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The Social Origins of Alliances: Uneven and Combined Development and the Case of Jordan 1955-7

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PhD
The University of Edinburgh
2011
Declaration

I declare that this thesis is of my own composition, based on my own work, with acknowledgement of other sources and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

James Allinson
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I thought it would be easier, and take less time, to write this thesis. The list of people who made the project less difficult—who made it possible at all—would stretch to a greater length than the work itself. Of those who can be fitted on to this page, I would first like to acknowledge the support of ESRC Award Number PTA-031-2006-00106. I also gratefully acknowledge Toby Kelly, Adham Saouli and, in an earlier incarnation, Roland Dannreuther, for their role as supervisors. Their time, dedication and intellectual engagement with a project whose theoretical premises they did not share made an invaluable contribution.

In Jordan I accrued innumerable debts of gratitude, both intellectual and personal. I am grateful to the Center for Strategic Studies, for giving me their time, facilities and aid in contacting interviewees. I particularly thank Mohammed El-Masri for his help, intellectual stimulation and provision of ideas on pastoral nomadism. Tariq Tell was, and remains, a lodestar for Jordanian politics, sociology and history, and much else besides. Hassan Nasrallah provided both intellectual companionship and aid with interviews, as did Marwan Hassoun. Maha Jazi’s aid was also invaluable.

I would like to thank the participants at the Theory and Practice workshop of the Politics and IR department at Edinburgh, the International Politics Research Group and the Historical Materialism, WOCMES, SGIR, and Mediterranean Research Meeting conferences for their input. Parts of this thesis developed from co-authored articles published in The Cambridge Review of International Affairs and Capital Class, and I thank the reviewers and editors for their comments. Justin Rosenberg, John Glenn, Luke Cooper and Kamran Matin also all proved excellent critics. My dear friends and comrades Gonzalo Pozo-Martin and Rosalind Cavaghan provided intellectual and emotional support in equal measure. Paolo Maggiolini helped the development of this thesis as both friend and collaborator on a conference paper for the Matrice Mediorientale seminar. More than anyone else, this thesis has emerged in dialogue, published and not, with Alex Anievas. Without him I would have slept more, but my life and work would have been much poorer. Aoife McKenna, to whom I owe more than can be written, not only improved the final draft both intellectually and grammatically but also provided an
inspiration to continue throughout the difficult closing stages. The support, of all kinds, given by my brother and sister ensured that this thesis was actually completed.

One thousand pages would be insufficient to acknowledge how much this work owes to my parents, Anne and Brian Allinson. That is why I dedicate the entire work to them.
Abstract

This thesis answers the question: ‘what explains Jordan’s international alignments between 1955 and 1957?’ In so doing, the thesis addresses the broader question of why states in the Global South make alignments and explores the conditions under which these alignments are generated. The thesis advances beyond existing accounts in the historical and International Relations (IR) literature: especially the ‘omni-balancing school who argue that in Southern States, ruling regimes balance or bandwagon (like state actors in neo-realist theory) but directed against both internal and external threats. This thesis argues that such explanations explain Southern state behaviour by some lack or failure in comparison to the states of the global North. The thesis argues that omni-balancing imports neo-realist assumptions inside the state, endowing regimes with an autonomy they do not necessarily hold.

The thesis adopts the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development to overcome these challenges in explaining Jordan’s alignments between 1955 and 1957. Using this case study, at a turning point in the international relations of the Middle East where Jordan could have taken either path, the thesis illuminates the potential utility of this theoretical framework for the region as a whole. The thesis argues that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries a ‘combined social formation’ emerged east of the Jordan river through the processes of Ottoman mimetic reform, land reform and state formation under the British mandate. The main characteristics of this social formation were a relatively egalitarian rural land-holding structure and a mechanism of combination with the global capitalist system through British subsidy to the former nomadic pastoralists in the armed forces, replacing formerly tributary relations.

The thesis traces the social bases of the struggles that produced Jordan’s alignments between 1955 and 1957 to the emergence of this combined social formation and presents case studies of: the Jordanian responses to the Baghdad Pact, expulsion of British officers in the Jordanian armed forces, the Suez Crisis, abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and acceptance of US aid at the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The thesis will be of interest in the fields of IR and Middle East studies: contributing to IR by critiquing existing approaches and demonstrating the utility of a new theoretical framework that can overcome the dichotomy of universality/specificity in the region.
Note on Transliteration

This thesis uses a modified version of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* system of transliteration for Arabic names. Diacritics are not used for long vowels, and emphatic consonants are rendered as the equivalent Latin consonant. *Hamza* before a vowel at the beginning of a word is not indicated. Thus, for those sounds that do not exist in English the convention used in this thesis is:

ء ʾ
ز dh
ص s
ض d
ط t
ظ z
ع ʿ
غ gh
ة ‘a’ at the end of a word

Arabic terms are rendered in italics: commonly used words derived from Arabic (e.g. sheikh) are not. Common English spellings for personal and place names are used rather than transliteration: e.g. ‘Amman’ rather than ʿAmman, Gamal Abdel Nasser rather than Jamal ʿAbd Al-Nassar. Transliterations in quoted material are left in the original.
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Adwan</td>
<td>Large tribal confederation in central Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ashira (pl. ‘asha’ir)</td>
<td>Tribe/tribal confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba’ath Party</td>
<td>A pan-Arab nationalist party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Sakhr</td>
<td>Large tribal confederation in central Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Patrol</td>
<td>Force founded in 1930 to replace TJFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirah</td>
<td>Tribal territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euffendiyya</td>
<td>Section of the Middle Class: see Chapter 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellahin</td>
<td>Settled agriculturalists: peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Officers (Egypt/Jordan)</td>
<td>Nationalist army officers’ group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadari</td>
<td>Sedentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwaytat</td>
<td>Large tribal confederation in Southern Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikwhan (Saudi Arabia)</td>
<td>Tribal supporters of the House of Saud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNM</td>
<td>The Jordanian National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>The Jordan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khwha</td>
<td>Tribute taken by nomads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafruz</td>
<td>Individually held land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muqata’ ā (Iraq)</td>
<td>Estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musha’ ā</td>
<td>Collective and redistributive land tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasha</td>
<td>Ottoman official, officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkal (Iraq)</td>
<td>Intermediary between landlord and cultivator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzimat</td>
<td>19th Century Ottoman reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJFF</td>
<td>Transjordan Frontier Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of the Arabs</td>
<td>Pro-Nasser radio station broadcasting from Cairo</td>
</tr>
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Note: The Amirate of Transjordan was founded in 1922, becoming the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. For brevity, this thesis uses 'Jordan' and 'Transjordan' interchangeably for the Mandate and Ottoman periods.
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1. Introduction

Why do the states of the ‘Third World’ or the ‘South’ make their geopolitical alignments? Do they do so on the same basis as the states of the global North, or are they distinguished by the inapplicability of theoretical explanations derived from the Northern experience? Are the rulers of Southern states really so autonomous of—or insecure within—their societies that they freely manoeuvre between external and internal allies, seeking always to maintain their hold on power?

This thesis addresses these questions through a focused case study: providing a new answer to the question ‘What explains Jordan’s international alignments between 1955 and 1957?’ This historical period was one of enormous upheaval in the Middle East: the founding of independent states, the coming to power of military regimes influenced by an Arab nationalism that inspired mass opposition to existing monarchical or republican rulers, and a wave of anti-colonial and social ferment on a scale not to be repeated until the present time of writing. In this context, Hussein bin Talal, having ascended the throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1953, opened the possibility of the country asserting its independence from British control and aligning itself with the forces of anti-colonial Arab nationalism exemplified by Nasser’s Egypt. By 1957, however, this moment had passed and Jordan had returned firmly to the Western fold under the leadership of politicians from the generation that founded the state under the Amir Abdullah. This shift marked a decisive re-alignment of Jordan with the former colonial power and its successor in the region, the United States, against Arab nationalist forces. This thesis makes a contribution by offering a new explanation for these alignments, based upon the theoretical framework of uneven and combined

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1 I follow Glenn Snyder and Curtis Ryan’s definition of geopolitical alignment ‘as an informal relationship between two or more states, involving expectations of political and economic support that may include, but is not restricted to, security affairs’ cited in Ryan, Curtis R. (2009) Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.p.5. There are also negative alignments: the ending of an existing relationship of this kind or the rejection of an offer of such relationship. ‘South’ and ‘North’ refer to positions in a structure of relationships explored more fully in Chapter 2 of the thesis. These definitions are inseparable from that structure, changes in which thereby disrupt the binary opposition presupposed by ‘North’ and ‘South’: however, for the sake of convenience the ‘South’ refers to post-colonial states, or those that were the ‘object of colonial expansion’ rather than those that were doing the expanding—see Slater, David. (2004) Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations. London: Blackwell. p.8
development, thereby intervening into debates on the international relations of Southern states.

This first, introductory chapter reviews the literature on the international relations of the South and identifies the gap into which the thesis makes a contribution: the inability of existing theories, predicated on uni-linear ideas of development and the separation of geopolitical and social modes of explanation, to account for the basis upon which Southern ruling regimes ‘balance’ between external and internal enemies. The chapter reviews this literature, seeing its application to the international relations of the Arab world and in particular of Jordan as providing, within a body of generally insightful theory, a particularly sharp example of this lacuna. The chapter then explains how the thesis will work to fill this gap by providing a historical sociological explanation of a case study of Jordanian alignments in the mid-1950s: therefore defining historical sociology and its contribution and outlining the methods of the thesis. The final section of the chapter provides an overview of the thesis as a whole. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to identify and explain the problem that the thesis seeks to address.

1.1 The International Relations of the Southern State: the literature

International Relations theory, in its conventional ‘Neo-Realist’ and ‘Liberal’ variants, has proved a source of dissatisfaction to scholars analysing the polities of the Global South (see Ayoob, 1997 2005, Dannreuther, 2007, Krause, 1996, Krause and Williams, 1997, Smith, 2005, G.Neuman, 1998, Slater, 2004, Thomas, 1987). Dealing mainly with questions of state behaviour under the conditions of the wealthy economies of the global North, Kenneth Waltz’ neo-realist model of states as like units primarily concerned with security seemed not to fit the states of the South, whose regimes were insecurely embedded in societies that could not be assumed to operate as sealed boxes identical to the state (Waltz, 1979:128). Although further research fleshing out the neo-realist programme made use of evidence from the South (Krasner, 1985, Walt, 1987)
this was more often in the vein of confirming neo-realist assumptions about the state than challenging them. Likewise, the concern of liberal scholars with conditions of cooperation under economic and social interdependence (Keohane, 1984, Keohane and Nye, 2001) seemed remote in cases wherein ‘state structures have been at the center of intense discord over how societies should deal with their integration into the larger world economy’ (Migdal, 1994:10). The overall criticism of existing IR theory, then, is that its core concepts and models of interaction are restricted to a particular Northern experience, insufficiently able to explain, understand, or evaluate the geopolitics of the South (Neuman, 1998:3).

1.1.1 Consensus: the dilemma of the Southern State

What is the nature of this lack of fit, according to the critics of mainstream IR theory as applied to the South, and what are the solutions to it? The arguments are varied but convergence is visible around the notion of the Southern state as fundamentally different from the Northern experience—indeed, in some sense deficient in qualities that would allow traditional IR theory to apply to it. The basis of such theory in the notion of an autonomous state capable of carrying through its plans, at least within domestic society, results in difficulties in its extension to Southern states where this assumption does not hold (Migdal, 1994:11). According to this view, the Southern state falls low down on the continuum of ‘stateness’ (Nettl, 1968:562) and allowance must be made for this condition when analysing the international relations of such states.

In particular, these critiques hold that core concepts of mainstream IR theory appear inadequate when applied to Southern states—because, Kal Hoslti argues, the state in its assumed European form is not present in the South (Holst, 1998:109). Stephanie Neuman identifies the core concepts of IR that do not fit the South; these are anarchy, international system, sovereignty, and alliance formation (Neuman, 1998:6-11). Anarchy refers, of course, to the central idea of the Realist tradition that there is no higher power than the state: the corollary of this being that the state is the unified centre of power and authority in a certain jurisdiction and that the international system consists
of units such as these that may ally or oppose each other in order to assure their security. The perceived inadequacies of these concepts revolve around the nature of the Southern state. A single anarchic international system cannot be posed because Southern states in their weakness experience hierarchy as the primary external constraint on their behaviour and lack of order as the primary domestic condition, thereby reversing the distinction usually drawn in IR theory between domestic peace and international anarchy (Ecude, 1998:64-5, Neuman, 1998:4-5). The idea of sovereign state implies a unity and capacity that may not hold in the South where post-colonial borders cut across competing loyalties, with the result that the ‘state’ is one actor among many seeking power and security (Neuman, 1998:7-11). Caroline Thomas echoes this critique with a slight distinction, arguing that because the ‘process of forging loyalty to the state is still at an early stage…[p]olitical, economic and social structures are weak and often inflexible’: therefore ‘the problem of internal security makes the problem of external insecurity all the more acute’ (1987:4).

There is some degree of consensus then that the particular character of Southern states and their international relations lies in the insufficiency of nation-state identity, centralized authority and sovereign independence. The result of this disaggregation is the ‘third world security predicament’ in the form of a ‘lack of internal cohesion…lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions and state governing elites; easy susceptibility to internal and inter-state conflicts; distorted and dependent development’ (Ayoob, 1995:20). Although it may be able successfully to penetrate society and extract resources from it, the Southern state frequently finds its ambition to regulate its citizens’ behaviour frustrated (Migdal, 1988:8-9).

The overall impression of these analyses of Southern state formation is a contrast with their Euro-Atlantic counterparts. The elements of this contrast often appear contradictory. Thus ‘civil society’ is portrayed as simultaneously too strong or too weak (Sadowski, 1993:19); the state as a substitute for an entrepreneurial middle class or a constraint upon it; non-state groups and loyalties as competitors or components of the state. The gist of the contrast is that between a mediated, institutionalized politics and one in which social groups measure up their naked forces.
against one another, a distinction with a long history in comparative political science. Thus Samuel Huntington characterizes the ‘praetorian society’ as one in which ‘social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, [and] no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict’ (Huntington, 1968:194). The story is thus a dichotomous one, divided between ideal types of institutionalized and peaceful Northern polities on the one hand and the fragile late developing South on the other (Dannreuther, 2007:310-11). If the Southern state, as these accounts claim, is different then one would certainly expect additions or revisions of IR theory to be necessary in the light of these differences: and such an enterprise has been undertaken in the theories cohering around ideas of quasi-states, subaltern realism and omni-balancing.

1.1.2 Theoretical Solution(s): quasi-states, subaltern realists and omni-balancers

How is this conundrum of the Southern state grasped in IR theory? Three major contributions may be identified, all revolving around the same fundamental notion of the Southern state as insufficiently embedded in or representative of its society and thereby compelled to adopt a different mode of geopolitical alignment to that of Northern states, one that serves the needs of the ruling regime rather than the whole society.

Robert Jackson provides the most provocative version of this thesis, arguing that the states of the South are largely juridical constructs: ‘quasi-states’ whose sovereignty consists only in the negative sense of being free from external internal intervention but bereft of the positive capabilities actually to make use of this independence (1990:29). The acceptance of the norm of national liberation that followed the de-colonization of European empires means that such states are exempt from the ‘power competition’ through which they would normally be subsumed under the more powerful, and instead are sustained by an international society of multilateral agencies, aid and so forth (1990:23). The international relations of such states are not governed by what Jackson calls ‘the traditional sovereignty game’ but rather by the imperative of ‘quasi-statesmen’ to retain and increase the subventions they seek in order
to develop their economies while fending off any claims about international human
inghts (1990:171). As Mandy Turner argues, Jackson’s fundamental premises and
empirical evidence derive from the European statesmen who acquired and administered
the colonies and mandates, accepting their notions of backwardness and tutelage over
colonial peoples\(^2\) (Turner, 1999:36).

Jackson’s argument therefore concerns legal norms and the perceived inability
of Southern states to live up to these in their positive content. More pertinent to the
discussion of the alignments of Southern states is Mohammed Ayoob’s idea of
‘subaltern realism’—Ecude advances a kindred idea of ‘peripheral realism’ (Ecude,
1998:60-1). Ayoob argues that there is a particular ‘Third World Security Predicament’
that consists of the fact that the ‘Third World state elites’ major concern—indeed,
obsession—is with security at the level of both state structures and governing regimes’
(1995:4). The insufficient ‘stateness’ and competing centres of authority in the Southern
state, perhaps with more popular legitimacy, ‘makes the states acutely vulnerable to
external pressures’ (1995:4). Domestic and international insecurity are inextricably
intertwined: state elites seek to construct or participate in regional balances of power in
order to ‘further success of their state-building enterprise, especially since this is an
activity usually undertaken concurrently by neighbouring states that are at the same
stage in the development of their polities’ (1998:42). The entire process results from the
unavoidable imperative to adopt the model of the sovereign state: the Southern state
having to telescope into a few decades the process of building and expanding legitimate
authority that took centuries in the North, and unsurprisingly not doing as well

Ayoob thus roots the claimed inadequacy and insecurity of the Southern state
regime in an explicit schema of development in which Southern states are at a
particularly early stage. More concerned to extend than replace the framework of neo-

\(^2\) Jackson is at pains to stress his distance from colonial prejudice and his reliance on empirical
pragmatism(1990:10-11). Nonetheless, the patterns of comparison and allegory in his argument, linking
‘quasi’-states’ supposed dependency on international society to that of ‘poor citizens in welfare states’, and
‘affirmative action programmes which seek to extend substantive benefits to people who would not
otherwise qualify for them’ (1990:29) suggest an unacknowledged substratum of conservative
assumptions.
realism, Stephen David proposes a revision to the propositions of that research programme: the idea of ‘omni-balancing’ (1991). Omni-balancing is particularly important because, as is discussed below, it has been especially taken up in explanations of the geopolitics of Arab states and even more so in the case of Jordan (Brand, 1994, Frisch, 2011, Ryan, 2009). David’s claim is that the idea of a balance of power formed by states against a countervailing threat from another state, or joining with that state where the option of balancing is not available, is ‘basically correct’ (1991:233). However, the conditions of the Southern state require some revisions to this theory, he argues. The specific conditions are essentially those outlined in the theoretical perspectives above: both the domestic and international environments are ‘unstable, dangerous and often fatal’ to rulers unsuccessful in maintaining their regimes (1991:235). Furthermore, the recent and artificial nature of the post-colonial state means that regimes act not ‘in the national interest’ but in their own, or that of some sub-national group (1991:239).

On the above basis, David argues that the assumption that external threats will be the greatest security concern does not hold for Southern states. Rather, the rulers of these states face at any one time ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ adversaries that could be either external or domestic: the resultant behaviour may involve aligning with or appeasing apparently more threatening states (potentially a secondary adversary) in order to be more able to face down the primary internal adversary (1991:235). This is what is meant by ‘omni-balancing’—balancing in all directions. The theory therefore represents an extension of neo-realism rather than a replacement for it: retaining the idea that politics is a balancing act amongst competing interests but taking the South as an exception to the rule by which this balance is peacefully achieved at the domestic level. Southern state rulers are then seen as the actors rather than the state itself, acting in their interests rather than that of the security of the state and balancing between external and internal threats to preserve these (1991:237).

1.1.3 Empirical problems: omni-balancing, Middle East International Relations and Jordan

Omni-balancing has come to enjoy a fairly wide theoretical currency but one
particularly concentrated in studies of the Middle East (Freij, 1997, O'Reilly, 1998, Olson, 2006). Stephen David himself uses the Egyptian foreign policy switch under Sadat from Soviet to US ally as one of his major case studies (1991:249-50). This regional concentration may reflect what Ayubi refers to as a history of Arab states’ appearing ‘so easily able to switch regional and international alliances’ and ‘able overnight to launch complete reversals in domestic policy’ (Ayubi, 1995:1). Historical sociologists and international relations scholars have argued the effects of the Southern security predicament are particularly acute in the region (Hinnebusch, 2003, Lustick, 1997, Tilly, 1991). We find in the literature on omni-balancing a progression from a focus on the global South, discussed above, to one on the Middle East, then to Arab monarchies (Frisch, 2011, O'Reilly, 1998) and then to one member of that category, Jordan.

The idea that the Middle East, and especially the Arab world, stands out as an example of the omni-balancing approach reflects a broader conception of development (or lack of it) in the region, in line with the perspectives on the Southern state presented above. These claims are not without empirical support, but reflect a view of Arab states as trapped in a balancing act between a ‘Westphalian’ world of sovereign states and society composed of some super, or sub-national primordial identity such as Arabism or Islam³ (Bacik, 2008:49-50, Telhami and Barnett, 2002:15). In particular, the authoritarian monarchies of the region are seen as successful mediators between social groups and between domestic and international levels, acting ‘as referees of the political field…[with] more freedom of maneuver to divide, manipulate, and thus control society’s competing groups’ (2003:5). Lucas describes the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies in particular as such ‘linchpin’ monarchies (Lucas, 2004:111). Hillel Frisch argues that the omni-balancing (or, as he terms it, counterbalancing) lies behind the persistence of Arab monarchs in power, and the Jordanian Hashemites especially ‘successfully met the challenges [to their rule]…through techniques of counterbalancing between the Palestinians and Jordanians of East Bank origins on the home front and a strong relationship with the US on the external front’ (Frisch, 2011).

³ For a stringent critique of this position see Stein, Ewan. (2011) Beyond Arabism V. Sovereignty: Relocating Ideas in the International Relations of the Middle East. Review of International Studies.
It is unsurprising, then that Jordan has formed the case study basis for the most rigorous work based upon the premises of omni-balancing in the works of Laurie Brand (1994) and Curtis Ryan (Ryan, 2009). Although their rich analyses deal with later time periods, Brand and Ryan’s characterizations of the sources of Jordanian alignments are particularly useful because they link the empirical questions to the themes of omni-balancing and the idea of the Southern security dilemma discussed above. Both draw upon Stephen David’s version of omni-balancing (Brand, 1994:32, Ryan, 2009:9) to expand the neo-Realist version of security into a concept more amenable to a Southern state such as Jordan. Ryan and Brand thus follow the argument that because Southern states are weak in capacity, legitimacy or both, the basic policy concern is regime rather than ‘national’ security (2009:12). Where the two differ is that Brand focuses on the ‘exigencies of maintaining financial solvency… as a critical component of regime… security’ (Brand, 1994:25), a focus that Ryan critiques as mono-causal and neglecting the ‘multi-dimensional influences’ that regimes must take into account to preserve themselves (2009:10).

Laurie Brand’s central concept of budget security refers to the pursuit of a ‘range of possible responses to challenges to financial solvency’, alignment decisions being a component of that range (1994:28). Financial solvency is essential to preserve a given regime’s coercive power or distributive capacity: thus ‘[r]egime security in its most basic terms may in fact be budget security, understood in terms of reproducing the conditions necessary for the ruling coalition to pay the bills, preempt the development of opposition, or cultivate sufficient domestic support to make coercion against such groups possible’ (1994:26). Yet the conditions to be reproduced are, for Brand, essentially the narrow indicators of the Political Economy of International Relations—customs duties, trade relations, the proportions of different sectors in GDP and so forth (1994:33). I argue the reproduction of a regime in power requires more than that. The conditions of a regime’s remaining in power also involve the reproduction and management of structures of social relations, which generate the social groups that may threaten or support the regime, but which do not necessarily stop at the borders of the state. In particular the struggles over Jordan’s external subsidy
reflected more than just differences over aid but conflicts over the way that aid structured the relationship of the state and certain social groups within it to the global capitalist system—a critique of and engagement with Brand’s work that is taken up in the empirical sections of this thesis in Chapters 5 and 6. The notion of budget security explains the vital need for aid: it does not explain the choice of the particular provider of that aid amongst alternatives.

Curtis Ryan extends Brand’s account by arguing ‘that states align and realign according to relatively narrow interests of regime security’ (Ryan, 2009:13), of which budget security is merely one aspect. Thus ‘alignment and realignment depend not only on opportunities and constraints presented by the anarchic nature of the international system, but also on domestically generated policy preferences, which have pragmatic and material bases, rooted in the coalition of elites that make up the ruling regime’ (2009:13). Ryan identifies an ‘internal security dilemma’ by which the authoritarian states of the Arab world further militarize their societies to suppress internal opposition, feeding into the conventional external security dilemma and further exacerbating the internal problem as development stagnates (2009:33). The choice of alignment partners to alleviate this dilemma reflects the influence of the level of internal and external threat, the military balance, the political economy of the state and the legitimating factor of Arab nationalism (2009:39).

Ryan succeeds in extending Brand’s concept to cover factors other than budgetary solvency. However, like Brand, Ryan’s treatment of regime security as the analogue of a neo-realist model of international security is insufficient. It imparts to the state/regime a near-absolute autonomy, deriving from neo-Realist premises of sovereignty in anarchy, that there is no a priori reason to believe it possesses. The parsimony of the neo-realist model is its virtue. Hence the stress neo-realism has always laid on anarchy as the precondition for the security dilemma. States must, at a logical level, be independent of one another and concerned to defend their independence by force in order for the dynamic of the security dilemma work. Why, however, should we begin from the ontological assumptions of neo-Realist theory and assimilate the Hashemite regime to that logic?
1.1.4 Gap and Critique: the importing of neo-realist assumptions

The above question leads us to the gap in explanatory frameworks that extend the neo-realist model: relying on an idea of a dislocated Southern state as simultaneous balancer in international relations and domestic politics. I argue that we cannot analyse Southern geo-politics successfully through this lens for the following reasons; its conception of the Southern state and development is uni-linear, idealizing the Northern state and explaining Southern state behaviour by the absence of certain characteristics rather than their presence; it perpetuates a division between internal-social and external-geopolitical explanation by importing the neo-realist model of anarchic sovereign units inside Southern societies; and omni-balancing and subaltern realism give an insufficient account of the particular social bases upon which actors make their alignment decisions. Omni-balancing’s application to Jordan provides an example of this gap, reinforcing already existing lacunae in the diplomatic history of the state. I argue below for uneven and combined development as a better framework, rooted in historical sociology rather than neo-realist IR, through which to analyse Jordanian alignments. Prior to doing so however, we need to explore the gaps in omni-balancing and associated theories.

The first criticism to be made of the omni-balancing approach and the associated literature on Southern IR is its uni-linear vision of development, which leads to an explanation by the absence of certain ‘Western’ characteristics rather than explanation by the presence of empirically verifiable factors. Mohammed Ayoob argues that the Southern state is in the ‘early stages’ of the process of state-building characterized by Charles Tilly in the European case of the centralization of coercive power (Ayoob, 1997:122). It is the stresses of this compressed version of state-building that produce the internal threats to ruling elites, the specific characteristic of the Southern state that makes a revision of IR theory necessary (1998:45). The Southern state needs time to complete its journey to full statehood. Stephen David, in like fashion, argues that the artificiality of the colonial state means that a ‘type of narrowly defined interest perpetuates itself by preventing the formation of a national consciousness’, vesting the ruling regime with the independence and insecurity reserved
for the nation-state unit in conventional neo-realism (David, 1991:239). Thomas
(1987:4), and Holsti (1998:114) similarly work from the premise that there is a particular
type of Western state, with an attendant form of security and alignment-making, that is
either absent in the South or present only at an early and difficult stage.

My critique here is not to claim an identity between Northern and Southern
states. The lack of resources, deadly contention over forms and personnel of rule and
general frustration of the capacity of the central state to achieve its plans are real
phenomena in much, if not all, of the South. We can identify, with regrettable ease, an
enormous economic, social and political gap between certain ‘advanced’ states and
others not so blessed. My criticism of omni-balancing/subaltern realism in this regard is
that explains outcomes by deviations from a norm that may not itself exist, or at least
cannot be assumed to be the end-point to which Southern states are striving. This is
most clear in the distinction drawn between the ‘national security’ interests of the
Northern state and the ‘narrowly defined interest’ of the Southern ruling group (Ayoob,

Why assume that there is some actually-existing ‘national security interest’ that
Northern states follow and Southern states do not? Omni-balancing theorists seem to
accept particular, un-examined conception of the state as the representative of the
greater good or general will of a society. Two decades of critical security studies, as well
as ample historical examples have problematized this assumption (Booth, 2005:13,
Fierke, 2007:34). Who defines what a ‘threat’ is, by whom it is posed and how it should
be combated? Neither in the North nor the South can such questions be answered
objectively on the basis of an assumed ‘national interest’: who would then define what
that interest is? If we cannot assume, however, that the rulers of Northern states and
their conceptions of national security embody the interests of the society they rule, then
we cannot explain the behaviour of Southern states by virtue of negative contrast with
the North. As Simon Bromley puts the point in relation to more general theories of
‘modernization’: the ‘West developed because it had the following features—and the

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4 Examples such as Mrs Thatcher’s condemnation of the National Union of Miners as ‘the enemy within’
or the McArthyite purges of the early cold war immediately come to mind.
The non-European world remained undeveloped because it lacked them. But what is the evidence that it was this lack that accounts for the fortunes of the non-European world? (Bromley, 1994:7). The decision-makers of North and South may still differ in the interests they serve and how they seek to secure themselves, but that difference would need to be established by historical and sociological investigation rather than posed as the absence or insufficient development of national integration, representative pluralism or some other assumed characteristic of Northern polities. Rather, we should focus on ‘the historical character of surplus appropriation… the specific social relations which have governed these processes and… their patterns of reproduction and transformation by social forces’ (1994:4) for explanations of Southern state behaviour. As is explained below and further elaborated in Chapter 2, this thesis uses the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development to carry out such a task for Jordan.

Once we have problematized the contraposition of a Northern state attentive to the general security of the society it rules and a Southern state inadequate in this regard, a further lacuna in the omni-balancing or subaltern realist approach reveals itself. This is the importation of the model of sovereign states in anarchy inside the politics of Southern states themselves. As has been indicated by the review above, an important step in the arguments for a particularly Southern geo-politics is the claim that in the South the dichotomy of internal peace and external (potential) war is at best reversed, and at worse a state of permanently fighting on two fronts of insecurity (Ayoob, 1998:45, Brand, 1994:22, David, 1991:237, Neuman, 1998:3, Ryan, 2009:9, Thomas, 1987:4). On this basis the apparatus of neo-realism is retained with the one modification: that Southern ruling regimes and the internal and external threats to them are identified as the actors rather than states (Ayoob, 1997:121, Brand, 1994:23-4, David, 1991:236, Ryan, 2009:12). Yet, if we regard the idea of ‘national security’ in the North with scepticism then the explanatory model of omni-balancing becomes more difficult to sustain. We cannot simply refer to the regime’s desire to survive—a given—as the source of particular alignments worked out automatically through a neo-realist logic or ‘objective laws that have their roots in human nature’ (Morgenthau in David, 1991:237). It does not tell us very much to say that a regime desires to survive—on what
basis do regimes do so? Why are they threatened by certain internal forces and not others? Why amenable to certain alignments and not others? Or to take up the empirical gap addressed in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis ask, why did King Hussein reach out to certain allies and aid providers, proving more responsive to certain social groups at certain times? Once the uni-linear model of ‘true’ national security versus merely regime security in the South is undermined, it becomes necessary to answer such questions.

If we do wish to answer such questions then we have to reverse the manoeuvre effected by omni-balancing and sub-altern realism. These take the premise of the autonomy of the state system and geopolitics from ‘domestic’ social forces and then read this absolute autonomy back into the state itself. It then becomes impossible to explain the bases upon which certain alignments are made by the omni-balancing rulers both internally and externally: the explanations are given in the premises. If we assume that rulers are balancing to stay in power, and then explain that they choose options certain to help them stay in power, then the theory is likely to run close to tautology. Neither the assumption nor the explanation are unreasonable, however. My criticism is that they produce incomplete rather than incorrect explanations. We need to know why certain options and alliances lead to survival and strength: this means analysing in their own right the social bases and relationships that constitute and limit the interactions of the state system rather than import the model of absolute political autonomy. For this reason I propose a historical sociological approach, and in particular the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development, as a more fruitful lens of analysis.

1.2 Thesis contribution: historical sociology and uneven and combined development

What does it mean to take a historical sociological approach, and what is the contribution of the particular variant of historical sociology I propose to adopt? In the following section I offer a broad definition of historical sociology and its various streams and outline the engagement of this approach with the IR and the Middle East.
Then I argue that further explanation for Jordan’s alignments is required beyond diplomatic history or agent-centred foreign policy analysis and that uneven and combined development, as a variant of historical sociology, can provide a fruitful alternative theoretical framework.

1.2.1 The Definition and Traditions of Historical Sociology

Historical sociology is quite a slippery term, and its proponents more often practice this approach than define it, or offer definitions in terms of what historical sociology is not rather than what it is (for example, Halliday, 2005:36, Hobson, 2002:13). Thus, Philip Abrams argues that ‘there can be no relationship between’ the disciplines of history and sociology because ‘in terms of their fundamental preoccupations, history and sociology are and always have been the same thing’ (Abrams, 1982:x). That fundamental pre-occupation, Abrams argues is the common human condition of being able to act, to make and re-make institutions and practices but only within a framework and basis constructed by our predecessors—all of this being a time-bound process (1982:3). Theda Skocpol echoes this characterization, identifying historical sociology as work that ‘ask[s] questions about social structures or processes understood to be concretely situated in time and space…address[es] processes over time and take[s] temporal sequences seriously in accounting for outcomes’ and ‘highlight[s] the particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and patterns of change’ (Skocpol, 1984:1). One might object that everyone knows structures and processes are thus situated. However, historical sociology defines itself in this way precisely because the disciplines of history and sociology do effect the separation against which Abrams and Skocpol argue5. Where history reconstructs moments, actors and understandings and sociology examines structures of action or meaning at particular chronological or spatial points, historical sociology seeks to unite the two. Events, action and understanding occur within and through structures: but these structures are the mutable and emergent results of previous time-bound processes.

The roots of historical sociology are to be found then simply in the classical works of social theory: of Weber, Marx, Durkheim, De Tocqueville and others (Skocpol, 1984:356). The broad designation of historical sociology thus covers traditions that would be considered widely divergent in other contexts: the Weberian tradition centred on the building of ideal-types to understand differing constellations of domination: the historical materialist tradition (to which this thesis belongs) rooted in the notion of changing social relations of production: or the deep reconstruction of historical practices of the subject as exemplified in the work of Michel Foucault (1984:367-70). In general, however, these traditions all orient themselves towards the idea of a ‘transformation’ or transition of some kind, usually identified with some period around the year 1500 CE in Western Europe, that brought about contemporary forms of the state, production and belief (Abrams, 1982:4, Gellner, 1991:16, Skocpol, 1984:1). Marxists identify this transition with the emergence in some sense of a ‘capitalist mode of production’. The second chapter of this thesis presents a theoretical framework, uneven and combined development based on this idea, and its reformulations through engagement with the challenges of actual history. Scholars influenced by Weber emphasize a more contingent relationship between three (with some variation, Michael Mann opting for four and Charles Tilly for two) autonomous instances of power—production, knowledge and coercion or capital, state and ideology(Gellner, 1991:21, Giddens, 1985:2-5, Mann, 1993:254, Skocpol, 1979:4-5, Tilly, 1992:14-16).

1.2.2 Historical Sociology in International Relations and the Middle East

The problem-area of historical sociology, concerning the rise and transformation of the modern state, has led to a significant overlap with International Relations theory (Hobden, 1998:2). In particular, the work of historical sociologists influenced by the Weberian tradition, such as Michael Mann, Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly, has found a ready acceptance in IR because it seemed to fill in a gap in the realist idea of the state (1998:4). Tilly’s model of state formation, for example, depicts the impact of large-scale wars fought by Europe’s medieval and early modern polities. Kings had to develop taxation systems and bureaucracies to fund and run their wars, bringing in train the
social struggles and political forms characteristic of modernity (Tilly, 1992:67). Michael Mann lays a similar emphasis on the ‘caging’ (an evocative reference to Weber’s characterisation of rational-bureaucratic modernity) of social relations within states in the militarily competitive ‘multi-actor civilization’ of early modern Europe (Mann, 1993:254). Theda Skocpol, in explaining the constitutive revolutionary conflagrations of modernity, explicitly makes reference to the ‘analytically autonomous level of transnational reality’ (Skocpol, 1979:22). This mode of historical sociology has therefore held a particular appeal to realist-influenced IR scholars, given the stress it lays on the autonomous operation of the states system within a world of multiple struggles for domination. Indeed, a later generation of Weberian historical sociologists have criticized this body of work precisely for incorporating uncritically a Waltzian neo-realist view of the states system (Hobden, 1998:8, Hobson, 2002:63).

The second chapter of this thesis takes up historical materialists’ engagement with the question of political multiplicity and historical multi-linearity, and presents uneven and combined development as an alternative framework. For the present, however, it is worth noting that historical sociology, in Weberian and historical materialist forms, has already strongly influenced scholarship on the international relations of the Global South and the Middle East in particular. Omni-balancing type approaches at least implicitly rely on a historical sociology of differential state formation between the North and the South. In Mohammed Ayoob’s case, this involves explicitly drawing on Tilly’s model to characterize the process that has been compressed or remains at an early stage in the South (Ayoob, 1998:43-4). In the Middle East, in particular, the historical sociology of the formation of states and the incorporation of the region into a global system of competitive states and capitalist social relations already forms the basis for much IR analysis (see Halliday, 2000:8-9, 2005:99-100, Hinnebusch, 2002a:1-2, 2002b:34-5, Lustick, 1997). Ian Lustick explains the attempts to re-organise the region around the unifying state project of a ‘conquering core’ as examples of the process undergone in Europe in Italy and Germany and explicitly borrowing Alexander Gerschenkron’s notion of ‘historical backwardness’ (see Chapter 2 of this thesis), although treating these are largely autonomous of the changing nature of social relations (Lustick, 1997:657). Where this thesis fits in the stream of historical
sociology of the international relations of the Middle East is in taking the insights of scholars such as Fred Halliday and Ray Hinnebusch that the inter-state relations of the region interact fundamentally with the contradictions of class and state formation brought about by the integration of the region into the global system of capitalist social relations and competitive states. However, I seek to systematize those insights through the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development and examine its utility in explaining particular cases of alignments in a specific state, Jordan.

1.2.3 Jordan in the Literature: the need for explanation beyond diplomacy

Is it necessary, however to adopt such a level of analysis? Might we not adopt a simpler, actor-oriented approach such as that in the tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis? If Foreign Policy Analysis means an approach that embeds the foreign policies of Middle Eastern states both within the histories of social change in the region and a modified form of International Relations theory (such as Halliday, 2005, Hinnebusch, 2002b) then this thesis also belongs to that tradition. However, I do not adopt the approach that seeks to ‘attain generalizable knowledge’ about decision-makers’ behaviour ‘in terms of independent and dependent variables’ (Breuning, 2007:21). The implicit assumption of this approach, which this thesis does not share, is to act as a kind of expert in the policymaking process in order to ‘to help leaders make better decisions’ (2007:8). Since the evaluation of a ‘better’ or ‘worse’ decision involves an implicit value judgement in favour of the decision-maker (for example, one can only consider King Hussein’s policy decisions ‘good’ or ‘bad’ if one shares his aim of maintaining Hashemite rule) this thesis does not adopt it. The attempt to put ‘the human decision maker at the center of its endeavor’ and considers structures only in their aspect as domestic or external constraints (2007:173) is certainly understandable as an approach to historical evidence refracted through the experience of such decision-makers. However, it is vulnerable to the same criticism as that made above against omni-balancing perspectives. This is that the approach is not necessarily incorrect but does not go far enough in explanation. We register Hussein, or others, as the actors in deciding on a particular policy through the narrative of formation of that policy: to go
further and know how he was in a position to make such a decision and why requires an analysis based on structures such as that offered in this thesis.

Indeed, part of the contribution of this thesis lies in moving beyond the focus on the agency of King Hussein that characterises most previous work in the (diplomatic) history of Jordan (as seen in Ashton, 2008, Dann, 1989, Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001, Moussa, 1988, Robins, 2004, Salibi, 1993, Shlaim, 2007). At first sight the claim that Hussein’s decisions were responsible for Jordan’s alignments seems quite obviously true. Jordanian kings do not merely rule but govern, and with the brief but significant exception of the Nabulsi government (October 1956 to April 1957) Jordanian foreign policy was conducted by the King. The alignments analysed in this thesis (Hussein’s dalliance with the Baghdad Pact, his subsequent attraction to the Egyptian-Syrian axis, the annulment of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and final return to Western tutelage) all these are taken to reflect the personality and decisions of the King himself. Thus, in his recent and extensive biography of Hussein, Avi Shlaim attributes the variations in Jordan’s alignments to the character of the King, his misjudgements and coups de main (Shlaim, 2007:90-105).

Nigel Ashton’s biography of Hussein also reads Jordan’s international politics through the person of the king: his ‘astute understanding of power’ (2008:4), his empathy and idealism and his Hashemite Arabism (2008:10). The to-and-fro in Jordan’s alignment in the mid-1950s is again to be explained by the ‘uncertain and inconsistent’ judgement of the young monarch, and his return to pro-Western position as an instance of his now mature ‘personal and political courage (2008:50, 66). Of course, biographers explain events by the participation of their subjects in them and cannot be expected to provide more structural factors. However, more general treatments of the diplomatic history of the period (Dann, 1989, Gerges, 2001, Robins, 2004, Satloff, 1994) are just as likely to explain the Jordanian alignments of the 1950s with reference to Hussein’s personal political survival strategy. Thus Philip Robins describes the King’s foreign alignments as characterised by ‘policy mood swings’ (Robins, 2004:88). Satloff, like Shlaim, sees the confusion around the alignment with the Baghdad Pact as the result of ‘serious faults of judgement and leadership’ and ‘naïveté’ on the part of a ruler who was
still very young (Satloff, 1994:124). Fawaz Gerges emphasizes Hussein’s ‘tactical flexibility and adaptability’ as ruler whose ‘acts in inter-Arab affairs were taken for internal purposes and to ensure the survival of his throne’ (Gerges, 2001:89).

These works are not inaccurate or empirically shoddy. They are mostly exemplary reconstructions based on archival sources and interviews and critical engagement with them is therefore all the more revealing. My criticism rather is that these accounts emphasize agency at the expense of structure. King Hussein was a politically astute man. However, political acumen always uses certain resources to achieve given aims by concrete processes. To explain those aims, resources and processes requires us to examine the structures in which individuals, both internal and external, are embedded. Recent work on Jordan has added such explanation, especially that of Yoav Alon (2006, 2007). Alon echoes the notion of ‘combination’ used in this thesis, describing Jordan as an ‘improbable combination of foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal society’(2007:3). I provide a fuller engagement with Alon’s work in Chapter 4 because he is concerned with the Jordanian state-formation process itself rather than argument about its impact on later alignments—his argument and research therefore complement this thesis and provide evidence for its claims about the integration of tributary social relations into the colonial state.

A related concept here is to be found in Gokhan Bacik’s idea of ‘hybrid sovereignty’ (2008). Bahcik argues that Western sovereignty—in the sense of independent, uniform and ‘rational’ authority across a delineated territory—was ‘injected’ into the region in the Ottoman and colonial periods (2008:15). However, these alien structures remained largely formal, encasing within them ‘primordial and traditional patterns of behavior remain prevalent in the weak states’ of the Arab world (2008:5). As a result, ‘[g]iven the survival of transnational group identity, it is common for people to form alliances with foreign powers/ governments, even when those alliances are against their own rulers’ (2008:49). In particular, Jordanian politics is structured by the opposition between West Bank and East Bank, and by the search for budget security (2008:12). Bacik thus does not advance greatly on Brand’s work. Although strenuously denying any notion of ‘failure’ of the Arab state to follow some
Western model (2008:35-6), Bacik seems to accept at face value the self-conception of the Western state as ‘neutral and rational… objective, anticipatable [sic] accountable and transparent institutions’ against which the Arab state may be compared (2008:20). The contribution offered in this thesis by uneven and combined development is a different argument to Bacik’s based not on the failure of a Weberian ideal type but on the presence and interaction of identifiable social relations of production.

1.2.4 The Contribution of Uneven and Combined Development

It is here that I offer the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development as a route out of the impasse, and the explanation of Jordanian alignments in the 1950s as a test-run of its utility. I provide a full explication of this theoretical framework in the following chapter, but at this point it is necessary to say why uneven and combined development is needed and might be used. After all, the concept originates with Leon Trotsky’s intervention into the debates among Russian Marxists before, during and after the Revolution. The concept informs Trotsky’s Results and Prospects (Trotsky, 1972a:29-38), but is most fully developed in his History of the Russian Revolution. Uneven and combined development began, then, as the answer to the question best put by W.H. Auden; why did ‘old Russia suddenly mutate/ into a proletarian state?’ (in Knei-Paz, 1978:1). The concept has been extended since in both its chronological scope (see Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008, Matin, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2007, Rosenberg, 1996, Rosenberg, 2006) and problem area (Dufour, 2007, Lacher and Teschke, 2007, Shilliam, 2009, Teschke, 2003). In the following chapter I draw upon previously published work (Allinson and Anievas, 2010a, Allinson and Anievas, 2010b, Allinson and Anievas, 2009) to develop a more extensive account of uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework. Nonetheless, one might argue that Tsarist and revolutionary Russia and Jordanian foreign policy in the mid-1950s are not easily comparable objects of investigation and that uneven and combined development therefore represents an unpromising avenue of theoretical exploration.

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6 Mandy Turner uses the case of Nasser’s Egypt to argue for the utility of uneven and combined development as an explanation of the expansion of international society, but unfortunately her thesis remains unpublished. Turner, Mandy Mary 1999 The Expansion of International Society?: Egypt and Vietnam in the History of Uneven and Combined Development, PhD, International Relations, London School of Economics
Yet, the application of unfamiliar concepts to a new context may provide a route to original and innovative research. Such is the attempted contribution of this thesis, developing the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development by using it to structure the empirical investigation of the Jordanian case. Moreover, contrary to appearances, the idea of uneven and combined development represents an intervention into precisely that *problematique* of the international relations of the Southern state surveyed above. Trotsky’s original proposal of the ideas, if not the term itself, of uneven and combined development was directed precisely against a narrative of uni-linearity leading to a particular political outcome, from which different paths would then be considered incomplete or deviant. The common assumption of Trotsky and his theoretical opponents amongst the Russian Marxists of the early twentieth century was proletarian revolution to overthrow capitalism was possible, desirable and necessary. Needless to say, this goal is not shared by the majority of IR theorists. Nonetheless, and surprising as it may seem, it is the structure of the debate on this shared premise that sheds light on the theory of the international relations of the Global South and the Jordanian case as an instance of that wider phenomenon.

The question in this debate that Trotsky sought to answer was whether Russia had passed through the ‘necessary’ stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution and capitalist development sufficient to provide the material and political bases for socialist revolution. The classical position in this debate taken up by the Menshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party, was that late-developing states remained unripe for socialist revolution. Thus, the task of the proletariat was to ally themselves with the bourgeois in its struggle against pre-capitalist forms of rule. A second position, articulated most forcefully by Lenin, argued for an independent proletarian strategy of leadership to achieve bourgeois-democratic aims.

Trotsky’s striking intervention, upon which I expand in Chapter 2, was to begin from the recognition of the international character of the world capitalist system. It proposed that Russia’s minority working class movement could successfully telescope the supposedly indispensable stages of bourgeois democracy and capitalist development
into a single ‘uninterrupted’ or ‘permanent’ stage from which it would necessarily promote socialist revolution internationally. From this perspective, Trotsky conceived the Bolshevik revolution as a result of the international development of capitalism of which its fate was also bound. The essence of Trotsky’s argument might be summarized as the interaction of different patterns of social relations in a given society (or rather ‘social formation’) under the impact of the global expansion of capitalist social relations such that the distinct character of the resultant ‘combined social formation’ itself feeds back into the system of geopolitical competition that originally produced it.

What advantages does this framework offer by comparison with the perspectives reviewed above? Chapter 2 fully presents this theoretical framework but a quick explanation of its potential advantages is necessary here. One benefit is that uneven and combined development integrates social and ‘international’ explanation rather than subordinate one to the other, as in the conflation of domestic opposition and economic reproduction with the threat models of international security in omni-balancing and budget security. Nor does it assume that there is an ideal-type of state and state behaviour against which Southern states are measured and found wanting. Rather it seeks to explain the social bases and forces that contest the geopolitical alignment of the state, in the combined social formation brought about by the ‘whip of external necessity’ (see Turner, 1999:60-2 for a related argument). Uneven and combined development thus offers historical sociological explanations but of forces that are themselves ‘internationally’ constituted. Thus, in uneven and combined development the fusion of dissimilar social structures (or modes of production) within a single formation—represents the composite effect of geopolitical-military pressures establishing trajectories of social struggle that then feed back into geopolitical interactions such as alignments. How would such a theoretical framework be compared to empirical evidence, and following what methods?

1.3 Research Methods and Case Selection
As the preceding discussion has clarified, this thesis should be considered a work in the historical sociology of International Relations. Historical sociology refers to the general methodological approach defined in the section above. In this section I present the methods of the study: explaining the small-N case study in historical sociology; introducing the case and its selection criteria; and the method of data collection in historical evidence.

