
Thomas W. Higgins

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The University of Edinburgh
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Abstract

Many African Independent Churches emerged during the colonial era in central Kenya and western Nigeria. At times they were opposed by government officials and missionaries. Most scholars have limited the field of enquiry to the flash-points of this encounter, thereby emphasizing the relationship at its most severe. This study questions current assumptions about the encounter which have derived from these studies, arguing that both government and missionary officials in Kenya and Nigeria exhibited a broader range of perspectives and responses to African Independent Churches. To characterize them as mainly hostile to African Independent Churches is inaccurate.

This study also explores the various encounters between African Independent Churches and African politicians, clergymen, and local citizens. While some scholars have discussed the positive role of Africans in encouraging the growth of independent Christianity, this study will discuss the history in greater depth and complexity. The investigation will show the importance of understanding the encounter on both a local and national level, and the relationships between the two. It is taken for granted that European officials had authority over African leaders, but in regard to this topic many Africans possessed a largely unrecognized ability to influence and shape European perceptions of new religious movements.

Finally, this thesis will discuss how African Independent Churches sometimes provoked negative responses from others through confrontational missionary methods, caustic rhetoric, intimidation and even violence. These three themes resurface throughout the history of the encounter and illustrate how current assumptions can be reinterpreted. This thesis suggests the necessity of expanding the primary scholarly focuses, as well as altering the language and basic assumptions of the previous histories of the encounter.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABREVIATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1</td>
<td>Anglicans and Aladura in Yorubaland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td>The Colonial Administration and the Aladura in Yorubaland</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3</td>
<td>Anglicans and African Independent Churches in Central Kenya</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4</td>
<td>The Colonial Administration and African Independent Churches in Central Kenya</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCHIVAL SOURCES</td>
<td></td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMS PUBLICATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOURNAL ARTICLES</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
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<td><em>International Bulletin of Missionary Research</em></td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This thesis seeks to show how current characterizations of mission and government responses to African Independent Churches (AIC) are based on a limited number of themes, and for that reason, stereotypes about them may at times be inaccurate. It will be argued that this is primarily the case because scholars have often narrowed their focus in the encounter to European officials and missionaries and largely neglected African officials and African Anglicans. In addition, there has been a tendency to focus primarily upon conflict, division and hostility at the expense of other aspects of the encounter. Many of the histories of the encounter in this study have also been written with the primary interest of identifying with AICs. This approach was part of the positive desire to make Africans the centre of African history. One of the consequences for the history of the encounter, however, was that many of these studies failed to explore the breadth and depth of missionary and government actions and attitudes. The present thesis seeks to address this in the following ways. The history will be expanded to show that European mission and government officials possessed a considerable variety of attitudes about AICs;

1 Instead of African Independent Church, some scholars prefer to use the terms, African Indigenous Church, African Initiated Church or African Instituted Church.
Africans within the church and the colonial administration played a central role in the encounter; and AICs were complicit in fostering or creating some of the negativity of the encounter. These three aspects of the encounter have not been explored exhaustively, and in some cases not at all. By including broader discussions on these three aspects of the encounter, it will become evident that some assumptions about the encounter may be inaccurate.

This thesis is not intended to be a complete history of the encounter. Rather, it is meant to discuss additional aspects of the encounter and to show how these neglected examples should inform current understandings. Thus, it should be seen as a supplement to existing scholarship and a partial critique. It is not intended to replace other studies because not every perspective will be represented on every topic. This would swell the present study to an unmanageable size, and in many cases it would simply be impossible. AIC accounts of the encounter tend to focus on certain episodes, while the documents that this study is based upon tend to focus on other episodes, so it is not simply a matter of comparing two versions of the same story.

African Independent Churches have been described as churches started by Africans, governed by Africans and primarily for Africans. The first AICs emerged in Africa starting in the nineteenth century. The debate over how to describe AICs in academic circles has been nearly continuous since the publication of Bengt Sundkler’s _Bantu Prophets in South Africa_. The movement is so large and diverse that it resists broad description and categorization. Many scholars have at least agreed upon two basic types of AICs. The first type of AICs has been described as Ethiopian or African Churches, which appeared first in Ghana in 1862 and South Africa in 1882. The first African Churches in Nigeria came into existence six years later. These churches broke away from mission churches for various reasons.

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3 This common definition has been attributed to H. W. Turner.
6 The first African Church to emerge in Nigeria was the Native Baptist Church in Lagos. Sanneh, _West African Christianity_, 174.
including: economic, social, theological and historical. However, they were not radical innovators of the basic mission model. Lamin Sanneh believes that their primary importance was symbolic; they were “the proof that Africans … had arrived at a sense of responsibility for the future direction of the Church in their continent.”

The next type of AICs first emerged in the second decade of the twentieth century and was known in different parts of Africa as Zionist, Spirit, or Aladura churches. These innovative churches usually possessed a strong emphasis on prayer, healing, prophecy, and the Holy Spirit, and were sometimes led by a prophet figure.

**Scope and Methodology**

This study is designed to facilitate a comparison between east and west Africa, and particularly the Yoruba of western Nigeria and the Kikuyu and Kamba of central Kenya (some discussion will also be made of the encounter among Luo and Luyia of western Kenya). The second comparison will be made between political and religious perspectives. Thus, chapters one and three will be devoted to exploring religious responses to AICs in western Nigeria and central Kenya respectively. The second and fourth chapters will be devoted to discussing government responses to AICs in western Nigeria and central Kenya respectively.

Not every religious perspective about AICs can be explored in this study; therefore, it will focus primarily upon Anglicans, who were the product of the missionary activity of the Church Missionary Society. The study will be limited to the events that took place between the years 1918 to 1960 and will only look at a select group of AICs. This study will not deal with members of the business and settler communities, nor will it systematically consider the responses of the broader African community to AICs, though they all played an important part in this history. Furthermore, very little attention can be given to responses of Muslims and members of African Traditional (Indigenous) Religion.

This study looks at attitudes and responses towards certain AICs. In western Nigeria, the three AICs that will be the focus of this study are all Aladura churches and include, the Church of the Lord Aladura, the Christ Apostolic Church and the

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Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim. In central Kenya, the following AICs will be explored: the African Orthodox Church, the Kikuyu Karing’a Education Association, the African Independent Pentecostal Church, the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, the Arathi, the African Christian Church and Schools, and the African Brotherhood Church. Also, several AICs from western Kenya will be touched upon when relevant, including, the African Israel Church Nineveh, the Nomiya Luo Mission, the Dini ya Roho.

The evidence used in this study is primarily archival, depending largely upon the Special Collections at the University of Birmingham and the Harold Turner Collection at the Selly Oak campus. Documents were also found in the New College Library and the Andrew Walls Library both located at the University of Edinburgh, and at the University of Ibadan Special Collections in Nigeria. The bulk of sources on government officials came from the National Archives of Nigeria and Kenya at Ibadan and Nairobi respectively. There is a great body of unexplored documents relating to the encounter at these locations; they were written by Africans and Europeans, members of AICs and missions, political and religious leaders. They allow one to discover a spectrum of responses to AICs from people in various locations, who were all intimately involved in the encounter, but may not have been included in other studies. These archives have preserved intimate first-hand accounts of the encounter, very near to when the events were actually occurring. They are of immense value because they allow the historian to read the detailed thoughts of those who were involved in the episodes.
Chapter 1
Anglicans and Aladura in Yorubaland

The Church of England gave birth to several missionary societies; the Church Missionary Society (CMS) was supported by its more evangelically minded members. For a time the Yoruba Mission in western Nigeria was the most celebrated of all CMS missions around the world.¹ It began on 17 December 1842, when Henry Townsend and his wife landed at Badagry with a group of missionaries from Sierra Leone. Andrew Wilhelm, Mr. and Mrs. Gollmer, Mr. and Mrs. Crowther, Mr. Marsh, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Willoughby and nine others came ashore intent on founding a mission in Abeokuta. When travel to Abeokuta was temporarily impeded due to civil unrest, they began instead at Badagry. Progress was frustratingly slow in this economically depressed city; for eighteen months they toiled in Badagry to gain a toehold in Nigeria.² The result of their labour was disappointing, but from these inauspicious origins sprouted the Nigerian Anglican Church.³

This chapter focuses on the Anglicans who grew out of this humble enclave at Badagry, and discusses their perspectives and responses to the Aladura movement between 1918 and 1960. The Aladura is a group of African Independent Churches (AIC) that predominated in Yorubaland, western Nigeria. Anglican responses to the Aladura are diverse and resist generalizations. This chapter will challenge current understandings of the encounter by giving greater emphasis to the regional contexts and to the background of the Anglican Church. This reassessment will also proceed from discussions of unexplored encounters between Anglicans and African Independent Churches.

