A Study in Ruler-City Relations

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University of Edinburgh
2011
Signed Declaration

This thesis has been composed by the candidate, the work is the candidate’s own and the work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

Signed:
Abstract

This thesis treats of the use and meaning of the Greek concept of *eleutheria* (freedom) and the cognate term *autonomia* (autonomy) in the early Hellenistic Period (c.337-262 BC) with a specific focus on the role these concepts played in the creation and formalisation of a working relationship between city and king. It consists of six chapters divided equally into three parts with each part exploring one of the three major research questions of this thesis. Part One, Narratives, treats of the continuities and changes within the use and understanding of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* from the 5th to the 3rd centuries. Part Two, Analysis, focuses on the use in action of both terms and the role they played in structuring and defining the relationship between city and king. Part Three, Themes, explores the importance of commemoration and memorialisation within the early Hellenistic city, particularly the connection of *eleutheria* with democratic ideology and the afterlife of the Persian Wars. Underpinning each of these three sections is the argument that *eleutheria* played numerous, diverse roles within the relationship between city and king. In particular, emphasis is continually placed variously on its lack of definition, inherent ambiguity, and the malleability of its use in action.

Chapter one opens with the discovery of *eleutheria* during the Persian Wars and traces its development in the 5th and early 4th centuries, arguing in particular for a increasing synonymity between *eleutheria* and *autonomia*. Chapter two provides a narrative focused on the use and understanding of *eleutheria* in the years 337-262. It emphasises continuity rather than change in the use of *eleutheria* and provides a foundation for the subsequent analytical and thematic chapters. Chapter three analyses *eleutheria* itself. It emphasises the inherent fluidity of the term and argues that it eschewed definition and was adaptable to and compatible with many forms of royal control. Chapter four looks at the role of *eleutheria* within the relationship between city and king. It elaborates a distinction between Primary and Secondary freedom (freedom as a right or freedom as a gift) and treats of *eleutheria* as a point of either unity or discord within a city’s relationship with a king. Chapter five explores the connection between freedom and democracy and looks at how the past was used to create and enforce a democratic present, specifically in constructing both Alexander’s *nachleben* as either a tyrant or liberator and the validity of Athenian democratic ideology in the 3rd century. Chapter six concludes the thesis by returning to the Persian Wars. It analyses the use of the Wars as a conceptual prototype for later struggles, both by kings and by cities. Exploring the theme of the *lieu de mémoire*, it also outlines the significance of sites like Corinth and Plataia for personifying the historical memory of *eleutheria*. 
Acknowledgements

It is a great pleasure in finishing this thesis to be able to look back and thank all those who have helped me along the way. First of all, my inestimable thanks go to my supervisor Andrew Erskine. Without his patience, guidance, and careful supervision I would not even have begun this thesis, let alone completed it. His unerring criticism and his constant encouragement have been a continuous source of inspiration for me. I am also indebted to my secondary supervisor Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones for reading, supporting, and promoting my work, from application all the way to submission. To both I offer my deepest thanks.

This thesis would be much worse were it not for the input of those who have generously read and commented on it. To all I express my most sincere gratitude. Mathias Strøm Manly read a draft of chapter one, Michael Cummings and Calum Maciver read chapters three and four, while Ioanna Kralli read a draft of chapter five. Christian Habicht, in particular, generously read chapter six. Characteristically, his keen eye and encyclopaedic knowledge saved it from more errors than I care to mention. Julia Shear continually provided help throughout my dissertation, both in reading and discussing my work with me and I would like to thank her in particular for sending me two of her articles in advance of publication. I am also grateful to Sviatoslav Dmitriev for very kindly sending me an offprint of his book in advance of publication. Graham Oliver has been a constant source of support (and references) and has continually shared his epigraphic expertise with me.

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I began this thesis at the University of Edinburgh but over the past four years I have travelled from Edinburgh to Paris, to Athens, and back again. My greatest source of stability, love, and support throughout has been my girlfriend Nicolette, and to her my final and most tender thanks are given.
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Throughout this PhD thesis I use the Harvard system of references. I follow journal abbreviations as they appear in *L’Année philologique*. Greek authors are abbreviated after *Liddell and Scott* while Latin authors are abbreviated after the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. I provide below abbreviations for authors not mentioned in these works. All Greek references and quotations are from the *TLG*, excluding Simonides (Page 1981), Hyperides’ *Against Diondas* (Carey et al. 2008), and George Synkellos (Adler & Tuffin 2002). All translations of literary sources, unless noted, are from the editions of the Loeb Classical Library. All translations of epigraphic sources, unless noted, are my own.

Complete consistency regarding the use of Greek and Latin names is impossible and I make no pretence to it. I favour the Greek form throughout (Demetrios; Ambrakia, etc), but I use Latinised names when they are most recognisable (Athens, Corinth, Aristotle, Alexander, etc.). When two persons have the same name I use the Latinised form for the most famous and the Greek form for others: Alexander (III, the Great) and Alexandros (son of Polyperchon); Aristotle (philosopher) and Aristoteles (proposer of *IG* II\(^2\) 43).

For political terms I use a capital to denote a deity and a lower case to denote a concept, so *Demokratia, Boule*, and *Demos* (deities and personifications) and *demokratia, boule, demos* (concepts and institutions).
Abbreviations

**Ancient Authors**

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<td>Apollodoros of Athens</td>
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<td>Arr. Succ.</td>
<td>Arrian Successors (Τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον)</td>
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<td>Eus. Chron.</td>
<td>Eusebios Chronika</td>
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<td>Hyp. Epit.</td>
<td>Hyperides Epitaphios</td>
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<td>Hyperides Against Diondas</td>
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<td>Just.</td>
<td>Justin Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus</td>
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<td>Lycurg. Leoc.</td>
<td>Lykourgos Leokrates</td>
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<td>Longinus Sub.</td>
<td>Longinos, On the Sublime (Περὶ ὑψους)</td>
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<td>Porphyrios Chronika</td>
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<td>Teles On Exile (περὶ φυγῆς)</td>
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<td>Theokritos Idyll</td>
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<td>Vit. Arist.</td>
<td>Vitae Aristotelis</td>
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<td>Lefèvre Fr. (ed.), <em>Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes IV: Documents amphictioniques</em> (Paris, 2002)</td>
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I. Rhamnous
Petrakos, B., Ό Δήμος τοῦ Ραμνούντος, 2 vols. (Athens, 1999)

IG
Inscriptiones Graecae (Berlin, 1873-)

IK
Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien (Bonn, 1972-)

IK. Ery.

IK. Eph.

IK. Iasos

IK. Ilion
(IK 3) Frisch, P., Die Inschriften von Ilion (Bonn, 1975)

IK. Smyrna

IK. Stratonikeia

IK. Kyme
(IK 5) Engelmann, H., Die Inschriften von Kyme (Bonn, 1976)

IK. Adramytteion
(IK 50-1) Staube, J., Die Bucht von Adramytteion, 2 vols. (Bonn, 1996)

IK. Mylasa

IOSPE
Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1885)

IPArk

ISE
Moretti, L., Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche, 2 vols. (Florence, 1967-75)

Kleine Pauly
Der Kleine Pauly (Berlin, 1964-75)

Knoepfler Décrets
Knoepfler, D., Décrets érétrians de proxénie et de citoyenneté (Switzerland, 2001)

LSAM
Sokolowski, F., Lois Sacrées de l’Asie Mineure (Paris, 1955)

Mauerbauschriften
Maier, F.G., Griechische Mauerbauschriften, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1959-61)

M&L
Meiggs, R. & Lewis, D., Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC (Oxford, 1969)

Naturalization D
Osborne, M.J., Naturalization in Athens, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1981-83)

D = Decree number

OGIS
Dittenberger, W., Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, 2 vols.
(Leipzig, 1903-05)

P. Hibe

P. Köln
Groenwald, M. et al., *Kölner Papyri*, vol. 6 (Opladen, 1987)

P. Oxy.
The *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (London, 1898-)

R.C
Welles, C.B., *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (London, 1934)

Reynolds A & R

RIG
Michel, *Recueil d’Inscriptions Grecques* (Brussels, 1900)

Rigsby Asyli

Schenkungen KNr

KNr = Catalogue Number

SEG
*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (Leiden, 1923-)

SV

Syll.³

T. Calymnii
Segrè, M., *Tituli Calymnii* (Bergamo, 1952)

TAM
*Tituli Asiae Minoris* (Vienna, 1901-)

Tod
Introduction

The concepts of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* have been the subject of in-depth studies for the Classical and Roman periods, but no similar work exists for the Hellenistic period itself.\(^1\) This is partly because it has often been seen as a period of socio-political decline leading inexorably to the Roman conquest of the east; Philip of Macedon’s victory at Chaironea heralded the death of the *polis* and the end of Greek freedom.\(^2\) This view is what one may call the ‘declinist model’. Although this view is now widely discredited its repercussions are still felt by the fact that topics studied for the Classical and Roman periods remain untreated for the Hellenistic. The Greek slogan of freedom is one. As recently as 1984 it was necessary for Erich Gruen to make the seemingly obvious statement that “it can be shown that declarations of ‘freedom’, in one form or another, play a persistent role in international affairs through the whole of the Hellenistic era”.\(^3\) Gruen, however, was not concerned with the Hellenistic period itself, but with detecting within it the precedents for Rome’s use of *eleutheria*. This thesis treats the early Hellenistic period as a chronological and historical unit defined by the relationship between city and king, not as a period of decline from the Classical period nor as a prelude to the arrival of Rome. My analysis begins with the foundation of the League of Corinth in 337 and ends with the Athenian defeat after the Chremonidean War in 262.

Overview of Previous Scholarship

Previous studies on *eleutheria* have focussed mainly on the 5\(^{th}\) century. Kurt Raaflaub examined the origin of the concept *eleutheria* and its use within the 5\(^{th}\) century while Martin Ostwald did the same for *autonomia*. Important articles on the use and understanding of both concepts have been added by Bikerman, Lévy, Figueira, Karavites, and Hansen. Karavites, Bosworth, and Sealey have in particular pushed the study of both terms into the 4\(^{th}\) century.\(^4\) Seager and Tuplin have explored freedom in the Hellenistic period but both saw it as a debased, empty political slogan.\(^5\) In general, however, whatever work has been carried out on freedom in the Hellenistic period has approached it from the question of king/city relations,

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\(^2\) See most recently, Runciman 1990; Cawkwell 1996. Raaflaub too recently stated that “Greek liberty was crushed at the battle of Chaeronea” (*OCD* s.v. Freedom in the Ancient World).

\(^3\) Gruen 1984: 133.

\(^4\) On the historiography of *eleutheria* and *autonomia*, see Ch.1 §1.1-2.

\(^5\) Seager & Tuplin 1980; Seager 1981.
either as one aspect of an individual king’s policy with regard to the Greek cities under his authority or as one aspect of the question of king/city relations in general.  

The works of Alfred Heuß, Wolfgang Orth, and John Ma reveal the general trend of scholarly arguments regarding the nature of the relationship between city and king and the role of freedom within this. In his 1937 book *Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus* Alfred Heuß argued that a king could never, and indeed never tried to, impinge on the independence of the cities. He denied that there existed a legal basis for king/city relations and contended instead that the relationship was defined by royal adherence to Greek concepts and ideals, most notably the freedom of the city. This, he argued, was an inalienable right for all. He refused to distinguish between free and un-free cities arguing instead that when freedom was granted it was simply the reconfirmation of an inherent right that had only temporarily been in abeyance. Most importantly, he proposed that royal power never undermined civic independence; kings did not control cities, they just held their loyalty during times of war.

This view was immediately criticised by Elias Bikerman who showed that cities could indeed be subordinate to royal power which had the potential to be direct and invasive. Further, he argued that a royal grant of *eleutheria* was a tangible status benefaction because cities did not have freedom as an innate right and so could at times be un-free.

The strongest critique of Heuß’ work, however, was made by Wolfgang Orth in his 1977 work *Königlich Machtanspruch und städtische Freiheit*. Orth argued the complete opposite of Heuß and claimed that the Greek cities were totally powerless before the military might of the Hellenistic empires. *Eleutheria* was nothing but a buzzword, a civic concern that was paid lip-service by the kings before then being completely ignored. Any form of deference to a king, be it honours for a *philos* or the institution of ruler cult, revealed the abject submission of the un-free city to royal power. Orth’s view was particularly influential on scholarly perceptions of Greek freedom in the Hellenistic period with numerous later scholars arguing that ‘the freedom of the Greeks’ was just a royal sham used to dupe the cities into supporting the kings. According to this model, ‘the freedom of the Greeks’ was a political slogan of

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7 Bikerman 1939.

little to no practical significance which was only used to gain support during royal military campaigns.

However, despite the prevalence of Orth’s view in the 1980s and 1990s it was challenged. Bikerman had earlier pointed to a middle ground between total civic independence and complete royal control, and numerous scholars continued, after him, to view the relationship between city and king as more reciprocal in nature than was argued by Orth. This view was given a full exposition in John Ma’s 1999 study *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*. Ma aligned himself with Bikerman and argued for the ‘vitalist model’: that the Hellenistic period saw the continued vitality and importance of institutions like the *polis* and concepts like *eleutheria*. The relationship between city and king was not defined by either complete civic independence or total royal control, but was rather a shifting relationship based on a continual process of negotiation. It was characterised by a vibrant and mutually dependent system of civic petition and royal benefaction whereby the city’s status within the empire existed as a series of royal benefactions like tax-exemption. Such civic statuses were created, granted, and defined by royal proclamation and as such acknowledged royal authority over the city. However, the cities were not themselves powerless. Since the kings were continually in need of their active support numerous means existed for the cities to influence royal policy and attain for themselves preferential treatment and an increase in status, such as passing honours in the king’s favour and using moral force to ensure added benefactions from him.

Ma focuses on defining the role played by *eleutheria* within king/city relations by analysing the typology of civic statuses, that collection of royal benefactions and guarantees that defined a city as ‘free’ or ‘subject’. He discerns three main statuses: ‘genuinely free cities’ (existing outside an empire), ‘free cities’ (free by royal grant), and ‘dependent cities’ (subject to the king). He subdivides the category of ‘free cities’ into those who received freedom by submitting to royal control and having the status guaranteed by royal decree (‘surrender and grant’) and those who ensured it as a result of a bi-partite alliance with the king undertaken on apparently equal standing (‘allied’).

Ma’s model is overly legalistic, as has been recently argued by Laurent Capdetrey, and his views on the role of *eleutheria* as a medium of interaction between city and king can be criticised on two specific counts (detailed further in Ch.3 §2.3). First, Ma argued that ‘free cities’ were not subject to any forms of royal control but were as free and independent as

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‘genuinely free cities’. This ignores a fundamental distinction between both types of free city. What Ma terms ‘free cities’ were liable to royal interference and numerous examples attest to their being subject to royal taxation, garrisons, or the authority of royal officials. Although a ‘free city’ may still claim to be free, the nature of that freedom was fundamentally different from that of ‘genuinely free cities’ because it was freedom guaranteed by and compatible with royal power; ‘genuinely free cities’ were free because they were not submissive to royal power. There is a very important practical and conceptual difference here that Ma does not take full cognisance of (see further below).

Second, Ma argues that *eleutheria* was a legal status with solid, meaningful definitions and that as a result of this there existed a legal distinction between ‘free cities’ that attained the status by either royal declaration (‘surrender and grant’) or treaty (‘allied’). In practice, however, both ‘surrender and grant’ and ‘allied’ cities were equally liable to royal impositions and we should conclude that the guarantee of freedom through alliance was itself simply a form of ‘surrender and grant’. Ma’s creation of distinctions within ‘free cities’ undermines our understanding of the adaptability of the use in action of *eleutheria* as a part of king/city relations. We should only distinguish between what Ma termed ‘genuinely free cities’ and ‘free cities’ and view the practical status of the latter as not strictly defined by legal definitions, but fluid and characterised by a malleable series of benefactions and statuses based on royal grant and civic petition.

**Critique of Previous Scholarship**

There are however two more deep-seated problems with the focus hitherto taken in most studies of *eleutheria* in the Hellenistic period. The first problem is chronological. It is increasingly being noted that the early Hellenistic period was an era of transition and should be treated separately from both the Classical period and the later Hellenistic period, which was itself characterised by the arrival of Rome. The early Hellenistic period is typified by the expansion of the Macedonian monarchies and the creation and development of a bi-partite working relationship between the old Greek cities of Greece, the Aegean, and Asia Minor and the newly formed Macedonian empires. John Ma’s study produced a layered analysis of the relationship between cities and king in the late 3rd century when *eleutheria* was already a concept of some importance within a sophisticated and long established system of Seleukid rule. There remains, however, the question of how and why the concept of *eleutheria* came

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10 Ma 1999: 160-2; 2009: 126.
over time to hold this vaunted position within the dialogue between city and king. To answer this we must look at the role played by *eleutheria* in the early Hellenistic period when the mechanisms of the relationship between city and king were being developed. This thesis is the first attempt to do so.

The second problem is methodological. Modern studies of the early Hellenistic period have continually looked at *eleutheria* as part of the wider issue of the relationship between city and king. This has had the positive effect of highlighting the practical use in action of *eleutheria*, but it has also had the negative effect of moving analysis away from the concept itself and solely onto its relevancy for one particular academic question. This approach is exemplified in the works of Heuß, Orth, and Ma. Although their conclusions differ all conduct their analysis in the same way: they analyse the relationship between city and king first and then treat of *eleutheria* as one aspect of it.

This approach has problems. First, it leads scholars to mould their interpretation of *eleutheria* to fit the requirements of their model for the king/city relationship. Thus, Heuß could see *eleutheria* as guaranteeing the inalienable right of all cities to complete independence from foreign control, while Orth could dismiss it as empty propaganda designed to dupe the Greek cities into supporting one monarch or the other. Second, it creates an imbalance whereby *eleutheria* is studied simply as one of the many symptoms of the relationship between city and king rather than acting as a cause of it. Since *eleutheria* pre-dated the creation of a working relationship between city and king, we should analyse the ways in which it helped delineate the structural and ideological boundaries around which that relationship crystallised. In *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* Thomas Martin argued that “it always seems better to start historical investigation of the relations between the Hellenistic kings and the Greek city-states from the premise that these relations were a matter of practical arrangements worked out in a context unaffected by considerations of the theoretical components of royal and civic sovereignty”. Martin is of course correct to emphasis the “practical arrangements” of power within the relationship between city and king, but we must not remove “theoretical components” like *eleutheria* because these both structured and defined the practicalities of royal power. Ideology influenced not only the ways in which royal impositions were justified to the city but it also defined the language, and therefore the nature and understanding, of the relationship between both parties.

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Martin’s placement of “practical arrangements” over “theoretical components” hints at a key problem in studying *eleutheria* in the early Hellenistic period. Because no one has yet analysed what the Greek cities or the Macedonian monarchs actually meant when they referred to *eleutheria* or *autonomia* in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries, the role played by “theoretical components” like *eleutheria* in articulating the “practical arrangements” of the relationship between city and king has yet to be fully appreciated. This study is therefore necessary because not only does no detailed treatment exist of the important role played by *eleutheria* within king/city relations in the early Hellenistic Period but whatever work has been done on this question has approached it from the wrong perspective. Scholars have been inclined to analyse the relationship first, draw conclusions on this, and then apply them to an interpretation of *eleutheria*. My approach is to first study the use and understanding of *eleutheria* in the 5th and 4th centuries before then applying my conclusions to both an analysis of the nature of the relationship between city and king and a treatment of the importance of *eleutheria* within the early Hellenistic city.

**Methodology**

Mogens Hansen has outlined three ancient forms of *eleutheria*: the freedom of the Greek city from foreign control, the freedom of a faction (usually democratic) to political equality under law, and the freedom of a free individual in contrast with the slave.13 I am concerned primarily with the first, but I do address the second when necessary. Raaflaub has argued that when analysing *eleutheria* it is important to be attuned to changes in the use of the concept since these both influence and reflect social and political change. Therefore, I am careful within this thesis to base my analysis of the role of *eleutheria* within king/city relations on a study of the changes (and continuities) in the use and understanding of the term in the 5th, 4th, and 3rd centuries.14

In studying *eleutheria* as an aspect of king/city relations there has sometimes been a tendency to focus more on royal rather than civic usage.15 Throughout this thesis I argue that it is important to treat of both uses together. To this end I adopt and adapt an approach outlined by John Davies for interpreting the Hellenistic kingdoms.16 Employing Davies’ model I detect and analyse three perspectives on the use of *eleutheria*. First, top-down: its use by a ruling power (usually a king) to gain the support of cities. Second, bottom-up: its use by

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16 Davies 2002.
cities either as a point of ideological unity with or an assertion of discord against a ruler. Third, middle ground: its use as a political or cultural expression by and within the city itself. At times the royal use of freedom may stand in contradiction to the civic use, but it remains important to analyse both as valid interpretations and applications of a fundamentally adaptive and malleable term. This is particularly important since it is only through differences in use that we can trace differences in understanding and so fully comprehend the importance of _eleutheria_ in the early Hellenistic period.

It has not always been the case that scholars have treated alternative uses of _eleutheria_ as equally worthy of analysis. This is a manifestation of a wider misunderstanding of the difference between use and meaning, one I am at pains to avoid throughout this thesis. It is common for scholars to assume a particular meaning for _eleutheria_ and then criticise it as empty and cynical when not used in the way they would expect. They then end up applying pejorative, modern standards to their analyses. Graham Oliver has highlighted a major flaw in this approach by noting the “relativity and ultimate subjectivity” of modern scholars’ opinions on what actually constitutes an imposition on freedom. Royal impositions like garrisons and taxation, though frequently cited by scholars as negations of a city’s freedom, could at times be perfectly compatible with _eleutheria_ (Ch.3 §1.1-2). Therefore, what one might expect _eleutheria_ to mean was not always representative of how it was used. Within this thesis I do not apply a restrictive modern meaning to _eleutheria_ because the term was adaptable and appeared in different contexts to define different conditions. Each use, even if contradictory, reveals its importance in fulfilling a specific role at that time and in that context. Concepts like _eleutheria_ are, as Raaflaub pointed out, “concentrates of many things”; they do not have a single definition but can be interpreted and applied in various different ways. Because its use in differing contexts contributed to its nuanced and multifarious understanding it is important not to apply modern standards to _eleutheria_ or judge one use of it as valid and another as cynical. Rather, one must analyse the means by which it could be used in seemingly contradictory ways and draw from this conclusions on the nature of the concept itself and the role it played within political discourse.

I have argued against John Ma’s typology of statuses but I nonetheless think it necessary to have some form of general methodological model for analysing _eleutheria_ as an aspect of early Hellenistic king/city relations. To that end, I employ throughout this thesis a division

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18 Oliver 2001a: 42-3.
19 Raaflaub 2004: 7. He translates from Reinhart Koselleck: “meanings of words can be determined exactly through definitions; concepts can only be interpreted”.

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between Primary and Secondary freedom (see Ch.4). That is, Primary freedom as a quality self-asserted, self-guaranteed, and independent from the control of another polis or empire, and Secondary freedom as something granted by royal power and compatible with its various manifestations of control. Ma’s distinction between ‘genuinely free cities’ and ‘free cities’ is pejorative in that implies that the latter’s freedom was not perceived as genuine, which in turn suggests that eleutheria was just insincere royal sloganeering. Both categories of cities were free in their own, different ways. The free city that was not part of an empire saw its freedom as the quality of not being under a king’s control; the free city that was part of an empire saw its freedom as guaranteed and defined by royal control. Consequently, freedom was either a quality asserted by oneself or a quality granted by another. This marks the division between Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom and denotes the two mutually exclusive ways that freedom could be understood within the relationship between city and king.

Primary and Secondary freedom may denote the two ways of conceiving of eleutheria itself, but the conditions that constituted that freedom could in both cases be seen either positively or negatively, that is the Positive freedom to do something and the Negative freedom to not be restricted by something (see further, Ch.3 §2.1). This distinction can perhaps be explained as one of authority, namely the wish to acquire it (Positive) and the wish to curb it (Negative). Although Isaiah Berlin was not the first to draw this important distinction he was the first to popularise it in his 1959 essay Two Concepts of Liberty. Peter Liddel may have recently critiqued its use, but the ideas of Positive and Negative freedoms nonetheless remain a useful shorthand for characterising those criteria that the ancient Greeks saw as guaranteeing or impinging their eleutheria.

While I am concerned with analysing eleutheria as an aspect of king/city relations, I am also concerned with viewing it outside of this context and so appreciating the greater versatility and significance of the term itself. I focus on the question of memorialising and commemorating eleutheria within the early Hellenistic city from the perspectives of its connection with democracy and its role within the memory of the Persian Wars. This necessitates a different approach to that undertaken throughout the rest of the thesis and in this regard I have been influenced by Pierre Nora’s concept of the lieu de mémoire: “un lieu de mémoire dans tous les sens du mot va de l’objet le plus matériel et concret, éventuellement

20 Reprinted as Berlin 2002: 166-217. Erich Fromm (1942) earlier drew the distinction between ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from’.
21 Liddell 2007: 9-14, esp.10 n.42. Quentin Skinner (2002) has argued for the addition of a third form of freedom characterised as the active partaking of government so as to prevent enslavement from another power.
géographiquement situé, à l’objet le plus abstrait et intellectuellement construit”. Sites, monuments, objects, and individuals could encapsulate and evoke abstract, ideological significance where the precise historicity of the event was not as important as its emotive resonance. Nora applied this concept to a study of the memory of the French revolution of 1789, but it is equally applicable to ancient Greece, as Michael Jung has recently shown in his study of Marathon and Plataia as lieux des mémoires. In the final chapters of this thesis I show how not only landscapes, monuments, individuals, and institutions could be used to evoke the memory of the past and apply it anew to the needs of the present, but also how that memory could be actively altered, even created, to imbue within a modern idea a false, but compelling, historicity.

Evidence

Any study of the early Hellenistic period is hindered by the limitations of the evidence. It is important to make clear that I am not concerned with judging how free a city was or was not. Since I am interested only in analysing the use and understanding of the term eleutheria and its application within internal diplomacy, my work must be based on references to that concept itself. This means that I am restricted, primarily, to literary and epigraphic sources. The works of the Athenian orators Demosthenes, Aischines, Demades, Lykourgos, and Hyperides survive until 322 (the date of Hyperides’ Epitaphios), but a large proportion of this material is of limited use as it concerns the years before 337. Further, it preserves a very Athenian use of eleutheria and so too much reliance on it would only lead to a limited, Atheno-centric understanding of the term. Books 18-20 of Diodoros’ Bibliotheke offer an invaluable, detailed account of the years 323-302 and are based on the lost work of Hieronymos of Kardia, an Antigonid courtier and historian who was an eyewitness to, and active participant in, the history he described. Plutarch’s lives of Demosthenes, Phokion, Alexander, Demetrios, and Pyrrhos are also important, particularly for the account of the early 3rd century preserved in the latter two. Other sources like Pausanias’ Description of Greece and Justin’s heavily condensed epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ Philippic History are also helpful. However, since these sources are all secondary it is difficult to establish whether or not the use of eleutheria and autonomia within them reflects the author’s own usage or that

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22 Nora 1984.
23 Jung 2006.
24 On the dangers of Atheno-centrism, see Raaflaub 2004: 14.
25 On Hieronymos, see Hornblower 1981.
of his primary sources. With the almost total loss of the primary sources this question is impossible to answer.

By far our most important body of ancient evidence for the early Hellenistic period is the decrees of the Greek cities and the letters of Hellenistic kings and their officials. They preserve the voice of the *demos* and king and offer a contemporary view on their relationship and the political dialogue of the time. Thus, the epigraphic material is invaluable for discerning how and in what contexts terms like *eleutheria* were used. There remain however limitations on the evidence. Royal letters were by and large published at the initiative of the city when a benefaction or favourable status was confirmed. This takes the letter out of its wider context by presenting it as the final statement on a question when we know that it was but one link in a chain of negotiation consisting of civic decrees, royal letters, and speeches by ambassadors on both sides. The publication of a favourable letter served to “provide confirmation, a means of pinning down oral discourse”, but it also denotes for us the loss of this discourse, that wider context of petition and response that led to the guarantee of a status.26 The royal letter exists somewhat divorced from its wider diplomatic context. A process of negotiation took place before a grant of a status benefaction, but it is only in exceptional circumstances, such as in the decree of the Ionian League for Antiochos I (*IK*.Ery. 504) or in the letter of Antiochos II to Erythrai (*IK*.Ery. 31), that we get an insight into it.

Civic decrees may preserve the final word of the *demos*, but they too are selective. In particular, they do not record the debate that would have occurred within the *ekklesia* beforehand. They eschew internal, factional conflict within the city and present the *demos* as holding a single, unified voice. In some cases this ‘unity’ may only have come about after long, impassioned, and ultimately unresolved debate. It is only when we can compare the epigraphic material with the literary, which often takes us behind the epigraphic façade, that we can detect this discord. Naturally, when debate concerns the nature of a city’s freedom or its relationship with a king, as was the case in Athens in 304/3, civic decrees may only reveal one interpretation of a city’s freedom (see further Ch.4 §3).

Two further types of evidence have often been seen to reflect the independence of the *polis*. The first is coinage. The *communis opinio* used to be that a city under royal control was

26 Quote from Erskine 2001b: 321. Unfavourable decisions were unlikely to have been published by the city in question, see pg.130 with n.60.
free if it minted its own (particularly silver) coins but un-free if it did not.\textsuperscript{27} This view was critiqued by Thomas Martin in his study on the coinages of Thessaly under Macedonian control in the 4\textsuperscript{th} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries.\textsuperscript{28} He broke the connection between freedom and coinage by showing that a state’s right to mint coins was not affected by its submission to another power. Graham Oliver and John Kroll argued the same conclusion for Athens under Antigonos Gonatas in the years post-262.\textsuperscript{29} Christopher Howgego pointed out that there was clear evidence of a link between independence and coinage, but Andrew Meadows showed that this link arose in the late Hellenistic period and was a reflection of Rome’s intervention in the institutions of the Greek poleis.\textsuperscript{30} Sonja Ziesmann analysed the coinages of a selection of states in Greece and Asia Minor said to have either been granted autonomia by Philip and Alexander or fought for it from them and showed that in the late 4\textsuperscript{th} century no connection existed between a city’s freedom and its ability to mints coins.\textsuperscript{31} Most recently, Marie-Christine Marcelllesi has argued that throughout the Attalid kingdom royal and civic types coexisted during the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} centuries.\textsuperscript{32}

The link between freedom and coinage appears to be broken but the subject requires further study. Works on sovereignty and coinage have generally treated of either the late 4\textsuperscript{th} century (Martin and Ziesmann) or the late Hellenistic period (Meadows), thus avoiding the transitional early Hellenistic period. To assume that the link between freedom and coinage did not exist at all during the early Hellenistic period is just as dogmatic as claiming that it existed everywhere. For example, if the series of coins from Tion dated post-281 and bearing the inscription \textit{ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ} are to be connected with the liberation of the city from Herakleian control c.281 then we have at least the use of civic coinage to advertise freedom.\textsuperscript{33} Oliver’s and Kroll’s work on Athens and Antigonos Gonatas is a step in the right direction, but further work needs to be done on the relationship between coinage and freedom within specific poleis in the late 4\textsuperscript{th} and early 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries. However, considering the current communis opinio and the limits of this thesis I do not analyse coinage as an indicator of freedom unless the term \textit{eleutheria} appears on the coin itself.

\textsuperscript{28} Martin 1985.
\textsuperscript{29} Oliver 2001; Kroll & Walker 1993: 10-13.
\textsuperscript{30} Howgego 1995: 40-4; Meadows 2001.
\textsuperscript{31} Ziesmann 2005; echoed in Dmitriev 2011: 429-30.
\textsuperscript{32} Marcellesi 2010.
\textsuperscript{33} See pg.71 with n.137.
The presence of walls has also been taken at times to indicate a city’s freedom.\textsuperscript{34} However, as with coinage, this is a vexed question in need of detailed study for the period in question. A connection between the city’s control of forts and the political independence or \textit{eleutheria} of the \textit{demos} is often made, but the connection is one of military security leading to political security and the freedom of the city.\textsuperscript{35} In other cases a connection is explicitly made between the city’s freedom and its walls. Kolophon’s ability to build a wall joining the ancient city to the modern is connected with Alexander’s and Antigonos’ grant of \textit{eleutheria} to the \textit{demos}\textsuperscript{36} while Chios connects the building of a wall through public subscription with the protection of its \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{autonomia}.\textsuperscript{37} In both these cases, however, the connection between walls and freedom can only be made because the city published an inscription to this effect which has survived to the present day. Walls and forts could certainly add to a city’s sense of freedom but we cannot assume that in every case their presence was a sign of it. It is impossible to judge ideology from architecture alone so I will only make the connection between walls and freedom when it is explicitly drawn within the evidence.

\textbf{Outline of Thesis}

This thesis treats of the use and meaning of the Greek concept of \textit{eleutheria} (freedom) and the cognate term \textit{autonomia} (autonomy) in the early Hellenistic Period with a specific focus on the role these concepts played in the creation and formalisation of a working relationship between city and king. It consists of six chapters divided equally into three parts with each part exploring one of the three major research questions of this thesis. Part One, Narratives, treats of the continuities and changes within the use and understanding of \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{autonomia} from the 5\textsuperscript{th} to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries. Part Two, Analysis, focuses on the use in action of both terms and the role they played in structuring and defining the relationship between city and king. Part Three, Themes, explores the importance of commemoration and memorialisation within the early Hellenistic city, particularly the connection of \textit{eleutheria} with democratic ideology and the afterlife of the Persian Wars.

\textsuperscript{34} See, for example, Amit 1973: 118 “walls were the symbol of independence”.
\textsuperscript{35} SV 545; Herzog 1942: 15; IOSPE I 401; cf. I.Priene 19; App.2 nums.47, 18, 20, 22.
\textsuperscript{36} Mauerbauinschriften 69.6-12: ἐπειδὴ παρέδωκεν αὐτῷ Ἀλεξάνδρος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἅ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ Ἀντίγονος…ἐνθάδε τοῖς δήμοις τιμὴν παλαιὰ πόλιν…οṝερόνται ὑπὲρ τῆς ὑπάρχουσαν. See also Ma 2000: 340-1, 360.
\textsuperscript{37} Mauerbauinschriften 52-3.1-5: οἴδ’ βουλὸμενοι διὰ παντός ἐλευθέραν καὶ αὐτόνομον τὴν πατρίδα διαμένειν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν προαίρεσιν ὑπέσχοντο δωρεὰν χρήματα καὶ ἐδωκαν εἰς τὴν ὀχύρωσιν τῶν τείχων.
Chapter one offers a narrative of the origins and use of eleutheria and autonomia in the 5th and early 4th centuries. I begin by tracing the initial distinction between both terms before arguing for an increase in the use and significance of autonomia in the early 4th century as a result of its appearance within Spartan foreign policy and the King’s Peace. This increased importance of autonomia resulted in it being seen to convey a meaning equal to that of eleutheria. As a result both terms were joined together as a entirely new political phrase – eleutheria kai autonomia – in the late 380s, specifically in the context of the Second Athenian Confederacy. I argue that this phrase was an ideological tautology used to express the ideal of complete freedom sought by a city and that for the reminder of the 4th and 3rd centuries both terms were interchangeable and could be used synonymously. However, I show that despite this synonymity autonomia could also describe one specific aspect of eleutheria: the empowerment of the demos as the sovereign recipient of a royal grant of freedom.

Chapter two builds from the first by providing a narrative of the appearance and use of eleutheria and autonomia within the early Hellenistic Period, c.337-262. Since this chapter serves as an historical orientation for the reader its structure is more narrative than that of chapter one. As my main purpose is to orientate the reader for the subsequent analytic and thematic chapters, I emphasise throughout this chapter the appearance and development of the three major themes that underline this thesis: the connections and continuities in the use and understanding of eleutheria from the Classical to the Hellenistic Periods; the role played by eleutheria as a point of dialogue between city and king; and the omnipresence of the past within the use of eleutheria to conceptualise the present.

Chapter three is split into two sections with the first serving as a basis for the second. Section one is concerned with the features that were (and still are) seen to negate freedom, in particular garrisons and taxation. I show that these did not always inhibit freedom but could be presented as compatible with or even a support of it provided it served a function beneficial to the city. The terminology used to describe such features is important: a phylake (defence) rather than a phroura (garrison) or a syntaxis (contribution) rather than a phoros (taxation) hint at synergy rather than exploitation. Section two explores some of the different ways of analysing eleutheria. I look first at defining freedom through the application of Positive and Negative freedoms. I then apply this to an analysis of the use in action of eleutheria and argue that each use, even if cynical or hypocritical to us, must be analysed as a valid interpretation of it. Finally, I treat of the question of the role of eleutheria within modern typologies of statuses. Focusing particularly on John Ma’s work, I argue for a more malleable understanding of the use and meaning of eleutheria in king/city relations.
Chapter four applies the conclusions reached in chapter three to the question of the role of *eleutheria* within king/city relations by focusing in particular on the application of Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom as a theoretical model. I emphasise that *eleutheria* operated either as a point of unity or discord depending on the politics of its application: kings employed it to bind the city to the empire under royal patronage (Secondary freedom), while cities outwith the empire asserted it as a point of discord against royal control (Primary freedom). Focusing then on the relationship between king and Secondary free city I trace the practical and conceptual limits within which *eleutheria* operated as a royal status benefaction and argue that rather than defining a distinct status it was a general condition that varied in form from city to city. Finally, I take Athens’ relationship with Demetrios Poliorketes in the years 304-301 as a case study for conflict that could arise between Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom within king/city relations.

Chapter five concerns the connection between *eleutheria* and *demokratia*, both as an aspect of democratic ideology and as a means of constructing a democratic present through a revision of the recent past. It explores these themes by comparing and contrasting Athens, with her strongly *polis*-asserted understanding of democracy (Primary freedom), and the cities of Asia Minor, where democracy, like freedom, was a quality guaranteed by the king (Secondary freedom). I look first at Alexander’s democratic *nachleben* and analyse how for the Greek cities of Asia Minor he was a guarantor and defender of *eleutheria* and *demokratia*, but in Athens he could be seen to be either a patron of or threat to democracy depending on the political requirements of the time. I then contrast Athens’ political fluidity in the years 322-287 with the aggressive and revisionist pro-democratic narrative presented by the post-287 democracy. I show that democratic ideology was remarkably consistent between both Athens and the cities of Asia Minor, but I stress a fundamental conceptual difference between the Athenian understanding of *demokratia* as a Primary freedom and the Asian conception of it as a Secondary freedom. Lastly, I turn to terminology and question why after Alexander so few Successors are recorded as referring directly to, or guaranteeing, *demokratia*.

Chapter six explores the memory and commemoration of the Persian Wars. I am influenced throughout by the concept of the *lieu de mémoire* which I apply in its broadest sense by looking at the Macedonian and Greek manipulation of the places, monuments, documents, and concepts associated with the Persian Wars. I begin by exploring Philip’s and Alexander’s attempts to promote Hellenic unity under Macedonian rule by exploiting the historical significance of sites like Plataia, Thebes, and Corinth for the memory of the Persian War. I then turn to Athens and evaluate the juxtaposition of Macedon and Persia in the
Athenian propaganda of the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars, highlighting in particular the exemplification and manipulation of memory through space and cult, most notably at Thebes, Plataia, and in the cults of Zeus Eleutherios at Athens and Plataia. Finally, I survey the juxtaposition of the Gallic Invasions and Persian Wars in both literature and monumental structure, especially the layout of monuments at Delphi, before detailing the different perception of the Gallic Invasions as a struggle for *soteria* and not *eleutheria*.

Two appendices provide catalogues of the epigraphic attestations of *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, *demokratia*, and *soteria* in Athens and mainland Greece and the Greek cities of the Aegean and Asia Minor respectively. Both are referred to throughout in the style: **App.1 num.19.**
PART ONE
NARRATIVES
Chapter 1: The Origins, Development, and Synonymity of Eleutheria and Autonomia in the 5th and 4th Centuries

“Eleutheria meant in essence simply the state of not being actually and legally subject to a foreign power, even if bound to it by various obligations. Hence its similarity to autonomy.”

Billows 1990: 195

Introduction

It is fitting that a study of the political use of the Greek concept of eleutheria should open with the Persian Wars, that epoch-making series of events that gave birth to the concept itself. The connection between the Persian Wars and eleutheria has been thoroughly studied by Kurt Raaflaub in his recent book, The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece, while the origins of the term autonomia have also been the source of detailed studies by Ostwald, Karavites, and Raaflaub. In spite of this work, and perhaps as a result of its focus on one term or the other, the nature of the relationship between both terms – their different focuses, interconnectivity, and per chance even their synonymity – has not been satisfactorily addressed. Certain scholars argue that by the 4th and 3rd centuries both terms were wholly synonymous, while others claim that they were clearly distinct. Obviously both cannot be the case. Since eleutheria and autonomia commonly appear within the Hellenistic literary and epigraphic evidence pertaining to the relationship between city and king, as well as underlying the earlier historical narratives of the 5th and 4th centuries, their precise association with one another should be established before one analyses their role in formulating the relationship between city and king. Consequently, the following chapter will be concerned with just this.

In Section one I examine the origin and development of both terms individually and emphasise their initial distinctions in use and meaning. Eleutheria was understood as a negative freedom that could describe both the condition of being independent of another power and the process of liberation from such a power. Autonomia was understood as a positive freedom that asserted the internal independence of a state while under the wider subordination of another. In Section two I turn to the use and understanding of autonomia in the early 4th century and argue that its continued invocation by Sparta led to an increase in its meaning whereby it came to denote a condition equal to, if not synonymous with, that of eleutheria. To express this new meaning the phrase eleutheria kai autonomia was coined in the context of the Second Athenian Confederacy. In Section three I draw together again both
terms and argue that throughout the 4th and 3rd centuries eleutheria and autonomia were synonymous and that this arose from an increase in the significance of autonomia rather than, as has often been claimed, a decrease in the significance of eleutheria.

SECTION 1: THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ELEUTHERIA AND AUTONOMIA IN THE 5TH CENTURY

In what follows I trace the individual origins of eleutheria and autonomia before then analysing together the different focuses of each. Following the recent work of Kurt Raaflaub I distinguish between eleutheria as describing the external condition of freedom as independence from foreign control, but autonomia as describing the internal condition of freedom as self-government. However, by critiquing Raaflaub’s work I argue that, although he discerns distinct meanings for eleutheria and autonomia, both could be used synonymously even in the 5th century because autonomia could hold a significance very close to, if not exact with, that of eleutheria. This conclusion will inform my analysis of autonomia in Section two, where I trace this expanded meaning into the 4th century.

1.1. Eleutheria

The work of Kurt Raaflaub has been instrumental in understanding the origin and development of the Greek concept of eleutheria in the 5th century, and this brief analysis is highly indebted to it. In particular, Raaflaub has revealed the centrality of the Persian Wars in stimulating the creation of eleutheria after 479 to define the condition of not being under Persian control. He has shown that the abstract noun eleutheria developed from the use of the adjective eleutheros within the master-slave dynamic to describe an individual who was not under the control of another; in Athens in particular eleutheros and doulos were used by Solon to describe release from and submission to debt bondage.1 Eleutheria was discovered in the wake of the Persian Wars but it only achieved its full conceptual development in the late 470s once the magnitude of the victory and its long-term significance were fully understood.2 Throughout the 5th century the Persian Wars were remembered as a struggle for Greek eleutheria. Thucydides records that Pausanias sacrificed to Zeus Eleutherios after Plataia,3 while Simonides’ epigrams claimed that those who died at Plataia “clothed Greece

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3 Thuc. 2.71.2-4; Raaflaub 2004: 58-67, 84-9.
in freedom,” that at Artemision Athens “laid the bright foundations of freedom,” and that at Salamis Athens kept “all Greece from seeing the dawn of slavery”.4

In the wake of the Persian defeats at Salamis and Plataia and Sparta’s reluctance to lead an aggressive war against Persia in the Aegean and Asia Minor, Athens assumed the hegemony of the Greek allies c.478/7.5 The Athenian-led alliance, more commonly now called the Delian League, was originally designed to expel Persia from the remainder of Europe and ravage the King’s land. To this end, Hellenotamiai were charged with assessing a supposedly voluntary tax (phoros) of money or ships to be paid by each ally to a common fund on Delos.7 The expansion of warfare under Athenian leadership was initially justified as a campaign to ensure the eleutheria of the Greeks of the Aegean and Asia Minor, but this was soon seen as a pretext for Athenian aggression against Persia and the imposition of empire over the voluntary allies.8 John Davies has recently argued that due to the problems inherent in maintaining a large navy Athens had either to expand control over the allies so as to secure the raw materials needed to supply her fleet or forgo her naval experiment altogether.9 Since she chose the former her continuing hegemony over the Greek allies was a direct and inevitable consequence of the failure of Xerxes’ invasion. Cities that tried to leave the League, like Naxos in 471 and Thasos in 465, were besieged, had their walls torn down, and were forced to hand over their navies to Athens (Thuc. 1.100.1). Further, Athens increasingly interfered with her allies’ constitutions,10 while from 454 League funds were moved to Athens and the phoros became a forced and unpopular tribute.11

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5 *Hdt.* 8.3; Thuc. 1.95-6; D.S. 11.46.4; *ATL* III 97, 225-33; Brunt 1993: 47-74; Raaflaub 2004 87-9; Ostwald 1982: 24-5. On the date, see Arist. *Ath.* 23.5 with Rhodes 1981: 295-6.

6 Thuc. 1.95-6. Hornblower (1991a: 141-7) argues that Athens’ aim from the start was leadership against Persia.

7 Thuc. 1.96.1-2; D.S. 11.47; Plu. *Arist.* 24.1; *ATL* III 229-33. On the Hellenotamiai, see Hornblower 1991a: 145-6. It has been argued that while the League itself was to be permanent the phoros was only intended to last for the duration of the war with Persia (Wade-Gery 1945: 217 n.11; *ATL* III 230-1). Its permanency – ratified in the Peace of Nikias of 421 (below n.11) – no doubt contributed to the unpopularity of the term.

8 Thuc. 3.10.3; 6.76.3-4. Raaflaub 2004: 87-9; E. Will 1972: 132. Note in particular the claim of the Mytilenians: ἐξεμαχον μέντοι εὐγενεμέθα όσι ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλήνων Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει από τῶν Μήσου τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Thuc. 3.10.3).

9 Davies 2007.

10 *IK. Ery.* 4 (=*M&L* 40); *Lys.* 2.54-7; cf. *X. HG* 3.4.7. Both democracies (at Erythrai by the late 450s [*M&L* 40; *IG I* 14], Samos in 440/39 [Thuc. 1.115.3], and Miletos by the mid-430s [Herrmann 1970]) and oligarchies (*X. Ath. Pol.* 3.11) were installed. Merritt expressed scepticism on the “systematic” installation of democracies (*ATL* III 149-54) and Brock (2009) has recently confirmed this.

11 Thuc. 1.96.2 (with Hornblower 1991a: 146), 99.1, 121.5; Plut. *Arist.* 25.2.3-2; Raaflaub 2004: 137 with further references. The date of 454 is based on the fact that the Athenian tribute lists begin in this year, a synchronism
With the decrease in the Persian threat and the concomitant increase in Athenian control, Athens entered into a position of imperialist hegemony over the allies: a transformation reflected in modern terminology as the change from the Delian League to the Athenian Empire. The more Athens was seen to be negating the freedom of the allies the more she turned freedom into a slogan by referring to her own past exploits on behalf of it. Eventually, the destruction of the allies’ freedom become justified as a manifestation of Athens’ freedom. This led to the creation of two new dynamics: first, the use of *eleutheria* to describe the unequal nature of Greek control over Greeks, not simply Persian or foreign control over Greeks; second, Athens’ creation of new methods of justifying her control over the allies as a manifestation of her own *eleutheria*. When cast in the role of Persia – negating the freedom of the Greeks – Athens turned to the past, specifically her role in the Persian Wars, for justification. The contributions of others to the Wars were diminished and Athens’ role in their victory was presented as pre-eminent. From this, Athens claimed that she alone had ensured the freedom of the Greeks and so her freedom was more important than anyone else’s and could be asserted over it, having been captured and razed twice, yet still having fought and triumphed against Persia, Athens viewed her empire as her reward and saw herself as superior to those who had submitted in 480/79. From having promised freedom for the Greeks of Asia Athens now saw their freedom as unworthy and indeed a subversion of the full expression of her own.

The Peloponnesian War was in large part a reaction to Athens’ oppression of her allies’ freedom. Thucydides records that Athens, like Persia before, was enslaving the Greeks and that both Mytilene and Corinth appealed to Sparta against Athens’ imprecations on their freedom (Thuc. 1.124.1; 3.10-13). At the negotiations of 431 Sparta was happy to assume the mantle of defender of Greek *eleutheria* from Athens (Thuc. 1.69.1) and as the war

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questioned by Pritchett (1969). The continued payment of the *phoros* was ratified in the Peace of Nikias of 421 (Thuc. 5.18.5; cf. 4.81; SV 188; Ostwald 1982: 9, 28; Bosworth 1992: 125).

13 *M&L* 26=SEG XL 28; Hdt. 7.139, Thuc. 1.73-8; Lys. 2.24, 44-7; Isoc. 4.71-2, 98-100; 5.97; cf. Plato *Menex*. 242a-c, 244c; Raaflaub 2004: 166-172, 179-81.
14 Thuc. 6.76-80, 82.3-83.1 (with Hornblower 2008: 501-3); Isoc. 4.66-72, 83, 94-100; 6.43, 83; cf. Hdt. 6.11-13; 7.139; 8.22, 85.1; Chambers 1973: 83-8. For the idea that Athens’ empire was a reward for her sufferings on behalf of the freedom of all Greeks, see Isoc. 4.66-72, 83, 94-100, cf. 6.43, 83; Chambers 1973: 83-8. Thucydides connects Athens’ empire with its position as the freest of all Greeks (2.36-43; 6.89.6; 7.69.2; 8.68.4).
15 Thucydides has Hermokrates of Kamarina claim that for the Ionians the Persian Wars simply saw a change of masters from Persia to Athens (6.76.4). For Athens as enslaving the Greeks, see Thuc. 1.121.5; 3.10.3-5, 63.3; 4.86.1, 108.3; 5.9.9; 6.77.1, 88.1; 7.66.2, 68.2. She was also called a *polis tyrannos*, see Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3: Ar. Eq. 110-20. On the expression, see Tuplin 1985.
progressed she continually claimed to be freeing Greece from Athenian control. However, like Athens before, Sparta was using the Greek wish for eleutheria to justify and expand her own hegemony and her apparent altruism was soon questioned. The Spartan admiral Alkidas murdered Athenian allies despite that fact that they fought under compulsion (Thuc. 3.32.1-2), Sparta openly reneged on its commitments to defend Plataia as a site of Greek eleutheria in 427 (Thuc. 3.53-68), and after its capture they executed the Plataian survivors in order to expedite Theban entry into the war (Thuc. 3.68). Further, Brasidas liberated numerous Chalkidic cities only to install harmosts (military governors) and eventually return the cities to Athens in the Peace of Nikias, according to which they were to remain autonomous but now pay the phoros to Athens. The Peace severely undermined Spartan claims to be defending eleutheria since it guaranteed Athenian control over those states that Sparta had set out to liberate ten years before (Thuc. 5.18.8) and caused many of her allies to allege that Sparta was, with Athens, trying to enslave Hellas. Worse still, in 412 Sparta concluded a treaty with Persia that acknowledged the Great King’s authority over the Ionian Greeks and led to further claims that Sparta was trying to enslave Greece beneath the Persian yoke (Thuc. 8.18, 37.2, 43.3).

As an abstract concept, eleutheria initially lacked any kind of positive definition. Negatively, it described the status of not being subject to Persian political and military control, but it was a quite indistinct concept that was used through its simplistic contrast with douleia to denote freedom from or submission to the control of another power. It was an emotive call to arms, a quality for which one would fight and die, but it did not in any binding way define a specific situation or series of criteria; the manifestations of subjection and liberation – garrisons, governors, taxation, political interference – do not appear to have been as yet indelibly shackled to it, although they were to become so in the 4th century (below §3). Eleuthерia, the abstract noun, existed both as an active verb (eleutheroo) and a concrete noun (eleutherosis). All three forms of the word described different aspects of liberation: the verb to describe an individual or state liberating another (eleutheroo), the concrete noun to

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16 Thuc. 2.8.4, 72.1, 78.4; 3.13.7, 32.2, 59.4, 63.3; 4.85-7, 108.2-3, 121.1; 5.9.9; 8.43.3, 46.3; cf. Isoc. 4.122. For Sparta’s use and abuse of eleutheria during the Peloponnesian War, see Raaflaub 2004: 193-202.
17 Liberation: Thuc. 4.80-1, 83-8. Governors: Thuc. 4.132.3; 5.3.1. Phoros: Thuc. 5.18.5. Karavites (1982: 150-2) argues that Brasidas tried to obstruct the peace because he suspected that the fallout would be detrimental to both his and Sparta’s reputations. Brasidas was given heroic honours in Skione for his actions ὡς ἐλευθερόντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα (Thuc. 4.121.1; 5.11.1; Hornblower 1991a: 380-5, 449-56).
18 Thuc. 5.22.1, 27.2, 29.3; Raaflaub 2004 196-8; L. Mitchell 2007: 144-6. Concern over the nature of Sparta’s liberation of Greece had been voiced as early as 427 (Thuc. 3.32.2).
denote this process (*eleutherosis*), and the abstract noun to describe the resulting condition of being liberated (*eleutheria*). However, as we shall see further below, although *eleutheria* described the process and abstract condition of being free it was *autonomia* that was used within treaties and inter-state diplomacy to define the specific status arising from this (below §1.2). So, in 424 Brasidas freed the Chalkidic cities from Athenian control but the resulting status awarded them was *autonomia* (Thuc. 4.86-8).

The 5th century gave rise to two important and inter-connected aspects of the Greek concept of *eleutheria*. First, it became common that for one state to exercise fully its freedom it had to control and thus in part negate the freedom of other states. Second, *eleutheria* offered a means of describing the nature of power relations between Greek states as one of large states oppressing the freedom of smaller ones. *Eleutheria* was initially a concept writ large to describe the position of Greece as not being under Persian control, but when Athens expanded control over the Aegean states after the defeat of Persia she was seen to be a threat to the freedom of the Greek cities. Thucydides records that Athens’ control of the allies led to her position as the freest of all states. 21 This imbalance between the freedom of Athens and that of her allies meant that *eleutheria* was now used to define the power dynamics of inter-*polis* relations and acted as a rallying cry for the removal of one state from the control of another. Aigina and Corinth called on Sparta to liberate the Greeks from Athenian control in 431, while after the Peloponnesian War Thebes called on Athens to help liberate the Greeks from Sparta during the Corinthian War of 395-387. 22

*Eleutheria* was a concept of importance to all states. Smaller, dependent states under the oppressive influence of leading *poleis* like Athens and Sparta used *eleutheria* to describe the urge for independence, either by themselves (as was the case with Naxos, Thasos, and Mytilene under Athens) or with the assistance of others, and so used it to elicit the support of another leading *polis* in their liberation; a bottom-up approach. Leading *poleis*, however, could respond to such claims, or indeed assert them spontaneously, and claim to be liberating the cities; a top-down approach. Such claims were rarely if ever altruistic, but they allowed states like Athens and Sparta to define their military campaigns not as assertions of their own power but as manifestations of concern for the enemy’s oppressed allies, thus leading to the attainment of both willing allies and moral authority. 23 However, the enforcement of *eleutheria* as the will of a *hegemon* led to problems. Military concerns ultimately trumped

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21 Above n.14.
23 Raaflaub 2004: 87-9. See also Mytilene’s remark to Sparta in 428/7 (Thuc. 3.13.7): ἐὰν δ’ ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε, τὸ κράτος τοῦ πολέμου βεβαιώτερον ἔξετε.
benevolent magnanimity and although Sparta claimed to defend *eleutheria* she used the slogan to mask imperial expansion. The Peloponnesian War revealed the essential paradox of freedom in an age of major power blocs: to deny one state was to trust in and ally with another, thus creating a cycle of supposed liberation and oppression. Athens defeated Persia and assumed a leading position over the Greek states initially based on voluntary leadership, allied goodwill, and *eleutheria*. However, to maintain this position Athens had to control the allies, thus negating their freedom. Sparta was then called upon by Megara and Corinth to free the Greeks and in doing so replaced the hegemony once held by Athens. To maintain this leading position Sparta in turn had to enforce control over her new allies and in the Corinthian War Athens was again called upon to free the Greeks (*X. HG* 3.5.12-13). The cycle of hegemonies was to continue during the 4th century during which time *eleutheria* continued to denote, as it had in the 5th century, the ideal of “freedom from all internal and external compulsion”. However, political propaganda was increasingly expressed through *autonomia*, a term closely connected with *eleutheria* and of central importance to 4th century politics and diplomacy.

1.2. *Autonomia*

The origin and early development of *autonomia* has been traced on numerous occasions and a certain *communis opinio* has been reached. *Autonomia* originated within the 5th century Athenian Empire and was used to define the position of allies under Athenian military control who had lost their *eleutheria* but were still internally self-governing. *Autonomia* grew therefore from the relationship between stronger and weaker states. Some saw it as a negative status defined by its contrast with, and inherent lack of, *eleutheria*. It thus denoted the weaker state’s submission to the stronger, but the stronger state’s guarantee to the weaker of its internal political independence through the use of its own laws, “self-government which is willing to accept subordination to a superior power in some matters”. While this is one aspect of its use, others have pointed out that it can also be used to describe a position very similar to, if not identical with, *eleutheria*, a point to which I will return below. The difference in use reflects of course the term’s lack of definition; in many cases it appears to

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be understood simply as the opposite of that with which it is contrasted. Raaflaub, for one, has argued that autonomia carried many shades of meaning which would have been understood and emphasised in different contexts.

Autonomia was fundamentally part of the language of diplomacy and was commonly used in interstate relations to define the status of allies within the alliance systems of hegemones like Athens, Sparta, and Argos. Aigina was perhaps guaranteed autonomia in the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446. The Peace of Nikias of 421 ensured the autonomia of those cities captured from Athens by Sparta and then returned to Athenian control and paying the phoros (Thuc. 5.18.2-5). The Peace of 418/7 between Sparta and Argos also guaranteed the autonomia of each other’s allies. Brasidas freed the Chalkidic cities from Athenian control in 424/3 before then granting them autonomia as Sparta’s allies. Athens similarly freed the Sicilian cities from Syrakuse in 415 (Thuc. 6.84.3, 87.2) before then making them allies and granting them autonomia (Thuc. 6.85.1-2). Thucydides records that autonomia was the status given to Athenian allies during the Delian League but lost when it developed into the more autocratic Athenian Empire (Thuc. 1.97.1, 139-40; 3.10-11, 39.2, 46.5).

Within the epigraphic record autonomia is attested as granted by Athens to Karpathos perhaps pre-434/3 (IG I 1454.12), Mytilene post-427/6 (IG I 118.10-11), and Samos in both 412 (Thuc. 8.21; cf. IG I 96) and 405 (IG I 127.15-16 [=IG II 1]). Sparta’s Peloponnesian allies were also described as autonomous (Thuc. 1.144; 4.86.1, 88.1).

Although autonomia could denote both dependence and independence, and thus carry a meaning close to that of eleutheria, some scholars have insisted on studying autonomia

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32 Thuc. 5.77.6 (cf. 27.2, 79.1): καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως ἤμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια. Tuplin (1993: 98 n.3) connects the phrase with the King’s Peace (X. HG 5.1.31: πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμως ἄρειν). On τὰ πάτρια as the expected principle by which the cities of the Peloponnes would deal with each other, see Ostwald 1982: 4.
33 Thuc. 4.86.1, 87.5, 88.1. For Brasidas as the liberator of the Greeks, see Thuc. 4.85-7, 108.2, 114.3, 120.3, 121.1; 5.9.9-10.
34 John Ma (2009: 129-34) has recently emphasised its importance as a status benefaction.
35 If so, then this is this earliest documentary appearance of autonomia. Ma (2009) analyses the significance of autonomia as an Athenian benefaction and status definition for Karpathos.
36 On the context of Athens’ grant of autonomia to Samos in 412, see Ostwald 1993. Ma (2009: 128) suggests that IG I 29 also concerns a grant of autonomia but the term is not preserved on the stone. Autonomia is also guaranteed to Rhittenia in its alliance with Gortyn of c.480-450 (I.Cret. IV 80).
37 Figueira (1990: 64-72) has argued for different understandings of autonomia by Sparta and Athens by focusing on the different nature of their hegemonies by land and sea.
independently of eleutheria. A notable exception to this is Kurt Raaflaub who recently treated of the 5th century origin and development of both terms together. Raflaub argues that it is both difficult and counter-productive to try to define autonomia, but that in spite of this it is possible to discern very clear usage and therefore meaning. Eleutheria, he argues, looks outwards and defines the negative freedom of independence from a tyrant or foreign power; autonomia, on the other hand, looks inwards and defines the positive freedom of being free to do something. This argument had earlier been made by Bikerman, but Raaflaub augments it by arguing that even in examples where eleutheria and autonomia apparently carry the same meaning and define the same position they are in fact simply emphasising “opposite aspects of the same reality”: eleutheria expresses the negative, external aspect of freedom from foreign control; autonomia denoting the internal, positive aspect of freedom as self-rule. Therefore, although they could both be used to define the same situation, the choice of one over the other was not arbitrary but reflected the particular focus (internal or external) that the author wished to emphasise.

Raaflaub’s distinction is subtle and I wonder whether the difference he draws between external and internal focuses is actually present in the sources. At times it appears that he is forcing this distinction onto authors who seem to be playing on the ambiguity, perhaps even synonymity, of eleutheria and autonomia. Both terms were never accurately defined and are frequently used ambiguously; Thucydides never states that “autonomia denotes one’s internal freedom to do X”. Is it the case then that when both terms appear together and seem to define the same condition they in fact maintain subtle differences in internal and external focus, as Raaflaub argues, or is it that their inherent ambiguity in use and understanding allows him to apply such a subtle distinction in emphasis? In short, when Raaflaub reads the evidence is he elucidating a subtle distinction within it or reading his own distinction onto it?

Raaflaub is surely right to argue that there is a general distinction between eleutheria as external and autonomia as internal, but his meticulous division of both need not apply in every case. There are examples where no obvious distinction appears and it seems that ancient authors are exploiting ambiguities, not enforcing distinctions. In such situations we should not automatically apply Raaflaub’s distinction de rigour, rather we should at least be

38 Most notably Hansen (1995a), but also Ziesmann (2005).
41 Lévy (1983) argued for their synonymity but distinguished between autonomia as a negotiated independence, a political reality that could exist under a hegemon, and eleutheria as an ideal right that one attained through violent revolution. The difference for him reflected Greek modes of thought, not internal or external political focuses.
aware of the possibility that ancient authors may be exploiting ambiguity or synonymy. In one sentence Herodotos refers to the central Asian tribes revolting from Assyrian control and gaining their freedom; in the next he refers to them as consequently being autonomous (Hdt. 1.95.8-96.1). In his account of the Mytilenian debate Thucydides has Kleon state that autonomous Mytilene revolted for eleutheria (3.39.7) but Diodotos claim that free Mytilene revolted for autonomia (3.46.5-6). In the debate at Kamarina he has Hermokrates cryptically describe the Kamarinians as “free Dorians from the autonomous Peloponnesse”. In each case eleutheria and autonomia seem to be inter-changeable and describe the same position. Raaflaub’s distinction between internal and external focus could be forced onto these examples but this would be methodologically unsound because they provide no evidence for it. Rather, we should appreciate that in such cases the author’s focus is on the ambiguity between both terms, not the subtle delineation of internal and external statuses. Indeed, Raaflaub implies as much by stating that in the example of Hermokrates, Thucydides’ “juxtaposition of free and autonomous has the cumulative effect of creating a superlative positive notion”. Clear distinctions could exist, but so too could ambiguity or even the impression of synonymy.

The potential synonymy between eleutheria and autonomia is also evident in other contexts. In addition to describing the status of dependent allies within an alliance, autonomia could denote the status of tribes outside the power of an empire or state and so carry a meaning equivalent to complete independence from foreign control. We might at first assume here a meaning equivalent to that of eleutheria – freedom from foreign control – but Raaflaub argues instead that autonomia denotes the unqualified ability of these tribes to use their own laws. Eleutheria, he argues, would only be used if one wished to describe the freedom of these tribes from foreign rule. Regardless of whether or not the use of autonomia

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42 Lévy (1983: 261-7) argues that Kleon sees autonomia as a status granted by Athens and eleutheria as freedom attained by armed revolt. Diodotos, however, uses eleutheria to mean that Mytilene is not enslaved within the Athenian Empire but is revolting through words to attain independence from it, i.e. autonomia. Kleon, according to Lévy, sees autonomia as compatible with the Athenian arche. Diodotos does not. Figueira (1990: 71) argues for confusion here between Spartan and Athenian understandings of autonomia. See also, Karavites 1982: 158-61. Hornblower (1991a: 394, 427-8) criticises Lévy’s analysis as “somewhat forced” and points out that it would “demand that Thucydides be universally strict in his use of technical terms”, which, particularly in his speeches, he was not.

43 Thuc. 6.77.1: Δωριῆς ἑλευθερίας αὐτονόμου τῆς Πελοποννήσου τῶν Σικελικῶν οἰκονομίας. Hornblower (2008: 497-8) translates this as “Dorians and free inhabitants of Sicily, prung from the autonomous Peloponnesse”. He also comments on the “positive combination of ‘freedom and autonomy’”. For further possible examples of the synonymity of eleutheria and autonomia, see Lévy 1983: 256-7.

44 Raaflaub 2004: 152 with n.196.

45 Lévy 1983: 256-7; Sealey 1993: 241-2. See Thuc. 2.29.3, 96.2, 4, 98.3-4, 101.3; 6.88.4; Hp. Aēr. 16; X. An. 7.8.25; Cyr. 1.1.4; D. 1.23; 4.4.8; D.S. 19.17.3, 19.3.
reveals a subtle, internal focus the simple fact remains that it denotes a position that can also be called *eleutheria*. Therefore, even if they did originally carry subtle distinctions *eleutheria* and *autonomia* could describe the same position or status and carry similar, even interchangeable meanings.46 Because *autonomia* was used in different ways to denote more than one position and since the ancient Greeks did not rigorously define and classify political and ideological terminology, we would expect Raaflaub’s subtle distinction in focus to be quickly undermined.47 Unfortunately, Raaflaub does not take his analysis of *autonomia* into the 4th century. In what follows I argue that in the 4th century both *eleutheria* and *autonomia* became completely synonymous and that the means by which this came about reveals the potentiality for such synonymity in the 5th century.

SECTION 2: THE IMPORTANCE OF *AUTONOMIA* IN THE 4TH CENTURY

Xenophon’s *Hellenika* documents events of the early 4th century and maintains a focus on *autonomia* exceptional in the works of ancient historians. Herodotos, Thucydides, Polybios, and Diodoros all refer to *eleutheria* (as verb, noun, and adjective) much more frequently than *autonomia*,48 as do the 5th and 4th century writers Andokides, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Aristotle, Lykourgos, Dinarchos, and Hyperides.49 Uniquely, the *Hellenika* mentions *autonomia* (39 times) more often than *eleutheria* (29 times).50 Moreover, if we exclude references to *eleutheria* as the personal position of the free citizen or liberated slave (15 times), then the numbers are even more pronounced: 39 mentions of *autonomia* in a political context against 14 mentions of *eleutheria*. This unprecedented focus on *autonomia* over *eleutheria* has never to my knowledge been commented on, but I argue that it reflects the continued and expanded use of *autonomia* within Spartan and Greek 4th century international diplomacy in Greece and Asia Minor.51

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46 Hornblower (2003: 224) points out that *autonomia* can denote a degree of absence of foreign control and in this regard carries a meaning similar to *eleutheria*.
47 Welles 1965 (on defining *eleutheria*). Rhodes 1999: 36 (on 4th century *autonomia*): “the Greeks tended to legislate as if the meaning of key words was self-evident and did not need to be defined”.
48 Herodotos: (E)leutheria=81, (A)utonomia=2; Thucydides: E=106, A=48; Polybios: E=136, A=12; Diodoros: E=332, A=76.
49 Andokides: E=11, A=5; Isokrates: E=64, A=19; Demosthenes: E=155, A=21; Aristotle: E=281, A=1; Lykourgos: E=10, A=1; Dinarchos: E=20, A=1; Hyperides: E=27, A=1. Arrian’s *Anabasis* may refer to *autonomia* 23 times and *eleutheria* 20, but the use of *autonomia* is not political; it is only used to describe native tribes outside Persia’s and Alexander’s control.
50 Only 6 further references to *autonomia* occur in Xenophon’s works (An. 7.8.25; Cyr. 1.1.4 [twice]; Ages. 1.10; Lac. 3.1.4; Vect. 5.9.2), bringing the total number to 45. *Eleutheria* (noun and verb) appears a further 111 times.
51 Cuniberti (2006: 13-15) provides a useful quantitative analysis of the appearance of the stems δημοκρατ- αυτονομ- and ἐλευθερ- from the 6th century BC to the 2nd century AD. However, he looks only at chronological
In this section I look at the use of *autonomia* in the early 4th century and argue that two understandings of it existed: a Spartan one that saw *autonomia* as denoting alliance with and dependency upon Sparta (a status similar to her Peloponnesian allies), and an Athenian-led one that saw *autonomia* as signifying a state’s full internal and external freedom. It was widely seen that Sparta’s particular application of *autonomia* was not representative of the meaning it held within treaties. Therefore, as the speech of Autokles of 371 shows (see below), confusion existed over what exactly it denoted. Consequently, both Spartan and Athenian-led understandings of *autonomia* existed. I argue that to denote the Athenian-led definition of *autonomia* as full internal and external freedom the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* was coined and then enshrined within the Second Athenian Confederacy.

In the early 4th century Sparta appears to use *autonomia* in the same way as it had in the later 5th century (above §1.2): to denote the position of states removed from the control of an opposing power and integrated into Sparta’s own power-bloc as a series of autonomous but dependent allies. In 402/1 Sparta forced Elis to grant *autonomia* to her perioikic cities who then allied with Sparta. In 395 Lysandros invaded Boiotia and called on Haliartos “to revolt from the Thebans and become autonomous”, i.e. ally with Sparta (X. *HG* 3.5.18). During his campaigns in Asia in 397/6, Derkylidas made the Greek cities autonomous by removing them from Persian control and allying them with Sparta (X. *HG* 3.2.12-20). Agesilaos maintained this policy from 396 and in a meeting with Tissaphernes stated that his intention was that the Greek cities of Asia Minor “shall be autonomous, as are those in our part of Greece”, thus denoting their status as autonomous but dependent allies. The proposed peace treaties of 392 and 391, according to which the Greek cities would be autonomous, failed because Thebes, Argos, and Athens feared that Sparta would use the principle of *autonomia* to remove from their control the Boiotian cities, Corinth, and Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros respectively.

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52 X. *HG* 3.2.23-31; D.S. 14.34.1; Paus. 3.8.3; Karavites 1984: 179-80. For a detailed analysis of the war of 402-400 between Elis and Sparta, see Caprio 2005: 82-98. Capreedy (2008) looks at the tension between Elis’ local hegemony and Sparta’s control of the Peloponnesian League.

53 X. *HG* 3.4.5: *b’ ε’τεν αυτονόμους καὶ τας ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις εἶναι ὀσπερ καὶ τας ἐν τῇ παρ’ ἕμεν Ἑλλάδι. See also, X. *Ages*. 1.10; Plu. *Ages*. 9.1; Polyaen. 2.1.8. Karavites’ (1984: 178) claim that this denoted external freedom is correct only in regards freedom from Persian influence, not Spartan. Bosworth (1992: 127-31) treats of the Spartan use of *autonomia* in Asia Minor. Seager & Tuplin (1980) argue that the Greeks of Asia Minor only became conceived of as a unit between 400-386.

54 X. *HG* 4.8.14-15. The congress of 392 is known from a speech attributed to Andocides and a fragment of Philochoros (Andoc. 3; Philoch. *FGH* 328 F149), though the authenticity of the speech and the date of the congress are debated. Both Keen (1995b; 1998) and Badian (1991: 29-30) support the date of 392. Harris (2000) argues that the speech of Andocides is a later rhetorical exercise.
The King’s Peace of 387 marked a progression in Sparta’s position in Greece; Diodoros calls it the point at which Sparta began to fully expand her hegemony over Greece (15.19.1). The terms of the peace were handed down from Susa by the Great King. He decreed, and the Greeks accepted, that the cities of Asia were to be his, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were to be Athenian, but all the other cities, both large and small, were to be autonomous. Further, the King threatened to punish any who did not abide by these terms (X. HG 5.1.31). As overseer (prostates) of the peace Sparta was able to enforce its terms according to her own understanding of autonomia and ensure the dissolution of opposing power groups. Thebes was forced to dissolve the Boiotian League and grant the cities their autonomia (X. HG 5.1.32-3). However, when the Spartan general Phoibidas garrisoned the Kadmea in 383 Thebes was even denied its own autonomia. The burgeoning synoikism of Argos and Corinth was also stopped and the Argive garrison removed from Corinth. Mantinea was destroyed in 386 and sub-divided into four autonomous komai, each allied with Sparta. In 383 Sparta campaigned against Olynthos in order to protect the autonomia of those cities Olynthos was bringing into her sphere of influence. When Olynthos surrendered in 379 peace was made according to which she was to have the same enemies and friends as Sparta, to become an ally, and to follow wherever Sparta led, the same conditions given to Sparta’s other autonomous allies.

Autonomia was the key component of Sparta’s international policy and was repeatedly enshrined within the Persian-backed koinai eirenai (common peaces) that appeared

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55 The abandonment of the Greeks of Asia was a black-spot on Sparta’s record (D.S. 14.110.4; 15.19.4), something that Alexander manipulated during his invasion of Asia Minor in 334-332 (below pgs.194-5 with n.30).
56 Isokrates (4.115, 117, 175, 176; 8.68) and Diodoros (14.110.2-4; 15.5.1-2, 19.4) also refers to autonomia as the central tenet of the Peace.
57 For Spartan actions after the King’s Peace, see D.G. Rice 1974; Tuplin 1993: 87-100. On Sparta’s promotion of the autonomia of the individual over the federalism of the Boiotian and Olynthian Leagues, see Bearzot 2004: 21-30.
58 X. HG 5.2.25-36; D.S. 15.20.1-3; 16.29.2; Nepos Pelop. 5-6; Plu. Ages. 23; Moralia 575f-576a, 807f; Aristid. Rh. 409, 486, 488; Polyain. 2.3.1; Plb. 4.27.4; Scholium on Demosthenes 3.127. Sparta’s actions were widely unpopular (X. HG 5.4.1; 6.3.7-9; D.S. 15.20.2; Isoc. 4.126) and the Theban exiles eventually removed the garrison in 379 (X. HG 5.4.1-12; D.S. 15.25-7; Plu. Pelop. 7-13).
59 X. HG 5.1.34. On the union of Argos and Corinth, see most recently Bearzot 2004: 31-6; Fornis 2008: 149-176.
60 X. HG 5.2.1-7; D.S. 15.5.3-5, 12.1-2; Ephor. FGrH 70 F 79; Plb. 4.27.6-7; Paus. 8.8.9; cf. Plu. Pelop. 4. Capiro (2005: 216-21) places the destruction in the context of Sparto-Mantineian relations within the Peloponnesian League in the late 5th and early 4th centuries. Bearzot (2004: 37-44) argues that the destruction reveals a conflict between federalism and civic autonomy, but Rzepka (2005) correctly highlights that this “says more about how the Lacedaemonians applied the principle of autonomy to the poleis”.
61 X. HG 5.2.11-24, 2.37-3.9, 3.18-20, 26-7; D.S. 15.19.2-3, 20.3-23.5.
throughout the first half of the 4th century, from 387-367. This in turn led to the institutionalisation of *autonomia* as a key component of Greek international policy applicable in equal measure to both *hegemones*, like Thebes, and dependent *poleis*, like the Boiotian cities. As mentioned above, treaties between Sparta and Elis’ *perioikic* cities, the cities of the Olynthian League, Olynthos itself, the dissolved Mantineian *komai*, and others were made on terms of *autonomia* with *autonomia* denoting the removal of a state from the hegemony of a rival power and its forced alliance with Sparta.

