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Methods and Approaches to Theories of Philosophical Intuitions

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Abstract

This thesis is about the arguments and the methods that can sustain the epistemic support that comes from intuitions regarding hypothetical cases vis-à-vis theories of intuition.

In the past twenty years, philosophical intuitions have received new attention, spurred by fashionable experimental philosophy that empirically tests philosophers’ intuition-engendering hypothetical cases with experimental methods. The results purportedly show that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic variation, and error-prone. In response, philosophers have presented various theories of philosophical intuition and explanations of how intuitions are situated in the justificatory apparatus of philosophical methodology. Three types of theories prevail in the literature, each a plausible option for the explanatory sustenance of intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. Self-evidence theories depend on the understanding of the intuited proposition. Intellectual seemings theories depend on the content of the intuited proposition. Judgment theories depend on our normal capacities for making judgments. Judgment theories divide further into disposition-to-believe theories and capacity theories. I argue that, beyond objections and unique epistemic burdens that each theory faces regarding the methodologies underpinning their conception and defense, no one theory of intuition can be reasonably accepted over the others. The centrality of intuitions’ use in philosophical methodology and in philosophers’ ways of thinking and reasoning, giving an argument that supports intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status, which does not itself appeal to intuitions, is a precarious endeavor. I consider various methods to avoid engaging question-begging premises and epistemic circularity. However, none are successful when the theory at hand is characteristically a priori and countenances only intuitions that confer epistemic status.

In response to the ill-fated caricature of philosophical intuitions epistemic-status-conferrers, I present my own survey evidence concerning philosophers’ conception of intuition-use in philosophical method. Surprisingly, professional philosophers are more
inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of discovery more so than they are inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of justification. The upshot of these survey results motivates my preferred account philosophical intuitions wherein philosophical intuitions are bifurcated into epistemic (justificatory intuitions) and epistemically-related (intuitions of discovery) roles. In the light of the objections I pose regarding the proper grounding of intuitions, revising the standard conception of philosophical intuitions requires two sorts of moves in the debate. First, one must offer a proviso for sources of justification that do not epistemically depend on intuitions for the ability to confer epistemic status. This allows one to justify a theory of intuition without appeal to intuition or epistemic regress. Second, one must give an explanation for and build on the recognition that intuitions are bifurcated into justificatory and discovery roles. The added clarity of filling out the nature of bifurcation allows for a more accurate characterisation of philosophical intuitions in the methods of philosophy. Furthermore, that intuitions operate in discovery roles offers an explanation for philosophical innovation and progress.
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Introduction

This thesis is about the arguments and the methods that can sustain the epistemic support that comes from intuitions regarding hypothetical cases vis-à-vis theories of intuition. Philosophers tend to treat hypothetical case intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status on philosophical claims. Take the well-worn example of Gettier successfully motivating epistemologists to give up the received view that knowledge is justified true belief by offering a set of counterexamples that intuitively showed that mere justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. Philosophers’ intuitions about Getter’s cases provided strong evidence that justified true belief does not entail knowledge. However, why should one think that intuitions are epistemically efficacious in this way? Intuitions appear to come from nowhere, popping into attention without conscious deliberation or noticeable source. One cannot introspectively evaluate an intuing itself. That is, intuitions are occurrent; there are no steps between premises or between premises and conclusion on which to assess intuitions’ authority. One might provide a post hoc reconstruct of an argument that fits the intuitive conclusion, but that is not to introspectively evaluate the intuition itself.

Some philosophers have taken to the laboratory, conducting empirical surveys to collect data on how demographic and contextual variables account for differences amongst intuitions of philosophers and of the folk. These experimentalists have in mind the methods of conceptual analysis that examine folk theories of (e.g.) belief, knowledge, free will and determinism, justification, and intuition. Experimentalists argue that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic variation, and error-prone. Even if one rejects the empirical evidence against intuitions because the experimental methodologies are poorly implemented, their observations might be at least as good as armchair observations. Since philosophers generally take armchair observations as fodder for philosophical inquiry, the objection to intuitions’ epistemic efficacy ought to not be
dismissed without some consideration.

What kind of argument can sustain intuitions in the light of objections that question their ability to confer epistemic status? One sort of response is to exculpate philosophical intuitions from the experimentalists’ objections, and from those of intuition sceptics generally, by giving an explanation of how intuitions are situated in the justificatory apparatus of philosophy. That is, by giving an explanation of how philosophers’ intuitions are (e.g.) reliably tied to the truth, one has reason to think that their intuitional evidence can play epistemic roles. In another type of response, philosophers have tried to give voice to the unwritten argument behind the Gettier intuition, arguing that intuitions have *de facto* authority because the authority of intuition is the sort of authority that, once questioned, obliterations any epistemic authority whatsoever, including the authority to question the authority of intuition. Others argue that without intuitions philosophy itself has neither autonomy nor authority as an academic discipline. That is, to question intuitions is to be critical of philosophy itself and without the unmarred support of intuitions philosophers cannot make claims expressing general axioms or principles pertaining to lawful or to law-like connections that are simply taken as true, but are not logically necessary, starting points for philosophical analysis.

Take it that there is no received view of intuition. Rather, the literature is cast into three types of theories. Each is a plausible option for the explanatory sustenance of intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. Here is a rough sketch of the available kinds of theories in the contemporary literature. Self-evidence theories depend on the understanding of the intuited proposition. Intellectual seemings theories depend on the content of the intuited proposition. Judgment theories depend on our normal capacities for making judgments. Judgment theories divide further into disposition-to-believe theories and capacity theories. I argue that no one of these options can be reasonably accepted over the others. One reason is that philosophers cannot show that any one theory of intuition is more reasonable to accept that any other. Hence, the possibility of a received view of a theory of intuitions is an open question. Another reason is that, given the centrality of intuitions’ use in philosophical methodology and in philosophers’ ways of thinking and reasoning, creating an argument that supports intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status that does not itself appeal to intuitions is a precarious endeavour. I consider various methods to avoid engaging question-begging premises and epistemic circularity by the further appeal to intuitions. However, none are successful.
I present the findings of a survey of professional philosophers regarding the conception and use of intuitions in philosophy. The survey supports a view that philosophers use intuition not in just one mode – that of justification – but also use intuitions for discovery, or innovation. Bifurcating intuitions into these two types allows the use of intuitions in arguments that justify theories of intuition without committing to epistemic circularity and without engaging question begging premises. The idea is (roughly) this: Justificatory intuitions are the sort put to work as epistemic support; they provide justification. Were the intuition is undermined or defeated (ceteris paribus), so too would the proposition it supports be epistemically diminished. Intuitions of discovery are not epistemically efficacious. They are causally related to theory construction in ways that relate propositions of salience to the theory context. These may be ill-motivated, faulty, or plainly false without (epistemic) effect on related propositions or theory context. One can think of discovery intuitions as suppositions requiring some further epistemic work in order for one to be justified in believing them. This bifurcation of intuitions into epistemic (justificatory intuitions) and epistemically-related (intuitions of discovery) roles underpins my preferred account of philosophical intuitions. Furthermore, discovery intuitions are integral to a method of justifying a theory of intuitions where discovery intuitions supply fundaments, which, on the grounds of rational agreement in the context of a particular discourse, supply foundational-type justification. Ergo, a theory on intuitions can appeal to an alternative epistemic sources for is grounding. Justificatory intuitions are not, therefore, essential to justification. Getting to this conclusion and why one should accept it is the aim of this thesis. I outline the structure of my argument below.

Chapter 1 is primarily exegetical. I survey the ways historical and contemporary philosophers conceive of intuitions and their uses. I discuss various ways intuition has been classified, and present my own classificatory scheme. On my view, intuitions fall into three main types: self-evidence theories, intellectual seemings theories, and judgment theories. In Chapter 2, I argue that self-evidence theories are not apt sources of epistemic support because their immediacy precludes that one can discern inferentially from non-inferentially justified beliefs. In Chapter 3, I present objections that the various methods philosophers employ to identify and define a preferred theory of intuition are prone to characteristic difficulties. I argue that erecting one theory of intuition over its competitors must rely on arguments that are epistemically circular or entail a question-begging
premise. I show that none of the theories of intuition in the extant literature surpasses the others. In the final section of Chapter 3, I setup a dialectic wherein the intuition theorist constructs an analogue theory of intuition with a theory that the objector would not want to dismiss. The way the dialectic is setup is that the intuition theorist adopts all the critical aspects of the analogue such that the objector cannot reject the argument without also rejecting her own. I survey arguments for a causal theory of perception, offer an intuition analogue, and respond to the objection that causal explanation is ill-suited for justification in the context of intuition. However, the results are somewhat middling for the philosopher looking for firmer ground on which to establish a theory of intuition. Any theory of intuition that comes out of the proposed method will be dependent on the assumption built into the dialectic. The upshot is that a priori methods for defining and justifying one’s theory of intuition are critically underequipped to mount an argument for a theory of intuition that unifies both how we use intuitions to justify philosophical claims on the basis of hypothetical cases, and what intuitions are. In the light of these criticisms, one is left to wonder how philosophers conceive of intuitions and their use in practice, and whether the standard way of characterising intuition has overlooked critical elements. In Chapter 4, I present survey research that addresses the question of how experimental philosophers have attempted to characterise intuitions in philosophical methods of assessing hypothetical cases. The sample includes 282 professional philosophers from English-speaking regions around the globe. The results indicate that philosophers do not agree on an operative notion of intuition, but they do distinguish between intuitions used in the context of discovery and intuitions used in the context of justification. The latter finding is significant and interesting as it points in a direction of intuition use that is suppressed in the extant literature. In Chapter 5, I argue for a distinction between intuitions of discovery and intuitions of justification. Discovery intuitions provide fodder for philosophical argument by innovation (e.g., providing hypotheses for consideration), by identifying what sorts of cases concepts do and do not apply to (i.e., sketching the shape of a concept), by identifying in which situations a property putatively instantiates (i.e., sketching the property) or by making salient relevant features of hypothetical cases. I distinguish my view from similar views in the literature and respond to objections.
Chapter 1

The aim of this chapter is to survey the literature on the epistemological features of intuition, and the roles intuitions play in philosophical methods. The purpose for doing so is to make intelligible an operative notion of intuition in philosophical methods. One thing already clear is that intuitions are archetypical facets of philosophers’ reasoning repertoire. However, despite being archetypical, I argue that there is no received view of intuition; rather, several (inconsistent) theories of intuitions represent the extant literature on philosophical intuitions. In the next section, I aim to make clearer the general sorts of intuitions that I discuss in the following chapters. This set of theories constitutes the target of the criticisms of intuitions outlined in subsequent chapters.

1. Commonplace and philosophical intuitions: Gettier Case

Consider a very broad construal of intuitions: intellecctions that are “unmediated by words or rational analysis” (Myers, 2002, p. 18). Everyday examples are bountiful: one can have an intuition that it is seven o’clock, that betting on black will win and begging on red will not, that Venus Williams’ next serve will land on the left side of the tennis court, that someone is about to knock at the door or that something bad is happening to the grandkids. I am not concerned with these kinds of intuitions. Rather, I am concerned with intuitions in philosophers’ methods of argument. Ostensibly, these intuitions are the intuitions engendered when philosophers offer for intuitive appraisal putatively real and hypothetical cases, wherein intuitions provide epistemic support. I call these “philosophical intuitions.” Hypothetical cases support philosophical conclusions by way of at least one of an argument’s premises relying necessarily on intuitional justification.
derived from a supporting case. Examples of these include Putnam’s (1973/1975) Twin Earth case in Philosophy of Language, Chalmers’ (1996) Zombie case in Metaphysics of Mind, and Rawls’ (1971) cases for a conception of justice in Ethics. I outline a few important epistemological examples below. Perhaps the most salient to contemporary epistemologists are the cases that Gettier (1963) offers as counterexamples to justified true belief analyses of knowledge. Greco (2007) summarises Gettier-type cases in The Edinburgh Companion to 20th Century Philosophies:

On the basis of excellent reasons, S believes that her co-worker Mr. Nogot owns a Ford: Nogot testifies that he owns a Ford, and this is confirmed by S’s own relevant observations. From this S infers that someone in her office owns a Ford. As it turns out, S’s evidence is misleading and Nogot does not in fact own a Ford. However, another person in S’s office, Mr. Havit, does own a Ford, although S has no reason for believing this. (Greco, 2007, p. 177)

S has a justified true belief that a co-worker owns a Ford. Gettier’s cases satisfy the analyses of knowledge offered independently by Ayer (1956) and Chisholm (1957). However, intuitively S does not know that a co-worker owns a Ford. That is, Gettier showed, with epistemologists’ own intuitions, that one does not have knowledge in cases where one has mere justified true belief. Gettier’s argument spawned the central contemporary debate in epistemology regarding knowledge, as well as a great many other hypothetical cases aimed at diagnosing and supplementing whatever it is that is missing from, or wrong with, the analysis of the justified true belief account of knowledge (cf. Shope, 1983).

Consider two other hypothetical cases intended to engender intuitions about knowledge. Goldman (1976) thinks that what is lacking in the Gettier cases is an appropriate causal link between knowing and the object known. Goldman (1976) proposes the following sort of case:

Henry is unaware of being in an area populated by *papier-mâché* facsimiles of barns. The first barn-object Henry sees is a genuine barn. Henry is justified believing that

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1 S knows that p IFF p is true, S is sure that p is true, and S has the right to be sure that p is true (Ayer, 1956); S knows that p IFF S accepts that p, S has adequate evidence for p, and p is true (Chisholm, 1957).
the object is a barn because Henry’s has reliable faculties for identifying barns. However, the facsimiles are very good. If Henry where seeing a facsimile, he would think it a genuine barn.

Putatively, it is intuitive that Henry does not know that the object is a barn. Henry could have easily had a false belief with the same content. Henry could have been looking at a papier-mâché facsimile. Elsewhere in the knowledge debate, Jennifer Lackey (2007) addresses testimonial knowledge, offering a hypothetical case about credit and knowledge:

Morris is a visitor to Chicago, just off the train and needs to get to Sears Tower. Morris asks the first person he encounters, who, by chance, knows the way to the Sears Tower because they are a long time resident of Chicago. The Chicago native gives Morris ‘impeccable directions’ to Sears Tower.

The intuition Lackey wants us to have is that Morris knows the way to Sears Tower. However, this intuition counts against the credit views of knowledge (Greco, 2003). On the credit views, knowledge must be (primarily) the result of one’s own abilities and effort. Morris knows even though credit for the knowledge belongs primarily to the Chicago native. Thought experiments about knowledge proliferate in the contemporary epistemology literature. It is not necessary to rehearse the epistemological debate regarding knowledge to support the point that philosophical intuitions are prevalent and substantive aspects of philosophical methodology. It is clear that the practice of appealing to intuitions is widespread. However, the practice has come under fire from experimentally minded philosophers. I outline experimentalist objections in the next section.

2. Experimental Philosophy and Pressure on Philosophical Intuitions

Some philosophers have recently taken to the laboratory to test philosophical intuitions. Experimentalists use survey methods to collect data about folk intuitions on philosophers’ hypothetical cases. The evidence covers a variety of philosophical issues,

2 There is a noteworthy degree of warranted scepticism amongst philosophers about the veracity of the conclusions that experimental philosophers derive from the evidence they produce. Note, however, that I
including theory of reference, moral responsibility, attribution of moral rightness/wrongness, the nature of knowledge, free will and responsibility (Blair 1995; Greene, et al., 1998; Haidt et al., 1993; Machery, 2004; Nahmias, 2005; Nichols, 2002; Weinberg et al., 2001; Woolfolk, 2006; Swain, 2008). Stich (1990), for example, argues that intuitions are not well suited for use in philosophical methods, especially as they have come to be used in traditional epistemology. Despite the pervasiveness in practice of using intuitions in philosophical argument, systematic testing suggests that intuitions are unreliable. If the experimentalist is correct, then philosophers need to re-evaluate the use of intuitions and give some sort of justification of their roles in conferring epistemic status.

For example, Swain et al. (2008) find ordering effects with Truetemp Cases. They observed that participants who are first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less likely to indicate that Truetemp cases are instances of knowledge and that participants who are first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more likely to indicate that Truetemp cases are not instances of knowledge. “Intuitions track more than just the philosophically-relevant content of the thought-experiments; they track factors that are irrelevant to the issues the thought-experiments attempt to address” (Swain et al., 2008). Such easy manipulation undermines that intuitions are good forms of evidence in philosophical methodology. Weinberg, Stich and Nichols (2001) present more troubling results for philosophers. They argue that experiments regarding intuitions about knowledge reveal systematic cultural variation of the knowledge-concept. If intuitions are prone to be culturally relative, this poses a substantial reason to doubt that intuitions can grasp the concept of knowledge (if only one exists at all). Furthermore, if knowledge is not ubiquitously identified across cultures, we have reasons to doubt that philosophical intuitions justify or are evidence for philosophical claims regarding theories of...
knowledge. However, not all experimentalists’ critiques of intuition-use are dismissive. Some aim at demystifying and refining intuitions by identifying problematic usages. For instance, Nichols and Knobe (2007) attempt to show that intuitive responses can be sensitive to features of hypothetical cases that are not relevant to the philosophically salient issue in question. For example, in the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate, cases that evoke emotion tend to yield intuitions that are compatibilist whereas cases that are more theoretical will generally yield intuitions that are incompatibilist. Nichols and Knobe suggest that empirical work is required to identify when and if intuitions are stable. Philosophers, once aware of intuitional infelicities, can account for or avoid them by rearticulating hypothetical cases in more neutral ways. In this guise, experimental philosophy offers new light to guide the setup of hypothetical cases whereby intuitions are less prone to error and to bias.

The experimentalist critique provides a dialectical springboard to launch an inquiry into the nature of philosophical intuitions. One plausible line of response is to argue for some preferred theory of philosophical intuitions and that if philosophical intuitions are as such, they can do the epistemic work philosophers put them to. On another line of response, e.g., one could argue that philosophical intuitions are a basic source of justification or evidence, akin to perception. That is, on the second line of response, one is concerned with whether and how intuitions justify. These two kinds of responses highlight a distinction in approaches to the epistemological issues regarding philosophical intuitions. Here are two characteristic ways to of responding to criticisms of intuitions epistemic prowess. One can attempt a response that says what intuitions are, and, as such, are conferrers of epistemic status in appropriate contexts. We might characterize this as a gap filling, or abductive, method as one attempts to fill in what intuitions are as a way of explaining how philosophers use them. Another attempt at a response might aim to make light of skepticism of intuitions by showing how it is that intuitions themselves are conferrers of epistemic status (i.e., how intuitions are justified justifiers) vis-à-vis a theory of intuition that one is a position to reasonably accept. Both approaches are explored in the following chapters, with a somewhat arbitrary emphasis on the latter. In this and in the following chapter, I survey various ways that intuitions

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3 Two questions are left outstanding: Reforming intuition-use is helpful, but is reforming the methods of philosophy necessary? And, if philosophers’ use of intuitions is prone to error, is philosophy in jeopardy of lacking suitable evidential grounding (Cf. Hales, 2000)?
purportedly confer epistemic status and, in later chapters, I attempt to mete out which is the better of competing theories. I argue that no one conception or theory of intuition is uniquely sufficient to do the work that philosophers attempt to put them to doing (e.g., as justifiers or as evidence in support of philosophical claims). I argue that one of the central issues regarding the ontological question (i.e., What are intuitions?) is that what intuitions are is ambiguous from the first person phenomenological perspective. This issue permeates a priori armchair approaches to intuitions ontology and theory justification because one is unable to discriminate intuitions from non-intuitions. I offer other arguments to show that approaches that make claims about what intuitions are cannot be decided in a priori ways. Nevertheless, on a second approach we find a different emphasis, i.e., a theory of intuition must be justified and that justification ought not come from intuitions. Theories of intuition justified intuitionally suffer burdens of question begging, and epistemic circularity or regress. The methodological constrains on how a theory of philosophical intuitions can be offered is the focus of this thesis. A third line of response, one that I consider in the closing chapter, rearticulates or re-characterises the standard methods of philosophy in a way such that intuitions are not subject to criticisms of their ability to do the epistemic work philosophers put them to. It is this third line of response that I think is most promising; I argue that the two other lines of response have inadequacies that undermine their efficacy.

So that if the dialectical springboard provided by the work of experimental philosophers turns out to be under-motivating, I point out that although the work of experimental philosophers spawned the recent interest in philosophical intuitions, some philosophers were already dubious of intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. It is not uncommon to find philosophers who, like Lewis (1983), think that what philosophers call “intuitions” are really their opinions (p. x). Some think intuitions are more than opinions, but are unconvinced of intuitions’ uniqueness. For example, calling hunches, guesses, or opinions “intuitions” are simply attempts at garnering more authority for what would otherwise be mere hunches, guesses or opinions (Inwagen, 1997, p. 309).

Furthermore, there seems to be broad agreement that the notions of intuition used by philosophers are not ubiquitous. Wild’s (1938) survey of intuition in philosophy offers a systematic observation of the variation in the practice of appealing to intuitions. Wild cites that even the eminent Alfred Whitehead uses the intuition-concept in a variety of ways, including ‘fitting intuitions’, ‘conflicting’, ‘undeveloped’, ‘undesirable’, ‘tainted’,
‘fortunate’, and even ‘dying’ intuitions (Wild, 1938, pp. 85-6). Such seemingly haphazard use of “intuition” is likely to dissuade philosophers that intuitions are of significant importance. What is more is the added difficulty of thinking that the variety of ways “intuition” gets used is not indicative of a systematically deployed concept, but the use of a philosophers’ term of art. Terms of art are not usually subject to systematic categorisation. So, even if someone rejects that the experimentalist is a worthwhile dialectical counterpart, other critics of intuition could play the role of interlocutor. Nevertheless, there is a clear gap in the literature regarding what philosophical intuitions are, what work philosophical intuitions can properly be put to do, and what methods are appropriate for justifying philosophical intuitions. In the following sections, I outline the disparity in the conception of philosophical intuitions, in regard to their use and conception, and outline the range of theories of intuition that compose to characterise the literature on what intuitions are.

3. Problems with the Systemisation of the Concepts of Intuition

Systematisation of the use of intuition in philosophical contexts requires that we draw some preliminary distinctions. Sometimes “intuition” is used off-handedly in the context of discourse. For example, one offers an unreflective remark into discussion, usually within the understanding that “intuition” is sometimes used as a philosopher’s term of art, expressing opinion or authoritative remark. And, sometimes “intuition” is used to report some sense or sort of epistemic weight by the fact that the statement at hand is the product of a particular sort of cognitive act. That is, philosophers sometimes use “intuition” with artistic license and sometimes use “intuition” as indication of a certain kind of epistemic support. So, one can grant that philosophers use “intuition” as a term of art sometimes, as merely a kind of artist’s expression, but this leaves open that other instances of intuition are worthy of serious examination.

Trying to get clear on what intuitions are is not straightforward, given intuitions’ keystone role in philosophy and that there exist significant differences in the conception of intuition amongst even the most celebrated philosophers. Descartes, for example, argues that intuition is a sort of introspection: intuition is concept or belief, formed by “unclouded mental attention, so easy and distinct as to leave no room for doubt in regard
to the thing we are understanding” (*Rules*, Rule 3, EA155). Gödel relied on intuition as a fundamental truth-maker for mathematical proofs (Thompson, 1998). Plato alludes to something intuition-like as what apprehends the Forms (*Republic* 508). Frankena (1965) makes a similar observation regarding Aristotle, pointing out that deciding the virtuous mean is an intuitive operation (p. 33). Spinoza sees intuition as means for grasping the nature of a static world and static values, arguing that intuition grasps mathematical conclusions directly and without calculation.

Etiological analyses views of intuitions are interesting and informative (See Symons, 2008). Philosophical intuitions have a rooted history that informs their epistemological purpose.

Smythe and Evans (2007) suggest that the contemporary notion of intuition “probably” came into moral philosophy with British philosophers, perhaps with talk about a “moral sense”; and, specifically with Anthony Schaftsbury, Francis Hutchenson, Thomas Reid, and David Hume. Around the turn of the 20th century, G.E. Moore (1903), H.A. Pritchard (1912), and W.D. Ross (1939) took more direct and explicit approaches, providing the foundations for ethical intuitionism. They argue that intuition is essential to apprehending morality. Intuition, in some sense, *sees* or apprehends the moral realm, a "system of moral truth, as objective as all truth must be" (Ross, 1930/2000, p. 15). Each argues that intuition yields knowledge of this objective morality. Intuitive knowledge is propositional, is self-evident, is immediate, is non-inferential, and is not (directly) derived from the five senses. Sidgwick (1907/1981), in *The Methods of Ethics* (7th Ed.), generalises the position: "Writers who maintain that we have ‘intuitive knowledge’ of the rightness of

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4 Descartes, for instance, defines it this way:

> By intuition I mean, not the wavering assurance of the senses, or the deceitful judgment of a misconstruing imagination, but a conception, formed by unclouded mental attention, so easy and distinct as to leave no room for doubt in regard to the thing we are understanding. It comes to the same thing if we say: It is an indubitable conception formed by an unclouded and attentive mind; one that originates solely from the light of reason . . . Thus, anybody can see by mental intuition that he himself exists, that he thinks, that a triangle is bounded by just three lines, and a globe by a single surface, and so on; . . . (*Rules*, Rule 3, EA155)

5 Thompson (1998) comments,

> Gödel hints [at the importance of] avoiding mixing our pretheoretic intuitions without our more refined, analytic and topological ones, and – more fundamentally – whether we can, in practice, discriminate reliable intuitions from processes known, in retrospect, to lead to false beliefs. (p. 280)

6 The example often given here of Spinoza is that, “If one has the three numbers 1, 2 and 3 one may find intuitively that the fourth proportion is 6 (6 is to 3 as 2 is to 1)” (Fischbein 1987, p. 43). See Symons (2008) for an interesting note on intuitions’ role in medieval philosophy (pp. 2-3, n2). Symons argues that Aquinas’ notion of *vis cogitativa* has a kind of inner sense that helps one see the relevance in sensory experiences that is akin to the modern notion of intuition when contrasted with the notion of *sensus communis* (roughly, ‘commonsense’).
actions usually mean that this rightness is ascertained by simply 'looking at' the actions themselves, without considering their ulterior consequences” (p. 96). Although I am not here concerned with ethical or moral intuitionism, the debate regarding intuitions’ use in ethics has developed such that it can inform the use of intuitions in the broader topic of philosophical methods.7

We can expand the survey of intuition to Wild (1938) who insightfully outlines intuitions’ broad appeal, finding congruence regarding its use amongst religious, moral, and aesthetic discourse; in the notion of genius, and the realms of teleology and value. Wild’s broadly cast net furnishes a set of possible characterisers of intuition (summarised under thirty-one enumerated descriptors). The following presents the central ideas concisely, which is perhaps one of the clearer commemorations of Twentieth Century Intuitionists:

The essential ideas at the basis of all usage of the word “intuition” are (a) knowing, i.e. mental action; (b) immediacy, i.e. the knowing that cannot be explained as the outcome of previous knowing, or a process of knowing, but is characterized by an isolation from other mental facts; (c) inexplicableness: “Intuition” always carries with its utterance a flavor of mystery or miracle. We can “know because”, but not intuitively. This really follows from (b); (d) Truth: in spite of the fact that we do accept such expressions as “doubtful intuition”, “conflicting intuitions”, we only use the word when we mean to imply that knowledge, not opinion or deduction, is in question, and such epithets as “doubtful”, “conflicting” are used to describe the indefiniteness, vagueness, or apparent contradictoriness of the truth intuited, rather than its falsity. (Wild, 1938, pp. 220-221)

My aim is not to give a history of the concept of intuition or the historical development of the idea of intuition. Nor do I aim to give a history of the use of the term or its

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7 For the most part, I set aside ethical intuitions in this project. I have come to think that ethical intuitions have an affective or emotional component that epistemic intuitions ostensibly lack. Dealing with this affective component is beyond the scope of the present argument. Nor am I concerned in particular with mathematical and logical intuitions. Parsing out what is epistemic about these types of intuitions is difficult since their contents are often perceived as necessities. Nevertheless, intuitions in these domains are part of the discussion about the nature of philosophical intuitions. So, I will engage with discussion of them to some extent, but largely for the purpose of exegesis of the way intuitions have been characterised in the broader literature.
cognates. That is not to say that such a historical analysis is not informative, just that I am here going to focus on another kind of approach. I am interested in contemporary epistemic uses of intuitions and the methods by which philosophers present, argue for, and sustain a theory of philosophical intuitions. Let us briefly examine some relevant considerations before turning to sketch the theories of intuition available in the contemporary the literature.

Philosophers attempt to give an account for why episodic intellectual seemings that something is (or is not) the case are epistemically worthwhile. An anecdotal reason to think that intuitions do play a worthwhile role in philosophical methods is that intuitions play a central role in our everyday ways of thinking and reasoning. One does not present premises or evidence for every conclusion or deliberate every action, for example. Most choices and decisions are automatic, or intuitive (cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). One could tout Humanity’s survival as evidence that intuitive decisions tend to get things right. However, this evidence is only anecdotal. Philosophers generally hold philosophical reasoning to a higher standard than our everyday ways of thinking and reasoning. Hence, one should look further for epistemic support for the epistemic status of intuitions. However, one might hold the view that even if intuitions are error-prone heuristic devices, then philosophers need only be careful with their using them.

Philosophers are keen to the fact that intuitions can go awry. Contemporary intuition theorists generally take intuition to be defeasible. Suppose that S intuits that \( x \), and that S later comes to know that \( y \), and that if \( y \) is true then \( x \) cannot also be true. S’s intuitional justification that \( x \) is defeated (or undermined). S’s intuition that \( x \) is *prima facie* justified in virtue of her intuition that \( x \). However, it is not *ultima facie* justified. Since intuitions are defeasible, they can be treated with a tenor of charitability; and, if further consideration shows them to be faulty, one should not be surprised.

However, saying that intuitions are defeasible is not to say that all intuitions are equally defeasible. Some intuitions seem to be less prone to being wrong than others. Huemer (2008) distinguishes intuitions on the basis of the level of generality of the content of the intuitions. Taking intuitions to be “cognitive, intellectual states with propositional contents” (Huemer, 2008, p. 371), he divides intuitions into those that are

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8 I take it that all intuitions are defeasible and will note where appropriate when the theory in question does not take intuitions to be defeasible.

9 One might take this kind of position regarding the use of intuitions. However, if intuitions are error-prone often enough, the possibility that philosophers are led massively astray looms large without some further explanation.
“concrete,” those that are “abstract theoretical,” and those that are what he calls “mid-
level.” Abstract theoretical intuitions are generally less error-prone than concrete or mid-
level intuitions. Abstract theoretical intuitions are “about very general principles, such as
the intuition that the right action is always the action that has the best overall
consequences, or that it is wrong to treat individuals as mere means” (Huemer, 2008, p.
383). Concrete intuitions are about hypothetical cases; for example, “about specific
situations, such as the intuition that Singer’s Shallow Pond example, one is obligated to
rescue the drowning child, or that in the Trolley Car problem, one should turn the trolley
away from the five bystanders toward the one” (Huemer, 2008, p. 383). Mid-level
intuitions are about, “principles of an intermediate degree of generality, such as the
principle that, other things being equal, one ought to keep one’s promises; that one ought
to show gratitude for favors done to one; or that it is more important to avoid harming
others than it is to positively help others” (Huemer, 2008, p. 383). Huemer’s attempt to
distinguish intuitions on the basis of a classification that corresponds to when intuition
generally get things right says something about the way philosophers view intuitions. On
the one hand, intuitions are better suited to some roles than to others. On the other hand,
ratcheting up how fine-grained the operative notion of intuition is can offset intuitions’
malignment in philosophy.

Similarly, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) suggest that intuitions are divisible
into classes of strong intuitions, i.e., “anything close to universal” (p. 452); of first-off
intuitions, “which may be really little better than mere guesses” (pp. 452-3); of minimally
reflective intuitions, which “[result] from some modicum of attention, consideration, and
above all reflection of the particulars of the case at hand, as well as other theoretical
commitments” (p. 453); and, of Austinian intuitions, i.e., “the sorts of intuitions people

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10 In this class are what Huemer (2008) calls “formal intuitions” (p. 386):
1. If x is better than y and y is better than z, then x is better than z.
2. If x and y are qualitatively identical in nonevaluative respects, then x and y are also morally
   indistinguishable.
3. If it is permissible to do x, and it is permissible to do y given that one does x, then it is
   permissible to do both x and y.
4. If it is wrong to x, and it is wrong to do y, then it is wrong to do both x and y.
5. If two states of affairs, x and y, are so related that y can be produced by adding something
   valuable to x, without creating anything bad, lowering the value of anything in x, or removing
   anything of value from x, then y is better than x.

The ethical status (whether permissible, wrong, obligatory, etc.) of choosing (x and y) over (x and z) is the
same as that of choosing y over z, given the knowledge that x exists/occurs.

11 Dancy (1981) draws a similar distinction. He shows that ethical intuitions are sometimes about general
self-evident principles and, at other times, intuitions determine whether particular cases are instances
where general principles apply.
develop after a lengthy period of reflection and discussion – the sort of thing philosophy traditionally encourages” (p. 453). However, the classification appeals to two distinctive classification criteria. Strong intuitions are classed according to the content of the proposition intuited, while first-off, minimally reflective and Austinian intuitions are classed according to the sort of effort one puts toward attending to the intuition. Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) recognise this inconsistency. They turn to argue that the notion of intuition is not ubiquitous in philosophical methodology and subsequently present arguments for a formal strategy for identifying intuitions. I outline that strategy in Chapter 4. Presently, I want to further motivate the idea that there is no received view of intuitions by sketching another classification scheme suggested by Fischbein (1987), which aims at distinguishing intuition-types primarily according to methodological roles. Although Fischbein’s aim is to apply a useful notion of intuition to teaching mathematics and is primarily focused on the operation of intuitions therein, he displays a keen eye to the philosophical conceptions of intuitions. Furthermore, he intends to present a “comprehensive view” of intuitions. However, Feischbein introduces further disparity to a received view of intuition.

On Fischbein’s (1987) view, intuitions play “affirmatory,” “conjectural,” “anticipatory” and “conclusive” roles. Affirmatory intuitions make claims. They are “representations or interpretations of various facts accepted as certain, self-evident and self-consistent” (Fischbein, 1987, p. 60). Affirmatory intuitions sub-divide into semantic intuitions that refer to the meaning of concepts; relational intuitions that express apparently self-evident, self-consistent propositions; and inferential intuitions that occur after one has collected a minimal understanding of elements that one can generalise, and affirm their membership in a category. There is a second and distinct sub-division of affirmatory intuitions: ground intuitions are “all those basic representations and interpretations which develop naturally in a person – generally during his childhood – and are shared by all the members of a certain culture; and, individual intuitions that express an individuals’ acquired “intuitive representations related to their life and activity”

12 Mathematics and philosophy face the same general problem:

While trying to define the concepts used and to build deductive structures mathematicians have to take maximum care not to rely upon intuitive implicitly accepted, evidence. Consequently, they have to identify the pitfalls represented by intuitively accepted concepts and statements. […]

Trying to build deductive, logical structure mathematicians had, first of all, to accept a group of initial statements. The criterion used was that of (apparent) self-evidence: if one has to accept some initial, unproved statements as starting points, it is clear that one tries to choose them among such statements which may be accepted without proof. (Fischbein, 1987, p. 8)
Conjectural intuitions, contrast with affirmatory intuitions that aim at making a claim. Conjectural intuitions make, from apparently obscure, non-salient aspects of a situation, some speculation about future events. “All this may be done automatically before any systematic, complete analysis is made, and the results appear then to be an intuitive, global evaluation” (Feischbein, 1987, p. 61). Conjectural intuitions subdivide further into expert and lay intuitions. Conjectural intuitions are of the kind that is not focus of this project. It is a conjectural intuition as to where Venus Williams next serve with land. 

Although there is disparity in the classifications philosophers have given to intuitions, two core thematic classification criteria are displayed: classification on the basis of use and classification based on content. In Chapter 3, I give several arguments for why the available modes of classifying and conceptualizing intuitions are unsatisfying. At this point, one can lay claim, as I do, to being unsatisfied by the overall inconsistency amongst the various classificatory schemes. Furthermore, since our aim is to say something about the epistemology of intuition, the classification of the accounts of intuition available in the literature that I adopt should turn primarily on what sets theories of intuition apart on epistemic grounds. A second issue resonates among the varieties of intuitions. That is, the overall disagreement regarding what intuition is and what types of intuitions there are poses a methodological issue for those objecting to intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. An issue for experimental philosophers, and for other philosophers interested in the nature of intuition, is that in order to level an objection against intuitions’ use or say something substantive about intuition-use in philosophical methods, some unique concept or constructed definition is essential to theory development and subsequent justification. After all, one must give an accurate target of their criticisms or be able to indicate the subject of their analysis. However, with a myriad of notions of intuition available in the

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13 For example, “A name means an object (TLP 3.203)”.  
14 Fischbein (1987) also introduces two types of problem-solving intuitions. The first of these are **anticipatory intuitions.** “Anticipatory intuitions represent the preliminary, global view which precedes the analytical, fully developed solution to a problem” (p. 61). These must be distinguished from affirmatory intuitions. Affirmatory intuitions make an affirmation, or claim, of a given fact. In contrast, anticipatory intuitions appear as a solution of discovery, “as a solution to a problem and the sudden result of a previous solving endeavor”. Fischbein offers this note, “An anticipatory intuition is a preliminary solution to a specific problem while an affirmatory intuition represents a stable cognitive attitude with regard to a more general, common situation” (p. 61). Another type of problem-solving intuitions is “conclusive intuition.” Fischbein says just a little about these. He writes, “**Conclusive intuitions** summarize in a global, structured vision the basic ideas of the solution to a problem, previously elaborated” (p. 62). As I take them, conclusive intuitions require an understanding of the problem in question and a global synthesis of the solution, one that is not yet explicitly structured.
literature, rejoinders to the argument can deflect objections by pointing out that the experimentalists are objecting to a very limited scope of intuitions and not to the intuitions used in particular arguments (whatever they might be). The grounds for the experimentalists’ objection that the notion of intuitions in philosophical methods is irrevocably incoherent are observable and salient to the discussion regarding intuitions’ epistemic status. In the following section, I outline the various conceptions of intuition that are available in the literature on intuitions. My aim is to give an accurate representation of the range of views that philosophers appeal to in order to substantiate their use of philosophical intuitions.

4. Three Theories of Intuitions

The literature on intuition is characterised under three theories: (1) self-evidence theories of intuition; (2) intellectual seemings theories of intuitions; and, (3) theories of intuitions that treat intuitions as a species of judgment, which also include disposition-to-believe theories. Each camp is devoted to a particular conception of intuition, differing on the grounds of what provides for intuitions’ epistemic status. On the one hand, self-evidence theories of intuitions hold that intuitions epistemically depend on their contents. On the other hand are intuitions that do not epistemically depend on structured content for their epistemic status, but on phenomenology, or on distinctive intuitional phenomena that are bound up somehow with reliability. The phenomena in question are intellectual seeming states. These are intellectual seemings theories of intuitions. The third is a relatively recent camp of philosophers who argue that intuitions are a species of judgment; intuitions' epistemic status is tied to conditions for reliability of judgments in general. Disposition-to-believe theories of intuition hold that to intuit that \( p \) is an inclination or attraction to the corresponding judgment that \( p \). Below, I explain these theories further.

4.1. Intellectual Seemings Theory of Intuitions

Bealer (1996, 2000) argues that \textit{a priori} intuitions are occurrent intellectual seemings that present their targets as necessary. Intellectual seemings present themselves with a

\footnote{In Chapter 4, I present evidence that experimentalists haven’t accurately construed the target of their criticism. That is, they have left open that philosophers can be using types of intuitions to which the experimentalists’ criticisms do not apply.}
particular type of phenomenology, one that demarcates that they have a particular source for their epistemic status. Pust presents a characteristic formulation of the intellectual seemings view of philosophical intuition:16

At t, S has a rational intuition that p IF AND ONLY IF (a) at t, S has a *purely intellectual experience*, when considering the question whether, that p; and (b) at t, if S were to consider whether p is necessarily true, then S would have a *purely intellectual experience* that necessarily p. (Pust, 2000, 46 - emphasis added)

*A priori* intuitions present themselves as necessary. For example, ‘if p, then not not p’ seems necessarily the case. These contrast with “physical intuitions.” For example, it can be intuitive that if a house’s foundation is removed, it will fall. However, it is possible for the house not to fall, so the physical intuition does not seem necessary. Similarly, intuitions are neither hunches nor guesses, which do not present themselves with seeming necessity. Furthermore, intellectual seemings are not beliefs. Using an example drawn from Plantinga (1993), Pust (2000) asks his reader to imagine the case where one is informed by a reliable mathematician that a particular mathematical axiom is false, but at the same time finds the axiom intuitive. In these cases, “I may believe not p while it still seems to me necessarily true that p” (Pust, 2000, p. 33). The intellectual seeming is thus an identifying feature of intuition, one distinguishing it from belief. Intuitions are also distinctively epistemically efficacious. They are compelling in virtue of seeming necessary. When one considers the Gettier case, one considers the question of whether the case instantiates the concept of knowledge. It seems necessarily the case that S does not know that someone in the office owns a Ford.

Bealer argues that intuition is a basic source of evidence. A basic source of evidence is one “that has an appropriate kind of reliable tie to the truth” (Bealer, 2000, p. 8). What constitutes the appropriate kind of reliable tie? On Bealer’s view, contingent reliablism is too weak. According to contingent reliablism, “Something counts as a basic source of evidence iff there is a nomologically necessary, but nevertheless contingent, tie between its deliverances and the truth” (Bealer, 1996, p. 129). However, contingent reliablism

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16 A similar version of ethical intuition is advocated by Bedke (2008); “An ethical intuition that p is a kind of seeming state constituted by a consideration whether p, attended by positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p, and so a reason to believe that p.”
allows that things like guesses and telepathy can be reliable sources of evidence. Guesses and telepathy do not provide the appropriate kind of tie to the truth. Consider brain lesion cases. In these cases, the subject is in a normal epistemic environment conducive to normal functioning epistemic apparatus. However, the epistemic apparatus is functioning atypically: i.e., a brain lesion causes the agent to believe truly. Here, one has basic evidence, but the agent’s connection to the truth is spurious. Other, even more esoteric counterexamples can be constructed whereby the contingent nomological necessity bears in strange ways. For example, consider creatures of great and of small intellectual abilities, whereby the lesser of the two is bound to the truth in virtue of the contingent tie between the speculative deliverances of their intellectual apparatuses and those correct judgments of the beings of greater intelligence.

Bealer, instead, appeals to modal reliabilism (MR) to sustain the evidential status of intuitions. According to MR:

A candidate source (of evidence) is basic iff for cognitive conditions of some suitably high quality, necessarily, if someone in those cognitive conditions were to process theoretically the deliverances of the candidate source, the resulting theory would provide a correct assessment as to the truth or falsity of most of those deliverances. (Bealer, 2000, p. 9)

MR delivers both the appropriate kind of tie between intuition’s deliverances and the truth, and what it takes for a source of evidence to be basic. Moreover, Bealer points out that intuition fits the description of having the necessary modal tie.17

Note that on this account, the modal tie is one that “holds relative to some suitably good cognitive conditions [or approximations thereof], that is holistic in character, and that holds, not with absolute universality, [but] ‘for the most part’” (Bealer, 2000, p. 9-10). In order to fill in Bealer’s theory on intuition, we need to explain how the modal tie between the truth and the deliverances of intuition is one that holds ‘not with absolute universality’. In essence, we need an explanation of how the modal tie is both necessary and not universal. We can do so by examining how Bealer conceives of

17 “By definition, a candidate source of evidence is basic iff it has that sort of modal tie; intuition does have that sort of modal tie; therefore, intuition is a basic source of evidence” (Bealer, 2000, p. 9).
Intuitions are truth-tracking for Bealer in the sense that one has pro-intellectual seeming states only if one has a robust enough concept-set that one “determinately possesses.” Determine concept possession is twofold. First, one must at least possess a concept in the nominal sense: “A subject possesses a given concept (at least) nominally iff the subject has natural propositional attitudes (belief, desire, etc.) toward propositions which have that concept as a conceptual content” (Bealer, 2000, p. 10). Second, one’s possession of a concept must not be the result of misunderstanding, incomplete understanding or “just in virtue of satisfying our attribution practices or in any other such manner” (Bealer, 2000, p. 11). Furthermore, full possession of a concept may require understanding its relation to other concepts. Consider the following example aimed at explaining determinate concept possession (adapted from Bealer, 2000). Suppose the term “multigon” refers to closed plane figures; and, stipulate that the concept of multigon is a definite concept and that calling something a multigon is to apply the concept of multigon. Consider someone who has never applied it to triangles or squares. The question arises, are triangles and squares multigons? Now, for one to possess the concept multigon determinately, one must understand the categorical content of the concept (understanding entails that she must apply it correctly) and it must be possible for one to believe that triangles and squares are (are not) multigons. However, having never applied to concept to triangles and squares, there are two possibilities for proper application. Multigon may pick out the property of being a closed straight-sided planar figure or the property of being a closed straight-sided planar figure with five or more sides. Notice that one need not arrive at the correct intuition. It is enough on Bealer’s account that “an epistemic counterpart […] be able to go through the envisaged processes with that outcome” (2000, p. 17). Multigon example is that there is no metaphysical impossibility encumbering intellectual seemings as truth-tracking. MR allows that determinate concept possession is not dependent wholly on the concept set of the agent. The agent in question has the appropriate tie to the truth if some epistemic counterpart determinately possesses the concepts and applies the concepts correctly. Furthermore, on this view, one’s intuition may not be the upshot of having the correct, determinately possessed concepts,

\[18\] We can also do so by making the Kripkean point that necessity and universality come apart when what is necessary does not instantiate in all possible worlds and, hence, it does not hold universally.

\[19\] That is, Bealer is a molecularist in regard to concepts. However, a certain set of concepts may be required for intuitions’ truth-tracking abilities (Orlando, 1998).
but still have the appropriate tie to the truth when an epistemic counterpart in relevantly similar cognitive conditions determinately possesses the concepts in question.\textsuperscript{20}

On intellectual seemings theories of intuitions, intuitions are not beliefs. Rather, intuitions are distinctive intellectual episodes of the seeming necessity of the intuited content. Intuitions are modally reliable in virtue of determinately possessed concepts. S’s intuition is modally reliable only if there is an epistemic counterpart in a nearby world determinately that possesses the relevant concepts that entail the truth of S’s intuited proposition.

4.2. Judgment Theory of Intuitions

The judgment theory of intuition is the view that intuitions are aspects of normal capacities for judgment and, hence, intuitions are reliable in similar sorts of ways. I outline two classes of the judgment theory, the class that is represented by Williamson (2004, 2005, 2007) and Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009), who have a somewhat substantive disagreement over roughly the same notion of intuition, and the disposition-to-belief views of intuitions advanced respectively by Sosa (1998) [Sosa (2007) advocates a competency view] and by Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a, 2009b).

4.2.1. Williamson and Ichikawa and Jarvis

Williamson (2004, 2005, 2007) advocates a judgment theory of philosophical intuitions. On Williamson’s view, philosophical intuitions are judgments concerning (hypothetical or actual) cases with a counterfactual conditional in the major premise. The view that intuitions are judgments contrasts readily with views that intuitions are specific faculties or “mysterious” capacities; judgments are normal, everyday parts of our thinking and reasoning. The intuition as judgment has the following general form:

1. It is possible that the case could have occurred.
2. If the case had occurred, then the subject of the case would relevantly instantiate

\textsuperscript{20} We should keep in mind that Bealer is a rationalist, perhaps even a \textit{hyper-rationalist}. He thinks that many of our philosophically important concepts are semantically stable (Bealer, 1996, p. 134-135) and that other less stable concepts will become stable through the process of dialectical inquiry and philosophical analysis.
the $x$ in question.

3. It is possible that in relevantly similar cases the $x$ is likewise instantiated.\(^{21}\) (Williamson, 2004, p. 110).

