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Chagga Elites and the Politics of Ethnicity in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania

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Ph.D.
The University of Edinburgh
2012
Declaration

This thesis has been composed by myself from the results of my own work, except where otherwise acknowledged. It has not been submitted in any previous application for a degree.
Abstract

The focus of this thesis is on elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. Originating from the fertile yet crowded slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, this group is amongst the most entrepreneurial and best educated in Tanzania. In the literature on ethnicity, elites are usually understood as playing a key role in the imagining of ethnicities, while at the same time usually being venal and manipulating ethnicity for purely instrumental means. Yet this approach not only risks misrepresenting elites; it also clouds our understanding of ethnicity itself. This thesis interrogates themes of elites, politics and ethnicity through an examination of the trajectories of Chagga experience from the 1850s to the present.

Any discussion of Chagga ethnicity must have at its centre place - the landscape of Kilimanjaro, and the kibamba banana garden. Ideas of Chagga ethnicity were shaped by how the very first European explorers and missionaries saw the landscape of the mountainside. This formed how the colonial Tanganyikan state treated the Chagga people, placing them in an advantageous position through education, and a wealthy one through the growing of coffee. In the 1950s, the Chagga ethnic group came under a single political leadership for the first time with the introduction of a Paramount Chief. This decade marked a period of Chagga nationalism. The role of intellectuals in the articulation and imagination of Chagga ethnicity is examined through two Chagga-authored ethnohistories. After independence in 1961, the advantages of the colonial period placed Chagga elites in key roles in the new state. However, as Tanzania moved towards Julius Nyerere’s ujamaa socialism, the policies of the state began to clash with the more capitalist outlook of the Chagga elite. Nevertheless, through educational achievement and international migration, members of the Chagga elite were able to remain influential and powerful. As such, they were in an ideal position to take advantage of the political and economic liberalisation, even as new challenges emerged from within Kilimanjaro itself. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the role of ethnicity in the 2005 Presidential elections in Tanzania.

This thesis makes a contribution to the literature on ethnicity in Africa by providing an account of elites that is more nuanced than in much of the existing literature. Even though Kilimanjaro saw one of the strongest manifestations of ethnic nationalism during the colonial period, Chagga elites contributed greatly to the nation-building project in postcolonial Tanzania. Tanzanian nationalism, however, did not destroy a Chagga identity, but rather enabled a new imagining of Chagga ethnicity which today continues to have a role and saliency within the Tanzanian nation.
Dedication

In loving memory of

Simbo Ntiro
I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Alan Barnard, Dr Tom Molony and the late Dr Chuck Jedrej, for their advice, help and support in the completion of this thesis.

In Edinburgh, I would like to thank my colleagues in the School of Social and Political Science, and the Centre of African Studies, particularly Paul Swanepoel, Alex Beresford, Marc Fletcher, Kaori Nagai, Steve Kerr, Dan Hammett, Lawrence Dritsas, Joan Haig, Dave Edwards, Dan Allman, Salla Sariola, Fiona Mackay, Andy Newsham, Jude Murison, Emilie Venables, Julie Grant, Meera Venkatachalam, Gracian Mkodzongi, Louise Müller, and Adiel Mushi. Outside of the School, I would like to thank John and Liz Grace, Bill Donovan, Nanette Sutherland, Thom Scott-Philips, and Sandy, Rob and the staff and regulars at Dagda.

In Tanzania, I would like to thank all those who gave up their valuable time to assist me in the completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank David Sawe, Edward Kileo, Max Mmuya, George, Clemence, Linda and Diana Latson, Aloyce Tarimo, Simon Schnetzer, Kazuko Funakoshi, Mercy Wanjiru, Tracy, Tom Manuo and his family, Vicky Nsilo-Swai, Sajjad and everyone at Hill Street, Bianca, Liesbeth Hofs, and
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Particular thanks must go to Simbo Ntiro, for all his help and support, in so many aspects of the research that went into this thesis. He is sadly missed.

Steve Kerr and the vice-chancellor and staff at the Teofilo Kisanji University kindly hosted me for three months in 2008.

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Finally, I would like to thank my parents, for their endless love and support in the writing of this thesis.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Afro Shirazi Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bwana Ruksa</em></td>
<td>literally, Mr Do-as-you-please, name given to President Ali Hassan Mwinyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>African Progressive Party - Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi - Party of the Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo – Party of Democracy and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Chagga Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Church Missionary Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>daladala</em></td>
<td>commuter minibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESR</td>
<td>Education for Self Reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>habari</em></td>
<td>literally, news; also a genre of Swahili literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCCU</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Region Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khanga</td>
<td>colourful cloths often worn by women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNCU</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNPA</td>
<td>Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAKINI</td>
<td>Demokrasia Makini - Attentive Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>mangi</em></td>
<td>chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>mangi mkuu</em></td>
<td>paramount chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>masale</td>
<td>dracaena plant, the plant of peace and pardon used as border of <em>kihamba</em> and to mark the graves of ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>mbege</em></td>
<td>beer brewed from bananas and millet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>mtaa</em> (plural <em>mitaa</em>)</td>
<td>parish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mwalimu</em></td>
<td>literally, teacher; name given to President Julius Nyerere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR</td>
<td>National Convention for Construction and Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee of CCM; or National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National League for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>pilau</strong></td>
<td>rice dish, often consumed at times of celebration or remembrance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPT-MAENDELEO</strong></td>
<td>Progressive Party of Tanzania - Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAU</strong></td>
<td><em>Sauti ya Umma</em> – Voice of the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>shamba</strong></td>
<td>land on the lower slopes of Kilimanjaro used for maize production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TANU</strong></td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TEMCO</strong></td>
<td>Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TLP</strong></td>
<td>Tanzania Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UPDP</strong></td>
<td>United People’s Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>uhuru</strong></td>
<td>freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ujamaa</strong></td>
<td>literally, familyhood; Julius Nyerere’s African socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN</strong></td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis examines the trajectories of elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. This is a group that originates from the southern and eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, and is usually understood as one of the most capitalist-orientated groups in Tanzania. My focus will be on elite members of this ethnic group. As argued by Richard Werbner (2004) of elites in Botswana, African elites are not usually described in a positive light by the academic literature; they are frequently portrayed as little more than tyrants and thieves. Werbner, however, calls for a more empathetic and insightful view of elites. I argue that the negative portrayal of elites is particularly problematic when approaching questions of ethnicity, which are central to this thesis. With regard to ethnicity, many theorists state that elites are of great importance in the imagination of ethnic identity. Yet at the same time, these elites are described as purely instrumentally manipulating ethnicity for their own ends. This description, I argue, not only runs the danger of misrepresenting the elites: it is also theoretically problematic and clouds our understanding of theories of ethnicity. If the elites are playing such key roles in the imagination of ethnicity, and their own motives are the self-serving manipulation of ethnicity along instrumentalist lines, does this not reduce ethnicity to being purely instrumental? I argue that this is problematic for many theorists of ethnicity, as
instrumental theories alone fail to account for the appeal and power of ethnicity. Of course, it would be equally as problematic to assume purely altruistic motives to elites, or to deny that elites can be cunning and astute political actors. Rather, an analysis that has a more nuanced approach to elites provides can only a increase the richness of our understanding of ethnicity.

A study of the elite members of the Chagga ethnic group provides an excellent opportunity to explore these themes. It is a group that is often portrayed, and portrays itself, as being non-homogenous. They do not share a common origin, nor a common myth of origin, and there is a long history of intra-Chagga warfare and competition between the chiefdoms of the mountain. Perhaps most interestingly from the perspective of theories of ethnicity, they do not have a common language, but rather a series of mutually-unintelligible dialects. At the same time, although this group seems diverse, there is much to unite the Chagga ethnic group. In the 1950s, they had one of Tanganyika’s strongest ethnic nationalisms under a paramount chief. Their reputation as traders and capitalists finds Chagga people all over Tanzania. Most importantly, I argue, the kihamba system is found across the mountainside, and provides the most important aspect of the Chagga lifeworld.

Thus, the Chagga ethnic group is a fascinating case on which to base a study of theories of ethnicity. Despite the fact that Kilimanjaro receives a great deal of attention from researchers in a broad range of fields, surprisingly few deal directly with questions of ethnicity. This thesis makes a new contribution to the body of literature on Kilimanjaro through an examination of these themes, and does so through a variety of ways. First, while in previous decades some authors such as Kathleen Stahl (1964) have examined strata of elite Chagga membership, this is the only recent study of the Chagga ethnic
group to have this focus, placing the elites in a wider context in a way not performed by
Stahl. The focus on elites gives a new perspective on the existing debates of perennial
importance in Kilimanjaro, such as land shortages and migration. Secondly, this study
has breadth: most studies of the Chagga ethnic group limit themselves to one subgroup,
whereas my study attempts to encompass a broader Chagga identity. It does this
through the study of elites, who cut across the divisions between rival ex-chiefdoms.
Thirdly, it has an historic depth, which enables an analysis of the trajectories of Chagga
experience through the changes in national politics and economics. Again, it is the focus
upon elites that facilitates this depth. This thesis utilises the work of the earliest
European explorers to Kilimanjaro, whose contact was almost solely with a chiefly elite.

Tanzania is usually understood as a success story in African nation-building, particularly
in the field of alleviating ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, the trajectory of the Chagga elite
follows a similar pattern to that found in many African postcolonial states. This thesis
argues that members of the Chagga elite, who were the recipients of many of the
advantages of colonialism, particularly education, managed to maintain their elite
position even though the policies of socialist Tanzania were aimed at evening-out
development across the nation. With the liberalisation of the economy and politics,
they were in an ideal position to take advantage of the new economic and political
spaces that opened up. Yet in many ways Kilimanjaro remains a source of opposition in
Tanzania. This trajectory, that the members of a group receiving the advantages of
colonialism continued to be in a dominant position after independence, is a feature of
many African postcolonies. The study of a particular example, that of the Chagga elite,
provides an interesting account and serves to emphasise the role of agency of both state
and non-state actors.
As I stated above, the Tanzanian nation is usually considered in the literature to be a great success in its nation-building. This thesis does not deny this; in fact, a study of a rebellious group such as the Chagga only serves to emphasise the successes of the nation-building project. However, the apparent stability of some African nations does not necessarily mean that they have solved the divisions in society. A 1999 edited collection, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, contains a chapter on how Zimbabwe and Tanzania had been successful in maintaining peace through containing potential conflict (Dashwood and Pratt 1999). Writing in 1999, as well as praising the successes of Tanzania, Dashwood and Pratt (1999: 224) praise Zimbabwe’s “relative [success] in maintaining both political and economic stability”. Subsequent events in Zimbabwe have arguably shown these claims of the stability of Zimbabwe to be flawed. While I argue that Tanzania does not face the same issues that developed later in Zimbabwe, the example of the Dashwood and Pratt chapter shows how the divisions that remain in a society can remain despite the apparent stability.

Given that Tanzania is a rare example of an African postcolony that is praised for its internal stability and successful nation-building, it is a fascinating case to study. However, the existing literature on the role of ethnicity in Tanzanian politics has been limited. Compare Tanzania with its neighbour, Kenya: politics in Kenya is often seen “through an ethnic lens”, in which both Kenyan and outside observers view politics purely in terms of ethnic conflict, even when this does not present a full explanation for the Kenyan political scene (Lynch 2006: 61). While there are exceptions that do examine issues of ethnicity in Tanzania in more interesting ways (Askew 2002; Mercer, Page et al. 2008), studies that specifically look at the politics of Tanzania, tend to analyse ethnicity only in the context of describing Tanzania’s successful nation-building in the most glowing of terms. Many of these approaches fall into what Susan Geiger
(1997: 8-9) criticises as the “lacks and absences” approach; approaches that explain Tanzania’s peace and stability only in terms of what the nation lacks, such as large ethnic groups. A recent example of this is Elliot Green’s (2011) analysis of the stability of Tanzania through its unique demographic qualities. This current thesis fills a gap in the analysis by examining the role of agency in the creation of this national unity; the agency, as Geiger examines, not only of party activists but also of the members of the Chagga ethnic group opposed in some respects to the party’s project.

This thesis argues that, in a number of important respects, Tanzania did not eliminate ethnic differences in the country, nor did it cure the effects of the legacies of colonialism. However, this thesis does not conclude that the Tanzanian nation is facing great instability. A series of articles, mostly in the 1990s, claimed that Tanzania’s national unity was under threat from the strains of economic and political liberalisation. This thesis addresses these concerns with an examination of the multiparty elections in Tanzania, and the presidential candidates of Chagga ethnicity who stood in the elections. I find that, while the ethnicity of the candidates has a role to play, ethnicity has not turned out to be the divisive and destructive force that some had feared.

This introduction first examines the background to the Chagga ethnic group in Tanzania, and then focuses on the variations present in the group. The introduction goes on to discuss theories of ethnicity. Then there is a discussion on the importance of the elite research, and a discussion on the nature of the Chagga elite. Next is a discussion of my fieldwork and the methodological issues it raised. Finally, there is a summary of the rest of the chapters of this thesis.
The Chagga Ethnic Group and the *kihamba*

The Chagga ethnic group have as their homeland the southern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, on the Tanzanian side of the Kenya-Tanzania border. The sizes of the populations of ethnic groups in Tanzania are hard to estimate: in the interests of national unity questions of ethnicity have not been asked on censuses since the last census of the colonial period (Gulliver 1969: 36-37). This census, of 1957, gave the Chagga population as 318,167 (Moore 1977a: x). Estimating the Chagga population becomes particularly difficult because of the migration from Kilimanjaro to urban and rural areas elsewhere in Tanzania. The 2002 census gives the population of the Chagga-dominated districts of Hai, Moshi Rural, and Rombo as totalling 908,868; the population of Moshi Urban is of more mixed ethnicity, but is mostly Chagga, and is given as 144,336 (National Bureau of Statistics 2002b). Population density in the *kihamba* belt is high. Sally Falk Moore (Moore 1986: 110) described the area as a “rururb”: a rural area with an urban population density.

Central to Chagga life and identity is the *kihamba* banana grove. The *kihamba* belt, the zone of the mountain between 900 and 1,800 metres (3,000 and 6,000 feet) that was suitable for the cultivation of bananas, would become key to Chagga on many levels (Setel 1999: 32). The *kihamba* banana garden is not large, today typically being only around a hectare in size (Devenne, Chapuis et al. 2006: 178), but it contains not only the home of a Chagga man and his family but also the staple banana crop, vegetables, livestock and, after the start of the 20th century, coffee. The *kihamba* is of key importance to Chagga people:

> The *kihamba* existed on many levels at once – material and metaphorical. The *kihamba* was the lineage reproducer, agricultural producer, and the provider of material for shelter. It was a unit of political capital and the living manifestation of
key cosmological processes. Yet, first and foremost, it was none of these, but in its varied cultural topography, and with shifting emphases over time, it has simultaneously been all of them. (Setel 1999: 30)

There is an extent to which a feeling of attachment to home is a common feature. Nevertheless, there is evidence that this attachment is seen as being particularly strong amongst the Chagga ethnic group. Charles Dundas notes that Chagga people are “more attached to his home and country than is usual among Africans” (Dundas 1924: 195). More contemprarily, there is evidence that other ethnic groups consider Chagga people as more connected to their home places than other groups, with an elite member of a different ethnic group being quoted as saying “the Chaggas are more home-loving than we are… but if we can learn from them…” (Mercer, Page et al. 2008: 201). Thus, Chagga ethnicity is closely associated with place. One of the most important crops of the *kihamba* is the banana, with various varieties grown that not only serve as a staple food but are also used in brewing *mbege*, a beer brewed from bananas and millet (Von Clemm 1964). Another plant of great importance is *masale*, a variety of dracaena, which is known as the “plant of peace and pardon” and serves as the border of the *kihamba*, a plant which gives a “supernaturally protected legal right” to the land (Moore 1986: 81-82).

The plant that had the greatest economic impact, however, was the coffee tree. Arabica coffee was introduced to Kilimanjaro at the beginning of the 20th century, grown in the individual *kihamba* alongside the bananas. Coffee had been grown in Kilimanjaro since 1896, but the planting of coffee by Chagga people was not encouraged by the Germans as it was a danger to their own production (Ogutu 1972: 280). However, after the First World War as the territory became a League of Nations mandate, coffee growing by Chagga people was encouraged by the British administration. The District Officer for
Kilimanjaro from 1919-24 was Major (later Sir) Charles Dundas. Dundas was instrumental in pushing for Chagga people to start growing coffee. He was involved in 1923 with the establishment of the Kilimanjaro Native Planter’s Association (KNPA), the predecessor to the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), to represent the interests of Chagga planters against European settlers (Moore 1977a: 17).

While there are coffee estates in parts of Kilimanjaro, much of the coffee production in Kilimanjaro was done within the *kihamba*. The banana plants provide the necessary shade for the coffee trees (Munger 1952: 181). Thus, coffee was added to existing cultivation methods, rather than replacing them. This led to a continuation of both agricultural systems and norms of inheritance (Moore 1986: 117). Yet coffee, and the money it brought, caused great change on Kilimanjaro. It made Chagga people comparatively wealthy; although, as a senior agricultural officer commented in 1938, “It is generally held that the Chagga are a wealthy tribe. Is this actually the case? Much depends upon what standard constitutes a wealthy native” (Davies 1938: 27-28).

Nevertheless, coffee-growers in Kilimanjaro were significantly better off than most of the rest of the country. In 1957-8, the national per capita income was £6, while the average annual payments to coffee farmers in Kilimanjaro and Meru was £47 (Pratt 1976: 21). It led to what Moore (1986: 129) describes as a “cultural commitment” to the market, as Chagga people spent their money not only on goods but more importantly on education. Politically, the coffee production led to the creation of one of East Africa’s earliest cooperative unions, the KNCU: a “parallel, nonchiefly, nongovernmental organisation, mountainwide in its constituency” (Moore 1986: 124).

It was this that funded the Chagga Council and the building of the 1950s. Perhaps more importantly as it pertains to this thesis, the introduction of coffee led to the creation of a new, nonchiefly elite. This elite, spending their coffee money on education, would in
time no longer be dependent on the crop, yet it was the introduction of this source of income that would allow the creation of a nonchieflly elite group.

There is a striking difference in land use between the southern and eastern slopes (in what is now Tanzania), which are inhabited by agriculturalist Chagga, and the northern slopes (in what is now Kenya), where the conditions favour Maasai pastoralism (Campbell, Misana et al. 2004). Chagga people have also long held land further down the mountain slopes towards the plain, referred to as shamba, which is mostly for growing maize (Moore 1986: 82-84). This land, however, does not hold nearly the same importance that the kihamba does. It follows different inheritance rules. Most notably, however, this land “is unfit for human habitation… This is part of Chagga mythology – the bush is inhospitable with its brigands, animals and scorching heat” (Von Clemm 1964: 119). In fact, to a degree, any land away from the kihamba belt is not considered a right or moral place to live. Yet, Chagga people are found all over Tanzania: by 1957, members of the Chagga ethnic group were found in every region of Tanganyika save one. “All this for members of a cultural group that was known to stigmatisate any land off and away from Mount Kilimanjaro as uniformly unfit for habitation by decent human beings” (Setel 1999: 68).

**Chagga Variation and Identity**

The Chagga ethnic group is, in many ways, not an homogenous group. A point regularly emphasised to me while I was conducting fieldwork was the question as to whether Chagga consisted of a single ethnic group at all. The divisions within the Chagga ethnic group consist of a diversity of politics, history and language.
The Chagga ethnic group does not have a single origin; furthermore, there is no single myth of Chagga origin. The Bantu-speaking people who would become Chagga settled on the southern slopes of Mt Kilimanjaro in waves of migration, probably beginning around the 14th and 15th centuries (Moore 1977a: 5). Migrants came from the Galla, Kamba, Maasai, Pare, Unyamwezi and the Ngu Hills (Dundas 1924: 44; Stahl 1965: 37; Moore 1977a: 6). People from these varied backgrounds settled in what became known as the *kibamba* belt. The initial migrants to the southern slopes of Kilimanjaro five or six centuries ago came not as a result of a single migration, war or empire-building; rather they were attracted to this zone by the availability of water and the fertile soils suitable for the cultivation of bananas and grass for cattle (Stahl 1964: 43; Wimmelbücker 2002: 47). Thus, Chagga are of diverse origins. Furthermore, within most of the literature and my own research, Chagga people themselves readily recognise that the Chagga ethnic group has diverse origins away from Kilimanjaro1. This contrasts to some definitions of ethnicity presented in the academic literature, for example Bates’ (2006: 167) claim that “the term ‘ethnicity’ commonly refers to collectivities that share a myth of origin”. Such a definition is clearly faulty. The Chagga ethnic group is far from unique in lacking a common myth of origin; numerous empirical studies (including by Fardon (1987) and Lindgren (2004)) find other ethnic groups that neither have, nor claim to have, a common origin. It is clear from the Chagga example, as well as many others, that a common myth of origin is not an essential part of a definition of ethnicity, yet as Lentz (1995: 307) puts it, such views are “extraordinarily tenacious”.

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1 The notable exception with the literature is Stahl’s (1964: 51) observation that no chief during the time of her research would admit that their lineage had origins anywhere but Kilimanjaro. She notes that this stands in contrast to earlier work, such as Dundas (1924). The most convincing explanation that she offers for this disparity is that this is the result of a fear of European settlement and land seizures during the time of her research, and the fear that an admission of coming from somewhere else might weaken the historical claim of Chagga occupation of the land.
If one looks at a map of the ex-chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro, still real entities within Chagga understandings of place, one can see that they are arranged in what Moore (1986: 24) refers to as a vertical alignment, running from the forest down toward the plain. This pattern persisted throughout the political shifts of the 19th and 20th centuries down to place names today. The reasons for this arrangement are threefold. First, while the kihamba belt is remarkably homogenous running east to west, ravines and gorges impeded movement across the mountainside (Devenne and Bart 2006: 97). Even today, travel east-west across the kihamba belt is often not possible and necessitates travelling down the mountain to the plain; in the past, during times of conflict, such a journey could be difficult or impossible. Secondly, microclimatic differences exist between various altitudes, encouraging vertical interlocal trade (Moore 1986: 23). The third reason is one of the features of Kilimanjaro that most impressed European visitors: the irrigation system. The system of furrows that brought a year-round water supply to the kihamba belt impressed many of the European visitors discussed in this chapter, only increasing in reputation, as Dundas (1924: 261) writes: “Europeans have often been inclined to suspect that these Africans have solved the mystery of making water to run uphill”. These irrigation channels allowed the cultivation of bananas and sugar cane all year round² (Meyer 1891: 103). This furrow system, Dundas (1924: 262) argues, resulted in the development of chieftaincies in Kilimanjaro: “within the course of a furrow order must prevail.” (See also (Moore 1986: 23-24; Grove 1993)). By the late 19th century, irrigation not only provided water, but became “a focal point of political and social relations” (Bender 2007: 9).

² It was argued by two authors in the 1920s (Gillman 1923: 6-7; Dundas 1924: 262) that the irrigation system was not necessary for the production of any food crop, but rather for the production of eleusine, a crop used solely for brewing of mbege (banana beer). An informant of mine disagreed that this was the case, arguing that brewing was under the control of the monarchy for special occasions, doubting that it could be the basis of the rural economy (Personal Communication, 8/6/2008).
There is no doubt that the irrigation system was of great importance in the political and social development of Kilimanjaro; but using this to make essentialisations about Chagga ethnicity must be cautioned against. For example, the notable social anthropologist Bruno Gutmann, who published works of Chagga ethnography between 1905 and 1936, wrote in 1913 linking the development of societies from their origins as hunter-gatherers. With the development of the water rights and land tenure: “[t]he drive (Triebkraft) towards higher forms of social organization was thus instilled into the tribe” (cited in Winter 1979: 107). Such an approach has been criticised because the history of Kilimanjaro is not so easily condensed into stages of history (Wimmelbücker 2002: 73). A principal problem is that the irrigation system across Kilimanjaro is not constant, with the eastern slopes of Rombo having few furrows, agriculture there being mostly rain-fed (Stahl 1964: 339; Wimmelbücker 2002: 51). Thus, the approach of authors such as Gutmann is flawed; as Winter points out about Gutmann’s writing on this topic, it discloses more about the theories than the history (Winter 1979: 107).

Writing of Africa in general, Goran Hyden argues that the unique quality of African peasantry is that it is essentially rain-fed; this Hyden uses to argue that the African peasant is more socially independent than his Asian counterpart, and thus is less required to enter into the modern cash economy (Hyden 1980: 10). The example of Chagga irrigation systems provides a counterexample to Hyden’s assertion that African agriculture is essentially rain-fed. Hyden himself notes that the Chagga have more of an entrepreneurial spirit, and have more readily entered into the cash economy than other ethnic groups (ibid.: 53-56), yet he does not link this to the presence of a developed irrigation system, even though doing to do so would serve to strengthen his argument.
Pre-19th-century Chagga society is reconstructed by Moore (1977a: 6) as consisting of small, mostly autonomous settlements, consisting of several or one large patrilineages. The *mtaa* (plural *mitaa*) lineage lands were at that time distinct but later, as the population of Kilimanjaro grew, changed to form the continuous settlement that exists on Kilimanjaro today. Villages as such do not, and never did, exist (Hemp 2006: 2). The *mtaa* remains a relevant and important unit today, as it is within the lineage that such issues as *kihamba* inheritance are governed (see, for example, Moore’s (1986) work on law and land tenure). Through the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, “what had originally been many independent and small Chagga chiefdoms were gradually merged through precolonial conquest and alliance (and later through colonial administrative fiat) into larger and larger chiefdoms” (ibid.: 24). This consolidation meant that the number of chiefdoms moved from over a hundred at the beginning of the 19th century, to 37 by 1899 (Stahl 1965: 38). In 1924, Dundas (1924: 19-24) reports 28, and by the introduction of indirect rule there were 15 (Stahl 1965: 38). Eventually, and briefly, there was a single paramount chief. These consolidations led to a pattern of chieftaincies in what Moore refers to as a vertical alignment, running from the forest down towards the plain (Moore 1986: 24), a pattern which persisted throughout the political shifts of the 19th and 20th centuries down to place names today.

In Kilimanjaro in the late 1940s and 1950s, there was an active debate over the political shape of Kilimanjaro. Two commoners, early adopters of the coffee introduced at the

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3 Lineage theory has come under attack in the literature, with Kuper (1982: 92-93) stating the model “has no value for anthropological analysis... fac[ing] its long-evident bankruptcy”. However, in the case of Kilimanjaro, “people talk about ‘lineages’... so frequently and so emphatically that it is safe to claim that lineage serves as an important source of identity” (Pietilä 2007: 146). Pietilä does emphasise, however, that acknowledging the importance of patrilineages and their rules does not mean the acceptance of a rule-guided model, and that the rules and membership of a lineage are not immutable and unchanging.
beginning of the 20th century, established a political organisation that led to the
creation of a single political leadership for Kilimanjaro for the first time (Iliffe 1979: 490-494). The preferred candidate of the pro-paramountcy lobby was Thomas Marealle. Thomas Marealle was of royal blood. He was the grandson of one of the most famous chiefs of Kilimanjaro’s past, Marealle, ruler of the chiefdom of Marangu from c.1880 until his retirement in 1912 (Stahl 1964: 308-336). Prior to his election, T. Marealle was not directly involved in Kilimanjaro’s active political scene. A promising civil servant, he was sent to the UK for university courses and eventually became programme director of the Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station (Swahili Service) (Eckert 2006: 259-264). T. Marealle, with royal blood yet also educated and with much experience of working with the British administration, was an ideal candidate. He was elected into the post with a landslide on 10th November 1951 (Iliffe 1979: 493).

The 1950s were a period of Chagga nationalism, led by T. Marealle. A flag, an anthem and an annual Chagga Day were established. The Chagga nationalism of the 1950s has been described as “the period of Chagga self-awareness” (Stahl 1965: 48). Despite the achievements of the paramountcy, it became increasingly unpopular. T. Marealle was seen as too close to the British administration, and was increasingly self-aggrandising. Chagga nationalism stood in opposition to the Tanganyikan nationalism of Julius Nyerere and TANU. As matters came to a head, a referendum was held in 1960 over whether to continue the paramountcy. The result was a eight to one majority for the abolition of the paramount chief.
While place names may reflect old chiefdoms, the chiefs were abolished in Kilimanjaro easily, with surprisingly little fuss. The newly independent government abolished the powers of chiefs shortly after independence, yet Chagga people had already rejected the institution with a referendum that had abolished the paramount chief in 1960. Most commentators on Kilimanjaro (including (Stahl 1964; Mramba 1966; Samoff 1974)) agree that the abolition of the institution of chieftaincy was abolished remarkably smoothly. This was not the case in some other parts of Tanzania. For example, Nyamwezi chiefs and headmen retained a great deal of influence in this period, acting as “intermediaries between modernising bureaucratic authorities and the custom-bound populace” (Miller 1968: 187). By contrast, some former chiefs in Kilimanjaro did attempt to stand for parliamentary elections in independent Tanganyika, but they were eliminated in the district selections (Mramba 1966: 1-7).

The ease with which Chagga stopped traditional chiefly leadership is a curious factor in their history. For some commentators, Chagga identity and the institution of chieftaincy
seem to be intimately linked. Most notably, Kathleen Stahl’s *History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro* (1964), funded by the Chagga Council, presents Chagga history as essentially the diplomatic rivalries between the chiefs. Compiled during the 1950s, but not published until after the abolition of traditional rule, Stahl acknowledges the changes in the preface, admitting that the abolition “was effected with ease” (ibid.: 7).

In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I make the argument that intellectual history can give an insight into the reasons why the chiefs were so easily wiped away. While the Chagga nationalism, and the writing of the likes of Stahl, present chiefly rule as essential to Chagga identity, there were at the same time rival conceptions that placed less emphasis on the chief. Particularly from the non-chiefly elite, chiefs were not essential to Chagga ethnicity.

A notable divergence is the linguistic variations found across Kilimanjaro. Classifications of the languages can vary according to whether the language spoken in different parts of Kilimanjaro should be classed as different dialects or as unique languages in themselves. The Chagga today speak at least four distinct dialects, identified by Whiteley as Vunjo, Rombo, Kibosho and Machame. There are “considerable differences” between each dialect (Whiteley 1965: 68). Those from the chiefdom of Ngasseni, on the far east of the mountain, speak a language that cannot be understood even by their immediate neighbours (Stahl 1964: 343), whereas members of the Meru ethnic group to the west speak a dialect similar to that found in western Kilimanjaro⁴ (Spear 1997: 18). There is more linguistic variety within Chagga languages than there is between some other language groups that are given their own ethnic label. For example, there are bigger differences between Chagga dialects than there is between the central Kenyan languages

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⁴ Some authors use the phrase “Chagga-speaking peoples” to refer to members of the Chagga ethnic group (Tuan 2000; Myhre 2006; Bender 2007). This phrasing is problematic as it begs the question, what is a Chagga language?
of Kikuyu, Kamba and Embu, yet each of those have their own ethnic label (Phillipson and Montlahuc 2003: 475). The linguistic variety is interesting, as language is often considered one of the key determinants of an ethnic group. Language is often considered very important by writers on ethnicity. For example, historians (including Ranger (1989) and Johannes Fabian (1983)) give attention to the role of missionaries in standardising language dialects precisely because they are considered a key aspect of the imagining of ethnic identities. Leroy Vail (1989: 11) quotes Samuel Johnson’s adage that “languages are the pedigree of nations”. The importance of language is considered very great: “We are taught to express ourselves in a specific language which not only allows us to communicate and share in recorded material but places us in a specific cultural context” (Maråe 1993: 28).

How, then, does the lack of a single Chagga language impact upon these theories of ethnicity? Is the existence of a linguistically diverse population evidence against the prevailing view that language is a key determinant of ethnicity? In actual fact, the lack of a common language has caused some angst amongst Chagga people. For example, during the discussions over the formation of the paramount chief, the debates had to be conducted in Swahili, rather than a Chagga dialect, as their dialects were mutually unintelligible (Whiteley 1956: 352; Iliffe 1979: 331). Language was considered important to Chagga people, as they first attempted to talk in their own tongue, but interests of Chagga unity forced a move into Swahili. The Chagga-authored ethnohistories discussed in Chapter 3 were written in Swahili, not a Chagga dialect. This, I argue, was part of the project of these texts to show a unified Chagga identity.

Given these divisions, does it make sense to talk about a single Chagga ethnic group? From an outsider’s perspective, there is much that unites the Chagga ethnic group.
Indeed, as Chapter 2 will discuss, the name “Chagga” comes from outside. For the 19th century European imagination, there was much about the Chagga people that fitted their idea of nationhood: unlike many groups with more ambiguous boundaries, the boundaries of the kihamba belt formed a bounded, continuous territory for the Chagga people. More recently, there is much that connects the Chagga people. For as they themselves might not always see themselves as one people, the kihamba system is a constant across the mountain. Given the importance of the kihamba to Chagga moral life, this is an important factor in considering a single Chagga ethnic group.

Chagga are broadly seen as amongst the most capitalistic in outlook of Tanzania’s ethnic groups. As Siegel (1989: 365-366) argues of ethnic stereotypes, these are not necessarily just the subject of irrational or fallacious gossip, but rather can contain elements of historic truth and continue to inform social relations. There is certainly a long history of trade within Kilimanjaro and with the outside world. Kilimanjaro has a long history of regularly-held markets (Pietilä 2007: 4). They engaged with the outside world, trading with neighbouring areas for resources that Kilimanjaro lacked, such as clay, as well as the international market through Kilimanjaro’s key role in coastal trade routes. Yet it was the introduction of coffee at the beginning of the 20th century that truly led to an increased engagement with the market as they began to spend their coffee wealth not only on goods from outside as well as on education (Moore 1986: 129). Under colonial rule, the Chagga group were the only ethnicity with enough of an entrepreneurial tendency to begin to edge out Asian traders (Bryceson 1993: 92). A perceived distrust of socialism by Chagga people adds to the picture of them as capitalist (Moore 2009: 153-154).
Within this general overall essentialisation of Chagga people as capitalist, however, there exist variations. These understandings of varieties within Chagga people are gendered. Ethnic identities contain a strong gendered component. Writing of Ndebele in Zimbabwe, Björn Lindgren writes that Ndebele ethnicity is based upon male identity: “When men in Matabeleland talk about the Ndebele as brave, they are referring to themselves as brave men. And when colonialists write about Mzilikazi and the Ndebele as cruel, the are describing the men as cruel warriors” (Lindgren 2002: 22). Certainly, gender plays a key role in Chagga identity. For example, there is a strong stereotype that the women from Machame are strong at business, to the extent that they would murder their husbands to get along. Thus, under the banner of the Chagga stereotype as the capitalist ethnic group, there lie many sub-identities. These have a strong gender component. However, in the case of the overall Chagga stereotype, it is not as easy to say that it is simply a “male” or “female” stereotype.

It is quite possible that, looking at Kilimanjaro today, it seems from my outsider perspective to be more homogeneous than in previous decades. Take, for example, housing. The traditional Chagga house, made in a beehive shape and thatched with banana leaves, occurred in a variety of shapes across the mountain (Dundas 1924: 255-258). Today, that style of housing is all but extinct. The contemporary housing, from mud and wattle, through to cinderblock to the largest mansion, has more homogeneity across the mountainside than perhaps was present in the past.

Much of the internal Chagga suggestion that there is no such group as the Chagga stems from the localism that has been a persistent feature of Chagga politics. Moore describes the man who has land in the patrilineage:
What interests him when he joins the other men in the late afternoon for a beer and some talk is what is going on in the neighbourhood. He may well know the price of coffee on the world market, and may have hard of what the party is saying on somebody’s transistor radio, or at a meeting, or even in church on Sunday. But unless he is an official or works in town he is not likely to be preoccupied with what is going on in Moshi, at the administrative seat of the district, and certainly knows little or nothing about what is going on in the other ex-chiefdoms. The ties of the rural neighbourhoods are stronger to the administrative center and to the world away from the mountain than to other similar neighbourhoods in other ex-chiefdoms on the mountain. (Moore 1986: 141)

While true, the focus of this thesis is upon Chagga elites, a group that cuts horizontally across the vertical divisions present on Kilimanjaro.

**Do “Chagga” exist?**

Given the variations present in Chagga ethnicity, the question has to be raised as to whether it makes sense to talk of a single Chagga ethnic group. Most interestingly, this was a point raised by my informants themselves. Many conversations would begin the same way: I would tell the informant (or potential informant) that I was studying Chagga ethnicity. The first point that they would mention was regularly that Chagga are not a homogenous group, emphasising the divisions within Kilimanjaro, or that Chagga did not exist at all. “There is no such thing as Chagga!” I would hear regularly. The fascinating aspect of the denial of Chagganess is this: while the opening of any discussion on Chagga ethnicity would often begin with a denial of its existence, my interlocutor would more often than not subsequently make some reference to Chagga later in the conversation. After denying the existence of Chagga, they would later make remarks such as “We Chagga return to Kilimanjaro for Christmas”, or “That person is Chagga”. Despite their earlier denials, they clearly felt able to use Chagga in conversation, and imply the existence of the ethnic group. This contradiction led me to focus greatly on
Chagga ethnicity, and to search for any sub-Chagga ethnicities of which people may have been members.

The divisions within Chagga were also emphasised in the academic literature, and I set out to explore whether there existed any other groupings that could be described as ethnic groups. This was something that I searched for throughout the entirety of my fieldwork. If “Chagga” did not exist, then of which ethnic group were the people of Kilimanjaro members? I explored the possibly evidence that there could be separate ethnicities within the Chagga ethnic group, perhaps based upon the different language families of Kilimanjaro. I asked my informants directly. I listened closely whenever people spoke, or the conversations around me, to hear how people would identify themselves or others. I searched for any clues of people identifying themselves or others as being part of a sub-ethnicity, or to offer an ethnic identity as something other than Chagga. Given that my status as an outsider may have affected the ways in which my informants talked to me about ethnicity, I also paid attention to the conversations of Chagga and non-Chagga people around me. I even looked for relatively trivial sources, such as looking through the “tribe” column of hotel guestbooks to see if anybody identified themselves as being another ethnicity other than Chagga. I came up with absolutely nothing that suggested the existence of sub-Chagga ethnicities.

Of course, there was much evidence of the divisions within the Chagga ethnic group, as evidenced by my informants comments on Chagga ethnicity. Particular attention was drawn to the linguistic variations. There was also a set of essentialisations about parts of Kilimanjaro, and gendered stereotypes of people from a variety of places on the mountain. But there was nothing that could suggest the existence of ethnic identities. While there are communities, there were not imagined ones.
Assessing these issues led to the development of my ideas of ethnicity in general, as well as the specific issues surrounding Chagga ethnicity. I began to fear that my search for alternative ethnicities was based upon a faulty set of ideas: the idea that this complex, varied Chagga identity could not be people’s *real* ethnicity; there must be, underneath, some other monolingualist monocultural ethnicity that more closely fitted with theoretical models. This was clearly not the case, and I began to respect the diversity that was found across the Chagga ethnic group, and as a consequence the richness of ethnicity itself. Furthermore, this led me to reflect further upon Chagga political history. The Chagga ethnic group had seen, in the 1950s, one of Tanzania’s strongest ethnic nationalisms under the Paramount Chief. The denial of Chagga ethnicity led me to look beyond this period in understanding Chagga ethnicity, to concentrate on other aspects of Chagga ethnicity explored in this thesis: the moral economy, and the role of the landscape of Kilimanjaro and the *kihamba*.

The fascinating question was then why people would so readily deny the existence of Chagga. There was a lot to be learnt from the reasons why people felt that there was no Chagga ethnic group. The most commonly mentioned was the lack of a common Chagga language. This was not because of an understanding of sociological theory, but rather the impact that the lack of a common language had upon Chagga people’s day-to-day lives. It was not uncommon for husband and wives of Chagga ethnicity yet from different areas of Kilimanjaro to be unable to communicate in a Chagga dialect but resorting to Swahili. This concern about the lack of a common language extends further to the political field.
It is also, I argue, necessary to put people’s denials of Chaggaanness in the context of contemporary, Tanzania. With “tribalism” very much a taboo in Tanzania, in the political sphere strong expressions based on ethnicities are frowned upon. In the case of the Chagga ethnic group, this extends to the denial of the existence of the Chagga group itself. This, perhaps, is connected to the danger connected to the portrayal of Chagga as a single political block. Given that the Chagga ethnic group is in a powerful economic position, combined with the history of Chagga nationalism, they are a group in particularly sensitive position. For example, as illustrated in Chapter 6 of this thesis, for a political candidate to identify too strongly with a particular ethnic group is not a route to electoral success. Denying the existence of the Chagga ethnic group thus removes the possibility of a particular candidate being portrayed as a Chagga candidate.

**Theories of Ethnicity**

Ethnicity is a difficult term to define. Indeed, Richard Fardon (1987: 171) notes that “ethnicity is clearly not amenable to essential definition”. As with the concept of elites, it is at the same time obvious and yet at the same time problematic to define. Most definitions will result in empirical counter-examples. For example, Elliott Green (2005: 2) presents a definition of ethnicity, designed to be useful in the communications between academics and policy-makers, and which Green vehemently holds to be superior to the constructivist paradigm: “a belief in common descent, a common history and a common homeland”. The counterexamples to this definition are clear, for example the existence of many nomadic ethnic groups.

The problem with attempting to draw up a definition, or set of criteria, for ethnicity from one’s own research is the risk of draining from the concept all that is interesting.
Let us say that I attempted to define ethnicity in general based purely upon my research into Chagga: I would surely come up with a definition based essentially on a home land. This definition would not only have clear counterexamples – nomadic peoples, for instance – but also reduce our understanding of ethnicity. It is my contention that the Chagga connection to Kilimanjaro has many unique properties, and it does not follow from this that members of other ethnic groups in Tanzania feel the same way about their own homeplaces.

In the definition of ethnicity used in this thesis, I follow the concept of Benedict Anderson, who states that the nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each live the images of their communion” (Anderson 2006: 6). The concepts of nationalism and ethnicity are very close, and works on nationalism, such as Anderson’s, are often relevant to our understandings of ethnicity. The Chagga example illustrates the closeness between the concepts, with the flag and anthem of Chagga nationalism in the 1950s. It is a useful and powerful tool to not draw a sharp distinction between the imagining of ethnic groups, on the one hand, and nations on the other. Whereas in contemporary Tanzania the notions of kabila – “tribe”, or ethnic group – and taifa – nation – may be very different, historically there has not always been such a distinction. Colonial era Swahili books use taifa – nation – to refer to “tribe” as well as nation, with kabila also referring to tribe but being closer to clan (Madan 1903: 124, 357; Burt 1910: 96).

Two older approaches to the theorising of ethnicity are the primordialist and the instrumentalist approaches. Instrumentalist approaches emphasise how ethnicity is mobilised to achieve certain goals, often by elites. This approach, however, does not
account for the specific content of ethnicity, and does not explain why it is so powerful (Spear 2003: 17). Primordialist thinkers, on the other hand, emphasise the ‘primordial ties’ of ethnicity, through blood and groups with a common history and culture. Primordialists can emphasise the sociobiological elements of ethnicity, such as Pierre Van Den Berghe’s argument that ethnocentrism and racism (and by extension ethnicity and race themselves) are “biologically evolved mechanisms” (Van Den Berghe 1981: xiii). Edging close to this is Isaac’s concept of ethnicity as the “basic group identity”, a set of endowments and identifications given to an individual at the moment of birth at a given town in a given place (Isaacs 1975: 31). Primordialist approaches go some way to explaining the emotional power of ethnicity. The approach, however, is open to criticism. Thomas Spear (2003: 17) criticises the primordialist approach for failing to explain when and how ethnicity is invoked to such power in some contexts. This criticism can be mediated by an author such as Clifford Geertz; Geertz (1973: 259) places the processes by which ethnicity becomes an idiom for defending particular interest in a political and historical context, while at the same time holding that ethnicity itself is a “primordial attachment” that stems from a number of “givens”.

The real weakness of the primordialist approach is that it is based upon these “givens” and essentialisations of the nature of ethnicity, and is based upon an “a priori givenness of ethnic identity” that has been refuted empirically many times (Lentz 1995: 307). As shall be illustrated in this thesis with the case of Chagga ethnicity, many of the “givens” for classifying ethnic identity are not universally applicable – for example, the claim that that members of ethnicities share a common myth of origin, a claim disproved by the Chagga case amongst others. Another example is that of language.
Constructivist approaches have attempted to bridge the gap between the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches. John Iliffe lays out the process of how diverse, amorphous, and fluctuating precolonial identities were changed by a “historical misunderstanding” during the interwar period of indirect rule into fixed ethnic groups. “The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the colonial framework” (Iliffe 1979: 318). Iliffe’s work was influential on Terrence Ranger’s (1983) work, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”. However, Ranger’s approach has come under fire for denying the agency of Africans, particularly in the precolonial period. Determining the role of local people themselves in precolonial ethnogenesis is not an easy task, as the principal source present in the case of Kilimanjaro is that of the writings of European explorers and missionaries. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, however, I am able to draw from these texts evidence of Chagga agency, at least by chiefs, in forming Chagga identity. As such, an argument that puts full weight of ethnogenesis on indirect rule is faulty. Indeed, Ranger (1994: 78-82) would later acknowledge the drawbacks of this work as one that implies that the “invention” is a one-sided happening, in which the colonial and administrators played the role of the “inventor”, thus sidelining African agency and pre-colonial identities. Ranger moved away from the use of “invention” towards using Benedict Anderson’s word “imagined”.

Benedict Anderson coined the term “imagined communities” to refer to nations. He argues for a key role for elites and intelligentsia. The idea is a strong one, and I use the term “imagined” in this thesis. Yet it has received criticism. Anthony D. Smith argues that, while the elites may have some role in the particular articulation of a modern nation, it is “absurd” to talk of the intelligentsia as being solely responsible for constructing a nation such as Poland: the heritage of “ethnic ties” of memories, myths,
traditions, and language are necessary. Without these, a modern imagination or re-
construction, Smith argues, is inconceivable (Smith 1991: 364-365). As illustrated in
the case of Chagga nationalism, and the texts examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis,
Smith’s argument has its strengths: it is clear that elites cannot simply invent an
ethnicity from nothing out of thin air and have it given the appeal, force or longevity
that is seen in ethnicity. Nor, it should be noted in the Chagga case, do they attempt to
do so. Unfortunately, Smith goes too far in his neo-primordialism, again returning to
essentialisations of ethnicity which the Chagga example proves false. The most
convincing case is made by Thomas Spear:

Intellectuals need historical raw materials to construct their
stories if their reinterpretations are to ring true. Precisely
because struggles over tradition, custom and ethnicity are so
embedded in local discourse and so emotionally fraught, they
are readily evoked but not easily created. (Spear 2003: 26)

There is a strong role for literate elites in the imagination of ethnicity. Anderson looks
at print capitalism in Europe. The role of a literate intelligentsia has also been put in a
strong position in the African context, with Berman arguing that the construction of
African ethnicities featured similar involvement of a literate intelligensia (Berman 1998:
326-327).

**Conceptualising Elites**

The term “elite” has the contradictory nature of being both self-evident and having no
commonly-agreed definition. The idea that there are, in some sense, people at the ‘top’
of society has existed for a long time, and has remained remarkably constant over
thousands of years. Indeed, Josiah Ober (1991: 12) argues that the definition and
attributes of elites in ancient Athens are similar enough to our own that we can use the
modern terms to describe Athenian society with little fear of anachronism. The defining
characteristics given by Aristotle, in his *Politics*, of the elite as opposed to the mass of the population is close to our general understanding of elites today; these elites are distinguished from the rest of the citizenship by four factors: wealth, high birth, education and virtue (ibid.: 11-12). The criterion that stands out for the modern reader is that of virtue, a theme to which I shall return later. Aristotle himself notes that, given the difficulty in identifying genuine virtue, in identifying members of the elite the more visible criteria of wealth, good birth, superior education, and political position gave more useful criteria for sociological enquiry (Tessitore 1996: 18).

While the characteristics of elites drawn up by Aristotle do strike chords of recognition with the modern reader, establishing a definition of elites has caused a great deal of debate. In political science, with a much stronger focus on elites than anthropology, has generated a large number of definitions of the political elite. These definitions are of limited use for this thesis, as I shall discuss, but do have some interesting features. C. Wright Mills (Mills 1959: 3-4), in his influential study of leading figures at the top of US military, economic and governmental institutions, describes the elite as “men… in positions to make decisions having major consequences… they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society.” The difficulty of this approach is that it places too great an emphasis on the role of individuals within institutions and organizations. While the elites examined in this thesis have often been, at some point in their lives, leading members of powerful institutions, this is not always the case and it would not be informative to exclude them from the analysis. The wider difficulties with definitions that focus exclusively on political power are the twin problems of defining power itself, and empirically identifying those that wield it (Zuckerman 1977: 327). An interesting definition of the elite is “all persons capable, if they wish, of making substantial political trouble for high officials (i.e., other elite persons who happen to be
incumbents of authoritative positions) without being promptly repressed” (Burton and Higley 1987: 296). This definition had an appeal at certain stages of the fieldwork, where certain elites were willing and open in criticising elements of the state and those in current political power. The drawback is that this definition does not capture the politeness and modesty that forms the character of many Tanzanians, with even the powerful often showing a reluctance to offer criticisms of others; this makes using this definition problematic.

While elites are influential people, portrayals of elites that describe them as all-powerful do not fit with the arguments that I make about elite roles in the imagination of ethnicity. An example of the weight put on elites by some theorists is Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian sociologist working at the beginning of the 20th century, who echoed Marx in writing, “the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of elites: as one ascends, another declines” (Pareto 2005 [1901]: 36). Pareto has little concern for the role of non-elite groups in his social thought; his work proved influential on Mussolini’s fascism, and led Karl Popper to call him the “theoretician of totalitarianism” (Popper, cited in Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004: 157). Unfortunately, presupposing the power of elites is also common in works on ethnicity that only tangentially mention elites.

While it is difficult to draw wholesale from political science to construct a definition of elites for this thesis, there are many valuable features that can be extracted. In the works of C. Wright Mills and Mattei Dogan, there exists a concept of “elite interpenetration” as elites move from one power summit to another, for example moving from the summit of the civil service to a political career, or from leadership in the military to leadership in a private organisation (Dogan 2003: 1-2). As shall be seen in the thesis, this reflects
the life-course of the Chagga elite as they moved from sector to sector, particularly as illustrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The other important feature is the way in which authors recognise that the nature, size and composition of elites varies from place to place, and across time (Dogan 2003).

One of the issues with the study of elites in the European or North American context is that there is a portrayal of a large cleavage between the elite populations and non-elite members of society. In the African context, as Jean-Pascal Daloz (Daloz 2003: 280) argues, elites have a far closer relationship with the rest of the population, and are perhaps not as all-powerful and autonomous as in other contexts. To this extent, Daloz’s analysis chimes with the findings of this thesis. Unfortunately, Daloz’s (Daloz 2003: 280) conception of the relationship between the African elite and the rest of the population is one purely of patron-client relationships, with elites as the Big Men seeking to gain control over larger and larger factions in order to gain economic and political advantage. Again, the Afropessimist view of the African elite comes to the fore. My approach shows the Chagga elite to be close to the rest of the Chagga population not through these arrangements, but through mutual engagement with the moral economy.

While one of Aristotle’s criteria for elite membership is that they be virtuous, few other writers have picked up on that element of his definition. There are some exceptions: the Italian political theorist Gaetano Mosca argued at the beginning of the 20th century that the ruling elite should show moral leadership about the mediocre moral standards of the majority of the population (Parry 2005: 37). Nevertheless, the ethical content of elite membership has been broadly absent from discussion on elites. However, the afropessimist view of elites shows a re-emergence of the ethical content of elite
membership – that of the negative moral character of individuals of elite status in the African context.

A distinction, from the anthropological literature on elites, is drawn by George Marcus (Marcus 1979: 135) between strategic or societal elites on the one hand, and segmental or group-based elites on the other. The former are elites with significance for their society or region as a whole, while the latter have power only in their particular communities, institutions or professions. This distinction is clearly useful in helping conceptualise the difference between, say, and elite athlete and the head of a multinational company. When approaching the questions I ask about ethnic elites, however, it comes across the difficulty of scope: how does one define the difference between a community, on the one hand, and a society or region on the other? This could be an issue for research conducted on smaller ethnic communities, or on ethnic minorities in a larger community. For my research, with the scope of the project focused upon Tanzania, I can safely argue that the Chagga elites are influential enough on the national stage to be counted as a strategic elite.

One of the difficulties in conceptualising elites for this thesis is the broad time period that the piece covers. This makes it problematic to come up with the type of operative definition for elites used by most other studies of elites (see, for example, the operative definitions offered by (Higley and Dogan 1998: 223). It is quite clear that the strict criteria for elite membership changed over time; the general level of education in society has changed, for instance, as has levels of wealth. Setting precise criteria is impossible for a study of this nature. As a result, in developing the concept of elite used in this thesis, I spent time reflexively considering how the elite might be characterised. The criteria I began to use were very similar to those proposed by Aristotle: birth, wealth
and education. The relative value and importance of these criteria changed over time. In the pre-colonial and for much of the colonial period, with the majority of power in the hands of the chiefs, it was the position in the aristocracy that determined elite status. However, with the introduction of coffee and the introduction of mission education, the importance of education and wealth came to the fore, and after the abolition of the chieftaincy birth ceased to be a factor. Most recently, as the economy liberalised, education has arguably become less important as a route to elite status, as wealth became to be a more important determinant of elite status.