³ After this point, the term “Anglican” will be used for any member of the global Anglican communion.
The Yoruba occupy much of the land between the Niger River and the western border of Nigeria. J. D. Y. Peel offers a broad description of the Yoruba in, *Aladura: a Religious Movement among the Yoruba.* “The best definition of the Yoruba,” he writes, “apart from a linguistic one, would be all those people who trace back their origins to the city of Ile-Ife, where, according to one Yoruba myth, the human race was created, or who, as the Yoruba themselves put it, call themselves ‘sons of Odudua.’” Peel cautions against relying too heavily upon any single definition because this diverse ethnic, cultural and linguistic group of some eight million people encompasses multiple subgroups with unique heritages. Also, other ethnic groups in the area comprise around 30% of the total population of Yorubaland, thus it would be a mistake to assume the existence of uniformity among the inhabitants of Yorubaland.5

**The Birth of Anglicanism in Nigeria**

The Yoruba were the most numerous ethnic group among the Africans resettled in Sierra Leone by the British navy as part of the effort to end the transatlantic slave trade.6 Many engaged in trade and crafts, married and had families, and some of them converted to Christianity. While many Yoruba prospered in Sierra Leone, others did not and longed to return to their homeland. In 1839, a group of twenty-three Yoruba merchants left for Nigeria;7 less than five years later, some 300 emigrants settled in Badagry and 500 in Abeokuta.8 At the same time, a religious movement began in Sierra Leone to bring the gospel to other parts of West Africa. The Church Missionary Association, a partner with the CMS, began in 1840 for this purpose, and two years later they sent Henry Townsend, Samuel Crowther, and several others to Nigeria to start the Yoruba Mission.9

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Despite difficulties in Badagry, the CMS work outpaced Thomas Freeman’s Methodist mission, which had arrived in Nigeria shortly before Townsend’s party. In 1845, the political situation calmed enough to send D. Hinderer, a German missionary with the CMS, and a party of missionaries to Abeokuta. The *Saro* community (immigrants from Sierra Leone) had written to the CMS asking them to come and with this opening, the mission station fared better in Abeokuta than in Badagry; by 1849 it claimed 500 adherents. With the work in Badagry organized, and a mission in Lagos under Mr. Gollmer well in hand, Hinderer and his wife Anna, visited Ibadan in 1848 to see about the possibility of starting a station. Four years later they planted a church in Kutedi, just south of Ibadan, and several outposts were opened by two Sierra Leonean missionaries, Mr. Allan and Mr. Johnson. That same year, Adolphus Mann, a German missionary with the CMS began a mission at Ijaye.10

Several years earlier, the CMS had sent a German linguist named J. F. Schon and a Yoruba *Saro* named Samuel A. Crowther to accompany the Niger Expedition in 1841.11 The report that Crowther and Schon submitted to the Executive Committee convinced the CMS to begin the Niger Mission.12 Samuel Crowther was chosen to pioneer the new mission, which would make use of the Niger River to move inland. He accompanied a commercial expedition in 1857 and established CMS communities in and around Onitsha.13 After that point, and due largely to the skill and persistence of Crowther, the expansion of the Niger Mission was relatively quick. The second station was established at Bonny in 1866, Brass two years later, and Asaba in 1875. By 1915 stations were planted in Awka and Kaiyama, Ebu, Patani, Igbide and Ogwashi.14

Though the Niger Mission falls outside the parameters of this study, it claims a special place in the history of Christianity in Africa. According to J. B. Webster, “The Delta mission became Christianity’s greatest success in nineteenth-century

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11 The Niger Expedition was a commercial venture that explored the Niger River and was headed by Scottish trader Macgregor Laird.  
West Africa...”\(^{15}\) Unfortunately, space does not allow for a detailed description of the contributions of Crowther or the development of the Niger Mission, but this story has been well documented by other scholars.\(^{16}\)

During this period Yorubaland was fertile ground for many mission societies. Soon there were five separate mission organizations in the region: the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, the Church Missionary Society, the Free Church of Scotland, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the Roman Catholic Society of African Missionaries or White Fathers. Waves of missionaries arrived on Nigerian shores, but the climate levied a heavy toll on these new recruits. In 1895, six CMS missionaries came to Nigeria; within a few weeks, five died and the remaining missionary did not last the year. But due to the perseverance of the missionaries and the initiative of Nigerian Christians, the CMS extended into the interior and became the dominant Protestant missionary body in Nigeria.\(^{17}\)

The 1880s and the 1890s saw an increase in the tension between some European and African church leaders in Nigeria due to the changing attitudes of the former to the latter - the result of changing political conditions and social thinking of the time. A new sort of missionary, heavily influenced by an ardent evangelicalism, also played a role. The strain was apparent when the time came to select Bishop Samuel Crowther’s successor. European missionaries were divided on the matter, but the most vocal faction thought the next bishop should be a European. The matter came to a head during the Onitsha Finance Committee Meeting (1891) when charges were levelled against several African pastors by this faction. Thus began what J. B. Webster described in somewhat extreme language as the ‘Niger Purge.’ It involved the dismissal of several ordained and lay agents on what many believed to be trumped up charges. During the fallout, Crowther drew up plans for the Niger Delta Pastorate, which would be independent of the CMS. The Hamilton-Allen Deputation (1891) was sent by the Archbishop of Canterbury in December in the hopes of averting a permanent break. In January 1892 the deputation recommended a

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compromise - the appointments of a European bishop and an assistant Nigerian bishop. The Englishman, Joseph Hill, was consecrated bishop and the Nigerians, Isaac Oluwole and Charles Phillips were made assistant bishops. Many interpreted the Settlement of 1894 as a judgment of the failure of Crowther’s leadership and a slight against African leadership generally. Lamin Sanneh described the impact of the humiliation of Crowther on Nigerian Christianity in the following way: “The adverse view the CMS came to take of the work of Bishop Crowther in the Niger Mission was a significant factor in generating an active reservoir of separatist sentiment from which Indepedency was to gush forth in bursts of quick succession.” Though the first African Churches to separate from the missions did so before the so-called ‘Niger Purge,’ the event was part of a larger trend in African Christianity. The situation with the Niger Delta Pastorate reflected divisions felt in many churches in Nigeria.

The 1910s and 1920s saw a continuation of the growth of the CMS especially in the Districts of Ilesha, Ife, Ekiti and Ondo. The Annual Report of the CMS Committee stated, “…as a mission field, it [Nigeria] has in the last few years recorded the largest number of baptisms, larger than Uganda, larger even than all India or all China.” There were other advances during this period as well. In 1911, Provisional Church Councils were created in Ondo and Owo, adding to the three existing councils in Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan; these were touted as important steps toward the indigenous leadership of the church. There were also notable advances in educational missions and in ventures like the CMS bookshops.

The contribution of Nigerian Christian leaders was central to the growth of the Anglican Church. During this period Nigerians from Lagos were responsible for instigating and financing mission work in Ijebu. The Bishop of Lagos admitted that many Anglican communities began without his knowledge. Only after these unregistered groups requested a catechist or teacher did church leadership become

18 Webster, *The African Churches among the Yoruba*, 30-60.
aware of their presence.\textsuperscript{24} This reality certainly had an impact on the ability of missionaries to control the church at the local level. Because of this rapid growth, demand soon outstripped the capabilities of the mission network and there was uncertainty about how to meet the many requests from the indigenous population. Despite this pervasive sentiment in the 1930s, missionaries held onto the belief that training and directing new converts was God’s mandate for them.\textsuperscript{25} And despite much criticism they remained in Yorubaland, largely controlling the affairs of the Anglican Church until political independence was achieved in 1960.

\textbf{The Aladura Movement in Yorubaland}

The Aladura, or literally ‘the praying people’ in Yoruba, trace their origin to the period after 1918.\textsuperscript{26} Though this movement eventually grew beyond the boundaries of Yorubaland, it began and remains vital there to this day. Peel suggests that the Aladura emerged due to several causes: social change in Yoruba society, the growth of Christianity, the decline of African Traditional (Indigenous) Religion, the financial depression, natural disasters and epidemics.\textsuperscript{27} The Aladura churches are not unified in any official sense, but because they “have enough similarity in their origins, beliefs, leadership, and rituals to be known locally by the same term…” they are commonly lumped together.\textsuperscript{28} This chapter will focus on three Aladura Churches: the Christ Apostolic Church (CAC), the Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim (CS), and the Church of the Lord, Aladura (COL).\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} “Cooperation of African and British,” \textit{CMR} LXXV, June (1924): 166.
\textsuperscript{27} Peel, \textit{Aladura}, 292.
\textsuperscript{29} Two other prominent Aladura Churches are the Celestial Church of Christ and the Evangelical Church of Yahweh.
Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim

Moses Tunolase Orimolade was one of the founders of the Cherubim and Seraphim. He was born in the 1870s and became a Christian as a young man. In 1916, he visited the CMS church at Akoko where he impressed the congregation with his preaching abilities. Orimolade had ties to the African Church as well, spending time in Agege and eventually settling in Lagos, preaching during the week at Jehovah Shalom, the United Native African Church Cathedral. After a seven-year sickness and partial healing, he began his prophetic ministry. His early evangelistic tours took him throughout much of Yorubaland, in addition to parts of the Delta and the North. Initially, Orimolade encouraged converts to enter or to remain in the mission churches and resisted association with any single denomination. In 1925, he returned to Lagos and continued his preaching and healing ministry.

