How to Make Oneself a Work of Art by Killing Oneself
- Three Images of Suicidal Deaths in Deleuze’s Religious Thought -
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My thesis will explore Gilles Deleuze’s thoughts on suicide which may illuminate the meaning of his own suicide. In Chapter 1, I begin my discussion with Foucault’s idea of suicide which impressed Deleuze, the idea that suicide can be an art creating a new mode of existence. Necessary for this creation is the incorporation of the force or power of the outside, which is the absolute other of thought and of life and yet affects both. According to Hume’s insight, which also interested Deleuze, God may be one of many representations of this unknown outside. Hence death, made an art in the manner of Foucault, may be described in religious terms. Along this line of thought, in the following chapters I address three types of religious images of suicidal death that are found in Deleuze’s works and can be translated into attempts at folding the outside. In Chapter 2, I discuss the death of the martyr which Deleuze finds in Leibniz. In this death, the incorporation of the power of the outside by the one who dies results in the accomplishment of one’s subjectivity by imitating the unity of God as a representation of the outside. In Chapter 3, I discuss the death of Christ which Deleuze relates to Spinoza’s thought. In this death, the incorporation of the power of the outside amounts to the dissolution of the self of the dying person into Nature, embodying the multiplicity of the effects of this power beyond the unity of representation. In Chapter 4, I discuss the death of Dionysus as Antichrist which Deleuze reads in Nietzsche. In this death, the incorporation of the force of the outside leads the one who dies to exercise this force as one’s own force upon oneself in one’s act of self-destruction until one shatters the unity of God and the identity of the self. I will show that Deleuze conceived of these deaths as realizations of novel states of the mind and the body comparable to different types of music. Proceeding from the first death to the second and then the third, the one who dies exposes oneself to the outside more thoroughly. The forms of music realized in these deaths vary from the completion of harmony, with recourse to unity, to the enjoyment of disharmony as multiplicity in itself. In the series of these images of death, suicide manifests itself as an attempt at making oneself into a piece of music which the one who dies plays and listens to until the end, creating the multiplicity to be affirmed by one’s act of killing oneself.
I will begin my argument with the following statement made by Deleuze in a 1986 interview in which he talks about Foucault.

Subjectivation, that’s to say the operation of folding the line of the outside [l’opération qui consiste à plier la ligne du dehors], mustn’t be seen as just a way of protecting oneself, taking shelter. It’s rather the only way of confronting the line, riding it: you may be heading for death, suicide, but as Foucault says in a strange conversation with Schroeter, suicide then becomes an art which takes one’s whole life [qui prend toute la vie] (P: 154; 114; translation slightly altered).

The topic in this passage is Foucault’s idea of subjectivation and its possible relation to suicide. The key point to be noted here is that, although subjectivation - as the operation of folding the line of the outside - may lead to suicide, suicide in that case becomes an art. In short, Deleuze approves of suicide insofar as it is an act of subjectivation and, as such, an art. In this thesis, by tracking across Deleuze’s works the diversifications of this line of thought, anticipatory though they may be, I will try to cast light on the sense of his own suicide. First, then, what needs to be asked is what subjectivation - or the operation of folding the outside - is, and how suicide, when it is such an operation, can be an art.

In this chapter, by explicating the implications of the above statement, I will conduct the framework for the argument of this thesis. The reading of Foucault’s conversation with Schroeter will give us an idea of how the two are able to conceive of suicide as an art, and of how Deleuze understands this conception in relation to the former’s notion of subjectivation (Section 1). The overlap between Foucault’s notion of subjectivation and Hume’s notion of
subject as understood by Deleuze will draw our attention to the problematic common to these two notions (Section 2). This problematic will delimit the frame of the discussion after this chapter.

1. Suicide as Artistic Subjectivation

Before addressing Deleuze’s understanding of Foucault’s concept of subjectivation, I first turn to Foucault’s conversation with Schroeter, a German film director, referred to by Deleuze in the citation above. In this conversation, Foucault and Schroeter do not talk about subjectivation itself, but make passing mention of the possibility that suicide can be aesthetic:

[T]here is no conduct more beautiful, that merits more reflection with as much attention, than suicide. One should work on one’s suicide all one’s life. (DE4: 257; 318)

When Foucault says that suicide is a beautiful conduct worth reflecting on and spending one’s whole life on, he has two reasons in mind. One concerns the effect of this conduct on its social and cultural situation, and the other, its effect on the life of the person carrying this out. For one thing, Foucault proposes a positive evaluation of suicide, in opposition to its negative evaluation by society and from the standpoint of a “partisan of a true cultural combat” (DE4: 257; 318). When society requires individuals to live in established modes of existence or in oppressive ways, committing suicide, an act denounced by society, may be a means of resisting this social and cultural pressure. More importantly, committing suicide may enable the one who does so to create a novel mode of existence, irreducible to one’s self determined by specific social and cultural contexts. “An art of the self which would be the
complete contrary of oneself. To make one’s being an object of art, that’s what is worth the
effort” (DE4: 258; 318). To commit suicide may be a means of pursuing one’s singularity at
the cost of destroying oneself. If suicide can be an art, it is to the extent that it involves the
invention of one’s being in the same way as the creation of a work of art does.

During his conversation with Foucault, Schröeter makes an intriguing suggestion
concerning suicide. He says, “I could kill myself only in a state of grace or extreme pleasure,
but above all not in a state of depression (DE4: 257; 318). For him at least, what matters in
suicide is the pleasure it brings with it, indeed, an extraordinary pleasure even comparable to
grace. Foucault’s view is not so distant from Schröeter’s. Elsewhere he says:

We should consider ourselves lucky to have at hand (with suicide) an extremely
unique experience: it’s the one which above all the rest deserves the greatest
attention- not that it shouldn’t worry you (or comfort you)- but rather so that you
can make of it a fathomless pleasure whose patient and relentless preparation will
enlighten all of your life.¹

Foucault’s claim is that suicide, even in preparing for it, gives one such great pleasure so as
to change the quality of his or her life. Besides, as he says in another place:

And- I must say that’s my dream- I would like and I hope I’ll die of an overdose
(laughs) of pleasure of any kind. Because I think it’s really difficult and I always
have the feeling that I do not feel the pleasure, the complete total pleasure and, for
me, it’s related to death.²

In other words, complete, total pleasure for Foucault is inseparable from death. If the
preparation of suicide gives great pleasure, suicide itself does no less. As a kind of death, it is
inevitably related to the complete total pleasure which Foucault speaks of. For both Foucault
and Schröeter, the positive value of suicide thus also comes from the pleasure in committing
it. Because of this pleasure comparable to grace, suicide is no longer a damned act, as it is
usually regarded, but a blessed one.

One may wonder how these two intellects can say that suicide brings with it unusual pleasure, when normally suicide should be accompanied by agony. Remember that their positive evaluation of suicide is connected not only with this pleasure but also with the artistic creation of a new mode of existence. To this creation belongs the transformation of pain into indescribable pleasure, just as the depiction of a pitiful sight makes a beautiful picture pleasant to see. It is not killing oneself or dying that matters, but, in doing so, producing such new sensations or emotions that fill one’s being, until one feels it completely changing. To this extent, suicide is a manner of living, living otherwise, rather than a manner of dying.3

The course of the conversation between the two intellectuals attests to this view. Before starting to talk about suicide, Foucault says, equating a manner of living with art,

The art of living is to eliminate psychology, to create, with oneself and others, individualities, beings, relations, unnamable qualities. If one fails to do that in one’s life, it isn’t worth living. I don’t distinguish between people who make of their existence a work and those who make a work during their existence. An existence can be a perfect and sublime work. That’s something the Greeks understood, whereas we have completely forgotten it, above all since the Renaissance. (DE4: 256; 317)

Against psychoanalysis, which confines life in fixed schemata and represses its multiplicity, Foucault proposes creating in one’s life new connections, new ways of being, new qualities, in one’s relations to oneself and others, and calls a manner of doing it an art. In that case, there can be no distinction between creating a work of art and making oneself a work of art. To live is to make a work of art in one’s existence and to make one’s life itself a work of art. The fact that, after Foucault makes the above statement, he and Schroeter start to discuss suicide as an art, shows that suicide as such for them is nothing but one of the possible ways
of creating life as a work of art. Suicide is not a matter of killing or dying but of living and creating.

The equation of creating a work of art with creating one’s mode of existence implies not only an exhortation to an art inseparable from life, but also the critique of modern art separated from life. Elsewhere Foucault says:

What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?4

From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.5

In these two passages, Foucault criticizes the situation of our modern society in which art is reduced to the actions of experts, and insists on the importance of a different kind of art which consists in creating one’s own manner of living by oneself. In opposing the creation of individuals or their life by themselves to the creation of artistic objects by experts, Foucault implies that subjectivation can be such a new style of art.

Foucault also says above that the Greeks had known this art, while we have forgotten it. Although he does not mention subjectivation in this conversation, elsewhere in his work he thematically discusses the subjectivation amongst the ancient Greeks as such an art. So there is no wonder that Deleuze associates suicide and subjectivation in the citation at the beginning of this chapter. For subjectivation is an alias of the art of creating one’s mode of existence, and suicide is one of the many possible ways of practicing this art.

Leaving suicide aside for a while, what does Deleuze think Foucault’s idea of the ancient Greek subjectivation is, and what kind of art of creating one’s being does Deleuze find in the Foucault’s treatment of the Greeks? In Foucault, Deleuze defines this
subjectivation as the operation of folding force. In doing so, he keeps in mind Foucault’s account of the process of this operation. The Greek free man who rules others without being ruled by them does not exist as such from the beginning. At first he must train for, or experience, a battle against others. This training or experience enables one to fight a battle within oneself to overcome one’s desires. Only the one who can win this battle and rule himself can rule others, whether in a household or in a city state. In short, the free man is produced in the process that progresses from the reformation of one’s relation to others to the reformation of one’s relation to the self and then again back to the reformation of one’s relation to others. Deleuze describes this process as follows: “It is as if the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allow a relation to oneself to emerge, and constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own unique dimension” (F: 107; 100). When the relation with others in the battle against them is doubled by the relation with oneself in the battle within oneself, the latter relation folds the former into itself. This is not only the folding of relation but also the folding of force. For the force which once acted upon other forces in the relation with others comes to act upon itself in the relation with oneself. Here is an operation of “bending force, making it impinge on itself rather than on other forces: a “fold” in Foucault’s terms, “a relation of force with itself” [un rapport de la force avec soi] (P: 134; 98; translation slightly altered). Acting upon itself and being acted upon by itself, this force attains to its self-regulating autonomy. Hence, this force’s relation with itself constitutes an independent agent who presides not only over his relation to his self but also over his relation to others. Folding can be defined as the operation of internalizing into one’s mode of existence something external to its current form, in order to transform it. This operation constitutes a new type of subject which had not appeared until then, and therefore is called subjectivation.
This is what the Greeks did: they folded force, so that it still remained force [sans qu’elle cesse d’être force]. They made it relate back to itself. Far from ignoring interiority, individuality or subjectivity they invented the subject, but only as a derivative or the product of a ‘subjectivation’. They discovered the ‘aesthetic existence’—the doubling or the relation with oneself, the facultative rule of free man. (F: 108; 101; translation slightly altered)

Deleuze remarks on subjectivation, not because he sees in it the return to the subject, as so many critics accused Foucault of doing so through a gross misunderstanding, but rather because subjectivation discloses the fact that the subject is merely a derivative product of the preceding process and, as such, is variable as this process varies. This subject can be called the aesthetic existence, like a work of art - an art equal to the creation of a manner of living.

Foucault doesn’t use the word subject as though he’s talking about a person or a form of identity, but the words [les mots] “subjectivation” as a process, and “Self” as a relation (a relation to oneself). And what’s he talking about? About a relation of force to itself (whereas power was a relation of a force to other forces), about a “fold” of force. About establishing different modes of existence [modes d’existence], depending on the manner of [la manière de] folding the line of forces, or about inventing possibilities of life that concern [concernent] death too, our relations to death: existing not as a subject but as a work of art. (P: 127; 92; italics in translation; translation slightly altered)

Deleuze refers to the artistic character of Foucault’s subjectivation. If Foucault means by the word ‘subject’ neither a person nor a form of identity, it is because these notions usually suppose their universality and permanence. By connecting the subject to subjectivation as the process of its production, Foucault shows that each subject is particular and variable, invented in one situation and re-invented in another. This is not without relation to his idea of the act as the creation of one’s mode of existence by oneself. In fact, in terms of the aesthetic existence amongst the Greeks, Foucault relates that domination over oneself enables one to control one’s pleasure and structuralize various parts of one’s mind and body so that one’s
life embodies the beauty of moderation. If every citizen practices this, the state will be well-ordered, the lives of all citizens being in harmony with each other.\(^7\) What matters here is, as Deleuze states above, to invent new connections, new modes of existence and new qualities in the relation to oneself and to others. This is exactly what Foucault suggested as an art equal to the creation of a manner of living in his conversation with Schroeter. When Foucault said that the Greeks had known such an art, obviously he meant by this ‘art’ their subjectivation.

Crucial to the invention of such aesthetic existence is the change in the affect of force constituent of this existence.

Force is what belongs to the outside, since it is essentially a relation with [avec] other forces: it is inseparable in itself from the power [pouvoir] to affect other forces (spontaneity) and to be affected by others (receptivity). But what comes about as a result is a relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect of self on self. (F: 108; 100-101; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

For the time being, we can take the outside of something simply to be its others, although another, more important aspect will reveal itself soon. Above is described the change in quality of the affect of the forces which constitute the self. Since force consists in acting or being acted, it is inevitably in relation with other forces. How a force is related to other forces and how it affects or is affected by them determines what kind of force it is. To this extent, each force has a power to affect or to be affected. The affect generated by this power can be active or passive, spontaneous or receptive. When the affect which one’s force takes on changes, the way one senses or feels changes, and the way one shapes and colours one’s life by senses or feelings does also. To change an affect is to engender various intensities that compose lived experience. The product of subjectivation is aesthetic, insofar as the operation
of relating forces otherwise, the operation of folding the outside into the inside, brings with it a change in the affect of forces and therefore a change of senses or feelings.

This does not mean that first the subject is produced and then the intensities that fill it. Rather, the production of the subject is inseparable from the change in the affect of force. When a force is folded in the doubling of the relation to others by the relation to oneself, this force stops acting upon other forces and comes to act upon itself. It is no longer simply passive or active in relation to them, but at once active and passive in relation to itself. A force’s affecting other forces or being affected by them turns into its affecting and being affected by itself; this is the point at which the affect changes in the process of subjectivation. Given that from this auto-affection of force derives the autonomy which defines the subject as such, the change in the affect not only gives the subject the intensities that fill it, but also underlies the production of the subject itself.

Even if this change occurs between the self and the other or among their constituent forces, it is not only these forces or these forms that this change concerns. On this point, it is significant that in the above citation the sentence “Force is what belongs to the outside, since it is essentially a relation to other forces” (F: 108; 100-101) comes just before the topic of the affect of force is introduced. Ultimately, the outside mentioned here does not simply mean other forces for a force or the other for the self. Each of these other forces is in itself a force, and the other opposed to the self is still another self. The outside, in its proper sense, is literally outside all such forces or forms, never being inside any of them. The above quotation suggests that the affect of force in the first place comes from this outside. Deleuze notes this elsewhere:

But the outside concerns force: if force is always in relation with other forces, forces necessarily refer to an irreducible outside which no longer even has any form and is made up of distances that cannot be broken down through which one
force acts upon another or is acted upon by another. It is always from the outside that a force confers on others or receives from others the variable position to be found only at a particular distance or in a particular relation. (F: 92; 86)

When forces relate to and affect each other, for each force all other forces appear as coming from the outside, in the sense simply of distance or difference from oneself. Then, after all, what enables their relation and affects resides not in any of these forces in relation, but outside them all. Hence the outside of something inevitably leads to the absolute outside of everything. This is why force belongs to the outside, to the extent that force is itself a relation to other forces. This absolute outside is ungraspable by thought, which is just one of these forces in relation. The outside is itself an unpredictable factor of chance which decides how they are related, how they affect or are affected, on every occasion. It is the force of the outside distinct from any of these forces that relates them and makes them affect or be affected. For this reason, when the relation of forces and their affects change, the force of the outside has intervened.

The Greek practice of subjectivation is the result of the intervention by the force of the outside and, as such, is the fold of this force. Since the force of the outside relates forces and composes forms, “it is the outside that ‘explains’ the exteriority of forms, both for each one and for their mutual relation” (F: 120; 113), including the forms of the self and the other. So, when the relation with the other is folded into the relation with oneself, the latter relation enfolds within it the distance between the self and the other, along with the force of the outside which severs them by this distance. If a force can relate itself to itself just as it relates itself to other forces, it is because this force becomes exterior to itself, severed by a distance, in the same way as the self and the other are to each other. Given that the force of the outside exteriorizes forces and forms, a force’s relation to itself internalizes the force of the outside. Acting upon itself and being acted upon by itself, the coexistence of activity and passivity
within a force attests to the intervention by the force of the outside in the differenciation of these two kinds of affects. After all, what is folded during the process of subjectivation is, firstly, the relation of the self to the other, secondly, a force acting upon other forces in this relation, and thirdly, the force of the outside which relates forces and composes the forms of the self and the other.8

In the citation at the beginning of this chapter, Deleuze referred to subjectivation as “the operation which consists in folding the line of the outside” (P: 154; 114; translation slightly altered). Strictly speaking, he is saying that what subjectivation folds is not the force of the outside but the line of the outside. But these two phrases do not designate separate things. In another interview, he explains what this line is:

It’s a line that’s not abstract, though it has no particular shape. It’s no more in thought than in things, but it’s everywhere thought confronts some thing like madness, and life some thing like death. (P: 149; 110)

I think we ride such lines whenever we think bewilderingly enough or live forcefully enough. They’re lines that go beyond knowledge (how could they be “known”?), and it’s our relations to these lines that go beyond power relations (as Nietzsche says, who could call it “a will to control”?). Are you saying they’re already there in all Foucault’s work? That’s true, it’s the line of the Outside [la ligne du Dehors]. (P: 149-150; 110; translation slightly altered)

The line of the Outside mentioned here is like a border which separates thought or life from its absolute other: that is, madness or death. Thought or life, when it is intense enough, approaches its limit and faces its other. The line of the Outside is the shape which such an other takes in general when it is seen from the inside of thought or life. Given that what is beyond this line cannot be thought or lived, this line itself has no definite features. One can encounter this line only when one’s thought or life reaches its limit. To fold the force of the outside into ourselves and to combine our forces with this force is to move this border
between the outside and the inside into ourselves, so that the absolute difference internalized within us enables us to renew ourselves. The folding of the force of the outside is nothing but the folding of the line of the outside.

What matters in subjectivation is not so much the reconstitution of the relation among forces as it is the incorporation of the force or the line of the outside into this reconstituted relation. To the extent that the force of the outside, thus incorporated, determines the uniqueness of the affects, the uniqueness which defines the subject as such, subjectivation - the art of creating the aesthetic existence - depends on the fold of the force or line of the outside. The significance of Foucault’s analysis of the Greek practice of subjectivation, for Deleuze, lies in discerning in a certain historical form the ingress of this force or line of the outside radically distinct from the constituent forces or lines of this form or of their relation.9

Foucault’s high regard for the ancient Greeks’ practice of subjectivation entails neither an exhortation of a return to the ideal norm of antiquity, nor praise of domination over others. The case of the Greek free man is merely one example of many possible modes of subjectivation, one which appeared in the past. So Deleuze writes:

What must be stated, then, is that subjectivation, the relation to oneself, continues to create itself, but by metamorphosing itself [en se métamorphosant] and changing its mode [changeant de mode] to the point where the Greek mode is a distant memory”. (F: 111; 104; translation slightly altered)

What is required is not to imitate the Greek way, but to find other modes of subjectivation, in order to create other modes of existence for ourselves in the situation in which we live.

What he [Foucault]’s really interested in is our present-day relation to madness, our relation to punishment, our relation to power, to sexuality. Not the Greeks, but our relation to subjectivation [subjectivation], our ways of constituting ourselves as subjects. Thinking is always experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting, and
what we experiment with is always actuality, what’s coming into being, what’s new, what’s taking shape. (P: 144; 106; translation slightly altered)

The inquiry into subjectivation is itself “a practical search for another way of life, a new style” (P: 144; 106), rather than a purely theoretical investigation. When we discover another mode of subjectivation, this discovery changes the affects of our forces, and becomes an operation of subjectivation. Our speculative exploration may thus turn into a practical experiment of renewing our ways of being. The pursuit of subjectivation as art becomes an art of subjectivation. This practice in thought and life may lead to another practice in action. Foucault’s thought and politically active life were nothing but such a practice. When Deleuze, pondering on this practice, speaks of the possibility that suicide might be an artistic act of subjectivation, he also seems to suggest the possibility that his own suicide, committed much later, might be one. In resonance with Foucault’s notion of subjectivation, Deleuze not only adopted the idea of the art of creating one’s death being a form of life in his own way, but also found similar ideas in the thoughts of other thinkers he addressed, which I will discuss in the following chapters.

2. Subjectivation in Relation to the Outside or God

Before I move on to this, I will try to illuminate a supposition in the background of Deleuze’s idea of subjectivation, as this will help to delimit the frame of the discussion. To this end, it is relevant to go back to his first book, a treatise on Hume’s philosophy, Empiricism and Subjectivity. In this work, Deleuze proposed a concept of the subject quite similar to the outcome of subjectivation. Based on the link that Deleuze makes between Foucault and Hume, the problematic raised in terms of the former notion will prove also to be valid for the latter.
In this book, Deleuze sees the crux of Hume’s empiricism in his notion of the
subject. Hume distinguishes the random collection of ideas as immediately given to
sensation from the system in which they are arranged in order by the mediation of reflection.
The ideas in the collection are the impressions of sensation, and those in the system the
impressions of reflection. He identifies the collection with the mind and the system with the
subject, and asks how the former can become the latter. In order to answer this question, he
conceives of the principles of association and the principles of the passions, inducing them
from the functions of the mind. In order for the random collection of ideas to become the
ordered system, they must be connected. In order for them to be connected, they must be
reflected. The impressions of reflection thus proceed from the impressions of sensation.
However, not all the impressions of sensation become the impressions of reflection, since not
all ideas given in the mind are reflected and connected into the system. The ideas to be
reflected should be selected, according to the strength of the emotions that animate them.
Hume conceives of the principles of association to explain the first aspect and the principles
of the passions to explain the second aspect, the former determining in what way ideas are
connected and the latter, which ideas are selected to be connected. It is because these
principles affect the mind so that it connects ideas that their collection becomes the system
and the mind becomes the subject. What is important here is that these principles do not
describe the spontaneous acts of the mind but the effects upon it that enable it to act in order
to become the subject. In this sense, the mind does not become the subject by itself; neither
is the subject an independent and autonomous agent:

But the subject can go beyond the given because first of all it is, inside the mind,
the effect of principles transcending and affecting the mind. (ES: 5; 24; italics in
text)
Subjectivity is determined as an effect; it is in fact an *impression of reflection*. The mind, having been affected by the principles, turns now into a subject. (ES: 8; 26; italics in text)

Stated equally in these two passages is that the subject is the effect of the principles which affect the mind.\(^\text{12}\) Rather than subsisting by itself, the subject is produced by something external to it. In thus insisting, Deleuze understands Hume’s subject similarly to that of Foucault’s, as the outcome of subjectivation; for, in both cases, he conceives the subject to be a product that depends on the preceding process of production, with the latter being more important than the former.

This is not the only resemblance. Just as with Foucault’s subjectivation, the emergence of the subject in Hume is also accompanied by a change in the quality of affect.

What we must bring to light first of all is that the subject, being the effect of the principles within the mind, is but the mind being *activated*. We do not, then, have to ask whether for Hume the subject is active or passive, for this is a false alternative. If we did embrace it, we would have to insist on the passivity rather than the activity of the subject, since the latter is the effect of principles. The subject is the mind activated by principles, and the notion of activation avoids the alternative. To the extent that principles sink their effect into the depth of the mind, the subject, which is this very effect, becomes more and more active and less and less passive. It was passive in the beginning, it is active in the end. This confirms the idea that subjectivity is in fact a process, and that an inventory must be made of the diverse moments of this process. (ES: 127; 112-113; italics in text)

Here Deleuze is describing the change in quality of the affect during the process of the production of the subject in Hume. When the mind becomes the subject and the impression of sensation becomes the impression of reflection, the reception of the sensible turns to its reflective thought. Thus the mind’s becoming the subject is its turning from passive to active. Since this transition occurs by being affected by principles, the mind does not become active
by itself, but is activated by them. The notion of the genuinely active subject is merely the consequence abstracted from the process of its generation. Given that there is no consequence without process, the subjectivity of the subject should be sought in its transition from passivity to activity. On this point, too, Hume’s notion of the subject is similar to Foucault’s notion of subjectivation, since, in both cases, it is the change in affects that defines the subject as such.

Hume’s case, in which the passive mind takes on activity, might seem different from Foucault’s, in which an active force takes on passivity. However, looking at them more closely, we can find commonality in the two cases. In Hume’s case, the passive mind becomes active by being affected by the principles. In short, in the transition from passivity to activity, something acts upon the mind from outwith and makes it act by itself. In Foucault’s case, the force of the outside introduces passivity into the self’s active force so that it affects and is affected by itself. The commonality in the two cases is that the incorporation of the force of the outside enables the change of affects crucial to the emergence of the autonomous subject.¹³

Although Deleuze, in his book on Hume, does not use the word “fold” for this incorporation, we can find similar ideas there in relation to the theme of the production of the subject. One of them is the idea of the agreement between the principles affecting the mind and the unknown powers beyond it:

Therefore, the real problem would be to think, but only [mais seulement] at the right moment, of an agreement between the unknown powers [pouvoirs] on which the given appearances depend and the transcendent principles which determine the constitution of a subject within this very given [ce meme donné]. The real problem would be to think of an agreement between the powers of Nature [la Nature] and the principles of human nature, between Nature and the subject [entre les pouvoirs de la Nature et les principes de la nature humain, entre la Nature et le sujet]. (ES:
The principles, whether they are those of association or those of the passions, are the theoretical descriptions of the effects brought about in the mind. Certainly these effects are in the mind; but their cause is not there. If we search for this cause, we have to locate it outside of the mind, in Nature. This cause must be the powers of Nature, which are unknown except for the fact that they bring about their effects in the mind. The agreement of the principles of human nature and the unknown powers of Nature suggests that there is such a cause that cannot be known, outside of the effects which can be known. Based on this agreement, the subject which emerges by being affected by the principles can be equated to the product of the powers of Nature. Thus this agreement is a variant of the fold of the force of the outside, since it is an expression of the incorporation of the unknown power of Nature, the outside of the mind, into its inside, in order for the subject to emerge from it.

Another of these ideas that are close to that of the fold is the idea of the power proper to the subject. Since the subject is the association of ideas, the composition of the subject is simultaneous with that of the objects which this subject takes to be the referents of these ideas, and with the composition of the world as the totality of such objects: “[T]he system is completed in the identity between system and World [Monde]” (ES: 82; 80; translation slightly altered). The systematization of ideas to form the subject is at one with the systematization of its objects to form the world. Whereas ideas in their primal state, as they are given, lack associations, their associations are beyond the given, as also are the subject, the objects and the world. In other words, in order for the subject, the objects and the world to emerge, it is necessary for the mind to go beyond the given. In this act lies the power which is proper to the subject and enables it to posit itself.

Such is the dual power [puissance] of subjectivity: to believe and to invent, to
assume the secret powers [pouvoirs] and to presuppose abstract or distinct powers.⁴⁴ (ES: 91; 86)

In short, believing and inventing is what the subject does as a subject [ce que fait le sujet comme sujet]. … At the same time and through the same operation, while transcending the given, I judge and posit myself as subject (ES: 90; 85-86; translation slightly altered).

In short, as we believe and invent, we turn the given itself into a Nature [une Nature]. (ES: 152; 133; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

These passages refer to the double aspect of the power of the subject: to believe and to invent. It is not that the subject preexists and then carries out these two kinds of acts, but rather that they make the subject what it is. When the mind associates ideas and composes the subject, along with objects and the world, the mind believes in something outside the given and invents what this something is. In other words, for the mind to become the subject, it must believe and invent, by giving the unknown a shape that is knowable or understandable. In this sense, the subject’s power of positing itself, the object and the world consists in believing and inventing. Additionally, remember that the subject is composed by being affected by the principles of human nature or by the powers of Nature in agreement with these principles. That is to say, if the subject, in becoming itself, exercises its power of believing and inventing, this is possible by virtue of the incorporation of these unknown powers. To this extent, the power proper to the subject is another expression of the fold of the force of the outside - or the subject defined by this power is in itself such a fold. Here again, the similarity of Hume’s concept of the subject to Foucault’s is obvious. In both cases, the subject is the product of the operation of folding the force of the outside into the inside.¹⁵

The notion of the agreement between the principles of human nature and the powers of Nature, which is the basis of the possibility of the subject, reflects Hume’s view of
philosophy:

A cause may always be *thought*, as something in itself, transcending all the analogies which effectively [effectivement] provide it with a determined content, in the case of experience and knowledge. But the fact is that philosophy, being a human science, need not search for the cause; it should rather scrutinize effects. The cause cannot be *known*; principles have neither cause nor an origin of their power [pouvoir]. What is original is their effect upon the imagination. (ES: 6; 25; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

As the italics show, Deleuze stresses two things: firstly, that the cause can be thought, and secondly, that it cannot be known. It is not contradictory to say that philosophy should only seek for effects and yet to say that it can somehow talk about the cause, because it is in this complication that consists the central point of Hume’s view of philosophy. He conceives of the principles in exploring the effects upon the mind. Through such effects, the mind surpasses the given and becomes the subject, which in turn assumes and presupposes the unknown powers as the cause. The subject’s doing so, while inventing the cause and believing in it, is part of this effect. It is human nature that one cannot but think what is unknowable. It might be useless to explore it, if one can never know what it is, however much one thinks of it; but, it might be fruitful to some extent to explore how it can be thought, this thought being its very effects, while the cause is kept unknown in itself.

Philosophy, for Hume, scrutinizes effects and, in doing so, is led to scrutinizing the thought of the cause, not in the sense of determining the cause in itself, but in the sense of determining the effects upon this thought. The agreement between the powers of Nature and the principles of human nature is an idea typical of philosophy as a science. On the one hand, the principles theorize the known effects; on the other hand, the powers of Nature are assumed and presupposed as the unknowable, and yet thinkable, cause. The agreement between these two things reflects Hume’s idea of human nature and that of philosophy.
rooted in it, in which the investigation of effects cannot be identical to, and yet is inseparable from, the investigation of the cause.

Contrary to its appearance of a recommendation to seek merely for effects and to ignore the cause, Deleuze’s comment on Hume’s view of philosophy reveals that the investigation of the known effects is inseparable from that of the thought of the unknown cause, insofar as this thought is itself taken to be an effect. If knowing the known as known leads to thinking of the unknown as unknown, it is because the unknown has been involved in the possibility of the known. In the unknown, Hume, unlike Deleuze, sees the place of God.

We have seen that philosophy has nothing to say on the cause of the principles [la cause des principes] and on the origin of their power [pouvoir]. There, it is the place of God. We cannot make use of the principles of association in order to know the world as an effect of divine activity, and even less to know God as the cause of the world; but we can always think of God negatively, as the cause of the principles. It is in this sense that theism is valid, and it is in this sense that purpose is reintroduced. Purpose will be thought, albeit not known, as the original agreement between the principles of human nature and Nature [la Nature] itself. (ES: 77; 77; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

That Hume mentions God does not mean that he claims God’s existence, since Hume’s position, as Deleuze describes it here, is a kind of agnosticism. Hume criticizes all religious beliefs, including those of monotheism and polytheism, as abuses of the principles. The cause of the effect on the mind cannot be known positively, but only thought of negatively. God is one of the images that have been ascribed to the unknown cause, based on our rather arbitrary assumption of its intelligibility. Nobody knows whether God or something else exists beyond the extent of the knowable. We can only say that the place of the cause is there, the place without place, genuinely outside of the known.
Thus understood, Hume’s claim is neither the total affirmation nor the total negation of thinking of God. He is only clarifying in what context the thought of God can make sense and what sense it can make. From the standpoint of the science of the effect, certainly it does not make sense to discuss God as the cause beyond the extent of our knowledge. But, nevertheless, it does make sense to discuss thoughts of God as effects. This is not because this discussion demonstrates the existence of God or discloses what kind of Being He is; it is because this discussion discloses how thinkers approach the unknown and incorporate its force or power. This question is connected to the question, in Hume, of what kind of subject they make themselves and how they do so, and more generally speaking, what kind of mode of existence they create for themselves and how. Although scrutiny of the effect cannot elucidate the cause, it can at least elucidate the acts of the unknown affecting us or our own acts affected by it. The thought of God can make sense, insofar as this sense resides in the acts constituent of our modes of existence both from the outside and from the inside.

Given that believing and inventing are the powers that make the subject what it is, the subject cannot stop believing and inventing. Its thought never ceases to move towards the unknown, giving rise to images that can never be true. As far as the creation of our modes of existence is diverse, the invention of and the belief in the subject, the world and God, inseparable from this creation, cannot be exempt from essential diversity. Various images of God, by whatever names they are called, continue to appear, along with images of powers, those of the subject and those of the world, as necessary fictions.

In his essay “Hume”, Deleuze specifies the reason for this seemingly unreasonable situation: “the more illegitimate these beliefs are from the point of view of the principles of human nature, the more completely they belong to our nature” (ID: 231; 166):

Because if it is true that the principles of association determine the mind by
imposing on it a nature to discipline the delirium or fictions of the imagination [le délire or les fictions de l’imagination], conversely the imagination uses these same principles to pass off its fictions and fantasies as real, lending them a surety they would not otherwise have. In this sense, what is proper to fiction is feigning the relations themselves, including fictive relations, and making us believe in tales of madness. (Ibid: 230; 165; translation slightly altered)

But the illusion is particularly more serious when it belongs to human nature, that is, when the illegitimate operation or belief is incorrigible, inseparable from legitimate beliefs, and indispensable to their organization. Now the fanciful use of the principles of human nature becomes itself a principle. Delirium and fiction come over to the side of human nature. This is what Hume will demonstrate in his most subtle, most difficult analyses of ideas of the Self, the World and God; … (Ibid: 231; 165-166)

In short, believing in and inventing the subject, the world and God result in nothing but fictions and delirium; and, therefore, it is impossible to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate beliefs. For “the illegitimate beliefs in the World, the Self and God appear as the horizon of every possible legitimate belief, or as the lowest degree of belief. Because if everything is belief, everything is a question of the degree of belief, even the delirium of non-understanding” (Ibid: 232; 166). Therefore so-called illegitimate beliefs and delirium are not meaningless with regard to the works of the principles of human nature. Rather, they are quite meaningful. In spite of, or indeed, thanks to their minimal credibility, these beliefs can play the role of a horizon within which all beliefs appear; for illegitimate beliefs personify the fictitiousness and deliriousness of all beliefs, as the very characteristics of the works of the principles of human nature.16

This essential illegitimacy of belief connotes another similarity between Hume and Foucault. Even if no belief can establish its validity in the field of knowledge, however authentic and plausible it may look, this is not to say that there is no room anywhere to be made for it. In other words, it would be allowed in a field where the rigid distinction between
truth and falsehood does not work in the first place. Art is exemplary of such a field. That is to say, the subject, the world, God or whatever else, any object of belief, can have its own significance as an artistic creation, only insofar as it does not pretend to have the universality for everybody everywhere and at all times. We have seen that in both Hume and Foucault the subject is the product of the preceding process; that this production is accompanied by a change in the quality of affect and enabled by the intervention of the force of the unknown outside. The view that not only the subject but also the world and God are works of art is a corollary derived from and consistent with these similarities.

The idea that God is a kind of work of art is not lacking in Foucault. Expounding on Foucault’s thought, Deleuze writes that, along with Man-form, “the God-form is a compound” of forces of specific qualities and in a specific relation. When the relation of these forces changes, so do the forms they compose. “It is obvious that any form is precarious, since it depends on relations between forces and their mutations.” So, “the forces within man do not necessarily contribute to the composition of a Man-form, but may be otherwise invented in another compound or form.” Hence, the question is, “if the forces within man compose a form only by entering into a relation with forces from the outside, with what new forces do they now risk entering into a relation, and what new form will emerge that is neither God nor Man?” Just as God or Man is one of the various and variable relations of forces composed through the intervention of the force of the outside, subjectivation is a process of thus composing another such relation. If this process is an art of creating a work, these forms are also the works of similar arts.

In fact, Hume himself had the idea that in our experience there is something comparable to a work of art. Strangely enough, this idea includes a point which could undergird Foucault’s claim about the feelings evoked in suicide, which he mentioned in
passing without explaining his reasons. Taking the example of tragedy, Hume asks “how is it that the spectacle of passions, which are in themselves disagreeable and bleak, can come to delight us? The more the poet knows how to afflict [affliger], horrify, and make us indignant, ‘the more [we] are delighted’” (ES: 50; 57; translation slightly altered). The answer is through reflection, which can transform the quality of such passions. “[R]eflected passions change their quality: the sadness and bleakness of the represented [représentée] passions are eliminated in the pleasure of the almost infinite play of the imagination” (ES: 50; 58; translation slightly altered). Sorrowful and murky passions in themselves only evoke pain; but when they are performed on the stage and presented in images, the images of these passions evoke pleasure in the spectator. It is because the spectator reflects these passions and, through them, stretches his or her imaginations. If we expand this idea, it follows that, even when we feel these passions in response not to a drama, but to our own life, their reflection could change their quality. Then life becomes a kind of work of art, elaborated to make the intolerable tolerable, the unlivable livable. Here Hume’s idea not only comes close to Foucault’s, but also provides its explanation. If suicide can bring about pleasure, as Foucault insists, it is because the reflection of the pain caused in killing oneself can transform this pain into pleasure – a development of Hume’s idea. Continuing along the line of his thought, the unknown power of Nature enables us to pass from the impression of sensation to the impression of reflection and thus from pain to pleasure, making us the subject. Correspondingly, if suicide brings with it great pleasure for Foucault, it is insofar as suicide is subjectivation, the act of folding the force of the outside that enables us to engender novel feelings or sensations. In both cases, crucial to the transformation of pain into pleasure is, again, the intervention of the force or power of the outside, parallel to the production of the subject.

Strangely enough, the view of suicide as accompanied by the extreme pleasure, as
Foucault conceives of it, which supposes this intervention, suits Schroeter’s usage of the word “grace” for this pleasure, in agreement with Foucault. The usage of this word with its obvious religious connotations seems unfitted to a conversation in which these two thinkers are not talking about God or religion. However, given that God is one of the images ascribable to the outside, it is no wonder that the pleasure brought about in us by its force is described, in a simile, as the joy given by God. I do not mean that the two thinkers are unexpectedly and yet inevitably talking about God. Since all beliefs are beliefs in the unknown and thus fictitiously created, their differences are matters of degree, including the difference between one image of God and another, or between one such image of God and an image of something else. The outside may be conceived of as God for one person, but not for someone else. A conception of the outside can be religious or secular, but not exclusively either. In fact, while many other modern French philosophers who talk about the outside do not conceive of the outside as God, a few of them do. This fact underscores the essential neutrality of the outside.

The fact that thought tends to move towards the outside is an effect of the force of the outside; incorporating this force, thought approaches the outside more and more. The various images given to the outside are the products of this movement. Of course, we may address the contents of these images. But, what seems more important in our discussion here is to address the relation to the outside and the work of its force expressed in such thoughts and images. Examining thoughts or images of the outside, whether they call it God or not, can lead to examining how they are related to the outside, how its force works in them and how they in turn incorporate it, and, as a result, what kind of new mode of existence they create. Pointing in this direction, Deleuze’s insight into Hume’s philosophy, in its similarities to Foucault’s, suggests a general condition of the thoughts of the outside, including both religious and secular ones.
It is this insight that will orient our discussion from now on. Beginning with the next chapter, in order to cast light on the possible sense of Deleuze’s own suicide, I will search in his thought for images of suicidal deaths which could be works of art in the manner of Foucault’s idea of subjectivation. Given that subjectivation is the operation of folding the force of the outside and God is one of the images given to the outside, the thought of subjectivation might sometimes involve the thought of God. While Deleuze proclaims himself an atheist, he sometimes discusses God when he treats other writers or philosophers who discuss God thematically. We do not have to disregard these treatments of his as meaningless, nor read them as literal treatments of God. Rather, we can read them as treating of our relation to the outside, the work of its force or power upon us, and thence of our mode of existence ensuing from the incorporation of this force or power. This is the direction in which I would like to proceed, for the images of suicidal deaths in the face of the outside which I will find in Deleuze’s writings are closely connected with the images of a certain kind of godhead.

In this chapter, tracing the connections between Foucault and Hume that Deleuze makes, we addressed what this subjectivation is that consists in creating one’s own life in an artistic way, and what is implied by this art. Dealing with this matter showed us the direction to continue in, in order to find in Deleuze the thought of a suicide that can be a mode of artistic subjectivation.

When Foucault and Schroeter consider suicide as an art, what matters for them is another mode of existence enabled by suicide and lived until the end. Suicide is a possible way of creating life otherwise, and to this extent, at least for these two thinkers, suicide brings with it, not necessarily gloomy depression, but even extreme pleasure. Subjectivation is an operation of this creation. It consists in folding the force of the outside into the inside,
and as a result of this internalization, generating a new arrangement and new affects among the forces which constitute the self, so that they together compose another way of being. Consequently, subjectivation is an art of creating the self, just like a work of art which depends on the incorporation of the force of the outside (Section 1).

Similar to the product of Foucault’s subjectivation is the subject in Hume. The subject is the effect of the principles which affect the mind, and therefore, the product of the preceding process. In that the change in quality of the affects in the mind constitutes the subject, the subject is an aesthetic product, a kind of work of art. That this change is occasionally accompanied by the transformation of sad and bleak passions into delightful ones can be an explanation for Foucault’s mysterious position of finding great pleasure in suicide, which is supposed to be full of pain. In Hume, as in Foucault, this change is caused by the intervention of the force of the outside. Hume claims that the production of the subject is one with the belief in the unknown and the invention of some image for it. One such image is God, although this does not have to be the only one. From the overlap between Foucault and Hume in Deleuze’s thought, it follows that we can read in his discussion of a suicidal death in the face of a certain godhead his search for a death that can constitute a mode of artistic subjectivation (Section 2).

3 James W. Bernauer and Michael Mahon call Foucault’s ethics “beyond life and death”. Foucault neither denies life nor affirms death, but calls into question the false alternative between life and death, erroneously posed by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis identifies life with sexuality, and, in regulating the latter through the Oedipus complex, normalizes the former. Hence the alternative between living a life subjugated to social norms, or killing oneself and deviating from them. Resisting this alternative, Foucault seeks an ethics in ways of living or dying otherwise, and thus creating new forms of subjectivity. Therefore his ethics does not exclude suicide, insofar as it enables another mode of existence, undoing the false alternative between life and death. See Bernauer and Mahon, “Michel Foucault’s Ethical Imagination”, *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. Gary Gutting, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 149-164.

5 Ibid., p. 351.


7 Ibid., pp. 78-95. Especially, on the “aesthetics of existence”, see pp. 89-91.

8 I remarked that in Deleuze’s discussion of Fancis Bacon’s painting, which aims at capturing forces that give sensations and yet are outside them, is found the likeness of Foucauldian framework of subjectivation, in my article “The Logic of Sensation and the Subjectivation in Deleuze” in *Nishi-Nihon Tetsugaku Nenpou* (Annual Review of the Philosophical Association of Western Japan) No.6, October, 1998, pp. 64-66. By this remark I meant that a certain kind of art can be the medium for subjectivation, not only can subjectivation be an art, as argued in this chapter so far.

9 Deleuze finds the effect of the force of the outside not only in Foucault’s notion of subjectivation but also in other notions of his, in the styles and the contents of his writings. What disposes Deleuze to do so is Foucault and Blanchot’s complementary essays, in which the former discusses the outside as conceived by the latter, while the latter discusses the former’s life and thought, both essays being intimately related showing their friendship. Michel Foucault, *Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside*; Maurice Blanchot, *Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi, New York: Zone Books, 1990.

10 In fact, the theme of the subject is not so conspicuous in Hume’s philosophy. He himself does not call the epistemologically self-conscious self the subject. Deleuze’s formulation of Hume’s empiricism as tackling the question of the subject is a consequence of his reading Hume within a Kantian terminology and problematic. David Neil, “The Uses of Anachronism: Deleuze’s History of the Subject”, *Philosophy Today*, 1998, 42 (4), pp. 422-423. On the rethinking of Kantian philosophy in Deleuze’s reading of Hume, see also Martin Bell “Transcendental Empiricism? Deleuze’s Reading of Hume”, *Impressions of Hume*, ed. Maria Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 95-106. Peter S. Fosl accuses Deleuze of thus introducing Kantian frameworks into his reading of Hume without any textual evidence, in “Empiricism, Difference and Common Life”, *Man and World*, 1993, 26 (3), pp. 326-328. However, such a reading is justifiable in its own way in light of Deleuze’s view of philosophy. In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, he claims that one philosopher’s critique of another consists in the former’s posing the latter’s problem otherwise and finding a different solution, while drawing a new plan of thought. Hence the idea of the history of philosophy, proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?*, as the coexistence of various planes of immanence. For Deleuze, to philosophize is to repeat the history of philosophy differently, as he writes in *Difference and Repetition*, that is, to delineate these plans and their relations otherwise. With regard to this view of philosophy, Neil evaluates Deleuze’s reading of Hume as discovering in Hume’s empiricism a possible response to Kant’s critique and drawing Hume’s plan of thought in an unusual way in relation to Kant’s. It is in so doing that Deleuze’s way of philosophizing consists. “The Uses of Anachronism”, pp. 422-429.

