297,000 pesos.

Copy of the previous item.
London, 22 March 1845, Lord Dundonald to William Jackson: extract of a letter, stating that the offer of £6000 is a trivial recompense for his services to Chile; that regarding the confiscation of the Rio Claro estate, because he left the country, he was compelled to leave by the civil dissensions that arose; that he has not received due recognition for his extra-official contributions towards the independence of Chile.

8 Chesterfield Court, 2 April 1845, Lord Dundonald to H.N. Addington: stating that it is an advance to have obtained from the Chilean government and admission of the debt and Walpole has evidently worked very hard, but he will not accept the offer and requests that the enclosed copy of his memorial on his claims be shown to the Earl of Aberdeen.

1845, Lord Dundonald to H.N. Addington: enclosing documents relative to his claims, and hoping that Lord Aberdeen will see justice done to him.

1845, Lord Cochrane to the President of Chile: stating that he had prepared the accompanying memorandum before hearing of the £6000 vote, and protesting at the inadequacy of the sum.

Lord Cochrane: statement of claims; noting that soon after taking command he found it was necessary
not simply to carry out orders but also to initiate measures, which led to the capture of Valdivia; that he had to finance the squadron by extra-official acts, firstly by obtaining supplies from the enemy, secondly by levying imposts upon neutral ships.

5 Osnaburgh Terrace, Regents Park, July 1856, Lord Dundonald to the President of Chile: requesting that his brother William Cochrane's claim be settled.

ND, William Cochrane: petition to the government of Chile claiming £15,000 and £40,000 interest on the same, due to him on account of the Rising Star.

1856, William Cochrane to the President of Chile: petition that he will settle his claims in the matter of the Rising Star.

Thornham Hall, 27 June 1856, Clive to William Cochrane: stating his support for the petition.

London, 10 July 1856, Lord Dundonald to William Cochrane: stating he has faith in the justice of Colonel Cochrane's petition.

Long Clawson, Melton Mowbray, 20 June 1956, William Jackson to William Cochrane: certificate, that he sailed the Rising Star to Chile and delivered her in good condition; that the government repudiated the contract.

Photograph of a print made in London, 20 September 1821, of the Rising Star.

Lambeth, 24 October 1822, Henry Maudsley to Lord
Cochrane: stating that the expenses for work on the *Rising Star* remain to be paid; that Alvarez has refused to pay the expenses incident on the work; that he is enclosing copies of certificates of work done for and on the ship.

Account of revenue and expenditure on the *Rising Star* between 31 May 1820 and 2 March 1822, showing actual outlay on the ship at £13295.4s.2½d; that William Cochrane is owed £40500 or the contract sum of £15000 and 34 years' interest at £25500.

William Cochrane: summary of his claim upon the Chilean government in the matter of the *Rising Star*.

Copy of the previous item.

Extracts from Lord Cochrane's memoirs regarding the *Rising Star*.

Statement of facts respecting the *Rising Star*, collected from Lord Dundonald's memoirs, William Cochrane's claim and accounts, and a letter by William Jackson.

Copy of the previous item.

London, 2 August 1856, Lord Dundonald to the President of Chile: soliciting his attention for the sisters of the late Captain Crosbie and enclosing his memorial.

2 Belgrave Road, 28 October 1857, Lord Dundonald to the Chilean Minister: intimating that he will accept the £6000 which has been offered by Chile in settlement of his claims.
2248 Lord Dundonald to Abado Herley: requesting him to order payment of £6000 into his account at Coutts and Company.

2249 5 November 1857, Lord Dundonald to the President and Congress of Chile: thanking them for the vote of full pay for life, but pointing out that this is nominal as he cannot be expected to live long and requesting that he be granted instead half-pay retrospectively.

2250 1857, Lord Dundonald to the President of Chile: claiming the costs of the Rising Star on behalf of his brother, and protesting at the unfairness of preference in pay being given to San Martin over himself.

2251 1857, Lord Dundonald to the President and Congress of Chile: thanking him for the vote of full pay for life, touching on his deprivations for thirty years, and defending the seizure of the Ancon treasure.

2252 1857, Lord Dundonald to the people of Chile: outline of a letter acknowledging the belated justice that has been done to him.

2253 1857, Lord Dundonald: proclamation to the people of Chile, thanking them and drawing attention to his services in the liberation of Chile.

2254 Copy of the previous item.

2255 1857, Lord Dundonald: address to the Chilean people, recapitulating his services as commander-in-chief of the Chilean navy.

2256 1857, Lord Dundonald: address to the Peruvian people, referring to the adjoined exposition to
the Chileans; making additional remarks about his services in Peru.

1857, Lord Dundonald: abstract of his refutation of San Martin's accusations; sketch of his actions as naval commander during the liberation of Peru; remarks on the prize money due to him.

1857, Lord Dundonald to the People of Chile: pamphlet, stating that he acknowledges the recognition given to him by the government for his services; account of the same; account of the significance of the capture of Valdivia; stating that his financial rewards have been less than his expenses.