The Cherubim and Seraphim traces its origins also to the ministry of a young woman, Abiodun Akinsowon. Tradition states that she was contacted by an angel in June 1925 who told her to ‘proclaim His work on earth.’ Thereafter, she fell into a trance in which she experienced visions of celestial realms, was stricken with an illness and confined to bed. She was instructed in the vision to find Moses Orimolade and receive prayer lest she die. The prediction proved true; shortly after receiving prayer from Orimolade she recovered. Together they started the prayer group Egbe Serafu or Seraphim Society on 9 September 1925. The prayer meetings of the Society were held primarily in Orimolade’s home. The Baba Aladura and ‘Captain’ Abiodun, as they were known, also travelled around Nigeria preaching and healing.

The religious partnership between Orimolade and Akinsowon did not last indefinitely, however. In 1928, shortly after Akinsowon left the Anglican Church, the two founders parted ways. The primary cause of the division was a personality conflict, but it also had to do with the ‘improper’ relationship between Orimolade and a female congregant named Layinka Ijesha. Orimolade named his branch, the Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim and Akinsowon kept the name,

30 Peel, Aladura, 60-1.
31 Omoyajowo, Cherubim and Seraphim, 31.
32 Ibid., 5-6.
33 Peel, Aladura, 71-80.
Cherubim and Seraphim Society. Over the years additional religious bodies came out of the CS until by 1968, there were fourteen different CS derived groups registered in Lagos.35

The Christ Apostolic Church

Meanwhile in Ijebu Ode a prayer movement was afoot. In 1918 the influenza epidemic mercilessly ravaged Ijebu. J. B. Sadare, an Anglican Warden was holding meetings in his home when he heard the preaching of nineteen year-old Sophie Odunlami and suggested that they create the *Egbe Okuta Iyebiye* or Precious Stone (Diamond) Society. The society began to develop a unique set of theological emphases, which depended more upon dreams, visions and faith healing. In December 1923, Sadare led a group of people out of the Anglican Church because of his opposition to its positions on these theological issues. Some sixty people were re-baptized into this new community, which eventually became known as the Christ Apostolic Church.36

One member of the Precious Stone Society, David Ogunleye Odubanjo, was influenced by the literature of the Faith Tabernacle from the United States, especially the tract entitled *Sword of the Spirit* that championed concepts of faith healing. He wrote to the Faith Tabernacle and invited them to send missionaries. After discussions with the American missionary, A. Clark, the Precious Stone Society associated with the Faith Tabernacle and changed its name accordingly. It was not long, however, before doctrinal differences became apparent between some of the Nigerian and American members of the Faith Tabernacle; this was exacerbated by certain moral failings of Clark and in 1928 they chose to go separate ways.

Prior to the break, the Faith Tabernacle began to attract other Christians. J. A. Babatope began a church in Ilesha and Isaac Babalola Akinyele became a leader in Ibadan. One of the most important leaders of the Faith Tabernacle was the unassuming figure of Joseph Babalola, a steam-roller driver who experienced a vision that convinced him to begin preaching and healing. He joined after meeting I. B. Akinyele in Ibadan and was baptized by D. O. Odubanjo at Ebute Metta in 1929. Babalola played a special role in the 1930 revival that began in Ilesha and spread

35 Omoyajowo, *Cherubim and Seraphim*, 65.
throughout Yorubaland, including Ijesha, Ekiti and Akoko. Initially the revivalists preached a message of conversion to Christianity without claiming that one denomination was superior to the others, but over time, they began to channel converts into the Aladura churches.

After the American and Nigerian Faith Tabernacles divided, the British Pentecostal church known as the Apostolic Church heard about the Aladura and suggested a collaboration. The Apostolic Church sent D. P. Williams, George Perfect and others, and after preliminary discussions the Nigerian contingent of the Faith Tabernacle joined the Apostolic Church in 1931. Williams ordained several members of the community and returned to England, leaving Perfect in charge of organizing the movement.

The relationship between the Nigerian and British leaders of the Apostolic Church began to sour, however, in 1939 when some pastors publicly distanced themselves from the British church. The division revolved around the matter of faith healing. Allegedly, the British missionaries did not “depend entirely on God for physical healing.” A public split occurred in 1940. The group that separated from the British Apostolic Church was led by figures such as Akinyele, Odubanjo and Babalola and they renamed themselves the Nigerian Apostolic Church (later this was changed to United Apostolic Church and then to the Christ Apostolic Church).

**Church of the Lord Aladura**

The Church of the Lord, Aladura was started by Josiah Olunlowo Oshitelu of Ogere. Born in 1902, he reportedly possessed unique spiritual powers even as a child. Between 1913 and 1919 he attended an Anglican school at Porogun in Ijebu-Ode. After graduating, he was made a pupil teacher by the CMS and taught in

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37 Ibid., 91.
39 This distinction between ‘American’ and ‘Nigerian’ has limited applicability, for there were many Nigerians who remained with the American Faith Tabernacle missionaries. These terms have only been used in this case for the sake of clarity.
41 Ibid.
42 Peel, *Aladura*, 111-12.
several cities, including, Abeokuta, Asha, Erunbe and Erukute. He was a twenty-three year old Anglican catechist when he had a vision that frightened him so much he temporarily left work. Oshitelu consulted Samuel Shomoye, a prophetic figure associated with the Aladura, who interpreted the vision as a call to ministry. After being dismissed from the Anglican Church for introducing certain ‘irregularities’ into church practice in 1926, Oshitelu returned to Shomoye and remained with him for a further three years. He continued to have visions and develop his spiritual gifts of prayer and healing. At the end of this period he declared ‘The Gospel of Joy’ which was a ten part tract: three points dealing with the failings of Muslims, Christians and traditionalists, three prophesying the judgment of God, and four promising Divine healing. By 1930 he had garnered a degree of notoriety in Ijebuland and gathered a small group of ten followers - the beginnings of the Church of the Lord. Babalola and Akineyele visited Oshitelu in Ogere, but others, including Sadare, were leery of his ideas and remained aloof. For a time Oshitelu associated with the Babalola Revival, which was taking place in Ilesha, but began his own revival after falling out with the Faith Tabernacle over his ideas about the ‘revealed names of angels,’ ‘revealed words’ and witch finding.

Oshitelu’s early evangelistic campaigns took place in Abeokuta and Ibadan. By 1931 he had organized several congregations. Three years later the COL had opened churches in Ijebu, Ondo, Ekiti, Benin and Ilesha. The period of the greatest growth was between 1938 and 1950, when he added an average of three new branches each year.

The Initial Encounters between Anglicans and Aladura

Current assumptions about the encounter between Anglicans and the Aladura stem primarily, though not exclusively, from Aladura oral sources. The

44 Ibid., 18.
45 Peter B. Clarke, West Africa and Christianity (London: Edward Arnold, 1986), 175.
49 Turner, History of an African Independent Church, vol. 1, 54-60.
50 See footnote two in the Introduction.
methodological weakness of an approach that favours AIC oral histories in the encounter is quite clear. As important and relevant as these sources are, they do not offer an impartial representation of missionaries, government officials or other Africans. A closer look at other documents relating to the encounter reveals that scholarly reliance upon Aladura sources has skewed the history. Most secondary accounts of the encounter between Anglicans and the Aladura exclude or ignore a number of important episodes that could offer another side of missionary and government attitudes.51 In addition, most accounts of the encounter between Aladura and Anglicans focus on a small number of pivotal incidents during the period of schism, certainly the most heated and bitter moments, inadvertently emphasizing the points of crisis as normative. This chapter hopes to begin to correct some misconceptions by filling in the gaps of previous histories and expanding the discussion about the encounter in Yorubaland.

The events leading to schism between the Anglican Church and Aladura members have been documented by scholars, including, J. D. Y. Peel, J. A. Omoyajowo, R. C. Mitchell, H. W. Turner, and C. O. Oshun. All of these authors emphasize the antagonistic opposition of Anglicans. Omoyajowo proposes that the ‘intolerance’ of mission churches gradually pushed the Cherubim and Seraphim away.52 If this idea of intolerance suggests a series of steps towards schism, the first may have been when Archdeacon T. A. J. Ogunbiyi dismissed Akinsowon’s visions as hallucinations. This led to her meeting with Orimolade. The next step towards separation was Ogunbiyi’s concern about the, “explicit comparison of the members [of the Cherubim and Seraphim] with the Seraphim in heaven” and the extent of this community’s veneration of Orimolade.53 Oral sources claim that members of the CS in Lagos were forbidden special services in the mission churches, like baptisms, weddings, confirmation and burials. If true, these actions ostracized members of the CS.54 Another curious CS tradition was that Ogunbiyi became jealous of Moses Orimolade, even violent towards him, and sought to attack him through the use of

51 Many of the examples that will be explored below have never been discussed in previous histories of the encounter.
52 Omoyajowo, Cherubim and Seraphim, 9.
53 Ibid., 11.
54 No record was found in Anglican sources to support this account and the author gave no footnote. Omoyajowo, Cherubim and Seraphim, 60.
traditional medicine. These accounts are not corroborated in CMS sources, but must be admitted as part of the Aladura point of view.