11 If ideas are associated by the effects of the principles so that the collection of ideas thus becomes their system, the relations that associate them should be external to them as the terms to be associated. For Deleuze, the thesis that relations are external to terms is not only essential to Hume’s empiricism. As he says in his later period, reflecting on his philosophy thus far, “I’ve never renounced a kind of empiricism.” P. 122; 88). This empiricist thesis also inspired Deleuze himself to develop his thought by extending this thesis. On the mapping of this development, see Patric Hayden, “From Relation to Practice in the Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze”, *Man and World* 28(3): 283-302, 1995. Hayden points out that Deleuze reads Foucault in the light of empiricism as the theory and practice of such external relations. Ibid, p. 302, note. On the comparison of Deleuze’s empiricist thesis of the externality of relations
with the thoughts of other philosophers he addresses, and the examination of the subsistence of this thesis in his later thought, see Takashi Shirani, *Deleuze et une philosophie de l'immanence*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006., pp. 27-86. Shirani insists on the importance of this empiricist thesis throughout Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence as a whole.

12 Fosl denounces the insufficiency of this explanation. He claims that Deleuze overlooks the dialectic which defines the Humean subject, the dialectic between the effects of the principles on the one hand, and philosophical thinking and the “common life” shared with others on the other hand. “Empiricism, Difference and Common Life”, pp. 325-6. On the contrary, Bell appreciates the contribution of this explanation of Deleuze’s to the interpretation of Hume. The inconsistency between Books 1 and 2 of Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature* has been pointed out, because of the gap between the absence of the subject in the former and its presence in the latter. In Bell’s eyes, Deleuze’s explanation has the merit of bridging these two aspects consistently, by theorizing the transition from the absence of the subject to its presence. “Transcendental Empiricism? Deleuze’s Reading of Hume”, p. 103.

13 It is well known that Foucault’s archeological methodology is influenced by Nietzsche’s genealogy, which consists of disclosing the genesis of something or the conditions of its possibility. Neil sees in Deleuze’s reading of Hume “a Nietzschean genealogy of the subject” (Neil, “Use of Anachronism”, p. 429) in this sense. With regard to the link between Foucault and Hume on the theme of the subject, the commonality of the genealogical method used for the treatment of this theme in these two thinkers is intriguing. Foucault not only analyzes the Greek practice of subjectivation in a genealogical manner, but also develops a genealogy of the subject throughout his discussions of the history of knowledge parallel to the course of the formation of the modern subject. See Béatrice Han, “The Analytic of Finitude and the History of Subjectivation,” trans. Edward Pile, in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. Gary Gutting, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 176-209.

14 As seen in this citation, two French words, *puissance* and *pouvoir*, are translated by the same English word, *power*. Deleuze tends to use *pouvoir* to designate institutionalized and oppressive power, equivalent to ‘Power’, and *puissance* to designate the power which, outside of such oppressive institutions, activates and enriches each life in different ways. However, these are merely general tendencies, and he sometimes uses these words differently: for example, interchanging the meanings of these words, or taking both as almost the same in either of the two senses.

15 I dealt with Deleuze’s idea of Hume’s notion of the subject as embodying the unknown power outside it, based on the latter’s empiricism as the former understands it, in my article “The death and revival of the subject in Deleuze’s philosophy” (Japanese), in *Tetsugaku* (*The Annual Review of the Philosophical Association of Japan*), vol. 49, 1998, 281-282, and “The Empiricist Conception in Deleuze: Focusing on Empiricism and Subjectivity and Difference and Repetition” (Japanese), in *Revue de Philosophie Française* (Annual of French-Japanese Society of Philosophy), No.3, 1998, pp. 138-141. In these articles I put Hume’s notion of the subject in relation to similar frameworks found in Deleuze’s other works. However I did not underline its similarity to Foucault’s idea of subjectivation or relate it to Hume’s concept of God and Foucault’s concept of the outside, as I did and will do in this thesis. Here I refine and develop what I had discussed before shortly, so that I can relocate it in another context, in connection with the above ideas or concepts.

16 J. C. A. Gaskin examines Hume’s statements on religion scattered throughout all his works, and delineates Hume’s total critique of religious faith from the standpoint of his skepticism and secular morality. “Hume on Religion”, *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 313-344. In view of this critique, Gaskin concludes his article as follows: “It is simply to note the ‘continual miracle’ by which religious faith survives in the secular world against all the intellectual odds” (Ibid:
Deleuze’s statements in “Hume” that I have quoted and explicated so far somehow provide an answer to this question.

17 Neil points in this direction when he refers to Deleuze’s remark of “an intriguing affinity between a Humean conception of fiction and a Nietzschean appreciation of style” (“Use of Anachronism”, p. 429).

18 This view that knowledge is nothing but the system of such beliefs or inventions and, as such, is a work of art, has its echo in Deleuze’s later idea of philosophy. See the following statement in his collaboration with Claire Parnet: “There’s no question of difficulty or understanding: concepts are exactly like sounds, colours or images, they are intensities which suit you or not, which are acceptable or aren’t acceptable. Pop philosophy.” (D; 10; 4)

19 Hume himself would deny this. In Of Tragedy, he claims that the transformation of the sad or painful passions into pleasure occurs only in an encounter with an excellent work of art, not in life. The last sentence of this essay epitomizes this claim:

The uneasy passion being there raised alone, unaccompanied with any spirit, genius, or eloquence, conveys a pure uneasiness, and is attended with nothing that can soften it into pleasure or satisfaction. (Essays, Literary, Moral and Political, London: Ward, Lock, and Tyler, Warwick House, 1875, “Of Tragedy”, p. 133)

In short, for Hume, it is only the works of art elaborated by talented artists with all their artifices that can turn the uneasy passion of spectators into satisfaction. Without that kind of work, this change is impossible; in other words, one cannot by oneself change the quality of the passions felt in one’s own life. However, if Deleuze carries the consequence of Hume’s thought to its extreme and concludes that the self and the world along with God are fictions, it follows that life is after all an invention filled with fictions by each individual. From this standpoint, it is no wonder that this change in quality of the passions occurs not only in a work of art but also in life. This direction of thought is not unjustified in view of the fact that Deleuze understands Hume’s subjectivity and Foucault’s subjectivation in similar frameworks. In fact, the claim that one can do in one’s life something which a work of art can do is quite close to Foucault’s position that not only the creation of objects by experts, but also the creation of a manner of living by each individual - that is, subjectivation - is an art.

20 For example, Levinas is one of the latter people, and Blanchot one of the former.
Chapter 2

Martyrdom as the Accomplishment of Subjectivity: An Image in Leibniz

In the previous chapter, we saw that the possibility of subjectivation as an art for creating life depends on the intervention of the force of the outside. This force enables not only the production of a new mode of existence but also a change in the quality of the affects composing it. Given that God is a representation of the outside, we can translate the thought of God into that of the outside, of our relation to it and of the working of its force on our mode of existence, discerning in the process of this working the equivalent of subjectivation as an art.

We shall examine next how Deleuze had concretely developed the theme of such suicide as artistic subjectivation. When we explore his idea of this subjectivation, we come across his writing on Leibniz’s philosophy. In fact, in discussing Leibniz’s notion of the fold in The Fold: Leibniz and Baroque, Deleuze describes this notion similarly to Foucault’s subjectivation on several points. If we examine these similarities, we will encounter in this discussion a framework in which suicidal death can be a kind of art.

The objective of this Chapter is to read Deleuze’s discussion of Leibniz’s theory of the fold, paying attention to its three similarities to Foucault’s thought of subjectivation. These similarities together will provide a guiding thread to understanding how suicidal death in Leibniz can be subjectivation as an art. The first similarity of the fold to subjectivation concerns the operation of folding the outside into the inside in order to produce the subject (Section 1). The second similarity concerns the incorporation of the power of the outside by the fold (Section 2). The third similarity concerns the comparability of the mode of existence produced by the fold to a musical form. It will be shown that the death of the martyr as Deleuze finds it in Leibniz, the death in which this music is produced in its best form, is an
example of artistic subjectivation which by incorporating the power of the outside creates the mode of existence of the one who dies as a work of art (Section 3).

1. The Fold of the Soul and Mannerism

Let me begin by expounding how Deleuze understands Leibniz’s notion of the fold. Deleuze regards the fold for Leibniz as the principle of composition found in every entity whether organic or inorganic, physical or mental. For example, where an inorganic thing takes some form, this form is determined by the interaction between the elasticity inherent in matter and some external force, as when rock is carved by wind or water. An organic thing which has its characteristic body starts to exist by involving external matter into its inner unity, as a germ absorbs nutrition, transforms itself, and becomes an embryo. Or perception is a sort of fold, insofar as it is the reception of the unknown stimulus and its apprehension as the known, turning the outside of the mind into its inside. If an entity is composed or composes itself, it is by the operation of enveloping into the inside something outside it, delimiting and connecting the inside and the outside by this very operation, whether it is endogenous or exogenous. The fold means this operation, or the form composed by it.

The operation of folding is inseparable from and forms a pair with that of unfolding, not at all opposed to or excluded from it. An inorganic thing is always contiguous with others, as a stone with other stones, with the ground or water. This contiguity tells that the fold of an inorganic thing extends to the folds of others and thus unfolds itself. The germ of an organic thing contains in it the characteristic body which this organism will later acquire. The division of this germ is the operation of folding an external force in the shape of invagination and, at the same time, the operation of unfolding the body folded within the germ. The folding of perceptions also forms a pair with unfolding, since, in order for what is received to
be apprehended as such, the enveloped should be developed. The inseparability of unfolding and enfolding is conspicuous, in the case that small perceptions each of which cannot be specified compose a great perception and becomes specifiable as a whole. When small perceptions compose a great one, the folds of the former are unfolded in order to be enfolded into a greater fold of the latter, and then unfolded again this time in order to be exhibited as specifiable. Folding is at once unfolding, or the former develops into the latter.

The most basic fold underlying the appearance of all that appears, and the most important for the argument of this thesis, is that of the world and the soul. Although the world in itself is independent of all souls, the world for each soul does not exist unless the soul perceives the world. In this sense, the world is included in each soul. Each soul can in turn be such only by including in it the world seen from each unique point of view. The soul begins to exist by folding the world into it. It is this operation that constitutes the fold between the world and the soul.

Closure is the condition of being for the world. The condition of closure holds for the infinite opening of the finite: it “finitely represents infinity.” It gives the world the possibility of beginning over and again in each monad. The world must be placed in the subject in order that the subject can be for the world. This is the torsion that constitutes the fold of the world and of the soul (PLB: 36-37; 26).

In short, first the soul folds the world into it and then, on the basis of this folding, the world exists for the soul. In order to grasp the world, the soul must not only fold the world but also unfold this folded world. In other words, the soul not only perceives, but also specifies what is perceived, so as to get a better picture of it and cognize what it is. “[T]he whole world is only a virtuality that actually [actuellement] exists only in the folds of the soul which expresses it [l’exprime], the soul implementing inner unfolds [déplis] through which it endows itself with a representation of the included [incluse] world” (LB: 32, 23; translation
slightly altered). The soul’s enfolding and unfolding the world in it together constitute an operation of actualizing the virtual. Even if the virtual persists outside the actual, it cannot be understood as existing with some property, unless it is actualized. The soul’s folding the world is at one with the world’s being unfolded by the soul. Being enclosed in the soul thus gives the world the possibility of opening itself beyond this enclosure. The world is enfolded in the soul, and by the unfolding of the folded, the soul grasps the world as existing. This folding and unfolding explains the complicated relationship between the soul and the world, the relationship in which the world for each soul is within it and yet the world itself is outside the soul. To perceive is for the soul to enfold and unfold the world, and as we grow or just live our daily life, our perception changes from moment to moment. This means that the soul ceaselessly repeats its double operation of enfolding and unfolding, and continues to reconstitute both the soul and the world.

This is not simply a matter of mental representation. For, even the soul’s having the body, along with the correlative material parts of the world, is the consequence of this enfolding and unfolding of the soul. The soul only knows the world included in it. It perceives clearly and distinctly merely a part of the world seen from its unique point of view. This is a sign of the finitude of the monad. Because of this limitation, the soul always has another part which it perceives obscurely. The soul grasps this part, being contiguous with what it does not include, as something alien to the soul and resisting to its activity, that is, matter. “[T]he mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body. We can call ‘primary matter’ our passive power or the limitation of our activity: we can say that our primary matter requires extension, but also resistance or antitype, and yet an individuated requirement to possess a body that belongs to us” (PLB: 113; 85). When the soul folds the world in it, thanks to the finitude out of this closure, the soul divides what resists its activity and what does not, the spiritual which the
soul itself is and the material which the body and a corresponding part of the world are. The soul’s folding the world in it is, at the same time as and parallel to this folding, the soul’s composing the body which belongs to the soul and folds the world in its own way. To this extent, the soul’s fold of the world leads to and is doubled by the body’s pleat of the world.

The world is actualized in souls, and is realized in bodies. It is therefore folded over twice, first in the souls that actualize it, and again folded [replié] in the bodies that realize it, and each time according to a regime of laws that correspond to the nature of souls or to the determination of bodies. (PLB: 163; 120).

In this passage, the doubling of the fold of the soul and the pleat of the body is described as the concomitance of actualization in the former and realization in the latter. Actualization is to integrate obscure perceptions into clear ones, in order to explicate the world virtually implicated in the soul into an actual image. Realization is to shape the vibrations of matter stood for by obscure perceptions into bodily organs as perceiving and being perceived clearly, in order to concretize a possible world into material reality. “Replié”, the French word meaning “that which is folded again”, used above for realization, designates that the fold in the body repeats and doubles the fold in the soul. The world is folded twice, in the soul and in the body, and actualization in the former is accompanied by realization in the latter. In that the soul’s having the body derives from the soul’s enclosing itself, the fold of the soul has the priority to the pleat of the body in guiding it. “The folds [plis] in the soul resemble the pleats [replis] of matter, and in that fashion they are directing them” (PLB: 132; 98). If the fold of the soul is not a matter of mere mental representation, it is because the world and the body in it do not preexist in reality so that the soul then represents them as actual. Rather, the actualization by the fold of the soul constitutes the reality of the body and the corresponding material part of the world. This is what the fold of the soul’s directing the pleat of the body means.
This does not mean that the soul subsists all the time while others, including the body and the world, do not. Even the soul itself is the outcome of this operation, since each soul cannot exist as such if it is separated from what it sees from its unique point of view, in other words, separated from what it enfolds in it and unfolds out of it. As such, the enfolding and unfolding in the soul, bringing with it the parallel movement in the body, continues to renew the soul, the body and the world which is enfolded and unfolded in them, traversing both conscious and unconscious levels.

As theorizing this continuous renewal of the soul, the body and the world folded by them, Deleuze detects in Leibniz a kind of mannerism. For Deleuze, the manners at issue in Leibniz are the predicates. When the soul folds the world in and perceives its part clearly and distinctly, the soul knows this part so well as to describe what it is. In this sense, the soul’s operation of folding is also its operation of predicating. The predicate which the soul thus gives to what it folds is the element of Leibniz’s mannerism.

That the predicate is a verb, and that the verb is irreducible to the copula and to the attribute, mark the very base of the Leibnizian conception of the event. In the first place the event was deemed worthy of being raised to the state of a concept: the Stoics accomplished this by making the event neither an attribute nor a quality, but the incorporeal predicate of a subject of the proposition (not “the tree is green”, but “the tree greens…”). They concluded that the proposition stated a “manner of being” of the thing, an “aspect” that exceeded the Aristotelian alternative, essence-accident: for the verb “to be” they substituted “to arise” [s’ensuivre], and they put manner in the place of essence. (PLB: 71-72; 53; translation slightly altered)

Deleuze here states that Leibniz’s conceiving the predicate to be the event, expressed in the form of the verb, led Leibniz to develop his mannerism in contrast to Aristotelian essentialism. Thinking in this way, Deleuze puts Leibniz's idea of predicate in light of the Stoics notion of event. The event for the Stoics is not what happens, as is normally taken to
be, but its sense extracted from it. However not until the sense is extracted from what happens so as to predicate it, does what happens not turn out to happen as such, and to this extent, this sense itself is called the event, which is not confused with what happens and yet gives its sense and thus makes it happen. Equal to this event, the predicate is inseparable from and impossible without the act of its predication. A predicate does not belong to a subject, unless the subject is described by the predicate, strictly speaking, the subject is perceived so clearly and distinctly as to be described by the predicate. That is why Deleuze replaces “the tree is green” by “the tree greens”. Being green does not belong to the tree as its permanent attribute. Rather, the predication of the tree as green gives the tree its nature of being green. The tree becomes green by the predication of greenness. The predicate is the verb, in that it is not what the subject is but what it becomes in movement, concomitantly of the movement of predication.

In this movement, not only does the subject become the predicated state but this subject itself becomes. The tree becomes green while it becomes the tree itself. The thing is not that the predetermined predicate is attributed to the preexisting substance as the subject but that the substance as such itself becomes as it becomes what the predicate describes. On this matter, Deleuze writes: “[S]ubstance is not the subject of an attribute, but the inner unity of an event, the active unity of a change” (PLB: 75; 55). “The subject is defined by its unity, and the predicate as a verb expressing an action or a passion” (PLB: 71; 53). What is meant here is that substance does not precede a change which occurs to it, but, every time such a change occurs, its unity or the coherence of its course gives substance its existence. That is why he claims that the substance as the subject coincides with the unity of the change which occurs to it. However, in order that something turns out to happen, it must be known so that it is predicated and its sense is extracted. What identifies a change to the subject and gives the subject its existence is the predication of this change, while the predicate hits the unity of
this change. Therefore predication makes the subject as such, and in this sense, “the predicate is the ‘execution of travel’, an act, a movement, a change” (PLB: 71; 53), rather than their ex post facto description. When the sense of something happening is extracted as the predicate, this extraction is itself a happening. This predicate illuminates the unity of this change and constitutes the existence of the subject defined by this unity. In other words, the “manner of being”, predicated as how something is, gives the being itself of the predicated thing, described as what it is. This exactly parallels what takes place in the doubling of the actualization of clear perceptions with the realization of corresponding material entities. Hence Deleuze’s discovery of mannerism in Leibniz, as intimately linked with the theory of the fold of the soul.

Deleuze puts Leibniz’s mannerism in stark contrast to Aristotelian essentialism. This essentialism, the evaluation of essence, supposes the distinction between essence and accident, and the superiority of the former to the latter. The predicates that belong to the essence of the subject and those that do not are distinguished. Not only the subject and its predicate but also the relation between the former and the latter is predetermined. The predication of the subject is the constant connection of constant terms described in the form of the substantives by the mediation of the copula. On the contrary, in the Leibnizian predication, neither the subject nor the predicate nor their relation is constant, but the predication of what happens on each occasion makes the subject, the predicate and their relation what they are. This predication, in determining the manner of being of the subject, constitutes its being. As such, this predication is described in the form of the verb expressing the movement of the becoming of the subject. Among the predicates thus given, there is neither a distinction between the essential and the accidental predicates, since all these predicates are, so to speak, at once accidental and essential to the subject. Against essentialism, mannerism replaces essence with manner and objects to the predetermination
of the subject, the predicate and their relation.

Here again, this does not mean to substantialize the soul as the agent of the predication of the manner. Just as the soul is constituted by the operation of folding, this agent is the outcome of predication. Not only is the subject of the proposition de-substantialized but also the subject of the statement of this proposition.

This idea of mannerism illustrates the first similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation. As the commonality of the word ‘fold’ already tells, both these notions refer to the operation of folding the outside into the inside and generating the subject. In both cases, the subject is not an independent and autonomous agent but the product of the preceding process, and this process of production is more important than the product. Hence is the possibility of the incessant reconstitution of the subject.

This first similarity implies another point of convergence, concerning the nature of the operation of folding the outside into the inside, although in fact we have made several passing mentions of this point so far without pursuing it further. An allusion to this point is found in two aspects of mannerism as Deleuze summarizes.

Leibniz is haunted by depth [le fond] of the soul, the dark depth, the “fuscum subnigrum”. Substances or souls “draw everything from their own depths”. That is the second aspect of mannerism [maniérisme], without which the first would remain empty. The first is the spontaneity of manners that is opposed to the essentiality of the attribute. The second is the omnipresence of the dark depths which is opposed to the clarity of form, and without which manners would have no place to surge forth from. The entire formula of the mannerism [maniérisme] of substance is: “All is born to them out of their own depths, through a perfect spontaneity”. (PLB: 76-77; 56-57; translation slightly altered)

Here Deleuze states the inseparability of two aspects in Leibniz’s mannerism. The first aspect, the spontaneity of manners, is, as we have seen, that the manner of being is not
predetermined as the essential attribute of a preexisting subject, but itself arises with its predication. The predication of this manner of being constitutes at once the being of the predicated subject and the being of the soul as the predicating subject. In thus presenting the subject as the product of the preceding process, the first aspect of mannerism strikes the point of the above-mentioned similarity Leibniz’s fold and Foucault’s subjectivation. The second aspect, the omnipresence of the dark depth, is that these manners elucidated by predication emerge from the dark depth of the soul or substance, while the soul or substance draws them out of this depth. What is this dark depth? It is the world which is included in the soul. “[T]he world must be included in every subject as a basis [un fond] from which each one extracts the manners that correspond to its point of view” (PLB: 72; 53; italics in text). The French word for ‘basis’ is ‘fond’, the same word as that which was translated above into ‘depth’ or ‘depths’. The commonality of the word ‘depth(s)’ attests to the equation of the dark depth of the soul and the world included in it. If this depth is dark, it is because it remains obscure in contrast to clear perceptions, in other words, it remains virtual without being actualized. Whereas the first aspect of mannerism describes the soul’s actualization of what it predicates in the form of clear perceptions, the second aspect describes the persistence of the virtual field in the form of obscure perceptions in the soul. The inseparability of these two aspects means that the actualization of clear perceptions in the soul is always haunted by the virtuality of obscure perceptions in the background.

This is not the single statement of this inseparability of these two kinds of regions in the soul or the monad. While Deleuze formulates Leibniz’s idea of predicate in mannerism in The Fold, this formulation finds its base in the former’s rethinking of the latter’s idea in a broader perspective in The Logic of Sense. In this rethinking, Deleuze also suggests the inseparability of these two kinds of regions, associated with the two aspects of mannerism, although his terminology on this matter in The Logic of Sense is not exactly the same as that
in *The Fold*. Considering the predicate, he keeps in mind Leibniz’s thesis that all the predicates of a subject are included in the concept of this subject. But Deleuze does not accept this thesis, as is often the case, to be that all predicates preexist in the subject in order to predestine all that it experiences.

Leibniz holds [soutient] the famous thesis that each individual monad expresses the world. But this thesis is poorly understood as long as we interpret it to mean the inherence of predicates in the expressive monad. It is indeed true that the expressed world does not exist outside of the monad which expresses it, and thus that it does exist within the monads as the series of predicates which inhere in them. It is no less true, however, that God created the world rather than monads, and that what is expressed is not confused with its expression, but rather insists [insiste] and subsists. (LS: 134; 110; translation slightly altered)

To the extent that what is expressed does not exist outside of its expressions, that is, outside of the individuals which express it, the world is really the “appurtenance” of the subject and the event has really become the analytic predicate of a subject. (LS: 135-136; 111-112)

The first passage tells, as the reason why the inherence of all the predicates in the monad is an insufficient understanding of Leibniz’s thesis, that while the world exists only in the monad which expresses, the world nevertheless subsists and insists outside the monad. The second passage tells that the claim of the inherence of all the predicates in the monad is valid, if it is the whole story that the world does not exist outside the monad. Therefore, the point in Deleuze’s rethinking of Leibniz’s thesis is the subsistence or insistence of the world outside the monad. The significance of the first aspect of mannerism resided in showing that the being of the subject of the predicate is not constituted without the soul’s predication of manners of being. That is to say, only when the soul predicates what it experience, this predicate, along with the world as expressed in it, comes to belong to the monad. Certainly this claim can object to the understanding of Leibniz’s thesis as the preexistence of all the
predestined predicates within the monad. But, this claim cannot object to the presupposition of this understanding, the reduction of all the predicates as the belongings of the subject. To this extent, the first aspect of mannerism does not tell us any more than that the predicate and the world expressed by it exist in the monad which predicates. Even if the monad predicates the world as existing outside it, insofar as the monad includes in it what it predicates, both the predicate and the predicated world are in the monad. Note that in the phrase “what is expressed is not confused with its expression, but rather insists and subsists”, “what is expressed” means the world, and “its expression” means the monad. Then this phrase means that, except the predicates belonging to the subject, there should be something which may be predicated and yet has not been. This claim corresponds to the second aspect of mannerism, the omnipresence of the dark depth irreducible to the clear region of the soul elucidated by predication and, as such, objects to the above presupposition. Just as the first aspect of mannerism is empty without the second, the claim of the existence of the world inside the monad cannot save Leibniz’s thesis from determinism without the claim of the subsistence or insistence of the world outside the monad. For only the persistence of what may be predicated and yet has not been, or perhaps never can be, would paradoxically guarantee the possibility of the soul’s next, always another predication freed from predestination. At this point, “these predicates are no longer the analytic predicates of individuals determined within a world which carry out the description of these individuals. On the contrary, they are predicates which define persons synthetically, and open different worlds and individualities to them as so many variables or possibilities” (LS: 139; 115; italics in text).

The relation between the monad which expresses the world and this world as expressed is doubled by the relation between the proposition which expresses the sense and this sense as expressed.
Let us consider the complex status of sense or of that which is expressed. On one hand, it does not exist outside the proposition which expresses it; what is expressed does not exist outside its expression. This is why we cannot say that sense exists, but rather that it insists [insister] or subsists. On the other hand, it does not merge at all with the proposition, for it has an objective which is quite distinct. (LS: 33; 21; translation slightly altered)

Just as the world exists only in the monad and yet subsists or insists outside it, the sense exists only in the proposition which expresses it, and yet subsists or insists outside this proposition. This applies to the monad’s predication of the world. The world which is predicated by the monad and whose being is constituted by this predication exists only in that monad. However, even if the world has not been thus predicated and constituted, it nevertheless subsists or insists outside the monad as the cluster of senses unexpressed in the proposition or of genuine singularities before predication.

Writing that the world exists only inside the monad and yet the world subsists or insists outside the monad, Deleuze does not simply play with words. His usage of different words, ‘exist’ on the one hand and ‘subsist’ and ‘insist’ on the other hand, has its own reason in this thought. For example, on Bergson’s concept of pure past, Deleuze writes:

We cannot say that it was. It no longer exists, it does not exist, but it insists, it is. It insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present [actuel] present. It is the in-itself of time as the final ground of the passage of time (DR: 111; 82; italics in text)

That the past does not have to preserve itself in anything but itself, because it is in itself, survives and preserves itself in itself – such are the famous theses of *Matter and Memory*. This being in itself of the past [être en soi du passé] is what Bergson called the virtual. (PS: 73; 58; translation slightly altered)

Bergson conceived the pure past as the past in itself which can never be present but coexists with all the moments in the past, the present and the future, as the ground of their passage. In
other words, it is the virtual in itself which is never actualized and as such undergirds the actualization of the virtual into the always new. The locution “does not exist but insists” in the first passage is almost the same as that used in the claim that the world or the sense does not exist but rather insists or subsists outside the monad or the proposition. Although the word ‘subsist’ is lacking there, the phrase “survives and preserves itself” in the second passage has an echo of this word and compensates this lack. Hence different words correspond to different levels of being: What exists is what is actualized and therefore actual, and what insists or subsists is the virtual which has not been or can never be actualized. To apply this to the relation between the world and the monad: the world which exists in the monad is that which is actualized and actual, and the world which insists or subsists outside the monad is that which remains virtual. As summarized in The Fold, “[T]he soul is the expression of the world (actuality), but because the world is what the soul expresses (virtuality)” (PL: 37; 26). In other words, the subject is involved with the world which it actualizes in it and at once with the world which remains virtual outside the subject.

This duality in the subject specifies further the first similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation. Actualized clear perceptions and virtual obscure perceptions, the coexistence of these two kinds of regions in the soul designates that the world included in the soul is in contact with such a part that is not internalized in the soul but remains external. If the soul’s “[c]losure is the condition of being for the world” (PLB: 36; 26), indeed the condition of the soul’s openness to the world, it is because the soul knows the world outside it only by folding it into the inside, as mentioned above. However, strictly speaking, this is possible not only by the soul’s cognizing the world folded in it in the form of clear perceptions, but also by the soul’s sensing the persistence of the world outside the folded part, of the much larger unknown region represented by obscure perceptions. The coexistence of the two kinds of regions in the soul tells us that the folding of the world in the soul, of the
outside in the inside, not only makes the unknown known, but also brings the thus known into contact with the still unknown or the never knowable. This is similar to Foucault’s case in which the self folds into the inside not only the outside of this self but also the absolute outside of any forms including the self and the other. In both cases, the folding is not only the assimilation of the outside to the inside but also the introduction of the outside as such into the inside. Thus the first similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation, as the operation of folding the outside into the inside and producing the subject, implies that this operation keeps the folded outside being the other of the inside.

2. The Fold of Power and Morality

On this point of convergence, a dissimilarity between Leibniz and Foucault also appears. In Foucault, the introduction of the outside into the inside was immediately the incorporation of the force of the outside, a force which relates constituent forces and thus enabled one who incorporates this force to create a new mode of existence. But, in Leibniz, it seems that this introduction, designated by the omnipresence of the dark depth in the soul, is not necessarily the incorporation of the force of the outside. For the omnipresence of the dark depth, of the obscure region, is the sign of the limitation inherent in the soul, which has no other way than folding the world into it in order to grasp it, and therefore can only perceive its limited area clearly. However Deleuze’s discussion suggests that Leibniz pursued a way to make the soul go beyond its limit and make its fold the fold of the power of the outside. Leibniz did so in relation to his idea of morality. Hence the morality for him is a matter of the power of the soul.

That the soul needs morality does not mean that the soul lacks power. Before examining Leibniz’s idea of morality as Deleuze understands it, let us see what kind of
power the soul has in itself and why, nevertheless, the soul needs morality. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the activity of the soul consists in enfolding the world into it and then unfolding this enfolded world. In this operation is the soul’s power.

These are phenomena of subjugation, of domination, of appropriation that are filling up the domain of having, and this latter area is always located under a certain power (this being why Nietzsche felt himself so close to Leibniz). To have or to possess is to fold, in other words, to express [exprimer] what one contains ‘in [dans] a certain power’” (PLB: 148; 110; translation slightly altered).

Here is stated that to fold is to have or to possess, and in this sense a power. The phrase “to express what one contains” exactly fits what the soul does, that is, to unfold the world which it enfolds. But why is folding equal to having or possessing, what is the thing to be had or possessed and, in the first place, what does it mean to have or to possess? Deleuze makes an inventory of the possessions of ‘me’ as a monad as follows:

[I]t is first of all the thought of the self, the cogito, but also the fact that I have diverse thoughts, all my changing perceptions, all my predicates included, the entire world as perceived: and yet still, this zone of the world that I express [exprime] clearly, it is my special possession; and then, primary matter is what I own as the requirement of having a body. And finally, the body, a body, is what I own, a body that comes to fill [vient remplir] the requirement, as we have seen just previously: an organic body to which I am immediately ‘present,’ [auquel je suis immédiatement «présent»] that I can use in an immediate fashion and with which I coordinate what is perceived (I perceive with organs, with my hands, with my eyes…). (PLB: 143; 107; translation slightly altered).

In a word, what the soul possesses is all it constitutes by enfolding and unfolding: the consciousness of the self as that which thus enfolds and unfolds various kinds of perceptions generated through this operation, describable with various predicates all together composing the world for the soul. These are what the soul clearly perceives. Since primary matter, that is,
the dark depth, and the body are also listed, what the soul obscurely perceives seems to be the possessions of the monad. But basically, these possessions can be taken as related to clear perceptions as their basis, including those resulting from the integration of obscure perceptions. On the body in Leibniz, Deleuze writes that “the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body” (PLB: 113; 85), on the one hand, and that “we must have a body because our mind possesses a favored – clear and distinct – zone of expression. Now it is the clear zone that is the requirement for having a body” (PLB: 113; 85). These apparent contradictory statements mean that, although the darkness of the depth of the soul requires the body, in order for the body to be constituted to meet this requirement, it should be clearly perceived with its parts and totality shaped.

This is natural, considering that the realization in the body as the concretization of material vibrations into bodily organs is the doubling of the actualization in the soul as the integration of obscure perceptions into clear ones. In fact, it is impossible for the soul to think that it is “immediately present” to the body unless the former clearly perceives the latter as its own.

Besides, Deleuze also writes that “[p]redication was of the domain of having” (PLB: 147; 110). Obscure perceptions cannot be positively predicated with regard to how and what it is. If predication is a matter of possession, what the soul possesses is what it clearly perceives so as to predicate. Hence the zone of the world which the soul clearly expresses, more precisely, it does so without the resistance of primal matter or the mediation of the body, and therefore within itself as the purely spiritual, is called above its “special possession” in the sense that it personifies the essential and primordial character of possession. To possess means to perceive clearly, predicate and, in doing so, constitute the being of the perceived.

This is nothing but the operation of the fold of the soul doubled with the pleat of the body, the actualization in the soul accompanied by realization in the body. To fold is to produce what exists only for that soul and thus belongs to it properly, and, to this extent, it is to
possess including producing what is possessed.

If to fold is a power and the operation of doing so defines the soul, the soul itself is also a power. The souls, that is, “[m]onads of the first species are actions, powers in action, since they are inseparable from an actualization that they are implementing” (PLB: 158; 117; italics in text). Since the soul constitutes its own being by folding, the soul is in itself the exercise of the power of folding, of possession. The power as such is not in potentia, in latency, but in energeia, in action, being exercised and turning potentiality into actuality. As such, this power consists in actualizing the virtual. If it is the soul’s fate to embrace the virtual as the dark depth within, it is also to actualize it and make a clear region from the obscure one.

If the soul’s possession is a matter “of subjugation, of domination, of appropriation”, this is partly due to the fact that the fold of the soul constitutes all that exists for that soul. But, obviously, this is not the single and most important aspect of this matter since the words subjugation, domination and appropriation imply direct command over the subjugated, the dominated or the appropriated.

Appurtenance and possession hark back to domination. A specific body belongs to my monad, but as long as my monad dominates the monads that belong to the parts of my body. (PLB: 148; 110; italics in text).

Interpreted, if a body belongs to a soul, it is insofar as the soul as the monad of the first species dominates other monads before being the soul, that is, those which belong to the parts of the body. In short, the body’s belonging to the soul or the latter’s possession of the former resides in its domination over its parts.

Composed of material parts, the organic body is precisely that which the dominant possesses [celui que possède la dominante], a body that here finds the
That is to say, in being dominated by the soul and composed of material parts, the body obtains its specific unity. Taking into account the claims of the above two passages, the soul’s power of possession of the body, as that of the former’s domination over the later, consists in the soul’s giving the body its own unity only by virtue of which it can organize its material parts into the shape of a body.

What makes the organic body what it is is its proper unity throughout any change. Microscopically, the body of a living creature exchanges its material elements with those of the environment all the time, by breathing, drinking, an intake of nourishment, or a discharge of bodily waste, etc. Macroscopically, the organic body changes its shape through its growth or decline. In spite of all these changes, it continues to keep its identity as a particular living creature or individual. This is in stark contrast to the case of an inanimate and a genuinely material thing like a rock, which is, as a mere aggregate of smaller units, easily decomposed into them and loses its identity. What guarantees the continuity of the identity of the organic body is its specific unity which persists through all its changes. This unity should not come from the material from which the body is made but from something other than itself, that is, the soul. It is the soul of a living creature that gives its organic body its proper unity.

By giving this unity, the soul exercises its power of possession upon the body. Naturally enough, the exercise of this power involves that of a force which goes beyond mere actualization within the soul.

The soul is the principle of life through its presence and not through its action. Force is presence and not action. Each soul is inseparable from a body that belongs to it, and is present to it through projection. Every body is inseparable from the souls that belong to it, and that are present to it by requisition. These
appurtenances do not constitute an action, and even the souls of the body do not act upon the body to which they belong. (PLB: 162; 119; italics in text).

What is meant here is that the force through which the soul has effect on the body does not consist in action but in presence. This does not contradict the discussion so far that the power of the soul is in action, since, first, at issue there was power, and yet here it is force, and secondly, the word ‘action’ basically refers to different matters here and there. Power in action as discussed above concerned the actualization in the soul, also actualized itself, and as such, was in action. In contrast, in the above passage, action indicates the soul’s acting upon the body or the body’s acting upon the soul. “Force is not action” means that there is no such acting upon each other between the soul and body, even though there surely is some correspondence between them. Rather, this correspondence means the presence of the possessing to the possessed. The body belongs to the soul, or the soul belongs to the body, in both cases, by the latter’s being present to the former. Especially, what is invoked here to explain the body’s belonging to the soul is projection. It is because the soul projects itself on the body that the former is present to the latter so that there is correspondence between both. Strictly speaking, what is projected is not the soul itself. If the soul’s possession of and domination over the body consists in giving it its proper unity and doing so is equal to projection, then what the soul projects onto the body is the soul’s own unity, which is given to the body as its proper unity. To project one’s unity onto the other, this is the most important element of possession as domination. Thanks to this projection of unity, the soul feels itself being immediately present to the body and takes it as its belonging, as if the unity thus projected were the sign inscribed on its possessions.

Although at issue in the above passage is not the power in action, nevertheless, as the power of possession, it overlaps with the force of presence. The power in action in its proper sense is the soul’s power of actualization. As this actualization entails the realization in the
body, its work is not confined within the soul but extends to the body and corresponding material parts in the world, so as to constitute them while perceiving them. The force of presence works between actualization and realization, so that the former is doubled by the latter. If, parallel to the soul’s actualization, the body and correlative things are realized in concrete shapes with their own unities, it is because of this force through which the soul projects its unity onto them. In this sense, the force of presence is a part of the power of possession, its ineluctable extension going from the soul to the body. Indeed, the unity projected by this force has been provided by this power, in the soul’s perceiving something so clearly as to predicate it. For it was this predicate that gave at once the unity of what is perceived and predicated and the unity of the soul as the perceiving and predicating subject. Since the soul’s possession ranges over everything it perceives and constitutes as existing for it, its power of possession is accomplished only when it develops into the force of presence. This development is also the development of the unity of the soul from itself to others.

While the power of the soul resides in possession, its weakness also does there. “In fact, this new domain of having does not put us into an element of calm, which would be a relation of the proprietor and property that could be easily established once and for all. What rules in the domain of having are moving and perpetually reshuffled relations among the monads” (PLB: 147-148; 110). If possession is determined by the soul’s clear perception and its predication on each occasion, what is possessed continuously changes as this perception and predication change. Not only is what is possessed changeable. When the soul gives its unity to the body, based on the commonality of this unity, the body becomes present to the soul while the soul is present to the body. As mentioned above, “[e]ach soul is inseparable from a body that belongs to it, and is present to it through projection, also it is that “[e]very body is inseparable from the souls that belong to it, and that are present to it by requisition” (PLB: 162; 119). Once this mutual presence is established between the soul and the body, it
allows for the exchange of their characters. “[E]very body acquires individuality of a possessive insofar as it belongs to a private soul, and souls accede to a public status; that is, they are taken in a crowd or in a heap, inasmuch as they belong to a collective body” (PLB: 162; 119). The inner unity of the soul transfers to the body as an aggregate of *partes extra partes*, and the collectivity and fragility of this aggregate transfers to the soul. When the body takes over the unity of the soul as the sign of its priority in possession, a reversal of the relation of possession occurs in which what once possessed comes to be possessed by what was once possessed. The soul loses its power of possession and the body takes it over.

“While in truth the monad draws from itself all the perceived [tout le perçu], I act as if the bodies that are acting upon its body were acting upon the monad [les corps qui agissent sur le sien [le corps de la monad] agissaient sur elle [la monad]] and were causing its perceptions” (PLB: 132; 99; translation slightly altered). It is no longer that from the perceptions of the soul emerge the organs of the body and the correlative parts of the world. Now the soul perceives as if these parts acted upon these bodily organs so as to bring about the perceptions in the soul. Hence a misery of the soul, which believes that all comes from outside of itself and there is no way to do with this but reluctantly acquiescing in it.

Aiming at saving the soul from this misery, Leibniz’s morality approaches the task of reminding the soul of its power of possession, of constituting the body, the world and everything in it by virtue of the fold. If the soul finds what apparently comes from outwith to indeed come from within, the soul would recognize itself as the cause of all that happens to it and affirm them all as what it did by itself. Given that the soul’s loss of power comes from the oblivion of its own unity, the means of carrying out this task should consist in reminding the soul of its unity within itself.

Deleuze delineates how this is possible in discussing Leibniz’s way of finding an unexpected and involuntary incident to be voluntary and spontaneous.
Can we say that a pain is spontaneous in the soul of a dog that is flogged while it drinks its soup [mange sa soupe], or in that of Caesar the baby stung by a wasp while sucking at his mother’s breast? But the soul is not flogged or stung. Instead of sticking to abstractions, we have to restore the series. The movement of the rod does not begin with the blow: carrying the stick, a man has tiptoed up to the dog from behind, then he has raised the instrument in order then to strike it upon the dog’s body. This complex movement has an inner unity, just as, in the soul of the dog, the complex change has an active unity [Ce movement complexe a une unité intérieure, tout comme dans l’âme du chien le changement complexe a une unite active]: pain has not abruptly followed pleasure, but has been prepared by a thousand minute perceptions—the pitter-patter of feet, the hostile man’s odor, the impression of the stick being raised up, in short, an entire insensible “anxiety” from which pain will issue “sua sponte”, as if through a natural force integrating the preceding modifications. … The soul assigns itself a pain that delivers to its consciousness a series of minute perceptions that it had almost failed to remark because they were first buried in its depth. (PLB: 76; 56; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

Here it is claimed that even an involuntary painful incident can be called spontaneous, if the one who suffers it can grasp the unity of the change in one’s soul, in correspondence with the unity of the movement which one’s body encounters. Something happens, or turns out to happen, when the virtual, minute and obscure perceptions buried in the depth of the soul are actualized into clear ones and, parallel to this, the body and surrounding material things are realized in their concrete shapes and configuration. Given that from the fold of the soul derives the pleat of the body, the movement in which material things encounter the body derives from the change of perception in the soul, and not the opposite. Then the inclination along which the change of perception occurs to the soul should be the model of the inclination along which the movement of things occurs to the body. In other words, the inner unity of this movement corresponds to the unity of the change of perception, for the reason that the latter directs the former. When one finds in one’s soul the unity of the change of
perception corresponding to the unity of the movement, one locates the cause of this movement in one’s soul. The unity of the change of perception in the soul, insofar as it has prepared the unity of the movement in the body, constitutes a kind of motive in the soul, as the reason for this movement and the will to make it happen. To this extent, this unity in the soul is always active in principle. “[T]he event is voluntary when a motive can be assigned as a reason of the change of perception [comme raison du changement de perception]” (PLB: 94; 69; translation slightly altered). What one does actively and what one suffers passively do not make difference, since both prove to be born from within the soul because of its hidden motive.

In thus assigning to the soul the motive of an incident and turning the involuntary into voluntary is the discovery of the soul’s power and force. To find the unity of the change of perception and identify this unity with the reason for the unity of physical movement is to grasp the soul in its unity clearly and detect the projection of this unity in the body. This is to detect in both the soul and the body the exercise of the power of possession and the force of presence working from the soul to the body through the unity of the former.

Freedom for Leibniz is possible in thus recognizing what happens as the outcome of what one’s soul does, remembering its own power and force. For in doing so, the soul can confirm its autonomy in the sense that everything for it derives from it.

The act is free because it expresses the soul as a whole [l’âme tout entière] in the present (PLB: 96; 71; translation slightly altered).

*The perfect, completed act is that which receives from the soul that includes it the unity proper to a movement that is being made* (PLB: 96; 70; italics in text).

Although these two passages seemingly refer to different matters, one to the free act and the other to the perfect and completed act, in effect the two acts are not separate. The second
passage tells us that the perfect, completed act receives the unity proper to its movement from the soul. That is to say, the unity of the movement is given by the soul as the projection of its unity, as it occurs in turning an involuntary incident into a voluntary one. In light of this projection, the free act’s expression of the soul as a whole in the first passage is more understandable. For, if the act expresses the soul as a whole in the present, it is because the soul gives its unity to the act at the time of its being done. This finds its parallel formulation in the perfect, completed act in which the soul gives the movement that is being made its proper unity. Freedom results from the recognition that what happens to oneself comes from one’s soul as its voluntary outcome. Thus recognized, what happens is perfect and completed, as the spontaneous deed. Here is no distinction between the act and the event, since all that happens to oneself is, after all, the act of one’s soul.

Morality for Leibniz, as the discovery of the soul’s power and force, amounts to the recognition of what happens as the free and complete act ensuing from the soul’s autonomy, and in this sense to the production of this act. As such, Leibniz’s morality entails, according to the acquisition of this recognition, the expansion of a certain kind of region in the soul.

The amplitude of a reasonable soul is the region that it clearly expresses, that is, its living present. This amplitude is rather statistical, and subject to broad variation: the same soul does not have the same amplitude as a child, an adult, or an aging being, in good or bad health, and so on. Amplitude even has variable limits at any given moment. Morality consists in this for each individual: to attempt each time to extend its region of clear expression, to try to augment its amplitude, so as to produce a free act that expresses the most possible in one given condition or another. That is what progress is called, and all Leibniz’s morality is a morality of progress (PLB: 99; 73).

