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Against instrumental reason: spirituality, neo-Marxism, and Heideggerian thought in three major Spanish thinkers.

Beatriz Caballero Rodríguez

A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

University of Edinburgh
September 2008
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

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List of Abbreviations


Frankfurt School (FS)

Critical Theory (CT)

References to an author’s Complete Works will take the form of (year, volume: page).

Internal cross-references will take the following format: (chapter.section.subsequent subsections when required). For example (see 3.2.1) refers to chapter three, section two, subsection one.

Other comments

Although the pronouns he, him, and his shall be used for brevity throughout these thesis, they should be taken to refer to both genders when applicable.

In those instances when italics have been used within quotation marks, they are always the author’s.
Part I
1 Introduction

1.1 The project

The central argument of this thesis is that, contrary to what is generally believed, Critical Theory (CT) – as understood by the Frankfurt School (FS) – does exist and is developed in Spain influenced by and parallel to the Frankfurt School’s own research during the second half of the twentieth century\(^1\). Hence, the aim of this research is to provide evidence of the existence in Spain of thought developed in line with Frankfurtian CT. To this end, we shall explore the thought developed by three leading Spanish thinkers: José Luis López Aranguren, María Zambrano Alarcón, and Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate. This will be done from the perspective of two pivotal currents of thought arising from Germany: neo-Marxism and Heideggerian thought. By doing so, not only will this research draw attention to the much overlooked issue of CT in Spain, but it will also help to re-contextualize Spanish thought of the second half of the twentieth century in the broader sociological and philosophical discussions which were taking place in post-war Europe and the United States. To this end, the thesis has been structured in two parts. The aim of the first part is to provide an introduction as well as a methodological and historical contextualization which will establish the framework for the rest of the thesis. In the second part, I will carry out an interdisciplinary comparative study analysing which aspects of the thought of these Spanish thinkers converge with the thought of the FS, and which differ from them. Attention will also be paid to the socio-political atmosphere they are immersed in, so as to find out how it contributes to shape their thought.

We will start this chapter by framing this research within the field of the history of ideas, thus an introduction to what constitutes the history of ideas will ensue. This will be followed by an examination of what can be understood by CT in the context of the FS and how the FS developed it. A brief history of how the thought of the FS filtered in Spain will also be provided. Finally, the methodology and structure of this thesis will be discussed.

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\(^1\) The components of the FS are, originally, the members of the Institut für Sozialforschung or Institute for Social Research, who soon emigrate to the United States as a result of the threat of Nazism. There, and from a Marxist and Freudian platform, they develop their CT. Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and even Pollock form the core of the Institut. Fromm, Benjamin, Neumann, and Kirchheimer are also integral members, although their focus and association with the School differs from the members above mentioned, and as a result are sometimes described as being on the periphery. Habermas heads the second wave of this current of thought (for a brief history and reflection on the term “Frankfurt School” see Heller, 2002: 207; see also Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 225-26).
Thus, I would like to start this introduction by pointing out to the reader some methodological decisions which have largely shaped not only my approach to the topic of discussion, but also the conclusions reached. That is why it must be highlighted from the outset that this research, although it shares some points of confluence with literary criticism, does not fall under this discipline. Instead, it has been undertaken from the perspective of the history of ideas. Therefore, this will be reflected in the premises and methodology adopted, which are largely informed by Quentin Skinner’s work.

As Elizabeth Ann Clark explains, “the history of ideas achieved prominence in twentieth-century America under the aegis of Arthur O. Lovejoy” (2004: 107). Lovejoy argues that systems of thought are structured around key words and concepts which he refers to as “unit-ideas”. In order to trace these unit-ideas, he argues that research must be interdisciplinary and must take into account an expanded literary cannon which extends to different countries and incorporates linguistic research (see Clark, 2004: 107). During the 1960s, however, this approach has been criticized for stressing excessively formal thought and written texts, and adopting an “unhistorical” perspective (see Ritter, 1986: 236). A contrasting view argues that “social history is the necessary complement to the history of ideas” (Holborn, 1972: 208). It is from this perspective that Hajo Holborn points to Dilthey as the father of the history of ideas (1972: 203; see also Ritter, 1986: 237). Skinner, however, is critical of both approaches. For him, the term history of ideas refers to “as wide as possible a variety of historical inquiries into intellectual problems” (1969: 3). Whereas the two main – and conflicting – currents within the history of ideas insist, respectively, on the autonomy of the text to yield its own meaning and on interpreting the text according to its context, Skinner argues that both approaches are insufficient and that, instead, the history of ideas should interpret a text by interpreting the illocutionary intentions of its writer, as we shall discuss below (see 1969: 3-4, 45-46). From this perspective, contextual information will be used, not to interpret the text directly, but to contribute to elucidate the intentionality of its author. This is the methodological framework which this thesis is based on. Consequently, it will be explained below in greater detail.

Kari Palonen starts his reflection on the thought and methodology of Quentin Skinner by drawing the reader’s attention to a “spontaneous remark made by Quentin Skinner”, which, notwithstanding, pinpoints the core of his approach: “there is an awful lot of books, and if our books are not going to say something new, then we certainly ought not to be publishing them. Forests tremble as it is at the onset of authors” (Palonen, 2003: 1; Skinner, 2001: 21 respectively). This comment not only renders an analytical approach to exegesis unnecessary, but, crucially, also insufficient. It implies the desirability for interpretation to go beyond what is already said, beyond the text. That is why, in “A Reply to my Critics”, Skinner argues:
my objection is rather to those who assume that the business of understanding a text is simply a matter of recovering, by whatever means, the meaning of the text itself. This is the assumption [...] that I still wish to reject in the name of the need to recover, at the same time, what the author of the text may have meant by it (1988a: 282).

As Palonen explains, Skinner’s methodology involves “the critique of empiricism and the authority of contemporary sources” (2003: 25). Whereas empiricists believe in the possibility of perceiving data directly and producing an uncontentious description of it, this premise must be questioned (see Skinner, 2002: 1, 8-26). As Skinner underscores, “we are already caught up in the process of interpretation as soon as we begin to describe any aspect of our evidence in our own words” (Skinner, 2002: 16). This is one of the reasons why in this thesis, while factual evidence is provided wherever possible, its evaluation takes place in the light of historical contextualization and intentionality, which play a considerable role in this research as we shall see in the course of this chapter.

As Palonen argues, Skinner confronts the role of the academic emphasis placed upon truth in contrast with that of novelty, and as a consequence adopts a perspectivist view of knowledge (see Palonen, 2003: 1-2). It must be emphasized at the outset that this is precisely the methodology adopted in this research primarily because, as we shall see, CT adopts a similar approach of going beyond that which is. As a result, an analytical approach may result in the distortion of its thought. In contrast, adopting an approach which is in line with the methodological co-ordinates of CT not only can be considered to be a way of analysing it that does less violence to it, but more crucially, it avoids the pitfall of imposing an external framework of rationality as the guiding reference for the analysis of the work of Critical Theorists. For this reason, this methodology explores the role that biography and intentionality play in shaping the language, style, and content of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre’s writings. Thus, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of these authors’ work and it reveals aspects of their thought which may otherwise go unnoticed. What is more, I argue that this is precisely what happens in relation to the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, whose subversive and political content and their possible relation to CT have been overlooked until now.

As a result of this methodological choice, this introduction will not only provide an overview of this thesis, a brief introduction to the FS and CT, and a justification for the choice of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre as the focus of this research, but it will also

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2 Although the word perspectivism in reference to Ortega’s thought will be discussed in chapter three, in this context, perspectivism refers to the lack of a unique objective criterion to regulate methodology regarding research. As Palonen puts it, “it is always possible and desirable to propose a number of different perspectives on the study of the ‘same’ phenomena. [...] There are no ‘objective’ criteria for assessing research except for the competition of the perspectives themselves. The significance and the validity of ‘facts’ can always be assessed differently when judged from another perspective” (2003: 2).
discuss in more detail the importance of biography and intentionality, and the role that they play in the thesis, thus resulting in an unavoidably lengthy introduction.

1.2 The topic

The term CT is coined by the members of the Frankfurt School while in exile at Columbia University in New York (see Kellner, 1989: 43). At first, as Douglas Kellner points out, this term is partly used as a form of code “in order to cover over its commitment to Marxism in an environment that is quite hostile to a theory associated with socialist revolution and the Soviet Union” (1989: 44). Despite the fact that initially “critical theory” denoted the work of the Institut and it is still closely associated with it, the use of this label has expanded to describe work of a critical nature, although quite varied in character, intention, and substance. It is with its original meaning, in reference to the FS, that this term will be used throughout this study, which is why henceforth it will be used in capitals.

According to Brian Fay, “‘critical theory’ means a substantive, neo-Marxist theory of advanced capitalism, whose parts have been propounded by some or all of the members of the Frankfurt School and its followers” (1987: 4). Its aim is to transform society as opposed to uncritically reproducing it; its target is the critique of instrumental reason and the denunciation of the new forms of alienation developed by neo-capitalist society in particular. It can be characterized as a critical supradisciplinary discourse, expressed in a challenging language and style that require the active involvement of the reader (see Kellner, 1989: 1, 5-7, 46). As is well-known, instrumental reason refers to the framework of rationality according to which each object and each action is conceived and treated as a means and not as an end in itself. Although this concept is already developed in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (1947b), the phrase “instrumental reason” first appears in Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft (1967), that is, the German translation of Horkheimer’s English original (see Carlebach, 1977: 639). There, it is argued that reason, as has been known and exercised since the Enlightenment, is ruled by exploitation.

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3 When referring to the School in this context, Horkheimer – its director – and Adorno represent the ideological centre of the School. As Agnes Heller puts it, “the cause of the Frankfurt School was the cause of Horkheimer” (2002: 220).

4 As Frederic Jameson explains, “the new social formation in question no longer obeys the laws of classical capitalism, namely, the primacy of industrial production and the omnipresence of class struggle” (1991: 3). It is this advanced form of capitalism, which is devoid of class conscience and class struggle as such, that will be discussed throughout this thesis.

5 Although the term “instrumental reason” was first used by Horkheimer, it is grounded on Max Weber’s concept of the “iron cage” to refer to the dead-end of modern reason, a reason which focuses only on the means and loses sight of the ends (see Weber, 1958: 181; see also Rasmussen, 2006: 266). As David Rasmussen explains, “Weber coined the term Zweckrationalität, purposive-rational action. Reason, devoid of its redemptive and reconciliatory possibilities, could only be purposive, useful and calculating” (2006: 266). This forms the basis for Horkheimer’s concept of instrumental reason.
productivity, and profitability criteria which have become ends in themselves (see Horkheimer, 1973: 21). That is why, far from being the kind of interpersonal, critical, and reflexive reason which would encourage the development of the individual and of the society he inhabits, it constitutes an instrumental form of rationality which in fact proves to be irrational insofar as it leads to different destructive – rather than constructive or creative – paths. This rationality, guided by self-interested criteria, has equated utility with rationality, ultimately resulting in the subjugation of nature and the individual. More specifically, instrumental reason describes the use of reason, in the form of economy, communication, and cultural life with the purpose of social control (see Rasmussen, 2006: 266). These are the dynamics of thought and action which CT uncovers and denounces, opening up new directions of research and, particularly, different methodologies in philosophical, sociological, and socio-political investigation.

Understanding the role played by (neo-)Marxism and Heideggerian thought is of central importance because not only are they at the core of this debate, but their influence does not stop in Spain. Marxism in its different forms and Heideggerian thought have contributed to shaping to a large extent post-war European thought. Marxism has played a key role in the development of socio-political and economic policies and behaviours in Western society throughout the twentieth century. Insofar as it promises an alternative socio-economic structure to capitalism, it has been perceived as a powerful and inspiring ideology by some, while also being regarded as a dangerous threat which we need to protect.

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6 The terms “subject” or “individual” will be employed throughout the thesis as synonymous, despite the discussion their distinction has generated (see Bordwell, 1996: 15, 32). The reason for this choice lies, first, in the defence of the existence of the subject/individual in contrast with its disappearance, because without such a concept meaning and responsibility become impossible or, rather, non-applicable (see Bruns, 2005: 364-65; see also Bordwell, 1996: 15 respectively); second, because it is argued that, in the context of CT, the terminology “subject” and “individual” are the reflection of the assumptions, behaviours, and roles as described and prescribed by instrumental rationality. These terms are, therefore, opposed to “person” which is considered to reflect, not the duality between subject and object or the separation between the individual and the others, but an integral role as an agent in society and culture. “Person” emphasizes the incomplete, social nature, and humanistic aspect of the agent, thus, overcoming the limitations of the terms “subject” and “individual”.

7 As Stephen Bronner explains, for the FS, “technology generated under capitalism and its peculiar form of instrumental or scientific thinking increasingly undermines the reflective exercise of subjectivity. Moral judgment is understood as becoming increasingly subordinate to instrumental thinking, and, as a consequence, individuals appear threatened with the loss of their capacity for normative judgment” (2002: 223). It is because of this threat to the normative judgement of the individual and its consequences that instrumental reason is judged to be essentially irrational. In other words, it is an assessment made on moral grounds. It should also be noted that, for the FS and Adorno in particular, these consequences have materialized more clearly in the moral atrocities of Auschwitz (see Adorno, 2003: 19-36; see also Tiedemann, 2003: xi-xxvii; see also Horkheimer, 1947b: 161).

8 Unless specifically stated otherwise, all references to Marxism throughout the thesis refer to classical Marxism, understood as the body of work published by Marx and Engels, in contrast with other forms of Marxism which arise from the different interpretations or reactions to such work, such as Soviet Marxism or neo-Marxism (see Storey, 2001: 47-49; see also Heywood, 2000: 64).
and defend ourselves from by others\textsuperscript{9}. Thus, Marxism is of interest to this research not only because of the scope and relevance of its impact, but also because CT, although interdisciplinary in nature, must be understood within the framework of the renovation of the principles of the already then dated Marxism. On the other hand, phenomenology and Heideggerian thought must also be counted amongst the early influences on the thought of the FS. As Dermot Moran points out, “the Frankfurt School of Social Criticism […] developed largely in reaction to Heidegger, often juxtaposing the young Marx’s view of human alienation and domination by ideology against Heidegger’s account of man and the domination of technicity” (2000: 245). In fact, phenomenology and Heideggerian philosophy make an indelible impression on post-war European thought, also partly inspiring and influencing the development of French existentialism, and being at the very heart of postmodernism (for a more detailed account of Heidegger’s influence see Moran, 2000: 245-47; see also Taylor, 1993: 317).

There is ample evidence of the existence of links and of the critical engagement of Spanish thinkers with German thought and culture. As Juan López Morillas explains, “con su viaje de estudios a Alemania, en 1843-1844, Sanz del Río abre un período de incalculable trascendencia en la crónica del pensamiento y exploración de los valores de la cultura alemana en su triple dimensión filosófica, literaria y científica” (1956: 85; see also Ferrater Mora, 1982: 1879). In fact, Spanish thinkers have been particularly influenced by German thought since the introduction of Krausism by Julián Sanz del Río in the mid-nineteenth century (see Velasco, 2003: 17)\textsuperscript{10}. Krausism has been a movement of special

\textsuperscript{9} Grounded on the Marxist tradition, for the members of the FS, “ideology, in short, is a ‘totalitarian’ system which has managed and processed all social conflict out of existence” (see Eagleton, 1991: 127). This position is, of course, not without problems, for it unavoidably raises questions regarding how a critique of ideology would be thinkable and possible under such circumstances (see Eagleton, 1991: 127). Terry Eagleton, aware of this difficulty, understands ideology instead as “the ways in which specific ideas help to legitimate unjust and unnecessary forms of political domination” (1991: 167). Although it is important to highlight this negative meaning of the word “ideology”, for it will be relevant when discussing Marxist and neo-Marxist views, following Josh Beach, a broader definition of this term will be used (see Beach, 2005: 10, 14). It is necessary to acknowledge that every criticism and position comes from a certain ideology (see Beach, 2005: 13). In this sense, ideology is synonymous with world view, and, as such, is inescapable (Beach, 2005: 13). That is why Beach argues that “the study of ideology should not simply be a critical tool to identify and judge malignant institutions of power and the perversions of ideology, which promote or mystify injustice and inequality. It should also be about evaluating benevolent and empowering systems of thought as well as postulating new ideological worldviews” (2005: 14).

\textsuperscript{10} Following Elías Díaz, two stages can be identified in the development of Krausist philosophy in Spain (1973: 48-49). The first period expands from the introduction of the ideas of Karl Christian Friedrich Kraus by Julián Sanz del Río from 1854 until the latter’s death in 1869 or until the restoration of Bourbon Monarchy in 1875 (1973: 48-49). It is focused on Kraus’s thought. Its central ideas are based on the concept of panentheism, as a result of which it is assumed that life and thought are ruled by a racionalismo armónico or harmonic rationalism, according to which reason is able to harmonize or find a synthesis between concepts perceived as oppositions, such as nature and spirit, body and soul, and individual and State (Abellán, 1984: 428, 440). Krausism also believes in the moral progress of
relevance because, as José Ferrater Mora explains, “el krausismo dejó pronto de ser un movimiento filosófico atenido a las ideas de Krause para convertirse en un movimiento de renovación espiritual y en particular educativa” (1982: 1879-80). As José Luis Abellán explains, Krausism is basically a metaphysical philosophy which, as it was assimilated by its followers, acquired a religious, moral, and practical dimension (1984: 413). In fact, the Krausist doctrine contributes to renovating cultural life, while also destabilizing previous patterns of thought to the point that it has a reinvigorating impact on the development of socio-political events in Spain (see 1984: 424). It is particularly crucial in understanding the influence of the second period of Krausism, which is led by Francisco Giner de los Ríos and revolves around the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, thus creating what has become known as krausinstitutionalism. According to Fernando Velasco, krausinstitutionalism, rather than an inflexible set of doctrines, becomes an “estado del alma”, a certain disposition shared by those who are seeking an extensive intellectual and moral renovation (1993: 336-37). It is largely on these romantic ideals of nation, nature, God, and the individual imported from German idealism that the Republic is built, for, as Sebastian Faber explains, “the ideological basis of the Second Republic is not Gramscian Marxism but the nineteenth-century liberal tradition of Krausism” (2002: 64). This empathy towards the German cultural heritage is not an isolated position, but, in fact, a perceptible tendency during that period and the following years, which can also be observed in the influence that Nietzsche and also Schopenhauer had on the areas of philosophy and literature, particularly, on the authors of 98 (see Bretz, 2001: 126; see also Abellán, 1998: 13)11.

humanity (Abellán, 1984: 428). Ethics play a pivotal role in the structure of Krausist thought, which can be observed in the importance placed in values such as sincerity and honesty (Abellán, 1984: 428-29); this accounts for the prescriptive, and therefore, practical implications of this doctrine. The second period starts in 1876 when Francisco Giner de los Ríos – Julián Sanz del Río’s most salient follower – founds the Institución Libre de Enseñanza which, as a matter of fact, becomes an alternative University led by Krausists principles, resulting in what Velasco refers to as “krausinstitutionalismo” (see Díaz, 1973: 49; see also Velasco, 1993: 336; 2003: 22; Faber, 2002: 76). Krausinstitutionalismo, framed within the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and still as a development of the ideas of Kraus, refers to the attempt to moralize social life and reinvigorate Spanish thought (Velasco, 1993: 11). Its position rests upon three pivotal points: freedom as the pre-requisite of moral life and of science, consciousness as a guiding principle, and reason as the path towards truth (Velasco, 1993: 27; see also Abellán, 1988: 156-57). Díaz estimates that this second period ends around 1915 or 1917, the years of the respective deaths of Giner de los Ríos and Gumersindo de Azcárate, another promoter of Krausism (1973: 49).

11 The expression “authors of 98” is preferred here to “generation of 98” given its problematic nature, for as Ricardo Gullón explains, the latter is a baseless invention made by Azorín, and the authors it encompasses are better understood instead in the context of modernism (1969: 7-9; see also Blasco, 2000: 121-31). As Abellán explains, modernism in Spain constitutes a rupture with the past: “España no les gustaba y había que cambiarla […] para unos la solución tenía que ser la rebelión estética, para otros la revolución social, para los de más allí la exaltación nacionalista y para casi todos la ‘europeización’ del país” (1988: 63-64). Modernism in Spain is, therefore, a reaction to a crisis; in consequence, modernism must not be made synonymous with modernity because modernism constitutes the search for, the attempt to reach modernity (Abellán, 1989a: 17-18). In contrast, “‘moderno’ es todo lo referente a la Edad Moderna y que, por tanto, puede connotarse con los
A key member of that group is Unamuno. Understanding his influence on Zambrano and, to a lesser degree, also Aranguren and, even, Aguirre is of central importance. Unamuno’s work constitutes to a large extent a reaction to a widespread feeling of crisis.

As Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez explains, the decadence of the Spanish Empire starts after the period of maximum territorial expansion that Spain enjoyed under the Habsburgs (1962: 43). This process of disintegration of the Empire translates into a national crisis which can be observed after the Peninsular War against Napoleon (1808-14), described by Abellán as the beginning of Contemporary Spain (1984: 15). Social and political turmoil follows in different forms: the conflict between the liberals and the traditionalists (1822-23), the Catalan peasant insurrection (1827), and the First and Second Carlist Wars (1833-40 and 1873-76 respectively) (see Payne, 2006: 2; see also Carr, 2000: 205-25). In addition to this, the nineteenth century in Spain is marked by numerous pronunciamientos, civilian-military coups, which contribute to the lack of stability so characteristic of this period of Spanish history (see Carr, 2000: 205-25). In 1873, Amadeo of Saboy, the constitutional king, abdicates as a result of the pressures exercised by the army; the short-lived First Republic is born. However, the First Republic soon fails as a result of its ambitious goals and its utopian character, which is reflected in the lack of specific structures of government and of sufficient support (see Abellán, 1984: 665-67). The monarchy is restored with the entrance of King Alfonso XII in Madrid in January 1875 (see Abellán, 1988: 15). During the Restoration a compromise between the traditional, conservative forces and the progressive ones is sought in the form of the Canovist system of political alternation (see Abellán, 1988: 17, 23). Despite this attempt, former divisions within the country remain (see Abellán, 1988: 49): the political equilibrium granted by the Canovist system is only apparent because votes are coerced (Abellán, 1988: 23); there is a further, third, Carlist War (1876) (Abellán, 1988: 26). Catholicism becomes the official religion of the State. As a result it becomes an instrument of ideological and political legitimation, while forced to share its hegemony with the liberal bourgeoisie, creating resentment amongst families of lower income (see Abellán, 1988: 26; see also González Ruiz, 1977: 166). In this context, the Cuban-American war (1895-98) simply represents the culmination of an on-going, unresolved crisis (see Abellán, 1988: 30). As Abellán explains, “por un lado, nos hallamos ante el fin del llamado ciclo imperial, por otro, estamos ante una crisis del ‘sistema canovista’ con importantes implicaciones económicas, sociales y militares” (1988: 29). With the loss of the remaining Spanish colonies overseas, Spain is no longer an Imperialist power and as a result, its sense of identity and direction are profoundly questioned, at the same time that the disintegration
of the colonial structure has a serious impact on Spanish economy, to the extent that the core of the crisis of 1898 can be found in the end of this economic system (see Abellán, 1988: 29-30).

The twentieth century carries forward this crisis. As Sebastian Balfour explains, “the crisis of national identity which came to a head after the disaster made the search for an alternative and more authentic model of society to that of the Restoration all the more urgent” (1995: 415). This sense of crisis originates a profound debate regarding Spanish identity and its future whose participants are not only politicians, journalists, intellectuals, but also average people (see Balfour, 1995: 412). This debate is often referred to as el problema de España. As José Álvarez Junco explains,

the events of 1898 gave rise to a vast literature on ‘the Spanish problem’, generally in the form of a maudlin, self-denigrating nationalism. There were grandiose proposals for the transformation of the Spanish national character, a determination to europeizar, ‘to make European’, that is, to encourage pragmatism, industry and science, to leave behind El Cid, Don Quixote and Columbus (2002: 86).

An attempt to address this crisis is made by regeneracionismo. As Balfour indicates, “regenerationism was an old intellectual tradition stretching back to the seventeenth-century vogue for instant remedies for the nation’s early decline. In the aftermath of the disaster it took an overwhelming urgency” (1995: 411). Regenerationism, led by Joaquín Costa, strives to modernize, even europeanize, Spain (see Álvarez Junco, 1999: 74-75; see also Balfour, 1995: 412). Despite the divergence of its exponents, regenerationism insists that Spain must undergo a process of reform regarding economy, legislation, agriculture, and, particularly, education (see Harrison, 2000: 56-59; see also Balfour, 1995: 412). To this end, proposals for a programme of public works in the areas of irrigation, housing, and transport are put forward, although most of these ambitious projects do not come to fruition (Balfour, 1995: 412, 414-16).

This crisis manifests itself in numerous ways. As Carlos Barriuso explains, “en 1900 se produce una larga crisis de legitimidad del estado-nación que el recién constituido grupo intelectual aprovechará para formular una crítica al poder político reivindicando un papel rector en la conciencia social” (2004: 82). Influenced by German idealism, and by means of a philological and political (socialist) project of research and revival of Spain’s popular and mystical past, Unamuno “pretende […] traducir a la realidad española el modelo germano del Volksgeist” (Barriuso, 2004: 84; see also 85-87, 93). In addition, there are two conflicting elements which will also be present in later thinkers. On the one hand, there is a marked dichotomy; Unamuno searches for and defends national identity, even, or, rather, particularly those idealized traits which are now only part of a medieval past, while he still aspires to Europeanization (see Bretz, 2001: 141). On the other hand, he also rejects French
rationalism, as does d’Ors, and the question of faith takes centre stage in his work (see Bretz, 2001: 126). As Ródenas de Moya explains,

y entre un querer creer en Dios que es un anhelo ontológico y un resignarse a la incertidumbre van discursiendo, de un modo errabundo y brioso, uno tras otro, los ensayos que configuran esta formidable declaración de inseguridad del hombre arrojado al mundo (2006: 46).

His is the tragedy of a tortured mind whose rationality will not allow room for religion or faith. This not only shows Unamuno’s vital struggle, but also represents the dilemma that Spanish thinkers have traditionally faced (see Unamuno, 1983: 58-63, 68-69, 72-73; Baker, 1990: 37-56; Pérez, 2001: 5; Abellán, 1989a: 47).

Ortega is another key bridge between Spanish and German culture (see Mari, 1983: 126). The weight of the influence of Krausism and, more precisely, the mark of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza is palpable in Ortega, whose influence can be traced in Zambrano and Aranguren in particular, and in Aguirre to a lesser degree. After Aguirre’s stay in Germany (1905-1907), he remains deeply impressed by German philosophy and the European ways of German life and culture, being particularly influenced by German Idealism, Husserl’s phenomenology, and by Heidegger’s work (see Cacho Viu, 1998: 13; Menéndez Alzamora, 2004: 454).

As discussed above, Spanish identity becomes a problem of almost metaphysical proportions, as has been illustrated by the authors of 98 (see Álvarez Junco, 1999: 75). Ortega continues questioning the situation and identity of Spain in relation to both its own tradition and the rest of Europe. He exacerbates a dual attitude; in the first instance, there is admiration for the modern European way of life and a progressive rapprochement towards it is perceived as progress; these conflict with a strong sense of Spanish identity which lead him to view the problem of Spain as a historical, rather than as a political one (see Dobson, 1989: 83, 86-88, 98; see also Favretto, 2005: 113; Argullol, 2005: 21; Graham, 2001: 241)\(^\text{12}\). This dichotomy has an enormous influence on all three authors of this study, for they all are, in one way or another, as explained in the subsequent chapters, Ortegians. This said, the impact that other thinkers, although maybe less charismatic ones, have had on later Spanish intellectuals should not be underestimated. D’Ors, Marañón, and Zubiri have made vital contributions by, on the one hand, crossing the national borders through their germanophily – their interest in German culture – and, on the other hand, confronting tradition and progress, rationality and religion, in an attempt to shape Spanish identity (see Gracia, 1996: 22). As Bretz concludes, “the Spanish modernist reconceptualization of

\(^{12}\) The authors of 98 already show concern about the problem of Spain, *el problema de España*, which they tackle mainly from an aesthetic angle, and which more generally materializes in “críticas al sistema parlamentario, susceptibilidad ante los militares, crecimiento del anticlericalismo, preocupación política por la regeneración del país…” (Abellán, 1988: 67; see also 1989a: 168).
history and nation, of the past and its connection to collective identity contributes significantly to introduce new ways of imagining and experiencing that are fundamental to a modern and post-modern understanding of the world” (2001: 149). This is precisely the journey taken by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre who, driven by their historical and vital circumstances, develop a socio-cultural critique that goes beyond previously established parameters.

1.3 What is Critical Theory?

The aim of this section is to provide a brief introduction to CT in terms of its nature, topics, aims, methodology, and style, so that it can be used throughout the thesis as a point of reference and comparison in relation to Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in order to determine if their thought can also be considered to embody CT.

Before a discussion of what CT is can take place, the first feature of CT which needs to be highlighted is its diversity. As Fred Rush explains: “while it is characterized by certain shared core philosophical concerns, Critical Theory exhibits a diversity among its proponents that both contributes to its richness and poses substantial barriers to understanding its significance” (2004: 6; see also Held, 2004: 12; Thiebaut, 2003: 441). Thus, the idiosyncratic and, sometimes, substantial differences between the work of the individual members of the Institut should be understood as different manifestations of CT. Despite this diversity, as Rush indicates, there are some core concepts which are shared by all Critical Theorists. These include theoretical aims, but also central aspects of their content and style, for one of the characteristics of CT is the interrelation of its elements – the intrinsic link between content and style, theory and praxis. Bearing this in mind, we shall now focus on the central core elements which they share.

CT is first and foremost a critique of advanced capitalist society; its distinctiveness lies in that while traditional theory uncritically reproduces existing society, CT, by contrast, strives to transform it (see Kellner, 1989: 46). As Rush puts it, Critical Theory is not merely descriptive, it is a way to instigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social inequality that can, in turn, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least at diminishing domination and inequality) (2004: 9).

The study of ideology, for the FS, is linked to a project of liberation, in contrast with empirical sociology which professes a liberal and capitalistic ideology (Ricoeur, 1986: 6). Thus, it attempts to provide criticism and alternatives to traditional or mainstream social theory, as well as a critique of a full range of ideologies (see Kellner, 1989: 1, 44). Instead of targeting specific socio-economic and political problems only, its critique is directed against the specific rationality upon which Western society is based: instrumental reason. Such a critique is most clearly developed in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (1947b) and
Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). The structure of their critique is supported by three key elements which are at the core of their thought. First, the criticism of instrumental reason as a socially deficient rationality is the result of the ethical core implied in Critical Theory (see Honneth, 2004: 338). Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno, and Habermas share the conviction that the actualization of individual freedom requires adopting a common *praxis* that is more than the result of the mere coordination of individual interests (see Honneth, 2004: 343). Thus, their aim is the “cooperative self-actualization [which] includes […] the notion that subjects are not able to achieve a successful social life as long as they have not recognized the common core of value judgements that lies behind their respective individual interests” (Honneth, 2004: 343). However, it is important to highlight that, despite this ethical motivation, the possibility of a universal moral theory is rejected by Critical Theorists (see Honneth, 2004: 342). Second, capitalism is identified as the cause of an instrumental and ultimately deficient rationality (see Honneth, 2004: 338). And third, their critique establishes an intrinsic connection to *praxis*, which is necessary when the goal is to overcome the social suffering caused by this deficient rationality (see Honneth, 2004: 338). This attack against instrumental reason is comparable to the critique of reason developed by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre; even if they do not refer to this kind of rationality in terms of “instrumental reason”, the essence of their critique shares some remarkable similarities. As a result of the premises and critique discussed above, CT must adopt a different rationality itself in order to avoid being prey to its own criticism. Thus, CT claims to be essentially different in its theoretical content but, more radically, also in its methodology, effectively constituting a different rationality of its own right. This is also precisely what the three authors who are the object of this study aim to do with their critique, and even more comprehensively in the cases of Aguirre and Zambrano, through their use of language.

The work of the Institut is heavily influenced by Marx, Hegel, and Freud, and to a lesser degree by Lukács, Korsch and Gramsci, who stress the importance of subjectivity and culture (see Brunkhorst, 2004: 251; Whitebook, 2004: 74). Hence, their theoretical platform goes beyond Marxism, which they consider obsolete and inadequate to confront the new challenges brought about by advanced capitalism. As Marcuse states: “Marx’s image of the realm of necessity does not correspond to today’s highly developed industrial nations” (1968: xvii). Old Marxist economic models are also found to be in need of revision; influenced by Georg Lukács and the economists Grossmann and Pollock, the School adopts

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13 A glimpse of this – which will be developed at length in the coming chapters – can be observed in Zambrano’s elegant critique of Western reason, which she describes as *soberbia*, arrogance: “los breves pasos en que hemos acompañado a la razón en su caminar por nuestro angosto mundo de Occidente, son suficientes, creo yo, para poder advertir que la razón se ensobreció” (1939: 18).
more action-oriented theories (see Kellner, 1989: 11, 52). Economic movements and interests are no longer thought to fully represent or reflect society. As Kellner highlights,

Although Marcuse and his colleagues would accept the Marxian position that the economy is the crucial determining factor for all social life, they reject all forms of economic reductionism and attempt to describe the complex set of mediations connecting the economy, social and political institutions, culture, everyday life, and individual consciousness as parts of a reciprocally interacting social system (Kellner, 2001b: 11).

Whereas the concept of the proletariat becomes inapplicable, the social force which needs to be analysed is the mass (see Thiebaut, 2003: 444). The relevance of psychological and cultural forces is identified. Fromm and Marcuse develop their social analysis critically incorporating Freudian psychoanalysis14. At the same time, Adorno applies his musical insights to the same aim (see Rush, 2004: 30). In doing so, CT goes beyond interdisciplinarity and becomes supradisciplinary, for not only does it cross over several disciplines, but it questions the very idea of having boundaries between competing disciplines as a counter-productive and arbitrary division (see Kellner, 1989: 7-8, 36). It stresses the interconnections between philosophy, economics, politics, culture, and society, integrating these different dimensions of social reality in a social theory. The result, in the case of the FS, is a highly critical complex theory which targets instrumental reason, consumerism, mass society, and the culture industry. Similarly, although in a comment regarding Zambrano, Aranguren articulates his keenness on what he describes as a transdisciplinary discourse, which, as he explains, goes beyond philosophical reflection:

As we shall see in the course of the thesis, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre also develop a supra- or trans- disciplinary discourse, which in their case, includes another pivotal element, a reflection on spirituality.

1.3.1 The particularity of Critical Theory

According to Kellner, what distinguishes CT from other social theories is:

(1) their independent version of critical Marxism; (2) their supradisciplinary research which combined philosophy and the social sciences; and (3) their exile in the United States and ability to experience both the rise of fascism and the transition to a new stage of capitalism in the United States at first hand (1989: 76-77).

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14 The work of the Frankfurt School is to a large extent a response to the rise of fascism in Europe; given the irrationality of the latter, the School considers psychoanalysis to be necessary for the analysis of fascist society itself, but also of the society which creates the conditions for fascist ideology to emerge and thrive (see Whitebook, 2004: 74, 97).
The first two aspects have already been discussed above. In addition to these, the importance of exile must be underlined: “Critical Theory was born in the trauma of the Weimar Republic, grew to maturity in expatriation, and achieved cultural currency on its return from exile” (Rush, 2004: 6). CT is, to a large extent, a theory of exile (see Kellner, 1989: 80-81). Even its name, as pointed out above, is the result of the group’s stay in the United States. But most importantly, the content of their thought was shaped in no small measure by their experience of exile (see Kellner, 1989: 81; see also 66; Lonitz, 1999: 57, 200). Their condition as exiles provides them with an outsider’s perspective. It provides them with the critical distance which puts them in a privileged position to develop a fierce critique of the socio-economic and political dynamics which they encounter, as well as of the rationality which supports it.

Thus, the concept of reason becomes crucial to their critique: “all the authors mentioned above [the inner circle and the periphery of the Institute for Social Research] assume that the cause of the negative state of society is to be found in a deficit in social rationality” (Honneth, 2004: 339). Axel Honneth draws the reader’s attention to the fact that despite the different vocabulary used by the various members of the Institut –“irrational organization” (Horkheimer); “administered world” (Adorno); “one-dimensional society” (Marcuse), “repressive tolerance”; and “colonization of the social life-world” (Habermas)– they all refer to a deformed rationality in contrast to a presupposed “intact” rationality which would provide individuals the opportunity for self-actualization (see Honneth, 2004: 338-39). As Alan How explains, “for them Reason proper was an altogether bigger and more significant concept than mere reason. Part of their aim was to challenge what currently passed for reason, and extend it into something more comprehensive” (2003: 6). The specific nature and characteristics of this “intact” rationality, is either not very elaborate, or changes substantially from author to author, sharing only the core premise that it should allow for the self-actualization of the individual, whatever that may actually mean in practical terms (see Honneth, 2004: 341). Influenced by Hegel, the only characteristic of this self-actualization shared by the members of the Institut is that it involves “the conviction that the self-actualization of the individual is only successful when it is interwoven in its aims – by means of generally accepted principles or ends – with the self-actualization of all the other members of society” (see Honneth, 2004: 342). This premise is consistent not only with their concern with social justice, but, more primarily, with the undefined ethical premises guiding their thought.

As pointed out above, while in exile in the United States, Critical Theorists analyse not only the concept of reason, but also the basic features of contemporary capitalist societies, in particular the relationships between economy, state, society, culture, and the individual (Kellner, 1989: 51). They claim that there are important connections between
liberal capitalism and fascism. Thus, the origin, nature, and effects of fascism are also a major topic of research and discussion (Kellner 1989: 66-7). In fact, the *Institut’s* conception of mass culture, particularly in relation to communication and manipulation, is first shaped by how these are used by Hitler, but their analysis also extends to their use in democratic societies (see Kellner, 1989: 133-34; see also Brunkhorst, 1999: 49). Their analysis includes the development of consumer society, the culture industry, and the role of science and technology in the relationships of production, all of which are viewed as forms of control and domination over the weakened individual (Kellner, 1989: 5-6).

The analysis of art also plays a central role in CT, although the interpretation of this role differs substantially amongst different thinkers. As Hauke Brunkhorst puts it, where Benjamin saw a great chance for a revolutionary transformation of art by the new technical mass media, Adorno and Horkheimer were much more sceptical. They both emphasized the obvious power of the new media in fascist dictatorships, their manipulative potential to impose the will on [sic] the leaders to passive and authoritarian masses of people (1999: 48-49).

Adorno and Horkheimer, particularly the former, aspire to sublimate instrumental reason through art:

Aunque no de manera explícita, parece que ya en *Dialéctica de la Ilustración* se sugiere que la mimesis del arte puede contener una función crítica y, mediante una negación determinada de lo existente y de lo inmediato (injusticia social), contribuir a superar la autodestrucción de la Ilustración (Gomá Lanzón, 2004: 312).

For Adorno, art can restore genuine experience by providing an encounter with the new and the other (see Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii). For him, the aim is for aesthetics to overcome instrumental reason by developing a non-repressive rationality and social integration (see Wellmer, 1991: 151). But, in contrast with Benjamin, he is very selective regarding what kind of art may achieve this. Only art which negates itself through its lack of functionality, its disinterest, its refusal to become reified as an object of trade in the market has this subversive potential. As Gomá Lanzón explains,

El arte que se niega a sí mismo, el antiarte de Schönberg, Kafka, Beckett, Joyce o Klee es, para Adorno, el arte en sentido enfático o arte radical, porque destruye la ilusión de una belleza totalizada, orgánica, sistemática, ideal, y acepta lo feo y lo disonante de la realidad (2004: 314).

This resistance to function within the parameters established by instrumental reason, which is crucial to understanding Zambrano’s use of language, is one of the central aspects of the aims and methodology of CT as we shall discuss below.

**1.3.2 Aims**

Despite its diversity, it must be noted that CT can be described as holistic, in the sense that its methodology is not only dictated by its aims and its ideological standpoint, but it is also intrinsically connected to them. As Simone Chambers states, the aims of Critical Theory
are: “to show the internal relationship between knowledge and experience […], and to use the interconnectedness of knowledge and experience to break out of the given and project normative goals and ends” (2004: 221). This interconnectedness becomes apparent in any attempt to analyse any of these aspects separately, for such separation can only take place artificially with the purpose of carrying out their analysis, which is why a certain amount of repetition is necessarily involved.

The first point of cohesion for Critical Theorists is their agenda. “Critical Theory has a normative agenda. Its stated interest is the emancipation of humanity from injustice” (Chambers, 2004: 221)15. As Honneth observes, for Critical Theorists, the normative goal of society should be making the self-actualisation of each member reciprocally possible (see 2004: 344). The fact that it is not, is what turns its rational goals and practices into unreason16.

There are also other cohesive elements of CT. As Honneth observes: Critical Theory [...] insists on a mediation of theory and history in a concept of socially effective rationality. That is, the historical past should be understood from a practical point of view, as a process of development whose pathological deformation by capitalism may be overcome only by initiating a process of enlightenment among those involved. It is this working model of the intertwining of theory and history that grounds the unity of Critical Theory despite its variety of voices (2004: 337).

The influence of Marxism can be observed in the Frankfurt School’s interpretation of history, according to which there is a causal relationship between the existing socio-economic conditions and development of history. They differ from Marxism, however, in that they do not expect the proletariat to gain class-consciousness and overthrow the capitalist government, for they consider the proletariat and the class struggle as obsolete concepts (see Thiebaut, 2003: 449-50). Instead, they focus on the critique of the existing rationality and the socio-economic conditions it generates. It is hoped this critique will lead to a process of enlightenment which will eventually achieve the liberation of the individual consciousness from the ideology it is subjected to, thus eventually liberating society as a whole. Although the members of the School believe this liberation to be theoretically possible, they are all too aware of its difficulties and the limitations they face. For this reason, their focus, as the term CT indicates, is precisely the aspect of critique.

15 Normative, in this context, refers to how things ought to be. It is to be understood in contrast with descriptive and positive. On the one hand, as Rush explains, “Critical Theory is not merely descriptive, it is a way to instigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social inequality that can, in turn, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least at diminishing domination and inequality)” (2004: 9). On the other hand, whereas positive statements are falsifiable, normative statements are not (Driver, 2005: 31-62).

16 This link which Critical Theory makes between individual suffering the defective rationality which pinpoints as is cause is, as Honneth explains, the result of the incorporation of Freudian psychoanalysis into their thought (2004: 351, 354).
We have discussed above the theoretical dimension of this critique, but it is equally important to stress that, although the School does not focus on pursuing positive and specific paths for the liberation of the individual, their work still has significant practical implications. These implications can be observed in Marcuse’s defence of the Great Refusal:

Marcuse […] constantly advocated the “Great Refusal” as the proper political response to any form of irrational repression, and indeed this seems to be at least the starting point for political activism in the contemporary era: refusal of all forms of oppression and domination, relentless criticism of all of all [sic] policies that impact negatively on working people and progressive social programs, and militant opposition to any and all acts of aggression against Third World countries. Indeed, in an era of “positive thinking,” […] Marcuse’s emphasis on negative thinking, refusal, and opposition provides at least a starting point and part of a renewal of radical politics in the contemporary era (Kellner, n.d.: n.p.17).

It must be highlighted that it is not prescriptive. As Rush explains, “Marcuse does not think that Critical Theory can prescribe what precise changes should take place. Its role is limited to displaying the relevant possibilities.” (2004: 29-30). This also applies to the rest of the members of the Institut, who provide a critique of different aspects of society and rationality without developing and putting forward a positive plan of action. This is a deliberate position, which they also have in common with Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, whose implications we shall explore below.

1.3.3 Politics

As Chambers says, it is often thought that CT has no politics (2004: 219). She succinctly explains that there are several senses in which this statement is used:

Critical Theorists of this time explicitly refused to engage in party politics, voice opinions about current events, propose reform agendas, or indeed talk about political institutions in any specific way. The second sense in which early Critical Theory has no politics is that its critique focused more and more on a realm of culture and aesthetics detached from politics. […] Finally, and most significantly, early Critical Theory has no politics because its diagnosis of the times is so pessimistic as to make any political action, or indeed any attempt to break out of the logic of instrumental reason, futile (2004: 219).

However, the relationship of CT to politics is not as straightforward. Despite their lack of affiliation to party politics and their focus on cultural and aesthetic issues, this is no evidence of their lack of political commitment. Their non-engagement with party politics is more the result of their attempt to redefine the nature and dynamics of political practice than evidence of their apolitical attitude (see Chamber, 2004: 220). In contrast, “Critical Theory is envisioned as political in the sense of embracing the unavoidably political nature

17 Neither date nor page number are available for this quotation which has been extracted from a website which Kellner has devoted to Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School. The details of this website have been provided in the bibliography.
of all theory in attempting to direct it towards rationally chosen ends” (Chambers, 2004: 221).

For Adorno and Horkheimer, “to enter the world of action is to enter a world saturated by commodification and fully reified; it is to have one’s actions hijacked by overwhelming powers of management. The fully administered society ‘embraces those at war with it by coordinating their consciousness with its own’” (Chambers, 2004: 222; Chambers quotes Adorno, 1978: 206). The realization of the impossibility of escaping the existing co-ordinates of rationality, however, does not mean that their work is not political. As Chambers goes on to explain, “despite their pessimism, Horkheimer and Adorno continued to theorize. One of the ways of understanding their continued commitment to theory is to suggest that they replaced the question ‘what is to be done?’ with the much older one ‘how should one live one’s life?’” (2004: 222). This is not to be understood as an inner withdrawal. Instead, “like Socrates in the Gorgias, we see an embrace of truth over the demos and again, like Socrates, this is understood as ultimately political” (Chambers, 2004: 223). Their answer to the question posed above is “teaching the good life” (Adorno, 1978: 15). That is to say that they ultimately understood politics as paideia (see Chambers, 2004: 223). It is also in this sense that the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is political in nature as we shall see in the following chapters.

Thus, the aim of CT is liberating the individual from the all-encompassing ideology which constrains thought and possibility. Thought, however, cannot be freed from ideology, because of the totalising power of the totally administered society, but more crucially, because even that statement is made from an ideological standpoint (see footnote nine). This is obviously a problematic and paradoxical position, stating such a critique results in its own negation. Is this an error in judgement on Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s part or simply an aspect of their dialectical discourse and negative thought? Even though, as critics agree, making such a totalising statement about ideology from a Marxist background is self-disqualifying, if we become just for a moment less concerned with the logical coherence of the argument and go beyond what there is as expressed in the essays establishing the aims and methods of CT, it is then possible to argue that its very occurrence suggests its possibility (see Eagleton, 1991: 127). Adorno and Horkheimer, however, did not pursue this line of reasoning and their critique remains essentially negative. Even Marcuse, who does not state the impossibility to free consciousness from the limitations imposed by

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18 As Chambers explains, “Socrates claims that he is ‘one of the few Athenians (not to say the only one) who has attempted the true art of politics,’ [Gorgias, 521d] despite the fact that he avoided public office and democratic politics whenever he could. Care for the community or the true art of politics seeks truth and the improvement of souls through Socratic interrogation” (Chambers, 2004: 223; see also Plato, 1994: 481a-522b; 481b-482a).
instrumental reason, remains in the sphere of critique and admits not knowing who the agents of change may be (1970b: 69).

It is crucial to the understanding of the development of the comparison drawn in this thesis between CT and Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre that, as a result of not having been able to identify directly political paths towards liberation, the FS turns their focus towards psychological and moral aspects of the individual. It must be emphasized, however, that this move takes place not because they give up the possibility of having a political impact, but because they identify such possibility in the potential of the individual. As James Bohman explains,
in its initial phases, critical theory developed a clear and radical orientation to democratic theory through the ideal of a self-organized, free society that is an expressive totality. The normative contrast operative here is between the real consensus of democracy and the reifying effects of capitalist rationalization. But since the Frankfurt School theorists saw the spread of instrumental reason as turning modern society into a ‘false’ totality, democracy played less and less a role in their normative thinking; they sought potentials [sic] for non-dominating social relations deeper in the psychological capacities of human beings for solidarity, compassion, and the mimetic identification with others (1996: 210).

As we shall see in the course of the thesis, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre also link closely the personal to the political, and focus on the nature of the individual, not only from a psychological or moral perspective, but crucially, also from a spiritual one. These three thinkers solve the difficulty encountered by the FS in the realm of political action with a process of spiral change, a process of progressive and integrated layers of change that, by building on past steps, achieves a further and more comprehensive evolution. Moreover, this concept not only applies to the political project of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, but it also reflects the evolution of the thought of these three thinkers, which itself follows a spiral trajectory in as much as the development and unravelling of their ideas can be considered to be concentric, cumulative, and, yet, non-repetitive. This will be developed and explored in detail in the following chapters. Suffice it to say now that this spiral form, pointed out by scholars such as Chantal Maillard and Carmen Revilla Guzmán in relation to Zambrano’s work, is a concept which, although none of these three authors articulate it explicitly in their work, is nonetheless present as part of the underlying structure which grants coherence to their thought (see respectively 1990: 31; 2005: 51, 103). The spiral evolution of Aranguren and Aguirre’s thought, however, has not been discussed by previous scholars. In all likelihood, two main reasons account for this. In the case of Aranguren, much more attention has been paid to the content of specific and well-differentiated aspects of his work, such as his religious phase, his work on ethics, on communication, and his work as a critic than to all of his intellectual production as a whole. That is why, in contrast with this, the approach undertaken in this research offers a re-evaluation of his thought by looking at his entire intellectual production in conjunction with biographical data. In the
case of Aguirre, this spiral structure has been overlooked simply because no scholarly work has been produced in relation to Aguirre to date.

Based on their understanding of the dynamics of ideology, society, and the human being, for change and liberation to be possible, these authors must not be understood in absolute terms; liberation may only take place in a succession of stages. As a result, any possibility of change and liberation is spiral in as much as it is embedded and framed in democratic institutions. Change requires a first wave of people’s will and action to bring it into effect, but even then it would only be insufficient and ephemeral unless this institutionalisation of change is followed by the internalization and consistent praxis of such change by individuals. Once this stage of liberation is achieved, another such wave of action is hoped to come about and start a similar process which will lead to another stage of liberation, which will in turn, continue the process.

1.3.4 Understanding CT as methodology, praxis, and style.

The methodology and goals of the CT are first put forward by Horkheimer in his essay “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937) and Marcuse’s “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (1937) (Hohendahl, 2001: 6). Although Horkheimer’s essay constitutes a statement of the structure and aims of CT, “focusing on it alone provides a simplified and overly neat answer to the question of what is supposed to make Critical Theory critical” (Rush, 2004: 11). Similarly, the methodology and goals put forward by Marcuse are also subject to change and evolution, as Marcuse himself explains in relation to the aforementioned essay: “That most of this was written before Auschwitz deeply separates it from the present” (1968: xv). He also highlights that, at that time [1934-1838], it was not yet clear that the powers that had defeated fascism by virtue of their technical and economic superiority would strengthen and streamline the social structure which had produced fascism. [...] Capitalist society had not yet revealed all its strength and all its rationality, and the fate of the labor movement was still “uncertain” (1968: xi).

Thus, it becomes evident that CT is not only diverse in its manifestations, but also flexible, for it aims to address the problems associated with the ideology and rationality prevalent at the time that is being exercised.

Bearing this in mind, it must be stressed that the methodology of the members of the FS is intimately linked to its aims. In his essay “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (1937), Marcuse establishes the difference between philosophy and CT in that while the former, being concerned with pure reason alone, can never conclude anything that was not already present in essence, the latter is anchored in different aspects of the material conditions for thought and perception, allegedly providing a genuine platform for social transformations
(Hohendahl, 2001: 5-6). In Marcuse’s words, “truth that is more than the truth of what is
can be attained and intended only in opposition to established social relationships” (1968:
149). Seeking such truth is one of the core aims of CT. A similar search can also be found
in the three Spanish authors who are the subject of this research. Zambrano in particular is
explicitly critical of any “pensamiento ‘apriorístico’ que sólo se descubre a si mismo, su
propia estructura” (1989a: 32). As Elena Laurenzi explains, Zambrano is critical of
analytical forms of thought specifically because they are unable to go beyond that which is
already there (2004: 24). The perception of the insufficiency of instrumental reason to
develop and overcome its own limitations, the realization of its inadequacy, lies at the heart
of the cultivation of an alternative rationality which allows the thinker to express, but more
primarily, to conceive ideas beyond what already is. This is what the members of the
Frankfurt School and also Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre set out to do as we shall see
in the course of this thesis. As a result, CT highlights the insufficiencies and dangerous
consequences of instrumental reason. This does not mean that the FS advocates renouncing
reason altogether; “in One-Dimensional Man (1964), Marcuse differentiated more clearly
between reason as ‘Vernunft’[reason as common sense] and ‘instrumental reason’, yet he
continued to link reason and liberation – thereby also insisting on the revolutionary
potential of reason” (Hohendahl, 2001: 7). Hence, the logic of the critique of instrumental
reason itself already suggests the need to develop a more comprehensive alternative reason,
which any truly transformative research should be based on. That is why, in an effort to
break free from the framework of rationality of instrumental reason and develop and
encourage a richer, more humane reason, the distinguishing features of CT include a
supradisciplinary approach in terms of content and methodology, and the close connection
between content and style, conferring special importance to the subversive use of language
(see Kellner, 1989: 7, 77).

1.3.4.1 The methodology of Critical Theory

As indicated above, CT is a supradisciplinary effort to construct a comprehensive social
theory which can confront the key social and political problems that result from advanced
capitalism. By adopting a supradisciplinary approach, CT endeavours to integrate
experience and reality into its theoretical analysis (see Kellner, 1989: 7-8, 36). Despite this
approach, CT is suspicious of totalizing solutions. Instead, it rejects systematic thinking and
reclaims the value of fragmentary, contradictory, even experiential accounts of reality, for
only by embracing these aspects can the complexities of reality be grasped.

In stark contrast with the Anglophone empiric, analytic, and positivist traditions, for
CT, an essential element of reason and, consequently, of its methodology is speculation (see
How, 2003: 2-3)\(^9\). As indicated above, CT is concerned with the interpretations of what there is in such a way that reason may reach conclusions which go beyond its initial premises. As Rush puts it in relation to Adorno:

Adorno [...] does not think that Critical Theory is a theory of interpretation in the ordinary sense. Critical Theory does not study its objects with the aim of revealing meanings that are already there, independent of the interpretive process [...]. The objects of interpretation, as well as any particular interpretation of them, are always subject to further interpretation (2004: 34).

Thus, an awareness of the interconnections of the different aspects of society and the fabric of reality itself is necessary, along with room for speculation. Such an awareness is pursued by Horkheimer and Adorno with their negative dialectics and through Adorno’s aphoristic style. The value of speculation is argued particularly by Marcuse, because, as How indicates, “for Marcuse the positivist/empiricist [...] emphasis on the givenness of facts entails a distinctly conservative acceptance of things as they are” (2003: 3). In contrast with this acceptance, Marcuse argues that “the real field of knowledge is not the given facts about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form” (1955: 145). As indicated above, this is achieved by incorporating or stressing the role of elements traditionally excluded from the realm of reason. For this reason, the value of experience, subjectivity, and, ultimately, praxis, must also be highlighted.

### 1.3.4.2 The role of praxis, subjectivity, and experience

From CT’s perspective, there is an intrinsic link between theory and praxis, which becomes effective once the existing distorted rationality has been overcome (see Honneth, 2004: 353). Because their aim is precisely overcoming this distorted rationality, their work requires the resurgence and incorporation of this link.

In the specific case of the members of the FS, the element of praxis can be observed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, the ultimate goal of their critique is the liberation and the self-actualization of the individual. This is clearly a practical aspiration. Furthermore, as discussed above, because of this guiding goal, their thought has political implications, which, as such, belong to the realm of praxis. On the other hand, an aspect of their praxis can also be found in their biographical choices, although less so in the case of Horkheimer (see Bronner, 2002: 223-24). This is most visible in the case of Marcuse, who not only is a source of influence, but also of support, for the New Left in the United States

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\(^9\) It should be noted that, as see How explains, “in everyday English usage, the word ‘speculation’ suggests something vague and probably unjustified [...]. But because Critical Theory always sought to bring the social sciences into conjunction with philosophy I discovered the role of speculation could be seen in a quite different light. [...] Marcuse [...] in particular explicitly drew Hegel’s ideas on the intrinsically speculative nature of reason to form the basis of Critical Theory’s critique of empiricism” (2003: 2-3).
during the 1960s (see Bronner, 2002: 223). Erich Fromm is a consistent supporter of social justice, and campaigned for international human rights and the abolition of nuclear weapons (see Bronner, 2002: 223). And Adorno provides dozens of radio interviews in an effort to reach the public and make his views clear (see Bronner, 2002: 224). In so far as praxis is human praxis, it involves an element of experience and of subjectivity, which are also integrated into CT without falling prey to relativism (see Bronner, 2002: 220)\(^{20}\).

Another reason for the important role awarded to these elements is that, in contrast to the trends of recent continental philosophy, which seriously questions the concept and even existence of the subject, “[Critical Theorists] have produced a more socialized and integrated notion of subjectivity sensitive to ethical and political demands” (Rasmussen, 2004: xxxvi). Thus, the subject and the concepts of experience and subjectivity play a very relevant role in CT (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 216-17).

The concept of experience – which is intimately linked to subjectivity – is central to Critical Theory, as can be observed in Adorno’s work (see Rush, 2004: 10). For Adorno, the concept of experience is embedded in the socio-historical matrix in which it takes place (see Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii). Thus, as a result of the defective rationality his socio-historical experience is based upon, experience is shaped by the process of production and commerce of material goods (see Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii; see also Jay, 2001: 32). That is why he claims that genuine experience has disappeared (see Jay, 2001: 32). For this reason, one of the purposes of CT is recovering the value and the possibility of genuine experience, which is essential for a coherent rationality as well as for the self-actualization of the individual. In contrast, “for Adorno, [genuine] experience rather derives from an encounter with the otherness in which the self no longer remains the same—an experience of the other in a nondominating, nonsubsumptive and nonhomogenizing manner” (Rasmussen, 2004: xxxviii). Adorno’s aim is to recover this experience that has been lost, which he finds in the work of art (see Bronner, 2002: 149). In his view, genuine art provides an irreducible experience, an experience of the other. In doing so, the work of art overcomes the framework of instrumental rationality and encapsulates several paradoxes: in the work of art reflection becomes interwoven with experience and the work of art becomes a prolonged process as well as a moment in time, an instant (see Bronner, 2002: 149). As discussed above, the role of art in the process of liberation and self-actualization of the individual is shared by Critical Theorists. Similarly, although the extent or, even, the nature of the role that experience plays for each Critical Theorist varies, experience plays a central role in the possibility of a healthy rationality.

\(^{20}\) In order to dismiss any suspicions of relativism, it must be reiterated that “for the reinvestigation of human subjectivity Freud’s works were regarded as of paramount importance” (Held, 2004: 19). Moreover, as in the case of Marx, Freud’s thought undergoes a process of re-evaluation and revision.
Theoretical and methodological importance has been awarded to experience and subjectivity in the biographical text because, in this context, it constitutes a subversive genre. The reason why it is subversive is because, by its very nature, questions and destabilizes the structure of instrumental rationality, while welcoming other – experiential – forms of discourse. As Edward Said puts it,

a biographical text like *Minima Moralia* is an assault on biographical, narrative, or anecdotal continuity; its form exactly replicates its subtitle – *Reflections from Damaged Life* – a cascading serious of discontinuous fragments [...] whose grand synthesis has derisive contempt for the individual (2002: 202).

Thus, the interrelationship between aim, methodology, and style becomes apparent. This interrelationship is also a crucial feature of the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre for it is precisely because of the intertwining of these aspects that their work, like the work of the FS, presents a challenge to the established framework of rationality as we shall see in the coming chapters.

1.3.4.3 The role of style

The different elements which form CT are part of a holistic effort to subtract Critical Theorists themselves and readers from the dominant ideology of advanced capitalist society enough to make and process this criticism, but also to open up the possibility of the liberation of the individual from such ideology. For this reason, the style which Critical Theorists use to communicate is a deliberate consequence of their aims and their own ideology, and can be considered the materialization of their methodology. This style, although idiosyncratic to each one of them, shares the same aims, namely, the expression and communication of complex and interrelated trains of thought, but also the destabilisation of instrumental reason. Furthermore, this style of expression demands the engagement of the reader with the text; the reader no longer is a passive subject who absorbs information, but an active agent who strives to make sense of the text and of the society and ideology it discusses. That is why some critics, such as How, express their surprise at the description of CT as popular and, even, populist. He explains in relation to reading Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* in particular that

the style of language was the plainest obstacle. Marcuse mostly did not write in short, easily absorbable sentences, but in long, roving, muscular phrases where a sentence could last a whole paragraph and where the subject and object of the sentence seemed only distant cousins. [...] In dialectical fashion each clause reciprocally (re)defined the one that went before while simultaneously adding meaning to the one that came after. [...] It forced the reader to hold a variety of inter-related ideas together and allowed them to co-mingle and influence each other (How, 2003: 2).

This challenging language is by no means exclusive to Marcuse, for other members of the School also defy the linguistic limitations of lineal expression and demand the engagement of the reader with the text.
As Edward Said explains, “Adorno is exceptionally difficult to read, whether in his original German or in any number of translations. Jameson [in *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of Dialectic* (1990)] speaks very well about the sheer intelligence of his sentences, their incomparable refinement, their programmatically complex internal movement” (2002: 201). It must be stressed that the choice of this style is deliberate and obeys methodological reasons. As a result, many of Adorno’s works “are self-conscious exercises in embodying the movement of ideas in negative dialectic in a style of philosophical writing” (Rush, 2004: 35). This becomes even more palpable in his later work which is characterized by his aphoristic and poetic expression, in the hope that it “might resist instrumental demands by stubborn insistence upon nonpurposive activity” (Honneth, 2004: 342). As Holger Brier indicates:

Adorno was no poet. [...] But his texts are informed by a poetic, itself informed, and not only historically, by a certain kind of music and poetry. Invariably, this does have implications for his style. [...] message and medium have to collapse into each other (2001: 113).

By integrating this poetic expression into his thought, Adorno is hoping to access and convey concepts which would otherwise be beyond the reach of the traditional philosophical, sociological or aesthetic discourse. The integration of a poetic style into the reason developed by Critical Theorists has important implications, opening the door for the consideration of the highly poetic thought of Zambrano which shall be discussed at length in Chapter Four.

### 1.3.5 Reception of Critical Theory in Spain

The FS is first introduced in Spain in 1962 by Manuel Sacristán, by means of his translations of two of Adorno’s works: *Notas de literatura* and *Prismas; La crítica de la cultura y la sociedad*, both published by Ariel\(^{21}\). Despite this, it is Aguirre who is often credited with having introduced the works of the FS into Spain by editing and translating them, thus making them accessible to a Spanish readership (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 544; 1994, 5: 376; see also García Hortelano, 1985: 12). Gracia provides a more balanced account of the process of translation and edition in Spain of the members of the FS:

Taurus, de la mano de Jesús Aguirre, acometería una considerable renovación de su catálogo en los sesenta y setenta con la edición selectiva del pensamiento alemán contemporáneo, en particular la Escuela de Frankfurt, con T.H. Adorno o Walter Benjamin (aunque Adorno ya había sido traducido y editado por Manuel Sacristán desde Ariel), pero también Nietzsche. En el mismo sentido, Seix Barral editaba a Marcuse (1996: 34)\(^{22}\).

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\(^{21}\) Please see appendix one, where a list all of the books by Adorno, Benjamin, Horkheimer, and Marcuse published in Spain from 1962 until 1981 has been provided.

\(^{22}\) Although Seix Barral does translate and edit two of Marcuse’s books during the period this author is being introduced to a Spanish readership, it cannot be said that Seix Barral had a leading role in this
Hence, although there is good reason to praise Aguirre’s efforts in relation to the introduction of the FS in Spain, the extent of his role, however, must be carefully nuanced. We shall explore this issue in greater detail in Chapter Five, but suffice it to say that, in his role as translator and later editor for Taurus, Aguirre is chiefly responsible for the publication in Spain of at least seventeen books by Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Benjamin. Furthermore, this constitutes the most consistent and prolific effort to introduce the work of the School into Spain.

Regarding the influence, it is widely assumed that CT as developed by the FS has had little impact on the direction of Spanish intellectual development. This view can be illustrated by the opinion of Romero de Solís:

tanto una como otra corriente filosófica [estructuralismo y Escuela de Frankfurt], que ambicionaban renovar el pensamiento marxista europeo, fueron flor de un día. La desorientada y radicalizada izquierda española pretendía sustituir las toscas y oxidadas herramientas filosóficas del marxismo-leninismo por instrumentos más sutiles y en concordancia con las tareas con que se enfrentaba en el ocaso de la dictadura de Franco. [...] también opino que aquellos cultos y brillantes epígonos de Marx, como Adorno o Benjamin, traducidos a instancias de Jesús Aguirre, tampoco contribuyeron a la renovación del panorama filosófico y político de una España que se aprestaba a vivir la Transición (2002: 295-96).

Furthermore, it is generally agreed that Spanish thinkers have not produced any material which can be considered to fall under the category of CT, as can be observed in the fact that there is no mention of a possible Spanish CT which follows the tradition of the FS in the entry on CT in Barry Jordan’s *Spanish Culture and Society: The Essential Glossary*:

neither Republican exiles nor oppositional intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s in Spain managed to develop a serious and coherent body of Critical Theory (2002: 57).

However, in the course of the thesis, I will provide evidence to the contrary, showing that CT did contribute to the renovation of the socio-political panorama and, most importantly, that, although it has been largely overlooked, the thought of some Spanish authors – Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in particular – shows some defining characteristics which make it possible to refer to it as CT.

### 1.3.6 The presence of Critical Theory in Spanish thought

Although the focus of the previous section has been CT as first developed by the FS, it is important to stress that, even though the work of the FS will be used as a frame of reference, CT is not limited to them. As Kellner puts it, “a critical theory of society is always a project underway, it is always partial, historical, and subject to revision. Thus, one
is always moving toward a critical theory, open to new historical experiences, phenomena, and discourses” (2001b: 32). It is based on this understanding of CT that I argue that it is possible to conceive that, in response to the specific socio-political circumstances of twentieth-century Spain, a form of CT has been developed by some Spanish thinkers. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to provide evidence to argue that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, although idiosyncratically, all develop their thought in ways consistent with CT. Further research may show that other Spanish thinkers may also be considered Critical Theorists.

I will argue throughout the thesis that, as a result of the approach of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre towards content, style, and methodology they can be considered Critical Theorists. I do not, however, suggest that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre develop a co-ordinated line of research or form a cohesive school of thought. In fact, their interests, the specific focus of their thought, their form, and style are diverse, as we shall see. Nevertheless, it can be said that Aranguren and, although differently, also Aguirre develop a neo-Marxist critique of neo-capitalist society and its effect on the individual, whereas Zambrano, considerably influenced by Heidegger, focuses on the problem of being and its relationship with others and the world. What the three of them have in common, however, is the elaboration of a critique of instrumental reason which, as we have seen, lies at the very core of CT as developed by the FS. What is more, this critique forms the basis from which Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre develop the rest of their thought.

It is, of course, not my intention to argue that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre deliberately follow the patterns of thought described above in order to accommodate their work within the parameters of CT. Nonetheless, it remains true that a parallel development to that of the FS can be observed. After the unreason involved in any war, especially in a civil war, after the incongruities and the injustices of totalitarian ideology, a new form of reason had to be sought. As Diaz explains, “opposition culture during the dictatorship was importantly engaged in what one could term the reconstruction of ‘reason’ (i.e. rational discourse/thought)” (1995: 285). This is precisely one of the key characteristics of the decade of the 1960s in Spain. In this sense, the thought of Aranguren and Aguirre is a reaction against the ideology of the regime. More importantly, it is the rejection of the rationality exercised by the regime as well as an attempt to develop a questioning, yet coherent, reason. They are, of course, not alone in this quest. What is specific about them, in contrast with Diaz’s statement, is that they consider the reconstruction of reason a counter-productive exercise, for it was reason – instrumental reason – that allowed for such irrational development of events and ideology in the first place. Zambrano, although in exile, takes the same stand, defending the role of delirium in contrast with the abuses of reason (1996b: 169). Hence, what they advocate is a much more radical project, not the
reconstruction of instrumental reason, but its rejection in favour of a more humane and holistic alternative: experiential reason, a concept which will be developed in Chapter Four. Despite their lack of awareness or will to develop a co-ordinated or systematized intellectual production, they do, however, share the defining characteristics of CT: besides offering a poignant critique of modern society and the rationality on which it is founded, their theoretical work is shaped by an interactive critique which is expected to exercise an emancipating effect. In turn, this is hoped to spark a qualitative process of transformation of society, as we shall see in the course of this thesis.

Their work, however, does not constitute a mere replication or reiteration of CT as developed by the School. In contrast with the mostly pessimistic conclusions drawn by the FS, these Spanish thinkers offer a more hopeful vision. Partly informed by their highly developed sense of spirituality, they place their hopes for emancipation in a cyclical process of multilevelled change which can only start with the individual. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that all three of them share an interest in spirituality which they incorporate into their critique, and which becomes their distinctive contribution.

Religion is an inescapable fact of life for most Spaniards who are born during the first half of the 20th century; the strongly Catholic upbringing (both within the family circle and at school), the ubiquitous presence of the Church and the way in which religion has been absorbed culturally all translate into demands of public displays of piety, if not faith. This interest in spirituality results in a tradition that has incorporated spirituality and religion in general, and faith specifically, into its discourse as a conflicting aspect which, although it cannot be resolved, has to be addressed. What is more, Sebastian Faber considers that spirituality, as opposed to materialism, is the key feature of Hispanism, which suggests that the role of religion in these authors’s thought is, in fact, part of a long established defining trend of Hispanism (2002: 167, 175, 178-80, 183). As previously discussed, the long period of crisis and decline in which Spain is submerged results in the longing for a reinvention of Spanishness which gives way to a series of public debates and efforts aimed at the modernization and Europeanization of Spain. At the same time, there is a sense of pride or nostalgia regarding Spanish heritage and traditions (see Balfour, 1995: 415; see also 1.2). To add to the turmoil, these co-existing tendencies, the deep-rooted religiosity, and the keenness for progress and modernity are often considered incompatible, or, at the very least, conflicting. As a result of this confrontation, many pages have been devoted to this issue, some of them offering a conciliation of rationality and spirituality.

23 The main reason why the thought of FS is often described as pessimistic is because they do not clearly identify who the agent to bring about social change and personal emancipation will be (see García de la Serrana, 2004: 205). Moreover, without such an agent, the possibility of bringing this emancipation to fruition comes into question and the possibilities which they sketch in their writings remain confined to the realm of utopia.
Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre are no exception. Taking their cue from such influential Spanish thinkers as Unamuno and Ortega, they offer a resolution, individual and indeterminate, to the problem of the relationship between spirituality and rationality. They strive to overcome the concept and practice of established Catholicism by opting for faith rather than religion as part of a personal and social project of collective growth.

1.4 Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in the spotlight

The criteria for choosing these three thinkers as the central figures of this research are based not only on their attempt to overcome the co-ordinates set by instrumental reason, but also on their intellectual and circumstantial affinities and disparities.

The choice of Aguirre is due to the crucial role he plays in Spanish intellectual and public life under many different guises, such as those of priest, translator, editor, and aristocrat. But, more importantly, as mentioned above, he is often credited with having first introduced the works of the components of the FS to a Spanish readership (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 544; 1994, 5: 376). He translates and publishes a considerable number of their works into Spanish, encouraging the dissemination of their thought, as well as being considerably influenced by it himself. His influence – both under and after Franco – is considerable, not only because of his prominent social position, or his pre-eminent connections, but also because of his contact with the general public through his translations and contributions to El País (see Gullón, 1989; 13).

Aranguren, who befriends both Aguirre and Zambrano, and in that sense serves as a link between the two, has been included in this thesis because he shows a clear interest in the School and deals with and develops many of the key questions posed by the members of the Institut. What is more, his personal experience in the United States and his sparse but direct contact with Marcuse put him in a privileged and singular position to discuss, evaluate, and, even, develop neo-Marxist thought. In addition, Aranguren contributes, as does Aguirre, to newspapers with a diversity of regular articles which introduce Spanish readers to different currents of thought and encourage a critical outlook towards domestic affairs. All in all, Aranguren also exercises a considerable influence on the Spanish readership who – not without controversy (see Javier Marías, 1999) – holds him in high esteem as the number of awards received and the events held in his honour bear witness to (for more details of these awards see Blázquez, 1994a, 1: 12-13; see Blázquez, 1994b, 1:

24 Evidence of this is that Aguirre frequents the Palacio de la Zarzuela, the residence of the Spanish royal family, and he hosts the social event which introduced Felipe González, the future Spanish socialist president, to public life as the head of his party (see Gullón, 1989: 12-13; Aguirre, 1985: 46).
The polemic aroused by Javier Marias’s posthumous accusations against Aranguren bear testimony to the Manichean perspective often adopted towards people’s relationship with the regime. Whereas it is undeniable that thinkers such as Torrente, Ridruejo, Rosales, Lain, Rovar, Maravall, and Aranguren were supporters, some even ideologues, of the regime, it is equally true that from the late 1940s and 1950s they become disillusioned with the regime, exercising an increasing amount of criticism towards it (see Gracia, 2004: 218-19, 242, 260, 267, 275; see also Diaz, 1983: 75). As Jordi Gracia puts it, “dejaron de sentirse integrados en un sistema mejorable, para volverse disidentes” (2004: 370). It is the intention of this thesis to elucidate the complexities involved in the evolution of those within and, later, against the regime, with particular reference to Aranguren and Aguirre.

Finally, Zambrano offers a very different perspective on essentially the same topic: a critique of instrumental reason and the search for possible alternatives to it. Her personal experience as a woman in exile also contributes to shaping the direction, content, and style of her thought. This results in a coherent body of work with a deeply personal and symbolic outlook, offering what could be considered as a profoundly original, although less explicit, CT.

Although it is true that all three thinkers have been well-known public figures in one way or another and are, therefore, quite well-known, their thought tends to be understood and interpreted within the co-ordinates of the historical moment they shared and, to a certain extent, shaped, that is, their reaction towards the Franco regime, their position during the Spanish Transition, and, in the case of Zambrano, her contribution as an exile. What I would like to suggest, however, is that there is an important subversive element in their work which, although concerned with their historical circumstances, aims to transcend those in order to address the issue of rationality itself. Their work will thus provide evidence of the existence of attempts to liberate reason from its instrumentalization as part of a wider European current, opening the door to finding other such attempts in other authors whose work, although beyond the scope of this thesis, may be analysed in subsequent research. The study of these three thinkers from this perspective is, therefore, of interest because it constitutes a recuperation of a crucial aspect of their thought which has

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25 In 1982 he receives the award in social sciences “Giner de los Ríos”, in 1984 a public homage, in 1989 the Premio Nacional de Ensayo, and in 1991 a book-homage is published: Ética, día tras día. Homenaje al profesor Aranguren en su ochenta cumpleaños. Also in 1991, he receives the medal Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid, in 1993 the award León Felipe; later that year he becomes doctor honoris causa by the Universidad Carlos III, Madrid; he also receives a tribute by Círculo de Lectores and the Golden Medal of the city of Zaragoza; in November, he becomes emeritus professor at the Universidad Complutense, Madrid. In 1995, he receives the award Príncipe de Asturias for Communications and Humanities; in May of that same year, he becomes doctor honoris causa by the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 17-20).
passed largely unnoticed, and, of course, because it unveils evidence of the existence of a current of CT in the Frankfurtian sense in Spain, which, again, has typically been considered inexistent\textsuperscript{26}.

1.5 Methodology

The aim of this thesis is not to assess the philosophical, political, or intellectual value of CT. As Skinner puts it, “it is I think nothing less than fatal to good historical practice to introduce the question of truth into social explanation” (Skinner, 2002: 31). As Skinner explains, it is not the role of the historian, even in the area of the history of ideas, to engage in an analysis of the truth content of the past, but rather in its interpretation (see Skinner, 2002: 27-31). Consequently, my aim is to provide evidence to show that the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre largely falls under the co-ordinates of CT and can, therefore, be considered, even re-evaluated, as such. This is not to say that an analysis of the truth-value and even usefulness of their thought and work should not be undertaken from a different disciplinary perspective, but it simply falls beyond the scope of this research. In other words, this research is more concerned with establishing the inner coherence – or lack thereof – of these authors’ work and their belief system and how they relate, or not, to CT than to assess the rationality of their positions from an external and anachronistic framework of rationality (see Skinner, 2002: 27-56).

I would like to stress that although the purpose of this thesis is to reveal the existence of a link between Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre and CT, I do not intend to carry out a comparison between these three authors, nor do I suggest that such a comparison is possible or desirable. Although their thought converges in various points in so far as they all develop a fierce critique of neo-capitalist society and its rationality, the nature of their work, their style, and their praxis as well as their contributions remain distinct and original in each one of them. Regarding their points of convergence, these are the characteristics which, as we shall see throughout the thesis, account for their thought to be considered CT. I argue that through the analysis of the elements present in the content, methodology, and style of their work, and, in connection with the available biographical information, it is possible to observe how their thought conforms to the parameters established by CT as discussed above.

\textsuperscript{26} Evidence of this is can be found in Eamonn Rodger’s \textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary Spanish Culture}, whose entry on CT focuses exclusively on CT in the context of the literary criticism produced by academic authors or the mass media, but makes no mention of CT in Spain in the Frankfurtian sense (see 1999: 129-30). Similarly, as indicated above, Jordan dismisses the idea of the cultivation of CT in Spain (2002: 57).
Despite these common aspects of their work, each of these authors adopts a distinctive approach and style, which result in different intellectual contributions in the case of each individual author. This is true of their critique of instrumental reason, but particularly of the alternatives to it offered by each of them. As we shall see, in the case of Aranguren, these materialize in the study of human communication, particularly in relation to participative democracy, where, with the help of a more comprehensive, humanitarian, and political education, and a critical attitude, his hopes lie. Aguirre, like Aranguren, wagers on the power of critical thought; but rather than explicitly encouraging the reader to develop it, he aims to help the reader develop these critical skills by means of the effort and engagement required in the reading of his texts. In contrast, Zambrano, possibly the most original of the three of them, offers an altogether alternative rationality, namely, poetic reason. Such poetic reason will be discussed at length in Chapter Four.

Thus, whereas aiming to preserve the individuality and idiosyncrasies of the authors here studied, a number of common aspects inform the methodology of this research. As indicated above, the FS and Zambrano consider the empiric and analytical methodology barren in relation to sociological analysis. Taking into account that not only their work, but also the work of Aguirre and, to a lesser extent Aranguren, constitute an effort to communicate more than what it is said, it then becomes clear that an analysis of their work that aims at acknowledging and engaging with the more subtle and less explicit aspects of their thought requires more than simply attempting the exegesis of the available texts. In fact, because of the methodological features of their work, an analysis which limits itself to the text may have counterproductive results. An example of this can be found in the common interpretation of some of Zambrano’s texts as mystical (see Bundgård, 2004: 15; see also Pujalá, 1992: 80; Ortega Muñoz, 1980: 79). As I shall discuss in Chapter Four, these emerge from a close reading of the text which does not consider the aim of the author or function of the text. As a result of the importance of the elements of praxis and intentionality to the development of CT, this research relies substantially on the analysis and interpretation of biographical data. Hence, in the first place, an overview of the life and work of each author, an account of the interaction and evolution of these two elements, and the contextualization of the socio-historical period in which their work is produced and received will be provided in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. Second, a comparative analysis of their work with the relevant current of thought (either neo-Marxism or Heideggerian thought) will be carried out in those chapters. Then, there will be an overview of their socio-political content and other relevant aspects related to it, which may include a variety of topics, such as overtly political ones, their views on religion, the self, and art, as appropriate for each author discussed. In the light of all of this information, as part of the heuristic efforts of this thesis, a reconstruction of the premises which support their thought
will be attempted, so that their arguments come to light more clearly, but also so that it is possible to observe how the different aspects of their thought relate to each other and are part of a core project. Finally, their framework for the critique of instrumental reason will be evaluated in the last chapter, so as to determine whether or not their thought can actually be considered to be CT.

Because this research has an important component of re-construction, it will rely heavily on primary sources. However, as reiterated throughout this introduction, this heuristic analysis will not focus exclusively on the explicit content of the text. In addition to this, it will pay close attention to the implications of what it is said and of how it is expressed. Skinner has supported this approach by referring to the performative value of speech acts:

from the perspective of speech acts, ‘performatives’ illustrate the possibility that the point of interest is that ‘the same thing’ may be said in a number of ways and for a number of purposes. Hence, the strict meaning of words, what is said, is not the only and not even the main question that interests, but also how and why (by which intention) it is said (Palonen, 2003: 32).

As a consequence, it is important to consider the context in which a text is written and to interpret what the author intends to convey by writing such a text. In order to accomplish this, what this research attempts to elucidate is what the implicit premises and beliefs held by the authors are (see Skinner, 2002: 5). That is why quotations will often be provided whose main value to this research lies not in the main point which the text makes, but in the seemingly marginal information which they provide and which often reveals the premises and beliefs mentioned above; hence, the element of re-construction.

Several key themes, such as spirituality, utopia, and the notion of spiral development will be found to be present in all three authors. Although, based on this thematic cohesion, it may seem appropriate to structure each chapter around these themes, this structuring principle is not suitable for this research for several reasons.

First, having an identical structure in each chapter, would give their contents a false sense of homogeneity, which is not present in CT or amongst Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre.

Second, spirituality is not one of the defining manifestations of CT and, although its role is crucial to understanding the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, its relationship to the work of each author is significantly different. In the case of Aranguren and Aguirre, this spirituality is understood, particularly initially, in relation to its institutionalised form: religion and Catholicism in particular. Because of the socio-historical circumstances of Spain at that time, their faith and its impact on their thought can only be understood in relation to the socio-political and economic conditions they live in, which is why the chapters have been structured in such a way that these connections and their
implications are underlined and explored. In the case of Zambrano, her spirituality is deeply intertwined with her thought, which is why the chapter has been structured so as to highlight and analyse this connection. Nevertheless, for the purpose of cohesion, a section on the role of spirituality is included in the final chapter.

It must also be highlighted that, as in the case of the FS, and as a result of their premise of the interconnection of the social fabric and of existence itself, a certain element of apparent repetition is unavoidable. It occurs because, often, different aspects of the thought of these authors lead to different aspects of the same conclusion or, even, the same conclusion. Thus, this repetition is partial and crucial to the development of the argument, for it reinforces its coherence and intrinsic interconnectedness. It is also because of this interconnectedness that I consider counter-productive any attempt to structure the analysis of their thought in well-differentiated and fully comprehensive sections, for in the case of these authors such a structure would only result in the distortion of their thought.

Third, concepts such as utopia and the notion of spiral development are not structuring elements of their thought, but rather the consequences of its development; that is why they are best illustrated as the consequences of the premises of their thought.

With the aim of providing the reader with the critical frame of reference that this research is posited on, particular attention will now be paid to the levels of semantics, intentionality, and biography, for these intertwining aspects play a key role in the structure of this research and the development of the arguments made.

The semantic difficulties implicit in analysing a text from a perspective of the history of ideas must be acknowledged. Extracting, questioning, and paraphrasing specific concepts such as talante, mood – which will be further developed in Chapter Three – is particularly problematic, as can be seen in the sharp philosophic divergence in the history of ideas of whether such a practice is valid. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon and French structuralist traditions defend the existence of “text” as a separate and independent object from the psychological state of the agent who creates it, the hermeneutic tradition which draws on the writings of Dilthey and Heidegger is opposed to such separation between text and author (see Rosen, 1982: 2). Meaning, according to the latter, “is neither reducible to nor separable from its literal embodiment in a text” (Rosen, 1982: 2). In line with this, the methodology of this research has been very much oriented by Quentin Skinner’s postulate that one can neither solely rely on the socio-political, economic, and religious context of a text in order to extract its meaning, nor entirely dismiss these factors and consider the text as autonomous (see 1988b: 29). That is why intentionality plays a crucial role in the exercise of exegesis. In fact, Skinner suggests as a general hermeneutic rule that “the recovery of a writer’s (illocutionary) intentions must be treated as a necessary condition of
being able to interpret the meanings of his work” (1988c: 77; see also 1988b: 55-56). For this purpose, he makes two further points:

in order to be able to interpret the meaning of a text, it is necessary to consider factors other than the text itself. [...] I thus have been concerned to shift the emphasis of the discussion off the idea of the text as an autonomous object, and on to the idea of the text as an object linked to its creator, and thus on to the discussion of what its creator may have been doing in creating it (Skinner, 1988c: 78).

Thus, work and author become inextricably linked. Such is the key assumption this research rests upon, which – as with CT itself – accounts for its biographical approach. As a result of their methodological relevance, biography and intentionality shall be further developed below.

Regarding the issue of paraphrasing, this thesis also follows Skinner’s views. As a result, the use of a different vocabulary and different style of expression to those used by the authors studied is not only considered merely acceptable, but even often necessary in order to be able to develop arguments in the best possible manner and provide suitable explanations. As Skinner puts it,

It would be a quixotic form of self-denying ordinance to insist that our language of explanation must at this juncture match whatever language the people in question applied or could have applied to themselves. If we wish to furnish what we take to be the most powerful explanations available to us, we are bound to employ what we believe to be the best available explanatory theories and the concepts embodied in them (2002: 50).

It is also of paramount importance to acknowledge the political implications of the methodology which guides and structures this research. Palonen argues that Skinner adopts a “pro-political orientation [which] serves as a heuristic instrument” (2003: 4). Such a pro-political orientation is also present in this research. As indicated above, for Skinner, utterances have a performative value, that is why when it comes to the social realm and politics in particular saying something is doing something (see Palonen, 2003: 31-35). By means of his perspective of linguistic action, Skinner gives us a model of how to study political thought by giving a priority to politics over thought. [...] Skinner alters the perspective from the vita contemplativa to the vita activa. He gives us a model of how to study politics by studying theories, concepts and their role in the shifting horizons of the possible, using the well-known facts and more disputed narratives of the events precisely as auxiliary contextual instruments (Palonen, 2003: 94).

By thinking politically there is a shift in perspective. For this reason, it is necessary to understand that thinking politically goes far beyond thinking about politics. As John Pocock indicates,

political thought may be regarded as an aspect of social behaviour, of the ways in which men behave towards each other and towards the institutions of their society; or it may be regarded as an aspect of intellectuality, of men’s attempt to gain understanding of their experience and environment (1962: 185).
This has important consequences. As Palonen explains in relation to Skinner’s thought, “thinking politically is an aspect of the activity of politics itself” (see Palonen, 2003: 3; see also 29). Thus, the sphere of what politics is, and more importantly, of who makes politics, widens considerably to include not only the researcher, but also the author who is researched, whose political voice is, thus, revealed. As Palonen puts it, “to take ‘political life itself’ as the point of departure rehabilitates the political agents. They are not devalued or functionalized into bearers or representatives of some principle” (2003: 3). Thus, this rehabilitation of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre as political agents becomes simultaneously one of the aims of this research and one of the consequences of its methodology.

1.5.1 The role of biography

The fact that intentionality is a key methodological tool in the interpretation of these authors, as discussed above, is unquestionably problematic. The first and perhaps most serious problem arising from the concept of “intentionality” is its subjective, unmeasurable, and unverifiable nature, which may put the researcher in an uncomfortable situation; uncomfortable, indeed, if this hypothetical researcher’s methodology, in line with scientific practices, demands direct evidence of these claims of intentionality. Instead, indirect evidence, that is, biographical and contextual information will be used in this research in order to attempt to elucidate the authors’ intentionality. Its conclusions are, of course, not entirely verifiable. Nevertheless, the inferences made will be supported by existing material testimonies and are, therefore, falsifiable, thus avoiding the trap of relativism. Furthermore, as with intentionality itself, such a rejection of verifiability, of the aspiration of certainty, is very much in line with the stand taken by CT, as we shall see in the course of the thesis where further arguments supporting this position will be provided.

There are other reasons for incorporating biography as an important aspect of this research. First, the work of all three authors has been noticeably influenced and shaped by their psychological profile, or actitudes vitales in Ortegan terminology, and by key biographical events, at least as much as by their socio-historical background. Second, the fact that the analysis of Zambrano’s and Aguirre’s work, and, to a lesser extent, also Aranguren’s, constitutes an exercise of reconstruction makes considering their psychological profile and the key events of their biography crucial in not only contextualizing, but also understanding the content and scope of their work. Finally, as pointed out above, there is unwillingness on the part of these authors to separate author from work, life from theory, because of its impact on the content of their work, but more importantly on the framework of the rationality they adopt. What is more, as Carmen Revilla argues in relation to Zambrano, the unity and coherence of Zambrano’s works can
only be fully appreciated when they are approached and analysed in the light of her biography, more specifically, in the light of her “decisión de desvelar, de manifestar las posibilidades del ser humano” (2004 :7). Similarly, it is the biographical choices and the intentionality behind their work that reveals the unity and coherence within the diversity in the works of Aranguren and Aguirre. Due to their search for an overarching and conciliatory rationality, the division between biography and œuvre is perceived as artificial. The desirability and feasibility to establish different and distinct fields of research and experience is questioned. Consequently, a conscious effort is made to integrate the two, thus blurring their boundaries and differences. That is why a good number of the autobiographical testimonies found in their texts have been left there as a trail, the purpose of which is to complete the text providing it with a wider context, more profound content, and greater significance. This is particularly evident because, although there are important formal and stylistic differences between the three, their work shares a substantial emphasis on a traditionally autobiographic topic: selfhood, which is almost ever-present. Hence, one of the key characteristics of their contributions is the existence of this deliberate autobiographical element whose implications and significance have to be acknowledged and explored.