However, Sparta’s interpretation and application of *autonomia* was widely unpopular in the 390s and 380s and gave rise to an Athenian-led movement against Sparta’s *prostasia* of the peace and application of *autonomia*. In 384/3, after the destruction of Mantineia, Athens made an alliance with Chios on terms “of *eleutheria* and *autonomia*”. Over the next six years alliances on the same terms (*eleutheria* and *autonomia*) were made with Thebes (378/7), Chalkis (378/7), and presumably Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, and Byzantium. Finally, in 378/7, the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy was published, prescribing that members were to be “free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security…being governed under whatever form of government he wishes, neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute”.

The 370s were a decade of decline for Spartan power. Defeats by Athens at Naxos in 376 and Alyzia in 375 and by Thebes at Tegyrai in 375 were followed by Athenian successes in

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63 Bertoli (2003: 88-9) places the Second Athenian Confederacy in the context of Spartan abuses of *autonomia*.
64 *GHI* 20.20-1 (*App.1 num.1*); cf. Isoc. 4.28. Initial contact was apparently made by Chios (*GHI* 20.13-15, 30-5). A second copy of this treaty confirming the exact same terms – *eleutheria kai autonomia* – survives as *IG II*² 35 (*App.1 num.2*).
65 The alliance between Thebes and Athens does not survive, but it is mentioned elsewhere as having had the same terms as that of Chios (*GHI* 22.19-25); *IG II*² 40 may preserve a fragment of it (Cargill 1981: 52-6; Harding 33). Negotiations with Thebes were ongoing when the charter was published in Prytany VII 378/7 (*GHI* 22.72-8, with notes on pg.103; cf. Cargill 1981: 57-8). Stylianou (1998: 258-9) argues that the alliance with Chios was a renegotiation of an earlier one.
66 *IG II*² 44.21-2 (*App.1 num.4*).
68 *GHI* 22.10-23 (*App.1 num.3*). For these provisions in action, see Cargill 1981: 131-60; Hornblower 1991b: 211-15, 217-19; Bosworth 1992: 136-8; Bertoli 2003: 88-91; Rhodes & Osborne 2003: 101-2 (cf. the editors’ comments on *GHI* 24, 51, and 52); Rhodes 2010: 268-76. Stylianou (1998: 256-7) argues that these guarantees could be ignored in specific cases should the *synedrion* deem it necessary and pass a *dogma* to that end.
the Adriatic in bringing Kerkyra, Akarnania, and Kephallonia into the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{70} Such actions led to re-negotiations of the King’s Peace in 375\textsuperscript{71} and later in 371.\textsuperscript{72} Both peace may have re-confirmed the principle of \textit{autonomia} for all Greeks under Spartan \textit{prostasia}, but as had been the case in 387 they did not last long because the Spartan application of \textit{autonomia} – forcibly removing cities from another’s control, making them autonomous allies, and so securing one’s own hegemony – led directly to the outbreak of renewed hostilities. Thebes refused to sign to the peace of 371 because she again feared that Sparta would use the principle of \textit{autonomia} to remove her control of the Boiotian cities. As anticipated, a Spartan army under Kleombrotos invaded Boiotia in 371 but was defeated at Leuktra. This effectively signalled the end of Spartan hegemony in Greece and marked the beginning of a decade of Theban invasions of the Peloponnese and Lakonia.\textsuperscript{73} Another \textit{koine eirene} was negotiated in Athens in 371/0 which again guaranteed the \textit{autonomia} of all cities, both great and small, but now divided the \textit{prostasia} between Sparta and Athens and signatories were to abide by both the treaty itself and “the decrees of the Athenians and their allies”.\textsuperscript{74}

With the rise of Theban land power the application of \textit{autonomia} as an aspect of the \textit{koine eirene} changed. Whereas Sparta had destroyed Mantinea in alleged defence of \textit{autonomia}, Thebes now oversaw her reconstruction for the same reason (X. \textit{HG} 6.5.3-5).\textsuperscript{75} Whereas Sparta had repeatedly called for the dissolution of the Boiotian League in the name of the \textit{autonomia} of the Boiotian cities, Thebes now enforced her control over the League and

\textsuperscript{70} X. \textit{HG} 5.4.64-6; D.S. 15.36.5 with Stylianou 1998: 314-17; \textit{GHI} 24. Xenophon even comments on the goodwill felt towards Athens in the Adriatic.

\textsuperscript{71} Diod. 15.38.1-2 (with Stylianou 1998: 320-9): χειρὸς τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόμους καὶ ἀφορμὴταις εἶναι; Isoc. 8.16: τοῖς Ἐλλήνων αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων πόλεων ἔδειξε καὶ τὴν αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἐκατόστως. For further references to \textit{autonomia} as a clause within the peace, see D.S. 15.38.2, 40.1, 51.3; Isoc. 16.10, 17, 24, 43; cf. 15.109-10; X. \textit{HG} 6.2.1. Philochoros (\textit{FGrH} 328 F151) records that it was a renewal of the King’s Peace and that an altar to \textit{Eirene} was erected in Athens. For analyses of the peace of 375, see Ryder 1965: 124-6; Jehne 1994: 57-64; Stylianou 1998: 320-8.


\textsuperscript{74} X. \textit{HG} 6.5.2-5: Ἐμμενῶ τὰς σπόνδας ἐς βασιλείας κατεπέμψε καὶ τοῖς ψήφοιμοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τῶν συμμάχων...αὐτονόμους εἶναι ἡμῶν καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας πόλεις. Stylianou (1998: 408-9, with bibliography) argues that Athens was the sole \textit{prostatae} of the peace. Sordi (1951), Ryder (1965: 132-3), and Rhodes (2010: 232) more plausibly suggest that “autonomy was to be defined for the peace as it was in the Confederacy” (contra Lewis 1997: 31).

\textsuperscript{75} It is worth noting that Elis is recorded as having contributed three talents to the reconstruction. By supporting the re-foundation of Mantinea Elis was vicariously supporting her right to control her own periokia cities, a claim earlier challenged by Sparta.
sought to dissolve Spartan power in Lakonia by liberating the Messenians, re-founding Messene, and inserting a clause on Messenian autonomia into the koine eirene of 367.\textsuperscript{76} Regardless of the change of hegemon from Sparta to Thebes, the principle of autonomia remained central to Greek inter-state diplomacy and the institution of the koine eirene. Specific applications of autonomia may have changed – used to destroy Mantineia by Sparta; used to rebuild it by Thebes – but it was still used in essentially the same way: to undermine the centralised power of an opponent by removing from its control dependent and allied states. The legal application of autonomia within the koinai eirenai to all Greek states had formalised it as the central tenet of Greek diplomacy and the defining quality of civic independence. However, because it was never sufficiently defined the meaning and significance of autonomia could be seen to be much greater than Sparta’s, and later Thebes’, imperialistic applications of it.

Despite the fact that autonomia was ubiquitous within Greek diplomacy and treaties of the early 4\textsuperscript{th} century, the term was nowhere adequately defined. No single understanding of it existed. So, Xenophon records that Autokles said to the Spartans in 371 that “you always say, ‘the cities must be autonomous,’ but you are yourself the greatest obstacle in the way of their autonomia”.\textsuperscript{77} Peter Rhodes in particular has pointed to the example of the Boiotian cities, whose presence within the Boiotian League was seen to be compatible with autonomia by Thebes but not by Sparta, as an example of the fact that multiple understandings of autonomia could exist at the same time.\textsuperscript{78} Bosworth and Sealey have similarly pointed out that autonomia was often defined in respect of conditions that it was not, such as taxation, garrisons, and lack of self-government.\textsuperscript{79} Its appearance without definition in treaties like the King’s Peace meant that it could, and was, used by Sparta to justify any action she saw fit.\textsuperscript{80} Consequently, since Sparta used autonomia to install garrisons and harmosts, interfere with a city’s internal politics, exert military and political control, and destroy independent cities, autonomia itself came to define the opposite of these conditions.\textsuperscript{81}


\textsuperscript{77} X. \textit{HG} 6.3.7: ὑμεῖς δὲ ἔχεις μὲν φατεὶ αὐτονομίας τὰς πόλεις χεὶς εἶναι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐστε μάλιστα ἐμποδόν τῇ αὐτονομίᾳ. On Autokles’ speech, see most recently Bearzot 2004: 85-92.

\textsuperscript{78} Rhodes 1999; Keen 1995a. Hansen (1995b; 1996) argues that the Boiotian cities were not autonomous under Theban hegemony.


\textsuperscript{80} Sealey 1993: 243-4. Ryder (1965: 40) argues that Sparta ensured that autonomia was not defined.

\textsuperscript{81} Garrisons and Harmosts: X. \textit{HG} 3.1.4, 6-7, 16-20, 2.20; 4.8.1-3, 5; cf. D.S. 14.38.2-3, 84.3. Phleian Exiles: X. \textit{HG} 5.2.8-10, 3.10-17, 21-5. For other examples of Sparta interfering in the internal government of states, see de Ste Croix 1954: 20 n.5.
Pharnabazos defined *autonomia* as the demobilisation of Sparta’s armies and the removal of Spartan harmosts and garrisons (X. *HG* 3.2.20), as did Konon and Pharnabazos later.\(^\text{82}\) The Second Athenian Confederacy made numerous guarantees “so that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous”.\(^\text{83}\) This led to the creation of a second use of *autonomia* that was contrasted with Sparta’s abuses of it and her impositions on both the internal and external independence of many Greek states.

This anti-Spartan understanding of *autonomia* was enshrined within the Second Athenian Confederacy through the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia*. Sparta’s abuses of *autonomia*, when coupled with the increased importance of the term in the early 4\(^\text{th}\) century, led to a growth in the meaning and understanding of the concept. However, the Athenian-led understanding of *autonomia* as full internal and external freedom appears to have been inherent within the 5\(^\text{th}\) century meaning of *autonomia* (above §1.2). Therefore, the Athenian-led interpretation of *autonomia* as complete internal and external independence could simply be seen to be an expansion into 4\(^\text{th}\) century international politics of a meaning already present within the 5\(^\text{th}\) century. Whatever the case, two understandings of *autonomia* existed in the early 4\(^\text{th}\) century, one that denoted partial submission and one that denoted complete freedom. The use of *eleutheria kai autonomia* to describe the latter is of particular importance because it reveals the use of both terms together to denote a single, unified meaning as well as implying their synonymity and inter-changeability, a topic to which I now turn.

**SECTION 3: THE SYNONYMITY OF ELEUTHERIA AND AUTONOMIA**

The relationship between *eleutheria* and *autonomia* has been a point of some debate. While it is clear that both terms maintained broadly distinct meanings in the 5\(^\text{th}\) century, though could at times be seen to describe the same situation, their precise inter-relationship in the 4\(^\text{th}\) has been questioned. Two main schools of thought exist: first, that both terms maintained separate meanings as external and internal freedom from the 5\(^\text{th}\) to at least the 3\(^\text{rd}\) centuries;\(^\text{84}\) second, that both became intertwined, perhaps synonymous, as a result of a decrease in the meaning and significance of *eleutheria*.\(^\text{85}\) However, since *autonomia* could

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\(^{82}\) X. *HG* 4.8.1. Diodoros’ account (14.84.4) speaks of *eleutheria*, but it distinguishes between those cities asserting their *eleutheria* independently and those joining Konon.

\(^{83}\) *GHI* 22.9-23 (App.1 num.3). Ryder (1965: 55-6) argues that the main motivation was to show the islanders that Athens would not revert to 5\(^\text{th}\) century type.


denote full internal and external freedom by the early 4th century we should perhaps see the potential synonymity of both arising not from a decline in the meaning of eleutheria, as argued by Richard Billows (quoted at the opening of this chapter), but from a sustained increase in the meaning of autonomia. An important and influential article by Mogens Hansen on the use and understanding of autonomia from the 5th to the 3rd centuries does not take into consideration the relationship of autonomia with eleutheria. He explores neither the inter-connectivity of both terms nor the significance this has on the meaning of each term either individually or in unison. Further, he ignores the fact that eleutheria and autonomia could have more than one meaning (denoting Primary and Secondary conceptions of freedom). He lists numerous examples of royal grants of autonomia but does not cite cases where autonomia defines a city’s complete independence from foreign, or royal, control. Thus he explores only one aspect of one concept.

In what follows I argue that in the 4th and 3rd centuries eleutheria and autonomia were synonymous. I begin with Bosworth’s view that eleutheria was connected with autonomia so as to strengthen the former in the light of Spartan abuses of it, but I expand on this by proposing a precise context for the connection and detailing its development throughout the 4th century. I suggest that the synonymity of both terms arose as a result of the expansion of autonomia to international importance and that this synonymity first became apparent through a series of alliances made by Athens after the King’s Peace and as part of the build-up to the Second Athenian Confederacy. To describe clearly the inter-connectivity of both terms Athens created a new political catchphrase – eleutheria kai autonomia – the first epigraphic and literary examples of which appear in Athenian sources from 384 and 380 respectively. The phrase eleutheria kai autonomia defined the interpretation of autonomia as the full internal and external independence that was understood to be guaranteed by the King’s Peace but consistently undermined by the Spartan application of autonomia. Eleutheria kai autonomia was the phrase adopted by the League of Corinth of 337 and was later perpetuated by Antigonus Monophthalmos in the years 315-301. While it ceased to be regularly used after 301, the individual terms eleutheria and autonomia continued to be interchangeable. Nonetheless, on certain occasions autonomia could be used to denote an internal aspect of eleutheria, namely the empowerment of the demos.

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86 Hansen 1995a: 40-3. Such cases are: I.Priene 11; IK.Ilion 45; IG II2 457.16-17; 682.38-9; Hyp. Epit. 9.23; Lycurg. Leoc. 73; D.S. 18.9.5; 19.66.4, 73.1, 103.3.
The first clear evidence for a direct synonymity between *eleutheria* and *autonomia* arises from the Greek reaction to Spartan imperial policy of the early 4th century, particularly the enshrinement of *autonomia* within the King’s Peace of 387. In the early 4th century Sparta continually used *autonomia* in a way that could both then and earlier be termed *eleutheria*, namely the removal of a city from the control of another power. However, because such *autonomia* meant in practice the city’s subordination to Sparta and the potential for Spartan interference in its internal and external independence, a schism arose between the rhetorical use and practical application of *autonomia*. Nonetheless, because Persia and Athens employed *autonomia* to denote the removal of Spartan impositions, such as garrisons and harmosts, the term was increasingly seen in at least one way to be identical to *eleutheria*. In the King’s Peace *autonomia* denoted independence from Persian control, and indeed the control of any other state, again a position hitherto termed *eleutheria*. This meant that *autonomia* could denote ideally both independence from another’s control and the ability to govern oneself internally, internal and external freedom. Since this condition was to apply within the Peace to both small and large cities *autonomia* denoted in principle if not in actuality the independence of all states — *hegemones* and dependent *poleis* — from the internal and external control of others.  

It was Sparta’s application of it that undermined this ideal.

*Eleutheria* and *autonomia* may have had identical meanings, but it was Athens’ reaction to the peace that led to their explicit synonymity. The treaty of Prytany I 384/3 between Athens and Chios specifies that Chios is to be allied on terms “of freedom and autonomy” (*ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίαις καὶ αὐτονομίαις*). Bosworth correctly highlighted that the use of *eleutheria* added emotive force to *autonomia*, so recently abused by Sparta, but he emphasised neither the significance of this connection nor its implications for the relationship between both terms. Cargill referred to the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* as part of the “standard rhetoric of Greek diplomacy”, but the phrase is hardly standard at all since Athens’ treaty with Chios is the earliest surviving use of the phrase in both epigraphic or literary sources. This important fact has not to my knowledge ever been highlighted but it is highly

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88 Daverio Rocchi (2008) argues that the *autonomia* of all guaranteed within the King’s Peace is replaced with a more limited degree of *autonomia* as the smaller cities voluntarily align themselves with Athens and Sparta.  
89 Above n.64.  
91 Cargill 1981: 131. A passage in Thucydides (3.10.5: ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνοματὶ ξυνεστρατευόμεν) would appear to prefigure this connection, but both Lévy (1983: 261–7) and Raaflaub (2004: 154–5) argue that the terms are not being used as a formula. Hornblower (1991a: 394) translates “autonomous and free” and sees it as a formula. He is, however, guilty of the same error as Cargill in stating that “the words in combination often denote a fully sovereign state”, without providing examples of both terms being used together as a phrase. Xenophon ascribes the phrase “free and autonomous” to Derkylidas in 399 *(HG*
significant, not least for the context in which it arose.\textsuperscript{92} Coming three years after the King’s Peace the treaty responded to Sparta’s cynical, exploitative, and self-centred application of \textit{autonomia}: removing Theban control of Boiotia, nullifying the \textit{sympoliteia} of Argos and Corinth, and destroying Mantinea. In this tense political environment the treaty sought “not to contravene any of the things written on the \textit{stelai} about the Peace” (\textit{GHI} 20.21-3) but instead enforce under Athenian leadership a different interpretation of the \textit{autonomia} offered by the Peace but abused by Sparta. The connection of \textit{eleutheria} with \textit{autonomia} served to enforce to this end the meaning of \textit{autonomia} as internal and external freedom, while the creation of a new political slogan – \textit{eleutheria kai autonomia} – revealed the synonymity of both terms and their use as a single phrase to denote a single meaning.\textsuperscript{93} This was an Athenian political dialogue (\textit{eleutheria kai autonomia}) constructed in response to the Spartan one (\textit{autonomia}).

A full definition of \textit{eleutheria kai autonomia} was offered in the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (Prytany VII 378/7). Allies are twice stated to be free and autonomous (\textit{GHI} 22.9-10, 19-20) and in contrast with the King’s Peace this status is given a detailed definition: they are “to live at peace occupying their own territory in security…being free and autonomous, being governed under whatever form of government he wishes, neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute”.\textsuperscript{94} At this time Thebes was negotiating its entry to the Confederacy on these terms,\textsuperscript{95} while later in the same year Chalkis joined and was to be “free and autonomous and self-governing, neither being subject to a garrison from the Athenians nor bearing a \textit{phoros} nor receiving a foreign governor contrary to the resolutions of the allies”.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{92} Lévy (1983: 249) and Lanzillotta (2000: 153-4) note in passing that the use of both terms as a formula begins in 384. Von Scala (1898: 114-5), Wilcken (1929: 292-3 with n.2), and Accame (1941: 4-5) argue that Xenophon’s account of the terms of the King’s Peace (\textit{HG} 5.1.31) is paraphrased and should be emended to read “\textit{τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἕλευθεροις καὶ ἀυτονόμους ἀφεῖναι}” based on the appearance of both terms in Athens’ alliance with Chios (\textit{GHI} 20). Nolte (1923: 10-11) argued against this. Xenophon, Isokrates, and Ephoros (source for Diodoros’ account) are all contemporary and refer only to \textit{autonomia}; Athenian epigraphy refers to \textit{eleutheria kai autonomia}. This difference is significant and should be studied for what it is. It is methodologically unsound to assume that the epigraphy is correct and emend the literature accordingly.

\textsuperscript{93} Karavites (1984: 189) termed the phrase a “formulaic expression…which hardly distinguished between the meaning of the two words”.

\textsuperscript{94} Above n.68.

\textsuperscript{95} Above n.65.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{IG II} 44.21-6 (\textit{App.1 num.4}).
Marcello Bertoli has argued that *eleutheria* and *autonomia* are clearly defined within the Confederacy charter and so tried to separate from its list of guarantees the positive elements that define *autonomia* (own government, occupying territory) and the negative elements that define *eleutheria* (absence of garrison, governor, and tribute).\(^{97}\) However, any distinction between *eleutheria* and *autonomia* here would be artificially enforced because “the juxtaposition of free and autonomous has the cumulative effect of creating a superlatively positive notion” not explicating the positive and negative connotations of the following criteria.\(^{98}\) In fact, it was *autonomia* that had been used in the early 4\(^{th}\) century to describe the removal of Spartan garrisons or governors,\(^{99}\) thus giving it the ability to describe both positive and negative aspects of freedom; *eleutheria* was simply added for emotive force. The use of specific defining criteria was, as I emphasised above, an attempt to forestall Sparta’s continued abuse of *autonomia* by offering that which the King’s Peace failed to deliver, a definition reflective of its meaning and to which Sparta and other powers would be morally and legally (in the case of those who joined the Confederacy) bound to adhere.

Significantly, the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* also appears in literary sources for the first time in the late 380s. Delivered in summer 380, Isokrates’ *Panegyrikos* concerned itself with uniting Athens and Sparta against Persia in an attempt to arrogate to Greece the lands and wealth of Asia. It dates between the alliance with Chios (Prytany I 384/3) and the Second Athenian Confederacy (Prytany VII 378/7) and is part of the political and ideological environment in which the Confederacy developed. Isokrates was strongly against the King’s Peace, which acknowledged Persian control over the Ionian Greeks and the position of the Great King as guarantor of Greek *autonomia*. On a number of occasions he refers to *eleutheria* as the ideology both of the Persian Wars and the goal of his hypothetical campaign in Asia Minor (4.52, 83, 95, 124, 185), but he only uses *autonomia* in reference to the King’s Peace (4.115, 117, 175, 176).

On one occasion, however, the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* does appear in reference to the King’s Peace (4.117). Isokrates sets the scene by claiming that the *autonomia* offered in the King’s Peace (4.115: τὴν αὐτονομίαν...ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἀναγιγαμμένην) has not come to pass but that instead Greece suffers pirates, mercenary garrisons, *stasis*, democratic and oligarchic revolutions, as well as the rule of tyrants and barbarians (115-118). He states that the Greek cities are so far removed from “*eleutheria kai autonomia*” that some

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97 Bertoli 2003: 90-1. This approach also appears to inform Lanzillotta 2000.
98 Quotation borrowed from Raaflaub 2004: 153.
99 X. *HG* 4.8.1; 5.1.34; 6.3.18; D.S. 15.5.1, 38.1-2; cf. further above §2.
of them are ruled by tyrants, some are controlled by harmosts, some have been sacked and razed, and some have become slaves to the barbarians” (4.117), before then detailing in contrast the successes of the Persian Wars and thereafter, particularly the battle of Eurymedon and the Peace of Kallias (4.118). The change in Isokrates’ terminology from *autonomia* to *eleutheria kai autonomia* may be entirely arbitrary, but since it is rooted in the context of the Greek reaction to the King’s Peace and Sparta’s application of *autonomia* it may perhaps reflect the different terminologies of the King’s Peace (*autonomia*) and the Second Athenian Confederacy (*eleutheria kai autonomia*). This might appear to be a stretch, but we should bear in mind that this is the earliest recorded literary occurrence of the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* (summer 380) and that it appears in exactly the same historical and chronological context as the earliest epigraphic parallel (Prytany I 384/3): the Athenian-led Greek reaction to the terms of the King’s Peace and the Spartan use and abuse of *autonomia*. Isokrates’ example not only reveals, as before, the synonymity of both terms and their use together to express a single idea, it also shows that the phrase was used within both political rhetoric and inter-state diplomacy. Having their origin within the reception of the King’s Peace, both the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* and the synonymity of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* continue through the 4th century and into the 3rd.

First, the use of the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia*. After its first epigraphic and literary appearance in the late 380s the phrase frequently re-appears during the 4th century, often in contexts that reveal its importance within Athenian diplomatic tradition. Isokrates refers to it again in the *Plataikos* of c.375-371 (14.24-5) and in his letter to the rulers of Mytilene of c.350 (*Ep.8.7*) while it appears in both the alliance with Chalkis of 378/7 and the treaty with the Thracian kings of 357. It does not re-appear again epigraphically until Stratokles’ honorary decree for Lykourgos of 307/6, though Demosthenes mentions it seven times between 351 and 330: first, as the position of native tribes outside Philip of Macedon’s control (1.23; 4.4); second, as the status the Greeks would hold if the Peace of Philoktetes were emended to a *koine eirene* (7.30, 32); and third, as the terms of the League of Corinth

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100 Wilcken (1929: 292-3 n.2) argued that Isokrates’ use of terminology in regards the Kings’ Peace was wrong at 4.115 but right at 4.117. However, this is to ignore the nuance of usage and judge the text based on the prerequisites of one’s argument.

101 The failings Isokrates highlights are also similar to the later conditions of the Confederacy: tyrants and harmosts (*GHI* 22.21-3), cities sacked and razed (*GHI* 22.10-12), slaves to the barbarians (*GHI* 22.15-18).

102 *Chalkis: IG II² 44.21-6* (*App.1 num.4*). *Thrace: GHI 47* (*App.1 num.7*). It may also appear in the fragmentary alliance between Arkadia and Pisa of 365/4 (*SEG* XXIX 405; *App.1 num.5*).

103 *IG II² 457.16-17* (*App.1 num.13*). Subsequent examples are a decree of the tribe Akamantis of 304/3 (*Agora XVI* 114.7-9; *App.1 num.22*), the Chremonides Decree of 268/7 (*IG II² 686/7.72-4; *App.1 num.43*), and the honorary decree for Phaidros of Sphettos of 259/8 (*IG II² 682.38-40; *App.1 num. 48*).
The second use reflects Athens’ emphasis on *eleutheria kai autonomia* in contrast with the *autonomia* alone offered in the Persian-backed 4th century *koinai eirenai*; the third reflects Philip’s adoption of this Athenian diplomatic and ideological tradition in the League of Corinth, an organisation that modelled itself structurally on the Confederacy and undermined the model of the 4th century Persian-backed *koine eirene* by presenting a new, pro-Macedonian model for Greek peace. Therefore, not only can we perhaps see the use of *eleutheria kai autonomia* as a separate Athenian diplomatic tradition from the *autonomia* guaranteed by the Persian-backed *koinai eirenai*, but we can also trace the continuation of that diplomatic tradition under the League of Corinth and the Macedonian *koine eirene* of 337. The Confederacy and its guarantee of *eleutheria kai autonomia* began as an alternative solution to the problem of Greek *autonomia* posed by the King’s Peace; the League adopted this Athenian alternative and built from it a new, Macedonian model for a Greek *koine eirene*.

The phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* remained significant beyond the League of Corinth. In a universally overlooked but intriguing article P.J. Stylianou argues that the Macedonian *koine eirene* of 337 (the *pax Macedonica*) did not end, as is commonly assumed, with Greek defeat in the Hellenic War of 323/2 but that while the *synedrion* of the League was dissolved the *koine eirene* continued under Antipatros, Perdikkas, and Polyperchon before being supported by Antigonos from 315 until his death in 301. Stylianou’s argument rests primarily on the contentious assumption that the cities of Asia Minor were League members under Alexander, but a secondary consideration is Antigonos’ use of the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia* in the declaration at Tyre in 315 and in his dealings with the Greek cities until his death in 301. This, Stylianou argues, deliberately echoes the terminology of the League of Corinth and the *koine eirene* of 337 and seeks to build from it a new *koine eirene* under Antigonos’ leadership. Stylianou’s argument is interesting, particularly since Susanne Carlsson has recently shown that Antigonos is the only ruler from the late 4th to the late 3rd century to use the phrase *eleutheria kai autonomia*, barring Ptolemy’s brief imitation of it at Iasos in 309. Since the phrase does not appear in royal declarations after Antigonos’...

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104 As *hegemon* of the League Alexander made the Prienians free and autonomous in 334 (*GHI* 86b; *App.2* num.3).
106 Stylianou 1994, esp.48-70 for the Hellenistic evidence.
107 *I.Milet* 123.2-4 (*App.2* num.7); *OGIS* 5-6 (*App.2* nums.10-11) with D.S. 19.61.3 (the only occurrence of the phrase in Diodoros books XVIII-XX); *RC* 3-4.87-9 (*App.2* num.16); *IK.Iliion* 1.24-5 (*App.2* num.17). A Lemnian inscription referring to *eleutheria kai autonomia* and dating c.315-301 may reflect Antigonos’ liberation of the island in 314 (*SEG* L 826.12-13 [*App.1* num.10]; D.S. 19.68.4). For Ptolemy, see *IK.Iasos* 2-3 (*App.2* nums.12-13).
death,\footnote{An interesting point raised by Carlsson (2005: 164). The phrase may appear once more in a civic context in 297, but the stone is unfortunately broken at this point (I.Priene 11: \textit{App.2 num.21}).} and since his son Demetrios founded under his initiative a successor to the League of Corinth in 302 (the Hellenic League), we should perhaps see Antigonos following the diplomatic tradition of Philip and Alexander in legitimising his rule by presenting himself as the sole defender of Greek \textit{eleutheria kai autonomia}, a concept and phrase that I have shown originated in the Second Athenian Confederacy and continued under the League of Corinth.

Second, the inter-connectivity or synonymity of \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{autonomia}. The phrase \textit{eleutheria kai autonomia} may denote a single idea with a collective meaning, but when used individually the terms appear to have been interchangeable. An epigram quoted by Pausanias from a 4\textsuperscript{th} century statue of Epaminondas exploits this synonymity by claiming that he left “all of Greece autonomous in freedom”.\footnote{Paus. 9.15.6 (\textit{App.1 num.6}). Habicht (1985: 98, n.10) suggests that Pausanias used Plutarch’s lost \textit{Life of Epaminondas}. The epigram is num.46 in Zizza’s (2006) list.} Isokrates, whose work spans the 4\textsuperscript{th} century, continually exploits this synonymity. In his \textit{Panegyrikos} (4.175) of 380 he claims “that the states which have gained their \textit{eleutheria} through the Treaty feel grateful toward the King, because they believe that it was through him that they gained their \textit{autonomia}”; in the \textit{Plataikos} (4.43) of c.373-371 he states that Athens is fighting for the \textit{eleutheria} of the Greek cities from slavery before also stating that she is fighting for their \textit{autonomia}; in \textit{On the Peace} (8.58) of c.355 he asserts that after Leuktra Thebes could have “liberated the Peloponnese and made the other Greeks autonomous”; in the \textit{Evagoras} of c.370-365 he recounts that after Knidos the Greeks gained their \textit{eleutheria} (9.56), but later says that it was \textit{autonomia}, which he contrasts with \textit{douleia} (9.68); finally, in the \textit{Panathenaikos} (12.257) of 339 he describes as \textit{autonomia} Sparta’s ancestral position of never having followed another’s lead and always having been completely independent of foreign control, a status that would be better understood as \textit{eleutheria}.\footnote{In his Loeb edition Norlin translates \textit{autonomia} here as “free and independent”, thus catching its heightened meaning in this example.} Later examples also exist with Lykourgos describing in his \textit{Against Leokrates} how the Peace of Kallias delineated boundaries for Greek \textit{eleutheria} and that within these the Greek cities were autonomous.\footnote{Lycurg. \textit{Leoc.} 73. Lykourgos’ use of \textit{autonomia} to describe the Peace of Kallias is anachronistic (Ziesmann 2005: 87-92).} Both terms appear to have been interchangeable and synonymous.

That \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{autonomia} frequently appear as inter-changeable and synonymous in the 4\textsuperscript{th} century implies that they would have remained so in the 3\textsuperscript{rd}. Susanne Carlsson has recently doubted this and stressed instead their distinction into the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century. Her
arguments, however, are based solely on epigraphic evidence from four poleis (Iasos, Kalymna, Kos, and Miletos) and can be contested. First, she argues that from the late 4th to the 1st century autonomia could refer to both internal and external affairs. This is true, but she fails to explore this conclusion because she follows the work of Hansen who argues that eleutheria and autonomia remained distinct throughout the 4th and 3rd centuries and carried external and internal focuses respectively. Second, Carlsson argues that because the last extant royal guarantee of autonomia dates from shortly after 261 (IK.Ery. 31) and that guarantees of eleutheria increase from the 250s onwards, kings only referred to autonomia from 337-261 at which point royal dialogue changed and became expressed through eleutheria alone. This conclusion may be based as much on absence of evidence as on evidence of absence. Her evidence is solely epigraphic and comes only from Asia Minor. This may be necessary considering the focus of her work and the absence of literary sources but it raises questions concerning the ancient selection and publication of documents. For instance, although she claims that royal guarantees of autonomia ceased c.260-250, civic decrees referencing royal grants of autonomia continue into at least the 1st century. Moreover, five of her six attestations of eleutheria from c.261-200 come from one place, Mylasa, and constitute a dossier detailing Seleukos II’s initial grant of eleutheria c.240 and Philip V’s reconfirmation of it c.220. So, while the evidence could be made to reveal a decreased importance of autonomia within the 3rd century it is not as pronounced as Carlsson makes out and her conclusion that royal discourse switched from autonomia to eleutheria in the 260s, thus signifying a different meaning for each term, is not certain.

In fact, epigraphic and literary sources suggest that eleutheria and autonomia were synonymous in the late 4th and 3rd centuries and that the decision to refer to one or the other may have reflected local traditions. IK.Iasos 2-3 and IK.Ilion 45 record alliances between Ptolemy Soter and Iasos on one hand and Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia on the other. IK.Iasos 2-3 refer to eleutheria, autonomia, aphorologesia (absence of taxation), and aphrouresia (absence of garrisons) while IK.Ilion 45 mentions autonomia, aphorologesia,

113 The use of eleutheria post-260s appears in FD III (4) 153; I.Labraunda 3a, 8b, 5, 7; and most recently Isager & Carlsson 2008 (App.2 nums.38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 42). Carlsson’s argument that royal grants of eleutheria without autonomia began in the late 260s is also wrong, see Mauerbauschriften 64 (c.311-306); IG XII (5) Suppl.168 (c.306-301); IG XII (7) 506 (late 280s); cf. I.Didyma 358 (259/8) – App.2 nums.9, 15, 28, 36. Indirect, civic attestations of eleutheria without autonomia perhaps appear in IG XI (4) 566 (c.300-250); IK.Ery. 504 (c.268-262) – App.2 nums.14, 33.
114 Ma 1999: num.10 (201); IK.Iasos 4=Ma 1999: num. 28 (c.196); IK.Lampsakos 4 (196/5); IK.Knidos 51-5, 58 (45); cf. IG XII (2) 35 col.e=Sherk 1969: 26 (c.47-45).
and aphrouresia. The absence of eleutheria in Lysimacheia’s case marks not a different civic status, but rather that autonomia alone encompassed the meaning expressed at Iasos as eleutheria kai autonomia. This is also suggested by IK.Ery. 31 (shortly post-261) which records that Antiochos II confirmed to Erythrai, upon the city’s request, Alexander’s and Antigonos’ earlier grants of autonomia and aphorologesia. Since there is no solid evidence that either Alexander or Antigonos granted the status of autonomia alone – both used either eleutheria or eleutheria kai autonomia – we must assume that the use of autonomia here was equivalent to the eleutheria or eleutheria kai autonomia that the earlier kings probably guaranteed. Further, Antiochos II’s grant of autonomia and aphorologesia to Erythrai can be contrasted with Seleukos II’s guarantee of eleutheria and aphorologesia to Smyrna shortly thereafter. Since it is again doubtful that two distinct statuses with the same qualifications are meant, we should conclude that both terms carried the same meaning.

The lack of a contemporary literary source for the late 4th and early 3rd centuries is a problem for analysing the inter-connectivity of eleutheria and autonomia at this time because it would provide a balance to the epigraphic evidence. Diodoros’ account of the years 323-301 goes back to the lost eye-witness historian and Antigonid official Hieronymos of Kardia and exploits the synonymy of both terms, particularly as a means of avoiding stylistic repetition. However, it is doubtful whether or not we can attribute Diodoros’ specific use of one term or the other directly to Hieronymos and it is perhaps best not to analyse Diodoros’ text as an example of the synonymy of both terms in the late 4th century.

However, despite the large amount of evidence revealing the synonymy of eleutheria and autonomia in the 4th and 3rd centuries, there are examples which suggest that autonomia maintained a distinct emotive force, in particular a close connection with the internal, polis-centred dynamics of a grant of eleutheria. This use appears very infrequently in the 4th century, but some examples do suggest it. Isokrates contrasts autonomia with anomia in the Archidamnos (6.64-5) of c.366 and explicitly juxtaposes autonomia with self-government (διοικήσαι τὰ σφέτερ’ αὐτῶν) in the Panathenaikos of 339 (12.97). Hyperides perhaps connects autonomia with self-government, but the passage is fragmented and the context

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115 App.2 nums.12-13 and 26.
116 App.2 num.35.
117 Only Diodoros and Plutarch refer to Alexander using autonomia by itself: Diodoros (17.4.3 [Ambrakia], 24.1 [Karian cities, refuted by Nawotka 2003: 25-6]; Ziesmann [2005: 59-60] acknowledges that both accounts are “in keiner weiteren Quelle tradiert”); Plutarch (Plu. Alex. 34.2 [post-Gaugamela]; cf. Ziesmann 2005: 60-1).
118 FD III (4) 153 (App.2 num.38).
119 See D.S. 18.9.5-10.1, 62.1; 19.73.1-2, 105.1; 20.19.3 (with OGIS 5-6), 45.5, 46.1-3, 102.1. Compare also D.S. 20.110.2 with 20.110.6.
120 For the demos as recipient of eleutheria, see Ch.5 §3.2.
In the case of Miletos epigraphic evidence reveals that the city connected *autonomia* with the restoration of *demokratia*. For the 3rd century, Seleukos II granted Smyrna *eleutheria* and *aphorologesia* but Smyrna instead refers to its *autonomia*, *patrios politeia*, and *demokratia*, again, as was the case at Miletos, preferring perhaps to emphasise the internal focus of *autonomia*.

Although the evidence points overwhelmingly to the synonymity of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* in the late 4th and 3rd centuries, the above examples suggest that at times *autonomia* could carry a distinctly internal dynamic. However, since reference is also made to *eleutheria* in each of the aforementioned examples, we should conclude that *autonomia* could on occasion be used in the 4th and 3rd centuries to express a particularly internal aspect of *eleutheria*, namely the significance of *eleutheria* as a quality of the *demos*, its empowerment according to its own laws and democratic procedure (see further, Ch.5 §3.2).

Evidence from Priene adds another dimension and suggests that the choice to refer to *eleutheria* or *autonomia* may have been influenced by local traditions. Granted *eleutheria kai autonomia* by Alexander (I.Priene 1), Priene consistently referred to itself as autonomous (I.Priene 2–4, 6–7). This reflects not only the synonymity of *eleutheria* with *autonomia* but also that the choice of one term over the other was sometimes a matter of local significance, not royal benefaction.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I argued three main points. First, that although *eleutheria* and *autonomia* perhaps expressed different perspectives on the same situation in the 5th century, *autonomia* was able to carry in certain contexts a meaning very close to, if not synonymous with, *eleutheria*. This potential synonymity prefigures the eventual synonymity that would arise in the 4th century. Raaflaub insisted that although *autonomia* and *eleutheria* could describe the same situation they maintained different internal and external focuses. However, since the degree of internal independence *autonomia* denoted was not fixed and so could vary from a

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121 Hyp. Epit. 9.23. Blass (1894) offers some potential restorations. Ziesmann (2005: 96 n.207) provides an overview of scholarship on this passage. On the problems of restoring and interpreting it, see Petruziello 2009: 181-3. Herrman (2009a: 93) takes *autonomia* to be “a subordinate concept” to *eleutheria* “describing the city’s ability to maintain its own internal government”.

122 I.Milet 123.2-4 (App.2 num.7).


124 Terms like *nomoi* and *politeia* were not always connected with *autonomia* but could appear by themselves (SV 545; IK.Ery. 504; IG II² 448; Plb. 15.24.2–3; cf. IG II² 1129) or in connection with *eleutheria* (IG XII (5) Suppl.168; (7) 506; (9) 192; Arr. Succ. F5; Plb. 4.25.7, 84.5; 18.46.5, 15).

125 Priene only referred to itself as free and autonomous once, when celebrating the removal of the tyrant Hieron in 297 (above n.108).
limited amount under subordination to another power to total freedom from foreign control, I proposed that Raaflaub’s distinction in focus between _eleutheria_ and _autonomia_ was at times overly subtle. On certain occasions _autonomia_ could be understood as having a meaning equal to that of _eleutheria_.

Second, that in the early 4th century _autonomia_ carried a meaning equivalent to that of _eleutheria_ and that this meaning was enshrined as a _polis_ ideal within the King’s Peace and later _koinai eirenai_. I contended that two levels of _autonomia_ existed. One was espoused by Sparta and defined _autonomia_ as the status of her dependent allies. The other existed in opposition to this and defined _autonomia_ as full internal and external freedom. Both understandings existed at the same time because no definition of _autonomia_ was universally accepted; therefore it could denote mixed statuses. To convey this expanded meaning of _autonomia_ the phrase _eleutheria kai autonomia_ was coined. It arose in the context of the Second Athenian Confederacy and juxtaposed _autonomia_ with _eleutheria_ so as to apply to the former the emotive significance of the latter. As a result, _eleutheria_ and _autonomia_ grew increasingly synonymous in the 4th and 3rd centuries.

Third, I claimed that although both terms were most commonly used synonymously, _autonomia_ could also be used to describe a particularly internal, political aspect of _eleutheria_, the empowerment of the _demos_ to govern according to the laws, constitution, and traditions of the city. This was not a separate meaning, but rather an individual emotive force seeing _eleutheria_ as the empowerment of the organs of the state itself. I was also careful in this chapter to highlight that _eleutheria_ and _autonomia_ did not have single meanings. Rather, both terms could describe contrary positions: freedom as granted by one power and conditional upon its goodwill (Secondary freedom) and freedom as a self-guaranteed right often asserted against another’s control (Primary freedom). This distinction is of particular importance in studying freedom in the Hellenistic period and underpins the rest of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Towards an Ideological Narrative, 337-262

“Greek liberty was crushed at the battle of Chaeronea...In the Hellenistic period, politics were controlled by the great powers; local autonomy was the best that could be attained.”

Raaflaub 2003: 610

Introduction

With this chapter I continue my narrative into the early Hellenistic Period. This necessitates a somewhat different approach. In the previous chapter, I drew the development of *eleutheria* in broad strokes, outlining certain trends of particular importance to its use and understanding in the Classical Period. Now, however, since I turn to the period with which the four subsequent analytical and thematic chapters are exclusively concerned, a chronological narrative, particularly one focused on the use and understanding of *eleutheria*, is necessary so as to orientate the reader and provide a backdrop for the subsequent discursive chapters.

The chapter is divided into ten sections, each based around a particular period or event displaying important developments in the use and understanding of *eleutheria*. Thematically, my narrative is underpinned by three main points, each elucidating one of the three research questions of this thesis. First, and relevant to Part 1 – Narratives, I trace the changes and especially the continuities in the use and understanding of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* from the Classical Period to the Hellenistic. Historical circumstances are open to quick, dramatic change – such as the rise of the Macedonian kingdoms – but the institutions and concepts that underlie these processes are less inclined to such change.¹ Second, and relevant to Part 2 – Analysis, I introduce the role played by *eleutheria* as a point of dialogue between city and king, specifically the royal use of *eleutheria* as a means of attaining Greek goodwill (*eunoia*) and its use by the city as a means of manipulating royal intentions through moral force, questions more fully explored in Chapters 3 and 4. Third, and relevant to Part 3 – Themes, I touch upon at the omnipresence of the past within the use of *eleutheria* (and *demokratia*) to conceptualise the present, influenced in particular by the idea of the *lieu de mémoire*. Again, these questions are given extended treatment in Chapter 5 and 6. These three themes underscore the historical narrative and help tie the various narrative sections together.

Section 1: Philip and Alexander in Greece and Asia, 337-323

Contrary to Kurt Raaflaub’s statement (quoted at the opening of the chapter), the defeat of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea saw the long-term death of neither the polis nor Greek eleutheria. Philip tried to mollify Athens by treating it leniently but his swift punishment of Thebes was designed to shift attention towards a Macedonian-led Panhellenic campaign against Persia with the ostensible aim of avenging the destruction of temples in 480/79 and bringing eleutheria to the Ionian Greeks (D.S. 16.89.2, 91.2). Demosthenes had presented Philip as a barbarian invader bent on destroying Greek freedom, so by shifting attention to Persia, the barbarian par excellence, Philip utilised such anti-barbarian sentiment for his own ends. A League of Greek states, the League of Corinth, was founded in 337/6. Comprising a new Macedonian-backed common peace, the League replaced both the Peace of Antalkidas and the Persian-backed 4th century koinai eirenai; it provided a legal framework for the continuation of Macedonian authority in Greece, under which the Greek cities were to be free and autonomous. The League comprised a council (synedrion) of representatives from member states over which sat a military leader (hegemon) who commanded League troops.

The League appropriated the memory of the Persian Wars to Philip’s forthcoming campaign in Asia Minor. Corinth was the physical centre of the Hellenic League of 481-478 and so exemplified the Persian Wars as a struggle for Greek eleutheria; by using the site for the League’s foundation in 337/6, Philip paralleled the present with the past and evoked memories of the Persian Wars and eleutheria in order to validate and support his forthcoming invasion. The memory of the Persian Wars offered Philip a coherent ideological programme – defence of eleutheria from a foreign, barbarian invader – that could be appropriated to his own campaigns (Ch. 6 §1.1).

Alexander built upon these strategies. He employed League troops during his siege and capture of Thebes in autumn 335 and gave the synedrion the right to pass judgement on the

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7 Hellenic League: Ch.1 §1.1. Bertrand (1992: 122-3) described Corinth as a space where “les Grecs pourraient communier dans le souvenir des guerres médiques et préparer l’expédition contre les Perses”.
8 On what follows see the fuller treatment in Wallace 2011: 148-57.
Theban medisers for their alliances with Persia in 479 and now 335 (D.S. 17.14). The *synedrion* had Thebes destroyed, its citizens enslaved, and its exiles made outlaws (*agogimoi*) from all the cities of the League.\(^9\) This was formulated into an official *dogma* which granted Alexander, as *hegemon*, the authority to charge enemies as medisers and make outlaws (*agogimoi*) of any opponents (*GHI* 83 §4.25-8; 84a.10-13). Plataia, site of the Greek victory in 479, was re-founded as a physical and ideological balance to Thebes, thus displaying further Alexander’s reference to the Persian Wars in the build-up to his Asian campaign (Ch.6 §1.2).

Alexander’s use of *eleutheria* continued and expanded with his invasion of Asia Minor in 334 where he associated it with democracy. The defining moment was his liberation of Ephesos in 334. The democratic faction saw in Alexander an opportunity to assert its freedom and so led an uprising against those who betrayed the city to Persia in 335.\(^10\) Persia had been supporting oligarchies within the Greek cities and when presented with the reaction of the Ephesian democratic faction, Alexander realised the political necessity of supporting *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as a means of gaining support throughout Asia.\(^11\) Adapting his policy to fit the Greek reception of it, Alexander manipulated the factionalism within the Greek cities in order to equate Macedon with *eleutheria* and *demokratia* and Persia with tyranny, oligarchs, and garrisons. Alkimachos was dispatched to the Ionian and Aiolian cities to oversee the introduction there of democracy (Arr. *An.* 1.18.1-2).\(^12\) Alexander’s pro-democracy policy ensured that even after the Persian re-conquest of much of the Aegean and Asia Minor in 333, the cities returned to his side in 332 confident of the return of *eleutheria* and *demokratia*.\(^13\) After his victory at Gaugamela, he again wrote to the Greek cities telling

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\(^9\) For a recent, comprehensive commentary on the destruction of Thebes, see Sisti 2001: 321-37.


\(^13\) Chios, Tenedos, Lesbos, and presumably Kos were taken by force in 333 (D.S. 17.29.2; Arr. *An.* 2.1-2) only to revolt from Persian control in 332 (Arr. *An.* 3.2.3-7; Curt. 4.5.14-18), so too Eresos (above n.12). Labarre (1996: 24-42) treats of Lesbos between 336-332. *GHI* 85a+b concern the return of exiles to a democratic Mytilene and may date from 334-332 (Bikerman 1940: 33; Heisserer 1980: 118-41; Heisserer & Hodot 1986;
them that all their tyrannies were abolished and that they could govern themselves autonomously (Plu. Alex. 34.2).

Alexander’s relationship with the cities of Greece and the Aegean changed as he switched roles and began exercising authority not as *hegemon* of League allies but as king over subject cities. In 334 Alexander as *hegemon* had empowered the League to try the Aegean tyrants (*GHI* 84a.13-15; D.S. 17.14), but in 332 he empowered the cities by royal order to try the tyrants themselves (Arr. An. 3.2; Curt. 4.8.11). This shift in authority from *hegemon* to king is significant because the Aegean cities were part of the League but Alexander was not dealing with them through it. Therefore, although they enjoyed a more personal relationship with Alexander as king rather than *hegemon* this revealed a change in Alexander’s relationship with the League itself from ostensibly legal to overtly personal authority.

The Exiles Decree may further mark Alexander’s change from legal to personal authority, but it seems that he was nonetheless concerned with having the League rubberstamp it.\(^{14}\) There is no evidence for League activity after 331, but similarly there is no evidence that it had ceased to function by 324/3.\(^{15}\) However, when Krateros was dispatched to Macedon with orders to take charge of “the freedom of the Greeks” (Arr. An. 7.12.4), it may have been with a view to the implementation of the Exiles Decree. The reference to *eleutheria* suggests that the League, which had been established to safeguard Greek freedom, may have had some responsibility for the oversight of the Exiles Decree.\(^{16}\) Further, the Decree’s announcement at the Olympic Games of 324 also implies a connection with the League since the Panhellenic Games were meeting spots for the *synedrion*.\(^{17}\) Since Nikanor, who was sent by Alexander to announce the Decree at the Olympic Games, spoke with delegates from the Greek cities (Din. Dem. 82, 103; Hyp. Dem. 4) he may also have communicated the decree to the *synedrion* for

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\(^{15}\) On the Exiles Decree, see Din. Dem. 82; Hyp. Dem. 4; D.S. 18.8.4; 19.109.1; Curt. 10.2.4; Plu. *Moralia* 221a; Just. 13.5.2-3; *GHI* 83 §6; 90b; 101; IG IV\(^2\) 616, 617; *cf. GHI* 85a+b with n.24 below. The modern bibliography is enormous, see most recently W. Will 1983: 113-27; Worthington 1986; 1990; 1993; Bosworth 1988: 220-8; Hammond & Walbank 1988: 80-3; Faraguna 2003: 124-30; Dmitriev 2004.

\(^{16}\) Bosworth (1988: 223, 228), Billows (1990: 194), and Dixon (2007: 154-5) all argue that it was a dead letter by 323. Larsen (1926: 62) argues for its continued use. Heckel (1992: 194 with n.118) connects the Exiles Decree with Krateros’ commission. Wilcken (1967: 214-15; *cf. 1922: 117) and Cawkwell (1978: 175) suggest that the League validated the Decree. Hornblower (1991b: 268) refers to it as “an early instance of the abuse of the term ‘the freedom of the Greeks’ which was to run through Hellenistic history”.

\(^{17}\) Announcement: D.S. 17.109.1; 18.8.2-7; Curt. 10.2.4-7; Just. 13.5.2-5; Bikerman 1940: 26. *Panhellenic Games*: Curt. 4.5.11-12; D.S. 17.48.6; *cf. Brunet 1976: 213 n.2 (Isthmian); Aeschin. 3.254 (Pythian); *cf. Ryder 1965: 162.*
ratification. If so, then the occasion suggests the confluence of Alexander’s personal and the League’s institutional authority and shows his return, albeit temporarily, to a policy (eleutheria) and institution (League) that had served him well between 335-332.\(^{18}\)

Alexander’s unilateral order for all Greek cities to restore their exiles placed royal command above civic law and probably violated the terms of the League of Corinth.\(^{19}\) However, the application of this order was open to debate and ultimately authorised by civic laws.\(^{20}\) Alexander received embassies from the Greek cities, listening to each and seeking individual solutions to the Edict’s general application.\(^{21}\) Tegea negotiated the terms of its reconciliation with Alexander and the return of its exiles was validated by civic law as an implementation of royal edict.\(^{22}\) At Eresos Alexander empowered the demos to judge the restoration of the family of the tyrants according to local laws.\(^{23}\) At Mytilene the return of exiles was decreed by royal edict but enforced according to local law.\(^{24}\) The royal declaration of an order (formulated as a diagramma) to be enacted according to local laws underscores the delicate Hellenistic balance between royal authority and civic freedom: the city acknowledges royal authority only for that authority to validate itself through civic laws.\(^{25}\)

In the case of the return of the Samian exiles, however, there was no discussion with Athens, which held a cleruchy on the island. The announcement of its return to the Samians

\(^{18}\) Bikerman 1940: 33-4. An earlier parallel for the confluence of League and royal authority exists. In 335 the synedrion promised to rebuild the walls of Plataia (Arr. An. 1.9.10). Alexander announced the completion of this project at the Olympic Games of 328 (Plu. Alex. 34.1-2; Arist. 11.9; Fredricksmeyer 2000: 137-8). Since the synedrion would then have been in session, Alexander’s announcement synergised royal and League authority, see Wallace 2011: 149 with n.9.


\(^{21}\) D.S. 17.113.2-4, recording Elis, the Ammonians, Delphi, Corinth, and Epidaurus. Alexander appears to have dispatched Gorgios of Iasos to Epidaurus at this time (IG IV\(^2\) 616, 617 = IK. Iasos TT 50-1; dated pre-324 in Dmitriev 2004: 370-2). Gorgos ensured from Alexander Iasos’ control of the “little sea” (μικρῆς θαλάσσης) in c.334-332 (GHI 90a [IK. Iasos 30], to which Fabiani [2007; BE 2009: num.454] joins IK. Iasos 24). He was also active in ensuring the restoration of the Samians in 324/3 (below n.26). On Gorgos and his brother Minnion, see Heisserer 1980: 194-202; Heckel 2006: s.v. Gorgus [1]; s.v. Minnion.


was made before the Macedonian army. In a recent article Elisabetta Poddighe has shown that Athens argued that Alexander was playing the tyrant and undermining Athens’ eleutheria, while Alexander responded by saying that Athens herself acted the tyrant by negating Samos’ eleutheria. This dialogue marks an important point in the understanding of eleutheria as a political slogan. Although it was malleable and applicable in different, yet equally valid, ways, success came down to one’s ability to enforce one’s own interpretation through military and propagandistic power. Alexander could remove Samos from Athenian control just as Polypechon could later return it to Athens in 319 (D.S. 18.56.7), both in the name of eleutheria, because each had the power and authority to do so.

Section 2: The Hellenic (Lamian) War, 323/2

News of Alexander’s death was quickly followed in Greece by Athens’ declaration of war against Antipatros, governor of Macedon during Alexander’s Asian campaign, in late summer 323. Alliances were made with Aitolia, among others, and after initial victories at Plataia and Thermopylai, Leosthenes the Athenian general besieged Antipatros in Lamia. A series of defeats by sea, however, coupled with Macedonian reinforcements under Leonnatos and Krateros contributed to Greek defeat at Krannon in September 322. Athens surrendered, Piraeus was garrisoned, and a citizenship qualification of 2,000 drachmai was instituted. Antipatros installed similar ‘oligarchies’ and garrisons throughout Greece.

The presentation of the Hellenic War in both the epigraphic and literary sources is that of a war fought on behalf of Greek eleutheria. Diodoros paraphrases the Athenian decree declaring war: this parallels the Athenian-led struggle with the Persian Wars and assimilates Macedon to Persia as a foreign invader seeking to destroy Greek eleutheria (D.S. 18.10.2-3; Ch.6 §2.1). Hyperides’ contemporary Epitaphios, delivered over the Athenian war dead in spring 322, also presents the Hellenic War as a defence of Greek eleutheria from Macedon and parallels it with the earlier defence of eleutheria in the Persian Wars. Leosthenes is

27 Plu. Alex. 28.1-2; Just. 13.5.5-7; Poddighe 2007; cf. Landucci Gattinoni 2008: 64.
28 On the name ‘Hellenic’ rather than ‘Lamian’ War, see Ch.6 §2.3.
juxtaposed with the Athenian leaders of the Persian Wars, while the dead of 323/2 are praised above and beyond those of 480/79 (Ch.6 §2.2). The name ‘Hellenic War’, as attested in an honorary decree of December 318 (IG II² 448.44-5), explicitly ascribes to it ideals of Hellenic unity (under Athenian leadership) implicit within Diodoros and Hyperides. It is usual for wars to be named after the opponent and so to emphasise division first, as with the naming of the Persian Wars ta Medika. However, the name ‘Hellenic War’ marks a distinction from the ‘Persian War’ since it emphasises unity rather than the opponent’s otherness. Nonetheless, the testimonies of Hyperides and Diodoros show that in general Athens revisited its hegemony of 480/79 as a paradigm for its leadership in 323/2 and sought to define the Hellenic War via the ideology of the Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria.

The use of space was particularly important in defining memory and commemoration, as we saw with Philip’s and Alexander’s use of Corinth and Plataia. Copies of the first honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon (IG II² 448.1-35), who brought the announcement of Sikyon’s alliance with Athens, were erected on the akropolis and by the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the agora. The Stoa was a space with important ideological connections: it was dedicated to Zeus Eleutherios, commemorated Athens’ victory in the Persian Wars, and was the location for numerous monuments celebrating Athens’ eleutheria. This location marked an important ideological statement since it assimilated to the Hellenic War through space and monument the ideas of eleutheria and the Persian Wars (Ch.6 §2.3). Interestingly, however, memory could also be altered. In his Epitaphios, Hyperides overlooks Athens’ victory at Plataia and claims instead that it took place at Thebes (D.S 18.11.3-5; Hyp. Epit. 5.14-20, 7.2-17). Hyperides could not invoke Plataia as a site connected with the Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria because it now fought alongside Macedon, the new barbarian enemy, and against Athens in the struggle for Greek eleutheria (Ch.6 §2.2).


After Athens’ defeat in the Hellenic War an oligarchy was installed in the city and a garrison in the fort of Mounychia in Piraeus. The garrison was immensely unpopular within even the pro-Antipatros faction (D.S. 18.48.1-4; Plu. Phoc. 30.4-6). The government was based on a property restriction of 2,000 drachmai, but democratic institutions remained active

30 Ch.6 §2.1-3.
31 Hammond 1957.
32 IG II² 448.27-9 with the emendations of Oliver 2003b; cf. Wallace forthcoming A: section 1. For the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, see Oliver 2003b.
and the *demos* even commemorated some of its allies during the Hellenic War. Some oligarchic elements are detectable in the reduced *boule* and prominence of the *anagrapheus* over the *archon*, but the government is best seen as a timocratic democracy with a close, but not oppressive, connection to Macedon. However, it is termed an oligarchy in our sources and was remembered as such by the democrats (Ch.5 §2.1).

Upon Antipatros’ death in autumn 319 power passed to Polyperchon. Overlooked and angered, Antipatros’ son Kassandros established contacts with Antigonus and Ptolemy, as well as ensuring the loyalty of his father’s partisans in the oligarchies and garrisons throughout Greece, most importantly at Mounychia where he replaced the governor Menyllos with his nephew Nikanor. To counter Kassandros’ position in Greece Polyperchon decided to motivate the Greek cities against him. To this end, he issued an Edict in Philip Arrhidaios’ name restoring the Greek cities to their position under Philip and Alexander, i.e. free and autonomous as under the League of Corinth, and condemned the actions of their generals, i.e. Antipatros (D.S. 18.56). This invalidated Antipatros’ governorship of Macedon and Greece from 334-319 (the basis of Kassandros’ power), pardoned the Greeks for the Hellenic War, annulled Antipatros’ oligarchies and garrisons, and restored the general peace of 337. Those exiled and disenfranchised by Antipatros in 322, and earlier, were to return to the cities by the 30th of Xanthikos (late March 318) and the Greeks were to side with Polyperchon. Although there was no direct statement of freedom, autonomy, democracy, or the removal of garrisons, the Edict was well received in Greece.

Reaction to the Edict was mixed, with different factions viewing it differently. One group within the Athenian ‘oligarchy’ strongly favoured the removal of the garrison in Mounychia and so saw the Edict as a means to this end and a statement on Greek, specifically Athenian, *eleutheria*. Another group, under Phokion, preferred to side with Kassandros, maintain the garrison in Piraeus, and not restore the disenfranchised democrats. A third group existed with

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34 Oliver 2003a; Tracy 2003: 11; Grieb 2008: 54-5; Wallace forthcoming A: section 2.
37 A detailed expansion of what follows appears in Wallace forthcoming A: section 2. For overviews of the events of 319-317, see É. Will 1979: 45-52; 1984: 40-5; Hammond & Walbank 1988: 130-44; Errington 2008: 21-8. Also of importance are Bengtson 1964: 81-8 (Polyperchon and the Macedonian regency); Poddighe 1998; 2001 (Polyperchon’s policy in Greece); Paschidis 2008b (unattested campaign by Polyperchon in Asia Minor); Grieb 2008: 56-60 (political divisions within Athens); Dixon 2008: 156-70 (Polyperchon re-founding the League of Corinth).
the democrats (in Athens and elsewhere) who had been disenfranchised and/or exiled in 322 and saw in the Edict a guarantee of their re-enfranchisement under a restored democracy. By its various receptions within and outwith Athens the Edict became seen to guarantee both demokratia and eleutheria from garrisons. Although not present within the Edict itself, Polyperchon would later emphasise just these qualities.

The key moment came in Spring 318. After the return and restoration of the Athenian democratic exiles two Athenian delegations were dispatched to Polyperchon at Phokis. The pro-status-quo side under Phokion now favoured direct Macedonian control of Athens and the continuation of the garrison in Mounychia under Polyperchon’s control. The pro-democracy side under Hagnonides called for the return of autonomia, the expulsion of the garrison from Mounychia, and the restoration of democracy, all in accordance with (its interpretation of) the Edict. Diodoros records that Polyperchon’s instinct was to garrison Piraeus and so control Athens by force, but when faced with Hagnonides’ narrative of freedom and democracy he realised that to deceive the Greek cities would destroy his support base (D.S. 18.66.2-3; cf. Plu. Phoc. 33). So, like Alexander before him, he exploited factionalism and declared his support for freedom and democracy in order that the Greek cities would see that support for him provided eleutheria and tangible political benefits. Enforcement of the Edict would now be conditioned by Greece’s, specifically Athens’, reception of it.39 Before his invasion of the Peloponnese in late spring/early summer 318 Polyperchon dispatched letters to the Greek cities “ordering that those who through Antipatros’ influence had been made magistrates in the oligarchic governments should be put to death and that the people should be given back their autonomia” (D.S. 18.69.3). The Edict now assumed its full ideological significance as a statement on Greek freedom and democracy.

In late 318 another important document on Greek freedom was published, which connects directly with Polyperchon’s Edict and reveals the degree of ideological interaction between royal and civic dialogues of freedom at this time. Similarly, it also offers insights into the civic memory and commemoration of freedom. Athens’ second honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon was proposed by Hagnonides in December 318 (IG II² 448.36-88).40 Whereas the first decree used the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios and its connection with the Persian Wars to

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39 Another influence may have been Eresos, a free democracy earlier supported by Alexander, with which Polyperchon was now in contact, see GHI 83 §4; Wallace forthcoming A: section 2 with n.62.

40 The honorary decree of 323, erected in duplicate, was destroyed by the oligarchs between 322-319. In late 318 this initial decree was re-inscribed and a second one added. Published again in duplicate, the stelai of 318 were erected in the same places as those of 323, see Oliver 2003b. The second decree informs us that Euphron had died in 322.
enforce Athens’ hegemony in the Hellenic War, the second used the Hellenic War to support Athens’ actions in 318/7 by presenting the war as a struggle fought on behalf of democracy and freedom from garrisons, precisely Athens’ concerns in 318/7. Hagnonides used the second Euphron decree to reinterpret the goals and ideology of the Hellenic War so as to enforce Athenian hegemony in 318/7 and continue the struggle against Kassandros. Euphron’s removal of a Macedonian garrison from Sikyon in 323 offered a hopeful parallel for Athens, whose freedom was threatened so long as Kassandros’ garrison remained in Piraeus. In purpose, therefore, both Polyperchon’s and Hagnonides’ dialogues of eleutheria served to promote unity against the common enemy, Kassandros, and his power base, his garrisons. Both used eleutheria to forward their own aims, but each use of it interacted with the presentation and reception of the other. Further, Hagnonides’ re-interpretation of the Hellenic War within the second Euphron decree displays the vitality of the memory of freedom, specifically the Hellenic War, and the important role played by the past in validating action in the present.

Section 4: Antigonos and the Greeks, 318-311

Antigonos is often seen as the Hellenistic ruler who made the greatest effort in pursuance of the freedom of the Greeks and enjoyed the largest support as a result. However, his concern was purely pragmatic. He used eleutheria as a means of expanding control through persuasion and ideological force, rather than military might and oppression. This, however, does not mean that the actual application of the ideal was cynical and fraudulent. An important distinction needs to be drawn between the nature of an intention and its actual results. Like Polyperchon, Antigonos had no altruistic concern for Greek freedom, but his purely pragmatic support of it in the face of numerous setbacks was real, if selfishly motivated, and brought certain tangible benefits, such as the removal of garrisons and installation of democracies. Antigonos’ use of eleutheria reveals his concern for attaining

41 Wallace forthcoming A.
42 IG II² 448.46-8; Wallace forthcoming A: section 2. The division between city (asty) and Piraeus appears in the honorary decree of the deme Aixone for Demetrios of Phaleron (IG II² 1201). This anticipates the later division, physical and conceptual, of Piraeus from Athens (Bayliss 2002: 209-11; below pg.69 with n.126).
43 Billows 1990: 197-236 is an example; cf. Simpson 1959: 406
45 Billows 1990: 236; Derow 1993. Wheatley (1997: 166) argues that claims to freedom “cost nothing and did not necessarily require any follow-up or effort.” For a rebuttal of this view, see Ch.3 §2.
Greek support through goodwill (eunoia) and benefaction, achieved by defending and patronising polis ideals rather than exploiting military control.\textsuperscript{46}

The years 319-315, however, are a black mark on Antigonos’ record, most notably because his support of Kassandros ensured the fall of democratic Athens in 317. His concern for Greek freedom, therefore, is commonly seen to have begun with his declaration at Tyre in 315. However, Antigonos’ earliest cooperation with a Greek city, specifically termed ally (σύμμαχον οὖσαν), appears with Kyzikos in 319.\textsuperscript{47} Although others have shown that this does not display Antigonid concern for eleutheria,\textsuperscript{48} it does elucidate the origins of that concern and Antigonos’ focus on removing garrisons as a condition of freedom.

In 319 Antigonos intended to move through Asia removing the satraps installed at Triparadeisos and replace them with his own friends (D.S. 18.50). This forced Arrhidaios to defend his satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia by garrisoning the Greek cities. Kyzikos, however, refused to accept a garrison, and choosing instead “to maintain its freedom” was besieged (D.S. 18.51.3).\textsuperscript{49} When Antigonos heard of this he moved on Kyzikos but only arrived after Arrhidaios retreated. Nonetheless, Antigonos made clear his goodwill towards Kyzikos and publically sent ambassadors to Arrhidaios rebuking him for fortifying his satrapy and besieging a Greek ally. Diodoros, however, makes it clear that both Arrhidaios and Antigonos had the same intention, to garrison Kyzikos and use it in their forthcoming wars, and that Antigonos was using Arrhidaios’ siege as a cover for this.\textsuperscript{50} Antigonos’ late arrival marked, therefore, his failure to take the city. Still, “he made his goodwill (eunoia) toward the city manifest, even though failing to gain his entire objective” (D.S. 18.52.2). Military failure was cleverly turned into propaganda victory.

Antigonos’ ability to pluck victory from failure is the main point within this passage and it shows that he was aware of the importance of goodwill (eunoia) and of presenting himself as defender of the Greeks. Further, Kyzikos’ resistance to Arrhidaios revealed to Antigonos the Greek cities’ hatred of garrisons. It was Antigonos’ initial aggression that forced

\textsuperscript{46} Dmitriev (2011: 112-41) emphasises royal grants of freedom as a means of securing civic loyalty. For a more in depth analysis of eleutheria as a royal benefaction, see Ch.4 §2.2.

\textsuperscript{47} D.S. 18.51-2; Mar. Par. FGrH 239b F12. Wehrli (1968: 106) argues that σύμμαχον οὖσαν need only mean someone fighting with someone else, and not necessarily an ally.

\textsuperscript{48} Heuß 1938: 142-3; Simpson 1959: 391 (Antigonos defending an ally); Cloché 1948: 103; Billows 1990: 197-8 (concern for an ally need not imply concern for eleutheria); Cloché 1959: 122-3; Wehrli 1968: 106; Dmitriev 2011: 117 (purely military interest by Antigonos); Stylianou 1994: 38, 48 (Antigonos’ maintenance of the common peace of 337); Landucci Gattinoni 2008: 222-3 (Duris of Samos as Diodoros’ source).

\textsuperscript{49} Arrhidaios was also conspiring with one Timaioi of Kyzikos to alter the city’s constitution (Ath. 11.509a).

\textsuperscript{50} Identical intentions are applied to both: [Αντίγονος] κρίνας δὲ τὴν κηδυνεύουσαν πόλιν ἰδιῶν κατασκευασθαι πρὸς τὰς μελλόντας ἐπιρροὰς (D.S. 18.52.1); [Ἀρριδαίος] τὴν σατραπεῖαν ἐαυτῷ δυναστεῖαν κατασκευαζόμενος (D.S. 18.52.3).
Arrhidaios to garrison the Greek cities and besiege Kyzikos (D.S. 18.50.5). The cities then immediately turned against Arrhidaios thus allowing Antigonos to arrive on the scene and, despite the failure of his initial plan to capture Kyzikos, present himself as the city’s defender, all before a blow was struck with Arrhidaios. The situation was such that by forcing his opponents to garrison their cities Antigonos bred conflict between them and the cities under their control. This then allowed Antigonos to present his expansionist campaigns as manifestations of his concern for the cities’ safety. Antigonos appears to have put this into practice by invading Lydia shortly afterwards. As was no doubt expected, Kleitos the Macedonian satrap of Lydia garrisoned the cities while Antigonos, “taking some of them by force and winning others by persuasion”, won allies by presenting himself as their defender, perhaps even liberator through the removal of garrisons.51 Antigonos’ campaign at Kyzikos had been the immediate catalyst for this since it revealed both the extent of Greek hatred of garrisons and the importance of goodwill (eunoia) instead of military control. The second of these concerns appears in the balance of force and persuasion employed during the Lydian campaign;52 Antigonos’ initial plan was to take control of Kyzikos by force but when this failed he turned to persuasion and at Kyzikos and in Lydia he assumed the role of defender of the Greek cities, achieving support through persuasion, benefaction, and eunoia, as Polyperchon had done before him.

At Tyre in 315 Antigonos proclaimed that the Greeks were to be free, ungarrisoned, and autonomous.53 This marks the beginning of his commitment to eleutheria in his dealings with the Greek cities, but Diodoros (19.61.4) is quick to show that this is not purely magnanimous since Antigonos expected that the Greek hope for freedom (τὴν ἔλπιδα τῆς ἔλευθερίας) would make them eager allies (προθύμους συναγωγιστὰς). Antigonos’ declaration mimicked that of Polyperchon in 319/8 and was perhaps influenced by the presence of the latter’s son Alexandros at Tyre. Alliance with Alexandros ensured both a foothold in Greece and Polyperchon’s experience with the slogan of eleutheria.54 Antigonos promoted Greek eleutheria as the removal of garrisons and the guarantee of aphorologesia to the liberated cities. In summer/autumn 315 his general Aristodemos and

51 D.S. 18.52.6-8 (ᾲς μὲν βία χειροῦμενος, ᾲς δὲ πειθοὶ προσαγομένος); Landucci Gattinoni 2008: 223-4.
52 On the royal use of force and persuasion, see below pg.123 with n.30.
Polyperchon’s son Alexandros removed Kassandros’ garrisons from Kenchreai, Orchomenos, and Megalopolis before Alexandros defected to Kassandros’ side (D.S. 19.63-64). In 314 Aristodemos removed Kassandros’ and Alexandros’ garrisons from Kyllene, Patra, Aigion, and Dymai (D.S. 19.66-67.2). By sea, in summer 315, Antigonos’ nephew Dioskourides ensured the safety (asphaleia) of existing Aegean allies and brought further islands into the alliance (D.S. 19.62.9), no doubt claiming to bring them eleutheria. Lemnos joined Antigonos and may now have claimed its eleutheria and autonomia; good relations are also attested with Kos. Further reinforcements were dispatched to Greece under Telesphoros in spring 313 again to free the Greek cities and “establish among the Greeks the belief that [Antigonos] truly was (πρὸς ἀληθείαν) concerned for their freedom” (D.S. 19.74.1-2). By summer all the garrisoned cities of the Peloponnese, save Corinth and Sikyon, were freed, including even Oreos in Euboia.

In Karia, in 313, a major land and sea campaign was also launched under Antigonos’ generals Dokimos and Medios with the single purpose of freeing the Greek cities. Miletos was taken with civic help, Asandros’ garrison was removed, and eleutheria and autonomia restored to the city. Antigonos took Tralles and Kaunos, while another nephew Polemaios captured Iasos, probably also granting it eleutheria and autonomia (D.S. 19.75.5; §5 below). Kolophon, Erythrai, Teos and Lebedos, as well as the cities of the Ionian League all had their eleutheria and/or autonomia acknowledged, with Erythrai also being made aphorologetos after Alexander’s precedent. That autumn Polemaios was dispatched to Greece, again with orders to free the Greeks (D.S. 19.77.2, 78). He liberated Chalkis and left it ungarrisoned “in order to make it evident that Antigonos in very truth proposed to free the Greeks” (D.S. 19.78.2). He returned Oropos to the Boiotians, freed the Thebans by removing the Kadmean garrison, allied with Eretria and Karystos, before receiving entreaties from Athens to free the

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55 On the campaigns of 315-311, see Billows 1990: 109-34; Errington 2008: 30-3 (emphasising the role of stasis within the Greek cities); Wheatley 1997: 54-154 (focusing on Demetrios). On the chronology of these years, see Boiy 2007 (a hybrid high/low chronology); Stylianou 1994: 71-84 (anticipating Boiy’s results); Anson 2006 (campaigning again for a low chronology).
56 On Dioskourides and his campaigns in 315-313, see Hauben 1975: 27-30, num.10.
57 D.S. 19.68.2-4. SEG L 826, a late 4th century decree of the deme Hephaistia, may belong to this date (App.1 num.10). Another context may be the return of Lemnos to Athens in 305, see below §6.
58 I.Cos ED71d honours an associate of Antigonos, Nikomedes of Kos (Billows 1990: App.3, num.82).
59 D.S. 19.74.1-2, 75.6-7; IG II2 682.13-18; cf. Paschidis 2008a: 75-6. On Telesphoros and his campaigns in Greece, see Hauben 1975: 93-8, num.33.
60 D.S. 19.75.1-4; I.Miler 123.2-4 (App.2 num.7). IG II2 1129 (App.2 num.8) may also be connected with this event, see below pg.180 with n.92. Nawotka (1999: 19, 35) confusingly refers to Asandros as Antigonos’ general sent to liberate Miletos.
city (D.S. 19.78.3-4). He also removed Kassandros’ garrisons from the Phokian cities, before liberating Opus (D.S. 19.78.5).