Deleuze here equates the production of free acts, in which Leibniz’s morality consists, with the augmentation of the amplitude of the soul as its clear region in the present. The idea
of amplitude has its reason in the course of the choice of a certain act. When someone hesitates over what to do, one’s mind wavers between alternatives from one side to another like a pendulum, and finally swings to one or other side of the pendulum when one decides what to do. Whether in just imagining or effectively choosing either of these alternatives, the pendulum of the mind moves. This motion in the mind opens up an area in which various perceptions which one would experience in each act are concentrated and connected from one to another. The amplitude is this region which the soul perceives clearly with its moving like a pendulum. For instance, as Deleuze depicts, suppose that I hesitate whether I should go to a nightclub or work at home. The act of going to a nightclub gathers not only the perceptions of drinking, tasting alcohol and being intoxicated, but also the perceptions of going to and staying in the bar, walking in coldness, seeing the light, hearing the noise, being warmed up by the hot air and excitement. The act of working at home gathers the perceptions of reading and writing, the sight of letters and words in a book or on a screen, the touch and the sound of turning over pages and typing on a word processor, in contrast to the silence of the surrounding. When I imagine or choose one of these acts, my soul clearly expresses all these perceptions constituent of the experience of that act, and these perceptions altogether compose the amplitude of my soul at that time.

As such, the amplitude itself is a kind of the fold of the soul.

The action is voluntary when the soul – instead of undergoing the total effect into which these little appeals enter – gives itself a certain amplitude, such that it folds [plier] entirely in one direction or toward one side. (PLB: 94-95; 69-70; translation slightly altered)

If all minute perceptions are “the smallest inclinations that fold [qui plient] our soul in every direction, in the flash of an instant, under the stress of a thousand ‘little springs’” (PLB: 94; 69; translation slightly altered), the amplitude which encompasses these perceptions, turning
them in a certain direction in the choice of a certain act, is also a fold, a larger one integrating others. When a free, that is, completely voluntary act expresses the soul as a whole, receiving its unity from the soul, the amplitude of this act going through all the perceptions contained in it reveals not only the unity of the act but also the unity of the entire soul. In this sense, the amplitude of the free act is the fold of the entire soul, unfolding various perceptions included in this fold.

Underlying the equation of the augmentation of the amplitude with the production of the free act is again the correspondence of the unity of the soul to the unity of the movement of the body and surrounding material things. If miscellaneous perceptions involved in a certain act constitute a clear region in the soul, it is because the soul grasps this act in its coherence which connects all these perceptions. Without this coherence, these perceptions would be scattered and buried among many other obscure perceptions irrelevant to that act. Becoming aware of this coherence makes the soul recognize its unity, disclosed by its clear region thus illuminated. This is in exactly the same way as the discovery of the unity of the movement of material things to the body led to the discovery of the unity of the change of perception in the soul, so that an involuntary incident turns into voluntary. Hence the acquisition of the clear region in the soul agrees with the production of the free act by the soul.

Although the amplitude is the soul’s clear region at the time of the choice of an act, it does not mean that it only contains the perceptions in the present in a strict sense of the word. As already illustrated in the above examples of the alternative acts, even the perceptions in the present in which the act is being made are multiple and succeed in a certain length of time. Given that the choice of an act in the present may be affected by what happened before the act and may affect what follows, the amplitude can contain much more, past and future perceptions experienced or supposed to be experienced in the course of the matter. In other
words, the motive of an act, as the unity of the soul which chooses it, is not necessarily found merely in the present state of the soul but can extend to the past and future states relevant to the present act. “The motive is not even an internal determination, but an inclination. It is not the effect of the past, but the expression of the present. It must be observed to what degree Leibniz’s inclusion is always coded in the present: I write, I travel… If inclusion is extended to infinity in the past and the future, it is because it concerns first of all the living present that in each instance presides over their distribution [distribution]. Because it includes what I am doing right now – what I am in the act of doing – my individual notion also includes everything that has driven me to do what I am doing, and everything that will result from it, all the way to infinity” (PLB: 95; 70; translation slightly altered). Just as a moment in the present includes the preceding one and the succeeding one, the present of the act includes the past that drove one to choose it and the future that will result from this choice. “I travel” in the present may be preceded by “I lose my job” in the past and succeeded by “I find a new place to stay” in the future, and the latter two terms would have their respective preceding and succeeding terms. Encompassing the past and the future contiguous to the present of the act, and then the past of this past and the future of this future, the amplitude can expand in infinity. The greater consistence in the broader range of time the soul gives to its act, the larger amplitude the soul gains. The amplitude of the act of going to a night club gets larger if I have been writing a novel in which a protagonist goes to a night club and I needed its vivid depiction in order to make my novel better. The amplitude of the act of working at home gets larger, if I have been an alcoholic and took seriously the advice of a doctor not to drink, so that I will not be sent back to the hospital again. The larger the amplitude with the more perceptions the act produces, the freer the soul becomes, since the greater clear region the soul has, the greater unity it finds in itself, while confirming its greater power and force. Therefore the augmentation of the amplitude is the increase of the freedom of the soul in its
act, and in this sense, is called progress. We do not have to limit the discussion of the amplitude to the choice of an act in a literal sense. For, based on the position that all that happens is the act of the soul, the amplitude also applies to all the external movements paired with the corresponding changes of perception in the soul.

As a morality of progress, Leibniz’s morality leads the soul to augment its amplitude and increase the freedom of its act, in order to deliver it from its misery and bring it beyond its limit. In doing so, the soul imitates God as if God passed into it.

Extending its [a soul’s] clear region, prolonging God’s passage into the maximum, actualizing all the singularities that one concentrates, and even gaining new singularities [et meme gagner de nouvelles singularités] would amount to a soul’s progress. In this way, we might say that it imitates God. (PLB: 100; 73; translation slightly altered).

At the beginning of this passage, the extension of the clear region, that is, the augmentation of the amplitude, on the one hand, and the prolongation of God’s passage into the soul into the maximum, on the other hand, are juxtaposed, telling us that both are equivalent in being the soul’s progress. The following part specifies what this prolongation means. Singularities are virtual elements before actualization. That the soul not only actualizes all the singularities concentrated in it but also gains new singularities means that the soul not only makes clear the obscure perceptions that have been included in its dark depth, but also encounters a new obscure region beyond this extent as something which may subsequently become clear. Thus the soul’s gaining new singularities eventually contributes to the greater augmentation of its clear region. Given that the dark depth is the sign of the soul’s finitude, it is impossible for the soul to completely make it clear and escape from its presence. However, at least, the soul can augment its clear region as much as possible, turning the presence of this dark domain into a condition of this augmentation. In doing so, the soul, while being finite, goes beyond
something that the finite can do, as if the finite approximated to the infinite and the infinite was embodied in the finite. In this sense, it is said that the soul imitates God and God passes into the soul, when the soul extends its clear region to the utmost.

What kind of God does Leibniz have in mind here? It is, Deleuze answers, “God the reader, for Leibniz, who reads in everyone ‘what is done everywhere and even what has been done or will be’, who reads the future in the past because he can ‘unfold all the pleats that are only sensorially developed over time’” (PLB: 98; 72). God conceived of here is a reader, as a connotation of the notion of the omniscient. As the finite, the soul actualizes the virtual or unfolds the enfolded only in the course of time, along with the realization of the possible. The soul perceives only what it experiences in each present by the medium of what happens to its body. This is not the case with God. For Him to read is to unfold the folded, not gradually in succession but immediately and simultaneously, to actualize without realizing, and therefore to intuit in all that has happened in the past all that will happen in the future.

One might wonder how the soul as the finite can do so, just by extending its clear region, and, what it means that God passes into the soul and the soul imitates God, if God is such a reader. Strictly speaking, these questions concern what reading is or what is read.

Reading does not consist in concluding from the idea of a preceding condition the idea of the following condition, but in grasping the effort or tendency by which the following condition itself ensues from the preceding ‘by means of a natural force’. (PLB: 99; 72)

Even if God, as the result of His reading, perfectly knows what will come in the future, this is not what he reads. Rather, it is “the effort or tendency” which directs the move from what has come to what will come. To read this effort or tendency is not to know the conclusion of transition but to grasp its necessity. Reading, thus conceived, explains why not only God but also the soul can read, even though it cannot unfold all the pleats at once as God does. What
both God and the soul can read is the inclination of the movement of this unfolding. In fact, when the soul detects in itself the motive of what happens to its body, the soul exactly reads this inclination. This motive agrees with the soul’s own unity correlative with the unity of the external movement, and the discovery of this unity enables the soul to extend its clear region. So, when the soul extends its clear region, it has been reading the effort or tendency which carries this movement from its past condition to the future one. Thus reading is doing a part of what God can do perfectly and the soul would not be able to do this unless it extends its clear region. That is why the soul’s extension of its clear region, God’s passage into the soul and the soul’s imitation of God can be juxtaposed as equivalent.

Just after this juxtaposition, Deleuze writes:

Of course it is not only a conquest in [en] extension that matters, but an amplification, an intensification or an elevation of power, a growth in dimensions, and a gain in distinction. (PLB: 100; 73; translation slightly altered)

In short, the soul’s extension of its clear region, God’s passage into the soul and the soul’s imitation of God entail the intensification of the soul’s power. That the soul reads similarly to God means that the soul exercises a similar power to that of God, while the soul participates in His power. The sharing of reading involves the sharing of power. Since the soul’s power and force work through the development of the soul’s unity, the soul retrieves its power of possession by finding this unity, and increasing its power by enlarging this unity. It is as if the soul approached God and approximated its unity to that of God. Extending its power of possession to the force of presence, the soul inscribes its unity onto the body and the world that exist for it in the same way as God gives the unity to the world He creates. God passes into the soul and the soul imitates God, also in terms of the unity as the element of power.4

The discovery of the unity of the soul within itself is the rediscovery of what has been
there. This rediscovery enables the soul not only to increase its power but also realize that it, in itself, has been a power before this increase.

Divine reading is God’s veritable [véritable] passage into the monad (somewhat in the way Whitehead speaks of a “passage of Nature” into a place). Further, each monad is none other than a passage of God: each monad has a point of view, but this point of view is the “result” of God’s reading or viewing, which passes through [passe par] the monad and coincides with it. The monad is free because its action is the result of what passes through [passe par] it and is happening [se passe] within it (PLB: 99; 72-73; translation slightly altered).

God has passed into the monad even before it reads as God does, and to this extent, the monad is a passage of God. If this is the case, it is because each monad has its unique point of view to see its world. To have this point of view is to have a unique tendency or inclination by which the world enfolded in each monad is unfolded. Thanks to this tendency or inclination, the world for each monad unfurls with its own coherence and therefore uniqueness. This point of view embodies what God’s reading reveals, that is, the unity running through all that happens, and in this sense, the result of this reading. The monad, defined by seeing the world from its unique viewpoint, is this reading itself. The soul, even before it reads and increases its power, has been itself God’s reading and the exercise of His power. However, the soul realizes this only after it has read and increased its power so that its reading and power assimilates to God’s.

Here appears the second similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation. Both of these notions imply not only the fold of the outside but also the fold of the power or the force of the outside. Leibniz’s soul, folding the world in it, always includes as its dark depth the virtual which cannot be completely actualized and, to this extent, is the fold of the unknown outside as such. However, in fact, this fold is at once the fold of the power of the outside, that is, the incorporation of the power of God who created the virtual and can thus
actualize it all, the power beyond that of the soul and the power of the absolute other of the soul. In order to find itself to be the fold of this power, the soul should not be satisfied with being the mere fold of the outside, but produce a new fold which enables the soul to maximize its clear, actualized region and increase its power, re-folding the power of God. Leibniz’s morality shows the soul a way to do so. The second similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation applies to the soul insofar as it has (re)discovered itself as the fold of God’s power by practicing this morality.

3. The Martyr and the Damned

Leibniz’s morality as discussed above is inextricably linked with some musical forms. For the states of the soul and the body enabled by this morality are likened to accord and melody. In this respect, similarly to Foucault’s subjectivation, Leibniz’s fold suggests a possibility that a mode of existence as its product can be a work of art. Again as in Foucault, the power of the outside, incorporated into the soul by the help of this morality, contributes to the creation of this work.

We shall start with accord in Leibniz which Deleuze explains as follows:

In its own portion of the world or in its clear zone, each monad thus presents accords, inasmuch as an “accord” can be called the relation of a state with its differentials, that is, with the differential relations among infinitely small units that are integrated into this state. (PLB: 178; 130; italics in text)

Expressing [exprimant] the entire world, all monads include it in the form of an infinity of tiny perceptions, little solicitations, little springs or bursts of force: the presence of the world within me, my being-for the world, is an “anxiousness” (being on the lookout). I produce an accord each time I can establish in a sum of infinitely tiny things differential relations that will make possible an integration of
the sum - in other words, a clear and distinguished perception. It is a filter, a selection. (PLB: 178; 130-131; italics in text; translation slightly altered).

When tiny, that is, obscure perceptions are integrated into a clear one, the relation which the latter perception has with the relations among the former perceptions is called an accord. Since the establishment of these relations promotes the integration of obscure perceptions into a clear one, the relation of this perception with these relations tells the way how this integration works. Leibniz conceives of this relation, worthy of the name of accord, as harmonious at bottom, however little it is. For, if it were not so, tiny perceptions would not be coordinated with each other so as to form a single region with clarity. If it is said that the soul produces accords, it is because, when it has a clear perception, the soul has established the relations among obscure perceptions so that these relations are consonant with a clear perceptions made from obscure ones. Minute perceptions before integration are vague in themselves. They appear as genuine differences from each other. However their being as such leads them to turn into a clear perception. Just as a mixture of blue and yellow small points compounds a green area, obscure perceptions related in their being can constitute a clear perception. The relations established among these perceptions are comparable to differentials, since the proportion between $dx$ and $dy$, the change of $x$ and that of $y$, stands for the relation between one difference and another. Just as the solution of this calculation at every point, that is, the ensemble of the tangents decides the shape of a curve, the sum of such relations of differences composes an identifiable perception. In this sense, these relations are like differentials which as a whole can constitute an integral.\(^5\)

Given that the soul produces an accord anytime the soul integrates obscure perceptions into a clear one, this production itself is not exclusively a matter of morality. Nevertheless it can be so par excellence. For the largeness of the amplitude of the soul, at issue in Leibniz’s morality, is in tandem with the kind of the accord which the soul produces. The larger a clear
region in the soul is, the greater the amount of obscure perceptions successfully integrated into it is. The accord, that is, the relation of this region with the relations among these perceptions is more and more harmonious. Conversely, the smaller the clear region is, the smaller the amount of obscure perceptions integrated into it is, making this integration unsuccessful. Then the accord is more and more unharmonious. Insofar as the morality enables the soul to enlarge its amplitude and extend its clear region, it also enables the soul to produce harmonious accords.

The kind of the accord is correlative not only with the kind of perception but also with the kind of feeling predominant in the soul at each moment. The feeling that the soul has immediately when it includes the world in it without unfolding the enfolded is anxiety, since the world appears to the soul as an infinity of minute obscure perceptions on which the soul does not know. These perceptions are randomly mingled without being coordinated. The soul scarcely has a clear region and merely establishes an unharmonious relation between this region and the relations of its constituent perceptions. The accord which the soul produces is discordant. When these perceptions are well integrated into a clear perception, the soul enlarges its clear region and establishes a harmonious relation between this region and the relations of the perceptions integrated into it. The soul produces a harmonious accord. Pleasure replaces anxiety. So, the soul feels anxiety when it produces a discordant accord and feels pleasure when it produces a harmonious accord, just as we are usually supposed to feel when we hear these two types of accord in music proper. But here, rather than hearing the accords others play, the soul creates the accords it listens to, as if it were at once a musician and a listener.

The two kinds of feeling accompanying the two types of accord concern the states of the soul’s possession. As we have seen, the soul constitutes from what it clearly perceives what exists for it, and thus constituted are the soul’s possessions. With the least clear region,
the soul finds itself facing a lot of things that do not belong to it: this makes the soul anxious. Anxiety is the feeling of being alienated from the things in front of oneself. With its clear region enlarged, the soul finds itself facing many things belonging to it, which relieves or relaxes the soul. This relief or relaxation is the feeling of being familiar to the things in being oneself present to them. The anxiety for the discordant accord is the anxiety for the absence of the soul’s possession, and the pleasure of the harmonious accord is the pleasure of presence of this possession.

Just as the soul’s clear region and possession depend on the soul’s unity along with its power and force exercised through this unity, so do the soul’s accord and feeling. The largeness of this clear region is in proportion to the greatness of the soul’s unity, and it is this very unity that undergirds the successful integration of minute obscure perceptions into a clear and great one. For without any unity, disparate elements would never agree with each other so as to form a harmonious accord together. If the feeling involved with this accord is the feeling of possession, it is because this feeling, as the result of this integration, ensues from the inscription of the soul’s unity in what it constitutes by clearly perceiving. The harmonious accord and its pleasure attest to the soul’s greater unity, its greater power and force endorsed with this unity, while the discordant accord and its anxiety attests to the soul’s smaller unity, its smaller power and force endorsed with this unity.

To illustrate the contrast of accords and discords, of positive and negative feelings involved with it, Deleuze picks up the Leibniz’s parables of the martyr and the damned.

At its highest degree, a monad produces major and perfect accords: these occur where the small solicitations of anxiety, far from disappearing, are integrated in a pleasure that can be continued, prolonged, renewed, multiplied; that can proliferate, be reflexive and attractive for other accords, so that these solicitations give us [nous donnent; the subject in this sentence should be plural] the force to go further and further. This pleasure is a “felicity” specific to the soul; it is harmonic
par excellence, and can even be felt in the midst of the worst sufferings, such as in the joy of martyrs. In this sense the perfect accords are not pauses, but, on the contrary, dynamisms, which can pass into other accords, which can attract them, which can reappear, and which can be infinitely combined. (PLB: 179; 131; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

On the one hand, the epitome of the one who plays tremendously harmonious accords is the martyr. A major accord is a relation of a feeling of pleasure and small solicitations of anxiety when the latter are integrated and dissolved into the former. As such, this accord itself stands for a joyful pleasure which conquers negative emotions. If this accord is enhanced, it can defeat even severe suffering. The extreme of this accord is the joy of the martyrs in their agony of martyrdom. Led to death for the reason of their faith, the martyrs feel joy of dying for their faith in the midst of this worst suffering. If the martyrs can do so, it is because they connect this pain to the joy of the observance of their faith, create the perfect accord between beatitude and suffering, and dissolve the latter into the former. “The resolution of dissonance is tantamount to displacing pain, to searching for the major accord with which it is consonant, just as the martyr knows how to do it at the highest point and, in that way, not suppress pain itself, but suppress resonance or resentment, by avoiding passivity, by pursuing the effort to suppress causes” (PLB: 179-180: 131). Martyrdom is, in a sense, a trial of creating the most joyful accord from the cruelest suffering. With this accord, the martyrs can grasps all painful perceptions integrated into joy in the perfect harmony, taking even their own death and all that brought it to be blessed, as forming a kind of felicity. In surmounting the agony of their death, the martyrs also surmount the oppressive forces which caused this death, the ignorance, intolerance or violence of persecutors. Turning every painful perception into a source of new joy, the soul of the martyrs, without lingering with just one accord, continuously creates new major accords, multiplying and combining them differently, until their last moment.
On the other hand, the epitome of the one who plays harshly dissonant accords is the damned. In contrast to the martyrs who love God so much as to sacrifice themselves for this love, the damned, as conceived of by Leibniz, hate God and because of this hatred alienate themselves from possible joy.

A counterexample would be furnished by the damned, whose soul produces [dont l’âme produit] a dissonance on a unique note, a spirit [esprit] of vengeance or resentment, a hatred of God that goes to infinity; but it is still a form of music, a chord—thought diabolic—since the damned draw pleasure from their very pain…(PLB: 180; 131-132; translation slightly altered)

Although totally opposite to that of the martyr, the soul of the damned also plays an accord, insofar as it still feels pleasure into which it somehow integrates small perceptions of anxiety. This pleasure is the pleasure of hating God, in other words, hating the cause of everything and denying all anxious perceptions along with all that evokes them. Since it is impossible to harmoniously integrate these perceptions into this pleasure, the relation of this pleasure with the relations among these perceptions is unharmonious. Therefore the soul of the damned plays only a discordant accord, with a minor tone of a negative emotion. In doing so, this soul draws pleasure from pain itself, enjoying the unpleasantness of disharmony.

When the soul thus plays only a minor discordant accord, it has the minimum clear region, the minimum amplitude.

Even in this case the damned, Judas or Beelzebub, does not pay retribution for a past action, but for the hate of God that constitutes the present amplitude of his soul and fills it in the present. He is not damned for a past action but by a present action that he renews at every moment. This hate of God in which he finds a horrible pleasure is rebegun endlessly so that “crime will pile upon crime”. Judas is not damned because he betrayed God, but because, having betrayed God, he hates God all the more, and he dies of that hate. For a soul that is the absolute minimum of amplitude: to include in its clear region only a single predicate, that
of “hating God”. This is the only glimmer that remains for him [C’est la seule petite lueur qui lui reste] — a uniquely pallid glimmer — a “rage of Reason”. Were it to regain a little of its amplitude, and were it to refrain from hating in the present, the soul would immediately cease being damned — but it would be another soul causing the unity of another movement. As Leibniz states, the damned [le damné] is not eternally damned, he is merely “always [toujours] damnable”, and damns himself at every moment. Thus the damned are free — and free in the present — as are the beatified [les bienheureux]. What damn them is their current narrow-mindedness, their lack of amplitude. (PLB: 96-97; 71; italics in French text; translation slightly altered)

In a word, if the damned are damned, it is not because their act of hating God is evil, but rather because this act allows their soul only to have the smallest amplitude. The damned find their pleasure nowhere but in their act of hating God and negate anything else. So the clear region illuminated by the predicate “to hate God” does not include other predicates, that is to say, the pleasure of this act does not harmoniously integrate small perceptions of anxiety. Hence the soul has the minimum amplitude and produces a discordant accord. Nevertheless the damned are free in their own way. For, even if their act of hatred minimizes their amplitude, this act still expresses their soul which has only the minimum unity. The damned choose by themselves to perform the act which makes them what they are and to narrow their amplitude, while they could have performed another act and got another amplitude. The damned are not damned by others but damn themselves. However perverse it seems, here is a freedom of the damned and also a room for another act and amplitude.

The discordance produced by the soul of the damned is associated with the narrowness of the amplitude of this soul. If we think of the opposite case, it follows that the soul of the martyrs which produces perfect harmonious accords would have the maximum amplitude. Including only the single predicate of the very act of hatred in progress, the amplitude of the damned is limited within the present in which this act is being made. The same is true of the
unity of their soul illuminated by this predicate. In contrast, the amplitude of the martyrs extends beyond the present to the past since their birth and to the future until their last moment. For, when the martyrs choose to die for the sake of faith and take their whole life to have been for this purpose, the amplitude of their act of martyrdom encompasses everything that happens in their life. The greatest amplitude that this act gives illuminates the maximum unity of their soul. It is by inscribing this maximum unity that the soul succeeds in integrating a great deal of small solicitations of anxiety and intensely painful perceptions into a serene felicity. The maximum amplitude enables the soul of the martyr to produce perfect harmonious accords, manifesting the greatness of the unity and power of this soul.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the soul can augment its amplitude when it incorporates the power of God, while approximating its unity to His as much as possible. In relation to this, we understand why Deleuze picks up the martyr and the damned as the epitomes of the opposite souls with their own amplitudes and accords. While the martyrs devote themselves to faith as the love of God, the damned indulge themselves in the hatred of God. To the question why Deleuze refers to these two types whose religious implications are so obvious, it might be possible to answer that it is just because Leibniz conceives his philosophy inseparably from his thought of God. However, from the Deleuzian perspective, what matters in Leibniz’s conception is not God Himself but our relation to the outside and the states of our soul ensuing from this relationship. Delineating Leibniz’s images associated with God, Deleuze describes two types of attitudes which the soul can take in the face of the power of the outside, whether to affirm or negate it, to incorporate or expel it, and two states of the soul as the results of these attitudes. In general terms, the religious implications of the two types are the indications of the involvement of the power of the outside.

What is remarkable, the contrast of the martyr and the damned does not designate the simple dichotomy of the superior and the inferior, as it seems at first glance. In fact, the
martyr and the damned are complementary.

It has often been said that this progress of a soul could only be accomplished necessarily [nécessairement] to the detriment of others. But this is not true. Except for the damned, others can do just as much. It is only to the detriment of the damned, who are freely cut away. Their worst punishment is maybe [est peut-être] that of serving the progress of others, not by the negative example that they offer, but through the quantity of positive progress that they involuntarily leave to the world when they renounce their own clarity. In this sense, despite themselves, the damned could be attached in no better way to the best of all possible worlds.

Leibniz’s optimism is based on the infinity of the damned as the foundation of the best of all worlds: they liberate an infinite quantity of possible progress.

That is what multiplies their rage, and thus they make possible a world in progress [en progrès] (PLB: 101; 74; italics in text; translation slightly altered).

Deleuze here discusses the damned’s contribution to others with recourse to Leibniz’s assumption that the existing world is the best one and the total quantity of progress in it is determinate. Given that progress for Leibniz consists in the extension of the soul’s clear region, the quantity of progress equals the amount of clarity in the soul. If the total quantity of progress in the world is determinate, so also is the sum of the amount of clarity in all souls. In the single and best world, the amount of the virtual actualized at each moment should be decided in the best way. Based on this assumption, when someone can get more quantity of progress and increase the clear region in his or her soul, someone else abandons that quantity of progress and that amount of clarity. If the martyrs can maximize their amplitude, it is because the damned minimize their amplitude, both completely by their free will. That is why it is said that the souls progress to the detriment of the damned who give up their possible progress to others even though involuntarily. Renouncing the clarity of their soul, the damned “make possible the infinite progression of perfect accords in the other souls” (PLB: 180; 132), including and especially the souls of the martyrs. The same
complementarity as that of the martyr and the damned holds for the kinds of the accords that they produce. “[T]here can be no major and perfect accord in a monad unless there is a minor or dissonant accord in another, and inversely” (PLB: 183; 134; italics in text). The martyrs cannot create the perfect major accords with their maximum amplitude unless the damned create the minor dissonant accord with their minimum amplitude, and vice versa. Neither the martyr nor the damned can be as such without the other.

Thus understood, between the martyr and the damned are interpenetration and interdependence. A martyr gives his or her life for his or her faith and gets a great amount of progress. His or her self-sacrifice is for him- or herself. The damned renounces his or her progress so that others can get that amount of progress. His or her self-sacrifice is genuinely for others, even though it is involuntary. It turns out that the damned is a strange sort of martyr, one who is greater than the martyr in making the martyr as such. However, if the damned can be such a martyr, it is because the martyr is just concerned with his or her own progress and gives up becoming this greater martyr than him- or herself. While the damned makes the martyr as such, it is the martyr that makes the damned such a greater martyr than the martyr. After all, the martyr and the damned are two opposite types of martyrs who need each other to exist.

Underlying the interrelation between these two types is the assumption of the single and best world. This is not the world actualized in each soul from each unique point of view. Rather, it is the world which is supposed outside all souls beyond their uniqueness and virtually precedes any actualization by them. Even if the monads have no windows, they communicate with each other, insofar as they all include this virtual, one and the same world. The omnipresence of the dark depth in the soul is not only the sign of its finitude but also the basis for the communication among all souls, even if they themselves do not notice this communication. Based on the commonality of this world, an accord which a monad produces
corresponds to all other accords that all other monads produce. That is why the accords in the soul of the martyr can interrelate with the accord in the soul of the damned. It follows that, although each monad only hears the accords it plays, on the whole there is the accord of all such accords that all monads produce. Given that this world is the best of all possible ones, among these accords, including minor dissonant accords, is the most perfect harmony.

The correspondence of all accords in all souls concretizes itself in the interaction of the bodies belonging to these souls. In this interaction, another musical form, melody, shows itself. Even if each soul hears only the accords it plays, this does not mean that there is no way for it to perceive the accord of its accords with those of other souls. For, although each soul cannot feel the emotion in itself derived from the integration of pain and pleasure in other souls, it can nevertheless feel other souls feel this emotion. This sympathy is possible based on the all monad’s sharing one and the same world, and is effected in the interaction among the bodies that coexist in this world. In fact, if we can feel others feel a certain emotion, it is by seeing their gesture, by hearing the tone of their voice or by sensing their atmosphere, in a word, by sensing some material sign emitted from their bodies. Melody means the “conformity of the senses” (PLB: 185; 135) which occurs in such situations, traversing the accords in the souls. It is the vicissitude of the senses in conformity with each other felt by the souls through their bodies in relation. Since each soul at one moment feels multiple senses, its body being related to the bodies of other souls, each soul already plays and hears plural melodies at once. More precisely, each soul is involved in the concerto of these melodies. Their agreement expresses the communication among the souls through their bodies, and as such embodies the accord of the accords in the souls. The accord of accords becomes sensible for each monad in the shape of the concerto of melodies. This is the consequence of the doubling of the actualization in the soul with the realization in the body.
At its limit the material universe accedes to a unity in extension, a horizontal and collective unity [a unite en extension, horizontale et collective], where melodies of development themselves enter into relations of counterpoint, each spilling over its frame and becoming the motif of another such that all of Nature becomes an immense melody of bodies and of their flow [une immense mélodie des corps et de leur flux]. And this collective unity in extension does not contradict the other unity, the subjective, conceptual, spiritual, harmonic, and distributive unity. To the contrary, the former depends upon the latter by furnishing it with a body, exactly in the way the monad requires a body and organs, without which it would have no inkling of Nature. The “conformity of the senses” (melody) is the sign by which I recognize harmony in the real [le signe auquel je reconnais l’harmonie dans le réel]. There is not only harmony in harmony, but harmony between harmony and melody. In this sense harmony goes from the soul to the body, from the intelligible to the sensible, and extends into the sensible. (PLB: 185; 135; italics in text; translation slightly altered).

Likening the concerto of all melodies in one and the same world to a representative style of Baroque music, Deleuze clarifies the relation between accord and melody. Embodying the accord of all the accords in all souls, all the melodies that all souls play via their bodies intertwine with each other in one and the same world so that all these melodies weave a huge stream. According to the interplay of all melodies in this material flow, all accords also resonate, as if these melodies and accords composed counterpoint, in which multiple motifs modify themselves in response to each other. Considering that the interplay among the melodies enables the resonance among the accords, and the interaction among the bodies mediates the communication among the souls, it might seem that the order of melody directs the order of accord. But this is not the case. Given that the production of clear perceptions in the soul leads to the constitution of the body, the accord in the soul gives the body in which the melody unfurls. There is no melody without accord. It is the order of accord that directs the order of melody, the accord determining in what way the melody goes and in what key it is rendered. The thing is that the order of accord requires the order of
melody in which accords shape into melodies and interplays through them. This means that even while communicating with other souls via the bodies, it is each soul that decides how to communicate and how to constitute its own body and world, integrating its own tiny perceptions or solicitations and dealing with its own pain and pleasure.

To augment the amplitude of the soul and to produce more harmonious accords is to enlarge its unity and to intensify its power and force. As a result of this enlargement and intensification, the soul does not only control its accords and the melodies of its body, but also extends this control to the accords of other souls and the melodies of their bodies. From harmonious accords come harmonious melodies, and the more consonant with other melodies these melodies are, the more effectively these accords transmit to the accords of other souls. Conversely, from unharmonious accords come unharmonious melodies, and since they are not consonant with other melodies, these accords do not appeal to other accords so much. The soul which augments its amplitude and produces harmonious accords thus gets the strength to conduct the concerto of the melodies of the bodies of other souls. This strong initiative is due to this soul’s unity which is greater than others’ and as such subjects them.

The combination of the accord and the melody, based on the priority of the former to the latter, shows the inseparability of these musical forms from morality. The melody expresses the communication of all souls through their bodies. Although it opens each soul to others, this occurs as the consequence of the soul’s having the body required by the omnipresence of the dark depth. The accord expresses the successful harmonious integration of obscure perceptions composing this dark depth in each soul into its clear region and consequently the extension of this clear region, sometimes even beyond the ability of each soul. In that this integration in one soul can affect others through the bodies, the idea of the accord implies that communication does not necessarily amount to one soul’s dependence on...
others but may come from its autonomy and influence on them. While the melody entails the restriction imposed on the soul, the accord provides the means to overcome this restriction. The priority of the accord to the melody tells us that the finitude of the soul can be, beyond the mere fetter to restrain the soul, the condition for the progress of the soul should it be overcome. In effect, the melody is well organized and enriched under the guidance of the harmonious accord. Producing perfect and strong accords, the soul directs the way in which its body and the bodies of other souls interact in the melody and thus determines how the world existing for it appears to it. It is in the same way as the soul by its fold constitutes the body and the world, as the soul recognizes this by the help of morality. Thus Leibniz’s musical forms enable the soul to attain the very state enabled by his morality. Music is a double of morality, sharing the same task, in that the augmentation of the amplitude in the latter and the production of the harmonious accord in the former are equated by the mediation of the unity of the soul.

In such accord and harmony is found the third similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation. These musical forms, as the combined states of the soul and the body derived from the fold of the soul, are embodied in a mode of existence and, as such, illustrate a life as a work of art. When the soul and the body play the best accord and melody, pain turns into pleasure. What enables the creation of these best artistic forms and the transformation of affect is, as in Foucault, the folding of the power of the outside into the inside, represented in Leibniz as the soul’s incorporation of God’s power. Thus Leibniz’s fold, similarly to Foucault’s subjectivation, with recourse to the power of the outside, forms an art of creating life as a work, turning pain into pleasure and making unbearable life bearable.10

I have tried in this chapter to specify the similarities of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation in the wake of Deleuze’s discussion. I have done so, in order to find a variant
of the image of suicidal death equivalent to the artistic subjectivation.

The fold of the soul in Leibniz, by unfolding the world which it enfolds in it, constitutes the body and the world that exist for it. By this enfolding and unfolding, the soul perceives something so clearly as to predicate how it exists. In determining a manner of being of what it perceives and predicates, the soul constitutes the being of the entity existing for it and the being of itself as perceiving and predating. Thus the fold of the soul de-substicializes both the subject of the proposition of this predication and the subject of the statement of this proposition, that is, the soul itself. Similarly to Foucault’s subjectivation, Leibniz’s fold defines the subject as the outcome of the preceding process of production. The clear perception in the soul is inseparable from its obscure region, without which the soul would neither draw the manner of being nor constitute the beings of itself and what it perceives in this manner. In having this obscure region as its dark depth, the soul is the fold of the outside as such irreducible to the inside. This is the explication of an implication of the above similarity of Leibniz’s fold to Foucault’s subjectivation, complementing this similarity (Section 1).

Whereas the fold of the outside was at once the fold of the force of the outside in Foucault, at first glance this is not the case in Leibniz. Morality makes these two kinds of folds coincide or, indeed, makes this coincidence recognizable. When the soul constitutes the body and the world for it by clearly perceiving, it inscribes its unity in them and marks them as its belongings and in doing so undergirds this constitution. The soul has the power of possession and the force of projection in this sense. Morality consists in enabling the soul to recall its power and force it forgets. The discovery of the unity in what happens to the soul leads to the discovery of the unity of the soul, the former unity being the projection of the latter, and then to the discovery of the power and force of the soul exercised through this unity. When the clear region, the amplitude, of the soul augments in the light of its greater
unity thus discovered, the soul incorporates the power of God beyond its limit, approximating its unity to His. As a result, the soul finds what seemingly happened from outwith to have actually come from within through its own unity, and finds itself to have been the fold of the power of God. The fold of the outside is at once the fold of the power or the force of the outside in Leibniz as well as in Foucault, although in the former this would not be recognized unless the soul re-folds the power of the outside by the help of morality (Section 2).

The states of the soul and the body resulting from this morality are likened to musical forms. When the soul enlarges its amplitude as morality advises, the soul has gained its greater unity. Under the inscription of this unity, the relation of the soul’s clear region with the relations among the obscure perceptions integrated into this region becomes harmonious, reflecting the success of this integration. The soul produces a harmonious accord with which the soul turns the anxiety of obscure perceptions into a pleasure. Guided by this accord, the melody, as the vicissitude of the conformity of the body of this soul and the bodies of other souls, becomes harmonious. Conversely, when the soul’s amplitude and unity are small, the accord and the melody are inharmonious, while anxiety remains. Illustrating this contrast are the images of the martyr and the damned. What divides these two types is the difference in their attitude towards the power of the outside, represented as the power of God exercised through His unity, whether to affirm and incorporate this power or to negate and expel it. Just as subjectivation in Foucault does, the fold of the power of the outside in Leibniz creates life as a work of art, in which pain is transformed into pleasure (Section 3).

Based on the above three similarities, we can take Leibniz’s fold as a variant of Foucault’s subjectivation. Just as subjectivation in Foucault gives a perspective from which we can see suicide positively, the fold of the soul in Leibniz gives a perspective from which
we can see martyrdom positively, other than as self-sacrifice. Certainly, to die for the sake of one’s faith, as a martyr, is not exactly the same as to kill oneself. But nevertheless the two deaths are quite close, in that both are voluntary, the deaths that people choose when they do not necessarily have to. In Foucault as in Leibniz the operation of folding makes the mode of existence of the one who folds comparable with a work of art. In Leibniz as well as in Foucault, the force or the power of the outside is involved in this artistic subjectivation. If the soul of the martyr can play the perfect accords, it is because he or she maximizes the amplitude of his or her soul when it folds, and maximizes the incorporation of the power of the outside as God’s power. To do so is to maximize the unity of his or her soul while this soul imitates God and its unity approximates to God’s unity through which He exercises His power upon the world. The soul of the martyr produces the perfect accords by inscribing its unity in its body and world, just as God realizes the universal harmony in the world as a whole by conferring His unity on it. By virtue of this inscription, the soul recognizes all that happens to its body and world as coming from within itself and affirms them, by analogy to God’s creation and blessing of everything. Thus martyrdom in Leibniz results in the accomplishment of the supreme subjectivity as the agent of all that happens to it, including its own death, and the creation of the best work of art in this subjectivity. What enables both of these is the soul’s participation in God’s power and His unity beyond its own power and unity, while the soul folds its outside into the inside to the utmost.

Considering that the damned makes the martyr as such, we incline toward asking whether the death of the damned, as well as that of the martyr, can give a positive perspective on suicide. To the extent of Deleuze’s discussion on Leibniz, this direction of thought is not pursued. At best, the damned by their death full of hatred can merely contribute to the complete deaths of others, especially those of the martyrs. Even if the martyr and the damned depend on and penetrate into each other, they are poles apart,
opposed and separate. When Deleuze treats another philosopher, he mentions the possibility of a synthesis of two similar types. In doing so, he suggests that the death of a type such as the damned can be an instance of positively evaluated suicide. We will return to this matter later, after pondering on other themes.

1 In this book written in his late period, with regard to the affirmation of difference as his motto, Deleuze addresses Leibniz’s philosophy in a positive way, writing “No philosophy has ever pushed to such an extreme the affirmation of a one and same world, and of an infinite difference or variety in this world” (PLB: 78; 58). However, in his early period, Deleuze treated Leibniz’s philosophy rather negatively. In *Difference and Repetition*, one of his chief works of this time, Deleuze points out the limitation of Leibniz’s philosophy. Although Leibniz’s idea of infinitely small representation broke fresh ground for the affirmation of difference, he ended up by subjugating difference to the identity of representation. Hence Deleuze writes, on Leibniz as well as on Hegel, “The point is that in the last resort infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity as a presupposition of representation” (DR: 70; 49). The question of how to understand this change in Deleuze’s attitude towards Leibniz, a so-called “Leibniz problem”, has been raised. See Lang Baker, “The Cry of the Identicals: The Problem of Inclusion in Deleuze’s Reading of Leibniz”, *Philosophy Today*, Summer 1995, pp. 198-199, and Keith Robinson, “Events of Difference: The Fold in between Deleuze’s Reading of Leibniz”, *Epoché*, Volume 8, Issue 1, Fall 2003, pp.141-143. Baker regards this change not as the withdrawal of the previous negative evaluation but as the renewal of the way of situating the same matter and finding its value in its transitional state towards universal transversality (Baker, ibid, p. 199, pp. 209-210). Robinson sees in this change the shift of Deleuze’s focus from folding which ends up with closing itself within identity to unfolding opened to diversity (Robinson, ibid, pp. 155-157). Common to both is an opinion that the change in Deleuze’s point of view brought about the change in his attitude towards Leibniz. Agreeing with them, I will add one point. Underlying the possibility of the former change is the inseparable continuity of folding and unfolding Deleuze conceives of in *The Fold*. Based on this continuity, folding can no longer be an operation of simply closing itself. Paying attention to the process of this operation rather than its product enables us to rethink folding as an operation of incorporating the openness of unfolding. This shift of a viewpoint is also a factor which can explain the change in Deleuze’s attitude towards Leibniz, accompanied by the former’s discovery of the importance of the latter’s concept of the fold. I will discuss this matter again later in the notes.

2 Whereas the French word Deleuze uses for the fold in the soul is “pli”, that for the pleat of matter shaping into the body is “repli”. Although both words commonly have a sense of the fold, his usage of these words as a pair expresses, by the mediation of the prefix “re”, his thought that the latter is the doubling of the former. Unfortunately, the translation into English lacking a similar pair of words inevitably erases this nuance.

3 Laurence Bouquiaux remarks that when Leibniz invokes the perspective, it is not in order to define the object as the perceived by its various profiles but in order to define substance as the perceiving subject by its various perceptions. Bouquiaux’s point is that the substance in Leibniz is thus defined by the point of view which it has on the world and from which the former perceives the latter. Bouquiaux, “La notion de point de vue dans l’élaboration de la métaphysique leibnizienne” dans *Perspective: Leibniz, Whitehead, Deleuze*, Annales de l’institut de philosophie et de sciences morales, Paris: Vrin, 2006, p. 27. Bouquiaux’s claim that perception defines and integrates the perceiving subject and the perceived object joins
with the motif of the de-substantialization of the subject in Deleuze’s discussion on Leibniz. However Bouquiaux parts from Deleuze in terms of the view of the most important concept in Leibniz. On the one hand, Bouquiaux evaluates the concept of the fold Deleuze respects so much, in respect that it uncovers something in common in the three definitions of substance in *Discourse on Metaphysics*. That is, according to his summary, “with regard to its complete notion, substance is defined as the ultimate subject and the ensemble of all its predicates; with regard to its capacity of action, substance is defined as primitive force or primary entelechy; finally, with regard to its capacity of perception and representation, substance is defined as the point of view on the universe” (Ibid, p. 24; my translation). But, on the other hand, Bouquiaux insists that in order to fully explain the monad as the “simple” substance, the concept of the fold is not as effective as the notion of such a point of view that retains its metaphysical simplicity through fluctuating phenomena (Ibid, pp. 24-26). Here, while de-substantializing the monad, he substantializes its point of view. From Deleuze’s standpoint, each unique point of view cannot be there without the operation of the monad’s folding and unfolding of the world. If the monad has simplicity, it is qualified as such in the coherence of this operation and the continuity of its repetition. In prioritizing the point to the fold and assuming the uniqueness of the monad to preexist, Bouquiaux does not go as far as Deleuze in the direction of de-substantialization.

4 Usually the monad’s imitation of God in Leibniz is understood as the former’s imperfect copying of the latter. For example, see Jack Davidson, “Imitator of God: Leibniz on Human Freedom”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 36, Issue 3, July 1998, p. 405. Anne-Marie Roviello proposes a different understanding of this topic. She insists that the God in Leibniz which the monad imitates is the God who does not express Himself unless He leaves the monad initiative. So the monad’s imitation of God is not the imperfect reproduction of the model but the reprise of the creative act. Roviello, “La communauté des singuliers entre harmonie préétablie et libre institution”, dans *Perspective: Leibniz, Whitehead, Deleuze*, Annales de l’institut de philosophie et de sciences morales, Paris: Vrin, 2006, p. 116. Although Roviello objects to a few parts of Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz (Ibid, 113-114), strangely enough here she proposes a point which coincides with an aspect of Deleuze’s thought. This point concerns his concept of power in action which is, however rather than Leibniz’s, a projection of Deleuze’s. If power is necessarily in action and therefore is actualized, God does not have His power unless this power is exercised through the creature. That is why God expresses Himself only in the creative act of the monad. Both the idea of God and this concept of power show themselves more conspicuously in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza than in that of Leibniz, which we will see later.

5 Deleuze remarks that, as opposed to Descartes’ combination of clear and distinct on the one hand and combination of obscure and confused on the other, Leibniz claims that “the clear would be in itself confused and the distinct in itself obscure” (DR: 275; 213), although Deleuze’s own terminology is not entirely true to this interpretation. The idea of these new combinations is connected with the integration of minute perceptions into a great one analogously to the differential calculation. Even if minute perceptions are obscure, they are different from each other and to this extent distinct. A great perception into which they are integrated is clear and yet, as the collection of the elements embodying the relations between perceptions or the sum of all the solutions of the differentials between them, it is confused. For Deleuze’s discussion of this matter, see DR: 275-276; 213-214.

6 We can detect the hint of this direction of thought in Leibniz’s *The Confession of a Philosopher* to which Deleuze often refers in *The Fold*. In this book, Leibniz writes as follows:

From this it is evident that hatred of God accrues even to atheists. For whatever they think and say, given only that the nature and state of things is displeasing to them, by that very fact they hate God, even if they do not call what they hate God. (Leibniz,
In a word, “whoever hates nature, the present state of things, the world, hates God” (Ibid, p. 91). So there is no need to call what one hates God. What is called God is the unknown power which causes what happens to each monad in such a way and which makes things in the world for that monad to exist as such. It is not this power itself that harms or favours each monad. Rather, the difference in its attitudes towards this power results in the difference between harm and favour.