### 1.3.1 Methods and Data

The first key point is that this thesis is not a work in the discipline of history, but International Relations. It does not seek to reconstruct events but to evaluate particular theoretical explanations of events and thereby to judge the validity and usefulness of the theories upon which those explanations are based. In particular, the thesis introduces the novel theoretical framework of uneven and combined development (outlined more fully in Chapter 2) as such an explanation. The successive chapters then offer empirical historical evidence to substantiate and develop that framework. The aim of the thesis being to build theory by exploring the utility of this theoretical framework, it adopts the first of three strategies identified by Skocpol for historical sociological research: to ‘apply a single theoretical model to one or more of many possible instances covered by the model’ (Skocpol, 1984:362).

I undertake this strategy because, as Skocpol argues it is appropriate when the ‘practitioner… is chiefly interested in demonstrating and elaborating the inner logic of a general theoretical model’ and ‘detailed application of the general model to a relevant historical case (or cases) is very valuable, because it prompts the theorist to specify and operationalize what would otherwise necessarily remain very abstract concepts and theoretical propositions’ (1984:365). This thesis aims to undertake such a task for uneven and combined development.

Of course, no research strategy is without its drawbacks. One question that may arise in relation to this strategy is the nature of the data used in this thesis. The thesis relies mainly on secondary sources—historians’ work—supplemented with primary
sources of three kinds: the published British records of the mandate period and the Foreign and Colonial Office\textsuperscript{7}; participants’ memoirs; and semi-structured interviews with selected interviewees. The reason for this choice is that the aim of the thesis is not to establish what happened, but to address a gap in International Relations theory of which the case of Jordanian alignments in the mid-1950s provides an example. This implies, then, that the time a historian would take to track down archives and people and the correspondences between their accounts is better taken in critiquing the existing theories, elucidating my own theoretical framework and then comparing to the evidence in the secondary sources: taking Skocpol’s advice to use ‘excellent studies by specialists… as the basic source of evidence for a given study’ (1984:382).

The choice of such secondary sources poses some problems, however (well noted in Lustick, 1996). One of the main criticisms of historical sociologists is that ‘the connection between the claims they make about the past and relics that could conceivably serve as warrants for these claims is often… quite impossibly loose’ and reliant upon an arbitrary selection of secondary sources (Goldthorpe, 1991:223). It should be noted, however, that primary sources do not themselves offer neutral access to the events of the past: they are ‘second-order interpretations referring to the first order ones that individuals generate when they act and interact’ (Mouzelis, 1994:35). Selection goes on amongst these (in terms of what is preserved and by whom) as it does amongst secondary sources. Nonetheless, the question of knowing how the sources can support the argument is still a difficult one.

To answer that question in the empirical sections of the thesis, I ‘triangulate’ amongst secondary sources (Lustick, 1996:616). The advantage of looking at a particular period of one particular state’s history is that it is possible to cover all the relevant monographs ‘to construct a background narrative from the identity of claims made by different historians despite their approach from different archival sources and/or implicitly theoretic or political angles’ (1996:616). However, there are still points where the sources disagree or where a claim is crucial to the argument of the thesis: in which

\textsuperscript{7} The FCO records from the Amman embassy and the Iraqi mandate reports are published in the Cambridge Archive Editions series, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties. The reports of the Transjordan mandates were consulted in the original League of Nations publication.
case I adopt Skocpol’s suggestion that ‘[s]econdary research can also be strategically supplemented by carefully selected primary investigations or reinvestigations’ (Skocpol, 1984:382).

How can primary sources be reliably ‘selected’? There are three kinds of primary source used in this thesis: the published British archives, memoirs (of both British officers such as Glubb and Jordanian political activists and army officers) and semi-structured interviews with surviving participants. Why these and not others? There are both practical and methodological reasons for the choice of these supplementary primary sources. I have used the published British archives because the UK was the mandatory authority over (Trans) Jordan, and the alignment choices of the 1950s revolved around relations with the former colonial power. In addition to this research-based choice, there is the problem that there are no central Jordanian archives save for the Hashemite family records themselves, access to which is reserved for those on close terms with the ruling regime (for example Shlaim, 2007). Of course, the British records provide the British point of view. I have therefore also used the memoirs and texts of Jordanian participants from across the spectrum of political positions of the 1950s— from the King and his supporters, from members of the Free Officers, from the Communist and Ba’ath Parties. The edited workshop *Hukumat Saleman Al-Nabulsi* by the Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre also provided transcripts of the recollections of participants in the case studies of this thesis. Many of the key participants in the events are now dead or too infirm to be interviewed: I conducted interviews with participants (usually at lower levels or ranks on account of their youth at the time, such as Sheikh Al-Jazi or Munir Hamarneh) accessed through a ‘snowballing’ process via colleagues at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Jordan University, Amman.

1.3.1 *Jordanian Alignments as small N-Case study: data points and selection criteria*

If these methods of data collection offer reasonable conclusions about Jordan, can they be generalized in any way to the population of Southern states and their
alignments? This thesis adopts Rueschemeyer’s position that a ‘long sequence of historical development offers, provided that it is approached with sufficiently specified theoretical expectations, a large number of theoretically relevant observations that may rule out or suggest the revision of a whole series of propositions’ (2003:311). The observations of this thesis, consisting of the historical record, link the propositions derived from an explanatory theory to the phenomena they purport to explain. Thus a single or small N case study can still contribute to the growth of knowledge because:

‘[D]etailed case analyses often entail the generation, testing, revising, and retesting of explanatory propositions within the same complex material. The discipline that in such endeavors is imposed on willful interpretation and speculation derives from the often large number of theoretically relevant observations and from the fact that, for each of these, analytic intent and empirical evidence can be fairly closely matched, more closely than is possible in many studies with large Ns’ (2003:315).

Chapters 5 and 6 take as data points Jordan’s alignments of 1955-7, reaching back further into the country’s history to trace the social origins of these.

What are we talking about when we discuss these Jordanian alignments? To begin with the easy part of the question, ‘Jordanian’ here refers to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, situated between Palestine/Israel and Iraq. Founded in 1921 as the Emirate of Transjordan under British mandate authority. The territory was first conquered (in the Arab revolt of 1917) by Abdullah, a scion of the Hashemite ruling clan of the Hijaz. Renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, the state became notionally independent but tied to Britain through the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948. The Jordanian Army was funded by Britain and led by British officers (particularly the commander John Glubb ‘Pasha’). The Kingdom expanded as a result of the foundation of Israel and the consequent expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland—Palestinian refugees came to form the majority of the population and the West Bank was annexed to the Kingdom. Abdullah was assassinated in 1951: his son and heir Talal fell mentally ill and the throne passed officially to his son Hussein.

Hussein’s foreign policy therefore was developed in response to three main aspects: the relationship of dependency on British imperial power; the challenge of
radical Arab nationalist forces to that power and regimes (such as the Hashemites) associated with it; and the continuing conflict with Israel, increasingly allied to Jordan’s imperial patrons. The table below clarifies the alignments with which this thesis will deal:

**Figure 1 Jordanian Alignments 1955-7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baghdad Pact: Winter 1955</strong></td>
<td>Expulsion of British Officers: March 1956; Suez Crisis: Autumn 1956; Annulment of Anglo-Jordanian treaty/ Acceptance of Arab solidarity pact: January 1957; Rejection of Arab Solidarity Pact/ Acceptance of US Aid (covert Eisenhower doctrine) April 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial acceptance – UK+Iraq+ Turkey vs. Egypt</td>
<td>Against UK/ support Egypt; Effectively neutral – Hussein pro-Nasser, PM Nabulsi against involvement; Against UK, alignment with Syria, Egypt, S.A.; Pro-US, withdrawal from pro-Egypt/Syria/ Saudi alignment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why this state, and these times? As the second section of this chapter explained, the major works seeking to apply variants of omni-balancing (Brand, 1994, Ryan, 2009) have relied upon case studies of Jordanian alignments, as has the most in-depth application of the constructivist approach to alignments in the Middle East (Lynch, 1999). The choice of Jordan therefore provides useful theoretical alternatives and predecessors against which to ‘play off’ the explanations offered by uneven and combined development. If uneven and combined development offers more satisfying explanations in these cases then this would suggest a broader validity of the theory in the Middle East and the Global South, even if it cannot be said to have been established as a nomothetic law on the basis of these studies.
Furthermore, Jordan offers the ‘power of the good example’. Being a state essentially created by external intervention, in the midst of a bitter (Arab-Israeli) conflict in a central area of geopolitical competition, populated in its majority by refugees from that conflict and ruled over by a foreign (Hijazi) authoritarian monarchy in close alliance with external powers, Jordan would seem the perfect candidate to support omni-balancing theories. Indeed, this may be the reason why it has been chosen for the most rigorous versions of omni-balancing. Also, the period of 1955-7 saw the widest variation in alignments in Jordan’s history, with the possible exception of the Gulf War of 1991. Such wide oscillations suggest a great autonomy of the regime—taken together with Jordan’s inauspicious conditions therefore, if uneven and combined development offers a convincing alternative for the social origins of Jordan’s alignments, it is quite likely it can be extended to other cases.

As a final consideration, the time and place chosen for the case study of this thesis allows us to draw wider conclusions about the Middle East as a whole. The particular alignments analysed in this thesis represent a period in which Jordan was at a juncture between two potential outcomes seen elsewhere in the region. On the one side lay a ‘shaikhly authoritarianism’ of the right and on the other a ‘populist authoritarianism’ of the anti-colonial left (Hinnebusch, 2006:378). Jordan was in many ways a middle case between these two extremes: neither a populous radical republic such as Egypt or Syria was to become, nor an oil-based conservative monarchy such as Saudi Arabia or the Gulf sultanates. In the mid-1950s, however, the future of Jordan lay in the balance: the resolution of the crisis of the mid-50s on the basis of a pro-Western alignment led to a return to conservative monarchy. This was not pre-ordained, however. The events examined in this thesis constitute the process by which Jordan took one path rather than the other and therefore may be instructive for the region as a whole.

1.4 Summary of the Thesis Argument
The methodological approach of this thesis is thus a historical sociological one. In the content of its arguments and the manner of their presentation, however, the argument follows one particular stream in historical sociology: the Marxist approach of ‘rising from the abstract to the concrete.’ This first introductory chapter has established the concrete research question and the *problematique* in International Relations theory to which the answer will contribute. The rest of the thesis puts forward that answer—that, rather than the model of an autonomous omni-balancing king, the social bases of the struggles that produced Jordan’s alignments between 1955 and 1957 should be traced to the emergence of a ‘combined social formation’ in Jordan and its predecessors in the late Ottoman and British mandate periods. The main characteristics of this social formation were a relatively egalitarian rural land-holding structure and a mechanism of combination with the global capitalist system through British subsidy to the former nomadic pastoralists in the armed forces, replacing formerly tributary relations.

Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development and defines the key terms of tributary and capitalist relations, unevenness and combination. The chapter proposes uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework that recognises the multi-linear and interactive character of development. The chapter argues for a definition of ‘development’ as patterned change in social relations, referred to as modes of production. It defines unevenness as the chronologically and geographically uneven spread of this patterned change, thereby producing a greater accumulation of productive force. The chapter then defines combination as the causal interaction of different kinds of social relations of production, in particular that produced by the globally expansive nature of capitalist relations. Drawing on the insights of Francophone Marxist anthropology such as the work of Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude Meillasoux, the chapter identifies the transformation of a particular social relation (the direct extraction of surplus as by pastoralists and semi-pastoralists) and its combination with global capitalist relations through the British colonial subsidy as the key to understanding the Jordanian combined social formation and its later alignments. This claim sets the terms for the research presented in the subsequent two chapters.
Chapter 3 continues the argument by establishing the nature of the pre-capitalist relations that were combined in Jordan. The chapter proposes that these are best seen as ‘tributary relations’, whereby surplus product is directly taken by ‘extra-economic compulsion’ from the direct producers. However, these relations were characterized by a constant re-negotiation and re-formation of lower and higher points in the chain of tribute-taking: leading to what I call the ‘fractured tributary relations’ of the tribe characteristic of both settled and nomadic pastoralist communities in the lands that became Transjordan. The chapter relates how the nomadic pastoralists nonetheless enjoyed a strategic advantage over the settled communities and therefore most often exacted tribute from them. The chapter traces the origins, process and results of the Ottoman attempt to transform these relations in the Tanzimat reforms: which, I argue represent an instance of the operation of uneven and combined development through the ‘whip of external necessity’ by which pre-capitalist societies were forced to respond to the military-geopolitical and economic pressures emanating from more advanced capitalist powers.

Chapter 4 pursues the argument that the Jordanian military constituted the link between the long-term social process of uneven and combined development and the conjunctural alignment choices of the 1950s. The military, as in other Arab countries, became a field of political contestation in Jordan in the 1950s. However, the social base of the Jordanian military was a rather peculiar one, and a source of power for the regime against the anti-colonial movement. Chapter 4 explores therefore the role of the army in the Jordanian state-formation process, considering whether it represented a conduit of the combination of the fractured tributary relations presented in chapter 3 with the global capitalist system via Britain’s military subsidy. Through a focused comparison with Iraq chapter 4 therefore substantiates Haim Gerber’s claim that ‘because the agrarian and class structure [of Jordan] was more balanced… possibly this is why the army did not become a mirror of class struggle as in other Arab countries’ (Gerber, 1987:149). The chapter seeks to show how the subsistence crisis among the Jordanian bedouin in the 1930s, resulted from global depression, traditional dearth and exacerbated to the point of existential crisis by the imposition of state boundaries and the replacement of camels by motorized transport. In particular I examine how the
mandate state, in the form of Glubb Pasha, created an important part of Jordan’s combined social formation unintentionally and for geopolitical reasons. Glubb undertook consciously to ‘set in motion processes that reconfigured the economic bases of the nomadic economy, and put in place a system of militarized social provision that eased the plight of the poorer Bedouin’ (Tell, 2008:11). It was this transformation that replaced tributary relations with the British subsidy.

The fifth and sixth chapters of the thesis present explanations of Jordan’s alignments between 1955 and 1957 on the basis of the social origins outlined in the preceding two chapters. Chapter 5 deals with the struggle over the Baghdad Pact, a turning point in Jordan’s alignments as Hussein and his associates vacillated between an anti-Soviet alliance with Britain, the traditional imperial patron, and a mass movement inspired by anti-colonial nationalism. The chapter argues that Hussein’s oscillation between these positions reflected the pull of two poles within Jordan’s combined social formation: on the one hand the ‘new effendiyya’ produced by the expansion of the mandate state together with the dispossessed urban poor and refugees, and on the other the sections of the armed forces whose subsistence had been guaranteed by the British subsidy and at first passively, then actively supported the King and his smaller ruling condominium of merchants, landowners and sheikhs. Chapter 6 expands this historical analysis with studies of the expulsion of British officers in the Jordanian armed forces, the Suez Crisis, the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the acceptance of US aid at the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In these case studies the thesis presents the utility of uneven and combined development over other explanations in explaining the social bases of the contingent political struggles that led to the eventual alignment outcomes.

The concluding chapter 7 recapitulates the results of the thesis and attempts to draw from them implications for the study of the International Relations of the Middle East as a whole and especially in the contemporary region. The chapter proposes that uneven and combined development may offer a route out of confrontations on the questions of the specificity/universality of the Middle East and the disciplinary question of whether to focus on Middle Eastern studies or International Relations. In
the final section I suggest that uneven and combined development, as a theoretical framework designed originally to explain (and advance) social revolution in a so-called ‘backward’ country, may have a particular potency in analyzing the contemporary revolutionary upheavals in the region. Of course, any such claim requires a much greater theoretical specification of uneven and combined development. It is to this task we now turn.
2. The Theoretical Framework of Uneven and Combined Development

In this chapter I outline the analytical tools, basic concepts and intellectual heritage of the theoretical framework used in this thesis, namely uneven and combined development. This is an important task because both the general paradigm to which uneven and combined development belongs—that of historical materialism, which term I shall use interchangeably with 'Marxism'—and the contents of this framework itself are likely to be less familiar to IR scholars than the established schools of Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and so forth. In this chapter I therefore seek to develop a revived and novel theoretical framework from outside the mainstream schools of international relations in order to understand a particular set of phenomena later in the thesis: Jordanian alignments. In so doing, I seek to establish a means to add empirical substance to a debate around this theoretical framework, which has been criticised for lacking such substance. Uneven and combined development being a relative newcomer as an explicit theoretical concept in the study of International Relations, the main task of this chapter will therefore be to explain and define its terms and the analytical tools it offers for the rest of the thesis.

A basic definition of uneven and combined development is this: the interaction of different patterns of social relations in a given society (or rather ‘social formation’) under the impact of the global expansion of capitalist social relations (the ‘world economy’) such that the distinct character of the resultant ‘combined social formation’ itself feeds back into the system of geopolitical competition that originally produced it. Of course, simply to state the terms is not to substantiate their internal coherence or empirical reference. The rest of this chapter carries out that task. It begins with a restatement of the questions addressed by uneven and combined development. As I attempt to demonstrate below, uneven and combined development represents an attempt within the historical materialist tradition to grapple with the questions of the interrelation of the geo-political and the social and the international relations of ‘late-developing’ states. Uneven and combined development thus addresses the same *problematique* with which this thesis concerns itself. It may then help us address the gaps in the responses of other theoretical traditions (reviewed in the previous chapter) to
these questions. However, uneven and combined development is not a stand-alone theory or panacea. It is based on a long engagement of historical materialists with the problems of the geopolitical and of ‘late-development’.

The chapter therefore undertakes a clarification of the historical materialist basis to uneven and combined development and then reviews the contributions of historical materialist approaches to international relations such as the Lenin-Bukharin theory of imperialism, Rosa Luxemburg’s work on colonial expansion, World Systems and Dependency theory and the “political-Marxist” school of Ellen Meiksins Wood, Justin Rosenberg, Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher and the ‘two-logics’ controversy in recent Marxist international relations theory. Drawing from these contributions, the chapter then outlines the history and debates on the idea of uneven and combined development and presents a synthetic framework of the concept. This framework uses the previous contributions to fill in the gaps of Trotsky’s original and insightful but rather sketchy conceptualization of uneven and combined development. Thus, the theoretical framework presents ‘combination’ as the interweaving of a world economy (the global expansion of capitalist social relations through both market and state competition) with local social relations deriving from a pre-existing tributary mode of production—drawing therefore on the work of Nazih Ayubi and the anthropologists Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude Meillasoux. In the final section of the chapter, the place of agency, norms and the state are discussed, making use of Ayubi’s idea of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state within the ‘compound world economy’ (1995:13) and the discourse of Arab nationalism as an instance of the attempt to create a particular ‘historic bloc’ (1995:28).

2.1 Why Uneven and Combined Development?

As the previous chapter demonstrated, attempts to explain the phenomena of international relations in general and the foreign policies of states in the global South in particular encounter a ‘basic methodological disjuncture between sociological and geopolitical forms of explanation’ (Rosenberg, 2006:312). Historical materialism has not solved this problem. Indeed, where Realists and Neo-Realists have been accused of over-emphasizing a trans-historical anarchical system at the expense of understanding
the variations of domestic societies, historical materialists often face the opposite charge of focusing exclusively on a domestic social model and failing to understand or theorize the interactions amongst states, or reducing them to an epiphenomena of domestic social relations. Thus Kenneth Waltz argues that ‘Marx and the Marxists represent the fullest development of the second image’ i.e., of the claim that ‘the internal structure of states determines not only the form and use of military force but external behavior generally’ (Waltz, 1959:125). This criticism holds that historical materialists are concerned with processes of change from one kind of society to another and therefore not with the proper object of IR theory in the Realist tradition: the relationships between multiple societies conceived as sovereign states (Halliday and Rosenberg, 1998:383). In this view, historical materialist categories of social relations (e.g. the ‘capitalist mode of production’) are seen as domestic attributes of states which seem to be ineffective compared with the ‘distribution of capabilities’ as the source of behaviour in the international system: the common behaviour of ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ states providing evidence for this claim (Waltz, 1979:127). As Fred Halliday writes, from within a historical materialist perspective: ‘[t]hose who… have sought to elaborate a Marxist approach to International Relations have laboured under the theoretical difficulties that confront those who seek to analyse politics, and ideological factors, within the confines of specific states themselves’ (Halliday, 1994:48).

Other schools of IR theory have mounted similar criticisms of historical materialism. Martin Wight argued that Marxism was fundamentally a ‘theory of domestic society’ (1995:23). Kubalkova and Cruickshank’s study of Marxism and IR sees the two as at ‘different wave lengths’ and operating ‘at cross purposes’ (1989:11). Alexander Wendt’s influential statement of the Constructivist approach shares with Waltzian neo-Realism the explanatory priority placed on the system of sovereign states. However, Wendt argues the nature of that system may vary with the inter-subjective meanings emergent within the interactions of state leaders (Wendt, 1999:247). Wendt argues that the modes of production in Marxism are cultural, rather than material, forms.

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8 A body of work has emerged in International Relations which seeks to rehabilitate the tropes of pre-Waltzian realism (tragedy, prudence, limited knowledge and so forth) through a ‘counter-memory’ – see Molloy, Sean. (2006) The Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. These are works of intellectual history, however. Their empirical referents are to bodies of thought or the relationships between them: of interest, but not the subject of a thesis such as this one, based on the premise that there is something outside of the text.
and therefore vulnerable to ‘idealistic critique’ when offered as an explanation for international relations (1999:136). Historical sociologists, who share a general methodological outlook with Marxists, have also criticized historical materialism from the other side of the debate, arguing that Marxists have failed to integrate the impact of inter-state conflict and competition even on the decisive revolutionary moments they identify as crucial to the transition from one kind of society to another. Thus Charles Tilly famously argued that war made states (Tilly, 1992:67) and Theda Skocpol identified ‘developments within the international states system as such’ as central factors in the making of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions (Skocpol, 1979:23). Michael Mann advances the claim that ‘[s]tates did not grow primarily to cope with emerging classes….but to fight costlier wars and then to assist industrialization’ (Mann, 1993:728). These historical sociological explanations of the transition to capitalist (or ‘industrial’) society thus often find it easier to rely on the realist model (Mann, 1988:140-42, Skocpol, 1979:22) than on historical materialist premises.

These objections are strong ones. Historical materialism in its original form, like the other components of classical social theory in Weber and Durkheim, has displayed a tendency to fail to account theoretically for socio-political multiplicity and its effects (Rosenberg 2005; 2006; 2007). In part this is because Marx consciously and famously abstracted the inter-societal from his conception of society and its development (1990:727). Marx did write a great deal about the subject-matter of what would now be considered IR—around eight hundred pages on wars, diplomacy, and colonialism (Rosenberg, 1994:162)—but this research was not integrated into his theoretical system (Halliday, 1994:59). This has given rise to the criticism that Marxism is a variant of Eurocentric modernization theory, reliant upon what Charles Tilly calls the ‘pernicious postulate’ of development within a singular model of society (Tilly, 1982:11) and abstracted from the England of Marx’s day. Such an impression is hardly dispelled by such epigrams as that delivered by Marx to ‘backward’ German philosophers on the example of England’s industrialization: ‘De te fabula narratur!’ (“This story is told of you!”).

Apart from such verbal asides, Marx appears to have intended (although this may have been a short-lived plan) further volumes to *Capital* that would deal with questions of the state and International Relations (Callinicos, 2009:34). Whether he dropped the plan or not, Marx did not produce these works and left later generations of
Marxists to grapple with the problem of integrating Marx’s model of capitalist social relations with a world divided into multiple states and in which non-capitalist social relations predominated in most areas. The third section of this chapter explains the contributions of later historical materialists in grappling with this problem and argues that uneven and combined development represents such an attempt to respond to objections such as those outlined above: a response characterized by chronologically and geographically embedding Marx’s model of social relations in an actually existing world of multiple states and different forms of social relations (modes of production). It is argued that uneven and combined development is an attempt to deal with the problem that ‘very concept of the "international" itself poses problems for Marxists … [having] seen world affairs confidently in terms of a single world process.’ (Halliday, 1994:49). Uneven and combined development recognizes the existence of determinations arising from the fact that all societies coexist with and interact with others—thereby super-adding ‘a lateral field of causality over and above the “domestic” determinations arising from each and every one of the participant societies’ (Callinicos and Rosenberg, 2008:621). Before explicating how uneven and combined development can do this, it is necessary to explain the basic premises of the framework in the historical materialist conception of the social.

### 2.2 Basic concepts of Historical Materialism

This thesis offers a social explanation of Jordan’s geopolitical alignments in the 1950s: but what does ‘social’ mean in the framework of uneven and combined development that is presented to reach this explanation? The conception of the ‘social’ adopted here is the historical materialist one, which this section now broadly outlines. Much of what follows is a brief summary of often-contradictory definitions within Marx’s own writings and those of later Marxists. The following section outlines the basic proposition of historical materialism, the meanings of the terms ‘mode of production’ and ‘social relations of production’ and Marx’s account of the nature of capitalism. These clarifications are necessary because it is these basic concepts that have been modified through the intellectual engagement of IR and Marxism outlined in section 3 of this chapter and which go on to form the building blocks of uneven and combined development used in the rest of the thesis.
2.2.1 Social Relations of Production and Modes of Production

The most basic proposition of historical materialism is contained within the phrase itself: the idea that history starts from ‘the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself’ (Marx and Engels, 1999:58). Or, to use a more modern idiom, we should explain interactions amongst humans and their institutions by reference to a ‘foundation’ in material production that ‘ultimately governs the "social, political and intellectual life-processes in general”’ (Brewer, 1990:11). This is a very controversial claim, around which much of the criticism of Marxism centres. However, it is, like the Realist assertion of a logic of anarchy in international politics, a ‘hard core’ postulate of the kind identified by Imre Lakatos: an overarching claim that organises a research programme and to be judged by its ability to ‘resolve anomalies by introducing auxiliary theories that expand the explanatory power of the core postulates’ (Burawoy, 1989:761). Uneven and combined development represents an attempt at such expansion on the basis of this fundamental claim: extending historical materialist analysis to the domain of International Relations of the Global South.

From this postulate we get the most basic historical materialist concept of use to this thesis: that of the ‘mode of production’. I summarise a mode of production as a way of organising the ‘social relations of production’. We can identify, in the abstract, a limited number of ways in which such relations may be structured. A mode of production is not a tangible thing in which social relations operate—rather the social relations of production operate in ‘social formations’. The problematic questions of ideas, agency and the autonomy of the state are left aside for now to give a clearer picture of what these basic concepts mean: these thorny problems are addressed in the last section of this chapter. For now, what does ‘social relations’ of production’ mean in this thesis?

‘Social’ and ‘relation’ should not give us too much trouble: they are used here in their commonsense meaning as regularized interactions amongst people or groups of people. What about production? Production is the most basic prerequisite of human existence: the drawing of sustenance by humans from their physical surroundings. Of course, all animals do this but humans are distinguished by their use of technology (not just tools but tools to make tools) and their capacity for their organisation of production amongst each other to change over time. Production means, therefore, labour—‘an
appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man…common to all forms of society in which human beings live’ (Marx, 1990:290). What changes is not the need for this labour but the way in which it is organised, controlled and its products and material prerequisites distributed. These are production relations: ‘relations of effective power over persons and productive forces’(Cohen 1978: 63).^9

Production relations are patterned and change over time, Marx argues, as a result of the internal struggles that they generate. The central elements of these patterns may then be distilled in abstract form: a ‘mode of production.’ The basic elements of these patterns are labour and the productive forces (i.e. the means of production) which ‘for any production to take place…must be connected’(Marx, 1978:120). It is possible for this effective control over labour, its means and its products to be distributed equally amongst a community’s members. This was the prospect sketched by Marx of communism in both its ancient and future forms. In between lie modes of production that generate classes—where the direct producers do not control production but are rather subject to the effective control of another group who extract a surplus from the labour of the first group in production. From this premise Marx argues that:

The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant… It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers—relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power—in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice. (Marx, 1978:927)

It is these patterns of the social relations of production that are ‘developing’ unevenly and being combined in uneven and combined development. They mean the ‘relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers’.

There are many potential cultural and jurisprudential forms of these relationships. However, historical materialism claims that we can distinguish patterns between them.

^9 Critics of Marx from the Weberian or Neo-Realist traditions often distinguish between ‘power’ and ‘production’ as two alternatives sources of human action. On the basis of this distinction Marxism is criticised, for example, for failing to acknowledge the importance of power as the key concept of international relations. This criticism is misplaced because power, in the sense of control over things and people in production, is central to historical materialism. The changing patterns of power over production are the explanatory mechanism of the theory. The claim is not that power does not matter but that certain empirical outcomes of social life can be traced back, as emergent phenomena, to such patterns of power over production—a type of power known in capitalist societies as ‘economic’ but in others as divinely ordained or simply a brute fact of life.
on the basis of who controls the means of production, the produced surplus and the labour power that acts on the former to produce the latter. Do the direct producers control their own means of production? Do they control the surplus produced? If not, who does? We can schematize the possible production relations in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct producer controls means of production</th>
<th>Direct producer is means of production</th>
<th>Direct producer does not control means of production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communism/petty commodity</td>
<td>Not possible</td>
<td>Not possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tributary mode and its subsidiaries (feudalism, pastoralism etc)</td>
<td>Slavery</td>
<td>Capitalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is a representation of the logically possible abstractions of production relations. Yet it includes at the left hand side at least two different ‘modes’ in each cell. This is because there is a further axis of differentiation in those modes dependent on whether the direct producer controls the means of production, therefore necessitating the organisation of coercive power in some way to appropriate the product (Brenner, 2001:178).

### 2.2.2 The Capitalist Mode of Production

The task—far from universally successful—of historical materialists in International Relations theory has been to reconstruct the relationship between a particular mode of production (capitalism) and the global expansion of the system of sovereign states: phenomena that Marxists have seen as largely coeval (Halliday, 1994:61). In this thesis in particular, an argument will be advanced about the combination of social relations characteristic of two modes of production in Jordan, the
capitalist mode and the tributary mode. The tributary mode is explored in depth at the beginning of the next chapter where we examine the nature of social relations in Ottoman and British Mandate era Jordan. Here it is necessary to explain Marx’s view of the capitalist mode of production, the only mode that he analysed in detail, in order to understand its expansion as a world economy.

The capitalist mode of production for Marx is, as summarized above, characterized by the separation of direct producer—the worker—from the means of production. The worker is not compelled, as in the tributary or slave modes, to offer either labour power or surplus in the form of products to those (the capitalists) who control the means of production. However, the worker must sell her labour power to some capitalist in order to access the means of production, thereby providing the owner of the means of production with the surplus value that, Marx argues, is the source of profit. Furthermore, there are many competing capitalists ‘exploiting’ labour power to produce profit in this way. Or to use Gerry Cohen’s clarification: capitalist social production relations are those in which ‘immediate producers own their own labour power and no other productive force’ and ‘the point of production…is to use exchange value to produce more exchange value and then to use the additional exchange value to produce still more and so on’ (Cohen, 1978:181). Robert Brenner has usefully characterized Marx’s picture of the capitalist mode of production as functioning based on ‘rules of reproduction’ for the social actors in the system. These are constituted by two antagonistic relationships: the ‘vertical’ antagonisms between capitalist and labourer and the ‘horizontal’ relations among individual competing capitals (Brenner, 2006:6-7). The vertical antagonism results in the class struggle between capital and labour over the labour process and its product. The horizontal antagonism results in the competitive pressure on particular capitals to produce more efficiently, by intensifying the labour process, using innovative technology or geographical expansion.

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10 In Marx’s sense this means that the value produced by the workers’ labour power for the capitalist is less than that she receives in return as wages.
2.2.3 The Capitalist Mode of Production, Primitive Accumulation and World Economy

Why is this relevant? This characterization of the capitalist mode of production is relevant because it offers us the means to understand the linked expansion of the states system and world-economy into which this thesis argues Jordan was integrated with consequential effects for the country’s later alignments. It does so in two ways: explaining the origins of that expansion and its nature. Capitalism, if this analysis of it is accepted, is an inherently expansionary system. As explained above, each capitalist is driven to seek advantage at the expense of others. The main strategy to achieve this is by increasing the surplus value produced by the workers—extending the working day or introducing labour-saving technology without a commensurate reduction in working time. A further strategy is to expand into those areas where capitalist relations do not prevail. The competition among capitals thus leads them to search out new markets and ever-greater sources of profit across the globe, thereby unifying the world through the universalization of specific combinatory mechanisms. As the capitalist system matures, more and more societies become locked into processes and structures of interconnection and constitution by the emergence of a world economy. However, the state and inter-state competition was to play a significant role in transmitting these imperatives and therefore their impact even on areas (such as Jordan) where capital did not make a productive investment: a key aspect of the contribution of uneven and combined development which is discussed further below.

The origins of capitalist expansion lie, then, in the nature of the ‘specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers’. What of the second aspect of the expansion, the character of the transformations wrought on other societies? It will be recalled that capitalism is distinguished by what Marx called the ‘dual freedom’: the worker faces no direct coercion to work for any specific capitalist, or indeed to work at all, but being ‘free’ of the means of production she in effect has little choice but to do so. This situation differs from other modes of production in which ‘non-economic coercion is the basis for appropriation of surplus by a ruling class or its agents’ (Haldon, 1993:65). To move from the latter system to the
former implies a change in the entire basis of politics. This claim has two important consequences for the expansion of the international system and its nature in the Global South, of which Jordan is a part. First, capitalism is unique in separating off the ‘political’ realm from the ‘economic’ and therefore creating a global system of interactions between these political realms (states) apparently separate from the social relations of production over which they preside: in Justin Rosenberg’s words ‘the structural specificity of state sovereignty lies in its "abstraction" from civil society—an abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the market, and hence inseparable from capitalist relations of production’ (1994:123). In this argument (at this point presented only at an abstract level) a ‘geo-politics’ separate from ‘economics’ comes with capitalism because only capitalism produces a ‘politics’ separate from surplus extraction (1994:83).

The second contribution of Marx’s characterization of the capitalist mode of production is to direct our focus to the historical production of its precondition: the potential worker free from both means of production and from the compulsion to produce. In its concrete form this process is masterfully depicted by Marx as ‘primitive accumulation’. ‘Primitive’ here means original: the accumulation in question is of the means of production in the hands of (potential) capitalist at one end and property-less (potential) workers at the other, i.e. the ‘dual freedom’ described above. These are the preconditions—which does not mean the same thing as the causes—for capitalist social relations of production. These pre-conditions imply both the forcible separation of direct producers from control of the means of production (such as peasants from their land) and the removal of the power of other classes (such as feudal lords or tribal sheikhs) to compel the direct producers to hand over surplus by extra-economic coercion (1994:163). Marx summarises his definition of this ‘primitive accumulation’ in his notes on pre-capitalist modes of production:

[Primitive accumulation is] a historic process which dissolves the different forms, in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours. First and foremost: 1) a dissolution of the relation to the earth...2) dissolution of the relations in which man appears as the proprietor of the instrument of labour… dissolution both of the relations under which the labourers themselves, the living units of labour power are still a direct part of the objective conditions of production and are appropriated as such (Marx, 1978:97-98)
It is this concrete process that uneven and combined development offers first as an analytical tool for understanding the Jordanian case (Turner, 1999 presents a similar argument for Egypt). This unevenly distributed ‘historic process’ of dissolution and reconstitution is the starting point for tracing back the trajectories of any particular post-colonial state—a task undertaken for Jordan in the third and fourth chapters of this thesis. Those chapters look at how ‘the relation to the earth’ and the dissolution of the ‘different forms in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours’\(^{11}\) under the impact of the attempt and failure of the Ottoman Empire to compete with the capitalist powers such as Britain and France. This process (resulting in a certain kind of ‘combined development’ defined below) then provides an alternative account of the origins of Jordan’s geopolitical alignments.

The argument is jumping ahead of itself here, however. Before any discussion of the concrete case, certain problems in the concepts presented above must be recognized. Chief among these is that Marx’s model of the transition to capitalism is an abstraction based largely on the singular English experience and written as if there were only one society in the world. As Marx recognized, these were stringent and clearly counter-factual conditions. However, the work of embedding this abstraction in time and space was never fully carried out by Marx. As a result, it has been easy for Marxists themselves and others to see historical materialism as positing a world of separate societies: such entities passing uniformly through time and stages of modes of production like a locomotive on the rails. This view implies precisely that ‘methodological nationalism’ or dominance of domestic factors for which historical materialism has been criticised. Even worse: it may lead to the teleological conclusions of modernization theory or assumptions of the superiority of ‘civilized’ over ‘primitive’ nations. There has been no shortage of historical materialists willing to confirm such an impression, from elements of Marx’s own 1859 Preface to a Critique of Political Economy itself through to Bill Warren’s declaration that ‘direct colonialism…acted as a powerful engine of progressive social change’ (Warren, 1980:9).

One of the advantages of uneven and combined development is to suggest that this interpretation of Marxism, although certainly available in the texts themselves, is not

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\(^{11}\) This dissolution and reconstitution, expanded upon in chapter 3, involved the tributary relations prevalent in the Transjordanian steppe in the late Ottoman Empire: ‘primitive’ in the context of ‘primitive accumulation’, it must be stressed, means ‘original’ rather than any ‘primitive mode of production.’
a necessary one. A good reason for adopting a mode of production approach—further specified as uneven and combined development—is in fact that it allows us to ‘visualize intersystemic and intrasystemic relationships’ (Wolf, 1997:76). The important issue is not Marx’s (often scattered and inconsistent) schema of modes of production but rather his method of abstracting ‘the strategic relationships involved in the deployment of social labor by organised human pluralities…that underlie, orient and constrain interaction’ (1997:76). Marx provided a full account of the dynamics of only one of these, the capitalist mode. In *Capital* he consciously treated this example as if it were an isolated, singular society only in order to be better able to understand its fundamental dynamics. Throughout his and Engels’ historical work, and in political correspondence such as that with the Russian Marxist Vera Zasulich, frequently reaffirmed the multi-linear and interactive character of actual historical development (Lowy, 1981:23-4), an emphasis that has been re-discovered by recent research (see Anderson, 2010). Indeed, Marx took up precisely the example of the contrast between the expropriation of the Roman peasantry (creating the original “proletariat” but not capitalism) and the English transition to capitalism to argue that ‘events that are strikingly analogous, but taking place in different historical milieu, lead to totally disparate results’ (Marx, 1982:110). Nonetheless, the problem remains that historical materialism has had to grapple with the actually existing capitalism rather than an abstract one, and therefore with the existence of a states system and non-capitalist social relations which do not simply recede once capitalism comes on the scene. Later generations of Marxists attempted to deal with these problems (Brewer, 1990:15-16). They produced theoretical resources of use to this thesis: it is to their contributions that we now turn.
2.3 Theoretical Inheritance: Marxists and International Relations

The subject matter with which this thesis engages through the case of Jordan—the relations between states and the politics of late-developing states—has thus proved quite thorny terrain for historical materialists. However, the attempts of previous generations of historical materialists to deal with these questions have produced pertinent insights. This is because Marxists after Marx, from the ‘classical Marxists’ of the first quarter of the twentieth century onwards, were faced with real-world problems of imperialism and war and therefore to develop answers to two linked questions: i) what is the relationship between capitalism (a social system) and the international system of states and ii) why and how did capitalism expand into non-capitalist societies? These questions cover our area of interest in this thesis (the relationship between late-development and geopolitical alignments) and the contributions produced in answering are therefore worth considering in detail.

2.3.1 Classical Marxism: Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg

The version of these arguments with which most IR scholars are familiar is that presented in Lenin’s pamphlet *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. However, this short work should be considered a distillation of arguments formulated with much greater theoretical sophistication in Nikolai Bukharin’s *Imperialism and World Economy* (Callinicos, 2009:52). Lenin’s pamphlet is fundamentally concerned not, as much of the later theorizing inspired by it has been, with the relationship between the colonized and colonizing world but with the reasons for the outbreak of the First World War (Halliday, 1994:54). Lenin’s primary argument, based on the work of the liberal John Hobson, was that ‘imperialism’ (in the sense of war between the major powers to divide the world’s territory and resources between them) equates to ‘monopoly capitalism’ (Lenin, 2010:110). Capitalism, Lenin, claimed had reached a stage where finance and industrial capital had merged in huge monopolies: therefore ‘the export of capital’ had become more important than commodities, and the major capitalist states therefore came into conflict over the spaces into which to export this capital (2010:94-5). Moreover, this system blunted the revolutionary potential of the proletariat (thereby
explaining the failure of workers’ organisations to oppose the First World War) by making it ‘economically possible to corrupt certain sections of the working class’ (2010:160).

There is a problem here, however. Capital, in the sense of loans, shares and so forth, did not flow most profitably from the big capitalist states to the colonies, but rather to other capitalist states. Nor was there any visible mechanism by which the benefits of such investments as did exist were transferred to an ‘upper strata’ of the workers: indeed it was the higher-skilled and better paid workers who tended to found and join Communist Parties on the Leninist model (Callinicos, 2009:50). Bukharin (1973) argued a version of Lenin’s thesis without these empirically incorrect claims. He identified two contradictory tendencies in the capitalist world economy as it expanded: on the one hand, a tendency toward the concentration of capital and its integration into particular states and the other a tendency for capital and production to be internationalized (1973:121). The consequence of these two contradictory tendencies was for ‘state capitalist trusts’ to compete militarily as well as economically (1973:123-4).

As Bob Sutcliffe has pointed out, Lenin’s pamphlet does not really concern the relationships between colonial powers and their colonies or ‘developed’ and ‘under-developed’ countries (Sutcliffe, 2002:49). Nor does Bukharin, and both tend to take for granted the existence of many states through which the tendencies of concentration and centralization of capital come into operation. What Bukharin offers to this thesis is his conception of capitalism as a unified, global(ising) system of both economic and geopolitical competition: his starting point being the world economy defined as ‘a system of production relations and, correspondingly, exchange relations, on a world scale’ (1973:26). Bukharin thus highlights how capitalist relations are production relations, the transformation of which in a ‘combined’ way (which Bukharin does not discuss) may have important international consequences even if the state in question (like Jordan) is not a major exporter of commodities. Lenin offers the idea that capitalist development is inherently uneven, permanently re-ordering the capabilities of states to participate in the division of the world and leading to military conflict as a result of these disequilibria. Here we find a certain convergence of Marxist and realist hypotheses on the ‘the tendency in an international system for the powers of member states to change at different rates because of political, economic and technological developments’
which over time cause ‘of a fundamental redistribution of power in the system' (Gilpin, 1981:13). However, where this idea helps this thesis is offering an account of the imperative—brought about by the threat from the ‘unevenly’ more developed capitalist states—working on the Ottoman empire to transform its social relations in the late 19th and early 20th century, which then became the foundation for Jordan’s later social trajectory. This idea is explained more fully as Trotsky’s notion of the ‘whip of external necessity’ below and operationalised in chapter 3.

At the same time as Lenin and Bukharin, who focused on the struggles of the main capitalist powers to divide the rest of the world between them, Rosa Luxemburg offered an explanation of why and how capitalism expanded into non-capitalist areas through the medium of state power and colonial violence. Capitalism, Luxemburg argued in an interpretation that has mostly been rejected as teleological by later Marxist political economists (Brewer, 1990:63), necessarily requires a non-capitalist ‘outside’ to which it can market the surplus of goods created by the insufficient purchasing power of the workers (Luxemburg, 2003:330). She filled out Marx’s claims on the expansionary nature of capitalism and its primitive accumulation in ‘arguing that capitalism was, in fact, surrounded by pre-capitalist economic formations, and that competitive pressures drive capitalist firms and capitalist states to trade with these "outside" economies and ultimately to break them up’ (Brewer, 1990:62). In what Luxemburg called ‘natural economies’ (tending to elide the considerable differences amongst the non-capitalist areas) the peasant household largely controlled its own means of production and therefore had to be expelled by force from the land or access to it (Luxemburg, 2003:349-51).

Luxemburg has been criticized for overstretching her argument both in her ascription of an overall goal of consumption to capitalist social relations (which are not conscious agents but structures that empower and limit agents) and in her elision of all pre-capitalist societies to ‘natural economies’. Her relevant contribution here lies in her focus on the ‘the mechanisms of primitive accumulation, using force… at the margin where capitalist and pre-capitalist economic systems meet’ (Brewer, 1990:73). It is these mechanisms that prove useful in analysing the inter-relation of state formation and later alignments in states such as Jordan. Her central focus on how the social production relations of access to the means of production (most importantly, land) are transformed
will be adopted in chapter 4 of this thesis to examine Jordanian state-formation and in particular the role of the army in integrating formerly nomadic groups into the state.

2.3.2 ‘Structuralism’: Dependency and World Systems Theory

Luxemburg thus concerns herself with the accumulation of capital via the dispossession of the direct producers of the colonial world (Harvey, 2003:138, Luxemburg, 2003:328). This question, and in particular the place of the post-independence states of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia in the international system was taken up by a later generation of theorists influenced by historical materialism. Under the name of ‘dependency theory’, ‘world systems theory’ or ‘structuralism’ this is the branch of Marxist theory that has most readily found a place as an accepted paradigm of IR theory (Halliday, 1994:53). The origins of dependency theory lie in the work of Latin American economists such as Henrique Cardoso and Raul Prebisch. Seeking an explanation for the persistent poverty and subordination of Latin American economies, Prebisch argued that the lack of ‘dynamism’ in Latin American economies was due to the unequal distribution of land and consequent under-employment and restricted domestic market (Prebisch, 1971:3-4). Cardoso later revised this argument to take account for the degree of industrialization that had taken place in Latin America, characterizing this as ‘dependent capitalist development’ (Cardoso, 1982:121).

A more radical version of this argument was popularized by Andre Gunder Frank (1971, 1978). Frank identified a system of exploitation of ‘satellites’ (the colonial, semi-colonial and post-colonial states) exploited by a ‘metropolis’ (the imperial powers of Western Europe and the US). The means lie in the ‘unequal exchange’ (1978:103) of the commodities produced by the satellites: an inequality that is not challenged by the ruling class of the satellites who function even under conditions of nominal independence as a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ sharing an interest with the metropolis. The satellites are not ‘developing’ or un-developed—they are underdeveloped, thrown backwards or into stagnation by the exploitative relations benefiting the metropolis. Frank uses the example of northeast Brazil to illustrate this point (1971:180-3). Frank fundamentally sees the world economy as exchange for the market, with which a number of forms of labour relation (e.g. slavery or serfdom) are compatible: ‘c}apitalist
monopoly power reigned supreme from the very beginning’ (1971:48-9). This system begins with the expansion of European merchant capital in the 16th century (1978:13). No transition for the satellite society can be expected within the system: the solution is withdrawal from it, possibly by revolutionary means (1978:171).

The most influential version of the claims of dependency theory has been the World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein shares a periodization with Frank, arguing that ‘in the late fifteenth century, there came into existence what we may call a European world-economy’ (Wallerstein, 1974:15). This world economy, unlike previous world empires exacting tribute (Rome, China, the Islamic Empires and so forth) was ‘a kind of social system the world had not really known before…an economic but not a political entity’ (1974:15). The world-economy is thus united with a global plurality of states rather than a single empire—an outcome enabled by ‘the techniques of modern capitalism and the technology of modern science’ (1974:15).

This world system is the starting point for analysis of any individual state: there is ‘one expanding economy’ that appears as ‘various "national" (and "colonial") economies related through international trade’ (Hopkins, 1982:11).

This world economy, which is in a constant process of global expansion, is structured by an ‘integration of labor processes ("division of labor")’ and ‘a single set of accumulation processes, between its always more advanced, historically enlarging and geographically shifting core and its always less advanced, disproportionately enlarging and geographically shifting periphery’ (1982:11). These processes define three levels of states in the world system: the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery. The core states dominate the system, possess a strong state machinery and integrated national culture and specialize in production that requires ‘higher levels of skill and greater capitalization’ (Wallerstein, 1974:350). The periphery comprises ‘that geographical sector of it wherein production is primarily of lower-ranking goods (that is, goods, whose labor is less well-rewarded) but which is an integral part of the overall system of the division of labor’ because it produces basic commodities (1974:301). The peripheral state is weak, and at best semi-autonomous of the domination of the core (1974:349). In between, and distinguishing Wallerstein’s theory from Frank’s, we find the semi-periphery. The states of the semi-periphery deflect peripheral anger against the core, and

12 Although in later works Frank suggests a world system may extend back 5000 years.
form a kind of transmission mechanism whereby states can move up and down the ranks in the system (Wallerstein, 1974:350).

World Systems Theory has found a readier acceptance than most other versions of historical materialism and remains the form in which most students or scholars of IR will encounter Marxist concepts (Halliday, 1994:53). There are many aspects that the framework used in this thesis shares with World Systems Theory: such as the focus on a globally expanding capitalist economy structurally related to the states system and the way that different configurations of labour relations and classes affect the international relations of ‘peripheral’ states. Terence Hopkins’ argument that ‘the outward expansion of the capitalist world economy’ proceeds through a process of primitive accumulation, separating the direct producers from the means of production (Hopkins, 1982:16) is central to the notion of uneven and combined development used in this thesis.

However, there are also important differences that distinguish uneven and combined development from World Systems Theory and therefore suggest the possibility of a theoretical contribution by the former. As Fred Halliday argues, the IR paradigm of structuralism and the theoretical tradition of historical materialism are far from identical (Halliday, 1994:53). Halliday describes structuralism ‘a form of determinism, in the sense of denying freedom of action, or agency, to the elements in the structure’ and thereby different from the historical materialist emphasis on structures as the un-chosen circumstances in which agents make their own history (1994:53). This is probably unfair—one would struggle to find a statement from Wallerstein, Frank or others making such a disavowal of agency—but one of the first critiques encountered by historical materialists is that they ignore agency. As the last section of this chapter argues, historical materialism rather sees structures as endowing the powers, capabilities and interests for action, but the criticism may spring from identification with a paradigm called ‘structuralism.’