In summer 312, however, Telesphoros defected and captured Elis by deceit. He plundered Olympia and garrisoned Kyllene, before Polemaios brought him back to the fold, razed the garrison, and restored the treasure to Olympia. Diodoros’ account specifies that Telesphoros’ garrison enslaved Elis while its removal by Polemaios turned douleia into eleutheria. Thomas Kruse has cleverly identified in Pausanias an Antigonid monument in Olympia depicting Elis crowning statues of Demetrios and Polemaios which he argues was erected in thanks for Polemaios’ re-liberation of Elis and his preservation of peace. Kruse rightly emphasises that Telesphoros’ garrisoning of Elis and plundering of Olympia were particularly dangerous to Antigonos because it undermined his claim to bring eleutheria and so put in danger the goodwill (eunoia) and trust (pistis) that he received from the Greek cities. Accordingly, Polemaios’ important re-liberation of Elis and Olympia earned the general a statue on site. However, Polemaios’ actions were of added significance because 312/1 was an Olympic year, a co-incidence hitherto unrecognised. Telesphoros’ rebellion took place in the summer, perhaps some months before the Olympic Games, but Polemaios’ prompt removal of the garrison and restoration of the treasure betray his fear that at the forthcoming games a garrisoned and plundered Olympia would damage Antigonos’ image as a truthful, trustworthy, and genuine patron of Greek eleutheria. Although Telesphoros’ actions provided the greatest threat yet to the Greek perception of Antigonos’ commitment to eleutheria, Polemaios’ re-liberation of Elis meant that at the forthcoming Olympics the assembled Greeks would see a free, peaceful, and newly-liberated Elis under Antigonid patronage rather than a garrisoned city and pillaged shrine under the military control of Antigonos’ renegade general.

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63 The liberation of Lokris and Opus is attested epigraphically by an inscribed statue base for Peisis (FD III (4) 463; App.1 num.11), the leader of Boiotian troops during Polemaios’ Boiotian and Attic campaigns (on whom, see Paschidis 2008a: 312-15, C15). His statue also stood at Oropos, similarly liberated in 313 (I.Oropos 366; D.S. 19.77.6). Peisis later led a Thespian revolt against Demetrios in 293 (Plu. Demetr. 39.3-5).
64 D.S. 19.87.3: [Τελεσφόρος] τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐνετείχισε καὶ τὴν πόλιν κατεδόσασθο: [Πολεμαῖος] τὴν ἐντετειχισμένην ἀκρόπολιν κατασκάψας τὴν τε ἐλευθερίαν ἀπέδωκε τοῖς Ἑλίοις. The razing of the garrison was particularly emphatic; Demetrios did likewise for Athens in 307 (below pgs.62-3 with n.88).
65 Kruse 1992; Paus. 6.16.3: ἡ δὲ Ἡλίας Δημήτριος τὸν στρατηγόν τοῦ Σέλευκου καὶ Πολεμαῖον τὸν Λέγειον στεφανοῦσα ἐστὶν. Kruse reads a corrupt reference to Polemaios (as second direct object with Demetrios) and dates the monument to 311-309, after Elis’ liberation but before Polemaios’ revolt.
66 Due, in part, to the low dating of Telesphoros’ revolt to 311/0, see Errington 1977; Billows 1990: 131; Anson 2006. The synchronism is also unnoticed in high chronologies of Hammond & Walbank 1988: 157-8; Wheatley 1998b; Bosworth 2002; Boiy 2007.
67 Polemaios may also have been active at the Isthmian or Nemean Games of 312-310. Geagan (1968) publishes a late 4th century Nemean inscription mentioning troops from Keios, Kythnos, and Mykonos whom he sees as
By 311 Antigonos’ position within Asia Minor, the Aegean, the Peloponnese, and central Greece was secure. His successes had been based on his continued commitment to defend Greek *eleutheria* by removing his enemies’ garrisons. However, there were losses: he failed to ensure the alliance of Byzantion in autumn/winter 313/2, Demetrios lost the Battle of Gaza in autumn 312, and Seleukos regained the Upper Satrapies in 312/1. With failure to the north, south, and east, Antigonos’ only successes lay with Greek *eleutheria* to the west.

The peace of autumn 311 between Antigonos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy, and Kassandros contained at its end a clause guaranteeing the freedom of the Greeks (D.S. 19.105.1). The importance of this clause to Antigonos is evidenced in a letter sent to Skepsis (and elsewhere) and a responding civic decree, both of which emphasise that it was his personal concern that led to its inclusion. In his letter Antigonos emphasises his continued concern for Greek freedom, even explaining the cycle of Successor wars as part of his struggle for Greek freedom. He also prescribed that allied cities swear a mutual oath of allegiance to defend each other’s freedom, thus making king and cities *synagonistai* for *eleutheria* (*OGIS* 5+6). Freedom was presented as the ideological glue holding his empire together (Ch.4 §2.2), but Antigonos’ position as sole defender of *eleutheria* was soon threatened by both the revolt of Polemaios and the campaigns of Ptolemy in 309/8.

**Section 5: Antigonos, Ptolemy, and the Struggle for Freedom**

As early as 315 Ptolemy expressed his concern for Greek *eleutheria* by formulating a counter-Edict to Antigonos’ declaration at Tyre, thus revealing his awareness of the Greek slogan of *eleutheria* as a means of attaining Greek goodwill (D.S. 19.62.1). In mid-310, just after the Peace of 311, Ptolemy charged Antigonos with garrisoning the Kilikian cities and undermining their *eleutheria*. With Antigonos away in the east, Ptolemy evidently planned to assume his role as defender of freedom and garner some of the support Antigonos enjoyed. Leonidas was dispatched to Kilikia, but since he only won over the cities by force we can

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*Polemaios’ troops raised from the Nesiotic League and present at the Isthmos for one of the Nemean (autumn 311) or Isthmian (spring/summer 312, 310) Games.*


*Munro 1899 (ed. prin.); OGIS 5+6 (letter/decree); RC 1 (letter); SV 428 (letter); Harding num.132 (letter); Austin nums.38+39 (letter/decree); BD 6 (letter/decree).*
assume that Ptolemy’s call to Greek freedom was not immediately successful (D.S. 20.19.3-6).

Events reached a head in late summer 309 when Ptolemy began his personal campaign into the Aegean. Since Demetrios had retaken the Kilikian cities (D.S. 20.19.5), Ptolemy moved on Kilikia capturing Phaselis, Xanthos, and Kaunos. Myndos was also taken (D.S. 20.37.1), as well as perhaps Aspendos. Plutarch (Demetr. 7.3) records a siege of Halikarnassos which was interrupted by the timely arrival of Demetrios. Kos was established as base-camp and contact was perhaps made with Rhodes and Miletos. The Suda (Δ 431) records a treaty between Demetrios and Ptolemy in order to free the Greek cities, but this is almost certainly apocryphal.

From Kos Ptolemy contacted Polemaios, who had revolted from Antigonos sometime between mid-310 and mid-309. This ensured reinforcements, an increased standing in Asia Minor where Polemaios was still influential after his campaigns of 313 (D.S. 19.75.5), and an open gangway into Greece. Polemaios fortified Chalkis (IG II² 469) before sailing to Kos where over the winter of 309/8 he used his connections with the garrison he had earlier installed in Iasos to bring the city to Ptolemy’s side. A treaty was made by which Ptolemy swore to protect Iasos’ eleutheria, autonomia, aphrouresia, and aphorologesia, before Ptolemy had Polemaios poisoned that winter (D.S. 20.27.3). With Demetrios’ successful defence of Halikarnassos closing Asia Minor to him, Ptolemy moved on Greece in spring

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71 Perhaps because Ptolemy had pillaged the area in summer 312 (D.S. 19.79.6-7). Antigonos’ garrisons may have been presented as precautions against such raids and so contributed to the defence of the cities’ freedom (below pg 85).


73 Philokles captured the polis of Kaunos (D.S. 20.27.1-2) and Ptolemy took the garrisoned acropoleis, the Herakleion and Persikon (Polyaen. 3.16; Bosworth 2000: 234 n.121). A statue-base for Philokles survives (I.Kaunos 82). Kaunos returned to Antigonid hands by 302 (I.Kaunos 4, 83) and remained loyal to Demetrios in 287/6 (I.Kaunos 1; Plu. Demetr. 49.5).


75 Kos: D.S. 20.27.3; Bagnall 1976: 103. Philadelphos was born this winter: Mar. Par. FGrH 239b F19; Theoc. Idyll 17.58; Call. Del. 160-70. Rhodes: Bosworth 2000: 217-8, 236-8 with P.Köln 247, on which see Lehmann 1988a; Paschidis forthcoming. Miletos: IMilet 244 is a statue base for Πτολεμαῖος Λαέγγον Μακεδόν. The lack of royal title suggests a date pre-305 with the activities of 309/8 providing the context. On dedications in the nominative as a reflection of status, see Ma 2007: 207-8.


77 Wheatley 1989a.


308, where Polemaios’ murder left rich pickings. Sailing from Myndos he passed through Andros, liberating the island from its garrison, and landing at the Isthmos.  

Ptolemy took Sikyon and Corinth from Kratesipolis (D.S. 20.37.1-2; Poly. 8.58), as well as capturing Megara (D.L. 2.115). He chaired the Isthmian Games of 308 and declared his intention to free the Greek cities (Suda Δ 431), as Polyperchon had before him. Like Polyperchon and Antigonos, Ptolemy was “thinking that the goodwill (eunoia) of the Greeks would be a great gain for him in his own undertakings” (D.S. 20.37.2). However, when support failed to materialise, Ptolemy fell back on military control. Corinth, Sikyon, and Megara were garrisoned and entrusted to Leonidas. Ptolemy then returned to Egypt, no doubt aware of Antigonos’ return from the east.

Ptolemy’s Aegean campaign presents a number of interesting features. His guarantees to Iasos (ἐλευθερος ὃν καὶ αὐτόνομος καὶ ἀφρούρεσι καὶ ἀφορολόγητος) could be seen either as upstaging Antigonos’ commitment to aphrouresia or as guaranteeing to Iasos the continuation of the status it held under Antigonos. Ptolemy aimed to achieve the support of the Greek cities by presenting himself as a genuine defender and patron of Greek eleutheria. Where possible this was achieved through persuasion and eunoia rather than force. However, as with Antigonos’ Lydian campaign, both dynamics were employed. The Kilikian cities were all besieged, but at Iasos Ptolemy assumed the role of defender of eleutheria, framed through guarantees of aphorologesia and aphrouresia. Ptolemy did indeed garrison Sikyon and Corinth after he had declared the Greeks free, but it is important to note that this was a last resort employed when persuasion, dialogue, and appeals to eleutheria failed to win support. Like Polyperchon and Antigonos, Ptolemy had no altruistic love for eleutheria but he saw it as a profitable means of expanding hegemony through eunoia, synergy, and the granting of eleutheria and status guarantees. This is the course Ptolemy favoured; force was the recourse of the ideologically weak and only employed when persuasion failed.

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80 D.S. 20.37.1-2. The garrison may have been installed by Dioskourides under Antigonos’ orders or independently by Polemaios on his journey to Kos, see Seibert 1969: 188 n.41; Billows 1990: 224-5. Hammond & Walbank (1988: 170) strangely claim that it was Kassandros’. 
81 Hammond & Walbank 1988: 170: “[Ptolemy liberated] Corinth and Sicyon from the autocratic rule of Kratesipolis.” Polyainos, however, clearly states that Kratesipolis gave Corinth to Ptolemy, albeit by deceiving her troops. Paschidis (2008b: 248) attributes this to her wish to marry Ptolemy after the date of Polyperchon, which Paschidis dates to 308. Bosworth (2000) sees Ptolemy’s actions as a manifestation of royal aspirations and a threat to Kassandros’ throne. Zuffa (1971/2) sees them as orchestrated, with Kassandros’ connivance, against Antigonos’ holdings. Ptolemy also established a mint at Corinth in 308 (Ravel 1938; Chryssanthaki 2005: 163).
82 Billows 1990: 209-10. Antigonos granted aphorologesia to Erythrai, but the exact date is unknown (IK. Ery. 31.22-3 [App.2 num.35]). 
83 Bosworth comments that Ptolemy brought both Rhodes and Knidos to his side “through diplomacy rather than force” (2000: 217-8, 221).
Section 6: Demetrios Poliorketes in Greece, 307-301

Athens had fallen to Kassandros in 317 and had since then been under the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron who, as Kassandros’ epimeletes, had citizenship restricted to those owning more than 1,000 drachmai (D.S. 18.74.3). Demetrios described his rule as a correction of the democracy (Str. 9.1.20) and to history he was often seen to be a lawgiver. However, Pausanias (1.25.6; cf. Phaedrus Fab. 5.1) termed him a tyrant, Plutarch (Demetr. 10.2) termed him a monarch, Philochoros (FGrH 328 F66) called his rule a period of “the undermining of the demos” (καταλυσάντων τὸν δήμον, a charge Demetrios defended himself against [Str. 9.1.20]), and the restored democracy of 307-301 presented it as a period of oligarchic repression during which Athens was not free. Nonetheless, democratic procedures remained intact during these years even if few decrees were published on stone.

It was this regime that Antigonos decided in 308 to remove. Greek goodwill was, as ever, essential. Plutarch records an anecdote in which one of Antigonos’ philoi recommends that he capture and hold Athens as a gangway (ἐπιβάθρα) to Greece. Antigonos disagrees, arguing instead that Athenian goodwill (εὔνοια) would be a surer gangway (ἐπιβάθρα) into Greece; the restoration of Athens’ eleutheria and democracy would earn him greater support throughout Greece than forceful garrisoning would (Plu. Demetr. 8.3; cf. D.S. 19.78.2).

Departing from Ephesos, Demetrios Poliorketes entered the Piraeus by surprise on Thargelion 26th 308/7, one month and five days before the end of the Athenian year. He immediately proclaimed that he had been sent by his father to free Athens, expel the garrison, and restore the city’s constitution. Fighting ensued and Demetrios’ troops soon captured Piraeus. He encircled Mounychia, then freed Megara by expelling its garrison (Plu. Demetr. 9.5), before finally returning to Athens to capture Mounychia and raze the fort (D.S. 20.46.1). Athens was officially granted its freedom and democracy and entered into an

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84 IG II² 1201; IG XII (5) 444 B.15-6; Plu. Arist. 27.5 Synkellos Chron. 329, 331; Cicero De Re Publica 2.1.2.
85 Agora XVI 114.1-9; ISE 7.1-4; IG II² 498.15-18; cf. D.H. Din. 3; Plu. Demetr. 10.2. On the terminology used to describe Demetrios of Phaleron’s regime, see Landucci Gattinoni 2008: 270-1; Grieb 2008: 65-8.
87 D.S. 20.45.1-5; Polyain. 4.7.2. 6; Plu. Demetr. 8.3-9.2; Billows 1990: 147-9; Wheatley 1997: 168-9. On the terms used to describe the ‘constitution’ returned to Athens, see Ch.5 §3.2.
88 I follow Philochoros’ narrative of events (FGrH 328 F66; Plu. Demetr. 9.5-10.1; Wheatley 1997: 169-77). Diodoros claims that Demetrios took Mounychia before Megara (20.45.6-46.3; Billows 1990: 147-51). IG II² 479-80 (with restorations in Wilhelm 1942) honour Πυρ,*--- Ηρακλείαςιν, presumably an Antigonid officer though not identified as one by Billows (1990: App.3), for his help in removing the Mounychia garrison. Plutarch and Diodoros differentiate the expulsion of Kassandros’ garrison from Megara (Demetr. 9.5: τὴν ὕφοιναν ἀπὸ Δημητρίους ἐκβόλων) from the complete destruction of the fort at Mounychia (20.46.1: κατασκάφας τὴν Μουνυχίαν ὅλοκληρον). The distinction is important since it reveals different treatments of both cities by
alliance of *philia* and *symmachia* with Antigonos. Importantly, the removal of the garrison in Mounychia ensured the perpetuation of the restored democracy. Polyperchon’s failure to remove the garrison in 317 resulted in the collapse of the democracy and Athens’ capitulation to Kassandros. Piraeus and the garrison in Mounychia were the cornerstones of Athenian freedom and democracy, and Demetrios understood as much.

Demetrios, however, departed Athens in spring 306 to invade Cyprus and Egypt and then besiege an independent Rhodes. The siege of Rhodes may have showed that Antigonos felt that if cities were to be free then it was only to be by his volition and in alliance with him, but it does not appear to have harmed Antigonid self-presentation as liberator-kings. In Greece, Athens entered the Four Years War, the period from 307-304 in which it countered Kassandros’ attacks and awaited Demetrios’ eventual return. During these years Athens revisited the memory of the Hellenic War, now invoking it as a parallel for the current struggle for freedom from Antipatros’ son, Kassandros (*IG* II² 467, 554); as in 318/7, the plasticity of memory continued. Antigonid influence over the city during these years was apparently strong. Royal generals helped co-ordinate Athens’ defence and Demetrios personally appointed one Adeimantos as Athenian general for an exceptional two consecutive years, 306/5-305/4. Such appointments, particularly that of Adeimantos, reveal the extent of Antigonid influence over Athens during the Four Years War. However, since they were connected with the defence of Athens’ *eleutheria* from Kassandros they do not appear to have caused conflict within the city. Like other *poleis*, Athens could assimilate aspects of royal control when they contributed in a real and tangible manner to civic freedom (Ch.3 §1.1-2; Ch.4 §3).

Demetrios; indeed, Demetrios’ troops later appear stationed nearby at Aigosthena and honoured in Megara (*IG* VII 1 [Billows 1990: App.3 num.123], 5, 6; dated c.235-232 under Demetrios II by Paschidis 2008a: 295-302, C1-6). Further, Megara was apparently looted by Demetrios’ troops upon its liberation (D.S. 20.46.3; Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F66; D.L. 2.115; Plu. *Demetr.* 9.5-6). Athens was the propagandist public face of Antigonid policy, the expressed concern for *eunoia*; Megara was the military pragmatism behind it, the reliance on force.

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Demetrios returned to Greece in autumn 304. He broke Kassandros’ siege of Athens and pushed him beyond Thermopylai, he freed Chalkis by removing its Boiotian garrison, allied with the Boiotians and Aitolians, and took Kenchreai. He expelled Kassandros’ garrisons from Phyle and Panakton and returned both forts with Oropos to Athens.\(^\text{91}\) Elateia was perhaps also liberated now.\(^\text{92}\) In 303 he invaded the Peloponnese. The campaign, specifically the removal of Kassandros’ garrisons, was presented as one fought on behalf of Greek freedom, an ideology particularly strong in Athens.\(^\text{93}\) Sikyon, Corinth, Bura, and Skyros were liberated and had their garrisons removed, so too Arkadian Orchomenos, Troizen, Akte, and Arkadia (excluding Mantinea).\(^\text{94}\) Pleistarchos’ garrison was expelled from Argos and Demetrios chaired the Heraia festival there.\(^\text{95}\) Messene also came under his sway.\(^\text{96}\) At the Isthmian Games of spring/summer 302 Demetrios founded a Hellenic League of Greek states on the model of Philip and Alexander’s League of Corinth.\(^\text{97}\) This alliance of newly-liberated Greek states consisted of a synedrion (council) of synedroi (representatives) from member states, and was overseen by a board of presidents (proedroi). Demetrios was hegemon (leader) of both the League and its forces.\(^\text{98}\) The League was a manifestation of Antigonid hegemony but with it Demetrios sought to justify this hegemony within accountable parameters that defined the cities as free and established legal structures protecting this.

In Athens, however, Demetrios’ constant demands on the polis were seen to negate the eleutheria he had earlier granted. His initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries in spring 303


\(^{\text{92}}\) FD III (4) 218 (App.1 num.20), a Phokian epigram honouring Xanthippos’ defence of Elateia from Kassandros. On the date, see Paschidis 2008a: 323-6, C24. Lund (1992: 182) dates it to 301.

\(^{\text{93}}\) D.S. 20.45.1, 46, 100.6, 102.1, 111.2; Plut. Demetr. 8, 23.1-2; IG II\(^\text{2}\) 558.12-14, 498.15-18, 559+568.10-14; SEG XXXVI 165.15-18; Agora XVI 114.5-9; ISE 7; App.1 nums.21, 26, 28, 24, 22, 30.

\(^{\text{94}}\) D.S. 20.102-103.3; Plut. Demetr. 25.1; Polyaen. 4.7.3, 8. On Troizen, see also RIG 452.7-9 (App.1 num.27). According to Diodoros (20.102.2-3) and Plutarch (Demetr. 25.2), Sikyon was re-founded and re-named Demetrias, though this is debated. The name Sikyon is preserved in the treaty with Athens of Prytany XII 23, Skiørphorion 21, 303/2 (SEG LIII 101). IP Ark. 17 (SV 567), however, is a treaty between Synphalos and one Demetrias, based on Taeuber’s (1981) restorations of lines 173-81. It is perhaps dated between autumn 302 and autumn 301 (IP Ark. 17; Thür 1995; 1997a). See, however, Gauthier’s reservations (BE 1995: num.264).

\(^{\text{95}}\) D.S. 20.103.4-7; Plut. Demetr. 25.1-2. For Demetrios’ use of siege engines at Argos, see Poll. 4.89; Ath. 10.414f-415a. Argos established an annual celebration on the 17th day of the month in which Pleistarchos was expelled (ISE 39).

\(^{\text{96}}\) Plut. Demetr. 13.4; FD III (4) 7; Billows 1990: App.3, num.81.


\(^{\text{98}}\) Long sections of the League charter are preserved from Epidaurus (IG IV\(^\text{3}\) 1 68; ISE 44; SV 446; BD 8).
necessitated the reorganisation of the religious calendar.\textsuperscript{99} He demanded that his letters be given institutional weight within the ekklesia, and his mistress Lamia treated the city like her personal bank.\textsuperscript{100} The conflict between Athens’ and Demetrios’ understandings of eleutheria and the extent of royal interference each understanding permitted are important for our analysis of freedom as a potential point of both unity and discord between city and king (explored in Ch.4 §3).

Events in Asia soon had a bearing on Greece. In summer/autumn 302 Lysimachos invaded Hellespontine Phrygia from Thrace. Lampsakos and Parion capitulated and were left free. In Aiolia and Ionia his general Prepelaos took and garrisoned Ephesos, which he left free, as well as Teos, Kolophon, and Sardis, but failed to capture Erythrai and Klazomenai.\textsuperscript{101} In Greece, Demetrios invaded Thessaly, freed Larissa and Pherai by removing their garrisons, and won over Antrones, Pteleon, Dion, and Phthiotic Orchomenos (D.S. 20.110.2-6). Before he could invade Macedon, however, Antigonos called him back to Asia. A hasty peace was made with Kassandros which left the cities of Greece and Asia free. This saved face by showing that Demetrios was not abandoning his campaign for Greek freedom, merely transferring it to a new sphere.\textsuperscript{102} Demetrios removed Prepelaos’ garrison from Ephesos and returned the city to its previous status, before re-taking Lampsakos and Parion and entering winter quarters (D.S. 20.111.3). Events came to a head in summer 301 when at Ipsos the armies of Antigonos and Demetrios met those of Lysimachos and Seleukos. Antigonos lost his life in the battle. Lysimachos took control of Asia Minor as far as the Tauros, Ptolemy and Seleukos divided Syria between themselves, and Kassandros re-asserted control in central Greece. Demetrios, now a king without a kingdom, maintained some possessions in Greece and was to reappear again at Athens as conqueror in 295.

**Section 7: Demetrios and Ptolemy in Greece, 295-280\textsuperscript{103}**

Demetrios’ return to Athens in 295 marked his return as guarantor of eleutheria and demokratia. Since 301/0 Lachares, general of the mercenaries, had made himself tyrant under

\textsuperscript{99} Plu. Demetr. 26; D.S. 20.110.1; cf. Philoch. FGrH 328 F69-70. On the date and the reorganisation of the Athenian calendar, see below pgs.136-7 with n.77.

\textsuperscript{100} Wheatley 2003.

\textsuperscript{101} D.S. 20.107; IK.Eph. 1449. This campaign may be the origin of the later Hellenistic cult of Prepelaos attested at Kolophon (SEG XXXIX 1244; though cf. J. & L. Robert 1989: 84).

\textsuperscript{102} This may have allowed him to bring League troops to Asia (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 657.16-26).

the auspices of Kassandros. Opposition to his regime was led by Charias, the hoplite general, who garrisoned the Akropolis and ordered the people to feed his troops, only to be removed later and executed by Lachares. Charias’ partisans, the obscure Peirakoi soldiers, occupied Piraeus while Lachares increased control over Athens. Asty and Piraeus were again split, as in 319-317, except with the lines now drawn between a democratic Piraeus and tyrannical asty.

When Demetrios arrived in spring 295 he exploited this division by siding with the Piraeus-based faction (Polyaen. 4.7.5) and starving the city into submission. The surrender took place, coincidentally, at the time of the civic Dionysia in Elaphebolion 296/5. Demetrios called the people to the Assembly, lined the theatre with his troops, and then announced a gift of 100,000 bushels of grain and the restoration of the offices (ἀρχὰς) most loved by the people, likely denoting the restoration of democracy. Demetrios’ announcement is a classic example of the ‘surrender and grant’ model of benefaction whereby a city, upon capture, loses its status only to have it returned again by royal order. Athens’ democracy is so restored and the king as benefactor bestows grain on the famished populace. In thanks honours are granted, as had earlier been the case in 307, and Piraeus and Mounychia are given to Demetrios. These had been the bases of the democratic Peirakoi soldiers and it was from them that the democracy was restored. Demetrios’ control of Piraeus and garrisoning of Mounychia, authorised by Athenian decree, offered a physical manifestation of his ideological control over the restoration and granting of democracy.

104 Grieb (2008: 75-7) argues that the appellation tyrant is a back-projection of later sources (Paus. 1.29.10; Plu. Demetr. 33.4; Polyaen. 4.7.5; P.Oxy. X 1235).
109 The decree was proposed by Dromokleides (Paschidis 2008a: 129-31, A42). Demetrios also garrisoned Museion of his own volition (Plu. Demetr. 34.5). The Athenian decree was proposed by Dromokleides (Paschidis 2008a: 129-31, A42).
For the remaining four months of the archon year 296/5 Demetrios instituted a second, abridged year of twelve shortened months, complete with shortened tribal prytanies. Officials were elected for a second time, most notably the archon Nikias (termed Nikias hysteros) and the general of the equipment Phaidros of Sphettos. The normal secretary cycle continued into 295/4 and citizenship necessitated a dokimasia overseen by the thesmothetai. Peter Thonemann ascribes this shortened year to Demetrios’ wish to display his authority by altering Athenian religious and civic time, as earlier done with the Eleusinian mysteries in 304/3. While this is true, Demetrios’ actions also presented his arrival as a restoration of democracy with a re-organised democratic calendar displaying a new beginning after Lachares’ tyranny. This is how his arrival was commemorated almost a year to the day later in an honorary decree for his philos Herodoros. Passed the day before the civic Dionysia of 294 (Prytany IX 15, Elaphebolion 9), it praises Herodoros for aiding the ambassadors sent to negotiate with Demetrios and striving to ensure peace (eirene) and friendship (philia) so that the war would be over and that the demos, having taken control of the asty, would continue to have demokratia. The decree’s content and its announcement at the Dionysia of 294 commemorates Demetrios’ capture of the city almost exactly a year beforehand and reveals how the pro-Demetrios party wished to remember the events of Elaphebolion 295: as a restoration by Demetrios of demokratia to a unified Athens consisting of both Piraeus and asty.

However, when Demetrios assumed the Macedonian throne in 294 (Plu. Demetr. 36-7) he began to extend tighter control over Greece, thus allowing Ptolemy to present himself as patron of Greek eleutheria. Structural anomalies soon creep into the Athenian democratic system: Olympiodoros was archon for two consecutive years (294/3-293/2), the democratic system...
grammateus was replaced with the oligarchic anagrapheus for 294/3-292/1, as had been the case in 321-318, and the oligarchs exiled in 304/3 were recalled in 292/1. Direct royal control is also attested at Thespiae and Thebes, governed respectively by Peisis and Hieronymos. Having assumed the Macedonian throne, Demetrios needed stronger, securer, and more direct control over Greece. As with Antipatros and Kassandros before him, he was forced to rely on garrisons and tyrannies, thus turning him into an oppressor of Greek eleutheria. When Athens revolted in spring 287 Ptolemy actively supported the city and assumed the now vacant role of defender of Greek eleutheria. The Athenian general Phaidros of Sphettos protected the grain harvest from the attack of Antigonid troops from Piraeus and the Attic forts while Olympiodoros led the capture of the Museion hill from the Macedonian garrison thereon. The Ptolemaic general on Andros, Kallias of Sphettos, brother of Phaidros, provided military assistance before and during Demetrios’ siege (SEG XXVIII 60), and it was through the Ptolemaic agent Sostratos that peace was negotiated with Demetrios. Demetrios’ control of Piraeus and the Attic forts was acknowledged and the king left for Asia and his eventual death.

The revolt asserted Athens’ freedom and democracy over Demetrios’ garrisons and oligarchy, as had been done against Kassandros in 318/7 and 307-301. Further, the revolt emphasises two important points regarding Athens’ understanding of its own eleutheria: first, the removal of garrisons (Museion and Piraeus) was a necessary pre-requisite of freedom; second, the preservation of the grain supply was essential to the feeding and stabilisation of the renascent democracy. Phaidros was remembered for handing over the city to his successors “free, democratic, and autonomous”, while Pausanias says that with Olympiodoros’ capture of the Museion “Athens was freed from the Macedonians”.

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118 Habicht (1979: 27-33; cf. 1997: 90-1) defines the period 294-287 as an oligarchy, at least to the post-287 democracy. On the nature of this regime, see also Dinsmoor 1931: 39-44; T.L. Shear 1978: 53-5; Dreyer 1999: 111-48 (arguing against Habicht); Grieb 2008: 77-81. On Olympiodoros’ dual archonship, see below pgs.166-7 with n.41 and pgs.170-1 with n.56.
120 On the date, see Osborne 1979; Habicht 1997: 95-7; Oliver 2007: 62-4, 121-3. Others argue for spring 286, T.L. Shear 1978; J.L. Shear 2010 (based on new readings of the Kallias Decree, SEG XXVIII 60). Paschidis (2008a: 137 n.2) outlines the debate. The revolt is almost entirely known from the lengthy honorary inscription for Kallias of Sphettos (SEG XXVIII 60; T.L. Shear 1978).
121 Phaidros: IG II² 682.30-6; Osborne 1979; Habicht 1979: 45-67; Habicht 1997: 95-7; Osborne 2004: 207-8 (dating IG II² 682 to 259/8); Oliver 2007: 163-4; Paschidis 2008a: 140-5; A46. Olympiodoros: Paus. 1.26.2; below pgs.170-1 with ns.54-6.
123 Phaidros: IG II² 682.38-40 (App.1 num.48); Olympiodoros: Paus. 1.26.1-2. Also of note are IG II² 666+667 which honour Strombichos, a Macedonian defector from the Museion garrison, and refer to the revolt as fought on behalf of eleutheria (IG II² 666.7-15 [App.1 num.46]; below §10).
addition, the shield of Leokritos, the first man over the walls, was dedicated in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (Paus. 1.26.1-2), revealing again, as with the Euphron decrees of 322 and 318, the importance of location as a medium of memory and its connection with struggles for freedom. Philippides of Kephale established on his return from exile a contest to Demeter and Kore “as a memorial of the eleutheria of the demos” (IG II² 657.3-5) and the revolt is further presented as a return of eleutheria in the decrees passed by the restored democracy. However, the physical division of Piraeus from Athens, seen already in 318/7 and 296/5, marked a conceptual division within Athens’ understanding of eleutheria: the asty was free, but with Piraeus in Macedonian hands the united polis was not. The situation eased by 282/1 when the Attic forts were recaptured, but since Piraeus was controlled by the Macedonians Athens was forced to use subsidiary ports. Because money and grain were the cornerstones of Athens’ fragile democracy Athenian decrees of 285/4-282/1 frequently contained the anticipatory clause, “when Athens and the Piraeus are united”. An assault on Piraeus was attempted in the later 280s when Athens bribed Hierokles, a Macedonian general, to open the gates to the Athenian army. Hierokles, however, acted as a double agent and led the Athenians into an ambush in which eight generals and four hundred and twenty troops were slaughtered. Piraeus was to remain in Macedonian hands until 229 and the wish for its return was probably a motivating factor in the Chremonidean War (below §10). Athenian eleutheria and demokratia were, as always, intrinsically connected with the removal of garrisons and the control of Piraeus and the grain supply.

Section 8: Lysimachos and Seleukid Asia, 301-262

After Ipsos, Lysimachos gained possession of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which had since 334 a tradition of freedom. Although his image as tyrant of un-free Greek cities is now questioned, it is still notable that with the exception of his concession of eleutheria to those cities of Hellespontine Phrygia that came to his side in 302 there is not a single extant

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124 IG II² 654.15-17 (Prytany XII, 285/4; App.1 num.36); 657.31, 34-5 (Prytany III, 283/2; App.1 num.38).
126 IG II² 653.21-2, 654.17-8, 32-5, 657.31-6; Agora XVI 181.30-1; Oliver 2007: 121-7. The idea is also present in IG II² 646.22-3 (295/4); SEG XXVIII 60.65-6 (270/69).
127 Polyaen. 5.17.1; Paus. 1.29.10. Oliver (2007: 56-60) dates this assault to 286/5 (cf. T.L. Shear 1978: 82-3; Gauthier 1979: 356; Dreyer 1999: 238), but a later date is not impossible. IG II² 5227a honours Chairippos who died during an assault on Mounychia, “warding off the day of slavery on behalf of your beloved fatherland”. The epigram could refer to Demetrios’ assaults in 307 or 295 or even the failed Athenian assault of the 280s.
statement of freedom during his reign, either by him or by the cities under him. Since the example of 302 is a one-off whose purpose was to gain the support of the Greek cities during his invasion of Antigonus’ empire, this would appear to mark Lysimachos’ conscious avoidance of the term eleutheria in his relations with the Greek cities under his control.

Further, Lysimachos does not appear in later inscriptions as a guarantor of eleutheria, as do Alexander and Antigonus. Although the old adage concerning absence of evidence applies – and we lack Diodoros’ narrative post-302 – the lack of references to Lysimachos granting freedom suggests that he was notably reluctant to grant or recognise the status.

On the other hand, once the Greek cities of Asia Minor came, by and large, under Seleukid sway after the battle of Korupedion in 281, Seleukos and Antiochos were able to use their position of authority to grant benefactions to them, particularly in some cases the status of freedom. A just published inscription from Aigai commissioning divine honours for Seleukos and Antiochos refers to their guarantee of eleutheria, most likely in the aftermath of the battle of Korupedion. Antiochos also granted freedom to Priene, but the exact date is unknown, although it may be early since good relations existed between both from the early 270s. An apparently successful embassy under Komeas of Lambratia was sent to Seleukos by the cities of Lemnos in 281 concerning their eleutheria; demokratia was returned to Lemnos and the island itself was returned to Athenian control.

129 Lysimachos did, however, help Elateia remove itself from “the slavish bond of tyrants” and confirm its own eleutheria, see FD III (4) 220 (App.1 num.37); Lund 1992: 181.

130 IK Ery. 31.21-6 (App.2 num.35). Numerous cities, free under Antigonus, were placed under close control by Lysimachos. The Ionian cities, free and autonomous under Antigonus (IK.Ilium 1.24-6; App.2 num.17), were placed under the control of a royal general (SEG XXXV 926; IK.Smyrna 557. Second copy; Syll. 3 368). Kolophon, free under Antigonus (Mauerbaumschriften 69; App.2 num.9), was forced to synoikise into Ephesos-Arsinoe (Paus. 1.9.7-8; Rogers 2001). Lebedos, free but similarly forced to synoikise by Antigonus (RC 3.87-90; App.2 num.16), was destroyed (Paus. 7.3.5).


132 S.E. M. 1.294; Orth 1977: 108-11 (identifying the king).

133 I.Priene 18 (c.280-270) contains three honorary decrees for the Seleukid officer Larichos (Gauthier 1980). The city became free in 297 with the removal of the tyrant Hieron (I.Priene 11; cf. IK.Eph. 2001), but this status was lost sometime before Antiochos’ benefaction. The question is when. A context under Lysimachos makes most sense, particularly since Priene stopped referring to itself as autonomous from the mid-290s (Burstein 1986b: 137-8; Crowther 1996: 226-7) and it was caught knowingly deceiving Lysimachos in his adjudication with Samos of 283/2 (RC 7). Still, a Seleukid context is not impossible, especially if Priene sided with Lysimachos at Ipsos (Lund 1992: 207-8; contra Orth 1977: 107-11). Carlsson (2005: 159-60) overviews the debate.


135 IG II* 672.18, 28. SEG XXXVIII 74 is a fragmentary second copy (Schweigert 1941: 338-9; Tracy 2003: 55). The decree details conflict between the demes Hephaistia and Myrine (II.17-39) and may be connected with IG II* 550, which concerns Athenian control of Myrine and mentions “Antigonus”. Since Tracy dates IG II* 550 to c.280-240 (2003: 109-10; SEG XLV 92[1]), another possible context is Antigonus’ restoration of Lemnos in 256/5 (below n.174).
of Lemnos echoed that of Antigonos in 307 and earned him cult honours there;\textsuperscript{136} Lysimachos, in contrast, held the island from 301-281. Tion regained its \textit{eleutheria} from Herakleia Pontika after Korupedion, but a Seleukid connection is not certain.\textsuperscript{137} After 281 Kos was free/autonomous and democratic in its relations with both Seleukos and the Ptolemies and the status may have been acknowledged by both powers.\textsuperscript{138} Democracy was also perhaps awarded to Ilion.\textsuperscript{139}

Seleukid relations with the Greek cities in Asia Minor began during the 290s-280s when in spite of Lysimachos Seleukos presented himself to them as a ruler deeply concerned with ensuring Greek \textit{eunoia} through benefaction, as Polyperchon, Antigonos, and Ptolemy had done before him.\textsuperscript{140} This increased in the build-up to, and aftermath of, Korupedion. Seleukos deliberately contrasted himself with Lysimachos by further advancing his image as pious to the gods and trustworthy in benefaction to the Greeks.\textsuperscript{141} However, Seleukos was also concerned with establishing a precedent of \textit{eunoia} through benefaction that could be used by his descendent, as is vividly detailed in a letter of 281 to his general Sopatros: “for our policy (\textit{proairesis}) is always through benefactions to please the citizens of the Greek cities and with reverence to join in increasing the honours of the gods, so that we may be the object of goodwill (\textit{eunoia}) transmissible for all time to those who come after us” (\textit{RC} 9.5-9).

Later Seleukids continued the process of granting \textit{eleutheria}, \textit{autonomia}, and \textit{demokratia} to the Greek cities of Asia Minor, in many cases in accordance with the policies and precedents of their ancestors. Between 268-262 Antiochos allowed the Ionian cities their \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{demokratia} “according to the policy (\textit{airesis}) of his ancestors (\textit{progonoi})”.\textsuperscript{142} Antiochos II awarded \textit{autonomia} and \textit{aphorologesia} to Erythrai shortly after 261 in accordance with the precedents of Alexander and Antigonos and the care shown by his

\begin{footnotes}
\item 137 Tion was subject to Herakleia (Menn. \textit{FGrH} 434 F19.1), but a coin series post-281 bears the inscription \textit{EAEYŒERIA} (Waddington 1910: 615-6 with num.4). On Herakleia at this time, see Burstein 1976: 86-9.
\item 138 Herod. 2.27 (τὴν αὐτονομίαν ὁμονόματε Θαλής λύσει) with Sherwin-White 1978: 92-7; \textit{cf.} Grieb 2008: 184-5. For Kos and Seleukos in 281, see Hallof & Habicht 1998: 110, num.7 (\textit{SEG} XLVIII 1093) with \textit{SEG} LI 1054.10-11 (c.280) and \textit{SylL} 3 398.23-8 (279/8), which both express concern for Kos’ fragile democracy.
\item 139 \textit{IK}.\textit{Ili}on 25 (\textit{App.2 num.25}), a democratic oath text dated to the early 3\textsuperscript{rd} century by the editors. Lund (1992: 120-2), Rose (2003: 27-8), and Hertel (2004: 196) disassociate it from Lysimachos, but Hertel dates it shortly after his reign. Funck (1994; \textit{SEG} XLIV 981) connects it with Seleukos’ grants of \textit{eleutheria} and \textit{demokratia} after Korupedion. See also, Düssel 2003: 197-221 (\textit{SEG} LIII 1372); Maffi 2005.
\item 140 \textit{IK}.\textit{Eph.} 1453.5-6 (300/299); \textit{IDidyma} 479.5-9, 14-16 (300/299); 480.10-13 (300/299).
\item 142 \textit{IK}.\textit{Ery}. 504.14-20 (\textit{App.2 num.33}); below n.152.
\end{footnotes}
ancestors (*progonoi*) to the city.\(^ {143}\) He also returned *eleutheria* and *demokratia* to Miletos and Didyma in 259/8,\(^ {144}\) *autonomia* and *demokratia* to Smyrna c.248-242,\(^ {145}\) and *eleutheria* and *demokratia* to Labraunda c.240.\(^ {146}\) In the cases of the Ionian League, Miletos, Smyrna, and Labraunda the return of *eleutheria* also brought a return of *demokratia*, whether guaranteed by the king or emphasised by the city. Royal confirmations of freedom and democracy reflect the strong civic preference for the empowerment of the *demos* as a guarantee of political independence, as is emphasised at Priene (300-297),\(^ {147}\) in the cities of Asia Minor (280-278),\(^ {148}\) at Kyme (280-270),\(^ {149}\) and Erythrai (c.270-260).\(^ {150}\) Further, numerous democratic oath texts of the 3rd century detail the duties of the citizen in preserving the city’s democracy and living according to its rules. Examples from the Taurie Chersonese, Erythrai, Kalymna, and Kos reveal the close inter-connection between *eleutheria* and *demokratia* in civic ideology and show that though established within the Classical Period, this continued to expand during the 3rd century (Ch.5 §2.2).\(^ {151}\)

Similarly, the ways in which *eleutheria* was understood and defined during the 5th and 4th centuries continued throughout the 3rd (see Ch.3 §1.1-2), such as tax exemption (*I.K.Ery*. 31.21-8) and the removal of garrisons (Menn. *FGrH* 434 F9) or tyrants (*I.Didyma* 358; *App. Syr*. 344). Attempts to offer a more precise definition of *eleutheria* through the imposition of modifying criteria, such as *aphorologetos*, *aphrouresia*, and *patrios politeia*, continued into

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144 *I.Didyma* 358.6-7 (*App.2 num.36*); see below pg.182 with n.101 for context. In a later letter to Miletos (c.246-241) Seleukos II refers to “the many great benefactions granted to your city by our ancestors (*progonoi*) and my father”, implying no doubt Antiochos II’s earlier liberation (*I.Didyma* 493.2-3; Corradi 1929: 218).

145 *I.Smyrna* 573.65-6 (*App.2 num.37*); cf. *FD* III (4) 153.6-9 (*App.2 num.38*) referring to *eleutheria* and *aphorologesia*. *I.Smyrna* 576 (*App.2 num.39*) is a severely fragmentary mid-3rd century inscription referring to *τὴν δη*μοκρατίαν — *τὴν πάτριον πολίτειαν*; it is perhaps connected with the synoikism, on which see now Bencivenni 2003: 203-46.


148 Menn. *FGrH* 434 F11.4.

149 SEG LIV 1229 (*App.2 num.29*) details the responsibilities of generals to preserve and not undermine Kyme’s democracy. It is perhaps connected with SEG L 1195 (dated c.270 by Gauthier in SEG LIII 1365), which honours Philistairos for a gift of weapons and mentions his concern for Kyme’s democracy, cf. *I.K.Kyme* 12.


the 3rd century. Again, this was connected with one’s ability to create and enforce definition. On the one hand, the city achieved this by exploiting moral force to persuade the king to grant benefactions and statuses, like freedom. So, the Ionian League dispatched ambassadors to Antiochos I requesting that the king take care of the cities so that they remain free, democratic, and exercising their ancestral laws. Further, these ambassadors were to “reveal [to the king] that in doing so he will be responsible for many good things for the cities and at the same time will act in accordance with the policy (airesis) of his ancestors (progonoi)” 152 Campanile emphasises the importance of reciprocity and indirect force in this passage: loyalty is displayed to the king through cult and ancestors, thus legitimising the royal line and Seleukid power; in return the guarantee of freedom, democracy and ancestral laws is requested, thus weakening the king’s position as benefactor and forcing him to respond in kind with benefactions, in this case specified by the cities themselves. 153 A similar situation appears at Erythrai which sent ambassadors to Antiochos II to show him that the city was autonomous and aphorologetos under Alexander and Antigonos, thus pressuring him to outdo his predecessors by reconfirming the city’s earlier status and granting added benefits through the remittance of the Galatian tax. 154 In both cases, it was the city that dictated the terms of its eleutheria and the criteria that constituted it by exploiting ancestral precedent, dynastic loyalty, and moral obligation.

On the other hand, however, the increased definition of eleutheria was also achieved by the king’s favouring of specific modifying criteria, such as Antigonos’ aforementioned preference for aphrouresia (§4 above), thus emphasising his ability to create and enforce definitions through a monopoly on the granting of status benefactions (see further Ch.3 §2.2). The Nesiotic League posthumously honoured Ptolemy Soter for his return of eleutheria, nomoi, patrios politeia, and his remittance of eisphorai; 155 Lysimacheia’s treaty with Antiochos I guaranteed the city’s eleutheria/autonomia, demokratia, aphorologesia, and aphrouresia, 156 while Seleukos II later recognised Smyrna’s eleutheria, autonomia, demokratia, isonomia, and aphorologesia of land and city. 157 The movement towards

152 ΙΚ.Ερυ. 504.18-20: ἀποφαινόμεθαν δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ προσέβεις διότι ἵνα τούτῳ ποιῶν πολλῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίας ἐστι ταῖς πόλεῖς· μαθητῇ ταιν καὶ ἀμα ἀκόλουθα πράξει τὴν την προγόνων αἱρεσίαν.
154 Above n.143.
156 FD III (4) 153 (App.2 num.38); cf. above n.145.
defining eleutheria was an interconnected process undertaken by both city and king through different, yet related, methods.

Section 9: The Gallic Invasions in Greece and Asia, 280-270

The king’s monopoly on status benefactions and his role as defender of the Greek cities become more clearly conceptualised through the Gallic invasions of 280-278. These allowed the king to gain support and goodwill by presenting himself as protector and defender from the barbarian threat. When the Gauls arrived in Greece and Asia their repulse was initially undertaken by the cities. In Europe, Macedon was overrun and its then king Ptolemaios Keraunos was killed in battle.158 An alliance of Greek states staged an unsuccessful defence at Thermopylai in summer/autumn 279,159 before the Gauls were eventually repulsed at Delphi in late 279 by an alliance of Aitolians, Athenians, and Phokians, with not a little divine help.160 In Asia the Gauls were ferried across the Hellespont in 278 by Nikomedes of Bithynia to be used as mercenaries in his dynastic struggle with his brother and to defend both himself and the Northern League from Seleukid expansion.161 However, they soon took to ransacking the poleis’ land, a soft target for their smash-and-grab style of warfare. Priene (I.Priene 17) and Erythrai (I.Kry. Ery. 24, 28, cf. 29) undertook their own spirited defence, as did Kyzikos and Kyme with some assistance from Philetteiros of Pergamon.162

The Gallic invasions offered the kings a golden opportunity to present themselves as defenders of the Greek cities, a means to legitimise their power and promote their own piety and Hellenism.163 In Greece Antigonos Gonatas defeated a body of Gauls at Lysimacheia in spring 277.164 Soon after, this victory was presented as being “on behalf of the soteria of the Greeks” and commemorated by stelai dedicated in Antigonos’ honour by Herakleitos of Athmonon on the Athenian akropolis during the Great Panathenaia of either 262/1 or 258/7

159 Nachtergael 1977: 140-50 (with a particular focus on source analysis).
160 Strootman 2007: 108-12; Errington 2008: 80-2. For the epigraphic testimonia, see Syll.3 398; Actes 21-6.
162 Kyzikos: OGIS 748 (=Schenkungen KNr. 241; Austin 225). For interpretation and dating, see Launey 1944; Atkinson 1968: 44-9; Tarn (1926: 155) and Segré (1930: 488-92) argue for a higher dating of events. Kyme: SEG L 1195: Austin 266 (extract); Gauthier 2003.
In Asia, the kings also began to assume roles as defenders of the Greek cities from Gallic incursions. Erythrai moved from conducting its own defence to paying Antiochos II a protective Galatian tax (*ta Galatika*). Similarly, Philetairos’ assistance to the cities of Kyme and Kyzikos ensured him substantial honours, particularly in Kyme (cult and Philetairia festival).

The Gallic Invasions lead to the creation of a new barbarian motif in Hellenistic history and historiography, a new ‘Other’. Macedon kings continued to be presented as barbarians via a parallel with the Persian Wars (Ch.6 §2-3), but the violent arrival of the Gauls allowed the Macedonian kings themselves a means of promoting their Hellenic qualities. As a *lieu de mémoire* the Gallic Invasion of Greece was paralleled with the Persian Wars in form (as a violent barbarian invasion), in space (battles at Thermopylai and Delphi), but interestingly not in concept (Ch.6 §4). The Persian Wars were as a struggle for *eleutheria*; the Gallic Invasion for *soteria*. The conceptual difference reflected the different nature of the threat posed: one was lasting and political while the other was temporary and destructive. While the Gallic Invasion provided a fresh conceptualisation of the ‘Other’ within the Hellenistic Period, one particularly employed by the Macedonian kings, it did not overtake the memory of the Persian Wars as a struggle for *eleutheria*. Thus, the Chremonidean War of 268-262 was presented as a war fought on behalf of *eleutheria* because the nature of the struggle with Macedon was political, not one of small-scale raids. The Gallic Invasions marked a re-discovery of the ‘Other’, but they did not affect the ideological relevance of the Persian Wars as the parallel *par excellence* for a struggle for *eleutheria*.

**Section 10: Antigonos Gonatas and the Chremonidean War, 268-262**

Since the departure of Demetrios to Asia in 287 Antigonos Gonatas’ power had rested upon the tyrants and garrisons, such as Piraeus and elsewhere in the Peloponnese, installed by his father and loyal to him. This system of control was understandably unpopular, but necessary for the kingdom-less king, and was exploited by Pyrrhos who invaded the Peloponnese in 272 “to set free the cities which were subject to Antigonos” (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 26.9-10). Pyrrhos died that year (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 31-4) and Antigonos’ position as king of Macedon was then secure. Nonetheless, he continued to rely on strategically placed tyrants and

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168 Above n.162.  
garrisons. This dependency contributed to the Chremonidean War which was ostensibly undertaken by Athens, Sparta, and Ptolemy Philadelphos on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks and against Antigonos’ destruction of the laws and constitutions of the Greek states. The war began in the archonship of Peithidemos (268/7) and finished in that of Antipatros (262/1) with Antigonos’ capture of Athens by siege after his destruction of its harvest. Antigonos had kept the enemy troops divided by holding Acrocorinth and the Isthmos against Areos of Sparta, and preventing the Ptolemaic troops in Attica under Patroklos from rendezvousing with either those of Athens or Sparta. Athens’ defeat came with the bitter imposition of yet another Macedonian garrison on the Museion, as well as the attendant loss of the Attic forts; freedom again lost with garrisons installed. However, as a measure of the connection between aphrouresia and eleutheria, Athens’ freedom was returned by Antigonos in 256/5 when he removed the garrisons at Museion, Eleusis, Panakton, Phyle, Rhamnous, and Aphidnai, restored control of Lemnos and Imbros to Athens, and gave to the city the independence to elect its own officials. Piraeus, however, remained in Antigonos’ control.

The evidence for the Chremonidean War is severely fragmented. We are fortunate, however, to have three important epigraphic texts which elucidate the ways in which Athens conceived of and presented the war as a struggle for eleutheria from Macedonian control. First, the Chremonides Decree of 268/7 (IG II² 686/7). Proposed by Chremonides son of Eteokles of Aithalides, it declares war on Macedon and very carefully presents this as a struggle for eleutheria (Ch.6 §3.1). This was done by assimilating Macedon to Persia and using Athens’ defence of Greece’s eleutheria in 480/79 as a parallel for her present actions. As with the Hellenic War, this process enforced Athens’ hegemony by reference to the past. It presented the war as part of a wider cultural and quasi-national struggle against a foreign,


171 IG II² 686/7.13-16 (App.1 num.43).


barbarian opponent (in the mould of Persia), thus assimilating to it a pre-existing, ready-made ideological context that asserted Athenian hegemony, Macedonian ‘otherness’, and Hellenic unity through the quest for *eleutheria*. In contrast with the Hellenic War, however, the Chremonides Decree does emphasise some new elements, namely Atheno-Spartan unity and the need for *homoioi* between the Greek cities as a prerequisite of *eleutheria* from Macedon. Athens and Sparta had not stood united since 480/79 so their alliance now emphasised both the connection with the Persian Wars and the perception of the Chremonidean War as a national, Hellenic struggle in their image.175

Second, the Glaukon Decree of c.261-246.176 Proposed by the synedrion of the Greeks at Plataia it honours Glaukon son of Eteokles of Aithalides, brother of Chremonides and officer of Ptolemy Philadelphos (Ch.6 §3.2). Glaukon fought with Athens during the Chremonidean War and after Athens’ defeat took up service with Ptolemy Philadelphos (Teles *On Exile* 23). The decree re-emphasises the tropes explored within the Chremonides Decree – connection with the Persian Wars, focus on Greek *eleutheria, homoioi* as an aspect of this, Ptolemaic assistance to the Greeks – and provides our first evidence for both the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and Homooioi of the Greeks as well as the Eleutheria Games in honour of the dead of 480/79. The origin of both cult and Games is debated, but their evident importance within the mid-3rd century suggests that they are closely connected with the programme presented in the Chremonides Decree: *homoioi, eleutheria*, and the remembrance of the Persian Wars. Both cult and Games appear to have operated as foci of anti-Macedonianism, a dynamic aided by the importance of Plataia as a lieue de mémoire for *eleutheria* and the Persian Wars. This is furthered by a recently published decree in honour of Eudamos, assassin of Aristodamos, the Antigonid-backed tyrant of Megalopolis. That this decree was to be announced at the Eleutheria Games elucidates their politicisation and the concomitant use of Plataia and its historical traditions – Eleutheria Games and joint cult – as a mid-3rd century recruiting ground for a loose alliance of anti-Antigonid states.177

Third, the honorary decree for Strombichos of 266/5 (*IG* II² 666+667; *Naturalization D*78a+b). The decree was passed in winter 266/5, in the middle of the Chremonidean War, and records that Strombichos was a Macedonian officer who had been stationed in the Museion garrison by Demetrios Poliorcetes but had defected to the Athenian side in 287; he helped Olympiodoros’ troops capture the garrison and aided the *demos*’ struggle for

The timing of the decree is notable. The Chremonidean War was, in part, Athens’ attempt to remove the Macedonian garrison from Piraeus, an action deemed necessary for the full appreciation of the *eleutheria* of the united polis (asty and Piraeus). By winter 266/5 the war had been going on for two years and Athens had united with the forces of neither Patrokllos nor Areos. By turning to the past and honouring Strombichos, now twenty years after the event in question, Athens revisited another potential means of attaining its goal: the removal of garrisons through the defection or bribery of Macedonian officers. This approach had failed spectacularly at Piraeus in the late 280s but was ultimately to prove successful in 229. Strombichos’ example from 287 bears many similarities to that of Euphrôn of Sikyon in 318: an event and personality of the past is revisited and re-honoured because his previous actions are of present importance to the city. In both cases they had liberated a city by removing a garrison from it – Sikyon for Euphrôn; Athens and the Museion garrison for Strombichos – and were seen by Athens as successful historical solutions to the perennial problem of the Macedonian garrison in Mounychia and the attainment of *eleutheria* from it.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I offered a narrative history of the early Hellenistic Period based around the use of *eleutheria* within ruler-city relations. I presented an outline of the historical development and use of *eleutheria* that will be explored in greater depth within the subsequent chapters. Rather than assuming a division between the Classical and Hellenistic periods I traced the continuities in the use of *eleutheria* and the ways in which it was understood. Both city and king used it to expand hegemony by claiming to liberate the oppressed from external control (§§1-3, 5-6, 8, 10). As in the 5th century, *eleutheria* continued to be undermined by garrisons (§§3-4) and taxation (§§1, 5, 8), while remaining closely connected with democracy and one’s ability to govern according to one’s own laws (§§1, 3, 6-8, 10).

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178 *IG II*² 666.7-15 (App.1 num.46). The decree was erected in duplicate, which Tracy (2003b: 55) believes reflects the importance of the honourand’s actions. Komeas of Lamptrai is another example of honours erected in duplicate (above ns.134-5).


180 Osborne (1981-83: II 164) argues that Strombichos was honoured for his help during the Chremonidean War. However, the decree’s focus is clearly on the revolt of 287. Similar is *IG II*² 467 of 306/5, which ostensibly honours Timosthenes for help during the Four Years War but devotes only two lines (ll.22–4) to this compared with nineteen lines to his actions during the Hellenic War (ll.3-22).
I was sensitive to the continuity of the use and understanding of *eleutheria* from the Classical to Hellenistic Periods. *Eleutheria* continued to be seen to be undermined by oppressive foreign control and remained an important rallying cry for release from such control. While the nature of that control changed in many cases from that exercised by a city to that exercised by a king, its manifestations remained the same: garrisons, taxation, submission to external laws/authority, and the imposition of tyrannies. The growing synonymity of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* seen from the early 4th century continued into the 3rd, and the use of modifying criteria like *aphorologesia* and *aphrouresia* as a means of defining *eleutheria* was advanced by both civic petition and royal status definition and so remained central to its significance within international diplomacy (§§3-4, 8, 10).

With an eye towards the subsequent analytical chapters, I sketched the importance of *eleutheria* as a medium of interaction between city and king. *Eleutheria* was employed in different yet connected ways by both parties and served as a point of dialogue for promoting either unity or discord. Specific attention was placed on the royal use of *eleutheria* as a means of ensuring Greek goodwill (*eunoia*) and support, both for expansionist campaigns (§§3-6) and as a means of unifying their empire (§§1, 4, 8); it provided a means of defining a king’s relationship with his subjects through persuasion and patronage rather than force and military might. To ensure support kings were concerned with appearing truthful and sincere and so granted real, tangible benefactions. The civic awareness of such royal concerns allowed cities to use moral force as a means of attaining and perpetuating such benefactions. *Eleutheria* was a slogan and cynically employed at times, but it played an important and central role in the relationship between city and king (further, Ch.3-4).

Also, in anticipation of the subsequent thematic chapters, I was aware of the important role played by the memory and commemoration of *eleutheria* (and the Persian Wars) as a means of defining and manipulating the present. The use of a strong, aggressive democratic ideology to adapt the past to the needs of the present is particularly apparent at Athens with its cycles of oligarchy and democracy (§§2-3, 6-7). Reference to both the Persian Wars (§§1-2, 9-10) and the Hellenic War of 323/2 (§§3, 6) was used to ascribe to later conflicts a pre-existing ideological programme based around the concept of *eleutheria*. The concept of the *lieu de mémoire* shows that the processes of this appropriation are dynamic and are formed through institutions (League of Corinth emulating Hellenic League of 481-478, §1), action (present wars paralleled with past ones, §§1-3, 9-10), space (Corinth and Plataia, §§1, 2, 10), and cult (Zeus Eleutherios at Athens and Plataia, §§1-2, 10).
PART TWO
ANALYSIS
Chapter 3: Analysing and Understanding Eleutheria in the Early Hellenistic Period

“Freedom…required definition, and unlike the Romans, the Greeks had trouble with definitions.”

Welles 1965: 32

“It was the political theory of the day that cities were sovereign…There was no room in the theory for a king of a large territorial state to rule over a city, nor for a satrap either. But, as so often, people managed well enough without paying too much attention to the theory.”

Grainger 1990: 136

“En principe, la liberté et l’autonomie excluaient la païement d’un tribute au souverain et l’installation d’une garrison royale dans la cité.”

Migeotte 2005: 195

Introduction

Statements of freedom can be read in different ways with each conditioning one’s understanding of eleutheria. For example, according to the Peace of Nikias of 421 Delphi was to be autoteles, autodikos, and autonomos (Th. 5.18.2). In his study of autonomia, Ostwald read this exclusively, understanding that there existed a form of autonomia compatible with taxation and interference with the laws. Hansen read this inclusively and argued that autoteles and autodikos simply intensified the meaning of autonomia and defined two specific aspects of it.\(^1\) This is paradigmatic of the difficulties of understanding eleutheria. In 309, when Iasos allies with Ptolemy and was acknowledged as eleutheros, autonomos, aphrouretos, and aphorogetos (IK.Iasos 2), does this mean that there existed a form of eleutheria compatible with a phoura (garrison) and phoros (tax), or rather that aphrouresia and aphorologesia were two elements of eleutheria and simply intensified its meaning?

Crucially, both readings are semantically possible because the expression is ambiguous. However, some years later, c.305-283, Iasos again describes itself as eleutheros and autonomos even though it contributes a syntaxis (contribution), hosts a Ptolemaic phylake (defence), and is under the jurisdiction of a regional overseer or two (IK.Iasos 3). How is this

\(^1\) Ostwald 1982: 7; Hansen 1995a: 30-2.
compatible with Iasos’ earlier position as *aphrouretos* and *aphorologetos*? The answer raises two interesting points for this chapter. First, *phylake* and *syntaxis* are different terms and so compatible with the strict conditions of the 309 treaty, which only excluded a *phroura* and *phoros*. They denote a different intention and ideology by emphasising protection, negotiation, and synergy rather than oppression and taxation. Second, *eleutheria* is adaptable to the necessities of a situation. *Eleutheria* and *autonomia* originally appeared to guarantee exemption from taxation (*phoros*) and garrisoning (*phroura*), but this does not mean that they were incompatible with other forms of financial or military interference. Thus, the inherent ambiguity of the mantra ‘free, untaxed, and ungarrisoned’ is put to work: by itself, *IK.Iasos* 2 is read best by Hansen, but with the addition of *IK.Iasos* 3 Ostwald’s reading becomes preferable (with the necessary disclaimer on terminologies). Each reading is correct in part and each is equally valid for understanding *eleutheria*. Neither, however, takes full cognisance of the adaptability of *eleutheria* to the necessities of different situations. This is what makes it so difficult to define and so useful an aspect of ruler-city relations, and this is what this chapter seeks to explore.

This chapter is divided into two sections, with the first offering a framework for the second. Section 1 deals with two of the most important features seen to negate *eleutheria*: taxation and garrisons. I repeat the argument that grants of *aphrouresia* and *aphorologesia* only absolved the city from the *phroura* and *phoros* and were compatible with other impositions like the *phylake* or *syntaxis*. Furthermore, I argue that these features need not always undermine a state’s *eleutheria*, in fact they could be perfectly compatible with it, even contributory to it. Section 2 expands on this and in three parts explores the different ways of analysing, defining, and understanding *eleutheria*. Focus is placed on the adaptable use in action of *eleutheria* as an aspect of ruler-city relations. Part 1 looks at defining *eleutheria* through Positive and Negative understandings of freedom. It argues against a single meaning for *eleutheria* and emphasises instead the difficulties in defining freedom based on the ancient criteria used to classify it. This, more than anything else, argues for the fundamentally adaptive nature of *eleutheria* in use and understanding. Building from this, Part 2 focuses on its use in action and shows how seemingly mutually exclusive readings of *eleutheria* could appear in one situation. I argue that for a more layered appreciation of its meaning we must analyse each of its apparently contradictory or cynical uses as valid interpretations of

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3 For oligarchy and tyranny, see Ch.5.
eleutheria. Part 3 treats of eleutheria as part of the typology of statuses between city and king. Having already established the fluidity of its use in action, Part 3 eschews the creation of rigorous typologies and argues for a more malleable understanding of the use and meaning of eleutheria in ruler-city relations.

SECTION 1: NEGATIONS OF ELEUTHERIA

1.1: Garrisons

The foreign garrison is the quintessential example of an oppressive imposition on a city’s eleutheria. It is, however, evident that in certain cases the imposition of garrisons was not only compatible with eleutheria but even a defence (phylake) of it. Here I wish to look briefly at such contrasting views of the garrison and emphasise how it could be understood either as an imposition on or defence of freedom. Connected with this is the distinction between a phroura (garrison) and phylake (defence). The view is not new, but it is important and needs re-emphasis: a city subject to a garrison was not necessarily un-free. Such manifestations of royal power did not debase eleutheria into a meaningless slogan. Rather, eleutheria was adaptable to the necessities of power and more than one understanding of it existed: forms of garrisons and taxation were compatible with eleutheria for cities under royal control, just as they were incompatible for cities outside it. Employing again the very real distinction between understanding freedom in a Primary or Secondary sense, it is important to recognise the different understandings of eleutheria based on its use by cities within and outwith royal control.

The imposition of a garrison by a foreign power was generally seen as oppressive and indicative of foreign control, as reactions to Sparta’s garrisoning of Athens in 404 and Thebes in 382 show. As a result of these actions, the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy saw freedom from garrisons as a core aspect of eleutheria (IG II² 43.23). Later, and echoing the events of 382, Thebes asserted in 335 that she could not be free while the Kadmea was garrisoned by Macedon (below §2.2). Hellenistic examples are legion. The Macedonian garrison (phroura) in Mounychia from 322-307 and 295-229 was consistently seen to be a negation of Athens’ eleutheria. In 323 Rhodes regained its eleutheria by removing its

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7 D.S. 18.66.2 (318); 20.45-46.1 (307); IG II² 657.34-6 (283/2; App.1 num.38); 834.10-12 (229/8): καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποκατέστησεν ἐν τῇ πόλις μετὰ τού ἀδελφοῦ Μικάνος μετὰ τούς ἀποστόλας τὸν Πειραῖα. See in general, Habicht 1997 passim; Oliver 2007: 116-33, 169-71; Wallace forthcoming A.
Macedonian *phroura*. In 319 Kyzikos chose to resist Arrhidaios forcefully and undergo siege rather than accept a garrison (*phroura*) and change of constitution. In 313/2 Antigonos’ generals Dokimos and Medeios freed Miletos by removing Asandros’ *phroura*, an event Miletos saw as the return of its *eleutheria* and *autonomia*. In 281/0 Herakleia regained its *eleutheria* from Lysimachos by bribing the troops of his garrison (*phroura*), imprisoning their commander Herakleides, and razing the akropolis walls. Similarly, the Greek cities of the Black Sea asserted their *autonomia* from Lysimachos in 314/3 by expelling his *phrourai*. Furthermore, a series of 3rd century anti-tyranny decrees make territorial inviolability a key component of the free, democratic state. Common to all these examples is the presentation of the garrison as a *phroura*, a restrictive foreign imposition on the city’s freedom.

In certain cases, however, the presence of foreign garrisons could be justified as a defence against an opponent who threatened the city’s freedom. This understanding depended upon the reality of the threat posed by that opponent and the ability of the ruling power to present the garrison as a defensive feature contributing to the preservation of the city’s *eleutheria*. Under Philip and Alexander the League of Corinth had Macedonian garrisons in Ambrakia, Thebes, and Corinth, and appointed officials “in charge of the common defence” (οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι). Their ostensible purpose was to maintain the *status quo* and ensure the peaceful co-existence of League members. Since the opening lines of the League Charter claimed that all members were “free and autonomous” (D. 17.8), the garrisons and commanders officially contributed to this freedom even if they undermined a basic tenet of *eleutheria* as defined some forty years earlier in the charter of the Second Athenian League.

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9 D.S. 18.51-2; IG XII (5) 444.114; cf. Ath. 11.509a with Heckel 2006: 295 n.128.
10 D.S. 19.75.3-4; J.Milet. 123.1-4 (App.2 num.7). Other examples of the Antigonid removal of garrisons are Opus in 313/2 (D.S. 19.78.5; FD III (4) 463 [App.1 num.11]) and Troizen (RIG 452.7-9 [App.1 num.27]) and Argos in 303 (Plu. Demetr. 25.1; ISE 39; cf. Schenkungen KNr. 42-3).
12 D.S. 19.73. See also Burstein 1986a; 1986b; 1980: 75, where he argues that Lysimachos only used garrisons in “special circumstances”.
13 Different features are emphasised. SEG LI 1105.24-30 (teicha); Herzog 1942: 15 (tan akran); IOSPE I 401.8-12, 18-22 (limena, teiche, chorai); SV 545.23-6 (*phrourai*).
14 Bertoli 2003: 97-8. A good example is D.S. 19.66.3, where Aristodemos garrisons Kyllene to ensure its safety (τὴν ἀσφαλείαν) from Alexandros, son of Polyperchon.
Confederacy, namely the absence of garrisons. However, the garrisons were widely seen neither as defence from Persia, itself endangered by Macedonian imperialism, nor guarantees of inter-polis peace. For many they were simply the impositions of an oppressive power. Accordingly, the Akarnanians expelled their garrison upon Philip’s death and Thebes sought to expel the garrison on Kadmea in 335, declaring that she could not be free so long as she was garrisoned (D.S. 17.3.3-4.3; Din. 1.19-20). The view of garrisons as defending freedom was not in itself impossible, but the problem lay in the fact that although Philip and Alexander sought to present the garrisons as a defence of eleutheria, as ensured by membership of the League of Corinth, they served no ostensible purpose for the likes of Thebes, Athens, and Argos, other than repressing by force their own eleutheria.

There are, however, examples of foreign garrisons – frequently a phylake but sometimes a phroura – serving defensive purposes and contributing directly or indirectly to the city’s freedom. In 334, Alexander installed garrisons in Chios (phylake; praesidium) and Priene (phroura), in each case justified by reference to the city’s eleutheria. With further garrisons in Mytilene (phroura) and Rhodes (praesidium) the connection between defensive garrisons and civic freedom was probably widespread. From 315 onwards Antigonid policy focused on aphrouresia as a defining feature of freedom, but when garrisons did appear they were apparently justified as a defence of the eleutheria guaranteed under Antigonid suzerainty. Iasos, liberated in 313, was garrisoned by Polemaios – under Antigonus’ orders – by 309 at the latest, perhaps as a precautionary defence of its freedom (IK. Iasos 2). After the Peace of 311 Ptolemy charged Antigonos with having broken the clause regarding Greek freedom because he had garrisoned the cities of Kilikia, but these garrisons were likely precautions against the kind of destructive raids launched by Ptolemy himself on these cities in summer 312 (D.S. 19.79.6-7).

16 Above pg.46 n.5. Bertoli 2003 uses the charter (IG II² 43) as a yardstick against which to measure subsequent uses of eleutheria. This is contentious. The charter is an attempted definition constructed in response to Spartan actions; it is not the conclusive definition, such a thing did not exist.

17 Chios: GHI 84a; Curt. 4.8.12-13. Priene: GHI 86b.14-15; that Alexander ‘allows’ the garrison (καὶ τὴν φρουρὰ ἠλάβε ἔτσι ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἄκοραν) may suggest that it was controlled by Priene, contra Miletas 2008: 101; cf. Sherwin-White 1985: 86 n.141 “Alexander’s recommendation about the phroura is too fragmentary for any certainty as to its original purpose.” Mytilene: Att. An. 2.1.4; cf. Curt. 4.5.9. Rhodes: Curt. 4.8.12-13. Hauben (above n.8) argues that it undermined Rhodes’ freedom.

18 D.S. 19.61.3: ἐγκαλέσαντες Ἀντιγόνω φρουρὰς τινὰς διείληφε τῶν πόλεων.

19 Simpson (1959: 404-5) argues that, where it appears, garrisoning was a necessity, not a weakness in Antigonid policy relating to Greeks. This is exculpatory, but Antigonos was more sparing with garrisons than, say, Kassandros and Ptolemy in Greece and the Aegean.

20 D.S. 20.19.3-6: ἐγκαλεσάντες Ἀντιγόνω διότι φρουρὰς τινὰς διείληφε τῶν πόλεων.
Demetrios’ Hellenic League of 302/1 justified the installation of garrisons in numerous locations around Greece as a defence of eleutheria from the very real, and very recent, threat of Kassandros and his generals. At Corinth, Prepelaos’ phroura was removed from the Acrocorinth and replaced, on the Corinthians’ own insistence, with a defensive phylake until such time as the war with Kassandros ends. Further garrisons at key locations such as Aigosthena (perhaps also Megara) and possibly Chalkis ensured wider security without risking public opinion. Late in 302 Prepelaos attacked Ephesos, Teos, Kolophon, Erythrai, and Klazomenai. Diodoros’ account implies that some, if not all, held Antigonid garrisons, particularly Ephesos, whose constitution Prepelaos altered. However, an honorary decree of the Ionian League of 306-301, of which all the above cities were members, refers to “the eleutheria and autonomia of the cities”, thus signifying that although holding Antigonid garrisons these cities remained free and autonomous. In fact, individual League poleis like Teos, Kolophon, and Erythrai explicitly refer to themselves as free during Antigonos’ reign.

Further, and emphasising again the distinction between an imposing phroura and a defensive phylake, Diodoros records that when Demetrios re-took Ephesos in late 302 he removed Prepelaos’ phroura and replaced it with his own phylake. Similarly, Lysimachos’ garrisons and troops defended Priene and other cities during Demetrios’ raids in 287/6. Later, Seleukid troops and garrisons in Asia Minor offered protection to the cities against Gallic raids. Although not apparent in each and every case, it is clear that a contributing factor in

\[\text{Reference footnotes}\]

\[\text{1} \text{D.S. 20.103.1-3; τὴν Κόρινθον, ἦν ἕφροφος Πρεπελάος…τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν καταφυγόντων…τοὺς Κορινθίους ἐλευθέροις [Demetrios] παρεισήγηται φυλακὴν ἐις τῶν Αἰγιαλοκάνθων, βουλομένων τῶν πολιτῶν διὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τιμεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν μέχρι ἄν νὰ ὁ πρὸς Κάσσανδρον καταλυθῇ πόλεμος.}

\[\text{2} \text{Aigosthena: above pg.62.3 with n.88. Chalkis: implied by the fact that Chalkis was the gathering point for Demetrios’ land and sea forces in spring 302 (D.S. 20.110.2; Knoepfler Décrets XIII, 10, XIV [=IG XII (9) 198, 199+230, 210]; cf. Plu. Demetr. 43.5).}

\[\text{3} \text{D.S. 20.107.4-5; IK.Eph. 1449 with Rogers 2001: 615-20. On Prepelaos’ campaign, see pg.65 above.}

\[\text{4} \text{IK.Ilion 1.24-6 (App.2 num.17). For the speculative attribution of this text to the reign of Lysimachos, see pg.57 n.61.}

\[\text{5} \text{RC 3-4.87-89 (App.2 num.16); Mauerbauninschriften 69.6-7 (App.2 num.9); IK.Ery. 31.22-3 (App.2 num.35).}

\[\text{6} \text{D.S. 20.111.3; καὶ τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ Πρεπελάος τοῦ Λυσιμάχου στρατηγοῦ παρεισήγηται φυλακὴν ἐις τὴν Κόρινθον καταφυγὸν ἐπιτηροῦν, ἢδεν ἐν Φιλιππαι ἔτι τὴν ἔκθειν καταστόχους παρατηρεῖν ἐκ Ελλησποντος. See also Rogers 2001: 615-20 with IK.Eph. 1448, 1450 (=Bielman Retour 16), 1452-3, 1455. A phroura on Andros in 308, installed by either Antigonos or his renegade general Polemaios, is recorded by Diodoros (D.S. 20.37.1; above pg.61 with n.80).}

\[\text{7} \text{I.Priene 14 (=BD 11), 15 (=RC 6), cf. 16 (=RC 8).}

\[\text{8} \text{OGIS 748 (=Austin 225); Grainger 1990: 205-6; Ma 1999: 257-68, reading OGIS 219. Priene, under Sotas, also held fortified positions against the Gauls (I.Priene 17.24-5, 30-4). Erythrai conducted its own defence but a Seleukid military presence is likely (IK.Ery. 24; Barbantani 2010: 89-90). One Athenaios Dionysiou was an Erythraian general in the 270s and collected money for the Galatian war (IK.Ery. 24.5, 17); he is to be identified with the Athenaios who commanded a Seleukid naval base at this time (IK.Ilion 33.53-4; OGIS 221; RC 13; Austin 164).}
the role of the garrison was the idea that it contributed something tangible to the maintenance of the city’s _eleutheria_. In this regard it appears at times as a _phylake_ rather than a _phroura_.