…just as God harms only those by whom he is feared in a servile way, that is, who presume he will harm them, so on the other hand whoever firmly believes himself to be elected, i.e., dear to God, he (because he firmly loves God) brings it about that he is elected. (Ibid, p. 37)

While those who hate God harm themselves by believing that God hates them, those who love God are blessed by believing that God loves them. The above passage can also be read with regard to the unknown power of the outside. Those who deny this power and expel it from their inside oppose their modes of existence to what happens to them or to what exists for them, both enabled by this power. Those who affirm it and incorporate it in their inside harmonize their modes of existence with what happens to them and what exists for them. The contrast of these two types overlaps with that of the damned and the martyr as the extremes of these types.

7 The self-sacrifice of the damned for others is a part of a more general theme in Leibniz, that of the reason for the existence of the evil. In tracing the vicissitude of Leibniz’s concept of harmony, Frédéric de Buson shows how Leibniz conceives why evil exists in the best of all possible worlds by his theory of harmony. According to Leibniz’s famous formulation, the harmony is the “unity within variety”. The greater variety or diversity is and the greater the unity in it is, the greater the harmony. Then evil as the radically dissonant, although it seems to contradict the harmony in the world locally, indeed perfects this harmony on the whole. For evil not only increases diversity but also invites the unity inherent in it to increase. Only God who gives the diversity of all that he creates also gives such unity by His grace. Therefore evil contributes to the maximum harmony and the maximum grace. See Buson, “L’harmonie: métaphysique et phénoménalité”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, No1, 1995, pp. 101-109. Just as evil, being the dissonant, brings the world to the maximum harmony, the damned, producing dissonances, enables others to produce perfect accords in such world, the latter aspect being a variation of the former.

8 After mentioning that the narrowness of their amplitude damns the damned, Deleuze states “Perhaps this vision of damnation is so deeply rooted in the Baroque as a function of a much broader context. The Baroque has conceived of death in the present, as a movement that is in the act of being completed, and that is unexpected, but that is “accompanied” (PLB: 97; 71). With regard to this statement, he refers to the idea of “death in movement” discussed in Jean Rousse, La littérature de l’âge baroque en France, Paris: Corti, 1953 (PLB: 97; 153). This idea which for Rousse characterizes the Baroque is put in stark contrast to the idea of gracious death in Renaissance or that of serene death in the Middle Age. In the Baroque, the images of death insinuated in the life of people and enriched their reveries so as to make them feel fascination in horror or thrill in the threatening of the certainty of their daily life. Hence they had a taste for the images of cruel deaths, those by torture or at the stake, with a lot of pain and bloodshed. The death in movement is the death which, thus connected to physical and psychical movements, turns into a kind of spectacle, in which the ecstasy of spectators culminates in the middle of the pain of the one who is dying. Insofar as the life of
the individual is discerned in its self-motion going towards the end, death in such a sense not only accompanies life but also accomplishes it, since this death accelerates the intense movements from within oneself up to its climax (Ibid. pp. 113-117). It is intriguing that Deleuze finds the death of the damned to be close to such “death in movement”, while Rousse takes as its epitome the death of the martyr. For this suggests that Deleuze conceives not only the interpenetration between the martyr and the damned, but also the possibility that, in another context, the damned can personify the Baroque better than the martyr. Rather than the one who dissolves pain into pleasure, the one who extracts pleasure from pain completes death in movement characteristic of the Baroque. For, whereas pain as the trigger of the movement towards death is negated and integrated into ecstasy in the former, pain is affirmed in itself and thus transforms itself into ecstasy in the latter.

For Deleuze, the thing is not only that Leibniz thus treats “the production of accords” in his philosophy, but also that his philosophy itself is such production. In his interview on Leibniz, Deleuze speaks:

Music − are philosophers friends of music too? It seems clear to me that philosophy is truly an unvoiced song, with the same feel for movement that music has. That already applies to Leibniz who, paralleling baroque music, makes Harmony a basic concept. He makes philosophy the production of accords [accords]. Is that what a friend [l’ami] is, a harmony which even amounts to [qui va jusqu’à] dissonance? It’s not a matter of setting philosophy to music, or vice versa. Rather, it’s once again an operation of folding [une opération de pliage]: “fold by fold,” like Boulez and Mallarmé. (P: 222; 163; translation slightly altered)

Referring to the affinity between philosophy and music in sharing the same sensibility for movement, Deleuze calls a philosopher a friend of music. A case in point, he says, is Leibniz. When Deleuze speaks of a “friend” here, he supposes the idea of friend which he develops with Guattari in What Is Philosophy?. What they have in mind is “a friend who is no longer in relation with an other but with an Entity, an Objectality, an Essence [l’ami qui n’est plus en rapport avec un autre, mais avec une Entité, une Objectité, une Essence] (QP: 9; 3; translation slightly altered). Just as the joiner is the friend of the wood, the philosopher is the friend of the concept. In turn, for the philosopher or the joiner, his or her friend is the concept or the wood. It is not merely the material or medium from or by which he or she creates. It is the condition of the possibility of creation itself, the entity which suits the taste of the creator and stimulates his or her potentiality to create. In terms of Leibniz, he is, as a philosopher, a friend of concept. However, to the extent that the most important concept in his philosophy is that of harmony and all his concepts accord with each other, he is also a friend of music. The fold is not only one of such concepts that he created in his philosophy, but also the concept which coincides with the way they are intertwined and the mode he creates. The affinity between philosophy and music for Deleuze should be understood neither as the application of the former to the latter nor as that of the latter to the former, but as the operation of thus “folding one into another” (P: English translation 163).

Here we can see another aspect of the soul’s imitation of God entailed in the maximization of the amplitude. In Leibniz’s works, images of God being an artist who creates the world as his work appear frequently. One of such images is found in his Theodicy §78, in which Leibniz likens God to an architect who organizes all that should be in his architecture so that they manifest His perfection most efficiently. See Ibid, trans. E. M. Huggard, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951, pp. 164-165. Parallel to such an image of God as an artist is that of the martyr who creates his or her mode of existence as a work of art. While God resolves the radical dissonance of the evil into the maximum harmony in the best world, the martyr dissolves the dissonance of his or her agony into the accord of the joy of faith. The martyr repeats in his or her mode of existence what God does in the world.
According to Laurence Carlin, the harmony in Leibniz as the relation among things has its ground in the divine mind which sees it rather than in the things themselves. Carlin, “On the Very Concept of Harmony in Leibniz”, *The Review of Metaphysics* 54, September 2000, pp. 108-110. Only God can grasp the universal harmony in the best world He Himself created. To produce perfect major accords, as the martyr does, is to approximate one’s perception to the divine mind as such. According to Louis Guillermit, God’s power of making the world exist corresponds to the monad’s power of making the subject. Guillermit, “Puissance de dieu et base de la monade selon Leibniz”, *Archives de philosophie* Volume 51, Issue 3, pp. 404-405. Based on this correspondence, it is quite natural that the martyr in producing the perfect major accords, does in his or her mode of existence the same thing as God does in the world. If the martyr is an artist who produces the perfect major accords, it is by imitating God as an artist. If the martyr’s mode of existence is a work of art created by him- or herself, it is after the fashion of God’s creation of the world as His work of art.
Chapter 3

Crucifixion as the Dissolution into Nature: An Image in Spinoza

In the previous chapter, following Deleuze’s discussion of Leibniz, we addressed an example of a life made into an artistic work by the operation of folding the power of the outside, as in Foucault’s subjectivation. By changing the affect of the created mode of existence, we have a way of turning suicidal death into the best work of act and a perspective from which we can evaluate this death positively. It is as if Deleuze had seen in the Leibnizian framework the embodiment of Foucault’s idea which Deleuze himself remarked before he committed suicide.

However this is not without problems. For, even if Deleuze in his later period somehow favors Leibniz, there are difficulties in equating Deleuze’s understanding of Leibniz with Deleuze’s own thought without some reservation. One might think that Deleuze, a materialist thinker and a philosopher of difference, would refuse some of the important points in the previous chapter; for example, the primacy of the soul to the body and the former’s control over the latter, the importance of the unity of the former in this control, the soul’s imitation of God and the integration of disharmonies into harmonies by means of this unity, etc. Certainly we can read Deleuze’s treatment of God in Leibniz as the thought of the outside. But, insofar as it contains these motifs, it seems far from Deleuze’s own thought.

There is a philosopher in whose philosophy God holds a crucial role and yet whose great influence on Deleuze nobody denies: Spinoza. Deleuze also finds in Spinoza a theory of practice which cannot be without recourse to God, although Spinoza’s concepts of practice and God are quite different from Leibniz’s. So, the problem is not whether to speak of God or not to speak of God. Rather it is what kind of God is at issue, how it is conceived and how this concept works in a philosopher’s thought. If we examine, from this standpoint,
the difference between Leibniz and Spinoza and the uniqueness of the latter, it will give us a hint as to the crucial factors in the Leibnizian framework that make it irreconcilable with Deleuze’s thought, and, allowing for these factors, how the Leibnizian framework should be rethought in order to still draw from it some positive significance in conformity with Deleuze’s thought.

In this chapter, tracing the movement of Deleuze’s logic, I will start with considering the critique of Leibniz’s practice viewed from Spinoza’s standpoint to which Deleuze is more sympathetic. This critique comes from different ideas of God held by the two philosophers (Section 1). Besides, investigated further, Spinoza’s idea of God, different from Leibniz’s, involves a different theory of practice and a different musical form created in it (Section 2). Yet the two ideas of God, the two kinds of practices and musical forms are not unrelated but inseparably connected (Section 3). Then, the Leibnizian image of suicidal death proves to be a gate to another image of death as another type of art, found in Spinoza’s thought and closer to Deleuze’s (Section 4).

### 1. Idealism vs. Parallelism

As we have seen, Leibniz’s morality admonishes the augmentation of the amplitude of the soul so that in carrying out this task the soul imitates God and the latter passes into the former. However, from a Spinozist point of view, this moral practice has a problem in its theoretical basis. Obviously, the notion of this practice is closely connected with the idea of God. Indeed, the problem in Leibniz’s moral practice, in Spinoza’s eyes, comes from Leibniz’s idea of God.

To sum up the relevant argument in the previous chapter, the soul imitates God and the latter passes into the former, when the soul, by perceiving what happens to it in the present,
grasps the tendency inherent in all that happened and will happen to this soul from the past to the future. In doing so, the soul approximates itself to God who causes all that happens and therefore knows them all. The soul takes the unity of the event as its own unity and through this unity finds the exercise of its power in what happens, so as to believe that the soul is its cause. Just as God creates the one and the same world as the common horizon for all monads outside them, the soul now realizes that it constitutes the world for it along with its own body. Just as one and the same world reflects the unity of God, the body and the world for the soul reflect the unity of this soul. This inscription of the unity is also the sign of the soul’s imitation of God and the latter’s passage into the former.

In *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy*, Deleuze gives his view of the supposition of this moral practice. Even if the soul imitates God as the creator of the world and God passes into the soul, strictly speaking, the soul is not the cause of its world and body in the same sense as that in which God is the cause of one and the same world and everything in it. The causality of the soul as the soul itself recognizes it is ideal. In Leibniz, Deleuze sees such causality in that the repartition of cause and effect is decided by the quality of the soul’s representation of the terms concerned.

…the superior term, through its unity, expresses *more distinctly* what the other expresses in its multiplicity *less distinctly*. This indeed is how a division is made between causes and effects, actions and passions: when a swimming body [un corps nageant] is said to be the cause of ‘an infinite number of movements by the parts of the water’, rather than the reverse, this is because the body has a unity that allows a more distinct explanation of what is happening. Moreover, since the second term is expressed in the first, the latter as it were carves its own distinct expression in an obscure region [une region obscure] which surrounds it on all sides and in which it is plunged. (SPE: 305-306: 328-329; italics in text. translation slightly altered)

What is meant here is that whether something is cause or effect depends on whether it is
perceived distinctly or obscurely, more precisely, clearly and distinctly or obscurely and confusedly. If the soul perceives something more clearly and distinctly, it is thanks to the greater unity found in it. If the soul perceives something less clearly and distinctly and more obscurely and confusedly, it is because of its smaller unity and greater multiplicity. The soul detects between the former and the latter the relation of cause and effect, identifying the course of the movement going from cause to effect with the inscription of the greater unity of one thing into another with lesser unity. In the above example in which a swimming body and the movements of the water are compared, the former is regarded as cause and the latter as effect. When the soul and the body are in comparison, the latter is regarded as effect. The soul poses such causality according to the degree of the unity of the perceived and the clearness and distinctness of its perception. Cause and effect are determined in the way they appear to the soul as its ideas. To this extent, the causality between such cause and effect is ideal. Surely Leibniz’s moral practice supposes this ideal causality. Undergirding this practice is the theory that the fold of the soul constitutes the body and the world for that soul, and in this sense is their cause. When the soul recognizes itself as such a cause by the discovery of its own unity, this recognition supposes the equation between causality and the degree of unity as perceived clearly and distinctly.

In light of the main strand of Deleuze’s thought, the problem in this moral practice is obvious. The ideal causality presupposed in this practice implies the superiority of unity and the inferiority of multiplicity. These overlap with the superiority of the soul and the inferiority of the body. God as the One is conceived to ground this asymmetry, located on the side of the soul and unity, and to justify the subjugation of the body to the soul and that of multiplicity to unity. The accord and the melody rendered in this practice are the products of the rule of multiplicity by unity. All these are at odds with the general Deleuzian motto that genuine multiplicity should affirm itself and the body be never looked down upon.
Putting himself in a position of Spinoza whose thought he highly evaluates, Deleuze comments on idealism, including that of Leibniz. Spinoza would have much to say against it from the standpoint of his parallelism, even if the word parallelism is Leibnitz’s invention.

It should come as no surprise that Spinoza consequently speaks of “the idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body sub species aeternitatis”. He doesn’t mean that the body’s essence exists only in an idea. The mistake in the idealist interpretation is to turn against parallelism an argument that is an integral part of it, or to understand as a proof of ideality an argument of the pure causality [un argument de la pure causalité]. If an idea in God expresses the essence of this or that body, it is because God is the cause of essences; it follows that an essence is necessarily conceived through this cause. (SPE: 291: 312; Latin in English translation; translation slightly altered)

In a word, the error of idealistic interpretation according to which the essence of the body is only in an idea in the mind consists in the ignorance of the true cause, God, while parallelism is based on this very cause. Idealism here refers to a position in general which resides in identifying what exists with what appears to the mind and reducing reality to ideas. Insofar as Leibniz, in crucial parts of his thought, invokes such causality that adheres to this position, he counts as an idealist. For Spinoza, when the mind has an idea of the essence of the body, this essence is not a mere invention of the mind. The mind is neither the cause of this essence nor the true cause of its idea. The true cause of both an idea and its object is outside both the mind and the body, that is, God. If the mind has an idea of the essence of the body, it is as the effect of this true cause, in the same way as the essence of the body is the product of God. Spinoza’s parallelism claims that, if something in the mind and something in the body correspond to each other, it is because they both come from the third term, the veritable cause common to them. Idealism ignores this cause and mistakes this correspondence as the proof of the ideal causality from the mind to the body. From the standpoint of parallelism in
which their correspondence is conceived based on their equality, this is nothing but the distortion of the real circumstance.

Actually, Leibniz’s ideal causality alludes to the existence of the true cause common to and outside of the mind and the body, even though in an oblique way.

There is, however, an ‘ideal action’, as when I assign something bodily to be the cause of what happens in the soul (a suffering), or when I assign to a soul the cause of what happens to a body (a movement taken as voluntary). But this ideal action merely implies this: that the soul and the body, each in its fashion or following its own laws, express a single and the same thing: the World (PLB: 161; 118-119).

Here Deleuze claims that for Leibniz, an ideal action assumed between the soul and the body, whether from the former to the latter or reverse, indeed merely implies the expression of a single and the same world by both the soul and the body in their own way. Talking of the ideal action from the soul to the body, when the soul inscribes its unity into the body and what happens to it and assigns the soul to be their cause, this causality has nothing to do with the real action between the soul and the body. However, at least, in order for this inscription to occur, the soul and the body should be contiguous and connected otherwise. In Leibniz’s case, the mediator of this connection as the third term is one and the same world which is folded in the soul and the body and yet in itself outside both of them, virtual before its actualization and realization by them. The correspondence between the soul and the body is, rather than the result of the action from one to the other, whether it is real or ideal, the expression of this one and the same world which the soul and the body fold in their own way. Given that the unity of the world reflects the unity of God who creates it, the ideal action between the soul and the body, by expressing one and the same world, expresses God as the cause not only of this world, but also of the soul and the body. On this point, it seems that
Leibniz says almost the same thing as Spinoza.

Sensing a point in common between the two philosophers raises two questions. First, in spite of this commonness, how do the positions of these philosophers depart from each other? What is the difference between Leibniz’s idealism and Spinoza’s parallelism? This is also to question why the former supports the superiority of the soul to the body and the latter does not. Secondly, even if both these philosophers agree that God as the One is the true cause of the soul, the body and all that happens to them, does it resolve the problem of the subjugation of multiplicity to unity? How does Deleuze think, not Leibniz, but Spinoza can affirm multiplicity freed from this subjugation, in spite of their shared notion of God as the single true cause of everything? We can answer the first question by considering the similarity and dissimilarity of the ideas of God of the two philosophers and the second question by further examining Spinoza’s idea of God by focusing on this dissimilarity.

The similarity of the two philosophers as Deleuze sees it concerns the basic foundation of Spinoza’s thought in the Ethics. Spinoza conceives of God as substance composed of an infinity of attributes each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. This definition is not so rare in itself. For Deleuze, one of the characteristics of Spinoza’s concept of God is that he does not presuppose the existence of God from the beginning, but claims its constitution by these attributes, as reproduced in his ontological proof of God’s existence.

By a proof of the reality of the definition must be understood a veritable generation of the object defined. This is the sense of the first propositions of the Ethics: they are not hypothetical, but genetic. Because attributes are really distinct, irreducible one to the others, ultimate in their respective forms or in their kinds, because each is conceived through itself, they cannot contradict one another. They are necessarily compatible, and the substance they form is possible. (SPE: 68; 79; italics in text)

What Deleuze means here is that a proof of the existence of God at the beginning of the
Ethics is indeed “a logical constitution of substance” (SPE: 69; 79), that is, of God. For Spinoza, it is only God that is substance. Since each of the attributes is conceived by itself, not by the opposition to others, they neither contradict one another nor are divided among themselves. Although attributes are multiple in qualities, they are one in quantity. To say that all of them come together is to say that they compose unique substance. Thus the proof of the amalgamation of all attributes in such a way is at once the description of the logic of the generation of a single substance composed of them. “The irreducibility of the attributes not only proves, but constitutes the nonimpossibility of God as unique substance with all attributes” (SPE: 69; 79).

The operative factor here is Spinoza’s notion of real distinction. “It is the nature of real distinction between attributes that excludes all division of substance; it is this nature of real distinction that preserves in distinct terms all their respective positivity, forbidding their definition through opposition one to another, and referring them all to the same indivisible substance” (SPE: 69; 80). Real distinction is the distinction among attributes. It differs in nature from numerical distinction among finite modes. Finite modes are divided among them in number. But the concept of a certain kind of mode does not contain the number of existing modes of this kind. So the existence of finite modes which are numerically distinct depends on the causality external to the essence of that mode. In contrast, the attribute, since the essence it expresses is infinite, has internal causality because of which each attribute exists and is conceived by itself. Therefore numerical distinction which applies to the things with external causality does not apply to attributes. In other words, all attributes are not numerically distinct but constitute unique substance without division.\(^2\)

Deleuze finds a quite similar framework of the constitution of substance in Leibnitz. It is in his discussion on Leibnitz’s principle of contradiction that Deleuze refers to this framework. What the proposition A \(\neq\) non-A signifies is the purely identical to itself. This is
the indefinable, to which we attain when we go back from the definable to the terms defining it one after another. On this indefinable, which is called the absolute form, Deleuze writes:

Now it is precisely because all absolute forms are incapable of contradicting each other [se contradire] that they can belong to a same Being and, in being able to do this, they effectively belong to it. Since they are forms, their real distinction is formal and carries no ontological difference among beings to which each might be attributed: they are all attributed to a single and the same Being, that is both ontologically one and formally diverse. (PLB: 60; 44-45; translation slightly altered)

Discussing Leibniz’s absolute forms, Deleuze equates their distinction with the real distinction in Spinoza, and then claims that Leibniz, based on this distinction, concludes the existence of a single and the same Being composed of them all, just as Spinoza does. Since, as the proposition A ≠ non-A shows, the absolute form is indefinable, one form A can be discerned only by its difference from other forms B, C…. But this does not mean that the difference among these absolute forms entails a contradiction. It follows that they all gather and make up a single Being. Deleuze explains the attribution of absolute forms to a single Being in Leibniz almost in the same way as the constitution of substance by attributes in Spinoza, in both cases invoking the notion of real distinction. He even calls this constitution “the sole thesis common to Spinoza and Leibniz [la seule thèse commune à Spinoza et Leibniz]” (PLB: 59; 44; translation altered).

However, even if these two philosophers share the same idea of the constitution of substance, there is an unbridgeable difference between them, precisely in their ideas of the constituents of substance. This difference concerns the relation of extension to these constituents. It casts a shadow over the difference of their images of God, and it is this difference that results in the difference of their basic positions.

As most theologians and traditional philosophers do, Leibnitz excludes extension from
God’s essence. Hence he does not count extension in absolute forms which constitute substance. After this constitution, God creates extension ex nihilo. He also creates creatures by filling extension with the qualities of absolute forms. So the necessity by which God exists and that by which creatures exist are not univocal. Then God appears as a transcendent creator high above the creatures.

By contrast, Spinoza counts extension in attributes, and this had him denounced as a heretic. Since the same attributes as those which constitute substance, strictly speaking, two, thought and extension, make creatures, so for Spinoza God and creatures exist by the univocal necessity. Thanks to this sharing of attributes, not only does God appear as immanent in creatures, but also the latter as immanent in the former. In this reciprocal immanence, there is no need for the idea of a transcendent agent of creation from above, because God is in everything and everything is in God.

The difference between these two philosophers on how to treat extension and how to conceive of God brings about the difference between their basic positions. In Spinoza, since both extension and thought constitute substance, between the body as the mode of the former and the mind as the mode of the latter is equality, and the state of the body and the state of the mind correspond to each other. The idea of immanent God whose attributes include extension leads to parallelism. In Leibnitz, since extension does not constitute substance but is created by it, the mind composed of thought as one of absolute forms is regarded as superior to the body composed of extension. Hence, imitating God who creates extension, the soul rules the body as its ideal cause. The idea of transcendent God whose absolute forms excludes extension leads to idealism.

Here is the answer to the first question. The reason for the divergence of Leibniz and Spinoza’s positions, in spite of their supposition of God as the true cause of everything, resides in the difference in their notions of extension. Whether extension is conceived as
excluded from or included in the forms or attributes constituent of God’s existence divides idealism and parallelism. The exclusion of extension from these forms or attributes results in the claim of the superiority of the mind over the body, whereas the inclusion of extension in these forms or attributes results in the claim of the equality of both.

This difference makes Spinoza’s idea of God decisively distinguishable from those of many other philosophers: God who is immanent in creatures and in whom they are immanent. In fact, this reciprocal immanence is an alias of the equivalence of the existence of God and the production by Him, both these being based on the sharing of the same attributes by God and modes.

To say that the essence of God is power, is to say that God produces an infinity of things by virtue of the same power by which He exists. Therefore He produces them just as He exists [Il les produit donc comme il existe]. Cause of all things “in the same sense” as cause of Himself, He produces all things in his attributes, since His attributes constitute at once His essence and His existence. (SPE: 83; 94; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

What is meant here is that God exists and produces in the same way, because He does both by the same attributes. Since an infinity of attributes each of which expresses an infinite essence constitute a single Being, to God’s essence belongs absolutely infinite power to exist as the totality of all these attributes. Having this power entails having a capacity to be affected by itself in an infinity of ways. Therefore, God, in existing, produces an infinity of things in an infinity of ways as His affections. That is to say, the existence of God is at one with the production by Him. This equivalence is bridged by attributes which constitute His existence and by which He produces an infinity of things. It is crucial that extension is included in these attributes. For this inclusion ensures the continuity between God and all that He produces, even if the latter only have two of these attributes. Thus this inclusion
determines the reciprocal immanence of God and everything else, so that the latter is the mode of the former as a single substance. This is totally different from the situation of the creation by transcendent God, who, being free from and alien to extension, creates the world and everything in it from above. To mark this difference, Spinoza tended to replace the word ‘production’ for ‘creation’ and the word ‘mode’ for ‘creature’.

In such equivalence of God’s existence and His production is a clue to answering the second question. If we take this equivalence seriously, it follows that His existence is not only inseparable from but also even impossible without the existence of what He produces, rather than that God has preexisted and then produces. This is not the equation of God and what He produces, but the equation of God’s power to exist, His power to produce modes and their powers to exist. That God’s essence and existence are power means that God Himself is all these powers. For this God, strictly speaking, the word substance is no longer appropriate, insofar as it designates something permanent and unchangeable. Since God exists only in producing modes, as the power to produce them and as their powers to exist, God is only in such passage, or indeed, is this passage itself. At the same time as God exists as the One, He dissolves into multiple modes. Spinoza’s immanent God does not subjugate the multiple to the unity, because He is not the One separated from the multiple, but the One who is literally at one with the multiple, who appears only in His becoming multiple. That is why Spinoza could inspire Deleuze so that he would create his philosophy of difference, even though Spinoza was not the single source of this inspiration.3

2. Spinoza’s Ethical Practice in Contrast to Leibniz’s Moral Practice

In the equivalence of the existence of God and the production by Him in Spinoza’s philosophy, Deleuze detects a similar concept of power to that of Leibniz. On Spinoza’s
concept of power, Deleuze writes “The identity of power and essence means: a power is always an act or, at least, in action”, and “[T]here is no aptitude or capacity that remains ineffective, and so no power that is not actual” (SPE: 82; 93). If Spinoza’s God does not exist without producing, it is because God is this power in action itself. Spinoza’s idea of God thus entails the same concept of power in action as that in Leibniz. Such power was important in Leibniz’s moral practice which counsels the soul to incorporate the power of God. By this incorporation, the soul imitates God and God passes into the soul. This enables the soul to recover its own power, as a power in action. Deleuze finds in Spinoza a similar kind of practice to Leibniz’s on this point. In the former practice, as much as in the latter, what matters is the incorporation of God’s power in action by modes or creatures. But in spite of this similarity, the practices of these two philosophers should be different, given the difference between their basic positions and between their images of God. The dissimilarity of their practices also splits their ideas of the consequence of the incorporation of God’s power.4

The difference between Leibniz’s idealism and Spinoza’s parallelism underlies the difference of their theories of practice. Seeing the matter in Spinozist eyes, Deleuze criticizes the presupposition of idealist moral theory from a parallelist standpoint.

If parallelism is an original [originale] doctrine, this is not because it denies a real action between soul and body [de l’âme et du corps]. It is because it overturns the moral principle by which the actions of one are the passions of the other. “The order of actions and passions of our body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind.” What is a passion in the mind is also a passion in the body, what is an action in the mind is also an action in the body. Parallelism thus excludes any eminence of the soul, any spiritual and moral finality, any transcendence of a God who might base one series on the other. And parallelism is in this respect practically opposed not only to the doctrine of real action, but to the theories of preestablished harmony and occasionalism also. (SPE: 235; 256; italics
By insisting on the symmetry of the states of the mind and the body, parallelism is in stark contrast with the traditional moral principle which claims the asymmetry of these states. According to this principle, when one of these states is active, the other is passive. Although there are two combinations, that is, an action in the mind and a passion in the body, and a passion in the mind and an action in the body, the former pair is regarded as desirable, on account of the justice of the control by the mind over the body. In this respect, such principle is idealistic, and Leibniz’s theory of morality is one of its variants. In fact, the concepts of accord and melody, the soul’s unity inscribed into the multiplicity of the body and the world, and this unity’s leading the flux of this multiplicity, all these are possible only with recourse to the same rule as supposed in this principle. On the contrary, in parallelism, when either of the mind and the body is active, the other is so too, while either of them is passive, the other is also. When we think that our mind becomes active by ruling our body as something passive, indeed both our mind and body become passive. The mind which believes in its rule over the body puts both the mind and the body in servitude. That is why parallelism criticizes the traditional moral principle. In order to liberate the mind and the body from this servitude, practice must be conceived otherwise than the former’s rule over the latter.

In order to really think in terms of power [puissance], one must first of all pose the question with regard to the body [d’abord poser la question a propos du corps] (SPE: 236; 257; translation slightly altered).

To go to the limit of what we can [Aller jusqu’au bout de ce qu’on peut] is an ethical task properly so called. It is here that the Ethics takes the body as model; for every body extends its power as far as it can (SPE: 248; 269; italics in text. translation slightly altered).

As stated in these citations, the practice based on parallelism consists in letting the
mind explore what the body can do and thus pursuing the powers of the body and the mind. When either of the mind and the body becomes active, the other also does. So, if the mind tracks the body’s activity without restricting it, both the mind and the body increase their power. This is how the mind’s taking the body as model works. Deleuze names this practice ‘ethics’ after Spinoza’s *Ethics*. It is not by chance that in order to describe Spinoza’s practice Deleuze uses a word different from that for Leibnitz’s. This difference comes from Deleuze’s own terminology to distinguish morality and ethics. “Ethics, which is to say, a typology of immanent modes of existence, replaces Morality, which always refers existence to transcendent values” (SPP: 35; 23). While morality judges living things by transcendent values from above, ethics questions the immanent mode of existence of each living thing. Leibnitz’s practical theory, which presupposes the mind’s superiority to the body in the wake of transcendence of God, is a form of morality. It devalues the body and consequently represses the powers of the body and the mind. Spinoza’s ethics, advocating the equality of the body and the mind in immanent God, unchains the body from the rule by the mind and releases the power of them both. “The substitution of ethics for morality is a consequence of parallelism” (SPE: 236; 257). What is at issue is no more the transcendent maxim for everybody but an immanent question for each, since what one’s body can do, and how one’s mind can explore it, differs from person to person.

To be exact, “[w]hat it [a body] can do’ is its capacity to be affected, which is necessarily and constantly fulfilled by the relation of this being with others [rempli par la relation de cet être avec les autres]” (SPE: 248; 269; translation slightly altered). Affections which fulfill this capacity of a body are its modifications in relation to other bodies, including any change, that of its shape, act or state etc. There are two kinds of affections, actions and passions, whether they fulfill the body or the mind. Actions are the affections whose cause is the thing to which they emerge, while passions are those whose cause is not.
Insofar as we are prey to random encounter with external objects, most of our affections are passions. Two major passions in the mind are joy and sadness. We feel joy when we encounter the bodies which agree with us. Joyful passions are the feelings of the increase of our power as the result of the combination of our body with these bodies. On the contrary, we feel sadness when we encounter the bodies which disagree with us. Sad passions are the feeling of the decrease in our power as the result of the opposition between our body and these bodies or the decomposition of the former caused by the latter. Even if we can increase our power with joyful passions, it does not change the fact that our affections still depend on external objects. For Spinoza, the means to save ourselves from this passivity and make our affections active is the formation of the common notion.

The common notion is the notion of something common to plural bodies, concretely our body and the bodies it encounters. The thing which agrees or combines itself with our body is good. Given that in the basis of this combination of plural bodies should be something common to them, the common notion is the knowledge of the reason for this combination and for the goodness of the bodies thus combined with ours. As such, the common notion is an adequate idea in the sense that it expresses its cause. We increase our power and feel joy not only when our body encounters good things but also when our mind knows the reason for their goodness. The joy in the latter case is not given by external objects, but produced by our mind, from within it, in its understanding them. Such joy is no longer passion but action whose cause our mind itself is. Having the common notion enables us to turn our passion into action. “[P]assive joy is produced by an object that agrees with us, and whose power increases our power of action, but of which we do not yet have an adequate idea. Active joy we produce by ourselves, it flows from our power of action itself, follows from an adequate idea in us” (SPE: 253: 274).

Contrary to appearances, what is going on in this course is not the mind’s guiding the
body. Rather, it is the mind’s becoming active by following the body’s action. When the mind sees the commonness in plural bodies, it understands the reason for their combination. For the mind to do so is to locate in its body the cause of what happens among them, that is, to discover what the body can do. In doing so, the mind can locate in itself the cause of its idea of this very matter, discovering what the mind itself can do. Then the mind recognizes that not only this idea but also other ideas ensuing from it, including feelings, come from within this mind itself, all of them being active. “A mind that forms an adequate idea is the adequate cause of the ideas that follows from it: this is the sense in which it [a mind] is active” (SPE: 262; 283; italics in text). Finding the actions of the body leads the mind to turn from passions to actions, and not the reverse. The transformation of the passive affections into active ones by the formation of the common notion is a parallelistic practice par excellence.5

This practice is not unlike Leibniz’s on a few points. In Spinoza, while among passive affections of the mind are joy and sadness, all active affections are joy. So the transformation of passions into actions includes not only the change of the quality of joy but also the change of sadness into joy. The formation of the common notion brings about either or both of these changes.

Spinoza means that, even in the case of a body that does not agree with our own, and affects us with sadness, we can form an idea of what is common to that body and our own; the common notion will simply be very universal, implying a much more general viewpoint than that of the two bodies confronting each other. It has nonetheless a practical function: it makes us understand why these two bodies in particular do not agree from their own viewpoint [de leur propre point de vue]. … But when a very universal common notion makes us understand a disagreement, a feeling of active joy again flows from this: an active joy always follows from what we understand (SPE: 264-265; 285-286; italics in text, slightly altered)
What is meant here is that the common notion formed in terms of a body which disagrees with ours and brings sadness to us can change this sad passion into a joyful action. That these bodies disagree does not mean that there is nothing common between them. Insofar as they encounter each other, they should still have some commonness as the basis for this encounter. The commonness in this case would be quite general, beyond the similarity of the composition of the bodies in relation, and applicable to any body regardless of its particularity. In light of this generality or even universality, we can understand why a body does not agree with ours because of the particularity on the both sides. Here again, when the mind locates the cause of the affection of its body in this body itself, the mind can locate the cause of its affection in this mind itself. Then a passive sadness turns into an active joy. Even if the encounter with a body which disagrees with ours brings us a sad passion, the understanding of the reason for this disagreement engenders a joyful action from within this sad affection. The transformation of negative feelings into positive ones is a theme that Spinoza’s practice shares with Leibniz’s.

However we cannot always form the common notion when we feel a sad passion at the encounter with a bad thing. It is possible only on a certain condition. In observing this condition, another point of contact between the practices of the two philosophers will emerge.

But the sadness or opposition produced in us by a body that does not agree with our own never provides the occasion to form a common notion. So the process of forming common notions runs thus: We at first seek to experience a maximum of joyful passions (reason’s initial endeavor). So we seek to avoid sad passions, to escape their concatenation and to avert bad encounters. We then, secondly [en second lieu], use joyful passions to form corresponding common notions, whence flow active joys (the second effort of reason). These common notions are among the least universal, since they apply only to my body and to bodies that agree with it. But they strengthen our ability to avoid bad encounters; and above all they put
us in possession of our power of action and understanding. Thus, third, we become capable of forming more universal common notions that apply in all cases, even to bodies opposed to us; we become capable of understanding even our sadness, and of drawing from such understanding an active joy. (SPE: 266; 287; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

As stated above, in order to form the common notion from a sad passion, it is necessary to have gone through two previous stages. First, we must have experienced joyful passions for good bodies as much as possible. Secondly, we must have formed the common notions applicable to these bodies and ours. After these two steps we can form a third: the more general common notions valid for all bodies, including those opposed to ours. Only at this stage are we able to draw active joys from passive sadness. What is important in the transition from the second stage to the third is, as the phrase “above all” tells us, that the common notions formed in terms of the bodies which agree with ours give us the power of action and understanding. It is the acquisition of this power that enables us to form the more general common notions even in the face of sad passions which cannot be the occasions for these notions.

The combination of our body with others in agreement alone does not fully explain the acquisition of this power. Why does the power to form a general or universal common notion ensue from a particular combination of particular bodies? It is because a less general common notion we form at first not only designates the similarity of composition proper to these bodies, but also expresses something beyond it. “[E]ach common notion, on its own level, expresses God and leads us to knowledge of God” (SPE: 278; 298). “Each [Chaque] common notion expresses God as the source of the relations combined together in the bodies to which this notion applies” (SPE: 278; 298; translation slightly altered). One may object that we do not necessarily think of God when we conceive the commonness of plural bodies. Indeed, when it is said that each common notion expresses God and leads to knowledge of
God, it does not matter whether we are conscious of God as Himself or not.

Deleuze describes the way in which the common notion expresses God as follows:

Thus common notions give us knowledge of the positive order of Nature in the sense of [au sens de] an order of constitutive or characteristic relations by which bodies agree with, and are opposed to, one another. Laws of Nature no longer appear as commands and prohibitions, but for what they are: eternal truths, norms of composition, rules for the realization of powers [pouvoirs]. This order of Nature expresses God as its source; and the more we know things according to this order, the more our ideas themselves express God’s essence. All our knowledge expresses God, when it is governed by common notions. (SPE: 270-271; 291-292; translation slightly altered)

In a word, if we can say that the common notion expresses God, it is insofar as it is the notion of the order of Nature, the order which decides the agreement and disagreement of plural bodies. The similarity of composition of bodies designated by the common notion is the reason for their agreement and composition and, as such, is a part of this order. Nature in which all bodies continuously compose and decompose themselves is God viewed in a certain aspect who produces an infinity of things in an infinity of ways. Talking of Nature as “the sum of all the variations of matter in movement” or “the face of the whole universe” in Spinoza’s words, “[t]his face or sum corresponds to God’s omnipotence insofar as the latter comprises all the degrees of power or all the modal essences in this same attribute of extension” (SPE: 188; 206). The order of Nature, the order of the composition and decomposition of bodies, is the order in which God’s power realizes itself. This order is established by the exercise of God’s power and God does not exist outside of this exercise. To this extent the common notion, which comprises a part of the knowledge of the natural order of composition and decomposition, expresses as its source God who is power itself. To have the common notion is to know something about God as power. This is what it means
that the common notion expresses God and leads to knowledge of God.

Further, to have the common notion is not only to know this power but also to participate in it. “They [common notions] are explained by our power of thinking because, being in us as they are in God, they fall within our own power as they fall within the absolute power of God” (SPE: 258; 279). The notion which expresses God’s power, or God as power, is the same as the notion by which God understands Himself, and in this sense is in us just as it is in God. Certainly, if our notion is the same as God’s, it is merely in limited aspects. But that we have such a notion means that our power of thinking has become part of God’s power of thinking. Therefore to have the common notion is not only to know God as power but also to embody in ourselves such power working in this notion. If even the least general common notion gives us the power of action and understanding enough to form the most general common notion, it is because the former notion enables us to embody this power outside ours. It is only by the latter common notion we can transform our sad passions into joyful actions. Then the incorporation of God’s power, in supporting the formation of this notion, mediates this transformation. Here is the second similarity of Spinoza’s practice to Leibniz’s, which complements the first.

However these similarities can never cover the dissimilarities of the two kinds of practices. Even if the incorporation of God’s power has an indispensible part in the practices of the two philosophers, their ideas of God are different. So are their concepts of the kind of power and what its incorporation means. In Leibniz, God transcends the world and everything in it. The soul’s incorporation of God’s power means the former’s imitation of the latter. Just as God confers unity on the world He creates, the soul finds its unity inscribed into the body and the world. The power to be incorporated works through unity to integrate multiplicity. In Spinoza, God and everything in the world are immanent in each other. God’s power is exercised in producing an infinity of things as His modification so that His unity is
at one with their multiplicity. God’s power works through genuine multiplicity without being integrated into unity. To incorporate such power has a different outcome in Spinoza from that in Leibniz.

In Spinoza, the best state the mind can attain by this incorporation is through the acquisition of the third kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the essences of things. The common notion, the second kind of knowledge, once it is gained, inevitably leads to this third kind of knowledge. Contrary to appearances, this progress does not go in the direction to efface the differences among things based on their commonness. For the most general common notion, the notion of attribute, brings us, beyond the generality of all things, to the knowledge of their singularities. “An attribute is no longer understood merely as a common property of all the existing modes corresponding to it, but as what constitutes the singular essence of divine substance, and as what contains all the particular essences of its modes” (SPE: 279; 300; italics in text). For example, once we understand all bodies in the attribute of extension, on the basis of this common criterion we can grasp them in the degrees of their respective powers of existing in space. Thus the knowledge of what is common to all things, by comprehending them all, opens a way to the knowledge of the singular to each thing in relation to others. This third kind of knowledge is of the essences as such singularities and of their relations.  

Thus Spinoza can oppose the third kind of knowledge to the second, by saying that the second shows us in general terms that everything that exists depends on God, but the third alone allows us to understand the dependence of some given essence in particular. On the other hand, however, each essence agrees with all others. For all essences are involved in the production of each. This is no longer a matter of [It ne s’agit plus de] more or less general relative agreement between existing modes, but of an agreement that is at once singular and absolute, of each essence with all others. So the mind cannot know an essence, that is, know a thing sub specie aeternitatis, without being determined to know still more things, and to desire
On the one hand, the second kind of knowledge, designating the connection of all things through the attribute common to them, tells us of their dependence on God. On the other hand, the third kind of knowledge, revealing the equivalence of the essence of God and those of all things, tells us of the interdependence of their singular essences. While the former knowledge makes us understand God in an attribute, the latter makes us understand God in the essences or powers of all things each of which is a part of God’s essence or power. The dependence of all things on God, once understood abstractly, proves to be the interdependence of their essences grasped in the concrete. The progress from the second kind of knowledge to the third repeats the transition from the constitution of God’s existence to the production of all things by the mediation of attributes. The power or essence of God disperses itself into the powers or essences of all things without unifying them by His unity, not only in reality but also in knowledge. “Each essence is a part of God’s power, and is thus conceived through God’s essence itself, insofar as God’s essence is explicated through that essence” (SPE: 283; 304; italics in text). God’s essence is not there without being explicated by the essences of modes and God’s power is not there without being participated in by modes. It consists in diverging into their powers and developing itself through them. At the last stage of the incorporation of this power, with the third kind of knowledge, the mind comes to know lots of things along with their relations and wants to know still more, producing lots of ideas as God also does. Correspondingly, the mind finds that all things including itself and its body, are related to each other and fulfilled with lots of affections, producing still more affections as God does. In Spinoza’s practice, to incorporate God’s power is to open both the body and the mind to more and more modifications and connections, until both lose their identities in the diversities of their products.
In such states of the mind and the body, more precisely, in the thought of the body and in the body thought in it, Deleuze sees something like music.

In effect [En effet], the kinetic proposition tells us that a body is defined by relations of movement [mouvement] and rest, of slowness and speed between particles. That is, it is not defined by a form or by functions. Global form, specific form, and organic functions depend on relations of speed and slowness. Even the development of a form, the course of the development of a form, depends on these relations, and not the reverse. The important thing is to understand life, each individuality of life [chaque individualité de vie], not as a form, or a development of form, but as a complex relation between differential velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A composition of speeds and slowness on a plane of immanence. In the same way, a musical form will depend on a complex relation between speeds and slownesses of sound particles. It is not just a matter of music but of how to live: it is by speed and slowness that one slips in among things, that one connects with something else. One never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms. (SPP: 165-166; 123; italics in translation; translation slightly altered)

Here Deleuze finds musical forms in the relations of movement and rest, of slowness and speed, between particles constituent of bodies. Connecting with each other, bodies make a group or, indeed, constitute a new body on a higher level, so to speak. In this constitution, bodies affect each other and exchange their particles which move from one body to another with specific speeds and slowness. The relations between such speeds and slownesses show the arrangement of such particles at each moment, formed when they accelerate or decelerate in their reciprocal influences. This relation, that is, the proportion of the move of one particle to that of another, like the differential, stands for the change of the moving figure drawn by their traces. In this sense, speeds and slownesses of particles are called differential velocities, and the sum of all their relations decides the shape of the body constituted by all the particles at that time. What kind of body is constituted depends on what kind of relations of speeds
and slowness these particles have. Given that our body always encounters other bodies and changes with them, such relations are the matters of how we shape our body and create our life. Music as Deleuze conceives of it here is the composition of bodies based on such relations and the composition of the thought of these bodies in the same sense as the composition of a piece of music.

Such music is the outcome of Spinoza’s practice whose means is the formation of the common notion. For, even if there is no mention of its name in the above citation, it is exactly the common notion that enables such composition in the Spinozist perspective. The common notion, in designating the commonality of plural bodies, indeed the similarity of their composition, manifests the possibility of the combination of these bodies. In this sense, “a common notion is the representation of a composition between two or more bodies, and a unity of this composition” (SPP: 127; 54). By having the common notion, the mind knows that its body with other bodies composes a new body, and then the mind lives this body as its own. The relations of speeds and slownesses of particles, insofar as they are established among the connected bodies and make up the shape of a new body, are the constituents of this composition. Therefore to have the common notion is to sum up these relations, to compose a new body from plural bodies, and to compose a new mind which thinks of it, while making in this composition a likeness to music.

Given the similarity of Spinoza’s practice to that of Leibniz, it is no wonder that the musical forms, as their products, also have some similarity. The word “differential” which Deleuze uses to describe the components of both musical forms makes them comparable. In Leibniz’s case, Deleuze likened to the differentials the relations established among minute perceptions when they are integrated into a great one. Parallel to this, in Spinoza’s case, Deleuze refers to ‘differentials’ as the relations of speeds and slownesses of particles, that is, the relations which make up a composition of a body from plural bodies. In Leibniz, the
accord meant the relation of the relations among minute perceptions to a great perception, in other words, the relation of the differentials to their integral. In Spinoza, the equivalent to the accord is the relation of the relations of speeds and slownesses with the shape of a body composed from the sum of these relations. In Leibniz, whether the relations of minute perceptions harmonize with each other, whether the integration of these perceptions is successful, decided what kind of accord is produced, consonant or dissonant, major or minor. If the same holds for Spinoza, what decides the kind of accord in his case is whether the relations of speeds and slownesses are well coordinated across all the bodies in connection, that is, whether these bodies agree with each other. In other words, the consonant accord and the dissonant accords in Leibniz correspond to the good encounter and the bad encounter, or joy and sadness as their signs, in Spinoza. What matters in Leibniz’s practice is to resolve minor dissonant accords into major consonant accords. The equivalent act in Spinoza’s practice is to turn sad passions into joyful actions. Thus the musical forms in the two philosophers appear in the transformation of negative feelings into positive ones, in correlation with the generation of an ensemble from elements concerning both the mind and the body.

