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Situating Strangers

Understanding Hindu Community Life in Lusaka

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Ph.D.
The University of Edinburgh
2010
Declaration

I hereby certify that this thesis is entirely my own work. Some portions have previously been submitted for publication, copies of which are in Appendix D.

Date
Abstract
This thesis explores the complex identities of the Hindu community of Lusaka, Zambia. It argues that current theories in migration and diaspora studies are not sufficient for understanding such groups in post-colonial Africa. The thesis proposes that we should revisit ‘forgotten’ literature, on immigrants as ‘stranger’ communities, that originates from Georg Simmel’s 1908 essay, ‘The Stranger’. Such work, which this thesis terms ‘stranger theory’, usefully contributes to more contemporary approaches by enabling a comprehensive assessment of a community’s position and how that position changes over time. Stranger theory is used in this thesis to situate Lusaka’s Hindus (and Zambian Hindus more generally) as ‘organic’ members of the nation, whose relationships with wider society are characterised by both ‘nearness’ and ‘remoteness’.

The thesis first describes the emergence of a Zambian Hindu ethnic identity during colonial and immediate postcolonial (post-1964) periods focussing on migration and settlement patterns, immigrant networks and the emergence of cultural associations. A theme running throughout the thesis is that the ‘plural society’ of the colonial era (a society consisting of separate, racially-categorised groups with limited interaction) has persisted in Zambia in a postcolonial form, and that this is a useful way of understanding the position of the Hindu community in Zambia today. Following the historical discussion is an analysis of how the contemporary city of Lusaka is experienced by its Hindu residents, through mapping out spaces, social structures and practices that remain unique to Lusaka’s Hindus. Lusaka’s Hindu community is presented as both cohesive and fragmented; the thesis goes on to analyse the ways in which community identity itself is frequently broken down and reconfigured by its members. Zambia’s Hindus comprise diverse sets and subgroups of immigrants with uneven and ‘flexible’ approaches to, and experiences of, migration, citizenship and belonging, rather than embodying a single, quantifiable ‘diaspora’ entity. Yet, in local terms, Hindus in Lusaka are often treated as part of a general ‘Indian’ group; indeed, the thesis shows how Hindus’ relationships with other groups in Zambia emphasise the ‘stranger’ dimension of the community’s position in society. Finally, the thesis asserts that Zambian Hindu ‘twice migrants’—those who migrate onwards to new destinations—reinforce the existence and identities of the ‘home’ community in Zambia. Indeed, these twice migrants must be considered as African and Zambian transnational migrants as well as part of a South Asian ‘diaspora’.

Methodologically, the thesis is driven by situational analysis, and brings two separate versions of this approach (from Sociology and Anthropology) together, drawing on data collected in Zambia between 2006 and 2008.
Acknowledgements

Lawrence: natotela, zicomo, dhanyawaad, aabhaar, thank you.

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Indian languages

Bhajan Samellan  gathering for devotional song (an annual event, organised by the Hindu Association of Zambia)

Bhangra  blend of Punjabi traditional and Western pop music

Bishek to pour

Charotar Patidar  region and caste identity in Gujarat (often bearing the surname Patel)

Charotar Patidar Samaj  the social club for Charotar Patidars

Desh Pardesh home from home

Dhuleti Dhamaka  festival of colour, linked to Holi, usually in March

Diwali  festival of lights, occurs in October or November

Ganesh/Ganesha  lord of obstacles, symbolising prosperity and success

Hanuman  deity and devotee of Rama, symbolising strength

Hanuman Chalisa  prayer honouring Hanuman

Hanuman Jayanti  an annual festival honouring Hanuman

Havan  regular prayer meetings

Holi  festival of fire and Spring, usually in March

Khumba  gold pot at temple

Khumbabishek  consecration of a temple

Mahila Mandal  women’s association

Mandal  circle, association

Mandir  temple

Pravasi Bharatiya Divas’ Overseas Indian Days’

Sai Bhajans  hymns

Samachar  news (the Lusaka Hindu Association magazine)

Samaj  society/association/club

Tulsi  ‘holy basil’, Ocimum sanctum, has healing properties

Zambian/African languages

AmaNdiya  the Indians

Biltong  a cured, dried meat

Chaya  play/enjoy

Chibuku  local brew in Zambia, slang for strong alcohol

Kabadullahs  knee-length shorts

Mafaaz  women

Mwaices  children

Mwenye  Indian

Nkongole  credit, loan

Pata pata  flip flops

Tiyende Pamodzi  ‘Let’s work together’, a popular liberation song by the Heritage Singers of Zambia, presented by Kenneth Kaunda to Comex (notably, the band included musicians Kamal Kant Sharma and Promod Shankar on Indian traditional instruments, the tabla and sarod)

Umuntu/muntus  people (usually black people; used by Hindu twice migrants to mean anyone from Zambia)
# List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
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<td>CEEA</td>
<td>Citizens Economic Empowerment Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Charotar Patidar Samaj</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
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<td>HAZ</td>
<td>Hindu Association of Zambia</td>
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<td>HCA</td>
<td>Hindu Council of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td>Indian Business Council of Zambia</td>
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<td>ICCR</td>
<td>Indian Council for Cultural Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHC</td>
<td>Indian High Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>India Office Records, British Library</td>
</tr>
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<td>LHA</td>
<td>Lusaka Hindu Association</td>
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<td>LILA</td>
<td>Lusaka Indian Ladies Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA-UK</td>
<td>National Archives of the United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAZ</td>
<td>National Archives of Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Registrar of Societies</td>
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<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHP</td>
<td>Vishnu Hindu Parishad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIBC</td>
<td>Zambian Indigenous Business Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZINGO</td>
<td>Zambian Interfaith Networking Group on HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZMCA</td>
<td>Zambia Malayalee Cultural Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNBC</td>
<td>Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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Map 1: Zambia
Map 3: Lusaka City Centre (Government of Zambia, 1986)
Chapter 1

Situating Strangers: Literature in the Study of Hindu Life in Lusaka

Introduction

Early in my fieldwork, I decided to conduct ‘city walks’ with my research participants, members of Zambia’s Indian minority. I wanted to map the sites around Lusaka, Zambia’s capital city, that were important to them. According to Harvey Molotch, since sociologists do not live in the worlds they examine, they need to ‘get out’ and find the ‘space to walk through the world’ (in Becker, 1998: 16). During Karen Tranberg Hansen’s ethnographic tours of Lusaka’s Mtendere compounds, she did not use a car. She travelled there daily in a crowded minibus in throbbing traffic, and walked uneven roads. This, she said, taught her about the ‘everyday frustrations’ of her subjects’ lives, because this was how her informants traversed city spaces (Hansen, 1997: 175). My ‘city walks’ idea was, however, thwarted by local Indian informants. Before I had my own vehicle, interviewees would insist upon arranging taxis, sending drivers or collecting me by car themselves. Much later on, I took part in a Hindu custom which Lusaka Hindus call Hanuman Chalisa. I was told that in some parts of India idols are taken from the temple and walked from house to house receiving sustenance and blessings. But in Lusaka, idols travel in a convoy of cars. I drove with a Hindu companion from gate to gate, receiving apples and sweetmeats at every house. ‘Why don’t you walk with the idols?’ I asked her. ‘Walk?’ she responded, ‘Indians in Zambia don’t walk.’ Indeed, in a youth project with disposable cameras, entitled ‘Hindu life in Lusaka’, one teenage boy took several of his snaps from inside his family car (see Figure 1).
And in a Hindu youth group drawing competition entitled, ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, 11 of the 27 drawings included cars and roads as a central theme (see Figure 2). To appreciate the ‘everyday frustrations’ and experiences of my subjects, I often had to drive to and through their world.

Figure 1. Youth photograph of Burma Road, Lusaka

Figure 2. Detail from Drawing 5, ‘Roll the Dice’
This immediate alteration in my research design says much about the methodological challenges I faced as an inexperienced and ‘outsider’ researcher. However, it also says a great deal about my subjects, Hindus of Lusaka, themselves, about their perception of public and private spaces and customs, their material identities, their feelings of insecurity, and their own ‘outside’ position in the society of which they are a part.

Section 1. Thesis Aims and Structure
This thesis explores the complex identities of the Hindu community of Lusaka, Zambia. Its main aim is to unfasten Lusaka Hindus’ identity from a singular ‘homeland’ of India and discuss it more in terms of adaptation to Zambian surroundings, ethnic cohesion and fragmentation, migration narratives, shared local struggles and future aspirations. A central argument is that current theories in migration and diaspora studies are not sufficient for understanding Hindus in Lusaka and other such groups in postcolonial Africa. I propose that it is useful to incorporate earlier ‘forgotten’ work on ‘stranger’ communities, inspired by Georg Simmel, into analyses of immigrant populations like Zambia’s Hindus. This work illuminates ways in which such populations can (and should) be considered as ‘organic’ members of a society, as a ‘constant’ feature of a society despite a potential to ‘wander’, and as groups whose particular relationships to other groups are characterised by both cultural nearness and remoteness. Below, I distinguish Simmel’s idea of ‘near’ and ‘remote’ from the language of ‘home-host’, ‘here and there’, and ‘triadic relationships’ that currently steers diaspora discourse.

The thesis loosely follows a chronological arc, from the colonial to contemporary era. It begins with a historical account of migration and settlement,
the origins of Hindu cultural associations in Lusaka, and the construction of
Zambian Hindu ethnicity. It ends with a look at the second migrations of Hindus to
other countries, and some implications of this migration pattern for the future of
the Hindu community that remains in Lusaka. Between these beginning and end
points, the thesis examines the lives of Hindu community members in
contemporary times, considering their use of space in the city, internal group
identities and fissures, and external relationships.

Much of this thesis is dedicated to building up the idea of Zambian Hindu
ethnicity. I describe it both as a result of colonial circumstances and as an ongoing
construct. Group cohesion and fragmentation are treated as being equally
important in the Hindu community’s cultural reproduction; in exploring this I
examine generation, gender, caste, and migrant waves. In particular, the thesis
contributes to debates on ‘generation’, supporting other studies that try to unravel
rather than eschew its various meanings. Recognising the complexities and
contradictions of talking about ‘community’, the thesis aims to represent the
heterogeneity of positions taken by Hindu informants regarding their identities
and belonging. I argue that the ‘practice’ of Hindu ethnic identity is shaped and
constrained by social spaces and structures.

Indeed, an underlying assumption of the thesis is that the structure of
Northern Rhodesia’s ‘plural society’, a society consisting of separate, racially-
categorised groups with limited interaction, has persisted in Zambia in a
postcolonial form. This raises important questions about the interplays of race,
class and culture over time, and about the role of individual ethnic communities.
Although these questions are not specifically addressed here, the theme of plural
society is used as a framework for understanding Hindus’ position in Zambian society, and so feeds into analyses of ethnic identity and also interethnic relationships. In local terms, Hindus in Lusaka are often treated as part of a general ‘Indian’ group; indeed, the thesis shows how Hindus’ relationships with other groups in Zambia emphasise the ‘stranger’ dimension of the community’s position in society. Finally, the thesis asserts that Zambian Hindu ‘twice migrants’—those who migrate onwards to new destinations—reinforce the existence and identities of the ‘home’ community in Zambia. Indeed, these twice migrants must be considered as African and Zambian transnational migrants as well as part of a South Asian ‘diaspora’.

This chapter performs two functions: it discusses literature themes and provides an overview of the chapters that follow. Bodies of literature that have informed my analysis but to which I make no empirical or theoretical contribution are addressed where appropriate in the methodological and substantive chapters; some of them are signposted below. Although the following sections attempt to present literature themes sequentially, in the order they appear in my thesis, each theme threads through my work with varying force. Thus, the sections in this chapter do not correspond evenly to the substantive chapters to come. In concluding this introductory chapter I provide a brief chapter synopsis.

**Section 2. Situational Analysis: Defining Hindu Life in Lusaka as a ‘Social World’**

Before engaging with more theoretical literature themes, it is important to introduce the methodological approach of the thesis – situational analysis. This thesis plays a useful role in bringing together often unconnected literature on this
approach. Situational analysis is a ‘theory/methods package’ (Clarke, 2005: 4–5). It has been used widely in social studies disciplines ranging from public health and science studies to ethnic studies and identity. My work has been most strongly influenced theoretically in this area by the classic studies into social networks, cultural identity and urban conditions produced at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute/Manchester School. Scholars who worked there include J. Clyde Mitchell (1956, 1970, 1987), A.L. Epstein (1958, 1969) and Max Gluckman (1958, 1963). Many of these studies were conducted, coincidentally, in Zambia and other parts of Southern Africa.¹ The work of these African-based practitioners of the ‘situational’ approach has influenced more recent work in urban and cultural studies in a wide range of other settings – the essays collected in Alistair Rogers and Steven Vertovec’s edited volume, *The Urban Context: Ethnicity, Social Networks and Situational Analysis* (1995) provide examples. Of particular theoretical value is Vertovec’s *The Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Patterns*, and his reviews of diaspora and transnationalism (Vertovec, 1999, Vertovec and Cohen, 1999, Vertovec, 2000, 2004). Early sociological studies spiralling from the Chicago School have also guided my theory. In particular, Robert E. Park (1928) on immigrant minorities and Anselm Strauss ([1969] 1979) on identity and generation. I have also considered theories of ethnicity published by Park’s student, Everett C. Hughes (1983). Park also worked with Georg Simmel in Heidelberg and was the first to translate Simmel’s essay, ‘The Stranger’, which sits at the heart of my contribution to modern-day diaspora and transnationalism discourse.

¹ Dotson and Dotson, whose work on the Indian minority of Central Africa is pivotal in my research, also observed this geographic coincidence - that so many studies of society in Southern Africa, including their own, shared an anti-functionalist approach (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 386, fn9).
These authors and the methods they employed have also strongly shaped my epistemology and methodology. Some have guided my ethical concerns: the advice of Howard Becker, for example (a student of Hughes) has been of particular help (1974, 1998). All have contributed to the development of situational analysis as a distinct form of research in both the Manchester and Chicago Schools. In her prescriptive book, *Situational Analysis: Grounded Theory After the Postmodern Turn* (2005), Adele Clarke, of the Chicago School, sets out a historiography of the approach, but makes no reference to the Manchester School’s version. Although these two distinct routes into situational analysis do not converge in the literature I selected, applying different terms for similar phenomena, they do meet and play against each other at important junctures. My thesis brings together these two separate routes to produce an approach that grounds theory in data and discourse and envisages the context of actions, events, objects and meanings very similarly in terms of maps, arenas, fields, domains, and worlds. Importantly, in both Schools, it is the researcher who is ultimately responsible for isolating and mapping the analytical boundaries of study, given the observations they have made, and therefore there are, potentially, multiple interpretations of a situation (Mitchell, 1987: 7, Clarke, 2005: 13–15). Having mapped these boundaries, the broad goal in situational analysis becomes, in Clarke’s words,

> to understand, make known, and represent the heterogeneity of positions taken in the situation under study and/or within given (historical and/or visual and/or narrative) discourses in that situation. (2005:25, 32–3)

Here, borrowing from several of the sources above, I use the term ‘social world’ to denote a space which brings together individuals with shared concepts, commitments and institutions. While for Strauss, Mitchell and Gluckman, the heart
of a social world/‘domain’ is human action, Clarke – influenced by Bruno Latour –
calls for equal positioning of discourses and nonhuman ‘actants’ (things that act
without agency, such as spaces or objects) in the analysis (Clarke, 2005: 60–64). In
this thesis, then, I circumscribe a social world of ‘Hindu community life in Lusaka’,
rather than ‘the Lusaka Hindu community’ itself, because, as will become clear, the
thesis analyses more than human action.

Hindu community life in Lusaka is one of countless social worlds that can be
mapped within wider ‘social arenas’. These are broad sites of discourse about
which all actors within will have their own perspectives and commitments (Clarke,
2005: 37–8. See also Strauss, 1969[79]). This study maps Hindu life in Lusaka onto
two overlapping social arenas. Here I place Zambian Hindu ethnicity, and what my
informants often called their ‘Indianness’, articulated in academia as ‘diaspora’
identity, as the two distinct social arenas to which the analysis of Hindu
community life in Lusaka ultimately relates. Of course, ethnicity and diaspora are
not the only arenas upon which Hindu community life in Lusaka can be mapped
(other arenas might include local politics, economics, or religion), but these are the
arenas which best accommodate my participants’ concerns about their collective
identity, their position in wider Zambian society and their perceptions of the
future. The Hindu community of Lusaka is one part of a much wider Zambian
Hindu network, which, I assert, contributes to its ethnicity. Incorporating this
social network in analysis here is important for understanding why Hindus in
Lusaka act in certain ways. According to Mitchell, a social network is ‘a specific set
of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the
characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social
behaviour of the persons involved’ (1969: 2). Hindus will also be members of other networks, including Hindu networks rooted in alternative geographical sites (for example, the town of Livingstone or the Copperbelt towns), Indian clubs formed on non-religious terms (such as Tamil or Malayalee associations), or based on attachments to ‘homelands’ (such as Indian or Sri Lankan identity). Hindu individuals will, naturally, be members of non-ethnic social worlds, too – for example, worlds inscribed by profession, recreational interests, gender, socio-economic class, charitable work, or by other cultural terms – this will be apparent in subsequent analysis.

Section 3. Constructing Zambian Hindu Ethnicity: Practice and Structure

Unlike South Asians in East Africa and South Africa, comparable communities in central Africa have, until recently, received little scholarly attention. Indians from the Indian sub-Continent first came to Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) in the early twentieth century and settled as traders. Their numbers peaked following the Second World War but have slowly dwindled since Zambia’s independence in 1964: today there are estimated to be fewer than 2000 Hindu Indians permanently resident in the country, less than 0.1% of the total population. Despite their small numbers, Indians have striking presence in Zambian society, particularly in urban areas. Although many have migrated, and continue to migrate, away from Zambia, Indian, and Hindu, immigrants continue to arrive and settle. Most research on Indians in Zambia focuses on the minority’s history and early development. These studies range from colonial experiences of immigration and social relationships (West, 1994, Haig, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, forthcoming) to economic and political

Indians, particularly Muslim associations, feature in Felix Phiri’s recent book on
the resurgence of Islam in Zambia (2008). A catalogue of Indians in the country
during the 1960s, by T.A. Bhatt (1969), was published but, until now, has not been
analysed.

The definitive work on the subject remains *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi* by Lilian and Floyd Dotson (1968). It provides a thorough ethnographic survey of Indians’ migration, ethnicities, religions, intra-group and interethnic relations under colonialism and through national liberation movements, and an early glimpse at Indians as ‘Foreigners in the New Nations’. They treat Hindus as a distinct community within a wider Indian collective.

Chapter 3 of this thesis traces a history of Indian migration and settlement in Zambia, showing the construction of a Zambian Hindu ethnicity during the colonial and early postcolonial periods. Positioning Hindus as a distinct ethnic minority requires careful consideration of the definition of ethnicity itself. Here, I explain how ethnicity is defined in this thesis and look at some conditions involved in the construction of Zambian Hindu ethnicity: namely, migrant network ties, inter-group relationships, spatial segregation, shared material worlds, population growth and access to representation.

Crucially, ethnicity is not a fixed category so much as an ‘emergent phenomenon’ (Yancey et al., 1976). I argue, like Conzen, et al., that ethnicity is ‘a process of construction or invention which incorporates, adapts and amplifies pre-existing communal solidarities, cultural attributes and historical memories’, but which is ultimately ‘grounded in real-life context and social experience’ (quoted in...
Chapters 3 and 4 consider the conditions involved when an ethnicity emerges from or within immigrant communities, or more specifically from ‘migrant networks’. A migrant network, much like Mitchell’s social network, shapes, and so can be used to interpret, members’ behaviour. I show that a strong Hindu migrant network helped produce both Zambian Hindu ethnicity and a distinct Lusaka Hindu identity. A migrant network constitutes ‘sets of interpersonal ties based on kinship, friendship, and shared nationality that connect migrants, former migrants and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas’ (Massey et al., 1993: 448, Grieco, 1998: 704). I assert here that ties can also be based on established cultures that are not necessarily ‘national’: many Hindu individuals in Lusaka’s migrant network are, in terms of official and ‘felt’ nationality, Zambian or Sri Lankan or British, but are tied through Hindu culture or religion. Within the literature on migrant networks, interpersonal ties are presented as both strong and weak. Strong ties include family and kin relationships, while weak ties include neighbours or fellow workers. Weak ties are just as important as strong ties, because, although lacking the ‘same emotional strength’, they ‘unite diverse networks and increase the resources available to network members’ (Grieco, 1998: 705). Importantly, if this set of migrant network ties becomes endogamous and is maintained, then an ethnic group may emerge (Granovetter, 1973, Gurak and Caces, 1992, Grieco, 1998: 705).

Other conditions are clearly important in the construction of ethnic boundaries. The term ‘Zambian Hindus’ itself locks members’ identity to shared migratory pasts and religion: in fact, no individual was able to talk to me about his/her personal or family history without reference to the Hindu community at
large. Thomas Eriksen’s outright rejection of ethnicity as a characteristic property of a group (a definition provided by Glazer and Moynihan in 1963) is itself too restricting (1993). Group cohesion may require the assertion of certain ethnic properties, which nevertheless may change over time. More useful is Eriksen’s refutation of Manning Nash’s quip that ethnicity is based merely upon ‘bed, blood and cult’ – that is, perceived biological purity and endogamy, ideology of shared ancestry, and a shared religion. Instead, Eriksen prefers ethnicity as an ‘aspect of a relationship’ (1993: 34), through which it is ‘made relevant’ (1993: 1). Everett C. Hughes asserted the same:

An ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable difference from other groups; it is an ethnic group, on the contrary, because the people in and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs talk, feel, and act as if it were a separate group. (1984: 153–4)

Although both Eriksen’s focus on relationships and Hughes’s centring of perceived boundaries are vital, neither of them mutually excludes ‘measurable or observable difference’. Throughout my analysis I examine how members of Lusaka’s Hindu community talk, feel and act, while simultaneously using historical documentation, narrative, and contemporary visible markers of difference specifically in order to delineate Zambian Hindus’ history and activity from any other ethnic group. This is not to deny the ‘relational and interdependent’ nature of ethnicity, as Claire Alexander puts it. Writing about black identity in Britain, she, like Eriksen, insists that it is ‘only through interaction with others’ that ethnicity achieves not its subsistence but its significance (1996: 114).

While social interaction is central to ethnicity, there are also structural aspects to its formation and maintenance. In his preface to Mitchell’s book, Cities, Society and Social Perception: A Central African Perspective, Bruce Kapferer described
how Mitchell regarded a given ‘situation’ for study as both a ‘practice of structure’ and a ‘structure of practise’ (Mitchell, 1987: viii, also quoted in Rogers and Vertovec, 1995: 25). This symbiosis of human action and structural form works as a backdrop in my approach to identity formation. In studies of North American cities up until the 1970s, urban social structure was found to influence the development and maintenance of ethnic communities. The impact of residential segregation received particular scrutiny. Early research showed that separate immigrant identities were retained in and by geographic ‘ethnic enclaves’ (Yancey et al., 1976: 395). However, studies of the immigrant groups who arrived after the 1965 Immigration Act in the United States, which sanctioned an influx of diverse newcomers, undermined the link between separate living zones and ethnic identity in the city. Instead, the results of these studies signalled ethnic members’ ability to maintain strong ethnic networks despite living in dispersed metropolitan and suburban areas. Further, social mobility was accompanied by geographic mobility: affluent immigrants chose to live in more diverse areas of the city (Massey and Denton, 1985). Christina Avenarius, writing on Taiwanese communities in California, summarised that while the existence of ethnic enclaves ‘intensifies social segregation and social homogeneity’, it is also true that increased urbanism ‘rarely reduces boundaries between subcultures or barriers to integration’ (2007: 96).

Lusaka’s Second Class Zone, a space designated to Indians during colonialism, endures as a stronghold of Hindu (and other Indian) religious, economic and social

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2 As a point of interest, Simmel’s essay on ‘The Stranger’, which I come to in Section 7, was extracted from a chapter entitled, ‘Space and the Spatial Ordering of Society’ in which he related space to the construction of group identities. (See Donald Levine in Shack and Skinner, 1979: 21.)
activity and residence: a racial enclave of sorts. Chapters 3 and 4 argue that distinct Hindu spaces have been ‘produced’ (Lefebvre, 1991) through social behaviour; these spaces have, in turn, structured ethnic practice. Just as there are strong and weak ties across networks, I assert that there are also strong and weak ‘sites’ of activity. Michael Twaddle (1975) has asserted, convincingly, that spatial and urban segregation in East Africa was an important stimulus and strengthening force for Indian ‘exclusivity’. He argues against those who claim insularity as an unassailable property of South Asian migrant populations: rather, insular spaces produced insular behaviour. Caryn Abrahams notes that cultural or religious food networks located in Indian areas of Johannesburg reinforce racially-defined ‘cultural hubs’ (2007: 103). Analysis in Chapter 4 of a Hindu food market in contemporary Lusaka, draws on this and on an essay entitled ‘Who Rules the Streets?’ by Karen Hansen (2004). Identifying locations of ethnic expansion or contestation is an important process. Daniel Miller’s work is instructive here: he shows how in private spaces, such as the home, people appropriate, through material objects, the wider world around them (2001). For Miller, objects are not merely signs. Through their use people ‘create a world of practice.’ He cites Simmel in his argument that ‘human values do not exist other than through their objectification in cultural forms’ (Miller, 1998: 19). C.S. Fischer’s fundamental distinction between public and private worlds of city life (1981) is crucial to analyses in Chapters 3–5.

Fischer also claimed that population growth can enable ethnic group formation. That is, once the size of a social group reaches a ‘critical mass’, subgroups are able to form around separate characteristics and identities (1975: 1325). This is relevant to the construction of Zambian Hindu ethnicity on at least
two levels: in the self-imposed social distinction between Hindu and Muslim Indians in the early 1950s, and in the continuing emergence of a range of Hindu associations formed on diverse cultural terms (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 196–7). At both levels, the viability of the subgroup was and remains dependent on sufficient membership numbers and interest. Population decline is also important, for instance in increasing the vulnerability of a group and causing them to grip to their cultural values and customs, although this is overlooked by Fischer. Despite this simplicity, Fischer’s claim is valuable for emphasising the highly circumstantial aspects of group boundary-making. Towards the end, this thesis considers the effects of Zambian Hindus’ falling numbers. Another circumstantial and structural aspect of ethnicity formation among the Hindu minority, directly related to population numbers, has been the level of representation available to them during their migrations and settlement. In his edited volume, Immigrants and Associations, Lloyd Fallers presents a range of cases showing how underrepresented immigrant minorities have been forced to create their own institutions of social and political voice and self-protection (1967: 12). Chapters 3 explores the theme of representation, referencing literature on colonial attitudes towards Indian minorities – whom Pandit Nehru called India’s ‘children abroad’ (Gopal, 1976: 618). Chapters 7 and 8 return to this theme to consider present-day transnationalism and shifts in India’s political attitudes towards diaspora (Lessinger, 1992b, Van der Veer, 1995, Lall, 2001, Levitt et al., 2003: 569, Dickinson and Bailey, 2007).

**Section 4. Ethnic Adaptation in a Post-Colonial Plural Society**

Despite structural forces of discrimination during colonialism, Hindus’ memories of the late colonial period, as I have written about elsewhere, highlight a certain level
of social freedom and negotiation (Haig, 2010, forthcoming). These memories resonate across city spaces in the present day. Chapter 4 turns to contemporary Hindu social structures, practices and identities. It maps out shapes and spaces of Hindu community life in Lusaka, emphasising shared and cohesive aspects of the Hindu ethnic group. I develop the idea of strong and weak sites of activity, re-emphasising the distinction between private and public worlds, and demonstrating that ‘plural society’ provides a useful framework for understanding the Hindu community’s position in postcolonial Zambia. The chapter shows some of the ways Hindus have adapted and contributed to the maintenance of a form of societal structure. Ethnic group formation or maintenance is not, of course, confined to societies in which rigid racial or social barriers have been or remain institutionalised. In his introduction to Desh Pardesh, an examination of South Asian communities in Britain, Roger Ballard points to the creation of ‘adaptive strategies’ by British Asians as crucial in overcoming their subjugated position in British society (1994). Alexandro Portes similarly penned that transnational migrants retain ‘homeland’ identities while ‘adapting instrumentally’ to host countries (Portes et al., 1999: 229). Following these scholars, I use the term ‘adaptation’ in preference to assimilation, accommodation, or acculturation. Most debates on immigrant integration pivot on Introduction to the Science of Sociology, by Park and Burgess (1924). They categorised different modes of immigrant belonging to the nation or nation-state, or what they termed ‘the group’ (a ‘body of common experience and tradition’). These modes included competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation. All of these involve some level of adaptation. True ‘assimilation’ required sharing a nationally-defined ‘purpose and action’
Assimilating signals immigrants’ relinquishment of ‘old’ attachments and institutions in favour of ‘new’ alternatives in the host state/society (Gans, 1997: 877).

Northern Rhodesia’s colonial society, into which Hindu migrants arrived, was a plural society. Assimilation of the sort described above was unattainable. The term ‘plural society’ was first coined by J.S. Furnivall in reference to the Dutch East Indies (1939, Rumbaut, 1997: 944). The theory was advanced by M.G. Smith, who defined it strictly and in political terms as a society represented by a single government but consisting of groups separated by culture and ‘core institutions’ (quoted in Kuper and Smith, 1969). It has been largely utilised in studies of colonial societies, wherein it refers to (usually racially) segregated groups’ ‘economic symbiosis but mutual avoidance, the only unity being that imposed by the colonial powers’ (Bates, 2001: 6). As is clear in social histories of the period (Gann, 1958, 1964, Dotson and Dotson, 1968, Macmillan and Shapiro, 1999), plural society in Northern Rhodesia was indeed, as elsewhere, a ‘unit of disparate parts’, ‘lacking a common social will’ (Smith quoted in Bates, 2001: 6). Dotson and Dotson’s study of Central Africa’s Indian minority was framed in a discussion about plural society, a theory which they attempted to advance and refine during their two years in the field. They envisioned, perhaps optimistically, the end of plural society in independent, democratic African states. They considered plural society a redundant theory in relation to Indians’ futures in Africa, noting its descriptive power but analytic limitations (1968: 390–5).

In the years after Zambia’s independence in 1964, however, racial categories continued to remain distinct in social, spatial, economic, and even political terms.
(Chatterjee, 1993, Ferguson, 1999, Bates, 2001); their persistence is evident throughout my analysis. As Clarke et al. explained, in 'rigid plural societies, such as East and South Africa and Malaysia, ethnic relations have been minimal save for economic interaction' (Clarke et al., 1990: 16). Crawford Young considered possible political reasons for ethnic segmentation persisting in postcolonial states through what he termed ‘cultural pluralism’ (1976). His ‘culture’ is what this thesis would refer to as ethnicity. Although it is not a purpose of this thesis to explain how and why plural society in Zambia has persisted, the concept is used when stressing that Hindus’ belonging in Zambia should be considered in terms of cultural adaptation rather than assimilation. Exploring some economic and social spaces used by Hindus in Lusaka, Chapter 4 of this thesis shows that Zambian postcolonial society remained ‘plural’, inching closer to what Park described, of the segregated communities of Chicago and other US cities, as a case of ‘unity in diversity’ (quoted in Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 389).

Studying ‘assimilation’, then, is inappropriate in my research situation. Similarly, ‘acculturation’ does not explain Hindu community integration; this would describe Hindus as having become Zambian culturally but not socially, which is not the case (Gans, 1997: 876). I prefer the language of adaptation chiefly because assimilation and other terms have materialised in studies of the United States, and so their analytic power is limited when tackling immigration in countries like Zambia, in which, as I have described, particular structural legacies of colonialism endure. Further, adaptation is the most ‘open’ of these terms, allowing for the greatest possible range of individual relationships and modes of integration. In her study of Sikh youth in Britain, Kathleen Hall similarly found US-
based assimilation theory inadequate in explaining the ‘everyday acts of
translation’ through which ‘people negotiate what are often contradictory cultural
experiences in their lives’ (2002: 5). The matter of individual assimilation is, of
course, very different. None have phrased this more forcefully than Thomas and
Znaniecki, in their classic account of Polish immigrants in Europe and America
(1958). They dismissed individual assimilation as an ‘entirely secondary and
unimportant issue’ to the ‘fundamental process’ of ‘the formation of a new Polish-
American society out of those fragments separated from Polish society and
embedded in American society’ (quoted in Rumbaut, 1997: 945). Although
departing from them on the relevance of individual experiences, I see their work,
which has been subsumed within the ‘assimilation’ model, as aptly describing the
adaptation of Polish immigrants to their new surroundings.

Crucially, adaptation sets no normative value on immigrant and ethnic
minority behaviour, unlike early ‘straight-line’ assimilation and ‘melting pot’ ideas
(Park and Burgess, 1924). While later discourses on ‘segmented assimilation’ (Park,
(Portes and Zhou, 1993, Gans, 1997) incorporate some challenges to the
assimilation model, they nevertheless hold the model as a political and cultural
ideal. Rubén Rumbaut, while asserting that a ‘fruitful reformulation’ of assimilation
is required, is nevertheless responding to what he describes as a ‘deterioration of
outcomes’ of immigrant communities’ integration. These negative outcomes are
attributed to immigrants’ poor application of their own mechanisms of adaptation.
Included amongst deteriorating health, education, work ethic and increased risk
behaviour is ‘the development of an ethnic identity’ (1997: 923). I avoid such
negative inference in defining and discussing Hindu ethnic identity, having observed its potential as a positive resource for community members. Thomas and Znaniecki regarded the development of ethnic identity as a ‘device’ in itself for integration (Wiley, 1986: 36). The concept of adaptation does not devalue cultural qualities of ethnic immigrants (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970), which modern assimilation, acculturation, etc. theories, tend to do.

Finally, studies framed in other terms assume that the important question for immigrants is their group absorption into host countries’ dominant societies. As this thesis argues (particularly in Chapter 6), it is crucial to study the ways in which Hindus have fitted, and continue to fit, into their own receiving migrant network/ethnic community as a step to understanding their wider societal relationships. This latter type of adaptation is often much more relevant on a day-to-day basis for individual migrants, and it gathers theoretical importance as time passes and new sets of migrants arrive. Some work, most often on second generation immigrants, has incorporated the role of receiving communities (Zhou and Bankston, 1994, Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, Berry, 2006, Riccio, 2008). Key questions in this direction have been posed: ‘Assimilation From What? To What? For What?’ (Rumbaut, 1997: 943). Case studies, however, often fail to represent multiple dimensions of immigrants’ social worlds, vital in attempting to answer these questions. Just as with Thomas and Znaniecki’s Polish subjects, the production and reproduction of Zambia’s Hindu ethnic group involves members’ adoption and adaptation of skills and network connections. It is a ‘hybrid’ community (Bhabha, 1994, Zhou, 1997: 976). These skills and connections will, some purport, ‘ease’ ‘frictions of distance’ both inside and outside the community.
Adaptation is a process of compromise and, in this case, of ‘essentialising’ what it means to be ‘Indian’ or ‘Hindu’ (Shukla, 2003), particularly since members continue to migrate into and away from the group. The process causes, as well as alleviates, intra-community friction and fragmentation.

Section 5. Ethnic Fragmentation

Throughout this thesis, to varying degrees, the Hindu community in Lusaka is depicted as simultaneously cohesive and fragmented. Words like community or group ‘mask contradiction, complexity, ambiguity, and incompleteness’ (Hall and McGinty, 2002: 303). Chapter 5 focuses on three lines of friction and fragmentation within the Hindu community of Lusaka – age generation, gender and caste. Although these internal boundaries and distances are potentially divisive forces, the maintenance of ‘Hindu’ identity in Lusaka is contingent on, rather than mired by, them. I now collate some literature on the importance of incorporating these complexities into studies of ethnicity and migration. I then introduce some theories and studies on caste, class and gender, upon which analysis in Chapter 5 is based.

In keeping with the aim to represent the heterogeneity of positions taken within my research situation, the thesis describes a range of relationships among Hindus in Lusaka. As Jonathan Rutherford has observed, ‘cultures and identities can never be wholly separate, homogenous entities’ (1990: 26). According to Strauss, this is because all groups comprise individual members, who ‘bring with them to their participation in cooperative activity a body of symbolisation derived from […] other memberships’ ([1969] 1979: 153). The formation of ‘subgroups’ is therefore, he claims, inevitable. However, ‘subgroups’ may not always present
themselves as formalised entities. On the one hand, caste divisions in Lusaka
effected the establishment of separate social clubs, and therefore reified caste
units. On the other hand, age generation divisions – as pertinent as caste in
fracturing group relationships – are not formalised into coherent status groups.
Chapter 5 shows how both types of division – caste and age – break and bind ethnic
community identity, and relate to class, power and prestige (here I am influenced
Sandhya Shukla (2001) points to gender, sexuality and age generation as potential
‘fissures’ within migrant communities. Cutting across other subgroups, these
qualities exemplify limitations inherent in any identity category. Rutherford
described how ‘interrelationships of difference are marked by translation and
negotiation’ (1990: 26). In Lives in Translation, Kathleen Hall stresses Sikh youth’s
apparent contradictory accounts of themselves and their experiences as they
negotiate various positions in society (2002).

Caste and age generation have, throughout Hindus’ history in Lusaka,
operated with and against one another to produce distinct leadership problems in
the community (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 218). Again, in some cases, they have
contributed to the formation of new associations altogether. Vertovec and others
have described the formation of caste-based associations amongst East African
Hindus in Britain. Lusaka’s Hindu community is by no means so divided, partly due
to its low numbers, but I make use of these cases in my analysis (Vertovec, 2000: 26,
Chapter 1

Ramji, 2006). The caste system in India has developed over centuries into a matrix of localised social, economic and political group relationships. These relationships are structured hierarchically and based on beliefs of purity and pollution. Although the caste system is country-wide, it is divided into subcaste systems which operate on a local basis and tie specific subcaste groups to a hierarchy within discrete regions (Pocock quoted in Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 144). In *Caste in Overseas Communities*, B.M. Schwartz shows that, because of its local manifestations, the caste system *per se* cannot be transplanted from India and reconstructed abroad by migrant populations (Schwartz, 1967). Several case studies, in Fiji, the Caribbean, the United States and elsewhere have demonstrated this, showing also that variable precursors to migrations – ‘migration auspices’ – and experiences of migrating also prevent this reconstruction (Grieco, 1998: 706, Vertovec, 2000: 53).

Few studies, with Vertovec’s work an exception (2000: 24), focus on the role of the receiving society in this process. For example, Indians migrating to British colonies may not have been at liberty to re-establish caste hierarchies, even if they could. I provide accounts of how historic and present-day structures of power and prestige in Lusaka’s Hindu community have mitigated caste boundaries.

Migration, then, can strip away some of the force behind seemingly entrenched structures of social power and status. This is not, however, the case for the gender issues faced by Hindu women in Lusaka. James Clifford notes that women migrants often face additional challenges to male counterparts, in the form of coping with the ‘demands of old and new patriarchies’ (1997: 259). Female and

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3 Work by Hasmita Ramji came under fire in 2009 when an article she wrote for the British Journal of Sociology was retracted on grounds of plagiarism. See Corrigon, C. ‘Is academic plagiarism being hidden’, *The Guardian*, 28 July 2009. The work I cite was not involved in this controversy.
private domains (often overlapping) are those most commonly neglected in theories of cultural reproduction and identity formation (Chatterjee, 2001). But, as Chapter 5 shows, women are important carriers of Indian national, religious, ethnic and regional cultures, at least in their visual and symbolic forms – cuisine, customs, and clothing (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, McCrone, 1998: 120–4, Firth, 1999). Symbolic forms of identity are vital in the perpetuation of identity, as the literature on ethnicity shows (Miller, 1998). Importantly, this ‘symbolic continuation of tradition’ is perpetuated by the structure of gender itself, which enculturates individuals to accepted community behaviour and norms (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, Ganga, 2007). Ganga’s article, for example, on symbolic traditions shows that Italian women in Britain are privately lenient but publicly strict towards their daughters (2007). As Nira Yuval-Davis put it, in Gender and Nation, ‘women in their “proper” behaviour, in their “proper” clothing embody the line which signifies the collectivity’s boundaries’ (2004: 46). I argue that Hindu women themselves act as ‘boundary objects’ (Clarke, 2005: 50–51), marking ethnic difference and bringing together collective concerns in Lusaka society. Moreover, the processes involved in migration have historically taken, and continue to take on, very different and differently imagined meanings for women than men. Although I explore this only tentatively, I want to stress the ample scope and growing necessity for further research on this topic.

Section 6. Generations and Migrant Waves

‘Generation’ is also cast, in Chapter 5, as a fragmentary force, and this is developed further when focussing on divisions among distinct historical migrant ‘waves’ in Chapter 6. I show too that the process of ongoing Hindu migration into, and away
from, Zambia, plays a complicating role in shaping Hindu life in Lusaka. It is valuable here to unpack interconnecting meanings of ‘generation’, and relate them to migration patterns and communities’ modes of adaptation. The most comprehensive survey of literature on generation is provided by Rubén Rumbaut in his search for its conceptual and empirical utility in studies of US immigrant communities. There is, he reinforces, no agreed-upon definition or measurement for the term (2004: 1161). Noting that generation is polysemic and a relational concept, David Kertzer claimed that ‘it is not an appropriate tool for dividing societies into segments or populations into aggregates’ (1983: 128). Disagreeing to a point, this thesis analyses Hindu community life in Lusaka according to how it was described to me by members of separate, identifiable but often overlapping ‘generations’. Individuals carry with them imbrications of different generation concepts, which need to be teased apart in analysis. Here I identify two meanings of the word ‘generation’ that are actively discussed in Zambian settler societies: as indication of belonging and as age cohort.

The first meaning is a unit of measurement used by settled whites, Indians and other immigrant groups to determine ‘how Zambian’ a person is. ‘First generation’ refers to those persons in a family who first migrated to Zambia – the migrants – whereas ‘second’ generation refers to the first to be born or brought up in Zambia. Hence, a ‘third generation’ individual has stronger claims to Zambian identity than a ‘first generation’ or ‘second generation’ individual of the same age. Importantly, local rendering of this meaning among Hindus in Lusaka differentiates it from other case studies of immigrant generations in two important ways. First, individuals do not necessarily need to have been born in Zambia to
claim or be ascribed belonging to a particular generation. This can be contrasted to
Japanese people in the USA (and elsewhere), for whom there is a specific
terminology: first, second, and third generations are known as Issei, Nisei, Sansei
and Yonsei, where Nisei, Sansei and Yonsei refer to people born in the USA
(Bonacich and Modell, 1980). Second, belonging to a given generation is not
dependent on Zambian citizenship: many Indians permanently residing in the
country carry passports for Britain, India, the United States of America, or other
countries. In many studies of successive immigrant generations, particularly in the
United States, citizenship is assumed. I return to this first construction of
generation shortly when discussing the importance of migrant ‘waves’. Here I draw
out some important points at which it intersects with the second, more popular
meaning of the word.

In this second sense, cohorts separated by intervals of birth are supposed to
display different, and often conflicting, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours (Kertzer,
generations in immigrant ethnic communities diverge away from qualities
regarded by them and others as traditional and conservative. Importantly, age
cohorts will move together through different life stages as ‘generational units’ (for
example, as youth or elders). In this form, as Chapter 5 shows, the divisive
properties of age generation among Lusaka’s Hindus are both obvious and openly
acknowledged. Herbert Gans claims that ‘holding the loyalty of the young,’

4 In his article, ‘Generation as a Sociological Problem’, David Kertzer explains how different
disciplinary approaches have applied the term differently. In History it has been used
synonymously with ‘era’, for example, and in Anthropology it has customarily been used in the
study of kinship relations. He also explains how generation is used to denote stages through which
especially of successive immigrant generations, requires adults to reconstruct and reinvent their culture – in other words, to adapt it significantly – to their new environment (1997: 881). Importantly, as cohorts progress through different life stages, their interrelations change. Studies of South Asian immigrant communities as far-flung as Australia and the UK show that as people age their attitudes towards parents’ traditions soften and often their own ethnic ‘consumption’ increases (Lindridge et al., 2004: 21, Naidoo, 2007: 59). In the United States, this generational ‘ethnic retention’ among post-1965 immigrants has caused concern, and provoked a wealth of social research into modes of adaptation of younger immigrants (Rumbaut, 2004: 1160).

Chapter 6 analyses a rift between two successive ‘waves’ of Hindu incomers. The phenomenon is pertinent to immigrant societies generally, and the social complexities it generates are evidenced among migrants elsewhere (Baumann, 1996, Grieco, 1998, Eckstein and Barberia, 2002, Shukla, 2003, Ramji, 2006, Frenz, 2009, Strauss, [1969] 1979). The rift was described to me in interviews and depicted in personal and association papers as a division between the pre-Zambian independence Indian immigrants, the ‘residents’, and the post-independence newcomers, the ‘expatriates’. Susan Eckstein and Lorena Barberia use the terms ‘first waver’ and ‘second waver’ when comparing the first immigrant generations of two successive migrant waves of Cubans to America (2002). In addition to participants’ own ‘resident’ and ‘expatriate’ terms, I use the term ‘wave’ in preference to ‘waver’, and I use it in reference to all immigrant generations of particular waves. The actual chronological and political histories of Hindu migration are complex. For the most part, up until Chapter 6, I follow David Laitin’s
example in simplifying this migration as two waves in order to draw an ‘implicit comparison’ between the two resulting migrant identities that informants described, and their differing ties within spaces and structures of Lusaka society. Laitin essentialised group qualities in order to contrast experiences of Russian Jews emigrating respectively to Israel and New York (2004). In Chapter 6, I renounce this simple dualist construction. I assert instead that successive immigrant generations and the collectives they embody – what Rumbaut calls different ‘vintages’ within migration flows (2004: 1199) – have to some degree presented and will always present new challenges as established group members and newcomers negotiate their relationships and positions vis-à-vis others.

Most recent studies of immigrant minorities, particularly in the United States, focus on relationships within a single migrant wave, and contrast levels of assimilation among its constituent age cohorts and/or immigrant generations (Portes and Zhou, 1993, Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, Rumbaut, 2004, Avenarius, 2007). Others try to aggregate multiple waves, but in doing so conflate the experiences of age cohorts of different immigrant generations and migrant narratives – what Rumbaut terms ‘lumping’ together (2004: 1160. See also Gans, 1997). Sandhya Shukla’s book, India Abroad: Diasporic Cultures of Postwar America and England, is one example. Shukla wants to rework models of immigrant generations by incorporating age generation and migrant vintages into them, to produce what she calls ‘generations of diaspora’ (2003: 216). She emphasises ‘lateral’ connections of diasporic populations, as articulated by James Clifford (1997: 250), in order to account for mounting contradiction and complexity caused by new waves of migrants arriving into, and altering, established immigrant communities. Her
happy example is ‘the image of the fourth or fifth generation of Indians in Trinidad remixing bhangra produced by the children of Punjabi immigrants from the 1950s’ (Shukla, 2003: 215). However, whereas Shukla articulates such contradiction and complexity in terms of ‘assimilation’, it is sufficient to understand it in terms of adaptation and interaction. Anselm Strauss writes about this beautifully, using two examples – first, Octave Mannoni’s illustration of two waves of French immigrants (‘colonials’ and ‘metropolitans’) to Madagascar and their relationships with the local people and with each other across immigrant and age generations; and second, the emergence of Hawaiian society. In Strauss’s reading, Mannoni looks at implicit and explicit generational relations to identify ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ connections. Strauss then adds and applies ‘diagonal’ connections to the situation, thereby teasing apart rather than forging together the two meanings of generation (Strauss, [1969] 1979: 135–8).

Chapter 6, then, teases apart these different imbrications, situating participants in terms of age, immigrant generation and migrant wave. I consider the divisive and binding natures of migrant history and experiences of travel, for which I rely on Clifford’s Routes (1997). I also draw on the poetry and writing of Daljit Nagra, Amitav Ghosh and others – ‘diasporic literature’ in which travel divides as well as unites (Shukla, 2003: 132–174). Analysis includes how school experience and other forms of ‘rooting’ have impacted on Lusaka’s Hindu

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1 ‘Bhangra’ music combines traditional Punjabi music with Western pop.
2 Mannoni’s psychoanalytic explanations of these interrelationships, which he wrote about in Prospero and Caliban: the Psychology of Colonisation, have been criticised by his former student, Aime Cesaire, and by Franz Fanon. Strauss sets the ‘accuracy of Mannoni’s description quite aside’, treating the case as hypothetical. Strauss added ‘diagonal’ to Mannoni’s terms.
Arjun Appadurai and C. Breckenbridge describe how ‘diasporic groups have memories whose archaeology is fractured’. They continue:

> These collective recollections, often built on the harsh play of memory and desire over time, have many trajectories and fissures which sometimes correspond to generational politics. Even for apparently well-settled diasporic groups, the macro-politics of reproduction translates into the micro-politics of memory, among friends, relatives and generations. (Quoted in Vertovec, 2000: 148)

Certainly, as Vertovec notes, collective memories of migration and other shared experiences do not always 'consolidate' identities. The process of settling into new political, social and economic surroundings requires significant adaptation of previous ways of knowing and doing. Reflecting on the ‘Hindu diaspora’, Bhikhu Parekh describes overseas Hindus as being ‘deeply transformed by their diasporic experiences’ (1994: 617, Smith, 2003: 746). These experiences vary greatly, even within single communities. While Khalid Koser, in *New African Diasporas*, insightfully notes that diaspora identity is a ‘way of keeping the drama of the voyage of “otherness” alive’ (2003: x), it is worth adding that there are multiple dramas and multiple voyages.

In theories of ethnic formation, outlined earlier in this chapter, group qualities and identities are negotiated and under constant construction. In *Nation and Narration* and *The Location of Culture*, Homi Bhabha depicted group identity formation as a ‘hybridising’ process (1990, 1994). Although ongoing, the formation of Zambian Hindu ethnicity and the maintenance of a distinct Hindu community in Lusaka are not indissolubly linked to narrations of migratory pasts. The effects of memories and constructed divisions may ease or morph with greater distance from what Ernest Gellner called the ‘historic horizon’ (Gellner and Micaud, 1972: 12). This distance, or ‘remove’, is difficult to ‘grasp and measure’ (Rumbaut, 2004: 1162);
but it impacts upon group interaction, exclusion and belonging. These themes, of exclusion and belonging, reverberate throughout my analysis. Towards the end of Chapter 6 and in Chapters 7 and 8, as the thesis begins to tackle Hindus’ relationships outside the ethnic group, the analysis turns more avidly towards them. In doing so I also turn to Georg Simmel’s excursus, ‘The Stranger’, and other work it inspired, which I collectively term ‘stranger theory’.

**Section 7. Letting ‘The Stranger’ Back In: A Contribution to Diaspora Theory**

In this ‘Age of Migration’ (Castles and Miller, 1998), the modern nation-state is stressed from all directions to represent and protect its many ‘fragments’ while coping with increasing movements of people (Chatterjee, 1993, Massey et al., 1993). Chapter 7 considers Hindus’ interactions and relations with wider Zambian society, and touches on how Hindus, as a ‘fragment’, feel about representative authorities in and beyond Zambia. The chapter revisits literature on plural society and representation, and stranger theory is situated centrally in the examination of citizenship and belonging. Chapter 8 foregrounds recent debates on diaspora belonging and African transnationalism. Vertovec provides a review of three meanings of ‘diaspora’ – social form, type of consciousness, mode of cultural production – each of which feeds into my analysis (1999, 2000: 141–159). Viewed as ‘social forms’, migrant networks, and resulting ethnic groups, are often labelled ‘diasporas’ and treated as homogeneous entities. Studies of diaspora in this sense place the emphasis on ‘homeland’ or ‘foreign’ identity (Connor, 1986, Sheffer, 1986, Safran, 1991, Ballard, 1994, Clifford, 1994, Brah, 1996, Cohen, 1997, Mercer et al., 2008). They often describe migrant minorities as pockets of other places or people
elsewhere (animated by the development and maintenance of ‘Little Indias’, ‘Chinatowns’, etc. See Shukla, 2003). Other work in the field, as Vertovec thoroughly explains, has produced more nuanced and complex understandings of the term, to which this thesis aims to contribute. By foregrounding immigrant minorities’ locally situated identities (in this case, Zambian Hindu ethnicity) we can re-adjust this emphasis to ties and interactions across ‘new’ home places. These are, after all, the relationships that ‘matter’ most on a day-to-day basis. Instead of approaching ‘diaspora’ as a social form, here it is treated as a negotiable identity option. For Hindus in Lusaka, whose identity ‘options’ are relatively constrained (for a comparable case, see Waters, 1990), diaspora identity is highly valued despite being negotiated and used in a limited sense. Other studies have taken a similar approach in defining diaspora, exploring a variety of ways in which the term has been translated and used by migrants themselves (e.g. McGregor and Primorac, 2010). Rogers Brubaker prescribes that it be treated as ‘a stance, a claim’ which members can opt into, or out of on individual terms (2005: 12). In this sense it can be envisaged as an alternative social arena, or ‘third space between “home” and “new” lands’ (Shukla, 2003: 17). In ‘Diaspora and the Nation-State’, Cohen sees claiming diaspora identity as a way to ‘bridge the gap between the local and global’ (1996: 516). James Clifford’s later work emphasised how ‘decentred, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a teleology of origin/return’ (1997: 250). These readings are agreeably different to work that stresses a gap between home and host places, although they are still couched in terms of authentic ‘home’ identities. Nevertheless, many Hindus in Lusaka
conceptualise their Indian or Hindu cultural identity/belonging in global rather than Indian-specific terms.

Using the concept of diaspora as an identity option avoids constantly returning to India as the permanent production site of subjects’ cultural identities. Vertovec, referencing the work of Joanna Lessinger on Hindus in New York, and Dhooleka S. Raj on Punjabis in Britain, argues against having to study India in order to understand Indians elsewhere (2000: 1–2). Similarly, according to historian of Zambia Hugh Macmillan, Max Gluckman’s study of urbanisation in Zululand emphasises how ‘Africans living in towns should be studied in their urban context and not as uprooted tribesmen’ (1993: 701). Indeed, in his own work on the Jews of Zambia, Macmillan resists foregrounding diaspora identity in the community’s local history. Likewise, I want to incorporate into my analysis my subjects’ relationships with India, with other Indians and Hindus around the world, and with diaspora discourse without reducing them to ‘The Hindu Diaspora in Zambia’. Such terminology is important. Macmillan’s Jews are not in Zambia, they are of Zambia. Vertovec sensitively talks about ‘Trinidad Hindu’ and ‘British Hindu’ ethnicities, and ‘American Hinduism’ (2000: 33–4). Writing about Chinese takeaways in Britain, David Parker contests the terms ‘Chinese in Britain’ and ‘overseas Chinese’ on the basis of their ambiguous ‘modes of representation’ and the unequal position in which they place citizens of an ethnic minority (2000: 77). And according to Victor Lal, the experience of Fiji-Indians raises an important question for South Asians worldwide: ‘how many years should they wait to become “natives”?’ (1990: 128). Mahmood Mamdani similarly posed the question in his inaugural lecture, ‘When Does a Settler Become a Native?’ (1998).
The marginal position of immigrants in receiving societies is nothing new. Chapter 3 shows some ways in which Indians in Zambia were marginalised under colonialism, and Chapter 7 describes how and why perceptions of marginalisation persist among Hindus. There remains top-down incitement of anti-'foreign' feeling and indictment of foreign presence, with political advantage sought through rhetoric on the rights of African citizens and ‘indigenous’ Africans. This harks back to autochthonous policies instrumented by the first liberated nations in Africa (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000, Nyamnjoh, 2006, Dorman et al., 2007, Manby, 2009). The vulnerable position of ‘middlemen minorities’ in Africa’s newly independent nations and nation-building processes is perhaps best understood in terms of the shift from a society defined by structure to a society defined by collective national culture (Gellner, 1983). In Zambia’s pre-independence structure, Indians’ identities were closely linked to their racial position and their position as traders in the colonial economic system. Working with the idea that a form of this colonial cultural pluralism has persisted in Zambia, this thesis implies important continuities between the Hindu community’s past and present vulnerabilities. In his book *Insiders and Outsiders*, Francis Nyamnjoh notes that one effect of globalisation in Africa is that legal citizenship is pitted against ‘authentic’ rights of belonging (2006: 1–3). As well as top-down challenges to belonging pertinent to African cases, ‘mutual suspicion’ has emerged between Indian communities and other ethnic groups around the world (Clarke et al., 1990: 16, see also Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999). There remains adequate space for racism and prejudice where official, state-sanctioned belonging is not supported by what Tanya Basok calls ‘social membership’ (2004: 48). In addition, most independent African states have
not, until recently, offered dual citizenship options for settled immigrants (Manby, 2009: 33). Immigrant groups' social and legal claims to belonging in Africa have long been debated. In their edited collection, *Strangers in African Societies* (1979), William Shack and Elliott Skinner presented twelve essays on minority/immigrant groups in newly independent African states. Each draws in some way from early sociological work into ‘stranger’ communities.

In 1908 Georg Simmel wrote his essay ‘Der Fremde’, or ‘The Stranger’. This was first translated into English by Robert E. Park in 1924. Park’s translation and interpretation of Simmel’s work has, from the onset, been scrutinised. He paralleled Simmel’s stranger with what he termed the ‘marginal man’ (Park, 1928). But there are important differences between the two, to which Park’s student, Everett Stonequist, pointed (1937). Park’s marginal man has ‘divided loyalties’ for home and host places. The stranger, however – who appears as an immigrant trader in Simmel’s essay – has a relationship to his host society characterised by ‘nearness and remoteness’, but does not necessarily have direct loyalties to any other place ([1908] 1971: 147). In fact, the stranger is not the ‘wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather […] the man who comes today and stays tomorrow’ ([1908] 1971: 143). Stonequist’s most important contribution was in recasting this stranger as a cultural collectivity rather than an individual. Paul Siu developed these ideas in researching the ‘Chinese laundryman’ or ‘sojourner’, whom he positioned as one of many ‘deviant’ types of stranger. The marginal man and sojourner are definitively ‘ethnocentrist’ and their emotional loyalties remain with their ‘home’ cultures and country, to which they desire to travel every few years (1952, [1952] 1988). Their lives are comparable to transnational migrants in
present-day literature (addressed shortly). While many studies of immigrant minorities conflated different categories of stranger – just as studies today collapse them into ‘diasporas’ – important efforts were made to distinguish among sets of motivations and commitments. Margaret Mary Wood defined a stranger ‘outsider’, Becker wrote about ‘middleman trading peoples’, Sheldon Stryker defined ‘permanent minorities’, and Hubert Blalock coined the term ‘middleman minority’ (see literature summary in Bonacich, 1973: 583, and Levine, 1979: 21). Edna Bonacich explored immigrant communities by examining stages of adaptation: she described a progression from sojourner to stranger, stressing a persistent ‘reluctance to assimilate completely’ (1973: 583). Donald Levine also charted this progression, which continues in perpetuity as human migration goes on and on (1979: 31). A consistent observation in stranger theory is that ‘assimilation’ is often not the intended ‘end product’ of the ‘social interaction process’ (Shack, 1979: 3).

Since the 1970s, stranger theory has been virtually absent from scholarly literatures on minority assimilation, migration and belonging. In 1986, Gabriel Sheffer introduced what he saw as a ‘new field of study’, in the shape of Modern Diasporas. These were waves of ‘new’ immigrants holding to homeland ties and performing transnational activities (1986: 3–4). Stranger theory shows there was nothing essentially ‘new’ about these types of migrants. For example, Benedict Anderson (1992) described migrants’ ‘long-distance nationalism’, an idea already put forward in descriptions of types of stranger. In his paper, ‘Diasporas’, Clifford observed that, ‘Diaspora language appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, minority discourse’ (1994: 311). Shukla encourages researchers to revisit ‘older anthropological debates’ on South Asian minorities rather than being
seduced by the rush of diaspora discourse into thinking that the ‘theoretical vocabulary for such formations is new’ (Shukla, 2001: 567). Furthermore, as Vertovec states, diaspora continues to be overused and under theorised (Vertovec, 2000: 141). Unfortunately, the wealth of theoretical and empirical cases under the rubric of ‘stranger theory’ has not so far been taken up in these scholarly circles. Rather, the term stranger and related terms like sojourner have been consigned a historic, poetic or lyrical place in literature in migration, diaspora and transnationalism studies. Pnina Werbner, renowned for her work on British Pakistanis (Werbner, 1990a, 1990b, 1991), talks about ‘stranger migrants (immigrants, sojourners)’ as though there were no useful analytical differences in the available diction. She fails to articulate any distinction where it is implied: for example, in referring to ‘immigrants turned sojourners’ (1996: 68 and 74). Recent work with ‘stranger’ or ‘sojourner’ in their titles have not referenced stranger theory either (Amarjit Kaur, 2001, Earnest, 2006, Park, 2006). Expectations that the growing bodies of literature into migration and citizenship have begun to engage, or re-engage, with one of their theoretical antecedents, usually end in disappointment.