The case of Ogunbiyi’s relationship to the Aladura brings up an important point for this discussion and the broader history of the encounter. To what extent should the perspective of one Anglican individual be used to represent the whole? In the local context one finds all sorts of ‘personal’ conflicts that reflected personal interests and not the views of the larger body. In many cases, local disputes were unknown to people outside of the immediate vicinity. Assumptions about ‘Anglicans’ as well as the ‘Aladura’ must be qualified by such considerations. To say that Ogunbiyi’s perspective was one Anglican perspective (and even important in the local context) is justified, but his ‘personal’ conflicts do not represent an ‘official’ Anglican position. This distinction is applicable in other cases as well. Archdeacon W. E. Owen’s attitude towards the Dini ya Roho of Kenya is another example of a personal and idiosyncratic response to AICs, which has factored largely in Cynthia Hoehler-Fatton’s characterizations of the encounter. As case studies, Owen and Ogunbiyi are interesting and important, but not representative.

The failure of the relationship of the Precious Stone Society (CAC) and Anglican Church took place in 1922 due to a theological disagreement between Bishop Melville Jones and Reverend Joseph Sadare. The Bishop was concerned about the new theological ideas that Sadare was expounding. From Sadare’s point of view, the dispute was about his perceived right to live according to his own theological convictions, while for the Bishop it was a matter of Sadare’s failure to live according to previous theological commitments. In order to become an ordained minister in the Anglican Church, Sadare ascribed to certain theological tenets. As his theology began to evolve, he put more confidence in dreams and visions; this in turn had a direct influence on his rejection of infant baptism. Another intensifying conviction was the rejection of all medicine (Melville Jones was only concerned by his rejection of western medicine). Sadare repeatedly assured Melville Jones that he was willing to remain within accepted norms of Anglican theology, but in the end he

55 These are traditions of the CS and certain African Churches. Omoyajowo, Cherubim and Seraphim, 11, 18, 34.
could not. During the Synod of 1922, Melville Jones lamented Sadare’s ‘broken promise’ and informed those gathered that he asked Sadare to resign.\textsuperscript{58}

The relationship between the Anglican Church and Oshitelu (COL) ended over theological differences as well.\textsuperscript{59} The foundation of these differences was revelations that came through Oshitelu’s visions. These visions began in May 1925 while he was a CMS teacher at Erukute. They influenced his behaviour and outlook, though he had not taught them to fellow congregants. According to Harold Turner, opposition came against him from two directions. The woman he hoped to marry pressured him to forget the new revelations and D. M. George, the sub-district leader at Ishan insisted that he follow accepted church precepts. He parted ways with both the woman and the Anglican Church. On 2 February 1926 he was temporarily suspended, and then permanently dismissed by the Abeokuta District Council for ‘erroneous’ beliefs.\textsuperscript{60}

These schisms are merely the first chapter in the history of the encounter. If one ends discussion of the encounter at this point, it is quite logical to conclude that Anglicans were hostile to the Aladura. Ultimately, Peel, Turner, Omoyajowo, and Oshun come to this conclusion despite the fact that they all admit variations. The present study is based in part upon the conclusion that there are simply too many variations for them to be considered ‘exceptions.’ On the whole, scholars assert that the Aladura were victimized, persecuted and ‘unendingly opposed’ by the older churches.\textsuperscript{61} According to one author, the Aladura experienced an almost unsurpassed degree of coercion, ridicule and contempt from mission churches.\textsuperscript{62} Such generalizations deserve a sympathetic, but critical response.

Another relevant point is the degree of independence enjoyed by the Aladura whilst affiliated with the Anglican Church. The Precious Stone Society organized and governed their prayer society independently, though with the nominal oversight

\textsuperscript{58} Turner, \textit{History of an African Independent Church}, vol. 1, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{59} Some believe that Oshitelu’s refusal to be monogamous played a role in souring his relationship with the Anglican Church, though Turner asserts that if polygamy was a factor, it was not the primary one. Turner, \textit{History of an African Church}, vol. 1, 47.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 41.
of a local Anglican pastor. Turner described them as ‘semi-autonomous’ by 1920. Bishop Melville Jones visited the society several times and even gave them the nickname ‘Purity Band,’ but his visit was not in an official capacity. Apparently, the Anglican Church had no day to day control over the Seraphim Society. The Cherubim and Seraphim merely associated with the Anglican Church as it did with other denominations. Furthermore, Moses Orimolade, “…was neither a disgruntled nor a rebellious member of any denomination.” Oshitelu of the Church of the Lord ceased to be involved with the Anglican Church several years before he began his prophetic ministry. Taking these points into consideration, the early Aladura leaders can be described as individuals and small groups loosely connected to Anglicanism.

It should also be stated that these initial encounters were not between large, clearly defined groups, but usually conflicts between a few individuals. While eventually many Anglicans joined Aladura churches, they did not form substantial units at the points of schism. The disparate nature of the Aladura movement and the gradual exodus from the Anglican Church probably affected the way Anglican leaders responded to them. For this reason, it is quite difficult to describe the encounter in its early years as interaction between two clearly distinguished groups (i.e. Anglicans and Aladura).

Perhaps the most definitive collective Anglican response to the Aladura movement in the early years took place at a meeting of the Lagos Synod in 1933, several years after the emergence of these three Aladura groups. Some members of the synod felt that it was necessary to establish finally an official policy towards the Aladura movement. Motion 8 was raised by H. V. E. Johnson and B. F. Adesola. They asked “the Bishop of the Diocese to give attention to the rise of such bodies as the Seraphim, Aladura and the like, and to consider what steps if any should be [taken] with regard to them.” Essentially, they were asking if the Anglican Church should oppose the Aladura movement openly and collectively, or not at all. The

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66 Omoyajowo, *Cherubim and Seraphim*, 3.
67 Lagos Synod, “Motion No. 8,” 1933. UIL: WFS. This record was found in the W. F. Sosan Papers at the University of Ibadan Library and was torn and illegible in places.
record of the discussion is so enlightening that it will be given word-for-word where legible.

Rev. Latunde first spoke in disfavor of the motion [to oppose the Aladura]. He said he would suggest indirect attack by way [of] sermon on the pulpits to convince the members of our Church ... [who] joined the Order instead of excommunicating them, as it appears to be religious persecution if the latter measure ... be adopted; he also explained how he ... succeeded to win most of his members back to the church by weighing the good and the evil obtaining in the Seraphim Society in the balance of his sermon, and he thinks this is the best and most effective way.

Revs. Kuti, Olanle, Adejume and Mr. Adegboyega opposed the acceptance of the motion.

Rev. Adayinka was of the opinion that the motion be accepted because so many Churches have been broken down through the members joining these movements.

Rev. Delumo was of opinion that our members joining the Seraphim Order should be left alone as long as they do their duties in the church but if the rumor is true that certain sections of them are preparing to build a church, then the matter needs attention.

Bishop Howells then rose up and said that he does not agree with those speakers who opposed the motion and since the Methodist Mission had made a pronouncement about it, there is no reason why we should not.

The Diocesan [Bishop Melville Jones] then addressed the Meeting thus: “the Memorandum put up by the Wesleyans is with me at home; it is very easy to condemn a thing in theory but hard in practice. In a daily newspaper I read of one Wesleyan Minister who attended the consecration service held in one of the African Churches. I regret to see that. If the Wesleyans had made a pronouncement against such bodies, they would not have allowed their minister to go. I agree with my fellow Bishop [Howells] that no member who joined Seraphim and Aladura Movement should be allowed to hold offices in the church. I have disciplined some teachers for it. The lay readers are not to join such movements. This is different from excommunicating all from Holy Communion. These are the two measures of discipline in the church. The first one I can apply to the Seraphim Members [not allowing them to hold office] but not the second [excommunication]. Some of the speakers suggest that there should be not religious persecution. That is good.

We should in the first place clean our own houses. When the Diamond Society in Ijebu Ode started, I went there to address them. I took from them all the idols and charms etc. taken from members of our church there. When
Seraphim just started, one prominent member of our Church brought two large baskets full of charms to my courtyard taken from Xtians. When they [the Cherubim and Seraphim] started, they showed ... the corruptions in the Church. Let the pastors teach the people not to place their confidence in charms.

The next thing is we want to teach people truth. If a man takes poison we [must] find [a] remedy for him. The antidote to this thing is to teach them the truth, and if you listen to the address given this morning, the preacher gave pressure to the fact of propagating the gospel, and if we begin to teach people truth, there will be no opportunity for these people to seduce people away. If the Church has established the Xtian faith healing, it would have been otherwise.

