Education, Governance and Frames of Political Membership:

Migrant `Integration` Policy as Discourse in the Swiss case within Europe

Farah Jeelani Shaik

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DECLARATION

- I have composed this thesis
- The thesis is my own work
- The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified

Farah Jeelani Shaik

Signature: -------------------------------
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This study looks at Switzerland as an example of Western-European nation states’ strategic efforts to create migrant ‘integration’ agendas, which attempt the convergence of different, largely statist economic interests. According to the Swiss Federal Government’s overarching agenda, education is a key arena for advancement of the ‘integration’ of migrants in Swiss systems and society. I explore whether this statist strategy conceals and contains pre-existing power relations in relation to definitions of the ‘political membership’ of migrants. This study understands public policy as a carrier of shared ideas and ideologies transgressing national borders. It attempts to map the socio-political dimensions of policy discourses. ‘Dominant’ discourses of neo-liberalism and New Public Management in education policy reform in Switzerland in 2008 are examined. The examination connects arguments related to ‘soft’ governance in processes of Europeanisation and the emergence of a European shared space of education - in which Switzerland positions itself in particular ways - as policy through governance. It explores how this policy is referenced in a national normative context. I investigate the use of education standards drawn from comparative studies, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and how these are related to the migrant ‘integration’ mandate of the Swiss Federal government and the Canton of Zurich education authorities specifically for education agenda-setting. The study engages with the ‘problematisation’ of migrants in Swiss education discourses, (re-) triggering a national response which constructs, diffuses and institutionalises shared ideas of European policies within the logic of pre-existing normative ideologies about ‘migrants’, nation-building, ‘national identity’, ‘culture’ and norms of political membership.

I examine discourses in policy texts, media texts and policy actors’ narratives, in order to map the framing of a structural migrant ‘integration’ policy reform and a loose policy ‘network’ of ‘integration’. Moreover, I approach this discursive evidence in its relation to the historical and economic developments of migration within Europe in the last few decades; an account of Switzerland’s developing relationship to the EU; the integration and citizenship conceptions issuing from these developments and ‘political membership’ as understood in this study. Methodologically, I use eclectically a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach to researching Europe through the social bases, which are to be found in the national socio-political policy contexts: in other words the ‘translation’ of deterritorialised politics into national policy ‘solutions’. These deterritorialised policies frame and address social-democratic ideas such as ‘equality of opportunity’/‘equity’/’inclusion’ through standards introduced in education in what is termed an ‘integration’ framework. Integration however is directly related to issues of ‘political membership’. This study deals with how the use of social-democratic education standards as ‘flags of convenience’ may serve the liberal state in maintaining power relations. Lastly, it highlights the potentially cosmetic instrumentalisation and misapplication of education and its role in perpetuating pre-existing normative exclusionary principles of political membership.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Synopsis

‘We are like travellers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. While the terrain we are travelling on, the world society of states has changed, our normative map has not. I do not pretend to have a new map to replace the old one, but I do hope to contribute to a better understanding of salient fault-lines of the unknown territory, which we are traversing. The growing normative incongruities between international human rights norms, particularly as they pertain to the ‘rights of others’ - immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers – and assertions of territorial sovereignty are the novel features of this new landscape.’ (Seyla Benhabib, p. 6/7, 2004)

This thesis addresses what Benhabib (2004) has called the reconfiguration of the sovereignty of nation-states, and also the reconstitutions of citizenship. In this analysis citizenship is moving from a definition based on national membership toward a citizenship of residency which strengthens multiple ties to locality, to the region and to transnational institutions. This study works with these ideas, through exploring the reconfiguration of claims to territorial sovereignty of nation-states and conceptions of citizenship or political membership in the light of transnational migration, and in the context of the education of migrants in Switzerland. I share Benhabib’s concern that one of the most important questions regarding democratic citizenship is access to citizenship rights, or the attainment of political membership by non-members. This concern brings the idea of migrant ‘integration’ to the centre of my enquiry, and I examine the discourse of integration as it is reflected in education policy.

In this context, I support Benhabib’s (2009) argument that there is a crisis of the nation-state, along with globalisation and the rise of people’s movements between and within nation-states which have shifted or blurred the lines between citizens and residents, nationals and foreigners. This shift in the lines means that the current status of ‘citizen’ or ‘resident’ or ‘national’ or ‘foreigner’ no longer does justice to the constellations of possibility in terms of belonging. Individuals and families are increasingly re-rooted, move in multiple life spaces, which resignify ‘national’ contexts of living. In this study I explore how these ‘national’ contexts of living in the space of education is signified and understood in the case of Switzerland, by looking
at how the concept of ‘integration’ is understood. Integration of migrants, has been recently added to the discourse of policy spaces of citizenship, sovereignty and the ‘nation’.

The main argument presented here is that while governing is increasingly ‘deterritorialised’ in nation states, they are simultaneously trying to hold on to territorial sovereignty in the domain of membership rights. This in turn constitutes a dilemma between the foundations of liberal democracy and Universal Human Rights commitments. By using the term ‘deterritorialised’, Benhabib (2004) refers to the challenges the nation-state faces from the rise of a global economy through the formation of free markets in capital, finance and labour; moreover, there is an increasing internationalization of armament, communication, and information technologies; the emergence of international and transnational cultural networks and electronic spheres, and the growth of sub- and transnational political actors’. (Benhabib, 2004:4). These global developments have challenged the nation-state’s capacity to deal with the changes created by this new environment. Under these circumstances, she argues, ‘territoriality has become an anachronistic delimitation of material functions and cultural identities’ (2004:5). However, even in the face of a collapse of traditional concepts of sovereignty, monopoly over territory is exercised by nation-states through immigration and citizenship and more recently through ‘integration’ policies based on old, un-resignified concepts, which deny membership rights to large numbers of the population.

In this study, I explore the ways in which policy operates as a carrier of old modalities and frames of political membership or citizenship. Policy understood as an act of discursive negotiation of different normative claims and interests encompasses Switzerland’s participation in three wider contradictory aspects and interests; those of universalist human rights, those of global market competition and those of national closure. If policy is framed by states as a key socio-political driver of democratic change, such as presented in current ‘integration’ policies, then the perpetuation of pre-existing normative beliefs and old restrictive and exclusionary modalities or frames of political membership invariably conflict with meaningful change. I will argue that the ways in which (political) membership is discursively, i.e. ideologically as well as legally defined and practised within certain social institutions (such as
education), and referenced and used through specific policy resources, plays a key role as to who is or who isn’t a signified ‘member’ of this social order on a local, subjective and everyday level.

1.2 Education and Membership

Education policy and politics has often been named and framed as a nation-building activity by states; it remains one of the main features of party-political electoral arenas and is promoted as a means of changing society (chapter 3). In contrast with politicians, education actors often attempt to identify a strictly pedagogical role of education\(^1\) rather than a state or nation-building role; emphasizing the ‘depoliticized’ position of education as a platform for promoting what is named ‘equity’ among students (chapter 6). Education thus, as a social institution, becomes caught up in the normative claims of different social actors.

My focus here, then is on how education is framed in ‘integration’ policy; who is involved in this framing; which ‘evidence’ sources are referred to for the arguments behind this instrumentalisation and most importantly; in what ways do they address and/or demarcate political membership?

In this study, I interrogate the nation-building role attributed to education in framing migrant ‘integration’ and ‘membership’. Moreover, I explore the way in which a network of policy actors and policy texts and resources may reveal the discourses that construct particular understandings of the position and spaces in which migrants may or may not move within Swiss schools and society. I attempt to unravel the ways in which these understandings contribute to particular ideas of ‘political membership’ of migrants in Swiss contemporary socio-political discourses. These institutionally embedded and circulated understandings of the ‘migrant’ or ‘integration’, I argue, contribute to a particular construction of the signifying of ‘membership’ spaces within a society and a state. The meaning of ‘political membership’ that I adopt in this study derives from Seyla Benhabib’s definition, that is: ‘principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum

\(^{1}\) Bildungsauftrag: used as a term specifically by more than one interviewee, see chapter 6
seekers, into existing polities’ (2004:1). However, here, I restrict the focus to ‘migrant’, which is used as a term in Swiss discourses of ‘integration’.

These principles and practices of membership are then put into the context of increasingly ‘deterritorialised politics’ (Benhabib, 2004), which promote the nation-state’s interests in belonging to the global or, more specifically, the European space. In the Swiss case, these ‘deterritorialised politics’, which I focus upon are part of a policy space of educational comparison and participation in international studies, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which are highly relevant to the way in which migrants feature in the educational discourses on ‘integration’ (chapters 2 and 4). The concern raised in this study is that Swiss policy as discourse on migrants simultaneously maintains rigid migration and immigration policies that are potentially territorial and possibly based upon statist civic republican self-understandings of a projected ‘national’ or ‘collective cultural identity’ (chapter 3), which need to be satisfied or attained in order to become a member. Thus, the concerns are with the signifying of particular understandings of the ‘national’ or ‘culture’, which contribute to limiting spaces of belonging for what have been termed ‘migrants’ in Swiss society.

Thus, in developing this analysis, this study focuses on the idea of ‘integration’ in its translation into education policy in the particular context of Switzerland. ‘Integration’ lends itself to discursive analysis and enquiry because it contains the transfer or strategic attribution of meaning to socio-political ideas such as ‘culture’, ‘national identity’ or ideas of ‘equal opportunities’ or access to opportunities, according to contextual normative claims and interests of people within the process and space of policy as discourse. Here I am referencing what Lynch (1998) refers to as ‘flags of political convenience’ or ‘flagships’ according to Fairclough and Wodak (2008). This refers to the use of certain understandings and the signifying of such socio-political ideas by policy actors for the continuation of a distinct policy practice of territorially limiting the ‘national’ spaces of belonging, for various political reasons (chapter 3). It is the way in which these understandings and signified ideas may circulate and become embedded in institutional practices which is my primary concern with respect to the non-justifiable limiting of spaces of belonging in contemporary constellations of society.
1.3 Research on Political Membership

There is a serious lack of attention in public policy research to what I term a key policy attribute, which is the signifying or demarcating of `membership` within and through this policy as discourse, or the framing of `political membership` contained within what I term socio-civic policy. By socio-civic, I am referring to policy and institutional spaces which are not only social, but also address civic attributes, such as `membership`, `integration` or `national`; thus educational policy which addresses `integration` is socio-civic. I broadly base my theoretical conceptions of `membership` on Benhabib’s (2004) understanding of the conflicts of political membership discourses in contemporary states (see chapter 3). However, I extend her `membership` argument by exploring the way in which current discourses in `integration` policy can disclose existing membership and citizenship frames or ideologies through the medium of a particular form of governance used by Western-European nation states. This form of governance, I argue, is a form of `deterritorialised politics`, such as that referred to by Benhabib (2004). I look more closely at the way in which in education, Switzerland’s particular form of governance extending to a European policy space could disclose the framing of membership. I am looking at a small part of the entire discourse taking place in different state institutions and networks, and must be cautious about the generalisations I can make. However, my aim is not to generalise about membership frames in Switzerland or Europe, but rather to locate some particular policy and institutional spaces in which these frames could be signified and circulated in distinct ways and through particular types of governing mediums; and in this way contribute to the larger discourses on `migrants`, `citizenship`, `nation` and frames of membership. Therefore, undoubtedly this study is the first small step in my own research towards dismantling the larger topic of the re-signifying of belonging and membership in contemporary societies.

Benhabib (ibid) calls for the progression of social democracy, by resignifying membership and citizenship, relative to the extended interests of the nation-state to participate in a transnational policy space, such as Switzerland’s interest in participating in Europe. One part of her argument is built on the logic that if nation-states are engaging increasingly in deterritorialised or transnational politics - including transnational migration agreements or strong referencing of a transnational
policy space - they can no longer restrict political membership for migrants within their ‘borders’ on any good grounds for reasons of maintaining territorial functions and restrictions (Benhabib, 2004). I explore in this study whether Switzerland and its position in terms of Europe and particular forms of governance adopted in the educational sphere might disclose this very engagement in what Benhabib has named ‘deterritorialised politics’.

One of the main reasons I favour Benhabib’s deliberations on membership is that she does not deny that social democracy can operate through policy as discourse or be discursively or ideologically constructed per se. This means that she does not deny that the signifying or framing of membership is also occurring discursively, or rooted in social practices and institutions. However, at the same time she does not entirely favour the enlightenment-based conceptualisation of citizenship and membership as different thinkers (see chapter 3) have developed them theoretically until recently. Rather, she condemns nation-states for claiming social democratic status without adherence to what she refers to as the human right to membership, or what I would term right to belonging (see chapter 3). She proposes working with discourse, or the concept of ‘iteration’ (see chapter 3) not only in the disarticulation of power relations, but rather fully understanding and acknowledging, critically and constructively, the discursive element as the medium or ether through which democracy is operating. In this way, she proposes, membership can be resignified according to the changes in contemporary constellations of society, which become apparent though a careful analysis of the discourses constructing democratic practices.

Not only does she base her arguments for political membership as a human right (see chapter 3) on a thorough review and constructive critique of theorists, such as Emmanuel Kant (cosmopolitan right), Juergen Habermas, Hannah Arendt (the right of have rights) and John Rawls (law of peoples, distributive justice and migrations), but she also introduces the concept of ‘democratic iterations’ (Derrida, 1985), which is strongly linked to a discursive approach (chapters 2 and 3). This approach builds on, or takes into account previous normative political ideology of membership, such as already exists in contemporary democracies, and expands critically on this ideology by an emphasis on transdisciplinary research on political sociology of the state. It builds on Benhabib’s (2004) idea of resignifying membership rights more adapted to
current modalities of membership and state commitments. More concretely, this
means that although it is important to look at the theoretical bases upon which the
democratic state is built in terms of ideologies and norms as they constitute the
structures of the state (such as for example the civic-republican concept of the citizen
in Switzerland), it is essential to connect and extend this perspective to consider the
changing spaces of movement, detachment and attachment, de-rootedness and
rootedness of individuals, ways of being, belonging, identity, as well as the movement
of ideas. Moreover, this has to be done in constant relation to the history of `nation-
building’, forms of governing, state policies, structures, institutional practices,
boundary setting, referencing in constituting policy and the state’s outward
projections and relations outside these structures and boundaries. Without this
extension of the perspective, research on ‘membership’ remains fragmented and
excludes the interdisciplinarity of this term. I propose that this kind of research could
be based on a discursive approach, because it supposes that both the pre-existing
structural foundations of the state, as well as the changing modalities of the society
within the state operate, are constructed, and become ‘real’ through discourses.

In this sense, I use broadly or loosely the Critical Discursive method of Analysis
(CDA) (see chapter 2), which views ‘language as a form of social practice’
(Fairclough, 1989: 20) and focuses on the ways social and political domination is
produced and reproduced by text and talk. This study is based on the research
question, whether social and political domination in the form of restriction or limiting
of ‘membership’ for some people within Swiss society could potentially be contained
in the educational discourse of the ‘integration’ of migrants in Switzerland. In this
sense, I support Luke (1996:12) who articulated that discourse analysis can be
understood as a political act itself, an intervention that attempts to ‘interrupt’
everyday common sense (Silverman and Torode, 1980). Such an analysis has the
potential to destabilize ‘authoritative discourses’ (Bakhtin, 1998) and foreground
relations of inequality, domination and subordination.

The understanding of policy as discourse is elaborated in chapter 2, introducing my
use of Norman Fairclough’s framework for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as an
adapted methodological and theoretical conception, as well as other discourse
theorists (see chapter 2). The idea is, as explained above, to use this approach to
analysis as an orientation and not so much as a detailed technical device. The orientation then, is to understand the interconnected policy spaces of this study ‘migration, education and membership’, as being located in and constructed through discourse. Discourse can provide a way in which understandings and frames of membership, which is connected to migration policy, can be disclosed or located in a particular institutional arena. In my study this arena is education, which forms part of the ‘integration’ agenda of the Swiss state in its overarching migration policy, by being explicitly attributed the role to ‘integrate’ within its school policy and structures.

These interconnected spaces of my study thus require a more interdisciplinary approach to analysis. This favours what Benhabib has named a political sociological approach to analysis, which tries to identify ‘deterritorialised politics’ (as per Benhabib; chapter 3) in Switzerland in its relation to Europe. In turn, these types of deterritorialised politics form a part of the narrative on ‘integration’ of migrants in the Swiss case, through particular forms of policy referencing (chapter 2). In this sense, my use of both Fairclough’s framework on CDA and of other discourse theorists, combined with Benhabib’s exploration of contemporary modalities of membership in Western European nation-states, is meant to form an overarching perspective or orientation and broad theoretical and methodological space of analysis, rather than a detailed technical analysis in my empirical and secondary data. Rather, I would like to emphasize that I am borrowing the perspective of policy as discourse, potentially containing or disclosing contemporary changes and challenges of nation-states in the regulation of modalities of (political) membership. In this sense, this understanding of discourse can be seen as a distinctive theoretical and methodological lens through which I am analyzing policy texts, may they be interview narratives or legal and media texts.

This study therefore attempts to take into account the ‘growing normative incongruities’ with reference to the ‘rights of others’, or more specifically rights of migrants within Western-European states, which Benhabib refers to in the quote mentioned at the beginning. These incongruities could provide evidence of what Cole (2000; 2) calls the contradiction which nation-states are facing between ‘expansive and inclusionary principles of moral and political universalism, (…), and the
particularistic and exclusionary conceptions of democratic closure’. If these broadening principles of political universalism, possibly a growing trend if not a shared principle, are extended to include the more capitalist and economically ‘self-preservationist’ oriented outlook of states to compete in the global market, then the contradictions of policy run deep and are more complex. The incongruities, which nation-states face, occur between their attempts to participate in a world order of human rights, paired with the competitive alignments of the global market and the particularistic conceptions of ‘nationalistic’ closure in democratic states. This study explores the case of Switzerland as an example of a Western-European nation-state’s strategic efforts to create migrant ‘integration’ policies, which comply with this delicate coalescence of these different, largely statist interests in this specific area of ‘socio-civic’ policy. By socio-civic I also mean migrant ‘integration’ policy that encompasses multiple sectors within the state and also cuts across different hierarchies in governance.

1.4 Swiss Deterritorialised Politics `in` Europe

On the one hand, Switzerland’s particular position with respect to the European Union and the porous borderlines it has created for itself in and outside of Europe makes it an interesting case-study in terms of how long-standing migration is politicized and framed in social and education policy. Thus, in this study I attempt to take into account the plurality of environments, in which Switzerland’s discourse around migrant ‘integration’ is taking place and in which education is attributed a specific role to ‘solve’ a ‘problematised’ understanding of migration. I explore whether this is done in Switzerland, as in Europe as a growing trend, by adopting a specific form of ‘soft’ governance in education (Lawn and Lingard, 2002; Lawn, 2006), which supports or enhances this role attribution in sustaining existing power relations with reference to migrants in Swiss schools and society. There is an understanding here of changing forms of governance in Europe and possible links to the growth of comparison and measurement through education data (Grek et al. 2009). Thus, education governance becomes a medium through which certain kinds of knowledge and education data are used by key policy makers to frame or ‘solve’ a specific ‘problematised’ understanding of migrants within the Swiss systems of schooling and
society at large (see chapters 2 and 4). This ‘problematised’ understanding is rooted in ideas about essential differences in the educational achievement of Migrants and ‘Swiss’ students, and thus also differences in the access to professional opportunities. These differences were disclosed or made apparent through international studies, such as PISA, in which Swiss results showed large differences in results for migrant students and ‘Swiss’ students (chapter 4). The ‘problem’, which is conceived or drawn from this, is that there is a lack of sufficient ‘integration’ of young migrants and their families in Swiss society and institutions, which prevents them from being ‘full’ participants. One of these institutions named was the educational sphere. Thus, a policy ‘solution’ is framed in an overarching migrant ‘integration’ agenda, which includes education as one of the institutions which is responsible for ‘integrating’ migrants. My concern and interest lies in what this term or concept ‘integration’ means concretely or how it is understood in the educational discourse.

But how does this connect with the idea of ‘deterritorialization’ or the participation in a European space? If the Swiss state issues a large scale ‘integration’ policy, in what ways does this connect to this transnational policy space? In my study, I explore whether this is connected through the particular referencing of policy (as an example of ‘soft’ governance) to provide evidence for the framing of this policy ‘solution’. So I explore the use of a particular form of governing through referencing and borrowing of ideas and concepts. However, the act of negotiation or policy ‘solution’ addresses the all important question of whose claims and interests are being framed and met, in other words we are speaking about power relations, or the participants, who are framing the discourse.

According to Guiraudon and Favell (2009), the idea of a technocratic group of elites, manipulating mass populations at a European level is no longer a realistic model of studying European, or indeed any form of governance. However, this case-study of Switzerland, not part of the EU, but part of Europe, explores whether a loose network of people working at different levels of the federation and positioned politically at different points of the political spectrum nonetheless illustrate the existence of a policy space of ‘shared ideas’ (Novoa and Lawn, 2002). In this sense, they act as a policy elite through a shared interest in maintaining pre-existing conceptions of political membership that sustain their power. In my empirical data collection, I locate
different policy makers, and identify a loose network, such as could be circulating, interpreting, translating and ‘sharing’ certain ideas and understandings about migrant ‘integration’ in the context of schooling and education governance.

The specific location of the study – Switzerland - allows for the interrogation of migrant ‘integration’ within a distinctive multi-level framework of analysis that connects ‘Europe’ to the national context of Switzerland; the federal, cantonal governance system within that state; and the institutions responsible for ‘delivering’ integration through education at the local and school levels. Thus, this study locates Switzerland as a policy space within ‘Europe’, understood as a source of pressure from above and below to adhere to common (education) standards and as pushing processes of comparison through the Swiss policy space (see chapter 2).

There is an understanding within this study of Europe as ‘fluid and changing, itself swept by the international pressures and simultaneously located in and produced by the global, the idea of the European and the national’ (Grek et al., 2009: 6). ‘Europeanisation’ is understood as suggested by Grek et al. (2009) in their study on ‘Fabricating Quality in European Education’ as having the potential of simultaneously being a response to, as well as a conduit of globalisation (Rosamund, 2003: in Grek et al. 2009: 6). By this, they mean that Europeanisation can function as a vehicle for the transmission of global agendas into the national arena, and that it can provide a focus for support of a European social model in response to neo-liberal pressures from transnational organisations like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Grek et al., 2009).

In this study, I propose that Switzerland is caught up in these neo-liberal pressures by trying to create and sustain its place in Europe. For this study, I explore whether in Switzerland, policy understandings of migrant ‘integration’ in education are influenced by ‘problematised’ discourses of comparative performance in education (both international and European) and by the politics of migration and European economic integration (see chapters 3 and 5). One of the key factors of the construction of policy as discourse is therefore comparison and the way of building a particular kind of identity and participation of Switzerland in the European space (Arnott and Ozga, 2010). By participating in comparative education standards drawn from studies
such as the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Switzerland uses these standards in a particular way to frame migrant ‘integration’ policies for education (see chapter 4). PISA data are used by many nation states to justify change or provide support for existing policy direction or reform in both the domestic, or national and the European contexts (Grek, 2009). Grek (2009), in her discussion of the study results for the PISA ‘effect’ in Europe for the cases of Finland, Germany and the UK countries, provides the argument that ‘local’ policy actors use PISA as a form of ‘domestic policy legitimation’, or as a means of ‘defusing discussion of ‘real’ domestic issues (here long standing migration) by presenting policy as based on robust evidence’ (2009:34). She goes on to explain that the ‘local policy actor also signals, to an international audience’ and here I would add to the national audience, ‘through PISA, the adherence of their nation to reform agendas’ (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004:76) and in this manner joins the ‘club of competitive nations’ (Grek, 2009:35).

In my study, much of the empirical data collected refers to the use of education data drawn from comparative studies, particularly PISA. The kind of ‘knowledge’ derived from PISA (2000) in this case, is that of differences of educational attainment between migrants and ‘local’ Swiss students; where the migrants were shown to have much lower educational attainment levels. National follow up studies in Swiss education research have tried to identify the reasons behind these results and what they could mean for the Swiss education system (see chapter 4). A key issue in the questions posed to Swiss policy actors in the interviews I conducted in this study, is therefore also concerned with what kind of knowledge and information is used to inform ‘integration’ policy in their respective areas of work. PISA and the participation in an international comparative programme has evidently affected the policy process of ‘integration’ in Swiss education policy; ‘integration’ policy texts in education are peppered with terminology such as ‘standards’, ‘indicators’ and ‘quality’. PISA in this sense, could bear strong references as to how migrants’ educational attainment is viewed, drawn from and referenced for in policy relating to migrant ‘integration’ in Switzerland. I would argue that this use of this information or data is then politicized in particular ways (see chapter 6). This is where the ‘flags of political convenience’ (Lynch, 1998) play a role.
These mechanisms and forms of ‘soft’ governance (Lawn, 2006), reflect an approach to governance through the movement of ideas, notions and data, which are continually extending their co-authorship to a growing number of people in various positions and cross-sector mandates. Thus, we are dealing with a ‘constantly moving, liquid and undefined European education space’ (Grek et al., 2009:6). This is ‘policy through governance’ rather than ‘policy by governments’ (Alexiadou, 2007). In addition, these ideas are being continually re-constructed or re-contextualised in different normative national and local settings, such as in Swiss spaces of migrant presence. However, what are identifiable are common or shared ideas (Coulby, 2002; Grek et al., 2009), which are finding their ways across borders and across sectors. It is precisely this crosscutting nature of governance and the instruments that are used for governing that allow research about Europeanisation that has little to do with formal regulations or simply institutions (Guiraudon and Favell, 2009, Grek et al, 2009, Lawn 2006). This is an important perspective for my study, because I am trying to question whether Switzerland is engaging in deterritorialised politics, which does not only look at EU regulations for EU member states, but rather looks at the cross-cutting movement and circulation of shared ideas and concepts, which eventually find their way into various national settings and are used in distinctive political ways. Thus, the politicization of a specific national context, such as migrant ‘integration’ and membership frames in the Swiss case, is influenced by Europeanising effects.

In the context of this study, one of the issues that I pursue is the specific use of PISA data as policy evidence and how this is woven into narratives on ‘integration of migrants’ within Swiss systems. I link the ideas of ‘soft’ governance as ‘new’ modes of coordination through mechanisms of OMC (Open Method of Coordination), which are taking place in Switzerland through increased participation in European policy (Steiner-Khamsi, 2002) and its referencing of PISA and OECD data in education (Alexiadou, 2007) and its translation for ‘integration’. This policy is contextualised with the debate of ‘integration’ of migrants within the education system in an overarching ‘integration mandate’ set out by the Federal government in Switzerland.

These Europeanising developments, I argue, are contributing to what Benhabib (2004) describes as a ‘disaggregation or decline of citizenship through deterritorialised politics. Benhabib (ibid.) illustrates the disaggregation effect with reference to the
rights regimes of the contemporary European Union, in which, for example, the rights of citizens of member countries of the EU are sharply delineated from those of third-country nationals, within a patchwork of local, national, and supranational rights regimes. That this is also the case for Switzerland can be readily illustrated. Firstly, this kind of patchwork of rights regimes exists in Swiss economic policy related to economic immigration and migration (see chapter 5). Secondly, I understand Europe not only in the sense of the EU, but also as a transnational space of ideas (Grek et al. (2009), that travel and that create interdependencies and trends of deterritorialised politics in other European countries, such as Switzerland.

I therefore argue that modalities of ‘membership’ have also acquired multiple spheres and this same notion of fluidity, in that belonging is constituted not only at the regional or national levels, but rather has been extended through transnational migration and globalisation to create more porous and multi-dimensional identities. In the face of these developments, I argue that old concepts and modalities of membership are becoming increasingly questionable and require resignifying, taking into account this multi-dimensionality.

1.5 The Approach to Discourse

1.5.1 The structure of analysis

I adopt a loose interpretation of Fairclough’s framework on CDA along with some deliberations by other discourse theorists, combined with Benhabib’s exploration of contemporary modalities of membership in Western European nation-states. As stated earlier, the idea is to use this approach to analysis as a theoretical and methodological orientation rather than a technical device. The approaches to textual analysis used in this study are more traditional (see chapters 2 and 6), however they are shaped by theoretical and methodological orientation towards CDA. Thus the orientation is to understand the interconnected policy spaces of this study ‘migration, education and membership’, as being located in and constructed through discourse. Discourse provides a way in which understandings and frames of membership, which are connected to migration policy, can be disclosed or located in a particular institutional arena. In my study this arena is education, which forms part of the ‘integration’
agenda of the Swiss state in its overarching migration policy, by being explicitly attributed the role to ‘integrate’ within its school policy and structures.

The idea of discourse provides the tool through which both the phenomena of ‘deterritorialised politics’ and contemporary modalities of membership according to Benhabib (2004) can be disclosed, analysed and re-signified. The disclosure and analysis form the ‘critical’ part of CDA, whereas the re-signifying would represent the ‘constructive’ element, as suggested by Fairclough (2009:161).

This means that I am seeking to reveal, on the one hand (A) the existence and form of ‘deterritorialised politics’ for the case of Switzerland. This is done partly by examining the way ‘integration’ policy is referenced and what policy-informing evidence it draws from. Moreover, in addition to the policy reviewing in the areas of migration and education policy related to ‘integration’, I also review Swiss economic policy development in relation to migration in recent years (chapter 3 and 5), as economic and migration policy have been closely linked in Switzerland, since immigration has also been based on labour market choices made by the Swiss state. (A) is therefore analysed in the context of Switzerland, its migration and economic policy; the education policy connected to this; the policy referencing as a form of governing; and all these aspects in connection to its relation to Europe (see chapters 4, 5 and 6).

On the other hand, I am trying to discern and locate (B) the understanding of ‘integration’ - as a part of locating modalities of membership in social practices - and the concepts connected closely to this term, which are, for example, ‘migrant’, ‘culture’, ‘national’ and ‘membership’. I understand both these aspects of analysis (A and B) to be discernible or to be located in discourses; a) referencing as a form of ‘soft’ governance and b) construction of the understanding of modalities of membership through ‘integration’ policy in institutional arenas, such as education. In order to do so, in the first case (A), I review and follow up the policy informing sources and references in their particular form and translation into the ‘integration’ policy texts and policy actors’ understandings about these policy references (chapter 4 and 6). In the second case (B), I review ‘integration’ policy, both in Swiss Federal Law texts and by interviewing people located in various Federal and Cantonal departments; by reviewing media texts related to ‘integration’ of migrants in Swiss
schools; as well as by reviewing and interviewing education policy networks related to the area of ‘integration’ or ‘diversity’.

Structure of Analysis and link between Education-Migration-Membership

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>‘integration’ policy as discourse</th>
<th>Chapters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) Is Switzerland engaging in deterritorialised Politics?</td>
<td>The Swiss state frames large-scale ‘integration’ agenda: declaring the role of Education</td>
<td>Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Referencing of PISA: evidence for ‘problem’ of ‘integration’ of migrants</td>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
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<td>- Development of Education policy</td>
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<td>- Development of Economic policy</td>
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<td>- Development of Migration policy</td>
<td>Chapter 3 Chapter 5</td>
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<td>- Relationship ‘in’ and ‘out’ of Europe</td>
<td>Chapter 3 Chapter 5</td>
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<td>B) What does ‘integration’ mean according to the policy texts (both written and narratives)? How does this form a part of or contribute to frames of membership?</td>
<td>Understandings/ideologies/frames:</td>
<td>Chapter 5 Chapter 6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. An ideological appraisal of migration and pre-existing ideologies of membership</td>
<td>Chapter 5 Chapter 6</td>
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<td>2. The understanding of ‘culture’</td>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
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<td>3. Special Needs and the dichotomising of students</td>
<td>Chapter 4 Chapter 6</td>
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<td>4. Social Class and Mobility/Language</td>
<td>Chapter 4 Chapter 6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Evidence-based policy and the ‘soft’ governing solution</td>
<td>Chapter 4 Chapter 6</td>
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The discursive themes, which I have identified progressively throughout the analysis of both (A) and (B) have emerged as broadly the following:

- An ideological appraisal (of migration in Switzerland) and pre-existing structures/ideologies of political membership
- The understanding of culture
- Special Needs and the Dichotomising of Students
- Social Class and Mobility/Language
- Evidence-based policy and the ‘soft’ governing solution

These themes are discussed and connected to relate both the queries of (A) and (B). How this was done discursively is explained in the following sections.

1.5.2 An adapted model to the discursive approach

Discourse includes the Social practices that ‘mediate’ the relationship between general and abstract social structures and particular concrete social events; social fields, institutions and organizations are constituted as networks of social practices (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; in Fairclough, 2009). Here, the mediation of social practices that I focus on are ‘soft’ forms of education governance, which include the managing of the European policy space in the interests of dominant groups and actors (in Grek et al., 2009:123).

A Social process can be seen as the interplay between three levels of social reality: social structures, practices and events (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Here, the dialectical relationships are located within and between the discourses that are predominant in migrant ‘integration’ policy; i.e. policy texts about ‘integration’; sources of ‘knowledge’ referenced in these policy texts; and the narratives and representations of policy actors involved in policy processes and the networks of social practices in educational institutions located in various Cantons and regions within Switzerland. Education is a key arena for the ‘integration’ processes formulated by the Swiss Federal Government and by the increasingly Europeanised or globalised reference to comparative standards of education, and involvement in the European/global market. In this sense, the social processes within my enquiry concern the signifying, establishment or demarcation of ‘political membership’ frames and the relationships between discourses of ‘integration’ and social practices within educational institutions.

In exploring these relationships I draw on Fairclough’s (2009) identification of two dialectical relations: between structure (especially social practices as an intermediate level of structuring) and events (or structure and action, structure and strategy) and
within each, between semiotic and other elements. ’Dialectical’ here means a systematic method of argument that attempts to resolve the contradictions of opposing views or ideas. In my study, the dialectical aspect is also located within the negotiation processes of different, often competing normative claims and interests of different groups of policy actors in the continual development of policy as discourse. There are three major ways in which semiosis relates to other elements of social practices and of social events, according to Fairclough (2009) – as a facet of action; in the construing (representation) of aspects of the world; and in the constitution of identities. Moreover, there are three semiotic (or discourse-analytical) categories corresponding to these; ’genre (semiotic ways of acting and interacting), discourse and style (identities, or ’ways of being’, in their semiotic aspect: for example being a ’manager’ requires a certain form of semiotic style) ’ (2009: 164).

Discourses, in this sense, can be understood as semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world, which can be identified with different positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors. The location of these different groups of actors and their semiotic way of construing their specific understanding of ’integration’ is connected to the idea of disclosing existing power relations, such as is the key objective of CDA (Fairclough, 1992). The social actors I have focused on within this study are located within a relatively ‘loose’ network of ‘integration’ policy. Grek et al. (2009) explain how policy networks can increasingly blur boundaries between the state and civil society – what I term socio-civic policy – with the growth of cooperation or dispersed responsibilities among state and non-state agencies and involvement of actors from the private as well as voluntary sectors in the delivery of services; here the delivery of services related to what is termed ’integration’ processes. Thus, Europeanisation operates through what could be called a ‘cosmopolitan cross border elite’ (Grek et al., 2009:123), operating in and across different sectors:

’The elite, operating in political and managerial areas of transnational government, commerce, business and public services, is fluid, heterogeneous and polymorphic. When the elite operates within transnational governance, networks and partnerships and outside the old national and local ways, it becomes more diffuse and at the same time more obvious. Castells (2000a) has called the space in which it operates, the “space of flows”, a new connecting and shaping of social practices, including the managing of the space in the interests of dominant interests. It is this idea, which
has replaced the older national forms of conductive processes of control. It is not though a form, which can be controlled easily and within firm boundaries.’ (Grek et al. 2009:123)

However, the policy ‘elite’ is not a closed list of policy participants, as for example self-understandings and self-representation of students, migrants, parents, teachers etc. are also social actors involved in creating discourses of ‘integration’ or membership. The scope and scale of my study however have only permitted me to include the policy actors located within different federal and Cantonal departments in a loose network of ‘integration’ policy makers, who can also be termed ‘policy brokers’ according to Grek et al. (2009:6). They refer to people, who are located in some sense at the interface between the national and the European and who ‘translate’ the meaning of national data into policy terms or interpret European developments into the national space.

Stephen Ball (1993/1994) makes a distinction in the understanding of ‘policy’ between ‘policy as text’ and ‘policy as discourse’, whereby policy as discourse is inclusive of texts understood as not only written texts, but also conversations and interviews, as well as the ‘multi-modal’ texts (mixed language and visual images) (Fairclough, 2009). For my study, I understand text as language in use (Halliday & Hasan, 1985; in Luke, 1996:14). That is, any instance of written and spoken language that has coherence and coded meaning. All texts are located in key social institutions, such as for example families, schools, churches; workplaces, media, government etc. (see Luke, 1996:14).

‘It is through everyday texts that cultural categories and versions of children, students, adults, and workers are built up, established, and in a hierarchical social grid of the “normal”, are taught and learned; categories of gender identity, sexual desire, ethnic identity, class and work, regional solidarity, citizenship and national identity (Baker & Davies, 1993, Davies, 1989; C. Luke, 1991). (...) In other words, CDA tends to begin from poststructuralist scepticism toward the assumption that people have singular, essential social identities or fixed cultural, social class, or gendered characteristics. It assumes that subjectivities are strategically constructed and contested through textual practices and that they are crafted in the dynamics of everyday life.’ (Luke, 1996:14)
In addition to texts, however, CDA views ‘language as a form of social practice’ (Fairclough, 1989: 20) and is particularly interested in the ways social and political domination is produced and reproduced by text and talk. I would like to argue that it is with reference to this particular understanding of policy as discourse, containing language in use within texts that contributes in disclosing pre-existing power relations in the domain of membership practices. In line with this particular aim of Critical Discourse Analysis which theorists highlight (see Luke, 1996; Fairclough, 2009), I explore within my study whether the dialectical relationships between ‘integration’ discourses and social practices within schools are contributing to the persistence or continuation of potentially out-dated and discriminatory / exclusionary modalities of ‘membership’ or ‘citizenship’. Benhabib (2004) also suggests the dialectic of rights and identities: commonly, the individual who is the subject of rights is assumed to have some kind of fixed identity which precedes the entitlement to the right in question, but what is frequently neglected in her point of view, is that the exercise of rights themselves and the practice of political agency can change these identities.

In the following model of CDA derived from Fairclough (1992), ‘texts’ are seen to be embedded within what is termed the ‘three-dimensional conception of discourse’, in which the dimensions correspond to layers that restrict the production and meaning of a particular given text, or language in use.

(A) The first innermost layer (see model below) looks at linguistic construction and how it makes certain ways of shaping language even possible.

(B) The second layer is the way the text is produced, referenced, distributed and interpreted and how it shapes the meaning of that particular text in this process.

(C) In the third dimension or layer, the broader social structures (social, political and economic) are disclosed and the way in which the dominant class exerts power over society is focussed upon. Moreover, it explores how language is used to allow or limit certain textual constructions to maintain or change the power structure. This explains how particular ideologies work through discursive practices to maintain existing power relations.
Fairclough (2009), in his more recent work, has expanded or reformulated the intertextuality and relationships between the three levels through incorporating the use of a ‘dialectical-relational’ model of CDA (see below and Chapter 2). Although, in my study, I loosely base my framework of analysis on this newer conception of CDA, nonetheless this older model can be used to show how the empirical and policy text data within my thesis relate to the methodological approach of political sociology of Switzerland and Europeanising influences on education governance, which I combine (D) with the overarching contribution of Benhabib’s theoretical reflections on ‘membership’:

Perpetuation of restrictive and exclusionary modalities of ‘political membership’ for migrants in Swiss society through education ‘integration’ policy

Role of Education as part of the migrant ‘integration mandate’ of the Swiss Federal Government/ Migration Politics/ Federalism/ Economy

Europeanisation of education policy: (C)

‘Soft’ governance (B)

Below: a) – d)

TEXT

Semiosis (A)

DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

(Knowledge-reference, production, distribution, networking, interpretation)

SOCIAL PRACTICE (Ideology, Power/Hegemony)

Benhabib’s theoretical perspective on ‘membership’ as a human right

SOCIAL PROCESSES (Interplay between social structures, practices and events)

Analytical Framework of CDA, adapted from Fairclough, 1992, p. 73; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2009; Benhabib, 2004

In my adapted model above, I propose analysing the ways the texts (see below a) – d)) of ‘integration’ policy in education within my study disclose Europeanising practices of governance, or what Benhabib (2004) has named deterritorialised politics. As mentioned before, I do these using traditional methods of analysis, such as textual, thematic and narrative analysis, however with the logic of CDA, which I argue is not incompatible, but rather enhancing, overarching and framing the way texts or language is seen to influence and construct the social world.
Thus, governance acts as a **discursive practice** through which texts are referenced, produced, distributed and interpreted or consumed in certain ways. This corresponds to the discursive-analytical method of relating texts to other elements of social practice, by looking at *genre, discourse and style* (see above; Fairclough, 2009). In this sense, it is the method of analysing the particular way in which language relates both within and between texts (intertextuality) - written, spoken and image-based - to a particular way of acting or interacting of social actors or interviewees in a loose network of integration policy (*genre*); or in the particular construction of their understanding of ‘integration’ and related terms (*discourse*); and their personal identities, or ‘ways of being’ (*style*) in their respective positions or personal stances of being policy actors, political and public figures and social actors (Fairclough, 2009: 164).

I relate these discursive practices of potential Europeanisation of governance moreover, with the **social practices** consisting of multiple facets of ‘mediation’ between the general social structures of Swiss Federal Government and Cantonal Education Departments; the historical and economic backdrop of these structures, and the concrete social events which then take place in the Swiss school system (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; in Fairclough, 2009:164). Such as the specific role education has to play within an ‘integration framework’ launched by the Swiss Federal Government; the contemporary migration politics; the historical development and conjunctures of federalism and European economic integration of Switzerland (see chapters 3 and 5).

To this I add the wider or more over-arching theoretical perspective on how ‘membership’ frames are constituted through these discursive and social practices; Benhabib (2004) is thus positioned as a broad theoretical standpoint on the **social processes** of how ‘political membership’ or ‘citizenship’ is potentially framed and contained within these policy processes and particular dialectical-relational aspects of the ‘integration’ discourse.

Within my study, the specific policy **texts** are drawn from:
a) 40 media newspaper articles from different Cantons in Switzerland researched in the Swiss Social Archive in Zurich, of documents dating over a period of roughly six years, from 2000 to 2006; the topics are broadly categorized to include reports on migrant students within Swiss schools, party political stances and debates, case study scenarios, research ‘opinions’ on these issues, local school projects, school reports, narratives of teachers, parents, students and politicians. (see chapter 5)

b) The current or relatively recently introduced Integration policy legislative texts of the Swiss Federal Law (see chapter 5).

c) The Education policy ‘HARMOS’ and other texts and Swiss research resources on PISA and OECD education comparative results and reactions (see chapter 4).

d) 11 Narratives/Interviews of various policy actors/policy brokers/politicians/government officials / pedagogues/ teachers/ researchers in a loose ‘integration’ network (see chapter 6).

Ball (1993) raises the concern that although the concept of ‘policy as text’ does include aspects of looking at social agency and intentionality of actors, it may concentrate too much on ‘what those who inhabit policy think about and misses and fails to attend to what they do not think about’ (1993:14). It is important to think about the way in which policy collections of related policies exercise power through the production of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ as discourses. Moreover, as the understanding of policy in CDA encompasses the relational aspect of discourse with other elements of social practice, it is therefore in my own view more holistic. I have tried to incorporate this logic of relationality or ‘intertextuality’ (Fairclough, 1990a) in my analysis, by discussing policy texts in relation to each other and in relation to historical/economic discussions of Swiss migration and education contexts.

To avoid bias in the analysis of interview narratives or policy texts, I use triangulation, by using intertextuality between the texts and also in connecting these to historical, economic and migration developments both in the specific case of Switzerland, and in its unique position in and out of Europe, and generally in Europe itself in the last few decades. Moreover, I incorporate the themes which Swiss research has highlighted in the last few years in the context of PISA and migrant
performance in schools. To this I have added a review or reference to media texts, which were used according to how they appeared or were available in the Swiss social archive, thus being aware of a situational selection that can hardly be avoided, but abstaining from my own selection.

1.5.3 Discourse, Knowledge and Power

In order to link the discursive approach with my own adapted model of analysis, it becomes necessary to give more details as to how the notions of ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ feature within this approach and are linked to ‘discourse’; although I give a more detailed theoretical and methodological review in chapters 2 and 3, however, it is important to make some references here for clarification. I support Jessop’s (2004) approach that the particular concern of CDA is with the radical changes that are taking place in contemporary social life, such as the transformations in modalities of citizenship and membership, with how discourse figures within these processes of change and with the shifts in the relationship between semiosis and other social elements in networks of practices. In this sense, CDA is critical in that it aims to contribute to addressing what Fairclough (2009) calls the social ‘wrongs’ of the day (in a broad sense – injustice, inequality, lack of freedom) by analysing their sources and causes, resistance to them and possibilities of overcoming them (see chapter 2). So CDA seeks to clarify how semiosis in its relation to other social elements ‘figures in the establishment, reproduction and change of unequal power relations (domination, marginalisation, exclusion of some people by others) and in ideological processes, and how in more general terms it bears upon human ‘well-being’ (Fairclough, in Wodak and Meyer, 2009:163).

However, he emphasizes that the role of discourse in social practices cannot be taken for granted, but rather needs to be established through analysis. Discourse, in his particular approach is commonly used in various senses including

(a) meaning-making as an element of the social process, (b) the language associated with a particular social field or practice (e.g. ‘political discourse’), and (c) a way of construing aspects of the world with a particular social perspective (e.g. a ‘neo-liberal discourse of globalization’). It is easy to confuse them, so to at
least partially reduce the scope for confusion, I prefer to use semiosis for the first, most abstract and general sense (Fairclough et al., 2004), which has the further advantage of suggesting that discourse analysis is concerned with various ‘semiotic modalities’ of which language is only one (others are visual images and ‘body language’). (Fairclough in Wodak and Meyer, 2009:162/163)

In this sense, semiosis, is used by Fairclough as an ‘element of the social process, which is dialectically related to others – hence a ‘dialectical-relational’ approach (2009:163). In my study, this relation occurs within institutional spaces such as education and migration-related loose networks of organisations (and socio-cultural communities) where the discourses of political membership rights and identities are dialectical, such as suggested by Benhabib (2004). These relations between elements moreover, are dialectical in the sense of being different, but not ‘discrete’ or fully separate (Fairclough, 2009:163). According to Harvey (1996), this implies that each element ‘internalizes’ the others without being reducible to them. ‘Social relations, power, institutions, beliefs and cultural values are in part semiotic; they “internalize” semiosis without being reducible to it’ (Fairclough, 2009:163). In this perspective, political institutions or institutions such as education should not be treated as entirely semiotic, but rather the semiotic element can be explored in its relationship to other social elements.

Allan Luke (1996), in his review of CDA in education research, exemplifies how many educational analyses have difficulty in showing how large-scale social discourses are systematically (or unsystematically) manifest in everyday talk and writing in local sites. On the other hand, Gee (1990) argued that many socio-linguistic and linguistic analyses of texts pay close attention to patterns of language in use but stop short of exploring how discourses evidenced in local contexts have political and ideological consequences (Gee, Michaels & O’Conner, 1992).

In this way, a central task of contemporary approaches to discourse analysis is to theorize and study the micro politics of discourse, to examine actual patterns of language use with some degree of detail and explicitness but in ways that reconnect instances of local discourse with salient political, economic, and cultural formations (McHoul & Luke, 1989). (…) I want to explore the potential and value of discourse analysis explicitly tied to a sociological analysis of how educational knowledge, competence and curriculum
contribute to the differential production of power and subjectivity.  

In line with contemporary approaches to CDA, I emphasize within this study the need to explore how educational knowledge and referencing may contribute to sustaining or defining particular pre-existing ‘political membership’ frames or modalities. This may be discussed by looking at ways in which the role of education is framed within an ‘integration’ agenda of the Federal Government both within the policy texts and within subjective narratives, but also by looking at the specific kind of knowledge that is used to provide ‘evidence’ for policy-informing purposes. Moreover, I suggest that it is important to link semiotic analysis with a more macro-level perspective on Europeanising processes, on migration processes and understandings of migration within Europe and Switzerland and on political normative developments in Switzerland and the notions of ‘nation’ and ‘identity’ and ‘others’.

In his review, Luke describes, how after a period of psycholinguistic influences on linguistic research in education, and the collaborative work of psycholinguistics and ethnographers of communication, Michel Foucault’s post-structuralist analyses of social history and contemporary culture has reinforced ‘scepticism toward the transparency of talk, interview data, and narratives as unproblematic sources of information about “reality”, “truth”, “intent” and “motivation”’ (1972, 1977, 1979 and 1980; in Luke, 1996:9). Very broadly, Foucault described the constructing character of discourse; how in broader social formations and in local sites and uses, discourse defines, constructs and positions human subjects. According to Foucault (1972:49), “discourses systematically form the objects about which they speak”.

Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority. Discourses embody the meaning and use of propositions and words. Thus, certain possibilities for thought are constructed. Words are ordered and combined in particular ways and other combinations are displaced or excluded. (Ball, 1993: 14)

According to Stephen Ball (1993), in these terms the effects of policy are primarily discursive, because discourse changes the possibilities that one has for thinking ‘otherwise’. It limits what he calls ‘our responses to change and leads us to misunderstand what policy is by misunderstanding what it does.’ (1993:14). Here, the
crucial issue concerns how policy as discourse limits ‘membership’ through pre-emptive ideological demarcations and their continuous re-iterations. I connect this approach to the idea of the enactment of ‘social-democratic flag-bearing’ (Lynch, 1998; Fairclough and Wodak, 2008) and the idea of ‘dominant’ discourses, such as neo-liberalism and management theory (Ball, 1993; Jessop, 2004; Rizvi, 2006; Fairclough, 2009) within social and education policy. These knowledge-power relations within these dominant discourses are achieved according to Foucault, by the construction of “truths” about the social and natural world; truths that become taken-for-granted definitions and categories by which governments rule and monitor their populations and by which members of communities define themselves and others (Foucault, 1972; in Luke, 1996). Particularly in the case of migrants, historical movements have been from an outright namelessness and invisibility to inclusion in public discourses and human sciences as ‘deficit human subjects’ (Luke, 1996: 38). It is what Luke refers to as ‘the ontology of simultaneous presence and absence’ (1996:38; also Young, 1990). CDA, in this sense offers the evidence of what Rattansi (1992) calls ‘discursive deracialization’.

With respect to the aspect of ‘enactment’, it is helpful to consider how discourses include representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries. Fairclough (2009) refers to imaginaries as representations of how things might, could, or should be. However, in his more recent work, he prefers to replace the term ‘represent’ with ‘construe’, in order to emphasize an active and often difficult process of ‘grasping’ the world from a particular perspective. The knowledges of knowledge-economy or knowledge-society or the idea of an ‘economic citizen’, are imaginaries in this sense, or in other words projections of policy makers of possible state of affairs or what Fairclough calls ‘possible worlds’ (2009:165).

Rizvi (2006) bases his understanding of ‘imagination’ on a thorough critical review of the concepts of Appadurai ((2001), Greene (1995), Castoriadis (1987) Goankar (2002) and Taylor (2004). Importantly for policy discourse analysis, social imaginaries exist through ‘representation or implicit understandings embodied in what Wittgenstein (1974) called ‘ordinary language’; they are the means by which individuals understand their identities and place in the world and are able to suggest transformations of the prevailing order. ‘ Charles Taylor (2004: 24; in Rizvi,
2006:196) has elaborated that social imaginary not only is contained within everyday notions and images, but also in theories and practices; “theories are often in possession of a relatively few people, while social imaginary is more broadly shared and makes possible a widely shared sense of legitimacy. (...) For a theory to become a part of the social imaginary, it must evolve into a kind of common understanding that enables us to carry out our every day practices. In this way, social imaginary is both factual and normative.” However, according to Appadurai (2001) in addition to the role of the social imaginary in the formation of subjectivities, its analysis must include globalising contexts, which are diffusing social imaginaries across most communities of the world. Rizvi (2006) speaks about how people live today amongst many social imaginaries, which are additionally dictated by the dominant national (and transnational) formations and that people are forced to interpret and negotiate different, often competing social imaginaries. He emphasizes the need in policy research in education of posing the key questions about ways in which public policies relevant to the provision of education are being developed, enacted and evaluated. This pertains to the overarching question of how authority over education ‘role-fixing’ or ‘attribution’ is secured?

‘In my view, social imaginaries play a major role in making policies authoritative, in securing consent and becoming legitimate. They provide the backdrop against which people develop a common understanding that makes possible common policy practices and a shared sense of legitimacy. They bring together factual and normative aspects of policies, and enable people to develop a shared understanding of the problems to which policies are posed as solutions. Indeed, it is an effort to secure popular legitimacy that Governments spend large sums of money to develop a common understanding of policies so that they are evenly implemented, in line with their expectations. Indeed, Governments recognise the importance of developing a social imaginary within which policy practices are located. ‘ (Rizvi, 2006: 198)

Thus, Rizvi (ibid) highlights the need to discuss where the authority for the establishment of these social imaginaries comes from? He extends in this sense Ball’s (1994) conceptualisation of policy as being useful in demonstrating the complexities of the various ways in which policies are constructed and interpreted and through which authority is exercised, by also questioning the nature and extent of this authority itself.
In this study, the social imaginaries I am interested in are those contributing to the establishment or framing modalities of ‘membership’; I support the questions Rizvi (ibid.) asks about where the authority for the establishment of this social imaginary contributing to certain ideas about ‘membership’ comes from, and how and to which extent this authority is exercised. By taking into account the construction of policy as discourse through different texts and interviews with policy actors in a loose network of ‘integration’, more insight can be gained about the authority contributing to the framing of distinct modalities of ‘membership’.

Fairclough (2009), may offer an approach to analysing authority or power in that he suggests that imaginaries can be enacted as actual (networks of) practices and include materialisation of discourses. These enactments can in part also themselves be discursive and semiotic; discourses become enacted as genres; as for instance New Public Management discourses, which become enacted as new genres (see chapter 2). However, more relevant for my enquiry is the concept that discourses as imaginaries may also come to being ‘inculcated as new ways of being and identities’ (Fairclough, 2009):

Discourses as imaginaries may also come to being inculcated as new ways of being, new identities. Inculcation is a matter of, in the current jargon, people coming to ‘own’ discourses, to position themselves inside them, to act and think and talk and see themselves in terms of new discourses. Inculcation is a complex process, and probably less secure than enactment. A stage towards inculcation is rhetorical deployment; people may learn new discourses and use them for certain purposes while at the same time self-consciously keeping a distance from them. One of the mysteries of the dialectics of discourse is the process in which what begins as self-conscious rhetorical deployment becomes ‘ownership’ - how people become unconsciously positioned within a discourse. Inculcation also has its material aspects: discourses are dialectically inculcate not only in styles, ways of using language, they are also materialised in bodies, postures, gestures, ways of moving, and so forth (Fairclough, 2009:164/165; in Wodak and Meyer, 2009).

I attempt to map a loose network of policy actors and politicians, forming part of the processes of policy understood as discourse, and whose perceptions and understandings of ‘integration’ and what it involves in their respective and subjective
contexts is discussed in chapter 6. The concept of ‘inculcation’ raises the questions of whether and how people become part of, or, as Fairclough phrases it, ‘become unconsciously (or consciously) positioned within a discourse’ and come to eventually ‘own’ it (2009:165). This ‘begins with self-conscious rhetorical deployment’. Both aspects of ‘enactment’ and ‘inculcation’ in this sense look at the operationalization of discourse (Fairclough, 2009:171) and may offer what Rizvi (2006) calls the ‘analysis of the nature and extent of authority’. This operationalization of discourse is conceptualised in chapter 2.

I explore the way in which Switzerland responds to, and absorbs the OECD indicators (mainly from PISA), the benchmarks and standards, which form the basis for the EU education OMC policy, and which may then be used and referenced as policy-informing evidence by policy makers (see below for more detail, and also chapter 6) in the context of an ‘integration’ agenda. Here the focus of enquiry is on whether this reference, response or absorption is a form of ‘deterritorialised politics’. This in turn may contribute to conceal or ‘flag’ the perpetuation of existing conceptions and demarcations of political membership, thus enacting a specific power relation, authority and dominance through discourse.

1.5.4 The Critical and Constructive aspects of CDA

This is where the reference to the critical aspect of CDA comes into play. Critical social research, according to Fairclough (2009) aims to contribute to addressing the social ‘wrongs’ of the day (in a broad sense – injustice, inequality, lack of freedom) by analysing their sources and causes, resistance to them and possibilities for overcoming them. In this sense it has what has been termed both a ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ character. In other words CDA can operate ‘critically’ and ‘constructively’ (Luke, 1996:12).

On the one hand, it analyses and seeks to explain dialectical relations between semiosis and other social elements to clarify how semiosis figures in the establishment, reproduction and change of unequal power relations (dominance, marginalization, exclusion of some people by others) and in ideological processes, and how in more general terms it bears upon human ‘well-being’. These relations require analysis because there are no societies whose
logic and dynamic, including how semiosis figures within them, are fully transparent to all: the forms in which they appear to people are often in part misleading. On the other hand, critique is oriented to analysing and explaining, with a focus on these dialectical relations, the many ways in which the dominant logic and dynamic are tested, challenged and disrupted by people, and to identifying possibilities which these suggest for overcoming obstacles to addressing 'wrongs' and improving well-being. (Fairclough, 2009:163; in Wodak and Meyer, 2009)

CDA therefore can be used not only to 'disentangle' meanings and disclose power relations', but rather through theorization of power and its productive elements it suggests change possibilities at the macro and micro level (Liasidou, 2008:486). Both these 'critical' and 'constructive' aspects of the CDA approach may have significant potential applications in education. Moreover, I would like to propose that these aspects of CDA have potential applications for research on 'political membership' contained through and in policy as discourse.

Luke (1996) discusses how systematic asymmetries of power and resources between speakers and listeners and between readers and writers can be linked to the production and reproduction of stratified political and economic interests. In other words, discourse in institutional life can be perceived as a means for the 'naturalization and disguise of power relations that are tied to inequalities in the social production and distribution of symbolic and material resources' (1996:12). This, Luke (1996) exemplifies, means that the dominant discourses in contemporary cultures tend to represent those social formations and power relations that are the products of history, social formation and culture (for example gendered division of the work force and domestic labour, patterns of school achievement by minority groups, national economic development) as if they were established 'truths' or as discussed previously constructed 'possible worlds'.

By this account, critical discourse analysis is a political act itself, an intervention in the apparently natural flow of talk and text in institutional life that attempts to “interrupt” everyday common sense (Silverman & Torode, 1980). Such an analysis has the potential to destabilize “authorative discourses” (Bahkhtin, 1986) and foreground relations of inequality, domination and subordination. ' (Luke, 1996:12)
There is an understanding of CDA here, which I support for my study, which questions the very possibility of a non-ideological discourse (Luke, 1994a). Discourse has even been said to have a hegemonic function (Luke, 1996:20). Fairclough (2009) defines discourse as ideological as far as it contributes to sustaining particular relations of power and domination. Here, this pertains to ideology about ‘membership’ or ‘citizenship’ contained within policy as discourse. The task of a critical discourse analysis is thus to disarticulate and to critique texts as a way of disrupting ‘common sense’. Part of this disarticulation, according to Luke (1996) is to involve analysis of whose material interests are served by particular texts and discourse, and how that articulation works on readers and listeners, as well as strategies for reinflecting and rearticulating these discourses in everyday life, which is the more ‘constructive’ use of CDA.

With reference to the ideological character of discourse, it is important for this study to highlight that Benhabib (2009) in her theory on ‘membership’ does not accuse social democracy of being discursive or ideological per se. Rather, she proposes working with discourse, or the concept of ‘iteration’ (see chapter 3) not only in the disarticulation of power relations, but rather in understanding and acknowledging -critically and constructively - the discursive element as a medium through which democracy is operating. Thus, in this way, Benhabib’s approach to discourse does not contradict the purpose of CDA, of disarticulating the everyday ‘common sense’ view of policy texts (written, spoken or image-based) and of looking more closely at how frames of membership could be constructed through discourse, and contain certain ideologies. However, by working with the acknowledgement that discourses construct membership frames, one can also rearticulate and re-inflect more nuanced understandings of membership in relation to changing constellations of society, individual identities and state commitments.

Specifically linked to the theorization on ‘membership practices’, Benhabib (2004, 171ff.), as will be discussed in chapter 3, introduces the concept of ‘democratic iterations’ (Derrida, 1985), which in my own understanding is strongly linked to a discursive approach. This concept refers to such a ‘constructive’ use of CDA, as explained above, and offers what Benhabib refers to as ‘linguistic, legal, cultural, and political repetitions-in-transformation, invocations, which are also revocations; they
not only change established understandings but also transform what passes as the valid or established view of an authoritative precedent’ (2004: 180).

‘The treatment of aliens, foreigners and others in our midst is a crucial test case for the moral conscience as well as political reflexivity of liberal democracies. (…) The rights of foreigners, and aliens, whether they be refugees or guest workers, asylum seekers or adventurers, define that threshold, that boundary, at the site of which the identity of “we, the people” is defined and renegotiated, bounded and unravelled, circumscribed and rendered fluid. We are at a point in political evolution when the unitary model of citizenship, which bundled together residency upon a single territory with the subjection to a single administration of a people perceived to be a more or less cohesive entity, is at an end. The end of this model does not mean that its hold upon our political imagination and its normative force in guiding our institutions are obsolete. It does mean that we must be ready to imagine forms of political agency and subjectivity, which anticipate new modalities of political citizenship. I want to characterize these new political trends through the concept of “democratic iterations”. (Benhabib, 2004: 179).

The idea of ‘iteration thus connects seamlessly to the processes of policy as discourse (see section 2.3); because ‘iteration’ (Jacques Derrida, 1982, 1992:90ff: in Benhabib, 2004:179) refers to how ‘in a process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the first original usage and its intended meaning; instead every repetition is a form of variation’. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, and enriches it. Subsequently, there is no ‘original source’ of meaning or an ‘original’ to which all subsequent forms must conform. Benhabib asserts that every act of iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context.

However, although by this account all texts are normative, shaping and constructing rather than simply reflecting and describing, many CDA theorists which I refer to for my framework point out to the danger of relativism or de-valuing of ‘policy’ (Ball, 1993; Luke, 1996: Fairclough, 2009). Fairclough points out that there is nothing inevitable about the dialectics of discourse as he describes it. Although a new discourse may come into an institution or organization (or indeed networks of policy actors) it may not be enacted or inculcated. Alternatively, it may be enacted, but never fully inculcated. He points to this problematic aspect of social constructionism, where
it disregards the relative solidity and permanence of social entities and their resistance to change. In his view, even powerful discourses, such as the new discourses of management may meet with levels of resistance, which results in them being neither enacted nor inculcated to any degree. Therefore, in using a dialectical-relational theory of discourse in social, or indeed in any research, one needs to take into consideration in each case the circumstances and conditions that shape whether and to what degree social entities are resistant to new discourses (Fairclough, 2005a:4). In my study, this consideration is important when looking at the way in which education institutions and education actors react and act to reform policies related to ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’. In pedagogical terms, the topic of Special Educational Needs in Swiss education practice and the allocation of migrant students into Classes for Students with Learning Difficulties is an area, which looks at aspects of resistance to the discourse of ‘integration’ and/or ‘inclusion’ (see Chapters 4 and 6).

I propose using a transdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis in this ‘critical’ and ‘constructive’ sense, as outlined in this section, which contributes to avoiding the potential pitfalls of ‘discourse relativism’ or the questioning of any value of ‘policy’. The kind of methodological and theoretical framework, which I combine for my study, can provide tools for the denaturalization of texts, for revealing representations of texts, which could be ‘flags’ that often disguise their own authority through semiotic techniques. As Luke (1996) suggests, by adopting this approach, one can not only disclose power relations silenced by dominant social institutions, but also provide a more ‘constructive’ rearticulation of the discourses, which re-address, in my case, the boundaries of ‘membership’.

1.6 The logic and structure of the thesis

As this study seeks also to capture the tense and difficult positioning of education as a vehicle for the integration of migrants in Switzerland, within the context of competing trans-national and ‘local’ political demands and concerns, I offer a multi-layered approach and perspective to analysis. This approach highlights the tension in education as nation-building capacity. Education could be caught between conflicting demands and priorities for improved performance, for promoting Swiss culture and
identification, while embedded in a system of migration politics and a wider European policy space. I suggest *policy as discourse* (in chapter 2), which is multi-layered both in the contexts in which it is taking place and in the theoretical and methodological frameworks.

The structure of this study consequently builds on the logic of a combination of multi-level contexts and theory and methodological frameworks within which these discursive contexts are analysed. The narrative empirical data in chapter 6 and the media and policy text analysis in chapter 5 form the main body of analysis, but the thesis as such should be seen as an attempt of a more holistic analytical approach and aspects which combine into a broad analytical perspective of *policy as discourse*. This also supports the idea that more traditional methods of analysing policy texts and narrative texts are by no means incompatible with this holistic perspective on understanding policy as discourse and using a broad discursive approach to this study.

The outline or structure of this study is therefore built as follows:

Chapter 2: Operationalization: A methodological framework for analysing the case study of Switzerland within the context of European spaces broadly through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and other discourse theorists; this chapter shows how I approach the evidence.

Chapter 3: The theoretical framework on `political membership`; The historical and economic developments of migration within Europe in the last few decades; An account of Switzerland’s developing relationship to the EU; The integration and citizenship conceptions issuing from these developments; ‘political membership’ as per this study. This chapter identifies the positions from which I assess the evidence.

Chapter 4: An account of the policy-informing evidence referred to by Swiss policy makers within an ‘integration’ framework in the context of education;

Chapter 5: Media and policy text discourse around `integration` and what terminology is used, referred to and what kind of frames of `integration` are outlined by media and the Swiss Federal government;
Chapter 6: The understanding of `integration` and education related areas from the narrative point of view of Swiss policy actors (empirical interview data), in what I argue is a loose network of policy through governance.

Chapter 7: Discussion drawing together and linking all the arguments derived from chapters 2-6 and conclusive comments.

This is by no means a comprehensive list of aspects to be included in a discursive account about how concepts of `integration` are understood, re-constructed and perpetuated within policy. However, I hope to give a more holistic picture of the complexity and density of the debates. Initially, I had included aspects of social policy with respect to migration, such as `family` and `social in- and exclusion`; this involved looking at both texts in Swiss social policy as well as speaking to actors involved in the social departments, both federal and in Canton Zurich, to give a picture of how migration debates were understood in this particular part of a `loose network`. Although, I would argue that this does belong in an account about this `loose network`, for reasons of practicability and capacity of this study, I had to restrict myself to the narratives and policy texts I have included in this thesis, which seemed to be more reflective of the specific enquiry of this study.

In order to give a picture of different levels of governance within the Swiss context, I have focussed on Canton Zurich as an example of Cantonal interpretations and translation of `integration` policy within education. Thus, my purpose of analysing a Canton is not for comparison with other Cantons, but rather for the specific role, it plays within the wider `integration` policy discourse. The specific choice of this Canton was made from the 26 Swiss Cantons, is for different reasons; on the one hand Zurich stands out as a `best practice within political rhetoric, specific policy actors and also the history of education policy` Canton, which is frequently portrayed as a kind of `pioneer` in educational terms. Part of this understanding of Canton Zurich is one of the very aspects of enquiry within discourse. On the other hand, Zurich was the first Canton to ratify and commence the implementation of the policy on the abolition of Special Classes for Children with learning difficulties, which has a strong relevance for the topic of `integration` in educational terms (see chapters 4, 5 and 6). One specific policy actor, a former education minister and fiscal authority in
Zurich (see interview narratives chapter 6) was, I argue, very influential in shaping education policy throughout Switzerland.

1.7 Role of the Researcher and Reflexivity

I would like to take the opportunity to write a few lines about my own position and role within and outside of this study and thesis, which has been a deeply personal journey in many respects, lead by questions which have shaped my own history and life path. The use of the notion of discourse (see Fairclough, 1989), an analytical approach which views ‘language as a form of social practice’ (1989: 20) and focuses on the ways social and political domination is produced and reproduced by text and talk, invariably also creates the need to reflect on the role of the researcher within this analysis.