Studies of African belonging and citizenship have also neglected stranger theory. A section entitled ‘Politics of Belonging’ in Patrick Chabal’s slim volume, *Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling* discusses autochthony and allochthony; but despite referring to ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ in Africa, he draws on no past literature on the topic. (See also *Making Nations, Creating Strangers*, Dorman et al., 2007.) In April 2010, a panel brilliantly entitled, ‘Settled Strangers’, headed by historian Gisbert Oonk, met at the European Social Science and History Conference
in Ghent, Belgium. In the collection of papers circulated, all of which related directly to the concept of immigrants as ‘strangers’, there was no mention in any of Georg Simmel or the set of literature his work inspired (save for a common misattribution of the term ‘middleman minority’ to Edna Bonacich).\(^7\) At an earlier conference, Oonk presented a paper on Asians’ economic position in East Africa, also called ‘Settled Strangers’ (a precursor to his proposed monograph), in which he incorporated Simmel but misrepresented his and others’ work on several counts.\(^8\) The most significant of these was his misinterpretation of the strangers’ ‘nearness and remoteness’, and his obfuscation of the ‘organic’ nature of Simmel’s stranger. Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis use stranger theory to emphasise the cultural distances and ‘organic’ position of Zambian Hindus first regarding their interactions and their legal and social belonging in wider Zambian society, and second regarding their identity as ‘twice migrants’.

Zambia continues to be a ‘receiving’ state for Indian immigrants: in fact, a third migrant ‘wave’ is now underway with fresh, young talent exploring business investments in its liberalised economy. Nevertheless, since the early 1960s Zambia has also been a ‘sending’ state for Indians migrating onwards to the developed world, or back to India: what Bhachu famously called ‘twice migrants’ (1985). Onward migration of Hindus from Zambia, the subject of Chapter 8, has been prompted by economic insecurity, uneven representation, and political uncertainty. As described in Chapters 3 and 7, many Hindus treat citizenship as

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\(^7\) The full title of the panel was ‘Settled Strangers: Why Trading Minorities Cannot Become Natives’. The work of the panel was circulated in draft form and cannot be quoted from directly. Panel participants included Gisbert Oonk, Bruce Whitehouse, Rahul Oka, and Veerle Vanden Daeden.

\(^8\) India-East Africa Relations, British Institute of East Africa, Nairobi, 9 April 2009.
‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999, Benhabib, 2000, Nyamnjoh, 2006). There are now many more Zambian Hindu twice migrants than Hindus permanently residing in Zambia. Although I use it, the term ‘twice migrant’ is problematic, for two reasons. First, it implies that individuals cannot escape their ‘migrant’ status: in Mamdani’s terms, settlers will never be ‘natives’. Second, it assumes a primordial sense of ‘origin’. That is, the appropriate ‘home’ of the immigrants concerned is traced further back in history, not to (in this case) their African place of birth or belonging, but to an Indian or South Asian place of original or ancestral departure – a native place or ‘motherland’. Bhachu’s study on East African Sikh settlers in Britain revealed significant diversions and tensions among different sets of South Asians, focussing particularly on the transformation of cultural practices that had occurred during her Sikh subjects’ experiences in Africa; transformations that set them apart from others who had migrated directly to Britain from Asia (see also Alibhai-Brown, 2008, Frenz, 2009). The term ‘twice migrant’ persists in the analysis of South Asian ‘diasporas’ and Hindus from Zambia are increasingly being incorporated into this broad South Asian category. Chapter 8 considers how ‘Indian diaspora’ has been packaged by the Indian state as part of a ‘migration industry’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 76). It is important to position Zambian Indians not as types within such a ‘diaspora’, but instead as organic members of Zambian society. I use literature on transnationalism (Glick Schiller et al., 1992, Guarnizo and Smith, 2000, Itzigsohn, 2000, Délano, 2009) when analysing onward migrations, and in order to position Hindus from Zambia as active African transmigrants.
Conclusion and Synopsis

This introductory chapter began with a window to the world I was entering as a research student: a world in which Hindus have adapted their cultural practices to African urban surroundings, and a world in which their position in society appears structured by space and suspicion. One function of the chapter was to introduce bodies of literature relevant to the analysis of these processes. The other function was to provide an overview of the chapters to come. By way of conclusion and clarification, I now provide a short synopsis of each of these chapters. Chapter 2, directly following, is a somewhat stand-alone chapter entitled ‘The Tyranny of Strangers: Research Methods and Ethics’. The chapter is divided into two sections. First, I introduce and discuss literature on exploitation in research and, reflecting on my fieldwork experience, position myself as a research stranger. Second, I describe five ethical and methodological challenges that I encountered during my fieldwork, and discuss how I tackled them. Throughout the chapter, I foreground the situational analysis approach.

Chapter 3, ‘Constructing Zambian Hindu Ethnicity’ is the first of the analytical chapters. Its four sections explain the history of Indian immigration to Zambia and the way in which Indian, and particularly Hindu, immigrants sought and received uneven and uncertain political and cultural representation under colonialism and in the early years of Zambian independence. I argue that this led to Hindus’ feelings of estrangement from administrative systems governing their territorial movements, access to resources, and citizenship choices. This plants the seeds for later discussions on representation and diaspora identity in Chapters 7 and 8. Looking at the historical development of Hindu cultural associations in
Lusaka, the chapter shows that Hindus did exhibit some control over the spaces they occupied and the formation of sub-state networks and bodies of representation. The purpose of the chapter is to show how Zambian Hindu ethnicity formed, in terms of practice and structure.

Chapter 4 accelerates to Hindu community life as I encountered it during my fieldwork in Lusaka between 2006 and 2008. Entitled ‘Mandirs, Mandals, Markets and Malls’, its purpose is to examine the present-day spaces used by Hindus in Lusaka. Here, I build on histories of segregation and associations set out in the previous chapter. I propose that there exist strong and weak sites of Hindu activity across the city. The first of three chapter sections examines ‘safe’ places: colonially-segregated trading and residential zones, religious space, inside Hindu houses, and the Indian High Commission. The second looks at ‘quasi private’ spaces – Hindu association clubhouses, private schools, recreational sites and malls. The third section considers ‘uncertain’ places: markets and the street. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that Hindus in Lusaka share a ‘world of practice’ through the spaces they inhabit, objects and symbols they protect, and perceptions of place they describe. This has contributed to the maintenance of social distances in Zambia’s postcolonial plural society.

The focus of Chapter 5 is community fragmentation. The title, ‘Open Discourse, Silent Voices, and the Elephant in the Room’, refers to the three chapter sections: on generation, gender, and caste. Although up until this point the Hindu community is presented as both cohesive and fragmented, it is here that I represent the extent of its heterogeneity and the layers of negotiation required in intra-group identity formation and maintenance of individuals' social status. I
argue that Lusaka Hindu community identity itself is frequently broken down and reconfigured by its members, through their use of space, what they say, and how they represent themselves. In this sense, the community changes and the community stays the same.

Chapter 6 continues on the theme of fragmentation, analysing in detail a division between first and second wave migrants – known within the community as ‘residents’ and ‘expatriates’ (or, as the chapter title indicates, ‘kakawallahs’ and ‘expatias’). The chapter is divided into two sections. The first looks at how this division was relayed by informants. The importance of interrelations among successive immigrant generations, and diversity of experiences across and within different age cohorts is underscored. The second section examines the extent to which migrant ‘waves’ determine social relationships. I introduce a third ‘wave’ of Hindu newcomers to Lusaka. Immigrants’ adaptation into their receiving Hindu ethnic minority is proven to be vital in understanding their sense of unity and continuity. I argue, through youth accounts of sub-group differences, that even the most entrenched social divisions are not fixed.

The last two chapters turn from an inward-facing analysis to situate Hindu community life in wider society. The two chapters are intimately linked by concepts of representation and belonging, and theories into strangers, diaspora and transnationalism. Chapter 7, ‘Boundaries of Belonging’, explains Lusaka Hindus’ attitudes to citizenship as ‘flexible’. The first of three sections looks at Hindus’ position as ‘strangers’ and ‘scapegoats’ in Zambian politics and popular perception. Second is an analysis of local interactions, particularly relations with black Zambians, in terms of mutual suspicion. Third is an examination of present-
day sources of support and representation available to community members. These issues carry into Chapter 8, the final and shortest chapter, ‘Lusaka Hindu “Twice Migrants”’. Three sections here point to some causes, forms and effects of Zambian Hindus’ onward migrations. There are many possibilities for future research in this direction. Primarily here, I argue that Zambia’s twice migrants should be considered as African, as well as South Asian, transnational actors. The chapter considers the impact of Hindus’ onward migrations upon the people who remain ‘at home’ in Zambia, and contemplates the future shape of Hindu community life in Lusaka.
Chapter 2

The Tyranny of Strangers: Research Methods and Ethics

Introduction
In the previous chapter I briefly introduced situational analysis as my research approach, tracing two independent literature routes I took to reach it, one through the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute/Manchester School of Anthropology, the other through the Chicago School of Sociology. Both versions commit the researcher to circumscribing a clear field of study and grounding theory in data. Adele Clarke has described situational analysis as a ‘theory/methods package’ (2005: 4–5). Indeed, the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis – ethnicity, strangers, diaspora – shaped and were shaped by my methodology. This chapter, which is divided into two sections, describes the development of my methodology and explains some of the practical and ethical problems I faced during fieldwork and analysis. Following a short preliminary trip in November 2005 and some observations from April–September 2006 in Zambia’s Northern Province and Copperbelt towns, my fieldwork in Lusaka began in September 2006. I completed fieldwork (insofar as one ever does) in March 2008, continuing correspondence and internet research. This chapter seeks to show how, on the basis of this bounded timeframe, I try to capture the ongoing process of identity formation, and attempt to fix in words the underlying and changing relationships, practices, structures and discourses that nuance Hindu community life in Lusaka. In Karen Tranberg Hansen’s work, she asks, like Monica Wilson before her, how researchers can create a ‘moving model’.

Much of my effort both in data collection and analysis was directed at this reordering. There is a long history behind the way Hindus in Lusaka today live and interact with others, and there are important discourses about their contemporary position in society and their collective future: I treat these as important living elements in the situation. Adele Clarke advocates strongly that the goal of situational analysis is ‘to understand, make known, and represent the heterogeneity of positions taken in the situation under study and/or within given (historical and/or visual and/or narrative) discourses in that situation.’ (2005: 25, 32–3). Importantly, within this school of thought, situation and context are inextricable. That is, ‘context’ does not exist outside of the subjects, sites, objects and issues under study; it exists within them (Clarke, 2005: 71). ‘Mapping’ components (actors, social worlds, arenas, discourses) of a research project highlights the ways in which context and situation are mutually constructed. Mitchell articulates this, too, emphasising the importance of setting ‘contextual parameters’ around the situation under study (Mitchell, 1987). These parameters are the ‘conditions which, though lying beyond the immediate influence of social actors, nonetheless affect and effect their social actions and relationships’ (Vertovec, 2000: 19). Mapping contextual parameters requires grounding theory in data.

My data varies in type and depth. I drew on an assortment of data collection methods, including observation and conversations in homes, at events, correspondence by mail and over the internet, visiting archives, gathering official
records, conducting interviews and discussion groups, distributing questionnaires, reading community magazines, and involvement with creative youth projects (see Appendix A: table of research methods). My intention was to produce a ‘thick analysis’ of Hindu community life in Lusaka (Fosket quoted in Clarke, 2005: xxiii, 29); a ‘rich dialogue’ among various types of data I collected relating to the Hindu community (Ragin quoted in Becker, 1998: 62–3). This chapter shows the extent to which I rely on the breadth of my data in answering ethical questions about validity, reliability and representation. It also shows that collecting data, mapping contextual parameters, and reordering experiences were not ‘stages’ which took place at ‘discrete points’ in my research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 8). Rather, as part of the package approach, my methods and theory developed in parallel. In Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You’re Doing It, Howard Becker warns that, ‘There is no sense in imagining that this will be a neat, logical, unmessy process’ (1998: 9). The aim of this chapter is to tidy together some of the methodological and ethical problems I encountered. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first presents my ethical approach and a discussion about research ‘tyranny’ and knowledge ownership. The second is framed around five specific but interlinking challenges: (1) researching Hindu ethnicity in isolation, (2) acceptance and access as a research stranger, (3) researching sensitive subjects (4) research involving women and young people, and (5) sampling and representation. I explain how I tackled each challenge by way of demonstrating my aim to be a conscientious and critical researcher.
Section 1. Considering and Avoiding ‘Tyranny’ in Research

In his retrospective book, *Scenes from African Urban Life*, AL Epstein reflected that his research in Zambia during the 1950s was – as social research ‘must always be to some degree’ – exploitative (1992: 21). In the half century that has passed since his seminal work on African legal systems, he and other social scientists have determined to reduce this degree of exploitation in order both to protect research participants and to represent the situation as accurately as possible. In discussing my own position with regard to exploitation in fieldwork, I connect two ongoing debates in the sociology of knowledge – on ‘tyranny’ and knowledge ownership. Both debates involve the idea of ‘distance’ in research; that is, the extent to which a researcher is an ‘outsider’ or ‘stranger’ to the subject of study. Although entirely distinct from theories on stranger societies introduced in the previous chapter, literature in social research and anthropology into the ‘research stranger’ also pivots on boundary-making, interaction, and a tension (as Simmel described it) between ‘nearness and remoteness’ ([1908] 1971: 147). According to Hortense Powdermaker, in *Stranger and Friend: the Way of an Anthropologist*, the ‘heart’ of social research is ‘involvement and detachment’ (1966). The articulation of the research stranger has been credited to anthropologist Ronald Frankenberg (1957), who deliberately positioned himself as an outsider in his rural study in order to participate with minimal interference in village life. He impressed a moral obligation upon researchers to detach themselves from their research situation.

On Tyranny

Too much detachment, however, can lead to failures in representing and responding appropriately to research subjects’ concerns. The idea of research as a
form of ‘tyranny’ was introduced by Simon Bell in reaction to the shift towards participatory research in development studies, in which there is an explicit objective to intervene and effect change in policy and practice (Cooke and Kothari, 2002: 3-4). Some argue that in order to be moral, research requires this intervention goal (Stephens, 2004: 8). Participatory research methodology prescribes involvement of local knowledge, skills and priorities. In what way, then, is it ‘tyrannical’? And how does it relate to my research? Bell argued that researchers and powerful local social actors had the ability to exploit local knowledge to their own ends. He also described a ‘tyranny of methods’ in which outside experts applied their own scientific research tools, thereby compromising participant consent and control (Bell, 1994). For Meera Nanda the idea of tyranny has been taken too far, with the result that new participatory approaches, want to value local concerns and knowledge and delegitimize outside experts, assuming all the while that the local and the outside are irreconcilable and that the knowledge of the ‘outside’ experts[...] is nothing more than an imposition on reluctant local knowers (1998: 287).

Moreover, valuing local knowledge must not come at the expense of progress and reciprocity. An example provided by Cooke and Kothari in Participation: The New Tyranny?, suggests that in evaluating hunger, ‘viewing local African coping strategies as a product of local knowledge rather than a product of poverty itself misrepresents both the problem and solution’ (2002: 159). While Bell and Nanda, each in their own ways, react strongly to the shift towards local knowledge, both form part of a general alignment against Northern-based exploitation through research.

Although specifically addressing scientific knowledge, the debate on tyranny meets my methodological and ethical concerns. In postcolonial situations, local
participants in research sometimes feel additional vulnerability – colonialism was, after all, facilitated by Western abuse of statistical data, and post-colonial economic programmes did little to redress the balance. In *Decolonising Methodologies*, Linda Smith reminds researchers that there remains a sense of shared grievance on the part of the colonised against the colonisers, and additional ethical responsibilities preside when researching historically vulnerable groups (1999: 45. See also Beazley and Ennew, 2006: 189–199). In the study of race, Les Back describes how a white sociologist studying black minorities in US cities is seen as, ‘synonymous with a “note-taking” hand that is little more than an extension of the political arm of a racist state’ (2004: 205). I was born in Zambia and spent my childhood there, but on fieldwork I was initially perceived as a white, British researcher; my study was in a former British protectorate on an ethnic community within which I was a research stranger. Personal history and interests, even when made explicit, ‘work behind the backs’ of all involved in a research project (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2002: 144). In order to avoid exploitation, my research required a high degree of reflexivity.

In avoiding exploitation, I also required participant consent and reciprocity, the use of appropriate research methods, and the application of ‘situation ethics’ (Webb et al., 1981: 145). I detail some of the specific challenges I faced with consent and research methods in the following section. In some ways, these intertwine with reciprocity and situation ethics. The obvious currency of exchange available in the development field – the assurance of policy intervention – was not available to me. However, I value any valid assemblage of information as political and powerful whether or not it has a direct policy-changing agenda. When Dotson and Dotson were asked by Indian participants what ‘good’ their study would do the
Indian community, they responded honestly that, ‘it was highly unlikely that it would profit Indians much directly,’ but that their position in society would interest academics and the study would make a valuable contribution to knowledge (1968: 16–17). I followed their example. I made only immediate and realistic commitments by way of exchange: examples include agreeing to place copies of family photographs and records in the National Archives and supporting local Hindu charitable events by buying or distributing tickets, raffle tickets, or fliers. I never ‘bought lunch’ – a colloquial expression in Zambia for bribery – and this was never asked of me. Overall, individuals were willing to talk to me without any specified expectation of personal or community gain.

**On Knowledge Ownership**

There were, though, a range of attitudes about what I was entitled to know, what kind of study I should be conducting, and what I should do with any knowledge I acquired. I was several times during fieldwork asked to ‘show’ or ‘tell’ what I had ‘found out’ about the community so far. One woman exclaimed ‘We must arrange coffee with the ladies and you can tell us all about Hinduism here – we’re very ill-informed!’

A common misperception of my work was that it was a study of *Hinduism* in Zambia, rather than of Hindu community life. Some informants wanted to steer my work in that religious direction. There were a range of opinions about what the focus of my research ‘should’ be. While many informants wished to remain anonymous, others wanted their family histories to be represented and made central in my thesis. (I was once reprimanded for not ‘paying enough attention’ to somebody’s late father.) Several informants also felt that their

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1 Conversation with B.P., 4 November 2006
opinions were more reliable than others’, or that they had the ‘answers’ to my research questions. As I contemplate in the following section, during the course of research several people avoided me, others prevented me accessing key association committee meetings, and Hindu women were largely unresponsive. There were clear concerns about who in and out of the community owned and controlled knowledge about the community.

David Turnbull sees knowledge as both ‘situated and situating,’ and he regards power as the ability to move knowledge outside its space of production, such as was the case during Imperialism (2000: 19). What Turnbull’s analysis overlooks, however, is the vital role of the individual researcher in producing data. Mitchell’s situational analysis requires two processes: first, identifying the arena in which actors are placed and behave and second, ‘an appreciation of the set of meanings the actors themselves attribute to the behaviour’ (1987: 17). This dual process allows researchers to escape conflating local repertory with social scientific knowledge, something Ernest Gellner warns against (Hall and Jarvie 1996: 14). This does not imply that actors’ definitions are not important (Eriksen, 1993: 26). Rather, Miller asserts, researchers must ‘not allow people under study to determine what matters’ and thus we ‘must have our own criteria for determining why some things matter,’ which he grounds in observation (1998: 12–13, see also Clarke, 2005: 48). For instance, caste and citizenship are important and divisive forces in Lusaka’s Hindu community, but both were obfuscated and often dismissed by informants as not ‘mattering’. I treat the dismissal of caste, however, with the same degree of importance as its affirmation (Chapter 5), and my theory builds on Hindus’ attitudes towards citizenship (Chapter 7). The risk of tyranny or
exploitation in my research rests not so much on this position of relative power, as on my status as 'outsider'. Howard Becker reminds researchers of Thomas Kuhn’s teachings: that since we only ‘see’ what we have words and ideas for, we risk misinterpretation. Moreover, Becker urges researchers to gather as much and as varied data as possible in order to incorporate the ‘inconvenient facts’ that interfere with the ‘nice, neat story’ we want to tell (1998: 18–19, see also Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2003). My ability to avoid exploitation or tyranny in research, then, is rooted in situational analysis itself. My thesis goal is to reorder the experiences of the Hindu community in Lusaka and to represent the heterogeneity of positions taken by its members in regard to their collective identities. Ethically speaking, my goals include doing so with reflexivity, sensitivity, and an appropriate level of involvement and detachment. Below are five specific challenges in which my research approach, skills and ethics were tested.

Section 2. Five Challenges in Researching Hindu Community Life in Lusaka

Challenge 1. Validity: Researching Hindus ‘In Isolation’

Your focus is too narrow. You can’t understand Hindus by studying them in isolation. What you really want to do is hang out at [Hindus’] gates and when their servants knock off say, “Hey, what’s your opinion of your employers?”

The important question is surely what makes them different to Muslims? And you can only really know that by studying Muslims, too. And Muslims intermarry with blacks, so it’s also important to talk to the blacks and see what they think about Hindus. Otherwise your study is one-sided.

Why are you studying only Hindus? It’s better to look at the whole of humanity as one. Race is only an invention. You can’t learn anything if you look only at one group.

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2 Conversation with M.C., 5 July 2007.
3 Conversation with V.V., 5 October 2006.
One of the most personally-challenging aspects of my research was identifying and justifying the parameters of my study to myself and others in and around Lusaka. The extracts above are typical of comments made by other researchers, participants, volunteers, donor agency workers, business people, friends, and so on. They question not so much the utility of my study, but its validity. Their concerns stemmed from the idea that I could not understand Hindus in Zambia by studying them in isolation. This problem, of how to understand Hindu community life in Lusaka without also incorporating non-Hindu participants, discourses and spaces into my research agenda, is strongly represented in literature on ethnicity. Eriksen, upon whose definitions of ethnicity much of my theorizing is based, insisted that trying to study an ethnic group in isolation was tantamount to describing ‘one hand clapping’ (1993: 1, 9). Becker, too, asserted that ethnic groups cannot be studied alone: instead, their identity should be ‘traced to the network of relations with other groups’ from which they emerged (1998: 2). (See also Powdermaker, 1962.) Clarke, in Situational Analysis, claimed:

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\text{methodologically [...] if one seeks to understand a particular social world, one must understand all the arenas in which that world participates and the other worlds in those arenas and the related discourses, as these are all mutually influential/constitutive of that world. This is the basic project of social worlds/arena mapping (2005: 48. Emphasis in original.)}
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In fact, the more I read while on fieldwork and the more data I collected, the more I doubted my study’s validity on these grounds. How could I instill confidence in those participating in my research?

Throughout fieldwork, I explained to participants that my project (which was initially on the broad subject of Indians in Zambia, rather than on the more specific topic of Hindu community life in Lusaka) was necessarily constricted by time and
resources. In other words, in considering the validity of my study, I also had to ensure its viability. Notably, the underlying epistemology of the Chicago and Rhodes Livingstone/Manchester schools diverge on this topic in a fundamental way. Unlike Clarke (quoted above), Rogers and Vertovec – influenced by Manchester’s situational analysis – recognised that:

no single researcher could account in depth for the entire range of phenomena encompassing the issue under study. Hence, much thought went into methodological questions involving the isolation or ‘circumscription’ of research topics and units of analysis, modes of interconnection between ‘domains’ of human activity, and orders or levels of theoretical abstraction’ (1995: 5–11).

In other words, it was not viable for me to analyse the entire set of arenas and other worlds and domains that related back to the social world of Hindu community life in Lusaka. Indeed, this had never been my research goal. On many levels, my research is lesser for not involving non-Hindu perspectives or interethnic relations to a greater degree: the gaps are most apparent in Chapter 7 when discussing Hindus’ position in contemporary Zambian society. However, as W.I Thomas and D.S. Thomas wrote, although a researcher of collective identity is ‘unable to define’ the ‘total situation satisfactorily’, he or she can nevertheless draw on some of the ‘consequences’ of relationships with groups outside the direct focus of study (1970: 155).

In addition, the ‘social world’ I was mapping was not limited to human subjects and actions. I took care not to define my study as looking at a ‘type of people’ so much as at kinds and sites of behaviour and identity. In his guide to fieldwork, Becker uses the example of casting the drug user as a type of person rather than drug use as a type of activity (1998: 45–6). Another example might derive from Imtiaz Dharker’s poetry collection, Leaving Fingerprints, in which a palm
reader cries in despair, ‘I can no more read this hand/than I can read running water’. This, according to a reviewer for *The Guardian*, is Dharker’s ‘recognition that it’s what the hand does, not what it says, that matters.’ Researching ‘Hindu community life in Lusaka’ perhaps matters more/is more valid than researching ‘Lusaka Hindus’. In my analysis I try not to treat the community as a homogenous unit. In using a range of data-collection techniques, ample research questions arose that did not demand the direct incorporation of other ethnically-defined groups. As well as Hindus themselves, Hindu associations, structures and ‘boundary objects’ – human, physical or material markers used to signal difference and the ‘junctures where varied social worlds meet’ (Clarke, 2005: 50) – transpired as units of study. Situational analysis accommodates these multiple units and relates them to wider discourse. It also incorporates theories on *intra*-world conflicts and negotiations, which are central themes in my study of identity and interaction, drawn out in Chapters 5 and 6 (Clarke, 2005: 48–9). Although I concede that an ideal study of ethnicity would integrate multiple group perspectives and interactions, it was neither viable in this case nor entirely necessary for an understanding of Hindu community life in Lusaka.

**Challenge 2. Acceptance and Access: Being a Research Stranger**

To the writers, who have set to work on Mauritius, the island is a ‘lost Paradise’. [...] It is an island which the visitor leaves with a ‘feeling of peace’. To the Mauritian who cannot leave it is a prison: sugarcane and sugarcane, ending in the sea, and the diseased coconut trees, blighted by the rhinoceros beetle (Naipaul, 2002: 108).

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In this extract, from an essay in *The Writer and the World*, V.S. Naipaul describes the fleeting role of those writers who aim to document only what they see and experience themselves, to remain detached, to exploit, and then to go. The role of the research stranger is markedly different, relying on acceptance and access into a group for a significant period of time. Gaining and maintaining this can be difficult, however, precisely because those within the group know that, like Naipaul’s writers eventually, research strangers will take what they need from a situation and leave. My position as research stranger, and its particularly conspicuous nature, worked for and against me at different moments in fieldwork. I was a Northern-based academic with a return ticket to the First World. Frequently I was the only white and commonly the only non-Indian person in Hindu spaces or at Hindu-organised events. I was often the only woman among Hindu men, the only university-educated person in a room, the only non-Indian language speaker, or the only non-believer at religious gatherings. How did I gain and maintain access to research participants and sites? How did I avoid the exploitation that Naipaul describes? Here, I consider the role of gatekeepers and snowballing, and the importance of self-image in gaining access to research participants and sites. I also consider issues of ‘reactivity’ and responsibility once access has been gained.

At different moments in research I sought and received different levels of attention. At one Holi festival luncheon, for example, I wanted only to observe. My field notes recall:

> I was welcomed gladly by the Ladies, who scored scarlet powder into my cheeks and forehead upon arrival. The event was good for the attention they *didn’t* pay me [...] The Ladies behaved as if I were just one of them, or rather as if I wasn’t there.^[6]

In this case, I felt adequately accepted in my role as spectator: the women made me feel included by marking me with brightly coloured dye while at the same time overlooking my presence. At other times I wanted and/or was expected to be involved – dinner parties, movie-going, coffee meetings, conversations during the intervals of cultural shows, and so on. Most awkwardly, I was expected to attend a number of religious devotions that did not feed directly into my research. However, in order to gain and maintain acceptance and access in the long run, my participation at such events – and others’ awareness of my participation – was often more important than data-gathering. A highlight of one fundraising event was a woman exclaiming, ‘Ah! There you are! We see you so often that we’ve renamed you Joan Patel!’ Acceptance does not, however, equate to unguarded access: the woman who had ‘renamed’ me, with whom I had good rapport and who secured my invitations to several events, never invited me into her home, or agreed to be interviewed herself, and reportedly voted against my observation of the Lusaka Hindu Association’s women’s wing committee meetings.

The pressing question was how I might prevent my research stranger position from affecting access to places and people (De Laine, 2000: 45) and diluting the ‘richness and accuracy of data being collected’ (Young, 2004: 187). Access issues were often resolved with the help of willing ‘gatekeepers’. My gatekeepers, for the most part indispensable players in my research, included senior members of the Hindu Association of Zambia and other associations, students, influential family members, and friendly, well-connected shop owners. Although I tried not to rely on them for contacts, and thereby rescind control to a third party, my gatekeepers...
rarely tried to prevent me, to my knowledge, from accessing people or places. In fact, there was some competition within the Hindu Association of Zambia over who might find me the widest range of people to interview. ‘Snowballing’ also proved useful for widening my contacts and cross-checking data. However, I did not deliberately ‘practice’ this method. MacGaffey describes what snowballing entails:

The researcher first establishes his neutrality, then keeps in regular contact in informal settings and builds up bonds of trust and friendship to make it possible to move from one contact to another. (2000:24)

I find this quite exploitative as a deliberate method, suspecting that the ‘friendship’ in snowballing is often superficial, forming a means to a tape-recorded end. Professing friendship in the developing world is more political than many researchers care (dare?) to admit. I was always aware of the tensions between ‘stranger and friend’ which Powdermaker described. In fact, whenever informants or potential informants became genuine friends, they also became unlikely research informants since the involvement-detachment balance was skewed. The position of research stranger is difficult to achieve, having to ‘both look in at the setting as a “stranger” but also be immersed within the social reality of group members’ (De Laine, 2000: 63).

This aim is directly at odds with Pierre Bourdieu’s famous prescription that outsiders should find an ‘inside interviewer’ to operate on a researcher’s behalf, reducing intrusion and maximising compliance (1993:611–2). I erred in self-presentation more towards Frankenberg’s open outsider than Bourdieu’s hidden investigator. Participant observation, after all, is about ‘being present and getting involved in the flow of life’ of subjects (Hansen, 1997: 172). Having said that, some of my most interesting data stemmed from photographs taken by participants
themselves (I return to this in the section on youth below). I tried to foreground the ‘mutual constructions’ that located me and my subjects differently (Hansen, 1997: 173), and to work out how to reduce their impact and improve rapport on an individual basis (Merton, 1972: 22, Young, 2004: 191). I found levels of common ground most of the time. The fact that I was born and grew up in Zambia was an immediate source of trust to many participants, whose behaviour sometimes noticeably changed when this was revealed: in one case, a previously circumspect participant publicly embraced me when he learned of our common place of schooling. In deference to the tone of an occasion, I sometimes wore Indian-style clothes or jewellery, but I felt this emphasised cultural differences and my distance from Hindu women. At the end of my fieldwork, several women warmed towards me as an expectant mother, as though this transported me from the male domain in which I had previously been positioned (I discuss this further below).

Nevertheless, I could not access or was not invited to attend several key events, including a cremation, a society wedding, and an important committee meeting. Being a research stranger doubtless contributed to my exclusion from these events, and also from certain other sites and subjects along the way.

As well as finding individual levels with which to relate to people, I also wanted to project a public self-image in order that nobody could doubt my motivations or feel unfairly treated by me. There was also an obvious chain of command within the community, and gaining research ‘permission’ from the top was a fundamental display of respect. In many ways, my self-imaging and affiliation with Hindu community leaders associated me with the hierarchy of power and formalised my stranger position (Epstein, 1992: 10). Although I tried to
transmit evenly, through public networks and grapevines, who I was and what I was doing, there were many people who did not know. I was mistaken for a
journalist several times, and younger participants wanted to know if they would be in my ‘book’ (this is apparently a common assumption of child participants - see Fine and Glassner, 1979: 165). In ‘A Tent with a View’ (1996), Schumaker highlights the importance of subjects’ perceptions of researchers in shaping their acceptance and ‘reactivity’ – the degree to which behaviour changes in a researcher’s presence. Strauss, for example, described a study in which ‘lower class’ participants associated the interviewer ‘in a blurred way’ as representative of a higher authority and made requests accordingly (Strauss, [1969] 1979: 157). One of my interviewees asked that I anonymously pass on her concerns to the ‘executives’, saying that ‘having the chance to be heard’ was ‘refreshing’.8

Because of my sometimes ambiguous role, community members had a range of motivations for talking to me. The degree to which I was perceived as a stranger impacted strongly on their reactivity generally. For example, although ‘no position of genderless neutrality can be achieved’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 84), I was definitely positioned by many within a more male domain. Men treated me differently to the way they treated Hindu women, at least in the sense that they were more likely to meet me in a bar, invite me to join a table of men at a social club, or talk about Hindu women’s behaviour in a way that differentiated it from mine. Immediate surroundings and atmosphere contributed to reactivity. As is often the case, informal discussions produced more ‘revealing’ comments than

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formal and recorded interviews (see, for example, Tripp, 1997: 204). I was aware of some interviewees using one-to-one conversations to apply their own biases. In some group cases, I was excluded easily by individuals breaking into Indian language – language operated as a medium of power relations as well as a method of communication (Bourdieu, 2002:141). Indeed, where researchers are not ‘of’ the community, and particularly where their remit is not fully understood, members can often try to ‘co-opt them to a particular viewpoint’, prevent them from knowing certain things, or resent particular portrayals of the community (Williams, 2003: 160). Returning to Naipaul’s essay as an example, he summarised Mauritius as, ‘a conservative, wife-beating society [where] the government doesn’t want to offend anybody’ (2002: 111). All research informants to some degree fear that their words will be used to support such sweeping misrepresentations.

Bourdieu stressed how researchers, too, ‘feel anxious about making private words public,’ by using data generated through, ‘a relationship based on a trust that can only be established between two individuals’ (Bourdieu, et al., 1999: 1). Dotson and Dotson knew that Indian friends would feel the community’s trust at large had been ‘abused’ to some degree. After access has been granted, then, awareness of the terms of acceptance is central. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the researcher to limit reactivity and show sensitivity to individual’s concerns.

**Challenge 3. Sensitive Subjects**

Indians do not lack pride in their cultural and social heritage; they do not apologize either to themselves or to others for their existence. Still, they know by long experience that Europeans are apt to be extremely critical […]. These negative criticisms extend also in Central Africa to the Indians’ present mode of life and ways of doing business. They tend therefore to be sensitive to a surprisingly long list of subjects (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 15).
I encountered a long list of sensitive issues during my fieldwork, some of which have persisted since Dotson and Dotson’s research, and others which have arisen in recent years. Sensitive subjects were diverse, and could be either public or highly private in nature – examples include aspects of local politics, global right-wing Hindu politics, gender, educational achievements, HIV/AIDS in the community, caste hierarchies, corruption, personal business success, inter-race relationships and infidelity, and domestic violence. Gathering data on any of these subjects with informants was a challenge, particularly where divisive within the community in any significant way. My main concern was how I might broach sensitive subjects without alienating myself or jeopardising the trust which I was building.

About midway through my research, having observed social dynamics and conducted a number of interviews, it became clear that caste could not be set aside in my study of life in Lusaka. Caste is an issue that E. Zerubavel terms an ‘elephant in the room’ – a cumbersome community issue that was neither acknowledged nor discussed. In his book of that title, Zerubavel explains how ‘open secrets’ come about when ‘a group of people tacitly agree to outwardly ignore something of which they are all personally aware’ (2006: 2). Adele Clarke similarly asks researchers to articulate:

what we see as sites of silence in our data. What seems present but unarticulated? What thousand-pound gorillas do we think are sitting around in our situations of concern that nobody has bothered to mention yet? (2005: 85. Emphasis in original).

Caste in a sense was the easiest of the ‘elephants’ or sites of silence to identify; I also felt it was the most relevant to my research into ethnic identity. Dotson and Dotson found that careful conversational techniques were required in discussing it, admitting, ‘direct, census-type approach to the question of representation and
distribution would have been worse than futile’ and that ‘even an indirect approach had its pitfalls’ (1968: 159). In contrast, I found that direct, naive questioning on caste (unlike on, for example, racial intermarriage) bore the most open and detailed responses, which then provoked interesting discussions. In one case a woman who was interpreting for her father-in-law chose not to translate my questions on caste to him, instead explaining in English that it had proved problematic in her marriage. I revisit this case again in Chapter 5. Email correspondence also proved rewarding on this matter (this may be attributed to its particular distancing effect).

In any case, the challenge came when I realised that it was not caste, or any other surrounding social and political issue, to which respondents reacted most sensitively: it was to the idea that their identity itself was (once again) under scrutiny. In lamenting to a group of friends that certain participants were unwilling to answer ‘innocuous’ questions about their community’s development, one responded:

Not innocuous at all, it turns out. You’re asking them to reaffirm their racist position in society, say why they wear a Hindu uniform, speak a foreign language, and join an exclusive club. You’re thinking too liberally.\(^9\)

Malinowski claimed that ‘context’ is ‘indispensable’ for understanding words (1970: 159).\(^{10}\) This context – what I call situation – also explains silence. In November 2006 there was a Zambian national election; before and during any political change or any economic shift, Zambia’s Indian minorities tend to lower their profile.

\(^{10}\) Malinowski’s essay was entitled ‘The Context of Situation’. In situational analysis, the ‘situation’ of study is the context (see Clarke, 2005: 71). Malinowski’s use of ‘situation’ is closer in meaning to ‘circumstance’ or ‘event’.
While the hierarchies have altered since Dotson and Dotson’s study, Hindus in Zambia remain in an uncertain position and the recipients of much criticism – ‘scapegoats’, as Nyamnjoh depicted (2006). Government opposition during the 2006 election targeted ‘foreigners’, and the draft of the government’s own responding ‘Civic Empowerment Act’, had endorsed the concept of ‘indigenous’ Zambians (see Chapter 7). Some informants used participation in my research as an outlet for their concerns, just as Dotson and Dotson in the late 1950s had found interviewees ready to express discontent with European discrimination; others used my research to promote positive accounts of racial interaction. Dotson and Dotson suspected that some Indians would feel that the ‘truth’ had been distorted in their book, or that ‘it should have been left unsaid, considering the circumstances of the Indian’s position in Central African society’ (1968: 17). I faced a similar dilemma in feeling responsible for letting data dictate while also feeling a duty to protect not only my research subjects (who remain anonymous unless otherwise requested), but the Hindu community at large. This is the tension, the ‘dilemma of distance’, that characterises the role of the research stranger (De Laine, 2000: 63). In Reflexive Methodology, Alvesson and Sköldberg insist that all ‘constructed truths’ emerge through ‘powerful “lies” of exclusion and rhetoric,’ and that even the most well-respected ethnographic works are ‘economies of truth’ (2003: 135). Addressing this dilemma occurred for me during the personal and subjective process of selecting which data to use in writing up, and which to set aside.

Challenge 4. Research Involving Women and Young People

They don’t open up, they don’t open up. Traditionally an African woman is not supposed to just open up, discussing her problems with anybody. It’s the same with an
Indian woman. When they open up they have to have so much trust. Even the young ones, the modern girls, they learn to be discrete about certain topics. Home violence, caste, community problems. Gossip is everywhere, but not if you are an outsider, like a white person. They won’t open up about certain things.  

By far my greatest frustration in fieldwork was trying to access the female domain, and overlapping private domains, and to record women’s voices in the Hindu community. Despite problems in talking to women or visiting women at home, I found that many supported their children’s participation in a disposable camera project, which inadvertently revealed much about the private world of Hindu households. Here, I describe some of the challenges in accessing women’s perspectives. I also raise some ethical questions concerning my research approach and tools (photographs, drawings, writing) when working with young people and interpreting their data. Issues of access, consent, reactivity and positions of power of participants, central to debates on tyranny and knowledge ownership, surface here. Kothari argues that these issues should remain central and are not abrogated by the use of innovative techniques (Cooke and Kothari, 2002). How, then, did I tackle them?

Initially, women I met were positive about my research involvement in their associations, workplaces, and even their homes. Women’s roles in migration and identity formation are pivotal and yet overlooked, as I stressed in the previous chapter (Clifford, 1997, Chatterjee, 2001). I analyse gender issues separately in Chapter 5; here, I introduce some problems I had collecting the data upon which that analysis draws. The Lusaka Indian Ladies’ Association (LILA) was one of my first points of entry into Lusaka’s Hindu community, although the group is not exclusively for Hindu women (see Chapter 3). In early March 2007 they welcomed

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11 Interview with D., February 2008.
me into an exclusive lunch meeting and we informally discussed research goals and ideas. They agreed to fill out questionnaires for me following some initial interviews, after which individuals could discuss responses in detail on a voluntary basis. Fifty-one questionnaires were distributed, but after six months only seven had been returned. Two of these had been completed by men. Likely reasons had been anticipated and articulated to me in intervening meetings: some women did not feel comfortable answering several of my questions, others were not confident or proficient in written English, some husbands or sons did not allow women to complete them, many families were ‘too conservative’, or opted not to contribute to the research for undisclosed personal reasons. At first I assumed that the research method itself was the problem: but questionnaires were only one part of my research plan. Despite good rapport and women’s ongoing promises of participation, data collection continued to be very difficult. Focus groups fell apart and of over twenty planned interviews, only seven materialised, for the same reasons listed above, and also because of my own language limitations and some women’s poor spoken English. Language itself was not the primary challenge: in fact, the majority of my translators were women, and the ‘translations’ were (at times embarrassingly) from English to English—a translation of accent rather than language. Other methods also proved unsuccessful: for instance, one-to-one or paired Indian cookery classes were suggested by women themselves. This would give female informants a greater sense of interview control and allow me to learn about Hindu identity through migrating recipes. However, arrangements fell apart

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12 These opinions were expressed by many people. They are also recorded in the following interviews and formal conversations: N.M, 5 November 2006 and 20 April 2007; R.O.W., 5 May 2007; S.P., 5 June 2007; K.P.R., 21 May 2007; H.D., 30 November 2006 and 9 July 2007; S.N. 12 July 2007.
when husbands were consulted: the closest I came to my goal was making sweet mango stew with somebody’s black Zambian house girl. As mentioned above, attitudes towards me shifted slightly when I was pregnant, towards the end of my stay in Lusaka; I became more approachable to some women. Clearly, gender issues are significant within the community, and patriarchal structures limited my access to female and private domains.

Interestingly, though, many women and their husbands were enthusiastic about their teenage children participating in my research by using disposable cameras to take pictures of daily life, which would provide a window into (amongst other sites) the protected family home. Rather than being used ‘to illustrate a finding’ that I already deemed ‘significant’, these photographs were intended as an exciting research technique to generate raw data and guide my theory (Spindler and Spindler, 1967: x). Child-led photography has been used in several sociological and geographical studies (for example, Clark-Ibanez, 2007, Langevang, 2007). Fifteen women chose to take one camera each to pass on to consenting teenagers in the family. The project was entitled ‘Picturing Hindu Life in Lusaka’, and would provide participants with an easy and hopefully enjoyable way of depicting sites, scenes, ideas and people that were important to them (Barker and Weller, 2003). I provided a simple form for participants to describe what their pictures were of and why they had taken them. One woman was a secondary school headmistress and took five cameras to distribute to Hindu adolescent volunteers in her school. Of the fifteen cameras, seven were returned, reflecting the success of allowing young people to choose themselves whether or not they took part. The participants who completed the project were from various backgrounds. Aged between 13 and 16,
they included three first wave girls from Gujarati-speaking households and two boys and a girl from second wave, Southern Indian households. One mother, a second wave immigrant aged 30, submitted a spool that she had taken herself: her images were exclusively of the Hindu mandir (temple), which I reference in the discussion of gender in Chapter 5.

Young people’s images varied in content. For analytic purposes, I sorted their photos thematically: 23 images related to Hindu religion or culture, 24 to social life, 14 to school and extracurricular activities, 15 to shopping sites, and 3 miscellaneous – ‘Monkey on wall’, ‘A house in town’, and ‘A picture of a leopard’. Overall, twenty-five images were taken inside participants’ homes. This data provided fascinating glimpses of these unique spaces – what Hansen described as ‘crossover spaces between biography and history’ (1997: 171). This tool proved a good way to ‘access’ private houses, the ‘hard to reach’ places in my research (Kesby, 2007: 199). Youth’s use of cameras did not, though, avoid issues of ‘reactivity’: although I was not there, the camera remained present (see Becker, 1974: 18–19). Nevertheless, few pictures were posed, and photographs of home spaces were more revealing than any other data-gathering method. Families and adults appeared unguarded and engaged in a wide range of activities. Further, disposable cameras are not particularly ‘cool’: next to sophisticated cell phones and digital devices, they look to teenagers positively prehistoric. One young woman told me that she would ‘feel silly’ using it in public, which possibly explains the large number of photos taken at home.† Cameras also attract attention (Clark-Ibanez, 2007), putting young people at potential risk in a city like Lusaka.

† Conversation with M.A., 6 June 2007.
Correspondingly, public spaces represented are in relatively safe areas of the city. The few photographs of Lusaka’s streets are images taken from inside private cars; I use them in discussing community members’ perceptions of insecurity (Chapters 4 and 7).

Of course, no participant, especially minors, should be knowingly placed in danger. Research with young participants is attended by particular ethical concerns (Fine and Glassner, 1979, Barker and Weller, 2003, Kesby, 2007). At the same time, rather than separating out young people in my study, I aimed to treat them on equal footing with adults, recognising that all participants in my study, not just minors (as is often assumed), were, as Kesby emphasises, both social ‘becomings’ as well as independent ‘competent agents’ (Kesby, 2006, 2007: 194, 201). In their paper on the topic of research with young people (a standard if dated text on the subject), Gary Alan Fine and Barry Glassner presented four ‘ideal types’ of researcher role: friend, observer, supervisor and leader. At most Hindu social, cultural or religious events I took on the comparatively distanced role of ‘observer’ or participant observer. As a conspicuous member of the crowd, often recording behaviour in my notebook or field diary, and occasionally taking photographs, I was often approached by children or young people asking who I was and what I was doing. Although it was not my initial intention to work with Hindu youth in Lusaka, as my research progressed it became clear that generational divides and youth perspectives were significant in the community and for my theorising on ethnicity, migration and diaspora. As well as using observational techniques, I spoke to children and adolescents among their families, where my role was more participatory and probably less intimidating. Most of my data on youth groups,
however, comes from interviewing adult organisers. In all other circumstances, and applying ‘situation ethics’, I left the friend, supervisor and leader roles presented by Fine and Glassner to adults in the Hindu community. In addition to observation, open and passing conversations, adult-accompanied participant observation, and the disposable camera project (in which I had no direct contact with participants), I also took part more proactively in a weekend drawing and writing competition. This was organised through the Lusaka Hindu Association’s youth wing, Yuvas United.

Adult organisers of Yuvas United wanted to hold a fun event for their members. I suggested a drawing and writing competition entitled, ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, which could feed into my research. Yuvas United members took over planning: my role was as a panel judge, and I also designed ‘certificates’ for all participants as an incentive. Material and prizes were provided by Hindu-run company sponsors. At the event, in an attempt to secure informed consent, I said a few words of introduction, explaining why this topic had been chosen, why I was interested in young people’s ideas, and reminding them that their drawings may feed into my research (Fine and Glassner, 1979: 159). This was reiterated by Yuvas United organisers. There were 27 participants for the drawing competition and 17 for the writing competition (with 10 taking part in both). Youth were divided into three age categories, ranging from 6 to 18 in the drawing competition and 10 to 18 in the writing competition. I was pleased with the turn-out, although Yuvas United organisers were not: they had hoped to attract children of first wave families (the ‘residents’). Instead, 30 of the 34 participants were from second wave (‘expatriate’) families, and one was a recent third wave migrant. Although this skewed the data
significantly towards families whose ties to India are materially and emotionally stronger, the spaces of the city and the concerns depicted were reflected in other, more representative data forms, too, such as interviews with adults and participant observation. I return to the issue of representation in the final challenge, below.

My main ethical concern with youth data, however, was no so much with how widely I might extrapolate meanings, but how to interpret meanings in the first place. For example, did a drawing of intertwining Indian and Zambian national flags (Drawing 19) symbolise cooperation between the two nation-states or good relations between black and Indian people living in Zambia? How important is the use of national colours in the drawings? Does it mean anything that India was most often symbolised as a flag whereas Zambia was represented by a map? Was ‘Hindu’ conflated with ‘Indian’ in participants’ interpretations of the competition title? How did the medium itself steer topics being represented? For instance, did public spaces dominate drawings because they were more important to participants than private domains, or because (as I suspect) they are easier to draw? Depth of analysis required participants’ further explanations (see Punch, 2002: 336–7). As with the disposable camera project, I wanted some written or spoken explanation from participants in the drawing event to flesh out images. I explained that although the title was ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, participants could make up their own titles for drawings. This proved useful. Completed drawings were tacked to the walls in Hindu Hall and the panel was invited to judge them while participants took a break. The panel discussion itself was insightful, and is incorporated into analysis in Chapter 4. After the prize giving, participants who wished to could talk to me about their pictures: 8 children volunteered.
For ease of interpretation I organised the images thematically, although there is cross-over in my analysis. Of the 27 drawings (catalogued in Appendix B) eight depict multiple events or sites in the city, seven focus on single religious events or sites, three focus on single non-religious sites, four illustrate interethnic unity, three depict insecurity and crime, one highlights Indian migrant identity, and one shows a house and car. This last image (Figure 3) feeds minimally into my analysis, but is important here because it highlights a problem in research generally, often acute with young people. That is, whose voice or ideas are being expressed anyway? Figure 3 shows a drawing produced by a six-year-old participant, titled, ‘my mum told [me] to draw a car and house’.

Figure 3. Detail from Drawing 27, ‘my Mum told to draw a car and house’
Clearly, this data should be treated as a composite rather than individual account of Indian life in Zambia. Further, if it is the case that there is exists a separate ‘culture of childhood’ (Stone and Church, 1968) – something which Manneheim and Strauss supported in their notions of age generations detailed in Chapter 1 – then adult researchers are strangers on yet another level. Interpreting meanings behind young people’s photographs, pictures, and spoken and written words, requires special caution; but the perspective they present, however it is shaped and whomever it is shaped by, remains a valid contribution. I try not to limit prematurely such contributions in my study – on this I agree with Kesby, who promotes offering ‘a broader critique of society based on the insights that studies of/with “children” gives us’ (2007: 194).

**Challenge 5. Sampling: Representing Hindu Community Life in Lusaka**

Sampling is a kind of synecdoche, in which we want the part of a population or organisation or system we have studied to be taken to represent, meaningfully, the whole from which it was drawn (Becker, 1998: 67).

Issues of representative sampling arose perennially during my fieldwork and analysis. My position as research stranger prevented me accessing certain sites around the city. Gatekeepers and snowballing reduced problems of representation, but did not eliminate them: most of my research venues remained public and my informants tended to occupy the top end of various hierarchies. For the most part, although aiming to represent a heterogeneity of cultural associations, issues of acceptance (with women, for example) limited me to events run by the Hindu Association of Zambia and other publicly accessible clubs, rather than to smaller, often home-based associations based on language, region or caste. The diminutive
sample of women responding to my questionnaires (5 of 50) and participating in scheduled interviews (7 of >20) narrowed my use of their data. Youth photographs, drawings and writing represented small and specific sets of Hindus – for the most part, those members of the community already engaged, for a variety of reasons, in Hindu-related clubs and activities. How could I overcome these problems in order that my study represented, meaningfully and comprehensively, Hindu community life in Lusaka?

The issue of representation was accentuated by the fact that no-one could tell me how many Hindus there were in Lusaka (or Zambia) during my research. The Central Statistics Office had no up-to-date statistics on Hindus, because their reports were based on the 2000 census, since when the Hindu population had reportedly dwindled significantly. Nevertheless, they reported 5,442 Hindus in Zambia (0.1% of the total population), with almost equal numbers of men and women. Members of the Hindu Association of Zambia insisted there were as few as 1,300 Hindus in Lusaka, and another 1,000–1,500 across the country. The Indian High Commission estimated around five times that number, and individuals claimed their community was anything from 1,000 to 12,000 strong. I have chosen to use the Hindu Association figures on Lusaka because it is the body which most closely monitors and represents Hindus in the city; their figures fit realistically with official statistics. Reports from the next Census of Population and Housing (2010) will perhaps clarify this issue. In the meantime, how ‘representative’ my

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14 ‘Population by Sex and Religion’, Census of Population and Housing 2000, Central Statistics Office (this table is unpublished and was provided by special request).
research is of Lusaka’s Hindu community in statistical terms remains difficult to determine. One question I had to ask was, who counts as a Hindu?

My first archival port-of-call when I reached Lusaka was the Registrar of Societies, a department of the Zambian Ministry of Home Affairs with which every ‘non-government society with regular meetings’, from political pressure groups to churches and book clubs, is legally required to register, for a fee. Registration involves completing a detailed form about the association, its constitution, committee, membership numbers and restrictions, international links, and property; registered groups must submit an Annual Returns form detailing any changes. Information in the Registrar is public. I requested files on Hindu associations, and was given over 200 humidity-softened cardboard binders, the majority of which – contrary to a claim made by Felix Phiri (2007) – did not contain Hindu associations’ records. There was a general confusion in classification. I was given the files from the ‘Indian’ stacks, most of which I found were Muslim (both Indian and non-Indian), some of which pertained to non-specific spiritual groups, one of which was a Japanese yoga club, and one of which was the Theosophical Society. Many of the Hindu associations’ records were contained in files labelled ‘Muslim’. I received only twelve files relating to Hindus in Zambia, four of which related to Lusaka, and none of which provided up-to-date information. My first set of evidence poorly represented the city’s Hindu population and the Hindu community’s cultural verve. Confusion was not limited to Zambian official records:

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15 Interview with Jones J. Mwelwa, Registrar of Societies. The annual fee at the time of my research was ZMK 250,000 (equivalent of £35).
16 The inclusion of the Theosophical Society might be explained by the fact that, although the group itself is mixed, its organiser is a Hindu Indian based in Kitwe. Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.
the Hindu Association of Zambia, and its town member, the Lusaka Hindu
Association, constitutionally claim to represent Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and
Jains. However, these groups also had their own representative societies, and
interviews with their members revealed a tension between religious and cultural
affiliations. The gentleman in charge of the Buddhist Centre, for example, had
converted to Buddhism but still took part in many Hindu association cultural
celebrations. Other, typically younger, Hindus emphasised the cultural or ethnic
nature of their Hindu identity; some had never visited the temple and did not
worship. In short, Hindus in Lusaka had tacit knowledge of who was an insider and
outsider in the practice of their ethnicity (recall Hughes’ definition of ethnicity in
Chapter 1, 1984: 153–4). I chose to include as Hindu anyone who perceived
themselves as such.

In order to represent all corners of the community, though, sampling
remained challenging. Early in fieldwork, having spoken to a fairly wide range of
Hindus and attended several events – such as song and dance performances, a
fundraising fashion show, and Diwali (the festival of lights) – I realised that
participant observation and observation may temper sampling problems. Indeed,
some of the larger events I attended pulled in between 400 and 1,000 Hindus from
across Zambia (the Hindu Association of Zambia Sports Day, the Bhajan Samellan
singing event, and Chalo Chowpati festival are three examples). More significantly,
however, I learned quickly that participant observation was the most effective way
of accessing the widest range of people and places. My aim, after all, was not to

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18 Interview with B. P., 18 November 2005.
produce a survey of the community, but to represent its diversity – what A.F.C. Wallace described as ‘the actual diversity of habits, of motives, of personalities, of customs that do, in fact, coexist within the boundaries of any culturally-organised society’ (1970: 23). This method allowed me to connect through my personally-constructed research network to those at each extreme of the power hierarchy, including groups and individuals side-lined by those purporting to represent the Hindu community at large. Non-Gujarati clubs, lower-caste families, recent immigrants, acculturated Zambian citizens, illiterate women, Indian musicians: sectors of the community which may not be statistically strong, collectively represented, or publicly forthright are nevertheless integral to community life in Lusaka.

The concepts of ‘thick analysis’ and ‘rich dialogue’, to which I pointed at the start of this chapter, and which occupy the heart of my situational analysis approach, depend upon deep and varied data. Each new technique I used introduced new issues in sampling. As illustrated in Figure 3 above, some of the youth data was composite rather than individual. In the disposable camera project this may also be the case: circles of friends or family members may have offered ideas about what images would capture ‘Hindu Life in Lusaka’. And other sets of youth would have produced different pictures and offered different meanings (Becker, 1974: 15). In the case of questionnaires to women, the handful of responses nevertheless provided distinct insight, knowledge and female perspective. Questionnaires delivered over the internet to ex-Zambian Hindus dispersed across the UK and USA also provided fascinating glimpses of twice migrant belonging. In response to the paltry records about Hindu associations in the Registrar of
Societies, I endeavoured to collect as many official documents, correspondences, recordings, images, national newspaper clippings and association magazines as possible to fatten my analysis. I also used internet chat rooms and websites (most prominent in Chapter 8). I tried to avoid limiting my observation to human action and texts. As well as young participants’ visual accounts of Hindu life in Lusaka, I recorded in my field diary the objects, sounds, smells, colours, and so on that demarcated Hindu life from other social worlds. (I draw on these types of data most in Chapter 4.) Observations of this nature may be criticised for validity and reliability if used in isolation, but promise rigorous results if used in conjunction with other methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 87–9). The assortment of data types provided the means for supporting data gathered through participant observation – a way of triangulating and substantiating what I saw and experienced myself. It also, I hope, strengthens reader confidence (Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 24).

Inevitably, there will be significant sections of the Hindu community that I have failed to represent adequately through the channels and methods utilised during fieldwork, as well as individuals – as there are in any ethnically-defined community – who represent valuable exceptions to the rule.

**Wrapping Up/Writing Up**

In his chapter, ‘Writing In and Against Time’, Les Back asks us to consider what we are doing ‘as we sit down to write surrounded by piles of tapes and manuscripts’ (Back, 2004: 204). Which side of the story will we stress? What data will we set aside, and why? Situational analysis is inductive: it demands that researchers ground theory in data. But it is also a cumulative process, a theory/methods package in which data collection steers research questions steer data collection,
and so on... Research is, as Becker warned, a messy process. It is a process which spills into analysis and writing up. In these first two chapters, I hope to have tidied together some of the themes and techniques involved in my reading, fieldwork and analysis. All stages of research have been attended by several methodological, analytical and ethical concerns. My position as research stranger was potentially exploitative; above I have drawn out some of the ways in which I hope to have avoided tyranny in collecting and analysing data. These include reflexivity and a balance of involvement and detachment. Particular circumstances required ‘situation ethics’ and a set of techniques to improve access, acceptance/rapport, participant consent and confidence, ease of interpretation, and representative data. My ‘reordering’ of the Hindu community life in Lusaka, with regard to ethnic and diasporic identity formation, is grounded in many types of data. Therefore, I use material unevenly in the following six substantive chapters, in which my depth of analysis is rooted in the breadth of my primary sources.
Chapter 3

Constructing Zambian Hindu Ethnicity

Introduction
Talking to Hindus in Lusaka I often asked them to describe their sense of ‘identity’. If born in Zambia, or having lived in Zambia most of their lives, individuals tended to describe themselves first as Zambian. A common initial reply was, ‘I am Zambian, born and bred.’ They would second describe themselves as Hindu, and perhaps third as coming from a certain Indian region or linguistic group. Some younger community members would simply answer ‘mwenye’, a Zambian (Bemba and Nyanja) term for ‘Indian’. Citizenship was rarely mentioned, and when raised responses were surprisingly wide, including claims to Zambian, British, Indian, Tanzanian, Kenyan, South African, Canadian, American, Sri Lankan, French, Australian, and Mauritian nationality. Feelings of Zambian belonging and of Hindu cultural belonging transcended official nationality badges, with the exception of Zambian citizens wishing to emphasise their claim to Zambia as their home place. When put to them, most individuals agreed that their ethnic identity was ‘Zambian Hindu’. In Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity, Anselm Strauss insists that personal identity can only be understood when paralleled with collective identities, which, in turn, must be set in historical context ([1969] 1979: 173–5). The goal of this chapter, then, is to set a historical background to what I proceed to treat as Zambian Hindu ethnicity. The phenomenon is clearly constructed: Zambian identity itself is officially less than fifty years old. Hindus living in Zambia, like everyone else, constantly reinvent their ethnic identity, which, like all ethnic
invention, ‘incorporates, adapts and amplifies pre-existing communal solidarities, cultural attributes and historical memories’ (Conzen et al., quoted in Zhou, 1997: 982). This chapter shows that these commonalities have been strengthened by both practice (how Hindus act) and structure (the institutions and hierarchies within which they act) (Mitchell, 1987: viii). I argue that this ethnicity emerged through three main processes: the strengthening of a preceding Hindu migrant network, colonial marginalisation – particularly spatial segregation – and the need for community cultural and political self-representation. Discussing this cultural aspect involves exploring some of the symbols, such as Indian movies and sport, around which Zambian Hindu identity came to be structured. The analysis is rooted in data from British and Zambian archives, particularly the India Office Records at the British Library, London, and the Registrar of Societies in Lusaka. It also draws on my own quantitative analysis of a catalogue of Indian profiles gathered in the late 1960s – A Biographical Sketch of Indians in Zambia (Bhatt, 1969) – and on oral narratives, interviews, and correspondence.