The judgments that (1) and that (2) jointly entail that (3) is true. Take for example Gettier’s case. One judges that the hypothetical case Gettier presents could have occurred. It is possible that $S$ can have a justified true belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job, though misleadingly; and, if the Gettier case had occurred, $S$ would have a non-knowledge justified true belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. Finally, one judges that in cases that have relevantly similar features (Gettier and others provide many more) non-knowledge justified true belief instantiates. Likewise, one confronted with, e.g., an actual Gettier case makes similar non-modal judgments. That is, “in the light of our first-hand experience of the case, we can make that epistemological judgement without taking any detour through modal judgements about hypothetical Gettier cases” (Williamson, 2004, p. 112). The non-modal procedure requires the same capacity for the classification of the instantiation of knowledge as the modal procedure does in hypothetical cases. Intuitions involve “an offline application of our ability to classify people around us as knowing various truths or as ignorant of them, and as having or lacking other epistemologically relevant properties” (Williamson, 2007, p 188). On Williamson’s view, there is nothing particularly philosophical about the intuitive judgments of hypothetical cases in philosophy.\(^{22}\) Intuitions are aspects of normal ways of reasoning and judging \textit{simpliciter}.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) The argument could similarly represent the concept \textit{not} being instantiated.

\(^{22}\) The scope of Williamson’s claim that intuitions are certain kinds of judgments is restricted to the Gettier intuition, though he gestures at the likelihood of the account being generalised to theory in hypothetical case intuitions. There is hope in this direction, but without specific and detailed analyses of several other hypothetical case intuitions it’s an open question as to whether the Williamson’s judgment theory of intuition holds for all philosophical intuitions. Nevertheless, I will appeal to this openness and treat the account as though it generalises.

\(^{23}\) Williamson’s thinking about what counts as a relevant intuition is markedly different from others, such as Bealer. Williamson writes,

There is a tendency to call judgements ‘intuitive’ in a given context, whether or not they are modal in content, when the form of scepticism that arises most saliently for them in that context is scepticism about judgement. In that sense, even a perceptual judgement may count as intuitive. Similarly, the existential judgement ‘There are mountains’ may be considered intuitive even though it is inferential, derived from the perceptual demonstrative judgement ‘Those are mountains’ by a step of existential generalization. In what follows, the word ‘intuition’ will be used in that loose way, without any purported reference to a mysterious faculty of intuition. (Williamson, 2004, p. 114)

Bealer, on the other hand, distinguishes intuitions about the physical from intuitions that are purely
Williamson gives a detailed examination of philosophical intuitions. I will restrict my comments to the substantive intersections with the current project’s focus on methodological avenues that Williamson travels to sustain his view of intuition. Here, my aim is to sketch the various live theories of intuition available in the intuition literature. I turn now to sketch a similar view to Williamson’s judgment account, presented by Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009). My description of the debate between Williamson and Ichikawa and Jarvis will serve to further elucidate the general account.

Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) also advocate the view that intuitions are aspects of normal capacities for making counterfactual judgments. They disagree with Williamson, arguing that he has wrongly characterised one’s relation to hypothetical cases. That is, too many things could be relevantly true (or false) to the case at hand. Moreover, our ordinary understanding about the world is too strict to evaluate what might be true (or false) in the case. The truth or falsity of the counterfactual conditional judgment turns too easily on how the world actually is; not much has to go wrong for it to be false. As such, Williamson’s account does not satisfy what philosophers normally take intuitions to be, since “tradition has it that intuitions like the Gettier intuition have necessarily true contents” (Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2009, p. 223). Williamson argues that the counterfactual conditional is not known a priori. The counterfactual conditional of the intuitive judgment expresses empirical conditions in the antecedent and in the consequent. In Ichikawa’s and Jarvis’s view, this is a “disappointing result.”

Ichikawa and Jarvis argue that the relation that the agent occupies regarding the case is the kind of relation one occupies when reading a fictional story: restrictions on what might be true (or false) are stipulated by the story’s context. Truth and falsity doesn’t fluctuate because the case is, in some sense, fully stipulated. This re-illustration of the judgment theory allows that intuitions are true necessarily and a priori knowable.

It will be helpful to review aspects of the debate, though the seat of the disagreement seems not to turn on the conception of how to represent the Gettier case and its relations to the relevant agents, as Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) argue. Rather, it turns on what one rational.

24 In other words, Williamson argues that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification doesn’t have a clear application in the case of intuition about knowledge. Much of our understanding about what constitutes and does not constitute knowledge is empirically derived. However, that understanding plays no direct justificatory role in one’s intuitions about knowledge. So, at least in the case of intuitions about knowledge, there is no stereotypical application the a priori/a posteriori distinction. (Williamson, 2007, p. 190)
takes as the objects and the competencies involved in the intuitive judgment. I say more
on this below. Presently, I turn to expand on the judgment view by elucidating the debate
at hand. Williamson (2007) articulates the argument in the following way in regard to the
Gettier’s cases:

(1) \( \Diamond \exists x \exists p \text{GC}(x, p) \)
(2) \( \exists x \exists p \text{GC}(x, p) \implies \forall x \forall p [\text{GC}(x, p) \supset (\text{JTB}(x, p) \& \neg \text{K}(x, p))] \)
(3) \( \Diamond \exists x \exists p (\text{JTB}(x, p) \& \neg \text{K}(x, p))^{25} \)

Ichikawa and Jarvis argue that in some nearby possible world someone can satisfy
the Gettier text, but do so in a bad way. There are 'loopholes' in Gettier-like cases that
allow someone to satisfy the text but not have non-knowledge justified true belief. Usually the case is setup in such a way that the causal link between what one knows and one knowing is sufficient, but the failure to pay attention to other salient features that
overruns one's justification, leading to the conclusion that one does not know the relevant
proposition. For example, there are several clocks on the wall and one just happens to
look at the only clock with the correct time. One has a justified true belief about what
time it is and satisfies the condition of the Gettier text in way that if they were in a Gettier
case they would have knowledge. So, given that someone in the nearest world, where the
nearest world is the actual world, satisfies the Gettier text in a bad way, (2) is false. The
truth-value of the counterfactual can vary between possible worlds.

Williamson’s preemptory response to this kind of objection is this: “If we identify
an unwanted way in which the Gettier text might well have been realised, we can easily
repair the case by extending the text to rule out that way” (Williamson, 2007, pp. 200–
204; Williamson, 2009). That is, Williamson appeals to the standard methods of
philosophy whereby counterexamples to a hypothetical case are responded to by filling in
more detail to the case so that the possibility of the counterexample is eliminated.

Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) argue that the more attractive route to repairing

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25 In English:
1. It is possible for some x to stand to some p as given in the text of the Gettier case.
2. If some x were to stand to some p in a way satisfying the (literal interpreted) text of the Gettier
case, then anyone who satisfied the text of the case with a proposition would have non-
knowledge justified true belief.
3. So, it is possible to have non-knowledge justified true belief. (Ichikawa and Jarvis, 2009, p. 225)
Williamson’s argument is to stipulate the hypothetical case robustly in the first place. This would satisfy the traditional view that intuitions are *a priori* justified and necessarily true contents. On their judgment theory of intuitions, the truth-conditions of the Gettier case are not fixed by how the world is – neither the antecedent nor the consequent is contingently true, as Williamson would have it. Rather, the conditions for truth are fixed by the fictional story in question. The difference is that on Williamson's view truth is determined as a relation between the Gettier text and the world (actual and nearby) and the agent, while Ichikawa and Jarvis argue for the view that truth is determined by what is true in the fictional account of the Gettier story. The Gettier story carries more implications regarding what the relevant world is like than the Gettier text. Hence, the Gettier story is intended to eliminate the possibility of deviant ways of satisfying Gettier cases, which remain un-eliminated by the Gettier text.

Williamson (2009) responds to Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009), finding their proposal unsatisfactory because it appeals to processes that are inconsistent with the standard way of presenting hypothetical cases. Hypothetical cases are almost always under-specified. Individuals can fill out the Gettier story in different ways. However, when philosophers’ intuitions conflict it is not usually taken to be disagreement over the case at hand. Finally, the intuitive judgments Ichikawa and Jarvis argue for are epistemically better off than other sorts of counterfactual judgments, judgments that provide the basis for why we should think that intuitive judgments are reliable in the first place. This is a strange consequence indeed. In short, Williamson’s arguments add-up to show that the explanation of their proposed account describes something different from the sort of method of intuition philosophers’ use.

I leave open for now whether or which judgment theory of intuition is the better. Here, my aim is to exegete the relevant literature. Before turning to elucidate self-evidence theories of intuitions, I want to first sketch a second sort of judgment theory of

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26 The judgment is standardised in this way:

1. \( \exists x \exists p \ GC_{cf}(x, p) \)
2. \( \Box \forall x \forall p [GC_{cf}(x, p) \supset (JT B(x, p) \& \sim K(x, p))] \)
Therefore (3) \( \exists x \exists p [JT B(x, p) \& \sim K(x, p)] \)

In English:

1. It is possible for some \( x \) to stand to some \( p \) as given in the relation in which it is true in the fiction that \( x \) stands in the Gettier story.
2. Necessarily, if any \( x \) were to stand to any \( p \) in a way satisfying the true conditions as given by the fiction of the Gettier story, then anyone who satisfied the conditions of the story with a proposition would have non-knowledge justified true belief.
3. So, it is possible to have non-knowledge justified true belief. (Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2009, p. 227)
intuitions: the disposition-to-believe theory of intuitions.

4.2.2. Sosa, and Earlenbaugh and Molyneux

Ernest Sosa (1998) is a proponent of the disposition-to-believe view, which subsequently became the subject of undermining criticisms. However, a more recent attempt to resurrect the view is made by Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a, 2009b). I will briefly sketch Sosa’s account, the criticisms that undermine it and then Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s (2009b) account.

Sosa (1998, 2007) has made more than one attempt at offering a theory of intuitions. In an initial attempt, Sosa (1998) advocates a dispositional model whereby intuitions are an inclination or attraction to the corresponding judgment. Grundmann (2007) successfully criticises the dispositional theory of intuitions. He argues, “the purely dispositional analysis of intuition is relatively implausible, since intuitions are conscious, whereas dispositions exist whether or not we are conscious of them” (Grundmann, 2007, p. 72) One could have unconscious disposition to believe that \( p \) and that not \( p \). Thus, on the dispositional theory, one could have intuitions that \( p \) and that not \( p \), even if they believe only that \( p \) on the basis of their disposition that \( p \). Likewise, Bealer (1998) comments in regard to the dispositional view:

As I am writing this, I have spontaneous inclinations to believe countless things about, say, numbers. But at this very moment I am having no intuition about numbers. I am trying to write, and that is about all I can do at once; my mind is full. If I am to have an intuition about numbers, then above and beyond a mere inclination, something else must happen—a sui generis cognitive episode must occur. Inclinations to believe are simply not episodic in this way. (Bealer, 1998, p. 209)

Bealer’s substantive point is that intuitions as dispositions fail to satisfy a criterion that

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27 In a later instance, Sosa (2007) argues for an altogether different theory of intuitions based on competence and understanding. He writes,

When we rely on intuitions in philosophy […] we manifest a competence that enables us to get it right on a certain subject matter, by basing our beliefs on the sheer understanding of their contents. (Sosa, 2007, p. 102)

Sosa emphasises intuition as a competence, a reliability condition, and a mode of “apprehendings” of specific sorts of contents.
intuitions have a certain occurrent phenomenology: intuitions are episodic while one has
dispositions to believe, regardless of the episodic mental state. Sosa’s (1998) addition to
the raw inclination-to-believe that one is introspectively aware of their inclination to
intuitively judge does not block the objections. As we saw above, such an addition is
artificial and unfaithful to the phenomenology of intuitions. Intuitions are introspectively
unavailable. The failure to capture the common view of intuitional phenomenology is a
significant strike against Sosa.

Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a, 2009b) attempt another cultivation of the
dispositional theory of intuitions in a more moderate light than Sosa’s proposal. On their
view, intuitions are a kind of inclination-to-believe that “play purely heuristic and
rhetorical roles in the securing of philosophical positions” (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux,
2009a, p. 36). As such, to say that S has the intuition that \( p \) is rather to say that S is
inclined to believe P. Notice that to believe P is not to believe that \( p \) since intuition plays
no evidential role is assessing the truth-value of P. To be inclined to believe P is just to
say that under the proper conditions one would form the belief. The epistemic status of
one believing P pays no regard to the dispositional-causal processes that lead one to form
the belief. One does not, in virtue of the intuition alone, believe that \( p \).

How is Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s (2009a) theory able to deal with
Grundmann’s (2007) and Bealer’s (1998) objections, which they do not address
specifically in their paper? The force of the objection is that, on the dispositional view of
intuition, one can be simultaneously disposed to believe P and to believe ∼P, a putatively
untenable position. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux attempt to set this objection to the side
by distinguishing between “net” and “competitive” inclinations to believe.

Competitive inclinations can be co-occurrent in the agent—for example, one can
have a competitive inclination to eat the cake and a simultaneous competitive
inclination to stay on one’s diet. Net inclinations, on the other hand, are what is
left once the competitive inclinations fight it out. The net inclination is the winner
of the fight. In the end, then, one either has a net inclination to eat the cake (and,
ceteris paribus, one goes ahead) or one does not (and, ceteris paribus, one does not).
(Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009b, p. 48)
So, one can have the competitive inclination to believe $P$ or to believe $\neg P$. One’s net inclination to believe has it that one believes $P$ or believe $\neg P$; or, if neither win’s out over the other, one has no respective net inclination to believe either. However, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux have used “believe” in a curious way. If one believes $P$, one generally takes $P$ to have some positive epistemic value. Perhaps we can tease out the idea in this way: If one believes that $p$, one will not at the same time believe that $\neg p$. However, on Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s view, to believe $P$ is not to believe that $p$. There is no epistemic conflict when one merely believes $P$ and then believes $\neg P$.

However, Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s distinction between net and competitive inclinations to believe highlights a curiosity about their view. A very charitable reading would simply allow that to have the net inclination to believe $P$ is just the same with regard to “believe” as to have the competitive inclination to believe $P$, neither engendering that one believe that $p$, wherein $P$ has epistemic status conferred by one’s intuition. A more acute reading uncovers an inconsistency, an inconsistency that highlights the general way that epistemic status of $P$ is smuggled into mere inclination, and, in turn, manifests as epistemic conflict. To see the inconsistency, we need only notice that one’s net inclination to believe $P$ is epistemically more valuable that one’s competitive inclination to believe $\neg P$.

Earlenbaugh and Molyneux argue that the epistemic status of one’s believing $P$ is not dependent on the causal (i.e., intuitive processes) from which it originates. We should ask in what sense does one’s competitive inclinations to believe ‘fight it out’; under what criteria does one evaluate competing inclinations? The example offered is not informative. Whether I am more inclined to eat cake or more inclined to stay on my diet is not an artifact of inclination alone. I am more inclined to eat cake for reasons; moreover, those reasons are epistemic reasons. I eat cake because I know that eating cake will satisfy my sweet tooth. I am more inclined to stay on my diet because I know if I do not stay on my diet I won’t be able to fit into my tuxedo. Hence, my net inclination to believe is informed in the fight to see which inclination wins out by epistemic reasons. Moreover, those epistemic reasons are more than merely causally related to the resulting believing. My believing ‘I will stick to my diet’ is epistemically dependent on my believing that if I don’t stick to my diet I won’t fit into my tuxedo. That is, if I did not believe that fact, I wouldn’t be so disposed to not eat cake in any net sense. So to be net inclined to believe $P$ is epistemically dependent on reasons that are not merely causal. The inclination-to-
believe theories of intuition fail to make themselves good contenders among other accounts of philosophical intuitions available in the literature. They fail to be able to parse out conflicting inclinations in a way that respects the fact that we are not inclined to intuit, e.g., \( p \) and \( \neg p \).

I now move to sketch self-evidence theories of intuition.

### 4.3. Self-evidence Theory of Intuitions

The self-evidence theory of intuitions has its roots in early 20\(^{th}\) century Rationalism. Advanced mainly by Robert Audi (1993, 1996, 1998b, 1999, 2001, 2004), Lawrence BonJour (1998, 2000), and Russell Shafer-Landau (2003), the self-evidence account holds that (roughly) an intuited proposition is one that is true and that an adequate understanding of its contents is sufficient both for being justified in believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding (Audi, 1999, p. 206). Beliefs justified in this way do not rely on another belief for justification, i.e., they are non-inferentially justified. They can epistemically support other beliefs without themselves requiring further justification. Furthermore, they can epistemically ground or foundationally justify beliefs.

Audi’s self-evidence theory of intuition (1998b, 1999, 2004) is well articulated and well defended. Consider Audi as exemplar of the self-evidentialists. On Audi’s view, intuitions have four characteristics: directness, firmness, comprehension and pretheoretical requirements. They are descriptive of the cognitive sense of intuition: a psychological state asserting some belief. Audi distinguishes it from the propositional

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28 BonJour (2005) changes his position to more seemingist leanings whereby intuitions are not propositional.

29 Audi (1999) articulates another formulation:

I construe the basic kind of self-evident proposition as (roughly) a truth such that any adequate understanding of it meets two conditions: (1) in virtue of having that understanding, one is justified in believing the proposition (i.e., has justification for believing it, whether one in fact believes it or not); and (2) if one believes the proposition on the basis of that understanding, then one knows it. (p. 206)

30 (1) Intuitions are non-inferential (directness requirement) since one's belief of an intuited proposition is not on the basis of premise(s). (2) An intuition must be a moderately firm cognition (firmness requirement). "A mere inclination to believe is not an intuition; an intuition tends to be a 'conviction' (a term Ross sometimes used for an intuition) and to be relinquished only through such weighty considerations as a felt conflict with a firmly held theory or with another intuition" (Audi 2004, p. 110). (3) Intuitions are formed merely on the basis of understanding the contents of the intuited proposition (comprehension requirement). And, (4) The pretheoretical requirement, "[Intuitions] are neither evidentially dependent on theories nor themselves theoretical hypotheses" (Audi, 2004, p. 102).
sense. Here, a proposition is intuitive in virtue of its content: the meaning of its content allows it to be understood self-evidently.\(^{31}\) The distinction between cognitive and propositional senses of intuition allows for easy discernment of what is indicative of intuitions (i.e., identification requirements) and what provides for their epistemic status. Likewise, BonJour (1998) argues for a theory of intuition that allows that one can have a priori knowledge. It closely parallels Audi's (2004) attempt to establish the viability of a moral intuitionism. He writes, “A priori justification occurs by directly grasping or apprehending a necessary fact about the nature or structure of reality” (BonJour, 1998, pp. 15-16).\(^{32}\) BonJour (1998) follows in the tradition of Kant specifying, "a proposition will count as being justified a priori as long as no [positive] appeal to experience is needed for the proposition to be justified once it is understood, where it is allowed that experience may have been needed to achieve such an understanding" (p. 10).\(^{33}\) Accordingly, intuitions take as their target a single proposition. The proposition is intuitively understood or knowable via intuition. Its content is what determines the truth of the propositions. For example, one finds intuitive the proposition, ‘if A = B and B = C, then A = C’. The proposition is intuitively justified without epistemic support from theses of transitivity. The truth is grasped directly via intuition and without epistemic appeal to other beliefs. This does not preclude that one’s understanding of the contents of the proposition isn’t mediated by belief or experience. This type of understanding is not justificatory. It merely fills out the meaning of the proposition.\(^{34}\)

\(^{31}\) In general, Audi takes self-evidence to entail that the truth of a proposition is contained 'in itself'. That is, "a proposition is self-evident provided an adequate understanding of it is sufficient both for being justified in believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding" (Audi 2004, p. 49).

\(^{32}\) BonJour writes,

I am able to see or grasp or apprehend in a seemingly direct and unmediated way [intuitively] that the claim in question cannot fail to be true - that the nature of redness and greenness are such as to preclude their being jointly realized. It is this direct insight into the necessity of the claim in question that seems, at least prima facie, to justify my accepting it as true. (BonJour, 1998, p. 101)

\(^{33}\) Not that Audi too has an understanding requirement:

[A] proposition is self-evident provided an adequate understanding of it is sufficient both for being justified in believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding. (Audi 2004, p. 49)

\(^{34}\) Cf. BonJour, 1998. At the time when BonJour and Audi articulated their respective accounts, no theory of understanding was adequate to make the theoretical move required – mostly for the reason that only cursory attention had been given to the notion of understanding in regard to self-evidence. Linda Zagzebski (2001) had an available account of understanding at the time Audi was publishing his work. However, I do not see how it would connect with what Audi says about self-evidence, nor to BonJour’s attempts to free the contents of experience from the a posteriori justification. There is definitely more work that needs to go into elucidating a relevant notion of understanding. BonJour allows that understanding can mediate grasping the contents of a proposition singularly. For example, one's understanding of
So how does the self-evidence theory of intuition relate to philosophical intuitions? One apparent constraint is that philosophical intuitions’ content may be true but not analytic. That is, intuitively supported propositions prompted by hypothetical cases can have contents that are not self-evident in virtue of their meaning. Their content is not sufficient for understanding, which justifies one’s believing them. Consider Gettier’s case. The intuitively supported proposition seems to be the following: ‘S has a justified true belief that a co-worker owns a Ford, but does not know that a co-worker owns a Ford.’ The nature of thought experiments allows that the proposition can be known \textit{a priori} since there is no direct appeal to experience for its justification; Audi and BonJour each adopt a conception of \textit{a priori} that allows as much.\footnote{\textit{Bachelor}’ and ‘unmarried’ can be mediated by experience of bachelors and what is it to be unmarried. However, Audi and BonJour seem to be appealing to a different sense of understanding. This latter sense of understanding needs some sort of positive definition and defence. Furthermore, any such account will have to deal with Williamson (2007, Ch. 4.), who argues that understanding fails to be able to do the epistemological work required to preserve both necessity and a priority of intuitions.} Juxtapose the Gettier proposition with an obviously analytic proposition and the difficulty becomes more salient; for example, ‘\(p\) and not-not \(p\)’. Intuitive support for that \(p\) and not-not \(p\) comes by virtue of understanding the proposition’s content; one needs nothing more to be justified in believing it. How could that be so for the Gettier proposition? Audi and BonJour seem to own an explanation of how \textit{a priori} propositions are intuitively grasped and understood.

Rather than respond to this kind of criticism directly, the dialectical move that self-evidentialists make is to undermine the motivation for the criticism by dismantling the various construals of the analytic/synthetic distinction. For example, BonJour (1998) gives a detailed account of various notions of analyticity (e.g, Kant, Quine, and Frege) and argues that there is no suitably clear distinction for which propositions are analytic and which propositions are synthetic. In order to motivate the self-evidentialist view of intuition, I don’t need to rehearse those arguments.\footnote{Furthermore, they share the view with most intuition theorists that the propositions express necessary truths (Williamson not withstanding).} I need only to show how the Gettier proposition is intuitive on the self-evidentialist theory of intuition. I argue that understanding the meaning of the Gettier proposition is not confined to the arbitrarily discriminate boundaries of the content therein contained. Audi, for example, seems to think that intuitions are grounded in an understanding that is informed more broadly than

\footnote{BonJour’s arguments against analyticity are not without criticism (cf. Crane, 2003). Crane points out that Boghossian (1996) presents a Fregean view of analyticity that BonJour has not considered, but it is eminently plausible, even given BonJour’s criticisms.}
the definite content of the proposition in question. He writes,

The distinction between focally and globally grounded intuitions is not sharp. The same holds for a related contract between abstract and concrete intuitions. There are cases in which an intuitions with quite abstract content, like a concrete one with global content, is grounding in part on a conception of a single illustrative case. (Audi, 2004, p. 46)

BonJour indicates a similarly broad basis for construing the nature of the understanding in question. He writes that a proposition counts as being justified a priori, “even if the person's ability to understand [the proposition] in question derives, in whole or in part from experience” (BonJour, 1998, p. 11). On such unrestricted accounts of what can play into the meaning of the contents of intuitions, it is easy to see that philosophical intuitions fall well within the bounds of the sorts of intuitions the self-evidentialists argue for. It is a further question as to whether the propositions in questions are properly called synthetic a priori.

5. Summary

In this chapter, I presented a number of discrepant attempts at systemizing the notion of intuition operative in philosophical methods. I suggested a trio of positions, reflecting major divisions in the ways that intuitions are conceived in the literature and the different ways intuitions can have epistemic status. I also made some prefatory suggestions about where particular theories of intuitions go wrong. In the following three chapters, I expand my criticisms of theories of intuition. In Chapter 2, I argue that self-evidentialist theories of intuition fail to be viable candidates for philosophical intuitions. In Chapter 3, I argue, by way of generalizing various approaches that philosophers take to defining, characterizing and theorizing intuitions, that various aspect of each of the various approaches are epistemologically problematic. I point out a variety of issues that the approaches incur that make them unattractive means to offering a suitable account of intuitions. Finally, I argue that there is no theory of intuition that one can reasonably accept on a priori methodologies. In the closing chapter, I offer positive contributions to the literature, outlining how a theory of intuition can be supported.
Chapter 2

One aim of my thesis is to undermine the standard methodologies that philosophers use to argue for their preferred theories of intuition. The present chapter offers a criticism of self-evidence theories of intuition. My criticism turns on how much the methodological reliance on intuitional phenomena can tell us about intuitions, an issue that I revisit in Chapter 3.

One can sketch intuitional phenomena by reflecting on the what-it’s-likeness of intuitions. Intuitional phenomena are (e.g.) ‘a feeling of knowing’, ‘a seeming necessity’, ‘a feeling of certainty’, ‘a positive conviction towards truth’ and ‘feeling compelled to assent’. Here, I argue that intuitions under self-evidence theories are not apt sources of epistemic support, although not because of any particular flaw that intuitions themselves exhibit. Rather, I show that intuited beliefs and (a priori) sources of justification with similar phenomena are not distinguishable solely on the basis of their phenomena; and, (ceteris paribus) that the latter sorts of beliefs are not viable as intuitional justification.

Here is an analogy of the sort of situation the self-evidentialist is in. Consider the honeybee (apis mellifera) and its mimic, the drone fly (eristalis tenax). The two look as if they were identical. The drone fly evolved to look like the honeybee. Looking like a honeybee helps them to avoid predation. Honeybees have a nasty sting. So, if you think you are looking at a drone fly, you might actually be looking at a honeybee. Furthermore, if you were aware of the fact that drone flies look like honeybees, you would withhold your judgment that you were looking at a specimen of either species. In cases where one could be confused for the other, surely you could make a closer examination of the specimen, and make a correct evaluation. However, you no longer base your belief that you are looking at a drone fly (or honeybee) merely on your perception. I aim to show that
intuited beliefs have a something akin to a drone fly look-a-like, and once one is aware of that fact they must withhold thinking that their seemingly intuited belief is actually an intuited belief. The upshot of my argument against the self-evidentialist, which I call the “Undercutting Argument,” is that it is an open question whether one’s seemingly intuited belief is non-inferentially justified.

S’s belief that \( p \) is non-inferentially justified if, and only if, S’s belief that \( p \) does not directly depend on having justification for some other belief.¹

An actual intuited belief is non-inferentially justified. Notice that I distinguish between seemingly intuited belief and actually intuited belief. Seemingly intuited beliefs can turn out to be actually intuited beliefs or turn out to be beliefs justified on the basis of at least one other of the agent’s beliefs. Seemingly intuited beliefs and actually intuited beliefs are psychologically direct.

A belief is psychologically direct if and only if it is not apparently caused by any of one’s other beliefs.²

Contrast actually intuited beliefs with seemingly intuited beliefs that are justified unconsciously (or sub-consciously) and inferentially on the basis of at least one other justified belief.³ Both appear to the agent immediately, entering into attention without conscious deliberation: both have intuitional phenomena. Hence, from the practical point of view – i.e., the point of view of actually doing philosophy –, intuited beliefs that are

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¹ A belief is a mental instance of (truth-bearing) propositions, which is had by agents. An agent’s belief that \( p \) has propositional content. A proposition’s truth or falsity is independent of the agent. For instance, an agent may be mistaken about the truth of the proposition expressed by her belief, even if her belief is well justified. Justification for a belief can come via inference from some other justified belief. However, justification can come in a variety of ways, forms, and in different degrees.

² BonJour makes a related point. He describes psychological independence of intuited beliefs as the non-discursivity of their self-evidence. Intuition is non-discursive because it is inaccessible on reflection or introspection (BonJour, 1998, pp. 131-133).

³ The notion of ‘unconscious justification’ may stir some controversy since it may not be clear how a belief confers justification on another belief unconsciously. However, if we construe the inference not as a deliberative action, but as something that holds between beliefs that the agent has, we get something quite ordinary. Agents have beliefs that they are not (immediately) conscious of, and those beliefs provide justification for beliefs that they are (immediately) conscious of. Support from unconsciously held beliefs can either be both causal and justificatory, or justificatory only. However, the latter sorts of instances are more sometime difficult to identify. On route is to ask one on the basis of what reasons one believes, whereby previously unconsciously held beliefs become more salient.
non-inferentially justified and some beliefs that are inferentially justified are not
distinguishable solely on the basis of their phenomena. Hence, from one’s practical
perspective, once one realises that beliefs with intuitional phenomena are not always non-
inferentially justified, whether any belief that is apparently intuited is in fact non-
inferentially justified remains an open question. Hence, one should not trust intuited
beliefs to play the role of foundational epistemic girdle for other beliefs (it might very well
be a honeybee with a nasty sting).\(^4\)

It follows that even if moderate rationalists are successful in showing that
intuitions can provide non-inferential justification, once one becomes aware of the fact
that they are indistinguishable (in practice) from inferentially justified belief, it is no longer
reasonable to think that one’s seemingly intuitively justified beliefs are as they appear to be
epistemically. Any seemingly intuited belief could in fact be an inferentially justified belief.
I argue that knowing this possibility provides an “undercutting defeater” (cf. Pollock,
1986), cutting one off from using intuitive justification as foundational justification.\(^5\) In the
case of the honeybee and the drone fly, believing that honeybees and drone flies look alike
is an undercutting defeater to justifiedly believing that what you are looking at is a
honeybee or is a drone fly. I should also note that the Undercutting Argument is not a
standard version of Cartesian scepticism. I say more to this point below. To note the point
briefly here: I am not aiming to show that intuited beliefs are not justifiable. Rather, I
argue that one hasn’t legitimate access to intuitive justification in regard to a particular
seemingly intuited belief in the light of holding another belief, i.e., that seemingly and
actually intuited beliefs are not distinguishable from the perspective of one having one or
the other. The upshot of the point is that justification remains if (a) one is unaware of or
naïve of the indistinguishability and (b) there are other routes to showing that seemingly
intuited beliefs can be actually intuited. However, (b) only highlights the possibility of there
being actually intuited beliefs. Below, I discuss how the Undercutting Argument might
appear to be some form of Cartesian scepticism.

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\(^4\) BonJour seems to acknowledge this issue here:

[T]here is no apparent alternative to the reliance on immediate, non-discursive insights of some
sort as long as any sort of reasoning or thinking that goes beyond the bounds of direct
observation is to be countenanced. This being the case, the immediate and non-discursive
character of rational insight cannot by itself provide the basis for a cogent objection to moderate
rationalism. But the indispensability of rational insight does not by itself show, of course, that
such insights are genuinely cogent or truth-conducive. (Bonjour, 1998, p. 133)

\(^5\) This is not a problem for a naïve rationalist who is unaware of the brash similarity and has no reason to
undercut his intuitively justified belief.
The Undercutting Argument aims to undermine motivation for self-evidence theories of intuition and show that first-order intuitional justification is not sufficient for the foundational epistemic status of intuited beliefs. Without first-order justification, one must provide some alternative justification for thinking that the belief in question is intuitional, as one does not have access to the special foundational epistemic status of intuited beliefs. This further justification undermines the foundational epistemic status of actually intuited beliefs.

The chapter is structured in the following way. I outline moderate-rationalist foundationalism, which provides the context for the most plausible self-evident theories of intuition. Then I sketch self-evidence theories of intuition. I focus in particular on Audi’s conception of intuition. I present his very plausible moderate-rationalist foundationalist theory of inferentially justified beliefs and show how it lacks the resources to respond to the Undercutting Argument. I close by responding to objections that attempt to recover intuited beliefs’ foundational epistemic status and by distinguishing the Undercutting Argument from certain kinds of Cartesian scepticism.

1. Rationalists’ Foundationalism

Arguments concerning the structure of justified beliefs generally fall within two camps: coherentism and foundationalism. Coherentist justification holds that

\[ S's \text{ belief, } P, \text{ is justified if and only if } S's \text{ belief structure is more coherent with } P \text{ than it is without } P. \]

Alternatively, foundationalists hold that

\[ S's \text{ belief is justified if and only if either it is foundationally justified or its justification comes (at least in part) from a foundationally justified belief.} \]

A foundationally justified belief is a belief whose justification is not conferred by another justified belief.⁶

⁶ This does not imply that non-inferential and inferential beliefs are, as an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this chapter suggests, ‘mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive’. Rather, there is a
Foundational justification is primarily motivated as a response to epistemic regress problems. Epistemic regress concerns the ways that beliefs are conferred epistemic status. If beliefs are justified by other beliefs, then for any justified belief there must be at least one justified belief that confers justification on it. However, for any belief that justifies another, there must be some further belief that confers justification on the former. Hence, for any justified belief there must be an infinite chain of beliefs, i.e., an epistemic regress. However, finite intellectual abilities such as ours cannot be in possession of an infinite chain of beliefs. Hence, no belief is (ultimately) justified, if not foundationally.

Foundational beliefs are justified non-inferentially; they can confer justification on other beliefs without pain of epistemic regress. In essence, foundationally justified beliefs are epistemic regress stoppers, making justified belief plausible in the given scope of our finite intellectual capacities. The ability of intuited beliefs to provide foundations for justification is a primary motivation for thinking that intuited beliefs are essential to epistemological theories that reflect the intellectual abilities of epistemic agents like us.

The Undercutting Argument shows that intuited beliefs are not viable candidates for the foundational support of an agent’s structure of inferentially justified beliefs, limiting the range of beliefs that could foundationally support other beliefs to a posteriori sources. Seemingly, advocates of self-evidence theories of intuition can easily rebuff this issue. After all, philosophers can reflect on their intuitions and find, “a second-order reason or justification for thinking that accepting rational insight [intuition] or apparent self-evidence is at least likely to lead to believing the truth” (BonJour, 1998, p. 143). Indeed, BonJour (1998) argues that second-order justification does not burden the epistemic status of intuited beliefs because a first-order justification is sufficient for being justified. That is, the fact that one’s belief is intuited is sufficient since being self-evident is

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7 There are other alternatives that are not elucidated here: namely, circular chains of justified beliefs and that, at bottom, justification terminates at something other than belief. However, neither is focally relevant to the present objection regarding self-evidence theories of intuition.

8 Notice that I’m not objecting to foundationalism. There are a number of other sources that could provide foundation-type justification for beliefs. Occurrent visual-based beliefs are non-inferentially justified since one is justified believing them and there is no particular belief on which their epistemic status is dependent.
sufficient for being justified. In a similar move, Audi (2004) distinguishes between first-order intuitions, understanding a sentence expressing a self-evident proposition is sufficient for being justified in believing it (non-inferentially); and second-order intuitions, understanding that a sentence expresses a self-evident proposition and, as such, can be non-inferentially justified. Thus, justification can be twofold. There is a first-order justification that is direct, immediate, and non-inferential, i.e., apprehending *qua* intuition; and, a second-order justification that is inferential. First-order intuition is all that Audi and BonJour think is required for intuitions to be capable of conferring epistemic status. Moreover, philosophers can reflect on the belief in question to decide whether it is indeed self-evident (e.g., the belief that if A = B and B = C, then A = C).

I disagree. I argue that there is a generalisable problem that forces the intuitionists’ hand: *Meta-justification is required once an agent realises that what seems to be an intuited belief could be inferentially justified.* If the belief in question is taken by the agent to be intuited, even though it is in fact not, the belief in question cannot actually provide epistemic foundations for the justification of other beliefs. It relies on some other belief for the legitimised use of its epistemic status. It is thus open to epistemic regress objections.

One issue here turns on whether, for self-evidentialists, intuited beliefs can confer epistemic status on another belief solely on the basis of their being propositionally justified. Propositional justification (PJ) contrasts with doxastic justification (DJ).

**PJ** S’s belief that *p* is propositionally justified if there are grounds to rationally believe that *p*.\(^9\)

**DJ** S’s belief that *p* is doxastically justified if S has grounds to rationally believe that *p* and S actually believes that *p* on those grounds.

Hence, doxastic justification is to *justifiedly* believe that *p* and propositional justification is to *justifiably* believe that *p*. In both cases, *p* is justified. The grounds for *p*’s being doxastically justified are entailed in believing that *p*, whereas *p*’s being propositionally

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\(^9\) The objection that I present regarding metajustification is different from the one that BonJour (1998) responds to. BonJour responds to the objection that metajustification is required for one to rationally accept intuition in the first place. I’m arguing that metajustification is required only after an agent comes to have a certain realisation about the under-specification of intuitional phenomenology.

\(^{10}\) Notice that whether S believes that *p* on those grounds is not withstanding in regard to *p*’s being justified.
justified does not entail believing that \( p \).

A characteristic feature of self-evidence theories of intuition is that intuited beliefs are self-evident, i.e., they have self-evident content. Certainly, such beliefs are propositionally justified. I argue that, in order for intuited beliefs to ground other beliefs, they must be doxastically justified.\(^{11}\) If I am right, philosophers can be right about intuitions’ justifiability, but not be able to properly identify and use them in practice.

In the following section, I detail self-evidence theories of intuition and show how they are subject to the Undercutting Argument. I then discuss Audi’s moderate rationalist epistemology, in which his theory of intuition is operative, and show how intuitions fail to be apt foundational justifiers. Finally, I respond to a number of objections aimed at buttressing the use of intuited beliefs in foundational roles.

### 2. Self-evidence Theories of Intuition and the Undercutting Argument

Audi and BonJour (Audi 1993, 1998b, 2004; BonJour, 1998) present self-evidence theories of intuitions. Both stress that the epistemic status of intuited belief comes from self-evident content.\(^{12}\) Furthermore, neither thinks that there is anything particularly interesting about an intuitive faculty. Capacities for forming intuited beliefs are merely abilities “to understand and to think” (BonJour, 1998, pp. 107-9).\(^{13}\) Audi’s and BonJour’s notions of intuition are representative of the self-evidence theories of intuition; and, they have similar views of intuitional a priori justification. BonJour writes,

\(^{11}\) No horrible things will happen to foundationalists’ theories of justification like that which Audi presents in *The Structure of Justification* (1993). Non-inferential and foundational justification comes not just from intuited beliefs. Occurrent perceptually-based beliefs can provide the same kind of justification on Audi’s view. Despite the overall similarity between Audi and BonJour, they diverge on this point (cf. BonJour, 2007). I do not take the present argument to be objecting to foundationalist justification anyhow. My criticisms aim at a certain kind of intuitional justification.

\(^{12}\) I don’t think that for present purposes it is useful to consider the views where intuitions receive epistemic support from other sources as well. \( S \) could have the intuition that ‘if \( A = B \) and \( B = C \), then \( A = C \)’ whereby the intellectual seeming state provides evidence for its truth. The intellectual seemings view of intuitions holds that one’s mental state is what confers epistemic status on beliefs. Intellectual seemings theories of intuitions are not here withstanding with those theories of intuition being criticised. Rather, I am concerned with epistemic support garnered from the supposed content. That is, self-evidence theories of intuition distinguish from the intellectual seemings theory in a way that excludes the latter from the Undercutting Argument. The kinds of intuitions in question are self-evidence theories of intuitions because therein the content of the intuition alone provides for the epistemic efficacy of the intuited belief. The intuition, i.e., a kind of mental act, is what ties that epistemic efficacy to the agent, not what sustains it or constitutes its source.

\(^{13}\) Audi’s statement is much less concise (cf. Audi, 2004, p. 32 & 78).
Intuition is the intellectual act in which the necessity of such a proposition is seen or grasped or apprehended as an act of rational insight or rational intuition. Since this justification or evidence apparently depends on nothing beyond an understanding of the propositional content itself, a proposition whose necessity is apprehended in this way (or, sometimes, whose necessity is capable of being apprehended in this way) may be correlativey characterized as rationally self-evident: its very content provides, for one who grasps it properly, an immediately accessible reason for thinking that it is true. (BonJour, 1998, p. 102)

Audi describes intuitions in the following way: (1) Intuitions are non-inferential since one's belief of an intuited proposition is not on the basis of premise(s). (2) An intuition must be a moderately firm cognition. "A mere inclination to believe is not an intuition; an intuition tends to be a 'conviction' and to be relinquished only through such weighty considerations as a felt conflict with a firmly held theory or with another intuition" (Audi, 2004, p. 110). (3) Intuitions are formed merely on the basis of understanding the contents of the intuited proposition. And, (4) "Intuitions] are neither evidentially dependent on theories nor themselves theoretical hypotheses" (Audi, 2004, p. 102). These are referred to as the directness, firmness, comprehension, and pretheoretical requirements, respectively. Furthermore, in regard to the epistemic status of intuitions, Audi argues that it manifests in virtue of understanding a self-evident proposition.

[A self-evident proposition is] a truth such that understanding of it meets two conditions: that understanding is (a) sufficient for one’s being justified in believing it (i.e., for having justification for believing it, whether one in fact believes it or not) – this is why such a truth is evident in itself; and (b) sufficient for knowing the proposition provided one believes it on the basis of understanding it. (Audi, 1999, p. 206)

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14 BonJour writes of intuition generally as “the intellectual act in which the necessity of such a proposition is seen or grasped or apprehended as an act of rational insight or rational intuition (or, sometimes, a priori insight or intuition), where these phrases are mainly a way of stressing that such an act is seemingly (a) direct or immediate, non-discursive, and yet also (b) intellectual or reason-governed, anything but arbitrary or brute in character” (BonJour, 1998, p. 102).

15 Elsewhere, Audi articulates self-evidence similarly. While Audi argues that these are slightly different formulations of self-evidence, the differences do not impede my argument. A commentator pointed out that this articulation of a self-evident proposition entails that the proposition in question is in fact self-evident. I take it that that commentator wasn’t pointing out that the proposition was actually true since...
Notice a couple of key aspects of what BonJour and Audi say. When BonJour writes, ‘its very content provides […] an immediately accessible reason for thinking that it is true’, he indicates that it is the content that is epistemically efficacious. Audi’s construal of a self-evident proposition is instructive as well. Notice that (a) is a condition for justification but one need not in fact believe the proposition in question. And, (b) is a condition for doxastic justification, one’s justification is based on believing proposition. Both conditions must be met. I set aside the issue regarding the underspecified notion of understanding. We should notice that understanding is merely the mode of connecting the epistemic ground, i.e., the self-evident content, and the agent. Presently, I focus on what provides for the epistemic status of intuited belief.

One might attempt to point out that Audi’s notion of self-evidence concerns self-evident axioms or sentences expressing necessary truths. However, philosophical intuitions, i.e., intuitions about hypothetical cases such as those that Gettier (1963) presents are neither axiomatic nor self-evident solely on the basis of their content. Hence, one might point out that self-evidence theories of intuition are not, in my use of the term, philosophical intuitions. However, Audi notes that,

[T]he non-inferential justification of epistemic principles is consistent with the possibility that they are (1) inferentially justifiable, (2) justifiedly believed only after considerable reflection, and (3) defeasibly justified even then […] They may be justifiably believable only after reflection because the required kind of self-evidence is a matter of the kind of non-inferential knowledge obtainable by understanding, not a matter of the ease or speed with which the understanding comes; and given the fallibilism of the approach in question, justified beliefs of these principles may be deasible. Thus, one can have non-inferential justification for the relevant epistemic principles even if they are not self-evident in the way axioms are. They may in fact seem self-evident only after long reflection on appropriate examples; that help to explain how they can be defeasibly justified, but it does not imply that their justification is inferential. (Audi, 1993, pp. 368-369)

that would beg the question regarding adequate understanding (cf. Audi, 1998a, p. 95). However, he or she was right to point out that Audi is not here explicitly showing how to identify a self-evident proposition, much less that we should justifiedly believe that the proposition is self-evident.
So, it seems that Audi would extend self-evidence theories of intuition to philosophical intuitions. Furthermore, in a more conspicuous tone, Audi writes, “any (or virtually any) proposition can be known non-inferentially can also be known inferentially” (Audi, 1999, p. 116). Hence, there doesn’t seem to be a limit on what proposition are intuitionally accessible. There are several means to justifiedly believe self-evident propositions. For example, one may base justification for believing the proposition empirically or inferentially on other of one’s beliefs. For example, S may hold the belief that all three-dimensional objects are extended in space. She may do this on various epistemic grounds. S, for instance, justifiedly believes that all three-dimensional objects are extended in space on the basis of her belief that only points of geometry are not extended in space, a belief supported by theoretical knowledge that S has about geometry. Alternatively, S simply arrives at the belief in question intuitively. In virtue of understanding what it is to be three-dimensional and located in space, S understands and justifiedly believes that three-dimensional objects are extended in space. Here we have two modes of justification. But, certainly, we must distinguish S’s belief based on inference from S’s belief that is intuited, even if the proposition expressed in each instance is identical.

This may seem like a non-standard way of distinguishing beliefs. However, we commonly distinguish beliefs on the basis of the ways they are conferred epistemic status. We distinguish between S knowing that $p$ and S merely believing that $p$. We distinguish between S believing that $p$ on the basis of a reliable source and S believing that $p$ on the basis of a less reliable or an unreliable source. The content of the belief in question is identical. Its epistemic status provides the criterion for distinction. The distinction I’ve suggested is consistent with our ordinary ways of distinguishing beliefs.

To summarise the setup of the argument thus far, I have suggested that self-evidence theories of intuitions are open to a particular kind of objection. The general idea behind the objection is that intuited beliefs and some inferentially justified beliefs have phenomenological similarities but are epistemically distinguishable. Beliefs can have epistemic status grounded in different sources.

Let’s take up an example. Consider the proposition concerning tallness, $t$.

$t$: If A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, then A is taller than C.
Now, let us turn our attention to the act of coming to believe that \( t \) (is true), from S’s perspective. S considers \( t \), and - without evidence of epistemic inference from any other belief - \( t \) seems necessary to S. S believes that \( t \); \( t \) is psychologically direct. Now, consider that S asks herself why she believes that \( t \). She may respond that it’s simply intuitive, or self-evident that \( t \), or, she says, it is true because she is taller than her sister, her sister is taller than their mother, and she is taller than her mother. However, when S first comes to hold her belief that \( t \), no specific justificatory ground is available. Hence, for \( t \), there are a number of possible grounds for the belief’s epistemic status. Audi seems to be open to this possibility. He writes, "The person must also have a non-inferential disposition to attribute the belief that \( p \) to its ground, but we are fallible here and may wrongly think that some other belief is the ground - this is especially likely if the grounding belief is unconscious" (Audi, 1993, pp. 20-21). If \( t \) were unconsciously (or sub-consciously) based on (epistemic) inference with another of S’s beliefs, \( t \) would appear to S to have the same phenomena of ‘seemingness’ and immediacy as S’s actual intuition that \( t \). Hence, from S’s perspective \( t \)’s epistemic grounding is a mystery.

Thus far, I have shown that a self-evident proposition can be justifiably believed on grounds other than its content. I have also shown how it could be the case that one who thinks that one’s belief is intuited when it is possible that one’s justification for believing is conferred justification from one or more of one’s other beliefs. I have yet to show that the mystery is one that cannot be solved by second-order justification or that the self-evidence of \( t \)’s content is sufficient for its (foundational) justification. To do so, I turn to give a more detailed sketch of the foundationalist epistemology in which self-evident/intuited beliefs purportedly operate.

I focus here on Audi’s work.16 His position is both outstanding in its rigor and paradigmatic of foundationalism in regard to intuited beliefs playing the role of foundational beliefs in structures of justification (Audi, 1993). I call his epistemology a modest epistemic psychological foundationalism, or MEPF for short. I aim to show that MEPF lacks the resources to show that intuited beliefs ought to play foundational roles.

