The Body Now and Not Yet: An Exegetical Study of the Apostle Paul’s Anthropology, Eschatology, and Ethics in First Corinthians

By
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Declaration

I acknowledge that this thesis is entirely my own work. I have not submitted it in whole or in part for any other degree or professional qualification.

Jeromey Q. Martini
23 July 2009
Abstract

My study is a first step toward understanding the lived experience of the earliest followers of Christ. Restricting my study to Paul’s portrayal of believers in 1 Corinthians, I focus where Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics converge, asking: How does Paul propose believers live as bodies in the eschatological tension that comprises Christ’s resurrection and return – believers belonging still to the κόσμος, already to Christ?

My primary aim is to establish the premises that in 1 Corinthians believers are indistinguishable from bodies: believers are bodies. I establish my premiss by closely examining Paul’s concept of death as he argues it in 1 Corinthians 15. I argue that there Paul portrays believers consistently as bodies: whether bodies dead or bodies alive, believers are bodies.

My aim, secondarily, is to relate that premiss to the believer’s lived experience as Paul portrays it. If Paul portrays believers always as bodies, how does he expect believers-as-bodies to live in the world as he conceives it? I apply my premiss to Paul’s contention in 1 Corinthians 6 that πορνεία uniquely violates the body. Before unpacking Paul’s argument about πορνεία and the body, however, I first address the question: What is πορνεία? After reviewing competing proposals on πορνεία’s meaning, I examine primary Second Temple sources on πορνεία before proposing that πορνεία functions in the Second Temple period chiefly as an othering term, distinguishing the faithful from ‘Others’. I then turn to 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 and Paul’s argument concerning believers-as-bodies and πορνεία. I conclude that Paul there presents believers as bodies that belong already materially to the Lord, though they belong still to the κόσμος that contests the Lord. Believers are bodies ‘in Christ’, in the κόσμος, constituent of each.

I approach Paul exegetically and ideationally. I read Paul’s arguments and their inherent logics as they present themselves to me and I defend my reading of them. I make no claims about the social reality Paul’s arguments represent, nor do I claim either a foundational or a final reading of 1 Corinthians, Paul, or Paul’s followers. I offer in the end the barest beginning of an examination of the lived experience of the earliest recorded followers of Christ – a platform from which to consider more broadly lived experiences in Christian origins. I achieve a perspective from which to assess Paul’s followers, concluding with some ideas for further study.
Acknowledgements

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I both thank and am thankful for my children, Caelan and Kara – neither of whom existed before this project. They are my joy.

But it is above all my wife, Nicole, whom I thank for seeing this project to completion. Only because of her sacrifices, prayers, encouragements, and constancy through hopelessly difficult times can we echo Christ, however imperfectly: ‘It is finished.’

Nicole, I wholeheartedly dedicate this work to you.
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INTRODUCTION

Let no one say that I have said nothing new; the arrangement of the subject is new.

Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 696.22
Introduction

‘Our own body,’ remarks Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system’.¹ Merleau-Ponty introduces a phenomenology of the body that challenges the limitations of both empiricism and rationalism, reinvigorating interest in a subject – the human body – that philosophy and theology all but abandoned on account of Descartes’s cogito ergo sum. Michel Foucault likewise conducts attention to the body. He subverts social power structures by privileging the body over abstract forms of thought and by noting that the body is itself socially constructed and has a history.² It is not surprising, then, that ‘In recent years the human body has emerged as a central focus of research and theory in sociology and anthropology’.³ The human body is pivotal for discussions in philosophy,⁴ feminism,⁵ and gender studies.⁶ It finds its place in religious dialogue⁷ and theological reflection;⁸ questions of embodiment get raised

⁵ Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (University of California Press, 1993); Judith P. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge, 1990); Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy, and Gender, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Blackwell, 2002).
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even of God. And the body informs much in theological ethics: obviously in medical ethics, but also in political commentary and in conversation with popular culture. Western conceptions of the body remain forefront in a range of (inter)disciplinary discussions, leading Richard Warner to assert: ‘It is difficult to imagine a philosophical issue more fundamental to our understanding of science and self’.

Guiding Question, Purpose, and Thesis of My Study

Mine is not strictly a study about the human body, but the human body features crucially in my study. Mine is a study of Christian origins, of the earliest believers’ lived experience – as Paul presents it – of ‘the noteworthy tension between past and future, between “already fulfilled” and “not yet fulfilled”’. What did it mean for Paul’s followers to live ‘now’, being ‘in Christ’, ‘in the world’? Specifically, what did it mean to live ‘now’ as body? I ask: how does Paul propose believers as bodies live in the Meanwhile that comprises Christ’s resurrection and return – believers belonging still to the κόσμος, already to Christ? Broadly, my interest is Paul’s ethics: how does Paul propose believers as bodies live in the


10 Verhey suggests that ‘An account of persons and their embodiment may be regarded, if not as that upon which hangs all the law and the prophets of medical ethics, at least as that upon which hangs a good deal of the application of the standard principles of bioethics and especially, of course, the principle of respect for persons’. Alan Verhey, Reading the Bible in the Strange World of Modern Medicine (Eerdmans, 2003), 78.

11 William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Blackwell, 1998). Cavanaugh comments on torture under Pinochet’s Chilean rule through the lenses of the human body, the Eucharistic body of the tortured Christ, the political ruling body, and the ecclesiological body of Christ.


Meanwhile? Particularly, I approach Paul’s ethics through his anthropology: how does Paul propose believers as bodies live? Conjoining these is Paul’s eschatology: how does Paul propose believers as bodies live in the Meanwhile, belonging each to κόσμος and to Christ?

Focusing where Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics converge, the purpose of my study is first to establish a (somehow) holistic depiction of the person in Paul and second to consider how that affects Paul’s concrete commands for the believer’s everyday existence. The convergence of Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics manifests both a problem for Paul’s moral reasoning and a perspective from which to assess it. The problem is how Paul’s essentially holistic anthropology accommodates the believer’s dual association each with the κόσμος, which Christ is presently redeeming, and with Christ, who has redeemed believers. Believers are bodies redeemed (1 Cor 6.19-20), awaiting the redemption of their bodies (Rom 8.23). My perspective becomes the believer’s bodily, lived-experience – as Paul presents it – of this dual association. Restricting my study to 1 Corinthians, I develop the following thesis.

I hypothesize that in Paul believers are bodies that constitute materially part of the κόσμος: the present ‘order’, αἰών; Adamic and under the sway of Death. As bodies, believers belong materially already to the Lord. Believers are bodies ‘in Christ’, in the κόσμος, materially and legitimately constituent of each. The believer’s dual constituency plays concretely in Paul’s ethics where Paul commands believers to flee πορνεία. The male believer committing πορνεία adversely affects not (only) the believer himself but, impossibly, the Lord. How one behaves now, materially as σῶμα, matters not because the believer-as-body will be in future bodily raised, but because the believer belongs already bodily to the Lord. In answer to my enquiry, how does Paul propose believers as bodies live in the Meanwhile?, I conclude that although believers remain materially participant of the κόσμος’s (re)order into God’s Kingdom, the believer’s ultimate inheritance, they are to live actively ‘now’ as bodies possessed materially already by Christ.

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16 See ‘Aims and Limitations’, below.
My thesis embeds a number of premisses, and it is the job of this study to unpack and defend the major ones. But although Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics together form the object of my study, my primary premiss – the one on which the others depend – is anthropological: ‘believers are bodies’.

**The Anthropological Premiss: ‘Believers Are Bodies’**

By ‘believers are bodies’ I mean Paul presents a (somehow) holistic or monistic anthropology. I do not mean Paul’s anthropology cannot distinguish something called a ‘soul’ or perhaps – as in a few Jewish and in later gnostic texts – a ‘spirit’. I mean Paul presents believers as persons in their entirety (of whatever that consists), and ‘body’ is the believer’s visible, lived-in manifestation of that entirety. Negatively, I argue that Paul does not present believers as essentially divisible parts of ‘body’ and ‘soul’ (or ‘spirit’, ‘mind’, – whatever) where the soul (or whatever) meaningfully preserves the person independent of the body. This essential distinction between parts becomes normative in Christianity after Paul. It occurs in some Jewish works earlier than Paul and contemporary with him and in some rabbinical texts. It is commonplace in post-Platonic Greek and Roman works before, during, and after Paul’s time.\(^{17}\)

At the most basic level, these works share a preference for the soul (or whatever) to the body. In some cases this leads to overly negative perceptions and treatments of the body as though the body is something alien, evil. But that is the minority position and does not peak in popularity until perhaps the second and third centuries CE, chiefly in Christian and gnostic circles.\textsuperscript{18} Generally, these works


Importantly, although ancient Eastern religions can be rightly termed ‘dualistic,’ the dualism is less material than it is cosmic and moral. See Yuri Stoyanov, \textit{The Other God: Dualist Religion from Antiquity to the Cathars} (Yale University Press, 2000). On the contemporary (North American) Christian affinity with material dualism, see Philip J. Lee, \textit{Against the Protestant Gnostics} (OUP, 1987). Lee’s assessment of gnostic influence in the New Testament period is less persuasive.


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present a person’s body simply as a hindrance: a nuisance that clutters with passions and base thoughts the soul’s purest expression. Often, the soul comes to express itself fully only when the person dies. It is at death a soul escapes the limitation of its body and experiences unhindered, independent existence. In certain expressions of Judaism, the soul at death enters an ‘intermediate state’, existing temporarily independent of its body as it awaits the body’s resurrection. Although neither Stoics nor Epicureans conceive of a personal afterlife, for a few Stoics the soul’s ἠγεμονικόν (‘which is totally λογικόν’) conceivably survives temporarily after death – though the survival of this pure rationality should not be confused with the persistence of personal identity. Aune argues that even Epicureans, who deny the soul’s survival post-mortem, can nevertheless define death as the soul’s separation from the body.

Defending the Premiss ‘Believers Are Bodies’

Paul does not define death as the soul’s separation from the body. Certainly, he does not in 1 Corinthians suggest that death effects the soul’s meaningful independence of the body. In 1 Corinthians, Paul portrays believers at death in non-partitive terms, providing initial evidence of a somehow monistic or holistic

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19 Long, ‘Soul,’ 48. E.g., Zeno (SVF 1.145); Chrysippus (SVF 2.792); Epictetus (Disc. 2.1.17-19).

20 Although, e.g., Epictetus discusses the separation of soul from body (Disc. 2.1.17-19), ‘Stoic physics in any case limited the extent to which its view of the body could be assimilated to Plato’s. Eschatology of the sort one finds in the Phaedo or Republic 10, with all that implies for the soul’s independence, is alien to the Stoa. There is no transcendence in either a metaphysical or a personal sense. “What there was of fire in you shall pass into fire, earth shall pass into earth, air into air, water into water. There is no Hades, no Acheron, no Cocytos, no Phlegethon” (3.13.15)’. Robert F. Dobbin, Epictetus: Discourses Book 1 (OUP, 1998), 71-72.

21 Aune, ‘Human,’ 294-95. I note below some misgivings about Aune’s analysis.

22 By ‘meaningful independence’ I indicate that the soul preserves personal identity separate from the body, whether permanently or temporarily. Interpreters will be quick to point to 2 Cor 5.1-10 and Phil 1.23-24 as evidence of Paul’s convictions concerning an ‘intermediate state’. I explain below that I limit my study to 1 Corinthians and do not therefore engage with questions concerning Paul’s possible eschatological development. Whatever one concludes about an ‘intermediate state’ in Paul, however, Sevenster’s observation is indisputable: Paul nowhere uses ψυχή to convey the idea. J.N. Sevenster, ‘Some Remarks on the ΓΥΜΝΟΣ in II Cor. V. 3,’ in Studia Paulina in honorem J. de Zwaan, ed. J.N. Sevenster and W.C. van Unnik (Haarlem, 1953), 202-14.
anthropology.\textsuperscript{23} My argument becomes a negative one: Paul’s anthropology is not partitive. I do not attempt the much more challenging task of asserting, constructively, what Paul’s anthropology is; I reason only that if his anthropology is not partitive it is, somehow, holistic.

Of course, I could begin by arguing from what Paul’s anthropology is, based on a \textit{religionsgeschichtliche}-like comparison with anthropologies extant in Paul’s day. This has been done and, based on ‘parallels’ with often very little verbal coincidence, defenders of ‘Greek’ or ‘Jewish’\textsuperscript{24} partitive anthropologies vie with

\textsuperscript{23} I use ‘partitive’ and ‘holistic’ broadly to express anthropologies either that identify the soul’s (or whatever’s) meaningful independence of the body (see note above), or that do not conceive of personal identity independent of the body – regardless what ‘stuff’ composes the body as a whole. It is consequently immaterial to my definitions whether an anthropology materially distinguishes between ‘body’ and ‘soul’ (or whatever); the criterion is whether the soul (or whatever) capably identifies the person independent of the body. Significantly, I do not by these terms indicate any particular anthropology, whether (so-called) ‘Greek’ or ‘Hebrew’. In two essays, Aune criticizes importantly the false dichotomy NT scholars often make between ancient monistic and dualistic conceptions of human nature – ‘conceptions often linked respectively to Hebrew and Greek views of the person’. He rightly relates that in both Judaism and the Hellenistic philosophers ‘There were, in fact, many variations and permutations of monistic and dualistic conceptions of the universe and human nature’. Drawing on Long’s essay, Aune then makes seven claims about views of body and soul shared by All Hellenistic philosophers (noting exceptions).

I have misgivings about Aune quantifying his claims absolutely: not remotely All Hellenistic philosophers speak to Aune’s seven claims. Furthermore, our primary source knowledge especially of Stoicism – a particularly divergent tradition – is sparse. Aune can thus claim accurately only that Some Hellenistic philosophers share these views of body and soul. More troubling, however, is that Aune potentially misleads readers into supposing that the Hellenistic philosophers represent the entire range of anthropological conceptions available in the first century. Thus, inevitably Paul distinguishes the physical from the ‘inner’ person; everyone did. But of course the Hellenistic philosophers – all of them educated elite and all in some sense reacting to Plato, positively or adversely – do not represent the entirety of ancient anthropologies, whether Jewish or Greek. Despite my misgivings of Aune’s analysis, however, two of his claims in particular confirm my heuristic starting-point for assessing Paul’s anthropology in general terms. Aune claims that All (including Epicureans and Stoics) could define death as the separation of the soul from the body; and that All but the Epicureans and the Stoic Panaetius believed the soul continued to exist at least temporarily after separation from the body at death. I noted above that Stoic conceptions of the soul’s post-mortem independence are not meaningful independence. Granting Aune’s analysis, then, neither Stoics nor Epicureans – each, differently, representing a ‘holistic’ anthropology – present the soul’s meaningful independence of the body at death. See David E. Aune, ‘Two Pauline Models of the Person,’ in \textit{The Whole and Divided Self}, ed. David E. Aune and John McCarthy (Crossroads Publishing Co., 1997), 89-114; citations from pp. 90-91. Cf. Aune, ‘Human,’ 291-312. And cf. Long, ‘Soul,’ 34-57.

\textsuperscript{24} Barr (rightly) challenges that Cullmann rigs his reading of Paul by privileging as a determinative background only the holistic anthropology of the Hebrew Bible. Thus Cullmann overlooks the development of partitive anthropologies in Hellenistic Judaism. But the criticism equally can be turned back on Barr that he privileges for his reading only those expressions of Hellenistic Judaism that promote a partitive anthropology. Neither anthropology represents ‘normative’ Judaism of the Hellenistic period; Second Temple Judaism displays a diversity of expressions. James Barr, \textit{The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality} (Fortress, 1993); Oscar Cullmann, \textit{Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New Testament} (Epworth Press, 1958).
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defenders of ‘Greek’ or ‘Jewish’ holistic ones, each presenting plausible, internally-coherent cases. We lack definite criteria to judge among the possibilities.

Alternatively, I could examine individually Paul’s anthropological terms. Paul discusses the ‘soul’ (ψυχή) and the ‘spirit’ (πνεῦμα) – not to forget the ‘mind’ (νοῦς), ‘conscience’ (συνείδησις), ‘inner’ and ‘outer person’ (ἐσωτερικὸς ἐξωτερικός) and, of course, the ‘body’ (σῶμα). Thus Stacey reads ‘the

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26 Rom 2.9; 11.3; 13.1; 16.4; 1 Cor 15.45; 2 Cor 1.23; 12.15; Phil 1.27; 2.30; 1 Thess 2.8; 5.23. Cf. ψυχικός; 1 Cor 2.14; 15.44(2x), 46.

27 Even Fee acknowledges anthropological uses of πνεῦμα in Paul. On the whole Fee argues, persuasively, Paul uses πνεῦμα to refer to God’s ‘Holy Spirit’. But consider Rom 1.9; 8.16; 1 Cor 2.11; 5.3, 4, 5; 7.34; 14.14, 32; 16.18; 2 Cor 2.13; 7.1, 13; Gal 6.18; Phil 1.27; 4.23; 1 Thess 5.23. See Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Hendrickson, 1994), 15, n. 6.

28 Rom 1.28; 7.23, 25; 11.34; 12.2; 14.5; 1 Cor 1.10; 2.16(2x); 14.14, 15(2x), 19; Phil 4.7; διάνοια does not occur in Paul’s uncontested letters, but cf. Eph 2.3; 4.18; Col 1.21.

29 Rom 2.15; 9.1; 13.5; 1 Cor 8.7, 10, 12; 10.25, 27, 28, 29(2x); 2 Cor 1.12; 4.2; 5.11.

30 Rom 7.22; 2 Cor 4.16.

31 σῶμα: Rom 2.28; 7.18, 25; 8.3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13; 1 Cor 5.5; 6.16; 15.39, 50; 2 Cor 3.3; 4.11; 7.1, 5; 12.7; Gal 1.16; 4.13, 14; Phil 1.22, 24; Philem 16; σῶμα: Rom 1.24; 4.19; 6.6, 12; 7.4, 24; 8.10, 11, 13, 24; 12.1, 4, 5; 1 Cor 5.3; 6.13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20; 7.4, 34; 9.27; 10.16, 17; 11.24, 27, 29; 12.12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27; 13.3; 15.35, 37, 38, 40, 44; 2 Cor 4.10; 5.6, 8, 10; 10.10; 12.2, 3; Gal 6.17; Phil 1.20; 3.21; 1 Thess 5.23. Paul sometimes uses σῶμα synonymously with his positive uses of σῶμα, but he never uses σῶμα synonymously with his pejorative uses of σῶμα. In one passage Paul modifies σῶμα with τῆς ἀμαρτίας (‘the body of sin’; Rom 6.6), ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν (‘in your mortal body’; Rom 6.12), τοῦ θανάτου τούτου (‘the body of this death’; Rom 7.24), τὰ ἁμαρτία…ὑμῶν (‘your mortal body’; Rom 8.11), and he commands to ‘put to death’ (θηρασάσθε) ‘the deeds’ (tà πράξεις) of the body (Rom 8.13). Significantly, all these modifications reflect the presence and activity of the cosmic powers Sin and Death (introduced in Rom 5.12) – powers extrinsic to the believer. None of Paul’s unmodified uses of σῶμα is pejorative, with the arguable (though unlikely) exception that 1 Cor 9.27 suggests ascetic self-abasement.

It is disconcerting that in the quest for parallels to Paul’s σῶμα usage researchers usually limit criteria to 1) negative uses of σῶμα and 2) uses that oppose πνεῦμα. But as Aune notes, Greek (including Jewish) sources contemporary with Paul indiscriminately interchange σῶμα and σῶμα. E.g., Philo De gig. 29-31; Epictetus Diss. 2.1.17, 19; 3.7.4, 9; M. Aur. Med. 2.2; 3.16; 12.3. Aune,
Pauline view of man’ against backgrounds Judaic and Hellenistic, and Jewett reads ‘Paul’s anthropological terms’ against their conflict settings. But here we face the same trouble as before: we have no means to settle definitely whether Paul uses a particular term as a ‘Hebrew’ or a ‘Hellenist’ – or a Hellenistic-Hebrew; whether the term is his or his opponents’ – and who, precisely, his opponents are; whether he adopts fully or partly or not at all the school(s) of thought the term implies – and which school(s) of thought it is implying.

Besides, Paul uses a host of anthropological terms that have failed to pique much interest. He can speak from his ‘guts’ (σπλάγχνον) and mentions ‘knees’ (γόνυ), ‘face’ (πρόσωπον), ‘ears’ (οὖς), ‘hands’ (χεῖρ), and other ‘parts’ (μέλος). The banal as well as the exotic comprise Paul’s anthropological terms. And

‘Human,’ 296. Of the occurrences of נפש in the MT, the LXX renders humans 169 times by either σάρξ (146) or σῶμα (23). (104 occurrences concern animals.) See the analysis and evaluation by Daniel Lys, ‘L’arrière-plan et les connotations vétérantamentaires de sarx et de sôma,’ in Le Corps et le Corps du Christ dans la Première Épître aux Corinthiens: Congrès de l’ACFEB, Tarbes (1981), ed. Victor Guénet, LD 114 (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1983), 46-70; chart on pp. 50-51. It is therefore not sufficient to look for parallel anthropologies that 1) use σάρξ negatively and 2) oppose πνεῦμα; for the parallels to ring true they should also 3) use σῶμα positively. His privileging σάρξ and his failure to appreciate Paul’s idiosyncratic distinction between σάρξ and σῶμα proves fatal for Boyarin’s analysis of Paul’s ethics. Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (University of California Press, 1994).


33 Thus it is worth remarking that although interpreters still turn to Jewett’s conclusions as authoritative statements on Paul’s anthropology, very few any longer share Jewett’s reasons for those conclusions: namely, that Paul’s conflict with gnostic opponents shapes his anthropological language. 34 E.g.,
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although a comprehensive study could prove enlightening – e.g., most of Paul’s uses denote the visible person; his commonest referent to interiority is καρδία; many of his references are citations – it would not prove conclusive.

I do not aim to prove Paul’s anthropology conclusively; I am interested only whether he addresses believers chiefly as bodies (i.e., ‘holistically’) or as something more, besides. I thus begin my study where Bultmann says to begin: ‘the place to begin is the naïve popular usage in which soma means body – as a rule, man’s – which in a naïve anthropological view can be placed in contrast with the “soul” or the “spirit”’. But I begin equally whence Bultmann forbids: Paul’s portrayal of the believer’s body at death. Assessing Paul’s portrayal of death does not disclose his anthropology constructively, but it does introduce a simple, measurable control: Does Paul or does he not portray death as the soul’s (or whatever’s) meaningful independence of the body? If most, or all, partitive anthropologies depict death as the

| αἷμα (blood): Rom 3.15*, 25; 5.9; 1 Cor 10.16; 11.25, 27; 15.50; Gal 1.16. | μήτρα (womb): Rom 4.19 |
| γαστήρ (belly): 1 Thess 5.3 | νότον (back): Rom 11.10* |
| γλώσσα (tongue): Rom 3.13*; 14.11*; 1 Cor 12.10, 28, 30; 13.1, 8; 14.2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 39; Phil 2.11* | δαφρής (sense of smell): 1 Cor 12.17 |
| καρδία (heart): Rom 1.21, 24; 2.5, 15, 29; 5.5; 6.17; 8.27; 9.2; 10.1, 6*, 8*, 9, 10; 16.18; 1 Cor 2.9*; 4.5; 7.37; 14.25; 2 Cor 1.22; 2.4; 3.2, 3, 15; 4.6; 5.12; 6.11; 7.3; 8.16; 9.7; Gal 4.6; Phil 1.7; 4.7; 1 Thess 2.4, 17; 3.13 | οὖς (ear): Rom 11.8*; 1 Cor 2.9*; 12.16 |
| γόνυ (knee): Rom 11.4*; 14.11*; Phil 2.10* | ὀφθαλμός (eye): Rom 3.18*; 11.8*, 10*; 1 Cor 2.9*; 12.16, 17, 21; 15.52; Gal 3.1; 4.15 |
| κεφαλή (head): Rom 12.20*; 1 Cor 11.3, 4, 5, 7, 10; 12.21 | πούς/ἴχνος (feet/footprints): πούς: Rom 3.15*; 10.15*; 16.20; 1 Cor 12.21; 15.25*, 27*; ἴχνος: Rom 4.12; 2 Cor 12.18 |
| κολία (stomach): Rom 16.18; 1 Cor 6.13; Gal 1.15; Phil 3.19 | πρόσωπον (face): 1 Cor 13.12; 14.25; 2 Cor 1.11; 2.10; 3.7, 13, 18; 4.6; 5.12; 8.24; 10.1, 7; 11.20; Gal 1.22; 2.6, 11; 1 Thess 2.17; 3.10 |
| κομάω (hair/to grow hair): 1Cor 11.14/15 | σπλάγχνον (guts): 2 Cor 6.12; 7.15; Phil 1.18; 2.1; Philem 7, 12, 20 |
| κόμη (mouth): Rom 3.14*, 19; 10.8*, 9, 10; 15.6; 2 Cor 6.11; 13.1* | στόμα (mouth): Rom 3.14*, 19; 10.8*, 9, 10; 15.6; 2 Cor 6.11; 13.1* |
| λάρυγξ (throat): Rom 3.13* | φθόγγος (voice): Rom 10.18*; 14.7 |
| μέλος (part): Rom 6.13, 19; 7.5, 23; 12.4, 5; 1 Cor 6.15; 12.12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27 | χεῖλος (lips): Rom 3.13*; 1 Cor 14.21* |
| μέρος (part): 1 Cor 12.7 (other uses are not anthropological) | χεῖλα/ἀριστερός/δεξιός/ἀχειροποίητος (hand/left hand/without hands/right hand): χεῖλα: Rom 10.21*; 1 Cor 4.12; 12.15, 21; 16.21; 2 Cor 11.33; Gal 3.19; 6.11; 1 Thess 4.11; Philen 19; ἀριστερός: 2 Cor 6.7; δεξιός: Rom 8.34; 2 Cor 6.7; Gal 2.9; ἀχειροποίητος: 2 Cor 5.1 |

*A citation from the LXX.#

35 Bultmann, Theology, 1.193.

36 Bultmann claims it methodologically erroneous to begin with ὀμοία in Paul at either 1 Cor 15.35 or 2 Cor 5.1-10. He contends that in both places Paul is misled by ‘opponents’. Bultmann, Theology, 1.192; 1.202.
soul’s (or whatever’s) meaningful independence of the body, and Paul does not, then we have grounds to assert that Paul’s is not a partitive anthropology. By implication, we have grounds also to suggest Paul’s anthropology is somehow holistic, though we cannot identify precisely the strain of holistic anthropology, nor how Paul’s anthropological terms all interrelate.37 But my aims are not that grand.

**Study Aims and Limitations**

I do not aim to produce a Pauline anthropology of the body; mine is not a study of the Pauline σῶμα. My interest in σῶμα is incidental of my interest in Paul’s presentation and expectations of believers, as they are ‘now’, in the Meanwhile. Believers are ‘now’ – somehow – bodies and, I contend, 1 Corinthians shows them never to be anything but bodies. It is sufficient for my purposes to claim that believers are bodies before, at, and after death (through resurrection) without worrying about precisely how that works, (meta)physically. I aim to demonstrate my primary premiss: that, in 1 Corinthians, believers are bodies. From there, I aim to defend my thesis concerning the earliest believers’ lived experience – as Paul presents it – as a possible, plausible reading of Paul. Believers are passively constituent of Christ and κόσμος, but are to act for Christ in the κόσμος.

Accommodating my aims, I introduce a number of limitations to my study.

First, given my incidental interest in σῶμα, I limit my study only to Paul’s concentrated uses of the term in 1 Corinthians that denote the human body. I focus on 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 and chapter 15. Consequently I do not assess, except incidentally, Paul’s distinctive phrase, ‘σῶμα Χριστοῦ’. In all likelihood what Paul says about the σῶμα Χριστοῦ relates indelibly to his anthropological uses of σῶμα. There was often in the ancient world a close, conceptual association between the human and the social body.38 But my focus is the believer in Paul not, abstractly, the

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37 I stress again the distinction between ‘separation’ and ‘independence’. Blood, for example, separates from the body at death without achieving autonomy. To assert Paul’s anthropology is somehow ‘holistic’ is not to deny that for him ‘soul’, ‘spirit’ or the like are distinct material substances. But Paul distinguishes ‘hands’ and ‘hair’ and ‘knees’ without us supposing he means these parts of the body can go off and meaningfully exist independently and, unless otherwise demonstrated, the same can apply to the soul.

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σῶμα. And without denying the conceptual overlap between bodies human and
social, it does not follow that the phrase σῶμα Χριστοῦ is equivalent of the term
σῶμα, and vice versa. It remains possible to speak of the one without speaking of the
other. Just as other studies limit their attention to Paul’s uses of the social phrase, therefore, I limit mine to Paul’s uses of σῶμα that denote the human body in 1 Corinthians.

Second, I limit my study to Paul’s uses of σῶμα that denote the human body in 1 Corinthians. Admittedly, this limitation paves me an easier path for proving my premiss that believers are bodies. Contentions that Paul’s anthropology is not holistic generally come from readings of 2 Corinthians 5.1-10 and, both in support of those readings and deriving from them, from Philippians 1.23-24. But my reason for introducing this limitation is to impose a methodological control. Since the nineteenth century, interpreters have asserted – or, consequently, denied – that Paul’s eschatology and anthropology develop throughout his epistles. By limiting my study to 1 Corinthians, I eliminate the variables a wider study of Paul would introduce by eliminating the need to account for various development theories. My

39 Interpreters sensitive to the conceptual overlap between the word and the phrase must still mind that it is not the case every utterance of σῶμα is equally an utterance of σῶμα Χριστοῦ: All A are not B. Words acquire their significance through their occurrences in phrases and sentences such that readers must demonstrate whether, and in what ways, Paul uses σῶμα and σῶμα Χριστοῦ synonymously. Thus readers claiming some synonymy between the word and the phrase still capably distinguish between them, as I do here. On linguistic grounds for distinguishing words from phrases, see, e.g., John Lyons, Language and Linguistics: An Introduction (CUP, 1981), 136-78.

40 Recently, Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ, SNTSMS 137 (CUP, 2006). Jewett observes that ‘The term σῶμα has traditionally been discussed under the rubric of ecclesiology on account of the phrase σῶμα Χριστοῦ’. Jewett, Paul’s, 201. That focus was no longer so one-sided following Bulmann’s emphasis on anthropology.

41 Frequently, commentators on 2 Cor 5.1-10 appeal to Phil 1.23-24 and, circularly, commentators on Phil 1.23-24 appeal to 2 Cor 5.1-10. Hoffmann poses ‘the problem’ of 2 Cor 5.1-10 typically: ‘Das grundsätzliche Problem ist darin begründet, wie die Verse 5.2-5, die sich auf die Parusie zu beziehen scheinen, und die Verse 6-10, die eine gewisse Parallele in Phil 1.23 finden und daher anscheinend den Tod meinen, in ihrer Nebeneinanderstellung zu erklären sind’. Paul Hoffmann, Die Toten in Christus: Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung zur paulinischen Eschatologie (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1969), 253; cf. on Phil 1.23-24 pp. 288-96.

study and, consequently, my claims focus exclusively on Paul’s arguments in 1 Corinthians.

Third, my study is ideational. I aim to describe Paul’s arguments as they present themselves to me; the inherent logics of his converged anthropology, eschatology, and ethics. I make no claims about ‘reality’. I make no claims broadly about ‘Paul’ nor, specifically, about his congregation. I make no claims about the lived experiences of Paul’s followers themselves but only Paul’s presentation of those experiences. Except incidental of exegesis, I do not compare Paul with his contemporaries, argue about his place in the history of religions, pursue the origins of his language or thought, or unmask ideologies directing his discourse. I do not suppose to know what Paul ‘intended’ to say and, in Chapter Two, I will defend that I do not pursue the peculiar Sitz that effected Paul’s arguments. My object is Paul’s arguments phenomenally, as they present themselves to me. My aim is to describe the ideas Paul presents: a first but by no means foundational step to comprehending the lived experience of the earliest followers of Christ. My procedure is exegetical, reading closely one of the earliest extant (proto-)Christian documents that directs believers how that experience should be.

**Procedure and Contributions**

I section my study into an introduction and two parts. In Part One, ‘The Body Not Yet’, I examine in Chapters Two and Three Paul’s argument on death in 1 Corinthians 15. There, I establish my premiss that ‘believers are bodies’. I argue that believers as bodies belong still to Adam and the κόσμος, afflicted by Death, but that they belong also already to Christ – and are to act it. Believers are ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’, but are to behave ‘in Adam’, for Christ. Among other things, I argue also that σῶμα is of subsidiary importance in 1 Corinthians 15 and that the believer’s resurrection or eschatological ‘change’ does not (necessarily) denote a change in material composition but denotes the dislocation of Death from the body.

In Part Two, ‘The Body Now’, I examine Paul’s other major argument concerning the human σῶμα: 1 Corinthians 6.12-20, and the sin he distinguishes as a

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Introduction

unique bodily offence: πορνεία. In Chapter Four, I attempt to order competing theses on the meaning of πορνεία before contributing my own. I argue that πορνεία in the Second Temple period had radically different connotations for males than for females, and that for males the chief, specialized function of the term was to denote sex out of bounds of an established social group. In Chapter Five I exegete Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20, emphasizing the logic of Paul’s pathos: that believers in the κόσμος belong materially already to Christ. Believers experience redemption bodily already, even as they await their future resurrection. Consequently, what believers do with their bodies matters not because they will be bodily resurrected, but because they are already materially the Lord’s.

Following this Introduction, in Chapter One I review secondary literature related mostly to Paul’s concept of σῶμα. I devote significant space to Bultmann’s treatment of anthropology, eschatology and ethics in Paul. Following the Conclusion, in Appendix I I review secondary literature that relates Paul’s eschatology and ethics, and in Appendix II I give a chart displaying the πορν- word-group in the LXX.

I aim this study only as an initial enquiry into the lived experience of the earliest followers of Christ. I propose it neither as a first nor a final word. Through my work, however, I hope I contribute meaningfully to the study of Christian origins, perhaps in the following ways.

First, my approach to Paul’s anthropology, though neither exhaustive nor constructive, is both simple and controlled and presents a way to speak about the ‘person’ in Paul without conforming Paul a priori either to an external anthropology, ‘Hebrew’ or ‘Greek’, or internally to a hypothetical metatheory on Paul’s ‘in Christ’ language or other formulas.

Second, my exegesis introduces a fresh perspective on reading both Paul’s argument for the resurrection of the dead (1 Cor 15), and his prohibition of πορνεία (1 Cor 6.12-20). Cumulatively, my observations contribute to new and nuanced understandings of Paul.

Third, my examination of πορνεία in the Second Temple period helps to identify and order competing claims about the term. I further offer a general thesis concerning πορνεία in the Second Temple period.
Fourth, I offer an initial perspective, ideational, on the earliest believers’ experience of ‘the noteworthy tension between past and future’. Although my contribution is by no means exhaustive, it supplies grounds for further research on the often overlooked perspective of the believer’s bodily, lived experience.

Ultimately, my study contributes a fresh reading of what it means to be human in Paul. I consider again materials that many before me have considered but, so considering them, I bring a different perspective, a different arrangement of those materials leading, in significant respects, to a different understanding of what for Paul it means to be a ‘body’. In the next chapter, I overview briefly some of what others before me have said about the σῶμα in Paul.

44 Cullmann, Christ and Time, 212.
Chapter One
A Problem of Anthropology, Eschatology, Ethics

My study examines the earliest believers’ bodily, lived experience of being ‘in Christ’, in the κόσμος. I ask: how does Paul propose believers as bodies live in the Meanwhile that comprises Christ’s resurrection and return? I focus my study on the convergence of Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics, though I approach this focus through the human σῶμα in Paul. The purpose of this chapter is to situate my study among like studies on Paul.

But there are few like studies on Paul. Many discuss Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, or ethics, but not specifically their convergence. Studies routinely assess Paul’s ethics in relation to his eschatology, but treat Paul’s anthropology only incidentally. Exceptionally, Bultmann constructs his entire Pauline theology – foundational for his New Testament theology as a whole – under the rubrics of anthropology. At its centre Bultmann places σῶμα. His remarks are now familiar:

Pauline theology is not a speculative system. It deals with God not as He is in Himself but only with God as He is significant for man, for man’s responsibility and man’s salvation. Correspondingly, it does not deal with the world and man as they are in themselves, but constantly sees the world and man in their relation to God. Every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and vice versa. For this reason and in this sense Paul’s theology is, at the same time, anthropology.

He continues: ‘The most comprehensive term which Paul uses to characterize man’s existence is soma, body’. As Gundry sums-up: ‘Bultmann gives pride of

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1 See my survey in Appendix I.
2 Schrage includes two pages on Paul’s anthropology. Although Schrage’s approach is more broadly Christological, he recognizes that ‘the term sôma, “body”…is extraordinarily important for Pauline anthropology and ethics’ and that ‘For ethics, special importance attaches to what takes place in the interim, between the “body of sin” that belongs to the past on the one hand and the “spiritual body” of the future on the other’. Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, trans. David E. Green (T&T Clark, 1987), 218; see 218-19. Differently from Schrage, I do not contrast the past, morally negative ‘body of sin’ with the future ‘spiritual body’, redeemed; I query how the present believer-as-body, redeemed, relates to the future redemption of the believer-as-body. Schrage is influenced by Käsemann for his concept of the body, as is Tannehill who similarly blends anthropology, eschatology and ethics. Robert C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology, BZNW 32 (Berlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1967). See further below.
4 Bultmann, Theology, 1.192.
place to Pauline theology, interprets Pauline theology as anthropology, and makes σῶμα the key to that anthropology’.

Although he does not specifically note their convergence, Bultmann has proved a foundational interpreter of Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics. Following, I review Bultmann’s connections between Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics. I then overview reactions specifically to his thesis on the Pauline σῶμα before turning to my own study of the believer’s lived experience, focusing on the human σῶμα in Paul.

Paul’s σῶμα, Eschatology, and Ethics in Bultmann

Eschatology and Ethics

In 1924 Bultmann cast a problem for ethics in Paul that continues to mould works on Pauline ethics today. Succinctly, ‘the problem of ethics’ is the apparent antinomy between what Paul says believers are (indicative) and how he says they should behave (imperative). Noting that Paul follows statements about the believer’s freedom from sin with commands against sinning (e.g., Rom 6.1-7; 8.1-17; 1 Cor 6.9-11), Bultmann suggests that Paul presents us a genuine antinomy (echte Antinomie): contradictory assertions developing from an undivided state of affairs and therefore belonging essentially together. He queries how Paul derives imperatives from indicatives of believers’ righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), of their being ‘rightwised’ (δικαιωθείς), and he repeats Galatians 5.25 frequently as his prooftext: εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοχῶμεν (‘if we live by the Spirit, let us walk by the Spirit’).

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7 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 123; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 196.
Chapter One

Bultmann rejects solutions to the antinomy that appeal either to Christ-mysticism’s eschatological tension (eschatologische Spannung) or to idealism. Eschatological tension effects an ethical enthusiasm wherein believers experience the new life as a present reality – ‘the will and strength to accomplish the good’. This, Bultmann reasons, relapses into legalistic religion (Gesetzesreligion) and does not reckon with Christ’s totally abolishing sin. It negates the concrete person, forcing a discontinuity between the believer and the new being within. Idealism occurs when notions that believers receive a new moral disposition – an inclination toward the good akin to Stoicism’s προκόπτων – are introduced. But Bultmann contends such notions disregard that in Paul believers remain always sinful before God (lest grace should cease to be grace); they suggest that humanity factually redeems itself. Thus Bultmann rejects Wernle’s suggestion that Paul’s ethics are ‘enthusiastic’ – that since believers no longer sin the imperative is redundant and contradicts the indicative. He rejects as idealistic Jacoby’s dialectic, where believers must bring into actualization (imperative) the effect of God’s grace as a principle (indicative). The underlying problem with these views, Bultmann declares, is that they misunderstand ‘righteousness’ in Paul.

Righteousness is eschatological salvation (Heilsgut). It is a Jewish, forensic-eschatological term signifying God’s future verdict; it is the δικαιοσύνη τοῦ θεοῦ. Miraculously, paradoxically, God imputes already his incomprehensible verdict on

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8 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 125; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 198.
9 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 135; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 211. Importantly, the Christ-mysticism Bultmann here rejects is that derived from hellenistic mystery cults, such as Bousset and Deissmann describe; it is not Schweitzer’s construal of Jewish-apocalyptic mysticism. This is not to suggest Bultman accommodates Schweitzer’s views; I only aim Bultmann’s criticism at its intended target.
10 Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 201-202; Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 128-29.
12 Indicating Hermann Jacoby, Neutestamentliche Ethik (Königsberg: Verlag von Thomas & Oppermann, 1899). See further: Dennison, ‘Indicative,’ 58-60; Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 263.
13 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 123; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 196.
those who have faith:15 ‘the person who is rightwised (Gerechtfertigte) exists in an
eschatological dimension; the rightwised’s existence is miraculous.’16 Righteousness
is the rightwised’s realized mode of existence that no imperative can realize:
understanding oneself always a sinner before God in need of grace. In this way
Paul’s view of righteousness contradicts Judaism’s. In Judaism, according to
Bultmann, righteousness is only future whereas for Paul it is already realized; in
Judaism righteousness comes by observing works of the law and for Paul it comes by
grace through faith.17

Righteousness, consequently, is imperceptible except by the perspective of
faith (vom Glauben aus gesehen).18 It is not ‘sinlessness’ in any moral or experiential
sense, for it is wholly of God – wholly God’s verdict.19 In this way Bultmann dispels
the controversy whether God considers believers righteous or makes them so: whom
God considers righteous becomes righteous.20 Paul’s imperatives flow from this
understanding of righteousness. Citing Galatians 5.25, Bultmann remarks: ‘Because
the Christian is free from sin through justification, he is now to fight against sin’.21
Or, as he has Paul put it to believers: ‘Become what thou art’ – though not in any
idealistic sense of moral progress.22 Believers ‘become what they are’ through the
obedience of faith.

The ‘obedience of faith’ existentially connects Paul’s indicative and
imperative. Bultmann warns never to mistake faith for a work: faith is the believer’s

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15 ‘[D]ie Rechtfertigung Gottes wunderbares Tun bzw. Gottes unbegreifliches Urteil ist.’ Bultmann,
‘Problem,’ 128; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 201.
16 Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 198; Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 125. I replace Stenschke’s translation
(‘justified’) with Grobel’s more familiar ‘rightwised’. See the note in Bultmann, Theology, 1.253.
17 Bultmann, Theology, 1.278-82.
18 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 137; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 212.
19 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 135-36; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 211. ‘[T]he righteousness which God
adjudicates to man (the man of faith) is not “sinlessness” in the sense of ethical perfection, but is
“sinlessness” in the sense that God does not “count” man’s sin against him’. Bultmann, Theology,
1.276.
20 ‘Die alte Streitfrage, ob der δικαιοθείς nur von Gott als gerecht angesehen wird, oder ob er auch
gerecht ist, ist abzuweisen. Natürlich ist im Sinne des Paulus gerecht, wer von Gott als gerecht
angesehen wird’. Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 136, n. 2; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 211, n. 39. ‘These
perplexities all rest upon the misunderstanding that “righteousness” denotes the ethical quality of man,
whereas in truth it means his relation to God’: Bultmann, Theology, 1.277.
21 ‘Weil der Christ durch die Rechtfertigung die Sünde los ist, soll er gegen die Sünde kämpfen: εἰ
ζῶνεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοχῶμεν’. Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 126; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’
198-99.
22 Bultmann, Theology, 1.332. The line is a paradox from Pindar, Pythian Odes, line 72.
obedience to God’s act of salvation, the renunciation (Verzicht) of attempting to
establish relationship with God apart from God’s eschatological verdict. Since
individual righteousness rests entirely on God’s saving act, it can only be believed.23
The imperative is simply obedience in that faith: renouncing self and depending
entirely on God’s verdict. ‘The moral activity can only carry the intention of
obedience: the entire man understands himself as standing before God and, as far as
he acts, he places himself at God’s disposal’.24 Morality relates to self-understanding
rather than to public, ethical action; it is ‘the constant appropriation of grace by
faith’.25 There is therefore no new content for obedience – ‘nothing extraordinary is
required’.26

Empirically, then, the believer’s conduct is indistinguishable from the
unbeliever’s. What distinguishes believers is their character of obedience,
dependence27 – invisible except to the eyes of faith.28 Thus although believers
differentiate between valid and non-valid commands of the law29 and practise ‘love’
as Christ’s eschatological law,30 these are deeds done in freedom with no bearing on
the believer’s righteousness. Paul’s indicative that believers are rightwised sparks his
imperative that they live obedient to that existence. Believers do not live morally by
publicly concrete behaviours; the ‘move’ from the situation under Law to that under
grace effects no perceptible change. ‘No break takes place; no magical or mysterious
transformation of man in regard to his substance, the basis of nature, takes place’.31
Rather, ‘A new understanding of one’s self takes the place of the old’.32 Ethics in
Paul, according to Bultmann, are thus not concrete, empirical activities but the
obedience of faith – a self-understanding of one’s sinful condition and full
dependence on God’s gracious verdict of righteousness. Bultmann’s rejection of

23 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 135-36; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 211.
24 Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 213 (his italics).
25 Bultmann, Theology, 1.332.
26 Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 213.
27 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 138; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 213.
28 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 139; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 215.
29 Bultmann, Theology, 1.341.
30 Bultmann, Theology, 1.344.
31 Bultmann, Theology, 1.268-69.
32 Bultmann, Theology, 1.269.
concrete, empirical ethics in Paul accommodates his abandoning in Paul a concrete, empirical σῶμα.

**Ethics and the Body**

Jewett observes: ‘Bultmann never denies that σῶμα means the physical body of man, but no significance is imparted to such physicality’. For Bultmann, σῶμα in Paul refers only occasionally to the believer’s physical body – and then, only when Paul writes at his most incautious. σῶμα, rather, refers to a person’s ‘very essence’, leading to Bultmann’s famous declaration: ‘man does not have a soma; he is soma’. σῶμα signals the believer’s profound, existential relationship with her or himself. ‘Man, his person as a whole, can be denoted by soma…Man is called soma in respect to his being able to make himself the object of his own action or to experience himself as the subject to whom something happens…that is, as having a relationship to himself – as being able in a certain sense to distinguish himself from himself’. That is, ‘man is soma when he is objectivised in relation to himself by becoming the object of his own thought, attitude, or conduct; he is soma in that he can separate from himself and come under the domination of outside powers’.

The chief evidence that ‘the soma is not a something that outwardly clings to a man’s real self (to his soul, for instance)’ is that ‘in not a few cases soma can be translated simply “I” (or whatever personal pronoun fits the context)’. This is particularly apparent in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 where ‘The nuances of meaning in the word soma melt into one another in a strange fashion’, vacillating between the material body and the ‘self’. On one hand, Bultmann contends that Paul depends on the Hebrew Bible’s and Judaism’s uses of בשר for ‘The fact that soma can denote

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34 E.g., 1 Cor 15.35ff.: ‘But it is a methodological error to choose this passage as the point of departure for the interpretation of soma; for in it Paul lets himself be misled into adopting his opponents’ method of argumentation, and in so doing he uses the soma-concept in a way not characteristic of him elsewhere’; 2 Cor 5.1ff.; 12.2-4; Rom 7.1-7: ‘Nevertheless, it would be an error in method to proceed from such passages as these to interpret the soma-concept that is characteristic of Paul and determines his fundamental discussions’. Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.192; 202.
37 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.202-03.
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both the body and the whole man'. On the other hand, with reference specifically to
the σῶμα ψυχικόν – σῶμα πνευματικόν contrasts (1 Cor 15.44-46; cf. 2.14f.), he
declares: ‘Paul’s anthropological concepts had already been formed under the
influence of Gnosticism’.41

But Bultmann rejects wholly any gnostic dualism in Paul. The σῶμα
πνευματικόν does not mean a body formed of ethereal substance, but ‘that the self is
determined by the power of God which reconciles the cleft between self and self
within a man and hence does presuppose a relationship of man to himself’.42 By
consequence of having a relationship with oneself, one ‘can distinguish himself from
himself, and he will do this all the more as he experiences outside powers trying to
wrest him out out [sic] of his own control or even having done so’. When the
perceived separation between self and self becomes a divorce, one misunderstands
the relationship such that it becomes as one with a foreign being, ‘a “not-I”’. ‘In such
misunderstanding the original naive meaning, soma = body, can come to the surface
again so that the “double” to which the self is bound is regarded to be the material
body’. This dualism occurs in gnosticism but is in Paul, ‘of course, unthinkable’.43

Bultmann’s rejection of dualism in Paul does not, however, lead him to
suppose Paul conceives the ‘self’ as somehow a purely physical being. Quite to the
contrary. With the resurrection, ‘Paul did not dualistically distinguish between man’s
self (his “soul”) and his bodily soma as if the latter were an inappropriate shell, a
prison, to the former; nor does his hope expect a release of the self from its bodily
prison but expects instead the “bodily” resurrection – or rather the transformation of
the soma from under the power of flesh into a spiritual soma, i.e., a Spirit-ruled
soma’.44 This ‘transformation’ of the σῶμα reveals that ‘flesh’ (1 Cor 15.50), the
‘physical’ (ψυχικόν), or ‘dust’ (implying the physical – 1 Cor 15.44-49) are

40 Bultmann, Theology, 1.196. Cf. elsewhere: ‘the New Testament doctrine of man keeps close to that
R.H. Fuller (Fortress, 1956), 181.
41 Bultmann, Theology, 1.174. I have benefitted here from Fox’s assessment of Bultmann: Kenneth A.
Fox, ‘Paul’s Attitude toward the Body in Romans 6-8: Compared with Philo of Alexandria’ (PhD,
University of St. Michael’s College, 2001), esp. 4-11.
42 Bultmann, Theology, 1.199.
43 Bultmann, Theology, 1.199.
44 Bultmann, Theology, 1.201.
nonessential to the ἰδιότητα. The resurrection is central for Paul because it represents ‘the concept soma’ – a characteristic of human existence:

If man were no longer soma – if he no longer had a relationship to himself – he would no longer be a man. Since Paul’s capacity for abstract thinking is not a developed one, and he therefore does not distinguish terminologically between soma in the basic sense of that which characterizes human existence and soma as the phenomenon of the material body, he connects the idea of somatic existence in the eschatological consummation with a mythological teaching on the resurrection (1 Cor 15)...In distinction from this mythology the real intention of Paul must be made clear. It is that he asserts specific human existence, both before and beyond death, to be somatic existence in the basic sense defined above.

A consequence of Bultmann’s appraisal of ἰδιότητα in Paul is that the believer – who is ἰδιότητα – dissociates entirely from the κόσμος she inhabits. This is consistent with Bultmann’s appraisal of Paul’s ethics. As noted, Bultmann considers the believer’s existence ‘miraculous’: believers exists already ‘in an eschatological dimension’. Ethics are therefore publicly imperceptible – they are performances of the ‘obedience of faith’, seen only with the ‘eyes of faith’. The κόσμος, Bultmann observes, Paul usually identifies as ‘the implicit or explicit antithesis to the sphere of God or “the Lord”’. It is an ‘eschatological concept’ equivalent of ‘this age’, and is a power that overcomes humans. The “kosmos” comes to constitute an independent super-self over all individual selves...In modern terms, “the spirit of the world” is the atmosphere to whose compelling influence every man contributes but to which he is also always subject. Thus believers – though ‘in the world’ because they are still ‘in the flesh’ – are already beyond the κόσμος for they, having become already ‘new persons’, have ‘mastered it’ and will someday judge it.

Although believers persist in the κόσμος, they tellingly do not persist as ἰδιότητα, but as σάρξ:

A Christian’s existence is not magically transformed but even after he becomes a Christian his life continues to be an historical existence as long as

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47 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 125; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 198.
48 Bultmann, ‘Problem,’ 139; Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 215.
49 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.255.
50 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.256.
51 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.256-257.
52 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.257. Cf. 1 Cor 2.12; 3.21f.; 5.10; 6.2f.; 2 Cor 5.17; Gal 4.9.
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he is ‘in the flesh’. His existence is ever threatened by danger; and if he, too, must still suffer under the enmity of those ‘powers’, what is expressed in such statements is nothing else than the state of constant threat that menaces his existence.53

Even when Bultmann refers to the κόσμος as benign creation rather than as hostile sphere, he identifies believers as σάρξ, not σῶμα:

all that is ‘outward’ and ‘visible’, all that has its nature in external ‘appearance’ belongs to the sphere of ‘flesh’. In this sense, ‘flesh’ becomes synonymous with the term ‘world’ (κόσμος), insofar as cosmos denotes the world of created things which is the stage and the life-condition for ‘natural’ life, the world which is at man’s disposal, giving him the possibility to live from it and to be anxious about it.54

Consistent with his ethics, Bultmann removes the σῶμα – the believer as σῶμα – from the public sphere. The believer exists ‘eschatologically’. Even the eschatological judgment of the believer for ‘the things done through the body’ (2 Cor 5.10) refers ‘to what he has done not with his body, but with himself, what he has made of himself’.55 σῶμα is the believer in relationship with her or himself, coming under God’s dominion. Ethics, correspondingly, consists of the believer’s self-understanding that she or he depends entirely on God’s grace.

Few any longer swallow whole Bultmann’s existentialist reading of Paul, but many share much that underlies his thesis on σῶμα. Others, differently, have responded unfavourably. Following, I sketch briefly the positions of three competing ‘camps’ reacting to Bultmann’s thesis on σῶμα in Paul. I conclude by re-stating my study’s thesis and my procedure for working through it.

Reactions to Bultmann’s σῶμα: Favourable and Unfavourable

Favourable: The Persönlichkeit Hypothesis

Gundry contends that Bultmann derives his σῶμα thesis from his Doktorvater, Johannes Weiß.56 Weiß observes in 1 Corinthians 6.13-14 (and Romans 12.1) that σῶμα corresponds to the personal pronoun. He remarks: ‘das Wort σ.

genau an die Stelle tritt, wo in griech. Parallelen die ganze Persönlichkeit genannt

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53 Bultmann, Theology, 1.258.
54 Bultmann, Theology, 1.235.
55 Bultmann, Theology, 1.197.
56 Gundry, Sōma, 4. Gundry (n. 5) lists other works that predate Weiß with a similar understanding of σῶμα, to which I add Frédéric Louis Godet, Commentary on St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. Rev. A. Cusin, 2 vols., Clark’s Foreign Theological Library, New Series, Vol 27 (T&T Clark, 1886), I.307.
Rejecting idealistic readings that correspond σῶμα with Aristotelian categories of ‘Form und Stoff (ḥλη und μορφή oder εἶδος)’, Weiß concludes his comments on v. 13 by emphasizing the immateriality of Paul’s σῶμα: ‘Der Immaterialität des σῶμα entspricht es nun, daß Paulus ihn nicht im Tode zu Grunde gehend denkt, sondern seine Auferstehung behauptet’.

Following Weiß and Bultmann, important works on Paul’s anthropology developed the Persönlichkeit hypothesis. Thus Robinson remarks that ‘σῶμα…does not mean simply something external to a man himself, something he has. It is what he is. Indeed, σῶμα is the nearest equivalent our word “personality”. He distinguishes σάρξ from σῶμα as representing the whole person, differently regarded – as ‘man wholly perishable (σάρξ), man as wholly destined for God (σῶμα)’. Robinson’s main thesis is that ‘Hebrew’ anthropology is ultimately corporate rather than individual. ‘[T]he implication of “the body” for Hebrew, as opposed to Greek and later Western, thinking is one of solidarity, not individuation’. ‘There is therefore no ultimate distinction between the individual resurrection body and the one resurrection Body…to the Hebrew, individuality is not the least endangered by saying that, as σῶμα, man is “part of one stupendous whole”’. The key for Robinson is Acts 26.14, where Jesus asks Paul ‘Why are you persecuting me’ although Paul was persecuting Christians. Paul thus identified the body of believers as the body of Christ so that, in Mersch’s words: ‘it seems that he [Paul] can no longer look into the eyes of a Christian without meeting there the gaze of Christ’. Although on the one hand Robinson leaves room for σῶμα to refer to ‘“the body” as

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58 Weiß, Korintherbrief, 161.
59 John A.T. Robinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology, Studies in Biblical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1952), 28 (his italics). Robinson corrects Bultmann, however, noting that Bultmann ‘for all his Biblicism, gives Paul’s understanding of σῶμα as “the self as the object of its own conscious action” – the “me” rather than the “I”…Such a way of thinking is essentially un-Hebraic and indeed post-Cartesian’ (12-13, n. 1).
61 Robinson, The Body, 78.
62 Robinson, The Body, 80. One wonders whether Robinson’s ‘Hebrew’, gazing in a mirror, is capable of distinguishing her- or himself from parents, siblings, neighbours…
commonly understood…the external presence of the whole man’, 64 he ultimately abandons as ‘un-Hebraic’ any material denotation of σῶμα. 65 Thus the resurrection is not of the individual body, but the bound-together body corporate. 66

Stacey follows Robinson, but with greater sobriety. He stresses that ‘in true Hebrew fashion, there is a sense of corporateness behind every use of σῶμα in Paul’. 67 But he emphasizes the physical aspect of σῶμα’s reference to the whole person. ‘The body can be dedicated (Ro. 12.1) and the rest of the chapter shows that this means the whole man, physical, mental and emotional, not merely man in his physical strength’. 68 He remarks that resurrection is ‘the transformation of the person and the recreation of the body, for life on a spiritual plane’. 69

Best’s entire thesis rests on believers ‘forming a corporate personality with Christ’. 70 What precisely ‘corporate personality’ is Best cannot say: Adam and Christ are representatives each of ‘a conception of racial solidarity’ who are ‘solid’ with their respective races, 71 but such ‘inclusive’ or ‘corporate’ personality ‘cannot be reduced to logical terms’. 72 Best’s analysis leads him to conclude that Paul’s ‘conception of σῶμα is conditioned by Hebrew anthropology: the body is the man in his outward being’, 73 which meaning becomes clear in his interpretation of 1 Corinthians 6.16: ‘It is impossible to believe that for Paul fornicator and harlot make up “one physical body”; rather they form “one personality” or “one person”, and, since the means of union are physical, we have the outward emphasis which lies behind the word σῶμα’. 74 Dahl similarly initiates his thesis from the so-called Hebrew ‘corporate personality’, concluding: ‘Body in St. Paul means the whole

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64 Robinson, The Body, 27.
68 Stacey, Pauline View of Man, 186.
69 Stacey, Pauline View of Man, 189.
71 Best, One Body, 36.
72 Best, One Body, 111.
73 Best, One Body, 221.
74 Best, One Body, 75.
personality, and resurrection means the restoration – the final salvation – of that unified personality’. In Jewett’s estimation, ‘the utilization of the corporate-personality idea in the interpretation of the Pauline anthropological terms seems to produce far more smoke than light’.76

Unfavourable: σῶμα and ‘Communication’

Käsemann identifies σῶμα as the phenomenal person (‘Erscheinungsweise menschlichen Lebens’) and as the person in her or his ‘creatureliness’ (‘als die “Geschöpflichkeit” des Menschen’).77 He follows Bultmann, his Doktorvater, insofar as he corresponds σῶμα with personal pronouns to denote ‘eine “persönliche”’,78 and insofar as σῶμα makes possible the decision for or against God (‘die Entscheidung für oder wider Gott gestellt’).79 But he emphasizes, where Bultmann does not, the σῶμα as ‘connectedness’ with the ‘terrestrial sphere’ (‘die irdische Sphäre als solche’),80 and Paul’s ἐν formula that constructs the sphere of the believers’ connected existence in the σῶμα Χριστοῦ.81 For Käsemann, Paul develops the gnostic Άνθρωπος so that humans are materially in relation either to Adam, through σάρξ, or to Christ, through πνεῦμα.82

The notion that the embodied individual is connected – in ‘communication’ – with her or his world stabs directly at Bultmann’s existentialism. The body shows that ‘it is not permissible to interpret man as an individual resting within himself and

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77 Ernst Käsemann, *Leib und Leib Christi: Eine Untersuchung zur paulinischen Begrifflichkeit* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933), 118; 120.
79 Käsemann, *Leib*, 121.
81 On Käsemann’s σῶμα Χριστοῦ, see Jewett, *Paul’s*, 216-19.
82 ‘As the σάρξ, the earthly matter, stands in a cosmic context and forms a universal unity, while yet existing in many different manifestations and contained in many different vessels, so correspondingly does the πνεῦμα, the substance of the world of light in its sphere’. Ernst Käsemann, ‘The Pauline Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper,’ in *Essays on New Testament Themes* (SCM, 1964), 115.
fundamentally separable from the rest of the world’.83 Thus ‘corporeality is the
nature of man in his need to participate in creatureliness and in his capacity for
communication in the widest sense, that is to say, in his relationship to a world with
which he is confronted on each several occasion’;84 and: ‘man is always himself in
his particular world; his being is open towards all sides and is always set in a
structure of solidarity’.85 This resembles the emphases of Robinson, Best, and Dahl,
but goes further insofar as Käsemann insists upon the ‘decisive importance’ of
physical existence within solidarity. He remarks on Paul’s statement, ‘the body for
the Lord’, in 1 Corinthians 6.13:

If this is not viewed as reckless overstatement, it shows that the apostle
intends man to be understood entirely in the light of his corporeality and that
that is why he relates even Christology and soteriology to it. This
relationship is also the root of his eschatology of the physical resurrection,
which must not be set aside as being merely mythological unless the same is
done for the Christology and soteriology as well.86

Käsemann asserts that ‘Anthropology must then *eo ipso* be cosmology’,87 for
‘there is no such thing as a man without his particular and respective world’.88 Thus
‘Human existence is for him [Paul] no longer autonomous, it is determined by its
involvement in its universe; it is both the object and the arena of the strife between
heavenly and earthly powers. It is conditioned by the answer to the question: “To
which power do you belong? Which Lord do you serve?”’.89

Through his focus on Romans90 Tannehill develops Käsemann’s position,
retaining from Käsemann gnostic features such as Christ and Adam being inclusive
‘Aeon-men’. Tannehill reasons that because Christ is an aeon man, time does not
separate believers from his death and resurrection: Christ forms the entire epoch in
which believers exist. Moreover, that existence is physical. ‘σῶμα is not what
distinguishes one person from another, but that which relates him to others and

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85 Käsemann, ‘Anthropology,’ 22.
87 Käsemann, ‘Anthropology,’ 23.
88 Käsemann, ‘Anthropology,’ 27.
89 Käsemann, ‘Lord’s Supper,’ 117.
90 Thus distinguishable from my focus on 1 Corinthians.
which forms the basis of a self-determining participation in self-transcending realities. Thus σῶμα is clearly man in his physicalness’.\footnote{Tannehill, Dying, 70-71.}

The new world and salvation are already present, but they are hidden in the midst of the old world from which a believer cannot be isolated. The believer continues to suffer attacks of the old world, particularly through his body which has not yet been ‘transformed’. Tannehill notes that ‘The redemption of the body is tied up with the redemption of the physical creation, and this is still an object of hope and longing’.\footnote{Tannehill, Dying, 78.} The body continues to be a place where Sin and God wage war: both claim it and demand its obedience. Consequently, one is not saved apart from one’s body; rather, the fact that the body has not yet been redeemed means that one has not yet been fully redeemed. The Spirit’s presence is the guarantee of the resurrection of the body, and to put to death the ‘sins of the body’ is to participate in Christ’s death.

Käsemann’s position effects a wide influence. Thus Schweizer remarks, after considering σῶμα in Paul’s indicatives and imperatives: ‘The common rendering of Paul’s σῶμα by “person”, “personality” or even “individuality”\footnote{Noting C.H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), 90.} is thus justifiable to the degree that the word always denotes the whole man and not just a part’.\footnote{Eduard Schweizer, ‘σῶμα, κτλ.,’ in TDNT, 7.1065-66.} But he cautions that this ‘does not quite catch Paul’s own understanding’, noting that ‘σῶμα means man in his confrontation with God or sin or fellow-man’, that ‘σῶμα is the place where faith lives and where man surrenders to God’s lordship’, that it is ‘the sphere in which man serves’, that it is not an ‘inwardness’ that neglects ‘the other’.\footnote{Schweizer, ‘σῶμα, κτλ.,’ 7.1066.} Käsemann influences also the likes of Jewett,\footnote{Jewett maintains strong links with gnosticism; he discounts Käsemann’s explanation of σῶμα Χριστοῦ as based on the gnostic Aeon-Ἀνθρωπος. Pointedly, on the resurrected body: ‘The body does not bear continuity with itself, but will be given by God to each as the basis of communication and relationship. This unspoken assumption – that the body is the basis of relationship – seems to lie behind the entire discussion of the resurrection’. Jewett, Paul’s, 267; cf. 254-67.} Schrage,\footnote{Noted above: Schrage, Ethics, 218-19.} Dunn,\footnote{Dunn: ‘it is precisely “bodiness” (corporeality, corporeteness) which enables individuals as bodies to interact with one another, to cooperate with one another’. James D.G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Eerdmans, 1998), 56; cf. 55-61; 70-73. Cf. James D.G. Dunn, ‘Review of Robert H. Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology,’ SJT 31 (1978): 288-91.} and Thiselton.\footnote{Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGNT (Eerdmans/Paternoster, 2000), 464, and throughout.}
But not all are persuaded. Gundry complains that Käsemann does not go far enough from Bultmann; that he contradicts himself by denying a physical resurrection:

although admitting the strength of Paul’s teaching a physical resurrection, he subsumes that doctrine to a supposed deeper intention of Paul, viz., emphasis on the “communion” of the kingdom in opposition to isolation from nature, society, and history. Thus a mythology concerning the raising of physical bodies at a future last day translates into a present raising up of men as Christians communicative with the world around them.100

It is to Gundry’s (anti)thesis I now turn.

Unfavourable: σῶμα as the Body

In his 1976 monograph, Gundry makes a workmanlike effort to discredit entirely the Persönlichkeit hypothesis. By my reading, Gundry’s book produces a main thesis and two subordinate theses. The main thesis is negative: the Persönlichkeit hypothesis is not proved. The sub-theses are positive: σῶμα means always and everywhere the perceptible, physical body; and, Paul’s anthropology is a ‘duality’ – a unified composite of separable ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ parts. Gundry argues that σῶμα never denotes ‘the self’ – not only in Paul, but never in Greek literature generally, in the LXX, or in the rest of the New Testament.101 He then urges that the consistent view of the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Judaism of Paul’s time is ‘duality’,102 ‘a hybrid of “dual” and “unity”’ that insists the human is a whole being ‘made of two substances which belong together though they possess the capability of separation’.103 He concludes:

The Pauline expressions of this duality vary in terminology. We meet no single set formula, such as a neat and consistently used pairing of σῶμα and psychē. ‘Inner man’, ‘spirit’, ‘soul’, ‘mind’, ‘heart’ – all do duty for the incorporeal part of man and different functions thereof. ‘Outer man’, ‘flesh’, ‘body’, ‘members’, ‘mouth’, ‘face’, and several metaphors do similar duty for the corporeal part of man. Not only do terms from both categories stand side by side in pairs. That alone could indicate merely two viewpoints on an indivisible entity. But the terms frequently contrast, and sharply, even to the degree of their separation though separation is not desired and the corporeal

100 Gundry, Sōma, 198. Although he is favourable of it, Jewett notes the related insight – ‘one of the basic motifs in E. Käsemann’s interpretation of Paul’ – that σῶμα does not bear continuity with itself; only God is the actor and guarantor of continuity. Jewett, Paul’s, 267, n. 3.
101 Gundry, Sōma, 1-80.
102 Gundry, Sōma, 87-134. For a similar position, see John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Eerdmans, 1989).
103 Gundry, Sōma, 83-84.
is not denigrated. For the whole man in the unity of his parts, *anthrōpos* is ready to hand. Context will determine whether personal pronouns refer to the entire person or only to a representative part of him. *Sōma*, however, remains faithful to its solely physical meaning.\(^\text{104}\)

Ostensibly, Gundry achieves his main (anti)thesis. His study shows both that *sōma* means (at least) the physical body, and that it is unlikely that *sōma* represents the immaterial Persönlichkeit. But as Harrington remarks: ‘his thesis is not as startling as he makes it out to be’.\(^\text{105}\) For, as Ziesler observes: ‘To some extent Gundry is pushing at an open door, as relatively little recent work takes *sōma* to mean “person” without qualification’.\(^\text{106}\) Thus although Gundry shows that the Persönlichkeit hypothesis is an unlikely one, it is perhaps not a position held as widely as he suggests. Nevertheless, Gundry is warranted to call into account those hypotheses that in principle maintain the material aspect of *sōma* but that in practice abstract *sōma* from any material referent, slipping into ubiquitous references to ‘the *sōma* concept’, ‘solidarity’, or ‘communication’.

Gundry has less success demonstrating his sub-theses. As Dunn observes, ‘by posing the issue as a sharp either-or between *sōma* = “the whole person” and *sōma* = “the physical body alone”, he drives the discussion into extreme alternatives which do little justice to the broader usage of his texts or the more carefully nuanced analyses of those with whom he disagrees’.\(^\text{107}\) It is one thing to claim that *sōma* refers to the physical body – a claim to which even Bultmann concedes. But it does not follow that *sōma* as the physical body necessarily excludes a somehow monistic perception of the person. Gundry’s (brief) surveys of *sōma* in ‘extra-biblical literature’ (ch. 2) and of duality in ‘classical Greek thought’ (ch. 8) inadequately consider the nuanced, monistic positions of Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, or the Homeric and epic tradition.\(^\text{108}\) His appeal to ‘the normative view within late Judaism’ (ch. 9) seriously misrepresents Judaism’s diverse portrayals of the afterlife in the Second Temple period.\(^\text{109}\)

\(^{104}\) Gundry, *Sōma*, 156.


\(^{106}\) J.A. Ziesler, ‘*ΣΩΜΑ* in the Septuagint,’ *NovT* 25 (1983): 133, n. 3.

\(^{107}\) Dunn, ‘Review of Gundry,’ 290.

\(^{108}\) Cf. my Introduction, p. 9, n. 25. Consider Cicero’s assessment of views competing at his time: some envisioned death effecting the soul’s separation from the body; others, that death effects the cessation of body and soul, with no separability implied. *Tusc.* 1.11.23-24.

\(^{109}\) See further my Introduction, pp. 5-6, n. 17; Chapter Three, pp. 78-80 and nn.
Furthermore, Gundry does not attend sufficiently to Paul’s language of interiority to demonstrate ‘duality’ in Paul. Simply noting that Paul has interiority language does not prove he posits an anthropological ‘duality’, and interpreters by no means all equate – as Gundry effectively does – Paul’s uses of ‘inner man’, ‘spirit’, ‘soul’, ‘mind’, and ‘heart’. Indeed, Paul’s language of interiority is significant in its underdevelopment; as Gundry himself admits, ‘We meet no single set formula’. Although Gundry does not give us the option, it is conceivable that Paul refers to interiority language without any dualistic intonations and that σῶμα stands for the physical, human body. Dale Martin develops this idea.

