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From Queer Rejection of Gender Binaries to Nomadic Gender Corporealisation: A Reconsideration of Spaces Claimed by the Queering Literary Critics of the Late Twentieth Century

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Ph. D. The University of Edinburgh 2009
DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this thesis represents my original work, the result of my own original research, and that I have clearly cited all sources.

Karin Sellberg
I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Claire Colebrook and Doctor Suzanne Trill, for invaluable inspiration, expertise and guidance.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to produce a reconsideration of the queer spaces articulated in 1980s and 1990s literary criticism through the corporealising theory of gender and sexuality in the recent development of Australian material feminism and Rita Felski’s idea of transient time. It particularly focuses on interpretations of transgender characters in critical readings of Renaissance drama and contemporary fiction. The academic fields investigated are thus late twentieth-century Renaissance criticism of gender and sexuality, late twentieth-century queer interpretations of transgenderism and transgender characters in contemporary literature, contemporary transgender studies and material feminist theory.

Chapter 1 introduces a queer space articulated by discourses of gender and sexuality in 1980s and 1990s criticism of Renaissance drama. It concludes that the historical methodology of the critics is flawed and that the idea of Renaissance queerness is built as a contrast to late twentieth-century queerness.

Chapter 2 is a reconsideration of the Renaissance anatomical sources used by the canonical critics introduced in the previous chapter. It establishes that the queer idea of sex and gender developed through these should rather be read in light of the more corporeal Renaissance discourse of monstrosity.

Chapter 3 reconsiders the transgender characters in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and As You Like It and introduces a reading of Middleton and Dekker’s The Roaring Girl from a point of view that introduces Renaissance sexual monstrosity as a formation of corporealised though flexible gender subjectivity.

Chapter 4 introduces a late twentieth-century queer space partly articulated in relation to the Renaissance queer space. It critiques the theoretical foundations of late twentieth-century queer theory, introducing transgender responses to ‘queering’ readings of transgender bodies, as well as queer theorists’ own attempts to narrativise themselves as points of incoherence in Butler’s model and introduces a corporealising material feminist perspective of gender subjectivity as a more accommodating alternative.

Chapter 5 reconsiders queer readings of transgender characters in Angela Carter’s The Passion of New Eve. It concludes that the novel has been evaluated from a queer perspective and that it offers a more interesting comment on sex and gender if read from a material feminist point of view.

Chapter 6 discusses John Cameron Mitchell’s Hedwig and the Angry Inch as one transgender narrative that has been critiqued by transgender academia and Gore Vidal’s Myra Breckinridge as a transgender narrative that has been approved. It analyses and critiques the reasons for the texts’ reception and formulates a new poetics of corporeal gender based on the idea of nomadic gender subjectivity developed in the works of the Australian school of material feminists.

The thesis finally exchanges a queer reading of transgender characters for a nomadic corporeal reading that better accommodates the historical discourses surrounding the Renaissance material, the literary content of the contemporary fiction, and the idea of transgender identity as it is considered in transgender studies.
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[INTRODUCTION] Queer Space and Transient Time

Judith Halberstam argues in *In a Queer Time and Place* that the staking or definition of a ‘queer time’ and a ‘queer space’ is ambitious to the point of being hubristic (1). Yet, Halberstam recognises that there are a number of specific discourses conceived in relation to queer spatiality and temporality. She notes that specified ‘queer time and space are useful frameworks for assessing political and cultural change in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ (2005, 4). This change usually takes place through de-stabilisation of social norms: the production of queer time and space involves ‘queering’ preceding normalised notions of time and space and creating new challenging queer versions (Halberstam, 2005, 6).¹ One might ask, though, whether queer time and space can avoid becoming normalised once they have been named as a specific ‘time’ and ‘space’. The queering practices described in this thesis put normalised queer spaces under scrutiny and investigate the possibilities of a spatial and temporal thinking that does not reiterate normalising procedures. In doing so, I attempt to articulate a conception of time and space that can accommodate continuous flows of ‘political and cultural change’. This initially involves reviewing the construction of spatial and temporal interaction.

Queer Identity Space

So, why is the concept of space so important to queer theory? Michel Foucault establishes in ‘Of Other Spaces’ that the conception of the human being, including knowledge, the psyche and its basic discursive classifications are spatial in Western culture (23). The spatialisation of knowledge appeared as one of the facets of the
constitution of knowledge as a science (Foucault, 1996b, 346). This infers that discourses of knowledge became categorised into specific scientific laws, mechanisms and groups and territorialised into defined areas of belonging. Fields of scientific knowledge are constructed through inclusion of certain concepts and exclusion of others (Foucault, 2002, 139). Such inclusive and exclusive classifications make up the foundational structure of identity formation in queer theory. Queer theorists like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Nikki Sullivan and to some degree also Judith Halberstam continuously discuss who and what should be included or excluded under the umbrella of the queer and how to locate the various sexual- and gender subcategories. Identity for these authors is a matter of classification. They relate to sexual- and gender identities as areas of belonging; territories that are guarded by their inhabitants who are marked by certain identity traits. My thesis thus refers to the formation of queer identity in terms of ‘identity spaces’. These are internalised sites of subjective self-definition and self-categorisation, from which personal inclusion and exclusion of identifying experiences may take place.

However, identity spaces are not limited to subjective categories. As Judith Halberstam recognises in *In a Queer Time and Space*, identities are also attached to specific social sites and discourses. As an example, she mentions that reproductive and biological discourses often have been excluded from queer domains because they are connected to ‘bourgeois rules of respectability’ (5) and ideas of the heteronormative nuclear family (5). Certain specific sites, like the highway, the stage or the internet are considered to somehow represent queer identity, whereas others like the gender-specific communal bathrooms of many public places are spaces
connected to queer resistance. These queer spaces are points of shared experience that become linked to queer identity. They become channels through which queer concerns are communicated.

Identity spaces are examples of what Foucault terms ‘heterotopias’: they are sites of complex spatial and temporal juxtaposition (1986, 24). Heterotopias can take varied forms, but they have certain functions in common: they operate like hubs, linking ‘in a single real space several spaces’ (Foucault, 1986, 25), and connecting seemingly disparate moments or ‘slices in time’ (1986, 26). Halberstam notes that queer theory relates to past-time space in terms of shared narrative: there are certain critical queer ‘moments’ and momentary spaces that are narrated in order to represent queer emergence (10-11). Foucault would refer to these as ‘crisis heterotopias’: they are sites of shared memory, connected to specific subjective formations (1986, 24).

Identity spaces are not formed merely on personal memories and shared moments, but also on historical narratives and events. Historical discourses are heterotopias or ‘heterochronies’; accumulations of time that are connected to specific spaces, debates or periods (Foucault, 1986, 26). These spaces highlight the fact that heterotopias are exclusive and inclusive not merely in what is connected to them, but in who is allowed to enter: ‘To get in one must have a certain permission and make certain gestures’ (Foucault, 1986, 5). As Sandy Stone argues in ‘The Empire Strikes Back – A Posttranssexual Manifesto’, “Making” history, whether autobiographic, academic, or clinical is partly a struggle to ground an account in some natural inevitability (2006, 229). Historicism discourse does not merely choose the concepts...
of historical interest, but the groups of people that it is of interest to. This is how historical narrative becomes identity narrative, and how historical periods or events take part in the emergence of identity spaces: historical formations become imbued with values that are part of specific identity discourses (Foucault, 1986, 26).7

My thesis considers several queer identity spaces that function as heterotopias. The first one is both temporally and spatially defined: it is located on the English stage during the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I. My first three chapters examine the ways in which queer historicist critics like Jonathan Goldberg, Valerie Traub and Dympna Callaghan use discourses of Renaissance gender and sexuality to articulate more general discussions on gender- and sexual identity (Goldberg, 1994; Traub, 1992b; Callaghan, 2000b). The English Renaissance, and especially the English Renaissance stage is portrayed as something resembling a queer utopia, where sexuality did not function as an identity category and gender was not a binary construction, but a fluid scale (Callaghan, 2000b, 27-48; Orgel, 1996, 18-30).8 The pivotal character in these discussions also forms a queer heterotopia: the ‘transvestite’9 boy ‘actresses’10 on the Renaissance stage and the ‘breeched heroines’11 in William Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night, As You Like It and The Merchant of Venice are portrayed as sites of gendered and sexual conflict.12 They are used as ideally queer platforms, through which academic discussions and identity formations may emerge.

As my subsequent three chapters affirm, the idea of the modern transgendered body is also used as a queer identity space. Transgender characters in gender transgressive fiction and contemporary queer theory are depicted as figures of
resistance and change. Despite the fact that contemporary transgender discourse often poses itself against the gender deconstruction advocated in queer theory, these figures become heralds of queerness. Critics of novelists such as Angela Carter and Jeanette Winterson use the authors’ transgender characters as indicators of queer conceptual constructs. The transgender elements in these novels thus function as critical spaces devoted to queer agendas.

**Queer Historicism**

The thesis is conceptually divided into two parts: the first three chapters discuss formations of queer identity in Renaissance drama and the subsequent three chapters engage with late twentieth-century gender transgressive fiction. This historical juxtaposition is not unusual. Neither is it an arbitrary choice. Historicising practices and interpretations of the Renaissance have been connected to late twentieth-century formations of gender and sexuality in a number of works, by authors as diverse as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Kate Chedgzoy, Carla Freccero, Marjorie Garber, Catherine Belsey, Thomas Laqueur, and to some degree also by Angela Carter. What I establish here is not a new conception of the time periods nor the connection between them: it is a reconsideration of a continually reiterated and appropriated temporal juxtaposition.

I investigate why twentieth-century critics of gender and sexuality are drawn to Renaissance drama and how this relationship is sustained. Kate Chedgzoy’s *Shakespeare’s Queer Children* claims to celebrate ‘the pleasure and empowerment which the dispossessed and marginalised can derive from the appropriation of Shakespeare’ (1995, 6). Among other texts, she refers to Angela Carter’s *Wise*
Children, in which Shakespearean comedy provides an overt intertextual, although unpronounced format. Chedgzoy argues that social structure in Wise Children takes the form of a family romance, in which a highly performative modern theatrical world poses as Shakespearean drama’s unrecognised child. This is further highlighted by the fact that the protagonist twins are the illegitimate daughters of a hailed Shakespearean actor (1995, 72). Chedgzoy’s book attempts to strengthen the familial bond between modern culture and Renaissance drama, through adherence to a reiterated affirmative queerness (1995, 1-5).

Catherine Belsey’s Desire similarly argues that there are shared erotic patterns in pre-Enlightenment and postmodern narratives of desire (1994, 7-12). Belsey claims that her book establishes a sense of erotic continuity and shared trans-historical experience (1994, 3). Marjorie Garber also argues that Shakespearean comedy is frequently used to form historical bases for gender transgressive themes in fictional and non-fictional literary production. As Garber’s Vested Interests outlines the function of transvestism in modern fiction, it continually refers to the breeched heroines in Twelfth Night and As You Like It as templates from which ‘the transvestite’s progress’ (1992, 67) originates. She acknowledges that the reference to these characters produces ‘ruminations on the questions of constructed and essential gender identity’ (1992, 76) from which subsequent texts continually draw. The Shakespearean transvestite becomes a ‘reflecting mirror’ (Garber, 1992, 76) that perpetuates a sense of origin and sameness.

However, reflections refer to dissimilarity as well as similarity, and another stream of queer Renaissance criticism emphasises the difference between early
modern gender and sexuality and its modern equivalents. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick emphasises the impossibility of regarding Renaissance conceptions of gender and sexuality with anything resembling accuracy in *Epistemology of the Closet*. She argues that the very structure of these past concepts is so radically different that it is useless to refer to a Renaissance conception of queerness or transgender (1990, 90). Rather, Sedgwick dedicates herself to outlining the differences between past and present sexual and gender constructs (1990, 67-90).

Thomas Laqueur’s *Making Sex* similarly emphasises the conceptual chasm separating early modern and contemporary inter-relatedness of sex, gender and sexuality, although he argues that modern society should reconsider itself in relation to early modern examples (1990, 69-70).

Marjorie Garber acknowledges that these appropriations of queer Renaissance space take part in an identity ‘progress narrative’ (1992, 70). Shakespeare’s transvestite characters, the Elizabethan stage and early modern society are being ‘fetishized’ for the purpose of a queer discursive formation (Garber, 1992, 72). Garber does not present this as a problem and I do not think that it needs to be unless the relationship between past and present stagnates. Jacques Rancière argues in *The Names of History* that history and historicising practices by their very nature function as a ‘founding narrative’ (42). According to Rancière, historical analysis is a means of social empowerment: in a manner similar to the formation of commonwealth law, political agendas require historical precedent to gain authority; the choice of an historical event creates a foundation and establishes the agenda’s particular interpretation of that event. This process conjures an illusion of both
historical and political truth, since the agenda and its founding event act as narrative bases for one another.²⁰

However, as William B. Turner acknowledges in *A Genealogy of Queer Theory*, the immediate problem with the queer historian treatment of history is the fact that the founding narrative – the genealogy of queerness – undermines the basic tenets of queer methodology. The concept of a unified and linear history is one of queer theory’s main areas of contestation (Turner, 2000, 24). The historicist queer critics passionately argue against the presence of binary constructs in Renaissance discourse, but their own historical approach is entirely binary. Whether the relationship between past and present is defined by similarity or difference, the queer Renaissance critics uphold a relationship between a knowable ‘now’ and a desirable fetishised ‘then’.

The queer historicists primarily adhere to the new historicist school of criticism, which claims to move away from what they obscurely refer to as classical historicism.²¹ Although their analyses of the period factor in different social discourses, the underlying narrative construct is never reconsidered. Jonathan Goldberg’s introduction to *Queering the Renaissance* summarises the entire traditional history of the Renaissance by referring to Jacob Burckhardt’s interpretation of the period as the origin of Enlightenment consciousness and modernity; ‘a site for the creation of an “individual”’ (1994, 1).²² Goldberg ‘contests’ the conclusion of this thesis as a celebration of Burckhardt’s nineteenth-century individualism, but he does not linger on the historicist methodology entailed in its formation (1994, 1).
There is more than one traditional historicist methodology. Elizabeth Grosz’s *The Nick of Time* refers to classical readings of history by listing three stages extracted from Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘On the Utility and Liability of History for Life’. There is ‘Monumental History’, which is ‘composed of the images and stories of individual great men and noble singular deeds, those that stand out from the mediocrity and pettiness of everyday life’ (2004, 120). This type of history is invoked in the historicising practices that overtly aim to bind the present to past glories in order to shed light on contemporary issues and to elevate contemporary practices. Grosz argues that Nietzsche’s second type of history, the ‘Antiquarian History’, consciously diverges from the self-sufficient focus on the present in ‘Monumental History’ and thus emphasises ‘a respect and reverence for the past’ (2004, 121). Relics from previous times become infinitely precious and the past is portrayed as a thoroughly inimitable and radically other treasure-trove of virtue. The third stage of history is a ‘Critical History’ that ‘doesn’t simply revere the past and memorialize its greatest figures, objects and events, but that distances and dissolves the forces of the past in order to enable their reconfiguration in action in the present’ (Grosz, 2004, 122). This final type of history is the basis for historicising practices in academia. It distinguishes and measures past power struggles, suffering and injustice, in order to transform these into cautionary lessons for a more ‘developed’ present society.

The queer formations of the English Renaissance retain dogmatic and nostalgic ideas from all three of Nietzsche’s classical histories. The Renaissance is hailed for its glorious queerness. Goldberg argues that the queer readings are more authentic or ‘reverent’ than Burckhardt’s. Laqueur suggests that modern society
should learn from the gender constructs of the past. The ‘Monumental’ Renaissance transvestites become heroic figures that serve as templates for exemplary queerness and their social interactions and power struggles are carefully measured in order to develop an exemplary queer modern society.

Grosz sustains that all three classical historicising practices develop a skewed idea of being and time. She agrees with Nietzsche that history’s development into a scholarly discipline has severed the ties between the past and the present (2004, 123). This division is acutely present in the new historicist construction of the queer Renaissance. The past is perceived as an object of study, a model of a queer gender formation, a conceptual origin – a safely consistent, although ultimately unknowable construct to be considered from the continually developing present. The past is presented as simulacra – sets of texts or memories – whereas the present is real. The events of the past fit into the construction of this present, but they never truly become an integral part of it. They are not allowed to generate and expand with it.

**Trans(ient) Time and Identity Spatiality**

Foucault notes in ‘Of Other Spaces’ that contemporary theory has sometimes mistakenly been thought to entail a denial of the inherent inclusion of time within the notion of space. He strongly argues against this interpretation: critical theory does not attempt to detach space from time, but it involves ‘a certain manner of dealing with what we call time and what we call history’ (1986, 22, my emphasis). Foucault argues that a space-time continuum is presupposed in the Western conception of reality and Western discursive practices: ‘space itself has a history in Western experience, and it is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with
space’ (1986, 22). Space as it is conceived in Western thought is necessarily temporal (Foucault, 1986, 22). Elizabeth Grosz makes a similar argument in *The Nick of Time*. However, she establishes that the conception of time as an individual axis in a four-dimensional conception of reality is misleading. Time is a part of the spatial construct, but it is not an arrow pointing in a separate direction from space (2004, 4-5).

*The Nick of Time* does not attempt to solve the question of what time actually *is*. Grosz argues that the conception of time is an ancient mystery: ‘perhaps the most enigmatic, the most paradoxical, elusive and “unreal” of any form of material existence’ (2004, 4).24 Instead, she investigates the possibilities of an empowering conception of time and she starts with the body and the body’s temporal development: ‘We will not be able to understand its experimental nature unless we link subjectivity and the body directly to temporal immersion’ (2004, 5). Her study thus becomes an exploration of ‘the ontology of time, duration, or becoming, the ontological implications for living beings of their immersion in the always forward movement of time’ (2004, 4). It is the continually shaped and reshaped experience of being in time.

Similarly to this, Rita Felski’s *Doing Time* refers to an idea of being sexed and gendered in time. Sex and gender imply certain biological and social imperatives, which are not unconnected, but function or interact on multiple temporal planes simultaneously (2000, 17). A gendered and sexed temporality like this is not necessarily debilitating. The biological constructs are not fields of stagnant or normative routine. Elizabeth Grosz argues that the ‘biological organisation’ of life
opens up continual possibilities of change and multi-dimensionality both on an
dividual and a cultural level (2004, 1). Judith Halberstam notes that one of the
queerest constructs in life is the ‘middle-class logic of reproductive temporality’
(2005, 4). Grosz also notes the normalising nature of this logic and its potential for
‘queering’: reproduction is the result of connection, immersion and transformation of
the flesh. Darwinian evolutionary theory shows that the main advantage of the
reproductive function is that it opens up the possibility of mutations and infinite new
physical formations (Grosz, 2004, 7-8).

This corporeal being in time is not measurable through a single linear
narrative construct. It functions on multiple continually transforming planes
simultaneously. This poses a pivotal question: how can a sustainable, yet
conceptually delimiting reading of history be developed from such a multi-layered
time? Elizabeth Grosz argues that history can be outlined through the transient
although disruptive means of ‘the untimely’ (2004, 113): the ruptures in the forwards
movement of time – what she calls the ‘nicks’ of time (2004, 5). These are the
distinguishable moments, spaces, repetitions and events that form the connectivity of
time. Rita Felski refers to the historical narrative they produce as a transient
synchronous nonsynchronicity (2000, 23). It is a nomadic narrative, continually
connecting inter-temporal spaces and bodies.

Adopting this type of historical narration, my thesis holds on to the idea that
the Shakespearean transvestites and transgender characters in general may be
empowering and enabling literary constructs, despite the territorial treatments of
transgender empowerment mentioned above.²⁵ As Marjorie Garber shows in Vested
Interests, certain transgender characters have become ‘untimely’ events: they are not presented as bodies, but as ‘cultural symptoms’ (Garber, 1992, 70); they can be seen as operating like Foucauldian heterotopias, ruptures in space and time.

In response to this abstraction of the transgender concept, Jean Baudrillard states that ‘we are all agnostics, transvestites of art or sex’ (2002, 22). Rita Felski argues that ‘[t]his elevation of transsexual to a universal metaphor has a provocative force. It seeks to challenge our conventional distinctions between male and female, normal and deviant, real and fake’ (2000, 149).

However, Felski notes that although we may all be transsexuals in an abstract sense, ‘we certainly don’t all feel transsexual’ (2000, 149). The transgender space engenders intense negotiations between the value of historical and cultural connection and the necessary specificity of corporeal and cultural experience. This does not necessarily undermine the connectivity of the construct, but rather strengthens it. The transgender body becomes a central link in the multiplying dimensions of sexual and gender identity construction, social connectivity and inter-temporal juxtaposition. As such it produces spaces of cultural and political change, along with cultural and political connection and creation.

A space such as the transgender body may thus be considered as more than just an identity space: it is a function that enables connective identity spatiality. Foucault argues that ‘our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites’ (1986, 23). Foucault’s heterotopias are thus constituted more like connective complexes than specific spaces: ‘we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not
superimposable on one another’ (1986, 23). These complexes are crucial, however, in the communicability of any type of identification. Foucault argues that they can be defined via the various functions they perform and the ‘cluster of relations’ that are carried through them (1986, 23-24). The multitude of identity spaces that are conceived and re-conceived through the transgender body furnish it with a continual flux of connotations and locations. This site is not identifiable by a point in space, but by its formation of spatiality.

In its discussion of transgender spatiality, the thesis engages with gender and sexuality in relation to transgender discourse. For clarification, I thus include a list of technical terminology below.

**Sexual Categories**

**Sex:** (‘female’ or ‘male’) is a person’s physical sexual markers. It refers to biological factors, such as genitalia, chromosomes, and sexual hormones (OED, ‘sex n1’).

**Gender:** (‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’) is also known as social- or cultural sex. It signifies the role a person takes on in society, or the sex a person is considered to be by his/her surroundings (OED, ‘gender’). This construct is often divided into five subcategories:

**Gender Assignment:** The gender a person is legally assigned (Whittle, 2000, 7)

**Gender Role:** The gender a person is culturally assigned (Whittle, 2000, 7)
**Gender Identity:** Infers a person’s self identified gender (Whittle, 2000, 7)

**Gender Expression:** A person’s means to express a particular gender, for example through clothes, body language, make-up and hair-dos (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck”).

**Gender Attribution:** Other people’s gendering reactions to the person’s over-all gender performance (Whittle, 2000, 7)

**Sexuality:** Infers which sex a person gets sexually aroused by, whether a person is homo-, bi-, hetero- or (other)sexual (OED, ‘sexuality’). Sexual orientation may be determined based either on the biological sex, the gender identity or the gender role of a person (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck”; Whittle, 2000, 18-19).

**Transgender Identities**

**Transperson, TP:** an umbrella concept, which usually refers to individuals whose gender identities and/or gender expressions at times, or as a rule, differ from the norms of the sex they were registered as at birth (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck”).

**FTM:** a Female-To-Male transgender person. The first letter refers to the person’s biological sex, and the second letter denotes direction, or the sex he/she identifies with (Whittle, 2000, 21).

**MTF:** a Male-To-Female transgender person. The first letter refers to the person’s biological sex, and the second letter denotes direction, or the sex he/she identifies with (Whittle, 2000, 21).
Transsexual, TS: A person who experiences him/herself to belong to the sex “opposite” to his/her biological sex. TS can both be a medical diagnosis and a personal identity (Whittle, 2000, 11).

Transvestite, TV: a person who more or less often, completely or partially dresses in the attires, and takes on the gender role of the ‘opposite sex’ for the sake of his/her own well-being and/or for sexual pleasure (Whittle, 2000, 16-17).

Transgenderist/Transgender, TG: a person who more or less constantly lives in the gender role of the opposite sex, but chooses not to change his/her body surgically and/or hormonally. Alternatively, a transgenderist may be a person who identifies with the opposite sex, but chooses not to let this identity manifest in his/her appearance or behaviour (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’; Whittle, 2000, 15).

Intersex, IS: Person who is born with atypical sex organs, which means that it was impossible to definitely determine the person’s biological sex at birth. IS is a medical diagnosis (Whittle, 2000, 17-18).

Intergender, IG: Person who defines him/herself as being in between, or beyond the traditional genders or chooses not to define their gender identity at all. IG is a gender identity (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

Other Gendered Identities

Dragqueen, DQ: a man (often a gay man) who plays with the male gender expression, on stage or in order to rouse attention. DQ is usually not an identity, but a performance (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).
**Dragking, DK:** a woman (often a lesbian) who plays with the male gender expression, on stage or in order to rouse attention. DK is usually not an identity, but a performance (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

**Androgyne:** a person with a gender neutral exterior (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

**Bigender, BG:** a person who identifies both as a man and a woman (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

**Cross dresser, CD:** a person who dresses in the clothes of the opposite sex, regardless of reason (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

**Femme:** a lesbian with a feminine gender role/identity (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

**Butch:** a lesbian with a masculine gender role/identity (Lund, ‘Ord & Uttryck’).

**Stone Butch:** a lesbian who exclusively takes on a masculine role socially and in her sex life (Halberstam, 1998, 123).
In my attempt to outline the ways that gender studies and queer theory narrativise themselves historically, I have chosen to turn to 1980s and 1990s literary criticism of English Renaissance drama. Late twentieth-century historical criticism is dominated by Stephen Greenblatt’s project new historicism and its twin movement cultural materialism, both of which engage overtly with a range of critical theory and contemporary cultural studies and a large amount of this work is dedicated to queer ideas and the history of sexuality and gender. Interestingly, a large amount of new historicist and cultural materialist material focus on the English Renaissance, and more often than not the 1980s and early 1990s criticism engages with the drama of the period. They thus form unusually localised and temporally limited critical practices. Also, the critics engaging with the new historicism belong to a select group that continually react to and interact with the other members’ texts.

The gender related new historicist criticism forms an even more limited field, where a disproportionate amount of texts make theoretical responses to Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night, As You Like It* and *The Merchant of Venice.* Thomas Healy notes in his book on Renaissance criticism, *New Latitudes,* that despite the fact that new historicism emphasises diversity, it ‘has so far produced critical analysis [sic] of texts which tend to be recognisably similar to one another’ (68). This chapter will show that the new historicist idea of English Renaissance sexuality and gender formation can easily be read as a mutually narrated, theoretically imbued historical
construction; a collective fantasy, shared by a select group of keen feminist and queer literary critics.

Claire Colebrook suggests in *New Literary Histories* that new historicism’s particular and sustained preoccupation with the English Renaissance lands it in such a limited scope of time and space that it becomes oddly binary in its relational capacity (2). As Jonathan Goldberg states in his introduction to *Queering the Renaissance*, traditional scholarship has invested a certain amount of faith in the idea that the Renaissance is the cradle of modernity (1). Whereas the new historicists attempt to substantiate or refute this claim, the constantly reiterated relationship remains interestingly solid. This fact evokes a number of intriguing queries. What is the function of new historicist criticism? Is modernity here attempting to ‘find itself’, by relational analyses of its perceived origins? A simple psycho-analytic reading of the situation raises the question: does the Renaissance dominate the new historicist canon because of a more or less recognised Oedipal relationship to modernity?8

One of the main concerns in the new historicist texts on historical gender and sexuality is the development of the terms, and the difference between their usage in early modern English and contemporary English. Initially, I will thus provide a short etymological summary of the general new historicist and contemporary interpretations of early modern sexuality and gender.
Sexuality, as a term and a concept, was according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* not in common English use until the mid-nineteenth century (*OED*, ‘sexuality’). The adjective ‘sexual’ was in the early modern English of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries either used to connote something relating to the reproductive organs, or something related to or predicated on the biological sexes. It could also refer to the social and cultural relations between the sexes or to something particular to the female sex – something remarkably feminine (*OED*, ‘sexual’). Similarly, ‘sex’ in its noun form was not a term used in relation to what would be considered sexual interaction in contemporary discourse, but generally connoted biological sex, gender or genitalia (*OED*, ‘sex n¹’). The noun ‘sex’ was also used in an entirely non-gendered capacity, to signify a class or a kind, primarily of people (*OED*, ‘sex n²’).

On these grounds, Ian Maclean argues in *The Renaissance Notion of Woman*, that sex was a less erotically charged term in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England (2). It was a linguistic device used as a means of division; a measurement of polarity, not so much in terms of innate desires or desiring personalities as in the determination of physical differences and determining behaviours (Maclean, 2-3).

It is important to note that, despite the fact that the term for sexuality and the idea of sexual tendencies did not exist in early modern English, there were terms similar to contemporary conceptions of sexual personas in circulation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and these were used in adjectival forms to describe sexual interaction and relationships. There were a number of expressions for men who took part in certain sexual acts with other men: ‘sodomite’, ‘pederast’, ‘buggerer’ and ‘catamite’ are only a few of them (*OED*). There were also terms for women who took part in sexual intercourse with other women, such as ‘virago’ or ‘tribade’ (Park,
Sellberg

1997, 184-187; Traub, 1991, 66-67). However, these terms, with the exception of ‘virago’, usually signify the specific actions the person in question takes part in, rather than some form of innate desire or manifested persona (Park, 1997, 184-187). ‘Sodomy’ and ‘buggery’, for example, did most often refer to sexual acts between two men (OED, ‘sodomy’; ‘buggery’), but it could also be used to describe other socially unacceptable forms of sexual intercourse. Such acts included anal sex between a man and a woman; penetrative sex between two women; sexual interaction between a man and a child; or sexual abuse of an animal. Legally, it merely signified an ‘unnatural’ sexual act (Foucault, 1978, 37-39; Goldberg, 1992, 122). Sexual personas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are expressed rather in terms of sexual positioning, than as forms of desire.  

**Gender**, similarly to sexuality, did not possess the same connotations in sixteenth and seventeenth-century English as it does in modern usages. Whereas since the mid-twentieth century it may be used as a form of mental identification or group expression of femininity and/or masculinity, in early modern English the term generally referred to a type or a class (OED, ‘gender’).  

The word was also, as in modern linguistic discourse and a number of European languages, often used in reference to grammatical groups or divisions. These are sometimes separations into masculine and feminine ‘genders’, but many languages also have a neutral gender or a different set of classifications, such as animate and inanimate ‘genders’.  

The early modern term ‘gender’ is also used synonymously with biological sex, as an
indication of physical differentiation (*OED*, ‘gender’). It was thus inherently linked with particularly sexed connotations and sexually classified acts and attributes.

The terms ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ were used synonymously with ‘female’ and ‘male’ both in reference to biological features, in terms of belonging to one sex or the other, and as terms that signified gendered appearance and character traits (*OED*, ‘feminine’; ‘masculine’; ‘female’; ‘male’). Linguistically, the ‘gendered’ and the ‘sexed’ is thus less strictly defined in early modern English than in contemporary English. However, the definition between gendered and the non-gendered is also less strict. Variations of the terms ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ can be found in a number of grammatical, linguistic and classifying examples, which are often more or less gendered, but not always primarily so. For example, ‘effeminacy’ and ‘masculinity’ most obviously signify traits belonging to women or men, respectively, but could also refer to concepts that are culturally attributed to the masculine or the feminine, like strength, sensitivity, beauty, sense or any other quality that carries even remotely gendered connotations (*OED*, ‘effeminacy’; ‘masculinity’).

There is a great amount of critical disagreement and debate over how far the Renaissance borders between masculinity and femininity could stretch. Some scholars, like Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur suggest that the limits were malleable and that the gender contingency rested on a continually shifting sliding scale. What the connotations of femininity and masculinity actually were is unresolved, although most scholars agree on a lack of clarity, and the term ‘unclear’ is perhaps the best description of Renaissance gender available, considering that the debate is present not only among the scholars of early modern gender, but also within the textual remains of early modern society itself.
The new historicist gender debate recognises that it is useless to speculate on what terms and expressions actually stood for and how their connotations actually functioned in a society of the past. There are, however, examples of how certain words and phrases quite obviously operated differently to their modern usage and it is this concept of difference that becomes the starting point of the project of new historicism. In the introduction to *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Stephen Greenblatt expresses a wish to delve into the ‘textual traces’ (1) of an older society found in Renaissance texts and to let the long departed voices ‘make themselves heard through the voices of the living’ (1). It is the apparent difference between these voices that give such an act power, ‘for simulations are undertaken in full awareness of the absence of the life they contrive to represent, and hence they may skilfully anticipate and compensate for the vanishing of the actual life that has empowered them’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 1).

**The Project of New Historicism**

Catherine Gallagher states in ‘Marxism and the new historicism’ that

> Although there has been a certain amount of controversy over just what the new historicism is, what constitutes its essence and what its accidents, most of its adherents and opponents would agree that it entails reading literary and non-literary texts as constituents of historical discourses that are both inside and outside of texts and that its practitioners generally posit no fixed hierarchy of cause and effect as they trace the connections among texts, discourses, power, and the constitution of subjectivity (37).

This attempt to define the project of new historicism, outlines what its practitioners are trying to do, but not what it *is*, how it identifies itself, or where it positions its methodology. In a later volume Gallagher and Greenblatt argue that ‘new historicism
is not a repeatable methodology or a literary critical program’ (2000, 19) inferring that it exceeds these terms and conceptions. Greenblatt claims that the main problem of previous historical scholarship is that its methodology is ‘endlessly repeated’ (1988, 3) and thus ‘repeatedly fails for one reason: there is no escape from contingency’ (1988, 3). New historicism, according to Greenblatt and Gallagher, has no hidden agenda, and ‘because of this very lack of a given set of objects, new historicism becomes a history of possibilities’ (2000, 16). The authors show a fairly obvious agenda within these short passages, however: that is, the arduously upheld attempt to remain outside of any defining methodologies or agendas. Indeed, new historicism has a deeply localised sense of procedure, which as its name suggests, is part of a particular time and place in the history of literary criticism.

The term ‘new historicism’ implies a situatedness within a tradition of historicising criticism. In order to identify a new historicism, there must be a clear pre-existing conception of a more traditional ‘old’ historicism, to contest or depart from. There are also particular connotations to the declaration of a ‘new’ ‘–ism’: it has become a trope within twentieth-century academic discourse, thus inferring a number of pre-conceived expectations as to its objectives and intents. In order to comprehensively outline the ideas behind new historicism, the project needs to be critically historicised.

In his introduction to The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance, a collection of late twentieth-century Renaissance criticism, Stephen Greenblatt identifies previous twentieth-century lines of thought in Renaissance criticism in terms of two opposing critical schools (1982). Twentieth-century criticism in general
departs from the ideas of critical thought decreed by Coleridge, Shelley and Arnold, where the creative power of the author and an insight into his creative mind is the ultimate objective. The first of the newer lines of thought is the movement of new criticism, which argues in accordance with the emerging structuralist conceptions, that a text should be studied closely and exclusively as an autonomous whole. Criticism should involve a practice of stylistic analysis and close reading of structure and symbolic discourse. Form is synonymous with meaning, and thus any additional interaction is superfluous. The other school Greenblatt refers to, the ‘earlier historicism’ (Greenblatt, 1982, 2253) reacts to the overly simplistic readings produced by new criticism and offers a more historio-linguistic attempt to read Renaissance literature in terms of arduously calculated and contrived historical reconstructions. The text is still a discursively determined concept, but language is dependent on the dominant social discourses of the historical period. Greenblatt establishes that the ‘earlier historicism’ ‘tends to be monological; that is, it is concerned with discovering a single political vision, usually identical to that said to be held by the entire literate class or indeed the entire population’ (1982, 2253) Both new criticism and ‘earlier historicism’ read literary material as fixed coherent units. They do not allow for opposing discourses and historical inconsistency.

Both new criticism and ‘earlier historicism’ share one important feature with new historicism: they overtly draw criticism away from a historical author-intent level to a discursive level. They ultimately fail, however, because they consider text and language to be unified structures, and as later post-structuralist thinkers such as Saussure, Derrida, Barthes, Lacan and Foucault have established, language can never be truly homogenous. The new critics attempt to produce conclusive readings of their
texts, but once the texts become seen as merely ‘texts’ or segments of language, they are inevitably fluid concepts, prone to invite myriad readings and interpretations. The new critics’ intent is to unify, but their method leads to disarray. Also the more historically concerned critics of the early twentieth century often relate to discourse in terms of coherence and fixity. History here presents a field of establishable facts and the critics’ mission is to find them.

According to Greenblatt, the concerns arising from the methodology of previous criticism signifies a need for a school of criticism that does not require unity or conclusive evidence (1982, 2253-2254). Similarly, Thomas Healy claims that the project of new historicism in Renaissance scholarship arose from an increasing awareness of the difficulty in conclusively explaining, or ‘accessing’ the period through any specific selection of cultural artefacts: ‘The idea that the Renaissance could be named, classified, described, and interpreted so that it was rendered readily comprehensible within some generalised scheme of the humanities was no longer a clearly defined process’ (1992, 62). New historicism thus emerged as an attempt to access the cultural discourses of the past, or ‘speak with the dead’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 1) as Greenblatt conceives of it, in a way that fully engages with the fragmented nature of its voices, emphasising that ‘no discourse gives access to unchanging truth’ (Healy, 1992, 66). Unlike earlier critical schools, new historicism is ‘less concerned to establish the organic unity of literary works’ (Greenblatt, 1982, 2254) and is thus not obstructed by the discursive incongruities either of historical texts or textual scholarship. Rather, according to Greenblatt, new historicism is ‘open to such works as fields of force, places of dissension and shifting interests, occasions for the jostling of orthodox and subversive impulses’ (Greenblatt, 1982, 2254).
of historical incongruity and discursive inconclusiveness comprise the areas in which most new historicist criticism finds an interest.

In a move away from earlier historical scholarship, the new historicists attempt to read canonised historical material in new ways or ideas of a certain period through forgotten sources, because as Greenblatt claims: ‘the normal is constructed on the shifting sands of the aberrant’ (1988, 86). New historicism, as a methodology, turns its back on previous historical methodologies and areas of interest and forms new ideas of development and periodicity, new terms of value, and new connections between textual sources, previously unthought-of. The ‘new’ in new historicism thus signifies a rejection of earlier historical thought, placing it in opposition to ‘normal’ scholarship, in favour of the scholarly ‘aberrant’. This act of opposition is not merely a methodological swerve. The declaration of a ‘new’ ‘-ism’, echoes new criticism’s affirmation of a new paradigm within critical scholarship. It is a political and philosophical statement. Louis Montrose’s and Stephen Greenblatt’s early texts function much like new historicist manifestos. Although Greenblatt at one point claims that the project adheres to ‘no doctrine at all’ (1989, 1), most practitioners engage with poststructuralist and critical theory. This is evidenced in the degree that compilations like Kiernan Ryan’s New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader conditions its content according to it. Ryan’s reader includes an introductory section entitled ‘sources’, with extracts from the major theoretical writers influencing its content (1996).

The ‘new’ ‘-ism’ trope utilised by new historicism also signifies a conception of rebirth. It is a new way of conceptualising poststructuralist ideas that allows for
historical perspectives. Claire Colebrook argues in *New Literary Histories* that ‘it is almost a commonplace that post-structuralism was a form of ahistoricism, and that new historicism marked something like a “return” to history’ (1). This new historical thinking was to be a more ‘enlightened’ reformation of historical thinking: a form that heeds the poststructuralist lessons concerning the inevitable discrepancies of cross-cultural discourse, without falling prey to its relativism. The post-structural element of new historicism often takes the expression of ‘awareness’. Louis Montrose describes it as ‘a reciprocal concern with the historicity of texts and the textuality of history’ (20). The ‘historicity of texts’ denotes an awareness of the social specificity of all writing, and the ‘textuality of history’ suggests a recognition ‘that we can have no access to a full and authentic past, a lived material existence, unmediated by the surviving textual traces of the society in question’ (20).

The dual concern of new historicism within literary studies positions it on the one hand as a branch of historical criticism and on the other as a product of its post-structural reformation. This is a problematic position. Montrose acknowledges that an ‘enlightened’ post-poststructuralist history should recognise that the ‘textual traces are themselves subject to subsequent textual mediations when they are construed as the “documents” upon which historians ground their own texts, called histories’ (20, original emphasis). Whereas new historicism endeavours to consider the social forces at work in the formation of each historical document in its embrace, it fails to engage with the social forces directing its own formation. As Claire Colebrook acknowledges, the post-structural relativism threatening the basis of new historicist work is rather overridden than overcome and the problems concerning historicism presented by the post-structural theorists are not removed: they are
merely renamed and relocated. Colebrook states that ‘Not only does new historicism itself draw upon the work of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault and the broad range of post-structuralist thought, the questions raised by the problem of historicism have intensified rather than been resolved’ (1997, 1). The fact that new historicism outlines discrepancies, but makes no serious attempt to offer viable remedies, makes its discursive grounds even less stable than its predecessors within historical scholarship (Colebrook, 1997, 1-2). Similarly to Colebrook, Thomas Healy, Scott Wilson and Richard Strier acknowledge in their respective analyses of new historicism that the legacy to post-structural theory of history present in new historicist conceptions of textuality and historicity turns the movement against itself (Healy, 1992, 68-69; Wilson, 1995, 54-56; Strier, 1995, 68-69). Both Montrose and Greenblatt claim that they are aware of this fact (Montrose, 1989, 20; Greenblatt, 1980, 4-5; Greenblatt, 1982, 2254)²⁴, but as Healy establishes:

Although, claiming that they bring attention to their own historicity, New Historicists are reluctant to map out what that historicity is. In other words, the type of critical and political self-analysis which New Historicists claim to be aware of is insufficiently foregrounded when reading a Renaissance text (1992, 68).

Stephen Greenblatt claims that new historicism ‘erodes the firm ground of both criticism and literature’ (1982, 2254). He argues that its theoretical grounding encourages it ‘to ask questions about its own methodological assumptions and those of others’ (1982, 2254). The problem is that it only works as long as it remains in the ‘eroding’ or ‘asking’ position. When new historicism becomes problematised and questioned by its own standards, it does not stand up to the test. As Thomas Healy notes in New Latitudes, ‘if Greenblatt recognises that he believes “literature
professors are salaried middle-class shamans” he is reluctant to confront his position as shaman’ (Healy, 69; Greenblatt, 1988, 1). The tenets of new historicism cannot be reconciled with the project’s own position in critical scholarship. New historicism is not an oppositional, ‘aberrant’ or reactionary school of thought. Greenblatt himself is one of the most influential middle-class shamans in the Anglo-American academic community. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s new historicism became an established norm, with a place on most major university curriculums involving historical literary criticism, multiple entries in the prolific critical anthologies, and a number of readers and ‘how-to’ dedicated specifically to its methodologies. Although new historicism rejects the idea of critical canonicity, textual and historical unity and the adherence to an absolute historical truth, it happily harbours an idea of critical superiority, it forms coherent arguments out of historical disarray and it merely half-conceals an aspiration to get closer to a ‘true’ reality. In the introduction to The Power of Forms, Greenblatt states that his methodology will produce a more genuine idea of the social and political climate behind Shakespeare’s drama than the earlier critics have managed to provide (1982, 2253). Like new criticism, new historicism claims to get closer to some Platonic ideal or structure of reality, but in this case the ideal is a vision of a theoretically enforced structure of discursive power struggles. These power struggles, however, as Greenblatt himself notes (1982, 1988), cannot be captured or envisioned. When he argues that he enters the textual incongruities; the battlefields of historical discourse, in order ‘to speak with the dead’ (1988, 1), he reinforces the fantasy of unity and coherence that assumes that the dead are available to take part even in a reconstructed capacity in such communication. Although he acknowledges that ‘[i]t was true that I could only hear my own voice’ (1988, 1), he
contrives an idea of post-mortem articulation: ‘Many of the traces have little resonance, though every one, even the most trivial or tedious, contains some fragment of lost life; others seem uncannily full of the will to be heard’ (1988, 1).

New historicism as a practice thus fails to correspond with its theoretical grounding in several respects. The methodologies of new historicism inherently refer to two major theoretical stances: firstly the Foucauldian notion that the subjects and documents of a society should be read through social forces at play within its paradigmal framework; secondly the Lacanian idea that this framework can be accessed, and more importantly assessed through the interpretation of discursive difference. Foucault and Lacan both focus on the subject’s act of historicising itself, or conceptualising itself in terms of language, when forming an idea of identity, but they do so in radically different manners. Foucault discusses social discourses and subject referentiality from a materialist perspective, whereas Lacan analyses the subject’s entry into discourse from a psychoanalytic point of view. They both use the terms ‘subject’ and ‘discourse’, but these terms have radically different connotations in Marxist and psychoanalytic theory. Claire Colebrook establishes in *New Literary Histories* that for this reason the amalgamation of psychoanalytic and Marxist stances are deeply problematic. Foucault regards psychoanalysis as ‘an institution which produced sexual subjects as objects of knowledge and normalisation’ (1997, 175). The ‘desiring subject’ as a primal essence is according to Foucault an internalised fantasy. The only way to fit a psychoanalytic perspective into a Foucauldian reading is to regard psychoanalysis as a type of textual production. Psychoanalysis then becomes a form of discursive domain, under the rule of which the subjects relate to one another, invest and position themselves in an
economy of desire. This idea goes against the idea of the psychoanalytical subject, however. ‘Any description of the subject as a type of thing, with representable interests and motives or patterns of behaviour (such as the anthropological account of human life) is a misrecognition. Subjectivity can never be recognised in a system or order, because the subject always posits itself as an excess of any represented system’ (Colebrook, 1997, 178).

The development of Foucauldian desiring subjects and Lacanian economies of desire are nevertheless commonplace in new historicist as well as cultural materialist criticism. The juxtaposition is seldom problematised or even extrapolated upon. It has become a normalised part of the methodology. Often, the theoretical lines are not even separated in the historical and critical analysis. For the sake of clarification, however, this chapter will consequently outline the particularly Foucauldian, Derridean and Lacanian ideas in circulation in new historicist gender-oriented criticism in two different sections and offer examples of the connotations produced by their usages.

**Gender and Difference**

New historicism establishes that history is textually determined, but it also concludes that the historian needs to consider the text beyond its textual limits. Greenblatt complains that the closed textual system of new criticism reduces historical texts to linguistic markers. Its formalist approach is attempting to impose unity where there should or could be none. Claire Colebrook acknowledges that Jacques Derrida argues in *Writing and Difference* that structuralism suffers from the fact that it conceives of language in terms of unity (1997, 222-223). If there is nothing ‘outside’ of language,
there can be no conception of the ‘structurality of structure’ (Derrida, 1978, 352). Without some form of exterior viewpoint, there would be no possibility for the formation of language, and certainly not of a school like structuralism, which establishes its methodology on reading into the structure of language. Structuralism’s focus on unity leads it into a structural tautology.

In adherence to the structuralist linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida acknowledges that the sign is made up of a function both as ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’; it alludes both to an ideal meaning and to a physical – acoustic or textual – manifestation. Also in accordance with Saussure, Derrida states that the totality of the sign, as ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’, is involved in differential signification; in an always already present ‘play of differences’ (Derrida, 1996, 30), which creates meaning. Derrida refers to this game as différance. It is an *a priori* mode of becoming, necessary for any production of signification. As the origin of differences, however, the concept of différance seemingly eludes the productive game of difference. It is not a concept that comes before language, since such an idea is not possible according to linguistic theory, yet it is the agent of language production. It is the cause of signification, but also itself an effect without cause, which Derrida acknowledges is no effect at all. He states: ‘I have attempted to indicate a way out of the closure of this framework via the “trace” which is no more an effect than it has a cause, but which in and of itself, outside its text, is not sufficient to operate the necessary transgression.’ (1996, 31). The ‘trace’ is thus not inside language, but it is unsustainable outside language.
The analysis of the differential structurality, which Derrida refers to as deconstruction, equally emphasises the power of language on social reality and the importance of recognising and tracing the space/non-space, or rather the spacing; the ‘trace’ that somehow exceeds it. Similarly, Montrose and Greenblatt recognise the textuality of history, although they attempt to remove themselves from its process by analysing the historicity of the text. Problematically, however, as Derrida acknowledges, the ‘trace’ is not a concrete space from which such a practice can truly take place. The textualising of historicity will always already be a part of the text that is history. New historicism does not attempt to overcome this dilemma, but side-tracks it in an expression of awareness. This is where the school departs from post-structuralism: its basic conceptions are founded on the same idea, but its methodology refuses to fully incorporate its logical consequences. It does not perform deconstructive readings of literature.

If new historicism does not propagate a post-structural methodology, it nonetheless acknowledges a number of post-structural recognitions and ‘truths’. The idea of the textuality of history is merely one of these. Derridean conceptions, such as the tracing of *différance* in the structure of binary opposition in historical texts, as well as the deconstruction of philosophical discourse, are often freely appropriated in new historicist criticism. However, these ideas are inserted as side-lines, to shed light on curious examples – they are not incorporated in the general methodology of the text.

Similarly, new historicism does not directly adhere to psychoanalysis, but Lacan’s theories as well as less overt psychoanalytic conceptions are often
appropriated in individual pieces of criticism. There is a particular interest in Lacan and psychoanalysis in criticism focusing on gender and sexuality. Indeed, any form of gender studies can arguably be seen as a sub-school of psychoanalysis. The way ‘gender’ is conceived of in gender theory and contemporary discourse (that is, as an internal identification with the connotations pertaining to one of the sexes) is itself an inherently psychoanalytic idea – as is the concept of an internal sexuality.

Apart from this, Lacan’s post-structuralist psychoanalytic theories are inherently included in the conception of gendered subject formation, or indeed in the conception of any subject formation within a social reality determined by language and power. Lacan establishes a link between post-structuralist theories of language and their social effect on the individual subject. Lacanian ideas are present directly and indirectly in a large number of new historicist critics, including Stephen Orgel, Thomas Laqueur, Valerie Traub, Phyllis Rackin and Theodora Jankowski, in the form of character analyses, French feminist theory, studies of sexuality, explications of gendered language and numerous more. Indeed, psychoanalysis has such a bearing in contemporary discourse, that the new historicist texts that do not perform a psychoanalytic reading on some level do so in an attempt to overtly reject it.

Saint Foucault and Sexual Utopia

Although Derrida’s theories are inherent in new historicist methodology and Lacan features largely especially in the criticism exploring Renaissance gender, the first patriarch of new historicism is unquestionably Michel Foucault. Foucauldian materialist discourses, developed from Marxist sources such as Louis Althusser and Walter Benjamin are inherent in the new historicist methodology, although the
critical theorist is not always directly referenced in the texts. When his influence is acknowledged, it is commonly referred to in passing, without critical engagement with his theories. It is thus often unclear which particular facet of Foucault’s theories is being discussed. The name is thrown in as a discursive marker; a sign of belonging; a conceptual concept that the participants of the discourse are expected to know, but nobody cares to extrapolate on.\textsuperscript{33}

Additionally to Derrida’s ‘Différence’, Kiernan Ryan’s reader includes an extract on ‘Panopticism’ from Foucault’s \textit{Discipline and Punish} in its introductory sourcing section (1996, 11-16). This particular part of the work outlines the basis of Foucault’s social materialist theories. Foucault describes Jeremy Bentham’s architectural ideas for an institutional ‘Panopticon’ in terms of a state apparatus ‘for dissociating the seen/being seen dyad’ (1991, 202). In Bentham’s construction the observer is never seen to observe, and the observed thus possesses a sense of acting unobserved. Power, according to Foucault, functions most effectively if its source is hidden or unspecified:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (1991, 202-203).

Importantly, this implies that power relations need to remain unseen to function in a binary formation of absolute one-sided control.

A real subjection is born mechanically through a fictitious relation. So it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the regulations (1991, 202).
Through the construction of governing absolutes, the subjects believe themselves to act independently, when in fact their actions are determined by the controlling construct. In this case the governing apparatus is an architectural formation, but the movements of society could as well be controlled by ideological, pathological and religious subordinating discourses.\textsuperscript{34}

Throughout his work, Foucault determines that one of the most important discourses of power in any society is the discourse of normality. \textit{Madness and Civilization} for example, investigates how the discourse becomes internalised in Western culture, when scientific discourses establish the concept of pathological mental states and tendencies. The discourse forms its subjects into a socially valuable and functional shape. In order to control society effectively, the example of the ‘Panopticon’ illustrates that the discourse of normality needs to appear hidden. The discourse will thus not be visible in the social produce that adheres to ‘the normal’. It can however be glimpsed through society’s abnormalities; the waste material that is excluded from it.

A considerable amount of new historicist criticism is concerned with negotiations and exchange or circulation of ‘social energy’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 6) in societies of the past. The essays included in Ryan’s collection engage closely with power relations and invested discourses embedded in historical documents from a particular period and location, which are assumed to carry over to the literature produced. Following the notion that society’s norms are not directly readable, the new historicists often attempt to decipher historical societies from the documents that express a sense of disquietude or abnormality. In order to evaluate the contemporary
forcefulness of particular literary tropes and discursive oddities, new historicism turns to its most peripheral applications, for in true Foucauldian spirit, the movement pledges, ‘to try to track what can only be glimpsed, as it were, at the margins of the text’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 4).

So far, so good: the historical analyses, put in these terms, are straightforward appropriations of Foucault’s theories. The basic agendas are epistemological queries into the possibilities and limitations of Foucault’s social delineations. It is a simple matter of theory and practice – and indeed, as long as new historicism remains within the strict theoretical bounds it sets out for itself, the discourse is seemingly unproblematic and its practice appears sound. The problem is that new historical readings of history seldom do remain within these bounds.

The theoretical limits of new historicist methodology do not allow for a more complex reading of either Discipline and Punish or Foucault’s other works on power and knowledge. One of the most powerful and destructive normalising discourses, according to Foucault, is an act of ‘linear’ progressive historicising, which new historicism admittedly attempts to challenge. As shown above, however, in the discussion of Greenblatt and the failed ‘marginality’ of new historicism, this attempt is not particularly successful. A historicising methodology that claims progressive superiority over previous methodologies inevitably engages with a discourse of truth and normality. In The Order of Things, Foucault deems the concept of history one of the most ‘privileged and dangerous’ (405) of the humanist sciences’ attempts at ‘anthropologism’ (379). History and historicising fuel and establish the universalising tendency which Foucault discerns in all pursuits of knowledge:
To each of the sciences of man it offers a background, which establishes it and provides it with a fixed ground and, as it were, a homeland; it determines the cultural area – the chronological and geographical boundaries – in which that branch of knowledge can be recognized as having validity; but it also surrounds the sciences of man with a frontier that limits them and destroys, from the outset, their claim to validity within the element of universality (1989, 405).

The particularly strict limits in time and space that the new historicists establish for their historical analyses further complicates the already awkward relationship the movement shares with its own historicising methodology. The new historicist critics set up home in the English Renaissance; a shared discursive space within the dialogue of Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, which differentiates itself from, but simultaneously validates and further empowers their own particular social discourses. New historicism does not merely apply Foucauldian methodologies in reconstructions of historical social conflict – it establishes and normalises the image of Foucault and Foucauldian power relations in its reconstitution of progressive history.

Even if the Foucauldian methodology established in new historicism had been less prone to self-destruction, it would still prove incompatible with the type of analyses performed by many of the new historicist critics. Most of these readings interact with disparate pieces of critical theory, and unfortunately Foucault’s discourse of power and knowledge often jars with other social and cultural discourses. As recounted above, Foucault’s social theories are problematically incompatible with psychoanalysis, which is an important component in a large amount of criticism engaging with issues of gender and sexuality. New historicist readings of Renaissance gender and sexuality also often engage closely with queer
theory, which similarly to new historicism acknowledges Foucault as one of its seminal authors. The Foucauldian discourses established in queer theory are rather different, however, from the Foucauldian discourse inherent in new historicist methodology – and the juxtaposition of these discourses becomes confusing and incoherent.

Queer theory’s basic Foucauldian text is the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, individually entitled *The Will to Knowledge*. This work establishes a discourse, which in a manner that jars especially with the ideas expressed in *The Order of Things*, suggests that the obsessively ‘liberated’ sense of sexuality circulating in 1970s and 1980s Anglo-American society is an immediate product of one previous discourse. *The History of Sexuality* carries on the task of radically re-thinking the individual subject in history that Foucault started in *Madness and Civilization* when historicising the formation of the ‘psyche’ and the idea of psychological urges and tendencies. Foucault’s analysis of sexuality, however, moves in a different direction. *The History of Sexuality* not only attempts to re-think, but to re-write history. In ‘Part One: We “Other” Victorians’ in *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault writes that late twentieth-century sexuality is formed in an act of differentiation from nineteenth-century norms of sexual repression, which creates a directly opposite continual perpetuation: the overcoming of repression re-affirms its initial presence. Twentieth-century expressions of sexual liberalism thus reflect nineteenth-century sexual constrictions, rather than develop and explore a concept of their own. Free sexual expression is a myth, empowered and normalised by its previous restriction. Sexuality is always already determined by its limits. It is not a fixed concept; or even a concept in itself, but a fluid relationship founded on power,
the law and their internalisation. From the aspects developed through this idea, Foucault establishes the objective of ‘forming a different grid of historical decipherment by starting from a different theory of power; and, at the same time, of advancing little by little toward a different conception of power through a closer examination of an entire historical material’ (1998, 90-91). This section is followed by the foundation of a ‘method’ by which sexuality should be interpreted, a determination of the ‘domain’ that is to be referred to as sexuality and a final organisation or ‘periodization’ of sexuality into a new chronological unity.