However, just as the practices of the two philosophers are dissimilar, so also are the musical forms produced in these practices. In describing the music composed and played in Spinoza’s thought, Deleuze alludes to their divergence.

How do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum? How can a being take another being into its world, but while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world? And in this regard, what are the different types of sociabilities, for example? What is the difference between the society of human beings and the community of rational beings? … [sic] Now we are concerned, not with a relation of point to counterpoint, nor with the selection of a world, but with a symphony of Nature,
the composition of a world that is increasingly wide and intense. In what order and in what manner will the powers, speeds, and slownesses be composed? (SPP: 169-170; 126)

In a word, the composition of an individual can go on to higher levels, from an individual to a group, from a group to a society, and, at the end of this progress, Nature as a whole reveals itself as a sort of symphony. This symphony is composed of all such individuals, composing and decomposing themselves, exchanging particles and traversing all levels. The Spinozist musical form culminates here. It reminds us of the counterpoint in Leibniz, as the ensemble of all accords and melodies played by all souls and bodies in the single and best world. However Deleuze claims above that a Spinozist symphony of Nature has no relation to counterpoint. Besides, when he writes that this symphony has no relation to the selection of a world, we can read this as his insinuation about Leibniz’s idea that this world has been selected as the best from all possible worlds. These remarks suggest the differences of the Spinozist symphony from the Leibnizian counterpoint in Deleuze’s eyes.

In fact, the motifs of counterpoint and of the selection of the world illustrate the conspicuous characteristic not only in Leibniz’s musical form but also his thought in general. In Leibnizian counterpoint, all accords and melodies, responding to each other, weave a concerto as a whole. This mutual response is expected to produce harmonies among these accords and melodies, and to go towards the final resolution of dissonance into harmony. This is not without relation to the selection of this world as the best. If this world is the best of all possible worlds, it is because, while containing dissonances in its parts, it realizes, all the more, the most perfect harmony in the totality. The concept of counterpoint and that of the selection of the world suppose in common the predestination to harmony. This supposition is relevant to the integration of minute perceptions into a great one, of pain into pleasure, on the minimum scale. In any case, it implies the rigid dichotomy between
harmony and disharmony, the former being superior and the latter inferior, to justify the resolution of the latter into the former.

Breaking with this supposition, the Spinozist musical form differs from the Leibnizian. Certainly Spinoza agrees with Leibniz in terms of the value of joyful feelings over painful ones. But Spinoza conceives the way in which this value is put into practice otherwise than Leibniz. The joy ensuing from the common notion is not of the same kind as the joy ensuing from the good encounter in opposition to the bad encounter. The common notion teaches us that the both encounters have their causes in the bodies which encounter each other. This knowledge gives us such joy that is no longer passive but active. The active joy can emerge either from joyful passion or from sad passion, and as such is beyond the opposition between the good and bad encounters or between sad and joyful passions. Good and bad are relative ideas in principle, different from individual to individual, since the bad for one body can be good for another, and vice versa. When we can change our sad passion for a bad encounter into a joyful action, the most general common notion has made us surpass our particularity and attain to the viewpoint of Nature. At this point, we come to think of an ensemble composed of all bodies and take our body as its part so that our body and mind together play a symphony of Nature. We have passed from the second kind of knowledge to the third and grasped all things in their essences related to each other. The third kind of knowledge enables us to realize that all that happens to us comes from our own essences and therefore are fundamentally active affections, including our joy in gaining this insight. There is no distinction between good and bad, joyful and sad passions, accords and disaccords. Neither is there the final resolution of the latter into the former. There are only variations of various kinds of accords with their own nuances, moving across such distinctions, as the continual composition and decomposition of bodies and particles throughout Nature, corresponding to the parallel movement of our thought of it.
The difference between the two types of musical form of the two philosophers reflects the difference of their ideas of practice and God. Leibniz’s practice consists in the soul’s imitation of God and inscription of its unity into the body and the world. The accord produced by the soul is the unity of multiplicity enabled by this inscription. This accord is analogous to the harmony realized by God in the world. The transcendence of God and the soul’s rule over the body connote the superiority of that which gives unity to that which is given it, overlapping with the superiority of unity to multiplicity. Hence is the superiority of accord to disaccord, which undergirds the final resolution of disharmony into harmony. Spinoza’s practice consists in the mode’s participation in God’s power and the production of multiplicity in the body and the mind. The equivalent of accord is the composition of a body from particles or bodies and the composition of a corresponding thought. The accord here is also the unity of multiplicity in a sense. But rather than being inscribed from above, it emerges from within components as their combination. The mutual immanence between God and everything and the equality of the body and the mind lead to the absence of regulating unity and the affirmation of multiplicity as such. There is neither superiority nor inferiority between accord and disaccord, nor the final resolution of the latter into the former, but the endless multiplication of various nuanced accords beyond their opposition. Just as the different basic positions of the two philosophers result in their different ideas of God and practice, these ideas result in different conceptions of musical form as the product of practice.

3. Immanence Subsuming Transcendence

Even if Leibniz and Spinoza’s practices are different, it does not necessarily mean the two kinds of practice are separated from and independent of each other. Returning to
Deleuze’s statement on the relation between parallelism and idealism, on which these practices are based, he wrote “The mistake in the idealist interpretation is to turn against parallelism an argument that is an integral part of it, or to understand as a proof of ideality an argument of the pure causality [un argument de la pure causalité]” (SPE: 291; 312; translation slightly altered). This means that, while idealism addresses the same matter as parallelism does, the former does it erroneously and distorts the matter so that it contradicts the latter. If this is the case, it follows that what Spinoza theorizes is a truer expression of what Leibnitz theorizes and under the guise of the latter’s practice is the former’s practice.

We can discern the shadow of Spinoza’s practice in the discussion on Leibniz’s so far. In the latter, the soul recognizes its power by taking as the inscription of its unity the unity of what happens to the body. This recognition relies on the equation between the unity of the change of perception within the soul and the unity of the movement outwith the soul, between the unity of what the soul does and the unity of what happens to the body. However, that the discovery of the soul’s unity is possible only through the discovery of the unity of what happens to the body means that the soul knows its power by exploring what the body can do. The ideal causality by which the soul acts upon the body is established only on the premise of the preceding parallelism between the soul and the body. The attempt to establish such ideal causality is the attempt to confirm this parallelism.

Deleuze has suggested this direction of thought in his discussion on the reading by the soul. Reviewing this discussion, when the soul maximizes its amplitude, encompassing all its acts or attitudes in the past, the present and the future, the soul grasps the effort or tendency which penetrates all that happens to it. To read is to grasp this effort or tendency. It is to elucidate all that happens to the soul in light of its maximum unity. On this topic, Deleuze writes:
Reading does not consist in concluding from the idea of a preceding condition the idea of the following condition, but in grasping the effort or tendency by which the following condition itself ensues from the preceding ‘by means of a natural force’. (PLB: 99; 72).

We see that, when “the following condition itself ensues from the preceding” by the effort or tendency, this occurs ‘by means of a natural force’. So the effort or tendency which the soul grasps in reading is equivalent to that of a natural force which carries the preceding condition to the following. If the soul grasps its effort or tendency inherent in all that happens to it and maximizes its unity, it is by detecting the coherence in the fluctuating multiplicity of the body and the world, and grasping the effort or tendency of the natural force working in them. This coincides with what Spinoza’s practice suggests doing, although it is expressed in a different form. That is to say, the mind gets the knowledge of something common in plural bodies and discovers the power of the body parallel to the power of the mind. From the standpoint of Spinoza’s practice, the unity which the soul finds to have been its own unity in Leibniz’s practice, the unity inscribed in the multiplicity of the body and that of the world, is the unity which has subsisted in the multiplicity itself of the body and the world. If the soul can equate the latter unity with the former, it is because the soul has had in itself the similar unity of multiplicity, corresponding to that which is found in the body and the world. Hence the discovery of this unity does not amount to the discovery of the power solely of the soul exercised upon the body and the world, as Leibniz conceives, but to the discovery of the powers of both the mind and the body working together, as Spinoza conceives. Just as an attempt at establishing the Leibnizian ideal causality ends up with confirming the Spinozist parallelism, in the guise of Leibniz’s moral practice which insists on the soul’s control over the body is Spinoza’s ethical practice which advocates the equality of the mind and the body.

The same holds for the different images of God implied in these different ideas of
practice, and this difference concerns the difference of the images of the unity as a possible representation of power in these two philosophers. In the Leibnizian reading, the unity which the soul finds in the body and the world is supposed to be the inscription of the unity of the soul approximating the unity of God, the powers of the soul and God being exercised by these unities. From the Spinozist point of view, this unity is found in the connection of the multiple elements in the body, every time these elements are connected, and if their connection changes, so also does the unity found in it. Rather than being inscribed in the multiple from above, unity indeed comes from the multiple and returns to it, in both the body and the mind. The same is true of the unity of God encountered in the formation of the common notion. When the mind forms the notion of the attribute of extension, common to all bodies and their modifications, the mind also forms the notion of the attribute of thought, common to all minds and their modifications. Then the mind has an idea of God expressed as the combination of these two attributes and the cause of all their modifications. Although the mind proceeds from the unity of plural bodies to the unity of the attribute of extension and, correspondently, to the unity of the attribute of thought, and then to the unity of God composed of different attributes, attaining this maximum unity is not the final goal for the mind. Since God exists only in producing an infinity of things in all attributes, His unity consists solely in the multiplicity of the things thus produced. The unity of God appears from the multiplicity of attributes and disappears into the multiplicity of modes. His power equal to Himself does not reside in the stasis of unity but in the dynamism of the movement from multiplicity to unity and from unity to multiplicity. The formation of the common notion of plural things reveals that the mind and the body have been repeating the same movement as that of the totality whose parts they are, and in this movement is the participation of God’s power by both of them. The representation of power as unity is the abstraction of a certain transitional state in this movement. The God, conceived as the possessor of this power, who
is far beyond multiple things and rules them from above by this power is the substantialization of a phase of the God, who, personifying the power of the passage between the one and the multiple, appears from the multiple and disappears into them. Thus Leibniz’s transcendent God is a mask of Spinoza’s immanent God.

The relation between the perspective disclosed with the idea of immanent God and that of the idea of transcendent God overlaps with the relation between two kinds of planes conceived by Deleuze and Guattari. A plane for them is at once a thought of the world and a world thought by this thought. The two kinds of planes the authors distinguish are a plane of immanence and a plane of transcendence.

A plane of immanence, conceived under the influence of Spinoza, is a very important notion in Deleuze’s philosophy. Although this notion will be discussed later, I will mention it as far as the argument so far is concerned. When Deleuze spoke of the musical form in the composition of speeds and slownesses of particles, in passing he referred to the field in which it takes place, and called it a plane of immanence (SPP: 166; 123). A plane of immanence is equal to Nature as a whole which reveals itself when the composition reaches its highest level, that is, as the dimension in which a symphony of Nature is composed. In fact, he describes a plane of immanence as “[a] plane of musical composition, a plane of Nature, insofar as the latter is the fullest and most intense Individual, with parts that vary in an infinity of ways” (SPP: 170; 126). When an individual finds its body to be connectable to all others and modifiable in many ways, Nature appears as the composite of all bodies including that of this individual. A plane of immanence is this Nature and the thought of it, and as such is a dimension in which everything enters into universal communication. Composing and decomposing itself in its connection with others, everything incessantly changes its shape. So there is no privileged shape to be achieved or maintained.
There is no longer a form, but only relations of velocity between infinitesimal particles of an unformed material. There is no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force. Here the plan is concerned only with movements [des mouvements] and rests, with dynamic affective charges. (SPP: 172; 128)

On a plane of immanence are only the relations of differential velocities and the affective states that individualize bodies; and neither form nor subject is there. Since such individualization varies from time to time according to the change of these relations and affects, any individual cannot be confined in a certain figure. Therefore a plane of immanence lacks predetermined organizations of predetermined shapes.⁸

In contrast, there is another plane for such organizations.

It always involves forms and their developments, subjects and their formations. Development of forms and formation of subjects: this is the basic feature of this first type of plan. Thus, it is a plan of organization or development. Whatever one may say, then, it will always be a plan of transcendence that directs forms as well as subjects, and that stays hidden…⁹ In fact [en effet], it has an additional dimension; it always implies a dimension supplementary to the dimension of the given. (SPP: 172; 128; translation slightly altered).

A plane of transcendence is a dimension in which the organizations of the shapes of entities are directed in certain ways towards certain ends by the being in another supplementary, indeed, superior dimension. Therefore the developments of forms and the formations of subjects belong to this plane. The predetermined organization of a predetermined shape needs what predetermines it aside from the mode of existence of that entity. To this extent, such organization is the “organization that comes from above” (SPP: 172; 128) and as such is a component of a plane of transcendence.

If a plane of immanence is a “plane of musical composition”, so also can be a plane of transcendence, although the manner of composition of each plane is different. The music
played in Spinoza’s ethical practice endlessly produces variety of accords beyond the opposition of accord and disaccord. This is in the same manner that various types of individuals compose and decompose themselves in an infinity of ways on a plane of immanence of Nature. Conversely, the music played in Leibniz’s moral practice gives accord priority to disaccord and aims at resolving the latter into the former. Composed in this manner, Nature appears as the counterpoint in which the value of harmony regulates the succession of motifs or the coexistence of elements. Insofar as this value is ultimately grounded in the idea of God’s creation of the single and the best world that itself embodies the most perfect harmony, this value is not inherent in accord and disaccord themselves but extrapolated from another, supposedly higher, dimension. Thus the Leibnizian music of Nature composes a plane of transcendence on which the formation and the organization of the things are predestined from above so that specific outcomes are favored. The two types of music found in the thoughts of the two philosophers are the specimens of the two types of planes, although they are not the sole specimens.

However opposed the two plan(e)s are, Deleuze and Guattari did not think that these planes were separated from each other.

There are two very contrary conceptions of the word “plan,” or of the idea of a plan, even if these two conceptions blend into one another and we go from one to the other imperceptibly. (SPP: 171-172; 128)

Why does the opposition between the two kinds of planes lead to a still more abstract hypothesis? Because one continually passes from one to the other, by unnoticeable degrees and without being aware of it, or one becomes aware of it only afterward. Because one continually reconstitutes one plane atop another, or extricates one from the other. (MP: 330; 269)

No sooner than one finds oneself on either of these two kinds of planes, one passes from the
one plane to the other, and vice versa. But this does not mean an equality and a complementarity of these planes. If a plane of immanence leads to a plane of transcendence, it is because an infinity of individuations possible on the former includes even developments of forms and formations of subjects. If a plane of transcendence leads to a plane of immanence, it is because forms and subjects are neither rigid nor solid but always vulnerable to the changes into other types of individuations. The continual passage between the two planes shows the radical nature and comprehensiveness of a plane of immanence in relation to a plane of transcendence. The music which supposes the strict opposition between accord and disaccord and the resolution of the latter into the former is one of many possible forms of the music which arranges various types of accords in various ways.

The same is true of the relation between the Spinozist and Leibnizian perspectives opened up in the two types of practice along with the two different images of God implied in them. In Leibniz, the objective of moral practice is the accomplishment of the spiritual subjectivity in imitation of God in the way that the soul rules the body analogically to God’s rule over the world. Just as the composition of accord does, the formation of subject has priority on a plane of transcendence. God is the additional superior dimension which grounds this priority. In Spinoza, the objective of ethical practice is the engagement of the mind and the body in the composition and decomposition beyond their individuality, in the manner of God as the one who is composed of the multiple and decomposed into it. Just as the multiplicity encompassing accord and disaccord as its parts, the multiplicity of modifications produced in the repetitious composition and decomposition is at issue on a plane of immanence. God, who exists nowhere else but this process, is a plane of immanence itself. If under the guise of Leibniz’s practice is that of Spinoza and the transcendent God in Leibniz’s philosophy is a mask of the immanent God in Spinoza’s philosophy, it is in the same way as a plane of transcendence comes from and goes back to a plane of immanence, the latter plane
being more radical and comprehensive than the former.\(^\text{10}\)

Based on the discussion so far, we can answer the question of how we should rethink the Leibnizian framework so that we can draw from it some significance in conformity with Deleuze’s thought. In Deleuze’s discussion of Leibniz, there are surely the motifs which are contrary to Deleuze’s thought: the superiority of the mind to the body and that of unity to multiplicity, the imposition of the unity of the mind upon the multiplicity of the body, the resolution of disharmony into harmony, transcendent God abstracted from and ruling over the material. If all these motifs have their place in Deleuze’s thought, it is not in themselves, but insofar as they are inseparably connected with and directly led to other motifs with which Deleuze would be sympathetic. The equality of the body and the mind, the affirmation of multiplicity, the exploration of the unity inherent in multiplicity in both the body and the mind, new accords beyond the opposition of harmony and disharmony, immanent God constituted by all attributes and dissolved into His products in them: these are the motifs which Deleuze finds in Spinoza’s philosophy. These Spinozist motifs are the truer expression of what the Leibnizian motifs mean to express, and to this extent the former motifs underlies the latter. Hence, at least in the context of Deleuze’s thought, the latter have their significance only if they play the role of the gateway to the former, bringing us to a broader field beneath them.

4. Kenotic Life of Spinozist Christ, Kenotic Death of Bartleby a New Christ

The same would be true of the image of the suicidal death of the martyr as the acme of the Leibnizian practice. If Spinoza’s thought gives the more exact expression of what Leibniz’s thought means to express, underneath the image of the death of the martyr should be another image of death, not as an epitome of the accomplishment of subjectivity but that
of the embodiment of endless modifications. What such an epitome can be, according to the Spinozist framework, is the death of Christ.

What is meant here is not the Christ whom Deleuze and Guattari treat as the exponent of the Western human subject, when they write “The face is Christ. The face is the typical European” (MP: 216; 176). What is at issue is the Christ viewed from another angle, whose figure is, however, somehow related to that in the above sense. When Deleuze and Guattari speak of the face, they do not take it simply as a specific part of a body. Drawn forth from other bodily parts, it concentrates all their features and thus functions as a mark to classify and identify the kind of human. As the device of such identification accompanied with discrimination, Deleuze and Guattari call the face the machine of faciality. When they equate Christ with the face itself, they find him to be the personification of this device, whose figure is taken as the ideal of the Western white man and, as such, is professed to be the representative model of all humans lined in hierarchy. However this is just one side of the matter, since, as Deleuze and Guattari shrewdly add, Christ has another “face”. Taking an example of painting, in the Christian world, many artists have frequently painted Christ as the privileged subject of their works. Ironically, this canonization of Christ makes him deviate from the very canon that he is supposed to personify.

On the brighter side, painting has exploited all the resources of the Christ-face. Painting has taken the abstract white wall/black hole machine of faciality in all directions, using the face of Christ to produce every kind of facial unit and every degree of deviance. In this respect, there is an exultation in the painting of the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, like an unbridled freedom. Not only did Christ preside over the facialization of the entire body (his own) and the landscapification of all milieus (his own), but he composed all of the elementary faces and had every divergence at his disposal: Christ-athlete at the fair, Christ-Mannerist queer, Christ-Negro, or at least a Black Virgin at the edge of the wall. The most prodigious strokes of madness appear on canvas under the auspices of the Catholic Church.
When the hegemony of the face of the ideal man extends over other people than the normal white men, the presence of these others cannot but affect this ideal face so as to transform it and question its hegemony. The universalized canon, by universalizing itself and subsuming all exceptions, is in turn affected and contested by them. It is in the same way as “the more a language has or acquires the characteristics of a major language, the more it is affected by continuous variations that transpose it into a ‘minor’ language” (MP: 130; 102). It is just as well English, as it globally spreads and becomes a kind of world language, cannot but be acted upon and transformed by its dialects and other languages. Christ, just in being the face of everybody, loses his original face and gains various faces, until the face stops being the face. The most ideal Western human subject is haunted by many different kinds of individuations other than subjectivation, even other than humanization. The Spinozist framework will help us to view Christ from this angle. Strangely enough, a Christological concept irrelevant to Deleuze’s thought throws light on his anomalous Christ image.

This concept is kenosis, in which Christ’s birth, life and death is understood in the wake of God’s creation. In order to create creatures as finite beings, God as infinite Being humiliates Himself. It is in the same way that Christ is born as human and sacrifices himself in his acts leading to his crucifixion, by humiliating himself as God’s son. In short, Christ emptying himself in this birth, life and death repeats his Father’s act of emptying Himself to create. Usually Christology discerns two kinds of kenosis: kenosis in Christ’s incarnation and kenosis in his self-sacrifice up to crucifixion.¹¹

Intriguingly, even though Spinoza contested with the idea of God’s creation, the notion of kenosis fits well his idea of an immanent God who disperses Himself into His products. Connected to the Spinozist framework, two Christ images corresponding to these two kinds
of kenosis are found in Deleuze’s works, although he had no intention of appropriating this Christological notion. What is pertinent to the consideration of suicidal death is the image corresponding to kenosis in crucifixion. But kenosis in the incarnation is also relevant. For, we can discern in Deleuze’s thought a path running from kenosis in incarnation to kenosis in crucifixion. In fact, if we take kenosis seriously in its extreme form, it is in a sense inevitable that this concept, as a consequence of emptying oneself, results in the demolition of the human subject, rather than in its accomplishment, and literal death can be one of the possible ways of this demolition.

A Christ image corresponding to kenosis in incarnation appears in *What Is Philosophy?*. Deleuze and Guattari speak of Christ’s incarnation in relation to one of three elements of philosophy as they conceive it; the plane of immanence.

Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-external outside and the not-internal inside— that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought, which was thought once, as Christ was incarnated once, in order to show, that one time, the possibility of the impossible. (QP: 59; 59-60)

As far as an element of philosophy in general is concerned, Deleuze and Guattari treat the plane of immanence as a nonconceptual intuition, presupposed by the concepts of a philosopher and directing his or her thought, as a kind of his or her implicit view of the whole reality. Hence many philosophers identify it with Being or the One. But, in whatever shape it is imaged, a plane of immanence of each philosopher is inevitably a particular kind of image of thought. Then one may wonder if there is THE plane of immanence presupposed by all planes of immanence and abstracted from all their particularities. “It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it” (QP: 59; 59).
Insofar as no one can be absolved from the particularity of his or her own thought, no one can think THE plane of immanence in itself. Nevertheless there is a way to express this plane. If a philosopher, instituting his or her plane of immanence, can allude to that which cannot be subsumed in it, but nevertheless is inseparably connected with it as its source, he or she succeeds in showing that there is THE plane of immanence. In other words, establishing a particular image of thought, one can suggest that the inside of this image is in contact with the outside from which it comes. If Deleuze and Guattari liken this situation to Christ’s incarnation, it is because, born in human conditions, he retains inside himself God’s infinite powers outside of these conditions, attesting to “the possibility of the impossible”, just as a particular plane of immanence points to THE plane of immanence outside of it.

It is Spinoza who succeeded in doing so by instituting his own plane of immanence, and in this sense “thought the ‘best’ plane of immanence”. On this point, Deleuze and Guattari find Spinoza to be somehow like Christ.

Thus Spinoza is the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers are hardly more than apostles who distance themselves from or draw near to this mystery. Spinoza, the infinite becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought the “best” plane of immanence — that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions. (QP: 59; 60)

The reason why Spinoza could draw the best plane of immanence consists in his notion of attributes.

He discovered that freedom exists only within immanence. He fulfilled philosophy because he satisfied its prephilosophical presupposition. Immanence does not refer back to the Spinozist substance and modes, but, on the contrary, the Spinozist concepts of substance and modes refer back to the plane of immanence as their presupposition. This plane presents two sides to us, extension and thought, or
rather its two powers, power of being and power of thinking. Spinoza is the vertigo of immanence from which so many philosophers try in vain to escape.

(QP: 50; 48)

Although there is no word of attribute in this passage, it is obvious that the plane of immanence which the concepts of substance and modes refer back to as their presupposition designate attributes. For attributes, as the forms common to substance and mode, constitute the former and produce the latter, defining their reciprocal immanence. THE plane of immanence that no one can think in itself means a totality of all attributes only two of which, extension and thought, we can think, according to Spinoza. But, based on real distinction, when we grasp even one attribute, all other attributes accompany it without division. These attributes give our notion of an attribute an immense nonconceptual implication, the unthinkable outside of thought. When we take this outside as the transcendent One, we are obliged to force a definite orientation on our thought. However, if we can suggest that the inside and outside of thought are immanent to each other, as substance and modes by the mediation of attributes, we can make an image of thought which allows the emergence of quite a lot of other images of thought freed from such an obligation. This is how Spinoza’s thought of attributes fulfilled the requirement for giving the prephilosophical presupposition not only of his own philosophy but also of the philosophy itself. By the notion of attributes, he draws such a plane that points to THE plane of immanence outside of all particular planes, including his. In this respect, he is likened to Christ who was born as a human and yet incarnates God outside of all human conditions.12

This is not only the matter of thought. Given that in Spinoza’s practical philosophy the acquisition of certain kinds of knowledge increases the powers of the body and the mind, what is at issue is also the matter of mode of existence. A following statement in *A Thousand Plateaus* shows this.
After all, is not Spinoza’s *Ethics* the great book of the BwO [body without organs]? The attributes are types or genuses of BwO’s, substances, powers, zero intensities as matrices of production. The modes are everything that comes to pass: waves and vibrations, migrations, thresholds and gradients, intensities produced in a given type of substance starting from a given matrix. (MP: 190; 153)

It is well known that Deleuze and Guattari appropriated Artaud’s concept of a body without organs. Artaud denounces organs with definite forms and functions as both agents and bearers of the judgment of transcendent God. Hence he tries to make himself a body without organs in opposition to an organism composed of such organs in order to have done with this judgment. In the above citation Deleuze and Guattari equate this body without organs with Spinoza’s attribute. At this point, we do not have to limit the attributes that exist for us humans merely to extension and thought, being true to Spinoza’s original concept. If we seriously take Deleuze’s words that “attributes are true *verbs* [de véritables *verbes*] in Spinoza” (SPE: 37; 45; italics in text; translation slightly altered), then, just as the acts of thinking and existing for us define the attributes of thought and extension, any act can define an attribute as a power exercised in this act. Here is a sort of mannerism similar to that of the Stoics or Leibnitz which allows us to generate literally an infinity of attributes from our manners of living. According to such a mannerism, since a way of happening of what happens determines a way of being of the thing to which it happens, what kind of attribute or power is there determines what kind of body has this attribute or power. The intensities of this power, the modes of this attributes, give the content of the experience lived by this body. Then to discover a power of our body each time some act occurs in it is to compose our body independently of the bondage by organs with definite forms and functions. In other words, to draw an attribute of our body from its act is to make ourselves a body without organs. So thought can be experimentation to quest a novel mode of existence.
You may guess, for example, what kind of body without organs an anorexic body would be. When one cannot eat or drink, and even move because of malnutrition, one encounters a power of one’s body unnoticed in one’s daily experience, a power to genuinely be there independently of normal functions. This power of existence is a body without organs in this case. With this body, one may feel lightness because of the emptiness in the viscera, or feel the heaviness because of the lack of energy. These feelings are the intensities which fill this body. Anorexia might be the result of social and cultural pressures which impel people to be healthy and constrain their bodies within the organs with normal functions. Or it might be caused by different kinds of social and cultural pressures which force people, especially women, to be slim and smart and have the beautifully shaped organs. The disease may be either resistance or subjugation. But, having fallen into this so-called unhealthy condition, one may escape from the constraint of such organs, and even may enjoy an eccentric experience which so-called healthy condition can never give. In doing so, one undermines those pressures and goes beyond the banality of fitness towards a kind of “great health”. This is how an anorexic body without organs can be a practice or experimentation.

To make oneself a body without organs by acquiring an attribute given by an act is not necessarily to confine oneself to this body or this attribute. Just as an infinity of attributes constitute a single substance without division in Spinoza’s philosophy, a body without organs enters into contact and fuses with all others.

The problem of whether there is a same substance for all substances [une même substance pour toutes les substances], a single substance for all attributes, becomes: Is there a totality of all BwO’s? If the BwO is already a limit, what must we say of the totality of all BwO’s? It is a problem not of the One and the Multiple but of a fusional multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple. A formal multiplicity of substantial attributes that, as such, constitutes the ontological unity of substance. (MP: 190-191; 154; italics in
In spite of the negative outlook of their statement, Deleuze and Guattari do not necessarily mean to deny that there is a totality of all bodies without organs. For they write elsewhere: “The plane of consistence would be the totality of all BwO, a pure multiplicity of immanence” (MP: 195; 157). Since Deleuze and Guattari do not distinguish between the plane of consistence and the plane of immanence at this point, they admit that there is a totality of all bodies without organs, which is a plane of immanence. When they write above “A formal multiplicity of substantial attributes that, as such, constitutes the ontological unity of substance”, they obviously assume a single substance constituted of all attributes in Spinoza’s philosophy. The comparison of this phrase with the following ones in Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy endorses this assumption. “All formally distinct attributes are referred by understanding to an ontologically single substance” (SPE: 56; 65). “Ontologically one, formally diverse, such is the status of attributes [le statut des attributs]” (SPE: 56; 66; translation slightly altered). If the authors thus allow for a totality of all bodies without organs, what they mean by their negative statement on such a totality is, rather than the denial of its existence, the denial of positing it somewhere else over and above each body without organs. “[A] fusional multiplicity…beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple” signifies that each attribute is fused with all other attributes and together with them constitutes a substance, in short, that one attribute is merged with multiple attributes and with one substance constituted by them. There is no totality of all attributes aside from each attribute, and there is no totality of all bodies without organs aside from each body without organs, since one such body is immediately all those bodies and their totality. It is to this extent that a body without organs is already a limit beyond which there is no need to question, because this body in itself has already surpassed it.
This fusion has an important consequence. To make oneself a body without organs by discovering an attribute is to relate oneself to all other bodies without organs corresponding to all other attributes. A body grasped in its power enters into the interaction with all other powers. Substance as a totality of all attributes, a plane of immanence as a totality of all attributes, is a dimension disclosed by such overall interaction, one power relaying another and one body without organs renewing itself into another. This interaction leads a body to produce unexpected intensities foreign to its attribute and modify itself in an infinity of ways without the restraint by organs. Spinoza thus presents a way neither of reducing the outside as infinite to the inside of the finite nor of subjecting the inside to the outside, but of keeping the inside and yet enabling it, as such, to participate in the power of the outside. Hence Spinoza’s plane of immanence, equivalent to immanent God, challenges the judgment of transcendent God and gives a means to have done with it.

Talking of an anorexic body without organs, in its loss of appetite, it may see or hear more acutely than usual and feel itself pierced by colors and sounds. It is as if senses mingled and exchanged their functions. Or, the distress of hunger and fatigue may suddenly turn into indescribable euphoria. These things may be the outcomes of the interaction of one body without organs with others. This is just a trivial example of what a body can do. And yet nobody knows what it can do in the extreme.

If, as Deleuze and Guattari say, Spinoza in his philosophy connects the knowledge of an attribute and the generation of a body without organs, we can say that he also tries to do so in his life. By inventing the notion of such an attribute that constitutes the best plane of immanence, he makes himself a body without organs which joins a totality of all such bodies. He incorporates not only the outside of his thought into the inside, but also the outside of his body into the inside. Thus Spinoza, in both his thought and mode of existence, repeats, in his own way, kenosis in Christ’s incarnation. Spinoza is a Christ of philosophers in this double
sense, insofar as thought and life are inseparable for philosophers.

In both of these aspects, the operation of incorporating the outside in the inside is at one with the operation of emptying something of oneself. The operation of emptying one’s thought of the notions of properties particular to one’s body and thinking an attribute common to all bodies carries one to the idea of substance as a totality of all attributes. The operation of emptying one’s body of organs with determinate forms and functions invites one to the embodiment of the powers of all bodies without organs. This is just as incarnation is possible only if not only God empties Himself but also a human empties oneself, repeating the same act differently. However, if one carries out this act of emptying oneself thoroughly, one possible consequence will be to empty oneself even of one’s life. This is the way from kenosis in incarnation to kenosis in crucifixion. Curiously enough, in Deleuze’s thought is found not only a Christ image similar to the former kenosis but also to the latter. The latter image appears in Deleuze’s essay on Melville’s short story *Bartleby the Scrivener*. In fact, Deleuze calls a protagonist named Bartleby a new Christ.

In this short story, an attorney in New York hires a pale characterless young man, named Bartleby, as a new scrivener. But this new scrivener does not do any other work than to copy. Whenever an attorney asks him to do something else, Bartleby shuns it, saying “I would prefer not to”. Shortly he excuses himself even from copying, uttering a similar phrase. The attorney fires him and moves his office. Nevertheless Bartleby stays there, just because he would prefer not to move. He is arrested by the police and sent to the prison. He would prefer not to eat, and dies silently there.

Bartleby’s formula “I would prefer not to” leads the running of kenosis in this story. The absence of a verb after the preposition “to” shows a void which will expand further. Because of this absence, what he does not prefer is unclear after all. “[I]t [the formula] hollows out a zone of indetermination that renders words indistinguishable, that creates a
vacuum within language” (CC: 95; 73). The preferred and the non-preferred become indiscernible, the latter devouring the former. The vacuum of this indiscernibility turns out to be the void of lethargy. The formula empties him of the preferable. At last, he prefers nothing, eating, drinking and even living. His death is the consequence of the extension of his kenotic act in his speech up to his own life.

All particularity, all reference is abolished. The formula annihilates “copying”, the only reference in relation to which something might or might not be preferred. *I would prefer nothing rather than something*: not a will to nothingness, but the growth of a nothingness of the will. (CC: 92; 71; italic in French text added to translation)

Strictly speaking, the expansion of the void generated by the formula is not the result of Bartleby’s willing nothingness but the result of the nothingness of his will. When he first appeared as “a man without references, without possession, without properties, without qualities, without particularities” (CC: 96; 74), he had been a man of nothingness. But at least he had a reference of what he preferred to do, copying, and a property defined by it. His formula empties even such minimum reference and property. The thing is not that the non-preferable in stark contrast to the preferable increases. To refuse or not to prefer something concrete is already a will. He lacks even the weakest will in this sense. The preferable and the non-preferable make no difference to him. It is because of this indifference that he does nothing. The running of kenosis in his formula goes hand in hand with the growth of the nothingness of his will.

While the concept of kenosis thus shows a similarity between Christ and Bartleby, it is this very concept that shows their dissimilarity. This dissimilarity appears in their relation to others in the process of emptying himself and being led to death. Deleuze finds Melville to oppose Christ’s love of others and Bartleby’s as paternal charity and fraternity. “Melville will
never cease to elaborate on the radical opposition between fraternity and Christian ‘charity’ or paternal ‘philanthropy’” (CC: 108; 84). Charity as Deleuze conceives it consists in loving neighbours as God loves humans. The relation of the loving to the loved is analogous to that of transcendent God to human, one being superior and the other inferior, as a father and a son. Christ’s love is not an exception. Even if sacrificing oneself for others does not have an appearance of explicit domination, doing so often implies having the advantage over them or conversely being exploited by them. In short, self-sacrifice is not exempt from some inequality between the one who sacrifices oneself and others for whom he sacrifices himself. On the contrary, Bartleby’s emptying himself is not sacrificing himself for others. “[N]ever trying to save other souls”, he just tries to “open to all contacts” with them, “forming even fleeting and unresolved chords and accords with its equals” (CC: 112; 87). Stripped of any reference or property enables him to make his soul resonate with others’, all these souls revealing their singularities and communicating in their genuine difference, without ruling or being ruled. “Yet, what remains of souls once they are no longer attached to particularities…? What remains is precisely their ‘originality’, that is, a sound that each produces [chacune rend]” (CC: 111; 87; italics in text; translation slightly altered). “[F]raternity is a matter for original souls” (CC: 112; 87). The originality left after emptying himself of any particularity makes him enter into fraternity, an equal relation with others, so that he makes himself “the brother to us all” (CC: 114; 90). Like Christ, Bartleby empties himself until this act culminates in his death. But, Bartleby does so differently from Christ, and different ways of doing so amount to different types of love. Hence Bartleby is called a new Christ.

While the paternal charity among humans simulates the relation between transcendent God and the human, the fraternity among them, if it is related to some godhead, would allude to another kind of God, that is, immanent God who exists in everything in the world
including the human. Just as transcendent God is a guise for immanent God, paternal charity is a guise for fraternity and Christ’s kenosis does Bartleby’s, the former being a representation of a limited phase abstracted from the latter. When Deleuze writes: “paternity does not exist, it is an emptiness, a nothingness — or rather, a zone of indiscernibility haunted by brothers, by the brother and sister” (CC: 108; 84), he means not only that paternity is empty having no existence but also that it is derived from a certain kenotic act of emptying oneself. His statement that “an emtpiness, a nothingness” of paternity is a zone for fraternity suggests that a paternal kenotic act like that of Christ hides beneath it a potential for fraternity like that of Bartleby. From the Deleuzian perspective, Bartleby’s kenotic death is, rather than a variety of Christ’s kenotic death in crucifixion, the truer explication of what it implicates.

Just as kenosis in incarnation and kenosis in crucifixion in Christology are in continuity, so also are the two Christ images in Deleuze’s thought corresponding to these concepts. When Deleuze and Guattari referred to Spinoza as a Christ of philosophers, they invoked their idea of a body without organs. When Deleuze calls Bartleby a new Christ, the idea of a body without organ also looms in the background, even if he does not mention it by its name. On Bartleby’s formula, Deleuze writes:

Murmured in a soft, flat and patient voice, it [the formula] attains to the irremissible, by forming an unarticulated block [un bloc inarticulé], a single breath [un souffle unique]. (CC: 89; 68; translation slightly altered)

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe the body without organs in quite similar terms:

In order to resist using words composed of articulated phonetic units, it [a body without organs] utters only breaths [souffles] and cries that are sheer unarticulated
blocks [blocs inarticulés] of sound. (AO: 15; 9; translation slightly altered).

According to the latter passage, unarticulated blocks and breaths are the components of a body without organs, its weapons for resistance to articulated words, in alliance with segmented organs. In the former passage, the formula forms a similar kind of block and breath. The combination of these passages tells that, in uttering the formula, Bartleby is making his body a body without organs. Emptying oneself of references and properties and bringing one’s soul to its originality is parallel to emptying one’s body of organs and revealing it as a body without organs. This same operation leads one to incorporate the outside and then to annihilate oneself. A body without organs thus bridges kenosis in Spinoza and kenosis in Bartleby.19

One might object that, even if the route from kenosis in incarnation to kenosis in crucifixion goes straight in Christ, this is not the case with the two kinds of kenosis in Deleuze. In effect, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between making oneself a body without organs and killing oneself. “Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity” (MP: 198: 160). Resisting the organism by a body without organs does not mean destroying the physical body and taking its life away, but nullifying the effect of organization. It means connecting a body with others free from their organic identities so that various intensities pass through these bodies. This is impossible without at least maintaining the life of the physical body. So Deleuze and Guattari count being killed in “several ways of botching the BwO” (MP: 199; 161), since it undermines a body without organs itself.

Nevertheless it is undeniable that making a body without organs sometimes involves killing oneself, even if this involvement is not necessary or inevitable. Deleuze and Guattari
If the writer is a sorcerer, it is because writing is a becoming, writing is traversed by strange becomings that are not becomings-writer, but becomings-rat, becomings-insect, becomings-wolf, etc. We will have to explain why. Many suicides by writers are explained by these unnatural participations, these unnatural nuptials. (MP: 293-294; 240)

In a word, becomings-other than oneself, other than human, are inseparable from the danger of suicide. The writer, in delineating people and animals in his or her works, puts him- or herself in their place. When the writer overdoes it, he or she experiences becoming them, being beside him- or herself in a trance. This is nothing but emptying oneself of references and properties, that is, making oneself a body without organs. Participation in the above passage is a sociological term which designates a mental act to establish a kindred between themselves and other things, whether they are living or not, as in the case of totem. When this act is made in a certain context in which it is granted, and so as to meet the social and cultural standard there, it works to maintain the existent order, whether collective or individual. However, when this act goes beyond this limit, it endangers this order. Then participation is called unnatural, although it has been unnatural from the start. The writer’s becoming other than oneself, other than human is of such unnatural participation. When one’s identity thus becomes ambiguous, dying or even killing oneself does not make so much difference from becoming other or transforming oneself. Or, becoming other, other than living thing, may result in destroying oneself as such a creature. Certainly making oneself a body without organs is not necessarily killing oneself. But, when the process of making oneself a body without organs and becoming other is carried forward to the utmost, it may lead to killing oneself, as a matter of possibility. Bartleby dies petrified, against the stone wall in the prison. This suggests that his death is a consequence of his becoming other than
human, other than a living thing.

Underlying this path is, rather than merely one body without organs, a plane of immanence as a totality of all such bodies.

Unnatural participation. But the plane of composition, the plane of Nature, is precisely for participations of this kind, which continually make and unmake their assemblages [le plan de composition, le plan de Nature, est pour de telles participations, qui ne cessent de faire et défaire leur agencements], employing every artifice. (MP: 315; 258; italics in text; translations slightly altered)

As Deleuze and Guattari write elsewhere in the same volume “a pure plane of immanence, univocity, composition” (MP: 312; 255), the plane of composition mentioned here is equal to the plane of immanence, at this moment. So the above citation tells us that the plane of immanence is the place for unnatural participations which explained the suicide of the writer. If making oneself a body without organs involves not only losing one’s identity but also becoming other, it is because one body without organs thus attained is in interaction with all others, in order to constitute a plane of immanence. By virtue of this plane, one can incorporate the outside of one’s thought and life into the inside. It is this very plane that may draw one into death. A body without organs bridges kenosis in incarnation and kenosis in death, insofar as this body with all others constitutes a plane of immanence.

Thus undergirding the passage from the former kenosis to the latter, the idea of the plane of immanence buttresses the notion of the death at the end of this passage. Emptying one’s body of its particularities and discovering an attribute coexisting with others leads us to this plane and to the knowledge of this plane as Nature constituted by all these attributes, of the natural order of composition and decomposition of their modes, and of the interdependence of the powers or the essences of these modes, that is, the third kind of knowledge. If one pursues this knowledge to an extreme beyond the limit of the conservation
of one’s individuality, one finds one’s becoming others and dying indiscernible, making oneself completely merge into the natural order in which the power of Nature is exercised. Seeing things from the viewpoint of Nature brings one beyond the good and the evil which are valid only for oneself. When an animal eats a plant, this is evil for the latter, its body being shattered for digestion, and yet the same thing is good for the former, its body being fortified with nutrition. Even when a poison destroys a human body, it produces a combination of certain chemicals. Any phenomenon brings with it the composition of relations, and “any combination of relations is good for the viewpoint of the relations combined, that is, from the sole positive viewpoint [du seul point de vue positif]” (SPE: 227; 248; translation slightly altered). “Nothing here [ici] is evil from Nature’s viewpoint” (SPE: 227; 248; translation slightly altered). Once one achieves this viewpoint, one no longer regards as evil even one’s death, which is the lethal destruction of one’s body and therefore supposedly the worst evil for oneself.

If we consider a body with a definite given relation, it must necessarily encounter bodies whose relation cannot combine with its own, and will always eventually meet one whose relation destroys its own. Thus there is no death that is not brutal, violent and fortuitous; but this is precisely because any death is totally necessary within this order of encounters [il n’y a pas de mort qui ne soit brutale, violente et fortuite; mais précisément parce qu’elle est entièrement nécessaire dans cet ordre des rencontres]. (SPE: 217-218; 239; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

Given that the destruction of our body means our death, it is externally determined by the encounter with other bodies whose relation destroys that which composes our body. To this extent, death is fortuitous, and yet it is necessary in this fortuitousness itself. To understand this necessity of fortuitousness, under which is everything in Nature, is to regard one’s death as one of an infinity of ways of composition and decomposition there, in other words, as one
of the ways in which God exercises His power. Under such necessity, under a species of
eternity, the death of something and the life of something else which it becomes are
indiscernible. Then death is neither harmful nor sorrowful. Just as Spinoza’s immanent God
dissolves into His modifications He produces, we disperse ourselves into the compounds
generated in the destruction of our body. Our life has been a part of composition and
decomposition of everything in Nature, and so also is our death. In this sense, we continue to
live after our death, losing ourselves and taking the shape of other things. When the act of
emptying ourselves leads us to this death, it also leads us to this knowledge of our death. As
such, this death is the dissolution of the inside of our life and thought into the outside, as a
possible, not necessary, consequence of the incorporation of the power of the outside into the
inside enabled on the plane of immanence.

In this chapter, based on the similarity and dissimilarity between Leibniz and Spinoza
in Deleuze’s thought, we sought in Spinoza another image of suicidal death as an art, an
image which is more comprehensive and closer to Deleuze’s own thought than the image in
Leibniz.

The basic problem of Leibniz’s philosophy from Spinoza’s viewpoint is the exclusion
of extension from the forms constituent of God’s essence and existence. From this exclusion
are derived the transcendence of God as the One in relation to multiple things in the world
and the superiority of the soul to the body. Leibniz’s practice, insofar as it is conceived as the
soul’s imitation of God and incorporation of His power, consists in the soul’s ruling the body
and the inscription of the former’s unity into the latter’s multiplicity. Spinoza includes
extension in similar constituent attributes and thus claims the equality of the mind and the
body. Sharing such attributes, God and everything in the world, the one and the multiple, are
immanent in each other. Rather than Leibnitz’s, Spinoza’s thought contains the motifs which
conform to Deleuze’s high regard for of the body and affirmation of multiplicity (Section 1).