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16 Intuited beliefs are integral in a number of foundationalists’ epistemological positions, including those of Moser (1985), Fumerton (1995), and BonJour (1998) (cf. DePoc, 2007). The bulk of my criticism applies to their epistemological positions, and to many arguments where intuition does epistemic work.
2.1. Audi’s Self-evidence Epistemology

MEPF attempts to set out a foundational structure of an agent’s inferentially justified beliefs that is epistemically sound and psychologically accurate. MEPF is modest in the sense that not all justification for one’s inferentially justified beliefs comes from foundational beliefs. MEPF is psychological in the sense that if one has any beliefs at all, then one must have some beliefs that are causally direct and some that are epistemically direct so as to reflect the abilities of finite beings like us. MEPF is foundational in the sense that if one has any inferentially justified beliefs, one must have some beliefs that do not epistemically depend on other beliefs.

MEPF is consistent with reliablism and coherentism. For a reliablist, one’s belief is justified if it results from a reliable belief forming process. The coherence of belief with an agent’s other beliefs might also provide justification for believing it. Beliefs on MEPF can be coherently or reliably justified; nonetheless, ultimate justification comes only from foundational beliefs. Rearticulating Audi’s construal of a self-evident proposition (above) to reflect the epistemological entailments of MEPF, we can articulate a principle like the following:

\[(SE) \quad p \text{ is self-evident to } S \text{ provided } S's \text{ adequate understanding of } p \text{ is sufficient for } S's \text{ justifiedly believing that } p.\]

Only when beliefs are justified non-inferentially, providing justification for other beliefs without themselves needing further justification, do they escape epistemic regress.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\) Audi argues that, “\(p\) is self-evident provided an adequate understanding of it is sufficient for being justified in believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding” (Audi, 1999, p. 206). The formulation that I offer may be slightly stronger than what Audi suggests. It entails belief while belief is merely sufficient on Audi’s versions. However, I think it is what is necessary to make Audi’s account of self-evidence pragmatically useful to the agent concerned. Moreover, it maintains a certain level of psychological accuracy in MEPF.

\(^{18}\) It is worthy of note that non-inferentiality is not as clear-cut as foundationalists attempt to show. Bart Streumer argues that Audi’s reasoning for the distinction between inferential and non-inferential justification is not at all clear.

Audi comes closest to explaining [the distinction between inferential and non-inferential] when he distinguishes what he calls 'conclusions of inference' from 'conclusions of reflection'. He claims that conclusions of inference are "premised on propositions noted as evidence," and that reasoning that results in such conclusions is "premise-based." And he writes that conclusions of reflection "emerge from thinking about [something] as a whole, but not from one or more evidential premises," that drawing such a conclusion is "a kind of wrapping up of the question,
Filling out the setup, I am arguing that an epistemologically savvy agent cannot justifiably believe that an apparently intuited belief is justified in the appropriate way, i.e., the way in which it can be foundational in their MEPF structure of justified beliefs. An epistemically savvy agent is an agent who is aware of her foundationalist structure of justified beliefs and the epistemic implications thereof (Herein “Sam”). Furthermore, Sam has become aware that some seemingly intuited beliefs are justified inferentially. That is, Sam cannot justifiably believe that the belief in question is not justified by one or more of her other beliefs (i.e., she cannot tell if the belief in question is actually justified inferentially). Furthermore, that Sam justifiably believes on the basis of self-evident content is insufficient for foundational justification. I am not arguing that the agent’s belief, by matter of fact, cannot be non-inferentially justified and intuited. Nor am I arguing that the belief in question does not have the appropriate sort of justification to play the role of a foundational belief. Nor am I arguing that under any conditions an agent is unable to have foundational intuited beliefs. Rather, I am arguing from the perspective of an epistemically savvy agent. If my argument is successful, it stands to undermine some of the foundationalists’ abilities to avoid the regress problem. 19

Consider another example of a proposition that is self-evident and able to be intuited:

All first cousins share at least one grandparent. (Audi, 2004, p. 52)

On the one hand, Sam infers it from other beliefs that she holds about the

akin to concluding a practical matter with a decision,” that when one has drawn such a conclusion “one has obtained a view of the whole and thereby broadly characterized it,” and that reasoning that leads to such conclusions is ”non-linear and in a certain way global.” (Streumer, 2005)

Streumer (2005) asks why a conclusion that comes from one’s consideration of ‘the view of the whole’ is non-inferentially justified. The upshot of Streumer’s objection is that there is no clear line between what constitutes inference and what does not. Inferential and non-inferential categories do not clearly delineate between the relevant cases since inferential beliefs may also be non-inferential. I think Streumer’s concerns can be set-aside after a brief comment. ‘Inferential’ and ‘non-inferential’ are not consistent terms. That is, non-inference is not merely the negation of inference. ‘Inference’ entails a broad range of justificatory links while non-inference only precludes that the justificatory link(s) between the belief in question and another belief is absent.

19 It’s important to keep in mind that justification may come in degrees and there is some threshold for adequate justification. Ceteris paribus, reasons adding justification to justified beliefs don’t make those beliefs more justified than any other beliefs with threshold justification. Threshold justification, however, is subject to counterfactual conditions. For example, suppose that Sam has two independently and threshold-justified beliefs, P and Q. However, Q is slightly more justified than P. If Sam is presented with counterfactual conditions requiring that Sam cannot believe both P and Q (at the same time), Sam should (ceteris paribus) believe Q and not P.
relationships of kin in her own family. It is inferentially justified. Alternatively, Sam comes to believe the proposition because one *just sees* that the proposition is self-evident in virtue of the meaning of the sentence that expresses that proposition. In the latter case, there is no inference from another of Sam’s beliefs on which one bases believing it. It is non-inferentially justified. Now, consider that Sam has just come to entertain the proposition at hand. She has never previously considered whether all first cousins share at least one grandparent, though she possesses the ability to understand it self-evidently. Sam finds it intuitively compelling; it meets the directness, firmness, comprehension and pretheoretical requirements. It occurrently seems like it is an intuited belief. However, Sam also knows that some of her intuited beliefs are phenomenologically identical to beliefs that are justified inferentially, based on other beliefs that she holds. Such beliefs are “episodically inferential” (Audi, 1993, p. 238).

**(EI)** A belief is episodically inferential when it is held *occurrently* (in the activity of inferring it from some another belief) sustained by “unconscious inference processes” (Audi, 1993, p. 238).

Episodically inferential beliefs are phenomenologically immediate - appearing to consciousness as intuited beliefs do -, giving the sense that they are non-inferential (Audi, 1993, p. 238). And, unlike actually intuited beliefs, they epistemically depend on other beliefs since they are structurally inferential. Structurally inferential beliefs are grounded in some other belief(s) (Audi, 1993, p. 20). My argument turns, in part, on a picture of human psychology that includes some beliefs that are unconsciously (or sub-consciously) held, which support other beliefs of which one is consciously aware of. I won’t defend the accuracy of this view, which is surely something for psychologist to elaborate on. However, it is certainly a view that Audi endorses and is a component of MEPF (cf. Audi, 1982). He writes, "To be sure, we must allow 'unconscious' reasons, quite as we must allow unconscious evidential grounds" (Audi, 1993, p. 348). That is,

There is a sense in which one can believe for (and even be justified by) an 'unconscious' reason, one that, apart from special circumstances such as the help of another person, one cannot come to know one has as a reason. (Audi, 1993, p. 21).
Let’s formulate the notion of an unconscious inference in the following way:

(UI) Some justified beliefs, which S is occurrently attentive to, are conferred their justification by beliefs S holds unconsciously (or sub-consciously).

The upshot is that Sam cannot distinguish between the fact that her belief that all first cousins share at least one grandparent is based on inference from another of her beliefs or whether it is non-inferential. Thus, from Sam’s perspective, whether any apparently intuited belief is in fact non-inferential is an open question. That is, Sam cannot tell whether the given belief can be foundational in her belief structure because the agent cannot tell whether it is non-inferential. Sam cannot rationally accept that her seemingly intuited beliefs are non-inferentially justified. Hence, she should withhold using it as a foundational justifier for superstructure beliefs.

To elucidate, consider trying to hire a babysitter to watch the kids for the evening. The best babysitter on the block is Sam. However, the neighbor said that a babysitter named “Sam” stole some of her jewelry. However, you both know that there are two babysitters on the block named “Sam,” but they so closely resemble one another that your (somewhat senile and legally blind) neighbor is never very good at telling them apart. So there is no way to distinguish which is the thief, no matter how hard you might try. Given the importance of who is watching the kids, even if the “Sam” that you aim to hire is, in virtue of fact, the best babysitter on the block, you cannot reasonably choose one of the babysitters named “Sam” to watch the kids. If I am right, intuited beliefs are like babysitters. They are entrusted with a very important role and responsibility. The must actually do the epistemic work that foundationalism requires of them.

Another recap: We have assumed that there is an epistemologically savvy agent. Sam is aware of her beliefs having a justificatory structure consistent with MEPF. Sam’s beliefs are mental states (either occurrent or dispositional) having some attitude toward a sentence that express propositions. Some of Sam’s foundational beliefs are intuited beliefs. In order for Sam’s intuited belief to be foundational, the belief must (a) result from Sam’s intuitive faculty, (b) be self-evident (c) be non-inferential, (d) be appropriately justified, and
(e) be appropriately grounded. I move now to say what it means for Sam’s foundational belief to be appropriately justified and appropriately grounded in the context of MEPF.

2.2. Intuitional Foundational Justification

Four standard sources of justification are perception, introspection, memory, and reason. Sam comes to hold a belief because of its source. The operation of that source is the ground of the belief, which confers justification on Sam’s beliefs. The ground of Sam’s beliefs also provides the justification for Sam’s justifiedly believing them (Audi, 2001, p. 17). That is, “[A]ctual beliefs appropriately based on those sources,” through the activity or operation of those sources (i.e., *qua* ground), are justified and Sam receives justification for believing those beliefs (Audi, 2001, pp. 16-17). A belief may have a plurality of sources and grounds. Sources and grounds need not be same for a belief to be justified. For example, Sam holds the belief that nothing can be both green and red all over and at the same time because a trustworthy epistemologist told her it was true, but Sam’s understanding of it, an activity of reason, grounds the belief. For intuited beliefs, the source and ground must be, at least in part, reason. That is, the appropriate ground for an intuited belief is the operation of reason, and an appropriately justified belief is grounded at least partially in reason and not dependent on any other belief for its epistemic status. ²¹

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²⁰ Self-evidence is understood here as a criterion establishing that an intuited belief can be foundational, not that all foundational beliefs have this requirement. Self-evidence, as well as ‘non-inferentiality’, is also a criterion for a belief’s being arrived at intuitively. I’ve attempted to simplify the argument here under the assumption that if a belief is self-evident and non-inferential *qua* a foundation belief, the belief is implicitly understood as an intuited belief (though not all intuited beliefs play foundational roles).

²¹ Having elucidated the source for beliefs and grounds for justification, we can further expand on varieties justification. There are multiple ways Sam can justifiedly believe C. Some ways relevant for intuition are:

(1) Sam’s justification for believing C is direct, coming through self-evidence;
(2) Though self-evident, C is not obviously so to Sam. Sam consciously introspects, explicitly laying out the premises that lead to C, thus coming to believe C because it is supported by valid inferences;
(3) Sam previously believed C based on premises (as in 2), and now, grasps its veracity directly (as in 1); and,
(4) Sam remembers previously believing C and now accepts it on the basis of remembering previously believing it.

Any of the above cases provide ground for Sam’s justifiedly believing that C, though they differ regarding whether the grounds are appropriate for foundational intuited beliefs. On (1), Sam’s ground is the operation of ‘understanding’ and ‘thinking’: an activity of reason. It is the source of Sam’s belief and, in virtue of its activity, grounds for the belief’s justification as well as Sam’s justifiedly believing it. C is self-evident provided Sam’s adequate understanding of it is sufficient for Sam’s justifiedly believing it. On (2), introspection provides grounds; and, on (4), memory does. Neither of these are appropriate grounds for intuited beliefs because Sam infers their epistemic status from other beliefs. On (3), Sam’s ground is reason, introspection, or both. If (3) occurs merely as a process of reason, then the proposition is
I argue below that if Sam believes that intuited beliefs and merely seemingly intuited beliefs are phenomenologically the same, Sam cannot justifiably believe that any particular intuited belief is justifiably foundational - even if an intuited belief is appropriately justified to play a foundational role.\textsuperscript{22}

Suppose that Sam is confronted with the fact that what seems to be an intuited belief may be epistemically supported in that instance by another of Sam’s beliefs – i.e., Sam believes that she can be mistaken about the epistemic status of a psychologically direct belief. What recourse does Sam have to recover that intuited beliefs play foundational roles in MEPF? Sam’s belief is psychologically direct.\textsuperscript{23} That is, Sam’s phenomenological experience of the belief does not entail that the belief is causally or justificationally dependent on other beliefs. So, when Sam is conscious of a psychologically direct belief she is unaware of (or whether) other beliefs that confer its epistemic status. Thus, to Sam, it \textit{seems} to be psychologically and epistemically direct. BonJour describes psychological directness of intuited beliefs as the \textit{non-discursivity} of their phenomenological self-evidence. Intuition is non-discursive because it is inaccessible on reflection or introspection, having no steps or functions to evaluate for adequacy (BonJour, 1998, pp. 131-133). The process of arriving at self-evidence cannot be evaluated in a reflective way since there are no premises, no appeal to rules, and no appeal to any sort of explicit decision-procedure criteria. There are no evaluable relations amongst premises or relations of premises to conclusions.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, Sam is in a precarious position since, as BonJour points out, intuiting itself is non-discursive. That being the case, it is possible that Sam belief is psychologically direct but the product of unconscious processing, having positive epistemic dependence on other beliefs. The psychological independence of intuited beliefs is what makes intuited beliefs mistakable for causally immediate, inferentially justified beliefs.

Consider the following analogy, a twist on Mark Twain’s A Prince and a Pauper. By virtue of genetic chance, two identical boys (i.e., they are genotypically and

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\textsuperscript{22} Sam’s believing \textit{on the basis} of some justifying elements is to actually justify Sam’s believing \textit{on those elements}. See Audi, 1993, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{23} S’s belief is psychologically direct if and only if S’s phenomenological experience of the belief does not entail that the belief is causally or justificationally dependent on other beliefs.

\textsuperscript{24} “[T]here is no apparent alternative to the reliance on immediate, non-discursive insights of some sort as long as any sort of reasoning or thinking that goes beyond the bounds of direct observation is to be countenanced” (BonJour, 1998, p. 133).
phenotypically identical), Edward and Tom, are born at the same time to separate sets of parents: Edward is the son to the King and Queen of England; Tom is the son of paupers. Edward and Tom are accidentally switched at birth. Everyone believes that Edward is a pauper and Tom is Heir to the Throne of England since their relations to their parents (i.e., their source), which describe the necessary conditions for their statuses, are mistaken for one another’s. The fact of the matter is that Edward is Heir to the Throne of England and Tom is not. The ground of Edward’s status for becoming King is the activity of his source, i.e., his father and mother being King and Queen of England. Tom is merely a doppelganger. We can evidence this by the fact that if their real parents (i.e., sources/grounds) are discovered, we will reject Tom and accept Edward as the legitimate Heir to the Throne. Now, say that Sam sees Edward and Tom together. Sam forms the belief that the Heir to the Throne has a doppelganger. Since there can be only one (immediate) Heir to the Throne, Sam cannot reasonably judge that when he is looking at Edward, she is looking at the Heir. Moreover, neither can Sam judge that when she is looking at Tom, she is not looking at the Heir. The existence of the doppelganger and the inability to know which the son of the King and Queen is makes this impossible. Analogously, Sam’s believing that a belief has two indistinguishable epistemic grounds (i.e., a structurally inferential belief that Sam can alternatively hold intuitively) makes it the case that even if Sam holds the belief intuitively, Sam cannot be sure that the belief in question is really non-inferentially justified. Sam’s justification is undercut by the possibility. That is not to say that Sam’s belief is not justified, not justifiable, or unjustified. Sam merely doesn’t have epistemic access to its non-inferential justification for foundations of her structure of inferentially justified beliefs.

Let’s consider some plausible responses that the self-evidentialists can use to recover intuited beliefs ability to confer foundation justification.

3. Objections

Audi’s MEPF presupposes some plausible responses to the Undercutting Argument. I consider arguments one might pose in attempts to recover Sam’s ability to use intuited beliefs in foundational roles in her structure of inferentially justified beliefs. However, none turn out to be entirely satisfactory.

One might pose an objection to the Undercutting Argument by pointing out that
Sam’s seemingly intuited beliefs are *prima facie* justified. Audi articulates this principle in regard to MEPF that would support this view.

**(P1)** For any occurrent mental state \( m \), if \( S \) believes, non-inferentially and attentively, that \( S \) is in \( m \), then this belief is *prima facie* justified. (Audi, 1993, p. 307)

Furthermore, Audi thinks that \( S \) is still *prima facie* justified even if \( S \)'s belief is false or based on some other belief. Hence, Sam’s seemingly intuited belief is justified whether or not it is an actual intuited belief. *Prima facie* justification is the kind justification one has when one believes that \( p \). That is, Sam is *prima facie* justified in regard to her intuition that \( p \) whether or not she has evidence that not-\( p \). However, I've set up the case so that Sam also believes that any intuited belief that \( p \) might alternatively be a psychologically direct belief with inferential grounding in one or more of Sam’s other belief. The fact that Sam also believes this undercuts her *prima facie* justification. That is, it provides a primary defeater for any intuitional justification.

One might suggest that the requirement that Sam justifiedly believe her seemingly intuited belief is too strong because propositional justification is sufficient for Sam’s intuited belief conferring foundational justification on other of Sam’s beliefs. Moreover, there are other routes to non-inferential justification that are countenanced by MEPF that Sam can take advantage of. However, one will notice that I haven’t argued as much. Sam needn’t justifiedly believe that she is justified. Self-evident beliefs are justified in virtue of their content. Sam can reflect on that content and determine that the belief is self-evident. Rather, I’ve argued that Sam must be justified in using the belief in foundational roles of justification in light of a certain belief. In order to play foundational roles, beliefs with self-evident content must be non-inferentially justified. That is, I did not argue that Sam must have justification for thinking that such beliefs are justified non-inferentially. Rather, I argued that Sam must be justified in thinking that they are actually justified in the

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25 Here is a slightly stronger version of P1 that Audi doesn’t seem to hold, although I think it’s closer to what he is try get with P1.

\[ \text{(P1*)} \] S's occurrent belief that \( p \) is *prima facie* justified if \( S \) has some positive reason to believe that \( p \). S's reason to believe that \( p \) is that S's belief that \( p \) is occurrent; hence, S can't but believe that \( p \) (in that occurrent state).

26 Elucidating P1, Audi writes, “Should P1 stipulate that \( m \)'s occurring is the basis of S's belief, since a brain manipulator could perhaps install a false, groundless belief that one is, e.g., reasoning? I leave this open and assume that S's belief would still be *prima facie* justified.” (Audi, 1993, p. 307)
appropriate way. Being justified in the appropriate way entails that Sam’s intuited belief is actually grounded in the activity of reason and non-inferentially justified. Propositional justification fails to meet this criterion. Recall that above I offered the distinction that if Sam justifiedly believes that \( p \), Sam is doxastically justified and if Sam merely justifiably believes that \( p \), Sam is propositionally justified. Audi offers a notion of justification that falls somewhere between the two. It is possible that Sam has “situational justification.”

\[(SJ)\] S has situational justification for believing that \( p \), if S has good grounds for believing that \( p \).

In Audi’s words, "the presence in one's epistemic situation of a justifying ground for \( p \)" - even if Sam doesn’t believe that \( p \) on the basis of those grounds (Audi, 1993, p. 275). Since situational justification doesn’t require that one actually hold the belief in question to be justified, so perhaps it is best characterised as propositional justification. That is, if Sam justifiably believes that \( p \), then \( p \) is justified and \( p \) may be justified for Sam without Sam believing that \( p \). That is, situational justification is a sort of propositional justification wherein a proposition being justified is dependent on some facet of an agent’s epistemic repertoire. Given Audi’s conception of sources of justification, it is necessary for any foundational intuited belief that Sam’s justification for the belief does not epistemically depend on other beliefs. That is, \( p \) must be appropriately justified for Sam. Hence, one defending Audi’s view might point out that situational justification is sufficient for Sam’s justifiably believing that \( p \) since Sam has appropriate grounds for believing that \( p \) — i.e., non-inferential grounds — even though Sam’s belief with self-evident content is justified inferentially. For example, Sam has situational non-inferential justification that all first cousins share a common grandparent even if Sam justifiably believes it on the grounds of other beliefs.

Sam is in the situation such that she needs only to reflect on the content of the proposition to see and understand that it is true. Situational justification is a sort of propositional justification that falls within the purview of the agent. Hence, one might have license to say that Sam justifiably believes self-evident beliefs non-inferentially even though Sam also justifiably believes inferentially. Given that Sam has the ability to understand the proposition self-evidently, Sam is situationally justified regardless of whether Sam also justifiably believes on the basis of inference from other justified beliefs.
However, situational justification fails to be appropriately grounded. Although situational justification is non-inferential, it does not occur as an activity of reason, nor is it Sam’s actual justification for believing that \( p \). Some other (potential) grounds play the sustaining role for \( p \)'s being justified in Sam’s set of justified beliefs. If Sam were to reflect on what justifies her belief, she would cite other of her justified beliefs instead of its self-evident content. So, situational justification does not provide respite for the self-evidentialist.

Perhaps the tension here is indicative of a conflict of intuitions about what sort of justification can be operative in foundational roles. However, in order to maintain the psychological accuracy of MEPF, the actual grounds for one’s justification must be the operative grounds of reason, which eliminates that propositional justification is sufficient for foundational beliefs. Sam’s actual justification for her belief is what is relevant in her structure of inferentially justified beliefs. This line of criticism can be turned over again. The objector can return by arguing that MEPF is consistent with reliabilism. Foundational intuited beliefs can be justified in virtue of being the product of reliable belief-forming processes. Audi writes, “A reliabilist’s terminal beliefs may surely be foundationalist’s nonderivatively but defeasibly justified beliefs” (Audi, 1993, p. 112). Two forms of reliabilism to consider are reliabilism that requires second-order beliefs about the reliability of reliable belief-forming processes, and basic reliabilism, whereby the fact that one’s beliefs are reliably produced is sufficient for their being justified – roughly, internalist and externalist construals of reliable justification. The internalist construal requires that one have a further justified belief, it doesn’t constitute foundational justification. The externalist construal is a more plausible suggestion. Accordingly, intuited beliefs are the product of reliable belief-forming processes and that the process is reliable is sufficient to provide justification. Hence, Sam is justified without appealing to any other of an agent’s beliefs. However, on this mode of conferring justification we get a different picture of how intuited beliefs are conferred justification. Rather than justification conferred in virtue of self-evident content, justification is conferred in virtue of being the product of a reliable process. As such, intuited beliefs fail to be the sort of intuitions that are characteristic of self-evidence theories of intuition. While intuited belief would be grounded in the activity of reason, i.e., a reliable belief-forming process, Sam is unaware of that process. One response on my part would be to extend the Undercutting Argument to cover reliably produced intuitional beliefs. That is, the belief that psychologically direct beliefs are justified in ways characteristic of self-evident beliefs - or
inferentially justified by other beliefs - provides an undercutting defeater for Sam’s justification, even if it is reliably produced. However, this kind of response doesn’t cover the sort of justification that reliabilism is able to confer. (Basic) Reliabilism confers non-inferential justification on belief in virtue of the beliefs being a product of a reliable belief-forming process. No other of Sam’s beliefs confers justification on the reliably produced belief. It’s consistent with reliabilist non-inferential justification that the reliable belief-forming process involves epistemic inference from other of Sam’s beliefs, since the relevant justification is conferred by the fact that the process is reliable, not by any epistemic inference that is part thereof. So, on the reliabilist view, it matters not whether Sam’s belief is self-evidently justified in virtue of Sam’s understanding of its content or on the basis of other of Sam’s inferentially justified beliefs.

However, suppose that Sam has the belief, T, which has self-evident content, has intuitional phenomenology, and is the product of a reliable belief-forming process. The Undercutting Argument provides a defeater for Sam’s using beliefs with intuitional phenomenology in foundational roles, even if Sam’s actual grounds for justifiedly believing are the beliefs’ content. However, the question at hand is whether the undercutting defeater undermines justification that comes via the fact that the belief is the product of a reliable belief-forming process. I don’t think it does - at least not on the justificatory framework of MEPF. Such beliefs can be foundational in Sam’s structure of inferentially justified beliefs. However, the non-inferential type of justification that is operative is not intuitional justification that is characteristic of self-evidence theories of intuition. Rather, the type of justification required takes its epistemic prowess from reliabilism. I return to reliabilist intuitional justification in a later chapter. At present, for Audi’s self-evidence theory of intuition we find that self-evident content of a belief turns out to be insufficient to provide foundational grounds for inferentially justified superstructure beliefs. Hence, we are able to undermine some of the motivation for suggesting that the self-evidence theory of intuition is necessary to fill in the theoretical role in rationalist foundational justification. Note that this shouldn’t worry epistemologists too much since there are a number of other available foundational grounds for justification. I’ve merely attempted to show that self-evidence theories of intuitions don’t play very well the role that they have been intended for.

Returning to a point mentioned at the outset of this chapter, I’ll take these final few paragraphs of this section to separate the Undercutting Argument from certain forms
of Cartesian scepticism. Cartesian sceptical arguments, in essence, holds that if there exists a reason to doubt that \( p \), then one does not have knowledge that \( p \). A sceptic about justification extends knowledge skepticism to justification whereby if one has sufficient enough reason to doubt that \( p \), then one is not justified in believing that \( p \). This view makes more sense if one takes the position that there are threshold levels for justifiedly believing. On the threshold view, one might have (\textit{prima facie}) reasons to believe that \( p \) but lack sufficient justification to believe that \( p \) because there are reasons undermining that justification that renders one’s total (\textit{ultima facie}) justification insufficient. Let’s assume that justification comes in degrees and one’s justifiedly believing requires that one have sufficient, or threshold, justification. After all, plausible arguments for scepticism about justification seem to imply that justification is graduated.

We should consider whether one’s justification to for intuitional belief is the sort of justification that can fall short of threshold justification. I argue that there are no intuional beliefs that fall below the threshold justification. Certainly, some intuitions seem stronger or more certain than others. That is, I may have a deeper understanding or better grasp of one self-evident proposition than another. Intuitions we understand clearly seem to have greater epistemic efficacy than those that we just barely understand (though, that understanding is the basis of our justification for believing). However, every intuition whose justification is based on that understanding, i.e., in virtue of the propositions self-evidence, is non-inferentially justified and thus sufficient for foundational justification in one’s structure of justified beliefs (prior coming into contact with the Undercutting Argument). Any justification that is not non-inferential is not intuitional. Hence, there are no intuited beliefs that fall below threshold justification (i.e., non-inferentiality). Such beliefs are simply not intuitional. Ergo, a view that justification comes in degrees may hold for belief generally, but the threshold in the case of intuited beliefs is between being adequately justified and being less than adequately justified, which is the same as between being intuional and not. This is consistent with the Undercutting Argument, which holds that one's intuitionally justified beliefs, even if justified in the right sorts of way (i.e., non-inferentially), ought not to be used as foundational justifiers in the structure of one's justified beliefs since one is not able to differentiate actually and merely seemingly intuitionally justified beliefs. The upshot for the sceptic about intuional justification is that arguments regarding the in adequacy of intuional justification are arguments whereby the upshot is that such inadequately justified intuional beliefs are in fact not intuional.
With the preceding consideration in hand, we can consider whether the Undercutting Argument a version of Cartesian skepticism. One version of Cartesian scepticism would aim at showing that even if one’s seemingly intuited beliefs are defeasible in regard to whether they are actually intuitional beliefs, such beliefs are never first-order justified. However, this is not the case in regard to the Undercutting Argument. Intuited beliefs in non-foundational roles are not subjects of the argument. So, I've made not made an extended claim about the justification of intuitional superstructure beliefs. The Undercutting Argument shows why it is prudent for an epistemically conscientious agent to not rest superstructure beliefs on intuited beliefs. The Undercutting Argument fails to be sufficiently global to indict all justification for any intuitional belief.

Nevertheless, one might wonder whether the Undercutting Argument is an even weaker version of cartesian scepticism?

Audi argues that,

Since foundationalism countenances direct justification, I can be justified in believing $p$ without having one or more further beliefs expressing premises that provide me with an inferential justification for believing it; hence, second-order justification (at least of the most common, inferential kind) is not required for first-order justification, and – a point critical for rebutting skepticism – I can have justification for believing $p$ even if I cannot bring forward premises or grounds to show that I have it. (Audi, 1993, p. 363)

One might try to point out that the Undercutting Argument undermines Audi’s ‘critical point for rebutting scepticism’ and, therefore, is a sceptical argument against foundational justification. Like Cartesian sceptics, I introduce an undefeated defeater regarding the phenomena of intuitional beliefs being indistinguishable from the phenomena of seemingly intuited beliefs. Hence, one’s confidence in whether one’s seemingly intuited beliefs are actually intuited beliefs is undermined when they are aware of the undercutting defeater. The effect is that the rational agent ought to not rely on seemingly intuited beliefs as foundational justifiers; or, as I put it, they are ‘cut-off from the epistemic benefit of intuitional foundational justifiers’. However, I haven’t argued that one can’t be justified at all about foundational justifiers. I haven’t made any claim about other sources of foundational justification (e.g., visual perception). Moreover, one can have second-order justification about whether a proposition’s contents are the sorts of content that can be understood self-evidently – ergo, one could come be justified believing them on the basis of their content alone. So, the Undercutting Argument is not a sceptical argument about
justification generally. However, is the Undercutting Argument a sceptical argument against intuitional justification? Perhaps this is the case, but only for intuited beliefs that are intended for foundational roles since superstructure intuitions can be buttressed by second-order justifiers. It follows that if the Undercutting Argument is a sceptical argument it is a sceptical argument against foundational justification for intuited beliefs.

Notice, however, that I left open as to whether seemingly intuited beliefs were actually intuited beliefs in the relevant instances, i.e., it's at least an open question. Moreover, any rational agent that is not aware of the defeater would have no reason to exclude intuitions for their foundational justifiers. Such an agent would not be maximally rational, falling short of an ideal rational agent but may be a common occurrence nonetheless.

I'll mention a related issue regarding the internalism/externalism distinction in justifiers to scepticism. That is, it's one thing to be sceptical about one's beliefs about the external world, and it's another thing to be sceptical about one's beliefs about one's self. Internalists and externalists disagree over the accessibility of the justifiers for one's beliefs. Internalists generally hold that justifiers are consciously accessible reasons to believe. For example, one is justified believing that there is desk in front of them because they have a perceptual experience of there being a desk in front of them, and they can consciously access that perceptual experience. In contrast, externalists generally hold that one is justified believing that there is a desk in front of them only if there is a desk in front of them. Notice that the Undercutting Argument merely corners the internalist. An externalist might formulate his or her general justificatory principle in this way: one is justified believing that there is a desk in front of them only if in some relevantly close possible world there is a desk in front of them. Hence, even if one has no desk in front of them, one may be justified in believing that there is a desk in front of them if in some relevantly close possible world there is a desk there. Bealer (2000) offers a similar formulation for intuitions modal justification that I deal with in a later chapter. So, if the Undercutting Argument is a sceptical argument, it's not an attractive form of scepticism to defend. That is, one caricature of the Undercutting Argument is that one's intuitional beliefs are not justified in the presence of the conclusion of the Undercutting Argument, i.e., a defeater. However, I haven't undermined that every seemingly intuited beliefs (which are either inferentially or non-inferentially justified) are actually intuited beliefs (which are non-inferentially justified). Rather, I've argued for a normative conclusion that calls for
epistemetic conservatism in the foundations of justification. I think that this is a tenable position to hold; and, one that, at least, puts one at loggerheads with liberal foundationalists such as BonJour and Audi. Moreover, the argument reports a different conclusion than the Cartesian sceptic. That is, I haven’t argued that a certain mode of justification is undermined because one has reason to doubt that one is justified. Rather, precisely speaking, I’ve argued that one’s justification is undercut (i.e., one is cut off from positive epistemic features of non-inferential justification) since one has reason to doubt that justification in any particular instance is non-inferential. The Cartesian sceptic argues that one’s reason to doubt that one is justified in being justified in a particular way is sufficient to preclude that one is justified in that particular way. On the one hand, one’s belief that $p$ is possibly justified but one is cut off from the epistemic benefits of that justification. On the other hand, one’s belief is not justified because one has reasons that preclude one’s belief being justified.

Hence, the Undercutting Argument does not terminate at a sceptical conclusion. I grant that second-order justification is an indicator of that one can be non-inferentially justified in believing a particular proposition, but this does not resolve that one is non-inferentially justified in any relevant instance.

4. Summary

I have argued that by believing that beliefs with intuitional phenomenology can be justified inferentially one cannot use intuited beliefs to play foundational roles of justifying superstructure beliefs on Moderate Epistemic Psychological Foundationalism. The non-inferential character of intuited beliefs is indeterminate from the practical perspective. Intuited beliefs are phenomenologically indistinguishable from immediate beliefs that epistemically depend on other beliefs. Some phenomenologically immediate beliefs are structurally inferential – they are grounded in some other belief(s). The belief is structurally inferential because Sam, though unaware, infers the belief from at least one other belief on which the belief in question epistemically depends - in cases of episodically inferential beliefs, Sam’s justification is conferred by some other belief(s) unconsciously (or sub-consciously). Hence, in the face of believing that seemingly intuited beliefs can be justified on the basis of another belief, Sam cannot reasonably believe that the belief in question is appropriately grounded. Thus, one might say that Sam ought to reject intuited
beliefs on principle. Intuited beliefs are psychologically independent; their non-discursivity makes it an open question whether they are structurally inferential or properly non-inferential. Sam has no adequate means for evaluating their epistemic status.

The upshot of my objection is that Sam is unable to justify (to anyone) that any particular intuited belief is appropriately grounded. It is an open question as to whether an intuited belief is appropriately foundationally justified. Thus, intuited beliefs will be ineffective for foundationalists attempting to avoid epistemic regress arguments.

In the next chapter, I present and criticise standard armchair methods that philosophers use to construe various preferred theories of intuition. My aim is to sketch these methods to elucidate the manifold \textit{a priori} approaches to intuition fail to be able to render a ubiquitous or best account amongst the available theories of intuition available in the extant literature.
Chapter 3

In this chapter, I sketch philosophers’ attempt to characterise intuitions from the armchair and some of problems that those attempts engender. For the purpose of argument, I propose that we understand the contemporary literature on philosophical intuitions as subscribing to the following sort of view, which I call the Guiding Intuition:

\[(\text{GI})\quad \text{If it were the case that there is a correct theory of philosophical intuition, then there is one and only one correct theory of philosophical intuition.}\]

One is unlikely to find anywhere in the literature where anyone explicitly argues for (GI). However, (GI) is strongly implied, for example, in Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) objection to Williamson (2007) formulation of philosophical intuition, and Williamson’s rejoinder (2009). Each argues that their preferred theory is the better. We can highlight similar tension in Grundmann’s (2007) objections to Sosa’s (1998) dispositional theory of intuition; and, noting the inconsistencies amongst self-evidence, seemings, and judgment theories of intuition, a rather inelegant solution to saying what philosophical intuitions are is to accept that more than one of these theories is correct.\(^1\) Furthermore, pressure by intuition objectors seems to require that intuition theorists decide amongst the differing accounts. So, even if (GI) or something like it hasn’t been explicitly argued for, it seems to be a prevalently, implicitly and systematically endorsed, underlying premise in the literature on philosophical intuitions.\(^2\)

\(^1\) I agree that at first glance there is no practical impediment to philosopher’s invoking different theories of philosophical intuitions – perhaps different theories will range over different domains. For example, compare intuitions in epistemology and moral intuitions. Moral intuitions seem to have an emotional component that epistemic intuitions lack. This difference may be indicative of a substantial difference in the underlying cognitive processes or how intuitive deliverances garner conviction.

\(^2\) I merely point out that these facts provide evidence that (GI) is latent in arguments for philosophers’ respective preferred theories of intuition.
We should be interested in a correct theory of philosophical intuitions because what philosophical intuitions are is directly relevant to what philosophical intuitions can properly be put to do in philosophical methods. However, the available theories of intuition in the extant philosophical literature are theories construed from the armchair. I follow the convention of calling a priori methods armchair methods. Furthermore, armchair methods are (roughly) the standard methods of philosophy, although here our concern is with the standard approaches to the characterisation of philosophical intuitions. Standard philosophical approaches to the analysis of philosophical intuition utilise four armchair methods: the approach by phenomena, the approach by mention, the approach by method, and the approach by theory. Here are rough characterisations of each approach.

**Phenomena approach:** Philosophical intuitions are what they ‘seem’ to be. On the basis of intuitional phenomena we can discriminate intuitions from other sorts of intellections, define their scope and define their nature.

**Approach by mention:** By surveying the various construal of philosophical intuition in the literature, one can discern the core characteristics of intuition, which are represented by the commonalities the share.

**Approach by method:** Philosophical intuitions are whatever philosophers appeal to when offering evidence derived from the consideration of hypothetical cases.

**Approach by theory:** A dialectical approach, philosophical intuitions are construed under the theoretical constraints of the dialectic between the intuition theorists and intuition objector.

I argue that these standard approaches, because they are prone to error and are unable to

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3 My concern in these chapters is centrally with a priori methods and approaches to a theory of philosophical intuition. There is a literature in empirical psychology, for example, that regards intuitions generally. I’m sympathetic to this approach and have elsewhere attempted to synthesise the philosophical notions of intuition with theories of intuition available in the psychology literature. There is at least evidence that philosophy and psychology have the same target of inquiry when exploring what intuitions are (Kuntz, 2007). I have also attempt to synthesise a model of moral intuition from various theories and finding in the psychology literature (Kuntz, manuscript). However, since philosophers tend to largely ignore this literature – sometimes for good reasons since much of it is contended – my focus on armchair methods is consistent with the ways that philosopher argue for and construct their theories of intuition.

4 I grant that these may not exhaustive of ways intuitions are characterised. However, I think other criteria will falter in ways similar to those I present below.
resolve which of the various and competing accounts of philosophical intuitions is the best, do not suffice for the task of saying what philosophical intuitions are.

Getting clear on the approaches that philosophers enact to characterise philosophical intuitions and how philosophers tend to argue for their preferred theories, allows one to point out difficulties each approach encounters. For example, I expand on the issue of relying on intuitional phenomenology, which was a focal aspect of the Undercutting Argument in the previous chapter. I argued there that, from the practical perspective, one cannot distinguish between non-inferentially justified intuited beliefs and psychologically immediate, inferentially justified beliefs. I argue here that from the perspective of method, relying on intuitional phenomena as a constraint for what counts as an intuition is a highly suspect way of discriminating intuitions from similar kinds of intellactions.

The approach by method characterises philosophical intuitions by what they do. The result is a ubiquitous account of intuition as whatever it is that philosophers rely on when they offer as evidence yielded from the consideration of hypothetical cases. I take up a more sustained objection to the approach by method in the next chapter. (Claims that the approach by method is a successful route to characterizing intuitions are based on empirical observations about philosophical practice. So, I test those claims empirically by surveying philosophers about their conceptions of intuition-use and their conception of what intuitions are.) In the present chapter, I merely suggest some constraints on the approach generally. On the approach by mention, one attempts to extract common characteristics from accounts of intuitions available in the relevant literature. However, given the disparity of the accounts available in the extant literature, the approach by mention fails to be able to distill a single ubiquitous account. More hopeful results lay in the approach by theory. The approach by theory is dialectical in the sense that the intuition-theorists’ argument is an analogue of a theory an intuition-objector would not want to give up. The idea is that the resulting theory of intuition makes no theoretical commitments that the intuition objector can reasonably object to.

The upshot of these various methods is a set of theories of philosophical intuition that is riddled with inconsistencies amongst competing accounts. Self-evidence theories of intuition rely on the content of the intuited proposition (Audi, 1999, 2003, 2004; Bonjour, 1998, 2000). Intellectual seemings theories of intuition rely on the (modal) reliability of intuitions (Bealer, 1998, 2000; Pust, 2000). That is, S’s intuition that p is modally reliable if
someone in a nearby world that determinately possesses the relevant concepts that entail the truth of S’s intuited proposition, \( p \), and S has the intellectual seeming state that \( p \). Judgment theories of intuition rely on the normalcy and reliability of making judgments with modal content. Defenders of the judgment view make appeal to the reliability of judgments generally. Inclination-to-believe views of intuition (Sosa 1998; Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, 2009b; cf. Goldman & Pust, 2002) are types of judgment theories of intuition. Intellectual capacity theories of intuition rely on specific intellectual abilities or virtues in finite domains of expertise (Sosa, 2007; cf. Gobet & Chassy, 2009). It is not at all clear which is the correct theory; each has their benefits and burdens regarding the explanation of what philosophers do when they use hypothetical cases to support claims.

Having sketched the various ways of laying out conceptions of philosophical intuitions, I turn to argue that standard armchair ways that philosophers use to approach philosophical intuition are methodologically ill-fated. I call this the Out-competition Argument. I argue that there is no good *a priori* argument that one theory of philosophical intuition is the best of its competitors. Such arguments are encumbered by epistemic vices. Namely, they are committed either to begging the question about the nature of intuition, appealing to an epistemic regress of arguments concerning the correct theory of intuition, or appealing to an epistemically circular argument wherein one takes a premise that the theory of intuition to be justified is already justified or true.

By arguing that standard methods to intuition are epistemically unsatisfying, I aim to make room for a more plausible and alternative method for arguing for intuition. In the closing section, I attempt a reconciliatory *a priori* approach to a theory of philosophical intuition. However, the results are middling and uninspiring. I consider and ultimately argue for my own position in the final chapter. On my view, philosophical intuitions are of two sorts: intuitions of discovery (or innovation) and intuitions of justification. The focus of philosophers on the later type overlooks the centrality of the former, and their methodological contribution to the justification of theories of the justificatory intuitions.

In the next section, I give a brief sketch of general approaches that philosophers take to characterise philosophical intuitions. I then turn to elaborate each approach and point out methodological difficulties that each engenders. I then turn to show that there is no way from the armchair to reasonably adjudicate between theories of intuition.
1. A Priori Approaches to Intuition

In this section, armchair approaches to philosophical intuition are described, and some limitations are sketched.5

1.1. Approach by Phenomena

The principal mode of characterizing intuitions identifies correspondence between a unique kind of intellectual event and a certain type of first-person phenomenal experience. Call this the “approach by phenomena,” or “phenomena approach.” The Undercutting Argument in the previous chapter turns in part on the ambiguity engendered by relying on intuitional phenomena. The phenomena in question involve some sort of epistemic relevance, e.g., as ‘a feeling of knowing’, as ‘a seeming of necessity’ or as ‘an epistemic attraction/pull’. The unsurprising and frequently drawn conclusion is that intuitions are intellectual goings-on that apparently correlate with concurrent and occurrent intuitional phenomena. Since the previous chapter aims at undermining self-evidentialists’ appeal to intuitional phenomena, I focus here on seemingsists’ appeals to intuitional phenomena.

In the introductory section of Pust (2000), he writes, “Much of what follows involves a kind of phenomenological analysis […] I am […] trying to determine what ‘having an intuition that p’ involves from a first-person point of view” (Pust, 2000, p. 31). His approach is unabashedly based on first-person reports of the intuitional phenomena.

I assume that my readers […] will, reflecting on their own mental lives, share most of my judgments about the phenomenology of intuition. I see no way to make any progress toward understanding intuitions without utilizing such a methodology. (Pust, 2000, p. 31)

5 I have tried to give textual support from the relevant literature to avoid being overly serendipitous in my characterisation of the ways philosophers get to the notion of intuitions. However, I should like to be clear about how unambitious this ‘approach section’ of the thesis is and why it is necessary for the main argument in the Out-Competition Argument (below). I am not arguing that because philosophers use these various methods to define, characterise, and/or give an analysis of intuitions that the notions of intuitions thereby rendered are unequivocally undermined. Rather, I have included this introduction the Out-Competition Argument to hedge objections that I have pigeonholed philosophers’ ways of getting clear on intuitions. These standard approaches go to show that philosophers sit firmly in their armchairs when characterising intuitions.
However, we should question to what extent judgments regarding the phenomenology of philosophical intuition should play in ‘making progress’. I grant that the phenomena approach is quintessential to any argument concerning intuitions. There must, after all, be some prefatory way of ostensively identifying philosophical intuitions. Even if identifying is by way of stipulation, one must convey that stipulation via a communicable idea of the relevant analysandum. It is unobjectionable to use the phenomena approach for prefatory identification. However, the approach by phenomena is also used as a method for the specification and discrimination of intuitions from non-intuitions. Adherents use intuitional phenomena as constraints on theories of philosophical intuitions. It is this latter aspect of the approach that I object. The approach is heavily implemented in, e.g., both Pust’s and Bealer’s arguments for their respective intellectual seemings theories of intuitions. Pust continues the above cited passage, “I make free appeal to how things seem to me when I have intuitions of various kinds and I expect that the accuracy of an account can be tested by appeal to such data” (Pust, 2000, p. 31).

Critically, Pust argues that merely on the basis of one’s first-person experience of intuiting, one eliminates that intuitions cannot be hunches or be guesses (Pust, 2000, p. 34). The evidence that Pust offers for the distinction is “the intuitive peculiarity of calling one’s Gettier intuition or logical intuition 'a guess' or 'a hunch’” (Pust, 2000, p. 34 - emphasis added). Pust indicates that readers are expected to reflect on their own Getter intuitions as (intuitive) evidence for this distinction.

Consider another example of the approach by phenomena. Bealer (2000) argues that rational, or a priori, intuitions are basic evidential sources for belief. According to this view, intuitions are intellectual seeming states that are distinct from beliefs. Bealer writes,

[W]hen you first consider one of de Morgan’s laws, often it neither seems to be true nor seems to be false; after a moment’s reflection, however, something new happens: suddenly it just seems true. […] Of course, this kind of seeming is intellectual, not sensory or introspective (or imaginative). For this reason, intuitions are counted as “data of reason” not “data of experience.” (Bealer, 2000, p. 30)

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6 Sosa touches on this same sort of point: “ostensible intuition is like ostensible perception: the qualifier serves to cancel the success implication; what remains is mostly the phenomenology. In what follows we focus on the phenomenology, and ‘intuition’ will be short for ‘ostensible intuition’” (Sosa, 1996, p. 51).
Likewise, a further distinction is made regarding the scope of the types of intuitions in question. Bealer wants to be certain that his reader understands that he is concerned with “rational intuition,” and not “physical intuition” (Bealer, 2000, p. 30). In order to make the distinction, he once again appeals to phenomena:

[I]t does not seem that a house undermined must fall; plainly, it is possible for a house undermined to remain in its original position or, indeed, to rise up. By contrast, when we have a rational intuition, say, that if $P$ then not not $P$, this presents itself as necessary: it seems that things could not be otherwise; it must be that if $P$ then not not $P$. (Bealer, 2000, p. 30)

Bealer gives no argument for either distinction other than appealing to readers' own intuitions. One must surmise that he is relying on the phenomena as the mark of distinction between necessity seemings and possibility seemings. What distinguishes necessity seemings from possibility seemings is that the phenomena of necessary seemings are seeming necessities, while possibility seemings are not. On the one hand are intellectual seemings qua phenomena of necessity; on the other hand is the seeming necessity of intellectual seeming qua phenomena of necessity. The latter are intuitions about intuitions. The essentiality of the necessity of intellectual seemings (qua intuition) is itself the object of intuition. That is, one takes as intuitional object the seeming necessity of one’s intuitions. Or, it’s intuitively necessary that (rational) intuitions have the property of seeming necessary. If this sounds a bit wonky, it should. The seeming necessity of intellectual seemings (qua intuition) is substantiated as characteristic of intuition if when one assesses the content of one’s intuition it seems necessary. Roughly put: that intuitions have the property of purely intellectual seemings of necessity necessarily is itself an intuitive deliverance. However, let’s set this worry to the side for the moment so that we might allow Bealer the opportunity to buttress the phenomena of intuition in some other way that doesn’t include our intuitions about our intuitions.