As already mentioned, _phylake_ has a meaning difference from _phroura_. Whereas the latter implies oppression and control, the former denotes defence and cooperation and frequently appears to be compatible with the city’s _eleutheria_, to which its defensive function could be seen to contribute.\(^{29}\) If the king was bound to recognise a city as free then it was important that his imposition of royal troops was seen to protect the city’s freedom rather than restrict it. Hence the use of _phylake_ over _phroura_. The different terminology allowed him to simultaneously confirm a city as ungarrisoned (_aphrouretos_) yet still impose on it an ostensibly defensive military presence (_phylake_), all while maintaining his ideological commitment to the city’s _eleutheria_ and respecting the city’s privileged status as ungarrisoned. Though beyond the chronological limits of this work, the example of Philip V and Lysimacheia displays particularly clearly this distinction between _phylake_ and _phroura_ and its use in action. In 198 Flamininus and Philip V met in conference in Lokris. There the Aitolian Alexandros accused Philip of stationing a _phroura_ in Lysimacheia. Philip responded by claiming that it was not a _phroura_ but rather a _phylake_, and that it defended Lysimacheia from the Thracians.\(^{30}\) Earlier examples of this phenomenon have already been highlighted at Iasos under Ptolemy and Ephesos and Corinth under Demetrios.

It was also important that the city accept the ruler’s interpretation and recognise the imposition of a garrison as an ostensible defence of freedom and stability. For this to happen the garrison had to be actively and effectively seen to accomplish its defensive goals. In 322 Athens agreed to a temporary garrison in Mounychia, but when the pro-Antipatros government began to see it as repressive and requested its removal Antipatros refused. This was a major source of contention and eventually turned the moderate oligarchs against Kassandros in 319.\(^{31}\) If the garrison was seen to not fulfil its purpose, or to negate that which it set out to achieve, then its validity could be questioned. Chios accepted Alexander’s _phylake_ in 334 “until the Chians are reconciled” (_GHI_ 84a.17); once this happened Alexander abided by his word and removed the garrison upon Chian appeal (Curt. 4.8.12-13; Rhodes also appealed). Similarly, Iasos accepted Ptolemy’s _phylake_ and willingly paid a contribution

\(^{29}\) An early example of this use may be _IG_ I\(^1\) 38. It concerns Athenian affairs on Aigina c.457-445 and mentions a _φυλακὲν [...]. Aigina was allegedly guaranteed its _autonomia_ in the Thirty Years Peace of 446 and this may perhaps be connected with that event (above pg.24 with n.31). Woodhead (1974: 378-80) sees this as Athens tightening its defence of Aigina, but Lewis (1954: 24) aptly highlights the use of _phylake_ rather than _phroura_. See also Figueira 1981: 22 n.104.

\(^{30}\) _Plb_. 18.3.11, 4.5-6: οὐ τῆς _φρουροῦντας... ἀλλὰ τοῖς παραφυλάττοντας_. _Cf_. Chaniotis 2008: 112-14.

\(^{31}\) _D.S._ 18.48.1, _cf_. 74.3; Wallace _forthcoming A_.

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to it because it fulfilled its duty of protecting the land (*IK.Iasos* 3). Corinth went further and requested a *phylake* from Demetrios, thus authorising a royal imposition as a manifestation of civic will.\(^{32}\) In Itanos on Krete Patrokles was honoured for maintaining the city’s security and allowing it to employ its own laws; a garrison is highly likely.\(^{33}\) The garrison as a defence of *eleutheria*, security, or a city’s laws marks it and its purpose as a point of cohesion between civic mindset and royal will.\(^{34}\) Once the garrison ceased fulfilling this role or the city ceased ascribing to this ideology it would then be seen to be oppressive.

There are, however, difficulties in making a universally clear-cut distinction between a *phroura* as an imposition and a *phylake* as a defensive feature.\(^{35}\) The difference between both may be little more than ideological. For example, Demetrios’ *phylake* on the Acrocorinth lasted from 303 until its expulsion by Aratos in 243.\(^{36}\) At some point its function and public perception changed from that of a *phylake* to that of a *phroura*, presumably when it ceased to be a defensive feature against Kassandros and become instead a symbol of Antigonid control. The word *phylake* has clearly defensive connotations, but in practice the garrison had to be seen to fulfil this defensive role. In 313/2 Antigonos’ general Polemaios removed Kassandros’ *phroura* from Chalkis and left the city free and ungarrisoned (D.S. 19.78.2). However, an Athenian decree of post-306/5 reveals that Polemaios had earlier stationed one [---]otimos [ἐπὶ τὴν ἔναυσιν στρατοθηκὴν, most likely denoting (and euphemising) his command of a garrison.\(^{37}\) Whether installed under Antigonos’ orders or by Polemaios’ own volition after his rebellion from Antigonos, the removal of the garrison by [---]otimos was seen to herald the return of *eleutheria* to Chalkis in accordance with Antigonid policy.\(^{38}\) Demetrios’ and Polemaios’ *phylakai* were ostensibly defensive, but both, despite their euphemistic nomenclature, came to be seen as oppressive. Terminology was important – hence the general distinction between *phroura* and *phylake* – but it was not enough. A *phylake* that did not contribute to the wellbeing of the city was a powerful restriction on that city’s *eleutheria*.

So, the garrison need not always be an oppressive feature. Rather, it could be compatible with – indeed ensure – the city’s *eleutheria*. However, certain criteria had to be met. First, the


\(^{33}\) *I.Cret.* III (4) 2, 3; Spyridakis 1970: 71-7; Bagnall 1976: 120-6.

\(^{34}\) Heuß 1937: 230-1.

\(^{35}\) See Ma 1999: 117-18.

\(^{36}\) D.S. 20.103.3; Plu. *Arat.* 16-23; Plb. 2.43.4; 4.8.4; Polyaen. 4.6.1

\(^{37}\) *IG II*² 469.2-3 (*App.1* num.17).

\(^{38}\) *IG II*² 469.3-8 (*App.1* num.17). The situation is similar to that of Megara in 307/6: a prominent city dramatically left ungarrisoned, but troops stationed nearby serve the same purpose (above pgs.62-3 with n.88).
city had to accept the royal garrison by acknowledging its validity and recognising its role in defending the city’s stability and freedom. Second, the garrison itself had to live up to this and actually defend the land and protect the city from the incursions of foreign powers. This was its function. If it failed in this regard then it risked being seen as nothing but a tool of royal domination and the eventual impetus for popular revolt. Ultimately, the perception of a garrison’s function was closely connected with its name. A city may be aphrouretos but the presence of a phylake was within the strict semantic boundaries of its status. Such linguistic delicacies allowed manoeuvrability but also contributed to the ideological definition of the garrison’s purpose. The city was no longer garrisoned, it was defended. Little difference may exist in practice — a phylake ensures civic loyalty as much as a phroura — but words are important; they helped define positively the nature of the relationship and they influenced the way people conceived of such impositions. For a garrison to be seen to be a defence of a city’s freedom it had to balance both ideology and action; the phylake had actually to defend.

1.2: Taxation

Tribute was one of the most noticeable and burdensome aspects of foreign control, but like the imposition of garrisons it could appear in different guises (syntaxis, eisphora, dapane, Galatika), some compatible with or even contributory to eleutheria. A vital distinction here is that between the phoros and the syntaxis. The term for freedom from taxation is aphorologesia, a grant which, strictly speaking, absolves the city only of the phoros; a city was never asyntaxetos or adapanetos. A city can be free yet make any number of other forms of financial contribution.

Like garrisons, taxation was frequently seen to be an imposition on the eleutheria and autonomia of the city. In the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the allies were to be free and subject neither to garrison, archon, nor phoros, all in direct contrast with Sparta’s imperialist policies over the previous three decades. For the Greek cities of Asia Minor the Persian phoros and/or dasmos was a mark of their subservience to the Great King. Alexander realised this and dispatched Alkimachos to free the cities of Ionia and Aiolia by installing democracies, removing oligarchies, and cancelling the phoroi they paid to the barbarians,

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41 GHI 22.19-23 (App.1 num.3); Ch.1 §2 (historical context).
Antigonos and Antiochos I re-established Alexander’s gift of *eleutheria* and *aphorologesia* to Erythrai, while Ptolemy Soter likewise recognised Iasos’ *eleutheria* and *aphorologesia*.43 Antiochos I or II also confirmed identical terms with Lysimacheia.44 Ptolemy is said to have freed the cities of the Nesiotic League by returning their laws and lessening certain *eisphoria*, probably assessed by Demetrios in the 290s.45 Later, Ptolemy Philadelphos claimed that his father removed “harsh and difficult” *phoroi* and *paragologia* from Miletos.46

Some forms of taxation, particularly the *syntaxis*, appear to have been compatible with the city’s *eleutheria*. As we have seen with garrisons, terminology is important. *Phoros* and *syntaxis* may have achieved much the same goal, but the former’s implication of oppressive and foreign taxation, arising primarily from its use under the 5th century Athenian Empire, was a very real concern. Under the Athenian Empire *phoros* was compatible with *autonomia*, but by the 4th century that compatibility had ceased.47 Theopompos states that when founding the Second Athenian Confederacy the Athenians were careful to “call the *phoros syntaxis*, since the Greeks bear with difficulty the name *phoros*”.48 *Syntaxis* was a pseudonym for *phoros* but the name change was important since it brought a change in implication, as Plutarch himself makes clear (Solon 15.2):

> “Now later writers observe that the ancient Athenians used to cover up the ugliness of things with auspicious and kindly terms, giving them polite and endearing names. Thus they called harlots ‘companions’, taxes ‘contributions’, the garrison of a city its ‘guard’, and the prison a ‘chamber’.”49

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42 Arr. An. 1.17.10, 18.1-2; I.Ery 31.21-8; GHI 86b.
43 IK.Ery. 31.21-8 (App.2 num.35); IK.Iasos 2 (App.2 num.12).
44 IK.Ilion 45 (App.2 num.26); Ma 1999: 266-7 (on the date). The IK. editor dates it c.196, under Antiochos III, as does Piejko (1988: 154-5), who sees Philip V’s treaty with Lysimacheia as its prototype.
46 I.Milet. 139.4-7 (RC 14): τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἡμέτερον...||...φόρον τε | σκληρὸν καὶ χαλεπὸν απολύσαντα καὶ παραγωγῶν παρ’ ύμιν, α’ τινες | τοῦ βασιλέων κατέστησαν.
47 In the Peace of Nikias of 421 those cities that paid the *phoros* to Athens were to be autonomous (τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερόντας τὸν φόρον τῶν ἐπ᾽ Ἀριστείδου αυτονόμους εἶναι), see Thuc. 5.18.5; Ostwald 1982: 9, 28; Hornblower 1996: 477.
48 FGPh 115 F98: ἐλέγαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς φόρους συντάξεις, ἐπειδὴ χαλεπῶς ἐφέρον οἱ Ἑλληνεῖς τὸν φόρον ὄνομα. Theopompos’ use of *phero* denotes the burden of the *phoros*; it is a load given from one to the other while a *syntaxis* is an arrangement between two. See also GHI 22.23 (App.1 num.3): μήτε φόρον φέροντι.
49 ὁ δ’ οὖν οἱ νεωτέροι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λέγουσι τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων δυσχερείας ὀνόμασι χρηστοῖς καὶ φιλανθρώποις επικαλυπτότας αὐτοῖς ὑποκορίζεθαι, τὰς μὲν πόρνας ἑταίρας, τοὺς δὲ φόρους συντάξεις, φιλακάς δὲ τὰς φροντικάς τῶν πόλεων, οἴκημα δὲ τὸ δεσμοτήριον καλοῦντας.
Syntaxis was understood as a contribution and so was compatible with eleutheria. Under the Second Athenian Confederacy members were free and untaxed (phoros), but contributed a syntaxis towards the war against Persia and the maintenance of their newly-found eleutheria and demokratia.\(^{51}\) Antigonos extracted a dapane from Skepsis and elsewhere during the third Successor war and justified this by claiming that its use in the war contributed to the eleutheria of the Greeks.\(^{52}\) The syntaxis Ptolemy extracted from Iasos was probably connected with the Ptolemaic phylake, which protected Iasian land and preserved Iasos’ eleutheria and autonomia (IK.Iasos 3).\(^{53}\) Similarly, the monies contributed by the Nesiotic League under both Antigonos and Demetrios and Ptolemy Soter would have been connected with the maintenance of their eleutheria, as already guaranteed by both.\(^{54}\) Erythrai was absolved of the Galatika by Antiochos II, but as it is presented as an unusual honour the assumption is that it was widespread and therefore perfectly compatible with eleutheria and aphorologesia.\(^{55}\) Later, Selge could make payments of up to 700 talents to Achaios without demeaning the patris or undermining its eleutheria (Plb. 5.76.10-11). Syntaxis was less offensive than phoros and implied synergy over oppression, a contribution to a common goal rather than a foreign imposition.

Part of the compatibility of syntaxis with eleutheria lay in the purpose of the money. The phoros was most often simply a tax paid to the ruler and open to use however he saw fit.\(^{56}\) The syntaxis, however, often appears to denote a contribution to the defence of the city and its freedom. Therefore, it is paid at times into a common fund, such as the treasury of the Second Athenian Confederacy or the Nesiotic League, a fund over which the hegemon did not always exercise direct and complete control.\(^{57}\) Admittedly Alexander controlled the assessment, collection, and expenditure of the syntaxis between 334-332, but the purpose of the money was towards a common good, the campaign against Persia and the freedom of the

\(^{50}\) Aeschin. 2.71; GHI 47, 72.19; Rhodes & Osborne 2003: 101-2.  
\(^{51}\) Chios: GHI 84a. Priene was absolved from the syntaxis, thus implying its universality (GHI 86b; Mileta 2008: 36-40). For the phoros and Ephesos, see below n.56.  
\(^{52}\) OGIS 5.44-5, passim.  
\(^{55}\) IK.Ery. 31.26-8 (App.2 num.35). For the Galatika as a royal tax, see Heuβ 1937: 111.  
\(^{56}\) Sometimes, however, this could be for pious ends, as when Alexander ordered Ephesos to contribute to the temple of Artemis the phoros it earlier paid to Persia (Arr. An. 1.17.10; Stylianou 1994: 28-9).  
\(^{57}\) Under the Confederacy the allies initially had some control over the distribution of levied funds, se Rhodes 2010: 268.
Greek cities. Similarly, Ptolemy and his subordinates were most likely in direct control of the 
syntaxis levied from Iasos, but again the money was apparently intended to defend the land 
and secure Iasian freedom. The different conception between phoros and syntaxis reflects in 
part their different functions, and therefore different relationship to eletheria.

The evidence shows that as with garrisons, various forms of royal taxation (even the 
imposition at times of royal officials) could be compatible with civic eletheria. Again, the 
terminology used and the presentation of the tax were important elements in the city’s 
willingsness to accept it. The king would present the tax not as an imperial phoros, but as a 
syntaxis or dapane, which carried the idea of synergy. Thus, a change in terminology sought 
to alter ideology and make the tax a contributing factor in the city’s preservation, political 
independence, and eletheria. However, it was also necessary for the city to ascribe to this 
view and concede to the king the ability to enforce his authority over the city so as to protect 
his grant of eletheria.

SECTION 2: DEFINING ELEUTHERIA IN ACTION

“No matter how consistently they applied the policy, at no time did any of the senior 
Diadochoi intend to set the cities ‘free’ as we might conceive the term. The concept of 
‘freedom’ and autonomy meant simply this: that a polis may govern itself in any way it 
chooses, labelling itself democracy or oligarchy or tyranny as it wishes, but ultimately, 
control of its external policies rests solely with the dominant adjacent dynast(s)….freedom 
was] nothing more than a cynical gambit… it cost nothing and did not necessarily require any 
follow-up or effort.”

There are problems here. First, Wheatley seems to judge the ancient usage based on its 
failure to live up to modern value systems. This methodological error clouds his judgement 
on the use of eletheria and contributes to his second mistake. Wheatley describes eletheria 
as a “cynical gambit” because he sees it as nothing more than internal autonomy. But if 
eletheria is used by both king and city alike to mean just this, by what criteria then are we 
justified in deprecatting it as a “cynical gambit”? Third, Wheatley claims that eletheria 
entailed no actual “effort” on behalf of the Diadochoi. However, he later states that in 307 
“Athens was ‘free’, but needed aid to maintain and cement her new status”, before

58 Carlsson (2005: 238) analyses ten Iasian decrees of c.325-275 mentioning ἀτέλειαν ὁν ἣ πόλις κυρία ἐστίν, 
which may reveal limitations on Iasos’ finances after the imposition of this syntaxis.
60 Wheatley 1997: 166.
enumerating Antigonos’ gifts of land, money, grain, and timber; freedom indeed entailed very real commitments if it was to be a successful policy.\textsuperscript{61}

Wheatley’s privileging of modern usage and understanding over ancient is a methodological problem, and one that I am at pains to avoid throughout this thesis. Modern assumptions are to be avoided and ancient usage should be the primary criterion for analysing ancient \textit{eleutheria}. If certain usages seem cynical to our eyes, that is just the understandable diversity of an imperfectly defined ancient term in action. Numerous different presentations existed, and we must be careful to judge each as part of a wider, adaptable usage. We must not simply take one usage and use it to define others as cynical gambits.

As has been stated before, the focus of this section is on the adaptability of \textit{eleutheria} to various situations. Three parts treat of this from different perspectives: Part 1 looks at definitions; Part 2 looks at differing interpretations in use; and Part 3 looks at the typology of statuses between city and king. Again, I am concerned with constructing an image of \textit{eleutheria} based on the multifarious aspects of its use in action. Use elaborates meaning, and the fundamental malleability of its use argues for a layered and adaptable appreciation of its meaning.

\section*{2.1: Positive and Negative Freedom}

Numerous different approaches exist for analysing \textit{eleutheria}. In my introduction I have emphasised that of Primary and Secondary freedom, which distinguishes between freedom as an inherent, inalienable right (Primary) and freedom as a gift, guaranteed, defended, and authorised at the behest of another power (Secondary). A second approach expanding from this is that of Positive and Negative freedom. Rather than defining the conceptual state of freedom, this looks to define freedom according to the concrete features that contribute to or negate it. Some prefer to define \textit{eleutheria} and the \textit{polis} through positive freedoms, the active use of certain positive qualities: democracy, the ability to use one’s own laws, or to control one’s own lands. Others prefer negative freedoms, freedom as the passive absence of certain common restrictions: the imposition of garrisons, taxes, or foreign overseers. Here I argue that we must employ both definitions, but even then we should be aware that they do not offer the only means of understanding freedom.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{61} Wheatley 1997: 193. These gifts show that Antigonos understood well how to use \textit{euergesia} and \textit{eleutheria} as tools for Greek support.
The typology of Positive and Negative freedom is a useful way of looking at Greek *eleutheria* because, as was highlighted in chapters 1 and 2, throughout the 5th, 4th, and 3rd centuries *eleutheria* was continually defined by a series of criteria either active (Positive) or passive (Negative) in nature. The charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy is a good example as it gives a detailed definition of freedom/autonomy at that time and within that context. Members were to be “free and autonomous…to live at peace with a secure hold over their own land…to employ whichever constitution they liked, not to receive a garrison, not to be subject to a foreign official (*archon*), not to pay a *phoros*.” Here we see clearly the mix of Positive (live at peace; hold of land; own constitution) and Negative (no garrison; no *archon*; no taxation) freedoms. *Eleutheria* can encapsulate both the freedom to do X and not be subject to Y.

Hellenistic examples are of identical character. There are examples of *eleutheria* being defined purely positively, as the freedom to be a democracy and employ both the *patrioi nomoi* and (or) the *patrios politeia*.

Other examples define *eleutheria* purely negatively, as *aphorologesia* and/or *aphrouresia*. There are also a whole series of mixed definitions, employing both positive and negative elements. In 334 Alexander freed the Ionian and Aiolian cities by removing the oligarchies and *phoros*, installing democracies, and returning the laws (Arr. An. 1.18.2). In 318/7 and 307/6, after the return of the democracy, Athens’ freedom consisted of democracy, *nomoi*, and the absence of garrisons and oligarchy. Miletos, in 313, was free because the garrison was removed and democracy was restored. Eretria similarly defined its *eleutheria* as the absence of a garrison and the presence of both democracy and the *patrioi nomoi*. The honorary decree of the Nesiotic League for Ptolemy Soter commends him for freeing the cities, removing certain taxes and dues, and returning the *patrioi politeiai* and *nomoi*. Ilion’s treaty with Antiochos I or II describes the city as autonomous, democratic, *aphorologesia*, and *aphrouresia*. In a fragmentary decree of c.240-230, Smyrna calls itself autonomous, democratic, *aphrouresia*, and employing its

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63 GHI 22.10-23 (App.1 num.3).
64 Arr. An. 1.17.4; IG II' 457 (App.1 num.13); Plu. Mor. 851f-852e (App.1 num.14); IG II' 559+568 (App.1 num.28); I.Priene 11 (App.2 num.21); IK.Ery. 504 (App.2 num.33); IG XII (5) Suppl.168 (App.2 num.15).
65 D.S. 19.61.2; IK.Iasos 2 (App.2 num.12); RIG 452 (App.1 num.27); IK.Ery. 31 (App.2 num.35); above §1.1-2.
66 IG II' 448.46-65 (App.1 num.9) with Wallace forthcoming A. For Athens in 307, see Ch.2 §5; Ch.5 §2.1.
67 D.S. 19.75-4; I.Milet 123.2-4 (App.2 num.7).
69 IG XII (7) 506.10-16 (App.2 num.28).
70 IK.Ilion 45.12-15 (App.2 num.26).
patrioi nomoi.\textsuperscript{71} The importance of ownership of land as an element of eleutheria appears at Athens in the 280s regarding grain production and the Attic forts and at Labraunda between 240-220.\textsuperscript{72}

In almost all cases the choice of Positive and Negative criteria, and therefore each polis’ individual definition of eleutheria at that point in time, was conditioned by the immediately preceding circumstances. As is argued throughout this thesis, this again shows that the ‘meaning’ of eleutheria was fundamentally adaptive and malleable to the necessities of its use in action. The terms of the Second Athenian Confederacy were a reaction to both Spartan and 5th century Athenian abuses of autonomia. Alexander’s concern for democracy and his removal of the phoros were based on Persia’s use of both oligarchies and phoroi. Antigonos’ use of aphrouresia exploited the wide use of garrisons by other Successors. Ptolemy’s addition of aphorologesia attempted to expand on Antigonos’ aphrouresia and offer an added incentive to potential allies. Seleukos’ grants of eleutheria and concern for Greek eunoia after Korupedion were an attempt to contrast his rule with Lysimachos’ and ensure the loyalty of his old subjects. Eleutheria was expansive and adaptive, capable of holding a different focus at different times based on the needs and experiences of both ruler polis, both of whom sought to apply to it some form of tangible meaning.

The typology of Positive and Negative freedom is the main means of defining eleutheria. However, the diversity of criteria used reveals the multiplicity of ways in which eleutheria could be conceived of in individual circumstances. Each specific use of Positive and Negative criteria was not a full definition of freedom so much as one facet of its wider understanding important to that city at that point in time. This individual meaning was dependent in each instance upon the city, the time, and the historical context. Naturally, this alters the way one conceives of eleutheria and understands its use in action. So, aphorologesia was of importance to Erythrai under Antiochos II because it was a significant element of Alexander’s grant of eleutheria in 334, and was acknowledged as such by Antigonus Monophthalmos. The control of the land and the Attic forts was of importance to Athens post-287 because with Piraeus under Antigonid control it was upon them that the democracy depended for grain and security. However, whereas Athens may have seen its freedom as dependent upon the removal of royal garrisons, Iasos had little apparent concern in removing

\textsuperscript{71} IK. Smyrna 576 (\textit{App.2 num.39}); see above pg. 72 n. 145.
\textsuperscript{72} For example, \textit{IG II*} 650.14-17 (\textit{App.1 num.33}), 653.20-9, 654.15-35 (\textit{App.1 num.36}), 657.31-6 (\textit{App.1 num.38}); Oliver 2007: 121-7. \textit{I. Labraunda} 3a, 8b (\textit{App.2 nums.40-1}).
either her *phylake* or *syntaxis* and focused instead on maintaining her *eleutheria* by securing control of harbour taxes (*IK* *Iasos* 3).\(^{73}\)

So, despite the prevalent use of Positive and Negative criteria we do not have one, all encompassing, clear definition of *eleutheria*; no such thing existed. The charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy may be the fullest attempt but it too is simply a reaction to the needs of the times. Each definition of *eleutheria* is connected with one or more criteria, often different from criteria used elsewhere. So, in one case freedom is the absence of garrisons, in another the use of a democracy, in yet another, the ability to be in charge of one’s own land. This has obvious importance for the ‘meaning’ of *eleutheria*. Individual instances do not create a coherent, rounded image of *eleutheria*, but when taken together they can be used to create a composite impression of what *eleutheria* ought to be, in its widest, most exclusive sense: the avoidance of foreign control and interference in all matters and the ability to govern oneself, economically, militarily, and legally, according to one’s own laws, both domestically and internationally.

It is important to state that this is the ideal and not reality. Even in supra- *polis* organisations like the Second Athenian Confederacy, the League of Corinth, or the Hellenic League, in which the *eleutheria* of members was carefully defined, there was a difference between what *eleutheria* entailed on paper (or stone) and in practice. Athens’ self-interested imposition of garrisons and cleruchies, among other things, led to the disintegration of the Confederacy.\(^{74}\) Similarly, the imposition of a garrison in Sikyon (and surely elsewhere), the expulsion of the tyrants from Eresos, and the illegal entry of a Macedonian trireme into Piraeus were some of the small acts that fuelled Greek resentment against the League of Corinth.\(^{75}\) More generally, the imposition of garrisons and the support of tyrannies undermined the spirit if not the letter of the League and its claims to Greek freedom and autonomy.\(^{76}\)

The example of Iasos is of particular importance here because the use of different Positive and Negative criteria between *IK* *Iasos* 2 (309/8) and *IK* *Iasos* 3 (305-282) is instructive for our understanding of how such criteria assist in defining *eleutheria*.\(^{77}\) In *IK* *Iasos* 2 the city is free, autonomous, *aphorologetos*, and *aphrouretos*, a Negative definition implying that Iasos’

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\(^{73}\) These dues may relate to control of the “little sea”, an area of sea apparently abundant in fish and granted to Iasos by Alexander c.334-332 (above pg.49 n.21; Heisserer 1980: 171-9). If so, this emphasises further the importance of local concerns in one’s understanding of what constitutes *eleutheria*.

\(^{74}\) Above pg.50 n.68.

\(^{75}\) *IG* II’ 448.46-8 (*App.1 num.9*); D. 17.7, 26 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 41-7, 93-8.

\(^{76}\) D. 17 *passim*; Welles 1965: 38; below §2.2.

\(^{77}\) *App.2 num.12-13*. 

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freedom consisted of not being garrisoned or taxed. However, in *IK.Iasos* 3 the city houses a Ptolemaic *phylake* and contributes a *syntaxis*, both forms of garrisoning and taxation. Furthermore, although proofs (ἀξιώματα – most likely the terms given in *IK.Iasos* 2) of Iasos’ *eleutheria* and *autonomia* are given to the Ptolemaic official Aristoboulos by the Iasian ambassadors no mention is made of the earlier guarantees of *aphorologesia* and *aphrouresia*. This omission suggests that despite the strict semantic compatibility of *syntaxis* with *aphorologesia* and *phylake* with *aphrouresia* the imposition of both did to some degree undermine Iasos’ earlier guarantees of *aphorologesia* and *aphrouresia* and the city perhaps drew attention to this by avoiding mention of these guarantees.\(^{78}\) *Phylake* and *syntaxis* euphemise royal impositions on the *eleutheria* of the *polis* by operating within the semantic boundaries of *aphrouresia* and *aphorologesia*. However, the evidence from Iasos suggests that such impositions could still be seen to negate these guarantees. Since these guarantees defined the city’s *eleutheria* we would now expect the city to cease being free. But, contrary to expectations, it retains its *eleutheria*. This would seem to that the use of Positive or Negative criteria is not in itself a definitive method for understanding a city’s conception of its own *eleutheria* since the city can remain free even after their erosion. *Eleutheria* is adaptable to the changing situations of the *polis* and compatible with the removal of those guarantees that appear at one stage to have defined it.

Two further examples are indicative of the resilience of *eleutheria*. First, Mylasa was freed by Seleukos II c.240 and granted control over its land, particularly the shrine of Zeus Labraunda. However, although Mylasa still hosted a royal garrison in 220 this does not seem to have negated its *eleutheria* (*I.Labraunda* 3a.10-14, 4.10-16; below §2.3). Second, in Stratokles’ honorary decree for Lykourgos, Athens is free, autonomous, and democratic because it maintained its democratic authority in the face of Alexander’s power.\(^ {79}\) Passed in Prytany VI 307/6 the decree doubles as a warning to Demetrios Poliorketes of the city’s ability to withstand tyrannical power (Ch.5 §1.2.2). However, between 304-302 Demetrios succeeded where Alexander failed and used his influence over Stratokles and the Athenian *demos* to ensure the exile of many of his radical democratic opponents.\(^ {80}\) In clear contradiction to the paradigm established in the Lykourgos decree Athens subsumed its democracy to royal will.\(^ {81}\) Nonetheless, Athens still called itself “free and democratic” (Ch.4

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\(^{78}\) Migeotte 2005: 194-6: “La stèle qui nous est parvenue voulait non seulement perpétuer la mémoire de deux moments forts de leur histoire récente, mais peut-être marquer aussi leur déception.”

\(^ {79}\) *IG* II\(^ {1}\) 457; Plu. *Moralia* 851f-852e (*App.1* nums.13-14).

\(^ {80}\) Below pg.138-9 with n.81.

\(^ {81}\) See for example Plu. *Demetr.* 12.6; *Moralia* 851f; *SEG* XXVIII 60.79-83.
§3. Again, even though an official definition of *eleutheria* is undermined the city still promotes its freedom in the publication of its decrees. With both Iasos and Mylasa we have only the official decrees and treaties of the city, a genre of document that is careful to project an image of unity and cohesion. Plutarch’s *Life of Demetrios* takes us behind such texts and reveals the fervent debate taking place within the *polis* itself about the nature and understanding of its own *eleutheria* (examined in Ch.4 §3). However, for present purposes, these examples show that although Positive and Negative criteria of freedom offer a fruitful way of analysing the conception of *eleutheria* at a specific point in time, they are not by themselves the sole means of understanding *eleutheria*, which has layers of meaning and understanding and is fundamentally adaptable.

The choice of Positive and Negative criteria was dependent upon the politics of a particular situation and was frequently a reaction to preceding events. It was an attempt to give *eleutheria* some form of definition and is indicative of its understanding by one *polis* or Successor at one particular point in time. However, these criteria were an ideal and were frequently eroded in reality, sometimes even leading to the negation of a city’s freedom (as with Athens’ allies during the Social War of the mid 4th century). In other cases, however, the city maintained its *eleutheria* despite these erosions (Iasos, Mylasa, Athens in 304-302). Therefore, *eleutheria* could exist beyond the definitions ascribed to it. Although regularly defined by Positive or Negative criteria it had a meaning, understanding, and practical use beyond them and could even be compatible with their inevitable removal. It was adaptive to the necessities of change, often incorporating an emotive charge over definite criteria.

### 2.2: Differing Interpretations of *Eleutheria*

The above analysis of Positive and Negative freedom shows that when it came to the use in action of *eleutheria* numerous different points of view could exist at any one time. The corollary of this is that no single, exclusive interpretation of *eleutheria* existed. Different parties emphasised different readings of *eleutheria* based on different criteria, offering even radically different and mutually exclusive understandings of it. In such situations it is difficult to analyse usage without falling into the trap of following one as sincere and valid and another as hollow and manipulative. The goal of course is to maintain an analytical balance and present a reading of each usage sensitive to the position and understanding of each party, treating each as perfectly applicable and valid. Moreover, it is important not to espouse a pro-Athenian bias. That is, when presented with both an Athenian and another interpretation of *eleutheria* not to automatically favour the Athenian as sincere, or indeed correct. Just because
it is Athens, the self-professed and widely acknowledged defender of Greece’s *eleutheria* in 480/79, does not mean that its reading of *eleutheria* is the only valid one.82

The conflict between Alexander and Thebes in late 335 is an informative case-study of such differing interpretations of *eleutheria*. Two points of view are present, the ‘League’ view of the League of Corinth, which interprets *eleutheria* in a legalistic manner according to the official status of League members, and the ‘polis’ view of Thebes and Athens, which promotes a more traditional interpretation based on the freedom of the city from foreign restrictions. Both operated in conflict with one another, but both were for the time and context perfectly valid interpretations of *eleutheria*.

According to the ‘League’ view, the League of Corinth officially preserved the freedom and autonomy of all its members including even Thebes, with its garrisoned Kadmea and oligarchic government. Since this position had been recognised by all other members, Thebes was therefore theoretically free and autonomous and legally committed to maintaining the *status quo* as a preservation of this *eleutheria*. This stuck more closely to the letter of the League than to its spirit, but it was fully within the legal definition of *eleutheria* offered by the League and subscribed to by members.83 Commitment to the League represented a commitment to its interpretation of *eleutheria* and all this entailed. We may call this a “cynical gambit”, but it was a legal reality, officially accepted by all League members.

Furthermore, numerous smaller *poleis* saw their *eleutheria* as dependent upon the Macedonian *status quo*. One of the League’s professed goals was the maintenance of a pro-Macedonian *koine eirene* among the Greek *poleis*, and many fully subscribed to this.84 Certain Boiotian cities, like Plataia, Orchomenos, and Thespiai, saw in Macedon and the League their liberation from Theban oppression: Plataia was re-founded, Orchomenos’ walls were re-built, and Thespiai was honoured by Alexander.85 Similarly, Messene, Megalopolis, and others saw the League as an escape from Spartan and Athenian oppression, a viewpoint later voiced by the Megalopolitan historian Polybios (18.14.6–7).86 The League was also concerned with liberating the Asian cities from Persian control and avenging the invasion of 480/79. Both were emotive calls concerned with *eleutheria* and would have appealed to many

82 Heuβ 1965: 82-4; Raaflaub 2004: 14 (on the dangers of Atheno-centrism).
83 A point raised by Welles 1965: 38.
85 Wallace 2011: 149 with n.10.
86 On Philip’s involvement in the Peloponnese, see Plb. 18.14.6-7; Roebuck 1948; Hammond & Griffith 1979: 604-23. On his favouring of smaller states over Sparta, see Magnetto 1994 (on Syll. 665); Shipley 2000b (Spartan territory in 4th and 3rd centuries); Piérart 2001: 30-7 (land division and the Heraklids); Luraghi 2008: 17-18 (Messene).
as a noble use of Macedonian hegemony, and a welcome respite from Athenian, Spartan, and Theban bickering. Even in Athens, Phokion could argue that Greek *eleutheria* could be achieved with Athens following Macedonian leadership, if only one looked at the wider Hellenic picture rather than the narrower Athenian one (Plu. *Phoc*. 16.5-7).

Alexander, as *hegemon*, was in charge of the invasion of Asia Minor, a campaign that epitomised in action the freedom and autonomy of League members and the quest to spread this to the Asian Greeks. This lay at the heart of his propaganda and his position. Thebes’ defection from the League in 335 was a legal challenge, citing the terms of the King’s Peace over those of the League of Corinth, as well as an assertion of a different understanding of *eleutheria*, one that presented the Great King as defender of *eleutheria* and Alexander as an oppressive tyrant.87 This inverted the dynamic Alexander sought and threatened the dissolution of the League. Alexander’s destruction of Thebes was, therefore, an officially valid League action that sought to maintain the *koine eirene*, preserve Greek *eleutheria*, and punish the Medisers of (both the past and present), before liberating the Asian Greeks.88

Athens and Thebes espoused a different, ‘*polis*’ view according to which the League was only a polite, legal face to the Macedonian hegemony achieved and maintained by the sword. The use of garrisons at Thebes, Corinth, and Ambrakia was a clear suppression of *eleutheria*, a view shared by Elis, Argos, Aitolia, and Arkadia who all supported Thebes’ insurrection.89 Further, the installation of what a speech attributed to Demosthenes calls ‘*tyrannies*’ at Messene, Sikyon, Thebes, and elsewhere also compromised the ostensible freedom and autonomy of League members.90 Tyranny is simply the Demosthenic polemic of the democratic faction, and the likes of Polybios were quick to point out that many of these ‘*tyrannies*’ were simply pro-Macedonian governments tired of Athens and Sparta (18.14-15). However, the point remains that the legal arguments of the League did not counter the emotive and cultural resonance of freedom as incompatible with garrisons, oligarchies, tyrants, and foreign control.

Alexander’s use of the Persian Wars and his appeal to the liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor were also open to criticism in Greece. In contrast to the Great King, Alexander was present in force, installing garrisons, razing Thebes, and supporting ‘*tyrannies*’. He was the clear and present danger, not Persia, which had only been an indirect threat since the mid-5th century. In fact, Persia had a more recent track-record of defending *eleutheria* and *autonomia*.

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87 Arr. *An*. 1.9.7; D.S. 17.9.5, 14.2; Plu. *Alex*. 11.7-8; Just. *Epit*. 11.3.9; *cf*. Din. 1.19-20.
88 Wallace 2011: 150-2; Ch.6 §1.2.
89 D.S. 17.8.5-6; Din. 1.18-20. On the movement against Alexander in 336/5, see Ziesmann 2005: 66-85.
90 Below pg.157 with n.13.
through the King’s Peace, which Thebes emphasised as an alternative model to both the League and Alexander’s interpretation of *eleutheria*.\(^91\) Alexander’s attempts to deflect attention onto Persia were not foolproof; other interpretations of *eleutheria* existed.

In one way Alexander’s garrisoning and destruction of Thebes was a cynical employment of *eleutheria* as propaganda. In another way, however, Thebes’ decision to promote Persia as the model defender of Greek *eleutheria* was also an abasement of the ideal. Isokrates earlier opposed this idea in his *Panegyrikos* (4.115-18, 175), and others, like the Boiotian cities, acted likewise in 335. Both Alexander’s and Thebes’ views were to a degree cynical and manipulative, but this does not negate the validity of either as real and influential uses of *eleutheria* in action.

Other examples of mutually exclusive understandings of *eleutheria* are informative. In 324, when the Exiles Decree threatened the return of Samos to the Samians, Athens sought to change Alexander’s mind by claiming that he was negating Athens’ *eleutheria* and acting like a tyrant. Alexander turned the claim upon its head and pointed out that Athens was in fact the tyrant and the occupation of Samos removed the Samians’ freedom.\(^92\) Alexander restricted Athens’ freedom just as Athens restricted Samos’. The understanding of *eleutheria* was the same, but the difference lay in its application and who had the power to enforce their model. The Hellenic War also presents different understandings of *eleutheria*. Athens saw the war as a struggle for Greek *eleutheria* from Macedon and Athenian propaganda spoke proudly of “the freedom of the Greeks” (Ch.6 §2). However, the freedom of the Greeks was for Athens first and the Greeks second. An alliance of Boiotian cities fought a pitched battle against Athens at Plataia in autumn 322, thus inspiring Hyperides to condemn them as the “first opponents of freedom”; the Athenian attack on Styra on Euboia implies an anti-Athenian movement there as well.\(^93\) Athenian freedom did not equal Plataian or Euboian freedom and Athens oppressed Plataia and Samos to a much greater degree than Macedon oppressed Athens. Athenian propaganda during the Hellenic War was only one interpretation of *eleutheria* for one city; despite its force and pre-eminence it was not the only one.

As mentioned above, power played an important role in enforcing a definition or understanding of *eleutheria*. We have seen that while *eleutheria* certainly contained a series of ideals relating to the ultimate good and welfare of the state, no single unarguable definition

\(^{91}\) Bertoli (2003: 92-4) distinguishes between Alexander’s and Thebes’ use of *eleutheria*, but sees Thebes’ as reflecting the terms of the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (above n.16).


\(^{93}\) *Plataia*: Ch.2 §2; Wallace 2011: 157-60. *Styra*: Str. 10.1.6; *IG* II² 647.1-3. The Macedonian troops under Micion that landed at Rhamnous and were repulsed by Phokion perhaps sailed from Euboia (Plu. *Phoc.* 25.1-4; Bosworth 2003: 21 with ns.62-3; though cf. Heckel 2006: s.v. Micion).
existed. Therefore the definition of *eleutheria* in any given situation was dependent upon the ability of a state or individual to create and enforce their understanding of it. Power played a central role in this process. Whichever state or Successor was able to enforce their interpretation of *eleutheria* controlled the ideological discourse. Antigonos held this position between 315-301 and Ptolemy unsuccessfully contested it during his ‘Grand Tour’ of 309/8. Others may not necessarily have agreed with one’s definition, but military and ideological force was difficult to argue with and dissent was always something that had to be voiced carefully, through the right channels and in the correct ways. For example, Athens created the Second Athenian Confederacy because of the abuses of Sparta’s interpretation of *autonomia*, but the Confederacy was careful to act within the bounds of *autonomia* as defined (or in this case, not defined) by the King’s Peace (Ch.1 §2). Similarly, Athens was careful to accept Alexander’s presentation of Thebes’ ‘revolt’, even though she had originally supported the Theban struggle for freedom.\(^9^4\) There was a time to contest another’s definition of freedom and a time to follow it, and these had to be chosen carefully. Athens took on Alexander in 324/3 over Samos; both emphasised the same conception of freedom – the right for one state to not be oppressed by another – but due to Alexander’s military force his interpretation was ultimately successfully and Samos was returned to the Samians.

It may be a rather trite point but the freedom of one does not always equal the freedom of another. The same understanding may apply – freedom of X from the oppression of Y – but *eleutheria* can have more than one use and meaning at any one time, again emphasising its fundamental adaptability and lack of single definition. Different yet equally valid ways of understanding *eleutheria* could exist, each presenting different interpretations of its import and use. We may view one as more valid than another, but if both could exist then both were relevant in their own way. There is also the need to avoid an Atheno-centric viewpoint. The Hellenic War may have been presented as a war for Greek freedom, but it was only undertaken with Athens’ freedom in mind and was executed at the expense of states in Euboia and Boiotia. One’s monopoly of power helped one give to *eleutheria* a particular meaning and definition. If the kings could at times control, or at least influence, the definition of freedom then this raises questions concerning the role of *eleutheria* in negotiating the relationship between cities and kings and the status of cities, free and otherwise, within the Hellenistic kingdoms.

\(^9^4\) Wallace 2011: 150 with n.19.
2.3: Typology of Statuses

In the early Hellenistic period two mutually exclusive typologies of free city existed: that which saw its freedom as dependent upon its independence from another power, often Macedon (Athens, Sparta, Thebes, etc.), and that which saw it as compatible with another, often royal, power (Plataia, Samos, etc.). This dichotomy brings us deeper into the question of *eleutheria* as a typology of statuses defining the relationship of the *polis* to that of the Hellenistic empire: a difficult subject, and one at the heart of any study of the period. The central question concerns the variations within the two general divisions of freedom from and freedom under Macedonian control. In the latter case, different sorts of free cities were dependent upon Macedonian power: some were allied while some entered the empire through conquest; some saw the empire as a defender of freedom from the domination of another, others saw it as simply a defence of freedom, irrespective of the presence or threat of an opponent.

The question of ‘typologies of statuses’ and the role of *eleutheria* therein has recently been treated by both John Ma and Laurent Capdetrey.\(^{95}\) Although both focus on the Seleukid Empire, their conclusions are valid for the Hellenistic world in general when supplemented with other examples from elsewhere, as I will do throughout this section. Both analyses are based on a solid understanding of the ancient evidence, but it is my contention that not enough attention has been paid by Ma to the adaptability and malleability of the use in action of *eleutheria*. The result is that his analysis is too legalistic. Capdetrey’s analysis is more natural in that it acknowledges greater fluidity between statuses. ‘Typology of statuses’ also gives rise to difficulties by applying a modern system to ancient evidence that does not always fit it.\(^{96}\) When overly restrictive, it can stunt our understanding of the use and function of *eleutheria*, and therefore the malleability of ruler-city relations. I propose that Ma’s and Capdetrey’s typologies should be modified somewhat to take account of the adaptability of *eleutheria* and become more sensitive to the difficulties in creating definitions and typologies for a term which continually eschews both.

Ma’s analysis builds on Bickerman’s earlier work and is broken down into roughly three categories.\(^{97}\) First, ‘genuinely free cities’, those that existed outside the empire. Second, ‘free cities’, those that owed their freedom to royal recognition. Third, ‘dependent cities’, cities

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\(^{96}\) Ma 1999: 158-68.

\(^{97}\) Ma 1999: 150-74; Bickerman 1938; *cf.* 1939.
that were not free, but subject to the king. This latter category is further split into ‘subject cities’, which frequently dated documents by regnal years and were integrated into the royal chora, and ‘subordinate cities’, which were dependent but were not integrated into the royal chora. The status of dependent cities does not particularly concern us here, so I shall confine my remarks to what Ma termed the ‘genuinely free’ and ‘free’ cities.

For my purposes, however, I would like to change this terminology. The use of ‘genuinely free’ implies that the eleutheria of this type of city was more valid than that of the ‘free’ city. This is a point I argue against throughout this thesis. There is no single interpretation of freedom; there are simply different ways of viewing it in different situations with each no more inherently valid than the other. Still, Ma is correct that eleutheria was conceived of differently by cities within and outwith the empire. With this in mind, I would alter his nomenclature somewhat and refer instead to cities that conceive of the freedom in either Primary or Secondary manners. This captures the essential distinction between freedom as a self-guaranteed right (Primary/genuinely free city) and freedom as royal benefaction (Secondary/free city), but refrains from drawing implicit pejorative judgements on the validity of one over the other. Therefore, whenever I speak of the ‘Primary free’ and ‘Secondary free’ city I am critiquing and adapting Ma’s distinction between the ‘genuinely free’ and ‘free’ city.

In his typology of ‘Secondary free’ cities, Ma is mainly concerned with defining status through Bickerman’s surrender and grant model. In this scenario, when a city surrenders to a king or is taken by him it loses any legal position it previously held. It lacks any official status and all guarantees by previous kings become null and void. Thus, the surrender. It is then up to the king to return a status to the city by royal grant. If the king acknowledges precedent he may restore the city’s freedom and confirm certain guarantees like aphorologesia. However, the city’s future is entirely dependent upon the king, who may decide not to return its freedom and instead make it a ‘dependent city’.

99 This distinction also informs Migeotte 2005: 195.
100 Jones (1940: 315 n.8) was of much the same opinion when he claimed that “there certainly was a difference between genuine freedom (independence) and bogus freedom (under royal protection)”. Still, he saw that these statuses were fluid, not rigorous: “[they] depended on the de facto situation and I question whether the kings ever gave it [the distinction between statuses] precise legal formulation”.
102 For example, when Myos surrendered to Philip V he gave control of the city to Magnesia (Plb. 16.24.9; Ath. 3.78f)
however, powerless and it can influence the king’s decision by various strategies, such as by referring to honours it has passed or will pass (IK.Ilion 32), citing previous grants of freedom (IK.Ery. 31.21-8), appealing to dynastic proairesis (I.Didyma 480.10-13), or acclaiming the king’s role as defender of the Greek cities (IK.Ery. 504.14-20). In Ma’s view, once freedom is granted, ‘Secondary free’ cities were not subject to any forms of royal control but were as free and independent as ‘Primary free’ cities, i.e. those outside the empire.103

Ma also defines a second kind of ‘Secondary free’ city, that whose eleutheria is acknowledged and upheld by the king in a bilateral treaty and alliance (philia kai symmachia), thus ‘allied’ cities.104 Fewer early Hellenistic examples of this exist: Ptolemy and Iasos in 309 (IK.Iasos 2), Demetrios and Athens in 307/6 (D.S. 20.46.1-2), and Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia (IK.Ilion 45) are the most prominent. Other examples of philia kai symmachia exist between city and king which do not make mention of the city’s freedom, but this must have been implied since a king only allied with cities that were not under his control.105

For Ma, both models denote different legal bases for the king’s acknowledgement of the city’s freedom. Despite this, he is careful to note that the freedom of these cities, “though nominally equivalent to the full freedom of genuinely independent cities”, was in practice treated as a royal gift. As such, he feels that “in the end, there may have been little practical difference for cities which had entered royal control through ‘surrender and grant’, and those which had contracted an alliance with a king who enjoyed de facto control”.

Ma is certainly correct to highlight the different quasi-legal origins of both the ‘surrender and grant’ and ‘allied’ models, just as he is correct to question the actual distinction between the practicalities of both. He does not, however, pursue this apparent contradiction, which is a shame since the different origin but similar treatment of both models is quite revealing for the use of eleutheria at this time.

Both models served to integrate the city into royal control. Their different quasi-legal bases show how the king was able to use eleutheria to integrate both ‘Primary free’ and ‘Secondary free’ cities into a system that treated both parties the same: as free cities dependent upon royal will. The terms of alliance for the ‘allied’ city were similar to those between independent states, often with acknowledgements of freedom, autonomy, and

103 Ma 1999: 160-2; 2009: 126.
104 Ma 1999: 165; cf. Wehrli 1968: 127. Bikerman initially saw this as theoretical (1938: 140), but then acknowledged the difference between bi-lateral treaty with non-subject state and unilateral act with subject state (1939: 347).
105 SV 498 of 237/6 between Demetrios II and Gortyn and SV 549 of c.202-197 between Philip V and Lysimacheia.
democracy. There is, however, a distinction based on their use in action; it appears that the very act of acknowledging the ‘allied’ city’s freedom meant that the king viewed that freedom as then dependent upon and guaranteed by his royal will and so identical with the freedom of the city gained through the ‘surrender and grant’ model. In essence, alliance entailed the submission of the city to the king.

This is even suggested by the terminology of alliance. Aphorologesia and aphrouresia – present in both IK.Iasos 2 and IK.Ilion 45 – may be royal guarantees of non-interference, but they suggest the potentiality of garrisons and taxation just as they seek to avoid them; they acknowledge that the king, as a stronger power, had the ability to impose such restrictions if he saw fit, as later happened in Iasos (IK.Iasos 3). Aphorologesia and aphrouresia denote that the ‘allied city’ already saw itself as subordinate to the king and was trying to ensure limits to the potential, perhaps impending, royal presence.

Indeed, one could eschew the distinction between ‘allied’ and ‘surrender and grant’ models and argue that in its essence the very creation of a philia kai symmachia between city and king saw the submission of the city to royal power à la the ‘surrender and grant’ model. Alliance on such terms seems to have entailed the entry of the city into the remit of the royal symmachia, a body of cities, free or dependent, which were to follow royal foreign policy – diplomatic and at times military – and could be disposed of as if they were one’s empire. Iasos and Ptolemy between 309 and 285, our earliest example of this phenomenon, is characteristic, but other instances exist. Athens was granted its freedom and democracy by Demetrios and entered into philia kai symmachia with the king, only to have its independence consistently undermined (D.S. 20.46.1; Plu. Demetr. 24, 26-7). Ilion was free and democratic but because of its place in Antiochos I’s symmachia its territory could be disposed of as he wished. Philip and Lysimacheia allied in philia kai symmachia but Philip almost immediately garrisoned the city, employing like Ptolemy the ideological distinction between

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107 Magie (1950: 832-4) and Giovannini (2004: 80-3) disagree and argue that in such situations cities operated as sovereign states. It appears, however, that while cities acted freely in making the alliance they were generally subordinate after it. Cf. Gauthier BE 2005: 529-30 num.428. Bikerman (1939: 345-7) and Wehrli (1968: 105) argue that in signing a treaty in one’s own name a city exercised “l’indépendence absolue”. This is not strictly true. In addition to the aforementioned examples one can add the treaty between Athens and Sikyon (SEG LIII 101), at which time both were strongly under Demetrios’ control, and the sympoliteia of Smyrna and Magnesia-on-Maiander (IK.Smyrna 573), which openly acknowledged Smyrna’s subservience to Seleukos II.
109 IK.Ery. 504.14-20 (App.2 num.33); IK.Ilion 33.14-22 (RC 11; BD 18).
phylake and phroura (above §1.1). \(^{110}\) The Philippeis were philoi kai symmachai with Antiochos III, but their use of royal dating formulae reveals their dependence on the king. \(^{111}\)

In keeping with the fundamental adaptability of eleutheria, the freedom of ‘allied’ cities varied depending on both the ability and will of the king to impose himself on the city and the readiness of the city to acquiesce to royal power and ideology. In a treaty of philia kai symmachia of c.295 or c.285 Messene allied with Lysimachos, most likely against Demetrios Poliorketes (SEG LI 457). It suffered no royal interference that we know of. Similarly Lyttos and Antiochos II formed an alliance ensuring the supply of Cretan troops to the royal army (SV 486). Since the goal in both cases was not the immediate expansion of royal power, as had been the case at Iasos, Athens, and Lysimacheia, the city maintained a greater degree of independence.

Alternatively, the city could take advantage of royal weakness to further ensure its eleutheria and develop a heightened role within the symmachia. During the decline of centralised Seleukid authority in Asia Minor during the Laodikean War, Smyrna garrisoned the fort at Palaimnesia and “concluded a treaty of friendship (philia) with those in Magnesia on all terms of benefit to King Seleukos”. \(^{112}\) Faced with a strong and seemingly independent Smyrna, Seleukos responded to its ideological impetus and acknowledged in thanks its freedom, autonomy, and democracy. In this way, Smyrna put her eleutheria to work within the bounds of her philia kai symmachia to ensure a strengthened position within the Seleukid arche and the wider Greek world. \(^{113}\) Nonetheless, she justified it by reference to royal ideology and presented this freedom as solely dependent upon Seleukid fiat, employing her eleutheria so as to have it guaranteed by the king.

Eleutheria performed a very flexible role within the typology of statuses, undermining particularly the distinction between Ma’s two types of ‘Secondary free’ city (‘surrender and grant’ and ‘allied’). Consequently, it is more profitable to think simply in terms of one homogenous, but pliable, typology of free cities whose freedom was recognised by the king and remained to varying degrees under royal control. This group is to be contrasted with the ‘Primary free’ cities which remained outside royal control. In his recent study on the Seleukid Empire Laurent Capdetrey adopts this position, terming the former ‘cités dépendantes’ and

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\(^{110}\) SV 549; Plb. 18.3.11-4.6. The practicalities of one Antiochos’ symmachia with Lysimacheia remain unknown (IK.Ilios 45).


\(^{112}\) IK.Smyrna 573; BD 29.

\(^{113}\) IK.Smyrna 573; OGIS 228. On Smyrna’s democracy at this time, see Ch. 5 §2.2.
the latter ‘cités libres et autonomes’.\textsuperscript{114} This is a more natural way of thinking about the importance of \textit{eleutheria} within the typology of statuses. It lays greater weight on the use of \textit{eleutheria} in action rather than the quasi-legal basis of its application, and it acknowledges the inherent fluidity of the term and its compatibility with elements of royal interference. Capdetrey’s terminology, however, is unsatisfactory. It still favours the idea that the freedom of the city outside the empire is more valid than that of the city within it. The term ‘cités libres et autonomes’ implies that the ‘cités dépendantes’ were not free or autonomous. As I have been at pains to emphasise, neither understanding of freedom is inherently more valid than the other, they are both simply different ways of looking at different situations.

It is necessary to think in terms less rigid than Ma’s when \textit{eleutheria} is involved. His typology of statuses is too legalistic and severe in its use of \textit{eleutheria} as a criterion for measuring typologies.\textsuperscript{115} The uniformity of the treatment of ‘allied’ and ‘surrender and grant’ cities, despite their apparently separate legal statuses, as well as the numerous exceptions to his typologies,\textsuperscript{116} suggest that Ma’s system should be fine-tuned to take more account of the fundamental malleability of \textit{eleutheria} both in understanding and in action.\textsuperscript{117}

Ma’s position on the definition of \textit{eleutheria} adversely affects his understanding of \textit{eleutheria} as an aspect of his typology of statuses and more generally as a medium of ruler-city relations. He holds that “in certain contexts, \textit{αὐτονομία} or \textit{ἐλευθερία} were as clearly defined as \textit{ἀφορολογησία} or \textit{ἀνεπισταθεμένη}, with consequences as real”.\textsuperscript{118} Furthermore, he specifies the nature of this definition by arguing that ‘Secondary free’ cities were not subject to any forms of royal control, like tribute (direct and, probably, indirect), or garrisons. They had an independent diplomatic policy, minted their own silver types, had their constitutional integrity upheld by the king, and were to all intents and purposes as free and independent as ‘Primary free’ cities.\textsuperscript{119} Capdetrey has rightly criticised this as rigid and overly legalistic, arguing instead that a city was free if it was not integrated into royal land, enjoyed its own laws, and/or was free from tribute and controlled its own resources.\textsuperscript{120}

In fact, Ma is aware that his definition of a ‘Secondary free’ city has problems. He is careful to point out that freedom was considered to be a royal gift, allowed by royal \textit{fiat} and revocable by it. He notes the appearance of royal incursions on this freedom: defensive

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{115} Capdetrey 2007: 208.
\textsuperscript{116} Above n.101.
\textsuperscript{117} Cf. Capdetrey 2007: 193-4.
\textsuperscript{118} Ma 1999: 167-70, 167 (quote).
\textsuperscript{119} Ma 1999: 160-2.
\textsuperscript{120} Capdetrey 2007: 208.
\end{flushleft}
garrisons (phylakai), compulsory contributions to the state (syntaxis, eisphora), royal letters requesting (i.e. demanding) something, and general royal influence over civic institutions. Similarly, he notes instances where the characteristics of ‘Secondary free’ cities, like minting, appear in cities that are only with difficulty described as free.121

These points weaken Ma’s argument more than he admits. First, as argued above, they undermine Ma’s distinction between ‘surrender and grant’ and ‘allied’ cities as the two kinds of ‘Secondary free’ cities. Second, since ‘Secondary free’ cities are open to any number of royal incursions, Ma’s view that they were formally as free as ‘Primary free’ cities needs some modification, especially since the latter’s freedom is frequently characterised as the condition of not being subject to a king.122 Ma is correct to point out that both types of cities share the same terminology – eleutheria, autonomia, and demokratia – but he is wrong in claiming that this denotes similar positions. These terms are used because they are the standard rhetoric for defining and describing eleutheria. Their use by both types of cities does not denote similar positions, but different conceptions of the same terminology used to define different understandings of freedom. When used by a ‘Primary free’ city eleutheria, autonomia, and demokratia are conceived of differently than when used by a ‘Secondary free’ city. The terminology is simply the semantics of describing eleutheria. Simply put: same terminology, different understanding.

Beyond the distinctions between conceptualising freedom in Primary and Secondary ways, the use of eleutheria as a legal status between king and ‘Secondary free’ city was much more fluid than Ma concedes. He argues, as mentioned above, that grants of freedom to a ‘Secondary free’ city were expected to have “legal force” and so, in certain cases, gave eleutheria a meaning “as clearly defined as ἀφορολογησία or ἀνεπισταθμεία, with consequences as real”. This, however, is overly legalistic and places too much emphasis on concrete distinctions and meanings. By itself eleutheria had no inherent meaning; it was an abstract concept that denoted in essence simply the absence of Persian, or foreign, control. In my first two chapters I attempted to write a history of Classical and Hellenistic Greece that was sensitive to the constant (but unsuccessful) struggle to give solid definition to eleutheria. In the end, however, it was only ever as clearly defined as the modifiers used in conjunction with it, and any interpretation of it was contingent upon the power of the employer to enforce

121 Above n.101.
that understanding on other states, as detailed above. Ultimately, this gave the king great strength in giving meaning and definition to *eleutheria*, a fact of particular importance to the ‘Secondary free’ city, which relied on negotiation and royal grants to define its freedom. *Eleutheria* had no clear definition beyond that which was given to it in any particular situation or through any particular usage.

In fact, even terms such as *aphorologesia* were not as clearly defined as Ma suggests, nor were their consequences always real (above §2.1-2). Rather, they were employed within their strictest semantic limits, again as defined by the ruling or authoritative power. *Aphorologesia* defined only freedom from the *phoros* and could be compatible with *eisphora*, *syntaxis*, *dapane*, and *Galatika*, something Ma does not sufficiently emphasise. Similarly, *aphrouresia* meant exemption from the *phroura* alone and could be compatible with a *phylake*.

Although Ma is aware of such impositions, he does not take full cognisance of how much they undermine the idea of a clearly defined understanding of *eleutheria* for the ‘Secondary free’ city. His treatment of one particular event is telling. Around 240, Seleukos II granted Mylasa its *eleutheria* and gave it control of its lands and the shrine at Labraunda. This was to be overseen by the Seleukid general and local dynast Olympichos. However, Olympichos did not hand over control of Labraunda and he instead garrisoned the fort at Petra. Nonetheless, Mylasa retained a good relationship with Olympichos and both turned to the Antigonids in 227. Mylasa appealed to Philip V for the removal of Olympichos’ troops from Petra and the final restitution of the fort and Labraunda to the city. Philip favoured Mylasa and ordered Olympichos to hand over the shrine and its dependencies. Olympichos did so, and even apologised to Mylasa for his continued control of Petra in spite of Seleukos’ earlier declaration of freedom.

Ma emphasises the “legal argument” and sees this as an example of Olympichos’ accountability to the terms of Mylasa’s *eleutheria*. This is certainly true; Olympichos’ acknowledgement that the maintenance of the garrison in Petra was wrong is an important statement of royal accountability to a city’s free status. It is also, however, an attempt to justify actions now seen to have been illegal and it shows that Olympichos was only spurred to return Petra and control of Labraunda because of pressure from a higher authority, not any

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123 Heuß 1937: 235.
126 1.Labraunda 2-8; Crampa 1969: 80-5.
127 Ma 1999: 168-9. In Iasos actual proofs of their free status were produced when renegotiating this status with the Ptolemaic governor Aristoboulos (*IK.Iasos 3.2-3*; Giovannini 2004: 76).
legal argument. It is of interest that when Olympichos returns control of the garrison to Mylasa he claims in a letter to the demos that he maintained the garrison solely in the city’s best interests (a phylake rather than a phroura?). Indeed, it is remarkable that for (possibly) twenty years Olympichos could maintain an active military presence in clear contravention of the terms of Mylasa’s grant of eleutheria. Since Petra was only returned to Mylasa once a petition had been sent to Philip V, we can genuinely wonder whether the fortress would ever have been returned if not for Mylasa’s stubborn resilience. These actions show that instead of concrete definitions and legal structures, the meaning of eleutheria, as defined by its use in action, could be fluid and adaptable to both different situations and different definitions of it. Royal power could contravene its own terms of freedom by manipulating the purely semantic meaning of aphorologesia or aphrouresia, just as it could wilfully maintain a royal presence in clear contravention of the terms of its grant of freedom. As was also apparent at Iasos (above §2.1), continual civic resilience was needed to ensure the successful application of the royal grant of freedom for the ‘Secondary free’ city.

It is necessary for us to think less rigidly when it comes to the role of eleutheria in defining legal statuses. Eleutheria was only as defined as the modifiers used in conjunction with it. Ideally it implied total freedom – no dating by royal years, full local autonomy, own laws, etc. – but in reality it was compatible with various levels of royal interference. This was the same for both ‘surrender and grant’ and ‘allied’ cities. We should see the distinctions between these statuses as fluid. Eleutheria may recognise an initial legal difference, but in the practicality of its application it shows that both types of cities understood of their freedom in the same, Secondary manner. Thus, the use in action of eleutheria undermines the seemingly apparent distinctions between initial legal positions, positing the need for a more flexible understanding of the concept of eleutheria itself.

It also seems clear that we need to draw a much wider distinction between the eleutheria of cities outside the empire and those within it. For ‘Primary free’ cities the simple act of negotiating their eleutheria, of such central importance to the ‘Secondary free’ city, would have undermined it. That a king would then be able to negate some of these guarantees – aphorologesia, aphrouresia – would only have been a further insult. Freedom as a right, a quality in itself, was not compatible with the idea of it as a royal benefaction. The example of

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129 On these events, see most recently Bencivenni 2003: 247-98.
130 Capdetrey 2007: 205.
Smyrna and Lampsakos’ refusal to acknowledge royal ideology and accept their freedom as a gift of Antiochos III in 197 is an example of this: the values of understanding freedom in a Primary rather than a Secondary sense. Since Smyrna and Lampsakos had previously been free in the Secondary sense, their commitment to Primary freedom in 197 reveals again that statuses were malleable, particularly where *eleutheria* was involved. However, this does not show that both statuses were similar. Although a city could move from one to the other and the terminologies for expressing both positions are to a large degree the same, there were practical, interpretive, and ideological differences that the mere similarity of terminology did not cover. Statuses were fluid, and movement between them entailed concrete differences, both in action (royal intervention) and understanding (Primary/Secondary), even if the terminology used to describe them remained the same.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I demonstrated that *eleutheria* is compatible with many forms of royal impositions providing that they fulfilled a number of criteria. First, impositions often sought to avoid the stigma attached to terms like *phroura* and *phoros*. So, instead, we hear of *phylake*, *syntaxis*, *eisphora*, and *dapane*. Second, these terms, and the impositions they denoted, needed to be seen to be ideologically beneficial to the *polis*, which itself had to accept this presentation. Terming a military post a *phylake* or a financial imposition a *syntaxis* implied defence and synergy over repression and taxation. Third, the *phylake* and *syntaxis* had to fulfil (or be seen to fulfil) these functions to some degree. This proved their function to the city and gave it a reason to willingly follow the royal ideology. I also argued that the semantic precision of *aphorologesia* and *aphrouresia* denoted simply the avoidance of *phoros* and *phroura*. In practice they were compatible with *syntaxis* or *phylake*.

In practical terms I showed that we need to think of *eleutheria*, and indeed define it, as more fluid and adaptable than has previously been done. Through a study of Positive and Negative freedom I analysed some of the ancient means of defining *eleutheria*, emphasising their inability to create a rigorous and coherent definition. Individual definitions existed and were grounded on the exigencies of individual situations and their immediate history. Again, however, the adaptability of *eleutheria* to different, even mutually exclusive, understandings and uses came to the fore, thus highlighting my continued argument that *eleutheria* was

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131 Liv. 33.38.1-7 with Ma 1999: 2-6.
fundamentally pliant and malleable to the particular needs of particular parties; it was a wide-ranging concept that could mean all things to all men.

This has practical implications for the study of the typology of statuses, the quasi-legal relations between cities and kings. I argued against Ma’s overly-legalistic approach and emphasised instead a bipartite distinction between Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom based on mutually-exclusive understandings of freedom as either an inherent right (Primary) or granted by king (Secondary). I showed that the creation of rigorous typologies of status for ‘Secondary free’ cities is counter-productive since they were subject to varying levels of royal interference, while in general a city could perceive of its freedom in both Primary and Secondary ways at different points in time. Again, eleutheria is adaptive to the individual positions and statuses of individual cities, defining in each situation different facets of that city’s status or offering a positive definition of its situation. Classifications like Primary and Secondary or Positive and Negative freedom offer a useful shorthand for understanding general trends, but the fundamental malleability of eleutheria in use and understanding cautions against their use as rigorous typologies.
Chapter 4: **The Role of Eleutheria in Relations between City and King**

“The tension [between kings and Greek cities] arises out of the existence, side by side, of two elements, both with their own traditions, yet forced by historical events to come to terms with each other.”

F. Walbank 1993: 116

“Kings reveal their power by leading the masses wherever they wish through either persuasion or force. They persuade through benefactions, but compel through force.”

Δύνανται δ’ ἄγωντες ἐφ’ ἅ βουλονται τὰ πλῆθη διὰ πειθοὺς ή βίας. Πείθουσι μὲν δή δι’ εὐεργεσίων, βιάζονται δὲ διὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν

Strabo 9.2.40

“Greeks were willing to acknowledge the superiority of a benefactor only if they were able and willing to protect and support autonomy and self-government.”

Bringmann 1993: 8

**Introduction**

This chapter builds on the previous by looking specifically at the role played by *eleutheria* within relations between king and city. My analysis is based on the different ways that cities and kings conceive of freedom, either as a self-attained right (Primary) or as a result of royal guarantee (Secondary). Having already established that *eleutheria* was adaptive in use, malleable to individual situations, and lacking a single coherent definition, I use this chapter to expand on these conclusions and argue that within the relationship between king and city *eleutheria* could function either as a point of unity or conflict between both parties. This functional duality was conditioned by the adaptability of *eleutheria* to different needs and situations. *Eleutheria* remained prevalent within king/city relations because its lack of definition meant that it could always be used to assert something positive for the city, or even assert something negative in a positive way. It always defined the relationship between city and king in the best possible light. Even when undermined in practice through the imposition of royal will, the city could still use it to assert moral force over the king and garner benefactions as a result.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first two explore *eleutheria* via the distinctions of Primary and Secondary freedom, while the third provides a case study of these
distinctions in action. Section 1 analyses the role of *eleutheria* in the relationship between kings and cities free in the Primary sense. While Primary freedom as independence from foreign control could be seen to be a point of conflict with a king who sought to extend his influence over the city, *eleutheria* could also be seen as a point of unity between both parties. I draw attention to the different perception of the king’s actions, as control of the city’s freedom (conflict) or as support for it (unity).

Section 2 deals with the relationship between kings and cities free in the Secondary sense. This is subdivided into three parts. Part 1 offers a general overview of the relationship between city and king, laying particular emphasis on the euergetic process of civic petition and royal benefaction. Part 2 builds on this and looks at *eleutheria* itself as a benefaction, particularly its role in defining a positive ideology for the relationship between city and king. Part 3 delineates the practical and conceptual limits within which *eleutheria* operated as a status benefaction. I argue that *eleutheria* was not a single, concrete status but rather a general condition, the precise form of which varied depending on the city’s success in accruing benefits and guarantees from the king. Further, I propose that although a city’s *eleutheria* could be objectively undermined by royal impositions, it still existed as the ideal basis of the relationship between city and king. The city could still employ moral force to ensure that the king provide benefits and fulfil to some degree his self-ordained role as defender of *eleutheria*.

Section 3 expands on the arguments and theories put forth in Sections 1 and 2 by providing a case-study of *eleutheria* in action. It treats of Athens under Demetrios Poliorketes between 304-301 and looks at the ways in which *eleutheria* was used to vocalise both unity and conflict with the king depending on the politics of its employer. The difference in use is based on the city’s assertion of Primary freedom, thus causing conflict with the king, and Demetrios’ assertion of Secondary freedom, thus promoting unity with Athens but only on the city’s acceptance of *eleutheria* as a royal benefaction.

**SECTION 1: ELEUTHERIA BETWEEN KING AND PRIMARY FREE CITY**

Primary freedom was *eleutheria* guaranteed and asserted by the *polis*. It was attainable by the *polis* itself and was neither dependent on nor guaranteed by royal fiat. Since it necessitated that the city exist outside of the empire, it was achievable by very few. Indeed,
one of its main criteria was the belief that *eleutheria* could not exist as a guarantee from another power, it was a self-asserted and self-determinable right, defined by the absence of royal hegemony or control. *Eleutheria* as Primary freedom existed as a point of division between city and king whereas *eleutheria* as Secondary freedom was a gift and part of the culture of petition and benefaction. Both understandings of freedom are conceptually incompatible but since both exist contemporaneously they present two equally valid views on the meaning and understanding of freedom, regardless of their mutual exclusivity.

Primary freedom may have denied royal ability to grant *eleutheria*, but that does not mean that a freedom-based dialogue could not exist between city and king. In the Primary understanding, kings may not be the sole guarantors of freedom itself, but that was not a problem so long as they did not present themselves as such. *Eleutheria* still formed a productive element in the relationship between city and king because the king’s role as benefactor allowed him to grant the city certain gifts, like grain and money. These gifts supported the city’s defence of its *eleutheria* by providing it with the materials needed to maintain its freedom but which it had difficulty procuring by its own means. The gifts of grain, money, and troops by Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassandros during Demetrios’ siege of Rhodes gave the island state the means to defend its own Primary freedom and the kings were therefore honoured as defenders of the city rather than guarantors of its *eleutheria*. They did not provide Rhodes with freedom itself, simply the means with which to maintain it.² Athens is similar. In the early 3rd century Piraeus was separated from the city and so Athens lost its main conduit for imported grain, not to mention harbour dues and the money accruing from trade. The presence of Antigonid troops in Piraeus also posed a threat to the sowing and reaping of crops in the Attic *chora*.³ These were all threats to Athens’ *eleutheria*, but the provision of grain and money by Ptolemy, Spartokos, Audoleon, and Lysimachos, as well as

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² On the siege and its effect on Rhodes’ *eleutheria*, see most recently Wiemer 2011. Kassandros and Lysimachos were honoured for their contribution to Rhodes’ *soteria* while Ptolemy was honoured as a god (D.S. 19.100.2-4). Pausanias (1.8.6) claims that the Rhodians gave Ptolemy the epithet Soter, a statement long assumed to relate to the siege. Hazzard (1992) argues against this. In Pseudo Callisthenes’ account of Alexander’s will (3.33.8; Wolohojian 1969: 272, pg.154; cf. *Liber de Morte* 107-8), dated by Bosworth (2000) to 309/8 and connected with Ptolemaic-Rhodian diplomacy, Rhodes was to receive from Egypt money for the adornment of the city, triremes —so that it would safely be free‖ (ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἔλευθερον ἦτε), and annual gifts of grain (σίτου ἐλευθερίας ἐξ Αἰγύπτου δωρεάν). Although the money and grain are not directly connected to the maintenance of *eleutheria*, which has a military connotation through the gift of triremes, an implicit association exists between *eleutheria* and money, ships, and grain.