Martin begins his study by reading σῶμα first as the human, physical body. But differently from the views mentioned above, which all somehow attach Paul’s uses of σῶμα to the Hebrew Bible’s (holistic) depiction of בשר, Martin discounts entirely that a distinctively ‘Jewish’ view of the body persists in the Graeco-Roman period. He remarks: ‘on my reckoning, the Judaism of this period, certainly in its manifestations in Greek and Roman cities, but also in Palestine, is a Greco-Roman religion, having been indelibly affected by the dominant culture of Hellenism and to a lesser extent of Rome’. He takes Judaism to be ‘an ethnic subculture within the hegemonic culture of the Hellenistic Mediterranean’, arguing: ‘Any firm distinction between “Greco-Roman” and “Jewish” in this period is therefore historically misleading, even if, for some people, it is theologically important’.

Martin’s eschewal of much that is distinctively ‘Jewish’ licenses him to read σῶμα in 1 Corinthians against a fresh background: Greek medical texts. These texts, Martin reasons, disclose two competing, ideological constructions of the body. Because the physical body serves in the ancient world as a microcosm of the social body, the different ideologies reveal a competition in 1 Corinthians between those of

111 Aune likewise falls into this trap, collapsing Paul’s language of interiority into a so-called ‘irrational behavior model’ of Hellenistic psychology (this despite the remarkable lack of verbal coincidence between Paul’s interiority language and the philosophers’). David E. Aune, ‘Two Pauline Models of the Person,’ in The Whole and Divided Self, ed. David E. Aune and John McCarthy (Crossroads Publishing Co., 1997), esp. 97-100.
113 Martin, Corinthian, xiii-xiv.
114 Martin, Corinthian, xiv.
higher and lower social status, and their different ways of perceiving the (social) body. Thus,

Whereas Paul and (probably) the majority of the Corinthian Christians saw the body as a dangerously permeable entity threatened by polluting agents, a minority in the Corinthian church (which, following several other scholars, I call “the Strong”) stressed the hierarchical arrangement of the body and the proper balance of its constituents, without evincing much concern over body boundaries or pollution.\footnote{Martin, Corinthian, xv.}

Martin continues: ‘these positions correlate with socioeconomic status, the Strong being the higher-status group, who enjoy a relatively secure economic position and high level of education, and Paul, like many members of the Corinthian church, being among the less educated, less well-off inhabitants of the Roman Empire’.\footnote{Martin, Corinthian, xv. Although Martin writes in terms of ‘ideology’, he is cautious to distance himself from traditional forms of Marxism: ‘Unlike some older Marxist users of the term, I do not equate ideology with “false consciousness,” as against something called “truth”’ (xiv).} (He adds that Paul nevertheless likely came from a secure economic and educated background.)

One of Martin’s most useful contributions is that he corrects the misconception that the ancient world – the world, in fact, before Descartes – conceived of a material/immaterial dualism.\footnote{Martin, Corinthian, ch. 1.} Martin reminds interpreters of what most classicists know and what the older Religionsgeschichtliche Schule took for granted: in the ancient world, ψυχή and πνεῦμα are ‘stuff’ (ὕλη) that occupies space, even within the body.\footnote{Thus Gundry is wrong to dismiss Davies’s observation that ‘spiritual’ would have material nuances for both Paul and the rabbis. Gundry, Sōma, 165, n. 4. Noting W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology, 4th ed. (Mifflintown: Sigler Press, 1998), 303-08.} Thus even Platonic dualism does not posit an immaterial ψυχή. But Platonic dualism, Martin argues, was not prevalent in the first century. Moreover, ‘When we analyze the Platonism – or perhaps we should say the Platonisms – that were around, we encounter self-styled Platonists whose ideas of body and soul look to us remarkably like the monisms of Aristotle and the Stoics’.\footnote{Martin, Corinthian, 12.} Martin shows that Paul is likewise an anthropological monist. Although like Gundry Martin reads σῶμα as the physical human body, he identifies it with its non-separable – but material – ‘essences’ of ψυχή and πνεῦμα. Paul’s argument for the
resurrection, Martin argues, is for a rearrangement – never a separation – of those essences.

Martin achieves a fresh reading of σῶμα in Paul, though not without problems. Given their centrality to his thesis, Martin does not demonstrate sufficiently that the obscure, highly specialized medical texts are a reliable guide to broader Graeco-Roman ideologies of the body. Nor does he demonstrate sufficiently that the ‘logics of the body’ therein correspond to two, sharply divided status-groups. Furthermore, Martin dismisses in two sentences hundreds of monographs, articles, and conference papers that explore the nature of Jewish identity in the Graeco-Roman period. Although by now most students of first-century Judaism are content with Hengel’s dictum that all Judaism of the Hellenistic period is in some sense a Hellenized Judaism, this is not grounds then to read any expression of Hellenism into every expression of Judaism. First-century Judaism was Hellenized, but Hellenism shaped different Jewish groups differently. It is not the case that because first-century Judaism was Hellenized, Paul and his Corinthians – converts to Judaism’s God – therefore a priori conformed to one or the other of Martin’s proposed ideologies.

**Conclusion and Procedure**

My purpose this chapter has been to situate my study among like studies on Paul. Although few studies share my explicit focus on the convergence of Paul’s anthropology, eschatology, and ethics Bultmann, like my study, approaches Paul’s eschatology and ethics through Paul’s anthropology; specifically, through Paul’s understanding of σῶμα. I consequently reviewed Bultmann’s connections between σῶμα, eschatology, and ethics in Paul, and then turned my attention to alternate appraisals of σῶμα in Paul.

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120 Meggitt (248-49) gives a damning critique, noting: ‘Martin’s interpretive project was flawed from the outset by his failure to take into account the inconsistencies present within popular cultures and the multiple, incompatible constructions of the body individuals and groups within Corinth could reasonably be expected to possess’. Justin J. Meggitt, ‘Sources: Use, Abuse, Neglect. The Importance of Ancient Popular Culture,’ in *Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church*, ed. Edward Adams and David G. Horrell (Westminster/John Knox, 2004), 249.

Different from the studies reviewed above, I do not aim to produce a constructive theory of the Pauline σῶμα. I do not begin my study positing any metatheory of σῶμα in Paul, whether by comparison with anthropologies Jewish, Greek, or gnostic, or by fitting Paul’s talk of the human body into a broader thesis of σῶμα in Paul. I limit my study to the human σῶμα in Paul. My interest is the believer’s lived experience, as Paul presents it, and I aim initially only to demonstrate that Paul’s anthropology is somehow holistic.

I argue the premiss that, in 1 Corinthians, believers are bodies. As I noted in the Introduction, I establish my premiss by considering Paul’s portrayal of the body at death. I there noted also that my starting point with σῶμα is, in Bultmann’s words, ‘the naive popular usage in which soma means body’—a safe place to begin for, whatever more they take σῶμα to mean, the above interpreters all concede it at least means that. In what immediately follows, I perform a close reading of 1 Corinthians 15: Paul’s argument concerning the resurrection of the dead. I focus on how Paul portrays the fate of the body, establishing my premiss that believers are bodies that constitute part of the κόσμος.

122 Bultmann, Theology, 1.193.
Part One
The Body Not Yet

O, Dust. Learn to obey.

Thomas à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ* 3.13.2
Chapter Two

The Body Not Yet: The Argument for the Resurrection of the Dead, Part One – Establishing the Premiss (1 Corinthians 15.1-34)

In 1 Corinthians 15 Paul focuses on the resurrection of the dead. My focus is the fate of the body, and it is well to note early our two focuses are not the same. The difference is not simply that I stress more than Paul does his few remarks about the body. Nor is it that either of us suggests the resurrection does not affect the body: it does, and ‘the resurrection of the dead’ is as well ‘the resurrection of the body’. The difference is that whereas the fate of the body is central to my arguments, it is ancillary to Paul’s. For the fate of the body, I contend, against many interpretations of 1 Corinthians 15, is only incidental in Paul’s focused argument on the dead and death and his presenting Death as a present, inimical power. Paul pursues a single premiss throughout 1 Corinthians 15: ‘There is a resurrection of the dead’. And recognizing that the body’s fate is subordinate to Paul’s premiss shapes how I read the body in his argument and shapes the arguments I make from reading it. I take up de Boer’s thesis on Death in Paul,1 modify it occasionally, and extend it to argue that everything Paul says about the resurrection of the body and the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ depends upon and is limited by Paul’s mythology of Death. I assert in particular that:

1. Paul presents persons-as-bodies according to their association either with Christ or, by default, with Adam and Death;
2. Paul presents believers as bodies ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’ – as distinguishable already as ‘Christ’s own’, but not yet rescued from Adam and Death;
3. Paul refers to σῶμα specifically as an expedient to defend his premiss that there is a resurrection of the dead;
4. Paul does not describe the eschatological body in terms denoting material composition;
5. Paul describes the eschatological body in terms of the body’s liberation from Death, the negation of Death’s effects;

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1 Martinus C. de Boer, The Defeat of Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5, JSNTSup 22 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988).
Chapter Two

6. Paul does not present the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ as a change/exchange of bodies, the body somehow abstracted from the believer;

7. Paul presents the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ as a change/exchange of the believer’s associations: a change/exchange from association with the κόσμος – with Adam and Death – to association with the Kingdom – with God and Christ and Spirit. The body is only incidentally in view;

8. Paul presents the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ as the consequence of the Kingdom’s having already come, not as the condition to enter the coming Kingdom.

I finesse also the distinction that it is not Christ’s resurrection that effects the believer’s resurrection, but Christ’s return; the success of Christ’s reign and of Death’s defeat. In addition to these assertions I claim that Paul shows no signs of material anthropological dualism in 1 Corinthians 15. I conclude both that 1) believers are bodies (i.e., they are somehow non-partitive, never meaningfully independent ‘souls’ or ‘spirits’), and that 2) as bodies they constitute necessarily still a part of the κόσμος ruled now by Death.

Introduction and Procedure

Most interpreters agree 1 Corinthians 15 is a single unit comprising neatly two sections: vv. 1-34 and vv. 35-57, with v. 58 the conclusion to the chapter if not to the whole of 1 Corinthians.2 Interpreters agree also that each section divides again into three parts that show the stages of Paul’s argument. Thus Paul’s argument in section one consists of vv. 12-19, 20-28, and 29-34, and in section two vv. 35-41, 42-(49 or 50), and (50 or 51)-57. Verses 1-11 serve as the chapter’s introduction; v. 50, as the parentheses suggest, remains unsettled.

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The majority position is now that 1 Corinthians is a single letter rather than a composition of separate letters edited together.\textsuperscript{3} This conclusion extends from general dissatisfaction over partition theorists’ inability to agree on a scheme detailing the letter’s compositional parts (if the letter is so obviously partioned, its breaks in unity should be equally obvious; otherwise its disunity is an unproved a priori), the consistency of themes and theological preaching throughout the letter,\textsuperscript{4} the epistle’s rhetorical structure that maps a unified argument,\textsuperscript{5} and from the earliest mss, which all preserve the letter intact.\textsuperscript{6}

1 Corinthians 15 is about the resurrection of the dead. Paul repeats this tautology twelve times\textsuperscript{7} using a range of common terms to discuss both resurrection (ἀνάστασις, ἐγέρω) and death (ἀποθάνῃσκο, θάνατος, κομφό, νεκρός). Not for lexical reasons but for semantic ones I add σπείρω to Paul’s vocabulary for death: he so designates it in 15.36 and he retains that nuance when he repeats the verb four times opposite ἐγέρω in vv. 42-44.\textsuperscript{8} Likewise, in 15.22 ἀναποθοικό connotes


\textsuperscript{4} This second point relates to the first. As Fee puts it: ‘When one can make perfectly good sense of the document as it comes to us, such [partition] theories are unnecessary as they are unprovable’. Gordon D. Fee, \textit{The First Epistle to the Corinthians}, \textit{NICNT} (Eerdmans, 1987), 16. For the letter’s theological integrity, see famously Karl Barth, \textit{The Resurrection of the Dead}, trans. H.J. Stenning (Hodder and Stoughton, 1933).

\textsuperscript{5} Most influentially, Mitchell, \textit{Rhetoric}.

\textsuperscript{6} Collins, \textit{First Corinthians}, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{7} 15.12(2x), 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 29, 32, 35, 42, 52. Paul habitually appends ‘of the dead’ (ἐκ νεκρῶν) to ‘resurrection’ – usually to a form of ἐγείρω: Rom 1.4 (ἀνάστασις); 4.24, 6.4, 9; 7.4, 8.11(2x); 34 (in some less likely mss); 10.9; 2 Cor 1.9; 5.15 (ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγερθέντι); Gal 1.1; Phil 3.11 (ἐχανάστασιν); 1 Thess 1.10. I call it a ‘tautology’ because resurrection necessarily implies death – something to mind when reading Paul’s arguments in vv. 35ff. Hoffmann notes the tautology is distinctly a formula of the NT that refers mostly to Christ’s resurrection. The formula appears in all NT writings except James, 2 Peter, Jude, and Revelation; it does not occur in relevant literatures before or contemporary with the NT. Paul Hoffmann, \textit{Die Toten in Christus: Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung zur paulinischen Eschatologie} (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1969), 180-81.

\textsuperscript{8} Verse 37 sets the second person active (σπείρεις) against γενωόμενον, rather than the third person passive (σπείρεται) against ἐγείρεται.
resurrection (maybe more besides), again in v. 45 and, metaphorically, in v. 36.\(^9\)

‘Resurrection’ appears always in direct syntactical relation either to Christ or to the dead. Paul refers always to θάνατος, always to κοιμάω, three times to ἀποθνήσκω (15.22, 31, 32), and once to νεκρός (15.29) without direct attachment to Christ or resurrection – although resurrection is usually in the background. Paul designates ‘the dead’ with the (usually articular)\(^10\) plural of νεκρός and twice with the substantival participle of κοιμάω (15.18, 20).\(^11\)

Paul’s argument is about the resurrection of the dead. Recently, interpreters have analyzed his argument according to the structures of classical rhetoric.\(^12\) The analyses are not always consistent, and even when interpreters agree about classification they often differ over which aspects of the rhetorical categories apply.\(^13\)

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\(^9\) Verses 22 and 36 contrast ζωοποιέω with ἀποθνήσκω; v. 45 contrasts πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν with ψυχὴν ζῶσαν – a citation from Gen 2.7.

\(^10\) Jeremias observes that the article with νεκρός refers specifically to real, dead believers (vv. 29a, 35, 42, 52) and the lack of an article indicates the dead generically (vv. 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 29b, 32).

\(^11\) And cf. the verbal ‘κοιμηθῆκα’ in v. 51.


\(^13\) Things become even less consistent when interpreters classify further into rhetorical categories each sub-unit of Paul’s argument. It is a good reminder that rhetorical analysis demands the informed, but subjective, judgments of interpreters. This spoils any hopes in rhetoric as a first-order approach to history: rhetorical analysis presupposes we understand the text in order to classify the text in order to understand the text. Still, rhetorical analysis can be useful for getting at Paul’s argument so long as we do not let the ancient handbooks take over and dictate, a priori, what Paul can or cannot be saying.
But rhetorical analysts agree generally that 1 Corinthians 15 takes the form of deliberative rhetoric,\(^{14}\) and we can organize the argument as follows:

15.1-11: \(\text{exordium/narratio}\)\(^{15}\)

15.12-19: \(\text{argumentatio: propositio}^{16}/\text{refutatio}^{17}/\text{probatio}^{18}\)

15.20-28: \(\text{argumentatio: probatio or confirmatio}\)\(^{19}\)

15.29-34: \(\text{refutatio}^{20}/\text{probatio}^{21}/\text{peroratio or conclusio}\)\(^{22}\)

15.35-(49/50) \(\text{refutatio}^{23}/\text{subiectio}\)\(^{24}\)


\(^{18}\) Saw, *Rhetoric*, 232-34. Saw classifies v. 12 the *partitio* and vv. 13-19 the *probatio*.

\(^{19}\) The *probatio* and *confirmatio* are the same category. Eriksson, *Traditions*, 261-64; Saw, *Rhetoric*, 234-35; Schrage, *Korinther*, 4.154; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 240-42; Witherington III, *Conflict*, 292. Witherington takes all of vv. 21-50 as the *probatio*.

\(^{20}\) See Schrage below in note on ‘peroratio or conclusio’.


\(^{22}\) Schrage notes the difficulty of determining the rhetoric of this section. It could be a *refutatio* since it points back, essentially and formally, to vv. 12-19. But because it concludes the first part of the *argumentatio* and repeats rhetorical questions, it may be better to characterize it *peroratio* or *conclusio*. Watson takes it as the *peroratio*; Eriksson notes that this concludes the first *refutatio* of 15.12-34. Eriksson, *Traditions*, 264-66; Schrage, *Korinther*, 4.233; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 242-44.


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15.(50/51)-57 peroratio\(^{25}\)/confirmatio\(^{26}\)
15.58 peroratio\(^{27}\)/exhortatio\(^{28}\)

Of course, rhetorical categories are not the only way to organize Paul’s argument\(^{29}\) and, as noted, most commentators already grouped 1 Corinthians 15 into the same basic units before rhetorical analysis caught on. I include the analysis not because I suppose Paul to be an expert rhetor, but because observations from analysts can help identify the logical flow of Paul’s argument. Thiselton observes that one advantage to recognizing rhetoric in Paul’s argument is that it reminds us Paul addresses not just the intellect (as in pure argument), but ‘the emotions, human desire, and future policies of action’.\(^{30}\) I use rhetorical observations pragmatically, careful always rhetoric does not take over and run the show.\(^{31}\)

Most interpreters prepare to analyze Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15 by identifying with whom Paul argues. I do not. The consensus, it seems, is that we cannot begin to understand Paul’s argument until we discover first whether he counters gnostic convictions\(^{32}\) – even incipient ones\(^{33}\) – or ‘Greek’ dualistic

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\(^{26}\) Eriksson, Traditions, 272-75; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 247.

\(^{27}\) Eriksson, Traditions, 275; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 247-48; Mitchell, Rhetoric, 290; Schrage, Korinther, 4.362.


\(^{29}\) Wright (312) counts words and structures the chapter according to balanced pairs. He identifies 15.20-28 and 42-49 as the balanced keys to Paul’s argument, but he does not really account for vv. 29-31 which, according to his structure, should be the argument’s centre instead of ‘an interlude, a brief respite from dense and involved argumentation’. N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3, Christian Origins and the Question of God (SPCK, 2003), 338.

\(^{30}\) Thiselton, First Epistle, 41. He notes especially Mitchell’s discussion of deliberative rhetoric: Mitchell, Rhetoric, 20-64. Thiselton practises a complex use of italicization that (I suppose) makes sense in his commentary but little sense outwith it. Except for his conventional uses of italics, I de-italicize citations from his commentary without further remark.

\(^{31}\) It is inconsequential to my analysis of Paul’s argument whether Paul purposefully used rhetorical categories or whether he picked up rhetorical habits ‘in the air’. Anderson cautions wisely that the purpose of the handbooks was to help rhetors write speeches, not analyze them. R. Dean Anderson, Jr., Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul, CBET 18 (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996), 41. Insofar as rhetorical analysis discloses the possible flow of Paul’s argument, it services my end. But I am not bound by it, and it does not determine all Paul can say.

\(^{32}\) Jewett, Paul’s, 254-87; Werner Georg Käubel, Introduction to the New Testament, trans. Howard Clark Kee, Rev. ed. (Abingdon, 1975), 274-75; Wilhelm Lütgert, Freiheitspredigt und Schwarmgeister in Korinth, BFTh 12/3 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1908); Adolf Schlatter, Die korinthische Theologie, BFTh 18/2 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1914); Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in
anthropology\textsuperscript{34} or a hellenistic-Jewish traditional reading of Genesis\textsuperscript{35} or the Corinthians’ own over-realized eschatology\textsuperscript{36} or enthusiastic Corinthian women


prophets\textsuperscript{37} or a clash between high- and low-status ideological hierarchies of the body\textsuperscript{38} or some combination of these.\textsuperscript{39} The goal is to identify who stands behind vv. 12 and 35: the ‘some’ (τίνες) who say there is not a resurrection of the dead (v. 12) and the ‘someone’ (τίς) who asks how the dead are raised and with what sort of body they come (v. 35). The theories attempt to explain whether some Corinthians disbelieved the afterlife for physical bodies, or disbelieved the afterlife entirely, or believed they were resurrected spiritually already. And the theories attempt to discern whether Paul addresses one group with these troubles or different groups with conflicting ideas.\textsuperscript{40} What all the theories share in common, as Asher argues


\textsuperscript{37} Antoinette Clark Wire, \textit{The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric} (Fortress, 1995).


\textsuperscript{39} Most of the theories overlap. Thus, Fee holds simultaneously theories about dualistic anthropology and over-realized eschatology; Wire’s enthusiastic women prophets practise over-realized eschatology, and Schrage and Käsemann endorse both an over-realized eschatology and a gnostic hypothesis. de Boer defends a gnostic hypothesis but with significant attention to Philo’s hellenistic-Jewish reading of Genesis. And so forth.

ably, is the presupposition that any understanding of 1 Corinthians 15 requires we understand first the views of Paul’s ‘opponents’.41

Asher charges that this presupposition demonstrates a methodological fallacy. Citing R.G. Collingwood he insists that historical research follow a logical sequence of questions, and questions about source (in this case, Paul’s ‘opponents’) must not precede questions of function (e.g., Paul’s form of argument; rhetoric and style), cause (e.g., why Paul employs said form of argument), or time (e.g., when Paul developed the ideas he argues).42 Furthermore, Asher points to the ambiguity in Paul’s language (does Paul address the whole assembly? one group? different groups?), the scarcity of actual phrases attributable to the ‘opponents’ (and does one then simply reverse Paul’s ‘replies’ and know his interlocutors?),43 and to the fact that nobody has yet demonstrated Paul’s rhetoric in 1 Corinthians 15 is even polemical or antagonistic. Asher argues the chapter’s deliberative context accommodates Paul’s use of a didactic style.44

Other interpreters doubt our ability to reconstruct the ‘opponents’’ theology, and that theology is necessarily even at issue. The web of politics, status, race, gender, economics, religion, and philosophical differences all shape Paul’s ‘opponents’ more complexly than we can probably discern mirror-reading a handful of his theological statements. After all, ‘It is Paul who frames the issues in theological terms; indeed, this is an important part of his pastoral strategy’.45 I add to these obstructions shielding Paul’s ‘opponents’ that it is logically impracticable to restrict our reading of Paul by his ‘opponents’. Our only access to Paul’s ‘opponents’ is Paul. This means we are not, contrary to common opinion, presented a problem of the chicken-and-the-egg: that would suggest we have access equally to Paul’s arguments and to his ‘opponents’ and have no means of discerning with which we

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What we are presented is a problem of the horse-and-the-cart and, from the perspective of the interpreter whose only material is Paul, insisting that we first understand Paul’s ‘opponents’ before we can understand Paul insists that we set the cart before the horse. With all opponents-theories, at some point in the process, logically, we have somehow to understand Paul before understanding his ‘opponents’ – even if only to return and reappraise Paul afresh.

I put the matter simply. I do not, in fact, purpose to invalidate theses that describe Paul’s interlocutors or whatever particular political, social, ideological, or theological situations his letters reveal. These are valid ways of reading Paul, appropriate to their own ends, and illuminate aspects of Paul’s letters that otherwise remain hidden. My purpose is simply to lift the mark of prescription interpreters stamp on such readings, and to point out it is possible, legitimate, even, at some point, logically necessary to read Paul’s argument without heed of his particular Sitz im Leben. Thus I construct my arguments on my reading of Paul’s arguments, not on my reading of Paul’s occasion for writing them, nor even specially on ‘Paul’. I propose neither the last word nor the first. There is no ground floor entrance to the hermeneutical spiral; simply, I mark where I get in, describe – and defend – how I see Paul’s argument unfold, and await my next whorl.

46 Dunn’s essay is generally congenial with what I say here. He stumbles, though, when he declares this ‘a chicken-and-egg problem’ (295) so still concludes, but with important qualifications: ‘an ancient text like 1 Corinthians cannot be properly understood unless it is read against the background of its historical context and as part of a dialogue with the Corinthian church itself’. Dunn, ‘Reconstructions,’ 308-09. But what are the a priori criteria for ‘proper understanding’? It is the reader’s τέλος in reading that establishes criteria for what is ‘proper’, and that τέλος may require nothing whatever of historical Corinth. For a teleological reading strategy similar to mine, see Jeffrey Stout, ‘What Is the Meaning of a Text?’, New Literary History 14 (1982): 1-12.

47 This is the logical fallacy, ‘affirming the consequent’.

48 On this point I suspect Asher and I may disagree. With Asher, I privilege here Paul’s argumentative structure over opponents-theories, but I do not share Asher’s prescription that historians always follow his definite, sequential, interpretive steps. It is what the reader wants from the text that determines methodology. A social analysis like Martin’s Corinthian Body legitimately begins with ‘source’ questions because Martin begins with premisses on the social construction of language. Each reader sounds Paul’s texts with understandings of Jewish history, of ancient rhetoric, of Christian theology or contemporary pastoral concern; in Martin’s case, of Greek medical texts and Marxist ideology. Each sounding produces distinct resonances. Where there is danger and, I think, where Martin fails is failing to recognize the limits of one’s own reading by attempting to explain everything, or too much, by it. (Martin, for example, sweeps aside casually distinctions between Jew and non-Jew. Religion, race and the cultures embodying each have little space in his explanation of ‘the’ Corinthian problem.) Rhetorical analysis, like opponents-theories, also presupposes that we understand Paul’s argument in order to classify it. Thus Asher’s appeal to rhetoric as a first-order access to history strikes me naïve and idealistic and, I submit, his study proves the point. Many of his decisions for classifying Paul’s rhetoric beg his question about ‘source’ long before he introduces his ‘ancestral’ theory. For example, he without defence classifies 15.12-34 as representing the (real) ‘opponents’ agenda and, despite admitting that the terms do not correspond verbally, he reads Paul’s terms in 15.42-44a as...
Exegesis

Paul begins 1 Corinthians 15 abruptly, disconnected grammatically from the previous chapter. He opens by declaring his intentions: ‘γνωρίζω to you the gospel’. The verb means usually ‘to make known’ but, because the Corinthians must know already the gospel Paul preached them, commentators and translators often translate it ‘remind’. If, however, we accept Asher’s suggestion that Paul uses didactic style throughout 1 Corinthians 15, γνωρίζω makes good sense with its usual meaning and applies not only to this section but to the entire chapter. For what the Corinthians know, or think they know, is now inconsequential: Paul is about to (re)teach them what constitutes the gospel. And what constitutes the gospel is the resurrection of Christ and, by extension, the resurrection of the dead.

Introducing the Posited Premiss (15.1-11)

The first section of Paul’s argument introduces a premiss common to Paul and to the Corinthians. Rhetorical analysts divide this section into an exordium (vv.

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49 Mitchell, who nevertheless agrees 1 Cor 15 is its own rhetorical unit, remarks: ‘Against those who complain that this opening is too abrupt to follow 14:40, we note that the very purpose of this introductory formula is to change topics, so there is nothing strange about the transition it effects here’. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 284. Barth argues the whole epistle is a prelude to this resurrection chapter. Barth, Resurrection, 5. Cf. Victor P. Furnish, The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians, ed. James D.G. Dunn, New Testament Theology (CUP, 1999), 107. Fee suggests Paul ‘repeats two themes from the immediately preceding argument (14:33-38): (a) that this is the common ground of all who believe in and preach Christ, and (b) that his own apostolic ministry is the source of their life in Christ’.

50 LB, NIV, RSV, NRSV. Barth remarks: ‘verses 1-2 are the strong expression of Paul’s opinion that in what followed he was saying to them nothing that was in any way new or special, no esoteric secret doctrine, no special Paulinism, but simply reminding them of the basis of their Christianity, not to summon them elsewhere, but to call them back to themselves’. Barth, Resurrection, 112 (his italics). Senft opines, ‘Le verbe surprend’ and suggests Paul returns to elementary teaching; Allo remarks there is ‘une certaine exaggeration ironique’. P. E.-B Allo, Saint Paul Première Épître aux Corinthiens, 2nd ed., EBib (Paris: J.Gabalda, 1956), 388; Christophe Senft, La Première Épitre de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens, 2nd corrigée et augmentée ed., Commentaire du Nouveau Testament: deuxième série 7 (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1990), 187. Thiselton points to Wolff’s adamant rejection of any equivalence to ἀναμνῄσκειν, but Thiselton himself expresses it: ‘I want to restore to your full knowledge’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 1183; Christian Wolff, Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther, THKNT (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1982), 354.

51 ‘Make known’: ASV, NASB; ‘I declare’: KJV/NKJV. Asher argues γνωρίζω serves not only to remind the Corinthians what he has already taught, but is the ‘starting point’ for advancing the remainder of his instruction. He indicates Weiß’s claim that 15.1-3 shows this chapter is a διδαχή. Asher, Polarity, 53; Weiß, Korintherbrief, 343. Robertson and Plummer remark that Paul ‘has to begin again and teach them an elementary fact, which they had already accepted’. Robertson and Plummer, I Corinthians, 331.
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1-3a) and a *narratio* (vv. 3b-11), but Paul fashions the whole as an *inclusio*, establishing grounds by which he can claim that the Corinthians share with him a fundamental premiss:

v. 1: I preached (ἐὐθηγελιζάμην) and you received (παρελάβετε);

v. 11: we preached (κηρύσσομεν) and you believed (ἐπιστεύσατε).

The sum of what was preached, it turns out, is ‘Christ has been raised’. That premiss constitutes the substance of the *narratio*, and the *exordium* is the circuitous route Paul takes to get there.52 In the *exordium*, Paul transforms the gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) he preached and the Corinthians received (v. 1), to the ‘word’ (λόγῳ)53 he preached from which the Corinthians are in danger of losing grip (εἰ κατέχετε) – of having believed in vain (εἰκῇ; v. 2) – and finally to the tradition of the *narratio* he received (παρέλαβον) and delivered (παρέδωκα) to the Corinthians (v. 3). That Paul transforms his gospel (v. 1) to the received tradition (vv. 3ff.) may suggest he did not preach exactly this tradition to the Corinthians or, like his limited involvement in their baptisms (1.14-17), he did not preach it to all of them. That could explain his shift in emphasis from ‘I’ (v. 1) to ‘we’ (v. 11). At all events, Paul claims that the substance of this tradition was transmitted to the Corinthians, and they accepted it.54

The tradition itself is of a piece. Schrage notes that its use of the active and passive senses constructs a chiasm:55 he died (A) was buried (B) has been raised (B1) appeared (A1). Death (A) and resurrection (B1) are the elements of the

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52 The *exordium* sets forth the rhetor’s intention and topics. Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 235. Here we see: 1) Paul’s intent to instruct (γνωρίζω); 2) the continuity of ‘the gospel’ preached and the tradition (=Christ’s death and resurrection); and 3) the ‘vanity’ (v. 2) of disbelieving this preached gospel.

53 Collins notes λόγος is a ‘synonym for “gospel” (cf. 1:18)’; he accentuates that it is a word of God, from God, about God. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 533. See the brief discussion in Eriksson, *Traditions*, 252, n. 80.


56 This is Paul’s first of seven uses in the chapter of the perfect passive for ἐγήγερται (also vv. 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20). de Boer observes: ‘In other texts, Paul always employs the aorist, as he does in v. 15’. de Boer, *Defeat*, 218, n. 54. The only other instances of ἐγήγερται are Mark 16.14 and 2 Tim 2.8. The passive implies divine agency.

57 Surveying uses of ὤφθη (aorist passive of ὁράω), Wright admits ‘It is in fact impossible to build a theory of what people thought Jesus’ resurrection appearance consisted of…The word is quite consistent with people having non-objective “visions”; it is equally consistent with them seeing someone in the ordinary course of human affairs. Its meaning in the present context – both its meaning for Paul, and its meaning in the tradition he quotes – must be judged on wider criteria than linguistic usage alone’. Wright, *Resurrection*, 323. Schrage stresses the active sense of this passive verb (‘appeared’ rather than ‘was seen’), common in the LXX and elsewhere for God’s or God’s messengers’ appearances. Schrage, *Korinther*, 4.47-48 and nn. 160-65.
tautology, though the tautology itself does not occur in the first eleven verses.\footnote{Next section, Paul keeps distinct the central premiss of this section, ‘Christ has been raised’, from the premiss from the tautology, ‘there is a resurrection of the dead’. Thus ‘Christ has been raised’ occurs in vv. 12, 13 (negatively), 14, 15a, 15b (negatively), 16 (negatively), 17 (negatively); the tautology in vv. 12 (negatively), 13 (negatively), 16 (negatively). He merges the premisses in his triumphant declaration of v. 20; after that, he never again in mentions ‘Christ has been raised’, though he repeats the premiss from the tautology another six times (vv. 21 [negatively], 29 [negatively], 32 [negatively], 35, 42, 52).}

Important for our discussion is the specification that Christ ‘was buried’ (ἐτάφη; v. 4) and Paul’s aside that some of Christ’s witnesses ‘have died’ (ἐκοιμήθησαν; v. 6). It seems unlikely Paul uses Christ’s burial as an apology for the empty tomb.\footnote{Otherwise, Thiselton, First Epistle, 1192-93; 1197-1203. Kloppenborg traces the pre-Pauline development of the creed through Palestinian and hellenistic Jewish environments, arguing its Sitz im Leben was probably originally kerygmatic/confessional but that it was used as a baptism confession and expanded into an apology for the resurrection. John S. Kloppenborg, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pauline Formula 1 Cor 15:3b-5 in Light of Some Recent Literature,’ CBQ 40 (1978): 351-67.} More likely, the burial underscores the physical reality of Christ’s death\footnote{Watson: ‘The narratio is not designed to prove, but to provide the basis of proof in the argumentation’. Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 238. Cf. Eriksson, Traditions, 249. Wedderburn makes the point that, despite Paul’s argument to the contrary next section, the restoration of the god or hero to life does not eo ipso mean the same for the follower. Wedderburn, Baptism, 332-42; cf. 211, 231.} including, possibly, given Paul’s imposing Death mythology (vv. 20-28; 54-57), Christ’s physical placement in Death’s domain.\footnote{Fee, First Epistle, 725; Hays, First Corinthians, 256; Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Eerdmans, 2003), 170; Schrage, Korinther, 4.35-37.}

Paul’s aside on the dead witnesses may likewise pull some rhetorical

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\footnote{I find curious that de Boer resists so any mythology of an underworld when it suits well his thesis. de Boer, Defeat, 107; 217, n. 49; 218, n. 64. He seems to think, based solely on LXX Ps 87.6, that ‘burial’ denotes setting disinterestedly a body in a hole and ‘sleep’ as a metaphor for death excludes an underworld. But Hoffmann shows that the mythology of ‘the dead’ as denizens of Sheol or Hades plays out regularly in Homer and hellenistic literature, the Hebrew Bible, the LXX, and the pseudepigrapha, and that the ‘sleep’ metaphor from Homer onward signifies indiscriminately ‘the dead’ – with whatever that entails. He shows further that Paul does not use the term in any special}
weight: if having seen the risen Christ held status in the community (9.1), Paul’s addition may emphasize that even such esteemed believers succumb to death.63

In the remainder of the narratio Paul sets the tradition as the foundation for his own apostolate: last (ἔσχατον) in the sequence64 of witnesses,65 the stillborn (τῷ ἐκτρώματι),66 he is the least (ὁ ἐλάχιστος) of the apostles. But God’s grace toward him is not vain (κενός); through God’s grace working in him he laboured (κοπιάω) harder than all other apostles (v. 10).67 Paul used already the concept of ‘vanity’ to characterize Corinthian (potential) disbelief in the gospel (v. 2 – εἰκῇ), uses it again to characterize both preaching and faith without Christ’s resurrection from the dead (v. 14[2x] – κενός; v. 17 – ματαιά), and again in his final exhortation (v. 58) where he encourages the Corinthians that their labour (ὁ κόπος) is not ‘in vain’ (κενός).68

Paul concludes the section as he began it: declaring that the Corinthians accepted Christ’s resurrection as it was preached to them.

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64 Paul uses ἔσχατον to conclude the list (εἶτα/ἔπειτα). Contra Schütz, 106-07, who makes last ‘least significant’. Wire: “‘Last of all...’ refers only initially to his being the last of the apostles, as an expression of his modesty, but more significantly refers to being the last of all believers, as a denial that Corinthian spiritual experience can be a primary source for knowledge of the risen Christ”. Wire, *Women Prophets*, 161.

65 Wire notes that Paul’s tradition does not specify women witnesses, even though the earliest Gospel accounts begin with women and ‘it is doubtful that stories of appearances to women would have been constructed after the tradition had “more reliable” accounts’. Wire, *Women Prophets*, 162. Cf. Fee, *First Epistle*, 728; Wright, *Resurrection*, 326. Collins suggests they may be included with the generic ἀδελφοί. But that would set them out of sequence. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 536.


68 Most commentators recognize that Paul uses εἰκός, κενός, and ματαιά as similes. L&N lists εἰκῇ under the same semantic domain as κενός though, as many point out, κενός points to wanting in reality and ματαιά to wanting in result. Cf. Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 266 and n; Schrage, *Korinther*, 4.129 and n, 131; Thiselton, *First Epistle*, 1219-20. Eriksson sees the whole chapter as an inclusio framed by εἰκός and κενός, and v. 17 (with ματαιά) ‘a direct rephrasing of 15.2’. Eriksson, *Traditions*, 260.
Expounding the Posited Premiss – A Sorites (15.12-19)

Paul begins the next section, vv. 12-19, where he left the last: the agreed upon premiss that all the Corinthians accepted apostolic preaching about Christ’s resurrection. He constructs a hypothetical, logical argument to belittle the premiss that ‘there is no resurrection of the dead’. He shows that this ridiculous premiss leads to ridiculous conclusions that become ridiculous premisses in turn. Setting the agreed upon premiss against the denial of his premiss (the tautology), he asks rhetorically: If all accept the preaching about Christ – from the dead he has been raised – how can Some (τίνες) deny the resurrection of the dead? The one eo ipso requires the other, and Paul uses techniques such as reductio ad absurdum (vv. 13, 16) to show how contradictory is the logic of the ‘some’.

Paul constructs syllogistically seven conditional clauses to show the ridiculous consequences of denying the resurrection of the dead. Implicit throughout

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69 ‘Here it becomes completely plain that the Corinthians recognize Paul’s presupposition, the resurrection of Christ’. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 265 (his italics). Cf. Asher, Polarity, 60; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 239. Whatever the ‘actual’ Corinthians’ beliefs, Paul’s inclusio in the last section sets his terms: for the sake of argument, they do accept the preaching that Christ was raised from the dead.

70 Rhetorical analysts identify v. 12 as the propositio, defining the argument up to the propositio in v. 35. Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 239. Crucially, v. 35 does not introduce a new argument but maintains focus on Paul’s premiss from the tautology. Collins names v. 12a a diegesis, recapitulating the creed. Collins, First Corinthians, 541-42. Paul puts his rhetorical question awkwardly. He does not say straightforwardly: ‘Christ was raised from the dead’; that he saves for v. 20’s triumphant conclusion to this argument. Instead, he divides his protasis into two clauses, introducing the two distinct premisses that govern his argument. The main clause, ‘Christ is preached’, recalls the agreed upon premiss of the creed: ‘Christ has been raised’. In the subordinate clause, Paul includes the elements of his premiss from the tautology, emphasizing by word position that his issue is not ‘resurrection’, but ‘the dead’: ‘from the dead he has been raised’.

71 ‘Mit dem einen ist das andere eo ipso mitgegeben, so daß eins mit dem andern steht und fällt’. Schrage, Korinther, 4.125. I note above it is not eo ipso the case that what happens to the hero or god happens to the followers. But Paul argues in v. 21 that Christ was ‘a man’, one of ‘us’, so if resurrection from the dead happened to ‘one of us’, then resurrection from the dead happens.

72 ‘[H]e expects them to read the logic in reverse and admit therefore that there must be a resurrection of the dead’. Fee, First Epistle, 744.

73 ‘Again, I have no interest in deciphering the exact position of the ‘some’. Paul phrases a rhetorical question; for the purposes of following his deliberative argument his opponents need be only effects of his imagination which, since we follow Paul’s construction of the argument and not theirs, is in fact the case. Eriksson notes of v. 13: ‘This argumentation is not an expression of Paul’s own view, not an expression of Corinthian views, but Paul’s refutation of the logical conclusion of their views’. Eriksson, Traditions, 257. But that is the point throughout the argument: to demonstrate that undesirable consequences follow the premiss ‘there is no resurrection of the dead’.

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is that if Christ was raised, he was, first, one of the dead.75 Paul intensifies with ἄρα76 the consequences at v. 14 (‘vain’ preaching and believing), v. 15 (the apostles lie and, implicitly, God did not raise Christ), and v. 18 (the dead ‘in Christ’ have perished). He argues ad hominem77 his emphasis from vv. 1-11 on ‘preaching’ and ‘believing’, recapitulating elements from vv. 1-11 and shifting between the first and second person. If Christ was not raised, our preaching is vain (κενόν; v. 14; cf. ‘preaching’ in vv. 1, 11), we are false-witnesses (ψευδομάρτυρες; 15α; cf. the witnesses of vv. 5-8) and, implicitly, God did not raise Christ (15β; cf. the divine passive, v. 4). If Christ was not raised, your faith is vain (κενὴ; v. 14; ματαιά; v. 17; cf. ἐπιστεύσατε in v. 2 and παρελάβετε and ἐπιστεύσατε in vv. 1 and 11) and you remain in your sins (v. 17; cf. v. 3).78 Paul progresses his argument using a sorites:79 beginning with a posited premiss (‘Christ has been raised’) he leads to adverse conclusions. Syllogism after syllogism, the sorites uses the conclusion of the previous syllogism as a premiss in the next, repeating the procedure, potentially, endlessly.80

75 Eriksson recognizes the implied minor premiss of the syllogisms in vv. 13 and 16 (and presupposed in v. 12): ‘Christ is one of the dead’. Thus: If the dead are not raised and Christ is (was) one of the dead then Christ has not been raised. Eriksson, Traditions, 257, 259.

76 Allo: ‘dans la langue classique, ci ἄρα peut signifier “si, véritablement”; c’est le sens ici’; Fee: to strengthen the ‘if…then’ inference; Thiselton: ‘indicates a clear, logical consequence’. Allo, Première, 401; Fee, First Epistle, 742, n. 17; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1218. It is not remarkable that Paul uses ἄρα in a conditional clause; I mark it because he uses it three times out of seven.

77 Eriksson, Traditions, 258.

78 Paul usually refers to ἁμαρτία in the singular; his unusual use of the plural ἁμαρτίαις signals further that he here recapitulates the tradition.

79 See especially Eriksson, Traditions, 256-61; Mack, Rhetoric, 57. Saw sees vv. 16-19 as a reduplication (conduplicatio) of vv. 13-15, amplifying them; Wright describes the argument as a ‘spiral’ repeating twice the same argument in rapid succession. Saw, Rhetoric, 260; Wright, Resurrection, 331. But the arguments are not the same: Paul concludes in vv. 18-19 with the fate of real, dead believers; the argument makes no mention of the real dead before then. There may be a case to view vv. 13-16 as a reduplication of vv. 1-11 or, more accurately, a parody.

80 The sorites (‘heap’) was a philosophical problem: how many grains make a heap? Does one? A second? A third? There is no logical point at which adding another single grain transforms the individual grains into a ‘heap’. Similarly, arguments can be prolonged endlessly. ‘This form of argument was much used by the Academic Sceptics against the Stoics. The Stoics thought it legitimate to stop at a point at which the item did not clearly fall into the class in question’. Julia Annas, ed., Cicero: On Moral Ends, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (CUP, 2001), 106, n. 27 (her italics). Thus Chrysippus’s solution was the quiescent: at some point, he simply stopped answering the questions (cf. Cicero, Acad. post. 2.93). On the sorites argument and Stoic responses to it, see Jonathan Barnes, ‘Medicine, Experience and Logic,’ in Science and Speculation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, et al. (CUP, 1982), 24-68. Note that it is common in sorites arguments to imply from context premisses for the syllogism.
It is significant, then, where Paul does end. Beginning with a rhetorical denial of Christ’s resurrection, hypothetically, Paul concludes with implications for dead believers, really. If Christ is not raised, if there is no redemption from sins (v. 17), then those ‘sleepers’ (οἱ κοιμηθέντες; v. 18)\(^{81}\) ‘in Christ’ have perished (ἀπώλοντο).\(^{82}\) Whereas Paul comforted Thessalonian believers anxious over deaths in their community, Hays observes that Paul here ‘is trying to induce some anxiety among the Corinthians about this point’.\(^{83}\) The predicament of real, dead believers founds Paul’s \textit{ad hominem} arguments in vv. 29-34, and it carries forward his argument here to the next section where Christ is the first fruits τῶν κεκοιμημένων (v. 20). As a bridge, Paul in v. 19 sets the dead ‘in Christ’ opposite their living counterparts:

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\begin{align*}
v. 18 & \quad \text{oī koiμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ ἀπώλοντο} \\
v. 19 & \quad έν τῇ ζωῇ ταύτῃ ἐν Χριστῷ ἡλπικότεστε ἐσμὲν μόνον
\end{align*}
\]

Paul puts in emphatic position the prepositional phrase ‘in this life’, and ‘in Christ’ governs it as it did ‘the sleepers’ in the previous verse. The subject he puts last, a copula with verbal participle: ‘we are those who have hoped; we are hopers’.\(^{84}\)

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\(^{81}\) Again, this term is not special but an ‘euphémisme courant, n’implique pas, en soi, l’idée d’un réveil, c’est-à-dire de la résurrection, mais signifie simplement \textit{mourir}. Senft, \textit{Première Épitre}, 196. Cf. Hoffmann, \textit{Toten}, 186-206. What makes it remarkable is that Paul links verbally the dead, here, ‘in Christ’ with the dead, in v. 20, of whom Christ is ‘first fruits’. It may recall also the dead witnesses from the creed (v. 6) and possibly those of the community who perished by divine judgment (11.29). Cf. v. 51.

\(^{82}\) This extends to those ‘in Christ’ dead the eschatological fate awaiting those ‘in Christ’ not. de Boer compares Phil 1.28, where ἀπώλεια and σωτηρία are opposites, with 2 Cor 7.10 where θάνατος and σωτηρία are. de Boer, \textit{Defeat}, 219, n. 69. But in 2 Corinthians, θάνατος has believers in view; in Philippians, ἀπώλεια awaits the άντικειμένων. In Paul, ἀπάλλαμοι – and cf. ἀπάλλεια – intones God’s wrath on Others: Rom 2.12; 1 Cor 1.18-19; 10.9-10; 2 Cor 2.15; 4.3; cf. Rom 9.22; Phil 3.19. Hays comments on v. 17: ‘Interestingly, this formulation of the problem leaves intact Paul’s basically Jewish picture of reality: God is still real and still judges human sin. The Corinthians – precisely as Gentiles alienated from Israel’s God – are left with no hope, standing under the threat of God’s final verdict. Only the resurrection of Jesus offers a real possibility into a new life with God in which their sin is forgiven and overcome’. Hays, \textit{First Corinthians}, 261.

\(^{83}\) Hays, \textit{First Corinthians}, 261 (his italics). Obviously Paul is not saying the dead are destroyed, really, but that the ‘conclusion is true to the extent that the supposition of that protasis is granted’. de Boer, \textit{Defeat}, 219, n. 67. Paul’s argument does not require that actual Corinthians cared nothing about the departed; only that the premiss ‘the dead are not raised’ leads logically to this unhappy consequence.

\(^{84}\) So Weiß, \textit{Korintherbrief}, 355. Most commentators and translations treat ἡλπικότεστε ἐσμὲν as a periphrastic perfect, rendering: ‘If we hope in Christ’. A problem with this, besides that it accomplishes awkwardly what Paul could have done simply writing ἡλπίκαμεν, is that it requires an object, takes ἐν Χριστῷ, and misses the contrast with v. 18 and the continuity with v. 20. Allo also takes ἐσμὲν as a copula, treating ἡλπικότεστε as a substantive (‘hopers’) in the \textit{futur antérieur}: ‘si nous [ne] sommes [que des gens] qui auront “espéré” dans cette vie-ci en Christ, – [et cela] seulement, – nous sommes a plaindre plus que tous les homes’. Allo, \textit{Première}, 403.
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Including himself among the Corinthians with ἐσμὲν, Paul reinforces his shift from speculative philosophizing to concrete consequences. Thus the dead ‘in Christ’, who are destroyed, contrast us living ‘in Christ’, who are hopers. But what does μόνον modify, ‘we hopers’ or the entire clause? Is the protasis: ‘If we are, in this life “in Christ”, only hopers’ – or even, ‘are the only hopers’ (‘hopers alone’, i.e., as opposed to the hope-less dead), Or is it, ‘If we “in Christ” are hopers during only this life’? The end is the same: if hope is restricted to this life; if death truly effects destruction and hope does not extend to the grave; our ‘hope’ is an empty boast and we are more pitiable than any person.

We can follow Paul’s chain of logic from v. 17:

If there is no resurrection of the dead, Christ has not been raised;
If Christ has not been raised, our preaching/your faith is vain;
If our preaching is vain, we are false-witnesses of God who raised Christ;
If the dead are not raised, God did not raise Christ;
If the dead are not raised, Christ is not raised;
If Christ is not raised, your faith is vain;
If your faith is vain, there is no redemption from sins;
If there is no redemption from sins, the faithful dead (i.e., the dead ‘in Christ’) have perished;
If the faithful dead have perished, we the faithful living (i.e., we ‘in Christ’, ‘in this life’) are only hopers/hopers during only this life;
If we the faithful living are only hopers/hopers during only this life, we are more pitiable than any person.

85 Weiβ: ““nur hoffen”, d.h. ohne Erfüllung hoffen, genarrte Hoffende’. Weiβ, Korintherbrief, 355. I note, anecdotally, the line from Theocritus: ἔλπις ἐν ζωοῖσιν, ἀνέλπιστο δὲ θανόντες: ‘there is hope among the living, but being dead is hopeless’. Id. 4.42. Cf. Prov 11.7, nuanced differently in the LXX and MT. In the LXX, when a righteous man dies, hope (Ἑλπὶς) does not perish (Ἐλπὶς), but the boast of the wicked perishes (θλυμέα). In the MT, when a wicked man dies, his hope (יהוה) perishes (—heb) in his vigour/riches perishes (יַמָּה).

86 So James H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. 3: Syntax (T&T Clark, 1963), 228. A major objection to placing μόνον with ‘this life’ is that ‘hope’ is not characteristic of the believer’s final existence. Thus Hering: ‘But the idea of a hope to cheer us during the future life as well makes little sense, because that life is envisaged as bringing the fulfilment of all hopes’; Ellingworth and Hatton: ‘The main difficulty is that this clause appears to suggest that hope continues in a future life, which would contradict Romans 8.24 and possibly 1 Corinthians 13.13’. But this mistakes the contrast. The contrast is not between present existence and final existence; it is between being ‘in Christ’ alive and being ‘in Christ’ dead. From both, ‘hope’ looks still forward. Most, if not all, commentators and translations miss this contrast, making ‘in Christ’ the object of ‘hope’. See Barrett, First Epistle, 349-50; Paul Ellingworth and Howard Hatton, A Translator’s Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, Helps for Translators (UBS, 1985), 301-02; Fee, First Epistle, 744-45; Jean Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A.W. Heathcote and P.J. Alcock (The Epworth Press, 1962), 163-64; C.F.D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1953), 170; Schrage, Korinther, 4.134-35; Senft, Première Épitre, 195; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1221-22.
It is from the perspective of the real, dead believers Paul writes v. 19, as he does also vv. 18 and 20. It is the destruction of the dead that determines the hopelessness and consequent piteousness of the living. But v. 20’s triumphant declaration reverses Paul’s pathetic conclusion by professing the reason Paul uses ‘hope’ only positively elsewhere: elsewhere, Paul’s object for ‘hope’ is only Christ’s resurrection. Specifically, it is the eschatological reality that Christ’s resurrection ensures. To deny the resurrection is to deny the hope it effects.

An Apocalyptic Narrative (15.20-28)

Concluding the Argument (15.20a)

In v. 20 Paul ceases abruptly and definitely the silly reasoning of the previous section. He unites the agreed upon premiss, ‘Christ has been raised’, with his premiss from the tautology, ‘there is a resurrection of the dead’, and declares: Christ has been raised from the dead. After this point, Paul does not repeat again ‘Christ’s has been raised’. The premiss has served its purpose – to establish Paul’s own premiss – and the two premisses are now only one. The effect ripples back along

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87 It concerns Fee, pastorally, if contemporary Christians think this implies that ‘Christian faith is interested only in life in the future, or that somehow the Christian life is a mean existence at best’. Fee, First Epistle, 745. Paul, though, seems unperturbed to characterize Christian life in ‘this age’ as ‘groaning’ (Rom 8.22-23; 2 Cor 5.2, 4), to believe ‘acceptance of the gospel entails the acceptance of suffering’ (Jervis, 290; cf. 1 Thess 1.6; 3.3; Phil 3.8-11). And he presents even his present experiences of joy and peace as foretastes of the future (Rom 15.13; cf. Morrice). L. Ann Jervis, ‘Accepting Affliction: Paul’s Preaching on Suffering,’ in Character and Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Eerdmans, 2002), 290-316; William G. Morrice, Joy in the New Testament (Paternoster, 1984). Sabou argues that Paul characterizes the believer’s present reality as experiencing the ‘horror’ of the crucifixion. Sorin Sabou, Between Horror and Hope: Paul’s Metaphorical Language of “Death” in Romans 6:1-11, Paternoster Biblical Monographs (Paternoster, 2005).


90 BDAG (s.v. ‘vuví’) reports vuví δὲ introduces a real situation after an unreal conditional clause or sentence, but as a matter of fact; BDF §64.2 regards it the remnant of the Attic intensive suffix ‘–i’. de Boer observes that Paul regularly uses this word pair, remarking: ‘In the context they seem to carry as much theological weight as they do in Rom 3.21’. de Boer, Defeat, 220, n. 71.

91 Paul repeats his own premiss another six times: vv. 21 (negatively), 29 (negatively), 32 (negatively), 35, 42, 52. Mack remarks: ‘Note that the argument is not designed to support the first half of the thesis (“in fact Christ has been raised from the dead”), but the second (“the first fruits of
the chain of Paul’s argument: Christ has been raised from the dead, we are not pitiable but are legitimate hopers, the faithful dead have not been destroyed, believers are not in their sins, their faith is not in vain – and neither is apostolic preaching.

The compliment to Paul’s declaration, [Christ] is the first fruits of the ‘sleepers’, introduces his subject for the remainder of the section. Paul maintains focus on the plight of the real, dead believers by definite use of the participle (τῶν κεκοιμημένων) – the same definite participle he used in v. 18. The perfect tense stresses the dead’s persistent state of deadness: they have not been destroyed (v. 18) but they remain dead; they do not exist now in any other condition. Differently from the previous section, Paul does not attempt here to prove logically his argumentative end. As such, classifications of this section by classical rhetorical categories remain unpersuasive. Paul’s rhetoric here is apocalyptic rather than publicly rational; he
discloses – he does not demonstrate – Death’s origins in the κόσμος and its eventual demise, narrating the cosmic processes behind (his premiss) the resurrection of the dead.95

**Introducing the Narrative**

Paul plots vv. 20-28 as a single narrative with three movements, the hero of which is Christ; the antagonist, Death.96 Crucial to his plot is the story’s setting. Paul does not here relate a generic apocalyptic discourse on the fate(s) of the dead, the end of the world, or the life hereafter.97 He sets his discourse from the particular perspective of the real, dead believers he introduced in v. 18 – Christ is their first fruits (vv. 20). Following Christ’s escape from their shared predicament of death, the plot revolves round Christ’s actions that ensure his dead will escape the predicament, too. Verses 21-22 expound (ἐπειδὴ γὰρ) how the dead became in their predicament and how Christ as their first fruits assures they will not remain in it. Verses 23-24 sequence the proper order (τάγματι) of their escape: the resurrection of Christ the first fruits, then those who are his; then, it is τὸ τέλος. Verses 25-28 appose τὸ τέλος, detailing the behind-the-scenes processes that effect resurrection: Death’s destruction and God’s complete eschatological, cosmological order. Having begun with the particular predicament of real, dead believers Paul concludes with the grandest of cosmic scenes: God ‘all in all’ (v. 28). I consider each movement in turn.

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95 Schütz thinks Paul here attempts to prove the futurity of the resurrection, but as Asher observes ‘Paul has not shifted his argument to a defense of the future. Rather, given an apocalyptic framework, vv. 21-28 are simply the consequences of the antecedent of Christ’s resurrection mentioned in v. 20’. Asher, *Polarity*, 61; Schütz, *Paul*, 84-113. Asher is right: Christ’s resurrection effects the guarantee believers will themselves be resurrected – but as a consequence of the events narrated in vv. 21-28. Thus Asher is wrong to conclude from this that ‘vv. 21-28 are not the main thrust of Paul’s argument’ but a development of Paul’s thesis that ‘Christ’s resurrection is the foundation’ of the resurrection of the dead and related issues. Paul’s thesis is not about Christ’s resurrection; it is about the believer’s. The agreed upon premiss that Christ has been raised was an expedient to get Paul to this point and, after v. 20a, he does not use it again.

96 I use Frye’s sense of ‘hero’ as the character around whom the action centres. All plots consist of somebody ‘doing something’, so whatever that somebody does, fails to do, or could have done determines the plot. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton University Press, 1957), 33.

Chapter Two

First Movement: The Origin of Death and the Origin of Escape (15.20-22)

The imagery of the first fruits (ἀπαρχή) of the ‘sleepers’ places Christ in solidarity with the faithful dead, suggesting that his resurrection is ‘the first sheaf of the harvest which guarantees that there will be more to come’. Paul elaborates (ἐπειδὴ γὰρ) on this claim by setting out two pairs of parallel clauses, the second pair explaining further (ὡσπερ γὰρ; v. 22) the first.

δι’ ἄνθρωπον θάνατος καὶ
δι’ ἄνθρωπον ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν

Paul’s first set of clauses star two unnamed agents, each ‘a human’. The second set identifies these humans as exalted figureheads, Adam and Christ, but in the first both agents are anarthrous, generic; each is ‘one of us’. ‘One of us’ enabled Death (θάνατος) in the κόσμος and ‘one of us’ escaped it. Escape –

98 Wright, Resurrection, 333. Conzlemann emphasizes that ‘Paul is stating in the first instance that Jesus is the first of a series’. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 268. He notes further: ‘Paul, apparently on purpose, does not say: the first of those who have been raised, but: of those who have fallen asleep’. The real, dead believers remain Paul’s focus. de Boer thinks the imagery from the OT, used here figuratively, ‘symbolizes the first instalment and that part which includes, as by synecdoche, the whole. The image suggests both priority and inclusiveness…The resurrection of the dead is included in the resurrection of Christ from the dead’. de Boer, Defeat, 109. But Christ’s resurrection guarantees further resurrections; it does not produce them. Paul uses the term also for the ‘down-payment’ of the Spirit (2 Cor 1.22; 5.5) and for Stephanas as first fruits of a given geographical area. Fee, First Epistle, 749. Garland notes: ‘Christ’s resurrection as the firstfruits evokes the harvest metaphor used to describe the end of the age (Matt. 13:30, 39; Gal. 6:9; Rev. 14:15)’. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 706, n. 3.

99 Here it less the logical sense of substantiating a claim than the homiletical sense of elucidating one. Schrage notes the causal rather than temporal sense of ἐπειδὴ and conveys the explanatory range of the word pair using both ‘erläutert’ and ‘begründet’. Schrage, Korinther, 4.158; 162, n. 720.

100 Frye observes of most comedy and realistic fiction: ‘If superior neither to other men nor to his environment, the hero is one of us: we respond to a sense of his common humanity and demand from the poet the same canons of probability that we find in our own experience’. Frye, Anatomy, 34. In the first set Paul establishes Christ and Adam each as ‘one of us’; in the second, he exalts them beyond human categories. 1 Cor 15.21-22 is not, foremost, a statement on christology. It is a statement on the resurrection of the dead. Dead believers and their predicament as believers, dead, determines Paul’s plot throughout so that Adam’s function as instigator and Christ’s function as liberator each serve us insights not, first of all, about ‘Adam’ or ‘Christ’, but about the believer’s predicament of death. Whatever Pauline christology we derive from these statements we do well to mind it is christology of a second order: Paul is talking principally about something else.

101 This illuminates a major distinction between 1 Cor 15.20-28 and a christological text like Phil 2.5-11. Philippians supplies the story’s crucial middle that explains how the hero overcomes his predicament: it is Christ’s ‘obedience’ (Phil 2.8) that warrants his exaltation (vv. 9-11) – an obedience Paul sets as a model for believers to imitate (vv. 12-18). Cf. Larry W. Hurtado, ‘Jesus as Lordly Example in Philippians 2:5-11,’ in From Jesus to Paul: Studies in Honour of Francis Wright Beare, ed. P. Richardson and J.C. Hurd (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1984), 113-26. 1 Cor 15.20-28 gives no explanation how Christ overcomes his predicament (except the passive ‘he was raised’), nor does it attribute any mimetic significance to his actions. The passage explains how Christ overcomes the believer’s predicament. Christ-in-himself is not the focus; Christ-as-liberator-of-the-dead is.
resurrection – is not a grace reserved for gods and heroes, but a potentiality for ‘everyone’. θάνατος, we see soon, is the personified inimical power responsible for ‘everyone’s’ predicament: death. The introduction of Death here opposite Christ foreshadows their eventual contest.

In v. 22 Paul names the humans, associating Adam with death (Death) and Christ with death’s relief: life. Different from Romans 5, Paul does not at all in 1 Corinthians 15 connect Adam with Sin (cf. vv. 45-49). ‘Sin’ as a power plays no part in this argument, and Adam here is metonymous only with Death.102 ‘In Adam’ All die (ἀποθνῄσκουσιν) and ‘in Christ’ All will be made alive (ζωοποιηθῶσιν). Interpreters stress the future of ζωοποιηθῶσιν as opposed the present of ἀποθνῄσκουσιν but of equal interest is ζωοποιηθῶσιν is passive and ἀποθνῄσκουσιν active. Paul does not name Christ the agent of eschatological life-

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102 We must resist reading the Adam of Rom 5 into the Adam of 1 Cor 15; the arguments and emphases are different. In Rom 5 Paul tackles two powers, Sin and Death, and to do so uses from Gen 1-3 Adam’s transgression combined with death, its consequence (cf. 2 Bar 17.2-3; 23.4; 48.42-43; 54.14, 19; 56.6; 4 Ezra 3.5-7, 20-21; 4.30-31; 7.117-19; LAB 13.8-9). In 1 Cor 15 Paul’s argument is about Death only and, importantly, Death from the vantage point of real, dead believers. He does not associate Adam with ἁμαρτία, does not mention Adam’s παράπτωμα nor use the converse χάρις or δικ langueages but, expedient to his argument, focuses exclusively on Adam’s association with θάνατος. Most commentators presuppose Paul’s any mention of Adam means automatically he thinks of sin and they make explicit what Paul leaves unsaid. Barrett, who in his ‘Adam’ chapter barely mentions 1 Cor 15, compares Paul to other Jewish writers, remarking: ‘On the whole, [Paul’s] contemporaries, though not blind to Adam’s guilt, tended to stress the misfortune suffered on account of the fall’; but although ‘Paul found no difficulty in thinking and writing in these terms…Paul prefers to analyse the theological and anthropological significance of Adam’s act’. C.K. Barrett, From First Adam to Last: A Study in Pauline Theology (Adam & Charles Black, 1962), 14-15. (My italics.) This may be true of Rom 5, but ‘Adam’s act’, and Sin in particular, have little place in Paul’s discussion about the dead ‘in Christ’ in 1 Cor 15. In this narrative, Christ succumbs to Death utterly as Paul does not have him do to Sin; Christ joins fully the All ‘in Adam’ who die, becoming first of the faithful dead to escape Death. Thus as Barrett later observes (p. 20): ‘Paul does not say that all sinned in Adam…though he does say that all die in Adam’. (His italics.) We should also be mindful that Adam’s responsibility for Sin was only one of the mythologies available to Paul. Thus, e.g., 1 En 6-19 builds on Genesis to place responsibility on ‘Watchers’ – a pervasive mythology: 2 Bar 56.12-15; CD 2.17-3.1; 1 En 64.1-2; 69.4-5; 86.1-6; 106.13-17; Jub 4.15, 22; 5.1-8; 10.4-5; LAB 24.2-5; T.Reu 5.6-7; T.Naph 3.5; Wis 2.23-24; cf. Jude 6; 2 Pet 2.4. Differently, Sir 25.24 and 2 Bar 48.43 indict Eve, not Adam, and Philo, Opif. 151, is blasé about Adam’s transgression: it was ‘inevitable’. At all events, Sin has no rôle in 1 Cor 15.

103 Usually to express Paul’s polemic against his ‘opponents’ who supposedly claimed they had been raised, spiritually, already. E.g., Wire argues: ‘In other contexts Paul applies the Adam/Christ typology to the present before he extends it to the future (15:44b–49; Rom. 5:12-21), so it is probably inaccurate to speak of the Corinthians extending his reference to the future and the dead. Their present-tense reading is probably the common one and includes the future by implication in defending resurrection of the dead Paul is narrowing his use to the future’. Wire, Women Prophets, 165. Senft remarks the future is ‘en exprime la certitude’. Senft, Première Épitre, 197. Importantly, it is certainty in an event chronologically future.
making – here, it is Christ the first *human* of All the dead who is ‘made alive’ – but he will qualify Christ as ‘last Adam’ with πνεύμα ζωοποιοῦν in v. 45.

It is important not to confuse Adam and Christ for opposites antithetically, dialectically; for being binaries, antinomies, equals. Adam generates Christ. Their relationship is unequal, unidirectional, genetically and chronologically successive. Although Adam is a necessary cause of Christ, Christ is neither a cause of Adam nor Adam’s only possible effect. Christ is ‘of Adam’, ‘in Adam’, and it is not the case that Adam is ‘of’ or ‘in’ Christ. Christ is logically of the All ‘in Adam’ who die (cf. v. 3); he escapes Adam only by resurrection from the dead. But Adam is not logically of the All ‘in Christ’ to be made alive. Like Zeus from Kronos, Christ is not Adam’s opposite: he is Adam’s genetic successor.

Wright’s study of ‘in Christ’ language reports the phenomenon that Paul uses the preposition ἐν with Χριστῷ (and κυρίῳ) mostly to connote Christ’s function as messiah or lord of his people, and he uses διά with phrases that include Ἰησοῦ to connote Christ the human agent through whom God works. Similarly here, Paul uses διά in v. 21 with Christ (and Adam) as ἀνθρωπός, and switches to the preposition ἐν in v. 22 to use with Χριστῷ (and Ἀδὰμ). Paul just used ἐν Χριστῷ twice in vv. 18 and 19 non-instrumentally, and he just used διά twice instrumentally in v. 21. Considering also his habitual uses of the prepositions, therefore, there is little reason to suspect that Paul in v. 22 switches ἐν to the instrumental sense of διά. It is ‘in’ Adam and Christ that All die and are made alive, not ‘because of’ them. Without denying participatory or incorporative elements

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104 The agent is no more explicit if we take ἐν, as we should not, in the instrumental sense of διά.

105 As Allo observes, Adam was ‘un homme’ and Christ ‘un autre homme, descendant du premier’. Allo, *Première*, 406 (his italics).

106 Christ as cosmological first-cause in Col 1.16 – whether or not Paul wrote Colossians – is a different order of argument that does not correspond to Paul’s depiction of the particular Adam-Christ relationship here.

107 N.T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant* (Fortress, 1993), 44-46. Cf. v. 57 where God gives victory διὰ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and v. 58 where the believers’ work is ἐν κυρίῳ. Hurtado notes that in Pauline circles ‘it remained the case that to refer to Jesus as “Christ” (with or without the article) was to assert his significance as the divinely approved figure who acts as the eschatological agent of God’. Hurtado, *Lord Jesus Christ*, 100.

108 An instrumental use of ἐν in vv. 18-19 would suggest, ridiculously, that both the dead’s ‘destruction’ and the living’s ‘hopelessness’ are *because of* Christ. de Boer argues for a local sense of ἐν in v. 18 but abandons it for v. 22. de Boer, *Defeat*, 219 n. 68.

109 *Contra* de Boer, *Defeat*, 110-12; Furnish, *First Letter*, 111; A.J.M. Wedderburn, ‘Some Observations on Paul’s Use of the Phrases “In Christ” and “With Christ”’, *JSNT* 25 (1985): 89. For Dahl the ἐν is still local, but its locality covers universally All: the generation of Adam is universally
peculiar to Paul’s ‘in Christ’ and ‘in Adam’ language\textsuperscript{110} the phrases, at their most basic, distinguish believers from those who are not.\textsuperscript{111} In Paul, there are believers and there are ‘Others’, and there is no middle course.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} BDF remarks, pessimistically, that the phrase ‘utterly defies definite interpretation’. But studies abound, initiated by Deissmann’s and Bousssett’s claim that Christ became a spiritual substance believers inhabit mystically. Schweitzer stressed the crude realism of Paul’s Judaism and made much of the believer’s quasi-physical (\textit{naturhaften}) shared corporeity with the Body of the Messiah. French scholars Allo, Mersch, and Prat emphasized believers’ participation in the mystical, collective Christ, whereas Cerfaux denied a mystical Christ and saw ‘év’ connecting believers with the real, risen one (see Culliton on these authors). Davies promoted the believers’ becoming a ‘new Israel’, participating in a new Exodus in the Messiah; and Sanders, Wright, Dunn and others (e.g., recently, Powers) developed a ‘participationist’ soteriology at the centre of Paul’s doctrine of salvation. H. Wheeler Robinson popularized the idea of ‘Hebrew’ ‘corporate personality’ that influenced Dahl and Best and that others (e.g., Barrett, J.A.T. Robinson, Scroggs, Shedd, Wedderburn) developed along the lines of ‘solidarity’. And that, despite the best efforts of the Porters, father and son, to kill it, persists today (e.g., Son). Each revised understanding of the phrase offers important nuances, such as Hooker’s emphasis on ‘interchange’ and Wright’s on the Messiah’s role as True Human.


\textsuperscript{111} Most agree that this is a function of Paul’s ‘ἐν Χριστῷ’ language, though most do not follow Bultmann in limiting it to this function. Bultmann, \textit{Theology}, 1.311. I do not follow Bultmann limiting it to this function, either. But Paul does not expound on the phrase here, and it exceeds my aims to speculate on the phrase beyond its basic function in the argument.