There is a more concrete difference in the conception of the world economy advanced by World Systems or Dependency theory and that of uneven and combined development. Wallerstein and Frank see the capitalist world economy as constituted primarily by market exchange (Brewer, 1990:163). This is in contrast to the traditional historical materialist approach, which has focused on modes of production (Laclau, 1977:23). The forms of exploitation of labour in World Systems Theory are determined
by the core/periphery/semi-periphery roles in the market but they are all, in sense, capitalist relations by virtue of the existence of the global capitalist market (1990:177). Such a perspective would seem to miss out from explanation those areas (like Jordan) that neither exported primary commodities nor experienced significant industrial investment. Are they then part of the periphery or the ‘external area’ (Wallerstein, 1974:333)? If they are part of the periphery then the content of that concept would have to change: if they are external to the system then the problematic relation between geopolitical and social relations re-emerges because, at least in the Jordanian case, the state and its alignments have been geopolitically important even if its economic importance to the core has been negligible.

The focus of uneven and combined development on the social relations of production, I argue can help move beyond this bind. The important factor for the version of uneven and combined development presented here is not whether or how much a state exports or industrialises but rather the political struggles generated by the particular combination of social relations of production. These combinations, varied and open in their trajectory, are produced by the interaction of local forms with the global capitalist economy through geopolitically mediated processes of primitive accumulation. The outcomes of the struggles they generate form the basis of geopolitical alignments.

This argument about modes of production has been made before, by ‘neo-Marxists’ such as Ernesto Laclau (1977:34-41) and Samir Amin (1976:16-18). Their claim that modes of production in the periphery are not singular but ‘articulated’ within a ‘social formation’ is very similar to the notion of ‘combination’ used in this thesis. It is therefore dealt with in the section that explains that concept, drawing on the most sophisticated application of the concept to Arab states, that of Nazih Ayubi (1995:4).

2.3.3 The revival of Marxist IR and uneven and combined development

How is the importation of the concept of uneven and combined development into IR related to this intellectual context? Its origins lie, as explained in the next section, in Trotsky’s writings but the idea has been extended beyond his original boundaries. Uneven and combined development has been re-instated in part as a rejoinder to those, historical materialists and others, who argue that economic
‘globalisation’ has led to new forms of global governance superseding the state and inter-state competition (see Rosenberg, 2005). In particular, uneven and combined development formed an intervention into the debate on the post-Cold War and 9/11 conjuncture. On one side stood those historical materialists who saw the unprecedented military and economic dominance of the US, together with the expansion of global capital under the banner of free-market neo-liberalism, as heralding a new kind of system in which the ‘logics’ of capital and state were divorced: perhaps indicating even that Marxists had been wrong to treat them as united in the first place (Harris, 2004, Lacher, 2002, Lacher and Teschke, 2007, Robinson, 2007). On the other stood those historical materialists still concerned to defend some version of the unity of social and geopolitical explanation through a modes of production framework, albeit with some degree of autonomy in the inter-linking of these ‘two logics’ (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006, Callinicos, 2007, 2009, Harvey, 2003). Uneven and combined development was taken up by Justin Rosenberg as a way of uniting these forms of explanation, arguing that:

within the increasingly worldwide socio-historical process initiated by the emergence of modern capitalist society, relations and interactions between societies have been the site of distinctive causal dynamics whose operation has deflected the movement of events, both domestic and international, substantially away from anything which could have resulted from a unilinear path of endogenous development alone. (Rosenberg, 2005:8)

Uneven and combined development has thus emerged—or re-emerged—within the context of a debate on the relations between geopolitical and social forms of explanation. It is necessary to discuss here a particularly influential version of that relationship (and one with which the most prominent advocate of uneven and combined development, Justin Rosenberg, has been associated) known as ‘political Marxism’.

The political Marxists (known as such not because of their political activism but because of their stress on political or ‘superstructural’ factors) base their arguments on Robert Brenner’s (1977) critique of Immanuel Wallerstein. Brenner argued that Wallerstein, and others’ explanation for the rise of capitalism imputed a ‘capitalist rationality [i.e. responding to expanded opportunities for capitalist exchange] in a

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situation where capitalist social relations of production did not exist’ (Brenner, 1977:45). Brenner identifies certain ‘rules of reproduction’ in ‘social property relations’ that determine the pattern of economic development of any society. They set both the ‘possibilities and limits for economic action by individuals and collectives’ whilst inducing ‘the adoption by these agents of specific strategies as the best way to pursue their interests’ (Brenner, 1986:26, Brenner and Harman, 2006:137). The aggregate result of the carrying out of these strategies constitutes the logic of the mode of production.

One of the important implications of Brenner’s argument is to re-formulate the Marxist notion of the state. The main thrust of this argument has been to reject the traditional models of Marxist theory ‘which, explicitly or implicitly, treat the economic ‘base’ and the legal, political, and ideological ‘superstructures’ which ‘reflect’ or ‘correspond’ to it as ‘qualitatively different…separated spheres’ (Wood, 1981:68).

Rather, the state is constitutive of the mode of production: in the pre-capitalist feudal order the lordly ruling class reproduce themselves not by organizing and managing production but in their ability to organise themselves politically to extract the surplus from the direct producers (Brenner, 2001:178, 1986:28). Capitalism is different because, as ‘in every class society …there are two related but distinct “moments” of class exploitation: the appropriation of surplus labour and the coercive power that sustains it’ but in capitalism the coercive power is ‘uniquely separate’ from surplus appropriation (2005:16). The state separate from the relations of production is therefore are an aspect of capitalism as a mode of production.

These claims have important consequences for the Marxist theory of International Relations, although Political Marxists differ on the nature of those consequences. The most thorough-going application of Political Marxism to IR is the previously cited work by Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, in which he argues that because capitalism produces the separation between the political and economic and hence an anarchic system of sovereign states at a global level (Rosenberg, 1994:123). Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher argue rather that the states system is a contingent “historical legacy” of the absolutism that preceded the rise of capitalist relations in Europe and that capitalism may indeed tend to overcome this system (Lacher 2002, 148; 2006, 60; Teschke 2003, 145–46). Ellen Wood argues by contrast that capitalism requires the fracturing of political space, and therefore international relations, because
of the ‘global capital requires many nation states to…sustain the system of property and provide the kind of day-to-day regularity, predictability and legal order that capitalism needs more than any other social form’ (Wood, 2005:141)

What is the contribution of this discussion to the theoretical framework of this thesis? The renewal of interest in uneven and combined development has emerged from this Political Marxist school and in particular from Justin Rosenberg’s work: however, the particular relevance of their arguments here lies in the definitions Political Marxism offers of modes of production and the capitalist world economy. As the earlier section of this chapter on Marx suggested, this thesis gives a qualified acceptance to the definition of the capitalist mode of production as one in which extra-economic and economic compulsion are separate. The world economy is then seen as the historical expansion of this relationship from its European origins through both ‘economic’ and ‘geopolitical’ pressure. Benno Teschke provides a very useful summary of this point:

[The] developmental potential of regionally differentiated sets of property régimes generates inter-regional unevenness, which translates into international pressures that spark sociopolitical crises in ‘backward’ polities. These crises activate and intensify the domestic fault lines in regionally pre-existing class constellations— processes that lead to power struggles within and between polities that renegotiate and transform class relations, territorial scales and state forms. These social conflicts result in highly specific combinations of the old and the new. The dynamics of domestic trajectories are thus accelerated, their sociological composition transformed, and their directionality deflected in unforeseen ways, while their results react back on the international scene. (2003:19)

What Teschke refers to here as ‘property regimes’ are defined in this thesis as social relations of production. This distinction relates to the qualification of this thesis in accepting the Political Marxists’ arguments. The key tenet of the Political Marxists that the ‘base’ of forces of production is unimportant seems difficult to sustain once we recognize the ‘regional differentiation’ of social relations of production. Therefore there will be some accumulation of forces of production at a certain rate in a given place, endowing those states in which the new social relations of production prevail with greater capabilities to compete with or conquer other states. It is this that gives the imperative for so-called ‘backward’ states to attempt to change their societies in order to be overcome in geopolitical competition. Again, this process is recognized in Trotsky’s idea of the ‘whip of external necessity’ that forms a key part of uneven and combined development.
The purpose of this overview of Marxist approaches to International Relations has been to explain the basic concepts that are used in uneven and combined development and the contribution that previous Marxist thought has made. In particular, it provided the following substance for uneven and combined development: the definition of capitalism and the capitalist world economy as an inherently expansionary set of social relations based on the ‘dual freedom’\(^{14}\) of the direct producers; the resultant special character of those social relations in separating the economic and the political; the expansion of the states system reflecting this separation through the process of primitive accumulation. The next section presents uneven and combined development as a theoretical framework that synthesizes these insights and allows us to trace back the trajectories of particular international alignments through certain political struggles to the limits and opportunities provided by the uneven expansion of capitalist social relations.

2.4 Uneven and Combined Development: History and Structure

What is uneven and combined development, then, and how does it work? As the explication of Marxist approaches to International Relations above has indicated, uneven and combined development is a part of the broader Marxist tradition and relies upon it for its assumptions and basic concepts. However, it does add something in reconfiguring those concepts for a world in which capitalist social relations are embedded in a system of multiple states and other kinds of society. Uneven and combined development offers this contribution in part because of its origin in the debates around such a society: Tsarist Russia.

2.4.1 Origins of Trotsky’s Idea

The idea of uneven and combined development is most closely associated with the work of Leon Trotsky on Russia, although it has close parallels in Alexander Gerschenkron’s non-Marxist idea of ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’ (1965). Uneven and combined development as the corollary of the argument for

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\(^{14}\) That is, the freedom not to provide surplus but also the freedom from the means of production by which to be self-sufficient.
‘Permanent Revolution’ was Trotsky’s contribution to debates among Russian Marxists before and after the October Revolution. It is a revealing contribution because these debates, like the case of the Southern state dilemma discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, reflected the fact that the Russian Marxists had to orient themselves towards the social effects of a hierarchically organised but competitive inter-state system (Kagarlitsky, 1988:23).

Trotsky’s argument contra both Lenin and his Menshevik opponents, was that the Russian working class could lead an internationalist socialist revolution, despite its small size in relation to the peasantry. The reason for this was the uneven and combined development of capitalism in Russia: implanting a large and militant working class in the midst of the ‘feudal’ society and thereby linking that society to the world economy (Trotsky, 1997:31). The Russian bourgeoisie by contrast was nurtured (in the face of foreign competition) and protected (against the working class) by the state. Consequently they were led to support Tsarism. This different constellation of collective powers and interests did not match the expected scheme of many Marxists but rather the concrete history of capitalist development between the French and Russian revolutions (Knei-Paz, 1978:45).

2.4.2 Unevenness

Trotsky’s argument was thus concerned to support a particular political strategy. However, he later generalized and extended his conception of uneven and combined development after the Russian Revolution and his exile from the Soviet Union in 1927. What did he use the terms to mean, and how can they offer insight to research on the International Relations of states such as Jordan? Trotsky tends to take the idea of ‘development’ for granted: the earlier parts of this chapter therefore substantiated the concept based on the arguments of Marx and later historical materialists. That is, that what is developing is the human productive relationship with the environment and the associated distributions of control—the social relations of production, particular patterns of which form modes of production.

About unevenness, Trotsky had more to say. Trotsky claimed that unevenness was ‘the most general law of the historic process’ (1997:27). Put so baldly as this, the concept is likely to mislead—particularly in the use of the word ‘law’. Unevenness
would be better defined as a descriptive generalization rather than a covering law of the ‘if x then y’ kind. If we can find unevenness in all things, we will be unable to explain anything in particular. It is the particular, historically existing ‘combination’ (discussed in a further section below) aspect of uneven and combined development that gives the concept explanatory weight in specific cases. Unevenness is the precondition of such combinations. Treating unevenness in this way allows us to avoid the criticism that uneven and combined development is an ‘analytical tool with a very restricted usefulness’ (Linden, 2007:160) or ‘rather vapid’ without ‘any positive contribution’ (Elster, 1986:54).

If something is uneven, then there is more of it in one place or time than in another. We have already identified development as meaning patterned change in the social relations of production. In what sense can there be more of this somewhere or sometime than another and why would it matter? Trotsky argued that, in the case of Russia at least, ecological and topographical conditions—‘the gigantic and austere plain, open to eastern winds and Asiatic migrations’—led to the ‘slow tempo’ of Russian development (Trotsky, 1997:25). This seems initially to suggest a quantitative view, of a larger amount or greater pace of production resulting from more favourable natural conditions. Yet, as Justin Rosenberg points out, Trotsky’s outline of the peculiarities of Russian development is very far from an ecological or technological determinism (Rosenberg, 2006:324). The argument rather presupposes an interaction between the natural conditions that humans encounter in their collective efforts at production and the ‘social-historical milieu’ (Trotsky, 1972a:38) that emerges from those efforts.

The original bases of unevenness, then, lie in the ecologically given conditions that originally confronted the human species and render some places more potentially productive than others. These ecological variations across geographical space, in turn, work to promote further processes of internal differentiation. However, as the social relations of production change, these geographical determinations become progressively less fundamental. Even more importantly, the character of one particular subset of the unevenly distributed sets of social relations—capitalism—changes the ‘overall nature of historical change itself’ (Rosenberg, 2007:456). Capitalist relations emerge and become dominant in a particular place and time but within and through these antecedent processes of unevenness. From this ‘starting point’, it ‘gains mastery only gradually over
the inherited unevenness, breaking and altering it, employing therein its own means and methods’ (Trotsky, 2008:19). Reiterating Marx’s view of capitalism as inherently expansionary explained above, Trotsky argues further that capitalism tends towards both universalization and equalization, on the one hand, and differentiation and fragmentation, on the other. Thus:

In contrast to the economic systems which preceded it, capitalism inherently and constantly aims at economic expansion, at the penetration of new territories, the surmounting of economic differences, the conversion of self-sufficient provincial and national economies into a system of financial interrelationships. (2008:19)

In doing so, however, the expansionary tendency of capitalist relations leads to ‘developing some parts of world economy, while hampering and throwing back the development of others’. Trotsky goes on to note how it is ‘[o]nly the correlation of these two fundamental tendencies’, organically emerging from the ‘nature of capitalism’, that ‘explains to us the living texture of the historical process’ (2008:19).

Trotsky is unclear about the extent and nature of specific kinds of unevenness, having over-defined the concept as the ‘most general law of the historic process.’ However, we can distill from these passages two inter-related aspects of unevenness. We may refer to these as quantitative and qualitative types of unevenness. The quantitative kind means the accumulation of products or the capability to produce (i.e., technique, infrastructure and so on) in greater amount in one place or at a greater rate in one place rather than another. It is this simple comparison—by which we could say, for example that Baghdad in the second Hijri century was more developed than Scotland in the same period—that Trotsky could justly refer to as the ‘most general law of the historic process’. It represents simply the cashing out of the general abstraction of ‘production’ into an empirical reality where the conditions of that production are more favourable at other times and places than others. Even as relations of production come to reconstitute those conditions themselves, the quantitative aspect of unevenness remains important. Thus capitalist relations of production in particular exert a disruptive force on space, ‘which establishes discrete places differentiated from each other and at the same time pressures these places, across borders, into a single mould’ (Ashman, 2006, Smith, 2006:180, see also Smith, 1990).
Qualitative unevenness refers to the uneven distribution of types of social relations of production. How can a quality be unevenly distributed? The uneven distribution of social relations of production (such as tributary or capitalist relations) is a historical phenomenon. Certain types of these relations emerge in certain places rather than others. These relations have different pre-conditions, and generate different powers and interests. In particular, our interest lies in capitalist social relations of production because these provide the analytical tool for understanding the Jordanian case in the form of the concrete process of the attempt to impose or imitate capitalist social relations and the consequences of those attempts. These attempts result from the enormous competitive gulf—the quantitative unevenness—opened up between capitalist and non-capitalist production units (Carling, 2002:110). These are important distinctions to draw because it is on the basis of quantitatively greater productive capability, resulting from the qualitative transformation of social relations that Trotsky integrates the social and the geopolitical through the idea of the ‘whip of external necessity’.

2.4.3 The Whip of External Necessity

How are we to understand why it is that the history of most Southern states (as independent states or, as in Jordan’s case through their imperial antecedents) have been dominated by some attempt at social ‘catch-up’ determined by the need to survive in a competitive international system? The influential idea of ‘revolution from above’ (Trimberger, 1978) has been used in the Middle East to describe and account for this phenomenon. However, one of the key contributions of Trotsky was to account for precisely this kind of attempted mimetic modernization with his account of the ‘whip of external necessity’, or what Colin Barker calls the dynamic of ‘coercive comparison’ (Barker, 2006: 78). The ‘whip of external necessity’ is inflicted on those societies which have not experienced the qualitative transformation to capitalist social relations to adopt such transformations in response to the military-geopolitical and economic pressures emanating from the capitalist powers. This is a mechanism operating through the state system but reflecting the differences (‘unevenness’) in social production relations.

Although Trotsky touched on other societies, such as China, he only provided one fully worked example, as it were, of this mechanism of uneven and combined development. This was, of course, Russia (Trotsky, 1997:27-35, 1972a:29-51, 1972b:5-6). Although Davidson (2006b:212) argues that combination may refer to social and cultural forms, Trotsky’s use of the concept in his account of the ‘peculiarities of Russian development’ derives its efficacy from the interaction of the social relations of production. ‘Historical backwardness (sic),’ Trotsky writes, engenders an entirely new ‘combined’ social formation in which the latest conquests of capitalist technique and structure root themselves into the pre-existing relations, transforming and subjecting them and creating peculiar relations of classes (1977:33).

In the case of Russia the mode of production capitalism encountered was (in Trotsky’s words) feudalism. The political apparatus of that mode was simultaneously strengthened and undermined by the penetration of capitalism. The exigencies of Russia’s self-preservation ‘under the influence and the pressure of its more differentiated Western milieu… transmitted through the military-state organisation,’ compelled Russia to develop military technologies that would come to have manifold socio-economic implications and consequences in the longer term (1972a:41). It was under such geopolitical pressures that the Russian state explicitly imitated capitalist social relations of production (i.e. the ‘dual freedom’ of the labourer from both the compulsion to produce and the means of production) with the abolition of serfdom in 1861. Additionally, Russia’s subsequent policy of industrialization was a direct response to the external threats to Russia’s existence coming from the West (Knei-Paz, 1978:73). It was strengthened in that foreign and domestic capital supported and armed the autocracy. It was undermined by the fact that the price of that support was reliance upon a concentrated and combative working class produced by the adoption of advanced technique as part of the ‘advantage of backwardness’: the possibility of seizing ready-made the most up-to-date methods. As Knei-Paz notes, the so-called ‘backward’ countries ‘may be said to change not from within but from without, not by evolving but by “grafting on”, appending, new ways of life’ (1978:91). The outcome, according to

16 No stranger to the pejorative terms of his time, Trotsky’s writings often present a plethora of early twentieth century usages that we would rightly consider Eurocentric. However, as this chapter argues, the content of uneven and combined development (and, one might add, Trotsky’s entire political practice) work against this tendency.
Trotsky, was to generate the conditions for the political crisis of the revolution—a crisis then amenable to resolution by a proletarian seizure of power on the basis of the previous history of uneven and combined development (Lowy, 1981:1).

The reader familiar with debates in International Political Economy will note here a marked similarity between Trotsky’s conception of uneven (and combined) development and Alexander Gerschenkron’s ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective’ (1965). Although he did not acknowledge any influence, Gerschenkron seems to have read Trotsky and his essays bear an ‘uncanny’ similarity to Trotsky’s (Selwyn, 2011:423). Gerschenkron’s major proposition, which has influenced later political economists of development (Chang, 2002:7, Sen, 1984:9, Wade, 2004:351) is that:

in a number of important historical instances industrialization processes, when launched at length in a backward country, showed considerable differences, not only with regard to the speed of development (the rate of industrial growth) but also with regard to the productive and organisational structures of industry which emerged from those processes. Furthermore, these differences in the speed and character of industrial development were to a considerable extent the result of application of institutional instruments for which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country. In addition, the intellectual climate within which industrialization proceeded, its "spirit" or "ideology", differed considerably among advanced and backward countries.(1965:6)

Gerschenkron thus identifies, in a far more detailed manner than Trotsky, particular institutional and technical outcomes that can be mapped onto a chronological pattern of late development (Rosenberg, 2007:25). Gerschenkron also acknowledges a version of ‘combined development’ in arguing that ‘in every instance of industrialization, imitation of the evolution in advanced countries appears in combination with different, indigenously determined elements’ (Gerschenkron, 1965:26). However, where Trotsky can be more useful Gerschenkron is in his expansion of focus from the techno-industrial to the uneven and combined development of social relations as a whole (Selwyn, 2011:431). Gerschenkron does consider such relations—for example in his argument that serfdom and the lack of a unified jurisdiction were obstacles to Russian industrialization but simultaneously strengthened by it (Gerschenkron, 1965:18) — but for the most part his is a model built ‘around the effects of this structure without fully conceptualizing the structure itself’ (Rosenberg, 2007:22). In extending the analysis to state that did not undergo significant
industrialization drives, I suggest it is possible to use Trotsky’s Russian-based model more widely.

How might we do this? One starting point is to clarify the relationships in uneven and combined development. If we can adopt a procedure so foreign to Trotsky’s method as drawing a graphical summary of his thought, it might look something like this:

Figure 3 Model of Uneven and Combined Development in Russia

The advantage of representing Trotsky’s account of the Russian revolution in this way is in order to be able to extend it beyond that example. Trotsky argued for this, and his writings on China (Trotsky, 1969:3-8) and elsewhere suggested are informed by the ideas above but never in a coherent framework. However, the content of such a framework could be put thus: unevenness produces combination, which produces distinct trajectories of social conflict in late-developers and consequently the international management and effects of these crises in ‘countless mini czarisms’ (Rosenberg, 1996:12). Thus uneven and combined development represents a feed-back loop of determinations that are neither purely ‘social-internal’ nor ‘geopolitical-external’ but greater than the sum of the two. We can then alter the diagramme:
The body of this thesis uses the theoretical framework in this diagramme to analyse the case of Jordan, with the help of the definition of development and world economy provided by the overview of historical materialist approaches earlier in this chapter. That is, the investigation begins in Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the processes of primitive accumulation in Jordan brought about by the Ottoman attempts to ‘catch up’ with the West and then by British colonialism itself. The framework is then used to trace back the geopolitical alignments examined in chapters 5 and 6 not through some teleological determination but through political struggles on the bases provided by the particular ‘combined social formation’ of Jordan. What does this ‘combination’ mean?

2.4.4. Combination

Unevenness, then, produces combination. Trotsky refers, rather generally and elliptically, to the ‘drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ (1997:27). As I explain below, the notion of combination bears a strong similarity to the idea of the ‘articulation of modes of production’, which has also been used to analyse the Arab state (Ayubi, 1995:24-8, Brewer, 1990:225-40). These two approaches should not be
seen as contradictory: rather the ‘articulation’ approach, especially in the works of anthropologists in the ‘economic anthropology’ such as Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude Meillasoux provide examples of how to fill in Trotsky’s global account.

In advancing such an analysis I am extending Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined development somewhat beyond the boundaries of what he considered combination to be and the level at which it functions. Knei-Paz argues that Trotsky considered uneven and combined development applicable only to a set of countries similar to Russia: independent states adopting ‘catch-up’ industrialisation in order to compete militarily with others such as Germany, France or Britain (1978:63-4). Neil Davidson, for example, argues that a mere ‘articulation’ of two or more modes of production (I expand on the distinction between combination and articulation below) is, by itself, insufficient to be considered a ‘combined’ society. Rather, ‘[t]he detonation of the process of uneven and combined development requires sudden, intensive industrialisation and urbanisation, regardless of whether the pre-existing agrarian economy was based on feudal or capitalist relations’. In this reading combination is the internal effect of global uneven development (Davidson, 2006a:23). Jordan, being a colonial creation rather than a historically independent state and bereft of a large, new industrial working class in the period under discussion, would then be of little relevance to discussions of uneven and combined development and vice versa.

The implications of Trotsky’s idea may usefully extend, however, beyond the boundaries of its most famous instance. This task of theoretical extension has already been undertaken by Justin Rosenberg in three distinct, but interconnected ways. First, combined development refers to the coexistence and interactive development of all societies throughout history—that is, at a level between as well as within societies. Second, through these processes of inter-societal development, there results an interdependence of ‘the structures of social, material and cultural life’ (Rosenberg, 2006:324). This combination integrates the state and society into ‘regional political orders, cultural systems and material divisions of labour ’(2006:324). Finally, through this, more extended version of combined development, there occurs the interlacing and fusion of different modes of production in Trotsky’s original sense.

This discussion is relevant because it suggests how uneven and combined development can be used to understand the Jordanian case. Jordan—or rather the area
that became Jordan—did not use the ‘advantages of backwardness’ in order to leap ahead in quantitative development. However, it was integrated into a particular global order, a world economy based on capitalist social relations. The attempts to mimic or impose those relations (primitive accumulation) ‘combine’ certain social relations (the tribes of the tributary mode discussed below and in chapter 3) within the social formation and between it and the capitalist world economy through a particular mechanism of combination. This kind of combination need not be a market mechanism (e.g. the export of cash crops, industrialization drives and so-on). Indeed the value of using the idea of combination is that it allows us to see non-capitalist or non-market social relations of production as combined with the capitalist world economy. The idea of combination was not used by Trotsky in this way, but it was nevertheless implicit (Barker, 2006:72).

This idea that two or more modes of production can coexist and interconnect in a single social formation has already been put to use in the extensive analysis of the state in the Arab world by Nazih Ayubi (1995). Ayubi’s work draws on an extensive debate in the Marxist literature (Alavi et al., 1982, Foster-Carter, 1978, Laclau, 1977, Wolpe, 1980). The basic idea is that ‘that modes of production in the Middle East are often not singular and uni-dimensional but rather are articulated (i.e. two or modes can often coexist and interlink); and (b) that in many Middle Eastern social formations there is little correspondence among the various “instances” or manifestations of structural power in society’ (1995:26). The distinction between ‘combination’ and ‘articulation’ is thus a very slim one, and they may indeed be seen as the same phenomenon. The advantage of using the term uneven and combined development is that it directs our view to the origin of the combination in the unevenness of capitalist development and allows us to specify the particular mechanisms of combination.

Ayubi follows Laclau and Mouffe in defining articulation as ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (1995:28). This is a rather broad definition: in an earlier work Laclau refers to ‘economic systems’ as ‘constituted by the ‘articulation of modes of production.

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17 This is quite a different view from, for example, Hamza Alavi, who sees modes of production as only ever being in contradiction within a social formation, requiring therefore the concept of a ‘colonial mode of production’ to characterize the coercive processes of primitive accumulation in the Global South. See Alavi, Hamza. (1982) The Structure of Peripheral Capitalism. In Introduction to the Sociology Of "Developing Societies", edited by Hamza Alavi and Theodor Shanin. London: Macmillan. pp187-9
production’ (Laclau, 1977:42). One of the criticisms of the notion of articulation is that it is vague about the nature of the dominance or predominance of one mode of production over another (Wolpe, 1980:36). Ayubi specifies this relationship by referring to Althusser’s idea of different "levels" or instances of the social whole, such as the ideological, economic or coercive, which may then be in a state of ‘dislocation’ (decolage) between each other (Althusser and Balibar, 2009:110). Ayubi adopts this approach to argue that the Arab state modes of production, coercion and consent are dislocated or non-correspondent. Therefore one finds an articulation between cultural elements of pre-capitalist mode of production and certain social and cultural elements of pre-capitalist (e.g. feudalist, even slavery) modes of coercion and persuasion (1995:27). As a result the state is unable to mobilise a ‘historic bloc’ (Ayubi taking the term from Gramsci) and on the one hand becomes fierce but brittle in its relations with internal society and ‘circulationist’ (in the sense of redistributing rents acquired from outside) in its external relations (1995:25).

Articulation may thus characterise all epochs and social formations, registering the difference between a mode of production conceived in the abstract and the concrete social formation in which certain relations of production operate (Amin, 1976:16-17, Brewer, 1990:223-31, Foster-Carter, 1978). Combination, however, is a particular subset of articulation in which one of the modes— and it seems only capitalist relations possess this characteristic—impels the simultaneous transformation and reconstitution of the other. Uneven and combined development thus builds on Ayubi’s use of articulation by specifying a particular dynamic of capitalism that gives us as a starting point for analysis. That starting point, as I argued above, is the attempted imitation or imposition (with varying results) of the primitive accumulation process. The resulting combined formation displays a particular mechanism of combination between the pre-existing social relations and the global capitalist system mediated through the contradictory results of primitive accumulation. This sketch is based on Trotsky and

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18 There seems to be a close resemblance here between Ayubi’s articulation and non-correspondence and Kamran Matin’s pioneering application of uneven and combined development to the pre-modern Iranian state. Matin sees a combination of different forms of authority (corresponding to different modes of socioeconomic organization) ruling over a particular geopolitical space within which they related to the (pre existing) social reproductive texture without (necessarily) transforming … the actual process and organisation of labour and/or the basic forms and mechanism of surplus extraction’ Matin, Kamran. (2007) Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State-Formation in Premodern Iran. *European Journal of International Relations* 13:419-47.p.429
Ayubi, but how would its content work for Jordan? Suitable tools to fill in the 'combined' part of the Jordanian picture are to be found in the work of anthropologists working within the articulation approach, such as Claude Meillasoux and Pierre Phillipe Rey.

These 'new economic anthropologists' put the idea of articulation of modes of production to work in their research in West Africa. The results provide insights for a way to analyse Jordan. The main argument first of all of P.P. Rey in relation to Congo is that the relations of a pre-capitalist ‘lineage’ mode of production were interlocked those of the capitalist mode of production according to the epochs of the expansion of capitalism (Dupre and Rey, 1980:141).

The lineage mode, Rey claims comprises two classes—juniors and elders—largely carrying out production within their own households but extract a surplus via the exchange of dependent women and slaves (Dupre and Rey, 1980:142-3, Meillassoux, 1981:81). The preconditions for capitalism in the form of labourers free both from the coercion to produce and the means to do so are therefore not generated by this mode. As capitalist relations of production expand there follows ‘an initial link in the sphere of exchange, where interaction with capitalism reinforces the pre-capitalist mode’ and then a phase in which capitalism ‘takes root’, subordinating the pre-capitalist mode but still making use of it (Foster-Carter, 1978). The colonial period of forcibly changing the lineage relations in order to be able to recruit labourers, and the increasing penetration of European goods led to two phenomena: the reconstitution of the elders as interlocutors for the colonial power on the one hand and the monetarization of the dowry (the means of the circulation of un-free female labour, the circulation of male labour being destroyed by the abolition of slavery) (Brewer, 1990:250). This, Rey argues, lies behind the ‘tribalization’ of Congolese politics.

The important thing here is not the content of Rey and Meillassoux’s claims about the Congo and West African societies but the structure of the argument. Rey identifies a particular historical form of the circulation of economic surplus under the lineage mode of production—the bride price—that is transformed and reconstituted by the process of primitive accumulation. That process is managed by the elders of the lineage mode integrated into the colonial state, with later consequences for its political trajectory. The claims about the lineage mode of production in Africa and its
transformation may or may not be true: the contribution of French economic anthropology to this thesis is in offering a map of how combination can work. Following Rey’s example, I look therefore for the main extractive mechanisms of a pre-capitalist mode that are reconstituted, transformed or replaced by the primitive accumulation process. This is what leads to the propositions examined in chapters 4 and 5: that the end of raiding for *khuwwa* tribute transformed social relations in the Jordanian steppe and that the integration of the former *khuwwa* takers into British colonial state established a combinatory mechanism through the British subsidy. This subsidy was then the subject of the later struggles around Jordanian international alignment, fought out on the basis of the social forces produced by the foregoing history of combined development. I am here borrowing from Rey to fill in the boxes of the generalised model of uneven and combined development presented in figure 3.

Ayubi is also influenced by Rey and Meillassoux in his characterization of pre-capitalist relations in the Arab world amongst nomadic groups as a lineage mode of production (Ayubi, 1995:53-4). In the following chapter I propose that these relations are better characterised in the areas I analyse as tributary, but of a particularly fractured nature because of the topographical and climactic conditions of the area in question. However, an excursus into the contrast with the idea of a ‘lineage mode of production’ is useful here because it addresses a question about a major term both in this thesis and that of other literature on the subject: ‘tribe’. One must be able to describe the named social organisations such as the Huwaytat or Bani Sakhr which appear at the decisive moments discussed in the historical parts of this thesis and which would generally be referred to in Arabic as *qaba’il* or ‘*ašba’ir* (tribes). Yet doing so runs the risk of spiraling off into acceptance of the categories of colonial administrators, inflected with a generous dose of assumptions about the inherently ‘tribal’ nature of the Arab mind (see Layne, 1994, Massad, 2001, Shyrock, 1997). One may also end up conflating the practice of pastoral nomadism, the form of social organisation of the ‘tribe’ and the cultural marker of ‘bedouin’ identity (Eickelman, 2002:66). To add to the difficulty, the discourse of tribe and tribal identity is both readily used by the actors concerned in this thesis and is a fairly common phenomenon across the Arab world: raising questions of whether a historical materialist approach that is not based on such categories is appropriate for our analysis.
The first point to note is that although the tribe is a language of kinship in social organisation: it is not largely a genetic or biological relationship. Meillassoux's use of the concept of the lineage mode of production in the African context is explicitly designed to remove the 'pretext for exotic fantasies' about tribes (Meillassoux, 1981:x). Ayubi's claim that the lineage or kin-ordered mode of production is articulated with capitalist relations such that ‘coercive and/or persuasive aspects of the “lineage mode of production” may continue to survive even when the economic (e.g. pastoral) base of such a mode might have declined or even disappeared’ (1995:28) is important because it is very close to my own argument. Ayubi characterises the lineage/kin-ordered mode as one in which social roles are defined by notional blood relations and hence the tribe (1995:51). Rey and Meillasoux recognize that kinship and lineage are not biological relations but rather an ideological structure of social relations into which it is perfectly possible to integrate people not biologically related to one another. Rather, ‘kinship expresses the social relations which form the basis of social cohesion but is not the basis itself’ (Dupre and Rey, 1980:142). The clan, lineage or tribe, Rey argues, functions as a ‘production unit’ over land that is not alienable by exchange or war (1980:144). The same is true of the tribes discussed in this thesis. As Ayubi recognises people belonging to the same tribe are not all actually descended from a common ancestor and their claims to co-sanguinity are rather a particular way of laying claims to a ‘share of social labour’ (1995:53).

The tribe is thus best conceived of as a ‘unit of subsistence’ regulating access to certain productive resources such as pastures (Marx, 1977:344). The kinship relations that are claimed as the basis of the tribe are part of this regulatory infrastructure, assigning certain groups to positions as the takers or givers of tribute (1977:353-6). Most often the tribute givers are sedentary communities of direct producers and the takers nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists who practice both animal husbandry within individual households and the taking of tribute (Eickelman, 2002:71, Rogan, 1994:48, Tell, 2000:35). These are not the relations of a mode of production sui generis but rather a particular example of how tributary relations fray out and fracture into smaller segments where the unity of coercive power on which they are based is frustrated by topography or difficult climatic conditions. The addition of this conceptualization of the pre-capitalist relations in Jordan, based upon Rey and
Meillassoux’s approach directs our attention to the combination of these relations with the capitalist world economy in particular through the breakdown of *khunna* and its replacement by British subsidy.

Where is all this happening? The common concept of the concrete unit of analysis for uneven and combined development and articulation-based approaches such as that of Ayubi or Samir Amin is that of ‘social formation’ (Althusser and Balibar, 2009:231, Amin, 1976, Ayubi, 1995:16, Wolpe, 1980:34). Samir Amin defines a social formations as ‘concrete, organised structures that are marked by a dominant mode of production and the articulation around a complex group of modes of production that are subordinate to it’ through analysis of which ‘we discover how one mode of production predominates over the others, and how these modes of production are interconnected’ (Amin, 1976:16-17). Jordan, the concrete object of this thesis represents such a formation. Why use this term rather than simply talk about ‘Jordan’? Of course, as a short-hand, ‘Jordan’ is used throughout the rest of this work but the advantage of considering the object of analysis as a social formation rather than simply the juridical and political abstraction denoted by the name of the state is that it allows to consider why there is a ‘Jordan’ and what kind of thing it is.

2.5 States, Ideas and Agents in Uneven and Combined Development

The concept of a social formation brings us closer therefore to the named entities and people who appear as agents in the rest of thesis: the states of Jordan, Britain, Egypt and so on; the Jordanian National Movement and Arabist ideologies; King Hussein, Nasser and John Glubb. Where do the links run between these features and *dramatis personae* of the research and the historical materialist framework of uneven and combined development presented so far?

2.5.1 The Problem of the State

One of the most long-standing and toughest problems in Marxist theory has been the issue of the state and its relationship to the class struggle and social relations of production. The problem has not been resolved, although there is now a great deal of Marxist work on the state (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978, Jessop, 1982, Therborn,
One of the great criticisms of historical materialism is that it lacks a coherent theory of the state, oscillating between visions of the state as ‘an epiphenomenon (simple or complex) of an economic base … an instrument of class rule…[or] a factor of cohesion performing socially necessary as well as class functions’ (Jessop, 1982:20). It may be noted that these debates refer to the capitalist state, thereby sharpening the criticism that Marxism lacks a theory of the state that would apply to non-capitalist societies and thereby to the particular nature of interactions between states.

Yet, might it be possible to turn a perceived weakness into an advantage for research? Historical materialism may not base its claims on a theory of states in general, and thereby the assumption that states will behave in certain ways across time periods, cultures and geographical areas. However, Marxist theorists have developed a historical perspective on the state and particularly on the distinction between states under capitalist and pre-capitalist relations. Making such distinction allows us to grasp that the state as ‘an abstract construct [of]…the ensemble of institutions and personnel that possess the exclusive right to public power (or to the legitimate use of force) within a certain territorial society’ (Ayubi, 1995:30) is actually a fairly recent arrival in the Middle East, with consequences for the inter-relations amongst these ‘ensembles’ in the region.

Although historical materialist perspectives on the state differ greatly in many respects, they have settled on a key distinction of the capitalist state, one to which reference has been made in the previous sections of this chapter. This is that because ‘the form which exploitation takes under capitalism does not depend on the direct use of force but ‘un-comprehended laws of reproduction’ (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978:31). The relations of force are ‘abstracted from the immediate process of production and located in an instance standing apart from the direct producers…constituting discrete "political" and "economic" spheres’ (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978:31, see also Jessop, 1982, Rosenberg, 1994). So, where organised coercion is united with exploitation of the direct producers in pre-capitalist modes, under capitalism these are separated and the name given to the institutionalized command over coercion is the ‘state’, and to exploitation, ‘the economy’.

The contribution of uneven and combined development is to see this form as adopted, through imitation or conquest, in places where different social relations of production had previously held: social relations in which coercive power and economic
extraction were unified—resulting in a combined formation with its own dynamics and trajectories. Chapters 3 and 4 make use of this aspect of the framework in explaining the Jordanian case.

Doing so offers an advantage over the theories of omni-balancing reviewed in the previous chapter. In these theories, the post-colonial state is placed on a continuum of ‘stateness’ (Nettl, 1968:562) whose model is the Euro-Atlantic model of a legitimate power centre. From the post-colonial state’s inadequate achievement of this model and hence its dissociation from the society it rules flows the necessity of ‘balancing’ amongst enemies foreign and domestic (David, 1991:235). State behaviour is thus explained by a negative comparison with a more ‘advanced’ example—as Arab states’ institutions gain more autonomy and legitimacy they conform increasingly to a ‘neo-realist’ model of external behaviour (Mufti, 1996:8). My theoretical framework rather looks to explain state behaviour by examining how the postcolonial Arab (in this case study, Jordan) state is embedded in a society that differs substantively rather than negatively from the European example but in a patterned and therefore comprehensible way.

### 2.5.2 Agents, Ideas and Classes

Of course, what is examined in the rest of this thesis is not just the structural character of the state but state policy as a site of struggle between people holding different ideas. When looking, for example at the response of Ottoman administrators to the growing gap with Western European states in the 19th century, at the efforts of British colonialists to pacify the Transjordanian steppe seventy years later or the reactions of King Hussein to the geopolitical events of the 1950s, we are looking at agents and their decisions. It is important to understand what the structures of social relations in the theoretical framework of this chapter represent. These are not agents, but rather the ‘rules and resources’ that both provide and limit agents’ ‘ability to bring about some alteration in the course of events’ (Callinicos, 1987:85). As the first chapter of this thesis indicated, there are many accounts of Jordanian alignments in the 1950s that rely, as one might expect, on King Hussein’s role as the primary decision maker. These are not necessarily wrong but they have omitted the role of structures, which omission this thesis seeks to make good. In doing so, however, it should be borne in mind that to ‘say that social structures have explanatory autonomy is to say that they
cannot be eliminated from the explanation of social events…not…that individuals and their attributes, can or should be eliminated’ (1987:83). The structures involved might be those of international anarchy or the symbolic system of Arab nationalism. The concrete argument of this thesis, which can only be judged by the evidence brought forward in later chapters, is that in seeking to alter events for geopolitical reasons, agents had to attempt to change social relations of production or rely on the mobilisation of collectivities produced by those relations.

What would make such collectivities conscious of themselves as such and amenable to mobilisation? The decisions examined later in this thesis were made in the context of the struggle over a particular collectivity, the ‘Arab nation’ and Jordan’s place within it (Anderson, 2005:5-6). This might seem grounds to adopt approaches such as those of Michael Barnett (1998) or Marc Lynch, who see Hussein’s foreign policy as reflecting a ‘relationship between identity politics and the definition of interests’ that ‘necessarily rests on a definition of Jordanian identity in relation to the Arab order and in relation to Palestinian nationalism’ (Lynch, 1999:21). Indeed, one cannot analyse the period under discussion in this period without reference to the development of Arab nationalism as state doctrine and popular force. However, particular kinds of Arab nationalism (for we should perhaps speak of Arab nationalisms in the plural) appealed to certain social groups at certain times and not to others, and Jordan in the 1950s represented an especially sharp clash between two such versions. The Hashemites had their own version of Arab nationalist discourse, counter-posed to that of the Jordanian National Movement and the Left (Anderson, 2005:2). Understanding why this was the case, and the resulting consequences for geopolitical alignments, requires us to step outside the discourse itself and to the social classes to which particular discourses might appeal.

Is it legitimate, however, to use analytical categories such as ‘class’ here? The historical agents themselves only rarely articulate their own identity and the wellsprings of their action in such terms. More specific to the Arab world and to Jordan is the problem that class is not easily identified in the region and vertical divisions of tribe or sect more salient – in particular ‘the arid marches of Southeastern Syria that evolved into Trans-Jordan’ in which ‘pastoral nomadism loomed large in agricultural production.
and “security groups” based on localized loyalties to village and clan overwhelmed any wider consciousness of class’ (Tell, 2008:7).

It is not easy to define class in a way that is completely distinct from such status groups, occupations or the particular organised units of a given political system. Marx often used the word in this way, amongst others. Nonetheless, the extension of historical materialist research to non-capitalist societies in works (see Batatu, 2004, Croix, 1981) has clarified the term, however. Class is a relationship, rather than a thing, referring to: ‘the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure’ where exploitation means ‘the appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others’ (1981:43). This appropriation divides the population into groups ‘identified by their position in the whole system of social production, defined above all according to their relationship (primarily in terms of degree of ownership or control) to the means of production’ (Croix, 1981:43). Thus the patterns of social relations of production, discussed at length above, generate class.

However, in the actual conjunctures of history present a far messier picture, especially in those societies in which two ‘polar classes’ of workers and bourgeoisie are difficult to identify much less map to particular ideologies and outcomes (Ayubi, 1995:175). It is useful to turn to Ayubi’s re-reading of Gramsci and Althusser in the Arab context, which can add much-needed dimension of the explanation of ideologies to uneven and combined development. Ayubi, drawing on Gramsci and Althusser, sees ideologies (such as Arab nationalism) as attempts to ‘interpellate’ a ‘historic bloc’ of classes around a particular conception of the state, society and individual: the result of which, if successful, is the ‘integral state’ which is ‘not confined to the government but includes certain aspects of the civil society and is based on hegemony and leadership’ (Ayubi, 1995:8). Seeking to represent the interests of all classes under the leadership of one, or a fraction of one, such ideologies address or ‘interpellate’ members of various classes as part of a greater collectivity: a ‘national-popular’ form (1995:28). For this reason, different ideological discourses—or versions of the same one—can share almost all significant elements but represent different social classes and their conflict. One might point to the symmetry between Hashemite and radical or Nasserist versions of Arab nationalism as a case of this: both stressing the original unity of the Arab nation
and the need to defend it against foreign plots but with diametrically opposed
determinate content in their definition of who the enemy is (atheistic Communism in
the Hashemite version, Israel and Western imperialism in the radical one) and what the
nation should look like (a conservative monarchy versus a broadly egalitarian, often
republican vision).

Ayubi traces the particular flexibility and fluidity of ideologies such as Arab
nationalism to the ‘articulated’ (or in the terms used here, combined) nature of the social
formations of the Arab world and the consequent ‘lack of class hegemony in society’
(1995:173). Although one should avoid assuming that class hegemony is a normal
characteristic, the lack of which would explain certain outcomes, this thesis does adopt
Ayubi’s approach of seeing conflicts expressed in ideological terms as linked to struggles
for hegemony in a ‘variegated and fluid…class structure’ (1995:175). In particular, Ayubi
offers a useful characterization, expanded on in chapter 5 of this thesis of the
‘intermediate class categories’ produced by the ‘overdevelopment of the peripheral state’
(1995:177). These groups, often called the ‘new effendiyya’, to distinguish them from the
old notable class of the Ottoman Empire, who would most often form the leadership of
nationalist movements (1995:136). The rank and file of such movements, however, was
most often composed of diverse urban milieu, which Ayubi colourfully characterizes as
‘the pseudo-proletariat, the sub-proletariat, and the lumpen-proletariat’ (1995:178). The
mobilisations of these ‘social groups and fragments’ most often consist of ‘spontaneous,
street politics…food riots, violent demonstrations and challenging “mass prayers”
…that can bring together elements of the middle strata and elements of the proletaroid
groups’(1995:179). This perspective will be used in Chapters 5 and 6 where the thesis
examines the instances of political struggle that came to determine Jordan’s alignments
in the mid-1950s.

2.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to elaborate the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development and how it will be put to use in the empirical part of the thesis. Introducing such a concept – unfamiliar to most international relations scholars and undergirded with a further analytical and ontological apparatus from outside the discipline – runs the risk of confusion, however. Let us then recapitulate in summary form the main elements of the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter:

**Development:** This refers to patterned change in the social relations of production. Those social relations are best conceived through the abstraction of ‘modes of production.’ Modes of production consist of a particular arrangement of control – i.e. a structure of social relations – that brings together labour and the means of production.

**Unevenness:** This refers to the chronologically and geographically unequal distribution of the patterned change in social relations defined above, and of the production resulting from those relations. Unevenness is therefore both qualitative and quantitative. In this thesis I am interested in the results of quantitative unevenness – the military superiority of Western powers leading to threat or conquest – resulting in the distribution of qualitative unevenness in the form of the imitation or imposition of capitalist social relations of production.

**Primitive Accumulation:** This is the precondition of the operation of capitalist social relations. It means the separation of the labourer both from the coercive power of the taker of surplus and from the means by which to carry out independent production. It is the long term, historically visible process of imitation or imposition that constitutes qualitative unevenness. It does not necessarily reach the ideal type of perfectly free labour in a capitalist market but interacts with existing social relations to produce a combined social formation. This is the basis for the arguments of chapters 3 and 4 about the land and military in Jordan.

**Combination:** This is the effect of unevenness. It means the causal interaction of different kinds of social relations of production, which can be classified into modes of production. It operates both within the social formation and between it and the global capitalist system. It directs us therefore toward particular, concrete historical mechanisms of combination, which I hypothesise in the Jordanian case lie in the British subsidy to the armed forces and therefore to the pastoralists whose tribute based economy broke down by the mandate period.
The task of the rest of this thesis is to see if the theoretical framework elaborated in the above chapter works in empirical investigation. The following chapters provide that investigation.
3. Ottoman Transjordan and the Emergence of a Combined Social formation

The purpose of this chapter is to begin the application of the theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter by elucidating the origins of a combined social formation in the lands that became Jordan. My claim here is not that the Ottoman reforms of the mid-nineteenth century determined geopolitical alignments of a state not then formed. Rather I seek to trace the processes by which a social base, both empowering and constraining, was established for Hashemite rule and consequently for the geopolitical alignments necessary to maintain that rule within a wider regional context itself deriving from processes of uneven and combined development. The main argument of the chapter is that the Ottoman programme of mimetic reforms undertaken as a response to what corresponding to the ‘whip of external necessity’, beginning thereby the process of combination by which tributary surplus extraction was eventually transformed into the circulation of British subsidy.