Seleukos’ return of Lemnos, allowed the democratic asty to maintain its economic independence and stability and ensure its own eleutheria despite the loss of Piraeus.\footnote{Halfmann 1989: 32-3. Ptolemy: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 650; cf. SEG XXX 65. Spartokos: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 653. Audoleon: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 654, 655. Lysimachos: Agora XVI 172; cf. IG II\textsuperscript{2} 808 with SEG XLVIII 817; Burstein 1980b; Henry 1990. Seleukos: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 672+EM 12967 (App. 1 num.40).With Piraeus under Antigonid control Athens was forced to use harbours in the Attic countryside: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 654.29-30, 657.31-6; Oliver 2007: 123-5, 236-7. For the importance of grain collection during the Chremonidean war, see I.Rhamnous 3; cf. Oliver 2001b (analysis); Steinhauser 2009 (new readings).} It could be argued that a city’s reliance on royal gifts to ensure its freedom was a mark of dependency and therefore denoted the lack of truly self-guaranteed freedom. In a way this is true: although self-attained, Athens’ eleutheria between 287-262 was heavily dependent upon royal gifts of grain and money achieved through petition and the grant of honours.\footnote{T.L. Shear (1978: 26-7) highlights the urgency of the language used to describe one of Kallias’ missions in the late 280s: καὶ πολλακάλουσαν[ν] αὐτὸν σπουδάσατε ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Περσαλειμάτων ὅτ’ ἔτελε θάνατον τὴν ταχύτητην eis τὸ ἄστεν στίχοι καὶ χρήματαν (SEG XXVIII 60.47-50). Oliver (2007: 241-7 with App. 8) dates this mission to Artemision 282.} Without such gifts the loss of Piraeus and the Macedonian control of Eleusis, Rhamnous, and other forts in the mid-280s would have been crippling; the loss of Piraeus alone had caused Athens to surrender to Kassandros in 317.\footnote{Athens probably regained the Attic forts by 282/1 (Oliver 2007: 125-7). On the capitulation in 317, see D.S. 18.74.1; Wallace forthcoming A.} The reliance on foreign support, by Rhodes or Athens, marks a sign of practical and ideological dependency: even if one’s Primary freedom remained intact it did so thanks to the generosity of royal patrons. However, the weakness that such gifts of grain and money acknowledged could be turned into a point of strength, and therefore of unity between city and king. The honest discharge of gifts revealed the king to be a supporter of the city’s Primary freedom and not an attempted controller of it. This difference in perception between support and control is important. Unlike Demetrios in 304-301 (below §3) and 295 (Ch.2 §7), the Ptolemies did not seek to monopolise the granting of Athens’ eleutheria, they simply aimed to support it from the 280s to the 260s as a balance to Macedonian power.

Freedom maintained an active role in relations between king and cities free in both Primary and Secondary understandings, but on two different levels. The difference can be seen as one between support and control. For the former the king’s gifts of grain and money offered support to an ally in defence of its own eleutheria; the city may be heavily dependent upon royal patronage but its Primary freedom remains intact. For the latter, however, eleutheria itself is the royal gift with freedom acting as a means of control within the empire. The distinction between both positions was sometimes very fine. Royal support of a city’s Primary freedom was never purely magnanimous. Ideas such as glory, honour, and reputation...
were important, but gifts and support were motivated more often by the wish to maintain allies and expand influence. Thus, Ptolemy’s support of Athens post 287 earned him an ally against Demetrios and a friendly foothold within Greece, just as support for Rhodes had earlier done for Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassandros in 305. A delicate balance needed to be struck between the goals of the king and the city’s Primary freedom. Klaus Bringmann expressed the position rather well when he pointed out that the gifts offered by a king to such cities, though essentially passive bribes for goodwill and support, must not favour the giver over the receiver. Thus the Achaian League refused Eumenes II’s gift of money to provide travel expenses for its representatives because it felt that this would undermine its independence and make it indebted to the king. The gift was seen as a bribe for future support rather than a contribution to the League’s freedom. The king had to make sure that his gifts were not seen to undermine the city’s freedom, but rather support it.

In other situations, however, royal benefactions that contributed to a city’s eleutheria could be difficult to assimilate ideologically. Take, for instance, Antigonos Gonatas’ return of Eleusis and gift of twenty talants to Athens in 279, a gift that would in a very practical way have helped Athens defend its freedom from the threat posed at that time by Antigonos’ control of Piraeus and other Attic forts. Clearly Antigonos could not simultaneously be both undermining and defending Athens’ eleutheria. How then were his benefactions received? In Plutarch’s account of the honorary decree for Demochares (Plu. Moralia 851f), Antigonos’ gifts are not connected with Athens’ freedom, as was the case in the honorary decrees for Ptolemy, Audoleon, Spartokos, and Seleukos (above). Rather, the focus is placed on Demochares, who retrieved Eleusis and the gift of twenty talants from Antigonos. It would appear that although Antigonos was acting in a similar way to other kings – granting gifts to Athens that contributed to the maintenance of the city’s freedom – his actions were not given an ideological dimension; he returned Eleusis just as Seleukos returned Lemnos, but due to political circumstances only Seleukos was presented as a defender of Athens’ eleutheria.

A city’s self-assertion of Primary freedom could theoretically be a point of conflict since it denied the royal presentation of freedom as benefaction and the king as its sole guarantor. In practice, however, things could be somewhat different because freedom was, as ever, adaptable to the necessities of different circumstances. A city could be dependent upon royal

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7 Heuβ 1937: 227; Bringmann 1993: 15; 1995; Gauthier 1993: 213-15; Raaflaub 2004: 260. This theme underscores Bringmann 2000; see especially his comments on page v. See further, below §2.2.
9 On Antigonos’ donation, see below pg.169 n.49.
10 Publication of the honorary decree for Aristides of Lamptrai, which also mentions Antigonos’ return of Eleusis, will add further detail to the political and ideological context of Antigonos’ gifts (below pg.169 n.49).
benefaction to a greater or lesser degree yet maintain its Primary freedom provided that the gift was not *eleutheria* itself, but rather the means by which the city could ensure it for itself. This marks a degree of civic dependency on royal will and shows that the city’s Primary freedom could be jeopardised should the king stop supporting it. However, for a city free in the Primary sense, dependence on royal gifts marked a means to an end, the ultimate maintenance of its own *eleutheria*. For a city free in the Secondary sense, as we shall see in greater detail below, the gift was *eleutheria* itself. If the relationship between king and (Primary) free city was to work successfully then the king had to be seen to support the city’s self-attainment of freedom, not seek to bestow it.

**SECTION 2: ELEUTHERIA BETWEEN KING AND SECONDARY FREE CITY**

For a long time the image of relations between city and king in the Hellenistic period wavered between Heuβ’ model of continued royal adherence to the legal autonomy of the *polis* and Orth’s view of the king as all-powerful oppressor of the defenceless and un-free *polis*. A more sophisticated understanding of the relationship is now in the ascendency thanks in no small part to the early work of Bikerman and later Bertrand and Ma. This argues that the relationship between city and king was one of mutual necessity based on the premise of king as benefactor and protector and the city as loyal recipient of such benefactions through a processes of petition and dialogue and role assumption and fulfilment. The precise role played by *eleutheria* within this has, however, yet to be satisfactorily treated. As such, this section is devoted to an analysis of *eleutheria* as a means of interaction between king and (Secondary) free city. As I have consistently been at pains to point out, *eleutheria* is frequently found operating in different ways in different situations. Its lack of definition, coupled with its versatility as a political concept, allowed it to serve as a point of both unity and discord between city and king depending on the situation and the motives of those employing it.

**2.1: Petition and Benefaction: The Relationship Between City and King.**

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11 For an overview of this debate, see my introduction.
The Hellenistic period is defined by the two institutions of the Macedonian king and the Greek polis. Consequently, the relationship between both parties is, as Frank Walbank emphasised and is quoted at the top of this chapter, that of two entities “forced by historical events to come to terms with each other.” Both parties needed to develop a relationship that took cognisance of each other’s traditions and authority. That relationship, in its simplest form, was based on civic deference to royal authority and royal deference to civic laws and autonomy. The system of interaction was dynamic. A process of dialogue between city and king was continually played out and is preserved for us through royal letters and civic decrees. Within this discourse each party sought to promote itself through local traditions, authority, and both moral and military force, but was always careful to achieve balance and respect in this regard. This ever adapting procedure of interaction between royal and civic discourse lies at the heart of the relationship between city and king.

Royal dialogue is predominantly based on ideas of power, force, and control. These form the fundamentals of the ‘surrender and grant’ model, the system by which the city, having surrendered itself to the king, loses all status only to receive it again as a result of royal grant (Ch.3 §2.3). The king strives to monopolise the authorisation of statuses and benefactions and seeks to promote himself as the sole guarantor of such. This is the basis of Secondary freedom: freedom as a royal grant. In its turn, however, civic dialogue emphasises royal benefaction and euergetism as well as a history of interaction. It attempts to neutralise the aggressive and ideological force of the royal version of history and construct kingship as a tradition of benefaction, not power, and as protection and care, not suppression and control. This asserts the discourse of the polis over that of the king, and since the city monopolised the granting of honours kings were pressured to ascribe to this discourse.13 Part of this process was didactic. The civic discourse of honours sometimes acted as role ascription, applying to the king, and even his philoi, a series of functions and qualities which it could then pressure him to fulfil through the use of moral force.14 Thus royal power and control could be construed as benefaction and defence, a system that served the interests of both parties by validating royal power within civic models and elaborating the king as benefactor and defender. Through this process royal power and control was veiled and presented instead


14 On role ascription and moral force, see Billows 1995: 74-8; Ma 1999: 204-6; cf. Bringmann 1993: 18-19 “[Kings] tried to live up to the standards of benevolence that the cities were expecting”. Shipley (2000a: 59-64) emphasises how literary accounts of monarchy assume that “kings owe it to their position and to their dignity to behave in certain ways”. For Demetrios and Athens, see below §3.
as exchange, influence, and adhesion. The historical events of royal conquest and civic subordination were then “written into the inert stuff of history” and the relationship between both parties became one of synergy.\textsuperscript{15}

For those cities that conceived of freedom in the Secondary sense, the initial grant of a benefaction, status, or indeed freedom itself (even when confirmed within a treaty – Ch.3 §2.3) was not the end of the process. Freedom was a status benefaction that allowed the gaining of further benefactions, a stepping-stone to be employed in later negotiations. With this initial grant the king could present himself as munificent and amenable to civic petition. The city, by granting honours in return, confirms the king’s ability to grant such benefactions and institutionalises a relationship of civic petition and honours in exchange for royal benefactions. The system is self-perpetuating and later embassies to the king can ensure the guarantee of added benefits, like aphorologesia and aphrouresia (Ch.3 §1.1-2), or indeed re-confirmation of previous honours should the king die and a successor assume the throne.\textsuperscript{16} By publishing the grant on stone the city sought to give it tangibility and perpetuity, to turn it from a status benefaction into a quasi-legal position and so ensure its continuation under subsequent kings.\textsuperscript{17}

Cities have numerous methods of petition, all based around the idea of exerting moral pressure on the king. They can ascribe a role to him and compel him to fulfil it,\textsuperscript{18} refer to civic honours already granted to him,\textsuperscript{19} profess their loyalty through examples of allegiance,\textsuperscript{20} refer to earlier royal status grants,\textsuperscript{21} express their commitment to the dynasty,\textsuperscript{22} or refer to an

\textsuperscript{15} Ma 1999: 199-201, 226-8.
\textsuperscript{16} IK.Ery. 31.21-8 (App.2 num.35); Giovannini 2004: 80.
\textsuperscript{17} Lund 1992: 110. Bertrand (2001) analyses the ways in which the city could neutralise royal authority and integrate it into its own freedom (see further, below §3). He argues that the process declines throughout the Hellenistic Period before eventually dying out with the pax romana.
\textsuperscript{18} Above n.14. IK.Ery. 504.14-20, where the king is presented as defender of the Greek cities: [...]πᾶσαν ἐπιστημένην πολέμου τῶν ἱστορικῶν [...] A particularly fine, but somewhat later, example is RC 52 (Austin 239; Schenkungen KNR. 285) of 167, where Eumenes II quotes an elaborate decree of the Ionian Koinon calling him benefactor of the Greeks and praising his victories over the barbarians and his maintenance of peace.
\textsuperscript{19} Below ns.22, 27.
\textsuperscript{20} Smyrna emphasises its loyalty to Seleukos II so as to ensure his confirmation of its eleutheria (IK.Smyrna 573). The process also works in reverse. In I.Milet 139 Ptolemy Philadelphos requests Miletos’ continued loyalty by providing evidence of the city’s previous allegiance to his father.
\textsuperscript{21} Alexander the Great was often the precedent, see below pgs.155-6 with ns.9-10.
\textsuperscript{22} IK.Ilios 32.45-8 (OGIS 219): [...]ἀνεκδοτους αυτῶι τὴν ἐπιστημένην τὴν και ἀπολογισμένον τὴν τοῦ δῆμου ἐνυπον ἐν ἐς τοῦ πατρὶ τιτέρα αὐτοῦ βιολέα Σ[έ][λευκον και τῇ τῶν πασιν ἐνυπον οἰκίαν αἰεί δαιμονίαν τέτελεκεν. Cf. IK.Ery. 504.14-20; RC 22. Diodoros (18.93.7) recounts how during Demetrios’ siege Rhodes refused to pull down the statues of Antigonos and Demetrios because if the city were captured these would display its earlier friendship and help gain mercy from the kings. IG II' 774 (c.250/49) displays Athenian loyalty to Antigonos Gonatas based on its earlier relationship with Demetrios Poliorketes (below n.27).
established royal/dynastic policy or proairesis.\textsuperscript{23} This whole system is based on what Ma called “repressive tolerance”, the procedure of legitimising royal power through the acceptance of the king’s will as the ultimate source of status and the king as the sole guarantor of such. The result is that civic statuses, including eleutheria, become understood purely as royal benefactions. Since these are then achievable only through the process of petition and benefaction, the city’s conceptual horizons are closed to any other possible means of attainment. The king becomes sole guarantor of eleutheria, a status now achievable only through royal benefaction.

This system, however, served the interests of both parties. By making himself accessible to a discourse of petition and persuasion the king channelled the city’s potentially revolutionary zeal into dialogue rather than conflict. Similarly, the city acknowledged that tangible improvements, such as tax or garrison exemption, could be attained by petition and the passage of royal honours, rather than by rebellion. Overall, this avoided the need for violent revolution and so increased the stability and unity of the empire as an amalgamation of king and city,\textsuperscript{24} Walbank’s “two elements…with their own traditions”. From the initial grant of status onwards, each benefaction confirmed by the king became an historical moment, a precedent that could later be invoked by a city to either ensure reconfirmation of that status/benefaction, should the city be dealing with a different monarch, or act as a stepping-stone for the attainment of greater benefactions.\textsuperscript{25} This integrated the cities into the concept of empire, specifically the continuous process of dynasty, by providing a series of pre-existing benefactions or precedents which could be invoked didactically to present to a new ruler with a history of close inter-relations achieved through a process of civic honours and royal benefactions.\textsuperscript{26} During times of weakness or succession the city would be less inclined to revolt if there was a pre-existing historical relationship of benefaction upon which both it and the king could draw to ensure the continuation of its privileged status, thus tying it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23}I.Didyma 480.10-13; IK.Ery. 504.20. Further examples in Billows 1995: 43 with n.53. On proairesis, see below pg.129 with n.57.
\item \textsuperscript{24}Ma 1999: 126-7.
\item \textsuperscript{25}Ma 1999: 37-8: “royal benevolence and civic gratitude…could substantiate present claims and define the parameters for further rounds of interaction.” Reconfirmation: Above n.22. Stepping-stone: IK.Ery. 31.26-8 (App.2 num.35).
\item \textsuperscript{26}The process was self-aware on the royal side. In his letter to Sopatros of 281/0 (RC 9.5-9), Seleukos states that “our policy is always through benefactions to please the citizens of the Greek cities…so that we may be the object of good-will transmissible for all time to those who come after us”. Miletos also provides an informative example. By the 260s it had had close relations with the Antigonid, Seleukid, and Ptolemaic dynasties (Welles 1965: 42-3; Burstein 1980a). As such, it could draw on precedents of loyalty and benefaction when engaging with both Ptolemy Philadelphos (I.Milet 139 = RC 14) and Seleukos II (I.Didyma 493 = RC 22).
\end{itemize}
further to the empire and avoiding the impetus to revolution and independence.\textsuperscript{27} The system of petition and response, therefore, provided both city and king with a framework of benefaction, loyalty, and synergy around which their relationship could crystallise. As a status benefaction \textit{eleutheria} played an important role in this procedure.

\textbf{2.2: Eleutheria as Benefaction}

In a quotation prefixed to this chapter, Klaus Bringmann claimed that despite the deep differences that existed between the institutions of the king and the \textit{polis} the king’s role as benefactor validated his new relationship with the city by providing an understanding of kingship that emphasised the \textit{polis} first and defined the king and his actions in terms of \textit{polis} interests. The king as benefactor offered a means of assimilating royal power into civic structures without compromising the city’s \textit{eleutheria}.\textsuperscript{28} However, the role of king as grantor and defender of \textit{eleutheria} specifically is a facet of his royal character untreated by Bringmann. Within the wider multi-ethnic world \textit{eleutheria} was a tradition peculiar to the Greek cities and perennially important to a ruling power’s relationship with them.\textsuperscript{29} The king’s position as defender of \textit{eleutheria} revealed him to be fulfilling one of the many roles, such as benefactor, ascribed by Greek tradition. Since Secondary freedom was granted and guaranteed by royal fiat, the function of \textit{eleutheria} as an aspect of royal euergetism is of fundamental importance to our understanding of \textit{eleutheria} as an aspect of king/city relations.

First of all, it is important to emphasise that as guarantor of \textit{eleutheria} the king was not acting out of some high-minded sense of magnanimity. He was concerned with assimilating the city to his empire by presenting the latter in terms comprehensible and agreeable to the former; what Strabo described as the expansion of hegemony through persuasion over force (9.2.40).\textsuperscript{30} A grant of \textit{eleutheria}, like any other benefaction, was a form of passive bribe. It aimed to enforce royal hegemony over civic freedom and integrate the city, and its statuses, into the mechanism of empire, what Gianluca Cuniberti termed “autonomia senza

\textsuperscript{27} Evident in \textit{IK.Iliion} 32; \textit{I.Milet} 139 (RC 14); \textit{IK.Smyrna} 573; and even \textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 774, where, in the face of Alexandros’ invasion of Attica in 250/49, Athens remembers Kassandros’ incursions between 307-304 and so parallels Demetrios’ earlier and Gonatas’ current defence of freedom.

\textsuperscript{28} Paschidis 2008a: 487-8.

\textsuperscript{29} Heuβ 1937: 242; Ma 2003: 180-3; Mileta 2008: 23-33. An early example is Mardonios’ grant of what Herodotos calls democracy to the Greek cities of Asia Minor (Hdt. 6.43).

\textsuperscript{30} Persuasion and force are the twin powers of the Hellenistic king. Appian applies them to Seleukos Nikator (\textit{Syrr.} 281: συνατίς ὠν βιωκατάθω καὶ πέθανος προσκαταγέσθαι ἢ ῥόξε) and Diodoros to Antígono Monophthalmos (18.52.8; above pg.56 with n.51). See also Diodoros’ account of the Spartan hegemony of the late 380s (15.19.1).
The allowance of freedom came at the price of obedience and loyalty. Freedom was guaranteed by the ruler alone and dependent solely upon his will. However, even within this understanding of freedom the city was able to exercise a certain limited hegemony over its neighbours and allies. Echoing Cuniberti’s remarks, Hans-Ulrich Wiemer has recently argued that freedom and hegemony were inextricably linked, that freedom was “the perfect realisation of what independence really meant”. This, however, is to treat of freedom purely in a Primary understanding. It is abundantly clear that cities that owed their eleutheria to another power (Secondary freedom) could also exercise hegemony, but on a more local scale. Freedom and hegemony were not mutually exclusive.

Under the Athenian Empire localised Euboian hegemonies existed under the wider hegemony of Athens herself. Between 304-301, Athens was able to take the initiative in forming an alliance with Sikyon in Skirophorion 303/2 even though both cities were by then probably allied under Demetrios’ Hellenic League and closely under his control. Smyrna’s assimilation of Magnesia-on-Maiandros, though expressing fully Seleukos’ authority in granting eleutheria, was an aggressive and expansive manifestation of its wish for hegemony on a local scale. John Ma has treated of the phenomenon of local, small-scale warfare and reached the conclusion that local hegemonies remained vibrant throughout the Hellenistic period and into the Roman. So, although royal acknowledgement of eleutheria entailed the civic surrender of hegemonia to the king, it was not a complete surrender of hegemony. The city remained capable of exercising hegemony on a local scale provided this did not harm royal interests and was justified within the discourse of civic obedience to royal loyalty.

The royal grant of eleutheria was a means of extending dominion, but it did so in a pre-emptively euphemistic and integrative manner, one that played to civic expectations and attempted to utilise their emotive longing for its own ends. This is important. The civic response, however, fully engaged with this royal use – probably aware of the inherent lack of altruism – and by constant reference to it exerted moral force over the king, forcing him to live up to the role he had set himself and offer concrete benefactions to the city. Royal grants of eleutheria normalised the empire into the civic political sphere and provided a local

31 Cuniberti 2002.
34 SEG LIII 101: Prytany XII 23, Skirophorion 21. IG II² 493 and 494 were passed at the same meeting.
35 Ma 2000.
36 Above n.14; cf. below pgs.145-6 with n.104.
model by which the city could understand, and more importantly authorise, the king’s exceptional position over it by defining that position as the maintenance of its freedom. The king not only defended the physical safety of the city (soteria – Ch.6 §4) and contributed benefactions to it, but also asserted his wish to defend its political independence and contribute to its development as a polis through the guarantee and protection of its freedom.

Eleutheria was unique as a benefaction because it synergised city and king by offering a positive ideological programme for their unity, one that promoted civic loyalty to the king but also necessitated his active support for the city’s political wellbeing. This ideological dimension to eleutheria is of particular importance because beyond defining certain concrete improvements in a city’s status and independence, eleutheria also provided an implicit statement of principles on the nature of the relationship between both parties. A king could grant benefactions to any city within his empire, free or otherwise, but a grant of eleutheria, though used as a stepping-stone to further benefactions, singled out the recipient as one of a privileged few (Ch.3 §2.3).37 It defined for those lucky enough to receive it the nature of their individual relationship with the king in terms of politics and ideology, rather than gift-giving and protection, although it certainly encompassed these as well.

The use of eleutheria as a means of engaging king and city is amply attested in individual instances.38 However, in certain cases eleutheria was elaborated to define the very nature of the king’s relationship with all the Greek cities under his empire: eleutheria as the ideological glue holding the entire Hellenic face of the empire together. This, however, is rarer and usually connected with universal declarations of Greek freedom,39 the likes of which were employed by Alexander in Asia Minor between 334-332, Antigonus at Tyre in 315 and after the Peace of 311, and even Ptolemy in 310.40 In these situations eleutheria became more than just a status benefaction to a few favoured cities, but rather a general quality ostensibly entitled to all Greek cities and promised as a result of loyalty to a specific king. While the precise application of this freedom differed from city to city, the principle was one that

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37 By the end of the third century the status was perhaps highly institutionalised, as the expression αἱ αὐτόνομοι may denote, see Ma 1999: 160. In a letter of Augustus to Samos of c.38-27 eleutheria is referred to as τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλανθρόπων and one of τὰ τειμιώτατα φιλανθρώπων (Reynolds A&R 13).
39 On universal declarations, see Ch.2 §4. It is a phenomenon that sees a hiatus after Antigonus and only re-appears with Rome’s arrival in the late third century (Heuß 1937: 217; Bickermann 1932: 64-5 with n.2; Bernhardt 1971: 15). Bikerman (1939: 343 n.2) distinguishes between generalising edicts and grants of freedom to cities willing to cede themselves to the king. In the early third century Seleukos vocalised his policy through the concepts of euonoia and euergesia rather than eleutheria (IK.Eph. 1453; RC 9; above n.26).
40 Alexander: Att. An. 1.18.1-2; Nawotka 2003; Ch.2 §1. Antigonus: D.S. 19.61 (315), 105.1-2; OGIS 5+6 (311); Ch.2 §4. Ptolemy: D.S. 20.19.3-4; cf. IK.Iasos 2; Ch.2 §5; below pgs.196-7.
applied to all, and that was the important point. *Eleutheria* could be developed into the single defining characteristic of a king’s relationship with the Greek cities under his remit.

It is central to the success of *eleutheria* as a unifying ideological concept that it be seriously pursued with genuine zeal, only then could it ensure the king both immediate and long-lasting support. Antigonus Monophthalmos is the archetype. He employed such a policy from 315 to 301 which, although not without its setbacks, met with huge success in Asia Minor, the Aegean, and Greece (Ch.2 §4-6).\(^{41}\) Alexander’s earlier actions in Asia Minor, although of more limited scope, were equally successful (Ch.2 §1; cf. Ch.5 §1.1); Polyperchon’s too, but only in the immediate aftermath of his Edict.\(^{42}\) Antigonos, therefore, had precedents for the support that could be garnered through universal declarations of freedom, but it was he alone who saw its full potential, employing it as the key characteristic of his relationship with the Greek cities from 315-301.\(^{43}\)

Within Antigonus’ letter to Skepsis of 310/9 and the civic decree passed in reply (*OGIS* 5+6) we can trace Antigonus’ successful use of *eleutheria* as a means of integrating city and empire. Antigonus presents himself as the sole protector of Greek *eleutheria* and uses it not only as a point of dialogue but also as a means of defining and authorising his wider actions. That is, he went so far as to explain the recent cycle of Successor Wars in local Hellenic terms, namely high politics as a manifestation of concern for Greek *eleutheria*. Within this programme his *basileia* and military aggression were justified as expressions of concern for Greek *eleutheria*.\(^{44}\) When peace was established in 311 on the impetus and ratification of the Diadochoi alone, Antigonus presented it to the *poleis* (here Skepsis), the local Greek actors, as a statement on Greek *eleutheria* for all, claiming that “we exercised zeal for the *eleutheria* of the Greeks…as long as there was agreement on this we participated in the conference on the Hellespont”.\(^{45}\) The war and the resultant peace were carefully explained in terms comprehensible and complimentary to the *polis* and Antigonus’ relationship with it.

Further, Antigonus claimed that he had inserted into the treaty the requirement that:

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\(^{41}\) *Plu. Demetr.* 8.1-2; *Heuβ* 1938; Simpson 1959; Wehrli 1968: 104-29; Billows 1990: 189-236.

\(^{42}\) Ch.2 §3; Poddighe 1998; 2001; Wallace forthcoming A: section 2.

\(^{43}\) Billows (1995: 73-4) argues that Antigonus was the first to use benefaction as a way of securing Greek support. This is incorrect. Direct precedents were Alexander and Polyperchon; Billows’ account of Antigonus’ relations with the Greek cities tends towards eulogy (Derow 1993). Simpson (1958) and Wehrli (1968: 104-29) are more balanced and emphasise his use of *eleutheria* to gain support.

\(^{44}\) The funds (*dapanemata*) exacted from free cities to finance his aggressive wars of expansion were also presented as contributions to the defence of Greek freedom (II.43-5). Antipatros extorted similar *dapanemata* in 320/19, but without the ideological justification (*IK. Adramytteion* 34.9-14).

\(^{45}\) *OGIS* 5.1-7; trans. *BD* 6.
“All the Greeks are to swear to aid each other in preserving their eleutheria and autonomia...so that afterwards eleutheria would remain more certainly secure for all the Greeks if both they and the men in power are bound by oaths.”

This oath is important, but the precise understanding of it has caused debate. P.J. Stylianou argued that the Peace of 311 “was meant in fact to be between, on the one hand, all the Greeks, and on the other, Alexander IV and Macedon.” The role of the Greeks within this peace is important, but I think Stylianou is mistaken here. An accurate understanding of the treaty is difficult because, although we have both literary and epigraphic sources, both detail different parts of the treaty. Diodoros gives a brief breakdown of the main clauses of the whole treaty: Kassandros is strategos of Europe until Alexandros IV comes of age; Lysimachos rules Thrace; Ptolemy rules Egypt and the cities in Libya and Arabia; Antigonos rules Asia; and the Greeks are to be autonomous (19.105.1). Antigonos’ letter to Skepsis, however, elaborates in detail the clause on Greek autonomia, no doubt the least important clause for the Diadochoi signatories. This causes difficulty because Antigonos gives us a level of detail that does not exist within Diodoros’ cursory account.

Antigonos seems to be referring to two clauses in the Peace of 311 concerning Greek eleutheria, the second being an expansion on the first. First, a clause that the Diadochoi were to uphold Greek freedom, something explicitly mentioned by Diodoros (19.105.1). Second, a clause entered on Antigonos’ insistence that in pursuance of this the Greeks were “to swear to aid each other in preserving their eleutheria and autonomia” (OGIS 5.58-61). Only in this way can it be said that both the Diadochoi and the Greek cities were bound together by oath to defend Greek freedom. Each party swore to defend Greek freedom but neither swore a treaty or alliance with the other; the Greek cities were never actually party to the Peace of 311 because the Diadochoi and cities were individually bound by their own series of alliances, something the treaty in no way tried to alter.

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47 Stylianou 1994: 54-7. Bikerman (1939: 335 n.1) also argues for an oath between cities and Diadochoi. Stylianou’s article contains an appendix that argues for a composite High/Low chronology for the Early Hellenistic Period, something recently, but independently, canvassed by Boiy (2008).
48 Errington (2008: 34-5) unfavourably and incorrectly calls it a “minor point”.
49 OGIS 5.58-61: ἐνόρκων γενομένων τῶν τε Ἐλλήνων πάντων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσις ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθερίαις.
50 Understood by Simpson 1958: 393-4. Welles (1934: 10) and Bikerman (1939: 225 n.1) argued that the oath sworn by the Greeks related to the entire treaty and that the cities were obliged to support whoever alleged any of its terms broken. This is clearly not the case. The oath was concerned solely with the clause on Greek eleutheria since that is the only clause relevant to the Greek cities. Further, it is this clause alone, and not the treaty in general, that Ptolemy claimed Antigonos broke in 310 (D.S. 20.19.3). On the peace of 311, see most recently Dmitriev 2011: 121-9.
eleutheria was sworn upon by both Diadochoi and cities with the meaning that if any Diodochos broke it then the others were to attack while the cities were themselves to band together and defend their freedom in unison, thus effectively uniting cities and Successors against the offending party. Heuβ argued that this constituted a koine eirene and a mutual defence clause for the Greek cities.\textsuperscript{51} This is too strong; with no central organisation the Greek cities could not organise such mutual defence. The call to arms would have been made by Antigonos, or as it later transpired, Ptolemy, and under his leadership the Greek cities would unite against the offending party. The clause on Greek freedom was an ideological casus belli that existed both within and outwith of the treaty and could be used by one to open hostilities against a perceived offending party.\textsuperscript{52} Two separate oaths were sworn around a single clause on Greek freedom and both parties were required to defend this on identical grounds. Neither party was allied to the other, but they were to defend the same thing. This was the extent of the alliance between the kings and the Greek cities.\textsuperscript{53}

Successor and city were united in oath on the defence of one clause, that of Greek freedom. Antigonos obviously intended this for his own use. From 310 onwards he was shifting his attention to Babylon and Seleukos, and a re-assertion of eleutheria would only help secure his Asian (under Demetrios and Philippos) and Greek (under Polemaios and Aristodemos) possessions during his absence.\textsuperscript{54} Manipulating the Greek concern for eleutheria was a convenient means of maintaining authority and stability through persuasion and goodwill over military force. Indeed, Antigonos could be reasonably certain that Kassandros, Lysimachos, and Ptolemy, none of whom had yet made use of Greek eleutheria, would have little cause or success in utilising such a clause against him. His actions were, nonetheless, risky because between 310-308 Ptolemy did claim the role of defender of Greek freedom and tried to rouse the Greeks in its common defence (Ch.2 §5).

As well as a means of undermining his opponents in the eyes of the Greek cities, Antigonos saw eleutheria as a means of unifying under one banner himself, his empire, and the Greek cities within it. By inserting a clause on Greek eleutheria, no doubt dismissed as meaningless by his co-signatories, and then requiring the Greek cities to swear to it

\textsuperscript{51} Heuβ 1938: 153-9, Stylianou (1994: 54-7) argues that it was an attempt to restore the League of Corinth (cf. É. Will 1979: 63), Préaux (1978: 413) emphasises the aspect of symmachy.
\textsuperscript{52} Emphasised by Wehrli (1968: 54).
\textsuperscript{53} We can doubt whether or not the other three Diadochoi requested their dependent cities swear the oath, or whether they even communicated to them the full terms of the treaty, as Antigonos did.
\textsuperscript{54} On the campaigns of these generals, see Wheatley 1997: 138-53; 1998a. On Antigonos’ campaign in Babylon, see Bosworth 2002: 216-25; Wheatley 2002. It is almost exclusively known from the Babylonian Diadochi Chronicle (ABC 10). A new edition is being prepared by Bert van der Spek and a preliminary publication can be found online (http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles/bchp-diadochi/diadochi_01.html)
Antigonos created a coherent and encompassing ideological unity for his empire and the cities within it, but one which could be employed effectively in motivating the cities as allies against external threats. *Eleutheria* had been an important part of Antigonos’ relations with the Greek cities since 315, and possibly earlier. With the oath of 311 he successfully created a pseudo-legal basis for his associations with the Greek cities within his empire, and potentially those outside it should he extend his influence. With campaigns in Ionia, Caria, the Aegean, and mainland Greece Antigonos had been carefully presenting the expansion of his empire as a defence of Greek *eleutheria*. Now, the cities under his influence were bound by oath to likewise defend his empire as an expression of this.\(^55\) Both he and the Greek cities were legally bound to defend Greek *eleutheria*, the most important concept yet seen for synergising city and empire.

This marked a level of ideological unity hitherto unseen. The League of Corinth was certainly alleged to defend the *eleutheria* and *autonomia* of its members (D. 17.8), but these qualities were dependent upon the terms of the League itself. Now, however, the relationship between king and city was based exclusively around the defence and continuance of the principles of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* and nothing else; this is unity between ruler and cities based primarily on loyalty to ideology and concepts, not to politics and treaties.\(^56\) The strength of this unity lay in its ambiguity. *Eleutheria* remained undefined, beyond perhaps Antigonos’ promotion for *aphrouresia*. This was in direct contrast to its use in the League of Corinth with its multiple legalistic clauses. The individual application of *eleutheria* varied from city to city (below §2.3). Nonetheless, the concept itself was the unifying factor; it was vague enough so as not to restrict the king’s actions unnecessarily but positive and affirmative enough so as to secure loyalty and extend hegemony.

Antigonos and Demetrios refined the use of *eleutheria* as unity in their dealings with Athens between 307-301. Here *eleutheria* was stated to be the *proairesis* (policy) of the kings, a paradigmatic manifestation of their character.\(^57\) From this it was presented as the driving force behind Demetrios’ European campaigns of 307-301. As was the case with the Skepsis letter, aggressive campaigns of military expansion were portrayed simply as manifestations of Antigonid concern for Greek *eleutheria*. Antigonid *philoi* were commended

\(^{55}\) Halfmann (1989: 25) points out that Antigonos presents himself within his letter to Skepsis as the founder of the peace and sole guarantor of *eleutheria*. By taking the oath on *eleutheria*, the Greeks were compelled to support its only champion.

\(^{56}\) As I have shown, the Greek cities swore to uphold a clause of the treaty, but they were not signatories to it.

\(^{57}\) *IG II²* 469.5-8 (App.1 num.17), 558.12-14 (App.1 num.21). Ma (1999: 190) highlights the generalising force of *proairesis* as a moral attribute. Gauthier (1986: 56-7) reveals how it turns benefaction into the natural and inherent state of monarchy and not simply a personal choice.
for their concern for “royal affairs and the freedom of the Greeks”, a phrase that explicitly unifies king and city, empire and Hellenes, under a common ideological purpose: the preservation and expansion of freedom for the Greeks as manifest through Antigonid expansion. The defence and promotion of eleutheria was the prime rationalisation of relations between the Antigonids and the Greek cities. It sought to unite both parties under a common ideological purpose and present the expansion of the empire as a manifestation of royal concern for Greek eleutheria.

Eleutheria as royal benefaction, with the king as guarantor and defender, was designed to promote unity through a community of political and ideological interests. The example of Antigonos at Skepsis is particularly striking in that it reveals the creation of eleutheria as a legally-binding connection between the empire and the Greek cities. However, freedom could also be used to voice discontent and promote conflict, even in relations between the king and a Secondary free city within his remit.

Eleutheria promoted unity because it was a positive ideal that affirmed the rights and traditions of the polis and established the king as the new guarantor and protector of these. It promoted conflict, however, because it was not a universal gift and so its grant to one city implicitly acknowledged its absence from another. This aspect of eleutheria is not touched upon in most analyses of it. Eleutheria was granted only to a limited number of privileged cities, leaving many others not enslaved, but not officially acknowledged as free by the king and therefore in a weakened ideological position when it came to negotiating statuses and benefactions. Such cities were left with three choices: abide by the situation and try to reap certain limited benefits but not eleutheria; attempt to garner greater benefits possibly

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58 The evidence is abundant. *Years 315-311*: D.S. 19.64.2, 66.3, 74.1, 77.2, 78.2, 78.5, 87.3; *FD III* (4) 463 (App.1 num.11). *Years 307-301*: D.S. 20.45.1, 46, 100.6, 102.1, 111.2; Plu. Demetr. 8, 23.1-2; below pgs.144-5 with n.101 for the epigraphic evidence. Ma (1999: 187-90) emphasises how the trend of concerns for ‘the Greeks’ or ‘all the Greeks’ turns specific actions into general policies and integrates the individual polis into a wider human group. 59 For the success and failure of this in regards Athens, see below §3. 60 Campanile 1998: 381. Cases existed where a city unsuccessfully requested a grant of eleutheria. Negative judgements only get inscribed in exceptional circumstances and usually then by a different city that somehow benefitted from the judgement. Lysimachos’ re-script against Priene and in favour of Samos is a rare example, and only inscribed in Samos because the king judged in its favour (*RC* 7; *OGIS* 13). An excellent example is the letter of Augustus to Samos of c.38-27 denying its request for eleutheria (above n.37). Augustus calls eleutheria τὸ πάντων μέγιστον φιλάνθρωπον and only grants it to his closest supporters, such as Aphrodisias, who accordingly inscribed the letter in which it was favourably mentioned. 61 On non-free cities see Bikerman 1938: 141-8; 1939: 341-3; Ma 1999: 150-60; Capdetrey 2007: 209-18. Heuß (1937: 244) felt that the king either made all the cities free or none; free and un-free cities could not exist contemporaneously. Orth (1977: 185-6) believed in the totality of royal control and doubted whether cities were ever really free. 62 Some were seen to be royal property and passed or sold on. Telmessos received a guarantee from Ptolemy Philadelphos that he would not give it to anyone as a gift (*SEG* XXVIII 1224; Hauben 2004: 35-8). However, he
leading to a (re-)guarantee of eleutheria through renewed honours and petitions, or seek to attain freedom either by forcefully removing themselves from the empire and asserting their own Primary freedom or attaching themselves to a rival ruler who was willing to grant them Secondary freedom. Eleutheria, or more precisely the lack of it, could split the city from the empire, either ideologically through the belief that both parts stood for different goals, or militarily through the aggressive assertion of that which they were denied by the king. Either way, this marked a weakness in Ma’s “repressive tolerance”, the funnelling of rebellion into discourse through the procedure of petition, benefaction, and honours.

Conflict is also apparent in other ways. The dual understanding of freedom as Primary and/or Secondary is a case in point since it provides the city with Secondary freedom the model of the city with Primary freedom as a potential goal; a fuller manifestation of freedom which asserts the polis’ self-determination even over royal authority. Although a city could be free in either sense, if a choice had to be made Primary freedom was often preferable for those who could realistically achieve and maintain it. Smyrna and Lampsakos again provide the example, preferring their own Primary freedom over the Secondary freedom offered by Antiochos III. Both cities felt that the risks ran in defending their Primary freedom outweighed the guarantees accrued by their potential Secondary freedom. The simple fact that both saw fit at some time in the late third century to abandon the Secondary freedom guaranteed by the Seleukid Empire and assert their own Primary freedom shows that the distinction was worth fighting over and the position of Secondary free city could be seen as restrictive of a greater goal. The impetus for such assertion may have lain with the lethal combination of renewed civic power, as exercised by Smyrna over Magnesia, and weakened royal authority, something that Claire Préaux highlights elsewhere.

A further important point of conflict, analysed in greater detail below (§3), is the erosion of a grant of Secondary freedom through the gradual accumulation of royal impositions. This


63 A process which marks the exaggerated continuation of the discursive procedure. Mylasa continued petitioning Seleukos II and then Philip V for the return of Petra and full enjoyment of its eleutheria rather than revolt (above pgs.110-11). Smyrna preferred to annex Magnesia in the name of Seleukid loyalty so as to ensure guarantee of their eleutheria (IK. Smyrna 573), rather than use Seleukid weakness to assert their own Primary freedom. It later did so against Antiochos III (Liv. 33.38.1-7; Ma 1999: 2-6).

64 Asserting Primary freedom: the Black Sea cities from Lysimachos in winter 314/3 (D.S. 19.73); Athens and Demetrios in 287 (Ch.2 §7); Smyrna and Lampsakos under Antiochos III (above n.63). Granting Secondary freedom: Iasos and Ptolemy Soter in 308, but it is unknown whether this is a new grant or a reaffirmation of one given by Antigonos (IK. Iasos 2); Demetrios liberating the cities of the Peloponnese and central Greece in 304-301 (Ch.2 §6).

65 Above ns.63-4.

process is difficult to trace epigraphically because royal letters and civic decrees normally hide debate and conflict, but both Athens (307-301) and Iasos (309-285) are examples of cities whose initial grant of freedom was eroded over time thus contributing to a decline in support for the current position of royal fidelity. As we will see later (below §2.3), these examples also show eleutheria (in the Secondary sense) operating as an ever-shifting point of balance between the twin extremes that led to its dissolution: too little royal control (inspiring the city to Primary freedom) and too much (negating the city’sSecondary freedom).

2.3: The Functional Limits of Secondary Freedom

Since the king alone held a monopoly on the definition of statuses, freedom could only be achieved by royal grant (Ch.3 2.3). However, the king did not hold a monopoly on the revocation of freedom because there was more than one way by which Secondary freedom could cease to exist. There were two clearly distinguishable situations: the revocation of eleutheria by royal pronouncement or the forcible civic re-assertion of eleutheria seen when the city removed itself from the royal alliance. This latter condition worked in two ways: either the city entered into the remit of another ruler, either by free will or conquest, and ensured a further guarantee of its Secondary freedom or it removed itself entirely from royal control and asserted its own Primary freedom. These two potential situations – royal revocation and civic re-assertion of eleutheria – mark the limits of Secondary freedom by demarcating the conceptual and ideological space within which eleutheria operated as a status benefaction in the discursive relationship of petition and benefaction.

Within the poles of royal revocation and civic re-assertion, eleutheria acted as a general status rather than a definite set of specific and strictly-defined criteria. It did not carry a single consistent meaning. Rather, the practical form of the status it denoted was fluid and constantly changing based on the city’s success in accruing benefits and avoiding royal impositions. When a city gained more status guarantees and benefactions (aphorologesia, aphrouresia, etc) the practical form of its eleutheria was increased; when it suffered royal impositions (tax, garrison, enforced obedience to royal will) this was decreased. Too much movement in either direction might cause the city to lose its Secondary freedom through either civic re-assertion or royal revocation respectively. This model may be rather simplistic, but eleutheria operated fluidly and with great adaptability within the discourse of honours and euergetism that lead to the city’s attainment of royal benefactions and status recognition.

68 Above n.64.
Two cities may be acknowledged by royal grant as free, but neither of them is free in exactly the same way. Neither of them holds precisely the same guarantees of their free status. Magnesia in the 240s was strong enough to act with almost total independence as Seleukos II’s “viceroy in Asia Minor”, annexing Magnesia in his name and attaining royal recognition of *eleutheria, autonomia, demokratia, and aphorologesia* of land and city.\(^69\) However, Iasos in the early third century was forced to accept a Ptolemaic *phylake* and *syntaxis* and petition Ptolemy’s representative Aristoboulos not to annex its harbour dues.\(^70\) Regardless of these differences both cities were officially free and their relationship with the king operated within that zone of dialogue already defined as existing between the extremities of royal revocation and civic re-assertion. The specifics of their freedom were different because their historical circumstances were different, and this caused each city varying degrees of success when it came to defraying royal impositions and ensuring benefactions and recognition of statuses. To understand the nature of Secondary freedom it is vital to realise that freedom itself was ill-defined and adaptable. Its use was, I argue, defined by the functional limits of royal revocation and civic re-assertion, but within these limits its meaning was malleable and its use was fluid, operating to different extents as benefaction, typology of status, and conceptual ideology for the unity of empire. The practical status of *eleutheria* was different from city to city and unique to each. No single definition of it existed.

I have defined *eleutheria* as a point of discourse which itself exists between two extreme situations that negate Secondary freedom, royal revocation and civic re-assertion. This model can, however, be further refined. Without going so far as to revoke the city’s freedom the king did undermine it by continually asserting more and more royal control over the city by installing garrisons and taxes, or demanding obedience to royal will ahead of civic laws (see below). This process of erosion slowly undermined the initial grant of freedom and so cities often fought against it, as can be seen in the aforementioned case of Iasos claiming that Ptolemaic annexation of its harbour dues would undermine the Ptolemaic grant of freedom. This process is important because it reveals that there came a point whereby royal impositions became so oppressive that the city began to feel that its freedom was ceasing to exist in any practical sense. The city was still termed free in both royal letter and civic decree, but there was now a conflict between the civic assertion of laws and self-government and the royal assertion of control, authority, and obedience. Due to the fact that royal letter and civic

\(^{69}\) *IK*.Smyrna 573.10-11, 64-8 (*App.2 num.37*); *FD* III (4) 153 (*App.2 num.38*). Quotation of Tarn 1948: 206.

\(^{70}\) *IK*.Iasos 3.
decree eschew discord this conflict is difficult to detect, but informative examples are furnished by Iasos under Ptolemy Soter and Athens under Demetrios Poliorketes (see further, §3 below).

Ptolemy’s grant of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* to Iasos in 308 remained intact despite his imposition of a *phylake* and *syntaxis*. However, when Ptolemy attempted to assert control over Iasos’ harbour dues sometime after 305 the city sent an embassy to his representative Aristoboulos claiming that this would be contrary to the terms of Ptolemy’s earlier grant of freedom. Although Iasos would certainly have maintained its official status as free and autonomous, the loss of harbour dues was evidently the point at which it felt that its freedom would have become irreparably negated. Athens provides a further example. In 303 Athens existed as a free and autonomous city allied to Demetrios Poliorketes. However, Demetrios demanded that his word be given a measure of institutional force and be considered above civic laws and decrees. Some in Athens saw this as a negation of the city’s freedom, but even after the city ratified Demetrios’ wish it continued to be called free and autonomous, both by the king himself and in the decrees of the *demos* (below §3).

In both cases we can discern a point at which the city feels that the king has ceased treating its freedom as a mark of respect and unity and is now actively undermining it by enforcing further impositions. The city is acutely aware that it has reached the situation whereby the king asserts royal authority over civic freedom. The latter is now an encumbrance to the former and where before the king would have tried to persuade the city to accept his wish, as in Iasos’ case using terms like *phylake* and *syntaxis* to present impositions as defensive of and contributory to freedom, he now feels confident to impose his will without justification. Iasos was successful in that its embassy guaranteed renewed control over its harbour dues and in doing so ensured royal recognition of its freedom, but its silence regarding its earlier grant of *aphorologesia* and *aphrouresia* marked its concession of these guarantees to the realities of royal power. Athens, on the other hand, acquiesced totally to Demetrios between 304-301 and saw its future slide slowly into blind obedience to royal will. Still, both continued to be called free.

The instant at which the city recognised the potentially irreparable damage to its grant of *eleutheria* was a tipping-point in the relationship between city and king. In official documentation the city would still be called and refer to itself as free, but a line had unofficially been crossed where *eleutheria* was perhaps fatally undermined by royal force. This ‘tipping-point’ differed from city to city (harbour dues for Iasos; civic laws for Athens), but it would have existed in each free city; we just lack the means to detect it widely. It
marked the point at which the civic, but not the royal, understanding of *eleutheria* became undermined. Since the king maintained a monopoly on the granting and revocation of statuses *eleutheria* could only officially be revoked when the king said so, regardless of whether or not the city felt that he was undermining its freedom. Therefore, even though *eleutheria* was diluted in the civic understanding, the city still officially remained free, both in royal declarations and civic decrees.

This ‘tipping-point’ marked a change in the understanding and function of *eleutheria*. Freedom as a status was only as defined as the modifiers used in conjunction with it (*aphorologesia*, etc.). Nonetheless, it implied control and utilisation of one’s own laws, local self-government, and internal autonomy as long as this did not conflict with royal interests.  

When cities like Iasos and Athens began to see that the royal guarantee of freedom was no longer compatible with the free implementation of their own laws the potential for conflict arose and the city may have been inspired to seek confirmation or attainment of its *eleutheria* elsewhere. In such situations *eleutheria* began to denote less and less in practical terms, and came simply to signify something akin to the inviolability of civic laws and decrees only as far as these did not conflict with ever-changing royal will. When royal will ceased to defer to civic authority and instead asserted control over it, the relationship between king and Secondary free city was in steep decline.

Once past this ‘tipping-point’ *eleutheria* functioned as little more than an ideological veil concealing royal authority. Nonetheless, because it was extremely multifarious in function, it still exercised a degree of moral force over the king’s actions and contributed to the city’s receipt of concrete benefactions. Between 304-301 Athens was a city very securely under Demetrios’ control. Objectively, it was not free, in the sense that it was not its own master and the level of royal control was much greater than what could usually be acceptable for even a city enjoying Secondary freedom. The tipping-point had been the Kleomedon affair in 304/3 (below §3). However, *eleutheria* still remained prevalent, now more than ever before, in civic decrees, royal letters, and even architectural ideology.  

Even when practically undermined, freedom was a powerful idea to which it was still important to defer when in contact with the city. It was, as I have already said, ideological glue. Because the king had declared the city free, *eleutheria* remained present in the discourse between both parties. Even when apparently undermined it still facilitated the city’s gaining of benefactions by

71 Welles 1965: 32.
72 Below pgs.144-5 with ns.100-101.
exercising moral force over the king’s self-proclaimed role as its defender, as two Athenian decrees in honour of Demetrios’ philoi reveal.

The Athenian decree in honour of Oxythemis of Larissa, philos of Demetrios and a chief officer in Greece between 304-301, praises him for manifesting concern for “the eleutheria of the Greeks” and thanks him for negotiating the release of captured Athenian horsemen.73 The phrase “the eleutheria of the Greeks” refers generally to Demetrios’ campaign against Kassandros in Greece. However, its appearance here in conjunction with Oxythemis’ negotiations shows him applying this concern for Greek freedom more specifically in Athens’ interests. Quality and action are implicitly connected. Indeed, Athens states that she is honouring Oxythemis so as to inspire other philoi to follow his example and aid the city through similar manifestations of their concern for Greek freedom.74 Although Athens’ freedom had recently been severely undermined by Demetrios, eleutheria still served a practical function in facilitating and elucidating contact between both parties. It offered a paradigm for imitation and in doing so could help to inspire concrete benefactions to the city, both through the king himself and his friends.

A second case may be seen in the honorary decree for Medon, another royal philos.75 Medon is honoured generally for having acted on behalf of “the soteria of the demos and the eleutheria of the other Greeks” and specifically for being sent by Demetrios with some good but unknown announcement, which Paschidis speculates was Demetrios’ return of the Attic forts to Athenian control.76 This, he argues, was a deal sweetener for Stratokles’ re-organisation of the calendar in 304/3 to facilitate Demetrios’ induction into the Eleusinian mysteries.77 If so, then the return of the forts strengthened Athens’ democracy just as the

73 IG II² 558 (App.1 num.21). The date of the decree is contentious. M.B. Walbank (1990: 445-6, num.20) joins IG II² 558 with IG II² 484, which preserves the prescript of a decree dated to prytany VIII 304/3 (archonship of Pherecles, shortly after the Kleomedon affair). The join is accepted by Bielman (1994: 53-6), but rejected by Paschidis (2008a: 96 n.1) on false grounds. Paschidis claims that Tracy (2003: 151 n.3) rejected the association of IG II² 484 with IG II² 558. This, however, is not the case. Tracy only rejected the association of IG II² 484 with Agora XVI 119, a join earlier proposed by M.B. Walbank (1989: 90-91, num.18). The connection of IG II² 484 with IG II² 558, therefore, remains open. On Oxythemis, see Olshausen 1974: 100-3, num.77; Billows 1990: 414, num.86.


75 SEG XXXVI 165 (App.1 num.24).


77 Diodoros (20.110.1) and Plutarch (Demetr. 26) imply that this took place in 303/2, but epigraphic evidence shows that it took place in 304/3 with the month Mounychion renamed Anthesterion hysteros (SEG XXXVI 165; Plu. Demetr. 26; Woodhead 1989; Oliver 2007: 118 with n.36, 231-2). In light of this, Paschidis (2008a: 90-5) argues for a re-dating of Demetrios’ campaigns in 304-302: winter 304/3 in Athens, late winter/early spring 303 in the Peloponnese, and Mounychion/Anthesterion hysteros in Eleusis. On Paschidis’ model the
reorganisation of the calendar weakened it. The concepts of *eleutheria* and *soteria* facilitated Athens’ acceptance of the forts as a bribe because they presenting the return of the forts as a strengthening of the city’s freedom.

Although Athens’ freedom of political action and independence was being constantly eroded, the ideal of *eleutheria* as an aspect of royal ideology continued to facilitate contact between both players and ensure for the *polis* prolonged benefactions by forcing the king to ascribe to the ideology and role he established but had since undermined. As the decrees for Oxythemis and Medon show, the city could still refer to its free status as a means of gaining benefactions from the king and his *philoi*. Nonetheless, a line had been crossed. The city now saw that the king had undermined its freedom to a degree that rendered that freedom almost obsolete in any practical sense. In this situation dissent against the king was a danger. Factions within the *demos* could push to reassert the city’s freedom either by revolting from the king, and asserting anew a Primary understanding of its freedom, or by ally with another king and gaining an additional guarantee of its Secondary freedom. However, whether the city remained allied with the king, revolted from him, or allied with another king, *eleutheria* maintained an important role in the relationship between both city and king; its adaptability to different situations and understandings ensured as much.

**SECTION 3: ATHENS AND DEMETRIOS IN 303. A CASE-STUDY**

I have mentioned the example of Athens and Demetrios in the late 4th century a number of times. The years 304-301 are unique and highly informative because we have then the congruence of both epigraphic (a particularly active Athenian *demos*) and literary evidence (Diodoros XX and Plutarch’s *Life of Demetrios*). Further, ever since his liberation of Athens from Kassandros and Demetrios of Phaleron in 307 Demetrios’ actions in Greece and his relationship with Athens were based around his role as defender of *eleutheria*, a fact well represented in both source traditions. The period, therefore, offers a unique early Hellenistic opportunity to analyse the use and role of *eleutheria*, in both its Primary and Secondary forms, as an aspect of king/city relations.

My main focus will be on two particular events. First, Plutarch’s account of Demetrios’ dispatch of letters to the Athenian *demos* in favour of a friend and the reaction this elicited. Second, a series of honorary decrees passed shortly afterwards that refer to and detail further

Peloponnesian campaign was over by late spring 303. This, however, leaves a troublesome gap of a year of inactivity until the foundation of the League of Corinth at the Isthmia of late spring/summer 302. Landucci-Gattinoni (1983) explores Demetrios’ motives in wishing initiation.
letters sent by Demetrios calling for honours for at least two of his *philoi*. I will look at how
the literary evidence reveals that Athens’ implementation of its *eleutheria* and *demokratia* led
to discord with Demetrios, but how in the epigraphic evidence both ideals are used by
Demetrios to foster unity. An important part of this process is, I contend, the distinction
between Athens’ understanding of its freedom in a Primary sense and Demetrios’
understanding of it in a Secondary sense. That is, Athens’ belief that although Demetrios
restored its freedom this was simply the return of something that was legitimately and
inherently its own, and Demetrios’ belief that Athens’ freedom was contingent upon his
goodwill alone and that the *demos* should accordingly accommodate his wishes. Freedom
could be a point of conflict with the ruler when asserted by the *demos* because it promoted
the city over the king, but a point of unity when used by the king to present himself as
defender and patron.

The royal dispatch of letters to a city requesting honours for an individual and detailing
his actions is not uncommon. The earliest Hellenistic example is of Polyzorkenos writing to
Athens and requesting citizenship for two of his associates, Sonikos and Eu[---].
The phenomenon appears later with Antiochos I’s letter to Ilion requesting honours for his doctor
Metrodoros, a citizen who had recently healed the king of a neck wound. In neither of these
cases, however, do we have literary evidence detailing preceding conflict between city and
king, as we have at Athens. This allows us to read Demetrios’ letters, as represented within
the Athenian decrees, with an awareness of the political and ideological environment that
inspired them.

Plutarch describes how in spring 303 Kleomedon owed the *demos* fifty talents but that his
son, Kleainetos, persuaded Demetrios to send letters to the *demos* requesting absolution of
the fine (*Demetr. 24.3-5*). Although unhappy with the situation the *demos* obliged. It then
debated a motion (ἐγγονίδαὶ δὲ ψήφισμα) that from now on no Athenian citizen was to bring
before it letters from Demetrios (Plu. *Demetr. 24.4*). When informed of this, the king was
incensed. The *demos* hurriedly recanted its motion, executed some of those who proposed
and supported it, and exiled others. A new decree of Stratokles was passed (Plu. *Demetr.
24.4*):

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78 *IG II² 387 (Naturalization D35).*
79 *IK Ilion 34 (Austin 165).*
80 Dated by Paschidis 2008a: 96-7; 109-10.
81 Such as Democharis in 304/3 (Plu. *Demetr. 24.5*; *Moralia* 851f; Smith 1962; Habicht 1979: 24; Marasco 1984: 54-9; Asmonti 2004), possibly Kallias of Sphettos (*SEG XXVIII* 60.79-83; T.L. Shear 1978: 47-8), and perhaps Philippides of Kephale (*IG II²* 657.9-10, 48-50; Plu. *Demetr. 12.5; SEG XXVIII* 60.79-83 [with T.L. 138
“They voted besides (ἐτί δὲ προσεψηφίσαντο) that it was the pleasure of the Athenian people (διεδροχθαὶ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων) that whatsoever king Demetrios should ordain (κελεύσῃ) in future, this should be held righteous towards the gods and just towards men.”

In spring 303 Athens was at a crossroads. Demetrios’ letters and Stratokles’ re-organisation of the civic calendar caused Athens to be unsure of the nature of its political and judicial freedom under Demetrios’ rule. There is obvious unhappiness with Demetrios’ actions, but Plutarch’s account reveals a swing in the ekklesia from dissent to obedience after the Kleomedon affair. The end result is a manifestation of the initial problem: the expansion of royal power over the demos and the subordination of civic eleutheria to royal authority.

Royal letters, rather than diagrammata, were personal correspondences between a king and a city. They were usually phrased as polite requests, but contained the very clear insistence that it would be in the city’s interests to act in such a way. Thus the king’s will was performed, but the city could present its acquiescence as an enactment of its own laws, which remained valid and authoritative. In many cases a royal letter was seen to enforce freedom and civic justice, such as with the commissioning of foreign courts for inter-state arbitrations or by decreeing a trial but leaving its specifics in civic hands. In other cases it operated within the limits of civic laws, such as when Alexander sent letters to Eresos and Chios empowering them to try ex-tyrants under local laws (GHI 83; 84a-b). Alexander was ordering a specific action, but the terms of that action were delegated to the local laws. A city could even decide against the royal letter, as was the case with Eresos thrice deciding not to

Shear 1978: 49]; Sonnabend 1996: 310-12). On Athens’ praise for their adherence to the democracy, see Ch.5 §2.1.
82 Bikerman 1940: 28-32.
83 Welles 1965: 41-2 (on Alexander’s Exiles Decree); cf. Bertrand 2001: 11-12. IG XII (5) 1065 offers a good example, where the Ptolemaic general Bachchon writes to Karthaia on Keos and the demos follows his letter: καθὰ Βάχχων ἐγραψε[ν] καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἐψηφίσατο. Note also the juxtaposition of royal will and civic decree in the letter of Philip V to Larisa ordering the city to grant citizenship to resident Thessalians and Greeks (IG XII (2) 517.6. 17-18): κρίνω (Philip) ψήφίσθαι ὑμᾶς… ἐψάφηστε (Larisa) τὰ πολιτεία πρασσέμεν πέρ ἑαυτοῖς κατὰ τὰ ὁ βασιλείας ἐγγαύησε. On lines 26-7 Philip refers to the residents’ enfranchisement κατὰ τὴν παρὰ ἐμοῦ ἐπιστολὴν καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ ὑμέτερον.
allow the return of the descendents of its ex-tyrants despite the fact that Alexander, Polyperchon (in the name of Philip Arrhidaios), and Antigonos wrote to the city concerning the recall of its exiles (*GHI* 83 §§4-6).

There were two problems regarding Demetrios’ letter to Athens during the Kleomedon affair. First, Athens sought to legislate against any and all royal letters. Second, Demetrios aggressively insisted on the pre-eminence of his royal will over civic laws. Earlier, Alexander’s second letter to Chios requested – politely but leaving no doubt as to the king’s insistence – the non-prosecution of a royal philos, Alkimachos, despite the fact that he was being tried “for helping the barbarian” (ἐπὶ βαρβαρισμῶι), a charge against pro-Persian sympathisers delegated by Alexander himself to local laws. ⁸⁶ Alexander apparently enforced royal will over civic freedom but we do not possess a literary balance to show us how Alexander’s letter was received within the polis. It is Plutarch’s account of the reactions of both Athens and Demetrios that is so illuminating.

Plutarch presents Demetrios’ letter on behalf of Kleomedon as a watershed moment in his relationship with Athens. It appears as Demetrios’ first interference in Athens’ legal system and the first enforcement of royal will over civic eleutheria. This may have been the case, but since Demetrios could personally designate Adeimantos as general of the countryside (strategos epi ten chorán) for an exemplary two years (306/5-305/4) his influence had probably been growing since 307. ⁸⁷ Athens had had its freedom confirmed by royal will in 307 and with Demetrios absent in Cyprus, Egypt, and Rhodes she could exercise this with limited direct interference. The events of Spring 303, however, represented a change. Stratokles had earlier advertised democratic authority ahead of royal will in the Lykourgos decree of 307/6 (Ch.5 §1.2.2), but with the Kleomedon affair the Athenian demos reached its ‘tipping-point’: that point at which it could concede no more without negating its freedom. The demos now realised that its eleutheria and demokratia were dependent upon Demetrios’ will and that this was the more important of the two. The city’s political, judicial, and military autonomy could accommodate Adeimantos’ double generalship since it contributed directly to the maintenance of eleutheria from Kassandros during the Four Years War. Demetrios’ letter, however, had nothing even remotely to do with defending Athenian interests and was therefore nothing but an imposition on the city’s freedom. Civic authority

⁸⁶ *GHI* 84b. Bencivenni (2003: 15-38) offers a detailed commentary on Alexander’s relations with Chios, particularly the use of the royal diagramma. Ottone (2006) analyses the literary and epigraphic evidence for Alexander’s involvement in Chios. She argues that this letter was probably not written in favour of the Chian exile Theopompos, in whose name Alexander did at some stage write to Chios (*FGrH* 115 T2).

⁸⁷ Above pg.63 with n.90.
could not accommodate it as a defence of eleutheria or a manifestation of the king’s concern for it. Rather, Demetrios’ letter marked the point at which civic eleutheria clashed with royal will, and the latter won.

A precise analysis of Plutarch’s account of the demos’ debates provides insight into Athens’ assertion of its own eleutheria at this time. The decree that Athens proposes concerning the non-acceptance of further letters from Demetrios does not appear to have been passed. In a forthcoming article Andrew Erskine highlights that in Plutarch’s Life of Demetrios the phrase γράψαντος ψήφισμα denotes simply the proposal of a decree and not necessarily its resolution. Such is normally signified simply by ἐψηφίσαντο or some other form of the verb. Although Erskine does not cite the Kleomedon affair (Plu. Demetr. 24.3-5) it is another example of this phenomenon and further supports his argument. Plutarch very clearly distinguishes the Athenian proposition on non-acceptance of Demetrios’ letters (ἐγράφη δὲ ψήφισμα) from the demos’ validation of Stratokles’ decree on accepting whatever Demetrios orders as “righteous towards the gods and just towards men” (προσεψηφίσαντο δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ). The demos is unable to defend its own eleutheria or even apply it actively within the ekklesia but it accepts Demetrios’ letters even though they undermine its eleutheria and nomoi. It can only debate a motion on protecting these qualities without having the resolve to enact it and defend them. When it comes to Demetrios’ anger all hesitancy is lost; Athens validates the craziest of proposals and legally recognises Demetrios’ orders as binding over the laws and freedom it has just debased. The demos cannot protect its freedoms but it is quick to base them.

88 Erskine forthcoming, quoting Plutarch (Demetr. 34.4-5: γνώμην ἐγράψε Δημητρίῳ τῷ βασιλεί τοῦ Πειραιά παραδοθήναι καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν, ἐπιψηφισθέντων δὲ τούτων and Diodoros (20.46.2: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι γράψαντος ψήφισμα Στρατοκλέους ἐψηφίσαντο).

89 When Athens recants the decree Plutarch uses the expression τὸ ψήφισμα καθελὼν further indicating that it never passed beyond debate. When an enacted decree is destroyed it is invariably called στῆλη: Tod 98.11-14; IG II2 43.31-5; D. 22.36-8 (SV 306); GHI 39.30-1; 44.39-40; Hyp. Dion. 2.8-9; Philoch. FGrH 328 F55a; Arr. An. 2.1.4, 2.2; IG II2 448.61-3; cf. I.Priene 12.7-10. Hansen (1987: 68-9) states that “ψήφισμα is a term applied not only to decrees actually passed by the people but also to proposals put from the floor (but never put to the vote) and to probouleumata (including probouleumata that were never passed)”.

90 Plu. Demetr. 24.5: εἰπόντος δὲ τούς τῶν καλῶν κατάθεντο μαινέοντα τὸν Στρατοκλέα τοιαῦτα γράψαντα, Δημοχάρις, ο Λευκόνος ὁ λεύκωνος "μοίνοιστο μένιντα" εἶπεν “εἰ μή μαινόιστο.”

91 Plutarch’s account contrasts the ineffective democratic demos with the effective pro-Demetrios demos and again highlights Athens’ role in corrupting the king (cf. Plu. Demetr. 13.2). The emphasis on Democharies in Demetr. 24 may indicate that he was Plutarch’s source here, though neither Jacoby (FGrH 75) nor Marasco (1984) make this connection. Sweet (1951; followed by Smith 1962) argues that the anti-democratic tone in these passages points to Duris of Samos. Democharies, however, was himself perfectly capable of demeaning the demos for its sycophancy to Demetrios, an action he contrasted with his own principled defence of the democracy (Democh. FGrH 75 F1).
The fact that the *demos*’ initial decree was not validated shows that debate concerning the meaning and application of civic freedom over royal will was the order of the day. In essence, the question was whether or not to enforce the mantra detailed by Stratokles himself within the Lykourgos decree, to assert democratic authority over royal will. There was enough support for the Kleomedon letter to be accepted, but the *demos* appears to have been divided when it came to passing a binding decree on whether or not the precedent was to continue. There was a schism in the *demos* over how to apply its *eleutheria*. Some would have favoured appeasement while others would certainly have promoted the city’s right to its own *nomoi*, a claim, incidentally, that was central to Antigonid freedom propaganda (Ch.5 §3.2). Once the *demos* invalidated the proposal concerning the non-acceptance of Demetrios’ letters, debate turned to the execution and exile of those who had proposed and supported it, thus providing further evidence for the division within the *demos*. The validation of Stratokles’ decree, however, never appears to have been in doubt. Indeed, that the *demos* was willing to execute and exile those who spoke against Demetrios – some of whom, like Demochares, were major political figures – indicates the extent and willingness of its capitulation.92

The *demos* was evidently unsure as to how to utilise and enforce its *eleutheria* and *nomoi* and debated this within the *ekklesia*. Freedom operated here as a point of conflict both internally within the *demos* and externally in its relationship with Demetrios. The *demos* was divided concerning the application of its *eleutheria* and so capitulated to Demetrios, something which ultimately led to the execution and exile of some of its members. Earlier, the *demos* had triumphed when it stood united against Alexander, an event proudly memorialised in the Lykourgos decree. *Eleutheria* also acted as a point of conflict between the *demos* itself and Demetrios. It was the *demos*’ initial decision to assert its legal and political freedom against Demetrios that led to the king’s interference within the workings of the *polis*. The active application of civic *eleutheria* conflicted here with royal will; the king, and indeed Athens itself under Stratokles, was quick to deny the former in the face of the latter. The conflict is apparently between the democrats’ conception of Athens’ freedom as Primary, thus denoting complete independence even to legislate against royal will, and Demetrios’ conception of Athens’ freedom as Secondary, thus as compatible with and malleable to royal will. Athens’ uncertainty of the application and extent of its *eleutheria*

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92 Demochares’ exile (above n.81) displays the triumph of the monarchic model of Secondary freedom, exemplified by Stratokles, over the civic model of Primary freedom promoted by Demochares himself (*cf.* Grieb 2008: 73).
divided the city from the king and the *demos* from itself; obedience to Demetrios’ royal will and understanding of freedom brought about unity, enforced though it may have been.

A very different picture is drawn within the epigraphic evidence, which consists of a series of honorary decrees for Demetrios’ associates passed after the receipt of letters of recommendation from him. In two instances reference is made to the content of these letters, which emphasise the themes of unity and cohesion, built around the ideals of *eleutheria* and *demokratia*, thus giving us a very different picture of Demetrios’ interaction with Athens and the use of *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as an aspect of this.

Four extant honorary decrees were passed on the last day of the year 304/3, Prytany XII 29, Skirophorion 30. Two preserve exactly the same text and refer to letters of Demetrios regarding his *philoi* Sotimos and Eupolis (*SEG* XXXVI 164; *IG* II² 486),³ one preserves a different text concerning one Bianor (*SEG* XVI 58),⁴ while another preserves only the dating formulae and so may or may not have referenced a letter of Demetrios (*IG* II² 597 + Add. p.662). A fifth decree appears to mention a letter of Demetrios and may have been passed at the same meeting but since it is severely fragmented and no dating formulae survive it is not much use to us here.⁵ Excluding *IG* II² 597 + Add. p.662, which does not preserve the proposer’s name, all of the decrees were proposed by Stratokles of Diomeia. The date of the letters, Skirophorion 304/3, is only a short time after the Kleomedon affair (early spring 303). It is interesting to note that we have no further epigraphic examples of Demetrios sending letters to Athens. Perhaps we can see in the royal letters of Skirophorion 304/3 Demetrios and Stratokles making a conscious effort to display and enforce the terms of Stratokles’ newly passed decree concerning the “institutional weight” of Demetrios’ letters.⁶ Further, Stratokles’ reference to royal letters in the text of each decree deliberately emphasises the letters’ validity within the civic sphere and advertises royal authority over civic.⁷

Here, however, it is the content of the letters that is of primary importance since this goes some way to revealing how Demetrios saw fit to display and authorise his position. The decree in honour of Sotimos son of Dositheos of Kyrene, the fullest preserved text, is worth quoting (the decree for Eupolis preserves precisely the same text):⁸

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³ *App.1 nums.23, 25*. On Sotimos and Eupolis, see Billows 1990: App.3 nums.110 and 40.
⁴ On whom see Billows 1990: App.3 num.23.
⁵ Pritchett 1972: 169-74 + *IG* II² 739 (*SEG* XXXVIII 283): [περὶ ὧν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπέστειλεν...]. For the date, see Paschidis 2008a: 101.
⁷ Such was also the case with Polyperchon’s letter to Athens in praise of his associates Sonikos and Eu[---], *IG* II² 387 (*Naturalization D*35).
⁸ *SEG* XXXVI 164 (*App.1 num.23*); *IG* II² 486 (*App.1 num.25*).
“Stratokles son of Euthydemos of Diomeia proposed. In relation to what the king sent to the boule and the demos, declaring that he [Sotimos] is his friend, well-disposed to the kings’ affairs and the eleutheria of the Athenian people and that he, too, succours the fight for demokratia, and since the boule has deliberated in his favour and proposed to the assembly. With good fortune…etc.”

Freedom and democracy – those qualities implicit within Plutarch’s account of the Kleomedon affair – are taken from the civic sphere and appropriated to the royal. Now the king and his friends are the guardians and supporters of Athenian freedom and democracy, not the polis. The democratic city has lost its ability to protect and enforce its own Primary freedom because the king has assimilated these features to himself and has assumed more fully the royal role of patron and protector, specifically of the city’s Secondary freedom (above §2.1-3). Between the literary and epigraphic evidence we can see Athens’ change from active exponent to passive recipient of eleutheria and demokratia. Through the dispatch of letters, now all but legally binding, the king dictates to Athens the preservation of her own freedom. The process of royal appropriation of civic freedom reappears continually in Athenian inscriptions from 304/3-302/1 where every single reference to eleutheria and/or demokratia commemorates either Demetrios himself or his philoi: IG II² 558 (304/3); Agora XVI 114 (304/3); SEG XXXVI 164 (304/3), 165 (304/3); IG II² 486 (304/3), 498 (303/2), 559+568 (c.303/2); ISE 7 (303/2), which also refers to the erection of a bronze equestrian statue of Demetrios next to that of Demokratia (303/2). Within this programme the polis plays almost no role in defending its own eleutheria.

Self-assertive though it may be, Demetrios’ ideological monologue in these years is not self-centred. It is very consciously designed for public consumption and is targeted at the polis. His letters are directed specifically to the boule and demos. In this regard he is appropriating the language of the polis in order to normalise his relations with it. Eleutheria and demokratia act as a means of unifying city and king by presenting the king, his interests,

99 Translation adapted from Paschidis 2008a: 100-1.
100 The statue was apparently destroyed during the Antigonid damnation memoriae of 201 (Liv. 31.44) and its gilded remains were thrown into a well in the north-western corner of the agora, where they were found in 1971 (Shear 1973: 165-8 with pl.36; Houser 1982). These remains (left leg, sword, two sections of drapery, and a Pegasos from the helmet) are currently on display in the Agora Museum (B 1382-5). Brogan (2003; SEG LIII/1 151) argues that it stood on the square conglomerate base east of the Royal Stoa. McKesson Camp (2003: 162-5) place it atop the early Hellenistic gate that adjoined the west end of the Stoa Poikile and marked the north-western entrance to the agora. It also held the tropaion commemorating the Athenian cavalry’s repulse of Pleistarchos in autumn 304 (Paus. 1.15.1; Habicht 1985: 81-2; 1997: 74-5; Oliver 2007: 119).
101 App.1 nums.21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30. However, the use of verbal compounds in συν-, present in many of these texts (below pg.146 with ns.105-107), also allows the city to claim some degree of equality in purpose and action.
and actions in terms that assert polis ideals. Demetrios is assuming the position of defender of Greek eleutheria and playing a formalised role within a local tradition.

Demetrios is expressing an understanding of eleutheria different to that of the demos. During the Kleomedon affair the demos may have argued that Demetrios was undermining its enjoyment of eleutheria and demokratia but with the dispatch of these letters to Athens Demetrios is arguing that Athens was in fact misguided. It is he alone who is the guarantor and defender of both these qualities and it is through the munificence and vigilance of both himself and his philoi that they are to be achieved. The division is essentially that of the city’s understanding of its eleutheria as Primary freedom and the king’s understanding of it as Secondary. Athens felt that freedom was a right and tried to assert it for itself; Demetrios claimed that it was a gift guaranteed by him alone and so tried to monopolise it himself (cf. Diod 20.46.1; Ch.3 §2.3).