To give an example of the complexities involved with determining elite status, I will give the case of one profession and my thought process on reflecting on whether they have elite status: secondary school teachers. Teachers are educated, and recently qualified teachers are likely to be educated up to degree standard. From an educational point of view, this means that many were in the top percentiles of level of education in the country. In contemporary Tanzania, however, the wages of a state secondary school teacher are low. I believe that this precluded them from inclusion in the elite. It is not necessarily that their lack of wealth *per se* precludes them from elite status, but rather that this is a severely limiting factor in having the high status and influential position to consider them elite. In the context of the colonial period, however, I would definitely include teachers in the elite category. Similarly, some teachers in contemporary Tanzania have extraordinary status – for example, high-ranking officials in teaching unions. It is not so straightforward to define elites.

In terms of identifying contemporary elites as informants, there were several criteria that I used. As snowballing was an important way for me to gain informants, it was often a question of seeing how other elites would describe and behave around an individual.
This was often a clearer indication than having to untangle the modesty, or boasts, of an individual’s description of themselves. There were, however, various clues that I would watch for when determining whether an individual could be classed as elite, related to education, wealth and status. Education was an important factor, and most of my informants had received at least some tertiary level education or professional qualification. Study abroad, particularly in previous decades when the opportunities were more limited, was another key indicator.

Wealth was also important, but was a factor that was sometimes difficult to judge. Many of the outward displays of wealth, such as clothing, jewellery and mobile phones, were also used by non-elites to boost their status. The size and quality of housing was a more important criteria, particularly if an individual had multiple houses in Kilimanjaro and elsewhere. How they cared for their immediate family was also important; the schooling of the children of elites gave clues. The car that a person drove and regular foreign travel, were other indicators of elite status; these indicated either personal wealth, or a high-status job that provided these benefits.

**The Moral Economy**

In this thesis, I argue for the importance of the concept of the moral economy, and the relevance of the concept for understanding the role of elites in Chagga ethnicity. The term moral economy, and related concepts such as the economy of affection, emerged from the study of the peasantry. James C. Scott (1976) developed the idea of the moral economy, arguing that the economy of peasant villages was embedded in a moral universe of concerns of justice and rights paramount, with norms of reciprocity and charity strong. Goran Hyden (1980: 18-19, 99) uses the related term “economy of
affection”, referring to the way in which peasants do not behave in a manner purely directed at individual profit, but rather ways that are embedded in “a range of social considerations”, and mutual aid and reciprocity are strong features. Hyden (1980: 19) does not argue that the emergence of the capitalist market economy necessarily destroys the market economy, but rather the economy of affection can survive and affect the operation of the market economy. Tony Waters (1992) gives a number of examples to support Hyden’s notion of the “uncaptured peasantry”, showing how many of the poorest in society behave in a way which seems anomalous to a pure utility-maximising viewpoint. Theorists of moral economy stand in contrast to authors such as Samuel Popkin (1979), who bases his work on the notion that peasants are economically rational agents utilising a cost-benefit analysis.

The concept of the moral economy has usually been associated with the poor, whether it be 18th century rioting English poor (Thompson 1971) or peasants in the developing world (Scott 1976; Hyden 1980). Elites do have a place in works on moral economy; alas, much emphasis is placed upon their role as patrons in patron-client relationships (Berman 1998; de Sardan 1999). Elites use the moral economy to bolster their own position, for example to establish themselves as Big Men or to gain votes at election time. I do not wish to imply that these vertical relationships are unimportant in the context of developing an understanding of African politics. Nevertheless, there is a danger in creating a disconnect between the poor, who enter the moral economy because of their moral worldview, and the rich, who do so out of pure self-interest. Rather, I argue that elites are often part of the moral economy because they also share this moral worldview.
I am not the first to develop the idea of the moral economy in relation to work on Kilimanjaro. Tuulikki Pietilä, for example, develops a distinction in her work between the cash economy and the moral economy on Kilimanjaro, with the moral economy consisting of the requirements of gift-giving, feeding, patronage and feasting (Pietilä 2007: 12-13). This develops a theme in Sally Falk Moore’s (1986: 300) work between the values of tradition and modernity. My focus on elites, however, draws out these concepts from a fresh perspective.

**Researching Elites**

The focus of this research is on elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. The social anthropologist Richard Werbner describes how postcolonial African elites are portrayed in the academic literature: “predatory tyrants… prominent in their midst stand the African Big Men, alias the kleptomaniacs, and somewhat behind their backs scurry the agents of mismanagement, the swollen legions of self-serving or mindless bureaucrats” (Werbner 2004: 1). Such a view, in Werbner’s assessment, is essentially Afropessimistic in outlook. If all African elites are corrupt, save for perhaps Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, what hope is there for the continent? Through his work on the Kalanga ethnic group in Botswana, Werbner calls for a study of elites that does not automatically assume that they have only the most Machiavellian of motives, that any public act of good that they do is purely part of a cynical trick to maintain domination. Rather, researchers have to “bring to elites… the same empathy and insight that anthropologists bring to the rest of the people they study” (ibid.: 8).

Why are elites portrayed in this manner? In the anthropological field, George Marcus notes that researchers have personal, moral and ideological sympathies that often
motivate them to study non-elite groups rather than elites. “As a result, the cultural conditions of typical subjects of ethnography in complex societies are humanly portrayed while those of elites in the background appear more as caricatures, created from the ideological biases of the ethnographer” (Marcus 1979: 136). While undoubtedly the biases of the researcher matter, the problem with this argument is that other disciplines, such as politics and history, frequently have elites centre-stage yet still portray them negatively.

The pessimistic view of African elites is very much visible in the literature on ethnicity. Take, for example, the discussion on ethnicity that occurs with Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz’s *Africa Works* (1999). They draw upon Lonsdale’s distinction between political tribalism and moral ethnicity, arguing that the latter provides a basis for a more accountable politics in Africa. However, Chabal and Daloz are more pessimistic than Lonsdale, and ultimately ask, “how, in practise, a political system based upon moral ethnicity does not become, under the relentless pressure for the drive for power, the tyranny of political tribalism” (ibid.: 60). Elites are reduced to being the “Mobutus of Africa” (ibid.: 61). All elites are tarred with the same brush. Another example is the role of elites in Bruce Berman’s work on ethnicity. Berman’s analysis of elites is of value as he portrays elites as having a role not only in the “political tribalism” aspects of ethnicity, but also the creation of ideas of “moral ethnicity”. Yet Berman still argues that the elites only do so in order to maintain their own self-interest and to maintain their own patronage networks (Berman 1998: 327).

There are a number of problems with these approaches to elites. First of all, it is insulting to members of the elite group. Second, it is, as Werbner observes, essentially Afropessimist in outlook. Thirdly, and most importantly, it clouds our understanding of
the theoretical issues surrounding ethnicity. Given that many authors consider elites to be, in varying degrees, key in the imagination of ethnicity (including Berman (1991), Lonsdale (2004) and Lentz (1994)), if the elites are acting from purely instrumentalist motives then this makes ethnicity itself essentially instrumental in nature. Take, for example, Lonsdale’s critique of Bayart, who discusses: “politicized ethnicity too exclusively from an instrumental or top-down angle, at the cost of the view from below” (Lonsdale 2004: 76). Here, Lonsdale equates “top-down” with “instrumental” – so, given the importance of elites, ethnicity itself is close to being reduced to being purely instrumental. This leaves their arguments open to the strong critiques that can be made against instrumentalist theories of ethnicity. If a more nuanced consideration of elites is considered, and our understanding of elites is taken beyond them being solely instrumental actors acting for selfish motives, then these critiques are mediated. A more subtle approach, treating elites as more than instrumental manipulators of ethnicity, ensures that theories of ethnicity retain a depth beyond that of a purely instrumental approach.

A weakness in some studies of elites is that they argue for the importance of elites at the expense of other strata of society. Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian sociologist working at the beginning of the 20th century, echoed Marx in writing, “the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of elites: as one ascends, another declines” (Pareto 2005 [1901]: 36). Pareto has little concern for the role of non-elite groups in his social thought; his work proved influential on Mussolini’s fascism, and led Karl Popper to call him the “theoretician of totalitarianism” (Popper, cited in Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004: 157). More recently, Higley and Burton’s work places an emphasis on the role of elites in state stability (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton 1989). Their argument places an emphasis on the role of elites at the expense of non-elites.
The elites that are the subject of this thesis are cosmopolitan, and frequently intellectuals. It does not follow from this that they are the only members of society who have these characteristics. The sharp distinction between “cosmopolitans” and “locals” has been challenged in the literature, (Ferguson 1999: 211-218; Marsden 2008), “‘local’ on whose terms?” (Clifford 1992: 97) Cosmopolitans do not have to be elite (Notar 2008). Similarly, intellectuals are not necessarily elite: see for example Steven Feierman’s (1990) work on peasant intellectuals. Similarly, elites are not the only members of society capable of manipulating ethnicity for their own ends, using ethnicity in an instrumental manner (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 693-694).

**The Chagga Elite**

Over the history of Kilimanjaro, a number of groups that could be considered elite has emerged. During precolonial times, as described in Chapter 2, the traditional, aristocratic elite were in a powerful and influential position. It was not until the beginning of coffee production at the opening of the 20th century that a non-aristocratic elite was able to take over. As Samoff describes it:

> That class had its origins in both salaried employment and successful coffee farming during the period of British rule. By allying largely with the local peasantry and partly with the national anti-colonial movement, that class displaced the chiefs, whose own position both in the local economy and as political officers had been supported by the British administration. Though forced to make some adjustments, that class has largely opposed socialist initiatives from the centre. But simultaneously, due primarily to the access to education created by its rôle in local production, it has supplied a significant portion of the national leaders in Tanzania. (Samoff 1979: 57)

It is this elite that Samoff describes that form an important part of this thesis. As with ethnicity, elites are not easily defined. The individuals who might be considered part of the elite vary over time. For example, in the colonial period, an educated person such as
a secondary school teacher could be considered part of the elite; today, with the low 
wages of state-employed teachers, it makes less sense to speak of them as the elite. This 
thesis focuses upon those who are clearly members of an elite group: ambassadors, 
leading professionals, government ministers, senior party officials, etc. I argue in this 
thesis that the elite in question can accurately be described as a Chagga elite, rather 
than a section of a national elite who happen to be of Chagga ethnicity. I argue this for 
a number of reasons. I argue that the elite are in their position as a result of their 
Chagga ethnicity, in a legacy that runs back to the first European contact with 
Kilimanjaro and continued through indirect rule. Perhaps more importantly, I argue 
that the elite are not divorced from the moral economy of Kilimanjaro, but are very 
much part of it.

With the end of traditional rule, both through the rejection of the paramount and the 
elimination of chiefs as an institution, many chiefs became, in the words of Kileo 
(2005), paupers. There are notable exceptions, which weakens the distinction drawn by 
Samoff. The most senior of the chiefs at the end of the colonial period, themselves 
educated individuals and with substantial land holdings, were given state-sponsored jobs 
and roles. Thomas Marealle, for example, was employed by the state and sent abroad.

A study of Chagga elites raises the question as to whether the strata in question are 
ethnic in nature, or whether it is just a slice of a national elite. For example, Carol 
Myers-Scotton (1990; 1993) argues that there is a national elite in Tanzania made up 
of those fluent in English. Defining elites using a purely educational criteria, those with 
A-levels or above\(^5\), she argues that these elites are not necessarily the most wealthy in

\(^5\) A limitation of Myers-Scotton’s analysis is that she does not take into account the 
existence of non-elites who have become fluent in English outside of the formal
society, rather they are “the successors to the colonial officers in the civil service; they staff institutions of higher education and create the mass media; and they are the middle-range executives in the mainly still foreign-owned business corporations” (Myers-Scotton 1990: 28). Myers-Scotton (1990: 28) downplays the importance of ethnicity, arguing that the elite cuts across ethnic boundaries, and the extent to which the elite maintain ethnic ties is to gain access to resources. Myers-Scotton is certainly correct in identifying English language skills as an important social differentiator in Tanzania, it not only affects access to employment and education, but also is passed down through the generations. It is, however, not the full story, as Myers-Scotton reduces the importance of ethnicity down to its instrumental use by elites to gain access to resources. Chagga elites are engaged with the moral economy of Kilimanjaro, not purely using ethnicity for instrumental reasons. The moral economy, and the economy of affection, “reflects normative values about kinship, the symbolic meaning of exchange, social obligations, subsistence, and trade… ultimately [it is] a cultural rather than an economic construct” (Waters 1992: 163). As this term was popularised by the works of James Scott (1976) and Goran Hyden (1980), it is most often understood in terms of the peasantry. However, this thesis argues for its relevance beyond this section of society, to include the elite also.

There have been attempts to quantify the elite in Tanzania. Gordon M. Wilson used those appearing in Who’s Who in East Africa 1963-4 as his definition for being elite. In his analysis of the ethnicity of people appearing in this book, he found that Chagga ethnicity was over-represented in elite groups. While Chagga people made up only 5% of elected or appointed representatives, roughly in line with their share of the nation’s education system. Examples include people working in tourism, sex workers, and unskilled migrants from neighbouring countries.
population, they made up 11% of the elite civil servants, and 15% of all other elite groups (Wilson 1966: 432). Another statistical analysis was conducted by Hopkins (1971). Analysing members of the National Assembly and the upper-level government administrators, he finds that people of Chagga ethnicity made up 3.6% of legislators, yet 17.2% of administrators⁶ (ibid.: 77). “[T]he National Assembly reflects, in a rough fashion, the tribal proportions of the nation, while the administrative elite are highly overrepresentative of such tribes as the Haya, the Chagga and the Nyakyusa, and underrepresentative of others such as the Sukuma, the Makonde, and the Hehe” (ibid.: 75-76).

**Fieldwork – methodology**

The data in this thesis is drawn from a broad range of sources. The principal fieldwork, and the conducting of formal and informal interviews, was conducted on a series of trips to Tanzania between June 2005 and August 2007. I have also made use of a variety of archival sources, newspaper articles and books, written by both Chagga and non-Chagga authors, that I was able use as primary sources for this thesis. In many important aspects, it was the perspective from above that allowed these works to play an important role in this thesis. As discussed in this methodology section and in the main body of the thesis itself, an elite perspective enables such works to form a coherent part of the whole. It is the case that, for most of the early European authors, it was only with the elite members of the Chagga ethnic group that they had contact. Similarly, when examining Chagga-authored books, it is the case that, as in most societies, the books

⁶ There are some discrepancies between the figures presented by Hopkins and Wilson. Wilson states that 5% of administrators are Haya, whereas Hopkins gives 20.7%. This indicates the difficulties inherent in their statistical analyses.
tend to be written by the elite. First, however, I turn my attention to the fieldwork in Tanzania and some of the methodological issues which arose.

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted between 2005 and 2007, in Dar es Salaam, Moshi, and various sites around rural Kilimanjaro. My own contacts with Kilimanjaro, however, go back a lot further. I first visited Tanzania in 1997, when at the age of 16 I made a school exchange visit to a school in Moshi. I returned to the same school to teach for a year in 1998-9. This gave me a long-standing relationship with teachers at the school, although prior to starting my fieldwork in 2005 I had not had the opportunity to visit since the end of 2000. This long-standing connection gave me many opportunities for my research. While it is difficult to classify secondary school teachers as elites, due to their low salaries despite their educational achievements, they nevertheless provided an opportunity for making contacts. The members of staff that I had known for a long time provided opportunities to bounce ideas off of, and gave me the chance to ask questions of clarification about Chagga issues. Finally, the school on occasion provided me with accommodation while I was in Moshi, for which I am grateful.

While I had strong contacts in Moshi, I started the fieldwork for this thesis in Dar es Salaam, arriving in June 2005. The initial plan was to undertake 6 months Swahili language training in Dar es Salaam, while arranging the administrative issues such as research clearance. However, I soon found that my time in Dar es Salaam gave me opportunities for research and to cultivate important research contacts. A strength of the research is that fieldwork was not limited to only one geographical area, but was conducted in Dar es Salaam, Moshi town and rural Kilimanjaro. Given that the researched population is mobile, it was good to be in various locales. Having this broad
variety was an opportunity to see how their networks operated. Informants I would meet in Dar es Salaam would recommend contacts in Kilimanjaro, and vice versa. My informants were not necessarily permanently based in the locale in which I encountered them; I would sometimes meet Dar es Salaam-based informants in Kilimanjaro who were visiting their home area; on other occasions, I would meet Kilimanjaro-based informants when in Dar es Salaam. I found this to be a powerful indication of how the Chagga networks between Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro operated. A weakness of the research is that in scope it only included Dar es Salaam as a location outside of Kilimanjaro. Given that individuals of Chagga ethnicity are known for having a presence all over Tanzania, it might have been informative to have studied Chagga people in urban or rural communities away from Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam. For three months during the writing-up stage of this thesis, I was based at the Teofilo Kisanji University in Mbeya; however, under the terms of my visit, I was not conducting new research. However, given that Dar es Salaam is such an important locus of power in Tanzania, the fact that my study is of the Chagga elite tends to mitigated this weakness.

I spent the period of the general election campaign of 2005 between Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam. The polling day was originally set for 14th October, and I was due to return to the UK at the beginning of December; however, the polls were subsequently delayed until 14th December 2005. I delayed my return to the UK until January 2006. This resulted in benefits for the fieldwork, as I was able to stay in Kilimanjaro over the Christmas period. This was advantageous for my research as I made valuable contacts over the Christmas period, a well-known time for returning Chagga migrants to return to Kilimanjaro.
After a brief return visit to the UK, I started my second phase of fieldwork at the beginning of March 2006. While I spent some time in Dar es Salaam, and visited regularly to maintain research contacts, for the first three months I spent most of the time in Moshi town. Staying here enabled me not only to build research relationships in the town itself, but to reach easily various of the rural parts of Kilimanjaro via public transport and lifts with friends. I spent a six month period based in Machame Nkuu, from July 2006 until the end of the year when various personal difficulties and family illness forced me to make an unexpected return visit to the UK. Returning in April 2007, I spent an extra three months based mostly in Moshi, but making visits to various areas around Kilimanjaro.

Conducting elite research presents its own methodological challenges. Werbner notes the challenges of researching elites:

> It may well be that “studying up”, particularly in Africa, as a research strategy that demands the cultural competence and social networks of a known, experienced fieldworker. Possibly, also, the anthropologist must first become familiar with elites over a reasonable period on a casual basis, while doing other research, and not with the intent of doing systematic fieldwork among elites. Elites may have good reasons, not necessarily Machiavellian ones only, for wanting to observe and know the anthropologist closely before being ready to cooperate in the many ways needed for elite research. (Werbner 2004: 8)

It is not altogether clear that these trust issues are unique to researching elite populations. Nevertheless, developing trust was a key part of my fieldwork. Naturally, over the course of the length of PhD fieldwork, developing the long-term research relationships that Werbner discusses is difficult. However, in my own research, I found the research relationships I cultivated from the beginning of the fieldwork were in many ways the most fruitful.
I made initial contacts through a variety of channels. The teachers at the school at which I had contact provided me with opportunities to speak to their elite relatives. Another route was via Dr Tom Molony at the University of Edinburgh, who introduced me to whisky-drinking Chagga elites in Dar es Salaam. As I had cultivated a taste for whisky while in Edinburgh, I was able to arrive with a bottle of single malt which undoubtedly aided the initial research contacts. In terms of developing trust, I found that the informal environment was often more productive than meeting in a formal setting. Bars are a natural place for conversation, although not always appropriate for many informants. Travelling is another good opportunity for conversation, for example taking a drive around Dar es Salaam or walking around in the rural areas provided good opportunities to talk. In key respects, Werbner is correct in that taking the time to develop relationships is key to the research. For example, it took up to a year before the whisky-drinking circle in Dar es Salaam would begin to introduce me to friends and relatives of theirs who might aid me with the research. I could see no Machiavellian motivation for taking their time with me: it was simply an issue of trust. I had to prove myself to be a trustworthy person, with a knowledge of my subject that meant that I was not simply wasting the time of their busy relatives.

While the researcher, as Marcus observes, may have ideological and moral sympathies with underprivileged members of society, it is nevertheless the case that in the African context the researcher is far more likely to have more in common with the elite. For example, many of my subjects had visited the UK at some point in their lives. Given the high level of educational background of my informants, most interviews were conducted in English. I did employ a research assistant while in Moshi, although he was mostly employed in aiding me with the translations of the texts examined in Chapter 3. As I preferred the informal setting, I used a pen and notebook to take notes of interviews
and discussions. While I did consider starting to use a tape recorder, I found that the pen and notebook formed such a useful ‘prop’ that I did not do so. It was very useful to be able to be seen to write down the important details. Particularly while having a long and varied conversation in an informal environment, largely on subjects not relevant to the subject of this thesis, it was useful to be able to pull out the notebook when relevant subjects were raised. It also served as a reminder to those I was speaking with that I was also a researcher. On a handful of occasions, informants told me *not* to write down particular details. Naturally, I did not do so, and such details do not appear in this thesis. Nevertheless, it indicates that there is an openness about pen-and-paper discussions that is perhaps lacking in a tape-recorded one.

There is a disagreement in the literature over the ease of elite interviews. Werbner’s account above indicates that it is a challenging field, requiring long research relationships. On the other hand, John Galliher (1980), researching elites in the USA, found them completely open in sharing information, even when describing situations which broke ethical, or even legal, rules. “Powerful people seem so convinced of their own righteousness and so sure of their power that they usually talk freely” (ibid.: 303). This fits with one definition of elites as “all those persons capable, if they wish, of making substantial political trouble for high officials (i.e., other elite persons who happen to be incumbents of authoritative positions) without being promptly repressed” (Burton and Higley 1987: 296).

My own experience varied. It is correct to say that many informants were apparently openly expressing views. This, however, can hide the fact that elites are frequently skilled and experienced interview subjects. If they so choose, they can skilfully avoid answering questions, and can provide answers that are less than insightful. As observed
by Mark Kermode (2008), there was much to be gained from the more recalcitrant interview subjects. In terms of getting the most out of informants, the snowballing techniques that gained me access often served well in making a more constructive discussion. The interviews with people with whom I had received an introduction through another Chagga elite were often more constructive than those times when I had, as it were, just knocked on someone’s door. Even so, some subjects required some effort to get them to give more in-depth answers. On occasion, this was due to their assumption of a low level of knowledge on my part. It was thus sometimes necessary to illustrate how I already had some knowledge of the subject. One way was through exploring my knowledge of Chagga history. The other way in which I was able to explore subjects with informants was through my reading of the daily newspapers. While my newspaper reading had begun during the election campaign of 2005, to aid my understanding of the campaign. I found it extremely useful to continue doing so throughout my fieldwork; even when the events in the news did not directly pertain to my fieldwork, it still informed my discussions.

Apart from the fieldwork conducted in Tanzania, I also consulted archives: the National Archives in Kew, London, the Tanzanian National Archives in Dar es Salaam, and the Lutheran Mission Archives in Moshi. At the time I was conducting my research, this last archive was in danger of closing. This thesis also makes use of the published writings of missionaries, explorers and colonial officials who visited Kilimanjaro. Most of these works were accessed in Edinburgh, via the National Library. While I had encountered many of the works before starting the period of fieldwork in Tanzania, I only turned to study them in detail after I had completed this fieldwork. Turning back to my fieldnotes after reading these texts, I was struck by the similarity between my own descriptions and theirs. Using published works, cited by later academic authors over the
subsequent decades, presented a problem as far as creating a new and interesting angle on these works was concerned. I found, however, that my readings on the history of colonial science led me to place these works in a new context; and furthermore, to examine the relevance beyond the history of science.

I only became aware of the ethnohistories that form the basis for Chapter 3 of this thesis while in Tanzania, and I was eager to get hold of copies of the texts while in the field. Petro Itosi Marealle’s book had recently been republished, and I was able to find a copy in a bookshop in Dar es Salaam. I was lucky to find a copy for sale, as books on Chagga topics can be very popular. For instance, it took me some time to track down a copy of Alice Makule’s 2003 book, *Asili ya Wachaga na Baadhi ya Koo Zao*; the booksellers informed me that this was a very popular book, according to them bought mostly by Chagga people seeking to understand their own culture and history. Finding a copy of Sam Ntiro’s work, however, proved more difficult. Thanks to the librarian at Marangu Teacher Training College, I was able to find a copy in their library.

There is another side to the issues of trust and the research relationship. During the course of my fieldwork, various personal and family problems meant that, in December 2006, I had to return to the UK for several months. This was a very difficult time for me, and I was touched by the universal support I was offered by the Chagga elites during this time, and some went far out of their way to help me. For this I am grateful. This support is a natural extension of developing the types of trust and social networks necessary for this type of research.

Elite research raises certain unique ethical problems. In the writing of the thesis, maintaining the anonymity of informants can be a challenge. Even with the names
changed, details such as employment and personal histories can at times make the identity of an informant instantly knowable by an informed source. There are some particular cases when my informants comments, in the context of the rest of the thesis, would present an embarrassment to them. This I tried to avoid as much as possible, by ensuring the anonymity of most informants.

A more substantive ethical dilemma stems from the very nature of elite research: elite research will produce conclusions that are not necessarily in the interest of elites. While I have endeavoured to treat my informants with empathy and as human beings, at the heart of the thesis lies the assertion that these people who benefited from colonialism continued to do well in the postcolonial state. There stems from this a normative question, which I do not seek to answer: is it right that this should be the case? Depending on the sympathies of the reader, this mans that the research may not be to the benefit of the population researched. This seems to be a dilemma that could effectively cause difficulties for much elite-level research. While this issue is quite possibly unsolvable, elite-level research is nevertheless an important area to study. The best that a researcher can achieve is to portray the elites as accurately as possible.

**Thesis Structure**

Chapter 2, “Understandings of Kilimanjaro by European explorers, missionaries and colonial officials”, opens on 11th May 1848, with the first recorded sighting of Mount Kilimanjaro by European eyes. This chapter examines the ways in which the European visitors saw the mountain, and in turn the people who lived on its slopes. The chapter casts the texts written by European explorers, missionaries and colonialists in a new light. It places landscape in a central position, with the descriptions comparing the
landscape of Kilimanjaro with that of England, Scotland and Switzerland. Yet while their views were certainly shaped by 19th century European ideas of landscape, I argue that the Europeans did not conceive of it alone, but rather developed their conception of the mountain through a dialogue with their coastal African guides and Chagga elites. This chapter also argues that these academic debates are not only of interest to the historians of science, but also have a saliency and relevance to the later understandings of Chagga ethnicity.

Chapter 3, “Elite Imaginations of Ethnicity? Two Chagga Ethnohistories”, turns its attention to the work of Chagga intellectuals in the imagining of Chagga ethnicity in the 1940s and 1950s through an examination of two Swahili-language Chagga-authored ethnohistories. *Maisha ya Mchagga Hapa Duniani na Ahera* (translated on the title page as The Life of Mchagga here on Earth and After Death) was published in c.1947, and written by Petro Itosi Marealle, a chief from Marangu and uncle to Thomas Marealle, the paramount chief. The second work is *Desturi za Wachagga* (Traditions of the Chagga), published in 1953, by Sam Ntiro, from Machame, a commoner best known as an artist. While these texts highlight the work of elite intellectuals in the imagination of Chagga ethnicity, I argue in this chapter that they are a powerful example of the limits of imagination: the authors avoid talking in detail about many key events and conflicts in Chagga political history. Despite the different backgrounds of the authors, they agree in many aspects, but the authors differ on one key aspect: the role of the institution of chieftaincy. Whereas P.I. Marealle places the chief at the heart of the Chagga family, Ntiro presents a more democratic approach. I present these differences as providing a new perspective on the debate over the ease of the abolition of chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro after independence.
Chapter 4, “Nationalism, Ujamaa and the Chagga Elite”, examines how independence and the socialist project brought both new opportunities and setbacks for the Chagga elite. The relationship between Kilimanjaro and the nation has not always been smooth, and at times there have been secessionist rumblings. Nevertheless, the educational advantage that the Chagga elite had received from colonialism led them to take up key roles in the new state. Just as Chagga elites had engaged with the work of imagining a Chagga nation in the 1950s, so they contributed to the imagination of the Tanzanian nation. This chapter illustrates how the Chagga elite coped under the changing macropolitical and economic changes, through international migration and their maintaining of high levels of education.

Chapter 5, “Chagga Elites and the Moral Economy of Kilimanjaro”, illustrates the engagement of elites with Kilimanjaro itself, and their involvement in the moral economy. It gives examples of how elite migration relates to this moral economy, including the issues surrounding housing, burial and Christmas visits. The chapter also deals with the issues and challenges that have emerged in Kilimanjaro, particularly after the liberalisation of the economy. This liberalisation brought new opportunities for the Chagga elite, as the more capitalist direction of the country fitted in more with the Chagga capitalist outlook and also the Chagga elite were in an ideal position to take advantage of the opportunities presented. However, at the same time, new challenges emerged from Kilimanjaro itself, in the form of crises of land shortages and a declining coffee price.

Chapter 6, “Chagga Elites and Multiparty Democracy”, brings the thesis up to the present through an examination of the role of presidential candidates of Chagga ethnicity in Tanzania’s multiparty elections. This chapter focuses on the candidates
Augustine Mrema, in the 1995 elections, and Freeman Mbowe in 2005. It examines these figures in light of the role that Chagga elites have played in Tanzania’s political history, and explores the role of ethnicity in Tanzania’s multiparty democracy. While ethnicity does have a role to play, I argue that Tanzania does not face the collapse of national unity that some warned the liberalisation of the economy and politics would bring.
Chapter 2: Understandings of Kilimanjaro by European Explorers, Missionaries and Colonial Officials

On the 11\textsuperscript{th} May 1848, the explorer and missionary Johannes Rebmann became the first European to see the snow-capped peak of Mount Kilimanjaro. Already well-known on the coast because of its role in trade in the region, once Kilimanjaro became known in Europe then it attracted a steady and growing stream of European visitors. The landscape of Kilimanjaro was considered to be particularly beautiful, with a climate suited to European habitation, and its inhabitants with souls suitable for conversion. This chapter examines how the landscape of Kilimanjaro was understood by Europeans in a multiplicity of ways – alpine peaks, Scottish glens, and English gardens, often all at the same time. Through this understanding of landscape came an understanding of the people who inhabited that landscape. This, I argue, formed a key role in the shaping of Chagga identity, and the imagination of a single Chagga ethnic group.

Identity and place are closely linked. “When we think about social or cultural identity we inevitably tend to place it” (Tilley 2006: 14). The reverse is true, as the understanding of the landscape affects the way in which the local people are understood.
by outsiders. Patrick Harries examines the accounts of Swiss missionaries to southern Africa in the late 19th century. He argues that, upon their first arrival, their gaze was shaped very much by a typical European aesthetic, and they lacked the cognitive ability to ‘see’ the landscape or its inhabitants. “It was only through their cognitive (re)organization of the land that the missionaries gradually took charge of their environment… By investigating how these representatives of the Enlightenment saw the physical world, or infused it with meaning, we may come to a closer understanding of the ways in which Europeans saw – or failed to see – the local population” (Harries 2007: 97). I illustrate in this chapter how, from the earliest sighting of Kilimanjaro by European eyes, the landscape was more cognitively accessible for Europeans than much of the rest of East Africa; it was a far easier landscape to “see”. However, I develop the argument beyond Harries’s analysis, as the European understanding of African landscapes did not develop in isolation; rather “they are the product of historical dialogues and contestations amongst various African groups as well as with Europeans” (McGregor 2003: 88). There was often an implicit or explicit dialogue between local and European perceptions of landscape, blurring the distinction between “outside” and “inside” perspectives (Luig and Van Oppen 1997: 37). In the case of Kilimanjaro, I argue that this dialogue occurred between three groups: European visitors; their coastal and Zanzibari guides and informants; and elite members of the Chagga ethnic group. As such, it is essential to place the texts analysed in this chapter in the regional political and economic context.

It was with chiefs that the earliest European writers had the most contact, in the context of great rivalries between the chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro. In terms of what the European sources can tell us about the political history of Kilimanjaro, the most striking feature is the absences in their presentation. The Europeans had a great deal of
contact with Chief Rindi (known to the Europeans as Mandara) of the chiefdom of Moshi, and later Chief Marealle, of the chiefdom of Marangu. Almost completely absent from the European account is even the barest mention of Chief Sina of the chiefdom of Kibosho, even though he was arguably the most powerful of the chiefs during this time period. The reason for this, I shall illustrate, is that the rival chiefs Rindi and Marealle sought to downplay the significance of Sina, to bolster their own political influence. Given the shocking absence of even a mention of Sina in the European accounts, it is clear that they were hugely successful at this. As such, even though the focus of this chapter is the writings of Europeans, the agency of Chagga people is evident to the modern reader, even when it was not to the original writer.

In this chapter, I make use mostly of the published accounts of visitors to Kilimanjaro from 1848 until the 1920s. Yet similar perceptions of landscape discussed continue to the present. Towards the beginning of my own fieldwork in Tanzania, in December 2005, I visited rural Kilimanjaro for the first time in several years, visiting the home of an informant in Marangu. I wrote in my fieldnotes,

A lush lawn, hedges, flower beds, trees, and the occasional banana plant – it was like a particularly lush English garden (apart from the banana trees [sic]), the climate being perpetually the most perfect day of an English summer.
(Fieldnotes, 27/12/2005)

7 The grandfather of Thomas Marealle, the future Paramount Chief.
8 The over-estimating of the power and influence of chiefs seems to be a theme in the writing of Chagga history. The most notable example is probably Kathleen Stahl’s 1964 work *History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro*, which amounts to the history of Kilimanjaro as a diplomatic history of chiefs. While her research had been conducted during the period of the paramountcy, by the time her work was published the institution of chieftaincy had been abolished in Tanzania. She herself notes in a brief preface that the transition in Kilimanjaro “was effected with ease” (Stahl 1964: 7), yet the content of her work gives no clue as to why this was the case. Stahl had clearly overlaped the role and importance of the influence and depth of chieftaincy. It is ironic that Stahl made this mistake, as it was her work that rehabilitated the reputation of Chief Sina of Kibosho in the academic literature, and that plays a key role in establishing the historical background to this chapter.
At the time I wrote that passage, I had yet to read the texts discussed in the chapter. The comparison to England, as I was unaware at the time, was a theme that had run through the descriptions of Kilimanjaro by English authors since their earliest visits. This is despite the fact that 19th century and 21st century Kilimanjaro are vastly different in many respects. The home that I was visiting in Kilimanjaro was that of a well-off family, who had put great work and effort into developing a lawn and garden around their home. Comparisons work in the other direction as well. A Chagga friend of mine, staying in Edinburgh for three months, enjoyed the city and found it easy to navigate. The reason for this, he informed me, was that Edinburgh Castle reminded him of the peak of Kilimanjaro.

While the focus of this chapter is on earlier works, it has become almost a requirement that any book on Kilimanjaro begin with an evocative description of the mountain. The problem in an academic work is not the evocative passages per se, but when such images are used to make assumptions without sufficient basis. For example, in Marie Durrant’s 2004 PhD thesis, examining the sense of community and place amongst Chagga people, has an early section entitled “The Place Called Kilimanjaro”, writing of the “impossible illusion” of the snow-covered peak (Durrant 2004: 5-6). Unfortunately, while Durrant’s work establishes Chagga people’s connectedness to their home community, it fails to even question the existence of Kilimanjaro itself as a place, and so ignores the complexities within Chagga identity. In another example, the historian of Chagga history Kathleen Stahl writes, “having a focus, a single great mountain. . . .has bred in the Chagga a sense of identity” (Stahl 1964: 20). Stahl offers no evidence that this is the case, and given that her work is essentially the history of the competition between the
rival chiefdoms, the assertion that the mountain provides a single focus would need further explanation that Stahl does not offer. 

**Kilimanjaro Before 1848**

There is also a long history of trade in Kilimanjaro, with the area having a longer history of regularly held markets than most of the rest of Tanzania (Pietilä 2007: 4). Interlocal trade, particularly vertical trade, took advantage of varying ecological features within the *kihamba* belt (Moore 1986: 23). However, while Kilimanjaro provided fertile soil and natural resources, it lacked several key resources: iron ore, clay suitable for pottery, and *magaddi* cooking soda (Moore 1977a: 7). Given that blacksmiths are present from the beginning of historical memory (Wimmelbücker 2002: 61), and that there is archaeological evidence of pottery from centuries before the migrations of people who would become Chagga (Fosbrooke and Sassoon 1965), there is long evidence of trade with neighbouring regions. As important was Kilimanjaro’s role in the wider regional economy, and, via the coastal trade networks, the global economy. In the precolonial economy, Kilimanjaro formed a provisioning stop for caravans, and chiefs also traded with the caravans with ivory and slaves (Wittenberg 2004: 103-142). These trade routes were a key source of the competition and warfare between chiefdoms. It was vital that a chief would be able to offer safety to caravans while encamped on Kilimanjaro; thus, chiefs sought to have political control over as large an area as possible. By encouraging more caravans to visit, more goods were available to the chief to provide

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9 A contemporary reviewer makes a similar criticism, noting that this passage is “influenced by what the Chagga thought an alien observer wanted to hear” (Ostheimer 1965: 150). This criticism ignores the fact that Stahl’s book was commissioned in 1954 by the Chagga Trust, an organisation established by the Chagga Council and mostly funded by the KNCU (KNCU 1956: 9). While by the time Stahl published her work in 1965 the Chagga Council and the institution of chieftaincy had been abolished, it is still a national history.
goods from outside of Kilimanjaro to their subjects, a key way in which chiefs maintained power (Moore 1977a: 12-13).

From the beginning of the 19th century onwards, the political history of Kilimanjaro was shaped by a series of chiefs that Stahl refers to as the “empire builders” (Stahl 1964: 348). Charting the political history of 19th and 20th-century Kilimanjaro, there is seen the rise of chiefs from various parts of the mountain rising in turn, and dominating large areas, although never the entirety of the mountain. This was done through various means: military, diplomatic and economic. Moore expresses caution at the use of the term empire builder, as the extent of political control that the chiefs had over their areas of influence was not always deep (Moore 1986: 30). Nevertheless, the individuals involved in the battle for political control for Kilimanjaro did have an impact that shaped its politics and economy. The earliest was Orombo, who until his death in 1837 managed to unite the chiefs of eastern Kilimanjaro, in the area of Rombo now named after him, up to a zenith where he ruled over half of Kilimanjaro (Stahl 1964: 348). To a large degree the reason he held this position was through his control over the ivory trade (Moore 1986: 30-31). Orombo’s empire collapsed soon after his death, and subsequent decades saw the rise of the chiefdom of Kibosho (Stahl 1965: 40-42). In the timeframe covered by this chapter, there was the rise and fall of Chief Rindi of Moshi, his position largely secured through developing relations with Swahili traders and early European explorers (ibid.: 43). Subsequently, Marealle’s close relationship with the German colonial authorities would raise his chiefdom of Marangu into a dominant position, only for it to decline once Abdiel of Machame became the favourite of the British administration (ibid.: 46). The key theme in the political history of Kilimanjaro is that the mountain is placed in the broader regional political economy, and that the
greatest successes came to those chiefs able to take advantage of the opportunities made available by their relationship with outsiders.

The political and linguistic differences within Kilimanjaro have led some commentators to doubt whether there is a single Chagga ethnic group. “[I]t can be very misleading to think of all of the people of Kilimanjaro who are usually called Chagga as a single ethnic group” (Samoff 1974: 74). More tellingly, many Chagga people themselves during the course of my fieldwork would draw attention to the variation across Kilimanjaro, and state that there was no such thing as Chagga. There is a large degree to which Chagga identity was defined by people from outside of Kilimanjaro, as the next section on the origins of the words “Chagga” and “Kilimanjaro” will discuss.

**The Meanings of Kilimanjaro**

The origins of the words “Kilimanjaro”, and most likely also “Chagga”, lie outside of the region. It is not so unusual for a major African landmark to have a name given by outsiders. Another example would be the large waterfall on the Zambezi: the name Victoria Falls has obvious imperial roots, but the best known name in the vernacular, *Mosi-au-tunya* (the smoke that thunders) is a name popularised by David Livingstone’s Kololo guides. Those Leya people living on the river itself had a different name for the waterfall, *Syuungwe na mutitima* (the heavy mist that resounds), a name with additional connotations with water, rain, and fertility (McGregor 2003: 721). As with Kilimanjaro, the name is given that represents the outsider’s view of the distinct signpost in the landscape. The important difference is that there is no indigenous

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10 Another similarity is that both the Victoria Falls and Kilimanjaro have beers named after them: “Mosi” beer in Zambia, and the beers Kilimanjaro and Kibo Gold in Tanzania.
Chagga name for the entirety of Kilimanjaro, only names for the two peaks: Kibo, the western most snow-capped peak, and the shorter, more rugged Mawenzi to the east. Establishing the true etymologies of the words “Kilimanjaro” and “Chagga” has been widely attempted and there is no commonly agreed-upon etymology. Rather than return to these debates, I argue that it is productive to attempt to analyse the words on the level of folk-etymologies. Folk etymologies can inform us about the cultural and social aspects of the group that uses the etymologies in question. “[U]nlike true etymologies, which can be esoteric or alien, folk etymologies only exist if they are meaningful to the community of their users” (Rundblad and Kronenfeld 2003: 129-130). Approaching the etymological debate in this new way provides an insight into the social and cultural relations between Chagga people and both African and non-African outsiders.

The name “Kilimanjaro” almost definitely originates from the coast of East Africa, as the word was known on the coast before it became known to Chagga people in the area (Johnston 1886: 1), and the earliest European visitors note that the name Kilimanjaro is not known by the people who live on its slopes (Krapf 1860: 255). One possibility is that the name means mountain of whiteness (Thomson 1887: 116). Another suggested etymology is that the word means “mountain of caravans”\footnote{This definition means that the word “Kilimanjaro” is of mixed heritage. The Swahili word mlima means mountain, yet the diminutive prefix ki- means that kilima would more literally be translated as small hill. Depending upon the commentator, this is either a problematic linguistic feature (Hutchinson 1965: 67) or a term of endearment (Wimmelbücker 2002: 113). The word njaro, said to mean caravan, is not of Swahili origin, but is given as being either from a Chagga dialect (Hutchinson 1965: 65) or from Taveta (Wimmelbücker 2002: 113).}, an etymology that Krapf and Rebmann heard from the coastal porters who took them to Kilimanjaro, for whom the mountain offers “a landmark for the caravans seen everywhere from afar” (Krapf 1860: 255). This derivation is recounted recently by Wimmelbücker (2002: 113) in his 11
regional history of Kilimanjaro that puts a great deal of emphasis on the placing of
Kilimanjaro within the regional economy. Another etymology connected to trade routes
is recounted, not without scepticism, by Hutchinson (1965: 66), concerning a coral
outcrop in the sea north of Mombassa, used as a beacon by dhow sailors, known as
“Kilimanjaro”. Kilimanjaro the mountain acted in a similar purpose, acting as a signpost
for caravans travelling from the coast. While etymologies based upon regional trade are
perennially cited in the literature, reflecting the continued importance given to trade in
works on Kilimanjaro, some etymologies have fallen out of common use. For example, a
popular early derivation of “Kilimanjaro” was that it referred to *Njaro*, a supposed spirit
or demon of cold (Fischer 1884: 78; Johnston 1886: 1; Meyer 1891: 154). This
etymology fell into disuse in part because there was no other evidence for the existence
of a spirit named *Njaro* apart from in the name of the mountain, yet the disuse also
reflects a changing European view of Kilimanjaro, discussed further below.

As with the word “Kilimanjaro”, the origin of the word “Chagga” is obscure. It is almost
definitely of external origin (Stahl 1964: 39-40), again quite possibly from the coast
(Hollis 1910: 256). Stahl notes that, in the writings of early explorers, the name Chagga
is used by Europeans to refer to a place, rather than a people (Stahl 1964: 38). This
assertion is not entirely correct: it is true that Krapf and Rebmann refer to “the
inhabitants of Jagga” (Krapf 1860: 243), yet Stahl does not notice that barely two
sentences later Krapf refers to the people as “Jaggas” (ibid.: 243). As such, from the
earliest European contact, Chagga was used to refer to both the place and the people.
While the name Kilimanjaro has been the subject of some interesting European folk-
etymologies, the origins of the name “Chagga” has been the focus of some discussion by
Chagga people themselves. Many of these etymologies have a strong ironical component

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12 A rare later reference to *Njaro* as a spirit of cold is made by Stuart-Watt (1930: 213).
that reflects the naming of some other places in Kilimanjaro (Stahl 1964: 39-40). An example is a discussion within a 2003 popular ethnohistory Asili ya Wachaga (Traditions of the Chagga) by Alice Makule. She offers a variety of explanations for the name “Chagga” that she has heard across Kilimanjaro (Makule 2003: 26-29). One etymology uncovered by Makule’s investigation suggests that the Chagga people were originally known to outsiders by the Swahili name Watu wa Vichakani (people of the forest/bush). This was eventually shortened to Wachaka, and eventually Wachagga because, Makule reports, of the mispronunciation by German explorers in the area (ibid.: 28). While there is no doubt a number of variations of the spelling of the word by Europeans – Jagga (Krapf 1860: 453; Thornton 1865: 49); Chaga (Johnston 1885; Thomson 1887); and Dschagga (Gutmann 1935: 14) – none contain a ‘k’ consonant.

Nevertheless, the etymology that is based on the mishearings of Germans not only provides another etymology from outsiders, but also provides an element of mockery of the ignorance of the colonial power, and the subversion of a misheard word being expropriated by Swahili-speakers themselves. Another explanation presented by Makule is also rich in irony, concerning Chagga relations to the neighbouring Pare ethnic group.

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13 Similarly, one suggested etymology of the name of the neighbouring group “Wataveta” is “People of the plains” (Hollis 1910: 256).
14 Occasionally written by Johnston (1886) as “Čaga”.
15 The other question of Chagga etymology is whether the word is spelt with one g or two. The spelling with two gs is now ubiquitous in Tanzania to the extent that I did not encounter the word spelt with a single g. In the contemporary academic literature, with the exception of Thomas Spear (1997), the spelling is almost universally “Chagga”, the convention that I follow in this thesis. However, this would make the name probably unique in Bantu languages, as the double-g is meaningless (Werner 1924: 564). In German, however, the presence of the double consonant affects the pronunciation of the preceding vowel. There is evidence to believe, based upon a contemporary review of Dundas’ 1924 book Kilimanjaro and Its People, that the double-g spelling was far from common in this period, and the review speculates that Dundas was influenced by his reading of Bruno Gutmann and the standard German spelling “Dschagga”, combining this with Johnston’s “Chaga” (Werner 1924: 564). If this is the case, then it is likely that Dundas’ work went a large way to popularising the spelling used in this thesis. Thomas Marealle insisted on the double g spelling (Marealle 1952: 102).
The two groups have a long history of trade, competition and occasional warfare. This has developed into a long-standing *utani* (joking relationship) between Pare and Chagga peoples that has continued to this day, a lighthearted relationship of disrespect or insult at which usually no offence is taken, (Moreau 1944; Radcliffe-Brown 1949). According to Makule, the very names Pare and Chagga are based upon insults thrown at each other in battle; thus, the word “Chagga” is an insult in the Pare language, and vice-versa (Makule 2003: 27).  

16 This folk-etymology provides an ironic definition that helps cement the *utani* between the two peoples.

The folk-etymologies of “Kilimanjaro” and “Chagga” provide not only an ironic comment on social relations, but also, I argue, cement the point that the origins of Kilimanjaro and Chagga come from outside. It is to the outsiders that I now turn, examining the first Europeans to set eyes on Mount Kilimanjaro.

**The Snows of Kilimanjaro**

The first recorded sighting of Kilimanjaro was made by the German explorer-missionary Johannes Rebmann on 11th May 1848. Rebmann travelled in East Africa along with his fellow missionary Johann Ludwig Krapf on what was the earliest travels by Evangelical missionaries from the Church Missionary Society to East Africa (Beidelman 1982: 606). It was an important expedition insofar as it marked the first well-recorded European expedition to inland East Africa and marked the beginning of the classic period of East African exploration by Europeans (Bridges 1973: 220). Rebmann recorded the sighting in his journal, later printed in the journal of the Church Missionary Society:

> The mountains of Jagga gradually rose more distinctly to our sight. I observed something remarkably white on the top of a

16 Other research connects the word Chagga with *waha* (to kill) (Wimmelbücker 2002: 113), and the name Vagha exists in the Pare language (Kimambo 1969: 137).
high mountain… Soon after we sat down to rest a little, when I read the 111th Psalm, at which I had just arrived in my daily reading. It made a singular impression on my mind in the view of the beautiful snow mountain so near to the Equator. [emphasis in original] (Rebmann 1850: 17)

The writings of Krapf and Rebmann, the first based on direct European experience of the mountain, introduced many of the themes that would continue throughout the writings of other European visitors. First, they considered Kilimanjaro to be a place suitable for European inhabitation and cultivation: Krapf, on learning of his companion’s discovery, was delighted to hear of “a noble country in the interior, well fitted for cultivation” (Krapf 1860: 196). Secondly, they use Kilimanjaro as a direct metaphor for Chagga social structures. Finally, albeit to a less developed extent than later authors, they make a short comparison to Europe, referring to the snow (Rebmann 1850: 17).

News of the presence of a snow-mountain close to the equator reached Europe at a time when mountains were capturing the European imagination. Romanticism was expressed via poetry, as Shelley wrote about Mount Blanc:

Far, far above, piercing the infinite sky,
Mont Blanc appears – still, snowy, and serene;
[...] Power dwells apart in its tranquility
Remote, serene, and inaccessible:
And this, the naked countenance of earth,
On which I gaze, even these primæval mountains
Teach the adverting mind

(Shelley 2002 [1816]: 127)

Kilimanjaro became the subject of poetry soon after its discovery. The American poet Bayard Taylor, who never saw Kilimanjaro himself, wrote the poem “Kilimandjaro” circa 1855. This poem itself mentions Mount Blanc. It opens (Daly and Taylor 1875: 302-304):

Hail to thee, monarch of African mountains,
Remote, inaccessible, silent, and lone—
Who, from the heart of the tropical fervors,
Liftest to heaven thine alien snows,
Feeding forever the fountains that make thee
Father of Nile and Creator of Egypt!
(Taylor 1855: 98)

The snowfields of Kilimanjaro remain a theme throughout Bayard’s poem. Mountains and ice had captured the European imagination not only through the artistic and literate expressions of romanticism, but also through the leisure activities of the middle class. The Swiss Alps, in particular, became a popular destination during the “Golden Age” of mountaineering. Around the 1850s, a “Mont Blanc mania” developed, as Europeans and North Americans were attracted to the Swiss Alps in increasing numbers. Ice and glaciers, in particular, were transformed from potentially deadly threats into alluring, sublime landscape against which a man could test his mettle (Carey 2007: 503). For the British, this was connected to an anxiety about Britain’s decline and the pressing need to construct a British masculinity (Hansen 1995: 323). This desire for mountaineering had an imperial dimension. The vocabulary of Arctic and African exploration began to be used by Alpine climbers in this period (ibid.: 315-316). Alpine exploration allowed middle-class men with a few weeks’ holiday to travel to Switzerland and “act out the drama of the empire in the Alps. In this manner, the British conquest of the natural world came to symbolise British imperial domination of other territory during the 19th century” (ibid.: 323). Thus, *African* mountains themselves became a doubly important aspect of empire. The mountains of Africa, Wittenberg argues, became a topographical metaphor for Europeans to map and imagine racial differences and civilisational rank. “Accordingly, Africa’s snow-capped peaks were imagined as sublime, elevated sites of whiteness, in stark contrast to the supposed darkness of the African interior” (Wittenberg 2004: 64). While Wittenberg’s analysis of the role of the sublime wilderness of African peaks is strong, it does not give a
full account as, I argue, Europeans saw the landscape of Kilimanjaro in a multiplicity of ways.

The presence of snow so close to the equator was not initially disbelieved by the geographical establishment in Europe. The debates that developed, however, highlight some of the concerns of geographers of this period. At the Royal Geographical Society in London, prior to 1852 the presence of snow on Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya was accepted without question (Hamilton 1849; MacQueen 1850; Smyth 1851). This changed as, in 1852, William Desborough Cooley published *Inner Africa laid open*, a book that critiqued Krapf and Rebmann’s accounts. Cooley was a theoretical geographer of Africa, who never stepped foot on the continent yet frequently critiqued the leading explorers of his time based on his reading of classical geographies and the accounts of Arab visitors to London (Bridges 1976b; Bridges 1976a)\(^\text{17}\). In *Inner Africa laid open*, a central plank of Cooley’s strong condemnation of Krapf and Rebmann’s account of a snow-capped Kilimanjaro was a critique of the missionaries’ writing style; he described their prose as “studious… and affected”, and while in the presence of this “sublime scene” they should have “vivid impressions, conveyed in natural language” (Cooley 1852: 98). Thus, it was considered a weakness that Krapf and Rebmann’s writings lacked poetry, that their account lacked the sense of the

\(^{17}\) It was most likely Cooley who made the first use of the word Kilimanjaro in print. Three years before Krapf and Rebmann’s discovery in a piece based on the evidence of an Omani Arab from Zanzibar visiting Britain, Cooley wrote; “The most famous mountain of Eastern Africa is Kirimanjara, which we suppose, from a number of circumstances, to be the highest ridge crossed by the road to Monomoezi. The top of this mountain is strewed all over with red carnelian” (Cooley 1845: 213). The source of Cooley’s information was an interview with an Omani Arab from Zanzibar visiting Britain, Khamis bin Uthman (Bridges 1976a: 31). It seems unlikely that this source ever saw Kilimanjaro in person, yet here again the descriptions of sources from the East African coast are influential upon European writers. It is quite possible that the reason for Cooley’s strong denials of the presence of snow on the mountain was the defence of his own source, and by extension his methods.
sublime that was expected of authors witnessing such natural wonders. Krapf (1854) gave a vigorous defence of his account in a letter from East Africa, yet Cooley’s critique had done damage to the reputation of the relatively-unknown missionaries. For the next nine years the Royal Geographical Society largely doubted the presence of snow (Bridges 1976a: 41), until Von Decken reached high up the mountain and finally gave the presence of snow widespread acknowledgement (Murchison 1863: 2). Cooley, for his part, never acknowledged that there was anything more than intermittent freezing (Bridges 1976a: 41). This scientific debate was in part over the poetry of the descriptions of explorers, and only settled by mountaineers. In these debates over Kilimanjaro, I argue, the concerns of Romanticism collide.