\textsuperscript{112} Paul uses Christ in place of Jewish identity boundaries of ethnicity or torah: Jew or gentile, one is ‘God’s people’ when identified with Christ; otherwise, by default, one is identified with Adam and not ‘God’s people’ at all. Paul uses many expressions to distinguish believers from those not: ἅγιος,
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Christ others Adam by escaping him, thus producing a viable alternative to him. Christ escaped Adam, Death, by being ‘raised’ (v. 21) and ‘made alive’ (v. 23), and ‘his own’ will follow the same route. Christ died, really, and that identifies him with the real, dead believers of v. 20 (cf. v. 18): it is as ‘one of us’ he was raised in v. 21, and as first (fruits) of All the faithful dead he was made alive in v. 23 (cf. v. 20b). Where once Adam encompassed All, now Some – those already identified ‘in Christ’, ‘believers’ – are assured of their future escape, too. But this leaves believers in the awkward position of being doubly-marked: they are identified already as Christ’s by their hope (v. 19), but they are identified still with Adam by Death – by real death. Paul’s apocalyptic narrative reveals the happy outcome to this miserable predicament: Death, the power that binds ‘Christ’s own’ (v. 23), has limited days. Death will be routed, Christ will return, and Christ’s own, who share now in the common lot of the Other, will be rescued from Adam and Death and be made alive,


113 Christ is not the only alternative to Adam. Paul struggled throughout his career to express precisely how Christ relates to another alternative: Moses, i.e., torah.
constituents of the Kingdom of God, who will be ‘all in all’. But all this must occur in order (τάγμα).\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{114} A significant minority of scholars suggest it is not only believers who will be raised and saved, but everyone. The argument goes that since ‘death’ and ‘dying’ apply to a universal πάντες in v. 22, so resurrection and eschatological life must, too. Paul uses εἰς in v. 22 in the same instrumental sense as he uses δύνα in v. 21; ‘Adam’ and ‘Christ’ each represent All humanity and since All, indiscriminately, die (present tense) because of Adam, so All, indiscriminately, will receive eschatological life (ζωοποιηθήσονται) because of Christ. Paul does not restrict ‘salvation’ until the possessive genitive of v. 23 (οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ). This reference, however, is representative, not exclusive; it reformulates v. 20’s ‘unqualified’ reference to ‘sleepers’. In the end, Paul must preach universal resurrection; that is, universal salvation. Otherwise, God’s cosmological reign could not be truly ‘all in all’ (v. 28).

But besides its conflict with Paul’s restrictive statements on salvation elsewhere in Corinthians (e.g., 1 Cor 1.18-31; 3.16-17; 9.22; 11.32; cf. 2 Cor 2.15-16; 4.3; 5.10), the main difficulty with this reading is that its weighty claim is well out of proportion to the slender grammar meant to support it. It is possible to take Paul’s propositions in v. 22 dialectically, absolutely, but it is by no means logically necessary we do so. Dialogically, Paul’s wider narrative (and his statements elsewhere) tells against it. My reading suggests that 1) the definite participle τῶν κεκοιμημένων (v. 20) is qualified – v. 18 makes Christ first fruits of the real, dead believers; 2) there is little reason to suppose εἰς functions like δύνα in v. 22; and 3) ‘Christ’ and ‘Adam’ do not represent synonymous parallels: Christ is ‘in Adam’, but Adam is not ‘in Christ’; and Christ is only one of Adam’s possible effects – he does not constitute the whole of Adam. It follows that those ‘in Christ’ are limited sets ‘in Adam’, too, so the All ‘in Christ’ is a smaller batch of the All ‘in Adam’. Thus Sanders concedes too much when he admits that Paul ‘means really neither “all…all” nor “many…many”, but “all…many”’. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian, 473. Paul means really ‘All…All’. Truly All ‘in Adam’ die, including the All ‘in Christ’ to be made alive.

It seems that a theological end drives this universalist reading, as when Käsemann demands there ‘must’ be universal salvation for God’s reign to be truly ‘all in all’, that ‘all-powerful grace is unthinkable without eschatological universalism’; or when de Boer queries the universal offer of salvation without universal effect: ‘What does that really mean in view of the fact that most people will never have heard the proclamation of the gospel to respond to?’ Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans, 4th German ed. (Eerdmans, 1980), 157; de Boer, Defeat, 222, n. 89. But why is it ‘unthinkable’ that God’s cosmic reign is not universally salvific? Other eschatological and apocalyptic writers show no angst depicting God’s ‘all in all’ reign with the destruction or punishment of Others; for most, the justice of God’s eschatological reign is ‘unthinkable’ without it. In the Jewish literature that de Boer reviews on Death, we find nothing as generous to Others as de Boer makes Paul to be. Cf. also the hell tours popular in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature: Richard Bauckham, ‘Early Jewish Visions of Hell,’ JTS 41 (1990): 355-85; Martha Himmelfarb, Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form of Jewish and Christian Literature (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983). Boring attempts a both/and dialectic through identifying Paul’s distinct (but not contradictory) ‘images’ of salvation. But Boring gives no good reasons that Paul’s image of ‘God-as-king’ must apply universally when that image does not so apply for Paul’s contemporaries. M. Eugene Boring, ‘The Language of Universal Salvation in Paul,’ JBL 105 (1986): 280-81. Those reading universal salvation in 1 Cor 15 include Barth, Resurrection, 175; Dahl, Resurrection, 76, n. 3; de Boer, Defeat, 111-13; Furnish, First Letter, 111; Käsemann, Romans, 157; Schrage, Korinther, 4.163-66. And Furnish notes Andreas Lindemann, ‘Paulus und die korinthische Eschatologie. Zur These von einer “Entwicklung” im paulinischen Denken,’ NTS 37 (1991): 383-84.
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Second Movement: The Order of the Escape (15.23-24a)\textsuperscript{115}

The second movement sequences the order of escape from the predicament of death. Paul (re)introduces the subject of God’s order,\textsuperscript{116} and Christ’s actions to reorder dis-orderly agents support the militaristic connotations behind τάγμα.\textsuperscript{117} Christ of the All in Adam who die (v. 21a) becomes the first (fruits) of All the faithful dead (v. 20b) to be made alive (v. 23b). In sequence, Christ’s own (οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; cf. vv. 18, 20), possibly including the living (cf. vv. 19, 51ff.), will then (ἐπέτα) be made alive at Christ’s παρουσία (v. 23c). Paul uses ζωοποιέω instead of ἐγείρω suggesting that, as elsewhere in Paul, it is not simply resurrection in view but also salvation and eschatological life-making. From death (ἀποθνῄσκω), Christ’s own shall be quickened to completed salvation.\textsuperscript{119} Then (εἴτε), it is τὸ τέλος.

\textsuperscript{115} With Barrett, ‘I have made a break between verse 22 and verse 23 because it appears that at this point Paul embarks upon a new range of material’. Barrett, First Epistle, 354. Syntactically, however, ζωοποιήσσονται (v. 22) governs the remainder of the narrative, thus joining all three movements. Narratively, the predicament of Death and the promise of life demands resolution. Paul defends his premis that there is a resurrection of the dead by narrating that resolution. The narrative’s connectedness therefore tells against perceiving the remainder of it a ‘brief aside [that] does not contribute directly to Paul’s argument’. Furnish, First Letter, 112.

\textsuperscript{116} Paul discussed ἀκαταστάσεια in 14.33. Order (-τάσις-) is key to the remainder of the narrative: vv. 27 and 28 repeat ὑποτάσσομαι six times.

\textsuperscript{117} This is the only occurrence of τάγμα in the NT. Classical Greek uses the term for an order of soldiers in procession. Cf. Hays, First Corinthians, 264-65; Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 205; Claudia Setzer, Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and Early Christianity: Doctrine, Community, and Self-Definition (Brill Academic Publishers, 2004), 60; Wright, Resurrection, 336. In later and LXX Greek it can refer to orders of groups more generally. Cf. Allo, Première, 406-07; Barrett, First Epistle, 354; Schrage, Korinther, 4.167-68. Horsley unnecessarily polarizes apocalyptic and anti-imperialist agendas. The future-tense main verb (ζωοποιήσσονται) and two temporal clauses emphasize eschatological life-making as part of God’s future, re-ordered κόσμος. Presumably, Rome shall be included amongst All the powers sub-ordinated in future, but that is not here at point. See my note on ‘powers’ below. Witherington notes the eschatological orientation of Roman Imperialism. Witherington III, Conflict, 295-98.

\textsuperscript{118} Lincoln notes: ‘For those who had lost sight of any sequence Paul again emphasizes that the fullness of salvation is not yet a present possession, the reign of Christ and his followers is not yet complete’. The dative is temporal, used ‘to designate a specific day or night’. BDF §200. Conzelmann argues that παρουσία is not yet a technical term denoting the end-time presence of the Lord, but Collins asserts that Paul does so use it here and in 1 Thessalonians. Garland observes its use for the arrival of a potentate in a formal visit to a place and for the epiphany of a deity and argues ‘Paul subverts imperial ideology by applying this term to Christ’s glorious arrival at the end (cf. 1 Thess. 2:19; 3:13; 4:15; 5:23; 2 Thess. 2:1)’. Collins, First Corinthians, 552; Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 270; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 708; Lincoln, Paradise, 38. Garland (708, n. 7) notes also Paul’s uses of the term and the verb παρέσι (5.3) for Paul’s own arrival or presence (2 Cor 10.10; Phil 1.26; 2.12) and for the arrival of friends (1 Cor 16.17; 2 Cor 7.6-7).

\textsuperscript{119} Cf. Rom 4.17; 8.11; 2 Cor 3.6; Gal 3.21; cf. 1 Cor 15.36, 45. ‘Ζωοποιέω is used in the NT in an exclusively soteriological sense’. L. Schrottff, ‘Ζωοποιέω’, in EDNT, 2.110. Cf. de Boer, Defeat, 113. This does not reinforce de Boer’s contention for universal salvation but complies completely with Paul’s three tense of salvation. E.g., Rom 5.9-10: ‘now being justified (δικαιωθέντες)…we shall be saved (σωθησόμεθα)…we were being reconciled (δντες κατηλλάγημεν)…having been reconciled (καταλλαγέντες)…we shall be saved (σωθησόμεθα)’. Believers are not saved, finally, until the end.
Weiβ and Leitzmann render τὸ τέλος ‘the rest’, supposing a general resurrection.\(^{120}\) But commentators chorus unanimously that no usage anywhere supports this.\(^{121}\) Paul’s focus is the rescue of real, dead believers; he does not discuss a messianic age, a general resurrection, or a final judgment.\(^{122}\) He introduces τὸ τέλος with εἶτα, which Horsley calls a ‘weaker “then”’ and which Fee stresses shows a logical application.\(^{123}\) Paul’s shift from ἔπειτα to his uncommon use of εἶτα\(^{124}\) and the two ἔπειτα clauses in v. 24b support reading τὸ τέλος not as third in a sequence,

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\(^{122}\) See Davies’s assessment of Schweitzer’s and others’ eschatologies, leading to his conclusion: ‘τὸ τέλος [is] a technical phrase denoting the final consummation’. Davies, *Paul*, 295; discussion pp. 291-98. Davies cites evidence from elsewhere in Paul for an eschatological judgment of the world (1 Cor 1.7-8; 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 1.6, 10; 2.16) according to ‘works’ (1 Cor 4.4; 3.17; 6.9, 10). ‘[T]he Parousia will be followed immediately, or at any rate with only a very short interval, by the Resurrection and the judgement which will usher in the final consummation’. Cf. Furnish, *First Letter*, 107-08. Cf. also Acts 24.15, where Luke has Paul say: ‘there will be a resurrection both of the righteous and the unrighteous’. Collins notes Kreitzer’s attempt to cram a messianic kingdom between the parousia and the end but argues, based on Hill, that Christ’s kingdom is his present lordship from heaven. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 552; Charles E. Hill, ‘Paul’s Understanding of Christ’s Kingdom in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28,’ *NovT* 30 (1988): 297-320; Larry J. Kreitzer, *Jesus and God in Paul’s Eschatology*, *JSNTSup* 19 (Sheffield Academic Press, 1987), 131-64; esp. 142-45. Cf. Schrage who emphasizes that Christ’s reign is between his resurrection and parousia, not between his parousia and the end. Schrage, *Korinther*, 4.170-71. See Garland’s summary: Garland, *I Corinthians*, 709-10. In the end, whether the eschatological expectations of a future messianic age, general resurrection, and final judgment are ‘taken for granted’ by Paul (Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 68) – and all Jewish eschatological texts do not feature these expectations – Paul is silent about them here. With Barrett, ‘with this silence we must be content’. Barrett, *First Epistle*, 355.


\(^{124}\) This verse is Paul’s only uncontested use of ἔπειτα. He uses the term only in 1 Cor 15, and then only in some mss. In 15.5, ἔπειτα has decent support from p\(^{66}\) B, 1739, the ninth-century D, Υ and the majority text. ἔπειτα has Alexandrian support from Ν A and 33. But in 15.7, which concludes the list of vv. 4-7, ἔπειτα commands better support with p\(^{66}\) Ν A F G 33 and 1739 than does ἔτηρ, supported only by B, the seventh-century Ν, D and Υ, and the majority text. Of early witnesses, only B reads ἔπειτα in both vv. 5 and 7. ἔπειτα occurs in both verses in Ν A and 33. It is difficult to explain ἔπειτα in v. 7, so is best either to take ἔπειτα in both verses or to take ἔτηρ only in v. 5. We can explain ἔπειτα’s change to ἔπειτα in v. 7 by a scribe’s conforming it to v. 23, which also concludes a list or, if 15.5 read ἔπειτα, by dittography. Curiously, NA\(^{27}\) prefers ἔπειτα for both verses; Tischendorf records ἔπειτα for both. Metzger makes no comment in his textual commentary.
but as the culmination or ‘goal’ of the sequence. When the dead are quickened at Christ’s return, it is ‘the end’.

125 The subsequent temporal clauses that modify τὸ τέλος tell against Barth’s taking it adverbially (‘finally’; cf. 1 Pet 3.8); it is best understood nominally (‘the end’). Schrage: ‘Daß τέλος (vgl. 1,8) im Sinne des Endes aller Dinge und der Weltvollendung zu verstehen ist, also weder als Rest noch auch als adverbiale Akkusativ, zeigt vor allem die Auslegung des Paulus selbst, der durch die beiden folgenden ὅταν-sätze expliziert, was er unter τέλος versteht’. Schrage, Korinther, 4.171; Barth, Resurrection, 162-63. Fee: ‘With the resurrection of the dead, the end, or goal, has been reached’. Fee, First Epistle, 754.
Third Movement: The End (15.24b-28)

‘The end,’ observe Orr and Walther, ‘is characterized by an action: Christ will have nullified all aggregations of opposition to the rule of God and will assign this victory to the God and Father’.

In this final movement, Paul makes two points expedient to his argument. First, death, the predicament of real, dead believers is caused by Death, a hostile, cosmic power. Second, Christ’s reign is characterized by the total sub-ordination of the κόσμος: ‘the end’ is God’s absolute, unobstructed order; his ‘all in all’.

The two temporal clauses in v. 24b appose τὸ τέλος, the first directly; the second, the first. The verbs, present subjunctive in the first clause and aorist subjunctive in the second, combine with the ὅταν-adverbs to set ‘the end’ in the indefinite future as the consequence of Christ’s actions: ‘When he gives the kingdom to his God and Father, after destroying every rule and every authority and power’.

Horsley and Witherington remind us Corinth was a Roman city; they urge that Paul’s reference to ‘powers’ (ἑκτερόντων; v. 25) to name only Death (v. 26) –


127 NA27 follows the Koine active subjunctive παραδίδω in Ἡ A and D, corroborated by παραδοῖ in B F and G. BDF §95 agrees παραδοῖ here is subjunctive rather than indicative; cf. Thiselton, *First Epistle*, 1230-31.


129 Paul portrays the relationship between God and Christ as father and son (v. 28). As such, a possessive-pronominal use of the article makes better sense here than translating it definitely (‘the God and Father’: NASB; Orr and Walther, cited above) or indefinitely (‘to God and Father’: Collins, *First Corinthians*, 546) or, as most English translations and commentators do, by transposing the article to make God (indefinite) ‘the Father’.


the last \( \text{ἔσχατος} \) enemy to be defeated and the one responsible for the faithful dead’s predicament. Death is neither an ‘indifferent’ \( \text{ἀδιάφορα} \) to be faced apathetically,\(^{131}\) nor simply a hinderance to pleasure so to be faced without fear.\(^{132}\) It is not ‘an understanding of nature…as a cycle of death and growth’,\(^{133}\) nor a fitting conclusion to life – the grey head descending peaceably to Sheol.\(^{134}\) Death is – emphatically by the grammar – God’s enemy: a hypostasized, hostile power binding God’s faithful until ‘the end’.\(^{135}\)

de Boer rightly corrects Beker’s and Käsemann’s view that Christ has already defeated every power except Death: ‘The thesis of the passage is actually that Christ will defeat all the inimical powers including death’.\(^{136}\) Individually, Christ is himself free from All powers: he has been raised (v. 20), has received eschatological life (v. 23a) and – although Paul’s erratic use of verb tenses in vv. 24-28 makes difficult any definite conclusions – it seems all powers, including Death, have been sub-ordinated already to him.\(^{137}\) Functionally, Christ’s commission is cosmic. He reigns necessarily...
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138 On the battlefield, but only ‘until’ (ἂν) he sub-ordinates, cosmically, All enemy powers – notably, Death. In vv. 21-22, Paul foreshadowed the contest between Christ and Death, and it is at last Death’s defeat that initiates τὸ τέλος (v. 24a), Christ’s triumphant παρουσία (v. 23b), and the quickening (ζωόποιέω) of believers (v. 23a). This sequence of events determines what Paul will later say about the resurrection and eschatological ‘change’ of the body.

Paul pulls on two psalms, loosely, for language to characterize Christ’s reign. LXX Ps 109[110].1 and 8.7[6] speak of ‘enemies’ (τοὺς ἐχθρούς), ‘all’ (πᾶς) and, importantly, ‘sub-ordination’ (ὑποτάσσω/ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας). The psalms focus on ὑποτέτακται. Fee and Lambrecht argue that these verbs refer to a still future incident, thus in accord with the future subjection of powers in vv. 24-26. But de Boer takes the verbs at face value, contending that they show All powers have been subordinated already to Christ, the individual (cf. Paul’s unusual use of the perfect ἐγήγερται in vv. 4, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20). Since Christ the individual was freed from the powers, it is now Christ the exalted Lord freeing the κόσμος of them. de Boer, Defeat, 122-23; Martinus C. de Boer, ‘Paul’s Use of a Resurrection Tradition in 1 Cor 15,20-28,’ in The Corinthian Correspondence, ed. Reimund Bieringer, BETL 125 (Leuven University Press, 1996), 649-51; Fee, First Epistle, 757-59; Jan Lambrecht, ‘Paul’s Christological Use of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15.20-28,’ NTS 28 (1982): 510-11.

139 That it is necessary Christ so reign reinforces God’s order in the eschatological process. Conzelmann refers to Paul’s ‘brief allusion to the apocalyptic order (δεῖ, “he must”);’ Dahl defines δεῖ as ‘The eschatological necessity for the fulfilment of God’s purpose in creation and redemption’. Schrage explains it as an eschatological term that points to God’s will and plan of salvation: ‘das auf Gottes Heilsplan und -willen hindeutet’. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 272; Dahl, Resurrection, 109; Schrage, Korinther, 4.175.

140 Paul does not cite either psalm verbatim, and alludes only vaguely to LXX Ps 109[110].1. NA27’s Loci citati vel allegati notes both Ps 110.1 in v. 25 and Ps 8.7 in v. 27. Ellis classifies LXX Ps 8.7 in v. 27 a ‘quotation’ at variance only slightly from the LXX, and LXX Ps 109.1 in v. 25 an ‘allusion’, ‘not manifestly intentional’. Longenecker regards LXX Ps 8.7 a quotation in v. 27 and does not mention v. 25. Both Koch and Stanley treat LXX Ps 109.1 in v. 27 as a citation, adapted, but reject the category for LXX Ps 109.1 in v. 25 – Koch questioning whether Paul alludes to that psalm at all. Hays considers Paul’s use of both psalms ‘allusions’, whereas both Collins and Heil argue both psalms are citations to be taken together under the exegetical practice gezera shava, where one passage explains another through their shared terminology. Lambrecht usefully details Paul’s divergences from each psalm, emphasizing that Paul ‘rewrites’ each. Collins, First Corinthians, 550; E. Earle Ellis, Paul’s Use of the Old Testament (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), appendices I.A and B, pp. 150-54; Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (Yale University Press, 1989), 84; John Paul Heil, The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians, Studies in Biblical Literature 15 (SBL, 2005), 205; Dietrich-Alex Koch, Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums. Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus, BHT 69 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 18-20; Lambrecht, ‘Christological,’ 506-07; Richard N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period, 2nd ed. (Erdmans/Regent College, 1999), 94; Christopher D. Stanley, Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature, SNTSMS 74 (CUP, 1992), 206-07 and n. 85.
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ruling both over creation, embedding Gen 1-3 as a subtext,\textsuperscript{141} and over God’s ‘enemies’, with whom Paul identifies Death (v. 26). The psalms’ occurrences elsewhere in the NT suggest ‘an established pre-Pauline tradition of messianic psalm interpretation’.\textsuperscript{142} It is sometimes tricky to tell in this passage when Paul refers to Christ and when to God. His grammar makes plain that Christ is subject of the verbs in vv. 24-25,\textsuperscript{143} and in v. 28 Christ is himself sub-ordinated (ὑποταγήσεται), presumably, by God. It is less clear whether Christ or God acts for the verbs in vv. 26-27b,\textsuperscript{144} so unclear also whether Paul presents Christ a fully active or a partly passive regent. But the actions themselves are cosmic: the sub-ordination (ὑποτάσσει) occurs six times\textsuperscript{145} of not only dis-orderly agents (i.e., ‘enemies’) but of ‘all’ things

\textsuperscript{141} ‘The stories of creation and fall, as told in Gen 1.26-8 and 3.17-19, lie below the surface throughout, and the later parts of the chapter will allude frequently to the same passages’. Wright, \textit{Resurrection}, 334. Wright suggests further biblical echoes that themselves echo the creation narrative: the Theodotion Dan 2.44; Dan 7.14, 27 (335-36). Lambrecht likewise points to the Genesis subtext in vv. 23-28: Lambrecht, ‘Christological,’ 512-15.

\textsuperscript{142} Richard B. Hays, \textit{The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture} (Eerdmans, 2005), 109. Eph 1.20-23, Heb 1.3, 13; 2.8 and 1 Pet 3.22 allude to Ps 8.6 and Ps 110.1 together. Independently, Matt 22.44; 26.64, Mark 12.36; 14.62, [16.19]. Luke 20.42-43; 22.69, Acts 2.33-35, Rom 8.34, Eph 1.20, Col 3.1, Heb 8.1; 10.12-13 and 12.2 use Ps 110.1; Phil 3.20 refers to Ps 8.6. de Boer theorizes that Paul does not quote these psalms messianically but quotes a messianic tradition based on them. de Boer, \textit{Defeat}, 105-26. More recently: de Boer, ‘Resurrection Tradition,’ 639-51. But the strength of de Boer’s argument is equally its weakness. In order to establish the tradition, he highlights similarities 1 Cor 15.20-28 shares with other NT uses of the psalms, especially Eph 1.20-23. But in order to claim that these post-Pauline occurrences do not simply depend on Paul, he highlights also their differences. That leaves little evidence for an established ‘tradition’ or ‘creed’ – something by nature supposedly static enough to be memorable. At best, we can speculate there was a pre-Pauline use of these psalms messianically although, we must admit, we have no pre-Pauline evidence of it.

\textsuperscript{143} Despite the grammar, Barrett and Heil argue that God is the subject of v. 25 because God is subject of the ‘recognizable’ Ps 110. But Paul barely cites Ps 110 and, as Lambrecht emphasizes, he ‘rewrites’ what he does reference. Even granting that Paul’s audience recognized the psalm, Paul reworks it so Christ, not God, is its subject. Lambrecht, ‘Christological,’ 509-10. Fee may oversimplify matters; on the other hand, there is no clear way round Paul’s indefinite grammar: ‘The question of whether the passage is basically christo- or theocentric is perhaps a red herring. It is both. That is, God is the ultimate source of all things; but he works out his purposes in history through Christ. Hence both Christ and God can alternatively function as the subject of most of the verbs in this paragraph’. Fee, \textit{First Epistle}, 755, n. 44. Schrage notes Christ’s triumphant advance depends on God’s supplying him power: ‘Christus nur darum seinen Siegeszug antreten kann, weil Gott selbst ihm die Macht dazu verliehen hat, er also nie aus eigener Machtfülle und –vollkommenheit regiert, sondern in Gottes Auftrag die Mächte unterwirft’. Schrage, \textit{Korinther}, 4.178.

\textsuperscript{144} With Fee, I am inclined that ‘Christ is the subject of the verbs at least through v. 26; God is the “subject” of the passives in vv. 27c-28. What is not clear is how one is to understand v. 27ab’. Fee, \textit{First Epistle}, 755, n. 44. Cf. Lambrecht, ‘Christological,’ 506-12. But Schrage sees a subject change in v. 26, interpreting καταργεῖται a passivum divinium like v. 28a. Garland concludes from ὃς’s change of subject from Christ (v. 25) to God (v. 27): ‘Therefore, God is the one who defeats this last foe’. Garland, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 713; Schrage, \textit{Korinther}, 4.179-80.

\textsuperscript{145} Cf. de Boer: ‘The verb used here, ὑποτάσσεσαι, a cognate of the noun τάγμα used in v. 23a, literally means to “rank or order under”, and thus to “sub-ord-inate”’. de Boer, \textit{Defeat}, 115. In English, \textit{OED} reports an architectural use of ‘subordinate’ that gives the sense of -τασ- here: ‘to arrange (arches) in “orders”’. 71
(πάντα occurs ten times in vv. 20-28) – including Christ.\footnote{146} Christ’s reign is characterized by his present activity to re-order God’s dis-ordered κόσμος; by the establishment of ‘new creation as the fulfilment and redemption of the old’.\footnote{147} Paul identifies the focal-point of Christ’s reign – and his argument – by his absolute sentence in v. 26: Death’s defeat; Death’s ‘destruction’ or ‘depotentiation’ (v. 26).\footnote{148} Death will have no effects in God’s re-ordered κόσμος, and only with

\footnote{146} Hurtado notes 1 Cor 15.24-28 resembles the ‘monarchical monotheism’ of proto-orthodox circles (e.g., Asc. Isa.) that ‘represents an effort to affirm a fundamental singularity behind the plurality’. The divinity of the Son (Beloved) and Spirit are affirmed by distinguishing them from angels, but they are subordinated to the Father to avoid tritheism. ‘In these traditions, for example, prayer is characteristically offered to God through and/or in the name of Jesus and the reverencing of Jesus is done “to the glory of God”’. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, 600.


Although Paul uses other ordering-terms in this passage on cosmological reform, he does not use κόσμος. Adams shows well that Paul uses κόσμος mostly pejoratively in 1 Corinthians to effect boundaries between the believing community and the social world it inhabits. But Adams concludes too narrowly that Paul’s pejorative uses here (and in Galatians) means Paul rejects the κόσμος-in-itself rather than the systems and powers dis-ordering God’s good order (κόσμος/κτίσις) that Paul can reference elsewhere. Paul at no place in 1 Corinthians asserts Adams’s conclusion: ‘The world is not to be reformed; it is to be destroyed’ (149). The ‘rulers of this age’ will be disabled (2.6); those outwith Christ will be convicted (11.32; cf. 6.2); here, the rulers, authorities, powers and, ultimately, Death face their end. Adams is right: Paul restricts believers’ activities in the κόσμος – for their own good, the Corinthians must contribute little at present to the κόσμος’s reform. But the κόσμος-in-itself, the material world-order bound up with dis-orderly powers, is not to be destroyed utterly; Christ is to re-order it. Adams, focused lexically on κόσμος, misses the ordering activity here. For Paul does not present God, in heaven, awaiting ‘the end’ with his new-κόσμος to hand; he presents Christ, active here, readying the kingdom to hand to God. Both Caird and Hahne consider the eschatology of the natural world in Jewish literature and in Paul, and each emphasizes the literatures show human solidarity with the dis-ordered and corrupted world. Caird, Principalities, 54-79; Harry Allen Hahne, The Corruption and Redemption of Creation: Nature in Romans 8.19-22 and Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, ed. Mark Goodacre, Library of New Testament Studies 336 (T&T Clark, 2006). Adams is right that Paul uses κόσμος pejoratively in 1 Corinthians to distinguish between what is God’s and what opposes God. But when he concludes from this that Paul rejects the κόσμος entirely, he falls into the trap of equating the word-sense with a concept – of confusing an aspect, an application of the term, for the whole – and commits Barr’s ‘illegitimate totality transfer’ error he was earlier keen to avoid. Adams, Constructing, 17; James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (OUP, 1961), 218.

\footnote{148} Paul’s centring Christ’s reign round Death’s defeat is not an absolute statement of christology, but is relative to Paul’s argument for the resurrection of the dead. Hübner observes that in Paul, except for 1 Cor 13.11, either Christ or God is always the subject of καταργέω, and ‘normally in an apocalyptic context’. Dahl argues that Paul elsewhere never uses καταργέω in the sense of ‘annihilate’, adding: ‘the whole OT conception of aboliing, destroying, etc., seems to have this modified idea that the thing put an end to is still “somewhere”, though ineffective’. Indeed, in the post-Atomist Greek world – and before it no-one seems even to have considered the possibility – to suppose ‘something’
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Death displaced can Christ return triumphant (παρουσία) to see his own re-newed life (ζωοποιέω). In the Meanwhile, before they are rescued, believers suffer Death’s effects. Believers die, really. Paul’s narrative interrupts any mechanical cause-effect relationship between Christ’s resurrection and the believer’s: Christ is busy in the Meanwhile that constitutes the believer’s lived experience. Thus it is not because Christ was raised so believers will be raised, but because Christ was raised and returns – Death defeated, the κόσμος re-ordered –, so believers will be raised. Christ’s present reign, not his past resurrection, effects the believer’s future resurrection. Resurrection is bound up with cosmological renewal. Paul concludes his solution to the particular predicament of real, dead believers, fittingly, with the grandest of cosmic scenes: God reigning, absolutely, ‘all in all’.

149 Cf. Lincoln: ‘The fierce battle to make the powers recognize Christ’s rule is still in progress and only when the last enemy, death, is destroyed and the second stage of the great resurrection event, the resurrection of those in Christ, takes place will the end come. Then God will be all in all’. Lincoln, Paradise, 38.

150 ‘Christ’s reign and death coexist in the meantime, until the end...Indeed unless Christ’s reign is triumphant over the contrary powers on the grand side, including death, it is difficult to see how it can be regarded as totally effective for the life of the individual. The death which must be overcome is not only my death but the death of my world’. J. Davis McCaughey, ‘The Death of Death (I Corinthians 15:26),’ in Reconciliation and Hope: New Testament Essays on Atonement and Eschatology, Presented to L.L. Morris on His 60th Birthday, ed. Robert Banks (Paternoster, 1974), 251.

151 Christ’s resurrection effects hope; Christ’s return (with all that implies) effects resurrection.

152 Barth: ‘That God is all in all, is not true, but must become true...To set right what is in disorder, to abolish what is provisional, to overcome dualism [i.e., the tension between ‘now’ and ‘not yet’], to bring about the “God who is all in all”, such is the mission and significance of Christ’. Barth,
Paul’s narrative reveals an important aspect of his premiss. His consistent argument throughout this chapter is the resurrection of the dead, but here he reveals this means equally resurrection from the dead. Resurrection is not only objective; it is ablative. Resurrection removes believers not simply from a state, death, but from a power, Death. It is this cosmic aspect of Paul’s premiss that will dominate his discussion on the fate of the body (vv. 35ff).

*Ad Hominem* Exhortation (15.29-34)

Paul conjoins (ἐπεὶ) vv. 29-34 to his apocalyptic narrative.\(^{153}\) Because Christ is busy now exchanging present powers for God’s rule; because God’s Kingdom will come; because the dead will be rescued; Paul and the Corinthians comport themselves accordingly – even, as he describes it, ridiculously. In this section, Paul twice (vv. 29, 32) asserts his premiss from the tautology, asking four rhetorical questions in diatribe style\(^{154}\) that extend, *ad hominem*,\(^{155}\) from his and Corinthian practices.

There is little to say on this section of Paul’s argument because there is little we in fact know. It is not at all clear what Paul means by baptisms ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν,\(^{156}\) by his daily deaths and his battle with Ephesian beasts,\(^{157}\) or the full

*Resurrection*, 170 (his italics). Commentators rightly reject any notion of Stoic pantheism; it has no place in this apocalyptic rescue drama. Conzelmann points out the ‘seemingly pantheistic’ phrase in Sir 43.27 is, in 43.28, ‘explained in terms of the Jewish idea of the Creator…’ For he is greater than all his works’’. Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 275 n. 113. de Boer suggests πᾶν is best understood neither exclusively neuter nor exclusively masculine, but stands for ‘the totality of the world experienced by human beings…the universe in which all human beings live (cf. 8.6; Rom 11.36; Col 1.16)’. de Boer, *Defeat*, 125-26 (his italics). Cf. Thiselton, *First Epistle*, 1239. Collins takes it neuter: ‘God might be everything to everyone’. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 555.

\(^{153}\) *Contra* Senft: ‘La conjonction éπει…introduit normalement un argument à l’appui de ce qui vient d’être dit; mais ce n’est pas le cas ici. Le lien logique, s’il existe, est lâche. Les arguments rappellent ceux des v. 12-19 et pourraient leur faire suite’. Senft, *Première Épître*, 201. No; ἐπεὶ occurs here in its regular, causal sense, attached to the previous section. ‘Because this is the case, why…?’ Watson marks vv. 29-34 a *peroratio*. ‘Like the *peroratio* at the conclusion of a work, vv. 29-34 performs the two main functions of recapitulating the main points of the *probatio* and arousing pathos for the case and against the case of the opposition’. Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 242.


\(^{156}\) Hull reviews ‘forty or so’ modern readings of v. 29 (before adding his own). He cites Joyce: ‘no one could catalogue them in their entirety’. Thiselton considers modern and historical interpretations, but only thirteen: ‘It would detain us unduly to enumerate the many which scarcely deserve thought’. Because of the innumerable interpretations Senft confesses: ‘Le v. est embarrassant’. Both Hull and Thiselton agree that the suggestion of vicarious baptism, the most popular interpretation of the verse, lacks historical warrant. Michael F. Hull, *Baptism on Account of the Dead* (1 Cor 15:29): An Act of Faith in the Resurrection, *SBL Academia Biblica* 22 (SBL, 2005), 9; cf. his review pp. 7-49; J.D.
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significance of his two citations: the first attributable to Isa 22.13 and (anti-) Epicureanism;\(^{158}\) the second to a play by Menander, either directly or by hearsay.\(^{159}\) But the point is that the Corinthians’ actions, whatever they are, are moral, faithful to the Kingdom, and worthy of Paul’s ‘boast’ (καύχησις).\(^{160}\) Further, their actions demonstrate that they share Paul’s premiss: death is not the end; there is a resurrection of the dead and the faithful dead will be rescued.\(^{161}\) But, Paul argues, if his premiss is untrue then his and the Corinthians’ faithful, Kingdom actions are meaningless: there will be no Kingdom, for ‘tomorrow we die’.\(^{162}\)

Paul reasons that this contrary assertion is a deception (μὴ πλανᾶσθε) that will ruin the Corinthians’ faithful morality. He exhorts them: think rightly (ἐκνήψατε δικαίως),\(^{163}\) cease sinning (μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε), lest you resemble Some (τίνος) who are ignorant (ἀγνο σίαι) of God. The rebuke is a pathetic\(^{164}\) reminder of the Corinthians’

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\(^{157}\) The language is not likely literal: had Paul literally fought beasts in an Ephesian arena he would surely have died, and only once, – his Roman citizenship notwithstanding. Weiß and Héring see Paul using the language metaphorically and Malherbe, who calls Paul’s Ephesian battle ‘a notorious crux interpretum’, compares Paul’s language to the hellenistic moralists’ struggle with hedonism. Malherbe, ‘Beasts,’ 71, 77; Weiß, *Korintherbrief*, 355-65; Héring, *First Epistle*, 171.

\(^{158}\) Malherbe: ‘His quotation from Isa 22.13...in this context would be reminiscent of the slogan attributed to the Epicureans and reflects the contemporary anti-Epicurean bias’. Malherbe, ‘Beasts,’ 77.

\(^{159}\) Thais, frag. 218. Barrett remarks: ‘It is the only quotation from a non-biblical source in the genuine Pauline literature’. Barrett, *First Epistle*, 367. Cf. Allo, *Première*, 417; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 243. The saying was well known: e.g., Euripides, frag. 1,013; Diod. Sic., 16.54.4; Philo Det. 38. See Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 278-79, n. 139; Malherbe, ‘Beasts’; Thiselton, *First Epistle*, 1254 and n. 249. Koch also thinks Paul picked up the reference from an anthology or an isolated saying, and Garland expounds: ‘one cannot assume that Paul was familiar with Menander any more than one can assume that a person who cites a famous line from a Shakespeare play has read Shakespeare. It had become a cliché, perhaps even before Menander’. Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 722; Koch, *Schrift*, 44.

\(^{160}\) With, e.g., Fee and Murphy-O’Connor, I take this as an objective genitive. It is Paul’s boasting in them, not their boasting in him. Fee, *First Epistle*, 769; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Interpolations in 1 Corinthians,’ *CBQ* 48 (1986): 93.

\(^{161}\) I do not assess Jeremias’s thesis on the meaning of baptisms ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν, on which see Hull, but he is probably right that the definite τῶν νεκρῶν signals the real, dead believers. The real dead have been Paul’s focus since v. 18. Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood,’ 155-56; Hull, *Baptism*, 29-31.

\(^{162}\) Watson notes that Paul’s ad hominem remarks constitute a *topos* that ‘demonstrates that the opponents’ proposition is contradictory or foolish (Quintilian 5.13.16-17) and inconsistent (Quintilian 5.13.30), not in its logic, but in relation to their own and Paul’s ‘behavior’. Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 243.

\(^{163}\) ἐκνήψατε δικαίως is likely along the lines of coming to one’s senses – cf. Thiselton, *First Epistle*, 1255. The metaphor combines the ethical and noetic associations in this sentence.

\(^{164}\) Mack: ‘This is clearly another example of Paul’s use of *pathos* to bolster a weak argument’. Mack, *Rhetoric*, 58.
noetic base for their faithful activity. It counters Paul’s earlier distinguishing believers from those τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτο, τοῦ κόσμου. The Corinthians possess God’s Spirit; they have privileged, revealed (ἀποκαλύπτω) knowledge incomprehensible to those outwith the faith (2.1-16). Those who deny Paul’s premiss Paul demotes to the ignorance of the very κόσμος from which he distinguishes them – and this to their shame (ἐντροπή).

Paul’s exhortation concludes this round of argumentation, as exhortations conclude his arguments in vv. 49 and 58. But it does not conclude his argument. Paul pursues persistently his premiss for the resurrection of the dead in vv. 35-58, reiterating his premiss again in v. 35, v. 42, v. 52, and concluding with a peroratio that is a paean on Death’s defeat. In v. 35 Paul introduces a new round of argumentation – not a new argument – by proposing a logical objection to his premiss that he overcomes in order to establish his premiss.

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165 Scott examines the Spirit’s revelatory activity in 1 Cor 1.17-2.16 and contends the Spirit’s purpose is not to supplant rationality, but to produce thoughtful, moral behaviour. Ian W. Scott, Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of Paul: Story, Experience and the Spirit, WUNT 205 (Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 23-48. Scott’s thesis applies here, where the effect of ‘bad’ philosophy is ‘bad’ character, and where ἁμαρτάνω occurs in a list of noetic terms.
Chapter Three
The Body Not Yet: The Argument for the Resurrection of the Dead, Part Two –
Defending the Premiss (1 Corinthians 15.35-58)

Paul argues for the resurrection of the dead, not for the persistence of the body. That he claims the body does persist through resurrection is integral to his argument, but its rôle is subordinate: it is a means to his end. If we arrive at 1 Corinthians 15.35 fresh, unmarked by Paul’s argument of vv. 1-34, and ask the questions Paul proposes to answer: ‘How are the dead raised?’, ‘with what sort of body will they come?’, we likely ask the wrong questions. Paul’s argument does not supply details of personal eschatology. It does not address the believer’s existential need to know ‘what will I be like in the afterlife?’ Paul’s premiss is that there is a resurrection of the dead – a rescue from Death – and in v. 35 he introduces a commonsense objection – ‘however shall rotten corpses become living tissue?’ – in order to defend his premiss against it. He pursues his premiss doggedly through v. 58, instructing believers along the way how to behave in the Meanwhile as they await Christ and Kingdom.

In addition to the assertions I laid out at the beginning of last chapter I argue here, with reference specifically to vv. 35-58, that:

1. Paul does not use σῶμα to introduce a new argument in 1 Corinthians 15, but to substantiate his established premiss that there is a resurrection of the dead;
2. Paul does not compare the resurrected body to the believer’s lived-in, ‘natural’ body, but to a corpse;
3. Paul’s specific attention on the human body is limited to vv. 35-46;
4. Paul exhorts believers as bodies ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’ to comport themselves ‘in Adam’ as belonging to Christ.
5. Paul never promises believers they will ‘go’ to heaven, but assures believers the Kingdom will come;
6. Paul does not depict the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ as primarily or necessarily a change/exchange of the material body, but as a change/exchange of the believer’s association from Adam and Death to Christ and Kingdom.
The Objection (15.35)

Paul does not begin a fresh argument at v. 35. Having sufficiently established in vv. 12-34 that there is a resurrection of the dead, he introduces a logical objection to his premiss in order to refute it, thus reinforcing his premiss. The technique is typical of the diatribe and Paul puts his premiss, diatribe-style, on the lips of an imaginary objector, asking two questions that are really only one question, differently considered. ‘How are the dead raised? That is: with what sort of body

1 Many observe the construction here is similar to v. 12, beginning with a new refutatio and a new confirmatio of the premiss. Anders Eriksson, Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in 1 Corinthians, ConBNT 29 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998), 267; Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 4 vols., EKKNT 7 (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1991-2001), 4.272; Duane F. Watson, ‘Paul’s Rhetorical Strategy in 1 Corinthians 15,’ in Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, JSNTSup 90 (Sheffield, 1993), 245. Bulembat argues that the diatribe changes the theme from the preceding verses: Jean-Bosco Matand Bulembat, Noyau et enjeux de l’eschatologie paulinienne: De l’apocalyptique juive et de l’eschatologie hellénistique dans quelques arguments de l’apôtre Paul: Etude rhétorico-exégétique de 1 Co 15,35-58; 2 Co 5,1-10 et Rm 8,18-30, BZNW 84 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 39. But it is a mistake to confuse Paul’s second round of argumentation for a second argument; to confuse his objection for a new premiss. The diatribe does not introduce a new premiss – it introduces an objection to the established one. Paul repeats his premiss again at v. 42, and again at v. 52. And he concludes with a peroratio not on bodily existence, but with a jeering jab at Death (vv. 54-57).

2 Allo: ‘Ἀλλ’ ἐρεῖ τις, transition fréquente en “Diatribe”’; Wire: ‘His opening words, “But someone will say”, suggests that he is writing both sides of the dialogue, constructing a stereotyped interlocutor who sees the body decay and is sure there is only this life in which to eat, drink, and be merry’; P. E.-B Allo, Saint Paul Première Épître aux Corinthiens, 2nd ed., EBib (Paris: J.Gabalda, 1956), 421; Antoinette Clark Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric (Fortress, 1995), 169. Cf. Bulembat, Noyau, 39-40. Asher notes that ‘While almost all interpreters acknowledge the diatrical style of this verse theoretically, in practice, they interpret the questions as if they reproduced actual or similar questions that the dissenters of v. 12 had submitted’. Jeffrey R. Asher, Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection, HUT 42 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 64. I agree mostly with Asher’s critique except I see no reason ‘v. 12 refers to the actual situation at Corinth whereas v. 35 is general and anonymous, with no specific person in mind’ (65). Both verses present Paul’s premiss from the tautology, whatever all/many/some/(none) of the Corinthians believe.

3 A number of interpreters follow Jeremias to perceive two independent questions in v. 35. They argue Paul addresses the eschatological process of ‘how’ the dead will be raised and, separately, the precise nature of the resurrected body as distinct from the natural one. Most interpreters read the second question as a specification of the first and argue Paul has been leading up to a discussion of the body’s resurrection all along. I suggest both sets of interpreters commit a common error: seeing Paul’s use of σῶμα as an exposition on the eschatological body that contrasts the natural body believers experience now. Paul does not contrast the eschatological body with the believer’s present body; he contrasts the resurrected body with a corpse. Furthermore, the body is no longer the focus after a few verses, and it plays no part in Paul’s peroratio. The body here functions simply as an expedient to confirm Paul’s premiss that there is a resurrection of the dead. Those who perceive two distinct questions include Allo, Première, 417; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, SP 7 (The Liturgical Press, 1999), 562-63, 565; Eriksson, Traditions, 267; Joachim Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God’ [1 Cor. xv. 50],’ NTS 2 (1955/56): 156-57; N.T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3, Christian Origins and the Question of God (SPCK, 2003), 343. Gillmann offers a detailed refutation: John Gillman, ‘Transformation in 1 Cor 15,50-53,’ ETL 58 (1982): 309-33.

Asher, with most interpreters, regards the second question apposite to the first, but he develops this specially. Asher divides 1 Cor 15 sharply: vv. 12-34, emphasizing ‘death’, represent the
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will they [being now rotted corpses] come [from the ground]? By pointing out the obvious problem that bodies readily decompose in the grave, the question introduces a reasonable objection to Paul’s premiss that the dead will be raised.5

There is nothing particularly insidious about this objection. Increasingly, researchers into both Jewish and Graeco-Roman views of the afterlife agree these views varied in the first century CE, complementing, competing against, and often conjoining one another.6 Belief in resurrection as a general access to the afterlife was

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4 The second question does not introduce a new subject. The ‘they’ in ποίῳ δὲ σῶματι ἔρχονται; retains οἱ νεκροί as the subject from the first question, reinforcing that the second question apposes the first. This also tells against reading πῶς as being about the dead and ποίῳ about the living.


6 For bibliography of Jewish perceptions of the afterlife, see the Introduction, pp. 5-6, n 17. Goodman remarks on the Roman world: ‘Beliefs about the afterlife varied greatly, from doctrines about resurrection and the transmigration of souls (among Pythagoreans) to the defiant tombstones with the Latin abbreviation NFFNSNC (non fui, fui, non sum, non curo; i.e. “I was not, I was, I am not, I care not”’). Martin Goodman and (with the assistance of) Jane Sherwood, The Roman World 44 BC - AD 180, ed. Fergus Millar, Routledge History of the Ancient World (Routledge, 1997), 290. Cf. Martin, Corinthian, 109. Pseudo-Plato’s Axiochus muddles Cynic, Epicurean, and Platonic arguments about fearing death; Plutarch, an Epicurean, comforts his wife at the loss of their daughter and hints toward belief in reincarnation. Mor. 609B.
distinctively a Jewish development but, even in Judaism, resurrection had no fixed form. In some references, the resurrected become radically different, like angels or stars (2 Bar 51.8-12; 1 En. 39.7). In others, they resume something like normal life on earth (2 Macc 7.29; 2 Bar 50.2), even expecting to receive back their own disembowelled entrails (2 Macc 14.43-6). Sometimes there is the expectation of dying again after an extended, trouble-free life (1 En 25.4-6); at others, resurrection is into a renewed creation (1 En. 51.1-4). Many references are simply vague (Dan 12.2-3; 1 En. 62.13-15; 4Q521), and some supply more than one conception (2 Bar 50-51).

The Evangelists likewise present Christ’s resurrection distinctly in each Gospel, and Paul’s account of it in Galatians is distinct from what Luke ascribes him in Acts. Rabbinic discussions of the resurrection in the second and later centuries

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7 Chester: ‘In an important sense…the resurrection belief found in Daniel 12 emerges very naturally from within the Old Testament and Jewish tradition…Hence resurrection can be seen to represent a clear and central Jewish concept, as it develops’. Bremmer remarks on the (waning) contention that Zoroastrianism supplied Judaism’s concept of resurrection: ‘Although earlier generations of Iranists have suggested the contrary, an interest in resurrection is clearly not attested in the Old Avesta and any eschatology seems to be individual. In fact, it is virtually certain that Zoroastrian belief in resurrection does not belong to its earliest stages’. He concludes: ‘There thus is little reason to derive Jewish ideas about resurrection from Persian sources’. Jan N. Bremmer, The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife: The 1995 Read-Tuckwell Lectures at the University of Bristol (Routledge, 2002), 48; 50; Andrew Chester, ‘Resurrection and Transformation,’ in Auferstehung - Resurrection: The Fourth Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium: Resurrection, Transformation and Exaltation in Old Testament, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2001), 65 (his italics). Belief in resurrection developed mostly in the Hellenistic period. The doctrine barely occurs in the Hebrew Bible (Isa 26.19; Dan 12.1-3) and some Jewish groups, such as the Sadducees, actively denied it (e.g., Josephus, Ant. 18.16-17; B.J. 2.165; cf. m. Sanh. 10.1; ARN 5A; 10.826B; b. Sanh. 90b). Several Jewish writings of the period show a development toward the immortality of the soul: see Martin Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine During the Early Hellenistic Period, 2 vols. (SCM, 1974), 1.196-202; George W.E. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism (Harvard University Press, 1972), 177-80.

8 Interpreters often either exaggerate or play down the differences between the canonical Gospels’ depictions of Christ’s resurrection. The Gospels differ among Matthew’s worshipped Jesus, Luke’s ‘stranger’ Jesus on the Emmaus road, John’s breakfast-eating Jesus who appears in locked rooms, and Mark’s simple, empty tomb. But the accounts are not wholly irreconcilable, and their differences are not so acute as when compared to apocryphal gospels, such as the giant Jesus of Gos. Pet. 9.34-10.42. In distinction from apocryphal ‘extravagant legendary embellishments’, Bockmuehl observes that ‘The resurrection itself is nowhere described in the New Testament’; that ‘The canonical authors make no claim to be eyewitnesses’. Foster examines the mss evidence purported for the Gospel of Peter and questions, soundly, the early second century (or earlier) date frequently assigned it. Markus N.A. Bockmuehl, ‘Resurrection,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Jesus, ed. Markus N.A. Bockmuehl (CUP, 2001), 110; Paul Foster, ‘Are There Any Early Fragments of the So-Called Gospel of Peter?’, NTS 52 (2006): 1-28.

9 That the NT produces contrasting pictures of the resurrection upsets some Christian theologians more than others. Thus Stephen Davis attempts to harmonize the NT accounts. Alternatively, Nancey Murphy embraces the ‘contrasting verbal pictures of Jesus’. She reflects on them theologically, philosophically, and scientifically to construct a physicalist image of the resurrection that engenders believers to develop in moral character and social relations. Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Eerdmans, 1993), 53-61; Nancey Murphy, ‘The Resurrection Body and
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CE show the particulars of the doctrine were not then settled, especially as regards
the nature of the resurrection body, and it is the same in early Christian circles.10 The
doctrine continued to be worked out in the following centuries – intently in the
middle ages.11 Thus although by the rabbinic period belief in resurrection had
become a confession of orthodoxy (for both Jews and Christians), the details of the
doctrine would remain open for centuries.

My points are these. First, the rhetorical objection, ‘with what sort of body do
they come?’, need not imply any actual, hostile opposition at Corinth. The question
is appropriate to the topic – the resurrection of the dead – and it remained current
centuries after Paul in both Jewish and Christian circles. (The existence of Murphy’s
article suggests it remains current today.12) Further, the sophisticated, philosophical
objections to ‘crude’ resurrection directed against the increasingly unpopular
Christians of the second and third centuries CE – objections developed polemically
as from any real philosophical incredulity – may not apply to Paul’s quiet little
Corinthians of the early 50s.13 In Paul’s argument, the objection is an expedient to
reinforce his premiss.

Personal Identity: Possibilities and Limits of Eschatological Knowledge,’ in Resurrection:
Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert Russell, and Michael Welker
(Eerdmans, 2002), 202-18; citation p. 205.

10 Questions arise, often with conflicting answers. How is resurrection possible – how can ‘the dust’
revive? What will the resurrected look like? Will they retain their defects? Will they be naked or
clothed? How will the earth accommodate them all? Will they eat and drink? Copulate? Defecate?
Rabbincical Theology,’ AJT 19 (1915): 577-91. Marmorstein discusses similar issues in Athenagoras
and Tertullian. Wright reviews the afterlife in rabbincical literature and the Targumim; Segal in the
rabbis and early Church Fathers. Alan F. Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in the
Religions of the West (Doubleday, 2004), 532-638; Wright, Resurrection, 190-200. See the discussion
between the schools of Hillel and Shammai in Str-B, 3.473f. Cf. W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbincical
298-305. Cf. also 2 Bar 5.1-4. For early Christian conceptions see also F. Altermath, Du corps
psychique au corps spirituel. Interprétation de 1 Cor. 15,35-49 par les auteurs chrétiens des quatre
premiers siècles, BGBE (Tübingen: 1977); Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in

11 See Bynum, Resurrection; Neil Gillman, The Death of Death: Resurrection and Immortality
(Woodstock: Jewish Lights Publishing, 1997); Simcha Paull Raphael, Jewish Views of the Afterlife
(Jason Aronson, 1994).

12 Above: Murphy, ‘Resurrection Body.’

13 If views of the afterlife were as variable as researches now suggest, there seems little reason to think
Paul’s small group of early believers were picked-on specially for an unsophisticated idea of the
afterlife. Popular literature pointed to one-off restorations to life (e.g., Alcestis in Euripides’ Alcestis,
1115-61; Hercules in Lucian’s Hermodotus 7), and Luke presents a mixed ambivalence toward
resurrection amongst the philosophical crowd in Athens (Acts 17.32). Even in later periods, Setzer
observes that non-literary evidence (funerary inscriptions, ossuaries) shows ‘more evidence of
interaction and shared customs between groups, different kinds of Jews, Jews and Christians,
My second point is that the disorganized, conflicting, nonspecific portrayals of the resurrected body before and centuries after Paul, including the Evangelists’ variegated descriptions of Christ’s resurrected body, make plain there was no official ‘doctrine’ of resurrection worked out in detail. Granting even Paul’s brief encounter with the resurrected Christ, this should caution interpreters how much to expect from Paul’s few words on the body’s resurrection, and dissuade interpreters from taking one or two expressions of resurrection in other sources as worked-out systems with which to ‘parallel’ Paul. What little Paul says about the resurrection of the body we must first work out from him.

The Protasis of Paul’s Response: Introducing the Illustrations (15.36-41)

Paul introduces the objection to his premiss and passionately rejects it. ἄφρων (or ἄφρων σὺ)\(^{14}\) is an *exclamatio*, emotively dismissing as foolish a contrary proposition before mustering proofs against it.\(^{15}\) The exclamation predicts Paul’s answer to the objector: really, this is a stupid objection,\(^{16}\) for of course God is able to give whatever body he wants to (v. 38).\(^{17}\) Asher observes that Paul’s use of ἄφρων differs from Epictetus’s μωρ; it falls, rather, in line with the biblical libel against those rejecting God.\(^{18}\) The libel also recalls Paul’s noetic rebuke of v. 34, recreating the *pathos* that to reject the resurrection of the dead is to devolve to the ignorance of Christians and pagans’. Claudia Setzer, *Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and Early Christianity: Doctrine, Community, and Self-Definition* (Brill Academic Publishers, 2004), 123-24. At all events, the polemical objections to resurrection (and Christian ‘practices’ of cannibalism and baby-eating) that developed in the second and later centuries do not necessarily translate back to the early first.


\(^{15}\) Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 245.

\(^{16}\) Using the diatribe, ‘Paul and Epictetus both state the objection as a rhetorical question to show it to be absurd’. Malherbe, ‘ΜΗ ΓΕΝΟΙΤΟ,’ 239.

\(^{17}\) *b. Sanh.*, 91a answers similarly from confidence in God’s power: if workmen can more easily make figures of dust than water, God can easily raise persons of dust he has made of water; if a glass-blower can mend his broken glass God, who breathes his Spirit into a person, has surely sufficient power to raise the dead. Cf. Marmorstein, ‘Doctrine,’ 583-84.

the κόσμος. Paul thus slanders both the faith(fulness) of the hypothetical objector and the objector’s noetic distinctive as a follower of Christ and a recipient of the Spirit.19

To make his point Paul uses two illustrations (similitudes), about which I make two initial observations. First, the illustrations respond directly to the specific objection of v. 35: the problem is dead bodies, not ‘bodies’ in general. Second, the illustrations are ‘drawn from the world of everyday experience’.20 The imagery is gnomic, banal, ordinary – the common property of the perceiving world.

The banality of Paul’s illustrations is precisely what advances his argument. Bulembat notes that the rhetorical function of the similitude generally is to provide ‘un moyen d’induction et pas une preuve au sens strict’.21 Paul likewise uses the illustrations to introduce his point rather than to make it, applying them to his particular argument in vv. 42ff. through use of the conjunctions, οὐτος καὶ. Paul uses these conjunctions together often, but especially in 1 Corinthians he uses them rhetorically to transition from knowledge that is common or established to whatever particular teaching he wants to impart. Thus in 2.11 he moves from a maxim that only a person’s spirit knows a person’s thoughts, (οὐτος καὶ) to the declaration that nobody knows God’s thoughts except God’s Spirit. (And then on to ‘we have God’s Spirit so are privy to God’s thoughts’, etc.) In 9.13-14 he moves from the commonplace that temple workers make their living by the temple, (οὐτος καὶ) to insisting that evangelists be paid by their work with the gospel. Teaching male-female co-dependence in 11.11-12, he begins with the familiar creation story of the

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19 ἀ-φρων: the alpha privative negates the adjective φρόνιμος, the noun φρήν. Paul uses the verb, φρονέω, similarly at 13.11 and sets φρόνιμος opposite μωρός in 4.10. In 10.15 he identifies the Corinthians as φρονίμοις, and at 14.20 he exhorts them: ‘Do not be children in thinking (ταῖς φρεσίν) but be mature (τέλειοι) in thinking (ταῖς φρεσίν)’. On the combined ethical and noetic nature of the τέλειοι (cf. 2.6) see Markus N.A. Bockmuehl, Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity, WUNT (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990), 158-60.


21 ‘Le but d’une similitude (ou analogie) est de fournir une réalité familière qui permette de se rapprocher de la pensée proprement dite que l’orateur veut prouver. De fait, une analogie ne peut bien remplir sa fonction démonstrative que quand elle fournit des éléments de ressemblance. Elle doit en plus avoir quelque relation avec ce que l’auteur vise à montrer, même si elle peut contenir d’autres idées. Elle est un exemple, une illustration, un moyen d’induction et pas une preuve au sens strict’. Collins recounts from Aristotle’s Rhetorica that metaphors be ‘neither strange nor superficial’ (3.10.6), but that they derive ‘smart sayings’ (3.11.1, 6) so ‘it becomes evident to him [the hearer] that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, ‘How true it is! but I missed it!’ (3.11.6). Bulembat, Noyau, 44; Collins, First Corinthians, 563.
first woman formed from man, (οὐτος καὶ) to man coming now through woman and hence: co-dependency. Paul does not always use οὐτος καὶ in this way but, except for 16.1, he does so consistently throughout 1 Corinthians. The notable feature of this technique is the banality on the protasis side of the conjunctions. The illustrations are not didactic; it is the apodosis that imparts new knowledge.

The illustrations are not didactic but readers respond to them with various associations, sounding their depths. Some see, through the seed/stalk imagery, personal continuity before and after the resurrection. Others see the depreciation of ‘earthly’ flesh in favour of ‘heavenly’ or ‘spiritual’ existence. Others, distinctions between the body’s substance (σάρξ) and its form (σῶμα). I approach the illustrations at their shallowest. I strip them bare. I do this in part because Paul’s use of οὐτος καὶ suggests against locating in them anything novel, but that is not the only reason. Paul’s earliest listeners would immediately have made associations from his writing and Paul, himself, would have made associations composing it. The problem is not that readers make associations from Paul’s illustrations; it is that the illustrations are so efficiently generic they accommodate associations of any number.

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22 1 Cor 2.11; 9.14; 11.12; 12.12; 14.9, 12; 15.22, 42, 45. Cf. Rom 6.11; 11.31; Gal 4.3, 29; 1 Thess 4.14. Elsewhere: Eph 5.24; Col 3.13; 2 Tim 3.8; Heb 9.28; James 1.11; 2.17, 26; 3.5. In the Gospels, this use of οὕτως καὶ follows parables or stories (Matt 18.35; Luke 17.10) and illustrations (Matt 23.28; 24.33 par Luke 21.31). Paul uses the construction differently in Rom 5.15, 18, 19, 21; 6.4; 1 Cor 16.1; 2 Cor 7.14; 8.6, 11; cf. Matt 7.12; 17.12; Mark 7.18; 13.19; Luke 9.15; John 5.21, 26; Heb 5.3, 5. Watson identifies οὕτως καὶ an ‘application formula’. Orr and Walther remark: ‘houtos kai introduced more than a simple comparison: it marks a major step in the reasoning’. Fee suggests Paul uses the conjunctions ‘in applying a metaphor or analogy’. Asher overstates the evidence, declaring: ‘In the rest of the Pauline corpus, the formula οὕτως καὶ introduces a statement that follows from a previous argument or analogy’. Based on similarities with Matt 18.35, 23.28 and 24.33, Schrage calls Paul’s illustrations ‘synoptischen Metaphern und Gleichnissen’. He notes rightly the analogies are all from the ‘Erfahrungswelt der Schöpfung’. But it is not only that the conjugations (can) apply analogies, established arguments, and metaphors and parables; what binds them is their utter banality. The illustrations are gnomic, never in dispute; their purpose is never to teach something new. Asher, Polarity, 106 and n. 39; Fee, First Epistle, 784, n. 34; Orr and Walther, Corinthians, 343; Schrage, Korinther, 4.29; Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 245.


24 In his preface to The Order of Things, Foucault recounts reading of a medieval, Chinese encyclopaedia in which ‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulosity, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just
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Paul specifies the illustrations only a little. He takes for granted God’s providence over agriculture, and relates the visible world in terms vaguely resembling the biblical creation story (Gen 1-2). But these specifications are unremarkable – conventions for YHWH’s followers, and not a stretch for anybody else.25 There is little distinctive about Paul’s illustrations to deny the legitimacy of some, many, or all the various associations interpreters have proposed for them. I deny only any legitimate means of discriminating among them. Consequently, I object to using the illustrations as proofs to identify a distinct Pauline teaching or Corinthian position. The illustrations illustrate proofs. I read the illustrations at their functionally most basic: as banalities in service of Paul’s rhetorical apodosis (vv. 42ff.), and as his response to the specific objection to the resurrection of dead bodies (v. 35).

The Protasis of Paul’s Response: Examining the Illustrations (15.36-41)

Paul responds to the objection to the resurrection of the dead first by analogy to sowing seeds. His condition, ‘except the seed dies (ἀποθάνη), it cannot be enlivened (ζωοποιεῖται)ʹ, does not express the necessity of death before resurrection; broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies’. This classification, seemingly absurd, prompted Foucault to recognize that the self-evident way we order things is self-evident only as determined by our own social systems of thought, and it becomes nonsensical in other systems that order things equally self-evidently. This illustrates the readings of Paul’s illustrations. On behalf of Paul’s audience, it is self-evident to Asher that Paul depicts the natural order according to the stricures of cosmic polarity, and self-evident to Martin (and many others) that Paul mentions δόξα and ἀστήρ to teach that the resurrected become star-stuff. It is self-evident to Wright that Paul’s ‘entire chapter is built on Genesis 1 and 2’, and that Paul constructs his cosmology accordingly. It is self-evident to Sider that Paul’s seed analogy teaches continuity of persons before and after the resurrection, which, Altermath shows, was self-evident also to most Western Fathers while discontinuity was self-evident to most Eastern ones. Altermath, Du corps psychique; Asher, Polarity, 71-83; Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Pantheon, 1971), xv; Martin, Corinthian, 126-29; 132; Ronald J. Sider, ‘The Pauline Conception of the Resurrection Body in 1 Corinthians XV.35-54,’ NTS 21 (1975): 428-39; Wright, Resurrection, 346. The point is not that none of these readings is right but that potentially, on their own terms, each of them is. Paul’s generic illustrations accommodate any number of potentially legitimate associations. Stripping them down, I therefore do not achieve the ‘right’ reading, but only another legitimate one – a shallower one, uninformed by soundings from a possible Corinthian Sitz.

25 Even the philosophically erudite could assume God’s, or gods’, involvement in natural processes. And there is little in the Genesis narrative itself or what Paul recounts here that other ancient cosmogonies lack. That is to say, there is little peculiar in Paul’s description either to exclude associations from any number of taxonomies of nature, or to point exclusively to an arrangement other than Paul’s own. I note also that the reference to Genesis is not exact, though the differences are slight. Conzelmann suggests that ‘For the sake of alliteration [Paul] chooses κτήνη (instead of τετράποδα) and πτήνη (instead of πετεινά)’. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 282 n. 18. It is perhaps most likely that the Genesis tradition simply shapes how Paul intuits the visible world, how the world presents itself to him.
that is tautologous: resurrection is from the dead.  

Rather, it expresses the fact of death for the analogy. The objection is concerned with dead bodies, and Paul analogizes with corresponding emphasis on an equally dead body: the naked seed. To sow (σπείρω) in the analogy is to sow something dead; to bury a seed as one buries a body.  

Interpreters routinely miss the exact correspondence between the objection and the analogy. For although most interpreters accurately diagnose the objection as a concern over how corpses can be made alive, most equally treat the analogy as if it explains what a believer’s ‘natural’, living body will be like in the Kingdom. But there is no question here about living bodies. The objector queries how the dead will be raised: with what kind of body will the dead – now rotted corpses – exit the ground (ἐρχονται)? Mis-treating the objection shifts the analogy’s precise referent and, by consequence, Paul answers a different question altogether. For the objection is not, constructively: ‘what might I look like in the afterlife?’ an existential question for ministers, rabbis, and theologians. It is, contrarily: ‘how will the skeletal, rotted, worm-infested remains in the earth ever resemble something alive?’ Paul answers the negative objection by analogy. Keeping to the object of the objection, then, the ‘body to be’ (v. 37), the body God gives as he wills (v. 38), is

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26 Partly interpreters who draw this distinction presuppose Paul polemizes ‘opponents’ claiming to be spiritually resurrected already. But there is equally an eagerness to jump down to v. 51 and read death as necessary for the process of ‘transformation’. E.g., Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 326; Eriksson, Traditions, 269-70. But physical death is not in Paul part of any ‘process’: Paul is emphatic that d/Death is an enemy (v. 26); it is not an expedient to the believer’s soteriological end (cf. last chapter, esp. p. 67, n. 134). Paul does not once refer to ‘transformation’ in these verses; he answers an objection concerning corpses.  

27 There is no evidence of literary co-dependence with John 12.24; the imagery is basic. Bynum observes that these references become foundational for later Christianity: ‘The seed is the oldest Christian metaphor for the resurrection of the body’. Davies cites rabbinic comparisons between resurrection and plant life, remarking: ‘The analogy of the grain of corn used by Paul was thus probably a Rabbinic commonplace’. It is worth noting that the rabbinic comparisons do not suppose ‘transformation’ but query whether a person rises naked or clothed: b.Sanh. 90b; Pirı́ R. El. 33.245; Gen. Rab. 95.1. In another vein entirely, Lampe points to the Demeter cult. ‘Demeter, the goddess of the grain-bearing earth, cared for more than the seeds of grain in the fields. The crowds of deceased humans also belonged to her “seeds”. These human seeds of Demeter, called demetrians by Plutarch (Moralia 943b), thus may hope for revitalization’. Bynum, Resurrection, 3; Davies, Paul, 305; Peter Lampe, ‘Paul’s Concept of a Spiritual Body,’ in Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert Russell, and Michael Welker (Eerdmans, 2002), 107.  

28 Even those who read Paul’s ‘ποίῳ’ in v. 35 as introducing an independent question (‘How shall we imagine the new body?’) come away largely empty-handed. Paul simply does not answer what resurrected existence looks like. Paul gives no picture at all of the body’s future material state; all he tells us is that believers (as bodies) shall be absented of d/Death. Thus contra, e.g., Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood,’ 157.
distinguishable not from the believer’s present, lived-in, ‘natural’ body, but from a dead, rotted corpse.29

The same referent follows in Paul’s second analogy. Just as God gives each seed its own body (ἰδιον σῶμα), there are different types of bodies in the different spheres of the perceptible world.30 Paul puts upfront the point of his illustration in the form of a truism: ‘all flesh (σὰρξ) is not the same (οὐ ἄνωτῆ) flesh’ (v. 39). The point is difference. Differences abound between perceptible bodies, and Paul illustrates the point using four differing references (οὐ ἄνωτη/ἀλλη/ἐτέρα/διαφέρει) and two terms for the body (σὰρξ/σῶμα), identifying two spheres of bodily existence (σῶματα ἐποιώναι/σῶματα ἐπίγεια), and enumerating different objects of the visible world. There are several associative responses used to explain this second illustration, and I do not engage them individually. I make three claims of exegesis on points many interpreters use as proofs for different – often disparate – readings.

First, there is no structural contrast between σὰρξ and σῶμα.31 Unquestionably, Paul moves from the perceived ‘earthly’ order through to the

29 Thiselton typifies the slippage common to interpreters, haphazardly equating the believer’s living body and a corpse. He first compares the resurrected body with the believer’s living body – ‘as it is perceived to be in the old (empirical) creation’. But he later remarks that ‘the body that rots in the grave is emphatically not the body of the future resurrection’ (his italics). Cf., Bulembat, who makes the distinction ‘avant/après la mort’; Eriksson: ‘The point of the comparison is that the body is different before and after death’. Bulembat, Noyau, 41; Eriksson, Traditions, 269; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1261; 1267. The comparison is not between bodies before and after death, but between bodies really dead and bodies resurrected to new life. There is not here a generic problem with ‘bodies’; the objection is here a specific and sensible one concerning corpses. Cf. Paul’s contrast between the dead and the living in 15.18-19.

30 I find unpersuasive Asher’s taking vv. 36-38 as a response to the ‘foolish objector’ and vv. 39-41 a new section, teaching on cosmic polarity. Asher’s claim that Paul ‘leads the discussion’, Socratic-style, is wanting (there is no discussion); there is nothing sufficiently distinctive about vv. 39-41 to identify it definitely with ‘cosmic polarity’ (any more than with any cosmogony); and Asher must stumble over Paul’s repeating in v. 42 the same premiss from v. 35, from which he would have Paul depart. de Vaulx also distinguishes vv. 36-38 and 39-41, but on the grounds that the first set of verses answer πῶς; the second, ποίῳ. I could accept the distinction on de Vaulx’s terms if he claimed the second set merely answered ποίῳ: ‘it will be different from a corpse’, which is the object of the objection. But de Vaulx (as Asher) has the second set contrast between σὰρξ and σῶμα, for which I see little evidence. Asher, Polarity, 79, 81, 100 and n. 22; Jules de Vaulx, ‘Notes brèves sur 1 Co 15,35-36,’ in Le Corps et le Corps du Christ dans la Première Épître aux Corinthiens: Congrès de l’ACFEB, Tarbes (1981), ed. Victor Guénel, LD 114 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1983), 112-13.