To use uneven and combined development to understand this—or any—concrete social formation we must specify what is uneven, what is combined and why this combination matters. This chapter does so by analysing the beginnings of ‘Jordanian’ social formation as a case of liminal social relations on the edge of a tributary state. The first section of the chapter thus defines the nature of these relations and how they worked in practice in the sub-Syrian steppe. Then the argument proceeds to explain how the broader Ottoman social formation, a predominantly tributary state, was rendered ‘uneven’ in its contest with the European capitalist states. I attempt to establish how this geopolitical dynamic, rooted in the consequences of the competitive gap opened up by capitalist relations, led to Ottoman and mandate efforts to implant capitalist property norms in the Transjordanian steppe. The chapter thus substantiates the claim of the theoretical framework that uneven and combined development comprises, as I have characterised it, a process by which the uneven development of social relations is mediated through geopolitical competition to produce combined social formations which then themselves feed back into the geopolitical system that
produced them. The next section then provides an analytical history of the Ottoman attempt at mimetic modernization through the 1858 Land Code and the extension of state power into areas dominated by fragmented tributary relations. In the final part of the chapter I explain how the legacy of this process affected the emergence of the combined social formation of Jordan and in particular how the central extractive relationship of the taking of ‘brotherly’ tribute (khurawa) changed without polarizing the tribe.

3.1 Understanding the Ottoman Period: Tributary Social Relations

The purpose of this thesis, it will be recalled, is to offer an explanation for the geopolitical alignments of an Arab state that does not rely on the method of explanation by absence of Western characteristics. The uneven and combined development of social relations of production, I propose, offers such an explanation. To investigate this claim we must reach back into the pre-colonial history of the lands that became Jordan in order to establish exactly what was ‘uneven’ and what was ‘combined’, in the sense established in the previous chapter. As was briefly mentioned in that section, the prevailing social relations of production in the sub-Syrian steppe—later combined with the global system via the British subsidy—are best characterised as fragmented tributary ones. What does this claim mean, however, and where is the evidence to support it?

3.1.1 Tribes, Power and Tributary Social Relations of Production

The tributary mode of production represents, in the terms of the theoretical framework established in the previous chapter, one of the limited set of abstractions of how social relations of production are structured. Its key distinguishing attribute lies in the specific form ‘in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers’ (Marx, 1978:927). As we saw from the argument of the previous chapter, tributary relations are those in which the direct producers control the means of production but do not appropriate the surplus themselves. Therefore, the relations between the (usually agrarian) direct producer and the exploiter are ‘political’ rather than ‘economic’ in that they are based on ‘non-economic compulsion’—contrasted by Marx with the free
bargaining between capitalist and wage-worker in a capitalist economy’ (Hilton, 1990:5). In this contrast and within the schema of Marxist economic categories, workers exchange their labour power for wages in a market relation because only through doing so can they access the means of production and thereby reproduce themselves: the agrarian direct producers of the tributary mode (peasants, villeins, fellabin, *reaja*19 or however they may be known) generally have the means to reproduce themselves but render some portion of the surplus to a ruling class that exercises ‘actual or potential violence, that is… physical force and ideology’ (Haldon, 1993:77) to appropriate this surplus. The transition from the latter to the former type of relationships constitutes the primitive accumulation process discussed in the previous chapter, and whose particular history in Jordan and its predecessors forms the substance of uneven and combined development that underlies the later geopolitical trajectory of the state.

Conceiving of the tributary mode in this way allows us to overcome certain problems in the historical sociology of the Middle East: one is the supposedly *sui generis* nature of European society contrasted with a stereotyped vision of stagnant Eastern despotism into which Europeans expanded; and the other is the nature of the ‘tribe’ as an apparently ‘super-structural’ organisation that modifies supposedly more basic economic relationships. These two inter-linked problems distill a number of theoretical confusions and cul-de-sacs that await any historical sociological discussion of pre-capitalist communities outside of Western Europe. These derive from the most part either from adherence to or zealous rejection of the notion of an ‘Asiatic mode of production’ comprising a despotic state (perhaps encumbered with the obligation to irrigate wide, arid lands) ruling over autarkic village communities that held land in common as a vestige of a ‘tribal’ mode. This picture is then contrasted with the model of free towns and decentralized sovereignty in feudal Europe, which then accounts for the rise of European capitalism to later dominance. This story has been enthusiastically and repeatedly debunked (Anderson, 1980:465-95). Autarkic village communities often turn out to have been neither autarkic nor communal. Contrary to the claims of scholars such as Mustafa Hamarneh (Hamarneh, 1985:77) historical studies of the lands that became Jordan show that hamlets and bedouin tribes traded with each other and

19 The Arabic and Ottoman Turkish words for settled cultivators.
with Palestinian and Syrian towns and show evidence of private ownership (certainly of private cultivation) in land (Fischbach, 2000:38, Mundy, 1994:78). Nonetheless, if we strip away the intellectual chaff about ‘idyllic republics’ forming a ‘solid foundation for stagnant Asiatic despotism’ we find a rational kernel.

3.1.2 Tribes, Tribute and Coercive Power

That kernel lies in seeing (‘Western’) feudalism and (‘Eastern’) tribute-paying societies not as different modes of production rendering the respective geographical areas dynamic or stagnant but rather to place these empirically observable relations along a continuum generated by the dynamic of tributary mode itself. This then also allows us to understand the tribe as a ‘unit of subsistence’ (Marx, 1977:344). To explain: I follow Samir Amin (1976:14) and John Haldon (1993:64) in accepting that European feudalism was a variant of tributary social relations. Whether surplus is appropriated by (feudal) rent or (tributary) tax is not a fundamental difference but a variation in the ‘control exercised by the ruling class, or the state or state class over the community’ and ‘while this certainly affects the rate of exploitation, it does not affect the actual nature of the mode of surplus appropriation’(Haldon, 1993:65). Indeed, the practice of *khawwa*, the taking of tribute by pastoral nomads from settled cultivators, occupies a crucial place in the argument of this thesis and represents a further variant of tributary surplus appropriation. The variation in control by the appropriators of surplus is the important distinction and it derives from the basic dynamic of tributary relations.

An analogy with Robert Brenner’s characterization of the dynamic capitalist relations is useful here. Brenner sees capitalist relations, and their periodic crises, as driven by two fundamental divisions: the horizontal division between capital and labour and the vertical one between competing units of capital (Brenner, 2006:6-7). We may identify two similar basic divisions within the tributary mode. The first of these is the horizontal one between direct producer and the appropriator of the surplus: the appropriation ‘resisted more or less strongly and in many different ways, ranging from labour service inadequately performed to open rebellion…[that is] the conflict of classes, central to Marxist theory’ (Hilton, 1990:5). The tributary mode’s unity of economic and extra-economic coercion, however, means that the vertical division lies
not between units competing via the market but between central and local control of the coercive power by which surplus is extracted. This explains the constant tension in tributary systems between a central node of ‘despotic power’ and its functionaries who seek to transform their local control over the tribute into longer-lasting claims to exploitation. The gamut of despotic empires, feudal suzerainties, prebendal tax farmers and, I argue, nomadic dominion over settled communities, represents the range of different settlements of this dynamic.

Here we may register a zone of agreement between Weberian treatments of the relations between tribes and empires—in the work of scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Michael Mann—and a historical materialist conception compatible with uneven and combined development. The ‘despotic’ state, of which the Ottoman Empire serves as an example, in Mann’s scheme projects power into the society it rules only insofar as its functionaries, and most especially its coercive force, can reach. Complementing this view of the central state, Gellner and others see the tribe as a solution to the problem of security in those areas to which the central power does not extend (Gellner, 1990:109, Lapidus, 1990:42, Tapper, 1990:65). The concept of the tributary mode of production allows us to integrate these insights without collapsing the concepts of ‘tribe’, ‘bedouin’ and ‘pastoralism’ into the hackneyed clichés of colonial vintage, likely permanently to be undermined by empirical evidence (Eickelman, 2002:67, Mundy and Musallam, 2000:3-4). Given that tributary relations of production unite economic and extra-economic moments of exploitation, these can only operate within a radius of the reliable imposition of coercion—buttressed, to be sure, by various ideological configurations ordaining the tributary arrangements.

Where this radius of coercion dissipates, the tribute taking power would tend to fracture into smaller units: the lordly demesne, the Japanese ban or, most relevant for our purposes, the tribal domain known as the dirab. Topography is one readily observable reason for this fracturing of tributary power and a particularly important one for the consideration of the steppe-lands of Southern Syria. One must not reduce history to geography, however. The outcome of the crises between centralization and locality in the tributary mode were never fixed in advance, producing therefore the
waves of settlement and ‘bedouinization’ visible in the history of the Levant and its arid hinterland. On this basis then, the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter suggests that the system ‘combined’ with global capitalism in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Transjordan was a tributary one, but characterised by the fracturing of tributary power at the edges of the Ottoman state, into the taking of khuwwa. The story of the Ottoman attempt, in response to what Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity’, to transform these relations into tax-paying private property begins the trajectory of uneven and combined development in Jordan, leading to the particular conjuncture of the 1950s. Where is the empirical substance for this claim?

3.2 Tributary Relations in Late Ottoman Transjordan

The clear theoretical distinctions drawn above become rather more muddied the closer we get to concrete historical investigation. Nonetheless, the Ottoman state in both its juridical form and practical content confirms a picture of circles of coercive power exercised to extract tribute from the direct agricultural producers. This was expressed in the division between the cultivating and tax-paying masses (reaya) and the tax-taking holders of coercive power (asker) (Gerber, 1987:12). Throughout the 19th century, and perhaps even from its 16th century zenith, the dynamic of the tributary state manifested itself in the perennial tendency of the Ottoman Empire to descend into tax-farming of various sorts. The basis for the tributary system before 1858 was a division of land tenures into miri, agricultural land theoretically owned by the state, and mulk, private land in orchards, urban space and so on (Amadouny, 1999:xxviii). Cultivators did not pay tribute directly to the state, however. The state held title to the land but granted prebendal rights to intermediaries who extracted revenue from the cultivators, which was then fed upwards (minus the subtractions of these various intermediary officials) to the Sublime Porte. In the period of expansion from the 14th to the 16th century the intermediaries gained these rights as the spoils of victory and the reward for rendering military service (such as the sipahis, timariots, Jannisaries). Although this structure served the Ottomans well in their expansion into a Europe dominated by a more-fragmented version of the same system, its disadvantages became marked from the 18th century onwards. As the later sections of this chapter argue, this decline
reflected the process of uneven and combined development as the new, expansionary capitalist social relations became embedded in Western Europe, forcing the Ottomans into a game of ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’.

3.2.1 Sedentary and Nomadic Communities: Similarities of Structure

The general operation of tributary relations in the Ottoman Empire followed a recognizable pattern, then. What of our case of interest, the areas south of Syria which were to become the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan? We must note, of course, the distinction between settled and nomadic pastoralist communities but also a continuum of degrees of sedentarism or nomadism between them (Marx, 1977:344). The common observable pattern lies in the fracturing of tributary authority as Ottoman administration was stretched thin over inhospitable terrain. This idea of fractured tributary authority captures well the two social practices that both Ottoman and British modernisers sought to transform: the landholding system of musha‘a and the paying of khhuwwa tribute to pastoral nomads. In settled communities, most common in the rain-fed and defensible redoubts of the North-Western hill country, a sheikh or za‘im typically dominated the cultivators and extracted tribute from them though demonstrations of his authority: an authority dependent on his having enough surplus to entertain or intimidate others (1977:350). The sheikh might function, or be the descendant of men who had functioned, as an Ottoman tax collector. For example, the Majali overlords of Kerak—one of the families whose presence in the Jordanian ruling class has remained continuous to the point of monotony—extracted tribute from the cultivators of the town, of which they retained nine-tenths before rendering the remainder to the Sublime Porte (Hamarneh, 1985:85). Where topography and numbers allowed nomads to threaten such communities, the sheikh would often function as a conduit for tribute paid as khhuwwa, possibly forming a chieftancy in alliance with the nomads (Mundy, 1994:78). The nomadic and settled communities therefore shared a similar structure as a unit of subsistence (Fischbach, 2000:39). The organisation of the bedouin nomads mirrors that of the fellahin—or possibly the other way around (2000:40-6). What distinguished the two was the predatory unity of coercive and economic extraction exercised by the one over the other, in the liminal zone of a society structured in general
by that principal. Within the respective communities, there seem to have been practices of differential property rights to moveable and immoveable means of production which lent substance to the largely fictive claims of agnatic descent through which access was organised to these means. In the settled communities this was the practice of mushʿa agriculture.

The practice of mushʿa, although not universal and co-existing beside practices interpreted by later scholars as simple private property (2000:38), necessarily involved some communal control over production. In mushʿa villages the individual household cultivated its lands as a private unit but the quality and quantity of that land was periodically redistributed through the community—which is to say the heads of households—to ensure a rough equality across time. The idea that mushʿa represented a hang-over of some tribal egalitarianism (Hamarneh, 1985:77) has been undermined in favour of an interpretation that sees the system as an adaptation to tax demands (Mundy, 1994:78). This interpretation supports, rather than undermines, the conception advanced in this chapter of communities structured by tributary extractive relationships.

The cultivators in mushʿa villages at least did not hold absolute, alienable rights over their land, this being subject to a moral economy negotiated at the level of the community as a whole and producing a surplus accruing eventually to the sheikh, the state or the local bedouin. Certainly there were wide variations in this system in the amount and method of partition (Fischbach, 2000:39) and in the spread of the system itself. For example the prevalence of mushʿa seems to have varied with topography and therefore agricultural practice: areas of rain-fed cereal cultivation, most common in the north around ‘Ajlun, almost always practiced mushʿa whereas further south through the Balqa‘ valley and down through Kerak and Maʿan private plots of so-called mafrieq land (often orchards or groves less amenable to mushʿa partition) were more common (2000:40). Even given this variation, it is difficult to see how any partition could operate under conditions of absolute private property. Claims of patrilineal descent functioned
to organise the partition. In this regard the settled communities shared a structure with the nomadic ones: yet also fell prey to their demands for *khuwwa* tribute. How could this be the case? What was common and what was different between the takers and givers of surplus via *khuwwa*?

### 3.2.2 Sedentary and Nomadic Communities: Relations of Tribute

Both sedentary and nomadic communities thus seem to have displayed a structure in which the immovable means of production were held and managed communally but the moveable (tools, seeds, livestock) were held and used by households. In both a hierarchy seems to have prevailed, organised by essentially ideological ties of agnatic lineage which supported the claims of certain sheikhs to authority in negotiation over production, reproduction and distribution. Thus, the tribe organised differential access to the means of production. Amongst the bedouin nomadic pastoralists the land—-the tribal territory known as the *dirab*—was controlled by the tribe; the herd animals themselves by individual households (El-Masri, 2008:9, Marx, 1977:355). The tribe and its sub-units, structured on lines of notionally agnatic kinship, negotiate the terms of access to pasture for these herds (El-Masri, 2008:9, Marx, 1977:356). These similarities both in the structure of the communities and the broader cultural affinities should not obscure the tribute taking relationship, however. The absolute bi-modalism presented by Hamarneh (1985:77) has been undermined by a body of evidence that demonstrates that in many cases ‘relations between farmers and the Bedouin straddled the desert line’ and that ‘conflicts that broke out may not have been a case of desert versus sown but rather inter or even intra-tribal battles’ (Amadouny, 1999:xxviii). However, this historical scepticism may miss the overall important point. Settled cultivators paid tribute to bedouin: bedouin did not pay tribute to settled cultivators.

The reason for this relationship may be found in the core dynamic of the tributary mode of production. The nomadic pastoralist tribe functioned as unit of subsistence limiting and organizing access to the productive resources of a circumscribed area, the *dirab* (Marx, 1977:345). The bedouin thus occupied a particular
space, but in a different way to that of fully settled agriculturalists. The *dirah* is determined by the productive cycle of the tribe: the passage between different seasonally determined grazing lands (El-Masri, 2008:8). Vertical divisions did exist within the bedouin tribe—as one sheikh of the Huwayt bedouin of southern Jordan put it ‘naturally’ some tribesmen had more livestock than others and the sheikhs would usually have the most. Yet the corporate organisation of the tribe imposed some limit on the polarization of wealth and, most especially, control over the means of production (Marx, 1984:3). More important, however, was the horizontal division between the tribal subsistence units. Here we see the utility of identifying the core extractive relationship in any given social formation, at least in offering us an instructive analogy. Robert Brenner has usefully identified a process of ‘political accumulation’ in feudal Europe. Extractive authority being fractured in medieval Europe, as in the sub-Syrian steppe lands, tribute takers had an incentive to compete with one another to extend their coercive reach and thereby their access to surplus as tribute (Brenner, 1990:26-33). The lord, holding both “economic” and “political” over their tenants, could accumulate more surplus by only two methods: to make greater demands of the peasants, up to the point of threatening their subsistence, or to extend the area under his extractive control thereby coming into conflict with other lords also in possession of the means of coercion.

We may observe a similar dynamic in the regions in which the Ottoman tributary writ did not effectively run. In the desert and steppe of Southern Syria and Northern Arabia, tributary authority was fractured to an even greater degree than that of Western Europe. The various units of subsistence interacted with one another in a fashion resembling the famous anarchy of Realist international relations theory: each tribe required therefore to be organised so as to protect its grazing lands (immovable means of production) and herds (moveable means of production) from the threat of other tribes (Al-ʿAbbadi, 1984:98, El-Masri, 2008:21, Gellner, 1990:109, Hamarneh, 1985:51). This structure generated a logic of ‘political accumulation’ similar to that identified by Brenner, for the only means by which tribes could increase (or even protect) their surplus was military competition—raids and wars—with other tribes. However, unlike the struggles between European feudal lords, these conflicts only rarely congealed into central authority. Where chieftancies emerged these typically took the
form of alliance with or domination over settled communities which might then mutate into imperial tributary states such as the Ottomans became. Conflicts over pasture, or more often the reciprocal raiding of herds, were more fluid and inconclusive than those of agricultural land requiring long-term, fixed cultivation. The bedouin tribal unit was thus both more mobile and more attuned to military conflict than most settled communities: in a social formation based on coercive surplus extraction the bedouin therefore possessed a strategic advantage over settled cultivators, which advantage they used to obtain surplus in the form of *khuwwa*.

The taking of *khuwwa* by nomads from settled communities (as well as anyone seeking to pass through their territory) therefore reflects the ‘form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers’. A technologically advanced standing army, of the sort that the Ottomans later brought to bear, may be able to defeat mobile warriors (even then only in certain areas). A smaller settled community of cultivators, unprotected by hills or rivers, would be no match for the mobility of the nomads. The greater the range of the nomads, based on the hardiness of their type of livestock, the greater the strategic advantage they derived: hence the predominance of the camel (Hamarneh, 1985:49). The relationship, in other areas contiguous with our area of interest, was reversed only when a settled community was wealthy and established enough to send a permanent military force against the bedouin (Marx, 1977:349). Thus, sedentary cultivation was most advanced in those communities in ‘Ajlun, happily protected by the mountainous landscape from bedouin raids (Rogan, 2002:24) or in Salt where the Jordan River valley offered similar protection (2002:27). Even though the Saltis may have obtained a slightly better deal, as it were, they still had to give tribute to the ‘Adwan tribe (Hamarneh, 1985:49). The Karakis had a similar arrangement with the Bani Sakhr (1985:75). In the 1840s the Syrian Majlis Al-Shura (the assembly of notables in Damascus) took up the problem of peasants in the ‘Ajilun district fleeing bedouin demands for *khuwwa* (Rogan, 1994:35). Nor was the threat of coercion an idle one: travelers’ accounts of the 1870s refer to the destruction of at least two villages by the ‘Adwan and Bani Sakhr for refusing to pay tribute, and this even as the Ottoman central authority was regaining strength in the region (Hamarneh, 1985). The extraction of tribute could grow close to a market exchange, depending on the
defensive strength of the cultivators; but in every interaction between the two lurked potential compulsion (Gellner, 1990:111). There may have been scope for the cultivators to negotiate the terms of extraction or even to become clients of a different tribe—but clients they would remain.

Where has this examination of the social relations of Ottoman southern Syria taken the broader argument about uneven and combined development and Jordan’s geopolitical alignment? It was important to establish the nature of the basis of combination in Jordan, which we have now done. The pre-capitalist social relations were tributary, but fragmented, and reflected in two social practices—musha’ā and khnuwa—the transcendence of which would represent a process of primitive accumulation initiated by Ottoman and later British authorities. However, the results of this process was not the replication of an ideal-type of capitalist social relations but rather, as Trotsky outlined for Russia, a combined social formation whose trajectory to certain alignments can be traced back through these social processes. The remainder of this chapter and the next provide the empirical substance of this process, beginning with the story of the attempted Ottoman reforms due to what Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity.’ The following sections outline why the Ottoman Empire undertook these reforms in the late 19th century, the actual measures undertaken in the lands that became Jordan and the results produced.

3.3 The Origins of Ottoman Mimetic Reform: the ‘Whip of External Necessity’

The integration of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘zone of dependent support’ into a ‘single capitalist world’ (Migdal, 1994:10), which was to transform the coercive social symbiosis of settled and nomadic communities around the Jordan river, was embodied in the body of reforms and extension of the Empire’s central coercive power in the later 19th century (Quataert, 1994:762). This body of measures, collectively discussed under the heading of the ‘Tanzimat’ represented a similar process to that of the Russian emancipation of the serfs or the Japanese Meiji Restoration: attempts by tributary ruling classes to catch-up and compete with the capitalist states. In terms of the mechanisms
identified in the previous chapter, this was the ‘whip of external necessity’ produced by unevenness leading to the attempt to ‘turn foe in tutor’ that then led to combination. The unevenness in the Ottoman case refers to the productive and therefore military gulf between the Empire and the European powers (Bromley, 1994:46).

### 3.3.1 How Uneven Was Ottoman Development?

Recent scholarship on Ottoman economic history has conscientiously questioned the idea that the Empire’s economy stagnated in the 19th century (Quataert, 1994:843) and furnished us with evidence of the development of a native Ottoman bourgeoisie. Although these qualifications are important, the reform of the Ottoman land code and administrative re-organisations of the *tanzimat* represent an instance of how [i]nternational relations intertwine with ‘internal relations’ to bring about ‘new, unique and historically concrete combinations’ (Gramsci, 1971:182). In this section I seek to demonstrate how the feedback loop of uneven and combined development worked on the Ottoman Empire: I show how the competitive advantage of European states produced by the uneven development of capitalist social relations manifested itself in the disintegration of the outer provinces, fiscal crisis and consequently the compulsion to emulate capitalist social relations.

The Ottoman Empire under Sulayman the Magnificent was not merely a successful tributary state in a world of tributary states: it was the pre-eminent power West of the Himalayas, its revenue double that of the bloated Habsburg domains (Anderson, 1980:365). Yet by the late 19th century the Empire had slipped into the clichéd status of “the sick man of Europe”. Even if we now know contemporaries to have over-stated the malady, the overall diagnosis was correct. A gulf had opened up between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, erstwhile site of its predatory expansion (Issawi, 1980:1). The ‘internal’ aspects of this gulf—the degeneration of Ottoman tribute taking structures into local tax-farming rackets throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—cannot be separated from its “external” aspects such as the
imposition of unequal trade concessions, the secession of outer provinces under European protection or control (1980:1-3). As a result, the Empire was engaged in near constant defensive warfare of some kind: being at war for fully 53 of the years between 1800 and 1918 (Quataert, 1994:789). This feedback loop between geopolitical and social relations provides us with the beginning of the trajectories in Jordan taken up in later chapters: a process of attempted transformation engendered by the collapse of Ottoman manufacture in the face of Western European competition; the diminishing tax revenues gained through the tributary system and the loss of the Empire’s most productive territories. The attempt to extend—or rather to invent—the Ottoman state as an ‘infrastructural’ state, the buttress of an autopoietic system of capitalist property relations was thus a conscious response to this crisis.

3.3.2 Ottoman Reform as Response to the Whip of External Necessity

Where is the historical substance for this claim? One may trace a trajectory of decline in Ottoman fortunes closely correlated with the shift in trade away from the cross-Anatolian routes to the trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean transport of specie and commodities (Issawi, 1980:2). It was the second quarter of the nineteenth century however, when the ‘influx of European goods began in earnest—hand manufactures made in labor-intensive Western workshops as well as the more familiar machine-made cotton yarn and cloth’ (Quataert, 1994:762). The Anglo-Ottoman trade convention, signed in 1838 in partial recompense for British aid in the campaign against Muhammad Ali prohibited the granting of state monopolies and provided a model for the favourable treatment of merchants (Keyder, 1987:29) The Empire was increasingly dependent on an agricultural tribute losing out in the ‘coercive comparison’ (Barker, 2006:78) with those states in which capitalist social relations of production prevailed. As a result the central state sought desperately to remove or marginalize ‘its domestic rivals—urban guilds, tribes and provincial notables—while maintaining its place in the new world order’ (Quataert, 1994:762).

This attempt was not highly successful. The military superiority of Western capitalist powers such as Britain and France over the Ottoman Empire both reflected
and fed back into the crisis of the tributary system. As Eugene Rogan writes, using Michael Mann’s concept of ‘infrastructural power’:

[T]he penetration of society which infrastructural power permits allowed for an even greater share of production to be collected in taxes, which was essential for the maintenance of large-standing armies. While such changes were more characteristic of the nation-states of Western Europe, even multi-national Empires such as Russia and Austria had developed the infrastructural power to finance the modern armies which menaced Ottoman domains (Rogan, 2002:2)

Throughout the 19th century the Empire lost its most productive agricultural provinces to the twin forces of modernity—either directly to European imperialism or to local secessionist movements aspiring to emulate the French revolutionary model. The earliest and most instructive example may be found in the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 (Mitchell, 1988:17). The struggle between Britain and France, Europe’s two post-revolutionary states, resulted in the French occupation of Egypt: an experience whose puncture in the Ottoman social body was as deep as its duration was brief. The French troops left but French ideas did not. They found fertile ground in the head of Muhammad Ali, a local military commander of the traditional Balkan stamp, whose leadership combined the centrifugal tendency of tributary extraction with the aspiration to build a new mimetic order. Ali seized the Syrian provinces from Ottoman control, only to be frustrated by the Western powers (Rogan, 2002:2). Algeria was lost to French invasion a few years afterwards.

The worst of Ottoman fortunes was yet to come as the most productive European provinces were lost from the 1820s onwards. These provided the bulk of Ottoman revenues and their loss was ‘devastating’ to the Empire’s economy (Quataert, 1994:768). The Empire was sucked into a degenerative spiral: losing the provinces most productive of the agricultural tribute upon which the entire structure was based, and therefore losing further the capacity to govern other provinces. Revenue did actually increase from 1809 to 1885 but certainly not at the rate of increase in expenditure, leading to the crippling effective loss of fiscal sovereignty to the consortium of Western powers organised through the Public Debt Administration in 1881 (Issawi, 1980:361). It was this cycle of the loss of revenue that stimulated the Ottoman drive to extend taxable
cultivation, and therefore ‘infrastructural’ state power, in the sub-Syrian steppe (Rogan, 2002:45). This would inevitably bring a clash with the system of *khuwwa*, which we have identified as the central relationship of the fragmented tributary relations of production that prevailed in the lands that became Jordan, and as the basis of the later combined social formation. The process of Ottoman reform, instigated to ‘turn the foe into tutor’ was embodied in the Gulhane Rescript of 1839, the revised land code of 1858 and the expeditions to re-assert authority over the steppe and desert of southern Syria.

### 3.4. The process of Ottoman Mimetic Reform

The 1839 Gulhane Rescript and the 1858 Land Code were two faces of the same coin—or rather they represented the unfolding of unified tributary power into the division of economic and extra-economic coercion characteristic of those societies which had trounced the Ottoman Empire in geopolitical competition. The Gulhane Rescript established the general prospectus of change that would be carried out in the 1858 Land Code (Mundy and Smith, 2007:14). The 1839 Rescript established the principle of individual liability, equality before the law and security of private property (Anderson, 1980:389). The Land Code introduced a version of such principles into the economic base of the Empire, which would also require the extension of effective governance into those areas beset by fragmented tribute taking authorities such as the *khuwwa* -taking nomads. The Land Code and subsequent transformations of agrarian relations have formed a point of departure for most scholarship in the historical sociology of the Middle East (Baer, 1982, Gerber, 1987, Hinnebusch, 2003) and this thesis is no exception. The social dynamics of the later Jordanian state are rooted in the reforms of the late Ottoman period (Fischbach, 2000:7).

#### 3.4.1 The Land Code

Interpretations of the Land Code vary as to whether it was a success, whether it derived from a process of agrarian change or served to impose it and whether it actually altered practices on the land (Mundy and Smith, 2007:3-4). Our purpose here is not to
intervene in such arguments about the Ottoman Empire as a whole but to examine the origins and impact of the law on the lands that became Jordan: wherein the implementation of the code and concomitant re-assertion of central authority set the trajectory of uneven and combined development in the later social formation. Although scholars such as Michael Fischbach and Martha Mundy maintain that the land tenure structure remained quite similar before and after the Code, this neglects the significant change in who held extractive power and how—the partial decline of khawna whose full trajectory was only to be established in the mandate period. This occurred because the different principles of registration and taxation introduced to increase revenue along the lines of the successful capitalist states were in conflict with the khawna system. The extension of infrastructural power and the registration of private land thus occurred at the same time as co-dependent processes.

The Land Code itself mandated changes to the Ottoman tenure system which, it will be recalled from the earlier part of this chapter, distinguished between various rights to land. Most land was miri: land to which cultivators held usufruct rights but rendered tribute to the state as the nominal owner (Issawi, 1988:283). Mulk land was freely held but rarer than miri and most often in plots in towns (1988:283). There were other distinctions, such as the sultan’s personal lands and the awqaaf properties of religious endowments (1988:283) but, although they were very important in other contexts these were not so significant in Jordan. The 1858 Land Code established the right of individuals as legal owners of miri lands provided they could demonstrate their registration in a tapu deed (Rogan, 2002:13). The individual, not the community, was responsible for the payment of taxation (2002:13). Designed to maximize revenue through taxing every piece of cultivable land (Issawi, 1988:286) the code established a means under which uncultivated land reverted to state control. This implied of course that productively cultivated land and its fruits, after tax, were the alienable property of the registered owner. This is a different conception of property to that of the dirah or indeed the musba’a village, evidence of continuity with the pre-Land Code period notwithstanding (Fischbach, 2000:35). Donald Quaterr’s apt characterization of the Land Code as bearing a ‘capitalist trunk and a mercantilist foot’, therefore reflecting ‘the transitional nature of the state itself’ (Quataert, 1994:857) indicates the utility of

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considering this period as the starting point of a combined social formation.

### 3.4.2 Breaking Tributary Power

The Ottomans adopted a two-fold strategy to promote taxable cultivation by breaking the unity of economic and extra-economic coercion. Although the Ottoman administrators may not have expressed themselves in such terms, their twofold approach to the problem perfectly reflected this requirement. One the hand, the Ottomans sought to inflict exemplary defeats on the Bedouin tribes: on the other to induce settlement by stipulating that land registration (under the terms of the 1858 code) would be permitted only to those who actually cultivated their lands and by introducing communities—mainly Circassians and Christians—who would not pay *khawwa*. The settlement and registration of land by these communities led bedouin tribes such as the Bani Sakhr to register their own *dira* (Fischbach, 2000:46).

To assert control over the steppe meant a change of personnel and policy only reached some years into the *Tanzimat* reforms. As part of the reforms, the Porte appointed the efficient Mehmet Rasid Pasha to the position of *wali* (provincial governor) in Damascus (Rogan, 2002:48). Rasid’s remit was to extend the re-organised governance of the Ottoman state in its sub-Syrian hinterland, and he set about this work with vigour. Damascus sent military expeditions south to break the power of the Bani Sakhr and ʿAdwan tribes (2002:51). That military power, of course, formed the precondition for the extraction of *khawwa*. Rasid Pasha reversed the strategic imbalance that had hitherto guaranteed extractive rights to the pastoral nomadic tribes. In the campaigns against the ʿAdwan, the Ottoman forces were aided by the their adversaries’ attachment to recently founded areas of cultivation and short-range livestock pastures, undermining the advantage of easy flight in to the Eastern desert (Hamarneh, 1985:62). The Pasha moved his forces gradually southwards, from the most extensively settled and cultivated zones (which submitted to central authority more easily) down into the Balqa’ valley (Rogan, 2002:49). The expeditionary force was more sizeable and technologically advanced than previous Ottoman attempts, comprising three infantry battalions, nine
cavalry squadrons and several artillery pieces (2002:49). We may judge the impressiveness of the force by the reaction of the people of Salt, who soon submitted to the Pasha, and rendered to him three million piastres in tax arrears (2002:50). Having established a base in the only town of the Balqa’, Rasid thrust at the ‘Adwan encampment, killing 50 of their number, driving them from their tents and livestock and capturing their paramount chieftains (2002:52). This marked a serious blow not just for the ‘Adwan and their allies but for the practice of khunwa as a whole.

The khunwa-takers could not simply tolerate this turn of events. The Bani Sakhr reversed their traditional rivalry with the ‘Adwan—demonstrating perhaps the consciousness of a systemic threat to their practices of surplus extraction—and allied with them to raid Ramtha in 1869, re-asserting their rights to khunwa under Rasid’s nose in the cultivated district of the Hawran (2002:51). Rasid could no more accede to this bedouin provocation than the Bani Sakhr could willingly give up their extractive rights: two systems of surplus extraction were in conflict. Weakness on the Pasha’s part could have endangered the entire project of the new Ottoman power in the steppe (2002:51). Accompanied by the British and French consuls, Rasid’s 4000 Ottoman soldiers bested the Bani Sakhr, obtained their submission and 225,000 piastres to pay for the expedition ‘[i]f the first Balqa’ expedition introduced direct Ottoman rule to the district, the second campaign confirmed that the Ottomans were in Jordan [sic] to stay’(2002:51-2).

Rasid Pasha’s campaigns were not the end of khunwa, however. The topographical division between Southern Hawran and Northern Hijaz revealed itself in the limits to Ottoman power. Sharply conscious of the threat posed by the increase of British interests in Egypt, culminating in the 1882 occupation of the country, the Ottomans engaged in a number of schemes to establish an administrative centre in Ma’an ruling over the sparsely populated steppe surrounding the Haj route (2002:54). The choice of Ma’an reflected the intertwining of geopolitical and sociological factors that characterized the Ottoman modernization project as a whole—‘motivated by economic and strategic concerns: the sedentarization of the tribes, the extension of
cultivation, linkage with the Arabian peninsula and, after 1882, from potential British incursions’ (2002:54). Yet the Ottomans found themselves still circumscribed by the limits of a despotic rather than infrastructural power. Maʿan was too remote, and its inhabitants too used to making their own bargains with the local bedouin, to be governed let alone become a centre of governance (Rogan). The Damascene pashas had somewhat more success when they shifted focus to Karak. However they were only able to establish themselves thanks to a rift between the local Bani Sakhr and the Al-Majali, the ruling clan of Karak. Even then the Ottomans entered Karak in 1893 only after a week-long siege and an agreement to make the Majalis governors of the new Karak district (2002:55). The frailty of central Ottoman power was demonstrated by the Karak revolt of 1910. The further south and east the Ottomans proceeded, the more frustrated their schemes tended to become.

The scope of Ottoman re-engagement was therefore geographically circumscribed as its ‘despotic’ predecessors had been. Nonetheless the Ottoman efforts in the Balqaʾ and northward districts were no mere repetition of the temporary raids of the pre-Tanzimat era—tentative jabs of the tributary state into its hinterland. Rather the pashas sought to make productive tax-paying cultivable land out of the steppe and desert. This meant abolishing *khawwa* relations (implying the military operations described above) and installing communities which could bear tax-paying market relations. The second track of Ottoman policy in doing so was to settle or re-settled such communities in the more fertile areas of the territory: a common policy across the Empire (Quataert, 1994:849).

The Ottomans settled Circassian refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus in the Balqaʾ valley, heartland of the Bani Sakhr, in two waves; between 1878 and 1884 and again between 1901 and 1906 (Rogan, 2002:73). The authorities granted them land, tax free, to settle and farm around Amman. The Ottoman motive was to use these sturdy farmer-fighters to put an end to *khawwa* relations. The Circassians, culturally remote incomers to the region, would have no truck with paying tribute to bedouin—on whose *dirah*, moreover, they had settled—resulting in frequent clashes and occasional alliances
between the two (2002:75-6). They also introduced cut roads and wheeled transport. Such settlements had a knock-on effect, leading the *khuwwa* taking tribes to register their land in the Balqa’ within the terms of the 1858 Land Law (Fischbach, 2000:46). The settlement of Christians, fleeing an inter-clan dispute in Kerak, produced a similar effect around Madaba (Rogan, 2002:82). These Christians engaged in permanent agriculture and paid taxes but not *khuwwa*. Against the protests of Sattam al-Fayiz, the paramount chief of the Bani Sakhr whose men had mounted raids for *khuwwa* against the Madaba Christians, the Ottomans awarded the lands to the Christians. The award further alerted the ‘the powerful tribes of the region that they risked losing lands held by customary rights unless these were registered with the government land offices, put under cultivation and taxes regularly paid’ (2002:81).

### 3.5 Results of Ottoman Mimetic Reform

The preceding survey of the origins and process of Ottoman reform, undertaken to render that tributary empire fit to fend off the ‘whip of external necessity’ indicates the beginning of the trajectory of Jordan as a combined social formation, whose international alignments we will examine in later chapters. What were the important results of this process for these later developments? One can identify the following aspects that were later deepened by the British mandate, providing the social basis on which certain alignments were chosen and implemented: a topographical division in the campaigns against *khuwwa*-taking; a relatively more egalitarian land-holding structure in parts of the territory; and the emergence of division between *khuwwa* takers, or former *khuwwa*-takers, and the actual cultivators of lands they registered. These are all aspects of the transformation of one form of surplus extraction into another but without the decisive replacement of the older form—this would come only with the British subsidy and militarization and nationalization of the bedouin, a process analysed in the next chapter.

#### 3.5.1 Geographical Extent of the Impact of Ottoman Reform

One must first note the geographical, or rather topographical, division. Land
registration in the Tapu registers under the terms of the 1858 Land Code was only fully carried out in ‘Ajlun: in the Balqa’ the Bani Sakhr and others participated in the competitive registration detailed above. Further south the Ottomans did not intervene strongly although a market in land does seem to have existed (Rogan, 2002:92). Elements of the tribe as economic unit were preserved—by social distinction of the kind described above or by the persistent geographical division above and below the valley of Wadi Mujib at the lower end of the Dead Sea. Khuwwa continued to be taken in these areas and the sharecropping arrangements on Bani Sakhr ‘plantation villages’ retained elements of coercive subordination (2002:89). In the areas under full Ottoman control the taxes on the newly registered lands, although regularized and set at a maximum (Quataert, 1994:846), were still collected by tax farming. The Ottomans tried repeatedly to abolish tax farms but were without the infrastructure to replace them (1994:854).

The renewed attempt at tax collections undertaken in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century provoked a series of revolts, the most serious of which occurred at Karak in 1910 (Hamarneh, 1985:87). These revolts may be said to have reflected the ‘moral economy’ consciousness of direct cultivators under a tributary system: they would pay tribute either to the central state or to nomadic incursion but not to both (Rogan, 2002:185). A reasonable inference from the Karak revolt ‘is that the effective boundary of direct Ottoman rule in Syria in 1910 was the massive canyon of Wadi Mujib, which divided the districts of Salt and Karak’ (2002:215). This distinction took on even greater relevance under the British mandate as officials sought to govern both a ‘tribal zone’ characterised by what the colonial administrators saw as a warlike backwardness, and an area potentially at risk of infection by excessively modern doctrines of equality and anti-colonialism. The solution to this problem established the mechanism of combination between the Jordanian social formation and the global capitalist system: this story is told in the next chapter.

Within these distinct zones, further aspects of the transformation of the agrarian political economy distinguished the lands that would become Jordan. The first of these was the confirmation of a relatively egalitarian balance of landholding: this was not an
inevitable outcome but it did affect the later trajectory of the state in its relations with the populist Arab nationalism of the 1950s. In the areas registered and subject to the Tapu land registers according to the Land Code of 1858, the resulting distribution was fairly egalitarian: a marked contrast to other future Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in which the late nineteenth century saw a marked polarization between landlord and cultivator (Issawi, 1982:138). Land was for the most part ‘owned …by the cultivators who lived on it’ (Fischbach, 2000:55). There were some large land-holdings, certainly, such as the ‘entire village’ in the northern Jordan Valley ‘owned by a man from Tiberias and the Beni Sakher sheikh who settled there with his clan’ with ‘[t]he tribesmen…reduced to sharecroppers’ (Hamarneh, 1985:89). Thus effendis and absentee landlords were present but not dominant (Fischbach, 2000:54-5). Mutba‘a lands were not for the most part forcibly partitioned but voluntarily divided into fractions (Rogan, 2002:54). Norms of partition and cultivation varied, particularly between hill and plains villages (Mundy and Smith, 2007:236). This distribution can only be described as relatively egalitarian, however. It was common for one group (shuyukh, or some such term) to gain at the expense of the fellahin (Fischbach, 2000:52). Nonetheless, this inequality in land did not extend to the domination of the countryside by effendis, the resentment of which formed the social context for nationalist officers’ movements in Egypt, Iraq and Syria (Be’eri, 1970:456). Again this process was reinforced in the mandate period discussed in following chapter.

3.5.2 Beginnings of a Combined Social Formation

Perhaps the most significant feature of the late Ottoman period for the emergence of the Jordanian combined social formation was the change in social relations of production amongst the pastoral nomadic tribes. The Ottoman re-extension of the state produced a tendency—only that—for the fractured tributary relationships of the previous period to be replaced by something closer to capitalist social relations but with a crucial distinction that the horizontal ties of the tribe remained. This partial move from khuwwa to waged or semi-waged exploitation on the land was embodied in the so-called “plantation villages” that emerged in particular amongst the Bani Sakhr and ʿAdwan. The plantation village was an agricultural
settlement registered in the name of the tribe but worked by share-cropping tenants, often fellahin fleeing Palestine or Egypt (Rogan, 2002:90).

These developments represented something of the ‘combining of separate steps’ as the ‘material content’ of uneven and combined development (Trotsky, 1997:27). The ʿAdwan and the Bani Sakhr were the predominant tribes in the centre of what would become Jordan. A few decades previously both had practiced pastoral nomadism and khuwwa taking fairly extensively. The ʿAdwan, as mentioned previously, had taken up settled agriculture to a greater degree than the Bani Sakhr but their domains, even in 1880, were reported to hold countless droves of camels covering the plains (Hamarneh, 1985:61). The Bani Sakhr were ‘fully nomadic camel herding bedouin’ at the beginning of the 19th century (Lewis, 1987:124). Their dirah (territory) stretched mainly from summer grounds in the Eastern Balqa’ in the central area of Jordan roughly from Amman to Karak, to winter grounds in the Wadi Sirhan around the ‘right angle’ in the present day Saudi-Jordanian border (1987:124). They lived by camel herding, khuwwa from Salt and Karak and from the passage of the Haj through their territories—the pilgrims with camels and guides and were paid by the Ottomans to give Haj caravans safe passage (1987:124). As discussed below, although the 1858 land code allowed the Bani Sakhr and their paramount chiefs to become significant landowners, they were not fully settled cultivators even in the 20th century. The plantation village was part of the solution to this conundrum. By the 1930s many of the Bani Sakhr (and other tribes such as the Huwaytat) migrated with camels for part of the year while also controlling cultivated land (Bocco and Tell, 1994:123). They were no longer deep desert camel herders but neither were they settled yeomen. Even as late as 1952 the Department of Lands and Surveys found that of 2404 Bani Sakhr households, 1935 (i.e. 81%) lived in goat hair tents, 352 in stone houses, 87 in wooden or other houses and 30 in caves (Lewis, 1987:140).

These tribute-exacting pastoral nomadic confederacies adapted to the mimetic modernization drive of the Ottomans by means of sharecropping plantations. The ʿAdwan and the Bani Sakhr did register lands but partitioned them: in the case of the
Bani Sakhr in a geographical division of Mushaʿa land into southern, northern and central sections (Hamarneh, 1985:59). The area east of the Balqaʾ valley, extending into the Wadi Sirhan, was left as common dirab pasture, allowing the tribe’s members to continue their pastoral nomadic lifestyle (Hamarneh, 1985:61). The settled lands were mostly farmed by Palestinian or Egyptian sharecroppers. Title was assigned to named shaykhs in a fairly consensual process involving heads of household within the tribe—by contrast, the relationship with the fellahin sharecroppers was based on the sharecropper providing a fifth or more of the crop as rent, usually increasing as time passed (Lewis, 1987:130). A British traveler in 1876 reported that:

The bedouins] send across the Jordan, or to the few villages in the Gilead hills, and hire Christians to till their lands for them. Some Moslems [sic] go out for this purpose. ...These laborers are called fellahin. We should call them small farmers, or more properly, peasants. The farmer, at the beginning of the season, or when the contract is made is given four, five, or six dollars as the case may be. He receives also a pair of shoes, and has seed furnished him. But, besides these things, he receives nothing. He must provide his own men, cattle and implements. He must pay his own help and do all the work from ploughing to threshing (Merrill in Hamarneh, 1985:90).

This form seems to have spread quite rapidly. By 1883 there were nine tax-paying bedouin villages in the Salt district, traditionally the domain of the ‘Adwan, and by 1908 there were 19 such villages around Madaba in the orbit of the Bani Sakhr (Rogan, 1994:45). There were reported to be nineteen villages around the district of Jiza in the 1880s and twenty five in the 1890s—by the formation of the state of Jordan most of the land between Amman and Madaba and some beyond the Hijaz railway seems to have been cultivated (Lewis, 1987:131). This phenomenon is important because it established a pattern that was later reinforced and transformed by the military subsidy of the British mandate: the decline of tribute taking but its replacement by another form of surplus extraction that did not lead to the breakdown of the pastoral nomadic tribe seen, for example, in Iraq.

The mimetic reforms of the Ottomans generated contradictory dynamics, however. These led to further problems of governance under the mandate and might have produced a different trajectory for the combined social formation in Jordan were it
not for the fertile ground that they also provided for the militarization of the bedouin related in chapter 4. The extension of cultivated land and the suppression of *khuwwa* had begun to tell against bedouin livelihoods. Rogan delineates the effects of the Ottoman reform period thus:

The documentary evidence supports a working hypothesis that the poorer, more sedentarized tribes, whose members drew a greater share of their subsistence from agriculture, tended to communal tenure of tribal properties. Their shaykhs were less likely to hold vast, individual tracts of land because the tribesmen could ill afford such concentration… It is only among the wealthier, more powerful tribes that the sheikhs accumulated vast individual holdings. The tribesmen of the Bani Sakhr, with their great herds, drew ample subsistence from pastoralism and preserved their disdain for agricultural pursuits. This freed their shaykhs to register vast tracts of land without dissent from the rank-and-file, whose livelihood was not adversely affected so long as they enjoyed access to good pasturelands.’ (2002:188)

These dynamics seemed to return with the period of disorder in the post-WWI era, and could have led to the primitive accumulation of rural landed property and impoverished labour seen elsewhere, but this was only a potential outcome: the make-up of the Jordanian combined social formation owed much of its origin to the way in which the strategic relationship of surplus extraction was transformed in the late Ottoman period.

### 3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to explain the origins of the Jordanian combined social formation in the late Ottoman response to the threat posed by Western capitalist powers. To be sure, the tributary social relations prevalent in the Ottoman Empire possessed their own dynamic—outlined in this chapter as the unity of economic and extra-economic coercion. As such, it was prone to crises of centralization and decentralization, and to the fraying and fracturing of the system in areas beyond the penetrative reach of the central authority. These did not result in different social relations of production but rather a fragmented version of tributary relations. The lands that became Jordan were dominated by relations of this kind and most especially by the payment of tribute in the form of *khuwwa* by settled cultivators and weaker pastoralists to the large and powerful pastoral nomadic tribes.
The tributary system was not a static one, but where uneven and combined
development offers us an insight is into how the ‘whip of external necessity’ brought
about an attempt at mimetic modernisation by the Ottoman Empire: a strategy with
significant legacies for the state of Jordan. These were primarily in the geographically
distinct distributions of social relations on the land; the relatively egalitarian distribution
of that land amongst cultivators; and the replacement in some areas of relations of
tribute not directly by wage-labour and profit but by a form of share-cropping that
allowed pastoral nomadism to continue. It was this form of social relations—the
replacement of khuwwa by an alternative that was neither capital accumulation nor wage
labour—that underlay the combined social formation established under the British
mandate and in particular the importance of the British subsidy. The following chapter
takes up that story.
4. Land and the social origins of the Jordanian Military

The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate further the specific mechanism by which the social formation of ‘Transjordan’ became combined with the global system of capitalist social relations, following on from the account of Ottoman mimetic modernization in the previous chapter. I identify the Jordanian military, the core of the state apparatus and chief conduit for the British financial subsidy that maintained the state, as that mechanism. This conduit was established in the British mandate period albeit reinforcing and interacting with the legacies analysed in the previous chapter, of the Ottoman reforms undertaken to fend off the ‘whip of external necessity’. The case studies of chapters 5 and 6 present the claims both that the dilemmas of Jordan’s international alignments were fundamentally concerned with this mechanism of combination and that the process of uneven and combined development provided the social bases on which these dilemmas were fought out and resolved. The struggles around Jordan’s social and geopolitical orientation fought in the 1950s were, as in other Arab states fought out in part through and within the military (Be’eri, 1970:3, Hinnebusch, 2006:377, Krause, 1996:329). Jordan presents a distinct outcome however, undergoing the process of mass movements and nationalist mobilisation within the officer corps that the country’s neighbours also witnessed in the 1950s but with the distinct outcome of the King’s maintenance in power and a decisive return to Western tutelage.