The experience of growing up in the German-speaking Canton of Zurich, while having Indian roots, and my own identity as a naturalized Swiss, have and continue to form questions and challenges about what belonging means; about different spaces of being and the constitution of membership, including political membership. In order to carry out this study on Switzerland and Europe, I have travelled and lived in the United Kingdom for the last few years, and written this thesis in a Scottish University. This too has undoubtedly shaped and added to the multiplicity of spaces which I move in and out of on a regular basis. However, it is exactly this context which gives rise to questions as to how to approach this study and the analysis thereof, and not to ignore my own role in it. Being able to view and conduct the Swiss case study theoretically, epistemic and linguistically if not empirically from abroad has given me the possibility of what I would call at times a necessary distance to my own personal ties with Switzerland, and at the same time it has allowed me to be attentive to more European debates on migration, but also citizenship and membership modalities. Switzerland’s unique position with respect to wider Europe and the EU has only become more visible or perhaps more distinctive to me by having engaged in research in the UK and having an important exchange with researchers abroad.
I have also been faced with the challenge of multiple linguistic spaces of the thesis; writing the study up in English, while speaking about and describing German-speaking processes in Zurich; having the interview narratives in Swiss German with the interviewees; transcribing these texts into 'high' or written German, and then translating this back into English has made me face a lot of choices, selections and hurdles of terminology, exact meanings and also conveying what people have tried to tell me as honestly as I can. I myself am a tri-lingual speaker of English, German and Urdu, which are my second, third and first languages. Speaking about discourses in Switzerland and Swiss Cantons; about texts in the German language, but describing this in English as a conveying or descriptive medium has invariably made me jump back and forth between these two, or rather three ways of expression (as spoken Swiss-German, or 'Mundart', is distinctive from written or high German) and has created this particular written work as a result of these linguistic spaces. Thus, the style, ways and methods of description and the techniques that have found their way into this thesis are unavoidable forms of my personal expression in multi-linguistic contexts.

I was asked frequently about my own position and reasons for conducting this study while conducting the interviews for it. Most people I could speak to have expressed interest in my own work and life path in relation to my object of study and I have been very willing to speak about this, trying however to do this bearing in mind my role as a researcher and observer. Moving in the educational circle or networks has also enabled me to gain a richer insight into the Swiss world of education, which I had previously entered both as student and teacher in Swiss schools and universities. Speaking to some teachers has given me many valuable perspectives on their views about the link between schooling and migration and how they deal with and live this in their daily lives. The limits I have faced while doing this study are that I could not include all the interviews that I had conducted, nor could I include the views of students, parents and more teachers. However, this is giving me motivation to continue this line of research also with the aim of conducting studies inclusive of or rather focussed upon these perspectives and understandings of membership, or rather what Fairclough (2009) has named research about resistance to dominant discourses through the constitution of social identities. More specifically, I am interested in
exploring concepts of resistant identities manifested in and through discourses. This however, is object of further study (see chapter 7).

Before moving to the next chapter, I emphasize Benhabib’s (2004) suggestion that the experiment of the modern nation-state should be analyzed in different terms: the formation of the democratic people with its unique history and culture can be seen as an ongoing process of transformation and reflexive experimentation with collective identity in a process of democratic iterations. Hannah Arendt ([1951] 1968:269-297) has described how refugees, minorities, stateless and displaced persons are special categories of human beings created through the action of the nation-state. She (ibid.) argues that in a territorially bounded nation-state system, that is in a “state-centric” international order, one’s legal status is dependent upon protection by the highest authority that controls the territory upon which one resides and issues the papers to which one is entitled. This particular dependency of persons upon this highest authority, and also upon the good will or mercy of the state; and perhaps more importantly upon the fluctuations in political and societal discourses around membership is something that is an important and limiting feature of the constitution of belongingness. In my own experiences in this context, both with the ascription of being a `migrant` as well as `Swiss` and also gaining insight into the Swiss education system, as student, teacher and researcher has given me a strong sense of duality in the way meanings of `culture` and `belonging` are constructed, reproduced and attributed. This ascribed duality, in the face of all-subjective recording of personal experience, association, sense of belonging and multiplicity of spaces of being seems increasingly obtuse. With this study, I would like to challenge this ascription of ‘othering’ or limiting of membership for what is termed `migrants`, in the educational as well as in the socio-political sense, with a plea for more awareness about discourses that could contain these ascriptions and delimitations.

In the following chapter 2, I show how I approach the evidence in this study through an outline of an adapted loosely borrowed CDA methodological framework for analysing my case study of Switzerland within the context of European spaces.
Chapter 2: Methodology

In this chapter, I discuss the broad application of a methodologically multi-layered and critical, *dialectical-relational* approach to discourse analysis, as discussed in chapter 1, borrowed eclectically and loosely from Norman Fairclough’s method of CDA (2004) and from various other discourse theorists, according to whom policy is understood *as discourse*. Here I wish to highlight the tensions in the sensitive position of education, as previously discussed, caught between conflicting state demands and priorities for improving performance, for promoting ‘unifying’ notions about (distinctive) Swiss culture and identification (in other words ‘nation-building’), while being embedded in a system of party-political and controversial migration and territorial politics and the challenge of Switzerland’s participation in a wider European space. The enquiry is thus based on the instrumentalisation or role-fixing of education in the Swiss case, as a source of constructive contribution to *disclosure or disarticulation* of the institutional contradictions in the domain of membership rights within policy as discourse.

The enquiry is based on the hypothesis that Switzerland’s newly introduced education policy reform (2008) is a response or form of ‘deterritorialised politics’ (Benhabib, 2004), related to processes of Europeanisation of education policy (Grek et al., 2009; Alexiadou, 2008; Lawn and Keiner, 2006; Lawn and Lingard, 2002; Novoa and Lawn, 2002). This in turn may impact on the Swiss Migrant ‘integration’ agenda, in which education is identified as one of the main agents. The prominent role of education policy within the ‘integration’ agenda of the Swiss government is an opportunity to research ways in which certain frames and modalities of political membership or citizenship are potentially embedded within specific contexts and discourses such as are to be found in education.

2.1 Application of the dialectical-relational form of CDA

Fairclough (2009) In his approach to CDA, addresses the general question of the particular significance of semiosis and of dialectical relations between semiosis and
other social elements in social processes (issues, problems, and changes.) He opposes any view of method that seeks to neatly match methodologies to fields or text types. To do so is to impose a limitation on the advancement of fields of application of the dialectical-relational approach to CDA, which has developed since the early 1990s (see Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2009 and Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). I adopt Fairclough’s framework as a general outline and ‘thread’ to the framing of my own theoretical and methodological application. Moreover, he refers to ‘methodology’ rather than ‘method’ in discussing the dialectical-relational approach to CDA in transdisciplinary research, because he sees the process as a theoretical one in which methods are selected according to how the ‘object of research’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: in Fairclough, 2009:167) is theoretically constructed. The important point of distinction is that the specific methods used for a particular piece of research arise from the theoretical process of constructing its object. In this process, Fairclough identifies certain ‘steps’ or ‘states’, with the condition, however, that these are not interpreted in a mechanical way and that the relationship between these steps in doing research is not simply in sequential order (the sense of making ‘loops’ or referencing back to a previous step in order to make sense of a process). The specific methodology is derived from Bhaskar’s ‘explanatory critique’ (Bhaskar, 1986, Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; in Fairclough, 2009; in Wodak and Meyer, 2009:167ff). There are four main ‘stages’, which can be elaborated further as ‘steps’. These are drawn mainly from Fairclough’s framework of application (Fairclough; in Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 167ff.):

**Stage 1: Focus upon a social wrong, in its semiotic aspect.**

By ‘social wrong’, Fairclough offers a definition of ‘what can be understood in broad terms as aspects of social systems, forms or orders, which are detrimental to human well-being, and which could in principle be ameliorated if not eliminated, though perhaps only through major changes in these systems, forms or orders’ (2009:167/168). Examples are forms of inequality, lack of freedom, or racism. Here, we are looking at restricted or absence of ‘political membership’ for what is termed ‘migrants’ in Swiss systems. There are of course, considerable controversies about what constitutes a ‘social wrong’, and CDA will invariably be caught up in debates...
and arguments about this. These may be addressed in the theoretical processes themselves by which the methodology is determined through the following steps;

**Step 1**: Selecting a research topic, which relates to or points up a social wrong and which may be approached productively in a transdisciplinary way with a particular focus on dialectical relations between semiotic and other ‘moments’;

**Step 2**: Constructing objects of research for initially identified research topics by theorizing them in a transdisciplinary way;

This selection or approach to a transdisciplinary focus on dialectical relations between semiosis and other social elements is explicated in chapter 1 above. The ‘social wrong’ of lack or restriction of political membership for migrants, understood as a human right (see Benhabib, 2004 in 3.4) is approached through the political sociology of the state in its relation to Europe (see chapter 3 below) and the critical discursive analytical focus on semiosis and other social elements (in chapters 4, 5 and 6).

**Stage 2: Identifying obstacles to addressing the social wrong.**

This stage approaches the social wrong in a rather indirect way by asking what it is about the way in which social life is structured and organized that prevents it from being addressed. This requires adhering to the analyses of the social order through one ‘point of entry’, which can be semiotic; see steps 1-3 below:

**Step 1**: Analyse dialectical relations between semiosis and other social elements: between orders of discourse and other elements of social practices, other texts, and other elements of events;

**Step 2**: Select texts, and focuses and categories for their analysis, in the light of and appropriate to the constitution of the object of research;

**Step 3**: Carry out analyses of texts, both interdiscursive analysis, and linguistic/semiotic analysis.
For my specific dialectical-relational analysis of researching frames of ‘membership’ within policy as discourse, I have selected the following texts and related them to certain elements of social practice: media texts which relate to ‘migration and integration’ issues in education over a period of time (chapter 5); certain legal texts defining what the Federal government frames as ‘integration’ (chapter 5); recent policy texts relating to the ‘integration’ agenda within education (chapter 4); policy references and studies addressing these particular references emerging from both media and interview discourse (chapter 4); interview narratives with policy actors in a loose ‘integration’ network throughout different fields of education and migration in different levels of government (chapter 6). Moreover, within a literature review, I have outlined a historical development of Switzerland’s relationship within and without Europe (see chapter 3); along with an outline of how migration in Europe has resulted in specific ‘immigration’ and ‘migration’ policies and economic incentives, both in Europe in general and specifically in Switzerland over the past few decades (chapter 3).

Stage 3: Consider whether the social order `needs` the social wrong.

Fairclough (2009) clarifies what he means by this stage; considering whether the social wrong in question is inherent in the social order, whether it can be addressed within it, or only by changing it. It is a way of linking ‘is’ to ‘ought’: if a social order can be shown to inherently give rise to major social wrongs, then that is a reason for thinking that it should be changed. Here is where the ideological element of discourse comes in; if it contributes to sustaining particular relations of power and domination, it can justify the need to be addressed and changed. Stage 4 however, then clarifies in what ways this can be done.

Stage 4: Identify possible ways past the obstacles.

By moving from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ critique, or as discussed above, from ‘critical’ to ‘constructive’; this means identifying, with a focus on dialectical relations between semiosis and other elements, possibilities within the existing social process for overcoming obstacles to addressing the social wrong in question. This includes developing a semiotic ‘point of entry’ into research on the ways in which these
obstacles are actually tested, challenged and resisted, be it within organized political or social groups or movements, or more informally by people in the course of their ordinary working, social and domestic lives. A specific semiotic focus, which Fairclough refers to and which I adopt for the framework of my study is to include ways in which dominant discourse is reacted to, contested, criticized and opposed, for example in its argumentation, its construal of the world, its construal of social identities and so on.

In my study, this ‘constructive’ element of identification for overcoming the limitations to ‘membership’ practices perpetuated within policy as discourse are connected to the normative political theory of Benhabib (2004) in her concepts of ‘democratic iterations’ and ‘cosmopolitan federalism’ (see chapter 3). It offers points of departure for further research, which engages in identifying ways in which the construal of social identities is challenged and contested by actually researching the subjective and individual ‘identity’ self-awareness of actors involved in social processes and events in education and society. These actors could be students, parents and teachers, in relation to ‘membership’ and in relation to the discursive frames disclosed through this specific research study.

In the next section, the specific ‘operationalization’ of discourse in my analysis is addressed and theorized. Moreover, in chapter 3, the historical and economic developments of migration along with strands of political normative theory of citizenship and political membership within which I position my study are put into relation with the partly semiotic analysis discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.
2.2 Operationalization of Discourse: The Europeanisation of Education Policy in Switzerland

2.2.1 Comparison and a new symbolic language

‘Education was seen in the EU as a way of driving integration but in its new version, the individuation of learning responsibility, it also represents an abdication of its own responsibility. There is no vision offered but an endless circulation of plans and partnerships; no hope but only necessity, and no desire but only private compulsion. (…) The construction of the European education space, a market condition not a place, has turned into a symbolic expression of the legitimation of the power of capital, released from the boundaries of the nation state where “(p) olitical actions no longer find their legitimacy in a vision of the future, but have been reduced to managing the ordinary present” (Laidi, 1998, p.7). (...) Whose community of interest benefits from this lack of hope, and is affinity between transnational governance and citizens to be a conspicuous absence in this new European education space?’ (Lawn, 2000:30).

As discussed in Chapter 1, when we speak about the creation of a European space, we can no longer restrict its margins to regional, state or continental boundaries, but rather need to see an increasing structurization and often invisible impact through ‘networks and pathways that operate to a dynamic of flows and movement’ (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998: in Coulby, 2000:37; Lawn, 2006: Rizvi, 2006; Grek et al., 2009). Hence, it moves beyond mere legally defined and constructed European Spaces, such as the EU or the EMU (European Monetary Union). This opens up new possibilities of exploration, as it enables an in depth vertical and horizontal study of public policy as a carrier of shared ideas and ideologies, and to this I would add modalities of membership, transgressing national borders and attempts to map socio-political dimensions of policy discourses. Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation emphasises the ‘political’ nature of education policy problem solving and describes the process as a:

(a) Construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.’ (Radaelli, 2004:4).
Moreover, Lawn and Keiner (2006) suggest that Europeanisation can be as seen an ‘effect created by policy formation within the distinct structures of governance associated with the EU and the process of political problem-solving which shapes the interactions of actors and policy networks in Europe’ (2006:161). This political problem-solving in the Swiss case is the ‘problematised’ discourse around migration and migrants within the Swiss education system, (re-) triggering a national response which may be constructing, diffusing and institutionalising these shared ideas of European policies or policy references within the logic of pre-existing national ideologies about migrants and norms of political membership. The question remains how this kind of logic can transgress the EU’s space of influence on member states, such as in Switzerland’s case, when we are not looking at a member state?

In their study on ‘Fabricating Quality in European Education’, on discourses of Quality Assurance and Evaluation in education, Grek et al. (2009) explain how their interview data with national policy actors in different countries revealed many sources of origin of data used within their respective national policy; such as originating from Europe or the wider world of the OECD, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) or the World Bank. However, the source of pressures and requirements did not seem of great concern to these policy makers, rather than the focus on ensuring successful outcomes through ‘best’ education in comparison to other countries, and through the use of a distinctive language of high quality and standards. This kind of project of a ‘Europe of individuals’, who are seen to strive to accomplishing a set of goals, indicators and benchmarks, is made possible by the existence of networks through which data may flow, and through the capacity of technologies to connect individual student performance to the national and transnational indicators of performance (Grek et al., 2009:7). In Switzerland, the participation in OECD studies, such as PISA has provided the ground for the access and re-inflection of comparative education data and standards into their national

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2 This ‘problematised’ understanding is rooted in ideas about essential differences in the educational achievement of Migrants and ‘Swiss’ students, and thus also differences in the access to professional opportunities. These differences were disclosed or made apparent through international studies, such as PISA, in which Swiss results showed large differences in results for migrant students and ‘Swiss’ students (chapter 4). The ‘problem’, which is conceived or drawn from this, is that there is a lack of sufficient ‘integration’ of young migrants and their families in Swiss society and institutions, which prevents them from being ‘full’ participants.
system. The OECD, Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a non-curriculum-based measure of comparative educational performance of students at the end of compulsory schooling in literacy, mathematics, science and problem solving (see chapter 4); it has become one of the key international comparative measures of the effectiveness of schooling systems, and its data sets are heavily used by the EU and its member states (Grek et al. 2009). Lawn and Lingard (2002) speak about how there is an alignment of statistical educational categories across the OECD, Eurostat and UNESCO to work as a ‘magistrate of influence’ in helping to constitute Europe as a space of governance. Moreover, although the OECD can still be thought of as a think tank with the focus on economic policy, it may have become more of a policy actor in its own right in the context of globalisation (Henry et al., 2001; Rizvi and Lingard 2006; in Grek et al., 2009: 8).

Novoa and Yariv-Mashal (2003) observe that this politics of mutual accountability and the political intervention of the EU may have been legitimised by a system of comparison, with the argument of voluntary participation of nation states (see earlier). Here I propose that not only the member states of the EU have been affected by these kinds of agreements, such as the case of Switzerland can demonstrate. The Bologna Process, which was initially an initiative taken by France, Germany, Italy and the UK to develop the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010, has resulted in the addition of 38 signatories to its process by the end of 2003, including Switzerland. The aims of Bologna being the ‘encouragement of mobility of staff and students, comparability of degrees, a transferable system of credits and the promotion of cooperation in quality assurance and of a European dimension in Higher Education’ (Alexiadou, 2005:139). Rizvi (2006:203) explains how the Declaration insists that the reform process it prescribes is not a path towards an imposed uniformity over national higher education within Europe but ‘reflects a search for a common European answer to common European problems’; it uses ‘harmonisation’ instead.

The newly introduced education reform (2008) in Switzerland, which is discussed in chapter 4, bears the trademark of ‘HARMOS’ or Harmonising of Public Schools throughout the Swiss Cantons. It’s core principles are strongly based on a design to heighten the employability and mobility of citizens, similar to the Bologna Declaration, but also the referencing of OECD data and agenda setting through the
Lisbon Council (see later). The former assumes the importance of Europe-wide commitment to neo-liberal reforms in higher education. ‘HARMOS’ in Switzerland also includes the Primary and Pre-school sectors. Rizvi (2006) contends that while Bologna does not completely support liberalisation and deregulation of higher education, its main objectives are nonetheless informed by a market-logic and the idea that Europe needs to become a more effective system and effective player in the highly competitive global market in higher education. Again, the logic pervading the Swiss pendent to education reform is of policy that is ‘informed’ or ‘evidenced’ through comparative education standards drawn from international studies, the OECD and the Bologna reform process, which is thus deeply embedded in this neo-liberal outlook of common or shared ‘problem solving’ in which education is seen to provide solutions (Rizvi, 2006:203).

In her methodological framework for researching the ‘softer’ tool of education governance in the EU such as OMC, Alexiadou (2007) talks about how the legal status of education within the European Union had been historically weak. Only since 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty included an article 14 (1), has the Community achieved limited power over education through the introduction of the term ‘quality’. ‘The idea of “quality”...permits an intervention by the EU into what were previously “national” concerns (in terms of the direction of policy, and the means through which it was legitimate to fulfil them’ (Dale, 2003:11; Grek et al., 2009). Whether this particular method to overcome the obstacles of deregulated education systems also corresponds with the Swiss Federal (Central) Government’s efforts to overcome federal state structures and limitations in educational authority will be examined in chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Therefore, according to Novoa and Yariv-Mashal (2003) we are looking at a great influence of the OECD’s PISA and the EU’s indicators. They point out that the conclusions and recommendations that are derived from these programmes tends to shape policy debates and to set discursive agendas, influencing educational policies throughout the world. Grek et al. (2009) comment on this that such research produce definitions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ education systems, define policy ‘problems’ and offer directions towards solutions (see chapter 1 on this). Moreover, new styles of policy formation derived from the Lisbon Council produces trends towards greater policy
convergence, such as through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which administer quality assurance processes, introduce a set of indicators and benchmarks a new ‘soft’ form of governance (Lawn 2006; Alexiadou, 2007). Thus, in the issue of this kind of governing through data, there can be a co-dependence of commensurability and comparison as key in making data work as governing technologies (Grek et al., 2009).

‘Comparison for constant improvement against competition has come to be the standard by which public systems are judged, as the ideas of the private sector dominate the ‘new’ public. While states originally managed this process of comparison in a limited way, the flow of national data internationally has increased. Comparison is now cross-border; it is both an abstract form of competition and an element of it; it is a proxy for other forms of rivalry. Comparison is highly visible as a tool of governing at all levels – at the level of the organisation (to manage); of the state (to govern); indeed comparison events or ‘political spectacles’ (such as PISA) may be used because of their visibility.’ (Grek et al. 2009: 10)

As Lawn and Keiner (2006), question, the interests served in this constructed space - whilst maintaining the modernist notion of retaining nation states and national unification within– become blurred and increasingly diluted by the far-reaching permeation of its new symbolic language. However, it is precisely this permeation and the interest of different stakeholders, which is becoming of greater interest to social and political research when studying the impact of the EU, or what a European shared space of policy may entail. Both fields of research (sociological and political) have been faced with the challenges of studying the EU with what Guiraudon and Favell (2007) refer to as the limitations of ‘methodological nationalism’, which presents the difficulties of studying a space such as the EU, a ‘collective social entity that is neither a nation, a state or society’ (2007:3). In the case of Switzerland, it therefore becomes even more challenging, as it is not a member state of the EU, but rather maintains a borderline position with bi-lateral agreements and negotiates a certain independence from EU regulations. However, the question is whether, nonetheless, the impact of the EU or rather of Europeanising processes still exists invisibly. Researching the national responses to EU policy through what Radaelli (2004) refers to as ‘institutionalisation and incorporation into domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies’ suggests a reaffirmation of a research
approach which adheres to the traditional role of the nation state. However, to avoid this problem of ‘methodological nationalism’, Alexiadou (2007:108) suggests the ‘shift of analysis from policy making by governments to policy through governance’ (see chapter 1).

The term ‘governance’, according to Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006), has been adopted to reflect the ‘increasingly limited capacity of national political systems to achieve desired outcomes, due to the changing nature of social transactions that transcend the confines of the state’ (2006:29). They proceed to explain that ‘multilevel’ and ‘network governance’ are lenses that are used increasingly to explore the changing nature of states and policy-making, which are systems of constant negotiation throughout different levels of government (supranational, national, regional, local etc.). In their study (see above), Grek et al., (2009) focus on key questions in their interviews to policy actors, which include comparison as a key technology and networks as essential conduits and spaces of interaction/interrelationship. I have adopted this approach in identifying policy actors in the Swiss case and the type of questions I asked them.

‘These technologies are operating in national spaces that are shaped by ‘collective narratives’ or traditions (including national systems and practices of data collection, national understandings of commensurability and appropriate comparison), but that are also energised by global data requirements and flows. ’ (Grek et al., 2009:10)

Moreover, there is a growing importance of non-state actors in the policy process, and a policy orientation towards task-related problem solving (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006:29). This type of network governance and negotiation takes place in a loose ‘integration network’ in Switzerland, which has a distinctive ‘problematised’ discourse, in which education is seen to offer one ‘solution’. With reference to the nature of policy problems, Bacchi (1999) proposes that the nature of problem definition itself is problematic as a tool for governing and ought to be a central focus for analysis. I support this concern in that the logic of ‘problematisation’ of migration contributes to particular forms of understanding and frames of policy ‘solutions’, however within the boundaries of pre-existing restrictive membership rights.
In her theoretical and methodological framework, Alexiadou (2007) draws attention to the use of the concept of discourse (see before, chapter 1) in researching the reception and response of member states of the EU to its education policy coordination, such as the OMC. As discussed in the previous sections, CDA focuses on the ways social and political domination is reproduced by text and talk. In my empirical research within this study, the methodological aspect drawn from Alexiadou’s framework uses discourse analysis which focuses on the ‘interpretative repertoires’ that policy actors use, and the ‘discursive resources’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1995:81: in Alexiadou, 2007:109).

Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority. Discourses embody meaning and social relationships; they constitute both subjectivity and power relations. Discourses are ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’... In so far as discourses are constituted by exclusions as well as inclusions, by what cannot as well as what can be said, they stand in antagonistic relationship to other discourses. (Ball, 1990a:2; in Vidowich, 2001:7).

To understand this constitution of subjectivity of actors and their interpretation of organisational conditions, Alexiadou and Lange (2007) suggest using Weick’s (1995) theory. In my study, the organisational conditions the actors speak about are the education platform in the context of migration politics. Weick (1995) suggests that providing meaning for action, enacting the environment, constructing identities and generating social commitments, producing social relations, focusing on selected cues, and retrospectively creating justifications and construction of reality can be explored as properties of the ‘sense making’ that actors in organisations – and indeed in social life per se – use in order to make sense of their experience of reality. Therefore, as with Stephen Ball’s (1990a) understanding of discourse, the ‘stock of social knowledge of a social actor is then relational in so far as it is socially derived, and also constantly enacted, produced and reproduced in social and discursive interactions’ (Ball, 1990a quoted in Alexiadou, 2007:109). Policy as a discursive process therefore keeps extending its co-authorship in the subjective use, re-use and translation of the ‘stock of knowledge’. The particular type of knowledge used, re-used and the translation thereof into educational terms is what interests the enquiry within this study. In this sense, education becomes one of the contextual platforms into which stocks of social knowledge of social actors engaging with questions on
2.2.2 Nation-building, Education and Citizenship

Previous research might reflect the more traditional and modernist approaches to the EU that its policies retain an old 'European space based on states disguised as nations' (Appadurai, 1990). According to a number of theorists (Anderson, 1983; Bhabha, 1990, Featherstone, 1990; Igantieff, 1994; Khazanov, 1995), nationalism remains a prevalent ideology of almost all of Europe. Coulby (2003) offers a possible explanation for this prevalence; although the space of flows will most probably undermine the role and power of states, people may still cling to state forms because such a globalised space might mean the breakdown of democratic and civic institutions (see Benhabib, chapter 3). According to Coulby (2003), nationalism is a double-edged sword for states, which can assist in their formation and solidarity, but also can create fractures, disunity and dissolution.

In its own interest however, the 'nation-state' may survive as an entity and component of identity construction, to be used by states as a tool to preserve their local power. In chapter 3 the question is pursued why the seemingly persisting notion of the nation-state is of such importance in Switzerland. Moreover, the notion of federalism in Switzerland and parallels to the governing obstacles that the EU faces are elaborated. A part of chapter 3 is therefore dedicated to exploring precisely this 'identity construction' through the notion of a unifying national (integration) project. Mitchell (2003) explores the relationship of national education systems with state formation and economic change. She uses three main areas; the shifting spaces of citizenship (1), the schooling – society nexus (2) and multiculturalism in education (3). As my argument looks at discourse and demarcations of political membership contained in education policy, there is a need to consider the overall process of citizenship formation as shifting, contested and deeply spatial (Turner 1986; Marston and Mitchell, 2003; Benhabib, 2004). I use some of Mitchell’s argumentation for my analysis, because she connects and draws attention to these three distinctive aspects of
the ‘nation-state formation projects’, national education systems and multiculturalism. This is highly relevant to the Swiss case, which connects the historical development and contemporary discourses around federalism (regionalism) and the nation-state; identity construction; its relation to Europe; policy actors’ problematised understanding of migration; the use of multiculturalism to frame reconciliatory neo-liberal agendas and what this may mean for the role or purpose of education (see chapter 3).

2.2.3 The Economizing of Knowledge and Education

When exploring the role of education as a nation-building capacity and the changing face of education policy on a national level within Europe, the persistence in the idea of a nation-state may be quite crucial: Novoa (2000) calls to mind the relationship between the model of mass schooling and the model of the nation-state.

‘The ontology of modernity constructed a school, which played an important role in cultural and national unification. Buttressed by an ideology of modernization and by scientific rationality, this project successfully carried forward the project of integration of populations – or more precisely, citizens – within the new nation states. This was in fact more than its role. It was its reason of being.’ (Novoa, 2000:55).

In a post-modern society, relative to the massive changes that migration has brought over the last few decades, this traditional or modernist approach to school and kind of notion of knowledge seems limited or what Coulby calls ‘politically outdated and economically irrelevant’ (2002:44). This seems to be a failure to respect or enhance the diversity upon which a notion of Europe depends. For example, I would argue it does not seem to hold the promise of citizenship and rights to political membership within the political reality of the state, such as in the case of Switzerland, as the social democratic flag-bearing of the reform project ‘integration’ would seem to suggest.

Certain historically entrenched federal nations, such as Switzerland may seek to preserve the notion of a ‘depoliticized’ education, where policy makers try to override or circumvent the barriers of a self-governed institution such as education by simply changing its outer frameworks, resource allocations, introducing cross-regional education policy and curricula and coupling social and education policy gradually to
increase state control of school. This study is interested in unravelling whether this is brought about or enhanced by the new ‘soft’ governing modes as a form of deterritorialised politics, through shifts and flows of knowledge and shared ideological spaces (chapters 4, 5 and 6). It could be argued that schooling within the classrooms potentially remains more or less the same as it was since the beginning of the post-colonial era; however superficially, policies are outlined as being more generic, mutually signed agreements to commit to certain social-democratic attitudes and cover pre-existing ideologies, or what Alexiadou calls ‘old agendas’ (2007:106). In this study, I explore whether these ideologies are rooted in existing rigid migration and immigration policies that are persistently territorial (see chapter 3).

Stephen Ball (1993) discusses how these developments may be based upon the production and transformation and effects of true/false distinctions (Smart, 1986:164) and the application of science and hierarchisation to “problems” in education – like standards and quality. There may be, according to Ball (1993) an exclusive focus upon ‘secondary adjustments’, and that particularly if this takes the form of a kind of ‘naïve optimism’, it may obscure the discursive limitations acting on and through those adjustments and limit our responses to change.

With respect to the particular denominator ‘equity’ or referring to an idea of ‘inequality in education’, within the Swiss context, the Special Needs Educational reference (classifying the ‘migrant’ as ‘special needs pupils’, see chapters 4 and 6) and in the links the response to PISA data play a significant role (Grek, 2009). We are looking at the idea of dominant discourses, or the idea of a ‘hegemonic’ aspect of discourse. According to Liasidou, who looks at Special Educational Needs (SEN) discourses in Cyprus and uses a specific framework of CDA to analyse SEN policy, the ‘hegemony of the scientific discourse obscures and silences the existence of other discourses since the focus is placed solely on the panoptic gaze of the scientific ‘regimes of truth’ (Liasidou, 2008:490). She elaborates that in using this panoptic gaze, the newer ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration’ government agenda “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, and attaches to him his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him” (Foucault, 1982:212; in Liasidou, 2008:490), which in turn subjugates children to the normalizing and disciplinary technologies of power that obliterate their individuality, their autonomy and their value as human beings. In
my study, I explore whether this occurs through what is an ‘attribution’ of a dichotomised view of ‘migrant’ and ‘Swiss’, which goes even further to seeing this distinction as ‘normal’ and ‘extra-normative’ or requiring ‘specialist attention’ and care. There is even a referencing of a kind of ‘clinical approach’ to specialisation or separation which emerges in the narrative analysis in chapter 6:

'The medical discourse is legitimized through the “discourse of professionalism” (Fulcher, 1999) that can allegedly “normalize” the “deviant” students through expert intervention and remedy. The subjugating “regimes of truth” (Foucault 1980) conveyed through the “ideology of expertism” (Vlachou, 2004) become naturalized and legitimized through the scientific discourse of “expert” intervention and remedy.' (Liasidou, 2008:492).

A response to this then may be ‘secondary adjustments’, such as Ball (1993) discusses, which in fact obscure the power imbalances, that continue to permeate the policy. The paradox is that societies have changed and cultures have been reshaped and yet the core education remains the same in which the ‘national illusion’ is reproduced and students are not (or perhaps cannot be) empowered as critically thinking future citizens, because no such promise can be made within the real political setting of the country in its market-driven interests.

Rizvi (2006) discusses how the neo-liberal imaginary in education policy appears to have become globally convergent (Schugurensky, 1999), and is showing an unmistakable trend towards the acceptance of similar set of policy solutions to educational problems by many nation states, which would otherwise have very different social, historical and economic characteristics. ‘This hegemonic trend’, he contends, ‘represents an almost universal deepening of a shift from social democratic to neo-liberal orientations, manifested most clearly in privatisation policies and a heavy reliance on the market to solve various crises facing the state’ (Rizvi, 2006:200).

'The social imaginary within which these policy solutions are articulated regards individuals as consumers and education as a private good. (...) Over the past two decades however, there has been a profound shift in thinking about educational policy, with neo-liberalism precepts becoming ubiquitous – a part of our social imaginary. How has this happened? How have the languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and systems of
representation associated with neo-liberalism become so globally dominant? We cannot address this question without understanding how social imaginaries are formed and travel through time and space under the conditions of contemporary globalisation; how knowledge is now globally distributed and networked not only through systems of intergovernmental communication but also through popular media; and how the normative discourse of globalisation has itself contributed to it becoming politically hegemonic. ' (Rizvi, 2006:200)

Therefore, in considering the secondary policy adjustments (Ball, 1993) which states are adopting and which mask existing power relations or political hegemony, the importance of the increasing commodification or economizing of knowledge and education should be highlighted and explored. Such a perspective supports a critique of post-colonial discourse theory of the form of knowledge prevalent in European schools, which is still applicable as it appears to be unrecognised (see Freire, 1972; Carnoy, 1974; Feyerabend, 1978; Fanon, 1980a, 1980b; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Young, 1990; Joseph, 1992; Said, 1995; Young, 1995; Popkewitz, 1997; Apple 2000: in Colby, 2002:42). Knowledge, according to Neef (1998) has become the most important international trading commodity. In the context of this study this aspect may be highly relevant in the way that knowledge is used for particular political purposes, and in exploring how and to what end education features in a Federal ‘integration’ agenda.

In pursuing an increasing market-driven perspective on schooling and education, it is necessary to relate Europeanisation to the economy (Grek et al., 2009). The phenomena of Europeanisation and European Integration have been much debated among many economic analysts, and are considered by some to offer an alternative model to the perceived Anglo-American dominance in economic and cultural terms, but they have also contributed to the erosion of traditional functions of the welfare state and their displacement by the market (Alexiadou, 2005). Streeck (1999) and Scharpf (2001) claim that the European Monetary Union (EMU) has been driven by the political Right (chapter 3) and has an agenda of reduced social protection, further deregulation of labour markets, wage differentiation and other supply-side strategies within countries of the single market. From this point of view, the role of education and issues of social justice are driven by investing in human capital through education, as a ‘productive asset of the community’ and thinking of it as the
economizing of education (Streeck, 1999:5; in Alexiadou, 2005: 131). However, other analysts such as Jenson and Pochet (2002) have spoken in favour of the EMU project as not simply being determined by neo-liberal agendas, but as being sensitized towards the advantages of treating employment and social protection as factors which could in fact stabilize and strengthen the market (in Alexiadou, 2005). However, Alexiadou (2005) maintains, only the future would show to what extent the ‘social market model’ extending across Europe with the idea of human welfare and corporate political settlements, would be practicable.

In considering education as a commodity, I propose that this precept is being nurtured by the use of what one may call different parameters of measure, or ‘flags of political convenience’ (Lynch, 1998), or ‘flagships’ according to Fairclough and Wodak (in Jessop, Fairclough and Wodak, 2008) to serve mainly market-oriented purposes. These parameters of measure or what feature as policy-informing evidence have been referred to in educational policy research as ‘the international argument’, which describes when nations use experiences in other educational systems as sources of authority (Schriewer, 1990, 2000). Grounded in Niklas Luhman’s Theory of Self-referential Systems (Luhman, 1990), Schriewer elaborates how policy makers and educational research resort to the international argument when new educational policies and practices become contested. Steiner-Khamsi (2003) in her explorations into the politics of educational borrowing refers to lessons learned from abroad, which becomes a pet reference point for many national policy makers in Switzerland (2003:70). However, this study extends the use of ‘the international argument’ not only in the case of overcoming contestation of education policy reform, but its use as ‘flags of convenience’, which give the illusive cover story of the introduction of social-democratic measures, such as ‘inclusion’ or ‘equity’ and ‘equality of opportunity’ in education standards.

Fairclough and Jessop (2000) explore what is phrased as ‘New Capitalism’ with reference to this policy projection with the use of the ‘knowledge-economy’ discourse:

‘Governments on different scales and of quite varied political complexions now take it as a mere fact of life (though a `fact’
produced in part by inter-governmental agreements) that all must bow to the emerging logic of a globalising knowledge-driven economy. Responses to this emerging institutional and operational logic vary but their dominant, if not hegemonic, form in the Anglophone world is neo-liberalism. This is a political project for the re-structuring and re-scaling of social relations in accord with the demands of an unrestrained global capitalism (Bourdieu, 1998). In one or the other, it has been adopted in fact if not in theory by social democratic as well as conservative political parties throughout the world. With rare but important exceptions, neo-liberalism has come to dominate the political scene – and has resulted in the disorientation and disarming of economic, political, and social forces committed to radical alternatives. This in turn has contributed to the closure of public debate and a weakening of democracy. ’ (Jessop, 2000, in Fairclough, 2005a:5).

Jessop speaks about what I would call a ‘reconciling’ effect of this economic market-driven model of the state, which has resulted in a political project with social democratic as well as conservationists acting through this neo-liberal umbrella, which could be leading to a weakening of democracy and democratic values. ‘Softer’ forms of governance and international referencing can lend themselves quite usefully through national responses to EU policy by serving nation-state economic interests in avoiding more sensitive socio-political discourses, such as giving access to political rights and (re-) framing citizenship (see chapter 3).

In chapter 3, I identify the position from which I assess the evidence within this study by approaching the theoretical framework on ‘political membership’. Moreover, I give a brief depiction of the historical and economic developments of migration within Europe in the last few decades; an account of Switzerland’s developing relationship to the EU; the conceptions of integration and citizenship following from these developments and I consider how ‘political membership’ connects to these aspects.
Chapter 3: Literature Review

3.1 Section 1: The development in the concepts of membership

3.1.1 Introduction

The history of citizenship reveals that (these) nationalist aspirations are ideologies; they attempt to mould a complex, unruly, and unwieldy reality according to some simple governing principle of reduction, such as national membership. Every nation has its others, within and without (see Benhabib, 2002a). In fact, nationalism is constituted through a series of imaginary as well as very real demarcations between us and them, we and the others. Through membership practices, the state controls the synchronic and diachronic identity of the nation. Yet the nationality and citizenship rules of all peoples are an admixture of historical contingencies, territorial struggles, cultural clashes, and bureaucratic fiat. At certain historical junctures, these rules and the struggles surrounding them become more transparent and visible than at other times. We are at such a historical juncture when the problem of political boundaries has once more become visible. ‘ (Benhabib, 2004:18)

As the main purpose of this study is to look at ways in which political membership frames may be contained or embedded in migrant ‘integration’ policy discourses in education, or more broadly the demarcations of membership embedded in policy, it is important to provide the different theoretical perspectives from which I have derived my understanding and use of the concept of ‘political membership’. The nature of this study, exploring the manifold aspects influencing and shaping the Swiss discourse around migrants and the role of education within this discourse, might well render a single theoretical perspective obtuse and restricted. I have combined a number of channels or pathways of reflection and theory with reference to my research argumentation in the context of integration policy as discourse (on discourse see chapter 2). Therefore, rather than adopting a specific political theory, I have worked with Benhabib’s (2004, 2009) exposition of the boundaries of political community, which define some people as members and some as aliens. In her book on the ‘Rights of Others’, Benhabib (2004) emphasises how membership, in turn, is meaningful only when accompanied by rituals of entry, access, belonging and privilege. In this study,
it is precisely these rituals which are at the foreground of the discussion around the framing of migrant ‘integration’ by nation-states. Benhabib (2004) asks what the ‘guiding normative principles of membership should be in a world of increasingly deterritorialised politics?’. The membership she refers to is political membership, which she defines as the ‘principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers, into existing polities’ (2004:1). In my study, the principles and practices are those embedded in a particular policy reform project ‘integration’ of migrants in different Swiss state sectors in 2008, including education.

Benhabib (2009) explains how the modern nation-state has regulated membership in terms of one principal category, namely national membership. However, she argues, we have entered an era when state sovereignty is frayed and the institution of national citizenship has become disaggregated or separated into diverse elements. New modalities of membership have emerged, with the consequence that the boundaries of the political community, as defined by the current nation-state systems, are no longer adequate to regulate membership. Among other things, Benhabib (2009) highlights that transnational migrations, and the constitutional as well as policy issues suggested by the movement of people across state borders, are central to interstate relations and therefore to a normative theory of global justice. Although in my study I do not pursue the theoretical deliberations on global justice, nonetheless justice plays an important role in the way that Benhabib conceptualises her understanding of political membership rights and will be referred to only in the context of this conceptualisation.

Recent attempts to develop theories of international and global justice have been curiously silent on the matter of migration (see Pogge, 1992; Buchanan, 2000: Beitz [1979] 1999 and 2000: in Benhabib, 2009). According to Benhabib (2009), despite their criticism of state-centric assumptions, these theorists have not questioned the fundamental basis of state centrism, which is the policing and protecting of state boundaries against foreigners and intruders, refugees and asylum seekers. The control of migration – of immigration as well as emigration – Benhabib (2009) maintains, is crucial to state sovereignty; All pleas to develop “Post-Westphalian” conceptions of sovereignty (Buchanan, 2000 and 2001) are ineffective if they do not also address the normative regulation of the movement of peoples across territorial
boundaries, and to this I would add re-addressing the regulation of peoples already within state boundaries.

In examining membership, Benhabib’s (2004) questions how the project of democracy can be sustained in view of the obsolescence of Westphalian models of sovereignty and how the boundaries of the demos can be redefined in an increasingly interdependent world? In current political philosophy two broad lines of thinking in response to these questions have emerged: the “laws of peoples” model proposed by Rawls (1999) in contrast to Habermas (1998), who suggests the model of cosmopolitan citizenship based on a new law of nations. Whereas the Rawlsian law of peoples makes tolerance for regimes with different understandings of the moral and religious good its cornerstone, and compromises universal human rights claims for the sake of achieving international stability, Habermas’ model envisages the expansion of such universalistic claims in ever widening networks of solidarity (in Benhabib, 2009:9). Benhabib (2004), although taking into account both models in her own argumentative development (see 3.1.2), nonetheless critiques both for having mentioned relatively little about the dilemmas of democratic citizenship in a post-Westphalian world. Her claim is that currently the most important question regarding democratic citizenship is the access to citizenship rights, or the attainment of political membership rights by non-members. In the context of this study, this attainment of membership rights of migrants is the fundamental question with respect to the notion of ‘integration’. I ask, what exactly is meant by this notion and how is it framed for education policy as discourse?

In this context, I support Benhabib’s (2004) argument that there is a crisis of the nation-state, along with globalisation and the rise of people’s movements between and within nation-states which have shifted the lines between citizens and residents, nationals and foreigners. The main argument is that while there is an increasingly ‘deterritorialised’ way of governing occurring in nation states, they are simultaneously trying to hold on to territorial sovereignty in the domain of membership rights restrictions. This in turn constitutes a dilemma between the foundations of liberal democracy and Universal Human Rights commitments.

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1 Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on two things: territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents in domestic structures.
By using the term ‘deterritorialised’, Benhabib refers to the challenges the nation-state faces from the rise of a global economy through the ‘formation of free markets in capital, finance and labour; moreover, there is an increasing internationalization of armament, communication, and information technologies; the emergence of international and transnational cultural networks and electronic spheres, and the growth of sub- and transnational political actors’ (Benhabib, 2004:4). These global developments have challenged the nation-state’s capacity to deal with the changes created by this new environment. Under these circumstances, she argues, ‘territoriality has become an anachronistic delimitation of material functions and cultural identities’ (2004:5). However, even in the face of a collapse of traditional concepts of sovereignty, monopoly over territory is exercised by nation-states through immigration and citizenship policies based on old concepts, which deny membership rights to large numbers of the population. There seems to be a contradiction between what Cole (2000; 2) calls ‘expansive and inclusionary principles of moral and political universalism, (…), and the particularistic and exclusionary conceptions of democratic closure’.

Here I am interested in examining these questions about these contradictory commitments for the specific case of Switzerland, and its efforts to be part of Europe through the use of certain forms of transnational governance, while retaining its territorial sovereignty restrictions in terms of who or who should not belong as ‘members’ within its boundaries. The principal focus of this study is on a migrant ‘integration’ agenda launched in Switzerland, which attributes a specific role to education in this nation-building framework. The aim is to examine how ‘integration’ is framed and how membership is conceptualised within this framework and how the educational sphere of policy contributes to sustaining these conceptions of membership.

In her theoretical structure, Benhabib (2004) develops her arguments by considering how transnational migration has highlighted this constitutive dilemma, which is rooted within liberal democracies. The struggle is between claims of self-determining sovereignty and adherence to principles of universal human rights, which in her view are partly rooted in a ‘right to have rights’ (see Arendt, 1951, 1968, 177: in Benhabib, 2004: 51). Benhabib argues that the practices of political membership can be best
analysed through an *internal reconstruction* of those dual commitments. The Swiss case and the discourses around migrant ‘integration’ reveal these national struggles not only within the wider context of European trends in governance as a form of deterritorialised politics (see chapter 2), but also as crystallizing the finer tensions around the framing of internal and external ‘citizen’ boundaries *through discourses* (see chapter 2). These tensions according to Benhabib are the contradictions between states’ sovereign claims to control their borders as well as to monitor the quality and quantity of those they admit within them.

I follow Benhabib’s (2004) logic that membership or **political membership is a human right**, which nation-states fail to recognise despite their claims of being liberal democracies. She maintains that the *human right to membership* involves two broad categories: human rights and civil and political rights. The entitlement, firstly to all *civil rights*, - including rights to association, property, and contract - and eventually to *political rights* - including the right to vote, elect and to present oneself for election - must itself be considered a human right. This suggests that the sovereign discretion of the democratic community is circumscribed: once admission (into a nation-state) occurs, the path to membership ought not to be blocked. Benhabib (2009:11) speaks about the danger of ‘permanent alienage’ of migrants within nation-state boundaries:

‘Permanent alienage is not only incompatible with liberal-democratic understanding of human community; it is also a violation of fundamental human rights. The right to political membership must be accommodated by practices that are non-discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and execution, and justiciable when violated by states and other state-like organs. The doctrine of state sovereignty, which has so far shielded naturalization, citizenship, and denaturalization decisions from scrutiny by international as well as constitutional courts, must be challenged.’ (Benhabib, 2009:11).

Benhabib develops her argument of political membership as a human right, building and partly departing from different political thinkers such as Kant, Arendt, Habermas, Rawls and what she calls the ‘Decline-of-Citizenship school’. I outline below why this is highly relevant to this study and the case of Switzerland. Benhabib (2004, 2009) suggests that from a discourse-theoretical point of view (see Kant’s temporary right to sojourn and a longer-term visitation: in Benhabib, 2004:35-43), a nation-state
can no longer justify that a migrant should remain a permanent stranger in the land. This would amount to a ‘denial of communicative freedom and moral personality’ (Benhabib, 2004:141/142).

Benhabib (2004) further suggests that although nationalism offers one solution to the ‘conceptual gap in the legal construction of the constitutional state’ (and to this I would add the ‘discursive construction’ see chapter 2) and democratic perspectives (whether liberal, republican or multicultural) offer yet another, justification of the legal and discursive construction of the constitutional state is not given. She follows Habermas (1996, 84-104) in accepting that universal human rights and popular sovereignty, or the norms of private and public autonomy provide two indispensible foundations of the democratic constitutional state. Those Universal Human Rights have a context-transcending appeal, whereas popular and democratic sovereignty must constitute circumscribed demos, which acts to govern itself; self-governance therefore implies self-constitution. This would then present an irresolvable contradiction (Cole, 2000), because liberalism, the belief in universal moral equality, and democracy, the belief in citizens’ equality would be necessarily incompatible (Carl Schmitt, [1923] 1985).

Rather than calling for an end of the state system nor for world citizenship, Benhabib (2004) follows the Kantian tradition of cosmopolitan federalism and emphasizes the significance of membership within bounded communities and defends the need for ‘democratic attachments’, which need not be directed toward existing nation-state structures alone. ‘The core of democratic self-governance is the ideal of public autonomy, namely the principle that those who are subject to law should also be its authors’ (Benhabib, 2004:217). I share the concern Benhabib raises from this democratic ideal of self-governance that this democratic voice and public autonomy can hardly be reconfigured if nation-states allocate or frame faulty ideals of a ‘people’s homogeneity and territorial autochthony’ and marginalize ‘others’, who do not fit in this idea of homogeneity, within the nation state boundaries. Particularly, if this ideological allocation or framing is ‘flagged’ or construed through policy as being what Fairclough (2009) refers to as ‘a mere fact of life’ and assume dominance in discourses (see chapter 2).
Benhabib (2004) describes what she calls a ‘disaggregation or decline of citizenship. Western-European nation-states often attribute citizens’ identity to what she calls a ‘thick cultural coating’, while human rights are treated as being merely contextual (2004:123). Political integration, which Benhabib (2004:121) defines as ‘practices and rules, constitutional traditions and institutional habits, that bring individuals together to form a functioning political unity’, therefore is confined to ‘cultural’ integration. In this study, the question of the framing of ‘integration’ and whether it pertains to political, social or cultural integration is also addressed.

3.1.2 Research on Political Membership

There is a serious lack of attention in public policy research to the demarcations of ‘membership’ within and through policy as discourse, or the framing of ‘political membership’ contained within what I term socio-civic policy. I have called education policy related to migrant ‘integration’ socio-civic, because we are looking at social policies, which address civic attributes of ‘integration’ into systems and relating to notions of ‘national membership’, ‘belonging’, ‘culture’ and ‘nation’. Because these civic attributes are linked to the framing of boundaries of political communities, it made sense in my study to borrow eclectically some theoretical conceptions of ‘membership’ based on Benhabib’s (2004) understanding of the conflicts of political membership discourses in contemporary states. However, I extend the ‘membership’ argument by exploring the way in which current discourses in ‘integration’ policy can disclose existing membership and citizenship ideologies through the medium of a particular form of governance used by Western-European nation states. I am not departing from Benhabib by looking at membership frames through governance and policy as discourse, but rather am interested in disclosing the conflicts of nation-states Benhabib (2004) refers to, by examining socio-civic policy as discourse in the case of ‘integration’.

As discussed in chapter 2, by adopting a critical discursive approach to analysis (CDA), I investigate whether these normative principles and practices are confined or rationalised by the increasing efforts of Switzerland to join Europe and the global market through such ‘deterritorialised politics’; while simultaneously maintaining
existing rigid migration and immigration policies that are highly territorial and partly based upon statist civic republican self-understandings of `national identity`.

The logic for using what Fairclough (2009) refers to as a `transdisciplinary approach` to research on membership, is that there is an urgent need to examine Western-European nation-states` strategic efforts to create migrant `integration` policies in the context of contemporary modalities of membership. These policies may reveal the delicate act of coalescence of different, largely statist interests, which maintain existing power relations. The complexity and density of this plurality of environments, which I have tried to take into account within this study, in which discourses around migrant `integration` are taking place and in which education is attributed a specific role to `solve` a `problematised` understanding of migration, calls for new ways of looking at `policy` and `governance` as discussed in chapter 2. The specific questions which are raised are how this particular instrumentalisation of education is framed; who is involved in this framing; which sources are referred to for the arguments behind this instrumentalisation and most importantly; in what ways do they address political membership?

Thus, I explore whether policy could be the carrier of the perpetuation of old pre-existing normative frames or modalities of membership, if policy is understood as an act of discursive negotiation of different normative claims and interests. As discussed in chapter 2, this pertains to the idea of policy as discourse. How (political) membership is discursively, i.e. ideologically as well as legally defined plays a key role as to who or who does not have a `right to belong` or be a `member` of this order.

In this sense, there is a major lack of attention towards what I would like to call a key policy attribute, which needs to be addressed; the demarcations of `membership` within and through this act of policy as discourse, or the framing of `political membership`. I favour Benhabib`s (2004) understanding of the conflicts of political membership discourses in contemporary states for a number of reasons; not only does she base her arguments for political membership as a human right on a thorough review and constructive critique of theorists, such as Immanuel Kant (cosmopolitan right), Hannah Arendt (the right of have rights) and John Rawls (law of peoples, distributive justice and migrations), but she also introduces the concept of `democratic iterations` (Derrida, 1985), which in my own understanding is strongly linked to a
A discursive approach to combining normative political theory and political sociology of the state.

This approach builds on previous normative political ideology of membership, such as already exist in contemporary democracies, and expands critically on this ideology by transdisciplinary research on political sociology of the state. The understanding of policy as discourse is elaborated in chapter 2, introducing my eclectic use of Norman Fairclough’s framework for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the combination thereof with a political sociological approach to identifying ‘deterritorialised politics’ of a nation-state in a European space of policy through governance.

In Switzerland, not only are policy makers grappling with the economic needs to adhere to expansive and political transnationalism, but also in trying to establish a constructed policy notion of ‘national identity’ or clearly delineated ‘national culture’ (Benhabib, 2002) into which ‘the other’ or homogenised ‘migrant’ must integrate. The question which arises is whether this concept of ‘integration’, according to the key arguments I explore through a discursive approach throughout my chapters, maintains an exclusionary or narrowing approach to political membership, by preserving a host-society stance, host-guest or Swiss-Migrant dichotomy, and therefore restricting citizenship rights and naturalisation to large numbers of the population.

Historical development of migration in Europe paired with the economic labour migration agreements and different national immigration and migration policies, as will be discussed subsequently, give a rough picture of how ‘the world economy, or for that matter any economic system, possesses features of cooperation as well as the logic of unintended consequences’ (Benhabib, 2004:102).

Benhabib (2004) calls for the progression of social democracy relative to the extended interests of the nation-state to participate in a transnational policy space, such as Switzerland’s interest in participating in Europe. One part of her argumentation is built on the logic that if nation-states are engaging increasingly in ‘deterritorialised’ or transnational politics, including transnational migration agreements, they can no longer restrict political membership for migrants within their ‘borders’ on any good grounds for reasons of maintaining territorial functions and restrictions.
Importantly, Benhabib (2004) does not negate social democracy as discursive or ideological per se; and nor does she entirely favour the enlightenment-based conceptualisation of citizenship and membership. Rather, she refutes the claim of nation-states to being social democracies without adherence to what she refers to as the human right to membership, or what I would term a human right to belonging. She proposes working with discourse, or the concept of ‘iteration’ (see 3.1.3) not only in the disarticulation of power relations, but rather in understanding and acknowledging, critically and constructively, the discursive element as the medium through which democracy may operate.

Benhabib puts the development of contemporary frames of membership in relation to a disaggregation of state sovereignty and the institution of national citizenship in relation to transnational migration. She develops her argument by showing the process through which the modern nation-state has regulated membership in terms of one principal category: national membership. However, she also suggests that new modalities of membership are ignored by nation-states, with the result that the boundaries of the political community, as continually demarcated in policy by the nation-state system, are no longer adequate to regulate membership.

In the next subsection (3.1.2), these new modalities of membership, citizenship and integration and the challenges Western-European nation-states face in view of transnational migration in the last few decades are explored briefly. The second section of this chapter (3.2) is dedicated to showing the relevance of the historical developments in the case of Switzerland as a confederation and its economic and political relationship to Europe as contributing to forms of deterritorialised politics. The purpose of the literature review is to provide the context for the subsequent analysis, which is based on the methodological approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis as elaborated in the previous chapters.
3.1.3 European migration history, Integration and Citizenship in Europe

The shift towards ‘deterritorialised politics’

To understand the complex nature of migration within Europe in the last few decades and the effects of these developments on nation states and their respective social and political systems, it is important to examine processes of policy development, implementation and modes of governance of migration within European and national frameworks. According to Geddes:

‘the analysis of the politics of migration and immigration in Europe needs to be placed in the context of more general changes affecting European nation states, both internally – welfare state and labour market changes, for instance – and concerning international enlargements such as European integration.’ (Geddes, 2003:3/4).

Comparisons between countries in terms of their responses to these developments need to be placed in historical perspective (Novoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003). Novoa and Yariv-Mashal (2003) argue that by focussing on problems, which are rooted in the present, but possess a historical context, comparative education can gain critical distance from contemporary discourses of performance and international competition. In this section, in the context of migration policy, I seek to uncover the multiple interests that the nation-state is trying to reconcile while retaining territorial sovereignty and yet being a player in the global or European market.

Migration within and into Europe can very broadly be described as partly a legacy of Empire which established enduring ties with countries outside the European continent. It is also partly the outcome of wars, which lead to economic blockades and disputed boundaries and caused a mass flow of refugees. A further factor is the end of the ideological confrontation which caused the division of Europe between ‘East’ and ‘West’, and in the latter part of the 20th century, a convergence in the concepts of citizenship in Western European countries, based on democratic decision-making, mixed economies and social protection, ‘enabling the development of the Single Market and the principle of free movement of labour’ (Jordan, Strath and Triandafyllidou, 2003: 201). According to the World Migration Report, issued by the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2000), 150 million international migrants were living outside of the country of their nationality in 2000, which is approximately 2.5% of the world population at that time. The EU member states hosted less than 10% of the world’s international migrants, which consisted of about 15 million people of an EU population of 370 million (Geddes, 2003:14). Geddes (2003) points out that although this may appear to be relatively large numbers of people, the majority of the world’s inhabitants are born, live and die in a very small geographical region, and so human immobility is still a common phenomenon. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century marked far more extensive migration movements into the US or colonised areas than in this era of globalisation.

However, international migration does raise fundamental questions about ties between certain countries in terms of out-and in flow of migrants. Further questions relate to how these out-and in flows affect national economic and social systems; what policies the respective nation states are adopting in relation to immigration, both jointly in European terms, and individually in national terms; and, perhaps most strikingly, how this affects the lives of migrants within the respective nations. Although Switzerland did not have colonial history, nonetheless, European colonial past and ties with European countries have established certain migration movements, which have affected the countries’ economic and social considerations.

Looking at post-war migration movements, a distinction can be roughly made between a primary labour migration during the 1950s until 1973 or 1974, which occurred as a response to the requirements of European post-war economic reconstruction (Piore, 1979); secondary or family migration in the mid 1970s, after labour recruitment slowed down, and a third wave of migration in the aftermath of the end of the Cold war in 1989 to 1990, with a noticeable increase in asylum seeking and also what is deemed illegal migration (Geddes, 2003:17-19). Western Europe experienced post-war (WW2) immigration, which was structured by networks of sending and receiving countries - primarily based on colonial ties or labour recruitment agreements between states - and the development of the European economy, which necessitated a demand for migrant workers. To a large extent the post-war economic boom was sustained by migrants from other European countries and beyond (Geddes, 2003: 14). I would like to argue that this has had profound
effects on the way in which migrants are perceived until today in Western European
countries, such as Switzerland; During the early 1950s, migration was positively
viewed as a short-term and transitory phenomenon, which could potentially solve the
overpopulation of some countries and meet the temporary demand for foreign workers
to supplement their own labour force in other nations. Slow labour markets in sending
countries were seen to benefit from the prospects of savings sent by migrant workers
from abroad, implying the short-term intention of labour terms (Widgren, 1975:275-
276). However, this assumption, made by both sending and receiving countries, was
proved wrong during the 1960s. Less advanced countries of Europe in economic
terms, continued producing superfluous labour for a long period due to the change
from agricultural to industrial production (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995:2). Simultaneously, the increasing wealth of West-European industrial nations gradually
increased the reluctance of native inhabitants to accept low social status employment.
This led to further foreign labour force employment in these countries and a decrease
in skilled labour forces in sending countries, without the hope of returning workers.
Moreover, as will be shown in the Swiss case in chapter 5, immigration and residency
policies changed in order to facilitate these labour demands and had unforeseen
consequences in the eventual permanent settlement of foreign workers in these
receiving countries.

The 1960s marked Europe’s greatest increase in migratory movements compared to
other regions of the world, closely linked to the crude oil crisis and a serious
international economic recession; almost every year until the 1970s saw
approximately one million workers migrating to industrial Western Europe. This
declined in the 1970s, but was replaced by a steady increase in immigration from the
family members of migrant workers joining them and their children being born in the
new countries of residence. Governments began to give attention for the first time to
social considerations rather than the needs of the economy in terms of immigration
policy (Widgren, 1975:279). However, it remains unclear whether this shift away
from economically driven immigration policy has in fact occurred, or whether it has
been redefined in many nation states to better suit current economic requirements. An
insight into European migration policy and national systems of regulation and the
management of different sectors may aid in this enquiry.
The European border system during the 1970s and 80s was a well-maintained system of national labour markets, in which trade unions had a strong interest in ‘sustaining stability and control in return for economic partnership and social protection’ (Jordan, Strath and Triandafyllidou, 2003: 201). This caused a massive decrease in labour migrations in the EU area during that time. A redistribution of resources to poor regions, which had been sources of migrant labour in the post-war periods, such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Southern Italy, was initiated by institutions such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Cohesion Funds (Jordan, Strath and Triandafyllidou, 2003). Geddes (2003) explains that by the late 1970s it was relatively clear that the intended temporary migration had changed into what looked like permanent settlement. The immigrant communities within host countries had changed into including more women, being more varied in age groups and having increased association with social institutions of the welfare state, the labour market, and political system (Friedberg and Hunt, 2003).

It is important to note these developments of ‘permanent settlement’ of foreign workers and their families in Western-European countries; the changing of social constellations but also the position of preserving local culture or political stability are debates which reappear in current political discourses. Benhabib (2004) argues that nation-states also strive to guard their borders and to establish a sense of national identity and retaining this old idea of unity within the nation. They are however confronted with an ever-changing constellation of society, not only due to immigration, but also within the nation itself and its different regions, and political cleavages (see section 3).

International figures for the 1990s to 2000 show that certain countries experienced far more immigration than other European states: these are Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, which show foreign population rates of about 5-8%. These countries have offered different policy responses to immigration. In response to the demands of nationalist groups, one reaction seems to be the restriction of immigration in countries such as Switzerland (see section 3), Germany and France, with specific decisions made by the latter two since 1973 and 1974 to stop recruiting foreign workers or of not exceeding 10% of their representation within the total workforce. Similar responses were made by the
Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, particularly towards workers from the South of Europe (Widgren, 1975: 279). A less stringent solution was sought by increasing efforts to stabilize and integrate the immigrant population, given that it had now become evident that long-term settlement was a reality. Distinctions were made between wanted and unwanted migration, resulting from what has been called the ‘liberal paradox of open markets and relatively closed states’ (Hollifield, 2000a; in Geddes, 2003: 20). Although countries like Britain and other EU states were apparently opening up and becoming increasingly involved in the movement of goods, capital, services and money, the movement of people was becoming rigorously monitored.

As mentioned earlier, Western European industrial states such as Germany, Switzerland and the UK have had long-standing immigration; however even among these countries, there is vast divergence in terms of how they treat migrants, stemming from how the concept of nation and citizenship is perceived. In the UK, a large part of the migrant population appears to be enjoying citizens’ rights and seems to be integrated into the national population, notwithstanding the persisting existence of racism and xenophobia (Abbas, 2005). However, in Germany and similarly in Switzerland, the idea that migrants were a transitory phenomenon seems to have had the effect that immigrants are routinely refused citizenship and political rights (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).

The term ‘immigrant integration’ is widely employed to refer to the desired end-state of immigrant policies. (…) The term has been described as a ‘treacherous metaphor’ because it rests on an allusion to the mathematical process of building a whole number without being clear about the components of the whole into which the newcomers are supposed to ‘integrate’ (Banton, 2001). Despite this, there has been a reassertion of policies that emphasise socio-economic integration that places more responsibility on immigrants to adapt. (Geddes, 2003:5)

Faced with increased permanent settlement of migrants, European countries, especially Western industrial nations, attempt, in various ways, to define the process of integration into their national systems. However, as Banton (2001) explains above, migration is not straightforward. Distinctions between economic migration and asylum can be vague, as can be the terms ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ migration.
Categories such as voluntary migration and forced refugee are open to definition and redefinition by these receiving states. Particularly in Europe issues of ‘citizenship’ and ‘identity’ have become such crucially debated factors. One short-term reason for the increase in identity politics in contemporary Europe is the ramification of the end of the Cold War (Holmes and Murray, 1999). This time marked political instability and civil wars in Africa, Central Asia and former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, improved access to intercontinental transport contributed to increased migration flows from outside Western Europe, resulting often in steeply rising applications for asylum. Host countries reacted with restrictive and deterrent asylum regimes, as well as tightening external border controls at the periphery of Europe (King et al., 2000, in Jordan Strath and Triandafyllidou, 2003:203). The collapse of communism in Central, Eastern Europe, and USSR from 1989, and opening up of travel and the repercussions of serious local economic difficulties, encouraged mainly Central and Eastern Europeans to move to more stable parts of Europe, such as Switzerland. However, these migrants, who included asylum seekers and refugees, were often unwelcome in the West, facing racism and rigid immigration policies (Holmes and Murray, 1999). Western nations may have felt threatened by this influx of migrants with different cultural backgrounds, often representing new labour forces and sometimes depending on Welfare state resources.

According to Friedberg and Hunt (2003), welfare states play an important part in arbitrating the relationship between individuals and society and creating inclusion and exclusion. The longer-standing immigration countries of Western Europe have seen welfare state pressures, changes in welfare state organisation and changed welfare state ideologies, which have had important effects on the categorization of migrants (Friedberg and Hunt, 2003). A much-used argument against migration in many countries has been the questionable legitimacy of Asylum seekers receiving Welfare state benefits without ‘earning’ them and ‘living off the local tax money’. ‘It’s not so much the personality or character of asylum seekers that matters, but rather the way in which they are viewed by institutions and organisations in the countries to which they move.’ (Geddes, 2003: 3). Moreover, according to Jordan, Strath and Triandafyllidou (2003), at the end of the twentieth century, the organisation of the labour market underwent a deep transformation, creating an information society, consumption society and production of goods related to status. New perspectives on labour markets
brought changes to how employees were perceived. Social rights notion changed, and there was an emphasis on the responsibility to avoid burdening the taxpayer:

`Mobility was intrinsic to globalisation (Kassimati 2001): Governments competing for investment by companies which moved staff around in the world, sought to facilitate movements of people – to be ‘business-friendly’ was to be mobility-friendly. Hence immigration policy had to adapt to an environment in which borders were seen as potential barriers to economic efficiency and development, rather than boundaries for membership and social protection’ (Jordan, Strath and Triandafyllidou, 2003: 202/3)

Thus welfare states can play an important role in terms of inclusion or exclusion: ‘The legal status of immigrants and welfare state chauvinism can have a high impact on whether a resident immigrant is considered ‘worthy’ or not of receiving welfare state benefits, as often immigrants are portrayed as a drain on welfare state resources’ (Geddes, 2003: 22).

Another reason for heightened focus on issues of identity was that Western Europe itself was undergoing major changes: in the early 1990s the EU was undergoing a process of widening and deepening, by preparing admission of new member states, including Finland, Austria, Norway and Sweden. Further admission of Eastern European countries was planned, but much more sceptically perceived with the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 raised anxieties in many EU member states, particularly the UK and Denmark that the EU was turning into a ‘federalized super-state’, despite rules of subsidiarity (Holmes and Murray, 1999:3). The introduction of a common currency, of EU citizenship, the growing significance of the European Parliament and the fact that even the EU did not manage to alleviate socio-economic problems such as unemployment and recession, may have further enhanced this fear for national identity and sovereignty. Additionally, economic changes brought about by globalisation and the rise of new industrial countries resulted in economic restructuring and rapid social change in Europe (Castles, 1999:55). In the case of Switzerland, continual discussions about joining the EU were put onto the political agenda and repeatedly rejected by people’s votes and certain parties (see more section 3 and chapter 5).
De Palo and Faini (2006) argue that the belief that economic integration is key to social integration is prevalent in most nation states. Moreover, economic integration, they argue, particularly in the labour market, is more easily measured (De Palo and Faini, 2006: 5). However, even housing, education and health are easily measurable factors, and even from a neo-liberal, economic point of view can seem crucial as an investment in human capital. Migration itself may be highly contentious issue in the industrialized nations of Europe. In recent years, powerfully active anti-immigrant political parties, for example in France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland (see section 3), have given rise to heated debates about citizenship and migrants’ resident status. ‘Words such as flooding, swamping and invasion can enter the anti-immigration vernacular, frame debates about international migration, and can prompt the perception of international migration as a threat to security, welfare or internal social cohesion’ (Huysmans, 2000: quoted in Geddes, 2003: 8). There is a prevalent public perception in many Western European states that increases in crime rates are linked to increased migrant populations. Holmes and Murray (1996) argue that this perception is fuelled by how media and governments present crime rate statistics and that the primary explanation of any rise in crime rates is due to the high unemployment (Holmes and Murray, 1996:7).

According to the European Commission and a number of member states, a major shift in policy regarding recruitment of skilled and unskilled workers from outside the Union has occurred. Moreover, since 9/11, issues of national security have enhanced the fear of uncontrolled and illegal migration, although the attacks seemed to have been made by legal migrants (see Abbas, 2005; EUMC/RAXEN Report; Jordan, Strath and Triandafyllidou: 2003). To a certain extent, issues of national security and their linkage to migrants have generated a fundamental debate about identity in general, about the nature of citizenship and the efficacy of multiculturalism (Orhun, 2005). There is also concern about the alienation of migrants resulting from this debate. In the UK, or more accurately in England, this debate has recently caused an upsurge of political statements about ‘true integration’ (Orhun, 2005: 6) and ‘pride in diversity’ (Phillips, 2005) and the nature of Britishness in general.