I was examining some Candidates in the interior for Confirmation and a woman took her child in her arms, I noticed a charm on the person of the child and I asked the mother. She replied that it is to drive away sickness. If she had trusted in Christ, she would not have done so, we do not forbid the use of healing medicines. Let us clear our houses of all charms. If even you accept the motion, you cannot compel me to take the stop.68

The motion was put to vote and not accepted.

This synod illustrates that Anglican clergy were divided on the matter of how to respond to the Aladura. Anglican discussions of the Aladura were still in a state of infancy in 1933. The question being raised was not how to oppose the Aladura, but if they should oppose them collectively, and the tally revealed that the majority opposed any form of collective open opposition or measures such as excommunication. At first glance this appears to contradict the experience of Sadare and perhaps Oshitelu, but the answer is in the text above. Sadare and Oshitelu, according to the synod, could have remained in the Anglican Church, but not in a paid position. This clarifies an important point, for some scholars imply or state openly, that the Aladura were excommunicated from the Anglican Church, but the synod explicitly forbade this type of response.69

The bulk of the opinions offered at the synod came from Nigerian pastors; it was two Nigerians, Johnson and Adesola, who raised the motion in the first place. African Christian leaders were active in the discussions about the Aladura, but it is

68 Ibid.
equally clear that they were disunited amongst themselves. Some pastors wanted to oppose the Aladura, while others downplayed the threat. For instance, Reverend Adayinka was less tolerant of the Aladura than European missionaries, and notably here, Bishop Melville Jones. On the other end of the spectrum, Reverend Delumo had no problem with the Aladura remaining within the Anglican Church.

Finally, this synod reveals that open or collective opposition in the form of excommunication did not come from the top of the church hierarchy. If it did not originate from the synod, what opposition occurred sporadically must have come primarily from lower levels of Anglican leadership and from individuals. This raises interesting and important questions about the source of opposition within the Anglican Church, and specifically, the role of Nigerians in opposing the Aladura. Scholars have not attributed to this synod a proportional weight relative to its historical significance. All other alleged Anglican opposition to the Aladura movement must be interpreted in light of this momentous synod.

**Additional Anglican Perspectives on the Aladura**

Many studies discuss the initial encounters between Anglicans and Aladura, but neglect other encounters that shed additional light on the relationship. This thesis is concerned to a large degree with challenging assumptions about missionary and government perspectives. The fundamental question is, to what extent has there been a selective emphasis on particular perspectives, accompanied by a de-emphasis on other perspectives? Have scholars been as accurate as possible in their generalizations about mission and governmental perspectives? The task of this chapter and thesis is not to turn current assumptions on their heads, rather to make room in the discussion for a more nuanced discussion of this relationship and a more moderate tone. This is not a difficult task in theory, for it is a subtle shift, but in practice one is likely to run up against strongly entrenched assumptions about the mission churches and the government. It is therefore important to discuss many examples of different Anglican perspectives so that the weight of evidence will

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70 Previous studies of the encounter cited above have not discussed any of the examples in this section in detail, with the exception of the perspectives of Bishop Melville Jones.
convince the reader of the wisdom of adopting more cautious and qualified language. This is the main purpose of the following examples.

**H. Dallimore**

Archdeacon H. Dallimore produced one of the most thorough early Anglican records on the Aladura. He was the CMS superintendent in Ekiti District after 1929 and witnessed firsthand the work of the Aladura during the revival of the early 1930s. He was a tireless worker and well respected for his efforts in education and medical missions. Though he could sometimes be strident in his positions and quick to notice the ‘harm’ of the Aladura, he was also willing to acknowledge the ‘good.’ In 1931, he wrote one of the first Anglican tracts on the Aladura in response to the ‘urgent’ need for literature on the subject; unfortunately it was lost by the editor and never published, but he went on to write a number of other articles in CMS organs.71

In May 1931, he noted before the Executive Committee of the Yoruba Mission the harm the Aladura was causing. Reports of Aladura slander against the mission churches were circulating. Anglican leaders, among others, saw Aladura (and AIC) accusations as inflammatory and as designed to incite antagonism.72 Dallimore reserved his severest criticisms for the so-called ‘unscrupulous’ and ‘charlatan’ prophets who sheltered in the shadow of Babalola: those who went about claiming to be the prophet Babalola, who denounced the existing church as ‘full of errors,’ who sought to ‘seduce’ existing Christians,73 and who claimed to abhor the

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72 Allegedly, members of AICs, such as the Russellites, would stand outside Anglican Churches during Sunday morning services and level accusations against them.

73 There was a strong feeling of betrayal in missionary literature regarding instances of ‘sheep stealing.’ It was viewed as benefiting from the toil and sacrifice of another person, building upon the misfortune of Christian brothers and sisters, even exploiting the ‘domestic’ problems (personal disagreements) of other congregations.
‘money grabbing’ of the mission churches yet accepted gifts for their services.\(^\text{74}\) Under-girding his condemnation was the belief that the success of a few prophets would foster a subculture of ‘false teachers.’ Instead of open opposition to the Aladura, however, Dallimore advocated a certain distance or separation so that the Anglican Church may be spared direct conflicts.

When the Aladura movement exploded in Ekiti, Dallimore was familiar enough with the history of the area that he responded, “‘Prophets’ are not a new thing in West Africa . . .”, thus betraying either apathy or apprehension.\(^\text{75}\) He was honest enough to admit that in the past these prophets had occasionally possessed ‘real power.’ He saw them as positive when, for instance, they brought converts into the church in Ara, and as negative when they took members from the church in Efon. As the Aladura movement grew, he made sharp distinctions between the legitimate goals of Joseph Babalola, who was “touched by the Spirit of God,” and some of the ‘unscrupulous’ prophets who gathered around him.\(^\text{76}\) Dallimore never dismissed the Aladura completely. Perhaps he maintained a certain dispassion because he was convinced, especially at the beginning, that it was a movement with limited longevity, or perhaps he was ambivalent because he thought they had limited appeal to ‘mature’ Christians.

Dallimore regarded the Aladura as a component of God’s work in Yorubaland. After witnessing a preaching campaign, Dallimore stated, “It was a wonderful sight to see hundreds of idols and magical instruments surrendered, and to witness the crowds swayed by the personality of the prophet.”\(^\text{77}\) He thought that the Aladura “may be pregnant with much blessing.”\(^\text{78}\) In some areas, they were paving

\(^{74}\) It is unclear how common this practice was among mainstream Aladura, but there is evidence that it did occur at times. In a revealing letter, the Cherubim and Seraphim Prayer Band wrote to Moses Orimolade insisting that he cease charging for prayers, especially since he had publicly condemned the practice saying, “Freely ye have received, freely give.” From the reaction of the Prayer Band, it is clear that the practice was considered unacceptable by some members. However, a decade later several laws inhibiting the practice in the Rules and Regulations of the Cherubim and Seraphim suggest that it was still a problem. See: Praying Band at Balogun Street to Moses Orimolade, 1929. UIL: WFS. “Rules and Regulations of the Sacred Cherubim & Seraphim Missionary Society, Nigeria,” 1939 c. UIL: WFS.

\(^{75}\) Dallimore to Hooper, 18 June 1931.

\(^{76}\) Dallimore, “The Prophet Movement in Ekiti and Beyond,” 3.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., 2.

the way for the CMS and if the Anglican Church could follow the ministry of the prophets there would be considerable gain.

An essential dimension of his response to the Aladura was self-criticism. Dallimore thought that the enormous response to the Aladura reflected a failure of the Anglican Church. He acknowledged the ‘deadness’ of the church, “which is so like a brick wall … We need a shattering earthquake in some cases and in all the fire and the compulsion of the Holy Spirit.” Dallimore called for prayer, Bible study, holy living, and dependence on the Holy Spirit; he began a series of retreats at his home for personal devotions and spiritual renewal.

For Dallimore, the success of Aladura healing campaigns suggested the need for Anglicans to reaffirm their emphasis upon health and wellbeing. “The tremendous response to the appeal of the prophet has been as it were a crying from the house-tops by the non-vocal masses of their needs.” Great among these was the need for health. “We long to be able to tackle the terrible amount of sickness and suffering which the Prophet Movement, by its claim to heal, revealed.” In response to this insight, he called for more of an investment in medical missions, which, to his mind was a healing ministry.

In addition, Dallimore emphasized the need for more trained African and European missionaries, because current recruits were not able to deal with more than a fringe of the work. Ironically, the dwindling numbers of missionaries coincided with the increasing need for them due to the rapid growth of the Anglican Church. The need was so acute, in fact, that in January 1932 the Executive Committee of the Yoruba Mission authorized Dallimore to return home for the purpose of finding recruits for Nigeria. Dallimore also identified the need for theological education of the laity, which would give the congregation the tools to judge the claims of the prophets. Finally, he sought to increase discourse among clergy on the theological questions raised by the Aladura.