It is worth noting that most of the expeditions to Kilimanjaro, apart from those by a few of the missionaries, had a scientific purpose. Even those travelers visiting for primarily missionary concerns, such as Charles New in 1871 and Bishop Hannington in 1885, although lacking a scientific background, collected botanical and etymological samples and returned them to Europe (Cotton 1930: 98-100). Writing on South-East Africa, Harries (2007: 113) argues that the scientific measurement of landscape was a method Europeans used to develop an understanding, and a domination, of African landscapes. This, I argue, was true for some of the landscapes of East Africa, and certainly visitors to Kilimanjaro attempted to measure the mountain, yet the landscape of Kilimanjaro was far more immediately accessible to the European gaze. Take, for example, the writings of Joseph Thomson who travelled widely in East Africa and to Kilimanjaro in 1883. Thomson was a geologist by training, and the scientific language and descriptions originating from geology are peppered through his work for a general audience. For example, three hills in his writings became “three, small parasitic, volcanic cones” (Thomson 1887: 75). It is through scientific measurement that Thomson
developed an understanding of much of the landscape of East Africa. Thomson visited the chiefdom of Moshi in 1883, which resulted in a vastly different descriptive passage:

The villages occupies the top of a narrow ridge formed by a deep glen on either side. From the upper part of the small streams miniature canals, constructed with great skill, lead off the water and spread it over the entire ridge... A more rich and varied scene I have nowhere looked upon in Africa... Mochi, as it lay before me, had all the rich fertility and pleasing aspect of Taveta, with the advantage of a beautiful interchange of hill and glen... to the north towered, sovereign, majestic, awful in its silent calm, the snow-clad peak of Kibo. There was no feeling of confinement, and the blood courses more warmly through the veins, stimulated by the bracing mountain air, till one felt inclined to shout “Excelsior!” and climb the mountain heavenward. In Mochi one had none of that spirit of lotus-eating indolence induced by the dreamy, poetic life of Taveta. (ibid.: 77-78)

Thomson, a Scot, saw no need to stamp control over the landscape of Kilimanjaro through the use of scientific vocabulary, he immediately saw there the glens of his native Scotland. The landscape was already cognitively accessible to the European observer. Thomson’s description also features Kilimanjaro’s irrigation system, the human element being a necessary constituent in making a landscape to be considered picturesque during this period (Harries 2007: 103-104). In comparison to his descriptions of other African landscapes, the presence of a human element in the Kilimanjaro landscape reflects a very different understanding. The descriptions of the landscape elsewhere reflects an understanding that a “landscape of solid geology”, while not exactly timeless then reflecting the work of aeons (Bender 2002: S103). The descriptions of the land of Kilimanjaro, on the other hand, contains these elements but in addition has the element of a landscape shaped by human agency, on far shorter timescales. Thomson is also developing a moral geography of Kilimanjaro, beginning a theme that would develop through later writers. Because of the landscape, he considers the population of Kilimanjaro to be a vigorous, skilful, hard-working people.
This is a theme that would be developed by Harry Johnston, who in 1884 became the first European to spend an extended amount of time on Kilimanjaro (Oliver 1957: 52-88). He was a very influential author in shaping the established European ideas of the landscape and people of Kilimanjaro. Johnston arrived in the territory of Moshi, under the control of Chief Rindi. Rindi already had strong connections to the British Consul on Zanzibar, and was an admirer of the consul, John Kirk, partly because Kirk had previously sent Rindi a gift of several cannon. Kirk had given Johnston a letter of introduction, in Arabic script, which eased initial relations between Rindi and Johnston (ibid.: 61-62).

Johnston was a strong proponent of British colonisation of Kilimanjaro. By the 1880s, it was becoming clear to the colonial powers that Kilimanjaro was a “juicy plum” in East Africa (Pakenham 1997: 283). Much of Johnston’s writing had a clear imperial element. He had written:

> we camped out, and I, ravished with the beauty of scenery and with the magnificence of the view, set myself to work to create in imagination a fair city of civilisation which would rise on these grassy slopes, and dominate the cultivable lands below. Here, on these two hillocks, I would build my twin forts, and here would be my terraced vineyards; there cornfields and gardens, and there a handsome stone house, my preliminary palace... Then until darkness set in I stood on one of the seven hills of my African Rome, and pondered on the possibilities of its existence. (Johnston 1885: 153-154)

In 1884, Johnston wrote from Kilimanjaro to Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, the parliamentary undersecretary at the Foreign Office (Chamberlain 1972: 536), to advocate that Kilimanjaro should become British:

> The whole elevated region which surrounds the two large snow-clad peaks of Kilimanjaro is about equal in extent to the country of Switzerland, with perhaps the Tyrol added, and comprises every scale of temperature and kind of climate from ordinary tropical heat to bitter cold, and from hot dank moisture to bracing dryness, glaring sunshine, and chilly mists.
The average climate... is that of a Devonshire summer, with a midday temperature of 74 degrees and a night-reading of 56 degrees.

As well as Devon, Johnston also compares the scenery to Switzerland:

As to the scenery, I may say without exaggeration that I have never seen anything to equal it in beauty in an part of the earth I have yet visited. Sometimes I am reminded of Switzerland, when I see the eternal snows of the giant peaks, the dark sombre forests, and the thundering waterfalls; at other times I could believe myself in some English glade, when I stand knee-deep in bracken, or when I pass along the lanes of Chagga, where blackberry and male fern flourish together with many other plants of the temperate zone. My health, I need hardly say, is perfect, for I am living in the climate of a genial English summer, and though my Zanzibar porters feel the cold at night, they are rapidly becoming habituated to the altered temperature, and are stronger and brisker than on the enervating coasts... the Chagga people, being far from savages, have greatly studied the art of irrigation, and have brought down streams of water from the heights above in artificial channels... Here is a country as large as Switzerland, enjoying singularly fertile soil and healthy climate, capable of producing every vegetable production of the tropical and temperate zones, free from the tsetze fly, and therefore adapted to the breeding of oxen (which, in common with sheep and goats, exist already in great herds), inhabited sparsely by peaceful agriculturalists, skilled in native manufactures and capable and desirous of instruction. Here is a land eminently suited for European colonisation, situated near midway between the Equatorial lakes and the coast. Within a few years it must be either English, French or German. (Johnston 1995 [1884]: 1-3)

Here can be seen Johnston’s enthusiastic argument for the colonization of Kilimanjaro.

The alpine descriptions are present, with Johnston’s exaggeratedly comparing the size of Kilimanjaro to the size of Switzerland. This exaggeration must have been, in part, because Johnston wanted to justify the expense of the colonisation, yet his choice of comparator is still informative. There is also the comparison of the climate of Kilimanjaro to that of southern England, a theme he developed in his other writings when he often compared Kilimanjaro to Hertfordshire or Devonshire (Johnston 1886: 230,322,330). Using these multiplicities of description was not unusual; this example...
comes from a review article in a missionary journal, entitled “The Switzerland of Africa”, which reviews the increasing literature produced by visitors to Kilimanjaro:

The accounts of all these travelers unite in describing the scenery of this region as marvelously lovely. Totally different from the natural features of the burning continent, it combines the calm beauty of Devon, the luxuriance of the tropics, and the grandeur of Switzerland. If there is one part of Africa better adapted than another for the residence of Europeans, it seems to be this. (Morris 1885: 512-513)

There is no contradiction in understanding landscape in such a fashion. Giercyn (2000: 464) notes that places nest together “because the boundaries are (analytically and phenomenologically) elastic”: as Bender (2001: 6) describes it, they nest within one another “like Chinese boxes – except that the boxes are permeable”. Thus, there is no difficulty in an explorer such as Johnston seeing the peak of Kilimanjaro as a landscape reminiscent of Switzerland, and the village on its slopes as similar to an English village.

While colonisation schemes such as that presented by Johnston commonly met with rejection from the Foreign Office (Erberlie 1965: 16), his proposal met with some approval with others in London. The reasons for this were that highlands presented the type of fertile uplands considered suitable for European colonisation, in order to develop trade with Zanzibar (Pakenham 1997: 282-283), and to strike a blow against Bismarck (Oliver 1957: 72). Yet this policy did not meet with the approval of Kirk, the British Consulate on Zanzibar, who felt that British colonisation on Zanzibar would weaken the strength of the Sultan that he had spent the previous 20 years building up. Kirk suggested instead that Kilimanjaro become part of the Sultan’s territory; this proposal had the support of much of the British cabinet (Pakenham 1997: 283-284). However, this was rejected by the Prime Minister, William Gladstone, who memorably wrote, “Terribly have I been puzzled and perplexed on finding a group of the soberest men among us to have concocted a scheme such as that touching the mountain country
behind Zanzibar with an unrememberable name” (cited by Gwynn and Tuckwell 1917: 83-84). In the meantime, three Germans including Carl Peters arrived in East Africa and signed treaties with local chiefs, thus establishing the area as a German colony (Meritt 1978).

**House of God**

The people of Chagga ethnicity were attractive to the missionaries who came to East Africa. Missionaries, too, were desired by Chagga chiefs: in 1878, Rindi wrote to the Church Missionary Society in Mombassa, requesting Christian teachers to come to his chiefdom (Lenoble-Bart 2006: 12). Bishop Hannington from the CMS travelled to Moshi, and was greatly taken by the scenery: “God give Chagga to His son, for ‘tis a lovely spot. I frequently exclaimed to the men in rapture of delight, ‘England, England! You see England here.’ Yes, and that charming part of England, Devonshire.” (Hannington 1885: 612). The landscape of Kilimanjaro, according to the Bishop, made it ideally suitable for converting its populace to Christianity. Reverend Shaw, a later missionary from the CMS, was also very much taken by the scenery, and described Chagga as a “fine, well-built race. Their full development of bone and muscle being probably due to the exercise they all have to take in moving about on the steep hills: they seem intellectually superior to the general run of coast Natives” (Shaw 1887: 46). As well as the Protestants from the CMS, Catholic missionaries also came to Kilimanjaro (Lenoble-Bart 2006: 8-10). While the relationship between rival missionary denominations, local interests and foreign powers meant that the introduction of Christianity and mission education was not always smooth (ibid.: 8-10), it did have important lasting effects. First of all, while Christianity became the dominant global religion on the mountain, the mixture of Protestant and Catholic missionaries
meant that both faiths were represented. This formed another dimension by which Chagga ethnicity was not a single entity. Secondly, the opening of mission schools marked the beginning of the strong relationship between Chagga people and education that would place them in good stead in the future. As mission schools began to open before the First World War, Chagga parents did not only educate their sons, but also sent their daughters to be educated. Indeed, at times the numbers of girls being educated exceeded those of boys (Vavrus 2002: 373).

There was a strong spiritual or religious element for the Europeans themselves in the earliest accounts. The sublime, religious feelings felt by the Europeans are common before the 20th century. For example, Bishop Hannington (1885: 610) writes that both himself and his Zanzibari guides were “in ecstasies at the magnificent view before us”. Joseph Thomson (1887: : 80) saw it “in no way strange that the untutored savage… should see in this majestic mountain something more than a material existence, or, at least, should recognize it as the chosen abode of the Supreme Being.” This stands in contrast to the way that Kilimanjaro was written about in the middle of the 20th century, by which time the idea that Kilimanjaro was the seat of God was written about in a very different way, in terms of being the African “other”: “Many Africans, even those Europeanized, still think of Kilimanjaro as God’s throne. They pray to it” (Gunther 1955: 392). However, far from being the product of the African other, the idea that Kilimanjaro was the home of God was also one common in European thought. Indeed, by the time that Ernest Hemmingway used Kilimanjaro as a metaphor in his short story “The Snows of Kilimanjaro” in 1936, he was criticised by a contemporary reviewer for the idea of the white-capped mountain being the home of God as being over-familiar and clichéd (Evans 1961: 601). The position of the peak of Kilimanjaro in historical Chagga theology is not as simple as the Europeans may have suggested. The
Chagga conceptions of God centre around the sun, and the god named Ruwa, in Eastern and Central Kilimanjaro, or Iruuva in the West (Lema 1999: 41), and common to many languages in East Africa this word also means sun (Hinnels 1995). Kibo did have religious significance; there are reports that men making prayers or sacrifices would face Kibo (Dundas 1924: 146), and some burials are made with the corpse facing Kibo (Raum 1967 [1940]: 377). Thus, I argue that the idea of Kilimanjaro as the house of God is far closer to earlier European ideas about the peak, rather than indigenous Chagga theology. Whereas an approach to the mountain with a mystical dimension was expected of the earliest explorers, later it became common to assume that these were the views of Chagga people themselves.

The Chiefly Chagga Elite and European Contact

While the writers discussed in this chapter freely generalise about all the inhabitants of Kilimanjaro, it is clear from their writings that they dealt directly only with a narrow strata of Chagga society. Their contacts were almost entirely with chiefs, or their direct agents. Up until the point that some missionaries and district officials began to seek to write on broader sociological or anthropological concerns, for example, Gutmann and Dundas, the only Chagga that are named and characterised in the writings of Europeans are the chiefs. It is a characteristic of these individuals that the writers tended to generalise across all Chagga people. An example of this is the descriptions of Chief Rindi of Moshi, who had much contact with the early European visitors. They write positively of his physical characteristics (Johnston 1886: 103-104), his desire for knowledge, the presence of a Swahili interpreter in his court, and his strong knowledge of affairs of the coast (Hannington 1885: 162; Johnston 1886: 98; Thomson 1887: 76-77). Parallels are
visible here between these characterisations of the individual Rindi and later common
esentialisations of people of Chagga ethnicity.

The chiefs also sought to portray themselves as strong rulers, with absolute control and
power. Rebmann compares the landscape of East Africa to the social structures he saw,
comparing the lofty mountains of Kilimanjaro with the plains in the extent to which
Chagga people elevated one leader to great heights (Rebmann 1850: 22). Thomson
noted of Rindi, “The Wa-chaga, on hearing that their chief was coming, scuttled off in
great trepidation, as if it was his habit to chop off the heads of all who came in his way –
and indeed, it was one of his greatest delights to see the abject terror of his subjects,
over whom he wielded the most absolute authority” (Thomson 1887: 82: 82). Later
analysis has doubted that the chiefs had such all-encompassing power as they made
themselves appear to outsiders. The political position of a chief was frequently more
tenuous than they would make themselves out to be, assassination was a continual
threat and many chiefs (including Rindi (Stahl 1965: 42)) spent long periods in exile.
Even at home they were not always in as secure a position as they might at first have
appeared. For example, Moore (1970: 329-330) argues that, while the chief did have
the power to make judicial decisions, more often than not they would use judicial
methods such as the age-group assembly. Thus, the chief did not stand openly and make
decisions, rather the judicial procedures acknowledged the position of the chief while
allowing him to avoid making a show of authority. The chiefs had good reason to make
themselves seem as powerful as possible; as so much of the political power in
Kilimanjaro rested with their relationship with outsiders, then there was much to gain
by chiefs making themselves appear as strong as possible.
In their relations with the Europeans, chiefs made cunning and audacious moves to put themselves in a position of advantage over their rival chiefdoms. It was not unusual for explorers in East Africa to be used as pawns in the political games played by rulers (Bridges 1973: 230), but few cases are as vivid as the treatment of Chief Sina of Kibosho. Sina was one of the most powerful chiefs in Kilimanjaro’s history, ruling from c.1870 until 1897, and by the 1880s the extent of his influence and military might was unchallenged (Stahl 1965: 40-41). Stahl (1964) argues that, had the European powers not colonised East Africa, Kibosho would have become the chiefdom ruling the whole of Kilimanjaro. However, despite his being the most powerful chief by some margin, most of the European visitors had no contact with Sina. Further than that, neither the chiefdom of Kibosho nor Chief Sina is even mentioned by the European sources before the 1890s. This striking absence was not due to simple ignorance on the part of the Europeans, though it does indicate a naivety on their part regarding the political situation on Kilimanjaro. Rather, it was the actions of rival chiefs that were responsible. Chief Rindi, while being in a far weaker position militarily and politically, was diplomatically far more able. He extended his influence by writing to the world powers, including Queen Victoria and Kaiser Wilhelm, sending the latter an elephant tusk along with an envoy of his subjects (Meyer 1891: 89). Probably more productively, Rindi also corresponded with John Kirk, the British Consul on Zanzibar (Stahl 1965: 43). This contact was what recommended Johnston to visit Rindi in Kilimanjaro. Rindi went to great lengths so that these outsiders did not realise the extent of Sina’s true power. It was not until the colonial period that the German officials began to realise the extent of Sina’s power, and fuelled by rumours probably spread by Rindi, crushed Kibosho militarily in 1891 (ibid.: 43). There was no way in which Rindi could hope to defeat Sina by force of arms, but he had managed to manipulate the Germans into destroying his rival.
Although naive as to the political situation on Kilimanjaro, the visitors can through their writings give some insight into the shifting power dynamics. Hans Meyer\textsuperscript{18}, the German who became the first person to climb Kilimanjaro in 1889, visited Kilimanjaro on several occasions. He first visited the chiefdom of Moshi, but was not impressed by Chief Rindi. The portrait Meyer offered of Rindi is that of an aging, malicious ruler, almost bed-bound; a greedy slave trader, jealously seizing all that he can from European visitors to his small, besieged kingdom (Meyer 1891: 84-102). Meyer contrasts his experience of Rindi of Moshi with that of the rival chief Marealle of Marangu, the grandfather of Thomas Marealle the future Paramount Chief: “Of all the sovereigns of Jaga, [Marealle] is the only one I ever met who was at once intelligent, courteous, modest, and amiable – the very type of all a young prince ought to be, his swarthy skin notwithstanding.” (ibid.: 262). This change in emphasis marks the start of one of the key power shifts, as it would be Marealle who became the German favourite during the initial period of their colonisation. Marealle too was able to wield German military might to his own advantage in defeating his rivals, including the chiefdom of Moshi (Stahl 1964: 308-336).

\textbf{Foreign Visitors and Chagga Unity}

For all the bravado displayed by the chiefs in their belittling of their opponents, none of them persuaded any visitor who stepped foot on Kilimanjaro that the entirety of the mountain was under a single political leadership. Yet one assumption that is never questioned by the European visitors is that there is anything but a single Chagga ethnic group. From the writings of Rebmann and Krapf onwards, that there might have been a

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{18} Meyer was one of the earliest European visitors to mention Kibosho.}
variety of identities within Kilimanjaro is not questioned, even when they were well aware of the divisions that existed between rival chiefdoms. I have found no mention in the literature of any identifications of parts of Kilimanjaro as being sub-Chagga identities. Chagga internalisations of this unity in the examination of imaginations of Chagga ethnicity are the subject of the next chapter. The idea of there being a single Chagga ethnicity reflect the period of European, particularly German, thought at this time. Particularly in Central Europe, there was a search by intellectuals for lasting boundaries in the political fluidity following the Napoleonic wars. “[E]specially in the case of Germans, ideas of natural location and landscape became pivotal in the quest for political independence and unity” (Luig and Van Oppen 1997: 11). I argue that, upon reaching Kilimanjaro, the first visitors encountered a relatively contiguous landscape with a climate strikingly different from the plain, aiding their understanding that there was a single Chagga people.

It is my contention that a further reason that they held this view was the influence of the coastal and Zanzibari caravans that took the visitors to Kilimanjaro – the first mention of Chagga as a single people by Rebmann and Krapf predates their first visit to Kilimanjaro, and is based upon accounts that they had heard at the coast (Krapf 1860: 116-117). This does not mean that the traders necessarily saw Chagga in the same fashion as would later become the European ideas of “tribe”, but it does show that the origins of the idea of a Chagga people predate European contact. Finally, it appears that Chagga chiefs themselves played a role in portraying Kilimanjaro as a single entity. Johnston, before reaching Kilimanjaro, was under the assumption that Rindi was the
 Paramount Chief of all of Kilimanjaro\(^{19}\) (Johnston 1886: 139). The assumption that can be drawn from this is that Johnston was acting under the influence of Kirk on Zanzibar, who had corresponded with Rindi. The benefits to Rindi of cultivating such an impression are obvious since it elevated his position in comparison to his rival chiefdoms.

Thus, I argue that Chagga ethnicity is not simply the result of colonial “invention” out of whole-cloth, rather the product of various precolonial and colonial interactions. As described by Berman (1998: 311-312), ethnicities are “ambiguous, constantly contested and changing results of cultural politics; the outcome of an endless process in which they are always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in the process of creation”. These constructivist approaches emphasise the role of intellectuals, and other elite groups, in the articulation of ethnic or national identities (Berman 1998: 327; Spear 2003: 5). As I will illustrate in later chapters, intellectuals played a key role in the imagination of Chagga ethnicity. Yet these intellectuals were not in a position to invent an ethnic group with no historical precedence. As Spear (2003: 26) writes, “Intellectuals need historical raw materials to construct their stories if their reinterpretations are to ring true.”

**Into the Colonial Period**

The start of colonialism in Kilimanjaro was brutal. Carl Peters served as the Imperial Commissioner to Kilimanjaro from 1891-2. A brutal racist, Peter’s career came to an end following a scandal when news of his atrocities reached Germany, in particular a

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\(^{19}\) The writings of Joseph Thomson and his descriptions of the politics of Kilimanjaro had yet to reach print by the time of Johnston’s expedition (Johnston 1885: 139), partially explaining Johnston’s initial ignorance.
case in which he had one of his concubines and her lover publicly executed (Reuss 1981). The brutality of Peter’s reign is still remembered in Kilimanjaro to this day. One modern Chagga artist wrote of these continuing memories of this violence in Kilimanjaro, “After the execution, Peters erected his shameful monument, a gallows, outside the camp. I saw it when I was a child. ‘The Germans hanged our people there,’ I was told…” (Nicodemus 2008: 6). Military victories were necessary before the Germans considered that they had full control over the mountain. Persuaded by Rindi of Moshi shortly before his death, the Germans defeated Kibosho militarily in 1891 (Stahl 1965: 43-44). As Marealle of Marangu became German favourite, so too did he instigate military attacks against his rivals.

When it came to climbing the mountain, this was made far easier by the opening of the railway to the town of Moshi in 1913 and the construction of stone and metal huts, the Bismarck Hut at 8500ft and Peter’s Hut at 11,500ft, built in 1910 by a German settler (Cotton 1930: 97-121). Thus, by 1917, a guidebook to German East Africa notes, “A few years ago only a number of the hardiest climbers could boast having explored the glacier regions of German East Africa; to-day any tourist can climb the Kilimanjaro at his ease – he can even reach the craters of the two peaks on the back of a donkey” (Calvert 1917: 118). As the colonial period progressed, it was no longer necessary for a mountain climber to negotiate diplomatically with chiefs. Thus, there began to be visitors to Kilimanjaro whose interactions were not with chiefs, but with guides and porters. For example, Gillman’s visit in 1921, in which he has high praise for Chagga culture: “Nowhere in East Africa have I seen anything approaching the high standard of culture that is exhibited by the sturdy inhabitants of the cultivated zone of Kilimanjaro” (Gillman 1923: 6) While Gillman recognises the power of the chiefs, he himself did not
engage directly with them. His views, however, remain similar to those of the earlier writers.

The conquering of Kilimanjaro, through reaching the summit, had a clear imperial element. Writing in 1890 of the first recorded successful ascent of Kilimanjaro in 1889, Hans Meyer wrote, “Kilimanjaro was discovered by a German – the missionary, Rebmann; it was first explored by a German – Baron von der Decken; and it seemed to be almost a national duty that a German should be the first to tread the summit of this mountain, probably the loftiest in Africa, and certainly the highest in the German Empire” (Meyer 1891: vi). The response of the British mountaineering community to the loss of Kilimanjaro to Germany was to place an increased emphasis on Mount Kenya, “in Kenya we had a mountain nearly as high, more striking in its physical features, more difficult of ascent, and possessing a flora quite as interesting as its German rival” (Mackinder 1900: 153). Mount Kenya, argued as being the harder mountain to climb and scientifically more interesting, was the more fitting test of British manhood.

In 1916, during the First World War, Kilimanjaro fell to British forces. The initial changes were not great; the instructions given to the first British administrator sent there simply consisted of “Carry on” (Morison 1933: 140). Greater changes would occur following the First World War, when the colony of German East Africa came under British control under a League of Nations mandate. One important aspect here was the appointment to Kilimanjaro of Major Charles Dundas. As the District Officer for Kilimanjaro from 1919-24, he was instrumental in pushing for Chagga coffee production (Setel 1999: 262). Coffee had been grown in Kilimanjaro since 1896, but the planting of coffee by Chagga people was not encouraged by the Germans as it was a
danger to their own production (Ogutu 1972: 280). Dundas was involved with the establishment of the Kilimanjaro Native Planter’s Association (KNPA), representing the interests of Chagga planters against European settlers (Moore 1977a: 17).

In terms of coffee cultivation by Chagga farmers, coffee could be added to the existing methods of cultivation of bananas and vegetables in the *kihamba*, rather than replacing the older system. This leads to a large degree of continuation in both the system of agriculture and inheritance on the mountainside (Moore 1986: 117). Yet beyond this coffee cultivation would lead to massive changes in Kilimanjaro. Within the household, it altered the balance of power in favour of the men, as they took the right to the cash from coffee production as an adjunct to their heritable rights to the land, and saw no duty to share this cash with their wives (ibid.: 117). Coffee brought cultural change that Moore describes as a “cultural commitment to the market” (ibid.: 129), as Chagga farmers spent their coffee wealth on imported goods and educating their children. Coffee brought organisations to Kilimanjaro that cut across the divisions, such as the KNPA and its successor, the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union, and it is the coffee wealth that would later fund the Paramount Chief.

Coffee wealth also brought about the introduction of a non-chiefly Chagga elite who would prove very influential. An example is Joseph Merinyo, a commoner from Moshi, who was an early adopter of coffee production. Merinyo, as a servant of a German settler at the time, had visited Germany in 1907-8 (Moore 1986: 118-119). He became an informant and convert of Bruno Gutmann, and was influential on Gutmann’s thinking on social anthropology. Gutmann saw that the introduction of the coffee cash crop had led to a change from a religious attitude towards agriculture to a secular economic attitude, and the persons who were early adopters of coffee production such
as Merinyo provided a manifestation of these processes for Gutmann (Winter 1979: 56-57). Along with Petro Njau, also a commoner with coffee wealth, Merinyo would be influential in the early cooperative movement and later in the 1950s would lead the proto-nationalist Kilimanjaro Union party (Iliffe 1979: 491). Thus, the new elites that coffee wealth introduced would form a very important part in the political development of Kilimanjaro.

Merinyo and Njau also served as chief informants for Dundas’s influential book on Kilimanjaro and the Chagga ethnic group, *Kilimanjaro and Its People*, published in English in 1924 and in a Swahili translation eight years later. Dundas has been accused of writing his monograph purely to advance his career in the Colonial Service – apparently successfully, as soon after the publication of his work he was promoted to assistant Chief Secretary, and later Secretary of Native Affairs, for Tanganyika Territory (Winter 1979: 4-5). In this post, he argued against the policy of Indirect Rule and the establishment of “chiefs” and “tribes” in Tanganyika; instead he preferred policies based upon villages and regions, arising from his knowledge of the inherent complexities within Chagga and other ethnic groups (Jerman 1998: 164). *Kilimanjaro and Its People* became a very influential book on Kilimanjaro. As with other writers, Dundas too begins with a description of the mountain, noting, “To the writer the pursuit of this study has seemed less induced by mere interest for research than compelled by the spell of the mountain” (Dundas 1924: 5). The book would later be described by Thomas Marealle, the Paramount Chief, as “the Chagga Bible” (Marealle 1955: 2). It is interesting that Thomas Marealle should describe a book written by an outsider such as Dundas in such a way, rather than a book written by a Chagga person, as in the texts discussed in Chapter Three. In part, there was a political motivation in this: Dundas describes the position of the Paramount Chief’s grandfather, Marealle I, as “virtually
that of a paramount Chief of the whole tribe” (Dundas 1924: 104). This assessment, while historians such as Stahl have disagreed with it, went some way to legitimising Thomas Marealle, Marealle I’s grandson, as a Paramount Chief. Yet there are other reasons why Dundas’s book would have such status. It is the view of an outsider, and it was perhaps seen that this was able to give him a wider, more inclusive scope covering a broader sweep of Chagga identity. Given the drawbacks of the insider accounts discussed in the next chapter, this must have been appealing to T. Marealle and a wider Chagga audience.

**Conclusion**

The earliest European visitors to Kilimanjaro were frequently naive about the true political situation. Yet I argue that their work can still give us valuable information about the place and their work did prove influential on how later people saw Kilimanjaro, and how Chagga people would grow to see themselves. Through their work, several influences are evident. Their understanding of the landscape, frequently compared to the landscapes of Europe, came from the themes of Romanticism common in Europe at this time. At the same time, the influence of their coastal and Zanzibari guides and porters appears to be greater than the European travellers themselves give them credit for, as they clearly first reached Kilimanjaro with certain sets of ideas already in place. Finally, the influence on Chagga chiefs cannot be denied.

However, as the next chapter will go on to discuss, the power of chiefs was already weakened, and a wealthy, educated non-chiefly elite was already on the rise. The next chapter will illustrate how both the chiefly and non-chiefly elite would present imaginations of Chagga ethnicity.
Chapter 3: Elite Imaginations of Ethnicity?  
Two Chagga Ethnohistories

This chapter examines some of the aspects of the intellectual work of imagining Chagga ethnicity in the 1940s and 1950s. This was the period of political change on Kilimanjaro that would culminate in a single ruler for the Chagga for the first time in their history. While the political aspects of this period have received much attention, this chapter illustrates how the intellectual imagination of Chagga ethnicity played an important role with an arguably longer-lasting impact.

The focus of this chapter is two monographs published in Swahili by Chagga authors in the late colonial period. The first is *Maisha ya Mchagga Hapa Duniani na Ahera* (Hereafter *Maisha*), (as translated on the title page, The Life of a Mchagga here on Earth and After Death), by Petro Itosi Marealle, first published around 1947. The second work is *Desturi za Wachagga* (hereafter *Desturi*) (Traditions of the Chagga),

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20 I would like to particularly thank the assistance of Bariki Manuo with this chapter and his help with the translation of Swahili texts. All errors in translation are my own.  
21 The year of publication is not altogether clear. The author’s acknowledgment is dated February 1947 (Marealle 2002 [1947]: xii), although Geider’s (2002: 281-282) bibliography of ethnohistories lists the date of publication as 1951.
written by Sam Ntiro and first published in 1953\(^2\). These two books provide an excellent opportunity for comparison as the authors are of different backgrounds: P.I. Marealle was a chief from Marangu, Ntiro was not from a chiefly background but was rather an academic and artist from the rival chiefdom of Machame. Of course, both authors are intellectual elites, but as I will show their different backgrounds have an impact on the approaches to some key issues. While this chapter juxtaposes *Maisha* and *Desturi* and their authors in order to draw out the themes in both works, the authors do not present the books as rivals to each other. Indeed, Ntiro (1972 [1953]: vi) notes in the acknowledgements of *Desturi* that P.I. Marealle had read the complete manuscript and had offered corrections to the text. Ntiro does not refer to Petro Itosi Marealle’s book directly; neither book makes reference to any other written source. This is not unusual for ethnohistories of this type from this period, which rarely make direct reference to other books or authors (Geider 2002: 271). The limits of such a comparison between the texts is acknowledged: it cannot be generalised from these two authors that all members of the respective Chagga elites thought along similar lines. Following Gopāla Šaraṇa’s (1975: 53-57) distinction, the comparison is illustrative, and generalisations about elite Chagga thought cannot be made from only two texts.

I have decided to use the term ethnohistory to describe these texts, following van Binsbergen’s use of the term “literate ethnohistory”, defined as “a half-product, halfway between such traditions and reminiscences as operate within a strictly local frame of reference, on the one hand, and scholarly argument, on the other” (van Binsbergen 1992: 60). As such, this is a use of the term distinct from its other meaning, the subdiscipline of anthropology and history concerned with the history of ethnic groups.

I use this term despite the fact that, as will be discussed below, the historical content of the books is in some respects limited. A term used by Geider (2002: 256) that includes the type of texts discussed here is *habari* – a coastal Swahili genre that includes historiography, ethnography, biography and travelogue. However, I have decided against the use of this term as it implies a link between these Chagga ethnohistories and coastal Swahili texts that does not clearly exist, while at the same time hiding the comparison between these Swahili ethnohistories and those written in neighbouring countries in different vernaculars. I also avoid the term “vernacular history” used by Macola (2003), as in the context of these works it is not clear if the vernacular referred to is Swahili or a Chagga language.

**The Impact of the Texts**

With regard to the impact of the texts in Western academic work, they have largely been ignored in terms of adding to the scholarship of Kilimanjaro. Sally Falk Moore (1977a: 82), in a bibliography of books on Kilimanjaro, dismisses *Desturi* with the single sentence, “Nothing that is not in other sources”. *Maisha* received limited academic attention for its descriptions of historical carved rocks in Kilimanjaro used as teaching aids, and a section of *Maisha* was translated and reprinted in a European journal (Fosbrooke and Marealle 1952a; Fosbrooke and Marealle 1952b). However, apart from this limited attention, neither book has received much attention from European authors on the basis of their content – it is books largely by non-Chagga authors such as Bruno Gutmann, Charles Dundas and Kathleen Stahl that are the authorities generally in use in the Northern academic literature.
Swahili ethnohistories remain an area that is largely understudied. Geider (2002: 257), in an overview of the scope of the Swahili ethnohistory genre, notes, “The far-reaching neglect of these writings by the majority of anthropologists is quite striking.” To an extent, this may be due to the lack of English translation; in Zambia, an accurate English translation of the Bemba monograph *Isholwe Fyandi na Bantu Bandi* (My Ancestors and My People) played a vital role in positioning the text in historians’ understanding of precolonial Zambia (Macola 2001: 188). No complete translations of *Maisha* or *Desturi* exist, although sections of *Maisha* have appeared in the aforementioned work by Fosbrooke; and also the sections on education, proverbs and faith appeared in an issue of *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (Marealle and R.D. Swai 1965). These sections of *Maisha* are more widely cited than other untranslated sections of the book, (for example, Koponen 1988: 413; Clack 2009: 323) indicating that appearing in translation does boost the academic attention texts receive. More Tanzanian works are beginning to appear in translation, for example Gregory Maddox’s 2005 translation of Mathias Mnyampala’s *Historia, Mila na Desturi za Wagogo* (The History, Customs and Traditions of the Gogo) (Mnyampala 1995 [1954]). No such complete English translation exists of *Maisha* or *Desturi*. There is some evidence that these works in Tanzania are achieving more attention, for example in Geider’s (2002) overview of the ethnohistory genre in Tanzania. Hunter (2009) provides an examination of histories on Kilimanjaro that includes a discussion of *Maisha*; however, as I shall illustrate below, her analysis of *Maisha* is incomplete.

Within Kilimanjaro, I argue that the impact was not as great as with similar texts in other parts of Africa. Macola argues that vernacular ethnohistories in Zambia were of great importance during the colonial period, as they:
provided the cultural rationale for the social and administrative engineering that colonial officials were then striving to put into practice. In this regard, vernacular authors played a more fundamental role than contemporaneous colonial historians, or the anthropologists of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. (Macola 2003: 253)

Macola (2001: 188) contends that the vernacular text *Ifikolwe Fyandi na Bantu Bandi* became the “tribal bible” that shaped the ethnic consciousness of the royals and aristocrats of the Lunda ethnic group in Zambia. In the case of the Chagga ethnohistories, they did not have the same level of impact on Chagga consciousness. As mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, it was not one of the Chagga-authored ethnohistories that the Paramount Chief, Thomas Marealle, would describe as “the Chagga Bible”, but rather Charles Dundas’ *Kilimanjaro and Its People* (Marealle 1955: 2). Similarly, it was later deemed necessary by the Chagga Trust to commission an outsider, Kathleen Stahl, to produce a history of the Chagga people (KNCU 1956: 9; Stahl 1964). It is outside authority, it would seem, that Chagga sought in order to provide an insight into their own history. Given the misunderstandings by European visitors described in Chapter Two of this thesis, it is perhaps surprising that so much weight is placed by Chagga people themselves on books written by outsiders. A possible solution is given by the analysis of the texts in this chapter, in which the gaps evident in their presentation of the past indicate the difficulties of the political minefield of a Chagga-authored publication during this period.

Exactly how these ethnohistories were received in Kilimanjaro at this time is unknown, and something that I was not able to successfully reconstruct in my research. As Geider (2002: 278-279) observes of these type of texts, “Conditions of local reception are completely unknown. How are and were the texts used within the communities described? How are and were they valued on the local, regional and national levels?"
The key question that remains unanswered is how these texts were read. Benedict Anderson (2006: 35) considers reading to be a private activity, “performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull”. This description of reading is not completely true of the period that Anderson was writing about, as texts were often read aloud in a social context (Wogan 2001: 409). It remains unknown whether, during this period, reading was a public or private activity on Kilimanjaro. It can be imagined that sections of the work were read aloud in the mbege bars of Kilimanjaro, stimulating debate between the literate and non-literate alike over the work’s contents, much as the television news in a Tanzanian bar today promotes a discussion of the events. Thus, the picture becomes closer to French salons and British coffee houses that Habemas (1991) argues led to the creation of the public sphere. On the other hand, it is possible that the books were rarefied objects, kept locked in the elite’s private libraries like the chief’s secret treasures; the places where I came across the books myself. This lack of information of how the texts were read is a limitation of this chapter. What I have ascertained, however, is that ethnohistories are of perennial popularity in Tanzania. Other ethnic groups in Tanzania have also produced a steady stream of ethnohistories over the decades (Geider 2002: 279-285). With regard to books on Chagga ethnicity, both Desturi and Maisha were reprinted in subsequent decades, the former in 1972 and the latter in 2002. A new Chagga ethnohistory in Swahili, Asili ya Wachaga na Baadhi ya Koo Zao (Traditions of the Chagga and Some of Their Clans) was published in 2003 (Makule 2003). I attempted to buy a copy of this book in Dar es Salaam in 2006; it took me some time to locate a copy as the bookshops had all sold out, and the owners reported that it was a popular seller. These works must be popular enough to warrant continued production.
Historical Background

The publication of these two monographs occurred during a period that would result in Kilimanjaro’s coming under a single leader for the first time in its history – a period of complex political competition on Kilimanjaro within the framework of indirect rule. In 1925, Governor Donald Cameron took up his post and indirect rule was established in Tanganyika (Iliffe 1979: 318-325). Cameron explained the motivations behind his policy in a speech in 1925:

> it is our duty to do everything in our power to develop the native on lines which will not Westernize him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European… We must not destroy the African atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundation of his race… [we should] graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock, stock that had its foundations in the hearts and minds and thoughts of the people, and therefore on which we could build more easily, moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards, and yet all the time enlisting the real force of the spirit of the people, instead of killing all that out and trying to begin afresh. (Cameron; cited in Buell 1928: 451-452)

The ideology of indirect rule bears similarities to the motivations for publishing the monographs that are the subject of this chapter. In Kilimanjaro, the introduction of indirect rule led to the establishment of the Council of Chagga Chiefs. While initially the chiefs remained fully sovereign over their territories and treasuries, in 1929 the Council was reformed and the treasuries of all the chiefs were amalgamated and a single court of appeal established (Moore 1970: 334). From 1929 until 1946, the twenty chiefs on the Council were all of equal status.

The other key element of change on Kilimanjaro during this period was the growth of coffee growing. Iliffe (1979: 274) argues, “during the 1920s coffee-growing transformed the Chagga into peasants.” The number of coffee growers and trees exploded; in 1916
there were 100,000 trees; in 1925 close to a million; in 1935 nearly six million trees (Iliffe 1979: 274). Most of the growers had small plots, growing coffee in their existing *vihamba* (Iliffe 1979: 275). The chiefs were not separate from the coffee industry; as they frequently had large land-holdings and access to tribute labour, some chiefs became among the largest coffee farmers on Kilimanjaro. For example, in 1932 the retired chief of Machame, Shangali Ndeserua, had over 12,000 trees (Iliffe 1979: 275). Nevertheless, the introduction of coffee also led to the creation of both wealthy commoners, and of powerful, non-chiefly cooperative organisations: the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA) and its successor the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU). The KNPA was formed in 1923, to represent the interests of Chagga coffee growers. It was an immediate success, fast becoming a “parallel, nonchiefly, nongovernmental organisation, mountainwide in its constituency” (Moore 1986: 124). The first president was Joseph Merinyo, as discussed in Chapter Two, an informant of Bruno Gutmann. While the KNPA defeated attempts by the British administration to bring the organisation under their control via the Council of Chiefs (ibid.: 122-123), the organisation did not survive the collapse in the coffee price in 1929-30 (Iliffe 1979: 278-279). In 1932, the KNPA was transformed by government edict into the KNCU under the management of a European, A.L.B. Bennett (Moore 1986: 124). Despite this choppy beginning, and controversy in the early years as it was seen as a government institution, the KNCU “became a model for African progress for people throughout Tanganyika” (Iliffe 1979: 279).

There was pressure from a variety of directions for the creation of a single political leader for Kilimanjaro from the 1930s, either in the form of a Paramount Chief or a president of the Chagga Council. As a British District Officer put it at the time, “The Chagga had finally realised that unity was strength and that their chiefs were too
conservative to give that full measure of cooperation necessary to achieve complete homogeneity” (cited in Kileo 2005: 44). In part, from the chiefs this was a response to the success of the KNPA/KNCU in creating a mountainwide organisation that crossed over the traditional boundaries and threatened the chiefs’ authority (Iliffe 1979: 331).

The 21 chiefs on the council voted to elect a permanent president on the council on 2nd July 1934. The favoured candidate of the British administration, Chief Abdiel Shangali, came last with only three votes; Chief Abraham Salema of Moshi received four votes; the victor by a significant margin, with 14 votes, was Chief Petro Itosi Marealle (Kileo 2005: 44-46), the author of *Maisha*. P.I. Marealle, however, was never to become permanent president as, following the loss of their preferred candidate Chief Shangali, the British refused to ratify the results of the election (Lindsey 1965: 55). Petro Itosi Marealle had been thwarted in his attempt to become the leader of all of Chagga, although he would try again in subsequent decades.

In 1946, the Chagga Council was reformed. The central change was the dividing of the chiefdoms of Kilimanjaro into three divisions, with three divisional chiefs (*mwitori*) effectively ruling over the fifteen existing chiefs. Other changes to the Council involved allowing commoners to have representation on the Council for the first time (Moore 1986: 143). This was a development that was not popular amongst many of the chiefs themselves; they had rejected such a measure when it had been put before them in 1944, but in 1946 the provincial commissioner simply appointed the divisional chiefs (Iliffe 1979: 491). The three divisional chiefs were Abdiel Shangali, ruling Hai division, John Maruma ruling Rombo division, and Petro Itosi Marealle becoming the divisional chief for Vunjo division (Stahl 1964: 22-23; Iliffe 1979: 491). These three divisional chiefs now effectively ruled over chiefs who had previously considered themselves their peers. In addition, while the existing chiefs were frequently appointed to their positions
(including P.I. Marealle (Stahl 1964: 335)), they had at least an historic claim to their rule, whereas the existence of the divisional chiefs had far weaker historic precedent (Samoff 1974: 20). It was the opposition to these divisional chiefs that would be consolidated to create the movement that would lead to the Paramount Chief.

In 1947, Petro Njau and Joseph Merinyo formed the Kilimanjaro Union out of branches of the African Association in Kilimanjaro, and formed the political wing, the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (KCCU) in 1949 (Iliffe 1979: 490-494). This was the commoner-led organisation that would agitate for the introduction of a Paramount Chief. Merinyo was previously the leader of the KNPA, and Petro Njau was another educated commoner. Working as a teacher at the time, Njau said in the 1920s, “I wish I could tear off this black skin of mine. We are every whit as good as the whiteman and as fit to control our own country.” (Njau, cited in Stuart-Watt 1930: 199). As leader of the KCCU, Njau placed his political position in neo-traditionalist terms (Iliffe 1979: 492). Hunter describes how Njau used reconstructions of the past to justify his view that political authority lay with the citizens. Thus, he sought the creation of a Paramount Chief who would support the citizens’ rights against the abuses of power by the chiefs (Hunter 2009: 158-160).

Njau’s KCCU was able to mobilise a broad range of support for the introduction of a Paramount Chief. Many of the chiefs on the Chagga Council too wanted a Paramount, although they preferred a chairman from the council voted in by themselves, while Njau’s KCCU argued for a popularly elected chief (Iliffe 1979: 492). The key issue that motivated the Chagga people, however, was land: 9,093 hectares of vihamba land that had been alienated for European use was due to be returned to Chagga use. The issue of how this land was to be redistributed, with accusations of the divisional chiefs abusing
their power, became one of the key issues (ibid.: 491). The KCCU having won the argument, the elections for the post of Paramount Chief occurred on 10\textsuperscript{th} November 1951. The KCCU had chosen as their candidate Thomas Marealle. T. Marealle was of royal blood. He was the grandson of the most famous chiefs of Kilimanjaro’s past, Marealle, ruler of the chiefdom of Marangu from c.1880 until his retirement in 1912 (Stahl 1964: 308-336). Prior to his selection as candidate by the KCCU, T. Marealle was not directly involved in Kilimanjaro’s active political scene. A promising civil servant, he was sent to the UK for university courses and eventually becoming programme director of the Dar es Salaam Broadcasting Station (Swahili Service) (Eckert 2006: 259-264). He stood against the three divisional chiefs of that time: Chief Abdiel Shangali of Hai, Chief John Maruma of Rombo, and Chief Petro Itosi Marealle of Vunjo. P.I. Marealle withdrew when it became clear that he stood little chance against his relative Thomas Marealle; Abdiel Shangali performed well in his home of Machame; but overall Thomas Marealle won a landslide victory with 15,661 of the 24,022 votes cast (Iliffe 1979: 493). He was inaugurated as Paramount Chief on the 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1952.

The period of the Paramount Chief ran from 1952 until 1960. This was, as Stahl describes it, a period of “Chagga self-awareness”:

The new regime rode on the crest of popular enthusiasm arising from victory. Employing as its watchword the unity of all the Chagga people, it accomplished much. The face of Chaggaland was changed. The fine new buildings of the Chagga Council and Paramountcy Lodge beside it, and of the coffee co-operative… were cheering sights for visiting Africans from all over the Continent. The Chagga took zest in the feeling that they themselves were achieving something new. (Stahl 1965: 48)

The texts that are the subject of this chapter were written at a time when there was a large political movement towards placing Kilimanjaro under a single leader for the first
time in its history. The unity discourse was strong, and would come to be developed through the Chagga nationalism under the Paramount Chief. I argue that the timing of the publication of *Maisha* and *Desturi* was one in which the imagination of Chagga ethnicity was not only of intellectual but also of urgent political concern.

**The Authors**

While both Sam Ntiro and Petro Itosi Marealle were male, well-educated elites, their personal histories stand in contrast to each other. Sam Ntiro (1923-1993), the author of *Desturi*, is best known as one of Tanzania’s finest artists. Ntiro was born in the chiefdom of Machame. As a painter, he spent much time studying and teaching at Makerere College, Uganda. Indeed, it was while he was at Makerere that *Desturi* was published. In 1950, while visiting Kenya along with his tutor Mrs Trowell the Head of Art at Makerere, he was invited to a cocktail party attended by white settlers. The host of the party said of Ntiro,

> The Dean of Makerere spoke at the Njoro Club recently about the educated Africans and none of us had ever met one. So when we heard you were bringing one to Mrs Grant’s, we thought we’d hold a party to meet him and see what he was like. We are all astonished. He is charming and so cultured and interesting. (Frost 1978: 78-79)

Ntiro’s post-independence career was spent in part in service to the Tanzanian state, and he was High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1961 until 1964, as well as producing public works of art such as the roundabouts in Arusha commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration.

Ntiro’s legacy in Tanzania rests upon his reputation as an artist, rather than his work *Desturi*. However, *Desturi* ties into his work as an artist. Ntiro’s painting frequently featured scenes of Chagga life on Kilimanjaro (Agthe 1994: 375). He has been described
as an artist who was “technically skilled in the use of Western academic methods to illustrate… traditional life” (Delaquis 1976: 50). This combination of the African society and the Western technique brings out similar themes in his writings.

The background of Petro Itosi Marealle (1906-1982), the author of *Maisha*, stands in sharp contrast to that of Nitro. P.I. Marealle was the son of Marealle, the chief of Marangu whose diplomatic skills with the German forces made Marangu one of the most important chiefdoms on Kilimanjaro. P.I. Marealle’s half-brother, Mlanga, initially took over from Marealle following his death in 1916, but proved to be a weak ruler and he was deposed by the British in 1932. P.I. Marealle took over as chief of Marangu at a young age (Stahl 1964: 335). By all accounts, P.I. Marealle proved a shrewd and capable ruler. While the chief of Machame, Abdiel Shangali, was the British favourite, P.I. Marealle remained an influential figure and maintained good relations with Abdiel Shangali (ibid.: 335).

As with Nitro, P.I. Marealle was well-educated. As the son of a chief, P.I. Marealle benefited from the policy of the British administration, who sought to educate the offspring of the traditional aristocracy in Tanganyika in an attempt to prevent members of an educated non-aristocratic class from undermining their authority (Buell 1928: 463-464). A central plank of this policy was the establishing of an elite school for the sons of chiefs at Tabora, modelled along the lines of Eton and Harrow (Stöger-Eising 2000: 128), at which P.I. Marealle spent time as a clerk (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 128). The most famous alumnus of the school at Tabora was Julius Nyerere, indicating a certain self-defeating element of the British policy of educating the children of traditional rulers. P.I. Marealle had become chief at a young age, and in the 1940s he was seen as one of the progressive chiefs on the council (Lindsey 1965: 55). Given P.I.
Marealle’s political ambition, it seems likely that the motives for writing his book were in part personal advancement. When the book was written, he had already attempted once to be made the first Paramount Chief, and would do so again after its publication. However, P.I. Marealle also had academic concerns. While Ntiro was working in East Africa’s leading academic institution, P.I. Marealle had excellent contact with researchers and anthropologists in his chiefdom on Kilimanjaro. His home was close to the noted anthropologist and educationalist Otto Raum. In 1934, Bronislaw Malinowski visited Kilimanjaro, writing in a letter to his wife,

Here I am among the Djangga who are among the most progressive of East Africa – all European dress, Christianity, new houses, cooperative societies etc… In the evenings I have here the chief [Petro Itosi Marealle] who is young, intelligent, keen on native custom and speaks good English. We discuss at times politics, at times anthropology. It will all make lots of difference to my grip on the subject I teach (Malinowski and Masson 1995: 200).

Malinowski later corresponded with P.I. Marealle, as reported to the legal anthropologist Sally Falk Moore, who also became close to P.I. Marealle (Moore 2006: 304).

The presentation of the authors in the paratextual elements of the texts themselves is important as it shows how the authors were presented as trusted authorities. *Maisha* contains introductory notes by European authorities that are presented to give the text authority. The Reverend Richard Reusch, of the Leipzig Mission (Cotton 1930: 102) and with many years experience on Kilimanjaro, writes in his introductory note, “only a Chagga Chief of the calibre of Chief Petro or Chief Heri-Abdiel of Machame will be able to obtain this material from those old men and women, a European or a young Chagga will never be able to collect it” (Marealle 2002 [1947]: xiv). His position as Chief was clearly one of the key elements that gave the work authority, although his
education also played a role (ibid.: xiii). For the case of Ntiro, it is purely through his educational background that his authority lies – his position at the respected university of Makerere is in a prominent place in his book (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: i).

I contend that the two authors stand in contrast to each other in a number of ways. The chiefdoms from which they originate, Machame and Marangu, were the subjects of the central political rivalry between chiefdoms of the mid-20th century – as seen by the rivalry between Chief Abdiel Shangali of Machame with both P.I. Marealle and Thomas Marealle over the Paramountcy, as well as the later conflict between Thomas Marealle and Solomon Eliufoo. Given the inter-chiefdom rivalries described in Chapter Two, it might be thought that this was the greatest difference between the two men. However, as this chapter will illustrate, within the context of the move towards Chagga unity and nationalism of this period, such intra-chiefdom rivalries had faded in importance. Of far more salience is the difference of their relationship to the institution of chieftaincy.

The analysis of Gramsci on the role of intellectuals is of relevance. Gramsci analyses intellectuals in terms of their place within social relations. He writes,

> Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. (Gramsci 1971: 15)

Gramsci (1971: 112) describes “organic” intellectuals as those that rose out of the “world of production”. Thus, in 19th century Europe, the bourgeoisie produced organic intellectuals through the capitalist entrepreneur and technical specialists (ibid: 5), whereas the proletariat produced its own intellectuals (Kurzman and Owens 2002: 66). This can be contrasted to the “traditional” intellectuals, who had no such links to the
world of production. In an example from colonial Tanganyika, Feierman (1990: 20-21) presents the Kilindi chiefs as traditional intellectuals. These chiefs viewed themselves as partially autonomous, and with some freedom as to which power blocks they chose to align themselves with, although in practice they usually compromised with the dominant social group.