Since Bealer’s argument depends on being able to distinguish intuitions from other kinds of intellectual states, he needs some sort of defence for a method of making the distinction. By way of defence, we find that Bealer appeals primarily to the
phenomena approach. He writes, “phenomenological considerations make it clear that intuitions are likewise distinct from judgments, guesses, hunches, and common sense” (Bealer, 2000, p. 31).

This is the essence of the phenomena approach: first-person experience of intuitional phenomena delimits the theoretical characteristics of intuition, both in the context of a concept and in the context of a distinctive kind of intellection. We saw in the previous chapter that intuitional phenomenology can mislead one about the epistemic status of beliefs that seem intuited. I now move to present a more general argument that the phenomena approach fails to be a suitable method for characterising intuitions.

When Pust and Bealer appeal to intuitional phenomena to distinguish intuitions from hunches and from guesses, I take it that by doing so they are doing something more than ostensively identifying the target of further philosophical analysis. Rather, they attempt to place theoretical constrains on what intuitions are by what they seem to be. The seeming necessity of intellectual seemings is constitutive of their function as support for philosophical claims. As such, intuitions are not hunches and not guesses. Hunches (apparently) lack seeming necessity, as do guesses. That is, hunches do not evidence claims on the basis of seeming necessity, and nor do guesses. Guesses and hunches seem apparent, but they don't seem necessary. However, this may merely be a seemingsist construal of hunches. For example, Feigl (1958) defines a hunch as “a product of learning from past experience, which learning is not made explicit at the moment of the use of intuition.”

When for the sake of argument the alien visitors take up such a study. One savvy alien squishes over to a human and asks her, “What does your intuition appear to be to you?” She replies, in Bealerean fashion, “My intuition appears to be an intellectual seeming.” The alien says, “So intuitions are a particular type of seeming?” “Yes, that's right.” The human continues, “If you were human, you would understand the distinction.” Perhaps one should not be so concerned with aliens defining intuitions, as one should not be concerned about defining 'itch' to phenomenal zombies (Chalmers, 1996). Nevertheless, the alien objection highlights the centrality of intuitional phenomena to the characterisation of intuitions. (This objection is inspired by “Stipulation and Epistemological Privilege” by Tamara Horowitz. The paper is published posthumously, edited by Joseph L. Camp, Jr., in The Epistemology of A Priori Knowledge, Oxford University Press (2006), 138-152.)
And, he writes, “Intuition is a judgment based on the convergence and integration of former impressions or memories into a pattern of explanation or expectation in which perceptual details are not on the threshold of critical attention” (Feigl, 1958, p. 5). One is left to wonder how psychologically accurate the seemingsists’ distinction between intuitions, and hunches and guesses actually is.

Consider the following objection that attempts the dissolve the phenomenological discrimination of intuitions and guesses. This objection aims to show that intuitions and hunches can have the same phenomenological quality of seemingness. On this view, hunches distinguish from intuitions because there is some further fact that counts against the necessity of an intuition.

Here is the example. Consider two instances of the intuition that all bachelors are unmarried men. The first: Gary is a devout Christian. Gary has no gay relatives, openly gay acquaintances, or social or political contact with homosexuality. For Gary, to be male and unmarried is to be a bachelor. On Gary’s view, it seems necessary that all bachelors are unmarried men. The second: Sam has a gay uncle in a committed, long-term relationship. However, Sam’s uncle is unmarried because the political environment where he lives is anti-gay. Sam has the intuition that all bachelors are unmarried men. However, it doesn’t seem necessary to Sam that all bachelors are unmarried men. Sam wouldn’t say that all bachelors are unmarried because her uncle is unmarried but not a bachelor. In the face of her first hand experience of her uncle’s relationship, she may only count the intellectual seeming that all bachelors are unmarried men as a hunch or, perhaps even, a guess. She certainly holds it with less conviction of what the seemingsist would count as an intuition. Nevertheless, it is the sort of phenomenological seeming as Gary has when he considers the proposition. Hence, whether one’s intellectual seeming counts as an intuition or a hunch does not turn on it phenomenology of seeming necessary. Hunches can seem necessary or, at least, we can dissolve the ‘intuitive peculiarity’ of calling intuitions in these cases hunches.⁹

Even at its best, the phenomena approach only tells us what intuitions seem to be. Because intuitions are ostensibly not merely phenomena, e.g., they do things more than ‘seem’, e.g., they do epistemic work, phenomena alone cannot fill in the theory about

⁹ One might object that Sam doesn’t understand the concept of bachelor. However, we can fill out the case so that Sam uses “bachelor” correctly in a variety of contexts. It’s clear that she understands what bachelor means. Weatherson (2003) makes the point that one’s background beliefs correlate with the intuitions that one has.
what intuitions are. So, alone, the approach by phenomena does not provide substantial conclusions about the nature of intuitions. Furthermore, if one eliminates that hunches are not part of what one pretheoretically think of as intuitions, one restricts could properly be accommodate as intuitions in a theory of intuition. I turn now to a second mode of approach.

I have attempted to elucidate the issue regarding the relevance of intuitional phenomena for discriminating and saying what intuitions are. Particularly problematic is the intuitive evaluation that intuitions are seeming necessities. However, I don’t object to appealing to the phenomenology of intuitions in all cases. Phenomena can prefatorily identify what might be counted as intuitions.

### 1.2. Approach by Mention

A second standard approach to philosophical intuitions is to survey the literature for the available theories. The aim is to systemitise and to find consistencies amongst the various extant accounts. However, depending on the scope of the literature surveyed, accounts tend not to systemitise well. This may be in part due to what Lutz (2009) calls a “jumbled heritage of the contemporary uses of intuitions.” (p. 129). In Symons' (2008) etiological description of intuition, he observes that when the contemporary notion of intuition came on the scene with G.E. Moore, it was taken up in Kripke’s methods for analysis in linguistic philosophy. That is, G.E. Moore uses intuition to assess the use of ordinary language, while Kripke borrows the use of intuition, without redaction, to assess something closer to a theory of an ideal language (Lutz, 2009). The result is two distinctive forms of intuition that have become prevalent in the contemporary literature: as a commonsensical judgment and as an intellectual analogue of visual perception characterised by intellectual immediacy (Lutz, 2009). So, perhaps, it is not surprising that the notions of intuition available in the literature are discordant in the light of such divisive consequence of intuition’s etiology.

In the following, I sketch two attempts at the approach by mention and present some problematic entanglements. Namely, the approach by mention fails to result in a ubiquitous conception of intuition.

Wild (1938) draws out that intuition is a widely used notion, finding uses in religious, moral, and aesthetic discourse; and the realms of teleology and value, as well as
in central aspects the character of intellectual genius. Wild sketches characterisations of intuitions offered by Bergson, Spinoza, Croce, and Whitehead. The examination of these accounts aims at a better historical picture of intuitions' use in philosophical methodology, and provides an example of the approach at by mention.

A prefatory objection: One might find it difficult to conclude that surveying what philosophers say intuitions are and are not is a productive methodology because philosophers say intuitions are and are not a great many things, with little, if anything, tying together of all the epistemological underpinnings of various conceptions. For example, one must examine Bergson's notion of intuition with a cynical eye after reading, “By intuition is meant the kind of *intellectual sympathy* by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (Bergson, 1911).\(^{10}\) Alfred North Whitehead has a similar epistemical peculiarity when it comes to the truth of intuitions, which he sees as means of creating a future world of values. All intuitions for Whitehead are true and it is the task of the metaphysician to say how and why this is so (Wild, 1938, p. 86). It is also hard to reconcile Benedetto Croce's with the contemporary literature on intuitions. “[I]ntuition is for [Croce] the ‘expression of impressions’, i.e., the fundamental and first working of the spirit, the impressions themselves being mechanic and outside the realm of spirit” (Wild, 1938, p. 39). A closer cousin of the contemporary uses of intuition can be found in Spinoza, who saw intuition as providing the means of grasping the nature of a static world and static values.\(^{11}\) Intuitions make mathematical conclusions without stepwise calculation. Here is an example. “If one has the three numbers 1, 2 and 3 one may find intuitively that the fourth propositional is 6 (6 is to 3 as 2 is to 1)” (Fischbein 1987, p. 43). Intuitions are different from ideas arrived at by observation and from reasoning. However, it is intuition that delivers truth, and truth for Spinoza ultimately rests on God.\(^{12}\) However, this sort of epistemic grounding of intuitions is far abreast of many contemporary philosophers.


11 W.D. Ross evidences the relationship between moral intuitions and mathematical intuition. [General principles of duty] come to be self-evident to us just as mathematical axioms do. We find by experience that this couple of matches and that couple make four matches, that this couple of balls on a wire and that couple make four balls: and by reflection on these and similar discoveries we come to see that it is of the nature of two and two to make four. In a precisely similar way, we see the *prima facie* rightness of an act which would be the fulfillment of a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms, we apprehend *prima facie* rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfillment of a promise. (Ross, 1930/2002, p. 32-3)

12 This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the finite essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (*Ethics*, p. 67, *op. cit.* Wild, 1938).
The upshot of Wild’s survey is a summary of thirty-one dissonant descriptors. For example, Wild writes,

(3) Intuition is perception as distinct from sensation; that is, it involves the process of interpretation: not merely the sensation of burning, but the recognition of pain in a definite place. […]

(5) Intuition is feeling or emotion (as distinct from pain and pleasure), and so is a non-intellectual method of being aware, with the corresponding mental reaction to awareness; e.g. through love and the felt attraction to the beloved, or through distaste and the shrinking away from the offender we have an intuition of the beloved or the disliked object. […]

(6) Intuition is instinct on its mental side. It is a realization or knowledge of the suitable circumstance in which to act in a particular way. […]

(15) Intuition is ineradicable pragmatic belief, conscious or unconscious. Ineradicable, because without such belief the action, or even the life or the individual would cease to exist; pragmatic, because the belief need not be held theoretically at the time that it is held in action. […]

(21) Intuition is an appetite for new experience. It is a valuation of experience itself. […]

(26) Intuition is God immanent, and so gives us our sense of values, our imagination, our realization of reality as distinct from appearance, our past and future, our vision, our faith, our entrance into unity with a spiritual world. […]

(27) Intuition is a mental faculty which directs action, whether mental or physical, to a biological end through the subconscious mind. (Wild, 1938, pp. 211-217)

The display of inconsistency in the assessment of what intuition is followed by an attempt to systematise concise definition of intuition that unifies the dissimilar, sometimes bizarre, characteristic of intuition. Wild attempts to summarise,

We offer the two following definitions as reducing intuition to its lowest terms:

A. An intuition is an immediate awareness by a subject of some particular entity, without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account
B. Intuition is a method by which a subject becomes aware of an entity without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account for such awareness. (Wild, 1938, p. 226)

What should we take from Wild’s assessment of intuitions? Wild’s definition reflects the etiological differences elucidated by Lutz (2009). On the one hand, Wild describes intuition as an ‘immediate awareness’ and, on the other hand, as a ‘method’. Wild tries to capture what intuitions seem to be and the process by which becomes so aware, i.e., the intuited and the intuiting. Roughly, (A) corresponds with intellectual immediacy and (B) corresponds with judgment (i.e., a certain method of judgment).

I should comment on how it is not at all clear how Wild moves from her definitions and descriptions of the accounts of intuitions surveyed to the “lowest term” definition. It does seem plain that plenty has been left out after the boiling down to the final formulation of the definition. However, we might attribute this failing to a net cast too widely. Wild’s attempt tries to integrate conceptions of intuition in too many distant areas of philosophical discourse; each of which exercising its own unique language of use. It is far from surprising that consistency is hard to come by. What we do find is some consistency with Lutz’s (2009) observation.

I have attempted to show that the approach by mention has little promise of rendering an account of intuition that systematically captures the various notions of intuition surveyed into a usable conceptual artifice. Conclusions are rendered speculative because they fail to coherently systemitise the various notions of intuitions surveyed. Let’s turn to examine another example of the approach by mention.

Smythe and Evans (2007) present a more recent example of the approach by mention. They attempt to survey notions of conceptions of intuition is a specific domain, to give a rigorous account of intuitions about general moral principles. After surveying the various depictions of moral intuitions from which their account derives, we can

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13 Here ‘entity’ is intended to include ideas, facts, situations, and “any one individual particular whatever from a brick or the memory of a sound, to a society or the Absolute self” (Wild, 1938, p. 226).
14 The examples, Smythe and Evans (2007) provide are, “Some power of immediate perception of the human mind” (Price 1757); “A power of immediately seeing right and wrong” (Price 1757); “A judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of explicit reasoning process that a person can conceivably observe … The judgment flows spontaneously from the situations that engender them, rather than from any process of explicit reasoning” (Gopnik & Sevitzgebel 1998); “We come to recognize (the obligation)
summarise their view: a moral intuition involves a perception that is a spontaneous and mental conscious episode, which is non-inferential and immediate; a perceived obligation, and is an easily recognisable experience that carries a conviction (Smythe & Evans, 2007, p. 235). Here we find a more concise and consistent list of characteristics of intuition than in Wild (1938). But some doubt remains about what use such a summary explanation can play.

Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) and Weinberg (2007) have objected to this kind of approach. The objections have to do with the dialectic between defenders of intuitions in philosophical methods and their corresponding objectors. Weinberg (2007) points out that a construal of intuitions that takes into consideration all the various accounts of intuitions, “includes a rather large and motley class of cognitions” (Weinberg, 2007, p. 320). An ambiguity arises in the resulting characterisation that can be exploited by intuition defenders. That is, the approach by mention is not sufficiently fine-grained to give an account of the various types of intuition. This approach, like the approach by phenomena, has not pinned down anything particularly poignant that is useful in the context of the dialectic concerning the nature of intuitions. The picture rendered is not a well-crafted, ubiquitous notion of intuition; but a tattered, discontinuous picture of philosophers’ unsystematic definitions of intuition. The result is disparity in the various conceptions of the nature of intuition.

immediately or directly … this apprehension is immediate, in precisely the sense in which mathematical apprehension is immediate … the fact apprehended is self-evident” (Prichard 1912); “… getting face to face with a particular situation B, then directly apprehending the obligation to originate A in that situation” (Prichard 1912); “… what I have to do is study the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of the [duties] is more incumbent than another; I am bound to think that to do this is my prima facie sans phrase in the situation” (Ross 1930); “When you have an intuition that A, it seems to you that A … ‘seems’ is understood … as a term for a genuine cognitive episode … after a moment’s reflection, something happens; it now seems true” (Bealer 1998); “… when we have a ‘rational intuition’ … it presents itself as necessary: it does not seem that it could be otherwise …” (Bealer 1998); “… intuitions are some sort of spontaneous mental judgments” (Goldman and Pust 1998); “… when I contemplate doing this, I get an easily recognizable experience … the thought (even the conviction) that it would be wrong not to” (Hare 1997). (Op. cit. Smythe & Evans, 2007)

15 Although we are not here particularly concerned with the domain of moral intuitions, Smythe and Evans (2007) account is instructive for elucidating the method at hand.
16 For example, Smythe and Evans do not countenance the widely held view that moral intuition is a kind of judgment (cf. Lutz, 2009).
17 The reader with a keen eye will notice that the first chapter of this work relies on the approach by mention to distinguish self-evidentialist, seemingist, and judgment theories of intuition. One might object that the undermining of the approach by mention undermines the very method on which the present argument relies. In response to this type of objection, I point out that I haven’t used the approach to render a purportedly ubiquitous notion of intuition from the extant literature. Rather, I’ve used the approach to give a survey of the available accounts, and shown that those accounts are inconsistent in regard to what makes intuitions epistemically efficacious. Furthermore, as a point of method, it is useful
1.3. Approach by Method

The approach by method characterises intuitions by way of tracking intuitions’ use in philosophical methods. For example, Bealer writes, “It is truistic that intuitions are used as evidence (or reasons) in our standard justificatory practices” (Bealer, 2000, p. 30). This is the approach by method, which Bealer takes to substantiate and guide his overall characterisation. Bealer exemplifies the approach by method when he surveys the use of intuitions to substantiate his claim to their characterisation. In the next chapter, take up a more thoroughgoing objection to approach by method. I surveyed philosophers about the way conceive of intuition-use. The finding are interesting and significant, showing that the standard way of conceive of intuitions as justificatory is incomplete. My aim there is to undermine some of the assumptions that Weinberg (2007) and Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) make regarding the nature of intuition in philosophical methods; and, hence, the motivation for the approach by method in general. However, that argument motivates claims that are beyond the purview of this stage of the thesis. I ask the reader’s patience while I elucidate my criticisms of the standard ways of arguing for intuition before I move to make more positive contributions to the literature regarding how to successfully defend a theory of intuition. Presently, I offer a brief preliminary criticism of the approach by method.

Here I use Weinberg (2007) to exemplify the approach. He writes, “Instead of thinking in terms of a problem with something philosophers have – the intuitions themselves – I suggest that we turn our attention to something philosophers do” (Weinberg, 2007, p. 320). What philosophers do is cite whether or not a concept (intuitively) applies to a given (usually hypothetical) case, as such intuitions evidence philosophical claims. Weinberg labels this practice, “philosophers’ appeals to intuitions,” or PAI. Accordingly, the sort of evidence that intuition provides is defeasible. Intuitions can be faulty, wrong, or even perverse. Weinberg’s attempt to characterise his targeted domain of intuition relies centrally on tracking the intellections used as evidence on the evaluation of hypothetical cases. These intellections – i.e., philosophical intuition - provide evidence for philosophical claims and, in standard philosophical practice, do not to exegete the literature; however, it is unable to support more substantive claims about which is the correct theory of philosophical intuition.
themselves require any further support, a point only marginally uncontested.

The approach by method characterises intuitions in terms of their use, not their nature. In fact, the approach says almost nothing about intuitions are; it merely attempts a caricature of intuition in virtue of how and that philosophers tend to offer evidence in response to hypothetical cases. That is, intuitions are, essentially, what they do. Weinberg thinks that this is a positive feature of the approach since it is supposedly neutral in regards to individual differences amongst particular accounts of intuitions, avoiding the need for a specific target theory of intuitions.

However, the approach by method does not describe philosophical intuitions per se. One might object that this response misses the point of Weinberg’s approach. His approach allows something substantive to be said about philosophical intuitions without getting muddled in the details. Weinberg can point to philosophers’ appeals to intuitions without saying anything substantive about any particular account of intuition. On this view of philosophical intuitions, criticisms can be applied ubiquitously across accounts since philosophers can’t simply switch their theories of intuition for new ones. Any view that has it that intuitions are evidence for philosophical plain is implicated.

We should worry that Weinberg’s approach to defining the target of his objection (i.e., intuition-use) eliminates that some particular account of intuitions has the necessary epistemic support to do what philosophers intend it do in their standard practices. That is, this approach’s generalised, use-based characterisation of intuitions does not offer as an option that a satisfactory nuanced account is adequate. One line of criticism to pursue against Weinberg is to charge him with committing a fallacy of division. That is, one might argue that intuitions are reliable in some philosophical domains and not in others or that the intuitions of experts are more reliable that the intuitions of the folk. Thus, a method that lumps together intuitions without delimiting where they are more reliable and where they are less reliable rests would commit a kind of fallacy – namely, claiming that every theory of intuition is unreliable.

There is an underlying assumption to Weinberg’s approach, an assumption that underlies the approaches sketched thus far. That is, there is some one correct theory of philosophical intuitions that philosophers could appeal to justify their epistemic status of philosophical intuitions on hypothetical cases (GI). At this point in my argument, I want (GI) to remain intact. And, thus far, there I haven’t given a substantive reason to think otherwise. However, I criticise the approach by method in greater detail in the next
chapter. There I argue that Weinberg’s approach also fails to acknowledge the distinction between intuitions that are merely causally related to belief production (i.e., intuitions of discovery) and intuitions used as epistemic support (intuitions of justification). That is, I argue that the correct theory of intuition is one that acknowledges that some operative intuitions in philosophical methods are centrally important, but not as conveyors of epistemic status. Unfortunately, what Weinberg offers is a very sparsely detailed caricature, and it precludes that any theory of intuition is sufficiently nuanced to be immune to objections to intuitions’ reliability.

The upshot of the foregoing sketches of the approach by phenomena, the approach by mention, and the approach by method is that none is able to render a suitably unburdened idiosyncratic account of intuition. Rather, what has been produced in the literature are a number of inconsistent theories of intuition. Presently, let us continue to assume the status quo, e.g., there is one correct theory of philosophical intuitions, and that the literature is populated by a number of contenders that aim at satisfying (GI). In the next section, I argue that armchair approaches can’t mete out the best theory of intuition from amongst its competitors.

2. Out-competition Argument

Above I presented approaches philosophers use to manifest various notions of intuitions. However, these approaches do not resolve whether or which theory of intuitions outcompetes its competitors or whether a priori, or armchair, methods can give a fair final evaluation of philosophical intuition. I have not attempted to say which, if any, of the self-evidence theory, intellectual seemings theory, and judgment theory of intuitions is the best of the three. Here I address whether there is an evaluative method for adjudicating such a winner. I present such a method. Although, I argue that it, and other armchair methods like it, are unsuccessful at deciding because they are committed to appealing to philosophical intuitions in a bad ways, namely, by begging the question, or by epistemic regress or circularity. Question begging is centrally problematic when arguing for one’s preferred theory of philosophical intuition since one appeals for justification to intuitions of the kind the argument aims to substantiate. However, appeal to some other theory or kind of intuition is unattractive because such an argument is inconsistent with the conclusion that represents the correct theory of intuitions.
The upshot of the Out-Competition Argument is that there is no theory of intuition that can out-compete another. That is not to say that there is no better amongst the proposed competitors, but that any cogent argument for a theory of intuitions would not be able to overcome its competitors without doing violence to standard, fairly uncontroversial epistemic assumptions.

I now turn to elucidate the argument that theories of philosophical intuition cannot successfully win out against one another. I have assumed that there is a sound theory of intuitions that out-competes all other theories of intuitions. I argue that a theory of intuitions is beyond the purview of standard armchair philosophical methodology.

2.1. Criteria for Out-competing

Suppose that there is some theory of intuition that out-competes another theory of intuition. What are the grounds for adjudicating such a winner? Although this may be a matter of debate, there are fairly standard criteria to which philosophers tend to appeal. A theory (1a) should stand up to the weight of counterexamples and (1b) not be impugned by too many unacceptable theoretical consequences. That is, generally, one does not want one's theory of intuitions to do (too much) violence to other seated elements of theoretical importance. Furthermore, (1b₁) those terms by which a particular theory is analysed should be of theoretical significance; and, (1c) the analysis itself should be relatively simple. If one theory of intuitions is going to out-compete another, then the successful theory will better satisfy these criteria.

Notice that ‘better than’ could be understood in two ways. First, we might understand ‘better than’ as a qualitative claim that one theory satisfies the requirements to a higher degree than its competitors. The second way to understand ‘better than’ is quantitatively. That is, one theory will satisfy all the criteria and its competitors do not. However, it is safe to assume the theories of philosophical intuitions at hand satisfy each

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18 Theories of intuitions might also include sceptical theories offered by intuition-objectors.
19 My own view is toward naturalizing intuition via appeal to empirical science. Intuitions are intellectual events. On the one hand, we can test Williamson’s claim that intuitions are normal kinds of judgments and whether specific cognitive architecture is part of the intellectual process of intuitive evaluation. On the other hand, we can test what emotional components, if any, are necessary for intuition qua feelings of knowing. In epistemology, for example, we seem to lack correspondence with emotion, in contrast to moral intuitions.
20 Similar criteria are suggested by Weatherson (2003), impetus for the criteria here presented. However, I make no claim to their comprehensiveness, but I think further or other criteria will suffer essentially the flaw of appealing epistemic vices.
of the criteria. So, the determination of the better turns on a qualitative assessment.

The strategy of the Out-Composition Argument is the following:

For some set of theories of philosophical intuition, \( \Phi_1, \Phi_2, \ldots, \Phi_n \), consider the possibility that some theory of philosophical intuition, \( \Phi_1 \), out-competes another theory of philosophical intuition, \( \Phi_2 \), where competing theories are inconsistent.

(1) Consider what it is for \( \Phi_1 \) to out-compete, or be better than, \( \Phi_2 \).

(a) The weight of counterexamples against \( \Phi_2 \) are on the whole greater that the weight of the counterexamples against \( \Phi_1 \).
(b) The analysis of \( \Phi_1 \) has more unacceptable theoretical consequences than the analysis of \( \Phi_2 \). ([b] The analysed is theoretically significant, and analysed in other theoretically significant terms.)
(c) The analysis of \( \Phi_2 \) is less simple than the analysis of \( \Phi_1 \).

Call (1a), (1b), (1b), and (1c) “criteria.”

(2) The evaluation of criteria rely on some \( \Phi_n \).

(3) Thus, \( \Phi_1 \) being better than \( \Phi_2 \) - i.e., for \( \Phi_1 \) to out-compete \( \Phi_2 \) - must rely on some \( \Phi_n \), where either (a) \( \Phi_n = \Phi_1 \) or (b) \( \Phi_n = \Phi_{n+1} \).

(a) The epistemic status of \( \Phi_1 \) is dependent on itself. However, \( \Phi_1 \) out-competes \( \Phi_2 \) by begging the question or by appealing to epistemically circular support.
(b) The epistemic status of \( \Phi_1 \) is dependent on some other \( \Phi_{n+1} \) and some further argument is necessary to substantiate \( \Phi_{n+1} \). However, \( \Phi_1 \) out-competes \( \Phi_2 \) by appeal to epistemic regress.

(4) Thus, one theory of intuitions out-competes another only by question begging, epistemic circularity or epistemic regress.

In the following sections, I elucidate the Out-Composition Argument. Clearly, (2)

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21 Any evaluation of the relevant strengths of \( \Phi_1 \) and \( \Phi_2 \), regarding the criteria independently or jointly, relies on some \( \Phi_n \) wherein one’s evaluation may concern \( a \& b \), a \& c, or b \& c; or the consideration of a, b, & c as a whole). I argue for this premise below. Note that this form of the argument is stronger than alternatives wherein premise (2) does not rely on some theory of intuition. Seemingly more plausible versions might have it that all that is required of intuition is that one’s reliance on intuition not itself be intuition-dependent. I address this concern below, but find it can be set-aside for the moment.
is a contentious premise since it is not obvious why it must be the case that any evaluation of the criteria turns essentially on intuitions and, although, the stated focus and aim of this is ‘the arguments and the methods that can sustain the epistemic support that comes from intuitions regarding hypothetical cases vis-à-vis theories of intuition’ - much less obvious is why any evaluation of the criteria relies essentially on a theory of intuition. I argue that the evaluation of competing theories must ultimately turn on intuition, and eliminates that other means for evaluating the respective strengths and weaknesses of theories of intuition are biased, disproportionally arbitrary, or themselves grounded in intuitions. Then, I turn to show that any a priori defence of any theory of intuition turns on appeal to at least one epistemic vice of question begging, epistemic regress, or epistemic circularity.

2.1.1. Stand-up to the weight of counterexamples (1a)

Counterexamples are quintessential aspects of philosophical methodology. They are part of the mechanism by which theories are measured for both internal and external consistency. Regarding the later, we generally want our theories to not do violence to a received view. In the discourse that counterexamples occur, they provide evidence against some theory or some philosophical claim. Strong counterexamples might force one to give up the theory or falsify the philosophical claim in question. Weak counterexamples might only demand a clearer re-articulation of the original theory. Furthermore, when deciding the better of two competing theories, one adds-up the weights of the various looming counterexamples on the respective theory. Counterexamples may not be devastating but they are relevant to deciding whether one should adopt one theory over another (Weatherson, 2003).

Epistemology and metaphysics are especially sensitive to this criterion. Consider the analysis of what beliefs count as knowledge (cf. Shope, 1983). Epistemologists disregard a particular theory of knowledge if the counterexamples against it are too weighty and don’t conform to pretheoretical understanding. Gettier’s famous paper (1963) offers two counterexamples to the justified-true-belief theory of knowledge. Epistemologists took that Smith’s belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket and that Smith’s belief that Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston (or Barcelona; or Brest-Litovsk), though justified, to not count as knowledge. Two
counterexamples turned out to be sufficient to undermine the thesis that justified-true-belief counts as knowledge.

Consider counterexamples relevant to the intellectual seemings theory of intuitions. The intellectual seemingsist denies that intellectual seemings are beliefs. Pust offers a number of counterexamples by way of analogies to support the position. Here is the first analogy. Pust asks his reader to remember the Muller-Lyer illusion. One line seems longer than the other even though one has seen the image many times and has the belief that the lines are the same length. “The appearance that p […] is impenetrable by belief and even though I have the belief that not p, p still perceptually seems true” (Pust, 2000, p. 33). Here is a second analogy. Pust asks his reader to imagine the case where one is informed by a reliable mathematician that a particular mathematical axiom is false, but one still finds it ‘intuitive’. In these cases, “I may believe not p while it still seems to me necessarily true that p” (Pust, 2000, p. 33). Pust thinks that these counterexamples are decisive is showing that intuitions qua intellectual seemings are not beliefs. Ceteris paribus, a theory of philosophical intuition that holds that intuited beliefs are the primary conferrers of epistemic status have to explain away these counterexamples. It is not clear that they can. For example, in response to similar counterexamples by Paul Boghossian (2001), BonJour gives up the position that intuited beliefs are the primary conferrers of epistemic status. Intuitions are not propositional (BonJour, 2001, pp. 677-78; BonJour, 2005, p. 100). The counterexample was apparently too weighty for BonJour to maintain his previously held position.

2.1.2. Not be impugned by too many unacceptable theoretical consequences (1b)

The second criterion is that a theory not be impugned by too many unacceptable theoretical consequences. An unacceptable theoretical consequent of a theory occurs when an entailment of the theory does violence to some received view. “Unacceptable” does not require that one could not in some way accommodate such theoretical consequences. Rather, such unacceptability intended as prima facie unacceptable. Here is an

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22 However, it is a point that is elsewhere argued plays positively into self-evidentialist theories of intuition (Cf. Pust 2000 and Plantinga, 1993, pp. 103-8). Also, the way the analogy is set up in the argument appeals to intuitions. By asking the reader to imagine the case, Pust seems to be proposing that we evaluate whether the relevant concept instantiates in the imagined hypothetical case. Nevertheless, the argument could be augmented so that one is actually viewing the Muller-Lyer illusion.
example of an unacceptable theoretical consequence. Consider Parfit's (1984) Repugnant Conclusion. Suppose that we are trying to decide on public policy that affects the number of people that will be born in the future. If we choose one policy, future person will be few in number and have lives well-worth living. If we choose a second option, future persons will be much greater in number, but have lives barely worth living. The latter option has slightly more ‘utility’ (i.e., whatever makes life worth living) Suppose that Utilitarianism is true where the choice we should maximises whatever makes life worth living. Here is the principle that Parfit thinks engenders the paradox.

The Impersonal Total Principle: If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. (Parfit, 1984, p. 387)

However, a consequence for classic utilitarian theory is that it forces one to accept choice a policy where the overall average quality of life increases as a population grows, but the individual lives are barely worth living – an putatively unacceptable theoretical consequence.

If one were to evaluate the respective of theoretical consequences of a theory, how might one do so? One strategy is to offer an argument that the consequences of one theory are less problematic than the failures of another or vice versa. Both theories will have their deficiencies. Nevertheless, one is faced with evaluating the weightiness of those deficiencies. A strategy is to adopt a method where one asserts a metric on which to evaluate the respective weight of the theoretical consequences. The metric would assign specific values to unacceptable theoretical consequences according to an arbitrarily adopted metric. However, methods of this sort admit too much arbitrariness. That is, a merely arbitrary metric fails as a fair evaluative standard. There is no principled reason why one should choose one metric over another. I will suggest an accommodating route below when I address the approach by theory. I think that there are ways to avoid bad kinds of arbitrariness. Presently, I will leave the question open whereby purely arbitrary metrics are unacceptable because they do not offer a fair evaluative standard.
2.1.3. Terms of analysis should be of theoretical significance (1b)

The terms by which a particular theory is analysed should be of theoretical significance is in part a constraint on (1b), and in part an independent criterion of evaluation. The constraint is that the analysed concepts (re: (1b)) are theoretically significant, and the further criterion is that other theoretically significant terms are used for the analysis. Weatherson (2003) suggests that this is a precondition for theories having a “serious” classificatory scheme. Classificatory schemes require that one have a language that reflects the relevant concepts - concepts that the analysis ultimately aims at (Weatherson, 2003, p. 9). The criterion requires that the terms that give meaning to a theory should be of sufficient conceptual stature. That is why, for instance, epistemologists’ primary concern is the concept of knowledge and not the concept of believing. Knowledge is more theoretically significant. However, the concept of believing is itself theoretically significant and included in analyses of knowledge. Someone might challenge the theoretical significance of the seemingsist use of the notion of purely intellectual seeming experience and Williamson’s notion of what it is to stand in relation to the Gettier case. Remember that for the seemingsist intuitions are epistemically efficacious as purely intellectual seeming experiences. However, I have to admit that I’m not sure what to make of the notion. It is clear that the notion of a purely intellectual seeming experience is essential the seemingsist position. It’s not clear that an intellectual seeming experience is not unlike other seeming experiences that are not purely intellectual. That I am myself seems necessary. However, I could also and coordinately instantiate in some other world. Hence, it is not purely an intellectual matter that I am myself here and not in some other world. I have already argued that seemings is not a good criterion to delimiting intuitions from other similar experiences. So, without a response on that issue, the seemingsists’ lack the methodological recourse to distinguish purely intellectual seemings from intellectual seemings that are not purely intellectual. All things being equal, the notion of a purely intellectual experience fails to be maximally theoretically significant. A finer distinction is required on the part of the seemingsist in order to satisfy (1b) maximally well in regard to the term.
2.1.4. The analysis itself should be relatively simple (1c)

(1c) ‘Ockham’s Razor-esque’ criteria enjoy broad acceptance. Most fields and disciplines have the prima facie requirement that analyses be simple. Simplicity is, of course, relative to the theory in question. More complex theories will usually require more complex analysis. Since the evaluation of simplicity is in regard to the complexity of a particular theory (perhaps, also in respect to a competing theory), the evaluation whether one theory’s analysis is more or less simple than another’s analysis will encounter the same difficulties as evaluations in regard to (1a), a merely arbitrary metric will not suffice. Furthermore, a criterion of simplicity is that adequate theories should not have ad hoc postulates. Ad hoc postulates are aspects of or rejoinders to the theory that are merely added-on to accommodate counterexamples or unacceptable theoretical consequences. Ad hoc postulates count against the simplicity or elegance of a theory.

3. The Essentialness of Philosophical Intuitions

Thus far, I’ve suggested that there are a number of criteria on which theories of intuition can be evaluated in respect to one another. To reiterate: a theory of intuition will out-compete another if (1a) the counterexamples against it weigh less than those that weigh against its competitor, if (1b) its theoretical consequences make it less dubitable than its competitor’s theoretical consequences, if (1b1) the terms of analysis are theoretically significant, and if (1c) the analysis is more simple. Note that the evaluation of theories of intuition turn on evaluating them on-the-whole, taking into consideration all of the criteria together. Thus, it is possible that a theory be deficient in regard to one criteria but make it up in others so it’s on-the-whole better than its competitor.

Below, I argue that the evaluations rely centrally on an epistemic vice: question begging, epistemic regress or epistemic circularity. The general idea is that arguments for theories on intuition appeal to intuition in at least one way that requires appealing to an epistemic vice.

It is not necessary that any theory of intuition in particular be implicated in the evaluations. I only need to show that the evaluations are dependent on some theory of intuition. Also, it would count against, e.g., a judgment view of intuition, if its defence relied on epistemic appeal to, e.g., an intellectual seemings view of intuition. Furthermore,
I needn’t argue that the reliance on intuition is necessary since one may accept some metric or method for evaluation. Though, I have already argued that any metric will not be sufficient if it’s adopted arbitrarily.23

Regarding (1a), it should suffice to say that counterexamples rely on philosophical intuitions. If counterexamples are essential to evaluating the better of competing theories of philosophical intuition, then evaluation methods rely essential on philosophical intuitions. Counterexamples usually take the form of intuitions where one presents some case whereby the theory at hand fails to instantiate the relevant features of the case. This is what Gettier does when he presents counterexamples to theories of knowledge whereby knowledge is justified true belief. Intuitions that knowledge does not apply in Gettier cases provides evidence that knowledge is not mere justified true belief. The evaluation of the weight of counterexamples requires that one rely on intuition as a means of evaluating the respective weight of the unacceptable theoretical consequences of competing theories of intuition or that one rely on some arbitrary metric for evaluation. Regarding (1c), following Swinburne (1997), the proof that theory analysis should be simple is intuitive in itself. When one judges that an analysis or theory is simple, or elegant, it is an assessment that is intuitive in nature. There is no appeal to rules or procedures. It is the sort of judgment where one either sees it or not. So, I think there are grounds to show that even individual evaluations of individual criteria turn on intuition. However, my argument does not turn on that point in particular. Rather, I argue that on-the-whole evaluations turn on appealing to intuition. Each of (1a), (1b), (1b), and (1c) rely on intuition. Moreover, when evaluate theories on-the-whole, we appeal to intuition. This is problematical when evaluating competing theories of intuitions because intuitions are used in the evaluation and defence of a theory. The epistemological issues I raise here in regard to evaluating competing theories of intuition do not generalise to other optimistic theories, where the uses of intuitions are not contended. At this point, I set to the side the explanation how each individual criterion turns on intuition and move to argue how it is the case that evaluations on-the-whole turn on philosophical intuitions. Nevertheless, I think the argument can be articulated to cover the evaluation of individual criteria.

We can imagine how this sort of argument might take place. We consider the various theories of philosophical intuition; and, the respective counterexamples,

23 It is an open question whether there is a non-arbitrary metric. Presumably, a non-arbitrary metric would be fair amongst competing theories of intuition. However, I don’t know what such a metric might look like or even one is possible.
unacceptable theoretical consequences, and simplicity. We then try to evaluate from amongst the competitors which is the best in much the same way that a judge at the Westminster Dog Show evaluates which is the best contestant of a particular breed of canine. The judge has specific criteria but in the end she must make a judgment about which is the best dog by taking into account all of the candidates in respect to evaluative criteria on-the-whole.

I take it that judgments that involve ranking differences in kind and differences in quality rely on philosophical intuition. I set out a case for this claim below. In order to be successful, I have to present an argument that shows the evaluation turns on philosophical intuitions since it is philosophical intuition that the theories themselves aim. That is, it would be a much easier case to make if I argued that these judgments just appear without appeal to a (non-arbitrary) deliberative procedure, one that is inaccessible on reflection. Rather, I need to show that the evaluation turns on what we characteristically assign the role of intuitions to do, i.e., evaluate putatively real and hypothetical cases, whereby we have a paradigmatically intuitional response. Here is the sort of case I envision where (description) is the presentation of the case to be evaluated intuitively.

(description) Suppose it is the case that philosophical theory Φ₁ has the following evaluative standing:

Φ₁ has counterexamples d and e leveled against it in the literature, one substantially weaker than the other.

Φ₁ has negative theoretical consequences f and g, which are accommodated to some degree by Φ₁’s proponents.²⁴

Φ₁ is fairly simple. However, having had to accommodate f and g, Φ₁ has adopted some ad hoc postulate to reconcile the theory.

And, Φ₂ has the following evaluative standing:

Φ₂ has counterexamples h and i leveled against it in the literature, both are addressed by the proponents of the theory who argue that neither

²⁴ Note that I haven’t made the evaluation of the theoretical significance of analysed terms central (1b₁) to the description since it’s unclear that theoretical significance will make a sizable impact on the evaluation of the theory at hand. However, it’s worth just to note that Audi and BonJour leave the notion of ‘understanding’ open to interpretation. Neither gives an interpretation of how understanding confers epistemic status. Nevertheless, perhaps, in close races we might take (1b₁) into account.
undermines the theory (e.g., because the cases presented are far off possibilities).

Φ₂ has negative theoretical consequence j, which is accommodated to some degree by Φ₂’s proponents.

Φ₁ is elegant in its simplicity. The accommodation of j was made by a clearer articulation of the theory.

And, a similar description of the evaluative standing can be presented for any theory of philosophical intuition, Φₙ.

Given (description), which is reasonable to accept as a putatively real or hypothetical case (a case which we will assess intuitively), we can present the following argument for the best theory.

**(OC)**

1. Competing theories of philosophical intuition juxtapose according to (description).

2. If it were the case that competing theories of philosophical intuition juxtapose according to (description), then Φₙ is the best theory of intuition amongst its competitors.

3. Therefore, Φₙ is the best theory of intuition amongst its competitors. ²⁵

Notice that I have setup the argument the same way that one sets up an argument using a hypothetical case.²⁶ That is, given some description of a case, we evaluate whether the

²⁵ Following judgment views of intuition, one stands in relation to the description in some particular way that entails that one takes up an attitude towards the description in virtue of the juxtaposition in the way just described. We can easily re-describe the first premise in such a way that's consistent with other theories of intuition. So, I don't think that the argument necessarily turns one also accepting that one accept a judgment theory of intuition in particular. We could describe one's relation to the description in such a way that it intellectually seemings to one considering the description that it's necessary that Φₙ is the best of the competitors. Furthermore, the conclusion is not intended to follow necessarily from the premises. Since evaluative standing is relational. We should not find it surprising that (1) is met in different ways when philosophers have different internalised standards for, e.g., simplicity, or have relevantly different commitments to philosophical projects wherein there are relevantly different understandings of what is entailed by ‘the received view’. I take it that there is a commonplace understanding of a received view in philosophy. However, the received view is constituted by the overlapping theoretical commitments of philosophical projects generally, but all philosophers agree in regard to every one of their theoretical commitments. So what philosophers understand as the received view may deviate (slightly) as the theoretical commitments of philosopher's projects differ. Nevertheless, there is still substantial overlap.

²⁶ In modal terms, one might pose the argument in this way:

1. It's is possible that (description)
intuitional object (e.g., either the concept of knowledge or knowledge itself) instantiates in the case at hand. However, in the case of counterexamples, the hypothetical case aims at engendering a negative response. With some tweaks to the argument (think: modus tollens), we can change the intended response in such a way where the aim of the argument is to eliminate the less worthwhile theories, leaving only the best competitor left standing. So, I don’t think that one should take issue with the fact that (OC) is not strictly in the form of a counterexample. Furthermore, to put it in the form of a counterexample would be somewhat disingenuous towards the strategy of the argument because the description of the evaluative standing of each theory concerns counterexamples. One might charge the argument as being straightforwardly self-undermining. Rather, the argument is intended to reflect the ways that we make these kinds of evaluative judgments and not be straightforwardly self-undermining.

Let’s return to the Westminster Dog Show judge. Let’s call the judge ‘Teri’. Teri is presented with a pack of dogs of the same breed. She looks them over carefully. Teri is a vetted judge; she’s been judging dog shows for several years and is well respected by her peers. She has internalised the standard for evaluating this particular breed of canine, and she can recall each criteria on request. So, she is never in the position of making a bad judgment about what the criteria are or applies them wrongly. Teri evaluates each competitor in the pack. She may make an intermediate decision, pulling from the pack those that are clearly most outstanding. Perhaps the remaining competitors fail to meet one or more the criteria, just as we might eliminate a theory of intuition because it has a very strong counterexample that does a great deal of violence to our received views. Both in the case of canines and of theories, there is a failure to meet a criterion minimally. The remaining competitors wait to be judged. When Teri judges them, she evaluates them on-the-whole. Teri may find that some canine does better on a particular criterion than another, but weighs the respective strengths and weaknesses of each competitor in respect to one another. Teri’s evaluation of the best of the pack is the same kind of evaluation we make when we evaluate theories of intuition.

In measuring faults, judges are given this direction.

Any departure from the [criteria] should be considered a fault and the seriousness

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(2) Necessarily, if it were the case that competing theories of philosophical intuition juxtapose according to (description), the $\Phi_n$ is the best theory of intuition amongst its competitors.

(3) Therefore, given (description) $\Phi_n$ is the best theory of intuition amongst its competitors.
with which the fault should be regarded should be in exact proportion to its
degree. (American Kennel Club, n.d.)

So, there is no prescribed metric for evaluation. Let’s turn to (OC).

Admittedly, (OC) is a rough jab in the direction of structuring the evaluative
judgments that get made in these kinds of cases, but I think it’s a jab that lands squarely
enough. Furthermore, when we accept that some theory is better than another, we must
have justification for doing so. That is, we require ourselves to have justification for
believing the premises that support the conclusion regarding which theory of intuition is
the best of the lot. To that end, let’s consider what justification can be garnered for (3). I
argue that in order for one to be justified they must commit to an epistemic vice.

Let me say a few things about the content of (OC) and then what sort of
justification one has for believing its conclusion. There is plenty built into the first
premise, Regarding (1) (‘Competing theories of philosophical intuition juxtapose
according to (description).’), the juxtaposition concerns the description and the
comparison of the evaluative standing of the competitors, wherein their evaluative
standing is individually related to the agents internalised standards/criteria, e.g., regarding
weightiness of counterexamples, simplicity, \textit{ad hoc}ness, etc.; received views of
philosophical commonplace; and, related externally to its competitors evaluative
standings. So, to be juxtaposed according to (description) is to be whatever it is for the
theories of intuition to stand in relation to one another in regard to the criteria.

Now, consider what it is to be justified in believing (1). Let’s assume that (1) is
justified in virtue of (description). What justification does one have for believing it? One
must consider the various competing theories of intuitions in relation to the criteria and
to each other theory of intuition. Now consider Audi’s (2004) description of global
intuition, whereby intuiteds, "emerge from thinking about [something] as a whole, but not
from one or more evidential premises”, having, “[...] added up the evidences and inferred
their implication; one has obtained a view of the whole and thereby broadly characterized

\textsuperscript{27} There are, of course, other proposals for evaluating theories. As theory construction and evaluating
competing theories is central to science, a number of evaluative methods are available in the context of
that frame. However, I’m reluctant to accept that they are applicable to the present context \textit{a priori}
methodology. For example, with no prior evidence of probability for correctness, a Bayesian approach
seems implausible. Appealing to the agreement of expert judges is a plausible method. However, I show
in the following chapter that expert judges don’t agree on a conception of intuition. So, appeal to (broad)
agreement is unsuccessful.
it” (pp. 45-46). One can reflect for a very long time about the relevant strengths and weaknesses of each theory - just as Teri may consider the pack for quite a long time. One is justified in believing that (description) is as such just so far as one has reasons to believe that they have adequately considered the juxtaposition of the theories at hand. Consider the second premise, (2) (‘If it were the case that competing theories of philosophical intuition juxtapose in the described way, then \( \Phi_n \) is the best theory of intuition amongst its competitors.’), it describes the case where \( \Phi_n \)’s evaluative standing is determinate of its being the best of the competitors. It’s necessary that \( \Phi_n \) is the best theory of intuition amongst its competitors given (description). What justification does one have to believe (2)? I argue that one must endorse (3) in order to be justified in believing (2). To see why this is the case, consider Teri’s judging the best of the pack at the Westminster Dog Show. Suppose that Teri has whittled the field of contenders down to three dogs, Selfy, Seemy, and Judgy (led about the ring by their handlers, Robert, George, and Tim, respectively). Teri makes her final decision. It might be the case that Teri has in mind an exemplar of the breed – a conceptual ideal of the perfect specimen - against which she compares the three competitors. None will satisfy the exemplar, but one does so better than the others. However, in the case of a theory of intuition, there is no exemplar. Theories, generally, are not the sort of things that have exemplars. There may be exemplars of good theories, but not of theories of intuition themselves. In order to assess whether (2) is true one must engage it intuitively. One considers whether if it were the case that the competing theories of intuition juxtapose in the described way, it is the case that \( \Phi_n \) is the best of them. In order to do so one must already accept some theory of intuition. This acceptance may be only implicit. However, we can see that is necessary for the justification that one can have for believing (2). That is, one appeals to an epistemic vice in order to be justified in believing (2). That is, one begs the question.