According to Geddes (2003), European countries of immigration have sought to adopt migrant policies that are linked in some way to ideas about the social utility of
integration. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion are mediated in arenas such as nationality laws, welfare states, and labour markets, where there are pressures. While there are clear national particularities, there are also crosscutting factors presenting similar dilemmas to European countries of immigration (Geddes, 2003:24). In terms of ‘integration’, two contrasting cases can be mentioned within Europe. France views integration as a process in which migrants will assimilate into the French culture, values and ways of living, stemming from the belief that the majority of migrants originated from former French colonies and French speaking countries (De Palo and Faini, 2006: 4) and from Republican principles. In Germany, on the other hand, migrants were free to pursue their own way of life within the host country. However, they were starkly segregated in separate schools, and were offered different social benefits, reflecting the perspective that they would soon return to their sending countries. De Palo and Faini (2006) speak of a third model, the Dutch model, in which the need for a multicultural approach to integration was emphasized, as opposed to cultural assimilation or separation. The concept of multiculturalism is highly relevant to this study in terms of how difference or diversity is politicized in Swiss migration and integration politics, as will be explored in sections 2 and 3 of this chapter.

The subject of integration is strongly linked to political integration and whether and how countries grant citizenship rights to newcomers. The understanding of Political integration is based on Benhabib’s (2004:121) definition as ‘practices and rules, constitutional traditions and institutional habits, that bring individuals together to form a functioning political unity’. As in France, the UK and the Netherlands experienced long-standing immigration from former colonies, thus granting migrants the same formal rights as other national citizens, holding passports and nationality of the country to which they moved. In Germany or Switzerland, migrants were granted legal rights and welfare state membership or so-called denizenship, ‘which can be understood as legal and social rights linked to legal residence falling short of full citizenship.’ (Geddes, 2003:15) However, Castles (1999) points out that this incomplete membership status of denizenship is problematic, because partial citizenship creates expectations and cannot be regarded a static condition. The next step is for migrants with this status either to leave the country or to be allowed to become full citizens. In some countries like Germany and Switzerland, even the
children of people who have lived in those countries for decades may not be considered citizens (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).

In view of these developments, some immigration countries may therefore have very specific reasons, other than diminishing the risk of social tensions, for the particular ways in which they integrate migrants into their host societies. If restrictive immigration policy is applied despite economic benefits from foreign labour, governments have to seek other ways of recruiting labour. However, as mentioned previously, native inhabitants are often reluctant to do low status and low paid work. Widgren (1975) suggests that two long-term aspects will become increasingly predominant in immigration policy development:

‘One is the education of the children of migrant workers – is their education to prepare them for a future in their country of origin or in their country of residence or in both cultures. The other is the granting of political rights to immigrants. It is being found increasingly grotesque that adult foreigners living in Europe, are denied the right to vote and thus have a say in political life in the localities and countries where they live and work, and in their countries of origin as well, as long as they are abroad.’ (Widgren, 1975: 281)

In the next section the theoretical position within this thesis with respect to political integration and political membership is discussed and reviewed; mainly based on Seyla Benhabib’s theoretical framework for political membership as a human right and on how nation-states try to negotiate contradictory policies while becoming increasingly involved in what she terms ‘deterritorialised politics’. This section reviewed developments of migration in Europe and how these may have contributed to the introduction and changes of concepts of ‘integration’ and ‘citizenship’. In this sense, according to the theory presented in the next section, some of the developments in European migration history should be regarded as distinctive and pivotal in the way that membership is framed in Western European nation states, such as Switzerland, in the current time. The next theoretical section on political boundaries and membership provides a perspective on these conceptions. It forms the theoretical basis for analysis for Switzerland’s unique case history of nation or state-building project(s) amidst federalism and the role or symbolism of education as a part of this project (see section
3). The following subsection offers a distinctive perspective on ‘political membership’ as a theoretical basis for my further analysis within this study.

### 3.1.4. Political Membership as a Human Right

In this study, I follow Benhabib’s (2004) logic that membership or political membership is a human right, which nation-states fail to recognise and adopt in their membership practices despite the apparent frame of being liberal-democratic states. She develops her argument based on a thorough review and constructive critique of theorists, such as Emmanuel Kant (cosmopolitan right), Hannah Arendt (the right of have rights) and John Rawls (law of peoples, distributive justice and migrations) and also the ‘Decline-of-Citizenship’ school in political theory. I will give an outline of this discussion to portray Benhabib’s own position with respect to political membership and connect this to how I draw the theoretical perspective for my own study.

For Benhabib’s development of her own argument on political membership as a human right, she looks more closely at Emmanuel Kant’s understanding of ‘cosmopolitan right’, which he describes in his essay on “Perpetual Peace”, written in 1795 upon the signing of the Treaty of Basel by Prussia and revolutionary France (see Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997: in Benhabib, 2004:25). Benhabib (ibid.) points out that the visionary depth of Kant’s project for perpetual peace among nations is surprising for his time and represents a new domain between the law of specific polities on the one hand and customary international law on the other, because he focuses on moral and legal relations which hold among individuals across bounded communities. He formulates three definitive articles for perpetual peace among states: “The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican”; “The Law of Nations shall be founded on a Federation of Free States”; and “The Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality” (Kant [1795] 1923:434-446; [1795] 1994: 99-108). A majority of research on this essay has been focussing on the exact legal and political form that these articles could or would take, and on whether Kant meant to propose the establishment of a world federation of republics (eine foederative Vereignigung) or a league of sovereign nation-states (Voelkerbund).
The third Article of “Perpetual Peace” remains largely uncommented upon, according to Benhabib (2004), which is the only article that Kant himself explicitly designates with the terminology of Weltbürgerrecht (World citizenship). The German text reads: “Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränkt sein” (Kant [1795] 1923:443: in Benhabib, 2004:26)). According to Kant himself, there is an oddity in the word “hospitality”in this context, and he remarks that “it is not a question of philanthropy but of rights” (ibid). In other words, hospitality is not to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one’s land or who become dependent upon one’s act of kindness through circumstances of nature or history; hospitality is a “right” which belongs to all human beings insofar as we view them as potential participants in a world republic. But the “right” of hospitality is odd in that it does not regulate relationships among individuals who are members of a specific civil entity under whose jurisdiction they stand; this “right” regulates the interactions of individuals who belong to different civic entities, yet who encounter one another at the margins of bounded communities’ (Benhabib, 2004:26). In this sense, the right of hospitality is situated at the boundaries of the polity and delimits civic space by regulating relations among members and strangers; the right of hospitality occupies that space between human rights and civil rights, between the right of humanity in our person and the rights that accrue to us insofar as we are members of specific republics (Benhabib, ibid).

One of the reasons I support Benhabib’s understanding of membership in the current age is that she also departs from Kant, who clearly refers to rights of hospitality within this space of the margins of bounded communities and the boundaries of polity. However, in current policy spaces, it is precisely these margins which are becoming increasingly blurred and not signified in a more contemporary sense; with all the multiple commitments that the state has towards other states, towards individuals from other states, and towards some individuals already within the boundaries of the state. It is this regulation of relations among members and strangers, the notion of ‘member’ and of ‘stranger’, which then becomes important to resignify.

According to Kant, the “right to be a permanent visitor” [Gastrecht] is awarded though a freely chosen special contract that goes beyond what is owed to the other
morally and what he is entitled to legally; therefore Kant names this a “wohltägiger Vertrag”, a “contract of beneficence” ([1795] in Benhabib, 2004:28); It is considered a special privilege which the republican sovereign can grant to certain foreigners who reside in their territories, who perform certain functions, who represent their respective political entities, who engage in long-term trade, and such. Benhabib (2004) maintains that while Kant’s focus fell, for understandable historical reasons, upon the right of temporary sojourn, her concern is with the unbridgeable gap he suggests exists between the right of temporary sojourn and permanent residency. According to Kant, the first is a right, the second a privilege; granting the first to strangers is an obligation for a republican sovereign, whereas allowing the second is a “contract of beneficence” (ibid), therefore not an obligation. In Kant’s sense, therefore the rights of strangers and foreigners do not extend beyond the peaceful pursuit of their means of livelihood upon the territory of another. To this I would add, that Kant’s understanding of ‘foreigners’ and ‘the right to be a permanent visitor’ (Gastrecht) risks in current age to lead to what Benhabib (2004:xx) has named ‘permanent alienage’ of migrants living within contemporary societies within nation-states; this status of ‘permanent visitor’ points to the deep rootedness of ‘othering’ within a legal framework. However, Benhabib (2004:28) rightfully asks; ‘what about the right to political membership? Under what conditions, if any, can the guest become a member of the republican sovereign? How are the boundaries of the sovereign defined? ’.

Kant ([1795] in Benhabib, 2004:xx) envisages a world condition in which all members enter into a condition of lawful association with one another. Yet this civil condition of lawful coexistence is not equivalent to membership in a republican polity. Kant’s cosmopolitan citizenship still needs their individual republics to be citizens at all. This is why Kant is so careful to distinguish a “world government”, which he argues would result only in a “universal monarchy” and would be a "soulless despotism,” whereas a federative union (eine foederative Vereinigung) would still permit the exercise of citizenship within bounded communities (Kant [1795] 1923, 453; 1949, 328: in Benhabib, 2004:37ff).

Benhabib (2004) explains that we are left with an ambiguous Kantian legacy, because Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace” signalled a division between two conceptions of
sovereignty and paved the way for the transition from the first to the second. We can name these “Westphalian sovereignty” and “liberal international sovereignty” (see Held, 2002:4-6; Krasner, 1999:20-25; in Benhabib, 2004:39). In classical Westphalian regime of sovereignty, states are free and equal; they enjoy ultimate authority over all objects and subjects within a circumscribed territory; relations with other sovereigns are voluntary and contingent and limited in kind and scope to transitory military and economic alliances as well as cultural and religious affinities; above all states `regard cross-border processes as a `private matter` concerning only those immediately affected’ (Held, 2002:4). By contrast, Benhabib explains (2004:41) `in conceptions of liberal international sovereignty, the formal equality of states is increasingly dependent upon their subscribing to common values and principles such as the observance of human rights and the rule of law and respect of democratic self-determination. Sovereignty no longer means ultimate and arbitrary authority; states that treat their citizens in violation of certain norms, that close borders, prevent a free market, limit freedom of speech and association, and the like, are thought not to belong within a specific society of states or alliances; the anchoring of domestic principles in institutions shared with others is crucial.’

According to Benhabib’s (2004) research on Article One of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” ([1975] 1923:443: in Benhabib, 2004:41), which reads that “The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican”, Kant certainly can be seen to straddle the classical Westphalian and the liberal-international models of sovereignty. He clearly differentiated the tensions between the injunction of a universalistic morality to offer temporary sojourn to all and the legal privilege of the republican sovereign not to extend such temporary sojourn to full membership. Benhabib (2004), departing from Kant, argues that the right to membership of the temporary resident must be viewed as a human right, which can be justified along the principles of a universalistic morality. However, she asserts that the terms and conditions under which long-term membership can be granted remain the prerogative of the republican sovereign; yet these terms and conditions must fall under human rights constraints such as non-discrimination and the right of the migrant to due process, and must be respected. While the prerogative of states to stipulate some criteria of incorporation cannot be rejected, we still have to ask: `which are those incorporation practices that would be impermissible from a moral standpoint and which are those practices that are morally
indifferent – that is to say, neutral from the moral point of view?’ (Benhabib, 2002:43). In this study, these incorporation practices appear as the primary object of an agenda of migrant ‘integration’ in Switzerland and seemingly stipulate the path to membership for ‘foreigners’ or ‘visitors’ in the Kantian sense. However, I would argue that it becomes important to investigate what this stipulation contains and how exactly membership or ‘integration’ is understood and framed; and whether these are ‘permissible’ from a moral standpoint, or from a point of view of human rights.

According to Benhabib (2004), Kant’s formulations permit us to capture the structural contradictions between universalist and republican ideals of sovereignty in the modern revolutionary period; she calls this contradiction ‘the paradox of democratic legitimacy’ and describes it systematically. She (2004) unfolds this paradox by explaining that in an ideal situation, democratic rule would mean that all members of a sovereign body are to be respected as bearers of human rights, as well as the consociates of this sovereign body, and that these consociates of the sovereign freely associate with one another to establish a regime of self-governance under which each is to be considered both author of the laws and the subject to them. In this sense, this ideal of the original contact, as formulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and adopted by Kant, is a heuristically useful device for capturing the logic of modern democracies (Benhabib, 2004). ‘Modern democracies, unlike their ancient counterparts conceive of their citizens as right-bearing consociates; the rights of the citizen rest upon the “rights of man.” Les droits de l’homme et de citoyen do not contradict one another; on the contrary, they are co-dependent. This is the idealized logic of the modern democratic revolutions following the American and French examples’ (Benhabib, 2004:43). At this point of the argument, Benhabib (2004) points out what Habermas has named “the Janus face of the modern nation” (Habermas, 1998:115), namely the tension between universal human rights claims and particularistic cultural and national identities, which is constitutive of democratic legitimacy. ‘The democratic sovereign draws its legitimacy not merely from its act of constitution but, equally significant from the conformity of this act to universal principles of human rights that are in some sense said to precede and antedate the will of the sovereign and in accordance with which the sovereign undertakes to bind itself. “We, the people,” refers to a particular culture, history, and legacy; yet this people establishes itself as a democratic body by acting in the name of the “universal” ‘ (Benhabib, 2004:44). In
this way, modern democracies act in the name of universal principles which are then circumscribed within a particular civic community. However, potentially there is always a conflict between the interpretation of these rights claims, which precedes the formulations of the sovereign and the actual enactment of the democratic people which could potentially violate such interpretations. In short, Benhabib (ibid.) describes the paradox that the republican sovereign should undertake to bind its will by a series of precommitments to a set of formal and substantive norms, usually referred to as “human rights”; The rights and claims of others are then negotiated upon this terrain flanked by human rights on the one hand and sovereignty assertions on the other. She argues that while this paradox can never be fully resolved for democracies, its impact can be alleviated through renegotiation and reiteration of the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-determination;

‘Popular sovereignty, which means that those who are subject to law are also its authors, is not identical with territorial sovereignty. While the demos, as the popular sovereign, must assert control over a specific territorial domain, it can also engage in reflexive acts of self-constitution, whereby the boundaries of the demos can be readjusted. The politics of membership in the age of the disaggregation of citizenship rights is about negotiating the complexities of full membership rights, democratic voice, and territorial residence’ (Benhabib, 2004:48).

In order to develop her own argument about how political membership should be considered a human right despite the paradox of democratic legitimacy, Benhabib (2004) refers to Hannah Arendt who, after Kant, turned to the ambiguous legacy of cosmopolitan law, and who broke down the paradoxes at the heart of the territorially based sovereign system. Through a thorough historical analysis starting from Western colonialisation of Africa and other continents/countries, Arendt ([1951] 1968) shows how the perversion of the modern state from being an instrument of law into one of lawless discretion in the service of the nation was completed when states began to practice massive denaturalisations against unwanted minorities, thus creating millions of refugees, deported aliens, and stateless peoples across borders. Benhabib (2004) describes Arendt’s arguments, how refugees, minorities, stateless and displaced persons are special categories of human beings created through the action of the nation-state. In a territorially bounded nation-state system, that is in a “state-centric” international order, one’s legal status is dependent upon protection by the highest
authority that controls the territory upon which one resides and issues the papers to which one is entitled. One becomes a refugee if one is persecuted, expelled, and driven away from one’s homeland; one becomes a minority if the political majority in the polity declares that certain groups do not belong to the supposedly “homogeneous” people; one is a stateless person if the state whose protection one has hitherto enjoyed withdraws such protection, as well as nullifying the papers it has granted; one is a displaced person if, having been once rendered a refugee, a minority or a stateless person, one cannot find another polity to recognize one as its member, and remains in a state of limbo, caught between territories, none of which desire one to be its resident. It is here that Arendt concludes:

“We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerge who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation...The right that corresponds to this loss and that was never mentioned among the human rights cannot be expressed in the categories of the eighteenth century because they presume that rights spring immediately from the “nature” of man...the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible.” (Arendt [1951] 1968:269-297: in Benhabib, 2004:55).

In this sense, “the notion of a right to have rights arises out of the modern-statist conditions and is equivalent to the moral claim of a refugee or other stateless person to citizenship, or at least juridical personhood, within the social confines of some law-dispensing state” (Michelman, 1996:203: in Benhabib, 2004:54). From this Benhabib asks what kind of a moral claim is the one advanced by the refugee and the asylum seekers, the guest worker and the migrant, to be recognized as a member. What kind of right is entailed in the right to have rights?

Benhabib (2004:56) begins by analysing the phrase “the right to have rights”. The first use of the term “right” is addressed to humanity as such and enjoins us to recognize membership in some human group. In this sense this use of the term “right” brings to mind a moral imperative, namely to “Treat all human beings as persons belonging to some human group and entitled to the protection of the same.” Therefore, Benhabib (2004) concludes that what is invoked here is a moral claim to
membership and a certain form of treatment compatible with the claim to membership.

The second use of the term “right” in the phrase “the right to have rights” is built upon this prior claim of membership.

'To have a right, when one is already a member of an organized political and legal community, means that “I have a claim to do or not to do A, and you have an obligation not to hinder me from doing or not doing A.”. Rights claims entitle persons to engage or not in a course of action, and such entitlements create reciprocal obligations. Rights and obligations are correlated; rights discourse takes place among the consociates of a community. Such rights, which generate reciprocal obligations among consociates, that is, among those who are already recognized as members of a legal community, are usually referred to as “civil and political” rights or as citizens’ rights. Let us name the second use of the term “right” in the phrase “the right to have rights” its juridico-civil usage. In this usage, “rights” suggests a triangular relationship between the person who is entitled to rights, others upon whom this obligation creates a duty, and the protection of this rights claim and its enforcement through some established legal organ, most commonly the state and its apparatus’ (Benhabib, 2004:57).

In contemporary terms, Arendt is advocating a “civic” as opposed to an “ethnic” ideal of polity and belonging. I support this distinction in that frequently in contemporary modalities of membership, there is still a strong ethnic or cultural ideal of belonging, rather than civic or political. It is the mutual recognition of a group of consociates of each other as equal rights-bearing persons that constitutes for her the true meaning of political equality. In response to this, Benhabib (2004:60) asks, whether it could be that the institutional, even if not philosophical, solution to the dilemmas of human rights is to be found in the establishment of principles of civic nationalism? However, Arendt was just as sceptical about the ideas of world government as she was about the possibility of nation-state systems ever achieving justice and equality for all. World government, according to Arendt would destroy the space for polities in that it would not allow individuals to defend shared public spaces in common. Simultaneously, the nation-state system, on the other hand, always carried within itself the seeds of exclusionary injustice at home and the aggression abroad (Benhabib, 2004:61).
Benhabib (2004) maintains that in her reflections on the paradoxes of the right to have rights, nonetheless, Arendt took the framework of the nation-state, whether in its ethnic or civic variants, as a given. Her more experimental, fluid and open reflections on how to constitute democratically sovereign communities, which did not follow the model of the nation-state, were not explored further. I agree with Benhabib (2004) who wants to suggest that the experiment of the modern nation-state could be analyzed in different terms: the formation of the democratic people with its unique history and culture can be seen as an ongoing process of transformation and reflexive experimentation with collective identity in a process of democratic iterations. Here she departs from Arendt in that she believes that ‘the contradiction between human rights and sovereignty needs to be reconceptualised as the inherently conflictual aspects of reflexive collective-identity formation in complex, and increasingly multicultural and multinational, democracies’ (Benhabib, 2004:65).

Benhabib points out that Kant and Arendt are very close in their thinking here. Just as Kant leaves unexplained the philosophical and political step that could lead from the right of temporary sojourn to the right of membership, so too Arendt could not base “the right to have rights” i.e., to be recognized as a member of some organized human community, upon some further philosophical principle.

For Kant, granting the right to membership remains the prerogative of the republican sovereign and involves an act of “beneficence”. For Arendt, the actualization of the right to have rights entails the establishment of republican polities, in which the equality of each is guaranteed by the recognition of all. Such acts of republican constitution-making, according to Benhabib (2004), transform the inequalities and exclusions among human beings into a regime of equal rights claims. Arendt herself was deeply conscious of the lingering paradox that every act of republican constitution establishes new ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

‘I am arguing, then, that in Kant’s as well as Arendt’s work we encounter the same tension-filled conceptual construction; first and foremost are universalist moral claims concerning obligations we owe to each other as human beings. For Kant, this is the obligation to grant refuge to each human being in need, whereas for Hannah Arendt this is the obligation not to deny membership or not to deny the right to have rights. Yet for each thinker this Universalist moral right is politically and juridically so circumscribed that every act of
inclusion generates its own terms of exclusion. For Kant, there is no moral claim to permanent residency; for Arendt, there is no escaping the historical arbitrariness of republican acts of founding whose ark of equality will always include some and exclude others. Republican equality is distinct from universal moral equality. The right to have rights cannot be guaranteed by a world state or another world organization, but only by the collective will of circumscribed polities, which in turn, willy-nilly, perpetrate their own regimes of exclusion. We may say that Arendt’s and Kant’s moral cosmopolitanism fails their legal and civic particularism. The paradox of democratic self-determination leads the democratic sovereign to self-constitution as well as to exclusion’ (Benhabib, 2004:67).

Benhabib proposes that in order to find a way out of these dilemmas, philosophically we need to begin by taking a closer look at the two horns of this dilemma: the concept of rights on the one hand and that of sovereign privilege on the other. ‘Their assumptions concerning republican sovereignty lead Arendt and Kant to believe that exclusionary territorial control is an unchecked sovereign privilege which cannot be limited or trumped by other norms and institutions’ (Benhabib, 2004:68). Benhabib emphasizes that this is not the case, neither conceptually or institutionally, and that cosmopolitan rights create a network of obligations and imbrications around sovereignty, which is a key argument for this study.

The laws of the Peoples (Rawls), distributive justice, and `Decline-of-Citizenship`

Benhabib (2004) contends that missing from Kant’s as well as from Arendt’s argumentations was the explicit recognition of economic interdependence of peoples in a world society, and that despite their shrewd insights into the paradox of cosmopolitan right, their formulations lack a more thorough analysis of the interdependence of peoples, nations and states. Contemporary neo-Kantian discourse on migration, addressing the issue of such interdependence at all, treats it from the point of view of distributive justice on a global scale. It is assumed that the principal reason for migratory movements are economic, and that border-crossing movements must be viewed in the context of the world economic interdependencies. Contemporary Kantian cosmopolitans treat border-crossings, whether those of refugees, asylees or migrants, within these framework of global distributive justice; Benhabib (2004) examines these contemporary debates, beginning with John Rawl’s
'Law of the Peoples’. Rawl’s deliberations, she would argue is state-centric and cannot do justice either sociologically or normatively to questions raised by border-crossing (2004:73). On the other hand, global justice theorists, such as Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz, although they go much further than Rawls in pleading for justice across borders, simply subsume migratory movements under global distributive justice. Benhabib (ibid.) claims, that although each party appeals to Kant, they each distort Kant’s position in significant ways. The primary questions Benhabib (ibid.) asks in retribution to their positions is ‘what would be the contours of cosmopolitan right in the Kantian tradition, if we proceed from the view that human migratory movements have been omnipresent throughout human history, and that the actions of sovereign states in an interdependent world constitute “pull” as well as “push” factors in migration? ’ (2004:73). As an answer, she argues herself in favour of interdependence of peoples in a world society, because interactions among human communities are continual and not exceptions in the history of humans. In addition however, Benhabib (2004) maintains, the emergence of a regime of clearly demarcated sovereign state-territoriality is itself a recent product of modernity. In a second step she continues, migration rights cannot be subsumed under distributive justice claims, and finally, that the right to membership ought to be considered a human right, in the moral sense of the term, and it ought to become a legal right as well as by being incorporated into states’ constitutions through citizenship and naturalization provisions.

Neo-Kantian theories of global justice have been challenged by an influential school which Benhabib (2004:74) names “the decline of citizenship.” These theorists maintain that membership in cultural and political communities is not a matter of distributive justice but, rather, a crucial aspect of a community’s self-understanding and self-determination. While agreeing with this claim, Benhabib (ibid.) questions the views of migration and citizenship of Walzer, who is one of the foremost thinkers in this vein. According to Benhabib (ibid.), Walzer conflates ethical and political integration, in that he views the liberal-democratic state as a holistic cultural and ethnical entity. In contrast, Benhabib (2004) argues that it is not, which is a view I share and which I apply to this study. Although Walzer and others are right in raising concerns about the transformations of citizenship in the contemporary world, they are wrong in blaming immigration for these changes. Benhabib (2004) shares their
concern for democratic self-governance, but she maintains that the institutional developments of citizenship rights in the contemporary world are much more complicated and multifaceted than communitarians and decline-of-citizenship theorists would have us believe. She (ibid.2004:74) characterizes these transformations as the “disaggregation of citizenship”.

Returning to John Rawls, he argues that “a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed...in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death...thus, we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life” (Rawls,1993: 41; in Benhabib, 2004: 84). Here Benhabib (2004) calls to mind that the tension between the universalistic premises of Rawl’s political liberalism and the more particularistic orientations of his law of Peoples comes fully to light around this matter. To view political society as a “complete and closed social system” is incompatible with other premises of Rawlsian liberalism (Benhabib, 2004). Rawls understands persons to be endowed with two moral powers: namely a capacity to formulate and pursue an independent conception of the good: and a capacity for a sense of justice and to engage in mutual cooperative ventures with others (Rawls, 1999:82: in Benhabib, 2004:84). According to Benhabib (2004) it is exactly each of these capacities which would potentially bring the individual into conflict with the vision of a democratic society as a “complete and closed system”. Individuals could feel that their understanding of the good, be it for moral, political, religious, artistic, or scientific reasons, obliges them to leave the society into which they were born and to join another society. This would then imply that individuals, in pursuit of their sense of the good, should have a right to leave their societies. Emigration must be a fundamental liberty in a Rawlsian scheme, for otherwise his conception of the person becomes incoherent. The language of a “complete and closed society” is incompatible with the liberal vision of persons and their liberties. Moreover, if it is the case that some individuals’ conceptions of the good may induce them to leave their countries of birth, we also have to assume that there may be “common sympathies” and “communities of shared moral sense” which may not overlap with the boundaries of peoplehood. One’s sense of the moral good may or may not be attuned with the
boundaries of political community. ‘It is most likely that individuals in liberal-democratic cultures will be creatures with multiple, and often conflicting, visions of the good; they will have overlapping attachments to partial communities; in short they will be caught in circles of overlapping and intersecting sympathy and empathy’ (Benhabib, 2004:85). She (ibid.) contends that for example, observant Muslims, and observant Jews are not “elsewhere”; they are our neighbours, citizens, and ourselves in liberal-democratic societies. ‘Value pluralism at the intragroup level is parallel to value pluralism at the intergroup level. “The other” is not elsewhere’ (Benhabib, 2004:87).

Thus, Benhabib (2004) argues that Rawl’s commitment to legitimate moral and political pluralism is compromised by his vision of democratic peoples living in closed societies. Precisely a more radical pluralism would lead to the acknowledgement of the multiple and dynamic ties and interactions of peoples. As opposed to the vision of a “closed” society into which individuals are born and which they only leave in death, Benhabib (2004:94) proceeds from the assumption that liberal peoples have “fairly open borders”; that they not only permit a fundamental right to emigrate, but that they coexist within a system of mutual obligations and privileges, an essential component of which is a privilege to immigrate, that is, to enter another peoples territory and become a member of its society peacefully.

‘Peoples are radically and not merely episodically interdependent. Nation-states develop in history as units of a system of states. They emerge out of the ruins of old multinational empires. Large number of nation-states emerged in Europe and the Middle East after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian and the Ottoman empires at the end of the World War I. The decolonization struggles against the British, French, Portuguese and Dutch empires in the aftermath of World War II resulted in new states being born in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Latin American nations struggled against the Spanish empire. I view peoples and states as actors developing in the context of a world society. The nation-state, which combines territorial sovereignty with aspirations to cultural homogeneity and democratic constitutional government, is a unique product of world society as it undergoes political modernization’ (Benhabib, 2004:94).

Moreover, in answer to theorists, such as Beitz (1999) and Pogge (2002) who prefer to use the argument of global distributive justice to create economic justice among
peoples, Benhabib (2004) argues through epistemic, hermeneutic and democratic objections against this argumentation and rather suggests promoting cosmopolitan federalism. She (ibid) agrees with Beitz` s and Pogge`s liberal cosmopolitan vision that in a world of radical, and not merely accidental and transitory, interdependencies among peoples, our distributive obligations go well beyond the natural duty of assistance. However, she (ibid.) maintains that she is made uncomfortable by the imposition of a global redistributive principle to create economic justice among peoples, unless and until the compatibility of such a principle with democratic self-governance is examined. In her epistemic objection, Benhabib (2004:106) argues that `even if the world economy is best understood as a system of significantly patterned interdependencies and causal interconnections, generalized judgements about aggregate responsibilities are difficult to make. (...) In the absence of more precise judgements about global economic causalities, to extend the difference principle, with its radically redistributive agenda, to world economy is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness. When we are dealing with as complex a moral and epistemic objects as the world economic system, setting general global goals, upon which democratic consensus can be generated, is more desirable. We ought to treat the difference principle, which proceeds from a rather controversial aggregation of individual assets in the first place, as a guideline and a normative goal rather than as a specific policy for reducing inequalities. (...) I (Benhabib) do not share the theoretical certainty behind the difference principle: it is a criterion of judgement, not a blueprint for policy.`

In her hermeneutic objection, Benhabib (2004) retorts that there is a similar difficulty attached to the difference principle (according to Beitz, 1999, and Pogge, 2002: `social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are...to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged`). Any application of the difference principle across borders presupposes that we share clear and non-controversial judgements about who is to count as “the least advantaged” member of society; Benhabib (2004) does not believe that we possess such clear criteria, for this is not an econometric judgement alone, but a political-economic one. Amartya Sen convincingly argued against the fetishization of econometric data and maintained that, as opposed to global comparisons based on per capita GDP, which tell very little about the actual life conditions of the populations assessed, `quality of life` measurements would require
much more differentiated assessments of ‘human capacities’ (Sen, 1984, 1999). The
global application of the difference principle, however, implies that there is much
more convergence and consensus around controversial political and economic
judgements than there is and will ever be in a world community. In this sense,
Benhabib (2004:109) argues that ‘setting global guidelines, norms and standards that
permit local interpretation is far more desirable than assuming that a globally shared
standard for measuring well-being exists.’

As a third, democratic objection, Benhabib (ibid.) identifies that socio-economic
justice and criteria by which to measure it cannot be identified independently of
practices of democratic freedom and self-determination. Socio-economic equality is
itself a precondition for the effective exercise of democratic citizenship rights. The
equal value of liberty of citizens can be realised only if they also have access to and
enjoy a bundle of rights and entitlements which are necessary for them to lead lives of
human dignity and autonomy (Benhabib, 2004). In democratic societies, access to and
enjoyments of rights and entitlements are crucial aspects of the meaning of
citizenship. So the differences between Benhabib (2004) and the globalists are not
about whether socio-economic equality is necessary to democratic citizens’ equality;
it clearly is. Rather, she (ibid.) disagrees about the acceptable margin of democratic
divergence in the interpretation and concretization of socioeconomic rights and
entitlements. If we view the world economy as constituted by multiple levels, and
layers of governance, cooperation and coordination, the question becomes one of
mediating among these varied levels so as to create more convergence on some
commonly agreed-upon standards for the eradication of poverty, but through locally,
nationally, or regionally interpreted, instituted, and organized initiatives. Benhabib
(2004) calls such processes of interaction among actors in complex, multilayered
contexts of governance forms of democratic iteration.

‘Democratic iterations are moral and political dialogues in which
global principles and norms are reappropriated and reiterated by
constituencies of sizes, in a series of interlocking conversations
and interactions. Concerns for global justice can thereby become
guiding principles for action for democratic peoples themselves.
(...) The alternatives we face in thinking about international
distribution are not between pure global justice on the one hand
and democratic governance on the other, but rather, “democratic
justice” (see Shapiro, 1999), leading through a series of
interlocking, overlapping and intersecting institutional mechanisms to global justice. This is also the vision of federated cosmopolitanism. ’ (Benhabib, 2004:113/4)

Benhabib (ibid) describes what are the best-known objections to this, or her globalist vision, which have been voiced by a group of thinkers referred to as `The decline-of-citizenship school’, which includes communitarians, civic republicans, and liberal nationalists as well as social democrats (Sandel, 1996; Jacobson 1996; Walzer 1983 and 2001; Offe 1998; Streeck 1998; Hobsbawm 1996). These thinkers consider the waning of the nation-state, whether under the impact of economic globalization, the rise of international human rights norms, or the spread of attitudes of cosmopolitan detachment, as resulting in the devaluation of citizenship as institution and practice. Citizenship entails membership in a bounded community: the right to the determination of the boundaries as well as identity of this community are fundamental to democracy; therefore, they argue, economic and political globalization threatens to undermine citizenship. Walzer (2001) is among the few contemporary theorists who have addressed the significance of questions of membership for theories of justice as well as for theories of democracy. His position is built around one aspect of the paradox of democratic legitimacy, which Benhabib (2004) identified as being caused by the dual allegiance to human rights norms and to collective self-determination. Walzer (2001) is sceptical or even agnostic about universal human rights claims; He privileges the will of the political sovereign while seeking to leaven the possible injustices and inequities which may result from such acts and policies by considerations of compassion and fairness, sensitive contextual reasoning and moral openness. Benhabib (2004) in contrast argues that, as attractive as it may seem, this strategy is inadequate and that dilemmas of political membership in liberal democracies go to the heart of the self-definition, as well as self-constitution, of these polities precisely because, as liberal democracies, they are built on the constitutive tension between human rights and political sovereignty claims.

Benhabib (2004) agrees that the decline-of-citizenship school is correct in raising concerns about the transformations of citizenship in contemporary democracies, however maintains that they are wrong in tracing the causes of these transformations back to liberalized practices of membership and to the increased worldwide mobility of peoples. The decline of citizenship, if measured in terms of political participation
rates or even in terms of civic participation at large, as a significant body of recent scholarship has recently demonstrated, has domestic as well as global causes (see Putnam 2001, 2003). Immigration and porous borders, according to Benhabib (2004) and in my own view, rather than being causes of the decline of citizenship, are themselves caused by the same maelstroms which are undermining national political institutions: namely, the globalization of capital, financial, and labour markets (although people are never as mobile as money and assets); lack of control over the movement of stocks and bonds; emergence of catchall and ideologically non-differentiated mass parties; the rise of mass media politics and the eclipse of local votes and campaigns (see section 3). I agree with Benhabib (ibid.) that this general malaise can hardly be blamed on migrants, refugees, and asylees. Nor is the perception that migrants are passive and apolitical agents, who are simply swept around by global market forces, correct.

While immigration is not precluded by these theorists, they tend to favour the incorporation only of those foreigners who “are like us”, and who can become “model citizens” (Honig, 2001). Whether they believe it is their society’s cultural cohesion or the integrity of its political institutions that is threatened by mass migrations and the growing porousness of borders, communitarians, civic republicans, and liberal nationalists are concerned that cosmopolitans are not sufficiently sensitive to the special attachments which individuals have to their homes and countries (see Walzer, 1983 and 2001). While morally and legally Benhabib (2004) subscribes to the cosmopolitan alternative, politically she believes that the decline-of-citizenship theorists raise important concerns about the need for democratic self-governance and the legitimacy of boundaries. Nevertheless, if liberal cosmopolitans place global justice ahead of democratic process, decline-of-citizenship theorists mistakenly conflate the boundaries of political community with those of the ethical one. They are also guilty of neglecting political institutions while focusing excessively on cultural identities. Walzer (2001) for instance, does not distinguish between the methodological fiction of a unitary “cultural community” and the institutional policy. A democratic polity with pluralist traditions consists of many cultural groups and subgroups, many cultural traditions and counter traditions; furthermore the “national” culture itself is formed by the contested multiplicity of many traditions, narratives and historical appropriations. All this Walzer would hardly deny (see Walzer 2001).
Benhabib (2004) asks why exactly then is closure necessary to maintain the distinctiveness of cultures and groups? This is a question which is key to this study’s main objective;

‘I want to distinguish between cultural integration and political integration and to suggest that in robust liberal democracies, the porousness of borders is not a threat to, but rather an enrichment of, existing democratic diversity. Cultural communities are built around their members’ adherence to values, norms and traditions that bear a prescriptive value for their identity, in that failure to comply with them affects their own understandings of membership and belonging. Surely, though, there is always contestation and innovation around such cultural definitions and narratives: what does it mean to be an observant but a non-orthodox Jew? What does it mean to be modern Muslim woman? What does it mean to be a pro-choice Catholic? Cultural traditions consist of such narrative interpretation and reinterpretation, appropriation and subversion. The more alive a cultural tradition, the more contestation will be about its core elements (Benhabib, 2002a). Walzer invokes a “we”, which suggests an identity without conflict, a unity without “fissure”. It is a convenient methodological fiction, but its consequences for political argument can be undesirable’ (Benhabib, 2004:117).

A distinction between political and cultural integration shows how Western-European nation-states often attribute citizens’ identity to what she calls a “thick cultural coating”, while human rights are treated as being merely contextual (2004:123). Political integration, which Benhabib (2004:121) refers to as “practices and rules, constitutional traditions and institutional habits, that bring individuals together to form a functioning political unity”, therefore is narrowed or confined into ‘cultural’ integration.

“’Culture” cannot be constrained into a “we”. (...) This would suggest an identity without conflict, a unity without “fissure”. (...) Focusing on one aspect of an idealized model of citizenship alone, that of shared language and cultural heritage, they (the decline-of-citizenship school) neglect the institutional spaces within which the dialectic of political rights and cultural identities unfold. On the other hand, what communitarians neglect, in turn (...) is the crucial interdependencies of rights and identities, of political institutions and cultural communities’ (2004:126)

Although referring to two different schools of thought, there are two central ideas here, which I propose as key conceptions for the Swiss case, which will be elaborated in sections 3.1.3 and 3.2 of this chapter; rooted in the very development of nation-
states is the notion of a ‘collective or shared identity’ and a particular understanding of ‘culture’, which constitutes this ‘collective identity’. In this enquiry, I explore whether Swiss migration and integration politics could be based on strong assumptions and/or intentions of retaining cultural distinctiveness (see Benhabib, 2002 in her work ‘Claims of Culture’). This would explain a conceptualization of ‘integration’ with the use of a multi-cultural approach (see Mitchell, 2003: section 3.2), in both the overarching sphere of the nation-state, as well as more Cantonal localized and devolved systems, such as education. ‘Multi-cultural’, I would like to argue, suggests the retaining of cultural distinctiveness, existing alongside each other, without any porousness of borders, both internal and external.

Another argumentative perspective on ‘political integration’ and how it is framed by nation-states is made by Kofman (1999), who looks at the legal conceptual requirement upon which states base their ‘citizen’ criteria.

‘(Civic Republican) Citizenship was primarily defined in terms of political (civic and civil) rights and constituted the foundations of a political community and membership of the ‘nation’. Aptitude for citizenship was premised on a mode of civility, or on how to behave within the public spaces of the polis, and called for acceptance of agreed values underpinning the organisation of the nation-state (Oldfield, 1990). This citizen ‘without’ qualities brought a disinterested political rationality to the public arena, and those who were deemed unsuitable –slaves, colonial subjects, women and institutionalised – were thereby excluded.’ (Kofman, 1999: 126).

If one looks at this civic republican concept – which are the historical legal traditions in Switzerland as well as France - of the requirement of ‘aptitude for citizenship’, then the way in which integration is being conceptualised, could be understood in Federal terms from a historically rooted legal point of view. In order to become a citizen, one needed to behave in a certain way and have certain qualities, which had been predetermined by a mutual concept of agreed values based on a mode of civility. People (for example migrants) who were seen to lack these qualities were therefore excluded. The idea of ‘in-tegration’ lends itself to this notion of citizenship.

Benhabib (2009) suggests that spaces are platforms where political rights and identities are dialectical. Moreover, she suggests that there are interdependencies of
rights and identities, of political institutions and cultural communities. Political integration thus refers to those practices and rules, constitutional traditions and institutional habits that bring individuals together to form a functioning political community. This functioning has a twofold dimension in that not only must it be possible to run the economy, the state, and its administrative apparatus, but there must be also a dimension of belief in the legitimacy of the major institutions of societies to do so. The legal-rational authority of the modern state rests not only on administrative and economic efficiency but also on a belief in its legitimacy. Precisely because modern states presuppose a plurality of competing as well as coexisting worldviews, principles of political integration are necessarily more abstract and more generalizable than principles of cultural identity. 'In the modern state, political life is one sphere of existence among many others with their multiple claim upon us; the disjunction between personal identities and personal allegiances, public choices and private involvements, is constitutive of the freedom of citizens in liberal democracies' (Benhabib, 2004:121). Caesarini and Fulbrook (1996) explain that there will always be some variation across existing political communities as to the constituents of such political integration: the typology of civic and ethnic nationalism indicates such a range. Nonetheless, I share Benhabib’s (2004) proposition that in liberal democracies conceptions of human and citizens’ rights, constitutional traditions as well as democratic practices of election and representation, are the core normative elements of political integration. It is toward them that citizens as well as foreigners, nationals as well as resident aliens, have to show respect and loyalty, and toward any specific cultural tradition.

She (ibid) specifies that precisely because Walzer (1983 and 2001) conflates cultural with political integration (in the Spheres of Justice at least), many of his claims about immigration and naturalization policy give the impression that they are the result of what Kant would call “contracts of beneficence”. These policies seem to rest more on the moral good will and political generosity of the democratic people alone, than upon principles. I explore how in the Swiss case, the federal state may emphasize the ‘contributor’ or in the sense of Walzer and Kant, the “beneficent” or provider role of the state towards the ‘foreigners’, who are seen to be in a receiving role. ‘Integration’ then is not about political integration in the sense of enabling self-constitution or self-governance of people within a liberal democracy, but rather a civic republican
conception of citizenship seems to be prevalent (see Kofman, 1999). Furthermore, I explore what kind of arguments are used with respect to naturalization and the framing of integration, which I would argue is much more orientated towards a conception of cultural integration, and not political integration based on civic conceptions of human rights and belonging, such as are specified by Benhabib (2004).

Therefore, Benhabib (ibid.) concludes that the decline-of-citizenship school proceeds from an impoverished model of democratic identity as ethno-cultural commonality or homogeneity as well as minimizing the divisiveness of the debate within liberal democracies concerning migration. ‘Focusing on one aspect of an idealized model of citizenship alone, that of shared language and cultural heritage, they neglect the institutional spaces within which the dialectic of political rights and cultural identities unfolds’ (2004:127). Precisely because migrations, whatever their causes, pose such fundamental challenges to the self-understanding of liberal-democratic peoples, it is simply empirically false to assume, as the decline-of-citizenship theorists do, that shared cultural commonalities will always trump human rights claims. Rather, what become apparent are internally fractured political communities which continue to negotiate the terms of their own collective identities at the site of migration debates.

In the previous subsection, a brief overview was given about the transformations of citizenship practices in contemporary Europe. For example, although guest workers entered European countries throughout the 1950s and 60s in search of economic arrangements which were mutually beneficent to both receiving countries and the migrants themselves, these arrangements alone did not lead to the emergence of liberal citizenship policies until much later in the evolution of the European rights regime (see 3.1.2). Through these developments, it can be shown that practices and institutions of just membership cannot be reduced to the matter of redistributive justice, although the two are interrelated.

I highlight Benhabib’s argument that there is a crucial interdependence of rights and identities, of political institutions and cultural communities. I share her questions about whether once admission occurs for people into nation-states, what is the obligation of a liberal state to those it has admitted? Is there finally a human right to membership?
Benhabib (2004) argues that there is, and that this right is the obverse of the interdiction against denaturalization, such as was suggested by Arendt ([1951] 1968). From the viewpoint of discourse theory, the moral argument would have to proceed as follows according to Benhabib (2004): ‘If you and I enter into a moral dialogue with one another, and I am a member of a state of which you are seeking membership and you are not, then I must be able to show you with good grounds, with grounds that would be acceptable to each of us equally, why you can never join our association and become one of us. These must be grounds that you would accept if you were in my situation and I were in yours. Our reasons must be reciprocally acceptable; they must apply to each of us equally. Are there such grounds that would be reciprocally acceptable? Clearly, reasons that barred you from membership because of the kind of being you were, your ascriptive and non-elective attributes such as your race, gender, religion, ethnicity, language community or sexuality, would not be permissible, because I would then be reducing your capacity to exercise communicative freedom to those characteristics which were given to you by chance or accident and which you did not choose. No reasons that would bar certain groups of individuals from membership permanently because of the kinds of human beings they were could be reciprocally acceptable. However, criteria that stipulate that you must show certain qualifications, skills, and resources to become a member are permissible because they do not deny your communicative freedom. Length of stay, language competence, a certain proof of civic literacy, demonstration of material resources, or marketable skills are all conditions which certainly can be abused in practice, but which, from the standpoints of normative theory, do not violate the self-understanding of liberal democracies as associations which respect the communicative freedom of human beings qua human beings’ (Benhabib, 2004:169).

This right to membership entails a right to know on the part of the foreigner who is seeking membership: how can the conditions of naturalization be fulfilled? The answer to this question must be made publicly available to all, transparent in its formulations, and not be subject to bureaucratic capriciousness (Benhabib, 2004). There must be clear procedure, administered in lawful fashion, through which naturalization can occur and there must be a right of appeal in the event of the negative outcome, as there would be in most civil cases. One must not criminalize the
migrant and the foreigner; one must safeguard their right to due process, to representation in one’s language, and the right to independent counsel.

Benhabib states that the human right to membership straddles two broad categories: *human rights and civil and political rights*. She argues that the entitlement to all civil rights – including rights to association, property, and contract – and eventually to political rights, must itself be considered a human right. This suggests that the sovereign discretion of the democratic community is circumscribed; once admission occurs, the path to membership ought not to be blocked. Kant’s distinction between the temporary right to sojourn and the longer-term visitation can no longer be sustained, since from a discourse-theoretical point of view, I cannot justify to you with good grounds why you should remain a permanent stranger upon the land. This would amount to a denial of your communicative freedom and moral personality. The transformations of the institutions of citizenship in contemporary Europe, such as have been briefly explored in the previous subsection point out to developments in contradictory directions; they affirm the significance or continuation of ‘national citizenship’ on the one hand, and at the same time they minimize the distinction between the legal status of citizens and aliens. These developments, according to Benhabib’s assertions have led to the disaggregation of the unitary model of citizenship into its component elements.

Due to this disaggregation, there is an urgent need to shift the terrain of the argument for political membership from a normative analytical to an institutional sociological perspective. This supports the case for this study, to look at the embeddedness of membership frames within policy as discourse within the institutional debate around education and its wider implications for European trends in Switzerland. It is important for political philosophy to take stock of concrete trends and transformations, because, according to Benhabib it is through an internal critique of the contradictory potentials of institutions which frame our lives, we gain a clearer understanding of our rights and freedoms. There is no teleology of reconciliation promised by her considerations, she ascertains, as there was in Hegelian philosophy of Right, which tried to situate freedom in the world of “objective Spirit” ([1821] 1973); nor can the moral “ought” be reduced to the institutional “is”. Yet it is Benhabib’s (ibid) belief that if we will better appreciate the contradictory nature of the present if
we have a clearer sense of actual institutional transformations in the domain of membership rights. I agree with her that for too long normative political theory and political sociology of the modern state have gone their separate ways and that there is a need for their fruitful collaboration.

New modalities of membership and a sociological mode of citizenship rights

To summarize: I have drawn from Benhabib’s work on political membership and I ask the same questions as Benhabib: what is the status of citizenship today, in a world of increasingly deterritorialised politics? How is citizenship being reconfigured under contemporary conditions? How has the fraying of the four functions of the state – territoriality, administrative control, democratic legitimacy, and cultural identity – affected the theory and practice of citizenship? Following Max Weber, the citizen is the individual who has membership rights to reside within a territory, who is subject to the state’s administrative jurisdiction, and who is also, ideally, a member of the democratic sovereign in the name of whom laws are issued and administration is exercised; this unity of residency, administrative subjection, democratic participation, and cultural membership constitute the “ideal typical” model of citizenship in the modern nation-states of the West (see Weber [1956] 1978:901-926: in Benhabib, 2004:144)

According to Benhabib’s key arguments, the practice and institution of citizenship can be disaggregated into three components; collective identity, privileges of political membership, and social rights and claims. While political theorists tend to focus primarily on the privileges of political membership, social scientists and social historians have been more interested in the formation of collective identities and the evolution of rights claims associated with the status of citizenship (Benhabib, 2002a:162-171).

The view that citizenship is a status that confers upon one entitlement and benefits as well as obligations derives from T.H. Marshall (1950: in Benhabib, 2004:146); “Civil rights” arise with the birth of the absolutist state, and in their earliest and most basic form they entail the rights to the protection of life, liberty and property, the right to freedom of conscience, and certain associational rights, such as those of commerce
and marriage. “Political rights” in the narrow sense refer to the rights of self-determination, to hold and run for office, to establish political and non-political associations, including a free press and free institutions of science and culture. “Social rights” are last in Marshall’s catalogue; they were achieved historically through the struggles of the worker’s, women’s and other social movements of the past two centuries. Social rights entail the right to trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, health care rights, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, child care, housing, and educational subsidies. These social rights vary widely across the countries and depend on the social class compromises prevalent in any given welfare-state democracy (Soysal 1994). Their inclusion in any internationally agreed-upon catalogue of universal human rights – beyond the mere right to employment and a decent standard of living- is a bone of contention among different countries with different economic outlooks.

Benhabib seeks to illustrate the disaggregation effect with reference to the rights regimes of the contemporary European Union, in which the rights of citizens of member countries of the EU are sharply delineated from those of third-country nationals, within a patchwork of local, national, and supranational rights regimes. I extend this argument to include the idea of Europe not only in the sense of the EU, but also as a transnational space of common and shared ideas, that travel and that create interdependencies and trends of deterritorialised politics in other European countries, such as in the case of Switzerland (see section 3).

The unitary model, according to Benhabib (2004), which combined continuous residency upon a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative jurisdiction is coming apart. One can have one set of rights without being a national, as is the case for EU nationals; more commonly, though, one has social rights and benefits, by virtue of being a foreign worker, without either sharing in the same collective identity or having the privileges of political membership. The danger in this situation is that of “permanent alienage”, namely the creation of a group in society that partsakes of property rights and civil society without having access to political rights (Benhabib, 2004:146).
The dialectic of rights and identities

Through the evolution of a common rights regime within contemporary Europe, it becomes more visible that the greatest cross-national variations occur in the domain of social, economic and cultural rights. While political rights are being reconfigured throughout the EU, human rights and civil rights are based on general rights instruments such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Human rights have acquired a fundamental non-negotiable status; they are intended to be subject to the least variation on a country-by-country basis. They accrue to the human person because of his/her human dignity.

These developments therefore, Benhabib (ibid.) concludes, also suggest the dialectic of rights and identities: commonly, the individual who is the subject of rights is assumed to have some kind of fixed identity which precedes the entitlement to the right in question, but what is frequently neglected is that the exercise of rights themselves and the practice of political agency can change these identities. ‘Political identities are endogenous (Produced or growing from within) and not exogenous to processes of democratic iteration and the formation of rights’ (ibid.). Likewise, the meanings of rights claims are altered when exercised by subjects whose legal and political agency had not been foreseen or normatively anticipated in the initial formulation of rights.

'I would like to suggest that in the case of such dialectical conflicts we enter the domain of what Frank Michelman has called “jurisgenerative politics” (1988), namely contestation around rights and legal institutions which themselves pave way for new modes of political agency and interaction. Contrary to decline-of-citizenship theorists, who see migrations as detrimental to a country’s political and legal culture, the presence of individuals whose cultural identities differ from the majority introduces a dimension of “jurisgenerative politics” into the commonwealth. These are processes through which others become hermeneutical partners with us by reappropriating and reinterpreting our institutions and cultural traditions (2004:169)

Although, Benhabib does not imply that the end of the unitary citizenship model as it exists today must mean that its hold upon our political imagination and its normative force in guiding our institutions are obsolete. However, she maintains that does mean
that we must be ready to imagine forms of political agency and subjectivity, which anticipate new modalities of political citizenship. She characterizes these new political trends as concepts of ‘democratic iterations’, which I propose connects directly to the constructive element in the critical concept of policy as discourse (CDA: see Fairclough, 2009, chapter 2).

`By democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange (among actors in complex, multi-layered contexts of governance) through which universalist human rights claims and principles are contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society. These can take place in the “strong” public bodies of legislatives, the judiciary, and the executive as well as in the informal and “weak” publics of civil society associations and the media.` (2009: 179).

She describes the idea that the defining of ‘identity of the democratic people’ is an ongoing process of constitutional self-creation; while one can never eliminate the paradox that those who are excluded will not be among those who decide upon the rules of exclusion and inclusion, these distinctions can be made fluid and negotiable through processes of continuous and multiple democratic iterations. However, I would replace the contrast she makes between the ‘strong’ public bodies of legislative, judiciary and executive and the informal, or ‘weak’ public spheres of society associations and the media, with processes of policy as discourse; as this conceptual frame would look at the dialectical relationship between the different social elements (see section 2.3). Moreover, I propose the importance of looking at education as a discursive sphere in which ‘membership’ is currently contained and which for this reason must be included in the potential spheres where ‘democratic iterations’ are taking place and perhaps therefore must also take place. Moreover, this must be done by considering its relation to other political institutions and civil society. I would go even further to propose that education, through its instrumentalization has become invariably politicized and thus must feature in any references to constructive changes towards alleviating pre-existing power relations and discursive dominance or the framing of political membership.

There is an underlying idea here that defining the ‘identity’ or ‘identities’ of the sovereign nation is itself a process of fluid, open, and contentious public debate or
what I argue; through discourse. Often, the ‘lines separating “we and you”, “us and them”, rest on unexamined prejudices, ancient battles, historical injustices, and sheer administrative fiat’ (Benhabib, 2004: 178).

Outsiders are thus not at the borders of the polity, but within. In fact the very binarism between nations and foreigners, citizens and migrants, is sociologically inadequate and the reality is much more fluid, since many citizens are of migrant origin, and many nationals themselves are foreign-born. The practices of immigration and multiculturalism in contemporary democracies flow into one another (see Benhabib 2002a): The constitution of “we, the people” is a far more fluid, contentious, contested, and dynamic process than either Rawlsian liberals or decline-of-citizenship theorists would have us believe. As in her previous arguments she emphasizes that the Rawlsian vision of peoples as self-enclosed moral universes is not only empirically but also normatively flawed.

‘This vision cannot do justice to the dual identity of a people as an ethnos, as a community of shared fate, memories, and moral sympathies on the one hand, and as the demos, as the democratically enfranchised totality of all citizens, who may or may not belong to the same ethnos. All liberal democracies that are modern nation-states exhibit these two dimensions. The politics of peoplehood consists in their negotiation. The people are not a self-enclosed and self-sufficient entity. Peoplehood is dynamic and not a static reality. The presence of others who do not share the dominant culture’s memories and morals poses a challenge to the democratic legislatures to rearticulate the meaning of democratic universalism. Far from leading to the disintegration of the culture of democracy, such challenges reveal the depth and the breadth of the culture democracy. Only polities with strong democracies are capable of such Universalist rearticulation through which they refashion the meaning of their own peoplehood. Rather than the decline of citizenship, I see in these instances the reconfiguration of citizenship through democratic iterations’ (Benhabib, 2004:212)

Extension of the argument for this study

These aspects of reappropriation and reinterpretation of institutions and cultural traditions are key points for a distinctive theoretical and methodological approach to discourse analysis within this study (see Benhabib quote earlier); a dialectical-
relational approach to CDA which is mainly based on Norman Fairclough’s framework for analysing discourse (see chapter 2).

For this study, how do I address political membership and questions about the justification of the legal and more relevantly discursive constructions of the constitutional nation-state within education policy as discourse in my research questions and analysis chapters? In the next section, I offer a review of the historical development of Swiss understandings of ‘nation’ and how these are constructed by the policy elite or certain members of society with a political voice, who advanced a ‘unitary national project’ to create a governance system to overcome the problems of a highly federal system (of Cantons or member states). These forms of governance are relatively new and characterise coordination and concordat-based systems of participation (Alexiadou, 2007). This study explores the particular struggles the nation-state faces to establish territorial sovereignty and yet be a player in the global or European market within the discursive context of a particular state sector, which is education. Thus, the case-study of Switzerland embedded in Europe, is fraught with the complexity with which a particular policy of ‘integration’ is being promoted in the socio-political setting of European, migration and education politics and pre-existing ‘national’ polities. I seek to map the extent that education is attributed a specific role, through the creation of common standards of performance in Europe, or through standardised practices of ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration’. This is explored through the evidence that policy makers and politicians in the Swiss migration and education political field use and understand to inform or legitimise policy.

I combine the theory of ‘soft governance’ (Novoa and Lawn, 2000) with deterrioralised politics (Benhabib (2004). I explore the policy understanding of ‘integration’ introduced in education in Switzerland is being conceptualised; which sources of policy ‘evidence are being referred to by whom, and how this ‘soft governance’ (Novoa and Lawn, 2000) is seen to contribute to ‘solve’ a complex notion of migration and ‘nation’. Moreover, what is the attributed role of education in this policy ‘solution’? In this sense, my case-study relates directly to questions about political membership, because the discourses that set the framework for ‘integration’ are engaged with ideas about ‘national identity’, or ‘national culture’, or about how
governing ‘solutions’ are sought to construct a policy frame which appears to address what is deemed a ‘problem’ of migration, or ‘foreigners’ in Swiss society.

The overarching methodological and theoretical perspective loosely based on Critical Discourse Analysis as discussed in chapter 2 is that the very view of migration as a ‘problem’ is in itself problematic (Bacchi, 1999), because it produces a cosmetic reform, which finds a specific form as an approach to a deeply complex and controversial ideological discourse about political membership and belonging. The perceived ‘problem’ of migration itself or the contentious, ‘problematised’ debate around ‘culture’, is used here, I suggest, as a platform to serve the (neo-) liberal state (Mitchell, 2003).

Education is attributed the role to ‘integrate’ and change structures, ultimately serving the economic purpose of being part of the global/European market. At the same time, however, the language or discourse used to frame this policy is highly ‘social-democratic’: notably such terms as standards of equity, equality of opportunity, inclusion, multiculturalism and so on. Invariably the question arises, how education can socialise or be a platform for equitable chances or preparatory towards becoming an equal and active member of society, towards citizenship or political membership, when this same political membership is non-existent in the other state structures and the very notion of citizenship is based upon exclusionary foundations. Luke (1996; see later section 3) discusses how in an educational context in which schools are being called upon to provide access and ‘equity’ to increasingly heterogeneous student bodies, the ‘tensions between official discourses and minority discourses should be a principal focus for educational research.’ (1996:38). Debates continue over whether both gendered and racialized identities have essential differences and over the dangers of “false universalism”, which tends to “homogenize” difference (West, 1990: in Luke, 1996:38). Moreover, according to Rizvi (1993), the colonized ‘other’, meaning the person who has been assigned or attributed colored, gendered, different and ‘minority’ status, is produced through complex and interleaved textual and institutional practices, or I would put it, through discursive practices (see chapter 2). By mapping the discourse about ‘migrant integration’ in a relatively loose network of policy makers and politicians in the Swiss socio-political context of education, this
potential *cosmetic instrumentalisation of education* is addressed, which perpetuates this ‘colonizing’ or ‘dichotomizing’ effect of ‘migrant’ and ‘Swiss’.

This study is engaged with policies which I argue perpetuate frames of (absence of or limited) political membership within discourse, which could contribute to a ‘permanent alienage’ of migrants, such as Benhabib (2004) is concerned about. Moreover, I enquire whether this is being done under the guise of ‘social-democratically flagged’ reform policies (see chapters 4 and 5), which give the superficial notion of expanding membership spaces for migrants within the country. Benhabib speaks about how the EU hopes to avoid the much more controversial issues concerning cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic identities by focussing on broad institutional criteria. This could be applicable for the Swiss case in that education is made into one such institutional instrument through which ‘integration’ is referred to and framed. Often, Benhabib explains, xenophobic politics is easy politics, but the social factors and institutional trends behind immigration trends in Europe are made much more complicated and intractable. ‘Europe’s “others”, be they guest workers or refugees, asylum seekers or migrants, have become an obvious focus for the anxieties and uncertainties generated by Europe’s own “othering”, its transformations from a continent of nation-states into a transnational political entity, whose precise constitutional and political form is still uncertain’ (2004:166/167). In Switzerland these transformations, I would argue, are deeply related to Europeanising processes, the introduction of network governance and attempts to overcome regionalism or federalism, while retaining rigid immigration and political membership frames.

An internal critique of ‘contradictory potentials’, which Benhabib sees as being rooted in institutional transformations in the domain of membership rights, is what I address for the Swiss case within a European space (see Political Sociology approach). The institutional transformations in this case are revealed and drawn from both the discourses which arise from migration/immigration developments and economic and education policy (chapters 3, 4 and 5) and from narrative discourses embedded amongst a ‘loose network’ of policy actors within education and migration politics (chapter 6).
3.1.5 Multiculturalism in the context of a neo-liberal agenda and the role of education

In the previous section, one of the key arguments I derive from Benhabib’s critique towards Rawlsian and the ‘Decline-of-Citizenship’ theorists - which include a civic republican strand (see Elinor Kofman, 1999) such as I would argue can be found in contemporary Switzerland – is the emphasis on cultural integration, cultural criteria for acquiring membership, and the idea of ethnic rather than civic properties attributed to membership. According to Benhabib (2002a), the practices of immigration and multiculturalism in contemporary democracies flow into one another and the constitution of “we, the people” is a far more fluid, contentious, contested, and dynamic process than either Rawlsian liberals or decline-of-citizenship theorists would have us believe. In her arguments she emphasizes that the Rawlsian vision of peoples as self-enclosed moral universes is not only empirically but also normatively flawed. The key idea which emerges is that ‘outsiders’ are not at the borders of the polity, but within. In fact the very binarism between nationals and foreigners, citizens and migrants, is sociologically inadequate and the reality is much more fluid, since many citizens are of migrant origin, and many nationals themselves are foreign-born.

However, there are two aspects here which I would like to focus upon and extend from Benhabib’s argumentation about fluidity, which she also partially sees as rooted in a multicultural society. Here I critique the notion of multiculturalism, as a distinctive way in which difference or ‘culture’ can be politicized and framed in neo-liberal nation-states to serve dominant interests, such as in the example of Switzerland. What I argue for the Swiss case is that rooted in the very development of nation-states is the idea of a ‘collective or shared identity’ and a particular understanding of ‘culture’, which constitutes this ‘collective identity’. In this study, I explore whether Swiss migration and integration politics could be based on strong assumptions and/or intentions of retaining cultural distinctiveness (see Benhabib 2002 in her work ‘Claims of Culture’). This would explain a conceptualization of ‘integration’ with the use of a multi-cultural approach (see Mitchell, 2003), in both the overarching sphere of the nation-state, as well as more Cantonal localized and devolved systems, such as education. ‘Multi-cultural’, I would like to argue, suggests
the retaining of cultural distinctiveness; clearly delineated cultures existing alongside each other, without any porousness of borders, both internal and external.

The second aspect which I would like to focus upon is the role of education as a nation-building capacity and the attribution of this role to education in the nexus of state and society, and also (‘national’ or ‘collective’) identity. In one of her conclusive arguments drawn from the previous section, Benhabib (ibid.) suggests that there is a dialectic of rights and identities: Quite frequently, the individual who is the subject of rights is assumed to have some kind of fixed identity which precedes the entitlement to the right in question, However, what is frequently neglected is that the exercise of rights themselves and the practice of political agency can change these identities. “Political identities are endogenous (Produced or growing from within) and not exogenous to processes of democratic iteration and the formation of rights” (ibid.). Likewise, the meanings of rights claims are altered when exercised by subjects whose legal and political agency had not been foreseen or normatively anticipated in the initial formulation of rights. This formation of “political identities” is quite interesting to this study, as I am concerned with the place which is given to education or the educational sphere for “integration”, which can imply and stipulate many things in terms of identity formation. As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main questions posed in this study is whether education policy in an “integration” agenda is contributing to a particular understanding about membership and how this understanding is perpetuated or inhabited.

In this context, I focus both on multiculturalism as a significant strategy in the integration of migrants, through education. I review the working of multiculturalism in a variety of contexts, before focusing on nation-building projects in Switzerland in section 3.2. In developing this review, I draw on the work of Mitchell (2003) and her analysis of the ways in which neo-liberal ideology has been imported into education policy. According to Mitchell, education increasingly reflects:

a ‘push in neoliberal agendas, which stress global competitiveness, the reduction of costs of education and of social reproduction in general, the necessity for greater market choice and accountability and the imperative to create hierarchically conditioned, globally
oriented state subjects – i.e. individuals oriented to excel in ever transforming situations of global competition, either as workers, managers or entrepreneurs.’ (Mitchell, 2003:388).

Mitchell (2003) examines these questions through case studies in England, the United States and Canada, which allow her to explore the relationship of national education systems to state formation and economic change. She emphasises however that this examination is intended as a broad comparative synthesis of contemporary trends in Western-based education systems rather than as in-depth examination of each nation’s education policies or the contexts in which these policies are changing. Although she notes a general shift in many Western countries, how this plays out is greatly dependent on the individual state’s historical and geographical patterns of educational development.

Mitchell (2003) focuses her enquiry on three areas: (i) the shifting spaces of citizenship (ii), the schooling – society nexus and (iii) multiculturalism in education. The overall process of *citizenship* formation is obviously relevant to my concern with political membership (Turner 1986; Marston and Mitchell, 2003). The spatial component of citizenship, according to Mitchell (2003) is significant because of the connection between democratic participation in the physical and social environment (community) and the implicit understanding of ‘community’ as ultimately a national concept that is implied in the term ‘citizenship’. However, today citizens may not be confined to the national and the nation itself is tightly networked with others in a global system of social, political and economic interdependency, particularly in the face of transnational migration (Benhabib 2004). This may mean that states are no longer in the position to maintain a restricted definition of citizenship, which is based on either natural citizenship rights or on territorial location, but rather need to develop nuanced definitions of citizenship or strategic flexibility (Castles and Davidson, 2000).

In order to aid the formation of a national community in this new context it may be more important for ‘citizen-subjects’ to learn to work with and get along with others, especially those who may perceived as different. It may be more important for a citizen to become a globally oriented economic player, or able to work with, but also around the deterritorialised, highly flexible nature of individual state construction of
citizenship (Mitchell, 2003:389). Education comes into play in creating values based on both the flexibility of working with difference and towards economic goals:

‘These incipient technologies of power were a crucial aspect of state building, as well as instruments of bourgeois hegemony (Curtis, 1988). Thus the educational ‘project’ was far greater than mere schooling itself, but rather encompassed the creation of social identities, the maintenance of power relations, and the reorganization of the relationship between a capitalist economic formation, the state and its citizens-subjects’ (Mitchell, 2003: 390).

Although Mitchell refers here to a historical project of education as a state-building capacity (see section 3.2), the symbolic value and projection of ‘national identity’ as a key reference point for elite or bourgeois interests in Switzerland may continue to exist in contemporary state ‘integration’ programmes in education.

In relation to the education-society nexus, Mitchell reviews the shifting dynamics of the role or purpose of education in relation to economic change. In the early 1970s, critical scholars drew attention to the connections between systems of public education and their ‘correspondence’ to capitalist systems of accumulation and production. The critique shifted to focus on the reproduction of the social conditions of capitalist labour rather than the actual production of capitalist labourers. Schooling was identified as a crucial mechanism of control, but one which could also challenge some of the social evils associated with the rise of industrial capitalism: ‘As an institution intimately involved in the reproduction of consciousness, education was a key mechanism used by dominant elites to achieve a certain type of subordinate consciousness which aided in the maintenance of an unequal system of class relations’ (Mitchell, 2003:390; Katz, 1971). The critical sociology of education that developed throughout the 1970s and 1980s had many different strands within it, some of which were structuralist, others which focused on understanding of the experiences and agency of groups in asserting their own socio-cultural positions (Willis; 1977; Apple; 1979; Carnoy and Levin; 1985).