The first of four sections considers early signs of ethnic solidarity, telling the story of early Indian immigration to central Africa and describing broad patterns of settlement in Northern Rhodesia. Archival sources and interview accounts of the 1940s support the claim that chain migration and the resulting patron-client system compounded with poor official representation of Indians to produce an Indian migrant network and association that acted as a precursor to Hindu ethnic solidarity. The second section demonstrates the importance of spatial segregation in ethnic formation. Indian numbers increased in the post Second World War period, as did discrimination. A rising population of Indians in Northern Rhodesia,
as well as divisive politics in the Indian sub-Continent, resulted in a Hindu-Muslim division among the Indian minority. Despite continually being treated as a racially-defined unit by colonial authorities, Indians were able to carve out separate spaces for their religiously-defined networks within the Second Class Area allocated to them. As a case study I explain the development of the Lotus Sports Club. In section three the aim is to show how Indians in Zambia were all but neglected by authorities following Indian independence (1947) and in preparation for Central African Federation (1953–1963). I examine the history of the Lusaka Hindu Association in the 1950s, highlighting the importance of cultural as well as political representation. Lastly, the fourth section explains Indians’ position and uneven political and diplomatic representation following Zambian independence (in 1964). Data suggests that a second, distinct wave of Indian immigrants and an era of nationalisation acted as both fragmentary and cohesive forces in the construction of Zambian Hindu ethnicity.

Section 1. Early Signs of Ethnic Solidarity: The Hindu Network

As is well documented, Indians came across the Indian Ocean to colonial Africa in a series of distinctive waves. The first wave brought early sea-faring merchants, who came by dhow and traded along the eastern coastal regions, rarely settling or venturing very far inland (Mangat, 1969). The second wave in the mid-1800s brought the indentured labourers. These Indians, known as ‘coolies’ or ‘girmit’, worked initially on the sugar plantations and later on the railways, and they tended to be of various religions and lower-caste origins from across the sub-Continent (Kondapi, 1951, Tinker, 1974, Clarke et al., 1990). In many cases, indentured labourers would stay on in Africa after the end of their contracts
(typically five years). Members of this class of ‘free’ Indians carved out a space for themselves as laundry wallahs, hotel staff, vegetable hawkers, railway porters, and office clerks. The third wave, from the mid-1800s, brought the ‘Passenger’ class aboard the steamships: these Indians were self-funded, ‘consisting mainly of merchants and a sprinkling of teachers, lawyers, doctors, preachers, etc.’ (Rao, 1955: 44). By the end of the nineteenth century, Indian populations in South Africa and East Africa were operating at several levels of society and competing for various spaces in the economy.

The streets and districts of central Africa, however, unlike those in South Africa and the eastern coast, were not awash with this busy Indian history. Southern Rhodesia’s use of indentured labour was limited to five hundred Indians who were contracted to toil on the Mozambique-Rhodesia railway line (Ghai and Ghai, 1970, Patel, 1973: 2). Further, no class of free Indians emerged from them, since ‘hardly any survived the depredations of heat, animals and insects’, and those who did returned home (Ghai and Ghai, 1971: 6). While it is assumed that the Indians migrating to Northern Rhodesia did so under the indentured labour scheme (Gann, 1958: 179, Prithvish, 1977, Geber, 1996: 11, Phiri, 2000: 4), there is no evidence in the primary material to this effect, although it is probable that there was a small informal movement of workers from South Africa and eastern coastal countries. Indeed, several Indians I met in Lusaka perceived that their families’ African genealogies crossed cane fields and railway lines. It was also not uncommon for informants who had come much later to the country to make claims
such as, ‘The first Indians came as railway workers, then diverted to small trade’. However, as most Indians I spoke with knew, the vast majority of Indians migrating to Northern Rhodesia were Passengers who came to be shopkeepers. They were also relatively homogenous: almost without exception, they were male, came from the Gujarat region of North-west India, and were predominantly Hindu (Dotson and Dotson, 1968). In contrast to experiences elsewhere, central Africa’s Indian population was low and its economic role limited to small trade.

Of the central African territories, Northern Rhodesia received the fewest Indian immigrants: until the mid 1920s fewer than ten new Indian incomers entered per annum (Phiri, 2000: 18). Prior to becoming a British protectorate in 1924, the territory had been ruled by Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC). It was also divided into two: Northwestern Rhodesia was governed from the southerly town of Livingstone, and Northeastern Rhodesia was governed from Fort Jameson (now Chipata). (See Maps of British Central Africa and Zambia.) The division of these territories is significant to the pattern of Indian settlement and to the development of separate Hindu and Muslim migrant networks. Most Indians came to the territory direct from India, and a pattern emerged whereby Hindus mainly entered from the south, through Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia to Livingstone, and Muslims entered from the east, via the ports of Beira and Mombasa, through Nyasaland (now Malawi), to Fort Jameson. Even today, the Indian populations of these two sides of Zambia and their two major towns, Livingstone and Chipata, are dominated by Hindus and Muslims, respectively.

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Furthermore, the two parts of Northern Rhodesia initially developed separate attitudes towards Indian incomers, and separate legislation on immigration.\textsuperscript{3} Northwestern Rhodesia’s policy was modelled on Southern Rhodesia where the white population, ‘like that of South Africa, was usually hostile to Indian Immigration’ (Gann, 1958: 154). Northeastern Rhodesia’s, on the other hand, was modelled on Nyasaland, which had an open-door policy and allowed free movement between the two territories.

The first Indians recorded as settling in the territory are thought to be the Khamisa brothers, Muslims who came from Nyasaland and established themselves as traders in Fort Jameson in 1905. According to Dotson and Dotson, Indian informants in the 1950s told a ‘possibly apocryphal’ tale of the Khamisa brothers being welcomed in by brass band courtesy of white settlers (1968: 50). This story was told to me, fifty years on, by both Hindu and Muslim Indians, but had been embellished further to include the brothers being carried in by palanquin.\textsuperscript{4} Although white settlers and administrators were probably not quite that enthusiastic at the prospect of Indian trade, it was certainly not officially discouraged in the Northeastern side. After the unification of the two parts as Northern Rhodesia in 1911, however, the centralised government, based in Livingstone, reworked immigration and trade licensing legislation and, as I have argued elsewhere (Haig, 2007a), the resulting proclamation, based on racial policies from the South, was aimed at limiting Indian incomers.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{3} L/E/7/1332, file 763/1924, IOR.
\textsuperscript{4} Interviews with H.D., 30 November 2006; interview with G.P and G.H.P., 16 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{5} Immigration Regulation (Northern Rhodesia) Proclamation 1915, L/E/7/1332 File 763/1924, IOR.
From the onset, Indians in central Africa became closely identified with their mercantile role. This contributed to discrimination against them and, I argue, to the inadequate representation they received from governing authorities. It also, however, strengthened a network of interpersonal ties and support amongst them. In both Hindu and Muslim cases, the majority of Indian incomers entered as skilled artisans or, more commonly, trade apprentices. Indeed, the early Indian in Northern Rhodesia is a classic example of Simmel’s stranger, who ‘makes his appearance as a trader’ (Simmel, [1908] 1971: 143). Other scholars under the rubric of stranger theory also pinned economic qualities to the immigrant communities they described (Park, 1928, Bonacich, 1973, Siu, [1952] 1988). Importantly, such communities often established ties amongst themselves by way of securing support in their new environment (Fallers, 1967). In Northern Rhodesia a pattern of employment developed whereby Indians who had established themselves as traders would ‘call’ for shop assistants from among their kin in home villages or towns in Gujarat. After some time learning the ropes of business and saving money, often through their employers’ retention of part of their monthly salary, those called would be in a position to set up their own businesses and call, in turn, their own assistants.

This form of ‘chain migration’ helps explain the geographic division of Hindu and Muslim immigrants into the territory. It also led to a ‘patron-client’ system and the gradual growth of Indian presence. Evidence of the system’s strength is the fact that it took remarkably little time for apprentices to graduate towards business

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*This is supported by my analysis of Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue, in which over 90% of Indian men in Lusaka declared that they had arrived as apprentices, shop assistants, traders, shopkeepers, skilled tailors, or shops owners.*
ownership. This system, combined with Indians’ widespread use of shop credit schemes (known locally as nkongole), and with legislation restricting them to African trade, produced a web of cheaply-staffed, well-stocked, and busy stores (Dotson and Dotson, 1968, Morris, 1968). The system also produced a network of supportive interpersonal ties and loyalties. Although the pattern of chain migration relied on kinship ties to India, which were defined in separate Hindu and Muslim terms, the actual set of connections it produced in Africa was ‘necessarily new’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 199). These ‘weak’ ties nonetheless acted to ‘unite diverse networks and increase resources available to network members’ (Grieco, 1998: 705).

Partly because of the Indians’ initial success, and partly because of racial misunderstandings and fear based on the success of Indian traders elsewhere, white officials and settlers began to implement policies and engage in discriminatory practices (such as public segregation and trading restrictions) (Haig, 2007a). Their official intention, from 1924 when Britain officially took over administration of the territory, was to prevent a ‘great influx of Indians’. In South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, as soon as white ‘settlers were given sufficient home-rule authority to control immigration, Indians were denied further entry’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 32). The influence of these territories is evident in Northern Rhodesia’s imitative policies. For Indians already within the territory, this discrimination strained relations to local governing bodies. Although as British

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7 Analysis of Lusaka business owners in Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue shows that it took an average of six years.
8 Proposal to Adopt a Policy of Excluding Asiatic Immigrants, from India Office to Colonial Office, 04/04/25, L/E/7/1332 File 763/1924, IOR.
subjects, Indian emigrants were ostensibly protected by the colonial Government of India, their actual support and representation once in central Africa was remote at best. In 1927 the Government of India appointed an Agent (later the High Commissioner for India) in South Africa, and a similar post was created in East Africa. Although expressly to protect the welfare of indentured labourers, these channels were occasionally used by Indians in Northern Rhodesia in the absence of any local formal body of representation.\(^9\) In 1938, in response to the proposed establishment of a Standing Central African Council – a precursor to Central African Federation, in which Indians’ rights would be further reduced – two Indians from South Africa travelled to Lusaka to represent Northern Rhodesian Indians, at the request of several individuals, but were denied the opportunity to state their case.\(^10\)

In these circumstances, Indians began to strengthen their own network, already emerging through the process of chain migration, illustrated here. Under British colonial legislation, in order to ‘call’ an apprentice from India, employers were required to make an application and pay a deposit to the regional ‘Protector of Emigrants’ in India. Examining the application form, it is clear that considerable responsibility for prospective emigrants fell on employers’ shoulders. Figure 4 shows extracts from the application form which support this claim: employer applicants were required to declare the terms of salary, board, and provision of

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\(^9\) L/P&J/8/335 Collection 108/40C, IOR.
\(^10\) 30/11/38, Legislative Assembly, Question No. 1649 by Seth Govind Das., L/P&J/8/334 Collection 108/40B, IOR.
To

THE PROTECTOR OF EMIGRANTS,

Sir,

Under section 16 of the Indian Emigration Act 1922, I apply for permission to engage or assist to emigrate, skilled workers for employment under (Here enter name of employer) ……………………..

5. The terms of agreement such as—

(a) Period of employment … … … … …

(b) Rate of pay per mensum … … … … …

(c) Boarding whether free at employer's cost … … …

(d) Lodging do do … … … … …

(e) Clothing do do … … … … …

(f) Other terms, if any, under which the person is now engaged.

7. The accommodation to be provided for the skilled worker and his dependents

(a) until their departure out of India,

and

(b) during their voyage … … … … …

8. The provision as to medical aid, accommodation, etc., to be made by the employer

(a) for the health and well being of the person now, engaged and his dependents during the period of engagement, and

(b) for the repatriation of the person engaged and his dependents on the expiry of the period of engagement.

9. The security which the engager or employer proposes to deposit with the Protector for the due observance of the agreement and for the proper treatment by the engager or employer of the person engaged and his dependents.

10. The cost of passage of each person from the village in India mentioned against item 2 (f) to the place in the country of emigration mentioned against item 4.

Figure 4. Extracts from 'Form of Application' to 'Protector of Immigrants'\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\) 'Asiatic Immigration – Indians', Sec 3-51/Volume 1, National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ).
clothing and any other items during an emigrant’s employment, and they were required to take responsibility for the provision and expense of emigrants’ (and their dependents’) travel, medical aid, accommodation, and repatriation. The result of this considerable investment by employers was a hierarchical structure across the network. One Hindu shop owner told me:

Well, when they started trading [...] they were only getting a very small amount of money [...] And their boss would keep some back for later. And there were no beds, nothing like that. There was a small shop and [at the] end of the day, they would work for somebody and they would sleep on the counters [...]. And slowly they would build up the businesses and all that. And then they had a father of sorts in the community. They might feel indebted, but they wouldn’t have been able to be there and making money and getting to know people and being looked after if it wasn’t for that way of organising things.\(^\text{12}\)

Considerable tensions were caused by this patron-client system within the community (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 198–210). Aside from these tensions, however, the emergence of local elites facilitated the establishment of informal self-representation. In the 1930s, the Northern Rhodesia British Indian Association formed in Livingstone, and gradually cultivated town branches elsewhere in the territory. It proved important in representing political concerns of Indians.\(^\text{13}\)

According to one informant, who had been an active member of the Association,

In all major centres the British Indian Association was there. I joined in after it was set up, but I rose quickly to the top because of my position economically. Because of my business, I could speak for the worries of a great number of people, right the way down to the new people in the community.

When I asked him why he had initially joined, he answered,

Because discrimination legally was not allowed, but in practice it was the same situation as in South Africa – Apartheid. Nobody was there to stand for us. So I joined because of that.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{12}\) Interview with S.P., 5 June, 2007.

\(^{13}\) For example, a letter sent from the British Indian Association, N'Dola to the Government of Northern Rhodesia, June 1932, Sec 3-51, Vols. 14-16. The letter objects to a report from the Legislative Council, March 1932, on the ‘Asiatic problem’, Sec 3-51, Vol. 12-13, NAZ.

\(^{14}\) Interview with O., 7 March 2007.
This signals that from very early on, Indians in Northern Rhodesia perceived loyalties to, and sought support through the patron-client network. Apprentices were ‘looked after’ by those in positions of relative power, who could ‘speak for’ their ‘worries’. Being low in number (by 1931 there were only 176 Indians in the territory), and in the absence of any effective government representation, the broader Indian community acted collectively in these circumstances.

Section 2. Preparing the Grounds for Ethnicity: Spatial Segregation

Through strict immigration policy, the pre-war flow of Indians was kept down to a mere ‘trickle’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 51). After the war, however, this trend changed. Post-war expansion of the Northern Rhodesian economy, based on the excavation of new copper sources, was rapid (Barber, 1959: 330). British veterans ‘flooded in’ to the central African region (McCracken, 1991: 315). Housing areas, premium trading plots and agricultural land were kept aside ‘to protect the interests of the ex-servicemen’, who were offered the right of first refusal to purchase as a reward for their efforts in the war. Indian numbers increased rapidly, too, despite, in contrast, the significant discrimination to which they were, by then, subjected. Indian men were joined by Indian women in this period, and

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15 The country’s net output was estimated to have risen more than ten-fold between 1945 (£14 million) and 1955 (£143 million).
16 Letter to Dept. of Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi, from Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, 21/11/46, file L/P&J/8/335 Collection 108/40C, IOR.
17 Analysis of Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue shows that of 160 Lusaka Indians profiled in that period, 69.8% arrived in the 1940s and 1950s. Note: It is intriguing that the flow of Indians into central Africa did not ease up following India’s independence in 1947; migrants preferred to leave their free state for one still under British rule. According to Crispin Bates (2001: 37) migration overseas was a ‘means of escaping the increasingly inflexible and underemployed Indian labour market […] and being “reborn” into a world free of caste […]’. Relevant theories on stimuli for migration, although not specifically on colonial contexts, are summarised in Massey, et al. (1993).
children began to be born in the territory. Indian families were all but quarantined into ‘Second Class’ housing areas, and shop owners confined to strict retail zones. Kamwala, an Indian-dominated retail area in Lusaka, and Luburma, the Indian residential area beside it, now known locally as ‘Madras’, are the most compact examples of this – these are discussed further in Chapter 4. In 1935 Lusaka became the capital city of Zambia, due to its more central position in the territory.

Hindus and Muslims migrated here from west and east in more or less equal numbers. Limitations on trading licences had pushed fledgling Indian businesses outside the main municipalities and settlements found along the ‘line of rail’ (the route to the Copperbelt towns) and into rural outposts.

Although Indian numbers were kept to a minimum through strict immigration and trading policies, and although the idea that they represented a threat to white settler interests was greatly exaggerated, Indians did succeed economically. Their contribution to the colonial economy was significant, serving to supply a largely African market with basic goods at affordable prices. Their presence increased rapidly during the 1940s, reinvigorating anti-Asian sentiments, which were reframed in terms of threats to African interests. Indian wholesalers reportedly favoured Indian retail stores over African stores, against which they were in direct competition (Phiri, 2000: 26). Indians and whites had also been allowed to trade within ‘native reserves’, areas to which Africans were restricted.

In the late 1930s Indians were refused licences for these areas in order to ‘encourage’ African trade (Seleti, 1992: 161). Another example of spatial

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18 This is supported by analysis of Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue, and by the Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Brelsford, 1959: 7). Interview with N.K.F., 23 April 2007.
segregation is the Closed Towns Policy of 1945, ostensibly introduced to control competition in order to protect local African sellers and consumers from any escalation of prices. In reality, it merely granted British and Jewish traders a monopoly in business by denying Indians the right to trade inside towns.\(^\text{19}\)

In addition to white settler and official anxieties over expanding Indian trade competition, racial prejudice operated to exclude Indians. From the outset Indians were accused of having low ‘standards of habits of life’, rendering them ‘undesirable inhabitants’.\(^\text{20}\) This hygiene claim had been used to justify the separation of Indians and Europeans in restaurants, hotels, cinemas, clubs and swimming pools. One informant told me that Indians were banned from the swimming pool in Livingstone on account of their use of body and hair oils.\(^\text{21}\) Another informant told me that his Jewish neighbour twice emptied his pool after he and other Indian children had swum in it.\(^\text{22}\) Even Indian and Pakistani government representatives, after Indian Independence and Partition in the late 1940s, were ‘routinely denied admission’ to public venues (West, 1994: 99). The government’s ‘attitude’ towards Indian children’s education was described in an article published in *The Hindu* at the time as ‘step-motherly’.\(^\text{23}\) Children of Indians were segregated alongside Coloureds for school, and in order to obtain secondary

\(^{19}\) Letter from Mr. U.B. Merai, 28/03/45, regarding the restriction of trading rights in Northern Rhodesia forwarded by the High Commissioner for India to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Commonwealth Relations, L/P&J/8/335, Collection 108/40C, IOR.

\(^{20}\) Letter from J.C. Brundell (Chief Immigration Officer, Southern Rhodesia) to T. Hamilton (Chief Immigration Officer, Northern Rhodesia), 31/05/24, L/E/7/1332 File 763/1924, IOR.

\(^{21}\) Interview with O., 7 March 2007.

\(^{22}\) Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.

education Indians had to travel to Southern Rhodesia or further yet, to Tanzania, Kenya, India or the UK, until the inauguration of an Indian secondary school (Prince Philip School) in Lusaka in 1959. Through these discriminatory practices and policies, including restrictions on living and trading space, Indians were treated by white settlers and colonial authorities as a single collective group. Moreover, social segregation brought Northern Rhodesia’s Indians together in shared memories and experiences (this is explored further in Chapter 6).

However, during this period an important change was taking place: a gap was widening between Hindus and Muslims, partly related to the politics of India’s independence in 1947 and the Partition of Pakistan the following year (Dotson and Dotson, 1969: 192–3). As suggested above, separate Hindu and Muslim migrant networks had already established because of separate patterns of settlement and separate patron-client arrangements. Network members also shared little in terms of daily cultural and religious lifestyles: one informant described how, following Partition, the two ‘naturally and generally drifted apart’.24 Fischer has argued that once the size of a social group reaches a ‘critical mass’, separate groups are able to form around separate characteristics and identities (Fischer, 1975: 1325). Eventually, at the end of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s, as Indian population growth expanded, the Indian community began to restructure itself as much as was possible within the strictures of a plural colonial system. Separate Muslim and Hindu representational and cultural associations formed, and the Second Class area

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24 Interview with H.D., 7 July 2007. The division was not seen as surprising by most of my informants. However, two elderly interviewees stressed that the division was ‘social’ and not political – interview with G.H.P and G.P, 23 October 2006.
was reorganised around religiously-defined boundaries. One example of this is the
division of the Lusaka Indians Sports Club.

**Urban Space in Structuring Hindu Ethnic Practice: The Lotus Sports Club**
The Lotus Sports Club (‘Lotus’) is one of the largest and most well-used facilities
run by the Hindu community in Lusaka. Lotus was originally known as the Lusaka
Indians Sports Club, and dates back to the early 1950s when it was an all-Indian
establishment. For years before the formalisation of any sports association for
Indians in Lusaka, individuals had organised, where numbers allowed, leisurely
games of cricket and hockey, and also Indian games such as langdi, kho-kho and
kabadi. They played outdoors on patches of cleared land or in their gardens.25 In
the 1950s, when the population of the Indian minority grew and more people
wanted to take part and organise sports activities, ground was allocated to Indians
and a sports club formed. The ground was allocated by the colonial administration,
in the form of a large block of three unwanted scraps of land in the Second Class
area. The block measured roughly nine hundred square yards and was sandwiched
between Kamwala, the second class trading zone, and Luburma, the second class
residential zone. The current President of the club recalled the creation of the
grounds. He described the plot as a ‘dambo sort of thing’ – in fact, the flooded bowl
of a sandstone quarry; sandstone was commonly dynamited from the ground and
used to build houses and bridges. The space was then given to the Indians to turn
into a sports field, which required draining and re-filling the hollowed land; my

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informant recalled ‘helping out, carrying little bits of limestone or the like, piling them up, and helping to plant the grass’. 26

Those involved at that time in the construction of the sports grounds formed the ‘Lusaka Indians Sports Club’. However, relations between Muslims and Hindus were already straining, and manifest itself here in the early division of the sports grounds and club (although Muslim and Hindu individuals would continue to play sport together, and together they formed the Northern Rhodesian Indian Cricket Team). The Club President quoted above told me that the ‘two communities’ had a ‘different way of doing things’, so they approached the government to request separate Muslim and Hindu grounds. Another interviewee explained how the re-organisation of space amounted to dividing the sports ground, building a wall, and renaming the areas. 27 Up until the late 1960s maps of Lusaka show these two fields as the ‘Muslim Sports Club’ and ‘Indian Sports Club’. Their names were eventually changed to ‘Metropolitan’ and ‘Lotus’, respectively.

My informants used the word ‘club’ in two different senses, both as the ties among people and as the physical structure of the clubhouse. Lotus’s clubhouse was built after the ground had been divided and only when there were sufficient numbers of Hindus taking part to justify and enable the process:

Once there was [...] enough, what d’you call it, [Indian] settlers in Lusaka, then there was a club[house], [...] There’s a lot of history to it, I mean it started off as a little shed, it wasn’t, ach, there was nothing there. Then the community gathered a little money and whatever, then they built just a rudimentary clubhouse, and then over the years, you know, as we were becoming, as we got wealthy you know, and we did fundraising and what have you, got help from other towns, and we built up the place. 28

27 Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007.
Again, population size proved an important element in strengthening ethnic practice and structure. The association and site of its activities depended on adequate numbers of Hindus. Numbers are not, of course, sufficient: Hindu-Muslim relations were not strong enough for the maintenance of an all-Indian club, largely because of events in India and Pakistan and a ‘different way of doing things’.

Sharing space did not result in closer union either: as other studies have proven, ‘segregation can be maintained despite spatial proximity (revealed in disparate social networks)’ (Bridge, 1995: 281). Indeed, two separate, religiously defined sets of ties were formalised. In the Hindus’ case, these ties and the association that was built from them became literally and figuratively cemented over the years.

According to Fredrik Barth, change in a community is best understood when social behaviour is treated as the ‘allocation of time and resources’ (Barth, 1967: 661). As more time and space was allocated to recreational activity, and as the Hindu population grew, further ties developed and the shape of the community began to expand and change. As noted above, even weak ties are important in a migrant group because they, ‘unite diverse networks and increase the resources available to network members’ (Grieco, 1998: 705). In Lotus’s case, ties to Hindu networks in other towns were important in fundraising for the Lotus clubhouse, links to the Muslim communities were important for forming territory-wide sports teams, and links between Lotus and other Hindu associations in Lusaka strengthened the Hindu network.

Section 3. A House for Hindus: Building Ethnic Representation
Discrimination against Indians heightened when numbers increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s. There are a few explanations for this sudden rise in Indian
incomers. Dotson and Dotson assert that improvements in India’s education system resulted in more immigrants passing the required literacy test (1968: 51). Historian Michael West attributes the sudden jump in immigrant numbers to the falling of an ‘iron curtain’ around the borders of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was formed in 1953 (1994: 87). Official correspondence in the archives reinforces that there were widespread expectations that the future settler-dominated government of the planned Federation would ‘lose no time in clamping down hard on Asian immigration’. And as the Acting British High Commissioner in India observed, ‘immigration into Northern Rhodesia is at present increasing on account of fear that the new Federal Government will severely restrict it.’ Predictions were accurate; policy did tighten. Individuals’ movements between and within colonial territories were closely monitored and inhibited. In particular, policy restricted the migration of new Indian incomers to Southern Rhodesia, and the entry of male spouses of women born there. As a result, many Indians diverted to Northern Rhodesia. Official channels of support for the growing community remained weak. In 1945, two years before India’s independence, a statement was made to the Legislative Council, made up largely of white settlers (some of whom were ‘native representatives’) that Europeans and Africans were

29 Extract from letter to Commonwealth Relations Office, 12 July 1953, CO1015/501, National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter NA-UK).
30 Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from British High Commissioner in India (Acting), 21 August 1953, CO1015/505, NA-UK.
31 Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons (Control) Ordinance, Northern Rhodesia, 1 July 1953, CO1015/1256, NA-UK. This became an Act in 1954 and banned Indians (and specific others) from entering Southern Rhodesia from the north. In addition, the Federal Immigration Act (No. 3F) placed certain restrictions generally on crossing intra-Federal borders (see Patel, 1973: 5).
32 Two of my informants had ended up in Northern Rhodesia for this reason. Interview with O., 27 March 2007; interview with H.D., 30 November, 2006.
apprehensive about the ‘numbers of Indians who are now coming into the country’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 52).  

Moreover, India’s new Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru retracted his earlier promise to protect the rights of India’s ‘children abroad’ in favour of a policy towards campaigning for African nationalist liberation (Heimsath and Mansingh, 1971: 302, Gopal, 1976: 618, Mazrui, 1999, Dubey, 2000: 75). He described Indians as ‘guests in Africa’ (Anon, 1970: 6). India also had to protect its own fledgling position in the emerging world order. The Indian High Commissioner appointed to British East and Central Africa was instructed specifically ‘not to be the spokesman of Indians permanently resident’ in the country so as to avoid conflicts of interest between the two sovereign states. Consequently, some Indians became distanced politically from India and, ‘particularly the African-born generation, resented the High Commissioner’s interference in local affairs’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 323. For a comparable case see Smith, 2003: 749). Nehru stressed that Indians in Africa had been told ‘very definitely and precisely’ that the new Indian government would not ‘encourage or support them in anything they might want and which goes against the interests of Africans’ (quoted in Dubey, 2000: 75). In 1948 the British High Commissioner for India proposed that one seat in Lusaka’s Legislative Council be allocated to an Indian, ‘so that the interests of the Indian minority may not suffer unduly,’ but the seat was denied on the grounds that it was not in ‘African interest’, and there was no further insistence on the matter from Britain or

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33 In 1947 the recently-established African Representative Council in Lusaka also formally objected to the rise in Indian incomers (Phiri, 2000: 22).
34 Brief for Minister of State at Discussion with Mr. Krishnan Menon, 29 September 1951, CO1015/501, NA-UK.
India’s new policy on citizenship also proved exclusive: most Indians in Northern Rhodesia were rendered ineligible candidates (Anon, 1970: 5). While many were able to claim British Overseas citizen status, a number were rendered temporarily stateless. The result was further alienation from the Indian state apparatus.

While the years leading up to, and the years of Federation (1953–1963) were rife with racial discrimination and restriction, many Hindus looking back to this period remember it primarily for the cultural and social associations that they formed and the activities they enjoyed, which ranged from cricket friendlies and the development of the Lotus Sports Club to regular cinema-screenings of Indian films (Haig, 2010, forthcoming). Certainly, in the years after the Second World War when their numbers increased, Hindus across the territory became active in organising group events. They also managed property purchased by them for community purposes (such as the Indian School in Luanshya). Decades of wavering official support forced them to create their own institutions of social and political voice and self-protection (Fallers, 1967: 12). Through the British Indian Association they presented communal concerns to government, campaigning for improved rights. After India’s independence and Partition, however, the British Indian Association, much like the sports club, fractured along Hindu-Muslim lines, and the Muslim network formed a separate association. Indian Hindus kept the British Indian Association name and mandate, and continued to petition up until

35 16/08/1948, Letter from High Commissioner for India, London, to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, L/P&J/8/335 Collection 108/40C, IOR.
Zambian independence, and until it was more or less superseded by what came to be known as the Hindu Association of Zambia.

**From the Cultural to the Political: The Lusaka Hindu Association**

The Lusaka Hindu Association (LHA) was formed in 1951 from a social network of Hindus who wanted to formalise their ties.\(^{37}\) Distinct from the British Indian Association, LHA was first formed not for political representation, but for social purposes. One interviewee explained, ‘Our forefathers built a house because they wanted to show Indian movies, films’.\(^{38}\) This ‘house’ – Hindu Hall – was first established not as a place of worship or centre for political mobilisation as such, but as a cinema house and entertainment venue. Another informant told me that ‘normally the Hindu Halls had an auditorium for showing films, a stage for plays, and attached to that, later on, was the temple’.\(^{39}\) The Livingstone venue was the first to open, in 1952, and was named after V.K. Naik, who bid the most in a fundraising auction for the honour.\(^{40}\) The Lusaka Hindu Hall, built by LHA through community donations, followed in 1954. It was in this period that the great film circuit was established, helping to unite Indians across the territory. Film reels went on long and winding journeys from India to East Africa and then either to Southern Rhodesia and up to Livingstone, or directly by air freight to Lusaka. They were then transported by rail and projected wherever there was a Hindu Hall. On Friday and Saturday nights most of the community would show up for the occasion. I asked one elderly Indian what role the films had played in keeping

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\(^{37}\) Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007; interview with N.K.P., 23 April 2007. There was no LHA file in the Registrar of Societies records.

\(^{38}\) Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007.

\(^{39}\) Interview with H.D., 30 November 2006.

\(^{40}\) Interview with O., 7 March 2007.
people aware of Indian culture and politics. He insisted they had been purely for
entertainment. \(^4^1\)

At this point, accounts diverge slightly. I had several conversations and
interviews in which the management of the film circuit was described as the initial
raison d’être of LHA. \(^4^2\) However, according to others, whilst LHA was formed in part
to provide a social venue for its members, including film evenings, it was certain
individuals within LHA who independently organised the transportation of films
from town to town. It was from the film circuit, which connected existing town
associations, like LHA, that the territory-wide Hindu Society emerged. \(^4^3\) Gradually,
this Hindu Society (now the Hindu Association of Zambia, or HAZ), established
itself as a ‘parent’ body. \(^4^4\) Several others were under the impression that the
encompassing Hindu Society pre-dated the film-circuit, which, they said, merely
drew the network of smaller town associations under its ‘umbrella’. \(^4^5\) Despite minor
discrepancies, in each account it was the ‘social welfare’ or ‘social interest’ of the
Hindu community that was being formalised. \(^4^6\) There were, of course, other driving
forces, too, such as religious and cultural practices and education. \(^4^7\) Religious
meetings had previously been held in people’s homes: Hindu Halls provided a more

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\(^{4^1}\) Interview with N.K.P, 23 April 2007.

\(^{4^2}\) Most notably, interview with S.P., 5 June 2007.


\(^{4^6}\) This is evidenced in records at the RS. Aims and Objectives of the Monze Indian Welfare Society
(which joined the Monze Indian Sports Club and Monze Bhajan Mandal in 1972 to form the Monze
Hindu Association), file ORS/102/67/19; Chingola Hindu Association, which joined HAZ in 1977, file
ORS/102/67/5; and Ndola Hindu Samaj, file ORS/102/67/8, RS.

\(^{4^7}\) In the Copperbelt, where the political and social structure and facilities were very different to
Lusaka or the southern towns, associations were often all-encompassing, addressing the needs of
Hindus including religious and social welfare and education, political representation, and the
provision of sports facilities.
formal place of worship (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 97). However, only a small number of Hindus in Lusaka gathered for weekly prayer sessions at Hindu Hall until the mandir (temple) was built in 1974.\footnote{Interview with R.N., 23 April 2007.} One informant, who had been the religious officer on LHA’s committee for over twenty years, remembered, ‘I was working in all sections, but my main interest was for the religious. Because there was not much on the religious grounds, so afterwards, after the Hall was there, we started more on the religious.’\footnote{Interview with N.K.P., 23 April 2007.}

While these associations have come to be defined by the Hindu identity of their members, it is clear from records and oral accounts that the Lusaka Hindu Association initially emerged in order to bring members together on a cultural and social basis rather than for religion or faith-based activity. Indeed, its constitution states that membership is not limited to Hindus, but includes Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists. In this sense it departs in its historical rationale from comparable institutions elsewhere, such as the Caribbean, where early forms of Hindu association were shaped around religious worship (Vertovec, 2000: 47). According to the original constitution of the Registrar of Society records, which was not fine-tuned until 1975 (eleven years after Zambian independence) the first objective of HAZ was ‘to promote, foster and assist, through the medium of Member Samajes (societies), recreational and social welfare of Hindus generally’. Secondly, it aimed ‘to establish, maintain, manage and advance institutions for the benefit generally of persons professing the Hindu religion’. The third objective, which is the only one relating to Hinduism per se, was ‘to promote and foster the philosophy of
Humanism as a basic tenet of Hinduism’. The word Humanism was chosen, without doubt, to show the Hindu community’s acquiescence with the independent Zambian leadership: President Kenneth Kaunda had developed a philosophy of ‘Zambian Humanism’ (1967). Hindus were able to profess moral unity with ‘the Party’ in this sense, although the actual meanings and practices of each form of Humanism differed. According to their constitutions, HAZ’s member town associations are apolitical institutions.

However, as Glazer and Moynihan pointed out, ethnic groups are also interest groups (1970: 17). On many levels, Hindus in Northern Rhodesia and independent Zambia have rallied together through these associations to promote and protect their position in broad political terms. In the 1950s, as well as hosting Hindu cultural and social functions, Hindu Halls became a venue for community meetings and meetings of representative elites. At the same time as being strong symbols of Hindu space and identity, they were sites for positive exchanges with non-Hindus. Some were rented out to non-Hindus for social functions: in one letter to the Lusaka Hindu Association, the Mine school in Broken Hill requests ‘permission to use your famous Indian Hall’. More significantly, Lusaka, Hindu Hall was also offered as a meeting place for African national liberation activists. This signalled the emergence of nation-specific sentiments and loyalties among the Hindu community: many Hindus today identify the 1950s as the era of first belonging to Zambia. Indians at large offered help to African nationalists, but there

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50 HAZ Constitution, File ORS/102/67/48, RS.
51 Interview with K.P.R., 21 May 2007.
is very little documented on this (Dotson and Dotson, 1968, Phiri and Mufuzi, 2010, forthcoming). The nature of their help, described by Hindu informants as ‘moral’ or ‘silent’, was largely clandestine and in kind, but it was nevertheless vital to the movement.\textsuperscript{53} The Hindu community allowed African nationalists to hold meetings and rallies in Hindu Hall in Lusaka. Several private Indian spaces were also used by the nationalist agitators: one example is the offices of Ratilal Kapadia, who subsequently donated his property on Freedom Way in Lusaka to the first governing party of independent Zambia – the United National Independence Party (UNIP). One elderly interviewee, who runs a small production unit and shop selling (amongst other things) Zambian flags and buntings, explained that his business had started in the late 1950s when, ‘passing through our Hindu house’ he had been asked to make banners for the liberation struggle.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, although LHA did not act as a political association in terms of representing Hindus to governing authorities during the late colonial period, it significantly improved a sense of Hindu unity and agency in Lusaka.

The emergence of LHA depended on the existence of a network of individuals who were already communicating and interacting socially; but LHA’s existence also strengthened these ties and contributed to the enhancement of a network country-wide. This in turn brought about the national Hindu Association of Zambia. According to Raymond Breton, an ethnic community’s institutions are ‘the origin of much social life in which the people of that community get involved’. Consequently, he argued, community members ‘become tied together in a cohesive

\textsuperscript{53} About 10% of the profiles of Lusaka Indian men in Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue articulated their ‘silent support’ for Zambian independence.

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with G.B.P., 29 May 2007.
“interpersonal network”’ (Breton quoted in Yancey, et al., 1976: 396). Other studies of ethnicity and urban structure also emphasised the importance of local facilities and spaces, contributing to ‘cohesion and stability’, and acting as important precursors to both the development of an ‘autonomous community’ and the construction of informal networks of community members (Yancey and Ericksen, 1979: 253). So far I have asserted that ethnicity may emerge out of or through migrant networks; as these others studies support, however, new, located interpersonal networks (in this case Hindu networks in Lusaka and country-wide) were reinforced by the Indian minority’s restructuring of the facilities and spaces allocated to them under colonialism. Hindus constructed their own mechanisms for cultural and political representation, including a highly symbolic ‘house’ in the city. From these spaces, a new ethnic identity, based on Hindu ties specific to the territory, began to spread.

**More than one Hindu ‘house’?**

By the end of the 1950s, Hindus were sufficient in number for new social conflicts (in addition to patron-client divisions) to emerge within their own community. The most significant event relating to ideas of representation was the formation of the caste-based association, the Charotar Patidar Samaj (CPS). The majority of Hindus arriving into Northern Rhodesia carried the surname Patel and were of the Patidar caste. Most of these were Patidars from the region of Charotar in Gujarat, and they distinguished themselves from Patidars of other regions. Their association’s history is the most controversial, having been created by a subgroup of Patels within LHA following intra-community disagreement. Its origins are a source of
embarrassment to the community today. Even my most frank of interviewees said he did not know the whole story, offering only:

What happened, early days, I think, there was some problem between two... You had to stand for elections and so, somebody had a problem. I'm not sure about this. But they split and they started their own club. It was people who were already here, but a new group. Something like that.55

Records on CPS in the Registrar of Societies detail only that it was started in 1958, as the Charotar Social Club. The controversy seems to have arisen from Patidars’ objections to the upward socio-economic mobility of other, lower castes. Patidars themselves had experienced ‘recent ascendancy’ in the early twentieth century in India (Dwyer, 1994, Ramji, 2006, Dotson and Dotson, 1968), and in Northern Rhodesia wanted to protect their position, power, and ‘their surname Patel from appropriation by lesser castes’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 195). The ‘appropriation’ of the name Patel in Northern Rhodesia (and elsewhere in Africa) was not uncommon among lower caste Hindus, whose distance from Gujarat or elsewhere allowed them to climb above their ascribed caste identity (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 129–135). In Lusaka in the late 1950s, individual Patidars seemingly objected to the results of a LHA committee election (or ‘something like that’) and formed their own club. Again, this supports a link between population growth and the feasibility of group identity-formation. Importantly here, it highlights that there was no single way in which different sets of individuals within the Hindu network adapted to their new surroundings and perceived appropriate representation. The emergence of CPS in the late 1950s demonstrates the degree to which Hindu ethnic identity was taking hold, since the Hindu community at large was capable of absorbing these cultural divisions and overlooking them when more

55 Interview with S.P, 5 June 2007.
general Hindu interests (in relation to Muslims, for example) were challenged. Caste divisions are arguably an essential dimension of Hindu ethnicities. The ethnogenesis of Hindus, like other ethnic formation, was not so much a ‘way of looking back to the old world’ as a way for sets of immigrants to ‘define’ themselves ‘into the pluralist culture which existed before [they] arrived’ (Greeley quoted in Zhou, 1997: 981–2). CPS was specifically a ‘social club’ and not a political forum. In any case, in the eyes of the governing bodies, Hindus and Muslims remained a single racially-defined group. Towards the end of colonial rule in 1959, one Indian representative was nominated to the Legislative Council by the Governor of the territory at the time, Sir Arthur Benson. This was V.D. Mistry, a Hindu from Livingstone. Mistry most notably stood up for Indians’ collective rights during the review of the Northern Rhodesian constitution in the early 1960s, which proposed Indians’ rights to stand and vote on the council be severely curtailed.\(^5\) Although discrimination continued at this official level, Indians’ voices were by now strengthening and could not be ignored. Indeed, they played an important, if tacit, role in ending white domination.

**Section 4. New Politics, New Immigrants, and Hindu Ethnic Tension**

Independence in Zambia was formalised in 1964, led by Kenneth Kaunda. Liberation was not fought for uniformly; pockets of resistance formed across the territory and the campaign was divided by two main candidates. The majority of the country followed UNIP, headed by Kaunda, but in Livingstone and the south the people supported Harry Nkumbula and the African National Congress (ANC). In

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\(^5\) The Monckton Commission, 1960, and Macleod proposals for constitutional reform, 1961, were vital measures in the undoing of the Central African Federation.
both cases, Hindus provided encouragement to candidates, with more support for Nkumbula in the Livingstone area. Indians generally were keen to appear publicly supportive of African national liberation, even where they expressed private unease about regime change (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 320–321). Figure 5 is a picture of Kaunda being adorned with a lei of flowers on behalf of the Indian community, welcoming him back from independence talks in 1963. Images elsewhere show Indians and African nationalists presenting common allegiance; in private collections, Indian families keep photos of their parents or grandparents pictured with such individuals as Harry Nkumbula and Mainza Choma, and in later years with Lozi chief Lewanika II (see also image of Nkumbula in Macola, 2008). While a mark of political prudence, Hindus’ public front and involvement also reflects an important level of knowledge and concern for local-level political affairs. Zambia’s independence was, after all, political emancipation for Indians, too: one man told me, ‘When Zambia became free, we also felt free, inside and out.’ However, the laws of the newly independent Zambian state did not allow dual citizenship. Indians found themselves in an awkward position legally, ineligible for Indian (or Pakistani) citizenship in many cases, restricted to British Overseas Citizenship in others, and reluctant to relinquish the papers they had in order to acquire Zambian nationality.

57 Group conversation with members of Livingstone Hindu Association, 6 May 2007.
58 Interview with O., 7 March 2007.
60 This remained the case up until 2009 when the National Constitution Conference introduced to the Draft Constitution a set of clauses providing for dual citizenship and the restoration of Zambian citizenship of those who had relinquished it in order to acquire the citizenship of another country. This was adopted into the Constitution in 2010.
Some Indians, along with droves of white settlers, took the opportunity to migrate to Britain, but most stayed in Zambia where their businesses were flourishing, some expanding from small trade into manufacturing and real estate.\textsuperscript{61} In economic terms, the first years of independence were ‘boom time’.\textsuperscript{62} Hindus who had settled in Livingstone continued a ‘general drift’ towards Lusaka and further up the line of rail into Copperbelt towns, taking advantage of gaps left by whites.\textsuperscript{63} Indians in Lusaka began to drift outside their colonial residential and trading zones. The former ‘First Class’ area reserved for white-owned shops and white customers, ‘down town’ became a popular new site for Indian enterprise. It includes the city’s main street, Cairo Road (see map of Lusaka city centre). In the

\textsuperscript{61} Analysis of Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue indicates that one third of the Lusaka male business owners profiled accumulated businesses and diverted into industry after Independence.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview with H.D., 30 November 2006.

late 1950s trading licensing had relaxed, and many Indians applied to trade in the First Class area with white clientele. After independence in 1964, these streets were used by traders and customers who could afford inflated rents and prices – namely, whites, Indians, and wealthier black and Coloured Zambians. The three streets to the west of Cairo Road – renamed Chachacha Road, Freedom Way, and Lumumba Road – are now Indian strongholds. While Kamwala persisted as an area of Indian businesses with principally African customers, ‘down town’ quickly became cosmopolitan.

It was at this eventful time that settled Indian traders, still numbering less than 10,000, were joined by a second wave of Indian immigrants to Zambia. These Indians came on professional, short contracts, some brokered between Kaunda and India’s new Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Bilateral relations between the two postcolonial states were positive. Exchanges of state visits, economic and military cooperation, and aid and trade agreements were formalised in the late 1960s. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) had been involved in public life in Africa since its inception in 1950: it organised higher education scholarships for Africans and invited nationalist campaigners, among them Kaunda, to visit India.

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64 These roads were formerly known as Livingstone, Stanley, and Connaught, respectively. Chachacha was the name given to Zambia’s freedom struggle.

65 It is difficult to obtain the exact number of Indians, let alone Hindus. The 1969 census showed 10,785 ‘Asians’ resident in the territory, but this category included Ceylon, Cyprus, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan and Others. Of this total, around half were born in India, and around 1/3 were Indian citizens. Although immigrants from the region increased, they remained relatively few. Typically over 100 immigrants from ‘Asia’ were entering per annum between 1965 and 1970. In 1968, 245 Indians arrived from India itself, out of a total of 5,401 newcomers to the country (representing 4.5%). Statistical Yearbook (1970), 338/REPORT, Lusaka: Central Statistics Office, 5–6; Bhate (1968), Migration Statistics, Lusaka: Central Statistics Office, 32–33.


(Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 327). The new wave of Indian immigrants included teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, statisticians, and accountants. They were well educated, came from across the sub-Continent, often as family units, and introduced a new range of caste, linguistic, and regional and religious identities (many were Christian). Second-wave Hindus were also much more spatially scattered around Lusaka city, settling on arrival into racially-mixed, middle-class suburbs. After their contracts, some of these expatriates stayed on in Zambia and bought into businesses or found employment in other organisations, or with the Zambian government. Among Hindus, this new wave of incomers (still known as the ‘expatriates’) presented challenges to the predominantly Gujarati settlers (the ‘residents’) who had preceded them.

As Indian citizens, ‘expatriates’ had access to different representation from their settled counterparts, falling under direct consulship of the Indian High Commission. The first Indian High Commissioner to Zambia, Sambasiva Krishnamurti, appointed in 1965, acted as representative for a minority of Hindu settlers. However, regardless of religion or migration history, and only a few years into Independence, all Indians were treated equally by authorities as ‘foreign’ or non-‘indigenous’ persons. From 1968, the nationalising programme known as ‘Zambianisation’ took hold. In economic terms, the process was enshrined in the Mulungushi Reforms, which were modelled directly on Kenya’s Trade Licensing Act of the previous year (Macmillan, 2008: 206). The reforms included the government’s attainment of majority shareholdings in foreign-owned businesses, and coercive change in ownership of smaller enterprises into Zambian hands. Kaunda depicted Indians as ‘expatriate traders who did not need government
protection’ (Phiri, 2000: 55). When the process of nationalisation was under way, President Kaunda announced, ‘Zambia is now ours’ (Southall, 1980: 95). The policy allowed, even invited, Indians to keep their businesses by adopting Zambian citizenship. Some took up the offer, but despite the government’s rhetoric, citizenship was difficult to obtain (Macmillan, 2008). The majority found ways around it, either migrating away from Zambia, putting their business in Zambian-born children’s names, or striking private agreements with members of the Party. Some Indians met Kaunda’s aspirations: one informant explained how he had built up his textile factory from a single sewing machine to a company supporting 400 employees, and then sold the company in 1977 to a black Zambian – he continued managing and training staff for six years. In another case, a man who had arrived as an apprentice in the 1940s and built up his own business sold it, in 1968, to become its manager (Bhatt, 1969). The majority of Indians were, however, reluctant to relinquish businesses or citizenship links to other countries. This implied to Kaunda a lack of commitment to Zambia.

Most Indians, however, simply felt insecure about their position in the country, given the political events unfolding in Kenya and Uganda at this time, where Indians were suppressed and expelled as strangers (Mamdani, 1973, Bhachu, 1985, Ballard, 1993). The new era of African self-rule in many ways placed the Indian minority in a more polarised position: ‘non-racial’ politics emphasised the lack of shared moral unity between their ethnic communities and wider society. William Shack explains how African independence forced the breakdown of the

68 Questionnaire response from M.R., February 2009.
colonial society’s ‘pseudo-communitas’, a system based on semi-imposed boundaries and norms. This breakdown, he claims, led to the ‘loss of advantageous roles strangers had occupied in it’, and ultimately to the exaggeration of their ‘alien’ qualities (1979: 40–1). Among Hindus, the new wave of immigrants provided an ‘other’ against which those already settled could measure their own belonging. Differing migratory histories were stressed. LHA, purportedly representing all Hindus, quickly became regarded as a ‘Gujarati’ club. According to one ‘resident’ informant:

> After five years of independence things were going in a different way. The infrastructure started going down – education, medical, it started going down. The Association, LHA, kept running, normal. But individually people were making up their minds to go. Even the old timers. And the new expats had their own circles, so it was difficult to see the future.  

‘Old timers’ and ‘new expats’ are set apart. In another account, an interviewee recalled that ‘expatriates’ used Hindu Hall for religious events and gatherings, ‘being closer to Indian culture that way,’ but ‘left it to the Gujaratis as a place for social and political talk’. Nevertheless, in 1974, there was sufficient unity for Hindus to build a community temple. This subgroup distinction is analysed more fully in Chapters 5 and 6, but its roots in the era of Zambianisation are important. It also epitomises what Werbner has called the ‘fiction of unity’ in ethnic politics (quoted in Vertovec, 2000: 181). Instead of dismantling Zambian Hindu ethnicity, however, these fragments of Hindu culture helped to strengthen existing ties within the network, and they introduced new weak ties that increased resources for the group.

70 Interview with S.P, 5 June 2007.
71 Interview with S.G., 17 January 2008.
72 Interview with N.K.P. and viewing of visual recording of event, 23 April 2007.
Conclusion

This broad historical chapter has sketched the migration history of Hindus from the early twentieth century up until the early years of Zambian independence. Very little has been recorded about the position of Indians between 1970 and the present, which includes a dark period that lasted until the early-1990s and upon which few interviewees were willing to shed light. During what is known as Zambia’s ‘Second Republic’ (1972–91), in which Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party state, the process of nationalisation continued and the country’s dependence on copper was shaken as prices plummeted. Consequently, there was scarcity of resources, severe food and fuel shortages, environmental and agricultural degradation, and increased crime. Accounts of this darker era are incorporated into the following chapters, in order to understand and map shapes, spaces and concerns of contemporary Hindu community life in Lusaka.

Here, however, the task has been to describe the early construction of my analytical social arena, that of Zambian Hindu ethnicity. First, Indian and Hindu networks developed through a distinct pattern of chain migration and the establishment of a patron-client system. In the face of racial discrimination and the absence of effective representation, the Indian immigrant minority utilised this network as a source of support. Second, I showed that spatial segregation of Indians did not unify their identity; separate Muslim and Hindu networks were instead strengthened by events in South Asia and different ethnic practices. These produced new spaces of Hindu-specific activity, fortifying group identity. Third, throughout political change in the territory, including the shift to a Central African Federation, the struggle for African national liberation and the realisation of
Zambian independence, Hindus remained deprived of effective official representation. The cultural site of Hindu Hall took on political meaning in terms of symbolising Hindu community unity and support for Africans’ struggle: indeed, Hindus saw this as their own struggle, too, as organic members of a plural society and future Zambian nation. Fourth, the chapter also introduced a new immigrant wave of Hindus; their different modes of adaptation are explored in Chapter 6. Questions about the position of Hindus in the postcolonial state emerged here, too; this and their citizenship and Zambian belonging weave into analysis to come, most purposefully in Chapter 7. Now, though, I revisit the Lotus Sports Club and Hindu Hall, and introduce a range of other important sites of contemporary Hindu activity around Lusaka.
Chapter 4

**Mandirs, Mandals, Markets, and Malls: Mapping Contemporary Hindu Life in Lusaka**

*Introduction*

So far this thesis has discussed Hindu life in Lusaka as it was, in the colonial era (from the 1920s), during Central African Federation (1953–63), and in the early days of Zambian independence (from 1964). This section discusses contemporary Hindu life in Lusaka as encountered during my fieldwork between mid-2006 and early 2008. It necessarily touches on earlier history when explaining the roots of some cultural associations. However, I break away from the episodic approach taken so far, following instead Ernest Gellner's advice to examine the ‘social structures that maintain or disturb stability’, which, he claims, explain social stability and change better than a mere ‘list of successive conditions’ (1964: 19). Such structures are examined here by touring the city, visiting some sites of relevance to Hindus, describing a range of ways people relate to them, showing their changing shapes, and indicating areas of both cohesion and fragmentation. Central to analysis is the claim that postcolonial society here remains essentially plural. In Simmel’s essay, strangers were tied to others politically, but remained culturally distinct, through what he called a ‘form of union based on interaction’ (Simmel, [1908] 1971: 144). His influence on Park is evident here: Park described the restricted interplay and shared urban identities of ethnic groups in American cities as ‘unity in diversity’ (quoted in Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 389). Furnivall’s plural society was marked by a ‘medley of peoples’, who ‘mix but do not combine’. He went on,
As individuals they meet but only in the market place in buying and selling. There is a plural society with different sections of the community living side by side but in the same political unit. (Furnivall [1948] 1956, 304)

In many ways this still holds true of Hindus in Lusaka, whose interaction with others, although not limited to the economic sphere, exists in specific spaces and circumstances. Rather than focussing on the community’s relations with wider society (the subject of Chapter 7), however, my emphasis here is on the level of communal identity among Lusaka Hindus, examined through ideas about and uses of space.

Location is crucial to this thesis: the social world under scrutiny is Hindu community life in Lusaka. It is a world that unites Hindus with shared concepts, commitments and institutions, objects and discourses within specific urban surroundings (Mitchell, 1969, Rogers and Vertovec, 1995, Clarke, 2005). Stranger theory encourages analysis of the spatial and structural aspects of immigrants’ lives. While the city is merely one site in which my subjects’ identities are represented, and their lateral connections and other relationships reach far beyond it (Fallers, 1967: 12, Clifford, 1997: 250), these claims are particular to Lusaka’s Hindus. One interviewee described how:

Within Zambia you find that the Livingstonians are different, not substantially, but to the Copperbelt guys, for instance, or even the Lusaka people – they have their own little idiosyncrasies and way of thinking things. Some of them pick up their culture, a modus operandi of where they are.¹

Participant observation of Hindu communities across Zambia supports this claim; towns each had their own cultural emphases, internal politics, patterns of behaviour, and characteristic spaces.² Much of this chapter relates to how Hindus

¹ Interview with H.D., 30 June 2006.
² This was especially obvious at nationwide events such as the Hindu Association of Zambia Sports Day and the Bhajan Samellan in Ndola. At Sports Day one woman noted that towns literally fight
have adapted their cultural and social behaviour and spaces to suit an ever-changing but specific Lusaka environment. As well as descriptively setting the urban scene, space in the city provides a framework for expanding on the idea of the Hindu ethnic network. I assert that, just as there are strong and weak ties across this network (Massey et al., 1993, Grieco, 1998), so too are there strong and weak sites of Hindu activity. It is in how these sites are used that strong and weak interpersonal ties are formed and maintained, helping Zambian Hindu ethnicity itself to persist. This chapter provides evidence that Hindus’ position and relationships in Lusaka, which is characterised by ‘nearness’ and ‘remoteness’, is both an outcome and a factor in the maintenance of distinct Hindu spaces in the city. It is divided into three sections. The first examines ‘safe’ places: colonially-segregated trading and residential zones, religious space, inside Hindu houses, and the Indian High Commission. The second looks at ‘quasi private’ spaces – Hindu association clubhouses, private schools, recreational sites and malls. The third considers ‘uncertain’ places: markets and the street. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that Hindus’ community life in Lusaka is structured around a shared ‘world of practice’ and perceptions through the spaces members inhabit, objects and symbols they protect, and perceptions of place they describe.

Section 1. Being at Home in the City: Creating Safe Spaces

Certain spaces in Lusaka are treated as ‘safe’, highlighting some divisions between Hindus and Muslims, and Hindus and non-Indians. In this section, Lusaka Hindus are presented mainly as a cohesive community, although analysis also alludes to each other: ‘there is even a Discipline Trophy, which shows the boundaries between town relations’. Another said told me that ‘hosting towns’ always win because ‘it’s home turf, you feel stronger’. Conversation with M.A. and D.A., 3 July 2007; conversation with M.N. and S.S., 22 July 2007.
some lines of community fracture, particularly between Hindus of different socio-economic classes and migratory waves. Through their own ethnic network and use of strong sites of Hindu activity, Hindu community members are self-recognisable, share a ‘world of practice’, and united in their identification of ‘safe’ spaces in the city. These spaces are diverse and include the Second Class Area, Hindus’ homes, and the Indian High Commission.

Spatial Proximity and Social Distance: The Second Class Area
An obvious place to start a journey of Hindu life in Lusaka is Kamwala, the city’s bustling Second Class trading zone. Here, a certain level of social distance is still evident among members of different racially-defined groups. Lusaka was planned in 1935; its design, which is well-documented, incorporated racially segregated trading and residential spaces (Gann, 1964, Collins, 1969, Hansen, 1982, Williams, 1986). As argued with reference to the emergence of the Lotus Sports Club in the previous chapter, segregated retail and housing zones in Lusaka had a direct impact on the creation and strengthening of a Hindu ethnic network. Several studies of Southall in London have contested the area’s reputation as a ‘Punjabi’ or ‘Indian’ space, by showing the presence of others and an array of interrelationships among them (Bhachu, 1985, Baumann, 1996, Shukla, 2001, 2003). However, the ‘Indian’ zone in Lusaka was a colonial contrivance, within which Indians and black Africans were placed in unequal positions of power. Black Africans were the customers, not the shop owners, traders or residents. Kamwala did not merely have a reputation as an Indian space; it was legally sanctioned as one. One interviewee emphasised how small Lusaka still was in the 1950s, and how this heightened the significance of racially-bounded urban spaces. ‘There were
designated areas,’ he said. ‘This [the leafy suburban area of Rhodes Park, where he now resides] was a Jewish area. I never came here as a boy, but it was a short walk.’ Beyond the city there was ‘jungle’ and Lusaka was a ‘one horse town.’ In an article in the Lusaka Hindu Association magazine, *Samachar*, one man recalled how, ‘That very small geographic locality called Kamwala became Our World. We grew up there; we got married there, we died there.’ Indians came to own the southerly section of the city designated to them, and Hindus within that produced their own, distinct spaces, such as the Lotus Sports Club or Hindu Hall, attaching to them local meaning and memory. According to Vaughan Robinson, the nature and also the density of settlement is vital to the ‘symbolic’ emergence of a community (1986. See also Gans, 1979).

Today, Kamwala and Luburma, the adjoining residential area, are highly symbolic, forming a ‘mini India.’ Street names include Gandhi Road, Delhi Road and Bombay Road. The district lies off, and in sharp contrast to, Independence Avenue, one of the city’s main thoroughfares leading down town. Kamwala’s roads are reputedly poor: un-tarred, potholed, and a rat run in rush hour. On weekdays, the streets here crawl with cars, barrows, shoppers, hawkers, pickpockets and litter; the air becomes thick with heat, body odour, effluence, and burning rubber. One informant described the area as being ‘more Indian than India’ on account of

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1 Interview with K.P.R., 21 May 2007.
3 Interview with D., 20 January 2008.
the ‘clutter’ and ‘density of movement’ within it.  

There are many small Indian-run stores, usually staffed with non-Hindus and lower middle-class traders and suppliers. Stepping into one of the larger Indian shops can provide instant cool and protection. A fan whirs and customers talk quietly. Floor to ceiling shelving behind counters hold anything from household goods and bolts of cloth to spare parts and cell phones (for comparison see a description of a rural shop in the 1950s in Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 54–5). Although one shop may resemble another, however, not all Indians are in the ‘fast lane’ with business: there is a wide range of incomes here, and social distances are nowadays apparent between socio-economic classes as well as between Indians and black Africans.