**Question begging:** An argument is question begging if one's justification for one or more of its premises entails that one presupposes the truth of the conclusion.\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\) I leave open that there are other ways that an argument might beg the question. Notice that this formulation respects the difference between 'arguer justification' and 'audience justification'. Arguer justification aims at showing one's audience that one has reason to believe something. Audience justification aims at showing one's audience that one's audience has reason to believe something. (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, 1999) Hence, following Sinnott-Armstrong on this point, arguments themselves are not question begging. Rather, 'uses of arguments' can be question begging. I take it that the context of the Out-Competition Argument can aim at either arguer or audience justification since one might be in either...
I am in somewhat of a bind here in saying more precisely what the nature of the intuitive justification is. This is, in part, a methodological stalemate since to say how exactly (2) is intuitive would require that I myself implicitly endorse a theory of intuition. One option is to show how on each of the main competing theories of intuition justification for (2) is intuitional. Thus far, (OC) has sufficient similarity with judgment accounts of intuition wherein (2) is the intuitional step of the argument (cf. Williamson 2004). But we could rearticulate (OC) to reflect intuitional markers of intellectual seemings and self-evidence theories of intuition. For example, when one considers (description), it just seems necessarily the case that $\Phi_n$ is the best of the competitors. Or - rehashing Audi’s notion of global intuition -, there is “a sense in which intuitions may be globally grounded: based on an understanding of the proposition seen in context of the overall grounds for it” (Audi, 2004, p. 46) – when one considers (2) in context of (description), one is justified believing that (2) on the basis of its understanding. In each case, one appeals to a theory of intuition being true, or the best of the competitors, for how one is justified believing (2).

Suppose that someone wants to avoid begging the question so appeals to some other theory of intuition as the purveyor of justification for his or her preferred one. One avoids the question-begging problem since one’s justification comes not by way of the concluded theory of intuition. However, this is a deviant source of justification that plainly undermines one’s justification for (2).

We eliminated that the evaluation is grounded in some merely arbitrary metric. A merely arbitrary metric would quantify each theory’s evaluative standing. On the one hand, this would allow for an evaluation that doesn’t get caught up in evaluative differences across quality and quantity. However, an arbitrary metric fails to give fair standing to each of the competitors. With an eye to the sciences, one might suggest that theories of philosophical intuition could be evaluated on the basis of their predictive success. That is, the best theory would be the one that gets things correct the most. However, this sort of attempt should trouble us since whether philosophical intuitions get things correct is notoriously difficult to pin down. For example, it’s not at all clear to say when a theory of philosophical intuition gets things correct on things such as personal identity, modality, the nature of knowledge, and similar objects of philosophical inquiry.
that are only *a priori* accessible.

So, the most plausible option seems to be something along the line of what is presented above: criteria along which theories are evaluated for their explanatory success. We want to know which is the best theory by evaluating how it can be explained in the context of the received views about how the world is.

Any evaluation of the relevant strengths one theory of intuition has over another will rely on some theory of intuition. For any theory of intuition to out-compete any other, it must rely on some theory of intuition. Theories of philosophical intuition are at a methodological stalemate. If one is going to be able to out-compete the other, then some independent argument must be given for the theory of intuition that justifies that one is better than the other. However, any such argument will require yet another similar argument to justify that it is the relevant theory of intuition and not some other – and so on and so forth. An unattractive epistemic regress is thus required for any theory of intuition to out-compete another. Furthermore, to stipulate a theory of intuition that is seemingly adequate to buttress the epistemic regress would simply be to beg the question about which theory of intuition one should go with.

Thus, the intuition debate seems to lead to a rather ill-fated end. To evaluate which theory is the best, one must either rely on a method that requires an epistemic regress, some merely arbitrary metric for evaluation, or beg the question. None of these options is attractive.

In the next section, I reply to the argument that intuitions are basic sources of evidence and hence need no further grounds to provide for their epistemic status. Then, I consider a conciliatory method with the intuition-objector, one that aims at avoiding committing an epistemic vice.

### 4. Objections to Out-competition Argument

One sort of response to my argument is to deny that there needs to be a theory of intuition. Intuitions can play a justificatory role in philosophical methodology without one. For example, intuitions are a sort of basic or primitive evidence. That is, suppose a view of basic knowledge whereby one can come to have a knowledge-level belief from a reliable belief forming process without also knowing that the process is itself reliable.

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29 I respond to the objection that intuitions’ justification is not theory dependent below.
Here is a corollary for intuitional deliverances. One could come to have intuitions that are reliable evidence without also knowing that those intuitions are reliable. The fact that intuitions are reliable is enough. However, one risks running headlong into a standard bootstrapping objection. Following Cohen (2005), one’s justifiably believing that their intuitions are reliable cannot depend on intuitions, even if one’s intuitions are in fact reliable. That is, knowledge of the reliability of a belief forming process cannot rely on that same belief forming process (Cohen, 2005, p. 417n1). Some other method is required for establishing that fact independently or else one ends up in a viciously circular structure of justification. So, unless intuition’s basic reliability can be established independently of intuition, intuition’s reliability remains an open question.

Bealer (2000) tries to give an answer to the reliability of intuition. Bealer gives an explanatory argument for intuition’s basic reliability on modal grounds. Roughly, one’s intuition is modally reliable if one has the right set of concepts, determinately possessed. However, notice that Bealer’s argument for modal reliability turns on intuition. That is, we get a counterfactual conditional of this sort:

If it were the case that one’s epistemic counterpart were able to go through the envisaged process of intuiting given the correct set of determinately possessed concepts, then it would be the case that one’s intuition is modally reliable under similar cognitive conditions.

The assessment of the counterfactual is an intuitive assessment (cf. Williamson, 2007). I think it is safe to assume that a priori defences of intuition’s basic reliability are all intuition-dependent. Other arguments may suppose that appealing to intuition is a practical necessity to garner any kind of justification (Pritchard 2005). However, this doesn’t resolve the epistemic issue – at least not if there is an epistemically salient alternative.

It seems that the least objectionable position one might take with regard to the intuition dependence of intuitional justification is that intuition independence depends on the fact that intuitions are reliable (basic reliability). This position is viable since no argument – much less a theory – is required for intuitional justification, ergo, undermining that criteria are dependent on a theory of intuition (Although, the intuition that intuitions are basically reliable may be a necessary component of one’s claim to
intuitions’ basic reliability). There is a more that could be said in regard to the basic reliability of intuition. I’ll say just enough to move us past the objection that justification for criteria is dependent on a theory of intuition. Let’s begin by making a distinction between one’s being justified on the basis of the fact intuitional deliverances are basically reliable and one’s being justified in believing that on is justified on the basis of the fact that intuitional deliverances are reliable. For clarity, let’s call instances of the first class, ‘basically reliable’, and instances of the second sort, ‘justified basically reliable’. Basically reliable intuitions are justified in virtue of the brute fact that intuitions are reliable. Justified basically reliable intuitions are justified in virtue of having some reason to believe that intuitions are basically reliable, where that reason is not necessarily that one is aware of the fact that intuitions are basically reliable. For example, one’s justification supporting reason may be that intuitions of experts tend to agree. However, justified basic reliability is subject to errors, e.g., one’s justification can be wrong or mislead; and, one’s being justified basically reliable with respect to intuition does not entail that one is actually basically reliable, even if one’s justification is basically reliable. The objection tries to point out that all one needs for one’s intuition to be justified is for it to be the case that intuitions are reliable, irrespective of whether we have epistemic access to that fact. So, we can set aside justified basic reliability. Moreover, and perhaps to the surprise of some, we can set aside the basic reliability of intuition as a theory-independent source of justification. Let me explain. Basic reliability is an option excluded by the context of the Out-competition Argument. The context of the argument assumes that intuitions are fallible, each of the competing theories accepts as much about intuition. Fallibility does not entail unreliability. However, fallibility does entail the possibility of error. The question left to us is whether the possibility of error undermines that basic reliability of intuition is sufficient justification in the context of the Out-competition Argument. In this case, I think we are obligated to say that it does because the context of justification already puts into question that one’s intuitions are suitably grounded.

The objector might offer this sort of rejoinder: ‘No, you not realized the central force of my objection. You’ve attempted to deal with the fact of intuitions reliability solely in the context of the Out-competition Argument. I’m saying that intuitions are basically reliable tout court. The presumption that some theory of intuition is required in the justificatory context is an irrelevant extravagance.’ I think this move is loggerhead-inducing. It asks one to choose between justificatory contexts of the argument. On the
one hand is the context that I’ve set out on the formative question, ‘What justification for intuitions do we get from theories of intuition?’ One the other hand is the purportedly broader justificatory context that presumably includes the fact that intuitions are reliable. The objector assumes that the context that I’ve set out is subject to the broader context. However, clearly, since I’ve not violated or done violence to any of our general epistemic practices, the objector has present some argument for or present some reason as to how I’ve illegitimately pre-empted basic reliability of intuition from the justificatory resources of the argument content. I don’t see that any such argument is forthcoming since it is well within the purview of the present inquiry that I do so. If the objector thinks basic reliability is sufficient, he or she would have stopped reading this thesis at after the first sentence. So, let’s move on to examine other methods deciding from amongst the competitors, which is the best theory of intuition.

4.1. Alternative Means to Arrive at a Correct Theory of Philosophical Intuitions

I have argued that, on one kind of method for adjudicating the best of competing theories of intuition, one is committed to an epistemic vice. However, this does not preclude that some other method is available, one that does not commit to an epistemic vice. In this section, I sketch alternative methods to providing justification for one’s theory of intuition. One eminent possibility is that a method of wide reflective equilibrium (herein WRE) can epistemically sustain a theory of intuition over and above its competitors.30

Let’s understand WRE as a method aimed at the grounding of epistemic principles and norms in the normal deliberative capacities of epistemic agents under agreement. WRE aims at bringing into coherence theories and principles, individual judgments, and relevant background theories. WRE could be applied to epistemology by supplementing epistemic theories and principles, individual epistemic judgments, and relevant background theories about matters epistemic (i.e., scientific theories about how we make epistemic judgments).

Reflective equilibrium strategies’ epistemological appeal has attracted attention since they are arguably capable of sustaining principles of justification that avoid troubling epistemic vices. Lammenranta (1996) and Pust (2000) consider the possibility that

30 Reflective equilibrium is usually attributed to John Rawls (1951, 1971, 2001).
reflective equilibrium strategies can arrive at justification for epistemic principles in ways that are not committed to epistemic vices.

Lammenranta (1996) takes the following kind of position: The method of WRE is more basic than epistemic principles. One need not take epistemic principles as primary since WRE is simply the method we use in our everyday ways of figuring things out. Lammanranta explanation for why this is the case is dubious in virtue of it overburdening appeal to practicality and to doctrine. That is, he writes, “The first thing to notice is that actually it is the method we all use. […] When we come to believe that two of our beliefs can't both be true, it is, of course, rational to discard the one of which we are less confident. It would be irrational to discard the other one” (Lammenranta, 1996, p. 120). Lammenranta continues, “So, there is actually no rational alternative to the method of WRE.” However, this certainly can’t be right since one could rationally reject both beliefs. Nevertheless, this aspect of Lammenranta’s argument doesn’t affect the present supposition. Let’s consider now why WRE is attractive.

If the wide reflective equilibrium strategy is conceived as a method, as opposed to a justificatory procedure – since a justificatory procedure would entail taking epistemic principles in primary and apodictic positions -, then the principle of justification that supports the strategy can be whatever principle the strategy ends up justifying. Notice how this is a seemingly attractive route to take. The Out-Competition Argument supposes a method of evaluating competitors that is question begging because one must already accept that one’s theory of intuition is the best of the competitors in order to justify that it is the best of the competitors. However, on Lammenranta’s proposal, one need not presuppose that any theory of intuition is correct. Rather, whatever theory of intuition the method ends up at, ends up being the theory of intuition that supports the method of WRE. Let’s now turn to see whether Lammenranta’s suggestion will work for theories of intuition.

I will briefly sketch Lammenranta’s attempt to use WRE as a method to derive justificatory principles that are not dependent of epistemic circularity for their own epistemic support. I will then argue that adapting the method in the case of intuition will be unsuccessful because it is intuition-dependent in bad ways. I do so by relying of arguments put forth by Pust (2000).

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31 Alston (1998) takes a similar move.
4.1.1. Lammenranta: WRE as a Method to Intuition

Lammenranta (1996) argues that the reflective equilibrium strategy can be construed such that no justificatory principle is presupposed. Rather, the method itself can specify the principle of justification supporting it. Lammenranta suggests that in place of considered judgments stand epistemic judgments, and in place of principles and background theories stand a triumvirate: (a) a system of rules of justification, governing over the right psychological processes that produce justified belief; (b) reliabilist criterion of rule rightness, which pick out sufficiently reliable belief forming processes; and (c) the framework principle indicates when it is permitted under the right justification rules. And, lastly, in place of theoretical considerations stand empirical beliefs concerning the reliability of our psychological processes and other non-epistemic beliefs (1996, p. 118).32

Regarding (2), Lammenranta adopts the view proposed by Goldman (1986), arguing that these three types of rules together can specify under what conditions belief is justified. That is,

The justificational rules permit beliefs as a function of psychological processes that produce the beliefs. The criterion of rightness says that the right rules are those that pick out sufficiently reliable psychological processes. And the framework principles say a belief is justified if and only if it is permitted by the right justificational rules. (Lammenranta, 1996, p. 118)

Purportedly, once these are brought into equilibrium, one has in hand a non-circular deliverance of justificatory principles, which one can use to justify the method itself. Note that although Lammanranta has supplemented the strategy with reliabilist-aimed rules and principles, “a reliabilist must be ready to discard reliabilism if it fails to find a place in the state of WRE” (1996, p. 119). As such, reflective equilibrium is a strategy for deriving a set of epistemological rules and beliefs that are themselves provided justificational rules by the method of their deliverance. However, relying on WRE in the case of intuition is problematical. The method is dependent on an epistemically circular defence even if there

32 “The epistemic judgments concern the justification of particular beliefs. The epistemic rules specify the conditions under which different kinds of beliefs are justified. And non-epistemic beliefs are any beliefs that are not epistemic judgment or rules but that are relevant for choosing between alternative systems of judgments and rules” (Lammenranta, 1996, p. 118)
is no apodictic justificatory principle about intuition presupposed. In sketch, one must
careful in the case of intuition since intuitions are more fundamental to philosophical
methodology than reliablism. One cannot discharge a theory of intuition from WRE by
appeal to intuitions that ultimately rely on the discharged theory.

Following Lammenranta’s thinking, using the method of WRE, we get a picture
of the following, which needs to be brought into equilibrium in order to derive a best
tory of intuition:

(1) Epistemic judgments
(2) Competing theories of intuition
(3) The commonplace understanding of philosophers’ received view of
philosophy, empirically justified

Let’s consider the possibility for a reflective equilibrium strategy as a method, as opposed
to a justificatory procedure. From the view of method, we try to arrive at sound epistemic
principles that establish not only that intuitions have conferrable epistemic status, but also
their epistemic status is not epistemically dependent on the epistemic status of any other
of one’s beliefs. The method does not stipulate that intuitions are integral to the method
itself. However, when one submits theories of intuition to WRE, they are not in a
position to revise one’s theory of intuition so they are not essential to the method of
WRE. That is, WRE is essentially an intuitional methodology. One must use intuitions to
reach equilibrium. For example, Pust thinks that reflective equilibrium strategies rely on
global intuitions for their foundational justification. Pust (2000) argues, “RE are best
treated as versions of particularist or globalist intuitionism within which the process of
justification is linear and stops with intuitions” (p. 13). We don’t have to engage in much
mental exercise to see why this is the case. When we bring (1), (2) and (3) into equilibrium
we must exercise intuition to, e.g., decide which amongst our competing theories of
intuitions better satisfies our epistemic judgments. For example, which of the competing
theories better explains our judgments about Gettier cases or does less violence to our

33 Rawls’ metaphysical commitments in regard to intuition differ between his early and late writings. Rawls’s early work is neutral in regard to the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of an intuitive capacity of moral agents. Rawls’ later work is opposed to moral intuitionism (and moral facts) that would violate or preclude persons from being heteronymous (See Rawls, 1980, p. 519 and pp. 526-7). Rawls (1980), however, does not preclude that moral fact are ingredient in construing the principles of justice (p. 519).
received views of philosophy will look much of the same like judgments Teri makes about the best dog in the pack. We must take an evaluative stance toward how well theories will cohere or satisfy our epistemic judgments. Furthermore, if we accept Pust’s position, which is eminently plausible, that intuitions are essential to WRE, then one cannot, as Lammenranta’s method presupposes, revise away intuition under the auspices of WRE. In short, the constructivist picture offered by Lammenranta glosses the essential role of intuitions in bringing (1), (2), and (3) into equilibrium.34

Hence, a WRE defence of intuitions is dependent on intuitions. Intuitions must thus be both the object of inquiry and essential to the deliverance thereof. The epistemic status of theories of intuitions in reflective equilibrium strategies is thus open to objections of epistemic circularity since the object sought to be made to cohere – a theory of intuition – is (1) uneliminable from the method and (2) essential to the justification of its own epistemic status.

In the next section, I address the plausibility of using another method to justify theories of intuition: the approach by theory. The general idea here is to contextualise the arguments for one’s theory in the dialectic with an intuition objector. One attempts an argument for their preferred theory of intuition by using an analogue of some theory that the objector is unwilling to give up. This approach attempts to mitigate question begging and epistemic regress problems that theories of intuition are prone to when their justification depends on intuitions. However, the results here are middling and limit the application of the theory in philosophical methods generally.

5. Approach by Theory

Above I suggested that there are at least three kinds of theories of intuition discussed in the extant literature. I distinguished theories of intuition on the basis of what make intuitions’ epistemically efficacious. The looming theoretical problems have prevented philosophers from providing a theory of intuition that is without significant impediment. The central issue is that intuition’s epistemic grounds need independent support of their status as conferrers of epistemic status. That is, if one’s justification for the epistemic status of intuitions requires (epistemic) support from intuitions, then one is committed to

34 Observe that this does not undermine the original aim of Lammenranta’s argument. Nevertheless, so far as a theory of intuition is integral to the method, we should be wary of circularity and question-begging, though some further argument is necessary to advance this point.
an epistemic vice.

In this section, I address one possibility for a method that supports a theory of intuition but does not critically rely on intuitions for support. Note that what I am proposing in the primary position of salience is not a theory of intuition per se. Rather, I am presenting a method by which a theory of intuition can be supported without relying problematically on intuitions. The proposed method aims to circumvent question begging and circularity problems by presenting an intuition analogue of an argument that the intuition-objector would not want to give up. So, in the context of the argument, one gets some intuitions for free. However, the scope and application of the approach by method is too narrow to result in a successful theory of philosophical intuitions for broad philosophical consumption. One needs only to reject the analogue to refute the theory of intuition. I sketch such an argument, offer an intuition analogue, and respond to objections.

5.1. Analogue for a Theory of Philosophical Intuition

What sort of theory might provide a suitable analogue for philosophical intuition? Ones that strike to mind are causal explanations for visual perception. There is already a rough parallel between visual perception and intuition whereby intuition is a sort of intellectual seeing. Presumably, there are intuition-objectors would be unwilling to give up that causal explanations of visual perception provide justification for our visually based beliefs.

S justifiedly believes that \( p \) (where \( p \) results from S’s visual perceptions) if and only if the fact that \( p \) is related causally, in the appropriate way, to S believing that \( p \).

The following will spell out what goes into ‘in the appropriate way’. It must hold for both the explicans in the case of visual perception and in the case of intuition. Granted, there are theoretical issues that we will need to gloss, keeping interests of space and necessity in mind. However, the primary aim here is to set out the argument structure, and whether the theory of philosophical intuition is correct is outside the present argument. All I am trying to show is that arguments for intuition can be setup in this way, and some fruit could be born out by implementing this kind of approach. There is some potential here to gain insight into the nature of intuition by using causal theories of perception as our
analogue. Causal theories of perception (CTP) can help us describe the kind of connection between one's intuiting that \( p \) and \( p \)'s being the case.

Grice (1961), Goldman (1967), and Noë (2003) each present a version of causal explanatory arguments for visual perception. I will survey their arguments, offer a formulation of the general form of the causal explanation argument, explain the intuition analogue, and respond to objections. I should point out that the argument here is intended as an exemplar for the approach to non-question-beggingly argue for one’s theory of intuition. I don’t commit myself to the view expressed here (although I do find the view attractive in some ways). Moreover, there are some objections to the analogue that some may find worrisome in regard to its veracity. However, one should not read to deeply into these issues. The objections I draw against the method do not essentially turn on the correctness of the proposed theories. In the next sections, I tease out a *prima facie* plausible view of the causal theory of perception, and then take this as an analogue and apply it to a theory of intuition.

### 5.2. Causal Theory of Perception

Grice (1961) advocate for the follow formulation of CTP:

(1) It is true that \( X \) perceives \( M \) IFF some present-tense sense-datum statement is true of \( X \) which reports a state of affairs for which \( M \), in a way to be indicated by example, is causally responsible; and,

(2) a claim on the part of \( X \) to perceive \( M \), if it needs to be justified at all, is justified by showing that the existence of \( M \) is required if the circumstances reported by certain true sense-datum statements, some of which may be about persons other than \( X \), are to be causally accounted for. (Grice, 1961, pp. 151-2)

A “present-tense sense-datum” statement is a first-person report of his or her current sensory experience. For example: I see a sheet of paper in front of me. The sheet of paper is causally related to my seeing it. Notice where the explanatory work comes in to provide justification at (2): “[\( X \)] is justified by showing that the existence of \( M \) is required if the circumstances reported by certain true sense-datum statements.” The causal connection elucidated by an example describes how the sheet of paper is causally responsible for my
seeing it. My justification attached to seeing the sheet of paper is given by an explanation of how it is that one sees a sheet of paper as I have. However, the causal connection is spurious.

Noë (2003) points out that the Grice (1961) conception of the causal connection is too thin. Consider Noë’s (2003) formulation of Grice’s view:

\[
(CTP) \begin{align*}
[1] & S \text{ visually perceives that } o \text{ is } F \iff S \text{ has a visual experience as of } o \text{'s being } F. \\
[2] & o \text{ is } F \\
[3] & S \text{'s } o \text{-experience depends, causally, on } o \text{'s being } F.
\end{align*}
\]

However, [3] can be met in bad ways. For example, Noë presents a case where a neurosurgeon causes her patient to see a clock on the shelf by manipulating the patient’s brain. However, the surgeon does so because there is in fact a clock on the shelf. Moreover, if the patient’s brain had not been manipulated, she would see a clock on the shelf via normal visual perception if she were looking at it. However, when the neurosurgeon manipulates her brain, the fact that there is a clock on the shelf is still the cause of one’s experience of the clock. However, it does not match up with how the patient thinks that she is causally related to the clock on the wall. She believes that she is seeing it. Goldman’s (1967) explains the sort of causal connection that might avoid Noë’s objection. Goldman’s (1967) formulation of a causal theory of empirical knowing is an attempt to add a condition to justified true belief accounts of knowledge that avoids Gettier’s (1963) famous counter example. Goldman diagnoses the problem as the lack of a causal connection between \(p\) and knowing that \(p\).

Without a causal connection, \(p\) can be true because of luck. S sees that there is a vase in front of her IFF there is a certain kind of causal connection between S’s seeing that there is a vase and the presence of a vase and S’s believing that a vase is present. (Goldman, 1967, p. 358)

The connection between S’s knowing that \(p\) and \(p\) must be a perceptual one. S’s may have other routes to knowing that \(p\), but it does not count towards S’s perceptually knowing that \(p\). The precise nature of the causal process Goldman sets aside for the special sciences to detail, as the processes fall within their purview and not these of philosophers.
Notice that the causal explanation is what does the epistemic work for Goldman’s theory. It is this the aspect of the theory that we direct our interest.

Goldman elucidates an example to explain the relevant causal connections: S is seeing a lava field, inferring from the visual perception that a nearby mount erupted some centuries in the past. To know that a mountain erupted, S must infer from the visual perception of the lava field, and there must be some causal chain stretch back to the eruption and S’s seeing the resulting lava. Furthermore, S must have background beliefs that track the causal connection between seeing the lava field and the eruption that occurred centuries ago. So, S must have some corresponding beliefs that track the most relevant causal process lying between the lava field and the erupting mountain centuries ago. Goldman explains,

> [S]uppose that, after the mountain has erupted, a man somehow removes all the lava. A century later, a different man (not knowing of the real volcano) decides to make it look as if there had been a volcano, and therefore puts lava in appropriate places. Still later, S comes across this lava and concludes that the mountain erupted centuries ago. In this case, S cannot be said to know the proposition. (Goldman, 1967, p. 361)

However, if it were the case that the lava field is a reconstruction and S’s beliefs track the replacement of the lava field, then S would know that a mountain had erupted centuries ago. S’s background beliefs about what connects seeing the lava and the eruption of the lava from the mountain have to envisage the actual process at the most relevant points and there mustn’t be too many mistakes. The surgeon case doesn’t pass muster on this point. On Goldman’s view, the patient doesn’t know because the explanation of the causal connection doesn’t track how the patient came to have a justified true belief that there is a clock.

The upshot of the preceding discussion is a characteristic formulation of the causal conditions. Consider the following:

\[ \text{(CTP)} \]

1. \( S \) sees that \( x \) is \( P \) iff there is a causal connection (of a certain sort) between \( S \) seeing that \( x \) is \( P \) and \( P \) and \( S \)’s believing that \( x \) is \( P \).
2. \( x \) is \( P \)
S’s seeing that x is P depends, causally, on x’s being P.

(CTP) Example:

[1] S sees that x is a mug if and only if there is a causal connection (of a certain sort) between S seeing that x is a mug and the mug and S’s believing that x is a mug.

[2] x is a mug

[3] S’s seeing that x is a mug depends, causally, on x being a mug.

Noë’s diagnosis is this:

The perspectival aspects of perceptual content are only partly determined by how things are. They depend also on one’s relation to how things are. Any account of perception that ignores this dependence of how things look on one’s movements (that is, on changes in one’s relation to how things are) - in effect, ignoring the distinctively perspectival aspects of perceptual content - will fail to provide an adequate account of what perception is. (Noë, 2003)

The idea is that in order to properly track the causal relation one must co-ordinately track the causal relation in two dimensions. Noë (2003) suggests that two counterfactual dependency claims are required: (1) “that things would have looked different had they been different” and (2) “had one’s relation to how things are been different, things would have looked different.”

Here is a case to show how fine grained two-dimensional counterfactual dependence is: Consider that there exists a tiny electronic device, similar in size and shape of a contact lens, that is able to receive images and exactly reproduce them to your eye just as if you were seeing without the device. That is, - phenomenological speaking - seeing with the device and seeing without the device are indistinguishable. Now, take the well-worn example of the vase that sits on the table in front of you. When you see the vase with the device you don’t actually see the vase unless the causal relations are properly tracked. However, the use of the device forestalls one’s properly tracking the relationship along both dimensions. If the vase had been different, it would have looked different to you. However, if the relation to how the vase had been different, the vase would not have
looked different. That is, if the device were removed from your eye, the vase would look exactly the same as were you using the device.

Noë’s point is instructive because it shows how we should think about the nature of the causal connection between S seeing that x is P and the presence of P and S’s believing that x is P. The causal connection needs to be attended to in two dimensions. Furthermore, the explanation of the causal connection does the justificatory work for CTP. Without the right sort of causal connection, one fails to be justified.

Let us consider Goldman’s suggestion regarding the sort of causal connection required for knowledge.

S knows p because he has correctly reconstructed the causal chain leading from p to the evidence for p that S perceives [...]. This correct reconstruction is shown [...] by S's inference "mirroring" the rest of the causal chain. Such a correct reconstruction is a necessary condition of knowledge based on inference. (Goldman, 1967, p. 363)\(^{35}\)

The causal explanation that one gives for the link between believing that \(p\) and \(p\) must track the causal chain from the fact that \(p\) and one’s believing that \(p\). Adding Noë’s point, the explanation should also track one’s perspectival relation to \(p\). That is, the explanation should not leave open how \(p\) would have seemed different had one been at a different perspective.

(I have been somewhat disingenuous about Noë’s (2003) diagnosis of causal theories. I have presented him as attempting to properly constrain the causal relation. However, he makes further point that deserves attention.

The problem with the causal theory is not that it can’t specify or constrain the causal relation. [...] [It is, rather, that] no causal relation is so strange or unnatural that it is incompatible with genuine perception. (Noë, 2003)

That is, there is no causal relation that is so strange that the causal theory would not in principle be able to accommodate. Cases that are intuitively not genuine perception would count as genuine perception. I think this is overstating the case for CTP. CTP is limited

\(^{35}\) On Goldman’s view, one need not go through the explicit process of inferring.
by one’s background beliefs tracking ability. Presumably, that ability is sufficiently restricted such that what could in principle count as genuine perception would not be the case in actual practice. Further, the nature of the causal connection is limited by Goldman’s point that the precise nature of the causal intricacies of visual perception will be detailed by the special sciences.

Cases that present themselves as problematic for the causal theory are only problematic in so far as they are under-described. With a nuanced, detailed description of the same case, the causal theorist has fodder to fill in the appropriate explanation or eliminated it from a genuine instance of visual perception because if falls outside the constrains of the causal relations described by the special sciences. Rejoinder: the lack of definiteness of the cases that causal theories can cover is not a sign of erroneousness of causal theories, but an indication of the kind of world our believings and knowings (and intuitions) attend to.

Considering Noë’s point, we amend CTP₂ to address the two-dimensionality of the causal relation.

(CTP₃)[1] S sees that x is P iff there is a causal connection (of a certain sort) between S seeing that x is P and P (in relation to S as such) and S’s believing that x is P.³⁶
[2] x is P
[3] S’s seeing that x is P depends, causally, on x’s being P.

With this better-situated formulation of the causal argument that provides justification for visual perception, we can construct an analogue for philosophical intuition. The aim here is to produce an argument that parallels the causal argument for visual perception, one that someone cannot reject without also giving up the visual perception analogue.

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³⁶ Read ‘S intuits that x is P’ as a kind of “primitive propositional attitude” (Bealer, 1999, p. 31) and read ‘S intuiting that x is P’ as the cognitive process underlying. Hence, we avoid a substitution problem where the analysandum can be substituted in the analysans.

³⁷ Note that that I’m not making any claim to intuitive knowledge, only that the causal explanation is sufficient for justification. This is consistent with intuition’s being defeasible kinds of evidence.
5.3. Causal Theory of Intuition

Now, I can offer a parallel formulation for intuitions:

(CTI) [1] S intuits that x is p iff there is a causal connection (of a certain sort) between S intuiting that x is p and p (in relation to S as such) and S’s believing that x is p.

[2] x is p

[3] S’s intuiting that x is p depends, causally, on x’s being p.

(CTI) Example:

[1] S intuits that x (e.g., a Gettier case) is an instance of non-knowledge-justified-true-belief (NKJTB) if, and only if, there is a causal connection (of a certain sort) between S’s intuiting that x is an instance of NKJTB and NKJTB in relation to S as such (i.e., attending to the second-dimension of the causal connection) and S’s believing that x is an instance of NKJTB.

[2] x is an instance of NKJTB.

[3] S’s believing that x is an instance of NKJTB depends, causally, on x being an instance of NKJTB.

Some filling out of the details of CTI is due. Any filling out that I offer should be consistent with the visual perception analogue. In particular, I need to defuse the ambiguity regarding the nature of the two-dimensional causal relation. One difficulty that stands out is how to construe the relationship between S intuits that x is p and p where p isn’t the sort of things that one typically thinks bears a causal relation. For example, Bealer (1992) points out that intuition takes as its objects things such as modality, property identity, definition, evidence, justification, knowledge, and other similar ilk. Modality, property identity, definition, evidence, justification and knowledge are not the sorts of things that bear causal relations in ways visual perception do. CTP, takes as the objects of visual perception physical objects that are causally related to other objects, including one’s sensuous apparatus involved in one’s seeing the objects. Modality,

38 Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) use this term.
property identity, definition, evidence, justification, and knowledge are not the sorts of things that one’s background beliefs causally track in one-dimension, much less in two-dimensions. I briefly address this issue now and return to the nature of the causal connection below.

Consider a distinction that Pritchard (manuscript-a) draws between extensional and intensional intuitions. That is, extensional intuitions concern the application of a term to a putatively real or hypothetical case and intensional intuitions tell us about the its meaning. A common intensional intuition about knowledge, one which Pritchard offers as example, is that S’s knowledge that \( p \) entails that S believes that \( p \). However, intensional intuitions aren’t the sort of intuitions that one standardly draws from putatively real and hypothetical cases. That is, when one assesses the Gettier case, one doesn’t have the intuition that Smith’s knowledge that the man with ten coins will get the job in his pocket entails that Smith believes that the man with ten coins will get the job. So, intensional intuitions come apart from philosophical intuitions, even if they play a distinctive philosophical role.

Nevertheless, intensional and extensional intuitions can regard the same content. It is not hard to imaging a case where the target intuition has is that S’s knowledge that \( p \) entails that S believes that \( p \) or that S’s doesn’t know that \( p \) because S doesn’t believe that \( p \). Furthermore, the intension of knowledge, which (roughly) corresponds to one’s concept of knowledge (not to be confused with the concept of knowledge), is implicit in one’s extensional intuitions about knowledge. That is, it is a necessary presupposition of the case that if Smith didn’t believe that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job, Smith certainly wouldn’t know that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. So we can connect meaning and application. A further point to advance the idea: Bealer thinks that we can track concept possession by determining whether a speaker competently applies the corresponding term in a particular context. One can determine that someone possesses the concept of knowledge by deciding whether or not they apply the corresponding term accurately. So even though it doesn’t seem to be the case that we can (directly) causally track the concept of knowledge, we can track the concept of knowledge \( vis-à-vis \) the intuitional application of the cognate terms of the concept of knowledge.

\[39\] It seems that Pritchard has in mind here something akin to self-evidence accounts of intuition whereby one’s understanding of the meaning of the proposition is sufficient for one’s believing it.
knowledge to their extensions. So, even if there is no physical correlate of a concept we can track application of the cognate term to (merely possible) hypothetical cases where the concept instantiates.

Now that CTI has a little more *prima facie* plausibility, I can start to fill out what the formulation entails.

Regarding [1]: S intuits that \( x \) is \( p \) iff there is a causal connection (of a certain sort) between S intuiting that \( x \) is \( p \) and \( p \) (in relation to S as such) and S’s believing that \( x \) is \( p \), wherein intuition is a kind of propositional attitude that S takes regarding that \( x \) is \( p \) (S intuits that \( x \) is \( p \)) and S’s intuiting that \( x \) is \( p \) is the activity of that attitude. Consider the following example. Suppose that S intuits that the following:

\[(MP) \] if \( p \) then \( q \), therefore \( q \)' is an instance of a valid argument form.

When S has the intuitional attitude, she performs the activity of intuiting that MP. To fill out how we should understand, “in relation to S as such (i.e., attending to the second-dimension of the causal connection),” let us re-examine CTP\(_3\) to see what is the case for the perception formulation. In CTP\(_3\), S’s seeing that \( x \) is a mug and \( x \) is a mug and S’s believing that \( x \) is a mug are causally related. In CTI, NKJTB must hold a similar *trackable* relation to S. However, the intuition objector might point out that NTJTB is not a physical object; it is not anything like a mug. When epistemologist usually talk of, give arguments about, and present cases concerning knowledge and non-knowledge, they mean the concept of knowledge; or, in the case at hand, the concept of non-knowledge justified true belief. Philosophers want to find out how a particular concept applies in a given case. The Gettier case is just one example. Furthermore, since the overarching aim of the previous chapters has been to critique philosophers use and conception of intuition as they are used and conceived in the endeavour to apply them to hypothetical cases, the proposed method should not reach further than trying to give a method for conceiving hypothetical case intuitions. Hence, given the way the present approach is set out, NKJTB should be understood as the concept of NKJTB.

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40 There is a certain sort of ambiguity that arises since concepts are not necessarily identical with the meanings of the terms used to express them. Meanings can be somewhat imprecise when attached to terms. More could be said here regarding the relationship between concepts and their semantic expression. However, we only need to motivate the argument for the purpose of providing an example of the approach by theory.
Two questions need to be addressed: (1) What is the operative notion of concept? (2) Are concepts the sort of things that bear casual relations that can be tracked in two-dimensions?

(1) The dialectical juxtaposition of CTP3 and CTI precludes that we need to engage in a long-drawn-out attempt to say what concepts are in order to say what the operative notion of concept is in CTP3 and in CTI. In virtue of the dialect, both should turn on the same notion of concept. Otherwise, the dialectic setup dissolves. Here is one route that is not attractive. Consider the case where we stipulate that the notion of concept is a personal-psychological sense of concept, “a personal psychological sense of concept is that the concept is fixed by what’s in its owner’s head rather than what’s in the heads of other members of the community” (Goldman, 2007, p. 13). However, Goldman rejects these as the kind of concepts that are the target of our intuitions because they don’t fit the practice of offering hypothetical examples. A better fit, I (and Goldman) think, are concepts that can be shared, whereby an individual’s psychological concepts serve as a starting point, but discursive agreement and disagreement bring continuity amongst individuals’ psychological concepts. When one’s concept of knowledge is deviant, we give examples to correct it. For example, if two people were to discuss what a mug is they would come to hold roughly similar concepts of mug. Shared-concepts are what Goldman (2007) thinks philosophers aim at and operate with. Let us adopt shared psychological concepts as the operative notion of concepts in CTI. It stands to reason that shared psychological concepts are operative in CTP3.41

(2) Are shared-psychological concepts the sort of things that can bear causal relations in two-dimensions? The relevant counterfactual conditionals parallel those Noë offers for CTP. In the first dimension, one’s intuition would have been different if the target concept would have been different. In the second dimension, had one’s relation to the shared (psychological) concept been different, one’s intuition would have seemed different. Consider the evidence that experimental philosophers offer as criticisms of philosophers’ use of intuitions. They purport that the data suggests that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic differences, prone to error, and show that intuitions of

41 It is also possible to give the notion of concept here a gloss if the reader is unsatisfied with the shared psychological notion of concept. I think this position works well enough: When I use the notion of concept, I just mean that sort of concept I mean is whatever sort of concept ‘knowledge’ is when epistemologists try to say what knowledge is when they use hypothetical cases to give an analysis of knowledge. This is consistent with the scope of the argument.
the folk are inconsistent with the published intuition-data of professional philosophers. More specifically, consider Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001). The authors present experiments that test people’s intuitions on various Gettier-type cases. One significant finding is that East-Asians and Westerners attribute the concept of knowledge differently.

Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) think that these results and others like them support claims that epistemic intuitions vary between cultures. East-Asians tend to indicate that the agent knows, where Westerners tend to indicate that the agent merely believes. However, if we track the concept of knowledge causally, in its socio-historical context, we should not be surprised that East-Asians have different intuitions than Westerners. This is not a defect in intuition. Rather, it represents a failure to orient the analysis of the response to the concept in its correct sphere of those whom share it. If we track intuitions along the causal connections representing a concept’s development and current use in a socio-historical context, we find that intuitional deliverances are more reliable in that context. Where the criterion for reliability is something like consistency of intuitional deliverances among one’s epistemic peer group in that context. The data presented by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) tend to support such a move. Furthermore, one who restricts to domain of relevant intuitions to only the intuitional deliverances of philosophers, can disregard folk intuitions about knowledge. The idea here is that philosophical expertise is sufficient to motivate that there is a distinction between the intuitions of philosophers and those of the folk. Philosopher’s intuitions more reliably track the philosophical concept of knowledge, whereas intuitions of the folk are either unreliable, because the folk lack the relevant expertise, or folk intuitions track some concept other than the philosophical concept of knowledge. However, one might point out that caring about the intuitions of epistemologists is too narrow. It stifles the dialectical development of conceptual competence whereby users exchange their notions of ostensibly similar concepts with the aim of refining a ubiquitous shared concept. After

| Gettier intuitions: east and west (Weinberg et al., 2001) |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| Western                             | Really knows     | Only Believes   |
|                                     | 17               | 49              |
| East-Asians                         | 13               | 10              |

43 For example, participants in the study were presented with a Getter case, and the study arrived at the following results:
all, this seems to be the aim of contemporary epistemology. However, tracking the concept in the second-dimension is to track one’s relation to the concept as it has developed along these lanes of dialectical exchanges of concept refinement. For example, if one fails to track the concept knowledge through the exchange where justified true belief fails to be sufficient for knowledge, fake barn cases, fake-sheep cases, and truetemp cases, one’s intuitional deliverances about knowledge would presumably be less well off than intuitional deliverances that do. That is, one’s relation to the concept is describable in terms of one’s background beliefs.

I now turn to address the objection that explanation is not well suited to intuition’s justification.

5.4. Objections to CTI

Pust (2001) and Williamson (2004) attempt to defend their preferred theory of intuition from arguments that attempt to show that intuitions are not epistemically efficacious because intuition’s epistemic efficacy is not included in the best explanation of its occurrences. However, the proposed methodology relies centrally on explanation for justification. Williamson and Pust each make points suggestive of that explanation is not well suited to the justification of intuition. I address each of their points below.

Williamson (2004) argues that the demand for explanation of philosophical intuitions is an illegitimate one. The situation of the philosopher is one that requires the use of evidence. However, evidence can always be contested. Faced with any one piece of evidence, one’s interlocutor can always ask what one’s evidence for one’s evidence is. Thus, there simply is not an uncontestable starting point for (meta)philosophical inquiry (Williamson, 2004, p. 152). Furthermore, the demand of an explanation of intuitions use as evidence in philosophy is not one that the philosopher can satisfy because such explanations ultimately ground out in contingent psychological states – i.e., the psychologisation of evidence.44 Williamson’s point is that the requirement that one has evidence that their evidence is good evidence eventually turn out to depend on matters that are not philosophical (e.g., the reliability of our cognitive capacities is an empirical

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44 Williamson makes the following rhetorical point:

If we merely seek the best explanation of our having the intuitions, without any presumption in favor of their truth, we may find a psychological theory to explain them, but how are we to answer the questions about a mainly non-psychological universe that grip many metaphysicians and other philosophers? (Williamson, 2000, 236)
matter to be decided by scientific experimentation). However, if whether our evidence is
good evidence doesn’t ultimately rely on intuitions, intuitions lose their epistemic
authority – or, at least, intuitions authority as evidence is derivative. However, so do
epistemic claims that intuitions are not evidence, claims which themselves rely on
intuitions. So, there seems to be a kind of stalemate with regards to intuitions status as
evidence for philosophical claims.

Pust (2001) countenances that the perspective that the demand for explanation is
a legitimate dialectical move for one demanding reasons for why intuitions are at least
likely to lead one to the truth. However, the method on which the explanationist
argument relies is inconsistent with the content of the argument. Hence, the
explanationist argument is self-refuting. Pust (2001) sets up the explanationist sceptical
argument against intuitions by surveying the implementation of the explanationist
argument as it comes to be used in Goldman’s arguments against the use of intuitions to
of Goldman’s comments regarding the justificatory role of explanation in metaphysics to
apply broadly to how Goldman’s epistemological theory can be cashed out in
explanationist terms. Pust writes, “The credibility of intuitions as evidence for
metaphysical claims is undermined, Goldman maintains, if we can find good explanations
of our various intuitions that do not invoke objective metaphysical facts” (Pust, 2001, p.
233).

Pust lays out the explanationist objection to intuitions as evidence in the following
way:

[1] Aside from propositions describing the occurrence of her judgements, S is
justified in believing only those propositions which are part of the best
explanation of S’s making the judgements that she makes.
[2] Epistemic propositions are not part of the best explanation of S’s making the
judgements that she makes.
[3] S is not justified in accepting any epistemic propositions. (Pust 2001, 236)

Granting [2], the explanationist argument is only reasonable to accept if there are reasons

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45 Pust (2001) sets out the same argument for the metaphysical and moral domains. The key premise is
[1].
that justify believing that [1] is true. Pust (2001) suggests that there are only two ways to justify belief in [1]: [1] itself is intuitive or [1] is “inductively supported by our intuitions regarding particular cases of justified belief” (Pust, 2001, p. 243). Unfortunately, his discussion on these matters is too brief. Against the first proposal one could cite anecdotal evidence that many explanationists have offered defences of [1] by giving arguments and, if [1] were simply intuitive, no such argument would be necessary. Pust gives a somewhat different argument. He writes, “Against this, I can report that it isn’t at all intuitive to many of us that [1] is the correct criterion of justified belief. This is especially plausible once one sees what seem to be its sceptical implications” (Pust, 2001, p. 244). The second proposal suggests that explanationists support [1] by appeal to our intuitions about when (actual and hypothetical) belief is justified. However, many of those cases do not support [1]. Pust says little else at this point and moves to dismiss too casually. Nevertheless, a more difficult problem looms: even if the explanationist manages to garner intuitive support that [1] is true, the content of [1] and the fact that [1] is supported by way of intuition evidence is methodologically self-defeating. The explanationist cannot consistently endorse an intuitive method for justificatory support of [1] and hold that the content of [1] is justified.

In the context of the current proposal and given Williamson’s (2000, 2004) and Pust’s (2001) objections, I need to say why we should accept that the methodological move to offer an explanation of philosophical intuitions used as evidence is a legitimate move to make. I am required to do so because I want to use the explanationist strategy in the setup of an analogue of an argument that the intuition objector will not want to give up. That is, if I want to use explanation in my methodology for arguing for the epistemic status of intuitions, I need to defend it against those who would object to using explanation regarding intuition.

46 Pust’s argument on this matter is just this:

Consider, then, the second option for the explanationist, an inductive argument for [1] based on our intuitions about particular cases of justified and unjustified belief. To follow the route here envisaged, the explanationist would have to argue that [1] is supported by our intuitions regarding when particular actual and hypothetical beliefs are justified or unjustified. It is clear, I think, that the method of beginning with our intuitions about particular cases of justified belief will not support [1] since many of what seem, intuitively, to be our most justified beliefs run afoul of [1]. After all, many (though, of course, not all) of our particular epistemic beliefs, moral beliefs, and modal beliefs seem, intuitively, no less justified than our empirical beliefs. Indeed, some of them seem more justified. Since it seems implausible that all of these propositions are required in the best explanation of the occurrence of our judgements, it seems that [1], which requires such a role, derives no evidential support from such cases of intuitively justified belief. (Pust, 2001, p. 244)
At first gloss the difficulty seems severe. My aim is to give a positive explanation of intuitions as evidence in philosophical methods. Pust’s and Williamson’s points go to highlighting the lack of a solution to the dialectic between the intuition-theorist and the intuition-objector from the perspective of explanation. Williamson’s point is that the demand for explanation of evidence is illegitimate since evidence is not the sort of thing that rests on uncontestable grounds. The demand for explanation of one’s evidence is a moot point given the epistemic situation that we are in. Philosophy must start somewhere; namely, with the evidence that we have. Pust’s point is that the explanationist cannot mount a non-self-defeating objection to the explanation of intuitions’ use as evidence since the objections themselves require the use of intuitions as evidence. The upshot seems to be that to engage explanation as justification for intuitions as evidence is a frivolous pursuit. However, we should want to avoid that conclusion. We don’t want explanation to rely on philosophical intuition. To do so would commit us to begging the question when it comes to CTI, which relies on explanation for justification – and vis-à-vis, as Pust would have it, on intuitions. However, Pust leaves open the possibility of an explanation of intuitions as evidence. The argument he assesses is the negative argument that intuitions are not part of the best explanation of the occurrence of our judgments. He does not address the positive argument giving an explanation of the occurrences of our judgments, one that includes intuitions. Furthermore, that Pust’s negative argument fails doesn’t entail that we must also accept that the explanationist strategy relies on intuitions in a bad way. The argument relies on intuition in a bad way if it is not sanctioned by the dialectic with the intuition objector.