The 1990s brought a change in focus with attention to the role of education in state formation (Green, 1990, Novoa 2000): modern education systems in Europe and North America were understood as an important means for furthering state development with respect to its mercantilist aims and its training programmes for
bureaucratic positions and state manufacturing projects. National education systems were identified as an integral tool in creating political loyalty, operating to develop, manage and sustain myths and narratives of the nation in its ongoing unification (Mitchell, 2003; Weber, 1976; Gellner; 1983).

The role of education in state formation can be further examined in terms of political or citizenship education: as I show later in the thesis the Swiss education reform agenda includes a major curricular reform aimed at the creation of a cross-Cantonal linguistic regional curriculum based on the newer principles of ‘equity’ and inclusive education with established standards for all.

In the context of growing internal and external pressure on the nation state, and on the role of education within it, I now turn to the issue of multiculturalism. According to Mitchell, (op cit) multiculturalism functions as a key national narrative of coherence and unification in countries with large migrant populations. The core principle of the nation is thus difference, which is legitimated by a strong state and its ability to unify these differences in a single ‘project’ of nation-formation. In Switzerland, the idea of using diversity for unity refers back to the old idea of the helvetic elite in the 18th century and to the idea of neo-liberalism. This ‘project’ is mobilised through the regulation of individual and carefully delineated group rights, combined with inculcation of migrants in the context of the propagation of difference as welcome and advantageous to the state (Kobayashi, 1993; Mitchell, 2003). From this perspective, as Kymlicka (1995) points out, a narrative of liberalism and the freedom of the individual are professed, that serves the liberal state and creates a sense of unity, tolerance and national identity, despite or inclusive of multiple differences. Thus, the state operates, conceptualizes, or sets the terms of the politics of difference. Cultural pluralism is encouraged, but within what Mitchell (2003; 389) calls ‘strict parameters of liberalism’. I suggest therefore that in Switzerland, in the context of the adoption of neo-liberal agendas and an increasing reconciliation of right and left wing party agendas there is an emergent use of multiculturalism incorporating a shift towards ‘equity’ and social democracy inclusive of difference to frame a neo-liberal economically oriented educational purpose.
In the next section, the theoretical argumentation which I derive loosely from Benhabib (2004, 2009), Elinor Kofman (1999) and Katheryn Mitchell (2003) and which I extend will be explored specifically for the Swiss context. I argue that nation-building projects and the role of education and also the specific understandings of ‘culture’ are also rooted in the distinctive developments of Federalism in Switzerland as a nation-state, its relationship to Europe and also the stronghold of political parties on these specific themes and areas of discourse.

3.2 Section 2: Nation building projects in the Swiss context: The Swiss Federal Nation-State and the role of education

3.2.1. Introduction

The development of federalism and contemporary understanding of identity in federal states are described by Klaus von Beyme (2007) as representing a gradual shift of ideas about identity, and about federalism in response to developments such as migration. Public Education is an increasingly contested and debated area of policy agendas for integration. Mitchell (2003:389) considers that public systems of education are currently ‘under siege’ in many industrial nations due to profound shifts in the social organization of the economy, and because of the altered spatial relationship of individual states to new global economic regimes. Raised awareness among policy makers of the scope and impact of education policy in terms of outcomes for society and economic benefit was partly created in Switzerland by increased participation in international comparative studies and by increased pressures for standardization or provision and performance across Europe (Grek et al, 2009). As discussed in chapter 2, Europeanisation and the emergence of an Education policy space in Europe (Grek et al, ibid.) were points of reference for the shaping of education policy tools within nation states, including Switzerland. In this section, I take this analysis further by exploring the historical development of the Swiss state as a federation, the role of education in this development and its relationship to the European Union (EU).
A ‘European’ orientation is developed through ‘harmonized’ national policy, through soft governance methods such as benchmarks and indicators (Lawn 2006). Switzerland however, is a highly federal and regional system of education governance and federal democratic understandings created by a very distinctive historical process of national identity construction, and this creates particular conditions, which I consider below.

3.2.2. Federalism: in and out of Europe

This section examines the creation of federalism in Switzerland, and the implications and attribution of national identity construction in the face of regionalism. Münger (2002) argues that the formation of Switzerland in 1848 as a federal state was the project of an elite group, similar to the contemporary idea of European collaboration. The rootedness of this idea in the actual population happened only in the decades that followed. Indeed the federal state may exist largely at the symbolic level: identity remains strongly rooted in regional, local, contextual and individual realities. National identity may then be interpreted as a discursive construction, used for the governing of common spaces of shared elite or statist interests. Benedict Andersen (1991; in Rizvi, 2006: 1999) speaks about how nations are ‘imagined communities’ that were created in the early modernisation processes in the beginning stages by intellectuals, artists, political leaders and others, which only later become engrained in the whole society through stories, myths, songs, national narratives, to which I would add the mass media. Rizvi (2006) develops this point by explaining how processes of formal schooling play a major role in developing and sustaining national imaginaries. However, he goes on, assumptions surrounding what he calls ‘national authority’ (see chapter 1) that have come to being widely accepted occurs not only through the act of violence (Mann, 2004: in Rizvi, 2006:199) but also through powerful social imaginary that discourages people from even conceiving how things could in fact be otherwise (2006:199). And that educational policy studies continue to operate within what is called a Westphalian imaginary. According to Krasner (2000; in Rizvi, 2006:198), this Westphalian understanding includes the view that authority can only be exercised over a defined geographical territory, and that each state has autonomy to
develop its own policies; meaning that no external actors enjoy authority within the
borders of the state (see also Benhabib, 2004).

However, he goes on to explain that contemporary theories of globalisation have
destabilised this imaginary, even if the authority of states has not been entirely
abdicated and even if many states have maintained their strong positions. But this
kind of ‘deterriorialization’ of culture (see Tomlinson, 1999; or Benhabib, 2004),
Rizvi (2006) proposes, makes the question possible whether the authority of education
policy necessarily is coming from the states and if not; how do the contemporary
global processes intersect with the mechanisms of national policy development,
dissemination and evaluation?

This strand of arguments is supported here through analysis of the historical
development of federalism in Switzerland and of the politics of the EU, which have
certain parallels in terms of the emphasis on policies of consensus. This argument is
developed to draw a parallel between the governing mechanisms that disseminate
‘shared’ concepts into regional spheres, and does not propose other similarities in the
relationship between the federal state of Switzerland and its Cantons and the EU with
its member states.

By the 15th century, the former Swiss confederation was formally understood as a
system of bi-and multilateral agreements between the different regions. These
agreements were mainly made to secure peace in the regions and to protect against
foreign invasion, which however did not prevent inter-regional conflicts. Initially
three Cantons joined and then expanded to include other regions; they also began
occupying several regions, which then became (forcibly) part of the confederative
treaty. Regular meetings were held, which became institutionalised (Münger, 2001):
these historical developments are analysed by functionalists as ‘institutional spill-
overs’, or a mutual socialisation of elites through common problem-solving’ (Münger,
2002:13).

The reformation and counter-reformation led to crisis in the system, within what by
then had become thirteen regions; also resulting in urban and rural conflicts, from
which the urban regions emerged and remained stronger. Towards the mid 18th
century, populist protests against patrician power in certain cities and regions increased; under the influence of the French revolution constitutional struggles took place, in which there was resistance to regional landowners and employers and citizens demanded political rights. As the French army marched into Switzerland in 1798, they were celebrated as liberators from the rule of the patricians. The fall of Berne sealed the end of the old confederation.

Under Napoleon, Switzerland became the Helvetic Republic and its first modern constitution was written, in which the notion of a unified state was propagated. The Cantons were merely units of management and no longer had much autonomy. Some of the old regions were redistributed and amalgamated into newer regions. However, this newly ‘constructed’ one-dimensional and centralised republic did not endure for long after Napoleon’s troops left Swiss soil.

With the end of the Napoleonic era at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Switzerland was reconstituted as a federation and called the Swiss federation; in the regions, the ancien regime regained power. However, over time liberal ideas gained influence and introduced the principle of sovereignty of the people, the distribution of power public parliamentary debates and different political rights, such as voting and electoral power. However, the radicals wanted to create a unitary state, while conservatives wanted to retain the federal state: this led to the ‘Sonderbund’ or special federation created by the catholic conservative Cantons, which waged war against the reformist Cantons. The precarious outcome of this conflict was the creation of the federal nation state of 1848, the constitution of which still forms the basis of the contemporary Swiss constitution. The central state guaranteed citizens’ rights and was granted several important competences in the areas of the army, foreign politics, customs, measurements and money, but apart from this the sovereignty of the Cantons was protected (Andrey, 1986, de Capitani, 1986, Fahrni, 2000).

During the period between the Helvetic unitary constitution of Napoleon and the constitution of 1848, according to Münger (2002), the Swiss elite vacillated between the extremes of a modern, unitary nation state based on the French model and the

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4 Helvetia: old federative term for Switzerland
reconstructed old federal state. Gradually, they increasingly established the idea of a necessary *balance* between the autonomy of the Cantons and the power of a federal state. A growing number of intercantonal associations and societies were created with the purpose of constructing common value systems. One of the central associations was the Helvetic Society (1762), which was established by a correspondence network of young people from the urban upper social classes of Zurich, Berne, Basel and Lucerne. The first conceptions of integration originated here, which propagated a notion of ‘between and over the parties’ and ideas of reconciling diversity and unity at the same time, and a common Helvetic political and societal *identity*.

Münger (2002) discusses whether and how these elites established this Helvetic identity, and questions its existence in the population as a whole. Yet, in many ways, the perceived success of the Swiss ‘case’ of federal nationalization may offer an exemplary case of federalism to the EU given that four different language and cultural regions and 22 separate cantons have ‘attained’ national identity within a relatively short period (Freiburghaus, 2002). Moreover, the model of federalism presented by Switzerland may seem even more apposite as migration and increased heterogeneity may have added to the complexity of the politics of identity:

‘Although the institutional architecture of federalism and the territorial borders of the Cantons have scarcely changed in the history of the Swiss federal state, the societal, political and economic settings have undergone a massive change. (…) Foreign policy has gained importance in the face of globalization and European integration and is increasingly interwoven with internal politics. Lines of conflict no longer lie along the Cantonal borders, and at the same time, it is not territorial minorities, which have increased. The increasing importance of minorities and the raised complexity of socio-economic and cultural conflicts have withdrawn to the same extent from traditional territorial logic of federal conflict regulation, as have problems of urban spaces that fall through the meshes of federal minority protection.’ (Vatter, 2006:12-13)

Freiburghaus (2002) points to one of the ‘fathers’ of the idea of a European federal state, Denis de Rougement (1947), who took Switzerland as a model for his notion of ‘Vielfalt in der Einheit – Diversity in unity’. He tried to solidify the idea of a strongly federal European space, with *culture* rather than power or the economy as the main
mission. This mission was displaced by other motives of collaboration, such as conceived by Jean Monnet, which ultimately bore fruit.

Theoretical conceptualisations of federalism must be considered here. Federalism, according to Beyme (2007), is a trend of democracy. He distinguishes between *confederative* federalism, as in Switzerland or the United States, and *asymmetric* federalism, won by a struggle for distinction or separation, as for instance in devolved countries such as Scotland or Northern Ireland. However federalism theory is very diverse and encapsulates the history of the state as well as legislative or juridical theory; regionalism or the politics of identity. A significant conflict in the theory of federalism is that between “constitutionalists” and “governmentalists”, as the former refer to the law and legal regulations as the basis of validity, whereas the latter rely strongly on economy.

The Latin word ‘*foedus*’, is translated as a partnership regulated by a “covenant”. The word implied the creation of ‘true peace’ with international relationships managed through a combination of self-regulation and shared rule, as opposed to occupation and organisational growth (Beyme, 2007). Different political theorists and thinkers contributed to the development of the understanding of federalism. Johannes Althusius (1603), whose ideas were developed in Basel and Geneva among other places, is considered the father of modern federalism and of popular sovereignty, with his notion of concordance democracy or ‘consocialism’, which was however critiqued as being overly corporatist. The French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville (1859) proposed the freedom of smaller units, which he argued would mitigate the effects of too much equality in the process of democracy. His ideas were strongly based on parallel effect of territoriality and functional autonomy, as were those of his predecessor Althusius, with his Calvinistic view of society. The idea of “political engineering” and “*consociationalism*”, or “consociational engineering” in order to strengthen democracy was introduced by Arend Lijphart (1977) who argued that social groups can at best artificially create consent in a constitution. His idea was of a *concordance democracy*, instead of just issuing economic “policies” without doing justice to the political dimension. This tension between the economic and political dimension and validity of a federal state remains today one of the chief matters of
negotiation between different members of state and indeed in party politics in many federal nations.

The principle of subsidiarity had considerable influence on the shaping of Swiss federalism. Originally derived from Catholic social teaching (subsidiarius), the approach was however neither social nor catholic, but rather neo-liberal: the subsidiarity principle was rediscovered towards the end of the second millennium to create an ethical basis for the advancement of economic competition (Beyme, 2007). Subsidiarity in Switzerland may today be still a powerful tool for curbing federal policy (Freiburghaus, 2002), in domains where the central government has no competences. In relation to education policy, education provision in Switzerland has a strong federal tradition. It is only in reaction to the results from PISA and cross-cantonal national follow up studies that has there been a focus on looking at education at a cross-national level and scrutinizing tracking and streaming mechanisms and decision making patterns in the different federal education systems, as we shall see in Chapter 4. Larger policy reforms and shifts in both education and social policy are increasingly based on a system of Cantonal concordats or consensus; with the subsidiarity clause of the central government having the authority to intervene with other measures should the consensus-based policies fail to work. The tendency of education policy - within a wider framework of cross-sectoral integration policy and regulation - is a move towards harmonization of performance indicators and of the deregulation of systems of special needs education throughout the Cantons, as we shall see later in chapters 4 and 6.

In considering the status of subsidiarity further, it may be helpful to view Swiss national politics of harmonization (of education policy) as a parallel development to the developing European education policy space, so that the Swiss case may be illuminated by attention to the capacity of the EC to steer European education despite subsidiarity (Jones et al 2008). On the one hand, there is the reality of a common European market for maximizing benefits of labour migration, trade and joint industry. This vision is reached by consensus of nations willing or increasingly pressurized into becoming members. Freiburghaus (2002) explains that federal states assume that competences had previously all been in their hands and then were partially handed over to the federal government. In all federal states, according to
Freiburghaus (2002), - with the exception of the special case of Belgium – the competences of the total state or federal state grew with time, either because further areas of authority were handed over by the member states or because newly developing policies were allocated to the federal government from the beginning.

The governance of federal or member states requires ‘softer’ governing tools, such as networks and the OMC oriented policy processes; working with knowledge as a way of evaluation and getting the right people involved (Lawn and Lingard, 2006) working collaboratively and yet loosely at key levels of national and regional policy conceptualization (Alexiadou, 2007). The Swiss historical propagation of national identity by helvetic elite used precisely this type of mechanism to spread the idea of a national unity, without negating the reality of Cantonal sovereignty and diversity (Münger, 2002). In both the past and present Swiss federal state (and perhaps by analogy in the EU), there seems to be a sense of using consensus and approbation of pre-existent regionalism. Beyme (2007) argues that federal regions have always had the tendency to demonstrate little cooperation:

‘It was more of a replacement competition between centre and periphery. Confrontation outweighed cooperation, and where it was created, it did not follow constitutional paths, but developed ‘ministerial democracy’ or ‘contractual democracy’ to overcome the hurdles of a multilevel system. At the stage of the question, how the blockades of federalism can be overcome or rewritten against a Unitarian state, ‘bypass-strategies’ were discovered as open methods of coordination instead of previous top-down state regulation.’ (Obinger et al., 2005:506; in Beyme, 2007:22).

The side effects of an economically driven European mandate for national systems and the use of such methods as the OMC for governing in multilevel systems, is the overlapping or impact on other sectors within the state other than the market (Alexiadou, 2007). In other words, the overlapping or increased semiotic use of common aims in many state sectors, including education. Maximizing the economy from a state-oriented perspective, requires consideration of the needs of the labour market, of what know-how is needed, which demands are met and need to be recruited or filled by labour migration or the population. The individual is asked to contribute to a ‘knowledge economy’ or ‘knowledge society’, which will meet the demands of a highly de-regulated market. This in turn takes us directly to education
provision. Moreover, there will be influences on social and migration policy because of how populations are required to be managed, fitted and streamed.

The management of population groups and their impact on the labour market, takes the discussion of federalism and how it may be understood into relationship with migration politics, and politics of identity and difference, as they concern the legitimization of spaces of action for individuals or citizens within a population and the governance of individual choices and paths of professional and increasingly political choice. There seems to be a disjuncture between what Beyme (2007) describes as state-centred federalism and social-centred federalism; the former is considered a ‘disguised nation or Unitarian state’, whereas the latter is based on an interpersonal phenomenon on the level of communities.

Moreover, the historical development of federalism in Switzerland and of the politics of the EU may have certain parallels in terms of the emphasis on policies of consensus and principles of subsidiarity. There is a growing trend in governing mechanisms that disseminate ‘shared’ concepts into regional spheres through tools such as OMC or comparative standards within Europe or extending beyond national spaces. This in turn may well contribute in the way in which such standards are then used in education governance, which persist certain symbolic and discursively constructed notions on ‘national identity’ and ‘culture’.

This historical formation of conceptions of a confederative Swiss national treaty grown out of precarious consensus between different interest groups is essential to understand the roots of how identity could be understood, or rather propagated as a unitary project until today. There is a strong symbolic value of ‘national identity’ within Switzerland which remains strongly rooted in regional, local, contextual and individual realities. It becomes therefore helpful to view and interpret the concept of ‘national identity’ as a discursive construction or as a ‘social imaginary’ (Gaonkar, 2005:5; in Rizvi, 2006:197), used for the governing of common spaces of shared elite or statist interests (see earlier, chapters 1 and 2).
3.2.3 Parties and the shift from cleavage to reconciliation

In this subsection, I will consider the role played by party politics, especially at regional levels, with reference to education policy. Schwander (2005) discusses various approaches to aspects of nation building in terms of political parties. Defenders of the institutional approach such as Sartori (1994) root the structures of party systems in institutional factors such as the electoral system, whereas Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the structure of party systems through social tensions and conflicts within society, defined as ‘cleavages’. A cleavage, according to Bartolini and Mair (1996; in Schwander, 2005)) has three requirements; it needs to have a social tension, which is defined by a population group with a social indicator or feature, which separates them from another population group. This is also called the structural basis of a cleavage (Ladner, 2005).

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) base the development of European party systems on the existence of four cleavages (centre-periphery, state-church, urban-rural, labour-capital), which created a permanent link between certain population groups and the corresponding parties through the introduction of general voting rights. Their claims are disputed, however, (Schwander 2005; Ladner 2005) on the basis that, although the main parties of Switzerland did maintain steady support, their agendas changed considerably over time, along with the kinds of cleavages which exist in society. In Ladner’s view, Switzerland represents a case of ‘changing cleavages and responsive parties’ (2005). Both Schwander and Ladner describe one of the contemporary cleavages as value cleavage, created by the enormous shift in post-war value systems that divided the new middle class in leftist-oriented socio-cultural professionals and right-oriented managerialists. As the two population groups differed structurally through their choice of profession and at the level of awareness through their value orientation, the two defining attributes of a cleavage are fulfilled. Ladner identifies a second new cleavage in terms of the losers and winners in globalization.

The framing of education within a neo-liberal agenda is further evidenced by looking at a specific political party in Switzerland, which contributed to the integration agenda, which is being developed at different state and Cantonal levels. The Swiss
People’s Party (SVP) became the largest party in the Swiss parliament with 26.7 percent of the vote in 2003. In post-industrial countries, the SVP, along with the Austrian People’s Party, are the only far-right parties that have reached or exceeded the levels of electoral support of their largest established non-socialist competitors. McGann and Kitschelt (2005) analyze the evolution and support of these parties using survey data from the Swiss National Election Study 1999: they found both parties to fit the profile of a ‘new radical-right’ party (Kitschelt, 1995:149). According to Kitschelt (1995:148), to be successful, far-right parties adopt a ‘winning formula’, combining opposition to immigration with free-market economic and socio-cultural conservatism. However, there is also considerable evidence that the SVP is not simply a single-issue or protest party, but has an identifiable programme and constituency (Betz, 1994 Mudde, 1999 Van der Brug and Fennema 2003, in McGann and Kitschelt, 2005). Interestingly, in the 1990s, a splinter group of the SVP took up the concerns of opponents of globalisation and has developed from being primarily a protestant farmer party to an anti-integration party. As in Kitschelt’s (1995) ‘winning formula’ theory, new radical-right parties attract an electorate threatened by the modernization process of advanced capitalism: this consists of small business owners, routine white-collar workers, people inactive in the labour force and blue-collar workers. To maximize the support from all these groups, it is therefore necessary to have a programme that attracts all of these at the same time: this means economic liberalism, socio-cultural authoritarianism and opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. However, as Schwander (2005) suggests, shifts have also occurred in the party’s agenda because of the influences of globalization, or rather Europeanization, in particular the influence of the EU. In the mid 1980s, Christoph Blocher gained control of the Zurich section of the SVP and launched a strong anti-EU campaign. The 1993 referendum on the European Economic Association (EEA) brought Blocher into particular prominence; the ideological and successful profile of the newer SVP voters was now oriented towards an economically free-market, socio-culturally authoritarianism and opposition to immigration and the EU.

However, in 2007, Christoph Blocher, a former minister heading the department of migration and recent president of the SVP, was the person responsible for the setting up of a federal ‘integration report’, which conceptualized the idea and dimensions of integration and is the basis for integration recommended by the federal government to
cantonal policy processes. This report draws heavily on terminology and standards from PISA and OECD data and incorporates multiculturalist ideologies, reflecting multiculturalism’s strategic use for economic purposes, such as individual patriotism and strategic entrepreneurialism (Mitchell, 2003). Thus, a multicultural approach is reconcilable with neo-liberal and right wing policies, because it can use ‘flags’ or ‘badges’ of social democracy, and yet maintain restrictive political membership practices.

The development of the SVP and of cleavages within Switzerland might be an example for how other parties, such as the Social Party (SP), the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and the Christian Democrats (CVP) are also increasingly moving towards what Ladner (2003) calls ‘changing cleavages and responsive parties’. Networks of policy elites include people from different party sections who may be reconciled, by the process of market liberalization in Europe to agendas of integration.

If we return to Benhabib’s argument about the dilemma which nation-states are facing, these contradictory strategies can be researched through discourse analysis that scrutinises policy definitions and uses of ‘membership’ and ‘integration’. However, if we adopt a dialectical-relational critical approach to this analysis, these semiotic elements of policy need to be linked to elements of migration and economic historical development over recent decades (see section 3.1.2).

In the following Chapter 4, I give an account of the kinds of distinctive *policy-informing evidence* referred to by Swiss policy makers within an ‘integration’ framework in the context of education.
Chapter 4: Swiss Education Reform

4.1 The ‘Problematisation’ of the Migrant student in Swiss Research.

4.1.1 Introduction

A major strand of Swiss education research is dedicated to the concern that the Swiss State school system has become more selective and differentiated, and that this has had a detrimental effect on migrant pupils (Lischer, Kronig & Rosenberg, 2002). Swiss streaming practices within the compulsory public school system include special classes for children with learning difficulties. Migrant students are increasingly allocated to these special classes in disproportionate numbers, and these classes are linked to reduced education and career opportunities (Imdorf, 2003). Selection from primary school into different types of compulsory secondary schooling is streamed according to achievement results.

First some general facts and figures about the Swiss population, a short summary of the migration background and the Swiss school system are presented. The phenomenon of the special class and its effects is explained. The second part of this discussion focuses on possible reasons for this phenomenon and examines its effects on the educational opportunities of migrant students. The third section looks at comparative perspectives on Swiss streaming methods and at the approaches of different countries. In conclusion, the findings of earlier sections are summarized and analyzed in view of possible alterations and the future development of the Swiss school system.

4.1.2 The Swiss School System: recent facts and figures

The Swiss Census of 2000 shows that the foreign population, meaning people with nationalities other than Swiss, consists of one fifth of the entire population of Switzerland, which is roughly estimated to be around 7 Million (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2004). Half of this foreign population originates from the former Yugoslavia and from Italy. The historical background to migration shows two recent
migrant movements into Switzerland closely linked to labour market policy. The Swiss market economy required cheap labour both during the crude oil crisis of the mid-1970s and during the 1980s. These decades marked the influx of mainly Italian and Spanish migrant workers during the first period, and mainly Portuguese, Turkish and ex-Yugoslavian workers during the second period (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002). Local regulations concerning residence and work permits allowed mostly male foreign workers to bring their families into Switzerland after a certain time period, which led to an increasing population of migrant children and young people (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002). In addition to these migrant groups, there is a further population consisting of families and children originating from non-European countries, which has reached a significant number. As statistics show, there is a striking development in the increasing rate of children and young people from the countries of former Yugoslavia, who now make up more than one third (91,666 in 2004/05 within compulsory schools) of the entire migrant student population of Switzerland (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2005). Significantly, this group of children and young people have particular difficulties in academic achievement and further career opportunities within the Swiss system (Lischer, 2002).

A large proportion of these children often live with parents or grand-parents with low levels of educational qualification and low levels of literacy, often not beyond that of compulsory education of their respective countries of origin (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002). Research on educational attainment levels shows significant difference by country of origin; whereas high average levels of attainment are demonstrated by children from non-European countries and those from Austria, France and Germany, low average attainment levels are found among children from countries that are sources of cheap labour (Lischer, 2002). Language and mother tongue instruction may be significant here, and I discuss this below. Several studies suggest that the literacy background of families can have a high level of significance for the academic performance of a child (Bannwart and Bättig, 2002). At the same time, socio-economic background is known to be an important factor in influencing educational attainment, as I shall show later in this discussion. These contributory factors to low attainment are presented by policy makers as a justification for the highly selective practices of Swiss schools, and the data are considered and assessed within the context of special schooling. According to Lischer (2002), Swiss school statistics
cannot measure the social background variable of students, only nationality and mother tongue. However, researchers such as Lischer and Kronig (2002) established that the migration history and the large representation of nationality and mother tongue correspond to a high degree to the variable nationality and thus draw conclusions with some confidence as to the socio-economic background of migrant children.

The term ‘migrant or immigrant children’ refers to children, who have either migrated to Switzerland with their families, originating from other countries, or who were born in Switzerland, but hold passports entitling them to other nationalities, including dual-nationality (Lanfranchi, 2002). The political correctness of this term is arguable, as it includes third generation children, whose parents were born in Switzerland, but hold another nationality. Nonetheless, for reasons of consistency and relevance, this particular terminology will be used in this thesis, as a number of Swiss researchers have used various different terms to characterize the same category.

As shown in figure 4.1 (Appendix 4), the Swiss school system consists of five to six years of compulsory primary schooling, varying according to the different cantons.

Subsequently, in compulsory lower-secondary education, students are allocated to schools in different achievement tracks according to their prior achievement. Some schools require advanced levels of prior achievement, while others take pupils with basic levels of achievement. Upper secondary schooling is optional and similarly tracked into different achievement requirements, leading to different, and unequal academic qualifications; different vocational training programmes, technical and professional colleges or leading on to university (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2005). Data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office demonstrate that ‘depending on gender and ethnicity, pupils profit differently and to an increasing degree from the institutionalized dispersion of school success’ (Imdorf, 2003:1). Tertiary level education includes University or College education, vocational schools, apprenticeships and other professional institutes (Figure 1, Appendix 4). Formal qualifications obtained after either lower compulsory secondary school or optional upper secondary school, are crucial for successful transition into any of these tertiary level educational schools or professional placements.
During primary schooling, pupils with learning difficulties, or physical or mental disabilities, who have problems following the regular curriculum, can be either supported in the regular class or can be allocated to special classes, which run parallel to the regular class often in the same school, or to special schools (Lischer, 2002). Special classes for children with learning difficulties are not be confused with special schools for children with physical or mental learning disabilities. These special schools do not show significant differences in the numbers of Swiss pupils and migrant children and are not of relevance to this thesis. With respect to internal support for children with learning difficulties within the regular class, data are not available (Lischer, 2002).

The process for allocation into a special class is usually initiated by the class teacher, who can refer the student to a school psychologist, in response to what is deemed by the teacher as insufficient school achievement or difficulties of the child. With the consent of the parents, a school psychologist then assesses the student. On the basis of this examination a report is then drafted to the local school council. The official decision lies with the politically-elected school council and not with the parents, and although they are referred to, they do not have a formal right to decide (Lanfranchi, 1995: in Dojoatmodjo, 2003). Analyses have principally shown that migrant children are ‘highly affected by this early form of selection’ (Powell and Wagner, 2002, Kronig, 2001 quoted in Kronig, 2003:1). Kronig (2003) elaborates that there are two significant tendencies emerging from these analyses: firstly, the number of migrant children in special classes has more than trebled since the 1980s, whereas their overall representation in ordinary classes has only increased by 35%. In 2001, one in ten migrant children was allocated to a special school in Switzerland. Parallel to this increase, the number of Swiss pupils in special classes has decreased by almost one quarter. Secondly, the disproportionately high number of migrant children allocated to special classes continues to grow (see figure 2).
Figure 4.2: Percentage of children in special classes and IC classes (Lischer, 2003:18)

IC – Introduction Class (temporary)
Fremdsprachige: foreign-language speakers, or non-native speakers

Children allocated to special classes are then, on transition, selected into lower secondary schools with lower academic entry requirements. Very rarely are students able to deviate from the educational path set for them by this process (Lischer, 2002). According to research in the field of educational sociology, access to education for migrant children and young people diminishes the higher the educational level is: their representation in secondary schooling is lower than in primary, and even lower in tertiary education (Kronig, 2002).

The federal structure of the Swiss state means that the main responsibility for the public schooling system is delegated to the cantons, including the main funding and resources allocation. Their autonomy in educational matters means that not only are there twenty-six different cantonal school systems in Switzerland, but also as many different systems of special needs or special schooling (Djojobadjo, 2003). In the canton of Zurich for example, there is a legal differentiation between five types of special classes (see figure 1, Appendix 4). A more recent law allows the districts within the cantons a choice between use of the special class system or integrative support (Rosenberg, 2002). Interestingly, the special class allocation rate differs considerably among the different cantons, and is not in proportion to numbers of the local migrant population (Lischer, 2002). This is significant in the educational opportunity of migrant children. The possibility of a migrant pupil being allocated to a special class is higher or lower depending on the canton: it is highest in those in which there are already a large number of migrant pupils in special classes (Lischer, 2002).
Research shows that for example in the cantons of Zug (ZG) and Schaffhausen (SH) every sixth migrant child is allocated to a special class (15.8%, and 15.2%) (Lischer, 2002). However, these cantons have an average percentage of migrant children in compulsory schooling (Lischer, 2002). Interestingly, some cantons with the highest levels of migrant children have the lowest proportions in special classes. With respect to the children of families who emigrated from countries in the 1970s and 1980s, there is a significant difference between the allocation rates of migrant pupils of different nationalities, specifically in the second migration period. Of pupils from the former Yugoslavia (ex-YU) or from Turkey (TR), every eighth child was being taught in special classes in 2001 (Lischer, 2002). According to the study CONVEGNO (2002), there are also a high number of students from ‘other’ mainly non-European countries (Andere), which are unfortunately not statistically differentiated:

Figure 4.3: Percentage of children in special classes (Lischer, 2002:21)

1) I – Italy, E – Spain, ex-YU – former Yugoslavia, P – Portugal, TR – Turkey, D – Germany,
   A – Austria, F – France, Andere – Other countries

Research also seems to suggest that these allocations are not consistently based on similar if not the same criteria, but rather may have a random and discriminatory quality and therefore may be highly questionable (Kronig, 2002, Imdorf, 2003). The problems of developing policy measures and of developing good academic research on this issue are exacerbated by the complexity of allocation criteria within different schools and by the high number of factors that influence educational attainment. These include financial means of providing special internal support for children with learning difficulties, teaching methods with reference to heterogeneous classes,
assessment, differentiation of ability (explicitly the reference is made to IQ) language learning and *habitus*, as suggested by Bourdieu (1979; quoted in Kronig, 2002), to name a few among many. Nonetheless, the persistence of early selection and allocation, in other words of strong streaming practices within the Swiss school system, affects migrant students in terms of their educational and professional future to a very high degree and raises questions about their equal opportunities and life chances. It is also argued that such levels of segregation may become social and ethnic marginalization and widen the divide between socio-economic and socio-cultural groups.

4.1.3 Discussion of Swiss Allocation practices

The key question, according to Kronig (2002) is why, despite the recognition of the problem of the failure of migrant children by the Swiss Assembly of Cantonal Educational Departments (EDK), several joint efforts since 1972 to improve class room and school resources for foreign students, along with promoting Intercultural Education in teacher training, there has been no significant improvement in the situation. It is likely that there are strongly rooted beliefs about selection criteria and the justification for such a high allocation rate on an individual school basis, and on the basis of specific cantonal traditions, which are not easily seen as faults of the system or errors of judgment by those involved in allocations. When questioned about the allocation practices of schools and teachers and the high percentage of migrant pupils in special classes, many teachers and educationalists give reasons such as foreign culture and socialization, recent migration, problems in coping with the local school system, loss of home, roots and identity, the low literacy level of the parents, migrant parents ‘not-being-able-to-help with homework’ and language acquisition to explain this situation (Bannwart und Bättig, 2002). Notwithstanding the relevance of these factors, it is evident that those responsible for allocation see the problem as that of the pupils and their difficulties in adapting to the local system or their own incapacity. In view of such assumptions, the learning difficulties of migrant children seem to be almost expected by the system and by teachers (Czock, 1993, Hamburger, 1998: quoted in Kronig, 2002).
However, some researchers suggest that the problem is strongly linked to the rigidity and autonomy of the education system in Switzerland, particularly with reference to cantonal practices. Gomolla and Radtke (2002) link academic or school failure to ‘organizational activities’ (2002:54). Basing their argument on the research of Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963, 1968), they suggest that certain situations are dealt with not only in relation to the performance of a child, but by reference to existing organizational policies. In other words, as long as a certain percentage of places in special classes is organizationally pre-provided for and expected, it will almost certainly be used, despite all other efforts to reduce allocations (Kormann, 1998; quoted in Kronig, 2002). In any class there will always be students who perform less well than their peers; irrespective of the benchmark, these students will then be allocated to special classes if such provision exists. Kronig (2002) argues that for reasons such as this, high allocation rates cannot be entirely explained and justified with reference to the actual attainment levels of pupils (2002:26). Moreover, the difficulties of such a ‘labelling approach’, as Gomolla and Radtke (2002) suggest, are that organizational structures such as schools have the tendency to adopt problem-oriented approaches, looking for explanations outside their structure, which the child may be bringing in, such as cultural clashes, family-based miscommunication, social factors and the personal attributes of the child. The selection or allocation decision is often based upon and justified with barely scrutinised concepts about cultural differences and their effects upon the child’s capacity to achieve (Kronig, 2002). ‘The internal activities of the decision-makers (educationalists and teachers) and their share in defining the problem are not reflected on or assessed during the decision making process’ (Gomolla and Radtke, 2002: 56). In this practice reference to existing knowledge and interpretation of determining factors may be most important: ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’ are understood as determining factors within schools, and strongly associated with problems to which solutions already exist-namely allocation to special classes. Schools often have an established repertoire of interpretation and decision-making models, designed to diagnose and assist teaching staff in dealing with cases as they arise. The danger in such pre-constructed interpretative resources for schools, according to Gomolla and Radtke (2002), is that the allocation practice becomes habitual and unexamined.
The idea that the frequency of allocation of migrant children into special classes stems from reliance on mistaken and uninformed diagnosis methods is becoming more accepted (Kronig, Haeberlin and Eckhart, 2002; quoted in Lischer, 2002). It is felt that improvement of these methods would decrease the number of allocations. Studies show however that neither the actual academic performance of children nor the methods of diagnosis may be the primary reasons behind the allocation practice. A national study involving 2152 students of primary school level of year two within the German part of Switzerland and from Liechtenstein measured their achievement levels in language and general ability (Again explicit reference used is ‘IQ’) levels (see Kronig, Haeberlin and Eckhart, 2000; quoted in Kronig, 2002). Comparison of achievement results of migrant children in standard/normal classes with those of migrant children in special classes found a significant degree of overlap (Figure 5). Moreover, this overlap was also found with Swiss children in regular or mainstream classes compared to their Swiss peers in special classes. Accordingly it may be argued that there is no academic performance criterion which justifies allocation into special classes. ‘Learning difficulties’ in pupils are not clearly identifiable by reference to their academic attainment levels. The varied allocation rates in the different cantons strengthen the premise that high allocation quotas are linked to systemic errors rather than to the attributes of the students.

Figure 4.5 (Kronig, 2003)  Migrant children

(1) Achievement in language of instruction
(2) Intelligence test results/achievement
(3) Number of children (vertical)
(4) Percentage of correctly solved questions (horizontal)
(5) 10 - Number of migrant children in special classes
The same study showed that migrant children in regular or mainstream classes achieved the highest level of academic improvement (Kronig, 2002). These results are consistent with other studies conducted both nationally and internationally (Manhard and Crain, 1983; quoted in Kronig, 2002): these studies emphasise the suggestion that integrative or inclusive education is more efficient in improving academic performance than are segregating or streaming methods.

To summarize the sections so far, findings from both national and international studies related to student ability and attainment results suggest that the early selection practices and educational policy in Switzerland require scrutiny with respect to migrant students. There seems to be a general conviction that the problems lie mainly with the migrant pupils themselves. However, research evidence suggests that there is a link to the rigidity and autonomy of the education system in Switzerland, particularly with reference to cantonal practices.

The question remains whether integrative or inclusive education might be more efficient in improving academic performances. It can be argued that later selection might be more effective in the sense that school would have longer to compensate for pre-existing disadvantage, and that decisions about transition would be based on attainment levels and rather than social factors. Although looking towards other countries for possible solutions is problematic in view of different migration histories and different immigration policies, certain provisions such as a longer integrated time in schooling, as introduced in France, could improve situations for migrant students and alleviate the “ghettoizing” effect (Vellacott et al., 2003). In particular early allocation from primary to secondary schooling could be reassessed. The class teacher plays a significant role in educational decisions affecting migrant children in Switzerland. A crucial point is the level of expectation the teacher has of the student; teachers in Switzerland may have lower expectations of migrant students and may be negatively biased in general and in relation to allocation. Family support provision and adult education with respect to migration policy and migrant ‘integration’ is
closely linked to improved migrant student performance: Canada and France are relatively comparable and successful models (Vellacott et. al., 2003).

4.2. Swiss education reform policies

(The PISA Challenge 2008: `First national games of Swiss School Youth 2008`: `Triple jump`)  

This image shown above is part of a briefing by Oliver Maradan, deputy general secretary of the Swiss Conference of Education Ministers (EDK) and project leader of the coordination project of ‘Public School’ and HARMOS (Harmonising Public School); and his research colleague in this project, Max Mangold. The image shows the PISA tests symbolically by the leaning tower of Pisa in Italy in the background; the ‘jumper’, probably representing Swiss students, is leaping over the bear, signifying Canton Berne and the lion, which is Canton Zurich, and finally Canton Graubuenden. The briefing: ‘Education Standards in Switzerland; the HARMOS project’ was published in February 2005 in ‘PH Akzente’ a journal for Teacher Training. The Swiss Conference for Education Ministers or EDK is an intercantonal educational body, consisting of all the education ministers of every Canton as a directorate and also encompassing around 500 employees in what appears to be a large network of education policy administrators, researchers, policy brokers and
ministerial bureaucrats, but associated with and represented by some Federal authorities, education authorities within Cantons and Local Authorities alike. Chapter 6 elaborates on the impact and power of this educational body.

‘HARMOS’, or ‘Harmonising Public Schools’ in Switzerland took effect from the first of August 2009, after the required 10 Cantons had signed to ratify the concordat. In chapter 2, section 2.4, the system and instrument of concordats is explained in the context of Swiss Federalism and education governance. The content of this reform is the harmonising of education aims and of education transition systems throughout the cantons. According to the revised articles on education within the Federal constitution, which were approved by Swiss voters in 2006, those responsible for education i.e. the Cantons and the Federal Government jointly, are obliged to administer ‘important benchmarks’ nationally in a consistent way. Public schools have to adjust their practices in accordance with Article 62. Abs.4 of the Federal constitution. This, according to the EDK, has been done with the introduction of the HARMOS concordat. Maradan and Mangold, responsible for the project coordination of HARMOS, explain in their briefing that the main contents of this education reform are as follows:

1) Harmonising of the content of learning (Curriculum)
2) Consolidation of coordinated governance of Public Schools
3) Evaluation of the education system across the whole of Switzerland
4) Development of the quality of the education system

According to education actors (see chapter 6) and also some media coverage, this policy is a ‘response to the PISA shock’ (NZZ, 1.April, 2007). Close attention to the language of the policy texts and also the instruments introduced to achieve reform aims reveals a particular terminology and logic which reflect international or Europeanizing trends. Not only is the harmonising of learning content in public schools to be achieved throughout the cantons, but this is done through the introduction of coherent curricular content and measurable ‘education standards’ (Bildungsstandards). The national ‘education standards’ for Public Schools include ‘performance standards’ (Leistungsstandards) with minimum competence levels, which are to be achieved at the end of the 2nd, 6th and 9th school years. The EDK is to
control this attainment through an instrument called ‘education monitoring’ (Bildungsmonitoring). Four research consortia have developed these standards since 2005, for which they had to tender to the EDK.

In the Zurich Newspaper ‘Neue Zuercher Zeitung’ of 1st April 2007, the following text by Meier-Rust, translated by me from German, illustrates scepticism regarding the newly introduced Harmos policy and the associations that are made with PISA and ‘standards’:

Die Schweizer Antwort auf Pisa heisst HarmoS
The Swiss Answer to Pisa is called HarmoS

‘What a friendly word, who does not like it – Harmonisation. Perhaps this is the reason why the Harmonising of Public Schools – the so-called project HarmoS of the Swiss Conference of the Education ministers (EDK) – is drawing relatively less attention to itself. However, behind the friendly word possibly the broadest and most profound reform of Swiss schools is hidden. It would affect a small revolution, if it were to achieve its aim. (...)

There are currently a lot of questions and fears, expectations and apprehension sparked off in response to the planned introduction of national education standards – which lie at the heart of HarmoS. At this point, Switzerland not only enters the new territory of a testing culture unknown to Swiss schools so far. Because entirely different concepts are circulating, being used and having an effect with respect to the word ‘standard’ throughout the world, it is therefore quite an explosive area. Are these education standards about a national curriculum, like in the Asian countries, for which every school year requires a certain syllabus? Are they about selection criteria, whether a student will come into ‘Real- or Sekundarschule’? Or could it even be a whip for the teachers, because the results of national tests are used for ranking lists of schools or of teachers? For nearly every one of these feared things, there is a corresponding, dreaded example somewhere in the world.

At the very least with the education standards it becomes clear, what HarmoS really is, even if this is played down by the EDK; an answer to the evidently dreadful results of Switzerland in the PISA Test. These positions- 17th and 18th (in reading and sciences, PISA 2000) did not correspond to the fond myth of ‘the best of all school systems’. And if – as the Swiss evaluation of PISA showed – selection and therefore the school performance depends more strongly on the socio-economic background of the student rather than his or her ability, then this does not correspond either to the much propagated equality of opportunity.’

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5 Realschule: previously low-achievement requirement secondary school. Sekundarschule: average achievement level of secondary schooling.
This article identifies the controversial terminology used by HarmoS, in particular it claims that there is a lot of insecurity around ‘standards’ and their meaning. The aspect of ‘policy borrowing’ is noted as leading to ‘feared and dreaded’ forms of education standards found in other countries. It is striking that this policy is seen as a response to Swiss performance in the Pisa results, although the EDK denies being disciplined by Pisa in this particular reform (see Maradan and Mangold, above).

The HarmoS policy addresses early schooling or early school entry through the introduction of entry into Kindergarten for two years as an obligatory part of public schooling at the age of four. The entire ‘early schooling’ debate had been part of the campaign for ‘inclusive or integrative schooling’ as opposed to ‘specialist or Special Needs’ education. Research suggests that earlier entry into school promotes equal opportunities by enabling migrant children to learn the native language (whether German, French, Italian) early on (Lanfranchi, 2005; see also the interview with Lanfranchi, chapter 6).

HarmoS also strengthened school structures which support ‘day care’ (Tagesstrukturen) to enable children to have lunch and day care within school in out-of-school hours. This was established in collaboration with the Federal Department for Family and Social Policy. Within the interview narratives in chapter 6, this aspect was mentioned by Ernst Buschor, former education minister of Canton Zurich, as something that reinforces ‘integration’ and ‘socialisation’ in school. According to him, children ‘integrate’ themselves by teaching each other and socialising with each other out-of-school, rather than within school hours during lessons.

There is also a dispute amongst teachers and educationalists over whether the HarmoS policy has anything to do with ‘integrative schooling’ and the abolition of Special Classes for Children with learning difficulties. Although these are in effect two different policies, launched around the same time, there are some elements of an ‘integrative trend’, which features throughout the entire education reform agenda, including these two different policies. The new Public School Law opts for a new approach in the context of Special Needs Measures in Canton Zurich. The financing of Special Needs schooling was withdrawn from Invalid Insurance within the
framework of a New Financial Settlement (NFA) and this resulted in a reassessment and reorganisation of Special Needs Measures in schools in Canton Zurich. Officially, schools are no longer allowed to simply allocate students with ‘lower achievement requirements’ or ‘learning difficulties’ into Special Needs Classes or Schools, but rather should attempt where possible to ‘integrate’ or ‘include’ the children within normal classes. As a form of ‘best practice’, other Cantons are opting for similar reforms, or at least they are encouraged by the EDK to do so within due time. The interview narratives in chapter 6 look at the debates around PISA, HarmoS, Special Needs and the ‘integrative approach’ and ‘integration’ more closely.

This chapter looked at the role of education and education data in policy and discourse around migrants within the Swiss education system; the next chapter 5 will look the policy and discourse around ‘integration’ and what terminology is used, referred to and also what kind of concepts of ‘integration’ are outlined by the Media and the Federal Government.
Chapter 5: Integration Discourse and Policy

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, international and national findings relating to early selection practices and education policy concerning migrant children and their positioning within the Swiss education system give rise to a particular set of questions. What appears to be yet another national challenge to address the attainment gap may offer a backdrop to a deep rooted and long standing discourse on migration, societal developments and tensions between varied pressure groups with competing normative claims. What Switzerland is faced with today more directly than ever before, as it may well have refrained from acknowledging in the past, is an arena of public and political discussion around the phenomenon of being a migration country and the related restructuring of the Swiss society. This discussion includes debate about what constitutes a nation, about Swiss or Migrant identity and the rights to equal opportunities within different national spheres, and is mirrored within the education system. The role of education has a fundamental place within this discussion, given that measurable results of differences in academic performance and outcomes of local and migrant children within the system have been brought to the attention of the public and politicised as indicators of the level of ‘integration’ in the country. The Swiss system has to evaluate the status quo not simply from economic perspectives as may have been the case in the previous thirty years, but rather through debating what migration implies, constitutes and changes in a host society. Linked to this is the larger issue of the positioning of Switzerland in the framework of Europe and European migration, and what the increased dynamics of European economic deregulation, the opening of borders and the effects of joint ventures and agreements implies for Switzerland.

This chapter focuses on questions resulting from this contemporary debate in Switzerland and tries to map out the background of possible incentives and motives for education policy development. The chapter includes an analysis of media coverage of migrant students in Swiss schools during the period from 2000 to 2006 in some of the German and French speaking Cantons. Because of language and limitations to
access, media in the Italian Speaking Canton of Ticino are not included in this analysis.

The key concept of ‘integration’ as understood by the Swiss authorities and the public is the focus of this discussion. Selected key federal and local reports and guidelines involving ‘integration’ are referred to. Legal frameworks and political developments around this issue will be examined. A further aspect is the economic aspect of Swiss migration and the models that have determined the in- and outflow of migrants in Switzerland. More generally, this discussion analyses the discourse of ‘integration’ in the Swiss vernacular in order to assess its implications for the design of education policy ‘solutions’. The issue of interpretation of German or French expressions and their analogies in English must be noted here: it is difficult to convey all the nuances of meaning in translation. For this reason, some expressions will be specifically highlighted or retained in their original form for reasons of accuracy. Certain distinctive terms related to migration, such as ‘immigrant’, or ‘integration’ will be used in parenthesis, or used subsequently when referring to the particular terminology used in Switzerland, either by media, by authorities, in public speeches and in legislation for discursive purposes.

5.2 The Arena of Media Discourse for ‘Integration’

The following discussion delineates the development of issues concerning the presence of migrant (the term immigrant is specifically used throughout these paragraphs as used by Swiss media) children and youth in Swiss schools. This is done with a total of 40 newspaper articles taken from different Northern, Central and Western Swiss Cantons in the French and German linguistic regions covering the period from 2000 to 2006. These articles were accessed and analysed at the Swiss Social Archive in Zurich. The detailed descriptive element of this coverage is done with the intention of mapping out examples of the media discourse around this topical area during these years to identify which aspects of this issue were addressed and presented to the public. The terminology used in the different articles will not be specifically questioned or only partially discussed and analysed at this point. Drawing loosely on a dialectical-relational approach to CDA as outlined in chapter 2, I will
connect and relate the themes emerging from this chapter to the semiotic analysis of the narrative empirical data in chapter 6 and the other social elements contained within this analysis (see chapters 3, 4 and 6).

At a glance, the overall theme of these articles seems to have coherence throughout the different cantons and over this period of the last six or seven years until 2006. A persistent issue is how the ‘problem’ of having a surplus of migrant students within Swiss schools, mainly by schools and teachers, but also by the wider community. Parents, often Swiss parents, are portrayed as supplicants defending their right or their children’s right to a high quality school with high standards, often equated with schools with fewer migrant pupils.

On the other hand, children are shown as having rights of access to a fair education, or indeed to education, and their parents are often portrayed as a crucial influencing factor in contributing towards improved ‘integration’ into the community by their participation or cooperation with local school life, regulations and activities. Perspectives in favour of retaining high migrant representation in some schools, or trying to introduce distribution of migrants to other areas, are often contained within the same article. There are few examples of articles giving one side of the argument, regardless of the political positioning of the newspaper. The overall tone of the situation is that of a debate or a discussion, whereas the article headlines are often provocative, one-sided, or misleading in their tone, using expressions such as ‘flooding of Swiss schools’, or ‘boiling pot’.

The use of individual cases is frequent: articles often begin with a personal situation of a migrant child in a school, showing how he or she is being successfully or unsuccessfully ‘integrated’ in the school or in the community. Often, the ‘cases’ have the tone of an appeal to the general public or more specifically to Swiss parents, or the tone of the presenting a legal case, of entitlement to education. More generally, the right to being ‘integrated’ into the Swiss system is advocated and the main protagonists are teachers, schools, students and parents. The arguments used are teachers’ opinions, local authority perspectives on the situation and, less frequently, student opinion and parents’ views.
Views about lower academic performance and standards in schools with high numbers of migrants are presented and then discussed drawing on academic studies and experts. Sometimes interviews with academics, who have carried out research in Switzerland, are offered; these have emerged in recent years and largely challenge the idea that ethnic background is highly significant in how students perform. This argument is consistent throughout the articles of the entire period. Little has changed in public opinion as presented in the media: the public remains convinced that high numbers of migrants equals poor educational performance. The academic studies, the PISA results and their follow ups, but also individual school case studies mainly presented through media, seemed not to have changed the concerns of parents and communities in terms of how schools should operate or how education policies should be developed in the face of migration.

Individual school projects or canton-specific projects are frequently the topic of entire articles, with the outline of their main aims, and the practical outcomes to date. Although individual schools and their distinctive and often successful knowledge about how to deal with a high migrant student population are frequently portrayed, there is seldom a strong conceptualisation of ‘best practice’. Even if ideas are mentioned, it is more in relation to learning at local levels rather than extending to a national practice. In agreement with the delegation of education to Cantonal governance, a strong decentralized perspective and a tendency to perceive it as ‘to each their own’ emerges in the media discourse. There is a slightly more collaborative outlook to be found in the French-speaking region: references are made in newspapers from Fribourg and Geneva to ‘French speaking regional attitudes’ and contrasted with the German region.

There is a lingering uncertainty throughout the entire period about what exactly constitutes a successful school with a high level of heterogeneity. The idea that ‘integration’ is crucial for this success however seems to be largely accepted by political parties and the public within Switzerland: the extent or definition of integration remains the subject of heated debate. Particularly within the education forum, this revolves largely around whether separation of migrant students in ‘special classes’ is necessary or whether ‘integrative schooling’ is a more efficient solution or step towards successful ‘integration’. The rising numbers of students with migrant
backgrounds in these special classes is frequently referred to as the starting point for discussion. The backdrop features allusions to the PISA results and follow-up studies. However, references are also made to basic human and constitutional rights, and the obligation of state, canton and institutions to abide by these rights for all inhabitants of the country. In the following paragraphs, the articles are divided into the respective year of publication, and explored in more detail.

2000 coverage

The coverage in 2000 is taken from five cantons: Berne, Fribourg, Zurich, Lucerne and St. Gallen. Fribourg is the only French-speaking region, and has a high migrant population. The German speaking cantons have high migrant populations and an even geographical distribution across the German part of Switzerland. It is however noteworthy that the choice of cantons does not represent the respective linguistic regions: the strong federal system in Switzerland has allowed for very different structural outlooks and policy implementation in the different cantons.

In an August issue the politically right-centred “Der Bund”, a major Berne newspaper, portrays a pre-election political debate between a city council member of the far right SVP, the Swiss People’s party⁶ and an SP, a Social Democratic party member of the National Council. The SVP member suggests that ‘foreigners’ are a problematic element in schools and suggests separate classes during the initial six years of primary schooling for migrant students (the idea behind which is the acquisition of the German language) and possibly carrying on the separate class system in secondary education. The reasons he gives are disadvantages which Swiss students may suffer from with the increased ‘immigrant’ student population in schools, but giving no evidence to support his claims. Moreover, aggression and youth criminality are portrayed as an outcome or cultural trait of ‘foreign’ students, who need to be taught local rules and acclimatise themselves to the Swiss culture. Leistung or performance, he explains, is a central factor without which ‘one is an outcast from society’. The SP candidate, on the other hand, sees integration as essential to a working society. According to him, segregation is a mistake and mixed classes are beneficial for Swiss

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⁶ The SVP is strongest in German-speaking areas of Switzerland and after the 2003 general election is the largest party in the Swiss lower house of parliament with 55 out of 200 seats.
and ‘immigrant’ students in their school careers. Aggression is something inherently normal in all children, he explains, and the reason for its appearance is that children are generally not given a natural setting to vent their energies in their present surroundings: he believes in investing in more playgrounds or other recreational activities as a preventive measure against the emergence of aggression. Moreover, he sees the role of education as a ‘medium to create equal opportunities and rectify social differences’. His views are also offered without reference to any specific evidence (see: Der Bund, Nr. 197, 24. August 2000, Berne).

This political debate continues in subsequent issues of ‘Der Bund’ in the same year. It is pointed out that despite the strong SVP suggestion of increasing separate classes, the Cantonal School Directorate is clearly in favour of increased integration and immersion into regular or mainstream classes after a short period of induction, as has been previously set out in the Education Agenda to abolish Special Classes for Children with Learning Difficulties or Special Educational Needs. The French Swiss education system is highlighted as an exemplary case of this policy. Scientific evidence (or its absence) in terms of mixed class achievement and the effects of ‘immigrant’ students in ‘regular’ classes is taken into account and the ‘immigrant’ factor is not seen as the primary determinant but rather socio-economic background and extra-curricular activities are emphasised as potential influencing factors to be worked on. In an issue addressed mainly from the migrant point of view, an interview with a local researcher in pedagogy reveals the outcomes of a Study conducted in Fribourg, which provided evidence that Swiss students are not negatively affected by ‘immigrant’ students in ‘regular’ classes. Teachers are seen to play a key role in how ‘immigrant’ students are perceived or selected into or out of regular classes. However, the importance of supporting teachers with resources and provisions, such as specialist pedagogues is mentioned (Der Bund, Nr. 202 and Nr. 233, 30. August 2000, 5. October, 2000, Berne).

The ‘Neue Luzerner Zeitung’ (New Lucerne Newspaper) introduces the topic of the Lucerne SVP Federal President bringing forward a motion to introduce a 50% minimum quota of German speakers in school classes. The Federal governors however, according to the article, declined and positioned themselves clearly against such quotas. The opposition then launched a critique that the Federal government is
split because it includes Christian Church followers, who embrace a ‘love-thy-neighbour’ attitude and ignore the negative aspects of immigration, such as ‘slum creation, criminality and subcultures’. Federal government members from Lucerne responded that they referred to research evidence and argued that the elected council, members were generally agreed to be reliable sources of knowledge and information. This kind of stance, they suggest, should be brought forward to parliament (Neue Luzerner Zeitung, Nr. 298, 27. December, 2000).

Apart from the political debate, and issues dealing with the separate classes, individual cases of migrant students are discussed. The migrant parents of a Swiss born, Spanish-speaking child took legal action to have their daughter moved to a mixed language (or regular) class, after she was allocated to a separate class despite speaking fluent German. The appeal was declined on the basis that the child needed extra language support and that there is no benefit from the allocation of non-German speakers to mixed classes. A reason given for this was the disadvantage for Swiss students, however no scientific or other evidence provided to support these claims. Legal discrimination and equitable education as a constitutional right are discussed in this issue: there is an appeal from the state to canton Lucerne to respect to these rights. However, Swiss parents’ concerns are voiced, and the fact that Swiss families are increasingly moving away from areas with high migrant populations is noted. There is awareness of this ‘problem’ turning into a possible discrimination and legal issue; questions are raised about whether there is a change in the stance of new political leaders in the Federal Government, and whether this issue could turn into a Canton-versus-the State debacle (Neue Luzerner Zeitung, Nr. 202, 31. August 2000).

In Zurich, the centre-left ‘Tages Anzeiger’ outlines the importance of inclusive preschool education for immigrant children in Swiss schools, in a May issue. The article refers to two studies: a Swiss National Fund study on Migration and Intercultural Relations, and a study carried out by a team at the University of Zurich, Special schooling unit. Moreover, it makes reference to a large scale and long-term survey involving teacher, parent and student perceptions, which gives impressions of how these actors perceive transitions from Kindergarten into schools and reports how beneficial inclusion or how detrimental exclusion was for these people throughout their life course. According to the study, inclusion was generally favourable to the
lives of migrants throughout the schooling period and beyond, and suggests extended
effects to society at large (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 110, 12. May, 2000, Zurich). In a
further issue, a local bi-lingual German-Italian school is portrayed and experiences of
students presented: initiatives for similar projects are encouraged and the need for
financial resources emphasised (Tages Anzeiger Nr. 150, 30. June 2000).

Canton St. Gallen’s Daily Mail (St. Galler Tagblatt) focuses on the cultural aspect and
speaks of an increase in youth criminality and foreign youths possibly being a source
of this increase. Separate schooling is approved of and language acquisition is
stressed both for ‘immigrant’ children and parents, as central for integration. There is
a proposal for a type of official mediation authority (Anlaufstelle), provided by the
Canton (St. Galler Tagblatt, Nr. 26, 01.February, 2000).

The Fribourg newspapers ‘Le Temps’ and ‘La Liberté’ are distinctly different from
the German speaking newspapers in their tone in portraying the debate: the issues are
discussed in terms of personal views of students, parents and schools and details of
individual projects and provision are given. There is more reference to academic
opinions and research results. Moreover, articles are substantially longer than those in
the German speaking Canton papers. Integration as a concept is explained in detail
and the notion of ‘identity’ enters the discourse, unlike in the German Swiss
newspapers. There is a strong focus on community involvement in the discussion
around integration of ‘immigrant’ students into Swiss schools: articles describe the
support provided and assume a pro-integration attitude. Frequently, other Cantons are
referred to and contrasted with French Cantons in the debate. The German-French
division in how immigration or anti-immigration stances are adopted and subsequent
influences upon the system is mentioned, with the tendency for German speaking
Cantons to beg against integration and for separate school classes. The paper warns of
the danger that lies for society at large in such attitudes (Le Temps, Nr. 596, 28. Feb.
In 2001, the coverage involves the Cantons Basel, Lucerne, Berne, Zurich and Aargau all of which are German speaking Cantons. The ‘Basler Zeitung’ refers in a January issue to the increasing focus upon intercultural education, and comments that teacher training is involved in this. A survey of student teachers is presented, in which a large majority express the view that a multicultural school can be an asset, and that there is ‘much to be gained in terms of learning from one another’. Many student teachers were in favour of the supporting and retaining of cultures and languages of different pupils from diverse backgrounds. An SVP Executive Council member suggests development of mixed classes for ‘living and community reasons’, in order to avoid segregation in society and prevent Swiss families moving away from areas with high numbers of migrants. The acquisition of German is a central factor for him in terms of possible integration. An SP Executive council member retaliates by proposing that a change of attitudes in the face of ‘the cultural hybridism in West Europe’ is called for: in his opinion, ethnic origin should be considered secondary in the case of immigrants who respect the legal constitution of Swiss law. He proposes easier naturalization processes and attainment of citizenship, not merely for third generation ‘foreigners’, but also for the second generation. Both SVP and SP council members do not necessarily perceive the school as a medium for integration. However, both emphasize the necessity of acquiring the German language (Basler Zeitung, Nr. 7, 9. January 2001). A later issue of the same paper discusses the Fribourg study mentioned earlier and the reported prejudices against certain migrant groups, particularly students from the former Yugoslavia in Swiss schools. A great deal of descriptive demographic information is offered and a ‘strain’ upon classes is pointed out, despite ‘cultural richness’ occurring because of the presence of ‘immigrant’ students within the system. The heading and the gist of the article however highlight the ‘unused potential of multilinguism’; the lack of resources to develop this potential is criticized. Teachers are shown to be in need of relevant material. The language in the article speaks of the ‘immigrant problem’ (Basler Zeitung, Nr. 263, 10. Nov. 2001).

An issue of Lucerne’s ‘Neue Luzerner Zeitung’ continues the previous year’s discussion around the SVP motion to introduce a 50% minimum quota of Swiss students in Lucerne’s classrooms to bring about ‘improved integration of immigrant
students into the system’. The Cantonal Council rejects the proposal arguing that a higher percentage of Swiss students do not necessarily improve the quality of a class. The example of Germany and lack of improvement is pointed out. The paper then reports a debate about the idea of a quota. The debate covers actions already taken in relation to financial allocations and improving teacher training, as well as reducing class sizes and increasing special measures, and it is argued that these simply need time to take effect. However, this opinion is challenged by the argument that the existence of ‘special classes’ proves the point that the issue is not resolved (Neue Luzerner Zeitung, Nr. 13., 17. Jan, 2001).

An issue of Aargau’s newspaper ‘Aargauer Zeitung’ presents an interview with the teacher and head teacher of a secondary school in one of the districts of Aargau. They speak of different percentages of migrant students in different classes. In their opinion, the greater the diversity, the lower the potential for conflicts in their classrooms. They believe in a constructive approach and that ‘integration has been going on for the past twenty years’, but that nobody really speaks about it. The ‘problem’ from their point of view is that outside school, peer groups are usually divided by nationality and so young people do not have much interaction or exposure to other nationalities. ‘Nationalist’ students, who favour SVP politics do exist, they say, and there seems to be an underlying and subtle racism, which is never very explicit, and thus difficult to tackle actively or effectively. They speak about the setting up of a new ‘intercultural group’ within the school but express doubts about the impact of such a group, because teachers generally resist the additional burden in terms of integration work, which they are already doing in the classrooms. Moreover, the message may not be reaching the right people but rather those who already appear to have liberal attitudes. Both interviewees reject language problems as the cause of poor educational performances of migrant students; they think rather that there is a general decline in linguistic ability, in that slang and the use of broken sentences has become commonplace (Aargauer Zeitung, Nr. 15, 19. Jan. 2001).

The Zurich newspaper ‘Tages Anzeiger’ presents an article on academic and OECD studies as background for arguments against separation and the ‘special class system’. This is presented partly in an interview with a key local researcher in child psychology, language learning and special needs schooling. The article argues that
there is stigma attached to ‘special schooling’ and that teacher competence is reduced by the allocation of children to special classes. The academic suggests avenues for improvement such as QUIMS (Quality in Multicultural Schools: discussed in detail below), increased work with parents and within teacher training and teachers having more exposure to the cultural and ethnic backgrounds of students in their classrooms (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 118, 23. May 2001). A further issue illustrates an individual secondary school in Zurich, which attempts to ‘bridge cultural gaps’ and to generate understanding by having project weeks ‘to get to know your classmates’: teachers are interviewed about the results of these projects. They report a reduction in the potential for violence in the school; and that levels of violence are no higher in schools with large proportions of migrant pupils, such as theirs. It is their belief that their reputation is worse than the reality. One teacher declares a preference for teaching under-privileged students rather than ‘lost-rich’ children (verwahrlost) (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 225, 28. September 2001).

An issue of the Basler Zeitung reports that the Cantonal School Office has approved increased funding for translators to be employed in schools. This proposal was launched by the BUI (Directorate for Education, Environment and Integration) and the Coordinating/ion Office for Integration. The importance of having impartial externally employed translators is pointed out, in connection with discussions with parents, rather than the child him- or herself or relatives being used for translation purposes. The Swiss charity CARITAS has offered translators, to ‘avoid cultural misunderstandings’. The importance of acquiring the German language is pointed out. (Basler Zeitung, Nr. 263, 10. Nov. 2001).

2002 coverage

This coverage includes newspaper articles published in Zurich, Berne, Fribourg and Vaud. Fribourg and Vaud are both German and French speaking Cantons. An issue of Berne’s ‘Der Bund’ reports on a briefing of the Green Party of Switzerland; the main topic is that an increased number of students are being excluded because of language abilities. There is an effort to create schools with integrative measures as standard, rather than individual projects in various places. A child psychologist explains how separation or segregation for migrant children can cause long-lasting traumas, even
over generations, and adds that research shows that experiences of classrooms with mixed ethnicity show positive results for all children. There is generally no dispute over whether or not there should be ‘integration’, rather debate about how it should be achieved. It is pointed out that special classes are becoming the norm. It is also argued that the entire selective system within Switzerland itself needs to be changed rather than blaming teachers (Der Bund, Nr. 70, 2002). The ‘Tages Anzeiger’ covers a similar topic in a June issue. In response to SP appeals to redistribute ‘immigrant’ students more evenly across district schools; the schools concerned express strong opposition, with the argument that young children should not be forced to travel long distances to obtain education, and that this could cause emotional and psychological distress. Improvement in the districts and communities is suggested as an alternative and claimed to be already taking place in certain areas within Zurich (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 124, 1.June 2002).

An issue of a newsletter of the organisation VPOD (Union for Public Service in Zurich) outlines a survey dealing with allowing early and immediate schooling for children of Asylum Seekers in Switzerland. This survey reveals that French speaking cantons, and specifically Geneva, adheres to human rights principles in their Cantonal constitutional laws and accept the implications, whereas the German speaking Cantons do not include these rights and references in their respective constitutions. The differences in Cantonal practices are said to be reflected in the random or arbitrary allocation of migrant students into special or separate classes, denying (national) constitutional rights to equal treatment before the law and protection against discrimination. This survey was led by three organisations or projects; ‘Project Intercultural Education’ of the VPOD, the ‘Centre of Swiss-Immigrant Contact’ (CCSI) in Geneva and ‘Solidarity without Borders’ in Berne. Their appeal reflects more the human rights-oriented approach adopted by all public services sectors towards migrants (Der öffentliche Dienst VPOD, Newsletter, Nr. 17, 17. Oct. 2002). The topic of children without permanent residency being allowed to attend schools and their right to education is discussed in an issue of the Zurich ‘Tages Anzeiger’ which takes a similar approach as the article above and refers to the same survey (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 234, 9. Oct. 2002).
An individual school case study about three projects is presented in the ‘Freiburger Nachrichten’ in Fribourg: these projects are shown to have achieved positive results with respect to improving the general school atmosphere: ‘multiculturalism has been a part of school life for years’, states one teacher. The three ‘projects’ are the introduction of ‘German as a foreign language’ classes, specialist ‘assistance for foreign language children’, and a project called ‘Just Community’, in which school elections are held and whole school debates are organised. Children report feeling comfortable in this school and aggression is seen as a sign of puberty rather than characteristic of migrants. The head teacher comments that there is no golden rule for successfully dealing with an increasingly varied student body: ‘Every community has to find its own solution’ he states (Freiburger Nachrichten, Nr. 267, 19. Nov. 2002).