Within this framework, I present Ntiro as an organic intellectual emerging from the new, wealthy class of Chagga who had emerged from the introduction of coffee. P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, is very much in the mould of the traditional intellectual, being part of the chiefly class on Kilimanjaro. Within fifteen years of his work being published, the chiefs were abolished, and from that point traditional intellectuals such as P.I. Marealle were doomed. The distinction drawn by Gramsci is a valuable one in this instance because the political project of both authors is the same; that is, presenting a view of a unified Chagga ethnicity. The differences between the authors emerge over the issue of traditional political authority.

**The Language of Publication**

The works *Maisha* and *Desturi* were not only works of intellectual endeavour, but *published* works. Publication is not a simple transition between the author and reader “[p]ublishing, or rather the horizon of the publishable, precedes and constitutes both what can be written and read” (Malik 2008: 709). Within the context of the colonial state, low literacy levels meant that the development of nationalistic or ethnic sentiment produced through print was inevitably conducted by elites (Hagen 1997: 110). Publication plays an important role in Benedict Anderson’s work on the rise of nations and nationalism in Europe and the imagined community. “What… made the
new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a
system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of
communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson 2006:
42-43). This interplay, Anderson argues (2006: 43), led to the diversities of spoken
vernaculars being assembled into a smaller number of print-languages.

Publication, then, is an essentially political act. In a post-colonial Tanzanian example,
Shetler (2002) discusses the ethical and political dilemmas she faced in deciding
whether to publish written versions of the oral histories she gathered in the Mara
region. Shetler argues that the transformation of oral traditions into a written form, and
particularly a published form, is a political act that takes power away from some
members of the community and puts it into the hands of literate men:

Written knowledge does away with the need of community
elders to imagine and shape the past as they discuss the case at
hand over beer. It destroys the context in which oral tradition
is preserved. Written histories demand conformity to one
“true” history rather than a host of different kinds of histories
told differently in different contexts, especially in a place where
published books are rare. (Shetler 2002: 419-420)

Shetler’s analysis is correct insofar as that publication creates an emphasis that favours
the literate elite. Yet her assertion that published histories create “one ‘true’ history”
denies the fact that texts exist in the context of ongoing debates about the past. Where
multiple textual accounts exist, the texts exist within a state of competition in which
“the memory of the past becomes a political tool” (Macola 2001: 194). The competing
visions on Kilimanjaro and the way in which various texts are used is discussed further
by Hunter (2009).

Desturi was first published by the East African Literature Bureau under its Eagle Press
imprint. The East African Literature Bureau was a publishing enterprise established in
1948 by the East Africa High Commission with a developmental aim to produce texts for the increasing number of literate East Africans (Richards 1960: 536-539). Desturi was the first of their series Desturi na Masimulizi Katika Africa ya Masahriki – Customs and Tradition in East Africa (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: iii). The series went on to publish ethnohistories on various other ethnic groups, including Mnyampala’s work on the Gogo (Mnyampala 1995 [1954]). A Publisher’s Note (in both English and Swahili) appeared at the beginning of each book in the series (Geider 2002: 269), I quote here from the note at the start of Desturi:

[The series examines the customs and traditions which are still a living part of the social structure in most parts of East Africa. The series Custom and Tradition in East Africa, of which this volume is the first to be published, provides the means for African students and authors to explore this field as few Europeans can, to place on record for present and future students some of the customs with which they are familiar, and to preserve ancient oral tradition, which in this new age is not being handed on from elder to younger in the manner customary in days gone by… This series is designed to give young Africans as well as members of other races, an opportunity to study local history, traditions and customs, a study which, based as it is on a ‘concentrate of past experience’ can help in the building up of the balanced attitude to the complexities of modern life which a young nation must have if its achievements are to match its ideals. (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: iii)

The reference to “young nation” refers to the Tanganyikan state as a colonised nation consisting of a variety of ethnic groups, but it was easy for nationalists to understand this as a reference to an independent nation (Geider 2002: 269). I argue that there are striking similarities between the justification expressed in this introduction and the reasoning behind the introduction of indirect rule described by Cameron above.

Language is usually considered to be of great importance for the imagination of ethnicity. Yet both Desturi and Maisha are written in Swahili as was common for ethnohistories written in this period (Geider 2002). By the time the texts were
published, Swahili was already well established as the lingua franca of the territory.

Under German rule, after their failure to promote the German language in their colony, Swahili became the language of administration, the military and business (Pike 1986). By the time the British took over after the First World War, Swahili was well established as both a lingua franca and a medium of instruction in schools (Whiteley 1956: 348). The first Swahili newspaper, *Kivetu*, was established in 1937 (Scotton 1978: 1-6). Swahili had become the language used for all non-English publications by Africans in the territory, including ethnohistories. Maddox (1995: 5) points out the irony of this, as Swahili would ultimately serve the purposes of Tanganyikan nationalism. Anderson describes how print-capitalism assembled vernaculars into the print-languages that “laid the bases for national consciousnesses”. Print-languages created “unified fields of exchange and communication” that brought different readers of the same language together to form “the embryo of the nationally imagined community” (Anderson 2006: 44). Thus, this produces the irony that Maddox discusses: the use of Swahili in an ethnohistory that promotes one identity ends up promoting another.

There are clues within the acknowledgments of *Maisha* that tie the author’s use of Swahili with the colonial regime’s language policy. P.I. Marealle, as well as thanking the assistance of Swahili teachers at the Teacher’s Training School in Marangu, also thanks the East African Inter-Territorial Language Committee who helped correct the Swahili in the work and gave it their approval (Marealle 2002 [1947]: xii). This committee was established in 1930 by the colonial governments to establish a common Swahili dialect across the territories of Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda. The committee contained representatives of the government and missionaries from each of the territories (Broomfield 1931: 85), with seemingly no involvement of Africans. The aim
of the committee was to establish a uniform Swahili dialect across the British empire in East Africa, as well as the aims of the missionary component who saw the debates as having “the desirable end of making Swahili a medium for introducing African peoples into the modern mental world of Europe” (Roehl 1930: 200). It was this committee that established the Zanzibari dialect of Swahili as the standard across East Africa, a privileged position that it retains to the present. P.I. Marealle sought to fit his work within this project of the colonial government, praising the work of the committee. P.I. Marealle is linking his work closely to the language policy of the administration.

While Swahili was the lingua franca and the standard choice for published works, there is still an element of choice in the use of this language. Anderson (2006: 44) makes the claim that, of 16th century Europe, “[t]hen and now the bulk of mankind is monoglot”. This was not true of Kilimanjaro of the 1950s, as a large number of individuals would know Swahili, a vernacular Chagga language, and – in the case of elites such as Ntiro and P.I. Marealle at least – English. After 1945, a commentator observed that an “antagonism” between Swahili and the vernacular tongue had begun to emerge amongst Haya, Nyamwezi, Sukuma and Chagga, with some members of these groups pushing for the use of the vernacular and English (Whiteley 1956: 349). However, I argue that there were factors that prevented the ethnohistories being presented in a vernacular Chagga dialect. The differences between Chagga dialects made effective communication

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23 The debates on the committee over the form that the language would take were quite intense over the issue as to how man words of Arabic origin would be allowed in the official dialect of Swahili (Roehl 1930; Broomfield 1931). The eventual choice to allow words of Arabic origin into the language also has post-colonial relevance; the author Abdallah Khalid argues in favour of the Mombassa dialect, referred to as the “true Swahili language”, as opposed to Zanzibari Swahili, “the debased lingua franca form of our language, created by Arabs under Arab rule” (Khalid 1977: 120).

24 There is evidence that it was not true for the 16th century that most people were monoglot (Wogan 2001), and on a global level presently there are more multilingual than monolingual people (Skutnabb-Kangas 1995: 41).
about complex political issues impossible. During the discussions between the chiefs over the establishment of a Paramount in 1934, the discussions were conducted in Swahili (Iliffe 1979: 331). There was enough uniformity during the Chagga nationalism of the paramountcy in the 1950s to produce a Chagga motto for the flag and an anthem in a Chagga dialect. However, more complex political debate or complex negotiations proved impossible:

After the recent election of a Paramount Chief, the question arose as to what language the newly constituted Chaga nation should speak. None of the members of the dialect-cluster which makes up Chaga have been anxious for their particular dialect to be submerged, and it may be that it will be found necessary to displease everyone a little by using Swahili, rather than displease one section a great deal by using the dialect of another. (Whiteley 1956: 352)

Publishing an ethnohistory in a Chagga vernacular would limit the audience for the work, making publication less commercially viable, a factor acknowledged in Anderson’s work on print-capitalism (Anderson 2006: 43). More importantly, however, was the project of both texts of portraying a unified Chagga identity. It is my contention that writing in one Chagga dialect would not only limit the audience to one part of the mountain, it would also essentially promote one identity over another. The irony highlighted by Maddox is only amplified in the Chagga case: in order to promote Chagga unity, it was necessary to not use a Chagga dialect.

**The Structure of the Texts**

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25 The lyrics of the Chagga anthem were: “Uka Kibong’oto mpaka Usseri/Lukundanyi woose, woose bin./Iruva nalutarame Kilimanjaro Chagga Council,/Iruva nalutarame Kilimanjaro Chagga Council”. In English, “From Kibongo to Usseri/We Chagga people love one another/May the lord continue to bless the Kilimanjaro Chagga Council/May the lord continue to bless the Kilimanjaro Chagga Council.” This anthem was sung in schools from the 1950s up until the end of 1960 (Kileo 2005: 82-83).
The main text of *Desturi* is divided into three sections: *Kabla ya Wazungu* (Before the Europeans) (pages 1-22); *Ustaarabu wa Wazungu* (The Civilisation of the Europeans) (pages 22-41) and *Siku Zijazo* (The Days Ahead) (pages 42-50). In a similar way to the European texts discussed in the previous chapter, *Desturi* begins with a description of the peak of Kilimanjaro and the beauty of the mountain (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 1-3).

“*Kibo ni mlima weny e kupendeza macho*” (Kibo is a mountain that delights the eyes) (ibid.: 2). A structural oddity in *Desturi* is the placement of the section describing the *kihamba* banana garden. Rather than being placed at the point of the description of the landscape of Kilimanjaro at the start of the text, Ntiro places his discussion on the nature and importance of the *kihamba* in his final section describing contemporary concerns in Kilimanjaro (ibid.: 46-47). This placement emphasises the role of the *kihamba* in contemporary Chagga life: the *kihamba* was considered not part of the historical past, nor part of the natural beauty of the mountain, but rather part of the everyday life of the contemporary Chagga person.

The title of P.I. Marealle’s book begins with *Maisha ya* – “Life of” – a common phrase in the titles of colonial Swahili biographies (Topan 1997: 303). As such, it has been considered a biography, not of an individual but of an ideal Chagga life; “marking the life-cycle stages of an ideal tribesman… the idea of *maisha* ‘life’ as the biography of a collectivity emerges here” (Geider 2002: 269). *Maisha*’s first six chapters follow that of a biography, describing the life of a Chagga person from birth until burial, before he goes on to outline Chagga religious beliefs, witchcraft and Chagga fables. The final section concerns the interaction between foreigners and Chagga people on Kilimanjaro. The structure of the first six chapters seems to me to be reminiscent of the 1940 work *Chaga Childhood* by the European anthropologist and educationalist Otto Raum. This work follows the structure of *Maisha* in that it follows the lifecycle of a Chagga person from
conception and birth through to death and burial (Raum 1967 [1940]). Raum
conducted his research while based for many years at the Teacher’s Training School26
(ibid.: 56), close to P.I. Marealle’s home.

I argue that the content of P.I. Marealle’s work does, in some ways, distinguish him
from an earlier chiefly tradition. As described by Ntiro (1972 [1953]: 13-17), in earlier
times the chief was a figure characterised by a great deal of secrecy: he was not often
seen in public by the poorer members of society, and even the death of a chief was
sometimes kept secret to avoid attacks from rival chiefdoms. It was often considered
advisable for commoners to keep their dealings with the chief secret, as in the famous
Chagga proverb, “Mangi kakuwika ambo, rika ngumwonyi” (If the Chief gives you a ring,
hide it in your clothing.) (Dundas 1924: 345). Shetler (2002: 419) notes, of her work in
the Mara region of Tanzania, that issues surrounding initiation ceremonies is of
particular relevance to the balance of power between groups with regard to the
publishing of previously secret information. P.I. Marealle, however, openly describes
elements of the teaching given to initiates in the period of seclusion following the
circumcision ceremony (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 40-42). Some secrets could be told by
P.I. Marealle because they were no longer relevant: he describes how twelve sons of
prominent people would be chosen to be taught the secrets of the chief and the location
of his hidden treasure in case the chief had to flee due to war; the introduction of native
treasuries made such teachings no longer necessary. In another example, in the past
(according to Maisha, twenty years ago) there existed a fiction within Chagga
households that during the male initiation the anus was sealed with a plug known as
ngoso, meaning that an adult Chagga male did not defecate or produce flatulence (see
also (Raum 1967 [1940]: 318-319; Moore 1976)). During the period of seclusion

26 Now Marangu Teachers’ Training College
following circumcision, initiates were told the truth that this was a fiction, and taught ways of maintaining the fiction within the household. P.I. Marealle openly describes the secret about a fiction that was once performed in every Chagga household, according to P.I. Marealle’s reckoning, within his lifetime. This openness with what was once a closely-guarded secret reveals, I argue, the changing role of the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro. The chief had moved from a secretive figure, spending much time hidden from the populace, to a much more public role. Thomas Marealle’s role as Paramount, for instance, was of a man appearing to be very much a public leader.

**Chagga Unity**

Both *Maisha* and *Desturi* attempt to portray a view of a single, united Chagga ethnicity. This is not such a straightforward task, as within what is now known as the Chagga ethnic group there exists much variety; linguistic, historical and political divides create a diverse sense of Chagga ethnicity. During my fieldwork, after I would tell both informants and other Tanzanians that I was researching the Chagga ethnic group, by far the most common follow-up question from them was whether they were a single ethnic group. Nevertheless, both *Maisha* and *Desturi* come up with very similar descriptions, and to an extent definitions, of the Chagga ethnic group, and ways of explaining the diversity within Chagga ethnicity.

P.I. Marealle describes, and to an extent defines, the Chagga ethnic group simply: "*Wachagga ni watu wanaokaa kwenye mtelemko wa upande wa kusini wa mlima wa Kilimanjaro.*" (Wachagga are people who live on the southern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro) (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 118). He does not go into detail about the origins of these people, yet it is not correct to state, as Hunter does, that P.I. Marealle
“present[s] the Chagga as a unified group who had always lived on the slopes of Kilimanjaro” (Hunter 2009: 157). He writes earlier in the book, at the start of the section on marriage, “Wachaga ni watu wa kabila moja lenye watu wa koo za asili mbalimbali” (Chagga are people of one tribe with people of clans of various origins) (Marealle 2002 [1947]: 46). This variety of origins, P.I. Marealle tells us, leads the people in different places to have various different traditions, but marriage between different parts of Kilimanjaro means that over time the differences become less. Counter to Hunter’s argument that P.I. Marealle accepts nothing other than complete unity of a people who have lived on Kilimanjaro for an eternity, P.I. Marealle accepts a variety of origins for the various clans of Kilimanjaro. Ntiro writes in a very similar way about the variety on Kilimanjaro; “Kabila la Kichagga lilikuwa na koo nyingi – The Chagga tribe was many clans” (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 17). Accepting the variety between clans on Kilimanjaro is, for both P.I. Marealle and Ntiro, a very effective technique. It is a way of admitting that there is a variety of origins, histories and traditions on Kilimanjaro. At the same time, I argue that it diminishes the variations to the level of the clan, rather than as potential ethnicities.

While P.I. Marealle’s treatment of Chagga ethnogenesis is vague, Ntiro has a more detailed account. He describes many neighbouring ethnic groups coming to Kilimanjaro from neighbouring areas, including Sambaa, Pare, Meru and Kilindi: “Makabila haya yote yalipokwisha ingia Kilimanjaro, ndipo jina la Wachagga lilipoanza. Nchi nzima ilikuwa na sehemu 22, na kila sehemu ilikuwa na “mangi” wake” (When these tribes all finished entering Kilimanjaro, the name Chagga began. Within the entire country there were 22

27 Despite the spelling of Chagga with a double g in the title of the book, in most of the text of *Maisha* P.I. Marealle spells the name with a single g. This is the opposite of Makule’s *Asili ya Wachaga ya Baadhi ya Koo Zao* (2003), where, despite the title Chagga is spelt with a double g in the main text.
areas, and every area had its own chief) (ibid.: 6). Ntiro thus has more of a description of the population movements that would produce the Chagga ethnic group, but ultimately his idea of what makes the Chagga is the same as P.I. Marealle’s. It is an understanding of Chagga ethnicity based purely on the place Kilimanjaro.

Further to the project of both authors of presenting a unified Chagga ethnicity, they also seek to present an inclusive Chagga ethnicity. Neither work is attempting to play power games in the intra-Chagga political conflicts, despite the authors being from chiefdoms that were fierce rivals during this period. It is through their presentation of history and conflict within Kilimanjaro that the works show their greatest attempts at presenting an inclusive Chagga ethnicity. History plays a key role in the imagination of ethnic identities. “Modern ethnic or minority identity is commonly sought through historicist argument: the present is understood by reference to the past, and the interpretation of the past is made to generate the present” (McDonald 1986: 333). Narratives of the past are of great cultural importance, and so these narratives are frequently a contested area. This makes the lack of detailed presentations by both texts all the more remarkable.

*Desturi* has a section on the pre-colonial conflicts in Kilimanjaro, “*Vita kati ya Wachagga Wenyewe*” (Chagga Civil Wars) (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 6-9). He puts the weight of these conflicts on the disputes and jealousy between rival Chagga chiefs. However, this section is noticeably lacking in detail. He mentions no chiefs or chiefdoms by name, nor does he offer any kind of timeframe. The acknowledgement that conflicts did exist is more detailed than in *Maisha*, where there is no mention of intra-Chagga conflict. The key clash presented in *Maisha* is between European and Chagga civilisations. It is only once European contact with Kilimanjaro begins that P.I. Marealle begins to use names
and dates, whereas such details are not present in earlier parts of the book. The lack of detail in both works is striking when compared to the works of European authors from this period. I argue that the reason for this lack of detail is that for Ntiro and P.I. Marealle it was not possible to give a more detailed description of intra-Chagga conflict. How could Ntiro, a Machame resident, provide an account of the Machame-Kibosho conflict that would not alienate one group? How could P.I. Marealle present an account of his father that did not alienate the chiefdoms that Marealle used the German military might to crush? During this period, I argue, the sensitivities of the intra-Chagga conflicts meant that they had to turn to outsiders for accounts of their own history if Chagga unity was to be maintained.

A comparison between these Chagga ethnohistories and those of the Yoruba from West Africa draws the nature of the unity discourse into sharper focus. Like the Chagga ethnic group, Yoruba identity had several potential foci of identity amongst various smaller cultural or political groupings, and it was far from self-evidently inevitable that it was the Yoruba language grouping that would become the primary ethnic identity (Law 1996: 65). Yoruba intellectuals published many works, most notably Samuel Johnson’s nearly 700-page work *The History of the Yoruba, from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate*, published in 1921. This work was of key importance in the imagination of Yoruba identity, “through which the Yoruba have come to know themselves” (Peel 1989: 198). Johnson’s work, however, presents a particular view of Yoruba identity: one of a Christian identity that favoured Johnson’s own grouping within the Yoruba, the Oyo (ibid.). Johnson’s work stimulated rival accounts from authors from other Yoruba sub-groups, such that by the 1940s over 20 books and pamphlets on local history had been printed (Law 1996: 55). The diversity within Yoruba identity means that comparisons can be made to Chagga identity,
although how this subsequently played out in the printed word took on a very different character. Unlike the Yoruba, rather than providing accounts of Chagga identity that favour their particular subgroup, both *Maisha* and *Daima* attempt to be inclusive in their imagination of Chagga ethnicity.

**Community and Ujamaa**

Both texts discuss the role of community and working together, features of Chagga society of which both texts show approval. Ntiro describes how, within the clan (*ukoo*) people performed many tasks together – helping each other with problems, the brewing of beer, and the building of houses. “*Watu wa ukoo mmoja walijisaidia wenyewe kwa kila njia*” (People of one *ukoo* they helped each other through every means) (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 19). Through marriage, Ntiro argues, the members of different clans came together. P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, has a far more detailed description of the sense of a Chagga community, of what he refers to as *ujamaa*. It is P.I. Marealle’s conception of *ujamaa* upon which the rest of this subsection focuses.

*Ujamaa* is a term best-known as the Swahili word that Nyerere would later use to describe his model of African Socialism. Nyerere translates it’s meaning in 1962 as “familyhood” (Nyerere 1962b: 170), although it is a word with no precise English translation (Stöger-Eising 2000: 130). This lack of a precise translation would have appealed to P.I. Marealle, as he believed that the concept of *ujamaa* was one that did not exist in European society:

> Wachaga walifanya kazi zote kwa *ujamaa*, na mazao ya kazi hizo yalitumiwa kwa *ujamaa* pia. Hivi hapakuwako mtu aliyekosa kupata baraka ya *ujamaa* huo. Ustaarabu wa kigeni, hasa wa Kizungu, haupatani na *ujamaa* na namna hii (Wachaga did all work with *ujamaa*, and the products of this work was used with *ujamaa* also. Thus, a person without an error gets the blessing
Out of this lack of a European conception of *ujamaa* came the clash between European and Chagga civilisations (ibid.: 121).

Coming across a reference to *ujamaa* as a broader feature of an African society a decade before Nyerere wrote on the subject invites comparisons. Of course, there are essential differences between the writings of one of Africa’s most notable socialists and a leader of one of Tanganyika’s most capitalist ethnic groups: Nyerere puts a great emphasis on the damage caused by capitalism, class and excess individual wealth (for example, Nyerere 1962b); P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, places emphasis on the hierarchical structure of *ujamaa*. However, there are also striking similarities between the work of the two men. For both, *ujamaa* is a kinship metaphor, expanded to include those outside of the immediate family circle (Nyerere 1962b: 170; Marealle 2002 [1947]: 121). *Ujamaa* is understood not only as an actual characteristic of traditional society, but also as a normative dimension of the direction that society must take, combining both *ujamaa* and aspects of European modes of thought. For example, Nyerere (1968: 2) writes “We are doing this by emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organisation, and extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century world.” P.I. Marealle (2002 [1947]: 121) writes too of combining *ujamaa* with the good aspects of European culture as the main challenge facing Chagga society.

The other aspect of similarities between Nyerere and P.I. Marealle is that both works were written at key moments in their political careers – both men were, after all, politicians as well as scholars. Nyerere wrote the first important formulation of his
ideas, *Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism*, during the period in 1962 when he had resigned as Prime Minister in order to focus upon building TANU as an effective political organisation. The ideology of *ujamaa* would become key in that project (Pratt 1976: 114-121). P.I. Marealle, on the other hand, was still aiming to become the Paramount Chief. Both men had the aims of uniting their peoples behind an ideology. As Sprinzak observes, this is a theme that runs through the works of many African socialist leaders: “By universalising the communal character of traditional society, African leaders are not seeking support for indigenous institutions, but wish rather to deploy their deeply-rooted social orientations for new and broader national purposes” (Sprinzak 1973: 645). The P.I. Marealle example shows that this was not limited to post-independence socialist leaders, but was also present in the works of pre-independence nation-builders.

The presence of a Chagga concept of *ujamaa* has an impact on our understanding of Nyerere’s own political thought. A debate within the literature is whether Nyerere’s political philosophy was able to appeal to the people through its presentation of the myth of the past; Lofchie (1976: 488) argues that Nyerere’s philosophy would not appeal to the broad Tanzanian society as it would not appeal to the life-experiences of the Tanzania people. Metz (1982: 381) on the other hand argues that the appeal to a past set of egalitarian values is powerful precisely because it does not correspond to those life-experiences. The presence of a Chagga conception of *ujamaa* shows that the idea did have a broad appeal across Tanzanian society. This is particularly true when the very different societies from which Nyerere and P.I. Marealle emerged are considered.
Stöger-Eising (2000: 130) argues that Nyerere’s political philosophy arose through his background as a member of the Zanaki ethnic group. Zanaki society is understood as being an egalitarian, acephalous society (ibid.), very different from Chagga society with its strong institution of chieftaincy. Of course, Nyerere himself never claimed his philosophy was specifically Zanaki but rather African. The presence of the Chagga *ujamaa* adds to the strength of this position. However, it also serves to illustrate Bienen’s (1970: 252) point that the *ujamaa* philosophy was imprecise and it could lead to a multiplicity of government policies. This is particularly true when considering Nyerere’s own leadership style: while the *writings* of Nyerere might reflect an acephalous, Zanaki concept of *ujamaa*, his leadership frequently bordered on the authoritarian that reflects a more Chagga form of *ujamaa*.

**The Institution of Chieftaincy**

The key difference between *Maisha* and *Desturi* is the role of the institution of chieftaincy contained within the texts. Perhaps unsurprisingly given his background, P.I. Marealle goes to some lengths to establish the importance of the chief within the Chagga sense of *ujamaa*. Ntiro, on the other hand, places a great emphasis on the democratic aspects of the chieftaincy.

The important step that *Maisha* takes is in tying the chief to the family through the concept of *ujamaa*. P.I. Marealle (2002 [1947]: 121) writes, “*Ukichungulia historia ya ujamaa wa Kichaga utanona ya kwamba umaanzia nyumbani, kisha ndani ya koo, na kilele chake ujamaa huo ni umangi wa nchi.*” (If you look at the history of Chagga *ujamaa*, you will see that you begin at home, then inside the clan, and at the peak of that is the chieftdom of the country). Thus, there is a pyramid from the home, above that the clan,
and finally the chiefdom. This not only places the chiefdom, and by extension the chief, in an exalted position, but also places the chief as part of the family. Support for P.I. Marealle’s interpretation is reflected in the later anthropology on Kilimanjaro. Sally Falk Moore (1986: 59) describes the Chagga chief as the “universal kinsman”. A man was required to share a slaughtered animal or brewed beer within the lineage, and so too he could ask members of his lineage for meat or beer for a ritual occasion. A chief could claim from his subjects cattle, goats, beer and labour; “this was done in a kinship metaphor, an analogy to the obligation of one kinsmen to another” (Moore 1986: 59). I argue that this is the idea that is expressed through P.I. Marealle’s description of *ujamaa*.

*Maisha*’s presentation of the chieftaincy could hardly place it in a stronger position. It lies in a central place both within *ujamaa* – both the family itself, and this central idea of the Chagga worldview. As P.I. Marealle argues that *ujamaa* is not present amongst the Europeans, it follows from his argument that the chieftaincy itself is not European but Chagga. This is of great importance in the political situation of the time. With the creation of divisional chiefs on Kilimanjaro, a move with little historical precedent, the institution of the chieftaincy was under threat of being described as a foreign imposition. Given that there is reason to believe that P.I. Marealle wrote his work sometime prior to 1947, he is perhaps not referring directly to his status as divisional chief. Yet he himself was installed as Mangi by the British administration, so he was potentially in a weakened position.

Ntiro, on the other hand, places an emphasis on the democratic aspects of the chieftaincy. He does concede that historically the chief played an important role in almost all aspects of the lives of people (Ntiro 1972 [1953]: 17), yet Ntiro places great
emphasis on the freedom and choice in the selection of Chagga leadership – chieftaincy, in his view, is essentially democratic. He writes, “Wachagga wanapenda uhuru wa kuchagua “mangi” wao. (Chagga love the freedom of choosing their chief) (ibid.: 46). In particular, he describes the political development of the last previous few years, the problems with the divisional chiefs, and how an elected Paramount has improved the situation. Ntiro ends the section with the expression that the future would have more democracy and choice; “miaka ijayo bila shaka utawala wa Kichagga utakuwa na uhuru kuliko sasa.” (in future years, without a doubt, the government of Chagga will have freedom compared to now) (ibid.: 46). This statement is easy to read as a proto-nationalist expression of freedom. It also has ideas that are very similar to Petro Njau’s KCCU. With the emphasis on freedom and the beneficial nature of change, Ntiro’s conception is markedly different from P.I. Marealle’s reliance on tradition.

Two very different ideas about the chieftaincy emerge from these two authors. Under P.I. Marealle’s conception, it would seem almost impossible to eliminate the chief without the destruction of the Chagga way of life. For Ntiro, democratic leadership for Kilimanjaro was the important factor. As I go on to show, the post-independence abolition of chieftaincy occurred smoothly in Kilimanjaro; in fact, Chagga people themselves voted out the Paramount Chief in favour of an elected President. I argue that the two competing elite conceptions of Chagga ethnicity highlighted in this chapter provides a valuable insight into how this occurred.

By the late fifties, the popularity of Thomas Marealle personally and the position of the Paramount Chief had begun to decline. Thomas Marealle was increasingly seen as arrogant and abusing his position. In one incident, Thomas Marealle took offence at the way in which students heading to Makerere had allegedly snubbed him, and forced the
students in front of the Chagga Council with *masale* plants to beg forgiveness. Amongst those students was Edwin Mtei, future Minister of Finance and governor of the Bank of Tanzania; he writes of the incident, “the Mangi Mkuu did not endear himself to the future political leaders of Tanganyika” (Mtei 2009: 38). A weakness of the constitution of the Chagga Council was that there was no mechanism for replacing or deposing a sitting chief; presumably, Thomas Marealle was elected for life (Lindsey 1965: 75).

At the same time, TANU was becoming an increasing force in Tanganyika. TANU did not want to be seen to be directly involved in an internal ethnic conflict; TANU’s 1954 founding document had called for a united nation, strongly opposed to ethnic or tribal divisions (Feierman 1990: 225-226). However, the principle Chagga party opposed to the paramountcy, the Chagga Democratic Party (CDP), has been described as “TANU in an ethnic robe”28 (Mramba, cited in Iliffe 1979: 568). The paramountcy debate was a pressing one for Nyerere and TANU, as the successes that the Chagga Council brought had proven influential on other ethnic groups in Tanganyika (Iliffe 1979: 569). Nyerere was keen to present an example of the rejection of chiefly rule by the local people concerned (Samoff 1974: 22).

When Thomas Marealle attempted to gain additional powers, including making the position of Paramount Chief hereditary, he also attracted the opposition of the divisional chiefs. The pro-Marealle KCCU attempted to oust the divisional chiefs from office, a move that failed and in the subsequent elections of 1958 anti-Paramountcy candidates won all the councillor’s seats on the Council. This resulted in deadlock between Marealle and the Council, and the British administration saw no choice but to

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28 Bienen notes that the later operative myths of TANU was that its origins lay in the TAA and cooperative societies. However, he argues that ethnic unions did in fact play a role, citing the case of the Bukoba Buhaya Union (Bienen 1970: 24-25).
hold the 1960 referendum on the abolition of the chieftaincy (Twining 1960). The referendum of 1960 resulted in a majority of eight to one in favour of a President over a Paramount Chief (Iliffe 1979: 568). The Chagga people rejected the Paramount Chief in favour of a commoner from Machame, Solomon Eliufoo. After independence, the Makerere-educated Eliufoo was appointed Nyerere’s minister for education in February 1962, a post he held for many years (Pratt 1976: 51). P.I. Marealle was appointed acting President of the Chagga Council (Stahl 1969: 220). He was at last leader of the Chagga Council, but only for a brief few months. The Chagga Council was abolished months later, and in 1963 the African Chiefs Ordinance (Repeal) Act stripped chiefs of all official powers and responsibilities in the administrative and legal systems of Tanganyika (Pratt 1976: 194, 285n142). The transition was achieved remarkably smoothly.

The texts that are the subject of this chapter provide an insight into the intellectual background to this change. The justification for the institution of chieftaincy provided by P.I. Marealle proved to be easily wiped away. However, the competing idea of the democratic basis of Chagga ethnicity provided by Ntiro proved more durable. The traditional elite, and with it the traditional intellectuals such as P.I. Marealle, were destroyed along with the end of British administration. There remained, however, an imagination of Chagga ethnicity from the organic intellectual of the non-chieftainly elite who were now in a dominant position on Kilimanjaro. Thus, the type of elite typified by Ntiro provided a continued imagination of Chagga ethnicity. The imagination of Chagga ethnicity, I argue, lay not only in the pomp and ceremony of the Paramount Chief, nor in the strong role of the chieftaincy described by P.I. Marealle. Rather, the ideas portrayed by Ntiro would prove far more durable. Of course, Chagga ethnicity would play a very different role in the Independent – and detribalised – Tanzania, as
later chapters will discuss. Yet it continued to have relevance and salience in the newly Independent state.

**Conclusion**

The intellectual imaginations of Chagga ethnicity presented in this chapter illustrate a breadth to the project of imagining the Chagga group. The authors were of different backgrounds, both in terms of coming from rival chiefdoms and also from differing elite backgrounds. The fact that they came from rival chiefdoms, and yet both presented a project of Chagga unity, indicates that the intra-chiefdom rivalries described in Chapter Two had been subsumed by a broader idea of Chagga ethnicity. Yet I argue that the conflict between the traditional intellectual P.I. Marealle, and the organic intellectual from the new wealthy elite on Kilimanjaro, Ntiro, is played out in their pages. The elimination of the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro – not only achieved through government edict but by the Chagga rejecting the institution through a democratic vote – ended the power of the traditional elite.

Kileo describes the fate of the chiefs of Kilimanjaro as “From Chiefs to Paupers”:

> Times have really changed for Chagga Chiefs. There are no more guarantees of free alcohol ‘mbenge’, no more songs in praise of the chiefs, no more goats ‘ndafu’ and no more gifts of the fattest bull. Life has become a nightmare for Kilimanjaro’s few remaining traditional figureheads. (Kileo 2005: 135)

P.I. Marealle’s life was not so difficult following the abolition of the chieftaincy. As the next chapter will illustrate, the more powerful chiefs, including P.I. Marealle and Thomas Marealle, had a comfortable life following independence. Potential rivals to Nyerere’s government were frequently awarded with postings abroad. However, as Nyerere turned towards a socialist direction for Tanzania, the more important rivals
came not from a now-defunct traditional elite, but rather the capitalist-orientated Chagga elite.
Chapter 4: Nationalism, Ujamaa and the Chagga Elite

After Tanzania achieved independence in 1961, members of the Chagga elite were in a position to take up important and powerful positions in the new state. Just as the 1950s had seen work put towards the imagining of Chagga ethnicity, now many members of the Chagga elite set about the work of imagining the Tanzanian nation. However, the relationship between Kilimanjaro and the Tanzanian state was not always smooth. Particularly after 1967, as Tanzania moved in a more decisively socialist direction, relations between the capitalistic Chagga and the state were sometimes strained. Despite the aim of equalising development across Tanzania, this chapter argues that members of the Chagga elite were able to stay in a strong and powerful position in Tanzanian society.

It is a truism that, in most postcolonial African states, those ethnic groups that received the most advantages during the colonial period were left in an advantageous position after independence. Nevertheless, I argue that it is still informative to examine a particular case – that of Chagga in Tanzania – in more detail. The Tanzanian case is of particular interest as a state praised for its unity and stability. A 1999 edited collection, *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution*, contains a chapter on how Zimbabwe and
Tanzania had been successful in maintaining peace through containing potential conflict (Dashwood and Pratt 1999). Writing in 1999, as well as praising the successes of Tanzania, Dashwood and Pratt praise Zimbabwe’s “relative [success] in maintaining both political and economic stability” (ibid.: 224). Subsequent events in Zimbabwe have arguably shown these claims of the stability of Zimbabwe to be flawed. While Tanzania does not face the same issues that developed later in Zimbabwe, the example of the Dashwood and Pratt chapter is an example of how the divisions that remain in a society can remain despite the apparent stability.

Much of the direction that Tanzania was taking is expressed through the writings of President Julius Nyerere who served from 1962 until 1985. In his view, “the ideal society is based on human equality and on a combination of the freedom and unity of its members” (Nyerere 1966: 8). This chapter provides a new interpretation of how the attempt to introduce such a society in Tanzania resulted in certain gaps between these concepts, and how the attempts to pursue the causes of equality and unity resulted in the ability of Chagga people to retain the advantages they had moving into the post-colonial period. Key to this, I argue, is migration; particularly international migration with regard to the elite. This is closely linked to specifically Chagga norms of land inheritance and migration.

**Migration and the kihamba**

Past norms of Chagga land inheritance developed to encourage migration. A distinction is drawn in the norms of Chagga inheritance between the *kihamba* – the banana grove within which the Chagga man and his wife build their home – and the *shamba* farmland producing mainly maize further down the mountain (Moore 1986: 82-84). It is the
*kihamba* that contains the Chagga man’s home for himself and his wife; it is also where a Chagga person hopes one day to be buried. In the inheritance of *kihamba* land, the father had an obligation to provide a developed *kihamba* for his eldest son upon his marrying, whereas the youngest son would eventually inherit the father’s own *kihamba* (Moore 1986: 82-83). Thus, middle sons were left without any inherited *kihamba* land. They were expected to find their own *kihamba*, either through their brothers or inlaws, or most commonly through clearing bush to form a new *kihamba* (Moore 1986: 83; Setel 1999: 43). As the population increased and land became scarcer in Kilimanjaro’s *kihamba* belt, this presented a growing issue of landless middle sons. By the 1950s, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the middle sons to find new lands to settle (Munger 1952: 181-182), necessitating many to seek their fortunes beyond Kilimanjaro. Land shortage was a large push-factor for out-migration from Kilimanjaro. By 1957, members of the Chagga ethnic group were found in every region of Tanganika save one. “All this for members of a cultural group that was known to stigmatise any land off and away from Mount Kilimanjaro as uniformly unfit for habitation by decent human beings” (Setel 1999: 68).

However, I present the argument that elite migration was not due to landlessness. As the examples in this chapter illustrate, the elites in question may have lived elsewhere in Tanzania or abroad, yet maintained a *kihamba* back in Kilimanjaro. Von Clemm (1964: 104) observed that absentee *kihamba* land ownership was noted as a growing phenomenon back in the 1960s. International travel for Chagga people was older29, and had at times proved to be an influential force. Hans Meyer reported in 1891 that Chief

29 One informant claimed that the number of Chagga who travelled to Europe for education declined after independence, particularly after the introduction of Education for Self-Reliance placed the emphasis on primary education, because state scholarships to study abroad stopped (Fieldnotes, 16/8/2005). However, I did not manage to find any evidence supporting this claim.
Rindi had sent Chagga envoys to the Kaiser in Germany, along with a gift of an elephant tusk (Meyer 1891: 89, 97, 102). Meyer met the returned envoys during his time in Rindi’s chiefdom, viewing them with some distaste as they begged while at the same time the trip to Europe had given them an arrogant sense of superiority: “Unfortunately their contact with civilisation has not improved them” (ibid.: 97). Later colonial visits by Chagga individuals to Europe had more positive outcomes. As highlighted in Chapter 2, Joseph Merinyo travelled to Germany in 1907, a trip that proved influential in teaching him about German peasant co-operative movements, inspiring him to take up coffee growing and eventually leading to the establishment of the KNPA discussed in Chapter 3. Several of the people discussed in this chapter had studied outside of Africa prior to independence. Thomas Marealle, the Paramount Chief, studied in the UK from 1944 until 1946, at Cambridge and the London School of Economics, completing a course on social welfare (A New African Supreme Chief 1952: 3). The future minister, Asanterabi Nsilo Swai, studied at the University of New Delhi in the fifties, where he graduated with an honours degree. The post-independence travels of these individuals will be discussed below.

**Detribalising Tanzania**

The success of nation-building in Tanzania is much praised. Nyerere himself judged it as a success. As early as 1968, his overall assessment of Tanzania’s unity is strong: “Our country is one of those in Africa which is highly praised for its unity. We have no tribalism, no religious quarrelling, no colour discrimination, and we oppose discrimination and oppression on grounds of tribe, religion, or colour, wherever it exists” (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 74). Nyerere certainly paid heed to the religious

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30 See (Heilman and Kaiser 2002).
racial issues within Tanzania, yet the ethnic divisions received particular attention. For instance, as discussed in more detail below, the regional quota system was designed to correct for ethnic inequalities, rather than religious or other factors. The focus placed on the role of ethnicity in nation-building is curious in the light of the ethnic structure of the nation. Authors on Tanzania regularly note that the diverse ethnic makeup of Tanzania – usually cited as over 120 groups, only one of which makes up more than 5% of the population – is an important factor in the nation’s unity and stability (Hyden 1999: 146; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999: 93-94; Nyang’oro 2004: 7-10). This is part of what Susan Geiger (1997: 8-9) refers to as the “lacks and absences” theories of Tanzanian nationalism. These theories that focus on the absences in Tanzania reduce the nationalist movement to being “essentially passive and lacking in substance and power” (ibid.: 8). I agree with Geiger’s critique; however, Geiger’s focus on TANU activists is in danger of overlooking non-TANU actors. My own research presented in this chapter emphasises the agency of both state and non-state actors.

One of the reasons that ethnicity received such focus was that, unlike other identities, it is by its very nature regional in character. Nyerere was clearly concerned about secessionist threats. He seemed to be acutely aware of the difficulties faced by other nations in Africa, particularly his neighbours. For example, upon dissolving the Sukumaland Federal Council, Nyerere stated that “we can’t have another Katanga here” (cited by Iliffe 1979: 569). The Sukuma people are by far the largest ethnic group in Tanzania, numbering around 4 million and making up around 13% of the total population (Nyang’oro 2004: 7). When the Sukumaland Federal Council was threatened with abolition in 1960, they cited the successes achieved by the Chagga

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31 See, for example, the debates about race surrounding early multiparty democracy in Tanzania (Brennan 2005).
Council as a reason for their continued existence, and hoped that they would achieve similar successes through a Sukuma council. Nyerere saw a lot at stake here from a group inspired by the Chagga example.

While it seems unlikely that Nyerere faced a genuine secessionist threat from any region of Tanzania, there were certainly rumours of the threat from the wealthier peoples such as Chagga and Haya (Bjerk 2008: 158). My own research reveals that there were regular rumours of Chagga secessionism from the 1950s through to the 1970s, as evidenced in contemporary reports. In 1949, a British Intelligence report on the newly-founded Kilimanjaro Union stated that “[i]ts declared object – that is to say, declared to its own ‘inner circle’ – is the overthrow of European Government and the establishment of independent 100% African Government over the Northern Province” (Colonial Office 1949a). While the British clearly saw the Kilimanjaro Union as an organisation calling for independence, at that time it was not altogether clear whether they were calling for Tanganyikan independence or independence for Kilimanjaro. Chagga politics was also extremely insular; “Although wealthy, educated and politically minded, the Chagga were not a serious threat to territorial unity because they devoted so much energy to internal affairs” (Glickman 1972: 131).

Ideas of Chagga secessionism resurfaced in the 1970s. The level of unhappiness by Chagga people towards the socialist direction of Tanzania led one British diplomat to write:

32 Such claims of Chagga separatist movements are difficult to research in modern-day Tanzania. Attempts to discuss the issue with informed sources would usually lead to a referral to attempts by British settlers on formerly-German farms in the 1920s calling for Kilimanjaro to be transferred to Kenya, with its more settler-friendly government (Iliffe 1979: 276).
Meanwhile, there is one aspect of the national scene often forgotten but which I also believe to be significant in the present situation: the attitude of the influential and conservative Chagga tribe in the north. When I was there at the end of last month I heard some wild talk which even included suggestions of them seceding to Kenya or rallying around Chief Marealle in an effort to achieve “independence”. All this should not be taken too seriously. But underlying it there is an active dislike of socialist policies on the part of this intelligent and individualistic people. It is not something the Government can safely ignore; and it may be significant that no Chagga-owned properties have so far appeared in the list of expropriations (Phillips 1971).

Similarly, a British reporter commented upon calls for Kilimanjaro to join Kenya: “Well informed quarters in Kenya believe that there are close contacts between the Chagga and the Luo tribesmen in Kenya, and that their purpose is to have Kilimanjaro returned to Kenya” (Listowel 1972). Paul Bjerk (2008: 158-159) dismisses the secessionist threat from Kilimanjaro on the basis that Thomas Marealle saw himself as a rival to Nyerere for the national leadership of Tanzania, rather than leader of a separate leader of Kilimanjaro. While Bjerk is correct in that the secessionist threat was not serious, I argue that it does not seem likely that T. Marealle himself led the calls. T. Marealle’s own position seems to be closer to that of a Tanganyikan nationalist, albeit one with different views of the role of traditional leaders within the state.

While there may have been little genuine threat from secessionist movements in Tanzania, the threat of tribalism was still taken seriously. The approach to dealing with questions of ethnicity in Tanzania was well described by Nyerere in a 1968 radio broadcast marking Independence Day, Nyerere gave a speech that highlighted several issues he saw as pertinent to Tanzanian society. He set out his concerns about tribalism in Tanzania:

33 Presumably, this is a reference to Thomas Marealle, the former Paramount Chief.
34 The reporter Judith Listowel repeats the untrue myth that Queen Victoria had given the mountain to the German Kaiser.
I have begun to hear whispers about tribalism. Just after independence, we got complaints that people were being appointed to government positions on the basis of tribalism, and we immediately appointed a commission to look into the allegations. The commission proved without any doubt that there was no tribalism in the allocation of jobs in government. But just recently, I began to hear this complaint again. I did not treat it lightly. We called some of these people who were saying there is tribalism, and told them to give their evidence either to me or to Chief Mang’eny35 (the ombudsman). We promised to investigate immediately. But they have not given us one shred of evidence. (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 74-75)

Nyerere went on to explain how it was that members of certain ethnic groups were placed in an advantageous position during colonialism:

Tanzanians who had the opportunity for higher education during colonial rule were mostly Wahaya, Wachagga, and Wanyakyusa. And because most of the education was provided by missionaries, most of these people are also Christians. And when we replace Europeans who hold responsible jobs, and give those jobs to Tanzanians, the people who get them come mostly from these three tribes. Therefore, if you ask me why Wahaya, Wachagga, and Wanyakyusa have most of the jobs which require higher education, the answer is very obvious. They are the ones who got higher education during colonial times. I would say, look at the positions in politics, where a person is not asked about his educational qualifications. Look at Parliament, the National Executive, the Central Committee of TANU, and at the Cabinet. How many Wanyakyusa, Wahaya, or Wachagga are members? You will find that perhaps there aren’t any, or there is one or two. (ibid.: 75)

35 Erasto Mbwana Mang’eny was a chief of the Bondei ethnic group, from the Usambara mountains in north-eastern Tanzania. Chief Mang’eny was one of the earliest Tanganikans to receive a university degree, had a strong involvement with Bondei nationalism in the late fifties, yet was successfully able to rewrite his life history to make an accommodation with Tanganyikan nationalism, downplaying the ethnic component in favour of his role within the civil service (Willis 1993). Parallels can be seen between Mang’eny’s tactics and those of P.I. Marealle. Mang’eny, however, was able to rise to higher heights in government circles than P.I. Marealle: Mang’eny was not only the first Chairman of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, he later became an ambassador to the United Nations, and Speaker of the National Assembly (Norton 1973: 616; Mtei 2009: 25). Before becoming chief of the Bondei, Mang’eny was head teacher at Old Moshi Secondary School. As such, he would have met or taught many of the Chagga people discussed in this chapter, including Edwin Mtei and Wilbert Kleruu (Mtei 2009: 20).
Statistics from the period support the suggestion that, in the National Assembly, the ethnic makeup of the members broadly reflected the ethnic makeup of the country (Wilson 1966: 445-447; Hopkins 1971: 75-76). However, in terms of the administrative elite, some ethnic groups were significantly over-represented, the very groups Nyerere mentions: Haya, Chagga and Nyakyusa (Hopkins 1971: 75-76).

Nyerere went on to get to the heart of how ethnicity was considered in Tanzania:

> It is the job of the government to help, even favour, the more backward parts of the country, especially regarding education. We are doing this and will continue to do so. But if a Mchagga, a Mhaya or a Mnyakyusa young man were denied a job because of his tribe – when he is capable and there is no other Tanzanian with the necessary qualifications – then we would be practising a very stupid and very evil kind of tribalism which led to the establishment of Biafra[36]. I beg you, my brothers, avoid anything that could bring our country into this kind of disgrace. (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 76)

Two themes can be developed illustrating the tackling of the uneven development between ethnic groups in Tanzania. The first is the importance of education – this is clearly the factor that Nyerere sees as the roots of the inequalities between the various ethnic groups in Tanzania. The policy of Education for Self Reliance (ESR) was an attempt to deal with this, as discussed below. The second factor involved is the shutting down of accusations of tribalism. Making allegations of tribalism was itself dangerous, and “once people begin to think in these terms, then tribalism has begun to enter into our society” (ibid.: 75).

An important illustration of the role of ethnicity in Tanzania is through the census. The use of censuses by colonial powers is discussed by Benedict Anderson (2006: 164-170) as a way the colonial state was imagined. The census ascribes fixed identities to the colonial subjects: “The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone

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has one – and only one – extremely clear place. No fractions” (ibid.: 166). Thus, the multiplicity of an individual’s identities that existed in pre-colonial Tanzania (Iliffe 1979: 318) were reduced to boxes to be ticked; one single ethnic identity had to be assigned to each person, there was no room for a person to claim more complex ties or identities. As such, the census became a tool by which the colonial state imagined itself; a census made the population “bounded, determinate, and therefore – in principle – countable” (Anderson 2006). The census would also come to play a role in the imagination of the post-colonial Tanzanian state as well. The last census of the colonial period, in 1957, was also the last to ask the question of the ethnicity of the respondent. Subsequent post-independence censuses have not asked the question in the interests of national unity (Gulliver 1969: 36-37). Similarly, the question of religious affiliation was not asked following the 1967 census (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 697-698). Thus, I argue, while the colonial-era state was imagined through a census that defined people through their ethnic identity, the imagination of the post-colonial state was one in which these identities were not of any official relevance. With questions of ethnicity not being asked, and the subject becoming taboo, Nyerere sought to aid the unity of Tanzania. Yet I argue that this in itself did not promote his other cause, equality. If ethnicity were not to be talked about, then this was to the benefit of those ethnic groups in an advantageous position, including Chagga.

As is most vividly evidenced through the secessionist rumblings, Kilimanjaro’s relationship with the nation did not always run smooth. This is perhaps not surprising:

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37 The question of religious belief is one in which the quantifying nature of censuses is of political salience. While the 1957 census reported that Muslims outnumbered Christians by a ratio of 3:2, the 1967 census reported roughly equal numbers of the two faiths. The 1967 census was the last time this question was asked. There is a suspicion amongst some Tanzanian Muslims that the numbers of members of their faith were deliberately lowered in the 1967 census (Heilman and Kaiser 2002: 698).
given the great efforts put towards Chagga nationalism in the 1950s, the change in focus to Tanzanian nationalism was a jolt. Nevertheless, just as many Chagga people worked hard at the nationalism of the fifties, so did many work towards the Tanzanian nationalism. As the next section illustrates, it was not only Chagga people themselves who were put to work on imagining the Tanzanian nation; so was the mountain itself.

**Imagining Kilimanjaro, Imagining Tanzania**

At midnight on the 9th December 1961, as ceremonies marking the emergence of a new nation were being conducted in Dar es Salaam, Lieutenant Alexander Nyirenda, the first African commissioned officer in Tanganyika’s military, raised the flag of the newly independent nation at the summit of Mount Kilimanjaro (Taylor 1963: 218). The name of the peak of Mount Kilimanjaro was originally named by Hans Meyer, the first European to reach its peak, as Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze. This was renamed at independence to Uhuru Peak (Latham and Latham 1995: 72) – Freedom Peak. The continent’s highest peak was renamed in honour of the newly-independent nation.

The use of Mount Kilimanjaro as a Tanzanian nationalist symbol predates independence. Addressing the Tanganyikan parliament in October 1959, the then Chief Minister Nyerere (1966 [1959]: 72) said, “we, the people of Tanganyika, would like to light a candle and put it on the top of Mount Kilimanjaro which would shine beyond our borders giving hope where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity.

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While the summit may have been renamed along nationalist lines, there seems to have been no call to rename other features high on the mountain that retained their colonial names. So, there remains on Kilimanjaro features named after European explorers and missionaries: Gillman’s Point, named after the German scholar and mountain climber (Light 1947); the Rehmann Glacier, named after the missionary; Decken Glacier, named after Baron Von Decken; and numerous others. Neither was there any attempt to rename these features, or indeed the peak itself, during Chagga nationalism.
where before there was only humiliation.” At the same time as Nyerere spoke, Mount Kilimanjaro was still serving the interests of Chagga nationalism, as seen by the flag of the Chagga Council. The flag pictured here was on a billboard commemorating the death of T. Marealle at Mengeni grounds in Marangu. Here, the peak of Kibo is pictured, along with the plants of coffee, banana and masale, and a leopard signifying chiefly authority. It is my argument that Mount Kilimanjaro was used as a nationalist symbol by both of these competing sources of identity.

**Figure 2: The Flag of the Chagga Council**

Nyerere’s 1959 speech occurred at a time when TANU faced something of a battle in winning Kilimanjaro over to their cause. There is a danger in drawing too much meaning from the use of Kilimanjaro in the context of Nyerere’s speech and other visual uses of the mountain. Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman draw attention to the development of Israeli national symbols, putting their development in terms of “aesthetics versus ideology”, arguing that aesthetics had a greater impact in the
development of Israel’s national symbols than ideology and meaning (Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman 1993: 444-445). There is no doubt that the aesthetic value of Mount Kilimanjaro plays an important role in its use as a symbol, easily drawn as a visual representation and also a piece of alliteration in Nyerere’s speech. That does not mean that they are free of ideological meaning; following Dominguez’s critique of Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, there is not such a binary distinction between ideology and aesthetics as they suggest (Dominguez 1993: 452).