Reply to Williamson’s point: My aim is not to provide foundations for evidence but grip for moving a debate past its objectors. That is, I don’t want to engage in a project of providing explanation of the basic methods of philosophy. I want to setup the dialectic with objectors within a framework of agreed upon methods. Without a methodological context, there is no dialectic with the sceptic since there is no agreement on what epistemological claims are justified. I want the dialectic to remain neutral on that point in regard to the ultima facie grounds of intuitive evidence.
6. Summary

I have elucidated various approaches that philosophers use and appeal to in order to craft an account of intuitions, and to point out some shortcomings in those approaches that manifest singularly and in cooperation with other approaches. I have not intended this to be a systematic argument against such approaches. Rather, I have attempted to give a general picture of how notions of intuitions are presented. The reason for doing so was much in the way of setting up the Out-Competition Argument. I argued that finding the correct account of intuitions on standard philosophical methods is bound to fail. There is no theory of philosophical intuitions that can out-compete another without relying on a question begging argument or an epistemic regress. If this is correct, it is not true that one must be a sceptic regarding theories of intuitions. Rather, it is argued that armchair philosophical methodology by itself is insufficient. I think there is a way for philosophers to establish that intuition can do epistemic work. If the theory of intuition that one wants is a theory whereby intuition confers epistemic status, then one must also look outside the standard purview of philosophical methodology. It is my view that armchair philosophy on its own cannot offer an adequate defence of intuition-use because an adequate defence turns on what intuition is, as opposed to what intuitions must be.

In the next chapter, I present a survey about intuitions as professional philosophers conceptualise them. The results provide a springboard to a different kind of theory of intuition, one that countenances intuitions in non-justificatory roles. I discuss and defend such a theory of intuitions in the final chapter.
Chapter 4

This chapter addresses the definition and the operational use of intuitions in philosophical methods in the form of a research study, involving 282 philosophers from a wide array of academic backgrounds, areas of specialisation, and populating several regions of the globe. The survey examines whether philosophers agree on the conceptual definition and the operational use of intuitions, and investigates whether specific demographic variables and philosophical specialisation influence how philosophers define and use intuitions. The results obtained point to a number of significant findings, including that philosophers distinguish between intuitions used to formulate (discovery) and to test (justification) philosophical theory. The survey results suggest that strategies implemented to characterise philosophical intuition are not well motivated since, even though philosophers do not agree on a single account of intuition, they fail to capture a preferred usage of intuitions as aspects of discovery. The quantitative summary of survey findings informs the debate on this topic, and advances more defined routes for

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1 This chapter is from Kuntz, J.R. & Kuntz, J.R.C (Forthcoming). Surveying Philosophers about Philosophical Intuition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0047-2. The main text is my own; the analysis of the data is Dr. J.R.C. Kuntz, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Her essential contribution is included is Appendix 1 and 2.

2 Many credit Reichenbach (1938) for the distinction between context of justification and context of discovery. The distinctions origins are traced to philosophers as far back as Euclid and Aristotle (see Hoyningen-Huene, 1987) Salmon (1970) argues that the two contexts are historically and practically intertwined. Reichenbach’s distinction between context of discovery and context of justification separates the role of philosophy, whose sole concern (as he sees it) is with the context of justification, and the role of science, whose sole concern (as he sees it) is with the context of discovery, determining the psychological origin of a claim (Cf. Siegel, 1980). The context of discovery/justification distinction is used to argue for the disciplinary differences between philosophy of science and science. We can liken this distinction to one in epistemology, between the origin of a proposition and its justification. For example, I may come to hold the proposition ‘all bachelors are unmarried males’ in virtue someone’s utterance of it. However, my justification for believing it comes from understanding what it is to be a ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried and male’. However, the causes of belief are sometimes also reasons to believe, but not all cases of reasons to believe are normative; some are merely causal. When they are merely causal, philosophers have a tendency to disregard their epistemic significance.
subsequent approaches to the study of intuitions.

1. Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition

In the preceding chapters, I argued that standard a priori approaches to philosophical intuition are committed to relying on various epistemic vices. An epistemically unburdened theory of intuition is out of reach. In this chapter, I return to the frontlines of the debate about intuitions in philosophical methods. I explore how intuitions are conceived in terms of their use and definition by philosophers themselves. The experimental philosophers have been the dialectical springboard for the contemporary debate about the nature and epistemic efficacy of intuitions. The experimentalist rally against philosophers’ use of intuitions has prompted attempts to recover intuition for objections that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic differences, prone to error, and inconsistent with the published intuition-data of professional philosophers. Although experimentalists’ critiques and philosophers’ courted responses are relevant, they are not the focus of this chapter. Rather, the aim here is to test whether experimentalists’ characterisation of intuitions corresponds to the conception of intuition held by the philosophers they aim to criticise. The implication of the significant findings is more far reaching than the correctness of the experimentalists characterisation strategies. The findings point to widely underappreciated characterisation of intuitions. Namely, intuitions operate not only in roles of justification, but also in roles of discovery. The latter uses of intuitions are not well discriminated in the literature. However, as I show here, philosophers tend to agree that their role is important to the methods of philosophy. In the next chapter, I argue for a theory of philosophical intuition that countenances intuitions of both sorts. However, let’s here first survey the empirical evidence that supports such a bifurcation of intuitions.

The next section outlines the methods implemented to examine how philosophers conceive of the use of intuition in philosophical methods, and examines whether philosophers agree on accounts of intuition available in the literature. The data analyses suggests that experimentalist ways of characterising intuition-use in philosophical methods are inaccurate because they do not countenance that philosophers conceive of
intuitions in modes of justification and in modes of discovery. A number of objections are addressed in the closing section, including why a survey method is useful when a seemingly more useful method is to examine the work of philosophers directly. Improvements to survey research in this topic are suggested. The remainder of the present section of the paper outlines the strategies experimentalists implement to characterise intuition in terms of its use.

The characterisation strategies implemented to conceptualise the category of philosophical intuition are, at first glance, well-motivated since, as objectors point out, philosophers rely on substantially different accounts of intuition in practice. For example, some intuition theorists treat the act of intuiting as epistemically efficacious, an intellectual seeming, while others treat the content of intuition as epistemically efficacious, a self-evident proposition. We have seen in previous chapters that these are not exhaustive of the accounts of intuitions available in the extent literature. The disparity amongst notions of intuition available in the literature makes objecting to philosophical intuition difficult for experimentalists. Intuition objectors end up attacking an ‘undifferentiated mass’ of

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3 It is not my aim here to elaborate the theoretical implications for justificatory intuitions and intuitions of discovery. A systematic disentanglement of the uses of intuitions of discovery and of justification, and how intuitions of discovery and of justification are and can be cooperatively put to task will be addressed in the next chapter. I need here to only draw out the creditability of the distinction and report the salience of the distinction to ways that intuitions are ubiquitously characterised. I suggest the following: Justificatory intuitions are the sort put to work as epistemic support; they provide justification. Were the intuition undermined or defeated, (ceteris paribus) so too would the proposition it supports be epistemically diminished. Intuitions of discovery are not epistemically efficacious. They are causally related to theory construction in ways that relate propositions of salience to the theory context. These may be ill-motivated, faulty, plainly false or similarly incorrigible without (epistemic) effect on related propositions or theory context.

Examples of justificatory intuition are prevalent in philosophical methods. For example, Pust (2000) offers a thoroughgoing defence of intuitions as evidence, and Williamson (2004) defends the position that intuitions are a species of judgment. Both views present intuition in its justificatory role. Examples of intuitions of discovery are less obvious. Consider the role of intuition in dialectical argument. When engaged with argument, as one is presented with a move in chess, there are a number of moves one might make. Like in chess, one must see the alternatives and the relevant moves the opponent/interlocutor might make in response. The tactical solution is often intuited, a creative solution to the problem in the dynamic context of the debate. Experienced philosophers will often intuitively grasp the solution and the course of the dialectic in a couple of turns of the debate. For arguments to this point in the context of chess, see De Groot (1986) and Goblet and Chassy (2009). The next chapter gives arguments for how the bifurcation of intuitions is a subtile route to maintaining on the one hand, the standard picture of philosophical methodology whereby philosophical intuitions confer epistemic status, and, on the other hand, a theory of intuitions that can committing to epistemic vices in its own defence.

4 For example, self-evidential and seemings accounts of intuition differ from the kind of account offered by John Rawls (1951):

[I]t is required that the judgment be intuitive with respect to ethical principles, that is, that it should not be determined by a conscious application of principles so far as this may be evidenced by introspection. […] An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a thorough inquiry into the facts of the case, and it may follow a series of reflections on the possible effects of different decisions, and even the application of a common sense rule. (Rawls 1951, p. 183).

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intuition-kinds. Without a singular target, objections are easily rebuffed by pointing out that one’s preferred account of intuition is guilty only by association with other unsavory notions of intuition.\(^5\) Philosophers can avoid objections by defending individual accounts of intuition *ad infinitum* - a philosopher need only adopt a new or a slightly different account of intuition - , the proposed solution is to characterise intuition more generally to subsume the class of philosophers’ various construals of intuition. The two strategies for characterising intuition outlined below are indicative of the characterisation strategies employed in the literature. If these characterisation strategies fail, then experimentalists have misrepresented philosophers’ use of intuition.


**IDR** has the following conditions:

1. The strategy must take epistemic intuitions as data or input.
2. It must produce, as output, explicitly or implicitly normative claims or principles about matters epistemic.\(^6\)
3. The output of the strategy must depend, in part, on the epistemic intuitions it takes as input. If provided with significantly different intuitions, the strategy must yield significantly different output. (Weinberg *et al.* 2001, p. 432)

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\(^5\) Weinberg (2007) presents the problem this way:

A gloss of “intuition” that comports at all with both specialist and folk usage will take them to be a sort of intellectual seeming, phenomenologically distinct from perception (including proprioception and the like), explicit inference, and apparent memory traces. But this construal includes a rather large and motley class of cognitions. And the opponent [of philosophers reliance on intuition] would be unwise to keep the conversation focused on so broad a class, since it will include a great deal of cognition that the opponent presumably does not want to reject, such as the ordinary application of concepts to particulars (Bealer), or the claim that no object can be red all over and green all over (BonJour), or elementary mathematics (Sosa). The defenders can thus get away with – indeed, can benefit from – a vagueness in the target, as that vagueness lumps together the intuitions that the opponents really want to attack with many others that they really don’t, like criminals trying to hide themselves in a crowd of innocent bystanders. (Weinberg, 2007, p. 320)

\(^6\) “Explicitly normative claims include regulative claims about how we ought to go about the business of belief formation, claims about the relative merits of various strategies for belief formation, and evaluative claims about the merits of various epistemic situations. Implicitly normative claims include claims to the effect that one or another process of belief formation leads to justified beliefs or to real knowledge or that a doxastic structure of a certain kind amounts to real knowledge.” (Weinberg *et al.*, 2001, p. 432)
Characterisation Strategy 2: Weinberg (2007) endorses a second way of characterising intuition (perhaps also adding clarity to the intent of IDR): “Instead of thinking in terms of a problem with something philosophers have – the intuitions themselves – I suggest that we turn our attention to something philosophers do” (p. 320). What philosophers do is cite whether or not a concept (intuitively) applies to a given (usually hypothetical) case. As such, the intuition evidences (justifies) a particular philosophical claim. Intuitions can be faulty, wrong, or even perverse; on reflection, intuitions can be revised or brought into line with one’s other beliefs and judgments. Intuitions evidence philosophical claims and, in standard philosophical practice, do not themselves require any further, direct support. Weinberg labels this practice “Philosophers’ Appeals to Intuitions” (PAI).

In summary, the standard experimentalist objection to intuitions’ use in philosophical methods focuses on intuitions about hypothetical cases. These intuitions are regarded as evidence for a particular philosophical theory, providing justification for its correctness. If the experimentalist is correct, then philosophers need to re-evaluate the use of intuitions and give an explanation for their role as evidence, or move from their armchairs into the laboratory to determine how intuition operates in schema of the folk.

A formative question is to ask whether experimentalists have really captured the conception of intuition at work in philosophical methods. The aim of the following research is to determine whether there are discernible differences in philosophers’ conceptions of intuition and its uses in philosophical methods. The substantive research questions are divided into two groups. The first set of questions attempts to identify differences between the use of intuitions as justification and the use of intuitions as discovery. The second set of questions asks respondents to rank in respective order various definitions of intuition derived from the existing literature. The aim is to assess the correctness of the motivation behind strategies for characterising intuitions, and to assess how philosophers are conceiving of intuitions in practice.

2. Methodology

The data for the present study were collected via online survey. A survey link was sent to four philosophy list-servers: Philos-L, for philosophy in Europe; Philosop-l, for philosophy in North America, SPP-misc, for the Society for Philosophy and Psychology; and, Aphil-l, for the Australasian Association of Philosophy. The aim was to cast a broad
net about professional English-speaking philosophers. The survey link was active for three weeks. Overall, 282 professional philosophers agreed to participate in the study and completed the online survey. As shown in Table 1 (Henceforth, all tables can be found in Appendix 1), a larger proportion of participants were male (74.1%), white (87.6%), and had been granted or were currently pursuing their highest degree in philosophy, predominantly in the USA or Canada (43%), Northern Europe (29.6%), and Australasia (21.6%). In addition, half of the respondents had been practicing philosophy for less than 10 years (50.2%). With respect to area of specialisation, most of the categories provided were fairly well represented, though a greater proportion of respondents were associated to Metaphysics (10.6%), Epistemology (10.3%), Ethics (18.8%), Philosophy of Mind (17%), and Philosophy of Science (11.3%). This is a good depiction of the actual distribution across areas of expertise in the philosophical community.7

Respondents were instructed to access a web link connecting them to the survey page. The online survey consisted of 19 items, including demographic information (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, number of years practicing philosophy, area of specialisation, country and university where highest degree in philosophy was granted or currently being pursued, and current country and university affiliation), one measure with four items, one rank ordering exercise consisting of seven statements, and a cover page with a disclaimer regarding informed consent, confidentiality, and use of the data collected. The respondents were informed of the purpose of the research, conditions of participation, and deadlines for survey completion (see Appendix 3). In addition, the respondents were assured that only the principal investigators would review results.

Participants were professional philosophers, representing several regions of the globe and from a wide array of areas of specialisation. Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with each of the following four statements: “Intuitions are useful to justification in philosophical methods.”; “Intuitions are useful to discovery in philosophical methods.”; “Intuitions are essential to justification in philosophical methods.” and, “Intuitions are essential to discovery in philosophical methods.” In the final portion of the survey, respondents were asked to rank-order various definitions of intuition according to how they conceived intuitions’ use in philosophical methods.8

7 For reference, see Bourget and Chalmers (2009), who conducted a survey using a much larger sample size of philosophers.
8 The interest here is to examine whether differences emerge along the demographics surveyed by experimental philosophers – ones that reportedly impugn the practice of using intuition, e.g., group
3. Measures

The survey distributed in this study was comprised of two measures. These measures are described in detail in the following sections.

3.1. The Importance of Intuition in Philosophical Methods

A measure to assess perceptions of the importance of intuitions in discovery (e.g., theory development) and justification (e.g., theory evaluation) was developed for the present study (see Appendix 2). The aim of this measure was to determine individual perceptions of the degree of relevance of intuitions in philosophical methods. Participants were asked to evaluate the four statements, presented simultaneously, along 7-point a Likert-type scale with anchors from 1 (disagree to a very large extent) to 7 (agree to a very large extent).⁹

3.2. Rank-ordering Accounts of Intuition

In the subsequent section of the survey, participants were asked to rank-order seven accounts of intuition according to how each was consistent with their notion of intuition used in philosophical methods. The accounts presented in the survey were obtained from the literature. The original list compiled from a survey of the literature included 29 distinct accounts. Those that appear in the survey were selected on the basis of clarity –

affiliation (Weinberg et al., 2001) – and whether these differences emerge along demographic variables within the discipline. These variables include years of professional practice and academic affiliation. An observation made by G.A. Cohen (2000), one he makes from his armchair, motivates asking the respondents' academic affiliation. He writes,

[P]eople of my generation who studied philosophy at Harvard rather than at Oxford for the most part reject the analytic/synthetic distinction. And I can’t believe that this is an accident. That is, I can’t believe that Harvard just happened to be the place where both its leading thinker [Quine] and its graduate students, for independent reasons - merely, for example, in the independent light of reason itself- also came to reject it. And vice-versa, of course, for Oxford. […] So, in some sense of “because,” and in some sense of “Oxford,” I think I can say that I believe in the analytic/synthetic distinction because I studied at Oxford. And that is disturbing. For the fact that I studied at Oxford is no reason for thinking that the distinction is sound. (Cohen, 2000, p. 18)

If conceptual differences occur in regard to the analytic/synthetic distinction, we can posit that differences could be present in regard to conceptions of intuition as well.

⁹ The scale’s internal consistency was .82. Also, because the four importance statements were presented on the same survey page, a within-subjects analysis of variance was ran to assess whether study participants rated these statements similarly. Results showed that there were significant differences across ratings of importance.
after some refinement in an attempt to make them intelligible to a broader audience and more theory-independent —, and representative of the literature surveyed. Nine accounts were presented in a pilot survey distributed to the staff and post-graduate students at the University of Edinburgh. Two accounts were subsequently removed from the final survey due to a low degree of intelligibility (indicated by comments from participants) and a close similarity to other accounts of better quality. The remaining accounts of intuitions provide a representation of the kinds of accounts of intuition available in the literature. The seven accounts used in the present survey are as follows:

1. Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process (Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, 1998);
2. An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering (Weinberg, 2007);
3. A propositional attitude that is held with some degree of conviction, and solely on the basis of one's understanding of the proposition in question, not on the basis of some belief (Skelton, 2007);
4. An intellectual act whereby one is thinking occurrently of the abstract proposition that \( p \) and, merely on the basis of understanding it, believes that \( p \) (Sosa, 1998);
5. An intellectual state made up of (1) the consideration whether \( p \) and (2) positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for \( p \); together constituting *prima facie* reason to believe that \( p \) (Bedke, 2008);
6. The formation of a belief by unclouded mental attention to its contents, in a way that is so easy and yielding a belief that is so definite as to leave no room for doubt regarding its veracity (Descartes, *Rules*, Rule 3, EA155); and,
7. An intellectual happening that serves as evidence for the situation at hand’s instantiation of some concept (Goldman, 2007).

4. Discussion

The survey’s primary aim was to determine whether IDR and PAI strategies for
characterising intuition were consistent with philosophers’ conception of intuition-use in philosophers’ practices. The motivation behind these strategies, i.e., that philosophers do not share a common account of intuition that stands as target for the experimentalists’ objections, was also questioned. The analysis of survey results elicited a number of findings that merit detailed discussion. The major findings are addressed below.

With respect to the main research propositions - 1) the IDR and PAI strategies are inaccurate because they fail to be motivated properly and, 2) philosophers are using intuition as a mode of discovery and as a mode of justification -, support for both propositions was identified. The following section details how the survey results inform the advanced research propositions, and offers ways to reform methods of examining intuitions in philosophical methods.

4.1. The Importance of Intuition in Philosophical Methods

Regarding the second research proposition, philosophers exhibited greater levels of agreement with the statement that describes intuitions as *useful* to discovery than the statement that describes them as *useful* to justification. Furthermore, philosophers were divided regarding whether intuitions are *essential* to justification and tended to agree, though only slightly more so, that intuition is *essential* to discovery. Since the questions were presented together, in the same section of the survey, it is likely that the scores were attributed in relation to one another. Methodologically, it was important to present the statements simultaneously: the juxtaposition motivates the meaning and the context of “useful” and “essential”, as well as “discovery” and “justification”. The results indicate that philosophers agree with using intuitions as justificatory elements in their methods as well as using them to roles of discovery (e.g., to explore or to expand philosophical theory). The high frequency of responses indicating that intuition is not essential to justification is somewhat surprising and some might find this theoretically problematic for grounding philosophical theory. For example, Stephan Hales (2000) argues that some form of foundationalist justification about intuition is necessary for non-empirical knowledge. Other moderate rationalists are committed to similar theses (See Audi 2001, 2004; BonJour 1998). However, it may be the case that not many philosophers carry the

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10 No explicit definition of “discovery” and “justification” was offered to participants since the aim of the survey was to test philosophers’ own concepts of intuition and its uses. There was some worry that explicit definition or description of key terms would bias the results.
similar commitments to intuitions’ role in foundational justification. The results indicate philosophers think of intuitions as more useful than essential in regard to both justification and discovery. Furthermore, only 23.5% of participants agreed that intuitions were essential to justification. This suggests that intuitions’ role in philosophical methods may not be critical to the practice. If intuitions are not critical to justification, then some explanation of what grounds philosophical argument is necessary in light of worries about epistemic regress and circularity.\footnote{The theoretical implications of this are mitigated once one considers that other sources of justification can be foundational or play foundational roles (e.g., visual perception or some form of basic reliability).} Future research could advance from the present methodology by including interviews of a cross-section of participants to attempt to ascertain what it is that philosophers think performs this epistemic ground, if not intuitions.

Note that I am not taking position on the claim that intuitions are not in fact essential to justification. Moreover, I have yet to argue how the distinction between intuitions of justification, which epistemically support philosophical claims, and intuitions of discovery, which do not provide epistemic support, should be cached out. Rather, it is merely pointed out that philosophers tend to think that intuitions of discovery are also conceived as operative in philosophical methods. As much is confirmed by the analysis, and bears on whether IDR and PAI accurately characterise intuitions’ robust role in the philosophical methodology. IDR and PAI strategies fail to differentiate intuitions of discovery in the class of philosophical intuitions. This is problematic since experimentalist research methods do not distinguish whether the target intuition is intended to be justificatory or merely operate in a discovery role (e.g., identifying salient propositions in the thought experiment for further inquiry). Thus, criticisms of intuitions lump together intuitions of discovery with their intended target (i.e., justificatory intuitions). Whether intuitions of discovery are unreliable, subject to demographic differences, or prone to error has little justificatory import to the justification of philosophical claims.

In regard to the usefulness of intuitions to justification, the results also revealed that philosophers of science expressed significantly lower agreement than philosophers doing metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. In addition, philosophers of science displayed significantly lower agreement than ethicists in regard to intuitions being essential to justification. This is consistent with the naturalistic purview of the specialty. Philosophers of science aim at an empirical discipline, where empirical
findings are the primary source of the justification (e.g., by way of confirmation or
disconfirmation of proposed hypotheses). As a general claim about scientific practice,
conjectures and hypotheses are tested against empirical results, whereas empirical
evidence plays the justificatory role. Intuitions play diminutive roles the ultimate
justifications of the hard sciences. Philosophers of science might be following suit. When
juxtaposed with ethics, the difference becomes more salient. Ethicists tend to rely heavily
on intuitions about normative claims, which have no similar empirical results on which to
rely for justification (e.g., casuistic and reflective equilibrium strategies). This suggests that
the philosophy of science may be outside the experimental philosophers’ criticisms of
philosophical methods. However, this will have little impact on their project of
undermining a priori armchair intuitions since the data suggests that philosophers of
science tend not to indicate that they use intuition in the manner criticised in the
literature.

No obvious explanation presents itself regarding the distinction between the
context of justification and the context of discovery. Given the prevalence of the
distinction as it pertains to the philosophy of science, it is likely that philosophers of
science are quite familiar with the concept as it is used to distinguish their own specialty
from its target disciplines in science (cf. Schiemann, 2006). One might presume that they
interpret that intuitions’ usefulness to justification is definitional of philosophical practice.
If the root of the distinction between justification and discovery were a disciplinary one,
i.e., indexing justification to philosophy and discovery to science, one would expect that
intuitions’ use would more readily correspond to justification.

One might find that the methodology employed in asking participants to agree or
disagree with statements regarding intuitions’ usefulness and essentiality to discovery and
justification was deficient, since philosophers could have interpreted the statements in a
number of ways. Participants could have interpreted the statements as inquiring about the
general practice of employing intuition in philosophy; about their own practices of
employing intuition; or, normatively, about how intuitions should be employed in
philosophy. The survey attempts to mitigate interpreting the statements normatively by
using no normative terms in the statements. Future survey research should aim at
disambiguating the evaluative context.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} I am aware that the ambiguity of the evaluative context of the statements of essential and useful to
justification and of discovery leaves open a number of gaps between the survey findings and what might
Another and related concern is that higher levels of agreement with discovery statements than with justification statements might be explained by the fact that satisfying the concept of ‘useful in discovery’ is generally easier than satisfying the concept of ‘useful in justification’. It is, for example, much easier for something to be useful in discovery than useful in justification. One would expect that if the ease of satisfying the concepts were affecting how participants evaluated the statements, agreement with useful to discovery statements would have an overall higher ratings than useful to justification. Indeed, this is what the analysis of the data reveals. We also find a difference in ratings with regard to intuitions being essential to discovery and essential to justification. However, there is no similar ease in satisfying the concept of ‘essential in discovery’ or in satisfying the concept of ‘essential in justification’. Hence, one can infer that ease of concept satisfaction was not the primary evaluative criterion participants used to assign ratings to the statement. Future research design should attempt to identify cognitive processes and theoretical concerns that account for differences in agreement level between statements of importance to discovery and to justification.

4.2. Rank-ordering Accounts of Intuition

The survey results offer no indication that philosophers think differently about what intuition is on the basis of area of specialty or other demographic constraints. It should be noted that although the survey was distributed to a worldwide sample of philosophers, only an English version was provided, and a predominantly English-speaking sample participated in the study. Further empirical research is needed to identify demographic variation in conceptions and uses of intuition in philosophy.

That a similarly proportion of respondents ascribes the highest ranks to Account 1 and Account 2 (“Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable be claimed that the findings support. For example, the present argument relies thinking that the actual practices of philosophers are indicative of their reflections on, and conceptions of, intuition and intuitional methodologies. One can question the strength of that inference by pointing to a number of gaps between the survey findings and the actual practices of philosophers, including a gap between philosophers’ conception of intuition-use and actual practices of intuition-use in philosophical methodology, and a gap between philosophers’ conception of their own use of intuitions and conception of intuitions being essential to philosophical methodology. Future survey research should aim to eliminate these gaps. The current survey findings are offered with acknowledgement of these infelicitous artifacts of the original survey design.

13 Moreover, 70% of participants indicated that intuitions were not essential to justification, where one would expect ratings to go in the opposite direction given well-know worries about epistemic circularity and regress.
and explicit reasoning process.” and “An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering.” does not offer much hope that the conception of intuition is ubiquitous in philosophical methods. The first account is consistent with Williamson’s (2004) characterisation of intuition and is a primary motivation for Weinberg’s PAI. The characterisation that Weinberg offers of intuition in that paper also happens to be the basis of the second account of intuition (cf. Bealer, 1998, 2000; Bedke, 2008; Pust, 2000, 2001; Pust & Goldman, 1998). Furthermore, the two accounts are significantly different, as they have markedly different epistemic underpinnings. One account introduces intuition as a species of judgment, and the other presents intuition as a kind of intellectual seeming. Although both have similar phenomenology – i.e., they occur as the upshot of unobserved processes -, intellectual seemings are not judgments. As such, the accounts are inconsistent. Hence, there is not one clear account of intuition on which the respondents agree. The rank ordering exercise does not offer evidence that there is a systematic and unambiguous notion of intuition that philosophers agree on. This lends some degree of confirmation to support the motivation behind IDR and PAI, suggesting that philosophers do work with different conceptions of intuition in practice. This should not be a surprising result given the variety of intuition accounts available in the literature. However, the fact that philosophers differ on the conceptual formulation of intuition does not override the previously stated conclusion that philosophers tend to think of intuitions in discovery roles more so than in justificatory roles. The first proposition remains supported.

The findings also highlight that specific accounts were systematically ranked in high or in low positions. A reason for these findings has been drawn from an examination of the comments given by participants. The respondents expressed their difficulty in conceptualising some of the accounts of intuition presented. As a result, the more easily conceptualised accounts may have received higher rankings than the less discernible ones. For example, the lowest ranked account (“An intellectual state made up of (1) the consideration whether p, and (2) positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p; together constituting prima facie reason to believe that p”) may not have seemed as straightforward to the majority of the respondents as some of the highest ranked accounts. However, using a heuristic account is consistent with the target of the experimentalists’ critique. It is likely that philosophers in their common practices of
appealing to intuition do not have in mind a well-formulated, robust account of intuition.

Some significant correlations emerged when the results of the two parts of the survey were analysed. Philosophers that ranked highly Account 7 (“An intellectual happening that serves as evidence for the situation at hand’s instantiation of some concept.”) tended to have higher perceptions of usefulness and of essentiality of intuitions to justification. This is surprising given that intuitions treated as evidence play justificatory roles. Philosophers thinking of intuition as evidence would tend to think highly of intuitions as justificatory. In regard to intuition as discovery, philosophers that ranked highly Account 2 (“An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering.”) tended to also have higher perceptions of usefulness and of essentiality of intuitions to discovery. Account 2 leaves open whether the intuitions are justificatory. Philosophers holding this conception of intuition would then be open to intuition playing discovery roles, which is consistent with higher levels of agreement with statements regarding intuitions being useful and essential for discovery.

There are a number of limitations to the study that deserve comment and inform further research. The difficulty for participants in apprehending some of the accounts of intuition underscores the need for conceptual refinement in future empirical examinations of intuition. For example, philosophers theorising about what intuitions are dismiss that intuitions are hunches or guesses. However, analysis of the data suggests otherwise. Philosophers indicate thinking of their use of intuitions in the context of discovery, which does not eliminate that intuitions are hunches or guesses. If philosophers are correct in thinking about intuitions in these terms, presumably the epistemology of intuitions is either not central to the justification of philosophical theories, or intuitions play some other additional kind of epistemological role that is not primarily justificatory.

Another limitation of this study pertains to potential bias in attitude elicitation due to the manner in which the survey questions were presented. Specifically, the survey requested that participants offered their opinion about the role of intuition, not about their

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14 For example, George Bealer (2000) writes, “phenomenological considerations make it clear that intuitions are likewise distinct from judgments, guesses, hunches, and common sense. My view is simply that, like sensory seeming, intellectual seeming (intuition) is just one more primitive propositional attitude.” Pust (2001) holds the same kind of position. Pust argues that merely on the basis of one’s first-person experience of intuiting one eliminates that intuitions are not hunches or guesses, citing “the intuitive peculiarity of calling one’s Gettier intuition or logical intuition ‘a guess’ or ‘a hunch’” (Pust, 2001, p. 34 - emphasis added).
own use of intuition. The results may only represent a general, aggregate assessment of how respondents conceive of other philosophers’ use of intuition. Suppression and deflection effects may also be present, but unaccounted for. If these are present, participants’ responses would not indicate actual practices, but instead how philosophers want to believe intuition is defined and operationally used. These effects may be undermined by the accounts of intuition presented, which already appear in the literature, suggesting that at least some philosophers already conceive of intuition in these ways.

One might also worry about the potential for non-response bias and how it may have affected the conclusions drawn in the paper. In essence, the study seems to introduce potential for two types of issues: 1) the sample is mainly comprised of respondents sympathetic to the research methodology employed; therefore the sample was not representative of the general philosophical community, and 2) respondents self-select based on their interest in and views toward the subject matter. A consequent of either are results that are not representative of what might have been found in the broad philosophical community. Considering the comments collected from participants, different groups of respondents – motivated by sympathetic and unsympathetic attitudes toward the method and subject matter - seem to be represented in this study.

One could object to the implications of the survey results on the grounds that a survey method is an inaccurate means to deciphering how intuitions are used in philosophy, and that a better way would be to compile the published work of philosophers. Analysing the published work of philosophers closes the gap between philosophers’ own interpretation of philosophical practice and disambiguates the various ways the research questions could have been interpreted by participants. Furthermore the body of available evidence is the published work of philosophers, so the available evidence is very broad indeed. However, the available work of philosophers covers only those intuitions that make it into publication. It suffices to say that a great deal of philosophers’ intuitions go without mention in publication. Yet, they remain in the dialectical repertoire of philosophical debate held in professional conferences, departmental talks, and wherever philosophers express, create and defend their views. These views are accessible using a survey method, whereas a systematic review of the literature would leave them absent. In short, I acknowledge that there is a conceptual gap between what the survey assesses - i.e., philosophers’ conceptions of the use and of the nature of intuition, and what philosophers actually do - and that a survey method has
certain limitations. However, this is not to say that a survey method is not useful at all. The survey has drawn out that philosophers tend to think that intuitions can play discovery roles, a point not readily deployed in the literature.

There is a further issue in reviewing literature directly. Although one finds that the distinction between intuitions of discovery and intuitions of justification is cogent, there is little mention of the distinction in regard to intuitions in the literature. To satisfy detractors, one can show that the distinction is actually part of philosophical practice by pointing to instances in the literature when philosophers have indicated their intuitions as being used in roles of discovery. The examples are available in the philosophy of science literature: Kuhn’s notion of intuition is that of a “mode of hypothesis formation” (Fricker 1995). Henri Poincaré (1908) writes, “It is by logic that we prove, but by intuition that we discover” (p. 129). Kingsbury and McKeown-Green (2009) comment on the use of intuitions in formulating concepts in linguistic theory, including grammaticality and synonymy. “The aim of pumping these intuitions is [...] to amass fallible information for the use in construction and testing of a theory about what rules the native speaker has internalized” (Kingsbury & McKeown-Green, 2009, p. 175 - emphasis added). Intuitions are both what we make theories from and test theories against, and play roles of discovery and of justification.

Another objection one might lay against the survey approach here is that the argument presented is methodologically self-defeating. That is, I have attempted to support the view that intuitions are not accurately characterised in philosophical methodology by relying on intuitions of philosophers for epistemic support. Hence, the conclusions presented here are committed to the same methodological use of intuitions that the argument aims to critique. However, the survey was not constructed to elicit intuitive responses. The first set of questions regarding intuitions of discovery and intuitions of justification were presented simultaneously to participants. The questions themselves were articulated such that understanding the questions required the participant to read the entire question-set and make a considered, reflective judgment. Likewise, the second set of questions required some modicum of reflection and considered judgment about the proper ordering of intuition-types. It is possible that participants may have ranked accounts by appealing to intuition. However, whether participants’ responses were intuition-dependent doesn’t undermine the support for the research propositions since none of the research propositions call into question whether intuitions can do epistemic
work, and no substantive position on this aspect of the intuition debate has been taken here.

Another objection that might be pressed is that the argument against IDR and PAI is obscurantist rather than substantive. I aim to undermine motivation behind IDR and PAI by showing that philosophers conceive of intuitions in a role that IDR and PAI fail to distinguish from the intended target. That is, the experimentalist has mistakenly lumped together intuitions of discovery with intuitions of justification. However, even if that is the case, the experimentalist still has a legitimate target of criticism. Philosophers still use intuitions for justification. Hence, I haven’t undermined the experimentalists’ motivation for IDR and PAI, I’ve just pointed out that experimentalists need to do a better job of hashing out the targets of their objections.

Nevertheless, even if all one thinks that the survey analyses show is that experimentalists need to do a better job of hashing out the target of criticisms, that in itself is a substantive point to press in the literature on intuitions. Furthermore, it is a point that is deserving of attention more generally. Some recent attempts have been made towards spelling out what the distinction entails (e.g., Deutsch, 2010). Nevertheless, the onus seems to fall on the experimentalist to correctly identify the target of his or her criticisms. Some of the intuitions in the crowd are completely innocent bystanders.

The experimentalist might press back on the point that the dialectical onus is on him or her to be more precise about the kinds of intuitions that (1) motivate IDR and PAI and (2) the kind of intuitions that IDR and PAI aim at characterising. Even if the experimentalist has it wrong regarding what intuitions roles are in philosophical methodology, IDR and PAI still have their targets in the kinds of intuitions that do epistemic work. Regardless of what intuitions motivate either account, the most prevalent conception of intuitions in the philosophy literature is intuitions doing epistemic work. This kind of point goes to highlight the importance of the methodology employed by this chapter. Merely examining the literature on philosophical intuitions would likely go towards supporting the experimentalist rejoinder. However, when philosophers are asked about intuitions in philosophical methodology, a much different picture has begun to emerge. At the very least, the fact that intuitions of discovery are effective in philosophical methodology is supported by the present findings. Further works needs to be done to fish out what that fact entails.

Future research would benefit from conducting sorting exercises to identify
categories of intuition accounts, and from assessments of similarity among accounts of intuition to determine whether specific accounts are categorised similarly by different individuals. Philosophical analysis for the respective viability of each account in philosophical methods would also be beneficial. That is, each account would benefit from an epistemological analysis evaluating whether intuition conceived as such can actually do the epistemic work that philosophers report it as doing.

Finally, the present research aims at the actual practices of philosophers and the methodologies in which they deploy intuition. There is a gap between how philosophers actually deploy and use intuition, and what they report as how intuition is used in practice. Closing the gap can be helped by expanding the survey and asking participants to evaluate their own work, prompting them to examine how they have used intuition in publication, professional presentations of their work, and in conversations about philosophy generally. Results would more precisely identify the ways intuition is used in the various modes of philosophical practice, and the ways participants actually use intuitions.

5. Summary

The survey results tend to confirm that the IDR and PAI strategies are not well motivated since, even though philosophers do not agree on a single account of intuition, they fail to capture the preference for intuitions as aspects of discovery rather than justification. Furthermore, although survey methods have certain limitations regarding access to the actual practice of philosophers, they add legitimacy to the claims that philosophers use intuition in discovery roles in addition to their use in justificatory roles. In the next chapter, I disentangle the various uses of intuitions in the creative and in the justificatory contexts of philosophical methodology.
Chapter 5

In this final chapter, I expound on the distinction between justificatory intuitions and discovery intuitions, with particular focus on the latter sorts. I situate the distinction in what I call the “method of agreement”. The idea is similar to the approach by theory. In the approach by theory, S models a theory of intuition on a theory that an intuition-objector would not want to give up. (Pre-)theoretical commitments remove the intuition objector’s capacity to reasonably object. The underlying idea was that there is sufficient agreement on relevant aspects of the respective theories and sufficient symmetry in their supporting arguments that the objector cannot reject the theory of intuition without rejecting its analogue. On the method of agreement, I aim to make agreement clear, straightforward and epistemically efficacious in the justification of a theory of philosophical intuitions. Focally, the method of agreement also serves as a framework for elucidating intuitions of discovery.

Two considerations require some prefatory attention. First are the roles of intuitions in the justification of a theory of philosophical intuitions. Discovery intuitions are epistemically relevant, although not efficacious, in the sense that they do not confer epistemic status but play a role in justification. Discovery intuitions provide fodder for philosophical argument by innovation (e.g., providing hypotheses for consideration), by identifying what sorts of cases concepts may and may not apply to (i.e., sketching the shape of a concept), by identifying in which situations a property putatively instantiates (i.e., sketching the property) or by making salient relevant features of hypothetical cases. The second consideration is to determine what one’s justification for a theory of philosophical intuition can ultimately rely on if not (epistemically) on intuitions. However, the centrality of philosophical intuitions in the methods of philosophy precludes that one can completely eliminate intuitions from its methods. For example, Williamson writes,
It can seem, and is sometimes said, that any philosophical dispute, when pushed back far enough, turns into a conflict of intuitions about ultimate premises: ‘In the end, all we have to go on is our intuitions’. (Williamson, 2004, p. 109)

This leads us to the argument I presented in Chapter 3 that the defence of intuitions ultimately ends up relying on intuition in a bad way, by appeal to an epistemic vice, i.e., question-begging, epistemic regress, or epistemic circularity. One proposed option to redress the issue of justification is a method of assessing hypothetical cases that doesn’t depend on intuitions at all (Deutsch, 2010). Another option is to relegate intuitions entirely to non-justificatory roles, whereby intuitions are merely (and only) a causal impetus for bringing about beliefs¹ (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, 2009b). Both approaches are unattractive. The first fails to give an adequate explanatory story of intuitions’ central role in philosophical methodology; the second excludes some significant intuitions that are central to philosophical arguments. What follows is that if a method of justifying a theory of intuition does so by relying on intuitions in a bad way, then some alternative epistemic grounding is required, allowing for a theory of philosophical intuition to be justified without appealing to an epistemic vice.

The present chapter is structured in the following way. I summarise the relevant arguments from the preceding chapters. I then sketch the method of agreement and I elucidate the nature of intuitions of discovery (or innovation), drawing together their respective roles in the context of the method of agreement. I respond to objections and offer an account of progress in philosophy.

1. How things shape up

In Chapter 1, I outlined the literature regarding contemporary theories of philosophical intuitions and set out three competing kinds of theories: self-evidence, intellectual seemings, and judgment theory of intuitions. I distinguish the extant theories on the basis of epistemological features that make intuitions epistemically efficacious, or effective. The self-evidence theory offers a view whereby intuited beliefs are justified in virtue of one understanding their contents and believing them on the basis of that

¹ Notice that here the distinction between intuiting and the belief formed on the basis of one’s intuiting.
understanding. To make light of the self-evidence theory, I presented the Undercutting Argument. I argued that defenders of self-evidence views fail to be able to distinguish between actual intuitional deliverances and (phenomenologically) immediate beliefs that are inferentially based on at least one other of his or her beliefs. The latter are phenomenologically similar to intuited beliefs, inferentially justified, and fail to avoid epistemic regress objections. Hence, they fail to be able to operate in the grounding roles that moderate rationalists put them in. Granted, this is not an epistemic failure of the conception of intuitions under self-evidence theories, but a pragmatic one. Nevertheless, pragmatic failure should be recognised as an acute problem for self-evidentialists. If the self-evidentialists cannot say which phenomenologically immediate beliefs are actual intuited beliefs, they fail to render an account of intuition that has epistemological application beyond the level of theoretical specification.

A second competing theory of intuitions is the intellectual seemings view whereby intuitions are distinctive intellectual episodes entailing the seeming necessity of the intuited content. Intellectual seemings are sources of evidence in virtue of a reliable modal tie to the truth. A reliable tie to the truth comes by way of determinate concept possession. One determinately possesses a concept (roughly) if one deploys the concept correctly. Given some target concept, say, the concept of knowledge, one reliably intuits that knowledge does not apply in the Gettier case if one and one’s epistemic counterparts apply the concept of knowledge in roughly the same ways. Notably, this leaves some wiggle-room for possessing the correct concepts.² Bealer (2000) allows that determinate concept possession is discursive and evolving in a community of competent users. Given enough time and substantive dialogue, the correct concepts can be derived. Hence, it is possible that one possesses (or it is possible for one to possess) the correct set of concepts. I argued that intellectual seemings views of intuition rely too heavily on the seemingness of putative intuitional phenomena. On the one hand, it is fairly benign that one relies on intuitional phenomena to identify intuitions (pre-theoretically) for the purpose of getting clear on the object of philosophical inquiry. On the other hand, using intuitional phenomena as criteria for delivering the theoretical constraints for what does and does not count as an intuitions is ill-fated, since it illegitimately, in my view, restricts certain intellections from being properly considered as to whether or not they are intuitions. At

² Overall, this is a virtue of Bealer's theory. It's consistent with Goldman's notion of shared psychological concepts.
the very least, some further argument or approach is necessary to exempt hunches and guesses.

Finally, I presented the judgment theory of intuitions, which appeals to the general reliability of judgments as the source of intuitions’ ability to confer epistemic status. I have not offered much by way of a specific objection to the judgment view. Nevertheless, it falters, along with other armchair approaches to theories of intuition, to the Out-competition Argument. The Out-competition Argument shows why theories of intuition cannot out-compete one another without relying on an epistemic vice. That is, a defence of intuition inevitably relies on a theory of intuition in a question begging or an epistemically circular way, or by appealing to epistemic regress; undermining that a theory of intuition is knowably better than its competitors. The results of the Out-competition Argument left (GI) in a lurch.

**{(GI)}** If it were the case that there is a correct theory of philosophical intuition, then there is one and only one correct theory of philosophical intuition.

Either there is no correct theory of intuition or there is more than one correct theory (or there is none). However, the methods presented are not exhaustive of the *a priori* methods that might be implemented. Moreover, the Out-competition Argument only countenanced theories of intuition wherein intuitions confer epistemic status. Treating intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status is consistent with the received view wherein philosophers’ intuitions provide evidence or justification for a philosophical claim. Buckwalter and Stich (*manuscript*), for example, write,

> The bottom line is that in philosophy intuitions are often taken to be evidence relevant either to the truth or falsity of a philosophical theory that purports to characterize some philosophically important phenomenon (like knowledge or reference or moral permissibility), or to an account of some philosophically important concept. (Buckwalter & Stich, *manuscript*)

And, Bealer writes,

> Clearly, it is our standard justificatory procedure to use intuitions as evidence (or
The practice is prevalent enough that it suffices to say that intuitions are utilised to confer epistemic status in philosophy. However, the contemporary literature has focused mainly on a caricature of intuitions as epistemic status-conferring. Suppose that someone criticizes intuitions on the basis of empirical evidence that some candidate intuitions concerning a specific hypothetical case are unreliable and exhibit cultural variability (cf. Weinberg et al., 2001). However, such a view presupposes that the intuitions in question play epistemic roles that are justificatory. That is, one attends only to the caricatured notion of intuition-use. Rejoinders try to articulate an account of intuition that can maintain intuitions’ ability to confer epistemic status in the face of objections leveled by experimental philosophers (and others).

Contrasting the objections of experimental philosophers and the rejoinders of intuition-friendly philosophers, the survey results from Chapter 4 provide evidence that professional philosophers tend to think that intuitions operate in justificatory and in discovery roles. That is, the caricature of intuitions in philosophical methods is wrongheaded or, at least, incomplete. The results indicated that philosophers considered that non-justificatory uses of intuition were not only useful but also essential to methods of philosophy, more so than justificatory uses. My aim in this chapter is to defend a view of philosophical intuitions that bifurcates intuition-use into intuitions of discovery (or innovation) and intuitions of justification. I argue that intuitions of discovery are central to philosophical methods, even if not prevalent in the caricature of philosophers’ use of philosophical intuitions.

In the previous chapter, I said only enough to motivate the distinction between

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3 I call a caricature of intuition, rather than characteristic of intuition, since, similar to caricatures, it is somewhat representative of intuition, but it exaggerates a particular feature.

4 If what intuitions *do* is of perennial importance to what intuitions *are*, then the directionality here is somewhat contentious. On the one hand, I have pursued the view that what intuitions *are* is what puts limits on what intuitions can plausibly do in philosophical methods. That is, one must first say what intuitions are in order to assess what roles they can play in philosophical methods. However, a second approach is to assess what roles intuitions play in philosophical methods, and then assess whether intuitions can properly be put to work in those roles. Experimental philosophers who empirically test the creditability of intuitions use this latter method. This approach leaves open the question of what intuitions *are*. That is, the approach victimizes intuition theorists who envisage intuition operating in roles that don’t correspond to the view that intuitions are necessarily viable candidates for conferring epistemic status. We have seen that one implication for attending to the caricature of intuitions only as conferrers of epistemic status is to lump intuitions that do and do not confer epistemic status in together in experimental philosophy. Non-justificatory intuitions are found guilty only by association, where they haven’t done epistemic work to be found guilty of doing.
discovery and justificatory intuitions. Roughly, intuitions of discovery are merely causally related to the justification of philosophical claims; they are not epistemically efficacious. Here, I further explain the bifurcation of philosophical intuitions into justificatory and justification-related roles. I argue that bifurcating intuition allows for the possibility of a theory of intuition whose justification does not rely on an epistemic vice.

Before setting out some examples of intuitions of discovery, it is prudent to sketch the proposed method of agreement in which the bifurcation of intuitions is salient and operative. I should note that the method of agreement is intended to capture the dialectical methods of philosophy. That is, I think that philosophers actually engage in a kind of methodological to-and-fro. This accounts for the relatively slow progress of philosophy when compared to the natural sciences. In the following section, I briefly sketch the method of agreement before turning to say what the roles of philosophical intuition are therein.