79 Dallimore, “Concerning the Prophets,” 2-3.
80 Dallimore, “The Prophet Movement in Ekiti and Beyond,” 3.
81 Dallimore, “Latest news of the Aladura Movement,” 163. This sentiment was echoed by F. Melville Jones at the Lagos Synod. See: Motion No. 8, UIL: WFS.
Alexander Babatunde Akinyele

A. B. Akinyele was born in Ibadan in 1875 and began his ministry in 1910 after being ordained by Bishop Oluwole. He attended Fourah Bay College, earning Bachelor (1912), Master (1925), and Doctoral degrees (1936); he founded the Ibadan Grammar School and remained there from 1914 to 1933, only leaving after he was consecrated Assistant Bishop of Lagos on 15 July. Akinyele reached the pinnacle of his career in the church when he was made Bishop of the newly established Ibadan Diocese in 1952. 82 This chronology places Akinyele in a relatively high position of authority during the formative years of the Aladura, especially the revival of the early 1930s.

Akinyele was uniquely positioned in relation to the Aladura, as his brother, I. B. Akinyele, was prominent within the Christ Apostolic Church. A. B. Akinyele’s correspondence reveals that he was interacting with the concepts churned up by the activities of the Aladura. In a letter to “My Own Dear Brother” in 1926, Akinyele set out his views on faith healing. “I … believe in faith healing as much as you do … I will not only encourage [it], but join … It will be an honour to the … Church of Christ if all our healings would be done in that way; no one would doubt that.” 83 But a key qualification reverberated throughout Akinyele’s correspondence; while he was open to faith healing, a central practice of the Aladura, he opposed those who said that disagreements over faith healing constituted grounds for separation. When mediating a church dispute in Sabongida he warned that “evil … must follow schism...” 84 In the letter to “My Own Dear Brother” he wrote, “I am sure on biblical authority … that anything that savours of separation from an established church is not of Christ,” even a church that he acknowledged was not perfect. 85 The realization that the Anglican Church was at times guilty of corruption was not justification for schism, he argued, for all churches were guilty of this offense to one degree or other. 86 In a memorandum sent to Bishop Melville Jones, entitled “Relationships with Schismatic Bodies,” Akinyele dwelt further upon the great sin of schism, saying

83 Alexander Babatunde Akinyele to My Own Dear Brother, 6 March 1926. UIL: ABA.
84 Alexander Babatunde Akinyele to C. W. Wakeman, 23 February 1934. UIL: ABA.
85 Akinyele to My Own Dear Brother, 6 March 1926.
86 Ibid.
that it was unreasonable to leave “ones own house to take abode in another house simply because one nail or door is out of joint.”

Despite his unyielding views on schism, Akinyele supported a conciliatory response to AICs. He was fairly open to the Aladura and could say, “I respect the [Aladura] movement…” He believed that they had the potential to do great good, but also real harm; in this he paralleled Dallimore, who thought the Aladura was a mixed blessing. In “Relationship with Schismatic Bodies” Akinyele described his position on AICs, especially the so-called African Churches. He did not mention the Aladura by name, but they are at least implicated by the term ‘Schismatic Bodies’ in the title, and since this letter was written during a period when the Aladura were far more influential than the African Churches, it is likely that his comments were aimed at AICs generally.

Akinyele placed Nigerian AICs in the lineage of nonconformist churches that came out of the Church of England. Thus it was not a great intellectual leap for him to suggest that Anglican relations with AICs should, in some respects, mirror relations with other nonconformist churches. This intellectual framework, which situated AICs alongside the Wesleyan Methodists and Baptists as equals in this regard, was a creative and unique approach to church history at this time. One might even describe it as early evidence of the formation an African approach to Christian history or an African church historiography.

For Akinyele, the sticking point in fostering closer relations with AICs was polygamy (though not all AICs in Nigeria practiced or encouraged it). His position was more nuanced than mere rejection, however. In “Relationship with Schismatic Bodies,” he scrutinized the theological position of the United Native African Church on polygamy. The United Native African Church, he stated, accepted polygamy in its constitution because they believed that it was not the type of marriage that was important to God, but the conduct of the man and wife (or wives) within marriage. Since Jesus never explicitly proscribed polygamy, Akinyele saw room for

87 Alexander Babatunde Akinyele, “Relationships with Schismatic Bodies and how to Cope with Them,” to F. Melville Jones, 19 February 1935. UIL: ABA.
88 Akinyele to My Own Dear Brother, 6 March 1926.
89 All subsequent quotes and ideas in this section come from: Alexander Babatunde Akinyele, “Relationships with Schismatic Bodies and how to Cope with Them,” to F. Melville Jones, 19 February 1935. UIL: ABA.
compromise with AICs. But he drew the line when it came to polygamy and church leaders, for the Bible was quite clear that priests and elders should have only one wife. Thus, while he viewed AICs as similar to other nonconformist churches in origins, he pointed to an important difference between many of them on the question of polygamy – a difference which had ramifications for the question of closer union.

Akinyele supported closer relations with AICs, even those AICs who allowed their laity to practice polygamy. He was also a proponent of practices, such as faith healing, which were central to the Aladura. It is apparent from these documents that there was a considerable degree of compatibility between these key Aladura positions and this Anglican bishop. Akinyele’s correspondence further establishes the pattern of African involvement and influence in the debate on AICs. Akinyele was, himself, an influential Anglican, but because of his correspondence with Bishop Melville Jones, it is clear that his voice was heard at the highest level of church leadership in Nigeria.

C. Matthews

C. Matthews was a missionary in northern Nigeria at Lokoja where the mission experienced significant growth prior to the revival, but when the Aladura arrived, it increased still more. “We have had miracles, a mass movement, and a martyrdom here, all within two months; in fact it has been like living in the time of the Acts of the Apostles over again.”

She attributed the Revival directly to the preaching of Babalola, the steam-roller driver that ‘the Lord took.’ She praised his preaching for encouraging confession, repentance and belief in Jesus, and gave credence to Babalola’s claims saying, “He evidently possesses the gift of healing, and undoubtedly wonderful cures have been effected [sic].” In Lokoja, as in many other places, the missionaries were overwhelmed by demand. Matthews had neither the time nor the inclination to quibble with the Aladura in the midst of an over-abundance of converts. In this account the Anglican Church and the Aladura had a harmonious relationship because of the absence of competition. This example also highlights how there were distinct responses to the Aladura in various regions of Nigeria. In Lokoja, where the Anglican Church was not deeply entrenched and the

90 All the information in this section derives from the following source: C. Matthews, “A New Mass Movement,” CMO LVIII, July (1931).
numbers of new Christians plentiful, the relationship was basically cooperative. Perhaps the opposite extreme was in Lagos, which was at the very heart of the diocese. This case study also emphasizes how Anglican responses were influenced by Aladura missionary techniques in a given region. When the Aladura sought to evangelize non-Christians, the relationship with Anglicans was relatively cordial, but when they sought to proselytize members of the existing missions, strains quickly arose.

K. E. Ritsert

Three years later, C. Matthews and K. E. Ritsert moved from Lokoja to Kpata, which was located on the west bank of the confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers. According to Ritsert, the area had always been relatively hard to penetrate for Anglican catechists and only after the arrival of the Aladura prophets in Lokoja with their “wonderful preaching and powers of healing” did things begin to change.91 In fact, Ritsert and Matthews first noticed the phenomenon from the comfort of their front porch in Lokoja prior to moving to Kpata. “We used to see these people going by our bungalow day after day, their mats rolled up with their cooking pots on their heads, their lanterns in their hands, and the women with their babies tied on their backs.”92 The three hundred mile trek was apparently no barrier to those who wanted to see the prophet. These people who had resisted the CMS missionaries for so long “came back … full of all they had seen and heard, and … [they] went throughout the district repeating what they had heard, persuading men and women everywhere to burn and destroy their old household gods, and to go to the CMS teachers to learn to read!”93 The growth of this local movement compelled Matthews and Ritsert to go to Kpata, but they and the others who went, were soon overwhelmed. People arrived from other areas begging for teachers and evangelists. According to Ritsert, one senior catechist “was so harassed by continual callers who would come even in the night that his wife had to mount guard over him while he slept.”94

92 Ibid.
93 Ritsert, “Some Results of the Prophet Movement in Bassa Country.”
94 Ibid.
In Kpata the Aladura opened doors for the CMS that had been closed for many years. For that reason, Ritsert’s perspective on the Aladura was favourable and even complementary. She saw the Aladura as a positive force because the prophets encouraged people to join the mission churches. Her tone did not change even after the Aladura founded separate churches.\textsuperscript{95}

**T. E. Alvarez**

T. E. Alvarez, who was primarily at work in Bida, described the importance of the revival in nearby Kpata in the following way, “The floodgates are now open and people are pressing upon one another to enter the Kingdom of God.”\textsuperscript{96} Alvarez had been transferred from Sierra Leone to Onitsha (Niger Mission) in 1900. He witnessed the growth of the Ijaw and Isoko District churches, before moving to Bida (Yoruba Mission). He recalled the history of the church as one who witnessed it and thus his perspective has special relevancy.