31 Paul sometimes idiosyncratically uses σὰρξ pejoratively and σῶμα neutrally, but at other times he uses both neutrally. The terms are normally interchangeable in late hellenistic literature and the LXX, the LXX deriving both from בשר. Paul never refers to animals pejoratively as σὰρξ; he uses κρέας for ‘meat’ (8.13; cf. Rom 14.21). Various creative proposals are made for how Paul here must be interrelating or distinguishing σὰρξ, σῶμα, and δύσα. But Paul’s enumeration of creatures accords unremarkably with the LXX (and normal Greek) usage; although we can read Paul’s use here creatively – in many different ways – there is nothing distinctive in Paul’s usage to suggest we must. See my note on σὰρξ/σῶμα in the Introduction, pp. 8-9, n. 31. For how the LXX translates בשר, see Daniel Lys, ‘L’arrière-plan et les connotations vétér testamentaires de sarx et de soma,’ in Le Corps
perceived ‘heavenly’ one. But σάρξ is contrasted with σάρξ (v. 39), σῶμα is contrasted with σῶμα (v. 40), and δῶξα is contrasted with δῶξα (vv. 40-41). There are four terms in Paul’s σάρξ contrasts and only three in his δῶξα contrasts, the third producing an additional term of indefinite value. And unlike Paul’s initial set of contrasts that appends σάρξ to humans, animals, fowl, and fish, Paul appends δῶξα, not σῶμα, to sun, moon, and stars.

Second, both the ‘heavenly’ and the ‘earthly’ bodies are assigned δῶξα (v. 40), telling against a material contrast between ‘earthly’ σάρξ and ‘heavenly’ δῶξα. The grammar is textbook-standard: a μὲν…δὲ clause, ἡ δῶξα appended to ‘heavenly’ in the μὲν clause followed in the complementary δὲ clause by the article ἡ appended to ‘earthly’. Nothing in the grammar suggests we prefer ‘heavenly’ to ‘earthly’.

Third, Paul’s truism suggests the illustration’s point is difference. Akin to v. 38, the illustration reinforces that God is infinitely capable to furnish a body as he wills, and God has already proved his abilities through the infinitely different bodies.

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32 Thus upsetting, e.g., Fee’s intricate chiasm: Fee, First Epistle, 783. And for Fee’s chiasm to work we should also like reversed the middle terms, ‘heavenly’ and ‘earthly’.

33 Cf. Bulembat: ‘Quand il dit que la splendeur des corps célestes est autre que celle des corps terrestres, remarquons qu'il sait que Paul ne dit pas laquelle des deux est supérieure’. Bulembat, Noyau, 52. Against Asher, it is by no means the case that ‘heavenly’ and ‘earthly’ were ‘universally recognized as antithetical’ Asher, Polarity, 104. To read every expression of distinction or difference as division or antithesis is to read ancient taxonomies and cosmogonies through late-nineteenth-century dialectical philosophy. Ancient cosmogonies generally distinguished among ‘under the earth’, ‘the earth’, and ‘the heavens’ – and often layers of heavens that could include angels, demons, and powers, good or wicked; even Hades. See the distinct cosmologies represented in 2 Cor 12.1-10; Eph 3.10; 1 Kgs 22.19; Job 1.6f.; 2.1f.; Apoc.Abr. 19.4; Asc.Isa. 6-11; 1 En 70-71; 91.16; 2 En 3-22; 3 Bar 3-17; LAE 35.2 (Greek); TLev 2-3 (the different Greek recensions differ between three and seven heavens; cf. 4Q TestLevi 2.11-18); 1QH 3.19-23; Ovid Met. 1.43-49; Clement of Alexandria Strom. 5.11.77; Origen Hom. Gen. 2.5; Plato, Phaed 249A-B; Plutarch De facie in orbe lunae 27-29; De genio Socratis 590B (the meadow of ‘Hades’ is on the moon); De sera numinis vindicta 563D (Plutarch here shifts the tortures of the underworld to the heavenly regions). See Murdoch Edgcumbe Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body: A Study of 1 Corinthians 15, SBT 36 (SCM, 1962), 113-16; Paula R. Gooder, Only the Third Heaven? 2 Corinthians 12.1-10 and Heavenly Ascent, Library of New Testament Studies (T&T Clark, 2006); W. G. Lambert, ‘The Cosmology of Sumer and Babylon,’ in Ancient Cosmologies, ed. Carmen Blacker and Michael Loewe (Allen & Unwin, 1975), 42-65; Robert Mondi and with an introduction by Lowell Edmunds, ‘Greek Mythic Thought in the Light of the Near East,’ in Approaches to Greek Myth, ed. Lowell Edmunds (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 141-98; Adela Yarbro Collins, Cosmology and Eschatology in Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism (Brill, 2000), ch. two: ‘The Seven Heavens in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses’, 21-54. Paul here merely, and commonly, remarks on entities ‘earthly’ and ‘heavenly’, which accommodate any number of cosmogonies and taxonomies. Associations can have been made, but there is no indication v. 40 shows a ‘hierarchy’ (Martin) or a ‘sharp distinction’ (Asher). Martin, Corinthian, 130-32; Asher, Polarity, 102.
he fashioned in the perceptible world. Thus God is capable of giving the dead believer a body that is different – different not from the living believer’s body, which is not part of the objection; different from a dead, rotted corpse. There is nothing in the illustration indicating preference of one type of living body to another, and no mention whatever of ‘transformation’. Paul does not here address questions of the believer’s ‘continuity’ or ‘discontinuity’ between this age and the age to come. Both illustrations reinforce that God, however he does it, is able to fix the problem of dead bodies.

Stripping-down Paul’s illustrations does not exclude a priori any given associative reading, but it does change the sort of question we ask the text. We ask not, can we read this in a certain way; but, must we? Further, the precise referent for Paul’s illustrations is the dead, rotted corpse of v. 35’s objection. It is not, whatever Paul might later discuss, the living believer’s ‘natural’ body. There is no hint here of ‘transformation’. Finally, the illustrations function rhetorically as commonplaces; they do not introduce novel concepts. Novel concepts belong to the apodosis of Paul’s οὐτως καὶ.

The Apodosis of Paul’s Response: The First Series of Contrasts (15.42-44a)

Introducing the First Series of Contrasts

What follows immediately οὐτως καὶ in v. 42 is Paul’s premiss on the resurrection of the dead. He does not introduce a new premiss on ‘the transformation of the body’. He does not use any ‘transformation’ language at all. Death remains Paul’s focus and he refers again to the resurrection of the dead at v. 52 before the climax of his peroratio that is, itself, a dig at Death. Paul answers the objection about corpses that, in the same way that God capably supplies bodies to dead seeds and to the whole of the visible world, so rotten corpses are no deterrent: there is a resurrection of the dead – of dead bodies. Paul reinforces his focus on dead bodies by retaining σπείρω from the first illustration and setting it opposite ἐγείρω in four neat sets of contrasting terms.34

34 Allo remarks of the parallel rhythm: ‘on ne peut douter ici ce soit intentionnel’. Allo, Première, 423. BDF §490 notes that vv. 42-44a follow Cicero’s requirement that a concluding parallel section must exceed the previous sections in length and the number of its members (Cic Or. 3.48.186). Here, Paul’s concluding contrasts have ten syllables, ‘the longest of all these cola’.
σπείρεται ἐν φθορᾷ ἐγειρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ
σπείρεται ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ ἐγειρεται ἐν δόξῃ
σπείρεται ἐν θλίψει ἐγειρεται ἐν δυνάμει
σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν ἐγειρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν

There is no named subject for the first three sets of passive verbs, and many argue that Paul intends the ambiguity. But Paul names σῶμα explicitly in v. 44a, is still answering the objection over corpses (v. 35), and echoes patently the illustration of the seed’s (dead) ‘body’ (vv. 36-37). We can therefore reasonably imply σῶμα as the subject without spoiling any climactic disclosure. By translating σπείρεται ‘the body is buried’, GNB/TEV rightly identifies the bodies on the left of the contrasts as dead ones. This is faithful not only to σπείρω but also to ἐγείρω, for it is nonsense to speak of living bodies being ‘re-surrected’ – they are surrect.

The contrasts are often identified ‘antitheses’, which is true poetically but not, I will suggest, in the sense of producing true antinomies. The first set of contrasts is ‘fundamental’: φθορά-ἀφθαρσία recur in v. 50, with the cognate φθαρτός twice opposite ἀφθαρσία in vv. 53 and 54. ἀφθαρσία stands opposite οἱ νεκροὶ in v. 52. This set determines the connotations of the others. The final set is ‘the most comprehensive’, the contrasts’ rhetorical ‘klimax’. The final set contrasts between

36 Contra Gillmann: ‘If a noun is supplied in vv. 42b-43, then the dramatic impact of Paul’s rhetoric in vv. 42-44a is partially nullified’. Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 327. Otherwise, Fee: “body” is most likely intended as the subject for both verbs in each set’. Fee, First Epistle, 784 (italics his). So also Eriksson, Traditions, 270.
37 NLT equates living bodies and corpses: ‘our earthly bodies are planted in the ground when we die’.
38 OED: ‘upright’, from Latin, surrectus. To apply ἐγείρω to living bodies begs the question that Paul is talking about ‘transformation’. Thus contra, e.g., Fee: ‘The first three sets of contrasts are intended to describe the difference between the “naked seed” and “the body that is to be” (v. 37); that is, despite the verb “sown”, they are not intended to describe the body that is buried, but to contrast the present body with its future expression’. Schrage declares the contrasts ‘vier formal anaphorischen und sachlich parallelen Antithesen der alte und der neue Leib kontrastiert’. Fee, First Epistle, 784; Schrage, Korinther, 4.294. So also Eriksson, Traditions, 270; Andrew T. Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul’s Thought with Special Reference to His Eschatology, SNTSM 43 (CUP, 1981), 39-40; Martin, Corinthian, 126. Eriksson apparently changes his mind, remarking a few pages later: ‘it should be pointed out that when φθορά is used in 15:42, it designates the dissolution of the perishable dead body sown in the grave, where it decomposes before it is resurrected’. Likewise, Fee says in a later publication that the contrasts describe ‘the nature of the body that is laid in the grave’. Barrett proceeds focused on entombed bodies: Barrett, First Epistle, 372, cf. Eriksson, Traditions, 273, n. 158; Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Hendrickson, 1994), 263. Cf. διαφθορά in Acts 2.27, 31; 13.34-37.
39 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 283.
40 Lincoln, Paradise, 39.
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the σῶμα ψυχικόν and the σῶμα πνευματικόν, launching the next section of Paul’s argument – a second series of contrasts. Paul structures the remainder of his argument using contrasts (vv. 42-54a), concluding the chapter with a paean on Death’s defeat. Death’s defeat at τὸ τέλος conditions Paul’s entire argument.

Examining the First Three Sets within the First Series of Contrasts

Interpreters usually translate the first word-pair of the contrasts based on ἀφθαρσία, emphasizing the durative divergence between ‘mortality’ and ‘immortality’.42 But Thiselton argues rightly that ‘φθορά is the term within the semantic opposition that carries the decisive content, in relation to which the contrast is signaled by the alpha privative’.43 In nature, φθορά denotes ‘a breakdown of organic matter’44 – a sense of ‘decomposition’ or ‘a state of decay’45 that suits well φθορά’s referent here of a corpse. Paul elsewhere describes believers choosing between τὴν σάρκα, from which φθορά is reaped, or the Spirit, from whom is reaped ζωὴν αἰώνιον (Gal 6.8). The cognate adjective φθαρτός opposes God (Rom 1.23) and true eschatological reward (1 Cor 9.25). The cognate verb, φθείρω, can connote moral corruption (cf. 1 Cor 15.33), but in Paul the substantives only indicate moral corruption’s consequences.46 Paul binds up the term with the dis-ordered state of the κόσμος,47 characterizing creation’s passive48 enslavement to cosmic power(s) before

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41 Collins, First Corinthians, 567.

42 Or ‘perishability-imperishability’. This is the sense of the word-pair in much hellenistic philosophy (cf. also, for ἀφθαρσία alone, Wis 3.4; 15.3; 4 Macc 14.5). But whereas Paul elsewhere uses all the terms of these contrasts eschatologically, this is the only pair from Paul’s list that also corresponds to hellenistic philosophy. Asher’s defence of the philosophical sense nears circularity. He concludes that Paul demonstrates in vv. 39-41 that bodies are distributed in two cosmic spheres, but that the significance of that distribution is only made clear in vv. 42-44b. In vv. 42-44b, however, Asher’s evidence for preferring the terms philosophically rather than eschatologically is that they ‘must’ refer back to the cosmic polarity of vv. 39-41 ‘because, like the polar distribution in vv. 39-41, they consist of balanced, mutually exclusive opposites’. Even ignoring that vv. 39-41 are not (antithetically) balanced, not mutually exclusive, and not opposites, Asher leaves us with no significance for Paul’s distribution of bodies in vv. 38-41, and therefore with no evidence for the philosophical sense of the terms in vv. 42-44b. Asher, Polarity, 105-8, 142.


44 BDAG s.v. ‘φθορά’, 1.

45 Thiselton, First Epistle, 1272. Cf. L&N 20.38 (under the sub-domain, ‘Destroy’): ‘a state of ruin or destruction, with the implication of disintegration’.


47 Jewish apocalyptic thought determined the substance of the theologically honed usage in the NT, and esp. that of Paul, with its strict differentiation between the perishability of the present world and the imperishability of God’s world to come’. Holtz, ‘φθορά’, 3.422. Schrage applies φθορά not so
its eschatological liberation (Rom 8.21). φθορά thus denotes not duration but
direction: a ‘falling back into the Void [i.e., away from God]’49 and, ultimately,
‘subjection to death’.50

It is in subjection to d/Death that the body is sowed (buried) ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ. ἀτιμία
is a status term,51 and Paul uses it opposite δόξα in 2 Corinthians 6.8 in the sense of
‘dishonour’ or ‘humiliation’.52 Doble resists ‘vigorously’ any correspondence
between ἀτιμίᾳ, here, and ταπείσωσις in Philippians 3.21. He urges that Paul in
Philippians ‘baptizes’ ταπείσωσις into a positive pursuit: the term ‘points to
embracing selves whose lives, whose citizenship (1.27; 3.20), are characterized by
their embracing “humility”’.53 Elsewhere, 1 Enoch 98.3 presents a scene of wealthy
sinners who perish along with their goods, their glory and honour, God casting away
their spirits in ‘dishonour’; Psalms of Solomon 2.27 depicts a ‘humiliated’ corpse,
unburied and despised by God.

δόξα has a wider semantic range than ἀτιμία, but its pairing with ἀτιμίᾳ
orients its meaning here to something related to status.54 Kittel and von Rad see the
NT use dependent on ἰδίως, ‘always used in a secular sense for “honour”’, but also ‘as

48 Adams: ‘the image of enslavement points to an imposed state rather than an inherent one’. Edward
Adams, Constructing the World: A Study of Paul’s Cosmological Language, ed. John Barclay, Joel
Marcus, and John Riches, Studies of the New Testament and Its World (T&T Clark, 2000), 179. Dunn
and Harder see φθορά as a synonym for or elucidation of ματαιότης (Rom 8.20), but Fitzmyer takes
each term separately. See Hahne, Corruption, 190. Cf. James D.G. Dunn, Romans 1-8, WBC 38A
(Word, 1988), 470; Günther Harder, ‘φθείρω, κτλ.’, in TDNT, 9.104; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans. A


50 Harder, ‘φθείρω, κτλ.’, 9.103.

51 L&N put it under the semantic domain ‘Status’, the sub-domain ‘Low Status/Rank’.

52 Fee and Thielston both take it as ‘humiliation’. Fee, First Epistle, 785; Thielston, First Epistle,
1273.

53 Peter Doble, ‘“Vile Bodies” or Transformed Persons? Philippians 3.21 in Context,’ JSNT 86 (2002):
24, n. 54; 26.

54 Barrett states of ἀτιμία, somewhat obviously: ‘Paul seems to use this word as the term contrasting
with δόξα, which has no negative’. Barrett, First Epistle, 372. The semantic pairing is not simply
because δόξα has no negative, but in order to condition which aspect of δόξα is prominent. Cf.
Conzelmann: ‘δόξα, which no longer means “luster” (although this sense still rings in our ears), but
“honour”’. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 283.
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something “weighty” in man which gives him “importance”.55 Wright translates δόξα simply, ‘status’.56 Status remains in play even if we admit associations between δόξα, here, and those apocalyptic texts that describe God’s resurrected righteous ones becoming star-like ‘δόξα’ (Dan 12.1-3; 1 En 62.15; 105.11, 12; 2 Bar 51.10). The apocalyptic texts portray resurrection as vindication from foreign powers, relief from dishonour and injustice.57 In Paul’s argument, δόξα’s pairing with ἀτιμία suggests that δόξα denotes not what materials compose the resurrection body (‘star stuff’),58 but the (dead) believer’s eventual vindication from Death. As with Christ’s ‘glorification’, corpses shall be rescued from Death, vindicated, and shall receive their right status in God’s Kingdom.

Paul frequently contrasts the third set of terms: ἀσθένεια and δύναμις.59 He often associates δύναμις with God, Christ, or the Spirit,60 and he professes that both he and believers experience now the phenomenon of Spirit ‘power’.61 Generically, the ἀσθένεια word-group gives ‘the most common NT expressions for sickness’;62 But Paul often uses ἀσθένεια specially to diminish himself before God and God’s


56 Wright, Resurrection, 347. He notes, in comparison with Phil 3.20-21, the sense ‘of human beings becoming what they were meant to be, attaining at last their proper doxa instead of the shameful, dishonouring status and character they presently know’. Doble’s contrary remarks on ταπείσωσις aside (above), however, I emphasize that the contrast here is between specifically the status of a believer who, as a corpse, is enslaved to Death, and the believer who, finally freed, is vindicated of Death; is a Death-less body.

57 See Nickelsburg, Resurrection, esp. Section II.

58 So contra, e.g., Martin, Corinthian, 118, 126-29.

59 With δύναμις: ἀσθένεια 1 Cor 2.3-5; 2 Cor 12.9, 10; 13.4; ἀσθενέω 2 Cor 12.10; 13.3, 4; ἀσθένημα Rom 15.1.

60 δύναμις with, e.g. God: Rom 1.20; 9.17; 1 Cor 1.18; 6.14; 2 Cor 4.7; 6.7; 13.4; cf. δυνατά τῷ θεῷ: 2 Cor 10.4; Christ: 1 Cor 1.24; 5.4; 2 Cor 12.9; cf. δυνατέω: 2 Cor 13.3; Spirit: Rom 1.4; 15.13, 19; 1 Cor 2.4-5; Gal 3.5; 1 Thess 1.5; Gospel: Rom 1.16. See also Clinton E. Arnold, ‘Power,’ in DPL, 723-25; Walter Grundmann, ‘δύναμις, κτλ.’, in TDNT, 2.310-17.


62 Gustav Stählin, ‘ἀσθένεια, κτλ.’, in TDNT, 1.492.
power (e.g., 1 Cor 2.3; 2 Cor 12.9). Black observes that Paul’s concept of weakness is thus ‘markedly theocentric’, and that his anthropological understanding ‘presupposes a person’s whole being is dependent upon God and is subject to the limitations of all creation’. 63 ἀσθένεια can thus be understood as the limitation upon, hindrance to, experience of God’s full δύναμις. In this way, the ἀσθένεια-δύναμις contrast is similar to the ones preceding it for they, too, reflect creaturely limitations that oppose God. 64 Thiselton suggests Paul uses ἁσθένεια here to explicate further ‘the theme of decay (v. 42) and humiliation (v. 43a)’, and δύναμις to explicate further ‘decay’s reversal (v. 42) and the splendor (v. 43a) which characterizes the gifts, activity, and agency of the Holy Spirit (v.44).’ 65 For Dahl ἁσθένεια, like φθορά, demonstrates direction ‘towards the Void [i.e., away from God]’, and δύναμις, opposite ἁσθένεια, is direction toward God. 66

I have not discussed ἀφθαρσία. Besides its occurrences in 1 Corinthians 15 (also vv. 50, 53, 54), Paul uses the term only in Romans 2.7. There it appears as an eschatological end alongside δοξα and τιμή, though the resurrection body is not explicitly in view. As noted, Thiselton observes rightly that φθορά carries the decisive content in its semantic pairing with ἁφθαρσία. He offers finally for ἁφθαρσία the compound ‘decay’s reversal’, for which the α- maintains the directional sense of its pairing with φθορά. 67 ἁφθαρσία thus becomes un-decay, un-death and, taking death on Paul’s terms, un-Death. φθορά’s explicit direction toward

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64 Ellingworth and Hatton remark: ‘It is perhaps more likely that Paul makes three overlapping statements which are of equal importance and similar meaning’. Paul Ellingworth and Howard Hatton, A Translator’s Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, Helps for Translators (UBS, 1985), 317.

65 Thiselton, First Epistle, 1274 (his italics).


67 Perhaps because Thiselton is indefinite whether the bodies on the left side of the comparisons are dead or alive, he overloads φθορά, burdening it with the entire semantic range of its Hebrew cognates פָּחַר and בְּחַלָּה. Thus because the Hiph’al of חלש can include also moral perversity or corruption, Thiselton retains that sense in φθορά, implying its reversal in ἁφθαρσία. (But recall Hahne’s observation, above, that the substantives in Paul never denote moral corruption, only moral corruption’s consequences.) Doubtless Paul’s vision of participation in the Kingdom includes moral perfection, an un-doing Sin’s effects – though, unlike Death, Paul elsewhere expresses Sin’s power over believers already broken (Rom 6.2-11). But Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15 is specific: it is Death that is the enemy, and resurrection (and later, ‘change’) is an un-doing Death. Deidun writes concerning Paul’s moral expectations: ‘Ἀγαπητοί is being accomplished by God now, and all that he has done in the past, and will do in the future, is to be understood in relation to what he is doing in the Christians now’. T. J. Deidun, New Covenant Morality in Paul, AnBib 89 (Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1981), 62 (his italics).
death (Death) and ἀφθαρσία’s away from it nuances the connotations of the other pairs.

Summarizing the First Three Sets within the First Series of Contrasts

Contextually, the left-hand terms of the contrasts all associate with d/Death. Dead believers are bodies ‘buried’ into Death’s sphere of influence, and the terms convey Death’s effects on dead bodies. This is explicit with φθορά, connoting a decomposing corpse, but Paul uses ἀτιμία and ἀσθένεια frequently opposite God, as affiliates of the dis-ordered κόσμος of Death’s dominion. With the alpha privative, ἀφθαρσία represents the corpse’s un-decomposition. Thus in some sense, though we ought not to press it for concrete imagery, ἀφθαρσία is the body’s re-composition that answers the body’s de-composition in φθορά.68

The right-hand terms, though to an extent excepting δύναμις,69 are ubiquitous in their associations with God. They do not convey, positively, concretely, the nature of the resurrection body. Instead, they describe the resurrection body by its dissociation from the believer’s lived experience of φθορά, ἀτιμία and ἀσθένεια – ultimately, by dissociation of the believer’s lived experience under Death. The resurrected body is a reversal of what characterizes a dead one. Thus, strictly, these three sets of contrasts do not form antitheses in the sense of antinomies: mutually independent entities. φθορά informs ἀφθαρσία, as ἀτιμία does δόξα. ἀσθένεια can best be understood as what hinders δύναμις, and δύναμις subverts ἀσθένεια by working through it. ἀφθαρσία, δόξα and δύναμις associate vaguely with God and, particularly, with eventual, eschatological life with God in the (implicitly) re-ordered κόσμος. But Paul gives these terms chiefly according to their un-relatedness to the believer’s present lived experience of d/Death and the dis-ordered κόσμος.

Resurrection, as Paul’s earlier apocalyptic narrative disclosed (vv. 20-28), is the believer’s eventual rescue from Death. Resurrection is the believer’s bodily un-Death; the believer’s bodily un-decay, restored status, unhindered power.

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68 OED s.v. ‘re, prefix’. 2.d, reports that ‘In some cases re- has the same force as Eng. un-, implying an undoing of some previous action’. It would be a semantic error to read from this that Paul envisions the resurrection as literally the body’s re-growth of tissue and sinew, as though he applies to individuals Ezekiel’s nationalist vision. It may be Paul so envisions resurrection, but we cannot derive it from his word usage here.

69 I note above that δύναμις is a tangible expression of eschatological life. It is the phenomenal evidence that Christ is busy at work, re-ordering the κόσμος and battling Death.
John M. G. Barclay, ‘Πνευματικός in the Social Dialect of Pauline Christianity,’ in The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D.G. Dunn, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton (Eerdmans, 2004), 166. I argue that the term in 1 Cor 15 opposes what Paul generally associates with Adam (Death and κόσμος); perhaps that sense undergirds any more particular aspects of different opposing terms elsewhere. See last chapter, pp. 61-62, n.112, and Chapter Five, pp. 173-74, n. 6, on Paul’s terms that distinguish believers from Others.
locate the terms’ source, Lincoln’s remark of over twenty-five years ago remains germane: ‘No adequate comparative material has been found which establishes the exact origin of this ψυχικός/πνευματικός terminology’. Answering the question of origins is not necessary, however, to follow Paul’s argument. For whatever the terms’ provenance, Paul appropriates and (re)defines them to his own end. Paul concludes his list of contrasts with these somehow already familiar terms in v. 44a, picks them up again in v. 44b as the protasis of another οὖν καὶ construction, and leads to a second series of contrasts.

Before examining Paul’s second series of contrasts, I make two further observations. First, the σῶμα-itself remains constant on both sides of these contrasts.6 Believers, buried as bodies, dead, will be raised as bodies, ‘enlivened’. Regardless what he might later say, Paul indicates nothing here about a ‘change’ to the σῶμα-itself except that God is proved able to fix the problem of dead bodies: the dead ‘shall come’ as ‘bodies to be’ ‘different’ from rotten corpses. What ‘change’ Paul does indicate is a change to the σῶμα’s associations, from its burial into Death to its resurrection unto God, to un-Death. Second, and related, none of these terms in the contrasts says anything at all about the body’s material composition. These


75 I.e., already familiar either because they originated with the Corinthians, or because of Paul’s use of them already in the letter.

76 Confirmed by v. 44a, where σῶμα is explicitly the subject in each column.
observations bear on Paul’s (re)definition of the σῶμα ψυχικόν and the σῶμα πνευματικόν.

The Second Series of Contrasts: (Re)Defining ψυχικός and πνευματικός (15.44b-46)\(^\text{77}\)

The σῶμα πνευματικόν: A Provisional Understanding

Thiselton sketches three major interpretations of the σῶμα πνευματικόν.\(^\text{78}\) First, πνεύμα is the material (‘stuff’) comprising the resurrection body; second, σῶμα πνευματικόν is the post-mortem, non-physical ‘body’ in distinction from the ‘physical’ or ‘natural’ one; third, σῶμα πνευματικόν is the body animated by the Holy Spirit, which ‘derives its character from the last Adam, Christ, who is both Lord of the Spirit and himself raised by God through the Spirit’.\(^\text{79}\) Thiselton adopts the third position.

As a rejoinder to the first two positions, Thiselton notes that the other terms in Paul’s contrasts – decay/un-decay, humiliation/honour, weakness/power – do not denote ‘substances’ but modes of existence. Supporting this, he points to the -ικος suffixes on the πνευματικός-ψυχικός adjectives, endings ‘which regularly denote modes of being or characteristics’. It is -ινος endings that connote composition.\(^\text{80}\)

Fee contributes that Paul uses both πνευματικός and πνεύμα to refer to the Holy Spirit, not a ‘human’ spirit: ‘All of this to say that the small case “spiritual”

\(^{77}\) I (atypically) distinguish a shift in the argument between vv. 44a and 44b because Paul shifts from a strict contrast between what is ‘sown’ or ‘raised’ on the protasis of the οὕτως καὶ to developing and (re)defining in the apodosis what mean ψυχικός and πνευματικός. Watson also records a shift in the argument here, but for different reasons. Watson considers the conditional in v. 44b to function as ‘a proposition with a proof’ from judgment immediately following, and a shift ‘from proving that the resurrection body is reasonable to proving it is certain’. Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 246, n. 52. But it stretches credibility to classify Paul’s use of LXX Gen 2.7 a rhetorical, rational ‘proof’.

\(^{78}\) Thiselton, First Epistle, 1276-81.

\(^{79}\) Thiselton, First Epistle, 1278. Cf. Fee: ‘it is a body adapted to the eschatological existence that is under the ultimate domination of the Spirit’. Fee, First Epistle, 76 (his italics).

\(^{80}\) Thiselton, First Epistle, 1276 (his italics). Cf. Clavier: ‘La désinence “κόν”, la même que dans οὐρακικόν, semble indiquer que cette épithète ne désigne pas une composition, une formation psychique, en ψυχή, mais une dépendance ou une direction...II s’agirait plutôt d’une orientation différente, d’une direction, d’une inspiration’. Wright adds that adjectives ‘which end in –ικος indicate what something is “like”, giving an ethical or dynamic relation as opposed to a material one’. He notes their use in Aristotle of wombs ‘swollen with air’, and in Vitruvius of machines ‘moved by wind’ (Hist. Anim. 584b22; Vitr. 10.1.1). ‘The adjective describes, not what something is composed of, but what it is animated by’ (his italics). Fee notes it connotes ‘belonging to’ or ‘pertaining to’. H. Clavier, ‘Breves remarques sur la notion de ΣΧΗΜΑ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΝ,’ in The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology: in Honour of Charles Harold Dodd, ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube (CUP, 1956), 345-46; Fee, Empowering, 28-32; Wright, Resurrection, 351, n. 120; 352.
probably should be eliminated from our vocabulary, when it comes to this word in the Pauline corpus’.81 Barclay observes of πνευματικός’s ‘pagan’ uses: ‘even if the adjective has anthropological reference, it is never used in relation to some higher dimension of existence since πνεῦμα is very rarely employed to designate the highest human capacities’.

Finally, despite English translations, Paul does not reject a ‘physical’ body in favour of (implicitly) the believer’s immortal soul. Paul rejects the ψυχικόν, putting the ψυχή itself in contention. Any translation of ψυχικόν that implies it is the believer’s lived-in, ‘physical’ body is therefore at best unfortunate.83

Following Thiselton (et al.), I take provisionally an understanding of σῶμα πνευματικόν as the body pertaining or related to, characterized by, the Holy Spirit. But the full sense of the phrase only comes in relation to its semantic opposite, σῶμα ψυχικόν.

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81 Fee, *Empowering*, 32. Cf. Jewett: ‘Paul thinks of the Spirit as an eschatological gift…We note that he does not betray the slightest hesitation in referring to the divine spirit as his own. Here as in all the early “spirit” usage, Paul makes no distinction between the “spirit of man” and the “spirit of God”’. Jewett reads Paul through ‘Gnostic opponents’, and partitions 1 Corinthians into separate letters (here, he writes on 1 Cor 15-16). Jewett, *Paul’s*, 185-86. Although certain Qumran texts refer to human spirits (dispositions) good or evil, Sekki reports that in Qumran literature the Spirit most commonly refers to God’s Spirit, and that the literature generally follows biblical categories. ‘This tendency to stay within biblical categories means that there is no clear use of ruah in any of the nonbiblical, Hebrew Scrolls to mean a disembodied spectre or an aspect of human personality which survives death’. Arthur Everett Sekki, *The Meaning of Ruaḥ at Qumran*, SBL Diss 110 (Scholars Press, 1989), 95.

82 Barclay, ‘Πνευματικός,’ 163. Barclay notes πνευματικός is ‘an extremely rare term in non-Jewish Greek’, and where it does occur it takes the sense ‘gaseous’ or ‘windy’. E.g., Plutarch uses it for the airs circulating through the body (Mor. 129c, 290a-b, 978e), and in Athenaeus it refers to a flatulent (Deipn. 2.55b, 69e). In Epictetus *Diss*. 3.13-15 it is one of the four physical elements that dissipate at death. Barclay indicates Terrence Paige, ‘Who Believes in “Spirit”? πνεῦμα in Pagan Usage and Implications for the Gentile Christian Mission,’ *HTR* 95 (2002): 417-36.

83 RSV, NRSV, REB: ‘physical-spiritual’; KJV, NKJV, NIV, ASV, NLT, ESV: ‘natural-spiritual’; AMP: ‘natural (physical)-supernatural (spiritual)’; WYC: ‘beastly-spiritual’; The Message: ‘natural-supernatural’. Wright remarks, ‘It is safe to say that not only those who read the RSV, NRSV and REB, but quite a few who read other versions as well, assume at this point that Paul is describing the new, resurrected body as something which, to put it bluntly, is non-physical’. Cf. Martin: ‘the misleading translation of the RSV’; Hays: ‘The NRSV’s translation (“physical body”) is especially unfortunate, for it reinstates precisely the dualistic dichotomy between physical and spiritual that Paul is struggling to overcome’. Hays commends JB: ‘When it is sown it embodies the soul, when it is raised it embodies the spirit. If the soul has its own embodiment, so does the spirit have its own embodiment’. Conzelmann observes that ‘the antithesis to the σῶμα πνευματικόν is not a σῶμα σαρκικόν, but a σῶμα ψυχικόν’, and Gundry remarks similarly. Cf. in Col 1.22: τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκός; 2.11: τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός. Allo, on the other hand, says outright: ‘Ici ψυχικὸν et πνευματικὸν ont un sens “physique”, puisqu’il est question du “corps” et non plus le sens moral de ii,14, et de ii,15 ou de xii, 1, xiv, 37, etc., ni celui de x, 3-4’. Allo, *Première*, 424; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 283; Gundry, *Sōma*, 166; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 272; Martin, *Corinthian*, 127; Wright, *Resurrection*, 348.
The σῶμα ψυχικόν and the ψυχή

Whatever ψυχικός might have meant before Paul got hold of it, Paul conditions the term here by his citation of Genesis 2.7. That is a common enough assertion, but it often leads interpreters astray. The too typical response is to pick up on ψυχή from the citation and to turn immediately to the lexicons, sifting the semantic assortments supplying ψυχή and נפש. Thus we come away with interpretations of ψυχικός as ‘neutrally natural man’,84 ‘a person who lives on an entirely human level’,85 ‘animal person’,86 ‘the whole Hebrew person’,87 ‘ordinary human life’,88 ‘merely natural’,89 or the ‘bare idea of living’.90 The designations are innocuous, morally neutral – portrayals of humanity as it is ‘naturally’, independent of identity or identification with anything beyond being basically ‘human’. The designations are unlikely, for a number of reasons.

The first is that the means of acquiring them is poor procedure. The basic semantic unit is not the word, but the sentence.91 The question is not, ‘what does this word mean, lexically?’; but, ‘how does it function in this sentence?’

Second, both ψυχή and נפש have a wide semantic range. If, as many suggest, ψυχικός is a specialized term already familiar to Paul and the Corinthians, how does a quick quote from Genesis (re)define the term’s special nuances into ψυχή’s innocuous sense of ‘the whole Hebrew person’; ‘merely natural’?

Third, how is the basic sense of ψυχή or נפש an appropriate contrast to πνευματικός? If πνευματικός designates particularly God’s Holy Spirit and the Spirit’s inspiring activity in believers, how does the ‘ordinary’ person/body belong on the same list that opposes φθορά to ἀφθαρσία, ἀτιμία to δόξα, and ἀσθένεια to

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85 Thiselton, First Epistle, 1275.
86 Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 48-49. Cf. the Vulgate: animalis homo.
87 Alan F. Segal, ‘Paul’s “Soma Pneumatikon” and the Worship of Jesus,’ in The Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrew’s Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship of Jesus, ed. Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis (Brill, 1999), 259. Segal’s point is that Paul emphasizes the life of the whole person ‘— body and soul — together, not any Greek notion of body or soul’.
88 Wright, Resurrection, 350.
90 Grosheide, First Epistle, 385.
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δύναμις? If he is a ‘neutrally natural man’, simply an ‘animal person’ living ‘on an entirely human level’, how does that explain Paul’s close connections between the ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος (2.14) and the by no means neutrally natural ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰώνος τοῦ τούτου (2.6) and τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου (2.12)?

Fourth, if πνευματ-ικός denotes modes of being, dynamic relation, belonging or pertaining to the Holy πνεῦμα, how is ψυχ-ικός a sufficient counterweight, signifying bland, everyday existence directed by the bland, everyday ψυχή?

Finally, whatever in Paul’s writings gives the impression there exists a ‘neutrally natural’ category of human existence? Paul slices life in two, and humans either belong to Christ or they oppose him, belonging by default to Adam. There is in Paul no option of an ‘ordinary human life’ devoid of allegiance and moral obligation.

Paul’s contrast between ψυχικός and πνευματικός demands a more derogatory denotation for ψυχικός than being haplessly human. However he conditions ψυχικός, it is not by straightforward lexical derivations from ψυχή.

(Re)defining πνευματικός and ψυχικός: The Genesis Citation

Paul conditions the πνευματικός-ψυχικός contrast by his citation of Genesis 2.7. His declaration that there are σώματα ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν (v. 44b) becomes the self-evident protasis to his οὕτως καὶ rhetorical construction. The Genesis citation (v. 45) is the apodosis, posed as a first-class condition. The first term of the condition corresponds to the first statement after the οὕτως καὶ, and the apodosis of the condition corresponds to the second term of the apodosis of the οὕτως καὶ. Paul adds πρῶτος to the citation to make exact verbal contrasts between First and Last Adam, ψυχή and πνεῦμα, and living (ζῶσαν) and life-giving (ζῳοποιοῦν):

92 Gen 2.7b: 1 Cor 15.44a:... ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδαμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν LXX:... καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν Theodotion:... ἐγένετο ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν Symmachus:... ἐγένετο ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν MT: ἐγένετο ἀνθρωπος εις ψυχην ζωοποιουν


94 Stanley: ‘Nothing in either the Greek or Hebrew textual traditions offers any reason to think that Paul might have found the word πρῶτος in his Vorlage of Gen 2.7’. Christopher D. Stanley, Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature, SNTSMS 74 (CUP, 1992), 208.
The point of Paul’s argument – the apodosis of the οὕτως καὶ – is to associate the σώματα ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν either with the First Adam or with the Last: Christ. Paul introduced the Adam-Christ contrast in vv. 20-28 and he further develops it here. Comparing Paul’s references to Adam and Christ here with those of his earlier apocalyptic narrative reveals thematic clusters that surround each figure:

v. 21 δι’ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ ν. 22 ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἄδαμ ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἄδαμ 

The first human, Adam, is associated with Death, death, ψυχή, and the σῶμα ψυχικόν. The ‘last’ human, Christ, is associated with resurrection, life-making, (σῶμα) πνευματικόν, and πνεῦμα-plus-life-making. To these I add that ν. 44a associates σῶμα ψυχικόν with σπέιρεται (and consequently ἀποθνῄσκω; ν. 36) and σῶμα πνευματικόν with ἐγείρεται (and consequently ζῳοποιεῖται; ν. 36). Where ψυχ- occurs, so do its associations with Adam, Death, burial, and death; where πνεῦμα- occurs, so do Christ, Spirit, resurrection, and life-making.

Here is the point. ψυχή’s presence in the passage is literary, pragmatic. ψυχή imports nothing lexically into ψυχικός; ψυχικός derives entirely from its verbal association with Adam-as-ψυχή in Genesis 2.7. Paul identifies ψυχικός with Adam and, by metonym, with Death and Death’s effects. The term is entirely negative; there is nothing ‘neutral’ or ‘natural’ about it. Correspondingly, πνευματικός denotes association with the Last Adam and, specifically, Christ’s cosmic activity that promises to un-do Death, producing resurrection and life-making. As the Last Adam, Christ, re-orders the κόσμος, he functions as the Spirit did ordering original creation. But some read differently here Christ’s relationship with the πνεῦμα.

As with vv. 20-28, Paul’s discourse in this section is not publicly rational; his rhetoric does not conform naturally to the handbooks. Paul’s use of Genesis hardly resembles a rational ‘proof’. So contra Watson, ‘Rhetorical,’ 246.

It is not, as Lincoln suggests, that Paul has ‘widened’ ψυχικός so that it now carries both a neutral and a negative sense. ψυχικός is only negative; Paul supplies no ‘neutral’ category for Adamic existence. So also, although I do not endorse his entire analysis, Schweizer: ‘Paul’s usage is specific when he contrasts the πνευματικοί and the ψυχικοί …The contrast is especially sharp because Paul recognizes no neutral ground between them’. Lincoln, Paradise, 43; Eduard Schweizer, ‘πνεῦμα, πνευματικός, κτλ.,’ in TDNT, 6.436-37.
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Christ and the πνεῦμα: Function, Not Ontology

For Dunn, the contrast between First and Last Adam is an ontological proposition. The contrast requires that Christ materially became the Spirit so that Paul and the Corinthians now experience Christ as (Holy) Spirit.97 For Fee, the contrast is functional, and πνεῦμα derives simply from Paul’s use of the Genesis citation. Thus, ‘Paul’s basic reason for saying that Christ became “a life-giving πνεῦμα” is that the Septuagint had said of Adam that he became “a living ψυχή”’. As such, ‘Paul envisions the risen Christ as assuming the eschatological role that God played at the beginning’.98

Dunn’s position meets several objections, not least that ‘In the nominative, both as subject or as predicate noun (as here), when Paul intends the Holy Spirit, he always uses the article’.99 More generally, Dunn’s proposal falls against those objections raised above to readings of πνευματικός as a substance. Thus although Dunn does well to stress the believers’ phenomenal experience of the Spirit – their being ‘taken hold of by a mysterious power’100 – it does not follow that Christ therefore became materially the πνεῦμα any more than, correspondingly, believers – and All ‘in Adam’ – are materially ψυχή now. Paul makes no statement on the body’s future or present material composition. Finally, Dunn’s suggestion effectively detours Paul’s argument. Paul argues for the resurrection of the dead; he does not expound doctrinally on christology. Death sets the terms of his argument and he argues from the perspective of believers caught in the predicament of d/Death.

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100 Dunn, ‘Last Adam,’ 132. Paul portrays believers as experiencing the Spirit phenomenally, being assured of their identification with Christ: e.g., 2.10-16; 3.16; 6.19; 7.40; 12-14. Cf. Rom 8.9-17; 2 Cor 1.22; 5.5; Gal 3.1-5. (Cf. my note on δύναμις above.) Barclay proposes that ‘Once the new and overwhelming experience of God in early Christianity was interpreted as the presence of “the Spirit”, it was natural that this term, and its adjectival derivative, would play a prominent role in Christian discourse’. Cf. Lincoln: ‘In a Christian context πνεῦμα was seen to be most appropriate for describing experience of supernatural endowment’. Barclay, ‘Πνευματικός,’ 165; Lincoln, Paradise, 41.
presenting Christ throughout as functioning to alleviate the believer’s predicament. Whatever christology we locate in Paul’s argument is derivative.¹⁰¹

Fee argues more persuasively that Christ’s relation to πνεῦμα is here functional.¹⁰² As he did with ψυχή in association with Adam, Paul plays on language from the LXX passage, pulling out πνεῦμα’s association with ‘breath’. God ‘breathed’ (πνοήν) life into Adam; now ‘The one who will “breathe” new life into these mortal bodies – with life-giving πνεῦμα (as in Ezek 37:14) – and thus make them immortal is none other than the risen Christ himself’.¹⁰³ Adam, as ψυχήν ζῶσαν, functions for Death. Contrawise Christ, as πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, functions for the Spirit; for God (cf. v. 21). Christ was himself made alive, and through his activity so shall be All his own (v. 23). Neither ψυχή nor πνεῦμα denote the material ‘stuff’ composing Adam’s or Christ’s bodies.

ψυχικός and πνευματικός (Re)defined

Paul defines ψυχικός by its associations with Adam and, consequently, Death. It is not that the body is composed of or directed, blásté, by the ‘soul’; still less is it that we should understand ψυχή to connote what is ‘physical’. Simply, the σῶμα ψυχικόν is that body ‘in Adam’. Broadly, the σῶμα ψυχικόν includes everyone: All

¹⁰¹ Barrett: ‘It is only incidentally here that Paul discusses Christology. He never loses sight of his main theme, which is the vindication of the doctrine of the resurrection’. Barrett, First Epistle, 376. Barrett aims his remark against deriving a doctrine of pre-existence from v. 47, but it applies equally here. On his reading, Dunn admits that ‘1 Cor. 15.45 is unique in the Pauline writings’ and that we should treat it ‘with reserve’. Dunn, Theology of Paul, 262. Dunn persuasively debunks Hermann’s equating Christ with the Spirit on the basis of 2 Cor 3.17; he does not as persuasively replace the doctrine here. James D.G. Dunn, ‘2 Corinthians III.17-'The Lord is the Spirit’’, JTS 21 (1970): 309-20. Cf. I. Hermann, Kyrios und Pneuma: Studien zur Christologie der paulinischen Hauptbriefe (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1961).

¹⁰² Cf. Lincoln: ‘In Paul’s view the resurrection brought about such a transformation for Christ that Christ and the Spirit can now be identified in terms of their activity and functions’; Furnish: ‘This description of Christ tells us nothing about the apostle’s reflections, if he had any, concerning the relation of Christ to the Spirit. However, it most certainly reflects his understanding of Christ himself as the agent of God’s saving power’. Victor P. Furnish, The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians, ed. James D.G. Dunn, New Testament Theology (CUP, 1999), 114; Lincoln, Paradise, 44.

¹⁰³ Fee, Christology, 118. Ezek 37.1-14 describes Israel’s restoration, not personal resurrection. But Ezekiel plays similarly on the ambiguity of πνεῦμα/רוה, both meaning both ‘wind’ and ‘s/Spirit’. It is not clear at what point in the history of interpretation Ezek 37 began to be read as an expression of personal resurrection, but at least as early as its depiction in the Dura-Europos murals (232-56 CE). See H.C.C. Cavallin, Life After Death: Paul’s Argument for the Resurrection of the Dead in 1 Cor 15: Part 1: An Enquiry into the Jewish Background, ConBNT 7.1 (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1974), 107; 110-11, nn. 26-32; Chester, ‘Resurrection,’ 48-54. Several scholars have seen Ezekiel’s influence on a number of NT passages: Matt 27.51-53; 28.2; John 5.25, 28; 11.38-44; 20.22; 1 Cor 15.45; 1 Thess 4.8; Rev 11.11. (From Cavallin.) Cf. Joseph A. Grassi, ‘Ezekiel 37.1-14 and the New Testament,’ NTS 11 (1965): 162-64.
‘in Adam’ die (v. 22). But particularly, here, the phrase denotes the believer ‘in Adam’. Paul introduced the σῶμα ψυχικόν with reference specifically to a dead body: the buried σῶμα of v. 43a. Only those dead ‘in Christ’, ‘of Christ’, will become bodies ‘enlivened’ (vv. 22-23, 36, 45), ‘raised’ (vv. 42-44). Paul promises that the σῶμα ψυχικόν – the believer-as-corpse – will be raised a σῶμα πνευματικόν.

Paul associates πνευματικός with the Last Adam: Christ. Constructively, the σῶμα πνευματικόν has immediate associations with the Holy Spirit, but Paul does not give the σῶμα πνευματικόν chiefly in constructive terms. Mostly, he identifies it by what it is not. The σῶμα πνευματικόν is that body no longer determined by Adam: a corpse, buried in decay (φθορά), dishonour (ἀτιμία), and weakness (ἀσθένεια), and bound to Adam(-as-ψυχή), i.e., Death. Instead, the σῶμα πνευματικόν is the body released of decay (ἀφθαρσία), removed from dishonour (δόξα), no longer hindered from God’s full power (δύναμις). The σῶμα πνευματικόν is the σῶμα alive to God through Christ and Spirit specifically in terms of its release from Adam and Death and Death’s debilitating effects. And as the sequence of v. 46 (cf. vv. 23-24) shows, the σῶμα πνευματικόν is the believer-as-σῶμα enlivened at τὸ τέλος.

Importantly, throughout his contrasts between σώματα associated with either Adam or Christ, Paul never distinguishes believers from their bodies. σῶμα remains constant. There is never the hint that death effects the escape of something (ψυχή, πνεῦμα) from the body, even temporarily. Believers are bodies and, dead, they are buried dead bodies. Resurrection is thus not in 1 Corinthians a ‘life after life

104 Cf. Wire: ‘Paul rejects any positive reading of “soul” and identifies it with that which is sown in decay (cf. 2:14)’. Wire, Women Prophets, 170.
105 My study’s controls restrict me from adequately engaging 2 Cor 5.1-10 and Phil 1.23-24 and the question of Paul’s development. See the Introduction, pp. 12-13 and nn.
106 The perfect-tense ‘κεκοιμημένων’ in v. 20 reinforces the dead’s persistent state of deadness. Emphatically, I am not after a comprehensive ‘theology’ of death in Paul. Paul does not in 1 Corinthians speculate on the nature of the dead ‘in Christ’, and both ‘Jewish’ and ‘Greek’ conceptions of death accommodate his silence. It could be Paul retains the minimalist perspective of the Hebrew Bible and the Greek epic tradition: the dead are ‘shades’ in Sheol or Hades, drained of life. Resurrection would then make them alive. Alternatively, he may somehow adapt an Epicurean or Stoic position that believers at death dissipate, atomistically or into their constituent elements, and speculate that resurrection effects the believer’s reassemblage/re-creation. He does not say. What he reports in 1 Corinthians is that Death is a cosmic power that rules until τὸ τέλος. The ‘sleepers’ in Christ (vv. 18, 20) are implicit ‘hopers’ with the living (v. 19) for their future liberation (v. 23). Anecdotally, I note Bruce’s remark: The tension created by the postulated interval between death and resurrection might be relieved today if it were suggested that in the consciousness of the departed believer there is no interval between dissolution and investiture, however long an interval might be
after death’; resurrection is relief from d/Death. Death is in no way a soteriological end; Death is an enemy that shepherds until τὸ τέλος. Only at τὸ τέλος – Death defeated, the Kingdom established – do believers become bodies loosed of Death. Paul maintains his focus on d/Death to the end of his argument, declaring that ‘we shall not all die’ (πάντες οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα; v. 51), that the dead shall be raised (v. 52), that decay shall be undone (vv. 52-54), that ‘Death shall be swallowed up in victory’ (vv. 54-57). Immediately, however, he introduces a third series of contrasts that develop further his contrast between the two Adams. Notably, as he does so he leaves the σῶμα behind.

**The Third Series of Contrasts: The Two Adams (15.47-49)**

Taking Leave of the Body

Paul does not in vv. 35-46 discuss the living believer in her or his ‘natural’, lived-in body. In vv. 35-44a, σῶμα designates alternately the resurrection body and, specifically, a corpse. σῶμα as a corpse follows a hypothetical objection to Paul’s premiss that there is a resurrection of the dead: ‘How can the dead be raised if they are buried, rotted bodies? With what kind of body will these corpses come from the ground?’ Paul overcomes the objection, answering simply: ‘God can do it!’ (v. 38). He expounds that the body buried dead – in all its associations with Adam and Death – will be raised un-dead – un-Death-ed – enlivened in its association with God (Christ and life and Spirit). Associations under one order will have been replaced by associations under another. In v. 44 Paul drops σῶμα from his contrasts, and he never again picks it up. But he keeps the neuter σῶμα in view through v. 46, contrasting the neuter modifiers, ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν. After v. 46, he drops the neuters.

Paul shifts his focus in v. 47 from dead believers to living ones, taking leave of the body. Again: σῶμα no longer features explicitly in Paul’s argument; the argument is not a contrast between bodies. Paul has already answered adequately the objection concerning dead σῶμα; now, he turns to the ends awaiting living humans according to their present associations with either Adam or Christ. This does not

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108 Not even a penultimate end, for to be dead is to be in enemy territory. Cf. last chapter, pp. 66-67, esp. n. 134.
mean we somehow exclude bodies from view, however. Paul’s argument implies that persons are indistinguishable from their bodies: persons are bodies, whatever that entails. In vv. 47-49 Paul develops how persons relate to their only two possible modes of existence: association either with Adam or with Christ.

Contrasting the Two Adams

Still building on the Genesis citation, Paul in v. 47 introduces a new set of contrasts. There are no verbs in these verses, leaving readers to supply the tense. Adam and Christ remain the subjects, but Paul newly designates the pair as the first and second humans. The first and second humans here each represents his respective constituency ‘in Adam’ or ‘in Christ’, and Paul now applies their associative effects to living persons instead of only to dead believers.

Paul coins the adjective χοϊκός from Genesis’s χοῦς, reinforcing Adam’s connection to his environment that is explicit in the Hebrew but less acute in the LXX. Humans are dust (γῆ/עפר) and to dust (εἰς γῆν/אל־עפר) they will return (Gen 3.19). εξ οὐρανοῦ opposes εκ γῆς, but no adjective corresponds to χοϊκός. The lack of a corresponding adjective suggests that χοϊκός does not mark a contrast.


111 Paul gives no indication of tense in these verses. Not counting the participles ζῶσαν and ζῳοποιοῦν, the only verb between vv. 45-48 is ἐγένετο from the Genesis citation. Collins notes: ‘An elliptical phrase without a verb enunciates a statement of principle’. Collins, First Corinthians, 571. Paul applies associations with Adam and Christ generally to the lived experiences of everyone existing in the Meanwhile comprising Christ’s resurrection and return.

112 Gillmann: ‘In vv. 45-47 Paul develops the Adam-Christ typology; in vv. 48-49 he applies this to the lives of believers’. Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 330. But Paul marks his shift not in v. 48, but explicitly in v. 47 by newly designating his central characters as the first and second humans.

113 ‘The adjective is not found elsewhere in Greek’. Eduard Schweizer, ‘χοϊκός,’ in TDNT, 9.477.

114 The Hebrew makes a pun between ‘human’ (אדם) and ‘ground’ (אדמה): הָאָדָם כְּעֶפֶר הַגֵּן. The LXX renders this χοῖν απὸ τῆς γῆς. Paul’s adjective underscores Adam’s relation to ‘the ground’, qualifying him ‘dusty’. Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 571.

115 רַע stands behind both χοῦς (Gen 2.7) and γῆ (Gen 3.19). Cf. Ecc 3.20.

116 p46 ‘corrects’ the lack of symmetry, appending to the nominative δάνθρωπον the nominative πνευματικός. The seventh-century marginalia n and D, as well as א and י, append δύναμις, which may reflect Marcion’s use of δύναμις alone. Thiselton observes that already Tertullian objected to Marcion’s changing the text for his own purposes (Marc. 5.10). With Metzger, δάνθρωπος alone best accounts for the origin of the other readings and is ‘supported by a strong combination of early and good witnesses representing several text-types’. Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament : A Companion Volume to the United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament (Fourth Revised Edition), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: UBS, 1994), 568; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1285.
between types of material bodies; χοϊκός is not derogatory of ‘physical’ existence.\footnote{117} Instead, the adjective underscores Adam’s connection with his environment and, consequently, Death. Paul’s ‘dusty’ Adam shares all the frailty, decay, and death of the dis-ordered κόσμος.\footnote{118} Notably, Paul again makes no connection between Adam and Sin; he associates the ‘dusty’ human only with Death.\footnote{119}

Christ’s environment is ‘heaven’, and from heaven he comes at τὸ τέλος.\footnote{120} Paul nowhere promises believers they will ever go to heaven; his eschatology insists that Christ comes (παρουσιά) to rescue his constituents (οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; v. 23), having re-ordered the dis-ordered κόσμος (vv. 25-28; cf. vv. 51-56), defeated Death (v. 26), delivered God the Kingdom (vv. 23-24; cf. vv. 50-52). Paul’s eschatological scheme challenges notions both that ‘ἐξ οὐρανοῦ’ indicates Christ’s pre-existence,\footnote{121} when considered with the contrast of πνευματικόν and ψυχικόν. Paul, therefore, in the ‘classic passage’ of 1 Cor 15.21-22, does so only in Romans where his purpose is to battle both the powers Sin and Death instead of, here, only Death.

\footnote{117} Fee is right to dismiss notions that χοϊκός denotes the body’s material composition, but he misses that Paul has departed from specifically discussing the body altogether: ‘The use of the adjective indicates Paul’s interest is not in the “stuff” or dust of the earth per se, but in describing Adam’s body as being “earthy”, that is, subject to decay and death’. Fee, First Epistle, 792, n. 24. It is not that Adam’s body, somehow abstracted from Adam, is subject to decay and death, but that Adam is. There is neither a particular focus on Adam’s body, nor on what makes Adam up.

\footnote{118} Schweizer reviews υγρός in the Hebrew Bible and Jewish literature (it is uncommon in Greek writing), noting its use frequently both to demonstrate human frailty before YHWH and as a term for the dead. Schweizer, ‘χοϊκός,’ 9.472-77. Philo’s coincidental exegesis of Gen 2.7 has impressed many scholars (see above on the origins of the ψυχικός-πνευματικός contrast: pp. 94-95, n. 73). But since both Philo and Paul are reading the same Genesis text we should not be surprised by some overlap. Importantly, not only do their interpretations diverge significantly, but they do not share sufficiently one another’s crucial, distinctive language to evidence a common reading tradition (e.g., Paul: ψυχικόν; πνευματικόν; χοϊκός; Philo: γήϊνος; ἐκ σποράδος ὤλης; αἴσθητος; ἀσώματος). See further Robin Scroggs, The Last Adam: A Study in Pauline Anthropology (Fortress, 1966), 115-22; A.J.M. Wedderburn, ‘Philo’s “Heavenly Man”,’ NovT 15 (1973): 301-26.

\footnote{119} Cf. last chapter, p. 60, n. 102. Sider ‘suspects’ ‘that in vv. 45-49 the first man of the earth cannot be separated in St Paul’s mind from the fact that he became a sinner’. He appeals to ‘the other two classic passages where Paul contrasts Adam and Christ’, 1 Cor 15.21-22 and Rom 5.12-19, and concludes, erroneously: ‘it is precisely that Adam who sinned and thus brought sin and death on all his descendants who is in view’. Sider, ‘Pauline,’ 434. As noted last chapter, Paul does not associate Adam with sin in the ‘classic passage’ of 1 Cor 15.22-22; he does so only in Romans where his purpose is to battle both the powers Sin and Death instead of, here, only Death.

\footnote{120} ‘[T]he “second man”…comes from heaven; this place of origin, the motion from it to earth…and above all the character of “heaven” as the creator’s own sphere, where Jesus is currently ruling, is then indicated by epouranios’. Wright, Resurrection, 355 (his italics).

\footnote{121} In Paul’s telling of the story, Christ succeeds Adam, not the other way round. Cf. Lincoln: ‘For Paul to talk about the heavenly origin of Christ’s humanity by virtue of his pre-existence would be to contradict what he had said about the psychological being first and the spiritual second’. In his article on ‘pre-existence’, Hurtado excludes this verse from consideration. Otherwise, Allo argues for incarnation (so also Héring). But Allo’s reasoning is theological, not exegetical, and his comparison with Phil 2.6 is unpersuasive. 1 Cor 15 is not about christology, about Christ-in-himself; it is about Christ’s rescue of those bound to Death. Less persuasive is Conzlemann’s gnostic ‘Primal Man’, which suffers also from the lack of any actual evidence of first-century gnostic beliefs. Allo, Première, 428-29; Conzlemann, I Corinthians, 287, n. 62, and his ‘Excursus’ on pp. 284-86; Jean Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A.W. Heathcote and P.J. Allcock.
and that ἐκ γῆς and ἐξ οὐρανοῦ contrast the believer’s present and ultimate locales. Instead, they provide ‘a contrast in the clearest terms between the characteristics of two modes of existence’. As with the previous contrasts, the ‘modes of existence’ are determined by their associations with either Adam or Christ.

At v. 48 Paul introduces the living into his discourse. As with ἐκ γῆς and ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in v. 47, the correlative pronouns οἷος and τοιοῦτοι reinforce that it is the characterization of what is earthly and heavenly in view, not their location. The dusty ones share with Adam the fate of the dis-ordered κόσμος; ultimately, death. Death is the fate of the dusty human, and All ‘in Adam’ die. To be ‘dusty’ means here simply to be mortal, prone to death. The heavenly ones share through Christ the promise of the Kingdom (v. 50), that All ‘in Christ’ shall be ‘made alive’ at his coming (v. 22-23). Again: there is no mention at all of ‘bodies’. Instead, Paul concludes the contrasts by exhorting believers to behave appropriately according to their association with the ‘heavenly human’ to come, Christ.

The Exhortation (15.49)

Defence of the Subjunctive Reading

Contrary to English translations, the verbs in v. 49 are aorist indicative and aorist subjunctive, not present and future indicative. The discrepancy is not simply

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122 This is the fatal flaw undermining Asher’s entire analysis. By reading Paul’s argument as an explanation of the traverse between ‘earthly’ and ‘heavenly’ realms, Asher misses that Paul never once suggests believers ‘go’ to heaven, but promises explicitly that Christ and Kingdom will ‘come’. Asher, Polarity. Cf. Wright: ‘The point is not, in other words, that the new humanity will exist in a place called “heaven”. Rather, it will originate there, where Jesus himself is in his own risen and life-giving body; and it will transform the life of those who are presently located on earth and earthly in character’; Thiselton: ‘For heaven is not a locality as such, but the realm characterized by the immediate presence and purity of the living God in and through Christ and the Spirit’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 1287; Wright, Resurrection, 355. Cf. BDAG s.v. ἐπουράνιος, 2.

123 Thiselton, First Epistle, 1287.

124 Wire: ‘the Adam who dies gives way to the Adam who generates life, the earthly one to the heavenly one, and – at last they hear themselves named – those of earth to those of heaven’. For Wire, this sequence represents the baptismal traditions: ‘the spirit that gives life, the new human being from the old, the life that comes out of death’. Wire, Women Prophets, 172-73.

125 οἷος ... τοιοῦτοι are correlative pronouns that ‘denote quality characterization’ (Thiselton); ‘of such nature as the one, of such nature as the other’ (Fee). Thiselton, First Epistle, 1286, n. 145; Fee, First Epistle, 793, n. 30.

126 NIV, NKV, NASU, KV, ASV, NAS, RSV translate ἐφρέσαμεν ‘have borne’; TLB: ‘just as each of us now has a body like Adam’s’. NIV, NKV, NASU, KV, ASV, NAS, RSV, TLB translate the second φορέω ‘shall/will bear’, though the NIV and NRSV note the subjunctive as a variant.
translational but effects from a poor text-critical decision. Although by far the best mss, both in quality and diversity, show the subjunctive, φορέσωμεν,127 most commentators prefer the future, reading φορέσομεν.128 The reasons, if given, usually parrot Metzger’s ‘exegetical considerations (i.e., the context is didactic, not hortatory)’129 and Barrett’s explanation that the omicron and omega that distinguish each form are ‘pronounced identically’, so ‘only exegesis can determine the original sense’ (hence: back to Metzger).130

But these reasons are unsatisfactory. Barrett’s long and short ‘o’ of course cut both ways, and it is easier to account for the slip to the indicative in a handful of mss than to the subjunctive in the majority of them. Thus Fee asks why, if the future supposedly makes best exegetical sense, is there ‘a nearly universal…change to the hortatory subjunctive?’131 Collins argues that exegesis in fact supports a hortatory reading: just as in vv. 34 and 58, Paul concludes his rhetorical proofs with an exhortation.132 And I object that the passage’s being in a ‘didactic’ context is hardly reason to exclude an exhortation in Paul. The ‘problem’ of indicatives and


128 B, and a few minuscules. UBS4 ranks it ‘B’, promoting it from ‘C’ in UBS3. Weiβ compares the textual decision here to that between ἔχωμεν and ἔχομεν in Rom 5.1. Weiβ, Korintherbrief, 377.


130 Barrett, First Epistle, 369, n. 2.

131 ‘But the UBS committee abandoned its better text-critical sense here. If the reading of B et al. were original, given that it makes so much sense in context, how is one to account for such a nearly universal…change to the hortatory subjunctive?...Far better to make sense of what best explains how the other came about than to assume that the context cannot here be hortatory’. Fee, First Epistle, 787, n. 5. Fee elsewhere puts it: ‘the future is found in only a few disparate MSS and is easily accounted for on the very same grounds that it is adopted by so many, while it is nearly impossible to account for anyone’s having changed a clearly understandable future to the hortatory subjunctive so early and so often that it made its way into every textual history as the predominant reading’ (795).

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imperatives has been a cornerstone of Pauline ethics since Bultmann introduced it in 1924.133 ‘If we live by the Spirit, let us walk by the Spirit’ (Gal 5.25).

An additional problem is that most who prefer the future simply translate ἐφρέσαμεν (aorist) – without comment – as a present.134 Those few who do remark on the aorist do not well explain why Paul should have chosen the aorist to do, by their readings, the present’s job.135 The commonest solution is to view the aorist from the perspective of the future.136 Thus Schrage, acknowledging that v. 49 ‘ist nicht ohne Probleme’, explains the aorist as a statement of certainty.137 Kittel argues similarly,138 and Senft remarks: ‘Paul exprime avec force la certitude que la victoire du Christ et de la vie est déjà acquise et notre participation à sa victoire assurée (cf Rm 8.23-25; Ph 3.3s; 1 Jn 3.2)’.139 But the aorist in Romans 8.24, ἐσώθημεν, refers


134 Héring preserves the aorist with the passé simple: ‘Nous autres chrétiens sommes destinés à devenir des céléstes, à l’image de l’homme céleste, comme nous fûmes des terrestres à l’image du premier Adam’. Heathcote and Allcock reflect this in their English translation: ‘we Christians are destined to become heavenly, in the image of the Heavenly Man, as we were earthly in the image of the first Adam’ Jean Héring, La Première Épitre de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens, Commentaire du Nouveau Testament 7 (Neuchatel: Éditions Delachaux & Niestle, 1959), 149; Héring, First Épistle, 179. (My italics.) On the other hand, Héring is amiable to the subjunctive.

135 Fee: ‘had Paul intended a simple contrast between present and future, one would expect him to have continued to use the present here’. Fee, Christology, 119, n. 91. Of course, Paul does not ‘continue’ to use any tense here, for there has not been a verb since the citation in v. 45. Nevertheless, vv. 46-48 do not imply an aorist-future contrast.

136 Morris notes another option: ‘The use of the aorist may, as Parry thinks, be inceptive, “began to wear, put on”’, though Morris prefers to take it as perceived from the future, to ‘regard our life as a completed whole’. Orr and Walther offer: ‘The past aorist points to the condition, not the continuity of the experience’. Leon Morris, 1 Corinthians, Revised ed., TNTC (IVP, 1988), 231; Orr and Walther, Corinthians, 344. Morris gives no page reference, but notes Reginald St John Parry, Commentary on 1 Corinthians, CGTC (CUP, 1926).


139 Senft, Première Épitre, 210.
to τῇ ἐλπίδι – a believer’s present possession. And there are no comparable aorists in Philippians 3.3f. nor in 1 John 3.2.¹⁴⁰

The typical ‘exegetical considerations’ for dismissing the subjunctive (and the aorist as aorist) in fact call into question vv. 47-49’s typical exegesis. The exegesis of the verse typically follows the assumption that Paul’s preceding contrasts are between two types of body. Thus Kittel remarks on the verse: ‘It is speaking of the contrast between the earthly, physical σῶμα on the one side and the heavenly, pneumatic on the other’.¹⁴¹ The verb must therefore be future, Kittel reasons, for believers clearly do not possess their ‘pneumatic’ bodies now. But I have contended that vv. 47-49 do not contrast ‘bodies’ at all. And to look at Kittel’s reasoning the other way round, the aorist and subjunctive in v. 49 support my contention.¹⁴²

Examining the Exhortation

Paul clearly does not command Corinthians now ‘to bear’ the εἰκών of Christ’s resurrected, material body. Instead, Paul’s exhortation is consistent with his contrasts between the ‘dusty’ and ‘heavenly’ humans: the focus is on characterization.¹⁴³ Dusty humans are characterized by the Adam of earth. They have no future; their end is death. But believers, though ‘in Adam’, are no longer ‘of Adam’. They are marked ‘of Christ’ (15.23) and, consequently, are to represent Christ ‘effectively’, ‘functionally’,¹⁴⁴ now. Believers bore Adam’s character –

¹⁴⁰ Senft’s verses show only that believers have an assured future; they demonstrate nothing about aorist functions. The aorists in these verses reflect actual, past actions or, as in Phil 3.12, Paul negates the aorist: ‘I have not already obtained’. 1 John 3.2 likewise negates the aorist: ‘It does not yet appear what we shall be’. This is nothing like saying, positively, ‘we bore Adam’s image’ when supposedly we still do.


¹⁴² Sider affirms the subjunctive reading but misses that Paul has left the σῶμα behind. Consequently, he mistakenly has Paul exhort the believer to become already a σῶμα πνευματικόν: ‘Instead of predicting what Christians will be like, v. 49 is urging Christians now living to bear the image of the man of heaven. Presumably a living Christian with a very material, very physical body can become a σῶμα πνευματικόν. If so, then one cannot understand “spiritual body” as a non-material substance’. Sider, ‘Pauline,’ 434. But the σῶμα πνευματικόν is the believer’s future, passive, bodily rescue from Death. It does not manifest until τὸ τέλος.

¹⁴³ Fee: ‘the exhortation is not that the Corinthians try to assume their “heavenly body” now…Rather, they are being urged to conform to the life of the “Man of heaven” as those who now share his character and behavior’. Fee, First Epistle, 795. Fee falters, according to my reading, by reading vv. 47-48 still as a contrast between bodies so that Paul’s exhortation is sudden and jarring.

¹⁴⁴ Using Gen 1.26, Dahl puts it that the believer ‘effectively represents God’. Dahl, Resurrection, 110 (italics his). But Schrage and Barrett argue there is little here to indicate the ‘divine image’ of Genesis 1.26; perhaps more the image of Adam in Genesis 5.3. Barrett, First Epistle, 377; Schrage, Korinther, 4.310. Cf. Kittel, Rad, and Kleinknecht, ‘εἰκών,’ 2.396. See also Bultmann, Theology, 1.192-93. Clines asserts of εἰκών and μορφή, as well as of χαρακτήρ (Heb 1.3) and δομοίος (James 3.9), that
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ways of being τοῦ κόσμου that some Corinthians were (τινες ἦτε – 6.11; cf. 5.9-11; 6.9-11) when they were still fated not to inherit God’s Kingdom (6.9). Now, Paul exhorts believers to ‘put on’ Christ’s character.

Paul uses εἰκών with τοῦ υἱού in Romans 8.29, and with τὴν δόξαν κυρίου in 2 Corinthians 3.18. Kittel observes of the futurity in Romans 8.29: ‘Nevertheless, in this passage, and even more so in 2 C. 3:18, the eschatological statement is linked to an event which is already present for the Christian’. But this is equally true of 1 Corinthians 15.49. Paul expects believers to bear Christ’s εἰκών now and, using the first-person plural, Paul attaches himself concretely to his command. Paul, with the Corinthians, has not himself yet achieved Christ’s εἰκών but undergoes the continuous process of ‘image bearing’.