2. Sketch of Method

In Chapter 3, I set up a discursive method for arguing for one’s preferred theory of philosophical intuition. On that approach, i.e., the approach by theory, the intuition-theorist is able to maintain a theory of intuition by relying on an explanatory argument that parallels the explanatory argument for a theory that the intuition-objector would not want to give up. Hence, the objectors cannot reject the theory of intuition without also rejecting a preferred theory of their own. Such a methodology is attractive because it allows for a theory of intuition that is not epistemically burdened by appealing to an epistemic vice. However, the approach by theory has difficulty in responding to objectors that don’t have strong commitments to the target theory. That is, in the argument I set out, I used a causal theory of perception as a template for the explanatory argument for a

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5 This (re)re-thinking of intuitions is consistent with recent attempts to restore intuitions’ efficacy in philosophical methods showing that intuitions are utilised in non-justificatory roles. (Re)re-thinking is a pun on the title of a seminal volume of contemporary papers regarding the contemporary notion of intuition, *Rethinking Intuition* (Depaul & Ramsey (Eds.)). The volume focuses on intuitions’ ability to justify and provide evidence. The present chapters aims at the elucidation of intuition in further roles of discovery and innovation; hence, (re)re-thinking intuition.

6 We have seen in previous chapters that focus on method puts restriction on what and in what ways philosopher can say philosophical intuitions are. Notice that by bifurcating intuition I am not restructuring what intuition is in kind. Moreover, I haven’t made any positive arguments for what philosophical intuitions are, which is tangential to my primary focus on methods. Rather, I mean to show how intuition plays distinctive roles in the methods of justifying or providing intuitional evidence for philosophical claims. Whatever intuitions are can remain substantially the same along either branch.
causal theory of intuition. An objector that is not committed to a causal theory of perception has no reason to accept the causal theory of intuition on the approach by theory, since they can outright reject both the target theory and the theory of intuition.

The idea underlying the method of agreement is to remove the need to appeal to intuition as the providence of epistemic grounding for theories of intuition. That is, a theory of intuition may use intuitional deliverances as justification, but appeal to something else as what ultimately provides epistemic status, namely, the (basic) “epistemicizing” force of agreement. Below, I sketch the method of agreement, argue how intuitions of discovery and justification operate in the method, and give examples from the Gettier literature of discovery intuitions. Note that I will only offer a sketch of a method since a thoroughgoing defense deserves greater attention than what is appropriate to offer there. The present focus is to elucidate the role of discovery intuitions, and how they effect the justification of a theory of intuition. Nevertheless, the method should be familiar to those engaged in doing philosophy in academia.

Here is a sketch of the main components of the method of agreement. The method of agreement is a discursive and dialectical discourse of two or more epistemic peers, who, on the basis of relevant fundaments and a philosophically salient target, come to

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7 The term is was first borrowed from Plantinga (1993); here meaning, conferring epistemic status
8 Epistemic peers have similar evidence and knowledge about the domain of the discourse (cf. Conee, 2010). There is no robust requirement that epistemic peers have all the same evidence and knowledge. The notion of epistemic ‘peerdom’ is non-idealised. That is, I’m interested in de facto peers, which contrasts with a theoretical constraint idealised notion of ‘peerdom’ used to motivate the problem of disagreement. Furthermore, one might be worried about the possibility of disagreement amongst the epistemic peers, whom on the basis of the agreed upon fundaments don’t agree on the conclusions drawn from the discourse. I don’t think that is an overly pressing worry. The discourse is simply unsuccessful and parties need to redress what the appropriate fundaments for the target are.

With talk of epistemic peers under conditions of agreement, aiming at justification of a philosophical theory, one might be tempted to think that I’m just talking about reflective equilibrium. However, reflective equilibrium is an intuitional method, relying essentially on intuitions to decide on how to balance competing judgments about, say, some theory X, and one’s pre-theoretical intuitions about X (Pust, 2000). Since reflective equilibrium is an intuitional method, there must already be a theory of intuition in place to justify one’s intuitive judgments about how to balance competing judgments about X and one’s pre-theoretical intuitions about X. And, when X is just that theory of intuition, which must be presupposed, one ends up begging the question.

Also, the relevant justification here is of a limited sort. That is, justification is limited to the parties in agreement. I’ll bite the bullet on the counterintuitive consequences, although counterintuitiveness can be ameliorated to some degree. That is, on the proposed notion of agreement as epistemic-status conferring, if parties agreed that some belief-forming process was reliable, where otherwise it is ostensibly unreliable (e.g., crystal balls, tarot cards, or, perhaps, the BBC weather service), one seems to get justification where there should otherwise be none to be had. However, the justification that an ostensibly unreliable belief-forming process confers is limited to the discourse. Surely such discourse would be ineffectual is exporting any of their conclusions where some other party doesn’t agree that unreliable belief-forming processes confer justification. Nevertheless, I think there are reasons to think that agreement is a powerful overdetermining source of justification. For example, our belief that p
agree on some conclusion(s) in regard to the target.

The target of a discourse is whatever the parties to the discourse are attempting to justify or understand under constraints of rational agreement.\textsuperscript{9}

Fundaments are the propositions to which parties to a discourse agree and, in virtue of that agreement, can confer justification.\textsuperscript{10} It’s not necessary that all fundaments get used in the justification for the target. Fundaments are what the parties to the discourse agree when setting up the discourse.

A fundament, \( f \), is justified for any member of the discourse (in the context of the discourse) if and only if the members agree that \( f \).\textsuperscript{11}

I adopt a view of agreement based on a notion of speaker presupposition, namely, a notion of “common ground” advanced by Stalnaker (2002). However, speaker presupposition is a semantic theory, and I’m aiming at an epistemic account of agreement. Roughly, S and P agreeing that \( p \) sustains that S’s and P’s beliefs that \( p \) confer epistemic status in the context of their particular discourse. So, I engage in some gerrymandering, but the core of Stalnaker’s idea stands. I’ll call Stalnaker’s view “common ground,” or

\textbf{(CG)} It is common ground that \( \Phi \) in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that \( \Phi \), and all believe that all accept that \( \Phi \), and all believe that all believe that all accept that \( \Phi \), etc. (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716)

\textsuperscript{9} I won’t say more precisely what the constrains of rational agreement are. However, certainly included in those constrains are that contradictory believes help within the context of the discourse should be resolved before any substantive conclusions can be made.

\textsuperscript{10} Consider the debate about knowledge as it is represented in the contemporary literature on knowledge. What fundaments are at work there? Centrally, there are some presuppositions about the nature of truth, that propositions are truth-apt, propositions concerning the transmission of justification across premises, propositions concerning two-dimensional semantic frameworks (esp. in hypothetical cases involving possible worlds) and, if not some sort of transmission principle for knowledge, then certainly some form of closure principle for knowledge under known entailment.

\textsuperscript{11} Fundaments can be false or otherwise unjustified.
For our purposes we need a slight reformulation of the (CG) and too explain the relevant notion of acceptance.

\[(CG^*) \text{ is a fundament in discourse, } D, \text{ if all members of } D \text{ accept that } f, \text{ and all believe that all accept that } f, \text{ and all believe that all believe that all accept that } f, \text{ etc.}\]

I'll adopt Stalnaker's view of acceptance, whereby

To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716).

That is, fundaments are viable and suitable justificatory grounds because parties to the discourse agree to their *epistemizing* within the discourse. A conclusion of a discourse is related to fundaments (under agreement) in such a way that the fundaments providing justification are warranted. I expect that this occurs largely by way of discursive arguments. However, a discourse involves intuitions, but cannot rely only on philosophical intuitions in support of its conclusions. Let's call these intra-discourse intuitions.

The method of agreement countenances that philosophers have various competing theoretical commitments that would otherwise be latent and enigmatic. Agreement on fundaments mitigates (though likely does not remove) latent commitments of the members of the discourse that would otherwise obfuscate arguments within the discourse. Below, I outline the relevant notion of agreement.

For our purposes, agreement on some proposition, \( f \), is all that is required for participants in the discourse to recognise that \( f \) is a valid source of justification. There are no limits on what members of agreement can agree on. Consider the following case.

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12 Deutsch (2010) argues that justificatory intuitions are inessential to philosophical methods. Intuitions may play causal roles in belief formation. However, philosophical intuitions are mistakenly taken to be supporting premises in philosophical arguments.
significantly different tastes. Sam wants to visit the art museum and Tim wants to visit Edinburgh castle. They decide to split up and meet in St. Andrews’ Square at 2 pm. However, Tim has such a great time at the castle that he is late for the rendezvous. Sam waits in the square until 3 pm when Tim finally shows up. Sam is furious at Tim, but Tim is adamant that he was having such an enjoyable time that there was no way that we could pull himself away.

There is a strong moral component to this case that we should set aside. We need to ask what Tim can legitimately expect of Sam in an epistemic sense. The agreement that they would meet in the square at 2 pm is sufficient to justify Sam’s believing that Tim would be in the square at 2 pm. Tim must recognize the agreement since he was party to the agreement. Tim cannot hold Sam at fault for believing that he will be in St. Andrews’ Square at 2 pm. So, within the context of rational agreement between Sam and Tim, Sam is justified believing that Tim will be in the square at 2 pm.

To recapitulate what I’m arguing for here, I want it to be the case that agreement of epistemic peers on some shared belief that \( p \) allows that the belief that \( p \) justifies other things that they can believe, within certain constraints of the discourse and in the context of the method of agreement. The relevant notion of justification is deontological.

S’s belief that \( p \) is deontologically justified if and only if S believes that \( p \) while it is not the case that S is (epistemically) blameworthy for believing that \( p \) and would be blamed for believing that not-\( p \).

So, in the case above with Sam and Tim, Tim can’t blame Sam for believing that he’d be in the square at 2 pm. Moreover, Tim is blameworthy for not believing that he would be in the square. For example, if Tim is crawling through the crags of the castle at 1:58 pm and looks at his watch, forming the belief that ‘I’m not going to be in the square at 2 pm,’ Tim is blameworthy for believing. He is blameworthy even given his evidence that he is going to be late. Notice that Tim is blameworthy in virtue of violating the agreement with Sam. Tim is blameworthy because he believes that not-\( p \) when he and Sam agree that \( p \). However, Tim is clearly not blameworthy on a non-deontological formulation of justification, which can be formulated in the following kind of way:
S’s belief that $p$ is non-deontologically justified if and only if S believes that $p$ and S has evidence for believing that $p$ is at least likely to be true.

Hence, Tim’s belief would be justified since Tim has good evidence that he’s not going to make it to the square by 2 pm. I’m not arguing that non-deontological justification is irrelevant to agreement, only that the kind of justification that one gets from agreement of epistemic peers within the constraints of rational discourse is deontological justification. One can give an alternative reading of the case under other types of justification whereby Sam has evidence that Tim will be in the square at 2 pm. Namely, Tim said that he would meet Sam there at 2 pm. Hence, Sam would be (non-deontologically) justified believing that Tim would be in the square at 2 pm. Furthermore, when Tim is crawling through the crags of the castle at 1:58 pm and looks at his watch, forming the belief that ‘I’m not going to be in the square at 2 pm.’, Tim is not blameworthy for believing as such. In fact, Tim would be blameworthy for not forming the belief because he has good evidence to do so and he would knowingly believe falsely if he continued to believe that he would be in the square at 2 pm. However, this isn’t the relevant kind of justification that comes from agreement. On the non-deontological perspective, it is happenstance that Sam and Tim have the same evidence that justifies believing that the other will meet them in the square at 2 pm. If Sam’s or Tim’s evidence bases change, so would the justificatory status of their respective beliefs. However, the deontological justification of beliefs under agreement is not sensitive to fluctuations in one’s evidence base in the same way since what constitutes Sam’s and Tim’s reason to believe that the other will be in the square is that they agreed it would be so.\(^\text{13}\)

Notice that agreement with one’s epistemic peers is the onus of epistemic evaluation amongst those engaged in the discourse. However, it is not the only perspective of epistemic evaluation. Someone not engaged in the discourse may decide that the fundaments are preposterous. For example, suppose some set of epistemic peers come to agreement that the position of the moon affects the tectonics of the Earth in such a way that certain alignments of the moon can cause earthquakes. Suppose this geologist learns that there is a group of people that believe in, and are making public predictions about when earthquakes will occur on the basis of the position of the moon.

\(^{13}\) I’ve articulated the example here in terms of believing, it could easily be reformulated in terms of accepting with much consequence to the main points.
The geologist doesn’t agree that the moon causes earthquakes. In fact, it is false that the moon has any effect on the occurrence of earthquakes. Nevertheless, so long as no one entreats them to give up their agreement that that the position of the moon affects the tectonics of the Earth in such a way that certain alignments of the moon can cause earthquakes, their agreement is epistemically efficacious (in the context of their discourse). However, that doesn’t entail that we should believe anything they conclude from their discourse. Lots of people believe crazy and even perverse things under rational agreement. Sometimes they make it into broader epistemic inquiry (e.g., Descartes’ idea that the body and the soul communicate with another via humours interacting at the pineal gland – although, it was neither crazy nor perverse in its time). But, they don’t stand the test of time in the broadest domains of rational inquiry. I'll say more on this point below in regard to importing conclusions of one discourse into another discourse.

It is important to get a central point about agreement clear, as it is easily confused with a related notion of consensus. For example, Rescher (1993) examines a Habermasian notion of consensus as an ideal process that is solely and exhaustively driven by rational argumentation. However, Rescher argues that consensus-making is a process whose defence is question-begging. Its epistemic significance stems from its being a rational process. That is, consensus is epistemically significant only if it is rational. However, assessment of whether it is rational requires that one assume or presuppose some account of rationality. I do not at this point stipulate a process by which consensus is reached. Rather, I take the position that agreement on some proposition, \( p \), in a discursive context confers \( p \) epistemic status such that members’ belief that \( p \) confers justification. Furthermore, discourses are constituted by and sustained by the agreement(s) of its members. Discourses easily dissolve if their members fail to remain in agreement in regard to its fundaments (or target). And, agents that don’t agree to a discourse’s fundaments simply are not members to the discourse.

I address two further points to clarify the method: 1) the discrimination of the discourses; and, 2) distinguishing fundaments from similar notions in the philosopher’s methodological toolkit, such as platitudes and hinge propositions, which I address in the objections section below.\(^{14}\) Regarding the first point, discourses individuate along the

\(^{14}\) Nolan (2009), for example, addresses this sort of confusion. He writes, It is comparatively rare for people to explicitly take themselves to be employing a platitudes account when doing philosophical analysis. Many people are not even clear what they take themselves to be doing when they are writing about metaphysics—they may call something they
lines of their fundaments and targets. When philosophers present arguments that have different fundaments or a different target, they are operating in distinct discourses.

Here is an example of discourse individuation from the literature on Gettier’s counterexample to the JTB account of knowledge.\(^{15}\) What constitutes a Gettier-type example is central fundament in discourses regarding Gettier literature addressing Gettier’s objection. Take as the target of the discourse whether Gettier’s objection to the JTB analysis of knowledge is original in the philosophical literature. Here is Gettier’s objection.

\[(G)\] In [any] Gettier-type example concerning S and p

1. the truth condition holds regarding p [i.e., p is true];
2. the belief condition holds regarding p [i.e., S believes that p];
3. the justification condition holds regarding p [i.e., p’s is justified for S];
4. some proposition, q, is false;
5. either the justification condition holds regarding q, or at least S would be justified in believing q;
6. S does not know that p. (Shope, 1983, p. 4)

Here is an example of an attempt to engage a discourse that fails to reach agreement on fundaments. Shope’s (1983) questions the veracity of Scheffler's claim that a Gettier-like counterexample was already available in the literature. Scheffler points to a counterexample suggested by Russell (1948):

The Stopped Clock: S has a true belief, p, as to the time of day, but only because he is looking at a clock that he has good grounds to think is going. In fact it happened to be stopped. (Shope, 1983, p. 19-20)

So, S’s belief that p (i.e., what time it is) is both true and justified, but fails to be put forward an "analysis", or they may rely on an "intuition pump", or they may offer a counterexample to a theory without being explicit about what their justification for taking the counterexample to be correct is. Whether in such cases people take themselves to be doing conceptual analysis, or applying the results of another investigation (e.g. a result from the natural sciences), or doing something else, is not always clear.

\(^{15}\) Notice that I’m hashing out a fairly standard kind of objection is philosophy, whereby an objector gets wrong what it is they are aiming to criticise.
knowledge. However, Shope points out:

S violates a relevant procedure of rational inquiry by employing a measuring instrument that is not working, and so S does not actually satisfy the intent of a [...] standard analysis [of JTB theories of knowledge]. (Shope, 1983, p. 20)

I take Shope’s point to be that S believing that the clock is running doesn’t exclude that the clock is set to run so it reliably indicates the correct time, so the case lacks the right justificatory inference supporting S’s belief that the time is such-and-such. The counterexample fails to take as a fundament the condition of knowledge that requires that at least some of the evidence which justifies the belief that \( p \) is evidence which one employs in the rational procedure which leads them to justifiably believing that \( p \). The justification condition fails. So, Scheffler’s purported counterexample fails to show that Gettier-type arguments were already available in the literature because it fails to enter the discourse by assuming different analysis of knowledge as the shared fundament. At the very least, this example shows that Shope disagrees with Scheffler in regard to the fundament in regard to the originality of Gettier’s objection, i.e., what the requirements of a Gettier-type counterexample are. It is clear that it matters to the rejoinders to Gettier’s objection that they agree to the fundament of the discourse.

Notice that the target of discourse in the preceding example was that Gettier’s counterexample to the JTB analysis of knowledge was original, not that it is unsuccessful. The targets of a discourse vary in specificity. More general targets will have various success conditions. Less general targets may only have one condition for success, e.g., that parties in the discourse agree that the target proposition is true or false. Consider a discourse regarding the nature of intuition that takes as its target that a particular analysis of intuition is correct. For example,

\[(T1) \quad S \text{ intuits that } p \text{ if and only if, } S \text{ has an intentional mental state with propositional content, } p, p \text{ is psychologically immediate, and } p \text{ seems necessary to} \]

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16 One might point out that the clock is set to indicate the correct time at the moment that \( S \) looks at the clock, in which case it would not violate the justification condition.

17 Shope’s point could be alternatively cashed out in this way: One lacks justification for believing what time it is on the basis of the clock because the clock not working precludes that it can justify one’s belief in what time it is. One has a certain epistemic responsibility to find out whether the clock is correct.
Now consider a way that the discourse can fail to actualise because the parties involved fail to agree on the fundamentals to the discourse. In Chapter 3, I argued that the approach by phenomena was not a good way of theorising about the nature of intuition. Likewise, first person phenomenological considerations are problematic fundamentals in the discourse at hand. That is, one route to assessing the correctness of the target is to reflect on one’s own first person experiences of having an intuition. However, at least in some cases, our first person experiences of intuition diverge. Such is the case of the devout, conservative Christian and the niece with a gay uncle in a long-term committed relationship. Each has a different quality of phenomenological seeming in respect to the consideration of the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried men. To the conservative Christian, the proposition seems necessary; to the niece with a gay uncle, it does not. Surely not everyone will share my inclination towards thinking that this example shows that there is a substantive difference in the seemingness of intuitions. Bealer, for example, might argue that the niece fails to possess the concepts of bachelor since to be a bachelor is just to be an unmarried man. However, the disagreement over the saliency of my example goes to show that agreement on the fundamentals of a discourse is sometimes contentious. In cases like these, there are two options. Parties to formulating the discourse either reach agreement on relevant fundamentals, or take up two separate discourses (or none at all). In regard to the example at hand, I either reform my intuition about my counterexample to the essentiality of the necessity of intuitional seemingness — i.e., I accept Bealer’s view of concepts as molecular, definite and determinate (or Bealer capitulates to my point) or formulate two discourses, one under the Bealer’s view and one under my own. A third option is to not admit as fundamentals the first person experience of having an intuition. However, given the nature of the target, this third option is very unattractive since the natural way to view intuitings is from the first person perspective.

What are conditions for success of a discourse? The success conditions for a discourse with more general targets will be relatively broad. The two most relevant directions for success are top-down and bottom-up approaches. Bottom-up and top-down success conditions relate to two presuppositions about the justification fundamentals

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18 Notice there’s no justification condition here. We might add: ‘S is justifiedly believes p intuitionally if and only if S believes that p not on the basis of any other of S’s beliefs.’
provide: (1) Fundaments must be individually or jointly sufficient to justify conclusion of the discourse, and (2) A conclusion must be related to fundaments (under agreement) in such a way that the fundaments provide justification.

Bottom-up success occurs where the fundaments justify believing that the target proposition is either true or false. That is, fundaments serve as foundational-type justifiers that confer justification on beliefs directly or indirectly (e.g., where a justificatory chain terminates at a fundament). We saw in Chapter 2 that moderate rationalist foundationalists argue that intuited beliefs played the role of foundational justifiers and epistemic regress stoppers. In the approach by agreement, we find foundational-type justification as the fundaments under rational agreement of the epistemic peers engaged in a particular discourse.¹⁹

Top-down success occurs in the form of an explanation of the target that satisfies at least some of the fundaments. That is,

For some discourse, D, with target t, and set of fundaments, f; S is justified in believing t if S’s best explanation for t satisfies (at least some of) f.

Here is an example. Take t to be the justification condition of the Shope’s (G) [above]. That is, for some S who stands in a Gettier-type relation to p, S is justified in believing that p. For members of the discourse to agree to the justification condition in a way that manifests top-down success, the explanation of t will satisfy the fundaments of the discourse. I suggest that the fundaments be the conditions for justification that Ayer and Chisholm describe for the respective analyses of knowledge, since those conditions are the conditions that Gettier aims to capture. For simplicity, I set out just one central fundament by highlighting some of what Shope says in regard to Chisholm’s analysis of knowledge. For Chisholm, the justification condition is one of S’s having sufficient evidence for p being true (Shope, 1983, p. 11).²⁰ So, let’s assume some members, m, of

¹⁹ There is no identifiable and distinctive literature on the epistemology of agreement, with the notable exception of Kusch (2002) who argues that knowledge and justification are socially constructed deliverances of particular agents. Roughly, one being justified in believing that p requires that one successfully demands agreement that p from one’s epistemic peers within a particular (social) context. However, I take no positon on Kusch’s controversial assessment of the nature of knowledge and justification. Nevertheless, my view of agreement displays some kinship with Kusch’s view.

²⁰ Notice here that justification condition formulated in this way is independent of the belief condition. An alternative way putting this might be to say that S’s evidence that p is sufficient such that if S were to believe that p, S would be justified in believing that p. Neither, formulation entail that S actually believes
discourse, D, wherein m agree on fundament, f, whereby f states that p is justified for S only if S has evidence for p being true. Therefore, in order for t to satisfy the top-down condition of success, the best explanation of t amongst m must satisfy or include that f. That is, where S stands in a Gettier-type relation to p, the explanation of p’s being justified for S must include that S has adequate evidence for p being true.21

The method of agreement countenances the practices of philosophy as dialectical and discursive, wherein the agreement on the fundaments of a particular discourse provides foundation-like and regress stopping justification, which is either top-down or bottom-up.

In the following section, I explain the role of intuitions in a discourse. I then distinguish fundaments from platitudes and hinge propositions.

3. Intuitions and Fundaments (and their methodological ilk)

In discussing the bifurcation of intuitions into justificatory and discovery roles, I won’t focus on intuitions of justification, since we have a grasp of how intuitions get used to support philosophical claims. For present purposes, one can pick their preferred theory of intuition: self-evidentialist, intellectual seemingsist, or some judgment theory of intuition. More interesting, and the focus of this chapter, is the substantial role that intuitions of discovery play in philosophical methods and in the justification of a theory of intuition. I argue that discovery intuitions play roles akin to hypothesising or assuming or picking out the relevant aspects from hypothetical cases. Discovery intuitions provide fodder for philosophical argument by providing hypotheses for consideration; by sketching the shape of a concept, identifying so-called ‘borderline cases’; or, by making relevant features of hypothetical cases salient. In essence, discovery intuitions posit fundaments.

The method of agreement suggests that how philosophers have caricatured intuitional deliverances working in philosophical methods is wrongheaded. That is, the method shows where intuitions can operate in roles whereby intuitions don’t confer epistemic status (qua intuitions), but, rather, as fundaments under agreement. The prime example of philosophical intuition is the Gettier intuitions that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. After all, if anything is a philosophical intuition, the

that p.

intellectual deliverances we have when considering Gettier’s hypothetical cases are intuitions. If I can show how it is that Gettier intuitions are discovery intuitions as opposed to the caricatured justificatory intuitions, then I show how it is that intuitions get used in the context of discovery, how it is that intuitions in this context are not epistemically efficacious, and also that discovery intuitions are central to philosophical methodology.

Using the method of agreement as a framework by which we can more easily see how in the context of some discourses the Gettier intuition is not epistemically efficacious, let’s put Gettier’s (1963) argument into context. Gettier’s counterexamples were situated in a discourse where the target is the then-standard justified true belief theory of knowledge as represented by Ayer (1956) and Chisholm (1957). Gettier takes as fundaments to the discourse their respective analyses of knowledge. The presentation of his (1963) hypothetical cases results in intuitive deliverances that are:

(1) Evidence that mere justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge, and
(2) Fodder for further philosophical inquiry.

That is, in the context of the discourse Gettier has with Ayer and Chisholm, the Gettier intuition (re: 1) serves as evidence that the target theory is false. However, we need not think that the intuitional deliverance - that the agents in the hypothetical cases possess justified true beliefs that don’t count as knowledge - only operates as evidence in respect to the target of the discourse. There is no stipulation that the Gettier intuition is confined to a discourse. Hypothetical counterexamples and their related intuitional deliverances are mechanisms for reaching conclusions amongst members of the discourse. Only the fundaments and targets (under rational agreement of the discourse’s members) are discourse specific.

Consider an example where the Gettier intuitions enter into a discourse as an aspect of discovery, rather than as justification. That is, where the intuitional deliverances derived from Gettier’s cases manifest as propositions that associate in discourses as fundaments. Consider this example from the Gettier literature.

Goldman (1967) takes as a fundament for his causal theory of (empirical) knowledge the intuition that Smith does not know that either Jones owns a Ford or

\[ S \text{ knows that } P \text{ IFF (i) } P \text{ is true, (ii) } S \text{ believes that, and (iii) } S \text{ is justified in believing that } P. \]
Brown is in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{23} That is, members of the discourse must agree that having a justified true belief does not entail that one knows, wherein the Gettier intuition is epistemically efficacious in assessing that the agent in the case does not know. Without this fundament, Goldman’s argument fails to be motivated. In essence, Goldman’s attempt to say why Smith doesn’t know in the Gettier example presupposes that Gettier is right that Smith doesn’t know \(p\).\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, Goldman’s diagnosis of the case showcases a second mode of discovery intuitions. Consider the following passage where Goldman mines a Gettier case for a salient proposition on which his diagnosis of what is wrong in the Gettier case turns.

Notice that what makes \(p\) true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but that this fact has nothing to do with Smith’s believing \(p\) [Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona]. That is, there is no causal connection between the fact that Brown is in Barcelona and Smith’s believing \(p\). If Smith had come to believe \(p\) by reading a letter from Brown postmarked in Barcelona, then we might say that Smith knew \(p\). Alternatively, if Jones did own a Ford, and his owning the Ford was manifested by his offer of a ride to Smith, and this in turn resulted in Smith’s believing \(p\), then we would say that Smith knew \(p\). Thus, one thing that \textit{seems to be missing} in this example is a causal connection between the fact that makes \(p\) true [or simply: the fact that \(p\)] and Smith’s belief of \(p\). The requirement of such a causal connection is what I wish to add to the traditional analysis. (Goldman, 1967, p. 358; \textit{emphasis added})

Notice that Goldman picks out what ‘seems to be missing’. That is, I take it that Goldman is indicating that what is intuitively missing from the Gettier example is an

\textsuperscript{23} We should also note that Goldman presents an abbreviated version of the case, presumably because those engaged in the discourse are already familiar with Gettier’s famous argument. Filling in the details, Goldman writes,

This means that \(p\) is true, that Smith believes \(p\), and that Smith has adequate evidence for \(p\). But Smith does not know \(p\). (Goldman, 1967, p. 358)

\textsuperscript{24} Here’s a second example. Consider Lowy’s (1978) argument that many discussions of Gettier’s argument failure to properly construe the relevant notion of justification. That is, the relevant kind of justification in the Gettier can is justification one has for believing that \(p\), as oppose to one’s belief that \(p\) is justified. Here too we find that Lowy and her audience accept as fundament for the discourse Gettier’s intuitions that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. This is clear because if the Gettier intuition where not accepted as fundamental to the discourse, Lowy’s point would be moot. That is, if the members of the discourse didn’t think and accept that the Gettier intuition, Lowy’s argument fails to have relevance.
appropriate causal connection. Let me expound on this point. Consider a view that says that intuitions merely pick out what I call ‘philosophernalia’. Philosophernalia (i.e., philosophical paraphernalia) are the salient features (or properties) of or features (or properties) entailed by a hypothetical case. Regarding the Gettier case, Fedyk (2009) writes,

[T]he intuition is about […] some of the properties of the case, namely the fact that Smith’s belief is true and that it has been derived from things that Smith already knows, but that Smith’s reasoning relied on (unbeknownst to him) false lemmas. (p. 58)

The salient features of the case are primed by the context of the argument. For example, one is primed to apply their intensional concept of knowledge, or the concept implicated by the context of the discourse, by the fact that the Gettier’s argument is about knowledge. The same hypothetical case might be alternatively contextualized to invite one to apply their intensional concepts about (e.g.) premonitions or employment law. Here is another example. Turri (2010) presents Goldman’s fake barn case (Goldman, 1967) show how visual perception and knowledge come apart. Turri writes,

Consider this famous case.

(BARN) Henry and his son are driving through the country. Henry pulls over to stretch his legs and while doing so regales his son with a list of currently visible roadside items. “That’s a tractor. That’s a combine. That’s a horse. That’s a silo. And that’s a fine barn,” Henry added, pointing to the nearby roadside barn. And indeed Henry saw that a barn stood nearby. But unbeknownst to them the locals recently secretly replaced nearly every barn in the county with papier-mâché fake barns. Henry happens to see the one real barn in the whole county. But had he instead set eyes on any of the numerous nearby fakes, he would have falsely believed it was a barn. (Adapted from Goldman, 1976, pp. 172–3, who credits Carl Ginet) Epistemologists standardly classify BARN as a Gettier case and deny that Henry knows that a barn stands nearby. Suppose they are right. Certainly he can still see that a barn stands nearby, even if he lacks knowledge. This suggests the following
argument.

Henry sees that a barn stands nearby. (Premise)

Henry does not know that a barn stands nearby. (Premise)

So perceiving that Q does not entail knowing that Q.

Perception can flourish in environments where knowledge flounders. (Turri, 2010, pp. 202-203)

Turri’s argument is intended to exemplify the role of intuition in picking out philosophernalia – objections to Goldman’s argument not withstanding (i.e., that it fails to distinguish between seeing and seeing that). It is not an uncommon practice for philosophers to use hypothetical cases originally proposed to support one philosophical claim as grounds for making some different philosophical claim by picking up a different set of salient features of the case.  

Consider a second example (Chudnoff, 2010) where picking out what I call ‘philosophernalia’ is described in the literature. I have in a previous chapter objected to an approach to intuition that falls roughly under the heading of Phenomenalism whereby phenomenal presentation serves as justificatory. Chudnoff (2010) argues for a kind of phenomenalism of about intuitive justification. On Chudnoff’s view intuitions presentational phenomenology that p justifies one believing that p.  

(I) If it basically intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p.

Chudnoff models theory of intuition on the ways that we have prima facie justification for believing our perceptions. Perceptions and intuitions both have presentational phenomenology. Presentational phenomenology provides for one being justified in believing their perceptions and their intuitions. Presentational phenomenology entails two kinds of phenomenal properties: seeming to fact-intuit that p and seeming to be intellectually item-aware of an item that makes it the case that p. Seeming to fact-intuit that p is just to have an intellectual experience representing that p. To seeming to fact-intuit that p entails being intellectually item-aware.  

“Intuition experiences possess presentational phenomenology just in case they are experiences in which we both represent that p [fact-intuit] that p, say, and seem to be aware of an item that makes it the case that p [intellectually item-aware]” (Chudnoff, 2010).

Chudnoff (2010) offers some candidate propositions that could be the intuitional objects in the Gettier case. We can use these to distinguish between basic intuitive seemings and intuitive seemings.

(1) In the story: Smith has a justified true belief that P, but does not know that P.  
(2) Possibly: One can have a justified true belief that P, but not know that P.  
(3) If a thinker were related to P as Smith is according the Gettier’s text, he/she would have a justified true belief that P, but not know that P.  
(4) Necessarily: If every element in the Gettier story is true, then someone has a justified true belief that p, but does not know that p.  

Although each of (1) - (4) may in some sense be intuitive, (1) satisfies (I), because (1) has presentational phenomenology. It seems to the intuitor that (1) is the case and the intuitor is item aware of what makes (1) true. Namely, the intuitor is item aware of the fictional scenario. However, Chudnoff thinks that (3) is non-basic. That is, one is not item-aware of what makes (3) true. Chudnoff thinks that (3) is roughly Williamson’s view and (4) is roughly Ichikawa’s and Jarvis’s view of intuitions. (4) satisfies (I). Someone that considers (4) is intellectually item-aware of every element in the Gettier story being true, and in virtue of being true, someone has non-knowledge-justified-true-belief (though, I don’t think is accurately depicts Ichikawa and Jarvis point, which rather that the Gettier case is fully specified).

But, if it is the fictional story in (1) that makes (1), it is the Gettier text in (3) that makes (3) true. This is just the point that Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) make.
I have sketched a working notion of the relevant component parts of the kind of method that philosophical intuitions are used in modes of discovery. To elucidate discovery intuitions, I exemplified Shope who argues that a Scheffler misses what Gettier-type counterexamples entail; hence, Scheffler's argument that Gettier-style counterexamples were already in the literature fails to engage the Gettier-discourse. I showed how Goldman uses discovery intuitions to mine the feature of knowledge that is missing from the Gettier cases, and I showed how Turri uses discovery intuitions in a similar way to show that Fake Barn cases perception and knowledge come apart. I will now turn to sketch how the method is sufficient to arrive at a non-question begging, non-epistemically circular, and non-epistemic regress-entailing justification for a theory of philosophical intuitions.

The method of agreement resolves the primary issue that engenders justifying a theory of intuition in a bad way. The method gives an alternative source of foundational-type justification, i.e., fundaments under agreement of epistemic peers, to relying on intuition. On this view, intuitions can deliver fundaments. Fundaments require no further explication or defence for their ability to confer justification in the context of a particular discourse. Intuitional deliverances (as fundaments) confer epistemic status if members of a discourse agree to them. Hence, intuitional deliverances are justified, but not in virtue of any theory of intuition. Consider the case of the Westminster Dog Show judge in Chapter 3. I argued that the judge couldn’t apply the evaluative criteria in a way that doesn’t require that she rely on intuitions in a bad way. However, on the approach by agreement, we have an adequate explanation for evaluating a winner. That is, when the criteria for evaluating the winner are agreed on by the competitors, the criteria can justify the explanation for which of the pack is best. In virtue the top-down success criteria, the explanation can justify the conclusion of the discourse if the explanation satisfies or includes as least some of the fundaments. Ultimate justification comes in virtue of agreement of epistemic peers. Similarly, when we evaluate which is the best theory of philosophical intuition from amongst the competitors, the evaluative criteria are justified in virtue of the members of the discourse agreeing to them, not in virtue of intuitions.

In the follow section, I review some of the recent literature that attempts to describe how philosophers use intuitions similar ways. I distinguish my own view from these similar views. The benchmark for any view that attempts to characterise
philosophical intuitions is Gettier (1963). I argue that views that purport that intuitions in justificatory roles are not necessary for philosophical methods to be successful are overly ambitious and wrongheaded characterisations. I outline more moderate views that distinguish intuitions of discovery and intuitions of justification (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, 2009b; Ahlstrom, 2009). However, none pass muster for explanation better than the one I argued for above. I then turn to address some objections to the approach by method, including objections to the view of agreement that I argue for. I also argue that the notion of a fundament is distinct from so-called hinge propositions and platitudes. I close by arguing that the method of arguments aims at a fruitful kind of consensus amongst philosophers.

4. Alternative views

The following sections elucidate some other accounts of non-justificatory intuitions, and highlight the attractive features we can salvage from amongst them. For example, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009) argue that intuitions are not justificatory in the sense that they confer justification on philosophical claims. Rather, intuitions are dispositions to believe whereby one’s intuition that $p$ is a “praxic reason” to believe $p$ in the context of dialectical methodology. That is, one’s intuition serves as an explanatory reason for why one holds the belief that $p$. Ahlstrom (2009) argues that intuitions operate in justificatory and in discovery roles, providing fodder for conceptual analysis and identifying hypothetical cases in which concepts instantiate. Deutsch (2010) argues that, “in philosophy, it all comes down to arguments, not intuitions” (p. 457). It is often cited that if anything is an intuition, then what philosophers have in response to Gettier’s counterexamples is intuition (e.g., Williamson 2007).

4.1. Deutsch

Deutsch (2010) suggests that philosophers mischaracterize the presentation of hypothetical cases as intuition-dependent. He writes,

Gettier refuted the JTB theory, if he did, and Kripke refuted descriptivism, if he did, by presenting counterexamples, full stop. Whether these counterexamples are
intuitive for anyone is a separate, and purely psychological, matter. (Deutsch, 2010, p. 448)

Intuition’s role in counterexamples is merely causal. Deutsch (2010) writes,

Intuition may be the causal source of the judgment without being its justificatory source, and without the fact that the judgment is intuitive serving as a premise in an inference to the judgment’s truth. (p. 453)

Let’s take a look at what Deutsch argues that goes on when philosophers evoke intuitions about hypothetical cases. Accordingly, Gettier’s arguments have the following natural form:

(1) There is an F that is not a G.
(2) Hence, not all Fs are Gs.

The natural form is all that is necessary for the arguments to succeed. The alternative intuitive form that often gets attributed to Gettier’s arguments is the following:

(0) It is intuitive that there is an F that is not a G.
(1) So, there is an F that is not a G.
(2) Hence, not all Fs are Gs.

In the intuitive form of the argument, the step from (0) to (1) is inductive. (1) is epistemically supported by (0) and (1) entails (2). However, it is not clear that (0) has any bearing in the argument since that it is intuitive that there is an F that is not a G tells us only about the intuitor’s psychology; it doesn’t tell us that there is some F that is not a G. If the deduction of (2) from (1) is not amplified, then the justification for (2) comes entirely from (0). However, there is no reason to think that the justification (0) provided has any bearing on the truth of (2). Hence, the justification for (1) must be independent of (0) if it has any justification that bears on whether there is actually some F that is not a
G. More incriminating is that (0) is not represented in what Gettier actually says, and (0) is not required for a valid argument. It is not necessary to labour on what Gettier actually says since I agree that Deutsch is right to claim that there is no explicit avowal of intuition in the arguments as Gettier presents them. We need to understand his point regarding whether intuitions are necessary for Gettier’s counterexamples, and not whether Gettier is using intuitions to support his philosophical claims.

If the hypothetical cases are not intended to engender intuitions that justify or provide evidence for Gettier’s conclusion, what purpose do they have? Deutsch suggests that hypothetical cases can serve as genuine counterexamples whereby one’s intuition is only a causal component to forming the relevant belief. To have an intuition that some particular thing is an F but not a G is to believe that some particular thing is an F but not a G, a belief that is not justified in virtue of the (intuitional) process by which one comes to believe it.

Deutsch needs to say what makes a counterexample genuine. Clearly, any account of a counterexample that entails that counterexamples are intuitive is not going to suffice. For example, Deutsch mentions Weatherson (2003), whom describes counterexamples in this way:

[A] counterexample to the theory that all Fs are Gs is a possible situation such that no people have an intuition that some particular thing in story is an F but not a G.

Deutsch’s qualification that counterexamples must be genuine doesn’t eliminate intuition outright, however. He writes,

As far as I can see, there is nothing to prevent philosophers from maintaining

26 Another noteworthy concern is that the intuitive form of the argument is question-begging. That is, one must already accept (2) if one is to find (0) plausible. But, let's suppose for the sake of argument here that the intuitive form of the argument is supposed to convince someone that doesn't already believe (2).
27 “Knowing directly that, say, ‘Gödel’ does not refer to Schmidt in the Gödel-case is just intuiting that it doesn’t. Indeed, I take it as given that, if we know that ‘Gödel’ does not refer to Schmidt in the Gödel-case, we know this via intuition and, hence, directly. However, in asserting this, I mean to assert only that the causal source of the judgment is intuition. Intuition may be the causal source of the judgment without being its justificatory source, and without the fact that the judgment is intuitive serving as a premise in an inference to the judgment’s truth. This is an important distinction for understanding the role of intuition in philosophical methodology. Various arguments in philosophy—presentations of counterexamples to general philosophical theories, for example—may ‘rely’, or ‘depend,’ on intuition, but only causally, not inferentially or evidentially.” (Deutsch, 2010, p. 453)
that, on at least some occasions, the belief that a counterexample is genuine qualifies as direct, noninferential knowledge that the counterexample is genuine. The intuition that \( p \) would not be evidence for \( p \), on this metaphilosophical picture, but would instead be a \textit{manifestation} of one’s \textit{direct knowledge} that \( p \).

(Deutsch, 2010, p. 452)

The meta-philosophical picture is not clear since the relevant sameness between ‘a manifestation of one’s direct knowledge that \( p \)’ and ‘one’s intuition that \( p \)’ is intended to be a merely causal, non-epistemic feature. One implausible view is that one already has some inherent knowledge that \( p \). Hence, they know that \( p \) directly, without inference. However, presumably, one would know that (1) without the aid of any hypothetical case to point out that (1). One simply already knows that (1). I have to admit that I am not terribly clear on why Deutsch attempts to draw his causal analogue with direct knowledge. One’s direct knowledge that \( p \) is an epistemic notion whereby one’s direct knowledge that \( p \) is to know that \( p \) and if you know that \( p \) you have an intentional state that is distinctively epistemic.

If we accept Deutsch’s view, we allow him to sneak under the guise of ‘only causally’ an epistemic feature, i.e., direct knowledge. If we directly know that (1) and our directly knowing that (1) is only causally related to the apprehension of (1), then knowing is purportedly non-epistemic. However, Deutsch is using a notion of knowing that is inconsistent with the notion of knowing entailed by the Gettier case, which is not merely causal and entails that one has at least a justified true belief. Hence, there is a central and relevant inconsistency in Deutsch’s account. We might presume this is a quibble about the verbiage that Deutsch chooses to express his point. We might, for example, replace Deutsch’s use of ‘directly knowing’ with ‘directly apprehending’ or ‘accepting that \( p \), not on the basis of inference’. Let’s set these considerations to the side so that we might garner a better understanding of Deutsch’s argument. Perhaps there is yet something salvageable. Let’s return to the idea of a ‘genuine counterexample’.

A genuine counterexample is sufficient ground for the truth of (1); intuition plays no epistemic status-conferring role. (1) appeals to some other (non-intuitional) source of justification. Deutsch offers three alternative grounds for justifiedly believing that Smith does not know that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. First, it is a fact that Smith does not know since there is a causal disconnect between what Smith
purportedly knows and what Smith justifiably believes. Second, that Smith’s belief is only luckily correct is sufficient reason to believe that Smith doesn’t know. That is, the explanation that Smith’s belief is lucky better explains what is going on than the explanation that Smith knows. Third, the Gettier case contains a defeater that, if Smith were to become aware of the fact that it is he who will get the job and not Jones, this would undermine Smith’s believing that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. Deutsch thinks that none of these alternative grounds for justification appeal to the counterexample’s intuitiveness.

Deutsch isn’t entirely clear on the following important point regarding what role intuitions play in the justification of philosophical claims rendered from hypothetical cases. He writes,

[I]t is implausible to suppose that the last link of every justificatory chain must be a premise asserting the intuitiveness of some proposition. [...] More often than not, justifications come to an end with premises that assert something other than that some proposition is intuitive for someone or some group of people.

(Deutsch, 2010, p. 456)

On the basis of this suspicious observation, he concludes that, “philosophers need not appeal to intuitions as evidence, regardless if they sometimes do” (Deutsch, 2010, p. 455). However, the view that justification doesn’t ground out in intuitions is consistent with Gettier intuitions conferring justification on the claim that justified true belief is insufficient with knowledge. Deutsch’s point here seems to be that either (A) we need some further reason to believe that our intuional deliverances are justificatory (a reason not intuitionally supported) or (B) whatever non-intuitional justification supports (1) better not ultimately depend on intuitive justification. However, neither (A) nor (B) eliminates that intuitions are involved in the chain of justification.

Still, there is reason to think that eliminating intuitions as sources of justification from the Gettier argument doesn’t put one in a better or worse off epistemic situation. Suppose that (1) is true but one’s true belief that (1) (is true) is based on faulty evidence. Here is an example using visual perception that has similar features as Gettier cases.28 Suppose Alfred sees a swan that is actually a white swan painted black, forming a belief

28 Even though the evidence in question is not intuitive evidence, the example is still relevant to the point
that there is a swan that is not white. Alfred’s belief is true. There is a swan that is not white, even if it’s not the swan he observed and based his belief on. Furthermore, Alfred deduces that not all swans are white from his belief that there is a swan that is not white. Of course, it is true that there is a swan that is not white – there is at least one black swan, and so the belief he deduces is also true. Logically speaking, the argument is valid and sound. Epistemically speaking, the argument is unsatisfying because Alfred’s belief in (1) is prone to undermining. It doesn’t put Alfred in any better position epistemically, nor is Alfred any worse off than if he were relying on some further premise entailing that (1) is justified by Alfred’s intuition. Intuitions are defeasible. So, the fact that Alfred’s belief that (1) is defeasible because the evidence Alfred has for believing that (1) (is true) is faulty doesn’t put Alfred in a worse off position epistemically than if Alfred had intuitional justification. So, even if there is some prima facie reason to think that intuitions are not essential to the justification of (1), it doesn’t put one in a better position epistemically. Now, let’s see why Deutsch thinks that philosophers need not appeal to intuitions as evidence.

Deutsch needs to provide reasons independent of intuition for believing that (1) is at least likely to be true; there must be some independent support for the truth of (1). One way is to show that Gettier’s counterexamples are in fact true. That is, there is actually a man named “Smith” who has a justified true belief that another man named “Jones,” who has 10 coins in his pocket, will get a job, but doesn’t know that he will get the job. If the counterexample doesn’t occur in the actual world, then (1) is false or at least under-motivated. Deutsch makes no suggestion that we should allow for the possibility that the counterexample occur in some possible world, or that it could possibility occur in the actual world. Should we accept some similar alternative, perhaps one where a man named “Barney” and a woman named “Debby” play the roles of Smith and Jones? Surely we would since we can re-articulate the case without names. In fact, there is a range of (real) cases that one might substitute in the place of the Gettier case text. But not all hypothetical cases presented in the philosophy literature are similar to actual world analogues. We might ask Deutsch how we should think of counterexamples and cases that are false in the actual world (and probably in all nearby possible worlds). For example, Swampman and Transporter cases seem especially prone to being false in actual

29 It should be clear that I find Deutsch’s argument unsatisfying in some critical respect. However, I find some elements of his view attractive. These attractive features will be made more relevant to my own view below.
and nearby worlds. However, accounting for the actual possibility of such cases, in nearby or far off worlds, is an intuitive assessment with epistemic import. Specifically, one has the intuition that the Swampman case is actually possible, even if far-off.