The Canton of Vaud’s ‘24 Heures’ has a feature on an intercultural mediator - the only person assigned this post within the Canton - originally Bosnian, who grew up in Switzerland and discusses her work. This mediator explains that many Bosnian children went through the Swiss school system after immigrating to Switzerland during the war in their country and returned recently to Bosnia. She conducted a life history study with thirty-five students, portraying their cross-cultural switching between two or more cultures. She explains the importance of local Swiss teachers learning to understand about what life or world their students come from and have returned or are returning to. The term identity is never directly used, but implicitly referenced in the discussion (24 Heures, Nr. 303, 31. Dec. 2002).

2003 coverage

Canton Aargau’s ‘Aargau Zeitung’ gives a detailed account of a local project launched by two teachers, who adapted a red-cross project initiated in Zurich to their community. The project ‘Mitten unter Euch’ (In your midst) aims directly at working ‘preventively’ in favour of the integration of immigrant children into the community. It involves host families who voluntarily accept migrant children for regular visits into their families, so that these children can get to know Swiss culture. There is clear policy that the responsibility for upbringing remains with the parents of the children and that the host families are not to exceed their roles. There is a clear reference to a
transfer of what is perceived as ‘Best practice’. The involvement of the whole community is highlighted (Aargauer Zeitung, Nr. 51, 3. March 2003).

An issue of the Tages Anzeiger (Zurich) with the heading ‘Racism will not be tolerated. Point blank.’ reports on schools in Zurich with a high percentage of migrant students who are achieving higher rates of access to secondary level A (which is required for entry to higher education) and vocational traineeships which are very hard to obtain in Switzerland. Teachers suggest that the reasons for these high access rates may be a healthy school climate based on open communication, and numerous out-of-school projects and activities that reinforce student interaction. The extraordinary efforts made by teachers for their individual students and their pro-student attitude are emphasised. The article refers to the general question of school performance and argues that socio-economic background may be the most important factor in school attainment, and that provision has to be made to tackle these issues rather than focusing on ethnicity. The closing sentence of this article is a statement made by a teacher: ‘Maybe the secret lies in the fact that we are not making a big deal of it (the immigration issue).’ (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 159, 12. July, 2003). A similar stance is adopted in an article in St. Gallens ‘Tagblatt’ (Daily News): a local community discusses increased aggression in schools in the context of immigrant students with the heading ‘slum creation in our community’. Although there is a heated debate on appropriate measures to be taken, and comments such as that migrants are bringing their children into Switzerland, who are ‘like plants in a pot, bursting out of it and taking roots here’, it is generally agreed that there is ‘no formula for successful integration’ but that it requires respect, humanity, commitment and the participation of the community, the state and the education sector (St. Galler Tagblatt, Nr. 276, 26. Nov. 2003).

2004 coverage

The ‘Schaffhauser Nachrichten’ of the Canton of Schaffhausen in central Switzerland reports on two large projects launched in a Schaffhausen school and in several schools in Zurich. The project in Schaffhausen is called ‘Multilingual Switzerland’ and takes account of the existence of diverse language backgrounds of students in Swiss classes. This specific school has German introductory lesson, alongside instruction in the
native language of the students. The aims of this project are to recognise the importance of reinforcing first language learning and of retaining cultural and linguistic particularities. The second project is QUIMS (Quality in Multicultural Schools) and the project director, a member of the Zurich School Directorate, is interviewed about the aims and implications of this project as adopted by schools. He explains that this is a government-funded project, which provides financial resources to schools which opt to work towards an ethnically diverse school culture. This involves building community links and developing special skills in integrative work for teachers, students and parents. Twenty one schools are currently involved in this project in Zurich and a recent report has shown positive results. The aim is also that of alleviating differences resulting from socio-economic background: ‘The only thing left is to establish this at a policy level’, the project leader states (Schaffhauser Nachrichten, Nr 181, 6. August, 2004). The St. Galler Tagblatt talks to some adults of immigrant origin in the Cantons of Thurgau and St. Gallen. They explain how crucial language and culture courses were for them, but even more the extra effort and support of teachers who encouraged them to reach their targets and aim for higher education. Italian migrants are identified in this article as more easily integrated because of support from the Italian government for special first language and home culture classes in immigrant host countries. Other immigrant groups, such as the former Yugoslavians do not have this kind of support and its need is stressed (St. Galler Tagblatt, Nr. 175, 29. July, 2004).

2005 coverage

‘Tages Anzeiger’ (Zurich), in an August issue with the title ‘Multinational classes are not barrels of explosive’ explores the role of education and school. Despite an international trend towards Maths, Science and Languages, it argues, school is about more than this, including identity development. A Fribourg Swiss National Fund Study involving 2000 pupils is discussed, the objective of which is to uncover pupil perceptions in the light of migration and immigration. A majority of the participants perceived immigration into the country and having immigrant peers or multi-ethnic schools as a positive experience. This experience was shown to have contributed to a definite change towards more open attitudes and perception of people and
surroundings. This article argues that migration is no longer a ‘problem’, but rather the ‘normality’ of daily Swiss life (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 194, 22. August 2005). A further issue in September reports on an SVP motion of introducing German language examinations for migrant students on transition from special classes to regular classes. This motion was ‘overwhelmingly’ rejected with a reminder to other council members of what the concept of ‘integration’ means and of having committed to it. This motion was seen to be clearly going against human rights and fair chances (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 209, 8. September, 2005).

2006 coverage

Articles taken from this year include newspapers from the Cantons of Zurich, St. Gallen and Lucerne. The ‘St. Galler Tagblatt’ (St. Gallen Daily News) published an article with the title ‘nearly half of the number of our students is foreign-language speaking’. It reports on an even higher increase in migrant students in Kindergarten than in previous years, but states that there is no reason for pessimism. Addressing the issue is not primarily to do with these children learning German, the article elaborates, but rather concerns the education background of the parents and their attitudes to education, or the connection between the two (Bildungsnähe/ Bildungsferne, translated literally as Proximity to Education/ Distance from Education, used as an indicator) (St. Galler Tagblatt, Nr. 39, 16. Feb. 2006).

Two articles printed in two different newspapers in Zurich illustrate the importance of ‘recognition of multilinguism or the first language’ of students in Swiss schools. The right-centred ‘Neue Zürcher Zeitung’ (NZZ) reports on schools in Hamburg which have adopted an immersion approach and have bilingual classes focusing not only on German acquisition, but also on learning another language in the same class. This approach has established itself in several schools in Hamburg, and seems to have shown very positive results. The article expresses amazement that this model has not been adopted in other European countries, but raises the issue of financial resources to pay the second language teachers employed for these classes. In the Hamburg example, the countries of origin of the migrants are covering most of the costs of teachers’ salaries (NZZ, Nr. 10, 5. March 2006). A smaller local Zurich weekly newspaper ‘Der Zürcher Unterländer’ argues for the recognition of the profession of
DaZ teachers, or teachers of German as a second language: the article gives examples of teachers working with bi- or multi-lingual students. The importance of individualized teaching is highlighted (Der Zürcher Unterländer, Nr. 247. 24. Oct. 2006).

The ‘Neue Luzerner Zeitung’ (Lucerne) contains an interview with a senior school developer about his view on ‘integrative forms of schooling’: separation, he states, is the actual ‘problem’ or ‘issue’ within Swiss schools and not the difficulty of integration. In his opinion, students should be individually evaluated: the separation of groups of students is not the solution. PISA results have changed his perception of first language learning for students, which he now sees as a crucial step towards improvement of the second language. The central question according to him is ‘What do we want to achieve with our Volksschule (People’s school)?’ ‘Do we want an elite school or should a public or people’s school be exactly that; for all children equally’. He mentions that the public should not be misled by SVP anti-immigrant slogans. (Neue Luzerner Zeitung, Nr. 68, 22. March, 2006).

5.3. The development of migration policy in Switzerland

This part of the chapter gives an overview of the evolution of migration policy in Switzerland over the past thirty years in relation to economic developments. A historical account of migration in Europe is outlined in Chapter 3 and models and concepts of citizenship and political membership are discussed. This section links specific economic developments with the development of legal frameworks for ‘integration’ discussed in section 5.4, and thus adopts a more holistic approach to analysing ‘integration’ discourse. With the development of post-war migration into Western Europe, as discussed in Chapter 3, since the 1970s there has been a continuous increase in migration into Switzerland. This increase, accompanied by economically-driven migration policy, may have resulted in anxiety about ‘national identity’, and fear of its disintegration (Liebig, 2002). To understand this anxiety, it is important to identify the underlying principles behind particular policy choices made in Switzerland in this period. The development of the Swiss economy has been
influenced strongly by the immigration of foreign workers (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999).

Apart from the recession years from 1975 to 1979 and 1983, growth in migrant population rates persisted and reached 19% in 1994. Since 1996 the annual rate of rate has slowed; however, the permanent resident migrant population (in German ‘ausländische’, literal translation ‘foreign’) reached 1,541,600 towards the end of 2005, which corresponds to a fifth of the entire population in Switzerland (Wolter, 2006:31). According to the Federal Statistical Office, the permanent migrant resident population includes all ‘foreigners, who reside in Switzerland for at least one year without interruption regardless of the type of permit they hold’ (see permit descriptions Appendix 1): these permits allow holders to be active in the labour market, however some restrict mobility (Gross, 2006:5). Immigration is thus controlled in Switzerland by the system of authorisation which provides labour permits for four types of workers: the permanent permit, the annual permit, the seasonal permit and the frontier or cross-border permit (Flückiger, 1998) (see Appendix). Being born in Switzerland does not entitle a person to Swiss citizenship; therefore statistics on migrant or ‘foreign’ residents include second and third generation migrants. Wolter (2006:31) explains that the composition of the migrant population has changed throughout the different migration surges. The first wave of migrants came mainly from the industrialised north of Italy and those workers were relatively skilled. The high level of migration, which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century from the neighbouring countries steadily decreased, whereas migration from geographically distant areas increased. Between 1970 and 1990, the majority of the inflow was from the EU/EFTA countries, but their share declined steadily from 78.7% in 1970, to only 54.7% in 1990 (Gross, 2006:43). Piguet (2005) reports that the proportion of French and German migrants hardly changed between 1970 and 1990, whereas the number of migrants from Italy and Spain declined steadily. In 1990, migrants came increasingly from Portugal and from outside the EU/EFTA in particular Eastern Europe, Asia and South and Central America. Also migration from North America reduced to 2.8% from a peak of 7.1% in 1975. The largest recent migration inflow in the 1990s was primarily from the former Yugoslavian countries. Today this group constitutes nearly a quarter of the entire migrant population (Wolter, 2006:31). According to Flückiger (2001), as the first
wave of migrants were relatively skilled, the increased influx of migrants from economically less developed regions of Europe led to a decline in the skill level of migrant workers: according to a 1990 census, 47.5% of the migrant workforce had an education level limited to compulsory schooling.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of migrants for some regions of origin
(See countries represented in columns ascending as given from left to right below)

According to Piguet (2004: 59) there are roughly three ways in which the migrant population has increased in Switzerland: with new entries, with the conversions of seasonal (workers) permits into longer-term permits, and through births from migrant parents (see below). Decreases, on the other hand, occur as a result of leaving Switzerland, naturalizations, adoptions and deaths. Piguet (2004) states that the largest category in the inflow is the new migrants’ category (excluding the conversion of seasonal workers), which represents approximately 80%, the motives for which are set out below and elaborated in Appendix 3:

- Permits for people coming to Switzerland through family reunion; meaning families of workers, with one-year or establishment permits, who are not under quota and reduced period for family reunion.
• Political crisis in the world (Lebanon, Turkey, Sri Lanka, and former Yugoslavia) increase the number of permits allocated for humanitarian reasons;
• The other motives category increases in 1990s: students, accepted refugees, independently wealthy foreigners;
• While new seasonal permits are restricted by quota, the number of conversions of seasonal permits into longer-term permits is not.

(Piguet, 2004: 59).

According to Straubhaar and Golder (1999), with respect to migration policy, the historical experience of migration to Switzerland can be subdivided into three main periods. The first lasted until 1963 and was characterized by a liberal admission policy, with the exception of the time from 1914 to 1945. The second period began in 1963, when the Swiss government introduced restrictions on the admission of migrants, and the third period began in 1991, when an admission policy based on considerations of country of origin was introduced (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999). The authors point out that a distinctive feature of Swiss migration policy is that it was and remains today largely dominated by economic interests, mainly labour market considerations. However, there is a tension between these economic needs and political pressures from sectors of the public (Gross, 2006). These pressures took the form of popular initiatives, a political instrument of direct democracy in Switzerland where Swiss citizens can secure a vote, if a required number of signatures are collected. Table 5.2 summarizes a number of initiatives proposed by citizens that aimed to force the government to curb the continual growth in migration. These initiatives were however largely rejected when brought forward for public vote (Gross, 2006:12).
Table 5.2 List of proposed initiatives concerning immigration put to vote in Switzerland since 1968 and their outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of popular vote</th>
<th>Result (% popular votes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiatives to limit foreign population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Initiative against the establishment of foreigners.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Retired March 20, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Initiative against foreign ascendency.</td>
<td>June 7, 1970</td>
<td>Rejected (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Initiative against foreign overpopulation of Switzerland.</td>
<td>October 20, 1974</td>
<td>Rejected (65.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Initiative for the protection of Switzerland.</td>
<td>March 13, 1977</td>
<td>Rejected (70.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Initiative to limit the annual number of naturalizations.</td>
<td>March 13, 1977</td>
<td>Rejected (66.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Initiative to limit immigration.</td>
<td>December 4, 1988</td>
<td>Rejected (67.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Initiative to regulate immigration.</td>
<td>September 24, 2300</td>
<td>Rejected (63.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiative in favor of foreigners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Initiative &quot;standing by&quot; in favor of a new policy toward foreigners.</td>
<td>April 5, 1981</td>
<td>Rejected (83.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Piguet (2004), Annex pp 141-143.

The beginning of the industrialisation process in the middle of the 19th century created a significant demand for migrant workers in Switzerland; this requirement led to a liberal admission policy until the outbreak of World War I. A restrictive migration policy was introduced, which lasted until the end of World War II (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999). The favourable economic conditions and the fast recovery after WWII led to shortages in the Swiss labour market, which in turn induced a substantial demand for migrant workers. Once again, a liberalisation of admission policy was processed to meet the expanding labour demand, which increased the number of migrants living in Switzerland from 285,000 in 1950 to 585,000 in 1960, which, according to Straubhaar and Golder (1999) corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 7.4% of the migrant resident population. These changes to migration policy are processed at the federal government level, which was enabled from 1925 as an authority to pass laws on migration, and led to the 1931 Federal Law of Abode and Settlement (ANAG), which still forms the basis of Swiss migration policy today, with substantial modifications over time (Piguet, 2004).

As Straubhaar and Golder (1999) point out, the inflationary pressures of the growing Swiss economy as well as the growing percentage of migrants increased demands to control the influx of new migrants towards the end of the 1950s. For the first time after WWII, the Swiss federal government introduced regulations to curb and control the influx of new migrant workers by imposing ceilings: a general ceiling on Swiss...
and Migrant workers for all firms for the 1962 employment level and for 97 per cent of the 1964 level. However, this initial measure was not effective because the ceiling did not cover firms which did not employ migrant workers at that time. As a result, Swiss workers moved to the expanding and uncontrolled service sector, leaving their positions to be filled by migrant workers. There was a growth in the migrant population from 1960s through to the 1970s from approximately 11% to 17% (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999:3). The federal government reacted by introducing a ‘double ceiling’ in 1965, one which applied to total employment as before and the other limiting the number of migrant workers employed, which included cross-border workers (Flückiger, 1998). As Flückiger (1998) explains, this measure and the following linear reductions of the quotas ascribed to firms in the years 1966, 1967 and 1969, did reduce the foreign labour force. The general ceiling was however finally abolished in 1968, and there was a rise in total employment in the previous years. In 1970, the Swiss government introduced a migration quota system, which involved an annual maximum number of admittances for each residence category (excluding residence permits and commuter or frontier permits) (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999). The new aim was to control the entire immigrant population rather than only focussing on stabilisation of the labour force; Flückiger (1998) maintains that the more recent regulation dating from 1986 (which has been modified substantially since 2006) does not depart from this rationale and outlines these three objectives for Swiss migration policy:

a) Maintaining a balance between the Swiss population and the Migrant population;

b) Improving the structure of the labour market and ensuring employment equilibrium, and

c) Creating the right conditions for the integration of migrants and residents.


Moreover, the underlying assumption that foreigners come to Switzerland to earn money and then leave (the rotation principle, see Chapter 2) is still prevalent and consequently there is limited if no consideration of ‘integration’ policies from the 1970s through to the 1990s. The late 1980s were a period of economic growth and migrant workers are required to fill the deficit again; hence the quotas were raised.
There is a growing conflict between the two goals of Swiss migration policy and new external developments limit the government’s capacity to take action. There are ongoing debates on Switzerland’s position with respect to the EU and whether it should join the European Economic Area (EEA), the heart of the debate being free mobility (Gross, 2006) and reform of the Swiss migration policy. As Straubhaar and Golder (1999) elaborate, three arguments can be identified in favour of reform: that the regulations introduced did not take into account the needs of the Swiss labour market for qualified labour, leading to a disparity between labour demand and supply. This is due to the fact that the large majority of long term migrant residents in Switzerland entered as seasonal workers, who are largely low-skilled and have contributed to an over-sized industrial sector, and a high proportion of unemployed migrants. The second argument is that there is increasing international migration pressure on Western host countries, because of tensions in the Balkans, but also the opening of Eastern European borders and the demographic developments in the Near East and Northern Africa (Piguet, 2004). Moreover, the Swiss reluctance to join the European Economic Area in the 1990s had led to an ‘outsider’ role for Switzerland in the integration process in Europe, which resulted in disadvantage to the Swiss economy with respect to its European competitors and lesser attraction for high-skilled European workers to migrate to Switzerland (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999:5).

In 1990, in view of these considerations, the Swiss government launched the ‘three-circle model’, which anticipates free mobility with EU countries. This model, in contrast to the earlier measures, outlines three layers of admission according to geographical-political areas: the first circle involves complete freedom of movement with member countries of the European Economic Area. The second circle includes other countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with limited recruitment of migrant workers. The third circle implies that there should be no recruitment of migrant workers from all other countries (Gross, 2006:21). In 1999, a report was approved by the government to alter the approach to a two-circle model, in which the second and third circles of the previous model have been merged to a point system in which new migrants are screened in combination with an overall migration quota for all other countries other than the EEA (Straubhaar and Golder, 1999). Gross (2006) maintains that this alteration reflects racist discrimination towards non-EEA and other countries in the third circle, although Switzerland signed the International Convention against Racist Discrimination in 1992. Seasonal permits
are progressively eliminated and the quotas for annual permits are raised (Piguet, 2004). However, political reality may still apply the rationale of the three-circle-model today, although it ceased to be valid since 1998, given that the access to permanent residence, a work permit and to nationality is easier or more difficult depending on the ethnic and national background of the applicant (Spescha, 1999:68-69; quoted in Oser and Biedermann, 2003:101).

Table 5.3 Popular votes on legislation or agreements related to Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of popular vote</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New legislation on Immigration and International agreements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Revision of the LSEE* from 1931.</td>
<td>June 6, 1982</td>
<td>Rejected (50.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Amendments to the LSEE*.</td>
<td>June 20, 1986</td>
<td>Accepted (65.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Federal order on membership in the European Economic Area.</td>
<td>December 5, 1992</td>
<td>Rejected (50.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bilateral agreement with European Union</td>
<td>May 21, 2000</td>
<td>Accepted (67.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislation on naturalization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Project in favor of an easier naturalization process for young foreigners.</td>
<td>December 4, 1983</td>
<td>Rejected (55.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal order for a revision of the constitutional legislation on naturalizations.</td>
<td>December 4, 1983</td>
<td>Accepted (60.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Federal order for a revision of the constitutional legislation on the naturalizations of young foreigners.</td>
<td>June 12, 1994</td>
<td>Rejected by a majority of cantons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Federal order on easier naturalization process for 2nd generation young foreigners</td>
<td>September 26, 2001</td>
<td>Rejected (56.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Federal order on the acquisition of nationality for 3rd generation foreigners</td>
<td>September 26, 2004</td>
<td>Rejected (51.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* LSEE = Loi fédérale sur le Séjour et l’Enlaisement des Etrangers.

Questions arise as to whether these measures and approaches to Swiss migration policy are a success or failure, both in economic terms and with respect to societal pressures and perceptions. The continual formulation of popular initiatives (albeit almost none of which succeed), as shown in Table 5.3, raises the probability that over the thirty years between 1970 and 2000, there seems to be some level of dissatisfaction on the part of the Swiss public with the results of the migration policy.

Economically, Flückiger (1998) suggests that the inflow of migrant workers helped the Swiss economy to overcome a shortage of manpower and sustained economic growth. However, he elaborates, the channelling of the immigrants into distinctive sectors of the labour markets has contributed to the preservation of economic structures and delayed technical adaptations. As for regulating the migrant population rate within the country, tight control has not been achieved, but the quotas have been binding (Flückiger, 1998). The miscalculation of the rotation principle, which suggested that the majority of seasonal workers would return to their respective home
countries after earning some capital in Switzerland, was largely overruled by the way in which the permit progression is structured. Permit holders graduate from short to longer permits with time, and this feature, according to Gross (2006) introduces an ‘independent dynamics in the evolution of the structure of permit categories, which has not been taken into account by the quota policy’ (Gross, 2006:25). Furthermore, the outflow did not evolve as the Swiss authorities expected. This also contributed to migrant population growth. Even the economic slowdown of the 1990s did not affect a return to countries of origin, because of compulsory pension schemes and unemployment insurance, and also because recession periods in some countries of origin fell at the same time as Switzerland, which represented still a better economic situation for these migrant workers (Gross, 2006:35). An important factor for the recording of a large migrant population is that Switzerland remains one of the OECD countries with the lowest rates in naturalizations, which are severely constrained by rigorous administrative requirements, subjective evaluation and high cost with no guarantees of positive results. The reasons for this restrictive administrative process is that naturalization in Switzerland is coupled with acquiring citizenship from the municipality and the canton of residence (having different requirements of time of residence and costs), involving therefore three political levels in the whole process (Piguet, 2004).

According to Liebig (2006), in May 2000, the agreement on free mobility with EU15 and the 3 EFTA countries was approved by popular vote, which lifts restrictions progressively until 2007. Most economic needs are expected to be accommodated by EU/EFTA workers and comprehensive legislation is being drafted for citizens from other countries based on skill evaluation or the point system. Asylum policy is revised simultaneously and integration policies are eventually developed for all migrants, refugees, workers and their families alike. What this integration policy or movement towards a more comprehensive approach with respect to migration involves and implies will be focussed upon in the next part of this chapter.
5.4 The concept of `Integration` according to Federal Policy

In view of the examples of media coverage and the economic and political agenda and discourse, which developed over the last few years around the rising numbers of migrants in the country, there seems to be a lingering uncertainty as to what integration involves. Although government, both federal and cantonal, have more recently outlined a relatively specific legal framework (which is being revised at the time of writing) with respect to the ‘integration’ of migrants, the more complex societal outlook on this concept remains veiled and disputed. According to the vice president of the Federal Commission for Foreigners (Eidgenössische Kommission für Ausländer, EKA), ‘questions of integration appear on the political agenda, when the economy is generally running well, and when it has become clear to everyone, that it cannot be done without immigrants’ (Schmid, 2005:1). He suggests that this manifested itself in the year 2000, when the Swiss parliament finally managed to acknowledge integration as a state duty after what he describes as ‘decades of denial’ (Schmid, EKA, 2005:1). ‘Not simply a flourishing economy forces the topic of integration to be faced up to’, he states ‘but demographic perspectives’ (Schmid, EKA, 2005:1). The notion of integration has developed from being a politically disputed incentive adopted by left-wing Swiss parties in their stance towards migration into the country, into a commonly used term for a phenomenon faced by migrants wanting to settle in Switzerland today. Considering the media coverage - portrayed at the beginning of this chapter, there seems to be little dispute at present, over whether migrants should indeed be integrated into Swiss society or Swiss systems and institutions. According to Simone Pro dolliet (2006), the current director of the EKA office, the presence of migrants has sparked off a heated debate among the different political parties in Switzerland about the most appropriate way of handling this situation (see also chapter 3). While the Swiss People’s Party (right wing) demands ‘clear rules for everyone with no exceptions’, the Christian Democratic People’s Party focus on ‘the right to choice of denomination and identity’. The Free Democratic Party proposes a legal framework for integration in view of the realisation of an ‘open and successful Switzerland’, and the Social Democratic Party (left wing) set up an ‘integration offensive’ in favour of integration.
(Prodolliet, 2006:1). Therefore, the extent of integration and the understanding of the term remain persistently varied, as public and political discourse reveal. In terms of conceptual development, Swiss society has attempted to move away from approaches that are more traditional to a multicultural society, such as assimilation and segregation or separation. According to Berry et al. (1992) assimilation means a culturalisation process, in which a minority gives up the own culture entirely in favour of the majority culture. Segregation or separation intends to reduce the interaction with other cultural groups as far as possible and to withdraw from their influence. Integration on the other hand, which can be considered as the contemporary solution Swiss migration policy opts for, signifies that majority and minority groups retain aspects of their respective cultures and take up new elements of the other cultural groups at the same time. The outcome intended by integration is a common cultural framework while retaining essential differences (Berry et al. 1992; quoted in Oser and Biedermann, 2003:102). There is no doubt that this concept has gained ground and been recognized by state and the federal government as one of its key aspects and measures to be adopted in the debate around migration roughly since the turn of the century. This changed perception in contrast to the preceding years occurred, as Prodolliet (2006) suggests, because many social problems are linked in the debate to an alleged integration deficit of the migrant population. She points out however, that it is important to identify the secondary role of the country of origin in this problematisation and to focus instead on the socio-economic background of these migrants.

As discussed previously, the concept of integration had not found its way into legislation or even political rhetoric until recently, because of the economic rationale of temporary migration and the underlying assumptions related to the rotation principle (see Chapter 2, also Straubhaar and Fisher, 1994:134; in Gross, 2006:12). Faced with the undeniable reality of a migrant society, more recently, the concept has been incorporated into legal articles of federal law, with distinct guidelines as to the addressees of these regulations. In December 2005 a new federal legislation on ‘foreigners’ (the literal translation from Ausländer und Ausländerinnen) was passed and is being modified in 2009. This replaced the older ANAG legislation (see previous section) and encompasses regulation on migration into and out of the country, stay or residence, family reunion (Familiennachzug) and the encouragement
or advancement (Förderung) of integration of migrants (Federal Law on Foreigners: Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer, AuG, 16. December, 2005). A legal definition is given as to what constitutes ‘integration’ in the article 4 of this legislation:

Art. 4 Integration

1 The aim of integration is the cohabitation (living together) of the local and foreign population based on the principle of values of the federal constitution and mutual respect and tolerance.

2 Integration should enable long-term and rightfully present foreigners to partake in the economic, social and cultural life of society.

3 Integration requires both the respective willingness (volition) of the foreigners as well as the openness of the Swiss population.

4 It is required that the foreigners deal with or bear with the societal circumstances and the living conditions of Switzerland and particularly learn the language of the country.


The terminology used in this article is of crucial importance to understand the discursive rationale behind what is perceived and portrayed by the federal government as ‘integration’. The use of terms and expressions such as ‘foreigners’, ‘long-term and rightfully present’, the ‘requirement of openness from the Swiss population’ and ‘the willingness of the foreigners to integrate’, and ‘to bear with the societal circumstances’, throws some light on how migrants are perceived and presented. This involves what is expected of them, what distinctions are being made between migrants and what is deemed the ‘Swiss or local population’. An attempt at analysis is
made in the subsequent part of this chapter looking at both media and legal vernacular.

Swiss federal law is further elaborated on through decrees issued by the federal government, which are to be taken into consideration by the federal authorities, cantons, institutions, organisations and public alike. One such decree was passed on the Integration of Foreigners (Verordnung über die Integration von Ausländerinnen und Ausländer, 13. September 2000), which is currently under revision and is effective in full, along with the new federal law mentioned above, from 2008 (Press release, Federal Department of Justice and Police, 28.03.2007). The decree determines in its wording: ‘the principles and aims of integration of foreigners and their contribution to integration’ on the one hand. On the other it: ‘regulates the assignments or measures of the Federal Office for Migration (Bundesamt für Migration, BFM) in the area of integration and the assignments or measures and organisation of the Federal Commission on Foreigners’ (Eidgenössische Ausländerkommission, EKA). Article 2 of this decree specifies what aims integration involves and what this implies practically for the addressees;

Art. 2 Grundsätze und Ziele
(Art. 4 und 53 AuG)

1 Ziel der Integration ist die chancengleiche Teilhabe der Ausländerinnen und Ausländern an der schweizerischen Gesellschaft.

2 Die Integration ist eine Querschnittsaufgabe, welche die eidgenössischen, kantonalen und kommunalen Behörden zusammen mit den nichtstaatlichen Organisationen, einschließlich den Sozialpartnern und den Ausländerorganisationen, wahrzunehmen haben.

3 Sie hat in erster Linie über die Regelstrukturen zu erfolgen, namentlich über die Schule, die Berufsbildung, die Arbeitswelt sowie die Institutionen der sozialen Sicherheit und des Gesundheitswesens. Sondermassnahmen für Ausländerinnen und Ausländer sind nur im Sinne einer ergänzenden Unterstützung anzubieten.

1 The aim of Integration is the equitable (equal chances for) participation of foreigners in the Swiss society.

2 Integration is a cross-sectional (cross-cutting) assignment or measure, which has to be taken into account by federal, cantonal and municipal authorities together with the nongovernmental organisations, including the social partners and the organisations of foreigners.
3 It (integration) has to be carried out primarily by the regular structures, namely the school, the occupational or vocational training, the work environment, as well as the institutions of social security and health care. Special measures for foreigners are only to be offered in the sense of a subsidiary support.


The implementation of equal opportunities for migrants is one of the key features in what is deemed the intended outcomes of the integration framework and is allocated for continual indicator measurement (i.e. same employment figures for both Swiss and Migrants) to the Federal Office for Migration (BFM). The decree elaborates that the intention of successful integration (as in the articles above) is to be taken into consideration ‘in measure’ by authorities dealing with residential permits and the granting of stay, work, and family reunion permits. For an early grant of permit of residence, the successful acquisition of the language of the region is to be assessed (Art. 3). Specifications of how this is to occur and also the contribution of the migrants or ‘foreigners’ constitute the further articles of the decree.

A recent press release of March 2007 of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (EJPD), which is responsible for Migration and Integration issues in Switzerland, summarizes the aims for revision and improvement of the legal regulations around migration and ‘foreigners’. This was processed and put into use in 2008. An improved integration of people intending to remain in Switzerland, the abatement of misuse in Asylum seeking into the country, the lowering of attraction of Switzerland for Asylum-seekers who have not been approved and discharged and the restructuring of the financial subsidies for cantons in the area of Asylum are listed. According to the press release, Switzerland will practice ‘responsible migrant and asylum politics with consistent implementation of these laws and decrees’ (Press release: Medienmitteilungen, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizei Department EJPD, 28.03.2007).

As an important body in the area of migration concerns, the Federal Commission on Foreigners (EKA) was founded as an expert commission of the Federal Council in 1970 and assigned to the Federal Department of Justice and Police (EJPD) as a
commission outside of the parliament, whose members are elected by the Federal Council. Half of the thirty-headed commission members are migrants, according to the commission regulations, and one of three presidents is also of migrant origin. As set out in their website introduction, the commission engages in questions of social, economic, cultural, political, demographic and legal nature, with respect to the cohabitation of Swiss and Migrant population. They take positions on or comment about questions relating to migration and consult with the Federal Council with regard to integration policy. For ten years, the commission was assigned by the Federal Council the task of making propositions for a new outlook on migration politics; they highlight the importance of ensuring integration politics, which are in the interest of the resident immigrant population. They reinforce the idea that Switzerland should naturalize immigrants who feel close to local institutions, to encourage their participation in public life, and to enhance so called ‘citizen dialogue’ (Bürgergespräch) (Rey-von Allmen, 1998; quoted in Reichenbach and Oser, 1998:172). Furthermore, the federal state has committed itself to eradicate racism and to the promotion of human rights (Amarelle, 2005).

Since 2001, Switzerland has a financial measure called the ‘integration credit’, with which projects with different integrative foci are financially assisted. This credit is administered by the EKA, who inspects and evaluates project proposals and advances the proposals to the Federal office for Migration (BFM) for final evaluation. The EKA also voices its role as an informant to migrants, on the one hand, about life in Switzerland, and to the Swiss population on the other about the requirements and situation of the migrants. Several guidelines have been issued by the EKA, which refer directly to the process or concept of integration, both as specified by the commission itself, and by federal law and what this constitutes and implies. At an EKA conference in November 2006, the vice president of the commission, Dr. Walter Schmid, denotes what integration means according to the understanding of the EKA (literal translation):

‘Integration is a continual process, which affects all people in our society and requires the willingness of everybody, to engage in this process. Integration requires equality and equal opportunity, comprises possibilities of participation and of the constructive contention with conflicts. With respect to the integration of migrants, this means, that both the immigrants have to endeavour to integrate into the Swiss society, as well as the locals have to be
disposed to practice of openness, respect and acceptance towards the immigrants.’ (Schmid, 16.November 2006, Nationale Tagung der Eidgenössischen Ausländerkommission, p.5/12)

Interestingly, the choice of words here used by the EKA to refer to migrants is not ‘foreigners’ as encountered in federal legal idioms, but expressly ‘migrants’ or ‘immigrants’. This may reflect the varied ideologies with respect to how migrants are portrayed by media on the one hand, government law on the other, in contrast to organisations consisting of experts assigned to migration and integration per se. According to Prodolliet (2006), the current president of EKA, the federal policy differentiates ‘three pillars of integration politics’. Structural integration, via institutions such as education and further education, social security, health care etc., political integration, which can be ensured by possibility of political participation, such as electoral and voting rights and naturalization, and social and cultural integration, which apply primarily to everyday and recreational life (Prodolliet, 2006:3). However, integration is increasingly being structured into a decentralised implementation by respective cantons, with specific office allocations devoted to integration measures. Prodolliet (2006) concludes that this has led to a multiplication in integrative efforts, as the cantons have for their part launched similar ventures to support this approach on cantonal level.

Based on the ‘Diversity-Management’ approach, introduced in the USA in the 1990s, the EKA issued guidelines titled ‘Opening of the Institutions’ (Öffnung der Institutionen, 2005). This approach tries to reconcile equity with national economic considerations, based on the principle of taking heterogeneity as an asset towards high performance, rather than seeing it as a deficit - as might be the case with New Public Management. Bearing this approach in mind, the EKA gives suggestions (as subsidiary measures to the federal law on migration and integration) on changing institutional outlooks and workforce policy towards migrants and generally the whole population in the areas of basic, further, vocational education and the employment sector.

The other significant authority for issues around migration is the Federal Office for Migration (Bundesamt für Migration, BFM). A speech by Dr. Edward Gnesa, the director of BFM, throws much light on the political rhetoric around Swiss integration politics, and compares Switzerland to other European countries and places the debate
distinctly within the wider framework of European integration politics. In his speech, Gnesa (September, 2006) specifies the particularities of the Swiss case in a European comparison; According to his wording:

‘Switzerland is constituted by an elaborate federalism, which allocates competences in the integration framework to all three levels (Municipality, Canton, Federation), within each of which political decisions are linked recursively to direct-democratic decisions. Moreover, Switzerland shows to being one of the most liberal labour markets of the OECD. The unemployment levels are traditionally very low. In comparison to other countries, there is a high level of heterogeneity of political identity and culture on the small geographical area which is Switzerland. Our nation also has established a sovereign sense of lingocultural identities, around which the constitutional nation Switzerland has only established a relatively loose-symbolic parenthesis. Demographic distribution shows the agglomeration of social grouping (poor, aged, migrant etc.) in most cities and regions, rather than being distributed in specific regions only. Finally, Switzerland does not have a colonial past. The motor for immigration during the post-war period was primarily the demand for labour force, which issued bilateral agreements with emigrant states. This bilateral path with respect to the EU constitutes the key framework of the migration – and therefore also the integration politics of Switzerland today.’ (Edward Gnesa, 4. September, 2006, representative speech of BFM at ‘Days for Rights to Migration’)

He proceeds with a description of elements of Swiss integration politics, such as the necessity of time for the development of a broadly defined policy in light of the reasons given above and that despite the somewhat rigid framework set by various considerations (and evolved from legislation dating as far back as 1931), milestones have been established relatively quickly for integration policy during the last few years (Gnesa, 2006).

5.5 The rationale behind the Swiss vernacular in media and policy discourse on migration

‘Individual privacy, reduced state and a global market stand in a triangular relation towards each other, in the centre of which the education system has taken over the decisive allocation- and mediating function. […] The growing plurality of the knowledge society brings with it, that these environments (Milieu) increasingly exist alongside each other. What is perceived today as a new environment of migrant groups is only a particular expression of what has persisted as a common structural feature of society.’ (Hormel and Scherr, 2004:11)
The contemporary discourse on migration in Switzerland today seems to be permeated with tensions of trying to reconcile this plurality of environments, which Hormel and Scherr (2004) identify. On the one hand, strong cultural traditions rooted in a highly devolved Cantonal structure may render a common or national conceptualization of migration or integration challenging and nearly impossible, let alone attempted governance in this area. The reason for this challenge may lie in the very notion of identity within Switzerland itself, which has deeply embedded linguistic-cultural differences of regions, long-standing political divisions between these regions and the respected sovereignty of Cantons in the practical implementation of federal law. Migration, as suggested by the authors of the quotation above, although continually perceived as an alien and uncontrolled configuration engendered by economic incentives, globalisation and interdependencies, could however, shed light on the long-standing fragility of Swiss identity. This may partly account for the ambiguity and indistinctness of how integration or even migration and migrants themselves are understood, perceived and debated in Swiss society, media, federal and cantonal government and institutions, raising awareness of the much contested and veiled Swiss notion of identity and nationality. The media vernacular, though very varied depending on Cantons and regions, reflects in recent years a common lingering uncertainty and questioning approach as to what constitutes a successful pluralistic society, mirrored or potentially ‘created’ in the education system depending on the perception of the role of education. Schools are clearly seen as one of the areas where integration should occur (Prodolliet, 2006:3), potentially representing both a learning platform for local language and ‘culture’, but also preparing students for work. The debate around this potential ‘preparatory’ function of school connected to the idea of ‘integrating foreigners’ into local society and culture, apparently clashes with the more democratic ideas of retaining cultural identities of origin alongside the Swiss host culture, and getting rid of the notion of ‘immigrant’ versus ‘host’ altogether and rather speaking of the dynamics of a pluralistic society, or of cosmopolitan citizenship (see Benhabib, 2004: chapter 2). The sensitivity and complexity of what role education plays in the migration discourse is enhanced by the economic and social justice background to the debate. Equity, performance and discrimination suddenly emerged as key determinants and international standards, indicators and comparisons weave a more intricate web of accountability and awareness of the position of migrants in Swiss systems of
education and employment. Until recently, the goal of migration policy was largely to stabilize the level of the foreign resident population while not denying employers a source of foreign workers (Gross, 2006: 51). As we have seen, according to economic analysts (see Gross, 2006; also Straubhaar and Golder, 1999; Flückiger, 1998), until 2002, the federal government relied on two instruments: quotas on the inflow of new worker permits and the rotation principle, which assumes that individuals see migration as temporary. This economic outlook on migration and the large group of migrant workers and their successive family reunions in Switzerland may have fuelled the persisting public notion of ‘guests’ or ‘visitors’ to the country, who would leave eventually. In 2002, as indicated above, the policy was changed to the initial stages of implementing free mobility with EU/EFTA to alleviate the skill structure of migrants and satisfy employers (Gross, 2006). These national priorities, subsequent incentives, and the growing number of migrants may have added to the consternation of nationalists, political and public perception on migration policy and the emerging debate about ‘integration’.

In both media and Swiss authority rhetoric, questions arise as to how or whether Swiss national identity is under imminent threat of disintegration, or whether Swiss society has to redefine itself as to the legitimacy of membership and belonging. The political Parties in Switzerland and their debate around the notion of integration and acceptable levels thereof form a pivotal platform of rhetoric, which flows into public discourse and sets often rigid standards of what is deemed an acceptable or tolerated stance towards migrants. Migrants, both in federal legal idiom and also in public discourse, still very strongly hold the position of ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’, who have to adapt to the Swiss system and must have a willingness to integrate ‘into’ the Swiss society, whereas the ‘locals’ or ‘Swiss’ are encouraged to accept, respect and tolerate. The rigidity and severity of the process of permit progression, grant of residence and naturalization system, which has allowed for 2nd and 3rd generation migrants, born and raised in Switzerland to be persistently classified as ‘immigrants’ and not gain citizenship (Hamburger, Badawia and Hummrich, 2005); and the denial of political membership rights to large groups of population (Benhabib, 2004) may have contributed to this lasting impression of a receiving host society, with what is perceived as a threatening surplus of visitors, growing and ‘taking over’.
The complex tensions between long-standing cultural and structural traditions, political rhetoric and ideas of nation and belonging, the role of education as a mediating capacity and economically driven models of migration policy may have contributed to shaping the Swiss vernacular on migration. It remains to be seen however, whether and how the newer approaches to integration and the growing awareness of the historical development of this discourse will determine how the position of migrants both in particular sectors, such as education, and more broadly in Swiss society will be created and perceived.

In this chapter, the idea was to map certain discursive aspects of written media and policy texts related to `integration` and what terminology is used, referred to and what kind of frames of `integration` are outlined by media and the Swiss Federal government. In the following chapter 6, these aspects are linked to the understanding of `integration` and education related areas from the narrative point of view of Swiss policy actors (empirical interview data), in what I argue is a loose network of policy through governance.
Chapters 6: Discourses in Interview Narratives

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1. Structure and Logic of Analysis

As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, I borrow loosely both Fairclough’s framework on CDA and aspects from other discourse theorists, combined with Benhabib’s exploration of contemporary modalities of membership in Western European nation-states (chapter 3). This constructs an overarching perspective and broad theoretical and methodological space of analysis, rather than a mechanism for the detailed textual analysis in my empirical and secondary data. For my detailed textual analysis of semi-structured interview and policy texts, I use what could be termed traditional sociological methods, such as thematic coding and narrative analysis (Czarniawska, 2004; Holloway and Jefferson, 2000). However, I emphasize that these methods are compatible with the understanding and framework of CDA, as explored by different discourse theorists, such as Choulidaraki and Fairclough (1999), Fairclough (2009), Wodak (2009), Jessop (2004), Rizvi (2006), Liaskidou (2006), Ball (1993) and Luke (1996); I underline that I am adopting the perspective of policy as discourse, potentially containing or disclosing contemporary changes and challenges of nation-states in the regulation of modalities of (political) membership.

A narrative-thread throughout all the empirical data (media analysis, interviews) was that of anything associated with migration being perceived as a 'problem' to which school was the 'solution'.

Chapter 6 is organised to portray on the one hand the understanding of integration from different policy actor perspectives on different governing levels (federal, cantonal, and local) in a form of 'loose network of integration policy'. This loose network encompasses people working as policy makers and brokers (Greke et al. 2009) in the areas of integration, migration and education, located in different levels of government, Federal as well as Cantonal. Moreover, these people were found to be located and cooperating in and across different departments. The exploration includes the perspective of school integration policy makers and how in their understanding
education is seen to affect the ‘problem’ of migration/integration. Subsequently in section 6, which addresses the ‘solution’ part of the discourse, the structural reform is more narrowly explored, involving the different aspects of governance that are being introduced and the way in which these are linked to the role of education. Thus, section 6 is dedicated to the evidence that is seen to have provided the ground or legitimation for the perceived existence of a ‘problem’, in that PISA and different national follow up studies are the subject of debate and narration by different key players both in the educational as well as migration political field.

Initially, I was unsure whether to keep the individual interviews as a whole while using a narrative analysis, because, as I am also interested in looking at a potential argument for the existence of an ‘integration network’; there seemed to be reason enough to leave the interviews as entities of different perspectives within a network. However, as I transcribed the interviews and started an initial analysis to identify themes and topics, I realised that there was a distinctive logic to the way the interviewees spoke about different aspects of what looked like a complex web of different normative claims. Moreover, as I started coding the data according to these claims, I could identify a structure to linked arguments. However, to be more holistic in my analysis, following the logic of Holloway and Jefferson (2000), while looking at the data, I have tried to incorporate a view of the whole interview and interview situation, including my own reflexive thoughts with reference to each interviewee and interview content, in order to contextualize what had been said in selected sections of interviews. Sometimes however, interviews have been taken nearly as a whole for a particular section appropriate to thematic coding (Czarniawska, 2004) towards a normative claim, when the interviewee’s field of work was some particular strand, such as language or Special Needs teacher.

The structure which emerged and which I adopted within the topics has produced the following approach to analysis: interviewees were asked about their views on, associations with and understandings of ‘integration’, but also how this links or does not link to school. They were asked whether the meaning of integration in the context of their work had/has changed or in-/decreased in importance. Their opinions and experiences with the ongoing school reforms in Switzerland were elicited as was their
own position on these changes. Moreover, they were requested to talk about their own field of work (as I had chosen interviewees who in some form or other were associated with migration/integration and school), and to offer anything they considered important with reference to migration and school. An important part of the interview also dealt with questions about migration politics and inquiry about any impact on school politics from their own experience or opinion. Also a major part of interview questions were dedicated to inquire about what kind of knowledge, or forms of (shared) information they used personally or whether they knew of any particular kind of knowledge or evidence that were used in connection to these themes (migration/integration politics and policy/school reforms/school policy). The people or networks they worked in or with were also enquired about.

The interviews elicited, in most if not all cases some descriptive material, in which the interviewee described his or her particular line of work in the context of migration/integration/schooling. This usually was narrated in form of a personal history or how that person ended up in this particular work place. Developments/histories of their particular sectors or work institutions or organisations/groups were often talked about, usually alongside their personal stance toward these developments. Then links were made in response to the interviewee’s own way of narrative with questions about the Swiss school reforms and how school and integration is seen to play into their line of work.

6.1.2 Methodological aspects on doing Interview narratives

Identification, access and location of interviewees/network

The location of potential interviewees was a process of identifying both certain institutions, which would have a direct reference to migration policy on a Federal governmental level, Cantonal public policy level and more locally situated, such as in municipalities. The same was required for people within the educational domain. However, often, the two areas interlinked in a kind of interface level of policy, with people working in either areas or a position, which specifically linked these aspects through the frame of ‘integration’. And I also tried to contact people, who have been referred to specifically by media, policy content, rhetoric and other policy makers in a
kind of `snow ball` effect. Soon however, I could identity what could be called a relatively `loose network` of policy makers, pedagogues and what has been referred to as `policy brokers`, i.e. people dealing with a kind of `translation` of education data. I conducted a total of 23 interviews with various people in different organisations and networks related to `integration` in education/social and migration policy, who have given their permission to be quoted by name. The order of the list ranges (without any hierarchical sense) starting from people located in the Federal Departments, then Cantonal departments, Members of the Teacher Union, Integration Offices, Researchers, Council of Zurich Members, NGO representatives, Teachers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization and Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mario Gattiker</td>
<td>Vice Director - Directorate for Nationality, Integration and Federal Subsidies (Bundesamt für Migration BFM): IAM (Interdepartmental Working Group on Migration, Commission Integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Gerber</td>
<td>BFM – Projectleader ,Integration measures’ and Federal Integration Report - IAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcel Heiniger</td>
<td>BFS (Bundesamt fuer Statistik): Federal Statistical Office – Head of Section Migration and Demographics - IAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regine Buehlmann</td>
<td>EDK – Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education: Head of Department for Education and Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Hildbrand</td>
<td>Ministry of Education Zurich: Head of Educational Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markus Truninger</td>
<td>Public School Office Zurich: Section Heterogenic School classes and project leader QUIMS (Quality in Multicultural Schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanspeter Amstutz</td>
<td>Education Minister Zurich, Secondary School teacher, former Member of Cantonal Parliament/Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juergen Oelkers</td>
<td>Education Minister Zurich, Head of Department of Institute for Pedagogy University of Zurich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Buschor</td>
<td>Former Member of Governing Council of Zurich, Former Head of Education Ministry, Fiscal Reformist, New Public Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to reasons of practicability, density and capacity of this study, I restricted my detailed analysis to 11 interview narratives, which are highlighted in bold in the list above. The choice of narratives was made according to the themes which emerged in the interviews and which seemed to connect together to form more holistic arguments. As mentioned in the introduction, the links to social policy had to be omitted.
altogether. I left out the party political narratives I had conducted, again due to reasons of capacity within the study to make these references, although party politics are discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 5 in a more condensed way.

As discussed in the introduction to the study, the setting of my research within the German-speaking Cantons of Zurich and Berne and one interview in Canton Zug and one in French-speaking Canton Neuchatel (however with a German-native speaker interviewee) enabled me to interact and communicate with all policy actors in ‘Swiss German’. This German dialect (or dialects) naturally has its own forms of expression and specific linguistic idioms, distinctive to the regions, people and sectors, which I have encountered in the process of my research enquiry. I have thus conducted and recorded the interview narratives in the original Swiss-German dialect(s), however transcribed them into regular, or what the Swiss refer to as ‘High German’, which is the written German used both in Switzerland and Germany. Then as a further act of transcription, I have translated these narratives from (high) German into English for the purpose of presentation and analysis within this thesis. I myself am a bilingual, or first and second language speaker of English and (Swiss and high) German. Invariably, some of the distinctive characteristics of the narratives might have been lost in this process of transcription and translation (which are both not dissimilar I would argue in the considerations they raise for ‘authentic meaning’); however, I have tried to incorporate the German idioms along with the translations in footnotes, where I deemed them to be valuable and distinctive in their expression for the purpose of the discourse analysis. Again, I am well aware that this too is a process of selection and interpretation. Hopefully, the multi-level approach to analysis aids in retrieving more holistic understandings of both the narratives and policy texts within this study.

**Semi-structured interview framework**

The interview framework was a semi-structured interview with a set of questions, which were varied according to the different organisational setting or context from which the interviewee was speaking. The questions were kept fairly open-ended, so the interviewees were given ample space to extend their own personal view as they saw fit. However, very roughly, these were the type of questions which framed my interviews;
- Background details of interviewee, experience, reasons for working in education governance/planning/migration/promotion of integration related area

- Integration (of migrants in Switzerland): What do you spontaneously associate when you hear the word Integration? Your understanding of Integration? Where do you derive your understanding or perspective from? Are you referring to any existing or given concept? If yes, is this in written, conceptual, guideline or agreement form? Who does it refer to, or who has to adhere to this concept, guidelines, and agreements? Are these in any way obligatory? In your experience, where does this concept or thinking about integration come from?

- Is this an (Educational, Societal, Social, Cultural, Political or Economic) approach? Has it gained importance? If yes or no, could you name reasons for this development?

- What do you think is the role of education with respect to integration? Does education have anything to do with Integration, as you understand it? If yes or no, what are the reasons?

- How do you think integration in educational policy would affect Migrants or Swiss? What function or functions does education have in this context?

- How important is it to have integration as an educational concept or approach?

- If yes or no, how will or would it be implemented? Who would be a part of the implementation process?

- Would it have an impact on educational planning? If so, how?

- How would it be interpreted for the Cantonal Education System in Zurich? How would it involve or be envisaged for educational policy in terms of specific measures, curricula, resources, teacher training, competences and projects?

- Is this a political concept, which stems from federal government?

- If yes or no, how does this affect the Canton? How are the competences distributed?

- If integration is an overarching concept, how is it organised on federal and cantonal levels, in terms of Cantonal autonomy, subsidiarity, co organisation or –work, concept development and feedback within the policy cycle?
- Who is involved in the policy cycle? Who is involved in educational planning in this context? Who are the partners or groups/networks working together in this? Schools? Teachers and Teacher Training?

- Special Needs Education in Zurich: new regulation: what has effectuated the new regulation or reform of Special Classes? Does Integration of Migrants have any part in this? If yes or no, what are the reasons?

- Harmonisation principle? Which competences does federal government have for the harmonisation plan for education in Switzerland? How would you see the competences in the area of Integration, which is named within federal law and explicitly names school as one of the areas, where integration should take place?

- Is there intercantal collaboration, agreements or conceptual association with respect to Integration in Education? If yes, who is involved in this? How are the competences? Is this obligatory?

- Quality; what is understood by quality? As a concept, where does this come from? Is it due to heightened demands? By whom? How is New Public Management interpreted within the educational sector? How is quality to be achieved?

- Content within curricula is said to be improved; in what way? Language is given as a focal point: could you say anything about this?

- Could you say anything about political integration and whether this has anything to do with school?

- If interviewees referred to PISA: could you speak about whether or how this relates to the discussions prior to this question?

- Could you say something about these standards in education?

- The new language of the Federal government on `integration` in the sense of measurable results; how does the Canton stand towards this; subsidiarity? Is there an obligation to adhere to these standards?

- Is there anything, which you would like to add, or something you feel has not been addressed but which you find important?
Ethical concerns and dissemination

In most cases, interviewees were very accessible and open about the questions posed to them, and usually expanded on open-ended questions to include narratives about what they felt were related and relevant accounts. All interviewees granted me the permission to quote them by name, as long as it was in the framework of my thesis. They showed interest in the outcome or `results` of the study, and asked me to circulate publications once they were available. I would like to have a follow up interview or meeting with some of the interviewees in the process of my publications of papers after the submission of my thesis. Not only for reasons of bringing the written work of their personal voices back to them, but also to have a mutual feedback or follow up of the themes that they broached and how they could have developed or changed in the time period of the policy implementation.

There is the possible intention of a planned monograph to be published from this thesis. Some journal articles will be prepared according to chapters. Dissemination will occur in addition to publications via academic and teacher-oriented conferences and workshops. There is a planned possibility to engage teachers in processes of action-research as a follow-up to this project (see chapter 7).

6.1.3 Summary of Themes

The themes or broad discourse analysis of this chapter 6 links to the topics broached in chapter 5, on Switzerland as a case-study within Europe and about the key concept of `integration`, as understood by Swiss authorities and media discourse analysis. Chapter 5 depicts the development of media discourse from 2000 to 2006, on issues about the presence of migrant students in Swiss school systems in different Cantons. I was interested in taking into account how the debate in education politics developed regarding migration and all about how teachers, research or party politics were depicting their stances on migrant students within Swiss schools. For this purpose I analysed a range of 40 newspaper articles from different North, Central and West located Swiss Cantons (German and French linguistic regions), which give examples of media discourse around this topical area during the recent few years. Moreover, I discuss the development of migration policy during roughly the last thirty years in the
context of economic development and policy with respect to migration in Switzerland.
This was done in view of Swiss migration politics and its migratory history closely
associated with labour migration. In addition to this, examples are given of the
understanding of the ‘concept of integration’ according to Swiss authority rhetoric in
recent years and legal textual discourse. The Swiss Law for Foreigners plays an
important role within the discursive narrative about how the federal administration is
seen to coordinate an ‘integration advancement mandate’. This becomes even clearer
when we encounter Federal representatives in ‘integration’ policy, whose
understanding of these issues are closely linked to the mandate of the Swiss Law for
Foreigners. This makes Chapter 5 a part of the policy discourse analysis, which
constitutes the setting or backdrop to the perspectives and understanding of this policy
from the empirical data (interviews) that I conducted and which are presented and
discussed in this chapter.

As explored, in both media and Swiss authority rhetoric, questions arise as to how or
whether Swiss national identity is under imminent ‘threat of disintegration’, or
whether Swiss society has to redefine itself as to the legitimacy of membership and
belonging. The political parties in Switzerland and their debate around the notion of
integration and acceptable levels thereof form a pivotal platform of rhetoric, which
flows into educational discourse and appears to set frequently rigid standards of what
is deemed an acceptable or tolerated stance towards migrants. The evidence or
sources these politicians, policy makers, academics and pedagogues (featured in these
newspaper articles and the interviewees analysed in these chapters) refer to are the
data sources from PISA and national follow up studies, particularly referring to the
’Special Needs’ topic. This policy-informing evidence is discussed at length in
chapter 2.

Migrants, both in federal legal idiom, and also in public media and policy discourse, I
argue, are still viewed as ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’, who have to adapt to the Swiss
system and must have a willingness to integrate ‘into’ the Swiss society, whereas the
‘locals’ or ‘Swiss’ are encouraged to accept, respect and tolerate. ‘Integration’ is
sometimes used synonymously to ‘assimilation’ and these two terms are referred to
within the same narrative. Also, the state sees itself in a ‘provider’ role in which the
migrants are seen to be beneficiaries or what I argue, ‘recipients’ of integration
measures provided by the state and the different relevant sectors, such as education. This becomes apparent when we proceed to look at the interview rhetoric and content, which revolves around questions about how the interviewees view their personal or what they believe is a representative understanding of what integration means or is supposed to contribute, according to the field, department or organisation they work in.

There is a federal governmental understanding of the integration policy, which is focussed around provisions, especially monetary investments for advancing *language ability*. Many if not most interviewees speak in a way about migration with reference to education, with what I call a stance of an ‘ideological appraisal’ (section 6.2); they refer to migration as being something that has altered both in its own historical development and also in how it was treated by Swiss authorities and as a societal paradigm. There is a differentiation between on the one hand a disjointed economic orientated view of treating migrants, as labour migrants. As a private market phenomenon, which had up until recently not been seen to affect government or state sectors in any public way, in the sense that there should be provisions. However, at some point, migration perspectives are seen to have changed, in that labour migration perpetuated into family migration, asylum migration and also families with young people/children settling in Switzerland. In the seventies, the debate around social exclusion or equal opportunities became a political feature, however ebbed down over the years, and now seems to have re-emerged or ‘put back into the political agenda’ in the words of one interviewee, albeit with strong reference to the ‘problem’ of migration rather than ‘social class’. This appraisal is being made by educationalists as well as policy makers and actors within an ‘integration’ network alike.

My argument is that this ideological appraisal is viewed through the lens of a perceived distinction of ‘culture’, or in other words the grouping of migrants into a clearly distinguishable group, other than ‘Swiss’. The notion of ‘them and us’ (Benhabib, 2004) or ‘dichotomy’ (Lanfranchi, interviewee) creates a view of migrants within ‘Swiss society, culture and systems’ being ‘extraordinary’, ‘new’ or ‘guest’. It is what some interviewees referred to as ‘normative standards’ or ‘normality’, migrants being therefore extra-normative or not corresponding to these ‘norms’. This would also comply with an idea of the involvement of the state (sectors) as a
provisional actor, i.e. providing integration measures, ‘into’ a system, which now is confronted with migration and the ‘problems’ attached to it.

Two of the key arguments or topics which emerge here in this chapter, relate to the way in which ‘culture’ is understood within integration policy in education (see section 6.3) and with reference to ‘social class’ (see section 6.5) or questions about social mobility. Both points are crucial to the arguments I make in this study about how education is instrumentalised to push through some (inter-) national standards, which in their discursive elements are directly related to ‘culture’ and ‘social class’. Because they set certain parameters of identity, specifically notions about ‘Swiss identity’, when interviewees speak about multiculturalism or interculturalism (See also Chapter 2: difference and multiculturalism, Mitchell /Benhabib/Kofman), or about ‘in-tegration’ into a certain perceived understanding of culture and society, and ‘others’ or ‘foreigner’ and ‘us’ or the ‘Swiss’ and the ‘Migrant’.

Moreover, they seem to attribute social-democratic values or flags, such as ‘equal opportunities’ or ‘equity’ and ‘inclusion’ to the said introduced standards. Many interviewees point out the controversy of speaking about the actual or underlying educational ‘issue’ of socio-economic background or social class of the students, which was discerned as the primary cause for inequity and low educational performance levels according to PISA results; they speak about how ‘migration’ or ‘migrants’ may have become the political scapegoat for the sensitive political taboo of socio-economic background or social class of the student being the root cause of inequity in a democracy. ‘Migrant’ is often referred to synonymously with ‘low socio-economic background’; more on this is discussed in chapter 4.

At this point, the link between what in one interviewee’s words are the ‘migration strand’ of discourse and the ‘education strand’ of discourse becomes more apparent: this distinction made between ‘Swiss’ and ‘Migrants’, even in educational terms. The interesting areas of tension then come into play: on the one hand there are system actors engaged in education missives to ensure what many refer to as ‘equal chances’. On the other hand there is the migration actor side, which is also engaged in cross-structural missives, in their view, to ensure ‘equal chances’. School is seen to be a place where this can happen, through ‘integrative measures’. It is seen as what becomes apparent within the narratives presented in this chapter, as the ‘solving
agent’ to a ‘perceived problem’. One interviewee refers to a ‘Western modernity ideal’, which would like to promote a ‘school for everybody’; in other words perhaps the idea of ‘inclusion’.

There is a strong educational or pedagogical ‘problematisation’ of the issue of migrants in which a critical ‘Special Needs’ and ‘self-accusatory’ perspective is represented (see section 6.4). The section about this ‘streaming’ or ‘separating’\textsuperscript{7} pedagogical ideology that developed throughout the last years in the educational sector, raises questions about a perpetual ‘dichotomy’\textsuperscript{8} placed between Swiss and Migrants which I argue is the root to a ‘problematised’ policy perspective. The argument of the Special Needs ideology as a predominant catalyst for a problematised view of migration (see also chapter 2) and the responsive ‘solution-seeking’ that is arguably projected upon education policy and the school system, appears to be rooted in two discursive backgrounds. The following chapter will attempt to unravel in which ways they are powerfully interrelated. The discussion is that there is on the one hand, the ‘Special needs ideology’, which according to different education actors within the field has deep historical roots in Switzerland, dating back from the creation of an academic or scientific seat of both research and mainly teacher education; the first of its kind apparently in Europe. ‘Specialism’ or ‘therapeutic’ individual attention seems to have taken on a strong ideological educational perpetuation, in the sense of a kind of ‘clinical’ thinking, in which individual ‘special needs’ of a child, not able to be attended to by regular teachers, are seen to be best treated with specialist care. There is a statement or perception running within public school of two separate school systems with two different concordat- or principle systems of reference. Piecing together various narratives on special schooling by different actors, creates an image of two schooling systems, which seem to enhance or cater to each other’s needs. In this sense, the special needs school system, it could be argued, maintains quite a powerful position within the Swiss education system. Although because of its distinctive missive and separate institutional position, it may remain somewhat inconspicuous.

\textsuperscript{7} Translated from German: separierende Schulform
\textsuperscript{8} Term used by interviewee Andrea Lanfranchi in his narrative: see later
The arguments presented by several education actors or indeed policy makers are, that where the regular public school system, or the teachers therein could not fit certain children into what is called their ‘normative standards’ (often even peripherically speaking about ‘Swiss middle class’ normative standards), then they would relocate, refer or ‘delegate’ these children into the special needs sector, or *Therapeutic Pedagogy*. Supply and demand for specialists and therapists then increased with what appears an almost self-fuelling ‘mechanism’. These mechanisms are seen to be rooted in ‘organisational structures’, which enhance a certain course of action, because these measures simply exist and are consequently used as an effect (See chapter 4: Gomolla and Radtke, 2002). However, where does the theme of migration or children with migrant background play into these mechanisms? It is the phenomenon of ‘migrant’ or ‘foreign-language speaking’ (this is where language comes into picture) children, who are being classified or ‘streamed’ as ‘special needs’; in this sense, children with migrant background or multilingualism are regarded as a phenomenon requiring ‘specialist’ or individualised attention. On Special Educational Needs and dominant discourses, see Liasidou (2008) discussed in chapter 2.

In my understanding of the undercurrents within the narratives, there is the disputed discourse of *societal ‘cultural’ paradigm*, which is strongly associated, I would like to argue, with the particular missives or strands of thinking, from which the actors are speaking, reflecting or even projecting ideas about; It only makes sense to look at the understanding of ‘migration’ or ‘integration’ from each actor’s point of view in association to the particular strand of work or missive with which this person refers to this topic. In this sense, we are looking at different (ideological) normative strands of ‘socio-cultural’ paradigms.

On the one hand, there are the migration/immigration political and social policy fields and on the other, the educational fields of discourse. One could almost detect a two-way top-down and bottom-up developments of ‘migration’ or ‘cultural’ paradigms, in which immigration politics perpetuates the notion of a homogeneous group of ‘guest workers’ or ‘guests’, and the Special Needs education stronghold, which perpetuated to this point the notion of ‘migrant-background’ being classified as ‘special needs’. The ideological appraisal however occurs in a seemingly ‘new’ direction, where the
federal state changes its rhetoric to `integration` measures and provision, and where the pedagogues speak about `inclusion`.

`Two poles mark – roughly schematised – the area of conflict of the special needs debate in this case; On the one hand there are the `practioners`, who by the majority pursue a deficit-orientated category of `disadvantage` as a basis for their pedagogical action and therefore tend to interpret societal problem situations with individualising interpretations. On the other hand there are `integration theorists`, who see the unequal distribution of education chances predominantly placed in a highly selective and impenetrable education system. Remarkable about both discussion strands is that they neither reflect the objective of a societal standard biography upon which a consensus can be reached from a power- or dominance theoretical point of view, nor do they broach the issue of interrelations between social integration and system integration critically from a subject-orientated perspective.` (Sauter, 2007:66)

This quotation is quite significant for my arguments in the sense that it points to what Sauter (2007) refers to as an absence of power-or dominance theoretical reference towards the discourses, or of the interrelations between social – and system integration from the point of the view of the `subject` or in this case `the migrant`, or arguably an `identity`-perspective. It is this `consensus on a societal standard biography`, which interests me; how do policy actors, initialising a large scale, holistic structural educational reform in Switzerland conceive a standard sense of `the migrant` or of `culture`, in the way policy is then conceptualised; my argument with reference to this would be that the standards are created by the perpetuation of thinking about `the migrant` as `other than Swiss`, therefore structural changes being justifiable as a reasonable way of provision. There is then no need to refer to or to broach the highly contentious topic of `identity`, because it is already attributed or framed. At this point however, the competing normative claims, arguably power- and interest-related, appear, in which the sensitive and hugely controversial dichotomy is negotiatively woven into a fragile network of consensus. This system of consensus moreover, is a newer attribute of a `soft` form of governance (Novoa and Lawn, 2000), which can overcome the obstacles of federalism.
6. 2. An ideological appraisal and pre-existing structures/ideologies of political membership

Most if not all interviews regardless of whether the interviewee was education or more migration based in her/his line of work, and often even regardless of party political positioning, spoke about a certain point of required realisation of present day change in how migration `should’ be perceived from their point of view. It seemed to qualify a pivotal ideological appraisal about how migration had or up to this point has been seen or dealt with by Swiss authorities on the one hand or simply as a general national outlook towards migration as such. What runs as a thread across all interviews is that they refer to this ideological change happening due to changes in migration history and the way that Switzerland is seen to have dealt with or controlled migration into the country; the realisation at some point with the arrival and settlement of family migration.

Historical development of labour migration has been analysed regarding West-European countries such as Switzerland or Germany, who do not have a colonial past such as the UK or France for instance. In chapter 5 of this thesis, these historical developments paired with ideological debates are presented, which discuss the way in which during the early 1950s, migration was viewed as a short-term or transitory phenomenon, which would meet the temporary demands for foreign workers in their respective labour market needs. However, Switzerland dealt with labour migration control in a very specific way, which may have enhanced this continual belief of migration being a transitory or rather extraordinary state of affairs. In Chapter 5, section 5.2 about the development of migration policy in Switzerland the view of economic development with respect to migration is given roughly over the last thirty years, so after the 1950s. It follows the development of residency and work permit control during this span of time and explains how different economically motivated decisions influenced what then appeared as a steady rise in ‘foreign’ population, especially regarding low-skilled labour migrants. Interview data which now is presented here and in the subsequent chapter parts would support the argument that until recently, or indeed as I want to argue even in the present day, in 2010, the goal of migration policy has largely been to stabilise the level of migrant resident
population while not curtailing employers from the migrant source of workers (see Gross, 2006:51, also Straubhaar and Golder, 1999l; Flueckiger, 1998).

The choice of interviewee data in this chapter also stems from a desire to understand how both education and migration policy makers on different governing levels perceive, define or understand the notion of ‘integration’ and what they believe this implies for education. I would like to argue that this sets the frame for how policy is also being conceptualised for education, as education is seen as one of the main platforms where integration measures are seen to be implemented. The purpose of positioning these interviewees in their respective governing levels is to get a picture of what kinds of perspectives are located where within a potential ‘integration agenda’, which encompasses a kind of loose ‘network’ cutting across different levels of governance.