1 Corinthians 15.49 says nothing about the believer’s resurrected body. Consequently, the verse resembles less the indicative of Philippians 3.21 (with which it anyway shares little verbal overlap) than the imperative of Philippians 2.5:


Lys: ‘“image de Dieu” ne signifie pas “carnalité de Dieu”: contrairement à ce qu’on croit trop souvent, l’expression ne désigne pas l’essence mais la représentation, non pas la nature mais la fonction, c’est-à-dire, un rôle de médiation’. Lys, ‘L’arrière-plan,’ 69.

Kittel rejects Heinrici’s reading of the aorist as ‘the time which is past for the believer – he has already received the Spirit as a pledge’. Kittel, von Rad, and Kleinknecht, ‘εἰκών,’ 2.396, n. 99. Noting Heinrici, Das erste, 501.

Thiselton: ‘φορέω has the metaphorical force of Fr. porter; to wear, and regularly applies to clothes’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 1289 (his italics). Cf. the German, tragen, and in old English see OED, s.v. ‘bear’, verb, I.6.b. ‘to have upon the body (clothes, ornaments); to wear’. OED gives examples of this use from the ninth to the sixteenth century. BDAG: ‘to identify habitually w. someth., bear’.

In 2 Cor 3.18 εἰκόνα strictly relates to τὴν αὐτὴν, the pronoun modifying τὴν δόξαν.


Spicq notes the ‘continuous process’ evoked in 2 Cor 3.18, but appeals to a future-tense reading of 1 Cor 15.49, remarking: ‘This eschatological reproduction will not be consummated until the resurrection; it is realized here below through a progressive assimilation to the one glorified’. Spicq, ‘εἰκών,’ 4.19.

Although Bockmuehl takes the future-tense for 1 Cor 15.49, he nevertheless observes different emphases between 1 Cor 15.49 and Phil 3.21: ‘While 1 Cor. 15.49 speaks of the “glory” of the
τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. It in a sense mirrors Galatians 5.25 (‘if we live by the Spirit, let us walk by the Spirit’), for it implies: ‘if we are Christ’s (i.e., we no longer represent Adam), let us represent Christ’. And it coheres with Paul’s commands to ‘imitate me’ (1 Cor 4.16; 11.1)153 except, as noted, Paul here levels the field by identifying himself as participating equally in the process of imitation.

Paul assures the Corinthians they are no longer fated to Adam: they bore Adam’s ‘image’. They have not believed in vain (15.2, 14, 17) but are ‘in Christ’ (vv. 18, 19, 22), ‘of Christ’ (v. 23), are legitimate ‘hopers’ (v. 19), and death – the fate of All ‘in Adam’ – is not their end. Thus although believers remain ‘in Adam’ until τὸ τέλος, they are distinguishable from Adam already. They are ‘in Adam’, but in Adam they are ‘in Christ’ – and Paul expects them to act it. It is from this exhortation to ἀδελφοὶ ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’, Paul turns to his concluding series of contrasts and the believers’ ultimate inheritance of the Kingdom of God.

The Concluding Series of Contrasts: Inheriting God’s Kingdom (15.50-54a)

Introducing the Concluding Series of Contrasts

In verse 50 Paul introduces154 his final series of contrasts, winding down the argument he began in 15.12.155 Paul’s concluding series of contrasts and the paean

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154 Interpreters perhaps overvalue identifying whether v. 50 concludes v. 49 or initiates a new section. In either case, the ‘sections’ of Paul’s argument relate; they are not hermetically sealed units, and any sectioning of Paul’s argument at v. 50 must take into account that Paul ‘does not change his rhetorical pattern of argumentation, his thematic structure, his addressees, or his objective’. Asher, Polarity, 150. By my reading, Jeremias (and the many following him) is on the wrong track when he argues that vv. 36-49 ‘show that there is a resurrection body which is totally different from the natural body’, and ‘At v. 50 another problem is faced, namely, how this new body is given’. Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood,’ 155. I contend that σῶμα was ever only an expedient to Paul’s premiss on the resurrection of the dead; that its expediency ended after v. 46; and I point out that σῶμα does not once recur in Paul’s
that follows it do not function to persuade the Corinthians to adopt a new premiss hitherto not argued; instead, vv. 50-57 conclude Paul’s argument for the resurrection of the dead by disclosing what that means for the believer.

As with the contrasts immediately preceding them, Paul’s concluding series of contrasts are not between two types of material body. Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 15 has been from the outset an argument about the believer’s relation to death, and Paul maintains that focus here through the terms he contrasts in vv. 50-54a, and through his concluding paean on Death’s defeat in vv. 54b-57. His concluding series of contrasts maintains the structure of argument he began in 15.42:

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argument. Those vying that v. 50 initiates a new section include Collins: ‘The apostrophic vocative marks the beginning of a new unit’; Eriksson: ‘The propositio in 15:50 is introduced by τοῦτο δὲ φημι, ἀδελφοί, a formula which in 1 Cor 7:29 is used to introduce a new idea’; Watson: ‘A new beginning is indicated by the adversative particle δὲ and the vocative ἀδελφοί’. Collins, First Corinthians, 573; Eriksson, Traditions, 273; Watson, Rhetorical, 247, n. 53. Other interpreters emphasize that ‘verse 50 belongs to the argument in the preceding verses, but also functions as a transitional passage to what follows’. Pearson, Pneumatikos, 15. Cf. Allo: ‘un verset de liaison, qu’on donne lieu à la présente pérecope, comme d’ouverture à la suivante’. Allo, Première, 426. Dunn notes ‘Paul’s habit of summing up one phase of an argument with a sentence which introduces themes to be developed subsequently’. Dunn, ‘How?’, 10-13. See also Asher, Polarity, 146-57; Fee, First Epistle, 798; Gillman, ‘Transformation’, 332; Héring, First Epistle, 49-50. The textual tradition reflects the tension. Although certainly not the original reading, the Western D F G, Marcion (according to Tertullian), Tertullian himself, and Ambrosiaster insert a γάρ to secure v. 50’s connection to v. 49.

155 I emphasize again that Paul has defended a single premiss throughout 1 Cor 15: there is a resurrection from the dead. Paul does not here conclude a supposed separate argument on the body begun at v. 35; vv. 35ff. function simply to reinforce Paul’s singular premiss.

156 Contra Watson, vv. 50-54 are not another confirmatio, where Paul introduces a new premiss ‘that the transformation of the body is necessary to enter heavenly existence’. Watson, ‘Rhetorical’, 247. Similarly, contra Eriksson, Traditions, 272-75. There is no new premiss, no mention of σῶμα at all. Paul restates his major premiss on the resurrection of the dead (v. 52) and the passage as a whole expands upon that, concluding not with a statement on the believer’s future body, but with a paean on Death’s defeat. Death, not the believer, continues to drive Paul’s argument.

157 Cf. Grohsheide: ‘Paul no longer engages in a refutation of error, but assuming that all Corinthians believe that the dead will rise up, he sets forth what the Christian can expect when that happens’. Grosheide, First Epistle, 390. Mack, Saw, and Witherington identify vv. 50-58 the peroratio. Bullembat limits the peroratio to vv. 54-58, but to do so constructs an unlikely chiasm, the corresponding terms of which barely resemble one another either verbally or conceptually. Further, v. 54 links both grammatically and conceptually so tightly with vv. 50-53 that it is perhaps best to identify vv. 50-58 the peroratio and vv. 54-58 the climax of the peroratio – and of the argument as a whole (v. 58 being the argument’s concluding exhortation). Bullembat, Noyau, 35, 116; Burton L. Mack, Rhetoric and the New Testament, GBS (Fortress, 1990), 57; Insawn Saw, Paul’s Rhetoric in 1 Corinthians 15: An Analysis Utilizing the Theories of Classical Rhetoric (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1995), 238; Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Eerdmans, 1995), 292.
The terms on the left all relate to mortality and death, consequences of association with Adam and Death and the dis-ordered κόσμος. Those on the right emphasize un-death (note the repeated alpha privative), associating closely with the heavenly Christ and the Spirit and the Kingdom of God.159

1 Corinthians 15.50-54 is among the most worked-on texts in the NT, and I by no means attempt to address every exegetical enquiry posed this passage.160 Keeping the focus of my argument, I defend the three following claims:

158 Thiselton gives an excellent overview of the textual difficulties here. The earlier witnesses, p46, 6*, C*, 1739*, MSS of Old Latin, Vulgate, Coptic (Sah and Boh), Latin Irenaeus, Origen, Ambrosiaster, and Hilary, omit the first clause (τὸ φθαρτὸν…), jumping straight to τὸ θνητὸν…’. The longer is attested by 6*, B and D, a reading of C, Ψ, the margin in 1739c, Syriac, Byzantine, Greek of Origen, Athanasius, and Chrysostom. Thiselton notes that ‘Two clear canons of textual criticism conflict’: that the shorter reading is more probable; and that homoioteleuton often explains omissions of similar words or phrases. Conzelmann asserts that p46 is a result of homoioteleuton, resulting in an early divergence of readings. Thiselton (with UBS4 – a ‘B’) accepts the longer reading, though UBS3 was less certain (ranking it ‘C’). Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 289, n. 3; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1298.

159 Cf. Dunn: ‘it is evident at a glance that a contrast is being maintained throughout the section. It is a sustained contrast between the inadequacy (to put it no more strongly) of one mode of existence and another. The present mode of existence is characterized by weakness, mortality, and decay (to death). The mode of resurrection existence, in contrast, will be quite otherwise’. Dunn, ‘How?’, 11. Significantly, Paul nowhere in this argument speculates concretely on that ‘otherwise’; he begins with concrete imagery for mortality and gives ‘the mode of resurrection existence’ in terms un-doing mortality.

160 Bulembat summarizes lines of enquiry: ‘D’abord celui de son rapport avec ce qui précède. Est-ce que le v.50 s’attache à la partie précédente ou est-il celui qui introduit cette nouvelle unité? Est-ce que la section elle-même est engendrée par le v.35 ou est-elle une section indépendante? Quelle est sa fonction dans l’ensemble de 1 Co 15? Ensuite le problème de son organisation interne. En combien de petites unités logiques est-elle tissée? Comment progresse l’exposition de la pensée paulinienne? Enfin celui du contenu lui-même. De quoi est-il question en ces versets? De la résurrection des morts? de la transformation de tous, les vivants et les morts? ou de la victoire finale sur la mort? En outre, Paul envisageait-il d’être présent à la parousie ou bien avait-il déjà la sensation que celle-ci commençait à tarder?’ Cf. Asher: ‘Few passages in the New Testament have received such diverse interpretations as 1 Cor 15:50-57…Supplementing these discussions of the internal content of these
1. ‘Flesh and blood’ does not primarily nor necessarily denote the material composition of the body; instead, it identifies humans as ‘mortal’, prone to death;

2. the eschatological ‘change’, whether of believers dead or alive, does not primarily nor necessarily denote a material change/exchange of bodies; instead, it denotes the believer’s change/exchange from the dis-ordered κόσμος, dominated by Death, to the re-ordered κόσμος of the Kingdom of God;

3. the ‘necessity’ (δεῖ – v. 53) of the believer’s change/exchange is a consequence of the Kingdom having come, it is not a condition to the Kingdom coming.

‘Flesh and Blood Cannot Inherit the Kingdom of God’

Jeremias may well be right that σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα denotes living believers, that φθορὰ denotes dead ones (corpses in decomposition),\(^{161}\) and that ‘neither the living nor the dead can take part in the Kingdom of God – as they are’.\(^{162}\) But if he is right, it is not because σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα and φθορὰ form synthetic parallels, nor because Paul here argues for the body’s material ‘change’. In the first instance, Gillman rightly asserts that σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα and φθορὰ form synonymous not synthetic parallels.\(^{163}\)

verses are controversies surrounding whether Paul modified his eschatological thinking between 1 Thessalonians and 1 Corinthians and over what intellectual tradition (Jewish or Greek) he was operating when he discussed the resurrection as a transformation in vv. 51-52. Unfortunately, a consensus has proved elusive’. Asher, *Polarity*, 146; Bulembat, *Noyau*, 77.

\(^{161}\) As noted above, Eriksson here identifies φθορὰ with ‘the dissolution of the perishable dead body sown in the grave, where it decomposes before it is resurrected’. Eriksson, *Traditions*, 273, n. 158. Cf. διαφθορά in Acts 2.27, 31; 13.34-37. This differs from his earlier identification of the term with the believer’s ‘natural’, lived-in body. Contra Collins: “Perishable” – which can hardly mean “the dead”. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 579. So contra also Fee, *First Epistle*, 798, n. 11.

\(^{162}\) Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood,’ 152.

\(^{163}\) Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 316-18. But although I agree with Gillman’s objection, I do not follow his analysis. Jeremias argues that Paul in v. 50 transitions from discussion of the dead to discuss now the living, and that he structures his argument chiastically, in synthetic parallelism that opposes living believers to dead ones, both of them requiring eschatological ‘change’. But 1) Paul does not ‘transition’ to the living at v. 50; he did so already at vv. 47-48 (cf. Paul’s use of the first person in v. 49); 2) the corresponding terms of Jeremias’s supposed chiasm do not correspond verbally, syllabically, in length, or in number of words, making the chiastic structure a ‘thematic’ correspondence chiefly dependent on the interpreter’s imagination (the competing chiasms offered by, e.g., Bulembat and Gillman fail for the same reasons); and 3) as Dunn remarks, ‘it is irrelevant to the argument whether any of the terms in the left-hand column refer only to the living or also to the state in which they are sown/buried. The point is that all the terms variously characterize the impossibility of conceiving an existence which can be so characterized as the mode of existence into which believers will be resurrected’. Bulembat, *Noyau*, 98; Dunn, ‘How?’, 12; Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 321; Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood,’ 151-59.
For, as Dunn points out, Paul’s series of contrasts from v. 42 ‘at a glance’ shows ‘It should be self evident that “flesh and blood” belongs to the left hand column of the sequence of contrasts’. That noted, it is not self evident that σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα on the left side of the contrasts denotes primarily or necessarily the believer’s bodily, material ‘change’.

σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα has only one corresponding opposite (βασιλείαν θεοῦ), suggesting that we take the terms of the phrase together. Paul uses the terms together in Galatians 1.16 (cf. 1.10-11) to diminish teaching that is merely human before heavenly revelation. The phrase occurs elsewhere, and ‘frequently in rabbinic texts, especially in rabbinic parables as basar wadam; it denotes the natural man as a frail creature in opposition to God’. This denotation is consistent with Paul’s uses of the other terms on the left side of his four series of contrasts – none of which remark upon the body’s material make-up. More significantly, σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα’s semantic opposite, βασιλείαν θεοῦ, says nothing about bodies but, consistent with the other contrasts to this point, opposes associations with God against associations with the dis-ordered κόσμος.

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164 Dunn, ‘How?’, 12.
165 א and B, Clement, and Origen preserve the singular δύναται (so also NA27). A, C, D, Syriac, Vulgate and Irenaeus show the plural δύνανται, enforcing the supposition that Paul’s emphasis here is on the body’s material composition.
167 Jeremias, ‘Flesh and Blood,’ 152. Cf. Bulembat: ‘Avec Jeremias, nous trouvons donc qu’en 1 Co 15,50, l’expression “chair et sang” ne parle que des vivants, mais des vivants dont on souligne la fragilité, le fait qu’ils peuvent (mieux encore doivent) mourir’. Bulembat, Noyau, 90. Spicq reasons, ‘since the body’s vitality…is in the blood (Gen 9:4-5; Lev 17:1 Deut 12:23), the composite human is referred to by the expression “flesh and blood”’; ‘Being a creature (Isa 31:3; Jer 17:5; Joel 3:1), [σάρξ] is characterized by weakness and fragility; this is one of the most obvious contrasts with the deity’. Celsas Spicq, ‘σάρξ κτλ.,’ in TLNT, 3.233, 234. Cf. BDF, s.v. ‘σάρξ’, 3.a. Jeremias argues that Paul here synthetically parallels σάρξ καὶ αἷμα with φθορά, so that in vv. 50-54 ‘Basar wadam is only applied to living persons; the words flesh as well as blood exclude an application of the word-pair to the dead’. Those contesting Jeremias generally follow Gillman, who argues that ‘this exclusion is not as absolute as Jeremias suggests’. Gillman argues that Sir 14.17-18 is ‘a more general use of the Semitic word-pair’, noting: ‘To say that a generation of flesh and blood dies implies that this dual expression may also include what is dead’. But Bulembat retorts that Sirach ‘indique seulement que dans la nature d’un être fait de chair et de sang, il est inscrit qu’il mourra sûrement (θενάσω ἄποθανη),’ and that the immediate context of Sir 14.17-18 demonstrates that σάρξ καὶ αἷμα does not refer to the dead: ‘Une fois mort, la chair et le sang n’existent plus; c’est le processus de corruption qui commence’. At all events, Gillman’s reading at best proves that Paul’s reference might not refer to the living, not that it does not. Jeremias has on his side that vv. 51-54 clearly distinguish – though Gillman is right: they do not synthetically oppose one another – the living from the dead. Bulembat, Noyau, 87, 88; Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 316.
Chapter Three

Thus although both σάρξ and αἷμα each clearly denote material components, their occurrence together is not chiefly nor necessarily material but represents principally ‘the human person as seen from the perspective of his/her finite, fragile and transitory nature’. What excludes humans from Kingdom entry is thus not that they are composed materially of flesh-and-blood. Rather, it is that they are finite, fragile, and mortal. That is, that they belong still to the Kingdom of Death, suffering Death’s effects. Consequently, Paul now declares that believers – not, abstractly, their bodies – will at last be changed/exchanged from Death’s dominion to God’s.

The Eschatological ‘Change’

The ‘mystery’ – the apocalyptic disclosure – of the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ or ‘exchange’ is simply that believers will be finally transferred from Death and Adam to God’s ‘all in all’; to the Kingdom of God. What Paul describes in vv. 51-54a is not a material change of the believer’s body – Paul makes no mention of ‘bodies’ at all. What Paul describes is the coming of the Kingdom, implicitly the defeat of Death, and what that incidentally means for believers.

In vv. 51-54a, Paul develops his reference to ‘the Kingdom’ from v. 50. In v. 52 Paul describes – discloses – the coming of God’s Kingdom. As in Mark’s ‘little apocalypse’, it will come suddenly: in a moment (ἐν ἀτόμῳ), an eye-blink (ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ). The ‘last trumpet’ announces τὸ τέλος,170 which Paul’s earlier

168 Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 318. Garland makes an unwarranted application of this association, marking it ‘the condition of physical human existence’. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 741 (my italics). Gillman also shows clearly that, with the possible exception of Eph 6.12, no other references to σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα suggest an ethical sense. Similar to what I have remarked repeatedly above, Gillman observes: ‘Noticeably absent is an emphasis on Adam as the one through whom sin came into the world…In 1 Cor 15 Paul is not concerned with questions of morality, but mainly with the resurrection which is denied’. Gillman, ‘Transformation,’ 318.

169 As I presented last chapter, in 1 Cor 15 the Kingdom marks τὸ τέλος: the success of Christ’s reign. I do not take a position on the place of the Kingdom generally in Paul’s theology, its relation to the Synoptics, whether it is central, peripheral, or foreign to Paul, whether it is entirely futurist or sometimes immediate. I am interested in its particular function for this argument. For broader discussion, see: Youngmo Cho, Spirit and Kingdom in the Writings of Luke and Paul, Paternoster Biblical Monographs (Paternoster, 2005), 53-60; George Johnston, “‘Kingdom of God’ Sayings in Paul’s Letters,” in From Jesus to Paul: Studies in Honour of Francis Wright Beare, ed. P. Richardson and J.C. Hurd (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1984), 143-56; Larry J. Kreitzer, “Kingdom of God/Christ,” in DPL, 524-26; David Wenham, Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity? (Eerdmans, 1995), 71-80.

170 The trumpet is a traditional eschatological motif in apocalyptic literature: 1 Thess 4.16; Matt 24.31; Joel 2.1; Zeph 1.14-16; Zech 9.14; 4 Ezra [2 Esdr] 6.23; Sib. Or. 4.173-75. See Garland, 1 Corinthians, 743. Bockmuehl remarks on the NT’s symbolic use of the trumpet to announce the eschaton: ‘there is little here that is not compatible with a first-century Jewish background’. Markus N.A. Bockmuehl, “‘The Trumpet Shall Sound’: Shofar Symbolism and Its Reception in Early Christianity,’ in Templum Amicitiae: Essays on the Second Temple Presented to Ernst Bammel, ed.
apocalyptic narrative (vv. 20-28) defined by victory over the ‘last enemy’: Death. At
the trumpet’s sound, Death will have been deposed and All\(^1\) ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’
shall be (re)surrected into the Death-less Kingdom; into God’s ‘all in all’. At the
trumpet’s sound, the dead (οἱ νεκροὶ) shall be raised and we (the living) shall be
‘changed’.

Dahl complains that Paul uses so ‘weak’ a verb as ἀλλάσσω to indicate so
extraordinary an event as the believer’s eschatological ‘change’.\(^2\) But the problem
is not that Paul poorly chose his verb; it is that he is not saying what Dahl – and
others – say that he is saying. Merkel remarks of ἀλλάσσω: ‘The vb. designates
“change” in the broadest sense’.\(^3\) The word frequently indicates changes of such
banalities as clothes or wages,\(^4\) decrees and customs,\(^5\) or opinions.\(^6\) It gives also
a sense ‘exchange’.\(^7\) Paul’s usage reflects the word’s semantic range, where he
indicates both a ‘change’ in voice (Gal 4.20), and unbelievers’ ‘exchange’ of God for
idols (Rom 1.23) and of ‘natural’ sexual relations for ‘unnatural’ ones (Rom 1.26).
Interpreters differ whether Paul’s point in 1 Corinthians 15 is that believers’ bodies
will be ‘changed’, i.e., ‘transformed’, at the eschaton, or whether they will be
‘exchanged’, i.e., the old replaced with a new. But these differences miss that Paul
here says nothing about the body’s ‘change/exchange’ at all.

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William Horbury (JSNTSup 48, 1991), 217. Thus as Collins notes: ‘With the sound of the trumpet comes the passing of the present order of reality and the beginning of the kingdom of God’. Collins, First Corinthians, 580.

\(^1\) Fee notes ‘the considerable corruption in transmission’ this text suffers, sketching the five basic text forms attested in the mss. With Fee, NA\(^\text{\textsuperscript{77}}\) preserves the reading most likely responsible for the others: ‘we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed’. Fee, First Epistle, 796, n. 3. Garland contends that πάντες οὐ κοιμηθῆσομεθα does not mean ‘all will not die’; ‘Paul negates the verb even though it is the “all” that he intends to negate (cf. 2 Cor. 7.3)…He transposes the negative particle to create a parallelism with the next clause…He means so some Christians will be alive at the parousia’. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 748. Cf. Barrett, First Epistle, 380; Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 158; Schrage, Korinther, 4.370.


\(^3\) H. Merkel, ‘ἀλλάσσω,’ in EDNT, 1.62. Cf. L&N: ‘to cause a difference by altering the character or nature of something’ (58.43); BDAG: alternatively, ‘1. to make someth. other or different, change, alter’; and, ‘2. to exchange one thing for another, exchange’; LSJ: ‘make other than it is, change, alter’; ‘give in exchange, barter one thing for another’; ‘repay, requite’; ‘leave, quit’; ‘move one’s position’; ‘take one thing in exchange for another’; ‘take a new position, i.e. go to a place’.

\(^4\) E.g., Gen 31.7; 35.2; 41.14; Judg 14.13; 2 Sam 12.20; 2 Kgs 5.5, 22, 23; Psa 101.27(2x); Jer 52.33; Heb 1.12.

\(^5\) E.g., Ezr 6.11, 1; Isa 24.5; 1 Macc 1.49; Acts 6.14.

\(^6\) E.g., Wis 4.11; 12.20.

\(^7\) E.g., Lev 27.10(3x), 33; Psa 105.20; Isa 40.31; 41.1; Sir 7.18; 33.21.
σῶμα does not occur in these verses, has not occurred since v. 44, and will not occur again. Bodies, somehow abstracted from believers, are not the objects of ‘change’; believers themselves are. Thus Paul promises that All believers, dead or alive, shall be ‘changed/exchanged’ at the trumpet’s sound: ‘the dead’ (οἱ νεκροὶ) shall ‘be raised’, and ‘we’ (ἡμεῖς) shall ‘be changed/exchanged’. The point is not that believers’ bodies are materially ‘transformed’, requiring an unlikely use of ἀλλάσσω better suited to μορφή or σχῆμα. Nor is it that believers somehow swap bodies, the old for the new. What Paul promises to be swapped is the believer her or himself, ‘exchanged’ from the present, lived experience under Death to the future existence in the Kingdom of God.

The Necessity of the ‘Change’

Paul defines believers according to their present existence in the predicament of d/Death. The predicament came by a human, and by a human it will go away (v. 21) – but not yet. Until τὸ τέλος Death, the ‘last enemy’, retains power, and those ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’ continue to suffer Death’s effects. Meanwhile, Christ is busy re-ordering the dis-ordered κόσμος and finally, at τὸ τέλος – Death defeated, the κόσμος re-ordered and God ‘all in all’ – shall Christ’s own (v. 23) be no longer subject to Death but ‘made alive’. Paul presents resurrection and ‘change’ as contingencies of Death’s defeat such that this decay (τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο), this mortality (τὸ θνητὸς τοῦτο) shall ‘put on’ (ἐνδύσασθαι) un-decay (ἀφθαρσίαν), im(=un)-mortality.

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178 Contra Gundry, whose notion is typical of many: ‘The difference between allassō (1 Cor 15:51-2 bis) and metaschēmatizō (Phil 3:21) is insignificant. The double appearance of the former hardly constitutes evidence for a technical usage. And like metaschēmatizō, allassō also denotes change, or renovation, as shown by the subsequent statements: “For this perishable nature must put on the imperishable [and so on]” (vv. 53-4). Hence the fine distinction between a Pauline doctrine of new creation and an un-Pauline, Hellenistic doctrine of renovation lacks solid basis’. Gundry, Sōma, 181. But as I note above, there is little connection between 1 Cor 15 and Phil 3:21; they address different concerns. σῶμα is not at issue here in 1 Cor 15:51-2, has not been mentioned since 1 Cor 15:46, and does not occur again. We disallow the argument, therefore, whether Paul here more readily teaches ‘continuity’ through the so-called ‘Hebrew’ view of the body’s ‘change’ in terms of ‘transformation’, or whether he teaches ‘discontinuity’, reflecting so-called ‘Greek’ notions of one body being ‘exchanged’ for another. The ‘body’, somehow abstracted from the believer, is not here the object of the ‘change/exchange’.

179 Furnish remarks: ‘It is significant that Paul says nothing about putting off the flesh (σάρξ), much less the body (σῶμα). Indeed, his comments about the mystery of “change” and putting on a new form of existence presume a fundamental continuity of identity (σῶμα) for the subject who is thus transformed’. Furnish, First Letter, 116 (his italics). Cf. Beker, who notes it is not a resurrection of σάρξ but of σῶμα. J. Christian Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought (T&T Clark, 1980), 153. But in fact Paul here mentions neither a resurrection of σάρξ nor of σῶμα. Paul speaks of a ‘resurrection of the dead.’ Paul does not here identify σῶμα as the vehicle for continuity, for σῶμα is not his focus. Paul’s problem has to do with d/Death.
As in his other contrasts, Paul does not here speculate constructively on details of life in the Kingdom; it is sufficient for him to report it in terms of its dissociation from the believer’s lived experience under Death. Effectively, this existence, defined by Death, shall ‘put on’ the putting-off (α-) of Death.

The putting-off of Death is a necessary consequence of the Kingdom having come; it is not a condition of believers entering the Kingdom. The trumpet announcing the Kingdom’s arrival announces, implicitly, Death’s defeat. Because Paul gives the Kingdom in terms of Death’s defeat (v. 26), it is not until the Kingdom arrives that believers will be – can be – loosed of Death. Thus it is ‘necessary’ (δεῖ) that those ‘in Christ’, ‘of Christ’ ‘put on’ un-Death at the Kingdom’s arrival. Paul in v. 49 exhorted believers now to ‘wear’ Christ’s εἰκών, thus distinguishing them already from those who ‘wear’ Adam’s εἰκών. Here, Paul portrays how those ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’ shall be finally ‘changed’ from the dominion of Adam and Death to the Kingdom of God.

Nothing Paul says in vv. 50-54a focuses on the body-as-substance. ‘Body’ in fact does not appear in these verses, in the verses prior to this section, or in the section following. Paul’s reference to the believer’s ‘change’ is about the believer’s being ‘changed’ or ‘exchanged’ from one dominion to another. If bodily existence in

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180 Thiselton observes that the translation, ‘immortality’, though correct, ‘misses part of the added force provided by the use of the two terms liable to death and incapable of dying in deliberate semantic opposition’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 1297 (his italics and bolding).

181 Thus pace, e.g., Garland, who compares Paul’s language to imagery from, e.g., 1 En. 62.15-16 and 1QS 4.7-8 and suggests Paul’s ‘clothing imagery’ gives a concrete picture: “‘Putting on’ is equivalent to bearing the image of the heavenly one (15.49) and affirms that the new existence will be corporeal’. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 744. But although I agree Paul uses ‘clothing imagery’ similarly both here and in 15.49, I contest that neither place says anything particular about ‘corporeal’ existence. New existence will be σῶμα simply because the believer is σῶμα – nothing else is ever suggested. But Paul says nothing specific about that here.

182 de Boer remarks helpfully that ‘Neither mortality nor corruption denotes for Paul a necessary and natural process of decay, nor can either of them be equated with death as such. Rather, human mortality refers to the susceptibility of living human beings with their “natural” bodies to the onslaught of death (conceived as a cosmological power), an onslaught that culminates in corruption, the decay of these bodies upon physical demise. Death thereby attains its victory (v. 55). It is thus because of death’s great power that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God and that corruption does not inherit incorruption’. de Boer, Defeat, 132 (his italics).

183 Collins notes that ‘The qualities the risen body must attain are emphasized in the pair of contrasts. That the qualities of imperishability and immortality are indicated by Greek terms that begin with a privative alpha suggests that these are not qualities that belong to the perishable and mortal being. Deprived of imperishability and immortality, the risen body must receive these qualities as a gift’. Collins, First Corinthians, 581. But the terms on the right-hand side of Paul’s contrasts – here, ἀθανασίαν and ἀφθαρσίαν – are not ‘qualities’, concrete in and of themselves; they are un-qualities, specifically, un-d/Death.
Chapter Three

the Kingdom is to be continuous with the present age or different from it, Paul says nothing about it here. Indeed, none of the terms Paul uses throughout his contrasts tells us anything about the body’s material composition; even σάρξ καὶ αἷμα has as its semantic opposite nothing about ‘bodies’, but ‘the Kingdom of God’. What Paul indicates clearly is that the body ‘raised’, ‘enlivened’ and ‘changed’, will be a body absented of Death and Death’s effects.

Paul’s argument throughout 1 Corinthians 15 has been consistently the believer’s relation to Death. Believers persist now ‘in Adam’, passive constituents of the dis-ordered κόσμος, in subjection to Death. Paul answers the believer’s predicament of death in the eschatological scheme he sketched in vv. 20-28: believers dead and believers alive shall both at τὸ τέλος be bodily liberated from Death and all Death’s effects. Those dead ‘in Christ’ will be resurrected – rescued from Death; those alive ‘in Christ’ will equally be ‘made alive’ (ζωοποιέω), shaking Death. Death and not, abstractly, the body, nor even, specifically, the believer, has been the focus of Paul’s argument. The fates of believers and bodies are incidental of what Christ is now accomplishing – and shall successfully accomplish – in the κόσμος. For that reason, Paul’s argument moves seamlessly from discussion of resurrection and ‘change’ and onto his concluding remarks: a paean on Death’s defeat.

Paul’s Paean (15.54b-55, 57)

Paul concludes his argument on the resurrection of the dead with a paean on Death. When believers as bodies dead and believers as bodies alive are liberated equally from Death; when Christ has come, triumphant, the κόσμος re-ordered; when it is τὸ τέλος and God is ‘all in all’; then the Scripture will come to pass: ‘Death is swallowed in victory! O Death, where is your victory? O Death, where is your sting?’ ‘But thanks to God,’ Paul responds, ‘who has given us victory through our Lord Jesus Christ!’

Paul combines Isa 25.8 and Hos 13.14 without distinguishing them. He combines Isa 25.8 and Hos 13.14 without distinguishing them. His reference to Isa 25.8 differs from the LXX but conforms exactly to Theodotion.

184 I will consider v. 56 presently.
185 Heil identifies this as gezera shava, Ellis names it haraz, and Longenecker translates: ‘pearl stringing’. E. Earle Ellis, Paul’s Use of the Old Testament (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), 49-50; Heil, Rhetorical, 247; Richard N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1999), 99-100. Ellis observes that ‘Merged quotations are a
Jeromey Q. Martini

Uncial Q:186 the Hosea reference is idiosyncratic.187 Theodotion may be influenced by Paul rather than the other way round, and Paul’s Hosea reference is uniformly at odds with all extant witnesses, revealing little about Paul’s supposed Vorlage.188 Whatever his Vorlage, he conjoins these scriptures verbally using νῖκος and ὁ θάνατος,189 constructing from them a paean all his own.

Paul has argued consistently through 1 Corinthians 15 for the resurrection of the dead. Here, in his concluding section, the full ablative force of his premiss is clear. For resurrection is not simply of the dead, objectively; it is from the dead, from Death. Death is neither a natural nor a fitting end to life but an ‘enemy’, dis-ordering God’s κόσμος. All are caught by Death: All ‘in Adam’ die. But those who are Christ’s are not abandoned. Believers – those ‘in Christ, ‘in Adam’ – suffer still under Death’s effects. Those dead, really, suffer fully, dying; but those alive suffer,

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187 Hos 13.14b:

1. Cor 15.55:...

LXX:...

Aquila:...

Symmachus:...

Theodotion Uncial Q:...

Theodotion Syrohexapla:...

MT: ירא ד אבי מבית

188 Cf. Bulembat: ‘on ne saurait dire avec assurance si Paul avait ces versions-là à portée de main…Et même si on concédait que Θ existait à l’époque de l’Apôtre – peut-être sous une forme encore incomplète, en tant que Ur-théodosion –, il faudrait encore savoir pourquoi Paul avait préféré telle version, et non pas telle autre, dans tel contexte déterminé. Ici, par exemple, comment expliquer sa compréhension d’Os 13,14 au v.55 ?’ Bulembat, Noyau, 119. Stanley, on the other hand, explores the possibility Paul uses a non-Masoretic Vorlage that stands behind the LXX. See Collins, First Corinthians, 577-78; Stanley, Paul and the Language, 209-15; Thiselton, First Epistle, 1298-1301.

189 In all versions except Paul’s, including the MT, the second term in Hos 13.14b is יָדִיד (יָדִיד), not θάνατος. Bulembat notes LXX 2 Sam 22.6 converts both מcaught and יָדִיד to θάνατος, Bulembat, Noyau, 118, n. 94.
Chapter Three
too: ‘mortals’, prone to death. Paul exhorts mortal believers to bear the mantle of he who has overcome death: Christ. Already the Corinthians do this, prompting Paul’s ‘boast’ (v. 30) and his promise they will be ‘changed’, loosed of death and death’s effects. And those dead, really, — captives in decay, ignobility, and weakness — will be liberated of death, re-composed, vindicated to honour, and unhindered from God’s power.

The resurrection of the dead depends, necessarily (δὲ), on Christ’s success as regent. It depends on death’s defeat and on Christ’s triumphant παρουσία. Paul therefore concludes his didactic treatise, appropriately, with a militaristic taunt: a cheer for the champion whose victory over the enemy is sure. Thus it is not because Christ has already absorbed death’s ‘sting’ that Paul can jibe at death’s impotency; it is because death will yet καταργεῖται, the ‘last enemy’ of Christ’s reign. Paul appends his own paean to his scriptural pronouncement, thanking God for the victory (τὸ νῖκος) God is giving believers through (διὰ) the Lord Jesus Christ. Paul expects to participate in the resurrection/‘change’ — rather; the transfer to the Kingdom — not because he participates in (ἐν) what Christ has done already; strictly, that marks him Christ’s (v. 23), supplying him ‘hope’ (v. 19). Rather, Paul expects to participate in the Kingdom because of what Christ is doing now, and because of what Paul knows will yet be done.

The Exhortation (15.58)

As he did in vv. 33-34 and v. 49, Paul concludes his argument with an exhortation. He ends affectionately, directing ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί to be steadfast, immovable, standing firm in the Lord’s work. In the Meanwhile between Christ’s resurrection and return, the Meanwhile that constitutes the believer’s lived experience, believers’ labours are in (ἐν) the Lord, and they are not vain (κενὸς).

190 Collins: ‘The image of the transformation of the resurrected body as a victory over death evokes a military metaphor, which recalls the description of the parousia in 15:23-26…In Paul’s scenario the final enemy, the last evidence of evil to be destroyed, is death (vv. 26, 56)’. Collins, First Corinthians, 574.

191 So contra Thiselton: ‘Paul projects an eschatological vision of a stingless death precisely because Jesus Christ himself absorbed the sting on the basis of how his death and resurrection addresses the problem of human sin and the law (vv. 55-57)’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 1300. No; διδόντι is present, corresponding to Christ’s (and God’s) present activity in the κόσμος.

192 Mitchell identifies this the peroratio for the whole of 1 Cor 15. See last chapter, p. 39, n. 2.
1 Corinthians 15.56: An 'Interpolation'?

There remains the small matter of v. 56.

Fee admits that 15.56 brings ‘dissonance’ to Paul’s argument. Consequently, a few interpreters have proposed it is an interpolation, either by Paul himself or by an external editor. Garland asserts of the verse that ‘Without question, however, it expresses Paul’s theology’. But simply because the verse expresses Paul’s theology generally does not mean it belongs particularly to the argument of 1 Corinthians 15. I will not belabour the point but want briefly to assert that, whatever the reason for it, v. 56 is inexpedient to Paul’s argument for the resurrection of the dead.

Neither ‘law’ nor ‘Sin’ is ever at issue in any part 1 Corinthians 15. ‘Law’ in particular nowhere occurs in the chapter. As a workaround, Bulembat and Tomson each, independently, attempts to explain v. 56 by reference to a hypothetical Vorlage reconstructed through the Targums, and Hollander and Holleman together offer explanations based on Cynic views of the law and hellenistic ideas of degenerate humanity. But these approaches are highly speculative, and they do not in the end exonerate Paul from the poor argumentative technique of introducing new, undefined terms at his argument’s end.

Paul also never refers to ‘Sin’, though he mentions the plural ‘sins’ in his repetition of the tradition in v. 3, and in his recapitulation of the tradition in v. 17. He uses the verb ἁμαρτάνω in v. 34 as part of his noetic rebuke. But Paul does not

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193 Fee, First Epistle, 805.
195 Garland, 1 Corinthians, 749.
198 Collins contends that v. 56 ‘is not incidental to his [Paul’s] argument. It is his commentary on the pair of scriptural passages that he has woven into a single scripture, which speaks of a victory over death’. Collins, First Corinthians, 582. But if it is commentary, then it is commentary out of place in Paul’s argument. Whether Paul is ‘convinced that death itself is the result of sin’, that is not a conviction he in 1 Cor 15 develops. The argument reads more neatly and directly if we skip v. 56 entirely, v. 57 picking up v. 55’s reference to τὸ νίκος over Death, which is the point of Paul’s entire argument.
identify Sin as a power, as he does in Romans. And when he writes of God’s ‘enemies’ (vv. 24-26), he names only ‘Death’. In no mention of Adam does Paul ever associate Adam with Sin, only with Death. Furthermore, morality in general is not the focus of 1 Corinthians 15. Paul warns that denying his premiss will lead to immoral conduct (vv. 29-34), and he exhorts believers to behave according to their identification with Christ (v. 49). But both these exhortations service Paul’s premiss on the resurrection of the dead; neither of them expresses fear of the power of Sin.

Finally, it is significant that v. 57 appends naturally to v. 55 without introducing any literary ‘dissonance’. Verse 57 provides an appropriate, triumphant response to τὸ νῖκος queried of Death: τὸ νῖκος through our Lord Jesus Christ. Excluding v. 56’s didactic aside maintains the poetic cadence of Paul’s paean.

In the end, it is nonessential to my argument to settle the provenance of 1 Corinthians 15.56. I recognize at least three strategies for reading this verse, according to three separate ends. Reading 1 Corinthians 15 confessionally, for doctrine, ethics, or devotion, v. 56 is ‘Scripture’ and remains viable. Reading specifically to understand ‘Paul’, the reader must decide on the authenticity of the verse and how it contributes to Paul’s attitude to sin and law. Reading for Paul’s argument, i.e., as here, the verse may be set aside as either a post-Pauline gloss or a Pauline gaffe. In either case, it is not expedient to Paul’s argument on the resurrection of the dead.

**Conclusion**

Following Paul’s argument throughout 1 Corinthians 15, we observe Paul’s identification of the believer both still with Adam, already with Christ. We observe that at no point does Paul present the believer at death somehow distinguishable from her or his body, but that believers remain bodies dead, alive, and in the afterlife. Believers are bodies, and it is as bodies Paul exhorts them to bear Christ’s mantle (v. 49); to be bodies ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’, awaiting their liberation from Death.

In Part Two of my study, which follows, I apply this perspective of believers as bodies to Paul’s exhortation to ‘flee πορνεία’ – a vice Paul distinguishes as uniquely εἰς τὸ σῶμα. In Chapter Four, I attempt to unpack the convoluted and often contradictory assertions concerning πορνεία in Paul and first-century Judaism. In Chapter Five I examine closely Paul’s argument concerning πορνεία and the body in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20.
Part Two
The Body Now

Fix in us thy humble dwelling.

Charles Wesley, *Love Divine, All Loves Excelling*
Chapter Four
Paul and the Problem of πορνεία

For all his infamy for the subject, Paul says remarkably little about sex. And what he does say resembles little lexically the writings of his philosophical contemporaries. The moralists write variously about erotic love or sex in terms entirely absent from Paul’s epistles;1 Paul writes particularly about πορνεία – not something of great interest to them.2 In Part One, I considered how Paul depicts believers’ relationships to their bodies by examining how Paul depicts the believer at death. I concluded that Paul portrays believers as bodies, not distinguishable from them, and that believers-as-bodies constitute part of the dis-ordered κόσμος Christ is in process re-ordering.

In Part Two, my purpose is to consider Paul’s ethics. How does Paul expect believers-as-bodies ‘in Christ’, ‘in Adam’, to behave in the Meanwhile between Christ’s resurrection and return? I apply my study to a concrete ethical problem in Paul particular to the body: πορνεία. In 1 Corinthians 6.18, Paul distinguishes πορνεία a unique bodily offence: every other sin believers commit outside the body (ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός); πορνεία they commit εἰς it. My approach remains exegetical. I focus on Paul’s argument of 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 – a cluster of references to the

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human body and πορνεία, and Paul’s only extended discussion of πορνεία. But here I encounter a problem.

**The Problem of πορνεία**

*Introduction*

The problem is that πορνεία is by no means a straightforward term. Different scholars propose different meanings for πορνεία, and interpreters of Paul often use one or another of these, apparently unaware of competing definitions and sometimes mixing contradictory ones. Paul is himself less help than we might hope for grasping the language. Although he uses πορνεία more frequently than any other sexual term, he does not use it often and often only as one of many terms in a list. Paul’s lists are informative, still, for they distinguish πορνεία from vices such as adultery (μοιχεία) that interpreters often equate with it. But Paul’s only extensive use of the term occurs in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20. Consequently, interpreters bring to these verses understandings of πορνεία gleaned from reading more widely.

My purpose this chapter is not, principally, to contribute an alternative understanding of πορνεία – although I do make a modest proposal, incidentally. My aim, rather, is organizational: to sort, to assess, to retain and arrange or to dispose of parts or wholes of πορνεία proposals that affect our reading of Paul. In short, I aim first to complicate but ultimately to de-clutter πορνεία. In order to do so, I first survey competing theses on πορνεία before, second, examining first-hand important primary source uses of the term. Along the way, I offer the thesis that in Second Temple Judaism πορνεία is a gendered term with different denotations for males and for females; that it maintains a fixed function of effecting a social boundary that limits with which women a man may copulate, but that it displays a variable content, different groups legitimizing different sorts of women. I claim also that there is no evidence πορνεία ever indicates male fornication or adultery, though this is an appropriate application of the term for women. But my claims about πορνεία are incidental of my primary aim: to understand Second Temple uses of πορνεία in order

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3 Both πορνεία (2 Cor 12.21; Gal 5.19) and πόρνος (1 Cor 5.9, 10, 11; 6.9) appear in lists. Independent of lists are πορνεία (1 Cor 5.1; 6.13, 18; 7.2; 1 Thess 4.3), πορνεύω (1 Cor 6.18; 10.8) and πόρνη (1 Cor 6.15, 16).

4 See 1 Cor 6.9. The vice lists of, e.g., Matt 15.19, 3 Bar 8.5; 13.4, and Didache 5.1 likewise distinguish the terms, as does the Ethiopic of Mart.Isa. 1.2.5. Heb 13.4 declares that God will judge both the πόρνους and the μοιχοὺς.
better to assess competing readings of πορνεία and, ultimately, better to read πορνεία in Paul.

πορνεία: A Jewish Problem

Jerome translates πορνεία fornicatio, which the English, ‘fornication’, reflects. OED defines the English: ‘Voluntary sexual intercourse between a man (in restricted use, an unmarried man) and an unmarried woman. In Scripture extended to adultery’. Augustine includes fornicatio in his trinity of terms that connote sexual lust (also concupiscencia and cupiditas), all of them opposing charity. The sexual renunciation by monks and other Christian ascetics of the second and third centuries comes eventually to idealize Christian sexual conduct, and Paul is frequently affirmed their font. But significantly, the moralists of Paul’s day do not use πορνεία as an expression of lust. It is not one of the passions of the Stoics, nor one of the pleasures of the Epicureans. There is little interest in the term and, outwith Jewish literature, the word-group refers almost exclusively to professional prostitution, male or female. In Paul’s period, πορνεία is peculiarly a Jewish problem. But, in Jewish literature, does πορνεία mean fornicatio?


7 E.g., Brown, Body, 54-55.

8 Strob. 2.88,8 (SVF 3.378; Long and Sedley 2.404) lists the passions. τά τέσσαρα: ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. DL 111 originates this list with Zeno. Galan includes θυμός on the list (Plac. 4.7.24). Strobæus organizes the four passions as follows (2.90,19-91,9; SVF 3.394; Long and Sedley 2.406-07): ἐπιθυμία: ὀργὴ (wrath); ἔρωτες σφόδροι (intense sexual desire); τόθοι (yearnings); ἵμεροι (yearnings); φιληδονίαι (love of pleasure); φιλοπλουτίαι (love of wealth); φιλοδοξίαι (love of honours); ἡδονή: ἐπιχαιρεκακίαι (rejoicing in another’s misfortune); ἁμφιεματί (self-gratification); γοητεία (trickery); φρονέσ (envy); δοχυνία (hesitancy); ἄφανται (anguish); ἐκπλήξεις (astonishment); σίγχυσις (shame); δόρυθοι (confusion); δειπνιασία (superstition); δέος (dread); δέματα (terror); ἀἵμα: φθόνος (malice); ξίλα (envy); ξηλωτυπία (jealousy); ἔλεος (pity); πένθος (grief); ἄχθος (worry); ἄχος (sorrow); ἄνια (annoyance); ἀπέννα (mental pain) ἄνη ( vexation). Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.16. See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., vol. 1: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary; 2: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography (CUP, 1987), 1.410-19; 2.404-18.

9 Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 1.112-25; 2.114-29.

πορνεία: An Overview of Proposals

Bruce Malina famously raised this question in 1972, and Joseph Jensen responded. Malina points to the assumptions of NT exegetes who translate πορνεία ‘prostitution, unchastity, fornication, of every kind of unlawful sexual intercourse’. After reviewing the various NT expressions of πορνεία and making comparisons with rabbinc literature, Malina concludes:

πορνεία means unlawful sexual conduct, or unlawful conduct in general…prohibited by the Torah, written and/or oral…Aside from the instance of R. Eliezer, there is no evidence in traditional or contemporary usage of the word πορνεία that takes it to mean pre-betrothal, pre-marital, heterosexual intercourse of a non-cultic or non-commercial nature, i.e. what we call ‘fornication’ today.

Among those conceptions of πορνεία Malina challenges is Hauck and Schulz’s influential TDNT entry. Hauck and Schulz report πορνεία-זנות’s connection to prostitution. They link Judaism’s development of the term to supposed real problems with cultic prostitutes, and present πορνεία-זנות in the Hebrew Bible (/LXX) as harlotry, extra-marital intercourse, and often as adultery. They claim that in later Judaism πορνεία-זנות becomes often materially equivalent with adultery and ‘then comes to mean “sexual intercourse” in gen. without more precise definition’.17

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1 'πορνεία’, which lists first ‘prostitution’. Only on evidence of Matt 19.9 and 1 Cor 7.2 does it give ‘fornication, unchastity’; based on LXX Hos 4.11: ‘metaph., idolatry’.

11 It is not universally a Jewish problem. Philo uses the abstract πορνεία only in Mos. 1.300 and Spec. 1.282; the verb, πορνεύω, in Fug. 153; Spec. 1.281; Prov. 2.18. Josephus never mentions πορνεία, referring only once to πορνευτής in the sense of a ‘brothel’ (Ant. 19.357). Others do not use πορνεία at all but feature, e.g., θηρίον (4 Mace 1.20, 21, 22[2x], 24, 25, 28, 33; 5.23; 6.35; 9.31) or γυμνία (Ps. Phoc. 61, 67, 193, 194, 214). I take the Pseudo-Phocylides references from van der Horst’s concordance: Pieter Willem van der Horst, The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides: With Introduction and Commentary, SVTP 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 281-8.


14 Str-B, 342-43. The prohibition is to priests, that they cannot marry a woman either degraded by harlotry or one divorced from her husband. Malina notes that ‘much is made of this isolated opinion…of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (ca. 90), the well known, stalwart traditionalist’. He adds: ‘It certainly is not the general Rabbinic opinion, and hence should not be cited as characteristic of Rabbinic usage’. Malina, ‘Porneia,’ 15, and n. 4.


16 Friedrich Hauck and Siegfried Schulz, ‘πόρνη, κτλ.’ in TDNT, 6.579-95. By evidence of scholarly usage, at least in Paul, Hauck and Schulz remain the authority on πορνεία.

17 Hauck and Schulz, ‘πόρνη, κτλ.’ 6.587. Hall contends that the Talmud uses ‘intercourse of prostitution’ to cover any kind of sexual misbehaviour. Gary H. Hall, ‘זנות,’ in NIDOTE, 1.1124. He cites Gittin 81; Sanhedrin 82a; Avodah Zara 17c; Yevamot 59b.
Chapter Four

Jensen’s reply to Malina endorses the sort of reading Hauck and Schulz promote. Among his objections, Jensen criticizes Malina for reading the NT through the rabbis rather than examining biblical and Second Temple literature itself. Jensen supplies the lack and concludes that a major use of πορνεία in Jewish texts and the NT is ‘wanton behavior, including fornication’. 18

Perhaps because it is the familiar reading interpreters, at least of Paul, appear to favour Jensen’s and Hauck and Schulz’s position over Malina’s. But other interpreters have added weight to Malina’s claim. Like Malina, Peter Tomson considers how Paul mirrors rabbinical thought. Tomson argues that πορνεία in Paul is functionally equivalent to the rabbinical תרגום (הנוי)19 – the ‘uncovering nakedness’ of Leviticus 18.6. Resembling both the so-called Apostolic Decree (Acts 15.19-21) and the Noachide code, this use of πορνεία expects of Jew and (righteous) gentile alike compliance with the sexual norms outlined in Leviticus 18 and 20 – a connection between πορνεία and Leviticus Joseph Fitzmyer earlier made famous.

Fitzmyer observes that in CD 4.12b-5.14a זנות (=πορνεία) prohibits both ‘taking two wives in their lifetime’ (4.20-21) and taking as wives close relatives (5.7-8). The second זנות is ‘a clear reference to marriage within degrees of kinship proscribed by Lev 18:13’.20 The first has provoked more controversy; namely, whether זנות proscribes both polygamy and remarriage after divorce, polygamy alone, divorce alone, or a second marriage for any reason.21 Fitzmyer answers authoritatively, based on the (then) recently published 11QTemple 57.17-19’s proscription of both polygamy and divorce, that CD 4.20-21 prohibits both polygamy and divorce.22 He thus explains that Matthew’s permission to divorce on grounds of

21 Geza Vermes, ‘Sectarian Matrimonial Halakah in the Damascus Rule,’ JJS 25 (1974): 197. Vermes and Murphy-O’Connor famously contested whether the prohibition was of polygamy alone (Vermes) or divorce alone (Murphy-O’Connor). The stumbling stone was the masculine possessive pronominal suffix on מחייהם: ‘in their lifetime’. Vermes argued a prohibition to divorce should have the feminine suffix, for it is in the woman’s lifetime that remarriage is prohibited. Cf. Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, ‘An Essene Missionary Document? CD II, 14-IV, 1,’ RB 77 (1970): 201-29.
22 Fitzmyer, ‘Matthean,’ 95-96. With the publication of 11QTemple, Fitzmyer argued ‘the most natural interpretation of CD 4:20-21 is that the masculine pronominal suffix is used to refer to both the
πορνεία (Matt 5.32; 19.9) is for gentile Christians already married with too close a degree of kinship—an application not all Matthean scholars accept.

The precise meaning of זנות in CD likewise remains disputed. Schuller observes that other passages in CD permit divorce (CD 13.17; 4Q266.9.iii.5) so that, as Hempel comments, ‘a consensus on the interpretation of CD 4.20-21 par. seems as yet out of reach’. Whatever more it means, however, CD at least uses πορνεία-זנות to restrict marriages, whether from polygamy or remarriage or both and, as in the rabbis, the same text prohibits incestuous marriages according to Leviticus 18 and 20. Kampen’s general summary of πορνεία-זנות in CD is instructive: ‘In that document it is clearly a term used to define the ideological boundaries of the group’. We see this ideological use of the term in other Second Temple texts.

Other Second Temple texts expand the Levitical application of πορνεία-זנות, not least to prohibit exogamy. Christine Hayes observes that Jubilees, 4QMMT, and the Aramaic Levi Document (ALD) each presents its communities as ‘a kingdom of priests’. She argues that they apply priestly proscriptions to the whole community so that, among other things, ‘Lay intermarriage is treated like priestly intermarriage’. The emphasis on endogamy is patent in Jubilees and, there, πορνεία-זנות is used

man and the woman who are joined in marriage…Hence the first form of זنى should be understood here as an ensnarement in either polygamy or divorce’. Fitzmyer, ‘Matthean,’ 96.


28 Christine E. Hayes, Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the Bible to the Talmud (OUP, 2002), 69.

29 Endogamy was a major concern of the author, an important element in his teachings about purity…He makes brief allusions to sexual purity in connection with Sodom (16.5-6) and with Lot and his daughters (16.8-9; cf. 23.14)…but he has Abraham give explicit instructions about it to all his...
variously for ‘intermarriage with Canaanites (20:4-5), the illicit intercourse between
the Watchers and the women (7:21, 20:5), the fornication of the inhabitants of
Sodom and Gomorrah (16:5, 20:5-6) and, indirectly, Reuben’s fornication with
Bilhah (33:20). In 4QMMT B 75-82, זנות appears in lines 76 and 82. The author
prohibits admixture for cattle, clothing, and fields, then explains that as these items
are holy so the sons of Aaron are most holy (79). From this usage, Quimron and
Kampen identify the references to זנות as concerns over intermarriage between priests
and laity; Baumgarten and Hayes between Israelites and gentiles. Importantly, all
agree that זנות here concerns a problem of marital admixture.

sons, including the command that they not marry Canaanite women (20:3-6). James C. VanderKam,
The Book of Jubilees, ed. Michael A. Knibb, Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (Sheffield

30 Hayes, Gentile, 76. Cf. Cana Werman, ‘Jubilees 30: Building a Paradigm for the Ban on
Intermarriage,’ HTR 90 (1997): 14. Kirchoff identifies as πορνεία-זנות references to mixed marriages
(20.4; 25.1, 7f.; 30.7), homosexuality (16.5), adultery (39.6), incest with a father’s wife (33) and with
a father’s daughter (16.8). Kirchoff, Sünde, 26. But it is difficult to use Jubilees as evidence of זנות
usage for we have access to the term only through its translation into Ethiopic (Ge’ez). Although
VanderKam translates the Ethiopic terms for fornication, adultery, and sexual impurity, my
investigation requires the precise nuances between these; what we have in Jubilees reflects what זנות
meant to later Ebionite-Christian translators. Thus for, e.g., 20.5, even the grandparent languages
disagree. Cf. VanderKam’s notes on 7.21, 20.5, 33.20. See James C. VanderKam, The Book of
Jubilees, CSCO 511; Scriptores Aethiopici 88 (Lovani: In Aedibus E. Peeters, 1989), 46, 117, 223.
31 See Kampen, ‘4QMMT,’ 135.
32 Kampen, ‘4QMMT,’ 136; E. Qimron and J. Strugnell, Qumran Cave 4 V: Miqsat Ma’ase ha-Torah,
33 Hayes, Gentile, 82-89, and Qimron and Strugnell report Baumgarten’s opinion in Qimron and
Strugnell, DJD 10, 55, n. 75. Against the gentile hypothesis, Himmelfarb argues that there is little
evidence of mixed marriages prior to the Maccabean revolt. Hayes agrees, but claims that the problem
is marriages between converted gentiles and ethnic Jews. Hayes’s thesis is that the pure/impure binary
in the Hebrew Bible effects boundaries between Jews and ‘Gentile others’, and she distinguishes three
concepts of purity: ritual (Priestly), moral (Holiness code), and genealogical (Ezra-Nehemiah). She
notes (8-9): ‘Groups that defined their Jewishness mostly or exclusively in genealogical terms
established an impermeable boundary between Jews and Gentiles. Not only was it impossible for
Gentiles to become Jews, but also violations of the genealogical distinction between the two groups
(i.e., interethic sexual unions) were anathema. By contrast, groups that defined their Jewishness in
primarily moral or religious terms established a permeable boundary between Jews and Gentiles.
Gentiles who adopted the moral and religious characteristics of Jewish identity could become Jews of
a particular sort: Jews of nonnative birth. Insofar as certain privileges or functions within Jewish
society might be genealogically based, these nonnative Jews (or converts) retained a distinctive
identity within the larger group. Finally, any group that might define Jewish identity in exclusively
moral or religious terms would establish a boundary so permeable as to allow full assimilation in
every respect’. Hayes argues that although most Second Temple Jews somehow accept resident aliens (גרים)
or gentiles who marry Jews, foreswearing idolatry and immorality, Ezra erects an impermeable
boundary to gentiles by applying to all Israel the requirement of the high priest to endogamy and its
consequent: not to profane (הלל) his offspring among his people (Lev 21.15; cf. Neh 13.28-30). Ezra
innovates a ‘holy seed’ ideology, demanding the purity of Israel’s seed. Hayes contends that the term
‘pure’ in Ezra’s genealogical context means ‘unalloyed or free of admixture’, and that ‘impure’ means
of mixed lineage. ‘The terms apply to the offspring, or line of descendents, issuing from a particular
In *ALD* 6.3-4 πορνεία-זנות again implies marital admixture. Levi commands: ‘take for yourself a woman from my family and do not defile your seed with (=πορνῶν)’.34 Himmelfarb observes of the concrete plural πορνέας: ‘The author of *Aramaic Levi* assumed that a pious priest would hardly have needed urging to avoid harlots. Thus the meaning…must be more subtle; the woman must be unsuitable in some less obvious way’.35 Hayes puts the ‘less obvious way’ according to πορνεία-זנות’s prohibition of marital admixture: ‘the term zonah, or “outsider,” is a relative and essentially negative term, connoting a woman prohibited in marriage because she falls outside the bounds of a permitted group’.36 Hayes identifies the זונית (=πόρνη) as an ‘outsider’, making an observation more insightful than she acknowledges. Through this equation, Hayes makes the זוניאן functionally equivalent to the זורה אשה/נכריה – the ‘Strange Woman’ who was fundamental to restricting sexual contact in post-exilic Israel.37

Although she (unfortunately) limits her study only to the LXX Pentateuch, Kathy Gaca also observes associations between πορνεία and endogamy, further connecting endogamy to the practice of monotheism. In general terms, Gaca defines sexual fornication in the LXX as heterosexual ‘sexual intercourse between men and women that transgresses the criteria of religiously acceptable copulation…it is not vaguely against sexual irregularities of any sort, but against men and women engaging in sexual intercourse outside of God’s ordinance system’; that is ‘adultery, incest, or acts of sexual intercourse partly or fully in devotion to gods other than the Lord’.38 In particular, Gaca hypothesizes that ‘In the Septuagint Pentateuch

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36 Hayes, *Gentile*, 72. Hayes distinguishes *ALD* from the Testament of Levi, noting that in *ALD* זונה indicates sexual relations with all non-priestly women, whereas in *TLev* 9.9-10 it is priestly relations with women of strange nations. Thus the author of *TLev* maintains more open boundaries than does *ALD*.

37 Especially in Prov 1-9 – see my discussion below. Given *ALD*’s identification of all Israel as priests, it makes sense that זונה-πόρνη should become a shorthand for an ‘outsider’ since Lev 21.14 proscribes priests to marry women defiled by prostitution and prescribes they marry only from their own people.

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rebellious sexual fornication refers to heterosexual acts of copulation that deviate from biblical endogamy and from the closely related norm of worshipping God alone’.39 She argues that Paul’s problem with πορνεία originates in this Septuagintal understanding – an understanding that carries into the early Patristic period. Thus for Gaca, πορνεία is not (as Jensen and Hauck and Schulz) a catch-all for sexual irregularities; nor (as Malina and Tomson and Fitzmyer) a rabbinical-type application of Levitical holiness laws; nor (as Hayes) a problem of priestly purity. Instead, it reflects a Pentateuchal preservation of monotheism.

In her in-depth examination of 1 Corinthians 6.12-20, Renate Kirchoff surveys πορνεία usage in both Greek and Jewish sources throughout the Second Temple period. Focusing on Jewish uses, she follows Jensen and Hauck and Schulz to understand the abstract noun, πορνεία, as ‘fornication’ and sexual misbehaviour in general. But she develops this observation to show that the concrete noun, πόρνη, can be used as a derogatory term for any woman involved in non-permitted sexual practices including, but not limited to, prostitution.40

In a different vein, Jennifer Glancy focuses on πορνεία’s and πόρνη’s ‘regular’ association with prostitution proper in the Roman Empire. Prostitutes were often slaves, raising questions for Glancy about Paul’s and other early Christians’ ambivalence to slavery and their exhortations that slaves obey their masters.41

39 Gaca, Fornication, 158.
40 Kirchoff observes contemporary German language uses derogatorily “‘Dirne’, “Hure” and “Prostituierte” of non-professionals, though Prostituierte is the neutral of these terms (19). Her agenda is to query in Paul ‘was eine Frau zur πόρνη macht[?]’. She concludes Paul follows Jewish and Jewish Christian usage that identifies the πόρνη not always a professional, but a woman with whom a (Jewish) man is forbidden sexual relations: ‘Paulus steht mit seinem Gebrauch von πορνεία und πόρνη in 1Kor 6,12-20 in der jüdischen Tradition, die πορνεία als umfassende Bezeichnung für verbotene sexuelle Handlungen gebraucht und eine Frau πόρνη nennt, mit der ein jüdischer Mann sexuell nicht verkehren darf. Beide Begriffe betonen die Unrechtmäßigkeit dieses Sexualverkehrs’…’ Mit πόρνη und πορνεία drückt Paulus die Unrechtmäßigkeit dieser sexuellen Kontakte aus. Für ihn ist eine πόρνη nicht speziell eine Prostituierte, sondern grundsätzlich jede Frau, für die der Christ nicht der einzige Sexualpartner ist’. Kirchhoff, Sünde, 35; 67.
41 Jennifer A. Glancy, ‘Obstacles to Slaves’ Participation in the Corinthian Church,’ JBL 117 (1998): 481-501; Jennifer A. Glancy, Slavery in Early Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Carolyn Osiek, ‘Female Slaves, Porneia, and the Limits of Obedience,’ in Early Christian Families in Context: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, ed. David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek, Religion, Marriage, and Family (Eerdmans, 2003), 255-74. Jensen earlier raised the possibility that early Christians sexually exploited their slaves: ‘It can hardly be supposed that this sort of behavior was tolerated in the Christian community, but the silence of the New Testament is surprising…Human nature being what it is, the abuse of female slaves would tend to persist, even in Christian circles, especially those subject to hellenistic influences, unless the standard moral teaching made the matter clear’. But Jensen rejects the practice’s endorsement simply by extending (but without warrant) the meaning of πορνεία: ‘Unless we are willing to suppose that this important matter was completely ignored, we must suppose that the early Christians understood it to be included in the frequent
Carolyn Osiek observes: ‘Even if the Christian authors...do not intend to include sexual use as part of slaves’ obedience (and that is never clear), the question still remains how new Christians, used to the sexually abusive patterns of slavery as normal and morally neutral, would have heard these directives in the absence of anything more specific’.42

πορνεία: A Modest Proposal

I survey the above proposals on πορνεία to show it is by no means automatic how to read the term when we encounter it in Paul. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine πορνεία-זנות in the Hebrew Bible/LXX and Second Temple sources. My goal is better to assess interpretations of the term in Paul that appeal for support to biblical and Second Temple usage. I attempt to order theses on πορνεία and, consequently, I construct a thesis that retains the claims of some, eschews the claims of others, and attempts broadly to account for πορνεία’s various uses in the Second Temple period. I make several claims below, but one in particular both directs my study of the term and challenges a shortcoming common to all the proposals surveyed above.

It is by no means my original observation that זנות in the Hebrew Bible is a gendered term, applying specifically to women. Nevertheless, none of the above proposals sufficiently attends to the gender specificity of the term and, consequently, none remarks how the term both applies differently to women than to men, nor how it develops distinctively as a male vice in the Second Temple period. Taking seriously the gender specificity of πορνεία-זנות, for the remainder of this chapter I defend the following claims:

1. In normal Greek usage, πορνεία denotes sexual relations with or by professional prostitutes, male or female.

2. In the Hebrew Bible/LXX:

   2.1 πορνεία-זנות applies almost exclusively to females, denoting female ‘fornication’: heterosexual extramarital sex, professional (prostitution), premarital, or adulterous. Non-professionally, πορνεία-זנות is a transgression of the woman’s patriarchal bounds;

exhortations addressed to all about avoiding porneia and that, therefore, the term included this as well as other sorts of extra-marital intercourse’. Jensen, ‘Porneia,’ 184.

42 Osiek, ‘Slaves,’ 272.
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2.2 πορνεία-זנות is used metaphorically in certain rhetoric to portray Israel as an unfaithful wife, ‘fornicating’ with other gods. The metaphor maintains the social and lexical application of πορνεία-זנות only to females (Israel is always woman);

2.3 those few instances that imply a male subject for πορνεία-זנות denote exogamy, idolatry, or both;

2.4 πορνεία-זנות does not function as a catch-all for ‘sexual immorality’;

2.5 πορνεία-זנות does not denote sexual lust;

2.6 πορνεία-זנות is not a vice named among nor does it represent the sexual proscriptions of Leviticus 18 or 20 (incest, bestiality, homoeroticism, sex with a menstruant);

2.7 the πόρνη-זונה is a female, professional fornicator, legally secure and socially tolerated, if spurned. There is little evidence the πόρνη-זונה ever denotes an actual ‘sacred prostitute’.

3. In the Second Temple period:

3.1 πορνεία-זנות retains its biblical sense of female fornication;

3.2 πορνεία-זנות becomes a peculiar male vice. It refers generally to male sex with a woman who is ‘out of bounds’ of a particular group. This involves sometimes, but not automatically, the boundary effected by the proscriptions in Leviticus 18 and 20 (arguably, only incest);

3.3 πορνεία-זנות does not denote male ‘fornication’: heterosexual extramarital sex, premarital or adulterous;

3.4 πορνεία-זנות does not function as a catch-all for ‘sexual immorality’;

3.5 πορνεία-זנות does not denote sexual lust;

3.6 the πόρνη-זונה occasionally denotes not the professional prostitute but any woman ‘out of bounds’, sexually.

Arguably, the term πορνεία develops distinctively in the post-Apostolic period. I therefore restrict my investigation of πορνεία-זנות to Jewish sources prior to and contemporary with Paul, excluding from my study its occurrences in both
rabbinitic and patristic materials. Consequently, I also omit to consider the several occurrences of πορνεία in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. Although the Testaments may derive from earlier Jewish sources, there is good evidence that they have undergone significant Christian redaction. They, along with rabbinitic and patristic works, introduce too many variables for measuring the precise nuances of πορνεία-זנות in the Second Temple period.

In what follows, I examine πορνεία-זנות in certain Second Temple literature earlier than or contemporary with Paul. First, however, I briefly consider the term in the Hebrew Bible/LXX. This is important because Paul arguably appeals to biblical usage, because biblical usage reveals social attitudes that (I maintain) remain unchanged in the Roman era, and because understanding biblical usage shows that Second Temple usage of πορνεία-זנות developed distinctively.

πορνεία-זנות: Biblical Usage to the Post-Exile

In important respects, the pre-exilic sexual norms and practices of the Hebrew Bible often differ little from others in the ancient Near East. Men acquire women for marriage in monogamous or polygamous relationships, often from their

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43 This is not to say reading Paul does not benefit from better acquaintance with the rabbis, with whom he may share a number of perspectives, or from familiarity with the fathers – Paul’s earliest readers. But so reading does introduce significant variables into an investigation of the precise, historically conditioned nuances of a particular term. And, for discriminating the data, it demands a level of competence in both rabbinitic and patristics I cannot claim.

44 πορνεία: TRub 1.6; 3.3; 4.6; 7; 8; 11; 5.3; 5; 6.1; 4; TSim 5.3; 4; TLev 2.3; 9.9; 18.2; TJud title; 12.2; 13.3; 14.2; 3; 15.2; 18.2; TDan 5.6; TJos 3.8; TBen 8.2; 9.1; 10.10; πορνεύω: TSim 5.3; TJud 15.1; 2; TIss 7.2; Tarser 2.8; TBen 9.1; (cf. TAb 10.8); ἐκπορνεύω: TDan 5.5; πόρνη: TLev 14.5; 6. References from Albert-Marie Denis, Concordance grecque des Pseudépigraphes d'Ancien Testament: Concordance Corpus des textes Indices (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1987).


46 Founding the significantly different theses of Gaca, Fornication; Brian S. Rosner, Paul, Scripture and Ethics: A Study of 1 Corinthians 5-7, AGJU 22 (Leiden: Brill, 1994).