Undoubtedly, including (auto-)biography as part of an academic argument presents a number of difficulties. Even stating that their work includes a strong autobiographical component is itself problematic, for if the author is always implicated in his own work, then everything written could be considered autobiography (Anderson, 2001: 1). Paradoxically, this *reductio ad absurdum*, instead of proving the impossibility of this genre, states the importance of it and the implicit dangers of refusing to acknowledge the reach of the ever-present author. Despite efforts to relegate the personal to some clearly signposted and separated sections of the text, there are traces of the author throughout the text in the form of specific words or rhetorical constructions that modify several aspects of the discourse, thus conferring the personal a certain visibility (see Anderson, 2001: 122). The autobiographical is an inherent aspect in any text, although in varying degrees. Acknowledging it, both as a critic and as a writer is, therefore, not so much a practice which should be at odds with the standards of an acceptable argument, as the act of positioning oneself on a particular side of the discussion.

Having discussed the reasons for this approach, it should be noted that the emphasis of this analysis is placed not so much on the truth content of this markedly autobiographic material as on the implications and repercussions that arise from it (see Anderson, 2001: 91).

This autobiographical content performs a testimonial function. The personal account of the writer bears witness to a certain part of history, a part of history which in all
likelihood has been shared by others. The existing connection between biography and history effectively extends a bridge over the distance that separates the writer from the reader, the self from the other. Regardless of whether the reader is part of the historical event or historical context or not, the autobiographical text creates a set of two co-ordinates, personal experience and subjectivity on the one hand, and a socio-historical context, historicity, on the other, which the reader may find it easier to relate to. It contains an element of reality, even if this element just means that it has been experienced as real, which may resonate with the reader’s own experiences and circumstances. Autobiography not only contributes to closing the gap between the self and the other, but insofar as a silent other may find representation in that biography he also finds empowerment; the individual is released from his isolation, finds a voice, and gains a degree of visibility (see Anderson, 2001: 104).

However, this connection between autobiography and history is not without problems. First of all, it has been argued that testimonies can never provide a full picture, a totalizable account of events (Anderson, 2001: 127-28). Although this is, of course, true, it does not automatically dismiss the value of an autobiographical account as testimony; it only reminds us that, as human beings, we often experience a need or, at least, a desire for totalizing, explanatory, and definite accounts. There are a number of epistemological difficulties which make any claims for such knowledge highly suspicious as already suggested above (these views will be expanded in several discussions on perspectivism and epistemology in the course of the following chapters).

Autobiography as testimony also raises the issue of the role of subjectivity, because “our story cannot be ‘self-present’ to us, cannot be under the conscious control of the subject” (Anderson, 2001: 126). The question of control is a very relevant one; to what extent can anything actually be under the conscious control of the subject? Is control, on the contrary, an illusion, a working concept that allows the individual to gain a sense of safety and direction so as to go about his daily life? It seems reasonable to suggest that the actions of any individual will be influenced by intentionality on the one hand, and by the unconscious mind on the other. Other influences include the surrounding atmosphere, the socio-historical situation, the actions of others, as well as our perception of them and a long list of endogenic and exogenic factors. Determining the extent of this influence, and how this may affect the issue of control is a complex matter which deserves close attention, and although it cannot be resolved here, its complexity should not be underestimated. However, whether the individual is the agent of his own life story or whether he just bears witness to it does not affect his capability to perceive and the potential for expression. Autobiography

27 The terms “endogenic” and “exogenic” have been chosen here, although “inner” and “external” could have been used, with the intention of highlighting the psychological component of these factors.
is then an exercise which results in the representation and expression of the self and its circumstances, although, granted, it is a biased and partial one.

The presence of this autobiographical material also performs other functions, such as that of self-reflection, catharsis, and, more importantly, a methodological function as pointed out initially. That is why after having carefully considered the methodological risks this biographical approach entails, it has still been considered necessary to provide a comprehensive analysis of these authors. These functions and their implications will be studied at greater length in the subsequent chapters in reference to the authors.

Despite the key role of the biographical component in re-constructing and analysing the work of these intellectuals, it is just as important to acknowledge the limitations of this approach. The biographical data can only ever provide ad hoc explanations, because the reverse would result in an undefendable determinist view of personal choice and history. Therefore, the biography of a given author is only considered as a contributing factor, not a determining one, in accounting for his production and choices. It is this element of choice, not to mention the uniqueness of every individual biographical circumstance, which makes pointless the extrapolation of any conclusions of this nature as an a priori premise.

1.5.2 The implications of intentionality and style

Much of the analysis undertaken throughout this thesis rests upon what has been known as the “linguistic turn” introduced by Skinner. He describes this change of perspective and approach as follows:

I mark a strong distinction between what I take to be two distinguishable dimensions of language. One has conventionally been described as the dimension of meaning, the study of the sense and reference allegedly attaching to words and sentences. The other is best described as the dimension of linguistic action, the study of the range of things that speakers are capable of doing in (and by) their use of words and sentences. Traditional hermeneutics has generally, and often exclusively, concentrated on the first of these dimensions; I concentrate very much on the second (Skinner, 1996: 7-8).

Intentionality is, therefore, doubly relevant in this research because not only is it a defining aspect of the work of the authors here studied, but it is also a key element of the present hermeneutic approach. The FS and the three authors here studied envisage intentionality as playing a crucial role in their own works partly as a result of Heidegger’s influence, and partly as a necessary requirement for the cohesion of their own rationality and their project as a whole. Clarifying the nature in this cohesion in the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is of paramount importance for the argument and methodology of this thesis, because of the analysis, reconstruction, and interpretation of these authors’s thought will rest on such cohesion. That is why it must be emphasized that this cohesion is not an external construct or structure imposed a posteriori by the exegete on the groups of texts analysed with the objective of conferring to these texts or even creating a sense of
coherence that was not there in the first place. This is what Skinner refers to as the “mythology of coherence” (see Skinner, 1988b: 38-43; see also Skinner, 2002: 67-72). This, however, does not apply to the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre because they contain an inherent coherence that is the result of the intentionality which has shaped and guided their thought. Consequently, in their case, cohesion is the result of the awareness and, more importantly, intention of these authors to set out a project of criticism and rationality, which – although in different forms and different shapes – expands throughout their work and even their own lives. It is because of the pivotal role that intentionality plays in the thought of these authors that the link between biography and work is crucial in their analysis. The most immediate consequence of this position which insists on the link between text and author is the interconnectedness of the various levels of their work, such as biography, content, and meaning, to mention just a few, as indicated above. Some of the implications and materializations of such interconnectedness shall now be explored.

None of these three authors can be considered a systematic thinker. Despite their asystematic nature, their work is still part of a project of personal and social development. The key features of their writings must, therefore, be understood as aspects of such projects. In this context, and bearing in mind the relevance of intentionality, the form and style of their work are just as important as the content, for they are clearly concerned with the effect they would have on their readers, as their writings are produced in the hope of encouraging a certain reaction or motivation in the reader.

Intentionality is at the very core of their writings, which at a very basic but powerful level is aimed at two things: first, to communicate – as opposed to lecturing or indoctrinating – and, second, to motivate – to motivate the reader into action, into questioning or simply to engage with the text. An example of the centrality of communication can be found in the topicality and interest of the content – for their contemporary readers –, their frequent use of the newspaper article and the essay to establish a more direct and intimate connection with the reader, as well as a wide number of stylistic features, which will be discussed more at length in the course of the following chapters. The newspaper contribution plays a double role, that of reflecting the writer’s concerns and echoing those of many of the readers, as well as opening their thought to new possibilities and pointing to new horizons (see Gracia, 1996: 20). As for the connotations of essay writing, Bretz’s conclusion regarding the use of the footnote (or lack thereof), which also applies to our key three authors, forcefully grasps these authors’s perspective on communication:

they [Maragall, Unamuno, Ortega and other members of these generations] tend to avoid or minimally use footnotes, even in longer treatises such as Unamuno’s Del sentimiento trágico de la vida. Footnotes and source identification invest the writer with specialized authority that allows him to impart information rather than enter into exchange with the reader or antecedent texts (2001: 201).
It emerges from this how they avoid standing in a position of intellectual authority, deliberately stripping the text of those features which may provide such authority and create a further distance between reader and text. Although it can be argued that the mere fact of being published and being read may already, and perhaps unavoidably, put the author and the text in a position of authority, what remains true is that these authors are clearly concerned with the reception of their work; that they share the desire, the intention, to create a closer relationship between reader, the text, and the writer; and that they develop certain strategies in the attempt to do so.

This is also the case with Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre. Aranguren himself corroborates this in relation to the near-absence of footnotes in Zambrano’s work:

pareciéndose en esto al propio Ortega, nunca abusa de las citas, porque María Zambrano despoja totalmente su texto de citas y nos lo presenta desnudo, exento a nuestros ojos. De modo que la intertextualidad en María Zambrano está viva, pero más bien latente, y en cambio está bastante patente lo que hay de comunicación, no en universo cerrado, sino en universo abierto, como un juego abierto hacia la realidad (1983: 117; see also Laurenzi, 2004: 15).

Thus, they share the same aim of gaining closeness with the reader, at the same time as they emphasize the humanistic rather than scientific nature of their writings. Content, form, and style deliberately work together in a holistic manner, and only reluctantly are they separated here for the purpose of analysis. As we have seen, these features are not coincidental or fruit of an observation a posteriori, but a central premise of their work which consequently shape it. Having provided some evidence of their interconnectedness, which will be explored at length in Chapter Four, the key characteristics of their writings will be discussed below.

1.6 The writings

1.6.1 Style, content, and availability

This section will explore the style, content, and availability of Aranguren’s, Zambrano’s, and Aguirre’s work, which need to be considered in order to better understand the project of personal and socio-political development put forward by these authors, as well as the reach and significance of their ideas.

Aranguren is a fertile writer who writes on a variety of topics, especially religion, ethics, and socio-political issues. Aranguren starts his trajectory with a largely descriptive style, which Gracia, in relation to his analysis of d’Ors work, describes as “prosa científica de las humanidades” (1996: 27). As he matures intellectually and politically, his expression changes accordingly into a more inquisitive, digressive, personal, and dialogical style. Books, journals, and newspaper articles are his preferred means of expression. A number of lectures in both the academic and the public domain bear witness to his vocation as teacher, and to his proximity with his public or readers. All in all, his style is clear, coherent, and
communicative in an effort to reach the greatest number of readers possible, and to awaken their interest and critical attitude.

His regular newspaper articles coupled with his personal circumstances and his relation with the regime have contributed to making him a well-known intellectual with a considerable readership. Moreover, since 1994 the availability of his intellectual production has increased with Feliciano Blázquez’s publication of his complete works. There are also various secondary texts which introduce, discuss, and analyse Aranguren’s work, or aspects of it, especially his views on religion and ethics (see Gracia, 1996: 161; see also Chapter Three). Despite Aranguren’s prolific and wide-ranging career, he is probably best known for the series of articles published after his death as a result of the controversy between Javier Marías and Aranguren’s family and friends regarding Aranguren’s role and sympathies during the Francoist regime (Javier Marías, 1999). Although his role and impact on the process of Transition is widely recognised, the extent of the research on Aranguren’s interest in politics has been extremely limited. To my knowledge, only Victoria Camps and Carlos Soldevilla focus on this aspect of Aranguren’s work (see 1997: 181-189; 2004: 123-143 respectively). This thesis aims to reveal and elucidate the political dimension of Aranguren’s work and its relationship to CT.

Zambrano is probably the most prolific of the three, although her works are fragmentary, disperse, and elusive, reflecting the element of instability present almost throughout her life. Her style boasts an attractive simplicity, not simpleness, full of poetic and spiritual resonances because the focus of her reflection is not so much theoretical as it is existential and experiential, as we shall see (see Gómez Blesa, 2006: 36). She relies heavily on the use of symbols because she aims to communicate at different and progressively simultaneous levels, inviting the reader to consciously submerge himself in a fruitful and personal process of creation of meaning28. In recent years, particularly with the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of her birth in 2004, Zambrano has sparked popular interest which has resulted in an extensive number of publications on her works29. These include several doctoral theses, which, more or less successfully, have offered readings of different aspects of her thought30. Incidentally, Aranguren himself has supervised one such thesis entitled “La huida de Perséfone. María Zambrano y el conflicto de la temporalidad”

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28 In this sense, the Fundación María Zambrano (Vélez-Málaga) has fulfilled and continues to fulfil the task of promoting and preserving her legacy, as well as progressively publishing her remaining unpublished work.

29 In addition to this, in 2004 a film which portrays her later life is released, bearing witness to the popularity of this author. The film in question is entitled María querida and it is directed by José Luis García Sánchez.

30 See TESEO, a database of theses created by the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia.
(Eguizábal Subero, 1994). Two of the theses, “El pensamiento político y social de María Zambrano” and “Maria Zambrano: Política e Historia”, are dedicated to the political aspect of her thought, although they focus on her early writings (Salguero Robles, 1994; Paniagua, 1997 respectively). Some articles analyse her political contribution from different perspectives, most notably “Una lectura marxista de la obra de María Zambrano” and “Maria Zambrano y la guerra civil”, although, again, their focus is her early work (Dorang, 1991; Robles Carcedo, 1991, respectively; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 8-9). The purpose of the present thesis, nevertheless, is to analyse her political thought, not limited to the early and overtly political years, but to the entirety of her work, and interpret her views and evolution in the light of Heideggerian philosophy and in relation to CT.

Aguirre’s publications are, on the other hand, less extensive (see Herralde, 2006: 16). Except for a very limited number of smaller contributions to the debate on religion during the time he exercised his role as a priest, no literary work of his own is produced until after the end of the regime, and, even then, the quantity remains modest. This probably accounts for the fact that despite his importance as an influential intellectual and as a socialite, there are hardly any materials analysing his intellectual contributions; but his influential task as a translator, and editor-in-chief during the early 1970s at Taurus, a publishing house located in Madrid, should not be overlooked. His choice of authors, and the nature of the texts translated and published are highly significant, as well as his prologues, which – when available – give the reader a revealing insight into his motives and personal perspectives. He also tries his hand at journalism, proving his desire to maintain a direct contact with the public in an attempt to shape their attitudes as he had already started doing from the pulpit years earlier (see Gullón, 1989: 13). Despite his cultivation of the journalistic genre, and in contrast with Aranguren and Zambrano, his language is often obscure; its goal is to demand effort from the willing reader who, through this exercise, would awaken and practice independent thinking and a critical ability, which it is hoped could be extrapolated to other contexts. Although Chapter Five has been to a large extent a work of reconstruction, I believe that there exists sufficient material to carry out an analysis and evaluation of his contribution. What is more, given the influence he exerted on Spanish society, particularly during the Transition, the elucidation of the role he played is imperative in order to add one more piece to the incomplete puzzle of recent Spanish history, particularly considering that very little attention has been devoted to Aguirre’s role as an intellectual in his own right.

Thus, despite their multiple differences, what links together the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is their intention not only to engage with the reader, but to encourage the readers’ engagement with their texts, which they hope would trigger a process of individual and social change, as will be argued throughout this thesis.
1.6.2 Genre

Despite the problems involved in structuring their production according to clear generic labels given the heterogeneity of their content, form, and style, it is still useful for the purpose of analysis to consider whether or not their writings tend to have the traits of any of the major traditional genres. Anderson explains that “the markers of genre can thus be used to insist on the resemblance to what is already known, and to organize and regulate the meanings of a text for the reader” (2001: 10). Therefore, in order to be able to determine if a text belongs to a specific genre we must first establish if such a text exhibits the markers or patterns which are consistently found in a given genre. The usefulness of this method of classification and analysis is the motivation for the elucidation of how these authors’s work conforms to these patterns. Equally, the existence of such patterns, and their impact on the reception and elaboration of meaning makes traditional genre allocation incompatible with the subversive and creative project of CT as elaborated in these authors’s work, as I shall argue below and throughout the rest of this thesis. Bearing this in mind and the fact that the boundaries between the private and public tone and content of their writings are often blurred, their publications can be classified as epistles and partial semi-autobiographic accounts. They are also characterized by a more public format which tends to materialize in speeches (including sermons in the case of Aguirre), newspaper and journal articles, essays, and, very significantly for Aguirre, translations.

Nonetheless, the most prolifically cultivated genre by all three authors is the essay. As Gracia’s insightful account of the nature of the essay as a genre reveals, essays can be understood as a “reflexión no sistemática, sin talante exhaustivo ni científico, expresada en términos marcadamente personales, proclive a la digresión más o menos colateral y sensible a la huella de un estilo de autor” (1996: 9). The essays written by Aranguren, Aguirre, and Zambrano fulfil this description; all three share a deliberate, open-ended, non-systematic, often digressive, and openly personal style. Hence, format and style seem to validate the claim that the genre mainly used by these authors is the essay; however, it is only with difficulty and reluctance that these works can be described as essays. A closer look at their writings reveals that, even formally, they resist classification since the traditional genres used blend into each other; this is so because they often borrow traits from other genres, so it is not unusual to encounter an essay – or part of it – in the tone of a public speech, or of an autobiographical confession. Essay writing in the case of Zambrano often adopts an epistolary aura, which can also be said of Aranguren’s and Aguirre’s newspaper articles. In addition, there is also a recurrent element of loiterature, in reference to the digression and openness of their writings; openness in the sense of indeterminate, unfinished, but also in its openness to the other, in what it contains and does not contain of alterity (see Chambers, 1999: 37).
The borderlines between genres, as between disciplines, become blurred, conferring their expression a sense of fluidity on the one hand, and a sense of confusion and disorientation on the other. It is precisely because of this difficulty in confining Zambrano’s work to a particular genre that Aranguren describes her work as transgressive:

This transgressive characteristic is common to all three authors. In the case of Aguirre, this is also because of his use of language, which is markedly idiosyncratic and deliberately obscure, as we shall discuss in Chapter Five. Aranguren does not communicate in a poetic language; however, it is the nature of his critique that accounts for his transgressive style as shall be argued in Chapter Three.

Genre is more than the combination of content, format, and style. The aspirations and intentions of the author, insofar as they can be discerned from the text, must also be considered, as well as the nature and status of the resulting product. From the

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31 As Gerard Genette argues, the intentions and aspirations of the text can be traced in the paratext, which contributes to providing a contextualizing frame for the reader: “the paratext consists, as [the] ambiguous prefix suggests, of all those things which we are never certain belong to the text of a work.
aforementioned traits of essay writing, Gracia rightly concludes that “todo ello significa, por añadidura, que es un texto de opinión y, por debajo de un frecuente aspecto resolutivo o definitorio, su más íntima naturaleza lo aleja de lo conclusivo” (1996: 9). In contrast with this, even though neither Aranguren, Zambrano, nor Aguirre aim for conclusive and definitive results, and although their style is markedly personal, when examined under their own parameters, the content of their work cannot be considered as mere opinion either, for in line with CT, they aim to establish different epistemological grounds; they reject the dichotomy between science and doxa, between science and everything else. Yet, they still lack the definitiveness and conclusiveness or closure to become a political or philosophical system. Instead, their work may be described as a critique, but also as an invitation to the reader to share and to take part in the alternative framework of rationality in which they exercise their writings. Although personal, they cannot be considered individual, for they contain routes of personalized action in the direction of the realization of an alternative rationality which would become public and shared. That is why their writings transcend opinion and become a project in themselves; they go beyond hypothesis or theory to become possibility and action.

As indicated above, intentionality is crucial in the case of the FS, because it is precisely the shared aim of their project what provides their work with cohesion for the different manifestations of CT. Given the homogenizing and reactionary effects indicated above of classifying a text within a given genre, the allocation of a text elaborated by the members of the FS or by any of the three authors studied seems incompatible with the subversive and creative intentions of their project. Because their work constitutes an attack on the established patterns of rationality as well as an attempt to overcome them, it would then be misleading to classify their writings within established genres, such as essay or biography. However, it is unclear whether it is desirable or necessary to do away with genre altogether. As Derrida puts it, “a text cannot belong to no genre” (1981: 61). Semiotically, genre provides a useful framework of reference and understanding within which texts are not only interpreted, but also, even, produced (see Fowler 1989, p.216). That is why, in as much as the work of Critical Theorists shares the same aims and requires a specific methodology of their own, that is, the coherence between intentionality, content, and style, their work also constitutes a genre of their own, namely, CT. As Jane Feuer observes, “a but which contribute to present – or ‘presentify’ – the text by making it into a book. It not only marks a zone of transition between text and non-text (‘hors-texte’), but also a transaction” (Genette, 1988: 63; see also Allen, 2000: 103-04). For Jacques Derrida such information can be found in a deconstructionist effort outside the text, in the “exergue”: “Exergue derives from the Greek and means ‘outside of work’; the term was used to describe the space on a coin or medal reserved for inscriptions” (Smith, 2005: 140). In addition to these elements, as indicated above, this thesis will examine the content of texts in the light of the whole œuvre of the author and will also resort to biographical data in order to elucidate the intentionality of the author.
genre is ultimately an abstract conception rather than something that exists empirically in the world” (1992: 144). It is this relative flexibility of the nature of genre as an abstract conception which ultimately allows CT to become a genre of its own, for its common traits are sufficiently distinctive and cohesive to do so.

These traits, as well as their consequences, attest to the *praxis* of an ideological statement: in their effort to destabilize and, ultimately, overcome instrumental reason, they strive to overcome the boundaries, divisions, and separations that traditionally shape Western rationality.

1.7 Structure
This thesis, which is structured in a total of six chapters, has been divided in two parts which are quite distinct in focus and style. The first part, more theoretical and historical in nature, comprises two chapters. Its role is to provide an introduction and contextualization to the thesis that will not only establish the theoretical bases for the arguments that will be developed throughout the thesis, but it will also serve as a point of orientation and reference for the reader. Thus, after having introduced the aim and methodology of this research in Chapter One, Chapter Two provides a short introduction to twentieth-century Spain with an emphasis on the relevant socio-historical background for Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, as well as introducing their socio-political positions, for they are crucial to understanding the background against which the subsequent discussion takes place. The second part of the thesis comprises a total of four chapters: a chapter for each individual author and the conclusion. This second part, which is more critical, focuses on the evolution of each one of these thinkers: their thought and the development of their critical stance towards the different expressions of instrumental reason.

Chapter Three focuses on Aranguren. He is the first author to be discussed at length because, unlike Zambrano and Aguirre, his language is direct and his critique is fairly explicit, particularly during the later stages of his work; in fact, Amelia Varcárcel points to Aranguren’s clarity as one of the distinguishing features of his writings (1997: 43). This is why the analysis of his thought provides a useful platform for the rest of the thesis. This chapter explores Aranguren’s relationship to neo-Marxism and, more specifically, to Marcuse. Moreover, it sheds light on the fact that Aranguren explicitly develops some of the key topics first identified by the Frankfurt School, which are central to the critique of instrumental reason, making them his own subject matter. These topics include Aranguren’s criticism of consumerism and his denunciation of the manipulation citizens are subjected to from the mass media and the State, and he deals with them in an intentionally open and
easily accessible manner. The implications of this critique and Aranguren’s defence of the role of faith and of democratic values are also discussed at length.

Chapter Four turns to Zambrano’s thought. Unlike Aranguren, her thought is far from explicit. Instead, she often uses symbolic language to deal with disparate and abstract topics. This has lead to a tendency to qualify her as a mystical thinker, often overlooking other more concrete dimensions of her work. Hence, this chapter will attempt the task of the reconstruction of her thought so as to bring out the latent unity and coherence of her project. More specific aspects of her work will also be explored, particularly her socio-political dimension, with a special emphasis on her views on democracy, and the relationship between the spiritual and political dimensions. Her status as an exile is of relevance in order to analyse how this experience shapes her positions, as well as to explore the differences and coincidences with the position of those who remain within Spain, as well as their possible (in)communication.

Chapter Five focuses on Aguirre, who, despite being a very well-known public figure, has not been the object of any previous scholarly work. This chapter evaluates the role and influence of the different positions this charismatic intellectual held throughout his life, and especially clarifying his relationship to CT. It argues that, as a result of the influence of the School, Aguirre’s methodology and style are consistent with those of Critical Theory and his work should, therefore, be considered as such. Although Aguirre is often regarded as the introducer of the FS into Spain, he will be studied last for a number of reasons: there are fewer sources available because his own production is more limited than that of the previous authors; there are hardly any secondary texts available specifically on his work; and, more importantly, his style is obscure and fragmentary. Hence, this chapter has been, to a large extent, as in the case of Zambrano, a reconstruction of his thought. In a sense, Aguirre’s work can almost be viewed as the synthesis of Aranguren’s and Zambrano’s thought, for he covers the topics of the former in a style which is reminiscent of the latter in as much as his style shares many of her assumptions. That is why Aguirre will be discussed last, supported by the background and arguments used for his two contemporaries.

The sixth and final chapter focuses on pivotal aspects of Critical Theory, as argued throughout the thesis – the role of biography, fragmentation, exile, art, the subject, psychoanalysis, and spirituality – and it argues that all these elements are present in some form in the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre. Thus, it concludes, that, while maintaining the originality of their approach, considering the similarity and affinity of the aims, scope, choice of subject matter, methods, and style of these three thinkers to those of the FS, their thought can also be considered Critical Theory. Furthermore, by introducing the elements of spirituality, faith, and the role of choice, transcendentality becomes a key
aspect of their alternative to instrumental reason. In consequence, as we shall see, not only do they establish the singularity of their approach, but they also by-pass the limitations associated with the Frankfurt School.

Finally, it must be said that this thesis does not attempt to do provide a complete or totalizing account of these authors’s work. Because of the necessary limitations imposed by the format of a thesis, but, more importantly, because of the nature of these authors’s thought, such an attempt would be impossible and, more to the point, undesirable, since the value of their work lies, to a great extent, in their open-ended nature as we shall see in the course of the thesis.
2 Background and contextualization

The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextualization for Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre because, as Skinner explains, “we need to make it one of our principal tasks to situate the texts we study within such intellectual [historical] contexts as enable us to make sense of what their authors were doing in writing them” (2002: 3). That is why this chapter will focus on providing and discussing the historiographic, socio-political, and economic context in which Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre develop their work and how their key biographical events relate to such a context. This will be followed by a discussion of the issue of cultural hegemony, which will be explored so that the nature and reach of their work can be appreciated in reference to their historical moment. That is why particular attention will be paid to the situation of education, censorship, and culture during the Franco regime.

While the impact that this context may have had on their thought should not be overlooked, it is important not to be constrained by it either. As Quentin Skinner maintains, the “context” mistakenly gets treated as the determinant of what is said. It needs rather to be treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate. (In this way, [...] the context itself can be used as a sort of court of appeal for assessing the relative plausibility of incompatible ascriptions of intentionality) (1988b: 64).

For this reason, the present chapter will aim to provide a contextualizing framework which may be used as a point of reference throughout the thesis; intentionality, however, will carry more weight in the process of exegesis for the reasons indicated above. The unavoidably subjective nature of this category makes it a necessarily problematic methodological aspect. Nonetheless, its centrality renders it an indispensable element of this research. Therefore, beside context and background, biographical information will also be provided with the purpose of better understanding the authors’s motives and aims, in the hope that the reader will be in a better position to discern their intentionality (see 1.4.1).

2.1 The historiographic context

In order to provide a comprehensive background for this research, the question of the existence of a bourgeois revolution in Spain needs to be addressed. The answer to this question will provide a valuable insight into the Spanish socio-economic structure, not only during this period, but in subsequent years, shedding some light onto the events that would later unfold.

Jesús Cruz convincingly challenges some key premises of traditional historiography on this topic: the existence of a new social revolutionary class before 1850, the bourgeoisie, and the causal link in history between economic, political, and social processes (1996: 6,
He argues that although there are a number of new economic opportunities during the period 1750-1850, the social and economic dynamics of interaction remain unchanged, which accounts for the continuation of a traditional economy (1996: 41-42). This is possible because of the following dual, layered, and conflictive – although entirely coherent – attitude:

they [the political elite, generated by the self-perpetuating economic agents] embraced liberalism because that ideology is the agent of political stability and economic prosperity in northern Europe and America, because its economic principles are very much in line with their economic interests, and because they are attracted to its political message of freedom and progress against obscurantism and tradition. However, at the same time they had to maintain their domination in a society whose structure and organization is strongly opposed to the principles of the new ideology (Cruz, 1996: 206-07).

While their intellectual commitment, that is, their public discourse, displays a progressive attitude, their private discourse is still infused with the old values and ways (see Cruz, 1996: 173). Hence, Cruz concludes that a bourgeois revolution cannot account for the changes that take place in Spain between 1808 and 1853, for while there is economic and social continuity, the nature of this continuity is political, and that is why he refers to it as “Spain’s liberal revolution” (1996: 276). As Ringrose explains, “there is no ‘bourgeois revolution’, if by that phrase we mean a demand for political power by a new middle class born of the rise of capitalism” (1996: 392). Indeed, power does not change hands because the same mechanism of clientelism and patronage continues in place throughout the nineteenth century (see Cruz, 1996: 173, 176; see also Ringrose, 1996: 295). The change, as stated above, is rather of a political nature, embracing liberal rhetoric and values so as to move forward in the same direction as the developments in the rest in Europe and to secure legitimation.

In the light of the above, it is necessary to rethink the traditional conceptualization of Spanish modernity based on the liberal or Marxist models which stem from a linear evolutionist approach to historical processes and, indeed, progress (see Cruz, 1996: 4-5, 260). This is of great consequence to the present research, for it highlights the need to consider the role of other factors and dynamics in the process of change. Cruz points to three key elements which play a vital role during the revolutionary changes that take place in the first half of the nineteenth century: the power of hierarchical relationships; cultural hegemony, in particular the role of, in Bourdieu’s terminology, habitus, that is, internal structures at the heart of social norms and customs that are more resistant to change than economic structures; and, finally, the role of the unconscious (see Cruz, 1996: 9, 13, 10-11; Holguín, 2002: 8-9; Bourdieu, 1990: 53 respectively).

These factors also prove to be a great explanatory tool for the events which take place in twentieth-century Spain. From Cruz’s study we learn that the reach and depth of change
must not be taken at face value, and that its levels – economic, political, social, moral, and religious – must be analysed individually, although not separately. Understanding the irregularity and unevenness of the process of change may serve as an explanatory factor for the emergence of the two Spains and the subsequent conflict, while the power of *habitus* may also contribute to understanding the possibility of the peaceful Transition which takes place after the death of the dictator\textsuperscript{32}. As for the role and impact of cultural hegemony and the unconscious, they will be examined at greater length below.

More importantly, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre seem to have an intuitive understanding of the complexity and variety of factors involved in social change, and for that reason they emphasize that social progress can only be achieved when changes in behaviour are the reflection of a change in attitudes and beliefs which must start in the individual. The importance of this realization will unfold in the course of the thesis.

\subsection*{2.2 Socio-historical contextualization}

The socio-historical context of the authors studied will now be discussed, for it will provide us with an insight into their background, shedding some light on their circumstances: the challenges they face, their motivations, the influences they receive, and the influence they exert. It is, therefore, crucial in understanding their significance, for their contributions are closely linked to both their personal circumstances and the socio-political events that surround them and shape the world they live in.

All of them are born at the dawn of the twentieth century. The Spain into which Zambrano is born in 1904, rural Andalusia (Vélez-Málaga), is quite different from the more developed Spain that Aranguren (Ávila, 1909) and Aguirre (Madrid, 1934), the youngest of the three, are born into. Whereas both Aranguren and Aguirre come from well-off families who have a rather moderate political position, Zambrano’s father – D. Blas José Zambrano García de Carabante – is seriously committed to politics, becoming president of the *Agrupación Socialista Obrera*, the Socialist Party (1913), which effectively means that she is brought up in a left-wing atmosphere (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 28 and 2001: 14-15). It is, thus, hardly surprising that when the Second Republic is proclaimed in 1931, Zambrano embraces it full of hope. Although Aranguren and Aguirre do not suffer the Civil War itself and its consequences quite so dramatically as Zambrano does, these are still events which have had an unquestionable effect on them as people and as intellectuals (see Zambrano, 32)

\textsuperscript{32} The true Spain is understood as the Republican one by the exiled Republican refugees (see Faber 2002: 4); similar claims are made by Nationalists (see Lannon, 2002: 8; see Favretto, 2005: 114). The Civil War, far from settling the conflict of the two Spains, imposed a stronger and more definite separation between the two, although attempts for reconciliation, or at least communication, with the exiled Spain, are made at different points (see Gracia, 1996: 11, 16-18; see also 2.3.1).
1977: 368-69; Bundgård, 2005b: 8, 11-13; see also García Ruiz, 2000: 195-218). This is particularly so in the case of Zambrano, who, in reference to the Civil War and in an allusion to the sacrificial component of her generation, refers to it as the generation of the bull (see Moreno Sanz, 1996: 44; see also Robles, 2002: 381). Following the outbreak of the Civil War on 18 July 1936, Zambrano actively campaigns in favour of the Republic, even coming back from Chile, where she is staying with her husband, to offer her support to the Republican cause and becomes Consejero de Propaganda and Consejero Nacional de la Infancia Evacuada (Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29, 32). In the meantime, Aranguren, initially stationed with the Falangists for a short while in Aragón, soon goes back home supposedly afflicted with tuberculosis (1994, 1: 21). As a result, he does not shed any blood. His lack of political interest and involvement is patent at this stage, as is his rejection of violence. Aguirre, some thirty years younger than Zambrano and Aranguren, is only two years old when the war breaks out, and is, as a result, imbued with post-war values during his education. Although there is little information available on his family and early economic background, his surname – Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate – suggests the comfortable position of his family (Savater, 2006). This is confirmed by an anecdote which Aguirre used to tell regarding his early alimentary habits. This is how Savater remembers it:

33 Although Comte and Stuart Mill suggest that the concept of generation may have some historical significance because it may be involved in the process of social change, Ortega and Mannheim are the ones who develop this idea in greater detail and establish a link of causality (see Schwartz, 1999: 4). For Mannheim, Ortega, and their followers, “generation” makes reference to “groups of people who share a distinctive culture or a self-conscious identity by virtue of their having experienced the same historical events” (Alwin, 2003: 43). Ortega explores the concept of generation in El tema de nuestro tiempo (1923), a concept which is later often revisited. His disciple Julián Marías also engages with the concept of generation in El método histórico de las generaciones (1949) (see also Gracia, 1996: 103; Julián Marías, 1996: 104-108). The Ortegan concept of generation must be distinguished from that of “cohort” (see Alwin, 2003: 43). Cohort, which the Oxford English Dictionary may be defined as “a group of persons having a common statistical characteristic”, is more solidly anchored in the time and place of birth, namely, those who share the same band of time and place of birth qualify as members of a particular cohort, whereas generation is more flexible in terms of natural time and, more decisively, it requires having lived through one or several defining socio-historical events that would supposedly shape the attitude, outlook, and expression of its integrants. According to this view, a generation would exert some pressure for change upon the previous generation, until they become the policymakers and are being pressured themselves by the new generation who would start a new cycle (see Schwartz, 1999: 4). The existence of such cycles is, of course, arguable, as is the concept of generation as the key motivating factor for regular social change. Having said this, it should be noted that the term “cohorte” in Spanish only means group in a general or military sense. Taking into consideration the above, the concept of generation will be used throughout this thesis, not as an agent of social change, but as a contextualizing tool because as Raymond Williams explains, the term “generation” allows “the emergence of a sense in which the distinctiveness of a particular time or set of people is emphasized” (1983: 141). Given the weight placed upon the biographical factor in this research, it is helpful to revert to the generational classification developed within the Spanish tradition to better understand the key socio-historical co-ordinates which contextualize and shape each author (see Gullón, 1969: 162). This is particularly relevant, considering that all three authors, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, do refer to the concept of generation, not as a classificatory tool, but as a contextualizing one, thus, highlighting the importance they place on belonging to a specific historic time. Hence, the term “generation”, like the classification systems used throughout this research, will only be used for the purpose of reconstruction, interpretation, and analysis, and not as a definition or definitive category.
él era la única persona en el mundo que yo he conocido que no le gustaba el jamón. Es una cosa rarísima. “Pero ¿cómo que no te gusta el jamón? No hay nadie en el mundo que no le guste un jamón”. Y él [Aguirre] dice: “sí, porque cuando yo era pequeño no quería comer, no me gustaba comer, y entonces mi madre me alimentaba sólo de jamón serrano y de agua de solares, y ya no he podido volver a comer en mi vida ni el jamón ni el agua de solares” (2006).

Considering that at the time jamón, ham, is well out of reach for the majority of the population, it is only logical to assume that Aguirre’s family must have been comfortably off, which indicates a traditional, conservative, even Nationalist, background.

What is certain is that the Civil War and its outcome determine to a large extent the future of these three thinkers. With the defeat of the Republicans (1939), Zambrano finds it necessary to flee the country through the Pyrenees into France, to emigrate later to the American continent where her travels continue until 1953 when she returns to Europe, and, finally, in 1984, to Spain. This long exile and its consequences have a decisive influence on her, as will be argued in Chapter Four. After the end of the Civil War, the establishment of the Franco regime decisively influences the development of Aranguren and Aguirre’s thought. Nevertheless, although in different ways, as time goes by, they grow critical of National Catholicism, and as they distance themselves from Catholicism, their work and intellectual activity increasingly become the expression of their dissidence from the regime as we shall see throughout the thesis.

During the 1940s, most of the essays and articles published are regime-legitimating ones, as Gracia explains: “el intelectual vencido que permaneció en el interior calló a la fuerza o se resignó al Nuevo orden seleccionando sus asuntos desde la inocuidad aparente o real” (1996: 10). The gap between this discourse and what many of its initial supporters expect from the regime on the one hand, and the reality the regime actually delivers on the other, is steadily growing (see Gracia, 1996: 10-12). The worst enemy of the regime is reality itself:

In the 1950s a new opposition culture – its democratic colours somewhat muted – emerged from within the ranks of the privileged, as the sons and daughters of prominent Nationalist families turned their backs on a would-be totalitarian regime which they found politically appalling and culturally false, in the sense that it represented a negation of ethical, humanist civic values (Díaz, 1995: 284; see also Gracia, 1996: 12).

Disillusioned by the regime, this is the journey taken during the late 1950s and 1960s by some prominent intellectuals, ideologues, propagandists, and supporters of the regime such Pedro Lain Entralgo, Enrique Tierno Galván, Antonio Tovar, Luis Rosales, José Antonio Maravall, Gonzalo Torrente, José María Castellet, and Dionisio Ridruejo, but also Aranguren, and Aguirre. It is for this reason that, although it may seem contradictory to see the names Aranguren and Aguirre often associated with National Catholicism and the

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34 See Gracia, 1996: 26; see also Gracia, 2004: 218; Diaz, 2004: 498, 507-08, 510-12; for a study of political dissidence among writers in the post-war era, see Jordan, 1990.
regime’s hegemonic efforts, upon closer examination it becomes clear that theirs is a personal trajectory that goes from their somewhat sheltered early years, resulting in a naïve outlook, to the discovery of the distance between the regime’s discourse and its practice, which leads to their subsequent active dissidence (see Gracia, 2004: 219, 237, 242). The disillusionment involved in this process and the caution learnt may have been key factors in pushing their thought towards highly critical directions, searching for radically different alternatives. As Diaz goes on to explain, “Francoism, precisely because of its stultifying cultural and political dogmatism, sharpened the critical edge of new, emergent currents of thought and generated significant cultural and political forms of resistance among writers, poets, philosophers, and scientists” (1995: 285). Aranguren’s dissidence becomes most visible in the 1965 peaceful demonstration outside the vice-chancellor’s office, as a result of which he is removed from his Chair of Ethics and Sociology at the Universidad Complutense. Enrique Tierno Galván and Agustín García Calvo, who also demonstrate, suffer similar consequences (see Gracia, 2004: 266-67; see also Diaz, 2004: 514). Aguirre, being younger and having spent the latter part of the 1950s in Germany does not show (public) disconformity until the early 1960s, a time when dissidence and many of the existing concerns are voiced, alternatives explored, and change demanded (see Gracia, 1996: 13). Aguirre gives up his position as a priest (1969), not because of lack of faith, but because of the unsustainable socio-political and religious incongruities within the Spanish Catholic Church and National Catholicism in particular, which, as Gracia puts it “se nutre de elementos, por decirlo así, intraducibles al lenguaje racional” (2004: 42). As we shall see in Chapters Three and Five, these are turning points for both authors from which they sharpen their critique towards neo-capitalism and instrumental rationality in general. In fact, one of the most remarkable features of Spanish thought during the last few years of Francoism is the reintroduction of utopian thought, whose aim is to criticize the existing hegemonic reason and the dogmatism of state and bureaucratic practices (see Diaz, 1983: 166-67; see also Paris, 1977: 49; Castellet, 1977: 13; Gracia, 2004: 349). This is, in fact, one of the central links with the FS as shall be discussed in the following chapters.

It is necessary at this point to make a digression regarding the position of the Spanish Catholic Church during the Spanish Civil War and also during the dictatorship due to the historic relevance of the role it played, and, even more importantly, because understanding the position of the Church and its weight in socio-political and intellectual life during Francoism provides an essential insight into Aranguren’s and particularly Aguirre’s biographical and intellectual choices, which makes it crucial to the overall argument of this

35 Although this year is not explicitly mentioned on any sources as the year when Aguirre leaves the clergy, the rest of dates and contextual information about his life point – by a process of deduction – to 1969 as the year when Aguirre gives up his priestly vows and becomes editor in chief at Taurus.
thesis. This digression will provide evidence of what I have described above as its incongruities, which, as we shall see below and throughout this thesis, are present at the level of its political involvement, but also affect its internal institutional cohesion, the integrity of its spiritual values, and the religious commitment of its followers.

From the military coup against the Republic (18 July 1936), the Spanish Church sides with the insurgents (González Ruiz, 1977: 178). Evidence of this is the clearly supportive behaviour of many of its bishops. This is the case of the bishop of Salamanca, Pla i Deniel, who offers the episcopal palace as General Headquarters for Franco (González Ruiz, 1977: 178). In the face of Republican anti-clericalism, for the insurgents, the Civil War becomes a war “por Dios y por la patria” (Viñas, 1986: 163). In fact, in 1937, a collective Pastoral Letter issued by Spanish episcopacy legitimising the military rising and the Spanish Civil War, effectively giving the Nationalists its blessing and elevating the war to the status of a crusade (Giner, 1993: 53-54; see also González Ruiz, 1977: 178). Even then, however, it was possible to observe conflict within the Church. Three bishops decline signing the Pastoral letter: Francesc Vidal i Barraquer, of Tarragona, Múgica of Vitoria, and Irastorza Loinaz of Orihuela (Lannon, 1987: 204). What is more, Vidal i Barraquer criticizes the active engagement of the Church with the Francoist war efforts, and contacts – with little success – Pope Pius XII with the aim of bringing this issue to his attention, hoping for a papal condemnation of this position of the Spanish Catholic Church (González Ruiz, 1977: 178-81; Lannon, 1987: 205-06). Instead, later that year, the Vatican officially recognizes the rebel government, offering it its doctrinal support (Giner, 1993: 53; Lannon, 1987: 204-08).

At the end of the war, in 1939, the Church continues to be closely linked to Francoism, to the point that it provides one of the key pillars of legitimation for the regime (see Linz, 1993: 18). As a result, during the Francoist regime, the Spanish Catholic Church is plagued by incongruities, which can be observed in its political position, in its internal division, and in the relationship between religious observance and faith.

By providing the Francoist regime with legitimation, the measures implemented by the Republic which were considered anti-clerical are reversed (Lannon, 1987: 215). As a result, state funding for the clergy is restored (Lannon, 1987: 215). The Spanish Church regains its former spheres of power and influence, such as education, and marriage, and gains others, such as censorship (Lannon, 1987: 215; see also Giner, 1993: 57; Callahan, 2000: 463-69). Although neither education nor censorship are explicitly political activities, they have, however, serious political implications.

“El período de 1945 a 1957 es el punto álgido del triunfalismo católico de la identificación pública de la Iglesia” (Linz, 1993: 20). With the exception of Bishop Pildain and few others, not many dare to express dissenting views during this period (Callahan,

Until this separation takes place, the number of its members who feel or express dissatisfaction with the relationship between the Church and the regime grows with the passing of time. One of the reasons for this is the loss of some of the Church privileges and power, such as the loss of autonomy of the *Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica* (HOAC), a quasi union for Catholic workers (González Ruiz, 1977: 182). As Callahan puts it, although bishops and lay activists from Catholic Action remained loyal to Franco during the 1940s and 1950s, they struggled to break through the exclusions imposed by the regime. As circumstances changed during the 1960s, some bishops, priests, and religious began to question not only this attempt to confine the Church to a narrow role in a time of economic change and social upheaval, but also its identification with an authoritarian State (2000: 385).

Another cause for dissent within the Church, and of distance between the Church and the regime is the regime’s immobility regarding issues of social justice (Callahan, 2000: 502-03). An example of this can be found in the pastoral letter attacking social injustice issued by Bishop Vicente Enrique y Tarancón, which is met with accusations in the official press of being communist (Callahan, 2000: 407; see also Chapters Three and Five for a discussion of *curas rojos*, Marxist priests). As Callahan explains,

the divide between bishops and many, though by no means all, priests rested on more than differences of opinion over civil-ecclesiastical relations. [...] The causes of this avalanche of protest and demonstrations varied. Some protests were inspired by concern over abuses of civil rights, others by issues of social justice, and some, in the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, by regionalist sympathies, while still others were moved by demands for a more open ecclesiastical organization. Taken as a whole, the protest wave revealed widespread discontent with both the dictatorship and the hierarchy's ambiguous response to demands for fundamental reform in the way Spain was governed and in the Church's role within a society undergoing rapid social and economic change. [...] This historic and deeply conservative prophetism was now turned on its head in the form of vigorous clerical denunciations of the regime and even the hierarchy for tolerating social, economic, and political abuses regarded as incompatible with Christian values (2000: 516; see also Giner, 1993: 58-59).

Evidence of the growing distance between the regime and the Church can be found in the fines, even jail, in some cases, that the Francoist police imposes on priests for the dangerous contents of their religious homilies: 109 priests face such fines (see González Ruiz, 1977: 183-84; see also Linz, 1993: 23; Lannon, 1987: 253).

As a result of these tensions, paradoxically, the Church, or rather not the Church as an institution, but numerous priests and churches support those opposing the regime. In fact, some churches become a meeting – and sometimes a hiding – place for activists
This can be observed in the development of militant Catholic workers associations and in the clergy’s support for regionalist movements in Catalonia and in the Basque country around the 1960s (see Callahan, 2000: 382; Lannon, 1987: 235, 250). These, in addition to socio-political impact of the Vatican Council, contribute to undermining the close ties, as well as the appearance of consensus between Church and State (see Lannon, 1987: 235, 250).

It is important to understand the complexity of the internal division within the Spanish Catholic Church. Care must be taken not to reduce these internal divisions to the tensions that exist between the hierarchy of the Church and some dissident priests. There is an important division even within the hierarchy itself. Lannon highlights what happens to some associations related to the Church to illustrate this point: “what is certain is that JOC [Juventud Obrera Católica] and HOAC were actually undermined, not by Communist rivalry nor by state oppression, but by episcopal hostility” (1987: 235; see also McAdam, 2001: 181). As González Ruiz explains, there is “rivalidad entre los dos ‘primados de España’” (1977: 181).

The impact of the Second Vatican Council, which was held in Spain, must also be considered (see Brassloff, 1998: 6-41). Largely as a result of the spirit of this aggiornamento — lead, first, by Pope John XXIII and, later, Paul IV —, that is, the efforts of Catholicism to embrace modernity, “in the last decade of the military dictatorship the Spanish Church became as much its critic and opponent as its faithful supporter” (Lannon, 1987: 224, 249; see also Callahan, 2000: 515-26).

On balance, the Church’s position on social justice was stronger in 1965 than it had been a decade earlier, but it was not without any ambiguity. Impelled by the social documents of Pope John XXIII and the Vatican Council, the hierarchy developed a more realistic perception of social problems and, in some cases, became bolder in its criticism of official policy. This produced inevitable tension with the regime, although the bishops sought to contain the pressure from Catholic activists and clergy for a more aggressive approach (Callahan, 2000: 507).

Distance and tensions between the Spanish Church and the Vatican grow, as can be observed in the requests made by Pope Paul IV to Franco to relinquish the right of presentation to Spanish sees in 1968 (Lannon, 1987: 251). As Linz explains, “las relaciones entre Iglesia y Estado después del Concilio Vaticano experimentaron un cambio fundamental: de una cooperación íntima a distanciamiento, tensión e incluso conflicto”, the cause of which Linz identifies in a religious examination of consciousness (1993: 29).

The paradoxical relationship between religious observance and faith also deserves attention; high levels of church attendance, which diminishes from the 1960s onwards, is not necessarily evidence of the faith of the churchgoers (see McAdam, 2001: 181). Another reason for their religious observance can be found in socio-political pressures. As Callahan explains, “civil marriage was possible during the Franco period, but baptized Catholics
wishing to evade a church marriage had to take the audacious and potentially damaging step in personal and career terms of formally abjuring the Catholic faith” (2000: 473). Thus, participating in religious rituals was often a requisite for the successful integration in the work-place and in the community.

As a result of all of the above, this is how González Ruiz describes Catholicism in Spain during the Franco regime:

un puro convencionalismo, huero y vacío, de profundos intereses políticos, de ingenuidades cínicas o de cinismos ingenuos, que han ido jalonando rutinariamente la vida de la Iglesia española durante más de treinta años en una aparente “buena salud”, que, según frase popular, no era más que la llamada “mejoría de la muerte” (1977: 181).

As indicated above, it is vital to take into account the situation of the Church in Spain during this period, as well as its relationship to individual faith and to the State, in order to not only contextualize, but also understand the positions and development of the authors studied here, particularly Aranguren and Aguirre, as will become evident in the course of the thesis.

It is also important for this historical contextualization to underscore that the events which take place outside Spanish borders also have a considerable effect on these thinkers, not least because all three have and maintain significant links abroad. During her exile, Zambrano stays in Mexico, Puerto Rico, and other Latin American countries before returning to Europe, spending time in France, Italy, and Switzerland, until finally returning to Spain in 1984. Aranguren spends a number of years working in the United States, and Aguirre, who also travels extensively, spends a crucial formative period in Germany. Hence, none of them are oblivious to the Second World War or its consequences, which, despite Spain’s policy of non-intervention, also have repercussions for Spain. They also display a keen interest in post-war European thought, particularly Aranguren, who makes numerous references to phenomenology, irrationalism, existentialism, structuralism, and other currents of thought (see Soldevilla, 2004: 129).37 In the case of Aguirre, his frequent

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36 As Julián Marias explains, as a consequence of the outbreak of the Second World War, Spain does not receive the international help it needs to attempt its reconstruction (2005: 371). Furthermore, its international situation was not improved by Spain’s initial public support of the Axis (Julián Marias, 2005: 371). Later, as Wayne Bowen indicates, “World War II and the immediate consequences of its outcome strengthened General Franco’s commitment to autarky and restricted opportunities for alternative approaches” (2006: 94). Not only are Spanish exports and imports of food, raw materials, and energy seriously reduced as a consequence of the war, but Spain is also initially deprived from any aid from the Marshall Plan and has to face the partial economic embargo imposed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (see Bowen, 2006: 94).

references Heidegger, but also Sartre, and Kierkegaard, are evidence of his interest in existentialism (see Aguirre, 1969c: 15-16; 1985: 79-80, 83-86, 238; 1989: 103-105, 140). Nevertheless, the impact of world politics goes beyond their personal interests and interconnections (Díaz, 2004: 505). The Second World War and the two-sided atmosphere of tension of the Cold War, of which the regime soon becomes a pawn, precipitates Spain’s admittance to the UN (1958), the International Monetary Fund and a number of other international organizations (Portero, 2002: 214, 221; Viñas, 2002: 245; see also 3.2.2.1). International recognition of the Franco regime delivers the final blow to the claims of legitimacy of the already internally divided Republican government in exile (see Faber, 2002: 57-58; see also Balfour, 2000: 278).

Several events would have a considerable impact in the final years of the regime. In relation to the economy, despite constant anti-Marxist propaganda, the question “is Spain a society of mass consumption?” is already being asked in 1966, since the socio-economic features of Spanish society of that time do not match the rhetoric of the dictatorial regime it is subjected to (see Equipo Reseña, 1997: 154). As regards religion, in 1969, Pope Paul VI appoints the liberal Enrique Tarancón as Cardinal Primate. As a result, as indicated above, the Church undergoes a profound transformation, becoming a shelter for the opposition to the regime. So much so that in 1971, an assembly of bishops and priests issues a letter preaching reconciliation and begging for the forgiveness of the Spanish people for its role during the Civil War, paving the way for the bishops’s vote in 1973 in favour of formal separation from the state, as well as the abandonment of their political role (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 154). Politically, the fall of the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships in 1974 mark Spain as the last authoritarian regime in Western Europe.
(Powell, 1990: 254). Furthermore, they demonstrate the fragility of regimes previously considered to be impregnable (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 157). With Franco’s death in 1975, the peaceful process of Transition into a democratic society is set in motion. This process crucially involves a general political amnesty (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 162) and a silent agreement for political amnesia widely known as Pacto del Olvido (see Vilarós, 1998: 9-12). As Vilarós explains, “la política de reforma de aquellos años, ratificada en diciembre de 1976 en un referéndum político que recogió el 94,2% de los votos emitidos, fue claramente una política de borradura, de no cuestionamiento del pasado” (1998: 9). The culmination of this process can be observed in the advent of democracy (1976) and the Constitution of 1978 (Jordan, 2002: 53).

However, this seemingly smooth Transition does not shelter most members of society from the disorienting changes that took place after Franco’s death in 1975. An example of these can be found in the composition of the government; there are rapid political changes, but also some – perhaps disorienting – continuity, as is the case with a number Ministers and the king himself who, despite having served under Franco, soon adapt and become democratic politicians. In addition to these political changes, the advent of democracy and the new freedom it offers also mean rapid moral changes, both within and outside the realm of religion. There is a moral crisis on two levels. In order to understand the extent of this moral crisis, it is necessary, first, to acknowledge its historical roots. As indicated above, a deep sense of crisis is present in Spain since the nineteenth century and it is carried forward into the following century. There is a historic moral crisis that becomes evident when the loss of the remaining Spanish overseas colonies in 1898 proves that Spain can no longer be considered an empire (see 1.2). Furthermore, the two Spains can be considered as the expression of two attempts to provide a satisfactory solution to this crisis. As the victor of the Spanish Civil War, the Franco regime does its best to impose its own view on this issue: a united and homogenic Spain legitimised by the Francoist victory and by National Catholicism (Nash, 2000: 289). The asphyxiating limitations on individual and public freedom imposed by this dictatorial regime, as well as the artificiality of this marriage of convenience between Church and State make this regime model morally unsustainable and it results in the growing discontent and dissidence which become more visible towards the later stages of the regime. Consequently, the Transition and the young democracy tactfully look for conciliatory solutions. But it is not until very recently, with the recognition of the role that memory plays in the process of reconstructing history, but also in shaping the present, that this issue of national and moral identity is starting to be adequately

It must be noted that the characteristics and, even, the duration of the Transition are the subject of much debate (for a contemporary analysis see Collier, 1999: 97-119; Ferrán, 2000: 191-94).
addressed. It must be stressed that another reason why the regime had limited success in instilling their moral values is that, as Balfour observes, “social and economic change both stimulated and was accompanied by a revolution in values” (2000: 277; see also 283). This revolution is not without disorientation or confusion, for the rapid changes that take place during the *apertura* years of the regime bring about a moral crisis, perhaps individual in nature, although of social proportions, since these newly acquired values conflict with those defended by the regime (Carr, 1980: 30; Lannon, 1987: 50, 53). A similar phenomenon takes place during the Transition, when the political and moral freedom which citizens can now exercise conflicts with the learnt values and behaviours of their recent past.

There is disorientation and there is also disillusionment. The boom of the counter-culture during the last phase of the Franco regime strongly contrasts with the subsequent disenchantment that comes about with the advent of democracy (see Mainer, 1988: 15, 23). According to Vilarós, “desencanto, como bien sabemos, es el término aplicado al peculiar efecto politico-cultural causado en España más que por la transición a un régimen democrático-liberal, por el mismo hecho del fin de la dictadura franquista. Fue la película de Jaime Chávarri, *El desencanto* (1976), la que le dio al término carta de naturaleza” (1998: 23; see also Díaz, 1995: 289 who claims that this *desencanto* is often misrepresented). Undoubtedly, this disenchantment and disorientation are produced when the long-established attitude of “being against” ceases to be a meaningful practice, but they are also the result of the difficult materialization, or disappearance altogether, of many of the hopes and expectations so dearly embraced by those who opposed the regime and longed for democracy. Aranguren is well-aware of this process and of its moral repercussions which is one of the reasons why he takes upon himself the task of the moralist, he embodies in the figure of the intellectual, as we shall see in Chapter Three.

Aranguren and Aguirre both take an active interest in this process and maintain regular participation in public opinion through the publication of newspaper articles. In the case of Zambrano, although she also publishes a number of articles, the most remarkable effect democracy has on her – although not an immediate one – is her return to Spain (1984) and her recognition as the illustrious intellectual she is.

### 2.3 Reception and Cultural Hegemony

From the start, Zambrano and, progressively, also Aranguren and Aguirre all share a defiant political stance which seems to arise from their spiritual beliefs. These positions are

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41 The dictatorship exercises control over the dissemination of information, and even over the portrayal of history. In addition, the voluntary political amnesia which takes place during Transition and the reinstitution of democracy for the sake of peace and stability also obscures or misrepresents many aspects of Spain’s recent past, which are being questioned only recently (see Espinosa, 2006: 136, 159-69, 171-92, 196-204).
strongly reflected in their writings, but what is their impact and reach? As Faber explains, “even though the regime is obsessed with dominating all forms of cultural expression, it is clear that, with the exception of the years immediately following the Civil War, Francoism never really succeeded in wielding full cultural hegemony” (Faber, 2002: 37; for an analysis of hegemony see Gramsci, 1999: 277; also Faber, 2002: 31-33). Nonetheless, it does try to impose its hegemony indirectly through illiteracy and directly through censorship, the control of cultural expressions and public discourse (see Chulia, 2001: 25 on the suppression of the freedom of expression with the rise of Franco to power).  

The struggle for cultural hegemony is inevitably linked to cultural policy, which at the same time is dictated by political interests. In order to illustrate this relationship, and in order to understand better the regime’s cultural policy, we shall go back to the time of the Second Republic so that the roots and development of the regime’s positions in these matters can be observed.

2.3.1 Education

The illiteracy rate in 1930 is estimated to have been somewhere between 30 and 40 percent (Jordan, 2002: 131; Shubert, 1990: 37; Greaves, 1938: 25). In response to this situation, there are various initiatives amongst the Republicans to spread culture throughout Spain, although not without controversy; bread and tools to work seemed more urgent (see Faber, 2002: 78). This can be observed in the misiones pedagógicas, which are created in 1931 as a project which, although criticized for its paternalist and utopian attitude, still brings libraries, lectures, films, and plays to the remotest rural areas (see Faber, 2002: 77). The Republican government sets out to combat the high illiteracy levels by creating new schools:

\[\text{siete mil nuevas escuelas [fueron creadas] durante el primer bienio [de la República] y, a pesar del proceso de involución, dos mil más durante el bienio de las derechas. De 1931 a 1936 se crearon 13.850 plazas y 3.400 más entre 1934 y 1935 (Claret Miranda, 2006: 9).}\]

42 In addition to the above, their use of a deficient language and an equally deficient rationality must also be considered part of the effort of the regime to gain hegemony, but also legitimacy (see Gracia, 2004: 387).

43 Understanding the complexity of the word “culture” is crucial, although discussing it is beyond the scope of this research (for such a discussion see Eagleton, 2000: 1-31; see also Faber, 2002: 35, 37, 40, 65, 73, 82-86; Balibrea, 2005: 2). Suffice to say that when used in the present context it is in relation to high culture – books, journals, and art –, but also mass culture – radio, television, cinema –, as well as cultural practices in general.

44 In contrast, “en el período republicano, las fuerzas del Antiguo Régimen, base social del Alzamiento Militar, habían mostrado, tanto desde el poder como desde la oposición, clara animadversión al desarrollo científico y cultural y muy particularmente a los proyectos de reforma educativa” (Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 221-22). Their policy is to oppose any attempts to secularize education. It is in this sense that Claret Miranda mentions below a period of involución.
This marked interest and heavy investment in education, as well as the awareness of the impact that education may have on politics, leads to this effort being branded as “guerra escolar”. As Jaume Claret Miranda explains, this belligerent attitude towards education has serious consequences:

La ‘guerra escolar’ facilitó la articulación durante la Segunda República de un discurso de creciente violencia verbal contra profesores e intelectuales que, a partir del 18 de julio de 1936, con el fracaso del golpe de estado y el inicio de la guerra civil, se transformó en violencia explícita. Se acusaba a la intelectualidad española de haber introducido ideologías extranjeras desde cátedras y ateneos en detrimento de las esencias patrias, para acabar llevando al país a la decadencia a través de la instauración del régimen republicano (2006: 23).

Nevertheless, the accusation that educators have Republican loyalties seems to be based more on the efforts of the Republican government in fostering education, particularly primary education, and on the threat that falangists perceive – and voice – from it than in an accurate reflection of the educators’s affiliations (Claret Miranda, 2006: 10, 25). As Claret Miranda explains in reference to their political sympathies, “en realidad, el colectivo docente reproducía la diversidad también existente en la sociedad española” (2006: 25).

The educational effort of the Republicans intensifies during the first years of the Civil War. As Rafael Abella explains, “la incautación de todos los grandes colegios regentados por las órdenes religiosas significó el acceso de una infancia postergada a instalaciones que hasta julio de 1936 habían sido coto de unas clases privilegiadas” (1975: 285). Moreover, many unoccupied houses are transformed into schools. Regarding higher education, during the year 1937-1938 alone over four thousand grants are awarded (Abella, 1975: 294). The Republic is also concerned with adult illiteracy, and in January 1937, in an effort to combat it, creates the Milicias de la Cultura, which teaches basic reading and writing skills to voluntary military recruits and combatants (Abella, 1975: 286-87). The faith and hope deposited in culture are such that, in spite of the difficult and dangerous circumstances of war, the Congreso Internacional de Escritores para la Defensa de la Cultura is celebrated in Valencia in 1937 (Abella, 1975: 316). However, this eagerness also means that the boundaries between culture and propaganda are often blurred.

During the Civil War, “‘culture’, or more precisely ‘the defence of culture’, becomes the common cause in the name of which antifascist intellectuals of all different political backgrounds are able to unite” (see Faber, 2002: 73). Pío Moa affirms that “entre los intelectuales españoles hubo equilibrio, y no responde a la realidad el tópico de que casi todos los escritores y artistas defendieron la ‘república’” (2001: 347). However, most historians agree that, at least initially, the Republic received the support of the majority of Spanish intellectuals and artists. As de Meneses explains:

successive intellectuals’ manifestos made this support clear, even if some of the early signatories preferred to leave Spain quietly and quickly. The murder of the poet and playwright Federico García
Lorca in the very first days of the war by Nationalist forces galvanized Spanish intellectuals, who identified the Nationalists as enemies of culture (2001: 144).

Gracia also voices this view: “al principio, por tanto, los nombres mayores de la vida intelectual se mantuvieron leales a la República. [...] El entorno reaccionario, en cambio, estaba muy huérfano de patrones intelectuales de primera fila” (Gracia, 2004: 50). Picasso, Antonio Machado, Casals, Alberti, León Felipe, Buñuel, Miguel Hermández, Max Aub, Bergamin, Corpus Barga, Sender, Barea, and, of course, Zambrano, are amongst the Spanish intellectuals who support the Republic (see Moa, 2001: 347; see also de Meneses, 2001: 144-45). Numerous renowned intellectuals from abroad also offer their support to the Republic. As de Meneses puts it, “the supreme example of these intellectual concerns was the Second International Writers’s Congress for the Defence of Culture, held in Spain in 1937. [...] The message of solidarity for Spanish intellectuals and the Republican war effort in general was potent” (2001: 145). Some of the best-known intellectuals who express their support for the Republic include Ernest Hemingway, André Malraux, Arthur Koestler, Joris Ivens, César Vallejo, Egon Kisch, Pablo Neruda, and George Orwell, whose support contributes to a certain romantic image of the Spanish Civil War (see Faber, 2002: 15, 79; see also de Meneses, 2001: 145). Such romanticism can also be observed in Marcuse, who says that “the last time that freedom, solidarity, and humanity were the goals of a revolutionary struggle was on the battlefields of the Spanish civil war” (1968: xv). In contrast, Gracia questions the intellectual support received by Nationalists. He says that “el único respaldo profundo y auténtico era intelectualmente menor: procedía de las camadas de fascistas joseantonianos de los años treinta, y del grueso del tradicionalismo reaccionario de Acción Española (Maetzu, Luca de Tena...)” (Gracia, 2004: 51). The names of Baroja, Azorín, Marañón, and Pérez de Ayala should also be added to this list, because, as Gracia explains, after leaving Spain in 1937, they are engaged with war propaganda on the Nationalist side (see Gracia, 2004: 51-53). There are also some renowned supporters from abroad, such as Paul Claudel and Igor Stravinski (see Gracia, 2004: 50-51).

Both Republicans and Nationalists strongly believe in cultural nationalism. However, despite Nationalists’s belief in cultural nationalism and their defence of culture understood as identity, culture as knowledge and thought is perceived as a threat. The reasons for this are that, on the one hand, the concept of culture is soon equated with left-wing thought and, on the other, because the empowerment that knowledge may confer makes it dangerous for them. As a result, Nationalists seek cultural hegemony. Very much aware of the political power of education, in September 1938, the first Francoist

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45 Cultural nationalism is an idea originating in German Romanticism which claims that a nation’s essence emanates from the idiosyncrasies of its geographical location and its cultural-historical heritage (see Faber, 2002: 40).
government approves a law for the reform of secondary education (Claret Miranda, 2006: 29). As Claret Miranda points out, the reason behind their concern lies in their belief that it is in secondary education where the ruling classes are formed; therefore, shaping them according to Francoist principles was a priority (2006: 30).

Despite the efforts of the Republic, at the end of the Civil War, Spain still is a country with low levels of schooling, high levels of illiteracy, and insufficient educational infrastructure (Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 221). Jordi Mones i Pujol-Busquets argues that

ten esencia, las fuerzas sociales que recobraban el poder en 1939, concebían la enseñanza como un mecanismo que coadyuvara a mantener la población del Estado español en un estado de semi-hipnosis cultural. Esta política sería tanto más sensible cuanto más abandonada estuviera la enseñanza pública. [...] Parten de la base [sic] que la ignorancia del pueblo es una condición esencial para prevenir todo intento de cambio en la estructura económico-social (1977: 222).

This statement, however, needs to be clarified. It is true that illiteracy contributes to the regime’s endeavour to impose its cultural hegemony, for as Jordan explains, “the regime had no desire to promote reading since readers tend to have inquiring minds and may well criticize or oppose official views” (Jordan, 2002: 188). Nevertheless, and although active efforts to promote and expand access to education are not made by the regime until the 1960s, whatever education there is, is used for the political purposes of the regime46. That is why Mones i Pujol-Busquets later states that “a la escuela tradicional políticamente burocrática, socialmente clasista, ideológicamente conservadora, y metodológicamente uniformista, se le sumaba una politización llevada a extremos insospechados, basada en las nuevas doctrinas de los países del Eje” (1977: 223).

In 1945, the Ley de Enseñanza Primaria confirms that primary education should conform to the ideological and political principles of the regime and grants educational privileges to the Church (Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 225): “A cambio de su apoyo, la Iglesia se aseguró rápidamente el dominio ideológico y, sobre todo, el control de la política educativa” (Claret Miranda, 2006: 28). This law, however, does not mean substantive changes in the direction of education, which was already conforming largely to these principles since the end of the Civil War. It is not until the 1960s that some movements of educational reformation, such as the Basque ikastolas, are allowed to develop (Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 233).

Using education as a political instrument leads to the clear separation between education and culture. This can be observed in the distrust of the regime towards educators,

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46 It is not until 1960 that the illiteracy rate drops to some 15 percent, still a high rate. From 1963, literacy campaigns are progressively launched, so that by 1993 – well after the introduction of democracy – illiteracy is reduced to 3.5 percent, being largely confined to those over 45 years of age (for further details on illiteracy see Rodgers, 1999: 304; Jordan, 2002: 131; Aldcroft, 1996: 3).
whose loyalty to the regime has to be confirmed before they are allowed to teach (Claret Miranda, 2006: 27). Educators, researches, as well as research and teaching material are all under scrutiny and consequently purged by the regime, particularly at the beginning (see Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 223).

The Church is heavily involved in teaching and in cultural life, an example of which can be found in the considerable presence of the Opus Dei in Spanish universities (see Equipo Reseña, 1997:145-147; Iglesias, 2000; Jordan, 2002: 159; Lannon, 1987: 221-22). The result is a return of a scholastic style and the focus of education on the production of technicians who are needed by the global structure of capitalism (see Equipo Reseña, 1997: 145-47). As Lannon explains, “the Church found itself given a position of ideological hegemony, untroubled by its erstwhile enemies […]. These enemies had been killed, imprisoned, forced into exile, or effectively silenced” (1995: 276).

2.3.2 Censorship

As pointed out above, the high levels of illiteracy prevent a large portion of the population from accessing reading materials. Getting hold of these materials also presents a problem: also, under Franquism, in a censorship context, the market for reading matter of all kinds is initially purged of ‘anti-Spain’ elements, distorted by official controls and is highly restrictive in the choice and availability of material (Jordan, 2002: 188).

This means that an important number of titles deemed pernicious or not suitable, particularly foreign books, are destroyed or locked away47. Libraries and learning are often considered as left-wing propaganda (Jordan, 2002: 129). Public libraries do not enjoy the support of the regime, at the same time as the production of new material and the delivery of education are also closely controlled, making for largely stifled University classrooms which are reminiscent of the scholastic style, as indicated above (see Jordan, 2002: 129; see also Mones i Pujol-Busquets, 1977: 224). The voices of intellectuals in exile are virtually shut out until the early 1950s when there is a “hesitant beginning of a dialogue between dissident intellectuals in Spain and their colleagues in exile” (Faber, 2002: 37). Aranguren’s article “La evolución espiritual de los intelectuales españoles en la emigración” (1953) plays a vital role in starting this dialogue (see Diaz, 1983: 71-72, 75; see also 2004: 504; Gracia, 1996: 17; 2004: 158, 258)48. As Diaz explains,

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47 Paradoxically, some of the books confiscated have ended up in the National Library, thus ensuring their survival (Jordan, 2002: 129).

48 Aranguren himself explains how, as a result of this article, he befriends or becomes closer to several Spanish intellectuals in exile, including Zambrano: “a partir de aquel artículo, anudé o estreché una relación de muy afectuosa amistad con José Ferrater Mora, Juan Marichal, Antonio Sánchez Barbudo, Francisco Ayala, Max Aub, María Zambrano, Guillermo de Torre, [sic] Claudio Guillén” (1994, 6: 196).
Aranguren habla objetiva y elogiosamente en su trabajo (era uno de los primeros que lo hacía), [...] informando a los lectores españoles de la obra de nuestros exiliados en América. Insistirá de modo muy especial en el profundo y sincero amor de esos hombres hacia España, faceta ésta que, desgraciadamente, en modo alguno resultaba obvio recordar y poner de manifiesto ante los españoles del interior en aquellos momentos (1983: 71).

Although this communication continues uninterruptedly from this point onwards, it still remains true that the reach and, indeed, effect of such communication is limited, as is made evident by the fact that many exiled intellectuals and their contributions remain largely unknown until a much later date (Díaz, 1983: 72).

Meanwhile, writers in Spain, forced to work within the constraints of the regime, often develop alternative ways of expression while readers cultivate the art of reading between the lines (Jordan, 1990: ix). Censorship, however, is inconsistent; although established by the draconian Press Law of 1938, there are no clear guidelines to define which contents are allowed and which are not, reliance being placed to a great extent on the subjective opinions of the censors (see Jordan, 2002: 44). On the one hand, this subjective factor offers some leeway. On the other, this lack of clarity also contributes to enhancing insecurity, instability, and, ultimately, fear. Although this inconsistent censorship seems to be due more to lack of organization and the different interests of the people and institutions involved in the censoring process rather than being the result of a carefully developed strategy, the results, nonetheless, still echo Bentham’s Panopticon – a prison built in such a way that prisoners could be observed at any time without the prisoners being able to determine at any one point whether they are being observed or not (Bentham, 1995: 29-95). Thus, although authority and repression are not continuously imposed in an active way, their power rests rather on its possibility; if clear rules exist one can attempt to work outside their scope, but when instead of rules, control is exercised by the constant possibility of punishment for indeterminate reasons, then rules and boundaries are self-imposed, so that censorship results in self-censorship, which becomes even more relevant with the 1966 Press Law, as we shall see below.

Bearing this in mind, it must be highlighted that censorship also depends upon factors of an economic and political nature; on the one hand, the regime is trying to gain acceptance, both at home and abroad, particularly between the years 1945 (marking the beginning of a period of international isolation) and 1952 with the entrance of Spain into UNESCO (see Díaz, 2004: 499-503; see also Rodgers, 1999: 98); on the other hand, some of the restrictions of the dictatorship become partially lifted from the 1950s onwards, due to the pact with the US, one of whose side-effects is that American culture becomes fashionable (see Jordan, 2002: 243). A piercing satire of Spain’s unequal relationship with the USA is provided by Luis García Berlanga and Juan Antonio Bardem in Bienvenido Mister Marshall (1952). Both of these factors lead to the 1966 Press Law introduced by
Fraga; “prior censorship is abolished, but the authorities could still suppress or confiscate material after publication. This measure, though presented at the time as an important step towards liberalization, does little more than replace censorship by bureaucrats with self-censorship” (Rodgers, 1999: 98; see also Romero Salvadó, 1999: 155). Castellet’s reflection must also be taken into account:

Si con los años se suavizaron, en el terreno cultural, algunas de esas actitudes, no fue por inteligencia o permisividad del Régimen, sino por la debilidad o el vacío ideológico de sus planteadimientos culturales, frente a un cuerpo social que se iba recomponiendo lentamente y que, en consecuencia, recuperaba una parte –pero sólo una parte– del terreno perdido (1977: 14).

In any case, censorship is typically harsher on those forms of expression which reach the wider public, press and cinema in particular (Rodgers, 1999: 98). In the case of Aranguren, this means that because the readership of his early books and journals is mainly limited to the academic arena, he is not initially under the attentive eye of the censors quite so much as those who produce films or newspapers. However, he is subjected to attacks from within the Church, such as the one by Torrens (1956), insofar as he exercises a moderate self-criticism of Catholicism (see Aranguren, 1994: 1, 540; see also Blázquez, 1994a: 1, 15-16). Eventually, Aranguren becomes a regular contributor to Spanish newspapers: La Vanguardia (1970) and El País (1976). However, by the time that Aranguren’s mass divulgence of his thought may have been considered to have become potentially dangerous for the regime’s efforts to gain cultural hegemony, the dynamics of censorship had already changed. The 1966 Press Law and the eagerness of the regime for international acceptance would lead to the dictablanda, allowing for wider scope of expression49. This proves to be a successful strategy for the regime; by allowing some degree of dissidence to be voiced, the regime hopes to gain a wider degree of international acceptance and to promote a misleading national sense of relative freedom and Europeanization. Thus, this dissidence is assimilated by the regime, effectively rendering it innocuous.

Aranguren’s presence in the newspapers is of great significance, because, as Alexis Grohmann explains, the Spanish press plays a momentous political role during the Transition; in the absence of political parties, the newspapers, by initiating a political debate, create a point of reference at the same time as they inform the public (2006: 15). Aranguren himself is aware of the political role of newspapers, which confirms the intentionality of his contributions (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 496).

The end of the regime results in a proliferation of articles, books, and films, which lead to the cultural explosion of the 1980s. For Aranguren, it means that, not only can he

49 Although the term is used mostly in the context of Primo de Rivera’s regime, it is also applicable to the later years of Francoism, when – in an effort to gain international approval – repression arguably softens and becomes more inconsistent (see Alexander, 2002: 107; Collier, 1999: 106).
write in a bolder manner about socio-political issues – by then the main focus of his work – but also that these works enjoy a considerable readership, fuelled by Aranguren’s significant popularity. Having said that, it must be borne in mind that during the 1980s and even until the present day, the levels of readership in Spain are low by European standards (Jordan, 2002: 130, 177, 188; Stanton, 2002: 92)\(^5\).

Regarding Zambrano, it is important to bear in mind that, as Gracia puts it, “María Zambrano no dejó de ensayar en 1938” (1996: 65)\(^5\). However, due to the circumstances, many of her manuscripts are not published until the latter stages of her life and others are published posthumously.

Despite the publication of *Les Philosophes espagnols d’hier et d’aujourd’hui* by Alain Guy (1956), in which he highlights the importance of Zambrano, her work was largely overlooked. It is not until 1981, when she is awarded the *Premio Príncipe de Asturias*, that public attention is drawn to Zambrano’s work and worth (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 8, 35-36). Since then, she has been the object of an array of publications, particularly so recently, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of her birth. In spite of this recent popularity, little has been done to unravel and explore the political content of her thought beyond her early work. Aranguren has speculated on the different reasons why Zambrano’s thought may have been initially ignored or overlooked; he concludes that her being a heterodox disciple of Ortega, her exile, and her not having held a chair in a University are all factors which may have contributed to this (1983: 128-29). Her gender, however, should also be considered as one of the key factors which has contributed to her thought having been overlooked for so long, as well as for the later keen rediscovery of her work and persona.

Hence, although after her exile the mechanisms of censorship of the Franco regime do not affect her writing, other more subtle mechanisms of cultural hegemony, and her own personal circumstances, limit not so much her production as her publication (see Faber, 2002: ix). As a result of her status as an exile, access to her work and to that of the exiles in general is extremely difficult for those who stay within Spain. As discussed above, dialogue with the exiles is not initiated until 1953, but even then, gaining access to their work is difficult and limited (see above for further details on Aranguren’s role in this process). In an effort to preserve and promote her thought and legacy, in 1987 the *Fundación María* ...

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\(^5\)“In the mid-1980s the government published a survey showing that more than half of all Spaniards had not read a single newspaper in their lives. The same was true of books” (Stanton, 2002: 92).

\(^5\)It is worth noting that Gracia’s use of the verb “ensayar” in this context makes reference to Zambrano’s persistence in writing, specifically in the genre of the essay, *ensayo*. At the same time, “ensayar” also translates into “rehearsing”, which is also a very appropriate connotation for Zambrano’s work, for it hints at its open-ended, unfinished character which will be discussed at length in chapter four.
Zambrano is established. As a result of the Fundación's work, her manuscripts and letters are being preserved and made available to researchers, and some previously unpublished material has now been edited and published. Because of this, some considerable gaps may be found between the publication date of some of Zambrano's work, and the time when they were actually written. This distance bears testimony to the complexities of her life and work and it should be taken into account when approaching her publications, for it constitutes yet one more challenge in the task of establishing and understanding the structure and progression of her work.

Aguirre presents a very different picture. His status as a priest provides him with certain privileges, whose boundaries he pushes on numerous occasions and in various inventive ways, as can be observed in this anecdote recounted by Savater:

en el año 68, en una de las grandes algaradas [...] se organizó un lío tremendo y entraron [los alborotadores] en la iglesia. [...] Uno, en un momento determinado, salió por la ventana con el crucifijo que había cogido de la pared y se lo tiró a los guardias. [De] Todo esto, la prensa franquista [decía] “¡oh, pecado! ¡tiran el crucifijo...!”. Y entonces salió Jesús [diciendo]: un crucifijo, es un objeto sagrado, que en un caso de apuro, pues puede ser simplemente un objeto más (2006).

Despite the limited amount of publications of his own during the Franco regime, his rebellious position towards the regime is visible in his sermons (collected in Sermones de España, 1971b), which include a number of progressive topics and positions. Such progressiveness is also present in his choice of titles for the translations published in Taurus when he is religious editor (1969), and even more so later when he becomes editor-in-chief. It is not until the end of the regime that he becomes a writer in his own right. He is not alone in doing so. In fact, the freedom of expression granted by the new-born democracy propitiates a proliferation of publications, particularly autobiographical and semi-autobiographical works such as José María Pemán’s Mis encuentros con Franco (1976), Pedro Lain Entralgo’s Descargo de conciencia (1930-1960) (1976), and Carmen Martín Gaite’s El cuarto de atrás (1978) (see also Sobejano, 2003: 172). The significance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that these writings not only constitute an exercise of a newfound freedom, but they also provide a new epistemological stand which challenges the authoritarian and unilateral epistemology encouraged and imposed by the regime. As Fredric Jameson explains in relation to postmodernist narrative fiction, questioning of absolute truths about the past allows the past to be detotalized and the illusion of objectivity and truth present in the “grand narratives” crumbles (1984: xii). Similarly, the deliberate introduction of subjectivity in the biographical discourse invites the reader to engage with the writer encouraging a bond between the two. At the same time, the text becomes infused

52 Although there are no direct sources which mention this date explicitly, by a process of deduction, all the available information regarding Aguirre’s biography points to 1969 as the date he becomes religious editor for Taurus.
with human-like characteristics. Truth becomes fragmentary; the perception of reality is necessarily limited and partial. These (semi-)autobiographical accounts adopt a shift of perspective which allows a re-evaluation of the past. In contrast, Aguirre’s autobiographical style is not used to shape his confessions or memoirs of his actions during the regime; his post-1975 writings focus on post-1975 events. As in the case of Aranguren, it is of great significance that many of these writings are first published as newspaper articles. In fact, Aguirre has a very strong presence in the press, as this article in El País points out: “vinculado a EL PAIS [sic] desde la aparición del periódico, perteneció al comité asesor de cultura del mismo hasta su nombramiento de director general [de música] y ha sido colaborador habitual en nuestras páginas” (n.a. 1978: n.p.). Ricardo Gullón confirms Aguirre’s involvement in this newspaper: “aparece el País, con signo liberal, Jesús Aguirre muda de oficio: el periodismo le atrae, escribe y hace escribir; sugiere temas, apunta posibilidades” (1989: 13).

Beside the political implications of his involvement with the press highlighted above, this presence in the press means that Aguirre establishes a close relationship with the public; his name, his contributions, and opinions become familiar, expected. He becomes a mediator; Aguirre engages in the socio-cultural and political debate, maintaining contact and discussions with cultural figures and politicians, contributing to shape the socio-cultural and political landscape of his time; Aguirre also maintains contact through the newspapers with the wider public, thus also contributing to shape their opinions and preferences.

2.3.3 Culture

Regarding the totalitarian nature of Francoism, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán concludes that persigue un control sistemático de la organización de la convivencia y de la conciencia social sobre esa organización. No se limita pues a ejercer una represión física (terror, control judicial, estructural) sino que trata de falsificar la identidad de los individuos y de las clases sociales para impedirles el punto de partida de la conciencia de sí mismo y la delimitación de la otredad (Vázquez Montalbán, 1977: 68).

As a result, culture is used as an instrument of legitimation and perpetuation of power, an instrument of domination (see Equipo Reseña, 1997: 145-46). Media and education are controlled by the regime’s ideologues. Popular culture exercises certain control on the masses by means of its potential for escapism (Jordan, 2002: 243; Aguilar Fernández, 2002: 50; see also 3.2.2.1). On the other hand, the media is instrumentalized to serve political

53 This article, published originally by El País on the occasion of Aguirre’s wedding to the Duquesa de Alba, is currently available on the internet, however, El País does not provide information regarding the author or the original page where this article was published in the printed version (for more details see bibliography). Please note that when this occurs in other instances in the thesis, it will simply be indicated by n.p. and more information will be available in the bibliography.
purposes. As Enrique Bustamante explains, “the dictatorship had imposed a primarily political function on the press, radio, and television” (1995: 356). In fact, the instrumentalization of the media is first exploited by Nazism and is common to authoritarian and fascist regimes, although, as we shall discuss in Chapter Three, is not necessarily limited to them (see also 1.3)54. As Vázquez Montalbán observes, “para conseguir estos efectos uniformadores, el fascismo recurre a sofisticados instrumentos represivos, los más sofisticados hasta entonces conocidos, valiéndose ante todo del apabullante control de los aparatos ideológicos” (1977: 69). He adds that, as a result, the only redoubt of freedom is initially individual thought, but even that is coerced and attacked by bugged phone lines, controlled correspondence, and torture (Vázquez Montalbán, 1977: 69).

As discussed above, the Francoist regime makes numerous efforts to obtain cultural hegemony which expand across a wide range of cultural practices and institutional intervention, from the purging of teachers and of textbooks at schools to political indoctrination by means of children’s toys, from censorship to torture to mention just a few (see Iglesias, 2000; Balfour, 2000: 267). Despite its many efforts, Francoism fails to impose an official culture (Castellet, 1977: 13). As Castellet explains, “los intentos de llenar de contenido teórico la actividad ‘cultural’ del Nuevo orden, se estrellaron sucesivamente por la inviabilidad de sus propuestas” (1977: 13). Thus, one of the central reasons it fails is the weakness of the theoretical construct these attempts stand on, which Vázquez Montalbán describes as “desfachatez teórica del poder” (1977: 73; see also Castellet, 1977: 13). Carlos

54 Most historians do not accept the existence of fascism in Spain (see Payne, 1997; Knight, 2003: 114). That is why this is a term which requires some discussion. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos is considered the ideological founder of Spanish fascism (Payne, 1995: 258; 1999: 54-65). He starts developing his ideas in relation to his extreme nationalism in the early 1930s, drawing his inspiration from Italian fascism, and although he concludes that it would be counterproductive for Spain simply to imitate the Italian model, he does reproduce in Spain many of the key characteristics of Italian fascism (Payne, 1995: 258; 1999: 54-65). As a result, Spanish Falangism, “though to some extent derivative from the Italian form, it became a kind of Catholic and culturally more traditionalist fascism that was more marginal” (Payne, 1995: 466). Stanley Payne provides a working definition of fascism, according to which it is “a form of revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth that is based on a primarily vitalist philosophy, is structured on extreme elitism, mass mobilization, and the Führerprinzip, positively values violence as end as well as means and tends to normalize war or the military virtues” (1995: 14). The Franco regime can be considered fascist only to the extent that it fits this definition and it must be borne in mind that it does not share many of the features present in Italian or German fascism, namely, their secular character, their expansionist and imperialist program, and the racist agenda, in the case of Germany (see Payne, 1995: 8, 11, 262-66). As Gracia explains, “Franco usó desde la misma guerra la toxina del terror que es el miedo, y dos herramientas políticas que supo combinar con eficiencia, Falange y el integrismo católico. Dotó al nuevo Estado de un fascismo distinto y particular [...]”. Falange encarnó desde 1933 la versión española de esos movimientos europeos [el fascismo alemán, portugués e italiano], aunque es un partido tardío” (2004: 41; see also Abellán, 1989b: 385-392). Bearing in mind the idiosyncrasies of the Franco regime, the word fascism will be used in relation to it only in as much as “generic fascism is an abstraction which never existed in pure empirical form but constitutes a conceptual device which serves to clarify the analysis of individual political phenomena” (Payne, 1995: 4).
París describes the thought it generated as “un pensamiento dirigido, organizado y programado desde sus áreas propias de poder […] concebido de espaldas a la historia, en absoluta extrañeza con la sensibilidad propia de los tiempos” (1977: 49; see also Castellet, 1977: 13). The apparent paradox of the failure of a Francoist cultural hegemony in the face of its continuous hold on power until the natural death of the dictator is explained by Castellet: “la única fuerza del mismo [del franquismo], desde sus orígenes hasta el final, no estuvo en la evolución de las ideas, sino en la capacidad de represión” (Castellet, 1977: 14).

All in all, this chapter has aimed to provide a background of the social, economic, political, and cultural atmosphere lived throughout the period here studied, so that it can be used as a referential platform from which to undertake a more analytical approach throughout the rest of the thesis. This chapter, through the analysis of Cruz’s research, has highlighted the importance of taking into account the role that cultural hegemony, discussed in the present chapter, but also habitus, play in allowing changes to the structures of power and thought to take place. For this reason, Chapter Three explores in detail the concept of habitus and its relationship to false consciousness. Both habitus and false consciousness will be recurrent concepts in the analysis of the work of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, as we shall see in the following chapters.

In addition, the following key aspects of the development of the argument of this thesis emerge from this contextualization: religion and spirituality, Marxism, education and culture, and censorship. First, the problematic situation of the Church in relation to the State, to its own followers, and, ultimately, to faith during the Francoist dictatorship, has been underscored and discussed. This situation has an important bearing not only on shaping the experience of religion, morality, and thought of Spanish citizens during the regime and well into the Transition, but also on Aranguren and Aguirre in particular. As shall be discussed in Chapters Three and Five respectively, initially religion and then spirituality play a pivotal role in the evolution and thought of these two authors, to the extent that their motivations seem to be rooted in no small part in their religious beliefs first, and, later, in their spiritual commitment. Spirituality is also an ever-present aspect of Zambrano’s thought, which can be observed in her premises as well as in her conclusions, increasingly gaining visibility towards the later stages of her thought, as we shall see in Chapter Four. Second, Marxism plays a prominent role politically, both in reference to international relationships during this time and to interest and controversy that Marxist theory arouses. The latter will be explored in detail in reference to Aranguren and Aguirre in Chapters Three and Five respectively. On the one hand, they engage themselves in this controversy with the purpose of promoting a debate between Christians and Marxists in Spain. On the other hand, it is of paramount importance to understand the position of Marxism in Spain during this time and the relationship of Aranguren and Aguirre to it, in
order to analyse their response towards neo-Marxist positions, that is, those of the FS. Although their positions in this matter will be discussed in Chapters Three and Five as indicated above, an evaluation of such positions and how their thought and Zambrano’s thought relates to CT will take place in Chapter Six. Third, the present chapter has discussed education and culture in order to elucidate the cultural background against which these authors develop their thought. In addition, these are also relevant in order to understand the context which contributes to shaping these author’s motivations to award education and culture such importance in their thought and in their proposals, as shall become apparent in the course of the following chapters. This is particularly clear in the case of Aguirre, who devotes most of his lives to the endeavour of cultural dissemination, be it by means of his translations and editions of other authors’s works or be it by means of his direct involvement in the promotion of the arts, as was the case in the later stages of his career, as we shall see in Chapter Five. Fourth, censorship plays an important role in the analysis of the work of any author who wrote under the constrains of the Franco regime. This is the case with Aranguren, since there are indications to conclude that in the early stages of his career, his choice of subject matter was influenced by his awareness of the restrictions placed upon public expression by the regime, as will be argued in Chapter Three. Similarly, the expansion of his focus of interest and of his medium of publication – from books to newspapers and even television appearances – as well as the increasingly critical tone of his work is linked, on the one hand, to his extended stays in the United States where he was not subjected to this type of censorship, and, on the other hand, to the changes in the Press Law in the sixties and to the abolition of censorship which followed the end of the dictatorship. The impact of censorship on the work of Aguirre is even more apparent. Aguirre practically limits his publications during the regime to translations and editions and these are mostly of a religious nature until the mid-sixties. As will be argued in Chapter Five, it is not until the Transition – when state censorship has been abolished – that he starts publishing manuscripts of his own.