In subsequent decades, Kilimanjaro became a key part of the branding of the nation of Tanzania. The long-standing tourism slogan for Tanzania was “Tanzania: The Land of Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar” 39. There was undoubtedly a commercial imperative to this, to correct misconceptions by foreign tourists. Indeed, in 2006 the Tanzanian Tourist Board contracted an advertising agency to start a campaign to highlight the fact that Mount Kilimanjaro was in Tanzania, not Kenya, thus encouraging tourists to holiday in Tanzania (Personal email 10th January 2007). Yet the nationhood presented through tourism has a consequence beyond the commercial interests of attracting foreign exchange earnings; “it goes to the heart of a people because it serves to define their cultural identity and to make this visible, both to themselves, and to ‘others’” (Palmer 1999: 316). Within the African context, Fürsich and Robins argue that the discourse presented by African governments attempts to distinguish themselves from other nations as brands, as well as to present themselves as cohesive and concordant states (Fürsich and Robins 2004: 147). However, they conclude that the unequal nature of the global economy means that such branding directly addresses Western tourists, possibly hindering more constructive identity work (ibid.: 148).

39 However, the slogan has since been altered to “Tanzania: The Land of Kilimanjaro, Zanzibar and the Serengeti”, which breaks the direct metonymic link between Kilimanjaro and mainland Tanzania.
With the case of the branding of Tanzania as the Land of Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar, however, I argue that there is constructive identity work being performed that is addressing the local audience. The clear example is that the branding places an emphasis on the union between the mainland and Zanzibar, a union which has seen stresses and strains since Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined together in 1964 (see, for example, Shivji 2008). That this political dimension came into Tanzania’s branding was not ignored within the country, with one prominent businessman criticising the branding: “The worst part of the tourism brand… was to link ‘Kilimanjaro’ and ‘Zanzibar’. Clearly, Zanzibar is a unique and powerful brand by and of itself. The politics of the Union should not creep into the commercial arena or ventures… Zanzibar has its own distinctive essence and mysticism” (Mwapachu 2005: 185). Mwapachu sees the slogan as furthering the state’s own internal political agenda over Zanzibar. While Kilimanjaro’s place within Tanzania is not nearly as problematic as the simmering conflict on Zanzibar, it nevertheless presents the region of mainland Tanzania with the strongest example of an ethnic nationalism and a somewhat problematic relationship with the state. One reading of the tourism slogan would place Kilimanjaro as a metonym for mainland Tanzania, a theme that is present in other expressions. For example, the football team for mainland Tanzania is called the Kilimanjaro Stars.

Another use of the name Kilimanjaro for the tourist market was the Kilimanjaro Hotel in Dar es Salaam. Opened in 1965 through the National Development Corporation and a private company, this hotel was aimed at being the most luxurious in the country (Ministry of Information and Tourism 1968: 162, 198). Despite the state involvement, Nyerere made it clear that this was a place for outside visitors, not Tanzanians, as the overt show of wealth by Tanzanians was discouraged (Condon 1967: 352). Indeed, the morally dangerous nature of the hotel was reflected in a Swahili pulp novel of 1988, in
which it is a place of utter luxury, the “spatial ‘top’ of Dar es Salaam”, an immoral and corrupt city (Blommaert 1993: 26).

Yet I contend that there are plenty of examples where Kilimanjaro is used in the branding of commercial products very much aimed at the local market. There have been a number of beers using the name or image of Kilimanjaro. Tanzania Breweries produces Kilimanjaro Premium Lager, and the now-defunct brand Snow Cap, whereas Kibo Breweries previously produced a beer named Kibo Gold, named after the larger of Kilimanjaro’s peaks. The use of the image of the mountain on this beer led Tanzania Breweries to seek an injunction against Kibo breweries. The injunction was rejected, as while the peak appeared on both brands, it was found by the judge that this would not create deception (Kihwelo 2006: 681). Thus the image or name is used in a broad range of products from various companies. Few have any direct link to the mountain itself. A notable exception is Kilimanjaro bottled drinking water, produced by Bonite Bottlers in Moshi. Bonite Bottlers is owned by Reginald Mengi, the media tycoon and “Tanzania’s Silvio Berlusconi” (Lusekelo 2005), of Chagga ethnicity from Machame. Unlike other mountain-branded products, Kilimanjaro drinking water bases its brand on the place and landscape of the snow-capped mountain.

Just as the imagery of the mountain was being used for nationalist purposes by the state, I argue that many Chagga people were involved with the important work of imagining the Tanzanian nation. Given the educational advantages of many of the Chagga elite, it is not surprising that many were placed in powerful and influential positions in the Tanzanian state. The example of one cabinet minister will be discussed further below. Chagga people played a very important role in the imagination of the Tanzanian nation.
Sam Ntiro, the author of *Desturi za Wachagga*, after serving as High Commissioner to the UK, went on to become the Commissioner of Culture in Dar es Salaam from 1962 until 1972 (Ng’weno 1968: 69). As highlighted in the work of Kelly Askew (2006), the cultural policy of the state was an important component of Tanzania nationalism. Ntiro also produced public works of art, such as the roundabout in Arusha commemorating the Arusha Declaration.

Historians who are of Chagga ethnicity would become influential in the history department of the University of Dar es Salaam. To the extent that there was genuinely a “Dar es Salaam School” of history, it has been understood as referring to histories nationalist in viewpoint, aimed at uncovering African initiatives in Tanzanian history (Denoon and Kuper 1970). While much work was done by expatriate historians such as Terrence Ranger and John Iliffe, it was a 1969 volume edited by two Tanzanians, *A History of Tanzania* (Kimambo and Temu 1969), that marked the compilation of a coherent picture of the history of Tanzania (Denoon and Kuper 1970: 332). The editors of this work, Arnold Temu and Isaria Kimambo, are both of Chagga ethnicity. It is my contention that, just as the Chagga historians discussed in the previous chapter had worked hard on Chagga nationalism, so Chagga historians produced works of Tanzanian nationalism.

Numerous other examples exist of Chagga playing important roles in other aspects of the crafting of Tanzanian national identity. In a largely rural society without a domestic television service, symbols such as the currency were important ways whereby the state

40 Parallels can be drawn between the Tanzanian nationalist histories and the Chagga nationalist histories examined in Chapter Three of this thesis.
41 Ranger (1971) himself strenuously objected to the suggestion that there was a single Dar es Salaam School of history. See also the response of Denoon and Kuper (1971).
reaches a broad audience for their images and symbols of national identity. In 1965, following the dissolving of the East African Currency Board, Tanzania introduced its first post-independence currency. The design work was conducted by Messrs Thomas de la Rue, but the main design choices were made by the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Edwin Mtei, and Nsilo Swai (Mtei 2009: 85-86). Both of these men were of Chagga ethnicity.

Despite the tensions that existed between the moneyed Chagga and the state, there is no denying the strong influence of members of the Chagga elite in the imagining of Tanzania. Nevertheless, relations between the Chagga elite and the state would become particularly strained after the introduction of socialism in Tanzania following the Arusha Declaration of 1967.

**Socialism on Kilimanjaro**

“There was no impact of socialism on Kilimanjaro,” a successful businessman told me a few days after Christmas 2005 as we stood in his *kihamba* in Marangu. He was based in Dar es Salaam, but had built for himself a large home in Marangu, and had turned his *kihamba* into a garden with a fine lawn, imported plants in the shrubbery and a handful of well-tended banana plants. “Nyerere came and said that the Chagga were already socialist, because of the coffee cooperative.” But was that true, I asked, were Chagga socialist? That “depends on how you look at things” (Fieldnotes 27/12/05).

Socialism is generally not a popular position amongst Chagga people; “they were bourgeois people and the values, outlook, and standards of a bourgeoisie were an anomaly in the classless society which the central Government aimed to create” (Stahl
1969: 221). An example from my research is John, from Kibosho, who has been a businessman since the 1950s. He opened a specialist shop in Moshi in 1957, and soon after opened a branch in Arusha. The Moshi branch has proven to be a successful business, and is still in business today, run by John’s son (Fieldnotes, 27/10/05). John is an example of the Chagga entrepreneurs who entered the commercial sector prior to independence. While Asian traders dominated much of the trade in colonial Tanganyika, Chagga entrepreneurs were the only group of Africans who were able to edge out the Asian traders (Bryceson 1993: 92). Chagga entrepreneurs were able to challenge the dominance of Asian wholesale traders in Kilimanjaro (Wright 1955: 112), whereas the KNPA and KNCU both sought to exclude Asians from the coffee market (Curtis 1992: 513). John is an example of the entrepreneurial group of Chagga who were able to do well in an Asian-dominated sector before independence.

John also owns a bar several kilometres outside of Moshi, which he has been developing since 1965. We talked about his experiences of attempting to do business during the socialist period. John was reticent to criticise Nyerere; the strongest words against the former President was a “Well, he did things I didn’t like.” Pressing him on this, I found he was referring to the socialist policies that followed the Arusha Declaration. Of particular concern was the nationalisation of buildings that occurred; his bar just happened to be slightly below the minimum size of buildings that were nationalised; if he had built a larger structure prior to the nationalisations then he fears that it would have been nationalised. This he put down to luck. Mostly, however, to survive in business during the socialist period it was necessary to be flexible, and to not fight the government (Fieldnotes 16/3/2006).
The implementation of socialism in Tanzania was not even across the country. The policy which had probably the largest impact on rural Tanzania – the ujamaa villagisation programme – was not implemented to any significant degree in the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro. Nyerere spoke in his inaugural speech as President in 1962 of the need for Tanganyikans to live in “proper villages” (Nyerere 1962a: 182). In September 1967, Nyerere issued the second post-Arusha Declaration policy document after ESR, *Socialism and Rural Development* (Nyerere 1968 [1967]-b). This called for Tanzanians to live in collective villages, a voluntary process between 1967 and 1973 but with more of an element of coercion between 1973 and 1976 (Mpangala 2000: 82-83). While the official figures for the population movements are often called into doubt, the numbers are still large: Nyerere claims that around 70% of the population of Tanzania “moved their homes” over the course of 3 years (Nyerere 1977: 41-42). Despite scepticism over some of the figures, Hyden (1980: 130) describes the compulsory villagisation programme in rural Tanzania 1974-75 as the largest resettlement in the history of Africa. However, implementation was not even across Tanzania. Mtwara and Lindi regions had villagisation implemented quickly in 1972-74, as according to the government the civil war in neighbouring Mozambique put a scattered population at risk (Seppälä 2000: 50). Uptake in the more prosperous areas of Tanzania, including Tanga, Kilimanjaro and West Lake, was far slower (Briggs 1979: 698).

42 The sharpest distinction is between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar; the socialist programmes were “pursued quite independently of each other” (Askew 2006: 20). The form of socialism on Zanzibar was far closer to the Marxist-Leninist socialisms of Eastern Europe (ibid.: 20). The focus of this thesis is on the mainland of Tanzania. For more on Zanzibari socialism, see (Tordoff and Mazrui 1972; Askew 2006).

43 There is some doubt over the reliability of the government figures. Village leaders faced a great incentive to massage figures upwards as ujamaa villages with high levels of communal farming were prioritised in access to social services and credit (Samoff 1981: 300-301). Similarly, figures giving the numbers of people actually physically moved can be exaggerated, as these are derived from the figures of those living in collectivised villages, rather than those physically moved (Hyden 1980: 130).
No people from the *kikamba* belt of Kilimanjaro were moved to form new villages. The possibility, however, was considered to be very serious. Chagga farmers threatened to burn down the mountain rather than be moved from their homes (Ellis 1974: 44). In October 1973, the Prime Minister visited Kilimanjaro, and reassured the Chagga people that nobody would be moved. Chagga people, he argued, were already living together in villages, and he encouraged the people of Kilimanjaro to work hard on their existing land (Mosha 1976: 27). As such, the introduction of *ujamaa* villages in Tanzania amounted to a reorganisation of local government. The boundaries of new villages were drawn on the *kikamba* belt, effectively defining existing areas as *ujamaa* villages. These were Stage I villages, in the “formative” stage before any real evidence of communal living or work had been demonstrated (United Republic of Tanzania 1972: 62-63). These villages were actually defined along the lines of old sub-*mitaa* patrilineages, and gave patrilineages a political presence that had not existed since pre-colonial times (Moore 1986: 139).

While there does appear to be a certain degree of political upset surrounding the possibility of villagisation in Kilimanjaro, which necessitated a visit from the Prime Minister to calm the situation down, it does not follow from this that the reason that proper *ujamaa* villagisation was not introduced in Kilimanjaro was the potential political upset it could cause. The reasons are perhaps more prosaic: the parts of Tanzania with well-established perennial crop cultures, particularly coffee and bananas, did not see any resettlement (Shao 1986: 221).

Even though, like Mount Kilimanjaro, the Pare mountains did not experience any forced population movements or the introduction of substantive villagisation projects, it does not follow that the villagisation programme had no effect on Pare people. The
increasingly authoritarian state, Sheridan argues, reduced the state’s efficacy and authority, and as such led to resource abuse. Rather than direct action, it was the “political ambiguities and contradictions” that damaged the indigenous common property management regimes (Sheridan 2004). In the case of the Chagga elite, however, I found that there does not seem to be a memory that the villagisation programme had a detrimental effect. This is possibly because the restructuring that resulted from villagisation returned power to the *mitaa* lineage lands, thus fitting into Chagga traditional authority rather than acting against it. I found that it is also the case that the anger of the Chagga elite was directed more towards issues such as the effect of nationalisation on the coffee cooperative.

The post-Arusha Declaration 5-year plan states, “The co-operative is basically a socialist institution” (United Republic of Tanzania 1969: 31), before noting that a co-operative is only such if it does not take on the characteristics of a marketing organisation for capitalist farmers. Yet the nationalisation of cooperatives in the seventies was “a disaster”; the marketing organisations that replaced the cooperatives caused prices to lag behind the international migration, and payments were often delayed (McHenry 1994: 112-113). For a coffee growing area like Kilimanjaro, the impact was particularly severe: during the coffee boom of the late seventies, farmers in Kenya received 76% of the world price, whereas farmers in Tanzania only received 44% (Bevan, Collier et al. 1989: 43). Furthermore, the changes brought to the KNCU are remembered as having a particularly detrimental effect in Kilimanjaro. The Chagga businessman whose quote opened this section, doubting that socialism had much impact on Kilimanjaro, stated that the “disastrous” nationalisation of the marketing arm of the KNCU was the big impact of socialism on Kilimanjaro. According to him, the size of the workforce rose from ten to 600 (Fieldnotes 27/12/05). The
nationalisation of the KNCU is given by Thomas, a businessmen living in Moshi, as the reason that socialism was unpopular in Kilimanjaro. The KNCU belonged to the farmers, Thomas argues, but the government saw it as a political organ and wanted it run by the government. The nationalisation of the KNCU had particular importance to Chagga people not only because the price they received for their coffee dropped. Rather, the KNCU was recognised as doing a great service to the Chagga people, particularly during the 1950s. “Whatever Chagga had, came out of coffee” (Fieldnotes, 28/12/2005).

While the nationalisation of the KNCU was considered problematic, Chagga people were still capable of speaking socialist rhetoric. Sally Falk Moore reports a Ward Chairman on the issue: “The Chagga… have no problem with this… We have always done things in an *ujamaa* manner. We share everything with our brothers. We do everything together with our neighbours. You can ask anyone. We already have *ujamaa*” (cited in Moore 1977b: 158). A similar presentation was noted by G.R. Mboya, who investigated the uptake of *ujamaa* villages in Kilimanjaro in 1972. A local leader, asked his opinion of *ujamaa* villages, said, “But these… are nothing but Ujamaa villages… We build our houses together and we celebrate such occasions such as Saba Saba44, Independence Day and New Year’s Day together” (Mboya 1971: 65). Mboya is dismissive of these claims, questioning whether these examples of cooperation are really representative of an *ujamaa* village. While the *kihamba* belt did not see anybody forced from their homes, a handful of *ujamaa* villages were introduced in the lowlands of Kilimanjaro. Fred Lerise charts the history of one such village, called Chekereni and located just south of Moshi town. This village did attract Chagga migrants, who

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44 Saba Saba is a national holiday in Tanzania on 7th July, commemorating the formation of TANU on 7th July 1954 (Mazrui 1999: 1).
principally moved into the village because they lacked land on the *kihamba* belt to allow their children to inherit: “Land-seekers became ‘socialists’ in order to fulfil their cultural obligations” (Lerise 2005: 27). There is a theme running through the post-independence political discourse in Kilimanjaro which is the downplaying of ideology in favour of pragmatism. In Joel Samoff’s study of politics in Moshi town, he found that the important factor for constituents in choosing candidates for elected office was what the candidate could do for his constituents, rather than any ideological concerns. “Ideologues, and especially ideologues who are radical in the Tanzanian context, are simply not found in Tanzanian politics” (Samoff 1974: 165). This theme that runs through post-independence Chagga politics will be examined in more detail in the final chapter.

While Chagga people were not keen on the implementation of socialist policies in the *kihamba* belt, some Chagga were enthusiastic implementers of the policies elsewhere in Tanzania. An example is Dr Wilbert Kleruu, from Mwika in Kilimanjaro. As with many of the other Chagga elite, he too was educated at Old Moshi Secondary School, Tabora and Makerere. After this he attained a PhD in Political Science from the University of California. Kleruu returned to Tanzania, where in 1971 he was appointed by the President as Regional Commissioner for Iringa. Despite his Chagga ethnicity, Kleruu became an enthusiastic implementer of *ujamaa* villagisation. In 1971, the number of *ujamaa* villages in Iringa region during that year increased from 22 to 629 (Coulson 1975: 56). He took particular steps to bring capitalist maize farmers into *ujamaa* villages (Resnick 1981: 191). He was murdered at Christmas 1971 by a Hehe maize farmer.
The murder of Kleruu has been interpreted in a variety of ways. The murder was reported by a British newspaper as “Tanzania’s first political murder”, allegedly as a result of the “resentment of wealthy peasants against the state that had decided to collectivise their land” (Listowel 1972). For D.A. Low, it marked a “moment of truth” over whether Nyerere would force through coercive collectivisation policies (Low 1996: 52-53). For a Marxist such as John Saul, the murder is understood as being a result of his efforts to isolate a kulak class of rich peasants to release the energies of poorer peasants (Saul 1974: 62). Others had a more prosaic analysis of the murder, arguing that Kleruu had an “abrasive personality” (Ayres 1972), and there were rumours that he had insulted the murderer (Raikes 1979: 315-316). Nevertheless, as a British commentator noted, “If you recall the traditional peasants’ strong feeling for the land you will appreciate that Kleruu was in a hornet’s nest and regardless of who pulled the trigger there is little doubt that there are many people in the area who were happy to see him out of the way” (Ayres 1972). Whatever the understandings of the murder, the TANU publicity machine turned to make Kleruu a martyr “pioneer of socialism” (ibid.). Over half the cabinet, including Nyerere, attended his funeral. Kleruu was buried following Chagga tradition in his kihamba in Mwika, Kilimanjaro (Hasu 1999: 453). The man who had put so much effort into moving people away from their ancestral lands saw it important that he be buried on his own kihamba.

**Former Chiefs**

The elimination of the chieftaincy left some former Chagga chiefs in a difficult social and economic position, “paupers” as Edward Kileo (2005: 135) describes them. I argue that there were, however, some notable exceptions. The more powerful chiefs were given positions by the state. The Chagga divisional chiefs were given the chairmanships
of various Dar es Salaam based bodies (Mramba 1967: 110). Chief Adiel Shangali became chairman of the National Tourist Board (Tripp 1999: 44). Petro Itosi Marealle, the author of *Maisha ya Mchagga hapa Duniani na Ahera* discussed in the previous chapter, became respected as a TANU elder. He was Chairman of the Local Government Service Commission, and more prestigiously sat on the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State45 (United Republic of Tanzania 1973: 1). Interestingly, he is listed in the report of the commission as “Chief P.I. Marealle, M.B.E., an elder and Chairman of the Local Government Service Commission” (ibid.: 1). Sally Falk Moore, close to P.I. Marealle and his family for many decades, had P.I. Marealle describe it to her that Nyerere appointed him to a high position because he would much rather that P.I. Marealle be in Dar es Salaam, where he could be watched, than on Kilimanjaro where he could mobilise political opposition (Moore 1996: 590). Indeed, P.I. Marealle proved to be a skilled political operator. Moore reports that, despite there being no evidence of this during the 1950s, after independence P.I. Marealle claimed that he had been a secret member of TANU all along, and that he only hid this to keep out of trouble with the colonial government. Moore describes this as a “characteristically canny story to cover up his original opposition” (ibid.: 590). In any event, P.I. Marealle became a TANU elder. During the inauguration of Julius Nyerere46, there was a symbolic handing over of power to Nyerere

45 The Commission operated under relatively tight terms of reference set by Nyerere. The goal was the setting up of a one party state in Tanzania in the context of what Nyerere referred to as the “national ethic”, a commitment to individual liberty, social justice, democratic participation and racial equality (Pratt 1976: 202-203). Given these terms of reference, it is difficult to extract P.I. Marealle’s own opinions from that of the committee. Certainly, at the time there was little internal or external opposition to the establishment of the one-party state (Brennan 2005: 250). The key issue with the Commission, which led to Oscar Kambona’s refusing to sign the final report, was the call for a more authoritarian model of the one party state than the one the Commission advocated (Pratt 1976: 203-204).

46 Sources differ as to whether this event occurred at the swearing in of Nyerere as Prime Minister at independence in December 1961 (Maddox 2005: 86), at Nyerere’s
by two chiefs. The chiefs chosen for this were Chief Mazengo, at that time Paramount
Chief of the Ugogo Federation of the Central Province, and Chief Petro Itosi Marealle
(Feierman 1990: 229; Maddox 2005: 86). According to Maddox’s account, widespread
opposition to TANU amongst the chiefs made finding chiefs willing to perform this
ceremony a difficult task. Mazengo, Maddox tells us, had been a secret member of
TANU during the 1950s (Maddox 2005: 86), presumably a more accurate assertion
than P.I. Marealle’s more dubious claim of pre-independence membership.

While P.I. Marealle was able to remain in Tanzania and work closely with Nyerere’s
government, other leaders were placed in positions abroad. A particular case is Thomas
Marealle, the former Paramount Chief. At the time he left office, he was not at his most
popular, his reputation in Kilimanjaro was not helped by his attempts, after
independence, to sue the Kilimanjaro District Council for damages related to the
abolition of his office. He was awarded nearly 100 million shillings by the high court,
based on a lifetime’s future earnings (Eckert 2006: 262); however, national legislation
was soon passed to deny him compensation (McAuslan and Ghai 1966: 488; Wambali
2008: 285). “From this event and until very recently, Marealle’s image was that of the
prototype of a decadent and greedy chief who had firmly collaborated with the British
rulers” (Eckert 2006: 262). While his reputation may have not been at its strongest at
the time he left office – he was, after all, voted out – he was still one of the most
powerful Africans pre-independence who was not a member of TANU. The potential
was certainly there for him to form a locus of opposition, as seen with the secessionist
rumours. Nyerere gave T. Marealle a position abroad. T. Marealle was appointed to the
World Food Programme, with the United Nations, based in Rome. T. Marealle put it
inauguration as President of the Republic in 1962, (Feierman 1990: 229), or in 1965
following the electoral confirmation as President (Mramba 1967: 110). Unfortunately, I
was unable to find any firm evidence to clarify this confusion.
like this in an interview with a Tanzanian newspaper *The Express* in 2006: “Because of my achievements, I was called to join the United Nation’s FAO/WFP programme. I was in charge of all aid directed to Third World Countries. I was based in Rome, Italy for the entire 13 years of my service.” (T. Marealle, cited in Chuwa 2006). While T. Marealle may have put it this way more than 40 years later, at the time he was not happy with the situation. As a family member of T. Marealle put it to me, T. Marealle was “very bitter” about being moved into a position abroad, but “as he was working with the UN he had to accept the situation” (Fieldnotes, 25/3/2007). Yet, it is my contention that T. Marealle with his period of service to the state, died a Tanzanian national hero (Chagga Paramount Chief Marealle I I Departs. 3rd March 2007 2007). At his funeral in 2007, he was both a Chagga (Tindwa 2007) and a national hero. The time in exile proved to be an effective tool for the rehabilitation of T. Marealle’s character.

The impact of this political move by Nyerere, while it only applied to a few select individuals, is understood by some Chagga as a key reason why the elimination of chieftaincy was smoothly achieved in Kilimanjaro. Emanuelle (Fieldnotes 7/3/2006), for example, argued strongly that it was the strategic thinking of Nyerere that resulted in the smooth transition from the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro. By giving the former ethnic leaders positions either domestically or abroad, Emanuel argued, both the leaders themselves and their followers were placated. The leaders, receiving a well-paid position frequently abroad, were themselves satisfied with the quality of their lives, whereas their supporters were placated by seeing that their leader was in a senior position. I put it to Emanuelle the position presented to me by Edward Kileo, that it was the loss of legitimacy and trust in the leaders during the late colonial period that led to the smooth
abolition of the chieftaincy in Kilimanjaro. Emanuelle, however, argued that it was Nyerere’s strategic thinking that was the more important factor.

The story of P.I. Marealle’s son, known as the Colonel, illustrates how the foreign postings were used politically by Nyerere. I interviewed the Colonel’s wife. The Colonel and his wife, known as Mama Itosi, married in 1965, with Mama Itosi working as a secondary-school teacher while her husband continued his career in the military. In 1974, however, the couple moved to China, and later Japan, on government service for 4 years (Fieldnotes, 25/3/2007). The reason for this, revealed by Sally Falk Moore, is Colonel Marealle’s alleged involvement in a 1974 coup attempt against Nyerere’s government (Moore 1996: 590).

Tanzania has seen a number of attempted military insurrections against the government. By far the most serious was the January 1964 King’s African Rifles mutiny, in which a dispute over soldiers’ pay and a call for more rapid replacement of British officers by Tanzanians, escalated into a revolt of two battalions. Soldiers openly walked the streets of Dar es Salaam, Nyerere went into hiding, and after five days had no choice but to call in the British military to restore order (Pratt 1976: 178-179). This revolt resulted in a restructuring, and politicising, of the military and its renaming as the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (Omari 2002: 94). While relations between the military and the governing party were mostly strong, “the 1964 mutiny was not an isolated event” (ibid.: 97). Another aborted coup attempt occurred in January 1983, aimed squarely at the unpopularity of Nyerere’s regime. The coup was defeated by the security services the
day before it was due to take place, with nine officers being sentenced to life imprisonment\(^47\) (Mwakikagile 2004: 509-515).

The 1974 coup attempt that involved Colonel Marealle did not reach such an advanced stage. Indeed, it was later described thus by P.I. Marealle, the Colonel’s father: “They were simply army fellows drinking together and joking around. The talk of a coup was not serious” (P.I. Marealle, cited in Moore 1996: 590). Indeed, nobody was imprisoned or even tried over the 1974 coup. More than fifty officers that were reportedly involved in the coup were “removed from the army and given insignificant posts in parastatals”\(^48\) (Mwakikagile 2004: 515). As one of the purported ringleaders, Colonel Marealle was given a diplomatic posting in China\(^49\). The 1974 event differs from other military events in being understood as being along ethnic lines. A captain jailed for his role in the later 1983 coup attempt, described the 1974 event as “rather tribal by officers mainly from the Chagga group” (ibid.: 515). The coup attempt was not widely discussed in contemporary Tanzania, but an Internet source wrote on a messageboard:

> In fact, in the seventies, I think it was in 1974 or a little later, many Chaga army officers, at least 50 of them (which is A LOT), were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government of Mwalimu Nyerere. The coup plot was exclusively Chaga. No

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\(^{47}\) Mwakikagile quotes an army captain, jailed following the 1983 coup attempt: “during Mwalimu’s era, they were very keen to conceal any news of coups, as that would indicate the truth that the regime was not all that popular” (Mwakikagile 2004: 515). By its very nature, this claim is unverifiable.

\(^{48}\) In February 1975, General Sam Sarakikya, head of the army since 1964, was moved to become Minister of National Culture and Sport. The next two in the army hierarchy, an Asian and a CHAGGA, were passed over in favour of a TANU regional secretary (Pachter 1982: 606). This move was probably not directly related to the 1974 coup attempt, but rather was indicative of a policy “of making sure that the office corps does not become entrenched, and that it remains loyal to the party” (Pachter 1982: 606).

\(^{49}\) Moore (Moore 1996: 589-590) argues that the reason that Colonel Marealle was not imprisoned or even executed was due to his father “call[ing] in the debt” of his not causing political opposition to TANU following independence. However, that none of the other 50 officers involved were tried indicates an unwillingness of Nyerere to directly punish anybody for this coup, as part of his strategic response to the crisis at hand.
other army officers from other tribes were involved. The Chagas are not bad people anymore than anybody else, but had the coup succeeded, you know what would have happened. Other Tanzanians would have been saying the Chaga wanted to take over the country. Which is simply not true. I don’t believe for one moment that most Chagas feel that way. But that would have been the perception, and there could have been a backlash against them. (Ndugu 2004)

This quote not only illustrates how the 1974 coup is understood along ethnic lines, it also gives an illustration of how ethnicity is talked about in contemporary Tanzania. The commentator, despite accusing army officers of Chagga ethnicity being behind an attempted coup, is attempting to avoid any accusations of outright tribalism. The ideas about the dangers of tribalism introduced by Nyerere still have a salience and relevance in contemporary Tanzania.

Mama Itosi and her husband lived in China and Japan, working for the Tanzanian state as diplomats, before moving to London to conduct business. They returned to Tanzania to live in Marangu in 1984. This was a curious time to return, at the height of the Tanzanian economic crisis. Mama Itosi admitted that the situation was difficult in 1984. “Things were really bad, there was a shortage of food and goods. But I had no regrets for returning. Things were hard, but we managed to live through it.” I asked if the timing of their return was connected to the politics at this time; while Nyerere was still in office in 1984, it may have been becoming apparent to them that he would soon be leaving office. This connection was firmly denied by Mama Itosi. “People [in Marangu] were saying to us, things could not get worse, so we decided to return to help.” The activities of Mama Itosi following their return to Marangu will be discussed in the next chapter.
Asanterabi Nsilo Swai

The international migration of the Chagga elite was certainly not limited to members of the traditional elite. Asanterabi Nsilo Swai, a senior member of TANU before independence, was made a senior minister, becoming one of the key architects of Tanzania’s pre-Arusha Declaration economic planning. In 1967, he joined the UN, and served in New York until his retirement in 1984, when he returned to his home in Machame.

Nsilo Swai was born in 1925, in Nkuu, Machame. He studied at Makerere at the end of the forties. In 1958, he became the first General Manager of the Meru Cooperative Union. The Meru ethnic group inhabit Mount Meru, only 80 km west of Kilimanjaro and close to the town of Arusha. There is strong evidence that the historical origins of the Meru ethnic group come from western Kilimanjaro; at the very least, the Meru and Chagga share much of the same culture and similar political and social structures. The Meru language is very close to the dialect spoken in Nsilo Swai’s home of Machame (see Spear (1997: 17-34). The Meru Native Authority appointed a Chagga, Nsilo Swai, as General Manager, rather than an individual of Meru ethnicity, as “[t]here were no Meru tribesmen who had any knowledge of business” (Japhet and Seaton 1967: 63). This is a case of how Chagga individuals had influence beyond the borders of Kilimanjaro.

Nsilo Swai served as MP for Arusha District and Maasailand from 1960-65. In the first single-party election in 1965, he stood and won in the newly-formed Arusha Urban

50 The source of the biographical details for Nsilo Swai comes from the document “Historia fupi ya maharemu Asanterabi Zephania Nsilo Swai – A short history of the deceased, Asanterabi Zephania Nsilo Swai”, produced for mourners at his 1990 funeral in Machame.
constituency. This is an example of a person of Chagga ethnicity winning a constituency outside of Kilimanjaro. Arusha is a town 70 kilometres west of Moshi town, away from the area dominated by the Chagga ethnic group. The ethnic groups nearby to Arusha are Meru, Arusha and Masai. The population of Arusha town is ethnically diverse, attracting during the colonial period unskilled workers from all over the territory to work on nearby estates (Cliffe and Puritt 1967: 162). However, Chagga people also moved there to conduct business, for example John who opened up a specialist electronics store in the fifties, and the case of Adiel’s family discussed below. In the 1957 census, the last time a question of ethnicity was asked, the Chagga ethnic group was by far the largest ethnic group in Arusha town, making 20% of the total population (ibid.: 162). The 1965 election was a very close result for Nsilo Swai. While Nsilo Swai drew his main base of support from the Chagga community, he also drew upon other educated workers and Christians in the town (ibid.: 174). Nsilo Swai’s opponent was not from Arusha town either, he was a Muslim from the coast, and as such drew his support from Muslims in the town (ibid.: 174). The final result was close, with Nsilo Swai only receiving a very slim majority of 160, in part because he had spent so much time away from his constituency as a minister (ibid.: 174). Within Tanzania’s one-party democracy system, it was not unusual for government ministers to lose their seats, for example the minister Paul Bomani’s loss of his seat in 1965 (van Donge and Liviga 1986: 629). While the result was close for Nsilo Swai in 1965, it at least shows how a Chagga politician was able to attain electoral success outside of Kilimanjaro, in large part due to the large Chagga populations present elsewhere in Tanzania.

However, as the President had the power to also appoint MPs, being voted out in their own constituency was not necessarily the end of a cabinet career (van Donge and Liviga 1986: 628-629).
As a Minister, Nsilo Swai played an important role in developing Tanzania’s 1963 Five Year Plan. This placed an emphasis on raising Tanzania’s GDP through the development of industry, and placing an emphasis on the importance of foreign capital (van Arkadie 1973). The plan came under criticism from MPs representing poorer parts of Tanzania, who argued that the plan benefited the wealthier and more industrialised regions at the expense of the less well-off parts of the country (Bienen 1970: 301-302). The wealthier parts of Tanzania include, of course, Nsilo Swai’s own home of Kilimanjaro. I argue that it would be incorrect to characterise the plan as purely benefiting the Chagga people: it also contained measures disadvantageous to the Kilimanjaro economy, such as a 5% levy on crops not required for food consumption, thus hitting the Chagga coffee crop (ibid.: 300).

The other aspect of Nsilo Swai’s political career is his role in the independence struggles of other southern African nations. In the private library of Nsilo Swai’s home in Machame, the walls are covered in pictures of him meeting many illustrious world leaders, from Robert Kennedy to Haile Selassie. Yet at the same time as these pictures were taken, more covert meetings were taking place in Dar es Salaam with the leaders of the struggles for independence in southern Africa. Refugees from South Africa flowed to Tanganyika in the early sixties (Bjerk 2008: 272-276). In 1962, Nelson Mandela covertly visited Dar es Salaam to raise support for the ANC. During this stay, he stayed in Nsilo Swai’s house in Dar es Salaam. Intending to return to Dar es Salaam at a later date, Mandela left behind a number of personal items at Nsilo Swai’s home, including a pair of boots. However, Mandela did not get the opportunity to return before his arrest and imprisonment. His boots were not returned to him for another 33 years. In 1995, Nsilo Swai’s widow travelled to South Africa to personally return the boots to Mandela.

52 The plan only applied to mainland Tanzania (Bienen 1970: 281).
As shall be discussed below, Tanzania’s position during this period has helped Tanzania’s international reputation.

Nsilo Swai, after serving in Nyerere’s cabinet until 1967, moved to New York to work as Tanzania’s representative to the United Nations. Bjerk suggests that Nsilo Swai was moved to New York to calm internal divisions within the cabinet (Bjerk 2008: 308). Amongst some other Chagga, it was believed that Nsilo Swai was moved because he was not able to put his full support behind the direction that Tanzania was moving following the Arusha Declaration (Fieldnotes, 10/1/2011). His period in the United Nations is cited by some other Chagga as being important in opening doors to others working in the UN (Fieldnotes, 7/3/2006). To be fair, I could find no evidence that Nsilo Swai’s appointment led directly to the employment of other Chagga in positions; while Nsilo Swai certainly received letters from others of Chagga ethnicity, seeking employment. However, there is no evidence that anyone was employed because of these contacts. There was a number of people of Chagga ethnicity employed by the UN during this period (see, for example, (Temu 2007): this could in part be due to the educational advantages of the Chagga elite. Nsilo Swai retired in 1984, when he returned to Machame. This was the same year that Mama Itosi and her husband returned to Marangu. During his retirement, he worked for various business consultancies. He died in 1990 and was buried in his kibamba in Machame.

Adiel

Adiel was a European-educated Chagga, who worked in a senior position in an international organisation before running a parastatal and eventually entering private business. In these respects, his life history does not differ from others examined in this
chapter. However, Adiel proved himself to be unique in my research in some important viewpoints. Adiel’s family is from Old Moshi, where Adiel has inherited a *kihamba* even though he has no house there and puts “no economic use to the land”. His father was a teacher who moved his family to Arusha soon after Adiel’s birth, in the 1950s. His father’s brother followed him there soon after, where he established a successful business, and according to Adiel their family remains wealthy and well-known in Arusha. Adiel was educated in the UK in the sixties, before getting a job working for the East African Community based in Nairobi. He started working as a lawyer, but he was given the opportunity to specialise and began specialising in Telecommunications. This provided many opportunities for Adiel, as the telecommunication system in Nairobi was far more advanced than in Tanzania. Thus, when the EAC acrimoniously collapsed in 1977, Adiel returned to Tanzania to lead a parastatal. He was director from 1977 until 1987. Then he moved to the USA to work for a private company. It was there that his children were educated. In 1994, he returned to Tanzania to start his own business, along with his son, in Dar es Salaam. This was his first time operating his own business, a “sink or swim” situation as he describes it.

Adiel’s experiences highlight the advantages that working abroad gave for members of the Chagga elite. Adiel saw that working in the technologically more advanced environment of Nairobi gave him a comparative advantage upon returning to Tanzania. Similarly, Adiel’s work in a parastatal placed him in a strong position once the economy was liberalised. It was not uncommon for Chagga people who once worked in parastatals to set up new businesses after liberalisation that took advantage of their skills. “Precision Air is owned by Chagga people, set up by former directors of Air Tanzania. Another example – Chagga were high up in the Tanzania Audit Corporation,
so were in a position at liberalisation to take a more active role in the private sector”
(Emanuelle, fieldnotes, 15/1/2006).

While Adiel’s life history followed themes that were not uncommon for members of the
Chagga elite, some of Adiel’s views towards Kilimanjaro were unique amongst all of my
informants. He described a situation in which there was a common idea amongst
Chagga people to still see Kilimanjaro and Moshi as their home; even Chagga friends of
his, who had spent their entire lives in Dar es Salaam, still saw Moshi or Kilimanjaro as
their real home. Adiel criticised this view as “primitive”. Adiel explained that he had far
stronger feelings towards Arusha than Old Moshi, as this was where he had been
brought up. Throughout our conversation, he used the word “home” to refer to Arusha,
rather than either Moshi or Old Moshi. His dismissal of the Chagga connection to
Kilimanjaro prompted me to probe further. I asked Adiel where he will be buried. This
was a question I commonly asked informants; for Chagga people, the almost inevitable
response was that they would be buried on their kihamba back in rural Kilimanjaro.
Adiel, on the other hand, said that he had “never thought about it!” He explained that
it was important for a lot of Chagga people to be buried back on their kihamba, joking
“maybe this is just as well because space is becoming sparse in Dar es Salaam!”. If he
were to be knocked down by a car, he was sure his relatives “would take him back
home”, by which he was referring to Arusha, where both his parents were buried. For
Christmas, the other great occasion when Chagga people would return to Kilimanjaro,
he would often visit Arusha, a “hangover” as he put it from the time when both his
parents were alive and still living in the town. This stands in contrast to other Chagga
elites discussed in this chapter who, although living and working away from Kilimanjaro
for most of their careers, still ensured that they would be buried back in their own
kihamba.
Yet Adiel was not a man who considered Chagga traditions to be unimportant. He bemoaned the fact that “people are slowly losing their culture. In 20 or 30 years, culture will be completely diluted. Modern technology in particular is to blame. Americans are culprits number one. The way that Americans do things are copied by people all over the world.” Adiel saw the Chagga traditions as very valuable, and they were practised within his family in Arusha. His father would teach him about Chagga meat-sharing ceremonies, which they would practise in his household. Adiel spoke a little of the Chagga dialect of Old Moshi, if only to a limited extent. Perhaps most strikingly, with regard to his father’s land in Arusha, they followed certain norms that would normally apply only to the kihamba land of Kilimanjaro. His father obtained pieces of land for his sons close to his own, while Adiel’s youngest brother remained in the father’s house and inherited that land when his father died. Adiel’s relationship to Kilimanjaro and the kihamba system differed remarkably from that of my other informants. Even those individuals who lived and worked in Dar es Salaam, and for whom the Chagga traditions of visiting during Christmastime were more honoured in the breach than the observance, would still offer up an account which valued such visits.

The Legacy of Nyerere

In Dar es Salaam (Fieldnotes 3/11/2005), I sat in a bar drinking with Stanley, a Chagga businessman. He had recently returned from an international trade fair. Even though he

53 The traditional norms of land inheritance was that only the oldest son was provided with a kihamba once he married, with the youngest son inheriting the father’s kihamba and middle sons expected to clear and cultivate bush to start their own vihamba (Moore 1986: 82-83). However, amongst the elite at least, during the period of my research it was considered unfair not provide the middle sons with an inheritance, and so many sought to provide each son with a kihamba. Therefore, while Adiel’s example does not directly follow Chagga traditional norms, it closely mirrors contemporary Chagga practice.
was in his forties, and had been living in the UK with his parents and was educated there during the time Nyerere was president, Stanley had an extremely negative view of Nyerere and his socialist policies, dismissing them and Nyerere personally as being bad for Tanzania. His periods abroad doing business had been productive, he told me, because Tanzania had a strong reputation abroad. I asked him why this was the case, and he replied with a single word: “Nyerere”.

Coming from a man who was no fan of Nyerere’s socialist policies, this was a surprising utterance. Stanley went on to explain that Nyerere’s international reputation aided him while on such international visits. One way of examining the international views held of Nyerere abroad is through an examination of the obituaries that followed his death in 1999. Within Africa, the South African ANC was one of the first to respond, releasing a statement praising Nyerere’s role in the anti-Apartheid struggle: “The organisation [ANC] weeps in memory of this giant amongst men… The ANC pays homage to a true African legend, a man deserving of great admiration, respect and affection” (ANC 1999). President Mugabe of Zimbabwe offered similar praise for Nyerere’s role in their own struggle for independence (BBC 1999). Respects were paid in other African nations, with the flags in Kenya flying at half-mast for four days, and President Chiluba of Zambia praising the “great guide” of African politics (“Julius Nyerere: Press Coverage from the Internet” 1999). Praise too came from leaders outside of Africa, with President Clinton of the USA sending his respects, and with Prime Minister Blair of the UK praising Nyerere as “a leading African statesman of his time” (ibid. “Julius Nyerere: Press Coverage from the Internet”). He also received the highest praise from James D. Wolfensohn, then president of the World Bank, an organisation that Nyerere had not seen eye-to-eye with on issues over the years: “the ideals he represented will remain a source of inspiration and comfort for all of us. That is a legacy which even President
Nyerere – modest as he was – would have been proud of.” (Wolfenshohn, cited in "Julius Nyerere: Press Coverage from the Internet” 1999).

The press coverage within the Western media emphasised two sides to the legacy of Julius Nyerere: on the one hand, that of the morally upstanding leader who left a legacy of peace and stability for Tanzania, and on the other hand a leader who implemented policies that we economically disastrous. For example, in The Independent, the obituary stated of Nyerere’s economic policies, “Tanzania’s economy is still struggling to recover. Probably the economic programmes… were the biggest mistakes of Nyerere’s career” and yet concludes “Africa needs more leaders of Nyerere’s quality, integrity and wisdom” (Porteous 1999). The Economist provided an account which, while respecting Nyerere’s character, was ultimately damning of his time as President: “He was a magnificent teacher: articulate, questioning, stimulating, caring. He should never have been given charge of an economy” (Obituary: Julius Nyerere 1999).

The international press’s response to Nyerere’s death is critiqued by Cranford Pratt. While he acknowledges that the response included expressions of respect and affection, he concludes that the international obituaries and retrospectives of Nyerere’s life made “critical and sweeping judgements that, after all, because of his socialist policies, Nyerere had not served his people well” (Pratt 1999: 137). He sees a discontinuity between this international judgement and the emotional response within Tanzania. Pratt’s argument, however, is flawed. As Askew illustrates, there was indeed a disconnect between the international press’s focus on his economic legacies and the domestic Tanzanian response. Within Tanzania, both the official statements and the music composed in response to his death made no mention or analysis of *ujamaa* socialism (Askew 2006: 15-16). For Stanley the businessman, however, the irony is that
it is the proponent of African socialism that assists his essentially capitalist business dealings.

**Education on Kilimanjaro**

At independence, Tanzania had very few trained African professionals. There were only twelve African doctors registered in the territory, and five interns (Iliffe 1998: 112). By mid-1964, there were only twenty Tanganyikan graduate teachers working in the country (Tordoff 1967: 201). Furthermore, the limited number of secondary schools in the territory meant that many of the future elite attended the same schools. In a study defining the elite as those appearing in the 1963-64 edition of *Who’s Who in East Africa*, Gordon M. Wilson provides an insight into the educational background of those who appeared in the book. 30% of the elite were educated at Tabora Government School, St Andrew’s, Minaki had 8%, St Mary’s, Tabora had 5% and Old Moshi Secondary School had 5% (Wilson 1966: 440). Old Moshi Secondary School was the destination of many Chagga who would go on to be part of the elite. Edwin Mtei, the future Minister of Finance and founding member of the CHADEMA opposition party, gives some clue in his autobiography as the density of future members of the Tanzanian elite who were present at the school at this time. Mtei would walk to school with Wilfred Marealle, Arnold Temu (historian) and Wilbert Kleruu. His teachers at the time included Solomon Eliufoo, later President of the Chagga Council and education minister. This is only to mention a few of the names Mtei mentions (Mtei 2009). Given that most Tanzanians had only primary education, opportunities opened domestically for those with secondary or tertiary education. Peter Temu from Mamba, Kilimanjaro graduated from Makerere in 1962 with a honours degree in economics:

> Young Tanzanians who graduated then never looked for jobs…
> Any young Tanzanian with secondary school education or
better, was virtually assured of an office job, and anyone holding a university degree was simply hot cake!… I realized [visiting Stanford University in 1966] that while my country regarded me as a highly educated man, the wider world did not. (Temu 2007: 4-5)

Temu would go on to gain a PhD, and as with T. Marealle and Nsilo Swai, took up a job with the United Nations.

Education was considered by Nyerere to be an important aspect of nation-building. As Nyerere said, “The education provided by Tanzania for the students of Tanzania must serve the purposes of Tanzania” (Nyerere 1968 [1967]-a: 290). The post-Arusha Declaration aims of the education system were outlined in the document Education for Self-Reliance (ESR), presented by Nyerere in March 1967. ESR aimed to reflect the skills needs of an economy for which most worked in the rural sector. Thus, the emphasis was on primary education as a goal in itself, not as preparation for further academic study, and adult literacy programmes (Wedgewood 2005: 7). In terms of primary education, Tanzania did make some impressive achievements in literacy and primary school enrolment. Between 1966 and 1981, there was a six-fold increase in the number of primary school enrolments, reaching 97% gross enrolment by 1981 (Buchert 1994: 112). However, the focus on primary education meant that the post-primary sector stagnated. This resulted in Tanzania’s having one of the lowest enrolment rates for secondary schools in the world, at under 5% in 1978 (Ergas 1982: 579). The number of students enrolled in state secondary schools actually declined between 1977 and 1984 (Cooksey 1986: 184). This also resulted in low levels of attainment in English, with the numbers of people who could use English effectively estimated at 15% in 1972 (Mkilifi 1972: 204).
For entry to the limited numbers of secondary schools in Tanzania, a regional quota system was introduced, in an attempt to correct the disparities between areas of Tanzania that dated back to the colonial period (see also (O’Connor 1974: 75; Ergas 1982: 579; Cooksey 1986; Wedgewood 2005: 13). The quota system was an attempt to deal with the disparities between ethnic groups (Samoff 1987: 354-357). Samoff notes that this is one indication that the early postcolonial Tanzanian state was primarily concerned with the political saliency of ethnicity, as opposed to the other divisions within Tanzanian society along the lines of religion, race class or gender. However, as a way of fixing ethnic disparities, Samoff notes that a regional quota is an imperfect measure: the regions of Tanzania are an invention of the post-colonial state, with no historical basis back to the colonial inequalities. In detribalised Tanzania, it was not possible for an official body to ask the students to enter their ethnicity on an application form. Within Kilimanjaro Region, for example, it was not possible to differentiate between separate numbers for Chagga or Pare pupils entering secondary school. I argue that there is a gap between the government policies of detribalisation and the attempts to even out the colonial legacy of inequalities, a gap between policies of equality and policies of unity. Through this gap Chagga people were able to continue to educate their children.

While the drawbacks of ESR have been discussed in the literature (see, for example, Cooksey’s (1986) demolition of the policy), my research uncovered new ways in which the system could be manipulated to get around regional quota limitations. The method by which Chagga students were able to manipulate the system was described to me by Emmanuel:

At independence, there was a quota system for pupils transitioning from primary school to secondary school. This was on a regional basis. Because a good number of Chagga were
teachers in other regions, Chagga could send their kids to other regions to stay with them. They would also change their names, and drop their clan names. So they would be applying from a different region, and would not have a Chagga name, so there was no way to know they were Chagga. (Fieldnotes, 15/1/2006)

The effectiveness of this method was confirmed by a senior headmaster of Chagga ethnicity, at the time of my research a head teacher at a secondary school in Kilimanjaro Region.

Some people applying to Secondary School [during ESR] would drop their surname, so the people looking at the application did not know that they were Chagga. They might think, ‘We have too many Chagga already!’ But now, the selection process is fair, so people don’t do that now. It’s not possible to tell if someone is Chagga from what they write as their town on the form – someone putting Mwanza, for example, may be a Chagga who has moved there (Fieldnotes 21/10/2005).

Thus, Chagga students were able to take advantage of their social position to get around the official quota. The fact that Chagga people were by this stage spread all over Tanzania played an important role in enabling people of Chagga ethnicity to continue to receive state secondary education.

**Conclusion**

Nyerere’s projects of nation-building and *ujamaa* socialism provided potential problems for the Chagga elite. However, in practice, many of this elite were able to stay in a powerful position throughout the socialist period. Some of the ways in which they would do this was through the contrivance of the state, for example by being provided with state-sponsored positions abroad. In other ways, for example through the education system, they manipulated the state’s policies to their own ends. Chagga ethnicity plays a key role in this. The inequalities that existed in Tanzania stemmed from the policies of the colonial state. Furthermore, the methods used by the Chagga
elite tie closely to Chagga concepts of migration. At the same time that the migration took the Chagga elite away from Kilimanjaro, the desire to return for retirement, or at least burial, was maintained. With the broadly capitalistic Chagga outlook, and the advantageous position maintained through the socialist period, then the Chagga elite were in an excellent position to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the liberalisation of the economy. However, there were also new challenges brought by the changing economic and political environment. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 5: Elites and the Moral Economy of Kilimanjaro

Chagga ethnicity, I argue in this thesis, is intimately linked with place: the *kihamba*, and Kilimanjaro itself. This chapter seeks to explore the relationship between Chagga elites and life on the mountainside. Migration, as outlined in Chapter 4, has long been an important feature of the lives of elites. This chapter argues that elites are very much a part of the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. It explores the ways in which elite migrants continue to make their presence felt back home, through the building of houses and return visits for burials and Christmas. The chapter also examines how Kilimanjaro is perceived as facing difficulties, particularly following the liberalisation of the economy, and some of the ways in which elites are attempting to address these new challenges.