Nevertheless, most of the Hindu-staffed shops are regarded as ‘safe havens’ in an otherwise hectic zone. Strong stereotypes exist within the Hindu community, one of which is ‘the Gujarati trader’ (see Chapter 6). In the youth drawing competition, ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, however, only 3 of 27 images included Indian shops. None of the photo reels from the project on ‘Hindu Life in Lusaka’ contained shop images either. This reflects the sample of participants: mostly second wave migrants’ children, they have little contact with the Second Class Area on account of their family residences and workplaces being dispersed across the city, as mentioned in the chapter above. The three pertinent drawings show Safique’s fabric wholesaler and shop, Gandhi’s spice shop, and ‘Patel General Store’, the first two of which are genuine places and the last of which merely indicates a classic Gujarati (Patel) owned shop. In two of these drawings (Figure 6) Indians are behind

the counter. In many ways, the counter acts as a barrier between Hindu shop owners/their employees, and the largely black Zambian clientele. One middle-aged, first-wave migrant explained:

As a kid I used to hang around my dad's shop, help out and play behind the counter. We did that, kids like us. But it's a bit different now. You wouldn't really want children around too much. The shop is safe, but the area has gone down. Plus, kids have better things to do nowadays.10

Again, although not regarded as appropriate for children, Kamwala’s Hindu shop itself is emphasised as ‘safe’ in uncertain surroundings. In Zambia’s postcolonial society, most interaction between racially-defined groups takes place at an economic level, as Furnivall first insisted of plural society during colonialism. However, limited social and cultural contact of Hindus and others in Zambian society is not necessarily determined by plural structures. David Parker’s work on the Chinese takeaway in modern Britain, for instance, also describes a cultural boundary between groups of ethnic or racially-defined British people that meet only across the counter (2000).

Figure 6. Details from Drawing 6, 'Street Scene' and Drawing 4, 'Four Images of Indian Life in Zambia'

The neighbourhood of Luburma, also known as ‘Madras’ (but sometimes mapped as a separate area) has a different feel, with wider, more bare streets of fenced or walled-in properties. Most houses remain Indian-owned, and those which are not are often sought after by them. This is where the sports grounds are situated. The area is known as ‘Indian’. However, an ‘Indian’ community per se does not really exist. The black caretaker of Hindu Hall claimed that continued accumulation of property in this area has ‘backfired on Indians’. Not only does it deepen boundaries between them and wider Zambian society, he claimed, it becomes harder for them to ‘get outside their own problems,’ among which he included in-group class and caste struggles, and the Hindu-Muslim divide. In other words, spatial proximity has intensified interracial and subgroup differences. That said, most Hindu houses I visited (and many of the ‘problems’ I encountered) were dotted across the city. Some Hindus who grew up in the Second Class Area proceeded into safer, leafier suburbs. And the majority of second-wave immigrants or those migrating to Lusaka from other towns in Zambia after independence never lived in Luburma, due to the unavailability of property, to its early reputation as a lower-middle-class area, and to work contracts of immigrants fresh from India that often included organised accommodation. Despite this, Luburma remains an Indian stronghold and within it Hindu residents’ wealth and status ranges significantly.

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Resident Hindu and Muslim ‘brothers-but-not-twins’ remain distinct to community insiders.\textsuperscript{14} Although relations were often positive, local complaints included: ‘The reason the roads here are so bad is that the Muslims don’t pay their taxes’, and, ‘You can tell the Muslim houses – they are always building and there are more umuntu [blacks] around’, and, ‘The reason there are blacks here is that Muslims convert them, but it doesn’t stop the crime’.\textsuperscript{15} Here, Muslims are seen to regard the area with less value, and to increase insecurity by inviting in non-Indians. Some individuals stressed Muslim-Hindu similarities instead – there is substantial overlap of the two groups: shared business schemes, preferential Indian employment, shared car-pools for school children, Indian women’s circles, certain sports, friendship networks, and a communal front on some political matters (this is reiterated in Chapter 7). Interestingly, the three eldest contributors in the youth drawing event depicted positive Hindu-Muslim relations, symbolised by the juxtaposition of mosque and temple, and by physical embraces (Figure 7). Lusaka Central Mosque and the Hindu Mandir (a Radha Krishna temple built in 1974) sit side by side on the border between Luburma and the town centre, jointly symbolising the ‘Indian’ character of the area. Kamwala/Luburma is depicted in most Hindu youth drawings without any reference to Muslims – rather it is reified as the Hindu sports grounds, Hindu Hall, and sites of celebration, and in one drawing by the temple alone.\textsuperscript{16} The temple features in 11 of the 27 pictures.\textsuperscript{17} Curiously, one drawing shows only the mosque, and another placed the temple

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with A.P., 3 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{15} Conversation at D.’s house, 21 February 2008; conversation with D.A., August 2007.
\textsuperscript{16} Drawing 2, Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{17} Drawings 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21 and 22, Appendix B.
below a gospel church.\textsuperscript{18} Despite the competition title being ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, the validity of these two drawings was discussed by panel judges on the grounds that other ‘cultures’ were emphasised over Hindu culture.\textsuperscript{19} In this sense, panellists conflated Indian and Hindu labels, and the Muslim network in particular was marked out as a separate social world.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{drawing7.png}
\caption{Details from Drawing 6, ‘Street Scene’, Drawing 8, ‘Four Images of Hindu Life in Lusaka’ and Drawing 22, ‘Inter-religious Faith and Peace’}
\end{figure}

Depictions of positive Hindu-Muslim relationships, on the other hand, were praised by the panel. So too were accounts of positive relations among Hindus and black Zambians. There is, however, limited interaction between Hindus and black Zambians in Luburma. Many black, live-in house staff occupy small cottages within main plots – a publicly overlooked aspect of ‘ethnic enclaves’ in Africa. Data from the disposable camera project ‘Picturing Hindu Life in Lusaka’ includes two sets of

\textsuperscript{18} Drawings 14 and 15, Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{19} Panel discussion, ‘Indian Life in Zambia’ event, 16-17 January 2008.
photos of house staff. Images from the first comprise a house girl ironing, a kitchen maid laying dishes out to dry, and ‘my driver who picks me up from school’. One roll has several photographs of Hindu children playing in the house servants’ quarters at the back of the property, pictures of the house maid’s baby, and the gardener. Although these relationships are formative, accommodation is close, and loyalty often high, they do not signify the existence of a shared social network. In a study of London’s boroughs it was shown that ‘segregation can be maintained despite spatial proximity (revealed in disparate social networks)’ (Bridge, 1995: 263, 281). It is in these disparate networks, and in the resulting ‘nearness and remoteness’ of people of different ranks, religion, and race, that cultural pluralism is maintained in Lusaka’s Second Class Area.

Observing a ‘World of Practice’: Inside Hindus’ Houses
Regardless of their location or the socio-economic or caste positions of their owners, Hindus’ houses in Lusaka (and across Zambia) constitute a distinct aesthetic form. Grounds for the most part are well secured and well-tended. Satellite dishes, wrought iron swinging benches, and velour suites are ubiquitous. Inside, homes tend to be modestly furnished and decorated, often with ornaments, awards or effigies on doilies and in glass cabinets. Most families have a home shrine, or at least hangings or a calendar with a Hindu religious theme. Some calendars in homes are, like those that invariably hang in Hindu workplaces, from one of the big Indian businesses in Lusaka: for example, the Indo-Zambian Bank, Tata Motors, or Saro Agriculture. Frequently in private houses, especially the homes of first wave families, there is also African art or artefacts, ranging from local copperware to hunting trophies (in one case, a stuffed leopard). Invariably,
Hindus purchase the ‘Indian package from Multichoice’, a satellite television provider. ‘The news is different, more relevant to us’, one informant said, ‘We know that there’s an Indian character in the new Harry Potter film and that the monsoons are heavy this year. You can’t get that from BBC or ZNBC [Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation].’

Media has not always been central to Hindus’ lives in Lusaka: accounts of transnational ties prior to the 1990s rarely entail telephones, newspapers, magazines, or other material and technological routes to keeping in touch. One elderly man recalled the importance of radio during the 1940s, but emphasised that ‘it was for news, of anywhere, of Germany mostly, not as a way to keep us “Indian” or anything like that’. Nowadays, most families use the Internet and cell phones to connect them to friends, family and ethnic networks in other countries. One woman described ‘trawling the Internet daily’ to find a suitable spouse for her son.

Daniel Miller (2001) considers material culture not merely as a way in which people gather in the global world around them, but as a way for them to represent that world within their ‘private domain’. In this light, Hindus in Lusaka have adapted considerably to the globalising world, accessing and transmitting a relatively recent idea of India as a modern, connected, desirable place. Some use television to reconnect to Indian languages and current affairs, while others ‘want simply to watch cricket and hear a commentator with an accent we can understand’.

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21 Interview with O., 7 March 2007. This was supported by N.K.P, 23 April 2007, discussing the role of Indian film in the 1950s, which was purely for entertainment rather than as a way of ‘linking to India’.
22 Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.
23 Conversation with Mr. N., 3 July 2007.
language use. Rather than supporting the claim that Hindus (as a ‘diaspora’) ‘dwell in imagined worlds’ (Appadurai, 1998), however, Lusaka’s community demonstrates a certain cosmopolitanism. This is distinct from the ‘rooted’ cosmopolitanism described by Appiah (1998, Cohen cited in Kothari, 2008: 511). Rather than demonstrating an identity fixed to a place of original departure or belonging, Lusaka Hindus perform something of a ‘re-rooting’. Indeed, if Hindus’ homes are distinctly Indian and global, they are also distinctly Zambian.

In his later work, Miller presented objects not merely as signs. Through their use, he claimed, people ‘create a world of practice.’ He argued alongside Simmel that, ‘human values do not exist other than through their objectification in cultural forms’ (Miller, 1998: 19). Hindus who live in Lusaka have had to adapt to the city’s nuances, and this includes basic, household practice. Five of the seven participants who completed the photo project included images taken inside their homes. These showed family members performing various actions: ‘Mum making curd’, ‘Mum giving me a hair cut’, ‘Auntie watering goddess plant Tulsi’, ‘My mum praying’, ‘Dad going over my school report’. One picture is of a girl tying string around her brother’s wrist during a celebration known as Rakhu. Four pictures are of family meals – Indian fare and also ‘My family enjoying pizza’ and ‘a braai [Southern African barbeque] at home’. All reels also contained pictures of friends visiting and playing games. A mother who always appeared publicly wearing saris is pictured in jeans, and a man who assumes formal positions in business and at cultural gatherings is drinking beer and grilling meat. What is valuable about these photographs is the insight they offer into informal events around the home, ‘safe’ places where culture is both protected and adapted. As Kothari explains, ‘The
openness required at work and the parochialism involved at ‘home’ are less
disjunctive and functional than the distinction would suggest’ (2008: 510).

Ordinary practice of Indian cookery and custom is mixed in with non-specific
activity such as trimming hair, playing, and, as described above, interacting with
black house staff. Hindu identity at home is, like Ernest Renan’s ‘everyday
plebiscite’, created, embedded, played out and passed on in ordinary activity
(1994). This process, of reconfiguring culture at all levels, is an example of how
cosmopolitanism emerges ‘from below’ (Hesse, 2000: 28).

As well as everyday practice being altered to suit surroundings and
circumstances, Hindu custom and traditions have changed, too. Prayer sessions
take place regularly in people’s houses, particularly those of second-wave Hindus.
Every Sunday and Tuesday there are Havan prayers, and on Thursdays and
Sundays there are Sai Bhajans (hymns). One of the organisers explained to me that,
because the immigrant community is small:

Zambia is very unique – in India, UK, US, etc., gatherings take place in central places,
temples, not in people’s homes. Here there is direct interaction; you get to know
people in people’s homes.  

Reception rooms take on a different shape for prayer sessions, transformed to
accommodate an assembly of around twenty people. Stainless steel trays are
passed around with offerings of flowers, fruit and grains – different from those in
India. ‘We offer South African apples and Zambian hibiscus, but I don’t think the
gods mind’, one woman joked. Some recitations customarily last for 36 hours
nonstop: but in Lusaka they take place only in daylight because ‘after dark it’s not

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24 Renan refers specifically to nationalism; I use this term purely descriptively.
25 Interview with S.G. and B.N., 17 January 2008. Additionally, many women take part who have long
been in the habit of meeting religiously in the private sphere (see Dotson and Dotson, 1969: 97).
safe to move in Lusaka’. Water, fuel and electricity shortages during the 1980s forced many to adapt their lifestyle: one informant explained how:

In my family we have special pots, *maatlo*, all the way from India in my great grandfather’s day. They are a symbol of purity, and my mother used to only wash and drink out of these pots. But now they are decorative only. When the shortages came we used to have to share our water with other families, and we couldn’t know how they took care of [the pots], so they became tainted.

Even in more affluent times, Hindu cultural practice adapts to Zambian spaces and circumstances. The Hanuman process, in which gods are driven by car to people’s homes around town instead of in a walking procession, is one example of adaptation. Another, the most highly symbolic perhaps, is the altered practice of scattering ashes of cremated bodies: Chapter 7 explores this further.

Many of these customs and adaptations are unknown to the outsider, since they exist within the private space of the home. The home space is also seen as protecting the Hindu community’s socio-economic position and reputation in relation to other ethnic groups, as well as sheltering them from criticism. Hindus generally are more likely to socialise with middle or upper-class non-Indians than with less affluent or less well-educated blacks – race, as one informant stated ‘is important only up to a point’.

Two brothers described how, ‘race all depends on your bank balance. We meet in social clubs and sports clubs, but very few Indians would go home with a black Zambian, or invite them home’. They concluded that they would not go to ‘Mr. Chanda’s [Jo Blow’s] house, because he would expect you to invite him to yours.’ Some interviewees also had reservations about inviting Muslims or lower-caste to their houses; the link between home space and social harmony remains unbroken.

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28 Interview with Mrs. S., July 2007.
29 Meeting at the Friday Club, 13 July 2007.
and intimate relations cannot be overstated. Observations of Hindu house interiors, and accounts of how objects and spaces within them are used, demonstrate that in general Hindus in Lusaka share a located world of practice and perception.

**Diplomatic Protection? The Indian High Commission and Lusaka Indian Ladies**

About ten minutes’ drive from Kamwala, in a salubrious corner of the city called Longacres, is a cluster of diplomatic buildings. Among them, on Pandit Nehru Road, is the Indian High Commission (IHC). The foundation stone for the IHC building was laid by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1978; the building was inaugurated by President Kaunda and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi a decade later, in 1988. Like other diplomatic buildings, it is a fragment of its nation-state, a political ‘home from home’ in Zambia; it represents Indian citizens living in Zambia and provides consular services for all non-citizens who wish to travel to India. In addition to its legal and political roles, the IHC plays an important part in cultural reproduction and is a cultural site among many in Lusaka’s active Indian scene. Although only some Indians are diplomatically represented by the IHC, as noted in Chapter 3, it has consistently offered broad representation to all people of Indian ‘origin’. From the 1990s, India’s attitude towards her ‘children abroad’ shifted dramatically once again, this time towards policies of inclusion with a view to incorporating ‘Indians abroad’ to its economic and political advantage (Lessinger, 1992a, 1992b, Van der Veer, 1995, Lall, 2001, Dickinson and Bailey, 2007). India’s changing policies towards Indian immigrants and settlers in Africa over the decades has impacted strongly on how individuals imagine their belonging. As Clifford notes, ‘societies may wax and wane in diasporism, depending on changing possibilities – obstacles,
openings, antagonisms, connections, in their host country and transnationally’ (Clifford, 1997: 249. See also Smith, 2003: 746). The argument about the role of India’s ‘diaspora’ package on ideas of belonging is taken up again in Chapter 8. However, it is important not to overplay the impact of this most recent shift on the everyday relationship between Hindus in Lusaka and the IHC/India’s diplomatic and cultural missions. This relationship pivots more on local social status and cultural symbolism than on transnational opportunities. In short, the IHC offers an exclusive and secure site for specific types of Indian activity.

According to the Indian High Commissioner to Zambia at the time, ‘Indians, regardless of citizenship, cling to their roots, cling to their culture, so they always find they are closer to their roots, to their culture, if they keep close to the High Commission. It represents India.’ However, it is not the state of India (or any presiding political party) that the IHC represents; it is the idea of India, in its broadest sense. Many Hindus in Lusaka have what Brah described as a ‘homing desire’, as distinct from a ‘desire for homeland’ (1996: 180 and 193). The cultural services, loosely defined, that are offered by the IHC in Lusaka include use of the grounds for garden parties and of the building itself for meetings, children’s music and language lessons, and the provision of networks, sponsorship, and guidance for cultural functions held elsewhere. The High Commissioner and spouse also make themselves available for attendance at high profile cultural or charitable events. Again, these services are not limited to Indian citizens; the diplomatic role of the High Commissioner includes bringing together all those with ‘roots’ in India.

31 Interview with Indian High Commissioner, R.O. Wallang, 10 May 2007.
32 Interview with Indian High Commissioner, R.O. Wallang, 10 May 2007.
However, the services are predominantly used by second-wave or recent immigrants to Lusaka, who already possess stronger ties and connections to Indian culture and kin.\textsuperscript{33}

One of the most significant roles the IHC plays in Hindu community life is as host to the Lusaka Indian Ladies Association (LILA). LILA was started in 1980 by a group of second-wave (‘expatriate’) women friends, who had arrived in Zambia in the 1960s and stayed on beyond the end of their or their husbands’ contracts. The Indian High Commissioner’s wife at the time has been widely credited with formalising the association, known first as the Zambian Indian Ladies Association. According to one questionnaire respondent, the purpose was to ‘bring Indian ladies in Lusaka under one umbrella for cultural, social and charity work’.\textsuperscript{34} The association’s first public records date to 1989, by which time it had changed its name. In these records, and to this day, LILA’s official address is the IHC, to which it is intimately connected. Constitutionally, LILA’s Chairperson shall be, where applicable, the wife of the High Commissioner. One member described it as ‘sort of like a “First Lady” project’.\textsuperscript{35} LILA’s regular, monthly meetings take place on IHC premises, as do social gatherings; members also meet at the residence of the High Commissioner.\textsuperscript{36} The purpose of LILA has remained the same: open to all Indian women living in Lusaka, its express intention is ‘to subscribe to any local or other


\textsuperscript{34} LILA Questionnaire response from I.D.

\textsuperscript{35} LILA Questionnaire response from U.B.K.

\textsuperscript{36} The IHC residence is on Twin Palms Road, Kabulonga.
charity and to grant donations for any public purpose’. By linking to the High Commission, the association’s secular nature and its engagement with cultures across India for its charitable work are reinforced. As one questionnaire respondent wrote, ‘keeping it linked to the High Commission also ensures its continuity.’

Crucially, this is a strong site of ‘Indian’ identity. The building is well-kept, secure, and designed architecturally to represent modern India: it is (as are other Indian or Hindu buildings) a cultural boundary object or marker. LILA members reported feeling ‘safe’ and ‘at home’ within IHC grounds. Although not a site of family activity as such, the IHC was demonstrated as a place of importance to youth by those taking part in the ‘Indian Life in Zambia’ writing event and in the photo project. The High Commissioner explained that LILA members and Hindus who use IHC premises have ‘strong attachments to India’. He said that it was ‘perhaps due to their relative affluence, unlike in South Africa, that they have been able to maintain connections’.

There are few studies of the role played by diplomatic missions in the daily lives of immigrant communities (Gutierrez, 1997, Smith, 2003). The IHC in Lusaka, as other countries’ diplomatic sites may be, is a ‘diaspora space’ (Brah, 1996) in which both Indian cultural identities and

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37 File ORS/102/35/504, RS. Also LILA Constitution, courtesy of N.M., Indian High Commission, Lusaka.
38 LILA Questionnaire response from Anon.
39 LILA Questionnaire response from U.B.K.
40 LILA committee meeting, DATE. Questionnaire response from U.B.K.
41 Writing entries 15 and 17.
42 Interview with Indian High Commissioner, R.O. Wallang, 5 March 2007.
43 Gutierrez’s work on Mexican immigrants in the USA discusses the role of the Mexican Consulate. Smith’s historical comparative study of transantionalism mentions diplomatic missions in Mexico, Italy and Poland. There is an unpublished thesis from the Department of History at the University of Sydney on the cultural history of Australia House in London (Pyrke, 2008).
transnational ‘consciousness’ reside and can be openly expressed. As such, it provides a familiarly Indian environment and respite from a ‘stigmatized’ group identity based on race and difference (Smith, 2000: 203). Users, however, represent a specific elite and ‘vintage’ of Indian immigration to Zambia (Rumbaut, 2004: 1199). Most Hindus I spoke to had only tangential contact with the Commission, and some had never set foot in its grounds. Asked to recall important hallmarks in the development of Indian and Hindu community cultural life in Lusaka, no interviewee selected the inauguration of the IHC, although each presented accounts of the construction and opening of other sites such as Hindu Hall, the Mandir or the Lotus Sports Club. Even so, most Hindus regarded the IHC as a place of protection. One man said, ‘I suppose we could run there if things got bad.’

44 Although in many ways, the IHC physically represents a division within the Hindu community itself, between migrant waves (see Chapter 5), it is recognisable to all community members as a safe space for Hindus and other Indians in the city.

**Section 2. Going Out to the Indoors: Visiting Quasi-Private Spaces**

This section examines a range of places that Hindus regularly visit. These include strong sites of Hindu activity, such as venues for cultural celebration, and weak sites of Hindu activity, such as a garden centre on the outskirts of town. Through such spaces, particular aspects of Hindu culture have adapted. A scarcity of Hindu space requires further negotiation and pulls together potentially fragmented subgroups at particular cultural moments. In addition to clubhouses, Hindus visit sites around Lusaka for school and recreation: these tend to be areas physically

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protected from threat of theft or racial tension. This section looks first at the
‘clubhouse’, and second at private schools and recreational sites.

**Translating and Negotiating Culture through Space: Cultural Clubhouses**

Since colonial days, Hindus have coveted association clubhouses as exclusive places
for members. I include these as ‘quasi-private’ spaces, because they are open for
communal use and in many cases, at certain times, they are open to a wider public.

Strauss wrote that the existence of divergent backgrounds will ‘contribute to the
inevitable formation of subgroups’. He continued:

> because there exists within any group a divergency of concepts (whether imported or
developed) there is frequent, not to say continual, formation and dissolution of
coalitions, splinter groups, cliques, and other sub-groupings. ([1969] 1979: 153)

As the population of Hindus grew, so too did the range of subgroups, and subgroup
associations. In addition to the Lusaka Hindu Association (LHA) and Charotar
Patidar Samaj (CPS), introduced in the previous chapter, Hindus are members of
several ‘vernacular’ clubs and other caste-based organisations. The term
‘vernacular’ is used locally to describe associations based on Indian language,
religious sect, or region. The two most prominent and truly ‘vernacular’
associations (those centring on shared language) are the Zambian Malayalee
Cultural Association (ZMCA, from Kerala and Malayalam-speaking) and the Tamil
Association (from Tamil Nadu and Tamil-speaking).\(^45\) The volume of caste
associations intensified in many places in the 1960s (Morris, 1968: 34, Vertovec,
2000: 98). In Zambia, lower-caste associations were formed in this period,

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\(^45\) The ZMCA was founded in 1980 as a secular association. Through the 1970s and 1980s there were
at any given time between 350 and 500 Kerala Indians in Zambia. Members tend to exhibit a high
coinciding with the second wave of Hindu migrants. Women’s and youth associations have also formed: LHA has an active women’s wing, Streenikatan, and a youth wing, Yuvas United. As the Lusaka Hindu community’s associations expanded, so too did the demand for exclusive spaces. Hindu space is, however, a scarce resource in Lusaka. Associations use private homes or share communal Hindu spaces; namely, Hindu Hall – the clubhouse for LHA – and the Lotus Sports Club. CPS is a notable exception; it has its own clubhouse, exclusive to members. Because of this scarcity of space, clubhouses take on different meanings at different times, which is demonstrated below. First, however, I show that the existence and nature of certain spaces have enabled significant adaptation of Hindu cultural practice. The CPS clubhouse and members’ concepts of diet and status provide an example.

According to Dotson and Dotson, boundaries within the Hindu community in Zambia in the 1950s and 1960s were determined primarily by status. Further, they claimed, it was ‘mainly upon conformity to the dietary rules that the public reputation of a Hindu rests’, especially abstention from meat, but also alcohol (1968: 102). Today, food and drink remain key signifiers of gender and generational divisions in Hindu cultural associations in Lusaka. Food and drink also highlight the different ways associations have transformed and structured their practice, twisting conventional Gujarati relations. As I explained in Chapter 3, the majority of first wave immigrants to colonial Zambia were from Gujarat. Most were Patidars, carrying the surname Patel. Patidars had recently achieved upward social mobility,

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46 One example is the Shree Prajapati Mandal, which typically represented carpenters, mason and potters (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 195). See ORS/102/67/51, RS.
Chapter 4

distinguishing them from others in their ascribed caste. In Lusaka in the late 1950s, Patidars from the Charotar region of Gujarat broke away from LHA to form their own club, CPS. They built their clubhouse in a plot across the road from Hindu Hall. Writing at that time, Dotson and Dotson painted Patidars as a ‘distinctly ascetic lot’, saying that, ‘in particular the Patidars of the old Charotar district stand out in this respect’ (1968: 132). Comparatively strict adherence to religious custom and superior group behaviour among Patidars has also been described elsewhere. Hasmita Ramji claims that the migration of Patidars from eastern Africa to Britain gave an ‘injection of a more culturally conservative community’ to Britain’s Gujarati set (2006: 716).

It would not be surprising, therefore, if membership rules of CPS were more conservative than those of LHA. Fallers notes that ‘traditional culture and institutions of the homeland continue to influence the structure of associational life’ among immigrant communities (1967: 16). In Lusaka, however, CPS has evolved as far less conservative, at least where diet is concerned, than many groups, including LHA. LHA committees have upheld the rule to serve only vegetarian food and to prohibit the consumption of alcohol in Hindu Hall premises, although at their events held elsewhere, such as at Lotus, these rules are relaxed. The committee at CPS, on the other hand, allows chicken to be cooked and served in the clubhouse, and alcohol to be sold and consumed at their outdoor bar (Figure 8).
Despite its reputation as a ‘Gujarati club’, constitutionally, LHA represents all Hindus in Lusaka, and extends representation to Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists. The practice of strict rules in order not to offend members follows logically. But what explains the liberalisation of practice at CPS? The President of CPS told me, ‘You see, it’s because it’s more progressive, it’s more a social club than anything, it’s a place for us to do our own thing.’ The President of LHA supported this claim, saying that most members of CPS were also members of LHA, but ‘Hindu Hall has no bar’. One female member of CPS defended loosening attitudes to social conformity by saying, ‘We are progressive, that’s why, we are good people and give to charity but we can also enjoy chicken and beer at the club.’ Another yet said, ‘C’mon, this is our clubhouse, like a place to let our hair down. it’s not like we eat

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48 Interview with S.P., 5 June 2007.
In these accounts, it is the site itself – the place, the club, the bar – that justifies and symbolises action. For Strauss, the ‘heart of membership’ is its ‘symbolic character’ ([1969] 1979: 152). Within CPS, strict adherence to dietary customs no longer symbolises the association members’ superiority. Instead, over a generation, they have synonymised superiority with ‘being progressive’. This is symbolised by the very opposite in dietary practice, and facilitated by the creation of a specific space in which such activity is acceptable.

The desire among different sets of Hindus to have a space in which they can ‘do their own thing’ goes far in both bridging and maintaining subgroup boundaries. According to Darlene Miller, ‘Built environments are social spaces that both reflect and shape social relations’ (2005: 131). However, Hindu space is limited, and this requires that strong sites of Hindu identity and activity are negotiated and shared. A wide range of social relations is reflected within them. Hindu Hall, its adjacent Hindu library, and the Lotus sports grounds are regularly rented out to members or other associations and also to smaller social sets within them. In this sense they temporally change ‘ownership’, becoming quasi-private spaces for different group users. The President of Lotus described:

There are a number of social groups of 20–30 people who meet on particular nights. Like, I’m a member of the Friday Club, we meet up, about 15 guys, get the barbeque going and we all sit there, have a few drinks, let go of the frustrations of the week, have a bit of fun. In fact, it at times becomes private, because people know that these guys are here then and there. And then on Sundays we have the Sunday Club, and it’s only guys. It’s a very good thing to have because you release, you know, a pressure valve, you can release your frustrations, and it’s open, it’s a controlled environment, it’s not in town.  

Privacy amounts not only to seclusion from other Hindus, but also seclusion within an Indian space (‘not in town’): it is a cultural comfort zone of sorts. Yet members

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50 Conversation with T.P., 4 March 2007.
like to emphasise that Lotus is first a sports club, and only second a Hindu one.\textsuperscript{52}

Nevertheless, while it is used by the Zambian Cricket Union for training, and by other members for tournaments and private sports tuition, few non-Hindus groups socialise regularly at its bar. LHA’s facilities, particularly Hindu Hall, are also a ready venue for a range of Hindu subgroups and associations. During most of my fieldwork the Hall was under renovation, but it was still used often. This contrasted to other town’s Halls where activity had reportedly declined due to the falling numbers of Hindus. One woman explained of the Copperbelt, ‘Everything is lessening down. Here, people are living in their own space. It’s not like Lusaka.’\textsuperscript{53}

Some sites in Lusaka have been neglected. Across the road from Lusaka’s Hindu Hall is the dilapidating library, where Indian language and music lessons take place. Declining membership and interest in learning Indian scripts and instruments contributes to its poor state of repair. One gentleman recalled having language classes as a boy, when, ‘The floors were always polished. Desks were neatly arranged in rows, and we were raring to go.’\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, Yuvas United use it weekly for their ‘K[nowledge] Circle’, during which they read the Bhagavad-Gita and hold roundtable discussions on ‘hot issues’.\textsuperscript{55} However, for many young people Hindu youth activities are less related to Hindu culture than to social contact. One youth group leader described Yuvas United as a ‘way to get out of home’, explaining that:

\begin{quote}
unlike India where you just go out and play, here you have to keep status, everything is an issue, right? [...] So, you have to get with your own people. There are not many
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{53} Interview with M.P. and A.P., 13 July 2007.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with R.K., 25 April 2007.
Clubhouses for Hindus, then, are much like households for Hansen’s Mtendere dwellers; ‘the intersection of what C. Wright Mills perceptively termed private troubles and public issues’ (1997: 8). Hindu clubhouses are alternatives to the household domain; both are places where men have beer and thrash out frustrations, men and women enjoy communal cooking and gossip, friends meet, and particular cultures are adapted and expressed. The Hindu clubhouse is used as a ‘home from home’, not in the sense of a second ‘homeland’ but in the sense of a second space for ‘living in’.

One way in which clubhouses become ‘lived in’ is through their use as sites of celebration, bringing together disparate parts of the community and wider public. Every year, principally organised through the Hindu Association of Zambia (HAZ) and its town member LHA, the grounds of the Lotus Sports Club swell as a thousand people watch fireworks for Diwali, the festival of lights and a Hindu new year. Diwali here involves a programme of storytelling, play-acting, dancing, music, and (in 2006) a surprise appearance by Santa Claus. Along with the Hindu religious singing festival, the Bhajan Samellan, and Sports Day, this is the biggest annual event under the HAZ’s umbrella. As tickets are not exclusive to members, it attracts a racially diverse audience and has become a much-anticipated event in Lusaka’s social calendar. Although LHA is seen as a largely Gujarati organisation, this event draws all Hindus together. A Malayalee told me that, despite only four of the 15 Hindu member families of ZMCA being ‘active’ members of LHA, all took part in LHA’s major religious events. In his words, ‘There is little overlap, other than at

big events like Diwali and the Bhajans’.\textsuperscript{57} The festival was depicted in five youth
event drawings, the sole subject of two, and it was described or listed in 13 of the
17 writing entries.\textsuperscript{58}

Despite its unification of Lusaka’s Hindus, Diwali is also celebrated
independently by vernacular associations. In a *Samachar* article entitled, ‘How
Lusaka Celebrates’, five associations – LHA, the Tamil, Karnataka, and Telegu
associations and the Maharashtra Mandal – describe their own customs.\textsuperscript{59}
Moreover, Diwali and other events are also practiced by sets of kin and friends – as
one interviewee put it, ‘within the group that you move’.\textsuperscript{60} All of these celebrations,
however, are enacted either in private houses or in the few established Hindu
spaces. Vertovec classified Hindu practices in Surinam, Trinidad and Guyana into
six ‘forms’, following from which HAZ’s Diwali event would constitute an ‘official’
form, being ‘directly undertaken by the central national organisation’. The
vernacular associations’ practices would be ‘alternative official forms’, and
practices organised by smaller sets would be ‘collective forms’ (2000: 58–9).
Vertovec uses these classifications to understand the ‘extent of institutionalisation’
of Hindu religious practice. In his analysis, the way in which different sites of
activity (temples, stages, sports grounds, houses) are negotiated by different sets of
groups is underemphasised. His ordering nevertheless helps describe collective

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with R.K., 27 January 2008. Of the 100 families in ZMCA, there are 15 Hindus, 1 Muslim
and the rest are Christian. Note also that there are 4 active members of LHA: the others will almost
certainly be members, because LHA’s annual or lifetime fee entitles members to use of Hindu Hall
and significantly less expensive cremations and other religious services. Interview with S.P., 6 June
2007.

\textsuperscript{58} Drawings 1, 2, 5, 9 and 10, Appendix B.


\textsuperscript{60} Interview with R.K., 27 January 2008.
cultural activity in Lusaka, and raises questions about how certain aspects of Hindu culture become emphasised and publically displayed more than others.

Different patterns of behaviour have developed as appropriate in different spaces. In spaces that are not shared, such as the CPS clubhouse and IHC premises, this is emphasised. Three renditions of Holi and Dhuleti Dharmaka, the twinned festivals of spring, fire and colour, in 2007 highlight this. The first was a Holi luncheon run by LILA, exclusively for members and invited guests. It was held at the IHC. One woman called, ‘Let’s play Holi!’, a game of throwing coloured dye at one another. But several women called ‘Shh!’, and one said, ‘No high jinks! No, leave that for Hindu Hall - we are civilised here.”

Second, then, LHA organised festivities at Hindu Hall. Although open to all, the crowd was predominantly Gujarati, and the ceremony was conducted in Gujarati: in effect, Hindu Hall was a quasi-private space on this occasion (in the same way that Lotus is on, say, Friday nights). Women formed a prayer circle around a burning effigy and children ran wild casting brightly coloured powders at one another, as was discouraged at the IHC. Third, the following day CPS organised a Dhuleti Dharmaka lunch at their clubhouse, for members only. Children brought dyed water in toy machine guns, but they were limited to the yard: one woman said, ‘Here it’s “don’t spoil the walls!”’. So children are restricted. Not like at Hindu Hall, and not like in India.”

According to William Shack, ‘Ritual and symbol are not explanatory social processes; they are expressions of them’ (1979: 42). Different rituals at cultural events like Holi express the ways in which space has become exclusive and culture

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is adapting. While intra-community divisions are expressed and maintained such rituals and spaces, so too is the very diversity that symbolises ‘Indianness’ itself. In this sense, weak sites are, like weak ties, just as important as strong ones in keeping the ethnic network together.

‘Moving in Safe Circles’: Private Schools, Recreation and Shopping

One of the projects of LHA has been the purchase of Nkhwazi School, a prestigious primary school in Rhodes Park. It is, said one of its Executive Committee, the Association’s ‘Golden Egg’. In the LHA magazine, Samachar, the ‘Nkhwazi Saga’ was closely followed. Much of the drama behind its purchase and subsequent management involved internal politics, but there were also problems wrapped around the space itself – as prime real estate in the centre of the city, it was extremely costly. Nevertheless, it was purchased in 1998, through donations from the community, at which time the Nkhwazi Educational Trust was established consisting of associations representing the ‘Hindu Community at large’. Although a secular school and open to all who can afford its fees, it is highly symbolic as a site of Hindus’ ‘contribution’ to Zambian education. Other Indian-owned schools are dotted around the city and country. Hindu children, however, are not sent exclusively to these establishments, although the vast majority of those I spoke with attended one of Lusaka’s many private schools. Private schools are regarded as safe spaces, and, naturally, feature strongly in the formative experiences of

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63 Visit to Nkwhazi with I.D., 13 March 2007.
young Hindus in Lusaka. I analyse school experience as a force of generational and community adaptation and change in Chapter 6. In mapping areas of the city in which Hindus move, however, these schools are important (if weak) sites of activity. They link the community to an array of different social networks. Notably, they are places where financial means exclude a majority of Zambians; like others who can afford private school fees, most Hindus enjoy excellent education in a secure space. Contact with those outside of this socio-economic bracket is limited.

Other sites of strong and weak Hindu activity frequented on a regular basis include recreational places. Examples (there are of course dozens) include other South Asian association premises, such as the Guru Nanak (Sikh) temple and the Buddhist Centre. Non-South Asian clubs and clubhouses are central to the social lives of Hindus, too, especially for men: these include the Lions, Rotary, and Masons, and sports clubs like the Lusaka Golf Club or the car-racing tracks on the edge of town. Cafés, restaurants and five star hotels around the city are used for lunching, coffee meetings, and cultural events (for instance, a LILA fashion show, which I discuss in Chapter 7, was held in the Taj Pamodzi Hotel). One informant divulged of the Intercontinental Hotel, ‘we could practically hold LHA meetings in the gym here – so many Hindus are members!’.

Four youth drawings included the Kafue temple, an Amman (South Indian) style sanctuary (see Drawings 1, 4, 7 and 11). Kafue is a town south of Lusaka, with a small population of Hindus. Its family-run temple, of remarkable design, attracts frequent Hindu visitors from Lusaka. Other day trips include Mundawanga (a botanical garden and animal sanctuary in Chilanga, another town south of Lusaka), and Sandy’s Creations, a secured garden

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centre with a small play park and café. One woman told me that it was better for Hindus to:

keep to Indian places or places where whites or, ok, richer Zambians go, places with security gates, you know – then you know you’re moving in safe circles.¹⁶

Indeed, what these places have in common is their security systems: fees are paid, or prices are high, or security guards monitor the gates and car parks. Racial tension between Hindus and black Zambians is unlikely. According to Fischer, urban living makes people distance themselves from the ‘unknown, dissimilar, and potentially threatening’ (1981: 315). There is not necessarily anything specifically Hindu about the use of such spaces, but the sites are important in tracing everyday movements of Hindus around the city.

Among the most obvious ‘quasi-private’ spaces that affluent Hindus visit for recreation and retail are Western-style shopping malls. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, since Zambian independence, down town has been lined with Indian-owned, and Indian-run, shops. Although down town remains cosmopolitan, its popularity for middle-class customers dropped steeply throughout the years of Kaunda’s Second Republic (1972–1991). Multiparty democracy and economic liberalisation from the early 1990s onwards ushered in new retail alternatives. By this time, ‘walking about the city centre had become sheer agony for shoppers and pedestrians alike’ (Hansen, 2004: 62). South African and other international initiatives led to the ‘concretisation’ (Benjamin cited in Shields, 1989: 57) of new regional economic aspirations in Southern Africa, including, in 1999, Zambia’s first modern mall, Manda Hill. Shopping galleries or arcades, often with shop fronts to a communal corridor or a small, fenced-in car park, are not new features of the city –

examples from the 1980s include buildings along the main street, Cairo Road, and from the early 1990s include Northmeads, Longacres, Kabulonga, and Woodlands. Manda Hill and other malls such as Arcades and Crossroads, however, represent a more socially exclusive shopping experience. As part of a ‘new, post-apartheid moment in southern Africa’ (Miller, 2006: 29), these malls accommodate large international, often South African chain stores such as Shoprite, Spar, and Game, and also locally-owned shops. Several of these are Indian, including restaurants and ‘Curry in a Hurry’ take-away. Few Hindus reported shopping down town on a regular basis, although it remains, for the present, the central business district in terms of banking, business and postal headquarters.

Although Hindus refer to malls more often than down town shopping, this is neither unique to them nor devoid of exceptions, and in many cases mall shops do not stock essential products – textiles, full ranges of stationary, spare car parts, reasonably priced toiletries and pharmaceutical products. In fact, I observed many Indians shopping down town. In particular I met many Hindus coming and going from the Indo-Zambian Bank (IZB) on Cairo Road where many hold personal and business accounts; both finances and gossip are transferred here. The IZB is strong symbol of transnational belonging, but most of its Hindu users are long-term residents and citizens of Zambia. Like the bank, successful Indian businesses often have branches both down town and in malls. For customers, malls have safe parking, less risk of petty theft, cleaner walkways, and are places to be seen. On weekday mornings cafés are a meeting place for affluent housewives and professionals alike. Miller wrote, ‘To sit at one of the mall’s restaurants is to sup at

69 Interview with Chairman of IZB, Cyril Patro, 27 April 2007.
the table of globalisation and its attendant cosmopolitan sophistications’ (2002: 5, 2003). At weekends mall car parks are a hang-out place for young Indians: one participant in the writing competition quipped, ‘When came Shoprite and all in 1995/ Indians finally thought they were alive!’ Malls, or the Shoprite and Game stores that epitomise them for young users, were captured in four youth writing entries, 14 photographs and three drawings. At the Arcades mall there is a trendy cinema, of which four youth took photos. In many conversations with Hindus about cinema-going, I was only told twice about the Indian filmhouse downtown on Chachacha Road. One of the youth photos is of this cinema. Chapter 5 returns to how these spaces relate to age generations. Malls and other quasi-private spaces are, though, for all users, places of safety and ‘convenience’ as well as key sites in the ‘game of urban ascendancy’ (Shields, 1989: 154, 149).

Section 3. Being a Stranger in the City: Perceiving Outside Spaces

So far this chapter has analysed how different sites across Lusaka have reflected and structured Hindu activity, and how Hindus have negotiated among themselves in sharing limited Hindu-specific spaces. In this last section, I examine how Hindus negotiate and interpret their use of ‘uncertain’ urban space within wider Lusaka society. One criticism of stranger theory is that the stranger’s status as an outsider is defined in relation to a ‘host’ (just as diaspora is defined in relation to ‘home’). But a ‘stranger’ relationship is sometimes mutual, and hinges on mutually-articulated boundaries. A city itself, for example, can be a ‘world of strangers’ (Levine, 1979: 35). Wider social and political relationships are addresses in Chapter

71 Drawings 3, 4 and 7, Appendix B.
7, but here are introduced some important underlying ideas about urban life, status and purity, and Hindus’ desired projections of inter-racial relations, by examining first a market place, and second the ‘street’.

**Interpreting Culture through Space: The Tuesday Market**

Tuesday Market is an important Hindu institution in Lusaka. It began in the grounds of Hindu Hall in the mid-1990s as both an outlet for Hindu farmers’ vegetable produce and a safe alternative to established city markets and sprawling stalls on city centre streets, where Hindu women felt subjected to verbal abuse, health risks and petty thieving.\(^{72}\) The small weekly event became popular with a wide spectrum of customers, predominantly Indian, and including occasional tourists. During this period, however, street vending in Lusaka was reaching its peak (Hansen, 2004). Fairly quickly, Tuesday Market was commandeered by non-Hindu hawkers and street vendors, who sold vegetables at competitive prices and meat products that offended Hindu sensibilities. LHA’s committee promptly barred all sellers from its Hindu Hall premises. The Market, being popular among Indians, merely moved to the road and vacant land next to Hindu Hall. Vendors were requested by LHA to clean up after themselves and not to sell meat, fish or animals.\(^{73}\) But, according to an article written in *Samachar* in 1997:

> They carried on doing so with impunity. So much so that one of the vendors even let live goats inside the confines of the Mandir to feed on the lawn grown there. Also feathers and insides of chickens were found in the temple area. This disgusting behaviour was the last straw. [...] Also, with day’s business over, the area was left by vendors and some of our own farmers looking like a garbage pit. The smell of rotting vegetables and urine became part of the landscape.\(^{74}\)

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\(^{73}\) Interview with D., 20 January 2008.

In 1997, having attempted to negotiate with vendors on an individual level, LHA called upon the Lusaka City Council to close the Market down; armed police forces oversaw the process. Such attempts to ‘clean up’ city centre streets and market areas elsewhere were only temporarily successful, until police and paramilitary forces were also deployed in 1999 (Hansen, 2004: 62). In a complaint letter to *Samachar*, one Hindu gentleman expressed dismay that the ‘forceful removal of marketeers by paramilitary was initiated by our LHA’, an act he regarded as ‘short-sighted’ and detrimental to the ‘majority of the Hindu Community for the benefit of a few members whose surroundings were subject to disturbances and filth’. The Market’s popularity among Hindu buyers, however, drove it, once more, to other spots. It currently takes places in the grounds of St. Peter’s Church in Kabwata (a short drive from Kamwala) where a small entry fee for buyers and licenced sellers and the presence of local attendants ensures that the car park and market building are kept relatively clean and safe.

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Fluent in ciNyanja, Lusaka’s local tongue, one young Hindu woman haggles weekly for green chillies, okra, dried pulses, and a long list of vegetables for one of the local Muslim Indian restaurants. She also gets orders from Indian aunties in Livingstone for ingredients that other markets do not sell, including spices for specific Indian recipes. She said that she enjoyed ‘the banter’ and ‘chance to keep my ciNyanja going’, and added that she wouldn’t ‘feel so at ease’ or ‘assured of quality’ in other city markets. Most early and evening customers are Indian and Chinese, and the vendors black Zambian women and young men, although there were also Chinese-run stalls. Although the pattern was already changing as more Chinese immigrants were coming to Lusaka, the city’s Chinese restaurants are

76 Conversation with D.P., 19 February 2008.
often run by Indians.\footnote{Zambia Trade Directory (2005, 2006, 2007).} Hindus eat out at and own a range of restaurants, but mainly at Indian ones, where most prefer the menu and there is a high level of trust in hygiene standards. One friend, a second-wave incomer in his thirties, said, ‘Where else? Not Chinese, it’s odd, vegetables floating in the soup, no flavour!’. Chinese menus in Indian restaurants were ‘modified to our taste’, he claimed.\footnote{Conversation with D. and M.A., 3 July 2007.} His wife, a third-generation first-wave Hindu, agreed, adding, ‘Plus, you know where the food came from – not an unclean place downtown. Probably Tuesday Market.’\footnote{Conversation with D. and M.A., 3 July 2007.} An eleven-year-old participant in the writing project explained that her family doubted the cleanliness of food from other markets, when she wrote that Hindus ‘mostly buy our groceries from here [Tuesday Market]/ with no doubts to clear’.\footnote{Writing Entry 5. Conversation with Participant 5, 17 January 2008.} Hygiene and purity have religious significance for many Hindus, and are linked to caste status (see Chapter 5). The cleanliness of Tuesday Market goods are monitored to some degree, through control of the space in which they are sold. The economic chain is important here; because Indians own small farming outlets and food enterprises, they demand their own ‘alternative regulatory standard’ from other chains (Abrahams 2007: 103).
Notably, an Indian buyer is depicted in only one of six youth drawings of Tuesday Market (Figure 10): the others concentrate on black Zambian vendors.\(^{81}\)

When discussing her drawing, one thirteen-year-old participant told me, ‘[Tuesday Market] is nice because we can mix with Zambians who aren’t Indian.’\(^{82}\) In 8 of 17 writing entries, Tuesday Market was mentioned. One nine-year-old wrote, ‘There is Zambian trust, all poor people go there.’\(^ {83}\)

Remarkably, an eighteen-year-old participant wrote, ‘Kamwala and Tuesday Market are important because we can interact with Zambian minorities. Around 60% of the population of Lusaka is Indian.’\(^ {84}\) In two other essays, younger participants claimed that Indians occupied 30% and 25% of the Zambian population, respectively.\(^ {85}\) These claims prompted a discussion with participants at the event, in which it was clear that many are not often exposed to genuinely

\(^{81}\) Drawings 3, 4, 5, 8, 17, 18, Appendix B.
public places. Young people’s interpretations of their ethnic presence, and of
market sites and opportunities for interaction with non-Indian Zambians are
instructive, even where naïve. They bring to mind Furnivall’s rendering of
pluralism: ‘As individuals they meet but only in the market place in buying and
selling’ (Furnivall [1948] 1956, 304).

Most Hindu market-goers are, however, adults whose social networks are
wider than their children’s. For them, racial interaction is not a purpose of market
shopping. Tuesday Market is a site affiliated with their own community and with
relative safety and cleanliness; they would be unlikely on grounds of socio-
economic class and education to interact socially with black Zambian market
sellers anyway. The site, especially having moved into church premises, is not a
strong cultural boundary marker (as Hindu Hall and the IHC are). Rather, the site is
representative of what Monica Wilson saw as ‘frontiers of conflicting social
systems’, within which ‘stranger’ communities act as ‘interpreters’ (quoted in
Shack, 1979: 47). Rutherford described how ‘interrelationships of difference are
marked by translation and negotiation’ (1990: 26), and Hall similarly applied this to
Sikh youth in Britain who ‘negotiate often contradictory cultural experiences’
through ‘everyday acts of translation’ (2002: 5). Tuesday Market is a strong site of
Hindu activity not because it represents distinct Hindu identity in Zambia, but
because it is where some of the boundaries of this identity are translated on a one-
to-one level to a very different set of Lusaka residents.
The Street
Almost every youth writing entry described positive interracial unity or friendship, which was also conveyed in six of the children’s drawings. The panel judges approved of this message, and awarded merit to those who included it. One picture showed pupils of different racial backgrounds holding hands at school (Drawing 2), another depicted friends round a table at Diwali (Drawing 9), and one was of an Indian and black Zambian football player wearing each other’s T-shirts after a match at the Lotus Club (Drawing 21). The projection of positive inter-group relations was obviously important among this set of youth. The most realistic depiction of cultural interaction, not specifically referencing race, was a drawing of two ceremonies, one Zambian and one Indian – Kuomboka and Diwali, respectively (Drawing 19). This, in which the symbols were together but apart, captures the

![Figure 11. Detail from Drawing 8, 'Four Images of Indian Life in Zambia'](image)

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86 Drawings 2-7, Appendix B.
ideas of pluralism and cultural ‘nearness and remoteness’ to which I return in Chapter 7. The most unrealistic depiction of interracial interaction, on account of where it was placed, was of a Hindu, Muslim Indian, and black Zambian shaking hands together on the roadside (see Figure 11). Artistic licence aside, the picture highlights a very important space in Hindu community life in Lusaka: the public street. It is not how Hindus use this space that is central here – it is how they perceive of and avoid it.

As noted in Chapter 1, cars are important features of Hindus’ lives in Lusaka. Two sets of film taken by young Hindus included images of personal drivers who take them to school. In a third film, photographs were taken of a street from inside a car (Figure 1 in Chapter 1). An entry in the youth writing competition described:

Ladies, especially housewives are not able to go out during the week days. They are depended [sic] on their husband which is not possible on week days. Ladies cannot walk on roads.88

Two youth drawings depict why this is perceived to be the case. In the first, an Indian woman is on the street with a young black man wielding a knife; she pleads for her life as he tries to steal her possessions (Figure 12). In the second, an Indian women’s handbag is being taken by a small boy, and another woman is being accosted by two black men stealing jewellery. A caption reads, 'Indians are not able to walk on the streets of Zambia. [They are always] scared while walking. They have to depend on car[s] for everything' (Figure 13). Roads and cars were consequently strongly represented as part of ‘Indian Life in Zambia’: cars featured in seven drawings, and in four, roads or cars link multiple sites (see Drawings 2, 3, 4 and 7). The Lusaka street is perceived as a place of personal danger, in which there

is risk of theft, violence, disease and racial discrimination, and in which children and women are particularly vulnerable. 

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**Figure 12. Detail from Drawing 22, ‘Indian Life in Zambia (VII)’**

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**Figure 13. Detail from Drawing 24, ‘Indian Life in Zambia (V)’**

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In order to avoid portraying the Hindu community as acting homogenously in this regard, as a group of paranoid individuals, it is worth stressing that other ethnic minorities and relatively privileged or vulnerable sets of people behave in similar, cautious ways with regards to personal safety in Lusaka. Most middle-class people avoid the ‘compounds’, Lusaka’s less salubrious residential areas; and although the shabeen-like drinking holes in Thornpark (dubbed a Coloured area) are visited by some multiracial, middle-class friendship groups, they are avoided by most individuals. Particularly for those who lived through the 1980s in Lusaka, crime is a sensitive issue. One reason why the shopping malls are so popular among the Lusaka élite is because, ‘Being in the tightly policed, semiprivate interior of a mall is quite different from being “on the street”’ (Shields, 1989: 148–9). Avoiding this space in some people’s minds is linked to avoiding particular (racially-marked) social relationships. One interviewee told me that Hindu children can play with house servants’ children in their gardens, but are not allowed to play with them outside the gates, or visit black school friends’ houses after school, ‘because of the areas they might live in’. The conversation continued:

J.M.H. So, how does this affect how young people feel about the area outside their house, do you think?

R.K: Well, you’re in an outside context, so you know it’s not safe... How many Indian parents will freely tell their child, ‘no you go out, play with that, eh, that local Zambian boy’? I really doubt it.

J.M.H: Why is that?

R.K: Partly it’s security, partly we don’t understand them. No, okay, main thing is for security. It’s not safe outside.\(^{90}\)

In studies of youth, ethnicity, and public spaces, the street is often posited as an adult construct, which young people occupy without authoritative adult consent.

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Young people’s ‘larking about’ on the streets or in malls is ‘a form of youth resistance (conscious and unconscious) to adult power’ (Skelton and Valentine, 1998: 7). While this may be the case of Hindu youth in secure shopping mall car parks, it is not the case of Hindu youth on the street in Lusaka: no negotiation of ethnicity or resistance to parental authority takes place here. In some cases, though, Lusaka’s streets have been contested sites for Indians as a community. As Hansen describes in her chapter, ‘Who Rules the Streets?’, Indians in Kamwala objected to City Council action in 1999 to reallocate plots in the Kamwala Market area, claiming that they had been given the space by the previous administration (2004: 74–5). In another case, residents of Luburma complained to authorities that Burma Road and other streets in the Second Class Area were being used by ‘non-local traffic’ during rush hour, damaging ‘our roads’ and ‘reducing safety’.91 Young people’s accounts of positive relationships with all Zambians, trust in ‘the poor’ at Tuesday Market, interracial brotherhood, and so on, contrast sharply with depictions of how different spaces across the city are used. Public spaces are regarded as sites of insecurity, against which Hindus need to guard themselves and their privacy. The most arresting of the youth drawings, entitled ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, speaks for itself in illustrating this (Figure 14):

Conclusion

Both the previous chapter and this one attend to the allocation, negotiation and use of space as a vital factor in the construction and maintenance of the Hindu ethnic network. A look inside the term ‘Hindu’ in contemporary Lusaka reveals layers of association, activity, negotiation and complexity. In Kamwala and Luburma both historical and contemporary movement and inertia result in a mix of high and low-income businesses and residencies, socio-economic classes, and races. Visiting Hindus’ homes and family life restores the idea that the Hindu migrant network is bound together by shared concepts, in a ‘world of practice’ and perceptions. Further, Hindu identity is embedded and acted out in ordinary activity. Space, in terms of its location, history and nature, is important not only as a symbol of Hindu practice, but also in structuring Hindu practice. The allocation of space, the way it is negotiated and shared, and the way some sites are kept exclusive, has helped to produce strong and weak sites of activity. Strong sites,
Chapter 4

such as Hindu Hall, Lotus or CPS, are where the network’s core values and shared concepts are practiced and intensified. Weak sites, however, serve a diluted communal interest, because activity is shared with groups outside the network – these include shopping malls, work places, and also the Indian High Commission. Recall that weak ties, ‘unite diverse networks and increase the resources available to network members’ (Grieco, 1998: 705). Weak sites, correspondingly, are where diverse networks meet and resources are accessed: private schools and shopping malls are core examples of these. Importantly, it is not necessarily anything inherent about the site itself that makes it stronger or weaker. At certain times, ordinarily strong sites of Hindu practice can be weakened, such as regular tennis lessons taking place at the Lotus Sports Club. Nevertheless, both strong and weak sites help to maintain strong and weak interpersonal ties within the ethnic network, helping it (and to some degree cultural pluralism itself) persist. Chapter 6 analyses further some of the data on school experiences, and Chapter 7 fleshes out the Hindu community’s interaction with wider society (touching on relations with whites, non-Hindu Indians and Chinese) and what have been termed ‘diaspora spaces’. Before that, the thesis examines lines of fragmentation within Hindu community life in Lusaka itself.
Chapter 5

Open Discourse, Silent Voices and the Elephant in the Room: Fragmentation in Lusaka’s Hindu Community

Introduction
The previous two chapters have demonstrated that there is sufficient cohesion within the Lusaka Hindu community to treat it as a distinct community, although continuing to dispute that the Hindu minority in Zambia forms a quantifiable ‘diaspora’ entity. So far, in sketching a history and mapping Hindu spaces in the city, this thesis has acknowledged important fissures within Hindu community life. These fissures prompted some informants to contest the Hindu label itself: one went so far as to say it ‘doesn’t mean anything, it was imposed by outsiders who didn’t look inside’.

The purpose of this chapter and the following one is to look inside, and analyse four main fragmentary and structural forces and their impact on Hindu ethnic practice in Lusaka. Certainly, among the Lusaka Hindu community there are engrained, observable divisions, some of which, as already explained, are reflected and reinforced in cultural associations and use of space. Additionally, it is argued here, community differences are frequently broken down and reconfigured by those affected by them, through what they say and how they represent themselves. Here, then, I continue to validate my epistemological and methodological choice of situational analysis aiming for Adele Clarke’s goal to ‘represent the heterogeneity of positions taken in the situation’ and within certain discourses (2005: 25, 32–3). As explained in Chapter 2, Mitchell’s situational analysis requires two processes: first, identifying the arena in which actors are placed and

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behave and second, ‘an appreciation of the set of meanings the actors themselves attribute to the behaviour’ (1987: 17). Identified here are four intertwining divisions that were discussed, with varying degrees of reticence and renitence, by Lusaka Hindus. Each exposes ‘inherent limits’ of the ‘Hindu’ category circumscribed (Shukla, 2001). This chapter looks at three of these: generation, gender and caste. It also mentions throughout a fourth persisting division, that between first wave ‘residents’ and second wave ‘expatriates’, which is the subject of the following chapter.

**Section 1. Open Discourse: Generation**

In this first section two intertwining meanings of ‘generation’ are explained:
geneneration as age cohort and as a measurement of immigrant belonging. These are complicated further by the ongoing process of successive ‘waves’ of Hindu incomers to Zambia. The chapter teases apart different layers of meanings in order to understand complexities and contradictions within the Hindu community (Strauss, [1969] 1979: 135–8. See also Rumbaut, 2004). The first section looks at intergenerational conflict, the second at cross-generational action and apathy, and the third at connections to India and implications of generation for the migrant network.

**Representing Intergenerational Conflicts**

During my research it was not uncommon for older Hindus to lament the behaviour of Hindu youth. In turn, young Hindus rolled their eyes at elders bound by ‘tradition’. These relations are those Strauss lists as explicit, vertical, and ‘running both ways’ ([1969] 1979: 136). They are not new: Dotson and Dotson described of the 1950s, ‘a marked apathy and spiritlessness in the African-born
generation’ of Hindus who dreamt ‘openly’ of careers outside their fathers’ hard-
earned businesses (1968: 214). More often than not, however, the young people
Dotson and Dotson described did in the end, through family pressure and limited
opportunities elsewhere, follow their fathers into family business. Two young
brothers I interviewed, whose father had wished to be a doctor, pitied the older age
generation’s career course, saying, ‘I mean, there’s dad, still sitting looking at the
till.’ And a middle-aged businessman who on one hand lamented the younger
generation’s indifference to Hindu culture and history, on the other described his
own adolescent ambitions and antics in ‘the era of rock and roll’. However,
comparing 1950s experiences of generational divisions to contemporary Hindu
traders’ lives says as much about changing aspirations as it does about the
sameness of youth’s attitudes over time. Hindu businessmen in Lusaka today tend
overwhelmingly to want their children to receive higher education, usually abroad,
and enter the professions, not the trades (Chapter 7 returns to this when
addressing onward migration). Children and young people are encouraged to do
well at school and in after-school activities rather than devote time to gaining
work experience in family shops. Schooling has long been recognised in studies of
immigrant integration as contributing to different generational levels of
adaptation, and cultural rifts between ‘first generation’ migrants and their children
(Hansen, 1952, Smolicz, 1981, Portes and Zhou, 1993, Portes and Schauffler, 1994,
Already, in discussing school experiences of first wave adults during colonialism

\(^2\) Interview with O., 7 March 2007. This trend is also evidenced in analysis of Bhatt’s catalogue.
\(^3\) Interview with K.P., J.P. and M.P., 13 July 2007.
\(^4\) Interview with H.D., 30 November 2006.
and in viewing some contemporary private schools in Lusaka, differences in social relationships and access to wider society sets parents and their children apart. Education and school experience explains in part some diverging values among age generations in Lusaka’s Hindu community – this is revisited in the next chapter.