Thus, as indicated in the introduction, the following chapters in the second part of this thesis will consist of an analysis of the work and thought of the three authors object of this research, so that their contributions, particularly their relation to spirituality, political thought, Heideggerian philosophy, and CT can be assessed.
Part II
3 The presence of Marcuse and neo-Marxism in Aranguren’s thought

3.1 Introduction

As indicated in the introduction, several reasons account for the choice of Aranguren as the first author to be studied in relation to neo-Marxism. First, he actively encourages and participates in the dialogue with Marxism. Second, not only does he discuss and comment on the work of the FS, but, more importantly, there are numerous neo-Marxist elements readily observable in his work, unlike the cases of Aguirre or Zambrano, whose work requires a greater degree of reconstruction and heuristic effort. Having said this, it is important to point out that, as it will become clear in the course of this chapter, Aranguren does not develop CT as comprehensively as Aguirre and Zambrano do, for his style is more direct and transparent than theirs. His relevance lies in that, influenced by the neo-Marxist critique of advanced capitalism offered by the FS, his later thought incorporates these critical elements, which he often applies to the specific socio-political situation in Spain, becoming an influential voice during the process of Transition (see Argullol, 2005: 21). Like the FS, Aranguren criticizes mass culture and the forms of cultural control and manipulation, and he establishes links between economic stability, capitalism, consumerism, political participation, and the possibility of freedom and true choice. Third, Aranguren’s initial position will allow his analysis to function as a preliminary link between Aguirre, his close friend, and Zambrano, whom he also meets and whose thought he expresses interest in and which becomes an object of reflection in his work on several occasions (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 589; 1994, 6: 128-129, 134, 196, 330). Moreover, Aranguren is the only one of these three authors who shows awareness of the work of the other two in his own work. In this sense, he is the one element where an explicit connection between them can be traced, for he often reports and comments on the work and significance of both Aguirre and Zambrano. Fourth, Aranguren’s position in relation to exile also makes him a suitable starting point, for he strives to establish communication between those intellectuals who stay in Spain and those of the España peregrina. Furthermore, although he does not belong to the Republican exile, his later emigration to the United States, although it must be carefully nuanced, does offer him a valuable experience of exile, while it widens his horizon of reflection, as will be discussed later in the chapter. Fifth, and finally, despite the debate that takes place shortly after his death

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55 Although the use of the word “horizon” in the figurative sense as the extent of concepts or ideas thinkable or imaginable by one person or group may sound like journalese today, it will, nonetheless, be used throughout this thesis with the meaning indicated above because this is the vocabulary used originally by Critical Theorists, particularly Marcuse, to designate this concept and it still remains an
questioning some of his motives and loyalties, as well as his quality as a thinker, the relevance of his thought for this research rests on the worth of his contribution, which is patent in his work, as well as on its impact (see 1.4). The public nature, length, number, and variety of people involved in the debate is evidence of the weight that Aranguren’s figure, if not thought, bears on his coeval Spanish society; his impact, although impossible to be accurately measured, makes the study of his person and thought necessary to shed some light onto the puzzle that is post-war Spain.

Thus, with the purpose of clarifying Aranguren’s political positions and his relationship to Marxism and neo-Marxism, the present chapter will explore his links and attitude towards the FS. Moreover, in an effort to elucidate Aranguren’s intentionality and to show the specificity of his approach, this chapter will also look into his background, biography, and the role that religion and spirituality play in his thought.

3.1.1 Influences

One of the key characteristics of Aranguren’s thought is his awareness and interest in a wide range of currents and authors, which reflect his supradisciplinarity, a central feature of CT (see Chapter One). In fact, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre share a polymathic range of interests which represents not the fragmentation of the post-modernist individual, but the acceptance of his multiplicity, which reveals a sense of unity driven by the perceived interconnectedness of reality, concepts which shall be explored in Chapter Four, devoted to Zambrano.

Aranguren’s frequent reviews, comments, and allusions to a vast array of authors are a testimony to the task of dissemination he takes upon himself by contextualizing, echoing, and evaluating their work. Amidst this variety of influences, those of Unamuno, Ortega, d’Ors, Heidegger, and the FS particularly stand out, as we shall see below (see 3.2.1.1)

Although Aranguren’s relationship to Unamuno’s thought regarding religion shall be explored below, suffice it to say at this point that there are some important coincidences between the two authors as Amando de Miguel points out: “con el de Salamanca, Aranguren mantiene muchos puntos de contacto, como el gusto por la paradoja, el placer de la etimología o la angustia religiosa” (1997: 25). It must be said, however, that although...
both cultivate these, their positions on these issues are different as we shall see in the course of this chapter (see also Soldevilla, 2004: 126).

As Aranguren explains, “se ha dicho que María Zambrano pertenece a la llamada generación del 36, yo mismo pertenezco también a esa generación, aunque un poco posterior a ella, y he tenido los mismos maestros que ella” (1983: 126; see also Pastor García, 2000: 670; Díaz, 1983: 93; 2004: 510; Gracia, 1996: 24). Thus, Aranguren is also a late member of the intellectual circle created around Ortega and his teachings known as the Escuela de Madrid (see Abellán, 1989b: 230-31)\(^7\). What is more, Abellán sees in Aranguren’s work an attempt to complete Ortega philosophy by linking it to Catholicism (1989: 256). Ortega’s influence is visible in Aranguren’s interest in German philosophy. It is also apparent in the perspectivist reminiscences present in Aranguren’s concept of talante, which emphasize the inextricable link between philosophy and biography (see 1994, 1: 218, 224-27; 1994, 2: 563, 606; 1994, 4: 149). Thus, he keeps coming back to the question of personal identity, which may be described as an almost subsidiary topic for him (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 25; 1994, 2: 563, 606; see also Pastor García, 2000: 665; Gracia, 1996: 161). As with Zambrano, Aranguren, following Ortega, views life as the unfolding and realization of a personal project. This is particularly visible in his treatment of the concept of vocation, for “la verdadera vocación nos remite, no a un proyecto cualquiera, sino al proyecto fundamental de nuestra existencia” (Bonete, 2003: 436). This unfolding, one’s \textit{ethos}, is formed in the process of confrontation with reality and the appropriation of some of the possibilities displayed before us (see Bonete, 2003: 437).

Eugenio d’Ors also has a considerable influence on the direction of Aranguren’s thought. As Gracia explains, what La filosofía de Eugenio d’Ors (1945) – Aranguren’s first published book – confirms is “esa conciencia de prolongación de un mismo mundo cultural y de imposibilidad de reanudar el camino \textit{ex novo}” (1996: 16). This is crucial for developing Aranguren’s supradisciplinarity and his interest in German culture in particular. As Bretz explains, “Eugenio d’Ors labours to reconcile admiration for German cultural contributions with opposition to German militarism and at the same time, to establish a link between Latin and Germanic cultures” (Bretz, 2001: 126). This early interest in German

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\(^7\) Strictly speaking, the Madrid School ceases to exist in 1936 as a consequence of the Civil War (Abellán, 1989: 15-16). Despite José Gaos’s leadership in Mexico, the main difficulty it faces in exile is the subsequent diaspora that takes place in Latin America (Abellán, 1989: 254). The Madrid School in the mainland, headed by Julián Marías, along with Lain Entralgo, Joaquin Ruiz-Jiménez, and Aranguren himself, also suffers considerable difficulties, mainly the weight of the dictatorship upon intellectual and University life (Abellán, 1989: 255). As a result of the emerging personal and theoretical divergences, Abellán ultimately concludes that after 1936 it would be more appropriate to refer to the philosophical tradition that originated with Ortega, instead of using the term Madrid School (1989: 257). In any case, the term the Madrid School will be used throughout this thesis more as a starting intellectual and meeting point than as a geographical one. Incidentally, a similarity can be found with the FS, whose emigration to the United States does not affect its name.
culture can be observed in Aranguren’s effort to understand and build a bridge between Catholic and Protestant religions, and the impact of these beliefs on their attitudes and behaviours, and, ultimately, on their wider cultural frameworks, as can be observed in *Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia* (1952) and in *El protestantismo y la moral* (1954) – originally his doctoral thesis. In an effort to move on from the French rationalist tradition, d’Ors considers German culture as a model for the Spanish one (see Bretz, 2001: 126). Unlike Ortega, who deposits many of his hopes on the possibilities of rationality and science, d’Ors highlights the impossibility of solely rationalist explanations to successfully and satisfactorily account for the complexities of life and the human experience: “defining life as movement and flux, d’Ors argues that no figure, formula, or rational conceptualization fully comprehends its complexity and dynamism” (Bretz, 2001: 127). D’Ors rejects all-encompassing rationalist explanations in favour of an open-ended dialectic approach. Relying on Nietzschean philosophy, he defends the significance of dynamic oppositions, at the same time as he envisages irony as the bridge between Germanic and Mediterranean cultures (see Bretz, 2001: 128). It is from this rejection of rationalism that Aranguren develops his own CT – as do Zambrano and Aguirre – by unmasking the reductionist and destructive content of formulaic solutions and highlighting the value of contradiction. Instead of irony, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre wager for faith not only to bridge the cultural gap, but, more importantly, as the cohesive ingredient for their utopian socio-personal project.

Influenced by d’Ors and Ortega, Aranguren engages – as does Zambrano also – with Heideggerian thought (see Díaz, 2004: 505). In his prologue to the collection of essays entitled *Heidegger: La voz de tiempos sombríos* (1991), Aranguren shows his awareness and interest in the debate around Heideggerian thought, as well as his interest in Hölderlin and Lévinas (1991: 9). It is no coincidence that Aranguren chooses to question Heidegger’s *Dasein*: “¿sigue siendo esto ética o es, más bien, poesía? ¿Sigue siendo esto ética o es, más bien, religión?” (1991: 9). These questions explicitly raise the issue of ethics – central to Aranguren’s work – and relate it to poetry and to religion, also suggesting links between the two. By establishing this connection, Aranguren reveals the subject of his own interests at the same time as he hints at the direction his answers take. Moreover, he shows that the main interests in his own thought are also directly related to Heidegger’s, indicating a close relationship between them.

The focus of the rest of this chapter, however, will be the FS’s influence on Aranguren’s thought.

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58 It must be noted that when Aranguren writes about religion, he means mostly Christianity: the analysis of different forms of Christianity and the contrast between Christianity and other non-religious attitudes towards life, such as Marxism (see Aranguren, 1952, 1954, 1968, 1982b).
3.1.1.1 Aranguren and the Frankfurt School

According to Aranguren, “hoy mismo seguimos moviéndonos en torno a los grandes problemas planteados por la Escuela” (1994, 4: 543). What is more, the issues first identified by the FS become Aranguren’s subject matter, as we will see in the course of this chapter. Hence, this section will address the question of what Aranguren’s relationship to the FS is and what its intellectual consequences are.

Aranguren is not only aware of the works of the FS and of the relevance of their critique, but he also expresses interest in its reception and impact in Spain. In La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975), Aranguren argues against the perception that there was a late reception of CT in Spain (1994, 4: 427). In fact, he concludes that access to the FS in Spain cannot be considered as having been restricted to his generation, because the **Institut** does not immediately acquire a real social existence (Aranguren, 1994, 4, 542). The first books published in Spain by one of the members of the FS, Adorno’s **Notas de literatura** and **Prismas; La crítica de la cultura y la sociedad**, both date from 1962. Considering that the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* first appears in 1932, their introduction in Spain in the early sixties may, indeed, seem late. Nonetheless, the changes in focus, location, and even members of the School account for what Aranguren considers a delayed social existence. It is from this perspective that Aranguren argues against the perception of the late introduction of the FS in Spain late. Far from a late reception, Fernando Savater indicates that translations of the works of the FS are available in Spain earlier than in other European countries such as France (2006). In any case, according to his own recollection, Aranguren is one of the first people to discuss the thought of a member of the School in a Spanish university; he discussed Adorno’s **Minima Moralia** in the context of a seminar on ethics in the early 1960’s (1994, 5: 544). Despite these efforts, the adoption of such utopian theories – those of the FS – does not properly take place until 1969-1975, a period during which, according to Díaz, they had very direct repercussions in the realm of political action (1983: 166)⁵⁹.

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⁵⁹ It must be highlighted, however, that as Marsal notes, “la relación entre las ideas, las superestructuras ideológicas –de las que son ‘funcionarios’ los intelectuales– y la estructura económico-social no es inmediata y directamente causal como la de otros grupos sociales, sino mediata y compleja. De ahí también la mayor elusividad del intelectual ante la presión del poder que no puede medir bien las consecuencias difusas de lo que el intelectual dice o escribe” (1979: 37). Nevertheless, as Diaz observes above, there are indications to suggest that the introduction of the thought of the FS in Spain has a socio-political impact not only because it is introduced on the verge of a time when crucial decisions of this nature are being taken, namely, the Transition, but also because of the important political connections maintained by the person chiefly responsible for introducing it, Aguirre, as we shall discuss in chapter five. In both cases, the nature of this impact lies in that these ideas contribute to expanding the horizon of possibilities of those individuals who embrace them, at a time when many feel that change is at hand. However, in the light of the difficulty in establishing a relationship of
Aranguren’s views on the FS are first published in a newspaper article entitled “Marxismo e imaginación” included in La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975) (1994, 4: 541-44). He later returns to this topic in order to explain the nature of the title: “el marxismo con imaginación –‘imaginación dialéctica’, buen lema de lo que la Escuela ha querido ser con su gran sensibilidad para el arte y la literatura– por nadie ha estado mejor representado que por ellos durante años” (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 589). Thus, he expresses his admiration for these aspects of the work of the School.

However, it would be contradictory for Aranguren, and it would also go against the very spirit of the FS, not to exercise his critical attitude; the Institut is no exception. Although, on the one hand, Aranguren recognises the importance and impact of their thought, on the other hand, he points to their source of income and questions its possible impact on their work, and finally concedes that “en cualquier caso, la Escuela de Francfort es una prueba más de la imposibilidad de la pureza absoluta. Siempre ‘usamos’ o ‘somos usados’ y, con frecuencia, ambas cosas a la vez” (1994, 4: 543). Nevertheless, there is conclusive evidence to support Aranguren’s interest in and gratitude towards the FS.

He praises their achievement for having created what he describes as the first independent, heterodox Marxist circle (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 543). He also highlights their merit in having identified and analysed the problems associated with neo-capitalist societies:

la conciencia de nuevas alienaciones, la de la cultura de masas –en principio, para la Escuela, la cultura popular que sus miembros vivieron en América–, así como la del consumismo (y tanto, o más, contra el ascetismo puritano), se la debemos a este grupo. Y tantas cosas más, entre las cuales es imprescindible citar, frente a la razón tecnológica o reducción de la razón a “razón instrumental”, su voluntad de distinguir entre la técnica y la praxis (Aranguren, 1994, 4: 544).

The new forms of alienation, mass culture, consumerism – all by-products of the reduction of reason to instrumental reason – become, in fact, some of the very topics to which Aranguren devotes his attention during the most socio-politically oriented phase of his career. Aranguren also applauds the attitude of the members of the Institut who, in his view, live out their theory as a form of praxis (see 1994, 4: 544). By doing so, Aranguren acknowledges not only the relevance of their thought, but, more crucially, the element of praxis implicit in the rationality they propound, which reveals the value that Aranguren himself ascribes to it (see Rush, 2004: 16, 27). We will now turn our attention to Aranguren’s connection to the individual members of the FS, which shall be explored below.

causality between intellectual ideas and their impact on the realm of social and political action, it must be stressed that more research needs to be done in this area, which falls beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.1.1.2 Benjamin

Benjamin’s heterodox position in reference to the School and the difficulties and harshness experienced throughout his life, as well as his death at the Spanish-French border, awakens Aranguren’s and Aguirre’s interest. In fact, Aranguren points to Aguirre as the person responsible for making Benjamin accessible to a Spanish readership (1994, 4: 474, 477; 1994, 5: 291, 319; see also 5.3.1 and appendix one).

Aranguren devotes three articles to Benjamin, “Actualidad de Walter Benjamin”, “Viajero sin equipaje”, and “Un alto en la lectura”. Here he discusses his position as the harbinger of the New Left, as well as his independent approach towards Marxism and his attitude and views so often ahead of his time on issues such as the green movement, his position on art, culture, and violence (see 1994, 4: 474-83; 1994, 5: 291). Benjamin becomes a point of reference for Aranguren’s views on art, particularly regarding the reception of mass art (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 76, 106). Aranguren admires Benjamin as a non-orthodox member of the FS who does not leave behind a system but instead a number of anticipations, of gestated thoughts which he does not fully develop (1994, 4: 482). In fact, Aranguren describes him as excomulgado and excomunicado. With these terms, Aranguren emphasizes his condition of outcast, that is, his heterodoxy within the FS and his subsequent isolation from it (1994, 4: 481-82, 595). Both words highlight the isolation and rejection suffered as a consequence of his dissent. Furthermore, excomulgado – a deliberately religious term – reminds the reader of the then ever present power and influence on Spain of the Church, thus establishing an analogy between Benjamin and the situation of the more independent Spanish thinkers. What is more, this situation closely relates to the concept of inner exile, which once again stresses isolation in its different forms: from the self, from other possible interlocutors, from the standard accepted culture and society, and, eventually, from the nation-state (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 426, 482, 596; 1994, 5: 127; see also Salabert, 1988; Caudet, 2005: 55). This inner exile provides an inner retreat which, in the case of Benjamin, the rest of the FS, and many Spanish thinkers of this period, eventually including Aranguren himself, is also extended to the outer world. Physical exile in one form or the other is an experience which marks the life and work of these authors, highlighting once again the close connection between them, as we shall see throughout the thesis.

3.1.1.3 Adorno and Horkheimer

Aranguren refers to Adorno, along with Marcuse, Gramsci, Korsch, Habermas, Ernst Bloch, Schaff, and Garaudy, as one of the Marxist thinkers of greatest interest of his time for tackling the moral issues of Marxism (1994, 3: 185, 203). There are multiple references to Adorno and Horkheimer scattered throughout Aranguren’s work making his awareness and
interest in their work clear. Aranguren acknowledges Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s pioneering role in denouncing the culture industry and the manipulation of consciousness, issues which Aranguren dwells on himself (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 220). He reviews The Authoritarian Personality (1950) by Adorno and concisely summarizes its conclusion: “una correlación biunívoca entre liberalismo e inteligencia, fanatismo y pobreza intelectual” (1994, 4: 439). Thus, through Adorno’s work, Aranguren makes an indirect reference to the impoverishment of Spanish thought as a consequence of dictatorship. Its relevance lies in that this realization is one of the key factors that account for the evolution of Aranguren’s position in reference to the regime.

3.1.1.4 Aranguren and Marcuse

As indicated above, there is sufficient evidence to assert Aranguren’s interest in the FS and their work. The case of Marcuse is of particular interest because there are numerous parallels at a biographical and theoretical level. Biography and subjectivity play key roles in Aranguren’s thought. He makes an explicit link between intellectual production and biography, to such an extent that biography and identity become an almost subsidiary theme in his work. According to Aranguren, one’s own works are partly a biography insofar as they constitute a testimony to the self at the time of production, and for this reason they are necessarily incomplete (see 1994, 1: 25; see also 1994, 2: 563). Based on this, our relationship with our past self is described as dialectic, because it is made up of the combination of distance and rapprochement, oblivion and memory, past and present, all at the same time (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 25). The link is such that it works both ways, for, as Aranguren explains, biography also becomes a text: “ahora bien, la vida es también un ‘texto’, texto legible, y la bibliografía inseparablemente unida en muchos de nosotros [...] a la (auto)-biografía” (1994, 4: 529; see also 570-71; 3.2.3 on talante; the key role of biography will continue to be discussed in relation to Zambrano, Aguirre, and the FS in the following chapters). Thus, a comparison between the two figures will be carried out below.

While providing an overview of their thought, the purpose of this comparison is to illustrate how Marcuse’s work strongly influences Aranguren’s and to uncover how their circumstances influence the direction of their work. In fact, there is a convergence in the interests, approach, and conclusions of both authors before they meet in the 1960s, and even more so after this date, when Aranguren deals with and develops many of the same issues to which Marcuse devotes his attention: a critique of consumerist society and the new forms of alienation it brings about (see Soldevilla, 2004: 135). Moreover, having established that one

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of the paradigmatic features of neo-Marxism is the correspondence between theory and praxis, it is essential to pay close attention to the relationship between Aranguren’s biography and his work – as well as Zambrano’s and Aguirre’s – so that it can be determined whether they are the expression of a holistic project, as is the case with Critical Theorists, particularly Marcuse (see Rush, 2004: 16, 27; see also Brunkhorst, 2004: 263).

3.1.1.4.1 Early life

Aranguren is born in 1909 in an increasingly tense socio-political climate which culminates in the Semana Trágica that same year. His family, who enjoys a comfortable financial situation, is of conservative tendencies. Consequently, Aranguren receives a traditional religious education. At the age of nine, he is sent to a Jesuit boarding school in Madrid and continues studying with the Jesuits until he leaves for University. Although this young Aranguren bears few traits of the critical political writer he would later become, the seeds for his strong religious convictions which would shape his entire existence have already been firmly planted as we shall see below (for further details of Aranguren’s biography see Pastor García, 2000: 665-76). Some eleven years earlier, in 1898, Marcuse is born in Berlin to a well-off Jewish family and raised during a period of economic prosperity. Marcuse, unlike Aranguren who often meditates on the role of his received religion, Catholicism, does not possess a special interest in further exploring and asserting his Jewish background (see Kellner, 1989: 80).

After finishing secondary school, Aranguren’s health deteriorates and University has to wait for one year, which he spends learning French in Angulème. When he finally attends University, he chooses to do his first degree in Law, which he finishes in 1931. In 1932, he decides to register at University again to study philosophy. During this time, during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930) and the Spanish Second Republic which follows, Aranguren is not particularly interested in the socio-political situation of the country, assuming a moderate position. Thus, it is hardly surprising that when in 1936 the Spanish Civil War breaks out, Aranguren does not manifest any special inclination for either side. However, when offered the chance to escape the conflict by going to France, he declines the offer (see Pastor García, 2000: 668). Although, a man of peace, initially more interested in books than politics, Aranguren is compelled by the circumstances to go to the front in Aragón, where he joins a regiment of artillery of the Nationals, serving as the driver of the vehicle of his battery (see Pastor García, 2000: 668).

61 In July 1909, workers’s protests in Barcelona escalate into anti-clerical riots which are suppressed by force, consequently being named the Tragic Week (see Payne, 1993: 12).

62 Later, in 1969, when looking retrospectively over his life in Memorias y esperanzas españolas, Aranguren explains that his decision to pass up the opportunity of becoming an alferez, second
suffer from tuberculosis, thus gaining military permission to go back home. Similarly, when the Great War breaks out in 1914, two weeks after Marcuse’s sixteenth birthday, Marcuse’s rather sheltered upbringing also contributes to the fact that he adopts a rather neutral attitude towards it. By the end of 1914, the Germans already suffer the material consequences of the war. In 1916, when there are little prospects of a military victory, Marcuse is summoned into the Imperial German Reichswehr and is consequently forced to conclude his Gymnasium studies. At this point – as with Aranguren – Marcuse also manifests health problems; due to his weak eyesight, he is assigned to a relatively safe position in Berlin, where he is even allowed to attend Berlin University on an irregular basis.

### 3.1.1.4.2 War as the catalyst for a socio-political awakening

The Great War, which lasts a total of four years, provokes a great deal of discontent. As Barry Katz explains, “it is in these circumstances that Herbert Marcuse, stationed in the political centre of the country, began to develop political consciousness” (1982: 26). Another decisive factor in awakening his political consciousness is the violence involved in war which evokes in him feelings of revulsion. This rejection of violence can also be observed in his early political behaviour. Marcuse joins the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1917, a time of crisis and fragmentation for German socialism. As Katz points out:

> he remained a Social Democrat until the end of the war, and although he never became a party activist, he recalled that it is at this time that he began to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the socialist opposition in the writings of Marx (1982: 28).

In 1918, in the face of the murders of the socialist Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, he withdraws from the SDP, showing his disgust towards such actions – a reaction similar to the one which prompts Blas Zambrano’s withdrawal from the socialist party (see Marcuse, 2005: 71; see also 4.2.1). It is then when Marcuse starts to study Marx, although retaining his political independence (see McCarthy, 1991: 86). Aranguren’s interest in Marxism, however, develops considerably later. As a result of his conservative background, the demonization of Marxism, and the restrictive intellectual climate instigated by Franco’s regime, Aranguren does not substantially engage with Marxism until the late 1960s. Indeed, his first publication on the subject is *El marxismo como moral* (1968). Although arguably late, he enters into a dialogue with Marxism which is crucial for
understanding his socio-economic positions and his later engagement with neo-Marxism, as we shall see below.

The experience of war also has a transforming effect on Aranguren, although initially not of a political nature. In 1938, Aranguren marries María del Pilar in San Sebastián, where both families, his and hers, are residing during the conflict. From this date, and until 1941, Aranguren leads a life of reclusion and study which shapes his intellectual personality. Although the war ends in 1939, the post-war climate, along with his own self-reflective tendencies, contributes to a phase of social isolation but of intellectual fruition.

After the war, in 1919, Marcuse studies Germanistik at the Humboldt University in Berlin. During this period, when he considers himself an existentialist, he becomes friends with some then promising young intellectuals, such as Walter Benjamin and Georg Lukács. He transfers to Freiburg, where he studies Philosophy and Political Economy. As in the case of Aranguren, Marcuse only becomes interested in philosophy after having already spent some time at University studying other subjects, thus providing the basis for the supradisciplinary perspective that is so fundamental to Critical Theorists and which also forms part of Aranguren’s approach. Marcuse obtains his PhD in 1922 and returns to Berlin at the end of this year. In 1924, he marries a former Mathematics student, Sophie. The next important influence on his life would be the publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), as a result of which he returns to Freiburg in 1928 to study philosophy with Heidegger himself (1928-1932) (see Marcuse, 1991: 29; see also Kellner, 2001b: 2-3).

In 1933, in Frankfurt, he joins the Institut für Sozialforschung, but in 1934, Hitler becomes both chancellor and president of Germany and declares the Nazi Party the only legal political party. In the face of these events, Marcuse feels forced to flee from Nazism. He and his family emigrate first to Zurich, then to Geneva, finally arriving in New York in 1934, where he settles and adopts American nationality. The encounter of the members of the Institut with National Socialism, however, marks the route of their research which largely focuses on cultural production (see Graham, 1995: 3). A similar interest is awakened in Aranguren, who, like other members of the opposition intellectuals, become highly critical towards any form of cultural manipulation (see Graham, 1995: 3).

Marcuse is initially interested in the integration of Marxism and existentialism, so as to revise the position of Marxism towards the problem of the individual from an existentialist perspective. Communication with Heidegger, however, breaks down as a result of the latter’s tolerance of – if not outright support for – Nazism and Marcuse distances himself from existentialism (see Wolin, 1991: 20). In fact, in 1947, Marcuse sends Heidegger a letter by which he hopes to extract from him a public apology or explanation regarding his relationship with the Nazi regime and ideology (see Marcuse, 1991: 28-29). In this letter, Marcuse explains how Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man cannot
be separated, for this would contradict Heidegger’s own philosophy (see Marcuse, 1991: 29; see also Wolin, 1991: 20). No such public statement is ever issued by Heidegger. With this gesture, not only does the lack of correspondence between Heidegger’s thought and praxis become visible, but the relevance that such correspondence has for Marcuse is underscored (see Aranguren, 1991: 7-8). Varcárcel bears testimony to the value that Aranguren also awards to such correspondence and his critique of the distance which exists between Heidegger’s life and thought. She recalls that as a result of her teasing Aranguren in relation to Heidegger’s thought, he answers: “todo eso es la teoría, pero lo importante es la vida” (Varcárcel, 1997: 45).

As a result, Marcuse’s relationship with Heidegger is broken off, which results in a change of direction for Marcuse. Consequently, Aranguren considers that Marcuse only truly forms part of the Institut once he distances himself from Heidegger (see 1994, 4: 542-43). The Institut’s work continues in the United States, although not without financial difficulties (see Wiggershaus, 1994: 261-65). As Katz explains, “the small salaries of Marcuse and Neumann could only be maintained in 1941-42 by virtue of an outside grant from the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars” (1982: 106). At the same time, the allocation of such funds confers upon the Institut a certain privileged situation in relation to other refugee scholars of the same period (see Katz, 1982: 106). Aranguren explains how the Institut functions in New York and Los Angeles, maintaining a critical distance from American culture thanks to its economic independence (1994, 4: 542). Aranguren, thus, concludes that they owe the United States the great reputation and recognition the School acquires (1994, 4: 542). As Kellner explains, one of the key features that distinguishes CT from other social theories is “their exile in the United States and ability to experience both the rise of fascism and the transition to a new stage of capitalism in the United States at first hand” (1989: 76-77; see also 82). This contrast, comparable to the one experienced by Aranguren between the different economic and political circumstances of Spain and the United States as we shall see below, plays a decisive role in his thought. They maintain their identity, instead of being absorbed by the new culture in which they are embedded. More importantly, they become keen observers and critics of both socio-economic and political systems, as we shall see below.

According to Aranguren’s own recollection, it is a consequence of his experience of the Civil War that his personal attitude and his view of politics change considerably (see 1994, 6: 184). Thus, a clear evolution in Aranguren’s position on politics can be observed. The nature of his interests clearly widens; whereas he is initially interested in religion, apparently not concerning himself with politics, his critical attitude eventually makes him consider politics to be at the very core of his interests.
In Memorias y esperanzas españolas (1969b), Aranguren recalls that “la primera autoliberación que hube de llevar a cabo lo fue del medio familiar y colegial, de la educación conformista y conservadora, estrecha de miras, de todo o casi todo lo que me había rodeado” (1994, 6: 183). This, he continues, takes place before going into secondary school under the guidance of his first maestro, Don Luis, whom he considers a nonconformist (see 1994, 6: 183). At this stage, he still describes himself as apolitical, mainly due to his own conformist nature and as a result of the profound respect he feels for his father. As a result of the impact that the Spanish Civil War has on Aranguren, and despite feeling very close to his father, he decides to allow himself to go beyond imitation or repetition of learnt behaviour. Aranguren describes this change in attitude as a segundo alumbramiento or rebirth, which results in a commitment to being himself, to independence (1994, 6: 184). As a result of these experiences and decisions, he turns to religion and his awareness of his political responsibilities begins to awaken.

Politics, however, constitutes a path that he will not pursue for two decades. In Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952) he says:

me ocupé de religión, no porque no se permitía hablar con la más mínima libertad de política, sino porque, al revés, la política nunca me ha importado, de verdad, sino desde el punto de vista ético, y que los temas últimamente capitales para mí son los sociales y morales, los culturales en general, los religiosos en particular, y muy poco los estrictamente –estrechamente– políticos. A cada uno lo suyo, y lo mío, ciertamente, felizmente también, no es la política (1994, 1: 213; see also 1994, 6: 108; Gracia, 1996: 24).

This initial position, however, is in clear contrast with his views as published in Ética y política (1963):

el hombre es constitutivamente político y lo único que consigue con la abstención es continuar siéndolo, sólo que deficientemente. En realidad el hombre apolítico, a su pesar, opera políticamente: bien “dejando hacer”, bien desde fuera, en un grupo de presión, sin asumir responsabilidad política (Aranguren, 1994, 3: 72).

He continues to make his point by emphasizing that “lo político, como lo moral, constituyen una estructura, que es previa a que el hombre, cada hombre, se decida a comportarse moral o políticamente” (1994, 3: 124). Upon this realization, politics necessarily become a continuous focus in his subsequent work. In fact, he considers the separation between the private and political spheres as unsustainable (see 1994, 3: 67). Depoliticization, rather than the refusal to immerse oneself in politics, is viewed as conformist acceptance of the established regime (1994, 5: 113). Thus, Aranguren criticizes political apathy because it undermines the very dynamics of democracy: participation and a certain political tension (1994, 3: 122). That is why politics occupy centre stage in Aranguren’s work, as we shall see in the course of this chapter.
Aranguren himself is aware of this progression in the focus of his work; that is why he retrospectively explains this apparent shift in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* (1969b). There, in reference to the 1940s, he says that

en el contexto de la época, la presión de una censura agobiante, hacía imposible asumir una ‘política’ también en sentido amplio, pues nunca he tenido, ni tengo, vocación político-profesional, ni tampoco mucha fe en la militancia –más o menos clandestina– en los partidos de la oposición, y mi crítica del sistema es intelectual, moral y sociológica (1994, 6: 197).

Although it is true that, partly due to a lack of personal inclination and partly due to the pressures of the regime, Aranguren does not actively engage in politics during his early career, moved by his understanding of the close relationship that exists between religion, morality, ethics, and politics – this relationship will be developed in 3.2.1.1 –, which are all linked by a common motivation for justice, Aranguren says:

La verdad es que yo... no he hecho sino ocuparme de política, aun cuando, por supuesto, sin entrar en su “juego”, porque no me va ese juego de la competición para ganar la apuesta que en él se disputa, el poder. Yo creo que los intelectuales tenemos poco que hacer en tal contienda (1979c: n.p.; see also Camps, 1997: 189).

In any case, it is from the publication of *Ética y política* (1963) onwards that he demonstrates an awareness of the impossibility of effectively extracting oneself from politics and, as a result, he engages henceforth with politics from an intellectual platform, for he never becomes involved with party politics. He stresses this distinction in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* (1969b):

[me interesa mucho la política] como engagement de convivencia, fundado en una moral social, ninguna otra cosa de tejas abajo me importa más que la política [...]. Y no me interesa nada la política como afán de participación en el apartado de poder a través de sus dispositivos. Dispositivos que, sin embargo, me entretiene analizar, como viejos, toscos artefactos totalmente inadecuados a nuestro tiempo... y que, extrañamente, siguen funcionando aunque, a mi juicio, no para bien” (1994, 6: 229).

This is, in fact, an understanding of politics shared also by Aguirre and Zambrano, who – consistently with their style – do not explicitly formulate it as Aranguren does. In *La democracia establecida* (1979b), Aranguren succinctly summarizes his position: “creo en el compromiso político total y eso, y no otra cosa, es lo que entiendo por democracia como moral, democracia como modo de ser” (1994, 5: 530; see also Camps, 1997: 183-85).

### 3.1.1.4.3 Marcuse’s and Aranguren’s career and thought

In spite of all efforts to the contrary, in December 1942, the financial difficulties and the general climate, due to the United States entering the Second World War, lead to the suspension of the Instituto’s activities. At this point, Marcuse leaves Santa Monica, California, where he had been residing for a short while to move to Washington and join the Bureau of Intelligence in order to apply his particular regional knowledge, linguistic
competence, and other valuable skills to the analysis of intelligence data. Although in 1948 he is made Chief of the Central European Branch, he becomes intellectually and politically isolated. Due to his wife’s poor health, however, he remains in the job until her death in 1951.

In 1945, and coinciding with the end of the Second World War, Aranguren comes out of his isolation and starts attending tertulias, thus coming into contact with various promising and prominent intellectuals. As indicated above, between the years 1945 and 1955, Aranguren’s efforts are directed mainly towards Catholicism (see Blázquez, 1994a, 1: 12; see Pastor García, 2000: 678). In fact, Aranguren’s work is marked by his writings on religion, which constitutes one of the threads running through all his work, providing it with a certain cohesion. In 1951, Aranguren obtains his doctoral degree and, in 1956, he becomes professor of Ética y Sociología at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. The regime’s search for legitimation leads to the appointment as lecturers and the – possibly premature – pre-eminence of some very young intellectuals, such as Pedro Laín Entralgo, Antonio Tovar, and Aranguren himself, in the hope that, coming from a conservative background and having studied in post-war Francoist Spain, they would contribute to such a legitimation (Gracia, 1996: 19). This conservative background, as well as the pressures of the regime, can be observed in Aranguren’s earlier work, which – despite the evolution of his thought – has often led to him being considered a conservative thinker (Jordan, 2002: 118). The most representative book of this period is, thus, Catolicismo, día tras día, which, although published in 1955, gathers a number of articles written between 1949 and 1953. His tone, however, progressively becomes more inquisitorial, critical, and, even, polemic (see Gracia, 1996: 14). The publication of Ética (1958), introduces the second stage in Aranguren’s work; it signals “la primera aportación de peso a la filosofía moral, no subordinada a la preceptiva católica” (Gracia, 1996: 24). His attitude regarding the relationship between religion and ethics is to a large extent Unamunian, for as Bonete explains, “la religión no es la base de toda moral, sino al revés, la moral […] (el hacer el bien y el proceso de llegar a ser bueno) es la base de la religión” (2003: 390). Good, not happiness, forms the basis for Aranguren’s moral philosophy and, although religion is not at its foundation, it is still an integral component. In La ética de Ortega (1958), his focus widens to include three very closely interrelated fields of study: ethics, politics, and morality.

During the 1960s, universities experience a period of unrest with an increasing number of student protests (see Jordan, 2002: 243; see also Gracia, 2004: 276-79, 330; Balfour, 2000: 285). Aranguren expresses the need to open up the intellectual sphere of the

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63 Although Aranguren graduates from law and philosophy before the Civil War breaks out, he does not obtain his doctoral degree until 1951 (see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 17).
university system in *El futuro de la Universidad* (1963). During this time, his classes and persona become quite popular amongst students due to the climate of intellectual freedom he maintains, in spite of the control, restrictions, and, indeed, censorship imposed by the regime. This popularity is one of the characteristics shared with Marcuse for largely the same reasons, the *praxis* of intellectual freedom. Students are interested in Aranguren’s “intento de comprensión del marxismo, su búsqueda de una alianza implícita entre las formas más progresistas del catolicismo hispano […] y hasta la seducción física experimentada ante los sucesivos movimientos alternativos de nuestros días (feminismo, contracultura, objeción de conciencia, insumisión, ecologismo)” (Gracia, 1996: 25). This stage culminates with *Ética y política* (1963), which marks a stronger preoccupation with political and social issues and establishes Marxism as his main interlocutor (see Díaz, 1983: 100; see also 1983: 51, 62-63, 65 where the political aspect of his work is emphasized). In fact, in the period from 1963 to 1965, Aranguren already engages with several typically neo-Marxist topics, such as consumerism and manipulation (see 1994, 2: 559; see also 1994, 3: 107, 109, 158-59, 165; 1994, 5: 69, 90-91, 167-68). Hence, his distance from the regime grows as he becomes more critical of it and more interested in socio-political issues. This becomes visible in his participation in the peaceful demonstration of 1965, alongside other professors and over 15,000 students (see Pastor García, 2000: 672). As a result of this participation, Aranguren is formally sanctioned and, six months later, deprived of his chair, as is also the case with Agustín García Calvo and Enrique Tierno Galván. At this point, Aranguren, like Marcuse, chooses exile. He leaves Spain and becomes a visiting professor in different countries: Scandinavia, France, Italy, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and, finally, the United States, where he is eventually given a tenured position at the University of California, until he retires as *emeritus* professor in 1977 (see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 19; see also Pastor García, 2000: 673-74).

As regards Marcuse, he leaves the Bureau of Intelligence and returns to academic life, lecturing at Columbia (1952-1953) and Harvard (1954-1955), having received a Rockefeller Foundation grant to study Soviet Marxism, although during this period he also focuses his interests and work on Freud. In 1958, Marcuse receives a tenured position at Brandeis University where he stays until 1965, when his contract is allowed to lapse due to

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64 De Miguel explains, in relation to Aranguren’s abilities as a lecturer throughout his career, that “era un mago de la mayéutica. Llevaba el auditorio donde él quería” (1997: 26).

65 Although, strictly speaking, it may seem more appropriate to use the word “emigration” in order to refer to Aranguren’s choice, because he still visits Spain with certain frequency. The word “exile” has been used to emphasize that, although it may be argued that Aranguren’s decision to leave Spain is motivated by his professional situation, it is also politically motivated; not only is he deprived of his chair, but, more crucially, he is no longer prepared to work under the regime or its constrains.
political considerations (see Katz, 1982: 169). Thus, not only is Marcuse initially threatened by the persecution of the Nazi regime which made exile vital, but he also suffers the consequences of his overt political and philosophical positions in a country which boasts a climate of political and intellectual openness and freedom, the country which is offering him asylum. In 1965, Marcuse accepts a position at the University of California at San Diego. It is during the 1960s when Marcuse becomes, if not the leader, the inspiration of the New Left, travelling extensively and giving lectures and advice to activist students (see Marcuse, 2005). As Kellner explains in *Illuminations*: “Marcuse achieved world renown as ‘the guru of the New Left’” (2001a: 45). Incidentally, in May 1968, Marcuse is invited to Paris to take part in a symposium on Marx and is consequently present during the May events, participating in numerous debates and lectures. As result of his radical stand and political involvement, he is charged with accusations, such as politicizing university students and corrupting the minds of the young (see Katz, 1982: 171, 174). It is at California University where Marcuse and Aranguren meet for the first time and sporadically thereafter, professing a mutual admiration for each other (see Felipe y Eduardo López-Aranguren, 1997: 49; see also Rodríguez Ibañez, 1997: 15; Pastor García, 2000: 673). Both Marcuse and Aranguren prove to be independent-minded and highly critical; as a result they enjoy great popularity with the students, but pay dearly personally and professionally. Nonetheless, Marcuse maintains his revolutionary attitude until his death in July 1979, as does Aranguren.

During this time, California is at the heart of counter-culture, whose most visible expressions are the protests against the Vietnam War, the hippie movement, and the New Left. These trends and events have a decisive impact on Aranguren, who reflects on these events and becomes a fierce critic of American society, as can be observed in the following quotation:

Y por si todo esto [los problemas que conlleva la sociedad de consumo] no fuera bastante para dar pábulo a la crítica radical, [también están] el escándalo moral de la injusta y atroz guerra del Vietnam, el de la violencia establecida y ejercitada cotidianamente desde el poder, el del mantenimiento por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de toda clase de dictaduras y oligarquías, el del despilfarro para la destrucción, el del creciente militarismo e imperialismo (1994, 5: 168; see also Camps, 1997: 188).

As a result of this impact, Aranguren focuses his attention on sociological issues, such as communication and political behaviour (see Pastor García, 2000: 674). In the United States, Aranguren has a first-hand experience of “la revuelta, o revolución según algunos, de la juventud universitaria norteamericana, que se había originado precisamente en California para extenderse luego por el resto de la nación e irradiar desde allí a Europa, es decir, Alemania, Italia y Francia […]” (1994, 1: 85). It is from this Californian experience onwards that Aranguren keeps Spanish readers up to date on the FS, the New Left, and

Marcuse and Aranguren support mobilisations and resistance as means of pressure on the government of those who choose to step away from the silent majority (see Marcuse, 1969b: 81, 109; Aranguren, 1994, 2: 667-68). They both agree on the need for popular participation and involvement in politics. Thus, they defend the need for an essentially different kind of education, one that allows the individual to achieve more satisfactory levels of communication and political engagement. One of the goals of this wider form of education is to encourage a critical attitude and independent thinking in all individuals, in such a way that, free from manipulation and false needs, and realizing the close relationship between personal and social ethics, the individual’s best interest will coincide with society’s. As Aranguren explains in *El buen talante*, if we were more rationally selfish, we would all strive for the maximum good for everyone, that is, peace (1994, 2: 669). This is very closely linked to the notion of false consciousness discussed later on in this chapter.

The FS, Marcuse in particular, is often criticized for attacking numerous aspects of society while being rather vague about how society should be organized or liberated, as discussed in the first chapter (see García de la Serrana, 2004: 205; see also Chambers, 2004: 219, 224). Aranguren is equally vague at times regarding who the agents of social change should be; he concludes that the key elements of that change should be a social morality, social action, and the recuperation of the value of resistance (Aranguren 1994, 2: 598, 667; 1994, 5: 226-27). It is the emphasis placed on the elements mentioned above that suggests that, for Aranguren, it is ultimately the individual who is responsible for striving for this qualitative change. The vagueness of both Marcuse and Aranguren lies in that no specific group is appointed as the agent of change, because this agent is society itself; the power of liberation is within each individual member of society (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 459; see also Marcuse, 2005: 78; Marcuse, 1970b: 69, 71; García de la Serrana, 2004: 196-199, 205-206, 209; 1.2.3).

Aranguren describes Marcuse as an example of an intellectual leader, as an example of a young spirit in an old body (1994, 3: 697; 1994, 5: 566). He sees Marcuse’s position as half way between political and cultural radicalism, but, above all, as essentially utopian (1994, 5: 199). Aranguren himself is also interested in the possibilities of utopian thought.

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66 It is important to highlight that, as de Miguel puts it, “sospecho que nunca llegó a asimilar el modo de vida californiano” (1997: 28). The relevance of this lies in that, precisely because of not having adapted completely to the Californian way of life, because of not having been assimilated by North American Culture, Aranguren can observe this culture from the outside and adopt a more critical stance, as discussed in chapter six (see 6.1.3).
and consequently dedicates a total of four articles to this topic; “Política y utopía” (1994, 5: 399-401), “Comentarios a un libro utópico” (1994, 5: 435-37), “Los reversos y la calderilla de la utopía” (1994, 5: 438-40), and “La función de un utópico Ministerio de la Cultura” (1994, 5: 478-80). In fact, Aranguren considers it essential for the intellectual to have a critical and a utopian attitude, which should go hand in hand (1994, 5: 399-400, 454; see also 1994, 4: 381; Camps, 1997: 185). He summarizes his views on this matter by saying that “La utopía es el ‘espíritu’ de toda política que no se conforma con ser mera política. La utopía española de 1976 es la democracia [...]” (1994, 5: 401; see also 1994, 2: 714-15). This critical and utopian attitude constitutes a combination of qualities which is described by Aranguren as vital for the moral thinker and the politician. Aranguren understands this combination in Marxist terms:

Hence, Aranguren underscores the link that classical Marxism establishes between politics and utopia – later reinforced by Marcuse. Moreover, by bringing up Spain’s journey into democracy, Aranguren highlights that some formerly utopian possibilities, such as a democratic Spain, are no longer so (Aranguren, 1994, 3: 429; on the feasibility of formerly utopian ideas see also Marcuse, 1955: 157; 1970a: 139). What is more, Aranguren values the possibilities of utopia not only at a political level, but also at an individual one insofar as utopian vision is the first element that allows the individual to become a better version of himself (1984: 35). Projection, imagination, and utopia are all at the root of any process of evolution. What Aranguren does, in line with CT, is to empower the agent by linking his individual processes to those of the collective suggesting the relevance of his input.

Aranguren never loses contact with Spain during his stay in California. Not only is he an integral part of the Spanish residents there, but he also makes frequent trips to Spain (see Rodríguez Ibáñez, 1997: 14). Entre España y América (1974) signals another stage in Aranguren’s career, one that is marked by carrying out what he has always defended to be the role of the intellectual, that is, being a critic (see Díaz, 1983: 122, 160, 196; see also Pastor García, 2000: 679). Abellán, who also emphasizes the need to recover the role of the intellectual as the critic of society, praises Aranguren’s work in this area, describing him as “el crítico por excelencia de la etapa de transición” (1979a: 93-94; see also Castellet, 1976: 15; see also Camps, 1997: 185-87). At the same time, Aranguren highlights the influence that the work of the FS has had on him and other thinkers in establishing the importance of the role of critique (1994, 4: 544).
Aranguren, unlike Marcuse who chooses to remain in the United States and visits Germany only occasionally, settles back in Spain after Franco’s death. In 1976, his chair at the Universidad Complutense is reinstated by the Suárez government as a result of the decree of general amnesty\textsuperscript{67}. There, he teaches during the following three years until his retirement in 1979. After this point, he still publishes and often participates in conferences, interviews, debates, and makes television appearances always defending the virtues of democracy and becoming a public figure in the process (see Camps, 1997: 183). It is significant that Aranguren’s very last lecture at the Universidad Complutense in 1980 is on Marcuse, serving as a testimony to the relevance he awards to his thought (Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 19).

In conclusion, it can be said that the element which provides cohesion to Aranguren’s work is religion. As Aranguren explains, religion should be a major concern for anyone wanting to understand any given social structure because religion conditions our way of thinking (1994, 1: 242). Marcuse, on the other hand, has consistently and insistently focused on socio-political issues, and, unlike Aranguren, Marcuse does not discuss religion at any length; indeed, religion does not form part of the core of his main thesis. Despite this disparity, they share the same motivation: social justice. They seek a socio-political organization which, as Marcuse puts it, “would open the possibility of an essentially new human reality – namely, existence in free time on the basis of fulfilled vital needs” (1979: 227).

Marcuse firmly believes that we now possess the material bases, that is, the technological advances, to implement a socio-economic structure which may bring quality of life for everyone (see 1955: 157; see also 1970a: 139; 1979: 40). He describes a society of free men and women who live in peace – although not necessarily without conflict. The relationship between work and leisure would be inverted: the majority of the work would be carried out by machines, so that most of people’s time can be dedicated to their self-development and only a small fraction to work (Marcuse, 1970a: 129; 1958: 84; 1969a: 91). Marcuse, however, realizes that technological progress is not enough to bring about this qualitative change (1955: 50); people need to be freed, liberated. This liberation comes with negation, with a break with the existing structure, rather than with modifications which may result in its continuity (1970b: 65). From his point of view, individuals tend to reproduce the existing repressive structure, although human needs are historically determined and, thus, changeable (1970b: 65). He advocates a leap which can only be possible from a

\textsuperscript{67} Despite this amnesty, repression and violence do not stop during the Transition. As Falcón argues, the actions of terrorist groups as well as the violence of the State against marginalized groups of society – left-wing leaders, and, at a later point, alleged members of ETA – intensifies (2002: 16-18).
“fundamentally different experience of being” (1955: 24). According to Marcuse, awareness of our current situation as manipulated agents is the first step towards this idyllic society where there would be a qualitative difference in the social conditions, giving each one of us has the real opportunity to fulfil our potential (1969a: 33, 37; 1972: 83-86).

Aranguren, on the other hand, seems to be less vague and utopian by placing his hopes on democracy. A closer look at Aranguren’s views of genuine democracy, however, brings him much closer to Marcuse. Aranguren proves to be very critical towards the existing democratic models, which he considers merely formal (see 3.2.2.4); he strives for a fairer socio-economic structure which is essentially very similar to that propounded by Marcuse. Aranguren’s link to Marcuse, however, is stronger than the mere coincidence on abstract goals. As a result of their motivation, they share the same preoccupation about the new challenges brought about by neo-capitalism, such as the new forms of alienation, manipulation, consumerism, mass society, and its totalitarian manifestations, as we shall see at the end of this chapter. Thus, they both coincide on the inadequacy of the capitalist system as well as on the need for a revision of Marxism, as we shall see below. Hence, we shall first explore Aranguren’s views on religion, so that we can later see how they inform his thought on democracy, and, consequently, on politics.

3.2 Aranguren’s evolution

The second part of this chapter will discuss the structure and evolution of Aranguren’s thought, thus providing the basis from which to understand Aranguren’s approach to CT, which will be the focus of the third and final part of this chapter.

As indicated above, the following stages can be perceived in Aranguren’s work: the religious, ethical, socio-political stages, plus the performance of el oficio de intelectual, the role of the intellectual, which find a correspondence with Aranguren’s biographical evolution (see Pastor García, 2000: 678)\(^68\). This division, however, is only approximate and flexible due to Aranguren’s transgressive style. Incidentally, as discussed in Chapter One transgressive is how Aranguren describes Zambrano’s writing (1983: 114-15). This is, however, an adjective which also applies to him for largely the same reasons. It is transgressive because it emphasizes the continuous element of crossing or blurring standard separations, divisions, or borders of temporal and intellectual nature, hence his

\(^{68}\) It must be noted that, as pointed out in chapter one, the evolution of Aranguren’s thought follows a spiral trajectory, which is why the chronological order in which he develops his ideas is not linear. In the light of this, a direct reference to the work and year when he first presented an idea or concept is only provided when is considered relevant to the argument. Otherwise, a reference to his Complete Works is provided. In the interest of clarity, an appendix with the contents of each of the volumes and the corresponding original dates of publication for each of the books which they include has been compiled with the information provided by Blázquez (see appendix two).
supradisciplinarity. This is perceived as necessary, given that the issues he deals with are, in many ways, closely intertwined. This transgression also alludes to the provocative nature of Aranguren’s work. His provocation lies in crossing such boundaries, in voicing what others dare not think, and, above all, in his thought-provoking, tireless defence of the function of the intellectual, which he so keenly performs. The intellectual should, according to Aranguren, “criticar el sistema y luchar contra él desde relativamente dentro de él, con un pie dentro y otro fuera de él, desde la base, apoyándose sobre ella” (1994, 5: 419; see also 454). Aranguren adopts this role, thus emphasizing the correspondence between his theoretical and biographical stands. The overall result of this transgressive style is the supradisciplinarity of his work in the Frankfurtian sense, based on similar motivations to those of the Institut. This also means that the time-span and the main subject of discussion of each phase, as suggested above, are not rigorously clear-cut. As a whole, Aranguren valued the teachings of the past, and integrated them into a critical view of the present, developing an intellectual path that could be described as spiral thought, which, although it always advances, often gives the impression of going back to a former phase; it always does so at a higher level, building on the distance already covered to make continuous and solid progress as we shall now see.

3.2.1 Aranguren’s ethos
3.2.1.1 Religion

The ever-recurring theme and connection in Aranguren’s works is undoubtedly religion, more precisely, his talante religioso (see Pastor García, 2000: 680); but what exactly does he mean by that? What are the motives and intellectual consequences of his focus on religion?

Despite the permanent, even guiding presence of a religious element, an evolution of his thought and faith can be observed (Pastor García, 2000: 680-89). Rather than directly answering the question of what religion is, Aranguren prefers to emphasize what religion is not. In an allusion to Marx, Aranguren states that religion is not a phenomenon that derives from “una superestructura de alienación, sino la muestra más alta de esa intencionalidad ante-predicativa” (1994, 5: 54). That is to say that in Aranguren’s view, religion is an

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69 Although using a very different terminology, in his article “Aranguren no es un avión ni un pájaro”, de Miguel also argues that the difficulty in assigning Aranguren’s work to one discipline lies in the richness of his thought for it integrates philosophy, theology, morality, literary criticism, and so on, without being restricted by any of them (1997: 25-28).

70 This dynamic spiral structure of Aranguren’s thought may be the result of d’Ors influence, who, as Bretz explains, “advocates a complex definition of culture that links opposites and evolves dynamically towards ever new combinations” (2001: 126-27).
inherent pre-ontologic response to a human need. As Aranguren explains in *El protestantismo y la moral* (1954), religion is not the mere search for justice either, but a much more complex phenomenon, responding to the most inner needs of humankind (1994, 2: 45). His main concern is not its truth value, but what religion can do for us. He argues that each person has to face the very thorny task of searching for his perfection; the quest for virtue, as well as finding purpose or meaning to life, is the reason why one needs revelation, religion (see 1994, 2: 295, 326, 392, 586).

According to Aranguren, “el hombre está inserto en un orden que ni siquiera le es dado ver” (1994, 2: 295). By means of this assertion, Aranguren is making an elusive reference to the supra-rational or supra-moral elements which he considers to be part of human existence, such as destiny and fortune, but also to the very nature of such an existence, that is, our own finitude and our necessary moral freedom (see 1994, 2: 294-96). All of these circumstances and characteristics define the inherent co-ordinates according to which our existence develops. We are not, however, in a position to make sense of these co-ordinates. This results in an existential disorientation which, according to Aranguren, accounts for the need for religion to tell us about virtue and happiness (1994, 2: 295-96). Thus, Aranguren does not deal with specific issues regarding religion, dogma, and the Church as an Institution; these only become important as far as they fulfil their guiding role towards the individual (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 299).

Thus, this conception of religion, instead of exploring spirituality or seeking a foundation in faith, approaches religion almost as a utilitarian commodity which is required to provide a moral code and to satisfy people’s existential needs by providing an answer to the unanswerable. Defending religion on the grounds of its utility is a deeply problematic approach as we shall see below, but, first, the relationship between religion and morality shall be explored.

Subordinating morality to religion involves several serious difficulties. A religious morality is a heteronomous morality; its laws are placed outside the individual, thus, the individual is expected to follow a given moral code. This is to be done without questioning the suitability of such a code – which is unmodifiable –, thus limiting the individual’s moral choice to right or wrong, to go with or against the code. Aware of these shortcomings, as Aranguren’s thought develops, so do his views on morality and on ethics (see Cerezo, 1991b: 80). Thus, in *Ética* (1958), he opts for an autonomous morality where the individual has the freedom and responsibility of critically assessing the situation and making a moral choice based on his judgement. Although this may point to a Kantian morality, Aranguren’s opposition to individualistic ethical positions, particularly his concept of co-responsibility by which we are all co-responsible for each other’s decisions, suggests closer links to Heidegger than it does to Kant (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 298; 1994, 5: 394; Bonete, 2003: 107
In fact, a rejection of the strong individualism developed during the Enlightenment is visible throughout his ethics, which as Bonete explains, is based on: “la abertura del ethos personal al ethos social, [que] supone rechazar la separación drástica entre la dimensión personal y social de nuestros actos” (2003: 399-400). That is why Aranguren understands existence in terms of co-habitation, suggesting a link to Heidegger’s Mitsein, and religion in terms of its social dimension (see 1994, 5: 439; see also Bonete, 2003: 400).

Aranguren gradually evolves from a naive form of Catholicism, in which his main concerns are religion, the Church, and the Christian world, to the engaged and comprehensive view of Christianity already expressed in Catolicismo día tras día (1955) (see 1994, 1: 453; see also Díaz, 1983: 65). His naivety consists in the initially moderate critical acceptance of the Catholic dogma – including its heteronomous morality – and the ways of the Church as observed in Catolicismo y protestantismo (1952) and Protestantismo y la moral (1954). However, the involvement of the Catholic Church in politics clearly constitutes a disappointment for Aranguren – and for Aguirre, as we shall see in Chapter Five – (Aranguren, 1994, 5: 317; 1994, 3: 221). As discussed in Chapter Two, the Catholic Church does not sufficiently respond to the challenges posed by a society ruled by a totalitarian regime which, seeking empowerment and legitimation, aligns the Church to its political programme (see 2.2). Even the reforms undergone as a result of the Vatican Council (1962-1965) prove insufficient (see Callahan, 2000: 382); it is not until 1973 that the Spanish bishops vote to publish a document entitled “La Iglesia y la comunidad política” where they commit themselves to political neutrality (see Lannon, 1995: 279). From Aranguren’s perspective, if Catholics truly lived their faith they would then have to concern themselves with social justice (1994, 1: 676; 1994, 3: 220). In the face of this inconsistency, Aranguren, unwilling to let go of his faith, opts for a politically independent and morally autonomous form of faith (1994, 4: 434). His disillusionment has two effects; a personal one: he no longer feels part of the Catholic structure, so he prefers to define himself as Christian instead (see 1994, 1: 537; see also Pastor García, 2000: 688); and an intellectual one: the re-orientation of his thought towards socio-political discussions, so that he can contribute towards the creation of an essentially fairer society, which would be more in line with his own faith. As he puts it,

71 Having said this, Aranguren is a Kantian thinker in a different sense. As Camps explains, “si tomamos como punto de referencia la distinción kantiana entre ‘la moral política’ y ‘la política moral’, junto a la valoración que Kant hace de ambas posibilidades, no hay duda de que Aranguren opta por la propuesta kantiana. Una moral política sería una aberración, mientras una política moral es, precisamente, el fin que debemos desear para la política” (1997: 181; this relationship between morality and politics will be discussed with greater detail later on in the chapter). Nevertheless, Camps also points out that Aranguren does not use the Kantian text, Zum ewigen Frieden, first published in 1795 (Camps, 1997: 181).
Era menester que el cristianismo en cuanto tal, y concretamente el catolicismo, aceptasen el engagement mundano, fundado en una teología de las realidades terrenas, como se decía hace unos años, para que los cristianos, liberados de subrepticios compromisos, cobrasen conciencia de su responsabilidad social (1994, 3: 220).

Consequently, social justice becomes one of his priorities precisely because of his religious commitment; in pursuing the practical implications of his faith, the links to ethics and politics are perceived as necessary (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 676; 1994, 2: 157, 295, 299, 439, 458; 1994, 3: 220-21; 1994, 5: 201).

Thus, the evolution of Aranguren’s views on religion has an impact on his views on morality. He grows out of his scepticism regarding the reliability of autonomous morality, not only pointing out its feasibility, but also promoting tolerance and dialogue between heteronomous and autonomous forms of morality, such as religious, Marxist, and neo-Marxist morality (see 1994, 3: 185; see also 1994, 3: 180, 220, 606; 1994, 3: 56-57 respectively). He is able to do so because he understands “moral como autonarración e interpretación del ‘texto vivo’ en que consistimos” (1994, 2: 165). As Aranguren sees it – echoing Ortega’s ratiovitalism, a vitalist rationality which retains the role of reason, and Zubiri’s perspective on freedom and morality – each person is put in the situation of deciding what “his” good is, of realizing it in the world, and personally making it his own, apropiándoselo:

mi realidad natural es mi propia realidad, en tanto que recibida; mi realidad moral es mi propia realidad, en tanto que apropiada. Porque al realizar cada uno de mis actos voy realizando en mi mismo mi ethos, carácter o personalidad moral” (1994, 2: 217; see also Ortega, 1946, 3: 177-178; Zubiri, 1986).

Thus, in realizing one act or another, the individual is appropriating one possibility of being. It is by means of these acts, by appropriation, that his deep moral reality is created. Aranguren’s attempt to confer meaning to our individual existence with the appropriation of each ethical act reveals the influence of Ortega – who views the human being as a project – and particularly Zubiri, from whom Aranguren borrows the concept of appropriation (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 299, 307; see also Bonete, 2003: 392, 420; Soldevilla, 2004: 136-37).

In spite of Aranguren’s recognition and acceptance of heteronymous morality, there is unwillingness to relinquish the central role of religion. Even at a late point in his career, there is evidence of a certain resistance – in the psychoanalytic sense of the word – to accepting his growing non-religious outlook on life. This can be observed in Bajo el signo de la juventud (1982), where he describes superstition, esoterism, and rituals as manifestations of the religious experiences of young people, thus uncovering their talante religioso in some expressions of their otherwise secular life. This is how he puts it:

superstición, esoterismo, movimientos fundamentalistas y carismáticos, sectas, heterodoxias, recuperaciones rituales, entrega a lo ‘sagrado-salvaje’ y reencantamientos de la naturaleza, a los que
Although Aranguren does not explicitly deny the possibility of non-religious individuals, in fact, he acknowledges them in the Christian-Marxist dialogue, there is a not so much intellectual as personal reticence to fully accepting this fact, since, in Aranguren’s view, faith is, above all, the answer to the intrinsic uncertainties of human nature (see 1994, 2: 45). Thus, unable to accept the possibility of genuine atheism, Aranguren – like Zambrano and Aguirre – seeks symptoms of unconfessed spiritual yearning in people’s attitudes and behaviour. In addition to the forms of spirituality mentioned above, in La crisis del catolicismo (1969a), Aranguren offers quite a different example of secular spirituality. He argues that the use of certain drugs lead to an altered state of consciousness which can be equated to or, at least, compared to a mystical experience: “mediante la provocación, a través del LSD, de la marihuan, del Love-in, de un estado de alma absolutamente inhabitual, extático, se lograría una experiencia religioso-mística de unión con lo que en el lenguaje tradicional se denominaba ‘Dios’” (1994, 1: 740). A ubiquitous sense of spirituality and religion prevails in his thought.

This widespread spirituality is defended in two ways. First, there is the assumption that religion, rather than a creed is an inherent feeling or need, present in everyone – although with different intensity. As with the contents of the subconscious in psychoanalysis, these can be traced through several manifestations as seen above. The existence of a religious attitude and its expressions may be denied by the individual. Hence, the interpretation of this phenomenon will be independent of the will or intentionality of the individual or group analysed, as is the case, once again, in the practice of psychoanalysis (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 527; see also 1994, 5: 199-200, 610). What this effectively means is that Aranguren and those with such spiritual convictions – including Zambrano and Aguirre – put themselves in the privileged position of unveiling information about the subject which is not even accessible to the subject himself. Nevertheless, there are many who claim to have no religious or spiritual convictions and no need or longing for them. This is why the legitimacy of insisting on the unawareness of their spiritual yearning or on interpreting secular acts as expressions or symptoms of the latter is questionable. On the other hand, although this admittedly is a problematic position to adopt, its premises are not

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72 Phil Zuckerman, after a comprehensive world-wide study on the numbers of atheists published in 2007, has concluded that “between 500 million and 750 million humans currently do not believe in God” (2007: 61). It should be noted that the reason for the large margin of error is because the methodological and practical difficulties in obtaining this data has been factored in the result. Zuckerman’s argument is that the sheer vastness of these numbers alone is enough to question the validity of those arguments which claim the “innateness” of religious belief (2007: 60-61).
essentially different from those of psychoanalysis, namely, the existence of a psychological reality which is ordinarily inaccessible to the individual. Second, this ubiquitous spirituality is also maintained by assuming that religion is not only inherent, but also inescapable (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 610). Religion can be considered inescapable in the sense that, although at different levels and in different forms, it is ever-present in our personal experience and in society at large. Even more importantly, religion is also inescapable from the point of view of rationality because, for Aranguren, it can be the best – most fulfilling and least risky – rational choice available. This is to be understood in reference to Pascal’s theological wager (see Pascal, 1984: 154-56, 162-63). Pascal reasons that there is no rational way to positively find out whether God exists or not. Thus, we are left with two options: first, we may choose to believe that God does not exist, in which case, if we are right and there is no God, death will effectively be the end of everything, or if we are wrong and after having lived a godless life we discover that there is, indeed, a God, it will be our loss; second, we may choose to believe there is a God, in which case, if in death we are proved wrong, at least we would have enjoyed the comfort of faith during life, or, if, on the other hand, we are right, we can only benefit from having lived a life guided by this God. Thus, we can only win by wagering on God’s existence, because wagering against it does not result in any gain, even if we happen to win our wager. Pascal uses the term “wager” in place of “choice”, thus effectively emphasising the uncertain nature of such choices. With this reasoning, Pascal avoids supporting his belief in God on arbitrary foundations. Instead, faith is the result of a rational choice. There are strong resonances of Pascal’s practicality in Aranguren’s faith, and, in fact, numerous references to Pascal throughout Aranguren’s work. The influence of Pascal in Aranguren is such that Blázquez says in reference to Aranguren’s prologue to Pascal’s works that “[Aranguren,] de manera rigurosa, certera y precisa, se instala en el orbe de la filosofía del autor de Pensamientos sobre los problemas últimos” (1994, 6: 12).

Aranguren himself explains the nature of Pascal’s wager, and wonders whether

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73 As Frosh explains, psychoanalysis faces a serious critique regarding the dubious empirical foundation of its methodology, particularly in relation to the unconscious (1997: 43). The main difficulty of psychoanalysis is not so much providing evidence of the existence of the unconscious, as the privileged access of psychoanalysis to the unconscious, because “there can be no self – and other – knowledge of this kind which is direct and theory independent” (see 1997: 43). In other words, it is the reliance on the theoretical premises of psychoanalysis that allows access to its primary object of study. Similarly, it is Aranguren’s own conviction of the existence of a universally inherent spirituality that accounts for his interpretation of various instances of behaviour as religious manifestations.

¿Hay una falacia en el tránsito del apostar al creer, o se trata más bien de que el interlocutor se da cuenta de que esta ‘apuesta’ o compromiso total de la existencia no puede reposar sino sobre una creencia, y envuelve, por tanto, un acto de fe? (1994, 6: 611; see also 599).

He concludes that “las dos interpretaciones son posibles” (1994, 6: 612). However, given Aranguren’s religious nature, as seen throughout this chapter, his inclination is to interpret the wager as an act of faith in itself, thus aligning himself with Pascal.

This has far-reaching epistemological consequences. In the face of the impossibility of proving or disproving God’s existence, the belief in it is as much an act of faith as atheism is. Taking it a step further, even atheism can be labelled as a religion. As Eliade explains, there is a multitude of definitions that try to encompass the nature of religion; the main reason for this is the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon itself as well as the influence of the background of those attempting to provide such definition (1987: 282). Bearing in mind the intricate nature of this term, one of the possible ways to understand religion is in relation to its social, economic, historical, and cultural context, which may provide a motivation for religious practices which may not necessarily be linked to spirituality (see Eliade, 1987: 284). This approach suggests that the analysis of the manifestations of the religious structures, such as beliefs, customs, and rituals, accounts for religion itself. If religion is “profesión y observancia de la doctrina religiosa”, as one of the definitions found in the *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* (DRAE) suggests, the spiritual element is, then, not mandatory. In fact, from this perspective, Marxism itself, it has been claimed, has a religious quality, with its own rites and ideology (see Cristi, 2001: 145). Hence, on the grounds of this understanding of religion, it can be claimed that those who do not believe in God or in the transcendental nature of existence choosing to take a purely positivist approach not only towards science, but towards life itself, are doing so as followers of a particular religion: a religion whose doctrine is scepticism and whose dogma is the scientific method. As Bourdieu argues, “scientific thought has no foundation other than the collective belief in its foundations that the very functioning of the scientific field produces and presupposes” (1991: 8; see also 1975: 34). The key to understanding the religious nature of this position is the word “belief”, which reinforces the idea that there is no possibility of certainty and that science becomes irrelevant in this area. In the end, both perspectives require a leap of faith. This is precisely the key to Aranguren’s epistemological underpinning which shall also be further explored in the coming chapters in relation to Zambrano and Aguirre.

Although from a personal point of view Aranguren is far from denying the existence of a supreme being and the spiritual experience itself, rather than focusing on the individual personal dimension of religion, he analyses religion as a social phenomenon. Viewing religion as a social phenomenon explains why Aranguren interprets people’s religious
attitudes as a reaction to their personal needs – Unamuno’s attitude (see below) – rather than as any kind of transcendental communion (see Aranguren, 1994, 4: 532). This also applies to those who choose to believe in the non-existence of God, since they do so in an effort to maintain cognitive consistency, that is, the psychological effort to make their perceptions match up with their beliefs (see Báez Ramos, 2001: 29-36). Thus, Aranguren concludes that, in his opinion, Marx places the same wager as Pascal, only he does it in the opposite direction; given the unavailability of conclusive evidence and the inadequacy of reason to solve the question of the existence of God, Marx chooses to wager on its non-existence (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 222; for a more detailed discussion of Marx’s attitude towards religion see 3.3).

This position – although rational – is not without problems, for there are numerous plausible arguments against God’s existence75 (see also footnote eighteen). However, it must be noted that it is not the case that evidence of God’s (in)existence is readily available and Aranguren chooses to disregard it. What Aranguren argues is that this is a question which is beyond human capacity. Aranguren finds himself in the same quandary as Unamuno. Unamuno realizes that reason alone cannot provide proof of God’s existence, but neither can it deny it; thus, he concludes that reason must be transcended and justifies God’s existence on the grounds of his own need for it (see also Abellán, 1964: 85, 130). Unlike Unamuno, Aranguren does not resolve to transcend reason. Instead, given his need for God – which he thinks is shared by humankind – Aranguren, like Pascal, concludes that believing in God is the best rational choice.

75 There is, of course, no shortage of arguments against the existence of God. Richard Gale provides a series of counter-arguments to the main classical theistic arguments (2007: 86-101). He explains how the main flaw of the ontological argument, which sets to prove God’s existence on the basis of the analysis of the concept of God, is the nature of its premises, which are supposed to be self-evident and not based on sensorial evidence (see 2007: 86). The mystical argument shares the same problem, because the mystical experience cannot be perceived or verified by an external observer (see Gale, 2007: 98). Gale also deflates the cosmological argument, which is based on the principle that every fact can be explained only “in terms of the causal efficacy of a necessarily existent God-like being”; in other words, identifying God as the ultimate cause (see Gale, 2007: 90). The difficulty with this argument is that accepting it “would be arguing that it is epistemically rational to believe a proposition p because it is pragmatically rational to believe some proposition q, from which p follows or which is needed for the deduction of p” (Gale, 2007: 90). In other words, believing in something because it provides a convenient explanation is not evidence of is truthfulness. It should be noted that, whereas this is precisely Pascal’s and Aranguren’s argument for believing in God, at no point do they use this reasoning to argue the truth of God’s existence. Gale continues explaining that the teleological argument intends to apply inductive reasoning to conclude that facts of nature, such as the biological composition and organization of a living organism, are there as a result of divine design (see 2007: 97). This argument has to face the problem of evil: if worldly existence is created according to God’s design, who is supposed to be a benevolent and omnipotent being, how can evil be explained? According to Gale, the teleological argument has been ultimately invalidated by Darwin’s theory of evolution (see 2007: 97). Having pointed this out, it must be stressed that, in contrast with these arguments, what makes Aranguren’s approach valuable is that it does not constitute an attempt to prove God’s existence. As he puts it, “la creencia en la existencia de Dios es razonable: esto es lo más que hoy se puede decir” (1994, 1: 768). Instead, he focuses on the impact that faith – or lack thereof – may have on the subject and makes a vital choice based on this evaluation.
In conclusion, in Aranguren’s view, religion has a crucial social dimension and it is, therefore, inherently linked to morals, politics, and ethics (1994, 2: 295-99). As Gracia argues, “Aranguren había ido rebelándose desde el filo de los cincuenta contra el cristianismo saturado de embustes de sus jefes espirituales. Porque en muchos el cristianismo fue una convicción no sólo irrenunciable sino exigente razón antifranquista” (2004: 258-59, see also Gracia, 2004: 361). This socio-political dimension of religion is of crucial importance in understanding Aranguren’s background and his key underlying motivation: social justice. This becomes even more apparent with the advent of democracy in 1978 and the subsequent rapid transformation of values in Spanish society; these events are viewed by Aranguren as an opportunity to give a practical dimension to his work and, echoing Zubiri, Aranguren appropriates the oficio del intelectual. Moreover, this is a task which he will perform, not because he has left his religious stage behind, but rather, because of and from his talante religioso (1994, 2: 217).

3.2.1.2 Talante

Several references have been made to Aranguren’s talante religioso; it is now time to explore this concept. Aranguren first developed his concept of talante in El buen talante, as a foretaste to Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia (1952), although it is not published as an article in its own right until 1985 (1994, 2: 619).

Aranguren describes talante as a spontaneous and pre-rational disposition, closely related to our estado de ánimo or mood, terms that, in fact, he often uses interchangeably (see 1994, 1: 225; 1994, 2: 621-22, 630). The importance of this concept here is that it is vital for unravelling Aranguren’s understanding of the human being and of his process of evolution. For Aranguren, personal as well as intellectual evolution only takes place in a spiral trajectory; this becomes particularly clear upon analysing his approach to the concept of talante, as we shall discuss below. Talante is what determines our character. Our personality springs from our individual talante; each person possesses a fundamental talante from which all different moods emerge (see Aranguren, 1994, 1: 226; 1994, 2: 396). Moreover, our perception changes with it, thus “la realidad se nos aparece, así, como un reflejo del talante” (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 621). Each talante conditions the individual to perceive a different aspect of any given reality. Similarly, each act requires the right talante (Aranguren, 1994, 1: 218). For Aranguren, each person searches for the religion or, even, political ideas that best matches his talante (1994, 1: 224, 227). This view of talante closely echoes Ortega’s perspectivism, which questions our ability to perceive reality as a whole and concludes that individuals can only ever perceive reality from a specific perspective. Therefore, the process of discovering truth is necessarily the process of reconstructing the number of fragments, – perspectives – available to us (Ortega, 1946, 2: 18-19; 1946, 3:
Thus, influenced by Ortega, Aranguren encapsulates his conceptualization of *talante* as follows:

"pero acaso la fórmula que más libremente de presupuestos éticos resума lo que aquí queremos decir sea aquella del poeta, según la cual ‘todo es según el color del cristal con que se mira’. El cristal es nuestra alma, y su cambiante color, el estado en que ella se encuentra, su talante (1994, 2: 624)."

This point of view leads to two potentially dangerous directions: the relativistic and deterministic cul-de-sacs. Aranguren tackles both of them.

Aranguren is well aware of the immediate relativistic implications of suggesting that different perceptions of the same reality may be acceptable. In order to avoid the relativistic trap, Aranguren specifies that although there is no one *talante* that can be deemed best to gain knowledge, there is still a hierarchy relating the different anaemic dispositions. Hope, trust, faith, and peace are situated at the top of the ladder, conforming what he describes as *buen talante* (see Aranguren, 1994, 2: 634). It is from this understanding of *buen talante* that Aranguren develops what Soldevilla describes as a

"teoría de la acción [...] preocupada por dilucidar las condiciones de posibilidad éticas, sociales y políticas, de un actor que, en momentos de crisis, cuando los sentidos y valores socioculturales son severamente cuestionados, sólo cuenta con criterios propios para fundamentar su acción (see 2004: 130-41)."

Thus, we shall discuss below how, for Aranguren, *talante* affects the realm of ethics and consequently, also the realm of action.

The concept of *talante* may seem to imply the deterministic suggestion that we are bound by it to access only a certain aspect of reality. A closer look, however, will prove that this is not necessarily the case. As Aranguren himself clarifies, a certain *talante* can be induced or fomented by a number of means, thus leaving room for free will and personal choices (see 1994, 2: 70-71, 626). Amongst the factors which can have an impact on *talante*, Aranguren points to physical factors or more subtle methods, such as poetry, music, rhetoric, philosophy, and, of course, religion (see 1994, 2: 625-26). He even suggests that religion influences *talante* more than culture does, and urges the reader to remember that religion is culture, although not only culture (1994, 2: 629). Equally, some strong emotions, such as hatred, envy, or fear, can taint our *talante* when their intensity is such that they take control of our being (1994, 2: 621-22). *Talante*, therefore, is not a permanent disposition, but can be influenced and modified by circumstances and decisions. It is in this sense that its evolution is spiral: our inclinations and decisions will be influenced by our *talante*, but in turn, our *talante* will also be influenced by the result of such decisions, which ultimately will affect our following decisions in a progressive spiral movement that will last for as long as we live. Hence, the concepts of freedom and choice are at the very core of Aranguren’s thought. According to him, freedom cannot be granted by any political regime, because, first, it must be a personal attitude, a virtue (1994, 2: 459). Freedom cannot be
given; it can only be exercised by the appropriation of choices. In line with CT, this realization and the relationship between personal and political freedom become, in fact, the focus of the later part of his career, as we shall see later in the chapter.

_Talante_ is then a pre-moral disposition, and it is only by conscious decision-taking and the voluntary acquisition of habits that a moral _ethos_ is developed (see Bonete, 2003: 419). Nevertheless, the intellectual consequences of this seemingly tangential development of the theory of _talante_ are deep. What this means is that Aranguren grants subjectivity a privileged position on his work, since according to him, subjectivity or, to adopt his terminology, _talante_, is at the very foundation of every discourse. Accepting the subjective implications of _talante_ has consequences for Aranguren’s ethics. Vitalist postulates, such as Aranguren’s, which are deeply rooted in Ortega’s thought, must necessarily reject general or abstract mandates for, as Ortega puts it, “¿no es sospechosa una ética que al dictar sus normas se olvida de cómo es en su integra condición el objeto cuya perfección pretende definir e imperar?” (Ortega, 1946, 3: 101; see Bonete, 2003: 392-93). It is in this sense that, as argued above, Aranguren is not a Kantian, for the categorical imperative is too general and, therefore, insufficient for Aranguren’s ethics. This is also one of the reasons which moves Aranguren to discard his heteronomous morality in favour of an autonomous one, while at the same accepting people’s choice in either direction as discussed in the section above. The reach of the implications of _talante_, however, does not stop at ethics, but also hints at an epistemology, which, instead of being based upon an alleged objectivity, is flexible enough to reflect the nature and limitations of the researcher, including his subjectivity. Thus, Aranguren rejects any reductionist approach which rests on logic alone, such as scholastic and dialectic thought (1994, 1: 224; 1994, 2: 628). Hence, Aranguren shares with CT its concern with an excessive reliance on objectivity and their reclamation of other forms of knowledge (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 217). That is why, as Rabaté explains, “its [Critical Theory’s] main thrust is directed against positivism considered as a bourgeois distortion of a science whose current crisis has not been acknowledged because it has turned into a religion” (2002: 52; see also García de la Serrana, 2004: 190, 195; Adorno, 1976). The implications of the inclusion of subjectivity in the realm of epistemology will be furthered developed in connection to Zambrano and Aguirre in the following chapters.

76 Kant’s _categorical imperative_ states: “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (1995: 30).
3.2.2 The Marxist journey

3.2.2.1 Marxism in Spain

After having firmly established Aranguren’s religious background and its connection to social justice, understanding his relationship to the FS and to CT requires examining the other parameters around which his thought revolves, namely, his growing socio-political engagement and his interest in Marxism. Although Aranguren and Aguirre engage with Marxism and their position towards it is crucial to the later development of their thought, they cannot be considered Marxists. It is, nonetheless, necessary to be aware of the existence and evolution of Marxist ideas in Spain, so that the implications of the Marxist debate and its reception – particularly during the 1960s – can be understood, and Aranguren’s and Aguirre’s role can be contextualized. The aim, nature, and consequences of Aranguren’s engagement with Marxism shall be discussed below, so as to better understand the evolution of his thought into neo-Marxist positions.

Marxism is first introduced into Spain at the end of 1871 by Marx’s son-in-law, Paul Lafargue (see Jordan, 2002: 136). The Partido Comunista de España (PCE) is founded in 1921 as a splinter group of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), as a result of the PSOE’s rejection of the Third International (see Abellán, 1998: 227). Thus, the PCE’s birth reflects the serious fragmentation of the Spanish left which later contributes to its defeat in the Civil War (see Gómez, 2005: 281-290). Many landless peasants – mostly in the south of Spain – welcome Revolutionary ideas, particularly those of a Marxist or Anarchist nature.

As is well-known, the rise of Communism and of the anti-communist and fascist responses which were put forward during the 1920s 1930s was one of factors which lead to the Spanish Civil War. This tension, however, acquires an international relevance. Europe is engaged in a campaign against Communism, while also being cautious towards the advances of fascism. Thus, as Enrique Moradiellos concludes, “it was no coincidence that for almost three years Spain became the bloody setting of a miniature and small-scale European civil war, a forewarning of the war that would break out in September 1939” (2002: 96; see also 98-101).

Although the Communist Manifesto is translated into Spanish in 1872 and the first volumen of Das Kapital is translated in 1935, as a result of the Civil War and the fascist victory, subsequent translations of this nature will only take place in exile during the following years (see Ribas, 1981: 29-30; see also Abellán, 1998: 239). In fact, the rest of the volumes of Das Kapital are translated in Mexico during the years 1945-46 (see Abellán, 1998: 239).

With the end of the Civil War, many Republicans choose exile. This is the case of Luis Araquistán, a revolutionary Socialist, and of various thinkers of Marxist inclinations such as Julián Beistero, Vicente Uribe, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Fernando Claudín, David
García Bacca, Sánchez Barbudo, and Juan Rejano (see Abellán, 1998: 235-38; see also Díaz, 2004: 517-18; Faber, 2002: 86; Gracia, 2004: 159). Those who remain in Spain, however, witness the heavy-handed repression of the regime. Communism is demonized. Consequently, as Díaz explains,

durante muchos años no se publica, por lo que yo conozco, ningún libro español sobre filosofía marxista [...] en aquellos tiempos lo que se escribe sobre este tema posee, por lo general, un carácter fundamentalmente propagandístico, inspirado más por el deseo de la refutación (religiosa o política) que por el de una comprensión científica o filosófica (1983: 101).

There are, however, several intellectual and political circumstances which lead to the renewed interest in Marxism, particularly during the 1960s.

In spite of the lack of publications on Marxism from the end of the Spanish Civil War until the 1960’s, Marxism is far from being forgotten. In fact, Marxism and Marxists become almost the embodiment of all evil, the enemy, in the eyes of the regime. Rejecting Freemasonry and Communism becomes part of the regime’s ideological creed. This attitude is further encouraged by the events that would come about with the end of the Second World War. The Cold War reduces to a great extent the political debate to the dichotomy of capitalism as opposed to Communism, hence actively contributing to the already existing demonization of Marxism in Spain. Furthermore, an agreement is reached (1953) by which the United States is allowed to establish military bases in Spanish territory in exchange for some economic support; Spain is used as a pawn, by Western democracies and the United States in particular, in their strategic planning against Communism (see Balfour, 2000: 278; see also Liedtke, 2002: 233-38; Portero, 2002: 210-20; Chapter Two). In the meantime, the country enjoys the effects of the Economic Stabilization Plan (1959) which – designed to encourage foreign investment, industrialization, and economic growth – marked the death of autarky and the creation of a market economy with the introduction of Spain into the international economy (see Shubert, 1990: 207). As Shubert indicates, “industrialization brought a rising standard of living and with it new levels of consumption. Average income jumped from $290 (US) in 1955 to $497 in 1965 and $2,486 in 1975” (1990: 258). Spain rapidly adopts a capitalist economy. Indications of the growing spending power of the Spanish population and their adoption of a consumerist behaviour can be observed in the purchase of non-essential commodities. Whereas televisions were unaffordable for most of the population when they were first introduced in 1956, “by the 1970s the ownership of a television set had become the norm for Spanish households, even in the countryside. In 1975, 79 per cent of all homes and 63 per cent of the homes of farmers and agricultural labourers had a television” (Shubert, 1990: 258; see also de Riquer i Permanyer, 1995: 265;
Balfour, 2000: 283)\textsuperscript{77}. The acquisition of cars followed a similar pattern, so that by 1974 “one in nine inhabitants owned one” (Balfour, 2000: 283). Meanwhile, Spain becomes heavily influenced by American culture, which becomes fashionable amongst young people; the interest in television grows and American films are promoted by the regime to propitiate escapism (see Jordan, 2002: 243; see also Aguilar Fernández, 2002: 50; Shubert, 1990: 260-61)\textsuperscript{78}. Other forms of entertainment, such as football and, to a lesser extent, bullfighting are also fuelled by Franco, who used them as social tranquillizers (see Jordan, 2002: 243; see also Shubert, 1990: 260-61). The economic boom, however, had some hidden costs:

the rapid economic growth of 1962-9 is undeniable, but so too is the less palatable reality that underlay the bonanza: the structural weakness of the Spanish economy; the high social cost of the boom, disproportionately paid for by the poorest; and the lack of freedom (except for capital), which seriously impaired the quality of life (Díaz, 1995: 286).

These circumstances give raise to anti-American and anti-capitalist sentiments, and attract some degree of sympathy towards Communism\textsuperscript{79}.

During the 1960s, and largely as a consequence of the economic boom of this decade, there is a substantial increase in the numbers of students in higher education, which also increased dissent (Romero Salvadó, 1999: 152). As de Riquer i Permanyer explains, “this increasingly critical attitude was based on two fundamental principles: better information about world affairs and the decline of traditional religious values” (1995: 266). As a result, this post-war generation, which did not suffer repression in the same way as their parents may have done, hungry for political participation and freedom, becomes an important source of opposition against the regime and many of them find Marxism attractive.

In addition, Marxist works by some Spanish exiles are slowly being filtered into Spain. A number of journals of Marxist tendencies – in varying degrees – are published in exile during the early 1960s and find some – limited – distribution in Spain. This is the case of Realidad (Rome 1963, associated to the PCE), Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, and Mañana. Tribuna Democrática Española (Paris, 1963) (see Díaz, 2004: 515). Well-known Spanish intellectuals, such as Jorge Semprún, Manuel Sacristán, and Fernando Claudín, can

\textsuperscript{77} This is particularly relevant because, as Candice Bosse puts it, “it served as an asset that was an aperture to popular knowledge about the world and increased visibility of other socially lived realities” (2007: 47).

\textsuperscript{78} As Shubert explains, during this period, “there are two common denominators to the changes in leisure: it has become much more commercialized and it has been integrated into an increasingly homogeneous international – and American-dominated – leisure world” (1990: 261).

\textsuperscript{79} Boris Liedtke argues that, regarding the Madrid Agreements (1953) by which Spain accepts to become a part of the Western defence structure, “large sections of the Spanish political establishment and the left-wing opposition have argued that Franco had bought them [USA’s economic support] at the cost of national sovereignty” (2002: 229).
be found amongst the editors and contributors (see Díaz, 2004: 515). A similar interest in Marxism is also awakened amongst the Spanish exiles living in Latin America, as can be observed in the work of Wenceslao Roces, José Gaos, and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez (see Abellán, 1989: 238-40, 243-45). What is even more relevant is that their views, far from being dogmatic or orthodox, reflect a need for renewal (see Abellán, 1989: 238-40, 243-45).

In Spain, in 1954 Enrique Tierno Galván founds the Boletín del seminario de derecho político de Salamanca, which boasts an array of Marxists and Socialist contributors, such as Raúl Morodo, Elías Díaz, Fernando Morán, Ignacio Sotelo, and Iris Zavala (see Gracia, 1996: 26; see also Díaz, 2004: 505-06, 512). Thus, interest in Marxism within Spain grows and gradually steps outside clandestinity. As Gracia explains:

los primeros análisis marxistas de alguna solvencia se harían con la conciencia de extirpar el disfraz retórico y apuntar a diagnósticos precisos, de aires –todavía– vagamente regeneracionistas. Y me refiero a los que pueden aparecer en el Boletín de Tierno, en la misma Praxis de Aumente o a los que figuran en las páginas más interesantes de Índice en torno a 1960 (Gracia, 1996: 31).