David Halperin’s review of *The History of Sexuality* in *American Journal of Philology* aptly outlines the limitations of Foucault’s theory:

Volume One, for all its admittedly bright ideas, is dogmatic, tediously repetitious, full of hollow assertions, disdainful of historical documentation, and careless in its generalizations: it distributes over a period spanning from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries in a gradual process of change well known to Foucault only in its later, mid-nineteenth century manifestations (277).

The conceptions generated in *The History of Sexuality* are guilty of interestingly similar acts of historical normalisation and validation that Foucault criticises in *The Order of Things*. *The History of Sexuality* establishes that social conceptions of the present are dependent on society’s idea of the past, to a similar degree that *The Order of Things* argues that narrativisations of the past are validations of the present.

Foucauldian discourses that state that ‘[w]e must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code’ (1998, 90) are not the same as the Foucauldian discourses that establish and criticise historians like this narrator of their ‘perpetually secondary and derived character’ (2002, 380) and ‘their claim to universality’ (2002, 380). One of these Foucaults speaks as a historical theorist and
cultural materialist, whereas the other Foucault appears as a radical constructivist and a queer activist.\textsuperscript{36} The second Foucault is problematically inconsistent with the new historicist movement, since its founding historical narrative is as linear and ideologically biased as the conventional historicism Greenblatt and Montrose criticise (Greenblatt, 1982, 2253-2254; Montrose, 15-17).

Yet, new historicist gender critics often amalgamate the two Foucaults.\textsuperscript{37} The result is a Foucault that sets a theoretically murky example as he appears in the de-historicising historicist garbs picked up by Stephen Greenblatt and the other new historicists. Not unlike the new historicists, Foucault focuses a central part of his argument in \textit{The History of Sexuality} on the seventeenth century: ‘The Seventeenth century, then, was the beginning of an age of repression emblematic of what we call bourgeois societies, an age which perhaps we still have not completely left behind’ (1998, 17). He states that

The history of sexuality supposes two ruptures if one tries to center it on mechanisms of repression. The first, occurring in the course of the seventeenth century, was characterized by the advent of the great prohibitions, the exclusive promotion of adult marital sexuality, the imperatives of decency, the obligatory concealment of the body, the reduction to silence and mandatory reticences of language (1998, 115).

Before this initial ‘rupture’ the sexual reality in Europe was different altogether. Foucault argues that it contained the vestiges of the Greco-Roman social conventions, and accordingly, in the two successive volumes of \textit{The History of Sexuality}, Foucault proceeds to analyse the sexual conventions of the Ancient world, in a manner that suggests a desire to return to what once was.\textsuperscript{38}
Renaissance Self-Fashioning and the Queer Renaissance

Numerous new historicist and cultural materialist readings of gender and sexuality take Foucault’s lead in considering the English Renaissance to be the last outpost of Greco-Roman sexual fluidity; a utopian time before sexual repression, linguistic limitation and historical fixity. Despite some complaints about the generalising nature of Foucault’s thesis in volume one of *The History of Sexuality*, the foundations of his analysis are seldom questioned. In *Gay Ideas*, Richard Mohr refers to the queer historicist scholarship as the ‘generic worship of Saint Foucault’ (287), continually reiterating, further embellishing and re-appropriating Foucault’s basic arguments, as they form a new idea of what sexuality and/or gender before the ‘rupture’ actually was. The most notable texts in the critical canon on Renaissance sexuality include Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s *Between Men* (1985), Gregory W. Bredbeck’s *Sodomy and Interpretation* (1991), Jonathan Goldberg’s *Sodometries* (1992), Bruce R. Smith’s *Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare’s England* (1991), Alan Bray’s *Homosexuality in Renaissance England* (1994), Stephen Orgel’s *Impersonations* (1996) and Thomas Laqueur’s *Making Sex* (1992).

The interpretations of the sexual utopia before the mid-seventeenth century are numerous and varied. A number of them not only consider the Renaissance as the final period before Foucault’s paradigm shift, but as the beginning, or lead-up to what was to come; that is, as the cradle of modern identity. Perhaps the most influential of these narratives, partly because it was published considerably earlier than the other works and thus set an example, is Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance*
Self-Fashioning. This work has become less of an individual contribution to the discussion of subject formation and sexuality in the English Renaissance, and more of a concept. The basic argument of Renaissance Self-Fashioning, or the ‘starting point’ as Greenblatt conceives of it ‘is quite simply that in sixteenth-century England there were both selves and a sense that they could be fashioned’ (1). He argues that Renaissance texts show evidence of a considerable shift in the conception of the relationship between selves, identity and power: ‘Perhaps the simplest observation to make is that in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process’ (Greenblatt, 1980, 2).

Self-fashioning is the process or power to control one’s outward appearance, as well as that of others: ‘it is linked to manners and demeanor, particularly that of the elite; it may suggest hypocrisy and deception, an adherence to mere outward ceremony; it suggests representation of one’s nature or intention in speech and actions’ (Greenblatt, 1980, 3). This form of physical expression does not remain purely expressive, however. Renaissance self-fashioning is an internalised process of signification; a development of a readable and expressible identity. Greenblatt quotes Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures, asserting that ‘[t]here is no such thing as human nature independent of culture’ (Geertz quoted in Greenblatt, 1980, 3). Greenblatt argues that Renaissance culture recognises that there is no essential identity beyond or beneath the culturally inscribed. Self-fashioning is the power to inscribe and re-inscribe the surfaces, creating an acknowledged semblance of internality.
A number of critics of Renaissance gender and sexuality, including Greenblatt himself, Stephen Orgel, Peter Stallybrass, Valerie Traub and Lisa Jardine, appropriate the concept of Renaissance self-fashioning to gender identity and sexuality. The result is an idea of gender and sexuality that is mouldable and fluid – and most importantly, can be directed and developed. Some critics, such as Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur refer to the fact that the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ were synonymous in early modern English, arguing that the idea of gender and physical sex were one and the same. Identity did not exist separately from the body. The idea of Renaissance self-fashioning thus infers that not merely a detached gender identity, but also the Renaissance idea of the sexed body was fluid and susceptible to external and internal direction. Whether or not the idea of gender self-fashioning is taken to affect only mind or both mind and body, the concept of a fixed essential sex/gender is practically portrayed as nonexistent.

According to this idea, Renaissance bodies, sexed or not, were in many ways similar to actors on stage, capable of changing into subjectivities as they change their garments. Indeed, the sixteenth century religious controversialist Thomas Wright claims that this is the case in a discussion on appropriate attire in The passions of the minde in generall:

> some you haue so inconstant in their attire, that the varietie of their garments pregnantly proueth the ficklenesse of their heads: for they are not much vnlike to Stage-players, who adorne themselues gloriously like Gentlemen, then like clownes, after as women, then like fools, because the fashion of their garments maketh them resemble these persons (136).

If this conception of Renaissance subjectivity is taken seriously, it is perhaps unsurprising that the critics of Renaissance identity almost exclusively use drama in
their literary analyses. They engage with the plays in various ways, however: in formalist terms, theoretical terms and in terms of the materiality of the stage. The remaining section of this chapter will outline some of the ways in which gender identity, sexual roles and Renaissance drama operate in some feminist and queer new historicist criticism.

**Queering Renaissance Gender**


As recently as the year 2000, Stephen Greenblatt and Catherine Gallagher co-produced a volume entitled *Practicing New Historicism*, in which the new historicist methodology is being, as the title suggests, practised, re-assessed and exemplified. Some of the new historicist readers similarly direct their audience to a particular interpretation of the material. As mentioned, Ryan’s reader includes an introductory
section of appropriate background reading. H. Aram Veeser’s *The New Historicism* includes several essays that overtly point to specific theoretical readings of history, for example Frank Letricchia’s ‘Foucault’s Legacy – A New Historicism’ and Catherine Gallagher’s ‘Marxism and the New Historicism’. For obvious reasons, the compilations focusing on new historicist readings of gender and sexuality are specifically asking their readers to consider historical periods from a political feminist or gender/sexuality psychoanalytic perspective.

New historicist readings of the English Renaissance have a tendency to express immediate political agendas or theoretical directives. New historicism finds a discursive space in the English Renaissance, through which other more modern discourses may be circulated. The literary texts become a means of communication. Like the specific jargons of the particular contemporary discourses, the discursive space is narrowly administered and exclusively discussed. To clarify this notion, the following section will look closer at the space formed by the particular discourses of gender and sexuality.

An undue amount of essays and larger works on Renaissance gender and sexuality locate their ideas in a select number of passages from a select set of plays by William Shakespeare, often *As You Like It* (*AYL*), *Twelfth Night* (*TN*) and *The Merchant of Venice* (*MV*), which all feature female characters sporadically masked as the opposite gender. The early new historicist feminist criticism considers these plays as opportunities to question and re-consider gender roles. In ‘Disrupting Sexual Difference’, from the 1985 compilation *Alternative Shakespeares*, Catherine Belsey argues that the changes of gendered attire in *Twelfth Night* and *As You Like It* blur the differences between the male and female as well as the masculine and feminine,
creating a space in which all sexed and gendered embodiments are arbitrary when it comes to love. The Renaissance dramas become mouthpieces for Belsey’s standpoint in the gender debate.

Phyllis Rackin and Katherine E. Kelly have both produced articles further developing the idea of a relationship between gendered disguises and Renaissance problematisations of gender roles. Kelly acknowledges that characters confronted with the female transvestites in *As You Like It*, *Twelfth Night* and *The Merchant of Venice* comment on their feminine attributes, just like Shakespeare intertextually flaunts the actors’ actual maleness. Male and female connotations are continually invoked and cut short through the bodies of the boys-dressed-as-girls-dressed-as-boys. Kelly thus exposes the concept of gendered ‘personation’; the more general construction of gendered performance in society (1990). Phyllis Rackin refers to Rosalind’s epilogue in *As You Like It*, arguing that Shakespeare overtly asks the audience to ‘cooperate if the play is to work’ (1987). She argues that gendered connotation is explicitly recognised for what it is: nothing but gendered connotation.

Another faction of the discourse of Renaissance gender and sexuality considers the homoerotic connotations the characters with ambiguous sexual attributes produce. Mario DiGangi’s *The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama* further investigates Catherine Belsey’s ideas from ‘Disrupting Sexual Difference’, establishing that the Shakespearean comedy form enables not merely a space where different sex and gender becomes arbitrary, but where differently gendered sexual desires may be generated and momentarily sustained. However, according to DiGangi these desires are always ultimately suppressed. He argues that the couplings that go against the heteronormative imperative are always dissolved at the end of the
plays (1997, 29-63). Tracy Sedinger considers the suppression as a political necessity. In a society where, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick acknowledges in *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire*, the main political alliances were based on ‘homosocial’ intimacy, an intellectual platonic friendship between men, the implication of similarly formed homoerotic couplings would be rather threatening: ‘certain types of representation activate a desire that would frustrate efforts to render the sociopolitical space transparent’ (1985, 78). Carol Thomas Neely refers to the suppression of homoerotic bonds in terms of the medieval trope of ‘Lovesickness’ instead in ‘Lovesickness, Gender, and Subjectivity: *Twelfth Night* and *As You Like It*’. Thomas Neely argues that suppression of desires is a norm in early modern love discourse. The homoerotic connotations of *Twelfth Night* and *As You Like It* thus take a more subversive turn, since homoerotic desires are generated similarly by the heteroerotic aims of the main sexual couplings.

Marjorie Garber describes the transvestite character as an embodied ‘space of desire’ (1992, 75). According to Garber, Shakespearean transvestite characters embody a fetishised sense of gendered displacement. This is not because the character is *really* female or the actor is *really* male, however: it is because the body of the transvestite is overtly characterised as both and neither. In her Lacanian analysis, she argues that ‘[t]he transvestite here articulates herself/himself as that which escapes’ (1992, 75, original emphasis). She quotes Viola’s lament when about to fight a duel in *Twelfth Night* that ‘a little thing would make me tell them how little I lack of a man’ (*TN*, 109; III.iv.307-309) and Portia’s remark in *The Merchant of Venice*: ‘they shall think we are accomplished with what we lack’ (*MV*, 97; III.iv.61-
62). The expression of lack, according to Garber, denotes ‘that which cannot be satisfied’ (1992, 75), and is thus constantly coveted.

Peter Stallybrass, Theodora A. Jankowski and Valerie Traub explore the idea of lack in relation to bodily prosthetics. Stallybrass speculates on the possibility of the general boy actor wearing prosthetic breasts along with the dress and the wig. He acknowledges that Restoration transvestite actors often disband the illusion at a climactic point in the play, removing the wig or some other gendered device. The ‘real’ bodies of the Renaissance boy actors, however, remain concealed. Stallybrass reads this fact through a Freudian idea of fetishism: desire may be diverted from the genitals to another part of the body or some prosthetic gendered indication, if the shape is concealed. The boy actors, according to Stallybrass, are thus desirable because of their immediate gender indeterminacy and their fixed connotative gender devices (1992). Jankowski and Traub investigate the idea of the prosthetic body in terms of dislocation of female-female desire in Renaissance sexual discourse. In ‘The (In)significance of “Lesbian” Desire in Early Modern England’ Traub concludes that “feminine” homoerotic desires were dramatized because they did not signify’ (1992b, 80). The female-female bonds conjured by the Shakespearean transvestite characters are portrayed in terms of desire for an imagined maleness; a prosthetic phallus, which is disbanded once the lacking body is revealed (1993). Jankowski similarly determines that the woman-only space constructed between characters such as Portia and Nerissa in The Merchant of Venice do not suggest a repressed homoerotic intimacy; ‘some early modern closet’ (2000, 315), but an arena through which a more undefined relation is circulated: ‘What I have discovered is not so
much a “closet” as a “void”, but a void that is, paradoxically, full of possibilities’ (2000, 315).

In ‘Desires and the Differences it Makes’, Valerie Traub draws on previous new historical readings of *As You Like It* and *Twelfth Night* to form a theory of desire and difference. Traub spends a remarkably small amount of space discussing the textual material. The main body of the essay engages with discourses of Foucauldian power relations and eroticism. Without feeling the necessity to justify her Foucauldian approach, she states that ‘[e]rotic arousal is preeminently (but not exclusively) a function of power differences – of exchanges, withholdings, struggles, negotiations’ (1991, 93). However, she argues that the focus on gender transgressions in Shakespearean criticism is narrow-minded: ‘because of the institutionalised character of heterosexuality, gender has appeared as the sole determinant of arousal, but I suspect that gender is only one among many powerful differentials involved: arousal may be as motivated by the differences *within* each gender as by gender itself’ (1991, 93, original emphasis). The essay refers to ‘the desires circulating through the Phebe/Rosalind/Ganymede relation, or the Olivia/Viola/Cesario interaction’ (1991, 96) in passing, as it establishes a logic of desire based on a matrix of erotic position, rather than gendered subjectification. She refers to the power dynamics of S/M eroticism, where an economy of difference is created by the duality of top and bottom. Through this argument she suggests that new historicist criticism engaging with gender theory often takes an overly psychoanalytic stance: ‘The work I have begun here is only a first step in the much larger project of deconstructing “sex-desire”, in the words of Foucault, in the interest of “bodies and pleasure”’ (1991, 107).
Dympna Callaghan similarly engages with a Foucauldian conception of bodies and power relations in *Shakespeare Without Women*. Callaghan investigates the corporeality of Shakespeare’s comedies, particularly *Twelfth Night*. A large part of chapter one is devoted to an analysis of textual puns directed towards female and male genitalia and indications of castration. The fact that the letters C U [N] T take form in the discussion of Olivia’s writing style, creates an idea of female power; a prominent almost masculine genitalia, according to Callaghan – and as a male, Malvolio’s reading of the letters emphasises his C U T masculine position.

Renaissance bodies in *Shakespeare Without Women* are subjects to a phallic hierarchy, and desire is a matter of illusion and disillusion of gendered power (2000b, 26-48).

Callaghan’s analysis refers to what is arguably the most extreme, and what I will call the third faction of the new historicist readings of Renaissance gender and sexuality: Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur’s physical consideration of Renaissance self-fashioning radically juxtaposes sexed bodies and gendered performances. This sub-discourse, in which not merely bodily inscriptions, but sexed bodies can be fashioned, interestingly corresponds with the idea of sex and gender that Judith Butler forms in *Bodies that Matter*, inferring that sex is as culturally conditioned as gender (Butler, 1993, 57-91). In ‘Fiction and Friction’, included in *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Greenblatt analyses Shakespeare’s breeched female characters in *As You Like It* and *Twelfth Night*. To determine the normative ideas of sexual difference in Renaissance society from its textual margins, Greenblatt uses descriptions of human genitalia in contemporaneous anatomy texts,
establishing that sexual difference was a more fluid concept then than it is in modern society.

Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur both affirm the connection Greenblatt establishes between Renaissance sexual anatomy and the formation of sexual identity in Renaissance drama. Laqueur’s article ‘Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology’ infers that such texts could even be read as reflections of a common social conception: ‘Biology and human sexual experience mirrored the metaphysical reality on which, it was thought, the social order too rested’ (4). In his subsequent analysis of the progression of sexual conceptions in Europe, *Making Sex*, he directly refers to Greenblatt’s ‘Fiction and Friction’, stating that ‘The nature of sex, I argue in this and the next two chapters, is the result not of biology but of our needs in speaking about it’ (115).

Laqueur argues that the difference between the sexes was less rigid during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, than it was to become in the eighteenth century and onwards. Renaissance anatomy was according to Laqueur formed on the basis of traditions inherited from classical medicine, in particular the works of Galen. Sex and gender were conceived of in terms of a singular scale on which the male was situated on the one extreme and the female on the other. Gender and sex was thus a matter of degrees, and there was always a possibility that an individual would glide further from one end and closer to the other, or alternatively move back and forth through the course of a lifetime. Laqueur states that since sex and gender identity was a concept open to fashioning and self-fashioning, it was constantly threatened and never at rest: ‘In the absence of an Archimedean point in the body that assures the stability and nature of sexual difference’ (1990, 114).
Stephen Orgel adheres to Laqueur’s idea of Renaissance gender as a concept invoking a continual state of unrest and anxiety. Orgel’s *Impersonations* applies a psychoanalytic edge to Stephen Greenblatt’s notion of Renaissance self-fashioning. The text goes into a deep analysis of the ideas and practices that may have shaped the social norms in late Elizabethan and Jacobean England. His central question is: ‘*Why Did the English Stage Take Boys for Women?*’ (1996, 1, original emphasis). In order to offer an explanation to this question he revisits the anatomy sources established to be central to Renaissance gender identity in both the work of Greenblatt and Laqueur. He also reiterates a number of references to anti-theatrical sources previously made in Laura Levine’s *Men in Women’s Clothing*. The outcome of his study is remarkably close to that of Greenblatt and Laqueur. He affirms that Renaissance gender was a dialectical concern; a concept stirring continuous anxiety, because the belief in a self-fashioned gendered self inferred the threatening possibility of further fashioning.

**Speaking of/for Shakespeare: Manifest(o)ing the Dead**

The discourse of Renaissance gender and sexuality criticism finds problematisations of gender differentiation, gender roles, heteronormativity, sexual power structures, biological hegemony, and above all gender, sexual and biological fixity, in Shakespeare’s comedies. Dympna Callaghan acknowledges that ‘*[t]he Renaissance body, then, especially in the arena of the theatre, has been recognized as political, that is, as a site for the operation of power and the exercise of meaning*’ (2000b, 26). This certainly seems to be the case. One question remains, however: what powers are being operated, and whose meaning is being exercised? Are the Foucauldian,
Derridean and Lacanian – or indeed Greenblattian and Montrosian – readings of Renaissance bodies truly interpretations of Renaissance society, or are they rather reflections of the cultural climate in which they are being produced?

The introduction to *Practicing New Historicism* continually emphasises the importance of remaining outside of theoretical or critical fields and movements, in favour of a closeness or loyalty to the text: ‘Each time we approached the moment in the writing when it might have been appropriate to draw the “theoretical” lesson, to scold another school of criticism, or to point the way towards the path of virtue, we stopped, not because we’re shy of controversy, but because we cannot bear to see the long chains of close analysis go up in a puff of abstraction’ (Gallagher & Greenblatt, 2000, 19). The important notion here is thus close reading and authenticity, and this concept is considered in opposition to theoretical analysis. Yet, new historicist readings of Shakespeare and Renaissance society, including Greenblatt and Gallagher’s own work, contains a considerably small amount of close analysis that is not directly used to found a theoretical, social or cultural argument.

Theodora Jankowski states that her ‘exploration of the “lesbian void” has been a conscious effort to push the boundaries of our early modern field of vision, to try to “see” the previously invisible, to consider where “lesbians” have been hidden and how we might draw them out’ (2000, 315, original emphasis). Jankowski suggests that it is her task as a feminist new historicist to devise a way to consciously ‘push’ a modern concept into her early modern sources, despite the fact that she recognises that it is nowhere to be seen. Dympna Callaghan depicts her authorial position as similarly interventionist in *Shakespeare Without Women*: ‘In this I hope
that my analysis constitutes an intervention for current feminist politics by using the body in a Shakespeare text as a way of articulating the problems of its reclamation at this historical juncture for a feminist-materialist agenda” (47). 50

Jean E. Howard declares in her book review ‘The Early Modern and the Homoerotic Turn in Political Criticism’ that she takes the publication and republication of the numerous analyses of Renaissance gender and sexuality ‘as a sign that gay, lesbian and queer criticisms now have an acknowledged place in early modern literary and cultural studies’ (1998, 105). The emphasis here is on place, rather than time: Howard declares an objective to claim a specific location; to set up home, academically and politically in the readings of a period. She congratulates her fellow Renaissance gender scholars who have ‘contributed to the achievement of this ambitious goal’ (105). The new historicist studies of gender and sexuality have, according to Howard, changed the way a generalised ‘we’ conceives of ‘ourselves’ and history, and ‘ourselves’ in history, “deheterosexualising” our assumptions’ (106).

Throughout the new historicist explorations of Renaissance sexuality and gender, historicism is synonymous with some undefined form of socio-political ventriloquism. In order to explore this critical tendency further, I would like to return to Stephen Greenblatt’s heart-felt desire and admitted failure to ‘speak with the dead’ (1988, 1). In his uncomfortable position as de-historicising historian, Greenblatt makes up for his disability to speak with the dead, by repeatedly speaking for the dead, while criticising the people who merely speak of the dead. Rather than inferring a ‘totalizing’ notion of ‘artistic completeness’ (1988, 3) and reading the
Renaissance as a fixed concept that can be unproblematically spoken of, Greenblatt revitalises the period with his own conceptions and political agendas. He is rather building a manifesto on the traces of the dead, than manifesting their lost presence. As Greenblatt fears, all that can be heard is his own voice.

The initial chapters and introductions to Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, *Shakespearean Negotiations, Learning to Curse, Practicing New Historicism* and his latest *Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare* all focus on the author’s personal experiences of history and the process of writing history. Greenblatt portrays his academic works as private explorations – and perhaps that is what they should be read as. If the dead are mere mouthpieces for the living in new historicist criticism, then the most pressing question would be: what do the dead have to say about the living? What is appropriately spoken through this particular group of dead people? I shall return to these questions in chapter four.\(^{51}\) For now, though, it is more urgent to investigate why the dead are made to carry the voices of the living.

In the initial overtly dogmatic chapter of *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Greenblatt lists ten new historicist commandments; a number of ‘abjurations’ and ‘generative principles’ (12). Number two of this list reads: ‘There can be no motiveless creation’ (1988, 12). If this statement were applied not merely to Renaissance literature, but also to new historicist criticism of Renaissance literature, one cannot help but ask why the political agendas of modern authors would need to be developed through analyses of past societies. This is where Jacques Rancière’s
concept of the ‘founding narrative’ becomes relevant: the Renaissance is a historical event that creates a foundation for a political agenda.\textsuperscript{52}

There are not merely political discourses in circulation in Greenblatt’s texts, however. Especially his introductions\textsuperscript{53} often enter more personal territories than Rancière’s analysis accounts for. Scott Wilson suggests in \textit{Cultural Materialism} that the founding narrative within Greenblatt’s \textit{Learning to Curse} is constructed according to psychoanalytic tropes, in terms of a response to a founding academic trauma and a desire to transgress the boundaries it has created for him (Wilson, 60).\textsuperscript{54} Greenblatt’s rejection of critical theory, particularly poststructuralism, is explained in the introduction to \textit{Learning to Curse} through his original indebtedness to this movement. His ‘will to tell stories’ (Greenblatt, 1990, 5) is portrayed as an indomitable desire, on the one hand responding to the traumatic experience of being asked to remain within the boundaries of a conventional idea of historical truth (1990, 5), and on the other hand as an attempt to identify a sense of self: ‘My earliest recollections of “having an identity” or “being a self” are bound up with story-telling’ (1990, 6).

Desire and identity are deeply connected in psychoanalysis. Jacques Lacan describes the conceptualisation of identity as a realisation of an initial sensation of lack, or distance, fuelling a desire of closeness or completion (2006, 75-81). As recounted above, Lacan considers the subject position in relation to language. Since language is the means by which conceptualisations are made, the subject must always conceptualise him/herself within language, but the subject is also on some level conscious that this medium merely signifies the ‘real’, it will never be reality.
The initial sensation of lack is according to Lacan, the recognition of the gap between the symbolic order represented by language and the ‘real’. The subject will attempt to fill the gap; make him/herself ‘real’, by conceptualising him/herself, thus forming a sense of identity. Problematically, however, this form of self-representation still takes place within the symbolic order and will rather emphasise the subject’s otherness, or distance to the ‘real’, than bring him/her closer. Lacan argues that the subject will always long to restore him/herself as he/she was before the sensation of lack, but the idea of pre-significatory restoration can only be conceived of through signification (Lacan, 2006, 244-245).

The initial moment of subject formation, which Lacan claims to take place the first time an infant subject recognises his/her image in the mirror as him/herself is the moment that implements the sensation of lack. This symbolically becomes represented as a moment of castration, and the idea of pre-significatory restoration is thus signified by the fantasy of the restored phallus (Lacan, 2006, 75-81). The fantasised phallic being; the representation of the self within language ceaselessly takes place from the first time of subject recognition throughout a life generated by smokescreens of continual narrativisations and re-narrativisations of the self (Lacan, 2006, 76-77).

Sigmund Freud, the precursor of Lacan’s model of subjectivity and language, uses self narrativisation and symbolic representation (especially in dreams) as a means of getting closer to the reality of the subject in psychoanalytic therapy; unravelling his subject’s trauma by encouraging narrative self revelation. Lacan, however, insists that narrative, as an appropriation of language, does not reveal the
‘real’; it only further conceals it (2006, 77). Interestingly, considering his resistance to psychoanalysis, Stephen Greenblatt initially chooses to narrativise himself in both a Freudian and a Lacanian psychoanalytic manner in *Learning to Curse*. He sets out presenting his writing almost as a ‘therapeutic response to trauma’ (Wilson, 60). The introduction narrativises Greenblatt, as a new historicist, from his initial childhood desire for ‘story-telling’ (1990, 5-9) to his academic urges to conceptualise the non-conceptual past (1990, 9-11). Greenblatt is conceptualised as a subject, but there is still a sensation of lack. He expresses his desire to reach the past (1990, 11), and finishes the introduction to *Learning to Curse* once more regretfully conceding to the impossibility of reaching the ‘real’ past; ‘a real world, real body, real pain’ (Greenblatt, 1990, 15) within the traces of language available to historical scholarship (1990, 15). Greenblatt’s narrativisation of himself thus implicitly turns to a Freudian self-exposition and a Lacanian recognition of distance. In the spirit of Lacanian scholarship he creates for himself a founding narrative; an idea of the Renaissance that takes on the characteristics of a Lacanian phallus, a pre-Oedipal state of being.

The same volume that narrativises Greenblatt’s childhood desires, *Learning to Curse*, includes his controversial essay, ‘Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture’, which rejects psychoanalysis as unsuitable for readings of early modern subjectivity. In accordance with Foucault’s repressive hypothesis, Greenblatt argues that Renaissance identity predates the formation of the psychoanalytic subject. It cannot even truly be read in relation to the signifier ‘identity’. It exceeds modern language (1990, 131-145). In simple Lacanian terms, Greenblatt thus manages to steer his new historical journey of self exploration to a pre-Oedipal event; a founding narrative that
to some extent creates the illusion of closing the distance. The analyses of Renaissance subjectivity and the idea of trans-historical communication become Greenblatt’s and new historicism’s phallus.

Despite the fact that psychoanalysis according to Greenblatt is ‘a totalizing vision’ (1990, 138), he thus recognises himself as a psychoanalytic post-Oedipal subject, thoroughly other to the self-fashioning pre-Oedipal subjects in the Renaissance queer utopia, preceding this lacking state. Greenblatt’s rejection of psychoanalysis as lacking (1990, 134-135) can even be read as a component of this psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity. Most interesting in this equation, however, is the questionable analytic grounds for the founding narrative itself. As the following chapter shows, the conception of the Renaissance queer utopia is neither thoroughly established nor critically explored. It is a shared fantasy sustaining the political and scholarly identity of a small but canonical academic faction.
CHAPTER 2 Renaissance Self-Fashioning Revisited: Narrativised Claims to History

This chapter delves further into the historical materials and theoretical frameworks used by Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur in their founding narrative of a physically and mentally flexible gender self-fashioning Renaissance.¹ These authors eagerly depict a time before the restrictive ideas of sex, gender and sexuality, which modern feminism and queer studies continually battle with. The idea of a previous model challenges the inevitability of contemporary conceptions, furnishing feminist and queer scholars with an exceedingly attractive alternative model of early modern subjectivity. Angus McLaren aptly remarks in his review of Laqueur’s Making Sex, that ‘[g]iven its overarching argument, many readers will want to [my emphasis] like this book’ (1993, 833). Linda Woodbridge makes a similar claim about Orgel’s Impersonations: ‘His thesis is attractive: I too would like to [my emphasis] believe that Renaissance women rejoiced in more agency than we have thought’ (1999, 101). The new historicist advocates of Renaissance self-fashioning are proposing an argument which is easily accessible to modern readers, because it challenges constricted norms and hierarchies, not primarily within the idea of the early modern period, but within the methodologies of modern academic discourse. As discussed in the previous chapter, they thus form a basis; a founding narrative for these modern schools of thought.²

This chapter takes a closer look at the work of Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur, particularly in relation to two of their continuously reiterated examples of early modern discourse: the first is the medical discussion surrounding the source of sexual
differentiation, particularly the reflections on Galen’s homological sex thesis; the second example comprises the academic and public debate over the feminising effect of the early modern theatre. Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur take note of a continual reiteration of sexual aberrance or monstrosity (Greenblatt, 1988, 81; Orgel, 1996, 22; Laqueur, 1990, 128). As Michel Foucault notes in *The Order of Things*, this space of monstrosity which the new historicists colonise with discussions of modern ideas of gender and sexuality was a potent space also in the formation of early modern philosophical and scientific discourse (170). It is one of the heterotopias that is ‘outside of all places’ (Foucault, 1986, 24), but it is yet an integral part of the specific period. Foucault refers to it as a spacio-temporal mirror (1986, 24): ‘the monster is the root-stock of specification, but it is only a sub-species itself in the stubbornly slow stream of history’ (2002, 171).

**Self-Fashioned Sexual Difference**

The first space where Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur encounter sexual monstrosity is in the Renaissance discourse of sexual anatomy, which they claim to be founded on Galen’s homological sex thesis (Greenblatt, 1988, 78; Orgel, 1996, 20; Laqueur, 1990, 69). This model is derived from Galen’s *On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body*, where Galen describes the female genitalia to be in every part comparable, although entirely opposite to the male generative construction. According to Galen, the female genitals are internal inversions of their external male counterparts: ‘Turn outward the woman’s, turn inward, so to speak, and fold double the man’s, and you find them the same in both in every respect’ (628). Sex difference is subject to difference of temperature within humanity’s initial environment in the womb. If the
foetus grows on the right side, it will become a male. The less heated left side merely produces females (Galen, 628). Galen explains this concept, emphasising heat-energy required in order for the male organs to move out of the body, into their strategic generative position. The female genitals become distinguished through the defective environment of their growth, rendering them unable to protrude (Galen, 628).

Laqueur argues that Galenic anatomists were so intent on seeing a direct inversion of the male genitals whenever empirically analysing the female genitalia, that their descriptions were often anatomically flawed. The Galenic body ‘was so deeply enmeshed in the skeins of Renaissance medical and physiological theory, in both its high and its more popular incarnations, and so bound up with a political and cultural order, that it escaped entirely any logically determining contact with the boundaries of experience or, indeed, any explicit testing at all’ (Laqueur, 1990, 69). Laqueur uses the mid-sixteenth-century English Royal physician Thomas Vicary, as an example. In his work *The English-man’s treasvre* Vicary describes how the clitoris, which according to tradition he calls the Lazartus Pannicle, is situated midway between the womb (the matrix) and the opening of the vagina (the neck of the matrix):

> it [the necke of the Matrix] hath in the middell a Lazartus Pannicle which is called in Latine *Tengito*: And in the creation of this Pannicle is found two utilities. The first is, that by it goeth forth the Urine, or else it would be shed throughout all the *Vulva*: The second is, that when a woman doth let her thighs abroad, it altereth the ayre that commeth to the Matrix for to temper the heate (51).³

Vicary is convinced that the vagina is an inverted penis, and that women thus urinate and procreate with it. Since the clitoris was compared to the phallus at the time, he
places it at the centre of this two-fold activity: situated inside the vagina, by the neck of the womb, it functions like the tip of an inverted penis, controlling urination, as well as the procreative process of heat in the womb (Vicary, 51). Vicary is blinded by the socially constructed authority of Galenic medicine. His observations are theoretical to the point that they have no root in empirical evidence. He trusts his theories enough to disregard rather obvious indications of a more complex structural difference between male and female genital physiology.4

Referring to uncritical Galenic analyses such as this, Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur depict Renaissance sexual anatomy as an unequivocal reiteration of a single sexual formula (Greenblatt, 1988, 76-86; Orgel, 1996, 19-24; Laqueur, 1990, 98-108). According to this homological sex thesis, sexual differentiation functions as an uncontested hierarchy of heat, in which the female body is considered to be of the same essence, but is presented as a colder and thus defective male body. Orgel describes Renaissance anatomy as a form of anatomical history, in which ‘we all begin as female, and masculinity is a development out of and away from femininity’ (1996, 20). Greenblatt uses even more emphatic terms, invoking a Galenic metaphor, in which females are described as ‘creatures that have not yet emerged from the womb’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 80).

Orgel argues that there is evidence of a widespread empirical arbitrariness in the anatomical science of the period, since ‘the persistence of homology has little to do with science’ (1996, 24). He goes on to state that authority weighs ‘a great deal more heavily than empiricism’ in Renaissance anatomy (1996, 24). In other words, despite the newly born neo-classicist urge to further material knowledge,
Renaissance science was conceived through the biased lens of Renaissance politics, rather than the recently popular dissections conducted on human cadavers. Galen’s homological sex thesis reiterated and reified firmly rooted beliefs in male centrality. As Orgel argues, ‘Renaissance ideology had a vested interest in defining women in terms of men; the aim is thereby to establish the parameters of maleness, not womanhood’ (1996, 24).

This is not necessarily different from later constructs of sexual difference, however. The great distinction between contemporary and early modern teleologies of sexual difference is, according to Orgel, their relationship to the sexed body (1996, 19). Whereas a modern binary sex/gender formally appears static, the homological sex thesis would (in theory) admit a certain possibility of movement, and perhaps even reversal. It allows for a flexible quality to Renaissance sex, and with it gender and sexuality, which modern social constructs lack. Orgel, Laqueur and Greenblatt quote a number of early modern accounts and discussions of instances when spontaneous female-to-male sex changes are reputed to have taken place. They argue that such a possibility not only naturally follows, but should be duly expected within a sexual paradigm built on Galen’s homological sex thesis (Orgel, 1996, 19-24; Laqueur, 1990, 122-134; Greenblatt, 1988, 73-86). There was merely one sex, and the perfection of this sex was its male form. This suggests that Renaissance anatomists considered it natural that female bodies should, in an Aristotelian sense, yearn to progress towards perfection. Orgel claims that the flat-chested and narrow-hipped trends within Renaissance fashion, as well as the fact that women were played by men on the English Renaissance stage, testify to the truth of this claim (Orgel, 1996, 83-105).
The examples from the anatomy sources used by the new historicists suggest that spontaneous sex-change only occurred from the female to the male, never the other way around (Greenblatt, 1988, 73-86; Orgel, 1996, 20-24; Laqueur, 1990, 122-134). This fact is coherent with the homological sex thesis. Laqueur quotes Gaspar Bauhin’s *Theatrum Anatomicum* (Basel, 1605), establishing that ‘movement is always up the great chain of being: “we therefore never find in any true story that any man ever became a woman, because Nature tends always toward what is most perfect and not, on the contrary, to perform in such a way that what is perfect should become imperfect”’ (1990, 127).

The first case re-narrated by Laqueur, Orgel, and Greenblatt is immortalised in Montaigne’s travel journal and essays. Montaigne writes in his journal, that on going through the town of Vitry he heard an anecdote of a man named Germain ‘who was a woman up to the age of twenty-two, and only noticeable as such from having more hair about her chin than other girls, whence she was called Bearded Mary. One day, making an unusual effort in a leap, her virile utensils came out, and the Cardinal de Lenoncourt … gave her the name of Germain’ (1680, 529). Montaigne adds that, ‘[t]hey have still in the place a song, common in the mouths of the girls, in which they advise one another not to stretch their legs too wide, lest they should become men, as Mary Germain did’ (1680, 529).

Ambroise Paré reports the same incident in ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’, which is included in his highly influential *Collected Works*. He argues that the violence of Marie’s leap may have produced the Galenic heat needed to overcome her female deficiency:
Certainly, women have so many and like parts lying in their wombe, as men have hanging forth; onely a strong and lively heat seemes to bee wanting, which may drive forth that which lyes hid within: therefore in processe of time, the heat being encreased and flourishing, and the humidity (which is predominant in childhood) overcome, it is not impossible that the virile members, which hitherto sluggish by defect of heat, lay hid, may be put forth, especially if to that strength of the growing heat some vehement concussion or jactation of the body be joined (975).

Paré attempts to naturalise the concept of ‘monstrous’ sexual degenerates, by using Galen’s idea of a natural genital development, to describe these cases as examples of a belated natural progress. He concludes: ‘I thinke it manifest by these experiments and reasons, that it is *not fabulous* that some women haue beene changed into men’ (975, my emphasis).

Laqueur and Orgel argue that Montaigne and Pare’s insistence on the possible truth of this story proves that Renaissance medicine allows a greater mobility within the sexual binary than would be conceivable in post-enlightenment science (Laqueur, 1990, 127; Orgel, 1996, 21). The homological sex thesis could, as Greenblatt suggests, be considered in terms of a corporeal transvestism: it ‘imagines an individual identity emerging from the struggle between conflicting principles, the topographical account imagines gender as a result of the selective forcing out through heat of the original internal organ – like the reversal of a rubber glove – so that where there was only one sex, there are now two’ (1988, 81). The body is shaped according to an incorporation of the internal gender identity, the appropriate heat of which determines its sex. As Laqueur puts it, ‘mind and body are so intimately bound that conception can be understood as having an idea, and the body is like an actor on stage, ready to take on the roles assigned to it by culture’ (1990, 61).
The story of Marie Germaine is also quoted in Montaigne’s essay ‘Of the Force of Imagination’, alongside the story of Iphis from Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* (Montaigne, 1680, 34; Ovid, 2005, 50-61; IX.666-797). Iphis is brought up as a boy, and her father arranges for her to be married to another girl. Just before her marriage is to be consummated, Iphis is metamorphosed into a boy. As Laqueur puts it, ‘she gained a penis to match the phallus she already carried within’ (1990, 129). Laqueur compares this episode to another case recounted in the works of the French anatomist Jacques Duval, which is also referred to directly after the Marie Germaine anecdote in the English anatomist Helkiah Crooke’s *Mikromosgraphia* (250). According to Duval, a certain young female servant, Marie le Marcis, is reported to have fallen in love with a fellow servant, with whom she had been sharing a bed for some time. She declared to this woman that she was a man and proposed marriage. Since the couple demanded public confirmation of their love, Marie le Marcis needed a new sexual identity in the eyes of the community, so he/she asked to be called Marin. The community, however, rejected their claim and accused them of tribadism, which was a crime punishable by death (Laqueur, 1990, 136). Since the couple still asserted their innocence, a panel of surgeons was brought in to judge Marie/Marin’s true sex. They all, however, declared him/her to be a woman. Only Jacques Duval, who specialised on hermaphrodites, found ‘a male organ, rather large and hard’ by probing Marie’s vulva (Duval, 403, Greenblatt’s translation). This organ proved to be a penis, rather than a clitoris, since it ejaculated by Duval’s touch (Duval, 403). As was common in cases of hermaphrodisism, the panel commanded Marie/Marin to continue to wear women’s clothes, and not to have sexual relations with either sex,
until the age of twenty-five, when he/she would be asked to choose one definitive sex (Greenblatt, 1988, 74-75).

Laqueur states that the pivotal detail in this case is the fact that Marie/Marin was not immediately allowed to live as a man. He argues that the judges were less concerned with physical sex than Marie/Marin’s social gender, which according to Laqueur, they considered to inhabit a more formative position within the subject (Laqueur, 1990, 137). Such an understanding implies that the case of Marie/Marin anticipates 1980s and 1990s queer theory. Judith Butler, who next to Michel Foucault may be considered one of the key figures of this school, famously declares that gender identity does not directly develop from biological sex, but rather ‘it is an identity tenuously constituted through time – an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts’ (1999a, 179). Laqueur argues that it is the lack of a perfect masculine gender ‘act’ that makes the judges suspicious of Marie/Marin, rather than a perfect male sex. He states that the council’s reluctance to announce Marie/Marin a man, is a question of whether ‘someone who had lived all her life as a woman, had what it took to legitimately play a man’ (1990, 137) – a role, which in accordance with the homological sex thesis, was considered ‘higher’ or ‘more perfected’.

Laqueur claims that Marie/Marin’s period of probation was a way for him/her to earn his/her way into the social state of manhood: she plays and thus becomes a man (Laqueur, 1990, 137).

In accordance with Butler, Laqueur thus considers the ‘act’ of becoming to be a ‘speech act’; a linguistic performative event. However, Laqueur argues that Renaissance performative corporeality, as defined within the homological sex thesis,
possesses a greater possibility of dimensional flux than Butler’s Post-Lacanian model of the gendered body (1990, 109). Whereas Butler’s performative gender becomes inscribed on the body, the Renaissance gender inscribes from within the body. The Renaissance body invokes a conception in which the flesh is not merely a canvas, but also a scribe. Laqueur writes: ‘it is the constant back and forth, the interpretative dialogue between the corporeal and the linguistic, which itself constitutes the meanings of the body in the one-flesh model [the homological sex thesis]’ (1990, 119).

Greenblatt also considers the double agency of the corporeal and the linguistic to take part in a dialogic relationship (1988, 86-87). He confers on it an agency similar to a form which has become crucial to queer theory: Butler’s idea of the drag act (1999a, 174-177). Greenblatt uses the episode of Marie/Marin to show that the anecdotes of spontaneous sex change worked as disruptions of the homological sexual order (1988, 85). As extra-ordinary reflections of Galen’s idea of the original formation of sex, the sex changes were ‘imitations which effectively displace the meaning of the original’ (Butler, 1999a, 176), ‘harnessing the dominant order itself to do the work of dismantling its own hierarchy of orders’ (Meyer, 1994, 20). Greenblatt argues that the corporeal transvestism carried out by Marie/Marin represents a structural identity between man and woman – identity revealed in the dramatic disclosure of the penis concealed behind the labia – but it does not present this identity as reality. On the contrary, in some ways the case serves to marginalize, to render prodigious, the old wisdom (1988, 82).

Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt allow the Renaissance body to become, not only linguistically but also corporeally, what Elizabeth Grosz refers to as a body of ‘pure difference’ (1990, 93): their Renaissance body is a space which despite, and
because of its position within a society of strict sexual norms and mandatory sumptuary laws\textsuperscript{17} has the capability to create not merely a transcendent subjectivity, but a transcendent corporeality (Laqueur, 1990, 139-140; Orgel, 1996, 23; Greenblatt, 1988, 82). It simultaneously, however, creates an adjacent space in which something transcendent and abstract may acquire a shape: where a conception may take material form. When Laqueur expresses his excitement at Montaigne’s account of Iphis in ‘Of the Force of Imagination’, a woman whose wish and masculine mental image of herself transforms her flesh into its corporeal male counterpart, he also expresses his excitement at the possibilities such a transformation opens up: allowing an abstract idea to be shaped into something material, and present.

Laqueur makes a number of tenuous assumptions when he depicts the spontaneous sex changes of Marie Germaine and Marie/Marin, however. His reference to the panel decision to enforce an initial gender suspension in the case of Marie/Marin, so that the subject could ‘become’ masculine, is based on authorial deduction rather than textual evidence. Greenblatt points out that the panel did not directly state that Marie/Marin would become a man (1988, 82). Not unlike the procedures in modern cases of transsexuality, Marie/Marin was told to wait until he/she reached a slightly more mature age before making a final decision.\textsuperscript{18} This is more likely to refer to his/her ability to make a definitive choice than his/her ability to play a man. Rather than a matter of gender, it may be a matter of distrust in a young subject’s self-knowledge, considering what Thomas Wright calls ‘the frivolity of youth of either sex’ (1604, 40).
Laqueur thus, himself, readily performs a textual metamorphosis from abstract source to fleshed-out historical image, through which Greenblatt’s wish to ‘speak with the dead’ (1988, 1) seemingly comes true. The bodies of the past are given a precise (although flexible) shape: they are fashioned into the embodiment of a modern queer ideal. Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt construct a material embodiment of a utopian space, which is theoretically and critically self-fashioned.

**Fashioning the Renaissance**

Laqueur acknowledges that his historical analysis of the past to some extent is a reflection of the present. He states that his analysis of the ‘one-sex model’ is an attempt to shed further light on its successor, the ‘two-sex model’: ‘by making manifest the web of knowledge and rhetoric that supported the one-sex model, I am setting the stage for its challengers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (1990, 69). However, his construction of a utopian queer Renaissance also implies that gender and sexuality in present queer theory is a reflection of the past. As Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon establish in ‘Queering History’ the problem with such an endeavour is the fact that it constructs one concept of difference on top of another (Goldberg & Menon, 2005, 1610). Laqueur attempts to read his present through a past marked by difference, but this past is constructed by the present. A theory based on a past defined by its difference from the present, and a present defined by its difference from the past, is tautological. Although Laqueur’s sexual genealogy may reveal some truths about the present, it fails to give any specificity to the past. The notion of queer historicising contradicts its own premises: ‘In its turn against
universalism, historicism has replicated universalist assumptions’ (Goldberg & Menon, 2005, 1610).

Laqueur, Orgel, and Greenblatt construct Renaissance ways of thinking in terms of opposition to modern teleology. Laqueur develops a model in which the conception of sexual difference changes dramatically from a ‘one-sex model’ to a ‘two-sex model’ at some point during the nineteenth century, re-shaping the foundations of sexual logic. Laqueur states that ‘the empirically testable claims of the old model, which represent and are represented by the transcendental claim that there exists but one sex, are so farfetched to the modern scientific imagination that it takes a strenuous effort to understand how reasonable people could ever have held them’ (1990, 69). Orgel makes similar claims of difference, arguing that concepts a modern mind may consider contradictory, were readily accepted without much reflection (1996, 20).

The historical validity of these declarations of difference is dubious. Angus McLaren points out in his review of Making Sex, that the homologous sex thesis was never as uncontested as Laqueur claims (832). Also, the sexual fluidity derived from this conception was not as straight-forward. The question remains, however, whether Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel’s idea of Renaissance self-fashioning is entirely fictional, or if there is some degree of a historical basis for the idea of self-fashionable sex to be found within the early modern medical sources. So far, this and the previous chapter have suggested that the advocates of Renaissance self-fashioning, here specifically Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel, tend to form rather biased readings of the Renaissance, but to what extent are their narratives actually


drawn from the ideas more unequivocally embedded in the historical material referred to?

Although anatomists like Ambroise Paré attempt to show how spontaneous sex changes can be explained through contemporary medicine, he never claims, as Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel suggest, that they were part of a ‘natural’ paradigm. Paré discusses the sex changes in ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’, the title of which indicates that they are not ‘natural’. Paré attempts to merge the mythical and the metaphysical with the natural, a project which was popular in the period. He notes that there are numerous occurrences of spontaneous sex changes in Classical mythology. In Chapter 5 entitled ‘Of the changing of Sexe’, he invokes the authority of Pliny to show that traditionally, ‘such monsters did alwaies shew or portend some monstrous thing’ (Paré, 1634, 975). The sex changes are not Paré’s main focus, however. They are merely one of a myriad of monstrous creatures portrayed in Classical sources. Alongside his attempt to provide a natural explanation for spontaneous sex change, Paré thus provides illustrations and natural explanations to the generation of mermaids, centaurs, celestial beasts, and a number of half-human/half-beasts (1634, 961-980).

In ‘The Case of Marie Germain’, Patricia Parker notes that Paré’s ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’ was part of a vogue for monster and prodigy literature, in which it formed ‘a popular and even pornographically stimulating part’ (1993, 337). Its power of titillation lay in the fact that it encountered the perverse or unnatural. Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel’s interpretation of this particular work as a common conception of sexual reality is thus rather skewed. The other more scientific
works collected in *The workes of that famous chirurgion Ambrose Parey* often challenge rather than affirm the early modern reliance on Galen’s homological sex thesis. In ‘Of the Generation of Man’ Paré describes a number of women, whose wombs have actually fallen out of their vaginas, in a manner akin to the anecdotes of spontaneous sex change: ‘it comes out of the necke and a great portion thereof appeares without the privie parts’ (1634, 934). He gives many possible reasons for these occurrences, but none of them are related to excessive or ‘manly’ heat. He also recounts: ‘I remember that once I cured a young woman who had her wombe hanging out of her privie parts as big as an egge’ (934). This narrative gives an expressly non-phallic impression of the protruding female genitalia. It also concurs with an anti-Galenic objection to the homological sex thesis, made by French physician, Jacques Duval: ‘If you imagine the vulva completely turned inside out… you will have to envisage a large-mouthed bottle hanging from the woman, a bottle whose mouth rather than base would be attached to the body and which would bear no resemblance to what you had set out to imagine’ (Duval, 1603, 375).

Orgel bases a large part of his discussion of the homological sex thesis on *Mikromosgraphia* by the English anatomist Helkiah Crooke, which he explains to be ‘the authoritative compendium of anatomical and sexual knowledge’ in Jacobean England (1996, 156, note 8). Orgel claims that Crooke accepts Galen’s homological sex thesis ‘with minor reservations’ (1996, 21). Laqueur, contrarily, refers to Crooke as an adversary of the homological sex thesis, although a rather unsuccessful opponent. Crooke, in fact, writes in the ‘Controuersis’ to Book IV: ‘me thinks it is very absurd to say, that the necke of the wombe inuerted is like the member of a man’ (1615, 249). He goes on, in the ‘Controuersis’ to the next book, to argue,
Those things which Galen vrgeth concerning the similitude of the parts of generatiō or their differing only in scite and position, many men do esteeme very absurd ... Wherefore we must not thinke that the Female is an imperfect Male differing onely in the position of the Genitals (271).

Rather than validating the homological sex thesis, Crooke gives a distinct lecture on Aristotelian functionalism, according to which all species of animals are measured against one specific state of natural perfection (1999, 33-36; 192b8-b18). In accordance with this, Crooke explains that ‘the perfection of all naturall things is to be esteemed and measured by the end’ (271). He argues, in reference to Aristotle and Galen, that the sexes cannot be distinguished and divided up in the same way as the species: ‘This difference of the Sexes do not make the essentiall distinctions of the creature’ since ‘we know that the Male and Female are both of one kinde, & onely differ in cerraine accidents’ (271). However, Crooke disagrees with the conclusion that since there is only one state of perfection within the human species, there is also one more perfect and one less perfect sex.24 According to Crooke the female is as important in nature as the male: ‘we thinke that Nature intendeth the Generation of a Female as of a Male’ (271).

Crooke blames Aristotle for the fact that the less perfect female is sometimes portrayed as something less natural than the male: ‘hee … saith, that the female is a by worke or preuarication, yea the first monster in Nature’ (271).25 In Crooke’s opinion Galen follows Aristotle ‘something too neere’ (271), similarly claiming that females are produced accidentally; that they are the imperfect results of insufficient productive heat. Since both males and females are necessary for procreation, neither form can be accidental or unnatural (Crooke, 271). Women are not imperfect, nor monstrous in Crookes eyes. The monstrously sexed to him are the people who do not
adhere strictly to the sexual boundary: the very products that Orgel, Laqueur and Greenblatt attempt to make space for in the Renaissance sexual paradigm. Crooke describes monstrosity ‘[i]n the Sex, when they are of an vncertaine Sex, so that you may doubt whether it be a Male or a Female, or both, as Hermaphrodites’ (299).

Orgel quotes a number of sequences from Helkiah Crooke’s work where the author according to him is expressing Galenic ideas. He refers to a chapter on the male genitals, in which Crooke claims that ‘the Testicles in Men are larger, and of a hotter nature then in women…; heat abounding in men thrusts them forth of the body, whereas in women they remain within, because their dull and sluggish heat is not sufficient to thrust them out’ (Orgel, 1996, 22; Crooke, 206). Orgel also quotes Crooke’s account ‘Of the proportion of these parts both in men and women’ (Orgel, 1996, 21; Crooke, 216), where the author writes that ‘a woman is so much lesse perfect then a man by how much her heate is lesse and weaker then his’ (Orgel, 1996, 21; Crooke, 216). Orgel, however, disregards the fact that Crooke starts these particular accounts of the difference between the sexes with ‘Galen saieth’ (Orgel, 1996, 21; Crooke, 205; 216). He notes sequences where Crooke expressly makes a contrary argument, but quickly dismisses these, claiming that ‘ambiguity is in no way unusual in the period’ (Orgel, 1996, 22).

*Mikromosgraphia* is not a seat of ambiguity. Crooke devises a clear structure throughout the work: he states the particulars of different common medical discussions in his ‘chapters’, and his own thoughts and objections on the subjects in subsequent ‘controversies’. This Socratic form of arguments and counter-arguments produces most of the ‘ambiguities’ that Orgel uses to dismiss Crooke’s anti-Galenic
arguments. In his chapter on male genitals, Crooke quickly brushes past stories where an ‘operative heat’ in ‘truth’ has transformed certain women into men (1615, 217). However, in question 8 of the ‘controversies’ to the same chapter, entitled ‘How the parts of generation in men and women doe differ’ (249) Crooke ponders the reality of these stories more minutely, reminding his readership that the Galenic inversion does not add up anatomically. He recounts a number of incidents from Ancient, as well as modern sources, one of which is the story of Marie Germaine. He concludes: ‘But what shall we say to those so many stories of women changed into men? Truely, I think saith he, all of them monstrous and some not credible’ (250). Like Paré, Crooke thus refers these anecdotes to the realm of the monstrous, or unnatural: ‘it may well be answered that such parties were Hermaphrodites, that is, had the parts of both sexes’ (250).

Orgel draws similarly hasty conclusions in his discussion of the English physician Sir Thomas Browne’s *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*. Orgel initially quotes from the middle section of Browne’s chapter ‘Of Hares’, where the physician disclaims the homological sex thesis: ‘though Galen do favour the opinion, that the distinctive parts of sexes are onely different in position, that is inversion or protrusion, yet will this hardly be made out from the Anatomy of those parts, the testicles being so seated in the female that they admit not of protrusion, and the necke of the matrix wanting those parts which are discoverable in the organ of virility’ (1646, 228). Orgel proceeds to quote the beginning of the chapter, where Browne phrases the dilemma he is trying to solve: ‘As for the mutation of sexes, or transition into one another, we cannot deny it in Hares, it being observable in Man’ (226). Browne includes the following marginal gloss, beside the paragraph in question: ‘Transmutation of Sexes,
viz. of women into Men, granted’ (226) Orgel treats the combination of his initial quotation and this affirmative claim as a definite ambiguity:

 Granted! Women are totally different from men from before the moment of birth, even in the womb, and their genital organs ‘admit not of protrusion’, yet the possibility of their transformation into men goes without saying … these are for Browne, as for Montaigne, Ambroise Paré, and much of the time for Helkiah Crooke, facts (1996, 23).

This conclusion is not merely hasty, but thoroughly false. The complexities of Browne’s argument make it perfectly clear that the marginal note merely grants incidences believed to be sex changes to have taken place in hares and in humans. However, considering the anatomical impossibility of such occurrences, he comes to the same conclusion as Helkiah Crooke: both the hares and the humans in question must have been hermaphrodites: ‘the examples hereof have undergone no reall or new transexion, but were Androgynally borne, and under some kind of Hermaphrodites’ (1646, 228). Browne, like Crooke and Paré, invokes the idea of the unnatural. He concedes that all hares may seem to have two sexes, but he deduces that there are merely a few that do. What had seemed during his investigations to be a male generative organ on female hares had, by dissection, been proved to be ‘little bags or tumors’ (230). He finally concludes that there are monstrous aberrations of sex among hares and humans: ‘Now as we must acknowledge this Androgynall condition in man, so can we not deny the like doth happen in beasts … but that the whole species or kinde should be bisexous or double-sexed, we cannot affirme’ (Browne, 1646, 229).