Kilimanjaro Region remains, by many developmental indices, among the most developed areas of Tanzania. The 2000/01 Tanzanian Household Budget Survey reveals Kilimanjaro Region to be the region, outside of Dar es Salaam, with the highest rates of adult literacy; highest primary net enrolment ratio; largest percentage of households with access to mains electricity and with modern materials used for roofing (National Bureau of Statistics 2002a: 23-27). While the accounts of Kilimanjaro being amongst the most developed area of Tanzania are accurate, a number of studies in recent years have highlighted the disparities that exist between the well-off and less well-off in
Kilimanjaro. Philip W. Setel’s work on HIV/AIDS seeks to analyse that Kilimanjaro has amongst the highest rates of HIV infection in the country (Setel 1999: 1). This, Setel argues, reveals the paradox and contradictions of modernity for Chagga people:

On one hand, colonial and postcolonial institutions (such as the church and Western education) were seen as escape routes from increasingly crowded mountain slopes where, over time, fewer and fewer households could be successfully sustained by agriculture. On the other hand, these same ‘escape routes’ came to be associated with vulnerability to AIDS. (ibid.: 3)

Another sometimes harrowing account is Mary Howard and Ann V. Millard’s (1997) account of child malnutrition on Kilimanjaro. Despite the relative wealth present amongst Chagga people, rates of child malnutrition have been amongst the highest in the country. There is, Howard and Millard argue, a widening gap between the wealthy and the poor on the mountain. The poor are increasingly stigmatised and marginalised; “Hawa watu (these people) was a common referent to the poor – sometimes used by their own kin to convey a sense of distance or otherness from themselves” (ibid.: 4). To research elites is not to ignore the social problems of Kilimanjaro. Indeed, the social divisions in rural Kilimanjaro are all too visible. It is particularly evident through housing in the rural areas, where the large houses of the wealthy surrounded by fine gardens, stand next to the cinder brick houses of the less well-off.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines aspects of the elite place in the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. After exploring the concept of the moral economy, it examines one of the historical manifestations of this, *Kazi ya Jumatatu*. Attention then turns to the role of elite migration in Kilimanjaro, and the three most important ways that elites make their presence felt on the mountainside: through the construction of large and fine homes, burials, and the return visit for the Christmas celebrations. The second section of the chapter is on the perceptions of change, again
focused on the *kibamba* belt, particularly the impact of the liberalisation of the economy from the 1980s onwards. While elements of social change have been highlighted throughout the chapter, the second section focuses on the perceived crisis facing Kilimanjaro. This involves the land shortages and the decline of the coffee price, and a perceived change in the role of education for a younger generation. Many of these changes are directly linked to the liberalisation of the economy. Finally, the chapter examines one of the ways that elites have responded to these problems, through the creation of local NGOs.

**The Moral Economy**

The concept of the moral economy is, I argue, an important one for developing an understanding of the role of elites in Kilimanjaro. I am not the first author to draw attention to the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. Tuulikki Pietilä (2007: 12-13) uses a distinction in her work between the cash economy and the moral economy on Kilimanjaro. The moral economy consists of the requirements of gift-giving, feeding, patronage and feasting. It is not necessarily the case that those rich in the cash economy are any less part of this moral economy. Moore places the distinction between the cash and moral economy in terms of “tradition” and “modernity”. “Failure to maintain tradition … is also something with which the well-off can belabour the poor. The well-to-do can be at once both more modern and more traditional than their less fortunate relatives… The poor cannot afford to be properly traditional, and they certainly cannot afford to be modern” (Moore 1986: 300). Tradition is not an unchanging set of traits handed down from the past, but is rather subject to change and contains both continuities and discontinuities with the past (Handler and Linnekin 1984). Some of the traditions of previous generations were readily abandoned by subsequent ones, most
strikingly the traditional rule of the chiefs. Nevertheless, as we shall see, in many other areas traditions persist.

There is a danger, in drawing on these themes, that a dichotomy can be created, as with James Ferguson’s distinction between the “cosmopolitanism” of the city and the “localism” of the rural community (Ferguson 1999: 211-212). Rather, the interplays between urban and rural, cosmopolitanism and localism, can play out in very different ways. For example, amongst the Manjaco people of Guinea-Bissau, Eric Gable (2006: 387) argues that locality and cosmopolitanism “were not imagined as separate or opposed moral spaces”. The village was not associated with a constructive communalism, nor was cosmopolitanism associated with a destructive individuality (ibid.: 387). Nevertheless, with the Chagga case, it is worthwhile to draw a distinction between the moral economy on the one hand and the cash economy on the other. Following Moore and Pietilä, it can be informative to see how these distinctions play out in Kilimanjaro, as this chapter illustrates.

It is the *kihamba* belt that forms the basis for Chagga ethnicity. The ancestral homeland is placed in an important position for the imagination of many ethnicities. Kristen Cheney (2004), for example, finds that Ugandan children, even those who had little actual connection with their rural ancestral homes, imagined the rural areas to be integral to their ethnic identity. In the Chagga case, the distinction should not be drawn between rural and urban, but rather between the *kihamba* belt and everywhere else. Not all migrants from Kilimanjaro moved into urban environments, many moved to other rural parts of Tanzania. As I conducted research in Dar es Salaam, Moshi and rural Kilimanjaro, there is an aspect of Chagga migration that I did not significantly cover. W. Arens (1973) examines a polyethnic rural community one hundred miles east of
Kilimanjaro. The village in that study had a diverse ethnic population, having attracted migrants from all over Tanzania. Most were working as subsistence farmers. A notable exception were members of the Chagga ethnic group who lived up to their entrepreneurial reputation. Trade in the village was almost completely dominated by people of Chagga ethnicity, and those who were engaged in farming were producing a surplus which they would sell through networks of Chagga traders. Furthermore, both Chagga people themselves and others in the village saw the Chagga ethnic group as uniquely distinct from others in the village:

the Chagga entrepreneurs… employ common ethnicity to facilitate the achievement of their economic ends. In effect, they have chosen to seize upon the advantages afforded by emphasising ethnicity and in the process have ‘tribalised’ themselves. Their failure to blend socially and culturally in the community is intentional. They are not merely representatives of another tribe but rather a distinct socio-economic group or class. However, it is ethnicity which is the symbol of their economic position. (Arens 1973: 446-448)

As can be seen, Chagga in a rural community away from the kihamba belt behaved as entrepreneurs and traders in a similar way to their behaviour in the urban environment. Thus, I argue that the distinction that should be drawn is not a rural-urban distinction but rather between the kihamba belt and elsewhere.

Furthermore, while the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro is the basis of the Chagga moral world, I found that it is not the case that it is static and unchanging. As will be discussed, the building in Kilimanjaro has resulted in a place that is understood as looking radically different from previous years. One man, Frank, who had gone to school in Machame, described how when he was a schoolboy it was not possible to see the sky because of the tree and banana plant coverage (Fieldnotes, 15/7/2006). Indeed, there is evidence that the tree coverage in the kihamba belt has declined since the 1960s (Soini 2005b: 315). The change seen in the rural areas stands in contrast to the very
slow rate of change understood in the development of Moshi town. The town of Moshi is frequently viewed as being a town that is not developing or changing (Fieldnotes, 21/10/2005). It is rural Kilimanjaro that is dynamic and changing, the nearest urban environment is constant and stagnant.

This chapter examines the elite involvement in the moral economy. As discussed in Chapter 1, the danger of many studies of the moral economy is that elites are portrayed as little more than clients in the patron-client relationships (Berman 1998; de Sardan 1999). I wish to examine the role of the elite in a more nuanced fashion, as I shall do below. First, however, it is worth exploring the concept of the moral economy in more detail through the examination of two key features: meat sharing, and communal work.

**The Moral Economy in Kilimanjaro: Meat and Work**

To illustrate the issues surrounding the moral economy in Kilimanjaro, and its relation to the cash economy, I will give two examples. The first is the role of meat, and the role this has in both the cash and the moral economies. This is an example of the persistence of the moral economy. The second example, that of the requirement to give labour for communal projects, has seen a marked decline in the post-independence period. I examine some of the moral discussions surrounding this.

The role of meat in the moral economy is an interesting case that illustrates the distinction, and interaction, between the moral and cash economies. Moore draws this distinction: when slaughtering a man’s own cow or goat for a slaughtering feast, a Chagga man has an obligation to share the meat within the lineage, with specific portions being reserved for specific family members (Moore 1986: 70-72). Not inviting
a relative, or failing to send a relative the specified portion, was a social snub that can result in serious fracture within the lineage (ibid.: 215). The meat-sharing was thus one of the most important aspects of lineage life, and remains so in contemporary Chagga life. However, as Moore observes, it is also possible to buy meat by the kilogram from one of the many butchers shops present in the rural communities. This meat is bought in cash and for consumption at home, with no obligation to share within the lineage according to the meat-sharing norms. Moore notes the distinction here: meat from the slaughtering feast played a vital role within the lineage, yet was also a food that could be bought in cash from a shop. It is “both sacred and secular” (ibid.: 132). James Ferguson (1999: xvi-xvii) was a student of Sally Falk Moore, and similar themes exist in their work.

It should not be thought that Moore was simply observing a society on the cusp of social change. The importance of the lineage meat-sharing remains a key aspect of lineage life, although it is perhaps less common as the number of cattle owned on Kilimanjaro has declined. Meat continues to have a role in both the moral and the cash economy. There have been further developments in the Chagga diet since Moore’s research. Pork is a meat that has grown in popularity in Kilimanjaro over the last few decades, and nowadays pork butcheries are a common sight in all parts of the mountain. It is a meat that has been accepted into the Chagga diet. Yet this is not a meat that is considered suitable to be part of the meat-sharing norms (Fieldnotes 15/7/2007). It is a meat that is only bought and sold as part of the cash economy, it has not entered into the moral sphere of meat-sharing. Unlike chicken, according to one informant a meat that was itself a comparatively new introduction to the Chagga diet (Fieldnotes 12/3/2006), a pig is a large enough animal to make it ideal for these ceremonies. It seems that, it all other respects apart from the meat-sharing, pork is considered a meat
in the same category as goat or beef. Yet while other meats, as Moore states, can be both “sacred and secular”, pork is only secular. How, then, to explain my observation that pork has remained in the sphere of the cash economy and not entered into the moral economy? The only explanation I can see is that this is because pork is a new introduction to the Chagga diet. The moral economy, in this instance, has been resistant to change.

Another instance of the use of meat, for which Chagga are known widely across Tanzania, is a particular practise at Chagga weddings. Early in my fieldwork, I attended a wedding between two Chagga people at the YMCA in Moshi, a popular location for wedding ceremonies. Towards the end of the ceremony, wheeled out to the crowd was a trolley on which stood a whole barbecued goat. The goat was arranged in a standing position on the trolley. Its head had clearly removed before it was cooked, and had been replaced on the neck of the goat, with leaves placed in its mouth. I learnt from later ceremonies that the head was sometimes cooked as well, and decorated with carrots. The arrival of the goat was clearly a highlight of the ceremony, as the audience reacted with joy and ululation as the goat was moved too and fro infront of everyone. My Chagga friend told me that this was “Chagga cake” (Fieldnotes 7/12/2005). I thought at first that this was a jokey reference for my benefit, but I later discovered that the “Chagga cake” was well known both between Chagga people and with non-Chagga alike. The production of a whole barbecued goat was an essential feature of Chagga weddings. Furthermore, it was understood more broadly in Tanzania as being a peculiarly Chagga custom.

A further aspect of the moral economy of Kilimanjaro, one in which seems to have been in decline for decades, is the concept of Kazi ya Jumatatu. Literally meaning “Work of
Monday”, the phrase refers to the day put aside each week for work on communal projects, mostly the maintenance of Kilimanjaro’s elaborate water projects. It is a practice that still exists in parts of Kilimanjaro, but is very much in decline. Because it is practiced to nowhere near the same extent as in the colonial period, I was unaware of the term until I came across it in a colonial-era report in the archives of the Lutheran Mission in Moshi. The report referred to the development of a water project, and stated that “The people are quite willing and ready to work [on the new water points] on communal day as ‘Kazi ya Jumatatu’” (Chagga Native Authority 1961). I did not know the meaning of the phrase, beyond the literal Swahili translation, so I asked a number of my informants. The most complete account was offered by Cornelius, as I wrote in my fieldnotes:

*Kazi ya Jumatatu* refers to the communal work that was done every Monday. They would do work on furrows, roads etc. Even today in many places they still do this, but especially they did it under the authority of the chieftaincy. So, I ask, what if you live in the area but aren’t around? Well, the reply is, you have to give a certain amount of money, as you live there. Nowadays, Cornelius explains, much of the work is building schools. People have to bring stones etc., or money. ‘Businessmen give a lot of money’. This is only for government schools (the government supplies the teachers), not private school… Cornelius explains, In Kilimanjaro, this occurred in any area under the chiefdoms. The day was used even to build homes for people who couldn’t build their own, poor people. The night before they would sound the alarm (drums and special whistles) to notify people that the next day was the *Kazi ya Jumatatu*. If you didn’t go to the work, people would come round to your home and take one of your possessions (a chair etc.) that they would eventually sell (Fieldnotes, 4/4/2007).

The accounts given of this activity are interesting from an elite perspective, as it includes the ability of a wealthy member of society to give money rather than perform the labour. In the case of more modern building projects, it would become a necessity as money would be required to buy materials. It is also interesting that it is engagement with the cash economy that enables a Chagga person to essentially buy their way out of
work, and that it is through material goods that a fine for non-attendance is required. However, the practice of *Kazi ya Jumatatu* is seen as being in decline since the end of the institution of chieftaincy.

The necessity of this communal *Kazi ya Jumatatu* emerges from the needs of maintaining Kilimanjaro’s complex furrow system of irrigation. As Alison Grove (1993: 442-445) describes it, one day a week set aside for communal work, which mainly consisted of the repair and maintenance of furrows. However, it is clear that the practise has been in decline, and does not exist at all in many parts of Kilimanjaro. Matthew Bender (2007: 31) agrees that there has been a decline since the 1960s in the obligation for communal labour, a development he puts down to the demise of the chiefs. While my fieldwork supports Bender’s finding of a decline in the obligatory communal work, Bender’s assertion that the cause of this was the decline of the chiefs needs further unpacking: after all, it was the position of furrow chairman, rather than chiefs, that controlled the maintenance of furrows.

Much of the reason for the decline in furrows may lie with issues surrounding the controls the chiefs had over the production, distribution and sale of *mbege*, the banana beer that is popular in Kilimanjaro. It was chiefs that had control over the sale of *mbege*. As a result, it is understood today that the chiefs control over *mbege* resulted in a far more tightly controlled availability of alcohol than there is today. This was particularly true surrounding *Kazi ya Jumatatu*, with the *mbege* shops closing early the day before and remaining close throughout the work. (Fieldnotes, 19/12/2005, 12/4/2006, 6/7/2007). This control over the production and sale of alcoholic drinks was an aspect of life on Kilimanjaro that was sadly missed, even by those informants of mine who drank heavily themselves. It was considered that there was a moral decline since the
liberalisation of this trade after the chiefs were abolished. A different slant on the role of alcohol in communal work is provided by Moore (1986: 187). She argues that much of the reason for the decline in this work was that, in the colonial period, “work parties ended in beer parties”; in the austere atmosphere of socialism it was not possible for party or state officials to offer the same incentives. It is interesting how Moore and my informants both put a very different spin on the same issues surrounding alcohol and communal work, and an explanation for the decline in Kazi ya Jumatatu. Moore places an emphasis on the availability of alcohol in the past; my present-day informants emphasise the restrictions. The two are not mutually exclusive, yet give a very different impression of the moral qualities of the past. My explanation is that this discrepancy is a product of the period in which Moore and my research was conducted. Moore is writing, as she describes it, in an austere socialist time-period, whereas during my research the liberalised economic and political spheres led for a more permissive environment. For Moore’s informants, with their minds firmly on austerity, the past was a time when alcohol and celebration were more freely available. For my informants, the issues surrounding alcohol in the present were very much in their minds, so their understandings of the past became a place in which more control was exercised.

The moral economy is a useful concept when considering the Chagga elite. In the sections that follow, I use the concept to explore the issues surrounding elite migration and the continued links that migrants maintain with Kilimanjaro.

**Elite Migration and Returning to Kilimanjaro**

As illustrated by the cases in Chapter 4, the opportunities away from Kilimanjaro for the Chagga elite are great. Migration from Kilimanjaro, important for Chagga people of
all social backgrounds (see Setel 1999) became particularly important for many people of elite status. Opportunities in the state sector, as well as with international organisations, provided far more opportunities for advancement than the mountainside itself. Elevation to the levels described in Chapter 4 were simply not possible confined to the *kihamba* belt.

Nevertheless, the *kihamba* provides a continual draw for the Chagga elite. Philip was an elite Chagga in his fifties, running a successful business in Dar es Salaam. I met up with him in Marangu, on his *kihamba*, where he had constructed a fine home and garden. As the sun set, he speculated aloud as to whether it would be possible for him to live in Marangu while still continuing his business interests. He wondered whether, with modern communication technologies, it would be possible to conduct most of his business from his home in Marangu. The transport links to Kilimanjaro are relatively good for rural Tanzania, and it would be possible for him to fly from Moshi airstrip to Dar es Salaam in a matter of hours. Philip realised that this dream was not really possible if he was to keep a close watch over his business interests in the city. He would not have the opportunity to live in Kilimanjaro until retirement (Fieldnotes, 28/12/2005).

Retirement in Kilimanjaro is one of the key goals stated by many of Chagga ethnicity. This is perhaps a consequence of the impact of working in the public sector. Working in a position that came with a house, from teachers to high-ranking party officials, the necessity of building a house for retirement becomes clear. This is, of course, an issue not limited to people of Chagga ethnicity. There are, however, issues specifically related to Chagga people that shall be discussed in the following sections. I shall now discuss how the elites made their presence felt even while away from Kilimanjaro. One feature
of the examples I shall discuss is that they are rife with the possibilities of tension between elite and non-elite populations. Yet direct conflicts are absent. In terms of establishing the relationships between elite and non-elite members of society, I do not claim to give a full account of the relations or struggle between the two. As most of my informants were of elite status themselves, I approached the situations from very much a top-down perspective. This was mitigated to an extent by extended periods of fieldwork in Machame, where through living in the area more relationships with non-elites developed. In addition, I had close relationships with non-elite families stemming from my long-standing connection with the region. Following Pietilä’s (2007) work on gossip in Kilimanjaro, the gossip about elites often eventually reaches elite ears. These factors mitigate somewhat the elite focus of my research.

**Housing in “The Beverly Hills of Tanzania”**

Walking through the *kihamba* belt of Kilimanjaro, there are some strikingly large houses surrounded by fine gardens. Kilimanjaro is known for the size and quality of the houses. One Dar es Salaam-based young Chagga woman described Kilimanjaro as “the Beverly Hills of Tanzania” because of the high quality and size of the homes built by the wealthy in that area (Fieldnotes, 10/8/2005). While the traditional style of Chagga housing had some variation across Kilimanjaro, they mainly consisted of a conical beehive shape. The largest houses could reach 25 feet in diameter. The houses across Kilimanjaro were thickly thatched with banana leaves (Dundas 1924: 255-258). This style of housing has seen a decline over the 20th century. By the 1970s, the traditional style of housing was still present, although “used principally by ‘old mothers’ who greatly prefer them” (Moore 1977a: 3). This older generation has passed, as this style of housing is almost non-existent in contemporary Kilimanjaro. From the end of the 19th
century, starting with the chief’s houses, rectangular houses with mud and wattle walls began to be built (ibid.: 3). By the 1970s, wealthy men build cinderblock houses with cement floors and metal roofs (Moore 1977a: 3). Since then, the metal roof has become almost ubiquitous, with the 2000/01 Household Budget Survey revealing that 85% of the houses in Kilimanjaro Region had roofs made from “modern materials”, amongst the highest in Tanzania (National Bureau of Statistics 2002a: 23).

In terms of the traditional beehive Chagga house, during the course of my fieldwork I did not come across any of the structures currently inhabited as homes, and I only saw a handful across the mountain in museums and as cultural tourism exhibits in Mamba and Marangu. It seems that the “old mothers” that Moore reports as being the last inhabitants of such houses have passed. Indeed, I was sometimes pointed towards a new structure, or yard, and told that the now-deceased grandmother of the residence had lived in a traditional-style house on the property, standing alongside the modern style of the dwelling of the other inhabitants of the kihamba. When the grandmother had died they had removed the traditional house\textsuperscript{54} (Fieldnotes, 23/5/2006). The traditional Chagga house was not simply a dwelling, it was also a key symbol of the importance of cooperative work and community. This is an element emphasised by early anthropologists to Kilimanjaro. House building was a cooperative endeavour within the kinship group, and it was required for cousins to help with either the construction of a new house or the repairing of a house before the rains. Boys and men gathered material from the forest to construct the beams and rafters, while women and girls gathered the

\textsuperscript{54} It is not practical, outside of a museum context, to keep a traditional house as a memento in the kihamba. In 1999, while I was a teacher at Moshi Technical School, my English colleague conducted an undergraduate research project on the traditional Chagga house. He paid some men from Masama to construct a house in our garden at the school. He discovered the hard way that, unless a thatched house is kept regularly smoked through the use of a cooking fire, the insect life in the thatch makes the house uninhabitable.
material to thatch the house. The mutual obligation of the building of the house was helped by the feasting and beer-drinking that marked the house’s completion (Raum 1967 [1940]: 210). There was a phrased used by people who were regretting their own selfish behaviour towards their kinsmen, “The posts of my house are hitting me”, as he felt his very house had turned against him. “His house, everywhere the symbol of a man’s safety and independence, is not after all his own; it is built with the consent, help, and blessing of his kinsmen, and important house-building ceremonies testify to this interdependence” (Steiner 1954: 368). Today, the situation is very different, particularly with regard to elite housing. While the poor may receive some help with the construction of the homes, as mentioned in the discussion of Kazi ya Jumatatu above, there is no reciprocity in the construction of elite houses. Materials, and labour, are bought. There is a clear shift in this respect from the communal building of homes in the past.

Elite houses in the kihamba belt are of remarkable size and quality. While I am aware of only one house in the kihamba belt that is more than one story tall – the home of the family of Reginald Mengi, the business and media tycoon – the single-story houses of the elite were still of impressive size. A common feature was the number of bedrooms: often, there was one master bedroom and an additional bedroom for each of the family’s offspring. On occasion, each of the bedrooms had en suite bathroom facilities (Fieldnotes, 14/6/2007). However, many of these bedrooms were empty for most of the time. As I have discussed, opportunities took the Chagga elite away from Kilimanjaro for much of the year. By the time retirement approached, the children would be grown

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55 I heard it told that the Protea Aishi Machame hotel, owned by the 2005 CHADEMA Presidential candidate Freeman Mbowe and built on his ancestral kihamba, was originally constructed as his family home and later turned into a hotel (3/7/2007). I did not find confirmation for this story.
and be married, have *kibamba* of their own, or be away from Kilimanjaro. It was a striking feature that houses of such scale be built, with rooms for grown children, when the owner knew that most of the rooms would be empty for much of the year. The reason for this was given by one informant. A widow, her three children were all living in the USA, where she had lived with her late husband for many years. She and her husband had built a house in Kilimanjaro with rooms for each of her offspring, even though each of them was full-grown, married and living abroad. She was, however, completely clear as to the reason that a house of this scale was necessary: it was so that all of her family could be together at Christmas (Fieldnotes, 30/6/2006). The Chagga return visit to Christmas, as detailed below, was one of the key motivating factors for the construction of houses on the scale in which they were built. Some of the more extravagant constructions were built with other occasions in mind; one home-owner had built an extra wing of his house with three extra bedrooms to accommodate guests for his son’s wedding (Fieldnotes, 23/12/2005). But it was the Christmas visit that was the motivation for providing a bedroom for each family member, even those absent.

Size was not the only criteria for the construction of houses; the quality and craftsmanship of the construction also seemed to be of value and importance. Materials that were imported from outside of the region, plus the use of craftsmen from beyond Kilimanjaro itself, were proudly displayed (for example, fieldnotes 12/5/2006). Amy Stambach notes that the secondary education of girls in General Housecraft led to similarities and orderliness to interior design between one home and the next (Stambach 2000: 51-52). In looking at these houses, I often looked to see if I could see any sign in their architecture or design that harked back to earlier norms of Chagga house design. The traditional Chagga house was of a distinctive design, and I looked to see if any of the aspects of designs of modern Chagga houses provided a reference or
reflection on these earlier designs. I found it difficult to find anything that harked back to traditional designs or construction techniques. The possible exception is some of the designs of hotels such as the round and thatched Capricorn Hotel in Marangu, although these were not homes.

The contradiction at the heart of the housing situation in Kilimanjaro is that many of the large houses are empty for much of the year. In order to raise the cash to construct the property, work away from the mountainside. This means that, while the smaller houses of non-elite members of Chagga society may often be small and over-crowded, the larger elite housing is left empty. These are themes that are discussed below, and also pertain to the growing land shortage of Kilimanjaro. However, it should not be thought that this means that the elite housing on Kilimanjaro is of the nature of empty mansions that were little more than follies, designed to show the cosmopolitan sophistication of the owner. This was far from the case. The interior of these houses clearly indicated that these were homes, places to be lived in. They are places filled with ornaments and keepsakes, as well as treasured family photographs on the walls. Another interesting point was that the houses often had separate offices, designed for use of the Chagga elite to do work, and to complete their correspondence during retirement. Some had private libraries. These were houses designed to be a place in which to live and work.

As well as the houses themselves, there is also a strong tendency for the elites to surround their homes with large, often walled, gardens. There is a long connection made by European visitors between the landscape of Kilimanjaro and English gardens. Harry Johnston described one natural lawn as “only awaiting tennis to be perfect” (Johnston 1885: 154). The climate of Kilimanjaro is conducive to producing European-
style lawns and gardens. Yet they do require maintenance and upkeep. For example, Robert, a Dar es Salaam-based businessman, has a large kihamba on which he had built a large home and was developing a garden. He employs a full-time gardener to maintain the lawn. Robert also employs a specialist gardener from Dar es Salaam “from time to time” who had a more specialised knowledge in the maintenance of the lawn and taking care of the flowerbeds. Roberts speaks in pride of his imported English grasses that he used for his lawn (Fieldnotes, 27/12/2005). The European character of these gardens was, in Robert’s case at least, deliberate.

While the large homes and gardens take up space in the kihamba, I found that it was never the case that they completely replaced the growing of plants such as bananas and masale. In some cases, the area of the kihamba devoted to crops was in a separate space, separated from the garden by a wall. Robert, on the other hand, had chosen to grow a select few banana plants scattered across his lawn. “We made the decision to grow a few bananas, well and scientifically.” Nevertheless, one feature that seems to be growing more common on Kilimanjaro is the walls and gates that are being built around the borders of the kihamba plot. Joseph was considering building a wall and gate around his house, but was concerned that this would attract thieves who would assume that he had valuables inside his house (Fieldnotes, 20/08/2007). The presence of these walls surrounding properties radically alters the appearance of the landscape. In those parts of Kilimanjaro where walls are most common, the appearance is closer to that of a wealthier suburb of Dar es Salaam. The fact that other people’s kihamba are no longer accessible has some impact on the customs and traditions in Kilimanjaro. For example, there was an old tradition that any person passing a kihamba in which ripe bananas had been left on the plant was permitted to eat the fruit (Von Clemm 1964: 115). This is
presumably made impossible by the presence of a wall. Yet I argue that in a key respect the introduction of these walls is not as radical a shift as it may appear.

While the introduction of fences and walls to surround a *kihamba* may appear to be a new feature, I argue that it does not necessarily change the spatial relationship between the plots of Chagga persons. *Vihamba* had definite and fixed boundaries between them. The boundaries between *vihamba* continue to be marked by *masale* (*dracaena*) plants. As discussed in the literature, this plant is of large significance to Chagga people. It was used to mark the graves of ancestors (Dundas 1924: 192-193). It was known as the “plant of peace and pardon” (Wimmelbücker 2002: 53). Emissaries between rival chiefdoms, even in the case of all-out war, would not be killed if carrying *masale* (Kileo 2005: 34). It would be carried when a Chagga person was admitting guilt. For example if he had wronged another and was presenting a goat or cow to another in recompense, he would arrange a wreath of *masale* around the animal’s neck (Steiner 1954: 367). When Edwin Mtei and his fellow Makerere students were forced to apologise to the Paramount Chief for a perceived insult, the were made to carry a bundle of *masale* leaves (Mtei 2009: 37-38). It also plays an important role in divination (Myhre 2006). *Masale* is also used to mark the borders of individual *kihamba* plots. The *masale* provided a “supernaturally protected legal right” to that land (Moore 1986: 81-82). Indeed, on the Chagga flag pictured in Chapter 3, a *masale* plant is depicted as surrounding Kibo, coffee and the bananas.

The use of *masale* as a plant delineating the borders of a *kihamba* is almost ubiquitous for *vihamba* today. I noted in my research that even those people who have put up a

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56 In the 19th century, there were occasionally stone walls built around Chagga compounds to protect families, crops and livestock from wild animals (Wimmelbücker 2002: 253).
fence surrounding their *vihamba* still often have a row of these plants to mark the edges of their property. As Myhre argues, the *masale* plants are intertwined with the concepts of neighbourliness and boundary, entwining social, spatial and affective proximity.

“*Dracaena* as a means of separation is hence as integral to dwelling as the objects that transcend these boundaries” (Myhre 2006: 324). It seems to me that with such a concept of a spatial boundary between *vihamba*, the construction of a wall around the border does fit into much of the existing social order. I argue that the presence of the *masale* in addition to a fence or wall is not only a matter of ensuring a supernatural as well as physical protection for the *kihamba*. With the significance of the *masale* with regard to ensuring neighbourliness and proximity as well as division, the presence of the plant mitigates the potential lack of trust apparent in the construction of a fence. Again, the moral economy continues to be a powerful force on Kilimanjaro, even for the elite.

For the Western researcher, the housing situation on Kilimanjaro draws into sharp contrast the social divisions in the *kihamba* belt. Large houses of the elite stand empty, while their neighbours and kinsmen are crowded into far simpler, smaller dwellings. Gardens cover significant areas of elite *vihamba* in the context of severe land shortages. For the outsider researcher such as myself, this draws into relief the type of social divisions highlighted by Howard and Millard (1997). Given that my research was into elite members of the community, it is difficult for me to give a full account of the role of non-elite responses to elite housing. Nevertheless, there did emerge reasons to think that the conflict between the elites and non-elites is an issue that is less of a cause of social conflict than it might have been thought.

The construction of a house in Kilimanjaro is an imperative, and a key part of the moral economy. Commenting on the elite houses, William described how it was “ritually”
important to build a fine home on the *kihamba*. It has been described as relating back to the period of chieftaincy. A woman described it thus: “A man was supposed to provide a good house for his family. If he didn’t, the chief would ask him why not” (Fieldnotes, 15/6/2007). Compare this to the comments made by early twentieth century anthropologists of Kilimanjaro, where the community element of house-building was emphasised. In contemporary Kilimanjaro, the emphasis is put on the need for a good house. Therefore, in the views of these informants, the construction of elite houses is the meeting of this cultural requirements. I would add to this my observation that the houses of elites still meet meets many of the facets of *kihamba* production. As I observed, the elite *kihamba* might have large houses and gardens, yet they also still contained bananas, *masale*, and often livestock. In these important respects, despite the gardens, the homes of the elites are recognisably on a working *kihamba*.

There still remains the potential social problem of the competition between Chagga people over the size of their houses. One non-elite example was a friend of mine in Moshi, a secondary-school teacher called Mark who was nearing retirement during my fieldwork. Financially, over the time that I knew him he was often not in a strong position. He had children relatively late, and they were just entering secondary school as he neared retirement. To further add to his responsibilities, a relative of his in Dar es Salaam passed away, leaving him also responsible for two additional sets of school fees. He spent most of his spare time and money in the five years prior to retirement working on a house on his *kihamba* in Uru. The house was clearly important to Mark, as it was necessary for him to have a place to live with his young family. Yet he also felt the need to build a home that compared well with his neighbours; he expressed the need to “build a house at least as good as my brother’s” (Fieldnotes, 3/1/2006). His brother, working as a petty trader, probably had a similar level of income as Mark. In terms of a
person he was aiming to be competitive with, Mark had reasonable expectations. He was not looking to be in competition with the neighbouring elite houses, an unreasonable expectation on his salary. Rather, he had obtainable goals. I met Mark again in early 2011, after he had retired and his house had been completed. He was living in the house he had built, and very satisfied with its size and quality.

From the elite perspective, some elites are not naive to the social issues surrounding housing. The problem with regard to competition over house size was expressed to me by a woman, Sylvia, who was Chagga herself had retired to the large house on her husband’s *kihamba*. She told me that she recognised the danger the danger that competition between people over house sizes would have for Kilimanjaro. Her concern, however, was not about the competition between elite and non-elite members of society, but rather a concern about young people who suddenly had received a substantial income at a young age through trade and business. She was “trying to explain to them that they did not have to build such large houses”, and how it was unnecessary for young men barely in their twenties to sink all their wealth into the construction of such large houses (3/8/2007). This did indicate that there is elite awareness of the issues surrounding large houses, and how this uses up valuable *kihamba* land. However, it is a concern that raises more issues about intra-elite conflict than illustrating a broader social concern. As discussed in more detail in the second section of this chapter, the older, educated elite – of which Sylvia was a member – have many concerns about the younger elite generation. Sylvia’s concerns are not only a recognition of the problems raised by the large houses of Kilimanjaro, but also are connected to a desire to prevent the younger elite generation from gaining the prestige of larger houses. This connects to themes of the changing role of education, discussed below.
Burial in Kilimanjaro

Many members of the Chagga elite have complex backgrounds. An example is the son of Sam Ntiro, the late Simbo Ntiro. While his father was born in Machame, his mother was from Uganda. He was born in Kampala, and educated in the UK while his father worked there as High Commissioner after independence. After being educated in the UK, his son Simbo lived in Kenya for many years, and married a Kenyan. While he later moved to Tanzania and lived in Dar es Salaam, he rarely had the opportunity to visit Kilimanjaro. The time abroad affected his language: while Simbo was fluent in Swahili, he spoke it with a noticeable English accent. As such, Simbo has a complex background, with a multiplicity of potential identities with which he could identify himself. Yet Simbo’s own identity was proudly Tanzanian, and proudly Chagga. I asked, why are you Chagga? His reply was, “I will be buried in Kilimanjaro”. (Fieldnotes, 16/8/2005)

Historically, there has been a variety of rituals and traditions associated with burials and funerals in Kilimanjaro. There existed a tradition of exhuming the body a year or eighteen months after death, with the skull being kept in the deceased’s kihamba. It was this ceremony that marked the deceased’s having entered the ancestral group (Dundas 1924: 190-195). Given the numbers of Chagga people who have migrated from Kilimanjaro, unsurprisingly many deaths occur away from the mountain. If a person has to be buried away from Kilimanjaro, there are certain rituals that become necessary. According to William, if a Chagga person is buried in a “foreign land” – i.e., away from Kilimanjaro – “their spirit will haunt you, and cause misfortune”. This can be countered by taking some of the earth from the grave where the person was buried, and returning this to their kihamba back on Kilimanjaro. William had done this with his uncle’s
daughter, who had died suddenly and whose body was not able to be returned to Kilimanjaro for burial (Fieldnotes 28/7/2005). Others are vehement, however, that the desire to be buried on their *vihamba* is not connected in any way to beliefs connected to ancestors. Mama Itosi, for example, strongly disagreed that the practices were anything to do with ancestor worship. “It has nothing to do with superstition. It is just the feeling that home is Kilimanjaro” (Fieldnotes, 15/6/2007)

The importance for Chagga people of being buried in their *kihamba* is well covered in the literature. Charles Dundas wrote in the 1920s that the *kihamba*

> is first and foremost the family graveyard… [I]t is not to be wondered that the Chagga speaks and thinks of his grove as home, a place of intimate and sacred associations which he cannot be indifferent to. I make no doubt that it is this which in a large measure makes the Chagga more attached to his home and country than is usual among Africans. (Dundas 1924: 194-195)

Päivi Hasu (1999: 452) describes how burial in their *kihamba* is the essential element of Chagga identity. “The Chagga are those who die and become buried in the banana garden”. Even those richer members of the community for whom the *kihamba* may be of little economic significance consider it a necessity to be buried in the *kihamba* (ibid.: 452-453). Chagga people are far from unique in this characteristic. The Haya ethnic group, from north-western Tanzania, who are similar in some respects to Chagga, have similar practices. Brad Weiss argues that, no matter how far a person may have travelled during his or her lifetime, being buried on the appropriate farm provided an “occasion for the recentring of persons and objects as the dead are returned to the land, and these central lands are re-identified with those who inherit from the deceased” (Weiss 1993: 29). As well as this spatial recentring, Weiss argues, burial also provides a form of temporal focality. It creates obligations for the descendents of the deceased, while at the same time allowing the deceased to realise their own authority over their descendents.
“The near and the distant, the past and the future are continually cycled through the focal site [of the burial site]… The grave is an objectification of these processes of continuity and identification” (ibid.: 29).

Given that elites are relatively small in number, I did not have the opportunity to attend many funerals of elites. Unfortunately, I was in the UK during the time of the 2007 funerals of Thomas Marealle, the Paramount Chief, and instead had to follow the funerals via news reports and interviews after the case. I did get the opportunity to attend numerous non-elite funerals, and the I shall discuss the elite involvement in these funerals below. However, first I shall discuss some of the issues involved with the one elite funeral that I did have the opportunity to attend.

In 2009, I attended the funeral of Joseph, an elite Chagga man in his forties who I had known since the beginning of my fieldwork. Living in Dar es Salaam, he was a very strong networker, and as a consequence had many friends from all over of not just Tanzania but internationally. As a result, many of the events surrounding his death were well-attended not just by Chagga kin but also a variety of people from around the world. People began to gather at grounds of his rented flat in Dar es Salaam in the evenings following his death. The separate clusters of people in this wake, held over several nights, revealed something of the fracturing inherent in the life: the fellow elites – Chagga and non-Chagga – were in one area, while the mostly non-elite kinsmen had almost a separate gathering in another part of the compound. Those Chagga elite who were kin operated across both groups. There are, however, important ways in which the spheres interacted, for example the cash contributions made by people of all backgrounds were pooled.
A memorial service was held at the Anglican cathedral in Dar es Salaam, before the body was taken to Machame for the burial service. A coach was hired for the taking of the body and mourners to Moshi and then Machame. This coach was paid for by the contributions, although most of the elite travelled instead by private vehicle, or even flew to Moshi airstrip. Thus, most of the people taking the coach were not of elite status. Indeed, the coach stopped on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam for many of the mourners to buy sleeping mats, as well as charcoal as fuel can be scarce on Kilimanjaro. It was clear that there were many opportunities for tensions between elites and non-elites with these transport arrangements. While a contribution had to be made to travel on the coach, this contribution could be small or, through slight of hand, non-existent. With the bus fare to Moshi from Dar es Salaam starting at around 8,000/= Tanzanian schillings at this time, it can still be a saving to attend funerals. This leads to the possibility of kin using the transport to Machame not for the purpose of attending the funeral but rather for reason of getting a subsidised trip to Kilimanjaro. It was perhaps as a result of this fear that the decision had been made to hire the coach only from Dar es Salaam to Machame, and not for the return journey. Those making the return journey would have to make their own arrangements. Nevertheless, it was still a subsidised trip for the non-elites.

Joseph had a very international and cosmopolitan collection of friends. This did led me to wonder, as I travelled up to Machame, what the nature of the burial ceremony itself would be like. The most striking issue about the burial ceremony was the strong similarities between this ceremony and the non-elite burials I had attended. For the time that we were in Machame, the process of the burial was very similar to the non-elite burials that I had witnessed. As was usual, there was a large crowd from local mourners coming to the funeral. A Christian religious service was held, on this occasion
outside of the house of Joseph, although sometimes the religious services are held in a nearby church. Hymns, in the Machame dialect, were sung. Then, following a viewing of the body, the coffin was closed and carried to where the hole had been dug in the kihamba, alongside the grave of Joseph’s father. The coffin was placed in the ground and quickly buried, then the officiator called various categories of people to lay flowers on the grave. In a nod to the international presence of mourners, these categories were spoken in English as well as Swahili.

The funeral arrangements in Machame did not seem to me to be much different from those of a non-elite. The burial was conducted in the same fashion as it would be for the non-elite. This was an interesting observation, as Joseph was a man who was proud of his cosmopolitan achievements. He had been buried, as he wished, in his kihamba, according to Chagga custom. The funeral was clearly not considered the proper occasion to flaunt the cosmopolitan achievements of the deceased. Neither is it, as I shall discuss below, a time that the wealth of the mourners is to be displayed ostentatiously.

Elite involvement in funerals extends beyond the funeral of elites themselves, but also to elite attendance at the funerals of non-elites. How many funerals an elite might attend seems to depend on their proximity to Kilimanjaro. For the elites living in the kihamba belt, attendance at funerals was almost compulsory. The crowds of local residents that would attend every burial was a notable feature of life in the kihamba belt. This attendance was not only for religious or spiritual reasons, but also social. I visited an informant in Rombo, who had been landless himself but had recently bought a kihamba from a distant kinsman who had died childless. This seemed to be rare, but it was in fitting with Chagga tradition. To be sure of the role of his new kihamba, I asked where
he would be buried; he confirmed that he would be buried on his newly bought land. As my informant moving to a different part of Rombo from where he grew up, he was making a strong effort to be sure of fitting in with the resident population. One of the ways in which he did this was by making sure that he attended every local funeral, and made sure that he was seen at the occasions (Fieldnotes, 13/2/2006). By making the necessary appearance at events such as funerals, he was making sure that he was accepted by the community of which he had just become a member.

For elites not living in the kihamba belt, attendance at funerals seems to depend upon the distance from the place the funeral was taking place. In Moshi, many a time an interview was cancelled because an informant had to attend funeral. For those living in Dar es Salaam, visits to funerals were less common. Elite travel to funerals, for those in Moshi or Dar es Salaam, was often by chauffeur-driven car, or from Dar es Salaam a flight to Moshi airstrip was an option. Thus, elite attendance at funerals, while possibly not of high expense for the elites, was a relatively expensive occasion compared to the remainder of the Chagga population. It was more the time pressures than the cost of travel that limited elite attendance.

It is the case that elites make use of their access to the cash economy to attend funerals, yet overt displays of wealth during a funeral itself is not always fitting to the right and proper behaviour of a funeral. I attended the burial of an elderly woman in June 2007, who I had known since my earliest visits to Tanzania. Her funeral was held in Old Moshi. While I could not describe her own status as elite, she had educated children who had achieved positions in state and business positions. One of her sons was a judge. On the day of the burial, a church service was held in her local church in Old Moshi, and then there was a ten-minute walk to her kihamba where the burial was to take
place. Her son, who had been chauffeur-driven to the funeral in a new Land Cruiser, was driven this short distance from the church to the burial place. This action was the subject, after the burial was complete, of many rumours and discussions amongst the mourners, expressing the belief that this was an ostentatious show of wealth that was improper at the time of his mother’s funeral (Fieldnotes, 7/6/2007).

In the case of this incident, as I was not staying for an extended period of time in that area I was not aware of the full context of the situation. It was, however, memorable as it contrasted with my experiences witnessing other funerals in communities where I had been resident. When living in Machame, for instance, it was a common sight to see that elite members of the community arrived at non-elite funerals in expensive vehicles, sometimes with their own drivers. It was not uncommon to see the narrow roads almost blocked by the presence of such vehicles. It must have been obvious to the non-elites how the elites had arrived at the funerals. Yet I never heard any non-elites criticise elites for this fact, or comment that the elites had performed an ostentatious display of wealth by driving to the funeral, even when I was living in the community and was therefore in a position to hear of complaints. Because of this, the criticisms of the judge’s behaviour during his mother’s funeral were memorable. It was apparently acceptable to be driven to a funeral, yet to do so during the funeral is inappropriate. It is clear that proper behaviour during the funeral presents a balance in what behaviours are considered appropriate and inappropriate.

A similar story about the sensitivities surrounding funerals is described by Pietilä. Pietilä (2007: 155-159) examined the gossip surrounding the burial of the father of a prosperous entrepreneur: the son was criticised for making the funeral too much of a show of his own personal wealth, from the holding of the funeral ceremony in the
largest nearby church, to the grave itself being lined with stones. This is another example of the sensitivities involved surrounding funerals, similar to the ones surrounding cars that I observed. This sets the Chagga as distinct from some other groups. For example, Gable (2006: 390) describes funerals in Guinea-Bissau in which returning migrants from urban areas “transform the space of the funeral ceremony into a theatre of cosmopolitan accomplishments”. The Chagga experience is different, in that the cosmopolitan achievements are kept at arms-length from the funeral space. This does not mean, of course, that the rural area is devoid of reminders of the achievements of the cash economy – the large houses of the Chagga elite serve as a permanent reminder.

While part of the moral economy, and an arena in which overt displays of the cosmopolitan achievements of the elites are frowned upon, funerals have still been subject to social change. There have clearly been changes over the 160 years that European scholars have been studying the customs of Kilimanjaro. One of the notable features of Chagga burial customs was that, after a year of burial, the body was exhumed with the skull being kept in a clay jar on the kihamba57 (Raum 1967 [1940]: 380). This was a practise that was known about amongst contemporary Chagga, but not something that people practised. Similarly, I never saw any skulls in vihamba. I did notice that, in a handful of vihamba, grave markers had been placed to mark the site of burials of

57 The presence of these skulls in the kihamba grove is not mentioned by many of the earliest accounts of the kihamba belt of Kilimanjaro (Johnston 1886; Meyer 1891). It was only with those authors who had spent an extended time on Kilimanjaro, such as Bruno Gutmann (see Moore 1986: 81-82) and Charles Dundas (1924), that the written accounts emerged of the practice of exhumation. One possible reason for this was the fear of theft of the skulls by Europeans. The section on “Ethnology” in an 1871 British admiralty guide to scientific enquiry advises that a collection of skulls be procured and returned to Britain to aid in the study of skull shape (Herschel 1871: 235-236). This fear may have been realised; after the public hanging of Mangi Meli, the chief of Old Moshi, by the German authorities in 1899, there are reports that the head was taken to Germany, prompting calls in 2005 for its repatriation (Tagseth 2010: 18).
ancestors many generations past. These markers were not marked by crosses, I was told, because the ancestor had not converted to Christianity (Fieldnotes, 6/7/2006). The original deaths of these individuals may have dated back to the time that exhumation had occurred.

There has also apparently been more recent change to funerals compared to research conducted even a few decades ago. Today, they are increasingly understood as closer to one-day affairs. As described by Charles Dundas, funerals used to last through four or five days of various ceremonies (Dundas 1924: 184). More recently, during the funeral that Pietilä researched as being too much of a show of the achievements of the son, funerals were marked over the course of several days. Rather than holding a feast only on the day following the burial, as was required by custom, the son was criticised for providing food and drink on the day of the burial itself. This was deemed to be inappropriate by the deceased’s neighbours, making the funeral occasion seem too much like a feast (Pietilä 2007: 158). However, during my own research, it was not unusual for food and drink to be provided on the day of the funeral itself. The food served would include pilau, as well as banana-based dishes and usually chicken. As far as I could tell, this was not considered unusual or in poor taste. This may in part have been due to the nature of the funerals I attended. With a large migrant population, the difficulty of travelling to Kilimanjaro for a long period made longer events marking funerals ineffective. For people living and working even in nearby Moshi, a long trip to the funeral may have been problematic. This change in the funeral customs may be a consequence of a feature noted by Mercer, Page and Evans, that of the pressure of the diaspora to modernise burial and funeral customs (Mercer, Page et al. 2008: 157-178).
Christmas in Kilimanjaro

The other occasion that the Chagga are known for returning to Kilimanjaro is at Christmastime. Of course, it is hardly unusual for people from a variety of backgrounds to make a visit to a place they consider home during the Christmas period. Nevertheless, this is a feature of Chagga identity for which Chagga people are well-known; the visits are mentioned in some of the academic literature (see, for example, Omari 1987: 73; Setel 1996: 1171; Hasu 2009). The Christmas return visits are commented upon regularly by both Chagga and non-Chagga people in Tanzania. It is sometimes referred jokingly as a “pilgrimage” or even “Haj” (11/12/2005). There is a broad understanding that the Chagga are unusual for their desire to return back to Kilimanjaro for Christmas. “At Christmas time, the buses to the North will be full”, as one respondent put it (Fieldnotes, 28/7/2005). The emphasis that is placed on the Christmas visit in the popular discourse in Tanzania is a reflection of the broad understanding of Chagga people placing an emphasis on Kilimanjaro and of returning there.

There is an understanding amongst Chagga people that the Christmas visit is of traditional importance. The Christmas visit, I was told, was traditionally a time when a migrant would return to Kilimanjaro to receive the blessings of their parents for a successful and prosperous year ahead. The parents would spit in the faces of their offspring to give them their blessing (9/8/2005). Spitting was a traditional sign of blessing in Kilimanjaro, for example in the past used as a blessing for the household by a man at the start of a new day (Lema 1999: 50). I never personally witnessed any spitting, but the significance of returning annually remains.
Christmas is seen as an opportunity for urban-based Chagga elites to return to Kilimanjaro with their children to instil in them moral values. In one instance, I was sitting with a group of Chagga elites in Dar es Salaam; George was describing the visit he had made with his teenage son to Kilimanjaro over the course of several months over the previous Christmas. At the beginning of December, George did not seem to mind that his son had been out late, presumably drinking. However, on one occasion, it was the time to do some furrow maintenance as part of Kazi ya Jumatatu. The son, still in bed, asked his father, can we not just pay someone to do the work for us? George told the group that he explained to his son that this was not the point, and that he should learn to do work (Fieldnotes, 1/6/2007). This story told in Dar es Salaam tells of the moral lessons George was trying to teach his son during a Christmas visit. However, a point did occur to me, that I was unable to raise in the context of an elite group. According to the norms of Kazi ya Jumatatu, it was acceptable for those with resources to pay rather than perform work. George’s moral lesson to his son about the value of work was not a direct reflection of a traditional Chagga culture but rather his attempt to teach his own moral lessons.

While the ideal of the Christmas visit may be a time to teach the younger generation about the proper moral behaviour of the kihamba belt, in practise the experience of the young was often different. It was not uncommon to see teenagers walking around the roads of the kihamba belt at Christmastime, missing the comforts of their urban lifestyle. The direct clash between an urban-based youth and the older generation in Kilimanjaro was evident in some non-elite interactions. On one occasion, I was visiting Uru in the company of a non-elite informant. We visited his mother’s house, a small, smoke-filled mud-and-wattle house that she shared, according to Chagga tradition, with her two cows. She talked to her son about the visit of a niece of his, a young woman.
who had been sent to visit her. She was complaining at length about the girl’s behaviour. She had been spending a lot of her time in local bars, and while alcohol or sexual misconduct was not mentioned, she complained that the girl “only cares about television… I don’t want to see her again!” (Fieldnotes, 22/4/2006). In terms of elite people bringing their children and teenagers to Kilimanjaro for Christmas, I never heard any conflicts as vehemently expressed. One possibility for this is that, for the elite, Kilimanjaro contains many of the same facilities as Dar es Salaam. There would be no need to have conflicts over the television, for example, when the elite homes were equipped with many of the necessary amenities. In fact, many young urbanites seemed to do well over their Christmas trip (Fieldnotes, January 2006).

Christmas is an occasion that is looked forward to in Kilimanjaro. Spending time in Machame, there was clear sense of pride amongst the non-elite population that, come Christmas, well-known and influential national figures would be spending time in their neighbourhood. Visiting a church in the area, a non-elite expressed pride in the achievements of her neighbours: “at Christmas, Reginald Mengi will be sitting there”, she said, pointing at a pew (Fieldnotes, 3/10/2006). Thus, Christmas is a time when the successful children of Kilimanjaro, for whom their relatives are proud, return to the mountainside. It is again, I argue, displaying an interplay of cosmopolitanism and localism. It was said that the returning migrants took with them the necessary goods for the Christmas celebrations (Fieldnotes 10/1/2006). Principally, this means beer (whether mbege or bottled beers) and meat. The returning migrants for the Christmas celebrations were not physically bringing back beer and meat; rather, more often than not, they were returning with cash to buy these items locally. I argue that for it to be said that the migrants are returning with these goods, rather than the money to buy them, is placing the act of returning within the sphere of the moral economy rather than
the cash one. The interplay of the two spheres is interesting here. It is the achievements within the cash economy of the city that enable the returning migrant to purchase the goods necessary for Christmas to be celebrated in a suitable, traditional style. Yet it is not described in this manner, but is rather described in terms of the moral economy.

As the examples of housing, burial and Christmas illustrate, there are strong and important linkages between the elite people of Kilimanjaro. It is in Kilimanjaro that there are interesting interplays between the cash and the moral economies. These serve to emphasise the importance of Kilimanjaro and the *kihamba* to Chagga ethnicity. I shall now move on to the second half of this chapter, which discusses some of the new challenges facing the heart of the Chagga moral economy – Kilimanjaro itself.

**Liberalisation in Tanzania**

There are a number of new challenges facing Kilimanjaro that are of great concern to elites. In the second section of this chapter, I shall discuss the issues connected to land shortages, the declining coffee price, and the changing role of education, before concluding by discussing one of the ways these issues are addressed by elites through local NGOs. Many of these issues are understood as emerging from the process of liberalisation of Tanzania’s economy, which I shall now discuss.

By the 1980s, the economy of Tanzania was in a worsening position. Tanzania had previously maintained a balance of receiving a large amount of Western aid, on the one hand, while maintaining a radical position with regard to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa that often undermined the Western position (Biermann and Wagao 1986: 98). The country’s GDP was shrinking, the government was in permanent deficit
and the low levels of exports resulted in a worsening balance of trade (Svendsen 1986: 71-72). The macroeconomic problems translated into economic hardship for many of the citizens of Tanzania. The lack of availability of basic goods, by the mid-1980s, had become extreme. Basic consumer goods, such as sugar, soap, paraffin and cooking oil, were in short supply (Bevan, Collier et al. 1989: 49-51). As an example of the difficulties, I present the case of William’s wedding. William, originally from Old Moshi, was working as a university lecturer at a provincial university at the time I interviewed him in 2005. He got married on the 18th December 1982 in Old Moshi, but at the time he was working as a secondary-school teacher in Mbeya, South-West Tanzania. At this time William describes the country as “literally under embargo” because of the impossibility of importing goods. As the only clothes available were nylon clothes from China, William had to go to some lengths to provide clothing that he saw as suitable for him and his wife. For his suit, William had a brother in Canada who posted him the suit, although he was only able to receive it through a special permit from the Regional Commissioner for Mbeya. For his shirt, as the country had no cotton clothing available, William went to a Roman Catholic priest and received one that had been donated from Europe. His shoes he bought from an Italian living in Morogoro. His wife’s dress originated from Russia, brought over by a teacher friend who was visiting Russia on holiday. William was clearly a well-connected individual, who had to take advantage of his networks in order to receive the clothing he deemed suitable for his wedding.