Bassa work came nigh to breaking the hearts of European after European. There seemed an ideal field for a mission … Yet year in and year out the ground was hard and stony, and for over twenty years very little fruit was seen, very little extension of the work. But now all is changed, largely as a sequel to the preaching of a ‘prophet,’ an unlettered man in the strongest possible contrast to the highly-trained workers who first took the Gospel to Bassa.\textsuperscript{97}

Though this reference to Babalola is not as complete as others, it mirrors the views of Matthews and Ritsert. The CMS was enriched by the Aladura in an area marked by past failures, and for that Alvarez was complimentary of the Aladura movement.

**F. Melville Jones**

F. Melville Jones was the Bishop of Lagos and a very experienced missionary in Nigeria. His perspectives on the Aladura have already been described to a certain degree by H. W. Turner in *History of an African Independent Church*. This section will build upon Turner’s comments.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
Melville Jones praised certain elements of the Aladura such as the emphasis on prayer and holiness, but thought they went too far in prohibiting any use of western medicine. He applauded the Aladura for bringing many people to Christianity, but thought their lack of training after conversion was irresponsible because it left them worse off than before. Melville Jones commended their piety but believed that their great reliance on dreams and visions was excessive. He insisted that visions must be measured against the Bible and not the other way around.

The conflict between Melville Jones and Sadare revolved around Sadare’s ‘broken promises’ and his scepticism about infant baptism. Indeed, Sadare refused to baptize his own children as infants. In 1931, Melville Jones described Oshitelu and Babalola as ‘earnest’ men who desired reform, but thought that their theology was not very ‘balanced,’ especially after their preaching, in his view, began to emphasize certain biblical themes to unscriptural levels. In other words, Melville Jones’ perspective on the Aladura revolved around theological issues. Melville Jones thought the exodus of people leaving the Anglican Church illustrated “a sad weakness and want of stability among our adherents,” placing the emphasis on how easily they were led astray. He was also severe in his criticisms of the evangelistic methods of some Aladura; perhaps due to their belief in the failure of the older churches, evangelists purposefully sought to draw Christians away from mission churches. This problem was especially pronounced in areas where the Anglican Church was well established. Melville Jones viewed the use of holy water by some Aladura with a great deal of doubt. Initially he tried to find examples of “actual cures,” but claimed after investigation that he could find not one. When there were reports of faith healings by prophets he sought to give them rational explanations.

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100 Sanneh, *West African Christianity*, 194. A sermon presented by a Cherubim and Seraphim evangelist is very telling on this point. According to this individual, mission churches were worse than ‘failures,’ for they lured Africans away from true spirituality, as if part of some conspiracy of the white man. According to his conception, they did not fail to achieve genuine religion, but rather succeeded in promoting false religion. Quoting some unknown source, he said, “It is the wish of the Great Oneness that the Africans should awake from the lethargy of ignorance of worship into which we have been lured by the European Western Religious Administration.” It is unclear how widespread this perspective was in the Cherubim and Seraphim, but anyone who subscribed to this notion would have felt compelled to evangelize mission churches directly. Evangelist, “Voice from the East,” to the Workers in the Vineyard at Ibadan, UIL: WFS.
Melville Jones had little patience for those Aladura who criticized the practice of tithing, for such criticisms, he thought, depended upon a selective biblical exegesis.\footnote{Bishop of Lagos, \textit{Minutes of the Proceedings of the Third Session}, 9.}

Melville Jones’ response to the Aladura, however, was far less severe than some of his perspectives. It is important to remember his words at the synod, where he stood against the excommunication of Aladura. The thrust of his response was to shore up existing Anglican Churches. He supported a plan to educate Anglican clergy and laity through a series of tracts. These were to be sold in CMS bookshops and distributed to Anglican Churches. Like Dallimore, the Bishop responded to the Aladura with a degree of self-criticism; he believed that they revealed deficiencies within the Anglican Church.\footnote{Lagos Synod, \textit{Motion No. 8}. UIL: WFS.} In response to their healing ministry, he stated that the church must dedicate itself to “the matter of spiritual healing on scriptural lines.”\footnote{Phyllis L. Garlick, \textit{With the C.M.S. in West Africa, A Study in Partnership} (London: CMS, 1935), 66.} Finally, Melville Jones redoubled his efforts to give adequate supervision to all Anglican Churches.

\textbf{The Report of the Second Session of the Fifth Synod}

The Report of the Second Session of the Fifth Synod of the Diocese of Lagos is an important document on this subject. The author of the document does not give his name, but it was probably written by S. Vincent Latunde, the secretary of the synod. Whoever the author is, the report offers a self-ascribed conservative view of the Aladura in the 1930s.\footnote{Report of the Proceedings of the Second Session of the Fifth Synod of the Diocese of Lagos (CMS, 8-14 May 1933). The author wrote, “I know too [that] I may be thought narrow for saying what I have said on this subject, but we should remember Christ did not commend the ‘broad way,’ but on the other hand said – ‘straight is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life.’ So let us not be afraid to stand out boldly for our faith and practice, and where need calls, be a ‘separate’ people.”}

The author championed a sort of Anglican isolationism, which called for separation from the Aladura movement. Latunde was not opposed to fellowship with some Protestant denominations, like the Wesleyan Methodists, but opposed association with ‘schismatic’ churches (as well as Roman Catholics and Muslims). He believed if the Anglican Church disagreed with a church on ‘fundamental’ theological issues then it was wrong to associate publicly with them. Such actions
were likely to confuse parishioners about the Anglican position on matters such as polygamy. The author tried to make a distinction between the ‘schismatic’ churches and the people who attended them. His negative views applied to “erroneous systems, and doctrines and practices” not “individuals.”¹⁰⁵ This distinction reveals an effort to avoid a personal attack on people who attended schismatic churches, though this may not have been a great comfort to them.

As a conservative perspective on the Aladura, this essay displays remarkably little desire to ‘attack’ the Aladura in an offensive way. It does not propose any real plan for opposition; instead it calls for an isolationism which was probably more realistic and effective. The article attests to the defensiveness of the Anglican mindset and gives cause to question any generalized portrayal of the Anglican Church as personally aggressive.

**L. A. Lennon**

Canon Lennon was a West Indian missionary with the CMS stationed near Oshogbo. In a letter to W. Wilson Cash (the General Secretary of the CMS) he exposed quite clearly the different layers of the missionary mindset as he was commenting on the problems in the Yoruba Mission. In so many words he stated that lack of funding led to lack of supervision, which led to lack of training in churches, which created a vulnerable laity (and clergy), which led to schism. This logic, or elements of this logic, appeared in many missionary documents, not just in relation to the Aladura, but also in the context of mass movements. Lennon’s letter helps to explain the most common responses of the Anglican Church to the Aladura: more funding, training and supervision.¹⁰⁶

His article in the *Church Missionary Outlook* revealed other important presuppositions. The people of Akoko were “very eager for the Gospel and for education” which was a good thing, but he warned that “this makes them easily dissatisfied and susceptible to false religious sects and erroneous teaching.”¹⁰⁷ A group who was receptive to learning, Lennon thought, was open to anyone’s teaching. Unanswered requests for teachers and pastors within the Anglican Church

¹⁰⁶ L. A. Lennon to W. Wilson Cash, 1 October 1934. CMS/B: Gi/AC/10/part 2.
would naturally lead to schisms. WWI, the Depression and WWII decreased funding and personnel from London at a time when opportunities seemed to be infinite, but missionaries relentlessly pleaded for them anyway. Fledgling congregations who could not support a teacher during the Depression, searched for teachers of any kind or drifted along leaderless and the hierarchy of the Anglican Church could do little about it.

D. R. Oyebode

D. R. Oyebode was the CMS superintendent of Kukuruku District. When the Aladura made it clear that they wanted to establish a permanent presence near one of the Anglican Churches in Igarra, he appealed to the District Officer to stop the construction of the church. The CMS leaders at the Yoruba Conference of 1937 sanctioned his actions after the fact on the basis that the Aladura were likely to target them directly or at least to sow seeds of dissension in the church.108

Anglicans occasionally petitioned the government to refuse land to other churches, and this constituted an important example of active opposition to the Aladura outside of the four walls of the church. Such appeals generally occurred at the local level and at the initiative of a local pastor. It was a common part of Nigerian Christianity during this time; even AICs successfully engaged in this type of jockeying. What is not clear is exactly how often it occurred. Anglican clergy had no official authority to restrict the Aladura from accessing land. This matter was in the hands of District Heads. Therefore, any success in this approach depended on convincing the District Heads, who had their own points of view on AICs. It may also be that Oyebode was merely asking the government to enforce its own rules governing religious bodies. If the Aladura were seeking a site less than one mile from the Igarra church, then Oyebode’s petition was little more than routine. In principle, colonial officials would not have sanctioned the presence of two churches of differing persuasions so near to each other, though exceptions in practice necessitated such petitions on occasion.