4.2. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux

In Chapter 1, I presented and objected to Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s (2009a) dispositional theory of intuitions on which the reliability of intuitions is the general reliability of judgment. On their view, intuitions “play purely heuristic and rhetorical roles in the securing of philosophical positions” (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, p. 36). One’s inclination to believe P is simply to say that in such-and-such conditions one would believe P. The epistemic status of one believing P is not dependent on the causal processes leading to believing. Hence, one intuiting P does not provide epistemic status for one’s belief that P. However, my dismissal of these sorts of views was too quickly made. I argued, alongside Bealer (1998) and Grundmann (2007), that dispositional and judgment theories of intuition generally fail to be consistent with our first-person phenomenal experience of intuiting. However, I subsequently argued that phenomenal approaches fail when they put theoretical limitations on what intuitions are, effectively undermining my objection to dispositional theories of intuition. Nevertheless, I argued that Earlenbaugh and Molyneux faced a second kind of problem, one that undermines

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30 One further, related point would help dismantle Deutsch argument that intuitions are non-epistemic. In order for the natural form of the Gettier argument to go succeed, it must the case that (1) is true in the actual world. Consider the formulation of the Gettier case offered by Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009):

(1) $\exists x \exists p \ G_{cf}(x, p)$
(2) $\forall x \forall p \ [G_{cf}(x, p) \supset (JTB(x, p) \& \neg K(x, p))]$

Therefore (3) $\exists x \exists p \ (JTB(x, p) \& \neg K(x, p))$

In English:

(1) It’s possible for some x to stand to some as given in the text of the Gettier story.
(2) If some x were to stand to some p in a way satisfying the (literal interpreted) text of the Gettier story, then anyone who satisfied the text of the story with a proposition would have NKJTB.
(3) So, it’s possible to have NKJTB. (Ichikawa & Jarvis, 2009, p. 225)

Williamson (2007) has a similar formulation that Ichikawa and Jarvis argue against (2009). That disagreement is not essential here since both agree that modality is essential to describing the Gettier intuition even if they, however, disagree over how the modalities manifest. Ichikawa and Jarvis have the view that intuitions are modal judgments of (metaphysical) necessity. Returning to Deutsch’s form of the argument, the argument is sound only if (1) is true in the actual world. In order for it to be true in the actual world there must be at least one F that is not a G. The Gettier case is supposed to show that case obtains in the actual world, but that is not necessarily the case. Should we doubt that that Gettier case does not obtain? A moderate view is to suggest that if the Gettier intuition is only causally related, then (1) remains under-motivated without appealing to possibility.
their argument that intuitions are devoid of epistemic status. That is, there is a disparity between intuitions and dispositions to believe whereby one can have competing inclinations (e.g., toward both $p$ and not $p$). However, the sorts of intuitions that Earlenbaugh and Molyneux aim to characterize don’t seem to represent themselves in this way. In practice, when we have our intuition concerning the Gettier case, we have not wishy-washy intuitions - S has the intuition that it might be the case that $p$ or it might be the case that not-$p$ - , but, rather, a firm conviction that Smith does not know that the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job. Intuition tells us that it is either the case that $p$ or that it is the case that not-$p$. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux attempt to respond to the objection by categorising intuitions into ‘net’ and ‘competitive’ inclinations. Doing so requires that competitive inclinations (qua intuitions) have some sort of epistemic status. That is, when one’s competitive inclinations ‘fighting it out’, the winner is epistemically better off than the loser. It is no longer epistemically neutral as Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s theory purports. However, this is not to say that wishy-washy intuitions are not properly called intuitions. Intuitions of discovery offer a better diagnosis in these cases. Below, I explain what I mean here; and distinguish Earlenbaugh’s and Molyneux’s (2009a) view from my own.

At the core of their argument is the idea that intuitions play roles that produce, but don’t justify, beliefs; an idea I agree with even though their their defence of their account fails to capture this feature.

One eminent kind of motivation for ascribing non-evidential roles to intuitions is to avoid mentalism. Mentalism is the view that intuitions just tell us about the intuitor’s psychology so far as they are willing or unwilling to apply (e.g.) their (inten-)sional concept of knowledge to cases of mere justified true belief.\(^1\) Mentalism is inconsistent with what many philosophers take as the target of philosophical analysis.\(^2\) Intuitions about knowledge aim not at the concept of knowledge, but at knowledge itself. For example,

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\(^1\) If one takes one’s intuitions to be constitutive of the concepts they apply (cf. Weinberg & Crowley 2009), one has grounds to resurrect mentalism as a route to saying something more substantive about intuitions since intuitions would, in essence, determine the concepts they apply – they would not only be meaning-directed, but seemingly world-directed as well. However, there are some unflattering consequences to the constitutivity of concepts by intuitions. For relying on intuitions solely as means to concept determinacy leaves open the possibility that our intuitions are wholly mislead. There is no guarantee that intuitions connect up with their world counterparts in substantial ways.

\(^2\) What I’m calling “mentalism” is something distinct from what, for example, Conee and Feldman (2004) call “mentalism.” That view concerns justification, such that justificatory status is determined by the mental states of the believer. Conee and Feldman argue that if two agents have the same mental states, then the two agents have the same justification.
Williamson (2000, 2007) advocates such view whereby knowledge is a mental state. However, the fact that philosophers take the objects of philosophical analysis as those things that Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a) call “troubling extra-mental facts and entities” forces the realisation that intuitions should not be evidential. Troubling extra-mental facts and entities are non-mental objects of analysis such as morality, God, time, space, and persistence. Anyone that accepts that such objects of philosophical analysis cannot “possibly provide evidence concerning objects (like pure *possibilia*) that play no causal role in this universe, or objects (like abstract objects) that play no causal role period, or fact (like normative facts) that do not obviously involve causal potent truth-makers” (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, p. 40). Thus, because intuitions do get used to address troubling extra-mental facts and entities, either intuitions used in the analysis of such objects have been used wrongly, or they play some role other than providing evidence.33 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux advocate the latter position.

The central idea of Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a) is casched out in this way: “the role of intuitions (inclinations to believe) in philosophical methodology is non-evidential, and the question of how they could be used as evidence falls away.” Intuitions merely play heuristic and rhetorical roles, but not as truth indicators; rather, they play the role of persuaders in the discursive methods of philosophy (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, p. 36). Here is the kind of case that the authors think gives their position some initial plausibility:

> Harry the philosopher has several strong but brute inclinations to believe.

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33 Clearly, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a) are thinking here that in order for intuitions to be evidential, they must have some sort of causal relation to the objects that they purportedly evidence. However, intuition theorists, namely Bealer (2000), have argued that a causal connection is quite unlikely to be the case. Instead Bealer argues that intuition regarding what Earlenbaugh and Molyneux call ‘troubling extra-mental entities and facts’ has a reliable modal connection to their objects. But, let’s set this issue to the side.

To be sure, troubling extra-mental entities and facts are not the only objects of intuition. Cohnitz and Häggqvist (2009) set out the following distinction for the objects of philosophical inquiry (and vis-à-vis philosophical intuitions). One view is that philosophy is concerned with *metaphysical truths*, or “the properties that things may or may not have, independently of our practices in using language” (Cohnitz & Häggqvist 2009). A second view is that philosophy is aimed at our linguistic practices, investigating the meanings of philosophically salient terms – or, so-called ‘ordinary language philosophy’. The underpinning idea is that getting clear on the meanings and use of language will render moot or dissolve apparent philosophical problems and dilemmas. A third view is that philosophy is interested in concepts, which, though related to our ordinary language meanings and use, are not reducible to language. Getting clear on the shape, relations and content of concepts will lead to clearer access to some philosophical problems and dissolve others. So far as meanings, language, and concepts have worldly counterparts that are tractable by science, there is good reason to think they are something other than ‘troubling extra-mental facts and entities’.
Namely, he is strongly inclined to believe P, Q, R and S. As it happens, the other philosophers in Harry’s community are, with few exceptions, also inclined to believe the same propositions. Strangely, none of the philosophers has any introspective access to why they are so inclined. In fact, none of them can think of an argument for P, Q, R or S that does not rest on less appealing premises. Hence, they do not give arguments for the four propositions. Nevertheless, most philosophers believe P, Q, R and S and use them in premises for other arguments. (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, p. 44)

I show that this is a rather inaccurate and untenable characterisation of philosophy. One ancillary reason to think the characterisation is inaccurate is the lack of a specific example of a discourse where P, Q, R and S occur (Henceforth I’ll refer to P, Q, R, and S simply as Q). Furthermore, suppose that Sally and Jim both believe that Q, but can’t provide any reasons for why they think that Q is at least likely to be true. Surely, one should not believe Q, as one doesn’t have any reason for thinking that Q is true (or false). Earlenbaugh and Molyneux allude to a more tenable position when they suggest, following the passage cited above, one sort of reason for believing that Q: that positions that entail ~Q are generally taken to be bad. As such, one has a reason to think that Q is at least likely to be true, even if no direct defence of Q is forthcoming. However, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux claim that the lack of any direct reason to think that Q is at least likely to be true is sufficient to show that there are no reasons to think that Q is at least likely to be true. Clearly, this is not the case since the negation of Q is reason for thinking that Q is at least likely to be true. Furthermore, Q is not a reasonable philosophical position to take without reason to think Q is at least likely to be true.

Here is how Earlenbaugh and Molyneux get the methodological setup wrong. Suppose that some group of philosophers concerned with the value of knowledge all believe Q. However, following Earlenbaugh and Molyneux, none can provide a reason for thinking why Q is at least likely to be true. Nonetheless, because the group agrees that Q, the proposition is a legitimate supposition in their discourse about the value of knowledge. However, Q is legitimate only so far as it remains uncontested. The parties

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34 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux don’t present any specific examples for P, Q, R or S, but they seem to have in mind what I discussed above: platitudes. However, even platitudes have reasons to be believed. For example, we know that justified true belief is more valuable than mere true belief because we can provide justification for our believing truly. Furthermore, in most cases, philosophers may come up with alternative reasons for continuing to believe their mere inclinations.
agreeing to them in the context of the discourse support its justificatory status. Such is their role as one of conferrers of epistemic status. That is, we might say that they operate in *prima facie* epistemic roles. So, what Earlenbaugh and Molyneux have gotten wrong is the role of agreement in the discourse, which provides for Q’s epistemic status and justificatory prowess.

When diagnosing where Earlenbaugh and Molyneux go wrong, one finds that they seem to confuse their own argument as being part of the original discourse. Essentially, any disagreement about the status of Q serves to undermine Q’s ability to play roles of fundaments. Hence, once the authors object to Q, then Q no longer seems properly evidential. Furthermore, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a) aim at an explanation of intuitions as inclinations to believe that better satisfies how we normally speak about and use intuitions in philosophical methods. We should at least consider the explanation for why we should think intuitions are inclinations to believe. They write,

One can account for one’s belief by appealing to one’s intuitions because an intuition is an inclination to believe, hence:

I believe P because I find P intuitive

is akin to:

I believe P because I am inclined to believe P.

In this way, the appeal to intuitions is classified as a form of *praxic reason-giving*. The agent is asked why she is taking a certain action and she responds by saying that she *is inclined* to. We give answers like this all the time, whether we are accounting for why we chose the soup over the salad (because I am inclined toward the soup) or accounting for why we holidayed in Portugal rather than Mexico (I am inclined towards Portugal) or whatever. (Earlenbaugh & Molyneux, 2009a, pp. 45-46)

35 Furthermore supposing P, Q, R, and S without any reason is a legitimate more of philosophical inquiry. For, say that one suggests P and Q. However, one deduces from P and Q a contradiction. Hence, one has reason to belief that P, Q or both are false, irrespective of whether or not they had any reason to initially believe P or Q. And this seems perfectly in line with the normal ways that we do conceptual analysis. There is no burden on intuitive presuppositions.

36 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux make a not-so-subtle distinction between S’s believing *that* p and S’s believing P. One can be inclined towards believing P without believing that p. However, we have the intuition *that* S has a justified true belief that a co-worker owns a Ford, but does not know that a co-worker owns a Ford’, we hold a certain kind of propositional attitude, and we believe it on the basis our intuition. Moreover, we don’t merely hold the belief in any neutral sense; we believe that it is (at least likely to be) true. Furthermore, if we substitute their example into their formulation, we can’t make much
Now let us import this explanans into the Gettier case since, if anything is an intuition, our responses to the Gettier’s cases are intuitions. Surely, if Earlenbaugh’s and Moyneux’s explanation of intuitions holds, it must hold for the Gettier intuition. Suppose that one considering the Gettier case is asked why they hold the belief ‘S has a justified true belief that a co-worker owns a Ford, but does not know that a co-worker owns a Ford’. They would respond that they find the belief intuitive given the case. However, they would not respond that they are simply inclined to believe it. Rather, they would reply, perhaps as Goldman does, by saying that the Gettier case shows that S’s justification fails to be causally related to what she purportedly knows. Or, they would reply that the case shows that justified true belief fails to count as knowledge because the case reveals that there is a gap between what S justifiably and truly believes and what S purportedly knows. One wouldn’t respond that they are merely inclined to believe it, as it would be wholly insufficient. It would be something akin to a wife asking her partner why they bought a ridiculously expensive sports car and the reply being ‘Because I felt like it’. One’s inclinations of taste (towards soup and vacation destinations) are very much unlike philosophical intuitions. The former are more like inklings than robust inclinations to believe things philosophical.

Earlenbaugh and Molyneux offer an account that has some attractive features. Nevertheless, their argument for why we should accept that intuitions are inclinations to believe leaves their audience wanting. I argued that their account goes wrong in the way that they conceive of how philosophers use intuitions in philosophy, and that praxic reason-giving fails to offer epistemically neutral intuitions wherein our inclinations conflict. I suggest that what their account is getting at, although not quite reaching, is something like fundaments. However, where praxic reasons and intuitions of discovery (qua fundaments) diverge is that when intuitions are praxic reasons, their epistemic status, i.e., their warrant as reasons, is derived from the fact that they are intuitional deliverances. For example, when I say to you that it is intuitive to me that \( p \), it is that \( p \) is intuitive that serves as reason for me to believe that \( p \) and, moreover, reason for you to believe that \( p \)

\[
\text{I believe Portugal because I find Portugal intuitive}
\]
is akin to:

\[
\text{I believe Portugal because I am inclined to believe Portugal.}
\]

We must believe something that is about Portugal, and not merely be inclined towards it.
when I offer it as such. However, since intuitions fail to be epistemically neutral, one is unable to avoid using them in one’s justification for a theory of intuition in a bad way. On the contrary, when the deliverances of intuitions of agreed upon by one’s epistemic peers (in the context of a specific discourse), intuitions are epistemically efficacious in virtue of that agreement and not in virtue of their intuitiveness. Let’s consider another view in the recent literature.

4.3. Ahlstrom

Ahlstrom (2009) offers a view similar to my own preferred view. He argues that the elucidation of concepts by the application of categorisation intuitions sketches the structure of the concepts in two ways. Intuitions operate in justificatory roles in the evaluation of concepts through the determination of whether they do not apply in specific cases, “disqualifying analyses in so far as they either include counter-intuitive instances or fail to include instances” (Ahlstrom, 2009, p. 17). That is, the requirement that the concepts are mete out by necessity and sufficiency conditions entails that definitions of concepts are without counterexamples. Ahlstrom calls this “the requirement of exhaustiveness” (Ahlstrom, 2009, p. 16). Intuitions also operate in roles of discovery. They provide ‘positive material’, or candidate conditions of necessity and sufficiency. Intuitions about concepts and epistemic norms, “may serve to fix the subject matter of epistemology, by providing the basic material for the approximate accounts supplied by competent users of the corresponding terms” (Ahlstrom, 2009, p. 26). Like Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009a), he argues that, “intuition […] is stripped of the justificatory powers it has been endowed with within the dominant approach, and instead restricted to the context of epistemological discovery” (Ahlstrom, 2009, p. 26 - emphasis added).

In fact, Ahlstrom’s view is very much in line with my own, insofar as he sees intuition as operative in roles of discovery. The role of intuitions, he writes, “is not to evaluate or justify epistemological theories but to provide epistemological hypotheses” (Ahlstrom, 2009, p. 26). However, Ahlstrom isn’t entirely clear in his exposition regarding the bifurcation of intuitions. He writes, “epistemological hypotheses […] are properly evaluated not so much with reference to whether or not they clash of mesh with our intuitions” (Ahlstrom, 2009, p. 26 - emphasis added). Ahlstrom is unclear in respect to the expression ‘not so much’, since this doesn’t exclude that intuition can play some kind of role in justification.
What is lacking from Ahlstrom’s explication is a distinction between when intuitions about concepts are justificatory and when intuitions about concepts are aimed at discovery. Furthermore, such an analysis of categorisation intuitions that merely pertain to concepts (instead of the things that concepts apply – if anything at all) fails to capture what many philosophers take their arguments to mean. That is, many arguments about knowledge are about knowledge, not the concept of knowledge (cf. Williamson 2000, 2007). So, Ahlstrom hasn’t given us an account of intuitions that generalizes.

Nevertheless, Ahlstrom gives us clear indication that bifurcating philosophical intuitions into intuitions of justification and intuitions of discovery is a plausible route to resolving some epistemic issues regarding the ways that philosophers use intuitions. However, Ahlstrom does not resolve the issue of how to epistemically ground one’s intuitions when an intuition is insufficient ground for itself. Let’s turn to address an objection to the bifurcation of philosophical intuitions.

5. Objections

I have argued that bifurcating intuitions into intuitions that operate in the context of discovery and intuitions that operate in the context of justification provides a suitable explanatory route to justify a theory of intuition. Under constraints of rational agreement of one’s epistemic peers and in the context of a particular discourse, intuitional deliverances confer epistemic status not in virtue of their intuitiveness but, rather, in virtue of agreement. However, the direction of explanation here is somewhat awkward, since one would expect that intuitional deliverances, if they were reliable, would be reliable tout court. In this sense, if all that differs is the context of intuition use, then intuitions of justification and intuitions of discovery result from the same kind of reliable process. If intuitions would otherwise be reliable, why should we temper intuitions’ epistemic efficacy just because the role they play in the method of agreement? For example, the Gettier intuition that we have regarding Smith having a justified true belief that does not count as knowledge is intuitionally efficacious in one discourse: it is evidence that justified true belief theories of knowledge are false. However, in another discourse, say Goldman’s attempt to justify a causal theory of empirical knowledge, it is only epistemically efficacious in virtue of being a fundament to the discourse.

There are two points to be made here. First, if intuitions are reliable, then one’s
justifiedly believing that they are reliable ought to not rely on intuitions (Cohen, 2005). Second, the Out-competition Argument shows that no theory of intuition can be certified as the correct theory of intuition without appealing to intuitions in a bad way (i.e., question-beggingly, or epistemic circularity or regress). For the sake of argument, let’s grant that intuitions are reliable – a fundament in our discourse, if I may. Moreover, let’s grant that they are modally reliable in a similar way to what Bealer (2000) describes. Call this “strong modal reliability”.

\[(\text{SMR})\] One’s intuitions about knowledge are modally reliable if and only if one determinately possesses the concept of knowledge and deploys is the correct ways (i.e., in ways that one’s epistemic peers in some idealised possible world deploys the concept of knowledge correctly).

We can accommodate (SMR) in the method of agreement by distinguishing which grounds of justification are epistemically efficacious in the discourse. So, even if one’s intuition that \(p\) is (SMR)-reliable, what serves as ground for its epistemic efficacy in the context of the discourse is the members’ agreement on its status as a fundament of the discourse. Weaker versions of intuition’s reliability can be accommodated in the same way.\(^37\) That is, whether or not intuitions are reliable is \emph{nonsequitur} in regard to their justificatory status in the role of fundament.

A second objection is that what I call “fundaments” or the role that fundament play in the discursive practices of philosophy isn’t novel. Why should one think that fundament are not what Wittgenstein (1969) describes as “hinge propositions” in regard to the problem of scepticism, or what Wright (2004) describes as “hinges”, or what Lewis (1972) describes in regard to platitudes? Fundaments are similar to these artifacts of philosophical methodology in some respect; nevertheless, they differ in subtle and important ways. Filling out the differences will help illuminate the distinctive roles of discovery intuitions.

Standard talk of platitudes refers to propositions that are ordinarily taken to be true. Platitudes are, to use Lewis’ phrase, “what everyone knows, everyone knows that

\(^{37}\) However, the failure of philosophy to be able to offer necessity and sufficiency conditions for knowledge evidences that our concept of knowledge is not determinately possessed. Hence, (SMR) may not fit the actual situation that philosophers are in when assessing whether concepts apply in various hypothetical cases.
everyone knows, and so on” (Lewis, 1972, p. 256). Take, for example, Canberra-style (Jacksonian-style) conceptual analysis.38 One collects an ordinary, everyday proposition concerning some target concept as the starting point for analysis of the target concept. Jackson (1998) is explicit about the use of intuitions to identify our platitudeful folk conceptions of philosophically salient concepts.39 Prichard (manuscript-a) expresses a slightly different and stronger notion of platitude, what he calls ‘intensional platitudes’. Intensional platitudes regard the intension of the relevant intuitional object, e.g., knowledge.40 Intensional platitudes are “our most deep-seated intensional intuitions about a concept.” Notice that both the Canberra and Pritchard notions of platitude have it that platitudes are intuitional deliverances. Contrast notions of platitudes with one of a Wittgensteinian (1969) notion of hinge propositions.

Proposition Q is a hinge proposition for one’s argument that R iff one’s argument for R epistemically depends on Q and one cannot reasonably reject that Q given the domain of inquiry wherein, for all one knows, Q is not obviously false.41

Wright (2004) proposes something slightly different. On his view, "Hinges, broadly

38 Sometimes platitudes are sometimes called “pre-theoretical” intuitions (Pritchard, 2009a).
39 It is from these that one creates a Ramseyan Sentence describing T-terms in O-terms. Ramsey, like most positivists, distinguishes between terms denoting sensory and non-sensory data. Constituting different vocabularies, he gives them names 'primary' and 'secondary' terms without much specification on how the division is maintained. Most follow Lewis's distinction (1972/1999), dividing vocabularies into O-terms and T-terms. O-terms get meaning from outside a theory (it is not especially important for present purposes to say how). T-terms get their meaning from inside the theory, implicitly defined by their role and in the context of the theory.

A Ramseyan sentence allows that a story can be told about T-terms entirely with O-Terms vocabulary. T-terms are replaced by variables bound by an existential quantifier. In essence, the O-vocabulary describes the relations of the variable component T-terms' to each other. E.g., some x and some y exist in relation Z in W1. In other words, Ramseyan sentences offer O-term descriptions of existence and structure of T-terms.

40 Pritchard offers some examples:

1. Knowledge that p entails P;
2. S’s knowledge that p entails that S believes that p;
3. S’s knowledge that p entails that S is in possession of reasons for thinking that p is true;
4. S’s knowledge that p entails that S’s belief that p is not true simply as a matter of luck; and,
5. S’s knowledge that p is the result of S’s exercise of relevant cognitive ability.

41 Wittgenstein writes,

[The questions] that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. (Wittgenstein, 1969, 44c)
speaking, are standing certainties, exportable from context to context” (Wright, 2004, p. 190). Here, hinge propositions are presuppositions one can use, given a particular cognitive project. That is,

P is a presupposition of a particular cognitive project if to doubt P (in advance) would rationally commit one to doubting the significance or competence of the project. (Wright, 2004, p. 190)

One can help themselves to believing that p if and only if (1) one has no reason to think that p is not true and (2) any attempt to justify their belief that p doesn’t put one in a better epistemic position (and would otherwise commit one to an epistemic regress).

There are some significant differences between the epistemic role of hinge propositions and the role of fundaments. Nevertheless, there are similarities as well. For example, Bilgrami (2004) points out that hinge propositions are not the sort of things that are beyond doubt. Rather, “they cannot be [rationally] doubted while scientific investigation is on-going [in the context of the investigation itself]” (Bilgrami, 2004, p. 72). Fundaments have a similar standing. However, it is the rational agreement of members of the discourse that sustains the epistemicizing status of a fundament within the discourse. In contrast, for Wittgenstein and Wright, hinge propositions are sense-making features of a philosophical analysis. Hinge propositions are what must be assumed given the target of philosophical analysis or given presuppositions to a question.

My view of fundaments is distinct from Wright’s (2004) notion of hinges. Fundaments are exportable from context to context (or, from discourse to discourse), but not in any robust way. Rather, whether fundaments are exportable is based on whether the members of a new discourse agree to them. This allows that members of the discourse can take candidate fundaments as targets of meta-level discourse with the aim of agreeing to accept them as fundaments.

Platitudes and hinge propositions attempt to address the starting points of philosophical inquiry. Williamson (2004), for example, argues that the pursuit of incontestable starting points is illusory. However, the idea that underlines the standard

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42 "The attempt to justify P would involve further presuppositions in turn of no more secure a prior standing . . . and so on without limit; so that someone pursuing the relevant enquiry who accepted that there is nevertheless an onus to justify P would implicitly undertake a commitment to an infinite regress of justificatory projects, each concerned to vindicate the presuppositions of its predecessor” (Wright, 2004, p. 191-192).
notion of platitudes and hinge proposition is that all that is required is that there are uncontested starting points. This is not to say that such starting points are incontestable. For example, a number of authors in the debate about the value of knowledge take it that knowledge is more valuable than mere justified true belief as a fundament. This isn’t an uncontested platitude about knowledge (cf. Pritchard, 2009b). However, fundaments, though presented with a ring of intuitiveness, are epistemically efficacious because the parties to the debate agree to them, not because they seem intuitive. It is not uncharitable for one critical of intuitions to suppose that platitudes and hinge propositions require intuitive support. Perhaps this is one source of confusion over the role of intuitions in philosophical methods.

However, fundaments need not be intuitive (in a pre-theoretical or in a theory-laden sense) in either the sense that their intuitiveness confers on them epistemic status or in the sense that they are intuitive at all. Their ability to confer epistemic status is dependent on agreement among the members of the discourse, which contrasts with Wittgenstein’s epistemology whereby hinge propositions are necessary suppositions in a particular argument context in order for the investigation of the target to make sense. That is, the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge proposition is that hinge propositions such as ‘I have hands.’ cannot be rationally doubted in the context of everyday discourse. However, in some other context, say, in the context of the sceptical argument, the proposition, ‘I have hands.’, is subject to rational doubt. To put the point in another way, hinge propositions are held in place by the relevant structure of reasons (Pritchard, manuscript-b). The relevant structure of reasons is dictated by argument context. A fundament is merely what the parties to the discourse agree to with regard to the target of inquiry. This is not to say that all fundaments that the parties agree to at the beginning of the inquiry will be used to justify its conclusions. Also, there is no presumption that the fundaments are necessary or essential to making sense of the discourse. A discourse may utterly fail to reach a conclusion regarding, e.g., the nature of knowledge. One must in

Williamson comments,

Metaphilosophical talk of intuitions obscures our real methodological situation […] it feeds the methodological illusion of an incontestable starting-point, if not of intuited facts, then of facts as to what we intuit. There is no such starting point; evidence can always be contested. (Williamson, 2004, p. 152)

Williamson’s point is not insubstantial. However, the direction he argues for to supply resolution of the issue is slightly different from the one I present here.

Methodologically, platitudes need not and do not appeal to intuitional support in the frame of the dialectic, even if there is an argument that supports their presupposition.
such cases re-evaluate the relevant fundaments and reorient the domain of the discourse. Fundaments can be subject to rational doubt, but persist as justificatory elements of the discourse under the auspices of agreement. In the case of discovery intuitions, one might have no reason to believe them at all; as discovery intuitions they stand out as salient or as ‘philosophernalia’. Nevertheless, agreement on such artifacts makes them epistemically efficacious in certain discourses.

One might object by pointing out that the relevant notion of justification in the method of agreement is deontological. A deontological notion of justification is too weak a notion of justification to account for progress in philosophy or even that the conclusions of discourses are even roughly true. I address these objections below.

5.1. Prospects for Progress in Philosophy

I haven’t drawn any thoroughgoing conclusions regarding the correct theory of philosophical intuitions. However, it was not my primary aim to do so. Rather, my aim was to explore and criticise various armchair routes to defining and defending a theory of philosophical intuitions; and to sketch a method aimed at justifying a theory of philosophical intuitions that would suffice in the light of epistemological issues involving the foundations of justification. I have argued that the method of agreement allows one to circumvent problems of question-begging, circularity and regress by contextualising arguments for a theory of intuition in a dialectical and discursive discourse whereby the agreement of parties, i.e., epistemic peers, to the discourse agreement on fundaments serves as grounds for justification. This alternative source of justification fits with the standard methods of philosophical argument wherein philosophers engage in a focused, topical literature. I now turn to suggest how the method of agreement can give an account of progress in philosophy.

In doing so, I don’t mean to imply that philosophy does not make progress in its present endeavours. In fact, the method of agreement is meant to reflect the ways that philosophers actually do philosophy, and the bifurcation of intuitions of justification and

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45 Note that I am not committed to the view that fundaments are proposition that members of the discourse have no reasons to believe they are untrue. Members may have significant reasons to doubt a fundament, and agree to it in the context of the discourse. Granted, there is some question to the broader efficacy of the conclusions of such discourses. However, there is no in-principle reason why we should reject such discourses because they have questionable or false fundaments when the metric for the substantiality of their conclusions is the exportability of their conclusions to other discourses.
intuitions of discovery is already latent in philosophical methods – evidenced by the survey results presented in Chapter 4. Insofar as philosophers are engaging in and are using the method of agreement and bifurcating intuitions into discovery and justificatory roles, they are making progress (roughly) in the way I describe below. So, one shouldn’t think that this view is revisionist. Rather, it is an attempt to goad attention to how progress is made in philosophy.

How should one measure the progress of philosophy? The method of agreement suggests that at least one aim of philosophy is consensus. We can conceive of consensus as a process. The process is one that includes agreement on fundaments, dissent, revision, and consensus on conclusion of various discourses. Philosophical dissent is the failure of consensus on the conclusion of a discourse. In these cases, members of the discourse will usually revise the fundaments or their target. This is consistent with thinking that the role of philosophy is to formulate the right questions. Nevertheless, we get more out of the method of agreement than just the right questions. Discourses offer up conclusions and conclusions are portable. That is, members of other discourses, under constraints of rational agreement, can adopt them, but with novel justificatory prowess. Fundaments are epistemically efficacious in virtue of agreement, not that they are conclusions of a rational discourse or deliverances of justificatory intuition. In this respect discovery intuitions play an important role. Discovery intuitions allow that philosophers can posit fundaments that would otherwise have no justification for believing them. Interesting or salient aspects of hypothetical cases or philosophical arguments can be picked up and used in effective ways in philosophical argument. I presented two examples, Turri’s (2010) use of Goldman’s fake barn case and Goldman’s (1967) mining of the Gettier case.

Note that my aim was to elucidate the roles of discovery intuitions under agreement, a point that I take as something different from consensus. Consensus is had in regard to conclusions of a discourse, whereas agreement concerns its fundaments. Nevertheless, consensus is a tertiary matter that deserves some attention.

Clearly, consensus does not entail truth. Consensus allows that philosophers might be in complete agreement and still get things wrong. After all, just because most philosophers agree that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge doesn’t entail the fact that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge (cf. Weatherson, 2003). So, one seeking truth seems to be in a better position than one seeking consensus. Moreover, the way that I have setup the method of agreement allows that philosophers can agree on
fundaments that are false. Hence, the method of agreement seems to be in an even more perilous position than if one takes truth as the primary goal of philosophy. However, we need not take truth to be the only goal of philosophy. Instead of meting out what the primary goal of philosophy ought to be or what the conditions for philosophy’s success ought to be, I suggest that consensus is only one kind of goal of philosophy. Let me say a few things about consensus.

I would like to argue more firmly for something along the lines that the multiple discourse view of philosophy breeds a truth-apt notion of consensus when a conclusion of a discourse enjoys the broadest possible agreement in the various discourses of philosophical domains. Such a view is teleological in the sense that when all the philosophical questions have been formulated and answered, the conclusions of that discourse will be ultimately justified. There will be no rational dissenters to be found. There will be no further discourse to be had. Surely, if all of philosophy is spent, we've reached the truth of all things we can know (or we can't know anything at all). However, a more temperate relationship between consensus, deontological justification, and truth will do for the present purposes. The relationship is one mediated by reliability. For example, in the context of law, the full consensus of a jury of one's peers is a reliable indicator of one's guilt. It's true that juries sometimes get verdicts wrong. The fairly recent implementation of DNA testing has exonerated a number of people previously found guilty by consensus. But this isn't a problem for the method of agreement, which allows that conclusions of one discourse can be rejected, and fundaments revised. Surely, if given more evidence or some further argument, a panel of peers would reconsider the bases of their conclusions. However, on a teleological view of philosophical inquiry, when philosophy is spent, there are no more arguments to be had and there is no more evidence to be considered.

One might argue that in order to give a full account of reliability I need to spell out what the rational procedures within the discourse are for arriving at conclusions. I would like to leave this point open, and I think I'm in a good position to do so. I've argued that the conclusions of a discourse must meet at least one of top-down or bottom-up success conditions. Conclusions of a discourse as such rely essentially on their fundaments. In turn, the veracity of the conclusion is measured against their exportability to other discourses in other domains of inquiry. That is, more apt conclusions will be taken up more often into other successful discourses. Conclusions based on wishy-washy,
faulty, or even perverse fundaments will not be broadly exportable. Overtime one can expect that the rational efforts of concerted and noble-minded inquirers will sift through the various debates and render a coherent synthesis of the answers to which philosophical questions aim. The question as to what philosophical intuitions are will be undoubtedly central to that synthesis. Its measure will be whether it makes it into philosophy's final answer.

Perhaps taking a teleological view of philosophical inquiry relies too much on optimism and poetic license, and pays too little attention to the problems that philosophers face now in getting to whatever the notion of 'a final answer' might entail. But the point about reliability doesn't rely essentially on this feature. We can get reliability out of consensus. However, in order to do that, we can't rely on mere consensus since coercion, perverting forms of bias, and other psychological factors that tend to make epistemic inquiry worse off can drive consensus. Thus, consensus must be rational consensus and, hence, I should offer an account of what meets the requirements of rationality. I mentioned Rescher's (1993) point above, regarding that the defence of a rational process of consensus is ultimately question-begging since one must assume some perspective of rationality in order to make such an assessment. The same difficult problem looms over the present proposal. In fact, the problem looms over philosophy in general. However, the notion of consensus under consideration does not require that rationality is of one type. Various parties to the debate can be rational under different construals of what is rational. This might be a bullet biting point: Built into the method of agreement is that parties to a discourse are epistemic peers. Clear cases of irrationality would preclude epistemic peerdom. We can't get a discourse off the ground if our interlocutor is clearly irrational. However, in more borderline cases that we can imagine, epistemic peers will be equally competent in a domain but operate on different notions of what is rational. Nevertheless, there must be relevant overlap on what is rational in order for epistemic peers to even agree on fundaments. Agreement on fundaments will tend to make only those overlapping aspects of what counts as rational salient to the justification of a discourses conclusion.

Consider the Gettier intuition, which enjoys very broad agreement in philosophy. No one seems to doubt that the Gettier intuition doesn't provide evidence that justified true belief theories of knowledge are false. The results of the discourse wherein Gettier's argument shows the failure of justified true belief theories of knowledge get exported to
other discourses because the conclusion enjoys broad agreement amongst philosophers. So, even though philosophers have yet to reach consensus on what knowledge is (or what the concept of knowledge is), there is progress where a theory is discarded for its inadequacy and there is progress where conclusions of one discourse become fundaments for another. So conclusions of a discourse have some moderate degree of portability between philosophical domains. Furthermore, the availability of discovery intuitions as fundaments allows that novel philosophical claims can enter into various discourses of philosophy. This counts as significant progress.

6. Conclusion

I have offered a unique and useful way of conceptualising the field of available theories of intuition that are available in the literature. Theories of intuition can be distinguished on the basis of what provides for intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. This is consistent with the standard caricature of philosophical intuitions as epistemic status conferring, or justificatory. I outlined five armchair approaches to justifying a theory of intuition: the approach by phenomena, the approach by mention, the approach by method, the approach by theory, and the method of agreement. I argued that armchair approaches to justifying theories of intuition are prone to engage a trio of vices: question-begging, epistemic circularity and regress. However, when we ask philosophers about how they conceive of intuitions operating in philosophical methods, we find that the standard caricature of intuitions as justificatory is incomplete. Philosophers tend to think of philosophical methodology as involving intuitions in discovery roles as well. I offered some ways in which we can conceive of intuitions operating in discovery roles in the context of the method of agreement. The method of agreement attempts to capture at least one of the ways that philosophers do philosophy. I argued that it is a plausible way by which a preferred theory of intuitions could be justified amongst some set of epistemic peers. However, I offered no particular candidate for what the best theory of intuition might be because the method of agreement is open to all of them. The question as to which theory of intuition is the best gets answers as philosophy progresses, and as the conclusions of discourses that advocate particular theories of intuition get picked up and discarded by other discourses in the various areas and disciplines of philosophy. This provides a practical test for which is most useful to the
methods of philosophy and which best coheres with the best candidate theories across the spectrum of philosophical inquiry. However, at the present point, we are left with a rather unsatisfactory conclusion for armchair approaches: either none can out-compete any other as the best theory of intuition, per the Out-competition Argument, or they all are justified to some extent in some particular discourse, per the method of agreement. This shouldn't be a surprising conclusion. It's one in line with my own philosophical proclivity towards being humble about what one's position should be in regard to the nature of intuitions. Given the approaches surveyed above, there is no clear answer from the armchair to what intuitions are. Nevertheless, I haven't concluded that there is no answer to be had. Rather, I have argued that there are no conclusive answers to be had on the approaches I've presented above. Nevertheless, I make two substantive contributions to the literature: (1) I present a novel and useful bifurcation of intuitions into justificatory and discovery roles; and, (2) I defend a view of discovery intuitions whereby discovery intuitions are not epistemically efficacious because they are, in any sense, intuitive.
1. Descriptive Statistics

Response frequencies and distributions for the “Importance of Intuitions in Philosophical Methods” measure and the rank ordering exercise have the following results. With regard to the first item, the means obtained were 3.82 for the extent to which participants agreed that intuitions were useful to justification in philosophical methods (close to “neither agree nor disagree” anchor), 5.26 for the extent to which participants agreed that intuitions were useful to discovery in philosophical methods (between “somewhat agree” and “agree to a large extent” anchors), 2.95 for the extent to which participants agreed that intuitions were essential to justification in philosophical methods (close to “somewhat disagree” anchor), and 4.04 for the extent to which participants agreed that intuitions were essential to discovery in philosophical methods (close to “neither agree nor disagree” anchor).

Results show that 50.9% of the participants agreed that intuitions are useful to justification in philosophical methods, 83.3% agreed that intuitions are useful to discovery in philosophical methods, and 57% agreed that intuitions are essential to discovery (these percentages encompass a response range from “somewhat agree” to “agree to a very large extent”). Conversely, nearly 70% of the study participants considered that intuitions are not essential to justification.

Table 2 depicts the frequency of responses for the rank ordering section of the survey. The results reveal several interesting response patterns with respect to the respondents’ notion of intuition. For instance, the majority of the participants assigned the highest ranks to the first two accounts of intuition (“Judgment that is not made on the
basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process” and “An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering”). In addition, a large proportion of participants (58.8%) assigned the lowest ranks to the sixth account of intuition (“The formation of a belief by unclouded mental attention to its contents, in a way that is so easy and yielding a belief that is so definite as to leave no room for doubt regarding its veracity”). The responses for the remaining accounts were uniformly distributed across ranking values.

In order to further explore the meaning of these findings, bivariate correlations were conducted to ascertain relationships among participants’ rankings of accounts of intuition, the importance ascribed to intuitions with respect to their discovery and justificatory roles in philosophical methods, individual differences (e.g., age and gender). The following section will examine the results obtained.

2. Bivariate Correlations

Preliminary Pearson’s correlation analyses show that the four items pertaining to the role of intuitions in philosophical methods were positively and significantly correlated, with values ranging from .52 to .74 (p<.01). The respondents were able to conceptually distinguish the role of intuitions for discovery and for justification (magnitudes of the correlations between discovery and justification items ranging from .39 to .52). While less discriminating than the previous (magnitudes of the correlations between items capturing useful and essential role of intuitions ranging from .39 to .74), the respondents also differentiated useful from essential contributions of intuitions to philosophical methods. An analysis of response frequencies provides additional information regarding opinions toward intuitions’ importance to discovery and justification. With respect to justification, while 50.9% of the respondents agreed that intuitions were useful to justification in philosophical methods, only 23.5% agreed that intuitions were essential to justification in philosophical methods. Regarding the importance of intuitions for discovery in philosophical methods, 83.3% of respondents agreed that intuitions were useful to discovery, and 57% agreed that intuitions were essential to discovery. These findings will merit further attention in the discussion section of this paper.

Considering the nature of the data provided by the rank ordering exercise, Spearman’s rho correlations were conducted to examine the level of association among
ranked accounts of intuition, and between ranked accounts of intuition and perceptions of the importance of intuitions in philosophical methods (Table 3). Spearman rho tested the extent to which high rankings on one account corresponded to similar or discrepant rankings on other accounts. In addition, the relationships between composites of the four importance items were examined in relation to ranked accounts.

The analysis yielded multiple significant relationships among accounts of intuition. The negative correlations found among pairs of accounts indicate that participants who assign a high rank to a specific account of intuition will assign a lower rank to its paired account. These findings are of particular importance for correlations of moderate magnitude signalling discrepancies in rankings of specific pairs of accounts. As an example, respondents who assigned a high rank to the first and second accounts (“Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process” and “An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering”) ascribed a low rank to the fifth account (“An intellectual state made up of (1) the consideration whether p, and (2) positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p; together constituting prima facie reason to believe that p”); (rho= -.35, p<.01 and rho= -.46 , p<.01, respectively). The content of these accounts requires further analysis to establish theoretical rationale for these perceptual discrepancies.

With respect to the relationships among ranked accounts and importance of intuitions to discovery and justification, the results show a negative and significant relationship between importance attributed to the role of intuitions and the ranking of Accounts 3 and 4 (rho= -.18, p<.05 and rho= -.18, p<.05, respectively), and a positive and significant relationship between importance ratings and ranking of Account 7 (rho= .17, p<.05). When the composite measure was further decomposed into pairs of items to reflect the unique importance of intuitions for discovery or for justification, further patterns of relationship emerged. In particular, participants who attributed higher rank to Account 2 also considered intuitions to have an important role in discovery (rho= .21, p< .01). Interestingly, while the negative relationship between importance ratings and rank of Account 3 was common to discovery and justification ratings (rho= -.15, p< .05 and rho= -.16, p< .05, respectively), the negative relationship between importance ratings and Account 4 found for the composite measure is only echoed in discovery ratings, and is non-significant for justification ratings (rho= -.20, p< .01 and rho= -.12, ns, respectively).

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Conversely, the positive and significant relationship between ratings of importance and ranking of Account 7 is only found for ratings of justification ($\rho = .18$, $p < .01$).

A final relevant question to this study, one raised in previous theoretical debates (Cohen 2000, 18), refers to the relationships among perceptions of the importance of intuitions of discovery and of justification, and the respondents’ area of specialisation within the field. In order to address this question, a series of analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to explore significant mean differences across specialisation groups in respondents’ perceptions of the role of intuitions in discovery and in justification.

3. ANOVA

Analyses of variance were conducted to examine mean differences in perceptions of the role of intuition in discovery and in justification across areas of specialisation. In order to allow for greater statistical refinement, the seven areas of specialisation with larger samples of respondents (more than 15 respondents per cell) were included in the analysis. In addition, Tukey's HSD (Honest Significance) tests were conducted to identify the specific areas of specialisation where significant differences in perception emerged, both for the composite measure and its constituent items. The significant findings for Tukey’s HSD test show that philosophy of science participants expressed significantly lower agreement than their metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind counterparts with regard to the usefulness of intuitions to justification. In addition, philosophy of science participants also displayed significantly lower agreement than their ethics counterparts with respect to the extent to which they perceived intuitions to be essential to justification.

The implications of these findings will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
### Appendix 2

By J.R.C. Kuntz

Table 1: Frequencies for Demographic Variables

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
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Note: n = 223; Account 1 = Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process; Account 2 = An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering. Account 3 = A propositional attitude that is held with some degree of conviction, and solely on the basis of one's understanding of the proposition in question, not on the basis of some belief. Account 4 = An intellectual act whereby one is thinking occurrently of the abstract proposition that p and, merely on the basis of understanding it, believes that p. Account 5 = An intellectual state made up of (1) the consideration whether p, and (2) positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for p; together constituting prima facie reason to believe that p. Account 6 = The formation of a belief by unclouded mental attention to its contents, in a way that is so easy and yielding a belief that is so definite as to leave no room for doubt regarding its veracity. Account 7 = An intellectual happening that serves as evidence for the situation at hand’s instantiation of some concept.
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Appendix 3

Survey

Introductory Page:
There are recent criticisms of intuition's use in philosophical methods. Layers of this debate range from the necessity of intuition in philosophical methods to the rejoinders to the responses to objections that intuitions are not reliable indicators of truth. In this debate are various - perhaps competing - accounts of intuition: some preceding above-mentioned criticisms, some a product thereof. On the one hand, philosophers advocating intuition's role in philosophical methods might view the various accounts of intuition and the debate itself as a discursive attempt to get clear on the single correct account of intuition. On the other hand, philosophers argue that intuition is unreliable tout court. I think there is a middle ground: there are various kinds of intuition at work in philosophical methodology. This is ground that is subject to empirical testability. The aim of this survey is to help provide evidence for this hypothesis by asking professional philosophers with different theoretical orientations how they conceive of intuitions in the scope of philosophical methods.

Thank you for participating in what stands to be an exciting study. You will be asked for demographic data, a few short questions, and then to complete a short exercise. The entire survey should take about 20 minutes. Please take the survey only once and through to completion. Answers to this survey are anonymous.

Informed Consent Information: (Omitted from this sample)

Survey Items

Demographic Information:
1. Years of professional practice in philosophy. [Years beginning with your first year of
graduate (post-graduate) study.]

2. Academic institution where you obtained, or are currently pursuing, your highest-level degree in philosophy. (Academic institution and country)

3. Current academic institution, if for longer for 10 years. (Academic institution and country)

4. Gender (Female, Male)

5. To which group do you consider yourself to belong? White, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, Hispanic or Latino, Black or African American, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, No answer, Other [write-in]

6. Area of specialisation
Presented in randomised order: Aesthetics; Africana; American Philosophy; Applied Ethics; Philosophy of Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Feminism; History of Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Law; Philosophy of Literature; Logic; Philosophy of Mathematics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Mind; Non-Western Philosophy; Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Hermeneutics; Postmodernism, Philosophy of Culture and Critical Theory; Philosophy of Religion; Philosophy of Science; and Social and Political Philosophy.

Survey:
Please indicate the level to which you agree with the following statements.
1 - Disagree to a Very Large Extent; 2 - Disagree to a Large Extent; 3 - Somewhat Disagree; 4 - Neither Agree nor Disagree; 5 - Somewhat Agree; 6 - Agree to a Large Extent; 7 - Agree to a Very Large Extent)

1. Intuitions are useful to justification in philosophical methods.
2. Intuitions are useful to discovery in philosophical methods.
3. Intuitions are essential to justification in philosophical methods.
4. Intuitions are essential to discovery in philosophical methods.

Rank the following accounts of intuition according to how each fits with your notion of intuition used in philosophical methods. ['1' = lowest/worst; '7' = highest/best. Please, DO NOT rank any accounts equally.]
• Judgment that is not made on the basis of some kind of observable and explicit reasoning process.

• An intellectual happening whereby it seems that something is the case without arising from reasoning, or sensorial perceiving, or remembering.

• A propositional attitude that is held with some degree of conviction, and solely on the basis of one’s understanding of the proposition in question, not on the basis of some belief.

• An intellectual act whereby one is thinking occurrently of the abstract proposition that \( p \) and, merely on the basis of understanding it, believes that \( p \).

• An intellectual state made up of (1) the consideration whether \( p \), and (2) positive phenomenological qualities that count as evidence for \( p \); together constituting \textit{prima facie} reason to believe that \( p \).

• The formation of a belief by unclouded mental attention to its contents, in a way that is so easy and yielding a belief that is so definite as to leave no room for doubt regarding its veracity.

• An intellectual happening that serves as evidence for the situation at hand’s instantiation of some concept.
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Feigl, H. (1958). Critique of intuition according to scientific empiricism. Philosophy East and West, 8(1 & 2), 1-16.


Pritchard, D. (manuscript-a). The methodology of epistemology.