Such divergences, in values, attitudes and behaviour, are publicly displayed and even objectified (Miller, 1998: 19). At HAZ’s 2007 Sports Day, aural and visual contrasts between age generations were striking. Quasi-American and British accents floated among English-speaking Hindu teenagers who huddled in cliques, as opposed to the adults who milled more evenly but spoke mainly in Gujarati. One teenage group brazenly ordered pizzas instead of eating the Indian food provided. According to Jack Goody, eating is ‘a way of placing oneself in relation to others’ (1982: 37). Here, it distinguished a set of teenagers from parents and made them stand out amongst peers. As I sketched in the previous chapter, teenage Hindus use space across the city differently from their parents: teenagers gravitate more towards the fast food restaurants, bars, non-Indian eating places, and cinemas serving non-Indian snack food. Understanding the ways different age generations appear can help to analyse boundaries among them. Gregory Stone describes age as a ‘universe of appearance’, a substratum of community itself. His focus is on clothing (1970: 229–30). At Sports Day, teenage girls in particular contrasted visually with the age generation above them, the former wearing non-Indian clothes and the latter, for the most part, wearing Indian dress, albeit also casual (Figures 15 and 16). In short, exposure (direct or indirect) to British and North

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5 By casual I mean that they wore shalwar kameez, in polyester rather than cotton, and in favour of saris or pavades, although often Hindus in Lusaka wear shalwar kameez formally too. For a brief
American lifestyles, diets and material values was openly flaunted by the teenage generation; this contrasted to their parents’, particularly their mothers’, display of Indian cultural norms.

Figure 15. Younger generation at HAZ Sports Day 2007

Shukla explores the prevalent assumption of an age generation divide in migrant communities using a *National Geographic* image of a Hindu mother and her second generation daughter in the United States wearing a sari and leather cat suit, respectively (2003: 3). Although married, middle-aged and older Hindu women in Lusaka also tend to wear ‘traditional’ Indian clothes, such as saris and shalwar kameez, there is not an immediately obvious delineation in attire between immigrant generations, and there are certainly individual exceptions cutting across all age and immigrant generation categories. Conversely, among Hindu men the second-wave, ‘expatriate’ set are far more likely than first-wave ‘residents’ to wear Indian clothes, including younger men and teenagers. The exception to this is that older age, first-generation Hindus who came in the first wave prior to
Zambian independence (the ‘pioneers’) often wear kurta shirts or kurta pyjamas. Different choices of clothing here also indicate different uses of space. A mother in a sari is not likely to frequent the places where the trend was for leatherwear; nor would her daughter likely wear her cat suit around their family home. There is also a methodological challenge in assessing universes of appearance through observation. In Lusaka, for instance, young women in more conservative home circumstances are likely to wear ‘traditional’ Indian clothes more frequently but are also likely to appear at the shops, bars and cinema at the public malls less often: therefore the impression from observation in public spaces that younger age generation women wear non-Indian clothes is skewed by the public nature of the space itself.

This visual division, incorporating age, immigrant generations and migrant waves, is evidenced elsewhere, too. One study of widows in the UK shows that older women are more ritualistic than younger women in their attitudes towards grieving processes, particularly regarding conduct and dress. One young, second generation widow in the study chose not to appear in public wearing white, the customary colour of grief in Hindu culture, causing a rift with her mother. A third woman explained this is terms of age generation: ‘because her mother is old she is finding it hard to believe that anyone could grieve inside when they look so colourful outside’ (Firth, 1999: 108). These issues raise an important question of representation: are conduct and clothing the representations or the roots of generational divides? Hall, among others, suggests that identity should not be treated as a ‘given’, but rather as a ‘production’, ‘which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation’ (1990: 222).
In this sense, generation divisions are both represented and rooted in conduct and clothing. The trends detailed above, and the exceptions to them, challenge shared cultural norms but also rework and reinforce them. At one event, the presence of a young Hindu ‘cad’ indoctrinated into Western and white Zambian ways of life, impelled several older age people to make comments such as, ‘He’s Hindu but you won’t learn anything about our community from talking to him’, and ‘He doesn’t represent us.’ Younger informants disagreed, pointing out that this individual was clearly part of their community: he demonstrated his commitment to helping at the event, spoke Gujarati, lived with his parents in an Indian-dominated neighbourhood, and although he worked for a white Zambian company he shared his contacts there with Hindu traders. Through his behaviour – which falls outside the moral unity desired by older community members – and reactions to his behaviour from different age groups a most important aspect of the age-generational divide becomes apparent. That is, within it and its representations, the core of the community is broken down, reconfigured, produced. As Rumbaut noted, ‘generational cohorts and their sociodevelopmental contexts matter in processes of adaptation and social mobility’ (2004: 1199). I reiterate and expand upon this important point in the following chapter on subgroup distinctions and ethnic adaptation.

**Cross-Generational Action and Apathy**

There is contradiction within the community itself over which age generation leads in action, which in apathy. Empirical evidence indicates no clear links

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between age or immigrant generations and activity in Hindu associations. Most Hindus in Lusaka are paid-up members of LHA. Annual or life membership is relatively inexpensive, and includes cremation and other services. Non-members have to pay a significant fee for cremations, so there is an incentive for families to join, although only a small proportion of non-committee members are active (regularly volunteering or taking responsibility) within the Association. The ex-president of LHA attributed lack of involvement to a ‘generation gap’, explaining, ‘there’s a lot of apathy.’ Importantly, he levelled a (perceived) downturn in activity not against his children’s age generation, but against his own. His children’s generation were implicated, too: in the past, he recalled, young people would ‘go with our fathers, go to the movies, and we were interested in doing something’, but, he stressed, it was the adults who took initiative. Later on, talking about the provision of food at association events, he again invoked this ‘generation gap’:

[In the] early days [...] we used to go ourselves to cook. So, say if you’re having potatoes, you have to go early and boil all the potatoes, peel off all the skins, put them in the pot. We as children used to do that, we used to go at five o’clock in the morning, and it was fun for us, we used to really enjoy it. But now, there’s a different generation, different way of doing it – people want to order from a catering business [...].8

This is an example, he asserted, of the way parents of young people are not indoctrinating interest and involvement in the association and Hindu cultural practices. Another example was the poor turnout at HAZ Sports Day. A young adult expatriate alleged that the ‘Guju kids’ (third or fourth immigrant generation of the first immigrant wave) were less inclined to take part in Hindu club events for ‘cultural’ reasons: that they had adapted differently, and away from Indian ways.9

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8 Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007.
9 Conversation at D.’s house, 21 February 2008.
To what extent, then, do succeeding immigrant generations lose their connection and interest in ‘homeland’ culture? Some studies claim that there is an ‘ethnic resurgence’ among third generation immigrants. As Marcus Lee Hansen famously wrote, ‘what the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember’ (1952: 495). This is expanded upon, and disputed, more fully in the following chapters. To some degree, though, younger Hindus with first-wave roots do display disinterest in the religious and cultural aspects of Hinduism, as the ex-President of LHA expressed. However, in some cases, as individuals age, they ‘return to’, or in this case take on, tradition (Lindridge et al., 2004: 21). This is not always the case: the Chairman of the Lotus Sports Club (an important figure in Hindu life in Lusaka, and third-generation Zambian), did not recall the meaning of a nine-day festival, Navratri, held in Lotus grounds. He said,

Er, it’s where people dance round and round. [...] it’s the festival for, eh, um, I forget now. [...] But after the nine days we have a disco at the Club, we have all the disco lights and the younger crowds come. The theme is the same but it’s a lot more relaxed, and you can buy [alcoholic] drinks and what-have-you.\(^\text{10}\)

The emphasis for him is the social rather than the cultural or religious aspect of the festival, which he described vaguely as the ‘theme’, and which involves worship of female deities and incorporates a fast. It is the social aspect, too, that attracts ‘younger crowds’. Similarly, when I asked one woman at the Holi celebrations what the festival was about she replied, ‘I have no expertise!’ Another said, ‘I don’t know. I am an import in India. I was born and bred on this continent.’\(^\text{11}\)

On the other hand, many second-generation adults are keenly involved in the preservation of cultural knowledge and ties, such as those who have pushed for a

\(^{10}\) Interview with J.J., 14 May 2007.

\(^{11}\) Conversation with B., 3 March 2007.
history of their community to be written. It is also true that multiple factors influence the level of an association's involvement over time: LILA's membership figures fluctuate considerably, which one member attributed to the role of individual incoming chairpersons.\(^\text{12}\) Clifford noted that 'at different times in their history, societies may wax and wane in diasporism, depending on changing possibilities – obstacles, openings, antagonisms, and connections – in their host countries and transnationally' (1997: 249. See also Smith, 2003: 746). In addition, membership and participation of LHA or Lotus events may not prove the most reliable gauge of interest in 'homeland' culture. There is resistance by adults and young people alike against LHA itself on the grounds that it is not felt to represent all its members. Non-Gujarati speaking adults, mostly 'expatriates', do not tend to be active in LHA because, as I have alluded to and demonstrate in the next chapter, it is regarded as a 'Gujarati club' dominated by earlier migrants. They are not 'apathetic', however, since they likely take part in vernacular associations, such as the Malayalee or Tamil associations, with their families. Their children are generally encouraged to take part in Yuvas United, the only Hindu youth group available.

' Resident' children are less likely to take part altogether. One nineteen-year-old, a third-generation 'resident', told me how she discusses Hinduism with her husband and enjoys taking part in occasional events, but she is too busy 'being herself' to be an active member of any association. 'Being herself' does include Hindu identity, however: she told me that she makes up Indian dances from

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\(^{12}\) LILA Annual Returns forms, 1990-93, 1996-7, 2003-6, ORS/102/35/504, RS. LILA Questionnaire response from I.D.
watching television and said, ‘TV, not LHA, is how we keep up with Indian culture.’

This is supported by the youth writing project, in which eight pieces submitted referred to the Indian television package. One entry described:

Another way in which we are reminded of our motherland is through the television. Many Indian channels like Doorshashan, Sony, 2TV, NDTV, Sun TV and B4U and ZeeTV are broadcast here [sic.] Through these channels we know the latest events in India. We feel closer to home when viewing these channels. Even some Indians who have never been to India love to view these channels to learn about India.  

Yuvas United and Streenikaten, which started to encourage younger people and women into LHA, tend to appeal to those whose connections to India are already strong. My informant explained that she was not much involved in Yuvas, which was mostly for younger, ‘expat’ children. She went on, ‘these associations, they are, well, it’s [an age] generation thing.’ These complexities, which are analysed further in Chapter 6, sufficiently disturb the idea that any single age cohort is more active or apathetic than any other.

**Connections to India and implications for the network**

There are similar assertions in migration literature, that older age generations have stronger ties to ‘homeland’ than younger cohorts. Certainly, the original Hindu settlers in Lusaka have lost land and close kinship ties to Gujarat, and many second or third-generation Hindus have never or rarely visited the sub-Continent, epitomising the ‘lost origins’ of diaspora (Hall and McGrew, 1992). Informants commonly claimed that the ‘older generation’ had stronger homeland ties, or as one interviewee put it, ‘one leg always in India’. A cursory glance at the line-up of

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amateur dance teams for ‘Nritya’, a show organised by LHA’s youth wing, would support this idea. Teenage acts were mostly described as ‘modern’ and ‘global’, and older women’s and some younger children’s acts as ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’ Indian. The team with the eldest participants, from the Lusaka Indian Ladies Association (LILA), physically acted out their ‘ties’ to India using measures of cloth the colours of the Indian national flag (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Women from LILA performing a ‘traditional’ dance at ‘Nritya’. They wore Maharashtran saris, had imported pots as props, and encircled a Maypole decorated in the colours of the Indian flag.

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18 Yuvas United ‘Nritya’ poster at Hindu Hall, 2007, and introductions to acts by the Master of Ceremonies.

19 Conversation with the choreographer, R.N., 10 March 2007.
Figure 18. Young team of 11–13 year-olds at ‘Nritya’. They wore jeans and Indian scarves and jewellery, and danced Bollywood-style to modern Indian music.

Figure 19. A performance of classical instrumental music by three boys at ‘Nritya’
However, at the event itself, the ‘modern’ dances transpired also to have strong Indian themes (Figure 18) and a highlight was a classical instrumental performance by three young musicians (Figure 19). The event programme also contained five pages of text, compiled by young members, on Indian classical dance, and the name of the show itself, a Sanskrit term for the combination of rhythm and expression in dance, represents some desire to display connection or knowledge about Indian culture. The Chairman of Yuvas United wrote in the programme that the group ‘represents the fusion of our old culture to the present day Gen X way of life’. Even if connections to Hindu identity may not exist in the form of direct familial obligations or land ownership, or in ‘traditional forms’, but instead are modernised, ‘symbolic’ or ‘residual’, they nevertheless persist (Smolicz, 1979, 1981, Edwards, 1985).

It is equally inaccurate, though, to suggest that the nature of younger age generations’ ties are solely symbolic or residual. Successive waves of migrants to Zambia mean that some young people have much stronger and more recent connections to Indian families and cultures than longer-settled and older Indians in Lusaka. This is one reason why it is vital to tease apart individual layers of belonging in analysis, rather than to try to forge ‘generations of diaspora’ (Shukla, 2003: 215–6) by ‘lumping together’ age cohorts of different migratory pasts (Rumbaut, 2004: 1160). One eight-year-old participant in the ‘Hindu Life in Lusaka’ project entitled her drawing, ‘We Are in Zambia, but Our Thinking is in India’ (see Figure 20). The picture raises important questions about immigration generations, not least of which might be, which ‘homeland’ anyhow? Most extremely, the first-

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18 Letter from Yuvas United Chairperson in ‘Nritya’ programme, 2007: 5.
generation residents who came in the colonial era by steamer from Bombay have radically departing firsthand experiences of their ‘homeland’ culture from today’s young generation flying in from Mumbai. It is not possible to weigh one’s connections to India against the other. According to Dotson and Dotson, people of different age generations and migration histories will ‘differ importantly in their basic cultural orientation’ (1968: 212). The ‘life stage at point of migration’ is also vital, since individuals will ‘begin their adaptation processes in very different social contexts’ (Rumbaut, 2004: 1164–1167). Generation as ‘age’, then, cannot be untangled from migration history. In his oft-cited novel, *In an Antique Land*, Amitav Ghosh traces the lives of an Indian scholar and the young Indian slave whose story the scholar seeks in the archives of Egypt: the two characters are divided by centuries, but united by essentialised elements of an Indian culture in both. Although Ghosh demands a rethinking of the boundaries of belonging, the two identities he is trying to unite are ultimately incompatible.

Further, lost connections are not irretrievable. Second and third-generation Indians around the globe have been a target for the Government of India’s investment policies since the 1990s (Lessinger, 1992a, Parekh et al., 2003, Landy et al., 2004, Dickinson and Bailey, 2007). By cashing in on new opportunities, some of Lusaka’s second or third immigrant generation, adult-age Hindus have been attached or reattached to old and new networks (something developed in Chapter 7). Within distinct age cohorts of Hindus in Lusaka, then, ties to India are not monomorphic; there are multiple forms of connection.
Certainly the teenage generation – both second and third-generation ‘residents’ and second-generation ‘expatriates’ – are less likely to be involved in Hindu associations, which are, as analysis has shown, regarded as an older age generation or very young generation pastime. One nineteen-year-old informant lamented how ‘we perform rituals and customs without really knowing their religious significance’, but also admitted not having the desire or perceived capacity to rectify this.\footnote{Conversation with M.A., 4 March 2007.} Moreover, younger age generations of all waves of migrants are increasingly developing stronger direct connections to the West and Antipodes rather than/as well as to India. Among young adult ‘resident’ Indians, particularly the men, the question is about ‘how Zambian’ a person is; but for the adolescent set, of all immigrant waves, the question has also started to become
about ‘how Westernised’ or ‘how global’ – even ‘how diaspora’ – people are.\textsuperscript{22}

Rarely was identity described directly in terms of, as Shukla expects, ‘how Indian’ a person feels (2003: 216–7).\textsuperscript{21} This idea of Indianness was discussed in other terms, and can be inferred from youth drawings, where Indian cultures were rooted upon or around maps or natural landscape features of Zambia or Africa.\textsuperscript{24}

Changing and growing connections to India and other countries impact upon the Hindu ethnic network in Lusaka by increasing the natures and circumference of its strong and weak interpersonal ties. Revitalised or new interest in India has provided new access to cultural and economic resources for the network; increased ties to other countries have provided resources in terms of education, marriage opportunities, and consequential upward social mobility. These connections sustain the Hindu community in Lusaka. Schisms between age groups challenge the network but ultimately bring new meanings and dynamism to it, rather than shaking apart the shared concepts and values at its core. This is one invocation of Paul Gilroy’s idea of a ‘changing same’ in diaspora identity (1997: 335–6).\textsuperscript{25} Age-generational divisions are complicated by successive immigrant generations and also by successive waves of migration, as the next chapter will detail. Each age cohort might have features in common, but there is no single shared gaze or consciousness within age generations of Lusaka Hindus. Strauss claimed that ‘the world is different for persons of different age and generation even if they share in common, sex, class, and nationality, and occupation’ ([1969] 1979: 138) – here, he

\textsuperscript{22} The term ‘how diaspora’ was used by R.K., 25 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{21} The main exception was questions posed by the Indian High Commissioner, R.O.Wallang., 10 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{24} Drawings 1, 2, 3, 11, 13, 14, and 26, Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{25} Gilroy borrowed the term from activist/artist LeRoi Jones.
meets Stone (1970) and Shukla (2003) in their analyses. Stone’s ‘universes of appearance’ described age cohorts as sharing distinct outlooks. For him, the world also looked different for people of different genders.

**Section 2. Silent Voices: Gender**

Unlike generation, gender issues were not often discussed openly by participants, and far less so by women than men. As detailed in Chapter 2, there were distinct challenges in seeking women’s views. Questionnaires were not returned, planned focus groups did not assemble, interviews were interminably postponed. This came as no surprise to many male informants, including the Indian High Commissioner who described Hindu women in Zambia as overall more conservative and less literate than Hindu men. The caretaker of Hindu Hall, a confidante for many Hindus, claimed, ‘Traditionally an African woman is not supposed to just open up, discussing their problems with anybody. It’s the same with an Indian woman.’ He saw many similarities in the ‘traditional’ roles of African and Indian women, especially in the arena of cooking. A woman who has recently given birth or is in her monthly cycle, for example, is ‘respected’ and it is acknowledged that she is tired, and so she is ‘not supposed to touch the pot, she must not cook, or pour salt in the pot’. But while femininity is celebrated and respected in Lusaka Hindus’ religion and culture, in practice it is tightly controlled. The language of respect for women is entwined with a language of rules – ‘not supposed to’ and ‘she must not’. Rules of the Hindu home, the caretaker claimed, meant that women did not ‘open up’ without a great deal of trust. In the most severe cases, he said, women

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26 Interview with R.O. Wallang, 5 March 2007.
subjected to domestic abuse feel powerless to talk.\textsuperscript{29} Men’s behaviour, both inside the home and in public spaces, is often overlooked, but women are expected to conform to accepted community norms.\textsuperscript{30} Here the issue of gender and women’s conduct is analysed first through cooking, second through women’s roles in cultural associations, and third through the clothes women wear.

\textbf{Adapting Culture and Community Life Through Cooking}

While the kitchen has been identified in some feminist literature as a space of oppression, it is paradoxically an important space of control and liberation for many migrant women (Longhurst et al., 2009: 338). Among Hindus in Lusaka, the kitchen is nevertheless a gender-dividing domain. House staff to Hindus in Lusaka are often taught Indian cookery: one woman introduced me to her house girl saying, ‘She can cook anything Indian, she knows the words, the method.’\textsuperscript{31} The relationship between house staff and employers is a very important one, although not one addressed in this thesis. One woman talked at length about her traditional kitchenware and family history. In her kitchen she lined up all the utensils that remained from ‘the Zanzibar house’, and which had come originally from India. There were two heavy brass mortars and pestles, an alloy colander, ironware pots and beautifully round steel bowls, a stack of Tiffin containers, an old mincer, battered trays, petite spice grinders, chapatti pans and a tin sieve. She carefully described what each were made of and how they were used. They have kept the cooking lessons her mother and aunties had given her ‘alive’, even though she used them only rarely (her house girl uses them more often than she). She cannot bring

\textsuperscript{29} Interview with D., 20 January 2008.
\textsuperscript{31} Conversation with C.D., January 2008.
herself to clear the utensils away.\textsuperscript{32} Kitchen utensils act here as a source of pride and connection to one woman’s cultural heritage, not only in what they represented but in how she used them when making, and imparting upon others, particular recipes. Miller claimed that people construct themselves through objects and how they use them (1998: 19). Indeed, it is not only through the use of pots and pans, in cooking and teaching, that my informant was able to construct her identity, but also through merely preserving the objects. For several women I spoke with informally the activity of cooking was what mattered, and recipes provided an obvious, potent and everyday link to Indian culture (see Alibhai-Brown, 2008 for comparison).

Recipes often feature as a female contribution to souvenir programmes for cultural events. The Tuesday Market, as described in the previous chapter, was initially for Hindu women to purchase ingredients for such recipes in an appropriate and relatively safe environment. Cooking is one way in which women have had to adapt innovatively to their African environment, changing recipes to suit local ingredients, changing from a communal home kitchen to single responsibility, and often cooking in bulk for community events.\textsuperscript{33} Cooking is not a specifically female responsibility, however: many Indian restaurants have male chefs, and at association events food is often provided and served by men (see Figure 21). Most associational events offer a meal. Ticketed evening events at Hindu Hall often include dinner, whereas day-long galas and sports events at the Lotus Club are more likely to have food and drink stalls for which vouchers will be

\textsuperscript{32} Interview with S. family, 13 July 2007.

sold by the organising association. Typically, different regions of India will be represented and men and women will be involved. Although men do occupy the kitchen for events in Hindu Hall, food preparation is mainly the work of the women’s wing of the association, Streenikatan.  At other association events women often prepared food on site (see Figure 22). In any case, catering signifies a gender division because it is mostly designated either to men or women rather than being a mixed effort. In some associations, it is always a female role: according to one informant, women are only included at Charotar Patidar Samaj functions ‘when the men want lunch’.  

Figure 21. Men cooking for the 2007 Bhajan Samellan, Ndola. The man is adding chopped coriander to the pot. Men cooked three meals a day for two days for 900 people. Local African workers helped lift and stir the vats.

34 Conversation with D., 6 June 2007; interview with S.P., 6 June 2007.
Women in cultural associations

The same informant reported that at CPS women have to ‘peer through the window at some meetings’. My invitation to the CPS Annual General Meeting had been revoked on the grounds that I am a woman, and that non-committee member women were not permitted to attend. Most associations were not so restricting of women generally. Despite having strong female personalities on board, CPS has a reputation for male chauvinism. Other associations which were, in practice, equally male-dominated paid greater lip-service to gender equality. In his speech at the 34th annual gathering of the Bhajan event, the President of HAZ claimed:

*You would note from my introduction that I am using the word chairperson instead of the normal chairman. We are indeed changing with times and recognising the role that ladies of our society are playing.*

Figure 22. Women rolling purees for Charotar Patidar Samaj’s Dhuleti Dharmaka Lunch, CPS
He gave the example of Sonalben Patel, Vice Chairperson of LHA, and said, 'May there be more Sonalben’s at both the local and HAZ level.'\textsuperscript{36} I was also told countless times that women formed the ‘backbone’ of the Hindu community and its associations. Nevertheless, this rhetoric does not reflect the fact that committees are dominated by men, that the women who were involved were higher caste, well educated, and extraordinarily forthright, and that within LHA and other associations there still persisted separate ‘wings’ for women. At a social level, the division is also clear – recall the President of the Lotus Sports Club describing he exclusively male drinking clubs on Friday nights and Sunday afternoons. It is also the case, though, that women enjoy being segregated in some circumstances: LILA, for example, was instigated by women as an exclusive association for women, and various association ‘wings’ have emerged because women preferred ‘not having to answer to men’.\textsuperscript{37} Ironically, female seclusion through women’s groups is a way for women to cope with and control the new patriarchal system in which they find themselves (Clifford, 1997: 259). Women in the colonial era also found voice this way through their Mahila Mandals, and the religious and charitable emphases persist from then (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 97, Bhatt, 1969). In this sense, women have exercised a degree of control over their position within community associations, continuing to play a reliable and industrious role.

\textbf{Conforming to Community Norms: Women’s Clothing}

Returning to the theme of clothing and representation of community division, there are far fewer pressures on Hindu men and boys than on women and girls to

\textsuperscript{36} ‘HAZ Vote of Thanks at 34\textsuperscript{th} Bhajan Mahotsava’, 5 July 2004, private papers of A. Vashee, HAZ.

\textsuperscript{37} Conversation with I.D., 25 April 2007.
conform to dress codes. Although at informal or semi-formal events, such as Sports Day, there was a greater diversity of dress across age generations, at formal events the difference is less marked. At the Bhajan Samellan, for example, all women and girls dressed in Indian clothing – it was considered irreverent for them to do otherwise (Figure 23). Men and boys, on the other hand, dressed as they pleased; most wore trousers and shirts and a minority wore kurta pyjamas. The Bhajan Samellan is a country-wide religious event. In 2007, 900 Hindus travelled to take part. A guru and his entourage had been invited from the USA, at great expense. Individuals who usually stand out from the norm largely comply to it on such occasions.

Figure 23. Young women and girls in Indian attire at the 2007 Bhajan Samellan, Ndola. These girls were wearing different styles of shalwar kameez: to the left edge of the picture an older woman was wearing a sari.

As a proportion of the Hindu minority of Zambia, this figure has always been extremely significant. In 1983, 6,000 Hindus attended the event, representing over half of the total Hindu population at the time. See ‘Hindus Donate K13,000 to hospitals’, Daily Mail, 6 July 1983, ORS/102/67/48, RS.
At most religious, cultural and social events the gender divide was represented in how men and women dressed. At Holi, the festival of colour, held in the car park of Hindu Hall in 2007, women mostly wore saris and men wore western clothes. They were spatially divided then, too. Women sat in a wide circle with trays of candles, offerings and dyes, chanting and singing around a burning effigy. Men stood further back watching, only occasionally stepping in to the ritual. At the Diwali celebration too, an event ticketed to the public, women and girls tended to dress in Indian clothes, but men and boys did not. In the disposable camera project, ‘Hindu Life in Lusaka’ none of the pictures taken at non-uniformed schools showed young Hindus dressed any differently to non-Hindu peers. In the private domain there is a much wider array of dress. All the photographs of young people at home showed boys and girls alike wearing Western clothes. There were a few pictures of men in Indian clothing, particularly around the Indian High Commission. Interestingly, photos of women taken in the home showed a wider variety in dress than was observed publicly. Overall, men’s attire was far less variable than women’s, which changed according to the formality of the occasion and public nature of the space.

Hindu women and girls in Lusaka, then, are important carriers of Indian national, ethnic and regional cultures, at least in their visual and symbolic forms – cuisine, customs, clothing (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, McCrone, 1998, Firth, 1999, Yuval-Davis, 2004). As Nira Yuval-Davis put it, ‘Women in their “proper” behaviour, in their “proper” clothing embody the line which signifies the collectivity’s boundaries’ (2004: 46). Further, women’s roles in carrying their culture may be circumstantial and change across space: they may perform Hindu
rituals without understanding their religious meanings, and they may enjoy wearing Indian silks and jewellery to group functions but clamber into jeans and T-shirts when they are relaxing at home. Importantly, this ‘symbolic continuation of tradition’ is perpetuated by the structure of gender itself, which enculturates individuals to accepted community behaviour and norms (Pessar and Mahler, 2003: 813, Ganga, 2007). This becomes more important as a girl ages, and most so when she is married. Indeed, a young Hindu woman in Zambia faces a less certain home future than her brother, since upon marriage she will be expected to join her husband and his family, and conform to the norms of his community network, wherever that might be. Often, daughters ‘return’ to India in this way; frequently, however, Zambian Hindus seek, where possible, African-born partners or partners in the countries of their education (namely, Britain, the USA, Australia). In this sense, migration itself has historically taken, and continues to take on, very different and differently imagined meanings for women than men (this is echoed in Chapter 7).

Section 3. The Elephant in the Room: Caste

This section considers a third fragmentary force in the in Hindu community life in Lusaka. Caste, although largely invisible to the outsider, is a fascinating example of the way in which an immigrant, ethnic minority can adapt at a culturally systemic level. As the last chapter showed, caste is not always confined to the private, household domain and has shaped Hindu cultural spaces and practice across Lusaka. After a description of caste in Zambia, this section examines the claim that caste is a ‘thing of the past’, the assertion that it is ‘still alive’, and lastly some related and overlapping concerns with class and status.
**Caste in Zambia**

India’s caste system has developed into a matrix of localised social, economic and political group relationships. These relationships are structured hierarchically and based on beliefs of purity and pollution. Throughout the first wave of Indian emigration to Northern Rhodesia, caste was a major determinant in India of occupation, formal education, subcultural perspectives and values, prestige and social ranking, marital choice, religious practice and voluntary associations (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 147). Although the caste system is country-wide, it is divided into subcaste systems which operate on a local basis and tie specific subcaste groups to a hierarchy within discrete regions (Pocock quoted in Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 144). Because of its local manifestations the caste system *per se* cannot be transplanted from India and reconstructed abroad by migrant populations (Schwartz, 1967, Vertovec, 2000). According to Vertovec, ‘Outside of India, the complex systems of interaction which comprise the living stuff of caste are absent; caste identities are usually all that remain’ (2000: 24).

Caste identity, however, carries with it principles and practices (some of that ‘living stuff’) which cannot readily be shaken from the individual, especially when sufficient numbers of the same caste come together. These principles and practices generally correspond to four classical Vedanic categories known as the varnas: Brahma, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Sudra. The varnas encompass all castes and represent both divisions of labour and a scale of purity (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 142). The varna system, therefore, has in some cases survived where the caste system could not. In Northern Rhodesia, ‘migration auspices’ were important: low numbers of immigrants, the strictures of the plural colonial society migrants
entered, the nature of migration as a chain of individual males from a limited set of villages in Gujarat, and the subsequent patron-client relationship between shop owners and assistants that developed all contributed to the construction of a new hierarchical system internal to new Hindu migrant networks. A necessary pooling of resources among the fledgling migrant network, in order for instance to obtain Hindu communal sites of worship and maintain Hindu recreational activity, meant that, as in other places, ‘a sense of general Hindu communalism was fostered’ (Vertovec, 2004: 26). In negotiating identity within the Lusaka network, an individual’s behaviour according to the varnas became as important as specific caste standing (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 143).39

As well as divisions according to varnas, however, Hindu immigrants identified themselves with specific Indian localities. The majority of Hindus arriving into Northern Rhodesia, as Chapter 3 explained, carried the last name Patel and were of the Patidar caste, and most of these were Patidars from the region of Charotar in Gujarat. By the 1950s the Charotar Patidars in Lusaka were asserting their social ranking – based on subcaste, varna and location – in terms of community leadership. When this was contested locally, they formed their own, exclusive association. It was easier for Charotar Patidars to persist with caste practice and principles because of their relatively significant numbers. It was also possible for them to modify some practices, such as eating chicken and drinking alcohol (see Chapter 4); but this lowered others’ opinions of them in terms of varna standing. Although regional origins were important for all, Hindus who were in smaller numbers from a variety of subcastes and localities exchanged, relinquished

39 This was supported by K.P.R., 21 May 2007.
and adapted rituals and beliefs. The most willing to change were those whose ascribed caste rank was relatively low.\footnote{This phenomenon is well documented amongst low caste labourers in Fiji, South Africa and the Caribbean (Grieco, 1998; Vertovec, 2000).}

That said, the migration auspices of the first wave of Hindus to Northern Rhodesia resulted in weak representation of either the lowest or highest ends of the caste spectrum.\footnote{This contrasts with other contexts in Africa and elsewhere, including Fiji and the Caribbean. In Trinidad caste was maintained by the upper caste Brahmans, and the stigma associated with the very low castes persisted (Vertovec, 2000: 24).} Dotson and Dotson describe how immigrants to Africa ‘typically came from a broad middle stratum of Indian rural village society’ (1968: 129). In Northern Rhodesia they were mostly farmers, artisans and petty businessmen. This is evidenced in family professions, levels of education and last names of Indians listed in Bhatt’s catalogue (1969), and it is consistent with firsthand family narratives. The migration auspices of the second wave of Hindus to Zambia was markedly different, and they tend to represent a wider range of caste rankings from across India, including slightly higher castes.\footnote{Interview with R.O. Wallang, 10 May 2007.} However, they entered a Hindu community already structured around new hierarchies of profession, power and prestige specific to migratory histories and geographical regions of Zambia, and they had to negotiate their caste identity within an establishing ethnic network as well as within wider Zambian society.

**Caste as a ‘thing of the past’**

When Dotson and Dotson conducted their research in the late 1950s and mid-1960s they witnessed caste-based intercommunity conflicts but struggled to acquire firsthand details of the problems. They wrote that, ‘no Indian in Central Africa talks
willingly about caste except to deny its relevance to the local and current situation’ (1968: 195). Fifty years on, the majority of Hindus I spoke with also down-played the issue. One informant stated, ‘It’s nothing, not here.’ A statement, though, is ‘never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered’. The circumstances surrounding it are ‘indispensable’ in interpreting the words, which cannot be taken at face value (Malinowski, 1970: 159). That is, one should not be surprised that statements about the irrelevance of caste were made to researcher strangers, either in the 1950s and 1960s or the present, and it does not mean that caste is irrelevant. Caste is a sensitive issue in Zambia; it was used routinely during British and Federal rule as a retort by colonial officials to Indian protestations of racial discrimination (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 119, 126). It was also a moral burden for Indians in the struggle for independence and afterwards because of its implications for attitudes towards the local black Africans. Hindus in particular have understandably denied its relevance to their community in Zambia’s postcolonial plural society.

Importantly, my research revealed that Hindus in Lusaka today do remember caste negotiations in the 1950s, thereby supporting Dotson and Dotson’s claim that statements they gathered at the time were guarded. Furthermore, these memories are used by Hindus as proof that caste division is a ‘thing of the past’. By all accounts, individuals carry caste with them primarily in terms of ritual practice and principles of marriage. However, caste determined their likely trade sector, too, for which their last name (or, more accurately, their clan name) commonly

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44 Interview with O., 7 March 2007.
acted as a tag. For example, one man with the last name Valand (from a family of barbers, a fairly low caste) initially set up a barber shop and was employed in Northern Rhodesia at the British army barracks as a barber. Likewise, Nayees often offered barber services, and the wide-ranging last names of tailors in Bhatt’s 1969 catalogue distinguishes them from the voluminous Patels, who tended to establish shops in the African retail sector and in wholesale.

Caution is imperative in analysing last names in this immigrant situation, however, for four reasons. First, names do not always determine profession or position within a caste or subcaste group. Second, as mentioned in Chapter 3, many lower caste members chose to change their last names, often to Patel, in order to elevate themselves from their ascribed rank (to the disdain of higher caste members). Third, last names mattered little to non-Indians; interaction and social prestige was determined by other factors. Mr. Valand, for instance, had a relatively high social status locally because of his interaction with the white colonial community, despite his clan name indicating to other Indians that he was of low caste origins. And fourth, in the process of migrating to Central Africa, many Hindus assumed their fathers’ names, thereby skewing the relationships between name and caste/profession. While Dotson and Dotson relate this to the conscious self-elevation of Hindu migrants in the caste system, I argue for a slightly different interpretation. One community member has written up part of his family history, and under a section entitled, ‘Surnames: To Change or Not to Change’ explained this phenomenon:

46 Questionnaire response from M.V., November 2007.
47 Barbers in Northern Rhodesia appear to have been predominantly Muslim (analysis of Bhatt, 1969).
[My] studies have shown that the members of our community who settled in East Africa invariably used their actual surnames (atak, clan names) and are known by them, e.g. Solanki, Modasia, Chauhan, Vaja [...] whereas in Zimbabwe and Zambia the early settlers used their fathers’ names as surnames and these became the de facto surnames, e.g. Ranchhod, Bhagat, Laxman, Pragji [...]

He accounts for this by claiming that it was customary for a prospective immigrant when obtaining passports and immigration forms to write down first his own name and second his father’s name – in his case, Pragji Ranchhod (Pragji, son of Ranchhod) – since in India they did not have ‘surnames’ as such. One of Dotson and Dotson’s informants also claimed,

In India there were no surnames. A man had his own name and his father’s name, and it was only when our people came to Africa that they adopted a surname (1968: 134).

But importantly, in the case of Mr. Ranchhod and many others, the ‘surname’ adopted did not alter their caste ranking or promote them professionally. It did, however, obscure their caste origins, which were relatively low in comparison to, for example, the majority Patels. Whereas actively changing a clan name accepts and perpetuates the principles of caste, dropping caste-related names attempts to conceal or deny its relevance. Both are examples of ways in which Hindus have adapted culturally and socially to fit their new surroundings.

Those who continue to deny the relevance of caste come from across the caste spectrum and they use memories and reconstructions of the 1950s and 1960s to show the historical nature of caste in Lusaka. Mr. Ranchhod, the author of the above memoirs, told me that caste was not ‘much of a deal these days, but it used to be’. He recalled how in the Indian quarters the wealthier Patels in Lusaka had frowned upon his family for their lower caste roots. Then, in the 1950s along with many others, he enrolled in military training with the Central African Federation,

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rising up the ranks. As non-whites could not become commissioned officers, he settled for ‘three stripes as a staff sergeant’. He described how the majority Patels faced their comeuppance for caste aloofness:

\[ \text{I took it out on them on the parade ground. I used to shout, “You pot-bellied, curry-munching Patels!” After that, things weren’t so bad.} \]

Not only does he place caste conflict in the past, Ranchhod describes how these relationships improved, primarily through a military institution in which promotion and prestige was not linked to the Indian caste system. Space is illuminating here, too: caste discrimination operated within the Indian residential and retail zone, but was levelled on the parade ground.

Other descriptions highlighted the importance of space, too. For one thing, Hindu Hall, built in 1954, and the Mandir, built in 1974, are sites of communal religious worship in Lusaka. Prior to these sites, shrines in private homes sufficed for daily pujas and offerings. The limited resources of the Hindu migrant network for building a hall and temple meant that, for both projects, caste differences had to be put aside, although leadership of the projects was indisputably the role of higher caste members.\(^{50}\) Private homes were a sphere in which caste-based practices and principles (of purity and hygiene, for example) were enacted, and therefore private homes were sites in which caste was maintained. Two Patel brothers who grew up in the Copperbelt town of Kitwe recalled the ritual of eating vegetarian food in their family in the 1950s, which was occasionally broken when they ate chicken at functions at Kitwe Hindu Hall. ‘But it depends. Our parents wouldn’t go to the Nayees’s, for example, and eat chicken, but it was okay to do that

\[^{49}\text{Interview with K.P.R., 21 May 2007.}^\]

\[^{50}\text{This is based on conversations and interviews with several people who remembered either or both events firsthand and several others whose descriptions were second hand.}^\]
in Hindu Hall.’ Likewise, according to a study of caste in Western India, ‘Due to their profession, the Valand are excluded from any commensality. No group receives food from them’ (Perez, 2004: 79). The barber shaves the hair from others and is therefore polluted. Eating alongside Nayees or Valands in communal spaces was acceptable to members of the Patidars, but visiting their homes was not. A study of Hindu families in Rhodesia described how:

Families in the lower rungs of the caste-ladder do not interact so frequently with those in the upper echelons and vice versa. Hence, in family visits, caste is a fairly important determining factor when deciding which family to visit. Consciously or unconsciously, caste comes into the picture and indiscriminate visiting is the exception rather than the rule (Lalloo in Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 151).

Similar scenarios have developed in Britain, particularly amongst East African Gujaratis, whereby inter-caste activity exists in public rather than domestic contexts (Vertovec, 2000: 26). The exception in Lusaka’s history is the Patidar Charotar subgroup, who in the late 1950s physically divided quasi-public space according to caste by building a separate, exclusive clubhouse. Overall, however, in Hindus’ recollections of the late colonial and early independence periods in Lusaka, public venues were regarded as cleaner, in terms of the varna system, than the private spaces of low-caste families. The Pranjapati Mandal, established by a group of lower caste Hindus in 1966, met in members’ private homes. Caste divisions, with the exception of the Patidar Charotars, were silenced in public but expressed and maintained in private.

**Caste as ‘still alive’**
Caste divisions are also frequently broken down, reconfigured, and intercepted by other divisions in the community, and highlighted in issues relating to age.

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generation, leadership, and marriage. In the recollection above, in which the parents of two Patel brothers did not ‘eat chicken’ in the houses of lower caste Hindus, for instance, ‘the past’ was not presented as a strictly temporal entity: rather, it was embodied in the behaviour of an older age generation. Their parents’ caste-based practices and principles have not changed very much since the 1950s (they would still not eat chicken at a Nayees’s house, for example), but their sons have not inherited the same behaviour and attitudes. The sons treat caste, in its fading form, as a relic: it exists, but its role is diminishing. It represents a community of another time.

Caste and generation have, throughout Hindus’ history in Lusaka, operated with and against one another to produce distinct leadership problems in the community (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 218). Some of these concern cultural associations, as the case of CPS’s origins highlights. Even today, older age members of the Hindu community whose families are in their second or third immigrant generation tend to dominate the LHA, and this has agitated relations with younger, ‘newer’ Hindus and particularly those of higher castes. In some cases, it has contributed to the formation of new associations altogether. An example of this is the Zambia Malayalee Cultural Association, which was started by settled first-wave ‘expatriates’ in 1980 primarily to unite Kerala Indians in Zambia. Its Hindu members claim higher caste identities than those in LHA.\footnote{Interview with R.K., 27 February 2008; conversation with A.A., 5 October 2006.} In some ways, then, caste identities and practices have been reinvigorated in Lusaka by fresh waves of Indian incomers. Leadership problems are especially pronounced at the national level of HAZ. One executive committee member said, ‘You’d be surprised how
politics works in our community. There are real hierarchies’. When I asked him to elaborate, he said carefully, ‘Caste is unfortunately still alive here and the upper castes try to hold on to their positions in HAZ’.\textsuperscript{53} The caretaker of Hindu Hall agreed with this. Although he saw the main division as between Gujaratis and non-Gujaratis, and differences between what he called ‘sects’ (embodied in the various Hindu associations), he also observed ‘committee problems’ relating to upper and lower castes.\textsuperscript{54}

While it is a minority of Hindus who exercise caste superiorities in association committees, the majority Hindus do abide by caste-based practices and principles in terms of marriage. Dotson and Dotson described marriage as the single area in which caste norms were applied consistently ‘in the traditional way’ in social relations (1968: 193). During the span of their fieldwork, however, they encountered two intercaste marriages and one outgroup marriage, and consequently anticipated that ‘the control which caste now exercises over marital choice will certainly not last much longer’ (1968: 151, 359). But this relationship has on the whole persisted, although since the caste system itself does not exist in Zambia families are guided by wider varna principles. One young man expressed his situation in these terms. He had recently become engaged to a fellow undergraduate student in Australia and told me, ‘[My engagement] wasn’t arranged. But even if it had been, it made sense to find a bride outside [Zambia]. I am a Brahman, you see, so it is difficult to find anyone here to suit me.’\textsuperscript{55} The diminishing size of the community indeed provides little choice in partners,

\textsuperscript{53} Telephone conversation with H.D., 27 November 2007.
\textsuperscript{54} Interview with D., 20 January 2008.
\textsuperscript{55} Conversation with A.A., 5 October 2006.
especially for those concerned with caste or varna categorisations. Often parents or ‘aunties’ have travelled elsewhere in Africa or to India to find a suitable match for young men and women: today, they use the Internet for this purpose. Increasingly, young people also find partners during studies abroad, like the example above. In another, widely celebrated case, two Zambian Hindus met in Britain, and settled back in Zambia together. Indeed, many young Zambian Hindus would prefer partners who identify with Africa.\textsuperscript{56}

In one case I encountered, caste has caused demonstrable divisions within a family. I was interviewing an older gentlemen who was hard of hearing and spoke poor English; his daughter-in-law was translating for me. I asked if caste was or had been important for Zambia’s Hindus, to which she replied that it definitely remained important. She preferred not to translate the question to her father-in-law because caste had been a big issue with her marriage into the family. When I asked for further details she described caste in regional and vernacular terms rather than in its systemic form or in its connection to the varnas: ‘It’s not that we’re different levels. But their home town in India was very far from mine. And our languages are different.’ She claimed that ‘Twenty years ago [our marriage] would have been taboo’.\textsuperscript{57} Again, the younger age generations’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviours have accompanied what one young Hindu called the ‘fizzing out’ of caste. He claimed that he would marry whomever he was told to: the grandson of a cobbler (of the low-ranking Mochi caste) from Gujarat, he described caste as ‘only

\textsuperscript{56} Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007; interview with D., 20 January 2008.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with M.P. and A.P., 17 July 2007.
mattering to those who desire it to matter’. Parental assistance, opinion and permission is usually sought whatever the mode of choosing a partner. Caste and subcaste remain a consideration for parents, although this is perhaps more important among those with higher caste origins and among ‘expatriates’ who have stronger kinship links to India.

In situations elsewhere, different patterns have emerged among Hindu migrants. In Trinidad migrants included few women and a wide range of castes from across the Gangetic plain; endogamous marriages were early on abandoned, though sometimes marriage partners were selected according to varna statuses (Vertovec, 2000: 24). In Fiji, ‘caste-based endogamy increased with the establishment of households,’ which reflected the ‘need [of migrants] to maintain acceptable behaviour as defined by their families in India, including religious rites, dietary restrictions and marital patterns’ (Grieco, 1998). The same might be said of some East African communities where, as the population rapidly increased, marriages and the establishment of caste-based associations further embedded the boundaries between groups of different caste identity (Morris, 1968, Twaddle, 1975, Vertovec, 2000). There is not enough evidence here to say whether or not the growth in number of Hindu households in Lusaka in the 1950s and 1960s affected the persistence of caste ideals across the Hindu network; certainly spouses entering at that time were usually from the same home village as their partners in India, or from well-matched families from elsewhere in Africa. In any case, members of the next generation have more eclectic ideals. Although for some

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58 Interview with B.P., July 2007.
Hindus in Lusaka caste is clearly ‘still alive’ as a source of conflict or difference, it is much diminished from its structurally-encompassing/determinant form.

Caste is divisive in the community not only because it has shaped Hindu spaces, nor simply because there are those who admit that it matters and those who do not. Rather, caste is divisive because it has become embedded in real and meaningful ways that affect a whole series of relationships across and inside age generations, association committees, and families. In behavioural psychology, Thomas’s theorem holds that ‘situations defined as real are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas, 1970: 154). Here, it is a useful way of working through why caste continues to shape the Hindu community. Individual behaviour is ‘determined partly by institutions, taken as situation, and partly by behaviour of others, taken as situation’ (1970: 154). Even if the caste system itself as an institution cannot exist in Zambia, and even if on the whole caste-based practices and principles are not relevant in day-to-day living, if caste is defined as real and perceivable through symbolic interaction, it will have real consequences. The very fact that some Hindus’ behaviour is caste-based, and that this behaviour is then perceived as caste-based by others, who adjust their own responses to it accordingly, means that relationships graded according to caste-based ideas will persist.

**Caste, Status and Class**

Activities described here as ‘caste-based’ include competition for leadership and intracaste marriage. In many ways, these activities might be interpreted more generally in terms of prestige, status or socio-economic class (as per Weber, [1948] 2005). Indeed, the boundaries between caste (as ascribed status) and class (as
acquired status) are permeable in places (Barot, 1987). One interviewee said of socio-economic class,

Nah! It means nothing. You saw at the Lotus Sports Day, we’re all mingling. I could have pointed out, this one is a millionaire, this one is lower class, but you wouldn’t know otherwise. Maybe at a social level, they get invited to different houses to eat, but that’s it really.60

However, while contesting the importance of class status, there is an interesting overlap with the practices of caste – reflected, for instance, in use of private space and particularly with regard to where people eat. Nevertheless, while interconnected with the community’s caste-based cultural heritage, the immense importance of a person’s status and socio-economic class are expressed in many more ways than through caste-based activity. Hindu men in Lusaka have strong representation in what are termed the ‘service clubs’, such as the Rotary Club, the Lions Club, and the Masonic Lodge.61 Membership of these exclusive or secret associations is prized among successful élites in the Hindu community, although membership is unrelated to caste ranking.62 Below I look briefly at the relationship between caste, status and socio-economic class by considering reputations of community members and material wealth.

Status is a ‘huge issue’, according to one young man, who described the pressure he was under from his family to take part in association activity and organisation. ‘One needs to be seen to be involved’, he said.63 Another interviewee used exactly the same phrase: ‘One needs to be seen to be involved’ and continued, ‘by family, by employers, by elders, by the big-wigs, by the whole damn

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60 Interview with P.P., 30 July 2007.
61 Interviews with H.D., 30 November 2006; R.O. Wallang, 10 May 2007; conversation with D.C. and others, n.d.
63 Conversation with D.A., 7 July 2007.
Chapter 5

Status across the Hindu network is based on a conglomeration of adherence to community norms, caste origins, charitable contributions, perceived adherence to religious practices, economic success, family heritage, education, networking, and involvement in cultural and other associations. It does often have a strong link to caste. For example, many individuals of high achieved status in the community also have high caste status; these are mostly members of the Anavil caste (Brahmans in terms of the varna system, with clan last names including Naik, Desai, and Mehta). They are extremely well-regarded across Lusaka society, have done well in business, contribute money to the needy in Zambia, and devote time to the cultural endeavours of the Hindu community. However, there are also many other individuals who have high achieved status but whose caste origins are relatively low. Their high status is based on hard work, family history in Zambia, dedication to the Hindu associations, involvement in wider Zambian politics, and success in business. While caste is not a determining factor in high status, socio-economic class may be: those of high standing in the community tend to be those of a high socio-economic class.

Status is displayed in the community overtly and often expressed in terms of material wealth. One young Hindu student claimed:

The Zambian Hindu community is so fragmented, people shouldn’t look at it as a whole. It’s not like the Muslims society which looks out for its members. Hindus all want to be better than their fellows… ’see how much I’ve got’, ’see my new purchase’. It’s a class struggle.

She resisted the idea that this particular ‘fragmentation’ was also related to caste, and re-emphasised its material nature. ’It’s jealousy. It’s about wanting to show

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64 Interview with B.P., July 2007.
65 Conversation with M.S., 4 March 2007.
that you are better than somebody.’ Again, Miller’s ideas about constructing identity through use of objects is useful here; my informant equates competition over material wealth with socio-economic class struggle. Material wealth and status have long been linked in the mindsets of some Hindus in Zambia. This might be explained by a desire of lower castes to relocate status from the ascribed caste ladder onto one ranked on socio-economic achievement, but the phenomenon was not limited to lower castes. Perhaps the most overt symbols of wealth and status in Zambian society since the 1970s has been the Mercedes Benz, although it is prevalent today mainly among élite Indians and government officials.\textsuperscript{66} I was told by Hindus numerous times of how the area of Kanini, an Indian suburb in the Copperbelt town of Ndola, had at some point in the 1970s been in the \textit{Guinness Book of Records} for having the ‘highest number of Mercedes Benzes per square kilometre in the world’.\textsuperscript{67} It was always presented to me, however, not as proof of Indians’ wealth, but of their high standing in postcolonial society.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The three divisions in the Hindu community presented here can in some ways be mapped onto the spaces described in the previous chapter. The first division discussed was generation. Two meanings of generation pertain to Zambian society – that as age cohort and that as a unit measuring immigrant belonging. The most common issue, that of intergenerational conflicts and relations between age cohorts, was shown to be complicated by two different trajectories of youth resulting from two distinct migration waves. However, there are observable

\textsuperscript{66} When Dotson and Dotson revisited Zambia they were picked up in a black Mercedes Benz, which they described as the ‘prime status symbol in Central Africa’ (1968: 360-1).

\textsuperscript{67} A website search for verification merely tossed up more second-hand claims.
differences between teenagers and their parents: each, particularly women and girls, objectified their identity in clothing and conduct. Following comments made by informants, the chapter also examined the idea that younger generations were more apathetic. Parents are implicated in their children’s lack of enthusiasm and involvement in cultural associations. Again, waves of migration and mismatching immigrant generations among age cohorts rendered uneasy any generalisations. Finally, in analysing how people talked about and expressed their connections to a cultural ‘homeland’, the chapter found that single age cohorts contain multiple forms of ties to India. Overall, contradictions and confusions among age generations are made more complex yet by the ways in which they intercept with immigrant generations. The following chapter criticises further the utility of ‘lumping together’ sets of immigrants in this way.

The second division looked at was gender, first at cooking and the kitchen, in terms of both female space and objects and recipes as an everyday link to India. Hindus have adapted kitchen culture considerably as an immigrant community. Men and women cook separately for association functions. With regard to women’s roles in cultural associations, space is important in the exclusion of women, but also because women professed to wanting control over their own associational spaces, in the forms of women’s ‘wings’, the Indian High Commission, and meetings in private homes. Regarding clothing, women are expected to conform to community norms more than men, evidenced in their attire at formal and informal events. Lastly, migration itself means something very different for women than for men (see also Chapter 7).
The third division discussed was the ‘elephant in the room’: the big issue about which nobody talked unless at my instigation. Here the caste system and the reasons for the ways in which its principles and practices, and basic caste identities had to be renegotiated among new Hindu migrant networks was summarised. Hindus who arrived later into the community, bringing with them stronger kinship links and caste values, both reinvigorated caste ideals and had their caste ideals severely challenged in the new hierarchy. Two contemporary narratives of caste highlight internal group contradictions and the heterogeneity of opinions: caste as a ‘thing of the past’, and as a living concern. Importantly, caste was rarely a positive thing, although some higher caste informants were proud of their origins and sense of superiority. Caste occupies space in the home rather than in public venues, with two problematic exceptions of caste-based associations, such as CPS, and leadership problems that infiltrate committee meetings in association clubhouses or in Hindu Hall. These sites, however, are not entirely public: they are the quasi-private spaces as defined in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, they link some places directly to caste-based principles and practice. Finally, the existence of caste is supported by the ways in which people defined against it the similar concerns of status and socio-economic class. In the next chapter the focus is on discourse surrounding a most prominent community concern, and which has punctuated all the issues above: that between the residents and expatriates.
Chapter 6

The ‘Kakawallahs’ versus the ‘Expatias’: Subgroup Distinctions and Ethnic Transformation

Introduction

Here the contradictory notions of group homogeneity and fragmentation continue to be tackled, looking at a fourth division within Lusaka’s Hindu community that interlinks with the three analysed in the previous chapter (generation, gender and caste). This division relates directly to migration: a rift between successive waves of Indian incomers. The focus is on how it was described to me in interviews and depicted in personal and association papers, as a division between the pre-Zambian independence Indian migrants, the ‘residents’, and the post-independence newcomers, the ‘expatriates’. The terms first wave and second wave are used to distinguish the two, unless referring to community members’ own descriptions. The actual chronological and political histories of Hindu migration are complex. The thesis has so far followed David Laitin’s example (2004) in simplifying this migration as two waves in order to draw an ‘implicit comparison’ between the two resulting migrant identities that informants described, and their differing ties within spaces and structures of Lusaka society. In this chapter, however, I question this dualist framework, asserting instead that successive immigrant generations – what Rumbaut calls different ‘vintages’ within migration flows (2004: 1199) – have to some degree presented and will always present new challenges as established group members and newcomers negotiate their relationships and positions vis-à-vis others.
In fact, this chapter confronts a major problem in migration and diaspora studies: that discussion often focuses on assimilation, accommodation, acculturation, integration, and so on, of immigrants into host countries or dominant societies, rather than on how they fit into their receiving migrant or cultural network, or ethnic minority community. This latter type of adaptation is often much more relevant on a day-to-day basis for individual migrants, and it gathers theoretical importance as time passes and new waves of migrants arrive (Zhou and Bankston, 1994, Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, Berry, 2006, Riccio, 2008). Among the Hindus of Lusaka, migrants’ internal adaptation, into their receiving Hindu ethnic minority, plays an intimate part in the wider process of adapting to life in Zambia.

‘Adaptation’ captures some of the geographical, cultural, social, political, economic and individual tensions which attend migration and settlement, especially in postcolonial societies marked by racial and cultural pluralism. The concept of adaptation places value on cultural qualities of ethnic immigrants (as per Glazer and Moynihan, 1970). Here, it allows me to make central the creation of Hindu ethnicity in Zambia across subsequent migrant waves and, in the next chapter, to consider some implications of this process in relations with wider Zambian society. The production and reproduction of the new ethnic group, which emerges as a ‘hybrid’ community (Bhabha, 1994), involves members’ adoption and adaptation of skills and network connections that may eventually ‘ease’ ‘frictions of distance’ both inside and outside the community (see Harvey quoted in Kothari, 2008: 502). However, the negotiation and protection of Hindu community cohesion in Lusaka continues to involve a process of ‘essentialising’ what it means to be
‘Indian’ or ‘Hindu’ (Shukla, 2003) – a process which can require subgroup compromise and cause friction (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 196). This is demonstrated here.

Other key causes of friction within the community, addressed in the previous chapter, cannot here be ignored. Most entangled is the issue of generation. Both its meanings intercept various points in the analysis, where it returns to the importance of interrelations among successive immigrant generations and to the diversity of experiences across and within different age cohorts. Most recent studies of immigrant minorities, particularly in the United States, have focussed on relationships within a single migrant wave, and contrasted levels of assimilation among its constituent age cohorts and/or immigrant generations (Gans, 1997, Avenarius, 2007). Studies such as Shukla’s have tried, on the other hand, to aggregate multiple waves, but in doing so have conflated the experiences of age cohorts of different immigrant generations and migrant narratives – Rumbaut’s notion of ‘lumping’ together (2004: 1160). This chapter introduces a third wave of new expatriates, many of whom are young professionals and who have stronger attachments to the established second-wave community through language or regional customs. The presence of third-wave incomers challenges established relations between ‘residents’ and ‘expatriates’, whose boundaries are not fixed, but comprise stereotypes, memories, objects, languages, customs, and affiliations representative of discrete migratory pasts. It also complicates analysis of intergenerational relations. As in the previous chapter, the analysis is influenced by Strauss, incorporating ‘diagonal’ relations, and drawing on data from youth and young adults to tease apart different voices. Doing so highlights the limitations of
trying to analyse independently any single age cohort, immigrant generation or migrant wave.

The chapter is divided in two. The first section is an analysis of how informants represented the division, both to me and among themselves. ‘Residents’ and ‘expatriates’ identified as the cause or perpetuating reason for the division their different behaviours and attitudes as well as differences in language, migration narratives and other forms of ‘rooting’. Data used is weighted towards older adults (aged forty and over) and ‘residents’. The discursive construction of the division is examined by interpreting everyday talk and select articles in *Samachar*, the magazine produced from 1997–2001 by the Lusaka Hindu Association, and also how articles within the magazine have contributed to its perpetuation. In the second section some underlying weaknesses in the dualist construction of the Lusaka Hindu community are explained by considering the Muslim-Hindu divide and some pre-second-wave accounts of difference. Challenges are presented by the third wave of expatriate incomers. Using this material and accounts provided by younger age generations (below forty in this case) on the value of their school experiences, the section concludes that intra-community relations are moving towards a more unified ethnic sense of community. The purpose of the chapter overall is to show that new migrants do not enter societies like numbers onto a blank page: rather, they enter into already existing migrant social worlds and structures of migrant belonging. This produces an array of tensions within immigrant communities and highlights the importance of problematising the label of ‘diaspora’ upon immigrant populations.
Section 1. Insider Others: Characterising ‘Residents’ and ‘Expatriates’

This first section presents different ways in which the division between first and second waves was represented to me and (re)constructed in material produced by members of the Hindu community. The section is in three parts. The first considers stereotyping, which invokes behavioural and attitudinal bases for the rift, but which is itself a factor in its perpetuation. The idea of ‘ethnic stereotypes’ articulated by Eriksen (1993), among others, is used, although here applied to relations between Zambian Hindu subgroups. The second part shows how use of India’s regional languages in social and formal associational contexts helps to define subgroup difference. And the third shows how memories and the construction of two distinct migration narratives have been used to explain and justify subgroup difference. The process of reinterpreting past experiences in terms of particular migrations and other forms of ‘rooting’ has ‘set a limit’ to the Hindu community’s shared ‘historic horizon’ (Gellner and Micaud, 1972: 12), making it harder for new Hindu immigrants to negotiate their place in the receiving ethnic network.

Behaviour and Attitude: Stereotyping the ‘Inside Other’

In several humorous articles printed in their association magazine, Samachar, during the late 1990s, members of Lusaka’s Hindu Association attempted to satirise how two subgroups in their community interact. Two items in particular, by the same contributor, stand out. One is a short story entitled, ‘Expatias versus

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1 I avoid the term ‘sub-ethnicities’ here, used theoretically by Hastings (1997) and applied widely, because in this case the Gujarati ‘residents’ are distinct from an aggregate of Punjabi, Bengali, Malayalee, Tamil, and other Indian ethnic groups. While ‘expatriates’ may constitute a ‘sub-ethnicity’ of Zambian Hindus, they represent multiple ‘sub-ethnicities’ elsewhere. To avoid confusion, I use the term ‘subgroup’.