Early modern conceptions of sex certainly appear different from what Laqueur calls the ‘two-sex model’ of late twentieth- and early twenty-first century
thought. The difference may not be as directly opposite as Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel suggest, however. Perhaps the most striking feature of the discourse is the fact that we can talk about early modern conceptions in the plural. Montaigne, Paré, Crooke and Browne all have different conceptions of Renaissance sexual difference, as do the modern critics of the subject. There is enough flexibility within the conceptual paradigm for the early modern ideas of sexual difference to be open to discussion both to past and present thinkers. Susan Zimmermann suggests in The Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre that the Renaissance idea of the body was the space that was fluent at the time, rather than the Renaissance body as one coherent concept (24-66).

**Anti-Theatrical Fear of Fashioning**

In addition to the early modern medical sources, Stephen Orgel’s general argument in Impersonations relies heavily on the anti-theatrical polemicists. Orgel claims that the all-male casts on the English Renaissance stage are indicative of his proposed early modern conception of gender flexibility. He argues that all boys were considered to have travelled towards masculine perfection through the lower stages on the sexual scale (1996, 20). Orgel thus creates the image of a society where each male body to some degree was considered an actor. Lisa Jardine notes that the criticism preceding the new historicist movement agreed that the concept of the transvestite boy actress was thought of as a “verisimilitude” by the Elizabethan audience, who simply disregarded it, as we would disregard the creaking of stage scenery and accept the backcloth forest as “real” for the duration of the play’ (1992, 57). Orgel’s work, in which boys and women are both imperfect men (1996, 20),
suggests the possibility of an Elizabethan audience that would have considered boy actresses ‘natural’.

The ideas of sexual flux and queer gender self-fashioning are thus transported onto the context of the Renaissance stage, and particularly into the early modern criticism of the stage. Laura Levine argues in *Men in Women’s Clothing* that the anti-theatrical writers believed the theatre to possess an almost magical power of metamorphoses (1994, 12). She refers to a passage where Stephen Gosson describes playwrights as ‘the cuppes of Circes, that turne reasonable creatures into brute beastes’ (1579, 10). She notes that Phillip Stubbes makes a similar claim when he argues against people wearing the apparel of their opposite sex: ‘I neuer read nor heard of any people except drunkē with *Cyrces* cups, or poysoned with the *exorcisins* of *Medea* that famous and renowmed, that euer woulde weare suche kinde of attire’ (1583, F5v). Levine claims that these invocations of witchcraft in relation to drama and theatrical cross-dressing may indicate that the anti-theatrical writers were anxious that performance of femininity would literally turn the transvestite actors into women. As Donald Perret acknowledges in his review of *Men in Women’s Clothing*, the leaps of deduction in Levine’s study reveals that it ‘owes much to the new historicists’ interpretation of the Renaissance as that era in which power ‘manifests itself in theatrical ways’, and where ‘selves construct themselves in theatrical ways’’ (1996, 175).

Orgel and Levine especially emphasise one section from Phillip Stubbes’s *The Anatomie of Abuses*: ‘Our Apparell was giuen vs as a signe distinctiue to discern betwixt sex and sex, & therfore one to weare the Apparel of another sex, is to
participate with the same, and to adulterate the veritie of his owne kinde. Wherefore these Women may not improperly be called *Hermaphroditii*, that is, monsters of bothe kindes, half women, half men’ (Stubbes, 1583, F5v; Orgel, 27). Like Levine, Orgel connects this idea to the new historicist notion of theatrical subjectivity. He claims that ‘it is the fragility, the radical instability of our essence, that is assumed here, and the metamorphic quality of our sinful nature’ (Orgel, 27). According to Orgel, the fear of gender transgression from either sex implies that the sexes were imbued with a certain plasticity and that the sexual boundaries could be transversed: if a woman is made less female by virtue of her deficient apparel, she could certainly also be made more male if she were to wear appropriate masculine clothing (1996, 27). Orgel thus argues that the boy actresses on the English stage were to a certain degree conceived of as women (1996, 25).

Orgel’s conclusion is somewhat hasty, however. The fact that appropriate gender status is easily lost does not necessarily imply that it is as easily gained. Stubbes here expresses an idea of gender that is far from plastic within the acceptable gender norms: appropriate gender performance is conceived of as a strict and static piece of legislation, which immediately disqualifies the subject from his/her gendered status if he/she is slightly aberrant. Stubbes’s exclamation against women wearing men’s clothes is part of a larger discussion of the implications of the biblical commandments, in this case ‘Deuteronomy 22’, which emphasises the impossibility of change within the boundaries of human nature. A woman wearing men’s apparel is certainly not metamorphosed into a man, she becomes something altogether other. Stubbes implies that a change from woman to man would be
preferable to the current course of events, ‘as now they degenerat from godly sober women’ (1583, F5v).

Like Stubbes, William Prynne also argues vehemently for a static natural essence, which is the opposite of new historicist self-fashioning. Prynne is vehement in his judgement of each person’s essential ‘true’ gender: ‘it is a shameful and dishonest thing for a man to become a woman, and to appeare in the forme of a woman. And it is againe a most abominable thing for women to become men, (as many of haire-clipping moderne impudent Viragoes doe) and to weare the apparell of a man’ (1633, 188, my emphasis). Gosson similarly argues that it ‘is in outwarde signes to shelve them selues otherwise then they are, and so with in the compasse of a lye’ (1582, C4, my emphasis). Prynne and Gosson object to the fact that these people ‘dishonestly’ soil and belie their essential gender; what ‘they are’. Like Stubbes, they do not consider the wearers of the opposite gender’s garments to be less gendered, or more like the other gender, but rather soiled and sinful members of their own essential gender:

For why being a man, wilt thou not seeme to be that which thou art borne? Why dost thou take unto thy selfe a different forme? Why dost thou feine thy selfe a woman, or thou woman thy selfe to be a man? Nature hath clothed every sex with its owne garments (Prynne, 1633, 191-192).

Prynne concludes that these people are outside of the scope of humanity. He condemns the manly female ‘Viragoes’, claiming that ‘nature herselfe abhors to see a woman shorne or polled; a woman with cut haire is a filthy spectacle, and much like a monster’ (201). He is equally severe about men in female attire: ‘What Monster, or what Prodigy is this? They deny themselves to be men, and yet are such: They would be reputed women, but the quality of their body confesseth the contrary’ (195).
The anti-theatrical writers represent an extreme and at this time relatively marginal discourse within English Renaissance society. As Greenblatt points out in ‘Fiction and Friction’, these texts are deliberately chosen by the new historicists because of their marginality. The texts represent the ‘sands of the aberrant’ where the conception of the normal is constructed (Greenblatt, 1988, 86). The texts in question interestingly also deal with the idea of normality. The anti-theatrical writers attempt to define the limits of the ‘normal’, similarly to the way that the anatomical writers define the limits of the ‘natural’. Orgel argues that the fact that the concept of ‘normality’ and ‘naturality’ is discussed at all in relation to gender transgressions is a sign of disruption in the gender discourse of the time (1996, 18-30). This is undeniably a significant point: if the anti-theatrical and anatomical writers feel that the gender norms need to be re-established, it is reasonable to assume that they are not entirely stable. Orgel, however, unequivocally looks at normality as a measurement of sexual discourse. What if the sexual discourse were to be considered a reflection of the broader discourse of normality instead?

The medical sources, as well as the anti-theatrical sources, evoke more questions about the borders of humanity than the transition between the sexes: Crooke, Paré, Browne, Prynne and Stubbes do not merely refer to sexual and gender deviations as sexually different or slightly monstrous men and women – they are inhuman sex-less monsters, hermaphrodites, prodigies and abominations (Crooke, 217; Paré, 975; Browne, 228; Prynne, 195; Stubbes, F5v). The fact that the static sexes are continually used as signs of normal human behaviour or anatomy is a sign of the extent to which the gender discourse remains unproblematised. Gender- and/or sexual transgression is considered inconceivably monstrous because sex is thought to
be unquestionably determinate. The concept that is truly being evoked and interrogated is the monstrous, or aberrant. The question is: why were Renaissance thinkers so particularly interested in the aberrant? I propose that they were drawn to the boundaries of the conceivable for the same reason that the new historicists are: they attempt to define the limits of their identities. The narratives of monstrosity are part of the ‘sands of the aberrant’ that the Renaissance writers use to establish their own idea of normality.

**Monstrosity and Difference**

In *The Order of Things* Foucault outlines the traditional ways in which the modern concept of nature is considered to have developed: ‘Histories of ideas or of the sciences ... credit the seventeenth century, and especially the eighteenth, with a new curiosity: the curiosity that caused them, if not to discover the sciences of life, at least to give them a hitherto unsuspected scope and precision’ (136). The development of this interest is a straightforward move from the theologically based philosophy of the middle ages, towards a secular conception of a natural order. The basis of thought, which used to be an omni-potent deity, is gradually exchanged for a guiding spirit referred to as ‘Nature’ (Foucault, 2002, 137).

Foucault argues that the philosophers of the late seventeenth century began to introduce classifications and categorisation to human experience: before this ‘life itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by *natural history*’ (2002, 139). Life was not a concept and identity was not yet spatialised. There was a ‘history of living beings, the history of things, and the history of words’, but ‘man is not himself historical’
(Foucault, 2002, 403). Not until the eighteenth century approached its end ‘there appears another, more radical, history, that of man himself – a history that now concerns man’s very being, since he now realizes that he not only “has history” all around him, but is himself, in his own historicity, that by means of which a history of human life, a history of economics, and a history of languages are given their form’ (2002, 403). Foucault thus argues that history and temporal categorising and narrative at this point became a pre-requisite for identity formation.

According to this model, the nineteenth century thus provided a platform on which new human identities; the first modern identity spaces could be formed. The analyses of the experienced world only then became fully corporealised: before this time a body could not fashion or perform its own identity, for bodies were identifiable as part of a broader network of relations between sameness and difference; kinds and species Foucault, 2002, 136-137). Foucault thus argues that Renaissance thinkers could not fully conceive of the concept of modern identity. However, it was in the process of becoming and the Renaissance discourse of monstrosity was a pivotal part of this development (Foucault, 2002, 164-177).

Levine’s Men in Women’s Clothing constructs the Renaissance psyche as a site of instability and conflict. She also adds that it harbours ‘the antithesis between a monstrous self and “no inherent self”’ (23). For Levine, the concept of monstrosity, although implicated in the rise of modern identity, does not inhabit a dimension which could be considered synonymous with it (23-24). According to Foucault, however, monstrosity was central to the evolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century body of knowledge. Foucault argues in The Order of Things that additionally
to being the catalysts of a scientific classifying development and the roots of a less biologically static evolutionary thinking (164-168), monsters and prodigies were fore-runners in the formation of modern identity (172). Monsters, in their unnaturalness, provided a blueprint from which the Renaissance thinkers could project the structure of the binary between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ being. Monsters were connected to human being, but they were also ‘things’ that could be historicised (Foucault, 2002, 166-167).

Since the discourse of monstrosity is foundational to the establishment of natural science, it has been duly researched within the fields of philosophy and history of science. Interestingly, however, considering the numerous other scientific discourses invoked, this discourse has not been analysed to any greater length by Greenblatt’s 1980s and 1990s followers of new historicist gender and sexuality. This fact is curious, considering monstrosity’s pivotal position both in the Foucauldian model they claim to adhere to and the sexual discourse at work within the Renaissance sources they consult. most of the major anatomical and anti-theatrical works quoted by Orgel, Laqueur and Greenblatt refer to monstrosity at least in passing (Crooke, 217; Paré, 975; Browne, 228; Prynne, 195; Stubbes, F5v).

Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston note in ‘Unnatural Conceptions’ that stories of monsters and prodigies had been invoked for literary, religious, socially constructive and political purposes throughout the middle ages (22). According to Arnold I. Davidson, Martin Luther and Philip Melanchton’s usage of prodigious births in 1523 as a device against the Catholic Church, spurred on a sudden increase of monster and prodigy narratives in religious contexts (37-40). The newly
founded interest in natural science, which appeared throughout Renaissance Europe, interestingly merged with religious dogma: the religiously deviant was represented by biological discourses (Park & Daston, 1981, 23-25). It thus created the foundation of a discourse in which the binary of the natural and the unnatural as well as the natural and the supernatural crossed paths and juxtaposed, unsettling the boundaries between these concepts (Park & Daston, 25).

According to Davidson, the church used the sense of horror produced by the tales of monsters and prodigies in order to frighten people into submission. The church thus created a direct link between the moral order and the order of nature, in which monstrous children are produced by monstrous deeds: ‘the resulting bestial creature is a symbolic representation of God’s wrath, and the reaction of horror we have to such hideous creatures is intended to remind us of, and to impress upon us, the horror of the sin itself’ (Davidson, 1991, 47). Because of this link, words such as ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ are used in reference to deeds as well as to phenomena. The course of nature was considered synonymous with God’s will (Davidson, 1991, 48).

The scientific interest in monsters successively dissolved the link between Christian morals and nature (Park & Daston, 1981, 52). When scientific works, such as Helkiah Crooke’s Mikromosgraphia (and to some degree also Ambroise Paré’s On Monsters and Prodigies) form causal explanations of monstrous births; theories that were perfectly coherent with the rules of nature, monsters and prodigies could no longer be referred to as ‘unnatural’. The naturalisation of the horrific objects displaced the sense of horror that was considered the observer’s ‘natural’ reaction
according to the religious explanations of monsters (Daston, 1991, 120). According to Park and Daston’s unacknowledged though curiously Foucauldian reading of the history of monstrosity, this displacement created a paradigm shift (1981, 53).53

Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston argue in ‘Unnatural Conceptions’ that once the monstrous births had been stripped of their religious connotations, they were ‘presented as natural wonders or secrets – the visible effects of hidden causes known only to a few – it gained a new aura of intellectual respectability’ (1981, 40). Rather than being a separate concept with distinct and discrete associations, monstrous creatures were used in all branches of the natural sciences: ‘they approached monsters as special cases in the established fields of comparative anatomy and embryology rather than as items in a heterogeneous category composed solely of anomalies’ (Park & Daston, 1981, 52). The idea of the prodigious sign was demystified, along with the interpretative school that surrounded it. The discourse of monstrosity, however, remained a reflective tool; a means to re-consider the stigmas of ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ attached to the sciences (Park & Daston, 1981, 52-53).

Lorraine Daston further investigates the usage of the discourse of monstrosity in a subsequent article, ‘Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe’. She particularly focuses on the work of seventeenth-century writer and philosopher Francis Bacon, who vehemently denies any room for religious connotations to natural phenomena. He notes in Novum Organum that ‘some modern Men guilty of much levity, have so indulged this vanity, that they have essayed to sound natural Philosophy in the first Chapter of Genesis’ (10, original emphasis).54 This tendency has taken them on a false route: ‘the corruption of Philosophy through
superstition and intermixed Divinity … works much mischief, both to Philosophy in
general and particular’ (1667, 10). Bacon wants to eradicate what he calls the ‘Idols
or false Images, which besiege Mens minds’ (1667, 4), and interpret and learn from
nature anew. He lists ‘Diviantes’ and ‘Monsters’; creatures formed ‘when Nature
declines and goes aside from its ordinary course’ (1667, 31) as ‘instances’ that
should be catalogued because ‘he that knows the ways of Nature, he shall with more
ease observe its deviations. And again, he that understands its Deviations can better
discover its ordinary ways and methods’ (1667, 31).55

Bacon’s argument became central in the construction of a scientific thinking
which was not merely observatory, but also analytical (Park & Daston, 1981, 43-51).
According to Foucault, the natural sciences had up to this point followed an
Aristotelian tradition of natural historicising.56 The earlier Renaissance scientists
engaged in writing innumerable histories of natural phenomena (Foucault, 2002,
140). It was an attempt to understand all the elements of the natural world, through a
unitary, temporally- and visually one-dimensional system: ‘The history of a living
being was that living being itself’ (Foucault, 2002, 140). The concept of natural
development and continuity, which is an important component in modern
evolutionary theories, was not merely non-existent, but had no room to develop
within this closely taxonomical system (Foucault, 2002, 169).

Francis Bacon criticises his predecessors in *Novum Organum*. He considers
the methods of Aristotle and his followers to be ‘Anticipations of nature, because it is
rash and hasty’ (1667, 3), whereas the sort of science he believes would be more
beneficiary is an ‘interpretation of Nature’ (1667, 3). Bacon complains that
Aristotelian science has built up a structure, which is used by scientists in a manner not unlike the workings of superstition on ‘vulgar’ minds (1667, 4-9). Aristotle’s philosophy in general adhered to this overly simplistic system, according to Bacon: ‘By his Logick he corrupted natural Philosophy made the world consist of Categories attributed to the humane Soul (1667, 9). The Aristotelian tradition continually attempts to fit phenomena and events to Aristotle’s pre-conceived taxonomical method: ‘And though a greater strength and number of contrary instances occur, yet it doth either not observe, or contemn them, or remove, or reject them by a distinction not without great and dangerous prejudice’ (1667, 5). Bacon claims that a more useful system would be formed if the sciences should turn their methodology around, and build their view on the instances of failure to the norm: ‘the strength of a negative Instance is greater in constituting every Axiom’ (1667, 5).

What Bacon argues then is that the development of an evaluative natural science could not proceed unless natural history learnt to consider itself historically. It needed to trace itself back to its original structure. Bacon and his contemporaries started to view the Aristotelian tradition in a critical manner. Rather than referring to similarities and norms, like Aristotle, they attempted to outline the borderlines of nature, introducing differences and deviations in the scientific accounts (Park & Daston, 1981, 43-51). They described the shapes and multitudes of nature’s monsters, or as Foucault puts it ‘the background noise, as it were, the endless murmur of nature’ (2002, 169).

The recognition and interpretation of monstrous ‘background noise’ enabled the Renaissance scientists to look not merely to the universalised form, which had
been created through taxonomical tradition, but also to the principles that had precipitated its creation. Foucault states that ‘the proliferation of monsters without a future is necessary to enable us to work down again from the continuum, through a temporal series to the table’ (2002, 170). As an embodiment of that which does not fit into the taxonomy, ‘the monster provides an account, as through caricature, of the genesis of difference’ (Foucault, 171), and thus of the principle that structures the system of sameness.

Lorraine Daston’s ‘Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence’ adheres to Foucault’s idea of the monster as an early modern catalyst. Daston approaches the concept from a slightly different angle, however. The medieval conception of reality, according to Daston, basically divided phenomena into two groups: the natural and the supernatural. In coherence with the Aristotelian tradition, the natural phenomena were seen as the habitual custom of nature. The supernatural events, on the other hand, were considered to be the hidden course of the power above. Since natural history was constructed as a system of sameness there were a number of strange and singular creatures and events which did not fit the taxonomical mould, despite the fact that they clearly belonged to the natural rather than the divine realm. These were referred to as the preternatural (Daston, 1991, 98-100). Daston explains:

Although preternatural phenomena were in theory difficult to distinguish from natural events (since they belonged to the same, lower order of causation), and in practice difficult to distinguish from supernatural events (since they evoked the same sense of astonishment and wonder), they nonetheless constituted a third ontological domain until the late seventeenth century (1991, 99).

As Davidson argues, the preternatural phenomena were used as a link between the divine and the natural realms through their ontological ambiguity, taking the roles of
signs within the communication between God and humanity (Davidson, 1991, 37-43). Daston notes that ‘churches had long displayed curiosities of no particular religious significance, such as giant’s bones, ostrich eggs, and unicorn horns, alongside splinters of the true cross and other more conventional objects of devotion’ (1991, 106). When these phenomena were naturalised, they did not immediately lose their signification. They remained highly charged objects often called upon by reformers since, as John Spencer wrote in 1665, the word monster or prodigy gave ‘every pitiful prodigy-monger … credit enough with the People’ (Daston, 1991, 108).

Francis Bacon’s decision to use monsters as the catalysts of his new scientific thinking was thus highly controversial, but cleverly effective (Park & Daston, 1981, 43-51). If the preternatural had once been conceived as the signature of God, Bacon seems intent on now making it the signature of nature, something which would render a human signature possible. Bacon thus takes the monster discourse in an opposite direction, controlling nature, as it had formerly been controlled by people’s idea of what could be natural. He develops an idea of self-reflection, the act of ‘reveal[ing] the common forms’ (1667, 30) and recognises this reflection as a means of control.

Foucault considers this revelation to have been the first stage of modern identity. The idea that man had a position in scientific reasoning, as a thinking entity, made its first entry into the field of science, and thus into the way humanity conceived itself (2002, 136 -177). Bacon’s Novum Organum establishes that this statement is substantiated, and that this discovery furthermore made room for an
acknowledgement of human discursive constructs. Bacon recognised a monstrous streak within each part of nature, as a reflective part of each well-formed creature. The monstrous was thus part of the formation of the abstract concept signified by the term human identity: it dwelled in its very structure. It is not a monstrous identity, as Laura Levine suggests (1994, 23): Bacon shows that the monstrous is an integral part of the embryonic pre-modern subjective identity, at the stage it had reached by the mid-seventeenth century.

**Monsters in (Natural) History**

Davidson notes that there is a marked difference between the works published early into the transition of the preternatural phenomena into marginal natural phenomena (1991, 43-46). Earlier anatomists such as Ambroise Paré, whose ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’ was first published in 1564, exposes an ambivalently semi-superstitious approach to monstrous births, whereas Helkiah Crooke, who wrote *Mikromosgraphia* in 1615, delivers an objectively scientific view of monsters and prodigies.59

There are obvious structural differences in Paré’s and Crooke’s treatment of monsters and prodigies. Paré constructs a separate treatise discussing only monsters and prodigies, which was included in his more compendious anatomical *Collected Works* later. He thus treats the concept of monstrosity as an independent phenomenon. Although it was included in a work of natural science, it was not quite adopted as part of any of the natural concepts. The work ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’ contains a particular group of facts, alongside other separate areas of knowledge such as ‘Of the Generation of Man’ and ‘Of the Anatomy of Man’s Body’.
In Crooke’s *Mikromosgraphia*, monsters are introduced primarily in a subsection, Question XIII of Book 5, entitled ‘Of Monsters and Hermaphrodites’. Crooke, however, also refers to monstrous differences in certain men and women in Book 4, Question VIII, ‘How the Parts of Generation in Men and Women Doe Differ’. The monstrous births are included in different parts of the work, and Crooke attempts to conceive of the concepts in the same light as the rest of the natural phenomena to a completely different degree than Paré does. As mentioned above, Crooke even discusses whether or not, as Aristotle is said to have claimed, the female sex is an ‘Error or Monster in Nature’ (1615, 270) in the chapter ‘Of the Difference of the Sexes’, but concludes that it is not (1615, 270). The fact that Crooke finds it a matter of discussion whether something as commonplace within scientific thought as the female sex may be conceived of as a monster is a sign of how far monstrosity had been incorporated into the natural sciences.

Davidson also notes that Paré differentiates between monsters and prodigies (1991, 43). Paré distinguishes prodigies as supernatural phenomena, ‘those things which happen contrary to the whole course of nature: as, if a woman should bee delivered of a Snake, or a Dogge’ (1634, 961), whereas monsters belong to the sphere of the preternatural ‘what things soever are brought forth contrary to the common decree and order of nature. So wee terme that infant monstrous, which is borne with one arme alone or with two heads’ (1634, 961). In writing a treatise on monsters and prodigies, Paré thus still considers the preternatural as associated to the supernatural, rather than a fully incorporated part of the natural order. Although his account strives to produce a natural explanation to monstrosity, he also acknowledges the religious signification assigned to the more extreme of monstrous
but to conclude, those Monsters are thought to portend some ill, which are much differing from their nature’ (1634, 961).

Paré’s ambivalent attitude towards the concept he is treating is apparent throughout ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’. Like his religious predecessors on the subject, he mixes a great variety of curious creatures: there are rather ordinary ‘monsters’ of the sea, crocodiles and ostriches; entirely mythical ‘monsters’ like half-animal centaurs and mermaids; and there are malformed creatures of various species (1634). Park and Daston claim that such mixture was common among the secular monster writers of the period: they directly transferred the discourse of monstrosity from religious to scientific contexts. Like the non-religious relics in the Catholic churches, all slightly different phenomena were ‘granted honorary monstrous status by virtue of their rarity’ (Park & Daston, 1981, 36).

Davidson further notes that Paré acknowledges the fact that the naturalisation of monstrosity to some degree displaces the horror that formerly signified its moral incorrectness. Hence, Paré carefully alerts his readers when a phenomenon is prodigious and unnatural, so that they may enact the correct reaction of horror (Davidson, 1991, 50-51). Paré attempts to naturalise certain strange occurrences, but he is not yet prepared to separate the deviant creatures from the supernatural beasts they were usually attached to. This fact becomes especially obvious in the cases that confuse Paré as to their correct allocation in the monster/prodigy equation: ‘There are other creatures which astonish us doubly because they do not proceed from the above mentioned causes, but from a fusing together of strange species, which render the creature not only monstrous, but prodigious, that is to say, which is completely
abhorrent and against Nature’ (1634, 961). These cases often entail births of what was thought to be half-human/half-animal creatures. Paré attempts to explain these occurrences scientifically, suggesting that it comes out of the mixture of seed from different species. Nevertheless, he carefully makes sure that this explanation does not decrease the level of horror that the recount of such creatures should appropriately produce, pointing out that they are first and foremost prodigies. There may be a natural explanation available, but he emphasises that in most of the cases he prefers the traditional explanation, which would class them as signs of God’s moral displeasure: ‘It is certain that most often these monstrous and prodigious creatures proceed from the judgement of God, who permits fathers and mothers to produce such abominations from the disorder that they make in copulation, like brutish beasts’ (1634, 961).

Helkiah Crooke makes no acknowledgement of prodigies. He discusses monstrous formations within humans, dividing them in groups according to ‘Figure, Magnitude, Scituation and Number’ (1615). His account relies entirely on a natural discourse, and is thus devoid of reference to supernatural sources:

60 to speak as a Physitian or natural Philosopher, it must be granted that all these Aberrations of Nature are to be referred vnto the Materiall and Efficient causes of Generation. The Matter is the Seed, the Efficient or Agent is either Primarie or Secondarie. The Primarie or Principle cause is double: the formatiue Faculty and the Imagination. The Secondarie is the Instrument, to wit, the place and certaine qualities as heat (Crooke, 1615, 300).

Interestingly, Crooke’s treatment of monstrosity is solely devoted to sexual monstrosities or sexual causes of monstrous aberrations. As the quotation above indicates, Crooke considered monstrosity invariably to be connected to sexual mixture in some way or another. The sexual monsters; the hermaphrodites or
‘Androgynas’, are thus used as a type of blueprint for monstrous formation. They are incorporated in the basic cause of natural aberration. Similarly to Bacon’s reference to monsters, Crooke likens hermaphrodites to ‘Trauellors, who wander out of their way yet goe on their intended journey’ (1615, 299), and in accordance with Bacon’s maxims, Crooke uses these travellers to mark the journey of differentiation undertaken by every individual in the initial process of sexual differentiation (1615, Book 4 & 5).

For Crooke, the hermaphrodite comes to signify the sexually undifferentiated. This idea is apparent also in Paré’s ‘Of Monsters and Prodigies’, where in the middle of a scientific paragraph describing the features of a hermaphrodite body, the writer sees fit to invoke the legal regulations guarding these cases, as if to emphasise that differentiation is a practical necessity: ‘the lawes command those to chuse the sexe which they will use, and in which they will remaine and live, judging them to death if they be found to have departed from the sexe they made choice of, for some are thought to have abused both, and promiscuously to have had their pleasure with both men and women’ (1634, 972-973). Paré’s reference to hermaphrodites thus becomes an example of the monstrous opposite to the correct course of nature: the necessary differentiation between the sexes. Like Bacon, Crooke, and indeed Greenblatt, he seems to find that the normal is best defined through a close observance of the aberrant.

The discourse of monstrosity had implications also outside the scientific discourses of the time. Evidence of this can be found in the texts of the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century anti-theatrical polemicists. These writers often use the idea
of the monstrous – and particularly the hermaphroditical monstrous – similarly to Crooke and Paré. John Rainoldes refers to ‘monsters of nature’ (1599, 44) when he attempts to accentuate the incorrectness of sodomitical acts. William Prynne refers to ‘that monstrous unparalleled sinne of Sodomy’ (1633, 212), which his ‘Inke is not blacke enough to decipher’ (1633, 211). Rainoldes’ discussion of the sodomitical perpetrators particularly underline the fact that this act requires a man to take the passive sexual position meant for a woman (1599, 44). The anti-theatrical writers thus adopt monsters of sex, the performers of aberrant acts, to signal the ‘natural’ course of sexual interaction, much in the same way as Bacon uses monsters as reflections of a natural order.62

The employment of the discourse of monstrosity, however, also implies that monstrous acts recounted in the anti-theatrical tracts possess the catalytic power of Baconian monsters. Like Bacon’s monsters take the embryonic shape of a modern scientific and historically reflective identity, the gender-ambiguous monsters of the anti-theatrical tracts are the fore-runners of a modern self-reflective sexual identity. The monstrous became part of this new way of being. Jonathan Sawday claims in *The Body Emblazoned* that one of the significant changes brought about through the introduction of a self-reflective self – a Cartesian subject – in the discourse of the body was the recognition of internal ambiguity, generating internal contention between a reflective ‘I’ and an uncanny (or monstrous) body (29).

Interestingly, this particular contention between the familiar and the aberrant is what, according to the practitioners, distinguishes new historicist methodology.63 There are obvious similarities between the radical new historicists and the
increasingly self-reflective seventeenth-century writers. Bacon’s evaluation of the existing science almost paraphrases Greenblatt’s statement about 1940s criticism: ‘The things that are already invented in Sciences, are such as most commonly depend on vulgar Notions’ (1667, 2). His cure for this state of things is ‘search into the more inward, and remote mysteries of Nature’ (Bacon, 1667, 2). This will, according to Bacon, expose ‘these things, which indeed are more known to Nature’ (1667, 3, my emphasis). Similarly, Greenblatt suggests that in order to see the real framework of the common view of the sexes within Renaissance society, one must look to its strange extremes, the uncanny aberrations (1988, 86).

*The Order of Things* argues that historical thinking derives from the same source as natural science. Foucault claims that the interest in the ‘history’ of a particular concept appeared in the late seventeenth century, simultaneously with the modern idea of a secular ‘Nature’, and these two fields are not separable (2002, 140). The concept of ‘Nature’ appeared as an attempt to outline the ‘history’ of nature, which at the time meant the characteristics and elements of the life-giving entity (Foucault, 2002, 140). Similarly, the idea of a ‘history’ was implicated in Nature’s inherent aura of truth and authenticity: ‘For natural history to appear, it was not necessary for nature to become denser and more obscure ... it was necessary – and this is entirely opposite – for History to become Natural’ (Foucault, 2002, 140). When history and nature were separated, forming the antithetical schools of humanitarian and natural sciences, their methodologies; their ‘archaeological’ search for origins remained similar (Foucault, 2002, 422).
Both these schools, as Sawday acknowledges, developed in a parallel line with the Cartesian subject, which represented the introduction of the self in relation to an uncanny ‘other’ (1995, 29). New historicism, according to Foucault’s model, is an inheritor of the historical methodology developed from the type of natural history conducted by Bacon. They both attempt to outline their respective realities through a fascination with and subsequent alienation of an aberrant ‘other’. The concept that truly appears strange and ‘other’ in the new historicist analysis of Renaissance sex and gender, however, is the idea of the Renaissance. Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt marvel at the strange ‘wonder’ of Renaissance sex and gender and construct a self-reflective modern subjectivity through the objectifying analyses of a historical other.66

The question that inevitably arises in response to this conclusion is whether it is possible to conduct any form of historical analysis without this type of outcome. If historical methodology is bound to the Cartesian subject, and its methodology is parallel with the Cartesian dualism between a reflexive self and its uncanny ‘others’, then the texts produced will inevitably become founding narratives.67 I do not suggest that this necessarily is a problem. What is problematic about the new historicist research is that its practitioners do not recognise their analyses as founding narratives, or develop them according to their particular potential as such. Why not embrace historical criticism’s capacity to create new identity spaces? Why not read texts from the past in order to shed light on specific discourses developed in the present? What I will propose in the next chapter, through a re-interpretation of the pivotal critically self-fashioned Renaissance comedies, is a conception of historical texts as heterotopias or heterochronologies: points of communication or interaction
between past and present narratives. This is not what Greenblatt would call an
attempt to ‘speak with the dead’ (1988, 1), but a multi-discursive historical
transpositioning.
[CHAPTER 3] Monstrous Transvestites: Renaissance Self-Fashioning Reconsidered

Whereas the previous chapters outline and theorise the methodology of new historicist criticism on gender and sexuality, this chapter returns to the texts and passages commonly used in the models of Renaissance self-fashioning. The first chapter outlines the project of new historicism, and the second chapter analyses the theoretical conclusions drawn from ‘Fiction and Friction’, Making Sex and Impersonations. This chapter will round up the early modern section of the thesis by re-encountering and re-thinking the literary examples engaged with in the new historicist model of Renaissance gender and sexuality. The previous chapters have raised questions regarding the limitations of historical narrative and critical practice in connection with new historicist methodology, especially in regards to the formation of a personal founding narrative space, a political founding narrative space, or both.¹ This chapter continues to discuss the limitations of Stephen Greenblatt, Thomas Laqueur and Stephen Orgel’s applications of these narratives within their readings of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (TN), As You Like It (AYL) and The Merchant of Venice (MV) and Middleton and Dekker’s The Roaring Girl (RG), but it will also open up an idea of the possibilities these plays may provide if used as a more transient and enabling narrative space.² The chapter suggests that the discourse of monstrosity provides such spatiality.

Critical Founding Narratives

Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt shape their readings of the English Renaissance in order to fit the period into a postmodern founding narrative of a sexually self-
fashioning Renaissance. They use Michel Foucault’s conception of a time before modern sex and gender in *The History of Sexuality I*, but their analysis is incoherent with Foucault’s more analytical text on history and the development of the modern subject in *The Origin of Things*. According to the new historicists, Renaissance texts discussing gender and/or sexuality cannot be properly understood by modern readers, because the modern idea of two binary sexes is so embedded in our perception, that it confuses our perception of plots taking place in the earlier one-sex paradigm. They consider this confusion a product of Foucault’s early modern paradigm shift, which is presented as a perceptive chasm, and their dramatic analyses are seen as a means of bridging the ‘gap’.

The dramatic analyses are expressively used to reflect on modern rather than Renaissance concerns: Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel profess to use examples from Renaissance drama to illustrate and investigate how the perspective on gender-related issues differs in relation to modern standards. The texts are presented as quantitative analyses. Dramatic interludes, dialogues and character formations are used to demonstrate the relative amount of plasticity in Renaissance gender determination (Laqueur, 1990, 114-115; Greenblatt, 1988, 66-93; Orgel, 1996, 50-82). Yet, Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel often use the same examples from the same sources: they refer to limited passages from William Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night* and *As You Like It* so repetitively, and to such similar effect and emphasis, that it reads as invocation rather than analysis. The fact that the selection is so limited undermines rather than reinforces the prima facie value of the proposed ‘great’ amount of gender plasticity which is exhibited in Renaissance texts and documents.
So, what is going on here? If historical validity is a minor concern in these analyses, then what is actually at stake? Similarly to Greenblatt’s introductions, Orgel’s preface in Impersonations binds the discussion of Renaissance gender performativity and fluidity to a personal event. He describes how he has experienced a change in attitude towards sexuality, sexual difference, and sexual diffidence, throughout his lifetime, particularly recalling an epiphanic moment at his Boys School’s drama department. He realises that whereas women used to be considered the greatest moral danger to young susceptible boys’ minds, ‘suddenly, in 1948, travesty itself was the danger, and women had to be imported to save us from becoming pansies’ (Orgel, 1996, xiv). Although he acknowledges that the latter fear was very much present also in the times of the Renaissance transvestite theatre, Orgel’s main inquiry in Impersonations is: ‘Why did the English Stage Take Boys for Women?’ (Orgel, 1996, 1, original emphasis). He aspires to investigate why this custom, which is considered both slightly odd and morally dubious in modern society, was commonly accepted in Renaissance England. He argues that it was a particularly English Renaissance practice. Influences from France and Italy, as well as English Medieval custom, would have encouraged the English stage to use female actors. The English, for some reason, preferred a transvestite theatre. Referring to the works of Laqueur, Greenblatt and Levine, who all attempt to demonstrate how the Renaissance sexes differ from their modern equivalents, Orgel speculates on why and when this conception changed (1996, 2-3). The main emphasis of his study is thus put on what is different within the common sexual mentality of Renaissance England, and how the general conception of gender differentiation of those days challenges his own.
Thomas Laqueur similarly traces his scholarship to personal and political, as well as historical concerns. He writes that the intellectual origins of *Making Sex* stem from his professional and personal friendship with Catherine Gallagher and Peter Brown and the fact that he ‘encountered feminist and [new] historical scholarship’ (1990, vii), and that his original interest was in the historical conception of the female orgasm. This original intent is not inconsequential. Laqueur traces a concept that he considers self-evident back to a time when its existence was considered somewhat similarly but also altogether differently. Through reflection, his subsequent argument is then built on impressions of similarity and difference: he constructs an idea of two sexual paradigms divided by a conceptual chasm. The greatest benefit of this venture, as Laqueur to some degree recognises but barely develops, is a reflective insight into modern (1980’s and 1990’s) thought processes about gender (69-70). Unfortunately, his historical analysis becomes limited and stale as a result.

Despite the problems encountered in Orgel’s and Laqueur’s works, the usage of historical data to form critical founding narratives can be a useful and enabling scholarly process. As Elizabeth Grosz testifies in *The Nick of Time*, historical spaces can be used to form multi-dimensional enabling discourses. The main problem that reoccurs in Laqueur and Orgel’s historical analyses is the conceptualisation of historical movements in terms of a chasm between past and present, where historical documents gain signification merely in relation to modern comparatives. The idea of a perceptual chasm emphasises the historical differences rather than prepare a means of appreciating Renaissance literary complexities: instead of opening up spaces from texts of the past, it limits and alienates them. If time were to be
considered a more transient and multi-dimensional concept, and temporal discourses were to be treated as numerous co-existing co-dependent variables, the relationship between the critic and the historical material need not remain binary. Historical literary criticism should rather consider itself a part of a connective network of currents, than an all-knowing all-connected conceptual bridge.

This is where the previous discussion of Foucault becomes relevant. Rather than the linear progression and binary chasm of past and present discussed in Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel’s work, Foucault’s *The Order of Things* presents the early modern paradigm shift in terms of a conceptual delta. It is a space of intensely visible change, where numerous social discourses acquired further capacity to multiply and re-connect. The generator of Foucault’s model is the historical discourse of monstrosity and the enabling figures are the social and political monsters. Like all social discourses are transformed, transposed and multiplied through their individual aberrations according to Foucault, the Renaissance discourse of gender and sexuality is opened up and continually re-considered through the sexually monstrous transvestite or hermaphrodite. This character does not form a discursive space in itself so much as make possible the formation of new spaces within the general discourse of sexual norms.

**Internalised Renaissance Travesty: The Boy Actress**

In accordance with Stephen Orgel’s expressed desire to create a more detailed understanding of why Renaissance society accepted – and at a certain level even preferred – a transvestite theatre, he spends some time investigating the concept of the boy actress. He comments on how Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* seemingly
depicts beautiful boys as a preferable alternative to women: ‘eroticized boys appear to be a middle term between men and women, they are represented as enabling figures, as a way of getting from men to women’ (1996, 63). Orgel argues that Rosalind’s eroticised boy role, Ganymede, functions as a means to desexualise Rosalind, and thus bring her closer to the male she desires (1996, 63). Greenblatt makes a similar statement about boy actresses in general: ‘these figures function as modes of translation between distinct social discourses, channels through which the shared commotion of sexual excitement circulates’ (1988, 86-87). Orgel notes that eroticised boy- turned girl- turned boys, such as the boy Cesario, become instruments of connection and communication in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and As You Like It. Twelfth Night’s Orsino appeals to Cesario to act the messenger in his attempt to woo Olivia, indicating that the effeminate boy possesses the power to bridge the sexual spheres: ‘she will attend it better in thy youth’ (TN, 20; I.iv.27).

The idea of a particular power invested in the eroticised boy can, according to Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality 3, be traced back to classical sources. Foucault claims that Plutarch in particular considered love, as the appreciation of beauty, to be a concept which transcended the sexual barriers. Foucault quotes Plutarch’s ‘Dialogue of Love’: ‘They say that beauty is the flower of virtue … all these characteristics belong to both sexes alike’ (Foucault, 1990, 204). Boys were thus considered equally able to produce an amorous sensation within men as women. Although Plutarch presents the relationship of marriage to be more perfect than the relationship to a boy, he considers the love for women and boys to be equally virtuous. The love for boys has an additional advantage, however, in also producing the sensation of respect and friendship. Plutarch thus suggests that a relationship with
a boy could teach a man to discover an ability to love that is not only centred on the beauty of a person, but also discerns the character underneath, such as would be required in a happy marriage. The boy would then function as a catalyst, ‘enabler’ or ‘translator’ in the formation of marital bliss (Foucault, 1990, 203-206).

In accordance with Plutarch’s description of love, Viola and Rosalind both induce their future spouses to develop eroticised friendships with their boyish alter-egos before they enter into a marital relationship. In Viola’s case, the formation of a male-male friendship is necessary in order to catch Orsino’s attention. Orsino’s eroticised friendship for Cesario is the only thing that successfully distracts him from his purely physical attraction for Olivia. In this space Cesario may then sow the seeds of the virtuous marital love Orsino comes to hold for Viola (Shakespeare, TN).

Rosalind, on the other hand, knows that she already has Orlando’s love. She makes him enter into an eroticised friendship with Ganymede purely to cultivate him; to shape him into the type of husband she desires (Shakespeare, AYL). Rosalind deliberately uses the disguise of a Plutarchan boy to form a virtuous relationship.

Orgel and Greenblatt agree that Shakespeare frequently emphasises the boyish, androgynous and bi-gendered appearances of the ‘breeched’ female characters Viola/Cesario and Rosalind/Ganymede in Twelfth Night and As You Like It (Orgel, 1996, 51; Greenblatt, 1988, 91). Malvolio describes Cesario as:

Not yet old enough for a man, nor young enough for a boy: as a squash is before ‘tis a peascod, or a codling when ‘tis almost an apple. ‘Tis with him in standing water, between boy and man

(TN, 29; I.v.158-161)
Ganymede is described in similarly androgynous terms:

He is not very tall, yet for his years he’s tall.

His leg is but so so; and yet ‘tis well:

There was a pretty redness in his lip,

A little riper and more lusty red

Than that mix’d in his cheek

\( (AYL, 92; \text{III.v.118-122}) \)

Cesario and Ganymede’s appearances are initially contrived to desexualise the characters: both Viola and Rosalind choose their attires in order to “conceal me what I am” (TN, 10; I.ii.53) and not to “stir assailants” (AYL, 28; I.iii.109). Ironically, however, both characters not only stir the desires of both men and women towards them, but catalyse their own marriages and a number of additional marital liaisons among their fellow characters.¹⁹

Orgel and Greenblatt both explain the Renaissance penchant for boy actresses in terms of the prevalent anxiety which they claim to be stirred by the plasticity of the sexes in the homological sex thesis (Greenblatt, 1988, 87; Orgel, 1996, 63). Orgel considers the boy actress in terms of a political device, or a means of control: ‘In a society that has an investment in seeing women as imperfect men, the danger points will be those at which women reveal that they have an independent essence, an existence that is not, in fact, under male control’ (Orgel, 1996, 63). The boy actress evades this danger. It is a means to convey – as Malvolio expresses it – an essence not yet masculine, without creating a space for a dangerous feminine existence.

Shakespeare calls attention to the feminine, or rather the non-masculine status of the bodies ‘underneath’ Rosalind and Viola’s masculine disguises.²⁰ Viola fears
that her ‘lack of balls’ will reveal her real gender when she hears that Sir Andrew is challenging her to a sword fight: ‘Pray God defend me! A little thing / would make me tell them how much I lack of a / man’ (TN, 109; III.iv.307-309). Rosalind expresses a similar concern, when Celia does not immediately tell her who has scribbled ‘Rosalind’ on the bark of numerous trees. She indicates that her lack of a male lower body makes her as impatient as any woman:

Good my complexion! Dost thou think though I am caparisoned like a man I have a doublet and hose in my disposition? One inch of delay more is a South-sea of discovery.

(AYL, 70; III.ii.191-194)

However, through these male disguises Shakespeare also calls attention to the boy underneath the female characters Viola and Rosalind. The most obvious example is Rosalind’s epilogue in As You Like It, which is cited and recited in numerous of the new historicist work on gender self-fashioning: both before and after Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt’s introduction of the homological sex thesis (Orgel, 1996, 50; Digangi, 1997, 61; Rackin, 1987, 36; Kelly, 1990, 90; Garber, 1992, 76; Traub, 1991, 104). As Phyllis Rackin points out in ‘Androgyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine’, Rosalind immediately puts herself in a sexually ambiguous position (36), reminding the audience of the fact that in the late sixteenth century, ‘It is not the fashion to see the Lady in the epilogue’ (AYL, 131; Epilogue.198). She then delivers a short address to the men in the audience, in which she suggestively implies that she is actually not a lady:

If I were a woman, I would kiss as many of you as had
beards that pleased me, complexions that liked
me, and breaths that I defied not:

(AYL, 131; Epilogue.214-217, my emphasis)

Orgel argues that Rosalind’s speech primarily introduces the possibility of
homoerotic idealisation: the indication that Rosalind is actually a man would suggest
that the ideal union, the course towards which the play moves, is not between
Orlando and Rosalind, but between Orlando and Ganymede (1996, 57-58). However,
Katherine E. Kelly proposes in ‘The Queen’s Two Bodies’ that the situation is
slightly more complicated. Kelly argues that Shakespeare’s ‘breeched’ boy actresses
are a narrative function: a dialectical means to convey the tension between reality
and verisimilitude, which is, according to Kelly, the generator of much Elizabethan
and Jacobean drama. She thus connects Rosalind and Viola’s halting boy
performances to the extensively discussed ‘play within the play’ function used in
others Shakespeare dramas like Hamlet and A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
Rosalind’s speech is the climax of a part that ‘develops dialectically, shifting from
the woman to the boy and back again, subordinating both fictional personae to the
presence of a virtuoso performer’ (Kelly, 1990, 90). Thus Rosalind/Ganymede
positions him/herself as a boy and as a woman, but first and foremost as an actor.

**The Physicality of the Boy Actress**

Stephen Orgel, Thomas Laqueur and Stephen Greenblatt discuss references to nature
and nature’s power over humanity in Twelfth Night. There is particularly one
instance near the finale in Act V, which they linger on (Orgel, 1996, 51; Greenblatt,
1988, 71; Laqueur, 1990, 114). Sebastian attempts to console Olivia when she
realises that she has not wed Cesario, who she intended to marry. When she
furthermore understands that Cesario is actually Viola, Sebastian gives her a biologically based explanation:

So comes it lady, you have been mistook.
But nature to her bias drew in that.
You would have been contracted to a maid;
Nor are you therein, by my life, deceiv’d;
You are betroth’d both to a maid and man.

(*TN, 145; V.i.257-261*)

Greenblatt understands the ‘bias of nature’ in *Twelfth Night* to be related to the physical laws manifested in the homological sex thesis (1988, 71). The play leads the characters into a comic predicament, which is naturally and socially unsustainable:

‘To be matched with someone of one’s own sex is to follow an unnaturally straight line; heterosexuality, as the image of nature drawing to her bias implies, is bent’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 68). The predicament is not unlike Iphis’s problem, or that of Marie le Marcis, referred to in chapter 2. There, as in this case, the problem encountered when desire is allowed to follow a straight line, is dissolved when nature interferes to draw the individuals off their initial sexual course. Viola does not become a man, or turn out to actually be a man, like Iphis or Marie le Marcis, but she manages to produces a twin brother, who is so like her that ‘An apple cleft in two is not more twin / Than these two creatures’ (*TN, 143; V.i.221-222*). They are in fact ‘One face, one voice, one habit, and two persons’ (*TN, 143; V.i.214*), who may as well, except for the slight detail of sexual difference be one and the same. Olivia is thus not deceived. Sebastian *is* Viola, only with an extra bonus: Viola is ‘a maid’, but Sebastian is ‘a maid and man’.
This interpretation coheres with the homological sex thesis, according to which the new historicists argue that Renaissance men and women were essentially the same. They are differentiated merely by the woman’s insufficient heat. From this perspective, Olivia has unintentionally gained something when she marries Sebastian instead of Viola. Sebastian is the perfected version of Viola. He is what Viola would have been if she had not lacked the necessary heat. Greenblatt’s ‘Fiction and Friction’ explores what impact Galenic medicine may have had on Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night*: ‘What happens when a body is translated from “reality” to the stage or when a male actor is translated into the character of a woman?’ (1988, 87). The audience knows that the actor underneath Viola’s vestiary exterior is actually a boy. Viola’s insufficient heat is merely an act. He further inquires: ‘What does it mean for a Renaissance comedy, that most artificial of forms, to invoke nature or for nature, in the reified form of medical discourse, to assume the artificial form of Renaissance comedy?’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 87).

Greenblatt concludes that the answer is simple: ‘a conception of gender that is teleologically male and insists upon a verifiable sign that confirms nature’s final cause finds its supreme literary expression in a transvestite theatre’ (1988, 88). A perfected being can easily enact something further down the biological scale, because he possesses all the qualities she does. It would be difficult, however, for someone further down the scale to play a person on a higher level, since their different levels are affirmed by her lack. This perspective could explain why both Viola and Rosalind are presented as inadequate actors. Cesario and Ganymede are insistently described as androgynous or effeminate men.
Greenblatt establishes that the reference to ‘nature’s bias’ indicates that ‘Nature has triumphed … And nature’s triumph is society’s triumph’ (1988, 71). According to Greenblatt, Shakespeare infers something very similar to Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality 3*: it is easier for the characters to fall for someone of their own sex. The forces of nature, however, coerce them to act in a way that suits nature’s reproductive purposes. In accordance with Greenblatt, Thomas Laqueur infers that this image of the physical world is a reflection of the social norms in Renaissance society. Renaissance drama mirrored and was mirrored by the social constructs, like the social constructs mirrored and were mirrored by Galenic biology: ‘The one-sex body of the doctors, profoundly dependent on cultural meanings, served both as the microcosmic screen for a macrocosmic, hierarchic order and as the more or less stable sign for an intensely gendered social order’ (Laqueur, 1990, 115).

**Threatening Effeminacy**

Stephen Orgel argues in *Impersonations* that English Renaissance drama is infused with a ‘fear of effeminization’ (1996, 26). He extracts this argument from Thomas Laqueur’s *Making Sex* and Laura Levine’s *Men in Women’s Clothing*, both of which establishes that this anxiety is the primary reason for the avid production of anti-theatrical writing in Elizabethan and Jacobean England. Orgel claims that ‘effeminization’ was considered a veritable threat within Renaissance society, and consequently discusses the common occurrence of the word ‘effeminate’ within Renaissance discourse, including a number of Shakespearean dramas (1996, 26-52). Orgel further argues that this anxiety particularly sparked the anti-theatrical movement’s criticism of the transvestite theatre. According to Orgel, Renaissance
masculinity was continually destabilised because of the conceived possibility of being reduced to a woman. They feared that men involved in dramatic femininity may actually be turned into women (1996, 26-30).

Both Orgel and Laqueur quote three lines from act III, scene i of *Romeo and Juliet* (*Rom.*), where Romeo, after an extensive fight scene with Tybalt, questions his reluctance to hurt his enemy:

O sweet Juliet,

Thy beauty hath made me effeminate
And in my temper softened valor’s steel!

(*Rom.*, 164; III.i.115-117)

Laqueur uses this quotation to establish that the sexual scale within his conception of the Renaissance homological sex thesis does not merely allow an upwards climb, from man to woman. According to Laqueur, Romeo’s fear proves that the scale was flexible. Men could as likely digress into womanhood: ‘Men’s bodies too could somehow come unglued. “Effeminacy” in the sixteenth century was understood as a condition of instability, a state of men who through excessive devotion to women become more like them’ (1990, 123).

Laqueur’s understanding of the Renaissance usage of ‘effeminacy’ here is simplistic: he assumes that the effeminate is necessarily emasculating. Laqueur uses a 1589 example from the *Oxford English Dictionary* to substantiate his interpretation of the Renaissance usage of ‘effeminacy’: ‘The king was supposed to be … very amorous and effeminate’ (1990, 123). The main problem with this example is that Laqueur’s choice of quotation illustrates a usage of the word that according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* is not particularly common: ‘Unequivocal instances are
rare’ (OED, ‘Effeminate’ 3). Laqueur further misrepresents the specific significations of the word in his example. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that ‘effeminacy’ occasionally denoted something womanish or unmanly, but it also stood for self-indulgence and voluptuousness (OED, ‘Effeminate’ 1). Laqueur’s quotation is used as an example of the latter: ‘The notion “self-indulgent, voluptuous” seems sometimes to have received a special colouring from a pseudo-etymological rendering of the word as “devoted to women”’ (OED, ‘Effeminate’ 3). Romeo’s love for Juliet has thus not made him more feminine, but rather more self-indulgent and voluptuous.

An understanding of Romeo’s exclamation in regards of self-indulgence is more coherent with the full act III scene i’s course of events than Laqueur’s gender-bending interpretation. Throughout the fight with Tybalt, Romeo is blinded by personal amorous feelings. When Tybalt threatens him, he thinks of his bond of passion, which embraces the Capulets rather than the honourable bond of allegiance to his friends, who regard Capulets as enemies. He thus pleads:

I protest I never injur’d thee,
    But love thee better than thou canst devise:
    Till thou shalt know the reason of my love,
    And so good Capulet, which name I tender
    As dearly as mine own, be satisfied.

(Rom., 162; III.i.67-70)

Romeo’s self-indulgent change of priorities becomes the cause of his friend’s death. His shame at committing such a dishonourable betrayal is the reason why he laments
Juliet’s beauty. The full speech, of which Laqueur merely quotes a fraction, makes Romeo’s emotions clear:

This gentleman the Prince’s near ally,
My very friend hath got this mortal hurt
In my behalf, my reputation stain’d
With Tybalt’s slander, Tybalt that an hour
Hath been my cousin: O sweet Juliet,
Thy beauty hath made me effeminate,
And in my temper soften’d valour’s steel.

(Rom., 164; III.i.109-115)

Similarly to Laqueur, Orgel interprets Romeo’s usage of the word ‘effeminate’ as a sexualisation, pulling male identity down the homological sex scale: ‘Women are dangerous to men because sexual passion for women renders men effeminate: this is an age in which sexuality itself is misogynistic, as the love of women threatens the integrity of the perilously achieved male identity’ (1996, 26).