To get a sense of understanding of integration from a federal level, the following interviewee is placed in interesting positions as to an interdepartmental integration federal agenda; the interviewee Mario Gattiker, the vice president of the Federal Office for Migration (BFM) is a key player in the formulation and generating of an integration advancement mandate. This consists of a conceptual recommendation report for a cross-departmental, cross-federal, and cantonal level integration implementation plan. The Federal Office for Migration (BFM) is a large network of officials within the federal administration in the Federal Department for Police and Justice, dealing specifically with the regulation of immigration, migration and integration state matters. He is also represented in what is called the Interdepartmental Working Group for Migration (IAM), specifically dealing with integration measures.

In the case of Mario Gattiker (BFM), who is speaking in his narrative as a politician as well as a key policy maker, I would argue that it is quite crucial to understand what kind of background he comes from in terms of his current line of work. In addition, both his key position as the director of the Interdepartmental Board for Integration, a subgroup within the IAM, and the question of how this particular group is situated within the federal government are quite elementary aspects to understand more about the federal integration concept. I would like to argue that this may have some
discursive significance in the way, from his perspective, integration is conceptualised for the *Federal Office of Migration*, but also specifically the IAM.

I am essentially a solicitor, and have in fact only always dealt with migration questions. After my studies, I worked in a legal advisory place for refugees in Berne as a lawyer. Afterwards I became director of CARITAS Switzerland. The legal area of CARITAS, and that at a time when we had the big migration movements. Especially the Balkan wars, right. Or the whole Sri Lanka development, Turkey etc. We mainly did legal advice for refugees there. We also conducted the procedures of the Federal Office, right, Public Social Aid representation. I myself have done relatively a lot of fundamentals work, published relatively lot in Legal literature and Social Public Aid. Later in 2001, I became the secretary of the Federal Commission for Foreigners. Which was then entrusted with the mandate to do integration advancement. To build up the integration advancement mandate of the Federation, right. And there I had a double function, one of which was secretary of this in essence independent commission for foreigners and on the other hand, I was head of the section Integration of the then Federal Office for Questions dealing with Foreigners - later called the Federal Office for Immigration, Integration and Emigration.

And in this function, I developed the entire integration advancement in the Federal Office. There we mostly set the principles for the new Law for Foreigners⁹; we simply defined the role of the Federation for the coordination mandate. Integration as a crosscut mandate.¹⁰ With the coordination of the Federal Office on the federal level. And beyond that towards the Cantons and Municipalities, with the first approaches, with the idea to introduce the integration idea for legal procedures relating to foreigners. Particularly for the authorization of religious supervisors at the time. One was looking to consciously appoint these for integration questions, to take account of them in a decision for residence permission. That is where it actually started, in 2001. And before that, I would argue that there hadn`t been any integration in the Federal Office, no section head for integration.

And in 2003 later, I left the Commission for Foreigners and entered the Federal Office for Questions relating to Foreigners and became department head of a department `integration and citizenship`. There

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⁹ *Neues Auslaenderrecht*: see relevant article quoted in chapter 4

¹⁰ *Querschnittsaufgabe*
the whole citizenship and integration were added. And in the Personal Union, I was section head for integration and simply head of department. And then 2003, there was the Federal Office for Migration, which was a fusion with the IMES, the Federal Office for Refugees; and there later I took over a second department apart from my own in a new directorate area, namely the `subvention area’. We finance from the Federal Office in very large sums, right, the asylum structure of the Cantons. Large expenses, 500/600 million per year, which are aligned as subventions, next to the integration subventions, right. For the cantons. `MG

In this narrative, a first important point to note is that he comes from a legal background, a solicitor by education and then profession. As he explains, first working in Berne as a Refugee legal advice related lawyer and then in the legal department of CARITAS, a Swiss NGO, which remains to this day in 2010, quite a strong contributor towards local private integration measures, particularly in the areas of asylum and early language advancement.

He then describes moving into the Federal Administration area into key positions within different departments and groups, which are dealing with immigration and then later integration. In this function, he states, `I developed the entire integration advancement in the Federal Office’. Setting the principles for the Law for Foreigners (see Chapter 5) and also developing what he calls `defining the role of the Federation in a coordination mandate’. At some point, he also became in charge of the allocation of financial subventions towards the Cantons for asylum structure purposes. The weight of these statements paired with the continuation of his narrative give us a valuable insight into the considerable extent to which this particular interviewee is influential in `integration’ conceptualisation within the federal level of governance.

I suggest that the legal professional background path described in his narrative supports the arguments being made in chapter 5. Often with reforms in governance administration areas, the same key people will be in charge or perpetuated in their respective positions to take over a new mandate. Mario Gattiker’s strong legal background, and the mere fact of someone coming from an immigration law area being in charge of what can be argued is an influential position with respect to
integration concept in the federal administration, could be therefore quite significant to the following arguments.

In his narrative, he brings to notice what he explains are conceptual changes in the way migration was perceived by the federal government or the state as such.

`Yes, I would like to very much (talk about developments and changes in the concept of integration throughout his period of office). Yes, a lot happened. It is particularly important that integration, let’s say in fact until 1998 and actually even more clearly until the mandate of the Law on Foreigners of 2002, was not considered a state duty. We said in the nineties, eighties and often in the seventies, that integration is a matter of the foreigners11 themselves. They have self-responsibility. And who also has responsibility are the social partners, the employers, who employ foreign work forces. That is why there was a draft outline of the Law for Foreigners 1980 - which however was rejected in the popular vote - that the employers have to do integration measures; information events, to provide access to language courses etc. Why was it then the responsibility of the foreigners12 and of the employers? Because then one had labour migration. Switzerland then became an immigration country through labour migration. It was the case that nobody was there who was needy or dependent on support, how it later occurred with the asylum migration; people did not come to work, but sought protection and were therefore dependent upon the state in the beginning. That is why the understanding was there that this is a matter of privates. And that changed with the asylum migration. Also with the increase of family influx13. Therefore, the state duty gained importance. Within this logic; because family influx meant, next of kin were coming who did not yet have work, who do not get integrated via a working place, it meant children with foreign-language14 background were coming etc. That is a wholly different starting situation for integration processes; there you need state support as with the asylum migration. Until end of the nineties one said this is no longer totally a matter of the foreigners themselves, but of the non-governmental organisations, right. The state did not yet want anything to do with this. Not yet a conscious process that the state takes in its hands. That is why; end of the nineties, the Commission for Foreigners was outside of the state administration. And the administration in the area of migration tended to be aligned with policing. One engaged the Police for

11 Given in both feminine and masculine forms: Ausländerinnen und Ausländer
12 Given in both feminine and masculine forms: Ausländerinnen und Ausländer
13 Familienmehranzug: families arriving after the work migrants
14 fremdsprachige
Foreigners\textsuperscript{15} for the asylum migration, but one did not have the comprehensive understanding of migration. The change in paradigm was developed later with the missive for a new Law for Foreigners. There the Federal council, the legislator, said that due to a development of migration, labour force migration was no longer in the forefront, that there is asylum migration, and that the first manifest problems have appeared. There one said to oneself, the state could no longer keep itself outside. However, integration is not only but also a state duty. Namely not only of the Federation, but of the Cantons, of the Municipalities, according to the Law for Foreigners. And that naturally was the first real change. ` MG

Mario Gattiker makes some critical points about developments of ideas of state duty and ideology towards migration, which seems to have shifted from a purely labour oriented view of migrants towards a point of realisation of 'next of kin, who were in need of state support' for integration purposes. The choice of words with reference to migrants is striking; 'foreigners', in line with the title employed in the Federal law for 'Foreigners', which maintains the same terminology to this day.

A remarkable point he makes is that 'neediness' or 'support' from the state are first conceptualised with the arrival of Asylum seekers, but then also transferred to families of labour migrants. At first, he refers to the 'self-responsibility' of migrants and the responsibility of their employers. This seems to address the perspective of a disjointed private market phenomenon (see Chapter 5), which is not seen to affect the government as such with any responsibility towards the integration of migrants at that point. The working place was seen as a sufficient area for integration. Family and children speaking a foreign language arriving within the country then are seen as a new situation, which alters and shifts the responsibility towards the state. But even then, in the beginning, the interviewee speaks about how the state did not recognize its duty, but rather the non-governmental organisations took over this shared responsibility with the private market employers toward providing integration measures.

A very central point seems to me to be the reference to administration in the area of migration during the nineties being associated with the Police or Police for

\textsuperscript{15} Fremdenpolizei
Foreigners. This ideology of policing as a suitable stance or method for governing migration corresponds with an idea of Switzerland being mainly an Asylum Seeker’s host immigration country, with immigration regarded as requiring control and policing. An important aspect to note is that even today the Ministry for Justice and Police heads the Federal Office for Migration.

A ‘change in paradigm’ is then described where the Law for Foreigners changed due to the argument that labour migration was no longer the primary migratory reason, or rather the fact alluded to that Asylum migration was occurring which requires measures, as ‘first manifest problems were appearing’ and that the state needed to be involved at this point. I (Interviewer) did not inquire further into what kind of problems he was alluding to (although I had very much wanted to) because I did not want to interrupt this flow of narrative, which was quite extensive with reference to this topic. The striking factor however is this problematising aspect appearing repeatedly throughout the interviews.

The continuation in his narrative then proceeds to speak about what he explains is a second important change in the way migration or rather from now on ‘integration’ is viewed and dealt with by the state:

‘The second important change was – and this happened later after one said it is not just relevant private activities, which are supported by the state. But the state itself is actually an integration actor, right. The state with its structures is an integration actor itself and it has to develop its structures, which means education, the school system, the labour market, the health area, all federal areas in such a way that it is also accessible for all foreigners. That one is responsive to the needs consciously. And that was the second step, which was relevant. And that means that we of the Federal Office, that what was done in the nineties with the project financing of several millions, privately, has lost its significance. Rather we have to restructure all areas such as the Social insurance sector, the Cantons with the education system, all federal structures in such a way that they are also accessible for foreigners. And we cannot just do a project financing on the side. That led to it being explicitly mentioned in the new Integration order,

16 Feminine and masculine forms
17 F. and m. forms
and that was the second important change. The first change was that integration became a state missive and the second change is that the state looks at it as a missive of the regular state structures\(^\text{18}\). The primacy being the mainstreaming of the integration advancement, and not that one has a state structure and along side of this one has something little for the foreigners. Rather it is a holistic vision, where the entire foreign population has an exact equal place. That means the state has to adjust to the altered conditions of migration; and migration means that the society is plural, it is manifold, there are different religions and different cultures, and the state institutions have to do justice to this diversity. And should not delegate it to some little projects, where one has a language course with twenty people. And that is the kind of philosophy, which one sees in the Integration account (written under his direction) and most of all in the integration measures. There one has looked under a magnifying glass, how the state structures work today; are they in the position to cover the needs? What do we need to do to improve this even further? ’ MG

The change of the state being viewed as being an integration actor and the subsequent missive ideology to restructure is quite a crucial aspect in the sense that education is clearly seen to fall under this structural readaptation to 'the altered conditions of migration'. The wording in German is 'die veränderten Gegebenheiten von der Migration', which can both refer to the altered conditions which migration has brought to society, or the altered conditions within migration developments as such, i.e. migration itself has changed in its nature. Here I would think the interviewee most likely uses it with the former meaning, in that migration is seen to have changed the requirements of society. This becomes clearer when he speaks about the 'needs of foreigners' that the state structures have to meet in order for this new group to have the 'exact equal place' within these systems. That this has to happen in a totalitarian way seems to be an elementary point for the interviewee, as he stresses twice that simply having smaller scale projects for private, non-state actors, as they used to until recently is no longer sufficient to meet the larger scale needs. Rather a large-scale state structural reform is required, which incorporates the Cantons and the school system, which he calls a 'mainstreaming of integration advancement'. This particular wording of 'mainstreaming' is particularly interesting when we will later encounter interviewees speaking about 'standards' and 'harmonising', discussed in section 6.5.

\(^{18}\) Regelstrukturen
It is noteworthy that the interviewee speaks about the arguments of what he sees as requirements in favour of a totalitarian structural reform. Chapter 4 and section 6.6 of this chapter discuss this reform ideology in which this Federal uptake on structural change is argued to have predominantly influenced the way in which school reforms are now proceeding, despite the long-standing tradition of Cantonal authority in education matters.

A point which is important with reference to the discussion of this particular chapter section is the loose definition offered about what migration means; ‘migration means that the society is plural, it is manifold, there are different religions and different cultures, and the state institutions have to do justice to this diversity’. I think the reference to different religions and cultures and diversity is quite important; as we proceed in this chapter, the existence of a potentially multicultural approach or ideology to migration/integration within Federal policy but also school governing/policy actors is argued, which this particular quote seems to support. In chapter 2, Mitchell’s (2003) argument is raised how contemporary political progressives and conservatives within nations have found common ground in the utilization of multiculturalism. Although the idea of a pluralist society seems to have been taken into account by the interviewee - who is a Federal policy maker, arguably in a key position regarding ‘integration measures’ - it appeared significant to me in the way migrants were referred to as a particular group with particular needs. This forms a decisive link to the discussions in the language and special needs sections, which will be discussed in other sections in this chapter.

A key point his attributing the state to a provider role. He speaks about the state (sectors) being a providing actor, i.e. providing integration measures, ‘into’ a system, which now is confronted with migration and the ‘problems’ attached to it. There was at some point the ideological appraisal that the state could no longer keep itself out of the immigration/migration debate, which was seen to have been largely a private market sector responsibility. Integration then became a mandate, the organisation of which was seen to be a state responsibility. This development becomes clear when we look at the second quote in his narrative in terms of how the different departments and groups were being restructured, renamed and regrouped. Names of departments changed from more ‘immigration’ orientated association to ‘migration’, or from
‘Federal Office for Foreigners’ to ‘Federal Migration Office’. Moreover newly including integration and citizenship as add on to the originally more immigration, migration and emigration orientated mandate areas. When speaking about an ‘ideological appraisal’, integration and citizenship seen as new state mandates, would suggest that migration at some point was no longer seen by the Swiss federal authorities to be a transitory phenomenon, but rather reflect the extent to which Switzerland was seen at that point to have turned into a permanent migration settlement country. Gattiker remarks that before 2001, he would argue, there was no talk or mandate of integration in the Federal Office.

In chapter 2, one of the theoretical discussions revolves around the citizenship concept in Switzerland, and the foundations of how the rigid naturalisation procedures are conceptualised, namely based upon what I would like to argue is a civic republican model of citizenship. According to this model, the Swiss citizenship requirements are based on abstract qualities, which make this status separate from the civic societal sphere. Kofman (1995) who is discussed in chapter 2, argues that this kind of abstraction divorces the private sphere from the public and fails to recognize the extent to which the state is ‘imbricated in the private and community sectors’. In line with this framework of what citizenship requires, the way in which the integration measures are conceptualised by the federal government and required by ‘foreigners’ are arguably highly structural, geared towards ‘structural integration’, where the notion of what integration actually means for the individual is loosely held. The integration concept revolves around economic and educational integration, aided by the state structures, leaving social and particularly political integration/acquisition of citizenship out of the picture. This becomes clearer when Mario Gattiker offers his or what in his view is the Federal understanding of integration in the next narrative section, which follows shortly.

The historical origins of the civic republican model of citizenship are strongly rooted in a Roman legal culture, the basis for which still forms one of the foundation taught modules in the study of law in Switzerland to this day, in 2009. It is therefore quite relevant to take into account that a policy maker with a strong legal professional background in asylum and refugee law, who can be arguably seen as mainly responsible for the conceptualisation of integration within the Federal administration,
might have some ideological impact on the particular way in which integration is federally conceptualised and set up. It may well be rooted in a (historically roman) legal citizenship ideology and framework of how migration is understood; the basis of which is immigration law, the general tendency to be orientated towards the notion of migrants as 'foreign', 'new', 'a separate group', until recently as 'transitory', 'influx or access-orientated', or in other words a relatively young phenomenon, which now requires a provision from the state. However, in the present year 2010, generations of people with migrant background in Switzerland are arguably moving into the fourth generation settled, born and brought up in the country. The perpetuated notion of 'foreigners' or the dichotomy between Swiss and Migrants seen as two distinctive groups, in which the migrants are a homogeneous cluster that have to 'integrate', seems conflicting. The basis for this could partly also lie within the legal system of Switzerland, which is strongly based on a civic republican model for citizenship and how becoming a 'Swiss' citizen, i.e. how integration as a means would be conceptualised. I would like to argue that this is done with strong statist interests in favour of labour market requirements, aided by the legal administrative control mechanisms, which form the basis of a national 'integration advancement mandate' and that this in turn makes use of a 'problematised' view of migration. A noteworthy point is that this perpetuates an exclusionary model of citizenship (i.e. political membership, see Benhabib, 2004: chapter 2) as a basis for what is called an 'integration' mandate.

On the question about the creation or mandate of the Interdepartmental Working Group for Migration (IAM), he speaks about the development, which happened in this direction within the Federal structures, which changed to create this specific working group with a particular integration mandate.

'Well, the IAM has been around for a long time. It was created in the nineties, around the first strategy reports, which were given from the Federal Council’s Foreigner and Refugee Politics. That was then named Interdepartmental Group for Migration Questions. At the time, the former Federal Office for questions on Foreigners was a part of that, the Federal Office for Refugees, and who was particularly involved strongly with the whole migration is the area labour market, right. The labour market; admission of foreign workers. This was
located until the reorganisation until the end of the nineties in the BVD, namely the National Economy Department, at the time in the BIGA\(^\text{19}\). And the BIGA had also been a strong actor at the time. In migration questions, the BIGA has the free mobility of persons agreement\(^\text{20}\), and that actually was the core of the Interdepartmental Working Group for Migration questions named at the time. And there now all the departments are a part of and namely with respect to the whole spectrum of migration, right. Asylum- Foreign Politics, Transfer agreements, migration partnerships, the whole security area, which the Federal Office for Police and Justice are a part of. All departments bring their aspects into it and we have had an integration report 2005 in connection to the implementation of integration measures. And published in 2006. And based on this integration report the Federal Council entrusted the Federal Office for Migration together with the other departments to develop the presumed measures, right. Then we later came to this report, 22. August 2007, with these 45 measures. And there the Federal Council said that the implementation organisation should be the IAM (Interdepartmental Working Group for Migration), the body, which is the whole implementation measure of the Federation, which should be administered as a cross cutting mandate, and should be very broad. Especially concerning the BVD, but also the other departments, this should be the coordination group in a sense. Fitted high-rankingly\(^\text{21}\), right, with the directors, so that it is politically very high residing\(^\text{22}\). That introduced more into it. And under this highest implementation control group, there are then later different sub organisations. I preside over a working group: the Interdepartmental Board for Integration, which is under my direction and there actually all the dealings are done, which are classified as areas of work or the urban project. And there are three lines; work and language. Work and Education, right, particularly Education, BVD, CECO and the Federal Office for Social Security. Then in the middle, there is the Projet Urbain\(^\text{23}\), and this is the Federal Office for Accommodation and Spatial Planning. We are also strongly involved. Then there are the other measures, and there we do the monitoring for the other measures. In fact from the point of view of practice, the group is representing the operating force, specialists actually, who also understand a certain something. And the IAM, that is on the level of direction. Well, it is really also politically supported and represented within the Federal

\(^{19}\) Bundesamt für Industrie, Gewerbe und Arbeit; Federal Office for Industry, Trade and Labour

\(^{20}\) Personenfreizuegigkeitsabkommen: Bilateral Agreement with EU

\(^{21}\) hochrangig: of a high rank

\(^{22}\) Politisch hoch angesiedelt: in a politically hierarchical high rank

\(^{23}\) Urban Project
Council. This is the organisation, which is nothing else than a concretion of this coordination mandate, which the Federal Office of Migration has based on the Law for Foreigners.’ MG

This narration brings up the question about how the IAM was first formed and out of which Federal Offices it was issued: striking is the reference to how strongly in the interviewee’s perspective, the BVD, or the National Economy Department was involved in questions of migration. This strengthens the arguments made in chapter 5 about the labour market being the dominant sectoral actor in the way that migration was being ‘handled’ or accessed in Switzerland. The Federal Office for Industry, Trade and Labour was decisive in its participation of the free mobility of person’s agreement jointly with EU countries, Switzerland then also being a member of EFTA. In chapter 5, the economic incentives in the area of labour immigration in Switzerland and the economic policies set up from the sixties onwards illuminate the way in which economic politics shaped immigration politics.

Mario Gattiker explains how in 2008, when this interview was held, the ‘whole spectrum of migration’ is seen to be represented in this Interdepartmental Working Group for Migration, namely Asylum- and Foreign Politics, Transfer agreements, Migration partnerships with other countries, securitisation, which is represented by the Federal Office for Police and Justice. Understanding the federal administration structure in the areas of migration is crucial to map the picture of how integration measures are now seen to frame what is called a ‘cross-cut mandate’, running across different departments, federal, cantonal and municipal. In this sense, we are speaking of a massive structural reform, in which a relatively loose notion is having far-reaching reference. See chapters 4 and 5, on specific education and migration reform policies. My interest is how this reference impacts a specific sector and the role of education within this reform area.

24 An noteworthy point is that this ministry is headed by a representative of the right-wing Swiss people’s party: Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP): the present day integration report was according to another interviewee within the Federal Government the original idea of Christoph Blocher, whose controversial right-wing agenda sparked a heated political controversy, which ended in him being voted out of the Federal Council, and caused a considerable fractional divide in his own party
However, what exactly is the loose notion or understanding of integration within this reform incentive? Moreover, how does it comply with the strong reference to the *Law of Foreigners*, which is frequently mentioned by this interviewee? In the next part of the narrative, he speaks about how integration is measured or referred to in the federal departments and how or whether he sees it as having a binding character for the individual.

‘From the point of view of the individual? This has something to do with the understanding; how we understand integration. We understand integration as equality of opportunities. Integration is then reached, is then advanced, when foreigners from a comparable social stratum and background achieve similar success in the areas of structural integration and social integration, well participation. Well, this means not increased unemployment rates, not increased social benefits dependency, and not increased criminality; when one has comparable results. And the legislator has actually named three criteria, and these we try to implement everywhere. The first criteria is from the point of view of the foreigner; the adherence to the legal order and the recognition of the basic principles of the federal constitution. That we acknowledge the diversity, for example, when it is about clothing rules, but that (acknowledging) diversity has its limits when for example out of cultural reasons, girls are circumcised or if any kind of violence is justified. Private force in place of state force; there the acknowledgment has an end. It is very strongly about principles, therefore legal order. Where one is actually requiring assimilation.

And where one allows diversity in the private area, when it is not pushing to the limits of the other. The second criterion is the path of language attainment, where one simply thinks about it as a requirement, in most cases the requirement for the course of integration. However, one does also acknowledge even there that there is such a thing as a societal accepted segregation. (...) The state interferes there, where negative costs are generated; unemployment funds, social benefit funds etc. But language attainment is surely important as a second point. Thirdly, that one makes an effort to participate in the economic life and in the educational life. That one reaches a minimum (degree) of education, which is important for integration.

These are the three criteria, which actually are already looked at during

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25 *Chancengleichheit*: equality of chances or equality of opportunity

26 *Ausländerinnen und Ausländer*: feminine and masculine forms

27 Interviewee is referring to comparability to Swiss: see migration legal text chapter 5

28 *Vielfalt*: can be translated as diversity but also plurality

29 *Anpassung*: can be translated as assimilation, but also adaptation, accommodation

30 The interviewee is referring to ‘foreigners’ having to make an effort etc.
Switzerland does not go so far as in other countries, for example Germany, and newly in France and England, that one also requires language attainment during family influx. We are not yet that far that one asks for language attainment during immigration. However, we make a motivational appeal that whoever adheres to the legal order, whoever makes an effort to participate in the labour- and education areas and attains a language level required by the legal order, receives an earlier permanent residency permit than would be normally the case. We are actually focussing on incentive, right. The criteria we simply have and I would say when one looks at the integration measures then it is there that the focal points lie. `MG

Interviewer (me): Namely, in structural integration?
`Yes. Besides the adherence to the legal order, or the entire security question surely the area work and language is relevant. `MG

The three criteria the interviewee names strongly support the arguments made in connection to the prior section of his narrative; ‘foreigners’` adherence to the legal order and the basic principles of the constitution, which he even refers to as `requiring assimilation’. On the other hand, the legislator is seen to have to `acknowledge diversity` in the sense of granting certain distinctive features, such as diverse clothing for example. However, where the federal constitution is not adhered to, such as violation of certain human rights, the acknowledgement of diversity meets its limits; state force over private force. It seems significant that the legal order is emphasised as a strong feature as a basis for integration, if we go back to the arguments made about the legal stronghold the integration mandate is based upon, prior to this narrative section.

Integration is understood according to the interviewee, by `we` presumably meaning the federal authorities, as ‘equality of opportunities’; in chapter 5, the exact legal article in the Law for Foreigners, which he here refers to is quoted and discursively analysed. The argument I would like to make with respect to this `comparability` he refers to, is that economic, social or educational mobility of `migrants` does not seem to be a feature within the federal set-up of the integration agenda. In the sense that equality of opportunities is seen to be advanced with comparable social strata of Swiss (see arguments in chapter 5 and section 6 of this chapter). It could arguably be

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31 Zulassung: admittance into the country, at immigration
observed that people with migrant background are motivated to attain education and economic independence, however within their current economic or social class level. I would like to argue that this voices an interest to perpetuate certain economic strata within society, i.e. a statist interest in perpetuating an existing social class, or working class in order to ascertain the sufficient representation of an economic sector. As migration in Switzerland was mainly labour migration, this working class could be found largely within certain migrant background groups of the population; the families or offspring of labour migrants who had immigrated during the sixties, seventies and eighties (see Chapters 5). The question about ‘socio-economic background’ or ‘social class’ is discussed with reference to other interviewees in section 6.4 of this chapter.

An interesting choice of words with reference to this comparability is ‘participation’ in economy and education. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the interviewee goes on in his narrative to state that this means ‘not increased unemployment rates, not increased social benefits dependency, and not increased criminality; when one has comparable results’. Later he explains that ‘the state interferes there, where negative costs are generated; unemployment funds, social benefit funds etc.’. This statement seems quite significant in the choice of wording of ‘negative costs’; participation and financial independence is encouraged for the avoidance of negative costs for the state: it could be argued here that this does point to a strong economic-orientated view of integration from a federal point of view.

He mentions that the second criterion is the ‘path of language attainment’. Here is where education will be seen to play into the integration agenda, as will be discussed in later interview narratives in sections 3 and 5. ‘Language advancement’ is clearly seen as a requirement for integration. It is this continual reference to language, which makes it an important subtopic. However, in this thesis it is not theoretically broached, but rather is part of what according to the interview data emerged as a strong ‘integration measure’, which has implications for how education is brought into the reform scenario.

The interviewee’s remark that the state should acknowledge a certain ‘societal accepted segregation’ is quite striking. It is moreover required from the part of the
individual to `make an effort to participate in the economic life and in the educational life, to make an active effort to be financially independent’. These criteria would then be a motivational appeal for the easier or earlier granting of permanent residence. It could be argued again that integration as portrayed here by Mario Gattiker is geared towards a newly immigrated group. There is no talk about granting citizenship or naturalisation as such for the larger numbers of 2nd and 3rd generation, soon 4th generation, who have settled in Switzerland for a long time and are born there. Requirements for integration refer to economic and educational integration in terms of adhering to the principles of legal order within the country, gaining economic independence and that this can be realised by the state providing integration measures based on these criteria. Mainly it would seem, through providing language advancement or the structures to ensure equality of opportunities in terms of the economic and social class the migrants are currently placed in. A progression, economic, educational and mostly political, is not really broached or referred to.

6. 3. The understanding of `culture’

In the narrative we encountered in the previous section, a loose definition is offered by Mario Gattiker (BFM) about what he understands by migration. He states that `migration means that the society is plural, it is manifold, there are different religions and different cultures, and the state institutions have to do justice to this diversity’. As mentioned before, this particular reference to pluralism, culture and diversity is quite significant. Based on federal policy texts and also pedagogical references, I would like to argue that there is a multicultural approach or ideology to migration/integration within Federal policy but also school governing/policy actors, which pertains to the notion of `integration’ set up by policy. In contrast to many educationalists as shown in this section, who have a more critical stance towards multiculturalism, the federal uptake on migration has the tendency towards viewing migration in Switzerland reflected in a `multicultural society’, with clearly distinguishable cultural groups. Although the idea of a pluralist society seems to have been taken into account by the interviewee Mario Gattiker- who is a Federal policy maker, arguably in a key position regarding `integration measures’ - it appeared significant to me in the way migrants were referred to as a particular group with particular needs. This forms a decisive link
to the discussions around language and Special Needs, both of which will be discussed in this chapter.

The advocacy of a multicultural approach to ‘integration’ could be in favour of a dichotomising ideology and be convenient for the way in which statist interests can be maintained, as Mitchell (2003) suggests. She argues that multiculturalism can function as a key national narrative of coherence and unification in countries with large migrant population. The core principle of the nation thus being difference, which is seen to be legitimized by a strong state by its ability to unify these differences in a single ‘project’; of nation-formation (on Swiss nation-formation, see chapter 2, section 2.4). The project here would be an ‘integration’ agenda, with direct reference to education and the educational role in this project or reform. The process of this ‘project’ of a unifying idea, is through the regulation of individual and carefully delineated group rights, whereby it also represents an effort to integrate or inculcate migrants into a national fitting, where difference is propagated as welcome and advantageous to the state (Kobayashi, 1993; Mitchell, 1993). From this perspective, as Kymlicka (1995) points out, a narrative of liberalism and the freedom of the individual is professed, through which it serves to perform the liberal state and create a sense of unity, tolerance and national identity, despite or inclusive of multiple differences in the popular reality. Thus, the state can operate, conceptualize, or even set the terms of the politics of difference. Cultural pluralism is encouraged, but with the clause of the groups following certain rules within what Mitchell (2003) calls ‘strict parameters of liberalism’ (see Chapters 2 and 3; Switzerland and migration politics, integration concepts). The parameters then are set in Switzerland by the rigid citizenship and naturalisation procedures and also the Law for Foreigners and the subsequent conceptualisation of ‘integration’, in which distinctive groups are addressed, i.e. ‘migrants’ and ‘Swiss’.

A main point of discussion with reference to how integration is conceptualised for the education sector involves language instruction/advancement or the need to invest in language education that many if not all interviewee policy actors highlight. One particular interviewee is Claudio Nodari, who works in and is co-founder of the Institute for Intercultural Communication in Zurich, which is a private institute providing different language related themes and services for schools, individual
teachers and teacher training. Within the context of the arguments of this chapter section, it is what appears to me a significant insight into a perspective of a language expert, who is immersed in the context of his work within discourses around language teaching and ‘culture’ or migration. Moreover, this interviewee is linked both with the teacher training college in Zurich and his own private language institute, also being the author of several obligatory textbooks on ‘Teaching German as a Second Language’ within the language curriculum in Switzerland.

I was interested in pursuing the question about the concept of ‘Interculturalism’, in particular whether there was a conscious choice of this title or concept that was adopted for the institute as opposed to or different from multiculturalism. The interviewee launches an interesting ‘definition’ about multiculturalism, which may contribute to shed some light on his conceptual standing from an educationalist point of view.

‘Multiculturality32 defines a society in which many cultures simply are together, like the antique Venice. That was a particularly multicultural society. The Doges merely asked for two criteria, that one was loyal towards the Doges and that one wore one’s culturally specific clothing; at the time, there were no identity cards. One had to therefore nurture one’s culture and wear one’s clothing, and they lived peacefully with each other during 1100 years. That was one of the longest empires, the Venetians, who existed in our cultural circle. That was a multicultural society, composed of many cultures. But it was not interculturality, in the sense, that there was an exchange and something new could develop. That is actually, what is happening here with us, and the interculturality is happening. That is the reality. Even the multilingualism is a reality.’ CN

The interviewee probably refers to interculturality and multiculturality (not as such enlisted as English vocabulary words) as a societal phenomenon whereas speaking about interculturalism and multiculturalism would describe a particular strand of thought or theory about divisions of culture in society. Within the discussion in this section when speaking about concepts related to culture however, it makes more sense to refer to multiculturalism.

32 Multikulturalitaet
However, when referring to interculturality, he describes an ‘exchange’ and the development of ‘something new’. He is quite explicit about believing that this is the case for what is happening in Switzerland in 2008, as opposed to an arguably more static multicultural situation, which maintains different cultures co-existing alongside each other without much influence of one upon the other. The linguistic situation however remains a multilingual one, ‘a reality’ according to him. This conception of the influence of migration of Swiss society is a very critical point with reference to the way in which ‘integration’ or rather ‘integration measures’ are understood by many interviewees as will be shown in the following chapter sections. My argument would be that there is a multicultural approach to the integration agenda as conceptualised by both Federal but also Cantonal integration policy makers and education actors picking this up readily. In this sense, this interviewee’s particular stance, especially from a linguistic point of view is quite salient. The way in which cultures are understood would most likely influence the way in which language is also perceived and instructed. One interviewee, as will be referred to later, speaks about the existence of a distinctive view or normative standard of ‘monolingual habitus’ amongst Swiss educationalists, which preconceives that people are per se monolingual. This would mean that they view multilingualism not as a norm, but an extraordinary situation to be ‘dealt with’ in a deficient- attributing way, i.e. separation or isolation in which a notion of quarantine springs to mind.

Looking further into his narrative, the motivation to create this private institute and the particular programme attached to it then seem more recognizable as a missive which may not be entirely in par with the existing educational/linguistic conceptions used for language education, or indeed it’s place in the wider integration scheme. Indeed this becomes clearer when we delve into the continuation of his narrative about whether the name and missive of his institute reflect this particular conceptualisation of society, culture and language.

‘Our institute name actually has a certain background; there are different institutes for Intercultural Communication in Europe and in the beginning we had an exchange. The idea was that we would make a network, which includes Spain, Germany, Switzerland and Austria. But all these institutes had so much local work that this networking then did
not happen; it stayed however. But we never had the feeling we have to change our name because we did that.

The exposure to different cultures, to languages of different cultures, all this has also to do with interculturality. If you like, the culture of instruction is not the same as before. One has to change the perspective there, one has to....everything is in flux, it is not static. A multicultural society can be static. Interculturality is a dynamic term.

**Interviewee: Could one speak about hybrid identities?**

‘Fact is that one talks too much about cultures, about multiculturality or of ‘foreign-speaking’ children and of different ethnicities. And less of the Albanian-Swiss, or Swiss-Albanian. As I am, or probably you (meaning me, the interviewer) are. And where one can no longer simply say, I am an Albanian or I am Swiss, I am half-Albanian and half-Swiss. No, no, I am fully Swiss and I am fully Italian. And I even count double in the popular count. And even in Italy I count, probably the population numbers are not then quite accurate.

**Interviewee: How or would this ideologically reflect in the classroom, of differences, of languages?**

‘Yes, there interculturality also occurs. The discourse is separating, differentiating, discriminating, in that sense, keeping apart. But during the class, in the collective class this is not the case. If one talks to teachers and then tries to bring in this differentiation, then they say I have an Albanian who is much better than the Swiss...I (the interviewee personally) cannot work in teaching with this concept, which stems from the multiculturality line of thinking. It is about building up the school competences in language within school, so that everybody has school success. These are clearly strategic language logical competences and not only word forms. That is what it is about. To be able to write a text with coherence and texture. This capacity is not or is not yet purposefully conveyed. A lot is done linguistically but not with regard to textuality and also the coherence of train of thought. In a certain sense, it is the old school of rhetoric, which the Greeks had. This somehow came beneath the wheels with the communicative turn. It is a deficit, which exists. ’

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33 German; starr: could also be translated as ‘fixed’ or ‘inflexible’, but in this context I chose static.
34 Texthaftigkeit: a self-constructed word not actually listed but meaning everything concerning the proper writing of a text. I tried to do a similar self-construction with English, ‘textuality’
35 Unter die Raeder kommen: to come beneath the wheels, meaning it got submerged or down-trodden
The development of his argument regarding multicultural versus intercultural approach to teaching becomes more explicit here when he talks about interculturalism as opposed to multiculturalism, which can be static, is more dynamic and that education perspective has to change here. He personally cannot come to terms with or use the multicultural stance, which other teachers are seen to have, in his teaching approach. For him, the language logical competences as he calls them are ‘strategic’ rather than culturally orientated. Speaking too much about ‘cultures, foreign-language speakers and ethnicities’ are seen to be no longer valid for contemporary identities. He particularly refers to us both, Interviewer and Interviewee as examples for what one could refer to as hybrid identities, in which one is fully Swiss or fully Italian, and not restricted to terms such as half-Swiss or half-Albanian. This is an interesting notion of identity, although identity as a term never crops up within the interview. Throughout all interviews, I was particularly struck by this absence of use of this term ‘identity’. Rather people spoke about culture or ethnicity or ‘foreign-language’ or migrant when referring to any kind of identity attribution.

‘Discourse’ he explains is ‘separating, differentiating’ and eventually ‘discriminating and keeping apart’, but within the classroom collective this no longer matters or happens. So interculturality is seen to be a classroom reality too from the interviewee’s perspective. However he makes a distinction when it comes to the teacher, who in his/her reference to children then does use this separating or attributing choice of words, as in ‘I have an Albanian who is better than the Swiss’. This stance Nodari refers to as a multicultural stance, which he personally negates.

On a similar note, Markus Truninger - who is the founding father of the project QUIMS, Quality in Multicultural Schools, and is a policy maker within the Public School Office in the Education Directorate of Zurich - speaks about his idea of integration and the role of education as being more holistically orientated, by ‘building’ society through everyone involved, rather than what I argue is the contrasting federal view of ‘integrating’ a distinctly separate group into an already existing whole (see later argument about ‘multiculturalism’).

‘Well, I understand by integration that one builds a whole out of parts. This means, a society or a city or a canton, or a population should build
a good, colluding whole out of these parts. Actually, I do not believe in
the integration term, where some have to get integrated, but rather
integration - how it is also within the wording - to construct a whole out
of the parts. Not to take in some into a whole, which is how it is often
understood. However, this is my own definition, which I am using here.
In school, it is about a functional whole, well functioning is a criterion,
but also that these parts also can be of same value and having equal
rights and (feeling) equally well, or at least find a position. And this
naturally also applies for society, but it also applies to school as a school
unit, or for a class. (…) School naturally has an integration mandate,
also towards society; well school has in itself an integration mandate.
But it is clear that school should prepare apart from qualification also the
functioning of society. The integration mandate is part of the mandate
that school has. ’

School is perceived as a clear area which has a preparatory function for both
qualification but also the ‘functioning of society’, which is what integration is about
for the interviewee. Equal rights, and feeling equally well in the environment is
something which is remarked and goes in line with the social-democratic values,
which other educationalists we will encounter speak about. Moreover, he emphasises
that this is his personal definition, which is not always understood that way in policy.
In fact the interviewee points out that ‘I do not believe in the integration term, where
some have to get integrated’. It is interesting to observe the following bit of his
narrative in the context of the project QUIMS, Quality in Multicultural Schools.

*Interviewer (me): How is integration understood within the QUIMS mandate?*

‘Well, the title is tricky, we ask ourselves this sometimes too. It is
deceptive, and perhaps puts the attention in the wrong direction, but we
are speaking about the sphere of activity for school success and of social
integration. Well, the culture of recognition and equality and not
necessarily… naturally intercultural learning can play a role. That one
understands something of cultural differences or understands how to
handle it or of manifold identities – but that naturally is not the main
theme of QUIMS. The main theme is learning, learning achievements.
From our self-perception, culturalism is critical. We are never
completely on (this track)…we have a critical debate since…or always
have had. Or Radtke for example, there one has already discussed this
fifteen years ago. Well, naive multiculturalism I do not see as valuable,
but rather even dangerous, that one strengthens or that one makes some
kind of typologies into the main objects of learning. ’ MT
The interesting aspect about this narrative section is how Markus Truninger speaks about the dangers of a ‘naive multiculturalism’ and that ‘culturalism’ as such has been regarded as critical by educationalists, or their specific group. Previously, Claudio Nodari speaks about the difficulty of pinning down ‘culture’, and also gives his own definition of ‘interculturalism’, which according to him views society as a place in which different cultures mutually influence each other and create something new on a constant basis, in contrast to the concept of ‘multiculturalism’. Here, although the title of the project lead by Markus Truninger is *Quality in Multicultural Schools (QUIMS)*, the actual conceptual outlook seems to move away from multiculturalism in his own understanding and refer more to ‘*inclusion*’, as he speaks about equality, learning and recognition. Similarly, Andrea Lanfranchi, who is a school psychologist and lecturer for the Special Needs pedagogical institute in Zurich, negates the idea of ‘multiculturalism’ (see section 4 on Special Needs).

Moving into the governing level of the *Education Council of Canton Zurich* and also the *Zurich Teacher’s Association*, both interviewees also provide the point of view of teachers as well as being part of local education politics. Although politically still at the cantonal governing level, as teachers they are arguably more rooted in the local context or the direct school context and are discussed with this proximity to school practice. However, I would like to argue, both interviewees hold very different political positions with reference to migration and ‘migrants within their education system’.

The following interviewee, **Hans-Peter Amstutz** is a member of the *Education Council of Zurich*, having taught for over twenty years as a secondary school teacher and having been a Cantonal Minister in the Zurich Cantonal Council for sixteen years prior to his present office in 2009 as Education Council member. His understanding of ‘integration’ broach many similar references to those we encountered with the other interviewees from an education point of view, however with a more practice-oriented or personal stance with respect to ‘migrants’.

‘Well, I have the impression that integration, especially with people from the lower social class, especially from the Balkans, has failed quite
a bit. Everyone, who has a certain education level, or even just the Italians, they have been integrated much better, or people with good education from abroad, that is not a problem. I think, somewhere there, something has gone wrong with these people, largely from the Balkans, well around for half it worked. For girls integration is essentially better than for boys; this one has to say in the same breath. Nevertheless, a part of these lads has not even learned the language properly. One has missed them out there; one should have done something much earlier and further down. We have today in the upper school level, youth, who are speaking a (kind of) German, which cannot be listened to. Probably you know this, it is slang, and integration has partly failed so badly that they then make a kind of ghetto formation. And they come into a defensive demeanour, because they are apparently also not capable, or I don’t know what it comes down to. Because they are from the lowest class, the potential is missing a bit for them to receive some backup from home for learning; these are resources. That one is coming into our culture and must achieve a certain performance\textsuperscript{36} (level).

This one has to look at closely, well for me there are three or four reasons for a failed integration, I have already named it a little: the first reason; there are really too many people from the lowest class, there was nearly no rearrangement while coming in, well when they only have people, who are absolutely near-illiterate\textsuperscript{37}. A colleague says, one cannot suddenly make academics out of shepherds, but that is simply a fact. The second reason is, our country has not demanded enough that the assimilation or integration should occur, which means these ghetto formations could begin relatively soon. These people have been totally alienated. In the beginning, there were men who had jobs, they namely did the hard work, steel workers and who knows what not. But the women have had to remain at home, and that already did not work, right. There were huge problems. And the third reason is, our state has failed, by really not requiring German integration, well the language acquisition. One should have pressurized these schools from below that one says, we will not let these children hang around with these couple of hours\textsuperscript{38}, but rather had not seen to that one had for example half a year of intensive German lessons. In some municipalities, it has been done, and where the will was strong, it is better. (…) But I think in essence one has taken it too less seriously. In Germany one talks about for example – this is quite a dangerous word actually – but from the understanding one talks about a standard culture\textsuperscript{39}. You probably know this word. You

\textsuperscript{36} Leistung erbringen

\textsuperscript{37} bildungsfern: literally ‘far from education’.

\textsuperscript{38} Stuendchen: literally ‘little hours’

\textsuperscript{39} Leitkultur: defining culture, prevailing culture or standard culture
know how dangerous that it is, but a little something is there, when one actually does not know, what kind of rules there should be in a civilisation or a culture then it becomes critical. That is that. For other people, well the integration of the Spanish or the Italians, this had – I have experienced that in the seventies- also had caused some problems, but in comparison to how it is with the Balkans, it was harmless, it is a big difference. And now the Italians are delineating themselves from those of the Balkans, and that is bad, right. ‘ HA

This interviewee has strong views on what he calls a ‘failed integration’. On the one hand, he blames the migrants, or rather more specifically people from the Balkans for not having sufficiently integrated. He names a few reasons for this failed integration; low socio-economic background of this group to start with, the Swiss authorities not having demanded enough for them to ‘assimilate’ or ‘integrate’ (he seems to refer to these synonymously), and not having seen to require sufficient German acquisition. One of the ways in which he perceives the state to have demanded more ‘integration’ is the ways of adapting to local culture, or what he even refers to as adhering to a ‘standard culture’, or knowing the ‘rules of a civilization’ enough. A critical remark is when he speaks about how he thinks that ‘they (the migrants) come into a defensive demeanour, because they are apparently also not capable, or I don’t know what it comes down to’. Capability he goes on to explain means ‘because they are from the lowest class, the potential is missing a bit for them to receive some backup from home for learning; these are resources. That one is coming into our culture and must achieve a certain performance’. Again, we encounter the social class issue and the ‘problem’ of pupils not having the resources given from home to ensure equal chances. However, this interviewee also strongly attributes a responsibility to ‘integrate’ and ‘achieve’ to the migrants, and efforts from ‘their side’. This stance is interesting and has arguably certain similarities in the way the federal law conceptualises integration, as partly also something that must be ‘followed’ or ‘made an effort towards’ by the migrants themselves, in a way of being recipients; which I would like to argue has connotations towards the provider role of the state.

He points out that ‘standard culture’ is a dangerous word to use, probably referring to a kind of racist or ethnocentric meaning attributed to this reference to culture. However, he goes on to state that ‘there might be something there’, meaning that there still is a validity to this phrase. It is noteworthy to observe the kind of terminology
and expressions he uses, such as ‘ghetto formation’, ‘huge problems’ when women from the Balkans are staying at home and their men are working, ‘one cannot make academics out of shepherds’. This interviewee arguably has a stance towards what he perceives as this particular migrant group from the Balkans as being of lowest class, of not fitting in with comparison to other migrant groups such as Italian or Spanish.

I asked Hans-Peter Amstutz to talk more about his reference to language acquisition which he mentions as being a crucial factor, why integrating is ‘failing’.

*Interviewer (me): Is language something that is key to integration, which has to be advanced in school?*

‘Yes. Very central. You know the project that one advances language with the special program, the name of which escapes me. But one does not only language, but rather one tries to animate foreign parents, that they can show what they cook or a kind of exchange. I think it is right; language is an enormous key. I also believe however that the other has to happen too, it is also wrong if they cannot cultivate the language at home. For example, that works relatively badly with the Albanians. The Italians had a certain pride; the course in native language and culture is a subject, and there they had demanded considerably. The children did not always like going, but it was the pride of the Spanish, the Italians, they did that. And it appears to me that the native language and culture, which falls apart because the Balkan area is so fragmented itself. You cannot say everybody should attend the same course together, that would result in the biggest rumpus. Well, although they are a large number from this area, they are also fragmented. Well language, there our school has to certainly do a lot, we have to appear more demanding. (...) Well, one is allowed to retain one’s own roots, but if one is living in a country and one wants to live here, and the most want to live here, I don’t believe that they would like to go back down there, then one has to say to oneself we have two roots with time, and one has to nurture them. (...) The most important thing is that one has a good German lesson and that these children who have language deficits can educate themselves further in courses in school.’ HA

At times, the way this interviewee refers quite pointedly to what he perceives is the Balkan migrant group as being different in characteristic to other migrant groups; I would like to argue that amongst Swiss teachers, there could be attitudes to

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marginalize or ‘problematise’ what they see as this particular migrant group from the Balkans. In chapter 4, Swiss national research studies are discussed, which are centred on the large groups of students being streamed into Special Classes for Children with learning difficulties. These studies are seen to show that the majority of students who are represented within these classes, with increasing over-proportional numbers over the past thirty years, are largely pupils with migrant background from the Balkans. The educational discourse around this is that due to low socio-economic background, but also largely due to potentially xenophobic attitudes amongst teaching staff or perpetuated misconceptions stemming from a view of this particular group as being different, ‘more difficult to deal with’, ‘having disciplinary problems’, ‘being less capable’, not being able to ‘adapt’, these children have also been increasingly allocated or streamed into Special Needs classes (see section 5, Andrea Lanfranchi, Priska Sieber). The interviewee Hans- Peter Amstutz refers to the war-ridden or ‘fragmented’ background the Balkans represent and that this could cause ‘problems’ if one tries to develop or nurture the native language or culture; this group could not be homogenised, as Italians or Spanish. Generally, with reference to this narrative, I would like to argue that there is a strong implication made by the interviewee that migrants have certain characteristics, which contribute to a ‘failure in integration’. This points to a ‘problematised’ perception of migrants or migration. The argument of this particular kind of implication/problematisation existing amongst teachers in Switzerland, and more right-wing orientated party political rhetoric, is supported by the different narratives we encounter throughout these analysis chapters and by the discussions within the studies referred to in chapter 4.

A somewhat different stance is given by Lilo Laetsch, the head of the Teachers’ Association of Zurich (TAZ)\textsuperscript{41}, who speaks about how she had been approached by people to enter into school politics, when she had caused some commotion by continually using everything in the feminine form in school, around 1987. This kind of feminist approach of that time, she now explains, probably is outdated in 2008, but had struck a chord with the Teachers’ Association at the time, and brought her into school politics.

\textsuperscript{41} Teachers’s Union
’When one integrates oneself, then one loses a part of one’s own identity in a way. And I actually don’t want this. These children are living in two worlds, an old world and a new. And in my opinion there should be two integration criteria, that the ones who come here should learn the language, that is the most important. But that the people here, the Swiss, also learn to accept the other, the second culture. It shouldn’t just be a taking, but also a giving. I personally actually never had problems, also have had Muslims in the class, also girls with headscarf and they have never had problems within the class. Only towards outside, when we were outside, then they got problems from outside from society. But it was also an open girl, and did not have problems in that sense in communicating. For example I give (teach) ’religion and the world’, because I find it interesting and there we visited different church or religious prayer houses and that was interesting. Many Muslims visited a mosque for the first time with me. And that is the kind of perception, is not it, that all Muslims go to the mosque, that is not true; those are the kind of prejudices, right. It is always about ’the school has to do this and that and that’, but it can’t. School has a clear education mandate42, which it observes. There has to be a certain upbringing43 (mandate), but mainly it is about school. There should be frameworks given for integration, so that we can even work with this group and not the other way around. The education mandate shouldn’t be 10% school and 90% something else. Integration is important as a requirement so that school can even function.’

This interviewee also seems to negate the idea of ‘integration’ as it is currently understood in policy, however when it comes to an ‘integration’, then she believes it should be from the point of view of the migrants acquiring language, but she also believes that the Swiss have to learn to ‘accept’ the other culture. She goes on to speak about how prejudices can exist with reference to the homogeneity of a cultural or religious group and her own practical experience in her classroom. The education mandate is seen to include an integration mandate, however, she rates the ‘other’ function of school, ‘upbringing’ or perhaps socialisation as being only part of the school mandate. Her statement about how school is required ‘to do this and that’ probably reflects the impression that a lot is being asked of school with reference to a kind of socialisation or integration.

42 Bildungsauftrag
43 Erziehung: difficult term to translate into English: it can mean upbringing or education, but usually refers to upbringing which is thought as something parental, but in this case the interviewee is saying that school has a certain mandate to bring up children as well the schooling mandate.; differentiation between schooling and upbringing
An interesting point with reference to both interviewees on this cantonal level and the teaching strata is that they both voice the perception that there are ‘two roots’ or ‘two worlds’ for migrant students, in which they live in, and that both should be nurtured or acknowledged. However, the way in which this is brought about is quite different; on the one hand there is the stance that the migrants themselves are responsible and need to make efforts ‘to integrate’ in a manner of recipient actors, and on the other hand there is the perception that the state or Swiss need to acknowledge and accept the existence of ‘the other culture’ as a reality. What I would like to argue is that however, both attitudes ‘problematising’ migration in the sense of there being a ‘separating’ or ‘dichotomising’ way in which things are perceived or discursively spoken about.

6. 4. Special Needs and the dichotomising of students

Regine Buehlmann of the EDK (Education Ministers Directorate, intercantonal education body), is quoted here because it epitomizes the debate around Special Needs and the ideology behind this strand of education:

‘The EDK\textsuperscript{44} attempts a narrowing down of the term integration without making a claim that it could be a definition. (...) Well, the traditional content of integration is the integration of disabled children, therefore in a special needs\textsuperscript{45} sense. However, I would say that later the discussion around integration then ran under the label of ‘inclusion’, which is not so popular in Switzerland, but since recently still is running. This was actually running parallel, well the migration area and the special needs area took up this question simultaneously so to speak. Still, the special needs pedagogy has a much longer tradition and from that angle, one has to always make clear, because one has extreme overlaps\textsuperscript{46}, right. You mentioned in your paper about the difficulty\textsuperscript{47} of the special classes (for children with learning difficulties, see Chapter 2 term description) and there one has the segregation of any form of disability, which is nearly a bit too much. Learning disabled,

\textsuperscript{44} Education Ministers Directorate: see section 1.1 for short description
\textsuperscript{45} German: sonderpaedagogisch
\textsuperscript{46} German: Schnittstelle: can be translated as interface or overlap.
\textsuperscript{47} German: Problematik: noteworthy in terms of another ‘problematising’ stance, which is not apparent in the English translation.
behaviourally disabled, whatever, and there one has also a discussion whether there is an overrepresentation of migrants\textsuperscript{48} in these classes, which later possibly are classified as disabled due to cultural behaviour.’ RB

This interviewee is working since ten years as a Migration Appointee (affiliated with the Federal Commission for Foreigners, now called Federal Commission for Migration) in the Education Directors Conference (EDK). This is an intercantonal educational body consisting of all the education ministers of every Canton as a directorate and also encompassing around 500 employees in what appears to be a large network of education policy administrators, researchers, policy brokers and ministerial bureaucrats. However, it is also associated with and represented by some Federal authorities, education authorities within Cantons and Local Authorities alike. Section 6.6 will elaborate more about the impact and power of this educational body.

She refers to the traditional uptake of integration, which has both roots in the ‘migration’ discursive area, but also the ‘special needs’ strand of discourse. Special Needs is seen to be the older tradition, in the sense of ‘taking up the question of’ migrants, it is to be assumed. In Special Needs, disability refers to various forms of disability. The striking classification, which according to Buehlmann took place at some point within the special needs recent history is the potential classification of ‘culture’ or ‘cultural behaviour’ as a disability, which then ensued an overrepresentation of migrants within these classes. About the nature of special needs/classes and patterns of special class student numbers in Swiss schools, several national studies of recent years suggest a steady rise and overrepresentation of migrant students, which have been decisive or frequently referred to in both pedagogical research and school policy likewise and are presented in Chapter 4. 

Regine Buehlmann speaks about the segregation structure, which is a topic which is very closely associated with the argument made in this chapter about the origins of a distinctive ‘Special Needs or separating\textsuperscript{49} ideology’. However, it is important to note that Buehlmann differentiates between two thinking strands, which develop parallel according to her, ‘the migration area’ and the ‘special needs area’. If we look at

\textsuperscript{48} German: Migrantinnen und Migranten: feminine and masculine forms: this particular interviewee always uses both forms, also the same person, who referred to the ‘feminisation of migration’, which is quite interesting.

\textsuperscript{49} Separierende Schulform
interviewees who could be considered people situated in either respective area, their narratives give us a deeper insight into how these developments might be potentially linked in the view of the interviewees and how the discourses might differ or have a space of ‘overlap’ or ‘interface’.

If we take this initial quotation about the special needs area of discourse as a starting point, the following interview narratives begin to weave a more coherent story about how these developments might have happened during the individual interviewee work histories and what kind of concerns and conclusions they draw from their own experiences.

One interviewee stood out with respect to this discourse amongst these narratives because he had been brought to my prior notice while I conducted the media analysis (see Chapter 5 In one article, he was interviewed as an academic expert on Special Needs issues in a newspaper, which is the more centre-left larger newspaper in Zurich, Tages Anzeiger. The article featured an academic viewpoint and OECD studies as a background for arguments against educational separation/streaming and the ‘Special class system’ in Switzerland.

The interviewee Andrea Lanfranchi is a researcher/lecturer at the Zurich College for Curative or Therapeutic Pedagogy (Heilpaedagogik). His work is linked to child psychology; language learning and special needs schooling. What interested me while doing the media analysis was his perspective on tendencies in Switzerland with respect to Special Needs allocation (Tages Anzeiger, Nr. 118, 23. May 2001). I decided at that point to try to interview him personally if this was possible, as he may provide an interesting insight into this specialist strand of public school, which seems to be so distinctive in its own educational history and development, which becomes evident as we proceed into this narrative. It makes sense here to present his entry and personal history in terms of his line of work in his own words, as the narrative then links to topics, which are quite elementary for the arguments of this chapter section.

‘I come from the Italian Switzerland, am actually a labour migrant. We do not have universities in the south, or they did not have as I was studying at the time. I began working as a school psychologist immediately after my studies, at the School Psychology Office in
Zurich. As a school psychologist, you are very much at the forefront of the school happenings and you also see the sins of education politics, and of migration politics and social politics. And after ten years, eleven years school psychology I had had enough and then I was educator at the teacher seminary (teacher training college today), in Zurich. Now I am at the College for Therapeutic Pedagogy (HFH)\textsuperscript{50}. There I mostly engage in questions of integration, migration and do research in the area of advancement; Mostly prevention of achievement problems. Since a couple of years, I am engaged in the teaching and research with an emphasis on small children of pre-school age. I am lecturer at the HFH and there we are in a large team. (...) In this respect, I have a profile in research. Sometimes there is political consultation; I am in the Federal Commission for Questions on Family. There we engage in family politics and a part of it is `migration and family'. And education now plays a big role too. We are in the process of writing up a study with different chapters; family, upbringing and education. And this means, that...we are today of the opinion that a lot which succeeds in school or does not succeed has something to do with the family. Earlier we always used to look away a little. ` AL

Interviewer (me): Was there an ideological change, since the time he was employed at the School Psychology Office?

`I was there from 84 to 94, and those were the nineties, there was something like `special needs educationalisation’\textsuperscript{51} of the children; at the time special classes were created like mushrooms. This thought of having to optimise every child with advancement, but the idea was always, you can find experts\textsuperscript{52}, specialists\textsuperscript{53}. You have to delegate the child to the dyslexia therapist, to the special classes, to the special schools. And this time I have experienced very strongly, which was then a reason why I left. I no longer wanted to represent this sorting of children. I have seen for ten years 1500 children each year and have certainly placed half of them somewhere, partly against the conviction of the family and against my own conviction. Therefore, something changed, meaning until the year 2000 this special needs educationalisation increased, in Canton Zurich actually until the year 2005. Now we have....but we are talking about a systemic change since twenty years and now it is slowly but surely taking place. ` AL

\textsuperscript{50} German: Hochschule fuer Heilpaedagogik; `Heilpaedagogik’ can be translated as Curative, or Therapeutic or even as Orthopedagogy

\textsuperscript{51} German: Sonderpaedagogisierung; at best can be translated as processes leading up to special needs classification of children; educationalising them towards special needs.

\textsuperscript{52} German: Fachperson

\textsuperscript{53} German: Fachspezialisten
While conducting this particular interview, I was struck by the way in he offered a more personal narrative in contrast to many other interviews with policy makers and educationalists, who had the tendency to speak on behalf of their organisations, groups or departments and seldom used personal terminology.

He speaks about how you are at the ‘forefront of school happening’ as a school psychologist, and that there you have the insight into what he calls the ‘sins of education, migration and social politics’. He describes how during the decade of the nineties, a special needs way of thinking or what he refers to as a ‘special needs educationalisation’ occurred, where delegating away from yourself to an expert had, as I understand, become a trend or a norm. In the latter part of his interview, he goes on to elaborate about this delegating ideology. Quite striking is the way in which he explains his reasons for leaving that job, because ‘he no longer wanted to represent this sorting of the children’. Of which he speaks about having been responsible for ‘placing somewhere’, probably in the sense of having sorted or allocated them to specialist classes. Moreover, this was done, the interviewee explains, ‘against the conviction of the family’ and even ‘against his own conviction’. There is a strong sense of self-responsibility running across this narrative, in which the interviewee can no longer accept or ‘represent’ this manner of ‘sorting’, after having experienced or enacted it ‘strongly’ during the years of his work.

As I wanted to pursue this change in both structure and ideology, which he refers to during his narrative, I asked him about what his perspective on potential reasons were for these changes.

‘There are two catalysts; the first is that the measures are expensive, the money, the people who have to make the budget noticed that a lot of money to little effect is out of the window. And the other thing is, there are demographic changes and the teachers54 now notice slowly that there are lesser children and that because one is taking only the best ones from the majority and not everyone. Perhaps integration is failing because the teachers are losing their material, and that is a terrible thing. But I do not think on the level of ideology; in Italy, I was there at the time of the abolishment of the psychiatry and the special

54 German: Lehrerinnen; feminine form
classes. I was in Bologna, Rimini last week and we visited schools. But in Italy, there was an ideological movement. They said, this is not good what we are doing here and we have to stop with this separation. But here it is not the ideology, it is because of the money instead and the great number of children. `AL

Two reasons are named for an intended structural change; the realisation that a lot of money was being spent on measures, which did not show the desired result. And the other reason is that teachers are losing student numbers through the allocations and fear for their jobs. However, the interviewee does not believe that change in Switzerland is happening due to a change in ideology, as in Italy, where he explains change happened because of a conscious decision to move away from a separating ideology, because it is seen to be a negative or harmful way. The first reason he enlists is an issue which many interviewees referred to, as will be shown throughout this chapter, particularly within section 6 about school reforms; the idea that the separating school system was a failure of financial investment. More about this is discussed in chapter 4.

I was interested in finding out more about his views on this shift away from separation/streaming towards integration, and whether school is used as an instrument.

`Well, I do think that our only change, if one embeds this discourse with migrants – you (me, the interviewer) have here an emphasis on education sociology and integration – if one thinks about equal chances\textsuperscript{55}, then I do think that this reform movement now is meaningful, because where else should integration begin if not in school; there is where it starts. I draw hope from it that it is a good contribution towards equality of chances (see footnote 40). Well for me the ideology comes in fact afterwards\textsuperscript{56}. I endorse these integration efforts, which one could also call `inclusion`. Also from the angle that we cannot proceed in this way; this dichotomising of Swiss and Foreigners. Well, I actually come from this branch, the awareness of this absurd separation. We have now in the school system of Canton Zurich in the Upper school level (see Chapter 1 Appendix of Swiss school system scheme) of Secondary C classes for foreigners\textsuperscript{57}. Under

\textsuperscript{55} German: Chancengerechtigkeit: can be literally translated as’ just chances’; gerecht meaning ‘just’.

\textsuperscript{56} German: im Nachhinein: can be translated as ‘afterwards’ or also ‘in hindsight’.

\textsuperscript{57} German: Auslaenderklassen
the disguise of school structures one has the foreigners, but in principle, it becomes more and more evident that we have the less desired children with migration background in this Upper School Level. AL

The interviewee clearly supports the idea of integration associated with education, or ‘inclusion’, because school is ‘where it starts’. He states that this is ‘our only chance’, given the link with discourse around migrants, to make a ‘good contribution towards equality of chances.’ Something which differentiates this interviewee from most of the other interviewees is his choice of words with reference to equal chances; he uses the term Chancengerechtigkeit, instead of Chancengleichheit, the latter of which usually is used within policy texts or by policy actors, meaning equality of chances. Gerechtigkeit literally translates as ‘justice’, which gives the term Chancengerechtigkeit a flavour of being a kind of counter-action for discrimination, or associated with the idea of discrimination. A just chance would be the idea behind this noun, which in German is constructed from two words, as indeed many nouns are which one seldom encounters in English.

An interesting remark is ‘for me the ideology comes afterwards’, which could mean that he does not despair of the change happening due to other than ideological reasons, as he explains in the previous narrative section. Rather, he believes that the ideological change can happen after the structural change has been implemented.

Quite crucial within this quote was in my view that he says ‘we cannot proceed in this way; this dichotomising of Swiss and Foreigners. Well, I actually come from this branch, the awareness of this absurd separation’. The term dichotomy struck a chord with the underlying current of the Special Needs or ‘separating’ ideology, which was running so strongly as a discursive thread throughout all interviews. He classifies himself as belonging to the line of thinking in which making the absurdity of separation known or conscious to the educational sector, as I would understand, is the idea behind his work. He proceeds to give an example of migrant children being put into Upper Level Secondary School C, which is for lower achievement requirements, and which according to the interviewee have become convenient places to situate these children under the guise of ‘school structures’. About the classifications and
numbers of students within different school level types within the Swiss school system, please see Chapter 4. One of my questions was whether awkwardness existed, as to how to deal with the situation.

`In the beginning there was the opinion that this was an achievement, that we appointed these specialists and that they did a much better job than the generalists. This is very good for the children to send them to specialists. We ourselves are the misery, because we ourselves believed in this progress. Keyword, dyslexia therapy, right, as I myself have done specialisations, it came as a kind of clinical thinking. We are like in a clinic. And then, in my view – I am not a education politician, I was always in the forefront – at some point, we no longer followed up the numbers and no longer saw that this was happening.

Yesterday, I requested from the Education Directorate, from the Education Statistics, I was just curious, about the separation of the Special C Classes of city Zurich, these kids with hearing-or language difficulties. I have the numbers here now, I can show you, there were as I was in the city, 1984, sixty children in these classes, yes, around three or four classes with children with great language difficulties. Some years later there were hundred and twenty. Then a woman was employed as a coordinator, who took over the coordination as a logopediatrician, who coordinated within the city Zurich, which child comes in which class. And in the next year since she was employed, in three or four years, the number doubled. However, nobody actually noticed that. At some point somebody realised that there are no longer sixty, but three hundred and fifty, within fifteen years. That cannot be, that we produce three hundred language disabled. Therefore, there are mechanisms in these organisations that unfortunately are not based on chance. For instance, this coordination most certainly catered for their own establishment; logopediatricians who happen to have this job, one cannot reproach them for that. But we have to look at this self-critically and say, we did not notice for a long time how strongly the numbers have increased. And at some point, this was obvious. Because then also the costs increased.` AL

This is a key section of his narrative, as he speaks about how the Special Needs sector had an inherent belief that what they were doing was an `achievement’, specialisation being seen as an asset for the individual care or attention of children with learning difficulties. `We ourselves are the misery, because we ourselves
believed in the progress’ is a decisive comment. An interesting analogy he makes is that a ‘clinical thinking’ occurred, in which possibly children with any different normative traits were treated as ‘clinical cases’, which would be better looked after in the hands of specialists.

In the second half of this narrative section, he goes on to explain how the numbers started shooting up over the years, of children in special classes for learning ‘disabilities’ or difficulties. Particularly from the moment this coordinator for logopediatricians was employed. He states that there is a moment of recognition about ‘what was happening’ and that ‘there are mechanisms in these organisations that are not based on chance’. The term mechanisms is often referred to within some national follow up studies (see Chapter 4), or some studies conducted in Germany by Gomolla and Radtke (2002) with reference to their theory of ‘institutional discrimination’. This study was frequently quoted or referred to by Swiss national studies with the theme of separation or over-representation of migrants within special schools. Gomolla and Radtke (2002) suggest the possibility of academic or school failure because of ‘organizational activities’ (2002:54): for more details see chapter 4. Based on the research studies conducted by Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963, 1968), they argue that it depends not only on the performance of a child, but largely upon the already existing possibilities of an organization how a certain situation, in this case academic failure or maladaptation to a class, is assessed and dealt with. In other words, as long as a certain percentage of places in special classes are organizationally pre-provided for and expected, these will be most likely used, despite all other efforts to alleviate the allocation numbers (Kormann, 1998; quoted in Kronig, 2002). With a similar logic, Lanfranchi mentions that there is a kind of logic in the self-preservation of establishments such as the logopediatricians, which cannot be reproached, as people do want to perpetuate their work area. However, that in the face of what was happening, there needs to be a degree of ‘self-criticism’.