On the basis of the correspondence of the states of the mind and the body, Spinoza conceives a practice of turning negative feelings into positive ones by virtue of knowledge. The common notion, as the means for this practice, enables us to locate in our body the cause of what seems to happen from without, and parallel to this, to generate joyful actions from within our mind. Thus the mind discovers its power by discovering the power of the body. The most general common notion, the notion of attribute, leads us to know that, from the viewpoint of Nature, all that happens comes from the essences of things. Knowing this, we can feel active joy of all that happens to us, whether it brings us joyful or sad passions. In the musical form produced in such practice, new types of accords beyond the opposition of accord and disaccord or the dichotomy of pleasure and pain, endlessly modify themselves traversing all things (Section 2).

Although Leibniz and Spinoza’s ideas of God and practice are different, they are related. In Deleuze’s eyes, idealism distorts what parallelism means and uses this distorted form as its own premise. Therefore, Leibniz’s thought of practice based on idealism is a less exact expression of Spinoza’s thought of practice based on parallelism. The musical form produced in Leibniz’s practice is a restricted state of Spinoza’s. The Leibnizian idea of transcendent God is a mask of the Spinozist idea of immanent God. The relation between the thought of the two philosophers is the same as that between a plane of transcendence and a plane of immanence. The coming and going between the two planes does not mean their complementarity but the radicalness of a plane of immanence. Parallel to this, Leibnizian motifs which constitute the former plane hold a role of a gateway to more comprehensive motifs which constitute the latter plane, in this case, Spinoza’s (Section 3).

The same holds for the two images of suicidal deaths of the two philosophers. In the guise of the death of the Leibnizian martyr is the death of Spinozist Christ. Spinoza as a
Christ of philosophers, by his notion of attributes, thinks and lives the best plane of immanence as a totality of all attributes. His emptying his thought and life of his particularities and incorporating the power of the outside is like Christ’s kenotic incarnation. Extending Spinoza’s line of thought, Bartleby as a new Christ carries out the act of emptying to an extreme so as to empty himself of his life. His dying as a consequence of emptying himself is like Christ’s kenotic crucifixion. When the incorporation of the power of the outside thus lets someone die, one dissolves one’s individuality into the multiplicity of the others which it becomes, just as immanent God dissolves into His modifications (Section 4).

In the same way as that of Leibniz, Spinoza’s thought gives a framework to see suicidal death positively. In both cases, the incorporation of the power of the outside, represented as the power of God, enables the creation of the life lived in death as a work of art. What differs is that the Spinozist framework expresses more truly what the Leibnizian framework means to express, the former being closer to Deleuze’s thought than the latter. Leibniz in his moral practice proposes to find the inscription of the unity of the soul in what happens to the body. However, indeed, to do so is, as Spinoza proposes in his ethical practice, to find the parallel unities of the body and the mind, in order to get to the unity of Nature and then finally to the infinite multiplicity of everything in it. This Nature is immanent God viewed in a certain aspect as the one which comes from the multiple and returns to it. Transcendent God is a substantialization of a limited phrase in this movement. The power of God does not consist in conferring unity but producing multiplicity. The purpose of practice as the means to incorporate this power is not to accomplish oneself as the spiritual subject simulating transcendent God, but to open oneself to various individuations outside the subject so as to make one’s body and mind parts of infinite modifications of immanent God. When one can attain this purpose, one can understand all that happens to one’s body and
mind under the necessity of the essences or powers of all the things in Nature including one’s 
body and mind. There being neither good nor evil, Nature appears as the endless production 
of various accords beyond the opposition of accord and disaccord. The music in which 
accord has priority to disaccord and the latter is resolved into the former is merely one of the 
many forms that the music of this production can take. When one incorporates the power of 
God and merges into this music so as to forget one’s own individuality, one may let oneself 
die, understanding this death itself as a part of this music. Christ’s crucifixion was such a 
death that resides in thus dissolving into Nature and joining the becoming other than human, 
while affirming even his harshest passion as a part of this becoming. This is what the death 
of the Leibnizian martyr means to express, under the guise of the accomplishment of 
subjectivity.22

1 In the note in the previous chapter, I referred to Deleuze’s remark of Leibniz’s claim to 
combine clear and confused on the one hand and distinct and obscure on the other, as 
opposed to Descartes’ combination of clear and distinct and that of obscure and confused. I 
also pointed out that Deleuze’s own terminology is not entirely true to this remark. Here is an 
example of this inconsistency. In the above citation from Spinoza: Expressionism in 
Philosophy, Deleuze is true to Descartes’ terminology, while writing on Leibniz. First, in this 
citation, Deleuze contrasts distinct and obscure, in spite of his combination of both elsewhere. 
Secondly, just before this citation, he writes “But a certain area of confusion or obscurity is 
thus introduced into expression” (SPE: 305; 328), and combines obscure and confused. 
Thirdly, just after the citation in question, he writes “[T]hus each monad traces its distinct 
partial expression against the background [fond] of a confused total expression; it confusedly 
expresses the whole world, but clearly expresses only a part of it” (SPE: 306; 329). In the 
first sentence, Deleuze contrasts the distinctness in the part and the confusedness in the 
totality and in the second sentence the clearness in the part and the confusedness in the 
totality. In short, here he contrasts confused with both clear and distinct. From these three 
points, we can conclude that, at least in the citation in question, he combines clear and 
distinct on the one hand and combines obscure and confused on the other, contrasting these 
two pairs. Why Deleuze chooses this terminology here needs further analysis and discussion 
based on a closer examination of his thought on the comparison of Leibniz and Spinoza. 
However this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

2 The concept of real distinction comes from Scotus. There are objections to Deleuze’s 
invoking this concept to explain the constitution of a single substance by an infinity of 
attributes in Spinoza’s philosophy. Pierre Macherey criticizes Deleuze for introducing this 
concept into his reading of Spinoza, despite the absence of any evidence in Spinoza’s text to 
confirm his relation to Scotus. Pierre Macherey, “The Encounter with Spinoza,” in Deleuze: 
A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 150. To respond to these 
objections, Simon Duffy makes clear Deleuze’s intention of avoiding rigid interpretation in 
seeking for the authentic meaning of the text. If satisfied with thinking about the relations
between philosophers merely with regard to references or influences, as clearly represented in established ways of thinking, we run the risk of reducing the history of philosophy to the Hegelian dialectical movement, without questioning presuppositions instituted by authorities. Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, including his invoking of the Scotus' concept, is an attempt to challenge such presuppositions and delineate the history of philosophy otherwise. What matters is not to give another representation of the movement of thought, but to create another movement of thought outside representation. The logic of expression Deleuze finds in Spinoza is a means for such an attempt. Simon Duffy, “The Logic of Expression in Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza: A Strategy of Engagement”, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 12 (1), 2004, pp. 49-50.

The same holds for Bergsonian inspiration pervading Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza. Macherey criticizes Deleuze for identifying attribute with quality, introducing Bergson’s idea into the reading of Spinoza, again without any textual ground. Macherey, “The Encounter with Spinoza,” p. 151. Contrary to this, Robin Durie positively evaluates Deleuze’s recourse to Bergson and discusses its fruits. Certainly Deleuze applies Bergson’s concept of qualitative multiplicity to his understanding of the constitution of a single substance by an infinity of attributes in Spinoza. But this very application enables Deleuze to conceive the ontology of immanence and univocity in which the one never unifies the multiple but genuinely affirms it. Again, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza inspired by Bergson gives resolutions to some problems in Spinoza studies. Robin Durie, “Immanence and Difference: Toward a Relational Ontology”, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 60, 2002, pp. 166-184.

3 Alain Badiou insists that, while Deleuze advocates a Nietzschean principle of the reversal of Platonism, his invocation of Bergson or Spinoza against this principle leads him to reconstruct a kind of Platonism. The One or the totality as the virtual introduced in his thought in the wake of these philosophers is nothing but the hindrance to a true affirmation of the multiple as the actual. Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: La clameur de l’Etre*, Paris: Hachette, 1997, pp. 31-81. However, as so many scholars have already argued, this critique of Badiou does not undermine Deleuze’s thought. At least, Deleuze does not share the supposition of Badiou’s argument that the one and the multiple, the virtual and the actual are exclusive alternatives, so that the affirmation of the latter needs the total denial of the former. As Éric Alliez does in response to Badiou’s critique, we must discuss how Deleuze conceives the relation of the one and the multiple, the virtual and the actual, and how he makes these terms work outside of their dichotomy. Alliez describes this relation as follows:

> [T]here can be no Expression (of the ‘full body’ of the world) without Construction of assemblages of desire or ‘desiring machines’ that free Life in the _processual_ (i.e. non-totalising) and _performative_ identity between production and product. Construction without Expression is _void_ of any real becoming, of any _real-desire_ whatsoever”. (Éric Alliez, “Anti-Oedipus:Thirty Years On (Between Art and Politics)”, in *Deleuze and the Social*, ed. Martin Fuglsang and Bent Maier Sørensen, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press., 2006, p. 161, italics in text)

In short, there is no expression without construction and there is no construction without expression. This formulation also applies to Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza. If the multiple expresses the one, it is because the former constitutes the latter. The one cannot be there unless it is constituted by the multiple and expresses itself in the multiple. To this extent, the existence of the one is the sign of the productivity of the multiple and as such diversifies itself even into the one. Alliez writes that Deleuze’s thought in its constructivism goes beyond Bergson or Spinoza’s expressionism (Ibid, p. 163). With regard to Spinoza or Bergson studies in turn, it follows that we can reinterpret Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza or
Bergson from the viewpoint of this constructivism paired with expressionism in order to discover the potential of their thoughts. The interpretations of Duffy and Durie seem to go in this direction. As a detailed argument against Baduou’s reading of Spinoza from a Deleuzian viewpoint, Jon Roffe, “The Errant Name: Badiou and Deleuze on Invididuation, Causality and Infinite Modes in Spinoza”, Continental Philosophy Review 40, 2007, pp. 389-406.

4 Apart from the comparison to Leibniz, I addressed in detail the concept of this power in action in Spinoza as the capacity of being affected, based on the equation of God’s existence and production mediated by attributes, in Part 2 Chapter 1 Section 1 and 2 of my first thesis The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought. In that I dealt with these motifs with regard to the removal of finality or purposiveness from Spinoza’s philosophy with recourse to this concept of power in relation to a framework of “expression” as the main theme of Deleuze’s Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy.

5 I once discussed Spinoza’s practical philosophy as Deleuze conceives it, because of its respect for life, bringing in itself the reversal of the hierarchy established in the history of philosophy, the hierarchy amongst ontology, epistemology and the theory of passions. I detected in this reversal the reason for Deleuze’s reference to Spinoza as an atheist. “The Practical Philosophy in Deleuze: Spinoza as an Atheist” in Tetsugaku Nenpou, (Annual of Philosophy), Kyushu University, Japan, No.57, March, 1998, pp. 177-205 (Japanese).

6 For Deleuze, essences grasped in the third kind of knowledge are not static, as normally associated with the words “sub specie aeternitatis”. Spinozist essences as Deleuze conceives them are the degrees of power corresponding to certain relations of movement and rest of particles. So not only movement and rest express an essence, but also essence even implies movement and rest. As such, essences are dynamic. Bruce Bauch, “Temps, durée et mort chez Spinoza”, Philosophique 29/1, Printemps 2002, pp. 36-37.

7 It is not just a coincidence that Deleuze finds the differential in Leibniz and Spinoza. According to Duffy, Deleuze discerns the idea of the differential in the geometrical example of Spinoza’s Letter 12, supplementing it with Leibniz’s idea of the infinitesimal calculus. In other words, Deleuze sees something common to Leibniz and Spinoza in terms of their ideas of the differential. In the differential dy/dx, whereas dx and dy are disappearing, a concrete value dy/dx remains to designate their relation. Hence Deleuze gains an insight that relations are independent of terms. Duffy, “The Logic of Expression in Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza: A Strategy of Engagement”, pp. 51-54. This is a basic idea persisting in Deleuze’s works from his first book, that on Hume, in which Deleuze poses a thesis that relations are external to terms. Durie detects the operation of the logic that relations precede and produce terms here and there in Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza. Durie, “Immanence and Difference: Toward a Relational Ontology”, for example, pp. 169, 172, 183.

8 I once considered Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that a plane of immanence is a dimension attained by the acquisition of the third kind of knowledge, relating this idea back to Spinoza’s concepts of knowledge on which this idea is based. By closely examining the system of these concepts I elucidated the significance of the way Deleuze and Guattari composed A Thousand Plateaus. “The Plan of Immanence in A Thousand Plateaus: In Relation to Deleuze’s Spinoza: Practical Philosophy” in Tetsugaku Nenpou (Annual of Philosophy), Kyushu University, Japan, No.58, March, 1999, pp. 103-135 (Japanese).

9 It is not a mistake that a French word “plane” is translated into an English word “plan” in this citation, while it is translated into “plane” elsewhere. Miguel de Beistegui discerns the two senses of this French word which are important in relation to Deleuze’s idea of “plane”. One is a background which is behind and makes the foreground visible. The other is a design which is ahead and shapes what will be made. Miguel de Beistegui, “The Vertigo of Immanence: Deleuze’s Spinozism”, Research in Phenomenology, 35, 2005, pp. 83. When the latter sense seems dominant to the former in Deleuze’s usage of the French word ‘plane’, it is translated into the English word ‘plan’, which is the case with this citation.

10 I discussed in detail this complementarity of the plane of immanence and the plane of
transcendence in Part 3 Chapter 2 Section 4 of my first thesis *The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought*. In the preceding and succeeding parts I showed that a scheme similar to this complementarity persists in Deleuze from his early period to the later one while changing its shape, sometimes as the framework common to Spinoza and Nietzsche and sometimes as the combination of a Nietzschean concept and a Spinozist one.


For Spinoza, Christ is an incomparable being absolutely different from other humans. The former recognizes the latter’s excellence in his being endowed with the best knowledge.

Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to Christ’s mind immediately, and not as to the prophets through words and symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols. (Spinoza, *A Theologico-Political Treatise*, in *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza vol. 1*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, London: George Bell and Sons, 1883, p. 64)

God directly revealed to Christ the same knowledge, of the third kind, as God has of Himself. Christ did not understand this revelation by the medium of words or symbols, as the prophets did. Neither did he get this knowledge by starting from the inadequate idea and then progressing to the adequate idea step by step, as other humans do. Only he had had God’s idea of Himself from birth.

However, thinking Christ’s excellence in that way amounts to, even against Spinoza’s intention, suggesting that this excellence is not exclusively limited to Christ. In *A Theologico-Political Treatise*, certainly Spinoza writes: “nor do I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ” as to understand ideas of God’s essence by pure intuition. But he also admits that “God can communicate immediately with man, for without the intervention of bodily means He communicates to our minds His essence” (Ibid, p. 18). Further, in his letter 73 to Ordenburg he describes Christ as “the eternal son of God, that is, the eternal wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things, more especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus” (*The Correspondence of Spinoza*, trans. A. Wolf, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928, p. 344). In sum, the third kind of knowledge as the eternal wisdom, in principle, resides in everything and can be directly transmitted, not only to Christ but also to everybody, although this is hardly successful. Connecting the excellence of Christ to that of the knowledge he has, Spinoza opened a way to the thought that anybody has a potential of attaining to Christ-ness by continuing intellectual effort. Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that Spinoza, by virtue of his philosophical concepts, is a Christ of philosophers carries forward this thought and applies it to Spinoza himself.

On the equation of the plane of consistency and the plane of immanence at the time of *A Thousand Plateaus*, see the following statement of Deleuze and Guattari.

We call this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds and haecceities, the plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the plan(e) of organization or development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocity. (MP: 326; 266)

Later, in *What Is Philosophy?*, distinguishing three elements of philosophy, that is, concepts, conceptual personae, and plane, Deleuze and Guattari keep only immanence for plane and
Maximilian de Gaynesford tries to find some similarities between Deleuze and Guattari’s descriptions of the body without organs and the theological accounts of Christ’s incarnation in the fourth and fifth centuries. As one of these similarities, he refers to the kenotic-ness of the both bodies. One makes oneself a body without organs, when one empties oneself of organic functions and recomposes one’s body otherwise than as an organism. This is in the same way as Godhead empties itself to come into humanity, and humanity through the mixture with the divine renews itself. Maximilian de Gaynesford, “Bodily Organs and Organisation”, in Deleuze and Religion, ed. Mary Bryden, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 91-92.

In terms of the Christ’s incarnation, Gaynesford’s phrase does not fit the example of the body without organs as well as Alain Beaulieu’s rephrasing that the humanity of Christ’s body is partly eliminated in order to allow for the divine nature. Alain Beaulieu, “L’incarnation phénoménologique à l’épreuve du ‘corps sans organes’”, Laval théologique et philosophique, 60, 2, juin 2004, p. 314. While Beaulieu admits certain significance of Gaynesford’s situating the body without organs in relation to theological arguments, the former criticizes the latter for overlooking Deleuze and Guattari’s combat with transcendence. According to Beaulieu, Deleuze and Guattari’s thought of the body without organs is closer to Arius’s doctrine rather than the Nicene Creed. Whereas Arius poses the sharing of the same divinity by God, Christ and the human, the Nicene Creed, in order to counter the former, poses the co-substantiality of God and Christ. While Arius suggests a way to immanence, the Nicene Creed protects transcendence. So if there is a similarity between Christ’s incarnation and the body without organs, it would be understood better in relation to Arius’ anti-Nicene position rather than the Nicene Creed. Ibid, pp. 313-316. Beaulieu’s remark agrees with Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that conceiving attributes as the forms common to God and modes made Spinoza the author of the greatest book of the body without organs and a Christ of philosophers.

Michael Hardt understands the relation of kenosis in incarnation and that in crucifixion in such a way that the latter kenosis is the accomplishment of the former. Divine being comes to fully embody the plenitude of matter, only if it evacuates all transcendental forms from oneself, is forsaken by God and merges into matter. Therefore Christ’s death on the cross is at once the affirmation of life. Michael Hardt, “Exposure: Pasolini in the Flesh”, in A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. Brian Massumi, London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 78-83.

While this article is collected in the book on Deleuze and Guattari, there is no mention of Deleuze or Guattari in this article. Nevertheless Hardt’s insight seems to support the point of Christ images found in Deleuze’s works, as I will discuss later in this chapter.


Various interpretations to equate Bartleby and Christ agree in understanding the synopsis of the novel in such a way that Bartleby invites the lawyer to show charity to a stranger, while the lawyer refuses to respond to this call. These interpretations differ in what parts of the Bible are relevant to this plot. For example, Franklin relates it to Matthew 25 34-45, in which the least of men is regarded as the representative of Christ. Franklin, The Wake of the

Deleuze provides this view in expounding D. H. Lawrence’s short story “The Man Who Died”, a story of an ex-savior who once had died and then revived to live another life. In an obvious allusion to Christ, after his revival this man finds in both “giving without taking” as he did and “taking without giving” as his believers did before his execution the same kind of greed of taking advantage of the other. See Deleuze’s “D. H. Lawrence and Nietzsche, Saint Paul and John of Patmos”, CC: 67; 50.

The totality of all bodies without organs equivalent to a substance constituted by all attributes, Spinoza’s plane of immanence which is the best of all planes, Spinoza as a Christ of philosophers and Bartleby as a new Christ with his formula, nothingness of will and body without organs, I discussed these topics separately in Part 3 Chapter 2 and Part 4 Chapter 1 and 2 of my first thesis The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought. Here I augmented or refined each discussion and brought together all these topics by using the concepts of kenosis as a leading thread.

I analysed Deleuze’s discussion of Bartleby as a new Christ with regard to the critical transformation of Christian virtues including charity in Part 4 Chapter 2 Section 2 and 3 of my first thesis The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought. I also related this theme to Kafka’s minor literature as Deleuze and Guattari conceives it, and addressed the difference between Melville’s sadistic resistance and Kafka’s masochistic resistance to the law, corresponding to the difference between Jewish and Christian traditions in their background, in my article “The Threshold of Law: Deleuze’s ‘Bartleby’” in Gendai Shisou (Revue de la penseé d’aujourd’hui), vol.29-16, Tokyo: Seido-sha, December, 2001, pp. 8-28 (Japanese). In this thesis, with recourse to the concept of kenosis, I cast a new light not only on the connection between Spinoza as a Christ of philosophers and Bartleby as a new Christ, but also on the connection between Bartleby’s formula and his death.

Later, in What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari clearly distinguish the plane of immanence and the plane of composition, and conceive the former to belong to philosophy and the latter to art (QP: 204: 216).

I mentioned the risk of death involved in the plane of immanence in the Conclusion to my first thesis The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought. There, separate from the discussion in the preceding chapters, I related this motif to Hume’s view that killing oneself is one of the human abilities, just as building a house, and François Châtelet’s view that suicide can be a protest to human relationships in their status quo in which humans never cease trying to exterminate each other. Here in this thesis, independent of these views, applying the idea of the connection between the two kinds of kenosis enabled to stress the line from the plane of immanence to death.

Edith Wyschogrod accuses Deleuze and Guattari of expelling from their thought the element of the lack or the negative. In her eyes, the absence of such an element results in the absence of difference and the other in their thought. This leads not only to their replication of
the Neoplatonistic immobile One which suffocates multiplicity, but also to their failure in proposing a new image of the saint who lives or dies for and with others, as found in other so-called postmodern thinkers. Edith Wyschogrod, *Saint and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 191-229. However, Deleuze’s attempt to think of difference otherwise than lack or negativity should be evaluated in its proper context, that of a challenge to Hegelian dialectic. Besides, as discussed so far, Deleuze, even when he speaks of the One, conceives it to work for the affirmation of the multiple, and his thought does not lack images of a saint who lives and dies for such affirmation.
In the previous chapter, we found in Deleuze’s discussion of Spinoza another type of suicidal death which can be seen as an artistic work. As in Leibniz, the incorporation of the power of the outside was crucial in the creation of this work, since this incorporation entailed a change of the affect of the one who lives one’s death. But God and His power, standing for the outside and its power, were conceived by Spinoza differently from Leibniz. God is not transcendent but immanent and, as such, is the one fused with the multiple. Hence His power was conceived to work not through unity but through multiplicity. To die as the result of the extreme incorporation of this power is to dissolve oneself into the multiplicity of everything in Nature. Given that Deleuze’s motto is the affirmation of pure multiplicity, the image of this suicidal death in Spinoza seems to suit Deleuze’s own thought better than the image in Leibniz.

This does not mean that there is not a problem with the former image of suicidal death. The problem is that the epitome of the one who dies this death, embodying the Spinozist framework, is Christ. In fact, Deleuze makes numbers of negative comments on Christ. For this reason, it is not likely that Christ, for Deleuze, is the epitome of the best mode of existence. In addition to this, even if Christ’s death is suicidal, it is not suicide in the exact sense of the word. Some of Deleuze’s negative comments are somehow related to this point.

In order to reflect on this problem, it is helpful to turn to Deleuze’s discussion of Nietzsche. Deleuze’s negative comments on Christ are frequent when he discusses Nietzsche, whose own harsh criticism of Christianity is well known, along with his self-identification as a Greek god Dionysus equivalent to Antichrist. Moreover, Nietzsche in an affirmative way poses a concept of self-destruction which does not necessarily have to be literal suicide but
nevertheless can include it. Therefore it is worth trying to seek in Nietzsche another image of suicidal death closer to Deleuze’s own death than that of Spinozist Christ.

In fact it is not so easy to conclude that the Nietzschean image is better than the Spinozist one. Closely examined, Deleuze’s comments on Christ, in spite of their negative appearance, do include some positive elements. In turn, not all Deleuze’s comments on Nietzsche are entirely positive and, curiously enough, the former’s negative evaluation of the latter coexists with a positive evaluation of Spinoza in one book. In disentangling this complication, a correlation between Spinozist Christ and Nietzschean Dionysus will emerge. As Deleuze in his later period writes that all his works in his early period “tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation” (P; 185; 135), both Spinoza and Nietzsche greatly influenced Deleuze. Revealing this correlation between Spinozist Christ and Nietzschean Dionysus will lead to a view of the “Spinoza-Nietzsche equation” in another light.

The objective of this chapter is to address the image of a suicidal death found in Deleuze’s discussion of Nietzsche, along with the relation of this image to that of the suicidal death of Spinozist Christ. The suicidal death in Nietzsche also involves its unique way of incorporating the force of the outside, changing the affects in the one who dies, and creating oneself as a specific musical form. I will begin with Deleuze’s negative comments on Christ in relation to the Nietzschean framework. Although at first these statements seem quite negative, they later allude to more positive aspects of Christ (Section 1). The reason for this ambiguity can be sought in Deleuze’s understanding of Nietzschean concepts. The investigation into this understanding will disclose the closeness of Christ and Dionysus (Section 2). Despite this, for some reason, Christ is disfigured into a mere negative image opposed to Dionysus. This opposition, even if not exact in itself, will throw into relief Dionysus’s characteristic art of dealing with pain (Section 3). Closely connected with the musical form concretizing this art, Nietzsche’s way of thinking and style of writing have
their own problems. Ambiguity will prove to be not only in Christ but also in Dionysus and Nietzsche (Section 4). The respective merit and demerit of the Nietzschean framework and the Spinozist one, assessed from different viewpoints, will elucidate the complementary relation between Christ and Dionysus, or Spinoza and Nietzsche (Section 5).

1. Ambiguity in Christ

Although there are some positive images of Christ in Deleuze’s works, in a broader range of vision, the latter’s evaluation of the former in general is not so favorable. Even his “new” Christ is not completely exempt from this negative evaluation. Negative images of Christ are frequent in Deleuze’s discussion on Nietzsche, who declared himself to be an enemy of Christ. In “To Have Done with Judgment”, an article collected in Essays Critical and Clinical along with “Bartleby; or, the Formula”, Deleuze writes:

> But wherever someone wants to make us renounce combat, what he is offering us is a “nothingness of will”, a deification of the dream, a cult of death, even in its mildest form — that of the Buddha or Christ as a person (independently of what Saint Paul makes of him) (CC: 166; 133)

Here the point of Deleuze’s critique of Christ or Buddha is that a person who renounces combat and recommends us to do so does not have the will as the power to live, and thus worships death, whether intentionally or not. Deleuze once used the phrase “a nothingness of will” in order to describe the state of Bartleby. When Deleuze stated that in Bartleby is “not a will to nothingness, but the growth of a nothingness of will” (CC: 92; 71), Deleuze reversed the implication of Nietzsche’s phrase “man still prefers to will nothing, than not will”, in other words, the preference of the will to nothingness to the nothingness of will. While the will to nothingness still wills something, even if it is nothing, the nothingness of will lacks
any will for anything at all, the will itself being nothing. It is the extremity of the self-negation of the will to power up to its annihilation. This nothingness haunts both Christ and Bartleby. Christ, accepting his harshest destiny, bears the death on the cross. Bartleby, neither affirming nor negating, draws everything into lethargy. Both of them neither will nor act by themselves. Their attitudes are characterized not by activity but by passivity, as the word “passion” connotes it. For Nietzsche, who insists on the release of the strongest will to power, these attitudes are merely signs of weakness, and for Deleuze, as his sympathizer, too.

Along this line of thought, Deleuze associates Christ with the ass, one of the major symbols in Nietzsche’s works.

First of all the ass is Christ: it is Christ who takes up the heaviest burdens, it is he who bears the fruits of the negative as if they contained the positive mystery *par excellence* (NP: 208; 181; italics in translation).

If Christ is associated with the ass, it is because his accepting the harshest destiny resembles the ass’s bearing the heaviest burden. The ass is a character which appears in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. While Zarathustra momentarily leaves the higher men, his last disciples, they hold a festival to worship the ass. The ass is a symbol of the docile spirit which obeys the existent values and assumes the status quo. Even if the ass seems to affirm everything, this is merely appearance. For true affirmation, carried out by the strongest will to power, is possible only through the destruction of the established values and modes of existence which hinder this exercise. The affirmation without this destruction is a fake, “a caricature of affirmation” (NP: 213; 185). When Deleuze says that Christ is the ass, he means that Christ’s affirmation is like that of the ass. If Christ affirms everything including his death, it is because he lets everything go, in obedience to the Father, neither affirming nor negating.
Caught in the nothingness of will and renouncing his will to power, Christ is docile like the ass.

Taking the symbol of the ass alone, Deleuze’s image of Christ seems utterly negative. However, if we put this symbol in relation to other symbols in Nietzsche, it appears that this is not necessarily the case, although this does not mean that the negative tone is completely erased. Deleuze claims that in Nietzsche “the ass is also the camel” (NP: 207; 180), for the reason that both bear the heaviest burden and accept its weight as that of the real. The camel is the first of the three stages in the transformation of the spirit to overcome humanity towards the Overman. The second of them is the lion and the third the child. The camel symbolizes the obedience to moral duties and values. The lion refuses such duties and destroys these values. Although the lion destroys the old values, it cannot create new ones. It is the child that does so in his innocent play. These three stages do not necessarily designate three distinct persons or groups of people. Given that the transformation takes place by these three stages, one person may go through all of them. If so, not only the third one but also the first and the second are indispensable, since without any one of them transformation would not be accomplished. To this extent, even the ass in the first stage has some significance, as the starting point of and a state to be passed through in this transformation.

Deleuze states the significance in this sense more explicitly, when he talks of another symbol which is equivalent to the ass or the camel.

What Nietzsche calls self-destruction, active destruction, must not, above all, be confused with the passive extinction of the last man. We must not confuse, in Nietzsche’s term, “the last man” and “the man who wants to perish [périr]”. One is the final product of becoming reactive, the final way in which the reactive man who is tired of willing, preserves himself. The other is the product of a selection which undoubtedly passes through the last men but does not stop there. (NP: 200; 174)
Nihilism reaches its completion by passing through the last man, but going beyond him to the man who wants to perish. (NP: 201; 175)

These passages refer to two types which appear in the process of the completion of nihilism: the last man and the man who wants to perish. The completion of nihilism as the negation of life by life itself is tantamount to the transformation of the human into the Overman. For, by Nietzsche’s account, the human can become active only by destroying his or her essentially reactive mode of existence. This does not necessarily mean killing oneself but rather demolishing one’s human mode of existence to create a new one. One of two types precedes this destruction. It is the last man who passively fades away. The other actively destroys itself, while nihilism completes itself in this self-destruction. It is the man who wants to perish. The former type corresponds to the ass or the camel and the latter corresponds to the lion, and also to the child, insofar as he not only wants to perish but also enjoys his own perishing. The above passages mainly relate the distinction between these two types. However, reading carefully, between them is not only distinction but also continuity. The latter “passes through” the former, although the latter does not stop there and goes beyond the former. So being the last man is the prerequisite for becoming the man who wants to perish. One cannot become the man who wants to perish unless one passes through the last man. This is just as one cannot become the lion or the child unless one passes through the camel or the ass.

Besides, Deleuze sees in Christ something more than the mere last man. While being likened to the ass, this is not the only face of Christ.

But if beneath Paul’s interpretation we seek the personal type that is Christ, we can surmise that Christ belongs to nihilism in a very different way. He is kind and joyful, doesn’t condemn, is indifferent to guilt of any kind; he wants only to die.
[mourir]; he seeks his own death. He is thus well ahead of Saint Paul, for he represents the ultimate stage of nihilism: that of the last man or the man who wants to perish [périr]—the stage closest to Dionysian transmutation. Christ is “the most interesting of decadents”, a sort of Buddha. He enables a transmutation; from this point of view [de ce point de vue], the synthesis of Dionysus and Christ is now possible by itself [deviant elle-même possible]: “Dionysus-Crucified.” (N: 45; 96; translation slightly altered)

In short, Christ or even Buddha is at once the last man and the man who wants to perish. As such, they both are not only close to transmutation as the radical change in the quality of the will to power, but also enable this change. That the earlier stage enables the later stage is slightly different from the idea that attaining the latter requires passing through the former. Certainly it is common to both cases that the later stage supposes the earlier stage. But, while the second case just means that the earlier stage is a negative state which one should move out of, the first case even suggests that the earlier stage itself involves a positive element leading to the later stage. The second case applies to the mere last man. The first case applies to Christ or Buddha. This is because they both are the last men and at the same time the men who want to perish. Thanks to this uniqueness, Christ is close to Dionysus, the god of destruction incarnated in the man who wants to perish, so that even “the synthesis of Dionysus and Christ”3 is possible. Hence Deleuze writes elsewhere, “who is more suitable than Christ to play the role of the antichrist… and of Zarathustra himself?” (NP: 34-35; 30).

These statements of Deleuze on Christ are distinct from those in “To Have Done with Judgment”. While the latter merely refer to the nothingness of will in Christ and are just negative, the former also allude to the coming manifestation of his will to power, and are partly positive. This partial positivity comes from his ambiguity in being at once the last man and the man who wants to perish.

In fact, closely examined, “To Have Done with Judgment” has a similar kind of
ambiguity. The point of Deleuze’s critique of Christ in this article was his renunciation of combat and lack of the will to power. However, curiously, in this very article, Deleuze himself admits that the most important factor in combat does not reside in clashing with or fighting against something, as usually associated with the word “combat”. He distinguishes two kinds of combat. One is called the combat-against, the combat against the other and his or her oppressive forces. The other is called the combat-between, the combat between the forces constituent of oneself and those of others, needed in order to create a new combination among all these forces. Rather than the conflict of individuals, it is “the process through which a force enriches itself by seizing hold of other forces and joining itself to them in a new ensemble: a becoming” (CC: 165; 132). For Deleuze, the combat-between is more important than the combat-against, in that the latter is in vain unless the former complements it. “[T]hese external combats, these combats-against, find their justification in the combats-between that determine the composition of forces in the combatant” (Ibid, italics in text). This is because only the combat-between can give an alternative to the forms destroyed by the combat-against, creating a different combination among their constituent forces. The agent of this combat-between is the body without organs, or indeed, this body itself is this combat. Deleuze writes: “Combat, by contrast, is a powerful, nonorganic vitality that supplements force with force, and enriches whatever it takes hold of” (CC: 167; 133), and “The body without organs is an affective, intensive, anarchist body that consists solely of poles, zones, thresholds, and gradients. It is traversed by a powerful, nonorganic vitality” (CC: 164; 131). As a composition of bodily parts independent of organic forms or functions, the body without organs is traversed by the nonorganic vitality. Insofar as this vitality works by connecting these parts across the borders of individuals and creating a new composition of forces, the body without organs makes itself a combat-between. And, insofar as this vitality “defies organs and undoes their organization” (CC: 164; 131), the body without
organs also forms a combat-against the organism. Thus the body without organs is first of all the combat-between and then the combat-against. Recall that Bartleby, a new Christ, almost uncovered his body without organs, even if it was not explicitly mentioned. Or, in another context, in the field of art, Christ’s body was made into a body without organs. Above all, Spinoza a Christ of philosophers elaborated the thought of the body without organs and made himself a body without organs. Even if these “Christ”s did not carry their combat far enough in Deleuze’s eyes, at least their bodies without organs had been ready for it, forming their combat-between waiting for development as the combat-against. Although Christ is accused of lacking his will to combat, the combat-between, more important than the combat-against, has been launched in his body. He not only personifies a nothingness of will but also brings with him an element to evoke an affirmative will to power which will destroy negativity. This is in the same way as he is at once the last man and the man who wants to perish.

Why such ambiguity is in Christ and what it means should be questioned. Answering these questions will help us elucidate how the synthesis of Christ and Antichrist is possible, or how the former enables transmutation and becomes the latter. In order to proceed in this direction, it is necessary to further examine Deleuze’s idea of transmutation and his understanding of the qualities of force and those of the will to power at issue in transmutation.

2. Two Kinds of Passivity

If we carefully read Deleuze’s description of the course of transmutation, we notice that the passivity of force, that which characterizes Christ, plays an unexpectedly important part, although inconspicuously.

By Deleuze’s account, in transmutation, the quality of the will to power changes from
negative to affirmative, and the quality of force changes from reactive to active. What sets this change off is the change in the relation between the will to nothingness as the negative will to power and reactive forces.

Active destruction means: the point, the moment of transmutation in the will to nothingness. Destruction becomes active at the moment when, with the alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness broken, the will to nothingness is converted and crosses over to the side of affirmation, it is related to a power of affirming which destroys the reactive forces themselves. Destruction becomes active to the extent that the negative is transmuted and converted into affirmative power (NP: 200-201; 174; italics in text).

Deleuze claims that active destruction as the sign of transmutation occurs when reactive forces and the will to nothingness break their alliance. When the will to nothingness destroys reactive forces, the will is no longer negative but has become affirmative, and its destruction of reactive forces has become active. So it is the cancellation of the alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness that triggers transmutation.

However, what is crucial to the cancellation of this alliance is the emergence of the passivity in force and the nothingness in will.

We know what the result of this is - the last man, the one who prefers a nothingness of will, who prefers to fade away passively, rather than a will to nothingness. But this result is a result for the reactive man, not for the will to nothingness itself. The will to nothingness continues its enterprise, this time in silence, beyond the reactive man. Reactive forces break their alliance with the will to nothingness, the will to nothingness, in turn, breaks its alliance with reactive forces. It inspires in man a new inclination: for destroying himself, but destroying himself actively. (NP: 200; 174; italics in text)

Deleuze claims that the cancellation of the alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness starts with the emergence of passive force with the nothingness of will, and ends
with the appearance of active forces with the affirmative will to power. Since life in itself is essentially active, reactive forces belong to weakened and weakening life. As the result of this weakening and being weakened, they engender the last man who has lost his will and wishes to fade away passively. In negating life, reactive forces have allied themselves with the will to nothingness as the negative will to power. However, when they become passive, they ally themselves with the nothingness of will and break with the will to nothingness. Then the will to nothingness in turn break with these forces. This will, carrying the negation of life further, tries to destroy the weakest mode of existence as the goal of reactive forces. At this point, the last man, dissatisfied with just wishing to fade away passively, comes to will to destroy his passive mode of existence actively, throwing himself into the process of transmutation. In this development, it is the emergence of the passivity in force and the nothingness in will that undoes the alliance between reactive forces and the will to nothingness, and therefore leads forces to become active and will to become affirmative.

If the passivity of force holds such a crucial role, it is in relation to the radical passivity inherent in the will to power and underlying the becoming active of forces, although these two kinds of passivity are distinguished. This radical passivity is found in Deleuze’s definition of the will to power as a capacity to be affected.

In the first place, therefore, the will to power is manifested as the capacity to be affected [le pouvoir d’être affecté], as the determinate capacity of force to be affected [le pouvoir déterminé de la force d’être elle-même affectée]. (NP: 70; 62; translation slightly altered).

While Deleuze clearly states that the primary function of the will to power resides in being affected, it is unlikely that he reduces the will to power to passivity, especially, given that it is paired with the nothingness of will. In effect, elsewhere he specifies that he does not mean by the capacity to be affected the passivity of the will to power. “[F]or Nietzsche, the
capacity to be affected [le pouvoir d’être affecté] is not necessarily a passivity but an *affectivity*, a sensibility, a sensation” (NP: 70; 62; italics in text; translation slightly altered).

But the affectivity or sensibility he invokes has been defined as passivity for a long time in the history of philosophy. Even if Deleuze or Nietzsche would not agree with this tradition, the passive tense “to be affected” is unmistakable. Then, at issue in the will to power, or its affectivity, is a different kind of passivity from that which is paired with the nothingness of will or that which is understood after the manner of tradition in the history of philosophy.

The similarity of Nietzsche’s thought to Foucault’s casts light on this another kind of passivity or affectivity. Explaining Foucault’s notion of the outside, Deleuze writes:

> It was necessary to recover force, in the Nietzschean sense, or power, in the very particular sense of ‘will to power’, in order to [pour] discover this outside as limit, the ultimate horizon from which being folds itself [horizon ultime à partir de quoi l’être se plie] (F: 121; 113; translation slightly altered).

Although Deleuze here connects Nietzsche’s will to power and Foucault’s outside, what kind of connection Deleuze sees between them is unclear. This connection becomes clear, if we take into account his other statements on these notions. On the one hand, as we have seen before, he writes on Foucault’s thought: “It is always from the outside that a force confers on others or receives from others the variable position” (F: 92; 86). If forces constituent of all forms including the self and the other are related to each other, it is from the outside irreducible to any of these forces or forms. On the other, Deleuze defines Nietzsche’s will to power as “the principle of the synthesis of forces” (NP: 56; 50). The commonality of these two notions is that they both enable forces to relate themselves. Their difference is that while the outside as Foucault conceives it is the most external to any constituent force or constituted form, the will to power as Nietzsche conceives it is “a complement of force *and* something internal to it” (NP: 56; 49; italics in the French original text). That is why it is
called will, comparable to something ascribed to a certain entity as its internal motive to synthesize forces. This difference does not undermine but underpins the connection between the outside and the will to power. For, the will to power as the internal complement, in contrast to the outside as the most external, is something which receives the act from the outside and takes on this act. The radical passivity of the will to power is the passivity in correlation with the act of the force of the outside, not in relation to other wills to power or to the forces of constituent forms. The uniqueness of this passivity consists in that it is not paired with the activity of the same kind of thing, but with the activity of something incomparable. Now it is understandable why Deleuze uses the word “fold” in the above passage. The will to power is the fold of the force of the outside into the inside through this radical passivity. As the capacity to be affected, the will to power, by being affected by the force of the outside which enables the relation of constituent forces, itself becomes the principle to relate them. With the will to power as such, we find in Nietzsche the same framework as we have seen consistently in Deleuze’s discussions of Foucault, Leibniz and Spinoza.

The uniqueness of the radical passivity of the will to power is also that from this passivity derive the qualities of force including activity and passivity. This is the consequence of the correlation between the will to power and the force of the outside. On this point again, the similarity of Nietzsche’s thought to Foucault’s gives us a clue.

It is still from the outside that a force affects, or is affected by, others. The power to affect or to be affected [pouvoir d’affecter, or d’être affecté] is fulfilled [est rempli] in a variable way, depending on the forces involved in the relation (F: 95; 89; translation slightly altered).

Deleuze here puts in other terms his statement elsewhere that forces are related from the outside. In short, it is from the outside that forces affect or are affected by each other, and in
thus affecting or being affected, the power to affect or to be affected of each force is fulfilled. Although the word “pouvoir” should be translated into “power” in this context where Foucault’s notion of power is at issue, Deleuze’s French phrase “pouvoir d’affecter, or d’être affecté” is the same as that which is translated into the “capacity to affect or to be affected” in reference to the will to power. At first glance, there seems to be a contradiction between his statement that forces affect or are affected by each other, each of them having the power or the capacity to affect or to be affected, and another statement that the will to power is the capacity to be affected. But there is no contradiction between these two statements. For, given the correlation between the will to power and the force of the outside by which constituent forces are related, their affecting or being affected in this relation is the secondary outcome from the will to power’s being affected by the force of the outside.

Deleuze’s following statement endorses this claim.

The relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity to be affected [un pouvoir d’être affecté]. (NP: 70; 62; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

On Nietzsche’s will to power, Deleuze writes that each force is affected by virtue of the will to power as the capacity to be affected and each force’s thus being affected determines its relation to other forces. This is another way of describing the will to power as the principle of the synthesis of forces. This passage looks almost parallel to the previous statement about Foucault that each force’s affecting or being affected fulfills its capacity to affect or to be affected. However, strictly speaking, force or power’s affecting and being affected in Foucault’s case and its being affected in Nietzsche’s case do not refer to the same thing. In the above passage, it reads that “each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces”.

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A force’s superiority or inferiority to other forces means its acting upon or being acted upon by them, that is, affecting or being affected in the mutual relation of forces. The point here is that, whatever kind of force it is, every force should be affected in the first place. This affectivity corresponds to a force or will to power’s being affected in Nietzsche. From this affectivity derives the quality of each force in relation to other forces. “The will to power is the genetic element of force, that is to say the element that produces the quality due to each force in this relation” (NP: 59; 53). This quality corresponds to a force or power’s affecting or being affected in Foucault.

Hence two levels should be distinguished. On the first level is the radical passivity of the will to power in correlation with the act of the force of the outside. On this level, the will to power, being affected by the force of the outside, is defined primarily by the capacity to be affected. On the second level is the derivative activity or passivity of force or the will to power. On this level, constituent forces affect or are affected, and corresponding to each force, the will to power is determined secondarily as the capacity to affect or to be affected.

In claiming that from the affectivity in correlation with the force of the outside derives each force’s affecting and being affected in relation to other forces, we do not ignore Nietzsche’s basic framework that “The active and reactive are the qualities of force that derive from the will to power” (NP: 72; 63). For, by Deleuze’s account, reactivity in Nietzsche resides in being acted upon or affected in relation to other forces.

The affections [affections] of force are active insofar as the force appropriates anything that resists it and compels the obedience of inferior forces. Conversely [Inversement], when force is affected by superior forces which it obeys its affections [affections] are made to submit, or rather, they are acted (agies) (NP: 71; 63; the translator’s parentheses, translation slightly altered).

The first half of this passage refers to active forces, and the second half to forces of another
kind. There is no mention of the exact quality of the latter forces. But, given that, in Nietzsche’s terminology, “the superior or dominant forces are known as *active* and the inferior or dominated forces are known as *reactive*” (NP: 45; 40; italics in text), what is discussed in the second half should be reactive forces. Here the reactivity of these forces is sought in their being affected and acted upon by superior forces. Although this view of reactivity looks peculiar, it becomes understandable if we assume that Deleuze equates the distinction between being active and being reactive of a force in Nietzsche with the distinction between its affecting and being affected derived from the affectivity at issue.