The only other interpretation of ‘effeminate’ that the Oxford English Dictionary allows in connection to the love of a woman, except for the ‘self-indulgent and voluptuous’ connotation, is a usage of the participial adjective ‘effeminated’, where a man’s excessive devotion for a woman reduces him to her employment (OED ‘Effeminated’ b). Such a state does not cohere with either Romeo or Juliet’s behaviour, however. Romeo does not curse himself for being Juliet’s slave – he considers himself the slave of his emotions. This connotation of ‘effeminacy’ is more reminiscent of the comically exaggerated manners of the amorous Orsino, in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night:25

If ever thou shalt love,
In the sweet pangs of it remember me:
For, such as I am all true lovers are,
Unstaid and skittish in all motions else,
Save in the constant image of the creature
That is belov’d…

*(TN, 56; II.iv.15-20)*

Orsino also displays the other established signs of ‘effeminate’ amorous behaviour. From the very opening of the play, he expresses himself in terms of self-indulgence and voluptuousness: ‘If music be the food of love, play on, / Give me excess of it; that surfeiting, / The appetite may sicken, and so die...’ *(TN, 5; I.i.1-3).* Despite Orsino’s ‘effeminate’ love, however, there is no indication that the character should be considered emasculated. He is introduced as ‘A noble duke, in nature as in name’ *(TN, 9; I.ii.25).*

The example of Orsino demonstrates that the Renaissance idea of ‘effeminate’ behaviour is not necessarily emasculating. There is, however, evidence of a vast Renaissance debate concerning the behaviours appropriate for members of each gender. Thomas Wright lists the motions, expressions, apparel, and particularly the emotions that signify each gender in his *The Passions of the Mind in General.* He introduces his study praying that ‘Christ Iesus preserve you in his grace, … and deliver you from inordinate passions’ (1604, A3). The emotions that direct Romeo’s dishonourable change of allegiance in act III, scene i of *Romeo and Juliet* are referred to as effeminate, because they are accepted in women, but considered inordinate in a man. This fact does not steer the bearer of the passions towards femininity. He merely becomes an imperfectly emoted man.
Laqueur and Orgel’s example from *Romeo and Juliet* proves the insufficient complexity of a model where effeminate emotions are considered equal to femininity. It does not allow for different layers of gendered being. Orsino’s ‘effeminacy’ is not emasculating, because the source of this behaviour is his love for Olivia. As the description of Orsino shows, and the character himself implies, there is a significant difference between his gendered subjectivity and his effeminate passions. This is why he begs Viola, disguised as the boy Cesario, to express his emotions to the beloved Olivia: ‘I know thy constellation is right apt / For this affair’ (*TN*, 20; I.iv.35-36). The youngster’s effeminate appearance suits them better than his own or that of his more masculine attendants: ‘It shall become thee well to act my woes; / She will attend it better in thy youth’ (*TN*, 20; I.iv.26-27). Youth is here equated with femininity: ‘they shall yet belie thy happy years, / That say thou art a man ... all is semblative of a woman’s part’ (*TN*, 20; I.iv.30-34).28

The lack of communication between Orsino’s masculine character and the feminine connotations which his passions evoke, create a state of confusion. Carol Thomas Neely argues in ‘Lovesickness, Gender, and Subjectivity’, that such a state would not be readily accepted in Renaissance society, unless it was generated by desire (283-285). In a position of desire, the idea of gendered behaviour becomes somewhat displaced. In these situations it was acceptable for gendered manners not to correlate directly with the gender of their bearers (Thomas Neely, 294-296). Indeed, the usage of the word ‘effeminate’ in reference to amorous manners indicates that it was somewhat expected.
In the case of Orsino, however, the state of gendered confusion invoked by desire temporarily does influence the subjectivity of the person affected. This influence does not, as Laqueur and Orgel argue, place the subject on a different level on the sex scale: Orsino does not become a differently gendered or even a bi-gendered person during his amorous suspension, but he is depicted as inactive, incompetent, fickle and comical (TN). Despite his normally ‘noble’ traits, Orsino is considered to suffer from an effeminate ‘affliction’. His subjectivity, which is bound to his gender, temporarily decreases in precision and perfection when his amorous emotions take hold. Orsino is inactive because his gendered agency is off balance (TN). He becomes pathetic and slightly monstrous. This argument can be substantiated by Thomas Wright’s indication that differently gendered signals, such as motions, expressions, and apparel, slightly dehumanise their bearers, robbing them of a recognisable reference point. He uses an example from classical sources: ‘well alluded Diogenes, being asked a question of a yoong man, very neatly and finly apparreled; he sayd he would not answere him before he put off his apparell, that he might know whther he was a man or a woman: declaring by his effeminate attire, his womanish wantonnesse’ (1604, 137).

**Dramatic Transvestite Functions**

Greenblatt introduces a concept which he refers to as gender ‘swerving’ in ‘Fiction and Friction’ (68). The ideas of Orsino’s state of gender suspension and Viola/Cesario’s gender juxtaposition in *Twelfth Night* are posed against the concept of a natural ‘bias’ that draws the characters onto their intended course. The movement of the plot is thus sustained by ‘a strategic, happy swerving’ (Greenblatt,
Greenblatt argues that ‘Swerving is not a random image in the play; it is one of the central structural principles of Twelfth Night’ (1988, 68). This principle is not merely a function carrying dramatic signification, according to Greenblatt: it is the primary cause and interpretation inferred by the play. By allowing the characters and the plot to ‘swerve’ between a number of binary extremes; man and woman; master and servant; reality and staged reality, Shakespeare creates a situation of continual instability and friction.

Greenblatt recounts several instances in Twelfth Night, where a sense of swerving becomes obvious. He argues that Shakespeare’s deliberate references to the ambiguity of the breeched characters’ gender are examples of the means that create this dramatic effect. The fact that Viola/Cesario’s character actually appears to be both ‘a maid and man’ (TN, 145; V.i.261); both a humble servant and her ‘master’s mistress’ (TN, 149; V.i.324); both reality’s androgynous young actor and the versatile young girl of the play, allows the character to avoid absolute characterisation (Greenblatt, 1988, 70-72). Viola/Cesario is the incorporation of a conceptual paradox, which is portrayed rather as a reminder of the unreliability of recognition, than as a recognisable person.

Viola/Cesario tells Olivia at their first meeting: ‘by the very / fangs of malice I swear, I am not that I play’ (TN, 31; I.v.184-185). This comment is directly aimed at the audience, who knows that Viola is not the boy Olivia believes her to be. She thus calls attention to this particular act of swerving. However, the comment may also be interpreted as the interference of a deus ex machina, reminding the audience that Viola’s femininity, as well as Cesario’s masculinity, is an act. The conception of
Viola’s character thus swerves between genders on two planes simultaneously, creating a persona whose exterior attributes are so mutable that they eliminate any possibility of an interior essence.

Orgel concludes, that Viola’s lack of an individual essence is affirmed by the fact that she so easily gets exchanged for Sebastian when her femininity is exposed. He thus argues that gender in *Twelfth Night* is determined by attire:

only the costume, the chosen role, distinguishes Cesario from Viola and Viola from the Sebastian who is effortlessly substituted for her in Viola’s affections. The gender of these figures is mutable, constructed, a matter of choice (1996, 57).

In coherence with this argument, Greenblatt points out that Orsino will not consider Viola a woman until she has put on women’s garments, and the play finishes before she has a chance to do so (1988, 92). Despite the fact that Orsino knows Viola’s ‘true’ gender, he addresses her as a man:

Cesario, come;

For so you shall be while you are a man;

But when in other habits you are seen,

Orsino’s mistress, and his fancy’s queen.

(*TN*, 153; V.i.384-387)

Similarly, Rosalind/Ganymede immediately considers the inappropriateness of her male garments, when she realises that Orlando harbours affections for her female persona: ‘Alas the day, what shall I do with my doublet and / hose?’ (*AYL*, III.ii.215-216).

Orgel argues that Shakespeare’s usage of characters that lack essential genders is a sign of universal fluidity within the conceptual gender paradigm of
English Renaissance society (1996, 53-82). Viola/Cesario and Rosalind/Ganymede’s dualities thus become neatly explained through the tenets of the homological sex thesis: they appear to be dramatic reflections of the new historicist concept of Renaissance self-fashioning. Although Greenblatt makes similar connections between Renaissance medicine and Renaissance drama as Orgel, he does not reach the same conclusion. For Greenblatt ‘swerving’ is a dramatic and social function rather than a cultural explanation. ‘Fiction and Friction’ fetishises both the inherent duality assumed in Galen’s homological sex thesis and the dual gendered character of Viola/Cesario. Greenblatt considers gender ‘swerving’ to produce a form of titillating chafing and it becomes a particularly effective dramatic function because of its inherent eroticism. The contemporary success of Twelfth Night as well as the stories of spontaneous sex change is due to the sexual friction produced by the multiple layers of sexual identity involved in the construction of their protagonists (1988).

Both Greenblatt’s ‘Fiction and Friction’ and Orgel’s Impersonations create the idea of a particular transvestite function in Renaissance drama. For Orgel, the transvestite is a means of gendered communication; a dual persona that brings men closer to women, whereas Greenblatt considers the transvestite to be the embodiment of the friction between the sexes. Both Orgel and Greenblatt’s transvestites are ‘enabling figures’ (Orgel, 1996, 63): they are the centre of the dramatic sexual tensions that enable the plots of the plays to move forwards. Orgel and Greenblatt create bi-gendered transvestites: they portray characters that embody the borderlands of the gender binary. There is a notable difference, however. The character Orgel speaks of is something in between men and women; something half-way on the
sexual scale from men to women.\textsuperscript{31} Greenblatt’s transvestite function is dependent on the character being \textit{both} man and woman\textsuperscript{32}.

Orgel quotes Tennenhouse’s \textit{Power on Display}, arguing that Shakespeare’s \textit{The Merchant of Venice} creates ‘a problem which can only be resolved by a transvestite’ (Tennenhouse, 59; Orgel, 1996, 77).\textsuperscript{33} Orgel refers to the part of the play in which Portia and her maid Nerissa’s male personas demand their female personas’ husbands to give them the rings that their wives have earlier given them as love tokens. Portia sets up a test for her lover Bassanio, which she knows he will fail. Since her male persona Balthazar has saved the life of Bassanio’s beloved patron and friend Antonio, he cannot deny him the ring. The test, however, exposes the difference in value between the male and the female bond when, as Antonio puts it: ‘his deservings and my love withal / Be valued ‘gainst your wife’s commandment’ \textit{(MV}, 122; VI.i.446-447). Bassanio gives Balthasar the ring, and in Orgel’s opinion, shows what marriage is worth in comparison to the love between men (1996, 75-77).

In order for this comedy to have a suitably happy ending, Bassanio should thus be married to a man rather than a woman. This is the situation for which a transvestite is needed. Orgel argues that marriage does not constitute a repudiation of male bonding: ‘a wife is the supreme gift of male friendship’ (1996, 77). Antonio describes his generous act in suitably physical terms: ‘I once did lend my body for his wealth’ \textit{(MV}, 137; V.i.249). Since Antonio and Bassanio’s relationship has openly been deemed more important than marriage, something needs to be done if the play is to end on a harmonic note. According to Orgel, Portia hence ‘engineers a
marriage that does not constitute a repudiation of male friendship; and it is to the point that she has to pose as a man in order to do so’ (1996, 77).

Orgel argues that Portia becomes something in-between the man and the woman of Bassanio’s contentious affections, in order to mediate or ‘enable’ a happy resolution (1996, 77). However, Portia’s breech of the gender division is slightly different from that of Viola or Rosalind. Orgel notes that Portia is increasingly de-feminised throughout the play. She is strong and domineering (1996, 77). From the start, she sets the rules for her courtship and for the movements of the plot. She not merely dresses as a man to save Antonio: she transgresses her gender limits to get the upper hand in her prospective marriage. Unlike Viola and Rosalind, she appears to be a successful man, never slipping, and delivering a learned and thoughtful performance of the inherently male judicial profession. When Portia executes her cunning plan to expose Bassanio’s true feelings, she provides a final reminder that Balthazar’s mental virtues do not disappear when the doctor’s cloak is shed (MV).

Like Orgel suggests, Portia partially becomes a man, but her male characteristics not merely ‘enable’ a happy relationship to Bassanio, they constitute the ingredients for their happy union. If Portia succeeds to win over Bassanio’s affections by becoming a man, she manages to keep and control his affections by partially remaining in her male disguise. Before Portia reveals her dual personas, she attempts to make Bassanio jealous by telling him that she has slept with Balthasar, and after the revelation Bassanio flirtatiously responds by offering both his own and his wife’s marital services to Portia’s male alter-ego: ‘Sweet doctor, you shall be my bedfellow, - / When I am absent, then lie with my wife’ (MV, 138; V.i.284-285).
Despite Orgel’s examples of half-male/half-female performances, the way in which Portia holds on to her male character coheres better with Greenblatt’s definition of the transvestite function. Bassanio never directs his attentions to an in-between or bi-gendered character. He either addresses the female Portia or the male Balthazar, and so does his friend Antonio. Completing Bassanio’s flirtatious address, Antonio turns to Portia’s female side: ‘Sweet Lady, you have given me life and living’ (MV, 138; V.i.286). The transvestite function in Bassanio and Portia’s conventional marital relationship seemingly makes way for a decidedly more titillating ménage à trois, the sexual friction that generates and maintains a lasting marital happiness. This idea is strengthened by a mirror marriage between Nerissa, who disguises herself as Balthasar’s clerk, and her husband Gratiano. The latter suggestively states:

The first inter’gatory
That my Nerissa shall be sworn on, is,
Whether till the next night she had rather stay,
Or go to bed now (being two hours to day):
But were the day come, I should wish it dark
Till I were couching with the doctor’s clerk.

(MV, 139; V.i.300-305)

From the perspective of Greenblatt’s transvestite function, Shakespeare manages to create a final scene that does not dispel the binary sexual tension created by the transvestite characters, but rather strengthens it. The means are similar to those used in Twelfth Night and As You Like It. Viola is still in her masculine attire at the closing of the play, and as Orsino indicates, this means that she remains Cesario indefinitely
Rosalind regains her masculine credibility when she addresses the audience in the epilogue, implying that she is not a woman (AYL).

Although Greenblatt’s theory convincingly explains the suspended transvestite status of Shakespeare’s breeched heroines, it does not cohere with the rest of the argument presented in ‘Fiction and Friction’. Greenblatt argues that the sexual friction produces an erotic heat similar to the heat described in Galen’s homological sex thesis, in which the Roman philosopher claims that men and women are produced from the same seed. The gender of a phoetus depends on the amount of heat the womb manages to gather up when forming the seed. Greenblatt suggests that the development of the breeched heroines’ identities mirror this progression ‘because the transformation of gender identity figures the emergence of an individual out of a twinned sexual nature’ (91). He argues that the transvestite plays demonstrate the emergence of female identity: ‘Rosalind and Viola pass through the state of being men in order to become women’ (92). As Greenblatt’s own idea of the transvestite function shows, however, both Rosalind and Viola are more female in the beginning of the plays than at their closure. The characters rather reverse into a twinned state than emerge out of it.

In fact, neither Viola, Rosalind nor Portia are depicted as either men or women in the final scenes of Twelfth Night, As You Like It and The Merchant of Venice. Rather than being half-man/half-woman or both man and woman, the transvestite characters in these comedies attain their particular power from being neither man nor woman. When Rosalind’s epilogue suggests that she is not a woman, she does not explicitly expose herself as a man. Her implications of masculinity are
spoken while she continues to address her audience in her women’s garments, displaying feminine mannerisms. The epilogue Rosalind is neither thoroughly a man nor a woman: she indicates that she is a transvestite. Viola’s exposition is met with a reaction of wonder and references to ‘A natural perspective, that is and is not’ (TN, 143; V.i.215). Also Portia becomes a strange and conceptually unnatural character. Orgel establishes that English Renaissance society considered strong and masculine women to be slightly disturbing, and these were often made the objects of mirth (1996, 77). Portia takes a masculine upper hand until the very end of the The Merchant of Venice. It is Portia, rather than the male protagonists, who finally takes the first step towards terminating the action:

Let us go in,
And charge us there upon inter’gatories,
And we will answer all things faithfully.

(MV, V.i.297-299)

Like the other breeched heroines, she thus confesses herself to be something more destabilising and less definable than the ‘natural’ sexes entail. Shakespeare’s heroines are revealed as something beyond simple ‘nature’: Viola recognises that she has successively become a ‘poor monster’ (TV, 42; II.iii.33).

The Function of Monstrosity

As I established in chapter 2, the anti-theatrical writers continually refer to the act of gender transgression as monstrous or prodigious. William Prynne concludes his description of masculine women, stating that they are ‘much like a monster’ (201). Phillip Stubbes similarly states that they belong to the prodigies known as hermaphrodites (F5v). Prynne also refers to gender transgressors in general,
exclaiming ‘What Monster, or what Prodigy is this?’ (195). Transvestites are monsters of nature, and like Orsino’s reaction to the simultaneously unnatural and natural perspective indicates, they gain their particular power from being part of nature, yet outside of its norm.

As chapter two recounts, the idea of the monstrous and the prodigious was a fashionable concept in religious and scientific discourse throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was used in a similar fashion to the new historicist usage of the marginal or the ‘aberrant’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 86). References to monstrous or prodigious creatures were frequently included in tracts from a vast number of scientific and religiously oriented fields, as a means to allocate and sometimes even re-set the borders between the natural and the unnatural. Hermaphrodites and other sexually ambiguous people were referred to in diverse medical tracts, in order to form an idea of the natural sexual anatomy. Similarly, the anti-theatrical writers use examples of transvestites and androgynes in their stipulations of the natural gendered attributes and mannerisms. The abhorrence attributed to these monsters is charged by the contemporary social limits of gender normality.

This chapter is suggesting that Renaissance drama also uses monsters for their antithetical quality; for the fact that they simultaneously are a natural perspective and something beyond the limits of nature. This may seem similar to new historicist investigations of ‘normality’ within ‘aberration’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 86). There is an important difference, however. Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel read Renaissance monstrosity as an indication of accepted gender norms. The normal is the concept of interest: and since Greenblatt claims that ‘the normal is found in the
sands of the aberrant’ (Greenblatt, 1988, 86, my emphasis), the aberrant becomes a mere means to measure its limits. Greenblatt and Orgel also acknowledge a transvestite function, but this merely operates as a deliberator within the gender binary (1988; 1996). Neither Greenblatt nor Orgel consider the immediate function of the aberrant; the implications of a concept that is placed opposite to the natural orders. Rather than considering the invocations of monstrosity in Renaissance texts as judgements on transgender elements, the gender aberrant can be read as a reference to a more general function of monstrosity.

Renaissance drama is constructed on the principle of monstrosity. As Michael O’Connell points out in an article on the rejection of iconoclasm, the anti-theatrical writers did not merely consider the presence of transvestite actors on the Renaissance stage evil: they find the representational quality of the dramatic medium equally, if not more unacceptable (1985, 206-300). Orgel affirms that ‘the fact of transvestite boys is really only incidental; it is the whole concept of the mimetic art that is at issue, the art itself that effeminates’ (1996, 29). The anti-theatrical writers refer to the theatre as a space of voluptuous ‘effeminate’ behaviours. William Prynne argues that all stage-plays and their players are unnatural ‘in respect of the costly gawdinesse, the immodest lasciviousnesse, the fantastique strangeness, the meretricious, effeminate lust-provoking fashions of that apparell wherein they are commonly acted and frequented’ (1633, 216). Phillip Stubbes further claims that the theatrical space not merely displays monstrosity, but produces it: ‘these goodly pageants being done, euery mate sorts to his mate, euery one brings another homeward of their way verye friendly, and in their secret conclaues (couertly) they play ye Sodomits, or worse’ (1583, L8v).
The monstrous transvestite actors pose as a reflection of the dramatic medium. They transform gender reality into gender fiction. Transvestite characters mirror the well-known ‘natural’ conventions of gender according to an ‘unnatural’ exactness: they are overt reflections of gender, enacted and refashioned\(^{38}\). In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Friedrich Nietzsche describes classical tragedy as a progressive contention between Apolline forces, which serve the ends of conventional structure, and Dionysiac forces, issuing a state of disbelief and havoc. This continual dissension produces a cathartic effect, through which the audience may glimpse a possibility of something beyond the received beliefs.\(^{39}\) The given behaviour of the transvestite characters and the knowledge that this is an enacted behaviour, the natural mannerisms and their unnatural seat, may thus provide a certain amount of insight into the art of imitation.

According to Aristotle’s ‘Poetics’, imitation is the primary function of comedy. Comedy is presented as the antithesis of the ‘higher’ art of tragedy: ‘one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day’ (Aristotle, 1954, 18-19; II.1448a.). He states that ‘these elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation’ (1954, 29-30; II.1447b). If the comedy form reflects the form of tragedy, but is yet unlike tragedy, creating disbelief within the formal recognition, it creates a cathartic experience relating to the structure of drama. Comedy is the monstrous twin of tragedy, like drama according to the anti-theatrical writers is the monstrous form of life and the transvestite actor is the monstrous form of the naturally sexed human being. Shakespeare’s breeched heroines thus add an extra dimension to an already multi-dimensionally active hall of
mirrors, generating extra frictive power within the monstrously charged classical comedy form.

Both Orgel and Greenblatt argue that the transvestite characters are enablers or translators of sexual relationships between men and women. This is not, however, because they harbour parts of both sexes or because they are intermediates between the sexes, but because they are different from the sexes. This does not mean that they are an independent concept. The monstrous transvestite is the binary opposite of the binary sexes; the ‘natural’ sexual order. It is a deviation; a mutant of the sexual construct. Like the monsters described by Francis Bacon in Novum Organum and Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, the monstrous transvestite is created on the basis of an existing concept, but goes outside of its limits, and is thus charged with the ability to reconsider and reshape it. This monstrous transvestite cannot be considered as a group or a separate sex. One monster may not share many similarities with another. The transvestites formed in one play may be crucially different from those formed in another. The only thing that they definitely have in common is their status as sexual deviants or monsters.

The function of the monstrous transvestite is aptly represented in Thomas Middleton and Thomas Dekker’s The Roaring Girl (1611). Unlike the transvestites in Shakespeare’s comedies, Moll Cutpurse in Middleton and Dekker’s play is not one of the primary characters in the play. She is not one of the characters whose relationship is being enabled, but functions merely as the ‘enabler’. Also unlike Shakespeare’s transvestites, she is not a continually transgressive character; she does not move between different layers of gendered existence. Moll’s presence is merely
there to enable other characters’ sexual interests and marital movements. Her state as an outsider in the battle between the sexes makes her able to meddle in it (Middleton & Dekker, *RG*).

According to Orgel’s *Impersonations*, Moll’s character would have been attired in a male jerkin worn over a woman’s duster, ‘since the role was played by a boy, this was a way of indicating that she is “really” a woman’ (151). However, this form of dress does not make her look like either a man or a woman. It makes her look like a strange and sexually indefinable creature. Since Moll, unlike Shakespeare’s transvestites, does not move between differently gendered states, the duster and the jerkin is a way of signifying that she is different, and thus not to be confused either with the other men or the other women.

Orgel refers to the protagonist in *The Roaring Girl* as a final example of a number of English Renaissance ‘real-life’ transvestite case histories. The character Moll Cutpurse is based on ‘*Mistress Mary Frith, commonly called Moll Cutpurse*’ (Orgel, 1996, 139, original emphasis). The real Moll Cutpurse was immensely popular in early sixteenth-century London. She was as Middleton and Dekker’s character Sebastian puts it, ‘a creature / So strange in quality, a whole city takes / Note of her name and person’ (*RG*, 13; I.i.95-97). The original production of *The Roaring Girl* was thus intended to obtain its success through Moll Cutpurse’s popularity. From this point of view, Moll Cutpurse’s ‘strangeness’ not merely enables the sexual interactions in *The Roaring Girl*, but enables the actual dramatic production.
Yet, *Impersonations* reads Moll Cutpurse in terms of incompleteness. Orgel quotes the character Sir Alexander’s description of Moll: ‘her birth began / Ere she was all made’ (*RG*, 20; I.ii.129-130), claiming that the old man indict[s] that Moll is an unfinished human being. He refers to the Galenic descriptions of the human anatomy, stating that Moll would have been considered almost a man; on her way to being a man, but in a state of male incompleteness. Her mentality managed to be formed like a man’s but her mother’s womb failed to conjure up the amount of heat needed to give her a male body before she was born. Orgel argues that this also makes her an incomplete woman, if considered from the Aristotelian point of view that there is a state of perfection in both sexes. Moll’s attire and mannerisms are reflections of an inappropriate and thus incomplete female psyche (Orgel, 1996, 139-153).

This conception seems strange, considering the amount of power that Moll wields over both the characters and the structure of the play. The statement about Moll’s birth is, however, merely a fraction of Sir Alexander’s full speech. Considered in its actual context, the connotations of the words are less consistent with Orgel’s argument about sexual intermediacy and incompleteness:

A creature, saith he, nature hath brought forth
To mock the sex of woman. It is a thing
One knows not how to name, her birth began
Ere she was all made.

(*RG*, 20; I.ii.127-130)

Sir Alexander does not indicate that Moll was born before she was made into a man, but rather that she was born before she was shaped into a proper human being at all.
Sir Davy replies to Sir Alexander’s description: ‘A monster! ‘Tis some monster’ (RG, 20; I.ii.134). Sir Alexander later re-affirms this diagnosis: ‘This wench we speak of strays so from her kind, / Nature repents she made her’ (RG, 24; I.ii.211-212).

This monstrosity is sexually deviant, but it does not ‘stray’ within the sexual binary. Even in Sir Alexander’s most overt references to Moll’s prodigal nature, there is never any doubt that she is a woman. Moll Cutpurse is a monstrous woman, and she is aware that her monstrosity is her particular attraction. Trapdoor, a man Sir Alexander sends out to spy on her, manages to gain her trust by offering her a form of flattery that she apparently greatly appreciates. He assures her that he wishes to volunteer his services because of ‘The love I bear to you heroic spirit and masculine / womanhood.’ (RG, 42; II.i.322-323). Despite her affirmed womanhood, however, a man called Laxton, who vows at the beginning of the play, that ‘I will have nought to do with any woman’, finds this particular woman irresistibly attractive. When encountering her fierce persona, he exclaims: ‘Heart, I would give but too much money to be / nibbling with that wench.’ (RG, 34; II.i.169-170). Moll Cutpurse is thus attractive and powerful because she is a woman, and yet not a woman.

Moll’s power lies in the fact that she, in accordance with my stipulation of the monstrous function, is natural, and yet not natural. The play acquires its ends because of the fact that Moll’s monstrosity is commonly seen as strange, but simultaneously curiously attractive. Sebastian tricks his father, Sir Alexander, to believe that he intends to marry Moll in order to make him more benevolently inclined towards his actual fiancée. Despite his disdain for the monstrous, Sir Alexander readily believes
that Moll’s strangeness possesses enough power to lead his son down such a ‘crooked way’ *(RG*, 13; I.ii.103). He ‘grieves / As it becomes a father for a son / That could be so bewitched’ *(RG*, 13; I.i.100-102). Sir Alexander even trusts that Moll’s monstrosity gives her the power to change the course of his son’s life: ‘’Tis a mermaid / Has tolled my son to shipwreck.’ *(RG*, 24; I.ii.212-213).

Moll is also aware of her power to control the plot, and happily agrees to become the means of Sebastian’s happiness. In the final scene she acts as the conjuror of marital bliss, introducing Sir Alexander to his actual daughter-in-law: ‘Now are you as gulled as you would be. Thank me for’t, / I’d a forefinger in’t.’ *(RG*, 140; V.ii.168-169). This is not an overstatement. She personally arranges and carries out the plot to secure the happy union. As she puts it herself, she has a particular knack for devising marriage: ‘marriage is but a chopping and changing / where a maiden loses one head, and has a worse I’th’ place’ *(RG*, 47; II.ii.43-44). She states that she has acquired this skill, because her transgendered nature makes her complete in herself and thus allows her to remain outside of this convention: ‘I have no humour to marry. I love to lie o’both sides / o’th’bed myself and again on the other side’ *(RG*, 47; II.ii.36-37).

Moll Cutpurse offers *The Roaring Girl* an enabling monstrous transvestite function. Furthermore, Middleton and Dekker affirm the idea of the reflectivity of monstrosity, by indicating that the transvestite mirrors the concept of drama. Orgel notes that the playwrights romanticise Moll, implying that a strange surface may hide an honourable and natural interior: ‘Who’d think that in one body there could dwell / Deformity and beauty, heaven and hell?’ *(RG*, 109; IV.ii.198-199). He continues to
suggest that ‘the play makes similar claims for the theatre itself; … demonstrating that beneath the stage’s transgressive costume beats a chaste and true heart’ (Orgel, 1996, 149). Middleton and Dekker clearly make a connection between their transvestite character and the concept of drama in the epilogue to *The Roaring Girl*. They describe a painter, who attempts to paint the perfect woman, and although some people commend his work, some will still find faults. The painter then continually mends the painting, until ‘it was so vile, / So monstrous, and so ugly, all men did smile / At the poor painter’s folly’ (*RG*, 144; ‘Epilogue’, 13-15). Middleton and Dekker assure that they will not make the same mistake:

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Such we doubt
Is this our comedy – some perhaps do flout
The plot, saying ‘tis too thin, too weak, too mean;
Some for the person will revile the scene,
And wonder that a creature of her being
Should be the subject of a poet, seeing
In the world’s eye, none weighs so light;
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(*RG*, 144; ‘Epilogue’, 15-21)

The playwrights thus argue that although Moll Cutpurse is a strange woman and their comedy is a strange play, their creation of strangeness is better than a creation striving towards perfection, because perfection is not a universal concept. They conclude: ‘If we to every brain that’s humorous / Should fashion scenes, we, with the painter, shall / In striving to please all, please none at all’ (*RG*, 145; ‘Epilogue’, 28-30). The fact that Moll Cutpurse is neither man nor woman, and that she does not strive to be either, thus makes her monstrosity less vile. Moll gains her power of attraction because she is not as Greenblatt would claim both man and woman, nor as
Orgel suggests something between man and woman. Her function relies on the fact that she is comfortably neither man nor woman.
[CHAPTER 4] Becoming-Queer: Queer Space and Personal Narration

The thesis now makes a temporal leap from the queer space developed by historicisation of the past to a queer space formed through historicisation of the present. As I argued in the previous three chapters, the first space is shaped by historical contrast through idealist readings of a supposedly queer Renaissance. The space I will outline now is formed through acts of self-reflexive narration. Whereas the first space is a historicisation of the ‘other’, the second space is thus a historicisation of the ‘I’; the narrating subject. I will return to this idea. First, however, the discussion will turn to the theoretical queer discourse of the late 1980s and 1990s and the conceptualisation of the queer subject.

The previous chapters repeatedly refer to the fantasy of an ideal queer past constructed in the English Renaissance. It is now time to move to the queer fantasy conjectured in the 1980s and 1990s discussion of contemporary gender and sexuality. Kath Weston comments in *Gender in Real Time* that it was ‘an impossibly beautiful dream: to live in a genderless world, or if that’s not your cup of tea, to live in a world untrammelled by the inequalities historically associated with gender’ (1). This chapter will make a thorough investigation of the academic conception of the ‘queer’, the act of queering and above all the concept of queer identity, especially in relation to transgender studies conceptions of the transgender subject and transgender self-reflexive narratives.
The queer is an infamously difficult concept to define, as most readers, anthologies, introductions and guides acknowledge. David Halperin states that ‘there is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers’ (1995, 62, original emphasis). One of the reasons for this may be that it has been given a vast array of different more or less abstract interpretations. I will favour a theoretical, rather than a sociological interpretation of the movement, in which the formation of gendered and sexual identities and the limits of subjectivity are questioned.

Queer Identity: Performative and Non-Essential Subjectivity

Queer theory recognises the queer both in terms of a verbal and a subjective capacity; as the act of queering and a queer identity or concept. According to Diana Fuss both uses signal an attempt to deconstruct dominant sexual and gendered binaries; ‘to bring the hetero/homo opposition to the point of collapse’ (1991, 1). Annamarie Jagose claims that ‘queer describes those gestures or analytical models which dramatise incoherencies in the allegedly stable relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire’ (1996, 1). The Oxford English Dictionary describes queering as the critical endeavour to ‘challenge or deconstruct traditional ideas of sexuality and gender’ (OED, ‘queer’ v). The ‘queer’ thus becomes the defiantly non-binary, hyper-normal or abnormal and the act of ‘queering’ is an act of deconstructing or de-normalising.

The birth of queer theory as an academic movement is, as I mention in chapter one, often attributed to Michel Foucault’s influence and the publication of the three volumes of The History of Sexuality. How and where queer theory actually started and what it in reality entails is less easily defined. In Saint Foucault: Towards
a Gay Hagiography, David Halperin describes queer identity as a concept which by its definition cannot be defined: ‘Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. It is an identity without an essence’ (62). In A Genealogy of Queer Theory, William B. Turner describes it as a cultural and academic development that perhaps among other things can be traced back to an increased openness of gay and transgender people in public society and a resulting indeterminacy of the gender binary and heteronormative inevitability. The direct roots of this movement are indefinable but at the same time quite obviously lodged throughout the entirety of post-Enlightenment western history (Turner, 2000, 1-3). ‘Whatever the cause’, he writes however, ‘a large and rapidly growing body of scholarly literature exists under the rubric of “queer” and “queer theory”’ (Turner, 2000, 3).

Despite Turner’s claim to indefinable origins, queer theory as a defined academic movement certainly has a traceable past. The term ‘queer theory’ was coined by Teresa de Laurentis when attempting to distinguish a trend in recent theory of gender and sexuality at a conference held at the University of California, Santa Cruz in February 1990 (White, 2007, 1). A number of the theorists who make up the foundation of the field never directly identified with the movement themselves or were only attributed the title of ‘queer theorist’ after the publication of their key texts. Different readers, critical guides, websites and anthologies conjoin different critical theorists under the umbrella term of ‘queer theorists’ and a large proportion of these express widely different views on gender and sexual identity, gendered and sexual practice and academic methodology.
The majority of the various readers, anthologies, websites, introductions, critical guides and genealogies of queer theory do however agree that the two pivotal queer theorists are Michel Foucault and Judith Butler.\(^1\) Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality* (1976-84) trilogy lays the grounds for a critique of traditional presentations of identity and sexuality in history,\(^1\) and Butler’s *Gender Trouble* (1990) and *Bodies that Matter* (1993) are generally considered to have founded the specifically queer conception of where gendered and sexual identity is constructed and how it should be negotiated. There are a number of differences and basic incongruities in Foucault’s and Butler’s accounts,\(^1\) but they do agree on one basic stance: gender is entirely socially constructed.\(^1\)

Encountering various psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity and gender, mainly from Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, Butler’s *Gender Trouble* argues that gender is neither a natural concept nor a pre-determined essence; ‘rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts’ (1999a, 179, original emphasis). She explains that gender is a performance, but not in the sense that the actors or their social surroundings can control the results. This is why gender appears to be internal: neither society nor its individual subjects are in control of gender production. The concept is neither lodged internally or externally. It appears only within the repetition. This is where Butler introduces the great paradox of gender: without the myth of internality it could not be sustained. It is repeated precisely because it is ‘believe[d] and perform[ed] in the mode of belief’ (Butler, 1999a, 179). Despite this, however, the myth can never be fully embodied. The gendered self conducts ‘repeated acts that seek to approximate the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their occasional
discontinuity, reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this “ground”” (Butler, 1999a, 179).

Butler furthers her argument of performative gender in ‘Imitation and Gender Insubordination’, stating that gender performance inscribes a conception of sexual difference upon the body: ‘gender is a performance that produces the illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core; it produces on the skin, through the gesture, the move, the gait (that array of corporeal theatrics understood as gender presentation), the illusion of an inner depth’ (2004a, 134). She thus argues that not only internalised gendered difference, but the idea of an essential biological sexual difference is false, and that all signification of such is performative.14 In doing so, Butler challenges the division between sex and gender, considered to have been made first by Kessler and McKenna in 1978 (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Jagose, 1996). Bodily difference is here considered to be entirely discursive – and although she claims in the introduction to the subsequent Bodies that Matter that this was never her intent (Butler, 1993, x-xii), she continues to do so throughout that text.15

Butler devotes a great amount of space in Bodies that Matter, attempting to tie up the many loose ends identified in her theory of performativity after the publication of Gender Trouble.16 She further argues that all gender and sexual identities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual or straight, man, woman or transgender, should be exposed as what they are: performative re-articulations of an internalised social imperative. These should also be resisted as far as is possible and exchanged for a position of being critically citational and assuming a ‘stance’ of queerness (1993, 21-22; 222-242). It may be important politically, Butler argues, to perform
female or male, lesbian or gay identities, but the agents should be critically aware of the superficiality of these identities and ‘queer’ them; de-normalise them (1993, 176-178; 222-224).\textsuperscript{17}

Although Butler denies that there is such a thing as a queer identity, she creates a concept of queerness that infers a form of subject positioning.\textsuperscript{18} Butler’s demand for a resistance to internalised norms is the basis for the conceptualisation of queer identity in queer theory. However the resistant queer subject is considered in two ways: it is either a person who through their dissident gender attributes or sexual practices resists the dominant social norms, or a person who refuses to identify with any set identity categories of woman, man, lesbian, gay, bisexual or straight.\textsuperscript{19} Numerous guides, readers and introductions to queer theory quote Judith Butler’s \textit{Gender Trouble} and \textit{Bodies that Matter} when outlining queer identity and queer agendas.\textsuperscript{20} Butler’s performativity theory paves the way for an identity that operates like a form of non-identity; a rejection of identity, although it carries all the traits of the concept it defies. Unsurprisingly, this stance has proven problematic in relation to other political movements or academic conceptualisations of gender and sexuality.\textsuperscript{21} This chapter will particularly focus on its reverberations within transgender studies and conceptualisations of the transgender subject.

\textbf{Gender Fiction versus Transgender Identity}

Although the concept of transgenderism is celebrated as a space of transgressive gender formation in some works engaging with queer theory and Judith Butler’s performativity theory, a number of transgender academics have acknowledged that transgender subjectivity is incompatible with queerness.\textsuperscript{22} Whereas some transgender
scholars and authors, such as Stephen Whittle, Kate Bornstein and Julia Serano have attempted to find a common space for queer and transgender subjectivity (Whittle, 2006; Bornstein, 1995; Serano, 2007), others angrily reject queer theory as a form of transgender suppression and objectification (Jones, 2006; Zander, 2003).

Jordy Jones refers to Judith Butler in order to demonstrate queer theory’s tendency to objectify transgender subjectivity (2006). At the end of Gender Trouble, Judith Butler forms a liberatory idea of the transgender body. She discusses the concept of ‘drag’ as it is presented in Esther Newton’s Mother Camp. Drag performance, Butler argues, excellently displays the performative nature of gender attributes, since it ‘plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed’ (1999a, 175). Drag performance is not merely exemplary of how gender can be performed, but is an important agent in Butler’s political project of de-essentialising society’s general idea of gender: ‘In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency’ (1999a, 175, original emphasis).

This particular section of Gender Trouble has set off a great number of works on drag or camped-up gender difference as a discourse of gender resistance, collected for example in Moe Meyer’s The Politics and Poetics of Camp and Fabio Cleto’s Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject. In his introduction, Moe Meyer refers to Butler’s drag as he outlines a discourse of active resistance to social norms, a discourse of camp or ‘queerness’, which reconsiders gender transgressive deviation as a political device. Meyer describes the discourse of camp as the ‘constitution of a homosexual social identity’ (19); the political function within queer discourse. The
discourse of camp is a means of dispersing the terror of sublimation, but also acts as a parody of the dominant discourse: ‘By inverting the process of appropriation, Camp can be read as a critique of ideology through a parody that is always already appropriated’ (18).

The transgender body here becomes a political means for queer action.23 Meyer’s appropriation of Butler’s body in drag is an abstract space for exterior political battles, and Butler indeed advocates something similar in the section on Esther Newton’s *Mother Camp* in *Gender Trouble*. She writes about a performative and completely abstract conception of the transgender body. This fictional transgender character is a mere canvas for inherently queer and/or homosexual conflicts. In *Second Skins*, Jay Prosser points out that while Butler’s transgender abstraction has made the idea of transgender characteristics into something which is considered liberatory and fashionable, and thus given it a place within theoretical discourse, the concept does not allow for transgender subjectivity (1998). If gender is always performative, the transgender body – like any gendered body – is always in drag. The distinction which is usually made between a transsexual and a drag performer is the experience of an essential gender,24 the very thing that Butler attempts to abolish. According to this idea, the transsexual body, as an agent in Butler’s political project, thus partakes in the annihilation of its own particular existence.

Butler herself admits that her theory does not leave space for transgender identity. In ‘Against Proper Objects’, she suggests that there is an ‘important dissonance’ methodologically between lesbian and gay studies and transgender
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studies, indicating that the two are irreconcilable (1994, 11).\textsuperscript{25} Jay Prosser notes that Butler does not consider whether this might derive from a problem with the articulation of her theory: ‘For Butler the concern is queer’s capacity to include, a question about queer’s elasticity, about how far the term “queer” will stretch. What is not a concern is whether queer should even attempt to expand’ (1998, 58).

Butler defends and further explains her conception of drag in \textit{Bodies that Matter}, referring to the cult documentary \textit{Paris Is Burning}, which depicts a number of MTF transsexuals in New York. She concludes that ‘drag is not unproblematically subversive’ (231), on the grounds that for the purposes of the film, the filmmaker Jennie Livingston needs to ask the characters to perform femininity. She describes how Jennie Livingston metaphorically acquires a phallus ‘i.e. the ability to confer that femininity’ (Butler, 1993, 135), in the act of becoming the camera’s fetishising/feminising gaze and through this intrusion the drag performance becomes an act of violence (135-137). Butler describes the camera simultaneously as a means of rape and as a surgical instrument (135), thereby implying that there is a connection between gendered and sexual violence and trans-sex operations.

Jay Prosser criticises Butler’s usage of psychoanalytic language interchangeably as abstract and corporeal terms in \textit{Second Skins}. He notes that Butler’s discussion of ‘transsexualisation’ in \textit{Paris Is Burning} depends on a ‘crucial substitution of fleshly part with symbolic signifier’ (53).\textsuperscript{26} Butler identifies the abstract psycho-analytic concept of the ‘phallus’ in Livingstone’s gaze and she automatically translates it onto the body, thus short-circuiting the tension between the ‘real’ and mere signification: ‘the “real girl” acquir[es] a phallus … as she
represents the transsexual as a “real girl” (Prosser, 1998, 275). According to Prosser, such an exchange ‘displaces the materiality of transsexuality, and thus the materiality of sex, to the level of figurative’ (275).

Corporeal feminist Rosi Braidotti’s *Metamorphoses* similarly argues that Butler reduces the body to a purely superficial entity in *Bodies that Matter*. She also uses Butler’s discussion of Livingston’s phallus as an example. She considers this section, which is entitled ‘The Lesbian Phallus’ to form an appropriate conception of a phallus with ‘a sort of plastic quality, a transferability which leaves it open to appropriation and re-signification by others’ (2002, 43). This idea extinguishes the possibility of bodily experience. Braidotti explains: ‘I see in it a sort of reduction not only of the Phallus to its penile support, but also of the erotic body as a whole to the status of a prosthetic device’ (2002, 43).

In the political fervour of *Bodies that Matter* and *Gender Trouble*, Butler forgets the reality of the bodily inscriptions, when outlining the process of inscribing. Like the phallus, the transgender body is reduced to Butler’s prosthetic political marionette. It becomes an appropriate laboratory sample to dissect and discard, in order to show that it was never truly there. When the skin is peeled off, it reveals an essence of non-essential queer values. Yet Butler casts herself as the defender of the transgender community in *Gender Trouble* (174-180). Radical feminists, such as Janice G. Raymond tend to see transgender bodies as perpetuators of unwanted gender values (1980). Butler attempts to exculpate the transgender performers, arguing that drag liberates rather than perpetuates gender: ‘[a]s much as drag creates a unified picture of “woman” (what its critics often oppose), it also reveals the
distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which are falsely naturalized as a unity through the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence’ (1999a, 175, my emphasis).

Judith Butler’s objectification of the transgender body reverberates throughout the contemporary queer movement. In her latest book, *In a Queer Time & Place*, Judith Halberstam argues that transgender issues have acquired a secondary status in the conception of queer emancipation. Transgender bodies are made into bearers of non-essentialist queer ideals. She recounts a curious incidence, which took place when she stood up to give a paper after a viewing Susan Muska and Greta Olafsdottir’s documentary *The Brandon Teena Story* (1998), which explores the tragic events that led to the murder of the young FTM transsexual Brandon Teena. She fully expected to find her primarily transgender audience to consider this film, like many academics working within queer studies, to be a milestone within the popular conception of transgender subjects. However, she was faced with a deeply offended crowd that repeatedly charged Halberstam personally, along with Muska and Olafsdottir, with hijacking the tragic appeal of an FTM murder victim to forward inherently queer agendas (2005, 31-32).

Halberstam takes this academic setback as an opportunity to further investigate both the theoretical paradigm that constitutes the basis for contemporary queer theory, and to establish the reasons for the transgender community’s adamant sense of animosity towards it (2005). She uses what she calls ‘The Brandon Archive’, which includes *The Brandon Teena Story* as well as Kimberly Peirce’s *Boys Don’t Cry* (1999), to show that there is a tendency both within journalistic,
political, legal and gender theoretical discourses either to shift the attention away from Brandon Teena’s transgender identification, or to pathologise this condition.  

Kimberly Peirce’s *Boys Don’t Cry* portrays Brandon as a young person, whose confused state of gender dysphoria is a rite of passage in the discovery of a more mature and liberated sensibility. Peirce’s Brandon overcomes his concern with his wrongly sexed body in the final love scene with Lana Tisdel, indicating that everything about his life up to this point has been a lie. Before undressing Brandon, revealing his ‘true’ female form, Lana acknowledges that what they are about to perform is a lesbian love act, exclaiming ‘I don’t know if I’m gonna know how to do it’ (Peirce, 1999). Brandon, who has finally reached his state of cathartic self revelation, affirms that this is what they are about to do, answering her: ‘I’m sure you’ll figure it out’ (Peirce, 1999).

Halberstam comments that

Brandon’s promiscuity and liminal identity is depicted as immature and even pre-modern and as a form of false consciousness. When Brandon explores a mature and adult relationship with one woman who recognises him as ‘really female’, the film suggests, Brandon accedes to a modern form of homosexuality and is finally ‘free’ (2005, 25).

Brandon’s FTM identity is portrayed as a product of his rural hetero-normative upbringing. *Boys Don’t Cry* is a homosexual coming-of-age story, where the protagonist matures into the recognition that his/her desires for other women do not require him/her to be a man. The tragic fate of the real-life FTM Brandon Teena, when appropriated to the silver screen, is transformed into a queer drama, starring a fictional maturing lesbian (Halberstam, 2005, 86-92).
There is a similar process of transgender subject erasure at work in the transformation of Susan Swan’s 1993 novel *The Wives of Bath* into Judith Thompson and Lea Pool’s lesbian cult classic *Lost and Delirious* (2001). The novel depicts an inconclusively transgendered FTM, leading a double life at the prestigious Bath’s Ladies’ College: she sullenly accepts the role as the tom-boyish school girl Paulie during school days, but during weekends and evenings she becomes Paulie’s flirtatious brother Lewis, who claims to be staying near the school grounds, doing odd jobs for the gardener. As Lewis, Paulie expresses her masculinity in a number of ways, one of which is the courtship of Paulie’s room-mate Tory, who according to Swan, ‘always looked feminine – with milk-white hair you could die for and plump, high cheeks that coloured up the second anybody teased her’ (1993, 58). If Tory is portrayed as the ideal woman, Lewis is the ideal man. Tory appreciates Lewis’s advances, because he is the image of chivalric masculinity. Both characters enact an ideal of heteronormative courtship, until Lewis is discovered to be a girl.

In *Lost and Delirious*, the girl Paulie enters into a relationship with Tory. There is a strong mutual love between the girls, but when Tory’s sister finds them in a compromising position, Tory decides to sacrifice her passion for social acceptance, denying that the relationship had ever taken place. Desperately, Paulie enters into a cycle of enactments of chivalric pleas for love, and ultimately commits suicide. Lewis is cut out of the storyline. All but a few traces of Paulie’s original transgender subjectivity are lost in the novel’s transformation into a film. The concept is only allusively approached in a scene where Paulie dresses in a suit and asks Tory to dance, and another scene where she asks her second room-mate Mary to cut her hair. Mary responds: ‘She wants a guy, Paulie, not a girl with hacked hair’ (2001).
Paulie’s defeatist response to Mary’s claim further affirms the fact that in the conceptual gender paradigm of *Lost and Delirious* a girl is unquestionably always a girl.

In Loren King’s *Chicago Tribune* review of the film, *Lost and Delirious* is described boldly to go ‘where Hollywood rarely treads: into the passionate, intense and complex world of girls at the point in their lives when self-discovery is combined with enormous vulnerability’ (2001). Yet, this world is reserved for self-discovering girls who unproblematically identify as girls. Judith Thompson and Lea Pool are not bold enough to venture down the philosophically charged transgender paths that *The Wives of Bath* opens up. Judith Halberstam concludes that *Boys Don’t Cry* is similarly restricted to certain accepted areas. Rather than providing an attack on trans-phobic crime, Kimberly Peirce’s film confronts the binary gender conception in transgender identity: the villain of the piece is the the homophobic ‘backward-ness’ of non-urban communities, where the persistence of essential binary genders becomes the source of hate crime (Halberstam, 2005, 33-44).

Halberstam argues that the queering of Brandon, his transformation into a liberated non-essentialist subject, is an intentional agenda on Peirce’s part.²⁹ If *Boys Don’t Cry* were to appeal to its potential audience of urban intellectuals and culturally conscious viewers, its protagonist had to be re-appropriated to suit the urban idea of a sympathetic character. Trev Lynn Broughton and Joseph Bristow term this practice ‘butlerification’ in a similar observation regarding the reception of Angela Carter’s writings (1997, 19).³⁰ Once Brandon Teena has been ‘butlerified’; reconstituted as an urban ‘liberal subject’, his ‘death at the hands of local men can be
read simultaneously as a true tragedy and an indictment of backward rural communities’ (2005, 25). Judith Thompson and Lea Pool’s Paulie in Lost and Delirious is also appropriately queered before the film leads her to a seemingly liberating suicide. Paulie not only rejects a gender identity, but refuses to internalise any generic labels, also those referring to sexuality. Mary tries to convince Paulie to give up her fruitless pursuit of Tory: ‘Tory is not a lesbian, so you should just forget about her, okay!’ (2001) Paulie is shocked by Mary’s indications about her sexual identity: ‘Lesbian! Lesbian? Are you fucking kidding me? Do you think I’m a lesbian? … No! I’m Paulie in love with Tory, remember? And Tory is, she is, in love with me. Because she is mine and I am hers and neither of us are lesbians!’ (2001).

The fact that popular culture uncritically equates the ‘liberal’, ‘non-essential’ or ‘queer’ with the concept of enlightened urbanity, with the inevitable effect that its reverse – rural corporeal gender identification – is discarded as ‘backward’ or ‘immature’ is undoubtedly a problematic matter. It raises some serious questions about the validity of the premises behind the concept of queerness. It is especially dubious considering that the queer project sets out to eradicate the binary conception of right/wrong sexuality and gender. The ‘butlerification’ of Boys Don’t Cry and Lost and Delirious shows that this binary notion has simply been slightly redefined. I would like to argue that one of the reasons for this critical situation is the fact that the term ‘queer’ has been used, sometimes by the same author, to signify several different developments.
In ‘Outlaw Readings: Beyond Queer Theory’, an article interrogating the discontinuities between the queer movement, queer theory, and the queer project, Sally O’Driscoll describes the queer movement as the political struggle for LGBT rights, and she quotes Eve Sedgwick’s ‘Queer and Now’ in *Tendencies* to describe the concept of queerness in queer theory as ‘the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning where the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically’ (O’Driscoll, 31; Sedgwick, 8). She subsequently quotes Michael Warner’s *Fear of a Queer Planet* to define the objectives of the queer project as ‘a resistance to regimes of the normal’ (O’Driscoll, 31; Warner, xxvi). O’Driscoll acknowledges that the didacticism of the queer project problematically clashes with the openness of queer theory, as well as with the agendas of the political queer movement. Nevertheless, the libratory agenda of the queer project often slips into the frameworks of texts adhering both to queer theory and the queer movement.

In *Metamorphoses* Rosi Braidotti acknowledges that such a slippage occurs in Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter*. Braidotti discerns the presence of a political struggle lurking between the lines of the non-essentialist philosophy framing Butler’s work: ‘If the frame of reference is deconstructivist, … Butler’s passion is fundamentally political’ (2002, 42). Butler is not merely disbelieving of essential identities, she rejects them; she is not non-essentialist, but anti-essentialist. This is one of the points where, according to Braidotti, Butler’s logic fails (2002, 39-52). If there is no essential subjectivity dressing up or performing, how can such an entity be called to the fray? To explain further: Butler
states that the gendered subject has no agency over the gender he/she performs. ‘There is no volitional subject behind the mime who decides, as it were, which gender it will be today. ... gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is *performative* in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express.’ (Butler, 1993, 24). Yet, as mentioned above, Butler equally urges her reader to practise resistance. The logic of the former cancels the premises of the latter. According to Braidotti ‘[s]he defends a vision of the subject which, however much in process and non-essentialized, requires the workings of consciousness as a regulatory entity’ (Braidotti, 2002, 42). Braidotti notes that ‘Hegel casts a long and maybe even growing shadow over Butler’s work’ (2002, 42). Butler develops a definite separation between the psychic and the social, and then struggles to re-join them.

Furthermore, Braidotti acknowledges that whereas Butler’s theory engages heavily with psychoanalysis, her deconstructive agenda confuses several of the basic concepts of this theoretical paradigm (2002, 49). Most crucially, *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter* disregard the subject, which is where psychoanalysis starts, in Butler’s zeal to deconstruct its inscriptions. The entirely discursive body is constructed as a slate, and *nothing but* a slate. The idea of metamorphous pain, a concept which both interacts with and directs the body, does not enter into the equation. Braidotti points out that the type of interventions Butler urges onto the body ‘are neither easily accessible nor free of pain. In other words, changes hurt and transformations are painful; this does not mean that they are deprived of positive and even pleasurable side-effects, of course’ (2002, 43).
The concept of pain in relation to the body – and in relation to identification – is important. The experience and description of pain is pivotal both in academic transgender studies and fictional as well as non-fictional transgender coming-of-age narratives. The metamorphous pain is not merely physical, but mental and social and creates a chain of distinguishable transgender experience that is iterated and reiterated throughout transgender discourse. It creates a founding narrative; a common point of reference, through which the individual authors can meet and communicate. I will return to this concept at the end of the chapter.

Feminism and Butler’s Ideal Drag

As established above, Judith Butler’s queer theory cannot be considered without distinguishing its roots in the queer project’s political aim to resist ‘the regimes of the normal’ (Warner, xxvi). Her work also needs to be considered in relation to its roots in feminism and its adherence to the discursive opposition at play in feminism’s different strands. Butler’s *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter* are considered to be formative for and part of the third wave of feminism, which in some respects often is considered to be a reaction to second-wave feminism. Butler’s work and its incongruities with transgender studies thus needs to be considered in this relational light.

Both Chris Beasley and Linda J. Nicholson’s introductions to feminism consider the concept of gendered subjectivity and the idea of social construction of sex and gender to be one of the major spaces of contention between second- and third-wave feminism (Nicholson, 13-16; Beasley 25-35). Second- and third-wave feminist works generally take opposing stances regarding the constructivity of
gender. Although some early feminist thinkers, such as Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray argue that gender is discursively constructed (Beauvoir, 1949; Kristeva, 1987a; Irigaray, 1985), second-wave feminist work often considers gender identity to be physically determined and an essential gender identity to be a pivotal point that can be changed and challenged, but the core of which remains the same (Colebrook, 2004, 146). The idea of a fictional element to that essential gender subjectivity is inconceivable. Third-wave feminism deems gender identity to be more or less entirely socially constructed, and thus not physically determined (Colebrook, 2004, 146-147), which infers that a fictional element is inevitable. Essential gender is rejected as an oppressive myth (Felski, 1989, 119-120). Transgender thought usually disagrees with both of these approaches. According to the general conception within transgender studies, gender is indeed constructed to a certain degree. Constructedness in the case of a transgender person, however, does not infer an element of fictionality, if there is an authentic transgender experience of gender.

The first question urged by this conception is how experience authenticates subjectivity and the second question is why the concept of fictionality is demonised in theories of the gendered subject. I will consider the second question first. Both second-wave feminist and transgender writers express a fear of the artificial or fictional. The presence of such a fear infers that there is an immediate assumption of a division between the idea of the authentic ‘true’ narrative and the piece of ‘false’ fiction. Second-wave feminist and transgender academics alike reiterate claims of belonging and ownership of each particular discourse, in order to authenticate their theses. Especially works on transgender studies thus often introduce the topic in
autobiographical terms.\textsuperscript{43} It is a matter of asserting the right to move within the boundaries of a certain discourse.

Second-wave feminist and transgender discourse tread similar discursive grounds. They make claims on similar or affiliated territories. The difficulties appear because their particular claims of ownership or authenticity of these territories rely on the inauthenticity, or fictionality of the other. Stephen Whittle’s article ‘Where Did We Go Wrong? Feminism and Trans Theory – Two Teams on the Same Side?’ determines that the unnecessary incongruities which have developed within the advancement of the feminist and the transgender projects, can be traced back to the publication of Janice Raymond’s paranoid and polemical \textit{The Transsexual Empire} (1979), in which transgender bodies are viewed as perpetuators of unwanted gender values (2006, 195-198).\textsuperscript{44} He establishes that ‘[f]eminists when faced with trans people find themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea. They now see that general theories are nothing more than fictions’ (2006, 198). Raymond indeed claims that ‘[a]ll transsexuals rape women’s bodies by reducing the real female form to an artefact, appropriating this body for themselves’ (104). Transgender academics, on the other hand, generally have a different conception of essential gender subjectivity in relation to bodily sex. The concept of femininity is considered, if not disconnected, at least complexly related to the idea of a corporeal authenticity or ‘reality’ of gender.\textsuperscript{45}

Third-wave feminist thought and queer feminism may at first glance seem more conductive to the concept of transgenderism. Through notions such as the gender performativity of Judith Butler’s \textit{Gender Trouble} and \textit{Bodies that Matter}, the
idea of the ‘real female form’ is deemed to always be fictional. The artificiality of the transsexual body is thus not a threat to the discourse. Problematically, however, the idea that gender is entirely fictional eliminates the possibility of transgender experience. In this case, the transgender community expresses a sense of being fictionalised. Sandy Stone explores a number of ways in which transgender bodies have been used to ‘ventriloquize’ ideas from other discourses. In third-wave feminist writing, as well as research concerning medical advances “[b]odies are screens on which we see projected the momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing struggles over beliefs and practices’ (Stone, 229). Stone compares the projection of ideas onto transgender subjects to the objectification of women forcefully combated by feminist writers: ‘As with males theorizing about women from the beginning of time, theorists of gender have seen transsexuals as possessing something less than agency’ (229).