Praxis, although short-lived, also contributes to the Marxist debate in Spain (Díaz, 2004: 513). However, it is not until 1961 that the first serious book on Marxism since the end of the Spanish Civil War is published: Introducción al pensamiento marxista (see Díaz, 1983: 101). It is a collective work which publishes the outcome of a series of public lectures held at the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (from 17 October to 6 December 1958) and imparted by Carlos París, Carlos Alonso del Real, Pedro Lucas Verdú, José Lois Estévez, Carlos Eduardo Bastos de Soveral, Luis Legas y Lacambra, and José Guerra Campos. This publication opens an intense debate, by voicing a subject which could no longer be ignored. This revival of the Marxist debate is qualified by Díaz as the newest and most characteristic occurrence of this decade (1983: 143). In this same year, 1961, Aranguren directs an international seminar in Madrid on Nationalism and Marxism, also becoming one of the first Spanish authors to publicly discuss the influences of Marxist thought (see Blázquez, 1994b, 1: 18; see also Díaz, 1983: 99). Valuable Marxist analyses are also provided within Spain by Manuel Ballestero, Gustavo Bueno, and Carlos Castilla del Pino (Díaz, 2004: 517; see also Chandler, 1991: 381-83). Marxist ideas are also visible

80 It should be noted that, as indicated in chapter one, Manuel Sacristán plays an important role in the introduction of the FS in Spain for he was the translator of the first books by any of the members of the FS to ever be published in Spain, namely, Adorno’s Notas de literatura and Prismas, la crítica de la cultura y la sociedad (1962) (see 5.3.1; see also appendix one). In total, Sacristán translates three books by Adorno – the two mentioned above and Crítica cultural y sociedad (1969a) – and two books by Marcuse – El final de la utopía (1968b) and Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad (1970b). All of them are published by Ariel, with the sole exception of the last one, which is published by Martínez Roca.

81 Manuel Ballestero is interested in Marxism and, particularly, in its relation to existentialism, as can be observed in Marx o la crítica como fundamento (1967). He also focuses on the concept of freedom in relation to three key authors, namely, Nicolas de Cusa, Martin Luther, and Karl Marx, in La
in the arts; this is the case of the poets Gabriel Celaya and Blas de Otero, and the film
director Juan Antonio Bardem (see Gracia, 2004: 158). There are also several Marxist
activists, such as Simón Sánchez Montero, Julián Ariza, Marcelino Camacho, and Nicolás
Sartorius, who during the 1960s engage in the political debate in *Cuadernos para el
Diálogo* (see Gracia, 1996: 38). They also champion workers rights during Francoism and
continue to represent their interests during the Transition.

Aranguren repeatedly engages with Marxism from what Díaz describes as a Catholic-
Ortegan perspective, turning Marxism into his main interlocutor during this period (1983:
100). In fact, the Marxist-Christian dialogue becomes a central feature of the Spanish socio-
political debate during the 1960s. The publications of Pope John XXIII and the Second
Vatican Council “open the way to Christian-Marxist dialogue by clearly distinguishing
between ‘false philosophical teachings’ and the ‘historical movements that have economic,
social, cultural or political ends’ that they inspired” (Lannon, 1987: 248). These factors lead
to an increased interest in Marxist ideas in Spain and to the realization of the need for its
acknowledgment and discussion. It is certainly no longer possible to ignore that Marxists
are present in Spanish society; during the 1960s even their condemnation requires dialogue
and engagement (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 201; see also Aguirre, 1985: 214). A considerable
contribution to this dialogue, from a Marxist standpoint, is made by Manuel Azcárate and
Manuel Sacristán, which is described by Gracia as a “pieza esencial del comunismo en
España” (2004: 355; see also Gracia, 1996: 36; Díaz, 2004: 517). Aranguren and Aguirre,
from a Christian perspective, are also key contributors to this dialogue, as we shall see
below.

Another decisive factor in the revival of the Marxist debate in Spain is the reform of
the censorship system. As Pérez González explains, “with the new Press and Printing Law
of 1966, a ‘concession’ by Franco’s Information Minister, Manuel Fraga, pre-emptive
censorship disappeared. Instead a permanent sword of Damocles hung over newspaper
editors’ heads” (2000: 23; see also Chapter Two). Nevertheless, by relaxing the censorship

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*revolución del espíritu: Tres pensamientos de libertad* (1970). During the decade of 1960s, Gustavo
Bueno’s publications are sparse, but during the next decade, he becomes more prolific and focuses on
Marxism and on philosophical materialism in particular. Some of his most relevant publications during
this decade include: *Ensayos materialistas* (1972), “El materialismo histórico de Gramsci como teoría
del Espíritu objetivo” (1973a), “Sobre el significado de los Grundrisse en la interpretación del
sobre teoría y praxis” (1977), “Determinismo cultural y materialismo histórico” (1978a), and “Las
 fuerzas del trabajo y las fuerzas de la cultura” (1978b). Carlos Castillo del Pino relates Marxist
principles to psychiatric and psychoanalytic practice in *Fundamentos de antropología dialéctica*
(1969a) and *Psicoanálisis y marxismo* (1969b). He highlights, in particular, the relevance and impact of
the socio-economic context of the patient in the development and cure of different pathologies.
Incidentally, Castillo del Pino provides the prologue for Marcuse’s *Psicoanálisis y política*, entitled “La
inflexión del pensamiento de Marcuse en la antropología freudiana” (1969c).
system slightly – even if only on the surface – this law provides enough leeway for the
discussion in print of issues previously largely silenced, such as Marxism. In addition, the
centenary of the publication of Das Kapital takes place in 1967. This symbolic event is
taken by many as an invitation to revive, and, indeed, review the Marxist legacy (see
Abellán, 1998: 238-43 on the impact of this centenary on the exiled intellectuals). In
contrast with this, in 1967, the Ley Orgánica del Estado is approved, establishing the
definitive constitutional structure of the regime. This exacerbates the already present need
for the search for, or, at least, acknowledgement of, other alternatives.

In response to this climate, in 1968, Aranguren publishes El marxismo como moral –
after being deprived of his cátedra and after having travelled extensively as a result of his
subsequent exile. Only one year after Sánchez Vázquez publishes in Mexico Filosofía de la
praxis (see Gracia, 1996: 40). In 1968, Aranguren’s “El diálogo futuro entre marxistas y
cristianos” appears in Cristianos y Marxistas: Los problemas de un diálogo. This
emblematic collection of essays edited by Aguirre becomes what Díaz describes as the most
important book on the topic published in Spain, as we shall discuss in Chapter Five (1983:
143, 147; see also Gracia, 1996: 35).

As a result of the public nature of this dialogue, during the 1970s, Marxist ideology,
although still feared and rejected, enjoys a higher degree of toleration, with greater
availability of Marxist materials (see Gracia, 1996: 40-42). During the Transition, there is
an increasing awareness that democratic elections would have no validity as such without
the legalization and inclusion of the PCE in the elections. Therefore, the PCE was legalized
in June 1977 (Preston, 1990: 227). That same year, the PCE adopts Eurocommunism, thus
distancing itself from the much-feared Soviet Republic (see Jordan, 2002: 136). It must also
be noted, however, that after 1968-1969 Marxism experiences a decline in Spain, whose
lasting effects become evident in the unexpectedly low results obtained in the first
democratic elections after Franco’s death (1977) (see Diaz, 2004: 518; see also Jordan,
2002: 164).

3.2.2.2 Aranguren’s relation to Marxism

Several reasons drive Aranguren to turn Marxism into his interlocutor. As ever, his
biographical circumstances play a decisive role. Despite the injustice of his expulsion from
the Universidad Complutense (1965), it is not unreasonable to surmise that, from an
intellectual point of view, being freed – compulsorily, but freed nonetheless – from an
oppressing institution ultimately controlled by the government must have been a liberating
experience; as a result of his being expelled, he accepts a lecturing position abroad, in the
United States. Thus, his expulsion from university marks a turning point for him, because it
opens new horizons for Aranguren – quite literally geographically, but also intellectually.
The distance and perspective acquired during his stay in the United States, his immersion in US consumerist society, and his first-hand experience of the counter-culture promoted by the New Left, particularly at the University of California, all contribute to enhancing, not only his political engagement – which already has started back in Spain – but his awareness of the intrinsic interconnection between socio-economic and political issues. Aranguren himself explains that his choice of Marxism as a subject for discussion is the result of his decision to engage with the course of events, *por comprenderse*, as opposed to just theorising about them (1994, 3: 180-81); thus, highlighting once again his conscious effort to merge his theoretical positions with his actions.

According to Aranguren, Marxism represents the negation of metaphysics, the irruption of freedom in history, and the introduction of the conception that philosophers should change the world (1994, 2: 545). It is important to bear in mind that Aranguren insists on the concept of philosophy as subversion (1994, 5: 519). Consequently, he agrees with Marx in that the aim of philosophy is to transform the world. That is why, for Aranguren, Marxism matters more as *praxis* than as philosophical truth (1994, 2: 552). His discussion focuses on three key points, as we shall now see.

First, aware of the presence of Marxist ideas in a considerable sector of the opposition and equally aware of the rejection of Marxism by Christians, Aranguren – a non-Marxist author – is keen on promoting what he considers to be a very necessary dialogue. He is not interested in addressing Marxism to discard it; he is committed to creating a constructive dialogue with the aim of fostering comprehension on both sides (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 180-81). In fact, both Aranguren and Aguirre turn this into one of their priorities. In order to promote this dialogue, and in an effort to bridge the distance between Christianity, in particular Catholicism, and Communism, Aranguren also highlights that not only do they have in common their moral concern for social justice, but also that they share some of their problems, such as the exaltation of authority, obedience, discipline, and dogmatism (see 1994, 3: 223). On a more positive note, Aranguren also points out that both Catholicism and Communism are slowly overcoming this rigidity (see 1994, 3: 223). For Aranguren, these elements not only provide evidence of the similarities between Catholicism and Communism, but also of their shared need for renewal, which makes dialogue all the more urgent. Hence, Aranguren is convinced that there are lessons to be learnt from Marxism, just as Marxism also has a lot to learn from Christianity (1994, 6: 209). Similarly, in *Soviet Marxism*, Marcuse draws a parallel comparison between capitalism and Communism (1958: 88, 93, 185, 195, 197, 242). These analyses not only provide evidence of the similarities they discuss, but they are also a testimony to the subtlety of both authors, who are keen to overlook the formal differences which separate the above mentioned systems of thought, to reveal their fundamental similarities which should
not be considered as isolated occurrences, but as the manifestation of a shared rationality, that is, instrumental reason.

As a result of this dialogue, Aranguren hopes that those who are Marxist will continue to be so in an informed and reasoned way, and not just as a mere reaction against the regime. Equally, he denounces the way the anti-communist regimes and the mass media in general create a negative emotional response towards Marxism (1994, 3: 24, 59; see also Portero, 2002: 100-01). Aranguren encourages Marxists to become critical so that they “constituyan su marxismo como problema”; at the same time he hopes that “quienes sean anti-marxistas pasen a ser no-marlxistas” (1994: 3, 180-181). In fact, he suggests that “el más eficaz no-comunismo es el que [...] le admite la convivencia política, haciéndole aceptar así las reglas del juego democrático” (1994, 3: 185). Thus, Aranguren highlights the need for and benefits of a tolerant cohabitation (see 1994: 1, 682, 723).

Second, in an attempt to move Christians and Marxists closer, Aranguren is determined to provide evidence of the moral content of the Marxist discourse. Religion is identified at the centre of the discrepancy between Christians and Marxists. Aranguren is convinced of the impossibility of the Marxist quest for rationally ruling religion out of people’s lives (1994, 3: 220). In any case, Aranguren points out that Marx’s position on religion is ambiguous (1994, 3: 221). Marx views religion as a form of expression, mainly the expression of a very real misery (1994, 3: 221). It is in this sense that religion is, for Marx, the product of the social structure that perpetuates the exploitation and alienation of the proletariat. Religion, however, in as much as it represents the need for a sense of justice which is lacking in the worldly reality, is also viewed as protest, although insufficient and evasive in itself, but protest nonetheless (1994, 3: 221). In fact, Aranguren even questions the common assumption that Marx wants to do without religion altogether, describing Marx’s opinion towards it as twofold and ambivalent (1994, 5: 527). Aranguren explains how this interpretation is the result of the phrase “religion is the opium of the people”82 having been taken out of context and having been blown out of proportion (1994, 5: 527).

In addition to this, Aranguren also develops his argument in the opposite direction. He is also keen to suggest that certain forms of Catholic commitment are ideologically very close to Marxism: “repárese en el hecho de que los ‘progresistas católicos’ se agrupan, en los países que se hallan en situación pre-revolutionaria, formando verdaderas sectas [...]”. Y ¿en

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82 This phrase first appeared in 1844 in Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” (see Elster, 1986: 301). Incidentally, in La democracia establecida (1979b), Aranguren makes a counter-reading of Marx’s famous sentence “religion […] is the opium of the people” (Marx, 2002: 171): “yo pienso que si por ‘opio’ no se entiende estupefaciente paralizadore de la actividad mental, sino transposición de ésta al plano de una ‘irrealidad’ exaltante, levantado sobre la ‘realidad’ rastrera, estrechamente pragmática y ‘política’, la expresión de Marx es, dentro de la nueva cultura, perfectamente recuperable” (1994, 5: 527).
qué medida son católicos marxistizados o, más bien, paleo o neomarxistas católicos?” (1994, 1: 725). In spite of the undeniable theoretical differences, Aranguren is determined to highlight the common ground between Christians and Marxists in order to encourage a dialogue, going as far as to state that they both share the same core concern: social justice (see 1994, 3: 156).

Aranguren tries to overcome the perceived dichotomy between Christianity and Marxism by creating a bridge which connects them; he brings out the moralist in Marx. Aranguren argues that beneath Marxism’s scientific veil – which he quickly discards as over-pretentious – there is an underlying morality (1994, 3: 63). He claims that “Marx era moralista en términos socioeconómicos” (1994, 3: 156). He goes on to explain his claim:

porque no pudo hablar un lenguaje abiertamente moral, que no estaba vigente en su época; pero también porque no quiso hacerlo, precisamente por honradez. Frente al abuso de las palabras, tan propio de la era victoriana, conforme al cual todo ciudadano, por proletario que fuese, poseía la libertad abstracta de serlo todo… y la imposibilidad concreta de ser otra cosa que proletario, él luchó por la liberación real consistente en el acortamiento de la jornada de trabajo, en la elevación del trabajo, en la elevación del salario y en la seguridad social; y frente al “idealismo” […], Marx prefirió ser “materialista”. Pero los rótulos son, a veces, engañosos (1994, 3: 156).

In Aranguren’s eyes, Marx develops his materialism mainly because he is more of a moralist in the true sense of the word than the moralists of his time themselves. This may become more evident when Marxism’s aim is re-examined: the self-liberation of the proletariat. Aranguren’s argument is that, insofar as such a liberation is sought, Marxism – independently of Marx’s own terminology – can be considered as a moral movement for it is chiefly concerned with social justice (1994, 2: 458; 1994, 3: 78, 221; see also Camps, 1997: 182). That is why Aranguren does not perceive Marxism itself as a direct threat to Christianity, since, in Aranguren’s view, the moral dimension to Marxism means that Christians and Marxists pursue the very same thing: improving the conditions of our existence so as to allow the flourishing of the human being. Furthermore, in an effort to underscore the common moral ground of Christianity and Marxism, Aranguren points out that both share a common threat, that of capitalism: “una valoración cristiana auténtica y una valoración marxista de la existencia coinciden, la primera confesándolo abiertamente, la segunda no siempre, en que la oposición al capitalismo tiene que ser, ante todo, una oposición moral” (1994, 3: 220). It is not Marxism itself which poses a threat, but, rather, people’s interpretation or understanding of it.

All in all, Aranguren thinks that, historically, Marxism has exerted a good influence on the Catholic Church (1994, 3: 220). In Moral y sociedad (1966), Aranguren highlights that “la Iglesia, hasta bastante después de Marx, se prestó, sin restricción alguna, a representar este papel de aliada al poder civil” (1994, 4: 36). Here, Aranguren’s own ambivalence towards the Church can be observed; whereas Aranguren repeatedly criticizes the involvement of the Church in politics and he complains about the abandonment of the
element of social justice reflected in the distance between the Catholic creed and its praxis, the fact that he uses the past tense to make this statement suggests that these problems have been overcome. Two years later, however, in El marxismo como moral, Aranguren explains that Marxism has had a positive effect on the Catholic Church in the sense that it has encouraged it to recover the social character of its morality and gain awareness of the socio-economic conditionings which have been placed upon Catholic morality (1994, 3: 220). Despite this praise, he quickly becomes more critical of the role of the Catholic Church. Only one year later, in La crisis del catolicismo (1969a), Aranguren questions and urges at the same time the Church’s commitment to let go of its hold of power: “el catolicismo, en su estructura oficial, ¿se desligará de los poderosos o, por debajo de ciertas apariencias y a la hora de la verdad, seguirá vinculado a ellos? La crisis del catolicismo se manifiesta en este campo con extrema necesidad” (1994, 1: 725). That same year, in Memorias y esperanzas españolas (1969b), Aranguren argues that there are still lessons to be learned from Marxism, namely, “la liberación del individualismo, la abertura del hombre a la comunidad y sus problemas, la recuperación de la dimensión social de la moral” (1994, 6: 209; see also 1994, 5: 319-20). Thus, a tension between Aranguren’s will to safeguard the Church and a critique of Catholic practices with the aim of encouraging its evolution can be observed alongside the progression of his own views towards more critical stands.

Third, Aranguren does not defend the righteousness of Communism, but its value as a countervailing power (1994, 3: 58). He explains how Marxism has attempted to offer an alternative to Western civilisation, although its materialisation, Communism, fails to provide such an alternative in the full sense of the word (1994, 5: 588). Despite this failure, Aranguren thinks that Communism performs a valuable, even necessary function: serving as a countervailing power – at least until the creation of the United States of Europe – (1994, 3: 106, 123, 185). Thus, one of the benefits of Communism is that it represents a threat against what Aranguren considers to be the fundamentally unjust social disposition of the Western Welfare State (1994, 2: 554). Despite being positive about the impact that Communism may have on neo-capitalist societies, Aranguren remains critical of the dynamics of both socio-economic formats. In fact, Aranguren, like Marcuse who in Soviet Marxism (1958) draws frequent comparisons between Communism and western capitalism, also draws a critical comparison between the two systems: “cabe también plantearse el problema de si el Welfare State o ‘sociedad de consumo’ no es la réplica práctica al materialismo teórico marxista; y, dando un paso más, si uno y otro modelo, el neocapitalista y el paleocomunista, por parecerse demasiado entre sí, no serían ambos recusables” (Aranguren, 1994, 1: 724-25; see also Bernstein, 1994: 157). Aranguren’s concerns about the western Welfare State grow through time, so that, in fact – as the FS
does – he deals substantially with the new forms of alienation brought about by neo-
capitalism as we shall see in the next section.

In conclusion, there is ample evidence to suggest that Aranguren is very much
interested in Marxism. His engagement with Marxism is moved by an awareness of the
need for a dialogue and a shared sense of social justice. Moreover, Aranguren is aware of
the economic, cultural, moral, and, even, spiritual changes that Spanish society is
undergoing as a result of adopting a capitalist economy. Aranguren is particularly
concerned with the freedom – or lack thereof – that the Spanish Catholic Church allows its
devotees. As a result, he insists on the need to overcome the dogmatism of Catholicism, to
allow for intellectual freedom, and to establish a dialogue with Marxism (see 1994, 1: 723;
see also 1994, 3: 223). He identifies two main factors which hinder this dialogue: the
resistance of the Church to relinquish its position as a political power and the utilitzation
of religion as the ideology of the dominant class (1994, 3: 220-21). In the face of this,
Aranguren expresses his concern with the future of Christianity facing technological
materialism, Marxist Communism, and the different forms of contestation (1994, 5: 201).
At the same time, he also points out some drawbacks of Marxism, or, more precisely,
Communism (1994, 3: 154). He specifically criticizes the elimination of the private sphere
in that every aspect of life is absorbed by the State. As Aranguren explains, traditionally,
according to Plato and Aristotle, “la Ética aparece subordinada a la Política, esto es, la ética
individual y la ética social” (1994, 2: 194). He argues, however, that Communism extracts
extreme conclusions from this, reasoning that ethical is that which benefits the party and
anything which runs counter to its interest would, then, be immoral. Reducing ethics to
social ethics, dismissing the role of individual ethics is, for Aranguren, a serious
shortcoming of Communism (see 1994, 2: 195). Consequently, Aranguren considers
Communism to be a radical political form (1994, 5: 199). As regards the theoretical aspects
of Marxism, the changes brought about by the consumerist society require the abandonment
of Marxism’s intransigence and its adjustment to the new circumstances. Aranguren is
aware of how the evolution of capitalism into what has been referred to as the affluent
society, consumer society, and the subsequent change of perception that it has brought
about, requires a revision of classical Marxism in order to face the challenges of the new
forms of the alienation, the disappearance of the proletariat as understood by Marx, along
with class-consciousness, and all its implications. As Aranguren puts it,

el neocapitalismo, el tránsito de la economía de producción a la de consumo, y el acceso de los
obreros al “bienestar” –buenos sueldos, mucho tiempo libre, automóvil, confort moderno, aparatos
electrodomésticos y televisión para todos– han logrado la asimilación del proletariado blanco a los
As indicated above, although these issues are first formulated by the FS, they are gradually incorporated into Aranguren’s thought comprising his subject matter during this late period of his work as we shall discuss below.

3.2.2.3 The shortcomings of Marxism

Aranguren, like the members of the FS, is painfully aware of the deep changes that society has undergone on its way to becoming a consumerist economy. He is concerned with identifying the new forms of alienation which arise from these changes and which Classical Marxism can no longer address. He briefly explains this in *Memorias y esperanzas españolas* (1969b) using Marx’s own terminology: “Marx dijo bien que la pobreza conduce a la alienación. Lo que no tuvo tiempo de ver es que también el proletariado, fuerza de liberación según él, puede recaer en alienación, precisamente al salir de la pobreza y lograr un bienestar manipulado por los poderosos” (1994, 6: 246-47). Marxism needs to be revised if it is in any way to provide a coherent and suitable framework for critique and action.

Having chosen Marxism as his interlocutor, aware of its shortcomings, Aranguren makes the issues of neo-Marxism his own while taking the FS as his main point of reference (see 1994, 4: 543). Through this process, he experiences a re-evaluation and transformation of his own positions into more progressive and critical ones as we shall see below. The need for the renovation of Marxism will be illustrated with a brief account of some of its main problems. Then, Aranguren’s neo-Marxist critique of consumerist society will be analysed in relation to the FS, so as to clarify his relationship to CT.

The Marxist critique of capitalism falls short on several accounts. First, Communist ethics have an instrumental foundation. In the first stage of Communism, the violence of the proletariat is justified to overcome the existing power structures, thus seizing the State. Then power is given to the State as the great administrator. Hence, ethics is subjugated by the pursuit of power; the individual is subordinated to the community. The result is an inherently repressive society, which, in fact, has many features in common with fascism and, indeed, capitalism, as argued by Marcuse (1958: 93, 197). As Marsal puts it:

*nadie puede negar hoy que el análisis de los marxistas alemanes sobre el fascismo al considerarlo como un aliado “objetivo” del gran capitalismo –la identidad no idéntica– con absoluta independencia de sus connotaciones psicosociales y sus veleidades ideológicas, es fundamentalmente exacto* (1979: 24).

Second, Marxism unnecessarily gives up religion, depriving people of the experience of transcendence some of them may need (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 545; see also 5.3.3). Third, there is an important gap between the theory of what should be done, who should do it, and what shall be accomplished, and the actual pursuit of those goals (see Thiebaut, 2003: 449-51).
Furthermore, Critical Theorist consider that Marxism is in need of revision mainly because there are some aspects of the Marxist critique which are no longer applicable to advanced capitalist societies (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 196, 215; see also Chapter One). The image of the proletariat as opposed to the bourgeois ceases to be functional. As Joe McCarney explains, “the most pressing difficulty that faces anyone who today would be a Marxist in social theory [...] is that the original nomination of the revolutionary subject cannot now be sustained” (1990: 180). The main reason for this is that, with a substantial change in the nature of work, the workforce also changes substantially, becoming the middle class. The methods of control become more subtle, but also more comprehensive; force is relinquished in favour of manipulation – which is far more effective. Thus, the concept of alienation is no longer suitably descriptive, whereas false consciousness becomes an issue instead (see Marcuse, 2005: 78-79; see also Aranguren, 1994, 5: 167).

False consciousness is a controversial concept first used by Engels (see Eagleton, 1991: 89). Whereas eliminating alienation implies the notion of liberation from unwanted influences and constraints, eliminating false consciousness implies the liberation from influences and constraints which go against the individual’s best interests, even though the individual may be unaware of their existence in the first place. As Rosen explains, for the FS, “[false consciousness] registers the central idea that societies have a systematic character and that they are maintained, apparently irrationally in many cases, by virtue of the attitudes and beliefs of those who live in them” (1996: 30). Its relevance lies in that the neo-Marxist critique of manipulation – particularly manipulation of the mass media in the context of political propaganda and commercial advertising – is primarily based on the concept of false consciousness or voluntary servitude as Marcuse refers to it (2005: 78).

Aranguren, aware of the different factors which condition human will, desire, and behaviour, elaborates a critique in order to liberate individuals from such conditionings: “la ética social, así entendida, operaría sobre los condicionamientos biológicos, psíquicos y psicosociales, sociológicos, económicos y políticos de la moral, para conseguir así, indirecta y eficazmente, que los hombres lleguen a ser éticamente mejores” (1994, 3: 35). Marcuse insists on the need to free people from themselves, that is, to overcome false consciousness (see 1958: 92; 1970: 91; 1970a: 32). Similarly, Aranguren also expresses the hope that, once people are liberated from their socio-cultural conditioning, their desires would not go against their best interest. Thus, people would not only have a better chance of fulfilment, but they would have also evolved morally. Aranguren shares with the FS their views of false consciousness, although their terminology differs; Aranguren does not talk about overcoming false consciousness, but about encouraging egoísmo racional instead (see 1994, 3: 87-88; 1994, 2: 669). As Aranguren explains, freedom cannot be granted by any political regime, because it must first be a personal attitude (1994, 2: 459).
False consciousness, however, leads to a circular argument: not only does neo-capitalism create this type of false consciousness, but more importantly, it is this false consciousness that assures the continuity of the system. Thus, it functions as a perpetuating mechanism. False consciousness is, in fact, a complex concept which encounters a number of difficulties; its conflicts with intentionality and agency are amongst the most salient ones.

A full analysis of this term is beyond the scope of the present work (for such an analysis see Rosen, 1996: 24-29, 30-53, 270-75). In an attempt to shed some light on how behaviour may be – with no awareness or unreflectively – structured in such a way that it may go against the individual’s best interests, the concept of habitus put forward by Bourdieu will be compared to that of false consciousness.

One of its most commonly used definitions of habitus can be found in the Logic of Practice:

the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of organizing action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990: 53; see also 2003, 75).

Habitus as described above succeeds in accounting for repetitive patterns of behaviour – often shared with others – which can be explained by psychological and social mechanisms, bypassing the issues of intentionality and agency. It must be noticed, however, that although, according to this account, Bourdieu and the Critical Theorists share the conviction of the existence of a widespread conception of false consciousness in the sense that the agent’s rationalization of his own reality and experiences is inaccurate, they differ significantly in what the cause and solution for this situation may be. In Bourdieu’s view, the relationship between the habitus and the field that agent is embedded in prevents the agent from being able to step aside from the game he is participating in with no awareness of doing so, and will, therefore, perceive his actions as undetermined and free. Due to this sense of integration of the agent into a structure of relationships, but more importantly, of meaning, only an external observer equipped with meta-analytical tools can perceive, expose, and, ultimately, liberate such an agent from these relationships. Bourdieu’s approach, however, is criticized for falling into the scholastic fallacy, that is, Bourdieu’s claim that the researcher has an epistemologically privileged position (see Kyung-Man, 2004: 363). Critical theorists, in contrast, acknowledge the limited epistemological capabilities of the human being, accepting that the perception of totality is neither possible nor desirable; any such attempts would necessarily take a reductionist approach. Not having
a referent or foundation for truth or totality, their understanding of false consciousness does not rest on the truth value of their perceptions and conceptions, but on their role towards the fulfilment of each agent and his subsequent progression as a person, as can be observed in the quotation below:

Under the rule of a repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves (Marcuse, 1964: 7; see also García de la Serrana, 2004: 199).

By re-marrying theory and practice, Critical Theorists hope to empower each individual to re-assess and re-invent his relationships to the existing structures – social structures, but also, more radically, structures of thought. Having said that, the concept of *habitus* remains an illustrative conceptual tool which may bear an explanatory potential which is lacking and, indeed, problematic in false consciousness.

Thus, Aranguren shares with the FS their eagerness to point out the shortcomings of Classical Marxism, but also their interest in its modification. As a result, the FS, but also Aranguren, adopt a neo-Marxist perspective from which they identify the new problems that neo-capitalism presents; they criticize the manipulation of the mass media and the new forms of alienation developed in the consumerist society. Exploring this criticism and its implications will be the focus of the following section.

### 3.2.2.4 A Neo-Marxist critique of advanced capitalism

> “El ‘materialismo’ es la necesidad de los pobres y, hoy, el sórdido lujo de los ricos”

The implicit standpoint of the Marxist and neo-Marxist critique is the Aristotelian premise that the human essence – suppressed by capitalism – may flourish given the right conditions in the society people live in (see Kain, 2001: 3, 25, 52). In contrast, the consumerist behaviour encouraged by a neo-capitalist economy is considered to be to the detriment of the individual. As Aranguren puts it,


What links Aranguren to the FS is that, sharing this premise, they provide a wide-ranging critique of neo-capitalist society in the hope that such a critique will contribute to creating a freer, fairer, and more rational society where each individual is allowed and encouraged to participate in a process of self-government and of personal development. As we shall see
below, Aranguren’s analysis of democracy suggests that such a society will only flourish in a genuinely democratic system.

Aranguren explains that “democracia es participación activa del pueblo en el gobierno, democracia es elección, o dicho en el expresivo lenguaje político-popular, ‘elecciones’” (1994, 3: 108). Despite his continuous defence of democracy, existing democracy is far from fulfilling the characteristics of what Aranguren calls an authentic democracy: “una democracia meramente formal no es todavía una democracia, aun cuando lo parezca, si no ha establecido, como punto de partida, una igualdad de oportunidades para todos los que de verdad quieran aprovecharlas” (1994, 4: 189-90; see also 1994, 5: 431). For this reason, the possibility of democracy is dependant on the economic development of the nation (see 1994, 3: 136). Hence, Aranguren describes existing democracy as merely formal and insufficient (1994, 3: 128-29; 1994, 4: 248). Nonetheless, Aranguren says – making a humorous reference to the deficiencies of existing democracy – that “mi posición es clara: pienso, con Churchill, que la democracia (parlamentaria) establecida es el peor de los regímenes imaginables –con excepción de todos los demás…– que hasta ahora se han realizado” (1994, 5: 469). That is why he considers it necessary to strive for a utopian democracy which he adopts as a reference, guide, and aim (1994, 5: 400-01). According to Aranguren, “la democracia no es un status en el que pueda un pueblo cómodamente instalarse. Es una conquista ético-política de cada día, que sólo a través de una autocritica siempre vigilante puede mantenerse. Es más una aspiración que una posesión” (1994, 3: 111; see also 1994, 3: 108, 123). Thus, democracy is utopian in its very nature in the etymological sense of u-topia: not a place. For Aranguren, democracy, like utopia, is not a place, not even a state, but an aspiration and a process as seen above. Its high standards also account for its utopian nature, for the moral, ethical, political, and, even, educational demands it places on its agents can hardly be met, and, yet, cannot be given up (Aranguren, 1994, 3: 104-05). As Camps puts it, Aranguren “propugnó el compromiso, pero con la utopia, no con la imperfecta realidad” (1997: 185; see also 184). Although Aranguren does provide some suggestions of how to develop and achieve a genuinely democratic society, he does not put forward a detailed plan to do so. His focus is largely the critique of the existing – merely formal – democracy, as we shall see below.

Given that democracy rests on the possibility of free choice which requires sufficient information, Aranguren identifies communication as one of the key pillars of democracy. According to him, “la auténtica democracia es un sistema omnidireccional de comunicación. Nuestra ‘democracia’, el monopolio unidireccional de la comunicación” (1994, 5: 431; see also 114-15). With this concise phrase, Aranguren is making reference not only to the less than optimal levels of participation in the democratic process, but also to the very mechanics of such a process (1994, 3: 122; 1994, 5: 74-75). He criticizes the
limited availability of participation in this prefabricated democracy, the limited information, the lack of real choice given the manipulative environment in which individuals are immersed, and the deficiencies of political education (1994, 3: 108-09; 1994, 5: 74, 113, 125, 167; see also Wright, 2002: 78).

Thus, Aranguren is highly critical of the systems of communication: “La democracia ha sido ya descrita, en términos de ciencia moderna, como un sistema de comunicaciones entre el poder funcionalmente especializado y la masa” (1994, 3: 134; see also 1994, 5: 78). Concerned with this gap, Aranguren criticizes the use of the mass media and its effects, addressing the issue of manipulation. It is possible, however, to observe a changing, even, contradictory attitude towards the subject of manipulation, which bears testimony to the evolution of Aranguren’s thought. In La comunicación humana (1965) – this is, before his stay in the United States – Aranguren contemplates the possibility of the existence of manipulation by the mass media and quickly discards it (1994, 5: 91-92). Instead, he discusses “comunicación instrumental”, which refers to any communication whose aim is to produce a pre-established response in the receptor (1994, 5: 69; see also Gouldner, 2002: 84; Wright, 2002: 76-79). In contrast, in Entre España y América (1974) he fearlessly denounces manipulation:

el hombre americano de la “mayoría silenciosa” se siente libre porque puede elegir entre diversos modelos de automóviles, entre diversas marcas de otros, de todos los bienes de consumo, entre diversas confesiones religiosas y entre dos partidos políticos –últimamente entre Humphrey y Nixon–. E incluso moverse y elevarse dentro de una escala: pasar de baptista a merodista [sic], a unitario, a episcopaliano; pasar de demócrata a republicano; pasar de consumidor de Chevrolet, a través de toda la gama, a consumidor de Cadillae, o bien de consumidor de Ford a consumidor de Lincoln.

¿Es ésta una elección real? No. [...] porque tal asimilación es, en realidad, un conformismo conseguido por la manipulación o persuasión escasamente racional, lograda a través de los medios de comunicación colectivos (1994, 5: 167).

The influence that American culture and the existing socio-political atmosphere at the time have on him is palpable, encouraging him to take a critical stand towards an unsatisfactory cultural ideal, that of consumerist and technological society (see 1994, 5: 167).

The evolution of his thought can also be observed in reference to the issue of the homogenization of society. Even though in 1965 Aranguren is not ready to use the word manipulation, he is still concerned with the effect that the mass media have on society. An instance of such homogenization is pointed out even earlier, in La juventud europea y otros ensayos (1961), in relation to the phenomenon which he describes as aburguesamiento, the adoption of a bourgeois attitude. He describes this bourgeois attitude as “sentir como necesidades las presentadas como tales por la técnica moderna de la propaganda al servicio del capitalismo” (1994, 4: 194). As a result of having raised the standard of living, with individuals having a greater spending power than they or their parents used to before the adoption of a capitalist economy in Spain, the patterns of education, employment, and
leisure, particularly travel, pursued by young people, suggest to Aranguren that the distance which separates different social classes is disappearing. Instead, there is great mobility, both geographical and social, which results in a social levelling effect (1994, 4: 194). For this reason, still in _La juventud europea y otros ensayos_ (1961), Aranguren wonders if Western society has chosen a bloodless path to reaching the material objectives of Soviet social philosophy (1994, 4: 194-95).

In contrast, in _La comunicación humana_ (1965), Aranguren is more critical of such homogenization; he claims that mass media leads to the homogenization of the people into a differentless mass, which results in their conformism and the creation of a sense of consensus (see 1994, 5: 74-76). After his prolonged stay in the United States, in _Entre España y América_ (1974), Aranguren is ready to denounce homogenization as the result of the process of manipulation of the mass media. In this text, he analyses one specific aspect of this homogenization, the assimilation of difference into sameness (1994, 5: 166-67). He criticizes this assimilation process for two reasons:

en primer lugar porque, además de las reducidas comunidades indias, hay dos grandes etnias, la negra y la de los mejicano-americanos, que se hallan excluidas de la posibilidad misma de la asimilación. Y, en segundo lugar, porque tal asimilación es, en realidad, un conformismo conseguido por la manipulación o persuasión escasamente racional, lograda a través de los medios de comunicación colectivos (1994, 5: 167).

His concern with the influence of the mass media on the will of the individual, even if in _La comunicación humana_ (1965) he is still not really to refer to it as manipulation, can also be observed in his discussion of the concept of propaganda. In _La comunicación humana_, according to Aranguren, “las fronteras entre la información y la propaganda son difíciles de fijar, no solamente por ésta sino también por otra razón: la interferencia de la política en la información” (1994, 5: 89). He explains how linguistic evidence of the impossibility of determining where publicity stops and information begins and vice versa, can be found in the changes in the use of the Spanish words “propaganda”, which etymologically means to propagate information, and “publicidad”, which originally means to make a piece of information public (1994, 5: 89). He argues that the deliberately political content of this “propagation” with the aim of influencing people’s opinions and behaviours motivated the Ministry of Propaganda to become the Ministry of Information (1994, 5: 89). Aranguren’s conclusion is that the blur between propaganda and information is revealed in the attempt of the media to maintain an appearance of objectivity. His point is that often information is tainted by political or economic interests:

Mas cuando la prensa no es controlada por el Estado, suele serlo por las grandes empresas capitalistas, que interpretan la información, con ligeras variaciones, según tendencias muy semejantes, permitiéndose así una libertad más formal que real, pues los periódicos que se mantienen independientes de los grandes intereses difícilmente pueden hacer, faltos de posibilidades competitivas, sino tiradas muy cortas, y así su significación e influencia es mucho más “simbólica” que efectiva. Por eso la socialización de las emisoras de radio y televisión es, en el mundo actual, la
única manera de salvaguardar la libertad de información: que tales emisoras se constituyan en “servicios públicos” a los que todos los grupos político-sociales, cualquiera que sea su ideología, tengan acceso por igual (1994, 5: 72).

Aranguren suggests that information, when mediated by economic interests which are common to different companies, becomes one-sided; differences are minimal and there is no real critical, socio-political, or economic discussion. He highlights the importance of the economic and ideological independence of the mass media in order to ensure the quality and impartiality of the information they transmit. Far from being independent, if the services of information are run by the State, their political integrity is compromised, whereas if they are privately owned, they are subjected to the demands of the market. The mass media are dependent on consumption in as much as they become a product to be marketed.

Hence, Aranguren identifies the subordination of the mass media to the market as one of the key factors affecting the reliability and quality of the information transmitted. As a result, he considers that the information being transmitted is little in quantity and possibly biased, in the sense that it will be difficult to tell where propaganda stops and information begins; furthermore, it tends to be general and superficial so as not to disappoint any group of viewers (1994, 3: 107; 1994, 5: 74, 90). According to Aranguren, the mass media aim to entertain the audience with trivia so that they cannot gain a global perspective and full awareness of what is going on (1994, 5: 91). The result is that, despite the questionable quality of the information received – or precisely because of this – people still feel thirsty for information (see Aranguren 1994, 5: 91). His thesis is that this is a thirst which they often attempt to quench with the consumption of novelty – not information – in the realm of leisure in the form of films, books, and plays, to mention but a few.

During the early 1960s, Aranguren already shows a growing awareness of the phenomenon of consumption: “el hombre necesita hoy consumir sin cesar tiempo, dinero e información. Todo está intimamente ligado en una ‘forma de vida’, que nos puede gustar o no, pero que es la que ha adoptado para sí el hombre occidental” (1994, 5: 92; see also 1994, 5: 147). Thus, Aranguren becomes highly critical of the consumerist economy because of how it affects the quality and integrity of the products sold, but also individuals, who become consumers:

lo característico de ésta [economía] es que, en ella, el consumidor se ve atribuido el papel fundamental de motor de la rueda producción-consumo. Ha de ser, necesariamente –con necesidad impuesta por el sistema económico– el consumidor insaciable que demanda bienes de uso siempre nuevos y absolutamente innecesarios. Pero justamente por ser tan importante su función no puede confiársele, sin más, a su iniciativa, sino que es menester, a toda costa, estimular ésta. Para ello se monta todo un sistema de publicidad o propaganda que, mediante una perfecta técnica sociológica, psicológica y aun psicoanalítica del anuncio, alumbre en el consumidor una fuente incesante de necesidades siempre renovadas y de necesidades de prestigio y status social (1994, 3: 158).
Thus, publicity is identified as the key component of the consumerist economic structure, so that when consumption increases, so does production. For this reason, from Aranguren’s perspective, the welfare society constantly creates new needs and the impression of scarcity with the purpose of increasing consumption and prices (1994, 4: 543-44). That is why Aranguren’s critique of consumerist society cannot be understood without his reflections on the concept of manipulation. It is this constant fabrication of needs what makes Aranguren conclude that

sí, sin duda es improbable que un campesino andaluz que se muere de hambre se convierta en crítico del consumismo. Sólo quien ha pasado ya por esa forma de “felicidad” que brinda la sociedad americana establecida puede sentir su insuficiencia (1994, 5: 168; see also 1994, 2: 559; 1994, 3: 165; 1994, 4: 443; 1994, 5: 587).83

Aranguren explains that the American citizen in the silent majority feels free because he can choose amongst different automobile brands, amongst a multitude of commodities, different religions, and two political parties; yet, Aranguren questions the possibility of the existence of real choice, real freedom, that is, real democracy (1994, 5: 167). It is possible to observe how he takes the United States as a point of reference as regards the development of the consumerist society and its effects on politics and the individual. He argues that, considering the manipulation exercised by the mass media, the choices made in the political, economic, or, even, personal aspects of life, such as leisure, cannot be qualified as free or rational:

la manipulación publicitaria se traspone del plano económico al político exactamente con la misma técnica. El ciudadano es tan libre, o tan poco libre –según se consideren las cosas–, como el consumidor. Enteramente libre de coacción violenta, pero heterocondicionado –al menos mayoritariamente– por la presión social ejercida mediante los medios de comunicación de masas a los que, como no tenga una mente extremadamente crítica e independiente, es muy difícil que pueda resistir (Aranguren, 1994, 3: 159; see also 1994, 1: 775; 1994, 2: 689-90; 1994, 3: 53, 109, 158).

Aranguren emphasizes that the tendency in the Western world is to substitute terror with manipulation (1994, 2: 595; 1994, 3: 158):

el Welfare State o Estado de bienestar no es totalitario, puesto que no pretende absorber la vida entera, ni se impone por la coacción y la violencia. Es, en cambio, “manipulador” del ciudadano al que, como contrapartida de su sometimiento a la manipulación, le garantiza el bienestar, la abundancia y la seguridad. Esta manipulación es doble: manipulación económica y manipulación política (1994, 3: 158).

In Ética y política (1963), Aranguren is of the opinion that a preference for manipulation over coercion and violence indicates that the Welfare State cannot be considered totalitarian. As time goes by, in El marxismo como moral (1968), he reconsiders this position (1994, 3: 109). In fact, Propuestas morales (1983), he describes this

83 It should be noted that, as de Miguel points out, “el disgusto que le produce a Aranguren la sociedad de consumo no es por lo material, sino por lo moral” (1997: 27-28). Like Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man (1964), Aranguren’s aim is not to reject material abundance or technological advances, but their role and use in consumerist societies, which renders the individual subservient to them, instead of contributing towards his self-actualization.
generalized manipulation as a totalitarian form of government (1994, 2: 595). The Welfare State is considered totalitarian because of the lack of freedom that manipulation entails, but also because of the extent of its reach, its ubiquitousness. The reach of the mass media has lead to its presence in and invasion of the private sphere. Moreover, the division between private and public becomes blurred for the individual and for the politician. As a result, Aranguren implicitly suggests a parallelism between the Welfare State and fascist regimes by reminding us of the masterful utilization of the mass media as a powerful tool of manipulation made by fascist regimes:

el fascismo consistió en una utilización de las masas como material plástico, en el doble sentido de esta última palabra: moldeable a voluntad, gracias a las dotes estéticas o histriónicas de fascinación que había de poseer el Duce o el Führer, y susceptible de ordenaciones estéticas y rítmicas de valor plástico (1994, 5: 77; see also 76).

Democratic societies, however, maintain the appearance of freedom of choice. According to Aranguren, “la pregunta que hay que hacer, puesto que están siendo manipulados, no es si en efecto quieren tal o cual cosa (lo previsto desde arriba), sino si les será posible querer otra cosa” (1994, 2: 595). Manipulation in democratic societies involves lack of real choice, not because of the unavailability of choices and alternatives, but because of the individual’s ignorance of his own manipulation, that is, because of false consciousness (see Marcuse, 1979: 145). It is in this sense that, for Aranguren, the dictatorship of manipulation is worse than that of terror (1994, 2: 595). This has a far-reaching consequence: there is no distinctive agency. There is no one person, institution, political party, or regime against which to direct the individual’s anger, frustration, or unhappiness; there is no immediate agency to make directly responsible or to take action against, thus adding to the confusion and sense of loss of the individual (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 434; see also Marcuse, 1979: 32). On other occasions, Aranguren points to the Establishment, understood as those who after the Civil War enjoyed a comfortable economic and political position, as the agents of power (see 1994, 5: 172; 1994, 4: 425-432, 583-84, 586-90). It is precisely because of having identified the responsibility of the Establishment that Aranguren does not share the sense of hopelessness that runs through much of Marcuse’s work. In contrast, with this awareness, Aranguren feels democracy empowers Spanish citizens to take control over their own socio-economic and political destinies. Awareness of manipulation and its effects are, thus, vital to allow the process of liberation and empowerment. To this end, Aranguren discusses at length the effects of the mass media in Ética y política (1963), La comunicación humana (1965), and La democracia establecida (1979b). Apathy, a powerful ally of power, is pointed out as one of the effects of the manipulation of the mass media (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 74-76).

Apathy is a serious challenge for democracy because, whereas the essential feature of democracy is participation, apathy undermines participation and results in conformity (see
Aranguren, 1994, 3: 122; 1994, 5: 406, 418). That is why Aranguren concludes that in order to have a genuinely democratic society a profound change must take place, although not a mere political change, but a generalized personal one:

Para que haya verdadera democracia, lo hemos visto ya, tiene que producirse una auténtica conversión del hombre privado en hombre público. Cada ciudadano ha de anteponer el interés del Estado a su interés particular; más aún, debe vivir, obrar y pensar, ante todo, para la patria (1994, 3: 104-05).

Aranguren points to rhetoric as one of the main causes of political apathy because it obscures the political discussion and makes it very difficult for people to have an opinion about that which they cannot understand (1994, 5: 124-25). The challenge remains how to achieve political involvement. According to Aranguren, a healthy democratic society, where there is a successful process of communication and a comprehensive understanding of the problems and challenges faced, where individuals are concerned and involved with politics, can only be achieved by means of education: political, economic, and moral education (1994, 2: 711; 1994, 3: 89, 109; 1994, 5: 93, 113). Aranguren sees a direct connection between interest and awareness. His emphasis on education suggests that he believes that a process of enlightenment or awareness will result in the empowerment of those who undergo such a process, in such a way that it would have an objective social impact, hence his consistent emphasis on the importance of education, particularly political education. Aranguren also recognises the value of movements such as environmentalism and pacifism as effective ways of involving people in the political arena (see 1994, 2: 664, 666). It must be stressed, however, that Aranguren envisages a very different concept of socio-political transformation from that of the Enlightenment or Marxism, both of which, as Camps explains, expect the individual citizen to be the moralizing and revolutionary force which ultimately created the desired State (1997: 182). This is an unsatisfactory approach because “el Estado parece ser un fenómeno originario, que debe tener implícito el poder de su propia transformación” (Camps, 1997: 182). Instead, Aranguren advocates what he calls “ética de la aliedad” (1994, 3: 147-65; see also Bonete, 1997: 276): an understanding of ethics which results insufficient unless it is linked to a social project, hence his emphasis on co-habitation and co-responsibility (see Camps, 1997: 182; see also 3.2.1.1). That is why, ethics must be intrinsically linked to politics and transformation can only take place in stages; the individuals transform their society and their institutions at the same time, and the State also promotes social justice and self-development, which in turn, would have an effect on the individuals who would also affect the State. Hence, this understanding of ethics advocates the individual integrate into their community and from it to develop a process of spiral personal and socio-political transformation.
The level of commitment expected from the individual, however, is problematic. Marcuse suggests that liberated individuals organized as a community may unite and transcend their selfish interests and impulses (1970b: 150). Similarly, in *Ética y política* (1963a), Aranguren seems to suggest the subordination of the individual to the State, not so much the naïve assumption that there will be no conflict of interests between the two of them, but rather defining the role of the State as seeking the common good. To this effect, he explains that “el ‘bien común’, debe prevalecer por encima de las ganancias o beneficios de las ‘grandes sociedades’ y por encima también de un Estado concebido como poder y dominación” (1994, 3: 163). Having said that, despite this caution against the State as power and domination, Aranguren seems to believe that defending the State’s interests will have a positive repercussion on the individuals who form it. As he puts it: “en definitiva, las decisiones fundamentales para la sociedad han de hacerse desde el Estado y por el Estado” (see 1994, 3: 145; see also 111, 163). As a result, Aranguren defends the role of a paternalistic State whose intervention should not stop at the economic realm, but should also include the spheres of leisure time, education, and the search for justice, welfare, and equality. In his own words: “pero la planificación no debe limitarse al plano económico. El Estado moderno no puede ser éticamente neutral” (1994, 3: 146). Still in *Ética y política* (1963), when discussing the motivations for the intervention of the State in implementing social measures, particularly in reference to socialist government, Aranguren explains that “el motor no puede ser –no debe ser– el interés capitalista determinado a dar la primacía a los bienes suntuarios de consumo para conseguir así, como un subproducto ético, el bienestar material de todos, sino la organización, inspirada en una auténtica voluntad de justicia, de dar a cada uno lo suyo, de la democratización económico-social” (1994, 3: 162). That is why, as mentioned above, Camps highlights that Aranguren opts for a political approach which must be intrinsically moral, as opposed to a political morality, that is, the subordination of morality to politics; thus, for him, “la política debe aspirar a ser moral; la moral no debe condescender ante los condicionantes de la política” (1997: 181; see also 182).

This intrinsically moral State would, then, be obliged to adopt a paternalistic attitude so as to put in place the necessary mechanisms to promote social justice. Despite this necessity, Aranguren is well aware that such paternalistic interventionism on the part of the

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84 By embedding this quest for social justice in democratic co-ordinates, Aranguren indicates the central role that morality ought to play in socio-political and economic organization. At the same time, because of his advocacy of the separation between Church and State, these guiding moral principles can only arise from a heteronomous morality (see Aranguren, 1994, 3: 221). It is, therefore, coherent that as a result of these positions, Aranguren does not consider the formulation of a specific proposal of how to achieve such a society as his role. Furthermore, such a specific and comprehensive formulation would, in his eyes, be undesirable because it would also be necessarily limiting.
State results in the limitation of the freedom of the individual. This, however, seems to be a sacrifice which he is willing to justify on account of the greater common good referred to above. As he puts it, “se trata de limitar en cierta medida la libertad precisamente para salvaguardarla y para la democratización de su núcleo esencial” (1994, 3: 163).

The preponderance of the State’s interests over those of the individual, however, echoes the structure of Totalitarian regimes such as Communism and Fascism. Upon this realization, Aranguren becomes more aware of the tension between individual and the State, and the individual and society and, like the FS, draws a comparison between the two of them. Such a comparison is absorbed by Aranguren’s discourse and, although he does not explicitly develop its implications, allusions to such a comparison can be found in reference to other issues, particularly manipulation, as can be observed in this example: “ahora bien, los regímenes políticos de nuestro tiempo, lo mismo los totalitarios que los que pretenden no ser tales, para mover a las masas recurren con frecuencia al llamado ‘culto de la personalidad’” (1994, 3: 107; see also above). He perceives society, rather than as a nurturing community, as a hostile atmosphere and source of multiple threats to the individual which often shapes and limits the possibilities for personal and social development through the manipulation of the mass media. As Aranguren puts it in Entre España y América (1974) in relation to North American society,

verdaderamente la sociedad americana de hoy, manipulada por esos mismos medios de comunicación de masas […], por la “maquinaria” de una organización de los partidos que impide toda opción política real y por la voluntad de poder de las fuerzas económicas, militares y políticas que gobiernan el país, no ayuda a ser optimista (1994, 1: 775).

Regarding the issue of manipulation, the question that inevitably arises is: how is it possible to become aware of being manipulated in the first place? Aranguren argues that he is personally aware of this manipulation due to his role as intellectual, that is, his informed and critical attitude towards the Establishment (1994, 2: 638-39, 641; 1994, 4: 236-39; 1994, 5: 19-20, 69, 417-18). It is through education and his critique that Aranguren hopes to awaken an equally critical attitude in the reader, who would, then, become aware of his own false consciousness, initiating a process of liberation. Despite the vital role Aranguren assigns to education, particularly on the areas of communication, politics, and ethics, there is an elitist air to his positions, due to the privileged position he allocates the intellectual. The intellectual is supposedly aware and above the manipulation of the mass media and of the economic constraints which may influence his reasoning. Not only does the intellectual exercise the role of the invigilator from a political and moral point of view, but the intellectual is also able to free himself from false consciousness. Awarding intellectuals this high ground brings up the question of who invigilates the invigilators. Although Aranguren does not address this issue directly, given his assumptions on human nature, however, this question becomes irrelevant for him, for, if intellectuals performed their role successfully
and qualitatively change society, there would not be any need for invigilators at all – which remains an elitist position which he shares with the FS.

There is, in conclusion, sufficient evidence to conclude that Aranguren’s later thought is strongly influenced by the FS, to the point that he makes their preoccupations his own and develops his work in a manner consistent with the Critical Theorists’s approach. Aranguren develops a comprehensive critique of neo-capitalism, focusing on the issues of consumerism, mass media, manipulation, and mass society with the aim of liberating the individual (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 714; 1944, 5: 69, 328, 379-382, 440, 460-70, 472, 482-83, 485-86). It is for these reasons, that Aranguren can, therefore, be considered a Critical Theorist himself.

It must be added, however, that whereas Aranguren, like the members of the Frankfurt School, does not affiliate himself to any political party, with the advent of democracy, he considers that one of the main aims of this critical approach is precisely to have an impact on the political realm, so as to effectively crystallize Critical Theory’s transformative aspirations as described at the beginning of this thesis. Furthermore, he considers – along with many Spaniards – that the Transition is a period of change, renovation, and hope, when longed-for utopias have an actual chance of realization. This is, for Aranguren, a period which necessarily demands the political engagement, not only of intellectuals and politicians, but of the population at large, because only then – aided by a progressive programme of political education as indicated above – can a true transformative process take place in the form of an emancipated democratic society. Hence, whereas Critical Theory is often regarded as a negative philosophy as discussed in the introduction, Aranguren places Critical Theory in Spain in the context of positive action.

Motivated by his religious beliefs as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Aranguren strives throughout his career for social justice, towards which he contributes with his theoretical efforts in the fields of ethics and communication, but also with a more practical approach as he performs the task of the intellectual. Therefore, although Aranguren does not explicitly focus on the subject of religion in the later stages of this thought his personal religious commitment is incorporated in it and manifests itself throughout his work.

Such high hopes become, of course, doomed by the limitations of reality and its agents, giving way to a generalized feeling of disillusionment which is referred to as desencanto (see 2.2). Even then, Aranguren considered his self-appointed task as a critic more crucial than ever. His most radical refusal in this context is his refusal to adopt the pessimistic immobility often associated with the FS.

Aranguren’s faith in the democratic process is, in fact, in stark contrast with Marcuse’s Great Refusal: “Marcuse rejected, and continued to reject until the end of his life, the idea that transformation could be accomplished, furthered, or even aided by working within the existing democratic institutions [. . .]. Thus, the Great Refusal was a refusal to engage in liberal democratic politics. But it also seemed a refusal to engage in any type of politics or action” (Chambers, 2004: 224). As Marcuse himself puts it at the end of *One-Dimensional Man*: “the critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future, holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative” (1964: 257).
Aranguren’s theoretical contributions are designed to have a practical effect on himself as a writer, but also on his readers, awakening the individual to become a critical, participative, and creative member of society. In Aranguren’s own words, “la lección de mayo del 68 es la de la profundidad del cambio y, consiguientemente, la de la necesidad de un trabajo lento y asimismo en profundidad, para su logro cultural” (1994, 5: 507). Hence, much of his later work is dedicated to bring about this change; his theoretical work is also his praxis, his moral vivida, his resistance (Aranguren, 1994, 2: 606; Cerezo, 1991b: 81-84; see Soldevilla, 2004: 123-143; see also Camps, 1997: 181-189). Thus, it is possible to observe that Aranguren’s writings, like those of Zambrano and Aguirre, are intended to have a performative character. His hope is that his critical stand will have an impact in the political, but also moral decisions of his contemporaries. His relevance lies in that, as Lannon explains, “in these circumstances, any major shift of religious sensibility, any severe questioning of intellectual presuppositions, was likely to modify the vocabulary and tone of political discussion, and ultimately to affect political values and expectations” (1987: 243).

Despite this, Aranguren, like Marcuse and the rest of the members of the School, while a supporter of political dissidence, critique, and reform, refrains from suggesting any specific political pedagogical reform or programme (see Chambers 2004: 228). Whereas this has often been interpreted as a lack of commitment or consistency, it is, in fact, the direct result of their theoretical framework, where the role of a heterodox and autonomic ethics as well as the necessary separation between the critique and the politician would make it inappropriate and counter-productive for Aranguren – or any Critical Theorist as understood by the FS – to develop such a normative programme.

As indicated above, Aranguren, like Aguirre and Zambrano, eludes providing practical details of the specific organization of his political project, since the formalism of such a system would act as a constraint impeding the free development of each individual as such. In spite of this, he still points to intellectuals as one of the first steps towards providing the necessary framework for people to reach a stage in which they can freely engage in politics.
4 Demystifying Zambrano

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the political dimension of Zambrano’s work and how her experiences of the particular historical time she lives in serve her as an intellectual starting point, which she uses to widen her understanding of this period, provide a critique and an alternative to the established patterns of rationality by developing her razón poética — from now on referred to as poetic reason — whose nature and implications shall be discussed below. As Mercedes Gómez Blesa puts it,

el pensamiento de María Zambrano constituye una de las reflexiones más radicales sobre el logos filosófico de nuestra tradición, reflexión que abre dos vías o caminos paralelos en su trayectoria intelectual. Por un lado, una vía de negación o de crítica frente a la razón discursiva de la tradición metafísica, que se traduce en un análisis genealógico de dicha razón, a través del cual María Zambrano denuncia la voluntad de dominio del logos sobre lo real, voluntad que se concreta en su actitud violenta e impositiva hacia la alteridad al querer subsumirla en el espacio del pensamiento (2006: 37)

On the other hand, Gómez Blesa adds, poetic reason constitutes a positive alternative, as opposed to mere critique as she shall see in the course of the present chapter (2006: 37).

Zambrano’s thought can be described as superador. Superador is an adjective which has no exact equivalent in English. It comes from the verb superar, which means to go beyond or overcome. Thus, Zambrano’s thought is essentially understood as an attempt to overcome previous limitations or difficulties. It must be noted that the Spanish adjective superador does not commit to conveying what is overcome, or even if they – whatever these limitations or difficulties are – have been successfully overcome. Instead, this adjective focuses on the intention and attempt to overcome them. Even though this lack of commitment may seem to indicate that this adjective is essentially uninformative, it is actually very well-suited to describe Zambrano’s work because, instead of being limited to one task, it suggests that the essence of her thought consists of the action of overcoming in an abstract sense, in general; her thought is set to overcome existing patterns of thought and behaviour, in other words, to overcome the established framework of rationality. As we shall see in the course of this chapter, reasoning, for Zambrano, is articulated through language, to the point that the language used shapes and limits the scope of thought and expression. That is why Zambrano sets out to specifically overcome these limitations of language by developing poetic reason. Thus, by overcoming the limitations of language and of the established framework of rationality, specific aspects of the manifestations of human existence, such as personal, social, and political ones, may also be overcome as we shall see below. It is in this holistic sense that Zambrano’s thought can be described as superador or overcoming.
Zambrano, by conscious choice and with the purpose of being consistent with the content of her work, does not develop her thought systematically (see Maillard, 1990: 27). In fact, Zambrano considers that Spanish thought has not traditionally developed systematically and warns against the dangers of systematic thought (1939: 34). Nevertheless, and in contrast with Maillard, who claims that it would be a mistake to present Zambrano’s thought as an integrated philosophy, I argue that, despite her thought not being systematic, Zambrano does produce a consistent œuvre (see Maillard, 1990: 28). Maillard goes on to explain that the reason for this is that every interpretation is necessarily a distortion of the original thought, in as much as in order for the interpretation to be possible, it requires a re-thinking of the original (see Maillard, 1990: 28). This is particularly true in the case of Zambrano’s thought, whose poetic style invites the re-interpretation of its words. As Revilla Guzmán explains, Zambrano’s work continues to offer new possibilities for its interpretation, which, partly, “surgen de mi experiencia particular de lectura” (2005: 212). Re-interpretation, however, does not necessarily imply misinterpretation or distortion. In fact, I shall argue throughout the thesis that an important characteristic of poetic reason is, precisely, that it is designed to be appropriated and reinterpreted by each reader. Consequently, I do not suggest that Zambrano develops a finished, complete philosophy, but, rather, as we shall see in the course of this chapter, an open, yet coherent, project, which Revilla Guzmán describes as “un proyecto de revelación del ser humano, de alcance ético y radicalmente personal” (2004: 3).

Because of the absence of a system, a comprehensive approach to her work involves a substantial process of reconstruction based on the numerous clues that she sparingly leaves throughout her work (see 4.4 which is devoted to the reconstruction of her thought). Moreover, the unveiling and reconstruction of the premises and assumptions which underlie Zambrano’s thought is essential to understand the nature, implications, and range of her critique and her alternative, poetic reason. Hence, it is not until these have been analysed that we can delve into the discussion of poetic reason, which is why such discussion does not take place until section 4.4.6.

Two premises found in her thought will guide this analysis: the intentionality and coherence of her work. First, this intentionality can be found by analysing some crucial aspects of her biography, as we shall see below. Second, the coherence of her work can be observed not by analysing her work as a totality, because that would imply a self-sufficient, complete, product, but by the holistic approach to her work and persona. In order to do this, her recurrent main themes as well as their development will be explored. These themes include the analysis of the self, the concept of a person as opposed to an individual, her views on politics, the structure of time, and transcendence. Doing so is particularly important because one of the idiosyncrasies of Zambrano’s thought is the connectedness of
her philosophy; it is not possible to fully understand any isolated concept of hers if it is not in relation to the rest of her work. This is so because two of the underlying premises of her thought are the interrelation of being and the transcendence of reality, concepts which shall be explored at length in the course of this chapter.

Before proceeding with the rest of the chapter, one more feature of Zambrano’s thought and expression should be highlighted, because it has a decisive influence in the analysis that follows. This feature is best expressed by Abellán, who puts it as follows:

una cierta familiaridad con el pensamiento de María Zambrano, cuya obra vengo frecuentando desde hace más de veinte años, me ha llevado al convencimiento de que una comprensión profunda de su pensamiento y de su significado más hondo, exige haber sufrido un proceso iniciático que nos permita acceder a su declarado hermetismo (Abellán, 2006: 71).

Heidegger’s thought also requires a certain degree of initiation as a result of his ontological language, without an understanding of which his writings would be inaccessible (see 4.4.5.3). This, however, does not happen in Zambrano’s work, because in her case, this initiation does not require having learnt the use of certain vocabulary or intellectual concepts, but having an experiential baggage which would allow a greater degree of empathy towards her thought, but also a deeper level of access to it (see 4.4.3). Thus, biography and experientiality – an epistemological perspective heavily informed by lived experience – play central roles in accessing and understanding Zambrano’s work, which is why they are also central to the present analysis as we shall see below (see 4.2 and 4.4.3).

This chapter shall consist of three core parts, an introductory section, which will provide a historical and biographical frame of reference, a section which will explore her political views, and a final one focused on the reconstruction of the working premises that inform her thought.

4.2 Biography

“Pero la vida humana es traspasar límites y tiempo, trascender la separación” (Zambrano, 1996b: 170).

As indicated above, the interrelationship between Zambrano’s life and work is particularly significant in her because of the personal nature of her writings; thus, her intellectual work is directly linked to her personal evolution (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 5; see also Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 50, 212). As she puts it: “no se escribe ciertamente por necesidades literarias, sino por necesidad que la vida tiene de expresarse” (2004d: 25).

This interrelationship is also present in the opposite direction, for as Soldevilla puts it, “ha sido sobre todo María ZAMBRANO [sic] quien ha defendido con más énfasis la tradición española de pensamiento según la cual la articulación entre vida y obra se encarna en todo un ‘estilo de ver la vida’” (Soldevilla, 2004: 125; see also Zambrano, 1971: 277-78).
One of the first challenges which must be faced when approaching Zambrano’s thought is that it is — in many ways — resistant to analysis. This is so because of the level of abstraction of her texts, but also, most importantly, because of the hybridity of its content, form, and style as indicated in the introduction. As José Luis Mora García explains,

sobre su pensamiento [el de Zambrano], en cambio, ha habido, en mi opinión, una postura casi inevitablemente bifronte pues hablamos de una obra hecha, en buena medida, al margen –no me atrevería a decir contra– la filosofía académica. La posición de ésta ha tenido que ser, por una parte, de recuperación de un pensamiento que la interpela y del que no puede prescindir sin riesgo de empobrecerse, pero, por otra, de cierta incomodidad al ver cómo su lenguaje, método e instrumental se muestran poco ajustados para interpretar un pensamiento de los calificados no sólo como “no sistemáticos” sino que hace de la no delimitación entre formas de conocimiento su razón de ser (3-4).

As a result, as indicated in Chapter One, in an effort to overcome these challenges, the methodology chosen, in addition to the available textual evidence, also takes into account the biography and intentionality of the author. Hence, this analysis aims to go beyond literary exegesis and, following Skinner’s methodology as described in the introduction, it intends to reconstruct the premises and discuss the implications and consequences of Zambrano’s thought as a whole applying and respecting, in as much as possible, the co-ordinates of its own rationality.

This resistance to analysis is a feature shared by Aguirre and, to a lesser extent, by Aranguren. As indicated in the introduction, Zambrano is being analysed alongside Aranguren and Aguirre, because I argue throughout the thesis that the thought of these three thinkers can be considered to be a manifestation of CT and, as such, there are various important points of confluence. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the work of each of these thinkers constitutes an idiosyncratic and distinctive critique of the dominant paradigm of Western reason. As a result, the specificity of Zambrano’s thought will be discussed throughout this chapter, while also highlighting the points of confluence with Aranguren and Aguirre when found. In all three cases, the relevance of this resistance to analysis goes beyond the methodological challenge its analysis presents. It constitutes one of the key characteristics why their thought can be considered to be a form of CT, not only because of the inherent subversion present in any asystematic form of thought in as much as it poses a challenge to the existing systematic and hierarchical framework of rationality, but, more importantly, because in the degree that is analysis-resistant it is also resistant to being absorbed and neutralized by the dominant rationality. That is why any form of CT presents an initial resistance not just to the exegete, but also to the reader, who must agree to enter and function within the parameters offered by CT in order to have genuine access to the text. In other words, as we shall see here and in Chapter Five, it demands the engagement of the reader with the text, thus inviting him to partake in the alternative rationality the text offers.
Thus, Zambrano elaborates a form of CT because of her critique and resistance towards instrumental reason, but, crucially, also because of her methodology. Hence, Zambrano’s poetic reason cannot be considered to be philosophy or poetry, and certainly not science, but a supradisciplinary approach whose key characteristic is the integration of theory and practice. As Revilla Guzmán indicates,

esta misma “razón poética” es simultáneamente una razón práctica [...]. [...] la reflexión sobre la “razón poética” habría de evitar la reducción de su propuesta a la mera adopción de un lenguaje literario poetizante y atender, por el contrario, al sentido del carácter fronterizo de su discurso, a su singular inserción en la tradición filosófica y a la dimensión práctica de su pensamiento como aspectos indicativos de lo que de original y más auténtico hay en su filosofar (2004: 1).

This is an essential feature of her thought, even of her rationality, which must be considered as part of the methodology adopted for its analysis. That is why life and work form and inextricable link whose rupture would result in the misrepresentation and misinterpretation of her thought. Thus, the aim of this section is to highlight how many of her experiences have influenced the direction, tone, and content of her writings.

4.2.1 Zambrano’s early political commitment

Zambrano is born in 1904 in Vélez-Málaga. Although she soon leaves Andalusia (1908) to move to Madrid, this early Andalusian experience is deeply rooted into her spirit, leaving an indelible mark that will emerge in her work. This uprooting is all the more significant because it constitutes her first experience of destierro, contributing to the presentiment of her long exile (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 19-21). In 1909, the family moves to Segovia, where she discovers two key authors: Machado, whom she personally meets, and Aquinas, whose mystical poetry she connects with and cultivates an interest in (Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 27-28). In 1924, Zambrano and her family move back to Madrid where they settle. This city is also of central importance for her because it is in Madrid, at the Universidad Central, where she studies with J. Beistero, J. Gaos, M. García Morente, the young Zubiri, and, most notably, Ortega, who has a deep influence on her thought. There she teaches as an auxiliary lecturer (1931) (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 28-29, 32; see also Abellán, 1998: 15, 24; Zambrano, 1989a: 32). Abellán interprets this collaboration in the Department of Philosophy as a “signo inequívoco de que el renovador impulso filosófico había alcanzado ya al mundo femenino” (1989b: 240). More to the point, it is also evidence of Zambrano’s integration into Madrid’s intellectual life.

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89 As indicated above, Zambrano – strictly speaking – does not produce poetry; instead “cuando ella habla de poesía se refiere, radicalizando el término de la poiesis aristotélica [...], a una potencia específica del lenguaje que, por medios no conceptuales y a través de la ‘escucha’, descubre la unidad que subyace a la diversidad de la vida humana” (Maillard García, 1996: 53-54).
In Madrid, she befriends, even hosting regular tertulias in her home, several important intellectuals of that period: Miguel Hernández, Camilo José Cela, Luis Cernuda, José Antonio Maravall, Rafael Alberti, amongst others (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 24). As is also the case with Aguirre, Zambrano fosters interconnections of a personal and intellectual nature with prominent figures, playing the role of mediator between Ortega and younger writers during the period 1924-1927, which, in turn, is reflected in the eclectic nature of her work (see the correspondence between Zambrano and Ortega, Fundación María Zambrano)90.

During this period, her social awareness grows. In 1928, Zambrano joins the Federación Universitaria Escolar (F.U.E.), participating actively in its efforts to engage intellectuals in politics, which culminate in the meeting of the students with Valle-Inclán and Azaña (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 18-19; see also Fundación Maria Zambrano). As a result of that meeting, the Liga de Educación Social, of which Zambrano becomes a spokesperson, is created (see Fundación Maria Zambrano; see also Zambrano, 1986c: 267).

She is committed to the ideals of the Republic and actively supports Acción Republicana in the 1931 elections during the months of March and April. With the proclamation of the Republic (14/04/1931), Zambrano has a hard decision to make. She introduces Hacia un saber sobre el alma – a compilation of various introspective essays first published in its current form in 1987 – by recounting how she considers giving up philosophy three times in her life, once as a result of Luis Jiménez de Asúa’s offer of a seat in Parliament for the Socialist Party (2004c: 9, 11). By choosing to introduce herself with this episode, Zambrano informs the reader of the huge role philosophy plays in her life, but also of the tension she experiences between it and her sense of political responsibility. Zambrano declines the offer by saying that “el socialismo me era muy cercano pero no servia para la politica” (2004c: 11-12; see also Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29). This statement summarizes Zambrano’s position on the matter. By saying she feels very close to socialism, she expresses her involvement with the party and, yet, at the same time, she successfully avoids defining herself as a socialist, in all likelihood, as a result of her ambiguous feelings towards this party and party politics in general.

Several factors may have contributed to this ambiguity. Many intellectuals, such as Unamuno who becomes affiliated in 1894, favour the Socialist Party. Her inclination towards this party may have also been strengthened by the 1909 rapprochement between the Socialist and Republican Parties (see Abellán, 1998: 225). Other factors of a more personal

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90 Although such correspondence remains unpublished in print, the Fundación has made it available on electronic format, which is freely available from the Fundación’s website (for further details see the bibliography). In addition, the Fundación also provides biographical information which will be used in the course of this chapter.
nature also shape Zambrano’s perception of socialists and her views on politics. The relationship of her father, D. Blas, to the Agrupación Socialista Obrera, must be considered. In 1913, D. Blas joins the socialist organisation in Segovia, becoming president (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 28). His presidency, however, is short-lived. Following the murder of a random passer-by by the son of a conservative cacique, landowner, the workers of the Socialist Party volunteer to go to the funeral, but on their way there, they decide to go to the murderer’s home first to take the law into their own hands. The president of the socialist party, Zambrano’s father, opposes such a decision but, after realizing his impotence in the matter, he resigns from the party and discontinues his active involvement in politics:

lo dejó, dejó de ser socialista, su padre, y no entró ya a formar parte jamás de ningún partido. Y eso ella lo llevaría dentro también en Segovia porque… porque no había nacido para político, claro, pero lo que pasó es lo siguiente: había sucedido un crimen, un tonto crimen; [...] Dimitió irrevocablemente y no hubo arreglo; jamás volvió a intervenir en política. 'Había que educar a la gente primero' decía y hacía (Zambrano, 1989a: 81).

Zambrano does not provide further details regarding the identity of the parties involved in the incident or the date (1989a: 81). In a later reference to her father’s political tendencies, she states that her father remained a socialist until the birth of the Republic, which gives us some kind of temporal indication for this incident (2004c: 12). The atemporality with which Zambrano chooses to portray these events is not without significance, for it suggests that, from her point of view, they are not relegated to the specific date in which they actually occurred, but that the reason why they happened, their significance, may still apply to a different moment in time, Zambrano’s time.

The relevance of this incident lies in that it gives us an idea of the tense socio-political atmosphere of that time, but more importantly, in that it has a great impact in the lives of father and daughter. In fact, in a very similar move to the one her father made, Zambrano leaves Acción Republicana in the light of the passivity of the Government of the Second Republic to the street disturbances and the burning of churches (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 27; see also Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29). The animosity displayed by several groups of left-wing tendencies against religion, its symbols, and institutions must have strongly conflicted with her deeply rooted religious feelings, further adding to her disillusion and

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91 The influence of Zambrano’s father in her life and thought should not be ignored. Zambrano herself reveals and acknowledges this influence, not only by means of auto-biographical references to her father, as in the case of Delirio y destino (1989a), but also in a meaningful dedication in one of the short essays which comprise Bienaventurados first published in 1990, entitled “El filósofo” (2004a: 45-61). There she says: “a la memoria de mi padre, filósofo y guía” (2004a: 45-61). It is the word “guía”, guide, in conjunction with “philosopher”, which is of particular relevance here, because it situates the sphere of her father’s influence beyond the realm of parental tutelage and acknowledges his role in also influencing or guiding the direction of her thought.
ambiguity, which result in Zambrano promising to herself not to belong to any political party (see Zambrano, 1996a: 87). The revision of her role in politics as a direct consequence of these events strongly suggests an idealised vision of politics or, at least, the clarity of vision to distinguish between the real down-to-earth political dynamics of that time and the highly idealised, theoretical, and sanitised world of politics that Zambrano hoped for. Further evidence of this gap — and of her own awareness of it — are her interest in party politics and her simultaneous insistence on her inadequacy for such matters (see 2004c: 11-12; see also 1989a: 81).

Zambrano justifies this move by pointing out that is not possible to separate the moral and political dimensions of the individual. For this reason, any political programme should acknowledge the holistic aspect of human nature and do politics from this awareness (see Salguero Robles, 1994: 4). Zambrano, however, acknowledges the distance that separates political theory from its practice, and, instead of attempting to bridge the distance, she refuses to enter into the dynamics of party politics, looking for a solution which may recognise and encourage the unity of the human being. This overarching solution is found to reside in the human being, or rather, in being human, what she refers to as being a *persona*. Thus, Zambrano rejects political activism *per se* as insufficient. She does not, however, give up her political engagement. In fact, as Clare Nimmo puts is, “the political engagement [is] found at every turn in her writing” (1997: 893). Her solution is the integration of this political engagement into her project of development towards becoming *persona*. By doing so, she overcomes the limitations of political theory, which is inherently theoretical. At the same time, she renounces a programme of political action which requires the adherence and involvement of others. This is a move by which political engagement, perhaps paradoxically, does not involve the competition for votes or supporters; it is a personal political engagement, not because it renounces the social dimension of politics, but precisely because it understands the need for a genuine social involvement. This is a kind of social involvement which, from Zambrano’s point of view, cannot take place through representation, but through the wide-spread acquisition of a personal political engagement of the kind she adopts: a political engagement that is the result of a holistic engagement with reality. As Laurenzi explains, “esta práctica tenaz del pensamiento [de Zambrano] como intervención en lo real es uno de los tantos rasgos ‘inactuales’ de su personalidad filosófica” (2004: 14).

With the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936, Zambrano, alongside a group of young intellectuals – Rafael Alberti, José Bergamín, Ramón Gómez de la Serna, amongst others – signs a manifesto, the first of many, declaring her condemnation of the military coup (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 28-29). In September 1936, Zambrano marries the historian Alfonso Rodríguez Aldave and they both soon go to Chile as a result of her husband’s job in the
Spanish Embassy (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 29). Despite deciding not to involve herself in politics, during the Civil War, Zambrano returns to Spain from Chile to support the Republic; she is designated Consejero de Propaganda, and Consejero Nacional de la Infancia Evacuada (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 29, 32; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 29). This suggests that she takes it upon herself to carry out the task that her father described as a necessary pre-requisite to politics: educating first (Zambrano, 1989a: 81)\(^\text{92}\). In Horizonte del liberalismo (1930), Zambrano describes her motivations for the participation in the events that took place from the end of the 1920’s until the late 1930’s as an attempt to channel the great unrest of the masses, and explains that “mi actividad en la Guerra, siendo moderada, fue intensa, implacable como había sido mi vocación filosófica, que sin duda estaba detrás de ella sosteniéndome” (Zambrano, 2004c: 12; see also Zambrano, 1996a: 36).

By comparing her actions during the Civil War to her philosophical vocation and, more crucially, by saying that it is precisely this vocation that is supporting her, Zambrano hints that the motivation behind her involvement during the war also comes from her own engagement with her philosophical project. It is, thus, hardly surprising that it is during this period that she pens her most overtly political writings, such as “Preocupándose de lo social, la mujer” (1928), Nuevo liberalismo/ Horizonte del liberalismo (1930), and Los intelectuales en el drama de España (1937). After this period, her work turns to matters of a more personal and metaphysical – almost mystical – nature; despite this shift of focus, the entirety of her work remains the expression of the personal and political project already sketched out in her earlier work (see Cerezo, 1991a: 71, 87).

### 4.2.2 Exile

One of the common features that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre share is that they all spend a period of their lives abroad, which decisively changes their perspective and shapes their intellectual and political positions. This experience is lived most dramatically in the case of Zambrano, the only one who can – with propriety – be described as an exile. As Abellán explains, Spanish exiles are those who having supported the Republicans who leave Spain only upon realizing their cause is lost (1998: 34-35). This is precisely the case of Zambrano, who crosses the border into France on 28 January 1939 when all hope of a Republican victory is lost (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 32-33).

As Balibrea explains, “exiles are by definition desterrados, absent from the common territory of the nation, and the business of interpreting their culture is a plurinational (at

\(^{92}\) As indicated in chapter two, this importance placed upon the role of education is not limited to Zambrano, but a common trait amongst Republicans. In fact, Antoni Mora argues that “los filósofos republicanos viven su idea de paideia. El aspecto pedagógico como impulso básico de la filosofía es bien común en todos ellos” (2001: 132).
least binational) project. It involves contact with more than one ‘totalidad vivida’” (2005: 4; see also Zambrano, 1989a: 237). Being unrooted and having to adapt to the host culture shapes Zambrano’s perceptions, experiences, and, ultimately, her intellectual production because “María Zambrano ha sido, ante todo y sobre todo, exiliada, y así se ha considerado ella” (Abellán, 1989b: 260). That is why her work must be contextualized in her experience of exile.

What these exiles have in common is first and foremost their Republican background (see Mora, 2001: 128). There are other characteristics which can be identified as common to most intellectuals in exile (see Abellán, 1998: 35-39). First, they mostly settle in Spanish-speaking American countries, where – in the absence of Spain – they live in their ideal of Spain, holding on to values and traditions as they remember them, giving way to a narrative of loss and memory (see Valis, 2000: 126, 131-32). Second, they are influenced by the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and share a certain missionary character. Third, Abellán argues that they experience a growing depoliticization due to the difficulty of becoming part of public life in a foreign country, so they focus their efforts on more academic activities, such as translation, research, and teaching; many of them, despite having held left-wing positions, adopt liberal political positions, even though liberal economy leads to capitalism (see Abellán, 1998: 37). Faber punctuates this further saying that most exiles, though active in their own political struggle, kept an exceptionally low profile where Mexican or Latin American politics were concerned. Still, the ideological baggage they carried with them from the “Spanish revolution” had an important impact on their host societies (2002: xv). Zambrano’s defence of liberalism, however, is a cultural, even a spiritual one which allows for the development of the spirit by avoiding the dangers of an overpowering materialism (see Abellán, 1998: 37, 259; see also Bundgård, 2005a: 27).

This depoliticization, however, must, be further qualified. Although it is true that, for the reasons pointed out by Abellán, these exiles take little or no active part in public political life, particularly so with the passage of time, some Spanish philosophers in exile continue to write political philosophy. Defending this claim, however, requires devoting closer attention to the term “political philosophy”, which is inherently problematic. The tension of this term lies in that whereas “philosophy” suggests a theoretical, even hypothetical analysis, the word “political”, in contrast, evokes an active, pragmatical engagement with the world (see Bealy, 1999: 3). Although such analysis of both words

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93 Despite this apparent depolitization, it is crucial to highlight that because of their very status as exiles, their writings have an important weight. As Faber indicates, “for the exile, the simple act of writing becomes expressly political – sometimes to the point that literary fiction gives way to autobiography and memoir or to the polemic immediacy of the essay or the pamphlet” (2002: x). This political nature of writing can also be found in Zambrano, as argued below. In addition, Delirio y destino (1989a) provide the most obvious example of this blur between literary fiction and autobiography in Zambrano’s work, although it is by no means its only occurrence.
individually may suggest that political philosophy consists of a meta-analysis of politics, this is not the case, for this is the function of political science. Instead, political philosophy is, to a large extent, a meditation upon social life and organization, discussing how it ought to be and how it can be, while also providing a critique of what is. This is, indeed, a vast disciple whose boundaries are unclear. As Mora puts it,

‘filosofía política’ expresa una tensión, una violencia interna; se refiere a la lucha (una de ellas) de la historia de Occidente entre dos de sus creaciones mayores: la filosofía y la política. Emblemáticamente, la muerte de Sócrates –y toda la reflexión que arranca con ella– es lo que podríamos llamar el acta fundacional de lo que denominamos filosofía política (2001: 130).

That is why, after naming Walter Benjamin, the Frankfurt School, Georg Lukács, Hannah Arendt, Ernst Cassirer, Karl Jaspers, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Popper, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Paul Sartre as just some examples of twentieth century political philosophers, Mora goes on to say that it is precisely in this context of political philosophy that Spanish Republican philosophers such as Ramón Xirau, José Gaos, Juan David García Bacca, Eduardo Nicol, José Ferrater Mora, Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, Eugenio Imaz, José María Gallegos Rocafull, and, of course, Maria Zambrano, should be placed, because “su reflexión parte de la conciencia de una gran crisis filosófica y política” (2001: 131).

It is in this sense that many exiled Spanish philosophers develop their political philosophy and are, thus, far from depoliticized. Having said this, it is true that on the one hand, with the passing of time and the prolongation of her situation as an exile Zambrano’s writings become less and less overtly political, being more inclined towards inner and spiritual concerns, which are explored through the development of her poetic reason. This, however, by no means should be interpreted as the abandonment of her political interests, but as the subsequent methodological development of a coherent political aim. As Abellán puts it, “el sentido iniciático del proceso señalado [el vínculo entre biografía, obra, y crítica social] queda así asumido en un proyecto de regeneración moral de la sociedad” (2006: 84). Her turn to self is, therefore, part of this project identified by Abellán. For this reason, for Zambrano, the social and, therefore, also the political spheres start with the self, more precisely, with the moral implications that any individual choice carries:

Descubrir un camino, abrirlo, trazarlo, es la acción más humana, porque es al mismo tiempo acción y conocimiento; decisión y una cierta fe que regula la esperanza en forma tal de convertirla en voluntad. Es pues una acción moral entre todas (Zambrano, 1988b: 43; see also Abellán, 2006: 83).

Thus, morality is what binds the personal and the socio-political, which become necessarily interconnected (see 4.3.3 where this is developed in more detail). On the other hand, although Zambrano’s work deals with matters of political philosophy and integrates political philosophy into her thought, it goes beyond political philosophy by proposing and adopting an alternative rationality, that of poetic reason.
4.2.3 Zambrano’s journey

With the fall of the Republic (1939), Zambrano enters France starting a long displacement which takes her to several different countries through Europe and Latin America (see Abellán, 1998: 24, 282; for more details on the Republican emigration to Latin America see Soldevilla Oria, 2001: 35, 36, 46, 55, 72). From France, she travels to Mexico, where, in 1939, she holds a series of lectures in La Casa de España and she teaches at the Universidad de Morelia (see Faber, 2002: 45; see also Abellán, 2001: 21). In 1941, she moves to Cuba, teaching at the Universidad de la Habana and in the Instituto de Altos Estudios e Investigaciones. In 1943, she teaches at the Universidad de San Juan, Puerto Rico. This initial period of exile is particularly influenced by the situation of Spain and her physical distance from it:

muchos de los libros importantes del exilio aparecen también en esos años. La “circunstancia vital” era para todos ellos el recuerdo, la añoranza de España, la esperanza de la vuelta, la zozobra de la situación política internacional. Son libros que derivan todavía, en su mayor parte, de lecturas, influencias y estudios de la preguerra española. Deberán recordarse, entre otros muchos, los siguientes: de 1939, Filosofía y poesía, de María Zambrano (Díaz, 1983: 38; see also Abellán, 1998: 39).

Spain, as a cultural entity, becomes for the exiled intellectuals one of the central topics of reflection (Abellán, 1998: 38). Zambrano shares with her compatriots this concern for Spain. As Zambrano says through the voice of Antigone, which is equally applicable to the circumstances of the Spanish exiles, “gracias al destierro conocimos la tierra” (Zambrano, 1986c: 256). Reflecting Machado’s and Unamuno’s influence, Zambrano, like many other Republicans – most notably Francisco Ayala (see Faber, 2002: 46, 171) – perceives Spain as a spiritual community, whose singularity, in contrast with the rest of Europe, lies in that, from their point of view, the Spanish form of knowledge is asystematic and oblivious to the form of reason of modernity (Faber, 2002: 44-47, 49; see Zambrano, 1988a; see also the section below). As Francisco Caudet explains, exile is for Zambrano,

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94 According to Sophocles’s play, Antigone is the daughter – and half-sister – of the unwitting incestuous marriage of King Oedipus of Thebes with his mother Jocasta (see Sophocles, 2003). Her name is remembered because, when as a result of his struggle for power her brother Polynices is killed, she strives to provide him a traditional burial, even though she knows it is forbidden by pain of death. Consequently, her act of defiance earns her a death sentence. This story captures Zambrano’s imagination. In fact, she produces two works which focus on this figure; an article, “Delirio de Antígona” (1948), part of which she narrates in the first person, thus poetically appropriating Antogone’s fate at the same time that she empowers her with a voice; and a play, La tumba de Antígona (1967), which is re-edited in Senderos (1986c). The latter commences with a reflection on the figure of Antigone and the revelation that Zambrano identifies her sister Araceli with Antigone, for Zambrano perceives both women as sharing a similar disposition and fate (see Laurenzi, 2004: 55). Moreover, Zambrano alters Sophocles ending by keeping Antigone alive in her grave, so that she can become aware and reflect on the meaning of her sacrifice (see Laurenzi, 2004: 57). By conferring the protagonist this awareness, as Laurenzi observes, “su hazaña se coloca en el ámbito de lo ‘político’, pues se inspira en la búsqueda de la ley nueva, redentora, que parece dominar toda la historia occidental” (2004: 62; see also footnote eleven).
and many like her, almost a process of initiation into the human condition (2005: 21-24): exile challenges individuals to such an extent that it encourages them to look into their inner selves and develop their own personal project. Abellán also reiterates this point. According to him, “Zambrano vive el exilio y lo considera también para otros como un rito iniciático al conocimiento humano en sí” (Abellán, 2006: 72).

From 1946 – the year of her mother’s death – to 1948 Zambrano resides in Paris, where she is reunited with her sister. They both remain there until 1949 when they go to Mexico, where Zambrano is offered the chair of metaphysics previously held by García Bacca (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 33). This time (1946-1953) is marked by writings that make reference to the situation in Spain as well as to the political panorama in Europe (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 33; see also Faber, 2002: 44). This is also a period in which she is greatly concerned with the relationship between philosophy and poetry.