58 As with other aspects of the economic history of Tanzania, the impact was not uniform. For instance, when the lack of foreign exchange lead to restrictions on the amount of cooking oil imported into the country, this resulted in an economic boom for the coconut oil producing parts of Mafia Island (Caplan 2007: 684).
William also had to go to great lengths to provide for the wedding feast. He had to travel to Arusha to buy beer and soft drinks for the wedding. Unlike the drinks available in contemporary Tanzania, there were no fizzy soft drinks because of the limitation on the import of carbon dioxide, so he had to make do with flat ChemiCola. As he needed ten crates, this presented a difficulty as he would be stopped at one of the many roadblocks, and transporting such an amount would create difficulties. Therefore, William travelled to Arusha with a pastor, who could explain to the police that these supplies were needed for a wedding. In order to get ten crates of beer, he had to make use of a contact he had working in the brewery in order to get the necessary permit. He was also able to get hold of a couple of bottles of Russian vodka, a rare treat at a time when there was little in the way of bottled hard spirits. Most of the rest of the supplies William purchased in Mbeya. He bought rice, millet, sorghum, batteries, salt, sugar, and matches. With the rationing in place, he bought the goods in Mbeya, rather than Kilimanjaro, as he was known to the regional authorities in Mbeya. However, he also required a permit to move the goods between Mbeya and Kilimanjaro regions. In order to get some of these permits, he made use of his contacts with former students.

It took a lot of contacts for William to have a wedding in a fashion that he considered suitable. He reported to me that the guests described it as a great wedding. But William’s own assessment was that it was “horrible”, because of the shortages of the basic goods needed. These were “very difficult times”. Moving goods around Tanzania was extraordinarily difficult. In this, he blames the state. William has a strong case for doing so. From 1981, the party and the state both began to scapegoat the economic malaise on the corrupt practices of “economic saboteurs”, urging a crackdown on black marketeers and smugglers (Bryceson 1993: 74-75). However, engagement with the black market became almost ubiquitous in Tanzania, particularly in those areas close to
Tanzanians who got the opportunity to travel abroad were often given lists of consumer items to purchase for friends and relatives (Mtei 2009: 163-165). For Chagga people, with their long-standing engagement with the market economy, the shortages and privations were keenly felt.

Pressures developed within the cabinet and from experts within Tanzania that the country had no choice but to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for assistance, and to liberalise the economy (Holtom 2005: 560-563). For example, Edwin Mtei, a Chagga and Minister of Finance and Planning, was forced out of his job in 1979 for, according to his autobiography, advocating further negotiations with a visiting IMF team (Mtei 2009: 149-157). Relations between the International Monetary Fund and Nyerere were “replete with disaccord and vitriol” (Stein 1992: 59). While Nyerere did introduce some limited reforms in the 1984 budgets, it was becoming increasingly clear that the country would need more widespread reform and help from the International Financial Institutions (Holtom 2005: 562).

Julius Nyerere voluntarily left the presidency in 1985. Nyerere’s political influence did not end with his leaving office. He remained the chair of CCM, and was very much the party king-maker until his death in 1999 (ARD 2003: 10). He was influential in the establishment of multiparty democracy. Nyerere was replaced as President by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, formerly the president of Zanzibar (Nyang'oro 2004: 5). Mwinyi was, and still is, referred to as Bwana Ruka. The Swahili word ruka refers to permissiveness,

A survey in 1993 revealed that 94% of households in border areas in Tanzania engaged in the black market, as opposed to 66% in the interior (Bevan, Collier et al. 1989: 53). This indicates that cross-border smuggling played an important role in the black market.
or “do your own thing” (Hyden 1999: 143). This can refer to his weakness as a leader (Kjaer 2004: 400), where he showed inexperience and coercion from a variety of directions (Holtom 2005: 556). The term also refers to the *laissez-faire* direction that the country took under Mwinyi’s leadership. While it did ultimately alleviate some of Tanzania’s immediate economic problems, this shift in economic policy is often understood in the literature as occurring in a reckless, almost lawless fashion that resulted in a large increase in corruption (Hyden 1999: 143; Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002; ARD 2003: 3).

In the African context, the introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies is frequently understood as undermining social cohesion, resulting in increased ethnic, regional and religious tensions. J. ’Bayo Adekanye argues that in many African states, the rolling back of the state that SAP policies brought led to “a marked retreat away from the state and behind the psycho-socially protective shield of ethnic and religious identities and conflicts” (Adekanye 1995: 365). While Adekanye argues that the ethnically diverse ethnic composition of Tanzania has mediated many of these factors, Paul Kaiser (1996) develops Adekanye’s argument to conclude that social unity in Tanzania has “demised”. As shall be developed in the next chapter, reports of the demise of social unity have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, liberalisation has brought great social change to Tanzania. An issue that has been identified is that the liberalisation of the economy left much of the population unprepared: “the majority African community, bound by *ujamaa* leadership code restrictions, was less prepared for a privatization process that required a familiarity with the assumptions of a competitive, potentially lucrative, private sector environment” (Kaiser 2001: 96). Kaiser argues that this was to the benefit of members of the Asian business community. Another group in a position to take advantage of the new opportunities were the Chagga elite, who had experience working
in more capitalist communities abroad, or in parastatals within Tanzania. More broadly than the elite, “the era of liberalization was largely accepted among the Chagga with celebration as a time of freedom regained for material and political pursuits” (Pietilä 2007: 4).

**Land shortages and vihamba**

Kilimanjaro, or more specifically the *kihamba*, remains a desirable place for most Chagga: a place to visit for Christmas, a place to retire to, a place to be buried. Yet there is also a strong sense that Kilimanjaro is facing a crisis. This is of great moral concern; as one informant said, “A lot of important people in Chagga [pre-independence] history have died recently. This is because of the collapse in the coffee price… they used to have big farms, and so had lots of food, and there was little tension within society. But this has changed” (Fieldnotes, 28/7/2005). The problems facing Kilimanjaro are not only economic, they tie closely to the social and moral environment as well.

The key question in Kilimanjaro is the availability of *kihamba* land. The *kihamba* belt is one of the most densely populated rural areas of Tanzania. Kilimanjaro Region has a population density of 151 people per square kilometre, one of the highest in Tanzania (Mbonile 2006: 119). The *kihamba* belt has been described by Moore as a “rururb”, a rural area with an urban-like population density (Moore 1986: 110). The population of Kilimanjaro Region has increased with time, growing from just over a quarter of a million people in 1948, to over half a million by 1967, and over 1.3 million by the time of the 2002 census (Mbonile 2006: 118). The amount of *kihamba* land available is limited by altitude and climate. The plains are unsuitable for the production of bananas.
and coffee; the forests on the higher slopes are protected not only as part of the colonial inventions of the National Park and forest reserve (Misana 2006: 237) but also through sacred ritual (Clack 2009: 334). As a result, there is a limited amount of land suitable for kihamba production.

Concern about the population has a long history. The idea that Kilimanjaro was in some sense full is a common one amongst European colonialists, and even earlier. As early as 1884, when Harry Johnston was staying in the chiefdom of Chief Rindi and growing particularly tired of “being in the power of and subjected to the capricious interference of an African tyrant”, Johnston revealed that he could not simply move to an uninhabited area of the mountain as “there is no habitable part of Kilimanjaro without ownership” (emphasis in original) (Johnston [1884], cited in Oliver 1957: 62). It is not altogether clear whether Johnston is talking about individual ownership or whether he is referring to the fact that all of the mountain is under the influence of one chief or another. Entering into the colonial period, there was a constant concern about the availability of land in the kihamba belt. While the German colonialists initially believed that there was sufficient land for European settlement and farming, by 1907 they had decided not to alienate any further land from this area (Iliffe 1979: 144-145). The British colonialists were very concerned about population growth and land shortages, as the Provincial commissioner commented in 1937: “there will be few instances where we can allow alienation [of land in Kilimanjaro], owing to the extreme congestion of the Chagga tribe in the lands they now occupy” (Hallier 1937: 5). By 1952, land was becoming scarce, making it increasingly difficult for places for new vihamba to be found (Munger 1952: 181-182). Land, and the return of land alienated by the Germans, became one of the key political issues surrounding the creation of the Paramount Chief, as outlined in Chapter 3. By the 1960s, the mountainside was considered so crowded
that one commentator concluded that it was necessary for Chagga to leave Kilimanjaro, “This they must do if they are to maintain a minimal standard of living in the future” (Lindsey 1965: 97). By the 1980s, even the rich “know that there is not enough land for their own sons” (Moore 1986: 308). Concern that the Chagga people lack land has run through the generations.

Despite the fact that concerns over the availability of kihamba land have a long historical precedence, there is an increasing understanding that the mountain faces a looming crisis. “It falls on our generation”, said a successful insurance seller named Samuel, currently living in Moshi town (Fieldnotes, 22/03/2006). Samuel’s father had one daughter and five sons, including Samuel, from his first wife, and he later remarried and had another three sons and one daughter. His father had a “large [kihamba] plot”, that would allow his father’s sons to inherit “at least a small plot, enough to build a house”. As opposed to the traditional norms of land inheritance, in which only the eldest and youngest sons were obliged to be provided for, Samuel’s father wanted to provide for all of his sons. This was through a sense of fairness, and a belief that all of his sons should be treated equally. Samuel’s father went to some lengths to ensure that he had enough kihamba land for all of his sons:

> When my father was given his land, only part of it was growing bananas and coffee, the rest was growing maize. So, when my father began having a family, he saw that it was important to have a kihamba for each of his sons, land that grew bananas and coffee. So he expanded the amount of his land in which he grew bananas and coffee, so that his children would have a kihamba with bananas and coffee to inherit.

So it is possible to extend the land available for vihamba, but only to a certain extent. In previous decades, the land on the kihamba belt not used for homegardens – such as grazing areas, sweet potato fields, and masale groves set aside for burials and sacrifices – have gradually been converted into vihamba (Soini 2005b: 313).
While Samuel was able to inherit a *kihamba* suitable for the construction of a house and some farming, he had deep concerns about whether he would be able to provide enough land for his children. At the time that I interviewed him, he had a four-year old son and an infant daughter, and was expecting to have more children in the future. In a further move away from norms of land inheritance, Samuel also told me that he would want his daughter as well as his son to inherit a *kihamba*. As his daughter was only an infant, whether this will actually occur, and how this would sit with other members of the lineage, remains to be seen. In any event, the problems with land shortages, as Samuel sees them, “falls on [Samuel’s] generation”.

Samuel’s case is far from unique; concern is widespread about the shortage of available land. It also illustrates how the holdings of land-rich Chagga of the past soon dilute into minimal holdings for their descendants today. Another example is David, from Uru. David works as a teacher, and while this is an educated and respected profession, he is far from a wealthy man. His father, however, had a large amount of *kihamba* land. Because he had a lot of land, as David tells the story, his father decided to take a second wife in addition to his first. This was not so unusual in the past, as land-rich men would occasionally take a second, or more, wives, if they felt that they had enough land to provide each with a suitable *kihamba* (Wimmelbücker 2002: 175-177). However, polygamy was strongly discouraged by the Christian churches. When David’s father converted to Christianity, probably in the 1940s or very early fifties, he was strongly encouraged to move away from polygyny. Therefore David’s father’s first wife became his one and only wife, and his second wife was left only with a small *kihamba*, too small for her children to inherit (Fieldnotes, 22/3/2006). As the *kihamba* sizes decrease, land-rich peasants were increasingly in a less advantageous position. Particularly in the cases
of those who chose, like David’s father, to have large families, with the land pressures in Kilimanjaro the reproduction of the land-rich peasants became problematic.

The question arises: how can Kilimanjaro be facing a severe land shortage and crisis for almost a century? Stanley Kessi (23/3/2005) made to me the argument that the land problems highlighted in the archival sources were different to the current crisis faced by the Chagga land shortages. He argued that the colonial sources were referring to the fact that Kilimanjaro had no land left in the *kihamba* belt that was not settled, whereas today’s issue had become that individual *kihamba* sizes had declined to the point that they were no longer viable to farm. However, as far back as 1948, *kihamba* sizes, not just the availability of unsettled land, were a concern to the colonial authorities (Iliffe 1979: 347-348). There is plenty of concern in the extensive livelihoods literature on Kilimanjaro that the *kihamba* belt faces genuine difficulties with declining plot sizes (see, for example, Soini 2005a; Soini 2005b; Devenne, Chapuis et al. 2006). Eija Soini’s survey finds average *kihamba* sizes of under 0.6 hectares, and concludes, “Farms have been subdivided to the point that under present management most of them are too small to sustain a family. Some of the plots have just enough space for a house and cannot function as farms any more” (Soini 2005a: 165). It is clear that there are genuine and pressing problems facing families attempting to make a living from farming in Kilimanjaro.

Yet there is also a large nostalgic element to the understandings of Chagga elite towards the past generations. There is an understanding of the past in which land and cattle were plentiful. The *kihamba* system remains one of the most powerful aspects of the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. *Kihamba* land cannot be freely bought and sold. The ideal remains to keep it within the lineage. As such, *kihamba* ownership would ideally
be placed firmly in the realm of the moral economy, away from the cash economy. While this may act as an ideal, it is one that is not always reached. In practice, cash wealth plays a large role in *kihamba* inheritance. Many of those wealthier in cash terms seemed to have larger *kihamba* plots, or even multiple *vihamba*. This creates an irony in that those with access to the most land are those with access to other sources of income, and as such economically need the land least.

Similarly to the pressure on land, another important aspect of the moral economy that is understood as facing a decline is that of cattle. As discussed above, cattle slaughtering ceremonies remain a key aspect of lineage life. While meat is available from butchers’ shops, there is a decline in the number of cows owned by Chagga people and suitable for lineage feasting. In traditional houses, cattle were kept inside the owner’s house (Dundas 1924: 266-269). Even in the 1920s, there was a lack of available grazing in the *kihamba* belt (ibid.: 266). Collecting fodder from the lower slopes was a considerable labour, most usually performed by women (Wimmelbücker 2002: 56-57). These themes of cattle ownership extend to today. Cattle are kept in stalls, with zero grazing. As with the housing for humans, the quality of these stalls can vary greatly. The availability of suitable fodder is an issue that certainly continues. As an example below illustrates, the shortage of available fodder continues to be of relevance.

There is a perceived decline in the numbers of cattle kept in Kilimanjaro over the decades. For example, Tom, just turned 30, had a father from Masama but had spent most of his life in Morogoro and Moshi town. He remembers fondly of how, as a child, he would visit his paternal grandfather in Masama. Tom tells of how his grandfather had many cattle: “When we were visiting, my grandfather would ask us to ‘pick a cow’, and he would slaughter it. It was only because we were visiting, not because it was
Christmas or a wedding” (Fieldnotes, 29/3/2007). There is an understanding that times have changed, and that the past was a time when resources such as cattle were abundant. Like land, cattle plays a key role in the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. No amount of inputs from the cash economy can replace those resources. There are also problems in the realm of the cash economy, as the case of coffee production on Kilimanjaro illustrates.

Coffee

A key aspect of the kihamba system is coffee production. Note how David, above, used the phrase “coffee and bananas” as synonymous with kihamba. Coffee has historically been a hugely important cash crop for Chagga people. It not only led to the development of capitalism in Kilimanjaro, and the Chagga “cultural commitment” to the market (Moore 1986: 129), it also shaped the politics and development schemes of past decades. “Politics used to be about coffee” (Fieldnotes, 28/12/05). In 1993, the coffee market was liberalised in Tanzania, with private buyers being allowed for the first time (Ponte 2004). Thus, the KNCU no longer had the monopoly it had previously enjoyed as either a Chagga-run or state-run organ. While this has resulted in growers receiving a higher percentage of the export price of the coffee crop, there is evidence that it has not increased yields and has possibly led to a decrease in quality (Ponte 2004: 619; Itika 2005: 48-49). Stefano Ponte argues that the end of national ownership of key assets and markets such as coffee “undermines the legitimacy of the state and of public regulation in Africa” (Ponte 2004: 632-633). The problem with this argument is that national ownership of the KNCU was considered within Kilimanjaro to be disastrous. National ownership itself was problematic and did little to help the state’s legitimacy in Kilimanjaro at least.
Despite the historical importance, there was a common refrain during my fieldwork present on Kilimanjaro: there is no money any more in coffee. The common comments were that, while a Chagga may have had many coffee trees, “I am planning to uproot them because they do not make money these days” (for example, Fieldnotes 28/7/2005). Inputs, it was argued, have grown too expensive, while the price was consistently low. It was suggested that Chagga people were searching for a new cash crop; many were thinking of starting to grow vanilla. This provided potentially a better income, yet was difficult and expensive to start to grow (Fieldnotes, 30/6/2007).

While the overall quality of coffee may have declined following liberalisation, there has been a growth in elite gourmet coffees. For example, the Association of Kilimanjaro Speciality Coffee Growers (AKSCG) was formed in 2002, representing an aim to produce higher quality speciality coffees, which can reach prices 65% higher at auction than lower-quality coffees (Linton 2008: 241). There is a potential for coffee from Kilimanjaro in this market, in large part due to the hold that the mountain continues to have on the Western imagination. I have examined the coffee range available from one provider, Cafédirect (2008), and found that their most expensive range is their gourmet organic Fair Trade range. The coffees in this range are all named after the landscapes from which the coffee originated, all evocative and exotic: Mount Elgon, Cloud Forest – “the misty highlands surrounding the ancient Mayan city of Palenque” and of course Mount Kilimanjaro, “the rich volcanic soils of Mount Kilimanjaro”. It is my understanding that just as the mountains and highlands attracted the European explorers in previous centuries, now it attracts the European shopper in a supermarket. Caroline Wright makes the observation that the advertising campaign of Cafédirect did not focus upon the human labour involved in coffee production, but rather “the
suggestion is that geography and weather do most of the work” (Wright 2004: 668). The production of such coffees has been criticised as being dominated by the wealthier farmers, rather than the poorer members of the community (BBC 2005).

Despite the constant concern about the coffee price, however, the numbers of people who have actually stopped growing coffee are small. Even though many people were talking of stopping growing coffee, few have done so. An exception was Joseph. Earning a good wage from his employment, Joseph also had a large kihamba, over 13 acres. As the only son of his father, he inherited the entirety of his landholdings. Joseph grew the usual crops in his kihamba: bananas, vegetables and masale. Up until a few years ago, he also grew coffee. However, he realised that the coffee was not profitable. Instead of replacing the coffee with another conventional cash crop for international export, Joseph started to grow grass to sell to local farmers for fodder for their cattle. He told me that he made more money selling fodder to his neighbours than he could from producing coffee (Fieldnotes 30/8/2006).

The very fact that Chagga people are talking about uprooting their coffee trees tells us something about the role of coffee in the moral economy. It raises the issue of how coffee has been appropriated by Chagga people. Jigal Beez (2003) examines the far more recent introduction of rice cultivation through a Japanese irrigation project. Beez argues that, while rice production has been accepted economically by those involved in the project, it has not been appropriated in the culinary or ritual spheres. While rice-based dishes are not uncommon, for example the eating of pilau at celebrations and festive occasions, rice from Mbeya is far preferred by Chagga people to the rice from Kilimanjaro. Similarly, rice has yet to be appropriated in the ritual sphere; it is not used for brewing, nor is it suitable for offerings to ancestors. A similar argument could be
made for coffee. The willingness of Chagga farmers to even consider uprooting their trees as they were no longer profitable indicates that coffee remains firmly in the economic sphere and the cash economy. Coffee does not have a ritual role in Kilimanjaro. It is by no means necessarily the case that a cash-crop does not enter the ritual realm; in Buhaya, for example, coffee beans are considered suitable for sacrifice (Carlson 1990: 303-304). In Kilimanjaro, coffee has never taken on that role. For a crop that has been grown since the beginning of the twentieth century, and is recognised for having such a strong developmental role, it is remarkable that it is not of ritual importance. Beez speculates that, in a few generations, it is possible that “the ancestors will expect a feast of pilau.” (Beez 2003: 6). Given the slow rate of appropriation of coffee, I would suggest that this will not be the case.

The Changing Role of Education

Since the colonial period, it was education that gave the Chagga elite their great advantage. There were fears expressed during my fieldwork, however, that this is changing. The concern about education in Kilimanjaro extends to the changing role of schools in the region itself, particularly private schools. During the period of njamaa socialism and Education for Self Reliance, there were restrictions on the opening of private schools in Tanzania. However, through a variety of methods outlined by Samoff (1987), in Kilimanjaro there was a huge growth in the number of private schools60. By

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60 As an important aspect of ESR was political education, which was absent from the private schools, then there was theoretically a political gulf between students in the public and private sector. However, in practical terms, the political education in Tanzania has been analysed by various sources as being weak. This is in terms of the content and teaching of formal siasa (politics) classes (Cooksey 1986: 191); self-reliant activities such as school farms (ibid.: 191); and attempts to introduce less authoritarian and hierarchical teaching methods (Harber 1988: 200). Given these weaknesses in the political education, it is difficult to conclude that there would necessarily be a large political difference between students who had been to public and private schools.
the mid-1970s, Kilimanjaro had more private than government secondary schools. 42% of all the private secondary schools in the country, and a quarter of all secondary schools, were in Kilimanjaro (ibid.: 341). Even after the end of ESR, Kilimanjaro has maintained a tradition of non-governmental secondary education. The region still has the largest number of both public and private secondary schools in the country, with 74 non-governmental and 57 governmental secondary schools (Chediel, Sekwao et al. 2000: 18). Indeed, seminaries remain a popular choice for parents, as seminaries retained their independence throughout the socialist period and were never nationalised.

There is a concern, however, that the schools of Kilimanjaro are not being used to educate local children. “Nowadays, many parents elsewhere in the country send their children to school in Kilimanjaro. So, the education sector will be another economic base for Kilimanjaro – it will provide employment and housing. Parents want to send their children to Kilimanjaro because the climate is attractive for education” (Emmanuel, Fieldnotes, 15/1/2006). The landscape of Kilimanjaro is thus here described as a key aspect of the desirability of non-Chagga families to send their children to be educated there. Other informants were far more worried by this development. Edward, a retired teacher, said: “the belief that Chagga are well-educated is not always the case – Kilimanjaro has many schools but they are three-quarters full of non-Chagga from other regions. Schools are set up for income generation purposes, to address the problems of the decline in the coffee price” (Fieldnotes, 16/8/2005). Edward sees a concern that the brightest of the Chagga youth are not seeking formal education, but are rather pursuing the opportunities in the private sector.
Edward is concerned that private schools are nowadays being run for entrepreneurial reasons rather than for the benefit of local children. However, it was the case during ESR that private schools had to ensure that 25% of their intake was from outside of the region in which they were situated (Samoff 1987: 345). Furthermore, Emmanuel argues that having members of other ethnic groups studying in Kilimanjaro is a positive development for the promotion of good relations between Chagga and other ethnic groups in Tanzania. He calls for an increased effort to promote people from other regions to come to Kilimanjaro to study, particularly in the elite colleges present in the region including the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC) and the College of African Wildlife Management at Mwika (Fieldnotes, 7/3/2006).

Local NGOs

I shall now discuss one of the elite responses to the perceived problems faced by Kilimanjaro, the establishment of local NGOs. One of the features of Tanzanian politics that has received attention in the recent literature is that of the post-liberalisation emergence of local NGOs since the mid-1980s and their role in national politics (Kiondo 1995; Kelsall 2000; Mercer, Page et al. 2008). These processes are outlined by Gibbon:

As the middle class has ceased to be able to reproduce itself economically through the state, so its members have been obliged to mobilize resources (private and public) from ethnic, sub-ethnic and clan sources. For the middle classes remaining ‘at home’ this means a closer economic relation to those in the [urban] diaspora, while for those in the diaspora it implies an increased dependence on certain resources from home. The consequence is that the middle class ceases to be reproduced as a socio-economic category on the national plane, but becomes vertically fragmented through a process of ‘balkanisation’.

(Gibbon, cited in Kelsall 2000: 549-550)
Local development trusts, and the development levies they charge, are understood within this body of literature of being the new source of elite power in Tanzania.

However, viewing these developments from the Chagga perspective, I would argue that there is less new in these organisations than the literature would suggest. The historical role of the coffee cooperative, the KNCU, has many similarities with the newer organisations elsewhere in Tanzania. Local development levies have an antecedent in the coffee cess charged to all coffee farmers in Kilimanjaro by the KNCU. The coffee cess was the tax charged on coffee sales. It was this tax that filled the treasury of the Chagga Council in the 1950s, and paid for the schools, roads and dispensaries across the mountainside (Moore 1986: 129). The use of a coffee cess to fund development projects continued after the abolition of the Chagga Council; a coffee tax was collected at the village-level in the 1970s (ibid.: 127), and was used to fund nongovernmental school projects in the 1980s (Samoff 1987: 343). Nevertheless, the scale of the development projects of the 1950s was far greater. The cosmopolitan achievements of this era, such as the KNCU Coffee Tree Hotel in Moshi, stand as concrete reminders of this. The Chagga Council and the KNCU were the most developed examples of such ethnic organisations in colonial Tanzania, and as outlined previously in this thesis stood as examples to other ethnic groups in the country. It is the case that Kilimanjaro has a history that differs from much of the rest of Tanzania in respect of having a long history of a locally-funded developmental organisation on this scale.

Nevertheless, there are many NGOs that have sprung in Kilimanjaro following liberalisation. The KNCU is in nowhere near the position it was in the 1950s, having lost its monopoly following the liberalisation of the coffee trade. There are developmental organisations at all levels in Kilimanjaro. In Marangu, an example of this
was started by Mama Itosi. Upon returning to Tanzania, “Things were so bad that I couldn’t go back to teaching. I opted to come and live back in Marangu.” Rather than entering private business, she became a farmer, as she put it, and also became involved in church and women’s groups. She and her husband were also involved in the establishment of an opposition party, CHADEMA. As such, while not entering the business sector, Mama Itosi did take advantage of the new political spaces that opened up with the liberalisation of the political and economic spheres in Tanzania. Arriving back in 1984 gave the returning migrants a head start in establishing themselves following liberalisation in Tanzania. By the mid-90s, Mama Itosi had become involved in voluntary work with church and women’s groups. In particular, she became chair of the Marangu Community Development Association. This was an organisation established in the mid-1990s “to steer development”. Mama Itosi describes this time: “Everything had more or less collapsed. So this association worked hard on the environment, through projects like tree nurseries, supported through donor support from the US and Germany”. They also run clean water projects, support student through high schools and help Church-run nursery schools.

One of the Development Association’s projects is producing energy-efficient clay ovens. The availability of firewood is an issue in the kihamba belt. The ovens that the Association were promoting were made out of clay. Mount Kilimanjaro lacks clay. This is an issue that has a very long historical background, as some of the earliest trade with people beyond the mountainside was trading with nearby areas for clay (Moore 1977a: 7). For the clay ovens in Marangu, the clay has to be brought in from Mwanga, in the neighbouring Pare Mountains.
Other such organisations exist across Kilimanjaro, operating at different levels. As depicted in the literature, members of the Chagga elite have a strong involvement with these organisations. Reginald Mengi, one of Tanzania’s most notable businessmen from Machame, has had involvement in a number of these organisations. Mengi made large contributions to the Hai Education Trust Fund, an organisation that provides equipment, and renovates schools in Hai district (Kiondo 1995: 131). Mengi has also had heavy involvement with the Kilimanjaro Region Development Fund (KDF). This organisation is a regional body, concerning itself with development in the Kilimanjaro Region. Other prominent Chagga involved in the organisation included Basil Mramba and Thomas Marealle (Haonga 2005b). Addressing a meeting of the KDF, Mengi urged people from Kilimanjaro to use their entrepreneurial mindset to accelerate economic development in Kilimanjaro Region: “We have reached a level where some of us have nothing impressive to show at our places of birth, in terms of sustained education excellence and utilisation of natural resources” (Mengi, cited in Haonga 2005a). As such, these types of organisations operate on a variety of levels. They operate below the district level, such as the Marangu Development Association, at district level, and at regional level. However, none of the organisations are co-extensive with the Chagga ethnic group. They are either concerned with areas smaller than the Chagga area, or in the case of the KDF a broader area. This agrees with the findings of Mercer, Page and Evans, whose descriptions of hometown organisations in Tanzania as not being entirely delineated by ethnic group (Mercer, Page et al. 2008: 233).

The relationship between ethnicity and such organisations is also a question that has to be raised. Kelsall (2000: 550) describes the involvement of what he describes as “ethnic ‘trust funds’” in Meru. In the case of Kilimanjaro, however, the link between ethnicity and these organisations is by no means clear. As far as I could tell, there are none that
are co-extensive with Chagga ethnicity. The possibility occurred to me that the KDF was secretly a Chagga organisation, promoting Chagga interests. This was denied by individuals involved in the KDF, who emphasised that members of other ethnicities from Kilimanjaro Region were involved in the organisation (Fieldnotes, 23/8/2005). Non-Chagga from Kilimanjaro Region were involved in senior roles in the organisation, for example former Prime Minister Cleopa Msuya (Haonga 2005a). Kelsall’s fears of ethnic trust funds being the basis of a new emergence of ethnic conflict within Tanzania seem to be not the case in Kilimanjaro. This is possibly a consequence of the social position that the Chagga elite play in Tanzania: for a group that has remained in an economically powerful position, and operates across the nation, an association with the taboo subject of tribalism is not in their interests. For other ethnic groups, particularly those in a weaker position, the dynamics may very well be different.

Within the literature on these organisations, the involvement of elite individuals in establishing, running and funding district development NGOs is treated with suspicion. Kelsall (2000: 550) describes ethnically-based trust funds as “dominated by local elites with links to nationally influential kin and in some cases foreign donors. They are sources of money, influence, and politicking.” Similarly, Kiondo (1995: 166-167) expresses caution that the elite involvement in such organisations mean that they are purely a source of patronage. Elite involvement, it would seem, becomes equated with elites seeking only to develop and maintain their own powerbases. This presentation is similar to that criticised by Werbner of elites portrayed in a universally pessimistic light.

That is not to say that the role of elites in development projects should not be problematised. Such projects are not the focus of this thesis. There is an issue to be raised, for example, when international NGOs’ conceptions of empowerment serve
mainly to empower an elite rather than the broader population (Kelsall and Mercer 2003: 302-303). Another potential concern is that, with Tanzanian elites beginning to focus on their home areas, this would disproportionately benefit Kilimanjaro in comparison to other parts of Tanzania. These types of concerns are genuine issues surrounding elite involvement in local NGOs. However, attempts to address these concerns is not well served by taking as the starting point the assumption that elites are all merely venal and self-serving.

**Conclusion**

This chapter illustrated how Kilimanjaro itself is of great importance to people of Chagga ethnicity. Elite tend to spend a large amount of their time away from Kilimanjaro, yet maintain their links through the building of houses, attending funerals, and for Christmas visits. The moral economy of Kilimanjaro plays a very important role for the Chagga elites. Because of this, the perceived crises in Kilimanjaro over land, cattle and coffee strike at the heart of Chagga understandings of themselves. While liberalisation brought new economic opportunities, and opportunities in the field of local NGOs, it also brought with it new problems. There is a fear amongst some that the younger generation are not seeking the education that was the passport for the older generation to their elite status.

In terms of how local elite powerbases may have changed, it is necessary to examine the political liberalisation of Tanzania. That is the subject of the next chapter. Through an examination of the 2005 General Election in Tanzania, it sheds light on the role of ethnicity in contemporary Tanzania. While ethnicity does play a role in electoral
politics, the next chapter argues that the literature on Tanzanian politics that emphasised the collapse of national unity do not give an accurate account.
Chapter 6: Chagga Elites and Multiparty Democracy

Following the liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a liberalisation of Tanzanian politics. In 1992, in a top-down democratisation process, opposition political parties were legalised\(^{61}\). However, CCM\(^{62}\), the successor party to TANU, which has run Tanzania since independence, remains the dominant party. Tanzania has now had four multiparty general elections: 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Victory in the presidential elections for CCM has never been in serious doubt. Nevertheless, an examination of electoral politics provides an insight into the role of ethnicity in contemporary Tanzania.

With the introduction of multipartyism in Tanzania, the establishing of parties based along ethnic, religious or regional lines was prohibited. CCM was already a party with broad national appeal, and it is not only the legal prohibition that prevents the

\(^{61}\) This was a reintroduction of multiparty democracy. Before the introduction of a one-party state in 1964, opposition parties were in existence but largely ineffectual compared to the dominant power of TANU (Brennan 2005). The parties of the post-1992 reintroduction of multiparty democracy do not seem to have any direct links with those of the pre-1964 system.

\(^{62}\) In 1977, the sole mainland party TANU merged with its Zanzibari counterpart, the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – The Party of the Revolution. The constitution of the new party marked a change in direction for the party. It was no longer to be a mass membership party, but rather closer to a vanguard, adhering to an already constructed socialist ideology (Whitehead 2009: 270)
formation of new ethnically-based political parties. There are also demographic concerns, but most important is the great value placed upon national unity. This is a discourse that CCM has been able to utilise in its own campaigns. Tanzanian politics stand distinct from some other countries in the region. In Kenya, for instance, Gabrielle Lynch (2006: 61) argues that politics is seen by Kenyans themselves and outsiders alike as “view[ed]… through an ethnic lens”, even when this distorts other possible dimensions of politics. In Tanzania, where the role of ethnicity is very different, it is also too easy to present a candidate’s loss or victory as purely a result of ethnic factors. Ethnicity matters, but not in stark black and white terms.

This chapter seeks to examine the role of ethnicity in contemporary Tanzania through an examination of the Presidential aspirations of two Chagga candidates: Augustine Mrema in the 1995 election, and Freeman Mbowe in the 2005 elections. Mrema from Vunjo, Kilimanjaro, a CCM minister until he left the party to join the opposition party NCCR-Mageuzi months before the election, was a popular candidate with the working classes and youth both within and outside of Kilimanjaro. Nationally, he was by far the most popular opposition candidate, and arguably came close to causing an upset until Nyerere entered the campaign trail to secure victory for CCM’s candidate, Benjamin Mkapa. The second candidate who is a focus of this chapter is Freeman Mbowe in the 2005 election, from Machame in Kilimanjaro. Unlike Mrema, Mbowe did not emerge out of CCM but was a successful businessman. The party he represented, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party of Democracy and Development), CHADEMA, is in many ways a product of elite Chagga retirees. Despite a strong campaign, Mbowe’s performance in the election was a disappointment to CHADEMA. The study of these two candidates provides an interesting framework for examining the role of ethnicity in Tanzanian elections. Even though they did not present themselves as such, both were
understood to an extent to be a “Chagga candidate”. Yet, while Mrema drew his main support base from a disenchanted underclass, Mbowe drew much from a more elite, retiree background; in short, the Chagga elite that have been discussed in this thesis.

**Social Unity in Tanzania**

From the 1990s, a series of academic articles has argued that the strains of economic liberalisation have put strains on Tanzania’s lauded national unity (Hartmann 1991; Kaiser 1996; Campbell 1999; Kelsall 2000). Paul Kaiser (1996) writes of the “demise” of social unity in Tanzania, a word also used by John Campbell (Campbell 1999: 106):

> In a climate of political and economic liberalisation, Tanzanians are increasingly confronting one another in social, economic and political arenas on unequal terms, the perception of which feeds into increasing efforts, especially by the elite, to organise on the basis of ideas about ethnicity and religion to secure or preserve advantage.

Kelsall (2000: 550) argues that struggles over resources in Tanzania increasingly resulted in the mobilisation of popular forces that “are commonly couched in an ethnic and religious idiom”. Some of these authors present analyses of the political situation which are not in-depth. Kaiser (1996: 234-235), for instance, argues that ethnic differences are coming to the fore in Tanzanian politics, and cites as his main evidence for this the performance of Mrema in the 1995 campaign outside of Kilimanjaro. I argue that this analysis is somewhat simplistic, as shall be seen.

The concern is that the strains of economic liberalisation will lead multiparty democracy to be expressed along lines of ethnic, religious or other division. For example, the Tanzanian journalist Godfrey Mwakikagile (2004: 31) argues that multiparty democracies in Africa essentially establish themselves along ethnic lines. Even in Tanzania, where all parties stand on a national platform, the very fact that they
garner most of their support from their home regions indicates they are ethnic in character. Citing the broad range of ethnically-based parties, Mwakikagile (2004: 33) concludes that multiparty democracy “really means multiparty tribalism”. However, I argue that ethnicity did not suddenly appear as an electoral issue in 1992 with the introduction of multipartyism. There is evidence that it had a role to play during Tanzania’s one-party elections. Tanzania has had thirty years of single-party competitive elections, in which ethnicity would sometimes play a role. For example, Nsilo Swai’s election in Arusha in 1965, as detailed in Chapter Four, had elements of religion and ethnicity playing a role in that campaign. Similarly, Chagga people have always valued having people of Chagga ethnicity in the powerful positions that had control over their lives. The people of Vunjlo valued having a Minister for Education, Solomon Elifuoo, as their MP (Mramba 1967: 118).

Nevertheless, there were indeed some concerning developments in Tanzania during the early 1990s that added to the picture that social unity was under threat. Campbell (1999: 111) draws attention to the case of Reverend Christopher Mtikila, a non-Chagga firebrand preacher and politician. Throughout 1993 and 1994, Mtikila made a series of sermons in which he accused the Asian community of dominating the economy at the expense of the indigenous Africans (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002: 6). In an opinion poll in the early 1990s, he was the most popular politician in the country after Nyerere (Kaiser 1996: 233). Mtikila remains active in Tanzanian politics, but is a much reduced figure. His Democratic Party was finally allowed registration in 2002, enabling Mtikila to stand for the presidency in the 2005 elections. However, far from bringing the issues of indigenisation to the fore as argued by Ronald Aminzade (2003: 61-62), I note that Mtikila and the DP made hardly any impact during the 2005 polls, and he received less than 0.3% of the vote. Also in the early 1990s, there was a series of
incidents that raised the tensions between Christians and Muslims, including the 1994
Nevertheless, as this chapter will illustrate, I argue that peace and stability are still
strongly valued in Tanzania.

The Nyalali Commission and the Introduction of Multipartyism

The liberalisation of the political system, and the move to multiparty democracy in
Tanzania, was the very model of a top-down process. The key force in the move to
multiparty democracy was Julius Nyerere, the architect of Tanzania’s one-party state.
Stepping down as President in 1985, Nyerere had remained chair of CCM and
remained very influential in the transition to multiparty democracy and the first election
itself. Some authors point to the collapse of the one-party regimes in Eastern Europe,
and that this led Nyerere to argue that a transition to multiparty democracy would be
inevitable (Hyden 1999; Prokopenko 2005). However, if we reflect on the character of
Nyerere, it is problematic to put too much weight on Western influence. Consider
Nyerere’s record: from supporting Southern African liberation movements to rejecting
IMF conditionalities, Nyerere was not a leader who followed the diktats of Western
governments unless he also believed it to be right. While the changing international
environment may have figured in Nyerere’s reckoning, I argue that the main motive of
Nyerere was to revitalise CCM.

By the early 1990s, the liberalisation of Tanzania’s economy had put strains on the
ruling party. Corruption was seen as rampant in the ruling party, and CCM had been
nicknamed in parts of the country as “Chukua Chako Mapema” – Pocket what is at your
disposal quickly (Snyder 2008: 290). Dean McHenry argues that Nyerere called for
multiparty democracy as a way of revitalising CCM. Nyerere described the party in
1987 as “going to sleep”. McHenry argues that, as in 1962 when Nyerere resigned as leader to reinvent the link between the party and the broader population, so the move to multiparty democracy was a move to “reawaken” CCM. Engagement with the party was slipping, with falling attendance at local cell and branch meetings, a failure to pay membership dues, and a failure to elect local party leaders in many branches (McHenry 1994: 55-56). So, “the transition to democracy is the result primarily of the persuasive powers of Julius Nyerere and of the gradual institutionalization of new values within the ruling elite” (Hyden 1999: 154).

In 1991, President Mwinyi appointed a commission under Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to investigate the possibility of moving from a single-party system to multipartyism. In the broad-ranging consultation, the Nyalali Commission found that 77% of Tanzanians wanted to retain the single-party system (Chaligha, Mattes et al. 2002: 5). Nevertheless, the Commission recommended that Tanzania move away from a one-party state. The Commission recognised that, despite the fact that so many of the population called for the retention of the single-party system, there was still widespread dissatisfaction with the political scene in the country. Despite their support for a one-party system, respondents demanded changes in the political and economic policies, and accountability of CCM (Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo 2003: 122). There was the concern that, given the problems that CCM was perceived as having caused, to have many parties along the line of CCM would only cause greater misery – “if one CCM has brought us such misery, many CCMs will finish us off” (Snyder 2008: 290).

The recommendation of the Commission that Tanzania move away from the one-party system was not subject to public or parliamentary debate. Rather, a delegates conference of CCM accepted the report without discussion in February 1992 (Baregu
2000: 63). CCM retained the initiative, and thus was able to shape the democratisation process. While the party followed the Commission’s recommendations in introducing multiparty democracy, other changes recommended by the Commission were not implemented. For example, the Commission recommended that forty repressive and unconstitutional laws be amended or repealed\(^63\). CCM, however, did not do so, and the laws remained in place (Tripp 2000: 198). For example, the Preventive Detention Act, first put on the books in colonial times to combat the nationalist movement, remained law despite the recommendations of the Commission (Hyden 1999: 145).

One of the key issues, I argue, that emerged from the democratisation process in Tanzania was that CCM had access to far more resources than the other parties. The Nyalali Commission recommended that CCM divest itself of high-value assets, such as prime real-estate and sports stadiums (ARD 2003: 30). This recommendation was not followed, and CCM retained possession of all its assets. This has translated into a significant income for CCM. This is possibly an advantage that was exasperated by one recommendation of the Nyalali Commission that was implemented: the restructuring of CCM. CCM had previously had a large bureaucracy, but as the role of the party changed to one primarily concerned with contesting elections then the bureaucracy was stripped down at the national, Regional and District offices (Msekwa 1995: 6). This not only saved funds in itself (Mmuya 1998: 46-47), it also has apparently has freed up a large amount of office space for private use. In Moshi town, for instance, CCM is a major landlord for office space. This wealth leads to concerns amongst opposition parties. A member of CHADEMA in Marangu described to me the problems with CCM’s wealth, concluding “that money can be used to bribe people”, as well as other dirty tricks such as the secret funding of opposition parties and candidates in order to

\(^{63}\) Most of the 40 laws applied only to Zanzibar (Nyalali 1995: 16).
create discord within the opposition (Fieldnotes, 17/4/2007). Even if such illegal practices are discounted, I argue that CCM’s enormous funds contribute to the lack of a level playing field in Tanzania’s politics.

One of the key aspects, and perhaps the most successful, of the transition to multipartyism was the banning of parties along racial, religious or ethnic lines. Article 20(2) of the revised constitution states:

> it shall not be lawful for any political entity to be registered which according to its constitution or policy –
> a) aims at promoting or furthering the interests of:
>   i) any religious faith or group;
>   ii) any tribal group, place of origin, race or gender;
>   iii) only a particular area within any part of the United Republic

(United Republic of Tanzania 1998)

Independent presidential or parliamentary candidates are banned (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 7). It falls to the Registrar of Political Parties, appointed by the president, to govern whether political parties meet the requirements for registration.

There is a requirement under the Political Parties Act of 1992 that in order to be registered, parties must obtain 200 signatures from voters from at least 10 of Tanzania’s 26 regions. At least 2 of those regions must be from Zanzibar, at least one from Unguja and at least one from Pemba (Moroff 2010b: 9). While the Registrar has the power to refuse to register a party for the reason that it was based on ethnicity, region or religion, in practice the Registrar seems to prefer to use inadequate signatures as the reason for not registering a party. For example, in 1992 the Reverend Mtikila’s unregistered Democratic Party was causing religious and racial tensions to rise in Dar es Salaam. Registration for the DP was refused. Rather than not registering the party for reason of religious or discriminatory policies of the party, the Registrar instead denied registration
on the basis that the party had not received enough signatures from Zanzibar (Moroff 2010a: 754). This was a less controversial means of denying the party registration than doing so over the DP’s issues with the Union. It is argued by Hoffman and Robinson that the requirements for party registration have served as an impediment to the registering of new parties (Hoffman and Robinson 2009: 129-130). Certainly, over fifty parties have attempted to register yet failed to meet the registration requirements (Moroff 2010a: 755). Yet it is not at all clear, as Hoffman and Robinson argue, that this presents a major hindrance to democracy in Tanzania; if a party is unable to muster the resources to gather the necessary signatures nationally, by fair means or foul, then it seems to me that they also lack the capability to fight elections competitively.

While the constitutional and legal rules prohibit the formation of ethnically-based parties, there are other arguably more important reasons why ethnically-based parties have not been formed in Tanzania. The first is a simple question of demographics. With the broad ethnic diversity in Tanzania, it does not make electoral sense for a presidential candidate to push their ethnic affiliation as a source of votes. Yet, as with what Susan Geiger described as the “lacks and absences” theory of Tanzanian nationalism, there are more important issues occurring. There is a great value placed on Tanzania’s national unity. Tribalism is taboo. Tanzania’s national unity is very much valued, as is illustrated in the way that CCM is able to mobilise these forces to their own advantage.

Elections in Tanzania have been analysed as being far more based on the personalities of the candidates, than on the policies or ideological positions of the parties (Hyden 1999: 149; Baregu 2000: 71; Whitehead 2000: 6; Mørck 2006: 6). There are a number of reasons why this is the case. In the historic context, Tanzania under one-party rule had
competitive elections between prospective parliamentary candidates, each standing on the TANU/CCM platform. Thus, for the previous thirty years prior to multiparty rule and five general elections, I argue that the choice on offer had been essentially a choice based on the personalities of the candidates. Added to this is a weakness in opposition parties (Baregu 2000). While many political parties sprang up after the introduction of multipartyism, most had similar ideological positions, being broadly social democratic and capitalist in outlook (Whitehead 2000: 9). Few proved to be effective organisations and most lacked a coherent ideological or political platform. This was in part due to the weakness in civil society in Tanzania. There was no popular movement for multiparty democracy that could be translated into a political party. Civil society has been analysed in the literature as an important component in the democratisation of African states, including, but not limited to, the formation of new political parties (Habeson 1994). In neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Kenya, it was the trade union movement and other civil society groups that formed the basis for opposition parties (Kelsall 2003: 59-60). The weakness of civil society in Tanzania has limited the opportunities for parties to emerge along similar lines. Furthermore, the state of political parties since the liberalisation of the political system has led civil society organisations actively to avoid involvement or engagement with them. In the late 1990s, women’s, human rights and lawyers’ organisations met to discuss the possibility of constitutional reform. “One of their main concerns was to keep the initiative and leadership of constitutional reform out of the hands of the political parties, which they felt had no interest in genuine reform and were interested only in manipulating the process for their own self-serving interests” (Tripp 2000: 199).

Political parties are thus largely based upon dominant personalities, rather than popular movements or ideological positions. Many parties emerged out of elites, often older or
retired professional elites with previous experience in the state. The Chagga example, through the formation of CHADEMA, will be discussed further below. But, while CHADEMA arguably became the most successful example, there are other non-Chagga cases. NCCR-Mageuzi was originally founded by Mabere Marando, a former government security agent and civil rights lawyer, and the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD) was founded by former Minister of Justice Chief Said Fundikira (Whitehead 2000: 7). As the clashes within parties illustrate, to have organisations based upon large personalities is not a recipe for stable or constructive opposition politics. Furthermore, a focus on personality risks ethnicity becoming an active political issue.

**The 1995 General Election – The Candidacy of Augustine Mrema**

The first multiparty general election in mainland Tanzania was in October 1995. The CCM candidate for the presidency was Benjamin Mkapa, from Masasi in southern Tanzania (Mwakikagile 2004: 306). It was Nyerere’s influence that propelled Mkapa into the CCM nomination. Mkapa follows CCM’s pattern of selecting presidential candidates from the smaller of Tanzania’s ethnic groups. He was a former journalist, but a quiet man and “relatively unknown internally” within CCM (Maliyamkono 1995: 34). In the first round of the CCM selection criteria, in the lead was a young and ambitious Jakaya Kikwete. However, the relatively-unknown Mkapa received a strong boost when Nyerere made a speech that made it clear that he was Nyerere’s preferred candidate (Maliyamkono 1995: 32). Mkapa was portrayed as a “Mr Clean” candidate, distanced from the corruption of the Mwinyi administration (ibid.: 34). This proved to

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64 While Mkapa would later become known for his role in the continuing liberalisation of Tanzania’s economy, during his time as editor of the internal TANU newspaper he was known as “Comrade” Ben Mkapa (Tordoff and Mazrui 1972: 437).
be an important factor in the election campaign as corruption became a key campaign issue. Mkapa is married to Anna, a Chagga from Kilimanjaro.

Augustine Lyatonga Mrema is from Vunjo in Kilimanjaro. Mrema was originally a political education tutor, and a Bulgarian-trained security officer (Mapalala and Machumu 2005: 16). As a member of CCM, in 1985 he stood for parliament in Moshi Rural, but, in a precursor to his later long legal problems as an opposition politician, fought a long legal battle which saw him taking his seat in 1989 (ibid.: 16). Winning the seat in the 1990 election, he was appointed Minister for Home Affairs in President Mwinyi’s cabinet. Particularly in this post, he took a hands-on approach. A notable example was the resolving of a 1992-3 conflict within the church in Meru over the establishment of rival dioceses which had resulted in violence in which five people had died (Omari 1999). Mrema was sent to negotiate a peaceful compromise, which he successfully managed. As a result, he was made Deputy Prime Minister (Moore 1996: 595). In another example of his popular touch and hands-on approach, as a response to civil servants spending time away from their desks on personal business during office hours, Mrema ordered the chairs of government officials be confiscated if they failed to report for duty by 7:30am (Molony 2005: 5). Yet another example was when he personally lead policy officers to arrest a Detective Sergeant of the police force at a bar for selling beer for 260 shillings instead of the official price of 199 shillings ("The Mrema Phenomenon" 1991: 4). As the result of such actions, Mrema is regularly described in the literature as a populist (Sandbrook 1996: 77; Baregu 2000: 72; Kaiser 2001: 96). He became known as “Tanzania’s Robin Hood” ("The Mrema Phenomenon" 1991: 2).
Mrema pursued a populist anti-corruption message while in office. In early 1995, the Mwinyi government was accused of failing to take any significant steps against the well-connected company Mohamed Enterprises that had been accused of distributing food unfit for human consumption. Mrema promised that the company would be punished, but as a result of his efforts he was demoted to Minister of Youth and Culture. Mrema accused the Mwinyi government of high-level corruption, resulting in his expulsion from the Cabinet (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002: 6). Mrema left CCM and, in election year, sought an opposition party to join.

The series of events leading to Mrema’s leaving CCM naturally gives rise to the question as to whether leading figures in CCM deliberately provoked him to leave the party to become an opposition politician. I argue that there are a number of reasons why this could be the case. First of all, the broad popularity of Mrema would have made him a strong contender for being CCM’s presidential candidate, even though he tended to alienate those working closely with him. Secondly, in order to make multipartyism seem to be effective, having a strong opposition candidate could reflect well on CCM and the entire process. Thirdly, having such a strong opposition candidate who emerged from within CCM helped to shift the tone of the election towards CCM’s agenda.

Before Mrema left CCM, the most popular opposition politician in the country was the Reverend Mtikila. Mtikila was a dangerous figure, for both racial harmony and the union between Zanzibar and the mainland. Mrema, on the other hand, was ideologically close to CCM, and was even quoted as saying that he thought the policies of CCM were superb; it was only the quality of some of the leaders with whom he disagreed (Whitehead 2000: 9). However, if Mrema had been deliberately forced from within CCM to enter opposition politics, I argue that it was a strategy of CCM that came close to backfiring on the party in the 1995 elections.
Following his leaving of CCM, six months prior to the 1995 general election, Mrema sought an opposition party to join. He approached CHADEMA, at that time chaired by the former minister of finance, Edwin Mtei. The account presented by Mtei (2009: 202-203) is that Mrema insisted on being both presidential candidate and chairman of the party. While CHADEMA were willing to allow Mrema to be their presidential candidate, he instead became chairman and presidential candidate for the opposition party NCCR-Mageuzi (National Convention for Constitution and Reform). As with most opposition parties in Tanzania, the formation of NCCR-Mageuzi in 1992 had centred around a notable personality: in this case, Mabere Marando, a former government security agent and civil rights lawyer from Mara Region (Whitehead 2000: 7). Marando stepped aside as chair to allow Mrema to become both the chairman and the presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi. After securing the candidacy for NCCR-Mageuzi, Mrema sought to gather support from other opposition parties who would back him for president. Negotiations with the Civic United Front (CUF), a party with its main base of support in Pemba, Zanzibar, foundered over the failure to agree on a suitable running-mate for Mrema, with NCCR-Mageuzi insisting that the vice-presidential candidate come from within their ranks (Hoffman and Robinson 2009: 127-128). CHADEMA itself was suffering from religious and ethnic divisions within its own executive committee, and was unable to agree upon their presidential candidate for the 1995 polls (Mmuya 1998: 96). CHADEMA thus chose to back Mrema for the presidency. The CHADEMA chairman Mtei, who does not mention the CHADEMA infighting in his autobiography, describes how he believed that there was a deal between CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi. This deal was supposed to mean that NCCR-Mageuzi and CHADEMA were not to field rival parliamentary candidates. However, this alleged deal was soon broken, with NCCR-Mageuzi fielding candidates against
CHADEMA candidates. Edwin Mtei himself was standing in Arusha Urban constituency, the seat that had been held by another Chagga, Nsilo Swai, in the 1960s. Much to Mtei’s annoyance, NCCR-Mageuzi fielded Makongoro Nyerere, the son of Julius Nyerere, against him (Mtei 2009: 202-205). Mtei described the deal done for CHADEMA to support Mrema as “one of my major errors in life” (ibid.: 204). This gives some picture of the divisive nature of Mrema’s character.