Butler’s third-wave feminism and queer theory are once more accused of eliminating the possibility of agency and gendered experience in its attempt to problematise the idea of essential gender subjectivity, but most importantly, it is accused of making transgender bodies into screens; something less ‘real’. Experience and agency in both Stone’s and Raymond’s accounts are bound together and the idea of the reality of specific experience is portrayed as crucial for any form of identity. This is where I want to return to the other question posed above: how does experience authenticate subjectivity? Why should femininity or transgender subjectivity need to be justified by pain?
Julia Kristeva suggests that feminine writing creates an anti-space: a space that exists primarily in opposition to patriarchal discourse (1981, 166). Janice Raymond relates to feminist identity in a similar manner: as a woman-only hide-out, a subjectivity that acts like a buffer on the specific wounding experiences that patriarchy inflicts on women. In order to access this space, each subject needs to justify their right to enter. Raymond’s all-woman space is an extreme example, but Kristeva’s idea of a feminine discursive anti-space is visible also in a wider feminist community. Rita Felski refers to it in a rather negative light in *Beyond Feminist Aesthetics*. She suggests that a specifically female space defines femininity in terms of a compulsory marginality and oppression (1989, 47). According to Felski, there is a tendency among feminist writers to give what Judith Butler refers to in her eponymous book as ‘an Account of Oneself’ in order to establish a feminist identity. Felski presents several examples of feminist autobiographical accounts, or as she calls them, ‘confessionals’ (Butler, 2005; 1989, 86-121).

These confessionals seem to operate like identifying narratives by aspiring activists, justifying their belonging in the feminist community through negative experiences of patriarchal society and formative feminine pain. This pain forms a sense of shared feminine being. Yet, as Felski acknowledges, the idea that there is a specific feminine expression of a specific female space is not particularly coherent with the third-wave feminist idea that identity is entirely socially constructed and all such gendered essences are oppressive myths (1989, 121). It is even less coherent with the political zeal of the more extreme queer feminism that Judith Butler’s early work predicates, in which all such normalising regimes should be avidly resisted.
Yet, confessional authenticating narratives are not uncommon features in queer theory.

**The Paradox of the Queer Identity Narrative**

Numerous influential queer theorists and critics make a point out of assuring their readership that they are actually queer, and that they thus can make a legitimate contribution to queer discourse.\(^48\) The issue of sexual identity is undoubtedly not arbitrary to the queer canon. As David Halperin points out in *Saint Foucault – Towards a Gay Hagiography*, Michel Foucault became a crucial part of the queer canon predominantly because he became one of the famously gay victims of the AIDS epidemic in 1984 (3). Also Judith Butler, whose performativity theory has shaped queer theory as it is conceived today, openly identifies as non-heterosexual in her texts and elsewhere. Judith Halberstam and Gloria Anzaldúa refer to their own particular queer identities throughout their work. Kate Bornstein and Riki Wilchins build their work against their identities as queer MTF transsexual S/M dykes. Also the above mentioned David Halperin is openly gay.\(^49\) There are numerous other examples: the queer canon is largely constructed of gay people writing about gay people.

Of course, one might argue that, although not a coincidence, it is unsurprising that such a great amount of queer theorists openly identify as other than heterosexual. To be fair, these writers belong to groups that may have a particular interest in challenging traditional ideas of sexuality and gender. It is not always merely a matter of personal interest, however. It is also a matter of belonging.\(^50\) Before an author can be accepted into the theoretical idiom, he or she has to confirm his or her right to
speak. There is an implicated demand for participation in the queer discourse. Its participants do not simply talk about it. They are inherently expected to speak for the queer discourse; to give it a voice. Thus, when writing within queer theory, the critics are implicitly asked to become discursively queer.

As always, the potency of this discursive stigma is best demonstrated through the examples that do not quite meet the requirements. Its importance becomes apparent when heterosexual-identified queer theorists like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick attempt to come to terms with their place within the theoretical discourse. Sedgwick has oscillated between several alternative attempts at legitimising her contributions to queer theory. In *A Dialogue on Love* she argues that she can relate to non-heterosexual experience, because she has experienced a sense of otherness due to her obesity (1999, 19-24). In *Tendencies*, published six years earlier, she uses her struggle against breast cancer to affirm her identification with gay men. Her argument focuses on the physicality of her breasts. She claims that the diminished erotogenicity in her recreated breasts drew her towards masculinity and the sense of ‘loss’ inherent in their removal was similar to the trauma of the AIDS epidemic (1993, 262). Later, in an article on the construction of masculinity, she also professes that her breast cancer created a space in which she could relate to lesbians, since the baldness incurred by the chemotherapy sometimes caused her to be read as queer (1996, 11-20).

Sedgwick spends a considerable amount of energy building narratives that may allow her to become queer. She constructs a personal history, exploring the personal experiences that could possibly compare to an experience or an
understanding of queerness. Yet, her frequent change of focus suggests that her narratives fail to thoroughly convince. It implies that her narrated experiences do not yield the sense of authenticity, authority or understanding that will uncomplicatedly give her a place in the queer canon.

Just like there are numerous different takes and approaches to queer theory, there are obviously different kinds and degrees of authorial inclusion. Sedgwick’s anxiety of insufficient queerness becomes the focus of some of her texts like *Tendencies* and *A Dialogue on Love*, whereas it is merely implied in texts such as *Between Men* and *Epistemology of the Closet*. Other queering authorial narratives take a variety of more or less inclusive forms. Kate Bornstein’s identity narrative is the consistent ongoing focus of her texts. The character of the differently gendered author becomes the subject of gender discussion in *Gender Outlaw* and her experiences form the narrative around which it circulates. The book takes the form of a confessional, invoking an internal negotiation and ultimate understanding of the self. She writes:

> All my life, my non-traditional gender identity had been my biggest secret, my deepest shame. It’s not that I didn’t want to talk about this with someone; it’s just that I never saw anything in the culture that encouraged me to talk about my feeling that I was the wrong gender (Bornstein, 1995, 8).

She describes how this feeling leads to an urge to challenge the given norms:

> ‘This book, and the many other words, acts, art, and politics of other gender activists attest that it’s a time of cultural readiness for these theories – these ambiguities’ (1995, 111). Bornstein thus uses the differences and changes in her own body to exemplify a queer subject, and further, to signify the emergence of a queering society.
In the personal narrative or narratives that Judith Halberstam weaves into *Female Masculinity*, the author’s experiences are expressed as moments of shared recognition. Her preface recounts:

I was a masculine girl, and I am a masculine woman. For much of my life, my masculinity has been rendered shameful by public responses to my gender ambiguity. However, in the last ten years, I have been able to turn stigma into strength. This book is a result of a lengthy process of both self-examination and discussion with others (Halberstam, 1998, xii).

Like Bornstein, Halberstam acknowledges the production of her book to have initiated a queering process. Her self-examination and sharing of experience enables her to encounter queerness. However, unlike Bornstein, Halberstam’s authorial persona is less the focus of the texts, and more of a meeting-point: a cluster of ideas and dilemmas from which the discussion of various other gender narratives spring. Halberstam refers back to her initial introductory self-reflexive narrative throughout *Female Masculinity*, using words like ‘we’ in reference to queer experience to suggest a form of implicitness. The author is not the subject of the analysis, however, but rather the methodological means to the exploration of a recognised subjective perspective. Halberstam is positioned within the book, but her position is never completely localised.

Authorial confessionals primarily become problematic when they are posed next to the more anti-essentialist queer texts, like Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble*. The 1999 edition of the work includes an introductory autobiographical section in which the author, in rather stereotypical terms describes her personal hardships as a queer subject:
I grew up understanding something of the violence of gender norms: an uncle incarcerated for his anatomically anomalous body, deprived of family and friends, living out his days in an ‘institute’ in the Kansas prairies; gay cousins forced to leave their homes because of their sexuality, real and imagined; my own tempestuous coming out at the age of 16; and a subsequent adult landscape of lost jobs, lovers, and homes. All of this subjected me to strong and scarring condemnation but, luckily, did not prevent me from pursuing pleasure and insisting on a legitimating recognition for my sexual life (Butler, 1999a, xix).

Considering that this particular work asks its readership to actively resist internalised norms and essentialised identities, it is rather odd that Butler attaches such a clichéd construction of herself to it. She paints the image of the ideal queer experience. Her narrative is sustained by the type of backwards rural communities with their physically enforced norms of gender and sexuality, that Halberstam argues to be the stereotypical setting for queer pain. Butler here attempts to demonstrate an understanding of her subject matter and a reason for her ongoing battle against gender norms. Most importantly, she emphasises the formative pain she has personally experienced because of these norms.

Butler’s narrative of queerness differs noticeably from the other examples. Perhaps because of its incongruity with the subject matter, the author’s personal identity establishment has been expunged from the body of the texts, inhabiting a separate exclusive space in the preface. The form these sections take is also radically different from the rest of Butler’s text: the language is less formal and the tone is more intimate. Compared to the formal academic analysis of her subsequent theoretical thesis, this preface sounds oddly caricatured and sentimental. Similarly to the psychoanalytic binary of inside and outside that Butler attempts to challenge, the very structure of her work falls prey to the enlightenment division of experience.
and knowledge. Butler separates the authority of her experiences from the general theories, only to re-combine them and call it truth. The product is an oddly abstract and stale concept of queer subjectivity.

The problems presented in relation to Judith Butler’s narrative construction of queer identity are similar to the problems inherent in the basic stances of queer theory: the idea of queering; the unsettling of norms and de-centring of subjectivity, harbours a prevalent desire for resulting change, not least in Judith Butler’s own work – and change requires agents of change. The queer canon thus comes to function as a collective. It forms a norm of the legitimately queer, not unlike the norms of the legitimately gendered, which according to the definition of queer theory should be challenged. Scott Wilson declares in a chapter on queer theory in his introduction to Cultural Materialism that ‘[o]ne fascination of homosexual, gay, lesbian or queer communities is the fact that they cannot be based on the very thing that would define them’ (1995, 212). It is a concept that by its definition cancels itself out.

Judith Butler attempts to negotiate this problem in Bodies that Matter. She argues that the queer subject should perform gender challengingly and creatively, in order to avoid the creation of false universals and set identities. The resulting cancellation of queer identity, however, must equally be avoided. She thus states that this particular identity is acceptable because here ‘temporary totalization performed by identity categories is a necessary error’ (1993, 230). She acknowledges that without this, there will be no space for political agency.
Something is not quite right about a theory that requires ‘temporary errors’. In a recent essay, Claire Colebrook suggests that queer theory cannot be sustained unless it queers the concept of theory (2008a, 22). As long as queer theory operates within the perimeters of normative discourse, it can merely function in terms of opposition. It can never employ affirmative action. As it is, queer theory merely challenges the subject in psychoanalysis with different notions of the same character (2008a, 19). Gender subjectivity cannot be removed from the frame of the inside-outside binary, simply by the assertion that gender is performative rather than essential, or that what was once in should now be out. Subjectivity needs to be removed both from the inside and the outside – and be considered in terms altogether other. In this case, the concept of subjective agency need not rely on ‘totalisation’, temporary or sustained, because the subject does not depend on a totalising urge.

**Self-reflexive Narrative and Corporeal Becoming**

Kath Weston claims in *Gender in Real Time* that the growing realisation within gender studies that a queer world without gender was inconceivable brought about a tragic loss of theoretical influence on the movement: ‘Somewhere in the course of the changes leading up to the present century the dream died, and with it went a certain critical edge for gender studies’ (1). She argues that gender studies has become empirical, messy and paradoxical. Weston attempts to resurrect a critical side to the idea of gender, visualising queerness as a challenge to gendered power relations and the categories of gendered time and space. Judith Halberstam’s *In a Queer Time and Place* and Sara Ahmed’s *Queer Phenomenology* attempt to do something similar. Rita Felski aptly recognises that identities do not need to be
essential to function as identities: ‘The fact that they are socially constructed does not mean that they are less “real” or that their political function can be reduced to one of complicity with ruling ideologies’ (1989, 120). Weston, Halberstam and Ahmed’s works build theories of multitudinous, juxtapositional and continually created genders that move between gendered spaces; reconsider, and recreate them (Weston, 2002; Halberstam, 2006; Ahmed, 2007).

So how is this done? How can a type of subjectivity that escapes totalisation and stagnation be conceptualised? Claire Colebrook suggests that identity and identity construction should be considered from a corporeal feminist perspective (2000a; 2000b; 2004; 2008a). I will investigate this option in relation to self-reflexive gender narration in what is left of this chapter, and the following two chapters will form a conception of corporeal transgender characterisation in late twentieth-century fiction. In an article on possible departures from Judith Butler’s theories of subjectivity, Colebrook refers to this corporeal perspective as a specifically Australian school of feminism (2000a). I will adopt this term, although I choose to ignore the geographical specificity of it in order to incorporate some theorists that have definite conjectural similarities (including Colebrook herself), although sometimes more dubious Australian connections (e.g. Elspeth Probyn and Rosi Braidotti).

Colebrook’s article on Australian feminism discusses Judith Butler’s usage of Lacan in relation to Genevieve Lloyd, Moira Gatens and Elizabeth Grosz’s engagement with psychoanalysis. She argues that where Butler considers Lacan’s description of the subject’s conceptualisation of the ‘real’ to be the creation of false
internalised reality,\textsuperscript{55} these Australian feminists consider the mental positioning of the ‘real’ to be a form of ‘realization’ (2000a, 86); a process of ‘becoming’ real, or in the case of gender identification: becoming-woman and becoming-corporeal (86).\textsuperscript{56} The concept is derived in reference to the idea of becoming-woman that Deleuze and Guattari introduce in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-woman is a process of subjective othering that enables the subject to consider itself and communicate its conception of selfhood (2007, 304-307).\textsuperscript{57} Gatens refers to this in terms of a continual ‘doubling’, a play of contrast through which the subject represents itself in a network of bodies (1996, 40-43), whereas Lloyd describes it in terms of a self narrative or a shared fiction of identity (1993, 161-165).

Formation of identity creates possibilities rather than prisons for the body, since becoming-gendered is a continual mental and corporeal development. Judith Butler’s performativity theory challenges the idea that the body harbours ‘reality’ whereas the mind is a seat of self-illusion. As established above, she problematises the conception that ‘natural’ and ‘essential’ bodily attributes determine the formation of the mind – but her theories merely turn the concept inside out. The Australian feminists rather attempt to get rid of the split between the mind and the body, considering both in juxtaposition with one another. Employing a Spinozist understanding of the relation between mind and body, Genevieve Lloyd describes it thus: ‘The body is not the underlying cause of the mind’s awareness and knowledge, but rather the mind’s object – what it knows. And the mind knows itself only through reflection on its ideas of body. Its nature is to be the idea of a particular body.’ (Lloyd 1982, 20).
Rosi Braidotti considers the idea of a unified corporeal mentality and the process of becoming-gendered in a similar manner. However, she specifically emphasises the affirmative qualities of becoming; the possibilities of what Elizabeth Grosz refers to as ‘thinking the new’ (1999b, 15), and the connective powers of representational processes. For Braidotti, identity is an occupation of specific corporeal and representational spaces (2002, 12). Her *Metamorphoses* and *Transpositions* advocate an idea of Deleuzean nomadic subjectivity, which functions somewhat like a tracer of consciousness or an inconsistent and inconclusive subjective narrative. Each moment of shared experience or recognition is a location of intersecting and interrelating forces and ‘spatio-temporal variables’ (2002, 21). ‘A “location”, in fact, is not a self-appointed and self-designed subject-position. It is a collectively shared and constructed, jointly occupied spatio-temporal territory.’ (2002, 12). These locations are constantly altered. The subject-position is in continual flux. Nomadic gender is considered in terms of differently patterned ‘revisitations and retakes’ of shared encounters. It is a continual conditioning of connective events and experiences that lead to potential becomings.

Braidotti’s conception of becoming is connected to her idea of ethics: continual revisitations of shared spaces enable the process of becoming-ethical, or becoming more and more connected. The specificity of the identities are opened up to a number of different loci, indeed connect a number of different loci, but do not lose their specificity. An identity-in-becoming is the means by which spaces are connected, conditioned, revisited and reconsidered, rather than a specific space in itself (2006, 268-272). An urge or desire to identify would thus be considered an urge to become connected and a desire for affirmative reconsidering of previous
conditions. Connective experiences, whether painful or not, are revisited and reformed into possibilities for positive change.

Judith Halberstam’s *In a Queer Time and Space* suggests that this type of identity formation is intrinsically queer. It moves between mediums and negotiates subjectivity between the lines of ‘indefinite and virtual’ time and space (11), and it enables ‘political and cultural change’ (4). Claire Colebrook argues in adherence with Deleuze and Guattari that such queer movement requires a construction of difference; a play of doubles (2008a, 18). These doubles are not stable, but continually produce and reproduce one another in order to become more and more other. Like Moira Gatens, Colebrook argues that becoming-woman or becoming-other is a prerequisite for gendered communication, and like Braidotti she states that communication and connection is a prerequisite for change: ‘to know is to relate to, and conceptualise, what is other than oneself’ (2009a, 12). The gendered others are not fixed or essential, however; they are not states of gendered *being*, but processes of *becoming*-gendered.

Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter on radical becomings in *A Thousand Plateaus* describes three stages of becoming: becoming-woman, becoming-animal and becoming-imperceptible or molecular. It is a process of becoming more and more other. In the final stage, the subject is thoroughly liberated from the subjective and categorising state of being human (2007, 307-309). All the notions of concepts and their boundaries are erased. From a gendered perspective, a play of differences where gendered doubles form and reform in relation to one another is thus a process that moves towards gender transcendence. Continual gendering, othering, connection and
communication are processes that produce change as they move towards the limits of human consciousness and existence.

These are the type of queer processes that this thesis advocates. These intrinsically queering gendered becomings are a useful structure to consider the gendered self-reflexive identity narratives through. As Rita Felski acknowledges, autobiographical narratives are common within feminist and gender studies discourse. Judith Butler attempts to deal with the idea of self-narrative in her later work, *Giving an Account of Oneself*. According to Butler, the exchange of self-reflexive accounts creates spaces where the ‘I’ intersects with the ‘other’; they enable connection and communication, and it is through these that the individual subjects become ethically minded or socially responsible individuals (3-40). Butler’s account does not, however, give a particularly clear idea of how the relationships are further developed or re-shaped. They are described in oddly static terms. The analysis also to some level sustains the rejection of identity expressed in Butler’s earlier work: the identities formed in self-reflexive narratives are still presented as fictions that ‘blind the “self”’ (2005, 40), but these, according to Butler should in this particular case not be shunned, since subjective blindness is ‘an indispensible resource for ethics’ (2005, 40).

The idea of a ‘blinded’ ethical self is not sufficiently complex to harbour the identities formed through feminist self-reflexive narratives, however. Rita Felski argues that ‘Confessional writing has been central to this sphere, as it has played out an anxious, often uneasy struggle to discover a female self, a struggle which is by no means free of contradiction but which constitutes a necessary moment in the self-
definition of an oppositional community’ (1989, 121). I want to linger on Felski’s reference to a struggle played out and a moment of self-definition here. In Being in Time, Genevieve Lloyd refers to the ‘moments of being’ that Virginia Woolf describes in ‘Modern Fiction’ and the Proustian idea that fiction should attempt to capture a sliver of life (123-161). Lloyd argues that the achievement of this is not inconceivable, because the narration of defining moments can actually constitute their process of becoming: ‘writing can find truth by making it’ (1993, 163). She explains that reality is not reality until we understand it as such and identity exists only once it has been recognised. Once it is, it starts to become identity, founding its particular narrative: ‘to think myself as unified is to enact a unity – to tell a story’ (Lloyd, 1993, 164). The writer and the written word create each other symbiotically, like the identity narrative and the identifying subject both function within the identity-in-becoming. Thus identity formation and story-telling are synonymous, for ‘each of us, on the model we are now constructing, does something akin to what the writer does’ (Lloyd, 1993, 164).

Sara Ahmed similarly breaks down the boundaries between the authorial voice and the text in Differences that Matter. It includes a number of autobiographical narratives, although Ahmed makes sure to acknowledge and consider the implications of her self-narration. She notes that ‘[o]ne must be cautious of how the anecdote can become an absent centre, not only by being given the status of an event that simply happened, but also by being used as a justification for a given argument’ (143). However, she explains that anecdotal reflection is pivotal to what she is trying to achieve: ‘Through the telling of the anecdote, I have implicated myself in the subject of my research and any such implication always invokes an-
other who cannot be named’ (143). She argues that the account of her private experiences inserts her personally, ‘as a feminist’ (143), in the text. The anecdote thus functions as a point from which the text – and Ahmed in the text – becomes feminist.

Sandy Stone argues in ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ that the composition of autobiography is a process of territorialisation (2006, 229). Halberstam similarly claims that certain narratives and discourses form spaces of recognition. There are stories, like the reiterated recount of the problem a questionably gendered person faces when choosing between the mens’ and the ladies’ room, that function like indicators of specific identity categories. Like Lloyd, she speaks of these spaces in terms of ‘persistent presents’ or ‘moments’ of potential subject experience (Halberstam, 2005, 11). This idea of identity formation mirrors Rosi Braidotti’s conception of identity as a process of revisiting and reconsidering shared spaces of experience – and the identity narrative functions like a textual version of it.

**Becoming-Woman by Becoming-(Queer) Feminist**

Formative self-reflexive writing has been employed by the transgender community since the 1950s, when Christine Jorgensen’s successful sex change operation made headlines. However, Marjorie Garber notes in her *Vested Interests* that the greater part of these writers, or at least the ones that had been made famous by 1992 are MTF oriented (110). This is still the case. Whereas there are a number of shorter works, poetry collections, interviews and even theoretical works by FTM-oriented transsexuals, the self-reflexive narratives are largely an MTF genre. There are, however, a few popular FTM self-narratives in circulation, like Matt Kailey’s *Just
Add Hormones and Max Valero’s The Testosterone Files. Interestingly, as the titles indicate, these are largely focused on the experience of hormone treatment and bodily difference, whereas the MTF self-narratives mainly deal with the psychological, social and psycho-social experience of becoming-woman. This analysis of narrative as a means of becoming-gendered will thus primarily discuss self-reflexive MTF narratives.

Transgender autobiography has become one of the cornerstones of the transgender discourse and social transgender awareness. Bernice L. Hausman refers to transsexual autobiography as the establishment of a public space; a “true story” of transsexualism’ (1995, 174). There are several comprehensive analyses of this phenomenon, including Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes, Jay Prosser’s Second Skins, Bernice L. Hausman’s Changing Sex and Marjorie Garber’s Vested Interests. The academic analyses have slightly different selections of autobiographical writers, but they all engage with three standard MTF works: Renée Richards’s Second Serve, Jan Morris’s Conundrum and Christine Jorgensen’s A Personal Autobiography. All these narratives describe a traumatic sensation of alienation and bodily dysphoria that becomes somewhat cured through the realisation of transgender identity and the performance of a sex change operation. Jan Morris describes how she was always a girl in a boy’s body (1974, 169); Renée Richards describes how she initially led a double life, letting the Renée inside her out in secret (1983, 54), Christine Jorgensen recounts how she tried to identify as a homosexual, but failed, because she felt like a woman in a heterosexual relationship (1967, 38–49). All of these accounts are fairly linear narratives of subjective transgender realisation and the overcoming of trauma.
Califa and Prosser’s analyses of transgender narrative also investigate Kate Bornstein’s *Gender Outlaw*, which is radically different from its predecessors. This works, together with autobiographies like Riki Wilchins’s *Read My Lips*, Julia Serano’s *Whipping Girl* and Erica Zander’s *Transactions*, refuse to follow the straightforward autobiographical norm. They develop a form of narrative that is less focused on the realisation of transgender subjectivity, and the feeling of being wrongly embodied. They encounter the actuality of living as an MTF transsexual and the social and academic discourses that circulate around the gendered subject. They take advantage of their specific gendered position and their movement between the binary genders to investigate the boundaries, thus to some degree affirming Marjorie Garber’s rather objectifying and stigmatising statement that ‘it is to transsexuals and transvestites that we need to look if we want to understand what gender categories mean’ (1992, 110).

However, they do not necessarily adhere to Garber’s following statement that ‘transsexuals and transvestites are more concerned with maleness and femaleness than persons who are neither transvestite nor transsexual’ (1992, 110). Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander do not consider themselves to be truly male or female, and they do not attempt to belong to either one gender. Kate Bornstein notes that she is ‘supposed to be writing about how to be a girl. I don’t know how to be a girl. And I sure don’t know how to be a boy. And after thirty-seven years of trying to be male and over eight years of trying to be female, I’ve come to the conclusion that it’s really not worth the trouble’ (1995, 234).
Interestingly, Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander all identify with a form of feminism. Bornstein, as mentioned above, considers herself a queer lesbian S/M dyke; Zander aligns herself with S/M lesbianism and Wilchins and Serano are both queer lesbian feminists. Considering their shifting gender positions the formation of these feminist, queer, lesbian and S/M identities-in-becoming are particularly visible. Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander all acknowledge that their experiences will never be identical to biological women’s, yet they recount experiences of what Serano’s subtitle indicates to be the scapegoating of femininity in society and passionately advocate feminist and LGBT rights. These feminist critiques of society are fairly classical. Zander recounts how she noticed people treating her differently when she appeared and passed as a woman (2003, 210); Serano criticises the objectification of bodies and advocates a rebirth of celebratory femininity (2007, 16); Riki Wilchins and Kate Bornstein both outline and challenge the boundaries of gendered subjectivity (Wilchins, 1997; Bornstein, 1995, 45-69).

I would like to argue that there is more than a classic critique of patriarchal and heteronormative society forming within these narratives, following the authors’ shift from male to female. Firstly, Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander express a need to align themselves with the feminist discourse in order to combat the feminist fear of transgender women, as expressed by radical feminists such as Janice Raymond. All four transgender authors discuss *The Transsexual Empire* and attempt to establish themselves as the opposite of Raymond’s gender spies (Bornstein, 1995, 75-77; Wilchins, 1997, 59-62; Serano, 141-142; Zander, 229-233). Secondly, the transgender authors attempt to gain a form of femininity. In becoming-feminists, in narrating spaces of shared feminist concerns, they open up the possibility of creating
new ways of becoming-women. Despite their acknowledged difference – and to some degree also because of it – Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander attempt to engage the feminist community in a conversation that simultaneously revisits and repositions the idea of gendered identity and this becomes their particular means of becoming-woman.67

Marjorie Garber states that it is not surprising that MTF transsexuals have acquired more fame and space in literature and media. Employing a psychoanalytic feminist perspective of the gender binary, she argues that these subjects are still somewhere male, and because of their primary position in the gender binary, males have always taken precedence in these spheres (1992, 110). This is a rather simplistic interpretation of the MTF bias in transgender autobiographical production. Considering the discourses in circulation in Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander’s narratives, I would be more inclined to suggest a Deleuzean reading of this phenomenon. The authors initially construct themselves as other than the universal subject, the male. They iterate and reiterate the idea of their feminine otherness, but all four autobiographers finally realise that they are further other. They are the other of the other. A Deleuzean otherising process of becoming-woman here transforms into a process of becoming thoroughly gender other. The recounted experiences of patriarchal society’s oppression of femininity is used as an entrance into the feminist community, but the feminist discourse is also challenged to move further from the concept of gender; to start a process of ‘menacing’ (Wilchins, 1997, 61); ‘ungendering’ (Serano, 195); ‘queering’ (Bornstein, 1995, 164) or ‘TransCending’ (Zander, 257) the concept. The transgender narratives are thus attempting to shape feminism and their sense of femininity into a process of becoming-indefinable.
Kate Bornstein’s *Gender Outlaw* attempts to articulate a set of movements towards a final stage of gender transcendence. She concludes her narrative with a personal play entitled ‘Hidden: a Gender’, through which she unwittingly resounds Deleuze and Guattari’s radically transformative form of becoming, in creating a space where her gendered self may initialise a process of becoming-imperceptible (1995, 171-223). Bornstein’s eponymous protagonist states that ‘gender is not the issue. Gender is the battlefield. Or the playground’ (1995, 222). She adds that ‘One day we may not need that’ (1995, 222).

Jami Weinstein argues in reference to Elizabeth Grosz’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari that the process of becoming-imperceptible is an affirmation of gendered difference, but this should ultimately lead to a space beyond difference. She emphasises that Deleuze and Guattari’s processes of becoming only *begin* with becoming-woman (Grosz, 2005, 194; Weinstein, 2008, 25-26). Weinstein and Grosz finally want to institute a feminist politics of imperceptibility, ‘leaving its traces everywhere but never being able to be identified with a person, group or organisation’ (Grosz, 2004, 194; Weinstein, 2008, 26). Because of this, Weinstein argues that sexual difference may be a useful tool towards imperceptibility, but it should ultimately be extinguished.

I do not agree with this reading of Deleuze, and neither does Claire Colebrook. The idea of *becoming*-imperceptible does not necessarily infer a final *being*-imperceptible. Colebrook argues that the specific terms ‘woman’ and ‘animal’ merely signify states of further otherness (2008b, 7), and the ‘imperceptible’ is the idea of the completely other (2008a, 32). This state is a fantasy, or an ‘idea’ of
otherness, that is not supposed to be seen as a state, but rather a goal (2009a, 20). As the next two chapters establish, gender difference is not one consistent relationship, but a transformative cycle that pushes its own boundaries and enables both subjective and social change.
Whereas the previous chapters have encountered the queering of historical discourses and the formation of queer identity, this chapter focuses on queering practices in 1980s and 1990s literary criticism of Angela Carter’s work. Angela Carter has been recognised as one of the major postmodern feminist novelists of the late twentieth century and her work is considered to overtly engage with queering discourses. Since her most recognised novels were published before the rise of feminist and queer theorists like Judith Butler and Donna Haraway, however, she tends to be seen as iconically proto-queer. This chapter establishes that although there are important queer discourses within Carter’s texts, her project has also deliberately been read in a queer light: Carter criticism tends to perform a selective queering of the author’s work.

Noting that Angela Carter’s recent popularity marks an apparent change in the reception of the author’s writing since the 1970s when some of her texts were shunned by the feminist community, Joseph Bristow and Trev Lynn Broughton’s introduction to the 1997 critical compilation *The Infernal Desires of Angela Carter* questions what implications the recognition of such a dependence on cultural receptive trends has on the conception of the author’s work:

Her [Carter’s] early preoccupations, many of them deeply unfashionable at their inception, are now acclaimed as ‘anticipating’ postmodern feminists such as Judith Butler and Donna Haraway in a way it tests the resources of grammar to describe. What does this posthumous recognition, this after-the-fact ‘Butlerification’ of Carter mean for literary history, for feminist
This is an important question: to what extent has Angela Carter’s work been critically ‘butlerified’ or queered to fit the image of her authorship in feminist literary criticism? Sara Ahmed, Kate Chedgzoy, Marjorie Garber and numerous other influential critics present Carter as one of the major fictional writers within late twentieth-century postmodern feminist and queer literature.¹ I do not necessarily attempt to argue that this reading is flawed. Rather than to question whether this is truly what Angela Carter is, this chapter investigates whether this is all she can be. What types of readings have been ignored, omitted or brushed over in the process of queering Angela Carter? What readings may Angela Carter’s work enable?

I initiate my exploration of the possibilities of Angela Carter’s production by looking at what she does not produce. By comparing her to another author of fiction who has achieved iconic status within queer literary circles, Jeanette Winterson, I establish that Carter’s work certainly employs a more ambiguous engagement with queer agendas. Although Carter and Winterson’s work are often read in correlation with each other, there are also major differences in their approach to queer discourses. This is of course partially because Carter’s work was produced earlier, but nonetheless Winterson communicates with queer theory whereas Carter merely alludes to concepts prevalent in queer ideology. Winterson provides (semi-)fictional affirmations of queer values and Carter produces a number of more or less dubious queer metaphors and allegories.
Jeanette Winterson’s Affirmation of Butler and Haraway

Jeanette Winterson produces textbook examples of queer fiction. As Brenda Jo Brueggemann and Debra Moddelmog establish in ‘Coming-out Pedagogy’, Winterson’s fiction is thus an excellent base for teaching discourses of gender and sexuality to undergraduate students (2002). Richard Hobbs similarly considers Winterson’s Written on the Body to provide ‘a crucial doorway into the debate surrounding gender’ (5). This particular work is used as a canonical example of queering fiction in numerous critical essays,\(^2\) and the active connotations of the verb ‘queering’ are fitting here, since Winterson’s novel responds directly to Butlerian discourses. As the previous chapter establishes, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter conclude that the interplay between sex and gender is misrepresented in previous feminist and psychoanalytic discourse.\(^3\) According to Butler, sex is produced, or ‘written’ onto the body through the subject’s gender performance. The title of Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body refers to this idea. Structurally, the novel is perhaps one of Winterson’s most conventional texts. Its particular critical attraction is lodged in its queer presentation of gender attribution as excessive or arbitrary. Written on the Body revolves around the narrator’s sexual obsession for a woman. The narrative moves through the initial attraction as well as the physical consummation of this obsession in explicit detail, but although the character and the body of the first person narrator are explicitly described, the text never divulges his or her gender identity (Winterson, 1992).\(^4\)

Although the narrative framework of Written on the Body does not directly explore gender definitions, the absence of such is striking. The novel passively
questions the desire to define the gender of a narrator which despite a great amount of psychological and physical detail, refuses to take form. Winterson thus employs a negative didactic in which the absent gender attribution is given a key position. As Susan S. Lanser acknowledges in ‘Queering Narratology’, Winterson uses the destabilising power of silence in Written on the Body. The absence of the narrator’s gender is a form of particularly queer narrative poetics, in which the urge to categorise both in relation to binary gender and binary sexuality is challenged and finally overcome (Lanser, 1996, 252-256). The impossibility to define the narrator’s gender also destabilises definitions of the narrator’s sexual orientation and the narrative’s generic classification, since a female narrator would make it a lesbian narrative, whereas a male narrator would indicate a rather unremarkable piece of heteronormative romantic fiction.

As the critics of Jeanette Winterson’s work establish, Written on the Body overtly interacts with Judith Butler’s theories and perfectly demonstrates the impact of gender definitions in narrative constructs. Butler urges her readers to ‘resist the myth of interior origins’ (2004a, 339), in order to expose gender as a social construct which has been interiorised to pose as essential. Written on the Body is a direct answer to this challenge. The absence of any gender-specific language continually interrupts the performance of the ‘stylized repetition of [gendered] acts’ (1999a, 179) which Butler regards as necessary to construct the impression of a gendered essence. The ‘regulatory fiction’ (1999a, 180) of ‘gender coherence’ (1999a, 180) is destabilised in the reading of Written on the Body, showing that its continual presence is not essential. The marked absence of gender definitions additionally exposes the construct of gender continuity to be, as Butler argues, a central position
in the current perception of reality. Winterson explicitly ‘Butlerifies’ her narrative, creating a fictional parallel to Butler’s theories. She seemingly anticipates the reactions and theoretical references produced by her critical readership, and makes the correlations particularly pertinent in order to adhere to them.

*Written on the Body* is merely one of Winterson’s overtly queering pieces of fiction. If Winterson there responds to Butler by resisting gender definitions, *The Powerbook* directly portrays the queer potentiality of Butler’s conception of sex and gender performance. The protagonist, Ali, is able to transpose her gender performance onto her physical body. She dresses as a boy in order to smuggle tulip bulbs from Turkey to Holland, carrying two bulbs fitted as her testicles with a particularly fine tulip stem in the middle, to represent her phallus. Ali gets captured on her way to Holland and becomes a sex slave to a virginal princess. Not knowing what a male body should look like, the princess assumes that Ali’s tulip is an actual penis. Winterson writes: ‘Then a strange thing began to happen. As the princess kissed and petted my tulip, my own sensations grew exquisite, but as yet no stronger than my astonishment, as I felt my disguise come to life. The tulip began to stand’ (2000, 22). In adherence to Butler’s performativity, the convincing performance of masculinity here corporeally rewrites Ali’s body as male.

The Butlerian discourses reiterated in *The Powerbook* also interact with Donna Haraway’s emancipatory cyborg theories. Haraway’s ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’ gives the ‘queer’ feminist body of literary and cultural critics an opportunity to extend Butler’s ideas into a libratory agenda. Haraway forms an argument for women’s self-creation and recreation, comparing womanhood to the concept of the
‘cyborg’. She quotes a strand of feminism that claims that, like the cyborgs, women are not fully essential subjects. She particularly focuses on an argument posed in Catherine McKinnon’s ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory’, which suggests that the idealised objectification of the female body renders it an illusion or abstraction: ‘a woman is not simply alienated from her product, but in a deep sense she does not exist as a subject, or even potential subject, since she owes her existence as a woman to sexual appropriation’ (Haraway, 1990, 201).

Haraway does not agree that there necessarily is, as McKinnon claims, an “essential” non-existence of women’ (201), however. She argues that the feminist agenda should not be the construction of ‘self-knowledge of a self-who-is-not’ (201).

Instead, Haraway suggests that feminism should stop aspiring to the male-created myths that seek essential subjectivity, and attempt to find a more constructive mythology. She claims that the entirely performative characters of the Star Trek cyborgs, who seek no subjectivity, but exist merely in their simulation of a ‘common language’ (205), are the creatures feminism should look to: ‘The cyborg is a kind of dissembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This is the self feminists must code’ (205). The cyborg is never an individual being, nor an embodied community – it is a unit in which mind, body and tool form ‘a surface for writing’ (195), which is ‘in communication with all of [its] parts’ (223). As the individual units are neither physical apparatuses, under the control of biological processes, nor computers run by a conscious mind, they incorporate a conception of being which escapes the mind/body – and thus also the gender/sex – polemic. For Haraway they embody the possibility for feminism to break free from fatalist binarism, and to recreate itself in relation to a myth which embraces an identity of
creative and destructive possibilities: ‘Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves ... It means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, spaces, stories’ (223).

Winterson’s protagonist in the The Powerbook embodies the relationship between organic and mechanical construction which Haraway’s cyborgs symbolise. Ali’s body collaborates with her constructed phallus to actualise the physicality of her performed gender. In accordance with Butlerian and Harawayian principles, Winterson uses a cyborg to portray a situation in which a body becomes either male or female when it initially becomes conceived of as either male or female; when the social construct of gender difference becomes internalised. The libratory account of how the princess’ belief in Ali’s maleness becomes actualised in Ali’s body is portrayed in the novel as an example of the boundless possibilities of personal narrative: ‘I can change the story. I am the story’ (2000, 5).  

Jeanette Winterson’s Written on the Body and The Powerbook re-narrativise the prevalent mythologies of the queer canon and thus create recognisable queer spaces. The Butlerian imagery is worked into the symbolic language of the text, forming a platform of queer signification. Additionally, both novels interact with the discourses they evoke. Winterson asks and responds to her own questions in The Powerbook: ‘Why did I begin as I did, with Ali and the tulip?’ (209). She decides that it is because ‘I wanted to make a slot in time’ (2000, 209). Written on the Body refers to the possibilities that this narrative space creates: ‘The world is bundled up in this room ... We can take the world with us when we go and sling the sun under your
arm’ (190). Winterson conceptualises her development of queer space in her queering novels as a form of queer self-narrative.\textsuperscript{11} She compares herself to Rembrandt in *The Powerbook*:

> Why did Rembrandt use himself as a prop? Well, because he was there, but more importantly, because he wasn’t there. He was shifting his own boundaries. He was inching into other selves (2000, 214).

**The ‘Butlerification’ of Literary Value**

The ‘queer’ critical readership often reads Angela Carter’s work in the same theoretical light as Jeanette Winterson’s: as pieces of actively queering literary production.\textsuperscript{12} This is a problematic move. Whereas Winterson’s *Written on the Body* and *The Powerbook* were published in 1992 and 2000 respectively, when Judith Butler and Donna Haraway’s theories were properly established, Carter’s queer novels were written considerably earlier. There are certainly clear connections to Butler and Haraway also in Carter’s work, but these are particularly prominent in the novels published before *Gender Trouble* (1990) and ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’ (1985). This ‘anticipation’ of canonical queer theory has made Carter so popular among academics working within feminist and ‘queer’ theories, that she has been permanently labelled ‘The High Priestess of Post-Graduate Porn’ (Bristow & Broughton, 1; Sebestyen, 38). According to Lorna Sage, there were more postgraduate proposals for theses on Angela Carter’s work in 1994, than any other twentieth-century literary topic (2001, 3). The ‘anticipatory’ queer reading of Carter’s oeuvre is, however, rather selective. As Bristow and Broughton note in the quotation above, the queer reading of Carter will always be an ‘after-the-fact “butlerification”’ of the texts (19).\textsuperscript{13}
The queering tendency among Carter’s critics is particularly evident in the evaluation of the author’s work. Most feminist and queer critics interestingly find the author’s early queer novels somewhat problematic. Most critics agree that the pivotal point in Carter’s literary career was the publication of *Nights at the Circus* in 1984. Paulina Palmer writes in an essay on *Nights at the Circus* and the earlier *The Passion of New Eve* that the former is the more accomplished work, because it completes themes merely ‘touched upon’ in *The Passion of New Eve* (190). The title of her essay – ‘From Coded Mannequin to Bird Woman: Angela Carter’s Magic Flight’ – suggests that she considers Carter’s work to illustrate the writer’s ascent towards a correctly performative and ‘complete’ feminism. The popularity of *Nights at the Circus* shows that she is not the only critic to have considered the novel thus. There is an abundance of interviews and critical analyses on *Nights at the Circus*, which is uncontested by Carter’s other novels. It was awarded the James Tait Black Memorial Prize in 1984 and the critics protested openly when it did not appear on the 1984 Booker Prize shortlist (Gamble 2001, 136). Although the criticism is sometimes varying, the novel is nonetheless often described as Carter’s most ‘sophisticated’ or ‘complete’ work.

Bristow and Broughton’s introduction to the collection of essays *The Infernal Desires of Angela Carter* quote Robert Nye’s review of *Nights at the Circus*, which appeared in the guardian shortly after the novel’s publication. He suggests that her previous novels had been interesting but unconsummated attempts at introducing the discourses that Carter problematises in *Nights at the Circus*. ‘They could only be called successful --- if their author’s aim was merely to intrigue, and it is impossible to believe that Carter is that crude. *Nights at the Circus*, her new and most ambitious
novel to date, breaks fresh ground for her both in content and style, and is without
doubt her finest achievement so far’ (Broughton & Bristow, 1997, 5). Palmer
similarly claims that ‘In treating, in Nights at the Circus, themes of liberation and
change in personal relationships and the social formation, Carter focuses attention on
topics which, though absent from or marginalised in her earlier texts, were indirectly
heralded in them by means of her analysis of the contradictions and element of
violence in patriarchal social structures and institutions’ (201).

Despite the fact that throughout Angela Carter’s oeuvre there is a central
concern with images of femininity and the formation of gender identity, the critical
canon has determined that Nights at the Circus treats these concepts more
‘completely’ than Carter’s other novels. Both Palmer and Nye argue that their
appreciation is based on the recognition of increased authorial maturity. Nye writes
that ‘Angela Carter goes from strength to strength’ (Broughton & Bristow, 1997, 5),
implying that her authorship can be defined in terms of linear qualitative progression.
Palmer makes similar assumptions about the linearity of Carter’s literary career,
victoriously announcing that ‘[Carter] completes the movement from the
representation of woman as “coded mannequin”, trapped in conventional feminine
roles and positions, to the representation of her as “bird-woman”, courageously
exploring new realms, both personal and political’ (201).

Nights at the Circus was Carter’s latest novel when Palmer’s essay was
published in 1987. However, the majority of Carter’s critics make similar claims
about the superiority and increased maturity of Nights at the Circus even after her
last novel, Wise Children was published in 1991. The Oxford Companion to English
Literature praises *Nights at the Circus* at length in its entry on Angela Carter, stating that it is the author’s ‘chief achievement’ (176). She merely mentions *Wise Children* in passing. Joyce Carol Oates writes in her *New York Times* review on the novel that she found it entertaining, even though ‘Wise Children may not be Angela Carter’s most provocative or arresting work of fiction’ (Gamble, 2001, 163). The idea of Carter’s progressively developing feminist authorship is thus not sustained after *Nights at the Circus*, raising the question as to whether her apparent ‘insight’ into feminist ‘completeness’ has grown less sharp with old age or if the progressive elucidation of Carter’s work was merely a critically sustained myth in the first place.

Some critics avoid these questions, claiming that *Wise Children* should be set aside from Carter’s other work: it presents a different perspective on life, and thus applies separate discourses from the author’s earlier work, because Carter died of cancer only months after it was published. Beth A. Boehm states in ‘*Wise Children*: Angela Carter’s Swan Song’, that the novel should be read as a form of ‘memento mori’. This analysis cannot be related to Carter’s personal or political reasons for writing the book, however, since Lorna Sage adamantly claims, in her highly personal biography of Angela Carter, that the author was unaware of her cancer diagnosis when *Wise Children* was published (76).

*Wise Children* is structurally less unconventional than Carter’s immediately previous three novels, *The Infernal Pleasure Machines of Doctor Hoffman, The Passion of New Eve* and *Nights at the Circus* and it does not as overtly challenge set gender norms. *Nights at the Circus*, on the other hand overtly deconstructs all binary identity constructions. I will argue that *Nights at the Circus*’s abundant
popularity in comparison to the rest of Carter’s novels is due to its continual sexual and gender disruptions. Considering the critical climate at the time it was published,\(^{20}\) it is the most ‘politically correct’ of her works. *Nights at the Circus* adheres more thoroughly to the paradigm of early Butlerianism than any of the novels published before or after. Carter presents gender (as well as any other form of identity) as a matter of performance. The narrative is fittingly set partly on and partly off a circus arena, and it is often impossible to tell when the characters’ performances are genuine or part of the show. In accordance with Butler, Carter literally portrays gender as a fiction. The fiction is, however, disrupted. The circus train explodes somewhere in Siberia, the male protagonists are taken captives, and the women and animals are ‘translated into another world’; set free to compose their own futures (Carter, 1984, 225).

The narrative thus creates a space for a feminist libratory agenda. The liberation is cast in the hands of a grotesque ‘winged victory’.\(^{21}\) The protagonist, Fevvers, is portrayed as a form of feminine ‘monstrosity’, a large and often vulgar woman with a pair of powerful wings. Like Haraway’s cyborgs, Fevvers’s ‘monstrous’ being threatens the centre of Patriarchal society from its margins.\(^{22}\) Although the question is often asked, it is ultimately unclear whether or not Fevvers’ wings have been constructed by nature or by human hands, but as the narrative progresses the source of her ‘monstrous’ growths becomes unimportant. Although the wings are natural, Fevvers dyes them bottle-blonde.\(^{23}\) The ‘illegitimate fusion’ (Haraway, 218) that Fevvers is made from becomes naturalised, and like the cyborgs, she is a juxtaposition of woman and alien construction.
Much of the critical debate surrounding *Nights at the Circus* centres on the utopian aspects of the novel. Fevvers is often read, as in Paulina Palmer’s essay, to be the symbol of a final feminist victory; a simple liberatory icon ‘rebell[ing] against [her] captors and succeed[ing] in liberating [herself] from the tyranny of the circus’. When femininity has been set free, Fevvers is awarded a husband whose mind is ‘a perfect blank’ (Carter 1984, 222), so that she can prepare for ‘the subsequent reconstruction of his masculinity’ (Palmer, 200) and Fevvers conclusively laughs in victory, ‘mocking the existing political order’ (Palmer, 201). Aidan Day makes a similar analysis:

> The twentieth century that it looks forward to had, by the time Carter wrote the novel substantially happened. I read Fevvers’ laughter as, in part the delight of the victor, the delight that Angela Carter herself has retrospectively and that her character has prophetically, in knowing that the war for women’s rights, even if not ultimately won, would score up notable victories in the twentieth century. The celebratory laughter touches all human beings because the gaining of women’s rights is a gaining of the rights of being human (Day, 194).

Day notes that Fevvers is described in utopian terms early in the novel: ‘the pure child of the century that just now is waiting in the wings, the New Age in which no women will be bound down to the ground’ (Carter, 1984, 25; Day, 172).

As several critics acknowledge, however, there are numerous layers to Angela Carter’s recount of utopia. Fevvers’s performance as the Winged Victory has been rehearsed as one among many roles performed in the ‘museum for women monsters’ (Carter, 1984, 55) described early in the novel, among the other roles are Death the Protectress, the Angel of Death, Azrael, Venus and Gabriel. In *The Female Grotesque* Mary Russo comments on the fact that Carter’s cynical tone remains prevalent throughout Fevvers’s liberatory movement. Fevvers openly
proclaims herself to be the New Woman and her friend/carer Lizzie constantly reminds her that she performs the role slightly incorrectly. Russo concludes that:

This exchange between Lizzie and Fevvers is, like everything in the novel, inconclusive ... There is always something left over, something as untimely as subjectivity itself, that forms the basis of a new plan, perhaps another flight. Like Fevvers’ excessive body itself, the meaning of any possible flight lies in part in the very interstices of the narrative, as the many-vectored space of the here and now, rather than a utopia hereafter (Russo, 180-181).

Regardless of whether Carter considered herself to write a feminist utopia, however, the fact that Nights at the Circus presents such multiple ‘vectors’ and that the narrative voice elusively engages with the concept of being and performing on several levels, give the ‘queer’ feminist faction of her critics ample opportunity to apply various proto-Butler/Haraway perspectives to the novel. These arguments become more problematic to sustain in the discussions of The Passion of New Eve. There is one scene in particular, which most critics find highly problematic. In this scene the main ‘cyborgized’ female character Eve, who has surgically been transformed from the male Evelyn, against his/her will, performs sexual intercourse with the Hollywood superstar Tristessa St Ange, who has just been revealed to be a MTF transvestite. Carter describes how the two gender ambiguous bodies take it in turns to perform both gender roles: ‘Turn and turn about, now docile, now virile – when you lay below me all that white hair shifted from side to side … I beat down upon you mercilessly, with atavistic relish, but the glass woman I saw beneath me smashed under my passion and the splinters scattered and recomposed themselves into a man who overwhelmed me’ (1977, 149). She concludes that:

Every modulation of the selves we now projected upon each other’s flesh, selves – aspects of being, ideas – that seemed, during our embraces, to be the very essence of our selves; the concentrated
essence of being, as if, out of these fathomless kisses and our interpenetrating, undifferentiated sex, we had made the great Platonic hermaphrodite together (1977, 148).

In her essay on the development of Angela Carter’s feminist subject, Ricarda Schmidt argues that this passage displays one of the weaknesses of The Passion of New Eve. Eve and Tristessa inhabit either a male or a female sphere which is represented by either a dominant or a submissive role in their love-making. The act is symbolically likened to the image of the Platonic hermaphrodite, which is a creature combined of a clear male side and a clear female side. Schmidt considers this to be an incomplete form of androgyny, the application of which renders The Passion of New Eve an incomplete feminist novel. This male-and-female androgyny, is according to Schmidt, merely useful as a step towards the more refined neither-male-nor-female androgyny which is more easily traceable in Carter’s later novel, Nights at the Circus (Schmidt, 1990, 64).

Aidan Day spends the larger part of his chapter on The Passion of New Eve in Angela Carter: The Rational Glass arguing against Schmidt’s simplistic dismissal of the novel. He never questions Schmidt’s idea of a neither-male-nor-female androgyny as more sophisticated and complete than Platonic androgyny, however. He claims that Schmidt has merely misunderstood Carter’s usage of imagery. According to Day, the invocation of the Platonic hermaphrodite should not necessarily be taken literally. Day attempts to ‘save’ The Passion of New Eve, by claiming that despite the fact that the love-making passage seems to invoke “‘fixed entities” – of the male and the female’ (1998, 123), this cannot be what Carter meant to imply, since, in Day’s words: ‘we know that Carter was sharply opposed to the idea of such mythic entities or archetypes’ (1998, 123). He claims this regardless of
the fact that he fully accepts her to adhere to the myth of the New Woman and the Winged Victory in *Nights at the Circus* (Day, 1998, 175-80). Day finds no real proof of the ‘fact’ of Carter’s opposition to archetypes in *The Passion of New Eve* itself, but refers his reader to interviews and earlier novels to prove his point.28

Grudgingly or not, the critics agree that neither Eve nor Tristessa are at any point devoid of gender identity (Day, 1998; Schmidt, 1990; Lee, 1996; Hobbs, 2004; Punter; Johnson, 1997; 2000). The novel plays with the interchangability and fluidity between the male and the female, but both Eve and Tristessa are at each depicted moment either experiencing a male identity, a female identity or both. Despite the fact that critics like Aidan Day try to fit it into an uncomfortably narrow ‘queer’ ideal, the novel refuses to take the correct ‘queer’ shape. Rather than reading it in a different light, most critics thus consider it to be an early and uncouth example of ‘queer’ feminism,29 and award it acclaim for ‘anticipating’ the theories of Judith Butler.

**Carter’s Queer(ied) Utopia**

The sex scene between Eve and Tristessa in *The Passion of New Eve* is difficult to place for several different reasons. One of the critical issues discussed in relation to this section of the novel concerns the decision of whether or not to read it seriously.30 The text gives rise to similar concerns about ambiguity as the section describing the New Woman in *Nights at the Circus*: it is uncertain whether or not the author is describing a feminist utopia. This problem is emphasised by the presence of the essential image of the Platonic hermaphrodite, the actual essence of which none of the critics quite agrees upon.31 The second major point of critical disagreement
concerns the parts Tristessa and Eve play in the scenes leading up to and directly following the erotic union. Most critics attempt to argue that Eve is constructed as a gender ‘cyborg’ and that Tristessa becomes an embodiment of Butlerian gender performance: Eve is a corporealised construction and Tristessa continually re-iterates myths of femininity up to the point immediately before the love scene when her performative tableau is shorn.\textsuperscript{32} Considered separately and without Carter’s ambiguous layers of cynicism the two characters may arguably be read thus. As a unified concept, however, neither the de-feminised Tristessa, nor the ‘cyborgised’ Eve quite fit the libratory moulds that the critics place upon them.

Despite the fact that the novel was published as early as 1977, \textit{The Passion of New Eve} at first glance conveys a number of ideas that feminist theory did not fully express until the late 1980s. Lucie Armitt acknowledges in \textit{Theorising the Fantastic} that Eve is, like Haraway’s image of the cyborg, an amalgamation of physicality and construction (Armitt, 1996, 176-179). The radical women’s liberation movement that constructs her considers her to be a libratory ‘Messiah of the Antithesis’ (Carter, 1977, 67). Like Haraway’s cyborg the New Eve’s very existence is supposed to create a ‘powerful infidel heteroglossia’ (Haraway, 223), disrupting the Patriarchal ‘dialectic of creation’ (Carter, 1977, 67). The image of Eve will give birth to ‘other present-tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideological resources of victimisation so as to have real life’ (Haraway, 219). They will be creatures beyond gender, and will thus not be trapped in woman’s inevitable route through ‘Woman, Primitive, Zero, the Mirror Stage and its imaginary’ (Haraway, 219).\textsuperscript{33} Having once been a man, Eve initially needs to become a woman. Literally performing the feminine antithesis, she reversely tracks her own rebirth after her
transition, going through all the stages quoted above from the opposite direction; tracing the ‘feminisation of Father Time’ (Carter, 1977, 67). Eve experiences the Mirror Stage in her room in the feminist lair in Beulah, when she first sees the reflection of her female body: ‘I had become my own masturbatory fantasy. And – how can I put it – the cock in my head, still, twitched at the sight of myself.’ (Carter, 1977, 75). When she escapes Beulah she becomes the slave of the misogynist and impotent man Zero, who reduces all his slave women to primitive creatures by treating them like animals and not allowing them to speak. In the final part of the novel Eve enters a cave in search of Mother, the Goddess/surgeon who created her, but the journey leads her to a womb-like condition and a back-wards birth, ‘worming [her] way through’ (1977, 184) ‘[w]alls of meat and slimy velvet’ (1977, 184). When she reaches the end of her journey, the sea, she realises that she may be pregnant. Her journey is promising to give birth to a ‘hopefully monstrous’ creature which has been conceived by a cyborg and a phallic woman.

The storyline of New Eve in *The Passion of New Eve* does fit remarkably well with Haraway’s ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’. Similarly, the character of Tristessa St Ange can easily be read as anticipatory of Judith Butler’s formulation of gender performance. Tristessa, the Hollywood icon, performs all the myths of femininity. Carter writes that ‘She had been the dream itself made flesh though the flesh I knew her in was not flesh itself but only a moving picture of flesh, real but not substantial’ (1977, 7-8). When Eve is taught to perform femininity, her feminist captors show her clips of Tristessa’s roles. She is ‘the very type of romantic dissolution, necrophilia incarnate’ (1977, 7), and as such, the ‘real’ physical Tristessa, when Eve first sees her, is ‘a sleeping beauty who could never die since she had never lived’ (1977, 119).
She lives in a house of glass, ‘in her own mausoleum’ (1977, 112), surrounded by a waxwork collection aptly named ‘THE HALL OF THE IMMORTALS’ (1977, 119). The concept of Tristessa is fully non-essential: she is merely a screen on which femininity is performed.