Zambrano returns to Europe in 1953; she stays in Rome until 1964, when she moves to La Pièce, near Geneva (1964-1972), and, after her sister’s death, to Geneva itself. Juan Fernando Ortega Muñoz describes this period as the most fruitful (1992: 35). Although she does not abandon her interest in socio-political issues, as can be observed in Persona y Democracia (1958), this can be considered a period of a more metaphysical nature, mirroring to some extent the complexities and direction of the journey of her own life. She explores the concept of God and the differences between lo sagrado and lo divino. During this period, her thought takes her through less accessible paths, which require from the reader immersion and active co-operation in the interpretation of the chains of symbols that fill her pages. Personal experience comes to the fore in her work while it aims to unravel the intricacies of being; biography and intellectual production become, then, inextricably linked as observed in El hombre y lo divino (1955). Zambrano employs her experience of exile as a path which leads her on a journey into her inner self, subsequently reaching dimensions of herself, such as her descent to the ‘ínferos’, the underworld, which she may not have reached otherwise. It is during this European period (1953-1984), after having come to terms with the implications of exile, that she integrates her experiences shaping a more spiritual philosophy. In fact, Zambrano is aware of this internal process early on (1989a: 17). Using the third person to refer to herself, Zambrano already confirms in Delirio y destino – originally written in La Habana in the early fifties – this path to inner discovery opened by the pain she experienced: “y ahora, al no haber podido morir sentía que tenía que nacer por sí misma” (1989a: 11). The use of the third person in autobiography is a frequent occurrence with relevant connotations. The third person may be used to refer to a younger version of oneself which no longer exists. This, however, is unlikely to be the explanation for Zambrano’s use of it, for she is very aware of a sense of progression, that is, she is the person she is at the time of writing partly as a consequence of the person she was.
A more plausible explanation can be found in Bretz’s analysis of the modernist conceptualization of selfhood, according to which [it] emphasizes the presence of multiple I’s and in other theorizations takes the form of a subject that contains within itself one or multiple ‘others’. The two modes often coexist and although their difference appears slight, the shift in emphasis from an I constituted by multiple selves to an I which contains multiple others proves immensely productive in reimagining the self and its relations with other individuals and groups (2001: 77).

Although Zambrano is not a modernist, her use of the third person in reference to herself – which, in fact, is not constant, but shifts between ella and yo – is part of her deliberate attempt to blur the differentiation between the self and the other as described by Bretz, which is of great significance in understanding her overall thought, as we shall see in the course of this chapter.95

Zambrano insists on further exploring the concept of “exiliado”, not only from a theoretical perspective, but also by taking a very conscious attitude towards her own position. As she explains in relation to herself and others who suffered a similar fate, “eran ya diferentes. Tuvieron esa revelación: no eran iguales a los demás, ya no eran ciudadanos de ningún país, eran exiliados, desterrados, refugiados…” (Zambrano, 1989a: 237).

Although it cannot be said that Zambrano welcomes her first hand experience of exile, because this would imply some degree of desire for it, despite the strain of exile, she does embrace this experience. As Armando López Castro puts it,

María Zambrano supo aceptar la realidad desconocida sin renunciar a la historia que le tocó vivir, antes padeciéndola en su desnudez, por eso el exilio no fue para ella […] sino una forma de liberación y transformación constantes, el nacimiento de una vida más íntegra y completa (2001: 125; see also 120).

She embraces exile intellectually by exploring the concept of exile and its implications, but also at a personal level. Rather than settling down in any of the countries she emigrates to, creating a new ‘homeland’ for herself as many others in her situation do – an experience conveyed by José Gaos’s concept of being transterrado (see Abellán, 2001: 23) – Zambrano does not settle down until she is nearing the end of her life, when she finally returns to her motherland.

It is not until November 1984 that Zambrano returns to Spain and settles in Madrid, where she passes away in 1991. Ortega Muñoz, describing this period (1984-1991) of Zambrano’s thought, says: “el pensamiento de María Zambrano se torna más poético, se estiliza y se depura hasta alcanzar cierto aire místico” (1992: 37). This certain mystical flare, however, does not mean that her writings are strictly speaking mystical, as I shall argue in section 4.4.6.2. Instead, it refers to a turn to self, to being; for in an effort to

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95 As indicated in the introduction, modernism in Spain constitutes the attempt to reach and embody modernity (see Abellán, 1989a: 17-18; see also 1.2). In contrast with this, Zambrano criticizes modernity and its consequences, as we shall see in the course of this chapter.
express the ineffable, her writings become more intimate and her style more cryptic (see 4.4.5 and 4.4.6).

4.3 Zambrano’s socio-political dimension

Before delving into Zambrano’s political positions, the question of how she fits in the context of this research must be addressed. Zambrano’s engagement with Marxism is limited to her early work and it is of a critical nature, although some points of convergence with Marxism can be found, namely, the socio-political relevance placed in historical processes and the revolutionary role of political change assigned to the people (see Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 16, 48; see also Dorang, 1991: 107-08 respectively). However, unlike Aranguren and Aguirre, Zambrano does not associate herself with the CT developed by the FS96.

There are, nevertheless, several reasons to include Zambrano in this line of research. Zambrano’s work, as argued throughout this thesis, can be considered CT for two main reasons: its critique of instrumental reason and its methodology. Although, given her distance from the FS, it could well be argued that this is an ad hoc conclusion, there are biographical and intellectual elements which contribute to it. As we have seen with Aranguren and we will see with Aguirre, Zambrano’s interest in politics and spirituality lead her to adopt very critical positions towards instrumental reason. The specific direction of her thought is also very much shaped by the intellectual climate, particularly the influence of Ortega – which is also common to Aranguren –. She comes into contact with Heidegger as a result of Ortega’s teachings. It is through the influence of Heidegger that Zambrano shares a common intellectual background with Aranguren and Aguirre, but also with the FS97. What CT does in relation to Heidegger’s work is to move away from the question of Being to the question of being-in-the-world. This shift is not only common to the members of the FS, but also to Aranguren, Aguirre, and Zambrano (Heidegger’s influence on Zambrano will be explored in greater detail in 4.4).

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96 Although it is not possible to argue the intellectual engagement of Zambrano with the FS, as is the case with Aranguren and Aguirre, it should be noted that Zambrano did enter into contact with their thought. Evidence of this is her possession of an edition of a compilation of Benjamin and Adorno’s letters – Allemands. Une série de letters (1979) – and Adorno’s Sulla metacritica della gnoseologia (1964b), which can be found in the contents of her personal library (see Fundación María Zambrano). Because of this, and based on the nature of Zambrano’s own writings, it is possible to surmise that Zambrano is more inclined towards Adorno, given his sensibility towards music and poetry, as well as his poetic style which characterizes his writings as discussed in the introduction (see Brier, 2001: 113). Incidentally, Zambrano’s long trajectory of exile is visible in the language of the titles of the books of her personal collection, which provide a glimpse of Zambrano’s numerous relocations and cultural immersions. More to the point, they are also evidence of her familiarity, although limited, with CT.

97 For Heidegger’s influence on the FS, particularly on Marcuse and Habermas, see McCarthy, 1991: 83-85; see also Moran, 2000: 245.
4.3.1 Influences

Given the pivotal role that the influences received by these authors have in understanding their own positions, as well as how they relate to each other, this section will now explore such influences.

As Jesús Moreno Sanz explains, Zambrano was initially linked to the generation of 1929, a generation marked by the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, which is also known as the generation of freedom, in an allusion to its left-wing tendencies (1996: 14); in addition, Moreno Sanz observes that given Zambrano’s intellectual relationship with Ortega and her views about art and her aesthetic positions, she is also linked to the generation of 1927 (1996: 14-16). Aranguren, however, describes her as belonging to the generation of 1936, in the sense that her life is marked by the generational event of the Spanish Civil War and its consequences, in her case, exile (1983: 126; see also Gullón: 1969: 163, 167). Although it is possible to link Zambrano to all of these generations, her thought should also be understood in reference to the Madrid School; in fact, Abellán refers to Zambrano as one of the core members of the Madrid School (1989b: 236; see also 3.1.1). Her thought, however, diverges significantly from Ortega’s. As Abellán quotes from Zambrano’s own CV, “la razón vital de Ortega es su punto de partida; mas, tanto los temas como su pensamiento mismo, no siguen ese camino, como puede verse ya desde el ensayo Hacia un saber sobre el alma (1934)” (1989b: 259-60; for Zambrano’s views on Ortega’s thought and influences see Zambrano, 2004c: 13-14). Whereas Ortega’s vision of art and textuality is essentially harmonic, masculine, and hierarchically ordered, Zambrano propounds a subjective relationship towards art and, particularly, textuality which challenges traditional hierarchical divisions (see Bretz, 2001: 511). As Aranguren explains, “la gran distancia que separa a María Zambrano de todos los demás orteguianos es su tratamiento del lenguaje” (1983: 112; her use of language and the role assigned to it will be further explored in the context of analytical and post-structuralist philosophy in 4.4.5.1). Nonetheless, and despite the significance of her own intellectual contributions and her formal achievements, most notably poetic reason, the influence of Ortega is patent in the direction and content of her work. It is because of this and because, as Zambrano explains, “el ser discípulo de aquel maestro no dependía de seguir los estudios filosóficos, por eso tantos en España sentían serlo, por eso la vida española había cambiado indudablemente al ir impregnándose de su pensamiento”, that she can be considered a member, if somewhat heterodox, of the Madrid School (1989a: 94).

Unamuno, whom she does not meet despite being a personal friend of her father, is also amongst the key authors who influence her thought (Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 31; Zambrano, 1989a: 85, 88). Her link with Unamuno is particularly patent in the privileged
role her faith took throughout her work; this faith co-existed with intense periods of anguish in her life, which find expression in her work by exploring los inferos, the personal underworld (Zambrano, 1977a: 41-42, 55; 1986a: 15, 37). The difference lies in that “mientras que Unamuno admite la dialéctica irredenta entre la razón lógica y cardíaca, María Zambrano supera la dialéctica en su razón poética” (Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 20).

Other influences include Max Scheler’s concepts of co-understanding, co-love, and particularly his ordo amoris, order of love, which goes back to Aquinas, as well as some religious writers, such as San Juan de la Cruz and Pascal (see Zambrano, 1996a: 57; 1989a: 118; 2004c: 13, 24). She also acknowledges the influences of Parmenides, Hölderlin’s Empedocles, German Idealism, Nietzsche, phenomenology, Bergson, and Jung (see Zambrano, 2004c: 54; 1992a: 25; see also Mari, 1983: 126; Moreno Sanz, 1996: 38; Maillard, 1992: 25).

4.3.2 Zambrano’s particularity

Ortega Muñoz affirms that the key to the particularity of Zambrano’s approach lies in that “ella une a su extraordinaria sensibilidad poética su misma condición de mujer que le permite captar ese susurro interior, sentir originario” (1992: 12). This statement, however, must be carefully considered. It suggests that thought and expression in general are necessarily gendered manifestations of the self and, specifically, that the originality of Zambrano’s contribution heavily lies in her being a woman. Laurenzi also defends this position. As a result, she argues the need to “reconocer que el pensamiento tiene siempre carácter sexuado, y por consiguiente dual, […] que representa el pensamiento de una mujer o de un hombre concretos, que han trazado una trayectoria inseparable de vida y pensamiento” (2004: 14). Whereas there is a link between biography and intellectual production which is particularly integral to Zambrano’s work, the extent to which understanding Zambrano’s thought as essentially gendered is helpful or, even, faithful to Zambrano’s own intentions has to be questioned. Laurenzi herself, in an effort to support her point, brings up in the same page what I consider to be the main objection to arguing that Zambrano’s thought should be regarded as essentially gendered and dual in nature:

Maria Zambrano defendió siempre este vínculo necesario [entre vida y pensamiento], afirmando la necesidad de superar la abstracción y la fragmentación de las disciplinas distintas y dispersas para así recuperar un saber pleno, integral, que fuera saber de la vida y para la vida (2004: 14).

The point here is far from denying that the parameters of Western rationality have been defined by a reason which is gendered and as a consequence the manifestations of thought which take place within these parameters are considered gendered in relation to whether they conform with or react against existing gendered forms of expression. As Rosi Braidotti argues,
in European culture, history and philosophy, the notion of “difference” is central. It functions through dualist oppositions which assert a monological system of sameness through subcategories of difference. [...] Phallogocentrism as an apparatus of subjectivity works by organizing the significant/signifying differences according to a hierarchical scale that is governed by the standardized mainstream subject (2002:158).

Having acknowledged this, it must be underlined that the suitability of such parameters for the analysis of Zambrano’s thought is questionable. Whereas the notions of difference and sameness can be considered useful, even accurate when applied to the structure and dynamics of Western rationality, Zambrano’s thought is not merely one more manifestation of Western rationality. Instead, it constitutes a distinctive and comprehensive rationality which aims to overcome previous frameworks of reason by providing a viable alternative. For this reason, I argue that applying the very co-ordinates which Zambrano’s thought aims to overcome is not only unsuitable, but also a counter-productive exercise which risks the misrepresentation of the aim of her rationality.

Revilla Guzmán’s description of Zambrano’s rationality as “una forma de racionalidad receptiva e integradora, abierta a la transmisión, materna y, en último término por ello, poética” constitutes an example of such misinterpretation (2005: 19). On the one hand, the term materna, maternal or motherly, sits at odds with the previous claim of being integrating. Being motherly, suggest a protective/authoritative, emotional, and stereotypically feminine approach which is inadequate to describe Zambrano’s thought. What is more, this position belittles the intentionality, nature, function, and reach of Zambrano’s poetic language. Interpreting her adoption of a poetic language as a genre-related action is to misunderstand its significance. Moreover, when discussing other authors who, in Zambrano’s view, have integrated or attempted to integrate philosophy and poetry together, her referents, such as Heidegger and the Presocratics, are masculine (see Zambrano, 2004a: 51). On the other hand, Revilla Guzmán describes Zambrano’s rationality as poetic only in the last instance, pointing out that this poetic quality is the result of the previous adjectives: integrating, open, and, crucially maternal. This relationship of causality, however, betrays Revilla Guzmán’s position. First, the terms of this relationship of causality must be inverted, for whereas integrating, open, and poetic are adjectives closely linked to the observational evidence present in Zambrano’s writings, maternal, however, is a description which relies more heavily on the interpretation of such evidence. In fact, this interpretation reveals more about Revilla Guzmán’s own framework of rationality than it does about Zambrano’s; it suggests that Revilla Guzmán considers Zambrano’s rationality maternal because it is poetic and not the other way around, and it also reveals that Revilla Guzmán’s own framework of rationality is binary-structured with a clear opposition between paternal and maternal, between masculine and feminine discourse. What must be underscored is that the concept of a gendered expression, the division into a
feminine and masculine language, expression, or rationality – even if they do not necessarily correspond to male and female agents – is, in itself, the fruit of a dualistic understanding of reality. What Zambrano does is to step away from this dualist division, by making it inappropriate and inapplicable to her thought.

Another example can be found in Nimmo’s article entitled “The Poet and the Thinker: Maria Zambrano and Feminist Criticism” (1997), which shall now be discussed. As Nimmo indicates from the outset, although Zambrano is concerned with the situation and role of women, as manifested in some of her writings, she is, nevertheless, not a feminist (1997: 893). Moreno Sanz shares this view, and emphatically describes feminist accounts of Zambrano’s thought as “una grave tergiversación” (1996: 49; see also Moreno Sanz, 2003: 358). In spite of this, Nimmo points out that there are important points of convergence between Hélène Cixous and Zambrano’s thought, namely, their denunciation of the binary nature of Western culture and Western reason, and their poetic language (1997: 894, 896). However, there is also an important divergence in the premise that sustains and motivates their thought. Whereas, as Nimmo explains, “Cixous decries this two-term system in which, she maintains, the male side consistently triumphs over the female to the point where woman is equated with passivity, defeat, and death”, Zambrano is more concerned with the limiting divisiveness inherent in this form of reason than with the gender allocation of roles or characteristics (1997: 894). This is not to say that Zambrano is not concerned with the

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98 As Revilla Guzmán explains, it is true that “el tema de la mujer reaparece en los escritos zambranianos bajo diversos registros –de hecho se ocupará de la condición de la mujer en la actualidad y de su presencia en la historia, de figuras femeninas, cuyo protagonismo es más o menos destacado, y de personajes en virtud de la importancia que les concede justamente por su condición y por las implicaciones de la misma” (2005: 20). Zambrano, particularly her early writings, offers a testimony, even a denunciation, of the situation of women (see Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 26; see also Moreno Sanz, 2003: 59-61). Her concern for women continues throughout her work and is more explicitly manifested in writings where she lends a voice to various other women, such as “Eloísa o la existencia de la mujer” (1945), “Delirio de Antígona” (1947-48), and “Diótima de Mantinea” (1956), compiled by Laurenzi in María Zambrano; Nacer por sí misma (1995; see also Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 30). In these writings, Zambrano acknowledges and praises those forms of knowledge and understanding which have historically been associated with women and have, therefore, consequently been relegated. Nevertheless, Zambrano does not insist on highlighting and promoting this difference. Instead, her aim is to vindicate the value of these forms of knowledge, of thought, and ultimately, of being; her aim is to incorporate these into a wider, richer rationality which promotes overcoming a dualistic sense of being. As Maillard García explains, “la filósofa tiene muy claro que cuando llegue el momento de llevar a la luz de la conciencia el ser propio de la mujer, éste no debe seguir el camino de individuación que el hombre occidental agotó en la modernidad. En ella, dicho proceso que deja atrás el hecho de ser ante todo, criatura, toma visos de traición” (1996: 60). That is the reason why it must be highlighted that Zambrano’s pledge for the liberation of women, like the rest of her work, is done from a perspective of integration. As Revilla Guzmán herself indicates, “al considerar la situación actual de la mujer introduce, entre otras nociones, la de ‘integración’” (2005: 26). That is why, Moreno Sanz argues that Zambrano can only be considered a feminist in the sense of a “feminismo integrador” (2003: 60-61). The implication is that Zambrano does not set out to be a feminist, and her feminism is only the result of a by-product of a larger project of self-actualization with social and political ambitions, as shall be argued in the course of this chapter.
treatment of women or with their place in society as indicated above; this is not, however, the focus of her project, but an inherent aspect of it.

Nevertheless, as a result of these convergences, their resistance against a binary rationality and their use of poetic language, Nimmo argues that Zambrano’s work may be very close to the materialization of what Cixous refers to as l’écriture féminine (Nimmo, 1997: 897). This conclusion, however, is the result of applying ad hoc an external structure to the analysis of Zambrano’s work (see 1.5). Instead, it is crucial to take into account the role of intentionality in order to understand the distance which separates Cixious’s use and role of poetic language from Zambrano’s. As Nimmo explains, for Cixous, the value of the use of poetic language in her écriture féminine lies in that, because this type of writing situates itself outside the male-centred philosophical discourse, it constitutes a liberation, in particular, a liberation “from the law of gender” (Nimmo, 1997: 897). In contrast with this, and as we shall see in more detail in the course of this chapter, for Zambrano, the value of poetic language is multifold. Poetic language allows the writer to say the ineffable. As a result, and in line with Heidegger, Zambrano also believes that truth, Being, reveals itself in poetry. Zambrano’s poetic expression does not respond merely to a desire for aesthetic achievement; it is based on her belief that poetry may reveal and communicate truth where ordinary language is insufficient or ill-equipped. What is more, as discussed above, the metaphorical and symbolic expression achieved through poetic reason also allows for a multilayered text, whose ultimate meaning is individually constructed in the process of reading. In addition, as argued throughout the thesis, form and content are inextricably linked in Zambrano’s thought. Thus, Zambrano’s choice of adopting a poetic expression must be understood also as an ideological statement by which she refuses to sacrifice beauty in the interest of rationality. With poetic reason, Zambrano achieves the unity of these two elements, whose dichotomy is understood merely as the result of an unnecessarily limiting perception. Hence, although it is true that one of the goals of poetic reason is to overcome the binary division existing at the root of the prevailing gendered rationality, this is just one of the dichotomies which poetic reason aims to overcome. So, whereas when analysed from Cixous’s écriture féminine, as Nimmo argues, Zambrano’s work may not be “so far removed from such working in the feminine [Cixous’s understanding of working in the feminine]”, it becomes essentially different from it when

Footnote 99: For Cixous, l’écriture féminine constitutes a challenge to the phallogocentric discourse (see Klages, 2006: 102-06). As Mary Klages explains, Cixous considers that l’écriture féminine is possible only in poetry because, on the one hand, poetic language is more flexible in that its meaning is less determined in as much as it is closely related to the unconscious; it is also because of this relationship that poetry is more conducive to the expression of the repressed, such as female sexuality (see Klages, 2006: 102). On the other hand, l’écriture féminine represents a rupture with the phallogocentric structure and, as a result, offers a transformative potential (see Klages, 2006: 102).

In conclusion, analysing Zambrano’s thought and discourse in terms of gendered reason is misleading because such an analysis emphasizes the very differences which Zambrano’s rationality sets out to overcome. Hers is a rationality which arises from an integrating view of existence, to the point that her specificity is not the integration of opposites, but the realization that such opposites are just a perceived manifestation of transcendental unity, as we shall see in section 4.4.2.2.

4.3.3 Zambrano’s political thought

There are several ways in which Zambrano’s work is political. As explained above in the section on exile, from a theoretical, even philosophical point of view, Zambrano’s work, can be considered political philosophy. It is important to underscore, however, that – as I have been arguing throughout the thesis (see particularly 1.3.3) – Zambrano’s thought goes beyond political philosophy, and is, in fact, political in nature, not least because thinking politically is also politics in itself (see Palonen, 2003: 3, 29; see also 1.5).

The word “politics” carries a multiplicity of meanings; thus, without the intention of being comprehensive, some of these meanings will now be highlighted here with the purpose of clarifying what politics is in relation to the authors here discussed and Zambrano in particular. First, politics is primarily regarded as an activity which refers to the process of making decisions for all or part of a given community. More precisely, it is understood as the activity which constitutes the professional object of politicians and an activity which, in democratic societies, is only exercised through a process of democratic participation by the rest of citizens who choose to do so (see Bealy, 1999: 3). Second, the understanding of politics is sometimes restricted to “politics as what the government does (Bealy, 1999: 4). Third, politics is also understood as “conflict and the resolution of conflict” (Bealy, 1999: 4). And fourth, politics is often equated to current affairs (see Bealy, 1999: 4); it includes, for instance economic, social, and defensive decisions and situations both nationally and internationally. In this sense, people’s attitudes, positions, and behaviours not only have political implications, but are political in nature in as much as they have an effect on the state of things. In addition to these, as argued in the introduction, politics can also be considered as paideia, in as much as these authors in particular, hope to have an impact on the social organization and social practices of the society they live in by means of making people aware, “educating” (see 1.3.3). In the case of Zambrano, as argued above, she establishes an explicit link between education and politics, for she considers that – on a
large scale – only the former will enable the latter, thus, she takes on educational tasks as part of her political efforts\(^{100}\).

Furthermore, politics may still be understood in a more general and overarching way. As György Lukács explains borrowing Gottfried Keller’s expression, “everything is politics”. [...] Every action, thought and emotion of human beings is inseparably bound up with the life and struggles of the community, i.e., with politics; whether the humans themselves are conscious of this, unconscious of it or even trying to escape from it. Objectively their actions, thoughts and emotions nevertheless spring from and run into politics (2006: 386).

Zambrano herself has a similarly overarching view of politics, for she states that “se hace politica siempre que se piensa en dirigir la vida” (1930: 13). This is precisely what Zambrano aims to do through her thought and work. It is crucial to highlight that, for Zambrano, the criteria for doing politics is not whether the individual does have an impact in the world, but whether he intends to have it. Thus, by taking into account intentionality and defining politics according to Zambrano’s own standards, it becomes clear that Zambrano considers her own work as political because, as has been established above, Zambrano intends to have an impact on her world, her reality, through her writings and, by her own account, it is this intention to manage or lead life in a certain direction that constitutes politics.

Hence, although it is true that there are no explicitly political books in the strict sense after 1965, all of Zambrano’s work is the expression of an early political commitment and a project which encompasses the whole of her life, since, paraphrasing Moreno Sanz, it is her political conclusions that mark the rhythm and turns of her thought (1996: 148; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 31). This commitment can be observed in the interview that Zambrano gives Juan Carlos Marset in 1989, just two years before her death. There, looking retrospectively at her life and work, she declares that

la filosofía me era irrenunciable, pero más irrenunciables me eran la vida, el mundo. Yo no podia apartarme de lo que sucedía en el mundo, ni considerarme aparte, ni podia estar sola, desligada, ni podia restringirme a una sola actividad (1989b: 70; see also Moreno Sanz, 1996: 19).

In this statement made towards the end of her life, it is possible to see how Zambrano has managed to bridge what she used to perceive as separate, even conflicting activities: her philosophical and her political commitments. Here, although there are still traces of this tension, Zambrano’s resolution overcomes it; she renounces neither activity, developing a philosophy which is at the same time the expression and the exercise of her involvement with the world. From a theoretical perspective, the premise of her project is based on the

\(^{100}\) Evidence of this link can be found in the Liga de Educación Social, a political group which integrates education in its aims and its name, and whose spokesperson is Zambrano (see Fundación María Zambrano; see also Zambrano, 1986c: 267). As a result of this link, Zambrano continues to participate in different educational projects as argued in 4.2.1.
assumption that the revelation and incorporation of truth in the etymological sense of \textit{aletheia} – which can be achieved through poetic reason – will lead to a process of empowerment and liberation\textsuperscript{101}. As she explains, “no es que todo lo que se sabe tenga que ser sabido por todos; pero sí tendría que serlo, su centro vivo, aquello que va a constituir la nueva mentalidad” (2004c: 77).

Due to the holistic nature of the alternative rationality which Zambrano develops, traditional divisions, such as the separation between biography and intellectual production, as discussed above, become obsolete; a comprehensive approach to the different aspects of her person and thought becomes necessary to grasp the coherence and reach of her project. Zambrano’s approach is the unfolding of her person through her work; she develops a rationality where the personal is inextricably linked to the social, and, therefore, the political is at the very core of her project, as indicated above.

The social and political content of Zambrano’s thought – present even in her later work – is highlighted by Abellán’s \textit{Maria Zambrano: Una pensadora de nuestro tiempo}, in a chapter entitled “El universo iniciático de María Zambrano: Un camino hacia la redención social” (2006: 71-84). Abellán successfully summarizes how by approaching Zambrano’s thought from an experiential perspective and looking at the diverse manifestations of her thought in its globality, it is possible to observe how poetic reason, a rationality which apparently belongs to the realm of the personal is, in fact, intrinsically linked to the social and political aspects of existence:

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la pensadora afronta la crisis del racionalismo europeo –raíz de su actual agonía–, mediante un diálogo entre cielo e inferos que nos abra el acceso a la ‘razón mediadora’ –versión a su vez de su razón poética–, único camino para reconvertir la historia sacrificial de Occidente en una historia ética, donde el fondo trágico de la naturaleza humana quede superado en la construcción de una sociedad democrática, regenerada de sus dolencias ancestrales” (Abellán, 2006: 84).
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This aim, although not explicitly stated in each work, does run through the entirety of Zambrano’s writings, granting their diversity and dispersion a sense of cohesion.

Zambrano incorporates key elements from Heidegger’s and Ortega’s thought, and, yet, overcomes both of their approaches. Heidegger draws attention to the question of being and rethinks its meaning and significance, but more importantly, its place and interrelations, and, in doing so, highlights the insufficiency of ordinary language (see Heidegger, 1976: 291; 2000: 40; 2001: 181-182, 184-185). On the other hand, Ortega’s ratiovitalism sets the basis for the reincorporation of the vital element into philosophical discourse (see

\textsuperscript{101} In ancient philosophy, \textit{aletheia} means “unconcealing, bringing out of hiding” (Moyle, 2005: 112). \textit{Aletheia} means truth in two basic respects: “aletheia means both the truth of things in-themselves and telling or speaking the truth” (Moyle, 2005: 121). Heidegger also uses the concept of \textit{aletheia}, initially in its etymological sense, although the later Heidegger reinterprets it to mean “the truth of Being [which] needs the truthfulness of the thinker, the thinker is inspired with the truth only insofar as he belongs to Being” (Moyle, 2005: 121).
Nevertheless, neither of them sees these elements as inextricably linked to political theory or practice. For Zambrano, however, theory and practice form an intrinsic unity; they are but dimensions of the same reality. That is why poetic reason as a holistic methodology and realization of CT must find expression in the political realm by developing a theoretical and vital stance in line with her overall work. Despite the utopian elements of her project, her political theory provides a bottom-up approach that solidly links the personal to the political, offering the possibility of real, personal, but also socio-political change, as we shall discuss below (see Zambrano, 2004d: 53; see also 2004c: 77).

4.3.4 Politics and the human condition

As argued above, history and politics are inherent aspects of human life: where there is human life there is history, and where there are living human relationships there is politics; although, of course, both history and politics may be experienced and practiced at different levels of formality and involvement. The purpose of this section is, thus, to further explore the relationship between human life and politics which exists in Zambrano’s work.

According to Zambrano, “toda política parte necesariamente –aunque no lo sepamos– de una supuesta concepción del hombre; de una idea que éste tiene de sí, de su situación ante el mundo” (1996a: 206). Thus, the importance of analysing Zambrano’s conceptualization of human nature, which she describes in the following terms:

cada hombre está formado por un yo y una persona. La persona incluye el yo y lo trasciende, pues el yo es vigilía, atención; inmóvil es una especie de guardián. La persona, como su mismo nombre indica, es una forma, una máscara con la cual afrontamos la vida, la relación y el trato con los demás, con las cosas divinas y humanas. Esta persona moral, es verdaderamente humana, cuando porta dentro de sí la conciencia, el pensamiento, un cierto conocimiento de sí mismo (1988b: 79). Thus, integrating these two parts of the self is considered as a great achievement (see Zambrano, 1988b: 80).

She later goes on to explain that “la persona es algo más que el individuo; es el individuo dotado de conciencia, que se sabe a sí mismo y que se entiende a sí mismo como valor supremo” (1988b: 103). There is, nevertheless, a danger when the image of oneself exceeds the limits of the human condition, because in this situation responsibility is evaded and the self becomes a dream of deification (see Zambrano, 1988b: 70). Zambrano characterises a person as a living being who breathes in time and feeds on truth (1988b: 132). According to her, a person advances by integrating the different dimensions of time into a pro-active present; “la inclusión de lo social en la vida moral de la persona, requiere de ella una movilidad a través del presente, como si el presente fuese pasado y futuro a recorrer” (1988b: 161). In fact, the individual as a person is a new reality being unravelled throughout history (see Zambrano, 1988b: 135; for more details on the incomplete nature of the human being see 4.4.2).
Zambrano, while maintaining her Heideggerian and Ortegan heritage in the conception of the person as a project, overcomes their limitations. As Bretz explains:

Ortega’s text [La rebelion de las masas] reflects the widely recognized view in modernist and postmodernist thought that the individual constructs his own selfhood, but it evades the consequences of such a vision by creating an elite subject that recognizes disorder and then dispenses with it through an arbitrary imposition of order (2001: 355).

Like Ortega, Zambrano considers life to be a process of becoming:

El hombre tiene un nacimiento incompleto. Por eso no ha podido jamás conformarse con vivir naturalmente y ha necesitado algo más, religión, filosofía, arte o ciencia. [...] Por eso tiene que acabar de nacer enteramente y tiene también que hacerse su mundo, su hueco, su sitio, tiene que estar incesantemente de parto de sí mismo y de la realidad que lo aloje (2004c: 112).

It is this incompleteness or limitation that makes everyone equal in their quest for transcendence and self-development. This project reflects the limitations of human existence, while also emphasizing the role of hope. Zambrano considers the human condition as limiting for three main reasons: the human being is born into darkness, has to bear injustice throughout life, and death is inevitable (1988b: 55-56). Human existence is conflictive; both at the level of the individual, and even more so at a social level. At the same time, all human life is projected from an original feeling of hope, which originates from the human constitution of reality (see Zambrano, 1996a: 37). Hope is, quite literally, a vital component of the human condition.

Being as a project involves a continuous processes of death, resurrection, and rebirth (see Zambrano, 2004c: 18, 112). As Maillard García explains, “para Zambrano lo importante para comprender la estructura de la vida humana es el paso previo a la intencionalidad: la ensoñación que precede a la elección” (1996: 56). It is only because of having dreamt of or envisaged the possibility of an action or event in the first place that the will can be projected onto that action or event. Hence, that which has not yet been conceived cannot be willed. That is why our relationship with the realm of dreams plays a decisive role in opening possibilities for rebirth. According to Zambrano, a dream “es una ocultación desde la vigilia, el lugar donde el sujeto humano ve y se reconoce a sí mismo” (1992: 24). Dreams provide a different perspective to perceive the self; a certain dichotomy occurs so that the subject becomes its own object, we become spectators of our own performance. That is why successive awakenings, both literal and metaphorical may contribute to completing his project of personal existence. In fact, according to Zambrano,

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102 More specifically, for Zambrano, the nature of the individual is in itself a path. In her own words: “y abrir camino es la acción humana entre todas; lo propio del hombre, algo así como poner en ejercicio su ser y al par manifestarlo, pues el propio hombre es camino, él mismo” (1988b: 31; see also 43, 117, 165; Abellán, 2006: 83). That is to say that the human being is a path in as much as being human requires creating and walking a path.
this process of death and resurrection involved in rebirth lies at the very core of human life (2000: 18, 112).

Zambrano identifies hope as an essential element in making this continuous self-engenderment possible (2004c: 111). At the same time, her definition of hope relies heavily on the concept of transcendence:

la esperanza es hambre de nacer del todo, de llevar a plenitud, lo que solamente llevamos en proyecto. En este sentido, la esperanza es la substancia de nuestra vida, su último fondo; por ella somos hijos de nuestros sueños de los que no vemos, ni podemos comprobar (2004c: 112).

Hence, hope is going beyond; going beyond the present self towards a more complete, fulfilled stage of the self. The loss of hope, the loss of this capacity for self-engenderment results in the individual’s disconnection with reality. Such an existence, instead of engaging with reality by being-there, leads to loneliness and disorientation. Instrumental reason copes with this loss and limits its own perception of reality by means of its reliance on objectivity, which guarantees certainty, stability, and order, while shutting out any element which may disturb this system:

todas las creencias y también las ideas, que se refieren al orden del mundo, la figura de la realidad, están sostenidas por la esperanza. El hombre, que es al mismo tiempo algo fallido y solitario, necesita hacerse una realidad entera donde vivir: por eso edifica una objetividad. Objetividad que es la estabilidad vigente, el orden que a todos llega y cobija, que todo lo ordena y aquieta (Zambrano, 2004c: 114; see also Kuhn, 1962: 5, 24, 52).

As opposed to this controlling and self-perpetuating existence which results from the loss of hope, hope is identified as a regenerative force. It plays a crucial role in politics and history, for it is the element of hope which makes change, first, thinkable and, then, possible (see Zambrano, 1989a: 247; 1988a: 62).

4.3.4.1 A political animal

Zambrano questions the social nature of humankind. She argues that if society were a natural phenomenon, then societies would have differed according to atmospheric and spatial conditions. Instead, a great variety of societies is found and none of them is perfectly adapted to their medium (see 1988b: 98-99). In Delirio y destino, Zambrano insists on this point when she makes a reference to Scheler’s view about the human being as the only living creature which is not perfectly adapted to any medium (1989a: 118). The human response to this intrinsic inadaptation is, according to Zambrano, violence:

y es que la unidad en lo humano, ¿habrá de lograrse siempre por la violencia, nunca en la espontaneidad? No es posible, por lo visto, no lo fue entonces [en referencia al tumultuoso pasado español anterior a la Segunda República], que se lograra historia “natural” humana, realización espontánea de un orden, madurez de una nación al modo de un fruto de la naturaleza, como logro del influjo de los cielos en un tiempo configurado de antemano que lo albergara (Zambrano, 1989a: 129).

Society is, therefore, not natural, although it is, however, necessary. Loneliness is a key element of the human condition in the understanding of society, or at least, community. As
Zambrano says, “la persona vive en soledad”, a kind of loneliness and isolation that can be conquered with solidarity, solidarity with the other because, by realising the other is like ourselves, we will no longer be completely alone (1988b: 17; see also 1989a: 22). Furthermore, we need the community to help us define our own identity. As Zambrano explains:

y en la soledad [sentimos], el terror de lo invisible y presente; de esta condición humana que es sentirse sin verse. […] La inmediatez de nuestro propio “ser” resulta amenazadora, porque al quedarnos solos, no sabemos quién es ese que vive y piensa en nuestro fondo, y necesitamos regresar al lugar de la convivencia, allí en la comunidad, donde sabemos quién somos porque lo representamos (1988b: 98).

Thus, it is our sense of belonging to a community which shapes our identity based on the interrelationships that we develop and in the functions we adopt.

For this reason, Zambrano often avoids the treatment of society as an entity. Instead, she stresses that society is formed by individuals, that it is individual actions and attitudes that shape society: “individuo y ciudad, más tarde individuo y sociedad, están mutuamente condicionados: la ciudad ya está ahí cuando el individuo nace; mas él ha de hacerla, sin tregua” (1988b: 112). By this, Zambrano does not simply express their interrelation; she emphasizes the element of responsibility. Although social relations are established prior to their acceptance by the individual, it is the individual who will later reinforce, shake, or, even, destroy such relationships. Hence, once that awareness is developed and responsibility is accepted, the individual – quite literally – constantly creates, and re-creates a given society. Despite these possibilities, the individual capacity for change is presumably limited. Considering the scope and complexity of societal relationships, in the first instance, the individual can only hope to change some of society’s characteristics or relationships, rather than changing society itself. A city, as Zambrano refers to it, that is, a given society placed in a specific historical time, is for an individual who belongs to such a time his framework of perception and understanding, even an a priori to a certain extent, functioning very much like a sieve through which perception and particularly values are filtered before they can be conceptualized. Hence, a change in society as a whole, if such a concept can be accepted, can only be carried out across generations, because the dimension of time in both society and human existence must be acknowledged. As a result of time becoming a crucial factor in allowing such change or evolution to be possible, it is necessary to introduce the concept of spiral evolution, according to which, initially, small qualitative changes produce more substantial changes beyond the individual, which in turn make it possible for the individual – and in time also the institutions and society as a whole – to evolve further in a continuing chain of qualitative change. This quality of society as an a priori brings Zambrano to draw an analogy between city and conciencia, both as places – topographical and inner or spiritual – to live in and to live with (1988b: 111).
The concept of *conciencia* plays a huge role in Zambrano’s conception of the individual and hence of society. Although a complex term, three distinct meanings prevail in Zambrano’s usage of the word “*conciencia*”: first, consciousness as opposed to unconsciousness, second, awareness in the sense of knowledge, and, third, the ability to make moral distinctions. Although in any given instance of the use of the term “*conciencia*” one of these three meanings will prevail upon the others, Zambrano’s use of this term often harbours the connotations of the remaining two meanings. An example of this can be observed in the following quotation extracted from *Persona y democracia* (1958), which also succinctly synthesizes Zambrano’s moral position:

> si tenemos en la mente que no importa qué acontecimiento habido en no importa qué lugar del planeta y aún, en no importa qué momento del pasado tiene influencia en nuestras vidas, entonces el destino deja lugar a la conciencia y al afán de comprensión (1988b: 16).

Here “*conciencia*” involves a certain awakening, that is to say, to be alert to and aware of the events which take place in the world, to open one’s eyes to them – the opposite from unconscious. At the same time, this also implies gaining knowledge of the existence and nature of these events. Finally, while this process of awakening and awareness takes place, the moral sense of the individual is expected to develop and to be applied to this reality (see 1988b: 13-14)\(^{103}\); thus, as regards consciousness, particularly the senses of responsibility and compassion complement and reinforce each other (see also 2004d: 55-57).

Being conscious, as opposed to unconscious or asleep is closely related to the possibility of awareness. Both of these concepts are central to understanding Zambrano’s development of the self, as Zambrano’s recurrent metaphors – *soñar, ensoñar, despertar, nacer, renacer, morir, resucitar* – indicate (see 1988a: 43, 45, 48; 1988b: 67; 1989a: 17, 62, 291; 1992b: 3-4, 6, 24, 45, 49-50; 2004c: 18-19, 112-13, 121). Consciousness in the moral sense is also present in her discourse as responsibility, as seen in the quotation above (see 1988b: 20, 126); one can hardly speak of responsibility without awareness (see 1988b: 16, 39). Thus, all three aspects of *conciencia* intertwine.

These three aspects as well as an emphasis on a sense of responsibility can be observed in Zambrano’s understanding of *conciencia histórica* or historical consciousness. Zambrano argues that “el hombre puede estar en la historia de varias maneras: pasivamente o en activo. Lo cual sólo se realiza plenamente cuando se acepta la responsabilidad o cuando se la vive moralmente” (Zambrano, 1988b: 11). This statement is key to understanding what Zambrano later refers to as *conciencia histórica*, which she identifies

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\(^{103}\) For other examples of this three-fold use of the word “*conciencia*” see Zambrano, 1988b: 39, 67, 103; 1992: 29.
with historical responsibility (1988b: 20). Zambrano develops her own version of false consciousness and concludes, as the FS does, that the key is awareness, that is, knowledge and understanding. When Zambrano points out the extent of the interrelation of events, she rationally appeals to the person’s conscience, that is, his compassion towards others, but most importantly, it highlights what she considers to be the inseparable responsibility which goes hand in hand with awareness; the awareness of this interconnectedness demands an active engagement with reality and the development of a sense of responsibility towards that reality. By raising the issue of historical consciousness, not as an abstract choice, but as having a direct effect on us, therefore being in our best interest, it is reasonable to surmise that Zambrano must have believed that there is no conflict of interests – not between two individuals, nor between society and an individual – when the true good is pursued – as opposed to what is considered to be good in a state of false consciousness – (see 2004c: 205; 2004d: 105-106).

Consconsciousness and awareness are two processes very much immersed in time. Personal and historical consciousness in reference to the past serves as an acknowledgement of the interconnection between all events, thus, rationally justifying a secular sense of responsibility. Even more important is its future dimension: “la conciencia pues, corresponde a un futuro que hemos de hacer nosotros en parte; a un futuro, creación del hombre, aunque sólo sea porque él puede cerrarlo o abrirlo, porque le sirve de paso y lo puede negar o servir” (1988b: 126). The combination of these elements, a certain awareness and a projection of the future, is what makes the development of revolutionary politics possible.

Zambrano provides another definition of politics: “política es reforma, creación, revolución siempre, por tanto: lucha –conjunión– entre el individuo y la vida” (1996a: 204). That is why, according to Zambrano, politics demands historical consciousness, describing History, in turn, as a dramatic dialogue between the individual and the Universe (1996a: 204).

In Zambrano’s view, “existen concepciones de la vida en que religión, ética y política se confunden” (1996a: 203). They all have in common their non-conformity and their concern for what reality should be like. One of the core differences between them is their range of action; religion and ethics are oriented towards the isolated individual, while

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104 Zambrano’s sensibility goes beyond historical consciousness; she also discusses what she calls conciencia poética or poetic consciousness. As she explains, “una conciencia poética pues, recoge los varios conflictos de la condición humana” (1988b: 56). Here, the three aspects of consciousness discussed above also intertwine; the main difference between the two is one of degree, for this poetic consciousness requires a more subtle sensitivity to human needs and suffering; it focuses more on the experience of being human, than in the events which result from human behaviour.
politics needs society for the possibility of its own existence (1996a: 204). Thus, Zambrano acknowledges, as does Aranguren, the interrelations between these three fields (see 3.2.1.1).

Zambrano, influenced by Ortegan perspectivism, thinks that individual political inclinations are determined by the individual’s temperament (see also the discussion of talante, 3.2.1.2). According to her, the basic temperament for revolutionary politics is a vital optimism founded on an attitude of having faith in life (1996a: 225). Individualism, however, leads to subjective rebellion, to rebelling against one’s individual or social share in life; excessive individualism leads to anarchy and nihilism: a state of disintegration (see 1996a: 223). According to Zambrano, revolutionary or conservative politics can be chosen because of a search for justice, or because of cowardice or lack of enthusiasm respectively (1996a: 223-24). The tools of the politician are also different; the conservative politician would use reason as his most effective and reliable tool. The revolutionary politician, however, would rely mainly on intuition, which does not necessarily discard reason completely; but it is intuition, and not reason alone, that according to Zambrano would allow the politician to feel the beat of time, to sense its rhythm, and to be sensitive to its subsequent demands for change (1996a: 226). Zambrano summarizes the characteristics needed by a revolutionary politician in the following way:

afirmación de la vida, desconfianza de la razón, valor moral de todo lo que es aumento de la vida, superación constante, aprovechamiento del dolor en beneficio de los valores positivos, heroísmo del individuo como encarnador de los valores vitales… Nietzsche, en fin, o algo de él (1996a: 227).

Utopia is considered to be, by Zambrano, the germ of revolutionary longings (2004c: 156; 1996a: 65); she considers it the conceptual germ which enables change, enables history (1989a: 63). Furthermore, utopia extends even beyond that, because Zambrano’s philosophy in itself can be viewed as utopian in the sense that it accepts and absorbs paradoxes:

movilizándose hacia el núcleo de los más radicales interrogantes que suscitan las aporías a que ha ido llegando el pensamiento (y la vida) occidentales; de condescender, y no instalarse, sino seguir circunambulando alrededor del “punto oscuro” que le marca a la esperanza lo impensable, lo imposible (1996a: 65).

The crucial role of utopia will now be discussed in reference to democracy and also hope.

4.3.5 Democracy

Zambrano criticizes Western reason and the socio-political systems it has led to. Instead, she proposes what can be considered a utopian socio-political organization. In the context of poetic reason, she opts for a democracy that goes beyond the traditional parameters of representative democracy (1996a: 27, 69-70). She deals extensively with the term democracy in her book, Persona y democracia, first published in Puerto Rico, in 1958 (1988b: 7). Although abstract and undetermined, Zambrano provides her own definition of
democracy: “si hubiera que definir la democracia podría hacerse diciendo que es la sociedad en la cual no sólo es permitido, sino exigido, el ser persona” (1988b: 133). In addition, for Zambrano, an individual can only develop himself to fully become a person in an atmosphere of freedom. As Ortega Muñoz explains, “Zambrano llega a identificar el ser-libre con el ser-persona, que es ‘la suprema grandeza del hombre’” (1992: 54). Thus, Zambrano does not have in mind an ordinary democracy, but a system of socio-political organization which promotes not only the political participation of its integral members, but also their personal development (see Ortega Muñoz, 1992: 56). Hence the apparent circularity of the argument: it is only on the assumption of a pre-existing personal development that a political system which promotes personal development can be conceived. However, no such circularity exists because these changes are conceived as an exponential and progressive process, rather than as an absolute and definitive result.

For this utopian democracy to be possible, first, the interest of individual and society must coincide. As Zambrano puts it,

en la expresión “individuo” se insinúa siempre una oposición a la sociedad, un antagonismo. La palabra individuo sugiere lo que hay de irreductible en el hombre concreto individual, mas en sentido un tanto negativo. En cambio, persona incluye al individuo y además insinúa en la mente algo de positivo, algo irreductible por positivo, por ser un “más”; no una diferencia, simplemente (1988b: 133).

Democracy, however, is not without its problems. Zambrano refers back to the traditional meaning of democracy as a regime that serves the people to remind us of its original aim (1988b: 134). In this context, she reminds us that one of the dangers people face is that of becoming a mass. For her, this happens as a result of demagogy, which alienates people from reality, thus altering their sense of responsibility, consciousness, and time (1988b: 144, 149-50). Zambrano suggests re-examining the term pueblo, people, upon which democracy rests; pueblo, as a totality, includes all the members of a particular society, or pueblo as opposed to the individual (1988b: 144). The first may lead to a people oppressing other peoples, whereas the second can be described as a totalitarian majority where the individual is dismissed. An option which surmounts these difficulties must be sought instead; tensions must be integrated, diversities relished (1988b: 162). Zambrano concludes that

el orden democrático se logrará tan sólo con la participación de todos en cuanto persona, lo cual corresponde a la realidad humana. Y que la igualdad de todos los hombres, “dogma” fundamental de

105 It should be noted that Zambrano avoids providing or even outlining any of the practical principles and structures necessary for the materialization of a political system. This is not the result of an oversight on her part, but a consequence of the nature of this type of democracy. Because a democratic state for her is one which encourages the purpose of their citizen’s self-actualization, for Zambrano, this democracy entails the morality of the State as well as of their citizens. At the same time, and as a result of understanding the person as a Project and of the important role allocated to freedom rejects moral formulae, and consequently, also political formulae (see 1939: 77).
la fe democrática, es igualdad en tanto que personas humanas, no en cuanto a cualidades o caracteres; igualdad no es uniformidad. Es, por el contrario, el supuesto que permite aceptar las diferencias, la rica complejidad humana y no sólo la del presente, sino la del porvenir. La fe en lo incomprensible. ¿Será utópico pensar que este orden, en lugar de excluir realidades, las irá incluyendo todas? Orden es límite y límite es exclusión (1988b: 164).

Zambrano finds the key to overcoming the conflict between pueblo and individual in the development of the person, a person who, having acquired a higher, more integrating level of consciousness understands that ultimately there is coincidence between personal and common good. As a result, such a person cannot genuinely go against the interests of anyone in the community nor the community itself. A person in Zambrano’s sense is an individual who has understood and interiorised his transcendence and that of reality, integrating both as part of a more elevated unity, thus not solving – strictly speaking – but overcoming the conflict. This concept of unity shall be discussed below.

4.4 Zambrano in (re-)construction

Although, as I have already pointed out in the introduction, this re-construction of Zambrano’s, and, indeed, also Aguirre’s work, may seem to fall dangerously close to what Skinner calls the “mythology of coherence”, where the exegete provides an interpretation which unjustifiably assumes that an author has a coherent theory by moving from ideas to abstract principles in a desperate attempt to find coherence where there was, and, in fact, has always been, a certain amount of disorder and incongruity, this mythology is not applicable to the work of Zambrano nor Aguirre’s (see Skinner, 1988b: 38-43; see also Skinner, 2002: 67-72). With no intention of denying the existence of such practice as illustrated by Skinner, the work of Aranguren, and even more so that of Zambrano and Aguirre, exhibits the characteristics of digression, diffusion, elusion, and even contradiction in a deliberate manner, as a matter of methodology in their attempt to offer an alternative rationality. It is their awareness and intentionality, their deliberate characterization of their expression in the terms described above, which provide ample evidence of the coherence and unity of their project, for as Skinner states, “we need to understand what strategies have been voluntarily adopted to convey their meaning with deliberate obliqueness” (1988b: 51; see also 52, 60-61). It is this unravelling of evidence and the reconstruction of such a project that a large part of this section and the thesis as a whole will focus on.

Having discarded the pitfall of the mythology of coherence, the aims and method for this re-construction are best explained by borrowing Skinner’s words:

I seek to elucidate concepts not by focusing on the supposed ‘meanings’ of the terms we use to express them, but rather by asking what can be done with them and by examining their relationship to each other and to broader networks of beliefs (2002: 5).

Thus, this is precisely what will be attempted below in relation to Zambrano’s ontology, epistemology, and her use of language.
4.4.1 Resistance

A re-construction of Zambrano’s arguments and, more importantly, assumptions, as well as the contextualization of her work in the trends of post-war European philosophy, will now be carried out. The immediate difficulty encountered is the resistance of the text to such a process. The aim of this section is to make Zambrano’s ontology explicit, which will shed light onto the rest of her thought. The interconnectedness of her philosophy, however, means that it is not possible to dissect different elements of her thought – not even for the purpose of systematic analysis – because they can only be understood in relation to the whole. That is why, in the course of this discussion of ontology, certain assumptions that Zambrano makes will be used, along with various key terms which will only be developed at a later point. Only at the end of this discussion will the argument become clear and gain sense as a whole.

4.4.2 Ontology

4.4.2.1 Post-Heideggerian Zambrano

Zambrano’s thought is explicitly an attempt to overcome the co-ordinates set by Western thought often exemplified in Cartesian rationality. As she explains, “el drama de la Cultura Moderna ha sido la falta inicial de contacto entre la verdad de la razón y la vida” (2004d: 17; see also 21). She expands this idea explaining that

[la razón] nada dejaba de lo que en la vida quiere transcender. Dejó de haber alma y espíritu, si por espíritu entendemos la posibilidad infinita de toda vida y su necesidad (la necesidad individual) de renacer, pues el individuo, para serlo, necesita renacer, ser de nuevo engendrado (2004d: 23).

Thus, what she refers to as modern reason is perceived as limited and – more critically – limiting.

Although the term “instrumental reason” is not used by Zambrano, she is critical of the instrumentalization present in human life. She criticizes instrumentalization in a material sense, in reference to the proliferation of instruments and technology. As she puts it,

Mientras la vida se llenaba de instrumentos técnicos, de maravillas mecánicas, de cachivaches de todas clases, el alma y el corazón quedan vacíos, y las horas, al ser liberadas del trabajo opresor, transcurren más oprimidas todavía, porque están sujetas a la terrible opresión de la vaciedad de un tiempo muerto. La quietud se hacía imposible. Paralelamente a los medios de comunicación y a las posibilidades de ir y venir, el vacío se adueña de las vidas (2004c: 74-75).

She forcefully summarizes this critique in the next pages as follows:

La vida necesita del pensamiento, pero lo necesita porque no puede continuar el estado en que espontáneamente se produce. Porque no basta nacer una vez y moverse en un mundo de instrumentos útiles (2004c: 76-77).

Zambrano is also critical of instrumentalization in reference to the specific rationality which is based on criteria of self-interest and which treats beings as means and not ends in
themselves (see 2004d: 21). Thus, Zambrano develops a critique of such rationality and its material consequences, which she refers to as *historia sacrificial* (Zambrano, 1988b; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 43). With the term sacrificial history, Zambrano makes a direct allusion to the negative consequences of the instrumentality of reason: the development of history at the cost of human sacrifice (see Zambrano, 1977b: 16; see also Cerezo, 1991a: 80-82).

In the process of developing her critique and her poetic reason, Zambrano engages critically with the defining currents of post-war continental European thought, becoming herself a major figure in relation to the post-Heideggerian debate, and offering a genuinely original approach. In Aranguren’s words:

> esta fusión de filosofía y mística, que no tiene nada que ver con la poesía filosófica y mística, que no tiene nada que ver con la poesía filosófica o la lírica filosófica alemana, me parece que es algo genuinamente de María Zambrano y aunque tenga semejanzas o analogías con el pensamiento de Heidegger, y sin duda las tiene, esto no obsta para que se trate de un pensamiento profundamente original (1983: 130).

Zambrano’s thought has to be understood in reference to Heidegger’s. The terms of the debate are that whereas, traditionally, being has been studied by means of prioritising essence over existence, one of the key characteristics of Heidegger’s thought is that he defends the primacy of existence, giving priority to existence over essence, life over reason. Whereas according to Hegel, “all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real”, hence turning reality/rationality into his main object of study, Heidegger insists on the primacy of the ontological, that is, being understood as existence (Hegel, 2001: 18). From this point onwards, there is a shift in the line of philosophical inquiry, much of which focuses increasingly more on the concept of existence and develops and explores its consequences for ontology in general and for a philosophical interpretation of the human being in particular. This is the context from which Zambrano’s thought develops.

The consequence of this shift is that instead of a fixed being, now being is conceived as an unfolding. This, however, is not the determined unfolding of a pre-existing set of possibilities. Instead, being is conceived as self-construction. For Heidegger, existence is conceived as absolute actuality, a project. Existence is a process of free appropriation of one’s own possibilities. The scope of this process of taking charge depends on the individual’s understanding of his “being-in-the-world”, hence, *Dasein*, being there (see Abbagnano, 1994: 729). *Dasein* is being situated in time and space; therefore, *Dasein* involves an engagement with history (see Davis, 1996: 15); *Dasein* is a form of being which finds vital the understanding of its own existence (see Schalow, 2001: 24).

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106 Given the strong influence that German philosophy has had on Spanish thought, as indicated in the introduction, it is hardly surprising that this position bears important resemblances with Ortega’s vitalism and Zubiri’s morality.
Zambrano engages with this conception of existence. Being, for Zambrano, as for Heidegger and Ortega before her, is being as a project. Zambrano, as discussed above, is careful to draw a distinction between being an individual and being a person. Whereas the term individual emphasizes individuation, interpreted here as the separating and isolating element present in the human being, the term person suggests integration, which is what Zambrano is aiming for. Person, for Zambrano, is an actualization of being which is reminiscent of the Heideggerian concept of *Dasein*; person, in this sense, integrates the social and the historical in the process of the appropriation of freedom and reality. According to her, the human being is faced with an array of possibilities which he needs to take charge of. This array of possibilities is determined by his horizon of creativity, which directly shapes the possibilities of reality. Hence, in Zambrano’s view, a person, understood as being in the world in the form of *Dasein*, is intimately linked to the world and to other beings because of his essentially unfinished and open reality. She, however, shifts the emphasis from existence to experience, from theory to practice. This is, in fact, the key point of Zambrano’s departure from Heidegger.

Heidegger’s key question is: what is being? Zambrano does not dispute the relevance of the question posed by Heidegger, but she develops an experiential approach, rather than an entirely theoretical one. As Emile Cioran explains, “Maria Zambrano has not sold her soul to the Idea, she has safeguarded her unique essence by setting the experience of the Insoluble above reflection upon it, in short, she has transcended philosophy” (1992: 227). What is specific to her is that instead of attempting to resolve the question rationally, her work provides an answer because her œuvre is the very process of fulfilment of the project of becoming a person. It is no coincidence that Aranguren and Aguirre criticize the dissonance between Heidegger’s philosophical project – and tangentially also Ortega’s in the case of Aguirre – and his biographical choices (1991: 7-10; 1985: 79-81 respectively), thus, also highlighting their own commitment to bridge such gap. Hence, Zambrano goes one step beyond Heidegger, turning her work into the practice of *Dasein*.

Despite their many coincidences on core theoretical arguments, such as *Dasein*, the understanding of being as a project, the inherent temporality of being, the dangers of positivism, science and technology, and the liberating possibilities of art – particularly poetry – Zambrano still finds Heidegger’s positions insufficient. Zambrano’s key divergences from Heideggerian thought, such as her views on transcendence, unity, politics, language, and anti-elitism, spring from her recognition of the importance of experience, experiencing the theory proposed in her work, becoming a life project, but also the value of experience as a succession of subjective events which shape life. Zambrano still maintains the ontological primacy of being; what sets Zambrano apart from Heidegger and from other thinkers who may also have advocated the transcendental nature of being, such as Scheler,
Pascal, and Hölderlin is that her theoretical work is simultaneously the practice of her philosophy. There is, however, no contradiction with the argument above; practice in Zambrano encompasses theory; at the same time, theory does not exist isolated from life and experience, but it is intimately linked to praxis. In poetic reason, Zambrano finds a manner of expression that, by successfully combining content, form, and style, becomes a mode of expression of her own self-development, a tool for such development, and an invitation and guide for the development of others. It is an interactive, dynamic reason which cannot be considered as a fulfilment, but rather as a process; a process of multidimensional development which offers a plausible alternative to instrumental reason.

4.4.2.2 Transcendental unity

“Todo ser vive en función de un orbe, límite envolvente de todas sus actividades y sostén de su ser, quien, a su vez, le sostiene. Y este mutuo sostenerse, este equilibrio de existencias, es lo que crea el universo, la unidad” (Zambrano, 2003: 62).

The concepts of unity and transcendence, as well as their inter-relation and implications, will now be explored, for they are at the heart of Zambrano’s ontology, which the rest of her philosophy is built upon, for as she puts it: “llegar a ser, sólo es posible logrando la unidad” (2004d: 62).

One of the reasons why the concept of unity becomes problematic is because the defence of unity has been used as one of the founding principles for the project of modernity (for a critical account of modernity and responses to it see Hanssen, 2004: 285-287). Despite the diversity of perspectives and interpretations, in general terms, it can be said that moderns claim unity as one of the founding principles so that they can maintain the autonomy of the subject, and defend at the same time the existence of a purpose, both individual and social. This unity, however, means that they seek a foundation which they cannot provide, “for a foundation, in this context, would imply producing a homogeneity between empirical facts and a Grund or foundation which cannot be grasped empirically, since it is precisely the founding basis of the empirical realm” (Reijen, 2000: 225). The

107 As Habermas observes, people have been considering themselves moderns since the twelfth century – although not continuously – to refer to the distance which separate them from the ancients, whom they revere and seek to imitate (see 1981: 3-4). With the French Enlightenment, however, reverence towards the ancients is changed by and replaced with reverence towards science. It is modern science that inspires the belief “in the infinite progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral betterment” (see Habermas, 1981: 4). Consequently, these are turned into be the aims of the project of modernity: “the project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art, according to their inner logic. At the same time, this project intended to release the cognitive potentials of each of these domains to set them free from their esoteric forms” (Habermas, 1981: 9).
unity defended by the moderns is one which lays the foundations of epistemology, which in Western rationality is synonymous with science. It is the impossibility of offering an empirical validation for such foundation which makes the modern concept of unity nothing more than an illusion. In contrast, the existentialist approach is fundamentally anti-Romantic and anti-Idealist; it propounds the abandonment of a founding infinite principle, such as Reason, Absolute, Idea, or Spirit, so frequently invoked by modernists (Abbagnano, 1994: 726; see also Zambrano, 2004d: 75). Zambrano shares with existentialism the rejection of such principles, and is particularly opposed to such foundations: “soberbia de la razón es soberbia de la filosofía, es soberbia del hombre que parte en busca del conocimiento y que se cree tenerlo” (1939: 19). Zambrano is keen to highlight the dangers of this epistemological foundationalism which is why, linking them to the realm of politics, she describes it as absolutist (1996a: 180). She still harbours a moderate intellectual optimism based on the concept of unity. In contrast with this arrogant reason, Zambrano proposes to infuse reason with poetry:

This poetic form of history and reason is to be informed by a poetic epistemology. As she puts it,

Zambrano’s concept of unity, however, does not intend to provide the foundation for her epistemology. In contrast with the principles of modernity, Zambrano’s conception of unity is not the unifying element of a system that proclaims itself to be the explanation and aim of a universal, deterministic, and systematic project whose culmination is itself. Hers is a transcendental unity which forms the synthetic features of her ontology, not the founding principle of a deterministic system. Hence, unity and transcendence are the two synthetic arguments which underlie Zambrano’s ontology.

Although the concept of unity leads to deterministic conclusions, following Heidegger and Ortega, Zambrano’s understanding of being as a project grants her philosophy an indetermination and openness that distances it from such determinism. Both unity and indetermination are crucial to understanding the nature of the subject, as argued below.
4.4.2.3 Unity and the subject

Transcendental unity is of serious significance in unveiling Zambrano’s conception of the subject, and, ultimately, her political project. As discussed above, Zambrano’s conception of unity can only be understood within the Heideggerian tradition.

Zambrano subscribes to Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein*, according to which being is being-in-the-world-with-others (see 2004d: 54). The implication of this statement is that the self can only be understood insofar as it involves being-in-the-world and being-with-others, a starting point shared by Lévinas. Lévinas, however, accuses Heidegger of reducing the other to the same, the self: “the Dasein that Heidegger puts in place of the soul, of consciousness, of the Ego, retains the structure of the same” (Lévinas, 1974, 196). Contrary to Lévinas’s accusation, for Heidegger the world and the other have distinct existences which cannot be reduced to that of the self (see Davis, 1996: 32). According to Lévinas, “Western philosophy coincides with the unveiling of the other in which the Other, by manifesting itself as a being, loses its alterity” (Lévinas, 1966: 35; see also Bretz, 2001: 442). In Lévinas’s view, this reduction of the Other to the Same (self), is precisely at the root of the lack of a satisfactory ethical proposal in Western philosophy.

Zambrano’s standpoint is diametrically opposed to Lévinas’s; she escapes this reductionist loophole despite the centrality of the self. For Lévinas, phenomenology, Heidegger in particular, and Western philosophy in general, share the “inability to envisage an encounter with the Other which does not entail a return to the self” (Davis, 1996: 24; see also 1996: 19, 21; for a clear introduction and overview of phenomenology see Moran, 2000). Although this is an accurate observation – also applicable to Zambrano’s thought – it does not necessarily involve a reduction of the other to the self. Such a reduction is based on Lévinas’s misinterpretation of Heidegger (see Davis, 1996: 64-66). Whereas from Lévinas’s perspective *Dasein* and *Mitsein*, being-in-the-world-with-others, means the assimilation of the other and the elimination of differences, for everything is reduced to being, being is, in fact, something larger than the self and the other; it is existence itself, which is why its different manifestations – the self and the other – retain their idiosyncrasies. This is also what happens in Zambrano’s ontology. Like Lévinas, Zambrano criticizes the abstract nature of Heidegger’s being; Zambrano also focuses on the relation of being with others, but instead of dwelling on its linguistic limitations as Lévinas does in relation to ethics, she develops a poetic use of language that, because of its performative qualities, becomes simultaneously the expression and basis of her rationality.

*Mitsein*, *con-vivir*, is the axis of the relationship with the Other, which from an ethical perspective revolves around the concept of compassion (Zambrano, 1989a: 16; for the political significance of compassion see above). Thus, what Lévinas would qualify as the reduction of the Other to the Same is only part of the first layer of Zambrano’s reality;
her proposal is not the absorption of the Other by the self, but rather the transcendental dissolution of both in the realization of the transcendental unity which forms the basis of her ontology.

For Zambrano, Being, existence itself, has an interrelated nature which accounts for what I have been describing as transcendental unity, that is, unity at a different layer of reality beyond sensorial experience: ontological experience (see 2004d: 49-51). In order to clarify the argument, it will now be illustrated with symbolic logic, commonly employed in philosophical thought to this purpose:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{s} &= \text{self} \\
\text{o} &= \text{other} \\
\text{B} &= \text{Being}
\end{align*}
\]

\[(\text{s} \land \text{o}) \rightarrow \text{S}\]

Here, the result of the interaction between the self and the other, is the cannibalization of the other, which is the reductionism that Lévinas is referring to. From the other’s perspective, it could also be reasoned that \[(\text{s} \land \text{o}) \rightarrow \text{O},\] leading to a similar reductionism.

Zambrano’s proposal to overcome this problem has the form of \[(\text{s} \land \text{o}) \rightarrow \text{B}\] There, the result of the interaction between the individual self and the individual other is their transcendental fusion, while still preserving their individuality – in the sense of uniqueness, not in the sense of separation.

Expressing unity in this form, however, leads to a contradiction, and as Gutting points out in relation to some of the criticism directed against Derrida, any project of rational thought which is not consistent with the basic laws of logic – identity and non-contradiction – is meaningless; defending \[p \land \neg p\], that something is and is not at the same time, would be saying nothing (Gutting, 2001: 304).

If \[(\text{s} \land \text{o}) \rightarrow \text{B}\]
\[
\text{s} = \text{B} \land \text{o} = \text{B}, \text{ which ultimately means that s} = \text{ o}
\]

This is Lévinas’s objection as discussed above. In contrast, in Zambrano’s view, the self does not cannibalize the other, nor does it equate. However, if the self is not the same as the other, then it may seem that it claims that \[\text{s} \land \neg \text{s},\] which as indicated above goes against the first rule of logic. Zambrano overcomes this aporia by distinguishing between different levels of reality, immediate and transcendental; it is only in the transcendental plane of reality where there is unity and therefore no contradiction.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{s} &= \text{s} \\
\text{s} &\neq \text{o} \\
\text{S} &= \text{O}
\end{align*}
\]

\[(\text{s} = \text{B} \land \text{o} = \text{B}) \rightarrow \text{B} \text{ because B} = \forall, \text{ that is to say that if the self equals Being and the other equals Being, then they both are Being because, ultimately, Being is everything.}\]
Heidegger suggests that Being, as opposed to being, is God, that is a higher being (see Schalow, 2001: 3). In contrast, Zambrano – following the Krausist tradition – adopts a panentheist position, which in ontological terms means that being is a manifestation of Being, furthermore, being is Being, hence the inescapable interconnection of being and the transcendental unity of all that exists (Velasco, 2003: 11-12). Thus, there is only Being, although there are multiple manifestations of this Being; the transcendence of these manifestations reveals the unity of existence, that is, the transcendence of Being.

This statement does not suggest that $s \land \neg s$, it expresses that although at an immediate level there is no identity between the self and the other, upon realizing the transcendental unity of being, ultimately, there is equivalence between the self and the other at a transcendental level given that everything that is is an aspect of Being. Hence, the transcendental level no longer refers to the specific manifestations of being, but to Being, the entirety of everything which exists, which is beyond the scope of predicate logic.

It is only in the sense of this transcendental unity that Zambrano suggests the dissolution of the self, although she does so not by decentring the subject, but by de-individualising it; not by melting away the perceived boundaries between the self and the Other, but the very concepts of self and Other, distinctions which dissolve in light of the transcendence of their being, that is, upon realizing their unity. The centrality of her conception of unity, however, prevents Zambrano from renouncing the autonomy of the subject and announcing the dissolution of the self as Lacan and Foucault do (see Gutting, 2001: 239; Bruns, 2005: 364-65 respectively). Although Zambrano does acknowledge the unconscious – in fact, she praises some of the achievements of psychoanalysis – she is not prepared to give up the autonomy of consciousness (2004c: 124, 132). For her, the subject, at least initially, is still the centre. She denies the ruling power of the unconscious in a psychoanalytical sense (2004c: 134). Zambrano acknowledges the existence of underlying forces, such as instinct and repressed desire, as well as the tension they might create. Although Zambrano criticizes the alleged unity of the Cartesian self, she still defends a united vision of the subject to the extent that, for her, the conscious self is ultimately responsible for this subject (see Zambrano, 2004d: 92, 94, 107-108). Zambrano is reluctant to embrace the decentring of the subject in the Lacanian sense – the denial of the stability of the ego, which is deemed a mere illusion – because that would involve the relinquishment of intentionality, responsibility, transcendence, and the possibility of knowledge itself. So while post-modern thinkers view the idea of a ruling self as tyrannical, Zambrano rejects the decentring of the self in order to save ethics, and, with it, the very
possibility of personal development (see Appleby, 1996: 387-88). This translates into two interconnected arguments based on the possibility of identity and ethics respectively.

First, Zambrano adopts the Heideggerian concept of being as a project, which implies existence of identity, the introduction of time, the existence of possibility, choice, and intentionality.

A project requires the identity of the self with itself. This does not mean that the different elements should be identical amongst themselves forming just one, but that, even if there are different aspects of the self, they should form a cohesive self such that it must be identifiable at different times.

A project requires projection. If the dissolution of the self is accepted, then being can no longer be conceived as a project. A project is always a project for something to be developed; in this case, the self develops itself in several directions; however, if the self does not exist there is nothing to project from or towards. Even if it exists but has been decentred, then the elements of choice and intentionality disappear when the impact of time is considered. Although it could be argued that choice and intentionality can be maintained with a decentred self, this is so only in the present time; when the prospective and retrospective possibilities are explored (future and past), the decentred self – not being able to claim identity to itself in a cohesive manner – is unable to maintain the consistency of a project. Hence, being as a project requires a cohesive, responsible, knowledgeable – able to acquire and retain knowledge so that it is possible to speak of choice –, and recognizable – so it is possible to establish identity – self.

Second, Zambrano states that

cuando lo mido [mi yo], siento que es mío, que podría más allá, pero que este más acá a donde he ido a parar, ahí soy yo, ahí no tengo más remedio que aceptar responsabilidad, porque es el punto de la moral y es un punto también de revelación (1987: 70-71; see also Maillard García, 1996: 56).

The notion of responsibility is only meaningful in relation to a self; the possibility of ethics involves choice and personal identity. What is more, for an action to be considered

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108 As Ihab Hassan explains, the word postmodernism, or rather, postmodernidad, is first used by Federico de Onís in his Antologia de la poesía española e hispanoamericana (1934) in order “to indicate a mild reaction to modernism already latent within it” (1982: 260-61). Since then, this term, its usage, and its meaning have gained great complexity, to the point of becoming contentious. Several reasons account for the difficulties associated with this term. First of all, it encompasses a huge diversity, for it can be applied to numerous manifestations of cultural life, such as artistic, architectural, philosophical, and literary, to mention but a few (Hassan, 1982: 260). But perhaps more crucial to the disagreement is the fact that postmodernism is to a large extent a term created ad hoc for the purposes of classification and academic analysis, instead of a coherent and purposefully developed movement or school (see Hassan, 1982: 260). That is why, for Hassan, postmodernism is best described by the neologism “indeterminance”, which he uses “to designate two central, constitutive tendencies in postmodernism: one of indeterminacy, the other of immance” (1982: 269). With this terminology, he aims to make reference to the concepts of heterodoxy, randomness and various forms of unmaking: typically a string of concepts which require the prefix de- or dis-, such as decenterment, detotalization, and discontinuity (see Hassan, 1982: 269).
ethical the subject must have self-awareness as well as the possibility of self-control. Without them, it makes no more sense to consider that subject’s actions ethical than it would to do so with an animal’s actions – acting on instinct – or with natural phenomena – resulting from necessity. Choice and responsibility are only meaningful when: first, synchronically, there is a centred, conscious self who not only provides cohesion to the different dimensions of the self, but also rules over them, and second, diachronically there is personal identity, for if the subject who carried out a certain action disintegrates as such, then the concept of accountability is deemed irrelevant. Even if at best such a subject could be considered responsible for such an action at a present time, the decentred self – whose key characteristic is the lack of a unified ruling self – by being multiple, unpredictable, and inconsistent, lacks the cohesion necessary for the establishment of psychological personal identity, which in practical terms means that, regardless of present responsibility, where there is no identity there is no accountability.

All in all, from Zambrano’s point of view if there is no subject everything else falls to pieces; there is no knowledge, no choice, no ethics, and no future. Even time is reduced to the present, because with no sense of personal continuity there is no past or future to properly speak of, there is only now.

4.4.2.4 Ontological thirst: transcendence

A religious character is common to the three authors, but whereas Aranguren and Aguirre often refer to religion, evolving from a deeply rooted Catholicism to a more critical Christianity, Zambrano does not use the term religion as often; she prefers to talk about transcendence, thus avoiding stale orthodox formulae.

For Zambrano, “el anhelo es la primera manifestación de la vida humana” (1988b: 63). The defining characteristic of this longing is its indetermination, as we shall now see. As opposed to a need, a longing does not necessarily require an object; it is rather a sign of emptiness, the kind of emptiness that only manifests itself in human life. This accounts for the search for transcendence in human existence: “el alma no puede estar en sí, pues en la vida está el salir de sí, el no bastarse a sí misma, el ser trascendente” (2004d: 44). The satisfaction of the basic needs for subsistence is not enough for the fulfilment of a human life. The existence of this emptiness, of this longing, in different degrees for each one of us, only stresses the need for a journey of self-discovery because “conocerse es transcenderse” (1986a: 25). Thus, another kind of need is revealed; the need for transcendence, the need to explore our humanity, our very existence. As Zambrano puts it: “el hombre es el ser que padece su propia trascendencia. Y, por tanto, padece su realidad: la suya y la realidad en tanto que le es dada, que le concierne” (1992b: 9; see also 5).
The DRAE assigns to the word trascendencia, transcendence, three distinct meanings, all of which are crucial to apprehending Zambrano’s understanding and role of this concept so deeply rooted in her ontology. These meanings are: “1. Penetración, perspicacia. 2. Resultado, consecuencia de índole grave o muy importante. 3. Aquello que está más allá de los límites naturales y desligado de ellos.” Neither transcendence nor unity, despite being the central characteristics of Being, are immediately obvious. As a result of this concealed character, transcendence cannot be experienced just from any mental state; it requires a certain shrewdness, the penetration into the fabric of reality to see beyond immediate sensorial appearance. Influenced by phenomenology, Zambrano understands transcendence as the action by which the subject, the person in Zambrano’s terminology, directs himself towards the exterior, an exterior which includes not only the world but also the other. Heidegger understands “transcendencia como superación: es transcendente lo que realiza este sobrepasar” (Abbagnano, 1994: 733). Zambrano shares this view. For her, transcendence means project as well as projection, that is why it is an act of freedom (see Abbagnano, 1994: 734). From Heidegger’s perspective, however, “el transcender, y todo lo que en el trascender se revela (incluyendo la realidad fáctica), es una imposibilidad radical, es una nada aniquiladora” (Abbagnano, 1994: 739). Transcendence is nothingness. In contrast, Zambrano, based on her concept of unity, perceives transcendence as everythingness, transcendence is the connectedness of Being. It is by the experience of transcendence that the unity of existence can be perceived and the nature of Being can be understood:

desde los grados más humildes del ser la trascendencia se muestra como carácter último de la realidad que comienza ya por mostrarse en todo conjunto o estructura, en que el todo es algo más que la suma de las partes, que si lo son es porque se penetran unas a otras trascendiéndose (Zambrano, 2004c: 105).

Transcending, then, suggests the surmounting of limits, in Zambrano’s case, the limits of sensorial experience, the limits that separate the self from the world and the other, to access the realm of ontological experience where there is only unity, Being. Poetic reason, thus, stems not from the constant perception of unity, but from the awareness of and openness to the experience of transcendence which will in turn encourage the grasp of such unity.

Consequently, two different levels can be discerned in the concept of transcendence: an ontological and a personal one.

Trascendencia que no es sino la capacidad que tienen los seres para salir de si rebasando sus propios límites, dejando una huella de otro ser, produciendo un efecto, actuando más allá de sí como si el ser de cada cosa terminara en otra. Trascendencia que se agudiza y llega a su extremo en la vida humana en esa ‘irrefrenable tendencia de la persona’ (2004c: 105-06).

Personal transcendence, therefore, is intrinsic to the person. Transcendence and unity are intrinsic qualities of reality at an ontological level. That is why this experience of going beyond, of overcoming limits, is also the experience of the disappearance of separation. Differences and opposites vanish (see Zambrano, 2004d: 93). The self, the other, and the
world become one. Hence, transcendence and unity are but aspects of one experience, the experience of Being. This experience, although inherent, is also unassailable; it is an irrefutable tendency which cannot be eradicated. It can, however, be faded or ignored, although at a great cost:

tal vez esta irrefrenable tendencia [la de la trascendencia] no pueda ser cumplida jamás adecuadamente, pero al quedar incumplida por bajo de un cierto límite, la vida humana se hunde en inquietud y soledad, en una soledad y una agitación estériles (Zambrano, 2004c: 106).

The disregard of the intrinsic tendency for transcendence results in loneliness and restlessness, which Zambrano describes as the two major ingredients of crisis (2004c: 100-01). Inquietud, restlessness, is, then, the key symptom of transcendence; of its existence, but also of its denial. Two aspects of restlessness may be experienced: a positive kind of restlessness, inherent in human nature, which is an expression of our reaching for transcendence and an initially negative – in the sense of unpleasant, disagreeable – kind of restlessness. The latter is suffered as a result of the disregard for the call of transcendence and it leads to a crisis that goes beyond that which is bearable. It is negative only initially because, despite its unpleasantness, it may open the path for self-development; once the limits of that which that particular human being is willing or able to bear are surpassed, he is forced to look for alternatives, and one of his choices is the acknowledgement of and search for transcendence. The influence of San Juan de la Cruz’s concept of “noche oscura del alma” – a stage of anguish and darkness necessary before a mystical encounter with God – is particularly visible in Zambrano’s depiction of this process (see Zambrano, 1983: 17-32).

Loneliness is also inherent in human nature, being the result of our limiting and, ultimately, isolating perception of being. When the individual finds transcendence impossible, then, the self is closed to reality and is overcome by a feeling of loneliness instead (see Zambrano, 2004c: 105). Ignoring transcendence results in an endogenic type of loneliness, one which is the result of a lack of knowledge, of a feeling of uncertainty which leads, once again, to restlessness. Such loneliness is only conquerable once the immanent perception of being is replaced by a transcendent perception which reconnects the self with the original unity. Only the grasp of transcendence can provide meaning to existence and discard loneliness by providing a sense of belonging (see Zambrano, 1988b: 17; 2004c: 104). This accounts for the dual relation with transcendence. Transcendence involves a longing which may lead to loneliness and despair, but it may also provide meaning and hope to those who perceive it (Zambrano, see 2004c: 104).

4.4.3 Experiential philosophy

El existencialismo se ha desarrollado, por un lado, como una metafísica ontológica u ontocosmológica; por otro
lado, como espiritualismo radical; y en fin, por otro lado, como una forma de empirismo igualmente radical, por la cual la experiencia, entendida como existencia, ha perdido el carácter de inclusividad total y se ha convertido en abertura al mundo (Abbagnano, 1994: 729).

Zambrano’s thought, having developed her own ontology based on the transcendental unity of reality understood from a deeply spiritual perspective, incorporates these three strands. As discussed above, unlike post-war French philosophy, Zambrano refuses to acknowledge the disintegration of the subject and embraces, instead, an experiential philosophy. The meaning and implications of experiential philosophy shall now be explored.

Experiential philosophy can be traced back to the German tradition, to Hegel, whose dialectical proof is necessarily experiential (see Rosen, 1982: 22, 164). Foucault divides pre-structuralist French thought between philosophy of experience and philosophy of knowledge (see Gutting, 2001: 228). According to this division, the thought of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is described as experiential, due to their perspectives on the subject, language, and epistemology (see Gutting, 2001: 228). Although Zambrano differs from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in her views on the subject, language, and epistemology, her thought is also experiential. Complex and multidimensional as Zambrano’s philosophy is, experience is the key element that underlies all of her work, setting her apart from other trends and thinkers whom she might have been influenced by or sought inspiration in. As Gómez Blesa explains,

la nota más distintiva de este tipo de ensayo [el ensayo zambraniano] es la ‘autoimplicación del yo en lo escrito’ que marca el carácter experimental del conocimiento, de modo que éste no aparece desligado de la vida, sino imbricado en ella” (2006: 36).

It is worth punctuating the sense in which the word “experience” is being used in this context. As Williams indicates, experience may refer to “(i) knowledge gathered from past events, whether by conscious observation or by consideration and reflection; and (ii) a particular kind of consciousness, which can in some contexts be distinguished from ‘reason’ or ‘knowledge’” (1983: 126). It is in this latter sense that the concept of experience plays such a crucial role in understanding Zambrano’s thought in particular, but also CT at large. As Williams continues to explain, “experience, in this major tendency, is then the fullest, most active kind of consciousness, and it includes feeling as well as thought” (1983: 127). It is precisely because of this inclusive and democratic, in the sense of non-hierarchical, nature of experience that it constitutes such a valuable platform for Critical Theorists. That

109 Adorno, whom as seen above is read by Zambrano, develops what Rosen calls an “interpretative discipline of experience” (1982: 164). According to this, his philosophy can be considered experiential not only in what there is of first-hand account, but also because – influenced by phenomenology – his starting point is the everyday, non-philosophical experience; a trait also common to Zambrano and Aguirre.
is why Laurenzi emphasizes the role that experience plays in Zambrano’s epistemology: “sólo el saber de la experiencia le parecía legítimo, porque obedece a la vida y le da sustento sin sofocarla con superestructuras conceptuales” (2004: 24). In other words, Zambrano’s epistemology, her poetic reason, requires a form of perception and knowledge that is prepared to accept and not distort the reality which the person intends to engage with.

Juan José García argues in relation to Zambrano’s motives to develop her poetic reason that, “la realidad humana […] requiere para ser pensado [sic] un peculiar medio de visibilidad” (2005: 39). The breadth of reality which Zambrano and Critical Theorists aim to access, analyse, and communicate without resorting to artificially slicing this reality requires not only the immersion of the researcher into such reality, but also his adopting a way of relating to it which allows him to perceive it and explore it in its richness and complexity. This is what Garcia refers to as medium of visibility. It is experience, understood as indicated above, that provides such a medium of visibility, because it allows the integration of feeling and thought in a particular state of consciousness and as such constitutes a form of rationality. That is why, henceforth, this will be referred to as experiential rationality. It is this state of consciousness, this experiential rationality, which can be found at the base of Zambrano’s poetic reason. As she puts it, “antes que definir hay que sentir y ver” (2003: 62).

In the light of the primary role that Zambrano awards to experience, the focus of this section will be on elucidating the different levels in which Zambrano’s philosophy is fundamentally experiential.

First, her intellectual progression is, to a great extent, the result of her own life experiences. That is not to say that there is a deterministic relationship of causality between her intellectual progression and her life experiences; the production of her work is not the only and necessary the result of her experiences, although it is a result of such experiences nonetheless (see 1.5.1). As Revilla Guzmán observes, this is “un aspecto fundamental del filosofar zambraniano: el carácter biográfico y personalmente comprometido de esta obra, al que su autora se refería al hablar de sus escritos como fragmentos de una imposible autobiografía” (2005: 212; see also 50). This is particularly so because, as indicated above, her philosophy is to a great extent a philosophy of exile (see also 6.1.3).

Second, an analysis of the main topics she focuses on and develops reveals the centrality of this experiential element. To be born, reborn, unborn, to awaken, to dream, to envisage, sacrificial history, tragedy, transcendence, even poetic reason itself, are not objectifiable realities; they are experiential ones. Whereas, as discussed above, Hegel equates rationality to reality, Zambrano seems to defend an equation of a very different nature, that between experience and reality. Existentialism initiates a process of subjectivization which Zambrano continues without reaching relativist, irrationalist, or
nihilist conclusions. As Revilla Guzmán puts it, “la autora parece haber conservado siempre la confianza en la razón” (2005: 49). Consequently, Zambrano does not criticize reason itself, but the abuse of reason and its limitations; she criticizes Cartesian reason. She denounces the effects of objectivity starting from the separation between subject and object, which in her opinion has lead to stagnation and a false sense of control and order (see Zambrano, 2004c: 114). The anxiety experienced by the individual living in a society which supports such values is the result of accepting a dissecting rationality as the framework of most of life’s expressions. Zambrano is very critical of the rationality which insists on promoting a dissecting and fragmentary perception of reality. That is why she concludes that

no hace falta insistir en mostrar la atomización de todo lo humano, la tristísima fragmentación a que se ha llegado, primero en el pensamiento, luego en el arte, y por último en el hombre mismo, en el hombre vivo al cual se le ha mutilado con la más horrible de las mutilaciones extrayéndole su dignidad, extrayéndole su primacía moral (1939: 77).

For her, such rationality fails to provide a satisfactory model which acknowledges all dimensions of the human being and society.

In contrast with this, Zambrano advocates a more flexible reason which may be opened to all the different dimensions of human existence:

la razón humana tiene que asimilarse el movimiento, el fluir mismo de la historia, y aunque parezca poco realizable, adquirir una estructura dinámica en sustitución de la estructura estática que ha mantenido hasta ahora. Acerca, en suma, el entendimiento a la vida, pero a la vida humana en su total integridad (1977b: 93; see also Revilla, 2004: 2).

Poetic reason, which can be described as an integrating experiential rationality, provides such a model. Poetic reason aims to overcome the divisiveness of reality inherent in Cartesian rationality which functions according to dualist models and binary logic (see Maillard, 1998: 268). As Maillard explains, Zambrano’s thought develops “un movimiento dialéctico de progresiva superación de dualidades” (1990: 134). Zambrano’s rationality identifies the duality of our epistemological categories at the same time as, based on transcendental unity, dualism is exposed as an artificial abstraction. Accepting such abstractions as the accurate reflection of the structure of reality is what prevents the individual from becoming a person, from perceiving the healing unity and transcendence of existence. Hence, subjectivity, in the experiential sense, is the element which restores unity to rationality. Once the conceptual framework is one of a comprehensive rationality that mirrors reality, and not vice versa, then the unity and transcendence of being can be perceived.

Third, the experiential element in poetic reason is not limited to its theoretical framework; the element of practice is also essential to it. Zambrano’s work is often reminiscent of a religious allegory which can be understood and interpreted on many levels, where the content of the message largely depends on the reader’s own experiences as well
as on his readiness. As Abellán explains: “una comprensión en profundidad de la filosofía de María Zambrano exige penetrar en un universo iniciático producto a su vez de determinadas experiencias autobiográficas” (2006: 84). This explains why the meaning of Zambrano’s work is partly created by each reader as a result of the process sparked by the interaction of the text with the reader’s own experiences. This is also largely the reason why the content of Zambrano’s work exhibits a multilayered nature, for each reader’s level of access to it depends on his own experiences. Furthermore, because her work may be read and understood at different levels which depend heavily on the experiences of the reader, they are not intersubjective. This reliance on the experience of the reader for the creation of meaning makes the objective analysis of the different layers of Zambrano’s thought unfeasible. Bearing this in mind, in order to illustrate this point, an example of this can be found in the use of the word *ínferos*, underworld (although this is not a comprehensive list, instances of this term can be found in the following works: 1977a: 39, 40-41, 77; 1986a: 15, 37; 1986c: 12, 202, 204, 220). On top of its literal meaning, the word *ínferos* in Zambrano’s texts also refers to the personal underworld, which some of Zambrano’s readers may have no personal experience of, or, if they have, these *ínferos* would take a different meaning for each reader, a meaning which may even change over time for any given reader. This is why an objective analysis of each one of the layers of meaning in Zambrano’s poetic language is unfeasible.

The key issue in poetic reason is to provide a different kind of rationality as discussed above. This rationality would not be complete and coherent unless it reconciled duality, particularly, the duality between theory and practice. In Zambrano’s philosophy, this duality, this separation, is only possible conceptually. The theoretical element, the intellectual development of poetic reason, and the practical element of her philosophy, the actual linguistic expression as well as the *praxis* of poetic reason in her life, are inextricably connected. Another duality is also overcome in this process, that between writer and reader. Although physical and mental separation obviously still exists, this separation has been experientially overcome because, not only do they share the text, but they are also engaged in the same process. The text increases the reader’s awareness towards poetic reason by means of intellectual explanation and by direct contact with it. This direct contact is

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Because the term “*ínferos*” is borrowed from the ancient Greek, no definition of this term has been found in either the *DRAE*, the Spanish dictionary produced by María Moliner, or the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Only the Isodore of Seville’s *Etymologies* feature one entry devoted to this word, which states that “the underworld is named *inferus* because it is below, *infra*. Just as in the body, the lower things are all heavier, if they keep the order of their weight, so with the spirit, lower things are all sadder. This name originates in the Greek language, where it is called *inferus* because it is shown to have nothing pleasant to resound” (2005: XIV.9.10). Thus, we find that this term is grounded in the Greco-Roman tradition and it has topographical as well as anatomic and anaemic connotations loaded with spiritual significance.
particularly relevant because far from a passive experience it becomes an active one. As Zambrano explains in relation to art: “el arte verdadero disipa la contradicción entre acción y contemplación, pues es una contemplación activa o una actividad contemplativa, una contemplación que engendra una obra, de la que se desprende un producto” (2004d: 97).