Due to his specific stance, in which he situates himself as belonging to a branch committed towards the idea of integration or inclusion, questions were asked with reference to teacher training; did this sector change in its way of training due to the commitment to move away from specialism or delegation, as he had stated previously.
‘Very clearly. In the PHs (teacher training) most surely. In the College for Therapeutic Pedagogy, we now have a paper, a kind of concept, which quite clearly declares, we are now working in the direction of integration and that flows into the modules. It is a crosscutting theme, which is entering all the modules. But at the same time, we still have the training of logopediatricians, experts, psychomotor therapists, of people, who work with mentally disabled. There are departments where the things are networked and we have many common focus points. People, who really only do integration assignments and people with special assignments, working with autistic children. This means that for us the official policy is integration, advancement of integration. We also are strongly criticized as a College for Therapeutic Pedagogy by some Special Schools. There are these unions of special school teachers, they criticize by saying, ‘you are not loyal toward the people, who are working in the field’. Through this new system, with the abolishment of special classes, there are unfortunately some children, who fall through the meshes and end up in special schools for behaviourally conspicuous. One of the sections of these special schools criticizes that now it is showing that this integration is not successful, because these children end up with them. But we try to involve them repeatedly and not to dogmatically say, either integration or separation. It is a process. In German Switzerland, it is not like in Italy, an abrupt implementation of a total integration. (…) I must say there is no Canton in Switzerland, in which there isn’t something about integration in its legislation.  `AL

What is described here by Andrea Lanfranchi comes across as a complete hundred and eighty degree turn from a separating ideology towards a ‘crosscutting’ and ‘official policy’ of a concept of integration for the HFH (College for Therapeutic Pedagogy), as all modules are remodelled to include this integrative approach. What stands out in this narrative is the bit about how the HFH is critiqued heavily by the special needs teachers’ unions, who see this integrative approach as being ‘disloyal’ towards the people in the field, or as I gather the specialists. However, specialism is continued to be developed or trained alongside this integrative crosscutting missive. Lanfranchi does not elaborate how these two developments would co-exist. The critics are still attempted to be included in any discussion, despite their stance, so that there is not a dogmatic approach saying ‘either integration or separation’.

58 German: die offizielle Politik; literally politics, but also here policy.
59 German: verhaltensauffaellig
When referred to what his stance is on the changes that are happening, with reference particularly to migrants, he states in a further part of the narrative that `We are all somewhat overtaken by events; me too and Markus too (Markus Truninger, project leader of `QUIMS’, Quality in Multicultural Schools in Zurich). I believe that with time we have to take some distance from this idea of multiculturalism.` His positioning in terms of culture as an attribution or a factor, with reference to the separating ideology, is critical in terms of being within the public school sector and particularly within the special needs strand of education. Both Claudio Nodari and Andrea Lanfranchi seemed to defend the idea of moving away from multiculturalism and the idea of a `dichotomising’ of Swiss and migrants. An interesting point is that both people work in what could be seen as an interface between the public school sector and research or focus, on either special needs or language respectively. And they could both be grouped broadly as belonging to what Regine Buehlmann had distinguished as the `education’ side of the discourse. An argument in favour of this distinction increases as other interviewees with similar interface work positions are looked at.

This section moves on to present an interviewee with a similar stance, Priska Sieber, who is however positioned within teacher training, in the Swiss Conference of Rectors of Universities of Teacher Education (COHEP), as a researcher or project coordinator with the working group of Intercultural Pedagogy. This conference consists of commissioned groups working on different themes of teacher training. One of these themes having been identified as `Intercultural Pedagogy’, the origins of the title of which Priska Sieber talks about as part of her personal history narrative;

`Well the title is somewhat historical here; it was strongly discussed in this group. It is controversial, not everybody is happy with it, but for historical reasons, it is still called Intercultural Pedagogy. The working group consists of different people from PHs (Colleges for Teacher Training), and always one person representing the COHEP from the secretariat, who is more responsible for the flow of information amongst the group. The discourse was from below, the missive to cover this topic from above; we had a mandate from the COHEP, we have to do an enquiry on a drawback60, however in which I have to say

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60 German: *Missstandserhebung*: can be translated as an enquiry on something that is noticed to have gone wrong
in parentheses, we formulated the mandate, parenthesis closed. How did one institutionalise intercultural pedagogy while doing the institutionalisation of the College for Teacher Training as part of the training? And the other thing is to formulate further recommendations based on this enquiry, and a further point would be to suggest Best Practice now.’

PS

This initial narration about the working group and its broad missive set the tone of this interview, which gives quite a in depth insight into what the interviewee believes are the discourses related to ‘intercultural pedagogy’ and ‘migration meets education’ that run within the teacher training units of Switzerland and the joint efforts to create some mandates which could be applicable for all PHs, or colleges. The remark made on the creation of the missive or mandate stands out in it the choice of wording; ‘The discourse was from below, the missive to cover this topic from above; we had a mandate from the COHEP, we have to do an enquiry on a drawback, however in which I have to say in parentheses, we formulated the mandate, parenthesis closed.’ Priska Sieber refers to the discourse coming from ‘below’, by which I presume she means the education forefront or teachers or teaching as such. Whereas then the missive came from ‘above,’ i.e. the COHEP Directorate as a collective. These two movements are quite critical in terms of how the demand or conceptualisation of ‘intercultural pedagogy’ was brought to notice or where it actually originates within the public school sector and specifically in teacher training.

I was interested in the missive’s focal points. Particularly in connection to the comment made that the title of ‘intercultural pedagogy’ was within the group itself a controversial point upon which there was no agreement, as I understood. These comments seemed to suggest some discursive dispersion, which I enquired further into.

‘That is very heterogeneous. It is interesting in Switzerland, naturally, all the discourses from all Cantons come into this national working group, and these are very diverse. That is why it was also a problem to even formulate a mandate in this working group, because one has basic principle debates61, and one was bothered by this term ‘Intercultural pedagogy’. The people from Zurich62 thought that the whole

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61 German: Grundsatzdebatten
62 German: Zuercher; like saying Parisians, i.e. people from Paris
dramatising of culture leads to stigmatising and wanted to come away from it. They also call the whole area ‘socialisation and difference’, there nothing is referred to as ‘culture’ or ‘foreigner’, or ‘migration’ any more. And other schools, which said we will now only call this ‘migration and education’, and other such as the people from Buenderland, for them it is clearly ‘intercultural pedagogy’ and then the Romands come and say this is ‘language socialisation’. This is by principle not a consistently definable direction, because these discourses run so differently. And we from the German Switzerland clearly are influenced by Germany. In the Romandie by France and in Tessin by Italy, these are very close to these Italian discourses, but also very different. But those who are at the Roestigraben, they are then very different. But there are also consistent discourses, but here I have to say, these are strongly influenced by an EDK politics. Well if one looks at the EDK action plan PISA 2000, then there is strongly a particular kind of language in it. Also the recommendations of the EDK of 1991 on the schooling of ‘migrant children’ these are foreign-language speaking children. The foreign-language speaking then becomes a particularity, as a particular requirement and then soon is defined as a disability. And in the EDK programme the language advancement discourse is there very strongly, but then always also other streams, the cultures are so different.

Others say through (the lens of) research that it is the whole structural problem, which then is strengthened by PISA, by implementation. And one can summarize on the whole, and this is now my subjective interpretation, there are four, perhaps I will even come to five (streams of thinking): the Romands are strongly represented by the Geneva people, who have the only Professorship for intercultural pedagogy, where it is strongly the question of accommodation, l’acceuil des enfant’, where it is about how to accommodate or assimilate these children into our norm- and value system. One welcomes them, gives this an approval, so that they can make a positive development. Then we have the progressive German-Swiss discourse, which strongly thematises the structural debate; how our selective education system is leading to grouping and how children with foreign-language always

63 People from French-speaking Cantons
64 French-speaking Switzerland
65 Only Italian-speaking Canton Tessin
66 Some Cantons such as Berne or Fribourg, who are both German – and French speaking Cantons; Roestigraben refers to a metaphorical trench or divide between the two linguistic regions, characterised as a trench of Rösti, which is a national dish of German-speaking Switzerland.
67 German: fremdsprachig
68 German: Aufnahme, can be translated into either ‘accommodation’, or ‘absorption’ or even ‘assimilation’, depending on which meaning is referred to.
have bad marks and this why they don’t have motivation and therefore no school success. That is why we have to look in particular the structures more narrowly. The PISA discussion naturally enhanced this. Then come the traditional Swiss discourses, where it is said, the cultures are so diverse; one has to get to know the cultures. Then from the EDK above, the language advancement. So, these are the four areas, I would identify. ` PS

This particular section offers a lot of explanation about discursive strands and accentuates what the interviewee refers to a 'direction' or discourse (intercultural pedagogy) which is very 'heterogeneous', as there are so many different strands of thinking, differing according to the linguistic regions of Switzerland, which in many aspects have very distinctive (often political) divides in the way they conceptualise or treat migration. It appeared to me to be addressing the strands of different normative claims. The neighbouring countries Germany, France and Italy are seen to influence the discourses that run in the three respective linguistic regions of Switzerland.

Moreover, the range of streams goes from one end of the spectrum, in which any reference to 'culture' or even 'migration' is negated and moved away from and rather 'socialisation' is adopted to define this area of debate or pedagogy, which deals with 'difference' (see previous section 3 on 'culture'). Others seem to speak about 'migration' and its effect upon migration. One crucial comment is on the discursive strand strongly influenced from the interviewee’s point of view by EDK politics, or missives, which run in the direction of language advancement. Here it is interesting to contrast or to look at Regine Buehlmann’s narrative aspects, which speak about what focus they have in their programme. If one looks at EDK’s (Intercantonal Education Ministers Conference) policy language, the reference to language or the 'lingual' dimension is quite strong, or toward language advancement. This is interesting if we look at Mario Gattiker’s narrative when he talks about the main focus of integration measures endorsed by the Federal Government, or particularly the Federal Office for Migration in its mandate towards education. The reference to language advancement being one of the main measures of educational provision becomes quite clear.

The interviewee speaks about how ‘progressive German-Swiss discourse is about the question of structures and the abolishment of a ‘selective’ school system. She refers to
the ‘PISA discussion’, which is seen to have naturally enhanced this. The traditional German-Swiss discourses according to her look at the question of ‘culture, believe that cultures differ vastly, and therefore need to be focussed upon and taught. This latter strand seems to conform with a more multicultural approach to viewing cultural topics. The former stream, which she calls ‘progressive’ is something which in my view we encounter in many interviews when speaking about school reforms running currently in Switzerland.

My question regarding these discursive strands was whether this was a question about distinction between didactics, pedagogy or structure.

‘This (discussion) was strongly lead, but it is relatively easy to solve, because one can distinguish it analytically, and if one looks at the recommendations, which we formulated, then it is strongly employed that one was thinking of a multi-level model. Well that on the first level, the teacher training is not solely responsible. One cannot make us responsible for everything, because then one especially heats up the teachers, if you just say to them, ‘if you cannot deal with the migrant children, that is your problem’; we cannot communicate that. The second thing is the whole normative debate, we would like to be a school for everybody, still support a Western modernity ideal. Then the structures of the teacher training concretely, and then it goes down in fact to the didactic-methodical question of the teacher education. We would like to expand the competence of the teachers so far that they can then pass down these things in school. Therefore, actually everything was able to flow in (into the recommendations). ’ PS

The interesting wording here is the comment on the group’s ideology being Western modernity and of promoting a ‘school for everybody’. This ideal is often referred to by educationalist interviewees, in which moving away from a Special Needs stance is associated with inclusion and geared towards every child or giving equal chances to everybody.

‘I think an aim would really be if we could create an education system, where everybody is normalised. In the sense of being competent to respond to different requirements in a normal way, then we would have achieved a lot. From my point of view, we have succeeded with the Italian and Spanish children, and the second and third generations that one has normality. One looks at them and advances them – I know that
is not necessarily always the case – as individually as possible, if language advancement was really needed. The problem of school is that it has an integration function in society and the decisive thing is which society it wants to integrate towards. There is still the fictive middle class, homogeneous Swiss Jodle-culture\textsuperscript{69}. There is still a lot to do in Switzerland. But that also depends also on…well, if you go into the school Limmat in Zurich, or if you go to the school St. Johann in Basel, or in Berne, Baselstrasse, it is completely different. And I think it’s like that everywhere. ` PS

This narrative appears to me to have the over-arching theme of an important distinction between an ideology towards ‘difference’ which assumed a sense of ‘normality’, which is what the interviewee would defend. On the other hand, of it being treated as something out of the norm, or something particular or extraordinary. This links with the notions of ‘migration’ as such, language and also ‘foreign-speaking’ or ‘culture’ respectively classified as something extraordinary or out-of-the-norm. The argument of an ‘ideological appraisal’ is supported by this interviewee’s stance, or indeed if we look at Claudio Nodari’s and Andrea Lanfranchi’s narratives. The overall impression arises of a view that defends the notion of ‘normalising’ the migrant or diversity status of school. Priska Sieber speaks about having been successful in achieving this sense of normality for Italian or Spanish children of migrants, second or third generation, who probably are seen as being now no longer ‘specialised’ in the educational sense. One question was how she is experiencing or viewing the abolition of special classes.

`Well purely from the modern education ideal, it is the central element. But it is not so easy, fundamental regression in a system is never good. The problem is that the Special Needs educationalists absorb the migrants as their domain, and in Switzerland we are world champions what regards the strength of the Special Needs domain (speaks ironically). We had the first professorship\textsuperscript{70} for Therapeutic Pedagogy in Europe in 1931. We had the first teacher education institution in Europe, which only educates therapeutic pedagogues, 1924. Since then we have a massive growth of special needs institutions, personal and money, which flows into this Special needs pedagogy. This has effectuated in us having two separate education systems, and then the

\textsuperscript{69} German: Jodler-Kultur: referring to ‘Jodling’, a traditional Swiss musical practice, often associated with rural, backwards and out-dated Switzerland

\textsuperscript{70} German: Professur
IV came into picture too. We have a school concordat and a special needs concordat and in this sense, we have two separate school systems, which have developed alongside each other during hundred years. The regular school system actually always gives all the children off into the special school system, when the teachers felt that they were not responsible for children, who do not correspond to their normative principle. And in this way, the migrant children were actually also treated, they did not correspond to the Swiss middle class normality, and were therefore given over to the Special pedagogues. Now as the pressure comes, well purely from research and science, they do not actually have any basis for legitimation. The Swiss try to take their children out of this special system. Where integration is possible, the Swiss parents take their children out of the special needs system and they (the special needs pedagogues) fear then for their jobs and get migrant children. And this is why one has this crazily over-proportional number of migrant children in small classes (other term for special classes for children with learning difficulties). Now what is happening is that the small classes are being abolished, but now the migrant number is rising in the special schools. Earlier this was relatively stable, but now as one abolishes the small classes; we call it the communicative channel, right, when one presses here, then it comes up there above. This is already apparent from the statistics that the percentage will rise. ` PS

What was interesting to me was what Priska Sieber calls the `absorption of the migrant children through the special needs sector`. In par with what Andrea Lanfranchi talks about, the development of a ‘special needs educationalisation’ ideology of the special needs school sector, Sieber enhances this ‘specialisation’ picture by the image of a very strong special needs historical bases in Switzerland, in which special needs is developed as a scientific or academic strand, first of its kind in Europe. ‘Two different school systems’ were developed, in which Special Needs existed alongside the regular school system, and both of which had their strong holds and own concordat systems. One seemed to cater quite conveniently to the other in the sense that where the teachers did not see as children ‘meeting their normative standards’, they would delegate away to Special Needs. The Swiss middle class normality or normative standards are something even Claudio Nodari refers to. With reference to language and its association with ‘cultural’ paradigms, one interviewee also refers to a ‘monolingual habitus’, which is seen to be the normative standard of

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71 Invalid Insurance
the middle class in Switzerland, towards which the education system seems to be oriented.

Andrea Lanfranchi spoke about this delegation culture from one school system to another. These two systems seemed to me to have almost reciprocally fuelled each other throughout the years. Especially, with reference to migrants, the existence of special needs seems to have ‘solved’ the rather tedious problem of having to change or readapt to any changes occurring in society in the periphery of school. The existence of what was then seen as an excellent system of ‘specialisation’ was capable or seen to meet the ‘special needs’ of migrant children, who were seen as ‘deficient’ in terms of their school capabilities. Language, some of the interviewees we have encountered would argue, being the first and foremost concern, for which the teachers are not qualified to deal with in a satisfactory way.

Another critical point of reference within this narrative is that the interviewee explains how the Swiss parents were in a position to take out their children out of this special needs system. However, as with Andrea Lanfranchi, who talks about ‘mechanisms’, which enhance discriminatory trends occurring within education systems, Sieber says that special need pedagogues feared for their jobs and therefore more migrant children were placed within these classes. In chapter 4 this ‘organisational’ phenomenon and the theory of institutional discrimination because of the pre-existence of structures is discussed in more depth and is noteworthy with reference to the arguments made by these two interviewees.

The rise of the number of migrant students in special schools is something that Andrea Lanfranchi had referred to as a point of critique by the special needs teacher unions towards the HFH. Sieber here refers to it and shows me some statistics, in which there is a prediction element that numbers are and will steadily rise due to this abolishment of special classes. It made an impression as though the idea of a structural change does not change much in the actual chances of migrants within the school systems, because there are always other instruments to be had to ‘separate’ and delegate. This further supports the argument that a ‘separating’ or dichotomising ideology appears to be deeply rooted in the system and the actors, such as the teachers.
The question of evaluation instruments when it comes to special class selection was an area which was of interest to me, as I wanted to probe deeper into what Andrea Lanfranchi had explained was the continued specialisation training of school psychologists etc, but simultaneously the integrative HFH policy that was being adopted throughout all modules as a concept. I was curious whether this was something that was being discussed within the regular school teacher training units. 

'\textbf{It is an aim in the new Special Needs concordat that until the year 2011 a uniform evaluation instrument will be developed for the schooling in the special needs system. I think that is unrealistic, because if one sees what kinds of components play into these allocations, then it is too complex a system, that one could develop a uniform assessment instrument. But it is in the concordat, and the EDK has the responsibility to develop a coherent instrument, which then is used by all Cantons. But at the moment it is really the case, that according to the approach of the school psychologist, who are often still autonomous or under the inspection of the municipality, depending on preference, approach, social constellation, a child particularly then also comes into a special class, partially also in a special school. And if one looks at the process then it is the case that the teacher evaluates with his/her more or less appropriate system of assessment. If a child does not meet the normative expectation of the class, he/she has to repeat, if he/she has to repeat then it automatically comes into a special class. It is actually the teacher alone, who defines, \textquote{if a child does not suit me, then it will come into a special class}. It is being run this way at the moment. } \textit{PS} 

\textit{Interviewer (me): Would you be looking at a school external evaluation? (See Regine Buehlmann)}

\textquote{One should abolish the evaluation, in the sense of...I mean, as long as we have a selective education system, we have to make just selection decisions. And that means one has to use more or less the same achievement requirements on all these children, and that in fact leads to one third always not being \textquote{enough}. One has a systemic problem, when one sets a norm, one has to select according to the same achievement norm, and one third will be there where one needs to take measures. That is a very expensive system. Moreover, it is a system, which demotivates many children from learning, and if one looks back a little why this is happening, then one finds that these are some kinds...}'
of particular interests\textsuperscript{72} of teachers. If they want to heighten their esteem\textsuperscript{73} etc. The system could be that one would school collectively during nine years, and give the children as much as they can learn during these nine years. That will be more for some and less for others. And after nine years one says, ok, based on these competences – the school system should select, but not already after the first primary class, but rather that one says after nine years, and then to do a real external assessment. ‘You could preferably do an apprenticeship; you could go on to secondary school’. Well then, we have another problem that after nine years one has loads of migrant children, who fall out of the education system. That for me is in fact one of the biggest problems, which the Swiss education system has. For me, the right to education is not warranted. ‘

\textit{Interviewer (me): So is this a structural question?}

‘Yes, we naturally don’t have any provision. The provisions\textsuperscript{74} are given by the economy. Therefore, it is very important. And all choices/offers, which the state has to offer, are either for the extremely highly qualified or the extremely low qualified. That is not advantageous, the middle value is provided for more or less well by the economy, less I would say, and a lot fall out there. And particularly migrant children, this is shown quite well in the statistics. ‘

The interviewee launches into an interesting narration on the creation of a `uniform assessment instrument` for special needs allocation, which is being initiated by the EDK and within the concordat for special needs schooling. However, she says, the system is so `complex` in the way things are being run, that this seems to be an `unrealistic` idea. She goes on to explain in the way that school psychologists (see Andrea Lanfranchi on this), but mainly teachers are the main assessors or decision-making actors as to special class or special school allocation. In line with the arguments of some researchers in the field of special schooling and national follow up studies to PISA, which are referenced and discussed in chapter 4, Sieber supports the idea of `a systemic problem`, where norms are set in which `one has to select according to the same achievement norm`. This however results in a certain percentage of the class always falling under the category of not meeting the norm or

\textsuperscript{72} German: \textit{Partikularinteressen}

\textsuperscript{73} German: \textit{Ansehen}: could be translated as esteem, or in this case probably meaning `status`

\textsuperscript{74} German: \textit{Angebote}: could be translated as choices, offers, provisions, here probably meaning jobs
of not being ‘enough’. A question of expenses is raised, but also of demotivation that might be a result of this kind of normative standard. An interesting perspective is that ‘this is happening might be happening due ‘particular interests of teachers’, which in the German terminology holds a more distinctive meaning; teacher acting out of personal or selfish interests.

The debate about ‘provisions’ is quite crucial for the arguments made previously in this chapter, in that economy or the labour market is specifically mentioned by this interviewee with reference to choices or jobs. Even if the system would be changed structurally, as she suggests, nine years of unselected schooling, many migrant children would potentially ‘fall out of the education system’, because the economy does not cater towards a middle level of education. Either it caters to highly qualified or the lower end of the qualification scale. This notion of economy undermining educational efforts towards improvements of equal chances or equality of opportunity is discussed in section 6 and in chapter 4.

Moving into the cantonal governing level, I looked at key policy actors within the Public School Office of Zurich in the Education Directorate of Zurich, both of whom are directly related to ‘integration’ or ‘migration’ orientated work fields within the Public School sector in Canton Zurich. Joseph Hildbrand, who is in charge of the department Educational Planning within the Zurich Education Directorate and Markus Truninger, whom we have already encountered, the project leader of QUIMS, Quality in Multicultural Schools within the Zurich Public School Office. A project initiated in Canton Zurich and now implemented within education policy as a mandatory school project for all schools with 40% or more ‘foreign-language’ speaking students.

Joseph Hildbrand is a social psychologist and pedagogue by education, stating however that he never taught as a teacher as such outside of his pedagogical studies time. Then he was employed by the Zurich Education Ministry with the task of conducting school pilot projects, particularly in the area of children and youth, who have learning difficulties and what he calls ‘difficult life conditions’. These pilot projects were conducted by him for the course of several years and evaluated, and he remained in the work field of Special Needs (see also Andrea Lanfranchi chapter 6);
being in charge of the section ‘Special Needs’\textsuperscript{75} within the directorate. In this
function, he was in charge of conducting the ‘integrative pilot projects’\textsuperscript{76}, which tried
to increasingly integrate students with learning difficulties into the regular class
structures. In his narrative, he speaks about having been in charge of the working
group Special Needs, or team member of ‘Part-Autonomous Public School’\textsuperscript{77}, the
introduction of school administration or management. In 2009, he is department head
of the department \textit{Educational Planning} within the Education Directorate Zurich. He
refers to the pilot projects as something, which seemed quite significant during his
period of office. The conducting and evaluation of these projects seem to be a
preliminary step in the way of how in Zurich the ‘problematisation’ of migrants
within the school system were handled or picked up. The following narrative section
enlightens how the interviewee or in his opinion the educational discourse picked up
this theme.

‘The present alignment/direction? Well, I believe the basic theme is
actually inclusion and optimal advancement of youth. It is not…behind
this there is no political…yes, actually naturally there is always a
political (\textit{discussion}), but I think the motor, how should one say, of the
entire integrative alignment of the public school law now is (\textit{the
following}); on the one hand we have constructed more and more
separating structures, and have reached a degree, which is
internationally unique, right. And we are experiencing this…how shall
I say, one can see that in a two-sided way; one is also investing a lot.
That is to say, it is a very expensive system. However, this is naturally
not a commendation. A system, which is working by strongly
separating, is not a commendation for the system, which means, for a
majority – not of the entire political majority - but I believe for a
majority this not simply desired. That is the one aspect, the other aspect
is that one realises that research has pointed out that separating tools
are not hugely successful. This means we are doing something with a
lot of money, which later on the level of advancement for children and
adolescents is not successful. I must say that is the original clarification
that is in fact the alignment, right. To try to make something better,
which is more in favour of the children and adolescents. Saying this,
there are people who think…the SVP\textsuperscript{78} is decisively against this. The
teaching body is very critical about this, they are afraid that they will

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Sonderpaedagogik}
\item\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Integrative Schulversuche}
\item\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Teilautonome Volksschule}: see also next chapter section on Ernst Buschor
\item\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Schweizerische Volkspartei}: Swiss People’s Party, right wing party.
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get overburdened. It is therefore not ‘eaten’\textsuperscript{79}, it has now been decided on the legislative level, but it remains to be seen. Naturally, it is also the case that it has a very big significance on the level of migration politics. But I would say that the whole integration debate now in the field of education is about the high extent of separation, of migrant children as well as of children with other…Swiss children, who have school difficulties. And I would say about the limited achievement capacity as a tool.\textsuperscript{80} JH

This narrative is quite similar in its argumentative order to Andrea Lanfranchi’s uptake on how education has dealt with migration. An important point to note here is that both interviewees come from a strong ‘Special Needs’ educational side, the presently quoted interviewee having been particularly in charge of the section for ‘Special Needs’ within the Zurich Education Directorate. As Andrea Lanfranchi, Joseph Hildbrand believes that the main debate around integration for the educational discourse has been about ‘the extent of separation’ of migrant children mainly, but also ‘children with school difficulties’. At the end of this narrative bit he states that the debate was also mainly about one of the issues being the use of ‘limited achievement capacity’ of children as a tool, or what he probably means a measure for separation. He speaks about how this is a two-sided issue in that on the one hand separation has shown in ‘research’ to not be successful in advancing students, and that it is an expensive system moreover. There is a part in the narrative which stands out in the way that he describes how the ‘degree’ to which the Swiss system separates is internationally unique, meaning it however to ‘not be a commendation’ for the system to separate so strongly (see also Priska Sieber on this topic).

The integrative alignment or direction – to make things better for children and young people - is seen to be supported by a majority of people within the education system, with the exception of the SVP, and the critical teachers who might have reservations about becoming ‘overburdened’ by the new class orders. To my question whether this has any connection to migration politics or politics as such, he remarks that this would have a very big significance on this level. This argumentative frame is often the motivation in the eyes of those policy makers, who are in favour of an ‘integrative

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{gegessen}; literally, ‘eaten’, metaphorically meaning the policy idea has not yet been taken up by teachers
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Gefaess}; vessel, body, container: here can be translated as tool.
alignment’ of school, as will become even clearer as we move into the school reform section in the section 6. This stance of the failure of an expensive school system, which has proven (in research) to be unsuccessful in its use of separating tools is a striking position or attitude within Swiss education policy discourse, which forms one of the basis for the ‘problematised’ view with education and then legitimises the adoption of reform.

He goes on to speak about the role of the school, whether education has any distinct position in this discourse or a distinct feature; his understanding of integration from an education point of view;

‘I would also say, it is more from an education mandate (point of view). However, because the education mandate is always, also….what is the education mandate? It is above all that we want a democratic society; where one treats each other decently and people have equal rights. Where they are not treated unequally, where they can partake as much as possible in - I will try to just say – in culture, in democracy, in economic life. As much as possible on a good, high standard for preferably all. That is the ideal conception. And that the education system is an important prerequisite for this, in this sense this stuff naturally is interlinked. This wasn’t a terribly scientific explanation! ‘

JH

The education mandate according to him is a social democratic mandate, where everyone has the same rights and where they can partake in what he calls ‘culture, democracy and economic’ life, with a high standard. It is interesting to compare the choice of words to the federal perspective of Mario Gattiker prior to this section. As we will encounter in these analysis chapters, the role of education from the point of view of educationalists and education policy makers is quite distinctive in their motivation to create a democratic and equitable situation for all students. Which however is in conflict with what I would like to argue is the particular way in which the reform is taking place under the larger federal uptake on how migration is perceived, politicised and then structurally confined.

Markus Truninger speaks personally about what motivated him to enter into this area of work, first as a teacher and then as a project member of the department
‘foreigner pedagogy’ or now ‘intercultural education’ within the Public School Office Zurich.

‘Yes, well, I was a teacher und worked in district 5\textsuperscript{81}, in the school Limmat for nine years. This means, I have actually encountered the questions, which I am dealing with now, in practice. I was certainly at the time the only teacher with hundred (students)...well except Special Class E, right. Well even twenty years ago...well there were upper school level classes with lower requirements\textsuperscript{82}; well I am also upper school level teacher. At that point, there were really no Swiss children any more in those classes, and now that does occur now and then, but at that time it was relatively new. Well in district 5 it commenced earlier than elsewhere. And well yes, I have had a lot to do with parents as well. I have always liked working with parents, also have been at many people’s houses. Well, in a way this work fascinated me, I always understood the work of a teacher as social engagement. Well, in a way political engagement, which played a role in my youth, naturally. Well, these were somewhat the motivations. It is also the question, how a society can live together or how one can equalize differences, or inequalities. Those were the motivations.

Then I was requested, whether I would come to work here, from the practice. At the time in this position there was only one person, Gita Steiner, I don’t know if you know her from the literature. And she asked me; a second person, who has good connections to practice. At first I thought, actually no, I do not want to move away from practice. Then I told myself, for two years, I will do this part time. (…) At the time it was called `Foreigner Pedagogy’\textsuperscript{83}. Then I stayed two years and prolonged, and prolonged again, and now I have been here for twenty years. Actually, I didn’t want to, but naturally, it fascinated me, and even now, I do this with interest. `MT

The specific situation of teaching in the school Limmat is quite crucial in understanding his practical background. Limmat is a district in Canton Zurich known for it’s high residence percentage of people with migrant background, also known to be a rather poorer neighbourhood, which explains why he refers to having dealt with the questions he is now dealing in policy, previously in practice during his teaching years within this particular school. It is striking in the way in which refers to his

\textsuperscript{81} Kreis 5, a district in Canton Zurich, which is known for its high percentages in population with migration background.

\textsuperscript{82} Oberschulklassen: Oberschule was a streamed upper school level for children with lower achievement requirements; now it has been reformed to secondary school type C

\textsuperscript{83} Auslaenderpaedagogik
motivation to teach, presumably in particular in this district, also as a ‘social’ and even ‘political engagement’ in his contact with the students’ parents and their homes.

Moreover, I would like to argue that the fact that he was *Oberschullehrer*, or a class teacher for children with lower learning requirements, the classes which were represented by a majority of students with migrant background also plays a significant role for how he would now perceive ‘integration’. Namely in a similar way to Andrea Lanfranchi, having directly been confronted with or engaging with migration background as a school reality, living it directly in the context of school life. This would arguably have shaped his thinking about diversity in classrooms or about migration as such in connection to education. This is quite significant in terms of how in his narrative he understands the concept of integration or how QUIMS is conceptualised as follows.

An argument develops here in the educational field which is important to note, namely what was mentioned before; the perception of ‘self-critique’ in the way that migrants were seen to have been handled in school over the past thirty odd years (see chapter 2), a failure of a highly ‘separating’ or ‘segregating’ system, the need to change towards ‘integrative measures’ and ‘integration’, in which ‘integration’ I would like to argue is understood as ‘inclusion’. In this sense, the ‘problematised’ perspective here is with respect to a perceived ‘mis-managed’ system. We have so far encountered this discursive thread with Andrea Lanfranchi, Claudio Nodari, Priska Sieber, Joseph Hildbrand and Markus Truninger. All of these interviewees are noticeably educationalists, pedagogues and teachers, now placed in education policy.

6.5 Social Class and Mobility/Language

The topic of *economic or social class and mobility* is something I encountered repeatedly or as a thread throughout the narratives. Often both the educational as well as the migration political attributes of ‘migrant’ are seen as a handicap or synonymously used for ‘working class’. A notion that the ‘socio-economic status’ or background of students is the actual handicap for school achievement is something that arises repeatedly from the national follow up studies issuing from PISA; more on
this see chapter 4. It seems to be an underlying controversy, which is lurking behind
the entire discourse about migrant students, but never really picked up in the political
discourses. Pedagogues voice their concerns that this theme is often submerged or
substituted by a ‘problematisation’ of migrants, rather or used synonymously for
‘working class’. It may have become more politically convenient to use ‘migrant’ or
‘migration’ as a ‘problematic’ theme or concern rather than ‘socio-economic or social
class’. Although this latter topic had emerged quite strongly in the seventies in
Switzerland, it ebbed down eventually and now was being replaced with the ‘migrant’
issue. However, as labour migration was the main cause of migration movement into
Switzerland, many migrants are placed within the lower socio-economic scale of the
population. The debates around low school performance levels of migrants within the
PISA studies were picked up with reference to their socio-economic background and
results were found that this could be the determining factor in terms of school
achievement; coming from a less educated or resourced home or family background.
Moreover, in chapter 4, deliberations are made about multiple disadvantages for
migrant students due to the added disadvantage of being ‘migrant’ as well as from a
‘low socio-economic’ background. The disadvantage of being ‘migrant’ being the
discriminatory streaming methods and Special Needs classification of ‘culture’ or
‘migrant background’ or ‘foreign-language speakers’.

Moreover, the theme appears with reference to how integration is understood or
defined by the Federal Law for Foreigners (see chapter 5) and by Federal
Administrative authorities (see section 2). The wording of the particular legal text and
the references or understandings of what integration measures are seen to achieve,
seems to restrict people, who are addressed by the ‘integration’ article, within their
respective social and economic strata. In this sense, we are speaking about social and
economic mobility, which offers the idea of a progression in terms of equal chances
or opportunities, which are the terms used in what I argue is the social-democratic
language within the current integration standards in education.

In chapter 5, the recent development and changes of the face of migration in
Switzerland or indeed Europe are discussed. Labour migration and the economically
driven immigration policies which were issued since the sixties have lead to a
distinctive way in which state politics are conceptualising ‘integration’ as a mandate.
The idea of ‘equity’ or ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘participation’ presents itself in both legal textual wording and political rhetoric with reference to the position of migrants within Swiss economy and society. The initial theme of political membership (Benhabib, 2004), which I refer to in the introductory part of this analysis, is narrowly conceptualised for migrants as being ‘a part of the Swiss society with equal chances comparable to Swiss in a similar economic and social stratus’. My argument is that this particular stance or narrow idea of political membership restricts large groups of people to specific labour sectors with reference to limited economic progression. The education system has largely catered towards the preservation of certain labour market sectors by a highly streamed system, which ensures the continuity of the labour or working class (see chapter 5).

Now however, a large-scale structural reform in education is launched. Priska Sieber speaks within her narrative about choices or jobs (see section 4). Even if the education system would be changed structurally, nine years of unselected schooling, many migrant children would potentially ‘fall out of the education system’, because the economy does not cater towards a middle level of education. Either it caters to highly qualified or the lower end of the qualification scale. This notion of economy undermining educational efforts towards improvements of equal chances or equality of opportunity is discussed in section 6 and in chapter 5.

Federal funds and provisions in integration measures are an important area, which I argue provides an insight into what is being actually promoted or implemented within the ‘integration mandate’ chartered out by the Federal Government (see Mario Gattiker, section 2). Language advancement is something that is repeatedly referred to by all interviewees as an area of investment or advancement in education.

One particular interview, which was done with Claudio Nodari, who works in and is co-founder of the Institute for Intercultural Communication in Zurich, sheds some light on this investment or language advancement area of integration measures. This interviewee is placed in this private institute, which provides different language related themes and services for schools, individual teachers and teacher training. Within the context of the arguments of this chapter section, it is what appears to me a significant insight into a perspective of a language expert, who is immersed in the
context of his work within discourses around language teaching and migration. Moreover, this interviewee is linked both with the teacher training college in Zurich and his own private language institute, also being the author of several obligatory textbooks on ‘Teaching German as a Second Language’ within the language curriculum in Switzerland. In one part of his narrative he speaks about how the Federal focus is investing in private language schools for adults, and not so much the public school sector, which was an interesting observation, as education is referred to by the Federal Law for Foreigners and Federal Authorities as an area to apply integrative measures.

*Interviewer (me): Where do the monetary resources, which the Federal government promises for integration measures flow into?*

‘That is relatively easy to answer; as soon as Federal money and a lot of millions flow, in this area a lot of language schools will be opened, left, right and centre. And there one offers language courses. One learns, good morning, my name is... But even in these courses it is possible to develop strategies how to read a text, to read a house order or a contract. Daily competences but also school competences’

*Interviewer (FS): Do you think this is leading to an increasing privatisation of school?*

‘Well, that we have anyway, right. There is the Migro Clubschool, the Public College and these are the larger ones. But there are myriads of smaller course suppliers. One is investing in language advancement with the idea that even if – and this is also now an international development; in Austria, migrants have to attain within two years the level A2 in German. And they receive four hundred and fifty free hours of lessons. In Germany its six hundred hours with B2. I can at the most ghettoise myself with an A1 or a B2. Of course, a good basis for integration is given, but that is not crucial for integration. Crucial for integration are good school structures, good school support for children, good working conditions. Learning German on the job, so that the German instruction also leads to allowing me to make a progress at the work place. And not in some language school, which tells me, how the baker delivers his bread, whilst I am delivering metal in some metal construction firm. It is community development; it is about other areas than language advancement. I have nothing against

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84 German: *Links und rechts*: meaning ‘everywhere’.
language advancement, think it is good that is being done, but that can’t just be it. ‘CN

Interviewer (FS): Is this (referring to A1, B2) the notion of a language portfolio?

‘Yes. In Ireland, there is also a portfolio for migrants or near-illiterates. However, even there we have the problem that language performances are described within a collective European reference framework. But the language logical competences, which are needed to achieve these performances are not described. (...) Yes, this is also the out-put orientated. We have the A1, I do not know if you know this, A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, and C2. For the latter (Cs) competences are demanded, such as, I do not know, how to write a report, to read a complicated text, where I need big language logical competences. In front here (A1), only little language logical competences are needed, because it is about asking for directions, shopping. A2 already a little more. B2 one has to be able to argue a little. If we have the language logic in this level, then the basis is there. Then a worker comes until A2, because he does not have the basis. And these are not described, how one is supposed to build these up simultaneously. ‘CN

Interviewer (FS): How far would this restrict the mobility?

‘Well, enormously. In addition, we have in German-speaking Switzerland also that all this takes place in local dialect. Moreover, these A2 competences are then developed in local dialect, but it does not go beyond that. In other words, one can keep an intelligent, alert person quite dull/dumb with language courses. ‘CN

When asked about Federal financial resources which are named by several other interviewees in their respective line of work, such as Mario Gattiker, the interviewee states that ‘when it comes to a lot of Federal money in this area it flows usually into language schools’, of which many are opened. He elaborates that although there is a potential for language logical competences to be able to be built up in these courses as well as in school, the reality is different in terms of how it is conceptualised.

He expresses his concern that language advancement, though important to have been made aware of, however is not all that integration needs in terms of measures; he names ‘good school structures and support, working conditions, learning language on
the job for the relevant context and community development` as necessary elements apart from language advancement.

An interesting reference are the *levels of the European Language Portfolio*, which are used now in Switzerland to measure the language competence one is required to need to be `sufficiently integrated`. Claudio Nodari speaks about how the different levels are played out in terms of the build of language logical competences, which may be minimal at A1 to B2 levels, and which is the utmost level usually taught in language courses with the idea of integration. These competences however do not ensure any further competence to deal with more complex linguistic situations such as argumentation or writing a detailed text; `these are not described as to how they are supposed to be built up simultaneously`. `I can at the most ghettoise myself with an A1 or a B2` he states, which is quite a strong expression to use with respect to the question of `integration`.

The broader topic here seems to be about chances or possibilities offered to Migrants to learn German or the local language and to presumably have the same starting point in terms of jobs as locals would. *Restriction of mobility* and *lacking language competence as a handicap* emerge as the overarching themes from this narrative. As mentioned above, with reference to social and economic mobility and migrants, within the Swiss Federal law, a decree for integration, it is stated that `the aim of Integration is the equitable (equal chances for) participation of foreigners in the Swiss society`, economic, social and cultural. However, Swiss law also conceptualises integration as having `equal chances and opportunities which Swiss would have in a similar social and economic situation` (see Chapter 5). This strengthens my argument that **social or economic mobility** is not an aim at all of integration measures conceptualised according to the Federal government. Rather the terminology seems to suggest that integration has to ensure a person with migrant background to be able to do the work they are `currently` doing, geared mostly towards the adult part of the migrant population. Again a stance that seems indicative of the view of migration being a `temporary phenomenon` or `labour-oriented`, see also the previous interviewee narratives on this within this chapter.
6.6 Evidence-based policy and the `soft` governance solution

`The shock was that people in Switzerland still had the impression that they had the best schools. And they still do. And this shock that the schools are not that good, did affect a lot through PISA. Apart from this, for me it was interesting; in the Canton Zurich for the Upper School Reform we did nearly the same kind of tests and there were the same results as PISA almost to the point of the numbers after the comma. The statements that PISA does not fit for Switzerland is not true. One has to observe that PISA has partly become a true eye-sore for the ministerial bureaucracy and the education ministers (...). It has naturally disrupted the entire way in which education politics (policy) was being governed. And this was not liked. (...) It is a completely different governing paradigm, which school is going to need, which has been disputed in certain circles. The school leaders (directors) have accepted it, but the curricula have not been abolished or liberalised. Nowhere in Switzerland, nor in Germany. However, they are not so strictly applied. This is the problem. The whole change in paradigm has not yet been coped with. Perhaps at the level of the universities, but not in the lower levels of schooling`. EB

In chapter 4 of this thesis, Swiss research response to participation in international studies in education, such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2000/2003 are discussed; what features as a key point for research appraisal since 2001 are the national performance gaps between migrant and native/Swiss students, with much lower performance levels by migrant students. National follow up studies by Lischer (2003) and Kronig (2003) argue that a highly selective schooling mechanism could be the root cause for these discrepancies in performance in Switzerland. And furthermore that it is leading to what they call a worrying percentage of segregation of migrant students into Special Educational Needs classes (see chapters 4 and 6 section 4). This chapter section will also engage in how education and migration policy makers alike refer to this data and particular form of knowledge drawn from PISA and follow-ups as a source of policy-informing evidence. This pertains to the argument that this type of policy-evidence and knowledge drawn from comparison is a distinctive governing tool as a form of `soft governance`, gaining ground in European countries through the OECD (Alexiadou, 2007). Moreover, it can be shown by the Swiss example that this is not only
happening within the framework of the EU. Linking this concept of ‘soft governance’ to my overarching argument, I would like to propose that this form of cross-border or borderless policy and governance is a type of deterritorialised politics, which Seyla Benhabib refers to in connection to her arguments on Political membership practices of Western-European states (Benhabib, 2004). And that it contributes to the perpetuation of pre-existing normative ideologies and understanding of migration and political membership.

As discussed in chapter 2, the language or discourse used to frame the Swiss ‘integration’ orientated education policy reform is highly social-democratic; denominators such as ‘equity’, ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘inclusion’ are commonly used and referred to both in interview narratives and policy text itself. Some interviewees presented in this section will give an account as to their particular understanding or the reference to these specific denominators. It is this reference and policy-informing evidence based on standards drawn from comparison, which raises the question about the distinctive contextualisation processes, understanding and use of these standards in Swiss education policy and more widely the integration discourse.

The first interviewee quoted above is Ernst Buschor, who in many ways was and still is very influential as a fiscal authority (former Finance and Education Minister of Canton Zuerich, 1995 to 2003) in the way that education and more widely market-orientated education policy thinking developed in the Canton Zurich. From this specific Canton, it then spread as ‘best practice’ to other Swiss Cantons over time. Moreover, his ideas on governance influenced how financial administration in Switzerland changed accordingly over the past thirty years, including the introduction of New Public Management (NPM). On NPM and the Open Method of Coordination, see Alexiadou (2007) in chapter 2. In the quote, he speaks about a ‘change in paradigm’, which is clearly seen to have been sparked off through PISA; in a follow-up study conducted while he was the Zurich Education Minister (from 1995 to 2003), PISA data for national respectively local test results were seemingly identical to the international OECD study results taken for Switzerland. These findings then seemed to offer themselves as a confirmation for Swiss education policy makers to take the PISA results for Switzerland seriously. Mainly, they refer to it in connection to the
highly selective schooling and streaming methods for Migrant students. The problems are diagnosed in the treatment of Migrant students as 'Special Needs' (see section 4, this chapter). Many if not most interviewees I spoke to in my study refer to PISA as the 'eye-opener' in terms of what they deem is a much-needed change in education governance and structure. Where previous local efforts by well-meaning pedagogues failed to point out a growing discrepancy in student performance levels, inequities in the access to the job market, and a perceived state 'failure of a highly expensive investment in a selective system', PISA seemed to have brought these topics 'back into the political agenda', in the words of one interviewee. On a general note, PISA was seen as a favourable development for the now introduced Swiss school reforms, which in some interviewees' opinion were long overdue. In chapter 4, the Swiss education reform policies HARMOS (Harmonising Public School) and the abolishment of Special Needs classes in Canton Zurich are discussed with reference to PISA. Policy terminology and instruments seem to indicate a strong reference or 'educational borrowing' (Steiner-Khamsi, 2002), such as the introduction of education 'performance' standards and tools of monitoring 'quality in education' (see chapter 4, section 4.4).

The growing trend of comparison or looking across borders, both Cantonal borders and National borders for 'best practice' or for reference in educational matters, is confirmed by most interviewees, both in education as well as migration policy areas. **Joseph Hildbrand**, of the Department of Educational Planning within the Education Directorate and Public School Office of Canton Zurich speaks about different influences which affected a change in paradigm or shifts in governance in Switzerland.

'Seen from a Swiss point of view, Zuerich has become a leading Canton in terms of reforms, particularly through Ernst Buschor. I think this has to do with two things: Zuerich is a large and rich Canton, in Swiss terms. Therefore has large departments, such as the one I am heading now, which is not the case for any other Canton. And this has emerged because we have more finances and personnel. This plays a special role. And the entire, let’s say, New Public Management, out-put oriented education reform is naturally also influenced by Ernst Buschor, very strongly. A lot of power came from there. However, one has to say, that this is an international development. This is OECD, this
is the European Union, a little less EU, but a lot stands on the European Union. This is naturally strongly influenced by the Anglo-American (development/ standards) and from the Nordic states. The entire, I believe, French-speaking world is considerably less output oriented. From this point of view, Switzerland is simply in the suction of the development. What is interesting is that PISA is such a typical product; this is OECD. Hardly any country, European country can afford not to participate in PISA. Which means that measuring and comparing is a topic today. Moreover, Switzerland simply participates. I think it is interesting; we have a lot of contact with Germany, Austria and so on. We noticed that earlier we used to tag along more with these countries in education political discussions. Well, Austria perhaps not, but Germany certainly was leading. Now the Germans are coming to us to see what we are doing. They think now in a way that we did a couple of things earlier than they did. ` JH

Joseph Hildbrand points out that the New Public Management, and what he calls output oriented education reform was influenced by Ernst Buschor, but that ultimately this is an international development. Switzerland therefore is seen to be `in the suction of the development`, by which he suggests that hardly any European country could afford to keep out of this `measuring and comparing` trend launched through mainly the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), and partly the EU.

Given that the former politician and present-day economist Ernst Buschor appears as an influential policy figure for education politics, I think it necessary to give some background information about him to gain a more holistic understanding of his persona, especially as he is an interviewee. In terms of his career path, he studied economics in Switzerland in the late sixties and was first employed as an accounting officer at the Federal Financial Administration. After attaining his PhD in Finance Studies in 1970, he was appointed an expert mandate for finance questions in the Council of Europe. This may feature as an interesting point for the influences or trends which Joseph Hildbrand mentions in connection to a change in governing paradigm affected by the EU and OECD, however introduced by Ernst Buschor. In 1972 he entered the Finance Administration of Canton Zurich and became head official in 1975. In the eighties, Buschor gained recognition during his office as a professor and head of school at the University of St. Gallen for Business Administration with special focus on Public Administration. As of 1993 until 2003, he
was member of the Zurich Cantonal government, first as a director for the Department of Public Health and Welfare, and as of 1995 for the Department of Education. From 1997 until the end of his office in 2003, he became the President of the Canton Zurich government, also responsible for chairing different commissions and boards; particularly the ‘Swiss Harmonising of Public Budgets’, the national research program ‘impact of state measures’, the Swiss University Planning Commission and the ‘Swiss society for administrative science’. From 1998 to 2003, he was also member of the Swiss Polytechnic Council and vice-president of the Swiss University Conference.

With reference to his role as a former politician and the different functions or positions, which he had worked as, I would like to argue that this has some significance in the way that education policy has been shaped and influenced over the last few years since his appointment as the head of Department of Education in the nineties. Indeed, his narrative throws much light on how the ‘harmonising’ or ‘coordination of Public Budgets’ might have directly affected the way in which education governance has and is undergoing a massive structural change. The Education policy ‘HARMOS’ (see chapter 4 for more details), harmonising public school throughout Switzerland, which has been now ratified in 2009 by the required number of Cantons to come through as an education policy legislation, bears the stamp of this change in governing paradigm or the orientation towards ‘harmonising’. This entails the introduction of standards in education and an orientation towards ‘quality improvement’ through measuring common education standards. Although Ernst Buschor gives an account in the interview narrative about how he himself had pushed for the introduction of an education policy, such as ‘HARMOS’ during his office, he goes on to point out potential perils of the introduction of standards in the way they have been issued in education policy as of the year 2009.

‘Well, I would say it (the change in governing paradigm) is moving forward in the right direction, but the coherence of the system is not yet achieved. And this will be within reach. Although, in Germany there is also the question arising in certain circles, whether it is right to be doing the standards this way. Me personally, well...I am not going to voice negative comments, otherwise there wil be problems! But I am of the view that the type of standards, which we are making with HARMOS again lead to a petrification of the system. I think England
or Canada or the Nordic states are doing it better than us, by keeping the system flexible through school tests. But it is better to be doing something rather than nothing at all. But I am of the view that on the long run one has to be careful that the standards don’t become a hidden overregulated curriculum. And that threatens to happen. In Germany as well. And then we have the same problem on another level. I fear that it will end this way. But ok, let us do this now and then one has to make it flexible again. No, in principle we have a comparative case with the Professional Colleges\(^85\), which one had to build up through a relatively centralised process out of necessity. And now it is being deregulated. We are integrating the Professional Colleges into the University law. Although the strange thing is that the biggest opposition against deregulation is coming from the economy and from the Federal Department. This is typical. The apparatus in Berne is defending itself naturally! This is interesting, that the resistance is based exactly there and not below. I mean the Professional Colleges want to be deregulated themselves too. It is possible, but in the beginning...and here is it is somewhat similar; in the beginning it makes sense to take the leash on doing something until it works and then to deregulate. But then the danger is that the deregulation does not occur. And this risk is larger with the Public School, and there the pressure will have to come from the parents and the schools. Because from above they won’t do it. A bureaucracy will never relinquish power of its own free will. This is how it works in the whole world. In this sense there is a risk. But we have to take this on the leash for once, because the whole school level harmonisation wouldn’t happen otherwise. But the danger is that it will be stuck in this regulation. Except if the pressure comes from below. This came for the Professional Colleges. One could have done it perhaps via standardised tests, like the Nordic countries. But we have a regulating culture and this cannot be abolished over night. Yes, we will try it for a while, but then it has to be removed. Because these processes, these are really generational questions. I had to also learn this unfortunately.’

EB

This particular point on deregulation and more widely perhaps the discussion of the authority of education policy and practice is one of the larger disputes over the introduced HARMOS policy. According to Buschor, initially, the Central authority, in this case the Federal or Intercantonal Education authority, which is the Swiss Conference for Education Ministers (EDK) had to ‘take the leash’ and impose regulation through common standards. However, he voices concern in the

\(^{85}\text{Fachhochschulen}\)
continuation of such regulating measures in education (or indeed any other state sector): it could lead to a ‘petrification of the system’, or a kind of fossilisation in which local and contextual development would be stemmed. The only way in which deregulation could happen, according to Buschor, is if the stakeholders of the system, in this case, the public schools and parents, would then push for exercising their own sovereignty in the implementation of policy in contextual school practice. This would however be confronted with opposition from the Central authorities, because ‘bureaucracy does not willingly give up power’. Thus, the introduction of education standards in Swiss schools is sparking off a controversial debate, especially as meanings and use of standards is not established clearly, as is discussed partly in chapter 4, section 4.4.

One crucial way of speaking about the introduction of the education reform, is how Buschor speaks about necessity of ‘taking the leash’, or of taking measures to introduce a particular form of governing paradigm in order to feed it into the system through regulation. This kind of reference by policy makers in their understanding of what changes have been introduced portray a view that change only happens through an initial centrally governed harmonising or standardising policy. This would then allow a ‘change in paradigm’ or thinking about for instance inequity in education or the issues which were raised by PISA, such as the student allocation and selection mechanisms of the Cantons. Regine Buehlmann of the Swiss Conference of Education Ministers (EDK) within her narrative spoke about the difficulty of reconciling education sovereignty of the Cantons with the need to address issues such as discriminatory allocation practices in education within different Cantons; unless there was what she calls a ‘push from above’, awareness about such issues would not be raised. On the other hand, too much interference or governing power from the Central government would not correspond to the freedom of the Cantons to regulate education matters as per their own judgement and needs. In relation to comparison, which is happening through PISA for example, this development is often portrayed as an inevitable part of perhaps globalising processes; Switzerland is seen as being sucked into this trend, because ‘hardly any European country can afford to not participate’. There is one the one hand, this rather resigned view of participating in European or international trends, probably due to economic reasons (see chapters 3 and 5). On the other hand, these shared ideas are finding their way into references for
national reform policies, which are seen to introduce a required 'change in paradigm' for what are flagged as social-democratic reasons, such as alleviation of discriminatory local practices. This attitude is shared by many education policy makers in favour of the reform, as will become clearer as we proceed to the other narratives within this section.

When asked about his views on 'integration' in school, Ernst Buschor spoke about how on the one hand, what he calls 'socialisation' as the responsibility of the students and the parents, in that there needs to be 'willingness' on their part. See also Mario Gattiker on this in section 2. On the other hand, the structures and administration are addressed. Integration is seen as a 'side-process' of a 'new function' of the school to socialise.

This broaches the question where integration comes into the picture of 'harmonising public school' and advancing 'education standards', such as 'equity' or 'equality of opportunity'. With respect to the Federal uptake on standards, the narrative by Mario Gattiker, the vice president of the Federal Office for Migration (BFM), whom we previously encountered enlightens some points. I asked him where the influences for the notion of 'integration' came from and how education, which is named as one of the key areas where integration should apparently take place, features within this agenda.

Interviewer: Whether influences on concept of 'integration' came from EU, OECD or grew out of regional awareness?

'The holistic understanding of integration is what the legislator based on the federal structures. The cooperative work of different state structures is based on this, as far as one has not copied some sort of 'recipes', which are being done in other places. The EU has started a few years ago to make working groups with their handbook, who discuss integration questions, whereby this is clearly a domain reserve. It is not communal law. Nevertheless, there are working groups, who send out invitations to some sort of events, but we do not have access. We have an intergovernmental concentration on asylum and migration, which is a consortium, an intergovernmental, informal consortium, which was created in the nineties, revolving around questions on asylum. Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, well overseas states are members, in addition to eight European countries, West-European
countries and Switzerland is a part of this; was even responsible for building this up in the nineties. And there one had the first working groups for integration. One established that the idea of mainstreaming is quite common. There are states, who actually invest a lot in specific specialist programs. The Germans have such an approach with language advancement. Large language advancement programs parallel to the regular structures. In the mean time we are in fact trying to optimise the language advancement within the regular structures. And to only finance language courses, if they are complementary, for people, who do not have access to the regular structures. And we actually see the approaches there, which are also followed by others, of mainstreaming, and of integration. ’ MG

- Interviewer (FS): Concerning the educational sector, how did this feature within the integration agenda and whom did the government work with on this, the EDK (Swiss Conference for Education Ministers)?

Yes, this is correct. We have been working with the EDK for a long time. For example, at time the EDK did the action plan PISA, where one discovered that foreign-language speakers were having an enormous problem. Here the EDK did the action plan PISA and we made our contribution to this. Amongst other things we said, for example, we are going to orientate our language advancement towards the parents of children, who do not have access to the normal linguistic advancement opportunities. The focus group that is difficult to reach. Because school is saying, we are overburdened with this migration problem, we send our specialists to the school. What happens outside of the school is no longer in our influence zone. PISA naturally showed that the school environment is a decisive success factor. Whether the parents can accompany their children to school and talk to the teachers is a decisive factor; here Switzerland differs from other countries because we have much more migrant population. It is clear that Finland with the few thousand migrants, and then mostly from the same language regions (does not have the same situation).

- How did PISA feature in this discussion?

PISA came before we started with the integration report and the integration measures; the discourse about developing the regulation structures came from us. And that simply confirmed that everything goes hand in hand, simply occurred simultaneously. And there one developed the concepts. The school area is a typical example: the school has to do its job. The school has to be in the position to advance the foreign-language speaking children exactly in the same way as the others. And migration (policy) has to see to it that the school environment is restructured in such a way that school is supported. Which means we have to see that parents, who do not have access to language courses, will have access. Either by changing the structures in such a way, as we have done today with the supporting credits via the Law for

86 Schwer erreichbare Zielgruppe
87 Regelstrukturen
Foreigners and the Asylum Law, and financing the complementary offers. And this is the concept. The school area is a beautiful example. The EDK is also working with the implementation organisation and sees to it that one has the Cantonal representatives within the respective working groups. The EDK is also represented within this Interdepartmental Working Group for Integration, which I am presiding. So that the school area is on the table there. They have to know, what is happening.

This part of the interview narrative with Mario Gattiker, I would like to argue, shows how Switzerland’s integration strategy with respect to the role of education in this has developed and where the sources of reference lie. Gattiker mentions how some influences happened through an ‘informal’ intergovernmental consortium on asylum and migration, which involves several countries collaborating on integration concepts and regulation. One of the main concepts or trends he mentions is ‘mainstreaming’, which is applied to what can be assumed a holistic integration governing approach. Education is mentioned mainly in the context of language advancement: here the Federal government sees its area of impact. If we compare with the narratives by Mario Gattiker himself in section 2 and Claudio Nodari, when he refers to the main federal funds flowing into private language school; it becomes clearer how this focus was brought into picture. Examples of other countries also feature in the context of this consortium: Germany for example, who has applied language advancement in this manner. An inherent idea of ‘policy borrowing’ and ‘best practice’ is also suggested by the narrative. PISA features again very strongly as a platform for developing what role education is seen to play within a Federal ‘integration’ agenda. The EDK is represented and collaborated with strongly in the planning of the focus of education within the integration report of the Migration Office. The PISA action plan established by the EDK, who processed or tendered studies to process the PISA results for Switzerland, then draws out the ‘problem’ of migrant students and low education performances. The ‘problematisation’ of migration is brought into the picture and picked up as what can be argued is presented as an ‘equity’ discussion: because as Gattiker phrases it ‘foreign-language speaking children need to be advanced in exactly the same way as the others’. The state sees its area of influence in the promotion of structural changes in education and also providing additional or complementary advancement in language for ‘parents’; or in other words language schools for adults.
I asked the interviewee about the particulars of education data with reference to the integration report, which he and his team were responsible for putting together.

- **Was PISA referenced or featured within the integration report?**

  Yes, the action plan PISA was even made before the integration report of the BFM. We have taken up the entire PISA matter within the report in the context of school.’ MG

- **What was the focus within the school part of the report, was there also reference to youth and standards in education?**

  Of course, one can quanti’fy this. We wanted to also know, how many there are. How many people are we talking about, how much money is involved that we need to invest in this? We did not have any reliable data, we made estimations and took certain measures. And placed them into the political landscape, so that the discourse about the problem is effectuated.’ MG

- **How did this occur; via the BFS (Federal Statistical Office)?**

  Yes, the BFS partially also did not have any data. The 3000 (group of students at risk), these were calculated by Gerber himself (colleague of Gattiker within the IAM, not the BFS), because we said we need to know how many there are. Because we don`t have the data, we even said this: nobody is concerned that there is no data. And now you can see that revolving around these measures there are projects to improve the data situation. This is in the area of security; the entire dark field research. The fact of the tip of the ice berg, and what is underneath? In the statistics there is the problem that there is no population count anymore and there are different projects for studies. But politics has to know how many, right. And that is why we also made our own estimations: and this came through quite provocatively, that there are 150 000 women within the job market, who are at risk. 3000 from the point of the school, who are particularly at risk. And this was always the mandate, which I gave my people, that politics needs to know how much in order to have an idea.’ MG

The problem of lack of reliable data and estimation crops up within this narrative part. Gattiker speaks about how `politics needs quantifiable` evidence. The view that although they `did not have any reliable data`, but `made estimations and took certain measures` connects to the thought that figures give sense to policy-making. Moreover, Gattiker speaks about then `placing them into the political landscape, so that the discourse about the problem is effectuated`; again the idea emerges here that a change in paradigm or the `problematic` of a particular discourse need to be highlighted and introduced through offering data-evidence. If we compare this narrative with Ernst Bushor`s, Regine Buehlmann`s previously and Joseph Hildbrand`s subsequently, then
a 'problematisation' and instrumental use of comparative data emerges, which is seen to show inequities within national education systems as a strong evidence to push for structural reforms. Because of the strong Federal structure of Switzerland and the education authority given to the Cantons, the centrally pushed standardization or 'harmonisation' can be achieved by pertaining to social-democratic issues raised and flagged through such data and a system of 'voluntary' participation of Cantons in a system of concordat reform treaties.

With respect to the BFS, the Federal Statistical Office, which is responsible for producing the required quantifiable evidence, I interviewed Marcel Heiniger. He is a statistician at the Federal Statistical Office (BFS), which is the main generator and supplier for state-and Swiss population related data for both governmental planning but also the private market sector. This interviewee could be seen as a policy advisor for the BFM, amongst other departments, in terms of migration population data. He is also represented in what is called the Interdepartmental Working Group for Migration (IAM), specifically dealing with integration measures, which Mario Gattiker is head of. I was interested in his understanding about this idea of quantifiable 'policy-informing evidence' and standards of education within the context of integration, such as 'equality of opportunity' or 'equity' or 'inclusion' and whether this featured in the kind of data measurement and production, which he is involved in.

'Yes, there is the idea to compare equality of opportunity, to speak in simple terms, the group one wants to integrate with the local population. To look what it is and then one can establish if there are deficits. Integration would imply that the chances of one group are beneath that of the local. This sparks off large discussions and problems, and one asks what the comparison groups are. One cannot throw all Swiss in one pot and say, we are simply going to compare the entire Swiss population, in which there are different social classes, with some other migrant group. And if I take the highly qualified North-Americans, who are in fact, integrated better than Swiss even. They have larger living space, etc. One has to reflect a lot on how to compare. One can say 'to compare same with same'. Swiss from the same social class, but how does one define this? This is actually the big question, which arises and one generally looks at what kinds of integration measures are being offered, not just from BFM, but also Cantonal and Communal, then one always has this simplistic comparison between foreigners and Swiss. And if you see it this way, it may be an initial indication or information, and if you are lucky then one can subgroup the
foreigners in different nationality groups. And nationality X is better in terms of acquiring citizenship and so on and so forth. But for me this is very dissatisfactory in this sense. Particularly when one actually wants to disclose the equality of opportunity. There are massive problems there, and this is internationally always the discussion, how one can compare and how can one present this. And this also shows that one always has to have a scale of data, very very detailed data, for Swiss too, and not only Swiss, but at least to know what the level of education is. Well, one has to at first separately identify the naturalised Swiss, because as soon as someone acquires Swiss nationality, this person gets submerged in the number of Swiss, and then ‘there is no longer a problem’, right. And at least this one should be able to take out. And there is not only the problem of coverage of the migrant background people but also the local, because there would be a lot of attributes which would be important in order to identify groups.

The question of the socio-economic background?

‘Yes, this is effectively also a problem of data, because one cannot measure this in Switzerland. In England, they have the data from that point of view that they classify native born/foreign-born as being more important than nationality, right. However, here it is only about Swiss-Foreigner, which is all one can retrieve. That is it. The educational background of a person, this you cannot take out of any registry. Job, current activity, this is not in any registry; there have to be other surveys or sources. Then I am actually losing a lot of information, which I cannot even retrieve.’ MH

This interviewee highlights what in his view are the problems around the measurement of data involving ‘equality of opportunity’; the difficulties are seen to lie on different levels; On the one hand in pinning down what one is actually measuring, i.e. socio-economic background and/or nationality. Then there seems to be a problem that certain types of data are not retrievable in Switzerland, because all that is available is the simplistic comparison Swiss-Foreigner. The profession or educational background of a person is not retrievable. Or the particular attribute of ‘nationality’ is simply divisible into different nationalities, but not who for example has attained Swiss nationality or who is ‘born Swiss’. As he suggests that ‘Integration would imply that the chances of one group are beneath that of the local’: but in order to have effective measures to alleviate deficits one needs specific comparison groups. Different concepts of comparison are enlightened, such as comparing ‘same with same’; but for this one would need the specific data classifying people with ‘same’ features, such as Swiss with the same socio-economic background, which however is
not available. Then there is also the question about how data is presented, which becomes an interesting point when we see how Mario Gattiker speaks about the data within the integration report. With respect to the idea which Gattiker speaks about in terms of ‘risk groups’ or students with the potential to drop out of the school or job market system, I asked Marcel Heiniger whether this was a sensitive topic in terms of presenting or coverage, development and focus.

‘Not so much in the coverage, more or less within the administrative data, everything is covered neatly. In the surveys, it is different. It is clear that one focuses on certain groups and determines control samples. That one addresses certain people consciously, this we actually did in the health monitoring etc.

‘I hope you can see the role of the BFS in this whole integration discussion. You see that our role is more ad hoc. Honestly, we have not dealt with this theme scientifically. We had to get in external knowledge towards this theme. But the aim is that we can specify individual attributes, which we do not base on internal knowledge but that we get external expertise. And I think here we have to invest more. We have to methodologically put more thought into this. Also in comparison internationally, Switzerland sees itself primarily as data producer that is the perception of BFS, that we produce and provide data. All this exceeds in terms of thematic far beyond whatever we have done so far and in this sense, it is a challenge to engage with this and to do justice to these challenges.’

MH

The interview with Marcel Heiniger enlightens the considerations and reservations he voices in the use and presentation of data and how certain available data then also features within the integration report of the Federal Migration Office. Within the administrative data, by which he probably refers to the integration report, the data is ‘presented neatly’, however within the studies, certain distinctive selections are made in how the data is picked up. He also professes that ’the BFS have not dealt with this’, implying the integration orientated data provision, ’scientifically’, but rather had to bring in external knowledge. This aspect about the lack of reliable data specific to the Swiss case with respect to measuring ‘equality of opportunity’, which Mario Gattiker referred to as well, I would like to argue, is quite significant in why PISA data has featured prominently within the Integration report or in the backdrop of the role of education in the integration agenda; it would then provide the main policy-informing evidence, which ‘problematises’ the migrant; as it is difficult to make any distinctive national data statements on why there is inequality within the Swiss education system,
for example regarding socio-economic background, `the migrant` versus `Swiss` is all
the data distinction can offer. `The migrant` thus becomes a main denominator for
measuring inequality or inequity; this fits quite well into the integration framework of
`lack of integration` or the need to `integrate migrants`; because in educational
arguments, they are facing inequalities within the system.

Earlier interview narratives presented within this chapter enhance this discussion with
different normative attributions of `culture` or `migrant` used rather than `socio-
economic background` as a parameter for alleviating deficits in educational
performance of migrant students. Joseph Hildbrand speaks about this more
specifically within his narrative:

`The question of educational inequality, which is actually constant,
which is the nerve racking bit. Some efforts were made, but at the
same time, the success rate was not so hugely high. In the Nordic
countries in certain places, they were successful, but then in other
places they remained almost stable. But in the seventies, we
discussed this strongly, socio-economic prerequisites and
inequalities, inequality of opportunity and so on. Then the topic
vanished somewhat from the political agenda. Within I think
around fifteen years, perhaps even twenty, in the eighties and
nineties. And with PISA it reappeared enormously, it is, what I
would say, one of the most urgent education policy questions. Yes,
it is a very strong question, and now of course it is naturally
strongly associated with the migration question. Ultimately, PISA
also shows children from socio-economically disadvantaged social
classes are still having the worst educational opportunities. And
migration-background and foreign-language background is less
significant. But it often overlaps; often migrants come from socio-
economically lower social classes. But actually social class is still
the significant factor. ` JH

On `equity` and where this came from?