Considering the fact that *The Passion of New Eve* offers its queer and third-wave feminist critical readership such anticipatory iconic embodiments of Haraway’s and Butler’s early theories, it is perhaps not odd that they expect the union of these to be suitably utopian. At a pivotal moment, however, Tristessa and Eve abandon their potential for non-gendered being and perform the essentially male-and-female Platonic hermaphrodite. This sequence is only problematic if it is read as a possible pure utopian moment, embodying a ‘queer’ feminist myth. Aidan Day and Ricarda Schmidt do not merely attempt to find the absence of representation or the extinction of myth in Eve and Tristessa; they want to corporealise the modern myth of the perfectly queer being. They attempt to visualise a representation of an essentially gender-less entity. In Day’s and Schmidt’s readings of *The Passion of New Eve*, Butler and Haraway are taken for granted: like Fevvers’s wings, they have become naturalised. In their quest to eliminate universals, they have made Judith Butler and Danna Haraway themselves universal.

Aidan Day acknowledges that if Eve and Tristessa’s sex scene is not read as utopian, Carter’s Platonic hermaphrodite is not necessarily presented as an ideal. Instead, he argues, it may be considered a satire of the mythological being: ‘Carter’s passage on the ‘great Platonic hermaphrodite’ is daring because it goes right into mythic territory in order to make a point which is anti-mythic’ (Day, 124). The
critical discussion thus moves between ideal and satire, mythic portrayal or anti-myth. Aidan Day and Riccarda Schmidt attempt to define Angela Carter’s political relationship to her mythical referent. Yet, Carter frequently mentions mythological characters throughout the narrative of The Passion of New Eve, without taking a stand to the myths. Neither Day nor Schmidt linger over the fact that only a few paragraphs before she mentions the Platonic hermaphrodite, Carter makes a fleeting reference to the mythological character Tiresias.\(^36\) I would like to suggest that rather than either *idealising* or *satirising* the myth of the hermaphrodite – both approaches of which indicate that Carter in reality believes in a non-essential ‘queer’ self – the author simply invokes the symbolism of sexual difference and union connected to Plato’s hermaphrodite and the philosophy of abstract love inherent in this concept.

**Becoming the Platonic Hermaphrodite**

As Aidan Day claims, The Platonic hermaphrodite has been mythologised into a symbol of gender unity (1998, 123). It is invoked in canonical texts on gender transgression as various as Thomas Heywood’s *Apology for Actors* and Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’.\(^37\) The idea of the Platonic hermaphrodite has, because of this symbolic status, been greatly misconstrued. Plato’s formulation of the hermaphrodite is more ambiguous than its subsequent incarnations. Plato’s *The Symposium* stages a competition to explain the true meaning of love, in which Plato’s philosophical father, Socrates, takes part (2005). The idea of the hermaphrodite is not expressed by Socrates, but one of his opponents: Aristophanes, the famous comedian.\(^38\) This fact, in itself, throws an enigmatic light on the status of the idea. Aristophanes urges his listeners to accept that his narrative is not a joke (Plato, 2005,
Sellberg

32). He explains that in the beginning there were three human genders: ‘not just the present two, male and female. There was also a third one, a combination of these two; now its name survives, although the gender has vanished’ (Plato, 2005, 27). Each creature had either two male sides, two female sides or a female and a male side. The gods, however, decided to cut them in half, to decrease their strength. Aristophanes concludes that love is the individual demi-beings’ urge to find the other half, from which they have been so painfully separated (Plato, 2005, 32).

Eve and Tristessa come together in their erotic union, performing the myth of the Platonic (Aristophanes’s) hermaphroditical being of completeness. In the course of their intercourse they become one whole creature, rather than two separate halves. As Carter describes in the passage quoted above, their beings ‘smash’ (1977, 149) and ‘recompose’ (1977, 149), finally joining in ‘the mysterious equivalence of orgasm, that solvent of the self’ (1977, 149). Aristophanes states that once the halves are fused together ‘you are one person; and when you died, you would have a shared life in Hades, as one person instead of two’ (Plato, 2005, 31). Eve and Tristessa’s performance of the Platonic myth is shattered when Tristessa is killed and Eve lives on. Eve is, however, tempted to continue the ritual:

I was free to run away, to run back to the grave in the sand, to lie down upon it and there to waste away from sorrow. I was very much struck by the emblematic beauty of this idea; to die for love! So much had I become the mortal, deathward-turning aspect of Tristessa (Carter, 1977, 162).

Eve does not complete this particular mythic performance of love, however. She lives on when her other part has been severed and moves on to another stage. After Aristophanes has finished his speech in The Symposium, Plato proceeds to describe another idea of love. The final speech is given by Socrates, himself, who
Sellberg quotes the wise woman Diotima to claim that love has nothing to do with the particular lovers, but resides in a productive connection, the abstraction that draws them together. ‘The idea has been put forward ... that lovers are people who are looking for their own other halves. But my view is that love is directed neither at their half nor their whole unless, my friend, that turns out to be good ... Love’s function is giving birth in beauty both in body and in mind’ (Plato, 2005, 52-53).

Socrates explains that the love of a person allows the character to give birth to, and understand an abstraction of, love.

Socrates’s idea of love in Plato’s The Symposium has correlations with postmodern deconstructive philosophy – and not surprisingly – theories of performativity. He looks at love partly in terms of binary opposition, referring to two planes of existence: that of the divine and that of the physical, which, in view of Plato’s theory of subjectivity in The Republic, can also be interpreted as a plane of ‘ideal’ abstractions and a plane of physical imitations of these abstractions.

Socrates refers to love as a spirit, which is a concept that resides between the above opposites: ‘Being intermediate between the other two, they fill the gap between them and enable the universe to form an interconnected whole’ (Plato, 2005, 48). It is important to note that love is thus not just the union of two lovers: it is the concept which unifies the lovers with their abstract forms. The fact that other people consider there to be an appearance of love between two lovers, connects the lovers and their observers to the ideal abstraction. When love between lovers is discussed, ‘[w]hat we’re doing is picking out one kind of love and applying to it the name (“love”) that belongs to the whole class’ (Plato, 2005, 51). This image, or continual performance
of love, progressively creates an impression which may lead to the apprehension of the ideal drama.

As recounted above, Socrates explains that love is a desire for the good and the beautiful, which may connect its bearer to the actual concept of beauty. He relates how Diotima has told him: ‘Even you, Socrates, could perhaps be initiated in the rites of love I’ve described so far. But the purpose of these rites, if they are performed correctly, is to reach the final vision of the mysteries’ (Plato, 2005, 59). The ritual performance first takes the form of a sexual union with a beloved object, which if the roles are performed as roles, leads to the disruption of the particular love, through the comprehension of the generality of this object’s performance, and so to the comprehension – and apprehension – of the idea of beauty:

At first, if his guide leads him correctly, he should love just one body and in that relationship produce beautiful discourses. Next he should realize that the beauty of any one body is closely related to that of another, and that, if he is to pursue beauty of form, it’s very foolish not to regard the beauty of all bodies as one and the same ... Looking now at beauty in general and not just at individual instances, he will no longer be slavishly attached to the beauty of a boy, or of any particular person at all, or of a specific practice. Instead of this low and small-minded slavery, he will be turned towards the great sea of beauty and gazing on it he will give birth ... to many beautiful discourses and ideas (59-60).

The apprehension of the ‘beautiful and good’ is thus a conception which is gained through a continual performance; a creation and destruction of that which seems ‘beautiful and good’. Love, for Socrates, is an act of catharsis: a deconstruction which leads to a state that is both physical and abstract; both performance and form.

Carter presents an uncannily similar idea in the conclusion of *The Passion of New Eve*. At the end of her many adventures, Eve finds herself pregnant and embarks
upon a journey on the sea. The memory of her union of Tristessa is replaced by a greater union and this allows Eve to give birth to something beautiful – an embodied and unified imprint of the abstraction of their love: ‘after many, many embraces, he [Tristessa] vanishes when I open my eyes. The vengeance of the sex is love. Ocean, ocean, mother of mysteries, bear me to the place of birth’ (Carter, 1977, 191). Eve and Tristessa’s ritual of gendered love-making and their continual production and destruction of gendered performances symbolises Eve’s journey to a plane where gender performance and gender essence are inter-changeable and transposed.  

Unless it is seen as a direct critique of the ideas it presents, neither Aidan Day nor Ricarda Schmidt acknowledge performance to be anything but an enslaving practice; a submission to universalised forms. They note how Eve and Tristessa become more pronouncedly gendered in the scenes leading up to and directly following their sexual union (Day, 1998, 125; Schmidt, 66). Day claims that this is part of Carter’s satirising process. He suggests that she depicts a Butlerian concept of ‘drag’, to expose the false universals at play in her characters’ actions (1998, 125). He comments on how ‘the various selves which each partner projects upon the other only “seemed” to be “the very essence of our selves” and that it is only “as if” they had made the “Platonic hermaphrodite” together’ (Day, 124). Carter certainly does emphasise the performativity of the gendered roles that Eve and Tristessa put on, but these performances do not simply play upon their bodily surfaces in a charade of satirical love-making. Eve and Tristessa actively pursue their performances. If there is one myth Carter definitely does not attempt to crush here or anywhere else, it is the idea of a unifying love. *The Passion of New Eve* does not merely refer to, but directly paraphrases Socrates’s philosophy of love.
Carter indicates that before her union with Tristessa, Eve identifies as essentially male. When Zero and his primeval slaves force Eve to enact the groom in a wedding service, with Tristessa as bride, Eve comments:

I had become my old self again in the inverted world of mirrors. But this masquerade was more than skin deep. Under the mask of maleness I wore another mask of femaleness but a mask that now I never would be able to remove, no matter how hard I tried, although I was a boy disguised as a girl and now disguised as a boy again, like Rosalind in Elizabethan Arden. In the desert, we played out an arid pastoral (1977, 132, my emphasis).

After the sex scene, Tristessa instead expresses an essential masculine ego, and is denoted as ‘he’ until his tragic end. He describes his experience of his female self:

I was a lost soul. Tristessa is a lost soul who lodges in me; she’s lived in me so long I can’t remember a time she was not there, she came and took possession of my mirror one day when I was looking at myself. She invaded the mirror like an army with banners; she entered me through my eyes (1977, 151).

The binary male and female parts that Eve and Tristessa play out are part of an erotic ceremony of unification, which leaves neither of the parts unaffected. It is an extended state of becoming-man-and-woman: ‘He and I, she and he, are the sole oasis in this desert. --- every modulation of the selves we now projected upon each other’s flesh’ (Carter, 1977, 148). It is a ritualistic dance, in which there are two parts that Eve and Tristessa’s respective flesh take it in turns to act out. Eve states:

Masculine and feminine are correlatives which involve one another. I am sure of that – the quality and its negation are locked in necessity. But what the nature of masculine and the nature of feminine might be, whether they involve male and female, if they have anything to do with Tristessa’s so long neglected apparatus or my own factory fresh incision and engine-turned breasts, that I do not know (1977, 149-150).
Eve and Tristessa give birth to a Platonic concept of unification – an abstraction of love – because they take on each other’s performance: ‘I did not close my eyes for I saw in his face how beautiful I was’ (Carter, 1977, 151). The erotic progression thus, in addition to the binary reflections, includes an idea of identification, and as Eve expresses it, an ‘ecstasy of narcissistic gratification’ (Carter, 1977, 146). The ideas of difference and sameness; outside and inside are deconstructed, not by liberating Eve and Tristessa from gendered performance, but rather, by the cathartic production of ideal love.

Platonism and Deleuzeism

Claire Colebrook recognises in ‘How Queer Can You Go?’ that the idea of a theory as a prevalent line of thought or a transcendent norm and logic has been identified to have its origin in Platonism (2008a, 17). Feminist and queer theory, following French feminism and post-structural philosophy, attempt to move away from essentialist Platonic structures of thinking, although this attempt inevitably proves unsuccessful since the logic of the movement relies on a Platonic structure (Colebrook, 2008a, 17-19). Whereas Judith Butler’s later work on sexuality and gender responds to this dilemma by attempting to further de-essentialise the conception of theory and theorising, Colebrook suggests a reconsideration of Plato’s essential ideas and systems of logic. She advocates Gilles Deleuze’s appropriation of what she calls a ‘higher Platonism’ (2008a, 18) instead of the rejection of Platonic principles. This ‘high’ Platonism, which Deleuze develops in The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition, functions as a reversal of the Platonic relationship between pure ‘ideas’ and the ‘images of thought’ (2004, 164-208). It is not, however ‘the overcoming of
a transcendent logic in favour of lived experience, but an overturning of experience and the lived in favour of radically inhuman Ideas beyond judgement’ (Colebrook, 2008a, 18). This type of Platonism can be conceived of both as a radical essentialism (conceptually) and a radical non-essentialism (subjectively). Deleuze focuses on the conceptual, but rather than considering a concept, an idea or a structure of logic in terms of its compatibility with lived experience and the living subject as it presently is, Deleuze visualises ideas as springboards for becoming. Thus, whereas Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble attempts to outline what the concept of gender difference entails, or how it is constructed, Deleuze’s theory tries to consider the potentialities of gendered categories; what they may enable.

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze distinguishes the motives of Plato’s theory to be ‘a question of “making a difference,” the “thing” itself from its images, the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum’ (253). Plato does so in order to establish a binary relationship between the diverse and ultimately finite simulacra and the perfect, pure and infinite forms (Deleuze, 1990, 254). Deleuze attempts to deconstruct the opposition that is usually conceived within this construct. He argues that the forms are in fact compound simulacra of the diverse expressive simulacra, which do not function in opposition to finite expressions, but rather in correlation with them (1990, 279). According to Deleuze, forms and concepts are thus never certainties, ‘[i]n fact, concepts only ever designate possibilities’ (2004, 175). He explains that concepts and categories cannot denote ‘necessities’ (2004, 175), because reality is a relational process and concepts like simulacra are units within this process. As such, they may never alienate themselves from, or grasp the relational structure of which they are part.
Concepts should not be conceived of as representations of thought but as bases for relational encounters (2004, 176). Deleuze acknowledges that Plato states that ‘It is from “learning”, not from knowledge, that the transcendental conditions of thought may be drawn’ (2004, 206). It is in the encounters with Socrates that Plato’s texts develop their thought processes and conceptualisations. These encounters cannot themselves be rationalised, but may only be grasped, or given birth to (Plato, 2005, 53) through the senses ‘in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering’ (2004, 176). And as Plato acknowledges, these sensual catharses are the generators of continual becomings.

From this perspective, Tristessa and Eve’s ritualistic becomings as they ‘[t]urn and turn about, now docile, now virile’ (Carter, 1977, 149) may be conceived of in terms of steps in an intricate metamorphic process. Colebrook acknowledges that Deleuze’s conceptualisation of Platonic abstractions in The Logic of Sense shows that sexual categories may enable bodies to connect and ‘play with the “pure predicates” of sexuality’ (Colebrook, 2008a, 18). When Eve and Tristessa become the ideal sexed concepts; when they project gendered ‘aspects of being, ideas’ (Carter, 1977, 148) on each other’s flesh and form the platonic hermaphrodite together, they are ‘enjoying sexuality in its ideal and inhuman form’ (Colebrook, 2008a, 18) and the metamorphic desire that is generated in this act enables Eve to become the New Eve. She incorporates a new ideal, binary and thoroughly artificial process of becoming-woman. The male Evelyn’s former lover Leilah (who by this point has become Lilith) indicates that this was Mother’s plan all along: Eve had to go through the processes of gendered mirroring (Carter, 1977, 172-173).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Elizabeth Grosz and Moira Gatens consider the process of becoming-woman to be a process of mirroring or ‘doubling’. Becoming-woman is the othering or fictionalising of the self that constitutes the formation of the subject (Gatens, 1966, 43). Gatens argues in *Imaginary Bodies* that there is nothing outside of these illusions of the self; ‘rather, the human condition *is* a condition of illusion’. When arriving at the end of her journey Eve thus realises that Leilah, the only ‘real’ woman she had so far encountered was also an illusion: ‘She can never have existed, all the time mostly the projection of the lust and self-loathing of a young man called Evelyn, who does not exist, either’ (Carter, 1977, 175). This recognition is not portrayed in a negative light, however. Eve recounts that ‘the same moon that took Tristessa and me into its polarised embrace in the desert now swung up into the sky’ (Carter, 1977, 175-176) and the dis-illusory Leilah/Lilith leads her through her final process of becoming. This is where Eve becomes one with the ocean, which Angela Carter concomitantly likens to an abstraction of love, the disintegration of subjectivity and the escape from linear time (Carter, 1977, 190).

Time is inseparable from the type of becoming discussed here. Deleuze argues that one of the important outcomes of Plato’s emphasis on the process of learning rather than the concept of knowledge is that his idea of subjective conditioning becomes determined by reminiscence rather than innateness (2004, 206). The concept of time thus becomes a variable in the formation of subjectivity, and as such it may be transposed and transformed. Angela Carter refers to a significant relationship between time, desire and subjectivity in the sex scene between Eve and Tristessa in *The Passion of New Eve*, where “[t]he erotic clock halts
all clocks’ (148), but the concept is more thoroughly explored in her earlier novel, *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman*. This novel follows the young Desiderio’s erotic adventures and journeys through ‘Nebulous Time’ (189), ‘the anteriority of all times’ (189) as he attempts to restore reality to a city that has been laid under siege by the ‘Lord of Illusions’ (28), Doctor Hoffman.

The plot line of *Doctor Hoffman* is based around a war between a Freudian Reality Principle and the Pleasure Principle. Desiderio’s city is falling to ruins because Doctor Hoffman’s warfare of illusions has rendered time and space non-linear and multi-dimensional, so that ‘[n]othing in the city was what it seemed ... life itself had become nothing but a complex labyrinth and everything that could possibly exist, did so’ (Carter, 1972, 11): reality is merely a ‘flux of mirages’ (11). This overwhelming indeterminacy is produced when Doctor Hoffman succeeds in channelling pure actualised desire, or ‘Eroto-energy’ (Carter, 1972, 206) to generate a set of enormous all-enveloping mirage machines. These machines are powered by ‘a hundred of the best-matched lovers in the world, twined in a hundred of the most fervent embraces passion could device’ (Carter, 1972, 214).

The protagonist of *Doctor Hoffman* is led through the different stages of the novel by his desire for the Doctor’s daughter, Albertina. This changeable yet recognisably metamorphic character acknowledges that she and Desiderio are an ideal match. Their simulations and differences are symmetrical and their mutual desire is thus both infinitely powerful and inevitable. Yet, it is Desiderio’s desirous journey that transforms him into the image and the antithesis of his lover: ‘I had been transformed again. Time and travel had changed me almost beyond my own
recognition. Now I was entirely Albertina in the male aspect’ (Carter, 1972, 199). And as Desiderio is shaped by his desire for Albertina, so is she: ‘all the time you have known me, I’ve been maintained in my various appearances only by the power of your desire’ (204).\footnote{54}

Once more Carter refers to desire in terms of Plato’s ideal abstractions: Albertina is Desiderio’s ‘Platonic other, my necessary extinction, my dream made flesh’ (1972, 215). In Doctor Hoffman Carter develops her Platonic poetics and erotics further than in The Passion of New Eve, however. The relationship between the ideal ‘dream’ and the ephemeral ‘flesh’ is described here, not in terms of a Platonic dualism, but rather as a Deleuzean encounter: ‘There is the mirror and the image but there is also the image of the image; two mirrors reflect each other and images may be multiplied without end ... Ours is a supreme encounter, Desiderio. We are two such disseminating mirrors’ (Carter, 1972, 202). Carter acknowledges that there is no stable subjectivity or reality behind these mirrors, yet they are not immaterial: all of Doctor Hoffman’s mirages ‘though absolutely unreal, nevertheless, were’ (1972, 12). The Doctor attempts to liberate reality from the constraints of the Real.\footnote{55} The ‘eroto-energy’ produced by his desire machines supply ‘sufficient energy to intensify a symbol until it becomes an object according to the law of effective evolving, or, if you prefer a rather more explicit term, complex becoming’ (1972, 208). The Desiderio that narrates the story thus notes that he ‘is no longer the ‘I’ of my own story’: the protagonist self continually becomes transformed and transposed.
High Platonic Erotics and Poetics

In accordance with Deleuze’s ‘high’ Platonism, Albertina in Angela Carter’s Doctor Hoffman argues that ‘Love is the synthesis of dream and actuality’ (Carter, 1972, 202). The ‘pure predicates’ of sexuality are played out and played with in desirous spatiality, enabling the formation of a ‘matrix of the unprecedented’ (Carter, 1972, 202). Rosi Braidotti makes a similar argument about the relationship between desire and becoming in Transpositions: ‘Desire is the propelling and compelling force that is attracted to self-affirmation or the transformation of negative into positive passions ... To enact different steps of this process of becoming, one has to work on the conceptual coordinates.’ (2006, 169). She differentiates this nomadic form of gendered being from a concept of gender essentials: ‘These are not elaborated by voluntaristic self-naming, but rather through processes of careful revisitations and retakes, or patterns of repetition ... It is a transformative force that propels multiple, heterogeneous “becomings” of the subject’ (2006, 169-170).

Angela Carter acknowledges that these becomings are also a matter of power, and we thus return to queer theory and the question of liberation from gendered and sexual power dynamics. Lorna Sage recounts that Carter’s persistent interest in mirror relationships lead her to ‘look into some dangerous mirrors – like de Sade’s’ (1994, 31). Much to the horror of many contemporary feminists, Carter’s The Sadeian Woman discusses the idea of sexual power struggles as processes of liberation. Carter argues that Marquis de Sade’s work functions as a ritual transformation of ‘living flesh to dead meat’ (Carter, 1979, 138); from subject to pure object. De Sade’s women are bound to strict ritualistic performance, whether
these are dominant as in the case of his Juliette or submissive like the tormented Justine. These sexual power-relations are always presented in their utmost extreme, and as such they appear as performance; they become overt reiterations of sexual predicates. According to Carter, this process is best portrayed in ‘The Philosophy of the Bedroom’, where the young Eugénie is schooled in the ways of the libertine; she is supervised through a Sadeian ‘rite de passage’ (1979, 122, original emphasis) and finally rapes her own mother. Carter explains that Eugénie here “‘plays the husband” to her lovely Mama, acts out upon the mirror image of her own flesh a charade of domination and possession’ (1979, 126) and through the reflective objectification of her mother’s and her own flesh she is liberated from the bounds of her Oedipal subjectivity.\(^{57}\) This act gains its power because of the power that has been invested and divested from the performance’s signification. Eugénie simultaneously becomes the artifice and destroys the artifice (Carter, 1979, 129-130).

Deleuze makes a similar argument about the objectification involved in masochism in ‘Coldness and Cruelty’. The separate parties within the power relation enter into a strict performative contract and this leads to a cold and thoroughly dehumanising, but also re-humanising ritual (1997, 100). Masochism, which Deleuze relates to Freud’s death drive,\(^ {58}\) produces pleasure through the transcendence of sexualisation in a ritualised repetition of pain (Deleuze, 1997, 120). The sacrifice of pleasure enables transcendent pleasure. Angela Carter argues that a similar result is sought in sadism’s sacrifice to pleasure. She quotes the Marquis’ statement that ‘It is only by sacrificing everything to sensual pleasure that this being known as Man, cast into the world in spite of himself, may succeed in sowing a few roses on the thorns of life’ (Carter, 1979, 135). By giving up his self-governance, by relinquishing his
humanity to the abstract power ritual, Sade’s ‘Man’ may enable a certain amount of transformative agency.

This type of queer Deleuzean/Sadeian sexual liberation can also accommodate the sexual spaces in the queer/transgender discourse. Judith Halberstam discusses FTM transgender/butch lesbian performances of gendered roles during sexual encounters in *Female Masculinity*. Like Carter, she acknowledges that sex is liberating because it is a matter of performance; a reiteration of preconceived roles. It gains its power as an experience because of the power that has been invested in the performance’s signification. Because the roles have been played out before, the sex act is simultaneously a performance of a character’s self and a performance of something outside of him/her (Halberstam, 1998, 111-139). It deconstructs the boundaries between self and other; the player and what is played. These types of strictly gendered or conventional sexual roles, where performative power is deliberately played out may thus cathartically produce a possibility of self-creation.

Kate Bornstein, who defines herself as an S/M dyke also affirms the possibilities of ritualistic sex roles. In an interview with Lindsay McClune in the transgender chapter of *On Our Backs Guide to Lesbian Sex* she describes the liberating possibilities of S/M practises:

> What I’ve found in S/M is the rawest expression of power: I am, you’re not. I do, you receive. It is a constructed binary that is honored by both of the participants. When you give yourself consciously to that sort of thing, it’s like any other discipline, you achieve an ecstatic place from that (2004, 223).
Bornstein further explains that she prefers to partner up with women who identify as ‘old school butches’. She wants a sexual partner who adheres strictly to a traditional masculine gender role to perform her feminine gender role against. She describes the sexual interplay as a ritualistic dance:

When an old-school butch starts flirting with me, it’s a recognizable dance, it’s in my blood. And I just follow myself there, I follow her and she’s just ... It’s a dance of identities, and a very, very structured dance. Like any great dances, you have to learn the steps (222).

In the same chapter of the On Our Backs sex guide, FTM transsexual Patrick Califia’s ‘Femmes: A Love Letter’ describes how he found himself increasingly attracted to overtly feminine femme lesbians during his transformation into a man. He recounts how ‘this surprised me because I bought into the idea that if you are a transsexual man, you must on some level have negative feelings about the female form’ (2004, 199). Califia deduces that the fact that his bodily shape no longer invokes him to perform the feminine role helps him to appreciate it as a role: ‘Polarization. The more masculine my body has become, the more comfortable I feel putting my skin against Her’ (201). The presence of a traditional feminine part in the ritualistic gender game helps him to perform a traditional male part, and in the process affirm his progress in becoming a man: ‘By taking pleasure from me, a femme confirms that I am not deficient ... In some ways, a femme is my dick, because when she gets off around me, she makes what I have seem valuable to us both’ (202). Califia thus describes the performance of a gendered sex act to cathartically transform him into a man.

For Angela Carter, a truly liberating outcome of this gendering process would lead to an ultimate dissolution of categorised subjectivity, where ‘Being would cease
to be a state-in-itself” (1979, 129), not unlike Deleuze’s idea of becoming-imperceptible. This concept is simply presented in Doctor Hoffman, The Passion of New Eve and The Sadeian Woman as ‘love’, and like Plato’s transcendent love it is continually likened to the sea. Doctor Hoffman, the transformative power in Doctor Hoffman, is described as an inhuman abstraction of humanity: ‘He was cold, grey, still and fathomless – not a man; the sea’ (204). He has transformed the cogito to ‘I DESIRE THEREFORE I EXIST’, but he is portrayed as ‘a man without desires’ (1972, 211). The New Eve ‘commits’ herself and ‘her little passenger’ to this indefinable and all-enveloping sea in The Passion of New Eve (Carter, 1977, 190).

Carter’s love is constituted in reflective abstractions and hyper-temporal, hyper-spatial transpositions that in adherence to Deleuze ultimately enable a process of becoming-imperceptible:

Love is a perpetual journey that does not go through space, an endless oscillating motion that remains unmoved. Love creates for itself a tension that disrupts every tense in time. Love has certain elements in common with eternal regression, since this exchange of reflections can neither be exhausted nor destroyed, but is not a regression. It is a direct durationless, locationless progression towards an ultimate state of ecstatic annihilation (Carter, 1972, 202).
According to Claire Colebrook’s reading of Deleuze’s high Platonism and Angela Carter’s conception of love, sexual and gender predicates may be enabling concepts: they do not necessarily fix the subject, but rather engender transformations and reconsiderations of subjectivity. This chapter further investigates sexual, gendered and transgender spaces as these are articulated in transgender discourse and further develops the idea of an overtly gendered and/or trans-gendered poetics. I engage with two literary transgender characters: Hedwig from John Cameron Mitchell and Stephen Trask’s *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* and Myra/Myron from Gore Vidal’s *Myra Breckinridge* and *Myron*. Both characters are overtly gendered, although they are articulated as split subjectivities inhabiting disparate spaces of gender conflict. Both, however, eventually utilise their multiple directions to form themselves as less of a coherent individual space than a connective spatiality. Hedwig and Myra embrace their identities as characters of continual and multidimensional change and seize their opportunity to create ‘something beautiful and new’ (Mitchell & Trask, 74). Gendered absolutes and transgender spatiality become the generators of new connections and new spaces.

**Transgender Spaces**

Chapter four establishes that the transgender discourse sometimes finds queer appropriations of transgender bodies problematic.¹ The critical issue is posed in relation to experiential authenticity.² The idea of transgender subjectivity relies on certain categories of gender experience and these are safeguarded by the subjects that
express an adherence to them. There is thus a specific transgender space formed, which similar to queer theory poses itself in opposition to hetero-normative and gender-normative discourses in society, but unlike queer theory emphasises the innate quality of gender identity. The corporeal body in transgender studies is a material although rewritable entity, but the subjective gender is a psychological fact.

Transgender studies are thus simultaneously in liaison with queer theory and in opposition to it.

This ambiguous relationship is further complicated by the fact that transgender discourse inhabits a secondary position in relation to queer discourse in popular culture. In some cases, the voices of the transgender space thus express a similarly ‘other’ position in relation to queer culture as the lesbian and gay activists quoted in chapter four express in relation to hetero-normative discourse or the feminist scholars express in relation to patriarchal discourse. Jordy Jones defines transsexual identity fiercely in opposition to queer values in an article criticising the film version of John Cameron Mitchell and Stephen Trask’s punk rock musical *Hedwig and the Angry Inch*:

*Hedwig*, which has established a reputation as a transgender film, and more specifically as a film about a transsexual, features a main character who has been largely misrecognized. The character of Hedwig is not actually a transsexual woman, nor is John Cameron Mitchell, the man who created the character Hedwig, and who has played her on stage and screen. Hedwig is, rather, an overt citation of a transsexual woman, and Mitchell, as Hedwig, is a non-transsexual gay man in drag as his fantasy of a transsexual woman (2006, 450; original emphasis).

Interestingly, Jones’s reaction to the queering of popular culture takes a similar tone to radical feminist Janice G. Raymond’s disclaim of the patriarchal values inherent in transgender identity formation in *The Transsexual Empire*. He
argues that the transgender body is being objectified, or made into a canvas for inherently queer or homosexual conflicts, in something which *poses* as a transgender film, but fails to fulfil the necessary requirement of true transgender experience (2006, 450). In *Vested Interests* Marjorie Garber notes that similar discourses of opposition were prevalent in 1980s and 1990s lesbian and gay activism: the fact that transgender and queer identities had historically been equated stirred the lesbian and gay subjects to overtly distinguish themselves from their transgender counterparts (64-66). Yet, despite these distinctions, transgender and lesbian and gay discourses also share many theoretical and political goals and often inhabit overlapping experiential spaces.

In Jones’s article this simultaneous opposition and association creates logical incoherencies, which are most visible in his ambivalent treatment of Judith Butler. Jones initially adheres to Butlerian performativity when establishing a conception of gay gender subjectivity, quoting *Bodies that Matter* in order to establish a conception of the fetishism he supposes to be inherent in the drag act and the performativity implied in gay gender formation (450). In relation to transgender subjectivity, however, he uses the same sources to argue against the empirical and theoretical bases of Butler’s performatively constructed bodies (454). Although Jones discusses materiality and constructivism in general, the concept of performativity is logically acceptable in relation to queer bodies but flawed when used in connection to transgender corporeality.

Jones constructs distinct and grossly generalised theoretical platforms for queer and transgender being and these are strictly limited and conceptually fixed.
Jones’s concept of subjectivity is essentialist to the degree that he refuses to accept that a non-transsexual body attempts to represent a transsexual character (450). Yet, he presupposes that gay identity and gender formation is non-essential, emphasising the queerness of the superficiality in Butler’s continual re-signification practice. According to Jones, the fact that Hedwig is re-constituted as a number of different characters throughout the film proves her to be queer, and thus a superficially constructed homosexual (451). Queer identity is thus portrayed as fiction and transsexuality as ‘true’ gendered experience. In criticising the objectification of the transsexual subject, Jones objectifies what is constituted as its reverse group identity. He thus re-iterates the binary power struggle that landed transsexual subjectivity in a secondary position in the first place.

_Hedwig and the Angry Inch_ is discarded by Jordy Jones for being a homosexual man’s rendition of a transgender subject. Yet, Gore Vidal, who is also openly gay is not criticised by the transgender community for his rendition of transgender subjectivity in _Myra Breckinridge_. Kate Bornstein states that:

> People have underrated Gore Vidal’s _Myra Breckinridge_ ... I think it has a lot to do with the point Vidal makes: that the existence of transgendered people – people who exist sexually for pleasure, and not procreation – strikes terror at the heart of our puritanical Eurocentric culture ... I think he was on the mark, and I’d be proud to call Myra my sister (1995, 78).

Myra, like Hedwig, is an overtly postmodern, continually changing and often caricatured rendition of gender and transgender. Yet, a prolific transgender activist like Kate Bornstein embraces her image. This is not primarily because of decisive differences between the characters, but because of a split in the transgender discourse’s conception of identity. Jordy Jones represents a section of the
transgender discourse that emphasises the importance of a united transgender movement and a specific idea of transgender identity, whereas Kate Bornstein is more interested in the concept of gender transgressive identity formation.\textsuperscript{9}

Marjorie Garber, who is on Kate Bornstein’s side of the fence also portrays Vidal’s Myra Breckinridge as a transgender image of power (1992, 114). Myra, like one of Leslie Feinberg’s \textit{Transgender Warriors} is the model of transgender and/or feminine opposition to patriarchal society.\textsuperscript{10} Bornstein argues that ‘Vidal positions Myra as the voice and agent of doom for the traditional American male’ (1994, 78). The plot, which is narrated in diary form follows the newly transitioned MTF transsexual Myra as she penetrates a stronghold of patriarchal values, her uncle Buck Loner’s Academy for young aspiring actors in Hollywood, and claims a new surgically feminine space. She states that ‘I am the New Woman whose astonishing history is a poignant amalgam of vulgar dreams and knife-sharp realities’ (Vidal, 1968, 4),\textsuperscript{11} and ‘I too want a world and mean to have it. This man [Buck Loner] – any man – is simply a means of getting it (which is Man)’ (18). Myra portrays herself in superlative terms: ‘Myra Breckinridge is a dish’ (5), possessing ‘superbly shaped breasts’ (4) and ‘perfect thighs’ (5). She uses these body parts and her seductive feminine wiles to manipulate her way into the inner sanctum of American masculinity, which in \textit{Myra Breckinridge} is Buck Loner’s Hollywood (Vidal, 1968, 18), and literally rape the image of the American man, represented by the young Rusty Godowski (149-150).

Myra is strong and ruthless. She becomes the woman she wants to be and she shapes the world around her in accordance with it and although Vidal’s portrayal of
her is ambiguous, Kate Bornstein reads the image of the transsexual in this novel as powerful and triumphant. This is the reason why Bornstein celebrates the narrative and chooses to embrace its heroine. It is an affirmative image of transsexuality as a choice rather than an affliction. The transsexual character in *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* is more fraught. Hedwig does not initially wish to become a woman. She transitions in order to escape from a dire and restrictive East Berlin, only to find herself an abandoned housewife in a trailer in the American west when the Berlin wall falls one year later. Hedwig’s femininity is also less fetishised and celebratory. She describes herself as a ‘monster’ (Mitchell & Trask, 2000, 44) and a ‘freak’ (35). She has ‘tits of clay’ (44) and a ‘hideous beige shag’ wig (42). Instead of Myra’s narcissistic appreciation of her ‘too lovely for this world’ body (Vidal, 1987, 41), Hedwig expresses disgust when she first catches a glimpse of her wigged female self: ‘I catch myself in a mirror and for the first time see clearly the horror hunkering on my head’ (Mitchell & Trask, 2000, 46).

Jordy Jones and Kate Bornstein’s choice to read Hedwig and Myra from a perspective of transsexual identity is problematic. As mentioned above, both Myra and Hedwig are overtly stylised. Neither is truly portrayed as a complete subject – transsexual or not. Marjorie Garber notes that the image of the transsexual in *Myra Breckinridge* is idealised and radically inhuman. She is a ‘reified figure for blurred gender’ (Garber, 1992, 114) which Vidal ‘readily appropriate[s] to problematize sexual stereotypes’ (Garber, 1992, 114). The sexual stereotypes are also reified, however. Myra represents an element of the sexual indistinctness that outlines the distinctions. She thus becomes the ‘emblem of fear and desire – the fear and desire of the borderline and of technology’ (Garber, 1992, 16), that holds up the binary
structure. Hedwig is similarly presented as an image of the borderline and of its threatening destruction. She is likened to the Berlin wall: ‘Hedwig is like that wall, / standing before you in the divide / between East and West, / Slavery and Freedom, / Man and Woman’ (Mitchell & Trask, 2000, 15). She is an amalgamation of flesh and technology; reality and dream; life and death: ‘I rose from off of the doctor’s slab / like Lazarus from the pit’ (14). Her form is feared, ‘reviled’ and ‘graffitiéd’ (15), but without it the binaries could not survive: ‘There ain’t much of a difference / between a bridge and a wall / Without me right in the middle, babe / you would be nothing at all’ (15-16).

From Third Sex to Nomadic Sex

I will use the fictional transgender spaces formed by Myra Breckinridge and Hedwig to explore two different modes of transgender identity formation. Kate Bornstein’s choice to identify with a character like Myra Breckinridge becomes less surprising when read in relation to the author’s more general formulations of transgender subjectivity. Bornstein is more interested in the function of the transgender body than her subjective experience of it. She develops an idea of the transgender as a third space in the gender binary, based on Marjorie Garber’s reading of the transgressive possibilities of transgender bodies (Bornstein, 1995, 118; Garber, 1992, 10). Bornstein quotes Garber’s description of his ‘third’ dimension of gender as ‘that which questions binary thinking and introduces crisis’ (Bornstein, 1995, 118; Garber, 1992, 11). Garber insists that the ‘third’ is not a sex or a gender in the common sense: ‘The third is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility’ (1992, 11). One of the examples Garber gives to demonstrate the capacities of the
third space is Sophocles’s introduction of a third speaker in Greek drama. This character did not play a singular or significant part, but was ‘added to the protagonist and antagonist, enabling a freer, more dynamic dramaturgy’ (11). In this sense the ‘third’ sex is a non-subjective entity that enables flexibility and change within the sexual binary. It ‘deconstructs the binary of self and other’ (Garber, 1992, 12).

Garber also refers to the ‘third’ space inhabited by transgender bodies in terms of Lacan’s construction of the ‘third’ Symbolic dimension in Lacanian psychoanalysis (Lacan, 2002, 412-439). This dimension is not a realm set apart from the first two binary dimensions of the Real and the Imaginary, but is rather the concept that disrupts the fantasy of completeness conjured by the first two dimensions’ reflective positions (Lacan, 2002, 423). The Symbolic for Lacan is the realm of language and signification: it is where the direct relationship between reality and its images becomes disrupted and ‘the word’ comes into being as a signifier (423). Garber’s Lacanian transgender space is similar to Hedwig’s insistence that she is not merely a wall, but also a bridge. The ‘third’ space of gender disrupts the unity of the gender binary, but it also enables communication between the opposing camps.

Judith Halberstam finds Garber’s conceptualisation of transgender space too simplistic. She points out that ‘in all attempts to break a binary by producing a third term, Garber’s third space tends to stabilize the other two’ (1998, 26). Patrick Califia similarly accuses Kate Bornstein’s usage of Garber’s ‘third’ gender of adhering to an overly simplistic view of the power relations within the gender binary (1997, 250). Califia complains that whereas Bornstein’s approach is ‘well-meaning’ (1997, 254),
it is a utopian and abstract construct that ignores the ‘real’ experiences of sex and gender and the ‘deep ideological differences’ between different activist camps (1997, 254). Califia is particularly critical of Bornstein’s indication that the ‘third’ space is a privileged position occupied exclusively by transgender bodies. Bornstein rejects both bisexuality and androgyny as concepts that ‘hold two sides in place by defining themselves in the middle of two given polar opposites’ (1995, 133), but celebrates the transgender as a thoroughly transgressive concept.

Patrick Califia’s critique of Kate Bornstein is politically and socially justified. However, if Bornstein’s cries for political and social change are put aside – and her attempts to reclaim simplisticly formulated transgendered spaces are considered less literally – her analysis is not necessarily concerned with social and political realities. As Jay Prosser points out, Bornstein tends to cut and paste political agendas interchangeably with ‘bits and pieces of queer to produce a troubling performativity’ (1998, 175). The result is certainly problematic but also intriguing. Kate Bornstein juxtaposes abstract discursive functions with real-life transgender experiences in a narrative that functions neither as a theoretical manifesto or a political agenda, but rather like an incoherent and inconclusive drama of theoretical and political self-conceptualisation. This is how I choose to read Kate Bornstein – not as a transgender theorist but as the theorising, politicising and transgendering performance artist she overtly declares herself to be (1995, 143). As such, Bornstein’s work has significant potential. Gender Outlaw and Bornstein’s subsequent My Gender Workbook excellently portray processes of conceptualising, de-conceptualising and re-conceptualising. Bornstein moves between discourses and spaces related to gender,
transgender, politics and queer theory, but she conclusively only adheres to one idea: the concept of continually transgressive, multi-dimensional personal performance.16

Kate Bornstein’s ‘third’ transgender space adheres mainly to an idea of a radically performative, transgressive and multi-dimensional self. It is thus less of a location and more of a spatiality. Judith Halberstam argues that one of the major problems with Marjorie Garber’s ‘third’ space is that its position as a sexual/gendered other in relation to the gender binary clouds the fact that transgender is not a unitary concept: it closes down ‘the possibility that there may be a fourth, a fifth, sixth or one hundredth space beyond the binary’ (1998, 27). In Bornstein’s *Gender Outlaw*, the actual spaces opened up by the author’s conception of ‘third’-ness are multiple. When she argues that the ‘third’ would be better considered an arena for the ‘transgressively gendered’ (1995, 134), than a transgender space, she is not trying to do away with transgender; she is rather attempting to open up the concept of ‘third’-ness to a wider possibility of identity formation. In *My Gender Workbook* she lists 107 different answers to the question ‘Who am I?’, and she thus forms 107 different identity spaces that she considers to be driven by the ‘third’ transgressive spatiality, indicating that there are as many more as there are gender transgressive people (80-89).

Bornstein explores gender spatiality in terms of a ‘third’ theatre, where actors take on numerous differently gendered roles and create new gender transgressive and sexually challenging spaces: ‘Transgender is simply identity consciously performed on the infrequently used playing field of gender’ (124, my emphasis). Bornstein’s conception of S/M is also channelled through the idea of radical performance:
Sadomasochism intersects gender at the point of performance. We perform our identities, which include gender, and we perform our relationships, which include sex ... S/M is simply a relationship more consciously performed within the forbidden arena of power. (1995, 124)

Bornstein’s S/M is a play of previously formulated and often reiterated identities performed in order to form new spaces. This idea of gender generated spatiality correlates with Claire Colebrook’s suggestion to consider queerness in relation to Deleuze’s high Platonism and the production of radically inhuman gendered ideas.\(^{17}\)

In *My Gender Workbook*, Bornstein quotes a chain of conversations she has during one evening signed onto an S/M internet chat room. She creates a number of radically gendered, transgendered, dominant and submissive personas in separate conversation windows with separate partners. Each of these encounters produces something different and as they are brought to a close at the end of the evening, Bornstein transcend[s] her own spatial boundaries as their collective meeting point:

I sign off. My screen goes dark. And everyone I was, all the different roles I was playing, they’re floating out in front of me. All of my identities, everything I can be, is ready to be picked from some tree called me that never bears the same fruit twice. That’s what I’ve been talking about, honey. That’s what happens when I post hard (1998, 224–225).

**The Spatiality of Hedwig**

Myra Breckinridge is not considered a space for Kate Bornstein so much as a means to spatiality. This is where Bornstein’s approach differs from Jordy Jones’s reading of fictional transgender characters. Jones considers Hedwig in John Cameron Mitchell and Steven Trask’s *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* in terms of a fixed transgender category – something which the character does not consistently fit it into. According to a Deleuzean conception of subjectivity, consistency is not a necessary
requirement for identification, however. Jones acknowledges that Hedwig at certain
points is a homosexual man, but I will argue that there are other points when she is a
transsexual woman. The performances are caricatured, but the overlaps are often
hazy. Neither Hedwig’s homosexual nor her transsexual identities are fixed. They are
transient; continually changing. At the end of the play they are both ultimately
denied.

Hedwig can neither be read as the coherent and stable subjectivity that Jones
requires for transsexual subjectivity, nor as the superficial de-essentialised canvas
that he deems her to be. I prefer to consider her in terms of a body travelling in time
through a number of subjectified experiences and loci, similar to the type of
Deleuzian nomadism that Rosi Braidotti describes in *Metamorphoses* and
*Transpositions*. The body, for Braidotti, is a marker of subjectivity-in-becoming. It
continually moves through essentialised and corporealised subjective ‘locations’.
These are not to be considered separate from each other, but rather as planes
intermeshed by chains of memory (2002). Braidotti describes it in terms of speed
perception: ‘Just like travellers can capture the “essential lines” of landscape or of a
place in the speed of crossing it, this is not superficiality, but a way of framing the
longitudinal and latitudinal forces that structure a certain spatio-temporal “moment”’
(2006, 172). This momentary subject-positioning is continually transposed. It is a
recurrent conditioning of connective events that lead to new becomings. Cameron
Mitchell’s Hedwig becomes – and never ceases to be – a homosexual youth, like she
becomes and never ceases to be a transsexual, as long as these concepts are not
forced into a conception of mutual exclusivity.
Jones acknowledges that ‘[t]ranssexuality is not a fixed or closed category’ (2006, 450). However, desire is a fixed and essentially binary concept in Jones’s argument: ‘Transsexual subjectivity ... can be minimally defined as the articulation of a transsexual desire – and it is desire, more than anything else, that defines transsexuality’ (450). In order for a person to be classed as transsexual, according to Jones, he/she must always have had the desire to belong to the opposite sex (450). By these standards Hedwig is insufficiently transsexual. Her initial incarnation, the homosexual youth Hansel growing up in East Berlin, never expresses a desire to be female. However, if desire were considered a more transient concept, Hedwig certainly harbours a transsexual desire to be differently gendered. Merely because she is no longer male, Jones assumes that Hedwig’s body is female after she has gone through her ‘botched’ sex change operation (Jones, 2006, 451; Mitchell & Trask, 43), but in actual fact Hedwig is neither man nor woman: ‘The wound healed and I was left with a one inch mound of flesh where my penis used to be where my vagina never was’ (45). Like a transsexual, Hedwig feels that her genderless ‘Barbie Doll-crotch’ body is mismatched with her sense of identity (43), but it is ‘what I have to work with’ (66). Throughout a large part of the narrative, Hedwig harbours an intense desire to be coherently gendered. It is unclear, however, what gender she would choose.

Braidotti points out that the idea of nomadic subjectivity is not a matter of choice: ‘A “location”, in fact, is not a self-appointed and self-designed subject-position’ (2002, 12). It is rather a tracer of consciousness or an inconsistent and inconclusive subjective narrative-in-becoming. At the end of Hedwig and the Angry Inch, Hedwig removes her wig, smudges her make-up and draws the signature mark
of her male lover on her forehead. Jordy Jones reads this as the re-emergence of the homosexual man residing inside her all along (2006). In view of Braidotti’s nomadic subjectivity, I would rather describe it as a moment frozen in time: the close of the play – and Hedwig’s particular narrative. The traces of the familiar categories: the woman, the man and the lover, are all smudged over her face – in an unfamiliar pattern. As Hedwig herself describes it, she is ‘A collage / All sewn up’ (71). In accordance with Braidotti, she ultimately considers her subjectivity in geographical terms: ‘you can trace the lines / Through Misery’s design / That map across my body’ (Mitchell & Trask, 70).

Hedwig’s body becomes a material signifier of her subjective journey. Her experiences and personas are displayed on her skin. Her body is literally a map of her various adventures. This is how Rosi Braidotti characterises the space created by a Deleuzean nomadic methodology: ‘it works from minoritarian, positive and productive memory. What matters is the structure of the affective forces that make it perceivable to the viewer’ (2006, 172). The visible characteristics make Hedwig communicable: ‘Precepts, affects and concepts are the key elements’ (Braidotti, 2006, 172). Similarly to Deleuze’s high Platonism, Rosi Braidotti thus argues that Ideas of being are important tools in the process of transcendence. For Braidotti however, transcendence occurs because Ideas are spaces of possible communication and connection; ‘collectively shared and constructed, jointly occupied spatio-temporal territory’ (2002, 12). The concept of transition and ‘becoming’ that Rosi Braidotti develops in *Transpositions*, relies on the revisititation and reiteration of shared conceptive constructions. She argues that ‘[t]hese multi-layered levels of affectivity are the building blocks for creative transpositions, which compose a plane
of actualization of relations, that is to say points of contact between self and surroundings’ (2006, 172). Gender performance is an element within the active process of gendered transformation. The performance of generic roles is a means of communication between the individual subject and its others. When the subjective expression and experience becomes communicable; when it becomes a shared experiential space, the possibility of change is introduced. A shared space is transformed and transposed with every new input (Braidotti, 2006, 177).

The caricatured character Hedwig embraces and embodies a number of such shared spaces throughout the play. The text plays with the notion that the character is nothing beyond her markers: she is eponymous with her own ‘personal hair system ... My head-wig’ (Mitchell & Trask, 47). The narrative also engages directly with the philosophical discourses surrounding Plato’s gendered Ideas. *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* uses Aristophanes’s speech from Plato’s *The Symposium* as a narrative frame.

Mitchell acknowledges in a marketing interview that his authorial process started with the myth of the Platonic hermaphrodite (Crowther). In the play, Hedwig recounts how her mother told her about Aristophanes’s idea of love as a bedtime story, when she was still the little boy called Hansel. The myth is related in the song ‘The Origin of Love’, which serenades Hedwig’s idea of an ‘other half’ that has been shorn from her (31). She concludes that this initial differentiation is the source of love and love-making:

You had a way so familiar, / But I could not recognize, / Cause you had blood on your face; / I had blood in my eyes. / But I could swear by your expression / That the pain down in your soul / Was the same as the one down in mine. / That’s the pain, / Cuts a straight line / Down through the heart; / We called it love. / So we wrapped our arms around each other, / Trying to shove ourselves
Hedwig describes the hermaphroditical being as a concept of pure difference, empowered by an urge for unity, which is performed in ritual sex acts. She determines that ‘[i]t is clear that I must find my other half’ (31). In order to relate to the Platonic hermaphrodite, Hedwig realises that she will have to connect with another being, but she is uncertain what to look for: ‘is it a she or a he? Identical to me? Or somehow complimentary? Does my other half have what I don’t?’ (31-32). Hedwig contemplates the links between difference and sameness and decides that both need to be performed. She negotiates the ritualistic effects of this performance in relation to the act of becoming; ‘what about sex? Is that how we put ourselves back together again? ... can two people actually become one again?’ (32, my emphasis).

In adherence to Plato’s philosophy of unifying love, Hedwig finds that cathartically ‘becoming one’ is a process which is best conducted through continual progressions of ritual performance. Hedwig finds a lover, Tommy Gnosis, who she thinks may be her other half: ‘He’s the one. The one who was taken. The one who left. The twin born by fission’ (66). Tommy scorns her however, and makes himself a famous pop star using the songs they have written together. Hedwig then embarks on a tour of America, performing in the run-down backwaters of the towns where Tommy holds his concerts. The audience of the punk rock musical becomes cast as the unenthusiastic witnesses to Hedwig’s illegitimate twin show that has been tailing Tommy Gnosis’ all-American success. Hedwig curses and whines over the thankless person performing next door. She taught Tommy everything she knew about
performance, and appropriately gave him the name Gnosis, which is Greek for knowledge. Tommy, however, refuses to acknowledge that she has been part of either his life, or his success. Hedwig occasionally makes her audience aware of the applause from the other more appreciated concert next door, and of Tommy’s voice from afar. Tommy and Hedwig thus perform alongside each other, without crossing paths throughout the main bulk of the show.

Hedwig’s relationship to Tommy is not fully revealed until she sheds her wig at the end of the play and exposes Tommy Gnosis to be a persona within herself. Her ‘other half’ is literally her creation. Throughout the show Hedwig and Tommy have spoken about a media incident, in which the couple was found in a sexually compromising position, leading to a car accident. He says: ‘I realised there was only one person who had ever really been there for me in my life. And that person was me. The accident was a cry for help. I was yelling “Help!” to me’ (35). The estranged Tommy Gnosis is a part of the character he and Hedwig made together, ‘me, the real me, the me I used to be’ (42). Gnosis and Hedwig are both discovered to be performances, which have been made embodied.

When Hedwig reunites with Tommy in Cameron Mitchell’s one body, the stage directions state that two images of a male and a female face, which have been shown on a projector above the stage throughout the show, should be seen to merge into one single face (Mitchell & Trask, 79) In his article criticising Hedwig and the Angry Inch, Jordy Jones comes to the conclusion that Cameron Mitchell’s concept is simple: he creates the Platonic hermaphrodite. According to Jones, the final image indicates that the musical creates a holistic and psychoanalytic rendering of
Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s *Symposium*: ‘The origin ends at the ultimate destination: the halves made whole, the sexes united, ... the panic of self-loss through merger with the Other successfully managed, ... the One triumphant.’ (2006, 451).

Jones, however, fails to recognise the nature of the relationship between Hedwig and Gnosis in the first place.

The persona performing on the stage next door is not Hedwig’s other half, nor is the illegitimate gender-bender in the wig actually Hedwig: they are the *creation* that was made out of Hedwig’s union with her other half. The subjective spaces created throughout the show are connected through the performative spatiality embodied in the final collage. Hedwig complains that the differentiations between the personas ‘cut me up into parts’ (Mitchell & Trask, 70). These characteristics are all features of the emerging unity that is Hedwig. Despite its overt references to Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s *Symposium*, *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* thus correlates closer with Socrates’s speech on love and unity.²² Socrates states that love is created by the desire of the mortal to become immortal; it is the human desire for the divine (Plato, 2005, 56). In accordance with Socrates’s speech, Hedwig tells Tommy that love is immortal. When Tommy asks how, Hedwig replies:

(Hedwig:) ‘Well, perhaps because love creates something that was not there before.’

(Tommy:) ‘What, like procreation?’

(Hedwig:) ‘Yes, but not only.’

He grabs my ass and he laughs. I don’t.

(Hedwig:) ‘Sometimes just creation. Don’t move.’

I paint a bold silver cross on his forehead.

(Trask & Mitchell, 64).
The silver cross becomes the marker of the created character; the pop star Tommy Gnosis. Like Socrates shows, love gives birth to knowledge (Gnosis), and to ‘something beautiful and new’ (Trask & Mitchell, 74). This concept is immortal, because it is ‘More than a woman or a man’ (Trask & Mitchell, 73): it is the multiply gendered form; the ideal drama of love, which is reiterated continually through time. Socrates argues that ‘This is the way that every mortal thing is maintained in existence, not by being completely the same, as divine things [the ideals] are, but ... leav[ing] behind another new thing of the same type’ (Plato, 2005, 56, my emphasis).

The fact that the punk rock musical *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* is performed on stage emphasises this idea, since the same show will inevitably be reiterated in different spaces and with different performing bodies. Hedwig remains in a continual process of subjective becoming.

**The Transformative Concept**

Hedwig is not a subjective space, but a transformative concept. She is the embodiment of the type of transgender transcendence that Kate Bornstein describes in *Gender Outlaw* and *My Gender Workbook* and she bears the characteristics of Rosi Braidotti’s Deleuzean nomad. Her body carries the ‘essential lines’ of her thoroughly conceptualised internality and thus becomes a means of affective connectivity. Materiality here comes to function as spatiality rather than space – and connectivity rather than connection. Hedwig’s various identities-in-becoming are the means by which spaces are connected, conditioned, revisited and reconsidered, rather than specific spaces in themselves. Her urge to identify is an urge to become connected and a desire for affirmative reconsidering of previous conditions.
Connective experiences, whether painful or not, are revisited and reformed into possibilities for positive change.

Hedwig’s spatial and connective markers are equally material and transient. The play’s first turn from painful gendered becoming to affirmative change takes place after Hedwig’s surgical transformation has landed her a ‘Barbie Doll-crotch’ (Trask & Mitchell, 43), a divorce and a caravan home in the American west. The character lifts herself from the ‘personal hell’ of gendered no-man’s land, through processes of gendered becoming: ‘I put on some make-up / and turn up the tape deck / and pull the wig down on my head / suddenly I’m Miss Midwest / Midnight Checkout Queen’ (Mitchell & Trask, 47). She goes through repeated becomings of ‘Miss Behive 1963’ (48),’Miss Farah Fawcett from TV’ (49) and finally ‘this punk rock star / of stage and screen’ (52-53). Each of Hedwig’s characters are building blocks of ‘the woman I’ve become’ (47), and she celebrates them as parts of her continual journey, aware that the personas are transformative and not reversible: ‘I’m never turning back!’ (53).