The text encourages the reader to adopt a poetic rationality, which once it has triggered an experiential approach to reality works at a multiplicity of levels. She achieves this multi-level text by developing a digressive style which is full of symbolisms and metaphors. This is not the result of caprice, but of the consistency of her project. The unfinished nature her philosophy is the key feature, because the focus is not on the result, but on the process itself, a process that applies to her and to others. The implication is that she has not elaborated a corpus of knowledge which to pass on to others. Paradoxically, the closer she gets to this knowledge, the greater is the awareness of the need to persevere in the process itself. Symbolism and metaphor, not to forget her digressive style, provide the clues of an ever-unfinished puzzle leading to the reader’s – and writer’s – own self-development. As Cioran explains, “everything in Maria Zambrano leads to something else, everything involves an elsewhere, everything” (1992, 227-28). Hence, this active reading often leads to yet another process, that of discovering the reader’s own creative potential (see Maillard, 2004: 244). As Zambrano explains:

El verdadero ser creador en arte como en pensamiento ha de transcribir la experiencia del “secreto” mediante un lenguaje activo, ahondando cada vez más en el sentir de lo originario, hasta hundirse en un centro, donde la palabra es simultáneamente pensamiento, ritmo, imagen y silencio, ‘pura acción creadora’ (2004c: 42; see also Bundgård, 2004: 476).

The development of the person’s potential through artistic creation – particularly writing – is encouraged as part of a liberating process (see 4.4.5.4). For Zambrano, art, particularly poetry, constitutes a liberating phenomenon insofar as it contributes to our own self-development by the re-creation of being. Thus, in consonance with the later Heidegger, but also with Nietzsche, both of whom see art as the revelation of being, for Zambrano, the creative process and the revelation of being are intrinsically linked together (see Zambrano, 2004a: 51; see also Maillard, 1992: 51; 1990: 34; Bundgård, 2004: 480). As Bundgård puts it, “no cabe duda de que Zambrano, como Heidegger, considera a la poesía ‘la morada del ser’, por ser la poesía un lenguaje próximo al originario, es decir, por ser la poesía lenguaje autorreferencial y no comunicativo” (2000: 432). For Zambrano, however, the focus of this revelation is not the happening of truth as presence or actuality as is the case with Heidegger (see de Beisteguí, 2005: 140); the emphasis, for her, is on the experience and internalization of this revelation of being, which is expected to have a progressive transformative effect in the person who experiences it, hence contributing to the process of actualization of that particular person (see 2004d: 67-68).
4.4.4 Epistemology

The reliance on foundationalist knowledge is one the key characteristics of modernity (see Stiver, 2001: 5; see also 4.4.2.2). Post-modernity, however, shatters the illusion of absolute knowledge, providing a diversity of answers; “postmodernism […] calls for a redefinition of knowledge that displaces the relative/absolute dichotomy and identifies all knowledge as hermeneutic” (Hekman, 1990: 135; see also 4.4.2.3)\(^{111}\). Hence, post-structuralists and existentialists reject the possibility of absolute knowledge. A common objection to existentialism, however, voiced by Levi-Strauss is that “by remaining in the level of lived experience, Sartre and the other existentialists have limited themselves to the partial truths of subjectivity” (see Gutting, 2001: 225). Zambrano shares with existentialists the shift to the subject; however, along with Critical Theorists – despite regarding knowledge as essentially experiential – her embrace of subjectivity does not lead to a partial reality, but to an integrating one, as we shall now see.

Zambrano does not reject \textit{a priori} science’s claims of objectivity or rather validity. She rejects, however, the consequences of an ideological treatment of science: the belief that the discovery of truth may only come through scientific research, the abstraction of reality – and of the human being – in its quest for objectivity, and the instrumental approach it fosters. As she puts it,

la verdad que se le servía era verdad que no enamoraba su vida, que no la reducía [al hombre concreto]. Y que, además, sólo ha aprendido a través del interés […]. La vida real, el hombre real y concreto, quedaba, o ensoberbecido por la ideología positivista, que es lo único que se derivó de la razón dispersa, o humillado. Soberbia y humillación son las dos notas de la desesperación del alma moderna; sus dos polos (2004d: 21).

Zambrano’s proposal is one of integration, of fusion. She defends the role of subjectivity, although in doing so she does not elevate subjectivity to the position of being the only epistemological path. She proposes an anthropomorphic epistemology. Science has focused its efforts on building a construct of its object and its method. These criteria of objectivity have emerged from the realm of science, effectively fencing in the scope of cognoscibility. Cognoscibility is reduced to objectifiable phenomena which fit the established criteria of validity – not truth. The result is that, first, reality, in order to be cognoscible, must adjust to such criteria, hence the knowledge gained might well be a distorted version of reality – science itself, quantum mechanics in particular, suggests that the result of an experiment is determined by the expectations of the conductor of the

\(^{111}\) This can also be observed in literature, where one of the features of the postmodern condition is the use, adaptation, and subversion of ideas from other writers or eras (see Lyotard, 1998: 509-13; see also Hutcheon, 1989).
experiment (see Schrödinger, 1996: 486, 500). Second, those aspects of reality which do not adjust to the criteria of cognoscibility cannot be accepted as contributing factors to the knowledge obtained as a result of those aspects of reality which do adjust to the criteria of cognoscibility; hence, the resulting knowledge obtained is necessarily incomplete.

Zambrano is aware of this incompleteness. In fact, she argues that “el conocimiento debe alargar sus fronteras en las múltiples dimensiones de la vida humana en el espacio y en el tiempo” Zambrano, 2003: 132). As a result, her writings suggest an epistemology based on a different understanding of cognoscibility. She does not have a set of criteria which reality must fit into in order to be cognoscible; rather, cognoscibility depends not on the nature of the intended object but on the capacity of the person searching for knowledge. Reality in all its fullness is potentially cognoscible. However, specific cognoscibility depends on the capacity and capabilities of the person who intends to grasp it, which are necessarily limited. These capabilities may include subjective and intersubjective methods, logical, and poetic reasoning, not discarding but enhancing traditionally rational epistemological methods. From her point of view, cognoscibility is a person’s capacity to grasp reality. Hence, hers is an anthropomorphic epistemology.

Such an epistemology seems to further provide reasons for criticism on the grounds of limiting subjectivity. However, this subjectivity must be understood within, and applied to, a wider context, the context of poetic reason, bearing in mind that poetic reason should be viewed as a commitment to personal development. Zambrano’s insistence on becoming a person, rather than an individual is precisely to overcome the separation and isolation of the individual. Thus, in understanding a person as Dasein she is simultaneously sketching the guiding principles for her moral philosophy, her political theory, and her views on science. Despite the component of subjectivity involved in such an anthropomorphic epistemology, Zambrano does not give up the achievements of science; her objection goes against instrumental rationality, not science itself. Zambrano is opposed to the extension of scientific principles to epistemology, but not to the inclusion of science as an integral part of epistemology. It is not the scientific method that needs changing; it is its range of application. Science has provided humankind with a chance to suppress scarcity, hence, raising general living standards. However, science must be pursued bearing in mind the essential characteristics of Being, such as being-in-the-world and being-with-others.

Consequently, Zambrano – by means of facing the reader with semi-rhetorical questions –

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112 This is one of the consequences of the uncertainty principle formulated by Heisenberg, according to which “it is not possible, even in principle, to know the momentum and the position of a particle simultaneously and with perfect accuracy. The uncertainties in these two quantities are always such that \(\Delta p \Delta x > \hbar\)” (Crowell, 2003: 96). This is to say that light is both particle and energy; however, it is impossible for the observer to measure both simultaneously; thus, it is the observer’s choice of experiment which determines its result (see Heisenberg, 1996: 121-122; see also Crowell, 2003: 85-110).
warns against the dangers of pursuing scientific and technological achievement while dismissing personal and spiritual awareness:


It is by gaining awareness of this transcendental unity, by realizing that being is necessarily being-in-the-world, that instrumental rationality is no longer perceived as rational. By doing so, science would cease to be instrumental, while it would continue to be intersubjective in essence. Hence Zambrano’s embrace of the subject, an essentially integrating subjectivity, does not necessarily hold her to the limitations of generally associated with subjectivity.

4.4.5 Zambrano’s relationship to language

The importance of the use of language lies in the fact that knowledge is always mediated by language. Language is one of the first acknowledgements that the reality of the self is inextricably open to and dependent on the reality of the other. Language makes intersubjectivity possible, but, more fundamentally, is a testimony to the inherent nature of such intersubjectivity. Language is not only based on our existing rationality, but it contributes to its perpetuation. For this reason, language shapes dramatically the nature and quality of the intersubjective exchange. The intersubjective dialogue is a necessary requirement in the project of development and actualization of the self, which is why their realities are interdependent. Other thinkers such as Ricoeur and Habermas also underscore the centrality of the other, of the intersubjective exchange, to the development of human identity, and even justice (see respectively Stiver, 2001: 179; Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 243).

Aware of the essential role of language, Zambrano’s idiosyncratic usage of language is an attempt to develop a plausible alternative to instrumental reason. In line with her epistemology, poetic reason is the result of a constructive effort to open up the horizon of creativity and possibility. Thus, poetic reason will be explored after discussing the essential features of language which make poetic reason possible in the first place.

4.4.5.1 Language and reality

Zambrano does not elaborate a systematic theory of language in the sense that analytic philosophers do in their quest to clarify the very process and possibility of language, and the explanation of key controversial points, such as meaning and sense. The systematic nature of this attempt, along with the conceptualization of reality and experience within a theoretical paradigm goes against the very project of poetic reason. Nevertheless, Zambrano does make certain assumptions regarding the nature and possibilities of language which, although not developed in the form of an argument, are of key importance in understanding
poetic reason and the pivotal role of its language. In fact, her philosophy of being, in an attempt to overcome the standpoints of Heidegger and Derrida, must be contextualized within the post-1945 linguistic developments of analytical philosophy and post-structuralism.

As indicated in the introduction, Anglo-Saxon philosophers, influenced by Frege, argue that the basic meaning of a text is independent of the intentions of the author. The hermeneutic tradition which draws on the writings of Dilthey and Heidegger – including Zambrano – however, is opposed to such separation between author and text, on the grounds that meaning cannot be reduced to its literal embodiment in a given text (see Rosen, 1982: 2).

Zambrano’s usage of language in poetic reason suggests that, for her, meaning has various – often overlapping – levels. On the first level, meaning is regarded as public property, as Frege and Carnap claim (see Putnam, 1996: 5). It belongs to a public domain, regardless of its reach; its social dimension is what makes communication possible in the first place. Yet, there is also a personal, although not necessarily private, level. Bakhtin points this out in relation to the socio-ideological implications of language:

language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention (1998: 35).

Thus, the creativity of poetic reason lies in Zambrano’s usage of the language, but also in the exploitation of the reader’s ideolect – the idiosyncratic nature of each individual’s linguistic system – which leads to the re-creation of meaning through a series of interconnections which develop as a result of how language relates to lived experiences. Only after such interconnections have taken place is the process of reception and re-creation of meaning complete. As Maillard explains:

Nombrar poéticamente es crear por la palabra, dar existencia, esto es, sacar del ser oculto y misterioso, innombrado, al ente: lo visible. Es necesario, con respecto a esto, entender a María Zambrano bajo el prisma de Heidegger: la palabra poética es primera porque abre relaciones entonces in-existentes (no en el sentido de ‘no-existentes’, sino de ‘existentes en el interior’, ocultas a simple vista) (Maillard, 1992: 51).

As a result, Zambrano, as Lévinas, identifies in language the potential for revelation, for communicating content that is beyond individual experience or pre-existing knowledge (see Davis, 1996: 47).

Zambrano acknowledges the existence of reality aside from language. To do otherwise would be an immanentist reductionism. That is not to say that they are not interconnected and do not influence each other heavily, but despite this strong link one cannot be reduced to the other. Externalism, the suggestion that meaning is entirely outside the self is an oversimplification based on the illusion of correspondence between reference
and referent. The conceptualization of meaning as a mental state must also be rejected, because if this were the case, then sharing meaning – despite the differences produced by idiolects – would involve being in the same psychological state, even for the same individual at two different times (see Putnam, 1996: 5). This would annul the possibility of personal progression. What Zambrano’s conception of mind and language suggests instead is a number of overlapping psychological states that together form meaning, meshing the public and personal spheres of meaning, resulting in the intersubjectivity of meaning without excluding individuality. Hence, communication is enabled by the aspects which are shared by the interlocutors, while the idiosyncracies of their experiences and their personalities account for the creative, unfinished, progressive aspect of language which encourages personal development.

One key question remains unanswered: what is meaning? According to Norris, “it is a major precept of modern structural linguistics that meaning is not a relation of identity between signifier and signified but a product of the differences, the signifying contrasts and relationships that exist at every level of language” (1987: 85; see also 86). For Zambrano, however, there must be meaning beyond differences, particularly because her whole philosophy is about the overcoming of differences; the suggestion that everything is one is the ultimate negation of differences. Hence if meaning resides solely in a system of differences as structuralists and post-structuralists claim, Zambrano’s defence of unity would result in the lack of meaning; the impossibility of intelligibility (see Saussure, 1966: 120; see also Gutting, 2001: 302). As Zambrano explains:

Apegados a cultivar discernimientos y diferencias, habíamos olvidado la unidad que reside en el fondo de todo lo que el hombre crea, por la palabra. Es la “poiesis”, expresión y creación a un mismo tiempo, en unidad sagrada, de la cual por revelaciones sucesivas, irán naciendo, separándose al nacer –nacimiento es siempre separación–, la Poesía en sus diferentes especies y la Filosofía (2004c: 53).

In conclusion, based on Zambrano’s usage of language, the reconstruction of her premises and assumptions regarding this issue leads to conclude that in Zambrano’s view there is not just one element that determines the complex concept of meaning; instead, meaning depends on a myriad of factors, such as perceived differences, but also perceived similarities, intentionality, preconceptions, and archetypes.

Another issue to consider is the relationship between meaning and truth. According to Strawson, “we connect meaning with truth, and truth, too simply, with sentences; and sentences belong to language” (2004: 145). This is an argument which Zambrano does not enter into. She does not attempt to make this direct connection between meaning and truth; what Zambrano is concerned with is the experience of the world, which is mostly, if not entirely, mediated by language. Hence, the connection she does make is that between meaning and personal experience – be this personal or interpersonal experience, be this sensorial or conceptual experience. Whereas for Russell and Wittgenstein language mirrors
the world, for Zambrano it mirrors the self (see Fitzpatrick, 2005: 108; see also Zambrano, 1977a: 82).

4.4.5.2 The possibilities of language

There are some coincidences to be found between Zambrano and French post-war thought, particularly in relation to language. As Gutting explains, Derrida argues that “all thought is mediated through language and can never attain such total clarity. There is always a difference between what is thought (or experienced or said or written) and the ideal of pure, self-identical meaning” (2001: 292). For Zambrano thought is also mediated by language and as a result there is no identity between both. As Maillard explains, “el poeta descubre la poesía, recreándose la re-crea, y en el acto creativo vuelve a crearse también a sí mismo” (1990: 34). This is why the concept of process is central to poetic reason, because both the poet and the text are part of an open process of creation and re-creation of meaning. Thus, in this context it is impossible to maintain the full identity of thought and language in any given transmission primarily because there is never a fully finished content of the mind to transmit; the content of the mind is processual and, as such, unfinished.

Despite these coincidences, and unlike post-structuralist thinkers, such as Lacan who maintains that thought/consciousness is structured as a language, Zambrano does not defend this reductionist view. Instead, Zambrano conceptualizes language as our thinking medium, which by no means implies they share the same structure. From her point of view, thoughts are not necessarily either reduced or constrained by it. What is more, rather than constraining, Zambrano defends the liberating possibilities of language. It is certainly the case that a certain structure, as well as different types of rules and conventions, are inherent in language, which may initially limit the possibilities of expression within a given language. This fact is not, however, limited to language; it is rather a fact of life that can be experienced when facing the practical aspect of any activity, which is necessarily limited within its (chosen) medium of expression or materialization. However, this limited nature of the medium is not necessarily limiting. In this context, the workings of language may be compared to the very workings of the Universe. One of the hypotheses generally accepted is that there is a limited amount of matter and energy, which may be compared to the rules and vocabulary in a language. This matter and energy is located in an infinite vacuum. In the case of language this would relate to the unlimited number of possible worlds the human mind is able to conceive, that is, to the potentially infinite horizon of creativity. This limited matter and energy located in an infinite vacuum do not stand still, quite the opposite: it is in a continuous process of expansion. This process of expansion is precisely what makes it possible to describe the Universe as limited (it has limited matter and energy, and it also has boundaries, those which separate them from the absolute vacuum, from nothingness) and yet
as infinite (endlessly expanding). Similarly, the key to understanding the liberating possibilities of language is to view it as a process; as a medium which has to abide by certain rules necessary to make linguistic intersubjectivity functional, and, yet, the potentially infinite number of linguistic combinations makes the possibilities of language equally infinite. In Bourdieu’s terminology, language, as Zambrano understands it, is best described as *habitus*. As explained in Chapter Three, *habitus* is a number of structured structures, one of which is language (see Bourdieu, 1990: 53). That is why language conditions its users insofar as these structures are also structuring. Nevertheless, *habitus*, that is, these structured structures integrate a subjective dimension which is the reason why *habitus* has an in-built capacity to develop itself, thus, resulting in a limited, but infinite structure (see Bourdieu, 1990: 53).

There are at least two aspects which contribute to these infinite possibilities. On the one hand, when using language in a speech (in the Saussurean sense of *parole*) the possibilities of combination at the disposal of the speaker or writer are endless. On the other hand, from the listener’s or reader’s point of view, the communication of this speech never reaches a blank mind. Hence, the receiver not only absorbs and interprets the message, but this message may also lead to interconnections, creation and re-creation of meaning on the grounds of the new message in relation to the prior content of the mind. From this perspective, a text considered in its different layers of meaning, will convey, not so much different meanings, but different messages. It will evoke different associations in the mind; it will mesh or clash differently with the mind’s other content, leading to different and potentially infinite receptions. Unlike analytical philosophy, which searches for conditions of truth and the relationship between meaning and truth/referent, what Zambrano does is to open these relations to a multiplicity of possible referents that come up through individual connections, while maintaining intersubjectivity. When Strawson highlights the relevance of intentionality in the linguistic debate, he opens the doors to an array of subjective factors that influence the linguistic exchange (2004: 146). The subjective factor is, for Zambrano, the keystone which allows for the expansion possibilities of language (2004c: 48-49).

Ortega also reflects on the tension between the possibilities of language and its limitations:

> escribir bien consiste en hacer continuamente pequeñas erosiones a la gramática, al uso establecido, a la norma vigente de la lengua. Es un acto de rebeldía permanente contra el contorno social, una subversión. Escribir bien significa cierto radical denuedo. [...] Se encuentra [el traductor] ante el enorme aparato policiaco que son la gramática y el uso mostrenco (Ortega, 1946, 5: 430).

He identifies the roots of such tension not only in grammar, but also in common usage, in culture itself. Rebelling accounts for the possibility of linguistic communication itself; it is this stretching exercise that makes the possibilities of language endless. Rebelling against such constraints results not only in a wider scope of expression, but also in a wider mental
framework which overcomes – even if only partially – the restraining conventions imposed by socialization. Zambrano’s contribution lies in her shift of emphasis; the writer/speaker opens the path for new possibilities of language, but it is an open process, one that opens up in as many branches as there are potential readers/listeners who process that information, making new associations of their own and expanding the message expressed yet further (see Burke, 1958: 173-74). Hence, by emphasising the dynamic aspect of language, counting on the active perspective of both writer and reader as manifested in poetic reason, Zambrano overcomes the post-structuralist limitations of language.

4.4.5.3 Zambrano’s conceptualization of language in relation to Heidegger’s

The later Heidegger places language at the centre of the hermeneutic effort, for language is understood as logos (see Schalow, 2001: 25). His strong reliance on language is visible in the well-known phrase “language is the house of being” (Heidegger, 2002: 232). As Abbagnano expresses it, “la única manifestación auténtica y directa del ser es, según Heidegger, el lenguaje” (1994: 745). Hence, poetry is for Heidegger a path inwards towards being (see 2002: 200-241). Although Zambrano does not go as far as claiming language is the foundation of being – a foundation which she does not seek – she does perceive language as its manifestation (see 2004c: 162). She also assigns poetry a primary position (see 2004c: 162). According to Heidegger, philosophy coincides with poetry because both of them discover through words the meaning of being; “no es el hombre el que habla sino el lenguaje mismo y, en el lenguaje, el ser” (Abbagnano, 1994: 746). Zambrano, influenced by Heidegger, perceives the potentiality of this relationship and develops it in her poetic reason.

Despite the theoretical coincidences, as a result of Zambrano’s experiential attitudes, language becomes a central point of divergence between her and Heidegger. Although to a certain extent both of them seek to reinvent language, these attempts have resulted in very different and deliberate styles, which constitute an ideological statement, as we shall now see.

One of the first striking features of Heidegger’s language is its specificity. Unlike analytical philosophers, he does not reduce philosophical problems to linguistic problems. Instead, Heidegger devises a pre-emptive strike: he develops a language for ontology largely relying on etymology. He creates new and specific meanings for already existing words, while still moving within the limits prescribed by German grammar. He uses nominal phrases such as Dasein, In-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world), and Vorhandensein (presence-at-hand). He also confers new meanings to several key verbs. For example, besorgen, generally translated as “to be concerned”, is used in the sense of being-with; and fürsorgen, solicitude, becomes being-alongside. It constitutes an attempt to enhance his
linguistic precision and to avoid the creation of philosophical problems as a result of
deficient expression as denounced by analytic philosophers.

Some of Heidegger’s terminology is adopted by Zambrano; the concept of Holzwege,
whose translation entitles one of Zambrano’s publications, Claros del bosque (1977a),
probably constitutes the best known example (see Mari, 1983: 125). Zambrano, however,
far from being concerned with the precision of her vocabulary, opts for an “open” style
which relies on the active role on the part of the reader. By doing so, Zambrano overcomes
Heidegger’s work, which has a predominantly theoretical nature. Zambrano does not only
develop the concept of what becoming a person is and justifies its importance, but, by
expressing it in terms of poetic reason, she and the reader have already undertaken this
process. Similarly, by developing the concept of transcendence, she and her reader come
closer to the experience of such transcendence. An analogous process can be identified in
relation to unity. Hence, poetic reason is not only a matter of expression, but also of the
simultaneous experience/practice of the content of the text, which can be done at several
overlapping levels.

4.4.5.4 Art: Beyond the horizon

Zambrano, like Heidegger, sees art as the antidote to the crisis of our times (Young, 2001:
18). In fact, Heidegger’s conception of art has decisively influenced Zambrano’s. That is
why Zambrano’s views on art will now be explored in relation to Heidegger.

As Young explains, “in the sense in which Heidegger is interested, the origin of the
artwork is not the artist, but rather ‘art’” (2001: 15). The traditional answers to the question
‘what is art?’ are based on the creator (Nietzsche) or on the receiver (Kant and
Schopenhauer). From Heidegger’s point of view, in either of these two the essence of art
will be a psychological state, and it will therefore degenerate into aesthetics. For Heidegger,
then, the artist is the causal origin of the work of art, although not the origin of its status as
such. That is why he intends to focus on the work of art itself instead. Heidegger describes
art as the ‘happening of truth’ or, rather, as one of the ways of this happening (see Young,
2001: 16-17). Thus, he relates art to the act of seeking truth and refuses the idea of art for
art’s sake (Heidegger, 2000: 50; see also Clark, 2002: 41-42). Zambrano agrees with this
initial definition of art as the happening of truth, although – to be precise – in her case it
involves the happening of personal truth, that is, art as a means and materialisation of self-
discovery. It is at this point where Zambrano differs from Heidegger; for her, the nature of
art rests on the work of art itself as much as on the artist and the receiver. The reason for
this ultimately lies in the ontological assumption of unity. Given that everything is Being,
the different expressions of that Being – such as artist, receiver, and work of art – are all
equally relevant, for none of them could be understood without the others. Their separation
is the result of the conceptual effort to understand the different aspects involved in the process of Art. This is also directly related to Zambrano’s experiential approach. Zambrano’s understanding of art as the happening of personal truth provides the initial criterion for deciding what constitutes a work of art, namely, a human creation which may bring about the experience of personal truth for the artist as well as for the receiver. In this conception, the artist and receiver need not be different people. The differentiation between artist and receiver points initially to the nature of the relationship of the subject to the work of art—regardless of whether this subject has created or not the work of art. Thus, the artist who contemplates and engages with his own work becomes at that moment the receiver, just as any other person who contemplates and engages with it also does.

According to this understanding of art, as long as the above criterion is met, all forms of artistic expression would be considered equal; however, Zambrano is openly biased towards the written word, particularly poetry (see 2004d: 29). This predilection for the written word as the preferred artistic medium is not gratuitous; its causes and implications shall now be discussed. Initially, it seems to be because of the influence of the Heideggerian conception of the projection of truth as poetry (Dichtung). As Young explains, Heidegger is not making reference in this sense to linguistic poetry, “but rather poetry in a ‘broad’ sense that is equivalent to the happening of truth” (2001: 17). Hence, although influenced by Heidegger, Zambrano’s fondness for the written word, and particularly poetry, may come from a different direction.

Art is perceived as a liberating transcendent remedy. Zambrano describes it this way:

el arte parece ser el empeño por descifrar o perseguir la huella dejada por una forma perdida de existencia. Testimonio de que el hombre ha gozado alguna vez de una vida diferente. Pero en esta persecución las artes de la palabra parecen encerrar la clave más que las plásticas, siempre más de este mundo, más adaptadas a la realidad que se nos ofrece. La razón no es difícil de encontrar: las artes plásticas tienen menos que ver con el tiempo (2004c: 45).

Like Derrida, Zambrano inverts the traditional supremacy of speech over writing. Derrida denies the logocentric claim of the subsidiary nature of writing, according to which language is based on phonocentric principles, hence writing would only have a supplementary function; a mere transcription open to numerous misinterpretations as a result of the lack of immediacy (see Norris, 1987: 66, 69). In “Por qué se escribe” (1934) Zambrano explains the existing contrast between speaking and writing, and she expresses her preference for the latter:

escribir viene a ser lo contrario de hablar; se habla por necesidad momentánea inmediata y al hablar nos hacemos prisioneros de lo que hemos pronunciado, mientras que en el escribir se halla liberación y perdurabilidad –sólo se encuentra liberación cuando arribamos a algo permanente– (2004c: 37).

Furthermore, criticism of the priority traditionally awarded to speech over the written word can be inferred from her argument:
Nevertheless, important divergences in relation to Derrida can be found in the implications of this critique. This vindication of the written word does not mean that Zambrano focuses on literal meaning in the same way as Derrida does. For Derrida, “a precise and exact language should be absolutely univocal and literal [prope]: nonmetaphorical” (1976: 271; see also 275-79, 294). Consequently, as Norris explains, “Derrida will turn the argument round and insist on a rigorous literalism of the text” (1987: 86). Zambrano’s awareness of the lack of perfect identity between thought and language, however, deems linguistic expression, oral and written, incomplete. For this reason, the reception and subsequent analysis of any given linguistic expression as a finished product would result in a partial and deficient interpretation. Oral and written linguistic expressions are just aspects of a more complex process which involves a myriad of components, components which a rigorously literal analysis of the text would overlook (see 4.4.5). It is the open nature of the linguistic process that accounts for the possibility of expression. Despite admitting the lack of identity between thought and language in a specific linguistic expression, Zambrano does not give up on the possibilities of communication of language, which are achieved precisely by going beyond literal meaning. What makes poetic reason possible is precisely going beyond the text, acknowledging, but also surpassing its literal meaning. Furthermore, reluctance to stick to the literal meaning of the text indicates an “opposition between the letter and the spirit of the text, between a debased, merely literal way of understanding and a privileged access to revealed truth” (Norris, 1987: 87), an opposition which has been firmly maintained by Western tradition. Zambrano’s refusal to adhere only to the literal meaning may initially suggest that she defends such oppositions. Oppositions are, however, fruit of a dualist position. By contrast, the whole of Zambrano’s work exhibits the effort to overcome the dualism that is at the root of Western rationality, a dualism that instrumental rationality relies very heavily upon. In her thought, essentially monist, there is no opposition of meaning, but layers of it (see Revilla Guzmán, 2004: 4); layers which are not opposed to, but ultimately based on literal meaning.

Time also plays an important role in establishing a hierarchical relationship between oral and written language. Derrida perceives the element of time as one of the key differences between these modes of linguistic expression (see 1976: 141-42). That is why he argues that “the history of truth, of the truth of truth, has always been [...] the debasement of writing, and its repression outside ‘full’ speech” (Derrida, 1976: 3). From Derrida’s point of view, one of the marks of the logocentric prejudice is the identification of truth with the instance of self-present (oral) language (see Norris, 1987: 77). Like Derrida,
Zambrano inverts this relationship, manifesting her preference for the written over the spoken word on the basis of time (see 2004c: 45). Zambrano, echoing structuralists, recognizes and highlights the Saussurian contrast between langue and parole and feels that writing is the opposite of speaking, because “se habla por necesidad momentánea inmediata y al hablar nos hacemos prisioneros de lo que hemos pronunciado, mientras que en el escribir se halla liberación y perdurabilidad –sólo se encuentra liberación cuando arribamos a algo permanente” (2004c: 37). Spoken words are the result of an external necessity, but they are soon lost as a result of time (see 2004c: 35-36). The written word, however, is the response to an internal need; first the need for solitude and isolation, a combination that will encourage the writer to search and find secrets which then he feels compelled to write, and, second, the need to communicate defeating time (see 2004c: 37-39, 42).

Moreover, contrary to the logocentric prejudice which locates truth in the present, for Zambrano the perception of truth is directly related to the perception of unity. As she puts it, “conocimiento del hombre que no será sino el movimiento de reintegración, de restauración de la unidad humana hace tiempo perdida en la cultura europea” (1939: 77). As a result of this, for her, truth located is in the past, an indefinite, possibly merely imaginary past, when the perception of unity is effortless and immediate (see Zambrano, 2004d: 41). This unity, however, is transcendental and universal, which means that it also refers to time itself (see Zambrano, 2004d: 51). As a consequence, truth can also be found in the future, when the individual’s search for transcendence has resulted in a corazón transparente, transparent heart (see Zambrano, 2004d: 53); then, the perception of unity becomes apparent (see Zambrano, 2004d: 53). It is writing what provides the connection between past and future which makes the search for personal truth possible. Communication by the written word results in surmounting the limitations of the self by reaching others and by expanding its temporal possibilities. The linear dynamics of time itself are defied by creating an expression of the self which connects present, past, and future, not as mere retro/projection, but as simultaneous presence. Thus, writing is the transcendence of the self and time. Zambrano’s interest in time and its perception, and, what is more, the impact of that perception on our interaction with reality, is, in fact, part of the effort in post-war European thought to understand and re-examine the position of the individual in a fast-changing world. This can also be observed in Bergson’s thought, which offers another understanding of time away from linearity and which influences Zambrano’s view of time (see Guelarc, 2006: 1-13). As Zambrano explains:

si viviéramos en uno [tiempo] sólo quizá no hubiera confusión; si el solo tiempo fuese ése que tanto trabajo –ahora se daba cuenta– le había costado establecer: el tiempo sucesivo: antes, después, ahora, linealmente; el tiempo invención de la conciencia. Cuando leyó a Bergson le embriagó la crítica del tiempo a imagen y semejanza del espacio; el descubrimiento de “la durée” […] ese tiempo de la superficial conciencia, el tiempo cadena, condena (1989a: 115).

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For Bergson *durée*, duration, is the time which refers to the subject’s immediate experience, which should not be confused with the spatial articulation of passage of time (see Gutting, 2001: 56). As Bretz points out, the rejection of lineal time is influenced by the transformations of the scientific outlook on the subject; the overcoming of Newtonian theories and the theoretical alternatives proposed by other thinkers such as Bergson (2001: 147-48). Bretz goes on to explain that “the geological concept of strata, with variable components coexisting within a thick layer, displaces the image of time as a line” (2001: 150; see also 264, 278; Salguero Robles: 1994: 156, 273). Hence, Zambrano concludes that:

el tiempo no tiene una estructura simple, de una sola dimensión, diríamos. Pasa y queda. Al pasar se hace pasado, no desaparece. Si desapareciese totalmente no tendríamos historia. Mas, si el futuro no estuviese actuando, si el futuro fuese simple no-estar todavía, tampoco tendríamos historia. El futuro se nos presenta primariamente, como “lo que está al llegar” (1988b: 18; see also 1988b: 23, 75; 2004: 22).

There are yet other factors which – although not explicitly defended by Zambrano – are also at the root of her privileged treatment of writing, particularly poetry (see 2004c: 162). Unlike structuralists, Zambrano does not explicitly defend that the mind is structured as a language, and there are no indications to presume she held this conviction. Zambrano coincides with the structuralists, however, in that there is a strong relationship between language and the unconscious, particularly the pre-conscious. She sees in language not the structure of thought, but its medium, its vehicle (see 2004b: 131). She considers creative writing as a way of expressing more than the person is aware he knows: “pero la poesía nació como impetu hacia la claridad desde esas zonas oscuras, por eso precede a la Filosofía, lenguaje meramente inteligible, y le ayuda a nacer” (2004c: 162). Thus, this form of creative linguistic expression may bring to the fore pre-conscious and even unconscious knowledge.

This is particularly relevant for self-development. Although creativity, regardless of the art form, may also unleash the expression of the self, writing particularly encourages a liberating process because the linguistic process generates a number of interconnections of thoughts which may reach all spheres of human life, whereas the medium used for other art forms may trigger connections limited to that medium, unless these connections are made through language. This concept of expansion seems to be the development of Heidegger’s concept of art as “opening up the world” (Young, 2001: 19). Zambrano emphasizes the liberating possibilities of artistic creation. Art is highly regarded in Zambrano’s thought because it is considered to hold the key to the person’s development. This development can be considered and explored in different ways and levels, but this is initially so because of art’s interaction with freedom. Art may not only free the individual from the constraints of time, but it may also contribute to shaping freedom itself. Every individual chooses a life for himself, but in order to make such a choice, first, there must be a stage of *ensoñación*,...
daydream. Daydreaming or envisioning reflects the scope of our freedom and enables choice (see Zambrano, 1989a: 63). The practice of art – particularly poetry – broadens the horizon of freedom by the exercise of creativity, for – as in Nietzsche and Heidegger – it is in the artistic creation where Being reveals itself (see Zambrano, 2004c: 53; see also Bundgård, 2004, 408). Thus, Zambrano places her hopes in the liberating possibilities of the written word: “por la palabra nos hacemos libres” (2004c: 35; see also 42).

The assumption that underlies Zambrano’s concept of creativity is that human beings already possess a number of latent ideas about the world and about themselves: “para la vida, conocer es siempre recordar y toda ignorancia aparece en forma de olvido” (Zambrano, 2004d: 41). In this context, it is possible to surmise that she implies that there is a set of pre-cognitive conceptions or immanent ideas (see Zambrano, 2004d: 104). Another interpretation – not necessarily at odds with the previous hypothesis – could lead to claiming that transcendental unity involves (pre)-existing knowledge about Being. This is to say that $s \land o \rightarrow B$, where $B = \forall$; in other words, if the self and the other are both Being because everything is Being, then the self should have immediate knowledge not only about himself, but also about Being, about everything. This unity does not manifest itself in sensorial experience, but at the level of ontological experience. However, this would imply (pre)-existing knowledge of everything that exists which is difficult to maintain, considering that even the immediate knowledge about the self as a whole is open to discussion. In any case, there are also indications that Zambrano believes that there is certain latent knowledge which is the result of the process of socialisation and living-in-the-world itself (2004d: 94). The theoretical defence of this position takes Zambrano very close to Jung’s archetypes, whose influence also accounts for the importance she places in metaphor and symbolism.

Although Durkheim first coined the phrase collective consciousness in Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique (1895), it is Jung’s concept of collective unconscious that is relevant to Zambrano’s thought. As Jung argues in The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (1959), humanity possesses a collective unconscious which consists of ancestral images and thoughts. The content of this collective unconscious manifests itself through dreams, myths, religion, and unconscious fantasies. The key concept used by Jung to describe this content is that of archetypes, that is, condensed, universal and archaic, yet dynamic notions central to cultural organisation. These archetypes, such as the mother, the father, and the shadow, have a considerable effect upon the individual, not least because the individual is often unaware that these archetypes function as pre-conceptions through which to filter information. This idea of the collective unconscious often leads to the misconception that its contents are transmitted somehow genetically. Jung does not make such a claim. The collective unconscious refers to the common psychological ground which
leads to a common interpretation and retention of information and images. It is not a matter of a communal heritage of information; what is inherent is the predisposition to react in a similar way to similar stimuli. This common predisposition, added to having undergone a common process of socialization, in addition to the stress placed on certain experiences or concepts common in a given culture, accounts for the development of basic archetypes as the contents of the collective unconscious. Other terminology used includes the objective psyche and the historical unconscious; Zambrano prefers to refer to it as historical unconscious, given how it shapes and is shaped by history (see 1986b: 60).

Jung’s works have a strong influence on Zambrano; many of Zambrano’s attitudes are a reflection of Jung’s understanding of the historical unconscious (see Maillard, 1992: 25; see also Ortega Muñoz, 2001: 79-81). It is helpful to refer to Jung’s account of the historical unconscious in order to understand and explain Zambrano’s conception of creativity as the expression of the inner self, which might contain knowledge inaccessible to the conscious mind, and her use of metaphor and symbolism as a means to communicate a deeper, transcendental reality. Its relevance to Zambrano’s thought is better perceived in relation to metaphor, which – as discussed above – reflects some sort of latent knowledge that very much resembles the Jungian archetypes (see also Fernández Martorell, 2004: 57-58). Zambrano forcefully summarizes the role she assigns to metaphor in *Hacia un saber sobre el alma*:

As Gómez Blesa explains, “Zambrano defiende la capacidad cognoscitiva de la metáfora como forma originaria con la que el hombre percibe el entramado de relaciones con lo real” (2006: 36). It is by making use of metaphors, poetry and poetic reason that one can access and express concepts beyond their literal meaning, thus accessing a deeper or transcendent reality which is otherwise inaccessible (see Maillard, 1990: 34). As Bundgård indicates, “la enunciación del texto zambraniano recurre a imágenes o símbolos, pues lo inefable propio de ‘la comunicación de lo oculto’ desborda obviamente las posibilidades de las palabras del lenguaje habitual comunicativo” (2000: 72; see also 433-35). Thus, the informative connotations of metaphors will have a vital role in the development and use of poetic reason as we shall see below.
4.4.6 Poetic Reason

As a result of her epistemological position discussed above, Zambrano finds herself compelled to challenge existing patterns of thought and expression, even overcoming them. As Laurenzi explains, for Zambrano, “la filosofía debería romper la hegemonía de la mente y prestar atención al ser humano en su totalidad, explorando la inteligencia del cuerpo y del corazón” (2004: 26). Zambrano’s work, however, in as much as it accomplishes precisely that, the reclamation and incorporation of emotional, intuitive, and, even spiritual forms of knowledge, is no longer mere philosophy, it effectively becomes an alternative form of rationality; it becomes poetic reason.

4.4.6.1 What is behind poetic reason?

“La superación de esta escisión sería posible, dice Zambrano, mediante la sustitución de la razón racionalista como método de aprehensión de la realidad por la razón integradora poética, concebida como método de conocimiento y como razón práctica” (Bundgård, 2000: 27).

There are implicit assumptions from which Zambrano develops her work, turning this study to a certain extent into an archaeological task of uncovering and reconstructing such assumptions. Unveiling such assumptions and their implications has been the main focus of the previous section. During this process, reference has been made repeatedly to poetic

Although as emphasized throughout the thesis, Zambrano’s work goes beyond philosophy, it is not uncommon to find critics who equated the field of her thought to philosophical enquiry. An example of this is found in Nimmo, who states that Zambrano adopts an unconscious metaphysical position by believing that she is thinking from outside of philosophy (see 1997: 894). Nimmo argues that she adopts this position “through her explicitly poetic reinterpretation of the dominant element of philosophical discourse: reason, or the logos” (1997: 894). In stark contrast with this, Zambrano’s thought is neither metaphysical in nature – although it may have metaphysical components – nor does it constitute a reinterpretation of the dominant philosophical discourse. I argue that far from a reinterpretation of the existing paradigm of reason, what Zambrano attempts is to think and express herself from a different and alternative framework of rationality, poetic reason. Furthermore, I argue that understanding Zambrano’s work as the reinterpretation of reason is the result of attempting to assess Zambrano’s thought by applying an external epistemological standard of what reason is, namely, the prevailing standard in what Nimmo refers to as “the dominant philosophical discourse” (1997: 894). As Skinner explains, “the very idea of assessing the rationality of beliefs is thus dismissed as nothing better than an intrusion, a forcible imposition of our own epistemic standards on an alien ‘universe of discourse’ or ‘form of life’ (2002: 37). The danger in doing this, is not only the distortion of the author’s thought, which is interpreted from an external – and therefore inapplicable – epistemological and rational framework, but also that by so doing, the author’s thought, in this case Zambrano’s, becomes bound to this external rationality, making the possibility of offering an alternative inconceivable. It is because of this frame of interpretation that Nimmo undermines the subversive component of Zambrano’s poetic discourse by concluding that it offers a reinterpretation of the existing discourse. The existing discourse becomes, then, inescapable.
reason; however, it is not until the key assumptions which underlie her thought and provide it with coherence and cohesion have been explored, that poetic reason can be analysed.

As Bundgård points out, Zambrano already takes the first step towards poetic reason in her “Hacia un saber sobre el alma” (1934) and “en Horizonte del liberalismo, primer libro de María Zambrano, ya se encuentra formulada la noción de razón-poética” (2000: 21, 60). Despite these early foundations and the fact that the seed of poetic reason can be found throughout her entire work, poetic reason is the reflection of her mature thought. In fact, it is best exemplified in the works that follow her American exile, particularly from her 1953 return to Europe, a period which is often regarded as more mystical. This development is only consistent with the essence of Zambrano’s formulation of poetic reason. Unity, one of the key features of poetic reason, means that theory and practice – even of poetic reason itself – have to be integrated. The integration of opposites, however, is not conceived as an exercise which can be carried out leading to the perfect union and identity of its parts. Instead, as I have already indicated, poetic reason is conceived as a process which attempts such integration. This integration is rarely – if ever – complete; it is rather a spiral ladder with multiple steps or levels of complexion –completud– (see Zambrano, 1988a: 48). The importance of preserving this unity, while also relishing diversity, multidimensionality, and movement, change, can be observed below:

**Hoy [1928]** más que nunca rechazamos la visión del dogmatismo, que quisiera hacer de nuestra vida una gran avenida recta de gran unidad, grandiosidad, monotonía y ausencia de verdadera unidad. La unidad de la avenida es la unidad de la recta: unidad de agregación. Preferimos la unidad orgánica, integrante, de la curva, de la esfera que tiene centro vivo. Y la perspectiva de un paseo a gran velocidad por el centro de la urbe: diversidad de aspectos, sorpresas y dimensiones, también dinamismo. Que nuestro vivir tenga un centro y muchas dimensiones: las tres clásicas –conocer, sentir y obrar–, tres coordenadas, que fijan la vida, y otras nuevas, insospechadas, que engendra el espíritu máximo aparato de sorpresas (Zambrano, 2003: 61-62).

In **Bienaventurados**, in a short essay entitled “La corona de los seres”, Zambrano herself explicitly favours shaping the development of thought in the form of the spiral (see Zambrano, 2004a: 27-28). On reflecting on the relationship to Being and knowledge that authors may achieve through their work, Zambrano highlights the limitations of a thought or work whose shape is a circle, and expresses a preference for the spiral instead: “pero si el autor nos regala una obra espiral entonces hay esperanza todavía, el círculo no la da porque está cerrado para siempre. La espiral del ser. Los gnósticos se darán en espiral, en la que no hay reiteración” (2004a: 27). This is a shape which she also strives to achieve in her own thought. As Maillard explains, Zambrano’s thought does not form a complete, closed system, one which follows the trajectory of the circle (1990: 31). Instead, Maillard describes Zambrano’s thought as a spiral, as the spiral trajectory of personal evolution (1990: 31; see 114)

114 It should be noted that it is no coincidence that the geometric shape which integrates a circle and a sphere in a dynamic way by accommodating different dimensions is the spiral.
also Revilla Guzmán, 2005: 51, 103). Thus, as with Aranguren and Aguirre, Zambrano’s thought is spiral, for its development is based on the integration of opposites, leaping into the next layers of reality. This spiral process – which extends ad infinitum – is a conceptual strategy used to grasp the already existing transcendental unity of reality.

We are now in a position to discuss instrumental reason. We shall question Zambrano’s mysticism, and aim to elucidate the nature of poetic reason and its value as an alternative rationality.

4.4.6.2 Demystifying mysticism

Zambrano is dissatisfied with traditional Western rationality. Several reasons may account for this dissatisfaction. In line with the concept of gendered reason discussed in section 4.3.2, Maillard suggests that traditional forms of Western philosophy, particularly those that arise from Greek heritage, are based on specifically masculine forms of rationality, based on the concept of One as opposed to the Other, and which, in turn, is at the very core of our culture and organisation (1998: 268). Zambrano also perceives this primarily dualist vision which is at the basis of Western rationality. It is this binary division, which encourages opposition, difference, confrontation, separation, and, ultimately, loneliness, one of the aspects she attacks (see 2004d: 74; see also 1939: 77). Because of this awareness of separateness at all levels, instrumental reason is widely exercised and morally accepted. Even Heideggerian existentialism reflects such a mentality. As Abbagnano explains, for Heidegger “el ser de las cosas está, en consecuencia, subordinado y es relativo al ser del hombre” (1994: 734). Its reality consists in serving as instruments to the human being (see Heidegger, 2001: 80-85). Hence, in spite of himself, Heidegger is instrumentalist because the human being is the centre of existence and the rest of reality is only insofar as it is being-for the human being.

This rationality rejects transcendence, either by equating transcendence to God who is different and separate from the world’s realities or by rejecting transcendence altogether, by denying God and anything else that implies going beyond sensorial experience. Either way, being is immanent. The scope of reason is, then, limited to the interaction of the factual and the logical, where the factual dictates the logical and, ultimately, the possible. In contrast, because Zambrano understands being as project, possibility is inherent in it. Possibility is not limited, however, to the factual because it refers to that which has not yet happened, or to the logical as pretended by mechanist interpretations of reality; possibility goes beyond the logical to harbour the illogical, the improbable, the inconsistent, the unreasonable, and above all, the indeterminate. That is why, according to Zambrano, traditional Western rationality fails to reflect the essential nature of being. Instead, she
argues that “lo que ha de salvarnos, [no es] sino algo que sea razón, pero más ancho” (2003: 102).

Far from this wider reason, “el entendimiento moderno llegó a su desrealización a través de un cierto racionalismo que pide cuentas, que comienza con la duda. La realidad entonces parece huir” (2004d: 42). That is why, unlike Cartesian rationality, restricted to the factual and the logical, poetic reason attempts to be a reflection of existence. Hence it has to include non-rational components, such as emotion and faith. In Zambrano’s words,
y delirando la verdad increíble se hace cierta. Aparece entonces la razón. La razón que para mostrarse necesita una cierta certidumbre, una cierta verdad realizada y aun corporeizada. Lo increíble la ha precedido. Lo increíble viene a ser la prehistoria de la razón” (Zambrano, 1996b: 169).

That is why hers is not an irrationalist philosophy, because she does not rely solely on these components, which overall contribute to a more organic philosophy. Adopting poetic reason and hence undergoing the evolution from individual to person leaves no room for instrumentality. When existence is viewed as a whole, and this vision has lead to personal involvement, instrumentality is no longer a valuable option, it becomes senseless.

Zambrano claims that many of the problems experienced by Western civilisation, an expression of which can be found in the experience of crisis, are due to the failure of the Western tradition to provide a rationality that would account for and adequately reflect the nature of being (see respectively 2004c: 99, 100-101; 2004c: 29). That is why she sees the need to propose a different rationality, a rationality which instead of being limited to the factual and logical mirrors being; a rationality guided by and extended to transcendental unity (see 2004c: 105). This alternative rationality is called by Zambrano poetic reason. It is tempting after discarding Cartesian reason as limiting, to opt for an irrationalist philosophy, but she does not do this. Poetic reason is above all reason, because “el conocimiento que aquí se invoca [...] pide que la razón se haga poética sin dejar de ser razón” (Zambrano, 1986a: 30).

There is a tendency to over-emphasize Zambrano’s criticism of Cartesian reason, in the sense that it is often equated with the rejection of reason altogether, stressing in contrast the mystical character of Zambrano’s writing, with all the religious connotations it carries. Aranguren, in praising Zambrano’s uniqueness, describes her thought as the fusion of philosophy and mysticism (1983: 130). Bundgård’s characterization of Zambrano’s thought also exemplifies this position:
al hilo de este proceso, y siempre desde la perspectiva de la razón poética como método de aprehensión de la realidad profunda de la existencia, la filosofía-poética zambraniana se transforma en una religión-poética de carácter místico que busca rebasar la escisión sujeto-objeto propia de la Modernidad en una unidad originaria supratemporal, previa a toda diferenciación de carácter lógico o racionalmente reflexivo (2004: 15).

This would be, however, an over-simplification. Rather than thoroughly rejecting it, Zambrano filters the qualities of Cartesian reason to overcome its shortcomings. It must not
be forgotten that, Zambrano, like Heidegger before her, is particularly concerned with the horizon of Cartesian reason, identifying the selectively restrictive nature of its scope as one of its main problems. Instead of filtering our perception of reality through a pre-imposed external framework of rationality, Zambrano advocates a poetic reason, a reason which may allow the person to engage with reality as is, thus allowing the person to participate more fully of such reality and to gain an improved knowledge of the self in the process. As Zambrano puts it, “y es que al encontrar la realidad nos encontramos a nosotros mismos, entramos en ella y, sin suponer nada parecido a ninguna identificación mística, lo cierto es que cuando entramos en esa realidad descubierta nos revelamos a nosotros mismos” (2004d: 43).

Poetic reason does not conform to the characteristics of religious or mystical thought:

Religious thought implies faith in a received system of beliefs which is not to be found in Zambrano’s work. Faith is, in fact, one of the distinctive features in Zambrano’s thought, although her faith does not conform to a received system as above. The factors contributing to the description of Zambrano’s thought as mystical shall now be explored.

The fact that her work is written in layers accounts for the multiplicity of meanings and its deceptive simplicity. Furthermore, her use of metaphor and spiritual symbols has often led to mystical interpretations of the contents of poetic reason. In addition, as a result of its accessible, although abstract, nature, the existentialist critique embedded in her work has often been overlooked, having been labelled as mystical instead.

Another factor which may have contributed to these seemingly mystical qualities is the influence of Spanish Golden Age mysticism found in her work. She expresses her interest in this aspect of the Spanish heritage by writing about one of the most celebrated mystics of this period San Juan de la Cruz (see 1977b: 81, 194, 196). His influence can be traced not only to the relevance she assigns to faith and transcendence, but also the style chosen, often drawing on the same symbolism, such as noche oscura, to refer to the loneliness, anguish, and uncertainty experienced by the soul (see 1977a: 142; 1986a: 95; 1989a: 249, 282). This influence alone, however, is insufficient to accurately qualify Zambrano’s thought as mystical.

The Catholic conception of mysticism refers to the union of the individual with God, that is, the part with the absolute; oriental mysticism, one the other hand, refers to the fusion of the part with the whole (see Abellán, 1979b: 245-46). Zambrano, however, does not admit this initial difference between God and the individual which is equally present in both traditions. From her point of view, such difference, as well as the experience of union, is
only a matter of perception for according to her ontology, everything is one, everything is Being.

Mysticism is above all experience, a personal and untransferable experience. It has been described as a state of the soul, which is as such, of course, unverifiable (see Abellán, 1979b: 245-46). This means that the qualification of an experience as mystical can only commence by the admittance of the individual who supposedly had such experience. Zambrano, however, never claimed such mystical state. Therefore, there is no evidence suggesting Zambrano ever had a direct mystic experience, which is not to be confused with the experience of transcendence.

In any case, Zambrano’s conception of unity clashes with the ontological supposition behind the mystical experience. Her experience is neither transcendental – in the sense of beyond of this world – nor ineffable; instead, she expresses in her writings the gradual integration of this transcendence in her being so as to become persona. As for the sense of this experience being inaccessible to reason, it is Zambrano’s endeavour to integrate such an experience of transcendence in a wider reason, poetic reason. Zambrano’s transcendence does not elude reason, it is at the very foundation of the poetic reason she advocates. It will be in reference to this daily transcendence that Zambrano’s thought will be referred to as spiritual at the most, resisting the stronger religious or obscurantist connotations.

4.4.6.3 What is poetic reason?

In a prologue to a compilation of her work, Zambrano describes her own thought as fragments of “una órbita que ininterrumpidamente se recorre y que solamente se mostraría entera si su centro se manifestase” (1971a: 10). This elusive image does succeed in conveying Zambrano’s unruly, although not unstructured, approach. Her works do not form a closed totality, instead they are open. Although, open not in the relativist sense to every possible interpretation, but open like being itself, in that they are not a given, but a project, a process. Her work places the reader in an active position as he is invited on to a personal and communal journey of self and mutual discovery and development.

One of the challenges of analysing Zambrano’s thought is that, as indicated above, it is – in many ways – resistant to analysis. First, the systematic exposition of her thought is itself a betrayal of its contents because it involves stepping away from poetic reason, that is, separating theory from practice. Second, the interconnectedness that according to her is intrinsic to reality expands to the contents of her thought, resisting the necessary linear exposition imposed by systematic language. Thus, although an overall account of Zambrano’s interconnectedness is possible, only the exposition of the whole of her thought – which is beyond the scope of this research – would escape the ghost of partiality and incompleteness. Third, definitions, as Socrates established, should be at the basis of debate.
The definitions of Zambrano’s concepts, however, are elusive and often circular, in the sense that most of them go back to the transcendental unity which grounds them. Nevertheless, these features – which are often interpreted as a creative or mystical flair, or even as plain elusiveness – are precisely what make poetic reason a feasible alternative to Cartesian rationality.

Unlike Heidegger, Zambrano’s key question is not so much being from an ontological perspective, but rather being from an anthropological and transcendental one. The result is that the key issue in her thought is co-being: being a person defined by the relation to the alterity of that which exists. This impossibility of separation, even if only methodological, is at the very core of her ontology and determines poetic reason. Poetic reason is the proposition of an integrating reason, una razón superadora. On the ontological basis of transcendental unity, poetic reason overcomes the limits set by the traditional dualist mentality. The separation and differences between the self, the other, and the world are surmounted and integrated in the unifying concept of Being. This ontological framework extends to all aspects of reason. Zambrano’s thought is also superador because in a process which initially is reminiscent of Hegelian dialectics, poetic reason strives to find an integrating synthesis to any opposing duality. However, unlike the Hegelian process, Zambrano’s does not continue ad infinitum, it continues describing a spiral form until it reaches unity, that is, Being. This integrating drive can be observed in what Aranguren describes as ‘espíritu transdiciplinar’, the attempt to find a more comprehensive reason which absorbs a multitude of disciplines offering new possibilities, what is more, new realms of investigation (1983: 137). In practical terms, poetic reason can only be understood, and, indeed, practiced from the perspective of Dasein, that is, being-in-the-world and being-with-others. For this reason, ontology, ethics, politics, arts, and any other spheres of human existence are closely intertwined, and, consequently, interrelated. Hence, for poetic reason to be consistent it has to be primarily a project, a process; a project of self-development that results in the process of the individual becoming a person. Poetic reason is an interactive, dynamic reason which cannot be considered as a fulfilment; instead, it is a process.

4.4.6.4 The power of the written word

As Jordan explains, for Barthes,

writing was no simple copy of things, no neutral vehicle for the transmission of determinate, pre-existing meanings, but annoyingly slippery, unstable, indeterminate: in short, an anti-communication. Thus the idea of writing as a shared communication between author and reader was an illusion, based on the fallacy that writing speaks (1990: viii).

It is precisely this indeterminate quality, the need to create meaning as opposed to extracting it, that accounts for the subversive value of the writing in CT. The focus is not a meta-
analysis of communication—or its (im)possibility—but its potential for expression and self-development. According to Foucault, “the transformation of discursive practice is linked to a whole range of usually complex modifications that can occur outside its domain (in forms of production, in social relationships, in political institutions)” (1977: 200). While Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre share this view, they also invert this relationship. In accordance with CT, they change their discursive practice in the hope that it will bring about a process of individual and societal transformation.

Poetic reason is not only a mental framework, a rationality, but in its written expression it also becomes a method. Poetic reason is an invitation to acknowledge the condition of project of our existence, but also a suggestion, or rather an array of suggestions of how to attempt to fulfil such a project. Poetic reason is the proposition of an alternative reason which intends to reach all aspects of life and the creative attempt of liberation through the written use of such a reason. In this latter sense, poetic reason is primarily a project of self-development, one that needs the medium of the written word as referral (and self-referral), that is, as a point of reference in time.

The main features of the rationality proposed by Zambrano have been laid out above, but what linguistic strategies does she use to explain, explore, experience, and exercise poetic reason? One of the characteristics that make her style so distinct is the intentionally digressive nature of her work. By means of this digression Zambrano’s discourse mirrors reality, emphasizing the intertwining of its facets, its complexity, its elusiveness, its depth, and its interconnection (see Grohmann, 2005: 142-43). That is why a focused, centred text is an indication of a distorted perception of Being, just as the linear representation of time is no more than an illusion. Unity means the intertwining, intermingling, interconnection, and interrelation of all different aspects of reality. This impossibility of linearity requires a different style of expression which can convey this wealth of meaning and connections. As I have shown, this is achieved with the multilayered discourse which results from her use of metaphor and symbolism (see 4.4.3). Going beyond literal meaning and yet taking it into account, facilitates a multilayered interpretation, but because these interpretations have to be anchored in the initial literal meaning relativism is avoided.

As Putnam argues, it is an idealization to consider that words have a definitive and defined extension or sense in which they can be understood and referred (1996: 4). Zambrano’s strategy is to rely on the problems posed by attempting to establish a perfect correspondence between reference and referent, because this opens up the multiple possibilities of language and the interactive construction of meaning becomes then feasible. It is precisely the incompleteness of words what makes Zambrano’s usage of them in a different kind of interplay—that of metaphors and symbolism—possible.
4.4.6.5 Textual analysis

The reconstruction and integration of Zambrano’s thought reveals a project of self-development which is to be attained through a non-instrumental rationality, that of poetic reason. Hence, poetic reason is not merely a stylistic feature or an alternative mode of reasoning; poetic reason is the integration of a holistic experiential rationality with the process of self-development.

Zambrano’s theory of the self, in addition to the liberating and revolutionary potential of art through the framework of poetic reason, points to textual analysis as an alternative to mainstream psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Lacanian. In this context, textual analysis, rather than attempting to understand the individual through the various manifestations of the unconscious, attempts to understand the person through its textual manifestations. The assumption which underlies this concept of textual analysis is parallel to Derrida – who states that “Il n’y a pas de hors texte”: “there is nothing outside the text” (1967: 227; 1976: 163). For Zambrano, everything is understood and interpreted through language, given that – as argued above – for her, language is the medium of thought.

Thus, poetic reason, considered as an art form in its own right, can be employed as such an exercise of textual analysis. This interpretation of poetic reason would result in the practical application of Zambrano’s theory of art, according to which art’s liberating possibilities are not only in the materialisation of art, but also and essentially, in the widening effect that it has over the horizon of possibility, as perceived by both the artist and the receiver. The key to self-development in Zambrano’s writings lies in the process set off by the possibilities of interpretation and interconnections. Similarly, a text – in the sense of a creative artistic expression – also opens up the possibilities of interpretation for the artist as well as for the receiver, who both become simultaneously the analyst and analysand.

Thus, Zambrano is connected to Aranguren – who was discussed in the previous chapter – through their reaction against instrumental reason and their efforts to provide an alternative to it. The same connection exists with respect to Aguirre, as shall be argued in the course of the following chapters. They should all be considered Critical Theorists because, very much in line with the project already put forward by the members of the FS, regardless of their relationship with it, they develop a critique, in the case of Aranguren, and a rationality in the case of Aguirre and, especially, Zambrano, that challenge and overcome the existing co-ordinates of instrumental rationality, as opposed to reproducing and perpetuating them as standard critique does. Parallel to the FS, who in an effort to expand the field of sociological research by embracing a supradisciplinary approach incorporate the element of psychoanalysis in their critique, taking the psychological as a symptom of the socio-political, Zambrano’s poetic reason integrates the personal and the social in a project where theory and practice inform and feed on each other in such a way
that an insight into the personal psyche is sought in order to understand and shape the
dynamics of the social and the political, calling for introspection and self-development
instead of therapy.
5 The unity behind Aguirre’s multiple faces

5.1 Introduction

Aguirre is perhaps the most enigmatic of all the three authors. His varied writings are scarce. They have hardly received any attention and never before have they been the object of academic research despite or, perhaps, because of the public attention other facets of his life and work have enjoyed. His writings, but also the other dimensions of his work and, even, the very unusual and fascinating trajectory of his life are of great interest for this research, for – although in a very different way from Aranguren or Zambrano – the conjunction of these facets embodies the development and expression of a project of CT.

The analysis of Aguirre’s work presents two central problems: first, his publications are less extensive than those of Aranguren and Zambrano, and second, his content and, particularly, his expression are more obscure and vague. For these reasons, as indicated in the introduction, his contribution is best understood after having explored what CT is, and having established the characteristics and strategies of its development in both Aranguren and Zambrano, for his work – not having developed a solid theoretical grounding – acquires a clearer sense as a whole when looked at in the context of the struggle against instrumental reason. Aguirre and Aranguren – who knew each other well and remained in close contact – develop similar interests and themes in their work\(^\text{115}\). It is perhaps more surprising that Aguirre’s thought coincides with Zambrano’s in a number of key features, for there is no evidence that would indicate that Aguirre has been directly influenced by Zambrano’s work\(^\text{116}\). One reason to explain such attunement is the fact that they share a similar heritage and they are both hugely influenced by Heidegger, whom Aguirre listens to in person (1985: 105). In fact, unlike Zambrano’s case, critical engagement with Heidegger’s persona and work is present throughout Aguirre’s publications. However, this alone does not constitute a satisfactory explanation. There are some key influences that they do not share, or, at least, not to the same degree, such as the influence of Ortega on Zambrano, or the FS on Aguirre\(^\text{117}\). What they do have in common, however, is a common goal: the rejection of and struggle against instrumental reason. In fact, they develop similar processes of resistance, mainly the destabilization of instrumental reason with a thought-

\(^{115}\) In an interview with Francisco Umbral, Aguirre says the following: “diría que Aranguren ha sido mi maestro si no sospechase que esa palabra no le gusta ni le suena bien” (1984b: 11).

\(^{116}\) The only reference which establishes some sort of connection between Aguirre and Zambrano is an article in \textit{El País}, which reports that Aguirre delivers the closing conference at a course of \textit{Filosofía y Letras} held in Seville in her honour (Aguilar, 1982: n.p.).

\(^{117}\) Although there is evidence of Aguirre’s familiarity with Ortega’s work and, indeed, his influence emerges in some aspects of Aguirre’s work, Aguirre is neither an Ortegan disciple nor a member of the Madrid School (see Aguirre, 1985: 81; 1989a: 64, 103).
provoking and subversive use of language, and the incorporation of faith to the realm of epistemology as a cornerstone of the alternative rationality that is proposed.

As pointed out in the introduction, Aguirre is not a systematic thinker. The consequence of this for the present research is that, as in the case of Zambrano, the analysis of his thought involves an important element of reconstruction, which is carried out first, by developing the theoretical implications of his positions, but also by developing and interpreting the implications of what may initially seem marginal comments in the light of the rest of his thought, because these seemingly marginal comments are, in fact, a deliberate aspect of his style and an intentional attempt to demand the engagement of the reader with the text, as we shall see in 5.4.4.

5.1.1 The underpinning of Aguirre’s thought

Me inicié a la lectura y a una expresión literaria adolescente en la humedad verde y el fuego subitáneo, catastrófico, de Santander, una ciudad norteña que del sur sólo al viento presta oídos. Más tarde, me entretuve con ‘los rigores de la idea’, ya filosófica, esto es, sentimental y descriptiva, ya teológica, y en mi caso razonada hasta el límite, en una Europa con larga y abundante vocación de consonantes, diéresis y nieve. Llegaron luego los madrileños, siempre de aprendizaje y nunca magistrales, en los que la crítica predominó, acertadamente, sobre la dialéctica. Sofoca ésta la libertad, mientras aquélla la vincula a la historia propia, cuyas razones cordiales, que la razón sí entiende, dan cuenta de la secreta gimnasia de nuestros saltos cualitativos (Aguirre, 1987a: 57).

This is how Aguirre summarizes his intellectual progression. Even from this short paragraph, it is already possible to discern in Aguirre’s life a key tension, dichotomy at first, between reason and faith, and conciliation later, between reason and lived experience. It is the purpose of this chapter to expand the evolution outlined above, particularly exploring the process, technique, and underlying critical framework by which this dichotomy is overcome, and to analyse it in the light of its socio-historical context. Special attention will be drawn to his style, a taste of which can be extracted from this passage, which − both personal and enigmatic − endeavours to avoid the beaten path of instrumental rationality.

Throughout this chapter we shall attempt a reconstruction of Aguirre’s life and intellectual contributions in the different roles he plays, such as priest, translator, editor, writer, and cultural ambassador. These will be examined in the light of CT and of his relationship to the FS, paying particular attention to the implications of his writings, and his views on the liberating possibilities of art.

5.2 Who is Jesús Aguirre?

As argued in previous chapters, one of the defining features of CT is the complementarity of theory and practice, where the actions of the agent become the materialization of his
theoretical discourse. This is even more relevant in the case of Aguirre because, not only does he have a considerable impact on intellectual, political, and public life, but also given the scarcity of his writings, the element of reconstruction involved in studying the work of Aguirre, as with Zambrano, makes the link between work and biography crucial. In fact, in line with CT, he demonstrates an awareness of the key role of the biographical component, as well as an overt willingness to incorporate it into his work. As a result, most of his writings incorporate a strong autobiographical component, even when the content is markedly non-biographical. An example of this can be found in his literary reviews, in which instead of aiming to express himself with objectivity, he deems this objectivity neither possible nor desirable, and embraces his subjectivity. Hence, he openly approaches all content from the perspective of his own experience and preferences. In fact, he points out how this is a conscious practice he follows as a result of the influence of the FS (see Aguirre, 1985: 237). This constitutes yet another attempt to vindicate the relationship between biography and work, whose separation is considered artificial and counter-productive as we shall see in the course of this chapter.

Jesús Aguirre has been described by Roberto Mesa – who knows him personally – as multifaceted, highlighting the variety of enterprises which he has embarked upon during his life, as well as his ability to deal successfully with each one of them (2002: 300). This multiplicity of interests and, indeed, endeavours, makes it difficult to clearly establish the different stages of his life. Such an attempt will be made, however, in order to provide a historical contextualization, thus gaining a better insight into his circumstances and possible motivations.

5.2.1 Aguirre’s early years

Jesús Aguirre Ortiz de Zárate is born in 1934 in Madrid, only two years before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Little is known about his childhood, except that he soon moves to Santander where his father, a military man, is stationed. There, he receives a conservative education, studying at the Catholic school of La Salle. He first stands out when, in July 1951, he becomes “premio extraordinario en el examen de Estado” (Lago Carballo, 2004: 26-27; see also Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 281). Then, he starts his theological education in the seminary school of Comillas.

He furthers his religious education in Munich with the support of a grant awarded by the Humboldt Stiftung. This period abroad is crucial in understanding Aguirre’s development and interests. While in Germany, he studies under the theologians Schmauss, Paschen, and Söhngen, and he is deeply influenced by the progressive liberal theologians Rahner and Ratzinger, whom he translates and publishes – the former contributes significantly to shaping the outcome of the Vatican Council, and latter was an influential
ecclesiastical figure at the time, to the extent of becoming the present Pope – (see Aguirre, 1985: 22; see also Lago Carballo, 2004: 26-27, 29)\textsuperscript{118}. Evidence of Aguirre’s interest in them as well as of their impact on Aguirre is the fact that their work becomes the object of Aguirre’s first published translations\textsuperscript{119}.

Aguirre recalls that “mediada la década de los cincuenta empecé, tembloroso, mis estudios de teología en Múnich. La capital del Isar y una beca, felizmente suculenta, de la Fundación Humboldt, me procuraron libros sin censura e inolvidables contactos personales” (1985: 22). Having received what can be considered as a reactionary education and coming from a totalitarian regime which severely restricts the exercise of a political, social, and, even, cultural debate, this experience has a decisive effect in broadening his horizons and shaping the young Aguirre into the politically engaged intellectual he later becomes. As Lannon explains,

it was not possible to study in Paris or Rome or Munich and then find the orthodoxies of the Spanish ghetto in the 1950s and early 1960s other than stifling. Nor was it possible to engage in serious discussion with foreign Marxists or even Catholic democrats and then tolerate the stultifying complacency of the Spanish Catholic dictatorship (1987: 48).

Aguirre himself explains in Casi ayer noche (1985) – a collection of autobiographical essays – how, influenced by Hegel, Goethe, Adorno, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Beethoven, he reaches what he describes as an early desencanto burgués, a bourgeois disillusionment, making a reference to how these figures have contributed to the awakening of his socio-political conscience (see Aguirre, 1985: 24). The authors selected when reflecting upon the influences which shape his own development are very informative in what he includes and in what he leaves out. This list is a testimony to the constant element of self-reflection and subjectivity present throughout his work. It is worth noting that other authors of great socio-political importance who also constitute an important influence on Aguirre, such as Lukács, Gadamer, and the rest of the members of the FS, have not been included in this list (see Aguirre, 1985: 26). The most obvious omission for the external observer is probably that of Benjamin, who left a strong mark on Aguirre’s literary production. Should we then distrust the personal information volunteered by this author?

\textsuperscript{118} Considering the amount of books which discuss religious matters which is translated and published by Aguirre during the Second Vatican Council, it is reasonable to surmise that Aguirre himself must have effectively played a very influential role in disseminating progressive religious ideas and, thus, fuelling the religious debate amongst Spanish readers during this period (see bibliography for details regarding his translations of religions publications).

\textsuperscript{119} The first one of Aguirre’s published translations is Söhngen’s El cristianismo de Goethe (1959), followed by El camino de la teología occidental (1961), also by Söhngen. In fact, as one would expect from his position as director of religious publications, his early translations focus mainly on matters of religion, although his scope quickly becomes wider (see his translations of Ratzinger, 1962; Schmauss, 1962; Rahner, 1962a; 1962b; Paschen, 1966; 1967; see also bibliography for more details).
Perhaps. Should we take this as evidence of the lack of knowledge or honesty about and with the self? We could do so, but we would be better off taking this information as an instance of experiential rationality, where this information corresponds to those authors that have been felt by Aguirre to have borne the most impact on his focus, thought, and process of production, rather than being the result of observation and measurement of the most frequent occurrence of the inclusion of the influence or thought of the aforementioned authors. Georges Gusdorf observes regarding the nature of the autobiographic text that it shows us not the objective stages of a career – to discern these is the task of the historian – but that it reveals instead the effort of a creator to give the meaning of his own mythical tale. [...] the testimony that he does produces constitutes no ultimate, conclusive authority – not only because objective scrutiny will always discover inaccuracies but much more because there is never an end to this dialogue of a life with itself in search of its own absolute (1980: 48).

In relation to Aguirre, this indicates that the fact that the evaluation he makes of his own influences differs substantially from an evaluation produced by an external observer is not necessarily evidence of his deceitfulness or lack of self-awareness, but it is more likely to correspond to the expression of, on the one hand, his own perception and, on the other, how he would like to be perceived and remembered, and who he would like his name to be associated with. That is why it is significant that none of the authors listed are Spanish. This invites the conclusion that Aguirre – despite having taken a proactive part in Spanish intellectual life – has deliberately distanced himself from Spanish intellectual tradition, even though its heritage is still visible in his work. Instead, most of the names listed are of Germanic origin.

Having obtained a degree in Philosophy and Theology and having been deeply influenced by the experience and contacts made, he returns from Germany in 1960 (see Villa Rodríguez, 2002: 285). Although it is not possible to refer to Aguirre as an exiliado because his leaving Spain is not the result of political pressure and the duration of his stay abroad is relatively brief, he still establishes strong contacts with Spanish exiles, to the point that he experiences a feeling of participation in exile through these contacts120. This is how he explains his relation to las Españas: “volví a España, a la primera, que será probablemente la geográfica; tenía amigos en la segunda, la del exilio, y compañeros en la tercera, que se llamaba disidencia interior” (1985: 26). The Spain he finds upon his return is hungry for dialogue and thirsty for change. His homecoming signals the start of his public life, which runs until 1992 with Crónica en la Comisaría, his last published work, which marks his retreat from the spotlight (see Villa Rodríguez, 2002: 285-86). From this point onwards, he progressively retires from the public sphere until 2001, when he passes away at the age of 66.

120 Even after Franco’s death his affinity and certainly his respect for the Spanish exiles is manifest in his indignation towards the political exploitation of their memory (see 1985: 55-58, 67-71).
5.2.2 Aguirre the priest

As with Aranguren and Zambrano, understanding Aguirre’s Christianity and its evolution is of crucial significance because it is at the foundation of the rest of his thought. Aguirre is ordained a priest in 1961 in his hometown of Santander. Soon after, he moves to Madrid and joins a small group of priests who work with Federico Sopeña at the church located in the Ciudad Universitaria (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 27). His work there is best understood within the context of a Church in deep need of renewal. This is a time when the Catholic Church – until then a strong ally of the regime and one of the hegemonic powers – experienced a process of marked division: inner division at first, but most visibly, the partial, but increasing process of rupture of the alliance between the Church and the State (for more details see 2.2).

This is also the case even at an individual – as opposed to an institutional – level. Despite the apparent compliance with religious rituals, there is an increasing gap between religious practice and religious faith. A survey undertaken in 1957 amongst 15,491 industrial workers by the HOAC (Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica) reveals that whereas over 86% declared themselves to be Catholic in rites of passage, over 41% describe themselves as anti-religious, and almost 55% are uninterested in religion (see Atkin, 2003: 276). Faith or, rather, the lack thereof, becomes a matter of concern for the Church. During the 1960s and 1970s, many priests and some concerned Catholics harbour fears that religious observance has become for many an empty formalism (see Lannon, 1987: 34). This is poignantly portrayed by García Berlanga in Plácido (1961), where the gap between truly charitable actions and keeping up class and religious commitments is patently visible (see Evans, 2000: 215). They hope, instead, that genuine religious commitment would be “expressed by action for social justice as well as pious exercises” (Lannon, 1987: 34-35).

Aguirre, a progressive priest, adopts a socio-politically engaged position. Given the restrictive and repressive characteristics of the regime, as well as the rigidity of the official line of the Spanish Catholic Church in moral and social issues, this translates into a growing dissent in both respects: dissent towards the regime and the Church, for even the reforms undertaken at the Vatican Council seem insufficient to Aguirre (see Aguirre, 1985: 169-93; see also Cazorla, 2000: 273-74). From this religious platform, Aguirre chooses a path of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{121}}\text{The Church has a clear awareness of this crisis of faith, which can be observed in some of its efforts to win acolytes, such as the organization of country camps where it tries to convert working class atheists to the Catholic faith (for a study of working-class consciousness around this time see Comín, 1974).}\]
socio-political activism which takes different shapes: those of his ministry, his political
activity, and his role as translator and editor.

The reflection encouraged by the Vatican Council on issues in relation to faith and
religious practices, the discussion of the challenges posed, and the changes proposed all
contribute to the growing awareness, particularly amongst young priests in the early 1960s,
of the existing gap between Catholic discourse and Catholic practice during Franco’s
dictatorship. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Catholic Church in Spain becomes, to the
astonishment of many observers, a force for political change (see Lannon, 1987: 243). In
response to the changes in Spanish society and the new trends in Catholic theology, many
priests, lay leaders, and, eventually, bishops publicly distanced themselves from the Franco
regime, costing the Church much of the support of the regime (see Lannon, 1995: 276).
Toward the end of the regime, the Church is certainly “lejos de aquella época en que,
principal beneficiaria de la ‘Cruzada’, saboreaba sus éxitos” (Vilar, 1985: 169).

Aguirre – aware of the privileged position enjoyed by the clergy during the regime –
sees in his ministry a chance to encourage a much-needed change (see 1985: 170, 172-73,
177, 217-25). Although in a semi-coded manner, Aguirre often uses his sermons to discuss
issues, such as the incongruities of the Catholic practice with the Christian faith. As
Aquilino Duque recalls:

dado el clima eclesial y social de la época en que desempeñó su ministerio, hubo de envolver en
sutiles circunloquios proposiciones tan audaces en su día como la del paralelismo entre la analogía
escolástica y la dialéctica marxista, o la contraposición de la ortopraxis de la esperanza a la ortodoxia
de la fe, o la misa como banquete frente a la misa como sacrificio, o la equiparación moral del
creyente y el ateo y la consiguiente renuncia del cristianismo a su catolicidad (2002: x).

Aguirre’s views regarding the excessive formalism of the Church echo those of
Krausism, whilst at the same time, he also defends the desirability of an active engagement
of the Church with social welfare – not directly politics – (see Aguirre, 1985: 141-51; see
also Velasco, 2003: 10-11; Morillas, 1956: 158-59). This suggests that some of the basic
difficulties of the Church as perceived by Aguirre are, in fact, very similar to those already
denounced a century earlier by prominent left-wing intellectuals, who despite the
incongruities of the Church are also reluctant to abandon their faith.

As with Aranguren, Aguirre’s interest in religion also sparks questions of a socio-
political nature. The problematic approach that Spanish society takes towards religion is
discussed in La religión como sistema establecido (1995), where Aguirre puts together a
number of the points made by a group of secular and non-secular contributors on the
occasion of a religious Congress (see Gómez del Castillo, 1995: 2). This work, although
theoretical in nature, has an incisive practical orientation in terms of criticizing current
religious practices, as well as informing and guiding future religious activity. However,
despite having been written in the late 1950s, this book is not published until 1995, in all
likelihood due to the boldness of its criticism and the political circumstances at the time when it was originally written\textsuperscript{122}. Even so, this work still constitutes a testimony to its socio-political atmosphere, to the nature of the religious debate, and to Aguirre’s early positions as we shall see below.

Its aim, as stated in the prologue, is the revision of Spanish social life and of the sociological aspect of the Church in particular (see López, 1995: 3). The argument is that “la vida social, por lo mismo que es pública, exige una revisión pública también” (López, 1995: 5). As a result, the need for a public dialogue regarding the socio-religious issues is emphasized (López, 1995: 7). This publication raises the very relevant question of what it means to be Catholic in the climate of that time. Thus, it discusses not only questions of faith, but particularly the relationship between the social structure and religion.

One of the central topics it deals with is the division between the bourgeoisie and the people, and the relationship of this bourgeoisie towards God. In Aguirre’s words,

\begin{quote}
en la burguesía, el testimonio corre a cargo de su inconsciencia y su frivolidad; de su entrega, sin hondura ni consistencia religiosa, al disfrute bobo e inelegante de la paz actual; de su desentendimiento de todo noble afán de justicia social y de mejoramiento de la situación del pueblo; de su lujo injustificado e insultante; de su inmoralidad, cuyo aumento hace aumentar en proporción la hipocresía de su fiero egoísmo (1995: 10).
\end{quote}

This critique towards bourgeois behaviour is evidence that Aguirre establishes an inextricable relationship between religion and social justice (see Aguirre, 1995: 10-16). He criticizes Spanish society using Heideggerian terminology; he criticizes its inauthenticity which he understands as “su terco distanciamiento de lo real” (Aguirre, 1995: 17). Aguirre explains how this inauthenticity leads to the division between an official Spain – materialized in the State, the Church, and the bourgeoisie – and what he describes as a vital Spain – represented by the common people – (see Aguirre, 1995: 17-18). He accuses this official Spain of \textit{inmovilidad}, that is, of adopting an inflexible posture whose lack of dynamism gives rise to political scepticism, class resentment, and anticlericalism (see Aguirre, 1995: 18). His proposal is a new understanding of Catholicism, which is evidence, once again, of the link between social and religious issues. As he explains,

\begin{quote}
se trata de un catolicismo ansioso, expectante; nada “clerical” y hasta “anticlerical”, pero muy “eclesial” y eclesiástico; un catolicismo social, radical y radicalmente social, social hasta sus tuétanos; angustiado y decidido en todo lo que se refiere a la suerte humana y sobrenatural de los humanos que sufran y se ven humillados. Un catolicismo que envuelve un nuevo patriotismo, amargo y sincero. Que se considera totalmente ajeno a la serie de identificaciones históricas que la España oficial ha venido cometiendo (1995: 19).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{122} Although this book is not published until 1995, it is possible to find more evidence of Aguirre’s insistence on the need of dialogue and revision regarding religious practices in his choice of material to translate and publish, and more explicitly, in introductions provided to such texts, particularly during the late 1960s (see Aguirre, 1967: 9-18; see also 1969d: 13-19).
This text constitutes evidence of Aguirre’s efforts to push for revision and renovation of Catholicism in Spain and of its relationship with the State; it is a call for meditation on the role of faith and its social implications. The rest of the book elaborates on these topics and, as a result of its eminently practical orientation, it also explores how young people relate to religion (see Aguirre, 1995: 33-51).

By expressing these criticisms, Aguirre is, in fact, representing a large portion of the Spanish public:

creemos que coincidiremos con todos los que más o menos detenidamente, y desde distintos ángulos, han dedicado alguna atención al tema [de la situación religiosa en España]. Nos adelantamos a calificar de inquietantemente grave la situación. Como que nos encontramos, nada menos, con una sociedad llamada católica que, en su dimensión religiosa, va definiéndose, cada día con más indudable relieve, por su vaciamiento de Catolicismo (Aguirre, 1995: 9).

As Gracia points out, “la tendencia a supuestos agnósticos o a un catolicismo muy crítico es la forma de responder a una omnipresente espiritualidad ritualizada, cínica y tan tosca como indigesta” (1996: 13). As a result, Aguirre advocates the renovation and modernization of many of the Church’s attitudes and perspectives, pointing to the Vatican Council as the turning point that, while being insufficient by itself, leaves room for such changes. In Aguirre’s eyes, “los católicos seriamente postconciliares […] [son] aquellos para los que vivir postconciliarmente no es vivir ‘después’ sino por delante del Concilio” (1969c: 23).

Thus, as observed above, the most salient feature of Aguirre’s Christianity is its social dimension – a position which he maintains throughout his life – for, from his point of view, calling oneself a Christian is meaningless unless religious practices are accompanied by a genuine social concern for justice. Faith, as a personal experience, is understood as a radical inwardness. This inwardness is not to be interpreted as reclusion or isolation. On the contrary, “esta interioridad radical obliga al hombre a enfrentarse, sin selección previa de ningún tipo, con la realidad entera en la que vive” (Aguirre, 1969d: 15). As in the case of Heidegger and Zambrano, for Aguirre, even such a personal and spiritual experience as faith, is, first and foremost, being-in-the-world. This applies not only to the individual experience, but it extends to a wider view of Christianity. As he puts it: “un cristianismo meramente interior ni es viable ni tampoco tiene por qué serlo” (1985: 235). This accounts for his critical and rebellious relationship with Catholicism. It is also this commitment

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123 Incidentally, it should be noted that Heidegger himself also initially joined the seminary (1901), although he would soon renounce his initial priestly vocation (see Schalow, 2001: 1). As a result of the awareness and significance of these connections, Aguirre is keen on highlighting Heidegger’s religious background: “el talante de Heidegger, personalmente católico de origen, ha de ser interpretado, según madrugadoramente advirtiera entre nosotros Aranguren, ‘como de una inequívoca procedencia luterana’” (1969c: 27).
which drives him to encourage the opening up of the Church to the issues of the world outside it and, ultimately, to abandon the priesthood. Aguirre, almost anticipating the morality of a global society, realizes the multilayered process of inter-action whose effects, as well as the symptoms it manifests, cannot be ignored. This is best exemplified in the case of Marxism, as we shall see in the next section.

5.2.3 Speaking about the unspeakable: the Christian and Marxist dialogue

5.2.3.1 Aguirre: a Marxist priest?

Although a highly cultivated intellectual, far from burying his head in books, Aguirre seeks to adopt a serious role of socio-political engagement. He succeeds in doing this at a variety of levels. As discussed above, Aguirre becomes engaged with his local community through his religious ministry, which he uses as a platform for raising complex issues for debate and opening up his parishioner’s horizons into directions which in many cases would not have been previously publicly unexplored. He also explores writing as a way of reaching a more specific audience. Through translation, he assures the availability of work—and thought—that would not otherwise reach the wider public in Spain. Moreover, he actively participates alongside Ignacio Fernández de Castro, Julio Cerón, Juan Gerona, Alfonso Carlos Comín, and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán—in the Frente de Liberación Popular, a political group in the opposition which sympathizes with socialism and advocates a revisionist Marxism (Díaz, 2004: 513; Baldó, 2003: 146). As Mesa remembers, “eran, también, los tiempos del compromiso político de Jesús con el Frente de Liberación Popular, los ‘felipes’; el grupo político más creativo, más interesante y más original de la oposición al franquismo” (Mesa, 2002: 301; see also Herralde, 2006: 11). These daring positions earn him a reputation as a cura rojo, communist priest, as Savater affectionately remembers (2004: 306).

Despite this reputation, Aguirre is not a communist or even a Marxist at any point. An analysis of the titles he publishes, edits, or translates reveals an intellectual progression very similar to that of Aranguren. His entering the priesthood, as well as the religious nature of his early publications, is evidence of his strong interest and commitment to religion. However, as in the case of Aranguren, Aguirre progressively becomes more critical of Spanish Catholicism and turns to more political issues. Aguirre shares Aranguren’s concerns regarding the need for a Christian-Marxist dialogue. As Aguirre himself explains in his introduction to his translation of Girardi’s *Marxismo y cristianismo* (1968), Aguirre was an active participant in regular debates between Catholic theologians and

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124 Along Aguirre with Aranguren—who have enjoyed recognition as the precursors of the Christian-Marxist dialogue—Alfonso Carlos Comín should also be mentioned as a promoter of this dialogue from his position as editor (see Herralde, 2006: 13).
Marxist intellectuals since 1965 (held in Salzburg). This interest in the debate leads to the publication of the collection of essays *Cristianos y marxistas; los problemas de un diálogo* (1969a) (see Chapter Three). Gracia describes this publication as emblematic for gathering together essays by such diverse authors as Karl Rhaner, Althusser, Sacristán, and Aranguren (1996: 35; see also Diaz, 1983: 143, 147). This collection of works does, in fact, mark a cornerstone in the socio-political and religious debate in Spain, not only because of the representative character of its contents, but also because despite all efforts to suppress this much-feared, although much needed-dialogue. The Christian-Marxist dialogue acquires a very public and popular dimension during the 1960s and, by means of this publication, this dialogue receives acknowledgement and, even, encouragement, as we shall see below (see also 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2). What is more, the importance of the engagement with Marxism is such that it seems to be one of the key tensions defining modernity in Spain. With the outbreak of the Civil War, modernity is halted. The liberal tradition is recuperated only as a result of anti-fascist positions adopted by some Spanish intellectuals. Only as a result of these efforts does Spain retake the path to modernity:

nuestros orígenes están escondidos en aquel intento por resistir a la hegemonía fascista y todo ello equivale a reanudar el ciclo de una modernidad que había perdido el uso de la razón con la pérdida de la lengua, o con la difusión de una lengua corrompida, propaganda y legitimación ideológica de una victoria medievalizante (Gracia, 2004: 387).

Marxism becomes an important contending ideology for it vows to tackle many of those socio-economic problems which shake the credibility and integrity of the Church. Given these circumstances, it is understandable how some priests, reluctant to let go of their faith, adopt Marxism as a way of facing the regime’s disregard for liberties and the perpetuation of strong social inequalities. Thus, they become *curas rojos*, “red priests” (see Callahan, 2000: 407). Some sectors of the clergy adopt a very active political stance, sympathizing with or defending Marxist ideals, particularly from the late 1960s onwards. Evidence of their involvement in socio-political issues in conflict with the interests of the regime can be found in their participation in political demonstrations like Barcelona’s *Caputxinada* (1966) and their support for regionalist movements, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country (see Atkin, 2003: 276)\(^\text{125}\). As Gracia argues, “el origen de una conciencia política de clase, anduvo para muchos en esas formas de cristianismo politizado, aunque a menudo fue confusamente politizado, que el padre Llanos emprende entonces” (2004: 359). The Jesuit priest José María Llanos, despite having assisted Franco spiritually during the 1940s, becomes during the 1960s a remarkable and inspiring figure who as a result of his faith engages in social work, combining his vows with his support for the

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\(^{125}\) This involvement should not be interpreted as a change in the position of the Church; instead, it represents a deviation from the established practice and from the official position on the role played by the Spanish Church as an institution.
Communist union *Comisiones Obreras* (see Lannon, 1987: 49; see also Gracia, 2004: 360, 362). Similarly, some Catholics, priests, and theologians, such as Alfonso Carlos Comín, González Ruiz, Olegario González de Cardedal, and the Jesuit Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, develop progressive or even Communist views (see Lannon, 1987: 49; see also Gracia, 2004: 36).

Nicolas Atkin explains that contact with the underprivileged urban poor, whose numbers were swelled by a rural exodus in the 1950s, brought about a growing awareness of the social divisions upon which the Francoist regime rested, and resulted in the appearance of “red priests” who took advantage of the privileged position of the clergy in respect of the law to stage workers’ meetings and sit-ins in their churches, and to rally striking workers with fiery oratory and impassioned pamphlets (2003: 276).

It is in this latter sense, more as an activist than a communist priest, that Aguirre has sometimes been considered a red priest, because as Savater explains,

ser rojo era facilitísimo. Ser cura, un cura que no estaba dentro de la ortodoxia, y además que citaba a Marx y Engels en alemán, y a Habermas, pues te puedes imaginar que eso, en aquella época, era bastante escandaloso (2006; see Herralde, 2006: 11; see also Atkin, 2003: 276).