We can still ask what divides the activity and the reactivity of force, while both qualities are derived from the radical passivity of the will to power. The key to thinking about this is in the first half of the above passage. It appears that in this part is the definition of active forces merely in relation to other, inferior forces. However we can read this definition otherwise, taking into consideration the relation to the force of the outside. For, in the phrase “the force appropriates anything that resists it”, we can read not only a force’s domination over inferior forces but also this force’s attitude towards the force of the outside affecting it. That is to say, being active means succeeding in incorporating this force and appropriating its act. This is how a force comes to act upon and dominate other forces. In contrast, being reactive is failing to do so. Hence, a force is only acted upon and dominated by other forces. In fact, just acting upon other forces or being acted upon by them is not enough to determine the quality of each force. For, in a usual situation, forces in interaction may act or be acted upon by others in turn, sometimes regardless of the quality of each force. So being acted upon just in relation to similar forces cannot be the ultimate reason to decisively distinguish active and reactive forces. If a force has appropriated the action of the force of the outside, the former can influence other constituent forces even in responding to their functions. This is what acting upon means. Conversely, if a force is merely acted upon
by the force of the outside without appropriating its action, the former results in being
influenced by other constituent forces, even in operating on them. This is what being acted
upon means. Activity and reactivity as qualities of force are thus determined first by a force’s
relation to the force of the outside, and then as the consequence of this relation, by a force’s
relation to other forces of a similar kind. This is in the same way as the self’s relation to the
other determined its relation to itself in Foucault’s consideration of the Greek practice of
subjectivation. In Foucault, the folding of the relation to the other is at once the folding of
the force of the outside, as the absolute other to both the self and the other. Also in Nietzsche,
there is a double operation of folding, that is, folding the force of the outside while
appropriating its action, and folding the relation to this force into the relation with other
similar forces.

Just as the qualities of force can be rethought with regard to its relation to the force of
the outside, so also can the qualities of the will to power, given the correspondence between
the qualities of force and the qualities of the will to power. There is affinity between active
forces and the affirmative will to power on the one hand, and between reactive forces and the
negative will to power on the other.

Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, becoming active
personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a becoming reactive (NP: 61; 54;
italics in text).

In short, when a force becomes active, in this becoming active is the affirmation by the
affirmative will to power, and when a force becomes reactive, in this becoming reactive is
the negation by the negative will to power. Then, affirmation consists of the will to power’s
affirming to incorporate the force of the outside and appropriate its action, in order to make a
force have affinity for this active will. Negation consists in the will to power’s negating to do
so, in order to make a force have affinity for this reactive will. In other words, affirmation is
the affirmation of the radical passivity of the will to power so that this passivity is activated
even to take on the act of the force of the outside, and negation is the negation of this
passivity until it refuses to take this act on.

Of course, this radical passivity is not the same as the passivity as a quality of force.
Here again, Deleuze’s view of the latter passivity is not an ordinary one.

In Nietzsche, “passive” does not mean “non-active”; “non-active” means
“reactive”; but “passive” means “non-acted” [non-agi]. The only thing that is
passive is reaction insofar as it is not acted (NP: 135; 118).

While defining reactive as being acted upon, which is normally regarded as passive, Deleuze
defines passive as being not acted upon. Passion for him is the extremely weakened state of
life, as the result of continuing becoming reactive under the domination of other forces.
“How far will reactive forces go? It is better to fade away passively!” (NP: 171; 149; italics
in translation) If here again a force’s relation with other forces reflects its relation to the
force of the outside, the passivity of force means primarily the state in which a force refuses
even to be acted upon by the force of the outside, and, as a result, secondarily the state in
which a force is not acted upon by other forces, neither acting upon them. In other words, the
passivity of force is the inertia of the will to power’s radical passivity from which the activity
and the reactivity of force derive. When the affectivity or the capacity to be affected is
inactivated, this capacity is no longer itself. Hence passive forces have affinity for the
nothingness of will.

Although passivity as a quality of force is the end product of the thorough negation of
the radical passivity of the will to power, the former passivity is somehow connected with
the latter. A force’s being passive, neither acting upon nor being acted upon, means its
disconnecting and secluding itself from other kinds of forces. In this state, passive forces break not only with active forces but also reactive ones which have been their companions so far. Parallel to this, the nothingness of will breaks not only with the affirmative will to power but also with the negative one. At this point, the radical passivity of the will to power, being neither affirmed nor negated, is laid bare, as what it is before affirmation or negation. To sum up, passivity as a quality of force, or superficial passivity, so to speak, if it is carried to an extreme, reveals the radical passivity of the will to power.

The connection between these two kinds of passivity explains the crucial role of the passive forces and the nothingness of will in the course of transmutation. When reactive forces become passive, they break with the will to nothingness and ally themselves with the nothingness of will. Then the will to nothingness in turn breaks with reactive forces and comes to actively destroy them. If the emergence of passive forces and the nothingness of will triggers transmutation, it is because the superficial passivity of force, going as far as possible, leads to the radical passivity of the will to power in correlation with the act of the force of the outside.

The emergence of passive forces prepares the appearance of active forces. This is how the synthesis of Christ and Dionysus is possible. Christ, or Buddha, not only preferred fading away passively but also actually died in this way; “he wants only to die [mourir]; he seeks his own death” (N: 45; 96; translation slightly altered). Besides, he taught others to die in that way; “he had already taught the reactive life to die serenely, to fade away passively” (NP: 178; 155). His act of teaching the reactive life to die and of practicing this himself, rather than sitting idle, characterizes the incipient phase of the exercise of active forces. Therefore Christ or Buddha is at once the last man and the man who wants to perish, precisely for the reason of his incomparable passivity.

With passive forces and the nothingness of will, active self-destruction has already
started, even if it has not been carried forward. This coincides with the existence of the body without organs in Christ or Christ-like figures as Deleuze conceives them, given that he equates the body without organs with the will to power.

The way to escape judgment is to make yourself a body without organs, to find your body without organs. This had already been Nietzsche’s project: to define the body in its becoming, in its intensity, as the capacity to affect or to be affected [pouvoir d’affecter et d’être affecté], that is, as *Will to Power*. (CC: 164; 131; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

If the body without organs is equal to the will to power, the existence of this body in Deleuze’s “Christ”’s suggests that in them the affectivity of the will to power is ready to affect or to be affected, even if it has not been fully activated. This is, again, because the superficial passivity of force reveals the radical passivity of the will to power.

3. Dionysus against the Crucified

Needless to say, in Deleuze and Nietzsche’s eyes, Christ did not go far enough. He has not completely passed to the final stage of transmutation, nor fully uncovered his body without organs. Then what did he lack? Remember for what Deleuze criticized the ass. Accepting everything, while bearing it as the burden, is not truly affirming, since the will to affirm is lacking there. In Christ’s case, even if the will to power in his body affirms to incorporate the force of the outside, he does not affirm it by his own will.

Going as far as he can man raises negation to a power of affirming. But *affirming in his all power [dans toute sa puissance], affirming affirmation itself—this is beyond man’s forces [forces]* (NP: 212; 185; translation slightly altered; italics in text).
This is why affirmation in all its power is double: affirmation is affirmed (NP: 214; 186).

In order for transmutation to be possible, affirmation should be double, affirming affirmation itself. The first affirmation is by the will to power in the body. It is to affirm to incorporate the force of the outside and appropriate its act so that the forces with affinity for this will to power can become active. The second affirmation is by the will proper, the will to power in the mind. It is to affirm the first affirmation, to double this affirmation in the body by another affirmation in the mind, that is, to affirm what is going on in one’s body as what one’s mind wants until one can even carry it out by oneself. If the first affirmation is the folding, so also is the second, complementing the first. While the first one is the folding of the force of the outside into the inside, the second one is the folding of what one’s will to power does in the body into what it does in the mind. The incorporation of the force of the outside is completed through such double affirmation, double folding. For, through this double operation, one not only appropriates the act of this force but also does this act as one’s own act by one’s will, as if this force itself were exercised through one’s force. Here is the Overman who actively destroys his own reactive mode of existence and overcomes his own humanity. Christ almost succeeded in the first affirmation, but did not attain to the second, since he did not will what he was actually doing. Without the second, the first affirmation comes to nothingness, missing its true sense. Action in force and affirmation in will are brought to naught and reduced to passion in force and nothing in will. It is only with the second affirmation that the first makes sense. It is with this second affirmation that Antichrist appears, personifying Dionysus as a god of destruction. The borderline between the first and second affirmations separates Christ and Antichrist. Both face the force of the outside and expose their wills to power to this force. But, one merely bears his being destroyed by this force, while the other proceeds to destroying himself by his will and exercising his force in this self-destruction.
What makes this difference is the extent to which each can incorporate the force of the outside.

While active forces are starting to work, the lack of the will to affirm it makes this activation end up with something else. If the affirmation of the incorporation of the force of the outside is not doubled by another affirmation and thus accomplished, the radical passivity once revealed is abstracted from the correlation with the act of the force of the outside. When the radical passivity is reduced to mere superficial passivity, the appropriation of the act of the force of the outside and the activation of relevant forces are interrupted. Incipient activity is turned into a pacified state in which combat never takes place. Once someone is thus removed from the process of transmutation and to him is ascribed the sheer superficial passivity, it is easy to manipulate or disfigure his image. The ass which remains the ass without becoming the lion or the child would be supposed to accept everything and bear it as the burden, even his manipulation by others. For Nietzsche-Deleuze, this is what happened in Christ. Nietzsche’s famous phrase “Dionysus-Crucified” can be read both as the equation of Dionysus and Christ and as their opposition. The former is the relation between Dionysus and Christ himself, and the latter is the relation between Dionysus and disfigured Christ.

In Dionysus and in Christ the martyr is the same, the passion is the same. It is the same phenomenon but in two opposed senses. On the one hand, the life that justifies suffering, that affirms suffering; on the other hand, the suffering that accuses life, that testifies against it, that makes life something that must be justified (NP: 16: 14-15).

Deleuze contrasts two kinds of martyrish passion, that of Dionysus and that of Christ, implying two kinds of relations between life and suffering. Dionysus was lacerated and devoured by a Titan god, and Christ was crucified in compliance with God’s will. Insofar as a god gives both of them deaths and sufferings, these are the same phenomena of martyrdom.
and passion. The difference of the two types is whether, in each of them, suffering justifies life or suffering testifies against life. Deleuze takes the case of Dionysus to be the former and the case of Christ to be the latter.

One may doubt if Christ who taught forgiveness and remonstrated about judging could accuse life because of suffering in it, however he himself suffered. Deleuze also points out the oddness in that Christ “who did not judge, who did not want to judge, will be made into an essential cog in the system of judgment” (CC; 55: 40). If Christ is regarded as such a person that judges life, it is as the result of manipulation and disfiguration. Quoting the following phrase of Nietzsche, Deleuze identifies Saint Paul as the culprit of this manipulation and disfiguration: “The invention of Paul, his means for establishing a priestly tyranny, for forming herds: the belief in immortality – that is to say, the doctrine of ‘judgment’”.6 It is with the institution of Christianity by Saint Paul that Christ was made into the judge against life. Christ disconnected from transmutation and opposed to Dionysus is the figure invented in this religion of judgment.

Endorsing this distinction between Christ himself and Christ in Christianity, Deleuze writes on the relation between life and suffering in Christianity.

For Christianity the fact of suffering in life means primarily that life is not just, that it is even essentially unjust, that it pays for an essential injustice by suffering, it is blameworthy because it suffers. The result of this is that life must be justified, that is to say, redeemed of its injustice or saved. Saved by that suffering which a little while ago accused it: it must suffer since it is blameworthy. These two aspects of Christianity form what Nietzsche calls “bad conscience” or the internalization of pain. They define truly Christian nihilism, that is to say the way in which Christianity denies life… (NP: 16-17: 15; italics in text).

At the beginning of the passage, it reads that in Christianity suffering makes life something unjust and to be justified. This relation between life and suffering in which the latter testifies
against the former coincides with their relation in Christ understood in opposition to Dionysus. This coincidence shows that if Christ’s passion is taken to be an accusation against life, it is within the confines of Christianity after Saint Paul.

Bad conscience, mentioned above, forms this religion’s system of judgment in the interiority of the individual. Characteristic of this system is that the existence of pain is made not only the reason for accusation against life of being unjust but also the reason for the compensation for this injustice. Life is blamed and saved at once, both because of suffering. The mechanism of bad conscience explains these double aspects. If someone is just, he or she does not have a bad conscience, and if someone who is unjust does not have a bad conscience, there is no chance for him or her to be saved from his or her injustice. In this sense, bad conscience is the evidence for one’s being unjust and at the same time the way of saving oneself from this injustice. Together these double aspects function not to redeem someone who has a bad conscience once and for all but to keep him or her in an unredeemable state. In order to be redeemed, one must have a bad conscience, and yet if one does so, one cannot be redeemed. In the plea of impossible redemption, suffering continues to be reproduced and life continues to be accused. Life is judged and judges itself in bad conscience. “[P]ain is made the consequence of a fault and the means of a salvation; pain is healed by manufacturing yet more pain, by internalizing it still further” (NP: 149: 130). Pain is never resolved but reproduced endlessly, internalized deep inside the heart of each person. With this reproduction and internalization, bad conscience is such a mechanism that enables each individual to judge oneself and to be judged forever in his or her inside.

If Christ is “made into an essential cog in the system of judgment”, it is not necessarily because he overtly judges, or at least is regarded as such a person that does so. Rather, he is inserted in this system, precisely because he is regarded as a savior who sacrificed himself to atone for our sins.
[T]here is no more beautiful saviour than the one who would be simultaneously executioner, victim and comforter, the Holy Trinity, the wonderful dream of bad conscience (NP: 18: 16).

The idea of Christ’s death as the atonement for our sin makes him a savior in triple senses. He is a comforter in that he took over our sins and eased our pains of being sinners. But, in order to do so, he must be a victim, since he had to assume all these sins by himself and suffer all these pains for us. In doing so, he must be an executioner, for he made us feel guiltier for our sins and gave us more pains. Then we are sent back to the start and go round in the same circle over and over again. The functions of the first and third senses correspond to the double aspects of bad conscience, healing pain and manufacturing more pain. The second sense makes Christ a model sufferer, the one who suffers just as, but much more than, we do with our bad conscience. The combination of these three senses of a savior in one person constitutes another, strange version of trinity, making him a personification of bad conscience.

Inseparably connected with the idea of such a savior is the idea of God who ordered His most beloved son to sacrifice himself. Insofar as Christ’s death is taken as the result of his obedience to his Father, God plays a role of the organizer who presides over the mechanism of bad conscience.

God put his son on the cross out of love; we respond to this love to the extent that we feel guilty, guilty of this death, and that we redress it by accusing ourselves, by paying interest on the debt. Through the love of God, through the sacrifice of his son, the whole of life becomes reactive. — Life dies but it is reborn as reactive. The reactive life is the content of survival as such, the content of the resurrection. The reactive life alone is God’s elect, the reactive life alone finds grace before God, before the will to nothingness. (NP: 177: 153-154; italics in text; translation slightly altered).
Appearing as the Father who orders His son to die, God grounds the internalization of pain and its endless reproduction. If Christ himself suffers and makes us suffer, it is insofar as he sacrifices himself to atone for our sins. The story that he sacrifices himself in compliance with God’s order and God in turn orders this self-sacrifice for His love of man dispose us to respond to this love. To do so is to continue to feel guilty of His son, even after he took over the debts of our sins, as if we still had all our debts. But, since the debts are too much, we can only pay off their interest, however guilty we feel. Obeying his Father’s order and assuming all sufferings coming from our sins, Christ gives us the model to respond to God’s love. The reward for this ideal response is Christ’s survival in heaven and resurrection on earth. The wish for a similar reward leads us to feel guilty more and more. Whereas Christ relieves us of pain and yet brings us back to it forever, God enforces this move, founding the mechanism of bad conscience.

The point of Deleuze’s critique is neither in the content of the teaching nor in that of each concept constituent of it. Rather, the point is in the way such teaching and concepts together influence our life and what they make it. What matters is “not ‘What does it mean?’ but rather ‘How does it work?’” (AO: 129; 109; italics in text). Where Christ’s obedience to God’s order is taken to be an ideal attitude for humans, there remains only the reactive life, merely being acted upon in being ordered. If God gives grace to the absolute obedience to His order, especially to the order of death, He is nothing but the will to nothingness itself, urging us to go towards nothingness. There is no room for the active life or the affirmative will to power.

Opposed to the passion of Christ in Christianity is that of Dionysus.

[H]e [Dionysus] is the god for whom life does not have to be justified, for whom life is essentially just. Moreover it is life which takes charge of justification, “it
affirms even the harshest suffering”. We must be clear, it does not resolve pain by internalizing it, it affirms it in the element of its exteriority. And, from this, the opposition of Dionysus and Christ is developed point by point as that of the affirmation of life (its extreme valuation) and the negation of life (its extreme depreciation). (NP: 18: 16)

If in Dionysus, life justifies suffering, while in Christ in Christianity, suffering testifies against life, it is because in the former pain is externalized, not internalized as in the latter. The problem is the external meaning of pain opposed to its internal meaning. What is this external meaning and how is it possible?

The active meaning of pain therefore appears as an external meaning. In order for pain to be judged from an active point of view it must be kept in the element of its exteriority. There is a whole art in this, an art which is that of the masters. The masters have a secret. They know that pain has only one meaning: giving pleasure to someone, giving pleasure to someone who inflicts or contemplates pain. If the active man is able not to take his own pain seriously it is because he always imagines someone to whom it gives pleasure. It is not for nothing that such an imagination is found in the belief in the active gods which peopled the Greek world (NP: 148: 129-130; italics in text).

Deleuze writes that a way by which one can provide one’s pain with an external meaning is to imagine someone who can have pleasure by seeing this pain. With the supposition of the other’s eyes which draw pleasure from pain, pain is no longer internalized in the person who suffers, but connected to the exteriority of this other. Rather than being reproduced as such, pain is fused with something else and itself connected to the exteriority of its other. Pain becomes external not only to the person who suffers it but also to itself as pain. Deleuze claims that such external pain is the pain of Dionysus. If he can affirm his passion as joyful, it is by assimilating into a Titan god who devours him and feeling the pleasure of this other in his pain. Since such pain does not evoke the feeling of guiltiness or debt, one need not be
judged or judge oneself. Pain does not testify against life full of pain. For, insofar as one can change pain into pleasure, pain is justified by one’s life itself capable of thus producing pleasure.

It is noticeable that this external meaning of pain is also called the active meaning. In fact, the contrast of internal and external here overlaps with the contrast of reactive and active in Deleuze’s sense. Generally speaking, as unwilling patience with unpleasant stimuli, “pain is a reaction” (NP: 148: 129), and pain in such an ordinary sense is internal. Besides, bear in mind that bad conscience, internalizing pain and reproducing it, makes our life reactive. Given that this internalization and reproduction is the result of being ordered and acted upon by God as the will to nothingness, the pain thus internalized and reproduced is also reactive. In contrast, pain is externalized, when the one who suffers assimilates to the other who enjoys seeing this suffering, to a Titan god in Dionysus’s case. One’s pain being mixed with the other’s pleasure, suffering is no longer mere passion but the action of producing pleasure. To this extent, the external pain acts upon by itself and as such is active.

Another noticeable locution, which Deleuze uses to describe the art of thus dealing with pain, is an art of the masters. He writes on the master opposed to the slave as follows: “What Nietzsche calls noble, high and master is sometimes active force, sometimes affirmative will. What he calls base, vile and slave is sometimes reactive force and sometimes negative will” (NP: 62: 55; italics in text). That the art of making pain active and external is called an art of the master means that in this art is working not only active forces but also an affirmative will to power, in contrast to and yet paired with the negative will to power’s making pain reactive and internal. This is no wonder, given the affinity between active force and the affirmative will to power or the affinity between reactive force and the negative will to power. The master is not the one who, as usually imagined, forcefully dominates the other, supposedly the slave, and arbitrarily gives him or her pain for one’s
pleasure. Rather it is the one who is a master of his or her pain by externalizing it and turning it into pleasure. The slave is not the one who suffers from the subjugation to the other, supposedly the master. It is the one who is a slave to his or her pain by internalizing and reproducing it to inflict it on him- or herself. Even if being the master or the slave entails a specific relation to the other, it is only as a consequence. What is in question in these two types is what kind of force and what kind of will are dominant in each of them. The way in which someone deals with his or her pain can be a mark to tell his or her type.

Not only in the case of God who sacrifices his beloved son for the love of humans, but also in the case of the god who enjoys seeing suffering, what matters is not what the idea means, but how it works to affect our life. However cruel and grotesque the idea of the Titan god who devours Dionysus is, for us to reflect on this idea, not to believe in this god ourselves, still has some sense. For, at least in its original cultural context, this idea enabled the person who holds it to bring his or her pain from interiority to exteriority and turn the reactive endurance of pain into the active production of pleasure, with his or her will to power affirmative. Remarkable is the way this idea infused into the life of the ancient Greek active forces and affirmative wills to power.

The existence of the link between external and active and that between internal and reactive coincides with the claim that the appropriation of the act of the force of the outside enables the forces constituent of modes of existence to become active, and that the failure of this appropriation makes these forces become reactive. The will of the one who makes one’s pain external and active is affirmative in the sense that it affirms this appropriation. The will of the one who keeps one’s pain internal and reactive is negative in the sense that it negates this appropriation. An idea of god, whether of God who sacrifices His son or of the god who enjoys devouring another god, is a representation of the force of the outside, that which is different from what it stands for and yet somehow expresses it. Different ideas of god
correspond to different attitudes towards the force of the outside and different types of people who face this force through these ideas. An idea of god, if it goes beyond its limit as a representation, may enable the one who conceives it to incorporate the force outside it. Or if this idea remains a sheer representation, it moves away the one who conceives it from this force itself, and puts him or her under its own power. This difference divides the two types of passion given by the god represented. In Deleuze’s eyes, the former is the case of Dionysus in which life becomes active by the appropriation of the act of the force of the outside thanks to the affirmative will to power. The latter is the case of Christ in Christianity in which life becomes reactive by the failure of this appropriation thanks to the negative will to power.

Revealing the radical passivity in his will to power in correlation to the act of the force of the outside, Christ took a step forward towards transmutation, as a comrade of Dionysus. However, short of another step, of the second affirmation doubling the first, the process stopped and this radical passivity was reduced to the superficial passivity like sheer inertia. He himself was divorced from the force of the outside and integrated into the system in which a certain representation of this force gives everything meaning, himself identified as an agent and a bearer of such signification. “[H]ow hard it is to break through the wall of the signifier. Many people have tried since Christ, beginning with Christ. But Christ himself botched the crossing, the jump, he bounced off the wall” (MP: 229; 187; italics in text). Blocked by the wall of the signifier, he himself is made into the likeness of such a wall, the face, the representative of the typical European human subject, at the same time as bad conscience becomes a condition of humanity.8

4. Ambiguity in Dionysus and Nietzsche

Deleuze equated the will to power with the body without organs, at once being the
capacity to affect and to be affected, based on the radical passivity of being affected by the force of the outside. Since this capacity is fully activated in the affirmative will to power, it is no wonder that we can find a body without organs in Dionysus’s passion. To mix one’s pain with the pleasure of the other who sees is to incorporate the other’s eyes into one’s body, changing the composition of this body itself. “An eye must be invoked that extracts pleasure from the event (this has nothing to do with vengeance): something Nietzsche himself calls the evaluating eye, or the eye of the gods who enjoy cruel spectacles. … So much is pain part of an active life and an obliging gaze” (AO: 226; 191). The coupling of bodily parts traversing several bodies across their border without being organized is the formation of a body without organs. When one appropriates the act of the force of the outside with one’s affirmative will to power and incorporates the other’s eyes into one’s body, one makes oneself a body without organs. Since one body without organs interacts with others and together they constitute a plane of immanence, where there is a body without organs is a plane of immanence. Every philosopher has his or her unique plane, including Nietzsche. A musical form composed on his plane shares the same characteristic with Dionysus’s way of exalting pain.

Let us recall Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return as a little ditty, a refrain, but which captures the mute and unthinkable forces of the Cosmos. We thus leave behind the assemblage to enter the age of the Machine, the immense mechanosphere, the plane of cosmicization of forces to be harnessed. Varèse’s procedure, at the dawn of this age, is exemplary: a musical machine of consistency, a sound machine (not a machine for reproducing sounds), which molecularizes and atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and harnesses a cosmic energy. If this machine must have an assemblage, it is the synthesizer. By assembling modules, source elements, and elements for treating sound (oscillators, generators, and transformers), by arranging microintervals, the synthesizer makes audible the sound process itself, the production of that process, and puts us in contact with still other elements beyond sound matter. It unites disparate elements in the material,
Deleuze and Guattari describe, as the epitome of Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return, electric music played by the synthesizer. Nietzsche’s eternal return as Deleuze understands it is not the eternal recurrence of the same incidents in the same order, but the return of the different in which what comes always differs from what has come and what will come from what comes. This is how all things in a state of flux are. Even if things are the same at the macroscopic level, all of them are changing from one moment to the next at the microscopic level. However solid it seems, any form is not permanent, since the molecules of matter composing it alter its arrangement at all times. Such arrangement or its alteration does not occur by virtue of the forces coming from within these forms but by virtue of other forces coming from their outside, which are called above the forces of the Cosmos. Although these forces are working every time and everywhere, it is difficult to grasp them. The established forms, as the components of our common sense and daily life, by giving the appearance of independent substances, prevent such forces from showing themselves to us explicitly. Art sometimes succeeds in allowing them to do so. “In art, and in painting as in music, it is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces. …. The task of painting is defined as the attempt to render visible forces that are not themselves visible. Likewise, music attempts to render sonorous forces that are not themselves sonorous” (FB: 39; 48). When a work of art is shaped into the unstable arrangements of material elements and its irregular alteration, it captures the forces of the Cosmos working among these elements. An example of this art is the music in which the forms and subjects presupposed as standards are dismantled into more basic elements, that is, molecularized, atomized and ionized, and among them are constituted anomalous arrangements. There is no recurring motif, no regular rhythm, no stable key and no harmonious accord, but various sound elements are randomly
combined. The instrument most suitable for such music is the synthesizer. It enables the player to change the quality of sound, the timbre, tone etc. or to add effects, such as echo or vibration, not by replacing the instrument or invoking the technical skills of the player, but by operating the machine, until it engenders such change or addition that is impossible by any instrument or technical skill. Since a player of the synthesizer can make this kind of change in a tune which he or she is now playing, the played sound reflects the process of its production. As such, the synthesizer not only produces extraordinary combinations of sounds but also, in this very production, itself embodies the intervention of cosmic forces. This is just as in the eternal return of the different is generated the diverse as such by virtue of these forces.

The music in which the established forms and subjects are decomposed into the elements of sound matter is comparable with Dionysus’s laceration in which his body is dismembered in pieces. The point to connect these two things is the affirmation of such multiplicity that can never be sublated into unity. Forms and subjects, insofar as they must keep their identity to subsist, are the outcome of the unification of the multiple and cannot survive without recourse to unity. In opposition, to decompose forms and subjects, as in electronic music and laceration, is to break unity and to affirm multiplicity freed from it.

Dionysus affirms all that appears, “even the most bitter suffering”, and appears in all that is affirmed. Multiple and pluralist affirmation – this is the essence of the tragic. This will become clearer if we consider the difficulties of making everything an object of affirmation. Here the effort and the genius of pluralism are necessary, the power of transformations, Dionysian laceration. (NP: 19; 17; italics in text)

The tragic is only to be found in multiplicity, in the diversity of affirmation as such. What defines the tragic is the joy of multiplicity, plural joy. (NP: 19; 17; italics in text)
In a word, Dionysus’s affirmation of the bitterest suffering of his laceration is a part of his affirmation of multiplicity, one of whose symbols is his laceration itself. Since even this bitterest suffering is one of the possible variations of life, indeed the most extreme one, to exalt this suffering is to bring the affirmation of multiplicity to the limit. It is not a matter of literally dismembering oneself to death. Rather it is a matter of acquiring such great “power of transformations” that one can make the bitterest suffering, or even dying, part of living joyfully, just as Dionysus resurrected after laceration. The counterpart of this transformation in music is the errant movements of the disorderly arrangements of sounds without any determinate motif, rhythm, key, accord, etc., introducing the effects of chance, until these movements challenge the notion of music. Dionysus’s way of exalting pain is like this music. If he makes his pain pleasure, it is in the same way as this chaotic music can be appreciated outside existent orders and dissonance can be enjoyed in itself without being resolved into harmony.9 In both this music and Dionysus’s exaltation of pain is the joy of the incessant reproduction of the diverse as such, that is, the eternal return of the different.10

Compared with Spinozist Christ’s way of dealing with pain, Nietzschean Dionysus’s way turns out to be aiming at having done with the vestige of unity remnant in the former. In other words, Spinoza, being more radical than Leibniz, is nevertheless not completely freed from his legacy. Certainly, unlike the case of the Leibnizian martyr, Spinozist Christ’s art of pain does not invoke the pre-established harmony by which unity is inscribed on multiplicity from above. But this art is like that of the Leibnizian martyr in that, in both of these arts, two opposite terms are subsumed under some unity, whether it is that of the one of these terms, the supposedly superior one, or the unity of the third term which however has similarity to one of them. If “there is no Good or Evil in Nature” (SPE: 233; 254) for Spinoza, it is because, in the last instance, both the good and the bad for the individual are integrated into
the higher good from the viewpoint of Nature. If sad and joyful passions disappear, it is because the adequate idea makes both of them active joys, also from this very viewpoint. The unity of the totality from whose viewpoint everything is the same while being different casts a shadow over the musical form expressing the Spinozist Christ’s art of dealing with pain. If beyond the opposition of accord and disaccord appears another, new accord, here is invoked such unity on that the possibility of this accord relies, reflecting the unity of Nature or God. Thus in the Spinozist framework still resides an attachment to accord and unity. With this attachment intact, even if multiplicity is allowed to a great extent, it cannot avoid some connection with unity. This is the problem of Spinozist Christ’s way of exalting with pain, tackled by Nietzschean Dionysus’s. Important here is not the praise of the pain itself or its counter-evaluation against pleasure, but, again, the affirmation of multiplicity. Not only in Leibniz and Spinoza but also in Nietzsche, at issue is still how to transform pain into pleasure. However, what matters now is how to do so, not by subjugating the pain of disaccord to the pleasure of accord as the higher form defined by its unity, but by making pain autonomous so as to produce pleasure by itself while multiplying itself. Hovering disaccords or even noises which cannot attain to the accord and yet nevertheless somehow compose music embody the pain which can never be resolved into pleasure but turns into pleasure by itself, as the pleasure of this pain itself. This pain or disaccord is exemplary of such multiplicity that cannot be sublimated into unity but, resisting this sublimation, gains its autonomy of actively transforming itself.

Such a musical form that epitomizes Nietzsche’s idea of eternal return is similar to his style of writing which determines the uniqueness of his plane of immanence. Prominent in many of his works is the style of aphorism. While Deleuze and Guattari admit the importance of this style, they do not locate this importance in this style itself.
It seems to us that fragmentary writing is not so much the issue in Nietzsche. It is instead speeds and slownesses: not writing slowly or rapidly, but rather writing, and everything else besides, as a production of speeds and slownesses between particles. No form will resist that, no character or no subject will survive it. Zarathustra is only speeds and slownesses, and the eternal return, the life of the eternal return, is the first great concrete freeing of nonpulsed time. *Ecce Homo* has only individuations by haecceities. It is inevitable that the Plan(e), thus conceived, will always fail, but that failures will be an integral part of the plan(e): See the multitude of plans for *The Will to Power*. For a given aphorism, it is always possible, even necessary, to introduce new relations of speed and slowness between its elements that truly make it change assemblages, jump from one assemblage to the next (the issue is therefore not the fragment). (MP: 329: 269)

The importance of Nietzsche’s style of aphorism resides in the individuation realized by it, the individuation by haecceity composed of speeds and slownesses between particles, with neither form nor subject, similar to the individuation in Spinoza. It is the fragmentarity of aphorism that contributes to this individuation. Each aphorism is concluded in itself and can be read independently of other aphorisms. In order to constitute a work, these aphorisms are put one after another without logical or reasonable connection between them. To create an aphorism besides the preceding ones is not just to add to an already solidified group another similar element. Adding a new element to a group changes all the relations among all its elements and changes the nature of this group as a whole. Then the speed and slowness of the thought running through each of these aphorisms and through all of them also change. Not only each aphorism but also the group of all the given aphorisms, that is to say, the plane of immanence composed by them, is a product of a variable individuation corresponding to the speed and slowness at that time. Writing or even reading aphorisms one after another is going through each unique individuation one after another and thus renewing the individuation of the whole of all the aphorisms written or read so far, each time drawing another plane of immanence. In this sense, Nietzsche’s style, the individuation and the plane,
both ensuing from this style, all these illustrate the eternal return of the different.11

Sharing the same kind of individuation, Nietzsche’s plane is slightly different from Spinoza’s. While the plane is continually decomposed only after its completion and then recomposed otherwise in the case of the latter, the plane always fails in the middle, without being completed in the case of the former. This difference comes from the two philosophers’ different attitudes towards the one. Spinoza allows room for the one, with the reservation of making it enter into the multiplication of the multiple. Hence the whole is constituted, even if it is variable and flexible, and the plane is completed, as the totality of all constituents. Nietzsche leaves no room for the one, strictly expulsing it from the multiple. This makes it impossible for the whole to be constituted. So the plane is never completed and is destroyed while it is still unfinished.

Hence the failure of his project *The Will to Power*, for which he wrote many aphorisms, made new plans over and over again and never wrote up the book himself. Every time he wrote one aphorism in addition to others, it changed his plane of immanence composed by all these aphorisms and his plan for the book, and this change made the completion impossible. Although it is most conspicuous in the case of *The Will to Power*, the movement of the renewal of the plane of immanence occurred or occurs also in other, finished works, when he wrote or we read them, insofar as these works are written in the style of aphorism. The failure of the plane or the plan is the consequence of his attempt to create multiplicity not to be integrated into unity and the consequence of the fragmentary style of his writing to carry out this attempt, embodying his thought in this style itself.12

Just as the musical form of the eternal return captures the forces of the Cosmos, Nietzsche’s fragmentary style involves in it the working of the force of the outside.

An aphorism is a play of forces, a state of forces which are always exterior to one
another. An aphorism doesn’t mean anything, it signifies nothing, and no more has a signifier than a signified. Those would be ways of restoring a text’s interiority. An aphorism is a state of forces, the last of which, meaning at once the most recent, the most actual, and the provisional-ultimate, is always [toujours] the most external. Nietzsche posits it quite clearly: if you want to know what I mean, find the force that gives what I say meaning, and a new meaning if need be. (ID: 357; 256; italics in text; translation slightly altered)

In Deleuze’s eyes, the characteristic of an aphorism is “the relation with the outside” (ID: 355; 255), which means that it is a style through which the force of the outside intervenes in the activities of both the writer and the reader. Logical or reasonable connection is lacking, not only between one aphorism and another, but also between one part of it and another. This lack involves at once the absence of the subject of the writer whose identity is given by this coherence as that of his or her interiority and the absence of the subject of the reader who builds up his or her own interiority by sharing this coherence. Despite the lack of this coherence, the sentences constituent of an aphorism or the aphorisms constituent of a work are somehow connected and make sense. This is by virtue of the force of the outside which, reducible neither to the interiority of the writing subject nor to that of the reading subject, comes from the exteriority to connect these parts and produce sense among them. This force enables the writer to write and the reader to read outside their interiorities. Since this force inspires them differently at every moment, the sense of an aphorism differs not only from person to person, but also every time one reads it. Therefore the sense which a reader finds in Nietzsche’s aphorism is not the same, even as that which Nietzsche himself wanted to give. Whether these senses coincide or not does not matter. “Rather, we must find, assign, join those external forces which give to any particular Nietzschean phrase its liberating meaning, its sense of exteriority” (ID: 357; 256). “In this way, there are no problems of interpretation for Nietzsche, there are only problems of machining: to machine Nietzsche’s text, to find out
which actual external force will get something through, like a current of energy” (ID: 357; 256; italics in the French text).

Although both the musical form of the eternal return and the fragmentary style of aphorism lead us to encounter the force of the outside, they have their own problems which have something in common. In terms of the musical form:

This synthesis of disparate elements is not without ambiguity. It has the same ambiguity, perhaps, as the modern valorization of children’s drawings, texts by the mad, and concerts of noise. Sometimes one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a jumble of lines and sounds; then instead of producing a cosmic machine capable of “rendering sonorous,” one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends up reproducing nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds. The claim is that one is opening music to all events, all irruptions, but one ends up reproducing a scrambling that prevents any event from happening. All one has left is a resonance chamber well on the way to forming a black hole. A material that is too rich remains too “territorialized”: on noise sources, on the nature of the objects… (MP: 424; 343-344)

The problem of music in which disparate elements of sound matter are randomly combined is that, while claiming to capture the forces of the Cosmos outside music, it often results in being exclusive and closed onto itself. In order to play this music, one may produce the sound which reflects the process of its production, insert into a piece of music unusual sounds or destroy the form of the piece itself etc. The intention of these attempts is to fold the outside of music into its inside and “render sonorous” the forces of the Cosmos working in the production of music. But, however ambitious these attempts are, if similar things repeat in similar ways indefinitely, there remains only monotony. Destruction and disorder themselves become a purpose and are made into a form and an order. When certain patterns of destruction or disorder and certain materials used to bring them into music come to hold the role of cliché, they start to exclude anything other than them. This resembles what
happens in the valorization of the drawings or writings of children or the mad. Certainly in their works are the enormous potentials of creation beyond the common sense of the adult or the sane. But if works are appreciated only because they are created by children or the mad, that is putting the cart before the horse. Similarly, when art, on the pretext of capturing the force of the outside, gives privilege to specific ways or means to do so and excludes others, it misses this very force, since this force consists in working differently at all times and producing the diverse. Without opening itself to the outside, art confines itself in the inside. Destroying forms, it replicates their likeness in this destruction. Undermining material base for certain forms and deterritorializing them, it constructs another basis and territorializes other forms.

Nietzsche’s fragmentary style of writing has the same problem. Deleuze and Guattari summarize it in terms of philosophical concepts.

Nietzsche’s aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown in thought. This is as much as to say that the fascicular system does not really break with dualism, with the complementarity between a subject and an object, a natural reality and a spiritual reality: unity is consistently thwarted and obstructed in the object, while a new type of unity Triumphs in the subject. The world has lost its pivot; the subject can no longer even dichotomize, but accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary dimension to that of its object (MP: 12: 6)

The point of the problem is, in a nutshell, that the style of aphorism thwarts and obstructs only the unity of the object and not that of the subject. This does not contradict Nietzsche’s attempt to destroy forms and subjects in his thought and style. For the reconstituted unity of the subject, as questioned by Deleuze and Guattari, is the unity residing in another dimension, that of the author’s higher spirituality, whose unity is defined otherwise than the unity of his
or her ordinary, conscious interiority. This reconstitution is related to aphorisms’ shattering the unity of knowledge, the unity which is at once the unity of the linear process of knowing and the unity of the known object, including the unity of the subject of the author from the viewpoint of the reader. Because of the lack of the unity of the object, the knowledge which aphorisms are supposed to express is given only as that of something impossible to be known. However, in the cyclic process of thus knowing the unknown repeatedly, in the way of the eternal return, a new type of subjective unity emerges. Even if intelligible unity is lacking among aphorisms or their objects, the continuity of their successive recurrence, hindering the continuity of knowledge, constitutes the unity of the writer otherwise. This unity is not knowable or intelligible, as the unity of the reasonable subject of conscious thought, but unknown and hidden, as the unity of the subject of unconsciousness or madness. This is in the same way that disorder, reproduced and patterned, turns into an order in the chaotic musical form of the eternal return. Paradoxically, by inventing the style which does not allow forms or subjects to subsist in the writing, Nietzsche makes himself the subject in another, superior dimension. ¹⁴

Deleuze and Guattari above call the system of multiplicity found in Nietzsche’s aphorism fascicular or radicle. This is a type of root, in which the single, principle root is cut in the middle and onto it secondary, multiple roots graft. While the forking of secondary roots expresses the affirmation of multiplicity, the remnant of the principle root to which they all are attached expresses the subsistence of unity or even the reemergence of the new one. Nietzsche’s aphorism shatters only the unity of the object and yet reconstitutes the unity of the subject at the higher level. Affirming the multiplicity of the object, an aphorism subsumes this multiplicity under the unity of the new subject. Hence it is likened to a system of the fascicular or radicle root in which multiplicity is affirmed only when it is subsumed into overall unity.
One may have doubts about Nietzsche’s position in Deleuze’s thought. Certainly, in the Nietzschean perspective, Dionysus is at the best stage in transmutation, in correspondence to the eternal return as the acme of Nietzsche’s thought. But Deleuze and Guattari point out the fault of Nietzsche’s style of writing and similar style of art that epitomize the eternal return and Dionysus’s mode of existence, associating this fault with the failure of Nietzsche’s plane of immanence. Remember that, in contrast to this failure, Deleuze and Guattari regarded Spinoza’s plane as the best one. Whereas Nietzschean Dionysus is ahead of Spinozist Christ with regard to transmutation, Spinoza is more successful than Nietzsche with regard to the plane of immanence. How can we understand the relation between these two aspects, while examining the correctness of Deleuze’s critique of Spinoza and Nietzsche? In order to answer this question, we must reconsider the relation between the Nietzschean framework and the Spinozist one in Deleuze’s thought. In doing so, another meaning of the synthesis of Christ and Dionysus and that of the “Spinoza-Nietzsche identity” will turn up.

5. The Synthesis of Christ and Dionysus based on the Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation

Deleuze does not consistently devaluate Nietzsche’s eternal return as he does with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze evaluated it as the best system to affirm multiplicity and put Nietzsche above Spinoza on this point.

Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes. Such a condition can be satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, etc. That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a
second principle, as a principle \textit{become}; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return. (DR: 59: 41; italics in text)

Deleuze’s critique of the Spinozist framework is that substance is independent of the modes while the latter are dependent on the former and therefore substance retains its primary identity preceding the modes. In this state, the multiple is still dominated by the one, the different by the identical. In order for the affirmation of difference to go further away, identity must be produced in the movement of the different and the one must be said of the multiple. For Deleuze at that time, only Nietzsche could theorize this by his notion of the eternal return. It is along this line of thought that Nietzsche, who shuts unity out of multiplicity, can be put above Spinoza, who insinuates unity into multiplicity.

In contrast to this evaluation of the eternal return is Deleuze and Guattari’s devaluation of it in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}. While they regard the fascicule or radicle root, to which they liken the eternal return, as the next best system to affirm multiplicity, they propose instead, the rhizome as the best one.

The multiple \textit{must be made}, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has available – always n-1, (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at n-1 dimensions. A system of this kind could be called a rhizome. (MP: 13: 6; italics in text)

The point of the rhizome is that it makes the one belong to the multiple, by subtracting the former from the latter, whereas the fascicule or radicle makes the multiple belong to the one, by adding a higher dimension to the multiple. A case in point of the rhizome is the potato.
The tubers of a potato appear in the middle of forking roots as their swollen parts. They are the masses of the nutrition absorbed by underground roots or produced by surface parts of the plant.Disconnected from the plant, tubers turn themselves into nutrition for the same kind of plants to spring from them. Consumed by the new plants, tubers disappear. When these plants grow up, they make other new tubers appear. Just as one potato plant has multiple tubers which will bear more tubers, a rhizome is essentially multiple, and multiplies itself. Each rhizome comes out of the multiple and goes into the multiple. What is important is the way in which the one is made a part of the multiple. Although a tuber of a potato has its own unity, this unity is not permanent, since a tuber modifies and multiplies itself without remaining one. To subtract the one from the multiple and make the former belong to the latter is not to expel the one from the multiple but to undo the former’s function of unifying the latter and incorporate the former into the process of the multiplication of the latter. This procedure is different from that of the fascicule or radicle which excludes the one from the multiple and thus results in reconstituting the superior unity of the exclusive agent.

If Deleuze and Guattari call Spinoza's plane of immanence the best one, it is because this plane is itself a rhizome. Not only the individuals on the plane are composed and decomposed by the individuation by the speeds and slownesses of particles, but also the plane itself is the product of such individuation. As the whole of all these individuals, the plane is composed and decomposed according to the movements of these individuals and their particles. Thus constituted, the plane of immanence can explain the generation of all possible planes without integrating them or limiting their potentialities in advance. From the multiple comes the one, and the one returns to the multiple, just as an infinity of attributes constitute substance and substance in turn dissolves into an infinity of modes. At this point, Spinoza’s plane manifests itself as a rhizome, since the one, whether it is this plane itself or an individual on it, loses its unifying function and joins the multiplication of the multiple.
Comparing Deleuze’s claim in *Difference and Repetition* and Deleuze and Guattari’s claim in *A Thousand Plateaus*, it turns out that these claims are not necessarily contradictory. Based on his own critique of Spinoza in the former book, Deleuze in the latter book reinterprets Spinoza’s thought, especially, his notion of the one and its relation to the multiple, so that the response to this critique can be found in Spinoza himself. The fruit of this reinterpretation is the idea of the plane of immanence or consistency. In the light of this idea it is also possible to reinterpret Nietzsche’s thought, disclosing in turn Nietzsche’s limit in the affirmation of multiplicity.

The higher regard for Spinoza above Nietzsche is not Deleuze’s final decision on the relation between these two philosophers. In *What is Philosophy?*, the very book in which Deleuze and Guattari take Spinoza’s plane as the best, they also invoke Nietzsche in terms of the notion correlative with the plane, without making negative comments on him. They define as the double task of philosophy creating concepts and instituting the plane. “Philosophy is at once concept creation and instituting of the plane” (QP: 43-44; 41).