Kakawallahs... shall the twain ever meet?”, and the second is an article on ‘Party Invitations’ which contrasts the social behaviour of Gujaratis and Punjabis (see Appendix C).² Apparently jovial in nature, the two items highlight subgroup differences including house decoration, punctuality, levels of hospitality, culinary habits, women’s social etiquette and ‘boldness’, alcohol consumption, linguistic skills, accents, musical and dance skills, association membership, and knowledge of India. The articles’ joking tone does not disguise the existence of rifts experienced within the community. According to an ex-Editor of Samachar the articles were aimed at ‘putting a humorous spin on the huge problem of groupist attitudes’ of some community members. She also pointed out that the ‘funny writings’ were ‘constructive criticism’ and that they accompanied more educational articles (such as that on five ways to celebrate Diwali cited in Chapter 4). Many people, however, were offended by seeing common intra-community stereotypes in print and by the appearance of letters to the Editor which openly pointed fingers over various community issues. The ex-Editor lamented, ‘It’s a shame people in our community can’t handle criticism – they closed us down.’³

One letter anomalous to this, signed ‘Expatriate’, ended, ‘Please keep up the good work and I do hope your community and the “expatias” as you call us will continue their support and contribution towards the Samachar.”⁴ Despite its positive sentiments, the letter reinforces the existence of the division – ‘your community’ and ‘you’ are distinguished from ‘us’. Samachar was chastised by many as a ‘resident’ project, being the magazine of the LHA, popularly regarded as a

Gujarati club. This us/them use of language was something I encountered frequently and is an example of what is termed ‘inside othering’ in this thesis. Two further examples follow. First, when I asked the Hindu Hall caretaker what he saw as the main division in the Hindu community, he unhesitatingly described a division between Gujaratis and non-Gujaratis, saying that, although the Gujaratis were ‘strong’, ‘amongst themselves, the whole community, there are others who abhor them.’\(^5\) And second, in describing ‘expatriates’ to me, the Vice-President of the Hindu Association of Zambia said, ‘They are here, they are inside the community, but they are not the same.’\(^6\) In these accounts, ‘others’ exist within ‘themselves’ and ‘they’ (who are ‘not the same’) are ‘here’ and ‘inside the community’. In attempting to articulate what constitutes this difference, or in referring to the ‘other’, community members often resorted to stereotypes.

Instances of open stereotyping are plentiful in my research data: a tally of this kind of inside othering in interviews alone amounts to 98 references to generalised characteristics or behaviours of and by ‘residents’ or ‘expatriates’. A simple exercise in tabling these stereotypes and labels used reveals some important complexities in subgroup representations (see Tables 1 and 2). According to Eriksen, stereotypes are used to help group members make sense of ‘an otherwise excruciatingly complicated social universe.’ They ‘contribute to defining one’s own group in relation to others by providing a tidy “map” of the social world.’ (1993: 24–5. See also Mitchell, 1956.) However, as my analysis below shows, Lusaka Hindus’ intra-group stereotyping is fairly untidy. Stereotypes of

\(^5\) Interview with D., 20 January 2008.
\(^6\) Interview with S.N., 12 July 2007.
occupation, citizenship, cultural involvement, moral superiority and caste are as contradictory as they are consistent.

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<th>Stereotypes</th>
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<th>... about Residents</th>
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<td><strong>What Expatriates say...</strong></td>
<td>more Indian&lt;br&gt;religiously devoted&lt;br&gt;professional&lt;br&gt;business leaders&lt;br&gt;active&lt;br&gt;diverse&lt;br&gt;cultural&lt;br&gt;charitable&lt;br&gt;educated</td>
<td>Gujurati&lt;br&gt;Westernised&lt;br&gt;less Indian&lt;br&gt;traders&lt;br&gt;Patel&lt;br&gt;old-fashioned&lt;br&gt;culturally apathetic&lt;br&gt;exclusive&lt;br&gt;cliquey&lt;br&gt;small-minded&lt;br&gt;poorly educated</td>
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<td><strong>What Residents say...</strong></td>
<td>Indian&lt;br&gt;conservative&lt;br&gt;judgemental&lt;br&gt;culturally minded&lt;br&gt;exclusive&lt;br&gt;clique&lt;br&gt;traditional&lt;br&gt;active in associations&lt;br&gt;lower caste</td>
<td>Zambia&lt;br&gt;community backbone&lt;br&gt;higher caste&lt;br&gt;dedicated to work&lt;br&gt;apathetic&lt;br&gt;family-oriented&lt;br&gt;culture fossils&lt;br&gt;charitable&lt;br&gt;adaptive&lt;br&gt;interactive</td>
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Table 1. Lusaka Hindu community subgroup stereotypes

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<th>Labels</th>
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<th>... about Residents</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What Expatriates say...</strong></td>
<td>so-called expatriates&lt;br&gt;diaspora&lt;br&gt;settled Indian</td>
<td>traders&lt;br&gt;shopkeepers&lt;br&gt;fossils&lt;br&gt;Gujus&lt;br&gt;Patels&lt;br&gt;African Indians</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>What Residents say...</strong></td>
<td>expatriates&lt;br&gt;expats&lt;br&gt;expatias&lt;br&gt;new arrivals&lt;br&gt;Namasteji crowd&lt;br&gt;post-colonials&lt;br&gt;Indian Indians</td>
<td>residents&lt;br&gt;originals&lt;br&gt;pioneers&lt;br&gt;kakawallas&lt;br&gt;fossils&lt;br&gt;old-timers&lt;br&gt;true Zambians&lt;br&gt;Zambian Indian</td>
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Table 2. Lusaka Hindu community subgroup labels
Chapter 6

The most common stereotype of the first-wave Hindu by members of the second wave was that they are ‘traders’ or ‘shopkeepers’. This generalisation was usually used derogatorily, as were the terms for first waves which often accompanied it – ‘Gujus’ or ‘Patels’. Aside from being ill-founded, as sections of earlier chapters show, these stereotypes of first waves dismiss the self-portraiture of ‘expats’ as being ‘business leaders’ (that is, in the trade sector) as well as professionals. ‘Residents’ preferred to think of themselves as ‘hard-working’ regardless of occupation, a self-casting that has been used among Hindu Gujaratis elsewhere to set them apart from other Indians and South Asians (Ramji, 2006: 707). Nevertheless, ‘trader’ and ‘professional’ tags have persisted. Although most informants used them knowing their inaccuracy, these terms provide an easy way of defining ‘internal differentiation’ between first and second waves, the constitutive elements of which are difficult to define (Hastings, 1997). Even the Indian High Commissioner to Zambia characterised the community in generalised, dualistic terms: ‘The Indian community would be more of the professional class, where the original settlers, the non-Indian passport holders, would be more of business class.’

Indeed, another common mislabelling is of first-wave immigrants as ‘Zambian Indian’ and second-wave immigrants as ‘Indian’, and the conflation of these labels with citizenship. Although second-wave immigrants are more likely to have Indian citizenship, there is no longer a linear connection between the

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[7] For example, this altered version of a racist joke was in constant circulation – Q. Why do you not have Gujus [der.] on your football team? A. Because whenever they get a corner they put up a shop.

contexts of initial immigration and current citizenship status. In fact, the majority of families will include a variety of citizenship claims (see Chapter 7). Rather, the terms are used, especially by self-purported ‘residents’, to rank ‘how Zambian’ a person is in terms of claims to national belonging and sentimental connections to place. Similarly, self-nominated ‘expatriates’ often describe themselves as ‘more Indian’, and stereotype themselves as a ‘diverse’, ‘cultural’ and ‘religiously devoted’ set within Lusaka’s Hindu community. One informant explained that these were qualities representative of ‘the whole of India, not just the north-west’. Both subgroups, in fact, depict second wave members as more ‘cultural’ or ‘culturally aware’, referring to Indian cultural knowledge and activities. For example, an elderly ‘resident’ wrote in Samachar that, ‘our resident Gujarati community still needs to make a greater effort to emulate our more culturally-minded South Indian fraternity.’

Some first-wave Hindus regard this form of cultural mindedness as ‘traditional’ and ‘conservative’. At this point, however, stereotypes of each group converge and some become indiscernible. Both subgroups label older-age members of the first-wave as ‘cultural fossils’ who have held on to Indian traditions, albeit of the past. Second-wave members dub them ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘small-minded’. Both groups label the other as ‘exclusive’ and ‘cliquey’. Another inconsistency is the stereotyping of first wave Hindus as being simultaneously ‘old fashioned’ and ‘Westernised’. These inconsistencies can be explained by the interplay of multiple and combining age cohorts and immigrant generations (as well as genders).

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9 Conversation at D.’s house, 21 February 2008.
Although individual exceptions and voices are important, stereotyping overlooks nuances such as generational and gender distinctions, and does not always reflect what individual people do (Eriksen, 1993: 24). Rather, stereotyping is a ‘device’ through which individuals ‘are able to reduce the complexity of social relations that confront them’, which is particularly acute in the urban immigrant minority scene (Mitchell, 1970: 89).

Looking again at Tables 1 and 2, we can see that first wave Hindus regard themselves as the ‘backbone’ of Lusaka’s Hindu community despite their purported relative ‘apathy’ towards Indian cultural associations and events. This is one of the main contentions between the two groups (and one encountered in discussing apathy in the two previous chapters): that the Gujarati first-wave Hindus dominate the Executive Committee of LHA, but that second-wave members organise and attend the events, and further that amongst the youth, the second-wave group is more involved in Hindu activities than the first. The normative value given to participation in cultural and community events is intimately linked to ideas of ‘Indianness’. ‘Indianness’ is awarded by members of both parties a moral value (this is evidenced in other studies, too - see Schwartz, 1967, Dubey, 2000, Rajagopal, 2000, Vertovec, 2000, Shukla, 2003, Lindridge et al., 2004, Naidoo, 2007). Indeed, feelings of moral superiority among second-wave immigrants stem from their perceived retention of ethnic practices, which include regarding themselves as ‘religiously devoted’, ‘cultural’, ‘charitable’ and ‘active’ within the community. However, for members of the first wave, feelings of moral superiority stem instead from their ability to be ‘adaptive’ with their Indian culture in Zambia, their sense of ‘Zambianess’, and from the idea that they are part of the ‘pioneering’ migrant
wave. They are ‘patrons’ or uncles (‘kakas’) of the community who are ‘family oriented’ and have, over generations, worked hard against and under different systems of government rule. They contributed to Zambia’s liberation struggle and are ‘charitable’. They label themselves ‘true Zambians’. In another case, Franco-Mauritians labelled themselves as ‘true Mauritian’ (Eriksen, 1993: 23). This is also redolent of other studies of immigrant waves, including Mannoni’s Madagascan study, in which, as Strauss explains, second-generation Madagascan-born French felt ‘superior’ but also ‘antagonistic’ towards French-born newcomers (Strauss, [1969] 1979: 136. Cf. with Cubans in the USA, Eckstein and Barberia, 2002: 805).

Another inconsistency across Tables 1 and 2 is the claim by ‘residents’ that they are ‘higher caste’, while at the same time labelling ‘expatriates’ the ‘Namasteji crowd’, which was explained to me as a group of high-caste newcomers from India.\footnote{Interview with R.K., 27 January 2008. Also Samachar, 1999, Vol. 2 (3): 11.} One informant claimed that, ‘It used to be more of the upper caste in Zambia but the 1970s influx of expats brought people from all over India, all sorts of people.’\footnote{Interview with K.P., J.P. and M.P., 13 July 2007.} As noted earlier, personal narratives of ‘residents’ and earlier research shows that caste divisions do not correlate directly with ‘waves’ of migration (Dotson and Dotson, 1968). Again, stereotype representations are not necessarily reflected in actual relationships and behaviour. While actual complexities of caste, gender, generations, occupations, and so on, are levelled in the process of stereotyping, exaggerated representations begin to inform group identity and behaviour. In writing about the stereotypes among a very different community in colonial Zambia (African tribes in the Copperbelt), J. Clyde Mitchell asserted that,
‘The falsity or justification of the stereotype [...] are of little moment: their significance is in the way in which these stereotypes provide the basis of social behaviour’ (1970: 87). As descriptions of group characteristics, they steer members’ interactions and expectations and act as a tool in the making of the ‘other’ (Fabian, 1983, 1990). While stereotypes certainly ‘enter into’ social relations, they do not solely determine them: other factors prevail (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 192). So entrenched are the ideas surrounding this division, however, that informants described two groups who face ‘different directions’, and have different ‘understanding power’. How did informants arrive at such polarisations?

**Defining Difference: Language**

The role of language in the creation of ethnic and national identities has been comprehensively outlined (Smolicz, 1979, 1981, Anderson, 1983, Edwards, 1985, Habermas, 1989, Vail, 1993). The production of newspapers and magazines – that is, printed forms of language, or ‘print capitalism’ – has played an important part in forging linguistic unity that both defines and transcends the nation (Anderson, 1983, Shukla, 2003. In Shukla see also Robert E. Park, 1922). For many immigrants and their descendants, however, low literacy levels or limited access to resources has prevented the preservation of written or printed language skills. Consequently, languages or dialects often shrink into the spoken and/or private spheres. And, perhaps due to their typically small population sizes and linguistic heterogeneity, even where immigrant ethnic communities have had the capacity to produce their own magazines and organise language schools for their children, often a compromise has been made towards the most widely-spoken or dominant language.

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or dialect (Avenarius, 2007). Few studies, however, have highlighted the intra-community tensions that such limitations and compromises can cause within these communities.

As analysis of the emergence of cultural associations and also of generation and gender has shown, Indian regional languages continue to play an important part in relations within Lusaka’s Hindu community. In fact, despite protestations by its members that LHA is inclusive of all Hindus, and articles in Samachar calling for greater unity across Lusaka’s Hindu subgroups, several articles in the association magazine were printed exclusively in Gujarati script or Roman-scripted Gujarati. The next subsection shows how even English language articles expose a Gujarati or ‘resident’ bias. Here, some opinion pieces and letters to the Editors of Samachar, and other research data is briefly examined – data in which differences in language are represented as the cause of the ‘resident’-‘expatriate’ division. Two important points are stressed. First, in this construction, Gujarati is pitted against an aggregate of Hindi and other regional languages including Punjabi, Bengali and Malayalam, and therefore language itself cannot be the sole cause or indicator of the rift. And second, the interplay of age and immigrant generations and migrant waves complicates linguistic boundaries among the Hindu community and signifies wider identity transformation.

The management of the LHA and its buildings by Gujarati Hindus has caused it to be labelled a ‘Gujarati Club’, and non-Gujaratis to feel reportedly unwelcome there. Lusaka’s Hindu associations do not represent what have been termed ‘convivial sites’ elsewhere (Mohan, 2006, 2008, Kothari, 2008, Mercer et al., 2008). Rather, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, they are sites demarcating and contesting
regional, caste, and linguistic identities. Most ‘vernacular’ associations, bounded by caste, region and language, formed when second-wave immigrants arrived and began negotiating their community status within the established Hindu network, made up predominantly of people of Gujarat origins. Two of the most significant linguistic associations that formed at this time were the Zambian Malayalee Cultural Association (ZMCA, from Kerala and Malayalam-speaking) and the Tamil Association (from Tamil Nadu and Tamil-speaking). Both included Christian Indians: one second-wave interviewee claimed that ‘the minority of expatriates were Hindus’ and, ‘because we shared language and customs of a later India, we connected to these Christians more easily’ than to first-wave Hindus.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, the management of LHA was largely left to first-wave immigrants. They outnumbered the newcomers, who, although constituting linguistically discrete sets, nevertheless defined themselves socially in relation to the dominant majority.

However, from the early 1970s onwards, many first-wave Hindus emigrated away from Zambia while the second wave into the country continued, and by the 1990s there were more or less equal numbers of the two subgroups. By 2006 the Hindu community in Lusaka was estimated to be around two-thirds ‘expat’.\(^\text{15}\) Importantly, the minority Gujaratis continued to dominate LHA, the management of Hindu Hall, and the administration (although not the use) of the Mandir.

Despite the levelling powers of the Mandir (the leader of which has customarily been recruited directly from India and has typically only spoken Hindi) and some charitable and celebratory projects which draw all Hindus

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together, there remains little overlap in social, associational terms. Interaction occurs amongst core social cliques in the community. Key players, who frequent the podiums and guest tables at cultural events, regularly call for better subgroup ‘cross-cultural’ representation in Lusaka’s Hindu associations generally, and in LHA particularly. From the late 1990s, adverts for LHA appeared in *Samachar* urging members to put aside their regional differences and encouraging ‘expatriates’ to run for office on the Executive Committee in order to ‘make a difference’. Conversely, letters from the Hindu public urged LHA to be more inclusive of ‘expatriates’: one sent anonymously by ‘A Gujarati’, stated, ‘LHA, get out your shell and tap this pool of worthy people [...] even though we come from different parts of Indian, WE ARE ONE.’ Another letter used the same, capitalised emphasis: ‘[Expatriates] need to be told how welcome they are. We may speak different languages, but we are all Hindus. WE ARE ONE.’

This ‘oneness’, however, was not symbolised in language. Language is both a private and public ‘ethnic marker’ (Edwards, 1985). At the community level language is effective in signalling and entrenching difference. As is clear in Table 1 above, second-wave Hindus distinguished themselves from the first wave in terms of their own, celebrated cultural and linguistic diversity. The difference signalled and entrenched is therefore a difference between the speakers of a set of non-Gujarati languages and speakers of Gujarati: the ‘expatias’ versus the ‘kakawallahs’. One interviewee described this watershed:

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We [from Kerala] speak the same language, and when you come out of the country it becomes a strong identity, like when I meet someone from Kerala we speak the same language, we move [together]. So [...] there’s not too much interlinked between all these different regional associations that are here. Well, I say that but then socially there is more a division of ‘who came when’. There’s a big North Indian group who came first, before everyone else - they speak Gujarati and they move [by] themselves.\textsuperscript{20}

The different groups people ‘move’ in are simplified into two when the complexity of language is perceived too complex to explain: the Gujarati speakers versus those who, typically, communicate across their regional divisions in Hindi.

LHA aims to represent all Hindus. Written communication in general from LHA’s Executive Committee to its members, however, is allegedly not widely circulated among second waves. Such communication would nevertheless be conducted in English, which most first and all second wave members speak and read. At meetings and events of LHA, though, ‘residents’ stand accused of conducting business and social affairs in spoken Gujarati. One man wrote to the Editors of \textit{Samachar} praising the magazine but lamenting that, although a paid-up life member of the association, ‘not being a Gujarati speaking member, it appears the Association does not bother much about our existence and presence as members.’\textsuperscript{21} Another letter, from ‘An Expatriate’ stated:

\begin{quote}
It is obvious [...] that the powers at be have deemed that no non-Gujarati speaking members are welcome either to your functions or in your membership. You say “Join LHA to make a difference.” OK I will, But:

1. I do not speak Gujarati – how will I understand the proceedings of your various meetings and functions?

2. I’m joining to make a difference – but I am just an “expat” – who will elect me on your board to help make that difference?\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[20]{Interview with R.K., 25 April 2007.}
\end{footnotes}
The Editors responded that all proceedings of LHA meetings are in English and that the Executive Committee of LHA had previously contained non-Gujaratis. However, one of the Editors, a non-Gujarati sitting on the Committee, admitted:

[As] a non-Gujarati, I feel sometimes out of place on the discussion that takes place at the meetings with the language making me incommunicative. This is by no means meant to distract the prospective non-Gujarati members from becoming a member of LHA Executive or from contributing to the Association activities [...]  

In his Editorial he goes on to say that fellow members have made him ‘feel at ease’ by speaking ‘the language best known to every Indian’: English. My own observations of meetings and events confirm that the bulk of business conversation takes place in English, but that in between agenda points, in break-away conversations, in joking, gossip, and in follow-up socialising, English is punctuated by exchanges in Gujarati.  

The ways in which language is used by group members to assert power or influence can be described as a form of ‘sub-cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1977. Lindridge et al., 2004, applied this to South Asian youth’s cultural adaptations in Britain).

This is not true of LHA’s women’s wing, Streenikatan, in which spoken Gujarati and Hindi are the predominant languages. Indeed, at other women’s meetings I attended, specifically those of LILA, language, and also gossip, was an openly discussed issue. Efforts were made on my behalf to speak in English, but aside from this women were reminded to talk in English or Hindi rather than Gujarati or amongst themselves in regional dialects in order that everyone could understand and there were ‘no secrets’. At LILA’s Holi celebrations at the Indian High Commission in 2007, one member sang some songs in Gujarati. This spurred a

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24 This is based on informal and formal meetings, including the HAZ AGM, 6 May 2007.
long debate over songs in other languages. One elderly second wave sang in Punjabi, but the Bengali women refused to sing, and nobody knew all the words to any Holi songs in Hindi.25 One new expatriate/third wave member, working in Lusaka for an aid organisation, told me that she found gatherings of Streenikatan more difficult than LILA because ‘there [at Streenikatan] there is less diversity – and Gujarati is the language of gossip’.26 In fact, all regional languages/dialects are utilised in gossip, both of which are used and performed by groups in ‘marking themselves off against others’ (Epstein, 1969: 124–5. See also Mitchell, 1970: 92).27 The non-Gujarati Editor of Samachar quoted above used his Editorial to remind members of India’s slogan, ‘Unity in diversity’, and he urged Hindus to ‘embrace’ each other’s cultures rather than negatively ‘commenting on’ differences in ‘behaviour and customs’.

Building on the complexities of age and immigrant generations discussed in the previous chapter, it is possible to show that the value placed on language helps differentiate the two waves of migrants and their descendants. The revival of ethnic and homeland interests by immigrant third generations (as asserted by Hansen) has been described as ‘largely symbolic’. Edwards shows a gradual thinning of ethnic culture in the United States, in which the symbolic characteristics of minorities are all that persist. He supports this, musing that, ‘the returning grandsons do not often want to learn the ancestral language’ (1985: 112–13). Although in vastly different circumstances, ethnic, homeland characteristics of

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27 The role of gossip and social networks was investigated by members of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in some depth. As well as Epstein, see Gluckman (1963).
the first wave of Hindus to Zambia has undergone a thinning as the second
generation grew up as part of a minority in African towns and cities. Skills in
written Gujarati have been lost, although not by all, and skills in Hindi have largely
been reduced to basic (even the President of LHA at the time of my research, who
worked closely with the priest at the Mandir, admitted that he needed a Hindi
translator\textsuperscript{28}). Many women marrying second-generation men were new migrants,
and their Indian language skills in some cases revived cultural interests within the
men’s home life and across the network. The third generation, however, are
exposed to Indian languages mainly at home – something mentioned in Chapter 4
when considering the way Miller’s material cosmopolitanism exists in the private
sphere.

In terms of age generations, however, many second-wave men of adult age
who grew up in Lusaka are fluent in at least one Indian language (but not usually
Gujarati). Many of them came to Zambia with their families and their family values,
which included retention of Indian language skills. Parents of this group were more
likely than first-wave counterparts to insist that their children learn these
languages. Third generation children of the first wave are therefore less skilled in
written Indian languages than second wave, second generation children of the
same age. In Lusaka, the Hindu Library (described in Chapter 4) and IHC are sites
for language classes, although interest over the years has been irregular. A letter to
the Editors of \textit{Samachar} in 1999 complained that ‘90%’ of the Hindu community ‘are
not really interested if their children learn Indian music or their Gujarati

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007.}
The classes on offer whilst I was present, though, were in Hindi (albeit that without exception, the handful of pupils in attendance were descendants of the second wave). As in studies of other immigrant communities (Avenarius, 2007), parents felt it was important to pursue a language that was culturally fitting but also ‘useful’ and ‘international’. Crucial here are shifting sites in which different languages are spoken (Lindridge et al., 2004: 223, Naidoo, 2007: 61). The private or quasi-private spheres house Indian languages; public spaces suppress their use. Indeed, first wave Hindus are far more likely to be skilled in a local African language such as ciNyanja, through greater exposure at work and school, and a different set of relations with locals. Both the cultural compromise of selecting Hindi for classes, and the adoption of local African languages are clear examples of how migrants adapt to changed circumstances, and in so doing transform ethnic diversity towards an essentialised sense of Indianness. Language is, therefore, important in overcoming as well as defining and symbolising the community rift, which has been produced through other factors.

Constructing Difference: Migration Narratives and Other Forms of ‘Rooting’
Constructing and reinforcing the migrant wave division has also required community members to collectively (albeit sometimes subconsciously) select and make meaningful moments from their past. In *Arabs and Berbers*, Gellner describes this process as setting a limit to a community’s ‘historic horizon’ (Gellner and Micaud, 1972: 12). For Lusaka’s Hindus, the limits of the community’s horizon are

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30 Conversation with A.B. and A.P., n.d. January 2008. This reifies the tension between the portrayal of LHA as the domain of ‘resident’ Gujaratis and the reality that its cultural services are predominantly used by second wave immigrants.
set at the earliest records and memories of migration from India and settling in
Zambia – subgroup belonging and characteristics are measured against these.

Other studies of overseas communities demand a stronger historical telescope and
focus on pre-migration contexts, or ‘migration auspices’, in explaining
contemporary internal differences (Clarke et al., 1990, Grieco, 1998, Eckstein and
Barberia, 2002, Ramji, 2006). While Indian culture provides concrete differences in
terms of regional, ethnic and cultural traits, informants on either side of the
‘resident’-'expatriate’ division here constructed difference largely from memories
of migration and post-migration experiences, or other forms of ‘rooting’.

Migration Narratives
Many of the narratives I recorded included stories of families’ journeys to Africa,
particularly journeys that took place before Zambian independence. As I note
elsewhere, the crossing to Africa at that time was reportedly harrowing: Passenger
Indians slept for up to a month on the open deck on wet mattresses and at the end
there was no guarantee of civility from immigration authorities or, worse,
permission to remain (Haig, 2010 forthcoming). Many Indians recalled the
steamships that they, their parents or grandparents had travelled on. These ships –
such as the SS Karanja and SS Kampala – have come to reify for many ‘residents’ the
perseverance of their families in what one man described as ‘surviving Central
Africa’.31 Two first-wave, second-generation brothers demonstrated (in their own
words) their ‘African belonging’ by showing me the travel trunk their mother had
brought on her first crossing; similarly, the woman I introduced in the previous

31 Interview with N.K.P., 25 April 2007. Other ship names mentioned include SS Tilawa, SS Khandala, SS
Amra, SS Kenya, SS Karangola. Informal conversations; interview with H.D., 9 July 2007; interview with
unpublished manuscript.
chapter who showed me her kitchen items told me proudly how some had been brought to Africa by dhow. The overland journey from the coast was also challenging, occupying a less central, but nonetheless valuable, place in personal and collective memory. A network of Indian families dotted from the coast inland had, in the late 1890s and early 1900s, established open lodging houses offering incoming immigrants shelter, food and local knowledge. Such families played a vital role in the movement and mood of the Indian community in Africa. A number of Hindus in Zambia today attribute their safe arrival to the Rana family. One informant wrote that from ‘the mid ‘30s up to the late ‘50s there were very few Indians from Northern Rhodesia who had not savoured the famed Rana hospitality.’ He remembered the Rana’s cook, Old Man Sam, whose brother, Nalumino Mundia, became a minister in Kaunda’s government. This is not mere trivia: accounts like this are recalled with great pride and used by ‘residents’ today to distinguish themselves from later incomers, and to legitimate their belonging in Zambia. The establishment of ‘roots’ is inextricable from ‘travel practices’ or ‘routes’ (Clifford, 1997).

By the mid-1950s some Indians returning from visits to India, or coming for the first time to Northern Rhodesia, travelled by air, at least for the East African leg of the journey. This mode of travel, however, was never mentioned to me in interviews: doing so served no purpose. Modes of travel, and memories of them, continue to be important, however, because they situate people relative to others in immigrant communities (Glick Schiller et al., 1992, Clifford, 1997, Portes et al.,

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33 Personal correspondence with M.V., July 2008.
34 Interview with K.P.R., 21 May 2007.
1999, Eckstein and Barberia, 2002). For Koser, ‘diaspora’ is a ‘way of being “other” among the established, of keeping alive the drama of the voyage of “otherness” in worlds that seek sameness and homogeneity’ (2003: x). But diaspora identity is also used to differentiate among community members themselves. Both first and second-wave Hindus reminisce, for example, about Zambia Airways (which operated independently from 1967 until 1995). This demonstrated a link to the shared struggle of the Kaunda years and to the transition, in the early 1990s, to multiparty democracy and a liberal economy. I return to the shared experiences of the two groups in the next section of the chapter. Here, though, the link to a bygone Zambia served to ‘root’ both more deeply to Zambia than post-liberalisation incomers.

Many Lusaka Hindus accept that the terminology of ‘resident’ and ‘expatriate’ has limitations, and that you can be both an official ‘permanent resident’ in Zambia as well as being part of the post-independence wave. Moreover, the term expatriate is applied to newer incomers in its definitive sense, forcing a reconsideration of the terminology. Two women who settled in Zambia in the mid 1970s claimed they were ‘ex-expatriates’.35 (The following section takes this up.) Despite public efforts to narrow the gap, such as articles and letters printed in Samachar, the desire to maintain these distinctions is strong. In fact, the author of the two humorous articles cited above, ostensibly aimed at eliminating ‘groupism’ in the community, has strong private opinions about the importance of maintaining a distinction. He proposed a new term for ‘residents’: the ‘originals’. He explained, ‘the determining factor is that “originals” are those whose parents or

grandparents got here by ship.’36 When I asked him why this distinction was so important, he responded:

I think it’s respect and recognition for those who came out when there was nothing but bush. The new arrivals don’t realise what our families had to go through.37

An elderly informant – now hailed as one of the ‘pioneers’ – similarly said, in discussing the significance of the migrant divide, ‘There is something from remembering how difficult it was.’38 Among this set of nostalgic informants, status is sought through memories or connections to particular (colonial era) transitions which exclude post-independence incomers.

Letters and articles printed in LHA’s magazine, Samachar, are again illuminating. I showed the three extracts below to second-wave informants. The extracts, written by ‘residents’, were interpreted negatively. Seen as implicitly privileging the history of the first migrant wave, they were regarded as excluding non-‘residents’.39

[Let] us examine the historical background of our presence in Zambia. Our founding fathers came to Zambia mainly from India in the early part of the century. They planted their roots despite a lot of hardships, discrimination and insults.40

Please remember that the leadership is there to ensure that the foundation of our Association laid by our dedicated and industrious fathers and forefathers continue to grow from strength to strength.41

In the hustle and bustle of life we seem to forget our “roots”[...] In the old days our parents were invited to this country by others who had set themselves up in business. [...] Our forefathers laid the foundations so that we may reap the rewards. But we forget how the “building” actually came about. To achieve anything in life we need to know where we came from in order to know where we are going.42

36 Interview with K.P.R., 13 March 2007.
37 Interview with K.P.R., 13 March 2007.
In the first two extracts, ‘forefathers’ and ‘founding fathers’ were not read by second waves in a general, poetic sense, but rather in specific terms of biological heritage. ‘Our’ was not interpreted as referring to that belonging to the entire Hindu community, despite the broad intended readership of the magazine. Of the third article, one respondent straightaway said, ‘Yeah, see, this isn’t the community’s history [...] it’s the history of the Gujaratis here. Where is the bit about us expats having to struggle against Zambianisation? We laid foundations, too.’

Further to these articles, a third of the issues of Samachar that were printed between 1997 and 2001 contained ‘profiles’ of outstanding individuals in Lusaka’s Hindu community – all profiles were of first wave members. One title was ‘The Intrepid Pioneer’, and captures the essence of the author’s project, which was to, ‘record our pioneering forefathers and make sure that the whole community knows what we owe these great men.’ In remembering the history of the Hindu community, however, ‘residents’ have often inadvertently forgotten the different journeys and struggles faced by second-wave immigrants.

Other Forms of ‘Rooting’: Youth Experiences and Schooling

Of course, travel and toil are not the only forms of rooting which migrants and their descendants use as measurements of generational belonging and subgroup difference. Clifford’s ‘routing’ refers to a much wider set of experiences and emotional tensions. Other memories and perceptions of growing up and learning to fit in are influential, too. The informant above remembered hitching rides on the

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backs of ox wagons driven by Afrikaners when a boy.\footnote{Interview with K.P.R., 13 March 2007.} Many Hindus value memories or anecdotes of their or their parents’ involvement in sport, popular culture, teenaged antics, African nationalist politics, or the establishment of cultural associations (Haig, 2010, forthcoming, Phiri and Mufuzi, 2010, forthcoming). Especially important has been the ability of the community to adapt their Indian culture to Africa, to have ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992), and shifted the emphasis of Indian celebrations to fit their surroundings (such as Diwali, which mainly celebrates the Hindu New Year in Zambia\footnote{Samachar, 1999, Vol. 2 (3): 11.}). Here, the focus is on informants’ memories of school experiences in this adaptation.

Memories of segregated schooling are used by many ‘residents’ to emphasise their place in the social history of Zambia. Those informants who were children during the 1940s and Federation (1953–63) recounted the train journey to boarding school in Southern Rhodesia. A stretch of trees along the railway line outside the town of Kafue was important to one man who travelled to school in Que Que (now Kwekwe) from the Copperbelt: those trees are now valued symbols of his children’s roots in Zambia.\footnote{Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.} Figure 24 is a photograph of Hindu children embarking upon the ‘school train’ at Livingstone. As detailed in Chapter 3, segregated education was used by the British in asserting control over minorities as well as over the African population: there were few secondary schools allocated to Asians and Coloureds during Federation, and, until the inauguration of Prince Phillip School in the late 1950s, these were in Southern Rhodesia. The man I interviewed is the boy pictured closest to the carriage. He fondly remembers the event as an adventure with
siblings and friends; he was delighted to think back to the tiffin box, filled with home cooked rice and sweets, which his mother prepared for him for the journey every school term. Such memories are valuable currency in negotiating community status, and (much like language) have been used as ‘sub-cultural capital’.

Figure 24. Harshad, Subhash and Indrajit boarding the train to Que Que from Livingstone

Frequently, in affirming that they felt ‘Zambian’, interviewees of this age and immigrant generation would substantiate their feelings by telling me about their school experience. Two examples follow. In both cases, the men interviewed were descendants of the first immigrant wave, second generation and aged in their early sixties.

JMH: And so you say you feel Zambian?

J: Yeah, I mean, you know, I’m properly Zambian, born here, went to school here. I went to Lotus Primary School, which is just next to Lotus Sports Club. Ah, it was again a school for Indians only. Then I went to a secondary school called

Prince Phillips Secondary School, which was for Indians and Coloureds. And then it became Kamwala Secondary School after Independence.  

JMH: So you say you feel ‘Zambian’ but you have quite a lot of memories of India as well?

SP: Well, yeah, it was my first eight years there. Well, there was no primary school there as such, because we – When I came to Zambia I did not know a word of English, I did not know. So I started to learn English at the age of eight or nine years. I did my studies at Lotus Primary School, which is here, from Grade One, basically, to Grade Three. [...] But this is - here is - where I went to school.  

In the first example the interviewee claims he is ‘properly’ Zambian in part as a product of schooling; he emphasises that he was born and schooled ‘here’. In the second example, the interviewee manipulates what is essentially a question about his connections to India, again emphasising his schooling, which he also stresses was ‘here’. Indeed, in their 1950s and 1960s study, Dotson and Dotson linked schooling closely with acculturation into plural society, pointing out the unique and relatively privileged education afforded to Indians (1968: 211–12). Shared school experience has emerged as pivotal in other examples, too: for instance, in her study of the Taiwanese community of Orange County, California, Avenarius used network analysis to identity strong, medium and weak ties. She found that sub-ethnic affiliations were the strongest, with shared language and shared school experience being the most significant bonds within those sub-ethnicities (2007: 101, 106). Here, shared memories of school experience have helped to construct and maintain strong ties within the first wave subgroup; but they have also come to represent the boundaries between those ties and weaker ones. In the next
section teenagers’ and young adults’ conceptualisations of how school experience affects subgroup difference are examined as is the involvement of a third migrant wave.

Section 2. Towards Ethnic Solidarity?
As explained above, Indian language use and historical narratives of migration and school experiences are used in constructing and maintaining a subgroup division between the first two migrant waves. This section challenges this dualist interpretation of the community. First, it looks critically at the extent to which migrant waves determine social relationships, using references to the Zambian Muslim-Hindu divide, to more immediate status-based fissures in the community, and to pre-second-wave relations. It also considers how a new, third wave of incomers from India is affecting the way community members think through the ‘resident’-’expatriate’ dyad – stranger theory is incorporated directly into analysis here. Second, this section demonstrates a shift in the conceptualisation of intra-community difference by examining contemporary youth accounts of school experience, considering once again the tangling meanings of generation. The section also presents preliminary data that has helped in making conjectures on the future of intra-community relations.

Re-thinking Subgroup Dualism
In 1998 Samachar printed an article ahead of the Hindu Association of Zambia’s Induction Dinner (welcoming the new executive committee) explaining why an invitation had been extended to the Chairman of the Lusaka Muslim Society. The article stated:
For a very long time the two communities, Hindus and Muslims, have lived together side by side with very little social contact. [...] But essentially, both communities are Gujaratis in their historical make-up, both hailing predominantly from the nearby districts of Surat and Bharuch. There is a similarity in migration pattern, accompanied by the usual struggles of the pioneer forefathers. [...] With so many, many things in common such as language, food, same family values and ancestry [...] should we not be more constructively and positively looking into those things that unite us rather than that which divides us? 53

This statement, which claims Hindus are ‘essentially’ Gujarati, obviously excludes Lusaka’s Hindus originating elsewhere in India (namely “expatriates”), and is therefore another example of the type of bias which they reportedly resent. It flags up Muslim and Hindu Gujaratis’ shared ancestry, customs and values. In V.S. Naipaul’s novel, A Bend in the River, the protagonist makes a similar claim about his community’s identity:

‘My family was Muslim. But we were a special group. We were distinct from the Arabs and other Muslims on the coast; in our customs and attitudes we were closer to the Hindus of north-western India, from which we had originally come.’ (1979)

These statements, however, reveal that shared origins, language, migration patterns, and struggles – purported in the section above as defining and unifying the ‘resident’ Hindu subgroup – are not sufficient determining forces in creating a cohesive community. After all, as Chapter 3 explained, the Indian communities (incorporating Muslims and Hindus) of Zambia and the East African coast disintegrated from the late 1940s, and Hindu migrants began forming separate ethnic communities. Unlike Naipaul’s protagonist, however, most first-wave Hindus in Lusaka would agree they are closer in ‘customs and attitudes’ to other Hindus than to Zambian Muslims of Gujarati origin.

In addition to the shortcomings of these forces (shared language, origins, and so on) in guaranteeing community cohesion, they do not dissolve other causes of

friction and fragmentation that exist within and across migrant waves in the community, such as age generation, gender, caste and socio-economic class. These often override ‘expatria’ versus ‘kakawallah’ sentiments in daily relationships. One Hindu student, cited in the previous chapter, identified status in the community not with family histories but with visible material wealth and ‘jealousy’. This was demonstrated to me by two of my key informants, well-respected ‘residents’ who had each conveyed to me on separate occasions personal rivalries in their relationship relating to their respective castes, business connections and personal conduct. Their case is fairly typical. Although they presented the division between first and second waves to me as the most significant barrier to community cohesion, they used personal family heritage in negotiating their own status vis-à-vis the other. On one occasion, they vied throughout a meeting over the relative contributions of their fathers (both of whom are regarded as ‘pioneers’).

Afterwards, one said:

Did you see what he was doing? Trying to make himself more important than me because his dad was political back then [in lead up to Zambian Independence].

While individual exceptions or anomalies do not disprove a rule, this case is evidence that on a daily, practical basis, interpersonal ties across the ethnic network are built upon a great deal more, and a great deal less, than shared historic bonds. ‘Resident’ and ‘expatriate’ distinctions, and the sentimental, nostalgic pasts they invoke are evidently important in building subgroup likenesses. But other group attributes and more immediate and material aspects of daily interaction also affect how ethnic group members interact and build

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54 Conversation with M.A., 4 March 2007.
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communal identities. According to Robert E. Park, ‘Likeness is, after all, a purely formal concept which by itself cannot hold anything together’ (quoted in Rumbaut, 1997: 944, fn7).

Further to this, instances of rivalry for status and a domination of earlier migrants in Hindu life in Zambia were documented prior to the second migrant wave. The similarities between the following two quotations, for example, spoken almost fifty years apart, are illuminating. The first is from an interview conducted by Dotson and Dotson in the early 1960s with a young community leader who had more recently emigrated to Northern Rhodesia (probably in the 1950s):

One of the big problems is that the old men who came out here first and made the money want to dominate things. They take the position that just because they have been here the longest, they can tell the rest of us what to do. Now it would be perfectly all right with us if some of these so-called leaders would actually lead the community. But they don’t. [...] These older men don’t want to lead. They just want to dominate. [...] If one of these old-timers decides to do something for the community, then they always want the community to accept it on their terms, or otherwise they won’t play. (1968: 219, emphasis added.)

The second is from a conversation I had with a prominent second-wave woman in 2007.

I’m going to resign from the Board of [the LHA] Nkhwazi School. It’s made up mainly of men from the original set that came here, and not many of them are professionals. The problem is, they don’t do anything, they just want to be leading and they want control of the purse-strings. They think they have power because they have been here longer. Traders should stick to their shop-keeping but they all want to interfere with the way I run the school.56

The first extract is critical of the ‘old-timers’, a label now used for expatriates (see Table 2 above). This informant referenced the ‘old men who came out here first’, and is directly comparable to the complaint in the second extract directed towards the ‘men from the original set that came here’. In both cases informants claimed that these men want to dominate rather than lead, and furthermore that their self-

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56 Conversation with I.D., 13 March 2007, emphasis added.
aggrandisation rests on the fact that that they (in the 1960s) ‘have been here the longest’, or (in 2007) ‘have been here longer’.

There are dissimilarities, too: the first extract includes age generation in the differential, which the second does not. The informant was a younger man, called out as an apprentice. The patron-client relationship (refer back to Chapter 3) was one of dominance and subservience, and the relative ages of migrants was important. In fact, many second generation Indians at the time were treated by their fathers as apprentice employees, and the above extract is part of a discussion on disunity across age generations rather than immigrant generations or migrant ‘waves’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 210–20). Importantly, in the second extract the informant is a woman: she also had strong opinions about the role of women in community leadership. Aside from these two main diversions, though, the two extracts make clear that subgroup labels and corresponding characteristics, presented by my informants and by items in Samachar as fixed and primordial, have not always been consolidated in ‘resident’ and ‘expatriate’ terms.

Moreover, these terms have, since the 1990s, been constantly criticised and reconfigured by community members. Just as there was a shift in rhetoric after the arrival of a second wave, I argue now that a shift has been taking place with the arrival of a third wave of newcomers from India. This is recorded in conversations with members of all three migrant waves. Members of the third wave began to arrive after the advent of multi-party democracy in Zambia in 1991. This set are mostly university-educated Indians who have come on short, renewable contracts to Zambia as part of non-governmental organisations, government aid programmes, international organisations such as the United Nations, or private
corporations or banks. Their numbers are not greatly significant on a national scale: although there are no figures specifically for Indian immigrants reproduced in the 2000 Census reports, incomers from ‘Asia and Oceania’ fell from 8.9% to 5% from 1990 to 2000 (we can presume this figure has recovered following China’s interest in Africa). An official from the Indian High Commission estimated from records there that, since 2000, 150 expatriate Indians had arrived, most posted to Lusaka. The third wave includes families, couples, and unmarried men and women. Many of these Indians have travelled and lived in other countries, and consider themselves as part of an Indian ‘diaspora’. They bring a significant new dynamic into a diminishing population of Hindus in Lusaka.

The focus here is on how their presence is altering the way community members conceptualise and express subgroup differences. Although most hold on to subgroup stereotypes and labels documented above, and relations remain strained, there was an observable shift in rhetoric and allegiance towards placing first and second-wave members in collective opposition to third-wave incomers. The section above alluded to this shift when discussing how second wave migrants used memories of Zambia Airways flights to distance themselves from newer migrants. The assertion here is that second-wave migrants have begun to build their own historic narrative linking them more closely to earlier migrants through shared memories and experiences which predate the third wave. One example is:

On 31st March 1971, the British gave KK an ultimatum, to raise salaries or they were out. He did not raise the salaries, and they left. KK and Indira Gandhi were good friends, and KK called Indians to fill the niche left by the British. Then, when the parastatals were privatised, the expatriates were the ones who bought them up. The

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58 Meeting with M.V., Indian High Commission, 16 January 2008.
expatriates also joined the trading sector with the residents who had remained and they helped to build the Zambian economy.\(^59\)

This interviewee had been employed as a teacher in 1979, and chose to settle in Zambia and buy into business. He runs a well-known printers with his long-term ‘resident’ associate. The account above is based to some degree on his own experience, but his potted history of second-wave migrants in Zambia is general, stresses the ‘expatriate’ contribution to Zambian growth, and omits political and intra-community rifts. Here, second wave ‘joined’ remaining first wave Hindus. In other relevant accounts, informants tended to emphasise the number of years second wave immigrants had lived in Zambia – such as, ‘We’ve been here twenty-one years. We came for three like everyone else, like so many stories’.\(^60\)

The emphasis both on ‘joining’ and on the longevity of second-wave members’ stay in Zambia are important indicators of transformation. The following quotation, from a 1997 article in \textit{Samachar}, links the two concepts:

\begin{quote}
One is almost afraid to use the word “expatriate” because it is hopelessly outmoded. We don’t have expatriates anymore. Most of them have been here for more than 20 years. In a Gujarati organisation like Streenikatan, people have \textbf{blended and mixed} so well over the past two decades that the “expatriate” has become an extinct species.\(^61\)
\end{quote}

The writer chooses to use Streenikatan, the LHA’s women’s wing whose members are largely Gujarati, as proof that ‘people have blended and mixed so well’. In this case, the ‘blending’ that has allegedly taken place is of non-Gujarati Hindu second wave women into the established body of Hindu women (consider again the importance of immigrants’ integration into their own ethnic community. See Thomas and Znaniecki, 1958). I asked one interviewee (whose history of

\(^{59}\) Interview with S.G. and B.N., 17 January 2008.

\(^{60}\) Conversation with M. family, 4 November 2006.

'expatriates’ is quoted above) how important the division between Gujaratis and others was in the community today. He responded:

In the initial stages interaction was not much. But these days, interaction is more than in the ‘70s. Now it is integration. Currently the LHA president is an ‘expat’. Plus, you see, the locals died or emigrated. The trend is to go to the US, etc. They act more Western.62

Here, differences between the first and second waves are made explicit, and stereotypes are again utilised – the first wave members, ‘the locals’, ‘act more Western’ and are more likely to have ‘emigrated’. But, again, amongst those who remain in Zambia there is ‘more interaction’ and ‘integration’.

Taking this idea of ‘joining’, ‘blending’ and ‘integrating’ further, in discussing the ‘uncertain future’ of LHA, an ex-President (an Indian-born first-wave Hindu) asserted:

The main reason is, it’s that three generations, three types of people have come in, so now we have to, you also have to blend with the other people slowly. First it was the expatriates and the Gujarati communities, and they’ve blended in because some of them came in and stayed, they didn’t go for further thing and they blended. Other ones are coming in now and we slowly have to blend, and we don’t know what’s gonna happen.63

In this account, first and second-wave immigrants, who are nevertheless ‘different types of people’, are said to have ‘blended’ successfully over time. The onus is placed on the newcomers: in the case of ‘expatriates’ they ‘came in and stayed’ rather than migrating back to India or onwards elsewhere. The ‘other ones’, of the third wave, are yet to integrate into the Hindu community, and whether they also ‘stay’ is not yet known. Similarly, the Chairman of the Indo-Zambian Bank (a second wave and Christian Indian) told me that most of his clients were ‘old timer’ Indians, and that ‘the proportion of expats would be negligible.’ He went on,

63 Interview with S.P., 5 June 2007, emphasis added.
‘Expats are a small proportion – they come and go.’ For him, the term ‘old timer’ has come to include second waves, and ‘expat’ now refers to third waves presently on short contracts to Zambia. (This supports the two women in the previous section who called themselves ‘ex-Expatriate’.) One of my key third-wave informants conceptualised the Hindu community, his receiving ethnic community in Zambia, in similar terms, in this case in stark contrast to his own wave.

It’s not expatriate identity. I am an Indian expatriate and we are Indian, full stop. But it’s not like that for the people here. It’s a distinct type of expatriate identity [...] Not everybody here is expatriate – some of them have been born, brought up here – but it’s that kind of identity. It’s not that kind of identity where if you say ‘Indian identity’, then they relate back to India: no, that also isn’t there. [...] It’s in a global world, they’re just trying to be here and there, and compare themselves to the West, so somewhere in-between, they’re not even sure as to what their identity is, if you really ask them.65

The language of all three informants quoted directly above – first, second, and third waves – resonates strongly with stranger theory. According to the first wave ex-President of LHA, ‘expatriates’ ‘came in and stayed’: they joined the established Hindu minority, a stranger community. For Simmel, the stranger was not the ‘wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather [...] the man who comes today and stays tomorrow’ ([1908]1971: 143). Further, the stranger embodies a specific type of interaction between groups: this interaction differed between settled strangers of the first wave and the newly arriving second wave, and contributed to the rift between them. According to the Chairman of the Indo-Zambian Bank, third wave, new expatriates ‘come and go’: in Simmel’s terms, they have not joined the others in becoming strangers. This third wave (like the second before them) are more akin to Wood’s ‘newcomer outsider’ or Siu’s ‘sojourner’ who regard employment as temporary and either desire to progress away from it, back

64 Interview with C. Patro, 27 April 2007.
to the homeland, or to return to the homeland every few years (Wood, 1934, Siu, 1952). Siu’s classic sojourner was the Chinese laundryman, who, ‘in contrast to the bicultural complex’ of more settled migrants, ‘clings to his own ethnic group’ (Siu, 1952, Levine et al., 1976: 831). My Hindu third-wave informant above expresses this difference: to him Zambian Indians are ‘trying to be here and there’ and their feelings of belonging are complex in comparison to newcomer Indian expatriates, who are ‘Indian, full stop’.

In his review of stranger theory, Levine tabled the changing positions of stranger relationships to host country society (1979: 21–36). Successive waves of migrants pass through a process of adaptation, beginning as ‘estranged natives’ (Skinner, 1963) and ending as organic members of society. This is evidenced by my informants’ shifting accounts of their own ethnic community. In the Lusaka Hindu community, this process of adaptation to local ‘host country’ society and surroundings involves intra-community turmoil as individual immigrants negotiate their position within their own ethnic community. It also ‘produces a range of dilemmas’ as the constituent elements of that ethnicity itself are reworked (Shukla, 2001). Again, this is not something that Simmel’s work addressed, and most literature on migration and stranger theory still emphasises migrants’ relationship with wider host society. Some writers on diaspora come closer to analysing the importance of adaptation at the ethnic level: Shukla asks us to consider how working class Guyanese Asian immigrants in Queens, New York impact on the cosmopolitan Indian ‘diaspora’ (2001: 565). Clifford argues that ‘a shared, ongoing history of displacement, of suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as important as the projection of a single origin’ (1997: 251). Among Lusaka
Hindus, this history of adaptation has been, at least internally, more important
than shared Indian roots. The distinction between first and second waves persists,
but as both parties adapt to changing ethnic, social and political contexts, accounts
of this distinction shift. The third wave of migrants presents a new group against
which adaptation can be measured. This shift is demonstrated in the section
following.

Youth Accounts of Subgroup Difference
In discussing school experience as a form of ‘rooting’, the section above drew on
interviews with first-wave Hindus who recalled school days from the 1940s
through to the 1960s. They used their accounts, along with narratives of colonial
migration in their families, to demonstrate their belonging to Zambia in relation to
second-wave Hindus, particularly those in their own age cohort. With importantly
different implications, many of the younger adults, adolescents and children whom
I encountered during my research (those whose schooling began in the mid-1970s
and onwards, including those still at school) also emphasised schooling as strongly
influencing belonging. Other studies on immigrant or transnational communities,
particularly but not exclusively in the United States, stress how school curricula
shape ethnic minorities’ national identities (Schiffauer, et al., 2004) and how
educational achievements affected assimilation or acculturation into host societies
(Dotson and Dotson, 1968, Smolicz, 1981, Gibson, 1989, Zhou and Bankston, 1994,
Boyd, 2002, Rumbaut, 2004). If the content of history textbooks or exam grades
were important elements of school experience in establishing belonging and
interaction with wider Zambian society, however, this was not articulated in
informants’ accounts, and it was not a subject I pursued. Rather, younger
informants connected shared school experiences broadly and imprecisely with belonging both to their own ethnic community and to an international and cosmopolitan society – an example of what some scholars have called transnationalism ‘from below’ (Appadurai, 1998, Guarnizo and Smith, 2000, Kothari, 2008).

Indeed, in these accounts and those in the previous section, the most important modes of adaptation are those pertaining to the consolidation of a Zambian Hindu ethnicity, rather than to incorporation into the Zambian national majority (see Thomas and Znaniecki quoted in Rumbaut, 1997: 945, n8). Just as older age ‘residents’ talked in terms of separate Hindu subgroups’ ‘different directions’ and ‘understanding power’, young adults and adolescents used accounts of school experience to distinguish separate ‘ways of looking’ and ‘points of reference’.66 Shared experiences and memories can be instrumental in producing what Simmel described as strangers’ differing ‘objectivity’ ([1908]1971: 145), or what Gilroy calls ‘forms of community consciousness’ (1987). These forms of community consciousness are under constant reconstruction, part of the ‘hybridising’ process (Bhabha, 1990, 1994). For example, despite using a similar terminology of polarised subgroups, the younger age cohorts did not conceptualise the intra-community division as pertaining solely, or stringently, to first and second waves. Younger adults and teenage members of all three migrant waves presented a more unified account of the present, established Hindu community (that is, downplaying migrant wave distinctions), and tended to contrast the

direction of its members’ collective gaze with Indians arriving as part of a new third wave Hindu. Below are four interview extracts, fairly representative of conversations with others of the same ages and migration stages, which support my claim.

The first and second are from interviews with first-wave Hindus, the second from a conversation with a second wave, and the last is from an interview with a third wave. The first extract is from a conversation with two Zambian-born, third-generation brothers who had attended a local Zambian primary school in the 1970s and then, as teenagers, boarding school in England. This was common among affluent Hindus at the time. The eldest told me:

We understand things better, differently, than expatriates [because] we did the Zambian school bit, so we have those memories just like others our age. But we also went abroad and had the best education, you see? These people just coming in are fresh out of India, went to school in India, all rote-learning, and they think they understand Indian life anywhere.67

In this extract, the brothers’ ‘understanding’ of life in Zambia is contrasted with that of ‘expatriates’, which in this case refers to third waves – ‘these people just coming in’. The Indian school experience of this contingent (as well as the Indian school system itself) is deemed less valuable. Conversely, the interviewee suggests that the brothers’ education abroad [in England] was superior and further facilitated their understanding. They nevertheless stress the importance of sharing school memories of Zambia with others in the community. The second extract is from an interview with a twenty-one-year-old, Zambian-born, third generation ‘resident’. She also values having been educated in two places, but in this case she had ‘done some schooling in India’ and then attended Chingelo, a Christian

boarding school in central Zambia, which had ‘put some bush life’ in her and consolidated her sense of ‘belonging here’. She described how,

I did some school time in India, I did some school time in Zambia, and I think I know both sides of the story, resident and expat, and I can interact with everyone in our community, and even those Indians coming in now.68

She feels she can relate to both first and second waves, explicitly because she schooled in Zambia and India. She recognises a third distinction between ‘our community’ and ‘those Indians coming in now’. Unlike the two brothers, perhaps due to her experience in India, she considers that she can interact with this third wave too.

The third extract is from a conversation with a nineteen-year-old member of the second wave. She is a university student in Australia. In discussing her network of friends in Lusaka, she told me,

I wasn’t born here but I went to school here. Most of us, us Indians or whatever, I mean, go to private schools nowadays. There are so many in Lusaka. It’s more about which school you go to than where your family hails from to be honest. If new people come from India it’s about ‘Which school are you going to go to?’ and not ‘Where in India are you from?’69

This girl does not raise the issue of Indian regional divisions other than to dismiss its importance. She talks about ‘us Indians’ in comparison to ‘new people from India’, and claims that local school choices play a more pivotal role in social networking than shared origins. The fourth extract supports this idea that a process of acculturation (to a Hindu ethnic core) has taken place among first and second waves who have shared their school experience in Zambia, although the interviewee strongly identifies Indian regional origins with collective understanding. This third wave, a recent arrival and young professional who

68 Interview with U., 16 February 2008.
69 Conversation at D.’s house, 21 February 2008.
volunteers with LHA’s youth group, Yuvas United, contrasted young Zambian Indians’ lack of interest in Indian regional cultures with his own, third migrant wave:

[Zambian Hindu teenagers today] are not essentially, well, because they don’t come from India, they don’t have a strong sense of regional difference. They were here. For them every other guy is an Indian and friend, because at school they sit together, their ideas gel and they think that they are one group. For them, the second generation expat, or third generation resident, it’s not a big issue, of where you come from. All they had as identity was Zambian with Indian Origin, right? So for them, all the Indians are the same.\(^7\)

He went on:

The first generation expats here, they are the same as me. Because we come from India, we know it differently, because we studied in the system, we know India better. Plus the kind of knowledge we have is much different from what people here have got.

Although in other encounters with this informant it was clear that he related more closely with some second-wave Hindus on a cultural and social level (for example, in speaking the same language of Malayalam and attending ZMCA events), in this extract he clearly makes a distinction between his own, third migrant wave and a collective Hindu youth. He also separates out first generation ‘expatriates’ (second wave) from others, and he compares this set to himself, regardless of differing age generations. Although much younger than this latter set, he regards their Indian school experience as formative in a shared understanding of Indian culture (in contrast to the stress on Zambian life in the three preceding extracts). Those schooled in India have a ‘different kind of knowledge’ and are ‘the same’. This data challenges findings of Mannheim and related studies, which claim, as the previous chapter explained, that members of age cohorts share a world view or the same direction of gaze (Eckstein and Barberia, 2002). Strauss’s ‘diagonal’ relations are

\(^7\) Interview with R.K., 25 April 2007.
important here: as members of a second generation grows up in a different social
and historical context from their parents and predecessors, their relationships will
be notably different (Strauss, [1969] 1979: 136–8).

School experience was present in other youth data forms, too, and reveals
likely shifts away from older informants’ preoccupation with immigrant waves.
Images of school life occupy 13 of the photographs taken by young Hindus in
Lusaka. They include pictures of friends going to school, friends at school, break-
time, extracurricular sports, the Model United Nations club, and parents’ evening.
One is of a school tuck shop and the participant has explained, ‘I chose it because it
is an important part of school and school is a very important part of our lives as
teenagers. Maybe THE most important!’.71 Despite the many photos showing black,
white, Coloured and Indian friends mixing at school, photos of friends travelling to
school together or of non-school activities (both at home and around the city)
show only Indian friends. This is important in considering adaptation as being into
the Zambian Hindu ethnic community and towards a perceived cosmopolitan social
life, rather than to Zambian society per se. In the drawing and writing
competitions, ‘Indian Life in Zambia’, two pictures included the International
School of Lusaka – ‘Pride of Africa’ (Drawing 2) and ‘A Week in the Life of a Hindu in
Lusaka’ (Drawing 4). Five writing entries detailed school relationships and
activities. Two of these essays, written by young second-wave Hindu descendants,
specifically connected school friendships with ‘understanding local life’ and in
‘making us closer to Zambia’.72

72 Entries 8 and 15, February 2008.
Once again, it is not feasible to analyse separately any single age cohort, immigrant generation or migrant wave without considering the web of relationships from which their identities form. Recall Figure 20 in the previous chapter, a drawing by a young third-wave migrant to which most young first and second waves did not relate: the drawing entitled, 'We are in Zambia, but our Thinking is in India'. Shared cultural identity in that case cut across age cohorts. It is also intriguing that another young third-wave participant in the drawing competition included Lusaka International Airport in his depiction of 'Indian Life in Lusaka' (Drawing 3). His age generation’s experience of travel is wider-reaching, as yet unfolding, and destined to be as distinct again from both his biological and migrant wave predecessors’ (one of the challenges of this field outlined by Gans, 1997 and Rumbaut, 2004: 1162). Often, age generational divides are marked by journeys and modes of travel, since in order to situate themselves within their own family and community history, immigrants often have to ‘journey’ (literally or figuratively) to other places. Daljit Nagra’s poem, ‘Look, We Have Coming to Dover!’ (2007) emphasises his father’s voyage to Britain and the promises of new places; in a later article, he described how his father was locked up in the Heathrow flight path, unable to travel anywhere new. The meaning of travel changes within living memories. Importantly, the drawing that included Lusaka airport also included the Munali Hills, to Lusaka’s south. Other youth drawings included these hills (Drawing 13) and the Victoria Falls (Drawing 14). As poet Imtiaz Dharker’s work demonstrates, identifying with landscape is also an important form of rooting, and

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this too is experienced differently by age and immigrant generations of different waves.74

As argued throughout, what it means to be Zambian Hindu or Hindu in Zambia is not fixed: such identities are constantly reworked. According to Conzen, et al., ethnicity is ‘a process of construction or invention which incorporates, adapts and amplifies pre-existing communal solidarities, cultural attributes and historical memories’, but which is ultimately ‘grounded in real-life context and social experience’ (quoted in Zhou, 1997: 982). This preliminary data with youth suggests that while looking to the past plays an important role in building subgroup divisions, present experiences are also formative. Shared school experience and new forms of rooting among youth of different migrant histories but similar age cohorts appears to be changing the nature of relations between immigrant waves. The emphasis in youth accounts lies more upon a difference between those who have grown up in Zambia and more recent newcomers, the ‘third wave’ of migrants. This third wave, although recent and numerically small, has changed the cultural context in which Hindus in Lusaka shape and perform their identities.