### 5.2.3.2 Aguirre’s contribution to the Christian and Marxist dialogue

As explained above, Aguirre’s greatest contribution to this dialogue is, first of all, the compilation and edition of a number of essays whose purpose is to voice different views and sides of the debate, which are published under the heading of *Cristianos y marxistas; los problemas de un diálogo* (1969a). He also writes the introduction to this publication, which he feels the need to entitle “Justificación”, and one essay under the title of “La historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos”.

It can be observed from his work how Aguirre perceives engagement in a Christian-Marxist dialogue as crucial for Spain’s socio-political evolution. As Aguirre puts it, “la utilidad del diálogo en sus diversas etapas hasta la actualidad es innegable. Los marxistas y los cristianos han reconocido una parte de su pasado, han luchado contra su propio integrismo, en suma, han eliminado prejuicios mutuos” (1969c: 33). The fact that Aguirre deems it appropriate to include his essay “La historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos” in another compilation of essays some fourteen years later – with no changes other than a slightly longer and contextualizing title: “Marxismo y cristianismo: la historia del diálogo y algunos pronósticos” – is evidence of Aguirre’s continuing interest in and perceived relevance of this matter (see Aguirre, 1985: 195-216).

As indicated by the title, Aguirre is keen to trace the history of the Christian and Marxist dialogue, possibly with the purpose of overcoming the resistance and rejection of Marxism by emphasizing that Marxist views have existed in Spain since the publication of Marx’s political-economic works written in 1844 (see 1969c: 13-14). More importantly, he
underscores that Marxism has been an object of debate since then (see Aguirre, 1969c: 13-14). Aguirre briefly highlights the historical evolution of this relationship, which he says has progressed from an open antagonism which finds expression in a violent form during the nineteenth century to the frequent and often public dialogue in the late 1960s (see 1969b: 7; 1969c: 18). His point is to, first, acknowledge the existence of such a dialogue and, then, to engage non-Marxists in the dialogue, especially Christians, so that it can become a constructive debate that may help to re-address Marxism itself, which has often been misinterpreted, as well as issues of faith (see Aguirre, 1969c: 18-19).

Aguirre briefly points out that this publication may seem belated, given that this debate has already taken place throughout the 1960s and this book dates from 1969 (1969b: 7). In line with Aguirre’s digressive and often obscure style, this point is not expanded until eleven pages later, where he explains that

antes de llegar a la década de los años sesenta, el diálogo […] transcurre en libros y revistas predominantemente. Es además un diálogo en el marxismo, y los coloquiantes principales son por lo menos marxistizantes de una manera activa o estudiosa. En nuestros días cobra empaque de notoriedad pública el diálogo entre los marxistas y los cristianos. […] Sociológicamente, por tanto, el fenómeno actual [de diálogo] es distinto, hasta en su expresión externa, del inmediato precedente (1969c: 18).

Thus, this dialogue is essentially different because, first, it is no longer one-sided; although only Marxists or marxistizantes, Marxist sympathisers, tend to enter the debate, during the 1960’s others join in. Christians, in particular, become more vocal; as a result, it has turned into a multi-sided dialogue. Second, it is no longer confined to the written word expressed in books or journals of limited circulation; it has become a public debate. By way of justification, he simply highlights once more the need for this dialogue and for the demystification of its nature. It is the inevitability of this dialogue that accounts for its necessity and importance. As he explains,

el diálogo existe hoy con dimensiones de amplia resonancia pública simplemente porque es necesario. [...] Hegel enseña que la libertad es la necesidad comprendida. Nuestro volumen quisiera contribuir a que el diálogo cristiano-marxista se realice en la libertad más difícil de conseguir: la libertad de si mismo (1969b: 8).

Thus, in contrast with Aranguren’s position, Aguirre’s motives for this publication are not to invite a dialogue between the two confronted ideologies, but rather to contribute to its viability and fertility.

Aguirre suggests that the first step in enabling a successful dialogue is a “fundamentación filológica”, the understanding of the terminology involved (1969c: 17). This almost Socratian importance placed on terminology is not a demand solely placed on the other, on the non-Marxists, to achieve an informed perspective, for he also identifies the need and willingness for a “lucha marxista contra su propio integrismo” (Aguirre, 1969c: 19). His call to reflect upon Marxists’s own fundamentalist positions reflects the need to
reconsider the views of classical Marxism, for much of its critique and doctrine are no longer applicable to Aguirre’s society, as argued by neo-Marxism. It is relevant how Aguirre repeatedly chooses the term *integrismo*, which he uses to qualify a Christian and Marxist standpoint, effectively criticizing the intransigence of both positions (1969c: 19, 33). Flexibility and tolerance are pre-requisites which need to be exercised by both sides. The premise, therefore, is that no understanding of the other and no communication is possible without a previous understanding of and preferably also reflection on the self. Examples of terms which are often misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misused include “dialectic”, “historicism”, and “alienation” (see Aguirre, 1969c: 15, 19). The latter, “alienation”, is particularly interesting. Aguirre defends a wider understanding of this concept, one that encompasses the ethical dimension of existentialism, as well as the psychoanalytic implications as explored by Marcuse and Fromm (see Aguirre, 1969c: 16).

As he points out, “debe, sobre todo, considerarse qué textura de realidad marxista y no marxista –no marxista todavía o nunca marxizable– hace posible que un concepto marginal en Marx [la alienación] preocupe hoy a sus seguidores en direcciones muy diversas” (1969c: 17). Here the manifold reach of Aguirre’s analysis can be observed. This is an exercise geared towards the reflection and understanding of Christianity and Marxism and their relationship and interaction. At the same time, it also constitutes a socio-political meta-analysis; this dialogue and its main issues are identified as symptoms which may reveal the socio-political inclinations of the society they occur in, as well as the lurking challenges which need addressing. He warns his readers that

es, desde luego, mala filología, esto es, fundamentación dañada para el diálogo, empeñarse en proyectar retrospectivamente la interpretación de una expresión de la actual realización marxista sobre las ‘intenciones’ del autor de *El capital* y otras obras escritas después de 1845 (1969c: 17-18).

Aguirre is, thus, well aware of the challenges and pitfalls involved in the exercise of interpretation of a text in relation to its terminology and intentionality. As a result, this text functions as an invitation to further the scope of this dialogue, by first establishing a clear socio-historical contextualization of classical Marxism, so that a clear distinction between classical Marxism and, its re-interpretations and revisions can be drawn in the light of the changing symptoms and needs of society (see also Aguirre, 1969c: 16). This is also evidence of Aguirre’s own awareness of the evolution of Marxist thought and of his early awareness of neo-Marxist thought and the work of the FS – whose relevance will be discussed at a later point in this chapter –, as can be observed in the references he makes in this publication to Marcuse, Fromm, and Adorno (see Aguirre, 1969c: 14, 16, 26 respectively).

At the core of Aguirre’s argument there is the realization of the connection between Christianity and Marxism. He draws a comparison between Christian and Marxist
behaviour when motivated by fundamentalist positions; “formalmente y en lo que respecta al mecanismo de los comportamientos, un catolicismo a troche y a moche está emparentado en múltiples aspectos con un marxismo a ultranza y de orejeras” (Aguirre, 1968: 14). This comparison hints at the shared characteristics that totalitarian forms may share, whilst also suggesting that a certain application of Christian or Marxist ideology may materialize in a totalitarian expression. This totalitarian aspect of religion and of Catholicism in particular is more explicitly addressed in his prologue to the translation of Vaticano II. La libertad religiosa, first published in 1967 (1969d: 16-17). The Vatican Council had decisive religious and political consequences, for “the Vatican Council in 1962, demolished the theological and ecclesiastical underpinnings of National-Catholicism and state confessionalism, as they plotted a new, more liberal, and more tolerant course for the Church” (Lannon, 1995: 278). As Lannon argues, the implication is that a participatory democratic society adjusted better to the new papal ideal than the existing dictatorship (1995: 278-279). Given the climate of growing social dissidence and growing internal tensions in the Church, the Vatican Council is a hard blow for the already fragile relations between Church and State in Spain. Aguirre, well aware of the political implications of the religious policies discussed at the Council, does not miss the opportunity to draw a comparison between the kind of religious practice widespread during the regime and the totalitarian government, thus subtly bringing to the fore, and questioning, the issue of the close relationship existing between the regime and the Church. He puts forward his criticism stating that Catholic faith is often more the compliance with duty rather than the result of individual decision, which has regrettable consequences;

la creencia adopta figuras y comportamientos más de fenómeno social que de acontecimiento personal. Tal hábito de indiscriminación rezuma por diversos canales. La fe se oficializa, lo cual nada tiene que ver con una vida religiosamente estructurada, que es la Iglesia. No solamente ‘se es’, sino que ‘se tiene’ que ser católico de una determinada manera única, que se descubre, a la postre, cargada con graves determinantes temporales extrínsecos en sí a la religión. […] La Iglesia parece entonces una sociedad que opera como un partido único (1969d: 17).

That is why the need for dialogue is closely linked to the need for reflection on one’s own position. Freedom is essential for this, since both dialogue and reflection are only meaningful and defendable from a religious and spiritual point of view, as free individual choices.

In fact, the problem of freedom takes centre-stage. Aguirre’s demand for freedom goes beyond the understanding of freedom as lack of external pressures or constrains; religious and political freedom is insufficient because genuine freedom, for Aguirre, can only be understood as freedom from the self (see 1969b: 8). This requires a reconsideration of the popular definition of freedom as the possibility to do one’s will, for it is the nature of
that will that is called into question, thus bringing in the issue of false consciousness, one of the key issues discussed by the FS (see 3.2.2.3). It is important to notice how, by acknowledging the existence of false consciousness, which Aguirre does by insisting on the need to become free from oneself, the implicit conclusion is that socio-political change starts in the self; only by liberating one’s own consciousness can socio-political decisions truly be free.

Despite defending the need for freedom, in his introduction to *Vaticano II. La libertad religiosa* (1967), Aguirre reflects upon the moral difficulties which arise with the enjoyment of religious freedom, for he is well aware and concerned with the religious and moral disorientation that has come about as a result of this change. He observes how, in many cases, Spaniards’s relationship to freedom follows the trajectory of the pendulum, that is, it goes from an imposed lack of freedom to its wide embrace, without a process of reflection and digestion of this personal and social development:

> en el problema de la libertad religiosa, como en tantos otros, los españoles hemos pasado, sin rendir los adecuados derechos de aduana, de una manera crispada de vivirlo, feroz incluso no pocas veces, a otra que más que tranquila resulta inerte, ya que no se enfrenta propiamente con el problema, sino que de hecho supone que éste ha dejado sin más de serlo. [...] hemos digerido casi sin trastornos este manjar [la libertad], que hasta ahora estuvo drásticamente excluido de nuestra dieta privada y pública (Aguirre, 1969d: 13).

This apparent contradiction between defending the abstract value of freedom, while having reservations regarding consequences of religious freedom suggests two things. First, it suggests Aguirre is more concerned with the various aspects of the practical implications of theoretical concepts, such as freedom, than with the systematic coherence of thought. Second, it also indicates that, in Aguirre’s view, change, in this case the award and exercise of freedom, should take place progressively in order to allow the individual to adapt to the consequences and demands of this process.

Influenced by Benjamin’s work, Aguirre does not conceive progress – in religion, in politics, and in the exercise of thought itself – as a necessary movement forward; he distrusts the benefits of progress for its own sake (see Aguirre, 1971d: 9). Instead, radical change, revolution, is achieved going back to the past and integrating that experience in a continuum of thought and history (see Aguirre, 1971d: 9). In line with this, thought is not conceived only as movement, but also as pause (see Aguirre, 1971d: 9); in other words, thought needs to be reflexive and integrate in the present the experience of the past as well as the projection of the future (see Aguirre, 1971d: 10). Geometrically, this combination of movement and pause is achieved by means of the spiral, which looked from above may be mistaken for a circle because each point of the circle coincides in diameter with those other circles above or below itself, hence representing a pause; it is only by acknowledging the
three-dimensionality of this geometrical shape that difference is perceived in each of the circles which comprise the spiral, it is this sense of change and progression which, in the spiral, represents movement. Hence, like in the case of Aranguren and Zambrano, for Aguirre, effective thought and effective change do not describe a linear trajectory, but a spiral one. According to Aguirre, this kind of thought is not to be understood merely as a theoretical position, for he urges to apply this kind of thought to deal with the socio-political situation of Spain at that time; that is, the final phase of Francoism and the glimpse of a possible transition to democracy.

The Vatican Council is perceived as a key step towards the revision of the role of the Catholic Church in Spain; it is crucial for opening the door to religious freedom, and with it, to prepare the Spanish people to deal with the possibilities of other freedoms which may come. According to Aguirre, after the Council, Catholicism should strive for a conception of the Church which accommodates, not excludes, the future, particularly the future that crystallizes in every new present (see Aguirre, 1969c: 21-23). One of the circumstances referred to in that present is lack of faith or atheism, whose increasing expansion constitutes another one of Aguirre’s key concerns and motives for this dialogue. Atheism is perceived not only as a problem, but, more crucially, as a symptom of the socio-economic and, even, political problems which Spain is faced with. According to Aguirre, atheism gains importance not because of its association with Marxism, but as a current human reality for which Marxism may just be a suitable vehicle (see 1969c: 24). In fact, in an essay entitled “La renovación intelectual del clero español”, included in Casi ayer noche, he wonders “¿por qué si no los diálogos más frecuentes, los únicos casi, han enfrentado a cristianos y marxistas? El marxismo no cubre hoy el fenómeno general de la increencia, si bien ocupa en él una porción considerable” (1985: 189). Raising these concerns already points to the relevance that faith plays throughout his work, more significantly in his engagement with neo-Marxism. Which yearning are they attempting to fulfil with Marxist atheism? And would a Christian alternative be able to fill that vacuum? Even more pressing for him is to find out why so many Spanish people have turned to atheism, because, as he observes,

en España, hijos de familias en las que se educa cristianamente no pierden la fe, sino que descubren un día que nunca la han tenido. El proceso llega a su término sin dramatismo, con una tranquilidad ni siquiera polémica (1985: 177).

These are the questions that Aguirre considers important for the individual and the Church to answer or at the very least to consider. However, in analysing these questions, another one arises: why is a religious alternative preferable to an atheist one? Despite his obvious concern with atheism, this is not a question which he answers satisfactorily. He does, however, engage more directly with the issue of atheism in “El ateísmo de la realidad”, published in Casi ayer noche (1985: 169-80).
Aguirre spends the first six pages of this essay accusing Catholicism and the Second Vatican Council in particular of not being able to deal appropriately with atheism:

preconciliarmente estábamos acostumbrados a explicar el ateísmo por la ceguera o por la mala voluntad de los ateos. Los especialistas católicos del tema –como también sobre protestantismo o comunismo– practicaban una cierta necrofilia, la de la acumulación indiscriminada de errores y puntos débiles de quien no merecía otro nombre que el de adversario. El ateo estaba fuera de nosotros. Dicha actitud pervive aún entre nosotros (1985: 174).

In fact, Aguirre argues that “es, sin duda, en el tema del ateísmo donde al Vaticano II se le transparentan mejor sus limitaciones” (1985: 173; see also 170). Aguirre is critical of the limitations of the perspective adopted by the Second Vatican Council, and by the approach of Christian theology to religion and faith. He argues that

la ética de la situación insiste en el sujeto determinado únicamente por sus circunstancias exteriores y no por una serie a priori de objetividades indebidas. […] La creencia en Dios se explicita como razón de una aceptación de los dogmas. […] Esta profundización del sujeto prepara a ésta para que sin disolverse pueda ser objetivado (1985: 173).

In contrast with the perception of atheism as the absolute other and the enemy, Aguirre argues that “nuestra deformada expresión, sobre todo práctica, del cristianismo hace que el ateísmo cobre hoy su avanzada magnitud social. El cristiano tiene razones y su historia somos nosotros, cristianos insinceros” (1985: 174-75). This is one of the chief reasons why he considers it is necessary to reflect upon atheism, because, as he puts it, “hablar de ateísmo es también hablar de nuestra equivocaciones” (1985: 175).

With this argument Aguirre is very nearly refusing to acknowledge the existence of atheism in its own right. Instead, he argues that atheism is a reaction – which he patronisingly considers understandable – to the shortcomings of Christianity. This argument, however, seems to be more the fruit of Aguirre’s keenness to get through to those Christians who may feel threatened by atheism than Aguirre’s own understanding of the nature of atheism. It is evidence of Aguirre’s involvement with the discussion, for he chooses to sacrifice logical and theoretical coherence in favour of gaining closeness to those to whom his essay is addressed – Christians who are intolerant towards atheism.

Unlike Aranguren, who as discussed in the previous chapter seems unable or unwilling to contemplate the existence of a fully atheist position, Aguirre does not share this belief. In fact, Aguirre goes beyond the subordination of atheism to Christian values, as he explicitly puts it one page later: “el ateísmo no es algo que hoy suceda en una sociedad cristiana. El ateo no lo es porque no sea cristiano, sino porque es ateo simplemente. Para ser increyente no es necesario aparearse de la fe; basta con no adentrarse nunca en ella” (1985: 176). He insists on this point: “el ateísmo tiene una razón, que es positiva porque no consiste en una negación de la fe, sino en una afirmación de sí mismo” (1985: 178). Furthermore, Aguirre argues that the refusal to acknowledge an atheism whose roots are independent from Christianity only reveals the self-centred disposition of Christianity:
“explicar el ateísmo presente como secuela de nuestras deficiencias es seguirnos sintiendo el centro del mundo” (1985: 179).

Instead, Aguirre, by way of conclusion, equates the ontological reality of atheism with the ontological reality of faith by comparing the origin of both of them: “la incredencia del ateo arranca de una realidad antecedente a su ateísmo, la misma que sustenta nuestra fe” (1985: 180). What is interesting about Aguirre’s account of the atheist’s or the believer’s position is Aguirre’s perspective. He chooses not to defend or attack either or these positions on the basis of their truthfulness. Aguirre does not base his argument on the inherent and self-evident existence – or non-existence – of God. Instead, like Aranguren, his argument is based on the primary concept of human freedom. Aguirre argues that whatever process drives a human being to either believe or disbelieve in God’s existence constitutes an exercise of such freedom, that is, a choice. That is why, in reference to atheism, he says: “no me refiero a una realidad en la que no intervenga, conformadoramente, el destino y la libertad del hombre” (1985: 180). In other words, human freedom does play a role in atheism. However, Aguirre argues from a patently religious position and the result is that he gets entangled with the role played by God in this issue. That is why he refers to destiny above and that is also why he continues the statement by saying that

es una realidad en la que, como su fundamento y finalidad, existe operativamente la libertad de Dios. […] Desde luego que la referencia a la libertad divina es de orden trascendental. […] No es una referencia que “sirva”. Imposible habilitar la libertad de Dios como causa del ateísmo (1985: 180).

Consequently, and despite having argued that the existence of atheism is an independent phenomenon from religion, Aguirre’s own beliefs seem to taint his argument which, in the last instance, reserves a place for God in the gestation process of atheism even if his role is not at all clear. It is because of this lack of clarity that Aguirre concludes that “la explicación de la fe y la explicación del ateísmo serían siempre inadecuadas” (1985: 180).

It is perhaps because of Aguirre’s own ambivalence towards the nature of atheism that he does not fully address the question of why a religious position is preferable to an atheist one. It is only tangentially that Aguirre points to the comforting and guiding role that faith may play in contemporary society, thus drawing an unspoken comparison with discomfort, loneliness, or even emptiness that the atheist may supposedly feel (see 1985: 231; see also 5.3.3).

Setting this digression on atheism aside and focusing again on the issue of the relationship between Christianity and Marxism or, more generally, between politics and religion, Aguirre concludes his introduction to Vaticano II. La libertad religiosa (1967), by focusing on the often difficult and by no means obvious relationship that has existed and exists between religion and politics. He is well aware of the political implications of
religion. This is not to say that Aguirre discusses the political role that religious figures should or should not play. What he does is to highlight the ideological implications of religious or non-religious positions. This idea is expressed in his essay “La renovación intelectual del clero español”, where he states that

los clérigos españoles y, clérigos o no, todo pensador católico español, tendrán pues que afrentar, si es que están decididos a una verdadera renovación, una actitud de doble filo: por un lado, la del acercamiento al Concilio, pero por otro, el que más quema, la de una toma de conciencia, seguida de una puesta al descubierto, de su índole histórica, esto es, también de su insuficiencia” (1985: 182).

By insisting on the need to provide a worldly contextualization of religious practices, Aguirre criticizes what he considers inconsistencies and inadequacies in the way that Christianity has played its social role, often by lacking a sufficient involvement in social issues, at the same time as it played an excessive role in politics. Nonetheless, he avoids advocating the well-known formula of a depoliticised religion, for he considers political implications are inescapable and that ignoring such implications results in a dangerous naivety. He expresses this idea forcefully when discussing the motives for the dialogue: “Dios ha dejado ya de ser pretexto que se invoca para no hacer una política, esto es, para hacer otra” (1969c: 33). This awareness of the almost ubiquitous nature of politics is visible throughout his work, for – although without becoming a militant in any party – he plays an active role in the development of the Spanish political panorama.

It is possible to observe, by the scope of people’s engagement – intellectuals and people at large – with the Marxist-Christian dialogue and by the implications of this dialogue, that this engagement with Marxism is one of the key features of Spanish modernity or, more precisely, “la recuperación que [...] tiene que llevar el cristiano a cabo de una ‘modernidad’ en la cual en cuanto creyente ha vivido un poco como invitado mosca” (1969c: 21). In fact, although perhaps not directly, these discussions have a decisive impact on the process of Transition that will develop soon afterwards. The encouragement of the rapprochement and tolerance, if not understanding, of initially diametrically opposed views proves to be an extremely valuable exercise in the path towards democracy. Ringrose explains how “where such [peaceful] transitions have been relatively smooth the historian invariably finds that essential elements of the new polity and economy actually took shape over several generations” (1996: 4). As discussed in the introduction, Cruz finds in *habitus* and unconscious structures, as well as the hegemonic structure, the roots for social change (see 1996: 9, 13, and 10-11 respectively). Equally, this exercise of acceptance, tolerance, and dialogue can be interpreted as the preamble to the events yet to come; these are elements and attitudes which, as indicated above, Aguirre consciously hopes that they would help in preparing people to deal with an increase in their freedom, first religious and then political. Consequently, it is possible to argue that these debates and, more crucially,
these attitudes, in line with the theoretical framework referred to above, have contributed to create the basic structures that have contributed to making the peaceful Transition into democracy possible.

5.2.4 Aguirre the editor

Aguirre’s path is one of increasing awareness; an awareness of the lamentable situation Spain finds itself in, as well as an awareness of his own position and his possibilities. By means of his experiences as a priest, where he comes into contact not only with his parishioners, but also with a considerable number of young people whom he teaches, he soon becomes painfully aware of the difficulties Spain is facing and he feels he can reasonably venture their sources and solutions. Even as a priest, Aguirre has already discovered the powerful potential of cultural transmission, and he is determined to disseminate that content which he considers will further the cause he first champions when he becomes a priest.

Still as a clergyman, Aguirre joins Taurus in the early sixties as director of religious publications, before becoming editor-in-chief in 1967 (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 26). Aguirre’s roles as priest and editor overlap for a short while; however, they will not co-exist for long. As Gullón points out, “su disentimiento se explica por el trasfondo de insatisfacción cada vez más perceptible en su comportamiento y en sus escritos” (1989: 16). In the prologue to the collection of sermons pronounced while preaching at Madrid’s Ciudad Universitaria significantly entitled Sermones en España (1971c), Aguirre already confesses that “me siento ahora lejos, más en sensibilidad que en fechas, de la trama de hechos e ideas desde la cual actuaba entonces” (1985: 217). This early distancing, along with his later decision to leave the clergy (1970), reflects an intellectual and personal progression which is by no means unique in the Spain of that period. A similar development in relation to faith and the Church is found in Aranguren (see Gracia, 1996: 13).

It is possible to identify in the earlier Aguirre an idealist young man who, influenced by his conservative upbringing and religious education, sees in priesthood the best way to bring to life these ideals. He is soon fascinated by German liberal theologians as well as by neo-Marxist thinkers. This fuels his sense of mission which is reflected in his immense capacity for crystallizing and transmitting these ideals, these high hopes, which he does in the form of carefully chosen translations and publications. Aguirre is, thus, a man who lives by his convictions. The problem is, however, that convictions do not always live up to expectations. Disillusioned by the limitations of the Vatican Council and by the distance between the core of his religious beliefs and a society which to a great extent makes a showcase of Catholicism, Aguirre stops preaching in 1969, and leaves the clergy soon thereafter (see 1985: 170, 173, 182, 218). In fact, during the 1960s unprecedented numbers
of priests seek laicization, with many abandoning religion altogether: “five priests were secularized in 1962/3, but 85 in 1966 and 125 in 1968; in the years 1975-7 no fewer than 845 left the priesthood” (Lannon, 1987: 90; see also 1987: 105, 224). In the case of Aguirre, however, this does not respond to a crisis of faith, which is present throughout his life. On the contrary, Aguirre professes himself a Christian throughout his life. Hence, this progression is testimony to his faith, but also to his social commitment, a commitment which, once again, Aguirre has expressed in different forms throughout his life.

The birth of Taurus provides an outlet for the expression of discrepancies and intellectual traditions which are not in consonance with the regime (see Gracia, 1996: 29). Aguirre’s links and progression within Taurus is not only a testimony to his personal evolution, but it also provides evidence of the expansion of his interests. His duties soon are extended so that he also takes charge of the “Cuadernos Taurus”, including foreign authors, particularly those of the FS in the collection “Ensayistas” (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 27; see also Gracia, 1996: 34). Here it is possible to observe the significance and influential nature of the existing friendship between Aguirre and Aranguren, because as Jean Bécarud suggests,

126 Aguirre explicitly confirms this in his interview with Umbral:

U: -Teología y filosofía. ¿Cómo se desprende uno de la teología?
A: -Yo no me he desprendido, yo no comparto la famosa máxima de Ortega de que en la creencia se está. La creencia es viva, fluctuante (1984b: 11).

The importance of his use of the adjective *fluctuante* should not be overlooked, for it indicates that Aguirre has experienced his faith dramatically, that is, not as a godly gift, but as a human endeavour and pursuit. That is why, in “No confesión, sino desmaquillaje”, he explains that “y para mí, sobre todo en cuanto a hombre que lucha por poder ser creyente (y no sólo por poder seguir siéndolo), cuenta el presente como el lugar menos equivoco de acción y de pasión, de salvación y de condena (1985: 218).

127 In 1954, Taurus is founded by Francisco Pérez González, Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot, and Miguel Sánchez López (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 11). Francisco Pérez González, its first director, publishes books which, although not directly opposed to the regime, are critical towards it (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 16). During the first few years, a number of collections which are continued by successive editors are launched. The collection “Ensayistas de hoy” includes Aranguren’s *Crítica y Meditación* (1957) and a wide range of other essays which deal with, in a first instance with spiritual concerns and, later, with essays of a socio-political nature. It is under this collection that Aguirre translates and publishes works by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, Ernest Bloch, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno to mention but a few (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 18). The next collection to be launched is “Cuadernos Taurus”, a series of paperbacks which includes well-known authors such as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, José Ortega y Gasset, Pedro Lain Entralgo, Julián Marías, and, of course, José Luis Aranguren (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 18-19). The aim of the collection “Sillar” is to recover and re-publish Spanish texts of historical and literary interest, such as *El Quijote* (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 19). Other collections are “Ser y Tiempo”, whose orientation was so similar to “Cuadernos Taurus” that it is soon replaced by it, “Ciencia y Sociedad”, which deals with the topics indicated in its title, and the humoristic “Club de la Sonrisa” (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 20-21).

128 The success of his translations of Benjamin and Adorno, as well as the publication of Cioran, translated by Fernando Savater (see Savater, 2004: 260) is such that they are re-edited on several occasions after Aguirre leaves Taurus, on account of their popularity, not only amongst students, but also amongst the greater public (see Vivas, 2004: 39; see also Pradera, 2004: 302).
Jesús Aguirre debió de verse orientado por Aranguren a la hora de decidirse a dar a conocer en España determinados autores: algo que tiene que ver en particular con la prestigiosa colección «Ensayistas», en la que figuran por lo demás seis de los propios títulos de don José Luis (2004: 287).

The nature of the collections he encourages and develops reflects some of the ongoing interests throughout his life, which, although ever present, vary in intensity at different stages of his existence. During his period as editor-in-chief of Taurus, Aguirre continues with the collections which are already being published, showing special interest in the collections “Ensayistas” and “Cuadernos” (Lago Carballo, 2004: 29). He also launches other influential collections such as “Publicaciones Religiosas”, which includes the work of renowned theologians such as Joseph Ratzinger and Karl Rahner, and “Biblioteca Política”, which is partly inspired and directed by Enrique Tierno Galván (Lago Carballo, 2004: 29).

Despite the pressure to make the publishing house a profitable enterprise – it belongs primarily to the bank Banco Ibérico (Pradera, 2004: 297) –, the orientation of Taurus’s publications during this period clearly obeys more a cultural and socio-political agenda, than an economic one. Aguirre – and with him Taurus – endeavours to expand the horizons of a present which he feels to be distant and isolated from the rest of European thought (see Mesa, 2002: 303). It is in this context that Aguirre translates and publishes the works of the FS.

5.3 The value of a critical perspective

5.3.1 Aguirre and the Frankfurt School

In the previous chapters I aimed to demonstrate Aranguren’s connections and parallels to Marcuse, as well as Zambrano’s efforts to provide an alternative to instrumental rationality.

129 Unfortunately, no records of Aguirre’s work for Taurus have survived the successive removals that the publishing house has experienced throughout the years. Therefore, no exhaustive list of works translated and edited by Aguirre has been produced. Although more work needs to be done to produce such a record, the present bibliography offers an extensive account of his work.

130 As Aguirre himself explains, his editorial work is not primarily guided by economic interests: “nunca saqué de prensas un best-seller o, según tartamudeaba un colega que ahora suda la academia, un west-seller. Precisamente por ser miembro entusiasta de la Muy Noble y Muy Desleal Cofradía del Despilfarro, les puse con frecuencia cara de perro a los agentes literarios, ballenas blancas, tigres apaisados” (1985: 45). It should be noted that although, unlike Aranguren, Aguirre does not explicitly focus on the analysis or critique of the consumerist society and the workings of neo-capitalism, it is possible to discern his negative attitude towards consumerism indirectly in some of his passing remarks. An example of this can be found in the following comment: “a través de su enfática lacrimogenia la Constitución Gaudium et Spes cifra la llegada de la Iglesia católica a un mundo moderno, que de facto, aunque la Constitución no lo sepa del todo, es más un mundo de producción que de progreso” (1985: 227). Here it is possible to observe that, although Aguirre is discussing the Catholic Church, he seizes the opportunity to contrapose progress to production, thus, infusing production with negative connotations which he does not elaborate on.
However, the reach of CT in Spain cannot be properly addressed without analysing the role played by Aguirre in introducing the writings of the School to Spain.

In the light of this, it may seem logical to dedicate the first chapter to the analysis of Aguirre’s thought. However, as explained in the introduction, he is best understood after coming into contact with the concepts previously explored, because, despite the nature of his writings, being more personal and less strictly philosophical, and despite not having such an extensive corpus of written work, his work in a way encompasses some key elements found on the other two authors. On the one hand, Aranguren’s rapprochement to the work of the members of the Institut can also be found in Aguirre’s writings and, on the other, Aguirre develops his own style of experiential rationality which, although differing from Zambrano’s, shares the same aims and many of the basic assumptions. The focus of this section will, therefore, be placed on the development of his experiential rationality as an alternative to instrumental rationality and as an expression of CT.

As indicated in the introduction, Aguirre is generally considered to have introduced the FS in Spain. However, although this statement is to a certain extent true, it requires clarification. Contrary to popular opinion, the first book ever published in Spain by one of the members of the FS is not translated or edited by Aguirre. Instead, it is translated by Manuel Sacristán, and published by Ariel in 1962. In fact, in 1962, Ariel publishes not one but two of Adorno’s books translated by Sacristán. The books in question are Notas de literatura and Prisms, la crítica de la cultura y la sociedad. Nevertheless, Aguirre has generally been considered the introducer of the FS into Spain on account of the fact that most of the works by Adorno and Benjamin published in Spain since shortly after this date and until the end of the Transition are published by Taurus at his request, and are often either translated or revised by him. The first of such books are Adorno’s Filosofía y superstición (1964a) and Justificación de la filosofía (1964b), which is translated by Aguirre when he is still a priest. What is more, in the case of Adorno, eight – possibly nine – out of the seventeen books written by Adorno and published in Spain during this period are, in fact, published by Taurus and are directly linked to Aguirre.

Aguirre plays a more exclusive role in the introduction of Benjamin. With the exception of Angelus Novus (1971a), which is translated by Héctor Murena and published

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131 Aranguren points on various occasions to Aguirre as the person chiefly responsible for having introduced the FS into Spain (see 1994, 4: 544; 1994, 5: 376).

132 It is unclear whether Aguirre is responsible for the publication of Teoría estética, which takes place in 1980, well after he resigns his position as editor-in-chief in Taurus. However, there is evidence that he maintains a strong association with Taurus after he leaves this position, as his continues translation, publication, and even edition of different works after this time. This is particularly the case in relation to his literary translations (see bibliography where a list of Aguirre’s translations has been provided).
by Edhasa, Aguirre is responsible for every publication of a work by Benjamin in Spain since his translation of Iluminaciones and Imaginación y sociedad in 1971 until 1975. Not only that, he also translates and prefaces all such books. Hence, although there is a gap of almost a decade between the introduction of Adorno and that of Benjamin, Aguirre is more involved than ever with Benjamin’s works, in all likelihood, as a result of his personal affinity towards his thought, as we shall discuss below.

The case of Horkheimer’s works, chronologically the second one of these authors to be introduced in Spain, is entirely different. Although Taurus is the first to publish one of Horkheimer’s books in Spain, La función de las ideologías (1966), it is unclear whether Aguirre is involved in its publication. It is translated by Víctor Sánchez de Zavala and its early date, 1966, before Aguirre becomes editor-in-chief, suggests that he does not commission this publication. This is not to say that Aguirre does not suggest it, which is a probable conjecture given on the one hand that Aguirre’s collaboration with Taurus dates from 1959 and, on the other, the evidence of his interest and affinity for the School; nevertheless, this remains only a conjecture as it cannot be verified. In any case, this and Sociológica (1966), which Horkheimer co-authors with Adorno, are the only ones of Horkheimer’s books to be published by Taurus. In fact, out all of the members of the FS, Horkheimer is the least published of all in Spain during the period that extends from his introduction in 1966 until the end of the Transition. Only five of his books, including Sociológica (1966), are published in Spain in the ten-year period from 1966 until 1976, and no other books by him appear from 1976 until 1982, when Alianza publishes Historia, metafísica y escepticismo. Five are dramatically fewer titles than in the case of Adorno, who, during the same period, has seventeen of his books published in Spain, or Marcuse, with sixteen. This is even fewer titles than Benjamin, who only has eight of his books published in Spain.

The reasons for this disparity are not clear. One might surmise that one of the factors involved may be that those books which are considered Horkheimer’s seminal work, such as Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947a) and Zur Kritik der Instrumentellen Vernunft (1967) are already translated into Spanish in Buenos Aires, where they are published as Dialéctica del Iluminismo (1969) and Crítica de la razón instrumental (1969), respectively. It would seem that as a result of their translation, they may have been already accessible to a Spanish audience, hence eliminating the need for their publication in Spain. However, it should also be noted that some books by the rest of the members of the School are translated and
published in Latin America, and this does not detract Spanish publishers from publishing yet more titles by these authors.\footnote{An example of this can be observed in the case of Benjamin, whose work is prolifically translated and published by Aguirre as indicated above, despite having already been translated and published in Spanish in Buenos Aires since 1961 (see Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 282).}

Marcuse is introduced to Spain in 1967 by Revista the Occidente, who publishes *El marxismo soviético*. From this point onwards, given Marcuse’s popularity, numerous publishing houses publish his works in Spain; out of sixteen books Seix Barral, Ariel, and Alianza publish two each, and various other companies publish the rest. In contrast with the authors discussed above, only one of Marcuse’s books is published by Taurus, namely, *Ética de la revolución*, which appears in 1969 when Aguirre is already editor-in-chief of Taurus.

As a result of the evidence discussed above, it is possible to affirm that Aguirre is the person who, in the capacities of translator and editor, has done the most to promote the introduction of the FS into Spain.\footnote{Although, as explained above, there is no exhaustive list of works edited by Aguirre, his engagement in the publication of works by the FS can be observed in the titles listed in the appendix one.} Moreover, he is the first person to introduce Horkheimer and Benjamin to a Spanish readership.

These efforts to introduce and promote the FS in Spain are also evidence of his interests and his theoretical background in the work of the School. These publications demonstrate Aguirre’s awareness of the existence of the School. What is more, they also demonstrate, on the one hand, an affinity with their thought, and, on the other hand, that he considers their work sufficiently relevant to commit to their translation and publication, passing over the opportunity to publish other currents, such as structuralism (see Romero de Solís, 2002: 295). Knowing Aguirre’s critical positions and subversive style together with his rejection of systematization, it is easy to understand why he does not feel as close to structuralism as he does to CT, thus declining the chance to publish the former (see 5.3.3 for more details on Aguirre’s style). In stark contrast with that, he perceives the need to translate and publish the FS. As he explains, “lo de Frankfurt, Benjamin sobre todo, Adorno y los otros, tenía que ver con el aburrimiento insoportable que me causaban los catecismos marxistas” (1985: 47). Aguirre had already acknowledged the importance of Marxism, having even encouraged a dialogue; however, he is also well aware that the Marxist coordinates no longer apply to neo-capitalist societies. Furthermore, Marxism is perceived as a set of dogmatic formulae. The alternative lies, therefore, with the FS, who offer a critical and penetrating approach to the challenges posed by the new forms of alienation, as discussed in Chapters One and Three.
Therefore, although the choice of titles for this exercise of translation and publication could have well been arbitrary or it could have followed reasons completely unrelated to their contents, there is evidence to suggest the contrary. This evidence is closely linked to Aguirre’s own biography and his socio-cultural context. In fact, he explains that he translates these texts because

quise que los estudiantes españoles leyesen textos escritos en la posguerra, y no sólo, engañados por la intemporalidad que lleva consigo el retraso de las traducciones, los de Lukács y Korsch, que poco o nada supieron del pacto de Hitler y de Stalin y de cómo al primero le derrotó no la revolución, sino la sociedad liberal, en la que no se había extinguido la dialéctica de la ilustración (1985: 47).

Although Aguirre does briefly explain why he is moved to translate and publish the works of the FS, as seen above, one may still ask why the FS is favoured over other trends of post-war European thought. What is there in the FS that resonates with Aguirre? What is there in its content that makes it relevant to the situation of Spain? His answer, echoing Marcuse’s terminology, is that “España se desvivía en una inquebrantable apariencia unidimensional” (Aguirre, 1985: 47). This statement, like much of Aguirre’s language, is rich in implications. By using the adjective unidimensional in a clear reference to Marcuse’s most influential work, One-Dimensional Man (1964), Aguirre is alluding to the totalitarian rule of the Franco regime, but also to the fundamentalist practices and attitudes that it fosters, as discussed above in relation to Christianity and Marxism. However, there is much more to this one-dimensionality. Aguirre uses the word apariencia, appearance, to suggest that, in fact, there is an under-layer of the Spanish population abundant with variety and alternatives, ready to embrace multidimensionality. Thus, he strives to provide the theoretical co-ordinates to create a platform which may activate these latent forces of change.

In conclusion, Aguirre has been largely, although not solely, responsible for the introduction of the thought of the members of the FS into the Spanish socio-cultural debate. Despite having discarded the element of exclusivity, Aguirre’s role in the introduction of neo-Marxism and CT has an important impact on Spanish intellectual thought, which is experiencing a period of expansion by having access to a wider range of material. Díaz suggests that, as a result of these editions of the School’s work, a wave of interest in the authors and some key topics discussed by the School, such as utopia or consumerism, is sparked during 1969-1975, a period during which they have very direct repercussions on

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135 A helpful interpretation of Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality can be found in Kellner’s introduction to the second edition of “One-Dimensional Man”, where he says: “I would propose interpreting ‘one-dimensional’ as conforming to existing thought and behavior and lacking a critical dimension and a dimension of potentialities that transcend the existing society. In Marcuse’s usage the adjective ‘one-dimensional’ describes practices that conform to pre-existing structures, norms, and behaviour, in contrast to multidimensional discourse, which focuses on possibilities that transcend the established state of affairs” (1991: xxvii; see also 1.2.1).
the realm of political action (see 1983: 166; see also Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 283). More importantly, as a consequence of this contact, some Spanish intellectuals, most notably Aranguren and Aguirre himself, develop their own brand of Critical Theory; they identify the key issues raised by the School making them their own subject matter. Whereas in Aranguren’s case, Marcuse is the most visible influence, in Aguirre’s case Benjamin is often echoed in terms of style and themes. A number of Benjaminian themes, such as the impoverishment of experience, the preference for an oral style, and the need to re-invent oneself, can be found in Aguirre (see 1975b: 12; see also 5.3.2).

5.3.2 Benjamin

We shall now explore Aguirre’s relationship to the FS’s theoretical framework and his connection to the different authors, Benjamin in particular, for he seems closest to his thought (see Herralde, 2006: 12-13).

Not only is Aguirre Benjamin’s translator, but he gains international recognition as an expert on his work, although this is something which has, at times, been called into question;

Jesús Aguirre, autor de defectuosas traducciones de Walter Benjamin, fue un peculiar especialista en Walter Benjamin de renombre mundial: aunque no se conoce un solo ensayo y menos aún un libro suyo sobre Benjamin, fue invitado por los germanistas norteamericanos a dictar conferencias en varias universidades norteamericanas (Gutiérrez Girardot, 2004: 282-83).

There are others, however, who praise his translations as well as his expertise on the subject (see Atienza, 2002: 307; see also Mesa, 2002: 302). Although the quality of Aguirre’s translations and understanding of Benjamin is open to argument, the lack of publications on the subject of Benjamin requires clarification. It is true that Aguirre does not write any books on Benjamin; however, it must be noted that Aguirre is no scholar. He is a translator and an intellectual. As such, he translates most of Benjamin’s work; in fact, as Juan García Hortelano points out, “Aguirre, en la década de los setenta, tradujo, anotó, comentó, y editó la obra de Benjamin” (1985: 12). In addition to Aguirre’s editions, translation, prologues, notes, and comments to the works of Benjamin, he also publishes – although in a rather informal and personal style – at least two newspaper articles in El País devoted to Benjamin, entitled “Moscú, capital del dolor” (1989b) and “Músicas para Walter Benjamin” (1990a), as well as an essay entitled “Walter Benjamin. Estética y revolución”. This essay first appears as a prologue to his translation of the first volume of Iluminaciones (1971b), which then reappears in the collection of essays Casi ayer noche under the name of “Estudios sobre Walter Benjamin” (see 1971b: 7-14; 1985: 115-40 respectively). Given the very limited number of his publications on Benjamin on the one hand and his reputation as a Benjaminian scholar on the other, it is possible to conclude that the comments about
Aguirre’s expertise on Benjamin are mainly based on his work as a translator and not on the production of works of a scholarly nature. Even so, there is no contradiction in defending his expertise and renown, for as is widely known, an exercise of translation is not a mere “transportation of meaning” into a different language, but it presupposes an understanding of the œuvre of the author in question, as well as its interpretation, because ultimately every translation is precisely this, an interpretation. As regards the quality of Aguirre’s translations of Benjamin, this is a matter which is beyond the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, Gutiérrez Girardot’s criticism of Aguirre’s expertise on Benjamin – other than his translations – is unfounded, as observed in the evidence of Aguirre’s work in this respect provided above. What his statement provides, however, is confirmation is the international renown of Aguirre’s reputation as an expert on Benjamin. Aguirre’s relationship with the School, however, goes beyond his interest in Benjamin. In the true fashion of CT, this relationship combines the intellectual aspect with the personal one. This relationship and its weight in the transmission of the works of the School are visible in Adorno’s will: “Adorno había dejado una disposición testamentaria de que cualquier traducción o cualquier cosa que saliera suya en castellano tenía que pasar por la revisión de Jesús Aguirre” (Savater, 2006).

Returning to Benjamin, Aguirre explains the choice made in selecting Benjamin’s texts as the object of his translations, saying that “no se trata, sin embargo, de una selección retrospectivista, sino de una cala en la experiencia de una sensibilidad que nos parece necesaria para llegar a un enriquecimiento del ámbito de lo subjetivo” (1971d: 14). Thus, Aguirre manifests his main interests. He is moved by a pedagogic intention, his aim is to expand the capabilities of perception of his readership in such a way that a further development of the self, a self-realisation, may be possible. Making use of Goethe’s terminology, García Hortelano describes Aguirre’s predilection for Benjamin in terms of elective affinities, making a reference to Goethe’s novel by the same title (1809) (1985: 12; Aguirre, 1985: 113-40)136. Such an affinity can be first spotted in the existence of some parallels between the two thinkers, such as their views on art, the concept of aura, the fragmentation and discontinuity of their work, and their overall highly cultivated and complex style. It is also possible that Aguirre may see in Benjamin’s dissension and fragmentation a reflection of Spain. Aguirre may also be drawn to Benjamin’s thought because a number of traditional elements are intertwined with other very progressive

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136 This influential term, “elective affinities”, Wahlverwandtschaften, whose central idea is that individuals experience an attraction towards other individuals according to the compatibility of their character, has also been employed by Weber in his essay “The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism” (1905), as well as by Benjamin, who writes an essay entitled “Goethe’s elective affinities” (see 2002: 36; 1924 respectively).
attitudes, as is the case with Aguirre himself. The latter aspect is particularly visible in their conception of time and progress. As Aguirre explains,

en su último texto [de Benjamin], *Tesis de filosofía de la historia*, la revolución es un ‘salto de tigre’ no al futuro, sino al pasado, [...] para hacer con él una experiencia que ‘haga saltar el continuum de la historia’. No hay aquí cabida para el progresismo futurista, ya que la acción revolucionaria debe liberar ‘el pasado oprimido’. Con estas tesis, Benjamin combate la ‘testaruda fe en el progreso’ de la socialdemocracia y del marxismo vulgar (1971d: 9).

In this aspect, Benjamin shows a more conservative attitude than that of other members of the *Institut*, which may contribute to further understanding Aguirre’s preference of Benjamin over the other members of the School. Benjamin refuses to venerate progress for its own sake. In fact, his concept of progress is not tied in to mechanical achievement and the increase of productivity. Progress for him does not follow a straight line forward, but rather a trajectory curved backwards. If progress is to be a synonym of improvement, then, for Benjamin, such improvement can only be found in the redemption of the past. Once this has been achieved the linear, hierarchical perception of time can no longer be sustained, hence history is perceived as a continuum, in which every point in time is in contact with every other point. This must have resonated in Aguirre, who, submerged in the last stages of the Franco dictatorship, sees both the necessity as well as the danger of change. The need for change is undeniable, but it involves a risk to the country’s stability. Hence, this change should not represent a break with their present time, but a recuperation of a past, which need not be real; instead, a conceptual past – one which may not have necessarily taken place – grants continuity and therefore stability. Placing the values sought in this conceptual past has yet more advantages. When the values are thought of as something that once was but is no more two things happen: first, their worth increases as a side-effect of the sense of loss, and second, their possibility is also increased in the knowledge that it once was, thus dissipating doubts as to whether they can come into being again. Hence, as he says in relation to Benjamin, “así será la memoria una facultad con función de futuro” (1971d: 14). Aguirre reinterprets Benjamin’s thought in relation to the situation in Spain, that is to say that he is cautious regarding the future of Spain, and firmly believes that any change – religious, political, or otherwise – must take place not with the desire to break with the past, but to integrate it in the exercise of shaping the future. His positions are, therefore, imminently practical when their role as engines for change is considered. As indicated above, this is but the reconstruction of Aguirre’s premises; however, the unfolding of this point can be observed in relation to Aguirre’s concern regarding religious freedom as discussed above.

There are a number of elements in Aguirre’s thought, such as the conceptions of progress and time discussed above, and even more in his personal life, such as having belonged to the clergy and becoming Duque de Alba, which reveal his conservative
tendencies. Despite these tendencies, it would be unfair to describe Aguirre as a conservative figure. In the first instance, he constantly promotes change: religious, in his early days as a priest, political, in the case of the Transition, cultural, when he becomes Duke. Second, he expresses rather daring views, as can be seen in his criticism of the insufficiency of the revolutionary movement, that is, the insufficiency of its scope: “la contracultura pudo haber recurrido al ‘acto gratuito’ (Los sótanos del Vaticano), a la protesta contra la heterosexualidad dominante (Corydon), al estado de lírico constante e intramundano (Los alimentos terrenos). Pero no lo hizo” (1985: 96). Therefore, in some ways, he perceives some his own thought as more progressive than the thought of those who, at that time, are considered to be the revolutionary force. The insufficiency of their positions, however, lies in that they do not offer a radical change, but a change that allows for the continuation of existing models and power structures. In contrast, Aguirre cultivates and promotes a mode of thought and expression distant from instrumental reasoning, as is patent in his style. It is the combination of these elements that accounts for Aguirre’s description as a Critical Theorist.

5.3.3 Epistemology

There is sufficient evidence to support the view that Aguirre has a strong interest in the School and that his thought and sensibilities are very much attuned to those of the members of the Institut. His work, however, is not one of mere repetition or transmission. He contributes actively to the debate by becoming a Critical Theorist himself. In addition, Aguirre brings to the fore and re-addresses an issue not generally associated with the FS, namely, faith. This section will, thus, explore the role of faith and how it shapes his epistemology.

The peculiarity of the CT developed by Spanish thinkers such as Aranguren, Zambrano and, of course, Aguirre is that having stripped materialist and religious standpoints of the possibility of absolute certainty, they advocate faith – now conceptualised as a life-choice in the sense of Pascal’s wager – as the most effective alternative to instrumental reason. Aguirre forcefully summarizes this position when he says that “con éstas [anécdotas utilizadas en la argumentación del hecho religioso], me ocurre un poco como con las argumentaciones profusas, que enfilan los escolásticos para convencernos de que Dios existe. En unas y otras faltan la apuesta y la ironía” (1989a: 78). 137

137 Aguirre’s disapproval of the search for proof for God’s existence may reflect the influence of the theologian Karl Rahner, who – as indicated above – is translated into Spanish by Aguirre himself. Rahner, who attends Heidegger’s lectures and is visibly influenced by his thought, defends natural knowledge of God, that is, that the human being possesses a latent knowledge of God’s existence and
Aguirre underlines that “todos ellos [los componentes de la Escuela de Frankfurt] se refieren ‘críticamente’ al estado de la cuestión del binomio ‘razón y revelación’ durante la coyuntura existencial” (1985: 238). Despite their Marxist background, the FS does not reject religion or transcendentality, but, unlike Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, for them, these concepts do not play a central role in the liberation of the individual (see Gómez Sánchez, 2004: 230-31; see also Sánchez, 1994: 617-46). Aguirre is interested in the relation between reason and revelation. For him, part of the process of overcoming instrumental reason is the integration of revelation into the scope of reason. This issue leads to Aguirre’s analysis of the contraposition of religion to consumerist behaviour, which he discusses in an essay entitled “Sociedad de consumo y comportamiento religioso”, published in Casi ayer noche (1985). Here he admits that “lo que me preocupa no es la desaparición de las conductas religiosas en la llamada sociedad de consumo, sino que aquéllas, con todas las mediaciones que se quiera, se acomoden a las leyes de ésta” (1985: 227). He goes on to explain that

en la sociedad de consumo la fe cristiana no debe resignarse a constituirse en una mercancía más con su precio de impuesto, su frecuencia semanal en la consumición, sus vendedores especializados, que serían sacerdotes y teólogos, incluso con sus diferentes marcas para satisfacer la variedad accidental de un mismo gusto básico. La vuelta a Dios es vislumbrada por Horkheimer como contrapeso de las condiciones oprimentes de la ‘sociedad totalmente planificada’ (1985: 231).

Making reference to Horkheimer’s position, Aguirre emphasizes faith, which is the key element of his response to the new forms of alienation. Highlighting this aspect leads to the development of a response that surpasses the problems posed by foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions.

Whereas foundationalism sustains that there is a foundation, one or several basic assertions which are intrinsically true and cognoscible, upon which all other knowledge is based, Critical Theorists defend that this is not the case.

There are several reasons for this. As explained in the previous chapter, adopting a foundationalist approach means accepting the rationality and epistemology it involves (see Parsons, 2007: 103-04). The implications are as follows. First, only that belief which is the result of a finite and non-circular chain of reasoning, supported by other beliefs acquired by the same procedure which can be ultimately traced back to the self-evident or indisputable foundation/s, is considered rational (see Parsons, 2007: 104). Second, there is an absolute truth. Furthermore, this truth is cognoscible. Hence, in this hierarchical epistemological system, knowledge is first acquired inductively, in the case of the natural world, or is self-evident, justified without inference, in the case of mathematical or logical truths, and that any attempt to provide evidence will necessarily ratify the mystery associated to such existence (see Kilby, 2004: 102).
anything which goes beyond this must be deductively inferred. That is why, according to this approach, theology and metaphysics do not fall into the scope of rationality or even epistemology.

This proves to be problematic. Proving the existence of an absolute truth is a difficult enterprise, even more so if the premise is that this absolute truth may be fully cognoscible by a human being. Defending this position turns out to be a lot more than an epistemological standpoint. It is first and foremost an ideological statement; one which suggests a modernist view of the world, where humans enjoy a privileged position to access and understand reality, or, at the very least, a very generous dose of confidence in our capabilities (see Neville, 1997: 316-17).

As opposed to this – influenced by Ortega – Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre have adopted a perspectivist epistemology. According to Aguirre,

la verdad social es patrimonio de todos, pero no de unos contra otros, sino de todos juntos, y por ello dicha verdad es tan utópica como irrenunciable. Alcanzar la utopía sería igual a quemarse en ella, y suprimirla como astro de cada mañana equivale a vivir en el hielo (1985: 61).

A number of implications stem from this statement: the rejection of totalitarianism, the defence of political equality, and the vindication of the worth of utopia. This theoretical standpoint finds expression in a number of specific instances. Aguirre’s rejection of totalitarianism can be observed in relation to politics, but also religion, and particularly the connection of the two. Aguirre opposes the systematisation of religion. He points out that


This statement is a reflection of Aguirre’s rejection of foundationalism. From this perspective, human attempts to dominate God which materialize in the systematization of religion are the expression of an arrogant overconfidence in our own faculties. The presupposition that humankind may know God’s will to such an extent as to systematize it, implies the equation of such a system to the absolute truth, one that is beyond understanding or questioning, one which demands acceptance, one which ultimately leads

138 This position – as any epistemological position – is also the result of ideology in the sense of worldview which shapes our perception and understanding as explained in chapter one. Ideology and, consequently, politics cannot be detached from epistemology. As the FS highlights in their critique of positivism, “science and knowledge are political in an analogous way that feminists remind us that the personal is political. Claiming to be apart in a separate private or value-free zone is itself a value-laden move that has an implication in the political world” (Chambers, 2004: 221). Consequently, from this point of view, the personal and the social, the political and the religious, and existence as a whole, are perceived and processed by the individual from a specific ideological, political, and epistemological perspective. In Aguirre’s case – also in the case of the FS – such a perspective involves the interconnectedness of the different spheres of reality.
to totalitarianism. That is why faith, in Aguirre’s view, must incorporate individual and social elements; it must be an individual choice with a social projection. It is possible to see in this rejection of the systematization of religion a global understanding of reality; the spheres of life and reality are no longer neatly separated; being is thought of in terms of *Dasein*. As with Zambrano, such a conceptualization of reality brings out the interconnectedness of being in such a way that the existing separation between the private and public spheres is overcome, not because the private sphere is invaded by the public one, as is often the case with instrumental reason, most visibly in the scope of mass media, but because the political significance and weight of the personal is highlighted, thus, empowering the individual. From Aguirre’s point of view, being cannot be mastered from within a system, for liberty is the very grounds of being, and rediscovering being necessarily implies experience and the expression of such an experience in a creative horizon where liberty can be exercised. That is why the only language that would reflect the reality of being must be an asystematic one. Only by challenging experiential reason and adopting CT, does Aguirre see a plausible path to the re-connection of our rationality and experience with our ontological reality.

It is then apparent how, for these Spanish thinkers, an absolute truth might exist but, if this were the case, it would be well beyond human grasp. Their position is also ideological; it suggests an alternative to the hierarchical epistemology as described above. This is an epistemology which springs from an understanding of human capabilities and needs because it has developed from them, instead of having been created as an abstract set of principles and rules imposed on human processes often constricting them.

That is not to say that these thinkers can be considered anti-foundationalist either, because the certainty of the non-existence of absolute truth as the starting point for elaborating an epistemology and a rationality leaves no room for doubt. It also reveals a governing principle which is absolute. Foundationalist and anti-foundationalist attitudes are deemed equally insufficient by these authors because they are both based on the parameters and possibilities of certainty. This is concisely summarized by Aguirre who claims that “la explicación del ateísmo y la explicación de la fe serán siempre inadecuadas” (1985: 180). In his view, no satisfactory answers can be achieved by exclusively intellectual means; a fuller conception of the rational, one that leaves room for the existential wager is needed (see Aguirre, 1989a: 78). In order to avoid these insufficiencies, the focus is shifted from knowledge to perception by defending the impossibility of absolute Knowledge, regardless of the existence of an absolute Truth.

Absolute Knowledge is conceived as a dangerous ideological chimera, one that shares with foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches a sense of certainty in their conclusions, a certainty that is more a construct than a reflection of reality or, indeed, of the
human epistemological capabilities. What these Spanish Critical Theorists advocate instead is the expansion of Pascal’s theological wager to the realm of epistemology. The emphasis is no longer placed on the possibility of truth or knowledge, because it has shifted to the scope of our capacities. Certainty is no longer sought. The claim for Knowledge is dropped in favour of knowledge; a knowledge that is the result of informed choices, but choices which are ultimately based not on certainty of any kind, but on the acknowledgement of our own fallibility. Hence, this knowledge is not ultimately based on absolute truth or certainty, but is, above all, a rational choice and an exercise of faith in that choice.

In these thinkers’s view, there is no Knowledge; only reasonable, functional and experiential knowledge is possible. Theirs is not a relativist position. Not just anything is considered knowledge; there is a requisite for reasonability. This knowledge does not aspire to the status of absolute truth, and for this reason it does not aspire to be fully satisfactorily explicative, although it should be functional for the existing paradigm of reality, not in an instrumental sense, but more from a Kuhnian perspective. Finally, because of their perspectivism, knowledge is experiential. This focus on experience changes the shape of epistemology, which ceases to be hierarchical, it is no longer vertical, it now becomes horizontal, integrating formerly shunned forms of knowledge – at least in Western civilization – such as faith and intuition. Broadening the methods for knowledge acquisition results in the readmission of metaphysics and theology into the realm of epistemology.

That is why their non-foundationalism expands the realms of the cognoscible but, more importantly, by first admitting the limitations of the human capabilities, it liberates reason from the constraints of foundationalist rationality, ultimately expanding the horizon of possibility of the individual who discovers a new kind of freedom, one which when experienced in sufficient number may even lead to the outcome of a more genuine form of democratic reality. This is in stark contrast with instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality, which is supported by arguments traditionally accepted as rational, has developed a social structure in which the individual is subjugated, in the same way as the Enlightenment subjugates nature for instrumental purposes (see Adorno, 1986; see also Horkheimer, 1973). This subjugation, along with the criteria of self-interest is what 139

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139 According to Kuhn, “these [paradigms] I take to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (1962: x). In order for a paradigm to be accepted, its theories have to be considered better than those of its competitor paradigms. This does not mean, however, that the competing paradigm must provide a satisfactory explanation and prediction for all facts, which so far, no one theory does. A paradigm is adopted when it is proved to be more satisfactorily explanatory than the previous paradigm was – having said that, it is possible for more than one paradigm to co-exist for a period of time. Scientific achievement by itself, however, is not enough for a paradigm to be generally adopted. Its acceptance by the community also requires that community to have been trained in the paradigm and, more crucially, the technological application of the paradigm – which is not to be equated per se with the instrumentalization of knowledge.
ultimately makes instrumental rationality, in fact, irrational. Far from this dynamics, this epistemology paves the way for an equally alternative rationality; one which moves away from the governing principle of instrumentality, favouring the promotion of self-development instead, a development which is hoped will ultimately translate into socio-political change. Hence, from this perspective, rational is that which, having satisfied the criteria of reasonable, functional, and experiential epistemology as outlined above, is a genuine expression of being, which implies that, at the same time, it encourages future expressions of being, when being is understood as an unravelling project in the Heideggerian sense, that is, as an interdependent being-in-the-world.

Despite Aguirre’s conscious and purposeful decision to express himself in a destabilising and thought-provoking manner – as we shall see below – by exercising his discourse from the platform of experiential reason, he does not develop a system of thought because any attempt of systematization would have defeated the purpose of the comprehensive and inclusive rationality he is committed to. The option of formal systematisation has to be rejected. Experiential reason, however, still demands a consistent application of supradisciplinarity. Only then does it become meaningful. Used otherwise, applied to individual sections of reality, experiential analysis would turn into no more than a tool for instrumental reason. Hence, Aguirre’s experiential rationality is expressed repeatedly throughout all areas of his thought. Although he does not theoretically develop any of these positions, the arguments as well as his overall style reveal this underlying theoretical standpoint, as the analysis of the most relevant features of this discourse will show.

5.4 Aguirre the Critical Theorist
This section will extract and analyse the underpinnings of Aguirre’s CT, by analysing the strategies he employs in order to develop his experiential rationality at the same time as the discourse of instrumental reason is undermined and destabilized by him and by those who engage actively and critically with the text. With this purpose in mind, close attention will be paid to specific aspects of his discourse, the nature and role of his style and structure, and the relevance and implications of the biographical component in particular.

5.4.1 Style and structure
Although many of Aguirre’s positions are progressive, the profoundness and reach of his wager for change can only be fully understood in relation to his writings. Only after a close analysis of his works, when not only their extension, topic, and content are considered, but when these are examined holistically in reference to their tone, style, structure, and the rest of his trajectory, does it become clear that the element that conveys unity to his thought as a
whole is precisely the struggle against instrumental reason. The rejection of instrumental reason and, indeed, the search for an alternative, is a common element in both his practical and literary work, for despite the diversity of the projects he undertakes or, rather, precisely because of this diversity, they retain a certain unity as a project of CT.

Style is, thus, one of the key aspects in which the influence of and parallels with the FS, Benjamin in particular, can be observed. Aguirre explains in reference to Benjamin that “las vías por las que acarrea sus materiales no son doctrinales, sino oblicuas, aquellas que él mismo describiera como propias de los surrealistas” (1971d: 8). This is also very true of Aguirre himself, as will be demonstrated below. It is important to recognize that despite the lack of systematic pretensions, Aguirre’s thought does contain a high degree of coherence as a project.

At the end of Casi ayer noche Aguirre explains that

las reflexiones que anteceden, como algunas otras desperdigadas en prólogos, conferencias y otros textos aparentemente de circunstancias, deben mucho, si no en su contenido material, desde luego que sí en la aprehensión formal, al estudio de la llamada Escuela crítica de Frankfurt. La lectura y la traducción –relectura múltiple– de Horkheimer; del malogrado Benjamin, de Adorno, muerto en olor de teoría, vienen siendo desde hace años tarea reflexiva de cabecera (1985: 237).

Despite having acknowledged his intellectual debt to the FS, Aguirre does not confirm whether or not, from his point of view, the content of the FS’s thought constitutes his subject matter. However, he readily admits that the way that they approach writing, presenting, and even structuring their thoughts is central to what he does. There are two important implications to be drawn from this. First, this reluctance to discuss the content of his work is consistent with the conscious tendency to opacity that he maintains, resisting any readymade formulae. Second, Aguirre acknowledges the influence that the form and structure of the FS’s writings have had on his work. This is of extreme importance to support the claim that Aguirre is a Critical Theorist, because in CT – as indicated in Chapter One – form and content are bound together as part of an effort to overcome instrumental reason. Hence, by adopting the form and structure employed by the FS, whatever the orientation of each individual article of book, its focus will still be the de-stabilisation of instrumental reason. An array of de-stabilising strategies, such as interdisciplinarity, perspectivism, fragmentation, but also integration, and contradiction are all key

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140 When asked directly the succinct question “Francfurt [sic]”, Aguirre replies: “La Escuela de Frankfur me ha dado, sobre todo, una osatura [sic] mental. Su rigor filosófico lo aplico hoy a otros problemas de la cultura y de la vida” (Umbral, Aguirre, 1984b: 11). Here, once again he highlights the influence that the methodology, structure, and style of FS has had on his thought. Aguirre explains that while these are present in his thought, its contents – at the time of the interview – have gone beyond the topics which are the primary concern of the School. Thus, this quotation provides further evidence of his rejection of readymade formulae, although by using the word “hoy” the implication is that the contents of his thought used to be closer to those of the FS and that they have expanded in relation to the evolution of his own occupation and interests.
characteristics of Aguirre’s holistic approach which, as is the case with Zambrano, aims to overcome the dualism of instrumental reason, by fostering experiential reason instead. The presence of these strategies in his style and structure will now be explored.

5.4.2 Know thyself

Aguirre’s style is insistently autobiographical. Although he does not elaborate on this topic by way of explanation, he has provided enough comments and indications to reasonably surmise that he has developed this style of personal analysis as a consequence of the conviction that the œuvre of a person cannot be separated from his biography and can, consequently, only be understood in relation to or, rather, in the light of it, echoing Ortega’s razón vital, vital reason (see Aguirre, 1985: 105).

As argued in the introduction, every text is autobiographical to a certain extent (see 1.5.1). In addition to this, there are other texts which are purposefully autobiographical, not only as a descriptive attribute, more also in terms of genre. As Gusdorf explains in relation to autobiography as a genre, it “requires a man to take a distance with regard to himself in order to reconstitute himself in the focus of his special unity and identity across time” (1980: 35). This distance, focus, and desire for unity and identity, however, are not present in Aguirre’s writings. He is not so concerned with providing a clear, lineal, coherent, cohesive, and comprehensive portrait of his own life, as he is with sharing with the reader some of his experiences, interests, and views, from a deeply personal, but also scattered, sometimes even chaotic and – at least initially – incoherent manner. Hence, his writings cannot be considered to belong to the genre of autobiography sensu stricto. Despite this, he is not only aware that he writes in an autobiographical manner, but he fully intends to do so. Even though Aguirre does not write an autobiography in the sense described before, he does write autobiographically, in the sense that autobiography may also be described as inwardness, as “the inward journey” (see Marcus, 1994: 235). It is in this latter sense that Aguirre himself admits that he is deliberately autobiographical in relation to his attitude and style, as we shall see below (see Aguirre, 1985: 27).

The importance that Aguirre accords memory, and, consequently, also to autobiography, becomes clear in Francisco Umbral’s interview:

U: -¿Qué importancia le concedes hoy a la memoria?
A: -Toda, muchísima, absoluta.
U: -Y la cultivas, a lo que veo. Tanto la memoria histórica de los Alba como tu memoria personal (1984b: 11).

141 It must be noted, however, that although these constitute the ideal co-ordinates which shape the genre of autobiography, in reality, autobiography may sometimes is expressed in a serial of even fragmentary manner, effectively raising questions regarding the nature and characteristics of personal identity (see Marcus, 1994: 238-39).
The value Aguirre awards to biography can be observed in two different facets. On the one hand, he turns to the personal life of whichever figure he is studying whenever possible to complete his view of the matter discussed, as can be observed in his work on Benjamin (1975b: 10-11). Even more relevant is that his writings – with the exception of his translations – are infused with his own autobiographical perspective; how he first encounters the topic or author discussed, the impact it has on him, and how he remembers these experiences; the most patent example of this can be found in *Casi ayer noche* (1985) and *Las horas situadas* (1989a), whose autobiographical component will be discussed below. Thus is why, when Umbral pushes Aguirre to tell him how he would describe the style of his writings, he highlights the element remembrance, by choosing it from the various examples offered by Umbral:

U: ¿En qué estilo erescribes?
A: -Depende del género. No se escribe igual un discurso para la Academia que un artículo urgente que le piden a uno de un periódico.
U: -Estás evitando contéstarme. ¿Eres rememorativo, crítico, ácido, sentimental?, cómo es la psicología del hombre que saca de ti el escrito; [sic]?

The importance of memory is crystallized in his autobiographical style. In relation to *Casi ayer noche*, Aguirre says that “sin duda son las primeras autobiografías que publico, y bien les viene, porque me viene bien, que la actitud de aprendiz se haga en ellas patente”, which demonstrates Aguirre’s deliberate choice of an autobiographical expression, but also his attitude of apprentice suggests an experimental and processual – rather than finished or complete – approach (1985: 27). This attitude of apprentice is not limited to his autobiographical style and is not motivated by his self-proclaimed status of neophyte in these matters. Far from it, it reveals his attitude towards life, as this statement indicates: “si algún día, hipotético y ciertamente lejano, alguien hubiese aprendido algo de mí, se hubiese sentido ‘impulsado a lo alto’ con mi ayuda, me gustaría, entonces, mirar hacia esa altura y, a mi vez, aprenderla” (1985: 27).

His autobiographical writings – particularly *Casi ayer noche* (1985), *Altas oportunidades* (1987a), *Crónica de una Dirección General* (1988c), *Las horas situadas* (1989a), and *Crónica en la Comisaría* (1992) – are far from the straightforward narration of memories and experiences following a mostly lineal time sequence from a first-person perspective that one may expect from this genre. This autobiographical component also leads to a certain opacity which is manifested in several ways. There is a certain whimsicality to the structure of some of his works. This is particularly so in *Casi ayer*

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142 The fact that he refers to the work in *Casi ayer noche* using the plural is an indication of Aguirre’s own perception of the fragmentation of his work, which shall be discussed below.
noche (1985) and Las horas situadas (1989a), where there is no obvious guiding criterion for the choice and inclusion of the essays compiled. His writings seem autobiographical almost despite himself, as many of the titles of the essays which make up his books indicate. In Casi ayer noche, these titles include: “El decir y el hacer de José Hierro”, “Santander, sitio de los vientos”, “Et in Arcadia ego”, “Como la turquesa, amargo”, “El mismo Julien Green”, and “Frankfurt 1971: Leyendo con gafas oscuras”, to mention but a few representative titles. Topics and titles equally varied are found in Las horas situadas (1989a): “Fausto y sus variaciones”, “La crueldad del texto”, “Lecciones de geografía”, “Academia en Sevilla”, and “Desconocido por su excelencia” are examples of this. A similar diversity is found – to various extents – in his other books 143. A look at these titles quickly reveals that – despite the autobiographical nature of these writings – the topics set out for discussion tend to be an author, a place, or, even, an event, very rarely putting himself at the centre of the discussion from the outset. Despite this tendency to act as a literary critic, or even an intellectual in Aranguren’s sense of the word, whichever views he transmits are very openly filtered through his persona.

This strategy maximizes his visibility within the text. He resorts to a form of experientialism to eliminate the illusion of objectivity; given that any transmission is necessarily mediated and therefore transformed in varying degrees as a necessary result of that mediation, the medium should be a visible part of the resulting transmission, because ignoring this fact or, what is more, taking great pains to erase all traces of such mediation – as it often happens with scientificist discourse – results in the obscurity, not only of the process of transmission, but of the transmitted content itself. Aguirre, therefore, makes himself visible, perceptible, and at all rates present in his writings, even if they are, as is often the case, a review of another author’s work.

At the same time, the contents of Aguirre’s writings may come across as bursts of disperse reflexions and memories rather than as an effort to elaborate a comprehensive account of his past, resulting in a fragmentary style (see 1985: 151) 144. An example of this

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143 Whereas his two volumes of Memorias de un cumplimiento seem to enjoy thematic cohesion, for they recount his memories in public office, the choice of the focus of their contents may also be described as whimsical, a perception which is emphasized due to the fragmentary and erratic nature of his style, as we shall discuss below.

144 In this context, fragmentation should not be confused with lack of coherence or, even, cohesion. It is fragmentary, above all, because it rejects a sense of unity, of totality, which does not necessarily affect the coherence of the text. The DRAE defines “fragmentación” as “acción y efecto de fragmentar” and, in turn, “fragmentar” as “reducir a fragmentos”. “Fragmentos” proves to be more informative, for it is defined as:

1. Parte o porción pequeña de algunas cosas quebradas o partidas.
2. Trozo o resto de una obra escultórica o arquitectónica.
3. Trozo de una obra literaria o musical.
4. Parte conservada de un libro o escrito.
fragmentation can be observed in his essay “El asesinato del abanico”, the first two paragraphs of which have been reproduced here to give the reader of sense of Aguirre’s idiosyncratic style (1989a: 43-46):

No ha muerto el abanico, sino que ha sido asesinado. Por sus despojos nos persiguen como fantasmas que una mano empuña a deshora o que trasluce una vitrina iluminada, subitáneamente, desde un atrás sin fondo. Es como si supiesen, los abanicos, que no hemos encontrado al malhechor y, como sin saberlo, los mantuviese ajados, desasiados largamente, en el tris majestuoso de la penúltima resistencia.

En años en que el peligro era inminente, las fechas de entreguerras, avió alguien del mal color que iban cobrando las figuritas de mazapán. Al buhonero, un mercado ambulante, le habían sustituido los pasajes por los que se deambulaba entre escaparates abigarrados y fijos. ¿Se habían aterido los enseres? No; los había maniatado –abanicos, quimonos, mazapanes o flores de tela y de papel–, convirtiéndolos en objetos, en meras cosas. Los escaparates son la fosa común de la economía de mercado, y la vitrina doméstica, que se instala en las estancias de respeto, alejadas temerariamente de los cuartos en que se vive, un enterramiento de lujo. Constituyen unos y otra el lugar donde empezamos, con memoria borrosa, a reconstruir el crimen (1989a: 43).

As can be observed in this sample of his work, Aguirre’s style is not only fragmentary, but also often disperse – even erratic –, erudite, almost cryptic, and, decidedly complex, as we shall discuss below.\(^{145}\)

Fragmentation is found at different levels; there is an almost unavoidable fragmentation of its content as a result of the writing practice which we shall discuss in more detail in section 5.4.5, namely, lack of revision, speed, and reliance on memory alone (see Aguirre, 1988c: 91). There is a structural fragmentation, that is, the components of his writings appear as fragmented, for their choice is not always transparent.\(^{146}\) The time of his writings is also fragmented, not only because, as one would expect, the writings appear over an extensive period of time, but also because the criterion and order for the publication and

Hence, this fragmentation refers to the lack of unity of Aguirre’s writings; it stresses that, structure-wise, his texts are formed by putting together different parts. In other words, the description of his style as fragmentary is a reflection on the distinctiveness of the fragments, or parts, which form it. This fragmentation stresses that the binding principles of the text are not always obvious to the reader and many not follow the expected patterns, such as thematic cohesion or temporal progression, or such patterns of cohesion may be applied very loosely. Instead, the guiding principle for structuring different parts seems to respond to the author’s preferences or subjective judgement. In any case, in reference to textual style – and in contrast with the definitions found in the dictionary – in as much as the different fragments form a whole text, this text has a basic degree of cohesion – even if it is only a material cohesion.

\(^{145}\) Umbral recalls that Aguirre used to say “elegí la pedantería como mi levita preferida” (1997).

\(^{146}\) Again, Casi ayer noche provides a good example of this structural fragmentation, for neither theme nor genre seem to be the guiding principle for the compilation of their contents. As Carlos Funcia states, “se trata de una recopilación de artículos y reportajes publicados entre 1967 y 1984 en Triunfo, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, EL PAIS [sic], ABC y libros colectivos” (1985: n.p.). It should be noted that it also includes a number of prologues, as it is the case with the essays on Benjamin and “Sermones la España”, thus, they are not compiled in relation to the original purpose or function of the texts. Instead, it seems to obey to the criteria of importance and cohesion as perceived by the author, who, as Funcia recalls, describes Casi ayer noche as “toda mi vida anterior” (1985: n.p.). García Hortelano further confirms this view, by referring to this book in his prologue to it as “el primer capítulo de las memorias de Jesús Aguirre” (1985: 15).
later re-edition and compilation of his prologues, newspaper articles, public speeches, even books, do not correspond to the time-frame in which they are originally written or published. Another aspect in which time is perceived as fragmentary is that, as indicated above, his narrative does not necessarily follow a lineal trajectory of time. Finally, Aguirre’s multifaceted life has also led to a generic fragmentation, because his writings have taken so many forms as expressed above, and also, because this variety has lead to the blending of these genres. This is not a casual feature of his work. It is in fact the result of, on the one hand, his close intellectual relation to Benjamin, whose work is typically fragmentary, and, on the other hand, it is one more exercise of resistance against systematisation. It represents the subversion of the traditional patterns of expression – and, indeed, also patterns of living– into a comprehensive and deliberately incomplete discourse. The result is a – fully intentional – de-systematised and anthropomorphic discourse.

5.4.3 Contradiction as coherence

The endeavour to produce an anthropomorphic discourse is patent in a number of different features, such as his autobiographical style, his fragmentation and reliance on memory, as already discussed, but also in his taste for contradiction.

The influence of Adorno, whom he refers to as “mi maestro Adorno”, can be observed in Aguirre’s rejection of systematic thought (1989a: 103). In his prologue to Adorno’s *Dialéctica negativa*, Aguirre explains that dissonances and contradictions must be recognized and accepted, even if not immediately understood, because the admission of this irrationality stirs reason away from domination (1975a: 7-9). Thus, Aguirre appreciates the value of contradiction, in fact, cultivating it in his own work. Influenced by perspectivism, he is aware of the multiple aspects of reality and, as a result, at times he may equally defend two opposites without the intention of reaching a harmonizing conclusion (see below for more details on the relationship between personal and public, and between solitude and social participation). This is mirrored in the multiplicity of roles that Aguirre performs throughout his life. As Mesa explains, “esta diversidad de facetas no encubría un ápice de frivolidad, como más de uno de sus muchos detractores proclamaba. Otra cosa muy distinta era que disfrutase con el juego de las ambigüedades” (2002: 300). These ambiguities and contradictions are for him an opportunity to explore and acknowledge a wider concept of reality, refusing to align himself with the established patterns of rationality and encouraging critical thinking.

5.4.4 Getting personal

Other elements, not strictly biographical, also contribute to enhancing the personal in his writings, both as a feature of the text, as well as in the sense of the relationship established
with the reader. Aguirre says about Benjamin that “más bien narra procesos de ideas, realizando la propuesta de Schelling de una ‘filosofía narrativa’” (1971d: 10). As discussed above, because of the influence that Benjamin has on Aguirre’s thought, the analyses which Aguirre makes of Benjamin’s work are often applicable to his own texts as well. This is the case with the statement above, which is also true of his own style in the sense that both Benjamin’s and Aguirre’s writings reflect the way they think, more precisely, their trains of thought. As Duque observes, “Aguirre escribía como hablaba” (2002: x). The use of this oral style, not only humanizes his discourse, but it also brings it closer to the reader, who may get the impression of familiarity and of an atemporal exchange or, even, one situated in the present time. The following quotation illustrates this point: “¿no es envoltura el dulce engaño que nos contaban cuando fuimos niños? Los Reyes Magos, el Niño Jesús, Ratoncito Pérez fueron, a su manera, papeles, lazos que, para acercarla [la ilusión] en seguida, distanciaba nuestra avidez de cualquier cumplimiento” (Aguirre, 1989a: 82). Here, Aguirre draws on a bank of shared memories with the reader to make a connection with him at the same time he makes his point. Aguirre uses the first-person plural to bring the reader into this reflection, which, by means of the rhetorical question, almost seems like a conversation in which the reader is invited to agree with the writer.

An intriguing lack of dates can soon be observed – also a feature of Zambrano’s work. As Duque suggests, “Jesús Aguirre se limitaría a borrar las fechas de acontecimientos tan memorables, insinuando que todo pudo haber sido ‘casi ayer noche’” (2002: xii). These characteristics, the result of his subjectivistic approach, mirror the behaviour of human memory; they alter the chronological order of events letting the individual’s prioritization emerge; they emphasize experiences rather than facts, creating a certain haziness familiar to the readers, who regardless of the nature of the information contained in the text may feel initially drawn to it because the text is experienced as a reflection of the readers, a reflection of what Spain has been through the eyes and experiences of one man, but also a reverberation of the personal memories of its readers. Aguirre stirs the memory of what was, encouraging a debate of what could be.

This style also includes a strong element of tension; tension between a personal, specific – though hazy – past and an intellectual, abstract content which would be problematic to situate in a finished, closed past, which is also expressed in his reluctance to provide dates. This tension is intensified by the problematic relationship he develops between the private and public spheres; he chooses to share intimate details which the reader need not know and which are not particularly relevant to the point being made, for example: “en la Casa de Goya, exponía cuadros Cristina Duclos, entre ellos un retrato de mi mujer que es de mi propiedad y que Cayetana había prestado sin mi permiso” (Aguirre, 1992: 77). Another example of this practice can be found in Crónica de una Dirección
General, where he explains that “[Pío Cabanillas] recibiría a la de Alba, sin rencor porque ésta y sus hijos habían perdido un Baedeker, que les prestó para un viaje memorable por países sometidos a los soviéticos” (1988c: 49). Other comments include observations regarding Cayetana’s hairdo (1988c: 82-84). He often dwells in minutiae, for example, his housekeeper’s choice of furniture for his office or her dislike of his socks (1992: 22).

Circuitous routes, routes filled up with banalities, need not be pointless; these routes are the reflection of an ideological statement. They declare that their point is not to achieve a resolution or conclusion, but rather the pursuit itself (see Chambers, 1999: 284). Thus, he makes his intimacy partly public. In addition to this, minutiae are discussed in conjunction with other issues of more intellectual weight and public interest, with the result of not only blurring the boundaries between private and public, but also relativizing both in the light of each other, thus questioning the value of what is considered important and on what grounds.

Similarly, he turns the public sphere into a private one. This is particularly true of his Memorias de un cumplimiento, where he recalls his experiences as Director General de Música (1988) and as Comisario de la Ciudad de Sevilla para la Exposición Universal de Sevilla (1992). Both books discuss the situations he encounters himself in when holding these public positions, including his decisions and actions. Given the public nature of the position, these can be considered to be of public interest – and he seems to have judged it so, since he decided to publish them; however, he chooses to be vague to the point of being uninformative. In these memoirs he often mentions friendship, anecdotes, fond memories, but also intrigues, vendettas, and power-struggles. These are generally just alluded to or only briefly discussed, as a result – and given the lack of familiarity of the reader with these events and these people – the text becomes largely inaccessible, sometimes to the point of being incomprehensible to those who did not share these moments and experiences with the author. That is how the public becomes private. The rest of his writings – again with the exception of his translations – also share a certain private style and sometimes an uninformative air. In fact, he openly admits – in reference to Las horas situadas – that “no es mi intención convertir este texto en una erudición acumulada” (1989a: 24).

The private and public spheres are interspersed at the level of Aguirre’s expression, but also at the level of reception, where an amount of input from the reader’s own experiences is expected to reconstruct the text. This is best illustrated with an example. Aguirre, in reference to the overstated expression of friendship, which he ventures is the result of the troubled consciousness that Spaniards share since the Civil War, states that algo queda hoy de aquello, sobre todo entre políticos, que propinan sin ton ni son espaldarazos, abrazos y tuteos, a la postre aspavientos que impregnan a nuestras liturgias democráticas de tintes amarillentos o azulados. Por suerte, los comunistas españoles nos han ahorrado, al menos por ahora, el triple ósculo del Pacto de Varsovia. Y, entre tanto, la comedida reverencia monárquica ofrece, sin prisas ni presiones, su fórmula general para la cortesía de la libertad (1985: 35).
Not only should the Spanish reader have the required general knowledge to understand the allusions made, as in the case of the Warsaw Pact (1955), but he should also read between the lines, to grasp what is meant by heavily charged expressions, such as “liturgias democráticas”. Because of the density of the discourse, the reader is expected to have a deep understanding of the society he lives in and its mechanisms. If he does not, the complex thread of cultural references and associations will make no sense, thus ultimately missing Aguirre’s argument or grasping it only partially. An example of these associations can be found above in the case of “de tintes amarillentos o azulados”. By making colour references, Aguirre enters the terrain of associations; these colours may have different meanings to different people depending to the association/s that each individual makes, obscuring the meaning of the sentence. Does amarillento, a pale tone of yellow, refer to the old, stale state of what is being described? Does it refer to its unhealthy state? Is blue a direct reference to fascist camisas azules? Or, is it azulado because of the lack of new oxygen, that is, because of the lack of genuine renovation? Or, are these private connotations that the reader cannot hope to understand?

Aguirre often seeks to engage the reader with the text by creating a sense of complicity by means of a number of strategies: volunteering some – unimportant – private details, the use of familiar tone, using nicknames, and recalling anecdotes of himself and others. However, although he often adopts a very familiar tone, this – at times – paradoxically excludes potential readers who lack the circumstantial knowledge, thus, effectively becoming a very private discourse. Gullón describes his style as follows:

lo traslucen el humor intermitente, las alusiones a figuras familiares –que no siempre lo serán para el receptor del texto– y un modo de verbalización inclinada a decir de otro modo lo que pudiera decirse sin recalar en lo semicríptico (1989: 15-16).

The frequent allusions to acquaintances, anecdotes, and an array of personal experiences which the reader cannot possibly share force the reader to do some guesswork based on an informed psychological profile of the author. As mentioned above, Aguirre often uses

147 Anecdotes are interspersed throughout Aguirre’s works. The following are just two example of these:

el director del teatro de San Carlos (¡viva Carlos III!), en Nápoles, me recomendó sobremanera su producción de El duque de Alba, de Donizetti. Le dije, con gran calma, que era esa la única ópera italiana que yo no podía importar a Madrid. ¿No le gusta Donizetti? Claro que sí, pero es que el duque de Alba soy yo. Atravesó, la criatura, varios rangos protocolarios y gritó a don Dionisio que el español estaba loco de remate. Rougemont le aseguró mi cordura. Ya no le vi en toda la cena (1988c: 78-79).

As mentioned above, these anecdotes – possibly more often than not – involve others, as is the case here:

[A Eduardo Ballester, director general de difusión cultural] le había pasado su gabinete una antología del 27, que dejó preparada su antecesor en el cargo. Su reacción fue, por desgracia, típica. Hojeó, sin ojearlo apenas, el original, y, no sabiendo qué otra pega ponerle, dijo despectivamente: yo esto no lo publico; la selección es incompleta; los he contado y no están los veintisiete. Rafael Pérez Sierra, director general de teatro, comentó al enterarse aquella misma mañana: ¡menos mal que no se trata de una antología del 98! (Lector benigno: no te escandalices; a un director general del libro del primer gobierno socialista, yo le he oído confundir, sin parpadeos, a Sinclair Lewis, el de Babitt, con el otro Lewis, mucho menos pesado por cierto) (1988c: 86-87; for more examples of other anecdotes see 1987a: 48; 1988c: 44; 1989a: 65, 86-87, 92, 116, 151, 57).
nicknames, which are not always introduced, let alone explained to the reader, such as “pintor de brocha gorda” in reference to Hitler, or the allusion to “el señor que supervisó la censura”, whose identity he never specifically reveals, although the reader might be able to gather it (see respectively 1985: 79, 101; 1988c: 48). In this respect, there is a parallel with Heidegger, who can be accessed only by those who have deciphered the references made in his particular use of language. So in this respect, he can almost be considered an elitist writer, for the content of his work is clearly not accessible to everyone. This is in contradiction, however, with his editorial commitment, which presumably aims at the divulgence of knowledge. In fact, it would also be in contradiction with one of his preferred mediums of expression, the newspaper article, which is directed to the wider public. These two aspects can, however, be reconciled when the text is understood as a multilayered discourse, as in the case of Zambrano. Aguirre does, indeed, reach for the wider public in an effort to provoke, first, their engagement with the text, and, then, their reaction and personal evolution. Aguirre explicitly affirms his belief in the powerful effect which books may have on the individual: “cualquier libro en el que nos adentremos atentamente, alterará nuestra manera de mirar, de andar, de soportar la despedida de la tarde” (1989a: 108).

This appeal to the wider public, however, does not imply that Aguirre feels the need to compromise in terms of language, quality, or content, since – from his point of view – tailoring his writings for the public will be a self-defeating exercise. By doing so, the subversive element of his writings would disappear, becoming, instead, an instrument for the perpetuation of the existing socio-cultural and political situation. For him, the effective subversion of instrumental reason must be a holistic exercise in order to be effective. That is why, instead of adopting the practice so widely used by the mass media in the hope of creating interest, Aguirre challenges the reader and demands a certain effort from him. These strategies serve the purpose of driving the reader away from his passive acceptance, forcing him to reconstruct the text in order to decode it, hence actively participating in the process of creation of meaning from a critical standpoint. In so doing, it is possible to observe how Aguirre, like Aranguren and Zambrano, always addresses individual people, while avoiding any patterns that would address people as a mass, therefore perpetuating such a status.

All of these factors have contributed to Aguirre’s writings being branded as obscure. At the end of Casi ayer noche Aguirre explains that “voluntariamente sigo un proceso de pensamiento, y en consecuencia de lenguaje, del cual no está excluido el hermetismo”

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148 As mentioned above, Aguirre’s written style largely reproduces the way he speaks. An instance of this can be found in his predilection for the use of nicknames, which – as Javier Pradera indicates – he also frequently uses in his oral style: “Jesús Aguirre, siempre [es] aficionado a utilizar motes para referirse a los ausentes” (2004: 291).
Although there is no evidence to suggest that Aguirre is ever aware of Jameson, they share a similar position on this issue. Jameson poses the question:

what if [...] they [the ideals of clarity and simplicity] are intended to speed the reader across a sentence in such a way that he can salute a readymade idea effortlessly in passing, without suspecting that real thought demands a descent into the materiality of language and a consent to time itself in the form of the sentence? (1974: xiii).