Mrema’s presence changed the fortunes of NCCR-Mageuzi. Comparing the local elections of 1994, before Mrema had joined the party, with the 1995 general election results, Mrema’s presence can be seen to increase the party’s share of the vote (Whitehead 2000: 8). The party received a lot of support from university lecturers and students (Maliyamkono 1995: 25-26). Much of the support for Mrema, however, came from an underclass of poor people known as the walalahoi (Mmuya 1998: 38-39; Temu and Due 2000: 707). Walalahoi literally translates as “those who sleep exhausted” (Molony 2005: xix), and can refer to the working class but is more commonly used to refer to a dissatisfied under class. This is a group that had been mobilised by Reverend Mtikila, who in his rhetoric portrayed himself as standing on the side of the walalahoi against wealthy Asian business interests (Campbell 1999: 111; Nyang’oro 2004: 48).

With Mrema’s popular touch, these were the supporters that began to offer large crowds for Mrema at his rallies. Mtei, unsurprisingly, was dismissive of the support from this group. “The campaign turned into a farce. Mrema was attracting such large crowds of unregistered unemployed youngsters, pushing his motor vehicle and women spreading their khanga for him to walk on, that he thought he was already in State House” (Mtei 2009: 203). Mrema got his biggest crowds in his home of Kilimanjaro, but he was also popular in urban areas elsewhere in the country such as Mbeya, Shinyanga and Dar es
Salaam. It has been argued that this support had a large ethnic component, drawing support from the large Chagga populations found in these urban centres (Omari 1997b: 63-65; Kaiser 2001: 96-97). Omari (1997b: 64) argues that Chagga traders operating in urban areas became the backbone of Mrema’s campaign, for example through daladala owners providing free transport to NCCR-Mageuzi rallies. Kaiser (2001: 96-97) describes how parts of Dar es Salaam with large Chagga populations developed a very different look from the rest of the city, as the green flags of CCM were replaced by NCCR-Mageuzi colours. Kaiser (2001: 96-97) argues that, while Mrema did not overtly use ethnicity in his campaign, he was understood as a “Chagga candidate”.

Mrema was not the only candidate that was strongly identified with a particular ethnic group. John Momose Cheyo, a prominent businessman from the Bariadi district in Shinyanga, became very much associated with his Sukuma ethnicity. He stood as a candidate for the UDP party (Whitehead 2000: 7), largely a one-man show (Maliyamkono 1995: 26). In Moroff’s statistical analysis, this was a party that received very regionalised support in Cheyo’s home area (Moroff 2010a: 760).

Mrema did not present a policy platform or ideological position radically different from CCM. I would argue that this was difficult for him as he had only joined the opposition party months before. Indeed, at a panel debate featuring all the candidates on September 18th 1995 at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, Dar es Salaam, Mrema was seen to depart from his prepared policy notes and to fail to talk about his party’s policies, instead speaking on the evils of corruption within CCM (Omari 1997a: 82-86). This built on his strong anti-corruption credentials as an anti-corruption campaigner when a minister. Mrema also used the rhetoric of the indigenisation debate, arguing that the government was favouring rich, foreign businessmen in contrast to the indigenous majority in Tanzania. This discourse was largely anti-Asian in character (Aminzade
2003: 54-55). In this sense, he took over much of Mtikila’s rhetoric. Given that it was the government’s links with an Asian-owned business that had led him to leave CCM, Mrema was able to link corruption to the anti-Asian sentiment at that time. However, as the campaign progressed, and Mrema’s great popular support became apparent to him, he began to make increasingly outlandish statements as he was campaigning. By the end of the campaign, he was claiming that within three weeks of taking office, President Mwinyi would be in the high security prison at Ukonga (Mtei 2009: 203).

As Mrema was touring Mara Region during the campaign, he made a courtesy visit to Julius Nyerere at his home of Butiama. The meeting was not smooth; Nyerere was quoted afterwards as saying that he would not allow the country to be “thrown to the dogs” (“Election Guide” 1995: 10; Mtei 2009: 203). Nyerere clearly saw Mrema as a candidate unfit to hold the presidency. Mtei blames Mrema for unleashing Nyerere to support CCM (Mtei 2009: 203-204). Nyerere’s involvement with the campaign was not without controversy, as some believed that it was not appropriate for the father of the nation to support a particular candidate (Richey and Ponte 1996: 82). Nevertheless, Nyerere made a forceful radio broadcast just before the election, in which he stated that the opposition candidates were unsuitable, mentioning Mrema by name, and that Mkapa was the only candidate suitable to be president (“Why Didn’t the Opposition Do Better?” 1996: 16).

This intervention by Nyerere was not simply an endorsement by the most popular politician in the country, I argue it was also tied closely to CCM’s message that they were the party of peace and unity, and that other parties would bring discord and even civil war to Tanzania. This message that CCM is the only party of peace, unity and the nation is a message that has been pushed in each of the multiparty election campaigns.
The comparison is drawn by CCM of the war and ethnic conflict in neighbouring countries, compared to the peace in Tanzania. Opposition parties are accused of playing on religious or ethnic cleavages. In the 1995 campaign, CCM widely used film footage of the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 10). Footage of the Rwandan genocide was also shown on the Mengi-owned national television channel ITV (TEMCO 2006: 101). Similar footage was shown on a local Morogoro-based television channel on the run-up to the 2000 election (ibid.: 101). It seems to be a powerful message: “the wider public still identifies CCM with national unity and opposition parties with dissension” (ARD 2003: 3). The use of such rhetoric by CCM is not without critics. A 1996 court case found that key members of the ruling party were being disingenuous in stating that, if opposition candidates were elected, it would bring civil war to Tanzania (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 9-10). Nevertheless, it remains a continued and powerful aspect of CCM’s campaign rhetoric in each multiparty general election.

The polls were held on the mainland on 29th October 1995. However, the polls were characterised in many areas by chaotic organisation, particularly in urban centres. Dar es Salaam suffered particularly from a shortage of materials, and the decision was made the day after the election to re-run the polls in Dar es Salaam only. Support for Mrema was visibly high in many parts of Dar es Salaam, with the NCCR-Mageuzi colours visible while CCM had little influence (Omari 1997b: 63-65; Kaiser 2001: 96-97). While opposition parties cried foul, the polls were re-run in Dar es Salaam constituencies on the 19th November. Turn-out was low, at only 42%, in a poll characterised by “apathy, confusion and disillusionment” (Richey and Ponte 1996: 85-86).
Table 1: 1995 Presidential election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National vote share (%)</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro Region vote share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.M. Cheyo</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.H. Lipumba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.W. Mkapa</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>61.82</td>
<td>20.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L. Mrema</td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>27.77</td>
<td>77.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Reeves and Klein 1995)

The results of the 1995 Presidential polls are given in Table 1. As can be seen, Mrema performed far more strongly in Kilimanjaro than he did nationally. The results are even clearer when the constituency results are considered: in his home constituency of Vunjo, he received over 90% of votes cast. In terms of MPs elected, NCCR-Mageuzi won 16 seats nationally, and CHADEMA won three (Richey and Ponte 1996: 86).

The strength of the numbers in Kilimanjaro has led commentators to argue that NCCR-Mageuzi was only successful because of the ethnicity of Augustine Mrema. Omari argues that it was simply the ethnicity of Mrema that gave NCCR-Mageuzi success in both the presidential and parliamentary elections in the Kilimanjaro Region, and further it was ethnicity that meant the party did less well in areas such as Shinyanga (Omari 1997b: 64-65). Such an analysis has been argued against by Moroff’s statistical analysis of the support bases of political parties in East Africa. Moroff (2010a) finds that NCCR-Mageuzi’s support, while not as national in character as CCM’s, is still amongst the widest for an opposition party in East Africa. Cheyo’s UDP, on the other hand, has a narrow base of support in his Cheyo’s home region. A statistical analysis of where parties in East Africa drew their support reveals that NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995 and CHADEMA in each multiparty election did not draw their support solely from one part of the country. Compared to the UDP, as well as most opposition parties in
neighbouring Kenya and Uganda, these parties did not draw support from Kilimanjaro alone (Moroff 2010a).

**After the 1995 elections**

Months after the 1995 election, I argue that a by-election result served to show the weaknesses in the argument that Mrema’s relative successes in the 1995 polls were purely ethnically-based. In 1996, Mrema stood as a parliamentary candidate in a by-election in Temeke constituency, Dar es Salaam. Temeke is an area that has been characterised as ethnically largely Wadengerko, and mostly Muslim (Whitehead 2009: 253). If ethnicity were the key deciding factor in Tanzanian elections, this would not seem to be fertile territory for a Chagga candidate such as Mrema. As was noted by political commentators before the by-election,

> Few observers believe he [Mrema] can win. He is a Chagga fighting an election a long way from his power base in Moshi and standing against a local man... He is a Christian in a predominantly Muslim constituency and has had difficult relations in the past when Muslim fundamentalists started attacking pork butchers’ shops and he had to bring the full force of the law down against them. ("Politics - Mkapa, Mrema, Amour, Hamad" 1996: 6)

Nevertheless, Mrema won the constituency with a landslide (Aminzade 2003: 54), albeit through maintaining close relations with a local Sheikh (Whitehead 2000: 10-11). Chagga candidates have since won seats in Dar es Salaam; in 2000, a Chagga, Rita Mlaki won Kawe constituency for CCM (Mmuya 2005: 37-38).

A tourist guide to Kilimanjaro, published in conjunction with the state-run Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA), contained a section describing some of the history of the Chagga people of Kilimanjaro. Concerning recent political developments, they observe:
From independence in 1961, up to Tanzania’s first multi-party elections in 1995, there had always been a Chagga in the government cabinet. That year the Chagga voted overwhelmingly along regional lines and against the ruling party candidates. The end result was that there was no Chagga face in the new cabinet… In the 1960s, a writer had noted that modern Chagga political actions cannot be understood without knowledge of the past. True. But, as the Chagga learned as a result of their 1995 vote, and jokes apart, looking back is not the best way forward. (Martin c.2000: 32)

This quote indicates the feeling that Chagga people had been punished following their support for opposition candidates in the 1995 polls. There was a shortage of CCM MPs of Chagga ethnicity; veteran Chagga ministers such as Basil Mramba had lost his Rombo seat in the election. Added to the growing perceived difficulties in the kihamba belt described in the previous chapter, this was a difficult period for Kilimanjaro. CCM had more successful results in Kilimanjaro in 2000 and 2005. Particularly in 2005, CCM was able to mobilise this dissatisfaction to their own advantage.

After his 1996 by-election success, Mrema’s star began to fade. The party Mrema had joined in 1995, NCCR-Mageuzi, soon descended into infighting. This has been characterised by Aminzade as a fight between the populism of Mrema and an “intellectual wing” of the founder and secretary general, Mabere Marando (Aminzade 2003: 55). However, the divide as described by Mmuya had an ethnic dimension. The party was divided into three camps, each self-describing in ethnic terms: the Musoma grouping surrounding the founder, Mabere Marando, from the East of Lake Victoria, the Haya group, from the west of the lake, and a Chagga grouping, which of course included Mrema himself (Mmuya 1998: 85-86). Given that the party was dominated by strong personalities, each of whom had their own local powerbases and sources of funds, it is perhaps not surprising that groupings took on these characteristics. The party
infighting worsened, and resulted in violence at a May 1997 meeting of NCCR-Mageuzi (Tripp 2000: 199).

Mrema left NCCR-Mageuzi in 1999. Allegations of theft from party coffers followed him to his new party (Hoffman and Robinson 2009: 127), the small Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), a party without a single MP. Mrema’s strong showing in the 1995 elections, and the subsequent victory in the Temeke by-election, was the highpoint of his electoral success. By the 2000 polls, as shown in Table 2, his showing nationally was down to under 8%. His support in Kilimanjaro Region remained stronger than in the nation as a whole, yet even in Kilimanjaro he came in second place to CCM’s Mkapa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National vote share (%)</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro Region vote share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Mkapa</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>71.74</td>
<td>48.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L. Mrema</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>41.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.H. Lipumba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>16.26</td>
<td>8.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Cheyo</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Whitehead (2009))

The role of ethnicity in Mrema’s political career has been easy to generalise and oversimplify. From pure demographics, however, it is clear that Mrema was not only a Chagga candidate; he received nearly 30% of the vote nationally in 1995, not possible if he was appealing only to a Chagga constituency. I argue that his Temeke bye-election victory is a clear indicator that his Chagga ethnicity was not a barrier to being elected as a Chagga candidate in non-Chagga areas. Mrema presented himself as a man of the walalahoi. Nevertheless, I do conclude that it does appear that ethnicity did have a role to play in Mrema’s relative success in 1995 and 1996. It seems that – uniquely in Tanzania’s multiparty elections – an important element in Mrema’s campaign was that
the Chagga migrant community was mobilised to support Mrema as a candidate. This seems to have been primarily working-class Chagga, working all over Tanzania and willing to campaign for Mrema. At the same time, for the more intellectual elements both within his own party and beyond, Mrema began to be seen as something of an embarrassment. Indeed, despite polling over 90% in some constituencies of Kilimanjaro in 1995, I found it difficult to find members of the Chagga elite who look on him fondly. However, there was a political force in CHADEMA that was far closer to the views of the Chagga elite, as it emerged out of the retired Chagga elite. First, however, I shall examine CCM’s choice of presidential candidate.

**The 2005 General Election – Jakaya Kikwete and CCM**

Prior to the 2005 polls, a newspaper commentator observed, “campaigns in Tanzania are characterised by two features: easy to be predicted and quite dull” (Muga 2005: 17). CCM’s victory in 2005 was never really in doubt. Their candidate was Jakaya Kikwete, from near Bagamoyo, on the coast of Tanzania. In 1995, when only in his forties, Kikwete had stood in the internal CCM selection process for choosing the CCM presidential candidate, coming first after the first round of voting (Maliyamkono 1995: 34). However, with Mkapa being Nyerere’s choice as a candidate, Kikwete waited a decade before trying again, serving as Mkapa’s Foreign Minister for the length of his administration, giving Kikwete valuable foreign experience.

CCM’s choice of candidate naturally received attention, as it was a near-certainty that the CCM candidate would win the election. Looking at some of the discussions surrounding their choice can, I argue, give an insight into the ethnic and religious discussions that go on in Tanzania. In the run-up to the selection of the candidate, the
“big tribe” discourse came into play. On one Internet messageboard, the following was posted as CCM considered its choice [transcribed as-is]:

for the benefit of the country in terms of peace and stability, and fairness to us, those of smaller tribes. We should NEVER elect a Chaga, Mhaya or Mnyakyusa, a Sukuma or a Nyamwezi as president of Tanzania; at least not yet. you will see what will happen if one of them is elected, how his or her people will be boasting, saying “You see? We told you we are in control! We are better! We are more intelligent! We are more populous! We are BIG!” Keep them out of Ikulu… have nothing against them simply because I come from a small tribe. I am against chaos and civil strife that may ensure if one of them enters Ikulu. That is why I am against having one of them as president of Tanzania…So, also for their own safety, please, please, keep the Chaga out of Ikulu; keep the Nyakyusa out of Ikulu; keep the Haya out of Ikulu, also keep the Sukuma and Nyamwezi out of Ikulu, until other tribes feel secure enough or believe that they can really trust them. Many of us do trust them as individuals like anybody else. They are fellow Tanzanians. But as tribes, I don’t think so. They have too much influence in the country. So to neutralize the pernicious influence, keep them out of State House… The future of our country is at stake. (Ndugu 2004)

Similar concerns over the “big tribe” discourse came up during the campaign. In the run-up to the 2005 polls, I asked George, a government employee in Kilimanjaro, about whether people would not vote for Freeman Mbowe because of his Chagga ethnicity. George said that people campaigning in the country would say that it was not desirable to have a president from “one of the big tribes” (Fieldnotes, 22/10/2005). By “big tribe”, he explained, he was not referring only to Chagga but also Haya, and Nyakyusa. George, a Chagga himself, did not think that this was a particularly serious issue, it “is just something people say when campaigning”. I later discovered that George was a strong supporter of CCM, which is possibly why he was downplaying the importance of the discourse, as it may have favoured his preferred candidate.

65 Ikulu refers to the State House.
Note the three ethnic groups George used when describing what he considered a “big tribe”: Chagga, Nyakyusa and Haya. From a demographic standpoint, these are not the largest groups in terms of population in Tanzania. Nyakyusa and Haya have, in many respects, a similar history to Chagga in that they were all groups that received the advantages offered by the colonial state. These were the very three groups that Nyerere, in his 1968 radio broadcast, warned against discriminating against because of the educational advantages of colonialism (Nyerere 1973 [1968]: 75). These issues have retained their relevance, despite the passage of nearly forty years of nation-building.

I found in my research that religion was a concern that arose over CCM’s choice of presidential candidate. The constitution of Tanzania states that, if the president comes from the mainland then the vice-president must come from Zanzibar, and vice-versa. So far, the only Zanzibari president has been Nyerere’s hand-picked successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Both Nyerere and Mkapa were Christian. This requirement of the constitution developed into an issue over religion in the 2005 polls. Kikwete, CCM’s presidential candidate, was from the mainland, and a Muslim. Given that Zanzibar is almost completely Muslim, this inevitably meant that Kikwete’s running mate was also Muslim. I found that this raised a concern in Kilimanjaro during the campaign that for the first time Tanzania looked likely to have both a Muslim president and vice-president (Fieldnotes, 25/10/2005). Ultimately, this did not seem to be a major factor, probably due to Kikwete’s personal appeal and that he was recognised as a moderate Muslim.

Nevertheless, I argue that this concern illustrates how religion, ethnicity and regionalism interact in Tanzania. If the belief is expressed that the presidential and vice-presidential candidates should be of different religions, this is not only making a point
that pertains to religion. Given that a Zanzibari candidate will almost inevitably be Muslim, if the candidates are to be of different religions then it follows that the mainland candidate must be Christian. As such, this would prohibit a candidate for president or vice-president who came from the mainland areas that are majority Muslim. So, in stating that having a mainland Muslim as presidential candidate is problematic, then this brings in interlinked issues of religion and region.

It is my understanding that, since the move to multiparty democracy, CCM has become a more potent election-fighting machine. Their slogan for the 2005 polls was “Ari Mpya, Ngusu Mpya, Kasi Mpya” – new determination, new strength, new speed. A clear theme of renewal ran through their campaign. This was helped by the perceived youth of Kikwete. While Kikwete was 55 years old at the time of the 2005 polls, older than Mbowe, he was very much perceived as a youthful candidate. His perceived good looks added to his youthful appeal (Kelsall 2007: 527). It seems to me that, in the context of a nation in which elders are usually respected as leaders, it was interesting to note the relative youth of both Kikwete and Mbowe, and furthermore that this youthfulness seemed to be broadly understood as a benefit for both candidates. It was an aid to the CCM campaign with their message of change. The need, and ability, of CCM to reinvigorate itself is a theme that has run through its history; from Nyerere’s resignation as Prime Minister in 1961 through to the introduction of multiparty democracy CCM is a party that has sought regularly to reinvent itself.

Particular attention was given by CCM towards winning over Kilimanjaro to their party. Kilimanjaro had proven itself to be an opposition stronghold (ibid.: 526), not only voting for opposition candidates but also providing a source of opposition leaders. The tactic deployed by CCM was described to me by a senior regional party figure as
explaining that people were “better off with us” (Fieldnotes, 5/7/2006). This drew upon perceived difficulties following the 1995 election, where much support was given by Kilimanjaro to opposition candidates. CCM’s campaign also involved making use of CCM’s resources. I was visiting a secondary school outside of Moshi in the run-up to the election. Five days before the election was due to be held, the school was provided with a satellite dish, reportedly worth 240,000 shillings. Reportedly, several other schools in the area had received dishes as well. No great secret was made of the fact that this was a gift from CCM. The party was perhaps targeting the school because one of the teachers was standing for a seat on the council as a CHADEMA candidate, and teachers unions were threatening to support CHADEMA at the election. Many of the senior teachers at the school were CCM supporters, although the leadership mostly kept their allegiance hidden from view (Fieldnotes, 27/10/2005).

Another tactic used by CCM was to get the endorsement of local leaders. Despite no longer having any official position in Tanzania, local ethnic and tribal leaders offered their support for Kikwete at large public rallies. In many respects, this harks back to the inauguration of Nyerere, where he was anointed as leader by Chief Mazengo of the Ugogo Federation, and Petro Itosi Marealle as the Chagga leader (Feierman 1990: 229; Maddox 2005: 86). It seems that these ceremonies across the country received much newspaper coverage, but there was little controversy that these old figures from the past were anointing their new leader. The only incident occurred in Mwanza. As Kikwete was being installed as a Sukuma chief by a Roman Catholic priest in front of a crowd of 45,000, a traditional healer took offence at the political use of this ethnic ritual. The healer attempted to prevent the ceremony from taking place and manhandled Kikwete, but was prevented from causing any damage by security guards (Kelsall 2007: 527).
The Chagga leader who gave his blessing to Kikwete was Thomas Marealle, the former Paramount Chief. This was one of Thomas Marealle’s last public acts before his death in 2007. In the context of the election campaign, this was a case of another piece of carefully-orchestrated political theatre. However, placed in the context of T. Marealle’s history, I argue that it takes on a further dimension. In terms of his recent political history, T. Marealle had not been a supporter of Mkapa. Rather, T. Marealle had offered his support in Tanzania’s previous elections to Mrema. Some believed that this was because of personal animosity between T. Marealle and the family of Mkapa’s Chagga wife. As such, there was perceived animosity between T. Marealle and Mkapa’s wife’s family that stemmed from the political clashes of the late colonial period. In this light, it is possible to attempt to explain the political support of T. Marealle through the old political struggle between Marangu and Machame: T. Marealle gave his support to Mrema because he is from his own area of Marangu, whereas Mbowe’s origins from Machame made him less suitable. Such an approach was denied by a family member of T. Marealle: “The Mangi Mkuu was never in the opposition. He supported Mrema to make CCM correct itself and work for the people. The Mangi Mkuu never became a member of an opposition party. And he supported Kikwete” (Fieldnotes, 12/4/2007).

In terms of garnering votes for Kikwete, it was probably not particularly significant. It was not an occasion that was widely talked about during the campaign. Nevertheless, I argue that the anointing of Kikwete marks a significant moment in T. Marealle’s political rehabilitation. It marked his acceptance of CCM. After a lifetime’s journey, including time away from Tanzania, T. Marealle was willing symbolically to pass on the mantle of leadership to Kikwete. Historically an opponent of TANU, T. Marealle was here granting his blessing to one of Nyerere’s successors. It also marks the acceptance of
By 2005, Mrema was no longer a potent political force. He received far less attention than Kikwete or CHADEMA’s candidate during the campaign, either from the national media or in the discourse. He received most of his press coverage at the start of his campaign. A change in the rules required all presidential candidates to have at least a University degree. The picture of him in his graduation robes was his most notable appearance in the campaign. He did not seem to have a developed policy platform, but did have a broadly populist anti-privatisation message (Mapalala and Machumu 2005: 16-17). However, as the campaign progressed, the attention of the media swung away from Mrema. This is perhaps an indication of the successes of CHADEMA’s campaigning.
The opposition party that made the most impact on the campaign trail was CHADEMA. This party was first registered as a political party in January 1993 (Richey and Ponte 1996: 81). There is an extent to which CHADEMA has been understood as a Chagga party. Sally Falk Moore, examining the politics of Kilimanjaro in 1993, writes of CHADEMA:

> For the Chagga people on Kilimanjaro, it was not the declarations of virtuous intention [in the CHADEMA Basic Principles and Objectives] but what they knew about the leadership that gave the party its identity. The construction of the organisation was in Chagga hands… I was told by several people on the mountain that, formal universalism of membership aside, CHADEMA was really a Chagga party (Moore 1996: 589)

CHADEMA has been perceived to be a party that is based along class and ethnic lines, seen as representing middle-class Chagga (Baregu 2000: 72). The ideological position of the party was broadly along the pro-business neoliberal economic lines, a “globalised post-socialist political rhetoric” as Moore (1996: 589) describes it.

Retirees played an important role in the party. “Closely interviewed, the CHADEMA leadership acknowledges that among its most relied upon members and supporters are the retired personnel from the public service” (Mmuya 1998: 39). Amongst these retirees, key figures were of Chagga ethnicity. These were people who followed trajectories similar to those discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, who had spent time abroad but then retired to Kilimanjaro. That is not to say that all Chagga elite retirees entered into opposition politics. The widow of Nsilo Swai, for example, became the Kilimanjaro regional chair of CCM. Nevertheless, Chagga retirees became key members of opposition parties, particularly CHADEMA. An example is Edwin Mtei, the former finance minister who left Nyerere’s government in the 1970s when his monetarist views clashed sharply with Nyerere’s socialism. According to his autobiography, discussions
over the formation of CHADEMA began in the elite Legion Club in Dar es Salaam, with Colonel Marealle playing an important role in the formation of the party (Mtei 2009: 195). In his detailed analysis of the internal structures of political parties in Tanzania, Max Mmuya describes the organisation of CHADEMA as similar to that of a business, organised through an Executive Committee rather than through grass-roots activists. “CHADEMA has shown a strong business orientation [more] than a political one which shows itself not only in its ideology but also in its organisation” (Mmuya 1998: 58-59). While senior members of the party were indeed of Chagga ethnicity, the upper echelons were by no means entirely Chagga. The Secretary General until 2004, for example, was Bob Makani, a Sukuma banker (Maliyamkono 1995: 25).

While CHADEMA was in no way an exclusively Chagga exercise, I argue that in many respects it was far more a party of the Chagga elite than Mrema’s brash populism. Instrumental in its founding were the members of the Chagga elite who left Tanzania during socialism. As described in Chapter 4, many of the returning migrants took advantage of the liberalisation of the economy to start new businesses. Some took advantage of the liberalisation of politics to start a new party, CHADEMA. The structures of the party reflected the business orientation of these retirees. As such, particularly in contrast with Mrema’s populism, CHADEMA was initially rather staid. They did not put forward their own presidential candidate until the 2005 election.

Freeman Mbowe was the CHADEMA presidential candidate for the 2005 polls. Mbowe is a businessman from Machame, Kilimanjaro. Unlike Mrema and many of the other opposition figures, Mbowe was not previously a high-ranking member of CCM. He was most likely a party member in the past, as one elderly informant described, “everyone was back then” (Fieldnotes 27/10/05), yet he never stood for public office as
a CCM candidate. While leaving him open to charges of inexperience, this complete break with the past seemed to be considered an advantage in Kilimanjaro. Mbowe is a well-known businessman in Tanzania. He owns several high-profile businesses in Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam, including the luxury Protea hotel in Machame, and Club Bilicanas nightclub in Dar es Salaam. The hotel in Machame is built upon his ancestral *kihamba*. Mbowe’s father, the late Alfayo Mbowe Aikael, was also a prominent businessman. He is understood in Kilimanjaro to have been a being a very wealthy man. He was, according to one informant, “one of the few Tanzanians who managed to become rich before independence” (Fieldnotes, 27/10/05). This wealth he used to support Nyerere and TANU. The background and links between Mbowe, his father and the independence struggle led to Mbowe receiving support in Kilimanjaro. While the business interests of Mbowe and his father reflect the capitalist interests of Chagga people, Mbowe also had a strong and clear link back to the independence struggle. One informant went as far as to say, “CHADEMA is popular because of Mbowe’s father… Mbowe is using Nyerere’s philosophy to gain support” (Fieldnotes, 19/11/2005). Through linking himself back to Nyerere, this was an attempt to counteract CCM’s place as the heir to Nyerere. It is not altogether clear to what extent detailed knowledge of Mbowe’s family history extended beyond Kilimanjaro and people of Chagga ethnicity, yet his was certainly a very well known family amongst the Chagga people of Kilimanjaro.

In the 1965 general election, Freeman Mbowe’s father, Alfayo Mbowe stood against Solomon Eliufoo in their home constituency of Hai. Solomon Eliufoo, leading anti-paramountcy campaigner and briefly President of the Chagga Council before its abolition, was a minister in Nyerere’s cabinet, and won the seat easily (Mramba 1967: 124). There are many stories concerning Alfayo Mbowe’s activities during the socialist
period in Tanzania. His political links with Nyerere, having funded the party in its formative stages, put him in good stead for his later business interests. He was reportedly permitted, despite the import restrictions on the country at the time, to import a Rolls Royce car into Tanzania (Fieldnotes, 2/12/2005). Another story concerns his involvement with a land deal in Dar es Salaam. Alfayo Mbowe, like his son, was involved in the hotel business. He was known in Kilimanjaro for acquiring the previously European-owned Kilimanjaro Hotel in Moshi (Mramba 1967: 118). In the early 1970s, amongst his properties was the Splendid Hotel, which stood on Samora Avenue in Dar es Salaam. According to my informant, he owned this property in conjunction with a cabinet minister66. “[Alfayo] Mbowe had supported Mwalimu financially during the independence struggle, and so was an influential person.” At this time, the East African Community was looking to build a telecommunications headquarters for Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. The site of the Splendid Hotel was deemed suitable. The individual in charge of looking for a suitable property, himself of Chagga ethnicity, went to the Registrar of Buildings at the Ministry of Lands. The Registrar agreed that this would be a suitable position, and sent notice to President Nyerere. Nyerere, not realising the ownership of the land, revoked Mbowe’s ownership. When Nyerere discovered that the hotel had belonged to Mbowe and the minister, he realised his mistake. He decreed that they be given another hotel, in Dar es Salaam. This tale showed the political influence of Alfayo Mbowe in the face of the sometimes arbitrary powers the state exercised in this period. Having told me this story, however, and as I asked further about issues surrounding Chagga ethnicity, the informant realised

66 For a government minister to be involved in a business such as this was presumably a violation of the post-Arusha Declaration Leadership Code, which prohibited people of middle or senior rank in the party or government from capitalist activities such as renting out property, earning more than one salary and being the directors of a company (Aminzade 2003: 48).
that it also contained another message: all of the actors in the tale, with the exception of Nyerere, were of Chagga ethnicity.

Mbowe, while an intelligent man who has a great deal of respect from academics and intellectuals, lacks the mass appeal of Mrema when addressing rallies. The CHADEMA party hired a helicopter for the length of the campaign to move Mbowe around between campaign stops (Bawazir 2005). The use of a helicopter was criticised by CCM as an expensive gimmick, particularly in light of CHADEMA’s campaign promise to dispose of the new presidential jet, and that people were only attending his rallies to see the helicopter (Mjema 2005). The helicopter received a remarkable amount of attention in the media. It also served to frame the debate over CHADEMA. For those sympathetic to CHADEMA, it was an effective campaign tool that drew attention to Mbowe’s policies (Fieldnotes, 27/10/2005).

CCM again used the tactic, effective in previous polls, of appealing to national unity and accusing their opponents of spreading division. At a campaign rally in Mvumi, Kikwete talked of the ethnic conflict in Burundi. He accused the opposition party leaders, “who are all out to divide this nation along tribal, religious or racial lines” (Kikwete, cited in Mwita 2005: 1). Particular criticism was directed to a particular policy of CHADEMA, the proposal to introduce provincial administrations with strong control over local resources. It appears that this policy was designed to tap into popular feeling that resources in Tanzania, particularly mineral wealth, were not going to local people. This policy was described in one opinion piece in the press as being in danger of “plunging this country into tribalism, something that no peace loving Tanzania would

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67 To draw the contrast between the funds accessed by various opposition parties, it was reported that the Reverend Mtikila arrived at DP rallies in Kangera Region, alone, on a motorbike (Byabato 2005: 4).
want to see rearing its ugly head… a very fertile material for instability and outright civil wars” (Joseph 2005: 7). Criticism along similar lines also came from CCM. The CCM minister Basil Mramba, campaigning in his home constituency of Rombo, Kilimanjaro, said: “CHADEMA should stop misleading people by advocating outdated policies that would cause disunity. We need our nation to stand stronger and united forever…

Tanzania eliminated tribal and racial lines of division. Those preaching disunity today have no room in the leadership of this country” (Mbowe, cited in Kitomary 2005: 4). Note that this was a speech on unity given by a Chagga politician to a Chagga audience.

It seems to me that the unity discourse employed by CCM, even though directed at candidates who happen to be of Chagga ethnicity, is not essentially anti-Chagga in content. Talk of national unity is not coded anti-Chagga sentiment.

Campaigning officially began on the 21st August 2005, with polling day originally scheduled for 30th October. However, on the 26th October, the CHADEMA vice-presidential candidate, Jumbe Rajab Jumbe, died suddenly (EISA 2006: vii). While the Zanzibari poll went ahead as planned, the decision was made to delay the poll on the mainland until the 14th December 2005, to give CHADEMA time to properly select a new vice-presidential candidate. Opposition parties, including CHADEMA, objected to this extension, as it would add considerable cost to their campaigns. In the immediate aftermath of Jumbe’s death, conspiracy theories were flying around about the true nature of his death, and possible CCM involvement. These rumours faded, however, when it became clear that Jumbe had died from a medical condition in hospital (Fieldnotes 27/10/2005 – 30/10/2005). Nevertheless, I argue that it was visibly the case that CCM benefited the most from the delayed polls, as they were the only party to prepare and distribute new election materials, and produce new poster designs.
The financial resources available to CCM, which dwarfed all other parties, were put to
good use in paying for these new materials. There were also allegations that the money
of CCM was used for the rigging of the election. It should be noted that the reports of
election observers and monitors, both local and international, found the polling to be
broadly free and fair (EISA 2006; Nyang’oro 2006: 3). The Tanzanian Election
Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) found the elections on the mainland to be “clean,
free and fair” (”Elections - the Aftermath” 2006: 15). Nevertheless, there was a belief
amongst some CHADEMA supporters that widespread vote-stealing had taken place. I
spoke to a high-ranking CHADEMA activist in Marangu. She clearly believed that
many votes were stolen. She said of Mbowe, “Most of his votes were stolen. Vote
rigging is rampant… Voting here is a nightmare. Mbowe had many votes stolen.” She
developed in detail the mechanisms by which election counts were rigged. With the
polls closing at 4pm, and no vote counting takes place until after nightfall – frequently,
in halls with no electric lighting – it became very easy to swap ballot papers. She was
also suspicious about those in charge of aiding illiterate voters, as these were selected by
CCM. Opposition parties had observers at the count, but she believes that these were
easily bought by CCM. “It is lopsided towards CCM. No opposition party will win in
the next 1 or 2 elections” (Fieldnotes, 17/4/2007). In the reports of election observers,
however, the counting of votes was specifically stated to have occurred according to the
Given the strengths of the campaigning, Mbowe and CHADEMA had a disappointing showing. Nationally, Mbowe achieved less than 6% of the vote. It came as a surprise to see Mbowe poll so poorly after his strong campaign. More strikingly, the parliamentary results for Kilimanjaro showed few victories for CHADEMA or other opposition candidates: with the exception of Moshi Urban constituency, won by CHADEMA, CCM received a clean sweep of Kilimanjaro. I argue that this was a remarkable achievement for CCM, and shows the success of their strategy. Kikwete was a popular candidate. As a CCM supporter said during the campaign, “Mbowe is popular. He puts his policies across well… If anyone other than Kikwete was standing against him, CCM could be in trouble!” (Fieldnotes, 22/10/2005).

The 1995 and 2005 results can be juxtaposed. A crude analysis sees a Chagga candidate in 1995 easily winning over Kilimanjaro and coming surprisingly close to becoming President, while the Chagga candidate in 2005 struggled both locally and nationally. Such an analysis does not take into account the huge visibility and popular support that Mrema had even before he left CCM, and how much more effective CCM has become at fighting elections. Nevertheless, there is a conclusion to be drawn that, following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National vote share (%)</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro Region vote share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.M. Kikwete</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>80.28</td>
<td>72.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.A. Mbowe</td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>20.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.H. Lipumba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.C. Mtikila</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.K. Shayo</td>
<td>MAKINI</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.S. Mvungi</td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.J. Makaidi</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C. Senkoro</td>
<td>PPT-MAENDELEO</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.H. Kyara</td>
<td>SAU</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L. Mrema</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: nec.or.tz)
Mrema’s 1995 successes in Kilimanjaro, the Chagga electorate have moved closer to the mainstream in Tanzania. During my fieldwork, the result of the 2005 election came as a surprise, and my initial conclusion was that CCM’s hegemony was now complete. However, subsequent events proved my initial conclusion to be incomplete.

**After the 2005 election**

While they had a strong showing in the 2005 polls, dissatisfaction with Kikwete and the new CCM regime soon set in. There was a growing dissatisfaction that livelihoods were not improving, and that there were few opportunities to determine the direction of Tanzania (Snyder 2008: 302). More notably, Kikwete’s regime was rocked by a number of massive corruption cases. His Prime Minister and close political ally, Edward Lowassa, was forced to resign over his involvement with a power generation scandal (Policy Forum 2009: 20). Basil Mramba, at the time MP for Rombo and a veteran CCM minister, was charged with offences relating to a 65 billion shilling gold auditing fraud (Rosina 2009). This corruption differed from that of previous regimes in that it was linked to political corruption: “For the first time in Tanzanian history, grand corruption was linked to election finance” (Policy Forum 2009: 4).

CHADEMA had some internal disputes in the 2005-2010 parliament, although not as large in scale as any of the disputes in which Mrema had been involved. One of CHADEMA’s few MPs, the young and ambitious non-Chagga Zitto Kabwe, apparently made a move to unseat Freeman Mbowe to become party chairman. He was, however, dissuaded from doing so by senior party officials including Edwin Mtei ("Rift in Ccm Now in the Open" 2010: 7-8). Nevertheless, CHADEMA did not implode as NCCR-Mageuzi had done a decade before, and it remains an effective political party.
The 2010 polls were marked by former presidential candidates standing instead as parliamentary candidates. Augustine Mrema chose not to run again for the presidency, instead standing and winning as an MP in his home constituency of Vunjo. Now in his late sixties, and rumoured to be in ill health, he is most likely looking to end his political career on a high and to secure himself some income. Freeman Mbowe also chose not to contest the presidency again, but stood as MP in his home constituency of Hai. The presidential candidate for CHADEMA was not of Chagga ethnicity, but rather the party’s MP for Karatu, Dr. Willibrod Slaa. A CHADEMA MP for the last fifteen years, Slaa made an impact in the previous parliament by publishing a “list of shame” of corrupt politicians, with names including Mkapa, Lowassa and Mramba (Policy Forum 2009: 92). There were reports that Slaa, knowing that the task of beating Kikwete was almost impossible and that standing for the presidency would mean he would lose his safe parliamentary seat, demanded that CHADEMA pay him the equivalent salary of what he would have earned as an MP over five years ("October 2010 - Election Guide" 2010: 8). Mbowe remains chairman of CHADEMA.

Not surprisingly, corruption was again a major theme of opposition party campaigns in the 2010 elections (TEMCO 2011: 57). Kikwete again portrayed CCM as the party of peace and unity on the campaign trail (Makulilo and Raphael 2010: 10). A few issues pertaining to national unity did emerge during the campaign. An Islamic newspaper, An Nuur, ran a headline saying, “Maaskofu wataleta Rwanda na Slaa wao – Bishops will cause another genocide with their Slaa” (TEMCO 2011: 84). In a separate incident, a CCM District Secretary claimed at a rally in Moshi town that CHADEMA had a poster in preparation alleging that, if there was a CHADEMA council in Moshi, all non-
Chagga people would be expelled from the municipality. No such poster was ever displayed (ibid.: 55).

Kikwete won the election, as was expected, but with a much reduced majority, nationally down from 80% in 2005 to 61% in 2010. Whereas CCM had dominated all of Kilimanjaro outside of Moshi town in the 2005 parliamentary polls, by 2010 the opposition had made a comeback.

**Table 4: 2010 Presidential election results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National vote share (%)</th>
<th>Kilimanjaro Region vote share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.M. Kuga</td>
<td>APPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.M. Kikwete</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>61.17</td>
<td>59.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.P. Slaa</td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>26.34</td>
<td>36.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.H. Lipumba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Rungwe</td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.B. Mgaywa</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y.N.D. Dovutwa</td>
<td>UPDP</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: nec.or.tz)

**Chagga Engagement in Politics**

Walking to the home of a friend in Uru on a Saturday morning, I noted the following in my fieldnotes:

Walking up from where the bus stops, we [me and my informant] walk with another mzee who is also walking up to his house... a bit further up, after we had passed the local CCM office. I ask if opposition parties were popular in Uru. He said that they didn’t have time for politics, they were too busy farming and making money! On the coast, he says, they have time for that kind of thing, but in Uru they were too busy. They weren’t concerned with politics, only economics! (Fieldnotes, 22/4/2006).

The assertion that Chagga were not interested in politics was one which I heard repeatedly in Kilimanjaro. In the light of the content of this thesis, this seems a curious statement. Historically, Chagga were involved in an intense political wrangling over the
establishment, and rejection, of the Paramount Chief. Indeed, the British saw the area as “the most politically advanced section of African population of the Territory” (Colonial Office 1949b). Neither could the post-independence or socialist periods be described as free of Chagga engagement with politics; as has been shown they continued to play a key role in the state in almost the highest of political offices. Come multipartyism, political parties were formed on the mountainside, and Chagga presidential candidates have played an important role. Party politics in Kilimanjaro has been active, as this chapter illustrates.

How, then, can one explain the view that Chagga people are not interested in politics, when there is clearly much Chagga involvement with Tanzanian politics? One possible reason is that the experience of Mrema’s candidacy in 1995 had resulted in a bloody nose for Kilimanjaro, and as such Chagga people are nervous about getting involved in politics again. However, I argue that the answer lies throughout Kilimanjaro’s political history. The economic affairs of Chagga identity, highlighted by the mzee quoted above, are considered central. As the trajectories discussed in this thesis show, it has often served Chagga interests best to avoid too much engagement in the political system. International migration is perhaps the ultimate expression of this. For despite the assertion that Chagga are not good at politics, for the Chagga elite this has been shown to be untrue; yet sometimes the most successful strategy is not to play at all. Expressions of Chagga ethnicity within the nation are not considered appropriate in terms of the strong nationalist tendencies in Tanzania.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis examined the trajectories of elite members of the Chagga ethnic group, from the mid-19th century through to the present. The study of these people has given new insights and nuances into theories of ethnicity, and particularly the role played by elites in the imagining of ethnic groups. It also gives a fresh look at the role of ethnicity in postcolonial Tanzanian politics, through the macroeconomic and political changes from socialism, through to political and economic liberalisation.

The Chagga ethnic group is a particularly interesting group to study with regard to theories of ethnicity. While Kilimanjaro receives a great deal of attention from academics from many disciplines, few have attempted to examine the breadth of the group and reflected upon how this affects theories of ethnicity. Chagga are often considered, most notably by themselves, as not a homogenous ethnic group. My attention was regularly drawn by informants to the divisions within Chagga. The most notable of these is the linguistic variation, and the mutually unintelligible dialects found on the mountainside. This throws up some fascinating features – for example, in order to maintain a unified view of Chagga people, ethnohistories have to be presented in a language that is not a Chagga vernacular. Sharing a common language is often cited as a feature of ethnic groups. The Chagga example shows that a common language is not
essential; yet, the lack of such a language causes much angst for the members of the group. This thesis, however, has attempted to portray Chagga as a group that does exist, particularly through their connection to Kilimanjaro and the *kihamba*.

In many theories of ethnicity, elites frequently have a key role to play in the formulation and imagination of ethnic identities. Yet the elites are not well served in the literature, and are usually portrayed as instrumental manipulators of ethnicity for their own ends. This raises theoretical difficulties, and it leaves the theories of ethnicity open to the critique that they are reduced to a purely instrumental model of ethnicity. This presents a difficulty: purely instrumental approaches have the weakness that they fail to adequately explain the emotional appeal of ethnicity. A more nuanced approach to our understanding of elites, however, removes this criticism.

The thesis offered new perspectives on theories of ethnicity in a number of different areas. The thesis began with an examination of Chagga ethnogenesis. The examination of the texts of European explorers, missionaries and colonial officials gave a fresh perspective on issues surrounding the creation of a Chagga ethnicity. The first point to make about ethnogenesis is that, while the name “Chagga” came from outside, there was still Chagga elite agency in the formulation of a Chagga group. This is important because it addresses some of the concerns that arise from the work of Terrence Ranger (1983): that he ignores both precolonial African identities and downplays the role of African agency. Thus, my work addresses some of the weaknesses of this approach, by giving attention to a broader timeframe than that of Indirect Rule. The second point is that my work illustrates the value of taking the *longue-durée* of the history of an ethnic group. Many of the issues that are relevant in postcolonial Tanzania have their roots in the precolonial period. The ideas of the explorers and missionaries, particularly
pertaining to the landscape of Kilimanjaro, shaped how the Chagga ethnic group were seen by the colonial officials. This gave the Chagga ethnic group advantages in fields such as education, and Chagga elites were in a position to take full advantage of these opportunities.

The thesis argues that elites have an important role to play. However, the next nuance of ethnicity the thesis highlights is the *limitations* of elite power in influencing ethnicity. The clearest example of this is in Chapter 3 of the thesis, which examines the role of two elite-authored Chagga ethnohistories. While both books are part of the project of Chagga unity, the *absences* from both texts only serve to highlight the disunities. Both works, for example, gloss over the intra-Chagga wars and conflicts of previous decades. This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it highlights the point made by Thomas Spear (2003: 26), “intellectuals need historical raw materials to construct their stories if their reinterpretations are to ring true”. Elites cannot simply make up the history of their own ethnic groups out of their imagination. The second, related point is that the intellectuals in question in Chapter 3 do not *attempt* to tell what they would understand as untruths to strengthen their case. While it is clear that elites present the facts and historical narrative in such a way as to strengthen their own unity agenda, the elites are also attempting to give an account without too many inaccuracies. It is difficult to conclude that these elites are the manipulative, scheming figures portrayed in parts of the literature.

The thesis goes on to examine the role of ethnicity in ostensibly detribalised Tanzanian society. The ethnic groups that received much of the benefits of colonialism such as education and employment, including the Chagga, remained in a powerful and influential position. This is far from an unusual feature of African postcolonies, and is
true in much of the rest of the continent. An examination of the Tanzania case is thus informative as Tanzania is widely considered a success story in avoiding ethnic conflict. The thesis examines the way that the Chagga elite were able to get around restrictions designed to equalise development across Tanzania. This also provides a more general insight into the role of ethnicity in postcolonial African states. It is not enough to assume that it is a natural feature of African states that those in a powerful position remain in such a role in the face of great political and economic changes. Rather, it took agency, work and, on occasion cunning, on the part of the Chagga people. They did this at times against the wishes of the state, falling between the gaps between conflicting policy aims of the state, and sometimes with its connivance. Ultimately, however, they made use of the advantages that the Chagga ethnic group inherited from the colonial era: the educational advantages, plus the migration of the Chagga ethnic group across Tanzania. Thus, there is an extent that the attempts at detribalising Tanzania, and equalising development across the nation, was a failure. Nevertheless, as I argue in subsequent chapters, the strong value placed on national unity prevails in contemporary Tanzania.

It is my contention throughout the thesis that central to any understanding of Chagga there must be place: Kilimanjaro and the kihamba. I do not draw from this a generalised conclusion that a homeland is the essential feature of a definition of ethnicity. Far from it: I argue that the Chagga connection to Kilimanjaro is widely considered to be stronger than those of other groups in Tanzania. This leads to the important factor of elite engagement with the moral economy of Kilimanjaro. I argue that the Chagga elite have to be seen as very much part of this moral economy. This adds another nuance to our understanding of the role of elites in ethnicity: elites are not isolated from the
broader moral economy of their communities, and neither are they just using the moral economy to reach their own political and economic gains.

Finally, the thesis concludes with an examination of the role of ethnicity in multiparty elections in Tanzania. While commentators at the start of Tanzania’s transition to multiparty democracy highlighted the risks to social unity, I argue that their concerns were premature. Tanzania has maintained its much-valued national unity. At the same time, I argue that ethnicity continues to have saliency and relevance in contemporary Tanzania. In the literature on the nation in Africa, there is much praise for Tanzania’s successes in nation-building. For example, Edward Miguel (2004) uses the “natural experiment” of the different policies of Kenya and Tanzania to compare the two sides of the border with regard to the two nation’s policies of dealing with ethnic claims on the state; Tanzania comes out as the superior case. This thesis seeks to probe more closely the way that ethnic differences were dealt with in postcolonial Tanzania. The problem with much of the existing literature is that it falls into what Susan Geiger (1997: 8-9) refers to as the “lacks and absences” approach, in which agency is denied to the people of Tanzania. A recent example is Elliot Green’s (2011) analysis of the role of demographics in explaining Tanzania’s stability; these works have their value, but do not present a complete picture because they fail to take into account the agency of the actors involved. The other difficulty with the literature on Tanzania’s stability is that it tends to present a simplistic dualism between the “stable” and the “unstable”. During multiparty election campaigns in Tanzania, CCM has been known to show images of the genocide in Rwanda to illustrate the dangers Tanzania faces; clearly, a simplistic presentation of the situation. The literature on Tanzania’s stability are, however, in danger of presenting the same simplistic dualism. In this respect, this thesis presents a
more nuanced presentation of ethnicity that recognises its role while at the same time understanding that its existence does not necessary plunge a state into conflict.

Thus, this thesis makes a contribution to how elites and ethnicity are understood in the Tanzanian context. Elites are powerful and influential figures, but not all-powerful in their ability, or desire, to shape ethnicities. They are not the tyrants that they are often portrayed as in the literature, but are part of the moral economy of the communities of which they are part. Finally, the thesis presents an analysis of the role of ethnicity in postcolonial Tanzania. Despite the fact that the relationship between Kilimanjaro and the state has not always been smooth, Chagga elites also contributed greatly to the Tanzania nation-building project. Tanzanian nationalism, however, did not destroy a Chagga identity. Rather, ethnicity continues to have a role and salience in the Tanzanian nation.
Appendix: List of Fieldwork Locations and Informants

Apart from the archival and published sources, the fieldwork that made up this thesis was informed by a wide range of formal and informal discussions, based in Dar es Salaam, Moshi and various parts of rural Kilimanjaro. Below are listed the primary subjects for interviews beyond the more informal discussions. Informants were all of Chagga ethnicity; the part of Kilimanjaro that they originate from is given in brackets after their name. The location of the interview is also given. The subjects of interviews were wide-ranging and varied, although usually consisted of a discussion of the informants personal history and background, and their experiences as elites over the course of macro-economic and political changes in Tanzania.

Phase 1: 24th June 2005 – 19th January 2006

28/7/2005: William (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam
10/8/2005: Hilda (Rombo), Dar es Salaam
12/8/2005: Aloyce (Rombo), Dar es Salaam
16/8/2005: Simbo (Machame), Dar es Salaam
27/9/2005: Aloyce (Rombo), Dar es Salaam
13/9/2005: Bright (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam
21/10/2005: Melissa (Rombo), Moshi
22/10/2005: Tom (Masama), Moshi
22/10/2005: Ezikiel (Kibosho), Moshi
24/10/2005: David (Uru), Moshi
24/10/2005: Ezikiel (Kibosho), Moshi
27/10/2005: Anael (Masama), Moshi
27/10/2005: John (Kibosho), Moshi
2 and 3/11/2005: Simbo and David (Machame), Dar es Salaam
11/11/2005: Linda and Diana (Machame), Dar es Salaam
22/11/2005: William (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam
5/12/2005: William (Old Moshi), Dar es Salaam
14/12/2005: Tom (Masama), Moshi
27/12/2005: Robert (Marangu), Marangu
28/12/2005: John (Kibosho), Moshi
28/12/2005: Thomas (Mamba), Moshi
30/12/2005: David (Uru), Moshi
2/1/2006: Anael (Masama), Moshi
3/1/2006: Aika (Machame), Dar es Salaam
15/1/2006: Emanuelle (Marangu), Dar es Salaam

**Phase 2: 16th February 2006 – 28th November 2006**

8/3/2006: Tom (Masama), Dar es Salaam
16/3/2006: Flora (Machame), Moshi
16/3/2006: John (Kibosho), Moshi
22/3/2006: Samuel (Kibosho), Moshi
22/3/2006: David (Uru), Uru
13/6/2006: Vicky (Marangu), Moshi
15/7/2006: Frank (Rombo), Moshi
30/8/2006: Joseph (Machame), Machame

Phase 3: 13\textsuperscript{th} April 2007 – 18\textsuperscript{th} August 2007

16/3/2007: Simbo (Machame), Dar es Salaam
16/3/2007: Joseph (Marangu), Dar es Salaam
16/3/2007: Anna (Machame), Dar es Salaam
25/3/2007: Marangu fieldwork
29/3/2007: Tom (Masama), Moshi
4/4/2007: Sam (Mamba), Moshi
R7/6/2005 – Masama fieldwork
14/6/2007 – 15/6/2007 Marangu fieldwork
30/6/2007 – Safari (Kibosho), Moshi

Additional research was conducted in Dar es Salaam, Machame and Moshi during July 2008; in Dar es Salaam and Moshi between September–December 2008; and in Dar es Salaam, Moshi, and Uru during January 2011.