**Conclusion**

The first section of this chapter built up the story of ‘Expatias versus Kakawallahs’, a division between first and second ‘waves’. Stereotypes, language use, migration narratives, and other forms of ‘rooting’ have all contributed to the making of boundaries between members of first and second migrant waves. In the second

section this dualist depiction of Lusaka’s Hindu community was questioned: Laitin’s exercise in simplifying two migration waves, while useful up until this point, has reached its analytic end. Not only are there now more than two waves in the Indian migration flow to Zambia, but there are ‘vintages’ (of age and immigrant generations) within these. As new migrant waves wash into the community and bring with them new sets of characteristics, and as different age cohorts progress and make room for those of different immigrant generations, ties within the Hindu network are reconfigured, common values and relationships are challenged, and Zambian Hindu ethnicity itself changes shape. As this change takes place, the ‘resident’-‘expatriate’ dualism inevitably transforms.

This transformation has so far required certain compromises, as in choice of Indian language and music classes for children or in the selection of memories used in collective histories – a process of ‘hybridising’ and ‘essentialising’ what it is to be Indian, or Zambian Indian. Like adaptations of caste described in the previous chapter, this process necessarily involves tension and ‘group conflict’ (Dotson and Dotson, 1968: 196). In these tensions the idea of a homogeneous diaspora community, argued against in Chapter 3, is strongly challenged. Safran and Cohen’s emphasis on shared memories of homeland are unhinged from ideas of migrant unity by this case study, in which no consensus of Hindus’ migration and homeland ties in Zambia has yet been reached. Despite the fragmentations presented in this chapter and the previous one, however, the Hindu community as a whole, in keeping with other Indian ethnic minorities elsewhere (Stacey, 1998, Lindridge et al., 2004, Naidoo, 2007), does often perpetuate a public or political sense of self unity. In fact, the next chapter, which considers Lusaka Hindus’ wider relations in
Zambia and attitudes towards citizenship, asks, ‘Might shared interests matter more than common sub-ethnic affiliations?’ (Avenarius, 2007: 96).
Chapter 7

Boundaries of Belonging: Local Interactions and Flexible Citizenship

Introduction

Having looked at the construction of Zambian Hindu identity from a historical perspective, and the creation of community-specific structures and practices that define and challenge Hindu life in Lusaka, the thesis now turns to wider national and transnational relationships and identities. The aim is to work through how complex differences within the Hindu community are masked by others in Zambian society, and in some cases transformed when the identity, security and belonging of the group are challenged or changed from the outside. A variety of levels of analysis are involved here – Zambian society, nation-states, diplomatic missions, transnational organisations and global migration. As explained in the preceding chapter, Zambia continues to be a ‘receiving’ state for Indian immigrants: in fact, a third migrant ‘wave’ is now underway with fresh, young talent exploring business investments in the country’s liberalised economy.

Nevertheless, since the early 1960s Zambia has also been a ‘sending’ state for Indians migrating onwards to the developed world, or back to India – what Bhachu famously called ‘twice migrants’ (1985). The total population of Hindus in Zambia has significantly fallen, with important implications for the identities of Lusaka’s resident Hindu minority. Here I explain some reasons for onwards migration, and how and why many in the community have come to regard citizenship itself as ‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999, Benhabib, 2000, Nyamnjoh, 2006).
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers continuing racial pluralism within Zambian society, in which Indians, including Hindus, have been and continue to be positioned by politicians as ‘strangers’ and scapegoats that do not authentically belong. The second shows that Hindus’ local interactions, particularly with black Zambians, remain limited, and are characterised by mutual suspicion. Here, I return to some issues relating to plural society and Hindus’ use of space in Lusaka. The section also considers Hindu women as representations of difference and unsettled belonging, and examines the affect of allegations of witchcraft and cultural distances on perceptions of Hindus’ rights to citizenship. Third, returning to the theme of representation, the chapter asserts that continued political uncertainty and poor and uneven cultural representation have shaped Hindus’ attitudes towards citizenship and official sources of support.

Section 1. Political Positioning of Hindus as Strangers and Scapegoats
A common response during my fieldwork to the question on why Hindus were leaving Zambia involved the threat of a new political regime under the then Presidential candidate, Michael Sata. As leader of the Patriotic Front (PF) in the 2006 election, Sata seriously challenged the incumbent President Levy Mwanawasa and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Sata expressed discontentment against ‘foreign’ (particularly Chinese) investment and promised Zambian jobs for ‘truly Zambian’ people. Against this and other opposition, the MMD government sought to win votes through policies that would ‘empower’ Zambia’s ‘indigenous’ population and enamour the country’s growing middle class. Hindus found themselves in a difficult position, between the PF’s anti-foreign rhetoric and the government’s use of racially divisive language. In both campaigns,
rhetoric against ‘foreigners’ was equated by the voting masses with Zambia’s Asian minorities (Larmer and Fraser, 2007, Gould, 2007). Belonging is, as Geschiere explained, ‘a choice weapon for manipulating elections’ (2009: 52). Across Africa, minority citizenship has been challenged, and Asians in particular have been ‘scapegoated’ in public debates on poverty, opportunities, and exploitation (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 5). This is not limited to Africa: Ballard described how the ‘new minorities’ of Britain continue to be marginalised despite having become ‘an integral part of the British social order’ (1994: 8).

For Simmel, stranger communities are ‘organic’ and integral parts of wider society. In African contexts, the experience of national liberation from colonialism played an important role in formalising strangers’ organic membership. That is, Hindus (and other Indians) emerged at Zambian Independence in 1964 with every other group, simultaneously, as members of a new political order. Their position in postcolonial plural society was, however, not treated by the governing party and others as equal to ‘indigenous’ Africans and their claims to equal rights continue to be contested. Months after the 2006 election, which saw the MMD hold on to government, Hindus feared that anti-foreign feelings would intensify. One informant simply said, ‘The future of Indians in Africa is unknown. If Sata comes to power, the Indian story here will change. And if Mwanawasa gets his way, Indians will all be disenfranchised.’ Several interviewees discussed a return to the dark years of Kaunda’s Second Republic, under which many of their community had chosen to leave the country rather than stay on, as one interviewee phrased it, ‘by virtue of corruption or chance’, and a correspondent from California wrote, ‘like

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1 Interview with J.P., 4 March 2007.
everyone else, buying their way out of trouble’. Political use of anti-foreign rhetoric is nothing new, and despite many Hindus holding Zambian citizenship and contributing to Zambia’s society and economy, they have been consistently treated as part of a wider group of ‘Indians’ and outsiders rather than as legitimate Zambian citizens or valuable permanent residents.

Records in the Registrar of Societies, through which all cultural associations officially registered with the state from the late 1950s, show that throughout the early 1980s Hindu groups across Zambia were identified by some individuals, including those representing government authorities, as racially exclusive organisations, despite their constitutions clearly stating otherwise. In some cases the Registrar denied associations the right to continue meeting. In most cases, a series of letters were sent back and forth, demanding further information such as minutes, bank statements, and membership details, and questioning Hindus’ citizenship choices. Two example extracts from Registrar letters follow:

Your application and other records prove that you have Nationality of Zambia, British and Indian, but all of the same race. I do not see the wisdom of becoming a Zambian, if the Association Committee is of either one tribal or one race.

What has been observed is, even after Zambian 20 years of Independence, not a single black Zambian appears in your religious Committee. [...] My philosophy doubts the wisdom of you becoming Zambians.

In all likelihood, these letters and demands represent the views of a somewhat officious Registrar. However, one informant (at the time a close acquaintance of Kaunda) remembered these exchanges as a ‘form of control through harassment –

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4 Letter from E. Mpelo, 15 June 1984, ORS/102/67/19, RS.
5 Letter from E. Mpelo, 4 June 1984, ORS/102/67/50, RS.
a way to remind Indians of our place in KK’s regime.” Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Hindu associations were treated as part of a general ‘Asian’ or ‘Indian’ category: some Hindu files remain labelled as ‘Muslim’. This lack of discernment is also evidenced in early statistical reports, in which Indian immigrants are included as ‘Asians’ along with Ceylonese, Cypriots, Israelis, Pakistanis and South East Asians. Throughout colonial rule and the years of Central African Federation, Indians were considered as a racial unit and often dealt with as separate to, and outside of, dominant black-white debates on political and civil rights. In other situations, such in-between groups – ‘browns’ or ‘Coloureds’ – have responded by joining forces. A fascinating study of the Pacific Northwest, for instance, shows a considerable level of intermarriage among Punjabi Indian and Mexican émigrés, both sidelined in national debates about black and white citizenship and rights (Leonard, 1992). While Hindus in Zambia have reinforced their ties with other social networks in order to bolster their position at different political moments, there is a general and intensifying sense that Hindu identity should be pronounced and protected. This causes various tensions, not least between Hindu association leaders and the Indian High Commission, which aims to lessen Indians’ Muslim-Hindu division.

The Indian High Commissioner in 2006 was closely involved in setting up the Indian Business Council of Zambia (IBC), which is explicitly aimed at bringing together Indians regardless of religious or other divisions, as well as supporting a

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6 Interview with K.P.R., 13 March 2007.
7 ‘Migration Statistics’ (1969), 338/REP, CSO.
8 Interview with R.O. Wallang, 10 May 2007.
Zambian network promoting investment opportunities in both India and Zambia.\(^9\)

Historical migration patterns provided a set of ties from which a financial network could emerge – a form ethnic networks often take (see Kilby, 1983). Chain migration in particular causes strong ties that lead to migrant networks not needing, at least initially, to create ‘additional ties with members of the host community’ (Grieco, 1998: 706). In part, the IBC was a collective response of Indian community elites to the strengthening of the Zambian Indigenous Business Council, which promotes black Zambian business interests. The IBC was also a mechanism for distinguishing between Indian and other, particularly Chinese, business activity. The steep incline in Chinese economic interest in Zambia, and alleged lack of Chinese corporate responsibility, formed the basis of Sata’s ‘anti-foreign’ campaign during the 2006 elections (Larmer and Fraser, 2007). In addition, the Indian High Commissioner claimed to have ‘investigated’ Sata’s anti-foreign stance, and found that the ‘root’ of the problem was ‘Pakistanis coming in over the last few years, who only want to make a quick buck’. They were, he said, known as ‘briefcase Asians’ or ‘containers’, using Zambia as a ‘stepping stone’.\(^{10}\) According to Nyamnjoh, globalisation in Africa is a primary reason for legal citizenship being pitted against ‘authentic’ rights of belonging (2006: 1–3). Certainly, in Zambia, increased foreign investment and activity, especially where detrimental to local

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\(^{10}\) Interview with R.O. Wallang, 5 March 2007. This allegation against Pakistanis was made by several Hindus during informal conversations. Interestingly, the idea of the territory as a ‘stepping stone’ for Indians was also alleged by colonial authorities and used to justify strict immigration controls from Northern Rhodesia to the south. See C01015/1256: The Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons (Control) Ordinance, Northern Rhodesia, 1957-59, NA-UK.
labour and economic advancement, has contributed to the political mal-
positioning of Hindus as generalised Indian or Asian outsiders.

Most recently, the draft of the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act (2006)
called for specific areas of trade and commerce to be reserved for ‘indigenous’
Zambians. Such terminology is important. Many felt uneasy about the use of the
word ‘indigenous’ in government policy – a word that also lingered over
discussions into citizenship in the Draft Constitution (2004). 11 Individual
approaches varied significantly. Some informants ‘understood’ that the Zambian
government saw them as a successful minority with greater opportunities than the
majority of black Zambians. In one interview, a prominent Hindu woman declared,

> We’ve got the wrong skin colour. But fair enough, every country wants to promote its
> own people. We are travelling through, that’s how they see it. Even if in reality we
> have nowhere else to go, we will always be ‘the Indians’ in Zambia – never just
> ‘Zambians’. It’s hard for minorities here. 12

This tension in terminology has been analysed in other immigrant case studies (Lal,
privately resist being treated as Indians, or cast as anything other than Zambians.
One interviewee lamented, ‘Despite this being my country, I am told, “You are an
Indian”’. 13 Another described, ‘Here, Sata comes and says, “I will drive you away”.
He, and even the government, does not distinguish between who are Indians here:
we are not Indians, we are Zambians.’ 14 Dipak Patel, Zambia’s trade minister,

11 The use of the term in the CEEA was officially opposed by the Hindu Association of Zambia.
Annual General Meeting, Hindu Association of Zambia, 6 May 2006. It does not appear in the final
Constitutional Review Commission, private papers of A. Vashee, HAZ.
12 Interview with I.D., 13 March 2007.
14 Interview with O., 7 March 2007.
famously retorted to the political call by ex-President Chiluba to ‘deport Dipak’, ‘Deport me back to where? Lusaka General Hospital [where he was born]?’.\(^{15}\) One interviewee similarly said, ‘Where could I run to? Kafue National Park?’\(^{16}\) In other cases, citizenship is regarded as anomalous to important aspect of acceptance: in his submission to the Constitutional Review Commission in 2004, the President of Hindu Association of Zambia stressed that, ‘Many Hindus are Zambian citizens, others are residents; either way, Zambia is their home’.\(^{17}\) The use of the term ‘indigenous’ in government discussions of economic empowerment was taken extremely seriously by HAZ. At its AGM in 2007, the President’s Report urged members to contribute to a ‘Committee of Citizens’ investigating how the CEEA affected different actors – the Committee included Greeks, Italians, Muslims, and other ethnically defined minorities. The HAZ Treasurer’s Report revealed that 6 million Kwacha (at the time £1000) had been allocated to fees for legal advice on the CEEA in 2006.\(^{18}\) The report also urged Hindu businessmen to ‘become active in their local Chambers of Commerce’ and ‘lobby on all aspects of economic activity to ensure that our interests are not adversely affected’.\(^{19}\) One member stated firmly: ‘Zambia is not a melting pot like UK or US. Why empower only the indigenous? Hindus belong here just the same.’\(^{20}\)

\(^{16}\) Interview with A.P., 3 May 2007.
\(^{17}\) ‘Comments to the Constitutional Review Commission on the Draft Constitution, 31 October 2005’, personal papers of A. Vashee, HAZ.
\(^{18}\) Treasurer’s Report, Hindu Association of Zambia, Year End 31 December 2006, presented 6 May 2007 at 32\(^{nd}\) Annual General Meeting & 82\(^{nd}\) General Conference, Lusaka.
\(^{19}\) President’s Report, Hindu Association of Zambia, 6 May 2007, 32\(^{nd}\) Annual General Meeting & 82\(^{nd}\) General Conference, Lusaka: 2.
Despite this claim to belonging, Hindus remain seen as ‘travelling through’. Likewise, despite its organic or integral role, Simmel’s hypothetical stranger community was a ‘potential wanderer’ (Simmel, [1908] 1971: 143). In this potential, and the freedom that perceived transnational connections or access to outside resources imply, there are ‘dangerous possibilities’ and opportunities for jealousy (Simmel, [1908] 1971: 146 and 148). The position itself is understood by comparatively disadvantaged black Africans as a form of opportunism (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 60). The impact of political generalisations of Hindus as Asians, and political rhetoric involving terms such as ‘foreign’ and ‘indigenous’ cannot be overestimated. Against a longer history of Zambia’s Indian minorities being used as ‘scapegoats’, such terms legitimate racial suspicions and add strain to inter-ethnic relationships. The problem, as one interviewee articulated it, is that the ‘common man doesn’t know the differences’ between Hindus with Zambian citizenship and other broadly Asian-looking people.\(^{21}\) A spokesman for the Zambian Indigenous Business Council claimed, ‘Zambia will not develop because we have let foreigners take over the running of our country.’\(^{22}\) Although this statement and those made by political parties in the 2006 election did not explicitly refer to Zambia’s immigrant minorities, neither did they articulate adequately to the Zambian public what was meant by ‘foreign’.

It remains difficult for Hindus in Zambia to acquire citizenship and equal rights. Representatives of the community involved in reviewing Zambia’s Draft

\(^{21}\) Interview with A.T.D., 7 August 2007. In 2006 I conducted 20 questionnaire-led interviews in Zambia’s Northern Province, where Indians reside in the town of Kasama. When asked where Indians lived, all 20 respondents identified the fishery and mill in the towns of Mpulungu and Mbala – outfits run by Middle Eastern Arabs.

Constitution (2004) and Draft Constitution (2010), for example, objected to clauses on citizenship and qualifications for Presidency that discriminated against minorities and supported the concept of different ‘classes’ of citizenship. In the Draft, Zambian citizenship would continue to be available by birth only to individuals whose mother or father is a Zambian citizen. Further, Presidential Candidates have to be third-generation citizens of Zambia, something that Hindu representatives feel excludes, ‘many patriotic and hardworking Zambians’. Hindus took the opportunity that the constitutional review offered to state:

There should be very strong laws against the use of ethnically divisive or inflammatory language by candidates or their campaigners in election campaigns. Electoral legislation must be very strong in this regard. Overzealous and short sighted politicians must not be allowed to undermine the ethnic harmony that Zambia enjoys, in sharp contrast to some neighbouring countries.

There have nonetheless been some important successes for Hindus in the national process of reviewing the national constitution: not least that a leading member of the National Constitution Conference (NCC)’s Citizenship Committee is currently a prominent Hindu. In 2009 the NCC included a clause on dual nationality into the Draft Constitution, following pressure from both minorities in Zambia and Zambian citizens living abroad (this is yet to take effect but, when it does, will have significant impact on Hindus’ feelings of acceptance, practical manoeuvres regarding family members’ citizenship claims, and migration). Usefully, rather than likening strangers to ‘outsiders’ in instances of subjugation or abuse, Simmel

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23 Draft Constitution, Part V (19), personal papers, A. Vashee, HAZ.
24 Draft Constitution, Part IV section 34(3) (a); Constitutional Review Presentation to Minority Report Commission, August 2004, personal papers, A. Vashee, HAZ.
25 Presentation of Recommendations to the Constitutional Review Commission, September 2004, personal papers of A. Vashee, HAZ.
26 http://www.ncczambia.org/draftconstitution.php. Other African countries have opted for dual nationality laws since the late 1990s (see Manby, 2009: 33).
compares them with ‘poor and sundry inner enemies’ (Simmel, [1908] 1971: 144).
Indeed, in nation-building processes in postcolonial Africa (that is, in the shift from a society dominated by structure to one defined by national culture, as per Gellner, 1983), marginalised groups and scapegoats have been ‘created’ from within national populations (Dorman et al., 2007). In this sense, Hindu ‘strangers’ are clearly organic members of wider Zambian society: they have, along with other Asian minorities, been identified and extracted from within it. In Zambia, these political uncertainties over rights to belonging, paired with economic downturn, have led Hindus to seek opportunities elsewhere. As Nyamnjoh explains of many African countries, the ‘need to keep hope alive’ directs people to ‘more successful and better organised sites of accumulation [...] in order to support family, friends and communities back home’ (2006: 22). Zambian Hindus are no exception. However, the negative treatment they receive as ‘strangers’ and ‘scapegoats’, and their access to outside networks and resources (their apparent ability to move away) ironically reinforce the idea that they do not really ‘belong’.

**Section 2. Near and Remote: Characterising Local Interaction**
The position of the stranger in society is, in Simmel’s words, ‘fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not really belong in it initially and that he brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it’ (1908: 143. Emphasis added). In immigrant communities like the Hindus of Lusaka, which are constantly shaped by new ‘waves’ and ‘vintages’ of incomers, adaptation is perpetual as non-indigenous qualities are freshly introduced. This causes problems within the group, as the previous two chapters demonstrate. It also helps sustain the ‘nearness and remoteness’ and ‘reciprocal tension’ that characterises stranger relations with
others in wider society (Simmel, [1908]1971: 149). Immediately following the end of colonial rule in Africa, and at poignant political moments thereafter, Asians’ and other minorities’ ‘alien qualities’ have been exaggerated (Shack, 1979: 40–1). In fact, one critique of stranger theory is that a community’s status is defined in relation to its ‘host’. Rather, the stranger relationship is necessarily mutual (Levine, 1979: 35). It represents a particular ‘form of union based on interaction’ (Simmel, [1908]1971: 144).\textsuperscript{27} This form masks various fragments existing within the group, which nevertheless complicate local relationships (Strauss, [1969] 1979). The emphasis must lie not on how an ethnic community has ‘integrated’ but on how it interacts. In other words, a research question should not be, ‘To what extent have Hindus integrated into Zambian society?’ but rather, ‘What characterises the various relationships between Hindus and others within Zambian society?’ Asking this will bring us closer to understanding the ways in which aspects or instances of ‘plural society’, in the form of cultural boundaries, have historically been broken down, reinforced or constructed anew. What are the boundary markers between Hindus and other groups? What are the remote, ‘alien qualities’ that have been emphasised? I deal with each of these questions in turn.

**Marking Difference: Material, Religious, Marital and Spatial Symbols**

Already, in the youth drawings and other data presented in Chapter 4, it is evident that projections of positive social interaction contradict accounts of Hindu cultural insularity and use of public spaces. There is an important symbolic and material aspect to the Hindu community’s interaction with other ethnic groups, which is

\textsuperscript{27} Here it is clear how Park and Burgess were influenced by Simmel in their early ideas about plural society, which they described as a ‘unity of diversity’. See Chapter 1.
largely spatially structured. One first-wave family described how they felt they had
‘mentally integrated’ into Zambia, but were still regarded as ‘foreigners’ by black
Zambians. In asserting their belonging, they explained:

We have the largest Zambian stamp collection outside the Post Office! We collect and
protect Zambian art and sculpture. Really, how much more integrated can we be?

The youngest son added that few people would be able to ‘support’ their belonging
in this way, regretting that nobody ever asks the question, ‘What do you have to
show you are Zambian?’.

Other families and homes display copperware and
African artefacts, too. A second wave woman who runs a successful business
amalgamating Zambian gems and Indian jewellery-making joked, ‘See, I am
connected to Zambia and India at the foundations, through rocks and ore.’

Similarly, a white Zambian noted of his Hindu colleague, ‘he’s so Zambian he has
malachite on the soles of his feet.’ In Chapter 4 I tried to capture some of the ways
in which Hindus’ households in Lusaka are distinctively Zambian, including the fact
that many rooms contain material symbols of attachments to Zambia and
represent the community’s ‘hybridised’ (Bhabha, 1990, 1994, Appadurai, 1998) and
‘essentialised’ (Shukla, 2001) identities. The problem is that collections of artefacts
and other material symbols of belonging to Zambia are largely restricted to this
private domain, where there is very little interaction with others in Zambian
society. Moreover, displaying African artefacts and other objects in the home
(often objects that symbolise tourism) is also more a trait of the white minority in
Zambia than the black majority and may therefore emphasise to black Zambians
not ‘integration’ so much as differences in social class and culture.

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A most profound example of Hindu cultural adaptation, particularly pertaining to first and established second wave community members, involves the performance of death rituals. Cremation is an important element of this ritual, and is organised through LHA. This is the primary reason for new members joining the association: it is a costly service for non-members (many white families pay local Hindu associations for cremations rather than opting for burial). One of the men who performs these, and other ceremonies, in Lusaka explained that many Hindus wish for their ashes to be returned to India, and where possible, taken to the Ganges River. Some people smuggle ashes from Zambia, burying them in ‘a hole in their yard until a person goes to India.’ The ‘expatriates’ in particular are ‘closer to the Indian way’, whereas ‘old timers have re-rooted’ to suit their Zambian surroundings: several of these families nowadays take their ashes to Zambia’s Kafue or Zambezi Rivers. In these cases, such practice represents what Beacon Mbiba has called the ‘changing practicalities’ of migrants’ traditional customs, but it also represents a shift in ideas about belonging (2010: 22). Another example of religious hybridism is the temple in the town of Kafue. The temple was consecrated in 2006, a four-day ceremony known as Kumbhabishek. ‘Kumbha’ is the gold pot at the flag mast of the temple, holding sanctified water. Bishek, meaning ‘to pour’ describes the process of purification – usually conducted on a twelve yearly cycle in temples in India. In this fascinating case of symbolic adaptation, the pot contains water from the Ganges, the Indian Ocean, and the Zambezi. This and altered ideas about appropriate destinations for cremated ashes are highly significant in terms

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31 Interview with S.P., 5 June 2007.
33 Interview with Mr. S., 26 January 2008.
of the Hindu community’s shifting ideas of belonging and ‘nearness’ to Zambian landscape. However, the rituals are also kept private and protected from other groups. As I explain below, relations are characterised by Hindus’ fear of being misunderstood, and so potential markers of belonging are instead translated as markers of ethnic insularity.

Public and established symbols of Hindu culture also tend to set Hindus apart from others rather than displaying common interests or the cultural concessions the community has made. Events like Diwali or even the Tuesday Market, although open to all, actually perpetuate cultural remoteness rather than nearness. Such public markers, as Edwards explains, ‘persist for a long time’, albeit that they are ‘often limited to special festivals, “days” and the like, may be linked to commercial interests, and can become available to anyone interested, group members or not’ (1985: 110). Crucial to the maintenance of Hindu identity in Zambia, festivals and other events represent distilled and hybrid cultural forms. They symbolise significant adaptation of Hindu community customs and the ‘many possibilities of similarities’ (Simmel, 1971: 148) between Hindus and others in Zambia. However, this is rarely translated to non-Hindus, who often infer from them the opposite: a failure to ‘integrate’. Stranger theory posits that immigrant stranger communities ‘stand at the frontiers of conflicting social systems’ not as outsiders but as ‘interpreters’ (Monica Wilson quoted in Shack, 1979: 47). This role requires constant negotiation of identities, especially (again) when migration is ongoing and visible distinctions are refreshed. Some public markers, like dress or ornamentation, may disappear over time (Edwards, 1985: 110). Among Lusaka Hindus, gender and generation have much to do with this, as the previous two
chapters touched upon. Mature Hindu women often wear Indian-style clothes, and younger generation women and girls frequently combine Indian and Western styles. One first-wave, second-generation student said,

I used to take the bus to college, but it got too uncomfortable, everyone staring. There is always, still, a barrier. Not from me, but I know that they treat me differently because of the colour of my skin and the different clothes I wear.  

In this sense, Hindu women themselves are objectified, marking cultural boundaries.

A central complaint of black Zambians against Hindus was that Hindus do not intermarry with other groups, especially non-Indians. A song by local artist Tongozi, asks why Indian men can ‘have’ black women, but black men cannot have Indian women. Extramarital relationships with black house staff and other employees are seen as fairly common, and rumours circulate about illegitimate, mixed-race children (far less so than those concerning Muslim Indians, however).  

Here, differences in local terms and perceptions of ‘integration’ matter a great deal: physical and sexual relationships between Hindus and non-Hindus are mostly hidden and rarely lead to marriage. In 2002 an artist in South Africa wrote a controversial song entitled ‘AmaNdiya’ (‘The Indians’), which accused South African Indians of ‘oppressing’ blacks and ‘warning them to assume their national responsibilities or risk losing their citizenship’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 57). A failure of exchange and of commitment, differently framed to that in Tongozi’s song, was articulated:

34 Conversation with M.A., 4 March 2007.
35 Interview with Anon., 20 January 2008; informal conversations. Muslim Indian men in Lusaka are, anecdotally, no more likely to intermarry with black Zambians than Hindus; however, this is not the case in other provinces (particularly Eastern Province).
I have never seen Dlamini emigrating to Bombay, India. Yet, Indians arrive everyday in Durban – they are packing the airport full.

South Africa’s post-Apartheid hierarchy of belonging is not dissimilar to Zambia’s postcolonial social order: both privilege ‘indigenous’ belonging over ‘foreign’ origins at one or other levels. In popular minds, as Nyamnjoh’s analysis of ‘AmaNdiya’ reveals, it is ‘only by renouncing their threatening tendency to straddle continents that the Indians can claim to belong truly to South Africa as citizens’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 62). As Clifford observed, it is the ‘connection (elsewhere) that makes a difference (here)’ (1994: 322). Upon marriage, Hindu women often move to their husband’s family home; in Zambia, this means that many Hindu women migrate away from Zambia, and also that many Hindu women in Zambia arrived as wives. This strongly shapes relations with non-Hindu men: women rarely consider non-Hindus as potential life partners.\(^36\) Importantly, adaptation towards African connections in marriage has taken place, and is not necessarily a conscious decision or rational choice. For example, many Hindus in Lusaka who have a choice in marriage, or a hand in arranging marriages, desire partners who identify with Africa. A society wedding in Lusaka in 2007 brought together two Zambian Hindus who had met at university in Britain. Mothers and aunties flock to Nairobi to find eligible partners for young family members whenever there is a marriage ‘fayre’.\(^37\) This is not apparent to the wider public, for whom Hindus’ public commitments to inter-racial relationships and intermarriage might serve to authenticate claims to belonging. Hindu ethnic endogamy, however, remains central to Zambian Hindus’ personal identities and community life.

\(^36\) Interview with A.P., 3 May 2007; interview with S.P., 5 June 2007; interview with M.P. and A, July 2007; informal conversations.

\(^37\) Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.
Hindu, and other Indian, community members do recognise the importance of publicly exhibiting commitments and belonging to Zambia. Hindus are among the most generous contributors to Zambian charities and local development projects. Problematically, Hindu associations and individuals in Lusaka have always conducted charitable work humbly, donating discretely or anonymously in order to be ‘truly benevolent’. As I develop in the two following sections, however, there is a growing tendency for the Hindu community to publicise its charitable work in order to improve its reputation and protect itself against political uncertainty.

Many also promote ways in which Hindus have ‘integrated’. At LILA’s fundraising fashion show in 2006, for example, the highlight was a ‘fusion dance’ in which Zambian and Indian traditional musicians and dancers were choreographed alongside one another. The programme promised, ‘tonight we show you how well we have merged with our host country.’ The language of ‘home’ and ‘host’, however, subtly and unintentionally perpetuated the idea that strangers are non-indigenous Africans. The choice of venue, too, symbolised a ‘straddling’ of continents: the fashion show took place at the Taj Pamodzi, one of Lusaka’s iconic hotels now run by an Indian conglomerate. Space is important in reflecting and determining boundaries of relationships in postcolonial plural society. Hindu and non-Hindu Zambian performers can meet on the stage in a ‘fusion dance’, or share a table in the audience watching the show, but at the end of the evening the likelihood is that the Indians will go their way and the non-Indians another. There

38 Interview with O., 7 March 2007.
39 Programme for LILA event, Mystic Medley, Taj Pamodzi, 5 November 2006.
are obvious exceptions to this, and many of these exceptions invoke the class and life experience explanations addressed in preceding chapters. That is, young, educated and worldly individuals of different ethnic or racial categories can meet at a bar and continue their relationship into the private sphere of their home or a home of their community (such as an association clubhouse).

Most Hindu-run events remain exclusive and are held in quasi-private spaces. Hindu immigrants and settlers are not passive actors in determining how their culture is accessed and shared. One example is the cultural programmes of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), which are siphoned through the Indian High Commission (IHC) and managed by local associations. The select cultural performances of the ICCR are explicitly intended for an African audience. This differs from cultural initiatives of other diplomatic missions. Mexico’s 'Program for Mexican People Living in Foreign Countries', for example, is an adjunct to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, and, through its consulates in the United States, sponsors Mexican cultural events and institutes specifically for Mexicans and Mexican Americans (Gutiérrez, 1997: 50, 56). In the ICCR’s case, the aim is for cultural exchange between India and wider populations of other countries around the world. However, sometimes immigrants’ ‘simultaneous strategies’ of cultural protection on the one hand and interaction with wider society on the other conflict and force the compromise of either – most often, of interaction (Clifford, 1997: 252). This compromise is apparent here. In practice, marketing of ICCR and other cultural events amongst Hindus is insular and tickets are made available through close-knit networks of Hindus across workplaces, homes and Hindu association gatherings. Access of non-Hindus to such events,
with the exception of the special guests of the IHC (such as Zambia’s Minister for Cultural Relations or a member of another country’s diplomatic mission) is controlled. At a 2007 show in Hindu Hall a non-Hindu, black Zambian journalist observed, ‘Look, there are only three blacks and two are the dancers! They don’t advertise to non-Indians.’ The reasons given by Hindu informants were simple: seating in Hindu Hall is limited and there is a keen audience of Indians for most events, which always raise money for local Zambian charities. There is also, as previous chapters highlight, a deep concern with Indian cultural divisions; some regard the ICCR as a mechanism for overcoming internal fragmentation. More importantly, though, as Chapters 3 and 4 discussed, Hindu Hall was established during colonial rule and has long been held as a quasi-private space for Hindu Indians. Community members remain reluctant to open its doors to a wider, potentially critical public. Some informants’ accounts implied such venues and events are sites of ‘sameness’ rather than ‘difference’: people often want to be with others ‘like them’ rather than not wanting to be with others ‘not like them’ (Essed and Goldberg quoted in Clarke, 2005: 27). The consequences nevertheless remain exclusionary. Insular marketing and protection of space and culture are not limited to the ICCR and other IHC-related events. Neither are they always free of ethnic or racial inference. In organising one fundraising event (a family day with children’s fairground activities, food stalls and a bar at the Lotus Sports Club) some Hindu women expressed their desire for a ‘Hindu only’ event, with no blacks, whites or

Muslims.\textsuperscript{42} Apparently some women found it ‘demeaning’ to ‘have to serve’ non-Hindus.\textsuperscript{43} Often the different ways events are managed result, in opposition to association and diplomatic aims, in (inadvertent) fortification of boundaries that exist between the Hindu community and wider Zambian society.

**Alien Qualities: Witchcraft, Medicines and Riches**

Spaces of Hindu community life in Lusaka remain key markers of the extent to which pluralism restricts relationships. One interviewee described how space indicates the limits of ethnic understanding. As the first Indian bookmaker in Zambia, he used to take bets on horse racing by telephone; not only was gambling ‘totally taboo’ among Hindu peers, it was ‘better for local [black] people not to know’ where he lived or worked, since, he claimed, it is ‘dangerous in this part of the world’ to be ‘known as someone who takes money in exchange for chance’.\textsuperscript{44}

Here, he was alluding to witchcraft, a potent issue in Africa, and one usually associated with the local, village and domestic spheres (Ciekawy and Geschiere, 1998) rather than with immigrant discourse. According to Clarke et al., ‘Almost everywhere, mutual suspicion characterises the generalised opinion of Indian and other ethnic groups about one another’ (1990). Although the authors go on to claim that ‘interpersonal relationships are usually friendly’, they do list instances across the globe of racial violence against South Asian minorities (Clarke et al., 1990: 16).

Although for the most part, daily interethnic relationships in Zambia have been positively constructed, racially-targeted attacks on Indians occur, including acts of violence in response to perceived Indian witchcraft. According to Nyamnjoh, such


\textsuperscript{43} Conversation with D.A., 6 May 2007; interview with S.P., 5 June 2007.

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.
violence in Southern Africa can be attributed not to race in its bluntest sense, but as a more general (and deeply penetrating) xenophobia in which the ‘haves’ are viewed with suspicion by the ‘ordinary’ African, ‘still trapped in shacks, shanty towns, joblessness, poverty, uncertainty […]’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 17). In the few cases of violence against Hindus in Zambia, witchcraft has not been the root of the issue: rather, economic jealousy, political instability, and personal grievances have prompted allegations of black magic.

Most significant was a uprising against Indians in the town of Livingstone in 1995 – referred to by Hindus as the ‘Livingstone pogrom’. Body parts were allegedly found in the freezer of a Hindu shopkeeper. Violent attacks against Indians and their property, and looting of Indian-run shops took place. According to one man involved in dissipating the issue:

> The story of witchcraft and cannibalism went round and of course there were riots, shops were burned. We took it up, my son and I, motored down there and interviewed people and it was quite traumatic. Then two Hindus were charged. [...] It was the workers in the shop that started it – it was all made up. The police found nothing.

Other Hindus saw it as a political stunt under a corrupt president looking for scapegoats to explain slow advancements in labour conditions – ‘a Chiluba thing’.45

Shop lootings against Indians were more common during Kaunda’s Second Republic. In an era of economic downturn, remembered for shortages and rations:

> Indians didn’t queue. We bought in bulk, had our own system of rationing. We bought forex on black market through Europeans – otherwise you were over-invoiced. We invested outside.”46

One non-Hindu explained how this clique behaviour and access to outside resources resulted in Indians being ‘easy targets’ of frustration:

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I’m an optimist. In dire circumstances you just pick a section of society to blame. The fuel shortages of the late ’70s, the food shortages in the ’80s, the failure of government. The people who looked like they were doing okay were the Indians, because they really invested in the ’60s, so people took things out on them. No maid in Livingstone found any human heart in her Asian boss’s freezer. But you blame them, release the tension. I hope.47

Some Hindus are also ‘optimists’. According to one interviewee,

In the riots when they attack shops it’s because they want to sabotage something, and it just so happens that most shops in these areas are Indian owned, but it’s not because they are Indian that they attack them.48

This positive statement does not represent mainstream opinion, which sees these rare acts of violence as racially-charged. One black informant said, ‘If you [a white person] had a shop, it wouldn’t be broken during riots, right? But the Indian’s shop would be broken.’49 Indeed, the apparent success of Indians in Zambia, especially in business, even in times of economic duress, has prompted exaggerations of their ‘alien qualities’. Some informants expressed frustration at Kaunda’s ‘two-faced’ attitude towards Hindus. He ‘helped to promote the image of the Indian hoarding money under mattresses, black marketeering, all that – he wouldn’t say “Indian”, only “shopkeeper”, but it made us targets’.50 Kaunda had personally engaged with Hindu spiritualism (from an early stage in his presidency he had a Hindu personal advisor, Mr. Raganathan, who reportedly practiced palmistry and psychic tricks), but he ‘kept this quiet because he knew the implications’.51 Studies elsewhere in Africa show how beliefs can circulate that those who are successful in uncertain times have resorted to ‘magical means’ and ‘consuming others’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006:

47 Conversation with M.C., 5 July 2007.
49 Interview with D. 20 January 2008.
50 Interview with K.P.R., 21 March 2007. Also, conversation with I.D., 30 May 2007; interview with S.G. and B.N, 17 January 2008; conversation with Mr. Mfula, Kaunda’s Chief of Staff, 14 January 2008; interview with Mr. S., 26 January 2008.
51 Interview with I.D., 30 May 2007; interview with K.P.R., 13 March 2007.
17–18, Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999). As well as wishing to avoid this connection, Hindus claim, Kaunda wanted to keep ‘good relations’ with the Indian state; the ‘new expats were welcomed in, but the old traders were made scapegoats’.

The ‘remoteness’ of Hindus’ position in society, then, does not necessarily relate to actual connections to other countries of belonging; it hinges on cultural distances that requires careful translation in order to prevent misunderstanding. The caretaker of Lusaka’s Hindu Hall described being approached by ‘local [black] guys’ who asked if it were true that ‘there is an Indian god who gives out money’. He went on, ‘It’s not so far-fetched – Ganesha is the god of wealth and his statuette sits in most houses.’ Home shrines themselves do little to allay negative ideas about alternative belief systems. Some house servants are involved in replacing the ghee or lighting candles around idols, photos of deceased family members and imported Hindu paraphernalia; those I spoke with emphasised their Christian faith.

There is a great deal of intrigue about Hindu religion. A *Daily Mail* article from 1981, lodged in the LHA and HAZ files at the Registrar of Societies, is entitled, ‘Praying for Rain’ and includes a photograph of Hindus worshipping. Another article, from *The Times*, is entitled, ‘Seeking Cure: Drink Urine’. Two lines are underscored in ink: that the practice was promoted by a ‘Hindu businessman and spiritual healer in Livingstone’ and that while it spread to other African countries, ‘Zambians looked down upon the practice as dirty.’ Some Hindus’ alternative approaches to public health accentuate their community ‘strangeness’; to local

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54 Conversations with house staff, 13 March 2007, 12 July 2007.
black Zambians, Indian traditional medicine appears different to African
traditional healing. One Indian woman gave me a homemade sweet, made from 76
different spices. She talked about their different properties: she used to make her
own medicine during the shortages in the 1970s and 1980s. She still makes the
‘occasional potion – right now a drink for [my son’s] hair – he’s balding and we are
looking for a bride. Actually, the house girl makes it’. Domestic workers doubtless
carry stories of spices and potions back to their own home environments, where
‘traditional medicines’ and ‘magic’ signify a range of local beliefs about power and
modernity.

Another example is HIV/AIDS, a disease that affects members of Lusaka’s
Hindu community but which is rarely discussed openly in terms of cross-
community suffering. Rather, LHA and other association members of ZINGO, the
Zambian Interfaith Networking Group on HIV/AIDS, frame the issue as a problem
affecting ‘the common man’, without reference to Hindu patients. This prompts
non-Hindus to question the community’s health practices: ‘does one of their
animal gods protect them against AIDS, too?’ The religious chairman of HAZ
claims he can relieve HIV symptoms and cure cancers with his method of yoga –
one member warned, ‘Better not say that too loud, they [the black staff] will think
it’s witchcraft.’

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57 Interview with S. family, 12 July 2007.
58 A significant acknowledgement that Hindu community members had, ‘too, succumbed to the
disease’ was made by HAZ President Ashok Vashee in his speech to ZINGO, 31 July 2006. This
contrasts sharply to the problem phrased as something affecting the ‘majority poor’ in Zambia’s
report in the minutes of Hindu Council of Africa AGM, 29 May 2004, and the Public Relations Report
and discussion, and issue raised under Any Other Business, HAZ AGM, 6 May 2007. One of the youth
participants in the Drawing competition included an AIDS ribbon in her drawing (Drawing 5).
60 Conversation at HAZ AGM, 6 May 2007.
othering in Southern African societies, it adds to general suspicions about Hindus’ success. It emphasises that Hindus are ‘foreign’ and undermines the authenticity of their belonging to the Zambian nation-state.

Section 3. Being Flexible: Alternative Sources of Support
Which bodies Hindus turn to for help and representation, especially in crises such as the Livingstone uprising, helps to explain the degree to which their relations with Zambian, Indian and other state apparatuses are uneven and uncertain – and thus why they treat citizenship as flexible. Chapter 3 explained the lack of institutional support available to Indians in central Africa during colonial times, the way in which Nehru’s government backed away from representing its ‘children abroad’ following Indian independence, and the awkward position regarding citizenship into which Hindus were placed during Zambianisation. This section looks at alternative sources of support sought by Hindus, which make use of transnational attachments and less formal membership than belonging to nations and states.

Although the main ‘pull’ factors for Hindus’ onward migrations are improved health care, education, personal security and work opportunities, uncertain local relationships and rights to belonging, as analysed in the two sections above, act as important ‘push’ factors. The following comments represent typical concerns of community members: ‘You never know – tomorrow you could have to go’,61 ‘Tomorrow anything can happen’,62 and ‘We still are thinking in our minds that we

61 Interview with B.P. (ii), July 2007.
Chapter 7

will one day have to emigrate’. In April 2007 an Indian was killed in Uganda during a short spell of violence; one family in Lusaka expressed concern that the same could ‘easily happen’ in Lusaka during political unrest. Divisions between immigrant waves are important here: many recent migrants regard Indian citizenship as a safe ‘get out’ card and the Indian High Commission as a site of political refuge for Indian passport holders. A young third-wave man queried, ‘When Air India comes to rescue us, who do you think they will carry first – those with Indian or those with Zambian passports?’ Trust in the Zambian government to protect Indian minority rights is fragile to say the least. Political party discourse of belonging during the 2006 elections (and the re-election in late 2008 following the death of President Mwanawasa), further damaged this trust. A discussion in the HAZ AGM on indigenous belonging prompted one member to request that certain comments be struck from the minutes because HAZ is constitutionally apolitical. The Chair responded, ‘No, HAZ must show its teeth. My town is a [Patriotic Front] stronghold. We have to change people’s minds. The government is not helping us.’ In fact, as the following chapter shows, HAZ is slowly strengthening its political power base, through active relationships with all political parties, in order to assure its member communities that their position in Zambian society, regardless of individuals’ citizenship, is protected.

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66 Discussion in HAZ AGM, 6 May 2006.
67 Meeting with HAZ committee members, 9 March 2007.
Among Lusaka’s Hindus there are, as in other migrant communities, multiple outlets for cultural expression and multiple forms and institutions for representation (Hall, 1990, Smith, 2003). Importantly, Hindus’ hybridised and adaptive identities often transcend state boundaries and particularistic ideas of nationality and citizenship. Zambian Hindus, despite having endured a stream of unjust policies against them for over a century, have come to include a relatively privileged set of individuals who to some degree play their passports like cards. According to one informant,

Home is what you make it internally. Once this is understood, the Citizenship and Passport are mere papers of convenience.  

A second reported,

Passports and citizenship is just one way of looking at the world. If you’ve been denied these things time and again you learn how to feel at home in a place without worrying about pieces of paper. Okay, they matter, but there’s ways of getting round these things. In my family for example nobody has the same citizenship, so we have access to different places, but we are all Zambian, and we’re all Indian on a cultural level, plus whatever new identity we find.

As is clear in the extract above, Hindus’ notions of flexible citizenship do not necessitate a rejection of a specifically Zambian, or other, sense of belonging. Rather, because citizenship of their colonial authority, place of birth, or country of ‘origin’ has been irregular and not guaranteed to Hindu Indians in Zambia, they have developed emotional and practical safety guards in the event of future discrimination. Such guards include mechanisms that avoid dependency on the immigration laws of a single country: most families I encountered during my research represented a range of citizenships.

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68 Questionnaire response from M.V., 2008.
69 Interview with B. P., July 2007. Italics denote emphasis in speech.
In times of need, Hindus have turned, in addition to or as alternatives to seeking help from Zambian authorities, to local cultural associations, personal networks, British, Indian, and other diplomatic institutions and transnational organisations. Two examples illustrate this. The first is the ‘Livingstone pogrom’. In all towns and cities, Hindu communities’ reputations and local relationships were seriously compromised by the allegations of witchcraft and misdemeanour. The Hindu community in Livingstone asked members of HAZ, based in Lusaka, to instigate a formal investigation and organise legal assistance. Meetings with Hindus accused of perpetrating witchcraft occurred in private houses. The British High Commission intervened to protect the rights of those in the town who were British passport holders. Legal representation was sought from Zambian private defence lawyers, and financed through various Hindu associations. In this case the Indian High Commission was not directly called upon to represent those concerned, despite the political and polemical nature of the concerns and the fact that some of those caught up in the allegations were Indian citizens. The Indian High Commissioner had claimed that Zambian Hindus felt ‘better represented’ by the IHC than by Zambian or British agencies, and that the British High Commission ‘frankly doesn’t take care of non-white citizens’. The representation that Hindus seek from the IHC is, though, as explained in Chapter 4, largely cultural. One prominent member of the community clarified that the IHC was not involved in

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71 Interview with R.O. Wallang, 5 March 2007.
the Livingstone uprising, ‘Because they’re more a cultural station than a political one.’

The second example is that HAZ was called upon in 2001 to liaise with Zambian immigration departments and the Drug Enforcement Commission following temporary detentions of Hindu incomers on grounds of drug trafficking by airport officials. Individuals concerned had packed poppy seeds and various other ingredients, including ‘white powders’, in their luggage. Legal advice was sought, again through Hindu associations rather than through state authorities, despite the fact that those concerned included Indian and Zambian citizens and visitors. HAZ negotiated with authorities and, in conjunction with the IHC, made a list of spices and herbs that Indians were likely to bring in, to avoid future misunderstandings. According to Levitt et al., less formality sometimes enables ‘greater flexibility and speedier responses to the different challenges that transnational migration poses over time’ (2003: 570. See also Ulrich Beck quoted in Vertovec, 1999: 454). Certainly in the two examples above, less formal, non-state associations and personal networks were perceived as more effective than official state diplomatic channels in meeting local needs.

Many leading individuals across Lusaka’s Hindu communities also turn to global associations to represent group identities and needs. Some of these associations are locally situated but linked to global movements. Right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations have exploited the interests and needs of Indians abroad in order to serve their own political purposes, whether in terms of financial support or cultural reinforcement (Rajagopal, 2000: 468, Appadurai quoted in

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72 Interview with S.P., 6 June 2007.
Vertovec, 2000: 144–5). A minority of politically proactive individuals in Zambia have sought links to such organisations through their local community associations. For example, town-level Hindu associations in Zambia, such as LHA, are members of HAZ. HAZ in turn is a member of the Hindu Council of Africa (HCA), a transnational organisation that promotes Hindu minorities’ cultural and religious heritage and champions their rights in Africa. In 1998, the Vice-Chairman of HAZ was nominated to represent Zambia in the HCA. The organisation has ties to the extreme right-wing nationalist organisation, the Vishra Hindu Parishad (VHP) or ‘World Hindu Council’. A central aim of the VHP is ‘to keep in touch with all the Hindus living abroad, and to organise and help them in all possible ways in protecting their Hindu identity’.  

The following passage from a 1998 article on the HCA, written by a HAZ member in Samachar, indicates the strength of belief that Lusaka Hindus have on the potential power of these bodies in representing them:

The strength of VHP is well known. What is also well known is its extremely strong links with the Bharatiya Janata Party [the party associated with Hindu nationalism, which was in power in India at this time]. The politics of the Indian sub-Continent is of little concern to us. What is of concern to us is the BJP’s commitment to the Hindu cause. As such it is capable of making strong representation on issues concerning Hindu minorities everywhere. HCA with the implied backing of both VHP and BJP should be able to stand by any African country going through crisis affecting minority rights.

Of course, one is not anticipating any intervention from India in the internal politics of any country. But it does mean that whenever there is a major and genuine victimisation of our community, diplomatic channels and gentle persuasion will become available where previously little existed to any effective degree.

The claim made here that Indian internal politics is ‘of little concern’ downplays the important implications of a BJP government for Hindus worldwide, and perhaps reveals that its author is writing on behalf of a predominantly first wave

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rather than second wave or more recent ‘expatriate’ committee of Hindus. Most post-1964 immigrants have a greater knowledge, and stake, in the politics of ‘home’, whereas first-wave settlers tend to have long shifted their political interests towards their Zambian or African setting. Nonetheless, what is captivating here is that the HCA, with its ‘implied’ support of worldwide and Indian political groups, is presented as a viable alternative in protecting Hindus culturally and also *diplomatically*. Insecurities about Hindu minorities’ position in African society (reinforced by regional insecurity in East Africa and South Africa) are evident. Diplomatic representation offered by state diplomatic missions and preceding envoys is considered ineffectual. Nevertheless, despite the distance from India that first-wave Hindus emphasise in accounts of representation, ‘traditional culture and institutions of the homeland continue to influence the structure of associational life’ within the community (Fallers, 1967: 15). Alternative political protection is sought in terms of Hindu rather than Indian identity; a reminder that cultural identity does not always translate as national identity, even in transnational or diaspora spheres.

Further to this, fragmentations within Lusaka’s ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’ social worlds mean that at different times it is politically prescient for members to emphasise different aspects of group identity. Following the London terrorist bombings in 2005, a suspect was arrested in the Zambian town of Chipata. The Hindu community wanted strongly to disassociate itself from Muslim extremist activity, marked by increased interest in aligning with worldwide Hindu
organisations (themselves extreme). Local hierarchies in Lusaka’s Hindu community based on migrant histories also affect sources of representation. Some members of LHA unwittingly supported the stereotype of their association as a ‘Gujarati Club’ by advertising a scheme launched by the Government of Gujarat offering half a million rupees to ‘any “Gujarat Samaj” overseas that wants to start a dedicated cultural centre’. In addition to the provision of language and other materials, the scheme promised ‘civic support for Non-Resident Indians from Gujarat’.

The variety of citizenship within families as well as across migrant waves also complicates matters: the Chairman of HAZ urged members to ‘bear in mind that many of our community members are not Zambian, and we have to protect them also’. There was a general feeling that the multiplicity of citizenships was irrelevant to the protection of the community as a whole: it was often pushed aside as ‘not mattering’ (as described in Chapter 2).

One of Zambia’s most influential citizens – the man who printed liberation banners and was contracted to manufacture Zambia’s flags – raised a crucial question for his community: ‘With so many different community sets and bits of paper, how do we belong?’ At first, given his imperfect English, I assumed that what he meant was ‘Where do we belong?’. Much diaspora literature asks this, usually evoking an ‘inbetween’ place, or ‘here and there’, or the idea that diasporic communities dwell, in Appadurai’s words, ‘in imagined worlds’ (1990). But he was not questioning his Zambian belonging; rather, he was querying his community’s

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75 Conversation at D.’s house, 21 February 2008.
77 Discussion at HAZ AGM, 6 May 2007.
citizenship as flexible, its choices of representation and modes of belonging. He went on, ‘In colonial times you could protest for change, but in independent Zambia there is nothing to change towards.’ According to William Shack, ‘In the strict Simmelian sense of the term’, strangers are ‘not found at either end of the alien-citizen continuum; they are betwixt and between’ (1979: 4). In this position they present distinct challenges to the nation-state structure. Chatterjee claims that cultural heterogeneity is suppressed by this structure, and therefore so too is access to full representation for transnational immigrants and minorities (1993). Certainly there exist few provisions for implementing ‘flexible citizenship’ in nation-states (especially where dual citizenship is not a legal option) despite the rhetoric of universal rights and claims to globalisation as accelerating ‘integration, interconnectedness and interdependence’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 6, 13). Alternative sources of representation for Hindus in Lusaka, and across Zambia, are both a cause and condition of attitudes towards citizenship.

Conclusion
This chapter first offered some reasons why Hindus in Lusaka, and Zambia more generally, treat their citizenship, where they can, as flexible. Fragmentations within the Hindu community complicate local relationships but are ultimately masked by the conflation of Hindus with wider ‘Asian’, ‘Indian’ and ‘foreign’ others by political parties and the wider public. Questions of authentic belonging at these levels impact strongly on Hindus’ local feelings of security and their sense of protection from the state. Second, the chapter showed how local interaction, particularly with black Zambians, has remained limited, and is characterised by

mutual suspicion, ethnic misunderstanding and cultural ‘nearness and remoteness’. This, importantly, is distinct from the ‘here and there’ or ‘triadic relationships’ of diaspora discourse, and therefore highlights one of the ways in which stranger theory makes a useful contribution to our understanding. Once again, Hindus’ use of space acts as an important boundary marker. Hindu women represent cultural differences and, through the community’s marriage systems, highlight the connection that Hindus have to other places. Allegations of witchcraft and cultural distances play an important role not only in others’ perceptions of Hindus’ rights to citizenship, but on how and why Hindus choose certain sources for legal and cultural representation. Lastly, the chapter built on earlier claims about Hindus’ poor and uneven representation in Zambia to show how alternative sources of minority protection have shaped Hindus’ attitudes towards citizenship and official state support.

Given their historical insecurities, as well as these current social and political uncertainties, many Zambian Hindus regard further migration of community members, whether permanent or temporary, as inevitable. The need to ‘make a plan’ is never far from individuals’ minds when politics is discussed. Later waves of immigrants, who maintained stronger ties to India in general, have been, as one informant claimed, ‘more open’ to returning there.80 The vast majority of émigrés, however, have ‘few active ties’ with the sub-Continent and are more likely to go to the West or Antipodes.81 It is worth emphasising that the second migration is rarely permanent, in the sense that ex-Zambians often return or maintain family ties in

81 Interview with R.O. Wallang, 10 May 2007.
Zambia. In fact, many twice migrants have maintained significant links to their home towns and kin in Zambia, as the next chapter demonstrates.
Chapter 8

Lusaka Hindu ‘Twice Migrants’: Between Indian Diaspora and African Transnationalism

Introduction
Building on ideas of uncertain belonging and flexible citizenship, this last chapter considers some causes, forms and effects of Zambian Hindus’ onward migrations. Research into Africa’s transnational migrants has sidelined, if not neglected, African migrant groups that fall outside a racially-bounded perception of African culture. Specifically, Indian migrants from Africa who settle elsewhere are more often considered part of a wider South Asian rather than African ‘diaspora’ (for example, Clarke et al., 1990, Ramji, 2006). This may reflect historical academic emphasis on the African transatlantic ‘diaspora’ (Bhachu, 1985, Gilroy, 1993, Vertovec, 2000), or popular, parochial attitudes towards different, racially-categorised sets of immigrants by receiving societies and states – such as those demonstrated in the preceding chapter. Or it may reflect the ethnic and cultural nature of networks and institutional support available to and instrumented by African South Asian immigrants themselves, also evidenced among Lusaka Hindus. Nevertheless, here the thesis argues for a reconceptualisation of African transnationalism that incorporates African South Asian minorities, with specific reference to Lusaka (and other Zambian) Hindus relocating to North America. In addition, studies of Hindu communities which include Zambian Hindu twice migrants in other countries should consider Zambia a legitimate and primary ‘homeplace’.
The first of three sections examines how Hindus from Lusaka, both those who remain and those who have migrated, frame their attachments to India and Zambia. It considers how these accounts challenge or fit into literature on ‘diaspora’ belonging. Another option for Hindu representation is incorporated into analysis here: that is, the offer of ‘PIO’ (Person of Indian Origin) status to certain ‘overseas’ Indian communities. Second is a brief examination of some transnational attachments and activities of ‘ex-Zambian Hindus’, particularly the case of the Mosi Open, an annual golf tournament that takes place in North America. Finally, the third section identifies some effects of twice migration and transnationalism on ethnic transformation in Lusaka, suggesting again that subgroup differences and internal fragmentations might matter less than shared Zambian Hindu identity.

**Section 1. Which Motherland?**
As was explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis, applying Bhachu’s term ‘twice migrant’ to ex-Zambian Hindus is problematic. It is slightly clumsy because it refers to the second migration of a community, whereas most individual ‘twice migrants’ are moving for the first time (Voigt-Graf, 2003: 162). It also implies that individuals cannot escape their ‘migrant’ status, and it assumes a primordial sense of ‘origin’. That is, the appropriate ‘home’ of the immigrants concerned is traced further back in history, not to (in this case) their African place of birth or belonging, but to an Indian or South Asian place of original departure – a native place or ‘motherland’. Bhachu’s own study on East African Sikh settlers in Britain revealed significant diversions and tensions among different sets of South Asians, focussing particularly on the transformation of cultural practices that had occurred during her Sikh subjects’ experiences in Africa; transformations that set
them apart from others who had migrated directly to Britain from Asia (see also Alibhai-Brown, 2008, Frenz, 2009). The term ‘twice migrant’ persists in the analysis of South Asian ‘diasporas’, terms which flatten the rugged identity terrains which such communities have crossed. In this section, I want to re-position ex-Zambian Indians not only as possible types within this broad South Asian category, but also as active African transnational migrants.

Seminal essays theorising on ‘diaspora’ pivot on the concept of homeland ties (Safran, 1991, Clifford, 1994, Cohen, 1997). William Safran’s diasporas ‘continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to the homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship’ (1991: 84). For many of my informants, an immediate sense of ‘homeland’ loyalty was to Zambia rather than, or in addition, to India. Some also identified with more than one other country through birth, schooling, marriage or work. Consider the following extract, written by a retired businessman:

As a Citizen [of Zambia] by birth, I have and will always have fond memories of paradise lost. I pay my respects to Africans in general as they were worthy hosts who gave me a good strike at my early education, living in harmony with all […] Atlanta is home now, it is where we rest our heads. […] Now some Zambian Indians in USA are retiring or ‘going back’ to India to give to the source that made who they are.¹

Here, there are multiple loyalties, to Zambia as place of birth and schooling, North America as a place of retirement or ‘rest’, and India as a ‘source’. Places are connected laterally by Indian and Hindu identities. Another ex-Zambian Hindu in the USA wrote:

Zambia is a home to me. It’s where my family is from. But in Zambia my Indianness was, “I am a Zambian and willing to struggle with you”, but you will never accept me.¹

¹ Email from M.V., July 2008.
In America, my new home, my Indianness means much more as an equal. This is where I work and live now.²

In this respondent’s case, ‘home’ is both Zambia as a place of birth and kinship, and America as a place of work and residence. The tension between belonging and acceptance in Zambia is clear. His sense of Indianness, although differently experienced, provides the lateral connection between these places. A Lusaka resident with family in the UK explained that there are ‘better facilities for being at home as an Indian in the UK and US’.³ Numerous informants also had direct connections to other African countries, particularly Zimbabwe, Kenya and South Africa.