47 See Appendix II for a chart displaying LXX translations of זנה.
own kin but not exclusively. Women are the property of their fathers or nearest living
male relative, until they became the property of their husbands. They are to remain
chaste, reserving sexual expression only for their husbands or, in the case of
concubines, their masters. Adultery (נוף) is a property offence committed by one
man against another, as is rape. But insofar as women are indictable in these acts
the offences serve as backhanded legitimizations to their personhood. Legally,
nothing prohibits men from expressing themselves sexually with wives, concubines
and, presumably, slaves, and with non-property women such as divorcées, non-
levirate widows, and prostitutes. A woman’s sexual activity is restricted by the man

48 Property does not mean mere chattel. Wegner notes that biblical and Mishnaic laws are ambiguous
about whether a woman is chattel or person; the key lies in whether some man has a proprietary
interest in her sexual or reproductive function. Judith Romney Wegner, Chattel or Person? The Status
of Women in the Mishnah (OUP, 1988), 19. Both legal and narrative texts disclose love relationships
between men and women: e.g., Jacob for Rachel (Gen 29.16-18, 20), Elkanah for Hannah (1 Sam 1.5),
Michal for David (1 Sam 18.20) and Paltiel for Michal (2 Sam 3.16). Cf. the precaution against
favouring the children of a beloved wife (Deut 21.15-17). See Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of
the Old Testament, trans. Margaret Kohl (SCM, 1974), 169-80. Citing Second Temple evidence,
Kraemer remarks: ‘Whatever formal roles fathers played in the selection of mates, sexual attraction
between the prospective spouses almost certainly played a role in actual marriage arrangements’. Ross
S. Kraemer, ‘Jewish Women in the Diaspora World of Late Antiquity,’ in Jewish Women in Historical
observes that certain women had better say in their marriage arrangements. She urges historians to
move beyond simplistic male/female dichotomies in constructing ancient family relations and to
attend also to status and wealth. Miriam Peskowitz, “Family/ies” in Antiquity: Evidence from
Tannaitic Literature and Roman Galilean Architecture,’ in The Jewish Family in Antiquity, ed. Shaye
J.D. Cohen, BJS no. 289 (Scholars Press, 1993), 28. Cf. Rebekah’s participation in the decision of her
marriage to Isaac (Gen 24.57).

49 It is true that ‘Unlike the Babylonians and the Assyrians who viewed adultery only as a crime
against the proprietary rights of the husband, the Old Testament legislation considers adultery also a
34. Nevertheless, the ‘evil act’ committed in Israel (Lev 20.20; Deut 22.22-27) is still a proprietary
wrong that compensates the husband.

Implications for Today (SCM, 1989), 158.

51 Nothing stipulates against men exploiting their slaves sexually, although Exod 21.7-11 requires any
girl sold into slavery by her father to be returned to her father if her master or his son does not marry
her at her age of marriage. Exod 20.17 prohibits coveting another’s slave, male or female. Ben Sira
takes this sexually (Sir 41.22), and there is some question whether the LXX alters Sirach’s Hebrew to
justify sex with one’s slave. See Osiek, ‘Slaves,’ 265. But Ben Sira’s warning reflects other demotic
wisdom, such as the Babylonian Counsels of Wisdom 66-67: ‘Do not honour a slave girl in your house
/ She shall not rule [your] bedroom like a wife’, or the Egyptian The Instruction of Pithotep 18,
which warns against approaching women belonging to another’s household. W. G. Lambert,
Babylonian Wisdom Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 103; Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient
Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings, vol. 1: The Old and Middle Kingdoms (University of
California Press, 1976), 68.
to whom she belongs: as wife, concubine, daughter, levirate daughter-in-law, or slave – except for the prostitute.

As neither unmarried virgin nor non-virgin wife the prostitute is a liminal woman, anomalously an autonomous sexual woman who is simultaneously accepted and scorned. Falling through society’s cracks she is institutionalized but indefinite; sought after but spurned; legally secure but vulnerable. Her profession provides a loophole in the patriarchy, allowing men sexual variety without disrupting the order of the home. Effectively, she maintains that order. Demosthenes famously declared: ‘The prostitutes we have for our pleasure, the concubines for the daily care of our bodies, and our wives so that we can have legitimate children and a true guardian of the house’. No comparable statement exists in Jewish literature, but the social effect of the prostitute is similar: man-to-woman sexual contact without consequences for anybody’s family. There is no record of sacred prostitution in ancient Israel, and the claims Israel’s neighbours frequently practised the activity

52 Examples of sanctioned extramarital sex for daughters and concubines occur with Lot’s daughters in Soddom (Gen 19.8) and the Levite’s concubine and his host’s daughter at Gibeah (Judg 19.24, 25-26). In neither case would the women have consented willingly to being raped.

53 ‘That which is liminal is that which is betwixt and between nearly [sic] defined categories. A harlot falls between the two allowable categories for women. She is neither an unmarried woman, nor a non-virgin wife’. Susan Niditch, ‘The Wronged Woman Righted: An Analysis of Genesis 38,’ HTR 72 (1979): 147, n. 13.

54 Based only on legal restrictions, Wegner identifies three types of autonomous woman, none of them the prostitute: the legally emancipated daughter who has outgrown her father’s jurisdiction; the divorcée, and the widow whose husband left an heir and ‘thus saved her from the automatic levirate tie’. Wegner, Chattel, 14.


56 Bird: ‘Whereas the promiscuity of a daughter or levirate-obligated widow offends the male to whom each is subject, and is penalized accordingly, the harlot’s activity violates no man’s rights or honor, and is consequently free from the sanctions imposed on the casual fornicator. Strictly speaking, her activity is not illicit – and neither is her role’. Phyllis A. Bird, ‘“To Play the Harlot”: An Inquiry into an Old Testament Metaphor,’ in Missing Persons and Mistaken Identities: Women and Gender in Ancient Israel (Fortress, 1997), 222.

57 Or. 59.122.

58 E.g., Judah in Gen 38; Samson in Judg 16.1.
lacks corroborating evidence. It is best to understand the biblical charges against it as polemical rhetoric with little relation to actual practices.59

Although preexilic Israelite sexual practices compare unremarkably to their neighbours’, in certain instances of heinous sexual offence the othering, ideological cry can be already heard: ‘Such things are not done in Israel!’60 In the exile, however, sex becomes different. Here, illicit sex is associated with foreignness – the ‘otherness’ of Israel’s neighbours, their idols and magic that compete with YHWH-alone religion. The exilic prophets express Israel’s worship of other gods with metaphors of prostitution and adultery: Israel forsakes her legitimate sexual partner for multiple foreign ones. The metaphors are not synonymous. The adulteress and the prostitute are socially, lexically, and logically distinct.

The prostitute (זונה) is a female professional fornicator, sanctioned within the patriarchy to allow men sexual variety without infringing on other men’s women.61

59 Outside the Bible, virtually all evidence for sacred prostitution comes from Herodotus’s Histories 1.199 – itself an ideologically charged account of the foreign East from a Greek perspective – and Lucian’s De syria dea §16. Bird notes that ‘Neither, however, uses the expression “sacred prostitution” in their descriptions of practices, which they refer to the general female population, not to professional prostitutes’. Bird, ‘Play,’ 221. n. 9. The biblical accounts and Ras Shamra tablets provide insufficient information to identify accurately the practices of the קדשה (literally, ‘holy one’). See further Gwendolyn Leick, Sex and Eroticism in Mesopotamian Literature (Routledge, 1994), esp. ch. 13 ‘L’amour Libre or Sacred Prostitution?’, pp. 147-56. Thus although sex and even prostitution may have taken place around the temple (e.g., 2 Kgs 23.7), the link to fertility rituals is tenuous at best. Cf. Karel van der Toorn, ‘Cultic Prostitution,’ in ABD, 5.511. Bird identifies the biblical tradition as commencing with Hosea, arguing that links between prostitutes and cult must be read in the context of Hosea’s polemical rhetoric, not as a reflection of actual practice. The lack of evidence leads Oden to suggest that ‘Perhaps, then, this alleged practice belongs in the same category with cannibalism, sodomy, and abhorrent dietary and sexual practices generally – that is to say, in the category of charges that one society levels against others as a part of that society’s process of self-definition’. Robert A. Oden, The Bible without Theology: The Theological Tradition and Alternatives to It (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 132. See further Mary Beard and John Henderson, ‘With This Body I Thee Worship: Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity,’ in Gender and the Body in the Ancient Mediterranean, ed. Maria Wyke (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 56-79; John R. Lanci, ‘The Stones Don’t Speak and the Texts Tell Lies: Sacred Sex at Corinth,’ in Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen, HTS 53 (Harvard University Press, 2005), 205-20; Karel van der Toorn, ‘Female Prostitution in Payment of Vows in Ancient Israel,’ JBL 108 (1989): esp. 201-204; Harold C. Washington, ‘The Strange Woman (זרה) of Proverbs 1-9 and Post-Exilic Judaean Society,’ in Second Temple Studies 2: Temple and Community in the Persian Period, ed. T.C. Eskenazi and K.H. Richards, JSOTSup 175 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1994), 224-25; Joan Goodnick Westenholz, ‘Tamar, Qēḏēšā, Qadištu, and Sacred Prostitution in Mesopotamia,’ HTR 82 (1989): 245-65.

60 Gen 34.7; Deut 22.21; Judg 19.22-26; 2 Sam 13.12; Jer 29.23; only Josh 7.15 does not use this formula in reference to a sexual offence. I follow Blenkinsopp in assigning these passages a preexilic date, though, of course, later redaction is possible. Joseph Blenkinsopp, ‘The Family in First Temple Israel,’ in Families in Ancient Israel, ed. Leo G. Perdue, et al., The Family, Religion, and Culture (Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 83.

61 Bird: ‘The anomaly of the prostitute as a tolerated specialist in an activity prohibited to every other woman is a particular feature of patriarchal society, representing an accommodation to the conflicting
Fornication (זנות) is female extramarital intercourse with an otherwise acceptable partner, and the fornicator offends not her sexual partner but whichever male she is responsible to. Adultery (נאף) is specifically the transgression of marriage bounds and may be committed by either males or females, the offences of both directed against only the husband of the adulteress (though also against God). Thus adultery and fornication do not function synonymously. Adultery forms a subset of fornication, but relative to gender: whereas all adulteresses fornicate, no adulterers do. And although all adulteresses are fornicators, not all fornicators are professionals. The adulteress is not a prostitute. It can be claimed, however, that adulteresses are prostitute-like, thus designating the adulteress a prostitute by dramatic apposition – a technique common to the prophets.

The controlling metaphor for prophets pre- and postexilic is always Israel as wife, so all references to prostitution are given through female adultery. Ezekiel demonstrates the distinction between the adulteress and the prostitute, mocking adulterous Israel because in her prostitute-like nymphomania she lacks the prostitute’s sense to expect recompense for her favours (16.1-43); she is judged, however, for infidelity. Hosea presents Gomer as more sagacious. Her prostitute-like pursuit of hire (2.12) lets Hosea describe Israel with imagery related to the prostitute’s fiscal motivations, but his judgments pertain only to the adulteress (2.2-4, 10). The prophets never condemn the prostitute herself. Their concern is the desires of men for exclusive control of their wives’ sexuality (and hence offspring) and, at the same time, for sexual access to other women. Bird, ‘Play,’ 224-25.

Thus Bird notes: ‘As a general term for extramarital sexual intercourse, ZNH is limited in its primary usage to female subjects, since it is only for women that marriage is the primary determinant of legal status and obligation. While male sexual activity is judged by the status of the female partner and is prohibited, or penalized, only when it violates the recognized marital rights of another male, female sexual activity is judged according to the woman’s marital status’. Bird, ‘Play,’ 222. The fornicator may offend her father (Deut 22.13-21; Lev 21.9) or father-in-law in the case of levirate widows (Gen 38.6-11, 24-26), and presumably her lord in the cases of slaves or concubines.


Although many take Gomer to be a professional prostitute, she is never designated a זונה but a זנונים. Bird argues that ‘The use of the abstract plural noun points to habitual behavior and inclination rather than profession’. Bird, ‘Play,’ 226. Thus Gomer is an ambitious fornicator but not necessarily a professional. At all events, Hosea describes her prostitute-like activity but judges her adultery.

Bird, ‘Play,’ 228.
prostitute-like behaviour of the adulterous wife; their goal: to redeem and rehabilitate this errant woman, returning her to her rightful role as righteous wife.

Hauck and Schulz fail to maintain the lexical, social, and logical distinctions between the prostitute and the adulteress. They remark, rightly: ‘It should not be overlooked, however, that זנה refers only to the woman’. But they do overlook the gender specificity of πορνεία-זנות and blend generically זנה and נאף. Consequently, scores of NT interpreters regard πορνεία a unisex term, equating it, generically, with μοιχεία. But זנה never stands for male adultery. Even metaphorically, it is always as a woman Israel ‘fornicates’ with other gods; it is as a wife Israel commits adultery. Reisser emphasizes the distinction lexically, but the social function of זנה likewise makes nonsensical its straightforward application to males. As an offence זנה refers to a woman’s sexual transgression of her patriarchal bounds, and adultery is but one expression of that transgression. There is no corresponding social condition to apply זנה to males, for males are no-one’s sexual property. Thus none of those few instances where the verb זנה implies a male subject indicates male fornication or adultery (explicitly: Exod 34.16; Num 25.1; implicitly: Lev 20.5; Deut 31.11; Judg 2.17; 8.27, 33). Instead, in every instance the prophetic, metaphorical sense applies

68 So, e.g., Kirchoff: ‘So kann πορνεία/זנות auch für μοιχεία/נאף stehen’. Kirchoff, Sünde, 35. Kirchoff notes for evidence Hos 4.2, 11; TRub 1.6; CD 4.20f., Matt 5.32; Rev 2.21f. (35, n. 110). But none of these examples equate generically πορνεία and μοιχεία. Hosea, Matthew, and Revelation involve female ποरνεία-זנות; CD 4.20f. deals with polygamy/divorce/remarriage (not adultery); TRub 1.6 represents not generic adultery but Levitical marriage proscriptions (Lev 18.8). Some argue Levitical proscriptions do not inform πορνεία in Matt 5.32. This is possible if Matthew’s focus is the state of the marriage (i.e., a marriage already in a state of πορνεία on account of kinship violations), in which case both male and female have committed πορνεία. But the actor in Matthew is male: it is he who gives the certificate of divorce (v. 31), he who divorces his wife (v. 32a), he who makes her an adulteress (v. 32b), he who marries a divorced woman (v. 33). It is therefore more natural to read the exception as an indictment of female πορνεία of which female adultery is a sub-set. Thus Matthew likely does not discuss male πορνεία, and he certainly does not equate πορνεία with male adultery. It is a man’s marrying a woman previously belonging to another male that causes male μοιχεία; her πορνεία is simply the ground legitimizing his divorce.
69 ‘Both word-groups are…to be clearly separated’. Horst Reisser, ‘πορνεία,’ in NIDNTT, 1.498. Fabry notes that this carries into the LXX: ‘The LXX generally uses moicheúō to translate ná’s, distinguishing it systematically from the semantic realm of zânâ (pornós). Adultery and prostitution are thus linguistically distinct phenomena’. H.-J. Fabry, ‘זנה: LXX,’ in TDOT, 9.118.
70 The exception to this, hypothetically, would be male slaves. But although the sexual use of male slaves is commonplace in pre-Christian Greece and Rome, there is no evidence in biblical Judaism that male slaves were regarded as their masters’ sexual property. Thus it is disappointing that on this point Hezser reports generically on Graeco-Roman slave practices but says nothing of Jewish ones. Catherine Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (OUP, 2005), esp. 179-82. Hezser does point to T.Hor. 2.5-6, which tells the story of R. Yehoshua’s visit to Rome. When R. Yehoshua found there a beautiful slave-boy who was about to be put to disgrace, he vowed to redeem him – and did so at great expense.
and men are charged with either pursuing other gods or participating in illicit cultic activity.\footnote{71 Cf. Bird, ‘Play,’ 220. The closest reference resembling male ‘fornication’ is Num 25.1. But the narrative makes clear that what provoked YHWH’s anger (25.3) was men taking daughters of Moab (25.1), sacrificing and prostrating before Moabite gods (25.2) so that ‘Israel bound itself to Baal-Peor’ (25.3). Thus judgment was directed not on men who simply ‘fornicated’, but Moses commanded Israel’s judges to slay those men ‘who have bound themselves to Baal-Peor’ (25.5). Phinehas was therefore celebrated for slaying ‘the man of Israel’ (25.6, 8) who lay openly with the Midianite woman (25.6).}

This reading of πορνεία-זנות in the Hebrew Bible/LXX helps us initially to quell the dispute between Malina’s and Jensen’s interpretations of the term. Malina’s conclusion that πορνεία does not mean fornication stands, but only when applied exclusively to men; Jensen’s retort that πορνεία does mean fornication demonstrates simply the unremarkable social reality that a woman’s means of legitimate sexual expression is restricted to marriage.\footnote{72 Malina, ‘Porneia,’ 10-17; Jensen, ‘Porneia,’ 161-84. All Jensen’s ‘proofs’ apply only to women. The closest exception is Ios. 43 where Philo boasts that Israelite youths, both male and female, remain chaste until marriage. Philo’s text identifies Potiphar’s wife a πόρνη, and in it Joseph claims that Israelite young men, unlike in neighbouring nations, do not visit prostitutes (who are anyway stoned to death) but ‘approach our virgin brides as pure as themselves’. But although Philo presents an ideal of male chastity, he does not denote male premarital sex ‘πορνεία’. πορνεία occurs here in regular Greek usage as male sex with a prostitute. So\textit{ contra} also Kirchhoff, \textit{Sünde}, 30-31. Besides the reference to Ios. 43, Kirchhoff points also to Philo’s \textit{Mos.} 1.300 as indicating non-conjugal sexual relations (‘nichtehelichen Sexverkehr’). But in this text πορνεία refers straightforwardly to ‘prostitution’. In \textit{Mos.} 1.295-300, Balak repeals his laws on prostitution (πορνεία), adultery, and seduction (φθορά) in order to enlist the most beautiful women of his land to ensnare Hebrew youths, leading the youths to renounce their traditions and venerate other gods. Thus Balak hopes to circumvent the oracle given Balam that promises Israelite successes. πορνεία occurs here in its normal application to actual prostitution, Balak repealing laws on ‘prostitution’. But more questionable than these evidences for πορνεία as generically ‘fornication’ is Jensen’s attempt to establish Philo’s sexual attitudes as normative in Second Temple Judaism by constructing a ‘tradition’ that connects Philo, R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, and the 12th Century CE (!) Maimonides. Jensen, ‘Porneia,’ 176-77.}

Thus although expectations for male extramarital chastity do develop,\footnote{73 As with most patriarchies, the Hebrew Bible/LXX generally portrays the male as the injured party in sexual misconduct. Thus the Levitical incest proscriptions identify the offences according to the male offended (father, son, brother); in 18.10, where sex is forbidden with a daughter’s daughter, the offence is against the father himself. Cf. Ezek 22.11. Even in cases of rape, such as Dinah and Tamar, a woman’s recourse depends on men (Gen 34; 2 Sam 13).} unless Second Temple Judaism advances a radical reversal of patriarchalism – and it does not – it is socially uninformed to assume that the term πορνεία-זנות simply extends to males of the Second Temple period female sexual proscriptions, \textit{viz.}, ‘fornication’. For men, πορνεία-זנות must mean something different.

\footnote{74 E.g., Philo \textit{Ios.} 43.}
Strange Women

An important development occurs after the exile that bears socially if not lexically on Second Temple πορνεία-τατι. Despite Jeremiah’s exhortation that the exiles settle in the land of their captivity, marry, and find spouses for their children (Jer 29.5-6), Ezra and Nehemiah complain that the exiled community breaks faith with YHWH by marrying strange women (נכריות נשים). Evidence of mixed marriages in biblical genealogies and possibly Graeco-Roman inscriptions suggests that strict endogamy was never followed fully, and ‘if the “problem” was as widespread as some passages indicate, this suggests that many Jews saw nothing objectionable with it’. Nevertheless, Ezra puts the practice in terms that reflect the Chronicler’s denunciations of Israel’s unfaithfulness to YHWH: exogamy is infidelity (מעל); it is, further, a corruption of the holy seed (9.2). Ezra’s solution (if not Nehemiah’s) is severe: purify yourselves by divorcing your foreign wives, sending them away with their children, and do not again transgress the law in this regard.

Ezra’s reading of Deuteronomic law is peculiar. Nowhere in the Pentateuch is divorce a solution to exogamy, and intermarriage is prohibited only with the surrounding Canaanite nations on account of the threat of idolatry. For Ezra, the

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75 Ezra 10.2, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 44; Neh 13.26, 27.
76 Besides Ruth the Moabitess, foreigners also bespeckle the genealogies of 1 Chronicles: the daughter of Shua the Canaanite (2.3), Jether the Ishmaelite (2.17), Jarha the Egyptian (2.34), Bithiah, Pharaoh’s daughter (4.18), and several men married into Moab (4.22). Furthermore, Isaiah extends good standing to the foreigner (56.1-8), and Achior the Ammonite converts to Judaism in Judith 14.10. On the inscriptions, see Ross S. Kraemer, ‘On the Meaning of the Term ‘Jew’ in Graeco-Roman Inscriptions,’ HTR 82 (1989): 48, n. 37. Williams cautions that Kraemer’s references ‘are all hypothetical’, contending: ‘our sole certain case of intermarriage is provided by the parents of the Christian disciple, Timothy.’ She notes, furthermore, that ‘Although Philo’s disapproving remarks about intermarriage points to the practice of exogamy among Jews at Alexandria, it is very hard to find instances of Jews either there or anywhere else who had married Gentiles’. Margaret H. Williams, The Jews Among the Greeks and Romans: A Diasporan Sourcebook (London: Ducksworth, 1998), 131.
77 Lester L. Grabbe, A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple Period: Volume 1: Yehud: A History of the Persian Province of Judah (2004), 313. Christine Yoder demonstrates that Persian period marriages were a lucrative business: not only does the husband become effective guardian of his wife’s finances, including her dowry, but ‘he st[ands] to gain certain less tangible (but not necessarily less valuable) social, political, or business advantages by aligning himself with her family’. Christine Roy Yoder, Wisdom as a Woman of Substance: A Socioeconomic Reading of Proverbs 1-9 and 31:10-31, ed. Otto Kaiser, BZAW 304 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 51.
78 The word occurs five times in Ezra’s address to Israel: 9.2, 4; 10.2, 6, 10. Cf. 1 Chr 2.7; 5.27; 9.1; 10.13; 2 Chr 12.2; 26.1, 6, 18; 28.19, 22; 29.6, 19; 30.7; 33.19; 36.14; etc. See Joseph Blenkinsopp, Ezra-Nehemiah: A Commentary, OTL (SCM, 1988), 176.
79 Deut 7.3-4; 23.2-9; cf. Exod 34.15. Note further that intermarriage is not among the sexual taboos of Lev 18 and 20, and Deut 21.10-14 (cf. Num 31.17-18) permits marriage to the beautiful (but
logic of exogamy emanates from his declaration that Israel’s seed is ‘holy’, and by his application to all Israel the priestly purity rules. Hayes argues that Ezra’s ‘holy seed’ exogamy is an innovation that makes impermeable the boundary between Jew and non-Jew: ‘Prior to Ezra, the boundary dividing Jew and Gentile was primarily moral-religious and could be crossed by Gentiles who forswore idolatry and immorality and joined the community of Israel either as resident aliens (gerim) or as Israelites by marriage’. But boundary-making and Jewish self-identity mark the Second Temple period, and separating sexually Jews from strangers is a priority even without Ezra’s emphasis on the holy seed.

Proverbs 1-9 presents a postexilic warning that young men avoid Strange Women (נָכְרִיָּאֶשׁ). Proverbs 1-9 devotes more space to the Strange Woman than to any other figure in the book, even than to her counterpart Woman...
Wisdom. She is designated ‘strange’ or ‘foreign’ (נכריה אשה/זרה אשה) in four passages (2.16-19; 5.3-23; 6.20-35; 7.4-27), and finally as ‘foolish’ (כסילות) in 9.13-18. The wise son will guard himself against her ‘smooth’ speech (חליקה – 2.16; 5.3; 6.24; 7.5, 21) that competes with Woman Wisdom’s words; only once is he warned about her physical beauty (6.25).

She is variously characterized as an adulteress (6.26, 29; 7.19; possibly in 2.17) a covenant-breaker (2.17), ‘bad’ (רע – 6.24), one who dresses like a prostitute (7.10), is loud or boisterous (מחיה – 7.11; 9.13), stubborn or rebellious (סרר – 7.11), whose feet wander from home (7.11) and who is lacking in knowledge (9.13).

Consistently, she is portrayed in cosmological terms that rival Woman Wisdom: she is a threat to life (2.19; 5.6 [חי]; 6.32; 7.23 [נפש]), her paths (2.18, 19; 5.6; 7.8, 25, 27; cf. 9.15) and house (2.18; 5.8; 7.8, 27; 9.14) lead to death and Sheol (2.18; 5.5; 7.27; 9.18), her chair or throne (כסא) is on the high places (מרום – 9.14) of the city where she sits (in contrast to Woman Wisdom, who stands) and calls to the simple, perverting their way.

Other ANE literature warns against sexual contact with female strangers, but the concentration of warnings in Proverbs 1-9 is unparalleled so that ‘The emphasis seems out of all proportion to the importance of sexual conduct’. The terms ‘strange’ (זר) and ‘foreign’ (נכריה) refer generally to what is outside a field of

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86 That these passages all refer to the same woman is seen by the use of similar lexical terms describing all of them, the parallel use of attributes to identify Lady Wisdom (2.10-11; 4.5-9; 7.4; 8.1), and a macrostructure juxtaposing speeches by and about Wisdom against the Strange Woman. See Yee, ‘Perfumed,’ 111-12.


88 Washington contends that ‘never in Proverbs 1-9 is the (נכריה/זרה אשה) explicitly identified as a prostitute,’ and that ‘it is impossible to interpret all the Strange Woman passages as prohibitions to adultery: 6.29 and 7.19 indicates that the זרה is married, but the others do not, and the expressions זרה and נכריה do not occur outside Proverbs with the sense of “adultery”’: Washington, ‘Strange,’ 226-27. On 2.17, McKane notes that ‘allup can refer not only to ‘friend, companion’ but also to a ‘teacher’ (often one’s father), suggesting that ‘Prov. 2.17 does not refer to the marriage of the ‘issa zara, but to her early education’ so that ‘She has impugned the authority of her father and the authority of God’. William McKane, Proverbs: A New Approach (SCM Press Ltd., 1970), 286.


recognition or of legitimacy. They can indicate ethnic foreigners and those outside a kinship group or household, non-priests, and deities or cultic practices outside covenant relationship with YHWH.

Interpreters often cast the Strange Woman either as a foreign, sacred prostitute, threatening YHWH worship, or else as an adulteress, she being strange in that she belongs to another man. But as Washington observes, the Stranger is not adulterous in all the pericopes, and the Hebrew Bible uses clear expressions for ‘adultery’ – none of them ‘strange’. Lack of evidence for cultic prostitutes suggests that that was not the problem occasioning the Strange Woman pericopes, as does the fact that only Proverbs 7 has cultic overtones. More to the point, Proverbs nowhere designates the Strange Woman a prostitute, either a זונה or even a קדשה. Proverbs 1-

91 See the extensive overview in L.A. Snijders, ‘The Meaning of זר in the Old Testament An Exegetical Study,’ *OsSt* 10 (1954): 1-154. Cf. the abbreviated version in L.A. Snijders, ‘זר/זור,’ in *TDOT*, 4.52-58. Snijders notes that נכריה does not always mean ethnically foreign and can be applied to an Israelite who is an ‘outsider’ by becoming estranged from the community by behaviours, so that the foreign woman represents deviation, faithlessness and the unknown: in effect, everything one must avoid. Snijders, ‘Meaning,’ esp. 63f., 78, 89.

92 I present Camp’s categorization of the terms: Claudia V. Camp, *Wise, Strange and Holy: The Strange Woman and the Making of the Bible*, ed. J. Cheryl Exum, *Gender, Culture, Theory* 9; *JSOTSup* 320 (Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 40-41, nn. 1-4. זר: 2 Kgs 19.24; Isa 1.7; 25.2, 5; 61.5; Jer 5.19; 30.8; 51.51; Ezek 7.21; 11.9; 28.7, 10; 30.12; 31.12; Hos 7.9; Obad 11; Joel 3.17; Job 15.19; Lam 5.2. רְצָה: Gen 17.12, 27; Exod 2.22; 12.43; 18.3; Lev 22.12; Deut 14.21; 15.3 (both Deut 14.21 and 15.3 distinguished from the ר ו who settles in the land); 17.15; 23.21; 29.21; Judg 19.12; 2 Sam 15.19; 22.45, 46; 1 Kgs 8.41, 43; 11.1, 8; Isa 2.6; 28.21; 56.3, 6; 60.10; 61.5; 62.8; Ezek 44.7, 9; Obad 11; Zeph 1.8; Ps 18.45, 46; 137.4; 144.7, 11; Ruth 2.10; Lam 5.2; 2 Chron. 6.32, 33; Ezra 10.2, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 44; Neh. 9.2; 13.26, 27, 30.

93 נכר: Lev 22.10, 12, 13; Deut 25.5; 1 Kgs 3.18; Jer 3.13; Ezek 16.32; Hos 5.7; Ps 69.9; 109.11; Job 19.13, 15, 17. רְצָה: Gen 31.15; Exod 21.8; Ps 69.9; Prov 23.27; 27.2; Job. 19.15; Qoh 6.2. ‘Because adultery and harlotry – that is, sexual activity outside the prescribed familial boundaries – are sometimes used as symbols for religious faithlessness, this meaning of ארץ overlaps at points with the connotation "outside the covenant"’. Camp, *Wise*, 40, n. 2.

94 זר only: Exod 29.33; 30.9; Lev 10.1; 22.10, 12, 13; Num 1.51; 3.14, 10, 38; 17.5; 18.4, 7; 26.61. ‘Because the priests are often conceptualized as of one family (“the sons of Aaron”), the connotation of זאר as “non-priest” is at points a subset of the connotation “not of one’s family”.’ Camp, *Wise*, 40, n. 3.

95 נכר: Deut 32.16; Isa 1.4; 17.10; 28.21; 43.12; Ezek 14.15; Hos 8.12; Ps 44.21; 58.4; 78.30; 81.10; Job. 19.27. רְצָה: Gen 35.2, 4; Deut 31.16; 32.12; Josh 24.20, 23; Judg 10.16; 1 Sam 7.3; Jer 2.21; 5.19; 8.18; Mal 2.11; Ps. 81.10; Dan 11.39; 2 Chron. 14.2; 33.15


99 Interpreters frequently take the feminine קדשה as ‘sacred prostitute’, despite that ‘the concept expressed by combining words for “sacred” (or “cultic”) and “prostitution”’ is not found in the Hebrew
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9 refers only twice to the prostitute: in 6.26 the Sage advises that sex with a prostitute is fiscally wiser than adultery, and in 7.10 he accuses the married Stranger of dressing in the garment of a prostitute (ש condolע). This comparison commends contrasts, the slander made more acute because the woman is not already of that occupation or social standing.

Blenkinsopp considers the rhetorical strategy of placing these teachings on the lips of Solomon, whose singular fault was being led astray by ‘strange (=foreign) women’. Washington observes: ‘In exilic and post-exilic contexts the word-pair זרה זכר becomes prominent, especially in the prophetic literature where it designates the foreign opponents of Judah (Obad. 11; Isa. 61.5; Jer. 5.19; cf. Lam. 5.2)’. He reasons: ‘The frequent collocation in Proverbs 1-9 of זרה זכר with נכר נערה suggests that here too the terminology denotes a “foreign” adversary of the Judean community’.

Washington and others speculate that Ezra’s crisis of exogamy and the return from exile occasions the warnings about the Strange Woman. Insofar as women Bible or in any ancient Semitic language’. Bird, ‘Play,’ 220. Bird notes that the term connects to what is sacred, but denies any automatic association with prostitution. It may be the case that prostitution happened around cultic sites and these hierodules who inhabited them, but that does not mean the hierodules were the prostitutes.

100 The πόρνη appears also in LXX Proverbs 5.3. The translator begins with a warning not found in the MT: ‘Do not pay heed to a worthless woman’ (φαύλη γυναικί). He then cautions that honey drips from the lips of a γυναικός πόρνης, a ‘harlot woman’, differing from the MT’s ‘the lips of a זרה’. As Cook observes, ‘the addition of γυναικός acts as a specification for זרה. Johann Cook, ‘An ג Steak (Proverbs 1-9 Septuagint): A Metaphor for Foreign Wisdom?’, ZAW 106 (1994): 465. Then, where the MT parallels the woman’s lips: ‘and her mouth is smoother than oil’, the translator drops the woman’s features and introduces a new teaching altogether, emphasizing the brevity of the sexual encounter: ‘honey drops from the lips of the harlot woman, who for a season pleases your palate’. The next pericope (5.15-23) – in both Hebrew and Greek – restricts the youth’s sexual encounters to his own woman. But the LXX is more emphatic, adding at v. 18 that ‘the water’ (=the woman) of the youth’s fountain be his own, and to v. 20’s warning against the Strange Woman that he not embrace a woman not his own. These alterations suggest, perhaps, the translator did not confuse the Strange Woman for a prostitute; rather, he incorporated the prostitute into the passage de novo in order to introduce a teaching of monogamous fidelity the Strange Woman alone did not convey. As Goodfriend observes, ‘Only Prov 23:27 identifies the nōkriyyā a zônā, but the LXX reads here zårâ, not zônâ’. Elaine A. Goodfriend, ‘Prostitution (OT),’ in ABD, 5.507.


104 Besides Washington, see especially Blenkinsopp, ‘Context,’ 457-93; Claudia V. Camp, Wisdom and the Feminine in the Book of Proverbs, Bible and Literature Series 11 (Sheffield: Almond, 1985);
could possess and inherit land, foreign spouses threaten the integrity of Israel’s land possession.\textsuperscript{105} The social crisis over land and exogamy suggests a sufficient threat to explain the concentrated assault on the Strange Woman in Proverbs 1-9. The threat to loss of land ownership and loss of labour to foreigners (5.9-10) echoes the consequences of disobeying the \textit{golah} leadership (Ezr 10.8), and the date of redaction and literary overlap with postexilic concerns about ethnic foreigners suggests a primarily \textit{ethnic} sense to ‘strangeness’ in Proverbs 1-9 – recognizing ‘ethnic’ as a \textit{golah} construct.\textsuperscript{106}

Thus the Strange Woman is she who falls outside the bounds of \textit{golah} consensus: she is \textit{not us}, and she must be rejected on those grounds. This does not mean she is not given secondarily as a ‘sexual stranger’.\textsuperscript{107} But in the hands of the


\textsuperscript{106} On their return from exile, the \textit{golah} naturally want rights to the land, and ‘marriage was the obvious way for the new arrivals to insert themselves into the farming economy’. Mary Douglas, ‘Responding to Ezra: The Priests and the Foreign Wives,’ \textit{BibInt} 10 (2002): 11. Theologically, they have priestly control of the cult; politically, they have Persian endorsement for control of the temple (Ezra 1.1-4; 6.1-5). Both instances mean control of the land. The returnees identify themselves ideologically as the only ‘true Israel’, adopting the name ‘\textit{golah}’ (‘the exiles’), and thereby classifying ‘their Judean rivals, together with the neighboring non-Judaean peoples (Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, residents of Samaria, etc.), as alien to Israel’. Washington, ‘Strange,’ 232-33. But as Grabbe notes: ‘The odd thing is that these “peoples of the land” were…probably in many cases the descendants of those from the Northern and Southern Kingdoms who had not been taken captive and were thus as much Israelite as those who returned from Babylon’. Grabbe, \textit{Judaic Religion}, 34. Significantly, we see the exclusion of certain families whose genealogical claims do not satisfy the \textit{golah} leadership (Ezra 2.59-60; Neh. 7.61-62), and the openness to allow certain foreigners to join the community (Ezra 6.21; Neh. 10.29). See Blenkinsopp, \textit{Ezra-Nehemiah}, 176.

\textsuperscript{107} Noting that in her earlier work she failed to attend to the sexual nature of the slanders, Camp argues that these combine with the multivalent meanings of ‘strangeness’ to construct an identity of women as ‘other’, making women into ‘Sexual Strangers’. Camp, \textit{Wise}, 67. But in order to prove her thesis she implausibly dates Prov 1-9 in the hellenistic period and contests any association between ‘strangeness’ and exogamy or idolatry, as evidenced by Ben Sira’s lack of attention to them. But besides the lack of evidence for a hellenistic redaction of Prov 1-9, I suggest below that the Stranger may have some rôle to play in Ben Sira. Furthermore, the Stranger is not given only sexual qualities:
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Persian period redactor, the unflattering sexual (and other!) attributes ascribed the Strange Woman are not the cause of the woman’s strangeness; rather, because she is strange – because she is non-golah – the redactor can describe her with whatever alienating mašilim come to hand.108 For everyone knows that good golah girls do not behave like that – ‘such things are not done in Israel!’

My concern is not with endogamy or ‘strangeness’; it is with πορνεία-ζόντα. But endogamy – the emphatic rejection of Strange Women – becomes a prescriptive mark of Jewish identity of the Second Temple period and the Diaspora.109 Indeed, without some form of ‘conversion’ ‘there is very little evidence for intermarriage in Palestine in the period leading up to the Maccabean revolt’.110 Hayes observes that ‘conversion’ remains possible: ‘the great majority’ of Jewish sources do not prohibit exogamy based on Ezra’s holy seed analogy but on maintaining moral purity.111 Thus

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108 Yee notes: ‘The father’s task in Proverbs 1-9 is to depict the Other Woman in the most dreadful fashion, so that his son does not succumb to her charms’. Yee, Banished, 150.

109 Barclay contends that in the Hellenistic period Judaism became not simply an ancestral trait but a mode of life to be adopted or abandoned. ‘Nonetheless, although such a distinction could now be made, the evidence indicates that it was ethnicity – precisely the combination of ancestry and custom – which was the core of Jewish identity in the Diaspora’. John M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE-117 CE) (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), 404 (his italics). Barclay gives five strands of evidence for this claim: ‘ethnic’ terminology in self reference; gentile perceptions of Jews as an ethnic group; thorough resocialization of proselytes; the importance of endogamy; and training children in the Jewish way of life. In addition to diasporic documents such as Joseph and Aseneth ‘which could be dismissed as extreme’, Barclay cites exogamic proscriptions ‘in the careful depiction of Moses’ marriage by Demetrius (fragment 3, Eusebius Praep Evang 9.29.1), and in Philo’s comments on the corrupting influence of exogamy (Spec. Leg. 3.29)’ (409-10). Cf. Tacitus’ hostile complaint that Jews refrain from intercourse with foreign women (Hist. 5.52), and on circumcision’s role preventing women from mixing with uncircumcised men: Theodotus in Eusebius Praep. Evang. 9.22.1-11; Jos. Ant. 1.192; the Greek addition to Esther (Add Esther 4.17u).


111 Hayes, Gentile, 70. She cites Josephus A.J. 4.191–192; 8.190–196; 20.139; Philo Spec. 3.29. She also reviews from Epstein reasons for endogamy: ‘(1) the custom of endogamy, (2) enmity with other groups, (3) religious differences with other groups, (4) racial differences (the desire to keep blood pure or free from adulteration), and (5) self-preservation in times of threatened assimilation’. Hayes, Gentile, 24; Epstein, Sex Laws. Cohen also notes different reasons given for exogamy than Ezra’s innovative reading of Deuteronomy. He observes further that although male conversion conditions entry into the community, there is not by the time of the Temple Scroll a procedure for ritual conversion of women. Of the captured war-bride, Cohen remarks: ‘apparently the Temple Scroll [63.14-15] imagines that the captive is naturalized merely through her marriage to an Israelite man, but for seven years she remains an outsider with respect to her husband’s – and, we may presume, the community’s – pure foods and sacrificial offerings’. Cohen, Beginnings, 256; see all ch. 8, pp. 241-62.
for many Jews it remains possible to marry Strangers, but only when the Stranger accepts Jewish religion and customs. That is, when the Stranger is no longer strange. Significantly, it is in the postexilic, Second Temple aversion to Strange marriages that πορνεία-זנות shifts from denoting strictly female sexual transgressions of patriarchal bounds to apply also, but differently, to males.

πορνεία-זנות: Sex out of Bounds – Second Temple Sources

Introduction

In my above review of theses on πορνεία, I noted certain Second Temple uses of πορνεία-זנות that apply either priestly marriage proscriptions\(^1\) or marriage proscriptions from Leviticus 18 and 20\(^2\) to all men of a community. There is no evidence the LXX develops מזות in these directions. Overall, the LXX translates the מזות word group faithfully with the πορν-,\(^3\) so the LXX maintains πορνεία as exclusively a female sexual offence; except for the prostitute, it shows a transgression of a woman’s patriarchal bounds. But besides the uses of πορνεία-זנות I noted above, there are a number of others that apply the term to men. Significantly, these do not prescribe priestly marriage rules, nor do they all appeal to Leviticus 18 and 20. I consider these now, concluding with a statement summarizing πορνεία-זנות’s function in the Second Temple period prior to and contemporary with Paul.

The Book of the Watchers (\textit{1 Enoch} 10.9; 8.2)

An early Hellenistic\(^*\) occurrence of πορνεία in extra-biblical Jewish literature appears in the \textit{Book of the Watchers}: \textit{1 Enoch} 10.9. There, a mythic retelling of Genesis 6.1-4 recounts the rebellion and descent to earth of heavenly beings (‘the Watchers’) at the time of the flood. The Watchers introduce humankind to all evils. They procreated with ‘the daughters of men’, siring the giants. God’s reaction to this progeny of beings heavenly and mortal is to command Gabriel: ‘Go to the bastards (μαζηρέους),\(^5\) the half-breeds (κιβδήλους), to the sons of πορνεία;\(^6\)

\(\textit{ALD},\ \textit{Jubilees},\ 4QMMT.\)

\(\textit{CD} \ 5.7-8.\)

\(\textit{See the chart in Appendix II.}\)

\(\textit{Nickelsburg suggests that the episode may allude to the wars of the Diadochoi, though the underlying myth may go back to the Babylonian exile. It is generally agreed the motif of instruction is secondary in chs 6-11, but their precise origins and dates of addition remain disputed. See Nickelsburg’s excursus on the Asael myth: George W.E. Nickelsburg, \textit{1 Enoch 1: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1-36; 81-108}, ed. Klaus Baltzer, \textit{Hermeneia} (Fortress, 2001), 191-93.}\)

\(\textit{Syncellus replaces μαζηρέους with γίγαντας; see below.}\)
and destroy the sons of the Watchers from among the sons of men; send them against
one another in a war of destruction’. But what does it mean to be a ‘son of
πορνεία’? The translations of Charles,117 Black,118 and Milik:119 ‘children/sons of
fornication’; or Knibb:120 ‘sons of the fornicators’, raises a question. Isaac’s121
rendering ‘sons of adultery’ is unfortunate: ‘adultery’ is a distinct and well-worn
word in both Greek and Aramaic, and nothing in the passage suggests here the
transgression of marital bounds.

By most accounts, πορνεία here stands for זנות, inviting the translation,
‘fornication’.122 But the translation raises a question: who fornicates with whom? As
noted, biblical זנה is exclusive to women: ‘fornication’, in the English sense of
extramarital sex, applies only to women, and men who behave like this only get into
trouble when they have sex with another man’s woman – daughters, concubines,
wives – in which cases they do not ‘fornicate’ but defile property or commit adultery.
In Enoch the problem is the action of the male Watchers; thus ‘fornication’ seems an
inappropriate translation. But a clue to זנות’s function is its appearance third in the
series of slanders against the Watchers’ offspring: they are ‘bastards’, ‘half-breeds’,
‘sons of πορνεία’.

Knibb takes μαζηρέους (bastards) as a transcription for the Aramaic זכרים. He
suggests that Syncellus’s replacement with γίγαντας (‘giants’) ‘is perhaps an
attempt to make sense of a word not understood’.123 The LXX takes זכר as the

of Early Documents Series I: Palestinian Jewish Texts (Pre-Rabbinic) (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917), 37.
118 Matthew Black and (in consultation with) James C. VanderKam, The Book of Enoch or 1 Enoch: A
New English Edition with Commentary and Textual Notes, ed. Albert-Marie Denis and M. de Jonge,
119 J.T. Milik and (with the collaboration of) Matthew Black, The Books of Enoch: Aramaic
Fragments of Qumrān Cave 4 (Oxford: At the Claredon Press, 1976), 175.
120 Michael A. Knibb and (in consultation with) Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopic Book of Enoch: A
New Edition in the Light of the Aramaic Dead Sea Fragments: Introduction, Translation and
121 E. Isaac, ‘1 (Ethiopic Apocalypse of) Enoch,’ in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha: Volume One:
Todd, 1983), 18.
122 4QEn7 iv is too fragmentary to add anything here; it is missing the relevant portions of this verse.
See Milik and Black, Enoch: Qumrān, 175, 346; photographic plate VIII.
123 Knibb and Ullendorff, Ethiopic Enoch, 88. Less persuasive is Black’s explanation that the
γίγαντας reference is original based on a supposed wordplay with Γαβριήλ. Black and VanderKam, 1
Enoch: English, 136.
offspring of a πόρνη (Deut 23.2[3]) or a foreigner (ἀλλογενής – Zech 9.6), and in later law it applies to the offspring of a forbidden union (m. Yeb. 4.13). ‘Half-breeds’ (πιστύς) likewise emphasizes mixed origins (cf. Lev 19.19; Deut 22.11; Wis 2.16).124 Keeping with the sense of the first two slanders, then, ‘sons of πορνεία’ completes a triple slam against the giants: they are offspring of an illegitimate sexual union, unrecognized and inauthentic. Along these lines, Nickelsburg translates ‘sons of πορνεία’, ‘sons of miscegenation’.125 This is appropriate – so long as we do not follow OED in designating miscegenation ‘a theory which advocates this as being advantageous to society’.126 For the ‘miscegenation’ depicted here is by no means presented advantageous. Thus the problem of πορνεία is not here male ‘fornication’, the Watchers’ extramarital sex, but admixture: sexual mixing outwith legitimate boundaries, producing illegitimate children as a result.

πορνεύω occurs also in 1 Enoch 8.2, but only in Codex Panopolitanus. As in 1 Enoch 10.9 the narrative builds on a myth related to Genesis 6.1-4. Here, however, the emphasis is on Asael’s teaching men how to craft instruments of war and adornments for women as products of mining and metallurgy. Syncellus adds that the sons of men made weapons for themselves and adornments for their daughters, and that the daughters then led astray the Watchers; Panopolitanus omits this reference but includes that ‘there was much wickedness’127 and they ἐπὸρνευσαν’ – possibly a summary of Syncellus. Milik matches ἐπὸρνευσαν with יָפֶן from 4QEn b 8.2,128 a word in the Hebrew Bible normally translated ‘worthless’,129 or ‘recklessness’,130 and that is applied consistently to men.131 Syncellus makes no reference to πορνεύω, 124 Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch 1, 213. Nickelsburg further refers to the usage of the Hebrew for the mixed marriages of priests and Levites in the discussion by Qimron and Strugnell, DJD 10, 172.

125 Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch 1, 223.

126 OED: ‘The mixing or interbreeding of (people of) different races or ethnic groups, esp. the interbreeding or sexual union of whites and non-whites; a theory which advocates this as being advantageous to society; marriage or cohabitation by members of different ethnic groups’.

127 One ms from the British Museum collection, BM 485, includes at the end of v. 1: ‘And the world was changed’, which Knibb observes ‘is certainly intelligible, the idea being that the world was changed as a result of the teaching given by the angels’. But most other mss read ‘and eternal change’, which makes little sense. Knibb and Ullendorff, Ethiopic Enoch, 81.

128 Milik and Black, Enoch: Qumrân, 170.

129 The participle adjective, פחזים, in Judg 9.4 corresponds in the LXX to θαμβουμένους; in Zeph 3.4 to καταφρονηταί.

130 The noun, פחזות, in Jer 23.32 corresponds in the LXX to ἐν τοῖς πλάνοις.

131 4Q184 1.2, 13, 15 also applies the term to women. The only explicitly sexual connotation in the Hebrew Bible is Reuben’s ‘defiling’ Jacob’s bed (LXX μιαίνω; usually, this translates καταφρονηταί). See the note below on Sir 23.17.
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reading: ‘and there was much wickedness upon the earth, and they obscured (ἡφάνισαν) their way’.132

The difficulty is that there appear to be competing versions of the myth of the Watchers’ descent embedded in 1 Enoch.133 In one version, the Watchers descend in order to marry and procreate with the daughters of men; a second suggests Asael revolts by descending to teach humans forbidden arts; in a third, the Watchers are sent to teach humans, but are unwittingly seduced by the daughters of men.134 πορνεύω as it stands in Panopolitanus hints at the inappropriate relations between Watchers and women akin to 10.9.

Tobit 4.12; 8.7

The book of Tobit, set in the Diaspora, contains two references to πορνεία, neither of which explicitly endorses either Ezra’s ‘holy seed’ ideology or fears of idolatry and apostasy.135 In the first reference, Tobit directs his son:

Guard yourself, my son, from all πορνεία. Foremost, take a wife from the descendants of your fathers – don’t take a strange woman (γυναῖκα ἀλλότριάν)136 who is not from the tribe of your fathers. For we are sons of the prophets: Noah! Abraham! Isaac! Jacob! Remember our fathers from old, son: all took wives from their brethren (τῶν ἀδελφών αὐτῶν), and they were blessed in their children. Their descendants will inherit the land. So now, son, love your brethren (τοὺς ἀδελφούς) – don’t be arrogant in your heart! From your brethren (τῶν ἀδελφών) – the sons and daughters of your people – take for yourself a wife from them (4.12-13a).

The second occurrence of πορνεία comes from Tobias as he prays before consummating his marriage to Sarah: ‘And now, Lord, it is not on account of πορνεία I take this, my sister (τὴν ἀδελφήν μου), but in sincerity (ἀληθείας)’ (8.7a). Translations of the first πορνεία reveal the imprecision surrounding the term:

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132 Greek texts taken from Matthew Black, *Apocalypsis Henochi Graece*, ed. Albert-Marie Denis and M. de Jonge, *Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti Graeci* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 22. Black notes that ‘the text of Sync. has the exact Biblical locution e.g. Gen. 6.12, ‹…›; Isa. 1.4, Tg. 130, ‹…›, Isa. 1.4, Tg. ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ ﷪ 

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132 Nickelsburg traces the myth through several texts: *1 Enoch* 86.1-4; *Jub.* 4.15; Targum Pseudo-Jonathan Gen. 6.2; *TRub 5*; *Ps.-Clem. Hom.* 8.11-15; Justin Martyr’s *Second Apology* 2.5. Except for *1 Enoch* 86.1-4, the sexual sin of the angels is the result rather than the purpose of their descent. Nickelsburg, *1 Enoch 1*, 195-96.

134 See the discussion in Nickelsburg, *1 Enoch 1*, esp. 196.


136 Typically how LXX Proverbs translates אֲשֶׁר רָדָה.
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‘fornication’;137 ‘immorality’;138 ‘whoredom’;139 ‘prostitutes’;140 ‘loose conduct’;141 it is the unanimous translation, ‘lust’, for the second that causes concern.142 On the basis of this understanding, Grabbe infers that Tobit may give ‘one of the first indications of an ascetic view of sex as being only for procreative purposes (cf. 8:7)’.143 But can πορνεία bear the burden of that inference?

Collins notes that the pretext of Second Temple marriages, unlike later rabbinic literature, is not procreation but the ‘helpmate’ idea of Genesis 2.20.144 This bears out in Tobit. Rather than pray for progeny, Tobias’s prayer twice mentions Eve’s function as Adam’s helper (8.6), and Tobias petitions that Sarah and he grow old together (8.7b). At no place in his prayer or in the entire book are any expectations placed on the reproductive potential of the couple’s union – a significant feature for literature composed during a period of comparatively low birth rates, and that stresses repeatedly that both Tobias and Sarah are the only children of their parents.145 We must resist importing into πορνεία later doctrines of matrimony. Rather, it is best to take the term on the basis of its uses in the book of Tobit itself.

138 NAB; RSV
139 KJV
140 TEV
141 NJB
142 NAB, NAV, RSV, NRSV, Fitzmyer, Tobit, 246; Moore, Tobit, 235. Also KJV: ‘lush’; NJB: ‘lustful motive’; TEV: ‘Lord, I have chosen Sarah because it is right, not because I lusted for her’. Cf. also ‘sexual urges’ for the entry πορνεία, citing only Tob 8.7 as proof, in J. Lust, E. Eynikel, and K. Hauspie, A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1996), 2.389.

The discrepancy dates at least to the Vulgate. Jerome renders the first occurrence fornicationem (as is his custom with πορνεία); the second, which appears in a longer narrative promoting the ascetic renunciation of sexual desire, he designates non luxuriae causa (Vulgate=4.13 and 8.9). The Qumran fragments lack these verses, though it is no likely way forward to posit Jerome’s vorlage held different Aramaic terms to correspond with πορνεία, or that his longer, ascetic context is original. See the discussion in Moore, Tobit, 60-63; 242-45. For a list of extant Tobit fragments from Qumran, see Fitzmyer, Tobit, 10.

143 Grabbe, Judaic Religion, 45.
144 John J. Collins, ‘Marriage, Divorce, and Family in Second Temple Judaism,’ in Families in Ancient Israel, ed. Leo G. Perdue, et al., The Family, Religion, and Culture (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 127. See further Sir 36.29-30; 4Q416 2.iii.25; 4Q416 iv; contrast m. Yeban 6.6. Biale observes that procreation in the Bible was a blessing to be sought; it was not a requirement until the rabbis turned it into a command. Biale, Eros, 35.
145 Tobias and Sarah are mentioned explicitly as single children in 3.10, 15, 17; 6.12, 15; 8.17. Kraemer notes that in the Graeco-Roman diaspora, ‘the epigraphical and papyrological evidence points to relatively small families, with probably reflects concomitantly low birthrates, especially in
Tobit makes explicit his intentions concerning \( \pi\rho\nu\varepsilon\iota \) in the sentences immediately following his imperative: avoid the Strange Woman and take a wife from among our brethren.\(^{146}\) The Strange Woman here seems to be she who is outwith Tobias’s particular clan rather than a gentile more generically. But the exhortation to endogamy is repeated through the book (1.9; 3.17; 6.12-16; 7.10-11), and Tobias’s marriage prayer reflects precisely his father’s imperative. By taking for his wife his ‘sister’ (\( \acute{\alpha}\delta\varepsilon\lambda\varsigma\varphi\eta\nu \)) – the feminine equivalent to ‘brethren’ (\( \acute{\alpha}\delta\varepsilon\lambda\varphi\omicron\omicron\varsigma \)) – Tobias marries not for \( \pi\rho\nu\varepsilon\iota \) but in sincerity.\(^{147}\) Nothing in the references to \( \pi\rho\nu\varepsilon\iota \) or in the book as a whole suggest Tobias’s concern lies with avoiding sexual pleasure, Josephus’s portrayal of the Essenes notwithstanding.\(^{148}\) Nor does it intimate somehow ‘male fornication’. \( \pi\rho\nu\varepsilon\iota \), rather, effects a social boundary, separating legitimate from illegitimate sexual contact based on one’s identity within a group. In the case of Tobit, the boundary is drawn not only between Jew and gentile, but pertains to marriage within a particular tribe.\(^{149}\) As in 1 Enoch, \( \pi\rho\nu\varepsilon\iota \) functions in Tobit as a male sexual boundary inappropriate to cross. And as in 1 Enoch, it is neither Ezra’s ‘holy seed’ ideology nor the definite proscriptions of Leviticus 18 and 20 that compose that boundary.
Ben Sira

πορνεία-זנות: Regular Usage

For the most part, Ben Sira uses πορνεία-זנות unremarkably in its regular associations with prostitution and female fornications. He also emphasizes its shamefulness (41.17; 42.8) and connects it, metaphorically, to idolatry (46.11). Ben Sira expresses great concern over errant wives and daughters – women who subvert the patriarchal structure of the home. He laments the ‘bad wife’ who commits adultery through her πορνεία, producing illegitimate offspring (23.23). Vowing that the woman’s progeny ‘will not take root’, he thus excludes the children from any right to inheritance. He warns also against the πορνεία-wife who actively seeks illicit sexual action – a source of anxiety to the good husband (26.9; cf. v. 5).

Unlike Philo, who despises the πόρνη for trapping men sexually, Ben Sira reflects other wisdom traditions in perceiving the πόρνη a threat only to young men’s money-sense. She costs a youth his inheritance (9.6) and, with revelry and feasting (18.30-33), wine, women, and prostitutes (19.2) forestall the youth his riches (19.1).  

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150 In 41.17 פוחָצ is behind πορνεία. Elsewhere, the Greek of Ben Sira translates פוחָצ ἐπιθυμία (23.5) and, according to a possible restoration of Masada, ἀφίστημι (19.2). On the Hebrew, see Jonas C. Greenfield, ‘The Meaning of פוחָצ’, in 'Al Kanfei Yonah: Collected Studies of Jonas C. Greenfield, ed. Shalom M. Paul, Michel E. Stone, and Avital Pinnick (Brill/The Hebrew University Press 2001), esp. 2.37.

151 E.g., the daughter in 22.2-3; 26.10; 42.9-14; the wife: 23.22-27; 25.16-26; 26.5-9. Few laud Ben Sira’s views on women, his extreme need of patriarchal control. He says, e.g., ‘Any iniquity is small compared to a woman’s iniquity; may a sinner’s lot befall her!’ (25.19); ‘Better is the wickedness of a man than a woman who does good; it is woman who brings shame and disgrace’ (42.14). See further W.C. Trenchard, Ben Sira’s View of Women: A Literary Analysis, BJS (Chico: Scholars Press, 1982).

152 Kirchoff observes ‘in Sir 23,23 ist μοιχεία die genauere Bestimmung des Delikts πορνεία’.

153 Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 69.

154 Spec. 3.51; Ios. 43. Philo adapts Deut 22.21-22 to represent Israel as laudably stoning to death any πόρνη. He makes several derogatory references to the πόρνη: Leg. 3.8; Sacr. 21; Conf. 144(2x); Migr. 69(2x), 224; Congr. 124; Fug. 114(2x), 149(3x); Mut. 205; Somm. 1.88; Mos. 1.302; Decal. 8; Spec. 1.102, 104, 280, 326(2x), 332(2x), 344. Note that LXX Deut 23.18 (perhaps influenced by פוחָצ in 23.19) translates ישנה with πόρνη, thus condemning prostitution for any daughter of Israel. Cf. below on Philo and Jsephus; cf. also Appendix II.

155 9.6; 19.2. Also 26.22 in the Greek translation of the expanded Hebrew text (=G2). Cf. Prov 6.26; 29.3. The economic sentiment is present in the Egyptian Instruction of Papyrus Insinger 8.1-2: ‘the [fool] brings disturbance to…because of his phallus / His love of fornication does harm to his livelihood’. Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings, vol. 3: The Late Period (University of California Press, 1980), 3.191. Economic grounds for rejecting prostitution is not indigenous to ANE demotic wisdom. In Xenophon, Socrates points to the potential damage caused by purchasing a ἑταίρα and asks how, then, the money was a benefit? (Oeconomicus 1.13.[O]). Cicero appeals to Antonius that without Caesar’s intervention, ‘you would have spent the whole of your life in brothels, taverns, gambling, and wine’ (Phil. 13.24.[B]). Philo, differently, uses Deut 23.17-18’s...
The prostitute also makes an appearance in certain mss at 9.3, raising a question about the presence of the Strange Woman in Sirach. It has become a commonplace that Ben Sira’s silence about intermarriage evidences the practical lack of exogamy in pre-Maccabean Judaism. But although advice on endogamy does not feature prominently in Ben Sira’s wisdom, it is perhaps an overstatement that it is entirely absent – especially in the translation by Ben Sira’s grandson.

In the eleventh-century Cairo Genizah MS A, an additional bicolon appears between Sirach 9.3 and 9.4. The Greek of v. 3 warns against a ‘strange woman’ (γυναικὶ ἑταριζομένη), which resembles colon one of MS A. But the third colon in MS A uses זונה, which the Syriac supports. The competing readings means ‘it becomes necessary to ascertain how much is authentic and where it fits’. Is the woman Strange, with the Greek and colon one, or a prostitute, as in colon two and the Syriac? The Syriac often alters its Hebrew and Greek parents according to its own theological motivations. On a question of sex – a topic dominating early Christian morals – we should be wary of using this Ebionite translation to establish our text. A strike against reading זונה. But although the Greek tries to be faithful to injunction against the πόρνη’s temple tithe to introduce and condemn a number of Stoic vices – including φιλαργυρία (love of money). Spec. 1.280-82.


159 Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 216.

the Hebrew’s intent, it does not always represent exactly Hebrew lexemes.\(^{161}\) The Greek is not enough to establish צזרה. We turn, therefore, elsewhere in Ben Sira.

The Strange Woman appears again at 41.20. There, a lacuna between columns one and two at the top of page IV of the first-century BCE Masada scroll leaves the following: וְזֶרֶה [...] רָחָּהוּ. Yadin supplies: of looking up[on a woman that hath a husband] (41.21c) / And of gazing upon a strange (woman) (41.20b).\(^{162}\) He notes, ‘This parallels the Greek: ἀπὸ ὀράσεως γυναικὸς ἑταίρας (20b), and this on the basis of Ben Sira 9,3: וְזֶרֶה אָלֶה אֶל רֶפֶן, which has been rendered: μὴ ὑπάντα γυναικὶ ἑταριζομένη’.\(^{163}\) Based on the parallel use, it is best to prefer the woman as Strange in 9.3, leaving open the possibility the warnings both in 9.3 and 41.20 are about sexual contact with women who are somehow Strange rather than prostitutes or women who are sexually loose.\(^{164}\)

Unquestionably, however, Ben Sira’s grandson does condemn exogamy in 47.20. In 47.19, Sirach condemns Solomon for bringing (presumably foreign) women to lie with him, so that he was ‘brought into subjection’ (ἐνεξοσσιάζομαι) in his body. Consequently (v. 20), he blemished his honour and, in Ezra’s language, profaned his seed (ἐβεβήλωσε τὸ σπέρμα). In Cairo Genizah, however, Solomon does not profane his seed, but shames his couch (יצועיכ). Gammie, noting Ben Sira’s disregard for food laws and his cosmopolitan openness to foreigners, argues that although the Greek of Ben Sira 47.20 suggests Ben Sira’s censure of mixed marriages, ‘The Hebrew text of the Cairo Genizah, however, which is clearly the more original reading, does not condemn the act of intermarriage, but of sexual profligacy’.\(^{165}\) Gammie concludes: ‘Ben Sira…nowhere condemns intermarriage – for aside from this crux interpretum none are present – and chose to bypass the opportunity to do so when the opportunity was readily at hand’.\(^{166}\)

\(^{161}\) Wright, Small, e.g., 115.

\(^{162}\) Yigael Yadin, The Ben Sira Scroll from Masada: With Introduction, Emendations and Commentary (Jerusalem: The Israel Exploration Society and the Shrine of the Book, 1965), 43; plate IV.

\(^{163}\) Yadin, Masada, 22. Cf. for the Greek and apparatus, Ziegler, Sirach, 320.

\(^{164}\) This makes misleading the RSV translations of both 9.3 (‘loose woman’) and 41.20 (‘prostitute’).

\(^{165}\) Gammie, ‘Sage in Sirach,’ 363.

\(^{166}\) Gammie, ‘Sage in Sirach,’ 363.
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But it is one thing to have a foreign man to dinner, another to have him marry your daughter. The lack of explicit condemnation of exogamy in 47.20 does not equal its endorsement, and the presence of the Strange Woman in Sir 9.3 and 41.20 may contest Gammie’s general conclusion. Further, Solomon’s folly as falling to foreign women was well established tradition by Ben Sira’s time. Thus it is reasonable that even the Genizah text indicts Solomon’s exogamy – a message Ben Sira’s grandson picks up and preserves. In the least, the Greek represents attitudes toward exogamy in the grandson’s day.

The πόρνος-Man

The Greek of Ben Sira introduces a construction of the πορν- group unusual in Jewish literature prior to the New Testament: the concrete masculine noun, πόρνος. In regular Greek usage the πόρνος is often a catamite, strictly the male counterpart to the πόρνη. But there is little evidence of male prostitution in Judaism, and that meaning does not suit Sirach 23.17. πόρνος occurs only in Sirach 23.17 in the LXX, and not at all in the Greek Pseudepigrapha. Regrettably, the Hebrew of Sirach 23 is not extant, for no masculine noun corresponds to זונה in the Hebrew Bible, nor does one appear in the Hebrew of Sirach or the Hebrew or Aramaic of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

167 ‘The grandson’s approach to the Hebrew seems to reflect more of a concern for the message than the medium’. Wright, Small, 115.
169 ‘The [female] prostitute has no male counterpart; male prostitution, which was homosexual, was a limited phenomenon and is poorly attested in our sources’. Bird, ‘Play,’ 224, n. 19. Of course, simply because it is not spoken of does not mean it did not exist.
170 The term does not appear in Denis, Concordance. It achieves currency in the NT, mostly in vice lists. See 1 Cor 5.9, 10, 11; 6.9; Eph 5.5; 1 Tim 1.10; Heb 12.16; 13.4; Rev 21.8; 22.15.
171 But see my discussion below. Bird notes ‘There is no masculine noun corresponding to zônâ, which is paired with keleb, “dog”, in Deut 23:19’.
Based on Deuteronomy 23.2-3, Philo identifies the πόρνοι as sons of prostitutes (Leg. 3.8).\(^{173}\) This replaces מֵרָע ('bastard') in the Hebrew of Deuteronomy and thus resembles the attitude expressed in 1 Enoch 10.9, discussed above. In the NT, Hebrews 12.16 names Esau both a πόρνος and βέβηλος ('godless'), vexing commentators because there is no biblical evidence of Esau’s sexual immorality.\(^{174}\) But Ellingworth notes that ‘Postcanonical Jewish tradition fastened on the fact that Esau took foreign wives (Gn. 26:34; 36:2f.) to describe him in increasingly negative terms’ (Jub. 25.1; Gn. Rab. 67; 78).\(^{175}\) Here, then, πόρνος indicts Esau as an exogamist. It may be that such connotations inform Sirach 23.16-17.

Di Lella identifies Sirach 23.16-17 as a numerical proverb, a didactic saying structured mnemonically with the numerical formula x/x-plus-one.\(^{176}\) Thus, 23.16 begins: ‘Two types (of person) multiply sins, and a third incurs wrath’, and moves to describing the three types: a heated soul unquenched, and two references to the πόρνος-man. Literally, the Greek reads in 23.16b-17:

- A soul heated as a fire burning
  (οὐ μὴ) will not be quenched (σβεσθῇ)
  until it be consumed (καταποθῇ)
- A πόρνος-man with σώματι σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ
  (οὐ μὴ) will not stop (παύσηται)
  until the fire break out (ἐκκαύσῃ).
- To a πόρνῳ-man all bread tastes sweet
  (οὐ μὴ) he will not cease (κοπάσῃ)
  until he dies (τελευτήσῃ).\(^{177}\)

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\(^{173}\) He equates them with lepers and the ceremonially unclean of Num 5.2.


\(^{175}\) Paul Ellingworth, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Paternoster, 1993), 666. Both Attridge and Lane reject any sense of ‘fornication’ in favour of a metaphorical application of the term that signals Esau’s idolatry. Attridge, Hebrews, 368-69; Lane, Hebrews 9-13, 454-55. So also Hauck and Schulz, ‘πόρνη, κτλ.,’ 6.587.

\(^{176}\) See the discussion in Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 25-27.

\(^{177}\) ψυχὴ θερμὴ ὡς πῦρ καἰόμενον
  οὐ μὴ σβεσθῇ
  ἐὼς ἄν καταποθῇ
  ἄνθρωπος πόρνος ἐν σώματι σαρκός αὐτοῦ
  οὐ μὴ παύσηται
  ἐὼς ἄν ἐκκαύσῃ πῦρ
  ἄνθρωπῳ πόρνῳ πᾶς ἄρτος ἡδὸς
  οὐ μὴ κοπάσῃ
  ἐὼς ἄν τελευτήσῃ
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The parallelism follows a strict structure: the type of person, followed by οὐ μή plus a verb of cessation, then ἐως, the indefinite ēv, and a verb of consummation. Di Lella suggests the first person is he with burning passion, the second he who commits incest, ‘the various forms of which are described and condemned in Leviticus 18:6-18 and 20:11-12, 14, 17, 19-21’, and the third the adulterer. The next stanza (vv. 18-21) then develops observations on the third person: according to Di Lella, the adulterer.178

Connecting the πόρνος-man and the ‘body of his flesh’ to Leviticus 18 has some merit. Leviticus 18.6 uses similar language to warn a man against coming near the household of his flesh: οἰκεῖα σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, and Second Temple texts such as CD 5.7-8 apply πορνεία-זנות to Levitical incest proscriptions.179 But the identification of the second πόρνος-man with adultery is not self evident.

As noted above, πορνεία-זנות and μοιχεία-נאף represent different semantic fields. The terms are lexically and logically distinct and are gender-specific: whereas all adulteresses commit πορνεία, no adulterers do. Male adultery involves one man’s wronging another. The adulterer does not offend the other man’s wife nor, if he is himself married, his own. In 23.18, Ben Sira chastens the man who ‘transgresses from his bed’ (παραβαίνων ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης αὐτοῦ). This man departs from his own bed, but there is no indication he enters another man’s bed, i.e., with another man’s wife. And unlike Proverbs 6.26-35, which details the retributive consequences awaiting adulterers from wronged husbands, Ben Sira warns that it is God who will levy judgment for the man’s transgression (Sir 23.19-21).

The social logic of the patriarchy – which Ben Sira’s statements on wives, daughters and women generally show he holds intact – likewise makes impossible that the man’s transgression is somehow ‘adultery’ against his own wife. And although Ben Sira is not in favour of young men frequenting prostitutes (9.6; 19.2 – noted above) his objection is fiscally motivated. He is not worried that youths lack sexual morality – that they commit pre- or extramarital ‘fornication’. Instead, he is concerned over their poor money management.

178 Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 324. Similarly, John G. Snaith, Ecclesiasticus or The Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach, CBC (CUP, 1974), 117-18.
179 See above.
What incites Ben Sira here seems to be the πόρνος-man’s sexual indiscrimination. In 23.16a, Ben Sira introduces the sexual nature of the offence as a burning soul, picking up on his prayer from 23.1-6 for God to check Ben Sira’s own passions. The man Ben Sira describes is sexually reckless. In 23.16, he is a πόρνος-man who takes for a partner his near of kin and, in 23.17, he chooses his partners indiscriminately: all bread (πᾶς ἄρτος) is sweet (ἡδύς). The ‘sweet bread’ of 23.17 echoes the Stranger’s sweet (ἡδέως) water and bread (ἄρτος) eaten in secret in Proverbs 9.17 – Proverbs 1-9’s final Strange Woman passage, and not one of the two pericopae that imply the woman is married. And just as the simpleton in Proverbs eats the Stranger’s bread in secret, so the πόρνος-man thinks he takes his ‘sweet bread’ in secret (Sir 23.18).