This process is important. On first sight Demetrios seems to divide himself from the city by attempting to coerce it into accepting a different understanding of eleutheria. However, Demetrios’ purpose within these letters is to utilise the royal understanding of Secondary freedom as a point of synergy between the disparate institutions of the Hellenistic king and the Greek polis. The decree for Sotimos (and that for Eupolis) is a good example. Sotimos is loyal to both the king’s affairs and the eleutheria of the Athenians. He exists as a nexus connecting both city and king and assimilating the interests of one to the other. Through them and their actions the king’s affairs and Athens’ freedom are drawn closer. Since Sotimos is a friend of the king and since Demetrios is writing to Athens, his actions are a manifestation of Demetrios’ own wishes and concerns. Modern work on role ascription usually focuses on the ways in which the city constructs a role for the king or his philoi to fill, but what we see here is Demetrios is using role ascription to provide Sotimos (and other philoi) with an ideological agenda that ingratiates him to Athens and reflects in turn the king’s own concerns for Athenian eleutheria and demokratia.

The process is vividly expressed by Sotimos’ role as “co-ally on behalf of the democracy” (συναγωνιστής ύπερ τῆς δημοκρατίας). The συν- (co-) stem is deliberately ambiguous.

102 Kralli (2000: 122) points to Athens’ emphasis on the honourand’s eunoia to Antigonos and Demetrios as another aspect of connection between city and king, a point earlier raised by Heuβ (1937: 251-2).

103 For the connection of royal and civic interests at this time, see SEG XXXVI 165.15-18; IG II² 469.5-8, 496.4-8, 19-21, 559+568.11-14; cf. IG II² 492.21-3, 495.18-20, 498, 558.7-9; SEG XVI 122 (1).

104 On role ascription and the philos, see Ma 1999: 206-14 (on the city publicising norms for the philos – “converting the royal official into a local euergetes”); Savalli-Lestrade 1996: 149-53; Paschidis 2008a: 486-90.

105 Robert (1960: 138-9 n.1) comments on the military connotations of synagonistes. Paschidis (2008a: 86 with n.4) argues for its ‘metaphorical’ use in Athenian decrees of this period. Whether or not Sotimos actually fought
It can connect Sotimos with either Demetrios or Athens, but perhaps the intention is to connect all three parties who now, through Sotimos’ example, work together defending the democracy. Numerous other examples from early Hellenistic Athens and elsewhere follow the same pattern: the *synagonistes* physically personifying the unity of royal and civic interests, usually expressed by mutual concern for *eleutheria* and/or *demokratia*. The ideals that motivate Sotimos also motivate Demetrios. In fact, since Demetrios wrote numerous letters of this sort to Athens it appears that he was actively applying to his *philoi* the qualities he would like Athens to see in himself: a concern for its *eleutheria*, the cohesion of this with royal affairs, and a mutual concern with upholding the democracy.

The letters also reveal a Demetrios concerned with promoting the democracy, a fact somewhat surprising since he rode roughshod over it a few months earlier. This is displayed vicariously through the designation of Sotimos (so too Eupolis) as a *synagonistes* for democracy. However, Demetrios also dispatched his letters to both the *boule* and the *demos*, and the resultant decrees for Sotimos and Eupolis were probouleumatic. This important fact suggests concern on Demetrios’ part for ensuring that a semblance of democratic procedure was followed when submitting to his wishes. The *boule* was a cornerstone of the democracy and its decreased role between 322/1-319/8 reflects its more oligarchic character at that time. Demetrios’ concern for the *boule*, when he could have just relied on Stratokles to propose the decrees, highlights his careful consideration for democratic procedure at this time. It also, however, symbolises his control over it: the maintenance of democratic institutions and procedure continued under his authority. Democracy is useful and can unite both parties, but only when employed on Demetrios’ terms and not against his will. When utilised in this way it is a useful ideal for synergising his relationship with the *polis*. The difference is again between different perceptions of *eleutheria* as *polis*-assertive (Primary) or

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106 Kralli (2000: 123) suggests that this need not be understood solely as Athens’ democracy. However, in Athenian public decrees the implication would be Athenian democracy first, Greek second.

107 *IG II² 471.14-18* (διατριβοντες παρα τοις βασιλευειν Αντιγόναι και Δημητριωι και συναγωνιζομενι υπερ του δημου του Αθηναιων), 558.11-14 (*App.1 num.21*), 559+568.10-14 (*App.1 num.28*); *RIG II² 452.7-9* (*App.1 num.27*); *IG II² 646.17-20* (συναγωνισαθη τωι δημωι εις το συνελευθηναι την τε φιλιαν την προς τον βασιλεα Δημητριον). See Kralli 2000: 126. Rhodes (1972: 263) lists *IG II² 486* (for Eupolis) as non-probouleumatic since it was passed by the *demos* (I.10: ἐδοθεν ταυτ [δημω]). However, although *SEG XXXVI* 164 (for Sotimos) – published after Rhodes’ work – was also passed by the *demos* (II.8-9, 17-18: ἐδοθε[ι] ταυτ [δημω]...δεσδοχι[ται ταυτ] [δημω] it is clearly probouleumatic (II.16-17: η βουλη προβεβουλεικε υπερ χαινυ[ιου εις] των δημων. Other examples of kings sending letters to both the Athenian *boule* and *demos* are Dionysios I (Tod 133) and Philip of Macedon (D. 12).

king-assertive (Secondary). Both must meet somewhere and in this case that somewhere is dictated by the king.

Regardless of the reality of the situation Demetrios was concerned with showing that he was in fact supportive of Athens’ democracy and indeed adherent to it. Democracy was too important and ingrained a concept for Demetrios to deny Athens. Instead, where it interfered with his interests, such as in the passing of a decree forbidding the use of royal letters in the *ekklesia*, Demetrios argued that democracy was best served by adhering to his wishes and displayed this by having both *boule* and *demos* validate these wishes. The dispatch of letters in support of Sotimos and Eupolis reveals Demetrios dictating to Athens the nature and meaning of its democracy. Freedom and democracy denote unity between city and king because he says so and because it is in the *polis’* interests not to refute the king’s propaganda.

Demetrios’ use of *eleutheria* and *demokratia* may have been cynical and hypocritical, but they offered a convenient way of eulogising Athens’ relationship with himself by presenting the relationship as a unity of ideals and goals. Although Demetrios appears to have assumed some measure of unofficial control over the use and meaning of both terms, they continued to offer a common mode of expression within the *polis* for integrating king and city and understanding Demetrios’ presence and actions. The decree for the unknown son of Menelaos of c.303/2 shows Stratokles connecting Demetrios’ campaign in Greece with the honourand’s concern for *eleutheria* and *demokratia*,110 while a dedication by Athenian *epilektos*, specially selected troops serving with Demetrios in the Peloponnese in 303, praises the king for defeating the enemies of the democracy and liberating the cities of Greece.111 Freedom and democracy were the methods of defining Demetrios’ actions in Greece and they served in at least Athens’ case to assimilate those actions to the ideals of the *polis*, thus integrating both parties within a common ideological framework. The process was also physical. The *epilektos* dedicated a bronze, gold plated equestrian statue of the deified Demetrios Soter next to the statue of *Demokratia* and thus close to the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios in the north-west corner of the *agora*.112 Demetrios’ statue situated itself within an ideological topography and interacted directly with the physical personifications of both *eleutheria* and *demokratia*. The dedication was a constructed statement on the relationship of the king to both ideals and its location within the heart of Athens exemplified the role played by both in integrating king and city.

110 IG II² 559+568 (App.1 num.28).
111 ISE 7.3–4 (App.1 num.30).
112 Above n.100.
Athens in 303 offers a case-study for *eleutheria* in action, which we see acting as a point of both unity and conflict. This again emphasises its lack of certain definition through the simultaneous existence of different understandings. Further, it again emphasises adaptability through its distinct implementation in different ways and situations. Fundamentally though, the Athenian case-study again brings to the fore the division between different perceptions of *eleutheria*, namely as Primary and Secondary freedom. The conflict between both understandings begins where each asserts its own understanding over the other. This became evident when the *demos* sought to assert against Demetrios its Primary freedom as self-assertion and absence of royal interference, and later when Demetrios responded by enforcing on Athens his brand of Secondary freedom as benefaction and integration with royal will.

The aggressive and relentless expansion of royal authority over civic *eleutheria* acted as a ‘tipping-point’. Athens could accommodate certain impositions – like Adeimantos’ dual generalship – if they could be seen to contribute to the defence of their *eleutheria*: in Adeimantos’ case by protecting the countryside and maintaining Athens’ hold on her forts. The phenomenon of the ‘tipping-point’ for cities free in a Secondary sense has been analysed above (above §2.3), but Athens’ case is interesting because it shows us conflict between a city that was apparently operating on a Primary understanding of *eleutheria* and a king who was operating on a Secondary understanding of it (at Iasos we saw a confluence of Secondary understandings). This is important. The example of Athens in 303 shows that even within a city promoting its Primary freedom there could, under certain circumstances, be a ‘grey-area’ within which the king could impose on the city a degree of control without undermining its Primary freedom (or at least not negating it enough for there to be an intractable conflict over it).

Ultimately, however, there came a point where the city saw that its freedom was being negated in the face of royal will; it had reached its ‘tipping-point’. Athens initially tried to legislate against this and enforce its *eleutheria* over royal will, but the latter was too powerful. The *demos* was forced to acquiesce and accept its Secondary freedom as promoted, guaranteed, and defended by Demetrios.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I showed that, based on one’s politics, *eleutheria* could be seen either as a point of unity or conflict within the relationship between city and king. First of all I analysed the role of *eleutheria* in the relationship between king and Primary free city, emphasising its
role as unity when the king was seen to support its attainment by the city itself, and as conflict when he was seen to try to control it himself.

Next I turned my attention to the role of *eleutheria* in the relationship between king and those cities that held Secondary freedom, a more complicated but common occurrence. First, I provided an overview of the relationship between both parties, laying particular emphasis on the role of civic petition and royal benefaction. Second, I turned to *eleutheria* itself as a benefaction, arguing that as such it was unique because it promoted an active ideological programme for the unity of city and king. Antigonos, I proposed, understood this and through the Peace of 311 used *eleutheria* to create an oath-based alliance between himself and the Greek cities in his empire. Both parties were united in common defence of Greek *eleutheria*, which then served as the single unifying concept within Antigonos’ Greek possessions, strengthening the empire through the alliance of king and cities in an ideological bond. Although this was *eleutheria* in its most ambitious statement of unity, I also tried to show how it could be used to vocalise conflict when the king’s impositions on a city were seen by that city to impinge the freedom it had been granted. Third, I offered a definition of the functional and conceptual limits of *eleutheria* as a medium of interaction between city and king. I argued that within the two poles of royal revocation and civic re-assertion freedom was a general but malleable status whose precise form was ever changing within the complex discourse of honours and benefactions. *Eleutheria* was only as defined as the specific guarantees won by the city. Two cities may have been called free but the actual form of that freedom differed based on their individual historical circumstances. Further, I argued that there was a ‘tipping-point’ at which the civic understanding of freedom was severely undermined by royal impositions, but that even beyond this *eleutheria* still functioned as a point of unity because it continued to define the ideology of the relationship, if not the actual status of it. The king still used it to define his relationship with the city, which could in its own turn use *eleutheria* to exert moral force over the king and attempt to ensure further benefactions.

I have taken the distinctions of Primary and Secondary freedom as my starting point, but I have also tried to move beyond these. In Section 3 I looked at Athens and Demetrios in 303 as a case-study of *eleutheria* in action as both conflict and unity. I emphasised the different understandings of Primary and Secondary freedom, but tried to show that the rigorous distinction between both was undermined by the fact that a city promoting its own Primary freedom could assimilate certain royal impositions yet still maintain this freedom. As was shown in Chapter 3, this was dependent upon the city’s willingness to acquiesce to such
impositions and both its and the king’s ability to present such as contributions to the city’s freedom.

*Eleutheria* could be employed by the king to justify to the city his impositions upon it, just as it could be used by the city when seeking to assert civic laws over royal authority. In both senses, Secondary or Primary, *eleutheria* offered a functional means of defining the relationship between city and king as either unity or discord based on the politics of its employer. Because it inherently lacked definition *eleutheria* was adaptive to the politics of its employer and the needs of individual situations. As an ideological concept it always asserted something positive for the city. When used to justify royal impositions, it served to assert something negative in a positive way. This versatility helped make it so useful and popular a means of both integrating city and king and asserting civic independence.
PART THREE
THEMES
Chapter 5: *Demokratia and Eleutheria: Democratic Ideology between City and King*

“Libertà e democrazia sono pertanto le due cifre che la memoria storica ha selezionato nella rappresentazione del proprio passato”

Culasso Gastaldi 2003: 81

“The interests of democracies and kings are naturally opposed”

τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἐχόντων τοῖς βασιλεύσι καὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις.

Apollonidas of Sikyon (Plb. 22.8.6)

**Introduction**

Hellenistic democracy has enjoyed a recent boom in study. Peter Rhodes laid the foundation for studying Hellenistic political systems and procedures with *The Decrees of the Greek States*, but more specifically Susanne Carlsson’s *Hellenistic Democracies* and Volker Grieb’s *Hellenistische Demokratie*, both published within the last two years, have emphasised the ubiquity and vitality of democracy within the Hellenistic period, in spite of what others may see as the decline of civic political independence in the face of royal authority.¹ Both these works, however, focus primarily on the practical functioning of democracy as a political system; they pay scant attention to democratic ideology.

This is the first of two thematic chapters on the adaptability of the memory of freedom. I am concerned here with the connection between *eleutheria* and democracy and democratic ideology. Emphasis is placed on the adaptability of *eleutheria* and *demokratia* to the requirements of individual contexts, particularly the role of memory in categorising and defining the past within the ever-changing present, a concern taken further in Chapter 6. Analysis jumps between Athens and the cities of Asia Minor, both of which reveal different yet equally valid and instructive interpretations of democracy and its role within the relationship between city and king, emphasising further the fundamental adaptability of *eleutheria* and concepts connected with it, like *demokratia*. In Athens, after the vicissitudes of the years 322–287, the restored democracy saw its *demokratia* as the key component in its *eleutheria* and asserted it as a political and ideological quality inherent to the *demos* and regained from Demetrios Poliorketes. In Asia, however, and stemming from Alexander’s

¹ Rhodes with Lewis 1997; Carlsson 2005 (PhD); 2010 (revised publication); Grieb 2008.
precedent, the Greek cities appear to have viewed *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as royal gifts, guaranteed by royal edict alone. This distinction between *demokratia* as *polis*-asserted in Athens but royally-guaranteed in Asia Minor is one of Primary (self-guaranteed) and Secondary (granted by benefaction) freedom, a fact of some importance for understanding the role of *eleutheria* as a point of both unity or discord in the relationship between city and king.

Analysis is divided into three sections. Section one looks at Alexander’s democratic *nachleben* and emphasises the different ways in which he is connected with democracy in Athens and the cities of Asia Minor. I emphasise the uniform memory of him as a guarantor of freedom and democracy in Asia Minor, but I highlight his differing memory in Athens in 319-317, when he was seen favourably due to his connection with Polyperchon, and 307/6, when the decree for Lykourgos presents him as an opponent of Athenian democracy. I use the differing views of Alexander to emphasise how concepts like *demokratia* are fluid and the memory of an individual or event is open to reinterpretation, constantly serving new functions when remembered in new contexts.

Section two looks at constitutional change and ideological consistency in Athens and Asia Minor. First, I look at Athens between 322-262. The period is marked by constant political change, but the *megistai timai* decrees of 287-270 over simplistically present the years 322-287 as a struggle between oligarchy and democracy. By exploring the language of these decrees I analyse how and why the democracy re-wrote the past in such a divisive manner, laying particular emphasis on the creation of Demetrios as an oligarchic foil against whom the democracy authorised and enforced its authority as the sole guarantor of Athenian *eleutheria*. Second, I return to the cities of Asia Minor where I highlight the close ideological similarities between democracy in Athens and Asia Minor. Nonetheless, I argue for a key conceptual difference in both *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as Primary freedoms in Athens and Greece but Secondary freedoms in Asia Minor.

Section three focuses on terminology, particularly the kings’ avoidance in explicitly committing to a city’s *demokratia*. By looking at instances where *demokratia* appears or does not appear I show that rulers generally avoided expressing their support for it and instead left this connection to be made by the *demos* itself. Rather, rulers refer to the *patrioi nomoi* and the *patrios politeia*, or they grant ‘freedom to the *demos*’. I argue that *demokratia* is asserted by the *demos* because it is a political expression of the *eleutheria* awarded by the king. Kings prefer more ill defined terms because they are hesitant to commit their support to one specific political form, an action that would offer a restrictive political and ideological definition to
royal grants of *eleutheria*, the usefulness of which lay in its ambiguity, its lack of clear definition.

**SECTION 1: ALEXANDER’S DEMOCRATIC NACHLEBEN**

This first section looks at both Athens and Asia Minor and seeks to explore through the memory of Alexander and his actions the different ways in which both regions presented and conceived of *demokratia*. I begin with the cities of Asia Minor, particularly how Alexander’s grant of freedom and democracy in 334 contributed to the continued association of both these terms into the 3rd century. Attention then turns to Athens where I look at Alexander’s *Nachleben* in 319–317 when he had a positive memory in Athenian public documents and in 307/6 when he had a negative one. The importance of contemporary concerns in creating Alexander’s image is emphasised and I argue that his afterlife and its connection with concepts like *eleutheria* and *demokratia* played an important role in developing in Athens, as in Asia, the relationship between ruler and city.

**1.1: Asia**

Alexander granted freedom and democracy to the Aegean islands and the cities of Ionia and Aiolia but these statuses were gifts, guaranteed and ensured by royal grant alone. The freedom Alexander brought was defined simply as the removal of Persian power and should therefore be understood as a negative freedom.² *Demokratia*, however, was an added benefaction that was awarded to the cities of Ionia and Aiolia – it was not given to the cities of Karia – and marked therefore one specifically positive freedom within a generally negative understanding of *eleutheria*.³ *Eleutheria* assumed a positive understanding for these cities through the addition and guarantee of *demokratia*. The freedom/autonomy of the Greek cities of Asia Minor had earlier been guaranteed by Athens and Sparta (Ch.1 §§1.1-2) but it was Alexander’s destruction of Persian power and his explicit grant of *eleutheria* and *demokratia* together that was immediately significant in the Hellenistic Period, particularly for his Successors who continually sought to emulate him in image and action.⁴ Many of Alexander’s guarantees of freedom and democracy were (re-)inscribed during the early

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² Alexander left Sardis and the other Lydians free and able to use their ancestral *nomoi* (Arr. *An*, 1.17.4). Bosworth (1980: 128-9) argues that Alexander’s main concern was to contrast himself with the Persians and “probably did not know” what those laws or customs were. See also Dmitriev 2011: 430-1.
³ Nawotka 2003 (democracy not granted in Karia). This may be connected with the fact that Karia remained under the rule of the satrap Ada, on whom see Heckel 2006: *s.v.* Ada [1]. On Alexander’s political arrangements with the Greek cities, see Dmitriev 2011: 427-32.
⁴ Meeus 2009a.
Hellenistic Period at times when his precedent would have been of particular importance for ensuring renewed guarantees of such statuses from his Successors. Eresos (c.306-301), Priene (c.295-287), and perhaps Chios (in the 3rd century?) all (re-)inscribed letters and judgements of Alexander confirming their freedom and democracy, while numerous other cities referred to his precedent (see below).  

Alexander’s promotion of democracy was not magnanimous, it was a pragmatic policy that exploited the internal divisions within the cities in order to enforce his own authority. Persia supported oligarchies and had many partisans within the Greek cities, so by presenting himself as the promoter of democracy Alexander mobilised the pro-democratic (or anti-Persian) factions to support him. The result was that anyone not supporting Alexander could be demonised as a pro-Persian oligarch who was fighting against Greek freedom and could therefore be charged under the League dogma on medising. Persia supported oligarchies in Asia so Alexander supported democracies because they offered loyalty to him; it was this same concern for loyalty that led both him and Philip to support oligarchies in Greece (below §1.2). This caused problems for Alexander’s public image because he was seen as a liberator in Asia by promoting freedom and democracy but then acted as a tyrant in Greece by preferring restrictive oligarchies. His support of democracy in Asia Minor marked simply a pragmatic coincidence whereby his interests and those of the democratic factions coalesced.

Regardless of his intention, however, his grant of freedom and democracy marked a new phase in the history of the cities of Asia Minor, a “constitutional New Deal” whose effects were felt into the Roman Period. Andrew Erskine suggests that the numerous cults of Alexander at Priene, Ephesos, and Erythrai may have been founded in thanks for his guarantees of freedom and democracy, while the likes of Erythrai, Eresos, Amisos, and Kolophon successfully invoked Alexander’s precedent when seeking guarantees of freedom,

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5 *Eresos: GHI* 83; Aneurin Ellis-Evans of Balliol College Oxford has shown that the dossier was inscribed on one stele at one point in time between 306-301. I thank Charles Crowther for bringing this to my attention. *Priene: GHI* 86b; Sherwin-White 1985. *Chios: GHI* 84a; the text refers to Alexander in the first and third person singular and in the first plural. He also appears both with and without the royal title, which is probably anachronistic for the text’s historical date of 334. Heisserer (1980: 89-92) tried to explain away these problems, but another solution is that an individual royal letter and civic decree were edited together and inscribed as one document in the late 4th or early 3rd centuries, as at Priene.

6 Wallace 2011: 150-1; Ch.2 §1.

7 D. 17; cf. Polybios’ corrective (18.14). Further, below §1.2.

8 Davies 2002: 2.

autonomy, and democracy from Antigonos, Antiochos II, and even Lucullus. Further, Alexander’s actions led directly to an assimilation of *demokratia* with *eleutheria* which meant that for the cities of Asia Minor in the Hellenistic period the guarantee of freedom implied royal support for democracy (below §3.1-2).

Alexander may have been remembered as the paradigmatic guarantor and defender of freedom and democracy but this memory is overly simplified and one-sided. Alexander only supported democracies in certain areas, like Ionia and Aiolia, which he did not visit in person, and he only installed these to win anti-Persian democrats to his side. His preference for oligarchies in mainland Greece reveals that his pro-democratic stance was purely pragmatic. Further, he was willing to subvert those democracies when needed. The ‘tyrant’ Hegesias was supported in Ephesos and his Ephesian murderers were charged by the Macedonian governor Philoxenos, a stark contrast to the Ephesian *demos*’ lavish honours to the earlier tyrannicide Heropythes. Also, Alexander’s dictate that all cities were to receive back their exiles was a clear infringement of their democratic self-government and the terms of the League of Corinth (Ch.2 §1). However, his destruction of Persian power and guarantee of freedom and democracy were more significant and influential than any later infringements of this freedom and democracy. Alexander became an exemplum of democratic patronage, a historical role that suited both cities and Successors, each of whom used his historical precedent to ensure support and benefactions in the present.

1.2: Alexander in Athens and Greece

Demosthenes’ presentation of Philip as a man with a deep hatred of freedom and democracy did not likely represent any political preference on Philip’s part, but was just Demosthenic scaremongering, a characteristic criticised by Polybios. Such rhetoric was undermined when Philip treated Athens leniently after Chaironea; no change in government was required, though the Eukrates stele reveals a sense of concern for the authority of the democracy (*GHI* 79). Philip’s actions elsewhere were, however, different. Throughout Greece both he and Alexander favoured whatever political system would bring the greatest

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11 *Hegesias*: Polyain. 6.49; Bosworth 1980: 132; Heckel 2006: s.v. Hegesias; Dmitiev 2011: 103-4, 130. *Heropythes*: Ephesian leader (Polyain. 7.23.2) and liberator posthumously honoured with public burial in the *agora* (Arr. An. 1.18.11, Ἡροπυθῆς τοῦ ἐλευθερώσαντος). His tomb was desecrated by the oligarchs in 335 suggesting that he was influential in turning Ephesos to Parmenion’s side in 336. On the context, see above pg.47 with n.10.

12 Above pg.46 with n.4; Plb. 18.14.
degree of loyalty to Macedon, which in many cases turned out to be oligarchies and tyrannies, or rather governments led by an individual or clique loyal to Macedon. Because the League prevented the overthrow of those governments in place at the time of a member’s accession to it, pro-Macedonian oligarchies and tyrannies, such as Eresos (D. 17.7), were to be upheld by the League. Eresos was governed by a series of tyrants who erected an altar to Zeus Philippios, a dedication which left no doubt where their allegiance lay; Messene was ruled by the sons of Philiades, who were re-installed by Alexander after being violently overthrown by the democratic faction upon Philip’s death; Sikyon had at its head an unknown gymnastic trainer (paidotribes); in Pellene the demos was overthrown and power given (perhaps returned after a democratic uprising) to a wrestler (palaistes) named Chairon; meanwhile, Thebes was ruled by an oligarchy of 300.13

1.2.1: Polyperchon’s Edict

Polyperchon’s Edict of autumn 318 sought to damage Kassandros’ position within Greece by invalidating the source of his power: the garrisons and oligarchies installed by his father Antipatros. To do so Polyperchon had to undermine the memory of Antipatros’ past position, thus destabilising Kassandros’ position in the present. This was accomplished in two ways. First, the Edict presented Philip Arrhidaios and not Antipatros as the legitimate successor to Alexander. Second, it motivated the Greek cities against Kassandros, his garrisons, and oligarchies by promising to return them to the position they held under Philip and Alexander, i.e. free and autonomous as under the League of Corinth. The Edict by-passed Antipatros and claimed that his position and actions after Alexander left for Asia in 334 were an aberration, an assumption of royal authority unsupported by Alexander and now Philip Arrhidaios. Greece was consequently excused its revolt from Macedon, the Hellenic War, and the legal position of relations between the Macedonian monarchy and the Greek states was returned to that under Philip, Alexander, and the League of Corinth, as a passage from the Edict reveals (D.S. 18.56.3):

\[\text{Eresos: D. 17.7 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 41-7. Messene: D. 17.4 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 37-8; Plb. 18.14.3; Frölich 2008: 204-8 (3rd century prominence of Philiades’ family). Sikyon: D. 17.16 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 75-6; cf. IG II² 448.46-8; Podlighe 2004 (indentifying the paidotribes). Pellene: D. 17.10 with Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 54-61; Paus. 7.27.7; Ath. 11.509B. Thebes: Just. 9.4.7; D.S. 16.87.3, 17.8.3-7; Paus. 9.1.8, 6.5; Arr. An. 1.7.1; cf. Plut. Moralia 177d; Wallace 2011: 148-57. For a useful overview of the evidence for these and other Alexander-backed tyrannies, see Ziesmann 2005: 62-3 with n.45. Kondratyuk (1977) argues that the League provided oligarchic groups with constant support. Demosthenes (18.295) and Hyperides (Dion. 6.31-7.2) provide lists of Macedonian sympathisers.}\]
“But whereas it happened that, while we [Philip Arrhidaios] were far away, certain of the Greeks, being ill advised, waged war against the Macedonians and were defeated by our generals, and many bitter things befell the cities, know ye that the generals have been responsible for these hardships, but that we, holding fast to our original policy (proairesis), are preparing peace for you and such governments (politeias) as you enjoyed under Philip and Alexander”.

The Edict hit the re-set button and restored Greco-Macedonian relations to the point they were at between 337-334: the Greeks officially free and autonomous within Philip’s and Alexander’s League of Corinth. However, Athens’ and Greece’s acceptance and support of the Edict had interesting implications. Since Polyperchon was ultimately restoring to Athens its freedom and democracy – presented as a return to the situation under the League of Corinth – the implication was that Athens and Greece had earlier been free and democratic under Philip and Alexander. Moreover, it was inferred that this freedom and democracy was to some extent guaranteed by the League itself and the kings. Therefore, by supporting Polyperchon and ascribing to his Edict Athens was re-writing its history by acknowledging that Philip and Alexander, through the League of Corinth, were the patrons and guarantors of Athenian freedom and democracy from 337-323, just as Polyperchon and Philip Arrhidaios were in 319-317. Previous conflicts with Philip and Alexander, such as the latter’s demand for the ten orators, were glossed over. This, however, left open the motivation for the Hellenic War. The Greeks were “ill-advised” in revolting in 323, but was Athens revolting misguided from the freedom and democracy allegedly guaranteed by Alexander, or was she revolting from the abuses of a wayward royal general (Antipatros).

Athens’ reception of Polyperchon’s Edict, and the historical non-sequitor left by it, can be traced within the second Euphron Decree (Prytany IV, 318/7), which retrospectively defined the goals of the Hellenic War of 323/2 by the concerns of 319-317: the removal of Antipatros’ garrison and the defence of democracy. The Hellenic War had its origins in Athenian conflict with Alexander, but it was re-interpreted within the second Euphron Decree as a pre-emptive war against Antipatros’ soon-to-be-installed garrison and oligarchy. The Euphron Decree expanded upon the position presented within Polyperchon’s Edict and re-cast the Hellenic War as a struggle against Antipatros on behalf of democracy, as it was presented within Polyperchon’s Edict, rather than against Alexander. Antipatros was now painted as the opponent of freedom and democracy, not Alexander, as he earlier had been.

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14 Cf. D.S. 18.56.2: ἡγούμενοι δεῖν ἐπαναγαγεῖν πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ὡς Φίλιππος ὁ ἡμέτερος πατήρ κατέστησεν.
during the Exiles Decree and the restitution of Samos to the Samians, and the Hellenic War took on democratic overtones that were not present in 323/2. 

Earlier evidence exists for a positive, or at least not negative, memory of Alexander within Athens. Shortly after the publication of Polyperchon’s Edict the demos passed a decree in honour of Ainetos of Rhodes (Prytany IV, 319/8) in which he is commended for having served the best interests of the Athenians and for having fought with King Alexander in Asia. Because Polyperchon presented his authority, manifest through Philip Arrhidaios and Alexander IV, as inherited from Alexander and because Athens regained its freedom and democracy through the application of Polyperchon’s Edict, the demos now honoured for their past connections with Alexander those associates of Polyperchon who now fought with him to restore Athens’ democracy and free it from the garrison in Piraeus. At the Panathenaia of Hekatombaion 318/7 Polyperchon’s son Alexandros dedicated panoplies to Athena Polias and this may also have been the context for the dedications to Athena Polias by Alexander’s wife Rhoxane, an act that would further reveal Athens’ rehabilitation of Alexander at this time.

In the mid to late 330s Alexander was seen to be a threat to Athens’ democracy and an active supporter of tyrannies and oligarchies, like Philip before him. However, when Polyperchon sought to present the Greek cities as having been free and democratic under Alexander, the Athenian demos was both willing and able to engage with this presentation and further a positive image of its relationship with him. The second Euphron Decree reveals how the Hellenic War was represented as a struggle against Antipatros, both in origin and action, while Rhoxane’s dedications and the honours for Ainetos reveal a positive presentation of Alexander and his importance, through Polyperchon, for the democracy of 319-317. A very different image, however, appears in the Lykourgos Decree of 307/6.

1.2.2: The Lykourgos Decree

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15 Above pg.101 with n.92.
16 For a detailed analysis of the memory of the Hellenic War within the two honorary decrees for Euphron of 323 and 318 and the Edict of Polyperchon, see Wallace forthcoming A.
18 In a separate example Polyperchon wrote to Athens requesting honours for Sonikos and Eul[---] because they were well-disposed towards the demos and did whatever they could for it (IG II² 387.11-15; Naturalization D35).
19 Alexandros: IG II² 1473; Schenkungen NKr 4. Rhoxane: IG II² 1492.45-57; Schenkungen KNr 3; SEG LIII/1 172 (new readings). Themelis (2003) sees both dedications as dating from 318/7. but Kosmetatou (2004) dates Rhoxane’s dedication anytime between 327-316.
Stratokles’ honorary decree for Lykourgos (Prytany VI, 307/6) offers a posthumous account of Lykourgos’ actions on behalf of Athens. It is preserved both on stone and in Plutarch’s *Lives of the Ten Orators*. The decree praises Lykourgos’ building programme, his fiscal management, and his commitment to the ideals of *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, and *demokratia*, specifically in reference to Alexander’s demand for the ten orators – Lykourgos included – in 335. It is of note to us here that the decree marks a return of Alexander to the democratic consciousness, but one very different from that of 319-317.

In the decree Lykourgos and Alexander are carefully constructed as binary opposites. Lykourgos is the champion of the *polis*, its freedom, autonomy, and democracy, and he stands up against those who would undermine it. Alexander, on the other hand, personifies the authoritarian, universal monarch who is out to crush both the individual and his free and democratic city (*IG II²* 457.9-21):

“When fear and great danger threatened the Greeks because Alexander had conquered the Thebans and had become master of Asia and the other parts of the world, Lykourgos continued to oppose him on behalf of the *demos* without corruption and blame, providing himself throughout all his life on behalf of the fatherland and the *soteria* of all the Greeks, and contesting with all skill for the city’s *eleutheria* and *autonomia*. When Alexander demanded his surrender the *demos* resolved not to hand him over nor to call for his punishment, knowing that in all cases it partook with Lykourgos in a just cause.”

Alexander is incorrectly said to have demanded Lykourgos once he had destroyed Thebes, conquered Asia, and was inspiring fear among the Greeks, thus giving a global scale to the threat he posed to the Greeks and the opposition offered by Lykourgos and Athens. Lykourgos is also incorrectly presented as the only orator demanded by Alexander and the only individual who stood against him. The nine other orators are forgotten, subsumed within the person and example of Lykourgos who is said to have fought Alexander with every skill he had to keep the city free and autonomous. Precisely because Lykourgos had protected Athens’ freedom and autonomy the *demos* has the will and ability to stand against Alexander and refuse to hand him over. The moral is, as Bertrand pointed out, that freedom and democracy are no longer a natural and perennial reality, rather it is up to each citizen to

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20 *IG II²* 457; Plu. *Moralia* 851f-852e. For the relationship between literary and epigraphic texts, see Oikonomides 1986; Prauscello 1999. Osborne (1981) argues that *IG II²* 513 is a second copy of the decree. Tracy (2003: 70-2) and Pauscello reject this. Gauthier (1985: 89-92) analyses Stratokles’ role in proposing the honours.

21 Bertrand (2001: 19) calls it a nostalgic return to the ideals of freedom and autonomy.
defend them and for the free and autonomous city to protect the citizen in return.22 The decree contrasts Alexander and Lykourgos as destroyer and defender of democracy, but by over-stating Alexander’s power and Lykourgos’ defiance it presents an exaggerated promotion of democratic authority, both for Lykourgos himself and for the demos that protected him.23 It records a narrative that displays the ability of Athenian democracy and the ideology of eleutheria and demokratia, as exemplified by Lykourgos, to stand against the totalitarian hybris of the king of the world.

Enrica Culasso Gastaldi has pointed out that in both 318 and 307 Athens offered posthumous honours to two individuals – Euphron and Lykourgos – who had previously supported the city, its freedom, and its democracy.24 The decrees were, therefore, restatements of the validity and authority of the democracy after periods of oligarchy. They created the subjects as heroic ideals and patrons of freedom and democracy and recorded their lives as inspirational models for citizens and benefactors of the restored democracies; indeed Volker Grieb argues that Lykourgos actually personifies the restored democracy.25 When it came to the Lykourgos Decree, however, it also served as a didactic exemplum to Demetrios of the strength and resilience of a free and autonomous Athens – a status he had just granted the city – against overarching royal interference. That its proposer, Stratokles, later had a key role in undermining that democracy by pandering to Demetrios’ whims should not detract from the image of democratic authority presented within the decree.

In both 319-317 and 307/6 the memory of Alexander was invoked to different ends. In 319-317 Polyperchon presented Alexander as a defender of freedom and democracy and Athens responded by honouring individuals closely connected with both, like Ainetos and Rhoxane, and suitably reinterpreting the origins and intentions of the Hellenic War. In 307/6, however, Alexander’s memory was overtly negative and he appeared as a threat to Athens’ freedom and democracy. This change marks an example of how different aspects of a person’s life can be invoked at different times to present an image of that person sensitive to the present context. In 319-317 it was Alexander’s role as patron of the freedom, autonomy, and political inviolability enshrined within the League of Corinth; in 307/6 it was his demand of the ten Athenian orators, specifically Lykourgos. This also reveals the important role that

22 Bertrand 2001: 19.
23 The point is more neatly presented in Plutarch’s account of the decree: οὐκ ἐξέδωκεν ὁ δήμος διὰ τὸν πατ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου φόβον (Moralia 852d).
memory itself played within the relationship between Successor and city. Polyperchon’s power was based on Philip Arrhidaios and Alexander IV as heirs to Alexander. Since Polyperchon was restoring Athens’ freedom and democracy it was only natural that a favourable picture of Alexander would be disseminated within Athenian public documents. Demetrios, however, had no such direct need of Alexander’s precedent since he ruled by his own right. Therefore, since there was no pro-Alexander, royal narrative to constrain and fashion the civic one, Athens was free to use the memory of Alexander’s actions however it wished, even to present him as anti-democratic. Between 319-317 and 307/6 Alexander’s democratic memory altered from a royal-asserted precedent of freedom to a polis-asserted example of royal hybris.

In the Greek cities of Asia Minor, however, it is the very simplicity, indeed permanency, of Alexander’s pro-democratic afterlife that is of note. He installed democracies in the cities of Ionia and Aiolia and because of this he was remembered as an example to be invoked by the cities to ensure the continuation of this status. The restriction of his grant to the cities of Ionia and Aiolia alone and his later anti-democratic actions were glossed over, or forgotten, and a unified, homogenous image was presented of Alexander as the archetypal and perennial guarantor of freedom and democracy, a role happily followed by his Successors.

The nature of Alexander’s differing image between Athens and the cities of Asia Minor, respectively a threat to and guarantor of democracy, stems from both his purely pragmatic response to individual historical circumstances and the cities’ individual needs at later points in time. In Greece, Alexander, like Philip before him, sought to install oligarchies and tyrannies as the best means of ensuring Macedonian control. In Asia, he supported democracies because the Persians had supported oligarchies. He manipulated the political schisms within the cities to create the short-hand of democracy as pro-Macedonian and oligarchy as pro-Persian. His concern for democracy was in no way born of altruism, nor did his preference for oligarchy in Greece stem from a love of that political system either. He followed both because they served his interests at different times. Later, both Athens and the cities of Asia Minor chose to promote or denigrate his democratic image based on their own needs.

SECTION 2: DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY AND CIVIC FREEDOM

In this section I explore further the question of ideology and memory, specifically the uniformity of democratic ideology in both Athens and Asia Minor, and the ways in which it was connected with eleutheria as the fullest expression of a city’s freedom. I begin with
Athens between 322-262, a period marked by dynamic political change but one that was simplified in the honorary decrees of the post-287 democracy as a struggle between oligarchy and democracy. By exploring the language of these decrees I argue that the past was re-written so as to enforce the authority of the post-287 democracy. Further, I argue that Demetrios was created as an oligarchic foil against whom the democracy could define itself – the *demos* – as the legitimate ruler of Athens and sole guarantor of its *eleutheria* and *demokratia*. I then turn to the Greek cities of Asia Minor where I detail the close ideological similarities between democracy in Athens and Asia Minor. From that, however, I argue for a key conceptual difference in both *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as a Primary freedom (a right) in Athens but a Secondary freedom (a gift) in Asia Minor.

**2.1: Athens, 322-262: The Erosion and Restoration of the Demos**

The years 322-262 are defined by political change: property-restricted timocracies of 322-319 and 317-307 gave way to democracies in 318/7 and 307-301, of which the years 304-301 were characterised by democratic subservience to Demetrios. With the turn of the century Lachares’ tyranny was replaced with a brief pro-Demetrios democracy which then turned into a more ‘oligarchic’ regime in the late 290s and early 280s. Democracy was restored after the Athenian revolt in 287 and this lasted until Antigonos captured Athens in 262; with a duration of 25 years this democracy was the longest period of political stability in a generation. The security of Athenian democracy from 401 to 322 was gone; Athens was now tossed between different Successors and different regimes, each with its own leading politicians.27

Ursula Hackl sees this as a period of decline. She argues that constant interference by the Successors led to a blurring of the distinctions between ‘democracy’ and ‘oligarchy’ and a commensurate decline in Athenian democracy.28 Hackl’s view, however, is one-sided and does not acknowledge the re-birth of a strong democratic ideology in the 280s. Helmut Halfmann, however, emphasises this rebirth and both he and Julia Shear argue that early 3rd century democrats were drawing on the experiences of their counterparts at the end of the 5th century to understand the cycle of democracies and oligarchies.29 Both influences are indeed detectable but the immediate impetus for the rebirth of democratic ideology and authority from 287 lay with the vicissitudes of the democracy in the years 322-287, particularly under

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26 I thank Julia Shear in particular for her insightful comments on this section.
Demetrios’ regimes of 304-301 and 295-287. Hackl’s impression of slow decline in the face of continuous and overwhelming royal interference is too simplistic. The period could instead be seen as one of necessary experimentation whereby a working relationship was developing between democratic ideology and royal patronage, and Athens’ relationship with the Ptolemies from 287-262 may be seen as a successful example of this. In Asia Minor, the Greek cities and Macedonian monarchies were simultaneously developing systems whereby concepts like eleutheria and demokratia were integrated into, and in turn helped define, the working relationship between both ruler and city (Ch.4; below §2.2).

Janice Gabbert offers a more pragmatic analysis of Athens during this period. She argues that politics at this time were essentially non-ideological in that all acknowledged democracy as the system of choice but debated the best means of achieving it: which ruler to ally with, what level of enfranchisement to accept, and what degree of royal control to integrate? Gabbert argues that there was no ideological debate at the time because there were no oligarchs, just people who saw different paths to the same end: the peace, stability, and prosperity of the city. For her, expressions like oligarchy, tyranny, and ‘undermining the demos’ are simply democratic rhetoric.

Gabbert’s model traces the essentially democratic character of the period and argues against the schism of democrat and oligarch that has frequently coloured scholarship. Nonetheless, divisions like ‘oligarch’ and ‘democrat’ informed political dialogue and were the mainstay of the radical democratic faction. Consequently, it is necessary to expand on Gabbert’s analysis and explore how and why the democracy of 287-262 used such distinctions reductively to re-write the past as a struggle between oligarchy and democracy. It will be necessary to look at post-287 decrees awarding the megistai timai (highest honours) to those who supported the democracy in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries. Ioanna Kralli’s analysis of these decrees emphasises their political rather than military focus and argues that in the early Hellenistic period it was more difficult for an Athenian to benefit the polis because he had to negotiate ever-changing political waters as the city’s loyalties constantly shifted between different kings.

Nino Luraghi recently showed that the demos used the narratives of these decrees, as accounts of the honourands’ lives, to write the official, democratic history of the years 322-

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31 T.L. Shear 1978: 54 “oligarchs like Philippides of Paiania, military leaders like Olympiodoros, and pro-Macedonian democrats like Stratokles”. Berlin (2002: 298) also questions such terminology: “the democrat, the oligarch, the plutocratic man: bricks defined in terms of the building into which they naturally fit”.
In what follows I draw upon his conclusions and explore the ways in which the *demos* constructed this narrative. However, I approach the question in a different manner. Rather than focusing on what the decrees do say about their honourands I focus on what they do not say. By analysing what the decrees leave out we explore from a different angle the question of how the *demos* constructed its narrative. The decrees focus on the honourands’ opposition to Demetrios and his regimes, with events and actions that do not fit this scheme dropped from the narrative. Therefore, the decrees are concerned as much with Demetrios, if tacitly, as they are with the honourand. The events they recount are selected to fit a pre-determined, anti-Demetrios narrative. Actions that do not fit this narrative are ignored. However, before I explore the *megistai timai* decrees of the post-287 democracy, it is necessary to look briefly at those passed by non-democratic regimes. This will provide context for the later analysis.

The *megistai timai* decrees awarded by non-democratic regimes to Philippides of Paiania in 293/2 (*SEG XLV* 101) and Phaidros of Sphettos in 259/8 (*IG II²* 682) do not contain strong statements of democratic ideology, implying that ideological loyalty was not the primary criterion for honours. Both Ioanna Kralli and Andrew Bayliss have emphasised the especially pro-Antigonid focus in the presentation of Phaidros’ honours in 259/8, with Bayliss in particular highlighting the proposer’s “extreme care” in chronicling Phaidros’ life. However, this pro-Antigonid view is completely absent from the decree for Philippides of Paiania which mentions few specific offices and provides no chronological or historical context for them. If Philippides had served Antigonid interests it is not mentioned, while his prominence under the democracy and even Lachares’ tyranny in making contacts with Kassandros, whom Pausanias (1.25.7) claimed was Lachares’ patron, is entirely glossed over. Philippides of Paiania is honoured for his life in politics, but this was not apparently a pro-Antigonid life and we should not see political loyalties and ideology as the primary motivating factor here.

Kralli and Bayliss identify an Antigonid-friendly narrative in the decree for Phaidros of Sphettos (*IG II²* 682), but they do not explore the decree’s detailed record of Phaidros’ life.

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34 Luraghi 2010: 253-60.
36 Gauthier (1985: 89-91) emphasises the decree’s silence on Philosophides’ actions under the democracy. Philippides proposed *IG II²* 641 (Prytany II, 299/8) in honour of ambassadors to Kassandros, an embassy on which he himself may have served (Paschidis 2008a: 113-15, A38). Tracy (2003: 38) joins *IG II²* 818 to lines 1-2 of *IG II²* 641. Habicht (1979: 28), however, points out that Philippides was *archon basileus* in 293/2, an office for which he may have been selected by Demetrios, as was the case with Olympiodoros’ double archonship in 294/3-293/2 (below n.56).
and actions even under regimes openly hostile to Demetrios. It records that Phaidros was general of the equipment twice in 296/5, first under Lachares’ ‘tyranny’ and then re-elected under Demetrios’ ‘democracy’. He was again twice general in 288/7, first under Demetrios’ ‘oligarchy’ and then under the restored democracy, whose revolt he supported; he is recorded as having handed Athens free, democratic, and autonomous to his successors. Phaidros was then elected general of the equipment in 287/6 and agonothetes in 282/1, both under the restored democracy, and he is recorded as having shared (financially?) in his son’s agonothesia in 265/4 during the Chremonidean War against Antigonos Gonatas. Also, the decree was perhaps passed in 259/8 which, although shortly after the collapse of the democracy to Antigonos in 262/1, is but three years before Antigonos’ return of eleutheria to Athens in 256/5 and may signify a softening of relations between Athens and Antigonos.

Phaidros may have been sympathetic to the Antigonids, and he was honoured under a pro-Antigonid regime, but the decree records that he undertook an embassy to Ptolemy Soter and he was honoured for military and political offices held under Lachares, Demetrios, and the radical democracy, regimes defined by the democracy as ‘tyranny’, ‘oligarchy’, and ‘democracy’ respectively. Phaidros apparently resided in Athens continuously from the 290s to the 250s and was able to adapt himself to the necessities of different regimes by putting the welfare of the polis as a whole first, not simply one political ideology. Volker Grieb has also emphasised this trait in Olympiodoros, who held office under Demetrios’ regimes of 304-301 and 295-287. Simple politico-ideological generalities like ‘oligarch’ and ‘democrat’ do not capture the nuanced careers of such individuals, but these are precisely the terms used by the democracy when it awarded Olympiodoros the megistai timai and nullified his non-democratic past (see below).

A very different image of the individual’s service to the state appears in the megistai timai offered by the democracy of 287-262; these decrees present the honourands’ loyalties

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37 The following outline is based on Habicht’s and Osborne’s dating of the Athenian revolt from Demetrios Poliorcetes to 287. If Julia Shear’s (2010) re-dating to 286 is correct then Phaidros’ relationship with both Demetrios’ regime and the restored democracy must be rethought. On the dating of the revolt, see above pg.68 n.120.
38 On the return of freedom in 256/5, see above pg.76 with n.174.
39 The date of his embassy to Ptolemy Soter (IG II 682.28-30) is debated. Paschidis (2008a: 143-4) overviews the evidence and favours 286/5-282.
41 Paschidis (2008a: 133-9, A44) argues that Olympiodoros was fundamentally anti-Macedonian but “accepted the leadership of a regime which did not seem to please him, in troubled times for his country”. Even so, his dual archonship, the first since that of Damasias in 582-579 (Arist. Ath. 13.2; Rhodes 1981: 180-4), and the return of the anagrapheus were fundamentally un-democratic, and he must have known as much.
42 On the political organisation of this regime, see Grieb 2008: 83-8.
as being with the democracy alone, not necessarily the city, which they spent long periods away from. In contrast with the *megistai timai* passed under pro-Macedonian regimes, those for Philippides of Kephale (283/2), Demosthenes (280/79), Demochares (271/0), Kallias of Sphettos (270/69), and perhaps even Olympiodoros (280s?) create and then highlight the honourands’ democratic actions alone.\(^{43}\) They are constructed as democratic paradigms who never cooperated with any other form of government or compromised their democratic principles. This image is artificial but the means by which it is created elucidate how and why the radical democracy connected Athens’ *eleutheria* and best interests with its form of *demokratia* alone. The following analysis has two foci: first, how the democratic *megistai timai* decrees construct a democratic narrative of the past by emphasising only certain aspects of the honourands’ careers, ignoring events that do not fit. Second, how such ‘subtle silences’ offered the restored democracy a form of implicit self-definition by creating periods of ‘oligarchy’ and ‘undermining of the *demos*’ as a political ‘other’, particularly in regards the regimes of 304-301 and 295-287 under Demetrios Poliorketes.\(^{44}\)

The decree for Philippides of Kephale (Prytany III, 283/2) opens with an account of his life at Lysimachos’ court, particularly his role in ensuring the burial of the Athenians who died at Ipsos and the release of those imprisoned by Antigonos and Demetrios (*IG II*\(^2\) 657.7-31). He is said to have “never done anything contrary to the democracy either in word or in deed” before he returned to Athens sometime between 287/6-284/3.\(^{45}\) We know from Plutarch that he criticised Stratokles on stage for “undermining the *demos*” by fawning on Demetrios and that he was consequently exiled shortly before 301 and fled to Lysimachos’ court.\(^{46}\) Philippides was prominent in Athens prior to his exile and won the Dionysia of either 313/2 or 311 (*IG II*\(^2\) 2323a.41; cf. 2325.164), during the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron. He was active on behalf of Athenian interests during his exile but the actions recorded by the decree all date to 301-298 and are only mentioned because they marked his opposition to Demetrios (II.14-32): overseeing the burial and repatriation of Athenians who fought at Ipsos

\(^{43}\) What Habicht (1979: 30) called a “untadelig demokratischen Haltung”. On Olympiodoros, see below ns.54-6. Cuniberti (2002: 463-5) argues that the *demos* is passive amid all this and is the subject of its citizens’ benefactions. However, it monopolised the language of euergetism (cf. Ch.4 §2.1), was scrupulous in grants of the *megistai timai* (Gauthier 1985: 77-89, 124-8; Kralli 1990-2000: 138-9), and took pains to construct a democratic narrative of its past and its honourands’ actions (Luraghi 2010: 253-60).

\(^{44}\) ‘Subtle silences’ is borrowed from Badian 1994.

\(^{45}\) *IG II*\(^2\) 657.48-50 (*App.1 num.38*); cf. *IG II*\(^2\) 698 in honour of an unknown individual (l.8): [οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν ὑπεναντίον τῶι δήμῳ], which Tracy (2003: 80-98) dates c.286/5-270.

and helping with the creation of a new peplos in 299/8 to replace that destroyed in 302/1, on which images of Antigonos and Demetrios were etched and whose accidental destruction was criticised by Philippides himself as a sign of divine disfavour at Stratokles’ deification of Demetrios.\textsuperscript{47} No further actions are attested from 299/8-287/6 and so Philippides is carefully presented within the decree as a staunch democrat who undertook no actions or positions under non-democratic regimes. Further, the focus on Philippides’ exile (c.304/3), his actions against Demetrios after Ipsos, and his return in 287/6 write the narrative of his life around Demetrios’ oligarchies; the narrative focus on the years 304/3, 301-299, and 287/6 promotes his democratic credentials and validates the democracy itself against its oligarchic, pro-Demetrios predecessors.

The decree for Demochares of 271/0 expands upon these features (Plu.\textit{ Moralia} 851d-f). The first actions it records are his leadership in rebuilding the walls in 307/6 (\textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 463+Agora XVI 109), his preparing arms for the Four Years War (\textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 1487.91-105), and his forming an alliance with the Boiotians in 304 (D.S. 20.100.6). This ignores the regimes loyal to Antipatros (322-319) and Kassandros (317-307) under which Demochares resided and against which he protested in his political life and written work.\textsuperscript{48} Further, the decree makes no mention of Demetrios during the years 307-303, even though we know from Diodoros that he was also instrumental in bringing the Boiotians to Athens’ side and so probably worked closely with Demochares. Helmut Halfmann speculates that Demochares’ successes in these years were largely based on the money and might of the Antigonid kings and although he does not suggest as much one suspects that Laches, the decree’s proposer and son of Demochares, deliberately ignored his father’s relations with Demetrios and his presence under the regimes of 322-307 in order to construct in 271/0 a more democratic-minded narrative at a time when Athens was moving towards what would become the Chremonidean War. Like Philippides, Demochares is said to have held no office and had no contact with Athens from 304/3 until his return in 286/5 when he acted on embassies to Lysimachos and Ptolemy (286/5) and was part of the delegation that received control of Eleusis from Antigonos Gonatas (279).\textsuperscript{49} His absence from Athens during its times of need is

\textsuperscript{47} Plu.\textit{ Demetr.} 12.4. On Demetrios and Athena’s peplos, see Buraselis 2008: 213-14.
\textsuperscript{48} Democh. \textit{FGH} 75 T1-2, F4; further evidence in Paschidis 2008a: 153 with n.2. Habicht (1979: 25-6) argues that the claim that Demochares held office under no oligarchy (οὐδεμίας ὀλιγαρχίας, below n.50) refers the years 317-307; Dreyer (1999: 116-17, \textit{cf.} 143), however, highlights the fluidity of the phrase. Logically, it should be taken to refer to the regimes under which Demochares was in exile, i.e. Demetrios’ regimes of 304-301 and 295-287 and perhaps Lachares’ ‘tyranny’ of c.301-295.
\textsuperscript{49} Plu.\textit{ Moralia} 851e-f; Habicht 1979: 24-5; Paschidis 2008a: 153-9, A49. Plutarch’s text records an embassy to Antipatros, long thought to be Antipatros Etesias, but Kevin Clinton, based on information provided to him by Basil Petrakos, argues that this should be emended to Antigonos since an as yet unpublished inscription of the
presented as a point of merit since it reveals his commitment to the democracy: “he was banished on behalf of the democracy...he would never take part in the oligarchy nor hold office while the demos was destroyed and of the Athenians who were in government at this same time he alone never took thought to disturb the fatherland with any form of government other than democracy”. Demochares’ actions during the years 322-307 were ignored, just as for 303-286, in order to create an image of a die-hard democratic partisan. His connection with Demetrios from 307-303 was glossed over because it would have undermined this democratic image by revealing his ‘capitulation’ to the future tyrant. However, Demetrios again plays a important but unspoken role within the decree. By focusing on the years 307-303, Demochares’ absence during the “oligarchies” of 303-287, and his return in 286, the decree constructs the democratic account of his life around the tacit but definite influence of Demetrios and his regimes, which again become implicit oligarchic foils to both Demochares and the post-287 democracy.

The decree for Kallias of Sphettos (Prytany VI, 270/69) functions in a similar way. It opens with a long outline of Kallias’ role in the revolt of 287 (SEG XXVIII 60.11-40) before detailing his later embassies to the Ptolemies on behalf of the restored democracy (ll.40-78). It then says that Kallias had earlier allowed his property “to be confiscated in the oligarchy so as to act in no way in opposition either to the laws or to the democracy which is the democracy of all Athenians”. Kallias’ exile, voluntary or otherwise, and the confiscation of his property is probably dated to 304/3, the same time as Demochares’. As with the Demochares decree, Kallias’ complete absence from Athenian public life before 287 is seen as a commendable sign of his commitment to the democracy alone, at the expense of the polis under all other regimes. Also, the narrative of his life and his democratic credentials is again structured around that of Demetrios and his control of Athens, both in 304/3 causing Kallias’ exile and in 287 leading to Kallias’ dramatic return, deus ex machina, to Athens and Athenian public life. As before, Demetrios is an oligarchic foil to the democratic protagonist and more
generally a patron of the oligarchic regimes against which the radical democracy constructs its present authority and validity.

Philippides, Demochares, and Kallias were perhaps all exiled from Athens in 304/3 and were not to return until after the revolt of 287, when the democracy was secured. Olympiodoros, however, was different but the presentation of his life was altered within his honorary decree to make it chime with the narratives of the other three. Pausanias (1.26.1-3) records a short biography of Olympiodoros which both Christian Habicht and Graham Oliver suggest goes back to a now lost epigraphic account, most likely another megistai timai decree seen by Pausanias. Olympiodoros mentions Olympiodoros’ defence of Eleusis, probably in 306 or 305/4, his alliance with the Aitolians in 304 (D.S. 20.100.6), his role in the capture of Piraeus and Mounychia, which may belong to either 307/6 or 296/5, and his capture of Museion during the revolt of 287. Assuming Pausanias records the events mentioned within the hypothetical decree, this would mean that the radical democracy’s report of Olympiodoros’ life and actions was again bracketed by events connected with, but not mentioning, Demetrios: his return in 304 and his expulsion in 287. The decree does not seem to record anything of Olympiodoros’ role between 304-287, a period in which he was a leading social, political, and military figure: probable commander of Piraeus in 296/5; archon for 294/3-293/2; recipient of a copy of Theophrastos’ will in the late 290s or early 280s; and strategos in 281/0. These events are ignored because they conflicted with cooperated democratic image of Olympiodoros that the decree wished to present; he had, in reality, cooperated with Demetrios on numerous occasions and was a leading personality under his regimes. Still, the focus of the narrative on 307-304 and 287 follows the plan seen in the decrees for Demochares, Kallias, and Philippides which narrate the honourand’s actions and the Athenian democracy as a parallel to Demetrios’ corruption of the demos and installation of oligarchies.

Olympiodoros remained in Athens continuously from before 307 until at least the end of

54 Paus. 1.26.3: Ὀλυμπιοδόρος δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ἐν Ἀθήναις εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ ἀκροτόλαι καὶ ἐν πρωτανείῳ τιμαῖ; Habicht 1985: 90-2, 101; Oliver 2007: 55-63. Others suggest that an honorary decree informed the work of either Philochoros or Demochares and that Pausanias borrowed it from them (Bearzot 1992: 91; Kralli 2000: 137 n.11; Paschidis 2008a: 135 with n.4). Gauthier (1985: 79) doubts that Olympiodoros’ honours constitute the megistai timai. On Olympiodoros’ career, see Paschidis 2008a: 133-9, A44.

55 Oliver 2007: 55-63 (analysis of decree). Oliver suggests that Olympiodoros captured Piraeus and Munychia in spring 295 when Demetrios sided with the remnants of Charias’ troops (Polyaen. 4.7.5). Another context could be the initial capture of Piraeus in 296/5, before Demetrios’ arrival, when the remnants of Charias’ pro-democratic faction fortified Piraeus, perhaps under Olympiodoros’ leadership, shortly after his execution.

the 280s (his date of death is unknown). He held office during the regimes of Demetrios (307-301), Lachares (c.297-295), Demetrios again (295-287), and the restored democracy (post-287/6), but within his (hypothetical) honorary decree, as preserved by Pausanias, this movement and adaptability is down-played and focus is placed instead on actions of importance to the democracy itself: his defence of Eleusis against Kassandros in 306-304, his capture of Piraeus for the democracy in 295 (Demetrios is notably absent), and his role in the revolt of 287. The decree for Phaidros had a pro-Antigonid focus but it did not demur from mentioning actions under other regimes. The decrees for Demochares, Kallias, and Philippides, however, have the same narrative focuses as that for Olympiodoros (304/3 and 287-post) and leave glaring omissions for the honourands’ lives between 304/3-287/6. Demochares and Kallias are said to have had no contact whatsoever with Athens during these years while Philippides’ benefactions under Lysimachos date from immediately after Demetrios’ expulsion from Athens and defeat at Ipsos, which they explicitly reference. In at least Olympiodoros’ case we can see that the democracy created this absence by ignoring those elements of his career that did not suit its ideological programme. The honourands’ absence from Athens and Athenian public life becomes a manifestation of their ideological purity and this in turn creates a political and ideological schism between democracy/freedom and oligarchy/slavery that can be used to enforce the legitimacy of “the democracy of all Athenians”.

An important dynamic of eleutheria is that it can be contrasted with a people or situation that can easily be defined as not being eleutheria. The use of an ‘other’ enforces legitimacy and meaning by contrasting a concept with that which it is not, thus creating a negative, but frequently authoritative, meaning (Ch.3 §2.1). What we see in the aforementioned decrees is a similar process whereby the self-definition of demokratia is made by creating an ‘other’ against which the democracy can present itself and its partisans, in this case ‘oligarchy’ and ‘undermining of the demos’. The gaps within the decrees for Demochares, Kallias, Philippides, and Olympiodoros served two purposes. First, by ignoring their actions and positions under non-democratic regimes the decrees constructed their honourands as exemplars for the restored, radical democracy, thus marking a democratic re-writing of the past as a regressive struggle between oligarchy and the inexorably victorious democracy.

57 SEG XXVIII 60.82-3 (App.1 num.42). Dreyer (1999: 126-7) argues against any ideological import for the phrase “democracy of all Athenians”.

58 Gauthier (1985: 84) emphasises the importance of the proposer in ‘creating’ the democratic narrative of the past: “Le citoyen chargé de rédiger et de presenter la proposition de décret n’avait ensuite qu’à choisir parmi les
Second, the accounts of the honourands’ lives are structured around the actions of Demetrios. Thus, the narratives of the ‘big men’ of the polis are built around those of the ‘bigger men’ of the empire. Lara O’Sullivan has recently commented on the democracy’s simplification of the past, particularly the years 304-301 and 295-287, into a homogenous and largely indistinguishable period of oligarchy and ‘undermining of the demos’.

However, she does not see that this process was facilitated by the fact that the regimes of 304-301 and 295-287 were both controlled by Demetrios, who, therefore, personified the ‘oligarchies’ he supported. By constructing the narratives of the honourands’ lives in parallel with Demetrios’ influence in Athens, the restored democracy could present Demetrios as a largely unspoken, implicit oligarchic foil to the democratic protagonists. Also, by presenting itself as the sole guarantor of Athenian demokratia and eleutheria the post-287 demos re-claimed the role that had been assumed by Demetrios between 304-301 and 295-287 when he presented freedom and democracy as qualities attainable solely by his own will (Ch.4 §3); the demos was again asserting its Primary freedom over the Secondary freedom offered intermittently by Demetrios. When read in this way, the decrees read less as records of the honourands’ lives and more as constructed statements on a theme: the legitimacy of the restored democracy as the sole guarantor of Athenian eleutheria, and the honourands’ continuous support for it against Demetrios and his oligarchies.

2.2: Asia, 334-262: Democratic Ideology and Secondary Freedom

Philippe Gauthier has emphasised that democracy was increasingly seen to be the political norm throughout the Hellenistic period. Peter Rhodes, however, has detected regional variations in its form and practice and suspects that in most cases democracy simply denotes some form of constitutional government with greater or lesser degrees of civic enfranchisement. In particular, he emphasises that not every government felt obliged to call itself democratic, even when democratic in form, while other states that did call themselves democracies were in fact less democratic that their counterparts. Demokratia in the cities of Asia Minor, therefore, does not have the strong, uniform connotation of enfranchisement for all, as seen with Athenian democracy post-287, but reflects more the variations inherent

bienfaits mentionnés ceux qui lui paraissaient les plus memorable; il pouvait aussi les regrouper ou les résumer à sa convenance‖. The decrees form “une sorte de verison officielle de l’histoire civique” (Gauthier 1985: 91).
59 O’Sullivan 2009a: 78.
60 Gauthier 1984.
62 Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 533-6, focusing on the examples of Chios, which calls itself democratic, and Priene, which does not.
within constitutional government when faced with varying levels of civic enfranchisement and royal interference, both Athenian concerns between 322-287. However, if functional differences exist regarding the level of enfranchisement, the political forms of democracy, or the degree of royal interference deemed acceptable, this does not alter the fact that the ideology of *demokratia* was strikingly consistent between Athens and Asia Minor.

There are cases where *demokratia* denotes something more than just generic constitutional government, and is instead explicitly connected with the political independence of the *demos* and the personal responsibility of the citizen to protect the democracy. In such cases *demokratia* defines, in Laurent Capdetrey’s words, “la politique normal de la cité”, and the state itself and its democracy become synonymous. In the Koan arbitration for Telos of c.300 citizens are to swear an oath to guard the democracy, abide by its judgements, and prevent others from undermining it. The democratic loyalty oath from the Tauric Chersonnese of the early 3rd century compels citizens to swear on behalf of the *soteria* and *eleutheria* of the city and its citizens that they will defend the *demokratia*, uphold the state, and judge decrees according to the democratic laws. In the late 3rd century *homopoliteia* of Kos and Kalymna citizens swear to uphold the *demokratia* and *patrioi nomoi* of Kos and abide by the judgements and decrees of the *ekklesia*. Inscriptions from Kyme and Erythrai of the mid-3rd century commend generals for defending the cities’ *eleutheria* and *demokratia* and for handing it over secure to their successors, while other examples connect *demokratia* with *homonoia* thus promoting it as a means of attaining civic unity and political harmony.

Contrasts are also made between democracy and oligarchy or tyranny. As in Athens, emphasising an oligarchic ‘Other’ creates by parallel a democratic ideology that promotes civic inclusion within the political machine, rather than isolation and elitism through oligarchy and tyranny. Such negative parallels also label opponents oligarchs and tyrants and as such threats to the city’s *eleutheria*. Alexander granted freedom and democracy to the

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63 Capdetrey 2007: 207. Grieb (2008: 178-80) emphasises the connection between laws, the *demos*, and *demokratia* in Hellenistic Kos.
64 Herzog 1942: 15 (*App.2 num.18*). A series of bronzes from Telos bearing the legend ΔΑΜΑΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ may be connected with the arbitration (Ziesmann 2005: 131-3).
65 IOSPE I 401.5-14 (*App.2 num.20*).
66 SV 545.14-18 (*App.2 num.46*). On the *homopoliteia* and Kos’ espousal of its own democracy, see Grieb 2008: 188-92.
67 Kyme: SEG LIV 1229.13 (*App.2 num.29*). Erythrai: *IK.Ery*. 29.12-14 (*App.2 num.34*). Athenian examples also exist. In 296/5 Phaidros handed Athens to his successors “free, democratic, and autonomous” (*IG II* 682.38-40; *App.1 num.48*) while in 267/6 Aristides handed Eleusis to his successor “safe and democratic” (*App.1 num.45* with n.49 above).
68 Lemos in 279/8 (*IG II 672.28+EM* 12967 [*App.1 num.40*]); Kos c.280 (*SEG I1.1 1054.8-11; *App.2 num.31*) and c.278 (*Syll.* 398.27-8; *App.2 num.32*); Erythrai c.268-262 (*IK.Ery*. 504.16-18; *App.2 num.33*).
cities of Ionia and Aiolia and contrasted this with the oligarchy supported by Persia (Arr. An. 1.18.1-2). In two letters to Chios he specifically contrasted the democracy that he and the Greeks brought with the “oligarchy that had previously been established among you by the barbarians” (GHI 84b.16-19). Ilion’s anti-tyranny decree of the early 3rd century continually contrasts the democracy it seeks to preserve with tyranny and oligarchy. In Erythrai the democracy contrasts itself with the tyrant that Philistes the tyrannicide killed and the oligarchy that later desecrated Philistes’ statue. Finally, in the homopoliteia of Kos and Kalymna citizens swear to accept and support neither oligarchy nor tyranny but only democracy.

Demokratia is also connected with eleutheria, an association which reflects Alexander’s grant of both to the Ionian and Aiolian cities and implies a similar understanding of democracy to that seen in Athens, i.e. a democratic government as the only means of ensuring the freedom of the city and its citizens. When Antigonos returned eleutheria and autonomia to Miletos it claimed that its demokratia was given back as well. A Delian decree dated post-301 and inscribed on a statue-base for Demetrios connects demokratia and eleutheria and further associates both with the best interests of the king. The oath of the Tauric Chersonnese not to undermine the democracy is sworn “on behalf of the soteria and eleutheria of the city and the citizens” and Lysimacheia’s treaty with Antiochos I or II guarantees the autonomia and demokratia of the city. The Ionian League called on Antiochos to preserve the eleutheria and demokratia of its cities, while Erythrai, Miletos, Smyrna, and Mylasa all individually connected their demokratia with their eleutheria.

Between Athens and Asia Minor democracy may have been different in form, but these differences were simply local variations on a general theme: constitutional government through the ekklesia and boule. Ideologically, both Athens and the cities of Asia Minor appear to have conceived of and presented demokratia in the same way, as the only political system that guarantees civic eleutheria, unifies the polis and the citizens within it, places the best interests of the whole above those of the few, and conceives of itself as a system in

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70 IK.Ilion 25 passim; above pg.71 with n.139.
72 SV 545.21-2 (App.2 num.46).
73 I.Milet 123.2-4 (App.2 num.7); cf. D.S. 19.75.4; IG II 1129.10-12 (App.2 num.8).
75 Above n.65.
76 IK.Ilion 45 (App.2 num.26).
conflict with the restrictive regimes of oligarchy and tyranny. However, underneath these conceptual similarities lurk deeper, more important differences. Democracy was the goal but Athens and the cities of Asia Minor had very different ideas on how to attain it and the role of the king in ensuring it. The Athenian democracy saw *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as self-asserted inherent rights, not royally-defined status benefactions (Ch.4 §3). In Asia Minor, however, *demokratia* and *eleutheria* were generally conceived of as royal gifts, status benefactions guaranteed and refuted by royal will. An important distinction is therefore marked between Athens perception of its *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as Primary and the Asian cities’ perception of them as Secondary. The situation in the cities of Asia Minor stems directly from Alexander, who unilaterally granted freedom and democracy to the cities of Ionia and Aiolia as a royal gift. Under Alexander, and then his Successors, both statuses continued to be guaranteed and revocable by royal edict (Ch.4 §2.2). In this way, *eleutheria* and *demokratia* existed as another status benefaction within the royally-enforced understanding of Secondary freedom.

Where *demokratia* appears in the historical narrative it does so as a status benefaction, something granted by a ruler to a city. The Greek, and indeed Lydian, cities of Asia Minor were granted freedom by Alexander, but it was a negative freedom defined simply as the removal of Persian control. Democracy was a positive freedom ensured by royal edict and granted to only a limited number of cities. Alexander granted democracy generally to the cities of Ionia and Aiolia (Arr. An. 1.18.1-2) and specific examples are attested from Chios (GHI 84a-b), Mytilene (GHI 85a), and Eresos (GHI 83). Under the Successors democracy remained a gift guaranteed by royal action. Miletos was liberated by Antigonos in 313/2 and its democracy was given back as a result of this action. On Delos, the island’s *demokratia* and *eleutheria* appear in a text concerning its relationship with Antigonos and Demetrios, possibly implying some form of royal guarantee of it. Seleukos appears to have been connected with the return of *demokratia* and *eleutheria* to Lemnos. Lysimacheia made an alliance with Antiochos I or II in which he swore to defend its democracy. Although not representing the king as the guarantor of democracy, it does create for him the opportunity to become it. The Ionian League called on Antiochos to “take care of the cities of the Ionian League so that in future they will be free and democratic”. When Antiochos Theos oversaw the removal of the tyrant Timarchos from Miletos the city claimed that it regained “*eleutheria* and *demokratia* from king Antiochos the god”. Even more striking, Smyrna acted

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79 Above pg.154 with n.2.
independently in annexing Magnesia-by-Sipylos during the Laodikian War but was concerned thereafter to ensure from Seleukos II the guarantee by royal edict of its autonomia and demokratia. Furthermore, Seleukos II later restored to Mylasa its freedom and democracy through his deputy Olympichos.80

We can see, therefore, that from Athens to the cities of Asia Minor the methods by which demokratia was authorised were strikingly similar, thus implying that despite regional variations in form the practicalities of its function and ideology were the same. Democracy was consistently presented as the sole political system that guaranteed freedom for the state. It empowered the citizens and politicians to act in the state’s best interests, and it enforced the legitimacy of the decisions of the demos, whatever the extent of its enfranchisement. However, an important distinction remained in its understanding as an innate, guaranteed, and self-assertive right within Athens and its understanding as a royal gift, guaranteed, defended, and ultimately revocable by royal will in the cities of Asia Minor. In this regard demokratia operates as one specific example of the wider conception of eleutheria itself: a Primary freedom (a right) in Athens but a Secondary freedom (a gift) in Asia Minor, where it existed as one royally guaranteed Positive freedom within a wider Secondary understanding of eleutheria. This, naturally, had important repercussions for the role of eleutheria within the dialogue between city and king where it could exist as a point of discord or of unity (Ch.4).

SECTION 3: DEMOKRATIA AND ROYAL TERMINOLOGY

In this final section the focus turns to terminology, specifically the royal avoidance of direct commitments to demokratia as a constitutional form and aspect of eleutheria. In part one I look at instances where demokratia appears, or indeed does not appear, in the early Hellenistic Period. I argue that rulers generally avoid expressing their support for demokratia, specifically as an aspect of eleutheria. Andrew Erskine has recently, and I believe correctly, argued that the connection between eleutheria and demokratia was made by the demos itself because it reflected its own political concerns.81 I will expand on this by suggesting that Hellenistic rulers by and large avoided making that connection precisely because it was a civic one and the preference for one political form over another would have restricted the plasticity of royal grants of eleutheria; when referring to political forms rulers usually express support for things like the patrioi nomoi, patrios politeia, or grant ‘freedom to the

81 Erskine forthcoming.
In part two I argue that *demokratia* is asserted by the *polis* because it is a quality inherently connected with the *demos*; it is a political expression of the *eleutheria* that they have been given by the king. Kings focus on more abstract terms because they are hesitant to commit their support to one specific political form, an action that would offer a restrictive political and ideological definition to royal grants of *eleutheria*, which were normally and ideally ambiguous and lacking clear definition.

### 3.1: Royal Avoidance of *Demokratia*

The earliest example of a Successor guaranteeing freedom to the Greeks is Polyperchon in 319/8. In cities like Athens and Eretria he seems also to have overturned Antipatros’ oligarchies and supported the restored *demoi*. However, there is no conclusive evidence that Polyperchon actually made explicit statements of support for *demokratia* itself. Diodoros and Plutarch claim that he stated his intention in autumn 319 to support democracy, but both accounts are contentious. Diodoros records that before the issue of his Edict Polyperchon and his advisors announced that they would restore the democracies to the Greek cities. This, however, is the only mention in Diodoros XVIII-XX of a Successor explicitly granting *demokratia* to a city. It occurs programmatically, before the actual issue of the Edict, but neither the Edict itself nor Diodoros’ subsequent narrative mention democracy. Since the Edict only became associated with *eleutheria* and *demokratia* as a result of its reception within the Greek cities, it would appear that either Diodoros or his source retroactively ascribed intent to Polyperchon based on the reception of the Edict within the Greek cities. Plutarch’s account is equally dubious (*Phoc. 32.1-2*). It records that Polyperchon sent a letter to Athens saying that the king was returning *demokratia* to Athens and ordering the Athenians to govern themselves in their traditional manner (*κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*). This is Plutarch’s only reference to the Edict and it is an obscure one at that. I have argued elsewhere that what we have here is again a conflated account in which Plutarch simplifies the process by which the Edict was received within the Greek cities and ascribes intent to it based on its reception.