Whereas Spinoza is the most successful practitioner of the latter aspect of this task, it is Nietzsche that is the pioneer of the former aspect. “Nietzsche laid down the task of philosophy when he wrote, ‘[Philosophers] must no longer accept concepts as gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing…’” (QP: 11; 5; italics in text). In the book which he writes in his later period and in which he discusses philosophy in general and that of himself, Deleuze thus combines the Spinozist framework and the Nietzschean one, both as the essentials of philosophy, unless one is superior or inferior to the other. Therefore, his final position on the relation between these two philosophers could be understood in this way, that is, as the synthesis of the two different frameworks as they are different. What we have to ask is how this synthesis is possible in the context of our argument here.
In fact, there is a seemingly rather conservative factor in *A Thousand Plateaus*, somehow in association with the high regard for Spinoza. Against what they are likely to say, the authors insist on the necessity of having the form and the subject along with the flow of intensities, the organism along with the body without organs.

You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of significance and interpretation [interprétation], if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quality to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You don’t reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. (MP: 199; 160; translation slightly altered)

This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. (MP: 199: 161)

What Deleuze and Guattari propose is, in short, to keep the organism, the form and the subject, the strata, that is, the mass of matter as their base, however, to the extent that they are held to a minimum. Although one may want to detect in this proposition the authors’ turning conservative, or even reactive, we should note that this proposition is with a reservation. If the organism, the strata, the form and the subject should be kept, it is only insofar as doing so helps one turn them against their oppressive functions, make something irreducible to them, pass through them, in order to liberate them from themselves. The reason for the authors to put this reservation is that, paradoxically, keeping the organism and the strata, the form and the subject is indispensable for reaching the body without organs and
the plane of immanence freed from the organism and the strata. In order to draw up the plane, one must live and think. In order to keep oneself alive, one must retain some unity as a living thing, and in order to continue to think, one must preserve a little sanity, although this does not justify solidifying and privileging certain modalities of the form and the subject. Held to a minimum, the organism and the strata, the form and the subject are preconditions for making oneself a body without organs and constituting a plane of immanence. Lacking these preconditions, one would be killed or slide into madness, losing its form as a living thing and its subjectivity as a human, pulled away from the body without organs and the plane of immanence.

The minimum significance and subjectivity should be retained, on condition that they do not prevent one from making oneself a body without organs and drawing a plane of immanence, this is quite similar to what happens on Spinoza’s plane. For what is at issue there is not to exclude forms and the subjects but to include them in the multiplication of the multiple, counteracting their oppressive functions. As in Nietzsche, this situation on Spinoza’s plane of immanence is connected with his style of writing.

There is a double reading of Spinoza: on the one hand, a systematic reading in pursuit of the idea of the whole [idée d’ensemble] and the unity of the parts, but on the other hand and at the same time, the affective reading, without an idea of the whole, where one is carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed according to the velocity of this or that part. (SPP: 174: 129; translation slightly altered)

This musical composition comes into play throughout Ethics, constituting it as one and the same Individual whose relations of speed and slowness do not cease to vary, successively and simultaneously. Successively: we have seen how the different parts of Ethics are affected by changing relative velocities [sont affectées de vitesses relatives changeants], until the absolute velocity of thought is reached in the third kind of knowledge. And simultaneously: the propositions and the
The first citation is on two types of reading which Spinoza’s works inspires, and the second citation is on the Individuation corresponding to the text itself of his *Ethics*, carried out along the line of these readings. If two types of reading are possible for Spinoza’s works, it is because his works, especially *Ethics*, have double structures that enable these readings. One such structure resides in the systematic unity of the parts of the work based on the connection of ideas in propositions and demonstrations, leading us to systematic reading. The other resides in the incessant fluctuation of the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness among these parts, following the intermittent eruption of feelings in the scholia, leading us to affective reading. These two structures run parallel to each other. A reader of Spinoza’s work, thinking along these double structures, not only conceives an image of the work, but also, looking through the lens of this work, grasps oneself, the world and the things. The musical composition in the second citation is the concretization of the latter structure as the reverse of the former. Not only is each part of *Ethics* an individual shaped by the relations of movement and rest or speed and slowness, but also this book itself is an Individual composed of all these individuals, without integrating them into a fixed totality. What is remarkable here is that what enables Spinoza to draw up his unique plane of immanence, while determining its uniqueness as such, is the coexistence of the logical and reasonable style of writing and the affective and intensive one. His adopting a rather traditional way of writing along with a singular one is in correlation with his making the subjects and forms, as traditional philosophical concepts, partake in the multiple modifying and multiplying itself. Such a style of writing and that of thinking also agree with the general tendency of *A Thousand Plateaus* in which the authors admonish to keep subjectivity and significance with them kept to a minimum.
So there is some truth in the accusation that the attitude of these authors is conservative. For there surely is ambiguity in their attitude of partly allowing subjectivity and significance, forms and strata, corresponding to the similar ambiguity in the way of thinking and the style of writing of the philosopher highly regarded in this book. Maintaining contact with the organism and the stratum, the form and the subject, easily leads to being trapped in them, far from making them resist themselves. Even if one does not remain in the same modality of the form and the subject but passes from one modality to another, this might simply mean incessantly returning to some form and subject, being bound to them. Similarly, if one adopts the singular style of writing always together with the traditional one, this might mean that one can never break with the same old tradition. Hence is a view that, in all these attitudes, the established values are kept unchanged. If such attitudes are acceptable in spite of their “conservativeness” in a sense, it is on the supposition that surviving, in order to continue to draw up the plane, has priority. In terms of the affirmation of multiplicity, on this supposition, to retain the unities of the ones, with their unifying functions limited, by inserting them into the multiple, would be the best way to affirm multiplicity, while keeping one’s life and sanity. However, if this supposition can be questioned, another way, another attitude will be possible.

It is along this line of thought that Deleuze evaluates Nietzsche. For what is worthy in the latter in the eyes of the former is the life beyond mere survival.

A beautiful recent text, one of the most profoundly Nietzschean to my knowledge, is Richard Deshayes’s *Vivre, c’est pas survivre*, which he wrote just before being wounded by a grenade during a demonstration. Perhaps the two cases are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps one can write on Nietzsche, and then in the course of experience produce Nietzschean utterances. (ID: 352; 252)
In terms of a young student who had written a text “Living, it is not surviving” before he was wounded, it does not matter whether he wrote on Nietzsche in this text. Rather it is a matter of the inseparability of thinking and writing on the life beyond survival on the one hand and unknowingly approaching a fatal experience and actually living such life on the other hand, as is the case with Nietzsche. Deleuze calls the text written or the utterance produced in this situation Nietzschean. Then he finds writing a Nietzschean text or producing Nietzschean utterances on the one hand and working or writing on Nietzsche’s texts on the other not to be mutually exclusive, although this does not mean that both are always inclusive.

Common to these two kinds of activities is that the one who engages in either of them exposes oneself to the force of the outside. The key to understanding the reason for this commonality resides in Nietzsche’s style of aphorism. It introduces the force of the outside into the text and involves both the writer and the reader with this force. It is the excess of the exposure to this force that drew Nietzsche into madness. This exposure led him to open up his interiority to the exterior until he shattered not only the subject in his thought and writing but also his own subject of thinking and writing.17 Given that what matters in reading Nietzsche is not interpretation but machination, that is, to combine one’s forces with the force of the outside, it is no wonder that reading him may draw the reader into the danger of the similar kind of collapse. Or, even if one does not read Nietzsche, when one is close to a collapse and, because of the loss of one’s identity in it, exposed to the force of the outside, one may produce utterances like those of Nietzsche. Although it is not a matter of necessity but that of greater probability, both these two situations ensue from the excess of the exposure to the force of the outside, as Nietzsche suffered because of his style.18 Even when the situation does not deteriorate so far, this exposure bridges between the two kinds of activities that are otherwise separate.
In his thinking and writing, Nietzsche most greatly exposed himself to the forces of the outside. In Deleuze’s eyes, no philosopher can compare with him on this point.

Indeed, when we open at random one of Nietzsche’s texts, it is one of the first times we no longer pass through an interior, whether it is the interior of the soul or consciousness, the interior of essence or the concept, in other words, that which has always constituted the principle of philosophy. What constitutes the style of philosophy is that the relation to the exterior is always mediated and dissolved by an interior, in an interior. On the contrary, Nietzsche grounds thought, and writing, in an immediate relation with the outside. (ID: 355-356; 255)

However, hooking up thought to the outside is, strictly speaking, something philosophers have never done… (ID: 356; 255)

The reason for the incomparability of Nietzsche with other philosophers is that, while the latter have made some interiority the principle of their philosophy, the former founded his philosophy on the relation to the outside. Given that philosophy in general has been traditionally defined as the reflection along the coherence of the thinking and writing subject or that of its thought or writing, interiority has been the principle of philosophy. Even when some philosophers related their thought to the outside, they mediated this relation by interiority and adjusted the outside to the inside, while keeping intact the identity of themselves as the thinking and writing subject. Shattering the subject in his style of writing and mode of existence, Nietzsche is the only philosopher that abandoned interiority and directly related his thought to the outside without the mediation of interiority. Insofar as interiority constitutes the identity of its holder, Nietzsche’s exposing himself to the force of the outside to the greatest degree corresponds to his criticizing any identity to the utmost extent. “No one has taken the critique of all [tout] identity farther than Nietzsche” (DRF: 190; 206; translation slightly altered), including the identity of his thought and that of himself as the subject. His immediate relation to the outside determines the incomparable
uniqueness of his thought, even at the cost of the failure of his plan(e) and of his life.

It is this exposure to the force of the outside that gives Nietzsche an extraordinary ability concerning the creation of concepts as the task of philosophy.

Philosophers sometimes exhibit a forgetfulness that almost makes them ill. According to Jaspers, Nietzsche, “corrected his ideas himself in order to create new ones without explicitly admitting it; when his health deteriorated he forgot the conclusion he had arrived at earlier”. (QP: 27; 21-22)

That Nietzsche corrected his thought so thoroughly that he forgets what he had previously thought means the incessant failure of his plane of immanence on the way to its completion. As he himself conceived, “the faculty of forgetting” is the “active super-conscious faculty”, whose job is “supporting consciousness and renewing its freshness, fluidity and mobile, agile chemistry at every moment” (NP: 129; 113). This faculty works well, when the interiority of consciousness is opened to the outside enough to take over its act. Although possessing too much of this faculty brought his thought away from consistency and made him ill, it gave his thought such freshness and fluidity that enabled him to create varieties of immense concepts. The excessive exposure to the force of the outside made him the pioneer of the creation of concepts and the pursuer of the multiplicity disconnected from unity, even if going further in this direction ended up with his falling into madness.19

Thus in exposing oneself to the force of the outside, until one destroys oneself and falls into a catastrophe, is the life beyond mere survival. Proceeding in this way comes with another danger, that of the reconstitution of the higher subject in this madness itself, the worse stratification as the back side of total disorder. “Staying stratified- organized, signified, subjected- is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever” (MP: 199; 161). In spite of these dangers, at least until one reaches the point of fatal
breaking down, one can live the multiplicity in no compromise with unity and detach oneself from organization, signification or subjectivation in an ordinary life, although one can never return. Based on the position that this kind of life has its own value, the supposition that survival has priority should be called into question. It is from this standpoint that Nietzsche can be put above Spinoza.

Whereas Spinoza drew up the best plane of immanence among those of all philosophers, Nietzsche exposed himself to the force of the outside most. Deleuze’s different ways of evaluating these two philosophers, occasionally putting one of them above the other, derive from two different standpoints corresponding to different answers to the question which has priority, surviving in order to continue to think and write constantly or risking one’s life in order to generate enormous intensities in thinking and writing. The difference between the two standpoints overlaps with the difference between the two philosophers’ means to fold the force of the outside into the inside and to affirm multiplicity. While one keeps the inside and yet makes it inseparable from the outside, the other opens his inside to the outside until the former is split into the latter. On the one hand, from the Nietzschean viewpoint, folding the outside into the inside does not make sense without going to an extreme, that is, exploding the inside toward the outside, at the risk of his breaking down. Here is a way of affirming multiplicity by refusing all unities, including that of the one who affirms. It is from this point of view that we can say that Nietzsche’s affirmation of multiplicity is ahead of Spinoza’s. On the other hand, from the Spinozist viewpoint, folding the outside into the inside should be restrained from ruining oneself, that is, kept within certain limits so that one retains the minimum interiority to survive. Here is a way of affirming multiplicity by absorbing unities without destroying them. From this point of view, it is said that Spinoza affirms multiplicity better than Nietzsche does, and the former invents the best plane of immanence, better than that of the latter. It is not a matter of which
philosopher or which way is unconditionally superior or inferior. Rather, the point is that from one viewpoint one of them is evaluated, and from another viewpoint the other is.

These two positions suggest the two poles of our possible relation to the force of the outside. We cannot say that seeking the exposure to this force to the last degree so as to lose one’s identity is always the best, neither is restricting this exposure and keeping this identity. Whether to include unity in oneself or exclude it from oneself concerns whether to allow for the idea of God, or indeed, of something which is represented as such. The idea of God is one of the possible representations of the outside which is in itself impossible to grasp. If this idea is often posited as the source of the total unity or respective unities of all entities, especially that of the human subject, it is as an inevitable means to prevent us from directly exposing ourselves to the force of the outside and avoiding the ensuing catastrophe. “[T]he supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself” (DR: 117; 86). The alliance between God and the human, rather than attesting to the necessity of faith, expresses, in a way, the limits beyond which a human cannot go insofar as he or she remains human. God is not the single representation of the outside. Even if we do not call it by this name, we can posit a similar supreme entity as the ultimate instance, whether it is a charismatic leader, a nation, an ideology, money or even the idealized form of the self etc. Our belief in such an entity that confers unity on us guarantees our identity and promotes the accomplishment of our thought and life with fair coherence. If we try to break with God or His like, we would have to break not only with this kind of thought and life but also with ourselves whose identity is guaranteed by His or its unity. In this sense, there is “a different and more mortuary betrothal between the dead God and the dissolved self” (DR: 127; 95). Certainly shattering the self does not necessarily mean killing oneself but may be the practice or experiment in one’s thinking, writing or living differently. But engaging in this practice or experiment, breaking off the connection with the One as the guarantor of the
identity of everything, may easily lead to shattering the living self of the thinking and writing subject.

Hence the difference between the aforementioned two positions of the two philosophers is intertwined with the difference of whether one leaves room for God or His like. Whereas God retains His minimum unity in Spinoza, while being fused with the multiple, the unity of god is smashed in Nietzsche, even if this ends up with reconstituting the higher unity of the absence of all unities. This difference reflects on the difference between the inclusion of unity in Spinozist Christ’s way of exalting pain and the exclusion of unity from Nietzschean Dionysus’s. In his death, Spinozist Christ retains the unity of God, in splitting his identity into the multiplicity in Nature as God who gives him death, and in sublimating his pain into the joy from the viewpoint of this Nature. Nietzschean Dionysus undoes along with his identity the unity of the god who gives him death, in blending them without subsuming the former to the latter, and in making his pain and the pleasure of this god part of multiplicity. Retaining God’s unity enables Christ to show that the movement made in his death, the dissolution into Nature and becoming other than human, can be made even in living in contact with the established modes of existence. Shattering of this unity leads Dionysus to show that the movement made in his death, the active self-destruction in his laceration, does not allow its participant to compromise with the established mode of existence, even if this uncompromising attitude risks one’s life. Considering that the idea of the One is a means to protect ourselves from so much exposure to the force of the outside as to ruin us, it is no wonder that the difference between the two possible modes of living suggested by the deaths of Christ and Dionysus in their relation to some godhead overlaps with the difference between the two attitudes found in Spinoza and Nietzsche.

Just as the Spinozist framework and the Nietzschean one are not completely separated from each other in Deleuze, neither are these two attitudes. Their complementarity can be
understood, again, with regard to the affirmation of multiplicity. What is in question in this
affirmation is not only the multiplicity of the types of multiplicities to be affirmed but also
the multiplicity of the ways of affirming them. With regard to the relation of multiplicity to
unity, there should be, at least, the multiplicity which includes unity and the multiplicity
which excludes unity. Certainly these two types or ways are not the only ones, neither is the
relation to unity the single perspective in which they should be viewed. It goes without
saying that there could be other, many more types of multiplicities and ways of affirming
them. But, at least in terms of this relation, these two types or ways together constitute the
minimum unit for a possibility of this affirmation, when they are related to each other in their
irreducible difference. For the combination of inclusive and exclusive multiplicities
expresses the potential for the divergence of the relation between the one and the multiple,
making the multiplication by the multiple surpass the unification by the one. To put this in
terms of the human mode of existence secured with recourse to unity, the affirmation of
multiplicity of life, if it is true to itself, should contain at least both the retention and the
demolition of this mode of existence, given that this affirmation cannot but start from our
current mode of existence in which we are still caught, however suffocating it is. Denying
either the retention or the demolition of this extant mode of existence, while taking these two
options in dichotomy, would result in damaging the multiplicity to be affirmed. The above
two positions found in Spinoza and Nietzsche make sense, in fact, only in their correlation.
On the one hand, there is a life which survives by compromising with the extant ways of
being, and on the other, there is a life which fails by going towards the life beyond mere
survival. The fullness of Life as a whole would not be there as such, if it favors only either of
these two variations, or even only them. The “Spinoza-Nietzsche equation” can mean in a
way the simplest form of the multiplicity of the affirmation of multiplicity of life carried out
on our human condition, although there would be other innumerable interpretations of this
equation in relation to many concepts of these two philosophers.

Thus understood, between Spinozist Christ and Nietzschean Dionysus is a similar relation to this equation, and, curiously enough, this relation overlaps with the relation of the martyr and the damned in Leibniz. Given that the death of Spinozist Christ gives the truer expression of what the death of the Leibnizian martyr means to express, it is no wonder that there is some resemblance between these two kinds of deaths. Dispersing his identity into the unity of Nature in his death, Christ leaves room for God as Nature and other humans to survive. Here is a sort of self-sacrifice like that of the martyr, or rather, the latter is like the former. Shattering his identity and God’s unity in his death, Nietzschean Dionysus does not allow this space and draws other humans into a similar break-down. Dionysus is like the damned whose act is seemingly not to the good of anyone, even of him- or herself, the former’s destruction for destruction being like the latter’s hatred for hatred. Whereas the life which sacrifices itself to leave room for the survival of the established modes of existence, whether God or human, would be praised by those who live in them, the life which nullifies these modes of existence to threaten their survival would be condemned by those who live in them. The contrast between the two types in both pairs is that between the life on which is put a high value from the standpoint of these modes of existence, and the life on which is put a low value from this standpoint. Needless to say, this evaluation is relative, and from an opposite standpoint an opposite evaluation would be given, the former life as conservative and the latter as revolutionary etc.

Even if the two pairs of types are similar, the supposition and the implication of the relation between the two types in each pair are different. In the Leibnizian framework, if there is a complementarity between the martyr and the damned, it is on the supposition of this world itself as the harmony, the world which is the single and the best one, and in which the amount of freedom is limited. This complementarity itself epitomizes this harmony in the
shape of the accord between the martyr’s perfect major accord and the damned’s discordant minor accord. There is no such supposition between Spinozist Christ and Nietzschean Dionysus, since neither Spinoza nor Nietzsche share with Leibniz the idea of a transcendent God who created the world and gave it order. Neither is there a necessity that the refusal of this idea which is one of many possible representations of the outside should be equated with the refusal of the incorporation of the power or the force of the outside as is the case with the Leibnizian damned. Hence the damned-like type in Nietzsche can be conceived otherwise, in correlation with the martyr-like type in Spinoza, this time both as incorporating the force of the outside, however differently.

What matters in this new complementarity between Spinozist Christ and Nietzschean Dionysus is the multiplicity of the affirmation of multiplicity. Rather than harmony, embodied in this complementarity, is, so to speak, the disharmony between the accord beyond the opposition of accord and disaccord on the one hand and the disaccord refusing any accord on the other. For one thing, certainly, for this affirmation, room for the established modes of existence should be allowed, as Christ suggested in his death. But this always entails a danger of being manipulated for the justification of these modes of existence themselves, as Christianity did to Christ. In order to save Christ’s death from this danger, it is necessary to give it another sense. Dionysus’s death, combined with Christ’s, brings it to the first stage of the process of transmutation. As belonging to the final stage, Dionysus’s death challenges the legitimacy of this justification, allowing no room for the established modes of existence. However, for another thing, Dionysus’s death alone cannot fully affirm the multiplicity of life, without being supplemented by Christ’s death. For, Life as a whole needs, in order to attain to its fullness, not only a life refusing the existent ways of being for new ones but also a life accepting them, either of both being not totalized, and both of them not being harmonized. Besides, we should not forget that the reconstitution of another, superior
form of the subject entailed in Nietzschean Dionysus’s self-destruction can be counterbalanced only by the mutual immanence of all things including these subjects and God implied in Spinozist Christ’s dissolution into Nature. Dionysus’s death and Christ’s death complement each other, epitomizing the multiplicity of the means to affirm the multiplicity of life. This is the Deleuzian version of “Dionysus-Crucified” as the formulation of their non-synthetic synthesis. The significance of Dionysus’s death consists in entering into relation with Christ’s, giving it another sense and together manifesting the smallest divergence towards this affirmation, while expressing the potentials for many other multiplicities.

In this chapter, comparable to the suicidal death as art in Spinoza, we found in Nietzsche an image of similar death which is however closer to suicide in the proper sense. These two types of deaths turned out to be complementary and express Deleuze’s motto in this very complementarity.

Spinozist Christ as we have seen in the previous chapter does not appear to be the epitome of the best and ultimate art of living. Deleuze makes many negative comments on Christ and their point resides in the distinction between accepting everything as the latter did and truly affirming. True affirmation requires the will to affirm and the will to combat the established values. Lacking both of these wills, Christ’s assuming his harshest destiny is acquiescing to the status quo. He is like the ass which docilely bears the heaviest burden without resisting. However, being the ass is not meaningless. In Nietzsche’s thought, the camel associated with the ass symbolizes the indispensable stage to be passed through for transmutation. Besides, Christ is not merely the ass. In Nietzsche’s terms, he is at once the last man who passively fades away and the man who wants to perish and actively destroys himself, in other words, the ass on the one hand and the lion and the child on the other. Most
advanced in the stage he belonged, Christ could have enabled transmutation and thus was almost synthesized with Dionysus. The allusion to the body without organs in Deleuze’s several images of Christ endorses the possibility of this synthesis. Since the body without organs forms the combat-between, more radical than the combat-against, its presence means the beginning of combat (Section 1).

The coexistence of negative and positive elements in Christ is due to the close connection between the superficial passivity of force and the radical passivity of the will to power. From the latter passivity, in correlation with the act of the force of the outside, derive the activity and reactivity as qualities of force. Whether forces can appropriate the act of the force of the outside or not decides whether they become active or reactive. Whether the will to power is affirmative or negative comes from whether the will affirms or negates its radical passivity which enables this appropriation. The passivity as a quality of force is the end product of becoming reactive, the state of inertia, and as such allies itself with the nothingness of will. However, with this weakest state of life, the radical passivity of the will to power, neither affirmed nor negated, is laid bare to the force of the outside. The superficial passivity of force, going to its limit, comes to reveal the radical passivity of the will to power and prepares transmutation. In the connection between these two kinds of passivity resides the reason for Christ’s ambiguity. This connection explains the emergence of the body without organs, equated with the will to power, in his body (Section 2).

But Christ neither became Dionysus nor completed transmutation. For, he lacked the affirmation by his will in his mind, the second affirmation doubling the first one in the body. Then the radical passivity manifesting itself was reduced to the superficial passivity which is, because of its docility, vulnerable to manipulation and disfiguration. Christ’s passion is made into the ideal model of the obedience to the order of transcendent God and the patience with suffering regarded as sin and atonement at once. Such an ideal inclines people to internalize
pain and reproduce it endlessly, as the reaction to transcendent values. In Dionysus’s passion, his pain of being lacerated is mingled with a Titan god’s pleasure of devouring him. Externalized in relation to the other, pain turns to the action of producing pleasure. Given that an idea of god is a representation of the outside, these two ways of exalting pain, associated with the two images of god, express two types of life in relation to the force of the outside. In one case, a representation of this force prevents people from appropriating the act of this force and keeps their life reactive. In the other, this representation allows people this appropriation so that their life becomes active (Section 3).

Embodying Dionysus’s art of exalting pain is a musical form in which established forms of music are fragmented and disparate elements are randomly combined. Both this art and this music epitomize the eternal return of the different, the way all things change from time to time. As such, Dionysus’s art of exalting pain is opposed not only to the art of Christ in Christianity but also to that of Spinozist Christ. When both sad and joyful passions turn into joyful actions and a new type of accord appears beyond the opposition of accord and disaccord in Spinozist Christ, opposite terms are integrated into a new oneness. The unity invoked here reflects the unity of Nature as a whole from whose viewpoint all affections are active joys. Nietzschean Dionysus’s art refuses any such unity and pursues the multiplicity freed from it, and so does Nietzsche’s fragmentary style of writing. But these attempts to affirm multiplicity have a common problem. The reproduction of multiplicity excluding all unities reconstitutes another unity at a higher dimension, just as disorder can turn into another order and unconsciousness or madness can be made into another subject. Ambiguity is not only in Christ but also in Dionysus and Nietzsche (Section 4).

This devaluation of Nietzsche coincides with the evaluation of Spinoza in that the latter includes the ones in the multiplication of the multiple. The attitude of retaining some unity not only characterizes Spinoza’s style of writing partly orthodox and partly singular but
also corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari’s advice of keeping the minimum form and strata, signification and subjectivity. The supposition here is the priority of surviving as a human subject or a living thing, in order to accomplish one’s thought with enough coherence. But, on another supposition, that of the priority of living beyond mere survival, as in Nietzsche, the pursuit of the multiplicity expelling all unities can be advocated, even at the cost of the failure of one’s thought and life, and of the reconstitution of a higher unity at the end. The difference between these two positions found in Spinoza and Nietzsche overlaps the difference between allowing for the idea of God or His like, accepting the supreme unity that guarantees one’s unity in order to survive, and refusing this unity and living the multiplicity without it, even if temporarily. This difference casts a shadow on the difference between the two types of deaths in these two philosophers. Christ, who scatters his unity and yet keeps the unity of Nature or God in his death, leaves room for others to live in compromise with their established modes of existence. Dionysus, who shatters both his unity and the unity of his god in his death, invites others to demolish these modes of existence even at the risk of breaking-down. Their two arts of dying, or the two positions on which they rely, complement each other, as two ways of affirming the multiplicity of life, which in their irreducible difference epitomize together the multiplicity of this affirmation itself. The complementarity between these two types or positions is likened to the disharmony between the accord beyond the opposition between accord and disaccord on the one hand and the disaccord refusing any accord on the other hand (Section 5).

As in Spinoza, in Nietzsche is also found a framework to view suicidal death, or even suicide proper, positively. Common to both cases is that death thus evaluated is conceived as the incorporation of the force of the outside. Viewed from the Nietzschean perspective, although Christ incorporates by the radical passivity of his will to power the force of the
outside which gives him death, he has no will of himself to affirm this incorporation. Carrying this incorporation through, Dionysus appropriates the act of this force until his act by giving himself death coincides with this act. Thus killing himself is the consequence of the extreme affirmation of his own suffering by his will as he himself wills, converting his passion into action. To accept the given death as Christ does is to leave himself to the becoming in Nature and dissolve in to it, without resisting the death coming from the outside. However, in doing so is an essentially reactive attitude, subjecting himself to the unity of Nature, even if Christ went further than mere reactivity or passivity. To give himself death by himself as Dionysus does is to destroy his reactive mode of existence and in this very destruction creates the movement of becoming-active combating reactivity and unity suppressing activity and multiplicity. While this is in a sense an act against Nature, the existence of this act saves Nature from indulging in passive unity. The fullness of Nature consists in its diversifying itself, embracing even this kind of act. In other words, a life resisting life itself enriches Life as a whole. And a life resisting life does not make sense as such without a life following the flow of life. Nietzschean Dionysus’s death, complementing and being complemented by Spinozist Christ’s as the two irreducible arts of living, gives both a sense of contributing to the multiplicity of life. This is just as the absolute disaccord adds itself to the absolute accord and realizes the disharmony between them, alluding to the potential of infinite divergence.

1 I once addressed this equation as the equation between a practical philosophy in Spinoza and a critical philosophy in Nietzsche, based on the inseparability of life and thought in these two philosophers, in my article “The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze: An attempt to Connect Practice and Critique in Philosophy” in Tetsugaku Ronbunsyu (Annual Review of the Philosophical Association at Kyushu University, Japan) No.30, September, 1994, pp. 59-75 (Japanese).
3 Although I often mentioned this synthesis overlapping with the Spinoza-Nietzsche equation, in Part 4 Chapter 2 of my first thesis The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought, I did not discuss Nietzschean Dionysus as Deleuze understands him at all. As a
result, I ended up by alluding to a possible connection between the death of Deleuze and that of Christ or Bartleby. In this thesis, correcting this obvious insufficiency, I will discuss Nietzschean Dionysus and then interpret the synthesis of Christ and Dionysus as Antichrist and the equation of Spinoza and Nietzsche differently. This will elucidate Deleuze’s suicide in a different light.

4 I borrowed the phrase “radical passivity” from Thomas Carl Wall, *Radical Passicity: Levinas, Blandhot and Agamben*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1999. In this book, Wall discusses the “passivity in the radical sense, before it is simply opposed to activity, is passive with regard to itself, and thus it submits to itself as though it were an exterior power” (Ibid.: 1; italics in text), found in the above three writers. Based on Wall’s insight and yet viewing the matter from a slightly different perspective, I use this phrase with its sense put in other words, that is, the passivity in correlation with the act of the force of the outside beyond the comparison with the forces constituent of all forms within our experience.

5 Although I have discussed Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power as the capacity to be affected, I did not discuss it in terms of its radical passivity, and of the correlation between this passivity and the act of the force of the outside, as I do here.

In Part 2 Chapter 2 Section 1 and 2 of my first thesis *The Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Thought*, I showed that this interpretation of Deleuze comes from his idea of the closeness between the will to power in Nietzsche and the power in Spinoza. I also showed that in the case of Nietzsche as well as in Spinoza, at issue for Deleuze is the removal of purposiveness or finality from the concept of power. The theme of Part 2 was the interpenetration or interaction between Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche and that of Spinoza in this way, and as its consequence, the undermining of teleology persisting in the concept of power in general and the undoing of the dichotomy between the existence and absence of God, each position advocated by either of these two philosophers. I summarize this theme in my article “Atheism of Power: The Basis of the Spinoza-Nietzsche Equation in Deleuze’s Early Thought” in *Gendai Shisou* (*Revue de la penseé d’aujourd’hui*), vol.30-10, Tokyo: Seido-sha, August, 2002, pp. 106-124 (Japanese).

I also referred to the will to power which is also the capacity to be affected, as the factor essential to Deleuze’s definition of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a critical philosophy against that of Kant, in my article “The Critical Philosophy in Deleuze: From Kant to Nietzsche” in *Tetsugaku Nenpou* (*Annual of Philosophy*), Kyushu University, Japan, No.56, March, 1997, pp. 95-121 (Japanese).


As Deleuze writes in the wake of Nietzsche (CC: 56-57; 41-42), decisive in Paul’s disfiguration of Christ was the former’s moving the centre of gravity in the latter’s teaching from life to afterlife after his death. “Paul simply shifted the centre of gravity of that entire existence beyond this existence – in the lie of the ‘ressurected’ Jesus” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ*, p. 167; italics in text). If this shift was so decisive as to disfigure the image of Christ, it is because, in Nietzsche’s eyes, his teaching had had nothing to do with afterlife assumed in the idea of immortality or resurrection but focused on this life on earth.

This ‘bringer of glad tiding’ died as he lived, as he taught – not to ‘redeem mankind’ but to demonstrate how one ought to live. What he bequeathed to mankind is his *practice*: his bearing before the judges, before the guard, before the accusers and every kind of calumny and mockery – his bearing on the *Cross*. (Ibid, pp. 159-160; italics in text)

The love Christ taught resided in the practice in life, and his death on the cross was nothing
but this practice in an extreme form. To love is not to redeem others, but to redeem oneself, by abstaining from accusing, slandering or despising others when they do so. For, one can save oneself only when one can love even those who hate one. The ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ is a condition of the heart – not something that comes ‘upon the earth’ or ‘after death’ (Ibid, p. 159). The idea of immortality endorsed by Christ’s resurrection detaches his teaching and practice from life and gives them a different meaning whose significance comes from somewhere else. Life is no longer evaluated according to how it is for each who lives it, but judged from above in the name of an afterlife superior to life. In Deleuze’s words, “immanent modes of existence” are replaced by “transcendent values” (SPP: 35; 23). Thus the shift of the centre of gravity in Christ’s teaching was a decisive step to make him the judge against life.

By the word art used here, no doubt Deleuze means not only skill but also art proper. For, since The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had had the idea that art in the sense of art proper makes life full of suffering tolerable. Aaron Ridley illustrates that, parallel to this idea, the idea of the art of the self “to make oneself tolerable to oneself” persists in Nietzsche’s thought to the end. After its appearance in Human, All Too Human and concretization in The Gay Science, the latter idea culminated in Nietzsche’s later period, with the deepening of his thought of the eternal return, amor fati and the necessity inherent in them. On this development, see Aaron Ridley, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 58-60, 78-88, 128-140.

Given the similarity of Nietzsche and Foucault as Deleuze remarks, it is intriguing that not only Foucault but also Nietzsche conceived the art of the self in a way comparable to art proper. In Deleuze’s concept of life as a work of art are the echoes of these two philosophers’ ideas of art.

While Deleuze treats bad conscience simply as a psychological matter in Nietzsche and Philosophy, later, collaborating with Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, he enlarges upon it by connecting it to psychoanalysis and capitalism. Given that “Anti-Oedipus subsumes Marx and Freud within a Nietzschean framework” (Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 83), it is no wonder that the authors give the notion of bad conscience, originally conceived by Nietzsche, such broad connotations inspired by Freud and Marx. It is based on these psychological and sociopolitical connotations that bad conscience can be regarded as a condition of humanity which is the fruit of Western modernity.

The extreme spiritualization of the despotic State, and the extreme internalization of the capitalist field, define bad conscience. The latter is not cynicism’s contrary; it is, in private persons, the correlate of the cynicism of special persons. All the cynical tactics of bad conscience, just as Nietzsche and then Lawrence and Miller analyzed them to arrive at a definition of civilized European man… (AO: 320; 268)

Here is stated the complementarity between the cynicism of capitalism in which everything can be traded, even in shameless ways, only if the seller and the buyer meet, and bad conscience as a mental state of feeling guilty without end. According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism, in enabling potentially everything to connect with each other through the mediation of money, internalizes them all beyond any boundary. However, if this immanent tendency fully unfolds, it may overturn capitalism itself, breaking down the hegemony of the capital. In order to prevent this, this tendency must be restricted, while the universal value of money, the very thing on that capitalism relies and yet that promotes this tendency, is maintained. In the social field, the state takes this job on. Even if it has no despot, it is despotic in its nature, since it enforces its orders and embodies the transcendent value to subject people. As such, the state stands for the universal value of money and yet regulates
the movements of internalization derived from this value. The counterpart of the state in the interiority of the private person is the Oedipus complex as the law which rules human unconsciousness. Oedipus’s being a king in the myth parallels the state’s being despotic. Psychoanalysis finds the Oedipus complex, the desire of incest, to be universal for all human beings and yet to be detestable and forbidden, as suggested by the tragic end of the story of the Greek king. This is in the same way as capitalism posits the desire of selling and buying everything and yet represses this desire by force of the despotic state. In both cases, desire, as the connectability of everything in their material continuity, is disguised with a disgraceful image and posited as forbidden from the beginning. Here is the mechanism to repress desire in capitalism, manipulating the division of and the correspondence between the social and the private.

Insofar as the Oedipus complex designates at once the desire and its prohibition, it can also take the shape of a kind of bad conscience, sharing that mechanism of accusing and saving oneself at the same time. Bad conscience in this sense, residing in the private interiority, is correlative with cynicism in the social field. Thus understood, bad conscience, along with cynicism, characterizes the private side of a capitalist person paired with his or her social side, so that the combination of both sides defines the humanity in capitalism. To this extent, bad conscience is a condition of the humanity in the West in which capitalism and psychoanalysis are most advanced.

In Dionysian music as Nietzsche conceives, dissonance, a kind of sense of disorder, is an indispensable element. Comparing the pleasure in seeing a tragedy with the pleasure in listening to musical dissonance, he writes:

"But what is the origin of that mysterious feature whereby the hero’s suffering, the most painful victories, the most agonizing oppositions of motives – in short, the exemplification of the wisdom of Silenus, or to put it in aesthetic terms, ugly and discordant elements – are repeatedly portrayed with such love and in such countless forms, precisely in the most voluptuous and youthful era of a people, unless a higher pleasure was perceived in it? (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music, trans. Shaun Whiteside, London: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 114)"

The pleasure produced by the tragic myth has the same origin as the pleasurable perception of dissonance in music. The Dionysiac, with its primal pleasure experienced even in pain, is the common womb of music and the tragic myth. (Ibid., p. 115)

Common to listening to dissonant music and seeing a tragic drama is the experience of the pleasure felt in pain itself. Nietzsche calls this experience Dionysiac, likening it to Dionysus’s feeling joy in his laceration. If dissonance is indispensable to Dionysian music, it is insofar as it produces the pleasure of pain similar to that of Dionysus.

Although dissonance is indispensable in Dionysiac music for Nietzsche, it is not only dissonance that matters for Deleuze. For what matters for him is such multiplicity that includes dissonance as its essential part, the multiplicity expressed in the shape of the eternal return of the different or the reproduction of the diverse.

Christoph Cox regards Dionysian music as the music of the eternal return as such. Invoking Deleuzian frameworks, he equates the opposition between Apolo and Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy with the opposition between two dimensions, that of being and that of becoming. Whereas in the former are solidly individuated particular entities, in the latter are only metamorphoses of all things in their indiscernibility. Hence Dionysiac music is the music which imitates such becomings in nature. Cox discusses that under the category of this music falls some of the experimental music of the 20th century that Deleuze and Guattari
refer in *A Thousand Plateaus*, those of Varèse, Cage Stockhausen etc. For even though the ways these musicians compose or play are different, it is common to all of them to produce sound as such a flow that can join other flows, those of the ideas, of the materials or media foreign to music, so that the music composed of such sounds expresses the becoming of all things. Christoph Cox, “Nietzsche, Dionysus, and the Ontology of Music”, in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson, Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 495-513.

11 In his short survey of major interpretations of Nietzsche’s style of aphorism, Alexander Nehamas describes their transition wavering between the tendency of searching in this style the unity of the writer’s intelligence and the tendency of appreciating the style’s fragmentarity itself without being unified, while on the whole the latter tendency is growing. Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 1985, pp. 14-17.

Besides, Nehamas points out that, whereas the importance of aphorism in Nietzsche as the epitome of multiplicity has been often discussed, the variety of his styles, only one of which is aphorism, has been overlooked. The multiplicity inherent in Nietzsche’s writing should be rethought of in terms of this variety (Ibid., p. 18). If it is true that, as Nehamas claims, in writing works one shapes oneself as the product of these works, Nietzsche’s use of various styles is intended for creating himself as the multiplicity without unity, making himself a part of the world as such multiplicity (Ibid., pp. 196-198, 232-234).

12 Petra Perry tries to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s negative evaluation of Nietzsche in *A Thousand Plateaus* as “disguised homage”, consistently with Deleuze’s positive evaluation of Nietzsche in *Difference and Repetition* in her “Deleuze’s Nietzsche”, *boundary 2*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp. 174-191. I agree with her when she sees in the failure of the plan(e) in Nietzsche “the radical transformation of the image of thought” (Ibid., p. 189). However, when she reduces this failure simply to the failure “of establishing a fixed plan” (Ibid.), I do not completely agree with her. For it seems to me that Nietzsche’s failure in question is not only the failure in this sense but also the failure of constituting the plan(e) itself. As I will discuss later, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari make rather negative comments not only on Nietzsche’s plane of immanence but also on his system of multiplicity. The failure of his plan(e) should be understood, first of all, consistently with these other negative comments, in other words, with some negative connotations. The claim of this part negativity does not necessarily result in the total devaluation of Nietzsche’s thought. That someone’s thought lacks something in just one aspect does not mean that his or her thought as a whole is worthless or meaningless. The plane of immanence is not the single most important element of philosophy. So it is probable that Nietzsche’s very failure in terms of this plane enriches his thought in other aspects and enables him to achieve what the one who can constitute the best plane of immanence cannot do. From the fourth to the fifth section of this chapter, I will pursue this line of thought, in addressing the relation between Deleuze’s Nietzschean framework and Spinozist one.

13 Deleuze connects this inevitable variety of the readings of an aphorism to the eternal return of the different as he understands it. Quoting Nietzsche’s phrase “An aphorism, properly stamped and moulded, has not been ‘deciphered’ just because it has been read out; on the contrary, this is just the beginning of its proper interpretation” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, p. 8; The quotation in the English translation of NP is slightly different), Deleuze writes:

Rumination and eternal return: two stomachs are not too many for thinking. There are two dimensions of interpretation and evaluation, the second also being the return of the first, the return of the aphorism or the cycle of the poem. All aphorisms must therefore be read twice. (NP: 36; 31)
Since not only “the aphorism is interpretation and the art of interpreting” (Ibid.) but also “the aphorism [must be] interpreted” (Ibid.), the aphorism has at least two dimensions of interpretation. While the interpretation of the aphorism calls for other interpretations, the aphorism itself calls for other aphorisms, both reproducing themselves in diverse ways. To this extent, the aphorism is “the form of pluralist thought” (Ibid.) which concretizes the return of the different in interpretation.

The eternal return understood as such is closely connected with the will to power, reflecting Deleuze’s view of the coherence between these two notions.

From the pluralist standpoint a sense is referred to the differential element from which its significance is derived, just as values are referred to the differential element from which their value is derived. This element which is always present, but always implicit and hidden in the poem or aphorism is like the second dimension of sense and values. It is by developing this element and by developing itself in it that philosophy in its essential relation with the poem and the aphorism constitutes complete interpretation and evaluation, that is to say, the art of thinking, superior faculty of thought [la faculté de penser supérieur] or “faculty of rumination”. (Ibid.; translation slightly altered)

As Deleuze writes elsewhere “The will to power is the differential element of forces” (NP: 59; 52), by the differential element mentioned above he means the will to power. When a writer gives his or her interpretation in the shape of an aphorism, he or she has a will to power only which can give such an interpretation. When a reader gives his or her interpretation of the interpretation expressed in this aphorism, he or she also has such a will to power, although it is different from the previous one. A reader’s interpreting an aphorism is developing at once his or her will to power and that of the writer of the aphorism. The same is true of the interpretation of this reader’s interpretation, ad infinitum. The eternal return of the different occurs in the successive development of a will to power by itself or by another will to power, whether these wills are of the same person or of different persons. That is why the sense of an aphorism differs from time to time. Considering that the will to power is correlative with the outside, as Deleuze will mention later, the eternal return of the different or the multiplication of the will to power in the aphorism or its interpretation is the outcome of the involvement of the force of the outside in writing or reading.

In effect, among the interpretations of Nietzsche in France contemporary with Deleuze, there was a current which went in a similar direction, however, with the positive evaluation of such subjectivity. This current, that of seeking in Nietzsche’s madness the sublime subject, distinguished from and superior to the conscious and reasonable subject, runs from Bataille to Foucault. Jacques Le Rider, *Nietzsche en France: De la fin du XIXe siècle au temps present*, Paris: P. U. F., 1999, pp. 171-176, 216-217.

For example, Nick Land would support this view. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari distinguished molar and molecular, the tendency repressing desire and that liberating it, and advocated the latter against the former. In contrast, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, they drew attention to the danger inherent in the molecular and admonished to keep the molar. Land believes that the change of their position in the latter book undid the radical nature of their claim in the former. Nick Land, “Making it with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production”, in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 24 No.1, January 1993, pp. 71-73.

In terms of Spinoza’s *Ethics*, Deleuze adds to these two types of structure running through the most parts of the volume, a third *Ethics* which is constituted in Book V, as the incarnation of the third kind of knowledge. CC: 183-185; 148-149.

With regard to the inseparability of Nietzsche’s thought and life, Richard Pinhas has the
view that Nietzsche’s falling into madness is his exploding his own subject, while being responsible for his statements of human’s metamorphosing into something other than human. In so doing, he tries to fuse his life with the destiny of the human as a whole, hoping for a new mode of existence to come. Richard Pinhas, *Les larmes de Nietzsche: Deleuze et musique*, Paris: Flammarion, 2001, pp. 85-86.

The inseparable connection between Nietzsche’s thought and life expressed in his aphorisms has its roots in the necessity for him to adopt this style and its original usage by the pioneer. According to Jill Marsden, Hippocrates who first wrote in this style used it to describe medical matters, that is, the experiences or experiments of the body. In his wake, Nietzsche intended this style for the experiment concerning not only his thought but also his body. He started to write in this style when his aggravated illness prevented him from thinking for a long time. Writing in this style in this health condition, he analyzed his affects related to the states of his body and attempted to transform these state by force of his ideas. In this sense, aphorism best epitomizes Zarathustra’s words that reading should be accompanied with learning by heart, in other words, it is necessary not only to think and understand by the mind but also incorporate one’s thought and understanding in one’s body. As a result, his aphorisms invite the reader to the experiment to read them otherwise than institutionalized habits and, parallel to this reading, to produce novel affects in the bodily experience. Jill Marsden, “Nietzsche and the Art of Aphorism”, in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson, Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 22-37.

The following statement of Deleuze applies to Nietzsche’s case thus understood.

> Literature rather moves in the direction of the ill-formed or the incomplete, as Gombrowicz said as well as practiced. Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. (CC: 11; 1)
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