Ritualistic dressing processes are common in MTF transgender autobiographies. They often feature as initial modes of becoming. Kate Bornstein states that this is ‘how I dress in the morning. That’s how I shift from one phase in my life to the next – first I try on the accessories’ (1995, 4). Erica Zander describes how putting on her best friend’s stockings gave her ‘a warm sense of “rightness”’ (2003, 13). Renée Richards recounts how she watched her mother putting on make-up and getting dressed in the morning: ‘Once she was awake ... she wasted little time in beginning a transformation that always struck me as incredible’ (1983, 8). Also
Jan Morris describes this act of gendered becoming in terms of ‘Images of magic’ (2002, 144). The full transformative experience, however, is seen as a gradual process. In RitaLynn Sly’s *So You Want To Be A Woman* this process is constructed as a ten-step programme with a neat calculation of costs for each step at the end of the book. Jan Morris describes it less rigidly as a process through which ‘I allowed myself to go further. I wore skirts for the first time, I experimented with cosmetics, I gradually developed the new persona which would one day be my only self’ (102).

Morris’s *Conundrum* finishes when this ‘only self’ has been formed; when she has ‘reached identity’ (138). With the exception of Kate Bornstein, Julia Serano and Riki Anne Wilchins, the majority of the canonical transsexual MTF autobiographers tend to strictly locate their transformative processes prior to and throughout their surgical sex change, but not beyond. Erica Zander argues that this is one of the reasons why it is difficult to maintain a functioning transsexual movement: once the transsexual subject has had his/her final surgery, he/she wants to identify within the gender binary, not as a transsexual (22). Kate Bornstein and Riki Wilchins decisively claim that this was never an option for them. Bornstein and Wilchins both consider themselves ‘gender outlaws’ (Bornstein, 1995, 69), residing in their radically other ‘genderhell’ (Wilchins, 2006, 547).

With the exception of these self-pronounced queer transsexual autobiographers, the continual process of gendered becoming is more visible in non-transsexual transgender bodies, where the interplay between biological sex and gendered otherness is not conclusively levelled. Sam Larsson’s psychoanalytic study *Det Andra Jaget vid Manlig Transvestism* (The Other Self in Male Transvestism, my
translation) establishes that MTF transvestites tend to continually negotiate between overtly masculine and feminine subjective personas, enabling a sensation of ‘transcendence’ (1997, 378). Virginia Prince, who despite her great influence on studies of transvestism prefers to identify as a ‘transgenderist’ (Ekins & King, 2005, 12), considers transgender transcendence to be a perpetual process to move beyond society’s sociological, psychological and philosophical limits: the transgender subjects or ‘transcendents’ (1978a, 45), who refuse to be ‘reflected back into the swarming mass of conformity’ belong to the few ‘individuals who have enough “escape velocity” to penetrate, climb over, and go beyond these barriers’ (1978a, 40).

Virginia Prince is wary that her definition of transgender transcendence may be perceived as a call for androgyny or gender elimination. She emphasises that she does not advocate a state of being that is firmly settled in-between the genders, or in a form of gender absence. Prince requires the full overt presence of both genders and all that they entail. She argues that the binaries constructed by society are necessary in the formation of a ‘fuller personality’ (1978a, 41). In this form of transcendence, gender becomes the enabling power and the transgender body becomes a transformative concept, not because it has access to a ‘third’ space outside gender, but because it has unlimited access within the binary. Prince does not advocate a form of anti-gender that affects the norm from beyond its boundaries: her ‘transcendent’ bodies use their mobility to transpose and transform these boundaries.

According to Prince’s agenda, a character like Hedwig in Stephen Trask and John Cameron Mitchell’s *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* may prove inadequately transgressive. Despite Prince’s typical 1970s stance that sex and gender are
completely separate entities (1973, 29), she is adamant about her choice to cherish and flaunt both her feminine and masculine bodily markers (her breasts and her penis) and she firmly believes that other ‘transcendent’ bodies should do so too (1978b, 54). Hedwig does not have a sexually marked body. Her ‘Barbie Doll-crotch’ and bare chest carry their corporeal gender insignia on the surface of the body, as prostheses. The body underneath is described as thoroughly androgynous. Her breasts are constructed from clay (Mitchell & Trask, 44), or tomatoes (72), and her genitalia are nothing but a blank de-gendered ‘one inch mound of flesh’ (45); a sexually frustrated ‘angry inch’ (45).

Gore Vidal’s Myra Breckinridge, on the other hand, is corporeally fully gendered. Throughout Myra Breckinridge she remains coherently feminine, although she uses a penile prosthesis to rape the young ‘stud’ Rusty Godowski (1968, 147). In Myron, Gore Vidal’s subsequent narrative of Myra’s adventures, the heroine’s gender coherence is more disrupted. Myra continually disappears and reappears; she blanks out for a few days and the radically masculine Myron Breckinridge takes over control of the body (1974). These two characters are portrayed as gendered polarities of one original subjectivity. Myra recounts how her previous incarnation, a sexually confused and gender dysphoric Myron Breckinridge contacted Dr Randolph Spenser Montag about his condition and was transformed into her present form. Myron was effeminate, homosexual and weak-minded, all traits which Dr Montag did not believe belonged in a male body: ‘There is no middle range’ (1968, 86). He ‘convinced Myron that one ought to live in consistent accordance with one’s essential nature’ (1968, 87, original emphasis), and thus Myra was born as the distilled femininity of Myron’s complex subjectivity. The Myron that
later reappears in *Myron* is no longer weak-minded and effeminate: he is a homophobic Republican ‘all American’ (1974, 218) Christian Scientist with a wife, a ranch and a respectable job (1968, 211-213). Myron is portrayed as the distilled masculinity that was repressed and banished from Myra/Myron’s body when Dr Montag performed his surgical and methodical gender polarisation.

The new Myron first appears after Myra loses her breast implants in a traffic accident (1968, 210). Once more the significance of the bodily markers is emphasised. Myra’s last words are: ‘Where are my breasts? *Where are my breasts*?’ (1968, 210). The pivotal markers are not just gender specific – they are also insignia related to Myra’s feminine sexuality. When Myra first wakes up at the hospital she has developed facial growth due to lack of hormone treatment and she is told that her hair has been cut off. This does not truly disturb her. It is the removal of her sexually charged breasts that reverts her to Myron’s masculinity. Myron’s definitive claim over the body is made through the surgical addition of a phallus (1974, 248). Myron and Myra subsequently perform their power struggle through the addition and removal of genitalia and mammaries on their body.32

In opposition to Virginia Prince’s denial that either sex or sexuality are related to gender identity,33 Myra and Myron Breckinridge explore the sexuality of their gendered bodies. When Myron first appears, he is less concerned with his effeminate hips, legs and facial features than with his female genitalia and his lack of a functioning phallus. When Myra is subsequently resurrected, she notes:

> Between my still gorgeous legs, within that sacred precinct where the finest of Scandinavia’s surgeons once fashioned a delicate vagina as cunningly contrived as the ear of a snail, that son of a bitch Myron has not only removed the delicate honeypot of every
real American boy’s dreams, but replaced it with A Thing! A ghastly long thick tubular object ... This cock has got to go! For one thing the overall effect is ghastly, since Myron was obviously too cheap to buy a pair of balls (Vidal, 1974, 248).

Whether male or female, Myra’s and Myron’s body is sexual, and as such it channels a great amount of power. Gore Vidal notes in one of his essays that sex always involves power (1999, 98). Myra considers her subjective defeat of Myron and her sexual defeat of Rusty in a similar light: ‘Having already destroyed subjectively the masculine principle, I must now shatter it objectively in the person of Rusty’ (1968, 113). All the heterosexual relationships in Myra Breckinridge and Myron are power struggles: the radically feminine Myra and the hyper-masculine Myron consistently claim the position of the Master/Mistress. The concept of mastery is directly reflected by sexual penetration. The phallic device here becomes a dual mark of power: Myra with her strap-on dildo is powerfully and overtly female in her possession of Rusty; and Myron is masculine and conventionally powerful in his relationship with his wife. As one of the characters notes: ‘there’s only room for one star in any bed’ (1968, 73). This is portrayed in relation to the earlier effeminate Myron, or as Myra calls him ‘Myron the First’ (1974, 277), who according to both Myron and Myra was a ’fag’ (1968, 66), who ‘invariably took it from behind’ (1968, 77). The polarised Myron and Myra are sexed extremes and thus become sexually powerful. This is portrayed as a reaction to the original Myron’s impassivity:

I had avenged Myron. A lifetime of being penetrated had brought him only misery. Now in the person of Rusty, I was able, as Woman Triumphant, to destroy the adored destroyer (Vidal, 1968, 150).

The heterosexual relationships in Myra Breckinridge and Myron are similar to S/M exhibitions of power. However, Kate Bornstein points out that the categorical
nature of the polarised power struggles of mastery and submission played out in S/M often tend to obscure the gender binaries: ‘S/M play can accommodate any combinations of sex, power, and gender play. When the play reaches the point of almost purely dealing with power, then many S/M players agree that gender has in fact been done away with’ (1995, 122). In Myra Breckinridge and Myron the power struggle is strictly gendered throughout. The concept of power is equated with gender: sex not only is power – power is sex. Rather than to evolve into a matter of pure power, Myra and Myron’s contention progressively becomes more purely sexual. Myra’s only mission is to crush ‘the masculine principle’ (1968, 113), and Myron’s primary pursuit is to suppress the image of the powerfully feminine in Myra (1974). If this binary power struggle were to dissolve, the concept of Myra/Myron would disappear. Myra indicates as much when she believes that she is on the brink of final victory: ‘But who am I? What do I feel? Do I exist at all? This is the unanswerable question’ (1968, 113).

The gendered absolutes are thus not portrayed as functioning subjectivities in Myra Breckinridge and Myron. Myra establishes that her role as the image of the ‘Woman Triumphant’ (1968, 57) is to become the transformative element that leads the society she inhabits into a new age. She considers herself ‘the creatrix of this world’ (1974, 333). Her ultimate goal is to form the basis for a society that is ‘more open, less limited, abandoning old-fashioned stereotypes of what is manly and what is feminine’ (1968, 123). After she successfully destroys the masculinity of Rusty in Myra Breckinridge, Myra sets out to create a whole ‘new race of beautiful, sterile, fun-loving Amazons’ (1974, 294). She produces silicon for breast implants in her closet, and subsequently implants breasts on young beautiful male victims after she
has abducted, raped and surgically castrated them in her hotel room (1974). At the end of the novel, Vidal indicates that Myra’s mission partially succeeded, when the still chauvinistic and homophobic Myron announces that the next Republican President is a ‘fun-loving Amazon’ (1974, 416).

**Transient Time and Space**

Despite their inhumanly absolute qualities, the polar extremes of masculinity and femininity are not portrayed as immovable in *Myra Breckinridge* and *Myron*. Myra and Myron are never stable entities, and neither are the times or spaces they inhabit. The shared body does not transform smoothly into the absolute feminine and the absolute masculine. Each transformation changes the body and its surroundings. It continually becomes something new. At the end of *Myron*, Myra transforms into one of her important role models; the influential Academy Award winning actress Maria Montez, and Montez subsequently develops into Myron. All the characters in the novel continually mould into reflections or amalgamations of one another. Despite his continued masculinity and conservatism, Myron remains devoid of a phallus until the end and his Republican friends – even the next Republican president – are similarly castrated and support this non-phallic and sterile type of masculinity.

Myra’s sexual relationships, especially in *Myra Breckinridge*, also transform over time. After her rape of Rusty, she admits:

> the very literalness of my victory deprived me of my anticipated glory. To my astonishment, I have now lost all interest in men. I have simply gone past them, as if I were a new creation, a mutant diverging from original stock to become something quite unlike its former self or any self known to the race (1968, 192).
At the beginning of the novel, Myra declares that she possesses ‘a means of exercising power over both sexes’ (1968, 77), and that she intends to use it. While she is planning to destroy masculinity in the form of Rusty, she also attempts to reform his girlfriend, Mary-Ann’s traditional sense of femininity. Myra attempts to seduce Mary-Ann, but she does not manage to exercise power over her (1968, 174). Although Myra is never aware of it, Vidal implies that Mary-Ann takes control and cleverly manipulates her seductress (1968, 185). Mary-Ann coyly protests but happily accepts Myra’s offers to help her establish a semi-successful singing career, and to move into Myra’s luxurious house. At the same time Vidal indicates that Mary-Ann plots to help Rusty gain his revenge on Myra by causing the car accident that has her transform into Myron (1968, 201-202). Mary-Ann also encourages Myra’s progressive loss of femininity before the personality-shifting discovery of her missing breasts. Myra declares that ‘All I want now in the way of human power is to make Mary-Ann love me so that I might continue to love her – even without possessing her – to the end of my days’ (1968, 192), but Mary-Ann is un-responsive: ‘If you were only a man, Myra, I would love you so!’ (1968, 192).

At the start of the novel Myra’s single object of desire is her own newly created feminine figure. Her diary is initially portrayed as a masturbatory fantasy; a description of what it is like ‘to be me, what it is like to possess superbly shaped breasts reminiscent of those sported by Jean Harlow’ (1968, 4). She waxes lyrical as she recounts how her body is supported by:

perfect thighs with hips resembling that archetypal mandolin from which the male principle draws forth music with prick of flesh so akin – in this simile – to pick of celluloid, blessed celluloid upon
which have been imprinted in our century all the dreams and shadows that have haunted the human race (1968, 5).

The newly created Myra expresses an idea of self that is similar to an MTF transvestite’s narcissistic fetishism. 36 Sam Larsson notes that a number of his research subjects consider their female personas to be ‘some kind of an “inner sexual partner”’ (1997, 483, original emphasis). The feminine persona in these MTF transvestites is a reflection of the subject’s sexual desires (Larsson, 1997, 483). Myra is portrayed as a fully manifested reflection of her own erotic dreams. She is her own corporealised attempt to ‘work out in life all one’s fantasies and so become entirely whole’ (Vidal, 1968, 63). When Myra becomes progressively infatuated with Mary-Ann, however, she attempts to recreate herself in terms of Mary-Ann’s fantasies and desires (1968, 191). She begins to see herself from Mary-Ann’s eyes. Myra’s shock when she realises what she looks like after the traffic accident is only secondarily related to her own desires – her primary concern is Mary-Ann: ‘I hope Mary-Ann can bear the gruesome sight. I hope I can’ (1968, 209).

Myra/Myron’s choice of gender in her sexual partner thus changes through the course of Myra Breckinridge. ‘Myron the First’ desires men and he transfers this position to the newly formed Myra. She subsequently goes ‘past’ men and turns her desire towards women (1968, 192), and this form of sexual attraction remains in the new Myron. The original Myron’s attraction to men is posed as one of the reasons for his decision to become a woman and Myra’s desire for Mary-Ann can certainly be conceived as one of the reasons for her transformation into a man. The transformative process can thus be read as a continual movement towards heterosexual.
The interaction between Myra/Myron’s gender- and sexual identities is not as simple as this, however. There is also a process that moves towards the disruption of heterosexuality. ‘Myron the First’ is queer and despite Myra’s conviction that her transformation into a woman will set this right, Myra also becomes queer. Already from the first few chapters of Myra Breckinridge, Myra’s desire for other women is overtly present, although the character attempts to deny it: ‘Between a beautiful girl and an unattractive man ... I shall always be drawn, like any healthy-minded woman, to the girl’ (1968, 87). Also the later hyper-masculine Myron avidly attempts to deny his interest in other men and equally desires and condemns the men he thinks may share his interest. Myron repeatedly observes the bodily features of a man called Maude, who despite Myron’s conviction of the opposite finds Myron repulsive: ‘Maude gave me a suspicious look. I think he was wearing eyeliner and is a fag, an element I do not mind when they keep to themselves and do not prey on minors or solicit straight people like yours truly’ (1974, 227).

Myra/Myron retains a repressed and combated queer sexual identity throughout the continual changes between gender identities. The sexual identity even partially generates the gendered changes. These identity spaces thus take part in a complex spatial matrix. Judith Halberstam notes in Female Masculinity that this is not an uncommon occurrence in the transgender community: ‘one axis of identification is a luxury most people cannot afford’ (159). Some FTM transsexuals who have previously identified as butch lesbians hold on to their queer identity although their gender identity changes, whereas others continue to be attracted to the gender they previously desired (Halberstam, 1998, 149). Richard Docter also states that some MTF transvestites are attracted to the opposite sex when they are dressed
as men and the same sex when they transform into their feminine persona (1988, 102). Gender and sexuality are thus not separate entities, but they are not uncomplicatedly related: there is not one universal connection between gender and sexual identity and the numerous forms of mutual interaction are often complex.

Judith Halberstam argues that gender and sexuality should be considered in relation to identity spaces. The interaction between transgender, homosexual and/or queer spaces that Halberstam constructs in *Female Masculinity* closely corresponds with Braidotti’s conception of nomadic subjectivity. She argues that most bodies move within, express and harbour several gendered and sexual subjectivities (Halberstam, 1998, 142-173). Halberstam analyses numerous masculine gender identities that are specifically female: masculinities that do not exclude the presence of femininity or femaleness. Sexual identities like butch lesbian, stone butch or drag king are some of these, but the non-sexual concept of the tomboy is also a female masculinity (1998, 111-173). Different identities are here related to in terms of common spaces and positive performativity. Each body performs a number of identities and relates to numerous spaces. These are not mutually exclusive or separate unless provoked to be so by binaristic social discourses (1998, 75-110). They affect and interact with one another to create subjective spatialities that enable continual gendered becomings.

Judith Halberstam’s political project advocates a conception of queer becoming which she considers in terms of becoming-strange. *Female Masculinity* explores the possibilities of disrupting the myth of unilateral gendered coherence. Halberstam portrays the body as an arena for multiple gender possibilities. She uses
non-coherent ‘strangely’ gendered portraits in art and cinema to emphasise its signifying potentials (1998, 29-43). Her conception is not solely related to identity spaces, but also to time. One of the major differences between being and becoming is the introduction of a temporal axis in the concept of subjectivity. Halbertsam’s queerness requires a queerly gendered space and time. Queer temporality is portrayed as a sense of time that disrupts the linearity of cause and effect and displaces the procreative principle of a ‘biological clock’ that measures the progressive movement of the body in time (Halberstam, 2005, 5). The idea of subjective becoming emphasises the future potentialities as well as the past of a body’s movement through time and space. Bodies are never merely positioned or present; they are moving towards spaces and away from spaces (Grosz, 1999b, 22). This transitory quality represents the subject’s power of his/her relationship to familiar social concepts such as gender.

In the introduction to Doing Time, Rita Felski refers to Julia Kristeva’s essay ‘Women’s Time’ where the linearity and coherence of time measurement is attributed to patriarchal constructs of subjectivity. This subjective history, which Kristeva argues to have dominated constructions of both masculine and feminine subjectivities, builds a strictly two-dimensional idea of the present in terms of a linear forwards movement determined on the movements of the past (1981, 19-20). Kristeva suggests that subjectivity in time within the third generation of feminism is a new temporal space: it should be considered according to connectivity fuelled by feminine circularity and multi-dimensionality in subjective narration (1981, 33-35). She argues that ‘female subjectivity would seem to provide a specific measure that essentially retains repetition and eternity from among the multiple modalities of time
known through the history of civilisations’ (1981, 16, original emphasis). Time is thus a part of the feminine spatial construct, although it ‘goes beyond history as it is traditionally understood’ (Felski, 2000, 16). It forms a space in gendered discourse ‘where new borders between what can and cannot be said can find the time to form’ (Jardine, 1981, 12, original emphasis).

Rita Felski is sceptical of the forced causality inherent in the gendering of time that Kristeva imposes. Gender has an impact on temporal constructs and these constructs have an impact on conceptions of gender, but they interact rather than contend (2000, 17). Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ poses the question: ‘What can “identity”, even “sexual identity,” mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very notion of identity is challenged?’ (34). Felski’s collection of essays Doing Time responds to this question by further investigating how the conceptions of time and space become reconsidered in this discursive arena (2000, 17). Kristeva argues that the temporal measurement considered in terms of female subjectivity ‘has so little to do with linear time (which passes) that the word “temporality” hardly fits’ (1981, 16). The change of the gender of time thus causes a displacement of the spatio-temporal construct. In Felski’s view, it is the change rather than the eventual gender that disrupts the myth of universal linearity in time. Felski suggests that the continual conceptions and re-conceptions of gendered constructs open the way for temporal multiplicity (2000, 23).

Gore Vidal’s Myron investigates the possibilities of multiple times and the possibilities of gender changes within the temporal construct. In Myron, the megalomaniac Myra grows more ambitious than her earlier self. Whereas the Myra
in *Myra Breckinridge* challenges ‘man’s eternal need for mastery over both space and distance’ (1968, 18), the Myra in *Myron* challenges man’s (Myron’s) need of mastery over time and establishes a new women’s time. *Myron*’s Myra decides that new gendered becoming requires a reconsideration of traditional gendered spaces through time. She uses the space that she establishes to be the generator of traditional gender reiteration in *Myra Breckinridge*: Hollywood cinema. She manages to get hers and Myron’s body transported (literally sucked into the television) onto the set of the 1948 production of *Siren of Babylon*, starring Bruce Cabot and Maria Montez. Myra plans to rewrite history by personally re-shaping the images that shaped history: ‘Once I have restored Hollywood to its ancient glory (and myself to what I was!), I shall very simply restructure the human race’ (1974, 250).

Reality within the *Siren of Babylon* is limited. It is compared to the back-side of a mirror (1974, 238); the binary opposite of the Real. Myra/Myron and a small additional number of people from different future points in time, who have also been transported into the reiteration of this Hollywood moment are trapped within a certain parameter of the MGM studios. Their perception is continually disrupted by reality altering ‘CUT TO’s which ‘is like being flung across a room by a giant hand’ (1974, 228) or ‘FADE TO BLACK’ s followed by ‘FADE TO LIGHT’ s, the interval of which feels like ‘this awful weight pressing in on you from all sides like when you’re deep under water and can’t breathe’ (1974, 226). Myra also notes that even if she leaves the actual set ‘all the while, back of everything, there is a giant screen hanging like in a drive-in movie against the blue-gray sky with the figures of Maria Montez and Bruce Cabot slowly acting out *Siren of Babylon* backwards from where we are’ (1974, 283).
The group of people that have ‘fallen’ into *Siren of Babylon* are known as ‘out-of-towners’ to the 1948 ‘locals’. They stay in the background and recurrently move back to the first day whenever the eight weeks of filming come to their end. Myra, however, refuses to adhere to this principle. She does not merely reiterate the Hollywood moment – she shapes it. The creation of the new race of fun-loving Amazons starts with a few ‘locals’ and extras lured into her hotel room, but her project continually expands. As the final week of filming is approaching, Myra manages to transpose her and Myron’s being into Maria Montez and in Montez’s body she redirects the Hollywood industry and resurrects the glamorous and overtly feminine personas that were slowly drifting out of fashion: ‘All these marvellous things are beginning to happen, thanks to my being so well located in time and space’ (1974, 408).

Myra escapes the lack of agency exhibited by the ‘out-of-towners’ who merely experience time in its circularity. She creates an alternative Myra-esque timeline that parasitically interacts with the time line she diverged from; her personal creation of time. This is what Rita Felski refers to in her model of temporality: she advocates branching multiplicity rather than linearity or circularity. She quotes Ernst Bloch stating that ‘[n]ot all people exist in the same Now. They do so only externally, through the fact that they can be seen today’ (Bloch, 1991, 97; Felski, 2000, 23). She argues, however, that this binding ‘externality’ is important – it is the means by which communication and agency is achieved. She thus forms a similar argument to Deleuzian feminists like Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz. Different layers of time: personal, political and the larger cultural histories interact and transpose to form a rhizomatic temporality (Grosz, 2004, 257; Felski, 2000, 17).
Rita Felski pays particular attention to transgender bodies in time. In her essay ‘Fin de Siècle, Fin de Sexe’, she investigates a cultural ‘myth’ reiterated by theorists like Judith Butler, Jean Baudrillard and Donna Haraway: the idea that the dissolution or transposition of the sexes could constitute the end of history (147). This myth is to some degree reiterated in all the literary transgender portraits discussed in this and the previous chapter. The mutually transgendered Eve and Tristessa’s sexual union ‘halts all clocks’ (Carter, 1977, 148); Doctor Hoffman’s time- and space-altering desire machines are solely operated by a beautiful hermaphrodite, because he/she represents ‘the inherent symmetry of divergent asymmetry’ (Carter, 1972, 213); Myra is described as ‘the Embodiment of Necessary Mutancy’ (Vidal, 1974, 258); and Hedwig’s gendered collage of a body is ‘The automatist’s undoing / The whole world starts unscrewing / As time collapses and space warps’ (Mitchell & Trask, 71).

Although Felski is critical of the inevitable lack of complexity following the application of the transgender as a ‘scholarly metaphor’ (2000, 150), and denies the possibility or usefulness of ‘ending’ history, she reaffirms the possibilities of the abstract idea of a time- and space-altering transgender function in ‘Fin de Siècle, Fin de Sexe’. According to Felski, the transgender debate’s vastly different views of what gender and transgender are, demonstrates the magnitude of its potential to become (150-151). The various negative responses to the idea of an abstract transgender function signifies the complexity that this concept harbours, and this complexity is the function that Felski refers to; it is the prevalent potentiality of the transgender concept. The ‘trans’ in transgender signifies movement or connection and the concept’s inherent repositioning of subjective space and reconsideration of
time produces multiplicity. Thus the transgender function does not end history – it multiplies the concept of temporality.

This expanding ‘Nebulous Time’ (Carter, 1972, 189) is simultaneously a ‘molecular’ time. It is a mode of becoming formed around relationships. This chapter has demonstrated various spaces of belonging; gender identities, transgender identities, sexual identities that are opened up and reconsidered according to the terms of transgender becoming. This is as much a dissolution of the subjective unit as an establishment of a coherently gendered self. Riki Wilchins claims that during her transitive stage ‘[i]t hurt to be me, and it hurt to see me’ (2006, 548). The subjective transposition causes wide-reaching transpositions. As mentioned in chapter four, Rosi Braidotti argues that the conception of gendered becoming is connected to the idea of becoming more and more connected. The differentiation of the gendered spaces connect them to other spaces (2006, 131-134), and thus produce not merely personal and specific, but social and general change.
[CONCLUSION]

I would like to return to where this thesis started: Foucault’s heterotopias and the shared identity spaces’ capacity for change. ‘Of Other Spaces’ states that ‘the last trait of the heterotopias is that they have a function in relation to all the space that remains’ (Foucault, 27). Foucault argues that heterotopias channel and enable spatiality. They are thus not so much spaces as continually changing connective events. Deleuze and Guattari’s processes of becoming operate in a similar manner. He describes them as ‘lines of flight’, ‘molecular connectivities’ or ‘haecceities’ (2007, 11; 303). They never develop linearly – they expand or ‘rupture’ multi-dimensionally (2007, 10). The rhizomatic structure of connections should be thought of in terms of ‘a map and not a tracing’ (2007, 13, original emphasis).

According to Deleuze, ‘subjectivating’ discourses deterritorialise and reterritorialise spaces (1999, 78-101; 2007, 10-11). It is a matter of developing ownership and rejecting it; shaping identity but never becoming quite identical. I have referred to this as spatiality rather than space, because it is a force of movement rather than a set point. Like Foucault’s monsters, the processes of becoming encompass both the concepts that are being shaped and the energy that shape them. Deleuze and Guattari also refer to the processes in terms of mutation and evolutionary biology (2007, 5-12). Subjectivity-in-becoming is a continual movement towards the radically other; the limits of the human. Through this subjectivating and spatialising motion it creates and recreates its own form (2007, 287-301).
One of the problems with the 1980s and 1990s development of queer identity spaces is the fact that they are safeguarded and formed as *spaces* rather than *spatialising* processes of formation: the various histories and founding narratives of self-fashioning and queerness discussed in this thesis are used to establish and strengthen a sense of stable and recognisable identity. This is neither a particularly queer nor an actively self-fashioning practice. Although it may produce ‘political’ and ‘cultural change’ (Halberstam, 2005, 6), the basic structure of the approach lacks a transformative ability. The identity spaces affirm and re-affirm a set sense of humanity rather than push its limits. The Renaissance hermaphrodites, the Shakespearean transvestites, Angela Carter’s Platonic lovers, the bodies of Hedwig and Myra and the idea of the transgender body are all used as historical or literary blue-prints or idealised structures to build identities against.

These transgender characters function as identity spaces because they have certain mythic and iconic qualities. They are connective heterotopias, and as Foucault recognises, such spaces have the ability to channel an infinite amount of spatialising discourses (1986, 25). Although some of the 1980s and 1990s critical identity spaces formed in relation to these characters are inflexible, the spatialising potential of the transgender characters certainly is not. My first three chapters show that both the Renaissance hermaphrodites and the breeched heroines of Shakespeare’s dramas are invested with an early modern conception of the monstrous, which at the time interacted in multiple social spheres simultaneously. As Foucault’s *The Order of Things* establishes, the discourse of monstrosity was even a pivotal transformative element in these spheres (171).
The Renaissance monstrous hermaphrodites and transvestites are enablers of change. John Cameron Mitchell and Steven Task’s *Hedwig and the Angry Inch* depicts the transgender body as a unifying ‘bridge’; a means of connection and change within the sexual binary. The transgender and hermaphroditical characters in Angela Carter’s novels are similarly portrayed as a transformative force. Gore Vidal’s Myra/Myron Breckinridge changes the minds and the bodies of others even more often than he/she changes his own. All these examples demonstrate that the depictions of transgender bodies function as enablers of transformative spatiality both in contemporary and Renaissance literature and social discourse. They are spatialising forces, ‘ruptures’ or ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2007, 10).

The question remains of how the transgender bodies themselves can get something out of their enabling power. Although some dominant transgender academics, including Patrick Califia and Jay Prosser, complain that an abstract idea of the transgender body is an objectification of ‘real’ transgender experience, Sandy Stone’s ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ suggests that such a concept can be made an asset to the transgender community: ‘we can seize upon the textual violence inscribed in the transsexual body and turn it into a reconstructive force’ (2006, 230). ‘Real’ experience is not a fixed concept to Stone. She argues that it is time for transsexuals to let themselves be ‘read’ – to move towards becoming the radically other bodies they have been portrayed as. In the process of what Moira Gatens calls ‘doubling’, transsexuals might use the objectified image of themselves and take part in a connective network that enables them to further change: they should move towards becoming-posttranssexual (Stone, 2006, 232; Gatens, 1996, 40-43).
So, what does this posttranssexualising spatiality entail? How does it affect the discourses of gender and sexuality encountered in this thesis? Sandy Stone’s manifesto attempts to remove the transsexual body from a position where it is merely a ‘screen’ on which other social discourses are projected (2006, 229), or a transformative heterotopia channelling other movements. Stone wants to give the transgender body a chance to take advantage of its own potential – to truly be a body in transition (2006, 330). Rosi Braidotti acknowledges this process to involve connection and communication. The choice to be ‘read’ as a transgender body; the overt signification of a ‘rupture’ also leads to ‘asignification’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2007, 10). Rhizomatic affect is the means by which the subjective becomes general and the general becomes subjective. As Braidotti expresses it: it is the becoming of ‘the affective being of the middle, the interconnection, the Relation’ (2006, 129).

This is where I wish to end this thesis. A nomadic subjectivity-in-becoming never functions as a singular moving unit. It is part of a network of connections and interconnections that continually transforms in relation to the multiple dimensions of the structure. If the aim of queer theory is to enable social and political change, then it needs to focus on the connectivity of sexuality and gender development between individuals rather than subjective performances (Butler, 1999a) or individual acts of resistance (Warner, 1993, xxvi). As Angela Carter, Gore Vidal and Kate Bornstein have shown, sexuality and gender are formed concomitantly, in mirroring interaction and complex identity dances. Sometimes these dances require ritualistic and overtly gendered parts, which are simultaneously played and provoked. Kate Bornstein argues that gender could take a lesson from S/M: like sexual games, identification
and gendering must be developed in relation to other people – they must be ‘consensual’ (1995, 123).
INTRODUCTION

1 Halberstam is critical of these simple deconstructive practices, however (2005, 4-5).
2 Foucault claims that this took place in the seventeenth century (1996b, 346). See also Foucault, The Order of Things. Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge further establishes that the basics of Western logic and linguistic or discursive categorisation depend on spatial units.
3 See for example Sedgwick’s argument that her struggle against breast cancer and her obesity has made her queer in Tendencies despite the fact that she is only attracted to men [See ch. 4, p.166] ; Sullivan’s classification of different types of queer (2003) and Halberstam’s position on queerness as an infinite well of new sexual- and gender identities (1998, 26-27). See also Judith Butler’s argument that transpeople are not queer because they identify with defined gender categories This exclusive statement performs a classifying act at the same time as it argues against classification. [See ch. 4, pp.150-151]
4 Halberstam refers to the highway and the urban space as queer (2005, 36; 97) and Kate Bornstein refers to the internet and the stage as queer (1995, 164; 1998, 206).
5 Halberstam, Marjorie Garber and Jay Prosser discuss the queer or transgender problematics connected to gender-specific public bathrooms (Halberstam, 1998, 26; Garber, 1992, 14; Edelman, 1993, 564)
6 [See ch. 4, pp.166-170]
7 Foucault further points out that the same heterotopia may be invested with different values in different discourses and different periods in time (1986, 25).
8 See also Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex and Stephen Greenblatt, ‘Fiction and Friction’.
9 These characters are referred to as ‘transvestites’ in for example Garber’s Vested Interests, Peter Stallybrass’s ‘Transvestism and the “body beneath”’, Stephen Orgel’s Impersonations and Stephen Greenblatt’s ‘Fiction and Friction’. It is important to note that they would not have been called that in early modern society, however. The term ‘transvestite’ was first coined in the early twentieth century by the German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld in ‘The Transvestites’ in 1910.
10 Katherine E. Kelly claims that Harley Granville-Barker first coined this expression in Prefaces to Shakespeare in 1946. It refers to the young actors who are cast to play the female parts in Renaissance drama (Kelly, 1990, 81). Kelly refers to ‘boy actresses’ in ‘The Queen’s Two Bodies’, as does Kathleen McLuskie in ‘The Act, the Role, and the Actor’.
11 The characters Viola/Cesario, Rosalind/Ganymede, Portia/Balthazar and Nerissa/Clerk are termed as such for example in Kelly’s ‘The Queen’s Two Bodies’, Orgel’s Impersonations, Garber’s Vested Interests and Steve Brown’s ‘The Boyhood of Shakespeare’s Heroines’.
14 Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes, Jordy Jones’s ‘Gender Without Genitals’ and Sandy Stone’s ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ all argue that queer theory objectifies transgender bodies. [See ch. 4, pp.153-154]
15 [See ch. 5]
16 See Sedgwick, Beyond Men and Epistemology of the Closet; Chedgoy, Shakespeare’s Queer Children; Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern; Garber, Vested Interests; Belsey, Desire; Laqueur, Making Sex and Angela Carter, Wise Children.
17 Chedgzoy here refers to Freud’s idea of the ‘family romance’, an eroticised power struggle within the nuclear family unit that ratifies the patriarchal supremacy. See Freud, ‘Family Romances’.
18 Belsey divides her book into two parts on ‘Desire Now’ and ‘Desire in Other Times’, where the latter includes Arthurian romance and the poetry of John Donne. She claims that one of the goals of her project is to show that Enlightenment values are not the only influence on modern culture: ‘to know for sure, at least from time to time, that the Cartesian Cogito is neither in control nor an origin’ (1994, 20).
19 See also Between Men, where Sedgwick outlines the continually shifting boundaries between male-male social and sexual bonds from Shakespeare to Oscar Wilde.
20 I return to the concept of the founding narrative and explore it more thoroughly in chapter 4. [See ch. 4, pp.165-184]
21 [See ch. 1, pp.26-30]
22 Although Goldberg does not cite the specific thesis by Burckhardt that he derives this idea from, he most certainly refers to The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Burckhardt does form a similar argument in his Judgements on History and Historians, however.
23 Dympna Callaghan’s Shakespeare Without Women, Jean E. Howard’s introduction to Shakespeare Reproduced, Valerie Wayne’s introduction to The Matter of Difference and Jonathan Goldberg’s Sodometries also express similar objectives (Callaghan, 2000b, 47; Howard, 1987, 3; Wayne, 1991, 1; Goldberg, 1992, 24). They all describe the Renaissance as a space through which they can channel modern social discourses.
24 Grosz argues that it is ‘neither fully “present”, a thing in itself, nor is it a pure abstraction, a metaphysical assumption that can be ignored in everyday practise’ (2004, 5).
25 I argue this in spite of the fact that theorists like Judith Halberstam, Jay Prosser and Patrick Califia criticise Donna Haraway, Jean Baudrillard and Rita Felski for making similar arguments. Halberstam, Prosser and Califia consider abstract arguments about gender transgression to be a conceptual hijacking of inherently transgender corporeal space. Sandy Stone acknowledges this criticism, but she suggests that there are other ways to read Haraway, Baudrillard and Felski’s work. Conceptual characters can give rise to more than one space. Transgender concerns are not necessarily excluded when a more abstract connotation of the transgender body is invoked – and the space created can be used by the transgender discourse as well as queer or feminist discourse as a means of empowerment (2006, 230). [See ch. 5, pp. 256-257]
26 Baudrillard argues that the idea of transsexuality thus signals the end of sexual difference and the end of history in ‘Transsexuality’.
27 Although the relationships and definitions of concepts like sex and gender are fervently debated by theorists like Judith Butler and Moira Gatens, I only include dictionary definitions here. The academic debates on sex and gender will be investigated throughout the rest of the thesis, however.
28 Halberstam argues that the stone butch is ‘possibly the only sexual identity defined almost solely in terms of what practises she does not engage in’ (1998, 123) The stone butch is hard and impermeable. There are numerous other categorised types of butch identities, such as strict butch, drag butch, soft butch and baby butch. However, Joan Nestle notes that there is only one defined femme identity (2004, 212).

CHAPTER 1

1 These two terms are often used interchangeably. However, cultural materialism explicitly differentiates itself from new historicism, by the adherence to Marxist analyses, but numerous self-proclaimed new historicist writers, including Stephen Greenblatt, Louis Montrose and Catherine Gallagher also rely on Marxist analyses, see e.g. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Shakespearean Negotiations, ‘Resonance and Wonder’, ‘The Improvisation of Power’; Gallagher, ‘Marxism and the New Historicism’; Montrose, ‘Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture’. The two terms are also used if not interchangeably, usually in conjunction with one another in works theorising the critical schools of the 1980s and 1990s: the introduction to Kiernan Ryan’s compilation of essays New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader claims that new historicism and cultural materialism are terms differentiated mainly by location; as American and British factions of one movement (ix-x); Scott Wilson’s Cultural Materialism maintains this claim
The idea including a division is often attributed to Michel Foucault's claim that modern sexuality emerged as performative (Laqueur, 1990; Orgel, 1996; Bredbeck, 1991; Smith, 1991; Goldberg, 1992). This division is often attributed to Michel Foucault's claim that modern sexuality emerged as performative. Laqueur, Orgel, Bredbeck, Smith and Goldberg discuss the difference between a modern internalised conception of sexuality and a Renaissance rejection of the parent of the same sex. The implication is that new historicism obsesses over the specifics of our own place in time and space may be identified. See discussion of "Saint Foucault". More recent new historicist/cultural materialist work engages with a wider variety of material, from a less restricted time span. See for example Hilda L. Smith's All Men and Both Sexes; Carolyn Dinshaw's Getting Medieval; or Catherine Gallagher's The Body Economic.

The works on Renaissance sexuality above all refer to Stephen Greenblatt's 'Fiction and Friction' in Shakespearean Negotiations and/or Renaissance Self-Fashioning. They also reference, cross-reference and respond to each other throughout. On top of this there is noticeable focus on a select group of writers in the new historicist/cultural materialist readers. Essays by Stephen Greenblatt, Jonathan Goldberg, Catherine Gallagher, Stephen Orgel, Peter Stallybrass, Jean E. Howard, Valerie Traub, Lisa Jardine, Bruce R. Smith, Catherine Belsey and Susan Zimmerman appear recurrently in 1980s and 1990s readers and compilations of Renaissance criticism such as e.g. Zimmerman's Erotic Politics: Desire on the Renaissance Stage; Callaghan's A Feminist Companion to Shakespeare; Ryan's New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader; Callaghan, Traub and Kaplan's Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture; Veeser's The New Historicism and The New Historicism – A Reader. See for example Greenblatt, 'Fiction and Friction'; Orgel, Impersonations; Callaghan, Shakespeare Without Women; Belsey, 'Disrupting Sexual Difference'; Traub, ‘Desire and the Differences it Makes’; Kelly, ‘The Queen’s Two Bodies: Shakespeare’s Boy Actress in Breeches’; Rackin, ‘Adrogyne, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage’; Thomas Neely, ‘Lovesickness, Gender and Subjectivity: Twelfth Night and As You Like It’; Pequigney, ‘The Two Antonios and Same-Sex Love in Twelfth Night and The Merchant of Venice’; Digangi, The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama and Garber, Vested Interests. See for example Montrose’s ‘Professing the Renaissance’ and Greenblatt’s ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’.

Goldberg refers to Jacob Burckhardt's interpretation of the origin of Western modernity in the essay The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, published in 1860. John Jeffries Martin acknowledges that the Renaissance in the late nineteenth century almost acquired a mythical status due to this idea (2003). As Jeffries Martin notes, this mysticism remains both in popular culture and in academic readings of Renaissance culture (2003, 1). It is particularly visible in new historicist interpretations of the transvestite body. [See intro, p.10]

See Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams on ‘the Oedipus complex’, where identity is argued to be formed when a child comes to terms with an initial desire towards the parent of the opposite sex and rejection of the parent of the same sex. The implication is that new historicism obsesses over the Renaissance, because it is constructed as a historical cradle; a parental period, from which the specifics of our own place in time and space may be identified. See discussion of ‘Saint Foucault’ below. Scott Wilson makes a similar point in Cultural Materialism, arguing that Greenblatt’s method in Learning to Curse functions ‘as a therapeutic response to trauma’ (60).

A number of new historicist scholars, including Laqueur, Orgel, Bredbeck, Smith and Goldberg discuss the difference between a modern internalised conception of sexuality and a Renaissance idea of sexuality as performative (Laqueur, 1990; Orgel, 1996; Bredbeck, 1991; Smith, 1991; Goldberg, 1992). This division is often attributed to Michel Foucault’s claim that modern sexuality emerged somewhere between the late seventeenth century and the ‘twilight’ (1998, 1) of the ‘Victorian Regime’ (1998, 1) in The History of Sexuality.
aly claims that the doctrinal one like Stephen Greenblatt as Strier exclaims: “Why should we expect a good literary or cultural critic to be a competent philosopher as well?” (1995, 68).

10 See [See intro, pp.16-17]
11 The gendering of modern, as well as early modern English is, however, far less obvious than in languages like Latin, French and German.
12 There is ample debate among feminist and gender scholars of the Renaissance about the relationship between the conception of the ‘sexed’ and the ‘gendered’ in early modern discourse. See discussion below of Laqueur, Making Sex; Orgel, Impersonations; Traub, Desire & Anxiety and ‘Gendering Mortality in Early Modern England’; and Belsey, ‘Disrupting Sexual Difference’. See also for example Jardine, Still Harping on Daughters and ‘Twins and Travesties’; Stallybrass, ‘Transvestism and the “body beneath”’.
13 There is a great amount of critical disagreement over the actual connotations of effeminacy. Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur both discuss it in relation to The Oxford English Dictionary definitions. For a further discussion of the critical debate around the word, see chapter 3. [See ch. 3, pp.118-124]
14 See discussion of Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt and the homological sex thesis in chapter 2. [See ch.2, pp.64-75]
16 See chapter 2 on the early modern gender debate. [See ch. 2, p. 64-83] The general indeterminacy of the genders is, according to Orgel’s Impersonations, especially visible in a couple of comical pamphlets, entitled Haec Vir and Hic Mulier, which deride the idea of an effeminate man and a masculine woman, respectively. See discussion of The Roaring Girl in chapter 3. [See ch. 3, pp.136-142]
17 See for example Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, p. 1; Orgel, Impersonations, p. 2; Zimmerman, Erotic Politics, p. 2-3, etc.
18 Richard Strier makes a similar point in Resistant Structures: ‘The phrase, “the new historicism” is fundamentally ambiguous. It takes its force from the contrast it establishes with something else, “the old ---,” but this is precisely where the ambiguity comes in. What is the contrasting term?’ (67). Judith Lowder Newton notes in ‘History as Usual?’ that for the feminist movement the ‘new’-ness of new historicism presents an opportunity to establish a ‘New Women’s History’ (1989, 154).
19 ‘New –ism’ movements, including new historicism, new criticism, new functionalism, etc., similarly to ‘post –ism’ declare both a distance from and an adherence to an earlier ‘ism’ through their names. They are thus bound to both continue along the same lines as the previous movement to some extent, and to radically transform it. Greenblatt, himself, questions whether new historicism’s success is ‘due entirely to the felicitous conjunction of two marketable signs: “new” and “ism”’ (1990, 3).
20 See Strier, Resistant Structures, pp 67-68.
21 See Montrose’s ‘Professing the Renaissance’; Greenblatt’s ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’ and the introductions to Renaissance Self-Fashioning and Shakespearean Negotiations. Scott Wilson acknowledges that Greenblatt rejects the idea of writing a manifesto, arguing that new historicism is a ‘practice rather than a doctrine’ (Greenblatt quoted in Strier, 54). Healy claims that the doctrinal grounds to the movement are found in Montrose’s writing rather than Greenblatt’s (1992, 66) and Claire Colebrook similarly suggests that the one text of Greenblatt’s that comes close to a manifesto is ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’ (1997, 25). I disagree with Healy and Colebrook on this point. Although informal in their tone, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Shakespearean Negotiations, Learning to Curse, ‘wonder and resonance’ and the introduction to Power and Forms all exhibit continuous passages where the author attempts to position himself and his methods in relation to the past and the reading of the past. See the discussion of Greenblatt and the manifest(0)ing of the dead below for a further elaboration of this point. [See ch. 1, pp.56-63]
22 See Wilson, pp 60-66; Healy, pp 67-69 and Colebrook, 23-26 on new historicism’s usage of critical theory.
23 Jean E. Howard discusses this idea in The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern England, pp. 3-5.
24 Neither Wilson nor Strier find this fact a serious problem within new historicism, however, because as Strier exclaims: ‘Why should we expect a good literary or cultural critic – or even an outstanding one like Stephen Greenblatt – to be a competent philosopher as well?’ (1995, 68).
Healy also acknowledges that new historicism ‘seems to ignore many of the premises it claims to operate on’ (68). Richard Strier argues that the problem with new historicism’s methodology is that it insists on a constant polemic – external and internal. When new historicism attempts to theorise itself; polemicise within itself, it deconstructs its own stances. See Strier, 67-79.

In his 1989 essay ‘Co-optation’, Gerald Graff comments on the growing interest in ‘radical’ criticism (including new historicism) in literature departments throughout the USA. See also Goldberg & Menon, ‘Queering History’; Fish, ‘Commentary: The Young and the Restless’ and Howard, ‘The Early Modern and the Homoerotic Turn in Political Criticism’, for discussions on the institutionalisation of new historicism and its bias in the teaching of Renaissance literature. For prolific anthologies of criticism that include a significant amount of new historicist contributions, see for example The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism; Shakespeare: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory 1945-2000 the Oxford and Cambridge Companions to English Literature; etc. Stephen Greenblatt is also the executive editor of The Norton Anthology of English Literature. For indicative readers and ‘how-to’ guides see e.g. Ryan, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader; Veeser, The New Historicism; Greenblatt and Gallagher, Practicing New Historicism.

I will sustain that new historicism is firmly grounded in psychoanalysis and the ideas of Lacan, although Greenblatt, himself effusively rejects psychoanalysis in ‘Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture’ as a ‘crippled’ (216) and ‘anachronistic’ (210) theoretical movement. Elizabeth Jane Bellamy’s review essay of Greenblatt’s essay argues that Greenblatt’s rejection of psychoanalysis is undermined by the fact that the ‘self’ in Renaissance Self-Fashioning is presented in psychoanalytical terms (2005, 9-10). Scott Wilson also argues that Greenblatt’s later discussions of Foucauldian power struggles are closely related to the treatment of transgression in psychoanalysis – more so than to the ideas of power developed by Foucault (63-65).

See e.g. Belsey, ‘Disrupting Sexual Difference’ or Desire, which has a full chapter on psychoanalytic theory. See also Traub’s work, including Desire & Anxiety, ‘Desire and the Differences it Makes’ and ‘The (In)significance of Lesbian Desire in Early Modern England’.


See Orgel, Impersonations; Laqueur, Making Sex; Rackin, ‘Adrogyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage’ and Jankowski, ‘...in the Lesbian Void: Woman-Woman Eroticism in Shakespeare’s Plays’. See also the discussion of the arguments developed in these works below. [See ch. 1. pp.48-56]

Laqueur’s Making Sex and Orgel’s Impersonations attempt to form an idea of Renaissance subjectivity as a concept of self before psychoanalysis. Elizabeth Jane Bellamy argues in ‘Desires and Disavowals’ that Stephen Greenblatt’s rejection of psychoanalysis in readings of the Renaissance in ‘Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture’ has done a lot of harm in readings of Renaissance culture. She acknowledges that David Aers’s ‘A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists; or, Reflections on Literary Critics Writing the “History of the Subject”’ and Lee Patterson’s ‘On the Margin: Postmodernism, Ironic History, and Medieval Studies’ and Greenblatt’s own ‘Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture’ avoid psychoanalytic readings where such are both enlightening and thoroughly historically defendable.


See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Madness and Civilisation, etc. Foucault argues that a member of society is always under the control of the dominant discourses of that society (1991, 202). This idea is developed from Althusser’s discussion of ISA’s (Ideological State Apparatuses), discourses and ideas maintaining the power structure in society in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.

Icon Books’ ‘Postmodern Encounters’ series acknowledges Foucault to be the initiator as well as the embodiment of queer theory in its title Foucault and Queer Theory. For a discussion of Foucault’s influencing ideas see William B. Turner A Genealogy of Queer Theory, ch 1 and Carla Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern, pp. 32-41.
Turner makes a similar point to this in *A Genealogy of Queer Theory*. In the chapter entitled ‘Foucault Didn’t Know What He Was Doing. And Neither Do I’, Turner argues that Foucault ‘s changes of mind and direction were part of his refusal to conform with any type of ‘ostensibly consistent, uniform identity’ (36).

Foucault is quoted as one coherent voice and there is no effort made to try to connect the different statements. For example Laqueur moves happily between quotations about sexuality from *The History of Sexuality* and history and science from *The Order of Things* throughout *Making Sex*. Halperin refers to numerous of Foucault’s famous works including *The History of Sexuality* and Foucault’s interviews on power/knowledge in *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* and Bredbeck similarly uses *The History of Sexuality* and Foucault’s interviews on power structures together in *Sodomy and Interpretation*.

It should be acknowledged that Foucault’s reading of Greco-Roman sexual behaviour is considerably less idealised and generalising than the objective and methodology of volume 1 may lead the reader to expect. Volume 2, *The Use of Pleasure* analyses ancient conceptions of the subject’s relationship to pleasures, such as food and sex, from a social, moral and political perspective. Volume 3: *The Care of the Self* traces different facets of ancient subject-hood in relation to gender formation, the body and sexual politics.

Mohr constructs a rather weak argument against social constructivism in the formation of sexual identities in *Gay Ideas*, but his observation of the near divine status of Foucault within queer criticism is apt. David Halperin, whose work *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* is directly attacked in *Gay Ideas*, responds to Mohr’s accusation in Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography which is an in-depth analysis of the construction of critical canonicity in queer theory. In this study Halperin agrees that there has been a great amount of rather uncritical usages of Foucault in queer scholarship, but he denies that he has personally been guilty of such simplistic appropriations.

Jean E. Howard comments approvingly on the rising popularity of Renaissance sexualities and the surge of criticism within the field in her 1998 review essay, ‘The early modern and the homoerotic turn in political criticism’ (105).

Ironically, this idea reiterates the ‘old’ historicist conceptions of the Renaissance, formulated by Jacob Burckhardt in *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. Burckhardt claims that Renaissance signalled ‘The Discovery of Man’ (198): the modern subject’s conception of himself as a subject (198-213).

Claire Colebrook notes that ‘self-fashioning became a point of convergence for many later new historicist enquiries’ (1997, 198). It is important to note that Renaissance Self-fashioning is not merely the basis for new historicist discussions of Renaissance gender – it is considered to be the initiator of new historicism in literary studies (Strier, 69).

Jonathan Sawday argues in *The Body Emblazoned* that the ‘Self’ also was a negative concept in 17th century culture, however (159).


As noted above, this is specifically the case for the new historicist texts of the 1980s and early 1990s. Susan Zimmerman’s introduction to *Erotic Politics* argues that this is a problem that she hopes may soon be remedied (1992, 7) and more recent work does indeed focus on a number of literary or textual mediums. See for example Hilda L. Smith’s *All Men and Both Sexes*; Carolyn Dinshaw’s *Getting Medieval*; or Catherine Gallagher’s *The Body Economic*

This has been contested, however. Denise A. Walen discusses a number of instances especially from *Twelfth Night* and *As You Like It* where she discerns specific traces of female homoerotics (2002).

This essay is included in Valerie Wayne’s *The Matter of Difference*.

Valerie Traub’s essay ‘Gendering Mortality in Early modern England’ also engages with early modern anatomy sources. She offers a more wide-ranging and in-depth analysis than either Laqueur, Orgel or Greenblatt, pondering over the gender implications of a science that treads closely to the concepts of desire, art and death. There are a number of other more nuanced works and collections of essays that engage with sixteenth and seventeenth-century anatomy. See e.g. Jonathan Sawday’s *The
Body Emblazoned; James J. Sheehan (ed) & Morton Sosna (ed), The Boundaries of Humanity; David Hillman (ed) & Carla Mazzio (ed), The Body in Parts; and to some extent Susan Zimmerman’s The Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre.

A number of other authors, including Jean E. Howard, Valerie Wayne and Jonathan Goldberg also express similar objectives in their texts (Howard, 1987, 3; Wayne, 1991, 1; Goldberg, 1992, 24). Howard argues that this is a conscious choice: ‘Genealogy ... is less important than what is done with the space opened up by prior work’ (1987, 3).

See chapter 4 on the narrativisation of the self. [See ch. 4, pp.165-184]

See e.g. Renaissance Self-fashioning; Shakespearean Negotiations and Learning to Curse.

Freud treats trauma as a founding event, from which discourses of desire, pain and sometimes pleasure emerge. See Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis.


See chapter 4 for further discussion on the narrativisation of the self. [See ch. 4, pp.165-184]

See for example Freud’s Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, ‘The Unconscious’ and ‘Repression’ in which he argues that the subject’s previous traumas need to be outlined in order to be overcome. An encyclopedia article included in volume 18 of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud refers to this as Freud’s cathartic technique – trauma is dispersed through revelation (Strachey, 2001, 235-239). The introduction to the compilation of Freud’s work On Metapsychology also refers to Freud’s cathartic method.

CHAPTER 2

1 [See ch. 1, pp.47-48]
2 [See ch. 1, pp.59-60]
3 All the early modern sources in this chapter are referred to according to their original publication dates.
4 For further extrapolation on this point, see Laqueur and Greenblatt (Laqueur, 1990, 98; Greenblatt, 1988, 85).
5 Laqueur, Valerie Traub and Jonathan Sawday all agree that social-political discourses are at least as prominent as the medical details in the illustrative Renaissance dissection engravings (Laqueur, 1990, 70-94; Traub, 1996a; Sawday, 16-38). Traub and Laqueur specifically discuss the image of femininity emerging in the illustrations. Traub argues that they straddle the boundaries between pornography and science (1996a, 82)
6 I am referring to Jacques Lacan’s stance on subject formation, which considers femininity in terms of phallic lack: femininity is the binary opposite that defines the concept of masculine phallic being (2006, 671-702). For further discussion of this, see for example Hélène Cixous’s ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ and Irigaray’s This Sex Which Is Not One. [See ch. 1, note 8]
7 Aristotle argues in his Physics that all beings strive towards the perfection of their kind (1999, 33-36; 192b8-b18). In the Metaphysics he additionally acknowledges that men and women are not of different kinds (1998, 311-312; I.9 1058a), so Orgel argues that since the male form in general is described as stronger and more capable than the female, the Aristotelian function of perfection would push all humans to strive towards masculinity. The Galenic idea of sexual differentiation as different values on the same scale demonstrates this idea (Orgel, 1996, 21).
8 Patricia Parker also discusses the various accounts of this incidence thoroughly in ‘Gender Ideology, Gender Change: The Case of Marie Germaine’. She points out that Laqueur and Greenblatt consciously choose to retell the anecdotes in Montaigne’s essay on ‘The Force of Imagination’ where the author describes a movement from female imperfection to male perfection: the text is ‘preoccupied not with the imperfection of women but with anecdotes of men who, on their wedding night or at equally inopportune times, also find that they lack the required “instrument”’ (Parker, 1993, 344). Presumably, Helkiah Crooke and Ambroise Paré also ‘choose’ to retell the particular stories of female-to-male sex changes, because they do not mention incidents of movements in the opposite direction (Crooke, 1615, 250; Paré, 1634, 975).
9 In Paré’s text Marie is 14 at the time of her sex change (1634, 975).
Tribadism signifies female/female penetration by use of an unusually enlarged clitoris.