Homeland ties seem to dominate the ‘triadic relationship’ that characterises much literature on case-study diaspora populations. In addition to homeland in this triadic relationship, diaspora members have ties to a host/receiving place and worldwide connections to other like-groups (see Vertovec, 2000: 144). In many ways, this approach advances the notion of diaspora as a site of dual belonging, of ‘here and there’ or the ‘local and global’ (Clifford, 1994, Cohen, 1996). However, the range of affiliations among ex-Zambian Hindus is far more complicated than either of these ‘diaspora’ models allow. The ‘decentred, lateral connections’ that James Clifford later described are much more apt (1997: 250). Even so, the connections he describes relate to ‘homeland’ culture, usually framed in singular terms. Ballard situated South Asians in Britain as ‘Desh Pardesh’, meaning ‘home from home’ or ‘home abroad’ (1994). ‘Home’ may be a place of actual return and material and practical connection, as it is for many second-wave or recent Hindu immigrants to

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³ Interview with B.P., 26 November 2005.
Zambia. But it may be less tangible than this, symbolising the broad culture upon which transnational connections are predicated. Further yet, it may have been ‘relegated to the register of the imagination’ (Mercer et al., 2008: 52), with home attachments resembling, as Walker Conner put it, the ‘stuff that dreams are made of’ (1986). The danger of diaspora theory is that it too often extracts referent populations away from – as outside, above, beyond, or detached from – the nation-state and/or society in which they reside, work, procreate, contribute daily and enact civil commitments. In such readings, the authentic ‘home’ of diaspora is rarely considered the place where members live.

None of the three respondents quoted above, for instance, had lived or ever planned to live in India, their material and familial ties to the place having long ago been severed. But their ‘Indianness’ remains an important aspect of their belonging. In a copy of LHA’s *Samachar*, the Editor wrote:

Unity in diversity is the rich cultural background of every Indian and this should be adhered to wherever we go and wherever we adapt to as our motherland.4

In this case, ‘motherland’ is seen as flexible in much the same way as citizenship. The Indian-Canadian stand-up comedian, Russell Peters, has a skit that was shown to me several times by young Hindus in Lusaka. Peters jokes:

I do a lot of travelling. I just came back from a trip to South Africa. I was in the Motherland. Not my motherland, obviously, you know. It’s the Black people’s motherland. I’m Indian, we have our own motherland – England.5

According to one informant, ‘It’s so true! Indians from everywhere flock to the UK as if it was an ancestral home.’6 Another agreed that she felt strong attachments to England through her sisters having moved there for marriage, adding, ‘And

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sometimes we go to India because it is still a home.” Even those who visit India for the first time identify with it possessively: for instance, ‘I felt okay when I visited India, I was a stranger there but it’s my home somehow’\(^7\) and, ‘It was a different experience - I was more like a foreigner in my own country!’\(^8\) Places of ‘home’ attachments can therefore be cumulative in some people’s minds. Additionally, in the words of one set of interviewees, Indian identity is ‘very portable’, whereas Zambian Hindus also carry special, rooted ties to Zambia, most constructed during young adulthood or formative years of childhood.\(^9\) Yet, for many, their belonging is non-negotiable: they are Zambian ‘born and bred’ and have no intentions of ‘becoming’ anything else or going anywhere new. Examples from interviews include, ‘Migrate? No, this is my home, better you shoot me’\(^10\) and ‘Home is here, abroad is for other people – I will die here’.\(^11\) Even for those who feel a diasporic aspect to their identity, emotional ties to Zambia are not necessarily lessened.

Further, for many, particularly families who left India during colonialism, India is an imaginary homeland; they may never have been to India, or may have lost any familial or other practical ties to locations there. They relate to it, as previous chapters show, through their personal beliefs and way of life and their local community’s cultural practices, through contact with more recent migrants, and through media and future aspirations. Zambia, on the other hand, is often a tangible site of family history, personal and collective memories, and life

\(^7\) Interview with M.P. and A., July 2007.
\(^8\) Interview with B.P., 25 November 2005.
\(^9\) Interview with S.P., 5 June 2007.
\(^10\) Conversation at D.’s house, February 2008.
\(^12\) Interview with M.P., K.P. and J.P., 13 July 2007.
experience: a ‘motherland’ for many. Again, as suggested in Chapter 4, many Lusaka Hindus have a ‘homing desire’, rather than a ‘desire for homeland’ (Brah, 1996: 180, 193).

Despite the emphasis on ‘homeland’ attachment in diaspora literature, there has been a longstanding emphasis in migration research (and in stranger theory) on the immigration policies and practices of receiving/host states, rather than on the emigration policies and practices of sending/home states (Délano, 2009: 764–5). Direct and indirect relationships between immigrants and their ‘home’ places are increasingly important as states are forced to ‘reconfigure their trans-territorial boundaries of belonging’ (Guarnizo and Smith, 2000: 8. See also Mercer et al., 2008: 52). In the Indian case, this reconfiguration has required (re)stimulation of ‘homeland’ sentiments and connections amongst Indians overseas, and it represents another clear shift in the attitudes of India towards its scattered populations abroad (Lessinger, 1992a,b, Van der Veer, 1995, Lall, 2001, Levitt et al., 2003, Dickinson and Bailey, 2007). Indeed, India is one of ‘many states that have become dependent on migrants’ economic remittances and political clout [and] are now implementing policies aimed at strengthening emigrants’ homeland membership and participation’ (Levitt et al., 2003: 569). Since the 1990s, India has concentrated on packaging an Indian ‘diaspora’ identity, for which there is a growing market. This has been paralleled by global Hindu organisations, which run summer schools for Hindu youth and recruit members to their worldwide forums. The most prominent of these is the VHP, introduced in the preceding chapter and

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13 This is not new; states have relied on overseas populations in other periods (Smith, 2003: 744).
relatively significant in Lusaka’s small Hindu community’s overseas activities.  

There are, then, competing programmes and organisations at the global level, and exploitation of the ‘overseas movement of Indians’ by Indian state and non-state actors (Appadurai 1990: 301, Vertovec, 2000: 144). This is part of a wider ‘migration industry’ (Cohen quoted in Nyamnjoh, 2006: 76), in which ‘diaspora’ identity is manufactured and packaged as a consumer commodity. Late twentieth century nostalgia has been described as ‘consumerist’ (Robertson quoted in Naidoo, 2007: 56). As well as a growing market for ethnic products and spices among Indians around the world, Indian ‘diaspora’ identity itself is for sale, through media sources, international promotional events, investment opportunities and other financial and status-related incentives. For ex-Zambian Hindus, an official ‘global Indian’ status is, much like their citizenship papers, an identity option that can be adopted or rescinded on an individual basis: diaspora is a ‘stance or claim’ (Brubaker, 2005). In this way, it complements Zambian Hindus’ attitudes on flexible official statuses.

India’s offer to its ‘diaspora’, however (for example, dual citizenship or entry permit privileges in exchange for financial investment), has been largely limited to settlers in strategic, advanced capitalist countries (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007). Many of the new investment opportunities, rights and privileges offered to Indian migrants elsewhere have not been widely promoted by Zambia’s Indian High Commission, or indeed are not directly applicable. Few Hindus from Zambia have ‘PIO’ (Person of Indian Origin) status, despite the buzz surrounding its benefits.

14 Misc. papers and press releases on ‘Hindu Heritage Camps’ in personal papers of HAZ Chairman, A. Vashee.
Indian state-run cultural events aimed at attracting the Indian diaspora, such as Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indian Days) are not widely advertised in Lusaka. The IHC’s initiation of the Indian Business Council, supporting inter-community enterprise and links to India is perhaps the most significant signal today of India’s shift towards embracing Zambia’s Indian immigrant minorities. For the most part, it is often only as twice migrants that Indians from Zambia are able to access these practical links to India. Although crucially, some economically successful twice migrants have used these privileges to help Zambian, rather than Indian, development, and to bolster their identity as Zambians, and their status and ‘legacy' within Zambia.\(^{15}\) Regardless of their paper loyalties, ex-Zambian Hindus have constructed ex-Zambian Indian associations in their new destinations, in order to build and maintain a distinctly ‘Zambian' identity. Many send remittances and charitable donations back to Zambia, and maintain property and/or investments there, where often someone in their family or extended family retains Zambian citizenship or residency.\(^ {16}\) Rarely have twice migrants, so far, relinquished material or familial attachments to Zambia altogether. Mercer et al. (2008) emphasise a tension between ‘homeplace’ as a place of imaginary belonging (as much diaspora literature treats it) and as an important site of active involvement (as development studies prefer to purport). Among Hindus from Lusaka, the two positions are not mutually exclusive: informants described both an imaginary ‘homeland' of India and active ties to their African home country.


Section 2. Attachments to Zambia and Transnational Activities

There is, of course, no embassy or consul as such which represents these types of migrants’ complex identities or webs of official, legal belonging. As the previous chapter articulated, the nation-state system has no provisions for representing flexible citizenship or transnational identities, despite claims that globalisation provides as ‘accelerated integration, interconnectedness and interdependence’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 6, 13). Nor is there any official ‘network’ for transmitting money to or investing in Zambia.\textsuperscript{17} Mercer et al. have criticised studies of migrant and transnational communities for presenting ‘networks’ as well-organised webs of ‘effective, open and even communication between the nodes with the homeplace at the centre’ (2008: 9). Rather, they claim – supported by data here – home associations are uneven, reflect a range of social hierarchies, and change in meaning and mandate over time (2008: 17). Rather than acting through designated threads in a global web of ex-Zambian Hindu migrants, sets of motivated and committed individuals have organised social and charitable links and flows amongst ex-Hindu Zambians and Hindu associations in Zambia on an informal basis – what is termed ‘immigrant-based transnationalism’ (Itzigsohn, 2000: 1127).

One correspondent described some ex-Zambian families in the UK as forming a ‘network of people all keeping in touch with home [Zambia], giving each other advice and a safe feeling’.\textsuperscript{18} Another expressed the importance of the ex-Zambian Indian network in the United States:

\begin{quote}
Zambian Indians are unique, because we all know each other. It’s a small place. I can travel from one end of America to the other and not stay in a single motel – the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} This will almost certainly change if dual nationality is offered under the revised Constitution.

\textsuperscript{18} Email correspondence with A.P., February 2008, emphasis in original.
people I know from Zambia will take me in, so it’s like a family abroad. There is always help.19

As well as providing practical support, the transnational network contributes to the maintenance of migrants’ rooted sense of belonging to Zambia. For example:

We are living in Florida now. No doubt about it, we love it here. But our hearts are in Africa, in Zambia. We think differently to other Indians here – we seek out other ex-Zambians and there’s a lot of nostalgia for home, for whichever town or place in Zambia you came from.20

Such nostalgia is reinforced through informal relationships, and it ranges from requests of incoming immigrants for Zambian products (branded peanut butter, confectionary, or biltong, a Southern African dried meat) to the formation of relatively powerful ex-Zambian associations. Through these associations, informal transnational ties and activities also help to sustain Hindu community life in Zambia, and contribute to Zambia’s development. As Mercer, et al. argued, it is partly through their development work that ‘diasporas’ ‘continually remake the home they came from’ (2008: 52).

Ex-Zambian Hindus around the globe have formed groups or contributed individually to Zambian development projects and charities. In the words of one twice migrant:

We Hindus [from Zambia] raise money to build schools, aid hungry and homeless, etc. We may not live in Zambia but our presence surely brought some tangible happiness and wealth to the country.21

Such efforts are usually channelled through Zambia’s Hindu associations, and ex-Zambian Hindus’ initiatives continue to support schools, clinics, charitable sports events, and other causes. Perhaps the most impressive initiative is the ‘Mosi Open’, a fundraising golf tournament organised every year or few years by ex-Zambian

20 Email from Anon., August 2008.
21 Email from M.V., July 2008.
Indians (predominantly Hindus) in North America. The Mosi Open started as an informal reunion of friends in Jacksonville in the early 1980s, and as one instigator described:

> It just grew and grew. The next year it was in Oklahoma, I think, then in L.A. We were fully booked and there were more people who wanted to come. It rotates every year, and it’s always on Labour Day or thereabouts.\(^\text{22}\)

In their letter to sponsors, the organising committee in 2003 described themselves as ‘a group of like-minded individuals from or born in Zambia’.\(^\text{23}\) They have chosen strong symbols of identity. ‘Mosi’ is short for ‘Mosi-oa-Tunya’, the mythic name of the Victoria Falls, for which Zambia is renowned. ‘Mosi’ is also Zambia’s national beer brand. The Mosi Open websites feature the Victoria Falls in the background, their logos are in Zambia’s national colours (Figure 25), and their music sound bites are African. Website texts are illuminating, too: each year the organisers invite people to the event using a particular mode of language. In 2003, the website reads:

> Shani Zonke!!!!! We want to welcome all Muntus to Austin’s wild west on Labor Day weekend 2003. Let’s put on our chi Cowboy hats, shine our spurs and boots, chaya some golf, socialise, recall the warmth and memories of Africa, and most importantly – raise funds to send back to Zambia. We hope y’all will enjoy the hospitality of Central Texas and we look forward to seeing y’all there.

Zambian English slang words (the greeting ‘how are you, everyone?’; ‘muntus’ for people, ‘chi-, meaning big, ‘chaya’ for play) intermingle with American clichés (the cowboy imagery, the use of ‘y’all’). In 2003, people were invited to ‘bring their Kabudulahs[sic] and Pata-Patas’. In local Zambian language ciNyanja, ‘kabadulas’ are knee-length shorts, and across Southern Africa, ‘pata-patas’ are a term for flip-flops. In 2009 participants were reminded to bring their ‘mwaices and mafaaz’ – Bemba terms for ‘children and wives’ – and to prepare for a ‘Truly Zambian

\(^{22}\) Interview with P.P., 30 July 2007.

experience’ (the stamp ‘Truly Zambian’ is a mark of authenticity on local Zambian products).\textsuperscript{24} In the separate invitation letter, organisers explained accommodation and transport plans, saying a coach was arranged between the golf club and hotel so that, ‘all us muntus [people in Bemba] can get chakolwad [drunk] with chibuku [a local brew in Zambia, used here as a euphemism for alcohol] without worrying about drinking and driving’.\textsuperscript{25} Every invitation ends with either the nationalist slogan, ‘One Zambia, One Nation!’ or the liberation saying, ‘Tiyende Pamodzi’ (Let’s Work Together).

\textit{Austin}

\textbf{MO\textsc{OPEN} 2003}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{mosi_open_2003.png}
\caption{2003 Mosi Open tournament logo (Austin, Texas)\label{figure:MosiOpen2003}}
\end{figure}

The fundraising model is revealing, too. Different sponsorship levels are offered, in exchange for different levels of advertisement and incentives. These are labelled Copper, Malachite, Gold, Emerald and Platinum, representing metals and ores upon which Zambia’s economy is dependent and which symbolise Zambian national pride. According to an online magazine article, the Mosi Open has ‘raised tens of thousands of dollars for many Zambian causes’.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, it has grown considerably since its inception in the 1980s: tournaments pull in hundreds of players from as many as 16 North American states, and raise as much as $50,000 for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} www.rimpproductions.com/mosi/donorlist.html, accessed 29 April 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{25} www.rimproductions.com/introletter/html, accessed 18 July 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{26} ‘Coyote Creek to Host 12\textsuperscript{th} Annual Mosi Open’, http://www.cybergolf.com/golf_news/coyote_creek_to_host_12th, accessed 23 October 2008.
\end{itemize}
charities in the host venue area and Zambia.\textsuperscript{27} One of the charities supported by the Mosi Open is the Zambia Children’s Fund, Canada. According to their website, their organisation, began:

\begin{quote}
when two energetic, passionate and socially conscious individuals got together and decided that they wanted to do something for their homeland, their people and their pride that is Africa.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

They are, as it happens, ex-Zambian Indians with Canadian citizenship, and the Board of Directors comprises three members born or brought up in Lusaka. Similar events and organisations have emerged in other countries. Zambian Hindus’ unique way of organising their Bhajan singing events, for instance, have prompted ex-Zambians in Britain to meet for the occasion.\textsuperscript{29} Individuals and associations working behind the scenes are important in reinforcing the existence and persistence of distinctly Zambian Hindu identities; they also play a vital role in the identity and position of Hindus who remain in Zambia.

\textbf{Section 3. ‘Staying Tomorrow’: Considering the Future of Hindu Life in Lusaka}

Numbers of Hindus in Zambia continue to fall as residents move elsewhere around the world. In a typical account, a thirty-year-old descendant of one of Lusaka’s most established families, now living in Florida, said that of his circle of 15 close childhood friends in Lusaka’s Hindu community, only two have not emigrated.\textsuperscript{30} Although many young people in Lusaka talk excitedly about their futures in other countries, older age members, regardless of migrant pasts, tend to lament the lack

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Interview with S.N., 13 July 2007; interview with B.P.(ii), July, 2007; interview with S family, 12 July 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Conversation with B.D., 29 May 2007.
\end{itemize}
of stability that such patterns help to bring about. As one prominent community member said:

Our parents sent us to Africa to find a better life. Now we send ours to the West for better education. They marry there, have children, that’s the problem: they don’t come back. So no-one can know where their future will be, and so where all of our futures will be.\(^{31}\)

The strength of familial attachments in the Hindu community means that many elderly people migrate to be with their children; twice migrants therefore reflect the whole spectrum of generations in Lusaka. Simmel’s stranger community, however, does not go: it ‘comes today and stays tomorrow’ despite its constant potential to ‘wander’ from the society of which it has become an organic part. One criticism of Simmel within stranger theory is that, unlike his ‘ideal type’, the structural position of stranger communities is ‘never static’ (Shack and Skinner, 1979: 10). So far this thesis has shown that, for the most part, Hindus’ structural position in Lusaka has shifted very little. This final section asks how onward migrations and transnational movement might alter this and change the direction of local adaptations and interactions.

Migration remains a selective process that is linked, especially when voluntary, to socio-economic status and access to network ties (Cohen, 1997; Nyamnjoh, 2006). Indeed, motivations and abilities for onwards migrations are highly significant in discussing the future shape of Hindu community life in Lusaka. Moving for better education or work opportunities, for example, is made possible by transnational networks. However, the trend also causes significant losses of well educated and highly skilled Hindus away from Lusaka. Although many affluent and educated members remain, there are few opportunities in Zambia for well-paid

\(^{31}\) Interview with G.B.P., 29 May 2007.
Chapter 8

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employment. Linked to this is the movement of Hindu women away from Zambia. Marriage, as noted in Chapters 3 and 5, has caused this outward migration; but there is now a new dimension as young women decide to move overseas independently following improved opportunities and attitudes towards female education and careers. While this adds to the web of connections available to Hindus living in Lusaka, it changes the nature of the community by altering gender hierarchies and adding to a ‘brain drain’ and also a ‘culture drain’. Similarly, as younger people move away for education, they also move towards a globalising idea of modern Indian identity: they carry back to the community ideas and material symbols of cosmopolitan and Western identities. As Chapter 5 sketched, identity among adolescents is often about ‘how Western’ or ‘how global’ individuals are: their ties to other countries in this discussion are central.

Additionally, younger people reinvigorate ties to India. Many second-wave migrants spent childhood years there and their families retain strong connections to Indian homes. Much literature signifies a loss of attachments of migrant children in relation to parents (Rumbaut, 1997: 1161). While this has been the case for early immigrant waves, many young children of later waves have held on to these formative ties: Drawing 26 (‘We Are in Zambia but Our Thinking is in India’) illustrates this. As they grow up, these children visit India on holiday and bring back to Hindu peers in Zambia images and stories of a place to which they all can culturally connect. Several first-wave informants said their school-age children

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had expressed desires to visit India. Halls’s ‘lost origins’ (1992) are not necessarily ‘found’, but new transnational ties, differently constituted, are gained. Vertovec presents one reading of ‘diaspora’ as a mode of cultural reproduction (2000: 153–6). Literature here highlights youth’s reclamation of traditional cultural forms in the shaping of new identities (Rogers and Vertovec, 1995, Baumann, 1996, Hall, 2002, Shukla, 2003), and also the actual media and technology through which an identity is shaped. Young people’s access to and interpretation of different aspects of global, Western, Indian and Hindu concepts, practices and structures are vital in producing and reproducing local ethnic culture.

As shown in the previous chapter, local perceptions of Hindus as having ‘outside’ loyalties and access to international resources emphasises to others in Lusaka the Hindus’ separate ethnic network. This access, the potential to wander and tightening of ethnic bonds increase as transnational connections grow. Each is framed locally, however, as forms of ‘opportunism’ (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 60), and used in political rhetoric and popular discourses to emphasise boundaries of Hindus’ belonging. Ironically, feelings of political uncertainty and personal insecurity that are brought about by this process act as a push factor for Hindus: the process becomes cyclical. Onward migrations are, therefore, potentially damaging to Hindu community life in Lusaka. On the other hand, heightened vulnerability – made more acute by shrinking numbers – forces further adaptation and strengthens the resolve among those who stay. Speaking to the Hindu Council of Africa, Zambia’s representative in 2004 stressed, ‘We must perceive ourselves as part of Africa and

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African society. We want to be accepted.’ In 2007, he emphasised, ‘We have to show how much we contribute as Zambians or Indians living in Zambia: we must change our attitudes and become more involved.’ Below I explain that transnational connections and onward migrations have bolstered ethnic cohesion and also fostered ethnic transformation that includes more public awareness of Hindus’ contributions in Zambia. While these processes of adaptation may emphasise ethnic difference, they might also support the visions expressed above for greater inclusion and involvement. They bring the Hindu community together and emphasise the depth of its belonging to Zambia.

For example, Zambian Hindus, regardless of citizenship, who migrate away from Zambia often carry with them, like Bhachu’s East African Sikhs, a distinct identity that separates them from other South Asian immigrants in their new destinations: a cohesive sense of being Zambian Hindu. As one informant, who lives in Florida, put it, ‘People just want to get together as Zambians so it’s not like it is in Zambia itself, where there are all those divisions.’ As Chapters 5 and 6 emphasise, Hindu community life in Lusaka is fragmented along many lines – age, immigrant generation, gender, caste, migrant wave. These lines of fragmentation become less important for those who move away. In fact, new geographic divisions are emphasised: rather than being concerned about which region in India a person is from, ex-Zambian Hindus tend to focus on Zambian home places. According to one interviewee, ‘Yeah, you know what’s interesting – there’s no Indian regional

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35 Country Report for Zambia, presented by Ashok Oza. Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of Hindu Council of Africa held in Blantyre, Malawi, Saturday 29 May 2004, personal papers of A. Vashee, HAZ.
36 A.O., statement made at the HAZ AGM, 6 May 2007.
divisions in the States, it’s more where you are from in Zambia.’\footnote{Interview with P.P., 30 July 2007.} This echoes a point made in Chapter 4, in justifying the study of Hindus in the city of Lusaka: that Hindu communities in different Zambian towns have formed their own clique identities. After the first few years of the Mosi Open, when the success of the model was evident, a ‘subsidiary sort of club’ was initiated for ‘Luanshya people’.

Luanshya is a town in Zambia’s Copperbelt, which once had a bustling Indian population, but which is now home to only a handful of Hindu families. Ex-Luanshya Indians (mostly Hindus) in North America apparently ‘number over 15,000’, and ‘like to get together to talk about the old days, the [copper] mines, the shops and the clubs’\footnote{Interview with P.P., 30 July 2007.}. Mercer et al. make much of home associations as relating to distinct home places rather than to cohesive ethnic identities. However, according to my ex-Luanshya informant and several other visiting ex-Zambian Hindus, their core identity is Zambian, and ‘when you come back, it’s not to your home town – there’s no one left there! – it’s to Lusaka, where you just slot in’\footnote{Meeting at the Friday Club, 13 July 2007.}.

According to Glick Schiller et al. (1992) ‘new’ migrants to the United States – the most recent wave – constitute the ‘transnationals’. But in Lusaka’s case, new immigrants, returnee twice migrants and settled members with overseas connections transform the Lusaka Hindu community into a transnational community: transnationalism emerges as one aspect of the community’s identity, and an important gelling agent.

Contributions from ex-Zambian Hindus to local Hindu projects and charities in Lusaka are vital in the process of transforming Hindu community relationships, by increasing the resources available to the community as a whole. Funding for the
Human Services Trust hospice on the outskirts of Lusaka was ‘bankrolled’ by a prominent ex-Zambian Hindu. Journalists were invited to the high profile inaugural event, attended by Kenneth Kaunda and the Minister of Health. One woman described it as ‘long speeches in the perishing cold,’ adding, ‘but better we make a positive scene these days’. Hindus representing the community in cultural associations feel that associations should focus on public relations, in order to demonstrate to the wider public their considerable contributions to Zambian charities and development projects. Only a minority maintain that charity should be conducted discreetly: most recognise the need to adapt this aspect of their giving in order to improve their position in society. Ex-Zambian Hindus sometimes give, as one informant described it, ‘colossal amounts’ in order to ‘become legends’ – that is, in order to gain or maintain their high status in the community. These outside connections to capital are perceived as vital for the transformation of Hindus’ reputation. Similarly, although many individuals have no connection with the Indian High Commission (as described in Chapter 4), associations like LILA increasingly use their connection to it in order to heighten the profile of certain charitable events. One example, documented in a 2000 edition of Samachar, was a ‘fun evening with dinner on the lawns of the Indian High Commission’. No fewer than 300 invited guests attended, including visiting ex-Zambian Hindus, and an impromptu raffle and clothes donation point were set up for the flood victims of Mozambique – an impressive US$4,000 was raised and presented to the High Commissioner of Mozambique on behalf of the people of Zambia. Such acts,

43 Interview with B.P. (ii), July 2007.
implying national unity, send a strong message locally that Indians in Zambia are also Indians of Zambia, despite the fact that the event took place in a distinctly Indian space.

The changing emphasis of LHA and other Hindu cultural associations towards public relations is significant. The Malayalee Association, constituting only 15 families, raised sums to donate ambulances to Mother Theresa Hospital, fund an AIDS counselling block at the University of Zambia, plant trees along the airport road, and assist with other Hindu-run projects. All of these were advertised to the wider public, and each involved financial support from beyond Zambia’s borders. Donations were gathered from Hindus abroad, to pay for 100,000 tonnes of maize food aid organised by HAZ, in the 2003 droughts.\(^{44}\) Not all charitable events of significance involve transnational dimensions, of course. Nevertheless, the need to promote Hindus’ contributions has a transnational dimension to it, since migrations away from Zambia have left the remaining minority more vulnerable. The President of HAZ stressed to the country’s Hindus the need to ‘brainstorm on promoting Hindu aspects of charity’, and being interviewed claimed ‘it’s utterly, utterly vital to start standing out for the right reasons’.\(^{45}\) Within the postcolonial plural society, social service is one way that Hindus can assert ‘social membership’, and hopefully improve their community reputation. Contributions at a national policy-making level are also critical: Hindus have, along with other immigrant minorities, negotiated ‘minority’ voices in government commissions and debates, such as the Constitutional Review Commission. According to French thinker Alain

\(^{44}\) Interview with A.V., May 2007
\(^{45}\) Address at the 34th Bhajan Samellan, Ndola, private papers of A. Vashee, HAZ; meeting with A.V., February 2008.
Touraine, quoted by Barnor Hesse in *Un/Settled Multiculturalisms*, the construction of a nation must involve immigrant and ethnic minorities, who ‘must also become a part of a memory, and must then transform it through their presence’ (1995: 298). National solidarity depends on ‘cultural entanglements’ produced by the migration of peoples. Hindus’ onward, as well as inward, migrations are important for this process.

The need for HAZ and other Hindu associations to influence local politics remains under debate within the community; HAZ constitutionally is apolitical, or rather, ‘supports the government of the day’. Its Chairman during the 2006 elections claimed, ‘Our previous political activities have all been reactive – rioting in Livingstone, assisting government in droughts, donating to Presidential campaign – but we need to stand more independently, as a unified whole.’ It is not only people in power who wish to see these changes: one man said, ‘Hey, we’re realising we’ve got to get together and act together – yes, we are connected to the outside, but no, we don’t want these “briefcase” Indians and Japanese and Chinese here either.’ In other words, an important distinction needs to be translated to the wider public between positive transnational ties and exploitative ‘foreign’ investors. Simmel stated that interaction between the stranger and others in society was strained because, ‘having only the absolutely general in common has exactly the effect of putting a special emphasis on that which is not common’ ([1908] 1971: 148). Here, Hindus seek to show a more specific set of commonalities between themselves and others in Zambia. Transnationalism at once hinders and

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46 Meeting with HAZ committee members, 9 March 2007.
helps the position of Hindus in their African settings. Importantly, while the structural position of the community remains fairly static, actual movements – in terms of cultural shifts, inward and onward migrations, and steps towards more positive ethnic interaction – signify that Hindus continue to adapt in order to remain a part of Zambian society.

**Conclusion**

Hindus from Lusaka, both those who remain and those who have migrated, conceptualise attachments to different places in an unrestricted sense. This chapter first discussed the changing attitudes of India towards its ‘diaspora’, and how Hindus from Lusaka access and interpret connections to India as a ‘source’ or ‘motherland’. Lusaka’s Hindus often consider terms such as ‘motherland’ and ‘home’ as flexible and cumulative. Second, the chapter briefly examined some transnational attachments and activities of ‘ex-Zambian Hindus’, particularly in North America. Analysis of the origins and symbolism of the Mosi Open, an annual golf tournament that unites ex-Zambian Hindus, showed that the ‘Zambian’ element of Hindu transnational migrants’ identities remains powerful. Ex-Zambian Hindu individual and associations indicate strongly that Zambia’s Hindu twice migrants cannot be overlooked in the analysis of African transnational activity; or, conversely, Zambia should be considered as a legitimate ‘home’ in the study of South Asians. The third section identified some ways in which twice migration and transnationalism has impacted on ethnic transformation in Lusaka. Although outside connections and increased onward migrations contribute to the vulnerability of the community that remains, these factors also encourage ethnic cohesion and public displays of Hindu contributions, thereby underscoring the
persistence, globally, of a Hindu identity that is intimately linked to feelings of Zambian belonging.
Chapter 9

**Conclusion: Malachite on the Soles of Their Feet**

When Dotson and Dotson wrote up their research in the late 1960s, shortly after Zambia’s independence and before the consolidation of power in Kaunda’s one party state, they perceived that there would be an end to plural society and a repositioning of Indian minorities within liberated African nations. Although the contours of the plural society have changed, Indian minorities in Africa have remained in a marginal position. They are described in both popular and academic discourses as ‘in between’, ‘at home abroad’, and ‘here and there’: middlemen stuck in a liminal space of not-quite-belonging. This study of Hindu community life in Lusaka has demonstrated some ways in which cultural pluralism has persisted in urban life, and ways in which Hindus continue to be situated as ‘strangers’ within Lusaka’s postcolonial and contemporary social and political structures.

Importantly, however, Lusaka’s Hindus, as a stranger community, are situated not as outsiders who do not belong, but as organic members of Zambian national society. Cultural tensions and distances remain between Hindus and others in this society: these are often spatially defined and they morph and are maintained by ongoing migrations of Hindus both into and away from the country.

This thesis has analysed Lusaka’s Hindu community in terms of its local position, internal and external relationships, and modes of adaptation. Doing so involves analysis of its ‘diaspora’ qualities, but the analysis is not limited to these qualities. The first chapter of this thesis argued that our understanding of Zambia’s Hindus, and of comparable communities in other postcolonial states in Africa, is
facilitated by incorporating stranger theory, particularly the work of Georg Simmel, into existing migration, transnationalism and diaspora discourses. This is because, as is evident in the substantive chapters, using stranger theory encourages analysis of relationships and local structures as well as the cultural practices that influence day-to-day lives of community members. The body of literature that this thesis brings together as ‘stranger theory’ underscores the way this thesis has been written. Below I draw out four heuristics of stranger theory (notably, the work of Simmel) that apply to the case of Hindus in Lusaka.

(1) Stranger theory helps us to understand the processes by which an immigrant minority becomes, despite its outside affiliations or identities, an integral or ‘organic’ part of a society. The emphasis is on ongoing constructions of members’ identities, roots and relationships within the place where they live and feel they belong, rather than on the retention of connections to a place they are supposed to be ‘from’ (a place of original departure) or, indeed, its globalised, ‘diaspora’ corollary. According to Bhabha,

What is theoretically innovative and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on the moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. (1994: 1–2)

In articulating cultural, and social, differences within and beyond their Hindu community life in Lusaka, community members and others have contributed to the production of specific social networks, spaces, social structures, practices and identities. These are the processes by which Hindus have become organically appended to the Zambian nation. Indeed, much of this thesis has been dedicated to explaining the construction of Zambian Hindu ethnic identity. The thesis has argued that Northern Rhodesia’s Hindu minority emerged at Zambian
independence in 1964 as organic members of the new postcolonial nation, although this was not recognised by all nor authenticated through automatic rights to citizenship. In addition, the thesis has argued that as organic members of Zambian society, Zambian Hindus who move away from the country should be considered as African as well as South Asian transnational migrants – the malachite on the soles of their feet travels with them, as it were.

(2) In using stranger theory to understand an immigrant minority’s structural position, it follows that emphasis lies on cultural adaptation rather than assimilation. Indeed, it may be the case that stranger theory lends itself to analysis of plural societies or otherwise culturally segregated societies. This thesis has shown that Hindu immigrants have adapted ideas of belonging and cultural practices to the local environment and to fit in to the ‘stranger’ position that the group has continued to occupy. Further, Hindus’ adaptation into their own immigrant and ethnic community in Zambia is an important element of understanding the group’s cohesion and position in wider society. Within stranger theory few studies directly tackle intra-community belonging, but the work collectively indicates that immigrants move through stages of belonging. There are, as with any ethnic community, many lines of internal fragmentation. Waves of Hindu migration into Zambia have produced interesting divisions within the Hindu community of Lusaka, some of which are discussed by members in terms of migrant histories and other forms of ‘rooting’. These different routes/roots, as well as age generations and locally-constructed and culturally inherited hierarchies of gender and caste, present significant challenges to Hindu newcomers to the city.
The stranger community is one whose relationships with other groups are characterised by paradox: they are at once 'near' and 'remote'. Importantly, the cultural 'nearness and remoteness' of Simmel’s stranger can involve but is not the same as the locational 'here and there' of diaspora theory. Being near does refer to location and physical proximity, as it does in diaspora theories, and it also refers to involvement in local society. Being remote refers to social or cultural distance and to what Simmel called 'objectivity' – detachment – that, unlike most diaspora theories, do not necessarily invoke direct connections or loyalties to another place or national identity. This is an excellent way of understanding Lusaka’s Hindus at large, although in individual cases there are more complex attachments and identities. The near-remote tension is partly an outcome of spatial segregation of Indians in urban Zambia; it also helps maintain spatial distances between Hindus and other groups. This thesis has argued that around the city of Lusaka there are strong and weak ‘sites’ of Hindu activity that both reinforce Zambian Hindu networks and ethnicity.

In stranger theory, the stranger is a ‘potential wanderer’. In this case, it is the potential of members of the Hindu community to wander, to migrate onwards, that holds their group in its stranger position and threatens their ‘authentic’ rights of belonging. Connections to Indian places and Indian diaspora identity are undeniably vital to how Hindus in Zambia feel they belong, and to the construction and maintenance of their group identity. ‘Diaspora’, however, is not one ‘way of being “other”’, as Koser (2003) put it, but rather one of many ways of ‘belonging’: it is a flexible identity claim of which there are multiple interpretations and uses. This thesis has shown some ways in which diaspora identity and associations are
used by Hindus (for example, as a mode of representation) to protect their local position and rights. The degree to which Hindus have genuine ‘ethnic options’ (Waters, 1990), however, remains linked to their structural position in society; a position from which they have not yet broken free.

**Boundaries of Current Work and Prospects for Future Research**

As with all social studies, this one has marked limitations, and hence there is great scope for further research in this area. Most obviously, perhaps, is the need for studies of Hindu life in other Zambian towns and locations, which would add complexities, contradictions and reinforcements to the claims made here about Zambian Hindu identities and interactions. The thesis has focussed on the ‘social world’ of Hindu community life in Lusaka, framed within a wider ‘social arena’ of Zambian Hindu ethnicity. Other, overlapping social arenas and discourses (Indian identity, Zambian identity, world politics, local politics, diaspora) and other worlds (a Muslim world, a diplomatic world, a world of Zambian citizens) cross into the situation circumscribed here. In defining ethnicity and race as social boundaries, analysis has been limited in certain ways: research of other social worlds may incorporate Hindus without emphasising such differences. In a sense, defining these boundaries reinforces them: as Thomas and Thomas claimed, ‘situations defined as real are real in their consequences’ (1970: 154. See also Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992). And as Shukla acknowledges:

> it is difficult to describe difference – inside or outside a broadly constituted entity such as nation or transnation – without reifying the boundaries of that difference through colour, caste, religion, or even more ambiguously, through ‘culture’ (2001: 553).

Throughout my analysis I made use of such ‘ambiguous’ terms, trying nonetheless to represent the heterogeneities and complexities that exist within them, even
where these acted as ‘inconvenient facts’ for the ‘nice neat story’ I wanted to tell (Becker, 1998: 19). Below I sketch the main points of each chapter, indicating where there is scope for further research.

The first chapter set out the main thesis aims and the literature themes that course through analysis. Here, situational analysis was introduced as my research approach, arrived at through two routes – one sociological and empirically grounded in urban studies in the United States, and the other anthropological and rooted in central and southern African cases. As far as I know, these two routes exist in parallel but are distinct: there are therefore exciting opportunities for researching the points at which they diverge and overlap. Scholars from both schools emphasise the importance of gathering data widely: this thesis is based upon data gathered through a wide set of methods, including participant observation, interviews, photography, youth drawing, and archival research.

Chapter 2, ‘The Tyranny of Strangers’, explained some concerns relating to data collection and analysis, and discussed literature on exploitation in research and my own position as a ‘research stranger’. The chapter worked through five specific methodological challenges concerning my research situation, from data collection through to writing up.

Six analytical chapters followed. Chapter 3, ‘Constructing Zambian Hindu Ethnicity’, sketched the history of Indian immigration to Zambia. Indian minorities received uneven and uncertain political and cultural representation under colonialism and in the early years of Zambian independence. The purpose of the chapter was to show how Zambian Hindu ethnicity formed, in terms of social practice and structure, and in relation to political circumstances, with specific
emphasis on the emergence of immigrant networks and cultural associations.

Unfortunately it was difficult to obtain information about the decades of Zambia’s Second Republic – hence there is scope for probing more deeply into the archives and inviting Hindus to narrate their experiences of this period. Chapter 4, ‘Mandirs, Mandals, Markets and Malls’, examined some present-day spaces used by Hindus in Lusaka. Strong and weak sites of Hindu activity mark important ethnic and subgroup boundaries across the city. Looking first at ‘safe’ places and second at ‘uncertain’ places, the chapter showed that social distances and plural structures have persisted and affect Hindu community adaptation and perspectives. Hindus in Lusaka share a ‘world of practice’ and perspectives through the spaces they inhabit, objects and symbols they protect, and ideas about place they describe.

Running through the thesis is the idea of simultaneous cohesion and fragmentation of Lusaka’s Hindu community. Chapter 5, ‘Open Discourses, Silent Voices and the Elephant in the Room’ and Chapter 6, ‘The “Kakawallahs” versus the “Expatias”’, addressed key areas of fragmentation: generation, gender, caste, and migrant waves. I analysed each through accounts of research participants and through secondary literature, allowing me to chart changes of emphasis over time. New immigrants’ adaptation into their own receiving ethnic minority is vital in understanding the community’s sense of unity and continuity. While many Hindus hold on to narratives of the past, and use them in positioning themselves against others in the community, these narratives themselves are apt to change. Youth accounts of sub-group differences show that even the most entrenched social divisions are not fixed.
Finally, in the last two chapters, I situated Lusaka Hindu community life within wider Zambian and global concerns. Chapter 7, ‘Boundaries of Belonging’, provided a three-part explanation for Lusaka Hindus’ attitudes towards their citizenship as ‘flexible’. Local renderings of Hindus as ‘strangers’ and ‘scapegoats’ in Zambian politics and popular perception, interethnic relations based on mutual suspicion, and ongoing mistrust of official sources of representation have shaped Hindus’ ideas about official belonging. Central here is the Indian state’s shifting ideas about its ‘diaspora’. Very little has been written about the role of diplomatic missions in the cultural lives of immigrant communities abroad: this is another site for further research. Representation, citizenship and modes of belonging were important themes for Chapter 8.

This final chapter, ‘Lusaka Hindu “Twice Migrants”’, outlined some causes, forms and effects of Zambian Hindus’ onward migrations. Prospects for research into ex-Zambian communities around the world seem boundless. The claim here was that Zambia’s twice migrants should be considered as African, as well as South Asian, transnational actors. Zambia, as I hope to have demonstrated throughout my study, is an authentic home place for thousands of Hindus. More research focusing on their many, varying, and deep contributions to Zambia is necessary, especially given their perceived vulnerability. Since the completion of field research for this thesis, Zambia has shifted towards the offer of dual nationality to its citizens. In late 2009, the National Constitution Conference incorporated a clause for dual citizenship into the state’s Draft Constitution. When it takes effect there will be opportunities for studying the impact of this change upon the Hindu community, and other minorities in and from Zambia. Lastly, in briefly considering
the future of Hindu life in Lusaka, of a minority whose numbers are falling, the thesis emphasised ethnic cohesion over fragmentation. This cohesion is rooted in a sense of belonging to Zambia as much as in shared Hindu customs and beliefs. Lusaka Hindus are a community endlessly adapting and ‘in process’, but ‘persistently there’ (Clifford 1994: 267); they are a ‘changing same’ (Gilroy, 1993). And, as a stranger community, they will ‘stay tomorrow’ (Simmel, 1908: 143).
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ORS/102/67/19, Monze Hindu Association
ORS/102/67/32, Ramakrishna Vedanta Centre
ORS/102/67/48, Hindu Association of Zambia
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Appendix A: Research Methods and Data Types

Participant observation (main formal events)
October 2006   Diwali festival, Lotus Sports Club (LHA)
November 2006  Mystic Medley Fashion Show, Taj Pamodzi (LILA)
November 2006  Cricket Triangular, Lotus Sports Club
               (Zambia-Sri Lanka Friendship Association)
March 2007     ‘Nritya’ Dance Competition, Hindu Hall (Yuvas United, LHA)
March 2007     Holi luncheon, Indian High Commission (LILA)
March 2007     Holi festival, Hindu Hall (LHA)
March 2007     Dhureti Dhamaka festival, Charotar Patidar Samaj (CPS)
May 2007       Chalo Chowpati, Lotus Sports Club (Yuvas United & Streenikatan)
May 2007       Indian Classical Concert, Hindu Hall (ICCR, LHA)
May 2007       Odissi Dance Night, Hindu Hall (IHC, LILA, ICCR, LHA)
July 2007      Opening of Makeni Hospice (Human Services Trust)
July 2007      Hanuman Chalisa
August 2007    Bhajan Sammelan, Ndola (HAZ)
January 2008   Tuesday and Saturday Havans
February 2008  Indian Republic Day (postponed from 26 January), various sites
February 2008  Valentine’s Day, Lotus Sports Club (Streenikatan)

(Observation, first-hand experience, conversations, field notes, photographs)

Formal recorded interviews
25 November 2005  B.P.
19 October 2006   H.D.
30 November 2006  H.D.
9 July 2007       H.D.
23 October 2006   G.H.P.
5 March 2007      R.O. Wallang
10 May 2007       R.O. Wallang
7 March 2007      O.
27 March 2007     O.
13 March 2007     K.P.R.
21 May 2007       K.P.R.
23 April 2007     N.K.P.
25 April 2007     R.K.
3 May 2007        A.P.
15 May 2007       J.J.
5 June 2007       S.P.
12 July 2007      S.N.
12 July 2007      S.S.
July 2007         M.P. and A.
July 2007         R.D.
11 July 2007      K.P.
13 July 2007      M.P.(ii), K.P., and J.P.
July 2007         B.P. (ii)
1 August 2007     R.B.D.
17 January 2008   S.G. and B.N.
20 January 2008 D.
27 February 2008 D.
26 January 2008 Mr. S.
16 February 2008 U.

(Field notes, audio records and transcripts)

**Formal unrecorded interviews**

27 February 2007 Mrs. M.
4 March 2007 V.K.P.
4 March 2007 J.P.
13 March 2007 I.D.
5 July 2007 I.D.
27 April 2007 Cyril Patro
29 May 2007 G.B.P.
29 May 2007 C.D.
6 July 2007 D.A.
12 July 2007 S. family
30 July 2007 P.P.
7 August 2007 A.T.D.
27 January 2008 R.K.
February 2008 K.P.(ii)
28 February 2008 P.P.
February 2008 A.V.

(Handwritten notes to pre-structured questions)

**Formal group meetings**

31 January 2007 Meeting with HAZ committee members, office of Chairman
9 March 2007 Meeting with HAZ committee members, office of Chairman
13 March 2007 Tour of Nkhwazi School
13 March 2007 Meeting with H.D., O., and C.K., private house
March 2007 LILA committee meeting, Indian High Commission
6 May 2007 HAZ Annual General Meeting, Hindu Hall
13 July 2007 Meeting at the Friday Club, Kitwe
27 January 2008 Meeting with Yuvas United organisers, Intercontinental Hotel

(Field notes, audio records, documents)

**Official archival sites**

*(See Primary Data sections in References)*

India Office Records, British Library, London (IOR)
National Archives, London (NA-UK)
National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka (NAZ)
Registrar of Societies, Lusaka (RS)
Central Statistics Office, Lusaka (CSO)
Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)

(Official government documents, official correspondence, press cuttings, Government gazettes, photographs, association records, published census reports, video footage)
Family records
(See Primary Data section in References)
(In addition to memoirs, I received photographs, personal letters, souvenirs, diaries)

Questionnaires
September 2006 Interview-led questionnaires, Northern Province (20 of 20)
May 2007 Lusaka Indian Ladies Association, Lusaka (7 of 50)
July 2007 Ex-Zambian Hindus in UK and USA (8 of 10)

(Questionnaire responses, accompanying letters or emails, notes from follow-up conversations)

Hindu associations’ material
(See Primary Data section in References)
Lusaka Hindu Association Samachar magazines (1997–2001), Lusaka
Souvenir programmes from various Hindu cultural events across Zambia (1980–2008)
Official correspondence and minutes
Miscellaneous documents

Disposable camera project
May–Nov 2007 ‘Hindu Life in Lusaka’ (8 of 15 cameras)

(Participant photographs, participants’ written explanations)

Drawing and writing competition
February 2008 ‘Indian Life in Zambia’ (34 participants, members of Yuvas United)

(27 drawings on A3 paper – see Appendix B – 15 essays, 2 poems, field notes)

Internet research
(See Internet Sources in References)
Appendix B: Drawings from Yuvas United Competition ‘Indian Life in Zambia’

Drawing 1. ‘Hindu Life in Zambia’. This colourful drawing in mixed media depicts several events and places inside a map of Zambia. At the top left is the gate to the Lotus Sports Club with fireworks bursting above it. To the right of that an Indian is on a running track wearing athletic gear. Along the bottom of the map there are Indian music and dance classes, and in the bottom corner places of worship.
Drawing 2. 'Pride of Africa'. The top corner of this drawing shows the International School of Lusaka, with white, Indian and black Zambian pupils holding hands. In the centre there is a map of Africa with Zambia pin-pointed in the middle, and the title of the drawing above it. Below this a road leads round to the Hindu temple in well-kept grounds. The right side of the picture focuses on Diwali. The Lotus Sports Club is at the top, adorned in lights for the occasion. A rocket is in the grass, and a girl holds a sparkler. She is next to the stage which shows an Indian girl performing a traditional dance for a large audience.
Drawing 3. ‘Indian Life in Zambia’. There are several scenes here, most inside a map of Zambia. At the top of the map is the Second Class Area, showing the temple and a road to what is labelled ‘House’ but was described to me as Hindu Hall. Below that is a picture of Lusaka International Airport. Next to that is Tuesday Market, showing apples, bananas, fruits and spices among the things for sale. At the bottom of the picture are the Munali Hills, which lie to the south of Lusaka on the way to Livingstone, a popular holiday destination for Lusaka Indians. An Indian and black Zambian are drawn shaking/holding hands. At the bottom right is Shoprite, which I was told was the one in Manda Hill shopping mall.
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Drawing 4. 'A Week in the Life of a Hindu in Lusaka'. This drawing shows seven different activities. On Sunday there is a trip to the neighbouring town, Kafue, which has an impressive temple often visited by Hindus as a day out. Monday shows a school day – at the International School of Lusaka, one of several top private schools attended by wealthier families’ children. On Tuesday is the Tuesday Market, represented by three black Zambian vendors with their groceries and scales, inside the area that is surrounded by a dirt road. On Wednesday is an Indian Tabla lesson, which only a few children (all expatriates) attend. On Thursday there is cricket, which the young illustrator explained was what his father did on that day. Friday is shown as a day of rest. On Saturday Manda Hill shopping mall is depicted, where the illustrator goes with his mother to do the shopping at Shoprite.
Drawing 5: ‘Roll the Dice’. This is another picture depicting multiple activities. In the top left corner the picture title appears on a banner the colours of the Indian flag, with an HIV/AIDS awareness ribbon attached to it. On the die in the centre of the picture there is shown charity, in the form of food, clothing and money, Diwali and its fireworks, and Tuesday Market, showing a basket and fruit, vegetables, bread and cheese. In the top right corner a bowls of gulab jamun, an Indian dessert, has the caption, ‘Most Indians eat traditional food.’ Below that is a car, with a statement reading, ‘Most Indians drive cars’. The two pictures to the bottom left and centre relate to Indian employment, in education, drawn as a maths sum, and industry, drawn as a mine and smelter.
Drawing 6. 'Street scene'. This bright drawing is an amalgamation of Independence Avenue and Cairo road, the heart of 'down town' administration and shopping. From Independence Avenue, on the way into town, cars pass the Mosque and Hindu Mandir. Gandhi’s spice shop is situated on a small street off Cairo Road, and its owners, the Gandhis, dry and package a number of spices common in Indian cookery, depicted here in rows of blue and green packets. Gandhi’s spices are also sold in Shoprite, Spar, and other supermarkets such as Melissa’s. The customers in this picture are black Zambians. Gandhis also serves vegetarian lunches on its small verandah, and sells other merchandise, as is shown by the stereos on the shelves in this picture.
Drawing 7. ‘Shops and Places’. This drawing shows multiple scenes, linked together by road, with a car at the bottom. To the left is Mundawanga, a botanical garden and zoo in Chilanga, to the South of Lusaka, which was described by the illustrator as a ‘favourite’ place to visit. In the centre is Kafue temple, another visitors’ site. To the right is Arcades shopping mall and Spar (a shop within Arcades), and to the bottom of the picture is Shoprite, which the illustrator told me was in Manda Hill.
Drawing 8: 'Four images of Hindu life in Lusaka'. The picture is divided into four scenes. The top left shows a Hindu, a black Zambian and a Muslim greeting one another, with low buildings in the background depicting the shops in Kamwala, and a car drawn to the side of the picture. The top right image shows the Mosque and Hindu Mandir in Lusaka, as seen from the road entrance. On the bottom right is the interior of an Indian shop, given the name 'Patel General Store'. The customers are black African and there is a young Indian man behind the counter. The bottom left scene is Tuesday Market. The illustrator has shown the wide range in foodstuffs available, from pumpkins to grains to imported apples. The customers in hats represent white tourists; interestingly, the focus is a black Zambian vendor breastfeeding her child.
Drawing 9. ‘Happy Diwali’. This illustration captures the festive sense of Diwali. Along the left are rows of stalls selling food and drink and toys. Under the fireworks display in the centre, children are playing with a ball, skipping rope and sparkler. Under them is another shower of fireworks. At the top right she has drawn the Diwali stage, which is an enormous structure, and has drawn in yellow and orange a troop of Indian dancers, watched by an audience of ‘mixed colours and kinds of people’. Below this are three non-Indian festival-goers socialising around a table.
Drawing 10. 'Oh! What a Fireworks!' This picture is of the Diwali celebrations at the Lotus Sports Club. The two people, in 'fashionable dress' are watching a display of fireworks.
Drawing 11. 'Kafue Temple'. This is a drawing of the temple in Kafue, which is of South Indian design. It serves as a visiting place for many Hindus travelling southward or seeking a weekend escape from the city.
Drawing 12. ‘The Hindu Mandir’. In this drawing the interior of the Lusaka temple is shown: the centrepiece is a table of offerings for the Hindu gods. On either side of the door are notice boards. Two cars are parked outside the temple, and its well-kept grounds are depicted by a neat row of potted plants.
Appendices

Drawing 13. 'Indian Life in Zambia (II)'. This image is of a Hindu temple, most likely the temple in Lusaka: it sits in an area of the city pestered by pied crows. In the background are hills, possibly the Munali Hills, and a sunset.
Drawing 14. ‘Welcome to the Gospel Church’. The top left image is of a church from the outside, and the bottom left image is of the Hindu Mandir from the inside. The right side of the page shows the Victoria Falls, the main national site of natural beauty in Zambia.
Drawing 15. ‘Indian Life in Zambia (III)’. This picture is of the mosque and its car park that are situated next to the Hindu temple in Lusaka.
Drawing 16. 'The Indo-Zambian Bank'. This bank is 'down town' on Cairo Road, Lusaka’s main thoroughfare.
Drawing 17. ‘Tuesday Market’. The main structure here is the open hall in the grounds of St. Peter’s Church, inside which are two black Zambian vendors selling fruit and vegetables and one ‘market boy’ carrying a basket on fruit on his head. Three Indian women, one in a dress and two in saris, are the customers. In the far right corner there is a queue of cars under a sign reading ‘Pay’.
Drawing 18. ‘Tuesday Market (II)’. This drawing shows the black Zambian vendors at the market, and someone buying green chillies.
Drawing 19. 'Indian Life in Zambia (IV)'. At the top the Zambian and Indian flags cross over one another. The left hand picture is of the Kuomboka ceremony in Western Province, a significant symbol of tradition in Zambia. To the right is a depiction of a Hindu offering at Diwali.
Drawing 20. Untitled. This image shows the Hindu temple, the Indian national flag, and an Indian and black Zambian holding hands.
Drawing 21. Untitled (II). Here, the Hindu Hall is shown under renovation. The letters ‘I’ and ‘Z’ indicate who is Indian and Zambian, respectively. Work on the Hindu Hall roof, stage, and new entrance hall is shown. Outside, an Indian has his arm around the shoulders of a black Zambian fellow football player.
Drawing 22. ‘Inter-religious Faith and Peace’. Here the temple and mosque are juxtaposed, and a Muslim has his arm around the shoulder of a Hindu. Above fly pied crows, which are common in this area of the city.
Drawing 23. 'Indian Life in Zambia (V). Here, on the street, an Indian woman, dressed in a shalwar kameez, is being held at knife-point by a young black Zambian street kid. She says, 'Don’t kill me with your knife. I will give you what you want. Please leave me.' The boy says, 'Hey, give your jewellery which you are wearing and money you have.'
Drawing 24. ‘Indian Life in Zambia (VI)’. An Indian’s house is surrounded by a high wall and electric fence and gate. There are bars on the windows of the house.
Drawing 25. ‘Indian Life in Zambia (VII)’. The scene here is of the intersection at Kamwala, at the city’s south end roundabout. To the left are two Indian establishments. Pied crows dominate the sky. The Indian woman in a sari is saying, ‘You small boy stop stealing my bag.’ The other woman, also an Indian, is crying, ‘Help! They are stealing my chain.’ The drawing is bordered by the colours and symbol of the Indian national flag.
Drawing 26. 'We are in Zambia But our thinking is in India'. Here, an Indian man in a shirt and necktie, and inside a map of Zambia, has thought bubbles to an Indian flag.
Drawing 27. ‘My mum told [me] to draw a car and house’. Inside the gated doors of this house, there is a kitchen and a living room with a television. Around the house there are drawings of a bicycle (top left), cars, and a truck (bottom right).
Appendix C: Extracts from *Samachar*, the Lusaka Hindu Association magazine

From the Lusaka Hindu Association’s magazine *Samachar* vol. 1, no. 5, pp 8–9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LADIES</th>
<th>Gujaratis with Gujaratis, the rest to God.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| LANGUAGE | 90% Gujarati  
|         | 8% English  
|         | 2% Fractured Hindi, examples:  
|         | "u apko kone baariyo ke mane car ki jarur hai?"  
|         | "hum tumare ghere aviya tha pan tum gharma nahi tha atle hum pacha gaya."  
|         | "ar bhai ma tumko samajauta he to tum samajta nahi, banking ka dhandha tumko avadha nahnin to shun kaam aisa ada ada dhandha me pada hai. Zambia me aaj kal kwacha ka rate bavaj gabadha jata he, kwacha ki value utari jaay chhe uska tumku bhaen chhe ke nahnin?"  
|         | K.P. |

**Punjabi**  
Punjabis with Punjabis, the rest to God.  
95% Hindi/Punjabi  
4% English  
1% Multi-fractured Gujarati, examples:  
"tamari tabiyat saro chhe?"  
"mane badho avde chhe."  
"tamari pan mare ghere ayo chhe"  
"are bahan tamaro shun kahun hum sabjee leva gayo hato pan badho khatam ho gaya hau"  

**DISCLAIMER**  
The Author takes no responsibility if any reader thinks he is commenting on his or her party!
EXPATIAS AND KAKAWALAS
.... shall the twain ever meet?

It was about 10 a.m. on a Sunday morning that I landed in Lusaka.

The month was October 1997 and it was stifling hot. I had intended putting up in a hotel, but my friend in Bombay had insisted that I put up with his relative who would be more than willing to take me around for my business in Lusaka.

The flight was on time and my host whom I shall call Mr. Patel picked me up from the airport. He was a pleasant person and somehow insisted on speaking to me in Gujarati. Having spent considerable time in various places in Gujarat I could make out that he must have hailed from Surat except that he studiously avoided using those flowery words which are the hallmark of the Surits. When he remarked ‘huluro anphal ko lapha padto chha’, I am sure he meant ‘sirai’ for ‘huluro’, but I gave him the benefit of the doubt.

We arrived at the house at about 11.30 a.m. and on entering the gate I noticed that in front of the house was a line of 200 litre drums cut in half in which were planted roses and other shrubs. We entered the house through the back door via the kitchen. I found this surprising, but I was told that this was the normal custom in most Indian households, the exceptions being purposebuilt flats and multi-storey housing units where one had no option but to use the front door.

As soon as I had settled down, Mrs. Patel brought me a glass of water, although I needed something more sustaining than water. I drank half a glass. I had to, as Mrs. Patel was standing tray in hand to take the glass back to the kitchen.

The art-deco of the lounge caught my eye. A couple of vases with plastic flowers, a glass cabinet full of miniature liquor bottles, a miniature soapstone Taj Mahal, family photographs together with copper etchings of various Hindu religious icons hung on the wall, some straight, some skew, and a calendar depicting Hanumanji with a Gujrati calendar wired on to it.

I was on the point of dozing off, when my host asked me, ‘tama haan leko, thandu ke garam? I was about to say: ek thando beer chaalse...

From the Lusaka Hindu Association's magazine Samachar vol. 1, no. 6, p. 23.
doha's name, each one of you have called one or two of your relatives to work for you, do you call them expatias? No, in fact you want everyone to accept them as one of us and not expatias, why these double standards? You know your attitude reminds me of a Gujarati kevat which goes something like Chhagan Mogan something something.

I assisted Smiler and said the saying is Chhagan Mogan to sonana ne parka chhokro garana.

Thanks, Smiler said. That's the kevat I wanted to mention pun hoon bhalu gela.

I thought it prudent not to get involved in this argument and took leave and thanked my hosts, still musing over this Expatria and Kakawalla syndrome.

I was later informed that this love hate relationship goes back over thirty years when the first batch of expatriates came to Zambia. They were recruited by the Zambian Government. Relations were extremely good for some time until certain misunderstandings arose, mostly in money transfers, further compounded by what the local residents rightly or wrongly perceived as a superiority complex by both Gujarati and non-Gujarati expatriates towards them. These expatriates were by and large mostly professionals. It was felt that they tended to look down upon the local residents, to the extent of displaying a condescending attitude towards them and to make matters worse it is said that they regarded the locals as a bunch of uneducated shopkeepers.

Over the years a lot of expatriates settled down and made Zambia their home. Time and social assimilation has to a large extent healed the ideological wounds that divided the two factions. However, it cannot be denied that there still remain pockets of diehard conservatives on both sides.

Being an outsider I thought there may have been faults in both camps and the following ditty came to mind, it goes something like this:

There is so much bad in the best of us
And there is so much good in the worst of us
That it ill behoves any of us
To speak ill of the rest of us.

From the Lusaka Hindu Association's magazine Samachar vol. 1, no. 5, p. 33.
Appendix D: Publications