Ben Sira’s problem with the πόρνος-man is not, directly, the man’s uncontrolled sexual passion. Uncontrolled sexual passion is the cause of the problem. Nor is the problem that the man commits adultery nor, simply, that he (somehow) ‘fornicates’. The problem is with whom the πόρνος-man copulates. Ben Sira shows the man to have no discrimination with whom he liaises sexually. Although Ben Sira does not promote Ezra’s ‘holy seed’ ideology, he shows that the πόρνος-man will settle for just any sexual partner, straying from ‘his own’ bed to take women somehow socially unacceptable (v. 18) thus provoking the ire of the Most High (vv. 19-21).

Clearly, this is the case with the man’s incest in v. 16. But evidence accumulates to suggest that v. 17 likewise condemns liaising sexually with women somehow out of bounds. Ben Sira’s allusion to the (non-adulterous) Strange Woman of Proverbs 9, his Strange Woman references in 9.3 and 41.20, his pericope on Solomon’s folly in 47.20, and the two concrete examples of πόρνος in the Second Temple period that identify πόρνος with the offspring of an illegitimate sexual union

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180 ‘Burning’ refers frequently to sexual desire in a variety of Graeco-Roman contexts, including the magical papyri, and by no means is it always negative. See Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Harvard University Press, 1990), 46-62; Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (Yale University Press, 1995), 212-14. Snaith suggests that ‘By a play on words the fire that consumes him probably refers both to strong sexual passion and to fire as a figure for sudden destruction’. Snaith, Ecclesiasticus, 118 (his italics). Importantly, ‘burning’ is not here equivalent with πορνεία.

181 Cf. Skehan and Di Lella, Ben Sira, 324.
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(Philo) or with exogamy (Hebrews), together with Ben Sira’s obvious dependence on demotic wisdom traditions – a motif of which warns against Strange Women – makes real the possibility that Ben Sira’s πόρνος-man is he whose indiscrimination partners him sexually with illegitimate women, whether with his own near of kin or with any woman somehow out of bounds.

Philo, Josephus, and the πόρνη

Philo generally uses πορνεία in its regular association with prostitution proper and occasionally in its metaphorical association with idolatry, and I have noted his usage ad hoc in several places above. Here, I concentrate on Philo’s portrayal of the πόρνη. Gaca shows how Philo’s commitment to a Middle Platonic renunciation of excessive physical appetites (ἐπιθυμία) leads him to apply the metaphorical usage of πορνεία to the passions, so that the soul dominated by appetites becomes ‘fornicated’ (πεπορνευμένη), rebelling against God’s laws and leading to multiple vices. Philo describes Appetitive Pleasure a πόρνη, and

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182 And recalling (above) that all uses of πορνεία-זנות that imply masculine subjects in the Hebrew Bible/LXX indict exogamy, idolatry, or both. Num 25.1-9 in particular highlights the provocation of YHWH’s ire through male exogamous πορνεία-זנות and consequent idolatry.

183 E.g., Instruction to Any 3.13-17 (noted above). Lichtheim, Egyptian 2, 137. Given Ben Sira’s supposed ‘cosmopolitan openness’ to strangers, it is worth noting his advice in Sir 11.34 that inviting a stranger (ἀλλότριον) into your home will make you a stranger (ἀπαλλοτριώσει) to your own.

184 As an aside, the emphasis here on reckless indiscrimination may provide a clue to the non-extant Hebrew Vorlage behind the Greek text. Although πορνεία in Second Temple literature most often translates the Hebrew זנות, it occasionally also translates זנה. Cf. Sir 41.17 and the reconstruction in 1 En 8.2, discussed above. But cf. Sir 23.5 (זנה=LXX ἐπιθυμία) and the reconstruction ἀποτύμω in 19.2 (=LXX ἀφίστημι). Cf. also the untranslanted and fragmentary 4Q172 4.3; 4Q511 24.5; 5Q16 4.3.

185 Gaca, Fornication, 194-204. Cf. Spec. 1.281-82; 4.79; Fug. 153, Cher. 51. Cf. Somm. 1.88, which depicts the outward senses (αἴσθησις) as χαρμαιτύπαις καὶ πόρναις. But like Tamar, Virtue also can disguise herself as a πόρνη: Congr. 124; Fug. 149.

186 Sacr. 20-21; Spec. 3.8. See Gaca, Fornication, 202.
identifies the πόρνη with polytheism (πολύθεος) and a-theism (ἄθεος). Through his philosophical predilection, Philo presents an ideal of male premarital chastity, identifying Potiphar’s wife and the Midianite killed by Phineas each a πόρνη.

Unlike Proverbs and Sirach, which give financial reasons for rejecting the πόρνη, Philo denounces the πόρνη herself. Despite evidence that most prostitutes of the Graeco-Roman period were slaves, Philo condemns the πόρνη for selling her beauty, choosing (ἐλομένης) this shameful life for the sake of shameful gain. Often, Philo reflects, time ends the πόρνη’s occupation. For when her beauty ‘withers away like some flowers’, men no longer approach her. Josephus reports similar sentiments about the prostitute, though he never refers to the πόρνη but always to the ἑταίρα. Appealing to biblical mandate, Philo excludes the πόρνη, her hire, and her children from temple worship, and he identifies the sons of a πόρνη as polytheists ignorant of God who is true husband and father. Philo expands the biblical proscription forbidding priests to marry a πόρνη so that priests must not even look on one; Josephus extends this proscription to apply equally to all men. Philo also endorses stoning prostitutes, applying to all prostitutes the biblical command to stone priests’ daughters who ply the trade.

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187 Fug. 1.114.
188 Ios. 43.
189 Ios. 43; Mos. 1.302.
190 This is a commonplace assertion, but see, e.g., Glancy, Slavery; Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (New York: Schocken Books, 1975).
191 Spec. 1.280.
193 Ant. 4.206. Here Josephus rejects the prostitute’s wages in the temple, reasoning that there can be no greater abuse of nature than this ignominy of the body. He goes on to compare the prostitute with a dog, saying that likewise the wages earned from a dog are not acceptable in the temple.
194 Josephus uses ἑταίρα even when repeating the biblical account of Solomon’s judgment between the two prostitutes: Ant. 8.27.
195 Conf. 1.144; Decal. 8; Spec. 1.102, 280, 326, 344; Migr. 69.
196 Mat. 1.205; cf. Spec. 1.332.
198 Ant. 4.245.
199 Spec. 3.51; Ios. 43; citing Deut 23.17; Migr. 224.
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Other Second Temple References to πορνεία-

πορνεία functions unremarkably in other Second Temple sources. Wisdom of Solomon connects πορνεία and idolatry metaphorically, but reverses the prophetic imagery by suggesting that πορνεία is idolatry’s effect rather than its cause (14.12, 24-27). 3 Baruch places πορνεία on two vice lists in conjunction with adultery, idol worship, divination, among other things (8.5; 13.4) and, similarly, Martyrdom of Isaiah describes Manasseh’s turning peoples to serve Beliar, causing sorcery and magic, augury and divination, and πορνεία (1.2.5). Knibb notes that the Ethiopian adds ‘adultery’.200

Psalms of Solomon 2 alludes to Pompey’s capture of Jerusalem in 63 BCE. Psalms 2.11 reads: ‘They set up the sons of Jerusalem for derision because of her prostitutes. Everyone passing by entered in broad daylight. They derided their lawless actions even in comparison to what they themselves were doing; before the sun they held up their unrighteousness to contempt’. Wright contends ‘they’ are the foreign Romans, ‘even by whose standards the sins of the Jerusalemites were despicable’.202 Thus, ‘such things done in Israel’ shapes the community’s identity by the negative reaction of Others.

In many Qumran texts זנות is a snare of Belial (CD 4.17) – the ‘eyes of זנות’ pointing to idolatry (CD 2.16; 1QS 1.6; 11Q19 59.14).203 In others, the זונה is unclean and kept from consecrated food (4Q251 16.2 [=4QHalakhah A]). It is unclear what

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201 Cf. James C. VanderKam, An Introduction to Early Judaism (Eerdmans, 2001), 129. VanderKam notes that since the Psalms mention nothing about the Temple’s destruction, the work was probably composed before 70 CE.


203 Regrettably, the references often get translated ‘lust’. But as 11Q19 59.14 makes clear, the ‘lusting’ eyes are eyes that stray from God’s commandments. The prophetic metaphor is thus retained. Cf. 1QpHab 5.7. On Belial, Mach notes: ‘Qumran writings mention demons and evil forces in several places. Nowhere is this demonology presented in a coherent fashion; it comprises different traditions that might be conceived as sometimes opposing views on the subject’. Michael Mach, ‘Demons,’ in Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. Lawerence H. Schiffman and James C. VanderKam (OUP, 2000), 1.189.
4Q270 7.1.12b-13 means by a man committing זנות with his wife. Given, however, that neither the Hebrew Bible nor other Second Temple literature identifies זנות definitely with Levitical proscriptions to homoeroticism, bestiality, or sex with menstruants, we should not assume immediately the man’s wife is menstruating (Lev 18.19). Some Qumran texts repeat biblical passages; others are terribly fragmentary.

**Conclusion**

What we do not find in Second Temple references is evidence πορνεία stands for ‘sexual lust’ or for the English sense of male ‘fornication’, including male adultery. It does not indicate the sex-act itself, nor is it limited to nor does it imply automatically the proscriptions of Leviticus 18 and 20. Of course this does not mean Second Temple Judaism was unconcerned with male profligacy or lust or adultery; it means only that πορνεία does not in this period stand for those particular offences. πορνεία is about boundaries. Kampen’s observation of זנות in CD applies generally: ‘it is clearly a term used to define the ideological boundaries of the group’.

For women, the boundaries reflect the patriarchy. πορνεία-זנות is female sexual conduct that violates the social strictures of a woman’s relationship to a

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204 Collins: ‘The nature of the offence is unclear. It may refer to relations during menses, which are specifically denounced in the Damascus Document (CD v.6-7). [My note: CD 5.6-7 does not use זנות for sex with a menstruant; 5.7-8 uses it for incest.] Alternatively, the code may presuppose a rule of temporary abstinence for married members of the sect’; Schuller and Wassen: ‘The offense here also may be sexual relations when conception is impossible (during pregnancy and after menopause), though the passage has also been interpreted as sexual relations during menstruation or when the marriage itself is illicit’. John J. Collins, ‘Family Life,’ in *Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman and James C. VanderKam (OUP, 2000), 1.288; Eileen M. Schuller and Cecilia Wassen, ‘Women: Daily Life,’ in *Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman and James C. VanderKam (OUP, 2000), 2.982.

205 E.g., 4Q169 3-4ii7 (citing Nah 3.4); 1QpHab V.7 (commentary on Hab 1.12-13a).


207 Pace Hayes, who says incautiously *Jub* 30.8, 13-15 presents the term as ‘the act of sexual union itself’. Hayes, *Gentile*, 73. As she later expounds (p. 74), her point is that gentiles *per se* are not contaminants. Since *Jubilees* presents all men as priests, all women are therefore priests’ daughters and forbidden from זנות (Lev 21.9). Because *Jubilees* considers all foreigners prohibited by Torah, the ordinary Israelite woman ‘fornicates’ out of bounds when she copulates with a non-Israelite male, causing profanation of the seed. But זנות does not suggest the sex-act itself.

208 Kampen, ‘*4QMMT,*’ 136.
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particular male, be he father, master, husband, or father-in-law. Notably, neither the Hebrew Bible nor the LXX condemns the professional prostitute209 – Philo and Josephus are distinctive in this regard. Nor does the Hebrew Bible/LXX explicitly forbid men to use prostitutes, except to caution them against economic squander. Hayes observes that in certain Second Temple texts the πόρνη-זונה represents any woman ‘out of bounds’ to the men of the community.210 In these texts, priestly proscriptions apply generally to the community’s males such that men are forbidden such women in the same way priests are forbidden marrying professional prostitutes.

For men, too, πορνεία is ‘sex out of bounds’, the boundaries relative to the particular community. Sometimes the boundaries are familial, as in Tobit; others are demonstrated by their progeny, as in 1 Enoch (cf. Jub 7.21; 20.5) or Philo’s interpretation of Numbers 5.2 (Leg. 3.8). Sometimes Leviticus 18 and 20 construct the boundary211 but even so, as in CD 4.12-5.14, they do not necessarily construct it completely.212 Further, πορνεία’s connection with Levitical proscriptions seems aimed specifically at incestuous marriages (and their consequent progeny?); there is no evidence linking πορνεία-זנות with sex explicitly bestial or homoerotic, and limited evidence it connotes sex with menstruants.213 This is not to say Levitical laws do not play prominently in Second Temple sexual ethics; it is only to say that their connection to πορνεία may be more particular than general. As in normal Greek usage, sex with a professional πόρνη is πορνεία and, as noted above, certain texts designate any woman ‘out of bounds’ a πόρνη-זונה. Despite its variety, Second Temple male πορνεία maintains a fixed function with variable content. Like female πορνεία-זנות, which indicates sexually transgressing patriarchal bounds, male πορνεία affects communal boundaries restricting with which women men may relate sexually.

209 LXX Deut 23.18 is an exception, translating הבש with πόρνη. But 23.19 goes on to indicate the persistent presence of prostitutes in Israel. Other texts, such as ALD 6.3-4 use זונה as a derogatory designation and do not point to actual prostitution.

210 Hayes, Gentile, 72.

211 Besides CD 5.7-8, cf. CD 7.1; 8.5.

212 The proscription regarding divorce/remarriage/polygamy in CD 4.20-21 is not from Lev 18 or 20 and, although Sir 23.16 seemingly upholds Levitical incest rules, Sir 23.17 uses πόρνος more broadly. Similarly, Jubilees’s use of πορνεία-זנות with reference to the Watchers (7.21; 20.5) and Sodom and Gomorrah (16.5; 20.5-6) does not derive explicitly from the marriage proscriptions of Lev 18 and 20.

213 See above on 4Q270 7.i.12b-13.
In sum, πορνεία refers to female fornication – a transgression of patriarchal bounds; it refers to prostitution – acts of and encounters with professional fornicators; and, for men, it refers to sex with women ‘out of bounds’, however differently those boundaries are construed. It does not refer to male extramarital sex generally, including adultery, nor to sexual desire. This somewhat lengthy detour from Paul helps us get our bearings as we turn to consider πορνεία in Paul’s argument of 1 Corinthians 6.12-20.
Chapter Five

Paul, πορνεία, and the Body

I began my study by asking how Paul proposes believers as bodies live in the Meanwhile that comprises Christ’s resurrection and return. In Part One, I established my premiss that, in Paul, believers are bodies. I examined Paul’s portrayal of the believer at death, concluding: 1) Paul presents believers as bodies, not distinguishable from them; 2) nothing Paul says about the body, σῶμα, suggests it is something distinguishable from the believer’s visible, material, lived-in body; 3) Paul distinguishes believers from Others, identifying them already as Christ’s though they remain bodies ‘in Adam’. My purpose in Part Two is to apply these conclusions to a concrete ethical problem in Paul particular to the body.

In Part Two, I consider the believer as body in relation to Paul’s prohibition of πορνεία. πορνεία is translated variously by interpreters, and I last chapter mapped-out various proposals interpreters give for the term before offering the modest proposal that πορνεία signals sex with someone somehow out of bounds to God’s people, however differently ‘God’s people’ may be defined. Turning now to Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20, I argue that:

1. At its most basic, πορνεία here functions to signify sex with a woman somehow out of bounds to the men in Paul’s congregation;
2. those men in Paul’s congregation committing πορνεία (ὁ πορνεύων) are guilty not of violating their own bodies, but of violating the body that belongs to the Lord;
3. ὁ πορνεύων and the offence of πορνεία need not in this passage refer to any real occurrence, but serves as an exemplum for Paul’s argument concerning Christ’s/God’s claims on believers-as-bodies;
4. πορνεία is not the point of this passage; the Lord’s/God’s claim already on believers-as-bodies in the κόσμος is.

I conclude that Paul’s argument for conduct here confirms that believers are to comport themselves as bodies materially yet in the κόσμος that belong materially already to the Lord.
1 Corinthians 6.12-20: A Problem of Sex?

1 Corinthians 6.12-20 contributes a self-contained argument to 1 Corinthians. The argument opens suddenly, grammatically independent of its surroundings, and it is not automatically apparent how it fits its immediate context. On one hand, the wider context seems focused on sex. 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 hinges chapters 5-6 to chapter 7 – chapters wherein Paul discusses sex bad and good, or sex he prohibits or permits believers in Christ. Paul condemns a man who commits πορνεία (5.1), reminds the Corinthians not to mix with believers behaving as πόρνοι


2 Note the lack of connective or transitional conjunctions, the immediate shift from second to first person.

3 Fee: ‘How this section relates to what immediately precedes is not at all certain’. Godet reasons the abrupt beginning is from its connection with v. 9, but that the passage does not connect to chapter five because that chapter concerns discipline, not impurity. Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Eerdmans, 1987), 250; Frédéric Louis Godet, Commentary on St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. Rev. A. Cusin, 2 vols., Clark’s Foreign Theological Library, New Series, Vol 27 (T&T Clark, 1886), 1.303.
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(5.9, 10, 11), excludes the πόρνοι from inheriting God’s Kingdom (6.9), and commissions believers to marry on account of τὰς πορνείας (7.2).

On the other hand, sex can be seen as only a superficial topos in these chapters. Having earlier condemned the community’s internal schisms (σχίσματα – chs 1-4), Paul moves on quickly from his expulsion of the believer who committed πορνεία (5.1-5).4 He admonishes the community to cleanse out ‘old leaven’ (τὴν παλαιὰν ζύμην) (5.6-8), reminding them not to mix (μὴ συναναμγωσθαι) with believers who imitate ‘outsiders’ (i.e., τοὺς ἕξως; τοῦ κόσμου τούτου) (5.9-13). He consents that believers cannot flee the κόσμος (5.10), but complains that believers take believers (οἱ ἁγιοί; ἄδελφοι) to ‘secular’ (i.e., τῶν ἁδίκων; ὁ κόσμος; τοὺς ἕξωθενημένους ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ; ἀπίστων) court (6.1-8). He asserts that outsiders (ἀδικοί) will not inherit God’s Kingdom, though he assures his Corinthians they are such outsiders no longer (6.9-11).

Besides the πόρνοι, who appear commonly in NT vice list,5 Paul’s only sexual references are the μοιχοὶ, μαλακοὶ, and ἀρσενοκόται (6.9-10). He uses no sexual terms in his first two vice lists (5.9-10, 11), and he populates all three lists mostly with non-sexual offenders: ἄρπαγες (5.10, 11; 6.10); εἰδολάται (5.10, 11; 6.10); σκληρεπταί (5.10, 11; 6.10); λοίδοροι (5.11; 6.10); μέθυσοι (5.11; 6.10); κλέπται (6.10). That Paul lists these offences separately tells against interpretations that pick-and-choose the sexual ones to be represented by the πορν- group; Paul’s catch-all for the offenders – including the πόρνοι – is ἀδικοί (6.9). Paul uses ἀδικοί to distinguish believers from Others – a distinction he makes repeatedly in the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians.6 Despite certain sexual overtones, sex is not the

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4 By comparison with the Greek magical papyri and CD 7.21-8.3, Yarbro Collins interprets the excommunication ‘communally and eschatologically, rather than in terms of the ultimate destiny of an individual’, urging: ‘The effect of the expulsion is that the sinner is removed from the realm of holiness and grace and transferred into the realm of Satan’s power, which will eventually feel God’s wrath’. Reading Corinthians through ideologies of the body disclosed in Greek medical texts, Martin remarks: ‘The body of Christ is not polluted by mere contact with the cosmos or by the body’s presence in the midst of the corrupt cosmos, but it may be polluted if its boundaries are permeated and an element of the cosmos gains entry into the body. In that case, the only remedy is violent expulsion of the polluting agent, which will result in the return of the body to a clean, healthy state’. Adela Yarbro Collins, ‘The Function of “Excommunication” in Paul,’ HTR 73 (1980): 259; 263; Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (Yale University Press, 1995), 170.

5 Eph 5.5; 1 Tim 1.9-10; Rev 21.8; 22.15.

6 In these first chapters of Corinthians, Paul refers disparagingly τοῖς ἁπαλλυμένοις (1.18), and frequently to members τοῦ κόσμου (τοῦτο) (1.20, 21, 27[2x], 28; 2.12; 3.19, 22; 4.9; cf. 5.10[2x]; 6.2[2x]) and τοῖς ἁλίκης τοῦτο (2.6[2x]; 8; 3.18). He distinguishes believers from Ἰουδαῖοι (1.22, 23, 24), Ἐλληνες (1.22, 24) and Ἑβραῖοι (1.23; cf. 5.1). He rejects ἐν διδακτοῖς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγους
dominant theme of 1 Corinthians 5-6. What Paul emphasizes in these chapters is the believer’s relation to Others, and it is that relation to Others that informs Paul’s discussion of πορνεία in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20.

1 Corinthians 6.12-20: The Argument

1 Corinthians 6.12-20 falls discernibly into two sections. In the first (6.12-14), Paul appeals from ethos to temper notions of autonomous liberty by what is ‘advantageous’. In the second section (6.15-20), a diatribe, Paul appeals from pathos that believers are not their own, but that what they do bodily may have undesirable consequences – not for the believer, individually but, unthinkably, for the Lord. The exhortation in v. 20 concludes Paul’s argument, directing believers to practise bodily liberty appropriate to belonging to God.

The terms consistent to every section of Paul’s argument are σῶμα and some or other association with God. σῶμα occurs twice each in vv. 13 and 18, once each in vv. 15, 16, 19 and 20. τὰ βρόματα and ἡ κοιλία, twice each in v. 13, μέλη, twice in v. 15, and σάρξ in v. 16 all hold σῶμα in view. σῶμα doubles for ἡμᾶς in v. 14, and is the implied subject of the second-person ἔστε in v. 19 and of ἡγορᾶσθητε in v. 20.

(2.13) and the ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος (2.14). He chastens believers for remaining ὡς σαρκίνοις (3.1), identifies ‘another’ (ἄλλος) who builds on his foundation (3.10), and discounts any ‘human court’ (ἄνθρωπος ἡμέρας) (4.3). Significantly, Paul sometimes others humanity at large, often elevating believers above ἄνθρωπος (1.25[2x]; 2.5, 9; 3.3, 4, 21; 4.1[?]; cf. 7.23; 9.8; 15.32.).

7 Importantly, contra, e.g., Neyrey and Hayes, neither is it purity language that binds this section together, or that becomes the focus of 6.12-20. As Countryman points out, ‘purity’ language is entirely absent from this passage (for Countryman, the problems all relate to property) – indeed, not one of the terms for ‘purity’ in Neyrey’s ‘semantic word field on clean and unclean’ occur in this passage. And, contra Hayes, Paul does not identify the believer’s body in 1 Cor 6.12-20 as a ‘holy body’, but as a body belonging to the Lord. L. William Countryman, Dirty, Greed, and Sex: Sexual Ethics in the New Testament and their Implications for Today (SCM, 1989); Christine E. Hayes, Gentle Impurities and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the Bible to the Talmud (OUP, 2002), 92 (and all ch. 5); Jerome H. Neyrey, Paul in Other Words: A Cultural Reading of His Letters (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 54-55.


Associations with God appear variously, whether θεός (vv. 13, 14, 19, 20), κύριος (vv. 13[2x], 14, 17), Χριστός (v. 15[2x]), (ἀγιον) πνεῦμα (vv. 17, 19), or ναός (v. 19).

The πορν- word group also features in the argument, and it is crucial we observe both where and how. The abstract noun, πορνεία, occurs once in v. 13 and as the object of Paul’s exhortation in v. 18. The concrete noun, πόρνη, occurs once each in vv. 15 and 16, and the substantive participle, ὁ πορνεύων, in v. 18. Structurally, πορνεία is out of place in v. 13. There, it introduces the exemplum of Paul’s pathos – an expedient to his premiss that believers belong bodily already to the Lord. The point of Paul’s argument is not the imperative of v. 18: ‘flee πορνεία!’ The point is not about πορνεία at all.10 Paul repeats his point throughout the argument, summed up in 6.19b: ‘you are not your own’. The point is that believers belong bodily already to the Lord; πορνεία simply illustrates that point.

The Appeal from Ethos (6.12-14)

Introduction and ‘Background’

Paul structures the initial section of his argument (vv. 12-14) in tight, antithetical parallelism.11 He contrasts statements with subsequent qualifications:

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10 Here I emphasize the function of πορνεία in Paul’s argument, contending that πορνεία’s function is illustrative. πορνεία is not the argument’s subject; σῶμα is. So contra the majority reading: e.g., Countryman: ‘porneia… is the subject of the whole section (6:12-20)’; Furnish: ‘The subject of 6:12-20 is indicated by the summary appeal in v. 18a, “Distance yourselves from porneia”; Collins: ‘The issue of sexual misconduct is the rhetorical stasis of the passage’; Schrage: ‘Mit V 12-20 greift Paulus erneut das Thema der πορνεία auf’. Collins, First Corinthians, 239; Countryman, Dirt, 104; Victor P. Furnish, The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians, ed. James D.G. Dunn, New Testament Theology (CUP, 1999), 55; Schrage, Korinther, 2.8. In effect, this does not change certain commentators’ conclusions; in practice, it sharpens the reasons for those conclusions. Thus, e.g., although Collins regards πορνεία the argument’s ‘stasis’ and ‘topic’, he nevertheless remarks that ‘The heart of Paul’s argument is, however, the importance of the human body, σῶμα’; that σῶμα is ‘the leitmotif of 6:12-20’. Collins, First Corinthians, 239; 241.

11 Héring: ‘This passage is written in two strophes constructed somewhat according to the rules of Hebrew poetry’. Jean Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A.W. Heathcote and P.J. Alcock (The Epworth Press, 1962), 44. Cf. the parallelism displayed by, e.g., Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians, IBC (John Knox Press, 1997), 102; Kirchhoff, Sünde, 106-11; Wiéner, ‘Notes,’ 88-89. The parallelism is evident in Heil’s chiastic structure, but his chiasm itself is superficial, a coincidence of language that repeats simply because it is what the argument is about (θεός, πορν-, σῶμα). Except for Heil’s C-C’ (vv. 16a, 17) – vv. 16-17 possibly an A-B-A’ structure its own – none of Heil’s chiastic units parallel exactly (e.g., different numbers of terms in each, exclusion of key terms). See Heil, Rhetorical, 105-11.
But Paul’s qualifications, not his statements, move his argument along. It is therefore nonessential first to establish if the statements are Corinthian slogans that represent libertine notions, whether derived from Stoicism, (proto-)gnosticism, (a corruption of) Paul’s own teaching, or, generally, ‘a familiar notion about freedom’; if they are even in fact evidence of actual ‘libertine notions’ or activity; or if the statements are ‘Corinthian slogans’ at all.

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15 Garland: ‘It is more plausible that Paul cites a familiar notion about freedom found in the Corinthian culture and recasts it in Christian terms than that he parrots the arguments of sensualists in the church to repudiate them’. Conzelmann concedes that the ‘slogans’ are ‘suited for use in various speculative frameworks’, as does Kirchoff: ‘Der Slogan ist nicht spezifisch genug, um ihn bestimmten
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At stake is supposedly that ‘The interpretation of 1 Corinthians is greatly conditioned by the exegete’s assessment of the situation of Corinth, because Paul’s words can mean different things when read against different backgrounds’. Of course this is true – even tautologous: different perspectives yield different perceptions. In Chapter Two, I noted that it is logically fallacious to prescribe readers to ‘determine as objectively as possible the positions adopted by the Corinthians’ before allowing readers legitimately to produce a reading of Paul’s philosophisch-theologischen Strömungen und ihren Trägerkreisen zuzuordnen’. Mitchell observes the ‘slogan’ not only in Stoicism but shows it ‘is political in origin’, and Deming situates the language in debates between what is moral and what is legal, leading him to conclude: ‘6:12 represents the position of the immoral man in 5:1, who has been exonerated by the courts’. Winter points out such sayings existed only by and for the élite; Martin, similarly, links them to ‘the Strong’, thus providing ‘firm evidence of their [the ‘Strong’s’] relatively high economic position’. Will Deming, ‘The Unity of 1 Corinthians 5-6,’ *JBL* 115 (1996): 303; cf. 299-303; David E. Garland, *1 Corinthians*, ed. Robert W. Yarbrough and Robert H. Stein, *Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament* (Baker, 2003), 228; Kirchhoff, *Sünde*, 76; Martin, *Corinthian*, 72; cf. 70-76; Mitchell, *Rhetoric*, 34, n. 66; Bruce W. Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change* (Eerdmans, 2001), 81-82. Cf. Richard A. Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, *ANTC* (Abingdon, 1998), 90.


17 Weiß identified these as ‘slogans’ in 1910, arguing from silence that the absence of τὸῦτο δὲ indicates a citation from the Corinthians’ letter. This has become the established, largely unreflective position of most interpreters. In 1965, Hurd listed twenty-two commentators who held the position (including himself for twenty-three), and Murphy-O’Connor added names to the list in 1978. By 2000 Thiselton could claim the position as fact, offering no evidence except that ‘The overwhelming majority of modern scholars adopt this view’. Hurd, *Origin*, 68; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Corinthian Slogans in 1 Cor 6:12-20,’ *CBQ* 40 (1978): 394, n. 9; Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGNT* (Eerdmans/Paternoster, 2000), 460-61; Weiß, *Korintherbrief*, 158. But B. Dodd, followed by Garland and May, disputes that these are citations. Noting the absence of introductory formula (as compared with 32 other citations in 1 Corinthians, ‘whether from the Corinthians, other literature or from hypothetical dialogue’ [43]), Dodd (44) applies Fox’s dictum: ‘If there is no marking at all, we must start with the assumption that there is no quotation, or at least that the quotation is an expression of the speaker’s viewpoint and sentiments’. Dodd instead focuses on Paul’s rhetorical use of the first-person singular, observing: ‘Sudden transitions to the first person singular characterize Paul’s paraenesis in 1 Corinthians’ (46). See Dodd, ‘Paradigmatic,’ 39-58; Michael V. Fox, ‘The Identification of Quotations in Biblical Literature,’ *ZAW* 92 (1980): 427; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 225-29; May, “Body”, 100-03.

18 Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Slogans,’ 391.

19 For a survey of how different assessments of the Corinthian situation have effect different readings of 1 Corinthians, see James D.G. Dunn, ‘Reconstructions of Corinthian Christianity and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians,’ in *Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church*, ed. Edward Adams and David G. Horrell (Westminster/John Knox, 2004), 295-310.

20 Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Slogans,’ 391.
argument. Any assessment of Corinthian positions logically presupposes a reading of Paul’s argument; my aim here is only that reading presupposed by my assessment of the Corinthian *Sitz.* But regardless, here in 1 Corinthians 6.12-14 Paul’s technique does not require of us intimate familiarity with hypothetical Corinthian positions. Whatever the statements’ origins, Paul proceeds first to endorse and then to qualify – to redefine – them. What progresses the argument is Paul’s qualifications.

Paul progresses his argument by his qualifications, establishing a hypothetical dialogue. The dialogue presents an argument from advantage characteristic of deliberative rhetoric – rhetoric Paul maintains through use of the diatribe in 6.15-20. The rhetoric is thus didactic, not polemical, underscoring again that, for the

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21 See Chapter Two, pp. 45-46. I do not subsequently produce an assessment of the Corinthian *Sitz,* which would send me round again the hermeneutical spiral and effect yet another reading of the argument – grounds for whorling again. My point is only to legitimate a pre-*Sitz* reading. Again, I am not after the reading, in either a foundational or a final sense. That would demand a level of disinterest I do not claim. I do not deny the validity of other readings that begin from associations with supposed Corinthian situations, but as these other readings develop premises and arguments appropriate to their ends, so my reading requires premises and arguments appropriate to mine.

22 Although few commentators are as uninterested in the Corinthian *Sitz* as am I, I have found none who disputes it is Paul’s qualifications that progress the argument – though not all agree the extent to which Paul finally endorses the initial statement. E.g., Fee: Paul ‘qualifies it [the statement] so sharply as to negate it – at least as a theological absolute’; Collins: ‘Paul’s normal approach to slogans exploited by the Corinthians (cf. 6:13a; 7:1; 8:1, 7; 10:23a-b; 14:34a) is to make some concession to the truth of a slogan and then take some reflective and critical distance from the range of possible applications’; Senft: ‘Paul ne va pas, comme on s’y attend peut-être, rejeter avec indignation ce slogan… Ce qui est nécessaire en revanche, c’est de montrer comment on fera de la liberté un usage qui ne lui soit pas contraire, mais compatible avec elle’; Witherington: ‘Paul does not seem to reject the slogan “Everything is permitted to me”’. Yarbrough observes Paul’s use of the same technique in 7.1, noting it also in Musonius. Yarbrough credits Jeremias as the first to remark on Paul’s technique. Collins, *First Corinthians,* 239; Fee, *First Epistle,* 250; Joachim Jeremias, ‘Zur Gedankführüng in den paulinischen Briefen: (3) Die Briefzitate in 1. Kor 8, 1-13,’ in *Studia Paulina in Honorem Johannis de Zwann Septuagenarii,* ed. J.N. Sevenster and W.C. van Unnik (Bohn: Haarlem, 1953), 151; Christophe Senft, *La Première Épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens,* 2nd corrigée et augmentée ed., *Commentaire du Nouveau Testament: deuxième série 7* (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1990), 82; Witherington III, *Conflict,* 167; O. Larry Yarbrough, *Not Like the Gentiles: Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul,* ed. Charles H. Talbert, Society of Biblical Studies Dissertation Series, no. 80 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), 93-94, n. 14. Responding to Weiß’s emphasis on the statement’s similarities to Stoicism, Mitchell argues that ‘even if the slogan did reflect solely Stoic thought, there is no reason to suppose that Paul’s response to that slogan (“not everything is advantageous”) must have arisen solely from the same milieu’. Mitchell, *Rhetoric,* 34, and n. 66.

23 Allo points out the statements can be construed equally as questions: ‘Tout m’est permis, (dites-vous?) – oui, mais…’. Allo, *Première,* 144. He considers the questions ‘plus ou moins ironique’ (142).


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sake of Paul’s argument, his ‘interlocutors’ – and their ‘slogans’ – need be only hypothetical constructs.26

The First Dialogue (6.12)

In the first dialogue (v. 12), Paul twice repeats the same statement before twice modifying it, differently. The statement itself does not appear verbatim in any writings contemporary with Paul, although similar language and sentiments occur in Stoic, legal, and political texts.27 At 10.23, in his instruction on idol meats, Paul twice repeats a similar statement, and once his first qualification from 6.12. He omits there to attach the personal pronouns and offers a different second qualification. Thus 10.23 reads:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement:</th>
<th>Qualification:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>πάντα ἔξεστιν</td>
<td>ἀλλὰ οὐ πάντα συφέφει</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πάντα ἔξεστιν</td>
<td>ἀλλὰ οὐ πάντα οἰκοδομεῖ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ἐξεστὶ (‘from a theoretical form ἔξειμι’)28 signals generally the unhindered capacity to perform a given action and, particularly, the moral or legal obligation to do so.29 As Collins interprets: ‘The slogan is roughly equivalent to contemporary jargon that proclaims that “it’s my right to do what I want”’.30 Besides these occurrences, Paul records the term only once: the negated participle, οὐκ ἔξον, marks a cosmic prohibition to repeat certain heavenly secrets (2 Cor 12.4). In both 6.12 and 10.23, Paul first qualifies the statement of unbridled liberty by what is ‘advantageous’.


27 In his note, Weiß supplies citations of his ‘parallels’ from Epictetus and Diogenes Laertius, as Mitchell does from Aristotle and Dio Chrysostom. Deming points to references in legal and moral texts. Winter observes that the lists of aphoristic sayings available to the public (i.e., the non-élite) contain ‘no examples of the statement in 1 Corinthians 6:12, 10:23’; ‘No pithy saying such as “do whatever you wish” (ποίει ὧσα βούλονται), which is the imperatival equivalent of 1 Corinthians 6:12, 10:23, can be found in public lists’. Deming, ‘Unity,’ 299-303; Mitchell, Rhetoric, 34, n. 66; Weiß, Korintherbrief, 157-58, n. 1; Winter, After, 82. Cf. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 108-09.

28 Thiselton, First Epistle, 461.

29 See L&N and cf. BDAG: ‘to be authorized for the doing of something’; ‘to be within the range of possibility’. Foerster emphasizes the lack of obstacles, whether moral or legal, and Betz notes of 1 Cor 6.12 that the believer is ‘free to do anything’. Hans Dieter Betz, ‘ἐξονομα, in NIDNTT, 611; Foerster, ἔξεστι, κτλ., esp. 2.560-61.

30 Collins, First Corinthians, 243.
True to its etymology, the compound verb συμφέρω can mean ‘to bring together’. Radcliffe reasons that this supplies a clue to Paul’s sexual ethic, but Radcliffe’s is theological reflection, not exegesis, and there is little evidence to support sexual overtones of συμφέρω here. Kretzer notes that ‘The most significant connotations of συμφέρω in both the Gospels and the Epistles are found in the meaning be useful/advantageous’, and Paul so uses the participle in 12.7 and the adjective in 7.35 and 10.33. The term denotes ‘advantage’ ‘in a wide range of ethical and political discussions in antiquity’, and Mitchell contends Paul uses it as part of his programme to redirect the Corinthians’ focus from autonomy and factionalism onto the community. This redirection is patent in 10.23, but the focus

31 ‘And it is no coincidence that Paul’s sexual ethic starts with what “brings together” since for him it is our bodiliness that enables us to be together. It is as bodily that we can be with each other. So the opening move away from the question of what is permissible to what brings together (sumpherei) is simply a consequence of his understanding of human sexuality’. Timothy Radcliffe, “Glorify God in Your Bodies”: 1 Corinthians 6,12-20 as a Sexual Ethic,’ NBl 67 (1986): 308.

32 BDAG, L&N, and TDNT do not include references to sexual activity. LSJ notes a sexual application only of the Ionic aorist middle subjunctive, συνενείκομαι: Lucian Hermot. 34; Tox. 15, which use makes little sense here.

33 A. Kretzer, συμφέρω, in EDNT, 3.289 (his italics). Cf. BDAG: ‘to be advantageous, help, confer a benefit, be profitable/useful’.

34 Cf. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 33. Mitchell (n. 57) notes Paul’s uses of other terms in 1 Corinthians that describe ‘advantage’ or ‘gain’: ‘μισθός in 9:18; κερδαίνειν in 9:20; ὧφελεῖν in 13:3; 14:6; ὄφελος in 15:32; and the litotes οὐκ έστιν κενός in 15:58. These are all ways of expressing the deliberative appeal to advantage’.

35 Mitchell argues against Weiß (and those many following him) that the term is not isolably Stoic: ‘Actually συμφέρειν is a key term used in a wide range of ethical and political discussions in antiquity, one attestation of which is the writings of Stoic philosophy’. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 33. Contra Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 108-09; Weiß, Korintherbrief, 158.

36 ‘In 6:12 Paul makes the common deliberative appeal to the interest of the audience as a major ingredient in their decision-making’; ‘In 10:23-11:1 Paul overtly and consciously redefines what is τὸ συμφέρον for the Corinthian community…By the parallel structure of verses 10:23a and 23b, one is led to deduce that the advantageous act is that which builds up the community’. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 34; 36-37.
in 6.12 is on the individual, not the community: the All things permitted one are not equally All in one’s own best interest.

Paul develops the notion of advantage in his second qualification through a wordplay between the cognates ἔξεστι and ἔξουσίαζω. ἔξουσίαζω denotes the right of control, exercising authority over something or someone. The statement and second qualification can be translated into a modus ponens argument so that Paul implicitly reasons: If it is the case that I (μοι) am unhindered (ἔξεστι) by All Things (πάντα), Then it is the case that I (ἔγω) shall be unmastered (οὐκ ἔξουσθήσομαι) by Something (τινός). Paul appeals from ethos, using the personal pronouns – notably, the emphatic ἔγω – to establish himself as a standard of comparison. Paul mirrors his emphasis on the first person, here, with his emphasis on the second person in his final ὠκ οἴδατε clause and concluding exhortation (vv. 19-20). His ethos, here, and the implied logic of his argument create suspense, inviting the response: ‘But what “Something”, do you imply, masters us?’

tινός corresponds to πάντα. It is here undefined, neuter, impersonal. But the argument’s suspense anticipates ground, opening the potential for generically ‘Something’ to become specifically ‘Someone’. This in fact occurs through Paul’s

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37 Mitchell: ‘It is most important that we do not prematurely interpret the first instance of this term in the letter at 6:12 in the light of the later reformulations of it which Paul will make (particularly in 10:23-11:1)’; Hays: ‘In Paul’s other uses of the verb sympherein in 1 Corinthians (10:23; 12:7), he is clearly talking about what is beneficial for the community, not the individual. Here in 1 Corinthians 6:12, however, the statement could be heard by the Corinthians in individualistic terms’; May: ‘Despite the steady minority of scholars who wish to read 6.12-20 as Paul presenting τὸνας as an offence against the community…there is no evidence of such’. Hays, First Corinthians, 103; May, “Body”, 104; Mitchell, Rhetoric, 35. I do not follow Mitchell to suppose that Paul in the remainder of 6.12-20 redirects focus from the individual to the ἐκκλησία. Paul quells autonomy, rather, by redirecting focus from the individual to ‘the Lord’: believers are not ‘their own’; they belong to the Lord and are, consequently, to glorify God in their bodies.

38 Again, Mitchell: ‘This is the generally accepted assumption upon which all deliberative argumentation is based – that one acts in accordance with one’s own best interest’. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 35. She notes (pp. 35-36, n. 71) Epict. Diss. 1.19.15; 1.22.1; 2.22.15; Dio Chrys. Or. 38.27 cf. 31.32, Sir 37.26; T; Gad. 7.1, 2.

39 So BDAG, L&N, LSJ.

40 See Collins, First Corinthians, 243-244; Dodd, ‘Paradigmatic,’ 39-58. Dodd (46, and n. 33) notes ‘Sudden transitions to the first person singular characterize Paul’s parenesis in 1 Corinthians’, listing 5.12; 8.13; 10.29-11.1; 12.31-13.3; 13.11-12; 14.6, 11, 14, 15, 18-19. The ἔγω corresponds to μοι, which is absent in Paul’s similar statement at 10.23. Paul maintains an appeal from ethos also in v. 15, where he again uses ἔγω to make himself the subject of the hypothetical offence.

41 Cf. Heil, Rhetorical, 111.

exemplum of the πόρνη in vv. 15-17; it is reversed in his only other uses of ἐξουσίαζω: the passage immediately following, where each spouse appropriately relinquishes ‘mastery’ of her or his own body to the other (7.4, twice).43

Paul’s first dialogue corrals notions of personal liberty. Paul teaches that All Things are not advantageous to believers; implicitly, Some Things may even enslave them. Consequently, how one practises liberty – not simply that one possesses it – is what truly matters. Paul expounds on the practice of liberty for the remainder of his argument, identifying it particularly in vv. 13-14 by the believer’s bodily relationship with the Lord. There too he introduces πορνεία, which he later develops as an exemplum to display how certain practices of autonomous liberty impossibly affect even the believer’s own Lord. Different from Others, believers(-as-bodies) are no longer autonomous: they must come to grips with the new reality that they truly are not their own. They are the Lord’s and are to practise, correspondingly, what glorifies God.

The Second Dialogue (6.13-14)

_Foods and Stomach ‘Destroyed’ (6.13a)_

Paul’s second dialogue introduces the terms of his diatribe, but how to read it divides interpreters. Structurally foods, stomach, and God’s destruction of each belong together, opposite body, Lord, and resurrection. The problem comes from deciding where to place the supposed citation marks meant to distinguish Paul’s comments from the Corinthians’. Along with most translations, does the ‘Corinthian

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43 Kempthorne assigns τινός a personal reference in 6.12 in retrospective reference to the incestuous man’s stepmother of 5.1. But in 6.12 τινός opposes the neuter πάντα, and far too much ground has been covered between 5.1 and 6.12 to maintain an obvious connection with 5.1. Paul’s argument opens the possibility for prospective personal application such that, as the argument unfolds, something might expand to include someone. But it is faulty procedure to look ahead to the personal use of τινός at 7.4 and reason backward that: ‘Thus τινός is to be taken as personal rather than neuter’. R. Kempthorne, ‘Incest and the Body of Christ: A Study of 1 Corinthians VI. 12-20,’ _NTS_ 14 (1968): 569. I stand with Fee’s generic translation: ‘I will not be mastered by anything (or anybody)’. Fee, _First Epistle_, 253 (his italics).
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slogan’ end with ‘the stomach for foods’ or, with most commentators, does it include God’s destruction of ‘both the one and the other’? But this problem is a dead end. Even granting that v. 13 presents a ‘Corinthian slogan’ at all – despite the absence of any formal markers – we are left still unawares the extent to which Paul endorses ‘God will destroy both foods and stomach’. Thus Barrett, who retains with the ‘slogan’ God’s destruction of each, remarks: ‘Paul probably did not frame it…but he appears to accept it’. Punctuation cannot save the day, and the problem remains whether κοιλία is synecdoche for σῶμα, and whether Paul affirms God’s destruction of it. Often overlooked in assessing this dialogue is how casually interpreters equate καταργέω with death.

καταργέω never denotes ‘death’. Paul uses the term in 1 Corinthians with God or Christ who depotentiate agents of the κόσμος (1.28; 2.6). The verb stands at the heart of Paul’s argument for the resurrection of the dead (15.24, 26), marking Death’s depotentiation and thus the success of Christ’s reign and, consequently, τὸ τέλος: the commencement of the Kingdom, the ‘making alive’ (ζωοποιέω) Christ’s own, God’s ‘all in all’. Similarly, in Romans 6.6 the (living) believer’s παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος is ‘crucified’ in baptism, depotentiating Sin’s power over the body (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας – ‘the body belonging to Sin’) so that believers no longer slave for Sin (μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίας); they are freed from Sin (δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας – 6.7). Paul never uses καταργέω to denote ‘death’, nor do any

44 RSV/NRSV, NEB, NIV, ESV, NAB, NLT. Cf. Johannes Behm, ‘κοιλία,’ in TDNT, 3.788; Countryman, Diirt, 203; Fee, First Epistle, 255; Furnish, First Letter, 58; Garland, I Corinthians, 230-31; Godet, First, 1.306-07; Jewett, Paul’s, 93; Kirchhoff, Sünde, 127; Morris, Corinthians, 96; Orr and Walther, Corinthians, 202-03.

45 Barrett, First Epistle, 146; Bruce, Corinthians, 63 (‘may have been part of the libertine argument’); Collins, First Corinthians, 245; Conzelmann, I Corinthians, 110; Goulder, ‘Libertines?’, 342; Gundry, Sōma, 58-59; Hays, First Corinthians, 104; Heil, Rhetorical, 106; Héring, First Epistle, 46; Martin, Corinthian, 175; May, “Body”, 107-08; Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Slogans,’ 394-96; Rosner, Paul, 129; Karl Olav Sandnes, Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles, SNTSMS 120 (CUP, 2002), 193; Schrage, Korinther, 2.20; Thesleff, First Epistle, 462-63; Anthony C. Thesleff, ‘Realized Eschatology at Corinth,’ NTS 24 (1978): 517; Weiß, Korintherbrief, 160; Witherington III, Conflict, 168 (‘more likely’).

46 Barrett, First Epistle, 146. Likewise, Betz, ἡξουσία, 2.611; Conzelmann, I Corinthians, 110; May, “Body”, 108; Rosner, Paul, 129.

47 See Chapter Three.

48 καταργέω also signals the future inactivity of prophhecies and tongues (13.8[2x]) – the ‘partial’ (τὸ ἐκ μέρους; 13.10) – and, elsewhere, the present inactivity of Torah (Rom 4.14; 7.2, 6; 2 Cor 3.7, 11, 13, 14, 17). Paul does not invalidate Torah, however (Rom 3.31). Although Christ and cross are invalidated for those being righteoused by Torah (Gal 5.4, 11), Torah does not invalidate God’s
sources besides him. That application derives, presumably, from the term’s connotations of ‘causing to cease to exist’, ‘to destroy’.

We need not here decide whether Paul predicts the κόσμος’s ‘total destruction’, or only the future inefficacy of its present order. In either event, the κόσμος will cease to be later the way it is now, and it is God’s and, specifically now, Christ’s rôle to bring the new order about. Significantly, in 1 Corinthians God’s and Christ’s arresting/destructive activity is aimed at Others: enemies, agents of the κόσμος; implicitly, at the dis-ordered κόσμος itself. The destructive sense of καταργέω invokes God’s and Christ’s very active, retributive, eschatological judgment and putting-to-rights.

Salient to 6.13 is that, besides that καταργέω nowhere else denotes ‘death’, Paul’s uses of καταργέω in 1 Corinthians exclude imagery of believers passing promise (Gal 3.17), nor does infidelity invalidate God’s faithfulness (Rom 3.3). In 1 Corinthians 13.11, Paul uses καταργέω of having ceased his own childish ways.

49 Eph 2.5; 2 Thess 2.8; 2 Tim 1.10; Luke 13.7; Heb 2.14. LXX only in 2 Esd 4.21, 23; 5.5; 6.8 – see Lust et al.: (active) ‘to cause to be idle; to hinder’; (passive) ‘to lie idle’. MM (331) notes: ‘This favourite Pauline verb is found in a weakened sense of “hindered” in P Oxy; also not infrequently as “render idle or inactive”. Cf. LSJ: leave unemployed or idle; make of no effect. See Euripides Phoen., 753; Polybius Fr. 176; P Oxy. 38.17. BDAG: ‘cause something to be unproductive, use up, exhaust, waste’; ‘cause something to lose its power or effectiveness, invalidate, make powerless’; ‘cause something to come to an end or to be no longer in existence, abolish, wipe out, set aside’; L&N: ‘put an end to’; ‘put a stop to’; ‘invalidate’; Hübner: ‘In the NT it includes the entire spectrum of meaning from the negative aspect make ineffective, destroy, render powerless, annul, use up (Luke 13:7) to the positive aspect of liberate, set free’; Delling: ‘to condemn to inactivity’; ‘to destroy’; ‘to remove from the sphere of activity’; Dahl: ‘To deprive a totality of its autonomy over against God so that it ceases to have any effective existence’. Murdoch Edgcumbe Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body: A Study of 1 Corinthians 15, SBT 36 (SCM, 1962), 117; Gerhard Delling, ‘καταργέω’, in TDNT, 1.452; H. Hübner, ‘καταργέω’, in E DNT, 2.267; J. Lust, E. Eynikel, and K. Hauspie, A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1996), 2.243.

50 Edward Adams, Constructing the World: A Study of Paul’s Cosmological Language, ed. John Barclay, Joel Marcus, and John Riches, Studies of the New Testament and Its World (T&T Clark, 2000), 115. I agree with very much of Adams’s analysis, but contest his sharp division between the world in rebellion to God, and the social and physical world of Paul’s and the Corinthians’ everyday experience. These are one world differently perceived – one order Christ is in process re-ordering. The phenomenal, ‘physical’ manifestations of the Spirit (chs 12-14) display that Christ’s present re-ordering activity is already materially effective. As bodies, the Corinthians are to become materially already a ‘micro-κόσμος of the new order (viz., the Kingdom) by behaving as ‘anti-κόσμος’ to the present, imical one. (Thus modifying Adams [116]: ‘The Christian congregation is not to be a micro-κόσμος but an anti-κόσμος.’) Adams divides where he should distinguish.

51 Concisely, Dahl, Resurrection, 117-19. I urge that it is anachronistic to speak of ‘total destruction’ in the ancient world; any future order will involve re-order. See ch. Two, pp. 70-71, n. 148.

52 Cf. 15.24-28. Significantly, except for 13.11, God or Christ is always the grammatical or logical subject of καταργέω in Paul. Hübner, ‘καταργέω,’ 2.267.
benignly and naturally away. As I argued in Part One, Death in 1 Corinthians is neither a benign nor a natural occurrence; it is the consequence of enemy activity (15.26). Thus believers die (15.6), the Lord may even punitively inflict sickness or death upon them (11.30), but God does not destroy believers; ‘destruction’ awaits Death itself. Indeed, it is from eschatological destruction that believers shall be saved: ‘We are chastened in order not to be condemned with the world’ (11.32). Even with the excommunicated man (5.5) Paul turns him over to Satan, not to God, ‘for the destruction of his flesh’ (εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός). Whatever κοιλία and βρῶμα connote, the believer is not participant of their destruction.

Paul does not disclose the precise referents for κοιλία and βρῶμα. Some suggest Paul here makes an offhanded disclosure of personal eschatology: ‘we shall not eat in the Kingdom’. But it is by no means automatic that Paul and his mid-first-century Corinthians dissociated ‘eating’ from ‘the Kingdom’, envisioning a future, stomachless existence. Paul’s depiction of the believer’s eschatological ‘change’ (1 Cor 15.51-52) says nothing of the body’s future, material composition; it indicates only Death’s absence from the believer.

53 Thus contra, e.g., Countryman: ‘The whole of the existing body will die and, in that sense, be destroyed’; Gundry: ‘[Paul]…wants to indicate that by means of resurrection God will counteract the destruction of the stomach, which ipso facto entails the death of the body’. Contra also May’s unlikely proposal, which imagines unspoken propositions corresponding to the actual propositions of the verse. May’s strict mirror-reading produces a highly improbable dialogue, requires Paul to promote the body’s ‘destruction’, and anticipates that, unlike what/how one eats, what one does (generically) sexually in the κόσμοι somehow retains its effects in the re-ordered κόσμοι of the Kingdom. Countryman, Dirt, 203; Gundry, Sōma, 55; May, “Body”, 106-110.

54 Thus Thiselton takes κοιλία as ‘the digestive system’ rather than a location within the body’, reasoning: ‘The σῶμα is not to be equated with the κοιλία, but somatic life is absorbed and transformed in the resurrection of the σῶμα in such a way that continuity as well as change characterizes the relationship between the present σῶμα, i.e., present life in its totality, and the resurrection σῶμα, i.e., the transformation of the whole human self as part of the raised corporeity in Christ’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 463 (his italics). Certainly Paul presents believers as a ‘totality’, as a ‘whole human self’. Where we examine his portrayal of believers in relation to death, we observe he does not distinguish believers from their bodies; believers are bodies. But Paul’s ‘transformation’ language is insufficient to alter the common, concrete term σῶμα into the abstract ‘somatic life’ Thiselton and others propose. Paul says not enough about ‘transformation’ to dislodge σῶμα from its reference to the body of everyday experience.

55 As I noted in Chapter Three, perceptions of the afterlife were largely unsettled in Paul’s period, and it is by no means automatic that Paul refers casually to a stomachless, post-resurrection body. Traditions exist such as 2 Macc 14.46, which anticipate specifically τὰ ἐντερά in the resurrection (cf. ἡ γλώσσα and αἱ χεῖρες in 7.10-11), and the Jesus tradition itself suggests there will be drinking (Mark 14.25 par Matt 26.29), or both feasting and drinking (Luke 22.16, 18) in the Kingdom.

56 See Chapter Three, esp. pp. 119-21. Even without accepting my reading of 1 Cor15, it reads a great deal into Paul to claim that the body’s ‘transformation’ means that foods and digestive organs are not constituent of resurrected existence, but are amiably ‘part of the perishing creaturely world’. Behm
A better clue is perhaps chapters 8-10, where Paul repeats βρῶμα when he discusses eating idol meats\textsuperscript{57} – an activity indigenous to Others that believers sometimes practise by accident of persisting in the κόσμος. Such practices may be in certain respects ἀδιάφορα for believers,\textsuperscript{58} but Paul and they know that idolaters ruled now by foods and stomach will share Death’s fate along with All ‘in Adam’, being finally ‘destroyed’. In this case, the contrast is not between believers’ material bodies (requiring that κοιλία be synecdoche for σῶμα), which God implausibly ‘destroys’ then subsequently ‘resurrects’. It is instead between the fates of Others, ruled by their stomachs, and of believers, ruled by the Lord.\textsuperscript{59}

At all events, it is not Paul’s statements that progress his argument; as in v. 12 (cf. 7.1; 8.1, 7; 10.23; 14.34), Paul’s qualifications move his argument along. Thus what is centrally important is not ‘foods’ and ‘stomach’, but ‘body’ and ‘Lord’; it is not that God will destroy (καταργήσει), but that he will resurrect (ἐξεγειρεῖ).\textsuperscript{60} Even without knowing precisely what βρῶμα and κοιλία connote, we are still in good

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\item 1 Cor 8.8, 13; 10.3. Hurd: ‘It is as though Paul had used ahead of time one of the points he intended to make in connection with the problem of idol meat (1 Cor. 8-10)’. Chs 8-10 share other literary features with 6.12-20, including the similar phrasing of 6.12 and 10.23, and the imperative of 10.14, that resembles that of 6.18: ἔφυγετε τὴν πορνείαν. Sandnes proposes that references to ‘bells’ in the Graeco-Roman world evoke a topos signalling gluttony, an undue pursuit of pleasure and, from a Jewish perspective, paganism generally. Rosner connects festal activity both to idolatry and the presence of prostitutes. Hurd, \textit{Origin}, 88; Brian S. Rosner, ‘Temple Prostitution in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20,’ \textit{NovT} 40 (1998): 336-51; Sandnes, Belly.

\item Tomson specifies that Paul is not blasé about eating idol meats but that, as in Rabbinic halakha, the ‘intention’ (συνείδησις) toward idolatry determines the action’s appropriateness. Peter J. Tomson, \textit{Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles}, vol. 1, Section III, CRINT (Fortress, 1990), ch. 5, esp. 208-20.

\item Witherington remarks: ‘But if Paul adds “and God will destroy all,” his meaning is that “one who lives by and for his or her belly will ultimately be destroyed”’. Witherington III, \textit{Conflict}, 168.

\item Horsley observes that the contrast is sharpened between vv. 13 and 14 by the similar sounds of the main verbs. Horsley, \textit{1 Corinthians}, 91.
\end{itemize}
position to affirm with Fee that ‘The matter of food…is no issue here at all’. Rather, it sets up the issue of the body and the Lord.

πορνεία, the Body, and the Lord (6.13b-14)

Paul’s qualification of ‘foods and stomach’ introduces the terms central to his subsequent appeal from pathos: σῶμα, ὁ κύριος, πορνεία. The statement and the qualification each repeat once, transposed, before each concludes with divine, eschatological action. The reversed qualification provides an exegetical clue that the negative phrase, οὐ τῇ πορνείᾳ, is not what defines the argument. πορνεία occurs importantly ahead of τῷ κυρίῳ in the initial qualification, but it does not recur in the reversal. Removing πορνεία leaves intact two sets of corresponding terms, revealing the absence of any terms that correspond to it. Thus πορνεία is isolated to the qualification; it qualifies the qualification.

τὰ βρώματα τῇ κοιλίᾳ τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοῖς βρώμασιν καὶ ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι

迢 δὲ θεός καὶ ταῦτην καὶ ταῦτα καταργήσει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξεγειρεῖ

v. 14 τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοῖς βρώμασιν καὶ ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι

Without πορνεία, the remaining terms correspond evenly. Importantly ‘foods’, not ‘stomach’, opposes ‘body’; ‘stomach’ opposes ‘the Lord’. God both ‘destroys’ (renders ineffective) the stomach and ‘raises’ the (believer-as-)σῶμα, but it does not follow that κοιλία necessarily represents the believer, that is, that κοιλία is necessarily synecdoche for the believer’s σῶμα. Looking to his qualifications, what Paul emphasizes by repetition is the pairing between the (believer-as-)body (σῶμα,
ἡμᾶς) and the Lord. But although reference to ‘the body for the Lord’ seems clear enough, it ‘is not so easy’⁶⁵ to explain its transposition, ‘the Lord for the body’.

Horsley dubs this transposition ‘awkward’,⁶⁶ and Murphy-O’Connor complains of interpretations that ‘must be classified as unintelligibly pretentious, or ingeniously imaginative, or intolerably pious’.⁶⁷ Murphy-O’Connor reasons that the only adequate explanation for this unique phrase in Paul is its formal function to balance its corresponding parallel, which must be, ipso facto, a ‘Corinthian slogan’.⁶⁸ But without any markers indicating a slogan of any sort, it is worth reflecting on the transposition as it presents itself to us. And taking the pair with Paul’s subsequent argument suggests that the transposition is not passively a formal function of its corresponding parallel, but that it actively supplies Paul’s pathos by portraying the believer and the Lord as intimately, inextricably bound.

The transposition of subject and object in the elliptical phrases⁶⁹ may signal that we are to consider these terms together rather than individually. The datives support this, reading better as ‘possession’ than ‘advantage’.⁷⁰ They thus stress mutually each term within the set as ‘the object possessed’.⁷¹ Foods and stomach

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⁶⁵ Fee, First Epistle, 256.
⁶⁶ Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 91.
⁶⁷ Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Slogans,’ 394-95.
⁶⁸ Murphy-O’Connor, ‘Slogans,’ 395. Murphy-O’Connor observes the ‘uniqueness’ of ‘the body for the Lord’ in the Pauline corpus, but he does not supply examples for the metathetical ‘slogan’.
⁷⁰ Wallace takes 6.13a as advantage: ‘food is for the benefit of the stomach’. Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament with Scripture, Subject, and Greek Word Indexes, 4th rev. ed. (Zondervan, 1996), 144. But the reverse makes little sense: how do foods ‘benefit’ from the stomach? Likewise, how is the believer’s body advantageous for the Lord?
⁷¹ BDF §189. Schrage senses conjugal connotations: ‘Angesichts der ehelichen Konnotationen auch im Verhältnis Kyrios/Christ (κολλᾶσθαι, ἕν) hatman auf Cant 2,16 verwiesen („Mein Geliebter ist mein und ich bin sein”), wo im Hebräischen (ָָּ) wie in der LXX ebenfalls der Dativ steht: ἄδειλωὶς μο ἐμοί, κἀγὼ αὐτῷ. Cf. Rosner: ‘Language characteristic of a marriage union also appears in verse 13, where Paul says that the body is meant for the Lord and vice versa’. Schrage, Korinther, 2.24, n. 311; Rosner, Paul, 132. The imagery need not be nuptial, however; it simply emphasizes the tight relationship between the terms. Thus ‘Food and the stomach can only fulfill their respective roles when they do so in relation to one another. Similarly, the body is only itself when it acts in accord with its relationship to Christ, and Christ is Lord in so far as he is present as Lord for those who belong to him’. Furnish, First Letter, 58. Cf. Kirchhoff, Sünde, 124-25. But the tight relationship between ‘foods’ and ‘stomach’ may less signal the body’s natural processes than it does those processes’ identification with idolatry.
therefore form a set, belonging intimately together, as do the (believer-as-)body and the Lord. Just as foods-and-stomach is somehow bound for eschatological destruction (καταργέω), so body-and-Lord participates in eschatological resurrection (cf. 15.20, 23), *escaping* Death’s destruction (καταργέω – 15.26). The intimacy between (believers-as-)bodies and the Lord implied by this transposition anticipates Paul’s *pathos* to follow: believers are Christ-members (v. 15), they and the Lord are intimately ‘stuck’ together (v. 17), the Spirit locates ‘in’ the believer-as-body (v. 19), believers are not autonomous – they are not their own (v. 19; v. 18, ironically); believers are the Lord’s (v. 13).72

In 6.14, ἡμᾶς stands for σῶμα – an observation Weiß long ago reasoned signals that σῶμα stands for the ‘Persönlichkeit’.73 Gundry argues rightly against this equivalence that ‘The three appearances of σῶμα before and after verse 14 should determine the nuance of the pronoun “us” rather than vice versa’,74 but he concludes wrongly that this *ipso facto* requires some form of dualism (or ‘duality’) in Paul. The mistake of the Persönlichkeit hypothesis was not the conclusion that in Paul ‘man does not *have* a soma; he *is* soma’;75 my investigation of Paul’s portrayal of the believer at death confirms precisely this conclusion. The mistake was assuming that any conception of the whole person must therefore primarily be *immaterial*, such that σῶμα loses its regular association with the perceptible, lived-in body and stands instead for the ‘personality’. σῶμα throughout this passage represents truly the ‘whole person’, but the ‘whole person’ as a *material* body. Paul gives no other category of existence. It is the believer as body that shall be raised, not destroyed, and the believer as body that is, very materially, ‘ἡμᾶς’.76

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74 Gundry, *Sōma*, 60.

75 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.194.

76 Godet observes of ἡμᾶς: ‘It is remarkable that Paul here places himself in the number of those who *shall rise* again, as elsewhere he ranks himself with those who shall be changed at Christ’s coming again’. Schnell launches from this observation to propose that 6.14 is a later interpolation, claiming that v. 14 interrupts the train of thought: ‘Ein durchgehender Gedankengang ergibt sich hingegen, wenn man V. 14 als eine nachpaulinische Glosse anseh’. But it is the *absence* of v. 14 that would interrupt Paul’s dialogue: v. 14 is structurally necessary to balance and qualify v. 13. Murphy-O’Connor notes further that Schnelle gives no motivation for the supposed interpolation; it serves no
Often overlooked here is that the focus of Paul’s argument here and throughout is not the *prospect* that God shall resurrect ἡμᾶς at τὸ τέλος; it is that believers belong intimately, bodily to the Lord now. Thus Byrne goes slightly askew to suggest that ‘the eschatology of the resurrection of the body, with the resurrection of the Lord as both model and pledge, leads to the possibility that bodily activity here and now can and should glorify God’.77 Likewise, Rosner appeals to the wrong sort of parallels when he points to Second Temple writings that present the body’s future as informing present behaviours.78 And Hays wrongly concludes: ‘If we could learn to think of our bodies as bodies with a future, we might be more careful about what we do with them now’.79 For although such a notion may helpfully correct existentialist readings of ethics in Paul,80 Paul does not here use the future resurrection as an incentive to right action. Paul focuses here and throughout this argument on the believer’s *present*, not *future* association with the Lord. It is the logic of the believer’s union with the Lord now, *not yet*, that controls v. 14’s reference to the resurrection.81

78 ‘The notion in these verses that the prospect of the future resurrection carries a demand for moral behaviour in the present is also a Biblical idea with a history of development’. Rosner, *Paul*, 130. Rosner gives as examples 2 Macc 7.9, 14; 2 Bar 50-51; 2 Esd; *TJud* 25.1-4; *TBen* 10.6-9; *TZeb* 10.4; *1QH* 6.29-34.
80 Thus Thiselton’s declaration that ‘Christians must strive to be now what they are to become’ intentionally counters Bultmann’s ‘become what thou art’. Bultmann, *Theology*; Thiselton, ‘Realized,’ 517.
81 It is worth pausing to speculate on the distinctive textual variants for this verse preserved in p46. As Comfort and Barrett describe: ἐξεγερεῖ was changed to ἐξηγερεῖ (probably by a different scribe) by deleting ι with slash through the letter; then that was changed to ἐξηγείρεν (probably by yet another scribe) by adding η and ι superlinearly and changing the final ι to η’. Philip W. Comfort and David P. Barrett, eds., *The Text of the Earliest New Testament Greek Manuscripts*, Corrected, Enlarged of *The Complete Text of the Earliest New Testament Manuscripts* ed. (Tyndale, 2001), 259, n.a. Metzger observes, rightly, that ‘The context makes the future necessary as the correlative of καταργήσει in ver. 13’. Metzger dismisses the aorist as ‘a mechanical repetition of the preceding tense’, and the present as ‘a slip of the pen’. Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament: A Companion Volume to the United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament* (Fourth Revised Edition), 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: UBS, 1994), 552. Manuscript evidence for all three tenses are divided fairly evenly; I add against the aorist that it can also be explained by conformity with Deutero-Pauline resurrection theology (e.g., Eph 2.6). The present is the most difficult reading and, given its occurrences also in p11, A, D*, P, 69, 88, 1241 (as well as the original p46), it is worth considering more fully. I agree with Metzger that the context demands a future *sense*, but not necessarily a future *tense*. It is in fact possible that Paul originally wrote a *futuristic present* here, stressing the *certainty* of the future resurrection on account of the believer’s *present* bond with Christ. This not only fits the context of
Chapter Five

The Appeal from Pathos (6.15-20)

Overview

Paul transitions suddenly to his appeal from pathos without grammatical connections to what precedes. In 6.12-14, Paul appeals from ethos in order to temper notions of autonomous liberty. In 6.15-20, Paul introduces a diatribe consisting of three οὐκ οἴδατε clauses that each underscores intimate, bodily connections. In the first (6.15), Paul identifies believers intimately with Christ, calling them ‘Christ-members’. In his final use of the first person, Paul asks pathetically whether the Corinthians suggest he should snatch away (ἄρας) Christ-members and stick them with a πόρνη. μὴ γένοιτο, he responds. Paul grounds his second clause (6.16-18) on human sexual intimacy, pointing out that the ignoble union between a believer and a πόρνη does not exclude Christ with whom the believer is ‘one Spirit’. Paul accuses believers who commit πορνεία (‘ὁ πορνεύων’) as committing it εἰς τὸ ἵδιον σῶμα meaning, through irony, εἰς the body belonging to the Lord. The final clause (6.19-20a) appeals to the believer’s intimate experience of the Spirit. Believers are God’s temple, and the Holy Spirit is proof-of-purchase that believers are not their own. Paul concludes with a second irony: consequently (δὴ), glorify God with (ironically) ‘your’ body. In other words: render unto God what is God’s.

Paul’s emphasis on the present in 1 Cor 6.12-20, but possibly also conforms to Paul’s usage in 2 Cor 5.1 where he speaks of the resurrection body as a building we have (Ἐκομήν). Of course, not all interpreters treat Paul’s use of Ἐκομὴν in 2 Cor 5.1 as a futuristic present, but those who do include P. E.-B Allo, Saint Paul Seconde Épitre aux Corinthiens, EBib (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1937), 121; Jean Héring, The Second Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A.W. Heathcote and P.J. Allcock (The Epworth Press, 1962), 47; Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Eerdmans, 1962), 163, n. 19; Jung Hoon Kim, The Significance of Clothing Imagery in the Pauline Corpus, JSNTSup 268 (T&T Clark, 2004), 212, n. 54; Jan Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, SP 8 (The Liturgical Press, 1999), 82; Frank J. Matera, II Corinthians: A Commentary, NTL (Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 120. Otherwise, see Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Eerdmans, 2005), 78; Margaret E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, vol. 1: Introduction and Commentary on II Corinthians I-VII, ICC (T&T Clark, 1994), 368-69. On the futuristic present, see BDF §323. I wish to thank Dr Charles Horton, chief curator, Chester Beatty Library, Dublin, for allowing me to examine first-hand 1 Cor 6.14 in p46.