ND, Lord Cochrane to Minister of Marine: stating that as he found the Montezuma enforcing a blockade without government authority, he is sending it to Valparaiso with the attestation of the officer that he was acting under government orders; requesting to be advised if this is correct.

ND, Lord Dundonald to the President and government of Chile: Draft of various ways of expressing the debts due to him by the Chilean government for the taking of Valdivia and the paying and preserving of the fleet; defence of his actions while commander of the Chilean fleet and observations on the injustice of the offer of £6000 that has been made to him in settlement of his claims.

ND, Lord Cochrane to Chilean envoy: offering to accept 25,000 dollars in lieu of all claims he has upon the Chilean government, otherwise he must have recourse to publishing his case.

ND: Note of the principal points of Lord Cochrane's
dispute with General San Martin.

2263 ND, Lord Dundonald to the President and Congress of Chile: protesting at the obstruction of the Accountant General, recapitulating his services and requesting a settlement of his claims.

2264 ND, Lord Dundonald: note of his remarks on Correa de Saa's objections in his letter of 28 June 1838, to Lord Dundonald's accounts.

2265 ND, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that with respect to Admiral Blanco's memorial claiming a share in the prize Potrillo, captured off Valdivia, and in the Peruana, inasmuch as the vital interests of the state depend upon the just distribution of rewards, the shore-bound admiral does not have a legitimate basis for claiming a share.

2266 ND, Lord Cochrane to NR: stating that it is his duty to send to Chile all vessels of war not sailing under the flag or authority of the government.

2267 Transcript of Lord Dundonald's Narrative of Services in the liberation of Chile, Peru and Brazil.

2268 Quintero, 6 November 1820, Lady Cochrane to Lord Cochrane: account of her visit to Aconcagua; that Mrs. Miers has been very kind to her; that Sir Thomas Hardy speaks of Lord Cochrane in the most kind and gentlemanly manner; the desirability of her going to England, and her reluctance to do so.

2269 Quintero, 16 November 1820, Lady Cochrane to Lord Cochrane: stating that she should go to England for the sake of the children who need to be brought up in good society; her sympathy for his despondency in the face of failure.

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6 April 1874, 11th Earl of Dundonald to Mr. Hunt: stating that with regard to the possibility of the Chilean government making a land grant for his father's services, he is not disposed to negotiate it himself; that the Rio Claro estate was given to Lord Cochrane so that his name might never cease from the land yet was forcibly taken back by the Chilean government; that they might be induced to make a grant to him in memory of his father and quite distinct from any claims.
PART TWENTY-FIVE

(Documents 2271 - 2286)

LETTERS AND PAPERS OF UNCERTAIN PROVENANCE,
DESTINATION AND DATE, AND MISCELLANEOUS
London, 7 November 1817: extract of a letter noting that Lord Cochrane has been offered the command of a squadron by the patriots in South America, and that he will probably accept the offer.

Birmingham, 6 June 1820, Joshua Scholefield to NR: enclosing a snuffbox to be given to Lord Cochrane as a token of his admiration for Lord Cochrane's work for humanity in South America.

Bay of Ancon, 10 July 1821, San Martin to NR: stating that the Valdivia, O'Higgins and Lautaro are leaving her tonight with their water butts fully charged; that the Montezuma will be ready to sail to Valparaiso in two or three days.

Valparaiso, 11 May 1824, NA to Lord Cochrane: account of the political instability of Chile; of the failure of Freire's expedition to Chiloé; of events in Peru; of rumours of French projects for South American colonies.

Typescript volume dated Lima, 31 January 1840: containing Lord Cochrane's proclamation to the inhabitants of independent Peru of 1 December 1822; Lord Cochrane's letter to the president of the Sovereign Congress of Peru of 12 December 1822; charges presented by General San Martin's legates to the Chilean government against Lord Cochrane of 11 March 1822; Lord Cochrane's reply to the charges made against him of 19 November 1822; General San Martin's letter to Lord Cochrane of 13 August 1821.

Copy of the previous item.

ND: Sundry notes taken from Joseph Allen's
Life of Admiral Lord Cochrane, on vessels referred to in the Document; on persons mentioned; and Other Notes.

2278 Copy of the previous item.

2279 Valparaiso, 27 December 1858, NA to Lord Dundonald: extract of a letter describing the state of party differences in Chile and the prosperity of the country.

Valparaiso, 27 May 1859, NA to Lord Dundonald: extract of a letter describing the political situation, the civil troubles, the economic development, the state of agriculture, the condition of the peasants, the conditions of travelling.

Valparaiso, 31 August 1859, NA to Lord Dundonald: extract of a letter describing the improvement of the country since the writer first came in 1818, and even since his last visit 25 years ago.

2280 ND: Note of the cost of cordage, cables and canvas.

2281 Proof copy of a review of Lord Cochrane's Narrative of Services in the liberation of Chile, Peru and Brazil.

2282 Draft note of letters received and sent in 1820.

2283 Four blank sheets of a ship's pay list.

2284 ND: Memorandum of sundry ship chandler's stores held by Thomas Edward Brown and Company of Valparaiso.

2285 ND: Note of three firms in Coquimbo, Calcutta
and London.

ND: Selection of quotations from Latin authors.