The expression that Polyperchon and other Successors apparently used, or at least that the cities ascribed to them, when referring to grants of democracy is ‘to grant freedom to the *demos*’. In his letters to the Greek cities before his invasion of the Peloponnese Polyperchon

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82 On Eretria, see Knoepfler *Decrets* VII (*IG* XII (9) 196).
83 D.S. 18.55.4: ἐπηγγείλαντο τὰς δημοκρατίας ἀποκαταστήσειν ταῖς πόλεσι.
84 Ch.2 §3; Wallace forthcoming A: section 2.
85 Wallace forthcoming A: section 2 with n.44.
apparently called for them to execute the leaders of Antipatros’ oligarchies and to return *autonomia* to the *demoi* (D.S. 18.69.3). At Kolophon Antigonos is praised for having given *eleutheria* to the *demos* while at Ios he is commended for having returned *eleutheria* to the *demos* but also for having ensured the ancestral laws. At Bura in 303/2 Demetrios is recorded as having given *autonomia* to the citizens (D.S. 20.103.4). At Iasos Ptolemy’s governor Aristoboulos does not refer to Iasos’ *demokratia* but instead expresses his commitment to defending the *eleutheria* and *autonomia* of the *demos*. The phrase is ambiguous when it comes to specific political ideologies, such as democracy or oligarchy, but it does display a clear preference for constitutional government by the *demos* while simultaneously leaving unspecified the exact level of enfranchisement of that *demos* and the extent of its submission to the ruler.

Demetrios was similarly and perhaps surprisingly ambiguous when it came to his restorations of *eleutheria* to Athens in 307 and 295. His campaigns in Greece between 307-301 were described by Athens as a defence of *eleutheria* and *demokratia*, but it is uncertain whether this is a purely civic interpretation of events – applying to the ruler the role that you wish him to fulfil – or whether Antigonid propaganda actively presented Demetrios’ campaigns in these terms. A series of honorary decrees for Demetrios’ *philoi* appear to quote royal letters and state that Demetrios revealed the honourands to be contesting on behalf of freedom and democracy (Ch.4 §3). However, since the text of the decrees – in each case identical – is constructed by their proposer in the *ekklesia* it is difficult to gauge whether they reflect precisely Demetrios’ actual language, although I have argued that they probably do (Ch.4 §3). It is informative therefore to read the literary accounts of Demetrios’ liberation of Athens in 307. Polyainos and the Suda record brief statements, but the major accounts are those of Diodoros and Plutarch, which go back to Hieronymos and Philochoros respectively, the former an intimate of Demetrios and the latter an Atthidographer and probable eyewitness to events. Interestingly, none of these sources mentions the restoration of *demokratia*; all frame Demetrios’ actions in terms of *eleutheria*. Diodoros (20.45.5, 46.1) records that Demetrios restored *eleutheria* to the *demos*, Plutarch (Demetr. 8.5, 10.1) states that his mission was to free Athens by restoring her *nomoi* and *patrios politeia*, Polyainos (4.7.6) claims that he simply made an announcement to free Athens, while the Suda (Δ 431) refers to him granting Athens the ability to govern herself autonomously (*αὐτονομεῖσθαι*) according to “the ancient customs of her constitution” (*τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείᾳ νόμιμα*). From these

86 Kolophon: Mauerbauninschriften 69.6-7 (App.2 num.9). Ios: IG XII (5) Suppl.168.2-3 (App.2 num.15).
87 IK Iasos 3.12-13 (App.2 num.13).
accounts it seems that Demetrios was reluctant, perhaps unwilling, to mention *demokratia* in 307, although he did send letters to Athens in 303 most likely claiming that his associates fought on behalf of *demokratia*, a concern that was then vicariously applied to him. Later, when he founded the Hellenic League in spring 302, Demetrios appears to have again avoided explicit statements of *demokratia* since the preserved sections of the League charter make no mention of it and refer instead to members’ *patriai politeiai* (*SV* 446.39-40). Considering the prohibition on internal political uprisings it is likely that whatever constitutions were in place at the time of entry into the League were to remain in force and were not permitted to be changed, just as was the case within the earlier League of Corinth.88

The Hellenic League was not exclusively a collection of democracies, but a collection of states loyal to Demetrios.

When Demetrios captured Athens by siege in spring 295 he restored the offices (*ἀρχας*) best loved by the people (Plu. *Demetr.* 24.6) and instituted a new democracy for the years 296/5-295/4 (Ch.2 §7). The decree for Herodoros of Prytany IX 295/4 refers to the *demos* recovering its *demokratia*, but interestingly makes no mention of Demetrios’ role in this; it is simply stated that the *demos* “having recovered the city, might continue to have democracy”.*89* Demetrios’ action in capturing Athens and restoring its democratic forms is removed from the event and although he may have helped the *demos* recover the city the restoration of *demokratia* is not directly ascribed to him. As before, the emphasis is placed on the *demos* in whose interest it was to promote democratic authority.

Successor hesitancy and civic preference for referring directly to *demokratia* is also apparent in Antigonos’ liberation of Miletos in 313/2, an event illuminated by a fortunate confluence of literary and epigraphic sources. Diodoros records (19.75.3-4) that when Antigonos’ generals Medios and Dokimos arrived before Miletos in 313/2 they roused the people to take back their freedom, besieged the akropolis, and restored Miletos’ constitution to autonomy (*εἰς αὐτονομίαν ἀποκατέστησαν τὸ πολίτευμα*). A parallel account is offered by the entry of 313/2 in the Milesian *stephanephoroi* list which states that “the city became free and autonomous thanks to Antigonos, and the democracy was given back”.*90* Whereas Diodoros employs, whether deliberately or not, an expression that echoes royal usage, the newly-empowered Milesian *demos* emphasises explicitly the restoration of its *demokratia*. Its

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88 *SV* 446.43-4: μηδ’ ἐπὶ νεωτερικῇ σημώνι: cf. D. 17.4-7 with GHI 83. On the League of Corinth, see Ch.2 §1.
89 *IG II* 2 646.22-3 (*App.1 num.32*). Translation: Burstein num.6.
90 *LMilet* 1 (3) 123.2-4 (*App.2 num.7*). The occasion marked the creation of a new *stephanephoroi* list, a new beginning for the free, autonomous, and democratic city.
connection with a passive (ἀπεδόθη) suggests that *demokratia* was not actively granted by Antigonus, like *eleutheria* and *autonomia* (ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνου), but was a consequence of his return of freedom and autonomy. As Andrew Erskine has argued, and is developed here, *demokratia* was a concern of the *demos* and it, not Antigonus, connected *demokratia* with *eleutheria*.91

A fragmented Milesian decree found on the Athenian Akropolis, perhaps dating as early as c.313 and referring to Antigonus’ liberation of Miletos, is of note here.92 A reference to Asandros is plausibly restored and the subject of the decree is said to have recently controlled (ἐκκυρίευσε) something, presumably Miletos. Mention is also made of the *nomoi* and *patrios politeia*. The decree is severely fragmented so the absence of *demokratia* within the preserved parts cannot be pushed too far, but the use of generalising terms like *nomoi* and *patrios politeia* contrast with Miletos’ explicit concern for *demokratia* and is more in line with Diodoros’ statement that Antigonus returned the *politeuma*. Such terms continually appear elsewhere: when a garrison was removed from Eretria c.308 or c.284-280 “the *demos* was freed and it recovered its *patrioi nomoi* and *demokratia*”; the charter of the Hellenic League refers to *patriai politeiai*; a decree from Ios claims that when Antigonus “returned *eleutheria* and the *patrioi nomoi* to the *demos*”; and a decree of the League of Islanders in honour of Ptolemy Soter commends him for having “freed the cities, returned the *nomoi* and restored the *patrios politeia* to all”.93 In the case of the League of Islanders we know that Delos, its centre, was free and democratic under Antigonus and Demetrios.94

Royal avoidance of commitments to *demokratia* can be seen and explained more clearly through a series of inscriptions from Erythrai and Smyrna. Sometime in the 260s the Ionian League sent an embassy to Antiochos I calling upon him to protect the cities so that they should remain free and democratic according to their *patrioi nomoi*.95 Christian Habicht has suggested that Antiochos’ reply to this embassy may survive in a royal letter to Erythrai of c.270-260 in which a king Antiochos swears to preserve Erythrai’s *autonomia* and *aphorologesia*, as had been the case under Alexander and Antigonus.96 If Habicht is correct,
then it is notable that Antiochos makes no mention of demokratia, so forcefully invoked by the Ionian League. Instead, he focuses on the more concrete forms of status benefaction, like eleutheria and the remittance of taxation, generally aphorologesia and specifically ta Galatika. Antiochos’ avoidance of demokratia is somewhat more noticeable when we consider that in a further Erythraian decree of the 260s the city’s generals are praised for preserving its demokratia and eleutheria, twin concerns already evoked within the Ionian embassy to the king. The exact relationship between these three inscriptions is not certain, nor is their attribution to a single reign, but what they show is the concern of Erythrai, and indeed the Ionian League, for royal guarantees of eleutheria and demokratia and the apparent royal hesitancy in explicitly granting the latter.

The situation at Smyrna emphasises more clearly the royal avoidance of declaring support for demokratia. In the treaty finalising Smyrna’s synoikism with Magnesia-by-Sipylos (c.245-243) the demos of Smyrna claims that Seleukos II Kallinikos “confirmed for the demos its autonomia and demokratia” and orders that those partaking of the synoikism are to swear “to join in preserving the autonomia and the demokratia, and the other things which have been granted to the Smyrnaids by King Seleukos”.

Smyrna evidently saw its autonomia and demokratia as guaranteed and defended by Seleukos, but the king’s view on the matter was somewhat different. A Delian decree confirming Smyrna’s asylia recounts a royal letter in which Seleukos’ benefactions to Smyrna were listed. He is said to have “granted to the Smyrnaids that their city and land should be free and not subject to tribute, and guarantees to them their existing land and promises to return their fatherland”. The different focus between the Smyrnaian decree and Seleukos’ letter is notable: the demos refers to more abstract political considerations of particular importance to it and its political authority, while Seleukos refers to more concrete, measurable status benefactions, such as the guarantee of land and tax-exemption. The different focuses represent to some degree the different concerns of both parties and, one suspects, their different understandings of what freedom denotes or ought to denote.

There are of course exceptions. In 260/59 Antiochos II intervened in Miletos through his general Hippomachos who removed the tyrant Timarchos and “brought eleutheria and demokratia thanks to king Antiochos the god”. Hippomachos may be the one honoured,

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97 The severely fragmented IK.Ery. 30 is also connected with these events.
98 IK.Ery. 29.12-14 (App.2 num.34).
101 1. Didyma 358.5-7 (App.2 num.36); App. Syr. 344; Polyaen. 5.25. On Hippomachos, see Grainger 1997: 94
but the restoration of freedom and democracy is explicitly ascribed to Antiochos. Unfortunately we cannot tell whether such terminology was used by Antiochos himself, but the ascription of it to him follows the scheme seen above where the *demos* is concerned with advertising and attaining royal confirmations of *demokratia*. A second case concerns the oath of alliance between Lysimacheia and an unspecified Antiochos, probably I or II. Antiochos swears that he will “protect the city as autonomous, democratic, […] ungarrisoned and untaxed”.\(^{102}\) The treaty is one of only a few bi-lateral treaties between a city and a king and so is exceptional for that reason alone (Ch.3 §2.3). It is also our only contemporary evidence for an explicit royal commitment to defend civic *demokratia*, but since it is a bilateral treaty the terms of Antiochos’ oath were perhaps asserted by Lysimacheia itself, not the king. Nonetheless, Antiochos accepted these terms and in doing so displayed an usual willingness to make a legal commitment to Lysimacheia’s democracy.

3.2: Explanations

At this stage it seems apparent that wherever possible Alexander’s successors avoided explicit commitments to *demokratia*. Demetrios’ letters to Athens concerning honours for his *philoi* are probably an exception but they do not claim that he himself granted *demokratia*, but rather that it is defended and perpetuated by him and his *philoi*. The case of Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia is also unusual since it represents the king engaging in a bilateral treaty with a city. Early Hellenistic rulers were hesitant in referring to *demokratia* and preferred instead other, less ideologically loaded phrases like *patrios politeia*, *politeuma*, *patrioi nomoi*, and ‘granting freedom to the *demos*’. Lara O’Sullivan has called such terms “notoriously slippery” but herein lies their appeal: they were inherently fluid and could be employed by different regimes to mean similar if not the same things. She points out that *patrios politeia* was used to describe such widely different regimes as the oligarchy of Antipatros in 322, the democracy of Polyperchon in 319/8, and the democracy of Demetrios in 307.\(^{103}\) The fluidity in use reflected the abstraction of what such terms were used to define: they avoided restrictive, ideologically-charged definitions and favoured instead non-descript

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\(^{s.v.}\) Hippomachos, Orth (1977: 153-8) and Grieb (2008: 243-5) analyse Timarchos’ tyranny and Antiochos’ grant of freedom. To mark the restoration of freedom a new list of *stephanephoroi* was begun in 259/8, as had been the case in 313/2. The *stephanephoros* then was Hippomachos Theronos (*I.Milet* 123.1-4) and Hippomachos Athenaiou may well be his grandson (Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 17-18, num.19). On the prominence of one Athenaios Dionysiou in the 270s, see above pg.86 n.28.

\(^{102}\) *IK.Ilios* 45.6-9 (*App.2 num.26*).

but evocative generalities which attempted to connect with an idealised political past, whether democratised or not, and define the present regime, whether democracy or not, as a parallel to it.

Rulers used terms like patrios politeia and nomoi precisely because they were ambiguous and defined a positive situation that favoured civic constitutional government without openly expressing a particular ideological bias. In this way, rulers could promote positive constitutional change in their favour without promoting a particular constitutional form itself, like democracy and oligarchy. That such terms were sometimes used in exactly the same way by cities is revealed within the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy where allied members were to be free, autonomous, and “governed under whatever form of politeia he wishes”. Similarly, in the Chremonides Decree Athens charged Antigonos Gonatas with seeking “to subvert the nomoi and patrioi politeiai of each city”, a generic enough claim that could be widely applied to Antigonos’ actions without relying on ideologically restrictive terminology like democracy and oligarchy, which would only have promoted political division among the allies. Demetrios’ Hellenic League of 302 did not, to our knowledge, reveal a preference for democracy even though he was seen to support this in his campaigns against Kassandros. Rather, the charter mentions patrioi nomoi because the League consisted of numerous different states with presumably different constitutional forms, such as the ‘tyranny’ of Nikodemos in Messene; the only important unifying factor was their alliance with the king, not the governments of individual members.

Alexander openly granted eleutheria and demokratia but his successors did not. Why? Alexander had the clear parallel in the Persian backed oligarchies and so could claim support for democracy in order to create a political contrast with Persia’s support of oligarchies. In this way, Alexander motivated the democratic factions within the Greek cities to his side. Interestingly, with the exception of Antiochos I or II and Lysimacheia, the only other evidence we have for Successors perhaps employing demokratia in their dealings with Greek cities comes from Polyperchon and Demetrios, both of whom were in a similar situation to Alexander and used democracy to motivate the democratic factions against Kassandros and his power base of garrisons and oligarchies. In such cases the royal use of demokratia was possible – though the evidence remains uncertain, specifically in Polyperchon’s case –

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104 Bertoli (2003: 99-100), in discussing Antigonos’ relations with Miletos, argues that instead of explicitly granting demokratia Antigonos simply “ristabilisce la πατριος πολιτεία, interpretata in senso democratico”.
105 IG II² 43.20-1 (App.1 num.3). Translation: GHI 22.
106 IG II² 686/7.15-16 (App.1 num.43). Translation: Austin num.61. Tarn (1913: 278-86) argues that the terms refer to Antigonos’ support of tyrants.
107 Plu. Demosth. 13.4; FD III (4) 7; Billows 1990: App.3 num. 81.
because it operated within a very specific ideological and geographical remit against Kassandros’ oligarchies in Greece. Even then *demokratia* was defined not by what it was but rather by what it was not: the restrictive, oligarchic regimes that Kassandros favoured.

Normally, however, such a clear ‘us and them’ distinction was not applicable. In Greece Alexander favoured whatever governments would provide the greatest degree of loyalty to him, which happened to be tyrannies and oligarchies. Alexander’s favouring of democracies in Asia Minor and oligarchies in Greece was purely pragmatic and had great success in Asia Minor, but it led to difficulties in Greece because it allowed him to be presented there as a tyrant and even a hypocrite who freed the Asian Greeks by removing oligarchies and installing democracies but then enslaved the European Greeks by supporting oligarchies (D. 17 *passim*). His support for democracies earned him successes in one area but left him open to bad will and dissension in another. Further, Alexander then came under fire from democrats for supporting regimes that could only dubiously be called democratic, as with his support of Hegesias in Ephesos. 108 Bearing in mind the difficult public image Alexander had to deal with in Greece it is not necessarily surprising that his successors chose to avoid making commitments to *demokratia*. If they explicitly granted a city its democracy then they would have left themselves open to critique should they support a potentially non-democratic regime elsewhere. Further, granting freedom and democracy would create a precedent whereby any and all grants of *eleutheria* would have to be accompanied by a grant of *demokratia*, a situation far too restrictive for such a fluid concept as freedom. Rulers generally relied on phrases like *patrios politeia*, *patrioi nomoi*, and ‘giving freedom to the *demos’*. Further, since each could be connected with *eleutheria* and/or *demokratia* the ruler’s commitment to them represented a commitment to the independence of the *demos*, which was in a sense democracy.

A common trend that appears throughout the evidence is the civic rather than royal insistence on *demokratia*. Athens (in 319-317, 307, and 295), Miletos, Erythrai, and Smyrna all refer to their *demokratia*, its restoration, and its support by the ruler even when that ruler chose not to vocalise such support himself. It is important to note, as Andrew Erskine has done, that *demokratia* was a civic concern and was seen by the *demos* as the natural consequence of a Successor’s grant of *eleutheria* to the city. 109 The islands of the Aegean and the cities of Ionia and Aiolia had been granted *eleutheria* and *demokratia* by Alexander in

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108 Above pg.156 with n.11.
so these cities saw one as dependent upon the other. Later grants of freedom and/or autonomy to the cities were taken to re-affirm the constitutional independence of the *demos*, a body whose authority could be and was described as democracy. Democracy was, as Demades said, intrinsically connected with the validity and authority of city’s laws.\textsuperscript{110} It was a civic concern – a manifestation of the primacy of the *demos* and its laws – not a royal one.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored a number of themes and some solid conclusions can be reached. I emphasised throughout the importance of memory and the central role played by the past in constructing the present. With the characterisation of Alexander in Athenian public decrees I showed how the *demos* could adapt as a political unit to the needs of Polyeperchon’s propaganda and accept, even implicitly, Alexander as earlier protector of its democracy. Further, through the re-interpretation of the Hellenic War as a struggle for democracy I detailed how the *demos* expanded on that propaganda and took an active role in altering the memory of the War to suit its present needs. This alteration of the past to suit the present also appeared in the democracy’s *megistai timai* decrees which presented a changed historical narrative that expounded democracy as the sole guarantor of freedom and the inexorable victor in the struggle with Demetrios and oligarchy. However, in Asia Minor we saw the simplification and entrenchment of Alexander’s memory as a patron and guarantor of democracy. This whitewashed his numerous attacks on civic freedom and perpetuated into the Roman period a simplified image of him as defender of democracy. Part of the resilience of this image is the fact that Alexander’s grant of freedom and democracy offered a precedent that was frequently invoked in the Hellenistic period and acted as a formative influence on the relationship between the Greek cities and Alexander’s Successors.

A leitmotiv of this chapter has been the division between Primary and Secondary freedom. This has been explored in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, but through the above analysis I furthered the argument that Athens and Asia Minor conceived of their freedom and democracy in Primary and Secondary manners respectively, with the restored democracy in Athens asserting its freedom as an innate right and the cities of Asia Minor presenting theirs as a royal gift. This, however, related simply to the means by which one attained freedom and

\[\text{demokratia} \text{― la capacité à vivre selon les lois propres de la cité} \]

\[\text{\begin{tabular}{c}
\text{110 de Falco 1954: F35: κρατίστη δημοκρατία, ἐν ἣ πάντες ὡς τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ φοβοῦνται τὸν νόμον τοῖς μὲν δούλοις ἢ ἀνάγκη νόμος τοῖς δὲ εὐθείᾳς ὁ νόμος ἀνάγκη. In their own decrees numerous cities connected democracy with the use of their laws, for example Athens (IG II' 448, 509; App.1 nums.9, 12), Priene (I.Priene 11; App.2 num.21), and Smyrna (I.K.Smyrna 573, 576; App.2 nums.37, 39). Capdetré (2007: 207-8) calls demokratia “la capacité à vivre selon les lois propres de la cité”.
\end{tabular}}\]
democracy. Once democracy was attained its role within the city was conceived of in similar terms on both sides of the Aegean: as the political system best ensuring the independence and political vitality of the city according to its own accountable laws. The means of achieving one’s freedom and democracy differed, and this altered the way one viewed one’s relationship with the Hellenistic kings (cf. Ch.4 §3), but the function and ideology of democracy remained, by and large, the same.

I also analysed the royal tendency to shun direct statements of support for democracy. We have seen that kings avoided explicitly granting democracy to cities and instead referred to terms like patrioi nomoi, patrios politeia, and granting ‘freedom to the demos’. This, I argued, revealed that when kings sought or were forced to offer some form of political definition for eleutheria they favoured abstractions that although positive in implication eschewed the civic dialogue of democracy, which was too ideologically restrictive for royal liking. Instead, kings granted freedom to the demos or gave it control over its nomoi or constitution, which was then presented by the demos as democracy. This, I suggested, marks different ways of conceiving of and defining eleutheria. When pushed, kings sought to define eleutheria via tangible status benefactions, such as remittance of taxation, removal of tyrants, and grants of land, benefactions that varied from city to city (Ch.3 §1.1-2). Kings tended to avoid potentially divisive political terminology. Cities, on the other hand, were by and large governed by the demos and so a royal grant of freedom guaranteed democracy in a sense since it was the demos itself that was empowered. Cities asserted democracy as an aspect of their freedom because not only were both qualities guaranteed as one by Alexander, but because democracy marked the political independence and authority of the city, specifically the demos, to govern itself. It asserted the polis, the demos, and the individual polites as the empowered and authoritative elements.
Chapter 6: The Memory and Commemoration of the Persian Wars

“The Persian Wars served as a paradigm, providing Greeks with a charter of identity …rooted deep in tales of resistance to outsiders.”

Alcock 2002: 84

Introduction

The Persian Wars provided a model for understanding the past. Herodotos, for one, saw them as the culmination of a temporal narrative explaining the Greek relationship with the east (Hdt. 1.1-5), and as such they were used for re-interpreting past conflicts like the Trojan War and Amazonomachy. However, just as they were used to explain the past so too were they later used as an ideological touchstone against which present struggles could be measured and defined, particularly to authorise a state’s actions and goals via historical parallel. With each use the memory and meaning of the Persian Wars themselves changed, becoming a continually adaptive matrix defined in part by the very wars they were used to justify: Athens and the Delian League (Thuc. 1.75.3, 76.2); the Peloponnesian War (Ar. Lys. 1132); Sparta’s campaigns in Asia (X. HG 3.4.3, 5.5; 7.1.34); and Alexander’s invasion of the Persian Empire (below §1.2).

This chapter analyses the memory and commemoration of the Persian Wars and their historical connection with Greek eleutheria in the early Hellenistic Period. Focus is placed on the role played by both Successor and city in this regard. Commenting on Greece during the early Roman Empire, Alcock concluded that the Persian Wars furthered “a successful political consensus between rulers and ruled”. Alcock’s symbiotic image is skewed by unique political considerations: 1st century AD Rome was omnipotent in the Greek world and there was no challenge to its authority either by city or king. In contrast, the early Hellenistic Period was a mix of powerful poleis, leagues, and empires in constant conflict. Accordingly, the memory of the Persian Wars and their significance for Greek eleutheria existed within this tense political environment as a point of either unity or discord depending on the politics of its employer. The forthcoming analysis, sensitive to these twin functions, aims to present a more dynamic exploration of the Persian Wars and their significance for Greek eleutheria.

2 There was also a Trojan parallel to Alexander’s actions, see Erskine 2001a: 228-32; L. Mitchell 2007: 191-4.
This chapter is split into four sections. Section one concentrates on rulers and is concerned with the Macedonian use of the ideology (*eleutheria*) and spaces (Corinth) connected with the Persian Wars. Sections two and three turn to the *polis*, specifically Athens, and evaluate the presentation of Macedon, *eleutheria*, and the Persian Wars during the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars. The Athenian, rather than Macedonian, use of ideology and space is emphasised. Section four turns to both king and *polis* and analyses how the Gallic Invasions were paralleled with the Persian Wars in literature and archaeology, notably the layout of monuments at Delphi, and questions why they were then seen to be a struggle for *soteria*, not *eleutheria*. Three key points underpin my analysis. First, the memory of the Persian Wars was adaptive, so its significance was malleable to individual contexts and ideologies. Second, the Persian Wars themselves also offered a contextualised ideology that was used by both Greeks and Macedonians to enforce their leadership by defining the enemy (Persia, Macedon, or the Gauls) as barbarians and themselves as defenders of Greek freedom. Third, the memory of the Persian Wars and Greek *eleutheria* was personified by sites, monuments, concepts, and documents important to the Wars, each of which acted as a *lieu de mémoire* by evoking abstract, ideological significance in contexts where the historicity of the subject was not as important as its emotive resonance in the present. Physical *lieux de mémoire* gave the Persian Wars a physically constructed meaning that could be adapted and expanded by later patronage and remembrance of these sites, what Gehrke called the continuous creation of ‘invented history’.

**SECTION 1: PHILIP, ALEXANDER, AND CORINTH**

Corinth was the location of the headquarters of the Greek alliance during the Persian Wars. Later, it became the founding spot of Philip’s and Alexander’s League of Corinth and the site for Hellenistic declarations of Greek freedom. This section explores how and why in each case Corinth and its Persian War past came to be connected with royal, Macedonian declarations of Greek freedom. I address the League of Corinth under Philip, then Alexander, before lastly looking at the use of the site by the Successors as the spot for royal declarations of Greek freedom.

**1.1: Philip and the League of Corinth**

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4 I have explored elsewhere the use of Persian War space and ideology during the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars (Wallace 2011: 157-65; *forthcoming A*: section 2 with ns.21-4).

5 Gehrke 2001: 286, 297-8; below §3.2.
Philip of Macedon was a source of debate in Athens. For Demosthenes he was a barbarian who hated freedom and democracy. He compared Philip with the Great King and called for alliance with Persia against him (3.16, 20, 24; 9.71; 12.6; 15.24). For Isocrates, however, Philip was Greece’s unifier. His dubious ancestry was Hellenised and he was destined to lead Greece in a new war against the barbarian (5 passim; Ep. 2-3). Athens, however, presented its defeat by Philip at Chaironea as a failed defence of freedom and the Greek motherland and paralleled it with her sacrifices for freedom during the Persian Wars. Aware of such sentiment, Philip emphasised his Hellenic credentials when founding the League of Corinth, which legitimated his position as hegemon of the Greeks and turned attention onto Persia as the barbarian threat.

‘League of Corinth’ is a modern misnomer for an organisation known in antiquity simply as ‘the Hellenes’. Since league meetings rotated between the panhellenic games, Corinth was no more the home of the League than Delphi or Olympia. Accordingly, G.T. Griffith cautioned against placing too much emphasis on modern nomenclature unattested in ancient sources, pointing out that only the inaugural meeting and that of Alexander’s acknowledgement took place at Corinth. However, Griffith underplays both the importance of these formative meetings and Corinth’s unique role in the foundation of the League. Over the winter of 337/6, Philip held at least two and possibly three meetings at Corinth, none of which coincided with the panhellenic Isthmian or Nemean Games. The choice of Corinth was therefore significant beyond its connection with any panhellenic festival, particularly since it was from Corinth that Philip called for the deployment of League troops to defend the eleutheria of the Greeks of Asia Minor and avenge the Persian destruction of temples in 480/79.

A deliberate connection was made between the League of Corinth, Philip’s war against Persia, and Corinth’s importance during the Persian Wars. In 480/79 Corinth had been the headquarters of the Hellenic League, the symbolic point of defence, and the furthest point

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6 Above pg.46 n.4.
8 GHI 82, 83 §2.4-6, 84a.9-13; Ar. An. 1.16.6; 3.23.8.
9 Above pg.48 n.17.
11 On the number of meetings, see Hammond & Griffith 1979: 626-7; Hammond & Walbank 1988: 572 n.4; commentary on GHI 76; Buckler & Beck 2008: 246.
12 D.S. 16.89.2, 91.2; 17.4.9. On the appearance of these themes throughout the campaigns of Philip and Alexander, see Wallace 2011: 149-50 with n.13; Squillace 2010: 76-80.
reached by the Persian advance. Its use as the foundation point for Philip’s League of Corinth paralleled its earlier use as headquarters of the Hellenic League, therefore allowing Philip to use it to personify and gain support for his alleged goals of Greek eleutheria and war against Persia. Because Corinth was not connected with the historical memory of one particular city, like Marathon and Salamis were for Athens or Thermopylai and Plataia were for Sparta, Corinth connected with the generalising ideology of the Persian Wars as a Greek struggle against Persia. Further, Philip’s declaration at Corinth of his intention to exact revenge for the destruction of temples in 480/79 was particularly significant since the temple of Poseidon at Isthmia was most likely one of those burned by the Persians. In every way Philip’s use of Corinth as the founding point of the League appropriated through monumental space the significance of the Persian Wars as a struggle for Greek eleutheria from Persia and applied that ideology verbatim to his Asian campaign. However, Corinth also allowed the creation of a Macedonian context for the memory of the Persian Wars, one that represented the League of Corinth as the historical and ideological successor of the earlier Hellenic League and Philip as the new defender of eleutheria.

1.2: Alexander and the League of Corinth

Alexander was elected hegemon at Corinth in 336, but it was Thebes and Plataia that conditioned the nature of his manipulation of the memory of the Persian Wars. Alexander used the League and the war against Persia to justify the destruction of Thebes in late 335 by passing judgement to the League synedrion. However, since many members were absent (Arr. An. 1.10.1), this ad hoc synedrion consisted of those League members who had fought alongside Alexander, namely Thespians, Plataians, Orchomenians, and Phokians. Nonetheless, the synedrion’s decision that Thebes was to be razed, it inhabitants sold into slavery, and its exiles made outlaws (agogimoi) from League cities was presented as an officially binding League dogma. During his Asian campaign Alexander continually referred

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13 Headquarters: Hdt. 7.172; D.S. 11.1.1, 3.3. Defence: Hdt. 7.173, 175. Furthest point: Bromeer 1971: 3. See also, Hdt. 7.195; 8.123; 9.88; D.S. 11.33.4; Plb. 12.26b.1; Plu. Them. 17.2. Emphasising its role as the spiritual centre of the Hellenic League, the Acrocorinth was called the Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολις by the Corinthians (Ath. 13.579c-e; Theopomp. Hist. FGrH 115 F285a+b; Timae. FGrH 566 F10; Chamael. F31; Plu. Moralia 871a-b; Scholion Pi. O. 13.32b; cf. Marincola 2007: 113-14).

14 Flower 2000: 98 with n.11.

15 Squillace 2010: 80, “great ideals…that would attract consensus among the Greeks”.

16 Bromeer (1971: 3) dates the destruction of the temple to c.480-470.

17 On what follows, see the expanded treatment in Wallace 2011: 148-57.

18 Arr. An. 1.8.8; Plu. Alex. 11.5; D.S. 17.13.5; Just. 11.3.8.
to a dogma of the Greeks that allowed the hegemon to prosecute medisers and made exiles agogimoi from League cities; the decision at Thebes is the obvious and only precedent.\textsuperscript{19}

Thebes was charged with having medised in 480/79, having been honoured as benefactors by the Persians, and having destroyed Plataia, the site of the Greek victory and Thebes’ infamous medism in 479.\textsuperscript{20} The charges were deliberately historical in nature and designed to parallel contemporary events with those of the Persian Wars; Justin (11.3.9) in particular records that Thebes’ current medism was emphasised. Justin is likely referring to Thebes’ alliance with Persia and the repartee that took place outside its walls when Alexander called upon the Thebans to join him in the common peace but the Thebans petitioned those willing to join them and the Great King in ridding Greece of the tyrant Alexander (D.S. 17.9.5; Plu. Alex. 11.4).\textsuperscript{21} This interchange undermined Alexander’s leadership by presenting him and not Persia as the real threat to Greek eleutheria. It is apt, therefore, that Thebes’ past and present medism was condemned within the synedrion, the official mouthpiece of the Greeks whose dogmata were binding on all members. The make-shift synedrion may have consisted of anti-Theban Boiotians, but their historical role in the struggle for eleutheria in 480/79 (most notably Plataia) allowed their judgement to be presented as that of those who fought for freedom in 480/79 against those who medised; Alexander was intentionally manipulating history at Thebes in 335. The synedrion’s prosecution of Thebes’ past and present medism re-emphasised Alexander’s hegemony of the Greeks and invalidated the embarrassing dialogue before the walls of Thebes. Further, it re-affirmed a united voice in support of Alexander’s Asian campaign.

Interestingly, Justin further records that the synedrion repeated the ‘Oath of Plataia’, a 4\textsuperscript{th} century document of largely Athenian construction that reiterated the decision of the Greeks taken after Plataia in 479 to besiege Thebes (Hdt. 9.86-8).\textsuperscript{22} Reference to the Oath authorised the synedrion’s destruction of Thebes by paralleling it with the Hellenic League’s earlier resolution. This connected the League of Corinth with its predecessor the Hellenic League and juxtaposed the dogmata of the former with those of the latter. The use of the Oath displays in particular the malleability of the memory of the Persian Wars. By referencing the

\textsuperscript{19} In particular at Eresos and Chios (GHI 83 §4; 84a+b; cf. Arr. An. 3.23.8). Further references in Wallace 2011: 150 with ns.20-7.

\textsuperscript{20} Charges: Arr. An. 1.9.6-10; D.S. 17.14; Just. 11.3.8-11. Benefactors: X. HG 6.3.20, 5.35; 7.1.34. Destruction of Plataia: X. HG 6.3.1; Isoc. 14; D.S. 15.46.6, 51.3, 57.1, 79.6; Paus. 9.14.2.

\textsuperscript{21} Wilcken 1967: 72-3; Lane Fox 1974: 87. Bosworth (1980: 79) calls the story “circumstantial”, but later emphasises its incisiveness against Alexander’s panhellenic pretensions (1988: 195). For an analysis of the different understandings of eleutheria presented here, see Ch.3 §2.2.

\textsuperscript{22} For a fuller treatment of the use of the Oath here, see Wallace 2011: 151 with ns.28-35. For the ‘falsche Urkunden’ of the Persian Wars, see Habicht 1961.
Oath, a document implicitly connected with the Athenian memory of the battle of Plataia (Lycurg. Leoc. 81; Theopomp.Hist FGrH 115 F153), the synedrion adapted to its anti-Theban agenda a pseudo-historical text already adapted to an Athenian agenda. Present authority was sought through past precedent, but that precedent was itself manipulated to suit the ever adapting needs of the present. The tradition of the Oath acted as a lieu de mémoire for the Persian Wars where, as we shall see later with the Themistokles Decree, another ‘falsche Urkunde’ of the Persian Wars, what mattered was not historical fact but the belief in what a historical tradition represented at a particular point in time. In this case it was Theban medism and Greek unity against the barbarian under Macedonian rather than Athenian leadership.

The destruction of Thebes was deliberately juxtaposed with the rebuilding of Plataia. After Chaeronea, Philip initiated the reconstruction of Plataia and from 337/6 it began sending naopoioi to Delphi again. After Thebes’ destruction in 335 the League synedrion vowed to re-build Plataia’s walls (Arr. An. 1.9.10) and it, along with other Boiotian cities, was awarded Theban land (D.S. 18.11.3-4). This was particularly significant since it was Thebes that had destroyed Plataia in 373. Financial support was also offered when Alexander announced at the Olympic Games of 328, when the League synedrion would have been in session, that he would rebuild Plataia in gratitude for her actions on behalf of Greek eleutheria during the Persian Wars (Plu. Alex. 34.1-2; Arist. 11.9). Patronage of Plataia and destruction of Thebes marked a new pro-Macedonian, League-backed balance of power in Boiotia. However, in light of the forthcoming invasion of Asia, it promoted rewards for the historical defenders of eleutheria and punishment for its enemies. Plataia may also have been patronised by the institution of the Eleutheria Games in honour of the dead of 479 as well as the consecration of the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks. The earliest evidence for both the games and the cult comes from the Glaukon Decree of the mid-3rd century (below §3.2), but their actual origins remain obscure. Considering their connection with the Persian Wars, Greek eleutheria, and the commemoration of the battle of Plataia, a foundation sensitive to these concerns is preferred. The events of 335 provide an ideal context, one for which I have argued in detail elsewhere.

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23 Rebuilding: Paus. 9.1.8. Recent survey work has mapped the outlines of Plataia’s new walls and shown that they enclosed a settlement area of 89 hectares (Aravantinos et al. 2003: 292-6, 302-5). Apparently the intention to rebuild Plataia was there from early on (D. 5.10; 6.30; 19.20-1, 42, 112, 326). Naopoioi: Kirsten 1950, col. 2312.  
24 Isoc. 5; X. HG 6.3.1; D.S. 15.46.6, 51.3; Paus. 9.1.5-8, 14.2. Thespiai was also destroyed. Thebes later destroyed Orchomenos in 364 (D.S. 15.57.1, 79.6).  
25 Fredricksmeyer 2000, 137-8; Wallace 2011: 149.  
26 Étienne & Piérart 1975 (App.1 num.50); cf. Heraklides Kretikos 1.11.  
Alexander’s destruction of Thebes and patronage of Plataia marked a calculated insult to not only Thebes but also Athens and Sparta. Moreover, it denoted a strongly Macedonian assimilation of the historical traditions of the Persian Wars. By rebuilding Plataia and destroying Thebes, Alexander reversed the traditional model of medising Thebes as tyrant of the Boiotian cities, most notably anti-Persian Plataia, whom she destroyed in 373. Athens’ inability to defend Thebes or repatriate the Plataians displayed her inability to support either her present or ancestral allies. Sparta, though victor in 479, collaborated with Thebes in destroying Plataia in 427 and openly denied then her commitments to defend it as a site of Greek eleutheria (Thuc. 3.53-68). By re-founding Plataia and condemning Theban medism, Alexander assumed in 335 the role that both Athens and Sparta had failed to fill from the 420s onwards. Sparta, however, received the most attention since she remained aloof from the League of Corinth and the new campaign for Greek eleutheria from the barbarian. The 300 Persian panoplies sent to Athens after the battle of Granikos evoked the 300 Spartan dead at Thermopylae and contrasted Spartan defeat with the victory of Alexander and the Greeks. Spartan absence from the new struggle for eleutheria was emphasised by the dedicatory inscription: “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks with the exception of the Lakedaimonians dedicate these spoils taken from the barbarians who live in Asia” (Arr. An. 1.16.7; Plu. Alex. 16.8). Sparta was the only power to have led an invasion of Asia, indirectly under the 10,000 and later in the 390s for the autonomia of the Greeks cities (Ch.1 §2). Alexander’s actions advertised Macedonian superiority over Thebes, Sparta, and Athens both in Asia and in Greece. As hegemon of Greece, Alexander used the memory of the Persian Wars to assume the mantle of defender of eleutheria, abandoned in turn by Thebes, Athens, and Sparta.

Alexander may have used the memory of the Persian Wars to stir up support for his campaigns, but the Wars themselves provided a dialogue for defining and understanding action through historical and conceptual parallel. However, there was a distinction between the memory with its associated, even constructed meaning and the present situation. The years of anti-Macedonian propaganda, built on parallels with the Persian Wars, could not be so easily turned on Persia. The Persian Wars were for the Greeks the archetypal manifestation of Greek eleutheria. They provided a way of viewing the world and Greece’s role within it, a

29 Touched upon by W. Will (1983: 56 with n.55).
30 Monti (2009) suggests that Alexander intended to parallel Sparta’s absence at Granikos with her absence at Marathon, the first battles in the Persian Wars of Alexander and Xerxes respectively. Spawforth (1994: 243) suggests that the inclusion of Spartan troops during the Parthian campaigns of Lucius Verus and Caracalla was designed to emphasise Rome’s success over Alexander’s failure in leading Spartan troops against the Persians.
medium of definition through which a contemporary struggle or enemy could be viewed, assimilated, and then condemned. The destruction of Thebes and patronage of Plataia by Alexander and the League, as well as the possible foundation of the Eleutheria, all emphasised a pro-Macedonian appropriation of the memory of the Persian Wars. However, this appropriation was sensitive to the embedded ideology of the Persian Wars and Plataia itself as a historical space, both of which were intrinsically connected with Greek _eleutheria_ from the barbarian. As a conceptual matrix, the memory of the Wars was simply a veil, and one that could fit Macedon as easily as Persia.

1.3: The Successors and Corinth

Michael Dixon has recently emphasised the importance of Corinth for royal declarations of freedom in the early Hellenistic Period. However, his analysis does not adequately explore how and why this significance developed. He draws attention to the importance of the Isthmian Games as a context for such declarations but does not explain how and why this context arose. Further, his focus on Polyperchon, though informative, detracts attention from the use of Corinth by other rulers. In what follows, I attempt to remedy this imbalance.

In late spring/early summer 318 Polyperchon entered the Peloponnese to enforce the terms of his Edict. He called together _synedroi_ from the Greek cities to discuss their alliance with him and the implementation of the Edict. At the same time he sent letters to the Peloponnesian cities calling for the execution of Antipatros’ partisans and the return of _autonomia_ to the _demoi_. Dixon has argued that Polyperchon was at this time chairing the Isthmian Games, and I am inclined to agree. It seems likely that he was using them to support his campaign for freedom and democracy; the Nemean Games of 319 may have been earlier used to test the waters before the announcement of his Edict. By chairing the Isthmian Games Polyperchon presented himself as protector and patron of the Greeks, and

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32 D.S. 18.69.3-4. At the siege of Megalopolis Diodoros (18.70.4) mentions Polyperchon and “the allies (σύμμαχοι)”. For the political and propaganda situation of 319-317, see Wallace forthcoming A.
34 A list of _theorodokoi_ (Miller 1988: 158-9) for the Nemean Games of either Metageitnion 319 or 317 mentions a certain Aristonous, probably Polyperchon’s general honoured at Eretria (Knoepfler _Décrets_ VIII). On Aristonous, see Heckel 2006: s.v. Aristonous (without knowledge of either Miller’s or Knoepfler’s inscriptions). Antipatros died and Polyperchon assumed the regency sometime between late April (Prytany X) and autumn 319 ( _IG_ II2 383b; D.S. 18.48.1-4; _Plu. Phoc._ 30.4-5). The Nemean Games fell in late August (Prytany II), on or just after Metageitnion 11/12 (Lambert 2002a; Perlman 1989; 2000: 154-5; criticised by Strasser 2007: 334 with n.29). It is possible, therefore, but far from certain, that Antipatros died before the Nemean Games of 319, at which Aristonous may have been sounding out allies and ensuring support for Polyperchon’s position in Greece.
offered a display of unity with his allies before the Peloponnesian campaign. As a physical space, however, Corinth held particular significance for Polyperchon: his Edict restored to the Greek cities the peace (*eirene*) and constitutions (*politeiai*) that existed under Philip and Alexander (D.S. 18.56.2) and had been validated by the League at Corinth in 337 and 336. Polyperchon’s authority was based on that of Philip and Alexander. Since he was restoring the political situation as it existed under their hegemony of the League of Corinth, the location of the Isthmian Games at Corinth offered a convenient physical expression of his political programme as an extension of previous Macedonian royal policy.

Ptolemy too made use of the Isthmian Games upon his arrival in Greece in spring/summer 308 (Ch.2 §5). He took control of Corinth and Sikyon before chairing the Isthmian Games where he announced the freedom of the Greeks and called for allies (Suda Δ 431):

“Indeed, he left the majority of the Greek cities autonomous and began announcing the Isthmian armistice (*τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδὰς*), encouraging them to make the pilgrimage (*ἐκεχούσιν*) to the Isthmian Games bearing olive branches as though they would be gathering for the purpose of liberation (*ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει*).”

Translation adapted from *Suda Online*

Like Polyperchon, Ptolemy used Corinth as a military base where his future allies could meet, under the guise of the Isthmian Games, in anticipation of his coming campaign fought ostensibly on behalf of Greek *eleutheria*. The Isthmian Games provided, as before, a panhellenic stage from which Ptolemy, having just toured the Aegean, could claim a wider ideological suzerainty over the Greek world.³⁵ Again, Corinth offered a useful symbolism. It was the foundation spot of Philip’s League and it was here that Alexander had been voted *hegemon*. Since Ptolemy had recently been styling himself king and sole legitimate successor to Alexander,³⁶ Corinth’s historical connections with Macedonian kingship, exemplified by leadership of Greece and support for Greek *eleutheria* through the League of Corinth, would presumably have been connected with Ptolemy’s patronage of the Games at Corinth and his creation of a similar system of Greek allies.³⁷ The use of olive branches, *theoroi* (*cf.* D. 18.91), and references to “the Isthmian armistice” all attest to his concern for peace and perhaps offer a parallel to the *koine eirene* guaranteed by the League under Philip and Alexander. Ptolemy promoted his potential kingship by mimicking earlier royal actions,

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³⁵ Like Polyperchon, Ptolemy’s associates appeared elsewhere, such as his son Lagos at the Arcadian Lykaia in 308 (*Syll.* 314b.7-8; Ath. 13.576e), a point missed by Dixon (2007: 173-5).
namely the defence of *eleutheria*, the provision of peace, and the leadership of the free Greeks. Corinth provided a symbolic microcosm of all these concerns.

Demetrios’ Hellenic League was inaugurated at the Isthmian Games of 302, shortly after his capture of Corinth (D.S. 20.102-103.3; Plu. *Demetr.* 25.1). Both Plutarch and a fragmentary letter to Demetrios from his *philos* Adeimantos of Lampsakos give the location as the Isthmos or Isthmian Games. The League met at the panhellenic Games (*SV* 466.72-3), which allowed Antigonid suzerainty and concern for Greek *eleutheria* to be presented to a massed Hellenic audience. Many of those present would have been allies and would have attested to Antigonid guarantees and proclamations of freedom. At the panhellenic Games Greeks would have seen the Hellenic League in action and witnessed Antigonid kingship in a quintessentially Greek context. However, in founding the Hellenic League at Corinth during the Isthmian Games, Demetrios was following in Polyperchon and Ptolemy’s footsteps by making a direct claim to be the sole and legitimate heir to Alexander. The father and son kings Antigonos and Demetrios leading a league of free Greek states deliberately evoked Philip’s and Alexander’s earlier example. Again Corinth acted as a location where Alexander’s Successors could connect with claims to kingship via the historical precedent of Philip’s and Alexander’s example of leadership of the Greeks on behalf of *eleutheria*.

Corinth later appears wearing a gold crown in the great procession of Ptolemy Philadelphos of the 270s (Ath. 5.201c-e). She stood by Alexander and Ptolemy Soter and was followed by personifications of the Ionian cities and those cities of Asia Minor and the islands that had been under Persian control; Interpretation of this procession has varied. Badian argued that the connection between Corinth and Ptolemy Soter harked back to his campaigns of 308, Lehmann suggested that Corinth signified Philadelphos’ new system of alliances in Greece, which would come to fruition during the Chremonidean War, Rice contended that Corinth symbolised the League of Corinth and Soter’s (vicariously Philadelphos’) position as successor to Alexander, while Frank Walbank argued that since the name ‘League of Corinth’ is a modern construct the personification of Corinth should be in

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38 Plu. *Demetr.* 25.3 (*ἐν δ’ Ἰσθμῷ*); *CID* IV 11 (*ἐν Ἰσθμίοις*). On this letter, see Jacquemin et al. 1995; Lefèvre 1998 (*SEG* XLVIII 588); Wallace *forthcoming* B (more precise date and new interpretation). On Adeimantos of Lampsakos, see above pg.63 with n.90.

39 Polemaios’ actions at Olympia before the Olympic Games of 312 indicate the importance of the panhellenic games to the Antigonid self-image as liberators (Ch.2 §4). Stylianou (1994: 61-7) argues that the League encapsulated all Greek cities in the Antigonid empire, thus subsuming all previous leagues.


no way taken to symbolise it; it merely stood for Greece. However, as I have shown above, the importance of Corinth was not connected with a single event or concern; its appearance within the procession must be understood within the context of the site’s earlier use by Philip, Alexander, Polyperchon, Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrios. It symbolised a conglomeration of meanings: claims to kingship, succession to Alexander, leadership of the Greeks, and support for Greek *eleutheria*. However, the presence of Corinth between Alexander and Ptolemy Soter most likely emphasised Philadelphos’ succession to their roles as patrons and defenders of the Greeks and their freedom, a role Philadelphos would later play during the Chremonidean War (below §3). The depiction also carried another edge since Corinth was at the time of the procession held by an Antigonid garrison and was itself in need of liberation.

The importance of Corinth and the Isthmian Games for statements of Greek *eleutheria* continued into the later Hellenistic and Roman Periods. Both Antigonos Doson (*SV* 507) in 224/3 and Philip V in 220 (Plb. 4.25.7-26.1) announced at Corinth their support for Greek freedom, while Titus Flamininus and Nero guaranteed Greek freedom during the Isthmian Games of 196 BC and 67 AD respectively. Corinth and the Isthmian Games were the defining characteristics of claims to Greek freedom: even though Nero amalgamated all the panhellenic Games into one year he waited until the Isthmian Games to make his declaration. For his actions he was associated with Zeus Eleutherios.

Philip and Alexander’s use of Corinth set a precedent for later *Diadochoi* who used Corinth to proclaim freedom not because of its connection with the Persian Wars but because of its connection with Philip, Alexander, and the League of Corinth. The change is important, but although Dixon detects it he does not explain it. Corinth’s connections with the Persian Wars and the Hellenic League of 481-479 provided Philip and Alexander with a panhellenic context closely associated with the Persian Wars and the defence of *eleutheria*. This,

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42 Badian 1966: 51 n.58; Lehmann 1988b: 146-7; E.E. Rice 1983: 102-10; F. Walbank 1996: 124 with n.31. See also Wilcken 1922: 105-6 (presence of cities near Corinth denotes their membership of the League of Corinth, recanted in 1978: 225 n.13); Ehrenberg 1938: 2-8 (doubts a specific reference to the League of Corinth); Tarn 1948: 228-32 (the significance of the personification of Corinth is insoluble).

43 One may question whether the audience would have detected such resonances, but if, as Andrew Stewart (1998: 281-2) has argued, the procession of cities echoed the procession of states subject to the Athenian Empire in Euoplis’ *The Cities*, then parallels with Alexander and the League of Corinth are eminently conceivable.

44 *Titus Flamininus*: Plb. 18.46; Liv. 33.32.5; Plu. *Flam. 10. Nero*: Suet. *Nero* 23-4; Paus. 7.17.1-4; cf. Plin. *Nat. 4.6.22*. Flamininus also chaired the Nemean Games and declared Greek freedom for a second time (Plu. *Flam. 12.2*).


46 *IG* II 1990.3-4 (dated 67/8 AD by Rosivach 1987: 277 n.44); *Syll.* 814.47-9. Numismatic evidence for the association exists from Corinth (Mattingly 1923: 214 num.110 with pl.40 num.15) and Sikyon (Fisher 1980: 6-9).

however, was less useful after Alexander’s destruction of the Persian Empire, so the contexts of panhellenism and Greek *eleutheria* had to be fulfilled in another way. The founding of Greek alliances during the Isthmian Games seen from Polyperchon onwards was an entirely new feature that provided an obvious and ready-made panhellenic occasion, while the *eleutheria* connection was provided by the memory of the League of Corinth, the *koine eirene* it guaranteed, and its role as protecting Greek freedom. The process by which this came about is worthy of note. Under Alexander there was much opposition to the League (Ch.3 §2.2) but, as Plutarch emphasises, Antipatros’ subsequent installation of garrisons and oligarchies in 322 made many *poleis* long for its return (Plu. *Phoc.* 29.1). Polyperchon tapped into this sentiment and with his Edict defined the situation under Philip and Alexander – the League of Corinth – as one of freedom and democracy. With this, the memory of the League and the position of the Greek cities under the kings became more widely connected with *eleutheria*, specifically in contrast with the years under Antipatros.\(^{48}\) However, the League of Corinth, as a political body itself, was not that important, nor was it re-founded.\(^{49}\) Corinth came simply to embody and enforce the principle that the League represented: Macedonian leadership of the Greek states authorised as a defence of Greek *eleutheria*. Corinth, as a physical space, personified the re-interpretation of the memory of the League and its newly re-emphasised connection with *eleutheria* and leadership of the Greeks. Polyperchon and others used Corinth to promote and enforce their own campaigns via an adapted historical parallel. Over time it eventually became connected with royal Macedonian declarations of *eleutheria* rather than with the Greek memory of the Persian Wars. Thanks to Philip and Alexander’s example, Corinth became constructed as a space significant exclusively for royal declarations of Greek freedom,\(^{50}\) thus explaining its lack of ideological significance during the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars (below §§2-3). This change in importance from the memory of the Persian Wars to the memory of the League of Corinth was an organic process facilitated by the fact that Corinth was not inherently connected with the Persian War past of one particular city. Further, Corinth’s changing significance reveals the versatility of memory, particularly that concerning the Persian Wars and *eleutheria*, to the needs of later contexts.

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\(^{48}\) Ch.2 §3; expanded in Wallace *forthcoming A.*

\(^{49}\) Dixon (2007: 153) disagrees: “Polyperchon, Ptolemy, as well as Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes all…attempted to revive the League of Corinth”.

\(^{50}\) Dixon (2007: 151-3) argues that declarations of freedom was more legitimate when Corinth was in the liberator’s hands. This is perhaps true: before declaring Greek freedom in 302, Demetrios twice tried in 306 to gain control of Corinth through bribery (Plu. *Demetr.* 15.1-2).
SECTION 2: THE HELLENIC WAR

Moving from the royal use of the memory of the Persian Wars I turn now to the polis use of this memory, specifically the Athenian presentation of the Hellenic War of 323/2. I address three major pieces of evidence for the War’s presentation: the decree declaring war, as preserved by Diodoros, Hyperides’ Epitaphios, delivered in spring 322, and the first honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon, passed in late 323. I emphasise throughout both the uniformity of the War’s presentation as fought under Athenian hegemony for Greek eleutheria from Macedon and its continual juxtaposition with the earlier Persian Wars from which it drew its significance and meaning. The Persian Wars, I contend, offered a model for later wars by presenting a pre-existing ideology that emphasised Greek eleutheria, Athenian leadership, and the barbarian ‘Other’. Further, I highlight the continued importance of spaces associated with the Persian Wars – Plataia, Thebes, Thermopylai – in re-asserting and re-interpreting memory within the present.

2.1: The ‘Hellenic War Decree’

Diodoros preserves an abridged copy of the Athenian decree declaring war on Macedon in summer 323, henceforth the ‘Hellenic War Decree’ (18.10.2-3). Seeing its origin in Hieronymos of Kardia, Lehmann suggested that Diodoros preserves an almost literal reproduction of the original decree; an example of Hieronymos’ penchant for “dokumentarische Präzision”.\(^{51}\) Rosen suggests that its proposer was Hyperides; considering his selection to deliver the funeral epitaph this is eminently possible.\(^{52}\)

The Hellenic War Decree is divided into two sections: first, the declaration of war and the mobilisation of arms for koine eleutheria; second, the ambassadors’ mission to appeal for a general uprising for koine soteria.\(^{53}\) If there is a distinction here between soteria and eleutheria, beyond a stylistic wish to avoid repetition, then it is of soteria as a process and eleutheria as the result. Nonetheless, the opening exhortation to “the common freedom of the Greeks” is programmatic and reveals eleutheria to be the dominant thought of the decree and therefore the war.\(^{54}\) The second part of the decree is of particular importance since it tells us


\(^{52}\) Rosen (1967: 55 n.60) considers this certain.


\(^{54}\) Rosen 1967: 55; D.S. 18.10.2: ἐγράψαν ψήφισμα τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας φροντίσαι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὰς μὲν φρουρουμένας πόλεις ἐλευθερώσαι. IG II^2^ 270, a decree dated to the late 320s by M.B. Walbank (2002: 63-4 num.6), honours an unknown person for support of “the eleutheria of the Greeks” (App.1 num.8).
that ambassadors were sent out to educate (διδάξοντας) Greece of Athens’ sacrifices for eleutheria during the Persian Wars and reveals how Athens wished to present her role in the Hellenic War (D.S. 18.10.3).\(^{55}\)

“Envoys should be sent to visit the Greek cities and tell them that formerly (πρότερον μὲν) the Athenian people, convinced that all Greece was the common fatherland (κοινὴν πατρίδα) of the Greeks, had fought by sea against those barbarians who had invaded Greece to enslave her (ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ), and that now (καὶ νῦν) too Athens believed it necessary to risk men and money and ships in defence of the common soteria of the Greeks.”

Athens’ purpose was to link Macedon with Persia. As Enrica Culasso Gastaldi has pointed out, the use of πρότερον μὲν and καὶ νῦν created a temporal link between the Persian and Hellenic Wars, while eleutheria offered a similar ideological link.\(^{56}\) The parallel served two goals.

First, it assimilated Macedon to Persia and condemned the former via its association with the latter. In calling Greece the “common fatherland of the Greeks” Athens created an exclusively Greek ethnic and geographical identity that defined Macedon, in juxtaposition with Persia, as a non-Greek foreigner invading the koine patris.\(^{57}\) The use of ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ gave intent to the Persian invasion but also doubled for the Macedonian occupation, which promoted slavery in its support of garrisons, the removal of which was one of Athens’ stated goals (D.S. 18.10.2; cf. Hyp. Epit. 5.14-20, 7.2-17). The term “barbarians” acts both as a contrast with “Greeks” (mentioned five times in the decree) and as a further parallel between Persia and Macedon.

Second, it presented Athens’ leadership during the Persian Wars as an ancestral precedent to be followed in the Hellenic War. By referring to “all Greece”, “koine patris”, and “the common eleutheria of the Greeks”, Athens attempted to provide the Hellenic War with a panhellenic ethos that would attract other Greek states to follow her in the struggle against the new barbarian. Athens wished to show the Greeks that she was leading Greece and defending their freedom in pursuance of the memory of her ancestral sacrifices on behalf of

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\(^{55}\) Both Hyperides and Demosthenes acted as ambassadors; others, like Pytheas and Kallimened, pleaded with the Greeks not to go to war (Plu. Moralia 850a; Dem. 27).

\(^{56}\) Culasso Gastaldi 2003: 78.

\(^{57}\) The addition of τῶν Ἑλλήνων gave a Hellenocentric twist to Isokrates’ earlier exhortation to Philip: ἀπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν (5.127).
all Greece in 480/79. The decree also supported Athenian naval supremacy in 323/2 by saying that the demos earlier fought the barbarians by sea in 480/79 and would likewise now fight “with men, and money, and ships”.

2.2: Hyperides’ Epitaphios

Delivered in Spring 322 over the Athenian dead, Hyperides’ Epitaphios was much admired in antiquity and provides the best contemporary evidence for Athenian sentiments towards the Hellenic War. Funerary orations are formulaic by nature. They are designed to raise national spirit by justifying the sacrifices of war, and the Persian Wars formed a mode of expression common to all. However, since the Epitaphios shares with the Hellenic War Decree the same relentless focus on the Persian Wars both should be treated in unison. The speech not only echoes the Decree, but in many cases expands upon its ideas.

The Epitaphios betrays a common ideological background with that of the Hellenic War Decree, due perhaps to Hyperides’ possible authorship of both. Athens’ leadership during the Hellenic War is again justified as a continuation of that enjoyed during the Persian Wars (2.1-8, 19-24). Indeed, Hyperides opens the Epitaphios with a programmatic reference to the Persian Wars (2.19-26) thus establishing it and Athens’ defence of eleutheria as the central motif of the entire Hellenic War. Expressions found within the Decree re-appear throughout the Epitaphios. Koine eleutheria appears twice while eleutheria occurs eight times. The phrase “all of Greece” (πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα) appear twice (2.22-3, 12.23), while the terms koinos, patris, and Hellas occur six, eight, and fifteen times respectively. Further, a fragmentary speech of the late 4th to mid-3rd centuries attributable perhaps to Leosthenes, or written as a rhetorical exercise in his memory, again presents the Hellenic War as fought “on behalf of the common eleutheria” of the wronged (ἀδικουμένων) Greeks.

58 Diodoros (18.9.1) also refers to Athens and Aitolia assuming “the eleutheria and common hegemonia of the Greeks”. Cuniberti (2002: 457-8) argues that hegemonia is used here in place of autonomia and this marks a conceptual change in the struggle for eleutheria. I am not so sure. Athens had always sought hegemony in the present by pointing to its past struggles for freedom, and the Hellenic War was no different in this regard (see further below §2.2-3).
59 For the Athenian naval campaigns of 323/2, see most recently Bosworth 2003; Wrightson forthcoming.
60 D.S. 18.13.5; Longin. Sub. 34.2; Plu. Moralia 849f.
61 For an overview of funerary speeches as a genre, see Loraux 1986; Worthington 1999: 34-6, 205-25; cf. Thuc. 2.34.
62 Lys. 2.21-44; Thuc. 2.41.5-42; Pl. Mx. 239d-241c; Worthington 1999: 34-5, 209-11.
65 P.Hibeh 15.31-3, 122; FGrH 105 F6. For eleutheria as the goal of the war, see also Plu. Phoc. 26.1; Suda Λ 84.
It is important to note, however, that the Epitaphios also expands on the Hellenic War Decree by manipulating the memory of specific events and places important to the Persian Wars so as to characterise Athens’ actions and define her goals in the present. Hyperides acknowledges the importance of Thermopylae by saying that Leosthenes’ victory nearby added to the site’s glory (7.24-5). Sparta’s defeat at Thermopylae is impliedly contrasted with Leosthenes’ glorious victory, a barbed analogy aimed at the Lakedaimonians who remained aloof from the Hellenic War, had recently been defeated during the revolt of Agis, and were now perhaps aiding Samos against Athens.66 The individuals of the Persian War past are also invoked.67 Whereas Miltiades and Themistokles merely pushed the Persians from Greece, Leosthenes surpassed them by defeating the Macedonian barbarians on their own soil (12.38-13.17). The reference to Miltiades and Themistokles juxtaposes Marathon and Salamis with Leosthenes’ victories at Thermopylae and Lamia and presents the battle at Thermopylae as a physical, but now Athenian, connection between the Persian and Hellenic Wars (5.23-30, 12.38-13.17).68 In fact, Hyperides claims that Thermopylae will hereafter serve as a memorial to Leosthenes’ actions whenever the Greeks visit Delphi for the Amphiktionic meetings (7.17-32).69 However, Hyperides was not above altering events to fit his agenda. Diodoros records that after Leosthenes took Thermopylae he returned to Boiotia, defeated the Boiotians at Plataea, before then moving north to defeat Antipatros and besiege him in Lamia. Hyperides alters the course of events by saying that Leosthenes first defeated the Boiotians by Thebes before then taking Thermopylae and defeating Antipatros. The altered order of events is perhaps designed to simulate the gradual expulsion of the Persian troops from Greece in 479/8, from Plataea, through Thessaly, to Macedon and beyond.70

Hyperides’ use of Thebes and Plataia is of particular note.71 Diodoros records a battle at Plataea between Leosthenes and an alliance of pro-Macedonian Boiotian troops (18.11.3-5). Hyperides, however, transposes this battle to Thebes and claims that the razed polis and Macedonian garrison inspired the Greeks to fight for eleutheria (5.14-20, 7.2-17). Considering his exhaustive use of references to the Persian Wars, Hyperides’ lack of mention of Plataia (for the battles of both 479 and 323) is surprising. The reason, however, is simple.

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66 For Spartan support of Samos, see Arist. Oec. 2.1346b.16-20 with Habicht 1975; cf. Shipley 1989: 168.
67 Herrman 2009a: 23.
68 The fragmentary speech off for Leosthenes also refers to Marathon and Salamis as paradigms for Athenian leadership in this new struggle for eleutheria (P.Hibeh 15.106-115; FGrH 105 F6).
70 D.S. 18.9.5, 11.3-5; Hyp. Epit. 5.14-30; Wallace 2011: 158 with n.64.
71 Treated more fully in Wallace 2011: 157-60.
Having been re-founded by Philip and Alexander, Plataia now fought for Macedon against Athens. Thebes, destroyed by Alexander, became a symbol of the Greek struggle for *eleutheria* from Macedon. The historical roles of Plataia and Thebes during the Persian Wars were reversed; Plataia became the ‘mediser’ fighting with the barbarian against Greek *eleutheria* and Thebes was the example towards Greek unity against the barbarian. This was a particularly difficult situation for Hyperides to assimilate into a funeral speech. By transposing the battle to Thebes, Plataia’s current ‘medism’ was expunged and an embarrassing ideological anomaly was ignored.

### 2.3: Zeus Eleutherios and the Decree for Euphrôn of Sikyon

The name ‘The Hellenic War’ (ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς πόλεμος) is unusual. The title first appears in the second honorary decree for Euphron of Sikyon (Prytany VI 318/7) and occurs not infrequently throughout the rest of the century. However, it is only once recorded in the literary tradition, where the more common ‘Lamian War’ may be traced back to the work of Hieronymos. Since ‘Hellenic War’ occurs first in Athenian epigraphy we must assume that it was Athens’ choice of name and although it only appears first in 318 (*IG* II² 448.44-5), the name most likely derives from 323. Ashton speculated that the lack of reference until 318 was due to the control exercised by Macedon over Athens; the oligarchic destruction of decrees relating to the Hellenic War would also have been a factor (*IG* II² 448.60-2). However, the simplest reasons for dating the name to 323/2 is that it echoes perfectly the views presented within the Hellenic War Decree and Hyperides’ *Epitaphios*.

The most notable thing about the name ‘Hellenic War’ is that is does not define the war by the enemy. Both the Persian Wars (τὰ Μηδικα or ὁ Περσικὸς πόλεμος) and Alexander’s campaign in Asia (ὁ Περσικὸς πόλεμος) were characterised by a divisive reference to the enemy. ‘Hellenic War’ appeals instead a sense of unity, although Macedonian otherness is of course implicit. It recalls in particular the name ‘the Hellenes’ used to describe the Hellenic League of 480-478, or the *Hellenotamiai* or *Hellenodikai* who assessed respectively

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73 Ashton 1984: 153 n.16.

74 *Persian Wars*: Hammond 1957; Isoc. 14.57.4; 6.42.9; 8.37.3, 88.7; 12.49.1; Pl. *Mx. 242b5*; Ephor. *FGrH 70 F119.61*. D.S. 11.33.3; 15.2.4, 44.1; D.H. 11.1.2; Th. 5.45, 10.46, 41.45; *Pomp. 3.9*; D. Chr. 11.145.4; Sopat.Rh. 8.143.11; Him. *Or. 6.211*; Lib. *Or. 1.66.10*. *Alexander*: *Arr. An. 3.6.3*; *Vit. Arist. 23.1-7*.

75 Lepore (1955: 176) suggests that this echoes Demosthenic rhetoric.
the taxation of Athenian allies and the Hellenicity of participants at the Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{76} Further, it also reflects the use of the name ‘the Hellenes’ to describe the Macedonian-led League of Corinth (337-323) and suggests Athens’ aggressive re-appropriation of leadership in the new struggle for Greek \textit{eleutheria} from Macedonian, rather than the earlier Macedonian-led struggle for Greek \textit{eleutheria} from Persia. Thus the name aspires to Athenian leadership of the Greeks and asserts Athens’ defence of \textit{eleutheria} on their collected behalf.\textsuperscript{77}

A connection with the Persian Wars and Greek \textit{eleutheria} is also made through the \textit{standort} of the Euphron decree by the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (\textit{IG II}² 448.26-30, 69-72).\textsuperscript{78} The Stoa, built c.430-420, was intrinsically connected with the Persian Wars and statements of \textit{eleutheria}. Monuments important to Athenian freedom were erected there: the foundation document of the Second Athenian Confederacy; statues of Konon and Euagoras; as well as the shields of Leokritos and Kydias, the latter of whom fought against the Kelts.\textsuperscript{79} The Stoa created an aggregative significance whereby the initial memory of \textit{eleutheria} and the Persian Wars was continually adjusted and expanded by new monuments celebrating later struggles for freedom. Similarly, by erecting new monuments by the Stoa the ideology of the Persian Wars was applied to them and the campaigns they commemorated. The Stoa was, therefore, a progressive ideological space where memory was adaptive and the context of each individual monument helped cumulatively define the meaning of each new one. Consequently, by placing by the Stoa the first decree for Euphon – being simply an account of Sikyon’s alliance with Athens – Athens appropriated to the entire Hellenic War the ethos of Greek \textit{eleutheria}, Athenian leadership, and a defining connection with the Persian Wars.\textsuperscript{80}

The Hellenic War Decree, Hyperides’ \textit{Epitaphios}, and the first decree for Euphon all reveal a coherent ideology for the Hellenic War. Past Athenian sacrifices on behalf of freedom – like Marathon and Salamis – were revisited because they provided an \textit{eleutheria}-based tradition that promoted Athenian leadership of the Greeks. In reality Athens may not have had hegemony over all the Greeks, but the ideological programme of the Hellenic War,

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Hellenic League}: Hdt. 7.132.2, 145.1, 172.1; 9.87.1; Thuc. 1.18, 132.2; \textit{ATL III} 97 with n.12; \textit{contra} Brunt 1993: 59-61: “[the alliance had] no official name at all”. \textit{Hellenotamiai}: Thuc. 1.96.1-2; Plu. Arist. 24.1; \textit{cf.} Arist. Ath. 23.5; \textit{ATL III} 229-33. \textit{Hellenodikai}: Spivey 2004: 77-8; L. Mitchell 2007: 63.

\textsuperscript{77} Culasso Gastaldi 2003: 77.

\textsuperscript{78} On the location of the Euphron decree, see Oliver 2003b. On its meaning both in 323 and 318, see Wallace \textit{forthcoming} A. On Zeus Eleutherios (sometimes known as Soter), see \textit{Agora} III 21-31; XIV 96-102; Oliver 2003b: 104-8; Raafuab 2004: 108-10.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Athenian Confederacy}: \textit{GHI} 22.65-6. \textit{Konon/Euagoras}: Isoc. 9.56-7; D. 20.67-70; Paus. 1.3.2. \textit{Leokritos/Kydias}: Paus. 1.26.1; 10.21.5-6; \textit{cf.} Ch.2 §7.

\textsuperscript{80} Upon his return to Athens in 322, Demothenes was commissioned to adorn the altar for the sacrifice to Zeus Soter (Plu. \textit{Dem.} 27.8).
assimilating that of the Persian Wars, appealed to this as an ideal. The continual references to *eleutheria* and Hellenes created a quintessentially Hellenic context for the struggle, while the recurrence of the Persian Wars emphasised Macedonian otherness and Greek unity in pursuit of a *koine eleutheria*. However, memory was also malleable. Hyperides glossed over the Greek victory at Plataia because it did not fit with Plataia’s role within the Persian Wars, while thanks to Leosthenes’ victory near Thermopylai that site assumed a new, Athenian significance for Greek *eleutheria*. Similarly, the continual focus on *eleutheria* and the Hellenes re-asserted Greek control over the historical traditions of the Persian Wars so recently appropriated by Alexander and still contentious, as Plataia’s alliance with Macedon exemplified. Athens disowned Macedonian leadership of the Greeks against Persia and reasserted her own leadership against Macedon, but she did so by adapting many of the methods adopted by Macedon itself. A very similar focus on identity, space, and the Persian Wars re-appears during the Chremonidean War.

**SECTION 3: THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR**

In 268 Athens assumed again a leading role in another war for Greek *eleutheria* from Macedon. Antigonos Gonatas was now the enemy and the decree declaring war, proposed by Chremonides son of Eteokles of Aithalides, is fortunately preserved.\(^81\) Although Athens’ presentation of the Chremonidean War conforms in general to the blueprint found during the Hellenic War there are differences, most notably the focus on *homonoia* as a prerequisite of *eleutheria* within the Chremonides Decree and the use of the historical and cultic landscape of Plataia within the Glaukon Decree. Both similarities and variations are worth analysing since they reveal the resilience, yet adaptability of the memory of the Persian Wars and Greek *eleutheria* as historical and ideological traditions. This section is again structured around the major pieces of evidence – the Chremonides Decree and the Glaukon Decree – and focus is once more placed on the versatile use of ideas, monuments, and monumental topography as *lieux de mémoire*.

**3.1: The Chremonides Decree**

Passed in late 268, the Chremonides Decree, like the Hellenic War Decree, presents the forthcoming war as a parallel to the Persian Wars (*IG II*² 686/7.7-18):

\(^81\) The war was named after the decree’s proposer, see Ath. 6.250f; Prandi 1989.
“Since previously (πρὸ τετευμ ἀνέν) the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and their respective allies after establishing a common friendship and alliance with each other have fought together many glorious battles against those who sought (ἐπιχειρούντας) to enslave the cities, which won them fame and brought freedom to the other Greeks; and now (καὶ νῦν), when similar circumstances have afflicted the whole of Greece because of [those] who seek (ἐπιχειρούντας) to subvert the laws and ancestral constitutions of each city, and King Ptolemy following the policy of his ancestor and of his sister conspicuously shows his zeal for the koine eleutheria of the Greeks…”

Trans. Austin num.61.

The decree compares the Chremonidean War with the Persian Wars in a manner already seen during the Hellenic War. A programmatic, though slightly obscure, reference to the Persian Wars leads to a clear juxtaposition of the Persian and Chremonidean Wars with the use of πρὸ τετευμ ἀνέν and νῦν δὲ echoing the similar balance found within the Hellenic War Decree. The decree also follows the Hellenic War Decree and Hyperides’ Epitaphios in presenting both Persia’s and Macedon’s goal as the enslavement of Greece. This is reinforced by the duplication of the participle ἐπιχειρούντας, applied to both Persia’s intent on slavery and Macedon’s crimes against Greek laws and ancestral constitutions. Further, Athens’ and Sparta’s actions are presented as ensuring, as they had in 480/79, the eleutheria of the Greeks, thus presenting Macedon, like Persia, as the destroyer of that freedom. As with the Hellenic War, Athens used the memory of the Persian Wars as an ideological framework around which the protagonists and goals of the Chremonidean War could be fitted: Athens as leader of the Greeks, Macedon as the barbarian interloper, and eleutheria as the ultimate goal. The model offered by the Persian Wars was particularly apt since the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 268 was the first between both states since the battle of Plataia in 479. Within the Chremonides Decree Athens took care to emphasise the coalescence of the alliances and ideals of the past with those of the present.

As seen earlier with the Hellenic War, Athens used the Persian Wars as a paradigm for enforcing her continual leadership of the Greeks. However, the Chremonides Decree reveals that the initiative for war lay with Sparta and Ptolemy Philadelphos who had allied with each

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82 Erskine (1990: 90-5) suggests that the avoidance of directly characterising Macedon as barbarians reflects Chremonides’ stoic connections and hesitancy for divisive terminology.

83 Tarn (1913: 278-86) suggested that this perhaps denotes disgust at Antigonus’ favouring of tyrants and garrisons in the Peloponnese.