82 The Latin F and G add the transitional ŵ, corresponding to the ŵ in their versions of vv. 16 and 19. Senft remarks that this is a ‘Nouvel argument, qui complète le précédent: l’appartenance au Christ est exclusive de toute autre’. Similarly, Horsley contends ‘Verse 13c thus states the point that verses 15-17 develop and explain, with verse 15 as an explanation of verse 13c and verses 16-17 as an explanation of verse 15’. Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 91; Senft, Première Épitre, 83.
Paul asks whether believers know they, as bodies, are μέλη Χριστοῦ. The genitive construction could imply possession, as it likely does for the Spirit in v. 19, thus: ‘Christ’s members’. But the repeated point of Paul’s argument – incidentally, different from 1 Corinthians 12 – is the intractable bond between Christ and the believer(-as-body).83 Given the intimacy implied between (believers-as-)bodies and both the Lord in v. 14 and the πόρνη in v. 16, as well as the ‘oneness’ that binds Christ and believers in v. 17, the genitive may better be regarded as of quality, emphasizing the tight connection between believers and Christ.84 Thus expecting his audience to echo his μὴ γένοιτο,85 Paul asks whether they think he ought to snatch away ‘Christ-members’ and join them (unthinkably) to a πόρνη.

It is unlikely we can settle definitely whether the πόρνη here is a rhetorical, hypothetical woman86 – a ‘representative of the cosmos’87 – or whether she stands for real brothel prostitutes,88 temple prostitutes,89 or the step-mother of 5.1.90 Hayes

83 In 1 Cor 12.12-26, Paul addresses the community collectively as the σῶμα Χριστοῦ not, as here, individually a μέλη Χριστοῦ. Paul in 1 Cor 12 identifies believers individually as a μέλη uniting together with other ‘members’; here, the focus is the believer’s bodily union with Christ. So also Fee, First Epistle, 258. Contra, e.g., Kempthorne, ‘Incest,’ 570-72; Bruce J. Malina and John J. Pilch, Social-Science Commentary on the Letters of Paul (Fortress, 2006), 84. I agree with Mitchell’s overall thesis that Paul throughout 1 Corinthians attempts to redirect the Corinthians’ focus from autonomy to community. 1 Cor 6 is certainly a fundamental step in that programme, but here Paul first breaks the believer’s autonomy by noting that any activity necessarily affects Christ. Paul later expands that position so the believer will act for what is advantageous for the community. Mitchell, Rhetoric.

84 BDF §165 notes that this genitive favours combinations with σῶμα. See further on Paul’s uses of the genitive of quality James H. Moulton and Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. 4: Style (T&T Clark, 1976), 90.


86 Craig, ‘First Epistle,’ 73; Hurd, Origen, 86, 164; Meeks, First, 129; Yarbrough, Not Like the Gentiles: Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul, 91, n. 9; 97: ‘his argument was a reductio ad absurdum’.

87 Martin, Corinthian, 176. So also Garland, 1 Corinthians, 232-33. Héring sees Aphrodite behind the πόρνη; ‘the shadow of the goddess of carnal love’. Héring, First Epistle, 46.

88 Fee, First Epistle, 258, n. 39; Fisk, ‘ΤΙΟΠΝΕΥΕΙΝ,’ 540-58; Antoinette Clark Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric (Fortress, 1995), 75-76. I find Mitchell’s reasoning on this point a hard sell. It is one thing to speculate that (some) Corinthian men practised sex with prostitutes because these men regarded their bodies out of the sphere of salvation, or even that they regarded sex with a prostitute a harmless indifference – so Theo K. Heckle, ‘Body and Soul in Saint Paul,’ in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed. John P. Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2000), 122. But despite how legitimate and commonplace an activity sex with prostitutes was, it is difficult to imagine these men promoting the activity as somehow ‘in their best interests’. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 36. Paul’s appeal from pathos in fact aims to shame the Corinthian men, implying that they do not regard the activity as ‘advantageous’, either.
identifies the πόρνη simply as a ‘sexually immoral woman’, Gaca as a woman religiously promiscuous, and Glancy reflects on the social reality that most πόρναι were slaves with no say over their sexual activity. Whomever she might ‘really’ be, however, Paul’s use of the diatribe licenses us to proceed with his argument as if she is a rhetorical construct. And even without knowing her precise social identity, it is

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90 J.H. Bernard, ‘The Connexion between the Fifth and Sixth Chapters of 1 Corinthians,’ *The Expositor* 7 (1907): 433-43; Deming, ‘Unity,’ 289-312; Furnish, *First Letter*, 56 (‘it is possible’); Goulder, ‘Libertines?’, 334-48; Kempthorne, ‘Incest,’ 568-74; Malina and Pilch, *Commentary*, 84. These theses laudably attempt to make sense especially of how Paul’s condemnation of litigations matches with his references to πορνεία. But not only are these theories wildly speculative, they also miss that πορνεία is not the thread common to 1 Cor 5-6; as Mitchell shows, it is the believer’s relation to ‘outsiders’. Cf. Mitchell, *Rhetoric*, 112. For critiques of the incest theory, see Garland, *1 Corinthians*, commentary on 1 Cor 5; Rosner, ‘Temple,’ esp. 338-41.


92 ‘The determining factor of a woman’s harlotry or whoredom in the biblical sense is not that she is sexually promiscuous, let alone that she is employed at a brothel, but that she is religiously promiscuous in her sexual, reproductive, and other ritual behavior, for she worships gods other than or in addition to the Lord…Biblical harlots fit into two types. Whores of the first type, religiously alien women, are πόρναι insofar as male members of the people spiritually “fornicate” (πορεύειν) against God with them through religiously mixed marriage or other rituals…Biblical harlots of the second type are women among God’s people who act as rebellious insiders. They are harlots (πόρναι) because they fornicate (πορευέσθαι) against God through their sexual or nonsexual religious rites’ Kathy L. Gaca, *The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity*, *Hellenistic Culture & Society* 40 (University of California Press, 2003), 165, 166. But Gaca both misreads the prophetic metaphors and illegitimately applies metaphorical language to social realities (cf. my criticism of Rosner, above). Indeed, Gaca effectively reverses the prophetic metaphors. In the prophets, the πόρνη was an insider, she being an expression of adulterous Israel the prophets were attempting to shame into fidelity. It is only in some Second Temple literature, not in the Septuagint Pentateuch to which Gaca restricts her study, that the πόρνη begins to stand for an ‘outsider’. Thus many of Gaca’s prooftexts include no reference at all to a πόρνη.

93 Jennifer A. Glancy, ‘Obstacles to Slaves’ Participation in the Corinthian Church,’ *JBL* 117 (1998): 481-501; Jennifer A. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity* (OUP, 2002), 65-67. Noting that ‘most cross-class urban groups would include some prostitutes’ and that enslaved prostitutes have no say over their occupation, Glancy observes: ‘The scholarly consensus that Paul understood membership in the Christian body to be incompatible with prostitution thus has unrecognized implications for understanding the difficulties that slaves would face in joining the church’. Glancy, *Slavery*, 66.
clear Paul presents her as a woman out of bounds to the men of his community. She is in effect a Strange Woman, an Other implicitly τοῦ κόσμου.94

Paul asks whether the Corinthians would have him ‘snatch away’95 a Christ-member to join with a πόρνη-member. His imagery is vivid. Kempthorne links ἄρας with texts involving forcible removal or expulsion;96 Allo remarks: ‘il entraîne une certain idée de violence’97 – a violence that points to Christ’s ‘odious abduction’. The genitive of quality removes any third-person distance from the actor so that the ‘member’ is now attributive of Christ, thereby forcing Christ to participate unwillingly in the ‘member’s’ πορνεία. Martin paints the imagery as ‘Christ’s “member” entering the body of the prostitute’,99 but the violence of ἄρας suggests the reverse: it is the πόρνη-member that penetrates Christ.100 Paul does not suggest πορνεία adversely affects the believer; permitting himself All things, the believer causes Christ to be ‘mastered’ by Something.101

The logic underlying Paul’s appeal here assumes what Schweitzer calls a naturhaften or ‘quasi-physical’ union between believers and Christ.102 What the

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94 May draws a similar conclusion: ‘Whether the πόρνη specifically relates to prostitution, or includes other sexual offences, a πόρνη is by definition an outsider’. He continues: ‘If πόρνη can be applied to any outside woman, then Paul is (at least implicitly) rejecting believers having sex with any outsider’. May, “Body”, 134. As my last chapter shows, Second Temple usage of πορν- supports May’s thesis.

95 I here read ἄρας with NA27, following p46 κ A B C D K L 33 1739, Latin, Syriac, etc. Héring follows F G P Ψ 81 104 pc to adopt ἄρα οὖν. Fee suggests the change to ἄρα οὖν is ‘probably due to the frequency of this combination in Romans’. Fee, First Epistle, 249, n. 3; Héring, First Epistle, 43.


97 Allo, Première, 145.

98 Godet, First, 1.308. Thiselton notes the translation of ἄρας into Latin: rapio – a graphic illustration on account of the term’s etymological tie to the English word, ‘rape’. Thiselton, First Epistle, 465.

99 Martin, Corinthian, 176.

100 In Graeco-Roman terms, the imagery puts Christ in the passive, ‘feminine’ position of the penetrated rather than the active, ‘masculine’ position of the penetrator. Thus it is not that ‘the man’s penetration of the prostitute makes Christ a penetrator of the prostitute also’, but that the man’s penetration of the prostitute makes Christ penetrated by the prostitute also. Martin, Corinthian, 177.

101 It is not the case that ‘the man who had intercourse with a prostitute was not unchanged by that act’. Countryman, Dirt, 204. Paul lists no adverse affects for the man; the only injured party is Christ.

believer does as σῶμα now necessarily includes Christ. Paul’s logic seems strange but, contra Gundry, that is no reason to invalidate it. The author of Ephesians failed to make sense of the ‘one flesh’ between spouses (Eph 5.32) and, using logic Gundry must find equally unsatisfactory, Epictetus speaks of humans bearing part of God within them so that God is participant in every human activity. May usefully counters Gundry’s objections, chiefly with the observation that it is the believer’s present, not eschatological, body with which Christ through the Spirit unites.

Paul’s first οὐκ οἴδατε clause makes the point that believers as bodies are not autonomous. Believers and the Lord are mutually ‘for’ one another so that the believer cannot act alone: whatever the believer does as body now necessarily involves Christ. All things may be permitted, but Some things are no longer advantageous and harm, if not the believer himself, then the believer’s Lord. Paul reinforces this point twice more in the following οὐκ οἴδατε clauses, concluding with the consequent command: ‘Glorify God in your body!’

The Second οὐκ οἴδατε (6.16-18)

The second οὐκ οἴδατε clause reinforces that believers as bodies are united already with the Lord. Paul speaks of ‘binding’ to a πόρνη, using the participle κολλώμενος that resembles the προσκολληθήεσται of Genesis 2.24. Miller has

103 ‘Everyone agrees so readily with Paul’s conclusion (Christians should not commit sexual immorality) that it is easy to miss how strange the logic behind it is for us and how natural to Paul’. E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Fortress, 1977), 455.

104 Gundry: ‘what could be the nature of a union between the physical bodies of Christ and of believers? A satisfactory answer seems lacking’. Gundry, Sōma, 61.

105 Importantly, Epictetus’s logic depends on Stoic pantheism and an understanding of ‘God’ as universal reason, which is significantly different from Paul’s argument. Epictetus: ‘You are a fragment of God (οὖς απόστασην αἳ); you have within you a part of him (ἐν σεαυτῷ μέρος ἐκείνου)...Will you not bear in mind, whenever you eat, who you are that eat, and whom you are nourishing? Whenever you indulge in intercourse with women (συνουσίᾳ χρῆ)...Will you not know that you are nourishing God, exercising God? You are bearing God about with you, you poor wretch, and know it not...It is within yourself that you bear, and do not perceive that you are defiling Him with impure thoughts and filthy. Yet in the presence of even an image of God you would not dare to do anything of the things you are now doing. But when God Himself is present in you, seeing and hearing everything, are you not ashamed to be thinking and doing such things as these, O insensible of your own nature, and object of God’s wrath!’ Diss. 2.8.9-14. Cf. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 112, n. 39; Deming, ‘Unity,’ 305; Robertson and Plummer, 1 Corinthians, 128. Héring makes a salient point: ‘What Stoicism has to say about God dwelling in the interior of the soul…is still farther away from Christian thought. For the Stoic is thinking of a natural kinship between human reason and God’. Héring, First Epistle, 47.

convincing few that Paul’s removal of the prefix, προσ-, signals Paul means
‘adhesion, rather than intercourse’. Fee, Kirchoff, and Rosner all supply examples
of the non-compounded form used in sexual contexts. Porter argues that κολλώμενος includes also an economic sense of ‘selling oneself into bondage or
incurring an obligation’ (cf. Luke 15.15). Attending to Glancy’s observation
that most πόρναι were slaves adds a possible dimension to Porter’s claim: Christ is then not only ‘snatched away’ and unwillingly ‘penetrated’ but, as though a πόρνος himself, is sold out to the πόρνη as he becomes with her ἐν σῶμα.

Paul anchors his imagery in a citation from Genesis 2.24. Heil notes Paul’s introductory ‘γάρ, φησίν’ expresses not writing but speaking, thus giving ‘voice to a
fundamental, universal authority about the reality of human marriage that holds even if this “saying” were not “written” in the scriptures’. The citation reinforces the believer’s intimacy with Christ by alluding to a nuptial union. The citation also
shifts Paul’s language from σῶμα to σάρξ, though Paul uses σάρξ here in its neutral sense that overlaps with σῶμα. Paul simply cites his source for, had he wanted to

111 Paul here follows the LXX by including οἱ δύο, absent from the MT. Fee notes that οἱ δύο occurs also in the Samaritan Pentateuch and the Targum of Jonathan, and cf. Mark 10.8, Matt 19.5, Eph 5.31. Fee, *First Epistle*, 259, n. 48. Cf. Stanley: ‘Apart from the intrusion of the introductory formula γάρ φησίν into the middle of the citation, which occurs only here in the Pauline corpus, the quotation in 1 Cor 6.6 follows the unanimous wording of the LXX tradition for Gen 2.24’. Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature*, *SNTSMS 74* (CUP, 1992), 195.
114 So also Gundry: ‘Although the pejorative connotation of “flesh” elsewhere may suit the general topic of immorality under discussion in 1 Corinthians 6, the specific use of flesh in the quotation and in its parallelism with σῶμα is not derogatory. In other words, only insofar as the context has to do with an illicit sexual union does a bad connotation adhere; this is not an instance of the type where “flesh” as such denotes man as weak, transitory, and even evil’. Gundry, *Sōma*, 62. *Contra* Boyarin: ‘Paul thus distinguishes between the flesh and the body. The flesh, i.e., sexuality, has been dispensed with in the Christian dispensation, precisely in order to spiritualize the body’. Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (University of California Press, 1994), 172. Boyarin
introduce σάρξ’s pejorative sense into the conversation, he ought to have claimed that those ‘binding’ to a πόρνη become with her ἐν σάρξ rather than, as he does say, ἐν σῶμα. But σάρξ does serve to move Paul’s argument along, facilitating his transition to the (ἀγά) πνεῦμα in vv. 17, 19.

Paul’s introduction of πνεῦμα sets ‘l’opposition familière’ in 1 Corinthians. Hays remarks: ‘Those who are in Christ have been united with him in a relationship of intimate union (“one spirit with him,” v. 17) that is analogous to – but even deeper than – sexual union’. As Paul expounds in v. 19, the πνεῦμα explains how believers are ‘one’ with Christ: they share the same πνεῦμα. Verse 19 also further explains Paul’s comments on v. 18.

Interpreters dispute vigorously over 1 Corinthians 6.18. Among the greatest problems is that Paul apparently privileges πορνεία a unique body violation so that ‘Many readers will ask: Has he forgotten gluttony, drunkenness, suicide?’ Fisk helpfully sketches the prevalent positions before concluding that Paul, with Jewish wisdom literature, ‘declares sexual sin to be profoundly (and even uniquely) self-destructive’. I offer a distinctive reading of v. 18 based, in part, on my contention that 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 is not in fact about πορνεία, but that πορνεία serves simply as an exemplum to Paul’s thesis that believers are bodies that belong bodily already to the Lord. Thus Fisk (and others), reading this argument as principally about πορνεία, concludes that the climax of Paul’s argument is Paul’s v. 18 imperative: φεύγετε τὴν πορνεία. I contest that climax as premature, leaving a too

115 Wiener, ‘Notes,’ 91. But it is not quite that ‘The flesh/spirit dualism operative in the argument in 1:18-4:21 is here employed to differentiate the quality of spiritual associations with the Lord from “fleshy” associations’. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 234, n. 73. πνεῦμα, rather, introduces the means by which believers are now ‘one’ with the Lord.

116 Hays, First Corinthians, 104. Horsley remarks: ‘There I an implied continuity of identity between the “bodies” who are members of Christ in verse 15 and the person(s) united to the Lord who become one “spirit” with him’. Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 92.

117 Martin: ‘The man’s body and Christ’s body share the same pneuma; the man’s body is therefore an appendage of Christ’s body, totally dependent on the pneumatic life-force of the larger body for its existence’. Cf. Fee: ‘the Spirit is responsible for our being “in Christ”’. Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Hendrickson, 1994), 134; Martin, Corinthian, 176.

118 Héring, First Epistle, 46.

long denouement in Paul’s third ὀκ σώματε and his final imperative that concludes the entire argument. Further, it overlooks that πορνεία is isolated only to this section of Paul’s argument whereas the believer’s bodily intimacy with the Lord features throughout.

Exhorting believers to φεύγετε τὴν πορνεία, Paul sets up a contrast between ‘all [πᾶν] sins’ and πορνεία.\(^{120}\) All sins are committed ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός; only the one committing πορνεία (πορνεύων) sins εἰς τὸ ἱδίον σῶμα. Fisk rejects the regular sense of εἰς as ‘into’ based on ‘the idiomatic force of ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς’ that suggests ‘against’.\(^{121}\) But the basic semantic unit is the sentence, and in this sentence – unlike the uses Fisk surveys – Paul explicitly sets εἰς opposite ἐκτὸς.\(^{122}\) Wiéner observes the pair is the third set of contrasts: Christ-member and πόρνη-member; one body/flesh with a πόρνη and one Spirit with the Lord; sins ἐκτὸς the body and εἰς one’s own body.\(^{123}\) Paul’s imagery retains its graphic realism so that the one committing πορνεία sins into his own body, Christ being penetrated by the πόρνη. For here is the irony: the body is not the believer’s ‘own’ at all.

Paul’s point in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 is not about πορνεία, it is about settling to whom the believer as body belongs. Paul has throughout his argument examined the believer’s inextricable bond with the Lord. Believers as bodies and the Lord are mutually for one another; believers as bodies are Christ-members, making impossible the believer’s autonomous activity; believers as bodies and Christ share a nuptial-like ‘oneness’. Paul’s statement that the man sins into ‘his own’ body is ironic. Everything that Paul has argued for to this point and all of his arguments to come

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120 Johnston remarks that ‘Attempts to mitigate the absolute force of πᾶν ἁμάρτημα δ ἐὰν πούῃ ἀνθρώπος through rhetorical or logical means and attempts to speak of kind of sin in this passage do not do justice to the ordinary semantics of anarthrous count nouns modified by πᾶς’. J. William Johnston, *The Use of πᾶς in the New Testament*, ed. D.A. Carson, *Studies in Biblical Greek 11* (Peter Lang, 2004), 156. Johnston sees this as evidence the statement is a Corinthian slogan. I resist reading a slogan here for the same reasons I did so above. Cf. Garland: ‘6:18a is not a Corinthian slogan because there are no markers to signal that. Further, the de is not contrastive but expresses an exception (unlike the alla in v 12). Finally, if it were a slogan then the refutation in 6:18b wouldn’t be adequate’. Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 236.

121 Fisk, ‘ΤΙΟΠΝΕΥΕΙΝ,’ 547; cf. 545-47, esp. n. 11.

122 Fisk briefly addresses this, though does not answer it satisfactorily when he says: ‘But the dynamic nature of language is such that precise lexical antonyms are not always available or necessary’. Fisk, ‘ΤΙΟΠΝΕΥΕΙΝ,’ 546. Martin adds that ‘Even when it is translated “against” (as in “the soldiers came against the city”), it tends to retain its connotations of penetration and invasion’. Martin, *Corinthian*, 178.

123 Wiéner, ‘Notes,’ 91.
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contest that believers are ‘their own’ bodies; the point of this entire passage is precisely the reverse: ‘you are not your own’ (v. 19). The man who commits πορνεία does not sin ‘into’ (or ‘against’) himself, but into (or against) the Lord.

Significantly, Paul never threatens the believer that committing πορνεία ruptures union with the Lord.124 Paul’s argument is pathetic, a means to shame his audience. The believer suffers no ill effects for his πορνεία; every disadvantage suffered is suffered only by Christ. Paul’s real stab in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 is not at practices of πορνεία but at Corinthian claims to autonomy. Paul’s point, repeated at every section of his argument, is that believer as bodies belong already to Christ. Paul’s remarks on πορνεία – whether referring to actual or hypothetical occurrences – are incidental to that claim. Consequently, Paul concludes his diatribe with a third οὐκ οἴδατε clause that says nothing at all about πορνεία but that underscores again that believers are not their own but have been redeemed as bodies already for the Lord. They ought therefore, Paul concludes, to glorify God with their bodies.

The Final οὐκ οἴδατε (6.19-20a)

Paul concludes his argument by reversing the ethos of vv. 12-14. There, Paul’s emphatic ἐγὼ underscored his example; here, Paul stresses the second person, setting the burden for appropriate behaviour squarely on the believers he addresses. In this final section Paul also reverses, finally, the presupposition that All things are permitted me, making patent the point of his entire argument: You are not your own!125 But first, Paul picks up on the πνεῦμα he introduced in v. 17.

Paul’s final rhetorical question is whether these believers know ‘your body’ is the temple of the ἅγιον πνεῦματός. Many identify σῶμα here with the social body, reasoning: ‘“Your” is plural, hence the social body’.126 But even a cursory glance at wider usage shows σῶμα occurs regularly in the singular with plural modifiers when context demands multiple bodies.127 Although Paul earlier used the imagery of the

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124 It is a commonplace amongst interpreters to read into Paul that πορνεία severs ties with Christ, but Paul never once says this. Thus contra, e.g., Garland: ‘In the context, sex with a prostitute severs the union with Christ and sabotages its resurrection destiny’. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 238.

125 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 113; Mitchell, Rhetoric, 120, n. 339.

126 Malina and Pilch, Commentary, 84.

127 E.g., Matt 6.25; Rom 6.12; 8.24; 1 Cor 15.35; 2 Cor 4.10; 5.6; Phil 3.21; Heb 10.22; 13.3; Num 8.7; Ezek 1.11, 23; Dan 1.15; 3.94; Sir 7.24; 3 Macc 2.29; 4 Macc 10.20; Josephus, Ant. 4.134, 291; 6.3,71; 12.105.
temple to identify believers corporately (3.16-17), ‘Here he dramatically transfers his metaphor to the individual’. As with Paul’s earlier imagery that emphasized the close bond between individual believers and Christ, Paul uses imagery of the Temple to locate in individual believers God’s divine presence through the Holy Spirit, thus revealing what ‘binds’ believers and the Lord. And, Paul reminds them, what ‘binds’ them they only have from God, reinforcing Paul’s focus that it is onto God, not the community, that Paul redirects Corinthian autonomy.

The nub of Paul’s argument is his declaration that ‘you are not your own’. It is to this point Paul has moved since his opening words in v. 12, combating Corinthian claims to autonomy. Believers as bodies are not their own; they are already ‘owned’. Paul uses language for purchasing slaves to end, finally, any Corinthian notion of autonomy. Believers as bodies are the Lord’s bodies, leading to Paul’s self-evident exhortation: therefore ( δ), glorify God in your bodies. Thus Mitchell gets ahead of herself: ‘The ethical implication of this principle is that one must make decisions on the basis of the entire church community, for Paul the μέλη...’


130 ‘God’s Spirit (pneuma), which is the only force that creates the new spiritual (pneumatikos) body, already dwells in Christians now (Rom 8:9-11:23). This pneumatological statement presents an interesting piece of realized eschatology – in spite of all the emphasis on the future aspect of resurrection, the external force that will resurrect us is already in us’. Peter Lampe, ‘Paul’s Concept of a Spiritual Body,’ in Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert Russell, and Michael Welker (Eerdmans, 2002), 109 (his italics).

131 ‘La relative que vous tenez de Dieu, loin d’être décorative, rappelle opportunément aux spiritualistes qu’avoir l’Esprit n’est pas glorieuse autonomie, mais obligation qui a pour conséquence la responsabilité de l’homme devant Dieu. C’est ce que les derniers mots du v. expriment clairement’. Senft, Première Épître, 85 (his italics).

132 Martin explains, ‘Agorazein refers not to the sale of a slave to a god by which the slave is actually freed, but to the ordinary sale of a slave by one owner to another owner. Therefore, when Christ buys a person, the salvific element of the metaphor is not in the movement from slavery to freedom but in the movement from a lower level of slavery (as the slave of just anybody or the slave of sin) to a higher level of slavery (as the slave of Christ)’. As Yoder puts it: ‘Redemption is a change of masters, and the New Testament use of this term is one of the strongest statements of the truth that the concern of God in atonement is our obedience, not our guilt’. Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (Yale University Press, 1990), 63; John Howard Yoder, Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2002), 301.
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Χριστοῦ (or the ναὸς τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματός), and not merely the self’. But Paul does not yet redirect Corinthian autonomy onto the community, and the μέλη Χριστοῦ and the ναὸς τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματός show that the believer as body is for the Lord, as God’s (not the community’s) ownership of the believer here implies.

Conclusion

Believers are to glorify God in their bodies: an ethical consequence to the believer’s bodied existence already united with the Lord. The exhortation applies narrowly to πορνεία, but combating πορνεία was never here Paul’s aim; πορνεία served simply to illustrate Paul’s expectation of the believer’s everyday moral existence.

For Bultmann, the believer’s moral existence is transcendent, located in the the ‘miraculous’ existence ‘in an eschatological dimension’. Ethics are ‘imperceptible’ except to the eyes of faith, reduced to the believer’s ‘obedience of faith’: a constant awareness of utter dependence on God’s eschatological verdict.

Ethics in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20 are immanently material, God’s divine presence locating in bodies still ‘in Adam’, in bodies in the κόσμος. The believer’s union with the Lord is graphic, naturhaft, so that concrete bodily behaviour materially affects Christ. Believers belong as bodies already to the Lord; they have been purchased and are to live for the Lord, glorifying God in their bodies, even as they await their bodies’ redemption. Believers will be raised as bodies, but it is not that eschatology that motivates Paul’s ethics here. It is Christ’s inextricable bond with the believer now, not the body’s liberation not yet, that is to compel believers’ behaviour, leading them to ‘bear Christ’ already (15.49) in the κόσμος.

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136 Bultmann, ‘Problem (ET),’ 213.
Conclusion

What I aim to have accomplished through this study is foremost to have established a perspective from which to assess the earliest believers’ lived experience of living ‘now’. Secondarily, I aim to have applied that perspective to consider a concrete command of Paul’s, meant to be lived out ‘now’ by the earliest believers. My study is ideational, focusing on what Paul said and how his logics present themselves to me. I claim nothing about ideologies operative behind Paul’s language, constructing it, nor anything about the specific socio-historical Sitz that occasioned Paul’s writing. My study is but the barest beginning toward accessing the earliest believers’ lived experience: a first-blush encounter with Paul’s arguments that invites further and ongoing reflection upon them. My study is therefore a first – but by no means foundational – step into Christian origins and the lived experience of the earliest documented followers of Christ.

My study led me to conclude that, in Paul, believers are bodies. In this respect, I am in league with Bultmann and his famous declaration that ‘Man does not have a body, he is a body’. But I began my study with the ‘naïve’, ‘popular’ view of the body, σῶμα, as the visible, lived-in body of everyday existence, and my study presented me little evidence to alter that perception of σῶμα. In this regard, I have sympathies with Gundry and Martin, who also recognize σῶμα as the material body. But unlike Gundry I do not see evidence for a ‘duality’ – an essential, separable, anthropological essence – and unlike Martin I do not see evidence that the resurrected σῶμα will shift the hierarchy of its anthropological essences, or even that such essences exist for Paul.

I concluded also that believers as σώματα remain constituent of the κόσμος – the dis-ordered world that Christ is in process re-ordering. Paul presents believers ‘in Christ’ but simultaneously ‘in Adam’. It is only at the eschaton, τὸ τέλος, the κόσμος re-ordered, that believers will be bodies finally liberated of the κόσμος’s dis-order. This puts me in league with interpreters such as Käsemann, who emphasize that a person remains always part of her or his constituent world. At the same time, I do not arrive at my conclusion by religionsgeschichtliche comparison that fits Paul into a metatheory (in Käsemann’s case, that Christ is a gnostic Aeon-Man). I am, further, more tenacious in identifying Paul’s σῶμα strictly as the believer’s visible, lived-in
Jeromey Q. Martini

body, and I resist philosophical abstractions such as σῶμα meaning ‘communication’.

Examining Paul’s exhortation in 1 Corinthians 6.12-20, I concluded that believers, as Paul presents them, experience redemption as bodies already united with Christ. I do not speculate on the metaphysics of such a union but note that, however it works, it bears the consequence that whatever believers do, bodily, now necessarily involves their Lord. Believers are not their own but are bodies purchased already for God. Consequently, they are to bear Christ’s image now (1 Cor 15.49), glorifying God in their bodies (1 Cor 6.20).

As noted, my study is but the barest beginning of a description of the earliest believers’ lived experience. I restricted my study only to one of Paul’s letters, and there tested my primary premiss on only one of Paul’s concrete commands. It may be profitable to examine Paul’s other references to the body at death in, say, 2 Corinthians and Philippians, to see if my primary premiss there stands. Further, it may be profitable to consider others of Paul’s exhortations, such as those concerning diet, sickness, healing, worship, or sexual activity more broadly. It may also prove helpful to admit greater input from social-scientific and religionsgeschichtliche approaches to Paul. Limited though it is, however, my study provides a platform from which further to assess lived experience in Christian origins – an assessment that begins with the premiss that believers are bodies ‘in Christ’, in the κόσμος, constituent of each.
Appendix I
Eschatology and Ethics in Paul’s Interpreters

All do not by any means affirm Victor Furnish’s sentiment that eschatology is ‘the heuristic key to Pauline theology as a whole’,¹ but eschatology has played a part in Pauline ethics almost since Pauline ethics debuted in the nineteenth century.² That is not to say eschatology has played the same part. In my study’s body, I have already surveyed Paul’s ethics and eschatology as Bultmann relates them. Following, I survey additional approaches. I first sketch how Weiß, Schweitzer, and Dibelius – all roughly contemporaries of Bultmann – relate Paul’s ethics and eschatology. I then survey works on New Testament ethics from the latter-half of the twentieth century. When interpreters give them, I include references to Paul’s anthropology.

Eschatology and Ethics: Some Formative Figures

Johannes Weiß

Eschatology plays an important rôle in Johannes Weiß’s portrayal of Pauline ethics.³ Weiß notes that Paul preaches not only freedom from guilt, but liberty from the personified power of Sin. He considers Paul’s conviction ‘enthusiastic’, and comes just short of ascribing to Paul a teaching of moral perfectionism.⁴ Weiß notes that Paul shares the ‘double viewpoint which permeates the whole of primitive Christianity’; namely, that through Jesus and the Spirit, God has already taken the decisive (eschatological) step in found in his dominion, pushing the kingdom of this

¹ Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (Abingdon, 1968), 114.
⁴ ‘But the last passage [1 Cor 6.11] also shows that this enthusiastic view of the new life is in truth a bold anticipation which does not correspond to reality’. Weiß and Knopf, History, 2.518.
Appendix I

age into the background. Consequently, the power of sin has been put to death; it is now ethically necessary to carry out that victory in the individual life.

Weiß recognizes the eschatological nature of this ethical conviction, though ties that to gnosticism in Paul. According to Weiß, Paul paradoxically holds together both the teachings of Jewish apocalypticism and Hellenistic mystical philosophy, and at several points (notably with regard to the resurrection) these views clash. Paul’s apocalyptic notion of God’s coming wrath likewise clashes with the doctrine of justification by faith. Instead, it survives in Paul as a utilitarian ‘prod to mortality’ as the church awaits the return of Christ.

Weiß contends that Paul shares with the early church the hope of the imminent Parousia, with consequences for his ethics: Sin has been conquered, Christ is soon returning, and the believer wants nothing more than ‘to appear blameless’ at Christ’s return. ‘[Paul’s] ethic, inasmuch as it moves in the imperative, is the alarm-cry of the last hour: still one more mighty, final exertion of strength – then comes the end!’

Albert Schweitzer

Better known for his emphasis on eschatology is Albert Schweitzer. Unlike Weiß, who suggests that Paul accommodates both eschatological and Hellenistic points of view, Schweitzer insists that such an blend is ‘untenable’. He polarizes the systems of thought so that ‘we must now consider either a purely eschatological or a purely Hellenistic explanation of [Paul’s] teaching’. Adopting the former, Schweitzer presents Paul’s views as thoroughly eschatological and, therefore, thoroughly in agreement with the teaching of Jesus. This is not to say that Paul’s ethics are the same as Jesus’s, however. On the contrary, for Jesus, John the Baptist, and primitive Christianity, ethics fall under the heading of ‘repentance’ – a concept that for Paul is ‘only the ethical act leading up to baptism’, and which never occurs

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5 Weiß and Knopf, History, 2.519.
6 ‘The idea just expressed is essentially an eschatological nature, a hope for the future; it is, therefore, mythological, gnostic’. Weiß and Knopf, History, 2.520.
7 Weiß and Knopf, History, 2.525.
8 Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 119.
9 Weiß and Knopf, History, 2.577.
where Paul is expounding on ethics. As such, ‘Those who continue to preach an ethic based only on the words of the historical Jesus are guilty of an unpardonable anachronism. They are leaving out of account the enablement to the good, which God has since then bestowed upon believers through the death and resurrection of Jesus, and the consequent gift of the Spirit’. For Paul, ethics are tied intimately to ‘mysticism’.

Schweitzer emphasizes that Paul’s mysticism is unlike Hellenistic mysticism. There is no unmediated unification of believer and God – no ‘God-mysticism’ at all until the end of the world’s historical process. The believer does not undergo ‘rebirth’ and is in no way exalted above the natural world. Paul’s mysticism, rather, is Christ-mysticism, and believers become mystically ‘in’ Christ through the sacrament of baptism. Through baptism believers really – not metaphorically – die and rise with Christ, and through this ‘quasi-physical’ (naturhaft) union the believer is supplied the Spirit and power for righteousness. (Significantly, Paul does not distinguish between Spirit of God and Spirit of Christ.) The realism of Paul’s mysticism – its naturhaft character – is foundational for Schweitzer’s depiction of Paul’s eschatological logic.

Naturhaft is an essential term in Schweitzer’s reckoning of Paul. Describing how twentieth-century interpreters came to recognize late Judaism as ‘the soil on

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15 ‘According to the Eschatological view the elect man shares the fate of the world. Therefore, so long as the world has not returned to God, he also cannot be in God’; ‘Paul does thus recognise a God-mysticism; but it is not in being contemporaneously with the Christ-mysticism. The presuppositions of this world-view make it impossible that they should co-exist, or that one should necessitate the other. They are chronologically successive, Christ-mysticism holding the field until God-mysticism becomes possible’. Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 12-13.
19 Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 15, 19. ‘In Paul, however, there is no staging of symbolism. He is content simply to assert the inconceivable view, that the historic fact of the dying and rising again realises itself in the believer’ (16).
which the theology of Paul had grown up’, Schweitzer argues that Holsten’s, Pfleiderer’s, and Holtzmann’s ‘naïve spiritualisation’ of Paul’s doctrine of redemption needed replacing: Paul’s doctrine as a whole bears the naturhaft character. In his translation, Montgomery reproduces a note from Schweitzer explaining the term:

In the special sense in which it is here used naturhaft is intended to convey that it is not a question of a purely spiritual redemption, but that the whole physical and hyperphysical being of the man is thereby translated into a new condition. Body and soul are redeemed together; and in such a way that not only the elect portion of mankind, but the whole world is completely transformed in a great catastrophic event.

Thus when Schweitzer depicts the believer ‘in Christ’ mystically, he means it really, physically, sharing literally a corporeity through which Christ can suffer for the Elect and the Elect for Christ and one another. ‘This reciprocity of relations is founded on the fact that the existences in question are physically interdependent in the same corporeity, and the one can pass over into the other’. The realism is for Paul, according to Schweitzer, a consequence of his eschatology.

Paul, in line with Jesus, expects that the resurrected Elect know solidarity with one another and with the Messiah. But unlike Jesus, Paul (with the Scribes) originally expected the resurrection would occur at the Messianic Age’s conclusion, not at its beginning. Since the Kingdom did not come following Christ’s resurrection Paul recast the doctrine of redemption according to the fact ‘that the Messiah is not only to appear in the future, but has already been present on earth in the conditions of human existence, and by His dying and rising again has made a first beginning of the resurrection of the dead’. Believers thus already share with the Messiah a solidarity, a corporeity. But this presents Paul a problem: how can the elect, living naturally on the earth, experience solidarity with Christ, existing already in a supernatural state? Paul solves the problem by inventing a double resurrection: ‘The problem how natural men can be in union with the already glorified person of

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23 Schweitzer, *Paul*, 162, n. 3.
Jesus thus receives the solution that these Elect are in reality no longer natural men, but, like Christ Himself, are already supernatural beings, only that in them this is not yet manifested'.

Schweitzer emphasizes that believers experience this supernatural age as part of a process of the whole world’s transformation; that ‘the rule of the Angel-powers is passing away and the Messianic period is beginning’. But experiencing this age promises conflict against these powers, not repose from them. Consequently, the believer’s dying with Christ includes suffering as part of the battle. Individually, believers experience a progressive displacement of their natural states by the supernatural. They are the risen-along-with-Christ, although they retain the external seeming of natural humans. The believer’s mystical participation in this process shapes Paul’s ethics, the demands of which presuppose ‘not the natural man but the “new creation” endowed with the Spirit, who has come into existence in the dying and rising again of Christ’. Believers thus ‘exercise the temper of mind appropriate to their liberation from the natural world’ without in fact leaving that world; Paul’s is an ethic wholly supernatural, without becoming unnatural. Schweitzer, reading Paul’s indicatives as a process, avoids altogether Bultmann’s problem of ethics:

Strictly speaking, it ought to have been a difficult question for Paul, how those who have died and risen with Christ can, in the new state of existence in which they now are, sin at all. For again and again he asserts that for those who have died and risen again the flesh and sin have been completely done away with. But this supra-mundane condition is only so far an accomplished fact that the baptized ought to be conscious that the limitations of the natural existence no longer apply to them, and that they ought not therefore to attribute to them an importance which they no longer possess. Really, and in principle, they are a new creation because the powers of death and resurrection, to the working of which they are subjected by their union with

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28 Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 110. This explains how those who have died in Christ have not missed the kingdom but participate in it by means of a ‘special pre-dated resurrection’, how believers alive at Christ’s return do not need first to die to take on the resurrection existence but can enter by simple transformation, and how Jesus’ resurrection has begun the general resurrection amongst the elect, though it is not outwardly manifest.

29 Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 112. Because the Law was mediated by angels, believers are freed from it, too (68-71).


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Christ, have begun their work in them. But at the same time this fact is only in process of being realised. Here ethics come into play.35

Schweitzer avoids Bultmann’s problem on a second front by observing that Paul in fact never derives imperatives from indicatives of righteousness by faith:

In the doctrine of justification by faith, redemption and ethics are like two roads, one of which leads up to one side of a ravine, and the other leads onwards from the opposite side – but there is no bridge by which to pass from one side to the other. But Paul is here in a favourable position, as compared with the Reformers, of not having to make desperate efforts to procure the unprocurable material necessary to build this bridge. For in the mystical being-in-Christ he possesses a concept of redemption from which ethics directly result as a natural function of the redeemed state. In this concept there is a logical foundation for the paradox, that the man before redemption was incapable of good works, but afterwards not only can but must bring them forth; since it is Christ who brings them forth in him.36

In this way, Schweitzer also challenges Dibelius’s thesis, which I review next. For, ‘By [Paul’s] eschatological thought he grasps ethics as life in the Spirit of Christ, and thereby creates a Christian ethic valid for all times to come’.37

Martin Dibelius

Dibelius casts eschatology as the antagonist to Paul’s ethics. To Dibelius, the earliest believers were almost fanatical in their expectation of the Parousia. As such, they were completely prepared for the world’s disappearance and ‘were therefore in no way prepared for the necessity of bringing forward hortatory sentences for everyday life’.38 But as time progressed, and the world did not disappear, believers began encountering situations that required ethical direction. Without their own tradition to draw from, they turned to collecting maxims ‘from the wise sayings of Jews and Greeks, and also from the words of Jesus and the experience of the churches’.39 The Jewish and Hellenistic sayings required slight ‘filling-out’ to be useable among Christians; the ‘special treasure’ of Jesus’s words gave ‘a storehouse of warnings and

teachings directed, or at least capable of being directed, towards the most varied everyday relationships, even when their teachings were by no means sufficient for all requirements of exhortation’. These maxims became the ‘common property’ of the early church, and were used in the church’s missionary endeavours. Paul, as a second generation Christian, inherited this tradition.

Paul, Dibelius notes, follows the epistolary forms of his times – ‘though not without himself changing what he found at hand’. Among Paul’s changes is that he includes near his letters’ ends – just before their ‘real’ conclusions – a section (‘paρænesis’) displaying maxims from the church’s collection. These maxims are ‘an almost unordered sequence of various individual exhortations which have no relation with the church concerned’. They ‘lack an immediate relation with the circumstances of the letter’, and contain ‘no far-reaching discussions based on religion or theology’. Where Pauline interpreters go wrong, Dibelius argues, is to suggest that the issues mentioned in the paρænesis sections of Paul’s letters reveal anything about the churches to whom Paul writes. For the paρænesis is not part of Paul’s ‘spiritual property’ like the rest of the letter; Paul passes them on only as part of his missionary activity.

For Dibelius, eschatological fervour precludes original ethical thought. Paul’s ethics and theology – his indicative and imperative – remain remote, unrelated. But Dibelius’s has alerted interpreters to important features of Paul’s ethics. He shows that Paul depends on Hellenistic epistolary forms and on pre-Pauline paρænesis (e.g., the ‘received’ \[\piαραλαμβάνω\] instruction in 1 Thess 4.1-2; 1 Cor 15.3). He also identifies in Paul’s letters discernable paρænesis sections (e.g., Rom 12-13; Gal 5.13ff, 6.1ff; 1 Thess 4.1ff; 5.1ff). But although Dibelius’s thesis on Paul’s ethics has

40 Dibelius, Tradition, 240.
42 Dibelius, Fresh, 143.
43 Dibelius, Tradition, 238.
44 Dibelius, Fresh, 143.
45 Dibelius allows a few occurrences of ‘detailed exhortations’ where Paul is forced to give original ethical advice when the maxims prove insufficient. E.g., the problem of mixed marriages in 1 Cor 7. Dibelius, Fresh, 224.
46 Note the groundbreaking commentary: Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians, Hermeneia (Fortress, 1979).
been influential,48 many point out that Paul does not neatly limit exhortations to paraënetic sections,49 and that Paul often links his exhortations directly to proclamations (e.g., Rom 6; Gal 5.25).50 Furthermore, identifying that Paul uses traditional ethics does not address how or why he uses them in any given letter. It is thus more difficult to divorce Paul’s ethics and theology than Dibelius suggests.

Bultmann, Weiß, Schweitzer or Dibelius do not give the final word on the relation between Paul’s ethics and eschatology. In what follows, I survey some contemporary figures who also relate ethics and eschatology in Paul.

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48 Karl Weidinger claims that only the inexorable demands of everyday life made Christians realize they remain on the earth, something the earlier period, dominated by fanatical eschatology, failed to grasp: Karl Weidinger, *Die Haustafeln: Ein Stück urchristlicher Paränese*, *UNT 14* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1928), 6-8. J.L. Houlden argues that Paul’s exhortations are not integral to his letters, that Paul applies morality inconsistently, and that Paul’s conviction regarding the Parousia ‘deals a crippling blow to the ordinary processes of ethical argument’. Similarly, Jack Sanders claims that although Paul’s ethics are eschatological in the sense that ‘love’ is the eschatological reality already present in this age, Paul’s view of the imminent Parousia demonstrates its impracticality. J.L. Houlden, *Ethics and the New Testament* (T&T Clark, 1992); Jack Sanders, *Ethics in the New Testament* (Fortress, 1975). L.H. Marshall assumes eschatology is a hindrance to Paul’s ethics, but suggests that Paul develops ethics, anyway: ‘with the exception of his teaching about marriage and, perhaps, his attitude to slavery, [Paul’s] ethical ideas were not affected by his eschatology, but set forth what he conceived to be the eternal will of God and the mind of Christ’ (218). On the other hand, Marshall reports that Paul’s ethical maxims ‘are as unrelated to one another as the maxims of the book of Proverbs’ (220). L.H. Marshall, *The Challenge of New Testament Ethics* (Macmillan and Co., 1946).

Dodd takes Dibelius’s theory in new directions. He formally separates kerygma and didaché, alienating Paul’s ethics from his theology in the way Dibelius isolates paraënetics. And like Dibelius, Dodd asserts that the early church’s eschatological fervour made it ‘unlikely that the church should ever produce anything like a code of social ethics’. C.H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law: The Relation of Faith and Ethics in Early Christianity* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1950), 29. The church does produce lasting moral direction, however, by corresponding itself to Israel of the OT: just as Torah was a ‘covenant’ between God and his people, Christianity is a ‘new covenant’ with the Church including legal (‘nomistic’) obligations in ‘the untranslatable agape’ (71) to be practised in concrete situations as Jesus’ teaching demonstrates. Dodd achieves Paul’s ethical development by collapsing eschatology into ‘mysticism’. Dodd argues that Paul experienced a ‘spiritual crisis’ between writing 1 and 2 Corinthians that challenged his belief in Christ’s imminence and forced ‘a growing emphasis on the eternal life here and now in communion with Christ…sometimes described as the transformation of eschatology into mysticism’. C.H. Dodd, *New Testament Studies* (Manchester University Press, 1953), 113.

49 In Romans, for example, imperatives occur in chs 3, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16; they appear in every chapter of 1 Corinthians except chs 2 and 13 – ch. 13 being an ethical treatise on ‘love’. And this does not account for moral commands through imperatival indicatives and infinitives, participles, verbs of entreaty (e.g., παρακαλῶ), future indicatives, hortatory and prohibitive subjunctives, optatives, commands implied by context, and various rhetorical devices. Cf. also Furnish, *Theology and Ethics*, 92-98.

Eschatology and Ethics: Some Contemporary Figures

Rudolf Schnackenberg

Schnackenberg allots Paul just under fifty pages in his book, focusing separately on the moral teachings of Jesus, the early church, and individual writers of the New Testament. Although he does not suggest a catch-all theme for New Testament ethics, he introduces his book by noting that ‘Nowhere in the New Testament is it possible to break the unity between religion and morality’. His conclusion suggests that only by presupposing the New Testament’s eschatological urgency ‘can we comprehend the radical demands made in the gospel, which have the holy will of God as their sole guiding principle and which could only be made in the light of the gospel of salvation, of the coming reign of God which, in Jesus, is already at hand’.

Schnackenburg attends to Paul’s anthropology, discussing σάρξ ‘as a power working for evil’, and the law as a promoter of sin’s power. Through baptism, the believer dies to sin with Christ and shares in the resurrection life already, although it will ‘only be revealed in its plenitude and glory at the resurrection at the last day’. Because Christians remain in ‘the mortal body’ under the influence of σάρξ, they still struggle against sin, for the full powers of ‘Death’ have not yet been swept away. Christians must fight the cosmic powers of evil, but the character of their morality is ‘hope’ as they battle, anticipating their full inheritance and final justification. ‘Thus the eschatological perspective was essential to St. Paul…and the moral exhortation follows inevitably from this’.

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52 Schnackenburg, Moral, 13.
53 Schnackenburg, Moral, 387.
54 Schnackenburg, Moral, 264.
55 Schnackenburg notes ‘Baptism – which, also according to Paul, every believer undergoes; there can be no doubt about that – is the place where every individual shares in salvation, where he enters into communion with Christ and becomes a member of the “Body of Christ”’. Schnackenburg, Moral, 269-70.
56 Schnackenburg, Moral, 270.
57 Schnackenburg, Moral, 282.
58 Schnackenburg, Moral, 272.
Robert Tannehill

The ‘eschatological perspective’ plays out differently in Robert Tannehill’s 1963 Yale PhD dissertation, *Dying and Rising with Christ*. Tannehill’s book is subtitled ‘A Study of Pauline Theology’, but its focus on the believer’s life in Christ places it squarely in the study of Pauline ethics. Tannehill acknowledges open points of contact with both Schweitzer and Bultmann, but seeks to root Paul’s language of past, present and future ‘dying’ and ‘rising’ with Christ in the eschatological outlook of salvation as *already* and *not yet*. This outlook ‘makes clear that the present participation in new life continues to be a participation in life through death, so that the believer must still rely upon God to grant this life in daily existence and at the resurrection’.

Tannehill notes that Paul's eschatology transformed traditional ideas when Paul came to grips with the contrasting facts that the decisive, eschatological event had already taken place, but that the old world continued to exist and to exercise a certain power. Tannehill suggests that, in addition to his discussion of a believer’s dying with Christ as a *past* event, Paul develops a theology of suffering that involves the Christian in the *present* in Christ’s death.

Because they prevent the believer from trusting in himself and so falling back into the old life, suffering and death are positive aspects of God's rule over his own, and can be understood as participation in Christ's death. God has already conquered death, not by abolishing it (this is still future), but by commandeering it for his own purposes.

The theme of dying and rising with Christ is the theological foundations of Paul’s exhortation, shaping his moral discourse. This he displays prominently in Romans 6 and in Galatians 5.24-25. Believers have *already* died to sin with Christ and *are* to reckon themselves dead to sin; they are *already* freed from slavery to sin, and *are not* to let sin rule in their bodies. Here, the indicative implies the imperative:

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60 Hübner agrees, discussing it as one of the few books mentioned in his ‘Exkursus: Zur Ethik’. See Hübner, ‘Paulusforschung,’ 2803-04.

61 Tannehill, *Dying*, 7-6.


63 Tannehill, *Dying*, 7-5.

64 Tannehill, *Dying*, 7-7.
a consequence of the ‘fundamental tension in Paul’s eschatology’. A key to understanding this tension lies in the body.

For Paul, the body is tied to the physical creation still awaiting redemption from the ‘powers’, making it a continual point of battle between God and sin. The body stands in contrast to the new life that is already present in the believer. ‘However, this does not mean that man’s redemption is fully accomplished, that he has been saved apart from the body. Rather, the fact that the body has not yet been redeemed means that man has not yet been fully redeemed’. This redemption is guaranteed by the gift of the Spirit, who performs a ‘killing function’ by destroying the old order in the believer. In the present, the believer has been transferred from slavery to the old order to slavery in the new order, but this eschatological change is accompanied by the believer’s continual struggle against the old powers. Salvation itself is a transfer of ownership, for ‘Man can be saved only if he is released from the powers of the old dominion, but he is released from these powers only if he is placed under a new Lord. Thus man is saved because he has a new Lord’. Paul’s exhortations, then, reflect the concerns of the concrete manifestations under a new lordship. Believers participate in this new lordship by continually dying with Christ in the ongoing renunciation of their ‘boast’ (the ability to save oneself by ‘works’ – a ‘righteousness’ by law). This continuing participation in the suffering of the present signals the future participation in the resurrection, and serves as the basis for Paul’s moral teaching.

Victor Paul Furnish

One year after Tannehill’s publication, Victor Paul Furnish released the book that has become the standard English treatment of Pauline ethics. Furnish’s study is comprehensive, including discussions on the sources and materials behind Paul’s ethical teaching, its major themes, and its theological structure. He is adamant that Paul’s exhortations cannot be assessed without attention to his theology, and that ‘the

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65 Tannehill, *Dying*, 78.
66 Tannehill, *Dying*, 79.
67 Tannehill, *Dying*, 82.
68 ‘It is apparent that Paul’s use of dying and rising with Christ is complex, emphasizing in turn the past entry into new life, the present participation in life through death, and the future participation in the life of the resurrection. Nevertheless, a unity is visible, for this complexity is simply a reflection of the complexity of Paul’s eschatology’. Tannehill, *Dying*, 129.
69 Furnish, *Theology and Ethics*.
relationship between proclamation and exhortation is not just formal, or only accidental, but thoroughly integral and vital to the apostle’s whole understanding of the gospel.\textsuperscript{70}

Related to eschatology, Furnish argues that Paul speaks in the apocalyptic language that contrasts ‘this age’, characterized by its pervasive evil and captivity to foreign powers, and ‘the age to come’ and God’s reign. God’s victory over the powers of this age comes through Christ’s death and resurrection, which is the decisive salvific event for believers. He notes that ‘The concept of salvation belongs unquestionably to the apostle’s eschatological perspective, and its basic reference is futuristic’.\textsuperscript{71} While there are present dimensions to salvation, ‘it is first of all something \textit{to come} and is granted to those who survive the refining “fire” of judgment at the last day’.\textsuperscript{72} Thus salvation involves both (negatively) salvation from wrath, and (positively) the future full transformation of life by God’s power – ‘the redemption of our bodies’. At the same time, God’s power is \textit{already} operative in the believer, so that ‘Even in the present age the “first fruits” of salvation may be savored and the authenticity of hope confirmed’.\textsuperscript{73} God’s power has broken in already in the event of Christ’s death and resurrection, as well as through the empowering, indwelling Spirit in the lives of believers.

At the same time, believers do not stand ‘between the ages, ‘but at the point where they interpenetrate’.\textsuperscript{74} Furnish makes this point in order to note that, although Paul does not deny the temporal aspects of the two ages, he subordinates them ‘to their qualitative aspects’. Paul’s eschatology retains its apocalyptic aspects, but these do not contain the whole of his thought, and ‘because the present is where man stands, enslaved by the powers of this world and yet confronted by the liberating power of God, the nature of man’s situation, the possibilities for his future and his responsibilities for the present, play a major role in Paul’s preaching’.\textsuperscript{75}

For Furnish, eschatology also shapes Paul’s view of the law and sin. The believer belongs to the kingdom of God but is exploitable by sin, a power of the

\textsuperscript{70} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 112.
\textsuperscript{71} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 122.
\textsuperscript{72} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 122.
\textsuperscript{73} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 126.
\textsuperscript{74} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 134.
\textsuperscript{75} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 135.
‘present evil age’, and the law becomes an agent for sin through its demands of obedience in the sense of achievement.\textsuperscript{76} Paul’s view of the righteousness of God is that it is ‘God’s creating, sustaining, and redeeming power’.\textsuperscript{77} This power is displayed through God’s covenant, but preeminently in Christ’s death and resurrection. Furnish contends that the righteousness of God cannot be isolated in Paul from his doctrine of justification by faith,\textsuperscript{78} because justification relates to the covenant power of God, it stands at the centre of Paul’s gospel. All righteousness in Paul is conceived of in terms of relationship – God’s relationship to his people and the believer’s to the covenant God, and to be justified is to stand in right relation with God, according to the power of his forensic-eschatological verdict.

Furnish echoes Tannehill’s views on ‘dying and rising with Christ’,\textsuperscript{79} and he resembles Bultmann in his discussion of ‘faith’ as ‘obedience’.\textsuperscript{80} In the end, although he admits that there is no adequate way to categorize Paul’s ethic, ‘the whole of Pauline theology – which includes what may be called the “Pauline ethic” – is eschatologically oriented and radically theocentric’.\textsuperscript{81}

Despite their differences, Schnackenburg, Tannehill and Furnish agree that Paul’s ethical discourse can only be understood as the result of his conviction that believers participate with Christ both in this age and in the age to come,\textsuperscript{82} an agreement that is paradigmatic for our study.

T.J. Deidun

In 1981, T.J. Deidun’s PhD thesis put forth the argument that Pauline ethics must be understood in the framework of the New Covenant, for Paul’s moral understanding is coloured by his interpretation of Ezekiel 36.27 and Jeremiah 31.31ff., and of the Spirit’s role in circumcising the believer’s heart.

\textsuperscript{76} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 142.

\textsuperscript{77} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 144.

\textsuperscript{78} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 145.

\textsuperscript{79} Furnish reports that Tannehill’s monograph appeared ‘just as the results of my own work were being put in final form,’ and suggests that ‘Insofar as I can tell, Tannehill’s findings are in every respect supportive of my analysis of the Pauline ethic’. Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 171, n.107.

\textsuperscript{80} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 184.

\textsuperscript{81} Furnish, \textit{Theology and Ethics}, 225.

\textsuperscript{82} Here is the spirit of Schweitzer’s admonition, that ‘Ethics, like the sacraments, is included within the sphere of the mystical dying and rising again with Christ, and is to be interpreted from this point of view’. Schweitzer, \textit{Mysticism}, 294.
Appendix I

It is [Paul’s] understanding of the implications of the New Covenant which enables him to give due weight to the imperative without in any way diminishing the wonder of the indicative, to maintain the prevenient of God’s activity in every act of Christian love without detracting from the autonomy of the human subject, and to uphold morality of love transcending all ethical categories grounded in the obligation of the law, while maintaining the obligation of the law as a necessary corollary to Christian love. In a word, it is Paul’s understanding of the New Covenant, and of the Christian’s situation ‘in the Spirit’ and in the human and social reality of the ‘body’ which enables him to elaborate an ‘ethic of the Spirit’ which remains essentially incarnational, ensuring a balanced synthesis of divine initiative and human response, of love and law, of spontaneity and principle, of *verbum internum* and *verbum externum*.83

Wolfgang Schrage

Wolfgang Schrage’s *The Ethics of the New Testament*84 is more generally an approach to New Testament ethics than his 1961 *Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese*.85 Nevertheless, he devotes a large section of the book to ‘The Christological Ethics of Paul’ in which he suggests that ‘we would have to say that God’s saving eschatological act in Jesus Christ is the basis and root of Pauline ethics’.86 Schrage argues that baptism is a gift of freedom and a change of servitude; it is linked to ethics as believers manifest the newness of life of Christ. Pneumatology is ultimately christological for the Spirit is the presence of the Lord in the community, and the spiritual gifts are themselves ultimately ethical (‘It is therefore not by accident that the catalogue of charismata in Romans 12 stands in the context of pænèsis’).87 And Schrage is clear that the Parousia is not the cause of Paul’s ethics.

His urgent insistence on ethics is not an emergency measure forced upon him by the so-called realities of continuing history. It is neither a compromise nor an accommodation to the world, but a consequence and an expression of the fact that in Christ a new world has begun and that everything is moving toward Christ’s universal victory and the absolute sovereignty of God.88

Schrage emphasizes the ‘concrete’ nature of Paul’s ethics. Although the Spirit guides believers, this does not mean to suggest that they are somehow freed from ‘external’ constraints or guidance. Appealing to pagan philosophers, Paul assumes some measure of ‘universal’ ethics (though Schrage deliberately denies ‘natural law’), and he sees a place for the law in ongoing moral guidance. But ‘the law of the Old Testament must first become the “law of Christ” and be interpreted with respect to its true intention’.89

The person of Christ is not significant to Paul’s ethics, and the words of Christ contribute only sparingly (it is significant for Schrage that Paul refers to the words of Christ and not the words of Jesus). Further, Schrage counts ‘love’ as the greatest commandment, but only as it finds expression in action. ‘When the signs of love cease to shine forth in concrete, visible life, the genuineness of love is in doubt’,90 and signals the corporate nature of Paul’s ethics as opposed to the individualist teachings of pagan philosophers.

Paul is not an ascetic (‘If only because of his belief in creation, Paul could not preach a dualistic asceticism hostile to the body, a radical withdrawal from the sensual secular world, involving above all rejection of corporeality and sexuality’),91 and he commends celibacy as a charism, for ‘eschatological and christological’ reasons; the Christian community has space to remain ‘honourably and happily single’.92 In the end, Paul’s ethics are shaped by God’s eschatological act in Christ, but must always be expressed in concrete situations.

J. Paul Sampley

Eschatology also underpins Paul’s ethics in J. Paul Sampley’s *Walking Between the Times.*93 Sampley argues that ‘The death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the primary reference point in Paul's thought world’.94 With Christ’s death and resurrection, the old aeon has ended and the new creation has begun, and both ages

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89 Schrage, *Ethics*, 206. ‘Paul’s battle against legalism is not against observance of the law but against the perverse interpretation of such observance as a condition for salvation’. Paul therefore presupposes the law in his exhortations, although it has lost its ‘binding authority’ (205).

90 Schrage, *Ethics*, 211.

91 Schrage, *Ethics*, 220.


exist simultaneously. Paul primarily speaks of believers in solidarity with Christ, and identifies how they are to be *now* by contrasting how they *were*, indicating a change in aeons. He views the old age from the perspective of the new, and sees all existence in solidarity: either one is in solidarity with Christ, and is a new creation, or one is in solidarity with Adam, and part of the old order under Sin.

Sin is not simply individual malfeasance for Paul; instead, it affects the created order that awaits God’s redemption.95 The world in Adam includes the rulers of this present age, under eschatological judgment. Sampley notes that ‘Despite Paul's pessimism about the state of the world, however, he never is tempted by the gnostic notion that the world itself is evil. God created the world. God will redeem it, in fact, has already begun to do so’.96 The protection from the world comes in the community of those in Christ, which is the ‘locus of grace’ and Paul’s primary context for thinking about believers. It is ‘the matri within which individual lives of faith are nurtured and maintained’.97 ‘Faith’ in the believer is marked by Paul from the two perspectives of Christ’s death and his coming; a believer is weak or strong in faith, and will continue to grow until Christ’s return. In the meanwhile, those ‘stronger’ in faith must be patient with the ‘weak’.

According to Sampley, ‘love’ is Paul’s ultimate test of morality, making genuine community possible, and ‘functions as the governor that sets some limits to what might otherwise be runaway individualism’.98 The final judgment is essential to Paul’s morality, and success depends on the works the believer has to offer. ‘What one does while in the body and how one lives out one's faith – those are the concerns Paul expects to dominate the judgement’.99 This is not something for believers to fear, however, but to anticipate. Paul looks backwards and forwards for moral motivation, so that ‘the two keys to why believers do whatever they do are gratitude for deliverance from the power of sin and anticipation of the fullness of glory that will be granted when one's stewardship is certified at the judgment day’.100 Sampley

100 Sampley, *Walking*, 103.
suggests that Paul’s view may be summarized by the boundaries of the Lord’s supper, which signals both Christ’s death and his coming Parousia.\footnote{Sampley, \textit{Walking}, 18.}

Richard B. Hays

In the spirit of Spicq, Richard Hays’s \textit{Moral Vision of the New Testament}\footnote{Richard B. Hays, \textit{The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation; a Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics} (HarperSanFrancisco, 1996).} attempts to write a book on New Testament ethics that is comprehensive but faithful to ‘les nuances’\footnote{Spicq is careful not to organize his work around a single theme such as ‘love’ or the person of Christ, nor in the categories and confines of ‘la Théologie spéculative’. Rather, ‘de constituer un dossier presque intégral des données textuelles et d’en exploiter les cohérences, tout en respectant la hiérarchie des valeurs, a fin de rendre intelligibles les idées exprimées par Jésus et ses Apôtres’ (1.10). He is concerned to retain ‘les nuances’ of the biblical authors and to articulate New Testament ethics in the language of the New Testament itself. At the same time, however, he is writing a theological ethic of the \textit{New Testament}. As such, he does not present a specifically \textit{Pauline} (or Matthean, etc.) ethic, but intends his work to be ‘une collection de thèmes majeurs, communs à presque tous les auteurs du Nouveau Testament’ (1.15, italics his). Paul is given some particular attention, though, in ‘la transfiguration eschatologique’ of the Christian into God’s image by ‘l’imitation du Christ’. For Paul’s congregations, who may not have seen Christ, imitating Christ is logically possible by imitating Christ’s ambassador, Paul. ‘Le devoir d’imiter Paul est fondé sur son titre privilégié de Père, qui implique celui de Didascale. Si tout disciple imite le Maître, les enfants sont tenus au premier chef de ressembler à leur père en l’imitant. C’est un axiome constant de la pédagogie antique, et l’Apôtre a bien l’entention de s’y conformer puisqu’il n’a jamais prescrit son “imitation” qu’aux seules communautés qu’il a fondées’ (2.721). Celsas Spicq, \textit{Théologie Morale du Nouveau Testament}, 2 vols. (Paris: J. Gabalda et Co., 1965).} of the individual New Testament authors. Hays begins his book with Paul, seeking to demonstrate that Paul’s ethics ‘are rooted in his theological thought’,\footnote{Hays, \textit{Moral Vision}, 18.} and he proposes ‘three recurrent, interlocking theological motifs that provide the framework for Paul’s ethical teaching: eschatology, the cross, and the new community in Christ’.\footnote{Hays, \textit{Moral Vision}, 19.} Hays suggests that Jesus’ death and resurrection signals the end of the old age and portends the beginning of the new, and that ‘Paul’s moral vision is intelligible only when his apocalyptic perspective is kept clearly in mind’.\footnote{Hays, \textit{Moral Vision}, 19.} The apocalyptic vision leads Paul to counsel his churches to live with both suffering and joy, to battle cosmic forces, and to be ready for the Parousia, awaiting the redemption of all creation.

All Paul’s ethical judgments are worked out in this context. The dialectical character of Paul’s eschatological vision (already/not yet) provides a critical framework for moral discernment: he is sharply critical not only of the old age that is passing away but also of those who claim unqualified
participation already in the new age. To live faithfully in the time between the times is to walk a tightrope of moral discernment, claiming neither too much nor too little for God’s transforming power within the community of faith.\textsuperscript{107}

Hays likewise emphasizes the cross as a ‘paradigm of faithfulness’: the act of Christ’s self-sacrificial obedience is paradigmatic for believers. This paradigmatic function is most fully developed in the Christ-hymn of Philippians 2.6-11, where Christ’s obedience to death is the pattern for believers. There, ‘The twin themes of conformity to Christ’s death and the imitation of Christ are foundational elements of Paul’s vision of the moral life’.\textsuperscript{108} Regarding the ‘new community’, Paul has replaced the boundary markers of circumcision and food laws with those of confession of faith, baptism and the experience of the Holy Spirit. Hays notes that Paul only exhorts the community (‘He articulates no basis for a general ethic applicable to those outside the church’),\textsuperscript{109} and one of his major foci is on maintaining unity in the church, for it is the location of eschatological salvation as God transforms his people. These three themes together frame Paul’s moral thought: ‘new creation in collision with the present age, the cross as paradigm for action, and the community as the locus of God’s saving power’.\textsuperscript{110}

Hays suggests that the motive for obedience to God is that believers participate in the effects of Christ’s death and resurrection, and have been set free for obedience by their transfer of lordship to Christ. Gratitude does not play a part, and threats of the Parousia are only used as a last resort. The shape of obedience comes down to two fundamental norms – ‘the unity of the community and the imitation of Christ’.\textsuperscript{111} On the whole, Paul is reluctant to specify narrow behavioural norms. Finally, Hays argues that the power for obedience is proclaimed by Paul to be God’s transformational power through the enabling of the Holy Spirit. ‘The Holy Spirit is not a theological abstraction but the manifestation of God’s presence in the community, making everything new. Those who respond the gospel have entered the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Hays, \textit{Moral Vision}, 27.
\item[111] Hays, \textit{Moral Vision}, 41.
\end{footnotes}
sphere of the Spirit’s power, where they find themselves changed and empowered for obedience’. Hays concludes with the observation that

Paul sees the community of faith being caught up into the story of God’s remaking of the world through Jesus Christ. Thus, to make ethical discernments is, for Paul, simply to recognize our place within the epic story of redemption. There is no meaningful distinction between theology and ethics in Paul’s thought, because Paul’s theology is fundamentally an account of God’s work of transforming his people into the image of Christ. 

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Appendix II
- πορν- in the LXX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>לנה</th>
<th>πορνεία: Jer 2.20; Ezek. 16.41; Mic 1.7(2x).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>πορνεύω: Deut 23.18(=23.19); 1 Chr 5.25; Psa 72.27(=73.27); Psa 105.39(=106.39); Jer 3.6, 8; Ezek 6.9; 16.15, 34; 23.19; Hos 3.3; 4.10, 18; Amos 7.17.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ἐκπορνεύω: Gen 38.24; Exod 34.15, 16(2x); Lev 17.7; 19.29; 20.5, 6; 21.9; Num 15.39; 25.1; Deut 22.21; Jdg 2.17; 8.27, 33; 2 Chr 21.11, 13(2x); Jer 31; Ezek 6.9; 16.16, 17, 26, 28(2x), 30, 33; 20.30; 23.3, 5; Hos 1.2(2x); 2.7; 4.12, 13, 14(2x), 18; 5.3.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>πόρνη: Gen 38.15; Lev. 21.7, 14; Deut 23.18(=23.19); 31.16; Josh 2.1; 6.17, 25; Jdg 11.1; 16.1; 1 Kgs 3.16; 22.38; Prov 6.26; 29.3; Isa 1.21; 23.15, 16; 57.3; Jer 3.3; 5.7; Ezek 16.31, 35; 23.30, 43(txt), 44; 9.1; Joel 3.3(=4.3); Nah 3.4.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>πορνικός: Prov 7.10.</td>
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<tr>
<td>לנונים</td>
<td>πορνεία: Gen 38.24; 2 Kgs 9.22; Ezek 23.11, 29; Hos 1.2(2x); 2.4(=2.2), 6(=4); 4.12; 5.4; Nah 3.4(2x).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>לנה</td>
<td>πορνεία: Num 14.33; Jer 3.2, 9; 13.27; 23.27; 43.7; Ezek 43.9; Hos 4.11; 6.10.</td>
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<tr>
<td>לנה</td>
<td>πορνεία: Ezek 16.15, 22, 25, 33, 34, 36; 23.7, 8(2x), 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 35. ἐκπορνεύω: Ezek 16.20, 26.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different in LXX</td>
<td>Omit: Lev 20.5(1x); Josh 6.22 [בנה=גננת]; Jdg 19.2; Prov 23.27 [בנה=אֶלֶךָ תָּאָם]; Isa 23.17(2x); 47.10; 57.9; Ezek 16.29 [בנה=דיִּמְחֵה]. 23.3(1x); Hos 4.15.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Add: Jer 3.7; Ezek 16.30(1x).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>πόρνη= لديك (hierodule): Deut 23.17(=23.18); note in Hos 4.14 תַּפִּישָׁת תֶּלֶּלֶּמִי (τελέω with the sense ‘to be consecrated to, to be initiated into the mysteries of’).</td>
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<td>πόρνη= כֹּזְב (‘bastard’): Deut 23.17(=23.18); note Zech 9.6 where LXX=אֱלֹּא יֵנֶּה (‘foreigner’).</td>
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<tr>
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<td>πόρνη= גֹּזְר (‘stranger’): Prov 5.3. Context suggests this is an addition of πόρνη, not an equation with גור.</td>
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<td>πορνικός= גָּלָל (‘glutton’): Prov 23.21.</td>
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<td>πορνικός= רֹעֲמ (‘high place’): Ezek 16.24.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>πορνεיוֹן= רֹעֲמ (‘high place’): Ezek 16.25, 31, 39.</td>
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