This chapter therefore analyses the evolution of the Jordanian social formation under the British mandate, and in particular the relationship between the changes in agrarian social relations and the formation of the core of the state in the military. In so doing, the chapter substantiates the insightful aside by Haim Gerber that in Jordan ‘the agrarian and class structure was more balanced, and possibly this is why the army did not become a mirror of class struggle as in other Arab countries’ (1987:159). This argument is echoed by later scholars (Tal, 2002, Tell, 2008). Tell adds to this the idea that the building of the military under the British mandate offered a form of ‘militarized social provision’ to impoverished bedouin (2008:10). Building upon these claims and
offering evidence to support them, I argue that these phenomena were part of the uneven and combined development of the Jordanian social formation, as previous forms of surplus extraction broke down but were replaced, not by the antagonisms of landowner versus landless labourer or wage-earner, but rather through the imperial subsidy that represented a mechanism of combination. This was layered on top of a legacy of relatively egalitarian land-holding, providing the basis for Jordan’s distinct political outcomes of the 1950s. The history in this chapter is thus the intertwined story of how the military was formed as the core of the Jordanian state and how the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ ‘which dissolves the different forms, in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours’ occurred.

The chapter therefore outlines the narrative history of the Jordanian military and the foundation of the state, and how this process has been understood in previous studies. In what follows I therefore provide a critique of those interpretations and then investigate the Gerber thesis by a comparison of Jordan’s military and agrarian history under the mandate with that of its neighbour with the most analogous experience (a British mandate administered in some cases by the same personnel such as Glubb) but divergent outcome: Iraq. I argue that this comparison supports Gerber’s claim. The polity built upon these social relations is, I argue, best understood as resulting in a combined social formation with consequences for the later political and geopolitical trajectory of Jordan. This combined social formation emerged in the mandate period as British officials sought simultaneously to create and control a society reflecting what they believed to be sound administration: a geographically bounded entity in which coercive and economic power was separate and therefore property-owning individuals could securely conduct market relations. This project disrupted, incorporated and reconstructed the agrarian social relations of Transjordan, creating a social basis for the Hashemite regime through the British subsidised armed forces but whose reproduction imposed certain limits and generated certain capabilities for that regime in its later geopolitical alignments.
4.1 Context: the origins of Transjordan and its military

Before we analyse the place of the military and agrarian social relations in Jordan’s uneven and combined development, some historical context is necessary. The history of the Jordanian armed forces in some ways predates that of the state itself. The region that became ‘Transjordan’ and then ‘Jordan’ was divided across several administrative districts under the Ottomans. The Transjordan mandate was created as a result of the First World War. The Arab Revolt, proclaimed by Sharif Hussein of the Hijaz and led by his son Faisal passed up through these areas in 1917-18 aiming to join up with British forces in Syria and create a united Arab kingdom ruled from Damascus. ‘Transjordan’ became part of this short-lived kingdom. Faisal’s rule was short-lived because the post-war settlement at San Remo allocated Syria neither to its inhabitants nor to Faisal but to the victorious French. Palestine, Iraq and the lands east of the Jordan were apportioned to Britain. The British offered the throne of the new kingdom of Iraq to Faisal and sent military emissaries, such as the Frederick Peake and the brothers Kirkbride, to the fractious ‘governments’ based mainly around local shaikhs, that had emerged east of the Jordan after the collapse of the Ottomans and the dispersal of Faisal’s followers (Kirkbride, 1956:20).

These ‘governments’ swiftly dissipated, however, as Faisal’s brother Abdullah struck north from the Hijaz in an attempt to reignite the Arab Revolt and re-stake the Hashemite claim to Syria. Upon reaching Amman and negotiating with Winston Churchill, Abdullah was at least temporarily disabused of this idea and agreed to become the ‘Amir of Transjordan’ subject to Britain’s overall direction and financial support. The Amirate – the ‘native’ administration with which Britain could deal– was founded in April 1921, the British mandate over ‘Transjordan’ declared in July 1922 and the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty signed in 1923. The armed forces and land settlement under discussion here are those of the mandate thus established: institutions that went on to form the core of the (notionally) independent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as the Amirate was declared in 1946.
4.1.1 The Birth of Transjordan

How and why was this entity created? The view of Jordan as an entirely a colonial product conjured out of terra nullis may be something of an exaggeration but the regularity of the state’s borders gives some idea of their contingent origins. In the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat the situation was fluid. The British had no particular concern with the area that became Transjordan, but they were fundamentally concerned with what lay around it. To the East, the bountiful oil fields of Iraq had to be secured and exploited. To the West, the Mediterranean pipeline at Haifa would export the product. The Palestine mandate, with its special conditions of Zionist immigration, was more often the British priority than the lands East of the Jordan. To the South a state of sorts was congealing around the Saudis, bitter enemies of the Hashemites, and favourites of the British. Abdullah’s thrust north for Amman provided an opportunity for Britain to fill this gap and divert conflict with the French over Syria: the Cairo Conference of 1921 therefore confirmed Abdullah as the ruler of an Arab government in an area carved out of the Palestine Mandate taken by the British under the Sykes-Picot agreement (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001:20).

In the period between the Ottoman collapse and Abdullah’s arrival there was no centralized force in the areas that were to form the Amirate. Various Ottoman left-overs attached themselves to Faisal’s Damascene government (particularly the istiqali, or ‘independentist’, officers who had defected from Ottoman service to join the Hashemite cause) or the local entities that surfaced in the post-war interregnum. More important were the British efforts to establish an armed force that would defend and govern (within a certain conception of these practices) a bounded polity in which economic and coercive structures were separated. These efforts passed through two main phases, based both on the—often relatively ad hoc—responses to circumstances encountered by the British and on their conceptions of the society they come to oversee and the society from which they came.
The first phase of the evolution of the Jordanian military extended from the establishment of the first ‘mobile reserve force’ in 1920 and continued in its essence under Peake’s command until the arrival of John Glubb as Peake’s deputy in 1930 (Dann, 1984:24). Two forces were thus established in this period: the Arab Legion, raised by Abdullah as he proceeded north in 1921, and the Trans Jordan Frontier Force recruited by Peake in 1926. The mobile force was re-established by Peake as the core of the Arab Legion (Vatikiotis, 1967:53). Abdullah brought with him a ‘regular battalion’ (al-katiba al-nidhamiya) of about 200 men and 100 camel cavalry (al-Luqyaani, 1993:18).

A number of rebellions against mandate authority (discussed in a later section) led Peake in 1923 to merge all the forces loyal to the mandate (Abdullah’s men, the remnants of the local Ottoman gendarmerie and the mobile force) into a single army under his command, henceforth known as the ‘Arab Legion’ (El-Edroos, 1980:213). The establishment of this force, coming together with the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty in 1923 set the co-ordinates of the relationship that was to continue at least until 1957: Britain subsidised Abdullah by 150,000 pounds a year whereas funding for the new Arab Legion was to pass directly through Peake (Vatikiotis, 1967:44).

The Arab Legion was conceived as an internal security force: the British High Commissioner in Palestine wanted a border patrol for the mandates both East and West of the Jordan to guard against Wahhabi raids from the newly founded Saudi kingdom (Glubb, 1948). On this basis, the Transjordan Frontier Force, composed mainly of Palestinians, was formed in 1926. The size of the Arab legion was correspondingly reduced to 900 men: the TJFF remained in existence until the end of the Palestine mandate in 1948, reaching a strength of 700 men two years before that date (Vatikiotis, 1967). The British were not satisfied with the TJFF’s performance: its replacement by the ‘Desert Patrol’ of the Arab Legion as the instrument of ‘pacification of the tribes’ marked the second phase of the building of Transjordan’s armed forces.

As discussed below, the creation of the Desert Patrol in 1930 represented a particular conception of the colonial state and its intervention into the political economy of Transjordan. Under the command of John Bagot Glubb, recently arrived from similar duties in Iraq, the Desert Patrol was intended to ‘secure the co-operation of the
beduin by convincing them that the "government" was not always an enemy’ (Kirkbride, 1956:62). By 1936 the Desert Patrol comprised 106 men with 3 officers out of a total force of 1007 (Diya and Saleh, 1997:266). Following the Palestine Revolt and the outbreak of the Second World War, however, the ‘Bedouin Mechanized force’ had grown to 800 men out of a total of 1600 in the Arab Legion (Vatikiotis, 1967:73). The 40 to 50 officers of the force were mainly ex-Ottoman Arab officers, recruited by Peake in 1921-22 when these men were in their twenties — only one new officer was admitted between 1922 and 1939 (1967:21).

By the end of the war the Legion contained some 8000 men, in addition to 1000 police (1967:75). The Legion itself comprised a mechanized brigade of three regiments, adding up to 3000 men (made up of recruits Glubb considered sufficiently ‘bedouin’), the Desert Patrol of 500 men (composed of similar recruits), garrison units adding up to 2000 (in Glubb’s eyes hadari townsman) men, 500 ancillary troops and 2000 trainees (Vatikiotis, 1967:75). Formal independence and the Arab-Israel campaign in which Glubb himself played an ambiguous role (Pappe, 2006:119) brought a wave of further expansion. By 1950 the legion’s strength had increased to 12,000, spending an annual subsidy of £6 million (Vatikiotis, 1967:78). Six years later the force had grown to 25,000 men staffed with 1,500 officers (Vatikiotis, 1967:23). It was this greatly expanded Arab Legion that became a site of struggle in the 1950s.

4.1.2 Understanding the Arab Legion

How are we to understand the creation of this force, its relationship to the society upon which British colonial power was imposed and is persistence after independence? Three main interpretations present themselves. The most enduring and popular interpretation derives from a kind of colonial folk wisdom which sees the bedouin as the archetypal ‘martial race’ whose presence in the Arab legion is sufficient explanation for its loyalty to the Hashemite regime and therefore Jordan’s escape from the ‘belated infusion of mass society into Arab politics’ and consequent instability that had befallen its neighbours (Vatikiotis, 1967:154). A second approach, offered by Joseph Massad, rejects these colonial assumptions the Arab Legion rather as a process
which ‘de-bedouinized’ the bedouin, in the sense of integrating them into the epistemology of the modern state, and then recreated them as a ‘sublated’ colonial version of their former selves (2001:7). The emphasis for Massad is on a process by which a certain national-Jordanian community is imagined and certain kind of subject placed within that community rather than the political economy of the preconditions and effects of that process. A final set of interpretations of the origins and role of the Arab Legion, based around what I have called the Gerber Thesis (Tal, 2002) (Tell, 2008) do provide the beginnings of such a political economy but without extensively investigating the main claim about the impact of Jordan’s agrarian social relations on the Arab Legion nor the geopolitical implications of that impact.

The view of the Arab Legion propagated by Glubb Pasha, his contemporaries and epigones, provides an excellent example of the colonial tropes of ‘military orientalism’ (Porter, 2009). In this version, best expressed by Glubb himself, the predominance of bedouin units in the Jordanian army secured the King’s position because they were composed of ‘hardy, simple men, with a straightforward and unquestioning belief in God… but little corrupted by foreign influences, [who] still regarded the Hashemite dynasty with reverence as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad [sic], and were not fertile soil for Communist propaganda’ (Glubb, 1957:436). The bedouin appear here as noble warrior figures imbued with a native intelligence but unsuited to the modern world except insofar as their warlike nature could be utilized by the colonial power. Recruitment to the Desert Patrol and the mechanized forces of the Arab legion would thereby give an outlet to their inherent capacity for courage and loyalty and transform their boisterous belligerence into an asset for the state (1948:103). Glubb’s broadest definition of ‘bedouin’ meant ‘tribes which own land, but themselves migrate to the desert for at least part of the year on camels…[such as] the Beni Sakhr, Huweitat and Sirhan’ (1938:499).

The notion of the bedouin as a ‘race’ naturally given to martial pursuits and therefore likely to join the army enjoyed a wide currency even after Glubb’s dismissal and the general retreat of British colonialism in the Arab world. Thus PJ Vatikiotis argues that the tribal, warrior culture of the Bedouin attracted them to the Jordanian
Arab Legion: ‘the beduin in a sense, came to the Legion with an anti-individualistic ethic, made possible by the primacy of collective security and responsibility in the tribe, clan and family’ (1967:20). Vatikiotis maintains that the bedouin tradition of loyalty to tribal chiefs was simply transferred to the monarchy, along with other martial traditions (1967:25). In this respect the order of battle within the Arab legion the combat and mobile units being dominated by bedouin, the logistical units by settled townsmen and Palestinians reflected nomadic disdain for settled, technical occupations. Vatikiotis goes so far as to claim that “[t]he beduin apparently is by nature of his cultural predilection averse to the acquisition of technical skills…even though… he is fond of driving vehicles’ (1967:25). This sort of claim—one that reduces the bedouin to a pre-modern, childlike essence—reaches an almost libidinal level in Axelrod’s argument that the Desert Patrol attracted ‘tribal recruits’ because they were ‘turned on by its weapons and handsome uniforms’ (Axelrod, 1978:28).

Joseph Massad (2001:2001) has followed Edward Said’s example in deconstructing the assumptions of Vatikiotis, Glubb, Kirkbride and others. It is important to note however that the issue is not whether Glubb and other British officials ‘liked’ the Bedouin or not. Beneath the stuffy essentialisms of the British officials lay a particular conception of global development which, as Toby Dodge has amply demonstrated in the case of Mandate Iraq:

allowed societies external to Europe to be divided into two broad categories: those judged to be immature and those condemned as pathological. The immature were perceived to be on a uni-linear historical path whose final destination would prove to be a European modernity. Those judged pathological were perceived to have deviated from that developmental path or had never been fit to join it. (Dodge, 2005:45)

Massad documents how the interpellation of Arab Legion recruits as soldiers and Transjordanians reflected such a conception. He describes a series of bodily and organisational practices:

embedded in a temporal schema, whose telos is European modernity; a geocultural schema, whose core is urbandy at the expense of the countryside and the desert; and a class schema, organised by bourgeois economics replacing the previous rules of property and ownership (2001:6)
These practices included the physical drills, organisational hierarchies and uniforms (an idealized version of bedouin clothing) of the Arab Legion. The creation of Transjordan’s armed forces under the mandate formed a constitutive/ repressive/disciplinary nexus by which the state sought to ‘constitute and produce the subjects and the categories… [it seeks] to discipline and/or repress (Massad, 2001:5).

Massad here draws upon a theoretical tradition that sees colonialism as a new epistemological model that divided the world ‘into two, into the material realm of things in themselves, as could now be said, and an abstract realm of their order or structure’ (Mitchell, 1988:13). The disciplinary apparatuses through which this transformation were effected served the needs of the colonial state and integration into global capitalism, but cannot be reduced to an effect of that integration because the very notion of such a relationship is itself an aspect of this epistemological model (1988:18) Massad does not explicitly repeat Mitchell’s argument here but his focus on the genealogy of bedouin-ness means that he does not pursue his suggestive arguments that ‘nationalizing the internal space of the nation state, through the conversion of communal property into bourgeois forms of property, was part of the same process of demarcating its borders in relation to foreign space while simultaneously subjecting that space to the law’ and that ‘the centrality of bourgeois forms of property to the national project could not have been more emphasized by the British’ (Massad, 2001:33).

Yoav Alon’s extensive study covers some of the same material as Massad and the discussion in this chapter, arguing the main British interest in Transjordan was to pacify the country as cheaply as possible (Alon, 2007:5). This was achieved under skilled and experienced colonial administrators such as Glubb and Kirkbride by a ‘laissez faire’ model of imperial rule that integrated the tribal population into the state (2007:6). Unlike in other Middle Eastern states, this was done mostly without coercion (2007:151). Thus Jordan was spared the history and apparatus of coercive rule from which the instability of other Arab states sprang, resulting in the peculiar but stable ‘combination of foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal society’ (2007:3). This support base, discussed more fully below, was called upon to defend the monarchy whenever it was under threat in the post-independence years.
(2007:153). Where this chapter adds to Alon is in demonstrating how the political economy of this process, interacted with and replaced previous forms of social relations. In the following section therefore, I investigate these claims (closely connected to Haim Gerber’s thesis about Jordan’s agrarian property relations) by means of a comparison with Iraq. In so doing, I argue that the constitutive schema of Massad and the close history offered by Alon represent a historical totality in which the ‘unevenness’ of Transjordan (the timing and nature of its integration into a global capitalist system) resulted in a particular combination of social forces in the army that distinguished Jordan from its neighbours.
4.2 Land Distribution and Primitive Accumulation in Mandate Jordan and Iraq

The central contention that, in Haim Gerber’s words, in Jordan ‘the agrarian and class structure was more balanced, and possibly this is why the army did not become a mirror of class struggle as in other Arab countries’ (Gerber, 1987:159) has been echoed in a number of works (Fischbach, 2000 2002:18, Tell, 2008:6-7). Yet this posited connection between Jordan’s agrarian social relations and the foundation of its army has not been fully investigated, nor its implications for the sources of Jordan’s geopolitical alignments drawn out. Comparison between the social histories of Iraq and Jordan is instructive. Similar colonial initiatives, carried out in some cases by the same personnel, resulted in different social combinations and trajectories for the two states in a later phase of their history. Michael Fischbach (1994, 2000) has provided comprehensive evidence in support of Gerber’s claims about the more egalitarian distribution of land in Jordan. But how did this agrarian political economy relate to the army, and how did Jordan differ in this respect from its close (dynastic and geographic) neighbour Iraq? What are the implications of these relationships then for the politics and foreign policies of Jordan in the period of nationalist revolutions such as those that engulfed Iraq?

4.2.1 Class, Collective Tenure and Land Settlement

In this section I examine the basis for claims that Jordan’s agrarian social relations were more egalitarian than those of other Arab states, and that this reduced the impact of class struggle in the army. How can we investigate the claim that Jordan’s agrarian structures, mediated through the army, affected its later trajectory? Further specifying the definition given in Chapter 2 of this thesis, I adopt Hanna Batatu’s approach to agrarian social relations in the Arab world, accepting that “property” and “lack of property” form the fundamental elements of the class… situation but ‘at the same time, it is beyond dispute that “property” varies in character or significance under varying circumstances and could, therefore, be properly understood only in its specific historical context’ (Batatu, 2004:7). This is compatible with the definition of class given
in Chapter 2 and expressed succinctly by Geoffrey de Ste Croix: ‘the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure’ where exploitation means ‘the appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others’ (1981:43). This appropriation divides the population into groups, i.e. classes, ‘identified by their position in the whole system of social production, defined above all according to their relationship (primarily in terms of degree of ownership or control) to the means of production’ (1981:43). In predominantly agrarian societies such as mandate era Transjordan and Iraq this definition means primarily the distribution of access to land, whether for tilling or grazing, and claims on the products of labour on that land. Following Batatu’s injunction that ‘members of a class may not be class-conscious in their behavior, but their behavior could nevertheless be class-conditioned’ how are we to assess the distribution and claims to land in Transjordan and Iraq and its relationship to the state-building enterprise in the military?

The principal mechanism of British policy toward land in the mandates was cadastral survey and settlement. This mechanism, applied throughout the Empire in Australia, India and Egypt was premised on a quite distinct understanding of property in land. First, the land was mapped: that is, represented as an abstract grid established by officials of the Department of Lands and Surveys. This geographical representation of land was inseparably bound to a social one. Each parcel of land had to have an owner and that ownership was registered by the colonial state. Land settlement in both Jordan and Iraq was recommended by Sir Ernest Dowson (Dodge, 2006:210) but only fully implemented in Jordan. Following a visit in 1926 Dowson recommended a survey of the country. This survey began in the provinces of ‘Ajlun, Balqa’, Karak and Ma’an (Fischbach, 1994:88). Land settlement itself began in 1933 in Jabal ‘Ajlun and Irbid; 1934 in Jarash and the Bani Sakhr bedouin area; 1939 in Amman and Madaba; 1940 in Salt; 1945 in Karak and the Bani Hassan bedouin area and 1949 in Tafila and Ma’an (Fischbach, 1994:94).

The essential goal of mandate land policy was that any form of collective rights in land, such as the musbih tenure discussed in the previous chapter, should be eradicated. This conception held by mandatory administrators of ‘native’ society and the
solution to its perceived problems reflected a shared notion of the historical sociological process of development and unevenness. For the colonial officers in the inter-war Arab mandates, British society represented the horizon of human achievement: the ‘Englishman with a liberal education’ with whose ‘subtle and elaborately developed’ (Sykes in Massad, 2001:106) brain the bedouin showed a strange affinity. The mandatory authorities saw the basis of British society as the free intercourse of rational individuals secure in their property: a liberty won through a long process of historical development and the overcoming of previous, unnatural and therefore tyrannical, ways of organizing society. George Walpole, the head of the Transjordan Department of Lands and Surveys, found it hard to imagine ‘a tenure more inimical to good farming’ than the collective rights involved in mushāʿ (Walpole, 1935:55). It was, in the words of the 1935 annual report on the Transjordan mandate, ‘a most serious obstacle to development’ (quoted in Fischbach, 2000:104). As mentioned in the previous chapter this form of tenure was not uniformly practiced throughout the areas that became Jordan, but it was most common in the more intensively farmed and settled areas of the north and west and most of all where grain was cultivated. Around two thirds of Jordanian villages were mushāʿ villages (Fischbach, 1994:83). The task of land survey and settlement was to remove this ‘inimical’ form of tenure.

4.2.2 The Results of Land Settlement: Land Distribution in Transjordan and Iraq

What were its results? In Jordan the settlement reinforced a pre-existing pattern of widely distributed smallholding. This pattern can be viewed in a number of ways: in the distribution of ownership, of holdings (i.e. the units in which land was actually farmed) and the number of taxpayers paying higher or lower rates of the land tax. The census carried out in 1939 as part of land survey and settlement found the average size of owned plots to be 56-78 dunums in well watered areas (such as the north west) and 120 dunums in drier areas in the south and east (Walpole, 1935:63). These means do not seem to have been skewed by polarization into very large and very small plots. According to the mandate annual report for 1938, 66% of landowners paid the lowest rate of less than one pound a year: 19% paid between one and two pounds, 7% between
two and three pounds and 8% more than three pounds (Colonial Office 1939:328). The division of the privately owned cultivated area provides perhaps the clearest evidence of Jordan’s relatively egalitarian land distribution, however. In 1952 36.3% of the privately owned area of land in Jordan was held in plots of under 100 dunums, 49.5% in plots of between 100 and 1000 dunums, 14.2% over 1000 dunums (Baer, 1957:194). In units of operation (rather than ownership) ‘in 1952 and 53, 24.9% of the farm area in the Hashemite Kingdom...was covered by small holdings of 10 to 100 dunums, 55.2% by medium size holdings (100-1000 dunums) and only 19.9% by large holdings (100-1000) dunums’ (1957:194).

The Iraqi pattern of land distribution during and after the mandate (which ended earlier in Iraq than in Jordan, in 1932) differed from this predominance of small holders. Of course, by definition the owners of smaller plots are always likely to outnumber the owners of larger plots: thus 72.9% of proprietors before the 1958 revolution in Iraq held plots of under 50 dunums but these covered only 6.2% of the cultivated area (Batatu, 2004:55). 55.1% of that area was owned in holdings of over 1000 dunums, the proprietors of which comprised under 1% of the landowners (2004:55). The average size of Iraqi holdings in 1953 was 510 dunums (Baer, 1957:194), between five and ten times the Jordanian figure. The land tax in Iraq was levied differently and in a manner more partial to large landowners: after 1931 the tax was levied only on products brought to market and then only at a relatively low rate of 12.5% for crops grown on large estates such as dates, barley and wheat (Batatu, 2004).

Before the introduction of the consumption tax, the mandate retained the Ottoman system of ‘leasing’ miri state lands 61.6% of the area (Baer, 1957:189) to landlords. In the district of ‘Amara, which was particularly dominated by large landlords, 16 landlords paid rent over 25,000 rupees a year (Sluglett, 2007:234). There were no individual smallholdings whatsoever in the district (2007:242). The state was chronically unable to collect sufficient revenue from agriculture, the shortfall being replaced only later by oil revenues (Tripp, 2000:69).

4.2.3 Landlessness and Wage Labour

The distribution and terms of access to land form the basis of differentiation
amongst classes in agrarian societies such as mandatory Transjordan and Iraq. The figures above have demonstrated the comparatively egalitarian distribution of land in Jordan. But what of those who do not themselves own land? They must find some other way of accessing its products by offering their labour to those with more land. Although it was probably untrue to say of Transjordan that the ‘number of persons in the villages entirely without land is negligible’ (Konikoff, 1946:38) comparison with Iraq again reveals a different structure to agrarian social relations. According to the 1953 census examined by Fischbach of 272,737 East Bank males (a figure that includes minors) there were 90,206 landowners that is around a third of households and probably more given the distortion introduced by including under-age males (Fischbach, 2000:157). In the northern areas of ‘Ajilun, Jarash and Irbid 60-80% of men owned lands (2000:157). An American survey of 1931 found that on average between only 10-20% of the men in Transjordanian villages were landless labourers (Fischbach, 2000:157).

There was landlessness and wage labour in Transjordan but these tended to be displaced from the geographical and social centres of state building. Given the small size of many plots, it seems likely that many cultivators leased their land to the holders of slightly larger plots while continuing to work them themselves: a kind of reverse sharecropping suggested by the discrepancy between the sizes of units of production and units of ownership (Baer, 1957:193). Some members of the Bani Sakhr from around the central Balqa’ valley had apparently taken up wage labour in the Zionist colonies west of the Jordan. Perhaps more extensive and more interesting was the extension of the form of the ‘bedouin plantation village’, discussed in the previous chapter. Here we seem to find a pattern at first sight similar to that of Iraq: sheikhs of large tribal groups registering land in their own name under the Ottomans and then being confirmed in that position by the British mandate. In particular the al-Fayiz, the dominant clan of the Bani Sakhr acquired swathes of the country around Madaba (Rogan, 2002:87). In the late Ottoman period the Bani Sakhr sold 4000 dunums to Christian merchants from Nablus who then employed sharecroppers to farm the land. However the Bani Sakhr shaykhs continued to extort rent from the new owners (Abujaber:77) and therefore indirectly from the Egyptian and Palestinian sharecroppers.
who had come to work the land. In the words of the colonial administrator Frederick Peake: ‘[t]o post his slaves around the harvesters with loaded rifles is about the extent to which the Sakhr owner may be called a farmer, and the actual work is done only by fellahin from Jebel Quds [i.e. near Jerusalem] and Nablus’ (Lewis, 1987:130). The Bani Sakhr lands still held in musha seem to have been partitioned out fairly consensually amongst households in 1945 (Alon, 2007:133). There were undoubtedly considerable differences of wealth and status amongst the transhumant groups but division over landholding and wage-labour seems to have been ‘exported’ outside of them, continuing the legacy described in the previous chapter.

In Iraq the extent of landlessness, sharecropping and plantation agriculture was much greater. Indeed the proportion of landholders to non-landholders was the reverse of that in Jordan: ‘four-fifths of the families of Iraq owned no land’ (Batatu, 2004:55). As we have seen, certain districts such as ‘Amara were dominated by large landowners whose estates were worked entirely by sharecroppers. Up until 1958, peasant landholders in Iraq were an ‘exceptional phenomenon’ (2004:76). As in Jordan, and in Gaza, prior to the Tanzimat reforms the settled cultivators were often distinguished from transhumant or fully nomadic pastoralists by ideologies of kinship—and often brutally direct—relations of tribute (2004:70-1). As in the areas that became Jordan, the Mesopotamian domains of the Ottoman Empire became subject to Ottoman‘direct pressure to break his [the sheikh’s] position’ reflecting ‘the indirect but far more potent influence of remoter forces – those of the world market – brought near to him by the new river communications’ (2004:74). However, the result was different to that seen in Jordan. Sheikhs were able essentially to expropriate their followers and clients by means of registering hitherto collectively held domains as their own, ‘substituting for the life-renewing patriarchal and blood relationships – where these existed – the new subversive relationships of production’ (2004:78).

These relationships brought about a particular combination reminiscent of the ‘second serfdom’ imposed in Eastern Europe to meet the demands of the grain market. The estates (muqata’a) that predominated in the most fertile riparian provinces were in some cases worked by the sheikh’s own tribal affiliates and sometimes by outside
sharecroppers or historically subject lineages (2004:79). The actual work of the estate was generally supervised by an intermediary group absent in Jordan known as the *sarkals*. The *sarkals* were sub-tenants of the sheikh and usually the heads of sub-units of his tribe who contracted the actual labour of sharecroppers or occasionally free peasants (Sluglett, 2007:163). The degeneration of sheikhly authority over the *sarkals* is indicated by the constant struggle of the British to enforce the sheikh’s right as tax gatherer against them (Dodge, 2005:111).

The sheikhs reinforced their power over the cultivators by legislative means. The 1933 Land Law marked a particularly repressive low point, to the extent that some legislators were concerned it might infringe the International Convention against Slavery (Sluglett, 2007:180). The law made the cultivators responsible for the condition of the crop up almost up until its sale, and also bound them to work off any debts they thus incurred. Agriculture being subject to various natural and market calamities, the net result of this law was to reduce many of the direct cultivators to debt bondage (Sluglett, 2007:180). Thus, although Jordan was not without agrarian discontent or distress amongst the poorer cultivators and therefore some degree of organisation among them in areas such as the Jordan Valley the country did not produce the pool of agrarian misery present in Iraq.

4.3 Combination and the integration of tribes into the mandate state

The changes wrought in the social formations of Jordan and Iraq under the mandate occurred not only at the bottom, amongst the cultivators and the exploited, but perhaps more importantly at the top amongst sheikhs, landlords and the state. Here again the British policy tended to reverberate between two conceptual limits, deriving from their own notions of the course of global development which had placed them in the position of imperial overlords. These differences played out in the varied attempts to found a social basis for the Hashemite monarchical regimes the British established to legitimate their control.
4.3.1 The Dilemmas of Mandate Rule: Governance and Shifting Social Relations

British conceptions and policies tended to vary between two views. At one pole, Mandate officers identified such rural social phenomena as ‘tribalism’, collective property or the large landed estates of the sheikhs with features of Britain’s own history that had to be overcome; it was ‘axiomatic that the tribesman is a bad citizen, unproductive subject and potential breaker of the peace’ (CO 696/2:719). This view emphasized the building of a stable society of property owners, secured against the depredations of the ‘tribal’ sector.

Yet the mandate authorities were also aware that they could not rule (cheaply at least) these territories without co-opting some local force. Hence they sought to also work through what they perceived as indigenous Arab social practices and institutions such as the ‘tribe’, re-trenching or even creating relationships of power and patronage on that basis. Army officers such as Glubb (who served in both Iraq and Transjordan) took the so-called ‘Sandeman system’ of subsidy and co-optation as their model (Bocco and Tell, 1994:120) The explicit or implicit aim of such policies was to secure the base of the regime against any threat of organised, anti-colonial mass politics; a threat embodied in the chief fantastic villain of the colonial imagination, ‘the semi-educated townsman’ (Batatu, 2004:88). The result was the creation of states, and therefore interaction between those states, in which ‘capitalism neither evolved mechanically from the modes of production that preceded [it]…, nor did it completely dissolve those modes’ but ‘sometimes coexisted with such modes and sometimes buttressed and prolonged certain of their aspects’ (Ayubi, 1995:41). In both of the mandates policy eventually settled on integrating and supporting willing sheikhs and establishing parallel (tribal) legal systems. However, Jordan and Iraq differed in how sheikly power was integrated into the state. In Iraq they were bound into a larger landowning ruling class at the expense of their tenants and notional kinsmen. In Jordan the armed forces formed a channel to reinvigorate the vertical loyalties of such groups as the Huwaytat and the Bani Sakhr at a point when their political economy was in crisis in the early 1930s. This process reinforced the ‘export’ of the development of horizontal divisions within these groups described above.
In both Jordan and Iraq the British authorities faced the task of imposing their will on newly-won territories without the financial or human resources upon which they had relied in earlier colonial endeavours. In the nineteen twenties in both mandates the British found the authority of their Hashemite protégés highly limited. In Iraq the mandate administrators were concerned to ensure that the king (whose wider Arab ambitions had not been forgotten) was stronger than any individual sheikh but not than the sheikhs in general. (Batatu, 2004:90). Faisal was particularly reliant on British forces in the form of the RAF to suppress any opposition and the British themselves favoured aerial bombardment as a method of tax collection, while drawing the rather fine distinction between ‘collecting’ revenue and punishing ‘defiance of government orders’ (Sluglett, 2007:189). In fact, British rule faced resistance from the very beginning of the mandate. Between 1919 and their official withdrawal from the mandate in 1932 the British faced a significant national uprising (the revolt of 1920), a two week general strike in 1931 and five local uprisings mainly concentrated in the Kurdish areas: between the first military coup under Bakr Sadiqi in 1936 the notionally independent kingdom saw five further localized rebellions (Batatu, 2004:467).

The ‘Revolution of 1920’ began in the cities essentially among former Ottoman civil servants, officers and parts of the Shi’a clergy (Zubaida, 2002:207). The revolt quickly developed into a mass movement against the mandate organised through both Shi’a and Sunni mosques in Baghdad (Tripp, 2000:42). Sheikhs and their tribes from the lower Euphrates joined the revolt, often from resentment at British favouritism towards certain sheikhs and clans or out of fear that the new government might curtail their privileges of taxation and tribute (Zubaida, 2002:210). The revolt was suppressed but the British administration learned a lesson from it. The large landowning sheikhs of provinces such as Kut and ‘Amara, having been recognized and cultivated by the British, stood with them against the revolt (Tripp, 2000:44). For the rest of the mandate the British sought to bolster the larger sheikhs in any way possible. Possessed of the notion that these men exercised a benevolent patriarchy over their cultivators, the mandate

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authorities went around forbidding people to mix outside of their ‘tribal’ areas, assigning headmen of various sorts to the position of paramount sheikh and preventing cultivators from escaping their sheikhs’ lands (Batatu, 2004:94). The upshot of this was to entrench and extend the social relations detailed in previous sections of this thesis.

This policy was embodied in the structure of the state in Iraq. From the first days of the British occupation the cities and the countryside were governed by different legal systems. Again borrowing from colonial practice in India, the Tribal Disputes Regulation made sheikhs responsible for administration of the law amongst their tribesmen (Dodge, 2005:95). Sheikhs were over-represented in the central state bodies. The Ottoman assembly of 1914 contained only one sheikhly delegate of the 34 representing Iraq: the 34 of the 99 members of the Iraqi Constituent assembly of 1924 were sheikhs or (the Kurdish equivalent) agbas (Batatu, 2004:95). Dobbs, the British high commissioner had originally sought an assembly made up entirely of sheikhs (Dodge, 2005:90). The sheikhs could, and often did, rely upon British armour and air support against their own tribal subordinates while also maintaining their own retainers (the hushiyya) who could be used to discipline any recalcitrant cultivators (Batatu, 2004:85).

Here we may register an important difference between Iraq and Jordan. Sheikhly power was not, in general, integrated into the state through the Iraqi army. The large landholding sheikhs were already posed against the cultivators who were often members of their own tribe. Such forces as they employed, borrowed from the British or paid for using British subsidies, were directed toward this division. The army itself was a secondary development. The first forces employed by Britain in Iraq (aside from British and Indian troops themselves) were the so-called ‘Iraq Levies’, a force of around 4000 men commanded by British officers and composed mostly of members of the Assyrian minority (Tarbush, 1982:76). Although Britain preferred to rely upon the RAF to police Iraq and its borders, the mandate authorities did found an army based around the ex-Ottoman and Sharifan officers who had congregated in Baghdad (1982:77). New officers were recruited but they were usually from towns- three quarters of those recruited by 1936 (1982:78). The enlisted ranks were in the view of the British colonial
The British sought to maintain parity between the army and the Iraq Levies and hence based both on voluntary recruitment (Tarbush, 1982:78) but the Iraq government, crucially, introduced conscription in 1935. As a result ‘unlike other state institutions such as the Parliament or the Cabinet, which were enclaves of privilege, the bulk of the officer corps was drawn from the middle classes’ (Batatu, 2004:764). These officers were overwhelmingly Sunni but ‘shared, to a lesser or greater degree, the popular discontent, especially those who…hailed from small provincial towns such as ‘Anah or Takrit, whose old local economies had been disrupted by the flow of European industrial goods or under the impact of the new communications.’ (2004:765). The Iraqi army thus included in its main ranks a mass of men connected to the generally miserable condition of the Iraqi cultivator, a junior officer group reflecting the displacement and dissatisfaction of the urban and semi-urban middle class and an upper-ranking group composed of ex-Sharifan officers increasingly integrated into the landowning ruling class around the monarchy.

4.3.3 Jordan: The Army and Primitive Accumulation on the Steppe

The establishment and expansion of the Jordanian armed forces under the mandate entrenched a quite different set of social relationships. In the early stage of the mandate, between 1922 and 1930 the British struggled to exert control over the territory of Transjordan on behalf of Abdullah. The first engagements of the Transjordan Armed forces under Peake were directed against recalcitrant communities that refused to pay tax or recognize the mandate authority. Almost as soon as the Amirate was founded its ‘Reserve Mobile Force’ was sent to suppress a revolt in May 1921 in the district of Kura near Irbid (El-Edroos, 1980:215). The revolt, which was not fully suppressed for a year, was in essence a refusal to pay taxes. The Force was more successful in its confrontation with the Balqa’ revolt of 1923 (1980:212). The Balqa’ revolt was an uprising led by the ‘Adwan sheikhs, marching into the Emir Abdullah’s encampment at Amman and demanding more favourable treatment (Alon, 2006:6). The
cause of the revolt, which was defeated relatively quickly, seems to have been ‘the changing balance of power in the Balqa’ region’ by which ‘the ‘Adwan and their allies found themselves weakened vis-à-vis both the government and their traditional rivals for hegemony in the region, the Bani Sakhr’ (2006:11). These incidents took place in the north and west of the country: the area which the British felt more able to secure. Peake, the commander of the Arab Legion (as the unified armed forces of the mandate became known in 1923) sought to base the armed forces on these regions, reflecting the belief that the more arid south and east of the country formed an only semi-governable tribal zone (Kirkbride, 1956:62). In particular the Transjordan Frontier Force, assigned to guard the porous and problematic border with Saudi Arabia, was to be composed of recruits from Palestinian towns.

The desert pacification policies adopted by the British mandate authorities and therefore the legacy they left to the later Jordanian state may seem merely ad hoc—but both the conceptual projects of the officers who implemented them and in the acceptance they found amongst the inhabitants of the desert themselves reflected the broader process of uneven and combined development that this thesis is concerned to trace. In this period we find therefore the establishment of the mechanism of combination between the Jordanian social formation and the global capitalist economy that would be so important to the later alignment decisions of the 1950s. This mechanism lay not in exports of commodities onto the world market nor in the heavy industrialisation of the country but rather in the embroilment of the colonial power in primitive accumulation: the ‘historic process which dissolves the different forms, in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours’.

The preceding sections of this chapter have discussed one aspect of Jordan’s distinctiveness from its neighbours in this regard: the relatively egalitarian distribution of land-holdings. The following section takes up a more direct intervention in the process: the replacement of the practices of surplus extraction in the form of khuwwa amongst nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists with a subsidy from the colonial power, administered through the armed forces. Just as Pierre Phillipe Rey and Claude Meillassou identified the sublation under colonial power of pre-capitalist (‘lineage’)

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relationships in the circulation of slaves and dowries (Brewer, 1990 1981:81), so one finds in this period of Jordanian history the replacement of *khuwwa*, raiding and herding by external subsidy rather than by polarization into owners and labourers. The policies of the British were of course worked out at a day-to-day level but their lasting results derived from the context to which they were applied: the breakdown of the tributary practices in the steppe outlined in chapter 3 and the new combination of the tribute-takers with colonial subsidy.

4.3.4 Glubb, 'Humane Imperialism' and Subsidy as Combination

What were the details of this process? Between the late 1920s and the early 1930s the Bedouin of Trans-Jordan, as we may now refer to the pastoralist nomads and semi-nomads for the sake of brevity, experienced a two-fold crisis in their livelihoods (2007:93-4). The first aspect of the crisis lay in a familiar, but especially harsh, dearth in subsistence caused by poor grazing but exacerbated by the changing market conditions for livestock. The second aspect derived more directly from the British project of creating a uniformly governable space in the mandated territories. As far as the subsistence crisis is concerned, the British mandate reports noted several years of poor winter rains in the 1930s which led to a ‘severe setback to schemes for Beduin cultivation’ (Colonial Office No.129, 1937:349).

Camel herding desert dwellers are accustomed to harsh dry weather, of course. The dry years of the early 1930s were exceptionally bad however and were made worse by the simultaneous impact of global depression and the new borders. Only 15 of 60 permanent wells were left within Transjordanian control. To make matters worse, the bedouin lost camels to Saudi raids and were unable to replace by the traditional method of raiding in response (Bocco and Tell, 1994:120). Certain of the Bani Sakhr sheikhs were reduced to wage labour in Palestine; overall bedouin (understood as those identified by the British as sheep or camel pastoralists) income halved, their livestock fell by 70% and Mandate medical officers estimated that 84% of the Bani Sakhr, Huwaytat and Sirhan confederations were malnourished (1994:121). The number of camels fell from 17,985 in 1932 to 6,150 (roughly half of those being held by the Bani Sakhr) in 1935 (Lewis, 1987:134). Glubb estimated that amongst ‘entirely nomadic’ bedouin each household held only seven or eight camels amongst the more economically diversified
perhaps only two (Bocco and Tell, 1994:134). This was a perilous state indeed, given that a precondition of mobile pastoralism is that the herders outnumber the animals (Anderson, 1974:220). The 1930s saw an ecological crisis in the Transjordanian steppe—ancient in its causes but both exacerbated and solved by the integration of Trans-Jordan into the global system of sovereign states and capitalist social relations.

The most immediate response of the Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat to the crisis was, if they had the means, not to replenish the camel herds but to switch to sheep and motorized transport (Lewis, 1987:135-6). Here we find the interaction of colonial policy, conceptions of development and the immediate effects of ecological crisis. As we have seen in the preceding sections of this chapter, the British sought to create a uniformly governable space, demarcated by clear borders. Within such a space cultivators would be free to bring the products to the market without extra-economic compulsion. This was quite a different model to that embodied in practices of raiding in the steppe: what I have argued in chapter 3 constituted a fractured tributary mode of production. These practices recognized neither the international borders nor the legitimacy of generalized punishment (rather than retribution) for acts of raiding to re-distribute the surplus. The post-Ottoman international settlement in the Middle East—establishing and policing borders that cut through the traditional movements of pastoralists and camel herders—was having a disruptive effect on the areas of Transjordan dominated by tribes such as the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat. They faced a colonial power determined to curb their traditional basis in raiding and taking tribute and they were deprived of free access to their traditional winter grounds in the Wadi Sirhan which became part of Saudi Arabia (Epstein, 1938:229). These factors exacerbated the impact of drought and the introduction of motorized transport on camel herding (Lewis, 1987:136).

Raiding seems to have been part of the normal operation of economic life for these groups. The withdrawal of Ottoman power and the interregnum of British administration under a Hashemite monarchy mostly-well disposed to its south-eastern allies from the Arab revolt seems to have led to something of a revival of raiding. Raiding to replace livestock was also a strategy to deal with poor grazing and the dying-off of sheep, cattle and camels. Moreover, as the power struggles in the Nejd remained
unsettled, raiders spilled across the desert from the *Ikhwān* 20 who had served with Ibn Saud and from Iraqi bedouin (Glubb, 1948:70). These raids would provoke retaliatory raids in return. Surviving inhabitants of the time from the Huwaytat emphasize both the poverty of the tribe’s existence and the ever-present potential for raids that would rob them of security and subsistence. Peake, the first British resident, reports a devastating cross-frontier *Ikhwān* raid in 1925 against the Sirhan of the central plain that saw ‘nearly all their flocks… looted’ and caused many of them to abandon nomadism, and now perhaps not more than half the tribe move into the desert in winter’ (Peake, 1958:221). The mandate reports of the late 1920s make annual reference to raids as a problem but one that was being resolved—only for similar paragraphs to appear in the report for the following year (Colonial Office No.40, 1929:99, Colonial Office No.47, 1930:138). At the beginning of 1929 ‘a military force was sent against a sheikh of the Ben[sic] Sakhr who had carried out a raid into Nejd…[i]n May a column was despatched to break up a concentration of Beduīn who were preparing for a similar raid’ (Colonial Office No.47, 1930:138). By 1930 the British authorities had simply to admit that ‘[r]elations between the Beduīn of Transjordan and the Hejaz-Nejd remained…unsatisfactory, in spite of the constant vigilance exercised by the British Forces and Trans-Jordan authorities in the punishment and prevention of raiding’ (Colonial Office No.59, 1931:195). The reason for this impotence, according to the British reports, was that:

The Wādi Sirhan, which is the winter grazing ground of certain of the nomad Trans-Jordanian tribes, is situated within the territory of Nejd. The Trans-Jordan nomads who cross the Nejd frontier in winter are beyond the protection of the British and local forces which are available in Trans-Jordan. It is impossible to disarm them, since, if in this annual migration the Trans-Jordan tribes were to go unarmed, they would speedily be stripped of their possessions by the hostile Beduīn of the Hejaz (Colonial Office No.59, 1931:196).

The creation of state boundaries in the established extractive space of the Bedouin—their *dirab*—thus introduced a different logic, contradictory to the fractured tributary system. As the British sought to enforce the conception of uniform governability necessary for their vision of prosperous, market-oriented yeomen, they created a self-sustaining dynamic of conflict with these tribes: confirming their original view of the steppe and desert nomad as an inherently ungovernable, if noble,

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20 The *Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*, or Muslim Brothers, were the force of tribesmen who allied with the Saud clan in the Arabian peninsula under the influence of the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahab—not to be confused with the organisation of the same name founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna.
International boundaries and British policy thus mounted a double blow against the south-Eastern tribes and in particular the Huwaytat (Bocco and Tell, 1994:119-20). First they suffered from drought and the cross-border raids of the Saudi Ikhwan and Iraqi tribes. Then their means of redress in the form of retaliatory raids was prevented or punished by the British, who would often exacerbate the problem by seizing livestock as punishment in kind (1994:123). It is easy—indeed, correct—to see Glubb as the embodiment of stuffy colonial paternalism replete with fantasies of how ‘the rural Arab has an extraordinary affinity with certain Englishmen’ (Glubb, 1948:103). He did perceive very clearly however, the impact of British rule on the nomadic pastoralist system and most especially in the southern desert: writing of how ‘in practice the whole emphasis…[of British policy] was laid on the importance of preventing them from raiding and not on protecting them' such that ‘[h]arassed by their own government on the one side and raided by Ibn Saud on the other, they were rapidly becoming so poor that many were already starving and few if any were properly nourished and clothed’ (1948:74-7). The dire situation extended beyond the Huwaytat even to the chiefly sections of the Bani Sakhr, as noted above.

Glubb offered a change of policy based on the so-called ‘humane imperialism’ practiced by the Scottish officer Robert Sandeman in the North-Western frontier provinces of India (Bocco and Tell, 1994:120). The underlying assumption of this policy—as in Iraq—was that the tribe was in some sense a ‘natural’ unit but the means of its preservation was both to strengthen the sheikhs and the vertical relationships binding members of the same tribe together rather than have them dissolve under the polarization of land into the hands of the sheikhs on the Iraqi model. It is significant, perhaps, that Glubb moved to Jordan from Iraq with this policy just as these divergences began to appear. Glubb saw that the basic lack of grazing lands, water and livestock was the immediate source of Bedouin distress (1994:120). His solution to raiding was to replace it as a source of surplus by subventions, both direct and deftly provided as a reward for assuring rather than threatening Britain’s governability of the desert (1994:122). The military, first of all the Desert Patrol, was the main institutional...
means for doing this. The soldier’s pay would form an insurance policy against hunger (Glubb, 1948:170) just as raiding and *khuwwa* had done. This apparently ad hoc policy, because of the broader factors delineated above, became the source of the ‘improbable combination of foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal society’ (Alon, 2007:3).

Glubb began his work with subventions to the chiefs of the Huwaytat, those most affected by drought and raids. These payments ‘[given the workings of tribal clientelism… were undoubtedly redistributed to the base of the tribe’ with the result that ‘[p]ayments by sheikhs to their tribal clients provided for the inability to rebuild flocks through raiding’ (Bocco and Tell, 1994:122). Glubb’s initial gambit was to give fifty dinars to Sheikh Bin Jazi of the Huwaytat (a leader of one of the two main sheikhly lineages of that tribe) and ten dinars to each subsidiary chieftain (Diya and Saleh, 1997:234). Glubb further recommended that the mandate authorities ‘shower’ the Huwaytat with funds amounting to six thousand pounds (1997:230). A further channel of distribution was established through the election of Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat sheikhs as parliamentary representatives of the northern and southern Bedouin constituencies respectively, gaining subsidies of two hundred pounds a year (1997:269). The main institutionalized channel of this subsidy however, was the shrewd integration of the former *khuwwa*-takers into the armed forces of the state, beginning with the Desert Patrol: a vital move, for a ‘jundi[s] [soldier’s] pay could sustain several bedouin families in the famine conditions of the 1930s’ (Bocco and Tell, 1994:122).