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10 Tribadism signifies female/female penetration by use of an unusually enlarged clitoris.

11 Quoted in Greenblatt, ‘Fiction and Friction’, p. 74.

12 Greenblatt claims that this is the common practice, although he finds it strange: ‘Perhaps at the trial’s end the judges had not the vaguest idea what Marin’s sex really was’ (1988, 75). He notes that he only knows one other early modern case of hermaphrodism that was brought to trial, and similar consequences followed then (1988, 178).

13 Greenblatt and Laqueur give detailed accounts of the trial (Greenblatt, 1988, 74-75; Laqueur, 1990, 136-137). Greenblatt acknowledges that Duval never discloses whether or not Marie/Marin’s gender would be her/his choice, but states that the traditional custom in such a case would be to let her/him choose. He does not substantiate this claim, however (1988, 75).

14 [See ch. 4, pp.146-148]

15 See chapter 4 on Judith Butler’s idea of drag in Gender Trouble. [See ch. 4, pp.149-150] Butler argues that the gap between the performer’s ‘real’ gender and his/her drag performance of gender destabilises the cultural fantasy of stable gender essence and reveals the performativity of gender in general (1999a, 174-177).

16 Grosz refers to Ferdinand de Saussure’s division of signifiers into binary opposites. She describes how Lacan transfers this structure onto the body (1990, 93-98). See chapter 4 for further discussion of Elizabeth Grosz’s conception of corporeality. [See ch. 4, pp.172-173]


18 Peggy Tine Cohen-Kettenis and Friedemann Pfäfflin state that young transsexuals are usually not allowed to start hormone treatment or prepare for surgery before they legally come of age in Western societies. Germany and Holland have made exceptions in some cases (2003, 165-166).

19 Patricia Parker further argues in ‘The Case of Marie Germain’ that the medical archive is not a particularly stable ground for interpretations of early modern gender and sexuality. She points out that Paré was not scientific writer in the modern sense of the word. According to Foucault the thorough differentiation between the sciences and the humanities was not developed until the late eighteenth century (2002, 235-237). Paré recounts exciting tales of strange and excitingly ‘virile’ phenomena. Like Montaigne, they are storytellers – writers eager to please their audiences and to establish themselves as ‘virilising’ social persona (Parker, 1993).

20 See for example Kathryn M. Brammall’s ‘Monstrous Metamorphosis’ and Steven Mullaney’s ‘Strange Things, Gross Terms, Curious Customs’ for a further discussion of the dialogue between discourses of science and discourses of monsters and monstrosity in early modern Europe. See also Arnold I. Davidson’s ‘The Horror of Monsters’; Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston’s ‘Unnatural Conceptions’ and Paula Findlen’s ‘Jokes of Nature and Jokes of Knowledge’ for an account of Paré’s pivotal position within this debate.

21 This argument is derived from book VII.33 of Pliny’s Natural History, but Paré’s interpretation is rather skewed. Pliny states that although hermaphrodites were ‘Once considered portents, now they are sources of entertainment’ (80). Helkiah Crooke’s Mikromosgraphia also refers to Pliny in his account of hermaphrodites, without invoking any portentous implications (249).


23 This passage is quoted both in Laqueur (1990, 93-94) and Greenblatt (1988, 81-82), neither of them consider it to disrupt their interpretation of the Renaissance sexual anatomy, however.

24 Crooke mistakenly attributes this conclusion to Aristotle, whereas this is only actually established in Galen’s On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (628). Aristotle in fact comes to the same conclusion as Crooke: he expressly states that sexual difference is an important function in nature, and that the female sex is as natural as the male (1998, 311-312; I.9 1058a).


26 Sawday’s The Body Emblazoned affirms this reading of Crooke’s Mikromosgraphia. Sawday shows that Orgel is not the only reader who was confused by the form of the work, however: many of Crooke’s fellow physicians complained that the section ‘of the parts belonging to generation’ was incorrect and that much of it was direct translation (1995, 225-226).

27 Orgel merely quotes the last part of this section (1996, 23).
See for example Sawday, The Body Emblazoned; Traub, ‘Gendering Mortality in Early Modern Anatomies’; Zimmermann, ‘The Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre’; Kern Paster, Humouring the Body.

Zimmermann argues that the continuous religious reforms of the time and the fluctuations of the conception of the religious subject influenced the idea of the early modern body. Like the religious interpretations, it multiplied and redeveloped (2005, 24-66).

Orgel also refers extensively to Jonas Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1996, 26-27).

Traub, Sawday and Zimmermann establish that the teachings of Vesalius were important for conceptions of the body at the time. These portray the body as a ‘miniature of the divine workmanship of God, and that its form corresponded to the greater form of the macrocosm’ (Sawday, 23).

Deuteronomy 22:5: ‘The woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment: for all that do so are abomination unto the LORD thy God’. (King James Bible, 210) Stubbes writes of Deuteronomy 22: “what man so euer weareth womans apparel is accursed, and what woman weareth mans apparel is accursed also” (Stubbes, Anatomie of Abuses, F5v).

Arnold I. Davidson notes in “The Horror of Monsters” that the term ‘abomination’ is often read synonymously with monstrosity, not merely in the anti-theatrical tracts, but in early modern society in general (40).

See Barish on the anti-theatrical writers’ reiteration of a Platonic essence (1981, 5-37).

See Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice; J.W. Binns’s ‘Women or Transvestites on the Elizabethan Stage?’; Ursula K. Heise’s ‘Transvestism and the Stage Controversy’ and Michael O’Connell’s ‘The Idolatrous Eye’.

See ch. 1, p.27

See Kathryn M. Brammall’s ‘Monstrous Metamorphosis’ for a discription of the strictness of class, gender, religious and political categories in Tudor society and a discussion of how the discourse of monstrosity disrupted the general norms. See also and Paula Findlen’s ‘Jokes of Nature and Jokes of Knowledge’ for an account of the impact the discourse of monstrosity had on conceptions of science and physical and corporeal reality.

Foucault’s history of histories shares certain features with his account of the early modern paradigm shift in constructions of sexual identities in The History of Sexuality 1. [See ch. 1, pp.37-44] Unlike The History of Sexuality, The Order of Things does not create a temporal chasm between a knowable present and a mysterious past, however: it refers to a complex web of paradigm shifts throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

See chapter 1 and chapter 4 on the formation of a critical identity through identity and/or founding narratives in New Historicism and queer studies.

[See intro, pp.3-7]

Foucault makes a similar argument in The History of Sexuality 1 and Orgel and Laqueur echo this idea in Impersonations and Making Sex by continually referring to the chasm between past and present identity. However, The Order of Things avoids that type of binary logic by constructing the discourse of identity and self-hood as a continual process of becoming (375-407).

See chapter 4 for a discussion of the concept of becoming. [See ch. 4, pp.172-178]

Orgel similarly argues that the Renaissance mind was a seat of ‘fragility’ (1996, 27), with a radically unstable essence, which results in a belief in ‘the metamorphic quality of our sinful nature’ (1996, 27).

Levine argues that although the monstrous transvestite actors described by the anti-theatrical writers slip between non-essential selves, there is something ‘essential and clearly monstrous locked “inside” him’ (1994, 24). This inherent monstrosity is a premonition of essential identities to come (1994, 24-25).

See for example James J. Sheehan and Morton Sosna’s collection The Boundaries of Humanity; Armand Marie Leroi’s Mutants and Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park’s Wonders and the Order of Nature and ‘Unnatural Conceptions’.

There are a number of studies, including Levine’s Men in Women’s Clothing, Greenblatt ‘Wonder’, Walker Bynum’s ‘Wonder’, that evoke the discourse of monstrosity, but not in connection with sexuality and gender.
Foucault treats monstrosity and the limits of the ‘normal’ not merely in The Order of Things, but also peripherally in The History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish, and pivotally throughout Madness and Civilisation.

This pamphlet named ‘Of two wonderful popish monsters’ was published in English in 1579 (Davidson, 1991, 37).


See also Sawday’s analysis of the religiously uncanny Renaissance body that emerged through the corporealisation of didacticism (1995, 141-183).

Political and social discourses used monstrosity in a similarly didactic way. See William E. Burns’s An Age of Wonders and Sawday’s chapter on the uncanny body in The Body Emblazoned (141-183). See also Evelleen Richards’s ‘A Political Anatomy of Monsters’, for a similar example in later discourses.


Most quotations of Bacon’s Novum Organum (London, 1620) are from The Novum Organum of Francis Bacon (London, 1667, ESTC R38681), the first English translation of Bacon’s original Latin.

Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston also quote this passage from the Novum Organum in ‘Unnatural Conceptions’ but their translation is taken from The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Basil Montagu (London, 1831), which calls the tract ‘Novum Organon’ and constructs the argument rather differently: ‘a compilation, or particular natural history, must be made of all the monsters and prodigious births of nature; of every thing, in short which is new, rare and unusual in nature’ (1831, 138; Park & Daston, 20).

The traces of this can be found e.g. in Crooke’s and Browne’s work. In his Physics, Aristotle sets up a system based on classification according to which all the animals and plants should be divided into species. Each species has a perfect form (quidditas or an essence). This form is determined according to specific traits (qualities): the types of looks and behaviours that are most common in a species become the perfection of their kind. The more perfect traits a creature exhibits (the better the actualisation of their potential), the more perfect an example of its species it will be (1999, 33-36; 192b8-b18) Roy Porter’s The Flesh in the Age of Reason describes the Aristotelian tradition as ‘All that old Aristotelian talk (potentials and actualisations, substance and accidents, qualities and quiddities)’ (51).

Park and Daston’s ‘Unnatural Conceptions’ notes that ‘Bacon was at pains to distinguish his history of marvels from “books of fabulous experiments and secrets” which served up as jumble of fact and fable to “curious and vain wits”’ (Park & Daston, 45; Bacon, 1831, 139). However, they also note that Bacon’s agenda became increasingly popular in scientific circles throughout the seventeenth century (1981, 43-51).

The 1831 translation of Novum Organum in The Works reads: ‘the passage from the miracles to art is easy; for if nature be once seized in her variation, and the cause be manifest, it will be easy to lead her by art to such deviation as she was first led by chance’ (138). The 1667 translation is less clear about the transition from divine power to human power, however. It merely states that ‘the properties and qualities, which are found to be miracles in nature, may be reduced, and comprehended under some form or certain Law, so all irregularity and singularity might be found to depend upon some common form’ (30).

Ambroise Paré argues that hermaphrodites ‘did alwaies shew or portend some monstrous thing’ (1634, 975), whereas Crooke merely treats them as natural deviations (1615, 250).

Although he does include causes that would not seem ‘natural’ to a modern scientist, such as what Montaigne calls ‘the force of imagination’ (1680, 34), these are described in a scientific fashion without allusion to supernatural interaction. Gail Kern Paster and Roy Porter argue that these types of scientific arguments were often accepted among natural scientists and medical professionals as part of the natural order (Kern Paster, 11-21; Porter, 44-61). See also Thomas Wright’s The Passions of the Mind in General (1604) and Robert Burton’s The anatomy of melancholy (1624).

See book 4 and 5 of Mikromosgraphia, in which Crooke uses sexual monstrosity as a primary example in every reference to the word ‘monster’.
CHAPTER 3

1 See ch. 1, pp.56-63
2 See intro
3 See ch. 1, pp. 46-47
4 See ch. 2, pp.88-97
5 See ch. 1, pp.56-63
6 See ch. 1, pp.37-44
7 In Twelfth Night these are: I.iv.24-34 (p. 20); I.iv.158-161 (p. 29); I.v.184-185 (pp. 30-31); V.i.257-262 (p. 145); V.i.326-327 (p. 149); V.i.384-387 (p. 153). In As You Like It they are: III.ii195-198 (pp. 70-71); III.ii.219-220 (p. 71); Epilogue.214-217 (pp. 131).
8 See ch. 1, pp.56-63
9 Laqueur has written extensively on this subject, see e.g. ‘Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology’ and Solitary Sex. In Making Sex, Laqueur recounts that he encountered the Renaissance concept of the orgasm as a nineteenth-century scholar, expecting there to be doubt about the existence of a female orgasm, as there was in late Victorian medical texts (1990, vii). Instead he finds that some early modern thinkers regarded the female orgasm as a necessary component in conception. The female orgasm’s existence makes him draw parallels between the modern and the early modern perception, whereas its necessity ‘surprised’ (1990, vii) him. The argument is immediately constructed on conceptions of similarity and difference. Moreover, Laqueur is convinced that the modern conception of the female orgasm harbours an absolute truth: ‘Experience must have shown that pregnancy often takes place without it’ (1990, vii, my emphasis).
10 See ch. 2, pp.64-88
11 See intro, pp.12-16
12 See ch. 2, pp.64-88
13 See intro, pp.12-16
14 See ch. 2, pp.88-97
15 There is an ample amount of criticism discussing this concept. See for example Phyllis Rackin’s ‘Adrogyne, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage’; Theodora A. Jankowski, ‘...in the Lesbian Void’; Tracey Sedinger’s ‘The Epistemology of Crossdressing’; Katherine Kelly’s ‘The Queen’s Two Bodies’; Marjorie Garber’s Vested Interests; Mario Diagni’s The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama; Valerie Traub’s ‘The Insignificance of Lesbian Desire’; Peter Stallybrass’s ‘Transvestism and the “body beneath”’; Kathleen McCluskie’s ‘The Act, the Role, and the Actor’; Lisa Jardine’s ‘Boy Actors. Female Roles, and Elizabethan Eroticism’, Jean E. Howard’s The Stage and Social Struggle and Steve Brown’s ‘The Boyhood of Shakespeare’s Heroines’.
16 Garber makes a similar argument about the ‘breeched’ heroines in Twelfth Night and As You Like It: she calls it the ‘transvestite effect’ (1992, 36-37).
17 This passage is from 767b-c of Plutarch’s ‘Dialogue of Love’ (Foucault, 1986, 204).
18 In adherence to Orgel and Greenblatt’s discussion of this, Dymphna Callaghan considers connections between portrayals of the boy and the eunuch in Twelfth Night (2000b, 44-46).
Garber and Traub also acknowledge this (Garber, 1992, 77; Traub, 1992b, 102; 1992, 157).

Orgel, Greenblatt, Digangi, Rackin, Kelly and Garber all discuss this fact (Orgel, 1996; Greenblatt, 1988; Digangi, 1997; Rackin, 1987; Kelly, 1990; Garber, 1992).

[See ch. 2, pp.64-88]

The anecdotes from his anatomy sources merely suggest movements from female to male. [See ch. 2, pp.64-88]

This quotation is originally from Puttenham, *English Poesie II*

Neither Laqueur nor Orgel discuss “effeminacy” in relation to *Twelfth Night*, although the concept is often alluded to in the play. Jean E. Howard argues that Orsino’s odd behaviour is merely accepted because he is “protected by his rank and gender” (1993, 115), thus implying that Orsino’s retained masculinity is central to the plot.

Orgel quotes William Perkins who claims that lavish clothes are unsuitable for men because they render their gender identity more dubious: “wanton and excessive apparel ... maketh a confusion of such degrees and callings as God hath ordained” (Perkins quoted in Orgel, 1996, 27). These are, however, perfectly acceptable in women (Orgel, 1996, 27)

See ch VI, ‘Discouerie of Passions in Apparrell’ and ch X ‘Of What Persons have Different Passions’. [See ch. 1, p.48; ch. 2, p.74]

Once more, Viola’s youth is equated with femininity here.

Greenblatt uses this quotation as an example, although it is not directed towards Viola, but her brother Sebastian in *Twelfth Night*.

[See ch. 1, pp.45-48]

Organ points out that Viola asks to be presented as a ‘eunuch’ to Orsino (*TN*, 10; I.i.56), a middle-sexed creature ‘that can sing both high and low’ (*TN*, 45; II.iii.42; Orgel, 1996, 54-56).

Greenblatt’s transvestites are expressly men and women: the sexual friction can only be produced by definite femininity and masculinity (1988, 90-93).

Jankowski’s ‘...in the Lesbian Void’; Katherine Kelly’s ‘The Queen’s Two Bodies’; Jardine’s ‘Cultural Confusion’; Joseph Pequigney’s ‘The Two Antonios’ and Karen Newman’s ‘Portia’s Ring’ also discuss this episode extensively.

[See ch. 1, p.29]

[See ch. 2, pp.97-105]

[See ch. 2, pp.83-88]

[See ch. 2, pp.83-88]

The effect of gender performance here is strikingly similar to Judith Butler’s description of the effect of drag. (1999a, 174-177). [See ch. 2, p.73; ch. 4, pp.149-150]

Nietzsche argues in *The Birth of Tragedy* that Greek tragedy is built on a tension between structured Appoline forces and destructive Dionysiac forces. One of the typical Appoline forces Nietzsche mentions is music (102). My reading of Nietzsche is conceived in relation to Andrew Ford’s ‘Katharsis: The Ancient Problem’, in which the cathartic qualities of the musical effects and their disruptions in Ancient Greek drama are invoked.

I am aware that this idea seems to echo the concept of a ‘third sex’, established by Sandra M. Gilbert in her article on transvestism, ‘Costumes of the Mind: Transvestism as Metaphor in Modern Literature’ and treated extensively by Marjorie Garber in *Vested Interests*. However, unlike Gilbert’s ‘third sex’ it is not, a separately sexed being. [See ch. 6, pp.227-228]

Consider for example the notable difference between the transvestite characters in *Twelfth Night, As You Like It* and *The Merchant of Venice*.

Orgel discusses this play extensively in relation to gender norms, sexuality and political discourses in *Impersonations* and ‘The Subtexts of The Roaring Girl’. Jean E. Howard engages with it in a similar manner in ‘Sex and social conflict: The Erotics of The Roaring Girl’. They both consider the difficulties in marking Moll Cutpurse as gender deviant, as well as the erotic power relations connected to her person, but neither Orgel nor Howard discuss her particular type of monstrosity or the ways it functions. Marjorie Garber and Dympna Callaghan touch upon it, however, noting that Moll is a ‘codpiece daughter’ (*RG*, 49; II.i.89-90); an early form of the erotic figure that Garber refers to as ‘the phallic woman’ (1992, 122).

This is interesting, considering the fact that Middleton and Dekker’s title overtly refers to Moll.
All references from *The Roaring Girl* are from the 1976 *New Mermaid* edition, which is the same edition that Howard uses.

Moll has authority over the other characters: they respect or fear her. She is aware of this power and consciously uses it to ‘enable’ all the final marriages in the play (Dekker & Middleton).

Moll’s gender is overtly referred to as a female masculinity here. This concept of identity is thoroughly explored by Judith Halberstam in *Female Masculinity*. [See ch. 6, pp.250-251]

CHAPTER 4

1 [See ch. 4, pp.165-184]
2 [See ch. 1, pp.37-44]
3 See for example Patrick Higgins’s *A Queer Reader*; Annamarie Jagose’s *Queer Theory: An Introduction*; Lee Edelman’s *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive*; Nikki Sullivan’s *A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory*; Riki Wilchins’s *Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer*; Michael Warner’s *Fear of a Queer Planet*.
4 Judith Butler questions the connotations and the limits of queer in *Bodies that Matter* (225-226). She notes that it is unclear what exactly the term stands for and how it is related to the older use of ‘queer’ as a derogatory term for the differently sexed or gendered.
5 [See ch. 1, pp.37-44]
6 Jagose notes that de Lauretis abandoned the movement only three years later, however (1996, 127)
7 Foucault never identified with queer theory. He died of AIDS in 1985, long before the instigation of the term. For example Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Diana Fuss, David Halperin, Esther Newton, Gayle Rubin, Adrienne Rich all wrote extensively before the wider instigation of the term. Judith Butler can also to some degree be included in this group: only the 1999 preface to *Gender Trouble* acknowledges the term ‘queer’. Butler definitively refers to herself as part of queer theory in *Bodies the Matter* and ‘Against Proper Objects’, however.
8 [See ch. 1, pp.37-44]
9 Compare for example the work of Elizabeth Grosz and Sara Ahmed versus the early work of Judith Butler: Grosz and Ahmed consider gender identity in terms of corporeality, whereas Butler’s *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter* emphasise the incorporeality of gender.
10 The queer theory resource on theory.org.uk even shows a mind map with links to profiles on the most important queer personas: Foucault, Butler and Madonna. The website also pretends to offer Foucault and Butler action figures for purchase.
11 See chapter 1 on Saint Foucault and the queer utopia. [See ch. 1, pp.34-44]
12 Interestingly, the theoretical bases of these works encounter the idea of identity and sexuality from widely different and often incoherent directions. *The History of Sexuality* trilogy is less about specific sexual identities than an attempt to historicise the concept of sexuality, and to outline the Greco-Roman relationships to bodies and society *before* the invention of sexual identity. As established in chapter 1, Foucault’s analyses of identity formation are based on the cultural materialist theories of Althusser, Benjamin and Adorno. Butler, however, develops her conception of gendered identity from a strictly psychoanalytic tradition, the very basis of which Foucault expressly despised. [See ch. 1, pp.37-44]
13 Foucault argues that the concept of the ‘self’ is constructed in contrast to and in alliance with the multiple normalising discourses controlling society and the social masses (1991, 135-169). He thus does not allow for an essential personal identity untouched by these discourses. Judith Butler similarly argues that gender is performative and regulated by the gender norms of society, and thus not dependent on an essential biological sex (1999a).
14 Butler here challenges the classical philosophical construction of a mind/body division. However, she also challenges Lacanian constructions of the subject and second-wave feminism based on ideas
of the ‘essentially feminine’ in the works of Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva (1991; 1993).
13 See for example the chapter ‘The Lesbian Phallus’ (Butler, 1993, 57-92).
16 See for example Bodies that Matter, pp. 230-231.
18 Butler here fiercely defends herself against the accusation that her theory of performativity and her idea of liberated being denies the possibility of political agency. She agrees that identities are necessary at times for this purpose, but she sustains that internality should be questioned (1993, 222-242).
19 I will extrapolate on the incoherence of this in the section below. [See ch. 4, pp.165-171]
20 This is a basic division, but the stance is expressed with many slight variations in the different introductions, readers and guides to queer theory. Depending on the particular goals of the works, the concept of non-identification is more or less emphasised. Sometimes the ‘queer’ is used as more of an umbrella term; as an inclusive non-normativity, for example in Nikki Sullivan’s A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory. Other times it is used as a point of resistance to any normalising discourses, as in Riki Wilchins’s Gender Theory, Queer Theory and Annamarie Jagose’s Queer Theory: An Introduction.
21 See for example Patrick Higgins’s A Queer Reader; Annamarie Jagose’s Queer Theory: An Introduction; Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive; Nikki Sullivan’s A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory; Riki Wilchins’s Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer and Michael Warner’s Fear of a Queer Planet.
22 It has been especially problematic for lesbian- or gay-identified people, especially lesbian and gay activists (Jagose, 1996; Watney, 1992; Sedgwick, 1993; Edelman, 1994; Warner, 1993; Halperin, 1995 and Sullivan, 2003). The resistance is more surprising to some, however: Jagose’s Queer Theory: An Introduction has a chapter on contestations of queer, which starts with ‘[a]lthough queer can be described as a logical development in twentieth-century gay and lesbian politics and scholarship, its progress has not been uncontentious’ (1996, 101). Halperin argues that there is a sense that ‘trendy and glamarously unspecified sexual outlaws’ stigmatise the people adhering to an ‘old-fashioned, essentialized, rigidly defined, specifically sexual (namely lesbian or gay) identity’ (1995, 65, original emphasis).
23 See for example Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes; Jordy Jones’s ‘Gender Without Genitals’, Jay Prosser’s Second Skins and Henry E. Rubin’s ‘Trans Studies’.
24 Interestingly, drag sometimes comes to stand for transvestism in early queer writing. See for example Meyer’s introduction to the Politics and Poetics of Camp; Fabio Cleto’s introduction to Camp and Kate Davy’s ‘Fe/male Impersonation’. Jagose’s index in Queer Theory: An Introduction has an entry on transvestism, but directs the reader to passages on drag.
25 [See intro, pp.17-19]
26 Despite the fact that she does not want to include transgender in queer studies, Butler shows an interest in the development of transgender identity in other parts of her work. See for example ‘Doing Justice to Someone’ and ‘Never Mind the Bollocks’.
27 Henry S. Rubin and Judith Halberstam also discuss and criticise Butler’s usage of Paris Is Burning (Rubin, 1999; Halberstam, 1995).
28 Jacob Hale and Nikki Sullivan have also written extensively on Boys Don’t Cry, and both recognise the problematics in relation to the portrayal of Brandon Teena’s gender identity, but neither question what role the popularity of queer theory has played in the formation of the character (Hale, 1998; Sullivan, 2003).
29 Halberstam notes that ‘The Brandon Archive’ also describes Brandon Teena as ‘a fantasy guy’ and ‘every woman’s dream’ (2005, 28). She argues that he ‘lived up to and even played into the romantic ideals that his girlfriends cultivated about masculinity’ (2005, 28).
30 Halberstam notes that there are rumours that Hilary Swank, who stars in Boys Don’t Cry as Brandon Teena, refused to shoot the lesbian love scene because it was inconsistent with her character, but Peirce still persistently stuck to the queer agenda and replaced Swank with a body double (2005, 90).
31 See for example Annamarie Jagose’s Queer Theory: An Introduction; Nikki Sullivan’s A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory and Riki Wilchins’s Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer.
32 Braidotti writes this before Butler’s latest two books on gender discourses, Undoing Gender and Giving an Account of Oneself were published, but in Giving an Account of Oneself Butler affirms that
she finds Friedrich Hegel’s conceptions of the ‘I’s’ relationship to its surroundings important to her work (2006, 26-30). Hegel constructs an idea of a binary power relationship between master and slave personas in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Braidotti refers here to Butler’s use of binary logic.

See for example Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes; Jay Prosser’s Second Skins; Bernice L. Hausman’s ‘Body, Technology and Gender’; Kate Bornstein’s Gender Outlaw and Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues.

[See ch. 4, pp.178-184]

See for example Claire Colebrook’s Gender; Leslie Heywood’s The Women’s Movement Today; Linda J. Nicholson’s Feminism/Postmodernism; Catherine Beasley’s What is Feminism? In all of these Butler is recognised to be a third-wave feminist, or postmodern feminist.

Chris Beasley argues that the postmodern feminisms emphasise plurality in opposition to the earlier emphasis on unity (1999, 81). Beasley includes queer theory under the umbrella of these feminisms (1999, 96-100). Claire Colebrook, on the other hand, distinguishes third-wave feminism as the movement that challenged the sex-gender distinction present in second-wave feminist work (2004, 146).

This is not a definitive distinction, however. See Iris van der Tuin on the ‘jumping generations’ of feminism (2009b)

The more extreme forms of third-wave feminism, such as the feminism that Judith Butler’s early work belongs to, emphasise the constructivity and performativity of all gendered difference. Other forms of third-wave feminism, such as corporeal feminism emphasise that there is a physical element in gender identification, and tone down the idea of fictionality connected to social construction: if all conceptions are socially constructed, then the fact that sexual difference is considered important in our culture makes it important. This is developed differently by Genevieve Lloyd, Moira Gatens, Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti. [See ch. 4, pp.172-176]

The rejection of essentialism is expressed to different degrees. Some third-wave feminist writers, like Thinking Fragments by Jane Flax and Beyond Feminist Aesthetics by Rita Felski express a certain distrust of essential gender, whereas Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter are actively anti-essentialist.

See for example Sandy Stone’s ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ and Jay Prosser’s Second Skins.

See Jordy Jones’s ‘Gender Without Genitals’ for a critique of the fictionalisation of transgender bodies and Janice Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire for an attack on the fictionalisation of gender that she feels is inherent in the transgender movement.

Chris Beasley acknowledges that feminism is often recognised as that which is spoken by women (1999, 33). Male feminist writers are thus controversial, as are feminists who are not unproblematically read as women. Vikki Bell also describes various ways in which feminism creates sense of ownership over their suffering (2000).

Sandy Stone discusses this in ‘The Empire Strikes Back’. See also Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes; Jay Prosser’s Second Skins and Judith Halberstam’s Female Masculinity. When I speak of autobiographical terms here, I do not mean to say that these works are necessarily autobiographies, but they use personal experiences of gender dysphoria or heteronormativity within the narratives. See chapter 6 for a further discussion of autobiographical transgender narrative. [See ch. 6, pp.227-231] It should be noted that many third-wave feminists use autobiographical narratives too, see for example Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera and Sara Ahmed’s Differences that Matter.

A number of transgender works include reactions to Raymond. The most obvious one is Sandy Stone’s ‘The Empire Strikes Back’, which is a direct response to the attack, but also Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes; Jay Prosser’s Second Skins; Kate Bornstein’s Gender Outlaw; Riki Wilchins’s Read My Lips; Julia Serano’s Whipping Girl and Erica Zander’s Transactions discuss it. [See ch. 4, pp.181]

See for example Patrick Califia’s Sex Changes; Jay Prosser’s Second Skins and Judith Halberstam’s Female Masculinity.

Jordy Jones and Jay Prosser express similar experiences of being objectified (Jones, 2006, 450-451; Prosser, 1998, 200-204). [See ch. 6, pp.222-224]

Foucault argues that this type of exclusivity is a typical sign of a heterotopia (1986, 26). [See intro, pp.3-6]

Gayle Rubin discusses the territorial border wars within lesbian and gay theory and politics in ‘Thinking Sex’.
transgender fiction and cinema. She prefers to look at affirmative portraits of transgender subjectivity, 66 being a “real” woman for a year before she died of complications from her sex change operation in the 1920s, Einar Wegener’s development into Lili Elbe lived her dream of being a ‘real’ woman for a year before she died of complications from her sex change operation in the 1920s (Hoyer, 1933).

Serano argues that both Hausman and Prosser’s analyses objectify transgender subjects for queer agendas. She recognises that Prosser attempts to de-academicise transgender and to introduce transgender perspectives, but according to Serano he still dismisses transsexual’s personal accounts in favour of theoretical constructs (2007, 208-210).

Garber, Prosser and Califia also engage with the great exception is Leslie Feinberg, who has written both the autobiographical Journal of a Transsexual (1980) and the novel Stone Butch Blues (1993). Feinberg does not unproblematically identify as transgender, however, but rather as a ‘gender warrior’ or a ‘stone butch’ (Halberstam, 1998, 118; Prosser, 1998, 190).

The autobiographical FTM works that have been produced, like Feinberg’s Journal of a Transsexual are infamously difficult to get hold of. Except for Prosser’s Second Skins, and Halberstam’s specifically FTM oriented Female Masculinity, the academic analyses of transgender autobiography largely ignore it. Neither Hausman nor Garber acknowledge Feinberg, and Califia only mentions Stone Butch Blues in passing.

MTF transsexuals as well as FTM often relate stories of having traumatic experiences when they start hormone treatment. This is usually not the centre of the narrative, however. See for example Julia Serano’s Whipping Girl and Erica Zander’s Transactions.

Julia Serano argues that both Hausman and Prosser’s analyses objectify transgender subjects for queer agendas. She recognises that Prosser attempts to de-academicise transgender and to introduce transgender perspectives, but according to Serano he still dismisses transsexual’s personal accounts in favour of theoretical constructs (2007, 208-210).

Garber, Prosser and Califia also engage with the novel Man into Woman by Niels Hoyer about the painter Einar Wegener’s development into Lili Elbe. Einar Wegener/Lili Elbe lived her dream of being a ‘real’ woman for a year before she died of complications from her sex change operation in the 1920s (Hoyer, 1933).

66 Judith Halberstam’s In a Queer Time and Space requests a new focus in the reception of transgender fiction and cinema. She prefers to look at affirmative portraits of transgender subjectivity,
rather than the classical accounts of socially induced pain and trauma, thus establishing an idea of transgender identity as a functional concept rather than an affliction (2004, 92-96).

67 For Bornstein this is an expressly transsexual femininity. [See ch. 6, pp.227-231]

CHAPTER 5

1 See Sara Ahmed’s *Differences that Matter*, Kate Chedgzoy’s *Shakespeare’s Queer Children* and Marjorie Garber’s *Vested Interests*. See also Brian McHale’s *Postmodern Fiction*; Gerardine Meany’s (*Un*)like *Subjects* and Jane Gallop’s ‘The Liberated Woman’.

2 See for example Susan Lanser’s ‘Queering Narratology’; Carol Guess’s ‘Que(e)rying Lesbian Identity’; Antje Lindenmeyer’s ‘Postmodern Concepts of the Body’; Brueggemann and Moddelmog’s ‘Coming-Out Pedagogy’; Richard Hobbs’s *Writing on the Body* and Mary Farwell’s *Heterosexual Plots and Lesbian Narratives*. These texts all use *Written on the Body* to demonstrate queer methodology and Butlerian performative theory.


6 All the works by Jeanette Winterson and Angela Carter are referred to according to their original publication date.

3 Brueggemann and Moddelmog note that it always becomes clear to their groups of undergraduate students that they need to know the gender of their narrator.

6 [See ch. 4, pp.149-150]

8 [See ch. 4, pp.146-148] But Carter’s contemporary pre-Butlerian readership also read her from a specifically queer, gender-defying perspective. See for example Paulina Palmer’s ‘From “Coded Mannequin” to Bird Woman’ (1987).

14 See for example Aidan Day’s *The Rational Glass*; Ricarda Schmidt’s ‘The Journey of the Subject in Angela Carter’s Fiction’; Christina Britzolakis’s ‘Angela Carter’s Fetishism’; and Paulina Palmer’s ‘From “Coded Mannequin” to Bird Woman’.

15 See for example *The Short Oxford History of English Literature*; *The Oxford Companion to English Literature*; Gina Wisker’s *Angela Carter: A Beginner’s Guide* and Andrew Hock Soon Ng’s ‘Subjecting Spaces: Angela Carter’s Love’.

16 As Gina Wisker recognises, the only works that come close are *The Magic Toyshop* and *The Bloody Chamber* (or *Burning Your Boats*, in which it is also collected).

18 Lorna Sage argues that *Wise Children* is the climatic finale of Carter’s critique of patriarchy, but both Sarah Gamble and Christina Britzolakis note that it is radically different from the author’s earlier work (Gamble, 1997, 181; Britzolakis, 1997, 55-56), in Britzolakis’s case this is described in terms of disappointment.
Sarah Gamble, Kate Webb and Aidan Day point out that in contrast to the earlier books, *Wise Children* loosely adheres to (and thus challenges) a conventional generic form: classical comedy. It thus follows a linear narrative, which is unambiguously comical (Gamble, 1997; Webb, 2000; Day, 1998).

It merely pre-dates Donna Haraway by a year and Judith Butler by five years. As Paulina Palmer and Mary Russo point out, it also overtly engages with Bakhtin’s critically popular idea of the ‘Carnivalesque’ (Palmer, 1987; Russo, 1994; Bakhtin, 1968). Finally, it coincides with the rising interest in proto-queer gender and sexuality in Shakespearean drama. [See ch. 1, pp.45-56]

For example Sarah Gamble, Lorna Sage, Yvonne Martinsson, Aidan Day, Paulina Palmer and Mary Russo comment on this (Gamble, 1997, 159; Sage, 1994, 48; Martinsson, 1996, 92; Day, 1998, 178; Palmer, 1987, 201; Russo, 1994, 166)

See especially Mary Russo’s *The Female Grotesque* for a further discussion of Fevvers’s monstrosity. See also Gamble, Sage, Martinsson, Day, Palmer, Linden Peach and Marina Warner on critiquing of patriarchy from the margins in *Nights at the Circus* (Russo, 1994; Gamble, 1997; Sage, 1994; Martinsson, 1996; Day, 1998; Palmer, 1987; Peach, 1998).

Especially Marina Warner comments on this in ‘Bottle Blonde, Double Drag’.


Russo, Warner and Peach point out that the feminist utopia in *Nights at the Circus* can equally be read as dystopian.

See for example Gamble, Sceats, Sage, Martinsson, Day, Warner and Peach (Gamble, 1997; Sceats, 2000; Sage, 1994; Martinsson, 1996; Day, 1998; Warner, 1994; Peach, 1998)

Day, Schmidt, Lee and Hobbs all describe this scene as deeply problematic (Day, 1998; Schmidt, 1990; Lee, 1996; Hobbs, 2004). Heather L. Johnson comments on the controversy surrounding it, but nevertheless she thinks that the scene is ‘supposed to espouse a positive reading’ (2000, 133).

Interestingly, Day especially refers to a passage from *The Sadeian Woman*, which is a work that rather overtly advocates sexual difference as a means of liberation [See ch. 5, pp.216-217]: ‘consolatory notions seem to me a false universals, to dull the pain of particular circumstances’ (Carter, 1979, 6; Day, 1998, 125). Again, Day does not question the libratory power of the semi-divine Fevvers (1998, 175-180)

Schmidt, Sceats and Day agree that it is an uncouth forerunner of *Nights at the Circus*. Alison Lee argues that it is an early and less sophisticated treatment of the issues that Jeanette Winterson raises in *Written on the Body* (Schmidt, 1990; Day, 1998; Lee, 1996).

Aidan Day suggests that the dystopian and satiric atmosphere in the rest of the novel could also be read into this scene (1998, 124) and Elaine Jordan argues that Eve(lyn) is still an essentially masculine and flawed narrator at this point (1994, 203). Richard Hobbs also notes that ‘Eve’s narrative does not connote truth’ (2004, 46).

See the discussions of the Platonic Hermaphrodite in Aidan Day’s *The Rational Glass*, p. 124; Ricarda Schmidt’s ‘The Journey of the Subject in Angela Carter’s Fiction’, p. 94, Sarah Sceats’s *Food, Consumption and the Body*, p. 55 and David Punter’s *The Hidden Script: Writing and the Unconscious*, p. 28.

See for example Aidan Day’s *The Rational Glass*; Ricarda Schmidt’s ‘The Journey of the Subject in Angela Carter’s Fiction’; Christina Britzolakis’s ‘Angela Carter’s Fetishism’; Richard Hobbs’s *Writing on the Body*; Alison Lee’s ‘Angela Carter’s New Eve(lyn)’; Mary Russo’s *The Female Grotesque*; Lucie Armitt’s *Theorising the Fantastic* and Linden Peach’s *Angela Carter*.

Haraway refers to Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse about the formation of the subject and especially the female other. [See ch. 1, pp.60-62]

Haraway’s cyborgs are referred to as ‘hopeful monsters’ by, among others, Lucie Armitt. It denotes the idea of transgressively mutating ‘hopeful monsters’ in evolutionary theory. [See ch. 2, pp.88-9]

Heather L. Johnson considers Eve and Tristessa in relation to transgender subjectivity formation and the idea of queerness developed by Kate Bornstein in ‘Unexpected Geometries’. This reading is definitely more successful. Johnson argues the *The Passion of New Eve* highlights the tension between interior and exterior subjectivities (1997, 166).
This reference is discussed in other critical approaches to The Passion of New Eve, however. See for example Roberta Rubenstein’s ‘Intersexions’, p. 110, and Alison Lee’s ‘Angela Carter’s New Eve(lyn)’, p. 86.
36 Both Freud and Heywood note that the story is told by Aristophanes, but they both quote the ideas it invokes as the word of Plato (Freud, 2001, 57-58; Heywood, 1830, 45)
37 [See ch. 1, pp. 34-36]
38 ‘The Cave Simile’ in Plato’s The Republic describes the relationship between abstract ‘ideas’ and physical forms. Physical beings are mere simulacra of a set of perfect concepts or ideas (Plato, 2003, 240-248).
39 Aidan Day, Roberta Rubenstein, and Elaine Jordan also discuss this passage in library terms (Day, 1998; Rubenstein, 1993; Jordan, 1994)
40 Carter forms a similarly idealised notion of love in The Sadeian Woman. She implies that the Sadeian terror and its intricate power contentions, inherently indicate the forceful nature of love. The struggles to intellectualise the Sadeian game and to keep love absent from the procedures, invoke the powerful hold the possibility of its appearance has on the tyrant. Carter writes: ‘only the possibility of love could awake the libertine to perfect, immaculate terror’ (1979, 150).
41 [See ch. 4, pp.149-150]
42 See Andrew Hock Soon Ng’s article on Angela Carter’s novella ‘Love’ and the author’s mythological construction of Love as a unifying concept (2008). See also The Sadeian Woman, Doctor Hoffman, ‘A Souvenir of Japan’, ‘Reflections’ and ‘Flesh and the Mirror’ from Fireworks. In all these stories Carter portrays love in terms of binary tensions. In Doctor Hoffman and ‘Reflections’ this tension is controlled by a hermaphrodite.
43 Heather L. Johnson also considers the gender play in The Passion of New Eve in ritualistic terms. She comments on the fact that Tristessa and Eve exchange genders – neither is ever de-gendered and they are never the same gender at the one time (Johnson, 1997).
44 Colebrook particularly recognises Luce Irigaray’s anti-platonic influence from Martin Heidegger in Speculum of the Other Woman, where she argues against the idea of a singular underlying form or pattern, in favour of subjective representation. Deleuze establishes in The Logic of Sense that the denunciation of Platonism dates back to Hegel and Kant (253).
45 Deluze discusses this in his chapter on ‘The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy’ in The Logic of Sense (253-279).
46 See Undoing Gender and Giving an Account of Oneself.
47 In The Logic of Sense Deleuze discusses Nietzsche’s claim to perform a ‘reverse Platonism’ (253). Deleuze’s Platonism is a re-consideration of Nietzsche’s critique (253-279).
48 Plato argues that the ‘ideal’ can never be truly conceptualised, it has to be imagined as the defining and conjoining structure behind its living incarnations (2003, 189-192).
49 Deleuze gives examples primarily from Nietzsche’s reverse Platonism and Lucretius’s affirmative Platonism and acknowledges that this binary construction is unchallenged in both (1990, 279)
50 [See ch. 4, pp.172-174]
51 Sally Robinson and Linden Peach both argue that Doctor Hoffman is a rewriting of the Oedipus story (Robinson, 2000; Peach, 1998). Freud’s ‘pleasure principle’ dictates that all subjects seek pleasure and avoid pain. The ‘reality principle’, on the other hand, makes the subject defer pleasure when it is necessary because of obstacles in his/her reality. The subject’s initial ‘id’ only listens to the pleasure principle, but as he/she develops an ego the reality principle becomes more prevalent (Freud, 2001). Brian McCabe’s Postmodern Fiction argues that Carter’s novel concludes that neither the reality principle nor the pleasure principle can prevail without the other. They are part of a binary relationship (1987, 144).
52 Lyndon Peach and Sally Robinson also comment on the fact that the women in Doctor Hoffman do not exist in their own right, but only as reflections of male desire (Peach, 1998, 103; Robinson, 1991, 101). The logic of desire is rather two-dimensional in both these analyses, however. Neither critic recognises the ritualistic aspect of desire in the novel, or the degree to which Desiderio is constructed through Albertina.
53 See chapter 1 on Lacan and the Real. [See ch. 1, pp.60-62] Susan Rubin Suleiman’s essay ‘The Fate of the Surrealist Imagination’ investigates the degree to which Doctor Hoffman plays with traditional
notion of reality, and the tension it constructs between reality and surreality, but she rather dubiously concludes that Carter tries to demonstrate the differences between female and male reality.

56 These include Lorna Sage. She tries to vindicate Carter, however, and argues, on dubious grounds, that Carter’s persistence in writing about de Sade must have indicated a denial of her own painful experiences of sexed power struggles. Sarah Gamble, Merja Makinen and Sally Keenan also discuss the feminist controversy stirred by Angela Carter’s *The Sadeian Woman* (Gamb, 1997; Makinen, 1997; Keenan, 1997). Gamble notes that Andrea Dworkins calls it a “pseudo-feminist literary essay” and Susanne Kappeler argues that it is a ‘misreading’ of an unequivocally evil de Sade (Gamb, 1997, 99; Dworkin, 1981, 84; Kappeler, 1986, 135). Gamble herself argues that *The Sadeian Woman* is not supposed to be read morally: it is an exploration of power and erotic extremism (1997, 103). Sarah Sceats and Sarah Gamble note that Carter initiates the study with a quotation from Foucault’s *Madness and Civilisation* and thus argue that the author attempts to demonstrate that desire and power are the formative elements in subjective development (Sceats, 2000, 44; Gamble, 1997, 103).

57 [See ch. 1. note 8] Carter argues that de Sade only allows Eugénie a limited liberation, however. De Sade indicates that the mother is about to climax, but she faints before she experiences any pleasure. If the mother had been allowed to enjoy her daughter’s rape, Carter claims that the liberation would have been complete. She concludes that de Sade is too misogynistic for this: ‘Transcendence would have crept in. He might even have to make room for hope’ (1979, 129).

58 Freud’s ‘death drive’ is related to the ‘pleasure principle’. It is a drive that steers the subject towards a return to the initial ‘id’; subject deletion; or transcendent ‘jouissance’ in Cixous, Kristeva and Irigaray’s terms. The death drive occupies a binary opposite position to ‘eros’, which is a tendency towards subject coherence, love and connection (Fred, 2001). This idea is somewhat similar to Nietzsche’s conception of Apolline and Dionysiac forces. [See ch. 3, p.135].

59 [See ch. 6. pp.227-231] See also Sue Ellen Case’s ‘Toward a Butch-Femme Aesthetic’ on the ritualistic and aesthetic qualities of performatve gender roles.

60 [See ch. 4. pp.175-176]

**CHAPTER 6**

[1] See ch. 4, 148-160]  

[3] I am referring to categories like TV, TS, TG, DQ, DK etc. [See intro, pp.17-19] See Sandy Stone’s ‘The Empire Strikes Back’ on the territorialisation of authenticate experience at work in transgender autobiographies. She argues that similar processes are behind the various ‘histories’ of the homosexual or transgender subject that have been produced: The obvious examples are Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality* and the various other ‘histories’ discussed in chapter 1 and 2. There are also more transgender-oriented ‘histories’, like Leslie Feinberg’s *Transgender Warriors* and the essays in Gilbert Herdt’s *Third Sex, Third Gender* about the cultural history of the transgender, and Joan Roughgarden’s *Evolution’s Rainbow* about the natural history and the spread of homosexual and transgender phenomena in biology.

[5] I use the term ‘transgender studies’ generally here, but as I discuss below, there are obviously a number of transgender scholars who do not adhere to this distinction. I discuss some of them in chapter 4: for example Riki Wilchins, Kate Bornstein and Judith Halberstam. Other scholars, like Virginia Prince develop hybrid gender identities.

[8] This is especially curious considering that *Myra Breckinridge* - and even more so *Myron*, Gore Vidal’s second installment in the narrative of Myra - overtly satirises the philosophy and psychology behind transsexual subjectivity, indicating that gender identity cannot be so definitely segregated. Both *Myra Breckinridge* and *Myron* are also political critiques. Myra Breckinridge challenges the censorship legislature at the time (1968). The novel escaped being banned, but it was termed ‘pornography’ by numerous reviews (1999b). At the time of *Myron’s* publication, a Supreme Court anti-pornography ruling had just appeared, and Vidal had to ‘clean up’ his new novel to avoid it getting banned: ‘I thought for a long time, what are the cleanest words I can find? And I discovered
that I couldn’t come up with any cleaner words than the names of the five Supreme Court justices and two other good citizens who have taken on the task of cleansing this country of pornography’ (1999b). The first edition of Myron uses these names instead of the ‘dirty words’: ‘For example, a cock becomes a Rehnquist. And a cunt becomes a whizzer white...’ (1999b, 243). These terms have been changed back in the edition used here.

9 I generalise hugely here by arguing that there is one definitive partition within the transgender discourse. Obviously there are numerous differences between transgender theorists. For the sake of this argument, I will concentrate on one particular division, however. Sandy Stone describes it in terms of one objectifying discourse that considers the idea of the transgender body in terms of its transgressive signification and one subjectifying discourse that attempts to establish a specific transgender experience of subjectivity (2006). Both discourses form identity spaces, but the first discourse forms a transgressive or queer space, whereas the second forms an idea of an essentially transgender space. The first group includes writers like Kate Bornstein, Riki Wilchins, Judith Halberstam, Marjorie Garber and Rita Felski, whereas the second space is inhabited by for example Patrick Califia, Leslie Feinberg, Jay Prosser. Needless to say, the clash with queer theory often occurs in connections with the second group. However, none of the members of the first group are uncomplicatedly queer. Although Bornstein, Wilchins and Halberstam embrace the term ‘queer’, they are critical of the Butlerian identity described in chapter 4. [See ch. 4, pp.146-148]

10 [See ch. 4, pp.160-165]

11 All quotations from Myra Breckinridge refer to the original year of publication.

12 Kate Bornstein argues against the conception of transsexuality as an affliction throughout Gender Outlaw and her subsequent The Gender Workbook. Judith Halberstam also discusses the pathologising of trans-issues in In a Queer Time and Space. [See ch. 4, note 66]

13 Garber bases her idea of the ‘third sex’ on an idea developed in Sandra M. Gilbert ‘Costumes of the Mind’ (Garber, 1992, 9; Gilbert, 1980, 394). Gilbert Herdt also explores the notion of a third sex or third gender in history in his introduction to Third Sex, Third Gender. Julia Epstein refers to it as an in-between state in ‘Either/Or-Neither/Both’. [See ch. 1, pp.60-62]

14 Nikki Sullivan also acknowledges that Bornstein’s idea of the transsexual is utopian and generalising, and thus falls into the trap that Rita Felski describes as transgender’s ‘elevation to the status of universal signifier’ which ‘subverts established distinctions ... but at the risk of homogenizing differences that matter politically’ (1996, 347). Whereas Bornstein attempts to be inclusive by suggesting that the word transgender be used inclusively to refer to anyone ‘transgressively gendered’ (1994, 134), she deprives the term of its politically specific signifying power (Sullivan, 2003, 116).

15 [See ch. 4, pp.160-165]

16 [See ch. 5, pp.210-220]

17 [See ch. 4, pp.172-175]

18 Jones argues that Hedwig’s new body signifies Cameron Mitchell’s “horror and fascination of phallic lack”, reducing femininity to a crude psychoanalytic other (2006, 451).

19 It is important to note that Braidotti does not consider this to be a Platonic methodology. She argues that her engagement with Deleuze and Spinoza is a move ‘against all Platonistic and classical humanist denials of embodiment’ (2006, 158). However, Braidotti’s reference to Plato simply equates the philosopher with Enlightenment humanism. She does not account for Deleuze’s continued engagement with Plato.

20 [See ch. 5, pp.204-210]

21 [See ch. 5, p.206]

22 See for example Renée Richards’s Second Serve, Jan Morris’s Conundrum, Christine Jorgensen’s A Personal Autobiography.

23 Despite this complaint, Zander’s own autobiography also ends with the final surgery. However, her dedication indicates that she is not sure if this operation has truly made her a woman: ‘I’m beginning to realize this is a question I will never be able to answer’ (5). Like Kate Bornstein and Riki Wilchins, Zander claims that she never ceased to identify as a transsexual.

24 In Bornstein’s work, particularly, this is not merely a question of ‘passing’. Bornstein states that she is unable to fully identify as a woman, in view of her male past. She argues that her subjectivity is a juxtaposition of everything she has been and everything she may become (1994, 3-4).
26 Larsson establishes that a great amount of male transvestites spend their professional life in traditionally masculine positions. They are often engineers, mechanics or physicists (1997, 124). The female roles are often hyper-feminised and overtly eroticised (1997, 322). According to Larsson, the male role become conceived of as a ‘commonsense reality’ (1997, 374, my translation), whereas the female role is considered ‘liberating’ (374, my translation); a form of transcendence. Larsson thus concludes that transvestism is a gendered interplay between the Real and the Imaginary that enables experiences of ‘subjective transgression’ (1997, 374, my translation).

27 See definition of transgenderist. [See intro, p.18] All references to Virginia Prince refer to the original year of publication. Prince officially changed her name, had breast enlargement surgery and wore feminine attire, but she never wished to have sexual reassignment surgery (Ekins & King, 2005, 12). She was even adamantly politically opposed to sex change surgery (1978b, 34). She did not wish to identify with transvestism because she objected to the fact that it was ‘generally defined in its most primitive manifestation’ (1973, 31), which is the traditional psychoanalytic idea of transvestite fetishism; ‘sexual arousal from wearing feminine attire.’ (1973, 31).

28 This is importantly different from Jordy Jones’s argument that Hedwig is insufficiently transsexual (2006, 450).

29 [See ch. 4, pp.147]. (Prince, 1973, 29-32)

30 The critique constructed in Myra Breckinridge and Myron also establishes that a life as a full man or a full female is impossible. Like Virginia Prince argues, such a division is construed as incompleteness. ‘In effect we all become HALF HUMANS!’ (Prince, 1978a, 41).

31 All quotations from Myra Breckinridge refer to the original year of publication.

32 Throughout Myron, Myra adds breast implants and Myron removes them. Myra manages to rid herself of Myron’s phallus, which he is unable to restore, but Myra is also unable to restore a new vagina.

33 Virginia Prince enforced this idea to the point that she insisted that the transvestite organisation she formed, Full Personality Expression (FPE) was exclusively for heterosexual transvestites (Ekins & King, 7). She argues that practically all transvestites are firmly heterosexual, and that the few that are not are a different, sexual rather than gender based class of crossdressers (1973, 31). She thus denies possibilities of sexual overlap and ignores ample epistemological evidence that some transvestites prefer sexual intercourse with men when they are dressed as women (Docter, 1988; Larsson, Lilja & Fossum, 112).

34 Vidal obviously echoes Foucault in this statement. [See ch. 1, pp.37-44]

35 Myron points out that he is sad to say that Myra’s effeminisation of Rusty seemingly was successful. He regretfully states that Rusty now is ‘a complete homosexual’ (1968, 212).

36 Psychoanalytic description and sources: Richard Docter, Magnus Hirschfield, Harry Benjamin.

37 Felski is sceptical of directly gendering time. Kristeva’s account of femininity is mythically lodged in biologicist ideas of femininity. She refers to female subjectivity and temporality in reproductive terms. It feeds into the binaristic construct of a ‘phallocentrically structured, forward moving time’ (Felski, 2000, 18) versus a ‘gynocentric, recurrent time’ (18).

38 Vidal states in an interview that he believes the Hollywood of the 1940’s, ‘when everybody went to the movies’ to have had the capacity to radically change the course of history (1999b, 248).

39 The pattern of connections through which the becomings interact is termed a ‘Rhizome’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. Each new ‘line’ of becoming, or ‘line of flight’ from a state of being transforms the existential whole (11-12). It is a multi-dimensional and interactive idea of time and space as a continually mutating ‘assemblage’ (2004, 4).

40 This essay is included in Doing Time.

41 [See intro, 12-16]

42 In Felski’s earlier version of this article, she criticises Baudrillard and Haraway’s abstract use of transgenderism as a trope for the breakdown of identity, arguing that theorists are ‘homogenizing differences that matter politically: the differences between men and women, the difference between those who occasionally play with the trope of transsexuality and those others for whom it is a matter of life and death’ (2006, 572). Her discussion is however, itself pointedly lacking of transgender input. Judith Halberstam criticises Felski in both Female Masculinity and In a Queer Time and Space for first attempting to engage with the subjective reality of transgenderism and then abstracting this complex phenomenon (1998, 166-167; 2005, 98-99). Jay Prosser similarly criticises Felski for using the concept of transsexuality as though it signified the same thing as the transgender umbrella.
concept: ‘That Felski’s essay itself does not distinguish between transgendered and transsexual certainly suggests the need for their distinction’ (1998, 201). Felski responds to this criticism by including a section on transgender discourse and demonstrating the particular ways in which Halberstam and Prosser generalise about transgender identities in the later version of ‘Fin de Siècle, Fin de Sexe’ (2000, 149-150)

43 Erica Zander argues in *TransActions* that most transgender autobiographies start with ‘Already when I was a little girl...’(13), but this account is always to some degree a reconsideration and reshaping of subjective events. The autobiographers mould their past so that it fits into the construction of a transgender identity.

44 Deleuze argues that ‘all becomings are molecular’ (2007, 303). They are all connected in the rhizomatic structure of social and subjective consciousness.

CONCLUSION

1 The connection between these theorists is not arbitrary. Deleuze and Foucault have participated in several shared interviews and Deleuze has written a book about his interpretation of Foucault’s theories – including his conception of ‘subjectivation’ and space (1999). Eleanor Kaufman describes their connection thus: ‘Deleuze and Foucault are not so much individual writers and thinkers as they are a mode or a configuration or even a constellation’ (2001, 70).

2 [See ch. 2, pp.88-97]

3 See Claire Colebrook’s ‘How Queer Can You Go?’ about the need to queer queer theory.

4 [See ch. 2, pp.88-105; ch. 3, pp.131-142]

5 [See ch. 6, pp.226-235]

6 [See ch. 5, pp.204-220]

7 [See ch. 6, pp.253-257]
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