`Equity, it is an education political key word at the moment, which
we are having difficulties to address. It is difficult to evaluate. Of
course, PISA gave a push here, right. We have seen in PISA 2000
that we were firstly disappointed in having faired so badly.
Because Switzerland was always giving the impression that, they
were the best. If someone would have said, we also have a school
system, which is not that good and produced problems, and then
one was being nearly torpedoed. Now suddenly one comes into
international comparison and sees, we are not really the best and
the biggest. This has created a deep insecurity. Secondly, this is
only the average on the ranking list. Then if one looked at the
variance of the majority, then we suddenly realised that we have a massive problem. Well, at the time, approx. 20% of the youth, could hardly understand a written text in year nine (of their education). And I have to say this was stronger comparatively than in other countries. There were a much larger number of countries, who were really successful. And this hurts and unsettles, and there is external pressure. Furthermore, I recall a debate, we had to answer some Cantonal Council queries; this is a risk group for our society. That is to say, there is a kind of automotive, because nobody can seriously have an interest to have a part of youth outside of the education system, who do not find any access to the job market, who fall out of the occupational system. Who by the way, then also are at risk otherwise, socially at risk? Both things somehow occurred, the comparison has brought about a sense of insecurity. But nationally one had to say, we have to engage with this question as well. We have to live out two basic questions within the education system, which have ultimately something to do with societal progression. I think on the one hand we have to produce excellence, because we are a rich society, and if we want to perpetuate our richness then we have to produce good material and we need good people. So that most of the people can achieve a standard as high as possible and that we do not disengage anybody. Then we realise that this has caused a lot of drive. We are engaging very strongly with this question. Which is politically very contentious, right? What kind of measures are to be taken? Then it (the discussion/issue) becomes more difficult.’ JH

Again the idea reappears that PISA brought back old educational concerns back into the political agenda. Hildbrand also speaks about two parallel developments, which occurred from PISA; the shock over having such low education standards when compared to other countries. The economic need to be a productive country in terms of the market and of having ‘good people’ with high standards, who do not fall ‘out of the system’. Then the societal progression concern aspect, that there aren’t any ‘risk groups’, who socially disengage. I would argue that this connects to a notion of the ‘economic citizen’ (see chapter 2) or the economizing of education. However, in his view, when it comes to the specific measures that are to be taken in the face of these two parallel national considerations, this becomes a politically loaded topic. This is where perhaps the use of ‘the migrant’ as a denominator to address or control the politically loaded education issues comes into play; as the Federal power lies within the areas of migration and immigration policies, this issue can be dealt with within this sector; through an integration mandate, which appoints a role to education within this agenda. Education governance then experiences a large-scale structural change.
with their own pedagogical discourses developing parallel to the Federal (see previous sections); ‘the migrant’ thus offers itself quite helpfully and strategically to flag an apparently social-democratic ‘solution’ to this ‘problem’, which appeared on the political and public agendas; integration or ‘inclusion’ becomes the logical ‘solution’, in which no specifications or deliberations about either lack of specific education data (socio-economic rather than migration-background orientated) or political membership (political integration) needs to be addressed.

In this chapter, drawing collectively from all the themes (6.2 – 6.6), which portray the understanding of ‘integration’ and education related areas from the narrative point of view of Swiss policy actors, I now proceed to the final discussion in chapter 7, which links and concludes all the theoretical and methodological arguments derived from chapters 2-6, which are key to analysing the evidence within this study.
Chapter 7: Discussion

7.1 Key concluding points

I would like to begin my discussion with a short account of a political initiative by the council of Canton Basel in August 2010 that addresses the introduction of `voting rights on a Cantonal level for migrants` without the requirement of Swiss citizenship. This issue was put to a referendum of the Swiss public on the 26th of September 2010. The initiative proposed that migrants with a residency permit and who have lived for at least five years in Canton Basel can vote and have electoral rights in Cantonal matters. A counter-proposal allowed voting rights for migrants, but not electoral rights; in other words without the right to be a political candidate. The initiative committee proposed a `Yes’ vote for both options:

![Image of a vote diagram](http://www.auslaenderstimmrecht-bs.ch/)

a) Would you like to accept the initiative `voting rights for migrants’? YES
b) Would you like to accept the counter-proposal of the government? YES
c) Casting question: would you prefer the initiative to the counter-proposal?

In response to this initiative and counter-proposal, the right-wing Swiss people`s Party (SVP) launched a counter-attack, and proposed the rejection of both options. The SVP youth party fraction reacts with posters on facebook calling for the rejection of this initiative (for an example see the image below). The SVP official counter-committee website stated that voting rights need to be linked with citizenship or nationality. Moreover, concerns are voiced that automatic voting rights for migrants in Cantons will `devalue Swiss nationality or citizenship rights`.
Their poster (see the right hand image) illustrates how the various languages other than German of migrants will prevent them from understanding what the vote is about and how to vote: this is an argument in support of saying ‘no’ to both initiative and counter-proposal. An earlier poster produced by the pro-initiative committee of the ‘introduction to voting rights for migrants’ (see image on the left) illustrates how the many languages of migrants were considered good enough by the Swiss state to enable the paying of taxes or filling the tax papers: this then is an argument for supporting the proposal. The SVP committee, in their counter-campaign, speaks about how ‘integration’ is something that migrants need to apply themselves to, rather than receiving political rights, which for them are invariably linked to attaining citizenship. If there is a successful integration – without making any direct reference to what precisely integration means – then only could citizenship and therefore also jointly political rights be granted to migrants.

On the 26th of September 2010, the Basel population rejected both the initiative and the counter initiative, with 42,086 contra votes and 9942 pro. A similar initiative was rejected in popular referenda in 1994, 2000, and 2006. The result is that voting rights
for migrants are still rare, if not nearly non-existent in Swiss Cantons, with the exceptions of Cantons Neuchatel and Jura as the only two regions to grant voting rights to non-naturalized migrants on a Cantonal level.

Political membership and the question of ‘integration’ continue, then, to lie at the heart of heated and contradictory political, policy and public debates in Swiss society - possibly in many Western-European nation-states - and these issues are interwoven in a complex web of multiple facets of discourse. I seek to highlight the link between some of these multiple facets, in relation to which, I suggest, ‘membership’ needs to be researched, resignified and resituated in more differentiated ways, which do justice to the complexity of the discourses. There is a great uncertainty and diffuse conceptions of ‘integration’ in the frameworks and political agendas launched by the Swiss federal government in support of integrative or inclusive approaches towards migrants in Swiss society and systems. I argue that the very tensions of these different and often contradictory state commitments and concepts may demonstrate the absence of a necessary resignifying of membership modalities in a developing social democratic state. This study reveals the tensions that arise from these contradictory commitments. In the tensions and challenges faced by nation states, membership and political membership remain a grey zone, which is largely untouched by policy reform agendas. Although change in social democracy may be indicated by concepts such as migrant ‘integration’ and the addressing of the ‘failure of the education system through mechanisms of segregation’ and the introduction of so-called social democratic standards, the way in which these concepts are politicized and instrumentalised is highly structured and caters to the needs of economic capital. The discourses point to a model of membership which promotes the economic rather than the civic person. However, the negotiated notion of difference is politicized by using assimilationalist, cultural ‘integration’ frames, which spread the idea of a standard culture and the in-tegration into ‘Swiss’ culture, different from others. This kind of politicization of difference, in a cultural and economic sense, is, I suggest, contrary to the social democratic ideal of membership, citizenship and participation, relative to the extended transnational interests and policy spaces of nation-states. Moreover, it could be perpetuating old, discriminatory modalities and lack of membership, if political membership is understood as a human right. If nation-states are extending their interests through membership of European or transnational migration agreements
and other transnational policy spaces, then the restriction of membership rights relative to these extended interests is contradictory and could be considered a breach of human rights for people in a social democracy, who are a part of the nation and contributing to economic stability and social development. I argue that membership is not developing in relation to the other commitments nation-states are making by claiming to be liberal social democracies. There is a hegemonic economic logic that drives the creation of secondary structural measures through policy, which curtails membership rights in response to economic agendas with neo-liberal influences and pressures. Hence, there is no interest in resignifying membership for migrants, as it does not serve the economic and political agenda of the state. This, I would argue, is leading to a closure of public debate and civic involvement and a weakening of democracy (Jessop, 2000; Fairclough, 2005a).

The challenge one faces as a researcher is to give due consideration to the ideologies of membership that are embedded within the multiple, often contradictory commitments of a nation-state in opening national borders in favour of joint markets on the one hand and simultaneously keeping territorial ‘traditional’ functions of membership on the other. To do justice to this debate, I recall Benhabib’s (2004) proposal that practices of political membership can best be analysed through an internal reconstruction of these multiple commitments. The Swiss case and the discourses around migrant ‘integration’ may reveal these national struggles not only within the wider context of trends in European governance as a form of deterritorialised politics (see chapter 2), but also as crystallising the finer tensions around the framing of internal and external ‘citizen’ boundaries through discourses. If we consider discourses as embodying “meaning and social relationships, which can constitute both subjectivity and power relations’, that are also ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' and thus can be ‘constituted by exclusions as well as inclusions, by what cannot as well as what can be said’ (Ball, 1990a:2; in Vidowich, 2001:7), then migrant ‘integration’ discourses are highly relevant to the dominant idea of membership. These particular understandings are then constructed, diffused and translated into institutional practices and may establish a kind of invisible continuity. I argue that it is precisely by looking more closely at socio-civic policy as discourse that these tensions may become more apparent when reconstructing the commitments nation-states are making in the different domains that
touch on ‘membership’ issues, such as migration, economic, and in this particular case education policy. This study has addressed the ways in which political membership frames might be contained or embedded in migrant ‘integration’ policy discourses in education, or more broadly how the demarcations of membership are embedded in what I have termed socio-civic policy. The ways in which this study addresses this principal question are summarised as follows:

1. **Political membership frames are restrictive, discriminatory and not addressed in Swiss integration policy discourses;** I argue that this is occurring:

   A) Through the problematisation of the ‘migrant’; Dichotomizing and ‘othering’ discourses perpetuate discriminatory modalities and practices of political membership, with the result that permanent ‘alienage’ of migrants remains predominant on multiple levels; European, Federal state, Cantonal, municipal and sectoral, such as in Education.

   B) Through the instrumentalisation and politicization of education: Education is attributed a role of ‘solving’ a problematised view of migrants in Swiss societies, institutions and systems, that is in discourses of education and migration policy. Historically, education has frequently been attributed a role in nation-building. However, the particular way in which Swiss ‘integration’ policy is framed for education is having a hollowing effect and dilution of educational substance through adopting secondary adjustments (structural rather than substantial) in response to standardization and Europeanisation.

2. **Europeanising forms of governance as deterritorialised politics;** by participating in and referencing of international studies, OECD, Lisbon, and Bologna: ‘soft governing’ methods contribute to this hollowing effect and to the continuation or perpetuation of restrictive frames of political membership. The reasons for this are that:

   A) Switzerland has contradictory commitments to economic policy, Europeanising trends, overcoming obstacles of Federal structures, and maintaining of territorial demarcations with restrictive immigration/migration policy; struggle to reconcile these commitments; tensions in convening a corresponding political strategy are evident.

   B) There is a lack of adherence to a human right to membership in Swiss policy as discourses, despite claiming to be a social democracy.
Particularly declarative in form of social-democratic referencing and ‘flag-bearing’ and politicization of social democratic terminology, however with the obvious absence of political integration. Maintaining a multicultural understanding of ‘culture’ as distinctive and ‘set’; migrants are to in-tegrate into a ‘standard culture’. There is a thick cultural coating of integration and discursive conceptualisation of membership.

3. **Through locating the research about political** in socio-civic policy discourses, such as those framed through ‘integration’ for education, rather than restricting investigation to legal, constitutional, or institutional spheres.

   A) This study illustrates the importance of an eclectic combination of different theories and methodologies, acknowledging discourse as a medium through which democracy operates and looking at the political sociology of the state in relation to the political normative theory that it builds on.

   B) By combining Critical and constructive elements of discourse analysis frame and Benhabib’s (2004) democratic iterations, I propose looking at resistance to dominant discourses through locating *social identities* or organised groups as *forms of resistance*: and thus I see individuals such as students, teachers, parents, families, communities: looking at the student-family-school-state nexus and how this contributes to the discursive construction and/or expression of social identities in relation to ‘membership’.

7.2 Restriction and absence of Political Membership in Swiss integration discourses

I suggest that the continued denial of political membership rights and naturalization to migrants is a neglect of democratic human rights in what is deemed a social democratic nation-state. The concept of integration or inclusion, I argue, is based on false assumptions (and/or intentions of maintaining) cultural distinctiveness in a globalized reality:

   ‘Collective identities are formed by strands of competing and contentious narratives in which universalizing aspirations and particularistic memories compete with one another to create
temporary narrative syntheses, which are then subsequently challenged and riven by new divisions and debates. Narratives of peoplehood and in particular of liberal-democratic peoplehood evolve historically through such disjunctions and disputations’ (see Smith, 2003: in Benhabib, 2004:84).

From the analyses in this study, I suggest that concepts of integration discussed here are based on an outdated normative model of Swiss culture and society. As Kofman (1999) has suggested the idea of ‘in-tegration’, lends itself to an idea of citizenship that requires a pre-conceptualised mode of civility. Swiss political rhetoric and migrant integration policy clearly requires the acquisition of ‘Swiss-ness’ and a measurement of the ‘level of integration’. These requirements, I argue, are not based on abstract qualities, which separate the private from the public or the cultural from the civic: rather the private identity is required to be enacted in ‘a certain way’ in order for entry into the politically active and participative sphere to be permitted. Thus the requirements for the attainment of citizenship are based on models of cultural distinctiveness; and they also clearly imply the interplay of cultural and political identity. This is what Benhabib (2004) refers to as the ‘thick cultural coating of political membership or the attribution of cultural membership, rather than political membership based on Universalist principles of human rights (see chapter 3)

I support Benhabib’s (2004) argument that membership or political membership is a human right, which nation-states fail to recognise despite their apparent liberal-democratic status. I extend her argument by calling this human right the ‘human right to belong’. By introducing the concept of ‘democratic iterations’ and ‘cosmopolitan federalism’, she (ibid.) defends the need to resignify rights and identity. I propose that those ‘defined as outsiders’ are not at the border of the polity, but within it: it is the dichotomy between nationals and ‘foreigners’, citizens and migrants which, according to Benhabib (2004), is socially inadequate, and the reality is much more fluid. Thus I support the idea of resignifying the concept of identity and citizen as fluid and not dichotomous, as the discourses analysed within this study reveal. Moreover, the civic requirements for political membership rights should not be based on a distinctive cultural understanding or prerequisite of ‘being Swiss’ or of ‘national identity’, as this idea is itself diffuse and has been reconfigured along with deterritorialised and globalised developments and commitments of nation-states.
Moreover, in the face of processes of Europeanisation (see chapter 2), these contribute to the ‘disaggregation of rights regimes’ (Benhabib, 2004:146) because economic policies are framed within member states of the EU and also other state players within the European space, such as Switzerland, which sharply delineate rights of citizens of EU member states from those of third-country nationals, within what Benhabib (2004:149) refers to as a ‘patchwork of local, national, and supranational rights regimes’. That this is the case within Switzerland is discussed in chapters 3 and 5.

With reference to the role of education, the education policies, discussed here, contribute, in my view to the perpetuation of frames of limited political membership, which may contribute to the ‘permanent alienage’ of migrants. This, I claim, is being done under the guise of ‘social-democratically flagged’ reform policies (see chapter 2), which have the superficial appearance of expanding membership spaces for migrants within the country. Benhabib (2004) discusses how the EU hopes to avoid the more controversial issues concerning cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic identities by focussing on broad institutional criteria. It presents a challenge for states to frame any policy regarding membership, such as is targeted with integration, which would potentially carry a lot of substantial reference with respects to frames and demarcations of spaces of belonging; however, the state avoids addressing these politically loaded issues by framing policies which may superficially address migration and societal changes, but however simply regulates through broad (see harmonization), de-federalising and rather cosmetic re-structuring. In the Swiss case education is an institutional instrument through which ‘integration’ is framed, with the result of a hollowing effect on educational purpose. I argue that this is the case because broad structural changes could lead to what one interviewee describes as a ‘petrification of the system’ through the increased reference to apparently social-democratic standards, which do not translate into realities for specific schools and classrooms for teachers, students and families. Nonetheless, I would argue that the introduction of such hollow references contribute to sustaining pre-existing understandings, frames and concepts of belonging, membership and ‘othering’, because they contain constructed and diffused ideas about ‘culture’ or problematised ‘migrant’, which get translated into the institutional levels.
Often, Benhabib (ibid.) explains, xenophobic politics is easy politics, but the social factors and institutional trends behind immigration trends in Europe are made much more complicated and intractable. ‘Europe’s “others”, whether they are guest workers or refugees, asylum seekers or migrants, have become an obvious focus for the anxieties and uncertainties generated by Europe’s own “othering”, its transformations from a continent of nation-states into a transnational political entity, whose precise constitutional and political form is still uncertain’ (2004:166/167). Thus transnational migration may only have brought into the foreground the reconfigurations which are happening to the political form of the nation-state, rather than being the sole cause of them. However, it is easier to use migration as ‘political scapegoat’. The precise constitutional and political form of the nation-state in the face of globalizing changes is fraught with uncertainties, and so policies addressing migration become hollow; because the essential questions in terms of contemporary modalities of membership are not addressed substantially or brought into debate from a conceptual or ideological point of view.

These uncertainties become apparent in Switzerland through these transformations, or adherence to deterritorialised or transnational politics, which I have argued are deeply related to Europeanising processes, while trying to restrain membership rights. We are looking at elements such as the introduction of network and ‘soft’ governance and attempts to overcome regionalism or federalism, while retaining rigid (im-) migration and political membership frames (see chapters 2 and 3).

This internal critique of ‘contradictory potentials’, which Benhabib (ibid.) sees as being rooted in institutional transformations in the domain of membership rights, is what I address for the Swiss case within a European space (see Political Sociology approach: chapter 2). The institutional transformations in this case are revealed and drawn from both the discourses which arise from migration/immigration developments and economic and education policy (chapters 3, 4 and 5) and from narrative discourses embedded amongst a ‘loose network’ of policy actors within education and migration politics (chapter 6).

As Benhabib (2004), I do not imply that the end of the unitary citizenship model as it exists today must mean that its hold upon our political imagination and its normative
force in guiding our institutions are obsolete. However, it does mean that we must be ready to imagine forms of political agency and subjectivity, which anticipate new modalities of political citizenship. Benhabib (2004) characterizes these new political trends as concepts of ‘democratic iterations’. I favour the concept she proposes, because it pertains to the complex processes of public argument, deliberation and exchange through which Universalist rights claims and principles are contested, contextualised, summoned and positioned in legal and political institutions, as well as relations within civil societies. Most importantly perhaps, it pertains to the idea of understanding and acknowledging, both critically and constructively, the discursive element as the medium or ether through which democracy is operating continually. The concept of ‘democratic iterations’ would offer such ‘constructive’ use of CDA, as it involves ‘linguistic, legal, cultural, and political repetitions-in-transformation, invocations, which are also revocations; they not only change established understandings but also transform what passes as the valid or established view of an authoritative precedent’ (Benhabib, 2004: 180).

To summarize, in this study, I have adopted and called for the use of a transdisciplinary approach to researching frames of ‘political membership’ within policy as discourse by using, eclectically, an adapted critical dialectical-relational discourse analysis framework (Fairclough, 2009). Critical social research, according to Fairclough (2009) aims to contribute to addressing the social ‘wrongs’ of the day (in a broad sense – injustice, inequality, lack of freedom, etc.) by analysing their sources and causes, resistance to them and possibilities of overcoming them. It has what has been termed both a ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ character. In this sense, CDA operates ‘critically’ and ‘constructively’ (Luke, 1996:12) and therefore can be used not only to ‘disentangle’ meanings and disclose power relations’, but rather through theorization of power and its productive elements suggests change possibilities at the macro and micro level (Liasidou, 2008:486; Ozga, 1990).

Both these ‘critical’ and ‘constructive’ aspects of the CDA approach, which I have suggested as per different theorists (Fairclough, 2009; Rizvi, 2006; Jessop, 2004; Ozga, 1990; Luke, 1996 and others see chapters 2 and 3), can have significant potential applications in education. Luke (1996) speaks about how systematic asymmetries of power and resources between speakers and listeners and between
readers and writers can be linked to the production and reproduction of stratified political and economic interests. In other words, discourse in institutional life can be perceived as a means for the ‘naturalization and disguise of power relations that are tied to inequalities in the social production and distribution of symbolic and material resources’ (1996:12). This, Luke (1996) exemplifies, would mean that the dominant discourses in contemporary cultures tend to represent those social formations and power relations that are the products of history, social formation and culture as if they were established ‘truths’ or as discussed previously, constructed ‘possible worlds’ or ‘imaginaries’ (Rizvi, 2006).

This approach highlights what I argue is a necessity to look at recontextualised or ‘translated’ Western-European nation-states’ strategic efforts to create migrant ‘integration’ agendas, which contain a sensitive, yet contradictory act of convergence of different, largely statist economic interests, which maintain certain pre-existing power relations (Benhabib, 2004; Fairclough, 2009; see also others, chapter 2). Thus, I have examined on the one hand ‘dominant’ discourses of neo-liberalism (Mitchell, 2003; Rizvi, 2006 Alexiadou, 2008; Grek et al., 2009 and others see chapters 2 and chapter 6) and New Public Management contained within new education policy reform introduced in Switzerland as of 2008. This examination was done by linking arguments related to changing modes of ‘soft’ governance in a European space of education (Novoa and Lawn, 2000; Grek et al., 2009 and others, see chapters 1 and 2) as a concept of policy through governance and how this policy is referenced in a national normative context. Thus, I have investigated how this policy referencing and change in governance is related to the migrant ‘integration’ mandate laid out by the Swiss Federal government and the Canton of Zurich education authorities specifically for the education agenda or role of education.

Linked with a particular perspective of changing forms of governance as a type of contemporary ‘deterritorialised politics’ of nation states (see Benhabib, chapter 3), I have proposed that this perspective enables an in depth vertical and horizontal study of public policy as a carrier of shared ideas and ideologies transgressing national borders (Grek et al. 2009 and others, see chapters 1 and 2) and attempts to take into account socio-political dimensions of policy discourses. Processes of Europeanisation, as discussed, have been understood as an ‘effect created by policy formation within
the distinct structures of governance associated with the EU and the process of political problem-solving which shapes the interactions of actors and policy networks in Europe’ (Keiner and Lawn, 2006:161). This political problem-solving in the Swiss case is the ‘problematised’ discourse around migration and migrants within the Swiss education system, which I have argued has (re-) triggered a national response which constructs, diffuses and institutionalises these shared ideas of European policies or policy references within the logic of pre-existing restrictive and absent ideologies and frames of political membership.

7.2.1 The problematisation of ‘the migrant’

Based on the preceding analyses of different social elements in this study, I argue that the conceptualization of the ‘integration’ framework predetermines that migrants need to familiarize themselves with the ‘local’ and ‘Swiss’ culture as a way to integration, based on the assumption that this culture is distinctive and separate from migrant culture(s). In chapter 3, I engaged in a review of how, faced with increased permanent settlement of migrants, European countries, especially Western industrial nations try to define multiple ways the process of ‘integration’ into their national systems. How this is done, is with a distinctive logic of how economic migration and asylum is framed, defined and redefined by the receiving states. In Switzerland, a long-standing economic dilemma of labour migration, increased influx and settlement of what were previously thought of as ‘guest workers’ and families has resulted in the setting up of complex economic and migration policies (see Chapter 5, 5.3). This is more recently enhanced with a use of multicultural approaches to frame what I term as ‘reconciliatory’ neo-liberal agendas of ‘integration’ throughout the political party spectrum in Switzerland (see Katheryn Mitchell, 2003; Grek et al., 2009 and others see chapters 2 and 3).

Although, what are perceived as other cultures are not questioned entirely or demanded to be abdicated, nonetheless, naturalization or the gaining of citizenship rights are connected to the acquisition of what is seen as ‘Swiss culture’ or ‘identity’. The political reality in Switzerland, as discussed in chapters 3 and 5, is however a stringent system of and the lowest percentage in naturalizations of migrants amongst
the European countries. This could point to the potential neglect or lack of engagement or taking into account what according to Benhabib (2002) is the transformations and hybridization of cultures or the ‘dialectics and interdependencies of rights and identities, of political institutions and cultural communities’; in other words the creation and perpetuation of social processes of political membership which are dialectically created through discursive and social practices. Indeed the notion of Swiss (‘national’) identity as such could be diffuse, individualized and not distinctive. I propose that Swiss ‘culture’ as such is subjectively and continually transformed, constructed, hybrid and constantly renegotiated within itself with not only the influences from migration but also the different lingo-cultural-and political divides and from the influences of globalization. Conditions set for integration in Switzerland however, could be based on a model of collective identity, which is seen as distinctive and ‘set’ (see Chapters 2 and 3).

In my understanding of the undercurrents within the interview narratives, there is a disputed discourse of societal ‘cultural’ paradigm or enactment/inculcation, which is strongly associated, I would like to argue, with the particular missives or strands of thinking, from which the actors are speaking, reflecting or even projecting ideas about. On the one hand there are the migration/immigration political and social policy fields and on the other the educational fields of discourse. One could almost detect a two-way top-down and bottom-up developments of ‘migration’ or ‘cultural’ paradigms or enactments, in which migration politics perpetuates the notion of a homogeneous group of ‘guest workers’ or ‘guests’, and the Special Needs education stronghold, which perpetuated to this point the notion of ‘migrant-background’ being classified as ‘special needs’. The ideological appraisal made by policy makers in response to this however occurs in a seemingly ‘new’ direction, where the federal state changes its rhetoric to ‘integration’ measures and provision, and where the pedagogues speak about ‘inclusion’.

In order to identify this, I have located a loose network of policy actors and politicians, and their perceptions and understandings of ‘integration’ and what it involves in their respective and subjective context. This was done by looking at what Alexiadou calls the ‘interpretative repertoires’ that policy actors’ use, and the ‘discursive resources’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1995:81: in Alexiadou, 2007:109).
Weick (1995) suggests that providing meaning for action, enacting the environment, constructing identities and generating social commitments, producing social relations, focusing on selected cues, and retrospectively creating justifications and construction of reality can be explored as properties of the `sense making’ that actors in organisations – and indeed in social life per se – use in order to make sense of their experience of reality.

With reference to justification and a particular construction of `making sense’, I argue that this is done with a problematising of `migration’ and `migrants’. In both media and Swiss authority rhetoric, there is a perception about Swiss national identity, which is under imminent `threat of disintegration’ and that Swiss society has to redefine itself as to the legitimacy of membership through `integration measures’. The political parties in Switzerland and their debate around the notion of integration and acceptable levels thereof form a pivotal platform of rhetoric, which flows and is translated into educational discourse and sets rigid standards of what is deemed an acceptable or tolerated stance towards migrants. The evidence or sources these politicians, policy makers, academics and pedagogues refer to are the data sources from PISA and national follow up studies, particularly referring to the `Special Needs’ topic. Migrants were found to be insufficiently `integrated’ and that this was made visible in their comparatively low academic results drawn from the PISA studies.

Migrants, both in federal legal idiom, and also in public media and policy discourse, I argue, still very strongly hold the position of ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’, who have to adapt to the Swiss system and must have a willingness to integrate ‘into’ the Swiss society, whereas the ‘locals’ or ‘Swiss’ are encouraged to accept, respect and tolerate.

`Integration’ is sometimes used synonymously to ‘assimilation’. The state (or certain key state actors) sees itself in a `provider’ role in which the migrants are seen to be beneficiaries or what I argue, ‘recipients’ of integration measures provided by the state and the different relevant sectors, such as education. On the one hand, there is a federal governmental understanding of the integration policy, which is focussed around provisions, especially monetary investments for advancing language ability. Benhabib (2004) speaks about a distinction between political and cultural integration in that Western-European nation-states often attribute citizens’ identity to what she
calls a ‘thick cultural coating’, while human rights are treated as being merely contextual (2004:123). Political integration, which Benhabib (2004:121) refers to as ‘practices and rules, constitutional traditions and institutional habits, that bring individuals together to form a functioning political unity’, therefore is narrowed or confined into ‘cultural’ integration. The primary focus of the Swiss ‘integration’ agenda on language and on focusing on education as being able to deliver ‘integration’ primarily through these kind of measures, I would argue does contain this ‘cultural’ interpretation of the term.

This becomes even more evident when looking at the following aspects; many if not most interviewees speak in a way about migration with reference to education, with what I have phrased as a stance of an ‘ideological appraisal’. They refer to migration as being something that has altered both in its own historical development and also in how it was treated by Swiss authorities and as a societal paradigm. My argument is that this ideological appraisal is viewed through the lens of a perceived distinction of ‘culture’, or in other words the grouping of migrants into a clearly distinguishable group, other than ‘Swiss’. The notion of ‘them and us’ (Benhabib, 2004) or othering, or ‘dichotomy’ (Lanfranchi, interviewee) creates a view of migrants within Swiss society, culture and systems as being ‘extraordinary’, ‘new’ or ‘guest’. It is what some interviewees referred to as ‘normative standards’ or ‘normality’; migrants being therefore extra-normative or not corresponding to these ‘norms’. This would also comply with an idea of the involvement of the state (sectors) as a provisional actor, i.e. providing integration measures, ‘into’ a system, which now is confronted with migration and the ‘problems’ attached to it.

Therefore, two important arguments or topics emerged from the narratives; one is related to the way in which ‘culture’ is understood within integration policy in education. In addition, the other is with reference to ‘social class’ or questions about social and economic mobility, which is something I encountered repeatedly or as a thread throughout the narratives. Often both the educational as well as the migration political attributes of ‘migrant’ are seen as a handicap or synonymously used for ‘working class’. A notion that the ‘socio-economic status’ or background of students is the actual handicap for school achievement is something that arises repeatedly from the national follow up studies issuing from PISA (see chapter 4). It seems to be an
underlying controversy, which is lurking behind the entire discourse about migrant students, but never really picked up in the political discourses. Pedagogues voice their concerns that this theme is often submerged or substituted by a `problematisation` of migrants, used synonymously for `working class`. It may have become more politically convenient to use `migrant` or `migration` as a `problematic` theme or concern rather than `socio-economic or social class`, which could be a politically loaded topic in a social democracy. Although this latter topic had emerged quite strongly in the seventies in Switzerland, it ebbed down eventually and now was being replaced with the `migrant` issue. However, as labour migration was the main cause of migration movement into Switzerland, many migrants are placed within the lower socio-economic scale of the population. The debates around low school performance levels of migrants within the PISA studies were picked up with reference to their socio-economic background and results were found that this could be the determining influencing factor in terms of school achievement; coming from a less educated or resourced home or family background. Moreover, in chapter 4, deliberations are made about multiple disadvantages for migrant students due to the added disadvantage of being classified as `migrant` as well as from a `low socio-economic` background. The disadvantage of being `migrant` being the discriminatory streaming methods and Special Needs classification of `culture` or `migrant background` or `foreign-language speakers` (see chapters 4 and 6).

A further aspect of the `problematisation` of migrants, is also the availability of data or numbers used as evidence to inform integration policy. An interviewee within the Federal Statistical office enlightens the considerations and reservations he voices in the use and presentation of data and how certain available data then also features within the integration report of the Federal Migration Office. Within the administrative data, by which he probably refers to the integration report, the data is `presented neatly`, however within the studies, certain distinctive selections are made in how the data is picked up. He also professes that `the BFS have not dealt with this`, implying the integration orientated data provision, `scientifically`, but rather had to bring in external knowledge. This aspect about the lack of reliable data specific to the Swiss case with respect to measuring `equality of opportunity`, I, I would like to argue, is quite significant in why PISA data has featured prominently within the Integration report or in the backdrop of the role of education in the integration agenda;
it would then provide the main policy-informing external evidence, which ‘problematises’ the migrant. As it is difficult to make any distinctive national data statements on why there is inequality within the Swiss education system, for example regarding socio-economic background, ‘the migrant’ versus ‘Swiss’ is all the data distinction can offer. ‘The migrant’ thus becomes a main denominator for measuring inequality or inequity. This in turn fits quite well into the integration framework of ‘lack of integration’ or the need to ‘integrate migrants’, because in educational arguments, they are facing inequalities within the system.

Moreover, the theme appears with reference to how integration is understood or defined by the *Federal Law for Foreigners* (see chapter 5) and by Federal Administrative authorities (see chapter 6). The wording of the particular legal text and the references or understandings of what integration measures are seen to achieve, seems to restrict people, who are addressed by the ‘integration’ article, within their respective social and economic strata. In this sense, we are speaking about social and economic mobility, which offers the idea of a progression in terms of equal chances or opportunities, which are the terms used in what I argue is the social-democratic language within the current integration standards in education.

In chapters 3 and 5, I discuss the recent development and changes of the face of migration in Switzerland or indeed Europe. Labour migration and the economically driven immigration policies which were issued since the sixties have lead to a distinctive way in which state politics are conceptualising ‘integration’ as a mandate. The idea of ‘equity’ or ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘participation’ presents itself in both legal textual wording and political rhetoric with reference to the position of migrants within Swiss economy and society. Membership or Integration is narrowly conceptualised for migrants as being ‘a part of the Swiss society with equal chances comparable to Swiss in a similar economic and social stratus’. My argument is that this particular stance or narrow idea of membership restricts large groups of people to specific labour sectors with reference to limited economic progression. In this sense, the education system has largely catered towards the preservation of certain labour market sectors by a highly streamed system, which ensures the continuity of the labour or working class (see chapter 5).
Currently since 2008 however, a large-scale structural reform in education is launched, including the abolishment or reduction of streaming methods. Even if the education system would be changed structurally, nine years of unselected schooling, many migrant children would potentially ‘fall out of the education system’, because the economy does not cater towards a middle level of education. Either it caters to highly qualified or the lower end of the qualification scale. This notion of economy undermining educational efforts towards improvements of equal chances or equality of opportunity is discussed in chapters 5 and 6.

Thus, the arguments I make in this study about how education is instrumentalised to push through some (inter-) national standards are directly related to the discursive elements of ‘culture’ and ‘social class’. Because these standards set certain parameters of identity, specifically notions about ‘Swiss national identity’, when interviewees speak about *multiculturalism* or *interculturalism*, or about ‘in-tegration’ into a certain perceived understanding of culture and society, and ‘others’ or ‘foreigner’ and ‘us’ or the ‘Swiss’ and the ‘Migrant’, often associated with a ‘lower social class’ or ‘working class’. With respect to multiculturalism, Mitchell (2003) has argued that often it can serve the state to reconcile neo-liberal agendas, particularly through the role of education featuring strongly within these agendas.

Kofman (1999) argued that if one looks at the civic republican concept – which are the historical legal traditions in Switzerland as well as France - of the requirement of ‘aptitude for citizenship’, then the way in which integration is being conceptualised, could also be understood in Federal terms from a historically rooted *legal* point of view. In order to become a citizen, one needed to behave in a certain way and have certain qualities, which had been predetermined by a mutual concept of agreed values based on a mode of civility. People who were seen not to have these qualities were therefore excluded, i.e. migrants. The idea of ‘in-tegration’ would seem to lend itself quite referentially to this notion of citizenship. With respect to the civic republican concept of citizenship, it is interesting to view certain semiotic styles in the interview narratives of certain migration policy actors, who potentially speak in interpretative repertoires through the lens of immigration and citizenship conceptions, discursively deeply rooted in the legal system.
In the mapping of ‘integration’ discourse, both in policy and narrative texts, there is an interesting and conspicuous absence of the term ‘identity’ or what is an understanding of ‘identity’ in ‘integration’ discourses. Questions arise how policy actors, initialising a large scale, holistic structural educational reform in Switzerland, conceive a standard sense of ‘the migrant’ or of ‘culture’, in the way policy is then conceptualised? I would argue that the standards are created by the perpetuation of thinking about ‘the migrant’ as ‘other than Swiss’, therefore structural or ‘secondary’ changes being justifiable as a reasonable way of provision. There is then no need in a sense to refer to or to broach the highly contentious topic of ‘identity’, because it is already attributed or framed in a fragile network of consensus.

7.2.2 Instrumentalisation and Politicisation of Education

The prominent role of education governance and policy within the ‘integration’ agenda setting of the Swiss government has allowed a deeper insight into the way in which certain frames and ideologies of political membership are embedded within certain contexts and discourses such as are to be found in what I have termed the socio-civic policy of migrant ‘integration’ (cross-border, cross-sector, cross-governing levels) relevant to education. In this sense, policy makers try to override or circumvent the barriers of a self-governed institution such as education (self-governed within Cantons) by simply changing its outer frameworks, resource allocations, introducing cross-regional education policy and curricula and coupling social and education policy gradually to increase state control of school. Grek et al. (2009) and Stephen Ball (1993) speak about how this could be based upon the production and transformation and effects of true/false distinctions (Smart, 1986:164) and the application of knowledge, science and hierarchisation to “problems” in education – like standards and quality. There might be, according to Ball (1993) an exclusive focus upon ‘secondary adjustments’, - in the Swiss case a ‘harmonising’ structural reform - and that particularly if this takes the form of a kind of ‘naïve optimism’, it may obscure the discursive limitations acting on and through those adjustments and limit our responses to change. In this case, this would limit the response to changing modalities and transfigurations of membership.
I have argued that Switzerland responds to, or rather in their case as a EU non-member state, absorbs the OECD indicators (mainly from PISA), benchmarks and standards, which largely form the basis for the EU education OMC policy, and which are then used and referenced as policy-informing evidence (see chapters 4 and 6). This referencing, response or absorption, I have suggested, is a form of ‘deterritorialised politics’, which in turn contributes to ‘cover’ or ‘flag’ the perpetuation of existing conceptions and demarcations of political membership, and thus would enact a specific power relation and dominance in discourse.

With respect to particular education policies, which have been introduced as a reform in Switzerland, at a glance the policy ‘HARMOS’ (see chapter 4, 4.4 and chapter 6) has little to do with either the PISA 2000 results or even ‘integration’, or ‘inclusion’ as a concept. However, according to narratives amongst education actors presented within the study and some media coverage during the time of the HARMOS ratification, this policy was a ‘response to the PISA shock’ (NZZ, 1.April, 2007). If one looks somewhat more closely at the language within the policy texts, also, the instruments introduced to achieve the said reform aims, certain terminology, and logic becomes visible, which do bear trademark signs of Europeanising trends. Not only is the ‘harmonising’ of learning content in public school to be achieved throughout the signatory cantons, but this has to be done with the introduction of coherent curricula contents and measurable ‘education standards’.

These national ‘education standards’ for Public School include ‘performance standards’ with minimum competence levels, which are to be achieved at the end of certain school years. Moreover, the Swiss Conference for Education Ministers (EDK), a powerful convening education governing body, controls this attainment through an instrument called ‘education monitoring’. In addition, the influential public fiscal figure Ernst Buschor is highlighted both by other interviewees as well as through his own narrative as a key contributing factor in the introduction of New Public Management in education governance (chapter 6).

In the logic of this new management ideology and Europeanising trends, terms such as ‘equity’, ‘quality’ and ‘inclusion’ emerge as social-democratic denominators, or what I have argued, as ‘flags of political convenience’ (Lynch, 1998). These
particular flags of convenience are key in pertaining to a policy construction ‘integration’, which problematises migration issues and seeks educational solutions. However, amongst policy makers in education and teachers, there might be a tendency in certain historically entrenched federal nations, such as Switzerland to preserve the notion of a ‘depoliticized’ education (see chapter 6); the role of education pronounced specifically as being removed from the entanglements of politics of different government parties and from cross-border or Switzerland’s relation to EU politics, and needing to maintain its primary function in creating ‘equitable’ learning platforms for all students. However, ‘equity’ itself has become a highly politicized indicator in the language of a European shared space of education used by national governments to legitimise convening reform projects (Grek et al, 2009; Grek, 2009 and others see chapters 1 and 2), and thus puts into question this very idea of education keeping a ‘depoliticized’ position. Moreover, in Swiss party politics, role-attribution of education features strongly in agenda-setting and in debates between different party politicians (see media analysis, chapter 5, and chapter 6); the prominent role of the far-right Swiss People’s Party in Swiss politics over the last few decades, I would argue, plays a particular role in how education is understood within a framework for ‘integration’ (see chapter 3).

7.3 Europeanising trends in policy as a form of deterritorialised politics

In response to the question whether Switzerland engages in deterritorialised politics, according to the deliberations made in chapters 1 and 2, there are a number of factors, which affirm this engagement. A crucial key to what I argue is a European orientation is the development of a sense of ‘harmonised’ national policy, which is seen to require governance of measurability and unification. Switzerland however, is faced with the reality of a highly federal and regional system of education governance and federal democratic understandings created by a very distinctive historical process of national identity construction (see chapter 3). Thus, the wider discussion is about how the Swiss educational modes of governance are deeply embedded in discourses, which have evolved from shifts of understandings in Swiss society and spheres of governance. In this sense, there is an understanding of democratic communities
formed and maintained largely by various mechanisms and practices of
governmentality (Foucault, 1991), which are rapidly changing to better suit an
expanded supra-national space of policy. This understanding is supported by
Katharyne Mitchell (2003) that the relationship between the role of education and the
shifts in understanding need to be explored in relation to the formation process of the
state and how citizenship is understood and formulated (and required and regulated
within the process of education). These aspects were linked to form an outline to the
argument of highly neo-liberally politicized and steered ‘soft’ governing methods
used to disseminate and ‘convene’ ideas of integration. I argue that this particular
understanding of integration in turn is related not only to an increasingly self-fuelled
process of ‘multilevel’ and ‘networked’ policy, but to what could be a potential
dilution of educational substance (i.e. what education is or should be about), growing
reconciliation of left and right political agendas and the predominance of national
priorities of how to manage economic purpose.

Nation building role-attribution and inculcation processes

The 1990s brought arguments involving the role of education in state formation (see
Andy Green, 1990); modern education systems in Europe and North America were an
important means for furthering state development with respect to its mercantilist aims
and its training programmes for bureaucratic positions and state manufacturing
projects. What supports my argument however is that national education systems were
argued as being viewed as an integral tool in creating political loyalty, operating to
develop, manage and sustain myths and narratives of the nation in its ongoing
unification (Mitchell, 2003; Weber, 1976; Gellner; 1983). Respectively, it could be
argued that the integration agenda, part of which is played out or formulated for
education systems in Switzerland is a crucial rhetorical tool for the propagation of a
unified nation; because it involves integration into what is seen as an established
system of collaborative loyalty with citizens or members of the population who have a
identity’ and ‘cultural integration’ (see chapter 3). The political loyalty in the Swiss
case however is an illusory reality for a vast number of the population taking part in
the education systems, because of its restrictive system of naturalization and the
denial of political rights to people, who are labelled as insufficiently ‘integrated’ (see
Chapter 3). It becomes interesting once we proceed further to what schooling or the actual content of education involves in terms of political or citizenship education; again, the shift in the Swiss education reform agenda includes a major curricular reform towards the creation of a cross-Cantonal linguistic regional curriculum based on the newer principles of ‘equity’ and inclusive education with more set standards for all.

Adding to the narratives and myths of a nation framing a highly federal system, Switzerland as other Western-based countries is faced with an extension of this whole debate to the European space (see Freiburghaus, 2002). Or in other words, changes in education are no longer simply linked to changes within national labour-capital relationships or to the formation of a nation-state or ‘national identity’, but also with spatial changes related to global economy, the changes brought by migration (chapter 3) and as mentioned, the overlap of policy spaces in a multilevel system, both vertically and horizontally (chapters 1 and 2).

I argue that education is economically *instrumentalised* in Swiss discourse within a highly socio-political debate around ‘migrants’ and ‘Swiss culture’ and notions of ‘national identity’. To begin with, although ‘integration’ is chartered out as a conceptual framework for enabling what are termed as ‘foreigners’ or ‘migrants’ to become a part of the Swiss ‘culture’, ‘society’ or ‘nation’, the use of this very terminology and distinctive policy understanding of all these concepts is worthy of semiotic scrutiny and critical discursive analysis. I propose that these concepts correspond and contribute to perpetuate frames of restrictive or absence of political membership of migrants, which are then perpetuated within policy as discourse. Thus, the crucial point is about the effect of policy as discourse of limiting ‘membership’ through pre-emptive ideological demarcations.

The specific way in which this is done is with the enactment of ‘social-democratic flag-bearing’. This relates to the idea of ‘dominant’ discourses, such as neo-liberalism and management theory (Ball, 1993; Jessop, 2004: Fairclough, 2009) within socio-civic or in this specific study, education policy. These knowledge-power relations within these dominant discourses are achieved according to Foucault, by the construction of “truths” about the social and natural world; truths that become taken-
for-granted definitions and categories by which governments rule and monitor their populations and by which members of communities define themselves and others (Foucault, 1972; in Luke, 1996). Particularly in the case of migrants, the historical movements have been from an outright namelessness and invisibility to an inclusion in public discourses and human sciences as ‘deficit human subjects’ (Luke, 1996: 38). It is what Luke refers to as ‘the ontology of simultaneous presence and absence’ (1996:38; also Young, 1990).

Fairclough’s (2009) term of imaginaries (also Rizvi, 2006) or the ‘enactment’ process of policy actors, is about representations of how things might or could or should be. The knowledges of knowledge-economy or knowledge-society or the idea of an ‘economic citizen’ as is discussed within this study, are imaginaries in this sense, or in other words projections of possible state of affairs or what Fairclough calls ‘possible worlds’ (2009:165). These imaginaries then can be enacted as actual (networks of) practices and include materialisation of discourses. These enactments can in part also themselves be discursal and semiotic; discourses become enacted as genres. For instance New Public Management discourses in Swiss ‘integration’ policy networks, which become enacted as new genres. Moreover, this enactment can happen through a process of inculcation. Fairclough (2009) describes ‘inculcation’ as a complex process in which one stage is rhetorical deployment; people learn new discourses and use them for certain purposes while at the same time self-consciously keeping a distance from them.

More specifically in the Swiss case, the discourse of the Special Educational Needs ‘stronghold’ in Switzerland (see chapter 6, 6.4) could be seen as a two-way process of inculcation, which plays a major role in the way certain discourses on ‘migrants’ have become enacted as genres. In this process, I argue, policy actors both became ‘inculcated’ in a particular genre but also resist to being ‘inculcated’ in another genre (Fairclough, 2009).

There is a strong educational or pedagogical ‘problematisation’ of the issue of migrants throughout the narratives by many education policy makers and in Swiss media, (see chapter 5), which presents a critical ‘Special Needs’ and ‘self-accusatory’ perspective. The argument of the Special Needs ideology as a predominant catalyst for
a problematised view of migration and the responsive ‘solution-seeking’ that is arguably projected upon education policy and the school system, appears to be rooted in two discursive backgrounds. The discussion is that there is on the one hand, the ‘Special needs ideology’, which according to different education actors within the field has deep historical roots in Switzerland, dating back from the creation of an academic or scientific seat of both research and mainly teacher education. ‘Specialism’ or ‘therapeutic’ individual attention has taken on a strong ideological educational perpetuation, in the sense of a kind of ‘clinical’ thinking, in which individual ‘special needs’ of a child, not able to be attended to by regular teachers, are seen to be best treated with specialist care. There is a statement or perception running within public school policy actors of two separate school systems with two different concordat- or principle systems of reference. Piecing together various narratives on special schooling by different actors, creates an image of two schooling systems, which seem to enhance or cater to each other’s needs. The arguments presented by several education actors or indeed policy makers are, that where the regular or mainstream public school system, or the teachers therein could not fit certain children into what is called their ‘normative standards’ or ‘Swiss middle class’ normative standards, then they would relocate, refer or ‘delegate’ these children into the special needs sector, or Therapeutic Pedagogy. Supply and demand for specialists and therapists then increased with what appears an almost self-fuelling ‘mechanism’. National follow up studies of PISA (see chapter 4), suggest that these mechanisms (see also Gomolla and Radtke, 2003, chapter 4) are seen to be rooted in ‘organisational structures’, which enhance a certain course of action, because these measures simply exist and are consequently used as an effect. These studies, highlighting this ‘problem’ are highly referenced by Swiss policy makers in both education and migration departments and within ‘integration’ policy and report (chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Here is where the phenomenon of ‘migrant’ or ‘foreign-language speaking’ children, who are being classified or ‘streamed’ as ‘special needs’ is made apparent; in this sense, children with migrant background or multilingualism were regarded as a phenomenon requiring ‘specialist’ or individualised attention. Therefore, in the case of the SEN ideology, which was a primary concern for many interviewees, this logic is often used here as an argument for the introduction of ‘inclusion’ or moving away
from separation. However, when the interviewees were asked to explain what they understand by ‘inclusion’, often other issues cropped up, such as tackling lack of equity in education due to disadvantages of low ‘socio-economic background’ (see chapter 6). In this sense, these interviewees may have positioned themselves rather unconsciously in the pro-‘integration’ agenda, although the purpose for using this specific structural reform is embedded in other motives and a different pedagogical understanding of ‘inclusion’, which does not refer to ‘migrants’, but rather looks at other factors of ‘inequity’. So within these organisation structures and mechanisms rooted within them, a particular inculcation could be seen to have happened of a ‘therapeutisation’ of ‘the migrant’ as a kind of ‘disability’ in learning or ‘learning disadvantage’; thereby reinforcing this delegation culture into SEN classes.

I would suggest that many interviewees are caught up in a process of discursive ‘inculcation’, which adopts a distinctive referencing and deploys a specific rhetoric of ‘social-democratic flags’, but however has reservations and pedagogical motives for being in favour of an ‘inclusive’ or ‘integrative’ approach to education. So while they refer to the problem of an inculcation that has happened in the past until now, they adhere to this being a reason to favour an ‘integrative’ approach.

Fairclough (2005a) points to a problematic aspect of social constructionism, where it disregards the relative solidity and permanence of social entities and their resistance to change. In his view, even powerful discourses, such as the new discourses of management may meet with levels of resistance, which results in them being neither enacted nor inculcated to any degree. Therefore, in using a dialectical-relational theory of discourse in social, or indeed in any research, one needs to take into consideration in each case the circumstances and conditions that shape whether and to what degree social entities are resistant to new discourses (Fairclough, 2005a:4).

I would argue that in the case of Swiss education policy actors, there is also a resistance towards inculcation; the problematised discourse of ‘migrants’ is often regretted by interviewees in their narratives and not understood as the actual ‘problem’ or any ‘problem’ in pedagogical senses. The rhetorical deployment or instrumentalisation of education for a problematisation of migration is often not in their subjective interest. This is also often with reference to abdicating
multiculturalism and rather using `interculturalism` to promote the understanding of fluid `cultures` (chapter 6). Many interviewees point out the controversy of speaking about the actual or underlying educational `issue` of socio-economic background or social class of the students (rather than `culture` or migrant-background) which was discerned as the primary cause for inequity and low educational performance levels according to PISA results; they speak about how `migration` or `migrants` may have become the political scapegoat for the sensitive political taboo of socio-economic background or social class of the student being the root cause of inequity in a democracy. In their view, regrettably `migrant` is often referred in education policy as being synonymous with `low socio-economic background`. Thus, they argue, migration is instrumentally used to `flag` actual socio-political issues. Important for the identification of any existing incuclation is however is that despite these reservations towards what migrant `integration` may imply as a federal conception or notion, the majority of education policy actors within the narratives was largely still in favour of `integration` as a preferable approach in education, although often understood as `inclusive education`, which in their view is more conducive to ensuring `equitable or equal chances`. So in this sense, they are still deploying the rhetorical tools used by Swiss Federal Government to convene an idea of `integration`, however believing to be doing so in their own pedagogical understanding of these terms.

Here, the link is made between what in one interviewee`s words are the `migration strand` of discourse and the `education strand` of discourse: the distinction or `dichotomising` of `Swiss` and `Migrants`, even in educational terms. On the one hand there are education system actors engaged in education missives to ensure what many refer to as `equal chances`. On the other hand there is the migration actor side, which is also engaged in cross-structural missives, in their view, to ensure `equal chances`. School is seen to be a place where this can happen, through `integrative measures`. It is seen as what becomes apparent within the narratives as the `solving agent` to a `perceived problem`. One interviewee refers to a `Western modernity ideal`, which would like to promote a `school for everybody`; in other words perhaps the idea of `inclusion`. 

This can be interpreted as a dominant discourse, or the idea of a ‘hegemonic’ aspect of discourse. According to Liasidou, who looks at Special Educational Needs (SEN) discourses in Cyprus and uses a specific framework of CDA to analyse SEN policy, the ‘hegemony of the scientific discourse obscures and silences the existence of other discourses since the focus is placed solely on the panoptic gaze of the scientific ‘regimes of truth’’ (Liasidou, 2008:490). She elaborates that in doing so, the newer ‘inclusion’ or my own Swiss case ‘integration’ government agenda “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, and attaches to him his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him” (Foucault, 1982:212; in Liasidou, 2008:490), which in turn subjugates children to the normalizing and disciplinary technologies of power that obliterate their individuality, their autonomy and their value as human beings. In my study, this occurs through what I argue is an ‘attribution’ of a dichotomised view of ‘migrant’ and ‘Swiss’, which goes even further to seeing this distinction as ‘normal’ and ‘extra-normative’ or requiring ‘specialist attention’ and care. There is even an understanding of a kind of ‘clinical approach’ to specialisation or separation seen to have happened in Swiss education systems so far, which emerges in the narrative analysis in chapter 6, which in the understanding of many interviewees needs to be responded to and changed. A response to this then being such ‘secondary adjustments’, according to Stephen Ball (1993), which in fact obscure the power imbalances, which still permeate the policy. I would argue that the Swiss education policy reform is such a ‘secondary adjustment’ or cosmetic structural change in response to what is in actuality a deeply controversial and complex discourse around ‘political membership’ of ‘migrants’ in Swiss society and systems.

7.4 Research on membership and resistance to dominant discourses

With reference to Fairclough’s (2009) dialectical-relational model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and how I have eclectically borrowed and combined ideas of ‘membership’ based on Seyla Benhabib (2004) with political sociology of the nation-state in the context of Europe (see chapter 1), I believe this study has much scope as a basis for further research in the ‘constructive’ use of CDA for the study of’
political membership’ (see Fairclough, 2009; also Luke, 1996; and Benhabib, 2004). The basis this study forms is that of having largely addressed a focus upon a social wrong in its semiotic aspect and in asking what it is about the way in which social life is structured and organized that prevents it from being addressed. Roughly, I have focussed my study upon the stages 1-3 described by Fairclough (2009) in his distinctive dialectical-relational approach to CDA (see chapter 2). As a further step, Fairclough (2009) proposes that one needs to consider whether the social wrong in question is inherent to the social order, whether it can be addressed within it, or only by changing it. It is a way of linking ‘is’ to ‘ought’; if a social order can be shown to inherently give rise to major social wrongs, then that is a reason for thinking that perhaps it should be changed. Here is where the ideological element of discourse comes in; if it contributes to sustaining particular relations of power and domination, as I would argue is the case in this specific study on ‘membership’, it can justify the need to be addressed and changed. Stage 4, in this framework would therefore try to identify ways past the obstacles by moving from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ critique, or as discussed, from ‘critical’ to ‘constructive’ CDA. This means identifying, with a focus on dialectical relations between semiosis and other elements, possibilities within the existing social process for overcoming obstacles to addressing the social wrong in question. This includes developing a semiotic ‘point of entry’ into research on the ways in which these obstacles are actually tested, challenged and resisted, be it within organized political or social groups or movements, or more informally by people in the course of their ordinary working, social and domestic lives. In part, through the narratives analyzed in this study, these obstacles have been tested to a certain degree. However, I would like to extend this specific semiotic focus, which Fairclough refers to and which I would strongly favour as a point of departure from the basis of my study by including ways in which dominant discourse is reacted to, contested, criticized and opposed in its construal of social identities.

This would involve identifying ways in which the construal of social identities is challenged and contested by actually researching subjective and individual ‘identity’ self-awareness (of actors involved in social processes and events in education and society, such as students, parents, families, communities, teachers etc.) in relation to ‘membership’ and in relation to the discursive frames disclosed through this specific research study. In this sense, I believe a crucial constitutive element of discourse is
the understanding of ‘integration’ and ‘membership’ from the point of view of students or migrant students and/or ‘Swiss’ (native) students and parents of students involved within the Swiss education system (or indeed participants in society as such). This element would be a platform for further research enquiry, to enhance and indeed deepen the arguments made within this study. In order to reformulate or re-contextualize political trends, as Benhabib (2004) suggests in her theoretical framework, the democratic ideal of self-governance, which requires the existence of democratic voice and public autonomy needs to be re-contextualised; ‘The core of democratic self-governance is the ideal of public autonomy, namely the principle that those who are subject to law should also be its authors’ (Benhabib, 2004:217). As I share the question Benhabib raises from this democratic ideal of self-governance that this democratic voice and public autonomy can hardly be reconfigured if nation-states allocate or frame faulty ideals of a ‘people’s homogeneity and territorial autochthony’; it becomes essential to revaluate the changing self-understandings of ‘belonging’ and ‘membership’ also from the point of view of the demos themselves; hence from a subjective self-understanding. Therefore, I propose that a departure point from this study, which engages in mapping a socio-political discourse around membership and ‘integration’, would be to locate subjective and personal self-understandings of individuals in a student-family-school nexus embedded within this methodological and theoretical multi-level analysis of policy as discourse. Thus, this is a gap in research, which needs to be explored and incorporated into a transdisciplinary collaboration of political sociology of the state within a wider global/European context through CDA to research social processes and identities of ‘political membership’.

To conduct a transdisciplinary research in a political sociology of education, the term ‘schools in transnational life worlds/life environments (Lebenswelten88)’ used by Sieber (2007:346) is particularly enlightening. Life world/or life environment refers to the daily, subjective spaces of (experienced, learnt, interactional and acted) reality of individuals, which can for example be structured transnationally. She emphasizes the need for an innovative research, which understands school or education as being embedded in conflicting (or constructive) processes within the transnational,  

88 Associated with concepts by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Alfred Schuetz (1899-1959), Juergen Habermas (1929)
understood as 1) socialisation processes and social spaces, which transcend the nation state boundaries. Moreover, it refers to an understanding of migration, which 2) does not follow the linear, mechanical, generic model of uni-directional processes of emigration, immigration and integration (for example through socialisation in school). Rather Sieber (2007) suggests that through (trans-) migration; new cultural and social constellations are produced everywhere, including school; perhaps pertaining to an idea of the fluidity of identity. Thus, new approaches to transdisciplinary research should look at how national education systems and actors involved interpret and deal with this plurality of environments and transnational processes. This exploration must include research on how the actors within this context, such as students, teachers and parents, understand, evaluate and self-identify with these processes. In my previous research so far, I have attempted to map a loose network of policy actors within a framework for ‘integration’ on different governing levels and looked at federal and cantonal ‘integration’ agenda-setting for education. However, there is a need to extend this map of ‘integration’ policy discourse to include children/youth, parents, families (and teachers) and their relation to these processes of ‘integration’ policy and to other policy actors. Therefore, I propose a discourse analytical approach, which includes the relational focus on self-perception/self-identification of migrants within education systems in a school-family-state nexus, embedded within the research on migrant ‘integration’ policy discourse based on my doctoral study.

In order to link these aspects of studying ‘life worlds’ of specific (education, social and political) actors, and of the role-attributing or role-fixing of education in democratic nation-building, it is important to map programmes of education, which address concepts of citizenship and membership in the Swiss context. Citizenship education in Switzerland is quite a fragmented and arguably controversial story (Sieber, 2007; Oser & Reichenbach, 2000). In the German-speaking Cantons more recently it is newly placed under the umbrella term ‘intercultural pedagogy’ (see Sieber, 2007): which contains several loose strands such as ‘Migration and Education’, ‘Migration Pedagogy’, ‘Pedagogy of Diversity’, ‘Dealing with Heterogeneity’ and also ‘Political Education’. The French speaking Cantons call it ‘education a la citoyennete’, in this sense more closer to the Anglo-Saxon ‘citizenship education’.
Research on political education in Switzerland has most recently been more orientated towards quantitative analyses of the Civic Education Study of the IAE for the Swiss context, which is a study on Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries, looking at Civic Knowledge and Engagement of students, age fourteen (Torney-Purta, M., Lehmann, R., Oswald, H. & Schulz, W., 2001; Maiello, Oser & Biedermann, 2003).

With respect to ‘civic or citizenship education’, there is very little specific policy issued as recommendations from the Federal state authorities; but, on the local and Cantonal levels different projects and curricular/modular approaches are encouraged and are incorporated into a holistic pedagogical approach, falling under the themes of ‘diversity and school’, ‘political awareness’, or as mentioned above, ‘intercultural pedagogy’. However, the specific terminology does not pertain to ‘civic’ or ‘citizenship’ education programmes. There is a Federal emphasis with respect to education reform recommendations put together by the Federal Department for Family Issues (EKFF) as a report, which incorporates federally commissioned study reports on family-school-education nexus, migration background of students, youth focus, and underachievement of student groups. There is a strong reference to OECD data and how Switzerland is comparatively situated to other countries. I was struck by the absence of studies with a discursive approach to analysis; or policy analysis of ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration’ as such. Lanfranchi (2005) has done some critical research on conflicting discourse issues within the inclusion framework. However, by large there is a perspective within Swiss education research, mostly approving of inclusive or integrative approach to education (Kronig, Haeberlin & Imdorf, 2004; Gomolla and Radtke, 2002; Lanfranchi, 2005, in chapter 4). As proposed within this study, within the Swiss context, Special Needs Education (classifying ‘migrant’ as ‘special needs’, see Lanfranchi, 2005) and the links to PISA response data plays a significant role. Particularly rooted in a highly critical perspective on the Special Needs schooling institutional practices recorded in Switzerland over the last few decades; this is a strong point of reference for the advancement of ‘inclusive’ or ‘integrative schooling’, which is often used synonymously. However, as I have argued that there is a danger in the use of ‘secondary adjustments’, or structural reform policies, as Ball (1993) speaks about, such as ‘inclusion’, which could in fact obscure the power imbalances, which still permeate the policy. In this sense, a new approach is to connect a critical
policy discourse analysis of inclusion/integration on a multi-level approach, by looking at Switzerland, federally and locally, embedded within European/global developments and policies, and by forming a link by looking at students and their families in relation to school and society and linked to politics of inclusion/integration.

In terms of methodology, what I highlight in this study and for future research is the importance of integrating CDA within frameworks for transdisciplinary education research (Fairclough, 2009; Jessop, 2004). The distinction of transdisciplinary research is that by ‘bringing in disciplines and theories together to address research issues, it sees ‘dialogue’ between them as a source for the theoretical and methodological development for each of them’ (Fairclough, 2009:163). Fleer, Hedegaard & Tudge (2009) speak about the importance of drawing upon a theoretical wholeness approach in researching childhood in the context of ‘global-local policies and practices’. This would a) provide insights into and critique policy imperatives, pedagogical processes and cultural contexts, b) provide insights into how different countries address contemporary global-local tensions, or in other words examine the use of deterritorialised politics, and c) foreground the educational context, through research in institutions such as families, school, child care and preschool (2009:3). Sieber (2009) highlights the necessity for a multidisciplinary approach to this kind of education research in Switzerland, which can comprehensively capture at the same time systematically, and thoroughly the complex mechanisms, the multi-level institutional contexts, different individual actors and actor groups in their respective orientation towards action, awareness and interactive relations. In my research by looking at ‘membership’ or frames of ‘citizenship’, as suggested by Benhabib (2004) in relation to a political sociology of nation-states in a European context one can move beyond the structure of discourse and expose the relational aspects of discourse within these interactional dimensions. Moreover, a global-local study of *children/youth as actors within policy as discourse*, I argue, can provide a more holistic lens by addressing ‘identity-fixing’ and attribution, self-identification, and educational implications of the plurality of environments, which have been outlined through my previous research.
There is a strong need in the area of research on Europeanising trends of a European space of education (Grek et al., 2009) and indeed in research on any cross-border policy, of looking at the playing fields of what I would term *misapplied authority over ‘membership’* in nation states. Rizvi (2006) has emphasized the need to question the nature and extent of authority in this increasingly glocalised space. The creation of boundaries by nation states has been used with the logic of territoriality, which often pertains to ideas of nationalistic closure to ‘preserve’ what is often seen as national culture or identity, and on the other hand to ‘protect’ the national borderlines created by long standing historical formation processes of peoplehood. However, the important appraisal to be made is of how ‘preservation’ happens in constantly changing and reshaped spaces of both human, technological and knowledge geographies and whether the very discursive nature of the way in which governance is operated puts into question an outdated conception of both preservation and protection. I argue that this is related to an intrinsic notion of ‘threat’ and ‘othering’. The frames of restrictive ‘political membership’ imposed by nation-states on people fail to acknowledge the constant social processes of meaning-making and identity construction of individuals within their systems, which I propose are inevitable, constant and fluid. I call upon a research that focuses on looking at authorship of belonging; both in relation to misapplied authority over ‘membership’ and subjective, interpersonal and relational self-understandings of belonging.
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9. Appendix

Appendix 1

Types of permits for newcomers: (Gross, 2006:24/25)

- **Short – term permit** (until 2001 only for seasonal work, Permit A): for 9 months over a period of 12: after 10 years of uninterrupted seasonal permits (renewable), a person can request a one-year permit. Since 1995 only available to citizens of EU/EFTA, but abolished since 2002. Now short-term permit is available to skilled foreigners from countries outside EU/EFTA with work contract for less than a year. Also for studies, training, retirement, wealthy people. No family reunion allowed.

- **One-year permit** (Permit B) awarded to foreign workers with work contracts of one year or more: automatically renewable with a work contract. After 10 years, permit can be converted into an establishment permit. Permit is attributed to family members through birth or family reunion.

- **Establishment permit** (Permit C) is delivered to a family once a worker has fulfilled the required waiting period with permits B (or exceptionally Permit A) to family members and newborn of workers with permit C already, and to foreigners who left and return to Switzerland within a certain deadline. The permit has no deadline and entitles to free job and residence mobility. Family reunion is possible at any time. Some municipalities have given voting rights to holders of such permits.

- **Cross-border permit** (Permit G) is a one year permit for workers who live in the neighbouring border regions and work in the adjacent region of CH: valid for one year and renewable. The person must return to a foreign domicile every day.

- **Asylum Seekers**: People admitted temporarily because of undue hardship in their home country are given other types of permits.
Appendix 2

Annex II: Historical benchmarks in immigration policy

1963: First ceiling to control foreign population. Permits are awarded only for workers in firms with less than 2% increase in overall employment compared to December 1962.

1965: The double ceiling policy. (i) In each firm, the level of foreign workforce must be reduced to 95% of its level at March 1, 1965. (ii) The total number of foreign workers employed cannot increase. Workers can no longer enter Switzerland only with a work contract. They must obtain a residence permit prior to entry. March 17, implementation of agreement signed with Italy. Guest workers can get one-year permit after 5 years of uninterrupted seasonal permits. Family reunion can happen after 18 months rather than 36 months.

1970: The global ceiling policy with quota determined by the Government every November 1. The Government allocates a quota of permits to specific enterprises, which suffer from a shortage and then another allocation is made to the cantons proportionately to the population.

1976: Italian guest workers can get one-year permit after 4 years of uninterrupted seasonal permits.

1990: The 3-circle model. Countries are classified into three groups: EU/EFTA countries; countries outside these associations but with similarities with Switzerland (in human rights record, in style of living and with commercial links) for which there are quotas on the number of permits attributed; rest of the world, from which immigration is allowed only exceptionally and for qualified workers.

1991: Yugoslavia is put in the third circle because of its human rights record and there is no economic migration anymore allowed. It is also excluded from the seasonal work.

1992: December 6, popular vote rejects membership in European Economic Area.

1998: The 2-circle model. Preferential treatment for EU/EFTA. Employers’ economic needs satisfied by EU/EFTA workers. Highly qualified people can come from all other countries.

2000: May. Approval of the bilateral agreement with EU on free mobility by popular vote.

2002: June 1. Implementation of the first phase of bilateral agreement with EU.

2004: June 1. Implementation of the second phase of bilateral agreement with EU.

2005: March. Expected vote by the Senate on the new immigration legislation project.

Appendix 3

Figure 5: Level and flows of foreigners

- New entries of workers and non-workers in Switzerland
  [80,446; 101,372; 85,541]
- Conversions of seasonal permits
  [7,377; 16,339; 1,866]
- Births
  [11,322; 14,471; 17,332]
- PERMANENT FOREIGN RESIDENT POPULATION
  [900,306; 1,100,262; 1,384,382]
- Exits from Switzerland
  [63,958; 59,587; 55,770]
- Regular and accelerated naturalizations
  [5,445; 5,455; 27,874]
- Other types of naturalizations
  [5,318; 2,519; 245]
- Deaths
  [5,895; 4,158; 4,602]
- Adoptions
  [437; 534; 581]

Source: OFE (2001a)

* Reinstate, renunciation and automatic naturalizations.

(Gross, 2006:29)

Figure 6: Inflow of permanent residents by motives

Source: OFE (2001a)
- Work permits under quotas
- Family reunion
- Converted seasonal p.
- Exceptional asylum
- Others

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Appendix 4

Figure 4.1: Swiss School System (simplified) – (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2005:8)