Again, Glubb began the work of ‘nationalising’ the Bedouin with the Huwaytat. At first the recruits, notably, were non-Jordanian nationals but Glubb soon succeeded in attracting his first twenty members of the Desert Patrol from the Trans-Jordanian Huwaytat (Glubb, 1948:92). These numbers were initially small, but one later officer of the Desert Patrol from the Jazi section of the Huwaytat reported that several hundred members of his clan—perhaps eight hundred—joined the Arab Legion and

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21 I am indebted to Nawaf Tell for this characterisation of the process. Interview, Amman, 8th of September 2008,
Desert Patrol combined\(^\text{22}\). Glubb then turned his attention to the Bani Sakhr to repeat his success (Glubb, 1948:102). By 1933 the Desert Patrol force contained 157 NCOs and men, of whom thirty five were Bani Sakhr (Lewis, 1987:104). The Arab Legion and Desert Patrol provided a replacement for the collapsing political economy of *khuwwa*, raids and full pastoralism and in particular an alternative for the next generation of sheikhly retainers left without a role: the mandate report for 1936 made mention of the ‘problem of the employment of sons of Beduin sheikhs …unwilling to engage in manual work and are unemployed and discontented in the tribes’ who ‘were formerly the leaders of tribal raids and have found no occupation since raiding ceased’ (Colonial Office No.129, 1937:349).

The systems of the Arab Legion replicated the mobilisation of loyalties used when the Hashemites first formed the ‘Faisali army’ in the Arab Revolt (Diya and Saleh, 1997:301). Ali Abu Nuwwar, who joined the mechanized division shortly after this point reported that most of the men were from the Huwaytat, Bani Sakhr or Bani Hassan (Nuwwar, 1990:18). Glubb’s favouritism towards those whom he considered sufficiently bedouin seems to have percolated the British officer corps, who held a higher opinion of the ‘sons of the Desert’ (1990:19). Abu Nuwwar reports that ‘the Bedouin officers looked upon us as new and for a short time as strange and called us *fellahin* and townsmen’ but with time came to regard him and as fellows as ‘like them sons of tribes even though we lived in stone houses’ (1990:17). Abu Nuwwar’s experience reflected the combined social formation emerging from the British mandate in Jordan, its conditions concisely summarized by Tariq Tell:

> the military bureaucratic "enclave economy" in the towns kept the country financially dependent even as its chief beneficiaries, the bedouin, grew ever more reliant on welfare handouts under Glubb's control. The villages were left fragmented and their inhabitants weighed down by debt. On the other hand, the economic decline of the bedouin was balanced by the privileges they enjoyed as the praetorian elite of the regime. Compared to Syria or Iraq, class anaagonisms in the countryside were muted by the prevalence of smallholdings and access to supplementary earnings from outside work (Tall, 2000:95).

This was the social legacy bequeathed to semi-independent Jordan by its mandate predecessor, and the basis for the cases of alignment in the 1950s that the

\(^{22}\) Interview with Sheikh ʿAnbar al-Dahash Ibn Jazi, Amman, 27th of May 2009
following two chapters will examine.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to illuminate the origins of Jordan’s military as a distinct mechanism linking the local social formation and the global system of interstate and capitalist competition. The comparison I have used in this chapter, between two Arab mandates with closely linked and similar early political histories but significantly different trajectories attempted to unearth the factors behind the course of the struggles in the Jordanian military in the 1950s, the conduct and outcome of which that had a decisive impact on Jordan’s geopolitical alignments in that period.

The investigation of the historical sociology of the founding of the mandate era militaries and its relationship to agrarian social relations and the histories of resistance and incorporation suggest that Haim Gerber’s basic contention is correct. However, there is more to be said than this. The histories of the mandate militaries in Jordan and Iraq reflect the same process. That process is the incorporation of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into a global capitalist system. In both cases the British both relayed the imperatives of that system, closely bound up with their own ideological conception of the societies they ruled, and responded to the tensions resulting from those imperatives. Yet the differences between Jordan and Iraq provide an example of the different trajectories established by uneven and combined development: of the way in which ‘national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic features of the world process’ (Trotsky, 1972a). In Iraq the attempts to exercise central control first by the British and then by the weakened post-mandate monarchy replicated a wider field of agrarian discontent. In Jordan, by contrast, a pre-existing pattern of widely spread landholding and the ‘export’ of vertical divisions outside of the larger confederations was reinforced by the timely intervention of the British in the country’s political economy. These differences were to be consequential when mass movements articulating both Arab nationalist and social aims arose in Jordan in the 1950s.
5. The Baghdad Pact

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a case study of uneven and combined development worked out through a particular alignment decision: Jordan’s response to the Baghdad Pact. The chapter therefore provides what was promised in the introduction to this thesis: an analysis that ‘reveals the meaning and interweaving of the general and the particular, of interests, states, cultures, rules and structured opportunity with individual understandings, capacities, motivations and more or less considered and deliberate action’ (Abrams, 1982:199). The particular event of the Baghdad Pact has been chosen because of the regional shift it encapsulates: following the injunction that ‘the challenge of an event is not a matter of grasping its concreteness but of apprehending, at an appropriate level of concreteness, the transition it signifies’ (1982:195).

The decade between the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and the Iraqi revolution of 1958 witnessed a schism amongst the Arab states: an emerging ‘Arab Cold War’ (Kerr, 1971) to match the global conflict in which the region was embedded. The protagonist on the anti-colonial Arab nationalist side was, of course, Egypt under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser. On the other stood Britain, facing the breakdown of its hegemony in the Middle East. Britain’s major ally in the Arab world was Iraq under the rule of the Hashemites and the pro-British Prime Minister, Nuri al-Sa‘id. Jordan and its alignment with one side or the other became, between 1955 and 1958, the object of this confrontation—described by Illan Pappe as a clash between ‘the state and the tribe’ (Pappe, 1994). The controversy around the formation of the Baghdad Pact, from February 1955 until January 1956 represented a turning point in this confrontation. What were the reasons for this division and Jordan’s oscillation between the two sides within it?

In answering these questions I seek to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of uneven and combined development in international relations theory. The chapter argues, based on the conception of uneven and combined development substantiated in the previous chapters, that the penetration of capitalist social relations into the lands that became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had produced by the 1950s a particular social formation whose tensions and contradictions produced the
differing policy stances toward the Baghdad Pact. The pact became such a crucial issue because it concerned the future of the British subsidy to Jordan and therefore the main mechanism by which Jordan was linked to the global capitalist system. The chapter proposes that in the Baghdad Pact period the still fragile regime of King Hussein oscillated between two polarized sets of social forces produced by the process of uneven and combined development: that of the effendiyya, the dispossessed Palestinians and rural migrants in Amman and the (small) labour movement who formed the base for the Arab nationalism on the one hand and the other former pastoralists and semi-pastoralists integrated into the state through the British funded army together with a narrower group of sheikhs and merchants around the Hashemite monarchy.

5.1 Understanding the Baghdad Pact Conjuncture: Existing Explanations

What explains changing Jordanian attitude to the pact and how is it connected to the question of the international relations of Southern States? The argument presented here is that the struggle over the Baghdad Pact in Jordan represented a crucial moment of force in the transition from one phase of the Arab system to another not just in involvement of Cold War rivalry but also in the social bases of the Arab states. This period saw, in Hinnebusch’s concise characterization, a rule of ‘oligarchic multi-polarity’ in which:

weak, fragmented Arab core barely emerging from colonial control. The Arab states were narrowly based oligarchies or dynasties, highly penetrated by the Great Powers, above all by Great Britain, which retained bases and treaty relations with regimes headed by its clients (Hinnebusch, 2002b:34).

Weak regimes unable to manage popular discontent, severe polarization of wealth and the legacies of still-partial decolonization exacerbated by the nakba ‘used anti-imperialist rhetoric to shore up their fragile legitimacy … sought protection from the Western powers against domestic opposition’ (2002b:34). The post-Baghdad Pact system was dominated by Nasser’s Egypt, ‘whose head start in the incorporation of popular support made it the only stable Arab state’ and consequently placed it ‘at the center of the Arab world, giving it a new cohesion, rolling back Western control, and enforcing Arab solidarity’ (2002b:35). The nature of this transition was a ‘congruence’ between the emergence of Nasser and ‘the destabilization of oligarchic states amidst the
political mobilisation of the middle class’ (2002b:35). Fred Halliday echoes this argument in viewing the mid-50s as period of transition to a system in which 'Arab nationalism, in alliance with Moscow, posed a challenge to Western dominance in the region…[and] regional wars…were conducted in east-west terms, the forces of the "Arab revolution" being pitted against the allies of the West’ (Halliday, 2005:99).

The particular struggles in Jordan and the resulting foreign policy must be seen in this light. The case offers us the opportunity to analyse uneven and combined development as, in Fred Halliday’s words the ‘inesscable context’ of the international relations of the Middle East (Halliday, 1999:319). Is it necessary, however to develop such a new explanation for empirical phenomena?

5.1.1 Realist Explanations

It is, because the existing explanations are insufficient. The case has been subject to neo-realist (Walt, 1987) and constructivist (Barnett, 1998) analyses against which we can judge the contribution of uneven and combined development. Stephen Walt’s Origins of Alliances (1987). Walt views the struggle over the Baghdad Pact as opening a period in which Nasser made:

various efforts to translate his own charisma and Egypt's regional structure into permanent hegemony in the Arab world. Relying on propaganda, subversion, and the astute manipulation [sic] of the ideology of Arab unity, Nasser repeatedly sought to entice or intimidate the other Arab states into accepting Egypt's leadership. These efforts ultimately failed because Nasser's targets were able to form alliances against him’ (1987:50).

The Baghdad Pact, for Walt, therefore becomes a further example of his overall principle by which states balance or bandwagon against threat—the judgement about whether to balance or bandwagon depending on the degree of the threat and the strength of the threatened state (1987:32-3). These principles are the invariant rules of anarchy—an axiom taken furthest in Elie Podeh’s treatment (1995) of the struggle over the pact. Podeh argues that ‘for the Arab states, the Baghdad Pact was not simply an offshoot of the Cold War; rather, they viewed it as part of the age-old struggle for regional dominance. Historically, the Egyptian-Iraqi struggle for hegemony is an extension of the old polarization or rivalry between the Mesopotamian and Nile Valleys.
for control of the lands lying in between’ (Podeh, 1995:1). Podeh argues that the reason states such as Egypt and Iraq would struggle for hegemony is that the Arab states form a sub-system of a Middle Eastern system itself nested in a global system of states – within this system states which rank high in certain indicators of capabilities will attempt to win predominance on the Prussian or Piedmontese model (1995:14-37). L.Carl Brown makes a kindred claim: the Arab world is part of the ‘Eastern Question system’ deriving from the fracturing of the Ottoman cultural space (Brown, 1984:2). The battle of the Baghdad Pact, fought out in and over Jordan, represented an attempt by Nasser to re-unite that space and become an Arab Cavour (1984:171).

What place does Jordan occupy in the neo-Realist narrative of the Baghdad Pact? The first point to note is the importance of Jordan’s eventual rejection of the pact, to the extent that ‘the whole history of the region might have been altered had Jordan joined the pact’ (Merwede Tell quoted in Podeh, 1995:172). Two theoretically significant assertions stand out in the realist-inspired treatments of Jordan’s policy towards the Baghdad Pact. These are significant because they allow us to explore the general lacunae of realist international theory in sundering ‘international’ from social realms of explanation and therefore to evaluate by contrast the alternative theoretical perspective developed here. The first assertion is that Jordan is important because the country (indeed the whole Levant) lies between two ‘natural’ power centres around the river basins of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates (Kerr, 1971:2, Podeh, 1995:1). States come into being around these rivers; since these states suffer ‘geographic insecurity’ (Podeh, 1995:14) they compete with each other, given the right leaders and capabilities, for primacy in the middle ground between them. It is therefore to be expected that Jordan would be suspended between, and perhaps torn apart by, the resulting conflict.

5.1.2 Constructivist Explanations

Realists and neo-realists are, of course, not the only theoretical perspective on the Baghdad Pact. As in Walt’s neo-realist treatment, the history of the Baghdad Pact has formed the empirical basis for a significant statement of this theoretical approach in Michael Barnett’s Dialogues in Arab Politics. Barnett points to the struggle over the pact in Jordan as the ‘final battle’ (1998:116) in a crucial phase of the reconstruction of norms in inter-Arab politics. This argument draws upon the notion of symbolic interactionism
to argue that the “game” of Arab politics was constructed in the playing, as Arab leaders sought to frame events and each other in ways that could then constrain them (1998:48-9). The Baghdad Pact represented a turning point in this process:

until that moment the dynastic rulers had largely kept the lid on radical Arabism. Iraq’s decision to ally with Turkey and the West, however, stoked the embers of Arabism, catalyzed a regional debate about the relationship between the Arab world and the West, led to the norm prohibiting alliances with the West, marked the passage to a more radical version of Arab nationalism and crowned Nasser as the unchallenged leader of Arab nationalism.(1998:21)

Radio broadcasts were the main channels for Nasser’s normative pressure on Hussein, leading to the ‘fierce rioting’ that scuttled the pact (1998:116).

Barnett’s approach moves beyond the equation of a mass opposition movement with military threat and places opposition to Israel and Western intervention at the centre of the ‘game of Arab politics’ (1998:8). He therefore brings us much closer to an understanding of the Jordanian response to the Baghdad Pact than do the neo- and proto-realist interpretations discussed above. Yet the norms and dialogues presented by Barnett—albeit plucked from a common ‘cultural storehouse’ of ‘sentiments and historical memories’ (1998:41)—seem oddly disembodied. Who were these listeners of Nasser’s and ‘rioters’ in Amman’s streets? Why did they take so heartily to the anti-Pact message? Why were others prepared to shoot them for that opposition? A footnote in Dialogues identifies class and inter-generational conflict as ‘domestic-centered’ explanations for ‘the rise and decline of domestic coalitions that support Arab nationalist goals’ (1998:275) and then leaves the matter at that. The implication here seems to be that ‘domestic centered’ explanations are unnecessary or undesirable.

Yet, without such explanations we are left with the problematic view that Arab nationalism—of the Nasserist or Ba’athist sort rather than monarchical Hashemite genus—itself represented an existential security threat to Jordan. This threat emanated from Egypt. It was advanced not through conventional military means but, in Glubb Pasha’s words of unintentional bathos, ‘murder…and…pamphlets’(FO371/121540:615).

The most common trope in this argument holds that the Egyptian radio station Voice of the Arabs, through its broadcasts of ‘slander, fabrications and sheer lies’ formed in Nasser’s hands a ‘means of psychological warfare’ which had an ‘enormous’ effect on the targeted states (Podeh, 1995:25). The demonstrations in Jordan against the Baghdad Pact are transformed in this view from an expression of domestic dissent into a form of
geopolitical struggle, subsidised and organised by Egyptian and Saudi officials (Brown, 1984:171, Podeh, 1995:181). Only if one accepts the premise that Egyptian propaganda posed an existential threat to Jordan can one argue, as Stephen Walt does for the neo-realist conclusion that Jordan refused accession to the Baghdad Pact in an instance of band-wagoning with the imminent threat posed by Nasser (Walt, 1987:68).

It is this reduction of the Baghdad Pact interlude to a play of ‘third image’ (Waltz, 1959) factors that leads to very curious empirical statements about Jordanian alignments in response to the pact. As we have seen, these arguments turn on the claim that Egyptian pan-Arab propaganda posed a security threat to Jordan. This claim allows the portrayal of Hussein as the ‘plucky little King’ being ‘bullied’ by Nasser. This assertion reflects directly the accounts of Hussein and the British, up to the ascription of the origins of nationalist literature to Egyptian diplomatic post (FO371/121464:607, see also FO371/121540:615, Podeh, 1995:25) but is undermined by other evidence. No doubt much of the printed material was distributed with Egyptian help and Voice of the Arabs was, needless to say, broadcast from Cairo. Yet the illegal Jordan Communist Party (which, if not quite the ubiquitous intriguers of the British imagination, did play a leading role in organizing popular opposition) certainly did not receive such support: it only had one printing press which had to be moved continuously to avoid detection and its cadres were recruited for the legibility of their handwriting.

To regard the anti-pact movement as a threat to Jordan equivalent to the military threats of realist theory, then, is incorrect. Indeed the movement pointed to Israel as the threat to national security, however much King Hussein may have fretted about the dangers of communist penetration in the region (Diya, 1983:200). Israel, not the Soviet Union or Egypt appeared the greater threat to most Jordanians’ national security. The majority of Jordan’s population were Palestinian refugees from the Israeli war of independence. The locus of any Jordanian bandwagoning or balancing efforts should be Israel. Of course the two states were officially at war, but Israel’s greater capabilities and potential aggressive intent were equally obvious. Israel mounted regular raids into Jordanian territory in the early 1950s, including a particularly bloody raid on the village of Qibya, that increased popular anger against the Hashemite regime. The Qibya raid is mentioned repeatedly in contemporary documents and memoirs as a catalyst for the

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23 Personal interview with Dr. Munir Hamarneh, Secretary General of the Jordan Communist Party, Amman 16th of February 2009.
movement that eventually emerged against Baghdad Pact, crystallizing the perception that Glubb and the British were uninterested in or incapable of defending Jordan (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh:121, al-Jamʿani, 2007:58, FO371/121542:628, WO2552C, 1995:583).

These arguments equate a mass movement, with its own dynamic and origins, with a military threat under the command of an identifiable state. Further, this equation presents Nasser’s Egypt as the pre-eminent threat to Jordan in the period a claim that can only be sustained by ignoring Israel and the state of legal and actual war between that country and Jordan throughout the period. The anti-pact movement certainly was a threat to the Jordanian regime and the British imperial power that sustained it. That threat was posed from within Jordanian society itself. The Voice of the Arabs appears in the memoirs of activists in the Jordan National Movement and the Jordanian Free Officers as a symbol of dignity and steadfastness and indeed as a boon to their movement (al-Jamʿani, 2007:58, Anderson, 2005:161-66). They were not compelled to listen to or read this material, still less to engage in demonstrations on the basis of it. There were, however, edicts against so doing and special measures forbidding the distribution of media from other Arab states, which were not observed (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985:141). In a useful contrast, Hussein made a radio address of his own on the 18th of December: the protests and strikes continued unabated (Satloff, 1994:122). Mass mobilisation in the towns of the East and West Banks certainly with Egyptian and Saudi aid and encouragement, characterized the anti-Baghdad pact movement. It was the political crisis caused by this movement that led to the Jordanian turn-around on the Baghdad Pact. The factors that produced this alignment therefore lie not solely in Egyptian intrigues directed against an age-old Mesopotamian rival but rather in how ‘societal change wrought political conflict’(Anderson, 2005:6) within the Jordanian social formation itself.

5.2 Social Formation and Historical Conjuncture in the Baghdad Pact

What are the particular explanations for the Baghdad Pact conjuncture in Jordan offered by uneven and combined development? They are, I argue, best summarized as
the oscillation of a new ruler between two polarized sets of social forces produced: that of the middle-class effendiyya, the dispossessed Palestinians and rural migrants in Amman and the (small) labour movement who formed the base for the Arab nationalism on the one hand and the other former pastoralists and semi-pastoralists integrated into the state through the British funded army.

5.2.1 The Effendiyya and the Arab Nationalist Moment

As I argued in the previous two chapters, this social formation resulted from the wider breakdown of the tributary system of the Ottoman Empire which was then replaced by largely British colonial domination over the Arab world as a whole. The effects of this ‘unevenness’ in the sense of the timing of Western penetration of the Arab world, may be divided into two aspects only one of which was present in Jordan. The relative lateness of Britain’s Arab colonial acquisitions (1880 for Egypt, 1920-22 for Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan) and their inheritance of the Indian administrative rather than East or South African settlement model meant the imposition of a state apparatus of surveillance, punishment and service largely staffed by “natives”. These civil servants, educators and officers would form the nucleus of a so-called “new effendiyya” who became the receptive audience of ideas of Arab national revival. This state-related effect of unevenness was matched by a directly economic one. Both Egypt and Iraq, prior to and indeed a causal factor in, were incorporated into global capitalism as rather conventional primary product exporters. In the case of Egypt cotton and in Iraq oil formed the main mechanism of combination with global capitalism. Here Jordan differed: the main mechanism of combination was the British subsidy to fund the state itself and in particular the armed forces. It was this subsidy that was the subject of the struggle over the Baghdad Pact. These mechanisms in all three states shared some aspects of the ‘rentier state’ (Beblawi, 1987:50-1). Nonetheless, these different mechanisms of combination resulting from unevenness produced different social forces and trajectories. The exigencies of colonial rule, export oriented agriculture and land reform favoured a large landholding class (leavened, more in Egypt than Iraq, with a portion of industrial capital) tied to the British. A late-coming state apparatus was staffed with the offspring of those who had lost out to these landholders and resented their national abjection in the face of Israel and the former colonial power. Added to
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this was an increasingly restive working class in ports and industry and fragments of an urban artisanate that had been undercut for at least a century by Western manufacturing. The Baghdad Pact tug-of-war between Nuri Al- Said and Nasser represented different phases in the breakdown of their regimes as a working out of this social trajectory.

The Baghdad Pact struggle was thus not pre-determined by uneven and combined development but reflected a broader regional transition best understood through its terms. The outcomes examined in this chapter were not, of course, predetermined by the previous social history outlined in this thesis. Rather the approach of examining uneven and combined development shows the options and constraints available at each point: the social basis of foreign policy. The options available to Jordan—here a short-hand for King Hussein and the decision-makers around him—in the middle of the 1950s fundamentally emerged from a transition in the politics of the Arab world. What was the nature of that transition and why did it occur? As mentioned above, the post-war system of states based on narrow ruling classes of landowners and merchants severely circumscribed by the persistence of colonial state apparatuses, was giving way to one of self-consciously anti-colonial and Arab nationalist regimes most often under military leadership under the banner of ‘freedom, unity and socialism.’ The locus of this transition was Egypt, the most populous and economically advanced Arab state, but the process unfolded through Syria and Iraq, obtruding then into Yemen/Aden and even Saudi Arabia. The conflicts beginning with the Baghdad Pact reflected this process. Jordan offers an intermediate case between these two paths, providing us with a clearer insight into the regional dynamics as a whole. Jordan in this period seemed poised equidistant between these two trajectories with a resulting oscillation in geopolitical alignments. The struggle between the populist and nationalist movement and the King’s basis of support therefore appears a particularly sharp and illuminating case of the broader context of uneven and combined development in the region in the 1950s.

In what sense, however, can uneven and combined development be cashed out to explain the particular options and constraints available to Jordan in this period? I argue that it can do so in demonstrating the linked origins of alignment decisions such as the Baghdad Pact, and the social bases within Jordan that favoured one or other alignment. At the regional level one vector of unevenness operated in the form of
British decline and the final results of the ‘disadvantage of historic priority’. Robert Gilpin, drawing upon Lenin and Trotsky, identifies ‘the tendency in an international system for the powers of member states to change at different rates because of political, economic and technological developments’ which over time cause ‘of a fundamental redistribution of power in the system’ (Gilpin, 1981:13).

Political, economic and technological change should not be taken as exogenous however but rather as results of the opposed but unitary tendencies to spatial immobilisation of investment and free circulation of capital in search of higher rates of profit (Smith, 1990:xv). British domination of the Middle East had undergone precisely such a course during and as a result of the Second World War. The war itself had demonstrated that Britain’s colonial power was far from invincible (Hussein, 1973:65). The Second World War rendered Britain finally unable to maintain control of the colonial possessions built up in the heyday of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The state was near bankrupt, having depended upon the financial productive clout of the United States (via lend lease) and the freshly industrialized population of the USSR (which bore the brunt of defeating the European axis) to survive the war. The Second World War thus represented a catastrophic recalibration of the state system in line with underlying patterns of uneven development. The most notable symptoms of this decline were, of course, the national liberation of India and then the withdrawal from Palestine and passing on of the mandate to the UN partition plan. Having been forced to recognise the impossibility of maintaining these possessions, however, British policymakers did not resign themselves to a gentle passage into second or third-rate status. Rather they clutched ever more desperately at their remaining influence in the Middle East by asserting control over the states in which they still held military installations, aid and the semi-colonial treaty apparatus. Those states comprised Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. At each of the decision points examined below the British attempt to maintain a weakening influence forms the first consideration.

What of the other side of the general transition in the Arab world in the 1950s, and therefore of the political forces with which Hussein had to deal both inside and outside Jordan at the time of the Baghdad Pact? These represented a particular response to the traumatic experience of unevenness mobilised within combined social formations, chiefly by that group known as the ‘new effendiyya’—a term with a ‘blurred meaning’ that
'grew out of daily social praxis' (Eppel, 2009:535). The effendiyya has something in common with the New Middle Class so favoured of Modernization Theorists: but it is a category suffused with the trauma of uneven development and embedded in the urban environment of combined development. In Eppel's succinct definition:

The principal common denominator that linked the members of the effendiyya in the first half of the 20th century was modernization: the acquisition of a modern education with all of its internal contradictions; the adoption and development of political discourse, primarily nationalism, sometimes colored by Communism or the Muslim Brotherhood; and an ambivalent relationship toward the West. (This ambivalence led them to oppose colonial control while adopting some of the ideas, values, concepts, and perceptions of identity that developed in the West in the process of modernization) (2009:537)

The definition of this group forcefully echoes Tom Naim's characterization of the mobilisational efforts of nationalists intellectuals activated by the ‘painful experience and fear of “under-development”’(Naim, 1975). The effendiyya formed the cadre of political parties in the Arab world and most especially in Egypt. Some of these cadres—perhaps those like Hassan al-Banna with a background in traditional industry and the semi-professional imamate (Naguib, 2006:16) entered the Muslim Brotherhood. Others—most often students—the Communist parties (Hussein, 1973:37). There is nothing unusual about this kind of leadership in situations of revolutionary crisis, of which the French and American revolutions provide ample evidence. What differs in the case of Egypt, Jordan and indeed most of the post-colonial world is the historical timing of those crises resulting from the unevenness of development. A distinguishing characteristic of the effendiyya as the Arab version of this phenomenon was that, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, army officers formed a kind of 'effendiyya in uniform' (Eppel, 2009:537). Two-thirds of the Egyptian officer corps in 1948 were the sons of salaried officials (Trimberger, 1978:152). Amongst the remainder the descendants of the upper levels of the peasantry were prominent (Be'eri, 1970:465) making the journey into urban life and state service characteristic of much of the effendiyya. This was as true of Jordan as it was of Egypt, Iraq (see chapter 4) and also Syria. What is interesting about Jordan is the different make-up of its combined social formation leading to different responses to the Arabist wave.

The effendiyya occupied a particular, somewhat weaker, place in Jordan than in its neighbours. The annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the flight of Palestinians
greatly increased their number and consciousness. As in other Arab states it was this group, supported by the young trade unions and people attracted to the towns as refugees or economic migrants, that formed the primary milieu of the Arab nationalist opposition (Anderson, 2005:119-28). Where Jordan differed was in the primary mechanism of its combination with the world economy—neither through agricultural exports (cotton, grain) that accelerated a polarization of power and wealth in the countryside nor through extractive resources (oil) that would engender a small but prospectively powerful working class. Rather the country’s main mechanism of combination was through the British subsidy to the armed forces, which had been judiciously used to integrate formerly semi-nomadic pastoralists into the state within a broader context of relatively egalitarian land distribution. The struggles of the 1950s, and especially the Baghdad Pact, revolved around – and were worked out through - the maintenance of this mechanism. The concern with the subsidy was repeated again and again. The British understood that their subsidy to the Jordanian armed forces was the main conduit of their influence in Jordan and had to be protected (FO371/115683:577). At each crucial point in the struggle over the Baghdad Pact the central question was the British subsidy to the armed forces.

Yet this question was not simply one of a neutral selection of aid providers. Rather it reached into Jordanian society itself and the contending political visions that had emerged. In the period beginning with the Baghdad Pact the freshly crowned King Hussein moved between two congealing sets of social forces in his expanded kingdom. On one side stood this grandfather’s coterie, ‘the King’s Men’, their British patrons and a (still largely passive) bloc of the Arab Legion. On the other were the forces of the Jordan National Movement, parties such as the ‘National Socialist Party’, the Ba’ath and the Communists based in trade unions and the (comparatively) urban milieu and a group of army officers increasingly hostile to British control of the institution. The Baghdad Pact struggle thus inextricably bound ‘international’ and ‘social’ in a way best

24 I do not intend here to repeat the narrative of sophisticated West Bankers against doggedly loyal East Bankers, so prevalent in both colonial and historical accounts. There is some truth to it, as there is to all clichés, but it is important to note counter-examples such as the 280 members of the Communist Party in the supposed conservative heartland of Karak (Anderson 2001:44), the radically oriented Hijaz Railway Workers’ Union established before the unification of the Banks (Hourani 2001:39) or the Marxist circles in East Bank towns which came together with the Palestinian National Liberation League to form the Jordanian Communist Party. See Al Ibil Al-dhababi l-d Hizb al Shnin”ii al-Urduni, 2001, Amman, Jordan Communist Party, p.42, also personal interview with Dr. Munir Hamarneh 16th of February 2009
understood by uneven and combined development. What was the substance of this social struggle?

5.2.2 The Pro-Baghdad Pact Forces

The arguments made to support the Baghdad Pact were notable for the inability of almost any Jordanian politician to support the pact on its own, anti-Communist terms – those who did speak in support of it tended to gloss the issue as the provision of more and better weaponry to ready the country against Israeli attack (Satloff, 1994:113). The actively pro-Baghdad Pact side consisted largely of the Glubb and the British – who, as we have seen, were so eager for Jordan to join the pact that they considered the shooting of anti-pact demonstrators an insufficiently firm response— and some of the ‘King’s Men’ in the cabinet. The mass of the army, away from the anti-pact Free Officers, seem to have remained loyal to the King’s decisions. As I argue below this was connected to the central issue around which the Baghdad Pact controversy revolved, that of subsidy to the armed forces.

British pressure to join the Baghdad Pact came not only through diplomatic channels but at the heart of the Jordanian state, through the position that General Glubb, the British officers and the annual subsidy occupied within it. This reflected the importance of the subsidy to both sides and its penetration into Jordanian society. The British saw Glubb and the subsidy as a vital conduit of influence in Jordan and the region, which had to be defended with the ‘utmost firmness’ against ‘the disruptive forces of Communism incited by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money’ (FO371/121462:602). After Nasser’s Czech arms deal both Glubb and the Foreign Office became increasingly distressed by the prospect of losing such a channel and considered it a matter of the highest importance that ‘General Glubb’s prestige… should not be weakened’ (FO371/115683:577). The prospect of a joint Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian replacement for the subsidy reduced Glubb to a state of near paranoiac terror, claiming that the anti-Baghdad Pact movement was a ‘carefully prepared plot by Egypt Saudi Arabia and Syria to drive out King Hussein and establish puppet republic’ and that the funding was a disguised Soviet ploy (FO371/121465:577). At every stage in the negotiations around the Baghdad Pact (from the original visit of Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu-l-Huda to London, through the visits of Beyar and Templer to Amman) the
pattern was for Jordan to demand or be offered increased subsidy in order to join the pact. The British conceded such inducements (but not the issue of control of the money via Glubb) to the Jordanian politicians with whom they negotiated but those politicians themselves were rejected by the Jordanian “street” who would not accept the pact.

Initially even some of those who came to oppose the pact, such as Sulaiman Nabulsi, met with Iraqi representatives to suggest what further aid would bring them round to the idea of Jordanian accession – a discussion perhaps made more amenable by a shared antipathy to Abu-l-Huda as Prime Minister (Satloff, 1994:106). Abu-l-Huda represented that narrow stratum of the ‘King’s men’ of adventurers turned advisors who had accompanied the old King Abdullah since the mandate period, ruling over a ‘police state with a civilian face’ (1994:71). Evidently out of favour both with the Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family and the semi-official opposition figures briefly falling into its orbit, he was dismissed in May 1955 (1994:104). His replacement, Saʿid al-Mufti was no populist demagogue, however, but the scion of landed Circassian family with close links to the Baghdad court (Satloff, 1994:105). The central figures in his cabinet, the defence minister Farhan Al-Shubaylat and the interior minister (later himself to become Prime Minister) Hazzaʿ al-Majali were powerful figures in the clans of Tafileh and Karak in the south-east of the country and ‘formed a potent pro-Iraqi/pro-British bloc’ (1994:106). Shubaylat in particular seems to have conferred closely with Glubb and the British out of concern that the King was too susceptible to ideas about reform of the Arab legion (FO371/115683, 1995:573).

The base of active support for the Baghdad Pact was fairly narrow, then, but more important were the implications of any accession decision for the power of the regime as a whole. Here again the crucial linkage between the army, the subsidy and Jordan’s mechanism of combination into the world economy becomes clear. The Anglo-Jordanian treaty, the vital issue for supporters of the pact, was the framework by which subsidy was delivered to Jordan and the control of the armed forces by British officers perpetuated. This control was particularly important for the ruling clique of which Abu-l-Huda formed a part – the army offered not only coercive force to support the regime but was also the main conduit for the electoral fraud by which particular cliques of the ‘King’s men’ maintained their rule (al-Jamʿani, 2007:48). Within the army, as discussed below, groups aspiring to the role of the Egyptian Free Officers had begun to form but
the rank and file remained passive and even prepared, at crucial points, to fire on demonstrators. This undoubtedly caused disquiet amongst the soldiers (al-Jamʿani, 2007:50) and concern amongst the Western powers about their reliability (WO2552C:580). Yet orders to fire were obeyed. The army was not the primary site of the struggle over the Baghdad Pact but rather its object – the Free Officers met to discuss their response to the situation only after the major demonstrations had taken place (al-Jamʿani, 2007:58). Front line troops were recruited largely from those pastoralist and formerly pastoralist groups—the “bedouin”—who had no roots amongst the protestors (WO2552C:580)—and for whom the British subsidised armed forces had replaced their traditional economy. However, the accelerating polarization within the country and the distancing of relations with Britain would subsequently bring about significant divisions within the army, which emerged after King Hussein’s sacrifice of Glubb as a scapegoat for the ire aroused by the suppression of the anti-Baghdad pact protests. The British subsidy and its role in integrating the bedouin in the state of course, preceded the existence of Jordan as an independent kingdom. The new factor that emerged in the Baghdad Pact interlude was that of a mass movement based on similar social forces to those that had emerged in other Arab states.

5.2.3 The Social Base of the anti-Baghdad Pact Movement

We can identify three main streams that joined together to form the nationalist current of which the anti-Baghdad Pact movement became a high point. As in any dynamic political movement there was a substantial overlap and common evolution between these but for the purpose of analysis we can view the main components as the National Socialist Party of Sulaiman Nabulsi and the civilian nationalist left of which the most significant groups were the Baʿath and Communist Parties as well as the Movement of Arab Nationalists (Gharabieh, 2004:85). To these should be added the military nationalists associated with the Baʿath and the Organisation of Jordanian Free Officers (Anderson, 2005:132). What is noticeable about all these groups is their location in the changing Jordanian social formation. The leadership of these groups belonged precisely to the professional and intellectual occupations associated with the implantation of the colonial state in Jordan (al-Hamoud, 1999:82, Anderson, 2005:143). As such they represented the Jordanian component of the new effendiyya,
demonstrating the fluidity of that class in their the new frequent migrations between government service and opposition, although there was a continuum between those closest and farthest from the regime. At the close end of the spectrum stood Sulaiman Al-Nabulsi of the National Socialist Party—regarded even by the Communists as a great national leader (Hijazain, 1999:123) but who also served as a member of previous governments, ambassador to London and secretary to the Prime Minister (Al-Sha‘ir, 1999:68). It is this fluidity that accounts, for example, for the founding of the National Socialist Party by Hazza‘ al-Majali who would go on to be the Prime Minister against whom the anti-Baghdad Pact movement was directed (Anderson, 2005:142).

At a somewhat greater remove from power we find the Jordanian branch of the Ba‘ath. Whereas the National Socialist Party shared only its unfortunate choice of name with parties in other Arab states, the Ba‘ath was of course supposed to be operate as a pan-Arab organisation. The party in Jordan, as in Iraq and Syrian, operated through both civilian and military wings. The Ba‘ath is thus particularly interesting because of this interaction and the internal fractures it generated in the army, the main mechanism of Jordan’s combination with the global capitalist relations. The party was founded in 1951 mainly by teachers (Anderson, 2005:136) but split over whether to have a conscious component in the military, which the main civilian leadership rejected. The civilian Ba‘ath grew sharply before and during the Baghdad Pact struggles, with a strong representation amongst teachers and the student union (Gharabieh, 2004:89). The party also claimed a majority representation in the leadership of the General Federation of Trade Unions, reflecting an influence carried over from the Palestinian union movement (2004:52). The party’s claims of thousands upon thousands of members are probably exaggeration (Anderson, 2005:143) but the claim of a widespread influence seems borne out in the organisation of demonstrations and strikes (2004:89).

The question of Ba‘athist influence allows us to consider the opposition within the military, the core of the state. The Ba‘ath officers shaded into the Organisation of

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25 Interview with Bahjat Abu Gharabieh, 4th of May 2009
26 Although the competition between the Communists and the Ba‘ath in the trade unions means Ba‘ath sources tend to emphasise their own influence and ignore that of the Communists and vice versa.
Jordanian Free Officers. Glubb considered this organisation an ‘invented’ front for Egyptian propaganda (FO371/121540:615) while US intelligence was concerned that a ‘a Palestinian elite group among younger Legion officers, similar to and inspired by the Free Officers in the Egyptian Army’ was developing (WO2552C:580). These views fit well with those explanations that see the Baghdad Pact opposition as the manipulation of Palestinian resentment to serve Egyptian hegemonic ends. The Free Officers were not invented, although they were a fairly small group, composed of supporters of all anti-colonialist parties or none: Daafi al-Jam‘ani, a leading Ba‘athist officer counted five Ba‘athists, one National Socialist, one Communist influenced engineering officer and six non-aligned officers among the core group(al-Jam‘ani, 2007:56).

As we have seen, US intelligence identified the Free Officers as mainly Palestinian. Although the Palestine question—and Glubb’s identification of Egypt rather than Israel as the main threat to the country—undoubtedly motivated the officers, they were not all Palestinians. Free Officer leaders such as al-Jam‘ani, Shahir abu Shahut and sympathisers and forebears such as Ali Abu Nuwwar (Nuwwar, 1990:9) and Abdullah Tell (Massad, 2001:166) came from East Bank town backgrounds of some prosperity. The Free Officers were not republicans but did seek closer military cooperation with Syria. As a social milieu they seem, as in other Arab states, to have formed part of the new effendiyya which formed the basis of nationalist discourse. They demanded the expulsion of the British officers and the Arabization of the army. This demand reflected quite directly their material interest: the persistence of British colonial power through Glubb’s command blocked the advance of Arab officers and especially those from town backgrounds (FO371/115683:573). Yet, if Glubb were removed would Britain continue its subsidy? The question was an open one. The search for an alternative subsidy implied at the same time a re-alignment in Jordan’s Arab politics and the advancement of that part of the new effendiyya in the officer corps(Be'eri, 1970:7)—what one is tempted to call the petit-bourgeoisie in arms. The advances of the Free Officers were to come in the main after the impact of the mass movement against the Baghdad Pact, only meeting to discuss their strategy after the downfall of the al-Majali cabinet (al-Jam‘ani, 2007:53).
The Ba’ath and the Nabulsites were thus embedded to greater or lesser degree in a ‘professional stratum…at the forefront of national political discourse throughout the region by the late 1940s because of its educational experiences and its unique position within a changing socio-economic milieu’ (Anderson, 2005:29). To their left stood the illegal Jordan Communist Party\(^{27}\). The JCP cadres usually came from the same backgrounds—sometimes families—as the Ba’ath and National Socialist Parties but sought to cultivate much stronger links with such working class organisation as existed in Jordan at the time\(^{28}\). The paradox of the ‘politics of combined and uneven development’ (Lowy, 1981:94) is that Communist Parties came to lead anti-colonial movements even in places where the industrial working class was very small. King Hussein’s contemporary denunciations of Communism have the ring of an instrumental appeal to Cold War priorities. This should not obscure the significant role of the JCP. Amnon Cohen, an Israeli historian working with Jordanian mukhabarat records, concludes that the JCP ‘was the most powerful political party in Jordan in the 1950s’(Cohen, 1982:57). But whom did this notionally proletarian party seek to lead?

In 1950s Jordan, the working class was small indeed. As I have argued above, the central mechanism of Jordan’s combination with the world economy was the British subsidy which flowed through the army to the regime’s agrarian base. There were, however, elements of a working class produced by the development, albeit highly limited, of capitalist productive enterprise and the operations of the state. Much, though not all, of the Jordanian working class movement owed its development to the nakbah. The Palestinian refugees of 1948 brought with them traditions of organisation from the (comparatively) more urban and industrialized areas of the Mandate. Of course, organised workers were a minority amongst wage-earners who themselves formed a small fraction of the population, as this table illustrates:

28 The story is told of a Jordanian communist who, having been imprisoned after the popular uprisings in the country in 1957 was visited by his father. On the way to the desert prison, the old man visited working class communities throughout Jordan to ask them what they thought of his son. Everywhere he was told that they had never heard of him. Upon telling his incarcerated son this news, the father was surprised to find the younger man apparently delighted and asked him “Why are you happy? The working class you’re supposed to be fighting for don’t even know you exist!” To which the younger man replied “No, this is a miracle. You found a working class in Jordan!” I am indebted to Mohammed el Masri for this anecdote.
The trade unions thus organised just over 1% of the labour force (both agricultural and non-agricultural) in the period of the Baghdad Pact; perhaps close to 2.5% at their height two years later. The noteworthy point here is not necessarily the absolute size but the rapid growth of the unions, in particular the ten-fold leap in the period of the struggle against the Baghdad Pact between 1954 and 1956. In part this growth was a legal artifice, union registration only having been permitted in 1953 (al-Hourani, 2001:12). Yet the period of enormous growth from a low base of the trade union movement coincides with the more general struggle against British colonialism and therefore with an awakening to the possibilities of political and economic activism amongst workers. Several of the most active of these unions were founded or expanded by Communist Party members (2001:36-56). The Party, which had its roots in a merger of East Bank Marxist circles and the Palestinian National Liberation League (Hijazain, 1999:122). Communist activists began in earnest to organise workers on both Banks in 1951\(^\text{29}\). The first groups of workers to organise themselves were in sectors of light industry associated with the increases in consumption and construction following the unification of the East and West Banks of the Jordan or often in the wage-earning sectors of the physical, financial and administrative infrastructure occasioned by the expansion of the state. Thus the General Union of Construction Workers, the Union of Municipality Employees, the Union of Public Service Employees, the Textile Workers

Union, the General Trade Union of Mining and Mining Employees, the Print Workers’ Union and the General Trade Union of Banks, Insurance and Auditing Employees were all established in 1954 (al-Hourani, 2001:36-56). The port workers’ union—Jordan having only one port at Aqaba—began in 1956 (2001:53) but the Hijaz Railway Workers union preceded even Jordanian independence in 1948 and was known for its militancy\(^{30}\).

What are the implications for our discussion of the Baghdad Pact of this history of the making of the Jordanian working class? This discussion allows us to fill in with empirical evidence, with theoretical guidance from the concept of uneven and combined development, the hole in accounts that see the anti-Baghdad Pact movement simply as an outgrowth of Nasser’s radio-borne propaganda. The Communist Party must be distinguished from the labour movement of course, but it was the significant—perhaps the most significant—organised force in the agitation against the Baghdad Pact. Its degree of organisation and commitment and its involvement in the trade unions were the source of this influence and therefore part of the pull on Jordan away from the pact. The party’s illegal newspaper *Muqawama Sha’ibiyya* was the only regular organ of any political party in the country (Cohen, 1982:50). The trade union movement in this period was largely led by Communist activists\(^{31}\), a strength reflected in the strikes and demonstrations organised against the pact and later in favour of the Nabulsi government (Hijazain, 1999:131). Their numbers were extremely limited but even Jordan’s limited degree of integration into the world economy as a governed unit of space produced an organisable group of workers in the administrative, educational and physical infrastructure of the state. In common with other Communist parties in the colonial world, the JCP adopted in some degree the politics of ‘stages’ of liberation (1999:122). Thus the primary points of the Communist Party programme, and therefore of the National Front it built, were the “independence of Jordan and the expulsion of the British forces and General Glubb Pasha and the Arabization of the army, the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty’, basic democratic rights and the ‘building of an independent national economy’ (Hamarneh, 2001:42)\(^{32}\).

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\(^{30}\) Personal communication with Mohammed El-Masri. The taxi drivers’ union was to become the largest union in the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions but was known for its passivity and infiltration by the secret police. However, this development took place after the period under discussion here. Interview with Walid al-Khayat; see also al-Hourani (2001:57).

\(^{31}\) Interview Walid al Khayat 2009, also *Afi‘al Al-Dhababi* pp.52-3

\(^{32}\) My translation.
The wage-earning working class, still less the organised and conscious part of it, remained a very small minority in the Jordanian social formation. There was little of the shock of the new, of rapid industrialisation and the disjuncture between rhythms of life within a few years, which has been so important a feature of uneven and combined development elsewhere (Davidson, 2006b:211). What had occurred was rapid urbanization and expansion of the population, partly as a result of the Palestinian influx after 1948 (Anderson, 2005:122). Much of the population was unemployed or underemployed—a British sociologist found 90% of Amman residents considered themselves to live in unacceptable poverty (cited in Anderson, 2005:125). 1950s Jordan does not display the vista of pre-revolutionary Russia but it does show a remarkable change in the society in one lifetime: from a society in which stone buildings were a comparative rarity to one in which 43.9% of the population was urbanised (Anderson, 2005:125). It was this urban population that provided the basis for the mass movements against the Baghdad Pact: “[w]hile the majority of the urban masses did not become party activists or even official members, the parties used their rising anger as ammunition against government policies. Workers, rural, migrants, and the unemployed all came out in protest whenever the parties led the way” (Anderson, 2005:125).

**5.3 Historical Outcome: the Baghdad Pact Struggle**

How did the struggle between these various social forces play out in the actual history of the Pact? The Baghdad Pact, was signed by Iraq and Turkey on the 24th of February 1955 (Podeh, 1995:1). The declared purpose of the pact was to deter the Soviet Union from threatening the Middle East. Egypt rejected the alliance: Britain joined it six weeks after it was first signed (Satloff, 1994:110). Egypt was more interested in the actual conflict embodied in the continual skirmishes along the armistice line with Israel than with a notional Soviet threat to be combated under Iraqi leadership (1994:110). Although the first signatories to the pact were Iraq and Turkey, the initiative aimed at creating a ‘central Treaty organisation’ along the lines of NATO, thereby integrating the Middle East and the consequent struggles around the pact into the dynamic of the global Cold War—an organisation that would, it was hoped, prevent the region’s oil reserves falling into Soviet hands and also providing for continued British influence over the local governments (Ashton, 1996:37). These dynamics covered both
the hostility between the superpower blocs and the tensions within them. Thus US officials such as Dulles saw more clearly than the British that the pact was unlikely to attract Egypt and that this would hobble the initiative. The US was also much more in favour of using the pact as a vehicle for a ‘Northern Tier’ of anti-Soviet states including Pakistan, while attempting to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab states. The US therefore did not join the pact and sought a moratorium on further Arab membership (1996:49). Yet this meant that the pact was apparently bereft of Arab support and particularly of Arab support amongst the ‘front-line’ states along the armistice line with Israel thereby undermining the notion that the USSR was the main threat to the region. This rendered potential Jordanian membership in the pact crucial for its success (Podeh, 1995:172).

5.3.1 Early Negotiations: The Crucial Subsidy

Jordan’s involvement with the pact began with intimations that the country might join given the right inducements. In late 1954, when proposals for the pact were being discussed, the then Jordanian Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu-l-Huda mounted an ‘ill-considered and ill-prepared visit to London ostensibly to negotiate for the revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty’ (FO371/121461:525) In his negotiations with Anthony Nutting at the Foreign Office in December 1954 presented the demand for Jordanian control over the subsidy and therefore the Jordanian armed forces. The British would not wear such insubordination. Abu-l-Huda was informed that there would be no changes to the subsidy and compounded the failure by implying that Jordan would join the Baghdad Pact (Satloff, 1994:104). Once Britain had officially joined the pact in April 1955, Abu-l-Huda was in an even greater quandary. He sought to bargain entry to the pact for treaty revision but (given the dependence on British subsidy of both the state he served and the ruling group to which he belonged) had no leverage over the colonial power. Hussein, to the extent that he displayed a position, began to favour entry to the pact, as did the notables of the National Socialist party such as Sulaiman Nabulsi. In their dealings with the Iraqis these men requested inducements for Jordan to join the pact, in return for which Nuri al-Sa’id demanded that the vacillating Abu-l-Huda be sacked (1994:106).
In the spring and summer of 1955, Hussein’s discussions with Glubb Pasha the British commander of the Jordanian armed forces seem to have centered on defensive strategy against Israel and the question of placing mechanized forces in the north of the country (FO371/115719:569). The British considered this concentration on the Palestine front evidence of a ‘timorous and indecisive’ attitude in the Jordanian government towards ‘what they privately admitted was the best course for the country’, i.e. joining the pact (FO371/121461:535). The British were resolved to cajole Jordan into a more a positive public attitude towards the pact, but were overtaken by events in the form of Nasser’s famous Czech arms deal.