Jameson suggests that the current demands for simplicity and clarity are the result of an ideological standpoint which fosters absorption and repetition while it hinders independent thought. Aguirre, well aware of this mechanism, is critical of its practice and refuses to partake in it. This position can be explicitly observed in Aguirre’s criticism of writers who, as in the case of Marshall McLuhan, turn their reader into spectators (1988c: 13). In contrast with this practice, what Aguirre is suggesting is that readers should engage with the text, rather than read passively. Consequently, he opts for a more labyrinthine and unfinished form of expression which is aimed to express and encourage critical thinking.

5.4.5 Erratic purposefulness

Aguirre’s work can be qualified as disconcerting or as disorienting at the very least. This disorientation is produced by the lack of indicators of time as well as by the unexpected personal nature of his writings. Moreover, his style also shares and increases this feeling of disorientation. Despite the obviously knowledgeable character of the author, his language seems to project an impression of randomness. In fact, he suggests that obscurity and contradiction should be visibly present in writing. By exercising such traits, presumptions of absolute truth disappear, thus mirroring more accurately the human nature of the writer:

también es transacción la palabra escrita. [...] Porque en ella conviven la verdad y los espejos, esto es que desde ella es inviable cualquier destello que no haya sido encandilado por la previa tiniebla. Suele escribirse con la mano derecha; entre tanto, ¿qué humor mantiene a la izquierda? La naturaleza no coincide con el hombre sino para acunarle antes o después de presentar batalla (Aguirre, 1989a: 41).

This is particularly so in relation to a number of unexpected associations evoked by Aguirre in terms of the topics chosen for discussion, but also in relation to his use of language, which is abundant with unlikely matches (see above for the role of minutiae). This is very revealing, because as Skinner explains, “we should study not the meaning of words, but their use” (1988b: 55). In order to throw some light onto the connotations and implications of Aguirre’s use of language, we shall now focus on his idiosyncratic use of language.

One of the features of Aguirre’s style is to use religious references to qualify political categories, such as “catecismos marxistas” or “liturgias democráticas” (1985: 47, 35 respectively). By so doing, Aguirre links political concepts, which in the minds of most Spaniards of that time are filled with great expectations as well as with prejudices, with complex religious memories which have far more concrete implications for this population,
providing them with a more attainable reality, hence achieving a more effective, efficient and complex level of communication than if longer sentences with more conventionally matched adjectives had been used instead. *Catecismos* evokes a long formulaic, dogmatic style, largely unrelated to the problem at hand, and *liturgias* emphasizes both the quasi-sacred nature of democracy, as well as its ritualistic format, a format that involves a communion, a communion of the people who participate in the process of government and become equal by doing so. In contrast, we can discern his wager for ironic freedom; the importance that he awards to irony is patent in this statement: “la prueba de la ironía sobre cualquier fenómeno de envergadura histórica equivale, sobre todo si se ejerce desde dentro, a un certificado de vitalidad” (1987a: 39; see also Aguirre, 1989a: 78; see also 5.3.3). The often erratic and obscure style that Aguirre develops is, therefore, the realization of a purposeful goal.

Another feature of Aguirre’s style is that it often appears casual, largely improvised; a perception which he encourages, as he admits at the end of *Crónica de una Dirección General*, “he escrito este libro de un tirón, sin fallos de memoria, en justo quince días, algunos asfixiantes, y otros tibios” (1988c: 91). The reader will find that this statement is quickly confirmed upon reading the book in question. A short passage is reproduced here to illustrate this:

Entretanto [mientras que Aguirre y otros esperaban a Fernando Arias Salgado] yo animaba, en voz baja, a García Margallo, director general de la juventud, para que nos regalase con no sé qué líos horribles del barrio de la Uva. Margallo era especialista en interrumpir al ministro, cuando éste dejaba de hablar en puntos suspensivos y se disponía a impartir directrices inteligibles. Luego fue “joven turco”, facción de UCD, apelativo que le sentaba casi tan bien como a Vicki, esposa de Joaquín Rodrigo; Vicki, en una clínica de urgencia, tras un leñazo de automóvil. La cabeza vendada y sin papeles de identidad encima, confundió al galeno de guardia, que inquiría quién era y respondía ella: soy turca. Y lo es. El médico pensaba que el tortazo le había hecho perder la cabeza; pues no señor (1988c: 39).

This paragraph exhibits a convoluted discourse which is not only erratic, but also particularly difficult to follow on account of the unusual metaphors used, such as “barrio de la Uva” meaning wine-related, the mention of numerous people who the reader is unlikely to be familiar with, and the mixture of formal and informal registers.

By means of these devices – his hermetism, his erratic discourse, and the tension between the personal and the public spheres –, Aguirre is pushing forward the established linguistic paradigm, opening up our linguistic possibilities and as a result also opening up our conceptualization of reality. His erratic and imaginative language which shares some of the frequent features of oral expression is by no means random. On the contrary, it could be argued that this errancy seems deliberate, and it is. With this language, Aguirre – in a similar way to what Zambrano achieves with her poetic reason – suggests the interconnection of otherwise distinctly separate realms of reality, inviting the reader to
establish supradisciplinary connections, altering the traditional perceptions of boundaries and of hierarchy: “the supposedly secondary comes to occupy the foreground of attention, and the hierarchizing distinction between the relevant and the pointless, on which story depends, begins to lose its own cogency” (Chambers, 1999: 117). Thus, the erratic discourse favours an egalitarian understanding of any given reality, for all aspects of it are deemed appropriate for inclusion, having abandoned the traditional patterns that establish relevance (see Grohmann, 2005: 141-42). What is more, digressive writing destabilizes pre-existing structures. Thus, an alternative to instrumental reason is offered and exercised with the adoption of the erratic discourse, for it represents, responds to, and encourages experiential rationality, while simultaneously undermining the premises and structures of instrumental reason.

Despite the purposefulness of his erratic writing, his frequent disregard for the reader or, alternatively, the excessive familiarity with him – which equally leads to a clueless reader149 – suggests that his motivations for writing maybe multiple and overlap. There is an overt socio-political agenda as discussed above. However, his style also suggests that his writing may have been an exercise of confession – this need for confession can be seen as an almost side-effect of his previous priesthood –, and, as such, an exercise of redemption or catharsis for his trapicheos políticos, in the sense that public disclosure may provide a sense of purification or relief. As Aguirre indicates, “la intimidad se cultiva en el género literario correspondiente: los diarios, muy teñidos de confesión religiosa” (1985: 173). Another factor which may have compelled him to write down some of his autobiographical experiences is his status as Duque de Alba, because as such he might have felt the obligation to record his life – and to research the previous holders of this title – for the sake of historical interest150. He seems to make an allusion to this in his speech of entry into the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, later compiled in Altas oportunidades:

149 This can be observed in his essay entitled “Decía Don Pedro”, in which he discusses the life of the, at the time, recently deceased Don Pedro as if he were a mutual acquaintance of his and the reader’s (1989a: 65-68). Although various anecdotes and reflections on Don Pedro’s life are made, his surname is never disclosed, so the reader is none the wiser. Similarly, in Crónica de una Dirección General, he initially refers to Pío Cabanillas, Minister of Culture, as simply Pío, and it is not until the next page that he reveals his surname (1988a: 15-16).

150 This urge to record his life is further confirmed by Aguirre’s claim that he is writing his diary, which is supposed to be a very candid account of his own life which includes details of those surrounding him:

U: ¿Qué escribes?
A: -Mi Diario.
[...]
U:
A: -[..] Recreo las gentes que pasan por esta casa, qué, como te he dicho, ya sólo son amigos. La cosa no es publicable hasta dentro de años. Hay mucha gente viva implicada (1984b: 12).

The existence of this diary is also alluded to by García Hortelano and Jorge Herralde (1985: 15; 2006: 14-15 respectively). Its contents, however, remain unpublished to this day: “me dijo [Jesús Aguirre],
no es añoranza, sino el pulso que debo tomarle responsablemente a mi presente, lo que me exhorta a reparar, sin aspereza alguna en las yemas de la memoria, las cuantas del “collar” académico que, en repetidas oportunidades, ha ennoblecido el pecho de los Duques de Alba (1987a: 19).

Incidentally, it should be noted that this diversity of motivations for his writings provides another explanation for the tension between the personal and private with the abstract and public discussed above.

5.5 The dynamics of the written word

In Aguirre’s varied and multifaceted existence there is one role, that of the transmitter, which he plays time and again under different guises; the priest, the editor, the translator, the writer, and the cultural ambassador. This endeavour is underlined by the thought that a process of enlightenment or awareness will result in the empowerment of those who become committed to genuine communication, which will in turn have an objective social impact. It can be said that he has made communication the endeavour of his life, from a very active perspective, a perspective which has always, to some degree, been influenced by his rapprochement to the FS, to such an extent that this influence, as Aguirre himself acknowledges, can be felt in the later part of his career when he opts to distance himself from some of his earlier positions, as we shall see below (1985: 237).

5.5.1 Translation

In order to understand Aguirre’s thought, the role of his written word, even if scarce when compared to Aranguren’s or Zambrano’s, must be addressed. The overarching assumption underpinning Aguirre’s work is that texts may contain a powerful element of self-liberation. This possibility is determined by the nature of the text, but also by the involvement of the reader – as agent – with the text. Bearing this in mind, the implications of the process of translation will now be addressed.

Looking back at Aguirre’s overall intellectual and cultural behaviour, the coherent – although erratic – development of an initial yearning can be observed. A creative and,
above all, a communicative streak have always been present in Aguirre’s public persona. These two elements are first expressed in the form of sermons; however, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the socio-political atmosphere of that time, along with his own dissent must have made it difficult for Aguirre to find his own voice. In this context, translation provides a safer outlet for expression, which might come under the heading of what Gracia refers to as “resistencia silenciosa” (see Gracia, 2004).

Aguirre becomes first published as a translator with Taurus in 1959 with Söhngen’s *El cristianismo de Goethe*. His second translation, also a book by Söhngen, is *El camino de la teología occidental* (1961) and constitutes one of Aguirre's few translations for a publishing house other than Taurus, in this case, Castilla. From this point onwards, as religious editor, Aguirre continues to translate and revise publications until 1969, when he becomes editor-in-chief and, as a result, he translates only occasionally, presumably only works which he feels particularly close to, as is the case with Benjamin’s.

It is crucial to emphasize that the exercise of translation is more than the mere transportation of meaning from one language to another; it is also a form of expression for the translator, even if only indirectly. This is even more so in an oppressive regime, where alternative – safer – forms of self-expression must be found. This conclusion has important consequences for the methodology of this research, which once again, follows Skinner’s footsteps. Skinner succinctly says: “the essence of my method consists in trying to place such texts within such contexts as enable us in turn to identify what their authors were doing in writing them” (1996: 7). Following his methodology, therefore, not only allows analysing an author’s translations in terms of what they “were doing in writing them”, but it also suggests that ignoring the role that these translations perform in an author’s œuvre would constitute a gross oversight in any attempt for a comprehensive analysis.

Bearing this in mind, Aguirre’s choice of authors and texts reveals his preferences, as well as his assessment of the situation and needs of the country. There is a certain paternalism guiding Aguirre’s translation, as according to his own testimony, he translates to a large extent for pedagogical motives (see Aguirre, 1968: 13; see also 1985: 47; 1971d: 14). The significance of his role as a translator rests, therefore, on the socio-political impact of his translations, but also on their informative value in relation to Aguirre’s character.

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153 It should be noted that, as Gracia indicates, “el incorformismo se ha diversificado y la única manera de oponerse al franquismo no es ya la militancia política o la pedagogía social porque puede serlo también la edición literaria, la poesía, la traducción, las artes plásticas o la crítica literaria” (2004: 370).
Contrary to popular belief, which often defines translation in terms of transfer or transposition, translation requires a degree of involvement on the part of the translator that results in a necessary interpretation of the text to be translated (see Benjamin, 2001: 17). Aguirre is aware of this interpretation and mediation, which leads him to affirm that translation is in itself a prologue:

¿los traductores son también prologuistas? Desde luego sí que son, cuando no merecen acabar en sujetos de juzgado de guardia, lo que los rapsodas, según el Platón que prefería Heidegger, respecto de los poetas: llevan a conocimiento las palabras de los autores que traducen. Resultan, pues, si atinan en su libro, discretísimos prologuistas no antes, sino dentro del texto (Aguirre, 1989a: 109).

The culmination of the processes of reading and writing materializes in his role as a translator, for the first action required to translate a text is to read it, while necessarily interpreting the given content, which is then rendered into the target language (for the hermeneutic aspect of translation see Simon, 1996: 44). The translated text is no longer identical to the original (see Simon, 1996: 154; see also Flotow, 1997: 39); the difference stems not only from the language it is expressed in, but more importantly from the fact that the resulting text is an interpretation of its original, hence it is no longer, not even as text itself, the fruit of its author, but the fruit of the author tainted with the fruit of the translator. Aguirre is aware of the deception that translations may imply; temporal, but also of authorship, and the pretensions of its content, which is often viewed as the original disregarding the mediation process (Aguirre, 1985: 47; see also 1989a: 23). As with other types of writings, Aguirre advocates transparency, for the packaging of a unitarian finished product – be this a translation, a review, an essay or any other text – is no more than an illusion obscuring the complexity, fragmentation, and multiplicity which conform any text and reality itself. Aguirre becomes increasingly concerned with the visibility of the translator – making frequent references to and comments about the process of translations and its results – possibly as one more step to unmasking the deliberate objective appearance portrayed in the discourse of instrumental rationality (see Aguirre, 1969c: 23-24; see also 1985: 22-23, 87, 97; 1988c: 14, 119; 1989a: 23; Venuti, 1998: 31; Gentzler, 2001: 37-38). This visibility is enhanced by the inclusion of prologues, which become more extensive in his later work (on the role and relevance of prologues see Aguirre, 1989a: 107-09).

The process of translation requires an intense level of engagement of the translator with the text, often resulting in the transformation of the translator as a result of the influence of and interaction with such text. It has been argued that during this process of translation, a journey through one’s own mind takes place, for the translator’s views are challenged and stretched to meet with those of the source text (see Caballero Rodríguez, 2002). A series of psychoanalytical processes takes place: a process of idealization, transference, analysis, and, finally, verbalisation (see Caballero Rodríguez, 2002).
Psychoanalytical processes are, in fact, an integral part of the process of translation, just as translation is inherent in the process of psychoanalysis (see Derrida, 1979: 3-12; see also Berman, 2001: 286-87; for the relationship between translation, puns, pain, and psychology see Levine, 1991: 13-14, 17-18, 20). These processes may have a cathartic effect in the author. In fact, in the case of Aguirre, it is possible to see how, influenced through the exercise of translation, he finally rebels against his source texts which are of religious and political nature, and although incorporating these influences, moves away from these sources to explore his own creativity.

All in all, translation itself is an activity which is in harmony with the principles of CT: “one needs to return to the present and try to create new relations, derived from the old, which reveal the logic of the other” (Gentzler, 2001: 20). Translation, in this sense, can be described as the crystallization of overcoming perceived duality: theory and practice, translator and author, writer and reader, the solitary and the social, the self and the other, source language and target language, source text and target text, old and new. Therefore, engagement with the process of translation, insofar as it means integration, can be exercised as an element of experiential rationality.

5.5.2 The writer and reader – a successful partnership

“Si está loco de atar quien declare haber amado durante una hora, nadie que escriba asiduamente podrá sacudirse los síntomas de una especial demencia. El entusiasmo verdadero nos posee; jamás lo poseemos” (Aguirre, 1989a: 41).

The aim of this section is to explore Aguirre’s views on writing and reading, arguing that they are two ends of the same process of communication.

Aguirre’s modest and later contribution as a writer is often overshadowed by his role as translator and editor (see above). Nonetheless, after his period as editor (1969-1977), Aguirre becomes a writer in his own right. As discussed above, elusiveness and obscurity are key features of his writings. Self-awareness is another defining aspect of his writings, which is expressed in the semi-autobiographical character of his work as well as in the elements of meta-analysis it incorporates.

This self-awareness is of particular significance in that it highlights the element of intentionality (see Skinner, 1988c: 77; see also 1.4). In fact, he affirms that “sólo soy capaz de escribir sobre aquello que amo” (1985: 168). This statement confirms the intellectual affinity that is discussed in relation to Benjamin, which, in fact, extends – in varying degrees – to all the authors and themes he portrays and discusses.

Self-awareness, however, is not solely directed to the act of writing, but because it involves intentionality, the intended effect of the written product must also be considered.
In this context, Aguirre draws attention to the contradictory position of the book in consumerist society (1985: 105). On the one hand, books are products, commodities, like any other; they have an exchange value, they are bought and sold, and abide by the general laws of the market. On the other hand, some books are subversive in nature. Their contents may be subversive. An even more effective subversive and destabilizing strategy consist of demanding readers’s engagement to the point when the reader becomes a subversive agent of his own. This is Aguirre’s strategy. He is not so concerned with what could be called the element of reception – which may carry misleading passive implications – as with the act of reading itself. The reader plays a decisively active role by, first, interpreting the text and conferring meaning to it and, second, by the process of self-actualization that he undertakes when actively involved with the process of the creation of meaning in reference to a text (see Aguirre, 1985: 24).

Aguirre analyses the nature and consequences of the reading process. In *Casi ayer noche*, he reflects on the loneliness that comes as a consequence not of the act of writing, as is the case with Zambrano, but of reading. Aguirre explains how “estas lecturas [novelas francesas e inglesas] sí que distanciaban de la casa, de sus ruidos y olores, de la familia y hasta de buena parte de los amigos” (1985: 19). In his view, the reader becomes isolated from his surroundings precisely because of being a reader – and as a result of his choice of text; the reader may become engrossed in the story, being transported to the world that is depicted and consequently being separated from the world where he is physically located.

More importantly, because reading is a process in which the reader must become unavoidably involved to different degrees, the reader undergoes a process of transformation as a result of his contact with the text which is proportionate to the degree of his involvement. It is this change that comes as a result of whichever knowledge or experience is acquired through a particular reading that also separates the reader from the world that surrounds him insofar as this reading experience is not shared by the surrounding individuals. In addition, reading is, in many cases, an activity which has to be carried out alone. Alone, not only in the sense of reading individually, or not sharing the experience, but also, depending on what is being read, reading in hiding, reading in the occultation that solitude provides.

This multiple isolation of the reader is not expressed negatively by Aguirre. Well aware of this mechanism, he uses it to consciously distance himself from the outside world. During his early years, he reads, at least partly, as a rebellious act; an act which allows him to break with the patterns established by his family, as can be observed from the information he volunteers on reading Goethe: “mi encuentro con Goethe pasó, pues, por las estaciones, sin parada ni fonda, de una modesta heterodoxia. Aquellos libros eran de un ‘descarriado’ entre los otros miembros de la familia que habían seguido senderos trillados”
This heterodoxy plays a very similar function in Aguirre to that which he describes in the man who marries a foreigner, expressing with this act his defiance (see Aguirre, 1995: 37). By the stealthy subversion of reading, he feels connected to the one man who breaks patterns dictated by habit and family expectation, at the same time as he is influenced by the contents of what he reads, opening his horizons and preparing him to also break the patterns of his family. In Aguirre’s case, the rebellious union is not carnal, but intellectual. A union which, like in the case of the young man, takes him away from the path set out for him.

Aguirre suggests that it is possible to explore different *egos* through the act of reading. He points out that “hay lecturas que nos permiten vivir por poder, el del autor, otros personajes, implicarnos por procuración en acciones ajenas a nuestras propias capacidades” (1985: 24). Hence Aguirre, although probably unaware, explores the practical side of the horizon of possibility opened up by literature as proposed by Zambrano. Unlike Zambrano, however, Aguirre once again focuses on how this may affect the reader rather than the writer. This is even more so in the act of re-reading:

la lectura de novelas me empuja siempre a la soledad, no así en cambio volver a leerlas, releerlas. Experiencia ésta quizá puramente personal a la que pudiera aplicarse alguna justificación teórica no descabellada, pero sí quebradiza por sutil. El punto de diferencia entre la lectura y una relectura sería en principio el siguiente: entrar en un mundo nuevo, irlo descubriendo requiere un aligeramiento del propio equipaje (Aguirre, 1985: 95).

As can be observed from these statements, Aguirre resists developing a unilineal argument. Instead, he often highlights the complexity and richness contained in any given issue. In this case, he contrasts the experience of the reading of novels with their re-reading. He insists on the personal nature of these reflections and, in an almost dialectic fashion, he links reading to solitude, and re-reading to its opposite, without revealing what that is: company? A sense of belonging? Of complicity? Aguirre suggests that re-reading is a social act in as much as it requires entering the story temporarily leaving behind one’s own identity; that is, to become the other. As he explains, “releer no es sólo volver a ocuparse, por azar o por moda, de un libro, sino leer en él” (1985: 59). He concludes this brief reflection by linking both experiences to the concept of adventure and exploration, reminding the reader that embarking on such adventure requires leaving some one’s own baggage behind; thus, effectively linking the process of reading and re-reading to personal development. As Derek Attridge argues, “creatively responding to the other […] involves the shifting of ingrained modes of understanding in order to take account of that which was systematically excluded by them” (2004: 123). Hence, after developing the solitary aspect brought about by reading, he is compelled to explore the different possibilities opened up by a re-reading.
This leaving behind one’s own identity has important socio-political consequences, for, as Adorno points out, “identidad es la forma originaria de ideología. Su sabor consiste en su adecuación a la realidad que opreme. […] Ciertamente, suponer la identidad es, incluso en la lógica formal, lo que hay de ideológico en el puro pensamiento” (1986: 151-53). Hence, freeing oneself from one’s own identity, possibly by adopting that of another, is a step towards understanding other socio-political perspectives (see Attridge, 2004: 123-26). Thus, it may open the door to the development of a political standpoint which may consider not only the interests of the self, but his own interests as part of a group. As Attridge puts it, “the other – whether the other I struggle to create or the other I encounter in the shape of a person or a work – arouses in me a sense of responsibility” (2004: 123). Two pages later, Attridge elaborates on the relationship between responsiveness to the other – which is even more present in the act of re-reading – and responsibility: “responsiveness to the other must involve something like responsibility because the other cannot come into existence unless it is affirmed, welcome, trusted, nurtured” (2004: 125). Thus, is precisely this empathetic exercise which enables the individual to develop a true political proposal which reflects his awareness of being-in-the-world.

5.6 The Transition

Díaz explains how “viewed with hindsight, the close links between opposition culture under Franco and the progressive culture of the democratic transition are evident” (1995: 283). This is particularly so in the case of Aguirre. Aguirre is of interest to this research, not only because of his ties with the FS, but also because of the extent of his impact on the process of Transition. He largely succeeds in blurring the boundaries between the personal and the political, continuously moving back and forth between the theoretical and the practical, so much so, that his personal and intellectual evolution can be considered as an accurate reflection of the changes that Spain underwent during his lifespan. We will now focus on Aguirre’s positions and role within the process of the Transition, which will be analysed in the context of the rest of his thought as discussed above.

5.6.1 Cultural Activist

As Gutiérrez Girardot explains, “el padre Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zárate reanudó la apertura a la cultura europea moderna” (2004: 282; see also 283). He has been described by José Villa Rodríguez as an “activista cultural” (2002: 286). This can be said of him on several levels. He takes upon himself the task of disseminating culture, which is expressed in his work as translator, editor, and later writer. But he goes beyond the limitations of paper, and becomes an intellectual and influential public figure with a cultural mission. As Lago Carballo remembers,
el palacete de la plaza del Marqués de Salamanca, [...] cobró con Jesús Aguirre nueva y más brillante vida como escenario de reuniones intelectuales y acontecimientos sociales. Igual sucedió cuando años más tarde se trasladaron las instalaciones de Taurus a un amplio piso de la calle Velázquez 76 (2004: 28).

As this quotation reveals, there is an important awareness of his belonging to a place in time, a place and time with which he engages with on a multitude of levels. As Herralde explains, Aguirre — along with other editors such as Javier Pradera, Pedro Altares, Faustino Lastra, Nacho Quintana, and Javier Abásolo — becomes *un poder fáctico*, a powerful agent in the cultural opposition against Francoism and in the socio-cultural scene thereafter (2006: 12). He sees himself as part of a group of intellectuals who have the opportunity and the duty of promoting deep changes in the Spanish panorama. These are far-reaching changes which range from the moral, religious, and social, to the political realms. This can, in fact, be observed in the equally wide range of contacts that he cultivates, which go from a powerful and diverse network which includes intellectuals, religious representatives, and political figures, to a more direct interaction with the wider public, *la España de a pie*, through a series of newspaper articles in *El País* (see Gullón, 1989: 13).

In practical terms, this means also that he plays a very active role in the political process of the Transition. This role includes supporting key figures. An example of this is best expressed in Aguirre’s own words: “Felipe González proclamó por primera vez, ante un público literalmente apiñado en mi despacho de Taurus, que era secretario general de su partido” (1985: 46; see also Lago Carballo, 2004: 29; Herralde, 2006: 12-13). Gullón, in his prologue to *Las horas situadas* recreates the atmosphere in which this event took place:

un político joven, todavía con motas de clandestinidad, accedió a presentar el libro de Fermín Solana sobre Besteiro y el socialismo. La preparación del acto había sido meticulosa, y el ambiente, favorecido por la naturaleza: aquella última luz de la Sierra filtrada por nubes ligeras que corrían de Este a Oeste, como impulsando la ceremonia cercana. Jesús se acercaba al mirador, escrutaba la caída de la tarde y traslucía su impaciencia en la sucesión del cigarrillo. Una hora más y el éxito se resolvería en canapés y cócteles. Llenaban las habitaciones cuando llegó el esperado, Felipe González, nervioso acaso, confortado por la seguridad de su huésped. El futuro presidente se convirtió en el representante y la representación y las expectativas se cumplieron (1989: 12).

Aguirre contributes greatly to establishing channels of communication between intellectuals, politicians, and even the Monarchy, as Gullón explains;

el espíritu de mediación y la confianza en las reacciones del Príncipe, con quien se mantenía en excelentes términos, le permitió a Jesús llevar a La Zarzuela a intelectuales de izquierda como José Luis Aranguren y José María Castellet. Serviría el diálogo de puente para el acercamiento, diluyendo en el espíritu de concordia la amenaza de una repetición de los conflictos entre la Corona y los intelectuales de los años de dictadura y de la *dictablanda* (1989: 12-13).

This exceptional position also gave him the opportunity to make his own political project heard and known, an intention which he openly voices (see Gullón, 1989: 12). In this respect, the words that he uses regarding Benjamin may well apply to himself: “¿trató entonces de hacer méritos políticos? Quizá, pero en tal caso ante un único tribunal, el suyo
“propio” (Aguirre, 1975b: 10). His project, in consonance with Aguirre’s style, is not elaborated explicitly in any of his writings. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe how he played an important role in the peaceful Transition, bringing closer together the then Prince Juan Carlos – nominated Franco’s heir and future king, in 1969 (Balfour, 2000: 288) –, the politicians of the opposition, and intellectuals:

al día siguiente, o al otro, sentados en su despacho [...] habló Aguirre de su proyecto político, de su modo de participar en la conciliación que llegaba, que inexorablemente llegaría. [...] la conciliación pasaba por el acercamiento del Príncipe a intelectuales y políticos de la oposición (see Gullón, 1989: 12).

The king to be, the opposition politicians, and intellectuals seem to be, for Aguirre, the three key forces whose co-operation is required for the advent of a peaceful Transition. The figure of the king is viewed as indispensable in this process since he appears to be the one candidate whose embodiment of power can be widely accepted as legitimate and conciliatory by most Spaniards.

Politicians are, of course, another indispensable element in any aspiring democracy (see Aguirre, 1985: 61, 153 on the role of intellectuals and politicians). Aguirre, however, is sceptical about a democracy led by politicians:

That is why the democratic solution appears to him as doubtful: “no es honesta una democracia reducida a las formas, pero que la democracia funcione sólo materialmente implica una deshonestidad suicida” (Aguirre, 1985: 31). He is not only concerned with what has been termed by Benjamin Barber as “thin democracy”\(^{154}\). He also questions the reach and validity of a system which might surpass the limitations associated with representative democracy, because, to him, democracy is only possible where true choice exists. Aguirre, like Aranguren, and, in line with the FS, criticizes the extent to which a democracy – as exercised in modern democratic nations – can be considered genuine democracy. At the same time, he questions the desirability of the latter based on false consciousness or, at the very least, the limited scope of the horizon of possibility of the voters (see 3.2.2.4). Only freedom and information can make choice possible.

The availability of these two elements, freedom and information, however, largely depends on the organization of the government. Despite his doubts, Aguirre remains hopeful:

\(^{154}\) Barber describes thin democracy as a democracy “whose democratic values are prudential and thus provisional, optional, and conditional – means to exclusively individualistic ends. [...] From this precarious foundation, no firm theory of citizenship, participation, public goods, or civic virtue can be expected to rise” (1984: 4).
esperemos que, a la larga, aunque aparentemente contra toda esperanza, los españoles, tanto los que mandan como los que se figuran que no obedecen, consigan distinguir entre la igualdad democrática y el igualitarismo que aburre y agota así la historia como la cultura, enfocadas desde una perspectiva totalitaria (1985: 37).

By referring to those who imagine themselves as not following orders, Aguirre is making a reference to the existence of false consciousness, while, at the same time, expressing his hope for people to overcome it. The implication is that only a process of spiral evolution can lead to a truly democratic system; by emphasizing the importance of exercising a political engagement, it suggests that personal change in a sufficient number of individuals should propel a change in the government in the same direction. The change in the individuals, however, cannot be complete because their vision and options are restricted by that government. The change in the government, in turn, may open up the vision and possibilities of the individuals again, so that in time, another change in the government will be demanded, leading to a spiral process which would ideally be repeated until the liberation of the individual and true democracy have been reached.

Given the insufficiency of monarchic, institutional, and political measures, the role of intellectuals in democracy is to provide a critical perspective, and to promote the critical change described above. In order for intellectuals to be able to perform these roles, Aguirre is keen to establish a distinct division between the political and cultural spheres. He affirms that “la política implica una gestión afirmativa, mientras que la cultura es una instancia crítica” (1985: 61). Unlike Aranguren, Aguirre does not insist on the separation of these roles into different people. He is content with a clear separation of tasks, which he initially does not perceive to be conflicting. What is more, the fact that Aguirre himself has performed both tasks simultaneously at numerous points throughout his life suggests that he sees both positions as complementary to each other. In conclusion, for Aguirre, there is no change without a critical exercise, but with criticism alone there is no progress; a positive political act is required. A well-developed balance between the two in all individuals would make the journey towards genuine democracy possible and desirable, and art holds the key to striking that balance.

5.7 The interrelation between the realm of politics and art

5.7.1 Aguirre the Duke

A more mature and down-to-earth Aguirre, one that now believes more in action than in utopia, is offered the post of Director General de Música (1977). At the insistence of Pío Cabanillas Gallas – the then Minister of Culture – and the Duquesa de Alba, he accepts the position which he would use as an opportunity to revive and promote the Spanish Art scene (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 30; see also Aguirre, 1988c: 13). By doing so, he resigns as editor-in-chief of Taurus in the autumn of 1977, thus closing an important chapter in his
life. It should be noted that although he does not go back to Taurus, he maintains links with it, publishing *Altas oportunidades* in 1987 (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 30).

It is after this period in the *Ministerio de Cultura* when, having renounced his priestly vows, he joins Cayetana Fitz-James Stuart, Duquesa de Alba, in matrimony thus becoming Duque de Alba on 16 January 1978 (see Lago Carballo, 2004: 30). At this point, Aguirre carries out the role of modern-day patron of the arts “por sentirse en cierto modo continuador de esa tradición de mecenazgo cultural de una estirpe nobiliaria”, as Reyes highlights (2002: 289). Being aware of the long-established tradition of art-patronage established by the house of Alba, Aguirre decides to continue with that role. This legacy can be observed in numerous instances throughout Spanish history. Álvaro Pablo Ortiz Rodríguez makes reference to the duke of Alba when discussing a number of proposals and changes in Spanish economy and culture that take place under the rule of Carlos III, between the years 1750-1816 and which he describes as part of a trend of Enlightenment, given their modernizing spirit (2003: 7, 11). Later, in 1824, the then duke of Alba, Carlos Miguel, forms a society of patronage with the purpose of opening a number of exhibitions, having opened a public gallery and imported several crates with works of art. Although this enterprise soon proves to be unsuccessful, it is evidence of his interest in the arts (see Vázquez, 2001: 50). The association of the duke of Alba with patronage and the arts in general is such that even in Goethe’s play, *Egmont*, the character of the Duke of Alba is used to represent culture (see Pugh, 2002: 74). In the twentieth century, the duke of Alba is credited with having supported the developments and reforms needed by the Prado Museum between the years 1931-1936 (see Sánchez Cantón, 1962: 67, 70). In 1962 an Institution named *Gran Duque de Alba* is inaugurated in Ávila with the purpose of the encouragement and support of art and research. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to conclude, like Reyes, that the dynasty of the duke of Alba is linked to progressive thinking; they can be considered enlightened nobility (see above). Aguirre himself takes an active interest in patronage, even from a historical point of view, as he explains in the speech he delivers on the occasion of becoming part of the *Real Academia Española* (1986: 19). It is, thus, reasonable to surmise that he may have taken this active role in the promotion of culture as a way of fulfilling what he is through his role as a nobleman (see Reyes, 2002: 290-91); that is a champion of culture and a promoter of the arts. Although I am not suggesting that he sought each and everyone of these positions as part of a grand narrative, it is also quite possible, that – in addition to the above – this embrace of the arts represents the continuation of a reform project which he first attempts in the moral sphere as a priest, then, as a translator and editor – becoming more involved in socio-political issues –, finally, as a duke, concentrating on the liberating possibilities of art. In any case, this task is observed in his frequent appearances in public performances, his joining the *Reales Academias* (Reales
Academias de Bellas Artes 1984, Sevillana de Buenas Letras 1985 y Española 1986), and in the creation or support of foundations to preserve different aspects of the Spanish cultural heritage, such as Fundación Casa de Alba. He also becomes a member of the Patronato de la Fundación El Monte (1992), in addition to his active participation as an influential intellectual figure, who on occasion holds political positions as when he becomes Director General de Música (1977), or Comisario del Pabellón de Sevilla (1991) (Villa Rodríguez, 2002: 285).

The end of the regime seems to have stimulated his own creativity because his writing activity increases substantially. Several publications in the form of compilations of short autobiographical essays see the light at this time; Casi ayer noche (1985), Las horas situadas (1989a), and several volumes of Memorias de un cumplimiento (1988c, 1992), the latter relating his autobiographical experiences in public office155. This is by no means an isolated occurrence. After Franco’s death, biography, or rather, autobiography, as a genre, blooms; the end of the dictatorship permits a reinterpretation of the past, at the same time as the rapid political changes which are turning Spain into a democratic country create the need for self-justification (see Villanueva, 1979: 31)156. Some of the essays collected in these books are first published as newspaper articles, thus being testimony to the public participation of the author in addition to his commitment to cultural transmission and dissemination. A collection of Aguirre’s speeches of admission to the Reales Academias is published under the name of Altas oportunidades (1987a). A collection of poems entitled Secreto a voces is also published during this same year, bearing testimony to the modest – in terms of number of publications – but also versatile and wide-ranging scope of Aguirre’s interests and writings. All in all, it can be said that towards the end of the regime and during the Transition, Aguirre performs two of the most important functions of the intellectual as described by Aranguren (see Chapter Three). Aguirre spreads culture by bringing awareness

155 Although I have only been able to find two published volumes of his Memorias de un cumplimiento – Crónica de una Dirección General (1988a) and Crónica en la Comisaría (1992) – the fact that they correspond to the volumes four and six respectively suggests that there are others – perhaps only planned or simply unpublished – (see Aguirre, 1992: 131). It is also possible, however, that Aguirre is being playful and may be trying – and succeeding – to deliberately confuse the reader, because in the course of the Crónica de una Dirección General, he refers to it as the third volume of his memoirs. Of course, if he has been truthful about having written that book without revising it and in only fifteen days, it might just be an honest mistake. In contrast, Crónica en la Comisaría is catalogued as volume six, whereas he starts the first chapter by referring to it as the second volume of his Memorias de un cumplimiento”, which suggests that if there are others, they are unpublished (1992: 11). This is confirmed when, towards the end of the book, he says “hasta ahora no he publicado de mis Memorias de un cumplimiento sino dos volúmenes” (1992: 131).

156 Far from being coincidental, it seems more likely that it is as a result of the socio-political circumstances indicated above, that the aforementioned books very much resemble the format of those published by Aranguren in the 1970s, such as La cultura española y la cultura establecida (1975), Entre España y América (1974), La democracia establecida. Una crítica intelectual (1979b), El oficio de intelectual y la crítica de la crítica (1979a), all collected in Aranguren’s complete works (1994).
towards the work of others and by means of his direct implication in a number of cultural institutions as outlined above. Moreover, he becomes a critic of a more social nature as explained at the beginning of this chapter, a feature which is constantly present at different levels during his *Memorias de un cumplimiento* (1988c; 1992).

5.7.2 Reconsidering Aguirre’s relationship to the School

In spite of the strong influence that the FS has on Aguirre’s intellectual path, and despite the fact that his name will remain linked to theirs, Aguirre – once again – breaks with his past. In line with his pattern of reinvention, after his editorial period, he decides to separate his image from the School – perhaps with the sole exception of Benjamin – by pursuing different interests (see Duque, 2004: n.p.). It is not clear when this decision is taken. In fact, it is rather likely that more than a decision, this distance from the School responds more to his own process of personal development than to a specific purposeful decision to change course and leave the FS behind. In any case, it is reasonable to assume that this process of separation from the School begins with his leaving Taurus. By leaving Taurus, Aguirre not only severs his editorial link to the School, but embarks upon a radically new life, not only accepting the position of Director General de Música but, more crucially, becoming Duque de Alba.

Thus, his thought seems to have moved on in a different direction. It is certainly difficult to reconcile his Marxist and neo-Marxist sympathies with his newly acquired title of duke. Furthermore, far from being a figure of resistance and subversion, Aguirre becomes a well-integrated part of the Establishment, contributing to its operation and its development. Moreover, breaking with his past, in this case with his relationship to the FS, does seem to fit a long-running pattern of borrón y cuenta nueva. However, although this may remain true, a closer look will reveal that Aguirre’s evolution, like that of Aranguren and Zambrano, follows a spiral pattern, in which the past is re-evaluated and re-integrated into a richer present, informing future developments. This is also true in relation to the FS (see Aguirre, 1984b: 11). Although he no longer maintains such a direct relationship with their thought after the translation and edition of their works at Taurus, there is ample evidence to support that, after that period, far from rejecting their work, he undergoes a process of internalization of their CT through its *praxis*. As argued in previous sections, Aguirre integrates the guiding principles of CT into his own thought and uses them as a framework of sociological meta-analysis (see Aguirre, 1984b: 11). His continuing close links with the School after his editorial role are readily observable not only in the style of CT that he cultivates in his own writings, but also in a number of essays and allusions that he includes in his post-1985 work, as has been pointed out throughout this chapter. Even the nature of his work as a cultural ambassador can also be considered as part of a project of
empowerment and liberation of the individual, very much in line with the role of art as seen by the FS. Thus, his readers cannot help but wonder what his motivations to distance himself from the School are. Is it a part of the array of contradictions he purposefully cultivates? Possibly. More likely still is the possibility that – based on the evidence of the pattern of regular reinvention developed by Aguirre – after having internalized and integrated some of the key features and methods developed by the Institut, namely, its CT, Aguirre decides to move on, distancing himself from the most theoretical aspects of the School and of the School as an entity. On the other hand, given his continued fidelity to the spirit of the School, to its aims and methodology, there is no reason to conclude that this distance from the School is the consequence of an intentional choice; it may simply be the result of the development of professional and personal events in Aguirre’s career and life. In other words, this may just correspond to a change of focus and not necessarily to a change of attitude or purpose, as argued above.

5.7.3 Art and aesthetics

Art, from the perspective of CT, plays a crucial role in encouraging the empowerment and emancipation of the individual. Given his relationship to the FS, it is likely that Aguirre shares their views regarding the liberation potential for art and that this is precisely one of the reasons why he becomes heavily involved in the arts community, tirelessly promoting it. The influence of Benjamin’s view can be observed in Aguirre’s attitudes toward art. Benjamin stands in a position contrary to the Kantian conception of art. He rejects the doctrine of l’art pour l’art, which he refers to as a theology of art, because it excludes the possibility of a social function of art (see Benjamin, 1992: 218). In Benjamin’s view, art does serve a purpose, although its purpose is not in art as product, but in art as process. Art opens up the possibilities for liberation and self-development, both for the artist, insofar as its very creation constitutes an expansion of his horizon of possibility, and also for the receiver, in as much as art is considered as an unfinished product which becomes singularly complete with every individual’s reception, and reaction to the work of art, because their combination will engage the receiver in the process of the creation of meaning. It is this unfinished nature and the individually participative mechanism of the work of art which makes it a vehicle for personal and social change, as we shall discuss below.

Some initial discrepancies can be observed in Aguirre; he does not theorize extensively about art, because in his opinion “la mejor lección de arte es siempre el arte mismo, cuyas explicaciones no pasan de ser añadiduras más o menos acertadas” (1989a: 86). This is the reason why, from a theoretical standpoint, he seems more interested in aesthetics, particularly in the concept of beauty, than in art per se. He is concerned with the nature of beauty and concludes that “la belleza, Señores Académicos, es, desde Kant, una
Having established the purposelessness of beauty, his interest shifts to its perception and its implications. It is at this stage where the Benjaminian resonances can be found:

ya he dicho, en oportunidad también académica, que abrigo la convicción estética, en la cual la razón se pone en vilo, de que nuestros ojos ven las cosas, los valores bellos, los siente nuestro corazón y les procura nuestra cabeza activa residencia, porque hemos sido, primero, cercados por sus argucias y sorprendidos, luego, por su presencia deslumbradora. Un poeta ciego puede, por tanto, cantar ese acoso, expresar su intensidad innumerável y única. No nos transmite lo que ve, sino que es visto (Aguirre, 1987a: 58-59).

Here Aguirre seems to imply that his criterion for identifying what art is based on the concept of beauty. He makes this move by displacing the emphasis from the object to the subject, which is consistent with the experiential rationality which he exercises in other areas of thought. Beauty is for Aguirre, first and foremost, the result of perception. However, he intends to escape the pitfall of relativism that awaits judgement based solely on a subjective account, because this would reduce beauty to a matter of taste. With this in mind, Aguirre refines his assertion and adds that beauty is not solely an emotional reaction to an object; rather, the emotional reaction is the first stage of a more complex process. This initial emotional reaction enables the eventual intellectual appreciation of the beautiful. By virtue of this process, Aguirre concludes that art would be, in the first instance, expression, and, then, representation, of the beautiful, because in the artist, as in the receiver, the emphasis is on the subject. The art object is looked at, at the same time as it returns that gaze, becoming, at once, subject and object. Contemplating a work of art establishes a connection with the artist; it is his perception and subsequent expression of the beautiful that the receiver contemplates and reacts to, hence establishing a link between artist and public, between the self and the other. Ultimately, this is a reference to Benjamin’s concept of aura, in which the singularity of the work of art is palpable in the “mirar y ser visto”, by which not only the work of art, but also the experience it arouses, are unique.

Aguirre, very much in the same vein as Benjamin, establishes a link between aesthetics and society. As Benjamin does in El origen del drama barroco (1990), Aguirre interprets art as a reconciliatory element, for it may transform chaos into order, extolling the value of singularity; Aguirre explains that “en el bosque, por demás enmarañado, de la sociedad en la cual nos desvivimos, los ojos puros, limpios, que miran la belleza porque por ella son mirados, buscan una frente habitable” (1987a: 53). This is reminiscent again of Benjamin’s aura. This connection becomes yet more evident by looking at an explicit reference to this concept. In an introduction to his translation of the second volume of Iluminaciones Aguirre explains that las cosas tienen un ‘aura’ cuando son capaces de levantar la vista y devolverle la mirada a quien las mira. La fantasmagoría busca objetividad. La idea de ‘aura’ no distrae hacia terrenos baldíos, sino
que ordena el análisis de la mecanización, del automatismo en los procesos de producción del capitalismo industrial (1972: 14).

Those objects which possess an aura, art, have been awarded characteristics generally reserved for the agent; looking back, beside the subjectivity involved in the act of looking also confers the object/subject a sense of uniqueness.

On the other hand, the connection between art and mechanization is finally made explicit. Hence, we are now in a position to derive several implications from the former extract. It communicates Aguirre’s view of society as complicated and knotty, having used the adjective “enmarañado”, tangled. Furthermore, he enhances the impact of this description by inverting the expected content. Where the reader would have every reason to read “the society in which we live”, he is surprised to find a play on words which equally suggests “the society which we barely live in/ we are devoted to”. This is no coincidence. With this masterful use of language, Aguirre condenses and criticizes the mechanisms and implication of instrumental reason. Most people live in the expectation, in the hope, in the quest of fulfilling whichever need has been awoken, instead of making life its own finality – possibly suggesting a parallel with art, the art of living; life itself escapes us. In contrast with an ontology where existence has priority over essence, where following Heidegger, Sartre, and Ortega the human being is only as he makes himself, this is a society which has awarded essence pre-eminence over existence. This is a society where pre-eminence is given to the essence of the object, not the subject. Thus, Aguirre argues that the unravelling of the subject, its existence, is mistaken with the attainment of the object, that is, the absorption of other into the self. This presents several problems. First, this act of absorption constitutes an ontological violence which prevents the possibility of the development of a satisfactory ethical apparatus on this basis. Second, the absorption of the other into the self leads to an ever incomplete and unsatisfied self, which cannot gain either self-recognition or fulfilment. The other, once subsumed into a self which is only aware of a lack which cannot be identified or resolved, cannot provide knowledge or fulfilment precisely because of having been subsumed and having lost its own individuality. “Desvivir” is, thus, this destructive process living-for, in the instrumental sense, which ultimately means “un-live” (see Aguirre, 1987a: 53). It is also significant that he would choose to use the metaphor of the forest, echoing Heidegger’s Lichtung, claro del bosque. Lichtung constitutes another reference to the transcendental yearning of the self, a self understood primarily as the process of existence, as expressed in Zambrano’s Claros del bosque (1977a). Instead, the genuine acknowledgement of our living in-the-world-with-others would require the consideration of objects not as objects, but as others. It is in this context that Aguirre locates the experience of beauty. Beauty is understood by Aguirre as an ultimately rational category as discussed above. Despite this, it is not accessible to everyone. Aguirre makes a
number of romantic assumptions which link beauty to purity, which possibly establishes a relationship of identity between the beautiful and the good. What is interesting about this qualification is that he suggests that beauty – the good – has to be present in some degree in the subject so that it can be perceived in the object. What is more, he points to a relationship of reciprocity, which suggests that rather than a finished process, the perception of beauty is like a circular current whose flux increases proportionally to the regularity of its circulation. Three key elements are then present in this statement: the unsatisfactory dynamics of society, the equation of beauty to good, and the reciprocity in the perception of beauty – therefore, also good. This argument places some degree of hope in the benevolent, even redeeming effects of beauty. Because the capacity of perception of beauty – and good – increases with its praxis, this would, once again, encourage, first, individual and, then, social change.

In conclusion, I hope to have provided evidence of Aguirre’s engagement in a multileveled project of transformation; transformation of the self, of his socio-cultural and political reality, and most importantly and more radically, a transformation of the very framework of thought, by providing an alternative to instrumental reason. His proactive attitude towards dialogue, cultural transmission, critical evolution, the use of a complex and rich language, as well as the contents he chooses to develop remain a testimony to his efforts and achievements as a Critical Theorist.
There is, I think, no more pressing task for progressive people in the First World than tirelessly to analyse and diagnose the fear and anxiety before Utopia itself: this relatively introspective and self-critical process need not wait on the emergence of new visions of the future, such as are bound to appear when the outlines of the new global order and its postnational class system have become stabilized. There is a collective therapy to be performed on the victims of depoliticization themselves, a rigorous look at everything we fantasize as mutilation, as privative, as oppressive, as mournful and depressing, about all the available visions of a radical transformation in the social order (Jameson, 2000: 388).

6 Is it Critical Theory after all?

Although, as argued throughout the thesis, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre certainly share a number of key elements with CT, it would not be fair to say that their thought conforms exactly to CT as developed by the FS. In the course of this chapter, we shall compare and analyse the characteristics and approaches adopted by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in contrast with the members of the School in order to provide cohesion to the thesis and determine, by way of conclusion, whether their work may still be considered CT.

6.1 Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre; their specificity

The specificity of their thought in relation to Frankfurtian CT will now be discussed adopting a global perspective towards their work based on the arguments made in previous chapters. The analysis will focus on pivotal aspects of CT, as argued throughout this thesis: the role of biography, fragmentation, exile, Marxism, art, the subject, psychoanalysis, and spirituality.

6.1.1 The vital role of biography

Although the genre of the writings of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre cannot be considered entirely biographical, their writings have in common a strong, recurring, and deliberate biographical component, whose presence and relevance has been highlighted throughout this thesis. This section will explore, however, the subversive significance of biography in the context of CT.

Within CT, the genre of biography is subversive. It is subversive because it reclaims the importance of the personal and the individual, both as important for its own sake, but also insofar as it contributes to shaping the public and collective. First, a biography is built from the perception of the self and from the relation between the self and the other. This shows an initial complexity which is resistant to the one-dimensional reductions characteristic of instrumental rationality. In fact, many of the key characteristics of the discourse of CT can be observed in biographic discourse itself, such as its concern for
human relationships, an experiential epistemology, fragmentation, errancy, interconnectedness, multilayered motivations and interests, and, of course, contradiction.

The biographic content is universal and unique at the same time, in as much as our humanity relates the individual to everyone else, sharing a common nature, sometimes a common historical context, and, often, also a number of common challenges, whose specificities may or may not be shared by others, but which make possible relating to each other. Simultaneously, a biography also stresses what is original and unrepeatable in the individual, conferring upon the person – the person whose biography is being told and also, by extension, those who read it – the sense of dignity that is robbed from him when he becomes part of the instrumental chain of reason and action.

According to Susana Narotzky, “there is a dialectical tension between doing and being that relates to the tension between structure and agency, [sic] in history” (2002: 45). This tension can be perhaps described as internalized and perceived, but not necessary. Such tension functions, in fact, as a mechanism of social control by means of the feeling of powerlessness that derives from it. Only by dissolving this distancing tension can individuals be empowered to become a proactive link between freedom and responsibility. By shifting the emphasis back on to the individual, this sense of powerlessness can be replaced by one of possibility and responsibility, by an awareness that the existing structures have been created and are, in fact, being perpetuated by either the will or the inaction of the agents of a given society. Only by re-evaluating the role, power, and impact of the individual, of each life history, of biography, can this tension be overcome and freedom exercised, not only as the reclamation of the positive freedom that governments often use as propaganda, but as the complex exercise of each individual taking charge of his own actions and their implications.

Biography, therefore, becomes the basic genre of anti-instrumental discourse, as it contains a richness and complexity that resists the processes of oversimplification typical of instrumental reason, and reclaims the epistemological value of experience, as opposed to the illusory impersonality and objectivity of factual data. For this reason, the discourse of experiential rationality is necessarily grounded in biographic expression.

6.1.2 Fragmentation

As argued throughout this thesis, fragmentation is a key aspect of CT. Fragmentation may be considered to be, to a certain extent, one of the characteristics of the FS in terms of their displacement, but also in terms of their membership, and even content (see Thiebaut, 2003: 441-43). As Kellner explains, “biographical material shows that Horkheimer, Marcuse, Pollock, Fromm, Lowenthal, and others […] were all drawn to Marxian ideas, which explained the war in terms of the dynamics of capitalism and imperialism and produced a
thoroughgoing critique of capitalist society, as well as an alternative to it” (1989: 9; see also Thiebaut, 2003: 447). Thus, Fromm, Pollock, Lowenthal, Neumann, and others, although initially attuned to the thought of the School develop in a divergent direction so that, in time, they distance themselves from the School, partly due in some cases to financial pressures, and partly because of the direction that their own interests take (for examples of such pressure see Wiggershaus, 1994: 229, 261-65, 295-96). The most dramatic case is, perhaps, that of Benjamin, whose acceptance by the School is never complete, mainly due to the existence of a number of ideological and personal tensions with its members (see Adorno and Benjamin’s correspondence edited by Lonitz, 1999). In some cases, the association to the Institut is more ideological than bureaucratic due to financial limitations. That is the case of Marcuse, who does not enjoy a steady income from the School, which is reflected in his trajectory, as can be observed in his acceptance of a number of positions which provide him with an income, ensuring his continuing intellectual involvement with the School. This is what happens when he becomes senior analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information (see Wiggershaus, 1994: 295-96, 301).

Despite this fragmentation, a clear consciousness of group exists both in terms of institutional association and in terms of a common purpose and project, however problematic these may be.

In contrast with this, and despite their connections of a personal and intellectual nature pointed out in the previous chapters, it cannot be said that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre form a group or a school of thought. In fact, they work independently of each other and, not only are they not organized as a group, but there is no conciencia de grupo, that is, no awareness of sharing a common project. This is hardly surprising considering their distance, both geographic – in the case of Zambrano in relation to Aranguren and Aguirre – and of focus, for they have engaged in different enterprises, having concerned themselves with different aspects of thought. Furthermore, their political and historical context, far from fostering the development of such associations, has oppressed and hindered free expression, free association, and critical thinking. Partly as a result of this policy, Zambrano chooses exile, while Aranguren and Aguirre spend part of their lives and careers abroad. It is precisely away from Spain where Zambrano develops much of their thought and Aranguren and Aguirre start adopting their most critical positions.

The fact that a formal association does not exist between these thinkers and that, notwithstanding, the thought they produce shares a common intellectual background, as well as similar aims and strategies, opens up the possibility that perhaps their biographical circumstances, in addition to their socio-historical context, may have been conducive to the development of such a style of thought. This can be observed particularly in relation to exile.
6.1.3 Inspirational exile

The existing relationship between exile and intellectual production is highlighted by Faber when he starts his book *Exile and Cultural Hegemony* by asking: “what is it about exile that makes it such a catalyst for cultural production?” (2002: 3). Faber ventures that the fruitful production of the exiles, despite their frequent lack of material, institutional, and, even, personal support is the expression of the fact that they feel wronged, for they have “a cause to defend, an enemy to denounce, or a lost land nostalgically to evoke” (2002: 3). It would be, of course, naïve to defend exile or, more precisely, injustice as the ultimate recipe for literary inspiration. It is in exile, nonetheless, where the link between biography and intellectual production becomes not only relevant but also evident. This is also the case in relation to the exiles of the Spanish Civil War – some 160,000 Spanish men and women from different walks of life (see Faber, 2002: 5) – who all share socio-political inclinations and convictions which, although they may differ on the specific formulation of their content, involve the need to seek refuge in a country other than their own. What these circumstances prompt is an intensity of emotion and an array of experiences that in most cases may not have taken place otherwise. It is only natural to assume that, in many of these cases, these emotions and experiences would seek expression; an expression which would take different forms for different people and which would often translate into the proliferation of their written production in the case of intellectuals and of those so inclined (see Kellner, 1989: 81). Faber suggests that, devoid of the fatherland, cultural production becomes the refuge of the intellectuals who find themselves in this situation. That is why, as Faber puts it, “denied the right to participate further in the history of his or her community, the exile starts living in and off memory” (2002: 6).

This is true not only of the Spanish exiles, but also of the members of the FS (see Faber, 2002: 6-7; Eagleton, 1997: 127; Kellner, 1989: 66). It is the triumph of Nazism that forces the members of the FS into exile. Equally, it is the triumph of the Nationalists which makes Zambrano opt for exile, as many other Spanish Republican intellectuals do, such as Joaquín Xirau, Eduardo Nicol, José Ferrater Mora, José Gaos, Manuel Granell, Francisco Ayala, Juan Larrea, José Bergamín, Eugenio Ímaz, Juan David García Bacca, Medina Echevarría, and Gallegos Rocaful y García to name but a few (see Abellán, 1998). This is also true of Aranguren, who, despite his initial compliance with the regime, chooses to emigrate to the United States when deprived of his chair. The relevance of this is that

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157 “Debido a que los Estados Unidos no reconoció nunca la existencia de un exilio republicano español, los que entraron en el país lo hicieron como emigrantes. Una emigración escasa debido a las restricciones impuestas por la Ley de Inmigración americana que permitía una cuota de admisión anual de doscientos cincuenta y dos (252) españoles. […] No obstante, el apoyo de la [sic] élites
those in exile tend to view the conditions in their home and host countries from an outsider’s perspective; Aranguren is no exception. Having first-hand experience of a system they have not been socialized in, does put them in an extraordinary position to perceive the internal contradictions and needs of the underlying social system. Equally, it also provides them with a new frame of reference and a certain critical distance to analyse their homeland. Furthermore, the familiarity of Aranguren and of the members of the Institut with authoritarian regimes, in addition to the stark initial contrast they find in the United States, seems to have contributed significantly to their analysis: “testimony by members of the Institut themselves indicates the extent to which their experience of exile influenced their choice of language, modes of expression, and development of their social theory” (Kellner, 1989: 81; see also 66; Lonitz, 1999: 57, 200). Far from fully integrating in American society and its socio-economic and political dynamics, they – both the members of the School and also Aranguren – retain an outsider’s view as is reflected in much of their critique. The experience of exile influences their views on the evolution from classical capitalism to neo-capitalism; neo-capitalism is novel to them, in contrast to those who perceive it as a natural socio-economic evolution (see Kellner, 1989: 82).

This can be observed in their fierce critique of consumerism, as well as in the comparison between authoritarian and liberal neo-capitalist societies, particularly in relation to the methods of control developed by both societies, and especially in relation to the use and impact of the mass media, as the Institut’s conception of mass culture and communications was first shaped by Hitler’s use of them (see Kellner, 1989: 66-67, 82, 130, 133-34). This kind of analysis, however, is not exempt from criticism. Eagleton argues that “the Frankfurt School of Marxism, several of whose members were refugees from Nazism, simply projects the ‘extreme’ ideological universe of fascism onto the quite different structures of liberal capitalist regimes” (1991: 127). Hence, their position as outsiders is a double-edged one. Being outsiders, which as we have seen above may become an advantageous intellectual position, may also lead to distortions or oversimplifications. Kellner points out how “they may have missed some of the ideological contradictions within mass culture and the socially critical and potentially progressive possibilities of the new media such as film, radio, and television” (1989: 83). In fact, there are few suggestions of satisfactory alternatives in the Frankfuritian CT, which is why – as indicated in previous chapters – it has often been described as pessimistic (see Bottomore, 2002: 17, 37-38; see also Bronner, 2002: 219, 225). As Marcuse concludes in relation to the
latent potential for liberation, “‘liberation of inherent possibilities’ no longer adequately expresses the historical alternative” (1964: 255). In contrast, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre do not place their hopes in technology, or political, or even institutional change, but on the individual, perhaps also missing the opportunities these elements may offer. In any case, the influence of the experience of emigration or exile – even long stays abroad in the case of Aguirre –, although underestimated, is central to their thought, to the point that “Critical Theory, like much modern philosophy and contemporary social theory, is exile theory, the product of thinkers forced by adverse circumstances into emigration” (Kellner, 1989: 81; see also 80).

6.1.4 Critical Theorists do not always wear red

As is widely known, the FS does have a strong Marxist grounding; in fact, their thought has often been described as neo-Marxist insofar as it re-addresses Marxism and elaborates new patterns of thought and criticism which aim to overcome the inadequacies and insufficiency of classical Marxism in relation to a neo-capitalist society. In contrast with this, none of the three key authors studied can be said to be either Marxist or neo-Marxist. Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre do not expressly attempt to recuperate or update Marxist principles. Their relationship with Marxism is one of dialogue and their interest in it is more of a social than a political nature.

Nevertheless, the importance of Marxism in their historical moment and in their work must not be underestimated. Although none of them are Marxists, they do engage with Marxism. It can be said that Aranguren and Aguirre do so extensively – as we have seen in the corresponding chapters – so that Marxism becomes their main interlocutor, especially between the years 1963-1969, after which point the neo-Marxist discourse occupies an important part of their work. Even Zambrano engages with Marxism to some extent in her early work, mostly from a critical perspective (see 4.3). This engagement, however small, provides evidence of their questioning existing socio-economic models and of their interest or quest into finding alternative ones. In the course of this thesis, I hope to have provided sufficient evidence of their knowledge of, and interest in Marxism, and how instead of adopting its ideology, it has provided them with an awareness of a number of key issues that they later engage with and develop in their own idiosyncratic ways.

Thus, whereas the FS adopts Marxism as their framework, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, by liberating themselves from such an intellectual constraint, take CT a step forward. Although adopting the critical stance promoted by neo-Marxism, by refusing to be shaped by Marxist ideology, they succeed in effectively freeing themselves from the limitations of a constraining rationality and open up their horizon of possibility. For this
reason, their work becomes more eclectic, also engaging with Heideggerian thought and French existentialism amongst other influences.

6.1.5 Art as authentic experience?

The position of the FS in relation to art has been the object of frequent criticism — even by left-wing authors — on the basis of its elitism. As Jameson explains,

what is unsatisfactory about the Frankfurt School’s position is not its negative and critical apparatus, but rather the positive value on which the latter depends, namely the valorization of traditional modernist high art as the locus of some genuinely critical and subversive, ‘autonomous’ aesthetic production (2000: 127).

Jameson objects to its elitism, but also to the reproduction of previous patterns of capitalist society through the acceptance of given cultural forms. These objections are applicable to Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre only partially. These thinkers are heirs of the Heideggerian tradition and, thus, they argue for the truth and authenticity of art in reference to high-culture manifestations of the work of art. However, they partly overcome some of the objections attached to this position by their encouragement of the individual’s artistic potential. In this way, art becomes a cathartic process of self-discovery — thus retaining its content of truth and authenticity —, expression, and eventually subversion by a process of spiral (r)evolution.

Jameson, who advocates more radical subversive forms, would still regard this as insufficient and ambiguous:

the ambiguity, in other words, is as much in the revolutionary’s own position as it is in the art object: insofar as he is himself a product of the society he condemns, his revolutionary attitude is bound to presuppose a negation of himself, an initial subjective dissociation that has to precede the objective, political one (2000: 68).

The attempt to negate the self, however, seems to suggest a deconstructionist position, a deconstructionist effort that is doomed from the start given the impossibility of entirely freeing oneself from the given cultural heritage (see Wight, 2004: 213). The position of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, instead, is, as we have observed, a conciliatory attempt to integrate and overcome this heritage.

6.1.6 Is there such a thing as the subject?

One of the distinctive characteristics of the thought of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is a strong reliance on the existence of the subject, as opposed to the increasing perception of its fragmentation and fragility.

The changing conceptualizing of human identity, with increasing emphasis on a divided subjectivity in a process of continual formation, has its roots in early modernity and continues to develop throughout Romanticism and the period of classic realism, in contrast with the stable subject interpellated by realist texts (Bretz, 2001: 441).
Different factors have contributed to this, most notoriously Nietzschean theories and psychoanalysis, which forces us to rethink the concept of the self, not only in terms of identity but also of control over the self and access to the inner self. Historical events such as the First and Second World Wars, with the destruction, displacement, exile, and death on a large scale, along with the subsequent climate of threat and tension contribute to emphasizing this atmosphere of fragmentation which culminates in Foucault’s claim of the death of the subject (see Bruns, 2005: 364-65).

Far from this, influenced by Unamuno and Ortega, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre regard the subject as the keystone which supports their moral and even political positions. From their perspective, although changes in the structures of society and its supporting institutions are considered necessary, the focus of their hopes for qualitative change lies in the individual as we have seen in previous chapters. So, in contrast to the heirs of the Marxist tradition, who envisage the self as a socio-economic product, these Spanish thinkers understand the self as a reflexive consciousness which enjoys a degree of cohesion. Theirs is not an atomistic and autonomous individual; it is a cohesive, although incomplete subject – still liable for ethical responsibility as a result of his freedom – who leads an existence which is intersubjective and interdependent on reality (for a quick overview of the process of deconstruction of the illusion of the Unitarian Cartesian subject see Bordwell, 1996a: 14-15).

According to the Marxist interpretation of the dynamics of socio-economic change, base-structure and superstructure constantly influence each other, so that a change in one would lead to a change in the other. Although Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre take a substantially different position, they share with Marxism the assumption that a change at any one level of the structure will destabilize that structure in such a way that another change is required. These changes may either be interpreted as anomalies which are absorbed in the process of adaptation and survival of the system, or they may spiral into a transformative process of grand-scale change. What is specific about the proposal made by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is that the change should come from the individual. This is radically different from Marxist projects for liberation. According to Marxism, the development of class-consciousness would lead the proletariat to join forces in order to overthrow the capitalist system, eventually replacing it with a communist one. Neo-Marxists, on the other hand, consider that a more efficient use of the available technology, that is, a socially oriented use, would lead to increased production. In turn, the superstructure could evolve into a more distributive society in terms of production, but also leisure, which would eventually allow for the liberation of the individual. Neither of these paths, however, has rendered satisfying changes, which poses some questions. Is it still
possible to defend the interaction of structure and superstructure? If it is, why have these paths proven insufficient?

Marxist analyses of culture largely rest on constructivist premises. Bordwell explains how from the perspective of the FS “culture is a social construction by its agents; at the same time, social processes construct culture; and social subjects are themselves constructs of culture” (1996a: 13). Although it is true that the pessimistic conclusions of Frankfuritian CT can be largely traced to the circularity of this argument, CT itself need not be caught up in this circle. In fact, by interpreting this process as a descriptive analysis rather than as a causative one, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre manage to offer a hopeful outlook that takes a spiral shape, instead of a circular one. Rather than changing the structures of socio-economic and political organisation, or the behaviour of the individual, what Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre suggest is that a more profound change at the level of the individual has to take place. Although these authors do not express themselves in this terminology, the idea remains that only a change in habitus can lead to long-lasting and effective change, the kind of qualitative change that would trigger a spiral process. The agent, although undoubtedly influenced by the process of socialization and culture itself, is not entirely determined by it; there exists some scope for dissent and innovation – without which history would be firmly anchored in a timeless period of stagnation and repetition. Still, the acknowledgement of the role and impact of social processes and culture, and, particularly, the fact that each individual is undeniably embedded in these makes it impossible for social change to follow a linear trajectory. Only a spiral trajectory may account for the complexity and slow progression of a multilayered process that is characterized by periods of apparent forward and backward movement. Thus, the possibilities of qualitative change lie in the uniqueness and unpredictability of the individual, or rather the person, as argued in the chapter on Zambrano. The difficulty, of course, remains how to make such a state of awareness and self-development widespread. The answer for Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre is spirituality, art, and an engagement with experiential rationality as described throughout the thesis.

6.1.7 Studying the soul

A similar approach can be found in relation to psychoanalysis. As Ricoeur explains, “the Frankfurt School claims that the project of liberation which its sociological critique offers for society parallels what psychoanalysis achieves for the individual” (1986: 7). Moreover, Marcuse and Fromm integrate psychoanalysis into the discourse and methodology of their social research, because in Marcuse’s words “psychological problems therefore turn into political problems” (1955: 21; see also Marcuse 1970b: 44; Roazen, 2003: 401-02; Thiebaut, 2003: 455; 1.3). Such an approach not only constitutes an innovation in relation
with established patterns of research, the links it suggests, and the directions it opens, but also puts into practice the supradisciplinarity that the School strives to achieve (see Kellner, 1989: 7-8, 36).

None of the Spanish authors studied, however, embrace psychoanalytic theory. Far from it, Freudian psychoanalysis is rejected – by Zambrano, who is more Jungian – or acknowledged, although played down – by Aranguren and Aguirre – (see respectively, Zambrano, 2004c: 135; Maillard, 1990: 35; Aranguren, 1994, 1: 640; 1994, 2: 34-5, 55, 128; 1994, 4: 487; Aguirre, 1969c: 16). Despite this lack of enthusiasm, some typically psychoanalytic elements, such as the existence of the unconscious, are incorporated into their thought, even if often not explicitly; without the presupposition of the different layers of the self and different levels of self-access, and, indeed, consciousness, the argument of false consciousness would be difficult to support and the power of symbolism as evoked by Zambrano would be seriously reduced. Furthermore, in their analysis of society and the individual, Aranguren and Zambrano identify the individual’s inner dissatisfaction as a symptom of the shortcomings of the process of and the result of their socialization (see Aranguren, 1994, 5: 168, 587; Zambrano, 2004c: 100-01, 105-06). The subversive nature of Freud’s findings lies in its value as a Copernican turn of the psyche, in as much as Freud distrusts conscious psychical manifestations, trusting instead in sources traditionally outcast from rationalist epistemology such as dreams and unintentional actions. The FS, and also Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, identify this blow to Cartesian rationality and invert the long-established parameters of truth by defending an experiential epistemology, as discussed in previous chapters. Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre differ from the FS, however, in that instead of applying the principles of psychoanalysis to their work, they rely on a return to transcendence to bridge the gap between the individual and society, and between the individual and himself. This is how Zambrano explains it:

As discussed above in relation to Marxism, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre resist fully committing themselves to a systematized ideology, in this case, psychoanalysis. They do, however, revert to psychoanalysis in an etymological sense; insofar as psychoanalysis is the study of the soul, the introduction or recognition of the element of faith and transcendence are crucial to the development and cohesion of their project.

6.1.8 Transcendence, faith, and spirituality

As highlighted above, psychoanalysis exposes the discomfort and affliction which affect the individual in our society. These are interpreted by Critical Theorists as symptomatic of the

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irrational and counter-productive structures which our culture and society are governed by. Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre – who share a common religious background – see the rejection of transcendence at the root of such symptoms. In contrast with the German tradition, Zambrano more directly, but also Aranguren and Aguirre, turn spirituality into the cornerstone of their thought (see Mari, 1983: 126). As Danièle Hervieu-Léger observes:

empirical investigations dealing with beliefs within these very societies [Western European and North American societies] attest with the same consistency that individual interest in the spiritual and the religious has not undergone any decline, despite a disenchantment introduced by the pervasive expansion of instrumental reason in all regions of life (2001: 161).

As Hervieu-Léger continues to argue, through faith, individuals construct or affiliate to systems of signification in order to give meaning to their own experience (2001: 161). Thus, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre integrate the element of faith into their thought. Paradoxically and perhaps contrary to the nature of faith itself, faith is not presented as a leap beyond what can be rationally explained; instead, faith is incorporated as a rational choice, not because of the rationality of its content, but because it is perceived as the best possible choice (see Aranguren’s discussion of Pascal’s wager in 3.2.1.1). By choosing faith, they avoid the traps of foundationalist and anti-foundationalist positions, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Thus, it is important to distinguish between ritualized religion and interior religion, although in the case of the latter, it would be more accurate to say spirituality rather than religion (see Hervieu-Léger, 2001: 162; see also Wuthnow, 2001: 306). The former does not require faith, whereas the latter refers to the spiritual or ethical engagement of the individual through the continuous appropriation of his transcendental reality and its implications (see Wuthnow, 2001: 306). It is in this latter sense that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre propose faith and transcendence as an antidote to the loss of meaning which may result from the instrumental rationality our socio-cultural and political reality. Their defence of transcendentality and faith must be understood as a response to the unsatisfactory socio-political situation of Spain, as well as to the religious and moral challenges that came about as a result of the latter.

The question of religion and, more particularly, faith has traditionally been central to the evolution of Spanish thought, as expressed by the Unamunian dilemma, as shown in Chapters One and Three. Crucial as it may be for Spanish thought, it is not exclusive to it. Their thought links in with the work of other authors, such as Ricoeur and Lévinas, who have also developed a deeply rooted spiritual philosophy (see Stiver, 2001: 161). In the case of Lévinas, his strong rejection of Heideggerian thought from a spiritual perspective informs much of his writings, as observed in Autrement qu’être, ou, Au-delà de l’essence (1974) and Totalité et infini, essai sur l’extériorité (1961). Their interest may be interpreted as the attempt to construct or find a system of signification which may give meaning to our
own existence as discussed above, or as an insightful attempt to resolve or shed light onto the tension that exists between the self and the other, so that an ethical proposal coherent with those findings may be put forward. Furthermore, the influence of religious and spiritual issues on socio-political events should not be underestimated (see Hinnells, 2005: 7-20). Much has been written about the role of religion and spirituality in the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the events that would later unfold. Many of the exiles and the victors claim to have spiritual motives; religion is used as a legitimating tool by the regime, but also as a point of support by the opposition (see Faber: 2002; see also Piñol: 1999; Callahan, 2000; Lannon, 1987; Lannon, 1995). This is, in fact, a very complex issue which – for reasons of space – cannot be discussed here in the length it deserves. I hope, however, to have drawn sufficient attention to its role and relevance; particularly, I hope a firm connection between the spiritual positions of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, and their socio-political critique has been established.

6.2 A question of words

Based on the evidence shown in this chapter, and, indeed, throughout the thesis, it has been argued that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre are original thinkers who have made a unique contribution to the history of ideas with their work. Having established their idiosyncrasies, another question must be asked: is there still enough common ground for them to be called Critical Theorists? This is the question which shall be addressed in the following section.

6.2.1 What is Critical Theory anyway?

This section shall not delve into a discussion of the meaning of CT in relation to the FS, for this issue has already been covered in Chapter One. What this section will do, however, is to discuss the implications of the term “Critical Theory” and assess whether or not it may be relevant to use it in relation to Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre.

It should be noted that term CT is made up of two complex concepts. What are their implications? CT is problematic in its inclusion of the word Theory when one of its objectives is precisely to challenge the traditional supremacy reserved for the concept of Theory and the kind of rationality and associations it generally implies. According to Jean-Michel Rabaté’s analysis of Theory, Theory can only be made from a specific historical position; hence it harbour’s in its very conception a certain agenda (2002: 2; see also Butler, 2004: 121-22). Theory, almost by definition, is also intrinsically lacking in praxis, Theory is understood as the opposite of practice, experience, life (see Rabaté, 2002:

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158 Theory per se is capitalized as opposed to theory when in reference to particular theories.
3). Rabaté points to two central functions: witnessing and questioning an existing situation, discourse, or practice (2002: 8-9). These features also imply that there is certain incompleteness about Theory and it is only because of this that it can exercise the above-mentioned functions. Despite the contemporary nature of this analysis – Rabaté’s book was only published in 2002 and its analysis focuses on the period from 1975 onwards – its conclusions about Theory are still useful and certainly applicable to the theory the present analysis is engaged with.

These features of Theory, not coincidentally, are very close to what Aranguren defended as the task of the critic. Is that because critics ought to be theorists? Are critics, as portrayed by Aranguren, already, and perhaps unknowingly, theorists? Perhaps so. In any event, this brings us to a more fundamental issue, although by no means new: the question of language. It is a matter of terminology, but undoubtedly, it is also a matter of perspective, for whereas Theory is associated with abstract, even impersonal concepts, the term “critical” refers to the individual. It requires an engagement with a specific perspective on socio-political, economic, moral, and possibly also other issues. In contrast with the abstraction of Theory, this critical engagement can only take place from a given background and history; one which corresponds to the values and interests defended in its attack.

Although CT does share the key points of Rabaté’s analysis insofar as it is Theory, it is also primarily critical. Describing Theory as “critical” confers it a distinctive edge that becomes crucial for its understanding; “critical” makes an unequivocal reference to the subversive nature of its methodology and aims. Rabaté, based on Benjamin’s use of the word, offers a succinct reflection on the meaning and implications of noun critique, whose adjective, “critical”, occupies our attention.

The negative sense of either pointing to the limits of knowledge as with Kant, or of attacking deficiencies in taste or artistic production; the positive one being the wish to make this activity reflexive in a redoubling mirror-image of creation: without criticism understood positively, creation could not know itself as an agency linked to a general process disposing of specific laws (Rabaté, 2002: 56).

Critique, therefore, implies a sense of insufficiency, as well as a sense of infinity (see Rabaté, 2002: 57). CT is, thus, empowered with a practical and material dimension, practical because it is hoped to exercise an impact beyond books and scholarly discussion, and material in as much as it aspires to move from being a critique to achieving the emancipation of the individuals who would then become critics themselves, as the proponents of CT can be argued to have been.

It is in this sense that Aranguren, Aguirre, and, even, Zambrano – despite her distance from the FS – can all be considered Critical Theorists. Despite their divergences, they all have in common the critique of instrumental reason, and share a number of basic
methodological features as shown in previous chapters, most notably the marriage between theory and praxis.

This quest to establish a solid connection between theory and practice is by no means specific to these authors. Moreover, as Kyung-Man says in relation to Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Taylor, and Jonathan Turner, “the relationship of theory to practice occupies the central place in the recent scholarship of social theory” (2004: 362). These approaches have in common the fact that they go beyond the theoretical models and accounts of agents and an examination of how they relate to each other and the institutions, by paying close attention to their practices, whose critical interpretation will in turn inform their theoretical analysis, becoming a meta-analysis and a meta-theory. Two key differences, the scope and the nature of the relationship between theory and practice, distance these approaches from the one adopted by the authors studied. What is specific about them is that this connection is not limited to social science, but is part of a wider research exercise that strives for supradisciplinarity. Moreover, their work must be understood in the context of the effort to rethink and redefine rationality in wider terms, and the re-association of theory and practice must be understood as part of such an effort.

6.2.2 Post-modern thinkers?

This section will address the position of Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre in relation to the debate about modernity and post-modernity. There is little agreement over the exact meaning and content of these terms, which increases the complexity of the debate. Bearing this in mind, and for the purpose of clarity, the present discussion will follow Jordan’s clarifying distinction, which states that postmodernity can be described:

first, as a philosophical approach in which postmodernism questions modernity, understood in terms of rationality, progress, freedom and human emancipation. [...] Second, a cultural approach, by which postmodernism is seen as a form of cultural sensibility or condition, characteristic of late capitalist, consumer society. [...] Third, as an aesthetic or stylistic approach, where postmodernism dissolves the binary division between high and low cultural forms and opens up a whole series of otherwise marginalized, forgotten or discarded cultural resources, thus endorsing a plurality, hybridity and promiscuity of styles (2002: 173).

Bearing these distinctions in mind, it could be said that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre are post-modern in their philosophical approach, given their questioning of modernity. One of the key elements which runs through their work is a critical standpoint towards foundationalist positions; they challenge the dominating role allocated to rationality; they question the role and reach of scientific knowledge; they reject the socio-economic and mechanical interpretation of progress as the increased capacity of production and consumption; and, they reclaim a space for transcendence. However, although they fit post-
modernist criteria in their critique of modernism, they are also critical of some key features of post-modernism.

As regards post-modernity from a cultural approach, one constitutive feature is “a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary ‘theory’ and in a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum” (Jameson, 2000: 193). It is precisely such depthlessness, such sense of loss and unfulfilment characteristics of consumerist societies, which these authors identify as symptoms of the insufficiency of such socio-economic organization and of the instrumental reason it stems from. In this sense, far from being post-modern, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre perceive post-modernity as a crisis, whose manifestations are but symptoms.

Their aesthetic or stylistic approach can hardly be considered post-modern either. Although far from adopting an elitist position regarding art, the reader is encouraged to engage with the artwork – particularly poetry or narration – the value of high art is still very much exalted. Moreover, whereas postmodernism empties art of political content, the value of reading and writing is so underscored that readers are encouraged to become writers, artists, as part of their process of empowerment and self-development, hence attributing art a crucial role in the process of liberation (see Eagleton, 1985; see also 4.4.5.4 and 5.7.3).

Hence, given the wider extent of their critique and the holistic approach of their work, modern and post-modern descriptors are insufficient to define it. In consonance with CT’s resistance to the division of knowledge, they can only be understood beyond the modern and post-modern division.

### 6.2.3 Post-theory

It is, then, problematic to comfortably locate CT, both in the Frankfurtian sense and the CT developed by Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre, in one of the much-debated drawers of modernism or post-modernism, for it does not clearly belong to either. In order to fully understand its specificity, attention must be drawn to the change of paradigm this radically different rationality propounds, that is, the re-evaluation of the value of theory itself and the re-introduction of the value of practice – not experimentation, but experience – as a key element to epistemology and heuristics. What is the position of CT, then, in relation to Post-Theory?

CT cannot be regarded as post-Theory, if post-theory is understood to be an attempt to obliterate any references to Theory, for the ubiquity of intertextuality means that we are unavoidably building on the texts and theories proposed in the past. What is more, even attempting to leave behind such a legacy would be against the spirit of integration of CT, which rather than a reinvention of our cultural heritage, propounds dismantling the existing hegemonic rationality by means of an alternative rationality that would promote a culture
primarily based on the values of *eros* rather than on *thanatos* (see Marcuse, 1970a: 50, 56, 78-79, 180). Unlike Derrida’s deconstructionism, CT is firmly based on the socio-historical and material conditions that propitiate its existence in the first place. Instead of struggling against the presence of this heritage, it strives to understand its causes, sources, interests, agents, reach, and tendencies, so that from an integrating – not totalizing – perspective, it can raise awareness of its dynamics and offer a plausible alternative.

CT is, however, post-Theory insofar as “post” emphasizes what comes after Theory as a reaction against what Bordwell refers to as Grand Theory, that is, Theory understood as a necessary framework of reference derived from “Lacanian psychoanalysis, Structuralist semiotics, Post-Structuralist literary theory, and variants of Althusserian Marxism” (Bordwell, 1996b: xiii). The approach of the FS is described as culturalism by Bordwell as a result of the ambitious reach of its scope; the overarching nature of its project would initially indicate that it qualifies as Grand Theory (see Bordwell, 1996a: 9). However, CT points in the direction of post-Theory in as much as it integrates, but does not limit itself to theory; it acknowledges and explores the routes offered by psychoanalysis and spirituality without them becoming overpowering frames of action and research. So, whereas Bordwell explains that “what is coming after Theory is not another Theory but theories and the activity of theorizing”, CT constitutes a bolder proposition in that, despite its name, it does not constitute so much a theory properly speaking, as a methodological path to developing, not yet other theories, but an alternative rationality that would open up new personal and socio-political possibilities (see Bordwell, 1996b: xiv).

6.3 A hopeful Critical Theory

If there are such key points of contact between some Spanish thinkers – this research only focuses on three, but there may well be more – and CT, to the extent that they can be called Critical Theorists themselves, why has the existence of CT in Spain gone previously unnoticed? There are a number of reasons for this.

It is tempting to point to the relatively late reception of some key Critical Theorists in Spain as one of the causes. However, the late nature of this reception can be called into question. As Savater explains, thanks to Aguirre’s editions and translations, Spanish readers gain access to key works of the FS at a time when Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, or Benjamin are hardly known in other European countries such as France and Italy;

*Jesús fue un poco la figura de proa de la Escuela de Frankfurt aquí, y el causante de que en España fuera conocida mucho antes que en Italia y otros países europeos, y yo creo que también mejor. (Savater, 2006; see also Gullón, 1989: 11; Aranguren’s arguments 1994, 4: 542; 5.3.1 and 5.3.2).*

Another explanation may be found in the clear association between neo-Marxism and CT, which makes it a very problematic designation to adopt in the context of Francoist
Spain given the rich and often negative connotations associated with Marxism. However, as discussed in Chapters Three and Five, the adoption or at least tolerance of Marxist views become very popular amongst members of the opposition to the regime, particularly during the 1960s.

Thus, the key factor may be found in the specificity of Spanish discourse, that is, that although many of the problems raised, such as the new forms of alienation brought about by the consumer society, mass culture, manipulation of the mass media, false consciousness, and mass art are discussed at length and tackled by Spanish authors — as is the case in Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre themselves — their essentially different discourse in terms of methodology, style, vocabulary, and form may have obscured their relationship and inherent similarities to CT as developed by the FS.

In any case, the problems posed, the most notable example being that of instrumental reasoning, are addressed in line with CT, that is, in a manner which is thought to destabilize instrumental reason. In addition, specific elements not present in the Frankfurtian CT are introduced. The FS, but also the legacy of existentialism, and a deep-rooted spiritual tradition, lead to a brand of CT that is concerned with the mechanisms of neo-capitalism and the consequences of instrumental reason, but which, contrary to the pessimistic tone of the School, finds hope in the self rather than in institutional, social, or political changes; a “bottom-up” approach is developed. From this perspective, the latter changes, although necessary, will only be gradually possible insofar as they are the result of a qualitative and widespread change of the self. Aguirre, Zambrano, and also, to a lesser extent, Aranguren conceive of this change as based on the conceptualisation of a transcendental self. The insufficiency of instrumental reason is diagnosed as an inherent yearning for transcendence, which may be conscious or unconscious, which, in fact, often masquerades as the continuous quest for the unattainable, often directed at material consumption. As a result of this transcendentality, the self and the other regain a fundamental equality that makes qualitative change possible. Art and (political) education are identified as desirable and effective routes towards personal self-development. As a result, a more hopeful critique is provided, in contrast with the FS who were uncertain as to where the agents for change may lie, Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre find the agent for change in the self who has been equipped with a vital element of transcendentality.

In conclusion, I hope to have provided enough evidence throughout this thesis to support the argument that Aranguren, Zambrano, and Aguirre can all be considered Critical Theorists based on their theoretical work, their praxis, and, more importantly, their efforts at unveiling the shortcomings and unsatisfactory outcomes of instrumental reason. Their project can be considered as part of an integral and coherent effort to destabilize
instrumental reason, as well as to create, provide, and exercise an alternative, subversive, and, ultimately, liberating rationality.

There is much, however, which has not been covered in this thesis. I would particularly like to draw attention to the actuality of the debate of the problem of reason. This can be observed in Bourdieu’s *Acts of Resistance. Against the Tyranny of the Market* (1998), where he includes an intervention, which coincidentally took place in Frankfurt, entitled “Abuse of Power by advocates of Reason” (1995). From this short intervention, it quickly becomes evident that, although the term “instrumental reason” may be in disuse, the issues and concerns it raises are far from obsolete or exhausted. Bourdieu criticizes the attempt of the West to impose a whole range of values, structures, and behaviours which have lead some cultures to “a very profound revolt against the reason which cannot be separated from the abuses of power which are armed or justified by reason (economic, scientific or any other)” (1998: 20). It is therefore visible how now, as before, the issue of reason remains a very problematic one, one that in the form of continuing crises, tensions, and dissatisfactions urgently demands our attention.
Appendix 1

A list of the first editions of the translations into Spanish and in Spain of books written by members of the FS – including Benjamin – has been compiled below. The period covered expands since the first appearance of any such books in 1962 until what is often considered the end of the Transition in 1981, although no books of this nature were actually published in 1981, making 1980 the de facto cut off date. It should be noted that other translations of these and other works into Spanish may have taken place earlier in Latin America. However, such texts have not been included here, for they are beyond the scope of this thesis.

_____ 1962b. Prismas; La crítica de la cultura y la sociedad, M. Sacristán (tr.), Ariel, Barcelona.
_____ 1966a. Disonancias: Música en el mundo dirigido, Rafael de la Vega (tr.), Rialp, Madrid.
_____ 1971b. La ideología como lenguaje, J. Pérez Corral (tr.), Taurus, Madrid.


____ 1970b. *Ontología de Hegel y teoría de la historicidad*, M. Sacristán (tr.), Martinez Roca, Barcelona.


Appendix 2

Please find below a list of the contents of Aranguren’s complete works as edited by F. Blázquez, which has been reproduced from Blázquez’s edition (see 1994, 1: 831-35; 1994, 2: 753-57; 1994, 3: 711-18; 1994, 4: 599-603; 1994, 5: 657-61; 1994, 6: 7-12). The details of the original publication of each text have been provided when available, as well as the pages and chapter that it corresponds to within the Obras Completas.


Volúmen 1. Filosofía y religión

Volúmen 2. Ética
_____ 1963c. Implicaciones de la filosofía en la vida contemporánea, Taurus, Madrid, pp.541-60.

Volúmen 3. Ética y sociedad

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Volúmen 4. Moral, sociología y política I


(Although Blázquez clarifies that it first appears in 1962, *Cuadernos por la Libertad de la Cultura*, París.)


Volúmen 5. Moral, sociología y política II


____ 1993. Ávila de santa Teresa de Jesús y de san Juan de la Cruz, Planeta, Barcelona, pp.615-55.
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Works authored by J. Aguirre, including prologues and introductions


159 This is the edition used and referred to throughout the thesis, however, the first edition is published in 1967, as indicated below in the list of works translated by Aguirre.
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____, Duque de Alba. 1987b. Discurso leído ante la Real Academia de Buenas Letras, el día 31 de mayo, en la recepción pública del Excelentísimo Señor Don Alberto Díaz Tejera y contestación del Excmo. Sr. Duque de Alba, Real Academia de Buenas Letras, Sevilla.
____, Duque de Alba, 1988a. El arpa en España de los siglos XVI al XVIII. Discurso del académico electo Nicanor Zabaleta Zala, leído en el acto de su recepción pública el día 24 de enero de 1988 y contestación del Duque de Alba, Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, Madrid.


1990c. Reflexiones y recuerdos Texto impreso discurso del académico electo Gregorio Prieto; y contestación del Sr. D. Jesús Aguirre y Ortiz de Zarate, Fundación Gregorio Prieto, Madrid, pp.31-42.


Works translated, edited, or revised by J. Aguirre


1971b. La ideología como lenguaje, J. Pérez Corral (tr.) Taurus, Madrid.


**Works by J.L. Aranguren**


160 The first page indicates that this book is published only after having been subjected to ecclesiastical censorship.


_____ 1958b. La ética de Ortega, Taurus, Madrid.

_____ 1963a. Ética y política, Guadarrama, Madrid.


_____ 1965. La comunicación humana, Guadarrama, Madrid.


_____ 1975. La cultura española y la cultura establecida, Taurus, Madrid.

_____ 1979a. El oficio de intelectual y la crítica de la crítica, Vox, Madrid.

_____ 1979b. La democracia establecida. Una crítica intelectual, Taurus, Madrid.


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_____ 1930. Nuevo liberalismo, Morata, Madrid.


_____ 1937. Los intelectuales en el drama de España, Panorama, Santiago de Chile.

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____ 1988a. La agonía de Europa, Mondadori, Madrid.
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