84 Halfmann (1989: 32-3) correctly argues that Athens was primarily concerned with her own freedom, not that of the Greeks. The panhellenic ethos displayed within the Chremonides Decree was an ideal, but important nonetheless.

85 L. Mitchell (2007: 208; cf. CAH VII.12 236) argues that Atheno-Spartan unity during the Hellenic War is also implied. This is unlikely since Sparta was then opposing Athens (above pg.203 n.66).
other first and only then called on Athens to join the campaign. Sparta and her allies had already set up a war council to which Athens was now to send two synedroi. In spite of this, Athens presents herself within the Chremonides Decree as the driving force behind the war. She claims that she had earlier led the struggle for Greek eleutheria during the Persian Wars (ll.12-13), projected to the other Greeks Ptolemy Philadelphos’ concern for freedom (ll.18-21), alleged that the Greeks were in agreement with this (ll.31-2), and planned on projecting this alliance to all Greeks (l.48). For Athens, the Persian Wars were her means of emphasising present leadership through past precedent. She alone had the historical precedent, built from the Persian Wars and perpetuated with subsequent struggles like the Hellenic War, to lead the Greeks towards freedom. The Persian Wars and Greek eleutheria were her prerogative, her call to leadership, and her means of understanding and presenting war. Even when following others the memory of the Persian Wars allowed Athens to present herself as leading. Tarn claimed that “the curse of the Greek race” was its inability to unite. With Athens however the ideals existed, but as a tool of hegemony.

Athens may have used the memory of the Persian Wars in what was for her a traditional way, but the image of eleutheria presented within the Chremonides Decree itself is quite novel. The decree stresses that a common harmony (koine homonoia) exists between the Greek cities and that this must be maintained as a prerequisite to the safety of the cities and, presumably, their eleutheria from Macedonian control. The idea of Greek unity as a requirement of Greek freedom informed the presentation of the earlier Hellenic War, but the specific focus on homonoia in the present and in perpetuity is new and presents an ideology that perhaps undercuts the Athenian narrative of leadership by emphasising a community of action and unity, not necessarily the leadership of one. The importance of homonoia increases when we analyse the Glaukon Decree of c.262-242 which is the earliest certain evidence for a cult at Plataia to both Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia of the Greeks (below §3.2).

It is perhaps fruitful to mention here the Themistokles Decree, another ‘falsche Urkunde’ of the Persian War that was found at Troizen and offers added insight into the reception and

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87 IG II² 686/7.48-52. Kallippos of Eleusis was one (IG II² 686/7.69). Habicht (1997: 144) speculated that Glaukon may have been the other, cf. Kralli 1996: 50. A copy of the alliance between Sparta and Philadelphos recently came to light on the island of Schoinoussa; we await publication of this very important document. I thank Kostas Buraselis for bringing this to my attention.
88 Tarn 1913: 296-7.
89 IG II² 686/7.31-5: ὅπως ἀν οὖν κοινὴς ὁμονοίας γενομένης τοῖς Ἑλλησὶ πρὸς τε τοὺς νῦν ἡδικηκότας καὶ παρεποιηθήσατος τὰς πόλεις προσθήκας μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου | καὶ μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἐπάρχοσιν ἀγαυνταί καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μεθ’ ὁμονοίαις σώζοσιν τὰς πόλεις.
commemoration of the Persian Wars within the 3rd century. Like the Oath of Plataia (above §1.2), the Themistokles Decree purports to be an authentic document of the Persian Wars, namely the mobilisation decree of Themistokles. Some have seen within it a historical core around which later interpolations were added. The écriture is of the 3rd century and Noel Robertson has argued that the document is to be connected with the Chremonidean War; he sees an analogy drawn within it between Athenian and Ptolemaic navies protecting Greek eleutheria in 480/79 and 268-262 respectively. Certainty regarding the date, purpose, or even content of the decree is impossible, but the claim that Athens was fighting for the eleutheria of the Greeks reflects late 4th and 3rd century Athenian propaganda. However, the inscription and erection of such a decree, like the Oath of Plataia, attests to the importance and vitality of the memory of the Persian Wars in the mid-3rd century. That the decree purports to be genuine reveals, through those very anachronisms derided by scholars of the Persian Wars, the continuing vitality of that historical tradition. It emphasises again the ever-adapting malleability of the memory of the Persian Wars and reveals how that tradition was continually revisited as a means of defining later struggles for Greek eleutheria. That Athens was presented within the decree as selflessly defending the freedom of the Greeks reveals that this image, one propagated by Athens herself, was followed by others and promoted by those who saw in it a similar goal.

3.2: Zeus Eleutherios and the Decree for Glaukon:

Of even greater importance for the memory and commemoration of the Persian Wars during the mid-3rd century is the honorary decree for Glaukon son of Eteokles of Aithalides, brother of Chremonides. The decree records honours passed by the koinon of the Greeks at Plataia in thanks for Glaukon’s goodwill towards the Greeks while in Athens and for the continuation of this policy after the Chremonidean War under King Ptolemy (cf. Teles On Exile 23). He beautified the shrine, contributed to the sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia, and patronised the Eleutheria. He and his descendents are rewarded with proedria at the Eleutheria Games, while the stele is to be erected next to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios

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90 Jameson 1960 (ed. prin.); 1962 (emendations); SEG XXII 274. On the early 19th century discovery and then loss of another Troizenian document purporting to date from the Persian Wars, see Frost 1978.
93 SEG XXII 274.14-18 (App.1 num.44).
94 Étienne & Piérart 1975 (text, French translation, commentary); Austin num.61 (English translation). For a full bibliography on the Glaukon decree and a more detailed analysis of what follows, see Wallace 2011: 160-4.
and *Homonoia*, paid for from the temple’s finances.\textsuperscript{95} The decree is the earliest datable evidence we have for both the Eleutheria Games and the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and Homonoia;\textsuperscript{96} it is also significant, as we shall for, for the layout of the monuments commemorating the Persian Wars and their integration into the events of the Eleutheria itself.

Although the decree mentions neither the Chremonidean War nor Glaukon’s actions within it, it should be read in this context. Glaukon was active during the Chremonidean War and was closely connected with the Ptolemaic court.\textsuperscript{97} Of particular note, however, is the fact that the Glaukon Decree explicates many of the themes evident within the Chremonides Decree: it references the Persian Wars and *eleutheria*, it defines the enemy as barbarians, and makes use of spaces connected with the Persian Wars, particularly Plataia (ll.16-24):\textsuperscript{98}

“…and he enriched the sanctuary with dedications and with revenues which must be safeguarded for Zeus Eleutherios [and] the *Homonoia* of the Greeks; and he has contributed to making more lavish the sacrifice in honour of Zeus Eleutherios and *Homonoia* and the contest which the Greeks celebrate at the tombs of the heroes who fought against the barbarians for the *eleutheria* of the Greeks.”

Trans. Austin num.63.

The reference to “the *eleutheria* of the Greeks” echoes of course the sentiments earlier seen within the Chremonides Decree, the Themistokles Decree, and the documents pertaining to the Hellenic War. Mention of “the barbarians” also repeats the Themistokles Decree, the Hellenic War Decree, and Hyperides’ *Epitaphios*, but contrasts with the Chremonides Decree which refers only allusively to the Persian Wars and avoids derogatory terminology. The focus on Plataia and the Persian War dead is notable because it displays Greek control over the site’s historical and ideological importance for *eleutheria*, something earlier lost to Alexander in 335 and avoided in Hyperides’ *Epitaphios* of 322. Here Glaukon’s benefactions are directly relevant to the battle of Plataia in that they aggrandise the memory of both it and those who died there on behalf of *eleutheria*. However, since the decree post-dates the Chremonidean War and this was, as we know from the Chremonides Decree, connected with the concepts of *homonoia* and *eleutheria*, the twin deities of Zeus Eleutherios and *Homonoia* of the Greeks emphasise the continuing importance of these concepts even after the Greek

\textsuperscript{95} For the possible identification of the altar of Zeus Eleutherios and *Homonoia* of the Greeks, see Spyropoulos 1973. On the Eleutheria, see Ch.1 §10; Wallace 2011: 147-9, 153-7, 162-5.

\textsuperscript{96} A fragment of Poseidippos of Kassandrea, dated sometime after c.289 and quoted by Herakleides Kretikos (1.11; Austin 101), refers to the Eleutheria.

\textsuperscript{97} He was general in 266/5 (*SEG* XXV 186) and had a statue in Olympia dedicated by Philadelphos (*Syll.* 462; Criscuolo 2003: 320-2). Further references in Wallace 2011: 160-1.

\textsuperscript{98} Recognised by F. Walbank, in *CAH* VII.1\textsuperscript{3} 236.
defeat within the Chremonidean War. Their appearance here, coupled with the importance of Plataia and the Eleutheria Games as the seat of the Greek koinon, all highlight the continuing significance of the site as a religious and political focal point for anti-Macedonianism both during and after the Chremonidean War.⁹⁹

The Glaukon Decree is of added importance because it offers an insight into the physical layout of the monuments relating to the memory of the Persian Wars in mid-3rd century Plataia. The decree had its standort next to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, which was supposedly erected shortly after the battle of Plataia and was inscribed with an epigram of Simonides praising military victory over Persia, Greek eleutheria, and the patronage of Zeus Eleutherios.¹⁰⁰ Even though the authenticity of the altar and epigram as an original Persian War monument can be doubted,¹⁰¹ by erecting the Glaukon Decree next to it, the koinon of the Greeks created a ‘symbolic juxtaposition’ between decree and supposedly authentic altar, one which through both content and location connected Glaukon, his benefactions, and the struggle against Macedon with the Persian Wars, Plataia, and Greek eleutheria.¹⁰² Zeus Eleutherios, present within both the Simonidean epigram and the Glaukon Decree, acted as royal patron for Greek eleutheria as discovered within the Persian Wars and fought for in the Chremonidean War. In this regard, the standort of the Glaukon Decree drew a connection with the past in much the same way that the standort of the Euphron Decree by the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios did in Athens. However, whereas the altar of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia emphasised a panhellenic memorialisation of a single event, the Stoa celebrated generally Athens’ leadership in struggles for the freedom of the Greeks. One established unity by promoting Greek-won freedom for the Greeks, the koinon of whom oversaw the cult; the other aimed at promoting through a magnanimous concern for eleutheria the leadership of one over the many.

The Glaukon Decree is of further significance as the earliest and most detailed datable attestation of the penteteric Eleutheria Games at Plataia. It reveals much about the physical layout of the monuments commemorating the Persian Wars and their use within these

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⁹⁹ Plataia’s importance is further emphasised by the announcement of honours for Eudamos, murderer of Aristodemos, the pro-Antigonid tyrant of Megalopolis, at Plataia [ἐν τοῖς ἄγονοι ὁν τίθενοι οἱ Ἑλλανες] (Stavrianopoulou 2002; SEG LII 447; Jung 2006, 304-11, 315-19; Wallace 2011: 161-2).
¹⁰⁰ Plu. Arist. 19.7; Moralia 873b; AP 6.50; Simon. XV: οὐδεντο ποθ’ Ἑλλανες νικας κρατει εργ’ Ἀρης, [εὐστάλαμεν ψυχῆς λήμμα τειδημένον] Πέσας εξελατοτες ἔλευθερα Ἑλλάδι κοινὸν ἄρθοπταντο Διὸς βασιλεύς Ἑλευθερίων. After the battle Pausanias made a separate sacrifice in the Plataian agora to Zeus Eleutherios (Thuc. 2.71.2).
¹⁰² Spawforth 1994: 234: “Symbolic juxtaposition’, whereby a monument or work of art disclosed its full meaning only when viewed (literally or imaginatively) in conjunction with others in the vicinity, was a time honoured practice in the setting up of Greek dedications and honours”. 

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In the Glaukon decree the *agon* (i.e. the Eleutheria) is said to have taken place “at the tomb of the heroes who fought against the barbarians for the liberty of the Greeks” (ll.20-4). The centre-piece of the Eleutheria was the hoplite race. Pausanias records that contestants raced from the trophy of 480/79, some fifteen *stades* from the city, to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, itself close (*οὐ πόσος δὲ ἀπὸ*) to the common tomb of the Greeks; Robert has adduced additional Hellenistic epigraphic evidence for this race. Presuming that its route was the same in the mid-3rd century, and there is no reason to think otherwise, then the Glaukon Decree, erected by the altar, was positioned within a pre-existing ideological landscape that was delimited by the Persian War monuments and structured by the Eleutheria; the past and the commemoration of the past respectively. Further, as a memorial to Glaukon’s benefactions to the Eleutheria Games and the joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios and *Homonoia* of the Greeks, the decree’s *standort* physically integrated it into the monumental topography of both these features. Through text, location, and cult the Glaukon Decree acted as a *lieu de mémoire* for the ideological, physical, and cultic significance of Plataia and Greek *eleutheria*.

The geography of Plataia’s Persian War monuments was, however, artificially constructed. Sometime between Herodotus and Pausanias the number of tombs at Plataia declined from many tombs of individual cities, to one Athenian, one Spartan, and one Greek tomb. Although undoubtedly a slow process, the alteration of the physical landscape began early, as suggested by Herodotus’ account of cenotaphs raised in shame by cities that missed the battle (9.85). It was only with the Chremonidean War and the alliance of Athens and Sparta on behalf of Greek *eleutheria*, for the first time since 480/79, that Plataia was presented as a site of Atheno-Spartan importance first and Greek second. This change was made physical through the altered layout of the tombs – perhaps even occurring during the mid-3rd century – and conceptual through the institution of an Atheno-Spartan *dialogos* deciding who was to lead the procession at the Eleutheria from at least the mid-2nd century onwards.

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104 App.1 num.50. For the epitaphic sense of *ἐπὶ* + dative, see Étienne and Piérart 1975, 55. A parallel appears in a late 2nd century Athenian *ἀγών ἐπιτάφιος* hoplite race (*IG II* 1006.22; Pritchett 1985: 106-9).
105 Paus. 9.2.5-6; Robert 1929.
106 Hdt 9.85; Paus. 9.2.5; Schachter 1994: 141-2; Flower & Marincola 2002: 254-6; Bremmer 2006.
107 Plutarch saw the battle of Plataia as a conciliatory balance between Athens and Sparta in that neither was awarded the victory (*Arist.* 20.1-3).
Hans-Joachim Gehrke has written of the importance of understanding ‘intentional history’, the process by which a society manipulates the past by creating “new facts, whether historical or not,” in order to interpret and understand itself and its current needs. At Plataia, memory was constructed, monumentalised, and perpetuated through the alteration of physical landmarks (tombs), the construction of festivals of remembrance (the Eleutheria), and the addition of monuments of ideological and cultic significance (Glaukon decree; cult of Homonoia of the Greeks). Rather than simply interacting with Plataia’s Persian War past, these additions updated and restructured it, providing new understandings of the past relevant to the requirements of the present. These new monuments, some of which, like the cult of Homonoia of the Greeks, personified important ideological additions to the Persian War history, rooted themselves in the past by connecting physically with older monuments, and through this association perpetuated themselves and the re-invention of the Persian War past they denoted within the present. As with the Oath of Plataia and the Themistokles Decree, these monuments may have denoted anachronistic reinterpretations of the Persian Wars, but they reveal the continued vitality of the Persian Wars and their connection with Greek eleutheria. The past was not stagnant historical fact; Plataia reveals the authority and importance of later monuments, sometimes anachronistic, in constructing and renewing in perpetuity the changing historical ‘reality’ of the Wars for the ever-changing present.

SECTION 4: JUXTAPOSING THE GALLIC INVASIONS AND THE PERSIAN WARS

The Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars drew on the Persian War past and its connection with the concept of eleutheria. However, whereas the Gallic Invasions of Greece and Asia Minor in the years 280-278 were paralleled with the Persian Wars they were not conceptualised as a struggle for eleutheria, but as one for soteria. In this section I first analyse the parallels between the Persian Wars and the Gallic Invasions, particularly through the use of monuments at Delphi and Athens, before then outlining the distinctions in meaning and significance between their different conceptualisation as struggles for eleutheria and soteria respectively. I then offer an explanation as to why the Gallic Invasions as a war fought for soteria from a new barbarian foe did not apparently influence the presentation of the later Chremonidean War.

110 Gehrke 2001: 306: “the created past needs to be confirmed and perpetuated in order to enter the social store of knowledge for good”.
The main literary accounts of the Gallic Invasions are provided by Pausanias and Justin. Pausanias’ account (1.4; 10.19.5-23.14) dates from the second century AD and is both derivative and, in places, exaggerated. Justin’s account (24.4-25.2) was probably also written during the late second century AD and is an abbreviation of the earlier, 1st century BC, *Philippic History* of Pompeius Trogus. Both accounts overlap, particularly in their treatment of the assault on Delphi, but Pausanias preserves much extra information and explicitly parallels the Gallic Invasion with the Persian Wars. For example, Pausanias compares the make-up of the Greek force at Thermopylae in 479 with that in 279 (10.19.12-20.5), he relates that the Greek position was turned by the same mountain pass used by the Persians (10.22.8-13, with the Phokians again as defenders), and his account of the assault on Delphi mirrors that of Herodotus in its focus on divine manifestations and natural disasters. Whether or not these exaggerated parallels are Pausanias’ own work or that of his source is unsure, but they reveal that the Gallic Invasions were paralleled with the Persian Wars in the literary sources at least.

Pausanias’ account of the monuments at Delphi also presents the Gallic Invasions as a parallel to the Persian Wars. Fortunately, an amount of this can be checked by paralleling the literary and archaeological sources. Pausanias informs us that the shields taken from the Galatians were dedicated on the temple of Apollo next to the Persian shields dedicated by Athens (10.19.4). Naturally, the balance was conscious and the Aitolians were attempting to parallel their role in the Gallic Invasions with Athens’ role in the Persian Wars by hanging the Gallic shields on the western and southern faces of the temple, in juxtaposition to the Persian shields on the eastern and northern sides. The Persian shields, therefore, took pride of place and could be seen on approach to Delphi from the east (the route taken by both Persians and Gauls), but the Gallic shields hung on the southern side, directly above the Athenian Stoa, a monument erected after the Persian Wars and decorated with ropes taken

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113 Hdt. 8.35-39; Paus. 10.23; cf. Tarn 1913: 155.
114 For the Galatian shields, see Amandry 1978. They are probably the arms mentioned in the Koan decree of 278 (Syll. 3 398.8-10: ὥστε ἣς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιστρατευσάντων ὀπλῶν). The Aitolians also made dedications in the Western Stoa (Amandry 1978; Scholten 2000: 38 n.31). Scholten (2000: 40-1 n.42) analyses dedications made outside Delphi.
115 Habicht 1979: 42; Scholten 2000: 40; S. Mitchell 2003: 282. Amandry (1978: 579 fig.7) provides a photograph of one of the temple blocks showing the imprint left by a Gallic shield. Bosworth (2002: 253 n.26), in error, claims that they were hung on the Athenian treasury. Aischines (3.115-16) reveals that the Persian shields were inscribed: Ἀθηναίοι ἀπὸ Μῆδων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε τάναντια τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐμάχοντο.
from Xerxes’ Hellespontine bridge.\textsuperscript{116} So, while the Persian shields greeted the visitor from the east a separate visual dialogue was created between the Athenian Stoa and the Gallic shields dedicated on the temple façade above it.\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, just as the shields balanced both Persian and Gaul with the achievements of Athens and Aitolia so did the Aitolian shields mark a parallel with the spoils in the Athenian Stoa below them. One should also note that some of the statues in honour of the Aitolian generals may have stood on the temple terrace above the Athenian Stoa, further enhancing the visual dialogue between Gallic shields and Persian spoils.\textsuperscript{118}

A similar use of monumental space took place in Athens. The shield of Kydias, the most outstanding of the Athenian soldiers at the Greek defence against the Gauls at Thermopylae in 279, was inscribed and dedicated by his relatives in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (Paus. 10.21.5-6). There, as at Delphi, the shield interacted with pre-existing monuments that commemorated Athenian \textit{eleutheria} as achieved during the Persian Wars and defended thereafter, such as the Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (\textit{GHI} 22), the Euphran Decree (\textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 448), and the shield of Leokritos (Paus. 1.26.1-2). Kydias’ shield assumed for Athens’ role in the Gallic Invasions the accumulated significance of these monuments, but also contributed a new dynamic to the memory of the Persian Wars by connecting them now with the defence of Greece from the Gallic barbarians. At both Athens and Delphi physical and cultic space was used to construct a direct connection between the Persian Wars and the Gallic Invasions, one that assumed for the latter the importance of the former as a united defence of Greece from irruptive barbarian invasion.

The Gallic Invasions may have been paralleled with the Persian Wars in both literary and archaeological sources, but they did not form a conceptual parallel. The Persian Wars were conceived of as a struggle for \textit{eleutheria} while the Gallic Invasions were uniformly presented as a struggle for \textit{soteria}, as is revealed in the earliest documentation for the Invasions in

\textsuperscript{116} Hdt. 9.121; \textit{FD II Col. Nax.} 37-121; \textit{CAH IV}\textsuperscript{2} 620-1; Flower & Marincola 2002: 310. Amandry (1978: 580-6) suggests that the Aitolian Western Stoa, built from Gallic spoils, was designed as a parallel to the Athenian Stoa.

\textsuperscript{117} The Athenian shields were not hanging for the Pythian Games of 290 (Plu. \textit{Demetr.} 13.1-3), when Atheno-Aitolian relations were at their nadir: the Aitolians had blocked the passes around Delphi, were kidnapping and ransoming Athenians (\textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 652; \textit{Naturalization D}75; Bielman \textit{Retour} num.18), and Demetrios organised his own Pythian Games in Athens in 290 (Plu. \textit{Demetr.} 40.4; cf. Errington 2009). Their re-erection post 278 signified Athens’ association with Aitolia in defending Thermopylae (Scholten 2000: 44). A peace treaty of five years duration, made c.289, between Demetrios and the Aitolian League recently came to light at Delphi (\textit{SEG XLVIII} 588; cf. \textit{LIII} 485 bis).

\textsuperscript{118} Paus. 10.15.2, 16.4, 18.7. Amandry (1978: 580) places the Aitolian monuments on the temple terrace in front of the Western Stoa, some distance back from the Athenian Stoa. Scholten (2000: 40 n.40) points out that the connection with the Athenian Stoa below the temple terrace would still have been apparent, though not as dramatic as that between the shields and Stoa.
Greece and Asia Minor. A Koan decree passed in response to the assault on Delphi and providing for sacrifices in commemoration of it refers specifically to Zeus Soter, a deity continually associated with the defence of Delphi.\footnote{Syll.\textsuperscript{2} 398 of July 278 (App.2 num.32).} A Smyrnaian decree in honour of Sotas commends him for defending Smyrna against Gallic incursions and protecting the \textit{koine soteria} of the \textit{demos}.\footnote{\textit{L.Priene} 17 of c.278-70.} Other texts from throughout Greece and Asia use \textit{soteria} when referring to the invasion.\footnote{IG II\textsuperscript{2} 677.6 (\textbf{App.1 num.49}); SEG XLVII 1739.25; \textit{Actes} 21.13-14; 22.5-6, 14-5; 25.3, 15-16. A Kymaian decree of c.280-278 (SEG L 1195.42; Gauthier [2003] dates is closer to 270) mentions a festival called \textit{τὰ Ζωτήρια}, which is probably connected with the Gallic invasion; Kyme had shortly before requested arms from Philetairos towards the defence of its land (SEG L 1195.1-19 [Austin num.226], 29-37), as had Kyzikos (\textit{OGIS} 748=Austin num.225; Schenkungen KNr. 241).} Even later, when the Aitolians re-organised the Delphic \textit{Soteria} festival in 250/49, the Gallic Invasions were still presented as fought solely on behalf of \textit{soteria}.\footnote{Actes nums.21-7; Bearzot 1989; Elwyn 1990; Champion 1995; 1996: 317-18. For the date, see Tracy 2003b: 165-8; Osborne 2009b: 91.} The choice of \textit{soteria} was dictated by the nature of the Gauls’ actions: they ransacked the \textit{chora};\footnote{\textit{I.K.Ery.} 24.12-13: 28.9-11 29-30; 29.7-10; \textit{I.Priene} 17.6-9, 13, 19-25, 31-8; \textit{I.Didyma} 426, 428.} kidnapped and ransomed citizens;\footnote{\textit{I.K.Ery.} 24.11-20: 28.14-18; \textit{I.Priene} 17.22-30, 35-7; SEG XLVII 1739.13-15; \textit{TAM} V 81.} pillaged temples;\footnote{\textit{Syll.}\textsuperscript{3} 398.1-9; \textit{I.Priene} 17.10-12, 15-18.} and caused famine by burning crops and rural buildings.\footnote{Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 398.1-9; \textit{I.Priene} 17.10-12, 15-18.} \textit{Soteria} defined the defence from such destructive though temporary incursions. Since there was no danger to the civic institutions or threat of lasting political submission, the Gallic Invasions were not widely presented as a threat to \textit{eleutheria}.\footnote{Pausanias (10.19.12) explicitly claims that the struggle was for survival and was “οὐκ ὑπὲρ ἑλευθερίας γεννήμενον, καθὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου ποτὲ”. The distinction is echoed in Caesar’s \textit{Gallic Wars} (7.77); the Cimbrii devastate the land but depart at length; the Romans bind the people in \textit{aeternam servitutem}. Strootman (2003: 135) argues that the Gallic threat was not comparable to the Persian. Polybios (2.35.7), however, does parallel the Persian Wars and Gallic Invasions as defences of \textit{eleutheria}.} The Invasions were a historical parallel to the Persian Wars, but they were not an enhancement of them. Although establishing a new barbarian paradigm, the Gallic Invasions could never replace the Persian Wars as the means for understanding both a foreign threat and Greek \textit{eleutheria}; simply put, the Persian Wars were “too compellingly authoritative to jettison”.\footnote{Alcock 2002: 177, referring to the remembrance of the Persian Wars in Roman Greece.}

\textbf{Conclusion:}

The Persian Wars were intrinsically connected with \textit{eleutheria}, as it was with them. Their significance in the late 4\textsuperscript{th} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries lay in large part with the fact that they were a historical parallel that could be used to promote a particular ideological programme. By
applying the model of the Persian Wars to a later struggle one defined that struggle as fought against a foreign, non-Greek ‘Other’ who intended to undermine the eleutheria of the Greeks. Control over memory was a means of enforcing hegemony in the present. Both Philip and Alexander employed the model of the Persian Wars to enforce their hegemony over the Greeks in anticipation of the invasion of Asia. Athens responded to this during the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars by re-asserting a Helleno-centric memory of the Wars that promoted Athenian leadership of the Greeks, presented Macedon as a barbarian invader, and styled Athens’ herself as a selfless defender of the eleutheria of the Greeks. The Gallic Invasions were also paralleled with the Persian Wars as a means of understanding and condemning them via a tried and tested historical parallel, “a myth-historical tradition of struggle against barbarism”. Eschewing Alcock’s claim that the Persian Wars fuelled “a successful political consensus between rulers and ruled”, I showed that in a time of multiple powers the memory of the Wars and their connection with the concept of eleutheria acted as a point of both unity and discord. Philip and Alexander manipulated the memory of the Persian Wars to promote Greek unity under Macedonian royal hegemony, a use later echoed in the Successors’ use of the site of Corinth as a backdrop for declarations of Greek freedom. However, I also traced the polis use of the Wars during the Hellenic and Chremonidean Wars, when it was designed to stoke conflict with Macedon and promote Athenian leadership. Since the Persian Wars provided a blueprint for presenting and understanding conflict, their use to promote either unity or division was based on the politics of whoever referred to them. The question ultimately became, whom did one wish to define as the ‘Other’: Persia, Macedon, or the Gauls.

Looking at the Persian Wars as a lieu de mémoire I also analysed the use of specific locations and concepts as connectors with the Wars. Sites like Corinth, Plataia, and Thebes personified physically the memory of the past within the present, even projecting it into the future. However, they were not simply static connectors. Memory did not exist as a series of immutable historical facts but rather as a malleable series of social readings continually altered and re-interpreted to fit the changing needs of the present. As such, Corinth, Plataia, and Thebes were employed by Philip and Alexander to support a Macedonian reading of the Persian Wars that denigrated Thebes, Sparta, and Athens and espoused instead Macedonian authority as the new, successful defender of Greek eleutheria. However, the site of Plataia

129 Spawforth (1994) looks at Rome’s later use of the Persian Wars during its conflicts with Parthia.
was later re-appropriated by Athens for a Greek, particularly Atheno-Spartan, memory of the Persian Wars and Greek *eleutheria*. By its very physicality, space could be altered to give tangibility to such new readings of the past. Monuments located near the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, such as the Euphron Decree and the shields of Leokritos and Kydias, assimilated to each present context the historical and ideological authority of the Persian Wars as an Athenian-led struggle for Greek *eleutheria*. Similarly, the erection of the Glaukon Decree next to the altar of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia integrated it, and vicariously the mid-3rd century struggle against Macedon, into the ideological topography of the Persian Wars and the Eleutheria Games, their cultic commemoration. The physicality of space assimilated the past to the present, but it also helped construct that past itself.

*Eleutheria*, as a political concept, was discovered during the Persian Wars and it was from them that it drew its meaning and significance. However, just as monuments and locations connected with the Wars could be altered to promote new meaning within the present so too could concepts. The addition of the cult of *Homonoia* of the Greeks to that of Zeus Eleutherios at Plataia, and the presence of both deities as *theoi symbomoi*, altered the physical, cultic, and conceptual landscape of Plataia as a site intrinsically connected with the Persian Wars. As the Oath of Plataia and the Themistokles Decree were ‘falsche Urkunden’ of the Persian Wars, so now was *homonoia* constructed as a ‘falsche Begriff’. Derivative and anachronistic they may be, but such anachronisms emphasised the abiding validity of the Persian War tradition and its continuing significance within the Hellenistic present.
Conclusion

The role played by *eleutheria* within the relationship between city and king in the early Hellenistic period was a diverse one. Throughout this thesis I have continually drawn attention to the inherent ambiguity in the meaning of *eleutheria* and the malleability of its use in action. This one conclusion has underlined the three main research questions undertaken by this thesis: the use and understanding of the concept of *eleutheria* (Part One); the role it played within the relationship between city and king (Part Two); and its connection with democratic ideology and its importance as a *lieu de mémoire* for memorialising and commemorating the past (Part Three).

First, use and understanding. I have shown that *eleutheria* lacked a clear definition and so was malleable in meaning. Its significance or meaning in each context was dependent upon individual circumstances with different criteria being emphasised by different states at different times. Context was all important and in each context different features of *eleutheria* were emphasised, often based on the local concerns of the *polis*. This lack of definition denotes an element of continuity in the use and understanding of *eleutheria* from the Classical to the Hellenistic periods; it allowed the concept to be continually exploited within the conflicts between Athens, Sparta, and Thebes in the late 5th and 4th centuries as it later was in the struggles between cities and kings in the late 4th and 3rd centuries. Nonetheless, *eleutheria* was not empty propaganda. Kings were concerned with ensuring the willing support of the cities and so were forced to offer tangible benefactions when guaranteeing their freedom.

Second, the relationship between king and city. Cities were not a homogenous political whole that thought and acted everywhere in one uniform way. Likewise, kings and their royal policies were not all the same. Contexts differed over time and space and the nature of the relationship between one king and city was a unique mix of royal policies, political necessity, civic traditions, and local history. Variety was the common thread and in the creation and structuring of the relationship between city and king the role played by *eleutheria* was a central but fluid one. As a status benefaction it expressed royal control over the city, but in a way that defined the empire in terms beneficial to the *polis*. It promoted unity between both parties, but the manners in which it was used and the precise statuses it denoted were open to great diversity. It could define positively various forms of royal control, but when the city wished to assert its independence then *eleutheria* could operate as a point of ideological
conflict with the king. The distinction between Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom is central to an accurate appreciation of the role it played within the relationship between city and king.

Third, democratic ideology and *lieu de mémoire*. Expanding from the fluidity in the use of *eleutheria* and the malleability of its role within king/city relations, I have also looked at the ways in which *eleutheria* was used to connect with both the recent and distant past. Athenian decrees post-287 revealed how the recent past was rewritten as a struggle between oligarchy and democracy so as to enforce the legitimacy of the latter as the one true guarantor of *eleutheria*. However, the use of the past was adaptive and a figure like Alexander the Great could retroactively be seen to be either a guarantor or threat to democracy depending on the political requirements of the time. As regards the more distant past, the historical tradition of the Persian Wars offered a powerful precedent not only for struggles between Greeks and foreign powers, like Persia and Macedon, but also for the ubiquity of *eleutheria* as a political and cultural concept within the Greek city. Sites of importance during the Wars existed within the present as *lieux de mémoire*. They connected with that past but since the idea they related – Greek *eleutheria* from a barbarian ‘other’ – was non-specific, the significance of such sites was malleable and could be adapted by both Greeks and Macedonians.

The specifics of the role of *eleutheria* within each of these three research questions were explored in each of the six chapters of this thesis.

In chapter one I traced the origins and initial distinctions of the terms *eleutheria* and *autonomia* before then arguing for a developing synonymity of both arising in the early 4th century, but perhaps stemming from 5th century ambiguity over their precise individual meanings. I argued that this synonymity arose not out of a decline in the significance of *eleutheria*, as had commonly been thought, but through an increase in the significance of *autonomia* to denote a condition equal in meaning to that of *eleutheria*. This, I showed, was a consequence of the continued use of the term in Spartan international diplomacy and its eventual incorporation within the King’s Peace and all subsequent *koinai eirenai*. I also drew attention to the disparity between the perceived meaning of *autonomia* as equal to *eleutheria* and the reality of its actual use by Sparta. I argued that as a result of this disparity a new political phrase was created, *eleutheria kai autonomia*, which sought to define, against Spartan abuses of *autonomia*, the ideal of total freedom from foreign control. Both *autonomia* and *eleutheria kai autonomia* described the same ideal and both remained common throughout the 4th century, the former in connection with the Persian-backed *koinai eirenai* and the latter with the Second Athenian League and later both the League of Corinth and the
propaganda of Antigonos Monophthalmos. However, I was careful to point out that despite its synonymity with *eleutheria, autonomia* could on occasions describe the specific significance of *eleutheria* as the empowerment of the *demos* to use its own laws.

Chapter two turned attention to the early Hellenistic period itself and provided a narrative of the years 337 to 262. I traced the continuities in the use and understanding of *eleutheria* from the Classical to the Hellenistic periods, arguing against a conceptual division between both; the battle of Chaironeia should not be treated as a dividing line between the free Classical *polis* and the un-free Hellenistic *polis*. Rather, it marked the creation of a new dynamic in the rise of the Macedonian empires and the importance of *eleutheria* as a point of dialogue between city and king. I drew attention to the royal use of grants of *eleutheria* as a means of ensuring Greek goodwill (*eunoia*) and support. This served numerous ends, not least gaining support for expansionist campaigns and unifying city and king under a common ideological banner. I also maintained that the constant concern of rulers to appear truthful in their grants of *eleutheria*, as attested within the sources, required their granting of tangible benefits to the cities.

In chapter three I moved to examine those features that were seen to undermine *eleutheria* and also to address some of the different ways in which it could be analysed and interpreted in practice. I argued that since many forms of foreign control could be compatible with, and even a defence of, the city’s freedom we must perforce be aware that *eleutheria* did not in practice carry a specific, single meaning but that what it entailed varied from context to context. I emphasised that it was vitally important that any foreign impositions on the city be seen to be ideologically beneficial to it, that they defend rather than restrict its freedom. The terminology used to describe them (*phylake* not *phroura*; *syntaxis* not *phoros*) was important since it hinted at defence and synergy rather than control and exploitation. I turned then to ancient classifications of *eleutheria* and showed that no single, universal definition existed but that meaning was adaptable and dependent upon individual contexts. I then applied these conclusions to a study of the typology of civic statuses and argued that, because of the malleable role played by *eleutheria* in the relationship between city and king, a more simple distinction should be drawn between Primary and Secondary perceptions of freedom. The borders between these statuses were, however, easily crossed and *eleutheria* could define in each case a positive understanding of the city’s position, both within and outwith the control of an empire.

In chapter four I applied these Primary and Secondary understandings of freedom to an analysis of the nature of the relationship between city and king. I argued that both
understandings were mutually exclusive and that *eleutheria* could be used to vocalise either discord or unity depending on the politics of its proposer. Focus was placed in particular on the role of *eleutheria* within the relationship between the king and those cities that were free in a Secondary manner, specifically its use as a royal status benefaction. I argued that *eleutheria* acted as a point of unity by providing a positive definition of royal power, one that served the interests of both city and king by presenting the king as a defender rather than oppressor of the city’s freedom. In the case of Antigonus Monophthalmos I showed that within his letter to the Skepsians he used *eleutheria* to strengthen his empire by unifying under a common ideological bond the goals of both king and city.

I was also concerned with tracing the functional limits of *eleutheria* within the relationship between city and king. I claimed that freedom could be negated by either royal cancellation of the status or civic reassertion of a Primary understanding of freedom, but that within these limits the practical status of individual free cities varied according to circumstance. Further, I argued that each city could reach a ‘tipping-point’, a point at which it perceived its Secondary freedom to be irrevocably undermined. When reached, the city saw that the king was no guaranteeing its freedom anymore and so could assert for itself, through revolt, a Primary perception of freedom or an alternative Secondary guarantee of freedom under the patronage of another king. I turned to Athens in the years 304-301 as a case-study for these theories in action and traced there the ideological conflict over whether the city’s freedom could best be attained in a Primary or a Secondary manner.

Chapter five marked the first of two thematic chapters focused on applying the idea of memory and commemoration, specifically the *lieu de mémoire*, to an analysis of *eleutheria*. This chapter dealt with the connection of *eleutheria* and *demokratia*, specifically within both democratic ideology and the memory and commemoration of the past. By treating of Alexander’s democratic *nachleben* I showed that, as with *eleutheria*, the memory of the individual was adaptive to individual political contexts. Athens followed the pro-democratic image of Alexander presented within Polyperchon’s Edict in 318/7, but asserted in 307/6 a different view that presented him as a threat to the city’s democracy. Expanding beyond Alexander, I also showed how the post-287 Athenian democracy actively reinterpreted and reconstructed the events and politics of the years 322-287 as a simplistic, bi-partite struggle between democrats and oligarchs with the aim of enforcing through historical legitimacy the validity of the post-287 democratic regime as the sole guarantor of Athens’ freedom.

I also explored the similar ways in which Athens and the cities of Asia Minor conceived of democracy, specifically its connection with *eleutheria* as denoting the empowerment of the
 Nonetheless, I was careful to show that, like *eleutheria* itself, *demokratia* could be read in both Primary and Secondary manners: Athens viewed its *demokratia* as a self-guaranteed and self-asserted right (Primary), but the cities of Asia Minor saw theirs as guaranteed by Alexander’s precedent and perpetuated thereafter as a royal status benefaction (Secondary). Importantly, however, I noted that kings only rarely made explicit reference to *demokratia*, preferring instead more abstract terms like *politeia* or *nomoi*. This, I argued, was in part because political terminology like *demokratia*, and its implicit alternative *oligarchia*, was potentially divisive and so kings left the connection between freedom and democracy to be made by the city itself, specifically the empowered *demos*.

In chapter six I turned attention to the continued importance within the early Hellenistic period of the sites, ideology, and concepts associated with the Persian Wars as the seminal struggle for Greek *eleutheria*. I treated of the different ways in which the historical significance of the Wars could be appropriated for the present and what purpose this served within the politics of the time. I argued in particular that the Persian Wars were primarily of use as a pre-existing ideological model that could be applied to, and hence offer an interpretation of, any struggle. They promoted the hegemony of one state by presenting that state as a defender of *eleutheria* – in Athens’ case imitating its role in 480/79 – and tarring their opponent as an ‘other’ who wished like Persia to remove Greek freedom. This model was employed by both Athens and Macedon and reflected the nature of the concept of *eleutheria* itself: it unified states under the banner of a Hellenic struggle for *eleutheria*, but promoted discord by asserting that struggle against another power.

I also illustrated how physical spaces and concepts served as *lieux de memoire* for the Persian Wars and Greek *eleutheria*. The sites of Corinth, Plataia, and Thebes were closely connected with the Persian Wars and so imbued with ideological significance. This also took place more locally within the monumental landscape of the *polis* itself, particularly through the layout of monuments in the north-west corner of the Athenian *agora* and on the battlefield of Plataia. I traced the malleability of the memory and historical significance of such locations and explained how they could be appropriated for different ends by both Macedon and Athens. I showed how Corinth became intrinsically connected with Macedonian guarantees of freedom rather than with the Greek defence of *eleutheria* as during the Persian Wars, but that Plataia’s historical significance could be manipulated by both Philip and Alexander in their campaigns against Persia but also by Athens against Macedon. Furthermore, I revealed that such sites were not simply receptacles of static, pre-existing ideology but rather that the interplay of their physical monuments, added to over time,
continually re-structured this ideology by constructing various layers of meaning, each grounded within not only the individual significance of the monument itself but also within the interplay of that monument with those around it, Spawforth’s “symbolic juxtaposition”. Plataia provided a good example when the concept of *homonoia* was deified and an altar to Zeus Eleutherios and *Homonoia* of the Greeks was consecrated, thus placing the later concept of *homonoia* within the historical and ideological context of the Persian Wars and Greek *eleutheria.*
APPENDIX 1
A Catalogue of Epigraphic Attestations of *Eleutheria*, *Autonomia*, and *Demokratia* in 4th and 3rd Century Greece and Athens

What follows is a catalogue of epigraphic references to *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, *demokratia*, *soteria*, and (*patrios*) *nomoi* and *politeia* from 384/3 to c.262 in mainland Greece. The catalogue is based primarily on references to *eleutheria*, *autonomia*, and *demokratia*. References to *soteria* and (*patrios*) *nomoi* and *politeia* are added where they coincide with these main criteria or are important themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Reference</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Eleutheria</th>
<th>Demokratia</th>
<th>Autonomia</th>
<th>Soteria</th>
<th>Nomoi and Politeia, inc. Patrios</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. GHI 20; IG II² 34</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>384/3</td>
<td>Athenian alliance with Chios</td>
<td>συμμάχος δὲ ποιεῖσθαι [Χίος ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ] (ll.19-21)</td>
<td>συμμάχος δὲ ποιεῖσθαι [Χίος ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ] (ll.19-21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. IG II² 35</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>384/3</td>
<td>2nd copy of the Chios alliance?</td>
<td>[συμμάχος δὲ ποιεῖσθαι Χίος ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ] (ll.12-13)</td>
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<td>[συμμάχος δὲ ποιεῖσθαι Χίος ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ] (ll.12-13)</td>
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<td>3. GHI 22; IG II² 43</td>
<td>Athens, Agora</td>
<td>378/7</td>
<td>Charter of 2nd Athenian Confederacy</td>
<td>ὅπως ἀν Λακεδαίμονιοι ἐδώσα τὸ Ἑλληνικὸς ἐλευθερίας καὶ αὐτονομίας ἦσσαν ἀγενός τὴν χωρὰν ἔχοντας ἐμ βεβαιῶν τῇ ν ἐαυτῶν</td>
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<td>6. Paus. 9.15.6</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>Epigram on statue of Epamino-ndas</td>
<td>αὐτόνομος δ’ Ἑλλὰς πᾶσ’ ἐν ἐλευθερίῃ (l.4)</td>
<td>αὐτόνομος δ’ Ἑλλὰς πᾶσ’ ἐν ἐλευθερίῃ (l.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. GHI 47; IG II 126</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>Athens and Thracian kings</td>
<td>[ἐλε]υθέρας εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους συμμάχους οὕσας Ἀ]θηναίῳς (l.16-17)</td>
<td>[ἐλε]υθέρας εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους συμμάχους οὕσας Ἀ]θηναίῳς (l.16-17)</td>
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<td>8. IG II 270;</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>323-318</td>
<td>Individual honoured for help on behalf of Greek freedom</td>
<td>ἀγα[νιῶμενος καὶ νῦν λέγων καὶ πράττει]ν ἀγαθ[ὸν ὦτι ἀν δύνηται ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας]ς τῶν Ἑλλ[ήνων] (l.5-7)</td>
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7) οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλισθίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι καὶ τὰς στήλας καθεῖλον νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ὁ τέκμος κατέλυθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν αὐτοποίησον (II.62-5)

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<td><strong>SEG L 826; Beschi 1996: 42-5, num.23</strong></td>
<td>Lemnos</td>
<td>315-301</td>
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<td>Freedom and autonomy on Lemnos</td>
<td>καθισταμένου δήμου τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ αὐτονομίαν (II.12-13)</td>
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<td><strong>FD III (4) 463; ISE 71</strong></td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>313/2</td>
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<td>Statue of Peisios; helped liberate Opos with Antigonid troops.</td>
<td>πεζοὶ δὲ ἵππης· τὸ γέγοι τὸ θεόμενον, οὐς προφέτηκεν· δὴ δάμως Ἡμωτῶν τούτου ἐμεθ’ ὁμομάν Χώρας, Βοιωτίας καὶ ἅγιον τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ ὅσιμων ἔλαβεν· Φιόουρας, Ἀσκρούσκην τε[ε]λευθερίαν (II.3-6)</td>
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<td><strong>12. IG II² 509</strong></td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>Post 307/6</td>
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<td><strong>14. Plu. Moralia 851f-852e</strong></td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>307/6</td>
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<td><strong>15. IG XII (9) 192</strong></td>
<td>Eretria (after Cyriac of Alcona)</td>
<td>c.308-287</td>
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</table>

| **16. IG II² 467** | Athens | 306/5 | Athens honours Timotheos for help in Hellenic War | ἠγωνίζετο ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας λέγων καὶ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων (II.6-8) |

<p>|   |   |   |   | ήγωνιζε[το ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας λέγων καὶ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ Καρυστίων (II.10-12) |</p>
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<th>Number and Reference</th>
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<th>Eleutheria</th>
<th>Demokratia</th>
<th>Autonomia</th>
<th>Soteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. Schweigert</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>304/3</td>
<td>Demetrios frees Chalkis</td>
<td>[τῆν τῆς πόλεως ἐλευ]θεριαν (1.30)</td>
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<td>20. <em>FD III (4) 218</em></td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>Elateia honours</td>
<td>Φωκε[ίς ανέθηκαν τῶι</td>
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<td>SEG XVIII 197</td>
<td>Xanthippos</td>
<td>Απόλλωνι Ἑλληνῶν Ἀμφαρέτου Φωκέα ἔλευθερώσαντα Ἑλάτειαν (II.1-2)</td>
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<td>22. Agora XVI 114</td>
<td>Athens Agora 304/3</td>
<td>[ἐ]πὶ δουλεῖα λαβὼν κατά [κράτος ἔλευθέρας καὶ] αὐτονόμους πεπόθηκεν (II.7-9)</td>
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<th>Soteria</th>
<th>Nomoi and Politeia, inc.</th>
<th>Patrios</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. IG II² 486</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>304/3</td>
<td>Demetrios instructs Athens to honour Eupolis</td>
<td>[περὶ οὗ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπέστειλεν τεῖ [βουλεύει καὶ τῶν δήμων ἀπ’οφαίνον φίλον εἰςαυτῶι καὶ εὗνοι]</td>
<td>[εἰ]ς τὰ τῶν βασιλεῖων πρᾶγματα καὶ τὴν τοῦ δῆμου τοῦ [Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ συναγισθοτιν ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας] (ll.11-16)</td>
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<td>26. IG II² 498</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>303/2</td>
<td>Athens Honours Medeios of Larissa</td>
<td>ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος ἀπέστελλεν τὸν ὑόν αὐτοῦ Δημήτριον ἐλευθερώσον [ντὰ τῆς] τ ἰν τῶν καὶ τοὺ ἄλλοις</td>
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<td><strong>27.</strong></td>
<td>Troizen</td>
<td>c.303/2</td>
<td>Zenodotos helps liberate city and remove garrison</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RIG 452</strong></td>
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<td>συνηγωνίσατο αὐτοῖς εἰς τὴν ἔλευθερίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἐξαγωγήν τῆς φρουρᾶς (ll. 7-9)</td>
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<td><strong>28.</strong></td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>c.303/2</td>
<td>Athens honours son of Menelaos of Macedon</td>
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<td><strong>IG II² 559+568</strong></td>
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<td>[και ἀπεσταλ]μένος μετ[ά Δημητρίου εἰς τήν Ἑλλάδα συνηγωνίζετο ύπερ τῆς ἔλευθερίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας (ll. 10-14)</td>
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<td><strong>29.</strong></td>
<td>Athens Agora</td>
<td>303/2-302/1</td>
<td>Unknown honorary decree</td>
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<td><strong>Agora XVI 120</strong></td>
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<td>ἀγ[ωνίζεσθαι ύπερ τοῦ δῆμου τοῦ Αθη[ναίων καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἐλλήνων σωτηρίας] (ll. 3-5)</td>
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<td>Nomoi and Politeia, inc. Patriots</td>
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<td>30. ISE 7</td>
<td>Athens, Near Plato’s Academy</td>
<td>303/2</td>
<td>Statue of Demetrios</td>
<td>τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ ἔξεβαλε καὶ ἠλευθέρωσε τὴν</td>
<td>τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ ἔξεβαλε καὶ ἠλευθέρωσε τὴν</td>
<td>[τοὺς δὲ μετ’ αὐ]τοῦ τιμῶν καὶ περὶ πλείστῳ[ν] ποιούμενος τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν, τούτων δὲ</td>
<td>καὶ δεηθέντων ἤγείσθαι τῆς κοινῆς ἔλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας (II.7-9)</td>
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<td>Statue of Demetrios</td>
<td>τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλείστων Ἑλλήνων (II.3-4)</td>
<td>τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλείστων Ἑλλήνων (II.3-4)</td>
<td>[τοὺς δὲ μετ’ αὐ]τοῦ τιμῶν καὶ περὶ πλείστῳ[ν] ποιούμενος τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν, τούτων δὲ</td>
<td>καὶ δεηθέντων ἤγείσθαι τῆς κοινῆς ἔλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας (II.7-9)</td>
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<td>31. IG II² 505</td>
<td>Athens Akropolis</td>
<td>302/1</td>
<td>Athens honours Nikandros and Polyzelos for</td>
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<td>Athens honours Nikandros and Polyzelos for</td>
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<td><strong>32.</strong></td>
<td><em>IG II² 646; Naturalization D68</em></td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>295/4</td>
<td>Athens honours Herodoros</td>
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<td><strong>33.</strong></td>
<td><em>IG II² 650</em></td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>286/5</td>
<td>Athens honours Zenon</td>
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<td>ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ</td>
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<td>[τῆς συνκομιδῆς το[ύ σίτου τῶι δήμωι ὅπως ἅ]ν ἀσφαλέστατα εἰσ[κομίζηται συναγωνιζ[ο]μενος τῇ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίαι (II.14-17)</td>
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<td><strong>34.</strong></td>
<td><em>IG II² 698</em></td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>c.286/5</td>
<td>Athens honours unknown individual</td>
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<td>[τοῦ δήμου τὴν ἐλευθερίαν] κομιζομένου (1.6)</td>
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<td>[οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν ὑπεναγ]τίον τῶι δήμωι (1.8)</td>
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<td>[<em>UDP</em>] τῆς δημοκρατίας (1.9)</td>
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<td>35. IG II² 698</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>c.286/5-270</td>
<td>Honours for an unknown individual</td>
<td>[τοῦ δήμου τήν ἐλευθερίαν] κομισμένου (I.6)</td>
<td>[ὑπέρ] τῆς δημοκρατίας (I.9)</td>
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<td>[οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν ὑπεναντίον τῶι δήμωι (I.8)]</td>
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<td>37. FD III (4) 220</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>c.284-281</td>
<td>Elateia honours Xanthippos</td>
<td>ταχόν ἔθεντο</td>
<td>τόνγε μετ᾿ εὐδοξίαν πάντες ἐλευθερίαν (II.11-12)</td>
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<td>38. IG II² 657</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>283/2</td>
<td>Athens honours Philippides of Kephale</td>
<td>καὶ κομισμένου τοῦ δήμου τήν ἐλευθερίαν διατεῖλεκε λέγον καὶ πράττον τὰ συμφέροντα τεί τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαι (II.31-3)</td>
<td>[οὐ]θέν ὑπεναντίον πρὸς δημοκρατίαν οὐδεπώποτε</td>
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<td>καὶ κομισμένου τοῦ δήμου την ἐλευθερίαν</td>
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<td>850f-851c</td>
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<td>пеполитеυμένω τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτῶν πρὸς ἑλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἀρίστα· φυγόντι δὲ δ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καταλυθέντος τοῦ δήμου (851c)</td>
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<td>[ἐποίησε]εν</td>
<td>[ὁ]οτε λόγω[ν</td>
<td>ἕργοι (II.48-50)</td>
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<td>αν διατετέλε κε λέγων και πράττων τα συμφέροντα τεi tῆς</td>
<td>πόλεως σωτηρίας (II.31-3)</td>
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<td>40.</td>
<td>IG II2</td>
<td>672+EM</td>
<td>279/8</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
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<td>12967</td>
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<td>Athens honors Komeas of Lamptrai</td>
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<td>ἐπειδῇ ύπό τοῦ βασιλέως Σαλεύκου[...38...πρεσ]βευ τῆς Κοιμέας ύπό τοῦ δήμου</td>
<td>δημοκρατία (I.18)</td>
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<td>[...] Αθηναίων ἑλευθερίας (II.39-41)</td>
<td>[ὀμον]οούσαν και δημοκρατουμενήν τὴν νήσον (I.28)</td>
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<td>41. Plu. Moralia 851d-f</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>271/0</td>
<td>Athens honours Demochares</td>
<td>φυγόντι μὲν ύπερ δημοκρατίας, μετεσχηκότι δὲ οὐδεμίας ὀλιγαρχίας οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν ἥρχότι καταλελυκότος τοῦ δήμου· καὶ μόνω Αθηναίων τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἦλικίαν πολιτευσάμενων μὴ μεμελετηκότι τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς ἐτέρους πολιτεύματο ς ἰ δημοκρατία...καὶ μηδὲν ύπεναντίον τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πεπραχότι μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἐργῳ (851f)</td>
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<td>42. SEG XXVIII 60</td>
<td>Athens, Agora</td>
<td>270/69</td>
<td>Athens honours Kallias of Sphettos</td>
<td>τεί πατρίδι Καλλίας ουδεπώποθ’ ύπερομείνας [......]ε[......κ]</td>
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<td>αταλελυμένου τοῦ δήμου ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν την ἐ[αυτού]</td>
<td>προεμενος δόσιν δοθήναι ἐν τεί ὀλιγαρχία ὡστε μηδὲν μηδὲν ύπεναντίον πράξει μήτε τοῖς νόμωι μήτε τεί δημο[κατί]</td>
<td>σι τεί ἔξ ἀπάντων Αθηναίων</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td><strong>IG II² 686/7; SV 476; Syl.³ 434/5</strong></td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>268/7</td>
<td>Chremonides proposes war on Macedon</td>
<td>τε δόξαν ἐκτίσαντο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις</td>
<td>Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκέυασαν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν (II.12-13)</td>
<td>[ἐχειν ἐκατέργος τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐλευθερίαν ἑαυτῶν ὄντας καὶ αὐτο[νόμους, πολιτείαν πολιτευομένους κατὰ] τὰ πάτρια (II.72-4)]</td>
<td>το[ὺς καταλύειν ἐπιχειροῦντας τοῦς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς πατρίους ἐκάστης πολιτείας (II.14-16)] [πολιτείαν πολιτευομένους κατὰ] τὰ πάτρια (II.73-4)]</td>
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<td>Nomoi and Politeia, inc. Patrios</td>
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<td>44. SEG XXII 274; M&amp;L 23</td>
<td>Troizen (Agora?)</td>
<td>3rd century</td>
<td>Mobilisation decree of Themistokes</td>
<td>καὶ ἀμυνόμεθα...</td>
<td>τῷ ἀμύναμον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τῆς ἐδώρτων [καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν Ἑλλήνων] μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Κορίνθων καὶ Αἰγίνητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τοῦ βουλομένων</td>
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<td>45. Ergon 2003: 15-16</td>
<td>Eleusis</td>
<td>267/6</td>
<td>Honorary decree for general Aristeides</td>
<td>σώιον καὶ δημοκρατο-ψυμον (unknown numbering)</td>
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<td>46. IG II² 666+667; Naturalizat-ion D78a+b</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>266/5</td>
<td>Athens honours Strombichos</td>
<td>λαξάνοτος τοῦ δήμου τὰ ὅπλα ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ...</td>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>IG II² 668</th>
<th>Athens, Akropolis</th>
<th>266/5</th>
<th>Archon sacrifices on behalf of <em>soteria</em></th>
<th>ἔθυεν ἐφ´ ἴγιείαι καὶ σωτηρίας τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν καὶ τῶν καὶ τῶν τῶν ἐν τεῖχοι τοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ (II.8-10)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>IG II² 668</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>259/8</td>
<td>Athens honours Phaidros of Sphettos</td>
<td>καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην αὐτόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους τοῖς μεθ´ ἐαυτὸν (II.38-40)</td>
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<td>καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην αὐτόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους τοῖς μεθ´ ἐαυτὸν (II.38-40)</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>IG II² 682; Syll.³ 409</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>259/8</td>
<td>Athens honours Phaidros of Sphettos</td>
<td>τὸν ἐπὶ Κίμωνος ἀρχοντὸς διετέλεσεν ἀγανικόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας (II.31-3)</td>
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<td>Number and Reference</td>
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<td>Content</td>
<td>Eleutheria</td>
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<td>49. IG II² 677</td>
<td>Athens, Akropolis</td>
<td>262/1 or 258/7</td>
<td>Herakleitos dedicates in place of Antigonos Gonatas</td>
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<td>50. Étienne &amp; Piérart 1975</td>
<td>Plataia, altar of Zeus Eleutherios</td>
<td>c.262-242</td>
<td>Koinon of Greeks honours Glaukon</td>
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APPENDIX 2
A Catalogue of Epigraphic Attestations of *Eleutheria, Autonomia, and Demokratia* in 4th and 3rd Century Asia Minor and the Aegean

What follows is a catalogue of epigraphic references to *eleutheria, autonomia, demokratia, soteria*, and (*patrios*) *nomoi* and *politeia* from 334 to c.220 in Asia Minor and the Aegean islands. The catalogue is based primarily on references to *eleutheria, demokratia, and autonomia*. References to *soteria* and (*patrios*) *nomoi* and *politeia* are added where they coincide with these main criteria or are important themselves.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Number and Reference</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th><em>Eleutheria</em></th>
<th><em>Demokratia</em></th>
<th><em>Autonomia</em></th>
<th><em>Soteria</em></th>
<th>Nomoi and Politeia, inc. Patrios</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>GHI</em> 84a</td>
<td>Chios</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Alexander returns democracy to Chios</td>
<td>ὃπως μηδὲν ἑναντίον ἤ τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ μηδὲ τῇ τῶν φυγάδων καθόδοι (ll.5-6)</td>
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<td>2. <em>GHI</em> 85a</td>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>334-332</td>
<td>Oath for Homonoia and the return of exiles</td>
<td>ὡς κεν οἱ πόλιται οἰκεῖ·εν τὰμ πλóλιν ἐν δαμοκρασίᾳ τόμ πάντα χρόνον ἐχόν·τες πρὸς ἀλλάλως ὡς εὐνοῖτατα (ll.2-4)</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Priene</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>Priene</td>
<td>αὐτονόμων</td>
<td>[ἐόν]των</td>
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<th>Priene 2</th>
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<th>honour(s)</th>
<th>Priene 6</th>
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<th>Priene 7</th>
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<th>Milet 6</th>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>I.Priene</td>
<td>330/29</td>
<td>Antigonos</td>
<td>I.Priene</td>
<td>330/29</td>
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<td>Philaios</td>
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<td>Milet 123; Syll. 3</td>
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<td>6.</td>
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<td>330/29</td>
<td>Antigonos</td>
<td>I.Priene</td>
<td>330/29</td>
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<td>Theodoros</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Milet</td>
<td>313/2</td>
<td>Antigonos captures Miletos</td>
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<td>9. Mauerbaumschriften 64</td>
<td>Kolophon</td>
<td>311-306</td>
<td>Kolophon builds walls</td>
<td>ὅπως ὁ ἰόμος φαίνηται παρέδωκεν αὐτῷ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ βασιλεύς</td>
<td>τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ Ἀντίγονος (II.6-7)</td>
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<td>ἐπὶ σωτηρίας παντὸς</td>
<td>τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Κολοφωνίων (II.8-9)</td>
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<td>10. OGIS 5; RC 1; SV 428</td>
<td>Skepsis</td>
<td>311/0</td>
<td>Letter to Skepsis by Antigonus</td>
<td>[τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλ]ευθερίας (II.1-2, 61)</td>
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<td>τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτ[ον]</td>
<td>ομίαν (II.55-6)</td>
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<td>11. OGIS 6</td>
<td>Skepsis</td>
<td>311/0</td>
<td>Skepsis’ reply</td>
<td>τοῖς Ἑλλησιῶν ὅτι ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ αὐτόνομοι ὅντες ἐν εἰρήνῃ (II.15-16)</td>
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<td>τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰρήνης</td>
<td>καὶ αὐτόνομας (II.8-9)</td>
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<td>12. IK.Iasos 2</td>
<td>Iasos</td>
<td>c.309</td>
<td>Iasos allies with Ptolemy</td>
<td>ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ αὐτόνομοι καὶ ἀφορουχητον καὶ</td>
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<td>κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοῦ Ἰασέων (I.20)</td>
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<td><strong>13.</strong></td>
<td><strong>IK. Iasos 3</strong></td>
<td><strong>Iasos</strong></td>
<td>c. 305-282</td>
<td>διαφυλάξω τὴν ἐλευθερίαν</td>
<td>καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἰασέων (II.12-13)</td>
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<td><strong>15.</strong></td>
<td><strong>IG XII (5) Suppl. 168</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ios</strong></td>
<td>c. 306-301</td>
<td>Αντίγονος ὁ βα[σι]λεύς — — τὴν τε ἐλευθερίαν ἀπέδωκεν τῶι δήμῳ τῶι Ἰητῶν καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς πατρίους (II.2-3)</td>
<td>...τοὺς νόμους τοὺς πατρίους — — ὡς ὁ δήμος μεθ’ ὁμόνοιας</td>
<td>πολιτεύτων νόμους χρώμενος τοῖς πατρίοις (II.3-4)</td>
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<td>16. RC 3-4</td>
<td>Ionia</td>
<td>306-301</td>
<td>Synoikism of Teos and Lebedos</td>
<td>[ὅπως ὧν ὄφειλον ἀι πόλεις ἔλευθεραι γένονται, νομίζον[τες γὰρ ὑμᾶς τὸ γε ἐφ’ ἡμῖν]</td>
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<td>εἶναι τάλλα ἔλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους πεποιηκέναι[αι] (II.87-9)</td>
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<td>17. IK.Ilion 1; Syll. 3 330</td>
<td>Ionian League</td>
<td>306-01</td>
<td>Honours for Malousios</td>
<td>πρέσβεις πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὑπὲρ τῆς ἔλευθερίας καὶ αὐτονομίας τῶν πόλεων (II.24-5)</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td><em>I.Cos</em> ED 21</td>
<td>Kos</td>
<td>c.300-200</td>
<td>Koan inscription</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td><em>IOSPE I 401</em></td>
<td>Black Sea Chersones</td>
<td>Early 3rd century</td>
<td>Citizen oath to protect democracy</td>
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<td>και ἐλευθερίας πόλεος και πολιτάν (II.5-7)</td>
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<td>διαφυλάξω τῶι δάμιει τῶι Χερσονασιτάν: οὐδὲ καταλύσω τῶι δαμοκρατίαν (II.13-14)</td>
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<td>και κρινῶ ψάφωι</td>
<td>κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (II.35-6)</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td><em>I. Priene 11</em></td>
<td>Priene</td>
<td>c.297</td>
<td>Soteria Festival</td>
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<td>22. 1. Priene 19</td>
<td>Priene</td>
<td>296/5</td>
<td>Priene honours Helikon</td>
<td>παρακαλῶν αὐτοὺς τησεῖν τὴν ἄκοιαν ἐπιμελώς, λογιζομένους ὡς οὐθὲν μειτίζον ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις Ἑλληνίδις τῆς ἑλευθερίας (II.17-20)</td>
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<td>Priene honours Megabyzos</td>
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<td>Πριηνέων αὐτονόμων ἑόντων (1.4)</td>
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<td>24. 1.Priene 4</td>
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<td>294/3</td>
<td>Priene honours Apellis</td>
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<td>Πριηνέων αὐτονόμων ὅντων (1.4)</td>
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<td>25. IK.Ilion 25</td>
<td>Ilion</td>
<td>c.281</td>
<td>Law against tyranny and oligarchy</td>
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<td>ἄπιστοιείνη τὸν τύραννον ἢ τὸν ὄλιγαρχήν ἢ τὸν δημοκράταν καταλύον τα (II.19-21, passim)</td>
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<td><strong>26.</strong></td>
<td><strong>IK. Ilion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>c.281 or early 260s.</td>
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<td>Symmachy between Antiochos I or II and Lysimachia.</td>
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<td>[διαφυλάξω τὴν πόλιν] [ἐν αὐτονομίαι καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίαι] [καὶ ἀφοιρήτου] [και ἀφορολόγητου] (Il.12-15)</td>
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<td><strong>27.</strong></td>
<td>Malay &amp; Ricl 2009</td>
<td>Aigai</td>
<td>281/0</td>
<td>Aigai institutes divine honours for Seleukos and Antiochos</td>
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<td>ἄγ[ειν δὲ καὶ κατὰ μήνα γ’ ἐκαστὸν δύο θύσια] [καὶ ἡ ἡμέραι ἐλευθερία] [καὶ ἑγεμόνεθα] (Il.18-20)</td>
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<td><strong>28.</strong></td>
<td>IG XII (7)</td>
<td>Nikouria</td>
<td>c.280 (309/8 and 295)</td>
<td>Eulogy of Ptolemy Soter</td>
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<td>τᾶς τε π[ῶλ]ες ἐλευθερώσας καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀποδοῦς] [καὶ τῷ πατρίῳ πολιτείᾳ πάσιν καταστήσας] [καὶ τῶν εἰσφορῶν κοιφίας] (Il.13-16)</td>
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<td>καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀποδοῦς] [καὶ τῷ πατρίῳ πολιτείᾳ πάσιν καταστήσας] (Il.14-15)</td>
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<td>29. SEG LIV 1229</td>
<td>Kyme</td>
<td>c.280-270</td>
<td>Generals are to defend freedom and democracy</td>
<td>ἵνα ἀ πόλις ἐλευθέρα</td>
<td>μή παραδοί τάν τι[ό]λιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δαμοκρατημέ[ν]ναι</td>
<td>καταλύσαι τῶν δάμων</td>
<td>ἵνα ἀ πόλις ἐλευθέρα</td>
<td>εὐφρόνητην καὶ σω[τί]ρα γεγονότα τοῦ ἰδίου (l.23)</td>
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<td>30. IK.Ilion 32; OGIS 219</td>
<td>Ilion</td>
<td>c.279-274</td>
<td>Ilion honours Antiochos I</td>
<td>μή παραδοί τάν τι[ό]λιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δαμοκρατημέ[ν]ναι</td>
<td>καταλύσαι τῶν δάμων (l.20)</td>
<td>τὰ καταλύσαι τῷ δάμῳ (l.23)</td>
<td>εὐφρόνητην καὶ σω[τί]ρα γεγονότα τοῦ ἰδίου (l.23)</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Syll. (^3) 398</td>
<td>Kos</td>
<td>278/7</td>
<td>Kos gives thanks for victory over the Celts.</td>
<td>τοίς τα β[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] δαμοκλατίαι εν ἠμεν α[υτοῖς και γενει ες τὸν ἄει χρό]νον (II.8-11)</td>
<td>τὰς τῶν Ἑλλάνων σωτηρίας (II.19-20, 25, 40)</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>IK.Ery. 504</td>
<td>Klazomenai</td>
<td>c.268-262</td>
<td>Divine honours for Antiochos I</td>
<td>τῶι πόλει[ων τῶν Ἰάδων ὅπως καὶ τὸ λοιπόν ἔλευθεραν οὐσαί καὶ δῆμο][κρατούμενα μεθ’ ὁμονοίας πολιτεύωνται κατὰ τοὺς πατρ[ους νόμους] (II.15-18)</td>
<td>τῶι πόλει[ων τῶν Ἰάδων ὅπως καὶ τὸ λοιπόν ἔλευθεραν οὐσαί καὶ δῆμο][κρατούμενα μεθ’ ὁμονοίας πολιτεύωνται κατὰ τοὺς πατρ[ους νόμους] (II.15-18)</td>
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<td>34. <strong>IK.Ery. 29</strong></td>
<td>Erythrai</td>
<td>c.270-260</td>
<td>Honours for generals upon leaving office.</td>
<td>δι’ ο[...] τὴν δημοκρατίαν συνδιετήσαν τοῖς ἄνδροι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν παρέδωκαν τοῖς μεθ’ αὐτούς α[...]κοὴν (ll.12-14)</td>
<td>δι’ ο[...] τὴν δημοκρατίαν συνδιετήσαν τοῖς ἄνδροι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν παρέδωκαν τοῖς μεθ’ αὐτούς α[...]κοὴν (ll.12-14)</td>
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<td>35. <strong>IK.Ery. 31; RC 15</strong></td>
<td>Erythrai</td>
<td>Post 261</td>
<td>Letter of Antiochos II to Erythrai</td>
<td>καὶ ἐπειδή οἱ περὶ Θαρσύνοντα καὶ Πυθῆν καὶ Βοτανοῦ ἀπέφαινον διότι ἐπὶ τε Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Ἀντιγόνου αὐτὸ[[ν]]μοι ἦν καὶ ἀφοιλόγητος ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν, καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγο[[ν]]οι ἐσπευδὸν ἀεί ποτε περὶ αὐτής, θεωροῦντας τοὺς τούτους τε κρί[[ν]]ατας δικαίους καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλόμενοι μὴ λείπεσθαι ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις, τὴν τε αὐτονομίαν ὑμῖν</td>
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<p>| 36. | <em>I. Didyma</em> 358; <em>OGIS</em> 226 | Didyma (Miletos) | 259/8 | Antiochos II returns freedom and democracy. | [ἐ]λευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν παρ[ά] βασ[ιλέως Αντι[όχου το[ῦ] Θεοῦ (ll.6-7)] | συνδιατηρήσωμεν καὶ ἀφορο[λογίτικα εἶναι συγχωροῦμεν τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀπάντων καὶ | [τῶν εἰς] τὰ Γαλατικὰ συναγομένων (ll.21-8) |
| 37. | <em>IK.Smyrna</em> 573; <em>OGIS</em> 229; <em>BD</em> 29 | Smyrna, probably c.245-243 | Synoikism of Smyrna and Magnesia | Σέλευκος…ἐβεβαιώσεν τῷ δήμῳ τὴν αὐτονομίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν (ll.11-2) | ἡ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἢ τὴν ἵσονομίαν καταλύοντα (ll.67-8) | ἀστασιάστως κατὰ τοὺς Σμύρναιον νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφισματα τοῦ δήμου (1.65) | ἡ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἢ τὴν ἵσονομίαν καταλύοντα (ll.67-8) |</p>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Delphi</td>
<td>c.245-</td>
<td>Seleukos II confirms grants to Smyrna</td>
<td>ἐπικεχώρηκε δὲ τοῖς [Σμύρνη] [ναίοις τάν τε πόλιν καὶ τάν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐλευθέραν εἶμεν καὶ ἀφο[ς] λόγητον (II.5-7)</td>
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<td>καὶ τὰν τε ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶις χώραν ἑβαίοι, καὶ τὰν πάτρι[ον]</td>
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<td><strong>42.</strong> Isager &amp; Karlsson 2008</td>
<td>Mylasa</td>
<td>c.230-220</td>
<td>Honorary decree for Olympichos</td>
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<td><strong>43.</strong></td>
<td>I. Labraunda 5</td>
<td>Mylasa</td>
<td>c.220</td>
<td>Philip V confirms Labraunda and land to Mylasa</td>
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<td><strong>44.</strong></td>
<td>I. Labraunda 7</td>
<td>Mylasa</td>
<td>c.220</td>
<td>Philip V writes to Olympichos concerning Mylasa</td>
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<td><strong>45.</strong> SEG XIX 578 = Mauerbau- inschriften 52-3</td>
<td>Chios</td>
<td>c.201</td>
<td>Public donations to build walls on Chios</td>
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*άκρας ἐξαγαγόντες ἑλευθέραν [καὶ] δημοκρατουμένην ἀπὸ κατεστήσαμεν ύμιν (ll.13-15)*

*άκρας ἐξαγαγόντες ἑλευθέραν [καὶ] δημοκρατουμένην ἀπὸ κατεστήσαμεν ύμιν (ll.13-15)*

*ἐν ἢ ἡμέραι ὁ δήμος ἐκομίσατο τὴν [τε ἑλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν]*

*ἐν ἢ ἡμέραι ὁ δήμος ἐκομίσατο τὴν [τε ἑλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν]*

*Σέλευκον δὲ ἀφίεντα τὴν πόλιν ἑλευθέραν ἀποδοῦ[ν]υμίν τὰ τε λοιπὰ χωρία τὰ προσόντα τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν (ll.34-6)*

*καθ’ ὁν καίρον Ἰσάλευκον ὑπεν [καὶ] ἐλευθερίας ἐκαθε[ῖπ]ε[ῖ]ν τῇ πόλιν πιὸν (ll.9-10)*

*οίδε βουλόμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἑλευθέραν καὶ αὐτόνομον τὴν πατρίδα διαμένειν (ll.1-2)*

*οίδε βουλόμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἑλευθέραν καὶ αὐτόνομον τὴν πατρίδα διαμένειν (ll.1-2)*
<table>
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<th>Number and Reference</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<th>Context</th>
<th>Eleutheria</th>
<th>Demokratia</th>
<th>Autonomia</th>
<th>Soteria</th>
<th>Nomoi and Politeia, inc. Patrios</th>
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<td>46. SV 545; T.Calymnii T XII</td>
<td>Kos</td>
<td>c.200</td>
<td>Homopoli-teia between Kos and Kalymna</td>
<td>ἐμμενῶ</td>
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<td>ταὶ καθεστακυίαι δαμοκρατίαι καὶ ταὶ ἀποκαταστάσει</td>
<td>τὰς ὀμοπολιτείας καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ἐγ Κώι πατρίοις (ll.14-16)</td>
<td>ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ οὐδὲ τύραννον οὐδὲ ἄλλο πολιτεύμα ξω δαμοκρατίας οὐ καταστάσω παρευρέσει οὐδεμιᾶι (ll.21-2)</td>
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<td>47. I.Cret. IV 184a</td>
<td>Gortyn</td>
<td>3rd century</td>
<td>Gortyn confirms status to Kaudians</td>
<td>ἐλευθέρων καὶ αὐτονόμους καὶ αὐτοδίκοντας τὰ πορτὶ ψευτόνς τὸν (ll.5-6)</td>
<td>ἐλευθέρων καὶ αὐτονόμους καὶ αὐτοδίκοντας τὰ πορτὶ ψευτόνς τὸν (ll.5-6)</td>
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