Here the intertwining of social and geopolitical factors through uneven and combined development becomes clear in the narrative of the Baghdad Pact in Jordan. The pact was originally signed in a context in which the newly formed Egyptian Free Officers’ regime and much of the Arab public were in no doubt as to the identity of their enemy (Anderson, 2005:157): a series of Israeli raids inflicted devastating casualties in Gaza and the West Bank (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985:121). In response to these, Nasser executed in September 1955 the first of his characteristic coups de main—the arms deal with Czechoslovakia that was in fact an agreement with the Soviet Union (Anderson, 2005:158). Egypt was seeking aid from the Soviet Union, the target of the Baghdad Pact, in order to fend off Israel, a friend of the British sponsor of the alliance. The British Embassy in Amman considered this ‘severe rebuff to the Western powers’ a major source of Nasser’s popularity in Jordan (FO371/121461:532). The Foreign Office instructed the local embassy that with ‘the new Soviet intrusion into the Middle East it is of the greatest importance that our position in Jordan, which depends quite considerably on General Glubb’s prestige, should not be weakened. We must therefore, take all possible measures to ensure that this does not happen.’ (FO371/115683:577).

5.3.2 Turning Points: The Czech Arms Deal and the Baghdad Pact

The importance of the Czech arms deal was that it offered a potential alternative source of support for Arab states to that of the old colonial power, and that alternative came from the Soviet power against which the Baghdad Pact was directed. The efforts of Britain, Turkey and Iraq would have to be redoubled to ensure Jordanian entry to the
pact. Abu-l-Huda was sacked and replaced by Sa‘id al-Mufti who was, in the British view, ‘not up to the responsibility of taking such a major decision’ as joining the pact. (FO371/121461:526). The British, and the Turks as conduits for British influence, increased their efforts to get Jordan to join the pact (al-Jam‘ani, 2007:48). The centerpiece of these efforts—‘with our support’ (FO371/121461:531)—was the visit of the Turkish President Celal Beyar to Amman in November of 1955. Bayar spent a week talking to Hussein’s advisors. The vital point again was increasing the subsidy for the Arab legion (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985). After the Turkish visit al-Mufti notified the British embassy of the price for Jordan’s entry, which the British considered an ‘extravagant list of their alleged military requirements’ (FO371/121461:531) which nonetheless indicated how Jordan could be brought into the pact. The Foreign Office was unambiguous about the means and importance of British influence in the country, reminding the Amman Embassy that ‘our position in Jordan… depends quite considerably on General Glubb’s prestige’ and to ‘assure Glubb that he has the full support of Her Majesty’s Government and that we shall back him if any attempt is made to impose measures on the Arab legion which are likely to impair its efficiency’, i.e. the Arabization of the officer corps. (FO371/115683:577). The British dispatched the Chief of General Staff, Gerald Templer with a modified financial package to win Hussein over (FO371/121461:531).

Templer went to Amman in December 1955 to gain Jordan’s entry to the pact. He failed because, the government ‘[g]overnment cannot or will not carry through unpopular policies…[m]ass pressure now so sways Amman authorities [that] they fear mob action if government tried to move against current Arab thinking’ (US embassy cited in Anderson, 2005:166). Shortly before Templer’s visit, the Commander in Chief of Egyptian (and therefore also Syrian) forces visited Amman to wide popular acclaim—a dramatic and personal illustration of the choice facing Jordan and the gulf between the regime and the populace (Satloff, 1994:116). Templer’s negotiations began only moderately cordially on the 7th December and throughout the following week degenerated to the point of humiliating collapse. The turning point was the resignation of four (West Bank) ministers from al-Mufti’s cabinet and the refusal of a Jordanian ‘counterproposal’. Glubb and the British put about the claim that the ministers had

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33 Arabization meant the replacement of British with Arab commanding officers
been bribed by the Saudis and Egyptians (FO371/121461:526). The ministers themselves insisted that the resignations were a matter of national honour (Diya, 1983:197). Whatever the truth of the affair it is noteworthy again that the British would not budge on the Jordanian demand in the ‘counterproposal’ for control of the subsidy to the Arab Legion (Satloff, 1994:119).

The cabinet crisis brought the resignation of Saʿid al-Mufti. Hussein replaced him with Hazzaʿ al-Majali, Kerak notable and former member of the National Socialist Party, explicitly to bring the country into the Baghdad Pact. These efforts gave rise to the ‘popular agitation’ (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985:129) that began on the 17th of December. There were widespread demonstrations throughout the kingdom: not just in Palestinian cities with existing histories of resistance such as Nablus and Jerusalem but also in Amman, Irbid, Salt, Jericho, Hebron, Aqaba and even the ‘tribal’ towns of Maʿan and Kerak. The protestors were certainly not satisfied by the choice of Majali to carry out precisely the opposite of their demands, and were willing to risk death. The British were very keen on the use of deadly force against protests and regarded their own countrymen in the legion as the only ones reliable enough to order the shooting of protestors (FO371/121466:640). Nationalist officers of the time also report that most soldiers were against shooting the protestors (al-Jamʿani, 2007:49). Yet orders to shoot were obeyed. At least 15 people were killed in the suppression of the December 1955 protests (Satloff, 1994:121). It was unclear how much more stress the regime could take, however. The King could not be assured even of the loyalty of his own civil servants nor al-Majali of his own cabinet ‘even senior government officials came out into the streets and consequently some of the Ministers…were intimidated into resigning’ (FO371/121461:527). Majali resigned and Hussein promised new elections which would be a referendum of sorts on the Pact (Satloff, 1994:122).

The fall of Hazzaʿ al Majali’s government marked the effective end of attempts to get Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact but the beginning of a new influence by the popular national movement on Jordanian alignments (Anderson, 2005:165). The caretaker government of Ibrahim al Hashim promised ‘no new pacts’ and to hold power only until new elections (Satloff, 1994:127). Having promised elections for the New Year, Hussein soon went back on the promise and revoked the dissolution of Parliament.
The opposition was understandably enraged at this demarche and set to organizing fresh demonstrations. The British Foreign Office urged the ‘utmost firmness’ in the ‘struggle between forces loyal to the Dynasty and the disruptive forces of Communism incited by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money’ and commended Hussein’s banning of a National Socialist public meeting (FO371/121462:603). This ban sparked off a new popular uprising, more serious than the first (al-Hourani and al-Tarawneh, 1985:156). The British certainly considered it such, discussing plans to evacuate British nationals (FO371/121464:607) and suggesting calling in Iraqi troops (FO371/121465:610). Entry to the pact was dropped and in effect the entire project of an anti-Soviet treaty organisation in the Middle East was seriously imperiled without Jordanian participation.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to examine the usefulness of uneven and combined development for analysis of the International Relations of the Middle East by a detailed examination of the Jordanian response to the Baghdad Pact. In so doing, I advanced an interpretation of those events that challenges the neo-realist and constructivist accounts (which hold a privileged position in the development of those theoretical traditions) and which expands, analytically and empirically, on existing historical sociological accounts. Based upon the sources used in this chapter, primary and secondary, I have attempted to demonstrate how the uneven development of capitalist social relations (embodied in the “late” arrival of the colonial state in Jordan and the results of earlier Ottoman attempts to catch up with the capitalist empires) produced the social trajectories through which the conscious political actors worked in the period of the struggle against the Baghdad Pact. The analysis in this chapter demonstrated in particular how the role of the effendiyya and urban popular milieu in Jordan’s social formation derived from uneven and combined development and the impact this had on the alignments of the state. The following chapter continues the analysis by taking up further case studies of Jordan’s alignments: the Suez Crisis, the expulsion of the British Officers, the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and the eventual acceptance of US aid.
6. Jordan between nationalism and colonialism

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a second case study illustrating the utility of uneven and combined development in explaining geopolitical alignments of post-colonial states, taking four instances of Jordanian alignment to do so. The chapter therefore provides evidence to support the theoretical claims for uneven and combined development made in chapters one and two and extends the argument made in the previous chapter on the Baghdad Pact. In that chapter, I argued that Jordanian policy towards the Baghdad Pact resulted from an oscillation between two polarized sets of social forces. These forces were produced in the Jordanian social formation by the process of uneven and combined development substantiated in chapters three and four.

In so doing, the chapter addresses some of the specific empirical lacunae present in omni-balancing approaches. For example, Laurie Brand is surely correct to claim that ‘[t]he US was willing to step in to play the former British role [in Jordan] because its strategic interest included maintaining regional stability to ensure the free flow of oil’ (1994:42). However, the statement that ‘a coup attempt by members of the army in 1957 led the king to dismiss his Arab nationalist-oriented Prime Minister’ leading to the removal of Arab budgetary aid and its replacement by US support (1994:42) requires some qualification. As is shown below, the purported coup attempt was a very murky business, of which most of the alleged leaders disavowed responsibility (Massad, 2001:192, Nuwwar, 1990:316).

Nonetheless, there was an influential Arab nationalist movement amongst army officers, and this movement was contemporaneous with and connected to the democratic upsurge that brought about the Nabulsi cabinet and its appeal for aid for the Arab solidarity pact. Although Brand and others have explained Jordan’s realignment with the West as a result of the ASP’s failure actually to come up with the money (Anderson, 2005:187), the Arab Solidarity Pact implied opposition to Western
intervention in the region and was hence presented incompatible with the US aid. As is
demonstrated below, it was the King’s insistence on the impossible demand of receiving
both that led to the rescinding of the Arab offer. The notion of budget security explains
the vital need for aid—it does not explain the choice of the particular provider of that
aid amongst alternatives.

The contribution of this chapter lies, then, in extending the argument already
made—that Jordan’s alignments resulted from the pull of the poles of Jordan’s social
formation—to a different case of behaviour to that analysed in chapter five. Indeed, the
events discussed in this chapter follow almost the mirror image of the Baghdad Pact
alignment. Jordan initially proposed adherence to the pact only then to reject it and
move closer to the emerging axis around Nasser’s Egypt. In this chapter I analyse
alignments that proceed to a high point of identification with the Arab axis in the
signing of the Arab Solidarity Pact in January 1957 then followed by the rejection of that
axis and the return to the Western fold with the implicit acceptance of the Eisenhower
doctrine in April of that year. If we can account for this variation in terms derived from
uneven and combined development then this case indicates the strength of the concept.

6.1 Origins of the alignments: unevenness and combination

The outcomes examined in this chapter were not, of course, predetermined by
the previous social history outlined in this thesis. As the previous chapter demonstrated
for the case of the Baghdad Pact, these contingent outcomes were responses to a social
context brought about by uneven and combined development. The decisions examined
below were largely responses, fought out on the basis of Jordan’s combined social
formation, to the programme of mimetic modernization, in Egypt. This programme
derived from the effects of colonial rule had been contradictory: introducing capitalist
development, permitting the partial growth of a bourgeoisie but centred around the
main mechanism of Egypt’s combination with the global economy, the cotton crop
(Hussein, 1973:61). This retardation of economic growth—the promotion and
entrenchment of uneven development by the colonial power—rendered the Egyptian
state unable to compete geopolitically. The loss of Palestine to the Zionist forces in 1948 revealed the basic dysfunctionality of the Egyptian ruling class.

As Mahmoud Hussein writes the Free Officers ‘hoped to create a strong Egyptianized state with the aid of an up-to-date army, and compensate the failure of the traditional representatives of the ruling class’ reflecting their keenly felt awareness of the political consequences of Egypt’s uneven development in the ‘politico-ideological inferiority… with respect to foreigners, loss of the state’s moral authority, and anachronism of the traditional political parties’ (Hussein, 1973:95). The steps of this attempt at mimetic modernization, resulting from the ‘whip of external necessity identified in Chapter 2, were were often impromptu and haphazard but they fed back into geopolitical competition itself providing the context to which weaker Arab states such as Jordan had to react. This was particularly the case in the Suez War as I demonstrate below, but the entire period was over-determined by the emergence of the Nasser regime in Egypt and the Anglo-Iraqi response to it: the poles between which Jordan swung and with which different social forces inside the Jordan state identified.

Such, then, was the regional context to which Jordan had to react. In the following section I analyse specifically how Jordan’s geopolitical alignments can be traced back to uneven and combined development. The decisions examined here—the expulsion of British officers, rhetorical belligerence and actual neutrality over Suez, the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the final decision to accept American rather than Arab aid in its place—were open and contingent matters. History could have been different. For it to have been so, however, different social forces would need to have been mobilized. Different strategies would need to have been pursued and soother structures successfully challenged or reinforced. The investigation below rather seeks to demonstrate that the oscillations of Hussein’s regime, in a context that was simultaneously ‘external’ and ‘domestic’ reflected the attractive force of two poles within the combined social formation that it ruled. As was argued in the previous chapter, these principal poles comprised on one side the effendiyya, their allies in a diverse milieu of the urban dispossessed and the embryonic working class but not a discontented rural mass. On the other we find the limited core of merchants, shaykhs and landowners
around the King and with them the formerly nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists who had been integrated into the state through military subsidy, the main mechanism of combination with the global capitalist economy. How does this scheme fare in comparison with the empirical evidence? I take up the case where the last chapter left off, immediately after the fall of the Baghdad Pact in early 1956 leading up to the expulsion of the British officers from Jordan in March of that year.

6.2 Glubb and the British officers

6.2.1 The Dilemma and Conflict

King Hussein decreed the dismissal and expulsion of General Glubb and the British officers, along with two of the senior Arab officers most associated with Glubb, on the 1st of March 1956 (al-Luqyaani, 1993:36). The command of British officers over the Jordanian army had allowed London effectively to determine Jordan’s responses to Israel on the one hand and the front-line Arab states, particularly Egypt, on the other thereby forming a crucial conduit of British influence in the Middle East. The FCO recognized this situation and saw it as crystallized in the position of General Glubb, as revealed in the dispatch of the 26th of October 1955 stating: ‘with the new Soviet intrusion into the Middle East it is of the greatest importance that our position in Jordan, which depends quite considerably on General Glubbs prestige, should not be weakened’ (FO371/115683:577).

The decision to expel the British officers therefore represented a further interaction between British decline and the assertiveness of the new effendiyya within the Jordanian combined social formation. The King’s move in dismissing Glubb appeared to take a step closer to the Nasserist anti-colonial position. The expulsion flowed from the mass movement against the Baghdad Pact in the preceding months: as Betty Anderson writes, ‘Jordan’s swing to the political left, begun in December 1955 appeared on a steady course’ with the dismissal of Glubb in March 1956 (Anderson, 2005:167). The dismissal of the British officers was thus a rejection, at least partial, of British tutelage over Jordan.
in favour of a more Arabist course.

How does uneven and combined development help us understand that course? As I have argued above, the British subsidy, administered directly through Glubb, represented the main mechanism of combination between the Jordanian social formation and the global political economy. The British subsidy was not simply one option amongst a number of alternatives available to the Hashemite regime to sustain itself—the position implied by theories of omni-balancing and budget and regime security. Rather the annual subvention formed an integral part of the Jordanian social formation, one whose rejection by the regime implied the search for an alternative social base. The kin-ordered networks of patronage and loyalty—the tribal confederations such as the Bani Sakhr and Huwaytat integrated and subsidised through the processes described in chapter 4—were thus maintained and reproduced in combination with the colonial and post-colonial state and beyond this to the imperial power in London. Yet the emergence of the effendiyya with the unification of the West and East Banks and the expansion of state functions was also replicated in the army itself. The Free Officers and their sympathizers represented this trend. The expulsion of the British officers necessarily implied a turn towards the Free Officers and the wider anti-colonial current to which they were linked. Hussein’s dismissal of Glubb and company should therefore be seen not simply as a royal decree but as a response to the struggles and dilemmas produced by uneven and combined development in the Jordanian social formation.

What evidence bears out this claim? The King had, since his ascent to the throne, entertained the idea that Glubb and his entourage were stifling the development of the Jordanian armed forces, preventing the appointment of talented Jordanian officers and inhibiting national defence against Israeli raids (al-Luqyaani, 1993:28). Foreign Office dispatches record several quarrels between the King and Glubb over materiel, appointments and the stationing of forces (FO371/115719:569). Already in the Autumn of 1955 British officials complained that ‘King Hussein is behaving in a manner calculated to undermine the organisation and discipline of the Arab legion’ and had described it as a ‘rabble’ without ‘proper organisation’ and ‘that good men were being kept back and incompetent people promoted’ (FO371/115683:573). While at
Sandhurst Hussein attended a party in Paris organised by the Free Officers group at which he established contact with Ali Abu Nuwwar whom he was later to promote, against Glubb’s resistance, to aide-de-camp (Massad, 2001:172). Hussein thus seems to have harboured a desire to get rid of Glubb from very early in his reign but could not simply act on that desire—contrary to the notion that Hussein’s personal policy was the most important factor in making Jordanian alignments. Such a decision had to await a changed political context in which possible alternative sources of support for the regime were available both inside and outside the Arab Legion.

What changed the political context was the movement against the Baghdad Pact, analysed in the previous chapter. This movement changed the options available to Hussein. The crisis had demonstrated the shakiness of the regime and, most of all, its reliance on the Arab Legion under British command. Retreat from the pact, and therefore victory for the forces of the anti-colonial left in the Jordanian National Movement, won Hussein breathing space by the beginning of 1956. The next step would have to be precisely made. The JNM, based in an urban and semi-urban milieu of the new effendiyya and the dispossessed urban milieu grew in influence and with it the current of pro-Nasser nationalist opinion. To repress it would require even greater, bloodier reliance on the Arab legion and therefore on the British. Yet to continue to allow the JNM, its supporters and the republican regime in Egypt to influence policy through their power in the street opened up a very dangerous route for the monarch. Hussein therefore made a tactical move to the left in dismissing Glubb. The killing of anti-Baghdad Pact demonstrators by the Arab legion was seen in the street largely as Glubb’s work (al-Jamʿani, 2007:49-50, Satloff, 1994:137). By dismissing the unloved Briton Hussein succeeded in deflecting the anger of the preceding months onto Glubb and indeed winning wide popular and regional acclaim.

This break from British influence over the Jordanian army involved both pre-conditions and consequences rooted in the Jordanian social formation. The dismissal of Glubb brought Hussein close to anti-colonial nationalists both military and civilian. First, the British officers had been largely running the Arab Legion. Their numbers had increased greatly after the Second World War. Expelling these officers from the army
and the country meant promoting Jordanians to replace them—for which personnel Hussein turned to the Free Officers’ movement and allied individuals such as Abu Nuwwar. According to Abu Nuwwar, the King visited him the night before dismissing Glubb explicitly seeking assurance that Abu Nuwwar and ‘the brother officers’ were capable and prepared for the ‘operation’ to take control of the army (Nuwwar, 1990:171). Hussein believed, at least, that sections of the army would remain loyal to Glubb and to Britain, telling the British ambassador that ‘although he realized the British officers would not start a revolt… some of the others in the Legion, particularly among the Bedouin from outside Jordan whom Glubb had recruited in the Legion, might do so’ and that ‘a number of them were plotting against him’ (FO371/121541:622). Glubb and his subordinate Peter Young, in a perhaps self-serving aside, also claimed that number of avowedly Bedouin officers were prepared to reject the decision by force only to be restrained by the British officers themselves: it seems some soldiers loyal to Glubb left the army in protest at his dismissal, particularly from the armoured car regiments and the First Infantry which had been the most prominent sites of Glubb’s military integration of the Bedouin into the state (Massad, 2001:186). A few British officers hung on under the terms of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty along with the British air and sea bases in the country but the army was now re-organised to reflect the control of Ali Abu Nuwwar and his allies in the Free Officers movement.

6.2.2 The Outcome

The dismissal of the British officers thus involved satisfying some of the demands of the effendiyya in and out of uniform and the wider group of demonstrators and strikers they could mobilise within the Jordanian combined social formation. Again this vector of combination was intertwined with British decline. The British ambassador considered the dismissal of Glubb the ‘most spectacular incident’ in the broader trend of ‘a movement away from the influence of Britain (and the lesser influence of Iraq) accompanied by a progressive alignment with the views and policies of Syria and Egypt’ (Johnston, 1957:679-80).

The British embassy considered the option of cutting off military supplies to Jordan as a response but hesitated on the grounds that there was ‘little doubt that the
Jordanians could get both financial and military help from the Egyptians and Saudis, possibly with Russian backing, for a time anyway which would be long enough to destroy our position… and would cost us the rights and facilities which the R.A.F at present have under the treaty (FO371/121466:647). Hussein’s decision thus implied the alignment away from Britain and towards Egypt. This carried further implications shown in those documents: why should the UK continue to subsidise a military over which it had lost control? From this dilemma followed a further shift in military and civilian bases of support for the regime. The King was acclaimed in the days following Glubb’s dismissal by thousands of demonstrators ‘in every town and village’ (Nuwwar, 1990:180), expressing their support for both Nasser and Hussein (FO371/121466:629).

In sum then, Glubb and the British officers represented the persistence of the apparatus of the British colonial state even in post-independence Jordan—an apparatus the British considered necessary for the geo-political reasons given in the documents above. Yet that apparatus also oversaw the distribution of a subsidy that played a central role in the Jordanian social formation as its main mechanism of combination with the global capitalist economy; indeed, the precondition for the reproduction of the state. In removing Glubb, Hussein undoubtedly acted out of a canny sense of self-preservation. Yet both his capability to make the decision and the necessity of making arose from the social context produced by uneven and combined development. The demand for full independence and career advancement in the army reflected the politics of the new effendiyya represented in Jordan by the JNM, the Free Officers and their associates such as Ali Abu Nuwwar. The dismissal of Glubb was a concession to these groups as a result of the crisis around the Baghdad Pact movement (reviewed in the preceding chapter.) By dismissing Glubb, Hussein had to rely further on Abu Nuwwar and the Free Officers, encouraging the nationalist wave inside Jordan’s borders and aligning the state more closely with Egypt where a military nationalist regime was already in power. This was a moment of anti-colonial unity. The moment was unlikely to last. Hussein remained a monarch of the old type in a binding treaty relationship with Britain. The alignments of the following twelve months reflected the sharpening and resolution of this contradiction, accelerated by the election of a nationalist government under the Jordanian National Movement umbrella, at almost the same time as the outbreak of the
Suez Crisis in the autumn of 1956.
6.3 Suez

6.3.1 The Dilemma and Conflict

The Suez case is particularly illuminating because it represents a fulcrum in the transition in Arab politics similar to that analysed in the previous chapter. Investigation of the Jordanian response to the Suez crisis demonstrates how unevenness and combination interact. At first sight the Jordanian position seems rather self-contradictory: it was Hussein who publicly declared support for Nasser and the nationalist Prime Minister Nabulsi who counseled caution and effective neutrality. In examining the elements of this conjuncture that produced the Suez Crisis and the Jordanian response to it, we do not find factors easily divisible along the boundaries of domestic, regional and external levels but rather the axes of unevenness and combination spread throughout those levels. The unevenness within capitalism presented in the second section of this chapter played a prominent role in the origin of the Suez Crisis.

The British alliance with France and Israel to weaken or overthrow Nasser represented a last desperate (and finally futile) attempt to maintain dominance in the Arab world. We may trace an explanatory plumb-line from the expulsion of the British officers to the Suez War, as the Glubb affair drove Prime Minister Anthony Eden to a near pathological obsession with Nasser. On the day of Glubb’s dismissal Eden, unable to believe that Jordanians were responsible, declaimed to Anthony Nutting ‘[w]hy can’t you get it into your head I want the man [Nasser] destroyed!’ (Hennessy, 2006:411). In the days following Glubb’s dismissal Eden took to haranguing the Middle East desks of the FCO, declaring his intent to re-take the Canal Zone with ‘a sort of 1940 look’ in his eye (Shuckburgh in Hennessy, 2006:411). Eden was undoubtedly drifting away from soundness of mind: but his Nasser mania was a symptom of a broader panic at Britain’s decline. The anxiety about the Canal Zone in particular reflected an aspiration to hegemonic status no longer warranted by the country’s economic base. The FCO civil servant Kirkpatrick was fond of pointing out that ‘Britain’s continued place as an advanced power depended upon both the maintenance of its strategic flow of oil
[through the Suez Canal] and upon the country’s willingness to take on those who sought to disrupt it’ (2006:416). The future Prime Minister Alec Douglas Home struck an even more alarmist tone, telling Eden one month after the Suez nationalization ‘we are finished if the Middle East goes and Russia and India and China rule from Africa to the Pacific’ (2006:421). Harold Macmillan was later to echo the same sentiments in his diary (Hennessy, 2006:434). Britain was no longer sufficiently ‘advanced’ a power to guarantee the flow of oil. The war to re-take the Canal Zone represented an adaptation to this fact.

To explain the other half of this conflict, Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and the acclamation in Jordan of this and other daring manoeuvres, we return to second aspect of uneven and combined development: the attempts at mimetic catch-up emerging from combined social formations brought about by the unevenly distributed impact of capitalist relations. The Egyptian Free Officers’ programme comprised the strengthening of the army through the expulsion of foreign influence, industrialisation and agrarian reform (Hussein, 1973:96). The new regime sought to shift Egypt’s source of foreign currency from the export of cotton—the main mechanism of combination by which capitalist relations had penetrated the country—towards a strategy of self-sufficient industrialization (Hinnebusch, 1985:23). In so doing Nasser took his place amongst the wider category of regimes that had emerged from the crises of permanent revolution resolved by ‘middle class nationalists determined on independence in the global arena and national unity internally’ (Hinnebusch, 1985:15).

To carry out this programme required energy, currency and weapons. The Suez nationalization emerged from these requirements. Nasser planned the famous Aswan High Dam to support modernization of both industry and agriculture (Hinnebusch, 1985:22). At first Nasser asked for Western funding for the Dam but was rebuffed—a humiliating brush-off being dispensed to the Egyptian ambassador in Washington on the 19th of June 1956 (Hennessy, 2006:416). Nasser ordered the nationalization of the canal a few days later. With this move Nasser both demonstrated his independence of the West (doubtless a gratifying revenge for the hauteur displayed by John Dulles) and sought to obtain a source of revenue for his revolution from above.
The overall foreign policy challenge that nationalization of the canal created for Jordan can thus be traced back to the unity of the axes of unevenness and combination. Nasser seized control of the means of creating an independent centre of accumulation from Britain which had lost the financial means to control the canal, the Indian Empire beyond it and predominance in the trade that passed through it. Yet in what sense did this affect the actual political outcomes in Jordan? Faced with imperial decline, Britain and France drew closer to Israel which in turn grew more belligerent in its reprisals for ‘infiltration’ from the West Bank. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1956 Israeli raids increased sharply. These raids became a major issue in the elections scheduled for October of that year. Hussein had called the elections in an attempt to maintain the popularity won through his dismissal of Glubb precisely to avoid a confrontation with the opposition over the treaty. The notional purpose of the treaty was to ensure the Jordan’s defence. Yet the country was sustaining its highest losses at Israeli hands since 1948, and Israel’s cross-border raids were increasing, a trend that ‘radicalized even further the opposition groups inside Jordan and prompted them to adopt an even more militant and anti-imperialist stand in the lead-up to the general elections’ (Shlaim, 2007:109). What purpose did the treaty with Britain—at best indifferent to, at worst complicit with Israel—serve? The treaty and its attendant subsidy were intertwined with the question of the response to the Israeli raids and alignment with Nasser or the UK. The effendiyya and its allies embodied in the Jordanian National Movement, on the advance following the victory of Arabization of the army, pressed these points forcefully in the election campaign (Shlaim, 2007:109). Unlike in the previous election of 1954, the regime did not rig the poll through using soldiers’ votes (2007:111).

The available Jordanian responses to the Suez invasion reflected the ‘two-fold effect’ of the clashes with Israel: accelerating the trend in Jordan's foreign policy away from the reliance on Britain and Iraq and towards Egypt and Syria’ and radicalizing ‘even further the opposition groups inside Jordan…to adopt an even more militant and anti-imperialist stand’ (Shlaim, 2007:109). The result of the election registered an overwhelming victory for the stand of these forces, organised in the JNM. The movement—comprising the communist-led National Front, the Ba’athists and Suleiman
Nabulsi’s more diffuse (and unfortunately named) National Socialist Party—won 200,000 of 240,000 votes cast in the October 1956 elections, the freest hitherto seen in the country (Anderson, 1997:260). The JNM’s programme stressed the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and support for Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood, although rhetorically opposed to British influence, supported the regime in its clashes with the left. The smaller Islamist party Hizb al-Tahrir, winning one seat in the parliament, limited itself to combining blood-curdling sectarian rhetoric with actual political quiescence.

Hussein asked Nabulsi, who had failed to gain a seat but remained the recognized leader of the JNM, to form a cabinet. Almost immediately the government had to react to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. Nabulsi was the first prime minister actually to have a power base independent of the King. An urban notable at the more conservative end of the JNM spectrum, he was aware that the present Jordanian army could not defeat an Israeli invasion of the West Bank—nor, Nasser seemed to indicate, was such a confrontation desirable for Egypt at that point (Gerges, 2001:98). Nabulsi and the organisations largely restrained popular demands for intervention on the side of Nasser: there were no major demonstrations around Suez. In this situation it was Hussein who had nothing to lose by competing to out-Arabize the Arab nationalists. His claim to stand by Nasser would never have to be cashed in. In any case, unevenness in the form of economic decline—as well as the guerilla resistance in the Canal Zone itself—forced the retreat of the tripartite alliance. The United States famously refused to accept this last colonial escapade but the means by which the US exerted its leverage is instructive: the US would not support the issue of IMF special drawing rights to halt a run on the pound (Hennessy, 2006:447).

6.3.2 The Outcome

The Suez crisis began with the apparent inclination of Hussein to support Nasser: even going so far as to telephone him after the nationalization to offer ‘hearty congratulations’ and potential military support—an offer the sincerity of which would never be tested (Gerges, 2001:98). In the end, however, Jordan effectively stood on the
sidelines in the conflict between its imperial patron and the emerging nationalist pole of Egypt. Under the terms of the military agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria signed in October 1956 Jordan was obliged to aid Egypt but all sides were content to allow Jordan to adopt discretion as the better part of valour, arguing that the country’s ‘first duty to the Arab cause was to hold her [sic] own frontiers’ (FO371/127876:686). Syrian, Saudi and Iraqi troops were allowed into the country while the newly-elected Nabulsi government was spared the decision to break diplomatic relations with Britain while still dependent on the subsidy (FO371/127876:686-7).

This outcome reflected rather the rise to power, through both elections and the Arabization of the army, of a cognate force to the Egyptian regime within Jordan: the effendiyya and its allies organised through the JNM and the ‘Free Officers’ in the army. Prime Minister Sulayman Nabulsi no doubt identified with Nasser’s nationalization of the canal and resistance to the subsequent invasion. However, for the first time in Jordanian history a cabinet exercising a genuine popular mandate was now taking the decisions. Hussein was now the one in a position to issue rhetorical support for Nasser while the cabinet acknowledged there was no way Jordan could take on Israel without Syrian support and simultaneously fight was in effect a war against the country’s patron. This situation further deepened the need for the JNM cabinet to find an alternative to the British subsidy. Yet the policy of effective neutrality had, paradoxically, a radicalizing effect as the government restrained its popular base with the purging of old regime officials and an official statement of the government’s intent to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (and with it the subsidy) and to establish relations with the Eastern bloc (FO371/127876:686). This outcome set the stage for more decisive confrontations over the abrogation of the treaty and the replacement of the subsidy, to which we now turn.

6.4 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty abrogation
6.4.1 The Dilemma and the Conflict

The Suez crisis had thus exposed the deep contradiction of the Anglo-Jordanian relationship, based around the annual subsidy and with it the entire apparatus of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. An unguarded dispatch to the embassy in Iraq from the Foreign Office summed up the situation even before the nationalization of the canal:

I am beginning to wonder whether our investment there [Jordan] is worth it...we get no adequate military or political return. Militarily the Arab Legion has, since Glubb's dismissal, ceased to be of much value. Politically Jordan, having refused to join the Baghdad Pact, seems to slipping increasingly over the Egyptian side of the fence. Is it worth our while to go on paying £12 million a year in order to prevent her falling over completely? We are only doing so because Jordan is the outer defence of Iraq; and if she goes there will be no buffer between Iraq and Egypt. Our future policy towards Jordan depends very much on the importance of maintaining this buffer (FO371/121468:650)

To the Foreign and Colonial Office, the subsidy was a matter simply of ensuring certain outcomes on the regional stage: it was that but also more. The subsidy represented the main mechanism of combination between Jordan’s rural political economy and the global capitalist system: the treaty represented the semi-colonial apparatus of control that Britain had attempted to preserve in the decade since the Second World War. Arguments around the subsidy, and therefore around Jordan’s alignment in the Arab world, therefore went deeper than such a view would allow.

These arguments, and the social bases they represented directed Jordan’s path towards the abrogation of the Treaty in early 1957. Once in power, however, the popular front represented of the JNM and its moment of anti-colonial unity with the king had begun to break down. Faced with crises over external orientation and the role of the monarchy, left and right wing divisions predictably developed. The JNM’s leaders differed over the speed with which the move toward the Arab unity should be accomplished and on which role the king should play in the new regime thus created (Anderson, 2005:182). It became clear that King and movement could not co-exist: this polarization took the form of arguments about how to replace the subsidy provided by the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. The Communist Party had consistently argued for the
abrogation of the treaty, only to be faced with the response ‘who will pay for Jordan?’\textsuperscript{34} The interaction of unevenness and combination made the abrogation of the treaty not only possible but necessary. As the dispatch quoted above indicates, the British side, Glubb’s dismissal had already led to a re-consideration of Jordan’s value.

On the other side of the ‘fence’, Nasser’s anti-colonial riposte to uneven development emerging from the social dynamics of combined development was providing a potential alternative to British subsidy. Nasser’s paradigmatic non-aligned revolution from above demonstrated not only the weakening of the colonial power during the Suez war but also the availability of different sources of finance. The Egypt-Czech arms deal of a year previously had already shown an example of the sort of alternative available (FO371/121461:531). The JNM was a movement against British control and once in power the Nabulsi cabinet moved to implement it main promise of abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty (Anderson, 2005:180).

The moves to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty represented a moment of centrifugality to the benefit of the left: an emerging fissure in the pan-nationalist front that had been formed with the King in the expulsion of Glubb. The autumn and winter of 1956 saw several advances in this process, both in the internal composition of the state and its external alignment. In December of that year Nabulsi dismissed, still with the King’s signature, several regime figures whom he considered ‘corrupt’, ‘inefficient’ or not ‘sincere nationalists’ (Anderson, 2005:177). Soon after the Prime Minister gave an interview to the New York Times stating that ‘Jordan cannot live forever as Jordan’ but would necessarily be part of a wider Arab structure at least in the military sphere (2005:178). This vision of course implied a shift in the financial and social basis of the state, away from the colonial power and towards the Arabist wave and the Eastern bloc. Nabulsi himself regarded this posture as conditional but drew a strong distinction between the options available to Jordan, saying in early 1957: ‘we do not side with the East unless the East sides with us. But we do not side with the West, because the West can never be with us. It wants to colonise and exploit us’ (2005:179). Breaking the regime’s 1953 anti-communist laws, Al-Nabulsi allowed the publication of the

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Dr Munir Hamarneh, Amman, 16\textsuperscript{th} of February 2009
Communist Party newspaper *al-Jamahir* and released leading Party figures from detention. It was becoming more difficult for the regime to identify openly with the British protector, which in any case was less interested in offering protection.

On the other side a most significant moves occurred with the signing of the Arab solidarity pact on the 19th of January 1957. The Arab Solidarity Agreement presented an alternative to the British subsidy, and was therefore the precondition for the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the answer to the question ‘who will pay for Jordan?’ The Agreement committed Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia to provide an annual subvention of 12.5 million pounds. Here, the Jordanian parliament (which the election of October had endowed for the first time with some actual reflection of public opinion) played an intermediary role. The Left in Parliament released a petition attacking the Eisenhower doctrine as an imperialist intervention in the region. The presence of Saudi Arabia, archetype of the conservative monarchy, amongst the potential backers of anti-colonial Jordan’s may seem puzzling. The incongruity only serves, however, again to reveal the transitional nature of this period in Arab politics and the trajectories brought about by the uneven and combined development of the region. The Saudis were motivated by a dynastic antipathy toward the Hashemites, whose continued presence on the Arab scene undermined the claim of the House of Saud to be protectors of the two sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina. Participation in the Arab Solidarity Pact aimed at chipping off the Jordanian Hashemites from their stronger co-sanguinaries in Iraq and thereby diminishing the Hashemite influence as a whole. The Jordanian regime’s close brush with collapse later in 1957 changed the Saudi attitude from a dynastic politics pursuing the interest of the house to one directed at preserving the status quo the region in general: hence the transformation from allies into enemies of Nasser in Yemen and elsewhere. That point was yet to be reached in the period under discussion, however.

6.4.2 The Outcome

Saudi participation in the Arab Solidarity Pact notwithstanding, the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty represented a victory for the anti-colonial pole in Jordan.
The official act of abrogation itself on the 13th of March 1957 was met with three days of official and unofficial celebrations (Anderson, 2005:180). The King clung to the nationalist banner once more but seems to have been thoroughly outflanked by force to his left, involving according to the British representative’s rather fevered and petulant report: ‘animosity shown by the mobs [sic] towards what may be described as the Jordanian middle classes…Such peoples [sic] were told by the crowd that they would soon be walking barefoot in the streets. The class struggle, rather than xenophobia, seemed to be the keynote’ (FO371/127878:760). Despite its rather wounded tone, this document lucidly identified the centrifugal trajectories that would become more apparent after the abrogation of the treaty:

The anti-British theme was common to both Right and Left and the only friction it generated was in the competition to see which side could pursue it most effectively. In this contest the King scored an important point in the dismissal of General Glubb and, with his Right Wing supporters, has been harping on this success ever since. Unfortunately for His Majesty, Glubb Pasha is now rather *vieux jeu* with opinion here, and something more than constant regurgitation of this year-old story is needed to keep up the King’s prestige as an Arab nationalist. King Hussein is known to be in favour of the Eisenhower Plan, and this is therefore a target where the Communists and the left have the advantage of him. (FO371/127878:762)

‘An old game’ the Glubb affair may have become: but the loss of the British treaty subsidy left Jordan suspended between its erstwhile colonial protector and a pan-nationalist alliance reliant on the social base of the effendiyya. This situation would have to be resolved one way or another. The ‘Eisenhower plan’ was indeed to mark the decisive confrontation, simultaneously external and internal, in the post-colonial confrontation over Jordan’s future. The following, final, section of this chapter analyses this confrontation and its outcome in terms of the social forces produced by uneven and combined development.

### 6.5 The Eisenhower Doctrine

#### 6.5.1 The Dilemma

This polarization around Jordan’s domestic direction and external alignment represented the ‘climax of a struggle between Right and Left in Jordan, exemplified respectively by King Hussein with his immediate advisors, and by the forces of radical nationalism working in close alliance with the mob [sic] from the cities and the refugee camps’ (FO371/127880:721).
Even before the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty Hussein was already bruiting the possibility of ‘very early action against Communism [sic] in Jordan’ (FO371/127989:705). Certainly surviving activists of the period maintain that the King sought to move against the JNM first, thereby assuring Jordan’s ability to accept American aid. Hussein began by attempting to suppress the left of the movement, sending out a ringing denunciation of ‘Communism’ in February and insisting on the closure of the Soviet news agency and *Al-Jamahir*, the open newspaper of the Jordan Communist Party (Anderson, 2005:179). The King also moved carefully to assure his base of support. He rallied the Muslim Brotherhood to his side, and engaged in ‘sounding out areas of likely personal support within the Army, maintaining a separate police’ and ‘secretly made contact with several influential tribal leaders to rally their support’ (WO2552S:714). This last was to prove especially important in the decisive confrontation of early April. US intelligence reports noted that ‘[w]orry about the Army's future financing is also reportedly spreading to the lower-ranking officers and undermining their confidence in the present [Nabulsi] Cabinet's policies’ (WO2552S:716).

This balance of forces was different to, for example, Egypt or Iraq where the anti-colonialist officers of the middle-to-upper ranks could rely upon the support or at least acquiescence of a rank-and-file drawn from disinherited rural populations.

On the nationalist side, the JNM retained its street strength in the cities but with an emerging political division inside its own ranks in the cabinet, especially between Nabulsi and the left grouped around the Foreign and Justice ministers Abdullah Rimawi and Shafiq Irshediat (Anderson, 2005:181). Outside of these manoeuvres, however, the JNM sought both to affirm the replacement of British subsidy with the Arab solidarity pact and to maintain its mobilisational structures through the organisation of ‘popular conferences’ which one of Hussein’s confidants considered ‘could be regarded only as a direct challenge to the king’ (FO371/127989:701). The two sides, based in the trajectory of Jordan’s uneven and combined development, were rapidly reaching a point of confrontation that would determine the alignment of the state.

The particular moves that precipitated this confrontation centred around the control of the state apparatus and its attitude to the Soviet Bloc—and by extension the emerging policy of ‘positive neutrality’ proposed by anti-colonialists such as Nasser (WO2552S:711).
3rd of April 1957 Nabulsi publicly announced the government’s intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, in the teeth of Hussein’s opposition (Anderson, 2005:182). There followed a flurry of reciprocal demands for the resignations of personnel to which each side objected: the JNM demanding the sacking of Hussein’s security chief and the royal side insisting on the dismissal of Abdallah Rimawi as foreign minister (FO371/127880:720). Hussein forced the resignation of the Nabulsi cabinet on the 10th of April (Anderson, 2005:182). The crisis was resolved at two levels of confrontation—civilian and military—and eventually in favour of the King and a pro-Western alignment in receipt of US aid but without formally joining the Eisenhower plan (Ashton, 2008:61).

6.5.2 The outcome

The details of the crisis are obscure but a broad outline can be deconstructed. The most noticeable aspect is the return of the King to a base of loyalty established through long years of military subsidy to the (formerly) nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists. First Hussein shored up his support in the army, the better to be able to use it against his civilian opponents. The centerpiece of the military side of the confrontation occurred in the abortive ‘coup’ attempts of April 1957, usually known as ‘operation Hashim’ and ‘the Zarqa affair’. The history of both these events is disputed, to say the least. What is known is that there was some kind of conspiracy within the army and that it occurred within the context of the civilian political confrontation between the king and the Nabulsi government. On the 8th of April roadblocks were set up around Amman, ostensibly to conduct a census of traffic under the codename ‘Operation Hashim’. Abu Nuwwar cancelled these manoeuvres after assuring the king that no conspiracy was afoot (Massad, 2001:192). Five days later fighting broke out in Zarqa between Bedouin and badari (sedentary) troops over rumours that the King had been assassinated, while troops were moved into strategic positions around Amman. According to the British account of the incident, Abu Nuwwar’s cousin Ma’an Abu Nuwwar (then commander of the first tank regiment) ‘ordered two predominantly Bedouin Infantry Regiments under his command on a night exercise; the troops refused to go’ (FO371/127880:734). The King rushed to Zarqa with Abu Nuwwar, thus forestalling any coup attempt (Satloff, 1994:167). Abu Nuwwar may have expected the troops in Amman to support him but found that they were commanded by bedouin NCOs loyal to the king.
The ‘Free Officers’ largely fled or were arrested. By these means Hussein assured himself of the military support that would later be fatally found lacking for his cousins in Iraq.

On the civilian side, an interregnum of a week proceeded in which new cabinets were appointed with remarkable alacrity: however the JNM did not give up immediately. Rather the opposition deepened the ‘popular conferences’ movement. Some state employees, particularly in the media observed calls to strike (FO371/127880:739). A national congress met in Nablus, effectively seeking to de-legitimise the King: the congress called a general strike and demonstrations in support of its demands for: the re-instatement of the national government; the rejection of the US Eisenhower plan; the dismissal of conservative officials and the taking of steps towards union with Egypt and Syria (FO371/127880:740). The movement did return to the streets but Hussein was well prepared. The King appointed a right-wing government on the 25th of April, in particular bringing in Akif al-Fayiz of the Bani Sakhr (FO371/127880:740). Not only were the troops used in the repression predominantly ‘Bedouin with blackened faces [to prevent their recognition]’ (FO371/127880:740) but at the same time, the large Bani Sakhr and ‘Adwan tribal confederations were mobilised to Amman to suppress dissent (Robins, 2004:100, Satloff, 1994:172). According to a Huwaytat sheikh who was a member of the military at the time, the Huwaytat from the south also rallied to support the King 35. The promise of US aid was both precondition and reward for Hussein’s decisive crushing of the opposition (Gerges, 2001:101).

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide further evidence for the utility of uneven and combined development to account for the underlying trajectories worked out in Jordanian alignments of the 1950s. It accounted first for the overall regional context in which those alignments were made, demonstrating how the weakening British position in the Middle East and the rise of an Egypt-centred nationalism reflected unevenness and combination. Focusing on Jordan, I then argued that the widely divergent alignments pursued in this period represented a microcosm of this wider process as Hussein oscillated between two

35 Interview with Sheikh ʿAnbar Dahash al-Jazi, Amman, 27th of May 2009
potential social bases of support before eventually returning to the core of the state established under the mandate: the British subsidised armed forces that had integrated the formerly nomadic pastoralists into the state. The contingent nature of these outcomes, and the clashes examined in detail in this chapter, demonstrate that these decisions cannot be treated simply as the choices of a regime ‘balancing’ above a society but rather reflect the composition of the social formation emerging from uneven and combined development as demonstrated in the previous chapters of this thesis.

At this point we have reached the end of the empirical investigation carried out in this thesis. I sought to provide an explanatory framework for geo-political phenomena based on uneven and combined development in contradistinction to the presuppositions of stages of historical backwardness underlying other theories such as omni-balancing. This chapter and the last have sought to provide such a focused examination—the success of which only the reader can judge. In the following, concluding chapter, I consider the broader implications of the results of this investigation for the study of the International Relations of the Middle East.
7. Conclusion, Discussion and Implications for Further Research

In this thesis I have sought to explain the case of Jordan’s alignments in the 1950s through the prism of a new theoretical approach: that of uneven and combined development. In doing so the thesis has been designed to develop theory by bringing the theoretical framework of uneven and combined development, derived from historical materialist premises, into engagement with an empirical study and to develop understanding of the international relations of a particular case of the international relations of a state in the Global South, Jordan.

In this final chapter I draw together these aims, reiterating the findings of the case, comparing these to the neo-realist, omni-balancing and constructivist theories reviewed in the first chapter and then drawing out the potential contribution of uneven and combined development to further study, especially of the Middle East. In particular I present the following relevant conclusions about uneven and combined development from the research on Jordan carried out in the main body of the thesis: i) the need to unify geopolitical and social modes of explanation; ii) the embedding of regimes in certain social relations rather than their dislocation from them; iii) the varying results of the ‘primitive accumulation’ process and accompanying mechanism of combination with the world economy as vital to the ensuing domestic and external trajectories of Arab states. The second half of this chapter deals with the contributions that these conclusions can make to current studies of Middle East International Relations—in a context at the time of writing where a theoretical perspective based upon the premise that ‘society, torn as it is by inner contradictions, conclusively reveals in a revolution not only its anatomy, but its "soul"’ (Trotsky, 1997:507) has suddenly become much more relevant.

As will be recalled, the problematique with which this thesis began is what Dannreuther and Kennedy refer to as ‘the international relations of the transition’ (2007:339). Chapter one therefore surveyed attempts to account for the specificity of international relations in those states which experienced the simultaneous, but problematic and incomplete, formation of centralized nation states amid the imitation
or imposition of capitalist social relations. I took up Jordan as one such instance of a ‘dependent zone of support’ whose existing social relations and ruling arrangements were disrupted by the expansionary dynamic of Euro-Atlantic capitalism (Migdal, 1994:10). The consensus around the international relations of these states is that they reflect this tardy arrival on the international scene in various forms of domestic disaggregation—along axes of class, religious, linguistic or ‘tribal’ distinction. This insufficient degree of ‘stateness’ (Nettl, 1968:561) then renders foreign policy a two-way conduit for these divisions to operate, lacking the basic characteristic of a unified agency that is presumed to undergird the international relations of other regions of the world. The result of this disaggregation is the ‘third world security predicament’ in the form of incoherent domestic societies; borders, institutions and elites lacking widespread legitimacy; an open invitation to external intervention and the making of foreign policy on the basis of domestic interest: in sum, a fundamentally ‘distorted and dependent development’ (Ayoob, 1995:20). Whereas the state actors of the European locus classicus of realist IR theory faced a security dilemma posed by the existence of other rational but sovereign actors, the Southern state faces an ‘insecurity dilemma’ rooted in its late development and constituted by the presence of both internal and external challenges (1997:121).

It is this consensus that the thesis sought to transcend and to challenge. The most succinct and rigorous example of theories based on the idea of the Southern security dilemma is the body of work concerned with ‘omni-balancing’. Jordan has already played the role of a testing ground for these theories in the form of concrete instances of alignments as the search to secure the Hashemite regime as a whole (Ryan, 2009) or simply its financial survival (Brand, 1994). At the heart of omni-balancing lies the contention that in Southern states regimes represent themselves rather than their societies and therefore although they engage balancing behaviour towards various sources of threat this ‘means appeasing other states (which often pose less pressing threats)’ than the domestic challenges to its power (David, 1991:235). In the case of Jordan, the thesis sought to move beyond Laurie Brand’s argument that foreign policy has served most often to assure the financial solvency of the regime (Brand, 1994:26). Curtis Ryan extends this argument to the ‘multi-dimensional’ threats to and resources of the regime (Ryan, 2009:10).
7.1 Summary of Chapters

The contribution of this thesis was thus to improve on the accounts described above. Therefore chapter 1 critically reviewed the existing explanations. The main claim of the chapter was not that these accounts do insufficient work in explaining Jordanian alignments. Rather, the critical lacuna of approaches based on omni-balancing and the Third World security dilemma is that they reproduce a uni-linear and non-interactive concept of development to undergird their assumptions behind the international relations of Southern states. The explanation is offered in the form of an absence—of integration, of ‘stateness’ or legitimacy—rather than of a presence. States such as Jordan appear as in some sense deviant as result of their late-development, ruled by regimes that pick domestic and internal allies as if they were the imagined sovereign and rational actors of neo-realist theory. These perspectives meet here with those more historical explanations of Jordanian alignments, also reviewed in chapter 1, which vest explanation almost entirely in the person of King Hussein. The question arises of how and why the regime (either in the person of Hussein or more broadly construed) made and was able to make the choices it did.

The theoretical framework of uneven and combined development, outlined and refined in the second chapter, fits into this gap. Chapter two therefore addressed the second aim of the thesis, to establish uneven and combined development as a viable theoretical framework for empirically based research in international relations. Uneven and combined development, revivified as an approach to International Relations by Justin Rosenberg and others, addresses the problem of the divided ontology of the discipline. On one side we find a tendency—exemplified by the neo-realist school but with its echoes amongst constructivists and others—to cast social interpretations of the origins of geopolitical phenomena out of the realm of enquiry on the grounds of their ‘reductionism’ to domestic factors. On the other we encounter attempts to understand International Relations under the rubric of historical sociology: producing a remarkable body of work but vulnerable to the objection that at key points a recalcitrant Realist logic of inter-state power competition emerges to trump the social, whether conceived in broadly Marxist or Weberian terms. The revival of uneven and combined development represents an attempt to overcome this ‘classical lacuna.’

Chapter 2 therefore set out to define and delimit the terms of this revived
theoretical framework. I argued for a middle position on the operation and extent of uneven and combined development: between Justin Rosenberg’s more maximalist conception of uneven and combined development as an explanation for the existence of political multiplicity and therefore ‘international relations’ almost from pre-history, and the limited conception which may or may not be ascribed to Trotsky himself, of uneven and combined development as representing solely the internal effects of capitalist transformation on late-developing societies. Rather, in chapter 2 I argued that uneven and combined development is a characteristic of the pre-capitalist era and that ‘the "combinedness" created by the world economy that links together national (or regional) formations’ (Ashman, 2006:94) but that it takes on its specific causal aspect of a feedback loop between social transformation and geopolitical relations only in the capitalist epoch (see Allinson and Anievas, 2010a, Allinson and Anievas, 2009). It is the logic of capitalist relations, in particular the attempt to imitate or impose the process of ‘primitive accumulation’, that gives particular content to uneven and combined development in a given case and thereby the means by which to trace by the social origins of foreign policy in that case.

Working from the Marxist premises that inform Trotsky’s concept, I defined ‘development’ as patterned change in social relations. The unevenness of this change consisted in its occurring earlier or more extensively in some places rather than others and producing a greater accumulation of productive force—‘growth’ in the terminology of orthodox economics. The interaction between these uneven areas produces combination: the causal interaction of different kinds of social relations of production, which can be classified into modes of production. In particular I argued that Jordan represents a ‘combined social formation’ in which the social relations of a particularly fragmented form of the tributary mode (the extraction of surplus as *khuwwa* by pastoralists and semi-pastoralists) was combined with the global capitalist system through the British colonial subsidy that replaced this form of surplus extraction. The colonial state itself, across the two sides of the Jordan that were unified in 1950, thus produced two social poles of attraction. One of these was the body of pastoralists and semi-pastoralists integrated into the state via military pay (the British subsidy) and embedded in a comparatively egalitarian landholding structure. The other was the group of the ‘new effendiyya’ of civil servants, teacher and army officers allied with a mass of
semi- or under-employed new urban dwellers. In chapter 2, I argued that by looking at the political struggle between these groups in the 1950s we can trace the social origins of Jordan’s international alignments and thereby demonstrate that uneven and combined development can answer questions about geopolitical phenomena.

The remainder of the thesis provided the evidence that uneven and combined development offers a fuller account of the origins of Jordanian geopolitical alignment than the other perspectives reviewed in the first chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 gave the content to answer the questions: what was the nature of the different choices available to King Hussein in the 1950s and what were the bases on which he made them? Chapters 5 and 6 gave case studies as an analytical historical account of the struggles that led to those choices. Chapter 3 argues that the basic elements of Jordan as a combined social formation can be traced back even to before the creation of the Transjordan mandate in 1922, to the late Ottoman period and the attempt by the Ottoman Empire at a mimetic transformation of social relations in order to increase revenues and thereby fend off the Western powers.

The chapter demonstrated that the spur for this attempted transformation lay in what Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of accelerating territorial and military decline, forcing the Ottomans consciously to imitate the social relations of the Western powers threatening them—a case of the mimetic modernization identified by Trotsky (Trotsky, 1997:25). It was at this point that, the chapter demonstrated, that the conflict between central and local tributary powers in southern Syria/northern Hijaz became an attempt to restructure social relations from localized coercive surplus extraction (inter-tribal raiding and the taking of _khuwwa_) to the provision of tax revenue by private cultivators to a uniform authority.

This attempted transformation, embodied in the _tanzimat_ reforms and the Ottoman expeditions into trans-Jordanian steppe, was far from entirely successful. Had it been so we would have less cause to speak of a ‘combined’ social formation rather than straightforwardly capitalist social relations. However, this period established the outlines of what would become the Jordanian social formation (laying the groundwork for a more decisive intervention under the British mandate) on the basis of which the struggles of the 1950s were to be conducted. The late Ottoman reformers did not succeed in their attempt to shift to a revenue regime based on productive, privatized
property relations rather than coercive authority—tax-farming was still in place when the Empire collapsed in 1918. Yet there were lasting effects of this attempted mimesis that were ramified under the British giving rise to that amalgam of social forces that formed the basis of Hussein’s decisions in the 1950s. These were two-fold: on the one hand the principle of settlement and registration of productive land as the basis for taxation but maintaining the horizontal unity of the tribe and on the other the establishment of a relatively egalitarian land-holding pattern in the settled areas. These represent the beginnings of ‘combination’ as a result of the uneven attempt at primitive accumulation—the creation of labourers free both from the compulsion and the means to use their labour power—in the Ottoman reforms. These were just the beginnings, however, and the resulting social formation could have taken a different path. The British mandate period proved decisive in bringing together this process with the formation of the core of the Jordanian state, the armed forces. It was the externally subsidised armed forces that became both the site and the object of the struggles of the 1950s, intertwining international and domestic politics.

Chapter 4 presented the specific mechanism by which the social formation of ‘Transjordan’ became ‘combined’ with the global system of capitalist social relations and inter-state competition in the mandate period, with important consequences for the alignments of the 1950s. This mechanism, the replacement of the coercive tributary extraction of khuwwa of pastoralists and sem-pastoralists with the British subsidised military pay, resulted from British policy and in particular the work of John Glubb ‘Pasha’. However, this policy was a response to the broader unfolding of the process of uneven and combined development. This was manifested in the dilemma to which the British had to respond and the conceptions that underlay that response. On one side, the maintenance of the coercive extraction of khuwwa was incompatible with the uniform exercise of British authority, with the establishment of a secure border with the Saudis and with the project of landed private property the British believed to be the bedrock of civilized prosperity—in short with the model now being imposed by the mandate powers across the region, of a uniformly governed space in which economic and non-economic power were formally separated. On the other side, the Mandate had to govern. Glubb and others saw that given an alternative to the collapsing khuwwa system, the tribes of the south and east could form the strongest allies of the regime
against any threat from the fabled ‘half-educated townsman’: the mixture of new effendiyya and underemployed migrants likely to result from an unchecked process of the separation of rural cultivators from the means of production even as their compulsion to produce tribute was removed. From this period emerged the ‘improbable combination of foreign and colonial regime together with indigenous Arab tribal society’ (Alon, 2007:3) that engaged in the alignments of the 1950s.

Chapter 4 thus demonstrated the utility of uneven and combined development for explaining such combinations by comparing the different outcomes in Iraq and Jordan, ruled by the same mandatory power and in some cases even the same personnel (such as Glubb himself). In Iraq the main mechanism of combination with the world economy swiftly became the export of oil, there was a significant workers’ movement and land settlement led to the entrenchment and even creation of shaikhly power over cultivators for whom the primitive accumulation process was dissolving the kinship ties of tributary relations. The army, and most especially its officer corps, became a repository for the resentment of the new (and old) effendiyya excluded from this structure. In Jordan, by contrast, the army was a means by which the process of primitive accumulation process—the breakdown of tributary relations and the replacement of coercive by non-coercive surplus extraction—produced the bedrock of later support for the regime, as British subsidy through ‘military Keynesianism’ (Tell, 2008:9) replaced the khawwa tribute. Individual land-holdings remained small and fairly evenly distributed: where there was polarization between large and small landholdings or between landless labourers and landlords this was usually in the form of ‘plantation villages’ worked by incoming sharecroppers on land registered in the name of a sheikh or a tribe as a whole that subsisted by pastoralism or military pay. The vertical ties of tribal loyalty—deriving from the main economic unit of the tributary past—were thus integrated in a new way into the state itself rather than undermined. The evidence of Chapter 4 supports the ‘Gerber thesis’ that Jordan’s path through the upheavals of the 1950s can be traced back to the transformations of its rural political economy. Uneven and combined development makes a contribution here by showing that those transformations consisted of responses to the uneven development of social relations of production and resulted in a particular combined social formation linked to the global capitalist system by a distinct mechanism of combination. On the basis of these
specificities we can then analyse Jordan’s later geopolitical alignments in social terms.

Chapters 5 and 6 took up this challenge by examining specific case studies of Jordan’s geopolitical alignments in the 1950s. These chapters thus sought to bridge the macro-phenomenon of uneven and combined development and concrete analysis of geopolitical alignments. Of course, it would not make sense to argue that because capitalist relations emerged in North Western Europe in the sixteenth century, King Hussein chose to align his state with the US in April 1957. The process does not work that way: nor should it be expected to, given that other structural theories of International Relations such as neo-Realism do not begin from the detailed cut and thrust of decisions about foreign policy. Rather, what uneven and combined development does in this chapter is indicate the social basis of the options available to Hussein and particular points and how the (contingent) outcomes emerged from struggles within the Jordanian combined social formation. Uneven and combined development, in the thick form of the historical evidence provided in chapters 3 and 4, explains the un-chosen circumstances in which geopolitical alignments were made.

Chapter 5 made the first such detailed study of the interaction between circumstance and agency. It focused on Jordanian policy towards the Baghdad Pact in 1955: the beginning of that decisive period that inaugurated a new Middle Eastern system centred around Egypt, Arab nationalism and military coups leading to revolutions from above. At this point and throughout the events analysed also in chapter 6, Jordan was poised between the two emerging camps of the Arab world, making the country an instructive case for the wider region. Chapter 5 argued that the shifting Jordanian policy toward the Baghdad Pact reflected the oscillation of the inexperienced Hussein between two poles within the combined social formation: on one side a popular movement emerging from the new effendiyya including part of the officer corps; a semi-proletarian urban milieu comprised of refugees and migrants; and the small working class. These are familiar forces to the students of the anti-colonialist Arab nationalism of the middle twentieth century. At the other pole stood the British; a clique of landowners, shaykhs and merchants associated with the palace and most importantly the pastoralists and semi-pastoralists who had been integrated into the rank and file of the army through the British subsidy. The purpose and possible replacement of that subsidy, as the historical documents examined in chapter 5 demonstrate, were at the
heart of the struggle. The anti-colonialist side won the first round thanks to a popular *intifada* in the winter of 1955-56.

Chapter 6 offered further case studies of Jordan’s alignments in the transitional period of 1956-7—a turning point during which Jordan seemed likely to enter the Arab nationalist camp only to end eventually firmly anchored to a new Western patron, the United States. The chapter examined the divergent outcomes of the major crises in that period: the expulsion of Glubb and the British officers in March 1956; the Suez Crisis in the autumn of that year; the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and finally the acceptance of US aid in April 1957.

At each point, the analysis traced how these outcomes emerged from the social struggles between the two poles of the Jordanian combined social formation, in particular as these were fought out over and through and the mechanism of combination itself—the British subsidised armed forces. The chapter identified a polarizing dynamic in Jordan over this issue. Hussein expelled Glubb and the British officers as a tactical move to garner some of the anti-colonial popularity of the anti-Baghdad pact moment, deflecting onto Glubb the opprobrium of the repression of that movement. In doing so, however, Hussein boosted and would increasingly have to rely on those forces, civilian and military, that wished to cut the sustaining link with Britain (the main mechanism of combination) and replace it with an Arab subsidy. This trend was expressed in the free elections of October 1956, after which a cabinet of nationalists and leftists from the Jordanian National movement was formed. Just at this point, the UK, France and Israel attacked Egypt, precipitating the Suez War. Again, Hussein tacked to the nationalist side to outflank the new Prime Minister Nabulsi. Nabulsi was a wealthy figure from the ‘moderate’ end of the Jordanian National Movement who had no intention of making good on promises to help Egypt against Israel. That would require war: the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, the central plank of the JNM’s programme, would not. Its implementation in March 1957—a decision essentially of the government reflecting the democratic success of the movement and the demands of its social base—clarified the polarization in the country over the acceptance of Arab or Western aid. This reached its peak with events of April 1957. Hussein, claiming that a coup was being planned, himself acted to decapitate the military and civilian opposition and relied on his supporters from the formerly pastoralist groups.
in the army to do so. The subsidy to these still had to be assured so Hussein accepted US aid as a replacement for the British.

7.2 The Contribution of Uneven and Combined Development: the dialectic of universal and particular in the Middle East

This thesis has thus provided an extended analysis of uneven and combined development in Jordan and how this shaped the trajectory of that state’s foreign policy at a period of transition in the Middle East. It was necessary to pursue this case in depth to contribute empirical weight to the hitherto largely theoretical work on uneven and combined development, and thereby to judge the explanatory utility of the concept in International Relations. Re-stated most directly, the conclusion of this thesis is this: Jordan’s alignments in the 1950s are best understood not as ‘omni-balancing’ but as emerging from the trajectory of political struggles engendered by the combination of pre-capitalist social relations and capitalist ones in the Jordanian social formation. The empirical chapters presented evidence to support this case for Jordan but what are the broader implications for the study of the region of the Middle East and the discipline of International Relations?

7.2.1 Intervening in the Debate: Particularism and Universalism in the Middle East

The results of this thesis present a potentially fruitful intervention into a key debate in (and between) Middle East studies and International Relations. This might be framed in Fred Halliday’s terms as the confrontation between universalism and particularism. Can the International Relations of the Middle East—as well as other aspects of the political life of that region—be understood only through its especial inheritance or is the subject amenable to analysis through the ‘universal tools and methods of social science’ (Stein, 2011:2)? The answer will depend on what we consider those universal tools to be, but the question opens up a scholarly terrain to which the concept of uneven and combined development may offer a significant contribution. To explain what this contribution might be, we must first consider how the broader argument of universalism versus particularism maps overlaps with arguments of ‘omnibalancing’ and defective state-society relations that the results of this thesis have challenged.
It will be recalled that one of the main contributions of uneven and combined development is to present a view of history that is interactive and multi-linear. Before the charge is raised that this is an uncontroversial ‘denial of the theory of unilinear development…[that] does not make any positive contribution’ (Elster, 1986:55) we must first reckon with the premises of the universalist/particularist debate in the study of Middle East International Relations. Here notions of the deformity of history and the inheritance of Modernization Theory retain their currency. The basic assumption is that the liberal self-image of the state is valid within its Western zone of origin—characterized by ‘the unconditional legitimacy of the state, a societal consensus over basic values and the near-elimination of violence from political life, which permitted a strong identification of the security of the state with the security of its citizens’ (Krause, 1996:320). One of the premises of this thesis has been that one cannot take for granted the existence of such ‘unconditional legitimacy’ of the state in the North: thereby rendering problematic the important point here is the contrast thus drawn between an integrated and legitimate Western state and a Middle Eastern state notable for the absence of these qualities. From this contrast flows the argument for omni-balancing with which this thesis has critically engaged.

This basic premise behind the dichotomy of universalism/particularism in the study of the Middle East may also be framed in disciplinary terms. Andrea Teti thus identifies a gap between a Middle East studies based on a hermeneutic understanding of the region’s supposedly *sui generis* characteristics and the discipline of International Relations which assumes ‘understands regional politics as a variation upon a universal set of laws based on "Western" history’ with the result that ‘they often highlight the region's exceptionalism rather than its distinctiveness, implicitly legitimizing the pursuit of exceptionalist policies such as the "necessity" of collaboration with unsavoury regimes during the Cold War’ (Teti, 2007:119). There is ample evidence to support this view in the canon of studies of international relations of the Middle East and in Middle East Studies. This exceptionalism is most often vested in the claim—far from baseless—that the states of the region area are constrained from ‘normal’ operation by the persistence of regional (Arabist, Islamic) or substate (tribal, sectarian) influences (Ismael and Ismael, 2000:8). L. Carl Brown codifies these elements into a series of ‘rules’ of the ‘Eastern Question game’: these consisting mostly of diplomatic short-
sightedness or attempts to ensnare external powers in various political initiatives (Brown, 1984:16-17). Michael Barnett gives these constraints a more definite content by referring to the ‘norms’ of opposition to Zionism and imperialism and affirmation of Arab identity (Barnett, 1998, see also Stein, 2011:14-15) while Marc Lynch extends this notion of inter-subjective norms of Arab identity into the public sphere beyond the state (Lynch, 1999:23).

7.2.2 The Advantages of Uneven and Combined Development

What relation does this discussion bear to the findings of this thesis and the potential of uneven and combined development? The parallels between Middle East Studies, International Relations and the debates amongst Russian Marxists of the early 20th century are not immediately apparent to the observer—but they are pertinent. They lie in the evolutionary model of development undergirding the study of Middle East international relations. As Ewan Stein argues, ‘the study of states in the Middle East has often stressed their artificiality and illegitimacy’ engendering a dichotomy ‘in which the state form (its borders and institutions) is treated as self-evidently part of the Western Westphalian system that was organised around the concept of sovereignty; while Arab society remains in a pre-modern condition’ (Stein, 2011:8). Malak Mufti’s research encapsulates this view in arguing that as regimes build stable political institutions—as their degree of “stateness” increases— their amenability to pan-Arab regionalist schemes decreases and thereby they come to resemble more closely the sovereign unitary actors of Realist international relations theory (Mufti, 1996:8). Here we reach the point of contact with the idea of omni-balancing in Jordan and elsewhere. Omni-balancing placed states on a continuum between the fully legitimate, embedded state of the West (which can then be understood through the lens of conventional international relations theory) and the fractured, disconnected Third World regime-state which must balance and bandwagon with elements of its pre-modern society. These states, of which Middle Eastern cases form a disproportionate part of the examples, should then be understood through a theory attuned to their deviation from the universal pattern (Brand, 1994:23-4, David, 1991:235, Frisch, 2011, O'Reilly, 1998, Olson, 2000, Ryan, 2009:9).

This thesis has attempted to show that uneven and combined development,
being derived from Marxist premises, has the advantage of rejecting the assumption that there is such a thing as an inherently “legitimate” or “normal” state towards which progress may be achieved or deflected. The concept allowed us rather to make statements about the actual and particular political economies in which states are embedded and within which—taking the imperative of regime survival as a given—certain alignments are then adopted. I took up Jordan as a particular instance of this process, but the method of examining how, in Trotsky’s words, ‘national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic features of the world process’ (1972a:147) might be a route to overcoming the universalist/particular divide. Yet, in what might these ‘basic features’ consist? Can we adopt the notion of ‘peculiarities’ of combination without slipping back precisely into the mode of false universalism by which the Middle East appears as a deformed caricature of the West?

The research presented in this thesis will hopefully have provided a tentative answer in the affirmative. It has offered uneven and combined development as a framework for ‘matching an analytic universalism with a historical particularism’ (Halliday, 1995:15). This means that the analytical categories and procedures are universal but that each region or social formation is to be understood through its ‘specific processes of historical formation’ (1995:15). These analytical categories, or ‘basic features’, were presented in Chapter 2 are the social relations of production, uneven in chronological and geographical distribution and therefore resulting in certain combined social formations on the basis of which political struggles are fought out. With this perspective we avoid the over-stretched claim of, for example, Isam Al-Khafaji that the transition to capitalism is a universal process and that therefore the Arab states of the first half of the twentieth century have to be considered pre-capitalist (Al-Khafaji, 2004:42). Rather than see forms of semi-servile labour in ‘the internal structure and working of agricultural systems’ as indicators of a society dominated by pre-capitalist relations (2004:42). we may then take a more nuanced view of these as combined with the global capitalist system.

7.2.3 The Risks and Responses to Eurocentrism

Yet, might not the argument put in this thesis still pose the risk of exporting a European standard by which to judge non-European societies? After all, the historic
process of primitive accumulation is ‘uneven’ in the sense that it occurred first and most fully in England and then exported elsewhere by means of colonial rule or mimetic modernization—as Trotsky put it to ‘turn the foe into tutor’. John Hobson argues precisely that behind ‘the revival of Marxism in the contemporary IR literature often lurks a Eurocentric narrative that subliminally naturalizes Western power’ (Hobson, 2007:593). Gurminder Bhambra has criticised uneven and combined development for working ‘within an already accepted ‘universal’ framework of categories which is, in fact, articulated in relation to an initial core that is European… [which] does little to mitigate the basic Eurocentric assumptions informing the underlying frameworks within which that difference is to be contained’ (Bhambra, 2011:679). In relation to the Arab world in particular, such criticisms reflect an attentiveness precisely to those aspects of the region usually taken to constitute its distinctiveness—the axes of sect, language and tribe or shared cultural systems of (Islamic) religious or (Arabic) linguistic heritage—at the expense of universal analytical categories such as those employed in uneven and combined development.

Dipesh Chakrabarty’s pioneering work (2008) offers the most powerful version of this argument. Chakrabarty argues that ‘uneven development’ (he refers to Trotsky but not to the idea of development as both uneven and combined) is an intellectual strategy to retain an essentially ‘historicist’ position (2008:12). By historicism, Chakrabarty means the assumption in history ‘that any object under investigation retained a unity of conception throughout its existence and attained full expression in secular, historical time’ (2008:xiv). The idea of uneven development, ‘originally invented in the workshop of the Scottish Enlightenment’ cannot overcome ‘the intimations of pre-existing histories that were singular and unique, histories that belonged to the multiple pasts of Europe’ (2008:xi,xiii). Chakrabarty regards uneven development as therefore implicated in a philosophy of the ‘not-yet’, by which the post-colonial subject is always waiting for a European status that should never have been expected to arrive: a

36 Chakrabarty’s contention about the origin of uneven development in the Scottish Enlightenment thought of Smith and Adam Ferguson is certainly correct. However, this may render the idea of greater rather than lesser relevance in the South. As Neil Davidson shows, the historical context of the Scottish Enlightenment displayed precisely that constellation of trauma, rapid transformation and imperative to ‘catch-up’ that characterises much of the post-colonial experience: see Davidson, Neil. (2003) Discovering the Scottish Revolution 1692-1746. London: Pluto Press.pp.273-5. Likewise one may point to Trotsky’s original presentation of uneven and combined development as an adaptation of historical materialism to the politics of a state that was simultaneously super- and sub-altern.
criticism that this thesis has made of existing approaches to the international relations of Southern states and which should therefore be taken especially seriously when mounted at the theoretical framework proffered as the potential solution to this problem.

Yet, closer examination of Chakrabarty’s argument reveals a similarity to uneven and combined development, particularly in its ‘combined’ aspect, and suggestions of an agenda for research similar to that followed in this thesis. Chakrabarty argues that ‘universal concepts of political modernity encounter pre-existing concepts categories, institutions and practices through which they get translated and configured differently’ (2008:xii). This statement calls to mind Trotsky’s description of ‘national peculiarities’ as ‘an original combination of the basic features’ of a world process constituted by the historical actuality of European dominance but not any necessary historical convergence on a European-style endpoint (Trotsky, 1972a:146-7). Chakrabarty’s distinction between different kinds of pasts, ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ poses an especially interesting field of comparison with the ideas of uneven and combined development. Chakrabarty speaks of ‘History 1’ as ‘the past that is internal to the structure of being of capital’ representing (in the person of a worker entering a factory) ‘a historical separation between his/her capacity to labor and the necessary tools of production…showing that he or she embodies a history that has realized this logical precondition of capital’ (2008:66). History 2 means ‘other kinds of pasts… [that] may be under the institutional domination of the logic of capital and exist in proximate relationship to it’ but ‘do not belong to the "life process" of capital’ and may be compatible with it (2008:66-7).

Chakrabarty’s notion of different kinds of pasts is not identical to uneven and combined development (2008:67). However, the research presented in this thesis works fundamentally from the premise of analysing ‘the concrete as a combination of the universal logic of History 1 and the heterotemporal horizons of innumerable History 2s’ (2008:xxvii). One does not have to look far in Trotsky’s writings37 to find colonial-era clichés, Eurocentric slips of the mind, and plain old rubbish about ‘Eastern barbarism’ or ‘Asiatic despotism’. However, the logic of uneven and combined development need not lead in this way. Indeed, as Kamran Matin argues in a closely-read engagement with post-colonial thought, uneven and combined development has the advantage of retaining the goal of understanding the ‘dynamics and processes that have enabled these

37 Although emphatically not, one must stress, in his political practice.
particular western categories to assume, in a real historical sense, universal significance’ (Matin, 2009:7). This thesis has attempted to reach such an understanding in a particular case. In so doing it has sought to emphasise those aspects of uneven and combined development compatible with the rejection of the idea of humanity’s progress through ‘a homogenous empty time’ (Benjamin, 1999:251-2) and instead envision a world of ‘[n]on-contemporaneity, non-linearity’ (Bensaid, 2002:23).

How, though, do the results of this thesis relate to these claims about the combination of universal and particular work? How do we go from them to understanding more about the International Relations of the Middle East, especially? How do concepts of unevenness and combination provide the means to understand the international relations of a particular ‘late-developing’ society and therefore offer a way to overcome the universal/particular distinction?

7.3 Lessons of the thesis

The answer I provided to the above questions and sought to substantiate in the case of Jordan is this: all forms of social relations of production (a universal analytical category) have been distributed unevenly in space and time. The descriptive generalization of ‘unevenness’ therefore has a universal character—if only to the extent this refers to the universal existence of particularities. Such a statement would remain at the level of tautology, were it not for the crucial distinction within uneven and combined development between different social relations of production and in particular capitalist relations and their predecessors. The emergence of capitalist relations begins a transformative process in the social relations of all societies, because of this universalizing imperative, that in turn changes the nature of unevenness in development. Pre-capitalist tributary social relations, uniting directly coercive and non-coercive moments of exploitation, also contain an imperative to expand. However, because these relations rely upon direct coercion in exploitation (being based on tribute rather than free labour), they expand extensively rather than intensively. That is, the exploiters seek to bring more producers and more territory under their sway rather than improving methods or compelling the adoption of new social relations. The dynamic of this tributary mode is therefore one of crisis between centralization and decentralization, as identified by Michael Mann. Where the central authority loses control, perhaps due to
geographical or topographical inaccessibility, the coercive power fragments into localized relations of tribute-taking.

### 7.3.1 Specifying unevenness and combination: social relations of production

The first lesson from this thesis in the application of uneven and combined development is in how to specify the meaning of this unevenness between different modes of production. Chapter 3 undertook this task in the Jordanian context (or rather for the lands that eventually became Jordan) identifying the dominant social relations of production as a fragmented form of tribute taking—the extraction occurring in the form of *khunwa*. Characterizing the social relations of the sub-Syrian steppe in this way led to an understanding of the ‘tribe’ not as an inherent cultural trait of Arab society but as an ‘economic unit’ whose content and operation changes with the imposition or adoption of new forms of social relations. This approach, of identifying the nature and history of the predominant pre-capitalist social relations, offers us an understanding of the ‘particular’ in universal terms. Given that almost the entire Arab world saw a similar dynamic of tributary centralization and fragmentation under the Ottoman Empire, identifying the place of a particular region along that continuum is the first step to understanding its later trajectory.

The second lesson offered by the thesis lies in how to apply the idea of combination: in other words, how the ‘particular’ becomes subject to the universalizing imperatives of capitalist social relations, thereby producing a particular combined social formation. Combination forms the bridge between macro-social concept of uneven and combined development and the particular phenomena studied under the heading of International Relations—phenomena such as international alignments. In the case of Jordan I traced the origins of those alignments back to struggles around how to sustain the alternatives to *khunwa*. Other cases would demonstrate different specific mechanisms of combination.

The way to find out what those mechanisms, based on the case study evidence in the thesis, is to find the operation of what Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity’. The thesis demonstrated that this imperative operates both by the familiar mimetic “revolutions from above” of the mid-nineteenth century, of which the
Ottoman *tanzimat*, provide one instance, and by the contested imposition of the framework of capitalist social relations under colonial rule. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the British land reform—reflecting a compromise between the demands of governmentality and a uni-linear conception of development on the other—embedded a roughly egalitarian land-holding structure in Jordan and replaced the taking of *khawwa* with imperial subsidy. This subsidy thus formed the main mechanism of combination—a non-market relation embedded in networks of vertical tribal solidarity—between the Jordanian social formation and the global capitalist economy. This was contrasted with Iraq, where the same mandate power produced different results and therefore different social bases for the struggles around international alignments in the 1950s.

The findings of chapter 4 on the emergence of the Jordanian combined social formation (detailing the positive bases of Jordan’s foreign policy rather than the negative absence of Western-ness) therefore demonstrate how a universalizing imperative becomes embodied a particular social trajectory or ‘an original combination of the basic features of the world process’. One might argue that this imperative was rather a matter of occasionally *ad hoc* policy making among the British. However, such a claim would both diminish the agency of the (Trans) Jordanian side and misunderstand the reasons why certain policies were chosen or effective. The Mandate authorities sought immediately to enforce their rule: but the context for this was the collapse of the Ottoman system and the return of raiding for *khawwa* as world depression and technological change caused the breakdown of the pastoralists economy. Raids exacerbated British problems in enforcing a border where the concept of a state authority uniform across space but absent from extractive coercion was an alien one. The solution to these problems meant dealing with transformations in the economic basis of raiding—and Glubb’s solution worked because it replaced the tribute exacted by raiding with direct subsidy from the world’s leading capitalist power.

### 7.3.2 Mechanisms of Combination

The utility of the concept of different mechanisms of combination, around which foreign policies are likely to revolve, was therefore a key finding of this thesis. It may be objected here that the notion of a mechanism of combination repeats the familiar idea of the domination of the rentier, or in Ayubi’s words ‘circulationist’, state in the region.
In this view, Jordan’s subsidy could be seen simply as a kind of strategic rent given because of its pivotal position next to Israel (Beblawi, 1987:61, Heydemann, 2000:23, Luciani, 1987:71, Tal, 2002:3). This strategic rent, unearned through productive enterprise, would then have the same effect as the oil rents distributed throughout the Gulf States, Iraq and Saudi Arabia although relatively meagre in quantity. The rentier state argument shares a basic outline with the notion of a deflected modernity discussed above. That is, it takes the classically assumed English or French path as the model from which late-developing states deviate: the particular nature of their deviation in this case being that the availability of external income hampers the emergence of an independent-minded third-estate that would demand representation in return for its financial contribution to the state (Anderson, 2006:201, Hinnebusch, 2006:375). Indeed, this argument identifies the pathologies of the rentier state with the absence of the characteristic slogan of what were once called the bourgeois revolutions in England, France and the USA—no taxation without representation (Beblawi, 1987:53). The history of inter-Arab relations can then be read through the conflicts between ‘production’ and ‘allocation’ states (Luciani, 1987:80).

The notion of a specific mechanism of combination in uneven and combined development, and in particular its application to the British subsidy to Jordan studied in this thesis, may thus seem to cover similar ground to that of idea of the rentier state. In particular, the allocation of an external revenue through a ‘hierarchy of layers of rentiers with the state or the government at the top of the pyramid, acting as the ultimate support of all other rentiers in the economy’ (Beblawi, 1987:53) resonates with the argument of this thesis that external subsidy provided to former pastoralists and semi-pastoralists combined this tributary groups with capitalist world economy via Britain, creating a support base for the Hashemites in the process. However, uneven and combined development offers advantages over the rentier state in being both broader and more specific. First of all, as a broad proposition, uneven and combined development dispenses with the belief—highly redolent of the stages theory of history—that an incipient bourgeoisie is required to lead the struggle for democratization on the basis of its fiscal contribution to the state. As critics of the rentier state thesis have pointed out, there is no reason to make this assumption in the Middle East, and therefore to derive the nature of the state and international relations in
the region from the failure of this assumption to hold true (Herb, 2003:25).

Second, at a more specific level, the notion of a predominant mechanism of combination allows us to differentiate amongst the very wide variety of external revenues sustaining the economies of most Arab states. This heterogeneity, and the attendant diversity of trajectories and outcomes, is subsumed beneath the concept of the rentier state. These mechanisms of combination will be found in the way not only that the national income is provided but how it relates, or possibly replaces, pre-capitalist social relations. In the specific case of Jordan this means the argument summarised above concerning the replacement of *khawwa* by subsidy but for other cases we will find different, possibly contrasting, mechanisms. The exploration of this aspect of UCD in the thesis therefore opens up further avenues of research in the region.

7.4 The potential for further research

Where might those avenues lead? Having summarised the conclusions of this thesis and their contribution to debates in the field of International Relations in the Middle East and more broadly, we must now consider critically those conclusions and the limitations of this work. Let us consider these in turn.

7.4.1 Extending the research framework beyond the case

The clearest limitation of this thesis has been in its scope. The empirical chapters took up a number of points of explanation following a detailed historical examination of the process of uneven and combined development within one state. The objection may be raised, then, that a long-term macro-historical process—uneven and combined development—is being used to explain immediate historical events at a different level. As explained at various points in this thesis, this is not the structure of my argument. Rather uneven and combined development provides the un-made circumstances in which the history of Jordan’s alignments was made. One could certainly argue, however, that looking in detail at Jordan only, albeit with analytical excursions into comparison with Iraq, might render problematic the drawing of general conclusions about the utility of uneven and combined development to the study of International Relations.

The concept of uneven and combined development in its present form being a
relatively recent arrival in the field, the main concern of this thesis has to been to examine its utility and therefore to build theory. The debate on the concept has hitherto been conducted in a quite abstract theoretical register, and characterised by a regrettable scantiness of in-depth studies uniting theoretical clarity and empirical evidence. This thesis sought to fill that gap. It was necessary, then, to provide a thorough examination of an empirical case, for which I chose Jordan in a particular period, that of the rapidly changing alignments of the 1950s. The reasoning behind this decision reflected the following considerations: Jordan is the subject of previous rigorous work based on the assumptions of omni-balancing (Brand, 1994, Ryan, 2009): Jordan in this period was a middle-case, poised between the simultaneously external and internal alternatives, to borrow terms from Hinnebusch of a ‘populist authoritarianism of the left’ and a ‘shaikhly authoritarianism of the right’ (2006:379) and its evolution would therefore shed light on the broader trajectories that led to those two poles elsewhere; and the country’s status as a predominantly agrarian economy lacking the proletarian concentrations of Tsarist Russia that first inspired the concept of uneven and combined development allows examination of how and how far the concept can be extended. Nonetheless, the reader may legitimately ask: after Jordan where next?

7.4.2 The potential for new cases

In the study of the Middle East, both as International Relations and comparative politics, the conclusion of this thesis suggests at least three paths forward from the necessarily limited work already undertaken: geographical, thematic and chronological. Geographical extent is perhaps the most straightforward way in which the research programme may expand. One means of doing this would be the integration of further case studies—a kind of work already being undertaken on Iran (Matin, 2006, 2007). This would not mean, however, a merely descriptive agglomeration of cases but the selection of research topics for analytical purposes. For example, what distinguishes Egypt from the rest of the Mashreq in its history of industrialization and modernizing revolution from above? Are there parallels between this case and Trotsky’s analysis of Russia? Does uneven and combined development reveal shared historical dynamics between the Arab and the indigenous non-Arab societies of the region, Turkey and Iran? One may also move up a level, from research on individual state to the region as a
whole. In the history of the international relations of the region, since there have been independent states able to have international relations, one observes a frequent division into two poles, associating certain forms of state-society relations with opposition to external influence and most especially that represented by Israel. These may be registered as ‘cold wars’ or bloody confrontation between the ‘moderate’ and the ‘steadfast’ played out in the weaker states such as Lebanon or Jordan—but the most consistent aspect of these divisions is the sudden shift of states from one camp to another, often accompanied by convulsive changes in the corresponding state-society relations (Ayubi, 1995:1). Uneven and combined development provides questions to ask about this history.

7.4.3 The Potential for New Themes

Raising the sights of uneven and combined development logically entails an orientation towards the thematic extension of the applicability of the concept. This thesis, in its attempt to break ground for uneven and combined development in International Relations, focused on a particular history of a particular states’ alignments but the results of the research suggest its potential for the consideration of themes or phenomena in the politics of the Middle East. One of these, suggested by the focus of my research, would be a more detailed ethnographic or historical approach to tribes, tribalism and the ‘shock of the new’ in the making of new social classes in the region. One of the most resonant aspects of uneven and combined development, particularly for the major oil-exporting states, concerns the extreme telescoping in ‘backward’ countries of processes of class formation and industrialisation. Thus, Trotsky identifies as one of the strategically important characteristics of the Russian working class the experience of ‘sharp changes of environment, ties, relations, and a sharp break with the past…combined with the concentrated oppressions of tsarism’ (1997:33). One is struck here by the similarity of the ‘shock of the new’ to the experience in the Gulf states registered by such novelists as “Abd-al-Rahman Munif whose novel Cities of Salt describes the fictional city of Harran ‘which had been undergoing constant change’ as the oil industry implants itself in a bedouin oasis, transforming the tribesmen into inhabitants of workers’ barracks from which ‘resentment moved like a bird from one
man to another’ (Munif, 1988:315).

At least one other major research project addressing these questions on the oil industry in Iran, where many of the workers came directly from pastoralist or semi-pastoralist tribes, is already under way and making some use of the idea of uneven and combined development.\(^{38}\) What, if any, are the political effects of such combinations, the interweavings of Chakrabarty’s History 1 and 2? Was Trotsky right to identify this as a factor in making working class movements more revolutionary? Is this true of a region which has seen few highly successful labour movements, whether they sought reforms or revolution? How did the uneven and combined development of the region affect not only labour movements but those of the peasants and communist parties?

7.5 Uneven and Combined Development and the Return of Revolution?

The consideration of these themes allows a further chronological extension of research based on uneven and combined development in the Middle East, one that both dramatically restates the relevance of the concept and yet also returns to Trotsky’s original *problematique* of revolution. Indeed, this task could perhaps provide the most important contribution of uneven and combined development to Middle East studies and International Relations. The task in question is the attempt to understand the revolutions and revolutionary movements that burst upon the Arab world precisely at the time of writing of this concluding chapter.

It would be adventurism of the most foolhardy sort even to begin to address this issue at the end of a doctoral thesis on a different topic. However, what can be noted is the especially sharp revelation provided by these events of the gap into which uneven and combined development fits and the warrant provided by them for a resuscitation of certain aspects of the theoretical framework. The revolutions and revolts of the ‘Arab Spring’ have re-opened in discussion about ‘returning to or revisiting approaches grounded in political economy, as a way to address issues such as neoliberalism, counter-revolution, contentious politics and social movements’ (Jadaliyya, 2011). Might there be grounds to reach therefore for a theoretical framework, such as

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\(^{38}\) The research project on *Social History of Labour in the Iranian Oil Industry 1908-2008* at the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.
uneven and combined development, pre-eminently concerned with questions of revolution and its international spread and origins?

Indeed, if there is a consensus about the revolutionary outbursts that have re-structured politics both between and within states in the Middle East in the months preceding the writing of this conclusion, it is that the conventional assumptions of much of Middle East studies and International Relations in the region must be re-thought. These assumptions, and the questions addressed in the field, in many ways reflect the dichotomy of universality and particularity and the ideas of insufficiently modern state-hood critiqued above and throughout this thesis. This ensemble of assumptions has also exercised a particularly powerful hold on policy-makers, especially in the United States. The first of these is that the politics of Arab societies are fundamentally connected to religious or sectarian identity: therefore the beneficiaries of any collapse of authoritarianism would most likely be Islamist movements. A second, and related assumption reflects the ‘end of history’ thesis promoted by Francis Fukuyama and others in the immediate aftermath of Cold War: ‘liberal democracy’ (by which is meant a market economy and electoral competition) has won the battle of history and therefore any regions of persistent authoritarianism may be expected either to move towards this model or require analysis to explain their failure so to do. Hence, much of the discussion in the decade preceding the revolutionary outbursts of 2011 concerned the durability of authoritarianism in the Arab world, the reasons for this, and whether it was worth explaining at all. (overviews of which are found in Anderson, 2006, Hinnebusch, 2006). The usual response to this dilemma was to pose one of two alternatives: either of Western military intervention in the manner of the arguments offered in favour of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the programme of gradual, NGO-led democratization favoured by such actors as the European Union.

At the time of writing of this thesis it is, of course, simply too soon to tell whether ideas of authoritarian resilience or Islamist resurgence will retain their currency in the study of Middle East international relations. That initial elections in both Tunisia and Egypt returned strong showings for Islamist-influenced parties, while Egypt remained under the (thoroughly shaky) control of a military junta, the Libyan National Transistional Council struggled to impose its Western-backed authority over the country and Syria and Yemen seemed to pass into slow-motion civil wars, gives cause to be even
more than usually cautious in discussing the future of the region. Nonetheless, it may be
useful precisely because of this uncertainty, to adopt an approach that sees revolution as
fundamentally a process that is neither solely ‘external’ nor ‘internal’ but a fundamental
interweaving of the two, for which, as Fred Halliday argues, the uneven and combined
‘terms of the larger capitalist whole’ form an inescapable background (1999:315).

The warrant for this claim comes not only from the place of the concept in the
consciousness of participants in the Arab revolutions themselves (al-Hamalawy, 2011).
Uneven and combined development, even in Trotsky’s rough outlines for Tsarist
Russia, presents some *prima facie* parallels (as well, of course, as very significant
differences) with the dynamics of the Arab revolutions. These lie in his identification of
the changing nature of social agency and the resulting dynamic (within, between and
across states) of the revolutionary process. One of the most striking aspects of the Arab
revolutions has been their passage across borders, most often through imitation rather
than direct intervention, and the consequent embroiling of external powers as military
actors: for example the Saudi-led intervention of the Gulf Co-operation Council in
Bahrain and the NATO action in Libya. Waves of popular uprisings across a zone of
shared culture and political systems are not new—one may think of Latin America in
the 1990s and 2000s, or the fall of the Warsaw Pact regimes—but the swiftness of the
Arab case and the rapid transition to military confrontation in certain states calls to
mind Trotsky’s somewhat apodictic comment that a revolution ‘begins on the national
arena’ and ‘unfolds on the international arena’ (1972a:276). Still more examples may
present themselves, as Qatar and Turkey seize the opportunity to re-organise the
regional architecture in their favour, in particular through intervention in the Syrian
rebellion.

This ‘contagion effect’ across borders and the consequent re-organisation of
regional geo-politics cannot be separate from the process of polarization that occurs
within each revolution. One might point especially to the loss of control by the
Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces over policy towards Israel in the
summer of 2011, when mass demonstrations effectively expelled the Israeli ambassador
from Cairo. The resulting fear of a ‘political tsunami’ (Benn, 2011) coloured subsequent
Israeli and US strategy in the region. Trotsky spoke of such processes of polarization
when he described a tendency to ‘call forth powerful class conflicts’ after the initial
euphoric toppling of the ancien régime (Trotsky, 1972a:29). These conflicts would then reflect the nature of the combined social formation, which in Russia he argued meant an inevitable divergence between the working class and any limited programme of simply political, rather than social or economic, change (1972a:29).

It would be entirely inappropriate simply to read off what one Russian revolutionary had to say a century prior to the ‘Arab spring’ and then imagine that the work of analysis had been done. However, what can be taken up here for future research is the idea that revolutions are not simply one event but a long process of flux, struggle and continuum, in which the initial removal of a ruling figurehead (the Tsar, Mubarak) shakes but does not completely destroy the structure of rule; and that the placement of any given society on the continuum between ancien régime and revolutionary transformation reflects the outcomes of struggles now openly waged amongst the classes emergent from uneven and combined development. Again with all necessary caveats, it is possible provisionally to discern that those states that (at the time of writing) have moved furthest along this continuum and which seem to reflect greater histories of industrialization and traditions of working-class collective action. At the time of writing, in Yemen and Libya, such organisation has so far played only a limited role while in Syria the uprising has yet to spread to urban and industrial centres around Aleppo or Damascus.

In Tunisia, by contrast, the participation of the General Federation of Tunisian Trade Unions in a general strike—historically a pillar of regime corporatism—seems to have marked the turning points in the ousting of Ben Ali (Piot, 2011). Egypt presented a picture redolent of the description of a Russia in which ‘peasant land-cultivation as a whole remained, right up to the revolution’ at a fairly low productive level, while ‘the extreme concentration’ of manufacturing industry meant that ‘no hierarchy of transitional layers’ imposed itself between potential vectors of class conflict (Trotsky, 1997:31-2). An initial examination of Egypt similarly reveals an agricultural sector 'dominated by small farmholders who hold less than one feddan [about one acre] each' but in which 'since 1987 agrarian strategy has focused on marginalising these small peasants and attacking their standard of living’ (Bush 2010: 52) combined with a number of large concentrations of manufacturing workers.

There is some evidence that the ‘Revolution of the 25th of January’ owed some
of its origins to a wave of strikes that passed through these concentrations and in particular in the symbolically important town of Mahalla el-Kubra. Some 1.7 million workers took part in more than 1,900 strikes and other protests (in the absence of free unions) between 2004 and 2008 (Beinin, 2009:49). According to Gamal Eid of the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, ‘[a]fter Mahalla in 2008, the first weaknesses in the regime appeared... [n]othing was the same in Egypt after that’ (Gopal 2011). The US state department, in a leaked diplomatic cable, recognized that "in Mahalla, a new organic opposition force bubbled to the surface, defying current political labels, and apparently not affiliated with the [Muslim Brotherhood]. This may require the [Mubarak] government to change its script’ (Gopal 2011). In the fall of Hosni Mubarak from power in February 2011 ‘workers visibly contributed to the revolutionary process by engaging in some sixty strikes, some with explicitly political demands’ (Beinin 2011). The polarization within the revolution, presented by Trotsky in his argument for the ‘passing over’ from political to economic demands on behalf of the workers, seemed in evidence in the months following the revolutions, particularly in Egypt as ‘[s]trikes and sit-ins... continued regularly... at the rate of several per week’ (despite the ban on such actions) (Beinin 2011), and passing into a second popular uprising in November of 2011 immediately prior to the first round of elections (Hamalawy, 2011).

The above, of course, constitutes mere reflection rather than fully finished and theoretically informed analysis. At this stage no more than that can be offered. My intent here is not to give a didactic explanation of processes still unfolding, the consequences of which will be felt and studied over many years. Rather, I am indicating a preliminary zone of comparison between the original problematique of uneven and combined development and the politically re-constitutive events of the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century in the Middle East. The purpose of such provisional considerations is only to lead us to more pertinent questions: does the original stress on concentrated populations of wage-labourers in agrarian countries under authoritarian rule still hold true for these cases? If so, how are the dynamics of polarization in the revolutionary period after the immediate fall of the authoritarian ruler likely to develop? Trotsky suggests a polarization around questions of more thorough-going social transformation—how much this is happening in the case of the Arab
revolutions? How is this ‘social’ dynamic related to the ‘geopolitical’ one of the extension of the revolutionary movements across borders and the re-casting of the security architecture of the region? At this point, of course, only questions are available. If, however, the concept of uneven and combined development can provide the right questions then it may serve a useful role guiding future research on a rapidly changing region.
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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Walid Al-Khayat, Former President of Jordanian Electricians’ Union, Communist Party member, Amman, 25th of February 2009

Mohammed Al-Masri, Researcher, Jordan Center for Strategic Studies, Amman 8th of September 2008

Sheikh ʿAnbar Dahash Al-Jazi, member of the Huwaytat, retired colonel of the Desert Patrol, Amman 27th of May 2009

Dr Munir Hamarneh, Secretary General, Jordanian Communist Party, Amman 16th of February 2009

Sheikh Mansur Al-Hawatmeh, member of the Bani Hamideh, retired Army officer, Amman, 4th of May 2009

Trevor Royle, Author, biographer of Glubb Pasha, Portobello, 13th of June 2008,

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