Three years later, Oyebode advocated an educational campaign to respond to the explicit and implicit criticisms put forward by the Aladura against the Anglican

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Church. The program sought to clarify the Anglican position for members who had questions. The proposed tracts were supposed to answer questions like, “Why go to church?” ‘Why I am a Christian’ and ‘What does Christ want me to do?’” Here the underlying presupposition was that, given a clearly articulated choice between the two movements, the average Anglican would choose to remain an Anglican.

**Conflict in the Anglican Church**

Conflict within the Anglican Church in Nigeria is much broader than the encounter with the Aladura. Before the advent of the Aladura, schism was a frequent occurrence, but this worst-case scenario was not the only outcome of church conflicts. To understand how Anglicans dealt with the Aladura it is necessary to look beyond them. Reading deeper into the history of conflict in the Anglican Church reveals that the conflicts that led to the Aladura schisms were not like many others.

In general, Anglican leadership displayed a desire to avoid conflict and a consistent pattern of conflict resolution. Most conflicts arose from problems at the local level. When they occurred, the first resort was a response from the local leaders: the catechist, teacher or pastor at the scene. Only after these attempts failed did Anglican superintendents become involved.

Once this took place, it was common for superintendents to solve conflicts by shifting CMS agents around. This was prevalent in situations where the congregation was clashing with the agent assigned to the church, in cases where the congregation was threatening to leave the Anglican Church or when a ‘troubemaking’ pastor was

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110 For examples see J. B. Webster’s *African Churches among the Yoruba*. For the Anglican perspective begin with the following sources: I. Oluwole to W. Fox, 8 September 1903. CMS/B: G/Y/A2/1/4. I. Oluwole, “Re: the Secession in Lagos Church,” to W. Fox, 8 September 1903. CMS/B: G/Y/A2/1/4. Herbert Tugwell, “Memorandum relating to […] the reception of schismatical persons,” 30 September 1903. CMS/B: G/Y/A2/1/4.

111 In one case in Ilesha, Bishop Vining wrote to Phillips about the difficulty of understanding local problems because of the lack of good information. He did not know the region personally, and the map that he had did not list the villages concerned. He preferred for disputes to be settled by local leaders. “My point is that Bishops should not step in on any matter which can be settled locally.” L. G. Vining, “Ifon, Ekiti, Omofo, Offa-Ilorin P.D.C.C.,” to S. C. Phillips, 29 June 1949. UIL: SCP.
transferred to a church where he could cause less damage.\textsuperscript{112} Shortages of pastors, teachers, and catechists was a chronic problem from the outset, thus, satisfying every demand was impossible. The task of the superintendent was to balance Anglican Church priorities with local demands. This meant that every pastor or teacher, of whatever skill and training, was utilized to the fullest. Shuffling a pastor in situations of conflict was better than dismissing him from service because they were not easy to replace.\textsuperscript{113} With the exception of certain moral failings, certain financial improprieties, and a few other ‘serious’ offences, a ‘troublesome’ pastor was transferred to a place where he could be monitored rather than asked to resign. The history of the Aladura reveals that theology was another serious offence. There was a degree of theological variation among the clergy, however, the cases of Oshitelu and Sadare illustrate how theological innovation was only permitted to a degree.

Transferring personnel occasionally had the unintended consequences of alienating people and aggravating the situation. Disgruntled pastors were known to refuse new assignments, even to the point of resignation, and congregations sometimes declined to pay an undesirable catechist or teacher. This prevented the indefinite use of this practice. When it was impossible to meet local demands another type of action became necessary.

At this point the Executive Committee of the Yoruba Mission or the Synod of the Anglican Church became involved. A deputation or commission of inquiry, consisting of several high ranking Anglican leaders was organized. In one case at Ondo, a faction within St. Stephen’s Church made several complaints against the Nigerian superintendent, S. C. Phillips (later Bishop of Ondo). He had withdrawn the license of M. C. Adeyemi in 1920. Other grievances included, “The suspension of members from Holy Communion…, the fees said to have been charged by the Rev. E. A. Kayode for baptism…, [and] an objectionable sermon preached by Mr. Dedeke.”\textsuperscript{114} Complicating matters, M. C. Adeyemi initiated legal proceedings.

Frank Melville Jones to G. T. Manley, 1917. NNAI: CMS(Y)1/2/2.
\textsuperscript{113} Not every clergyman agreed with this practice. F. Hedger criticized the policy of employing “men of whatever sort to supply the need of the moment” as a “bad one.” F. Hedger, “Report of the Ekiti District to the Executive Committee, 1918,” in Progress of the Yoruba and Hausa Mission. CMS/B: G3/A2/O/1-106.
\textsuperscript{114} Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Yoruba and Hausa Mission, Lagos, 20-24 August 1920. Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Yoruba and Hausa Mission, Lagos, 14-25 January 1921.
against Phillips in court. The group that supported Adeyemi had been worshipping separately for six months when the Executive Committee sent a deputation headed by the Ven. Archdeacon N. Johnson and Rev. R. S. Oyebode to try to resolve the matter, but they were unsuccessful in their attempt. A second deputation, consisting of the Bishop of Lagos and Oyebode arrived in December and convinced the group to return to St. Stephen’s. Dedeke was transferred to another parish, though it was against the will of Superintendent Phillips, and Kayode was instructed never to charge for baptisms. This example was described thoroughly in correspondence thus making it a good example to discuss here, but it was not exceptional in any other way. The pattern that emerged in this case was that after the attempts of the superintendent had failed, the Anglican Church or CMS investigated the situation and if a genuine cause for complaint was discovered (or if the threat of schism was very serious) a deputation was organized. These deputations were authorized to make compromises between parties.

Eventually, Dedeke did return to Ondo after animosity towards him had largely subsided. His return was championed by Phillips, but contingent upon negotiations with the elders of the church and private meetings with the “Odosida Party” who originally opposed Dedeke. While some of the Odosida Party continued to oppose the return of Dedeke, many changed their minds. Anglican officials, as seen in this case, frequently made use of personal negotiations and congregational meetings to resolve matters. The leadership of the Anglican Church could not simply impose their will upon congregations if there was strong opposition; this was made quite apparent after the advent of the AIC movement in Nigeria, and even to a certain degree when another mission were reasonably close, because a congregation was apt to switch allegiances in protest. Churches, or groups within churches, excelled at organizing, networking, and letter writing; they were adept at leveraging all options at their disposal (the ultimate being schism), therefore, Anglican leadership had to

115 Ibid.
116 As a member of a delegation to the Niger Mission, Bishop Melville Jones remarked that “I cannot help feeling the secede rs in this case had a real grievance.” See: Jones to Wilkie, 1917. NNAI: CMS(Y)1/6/12. Or see similar sentiments in: F. Hedger to Archdeacon [F. Melville Jones], 25 May n.d. NNAI: CMS(Y)1/5/11.
work to build local support through discussion, consensus building, and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{117}

Another important case took place at Sabongida in 1930. Part of the congregation was discontent with the pastor, J. O. Adediran, because he was allegedly divisive, abusive to the agents, and lacking tact. This faction was worshipping apart from the main body, claimed that progress of the mission had been stifled by Adediran and blamed him for the local revival of the ‘Ora Idol Fetish.’ Later allegations also included mishandling of church finances.\textsuperscript{118} They demanded that one of the previous teachers, either F. C. Akingbehin or I. M. Laninhun, be transferred back to Sabongida.\textsuperscript{119} The CMS superintendent, C. S. Jebb, was not convinced by the allegations against Adediran and refused to have him replaced. His belief was that the controversy was being stirred up by another CMS teacher (the author of the letters of complaint) named S. M. Imouhkuede. Jebb suspected that his motivation for causing the conflict was the denial of multiple transfer requests.\textsuperscript{120} Despite Jebb’s strong support of Adediran, the CMS Executive Committee called a hearing on the matter and both sides travelled to Lagos.\textsuperscript{121}

Adediran was acquitted of all charges after the investigation, and four years later he was promoted to superintendent. But the divisions in Sabongida persisted and a CMS teacher named Mr. Eguare was the leader of a new schism. His complaints against Adediran were somewhat similar to Imouhkuede’s though with a few additions. Bishop A. B. Akinyele was sent to Sabongida to reconcile the two factions. He called a series of meetings to discuss the problems and find a solution.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{118} J. O. Adediran to C. W. Jebb, 8 December 1930. NNAI: CMS(Y)2/2/19.
\textsuperscript{119} I. A. Imouhkuede, Asikoko Obohkaia, and Ogiongbe Ohimai to the Executive Committee of the Diocese of Lagos, May 1930. NNAI: CMS(Y)2/2/19.
\textsuperscript{120} Imouhkuede was unhappy at the Ondo School where he was “ruled by a young deacon” and wanted to return to Ora School. Jebb’s suspicions about Imouhkuede were strengthened by the fact that all signatures on the letter of complaint were written in the same hand and the letter came from Ondo, not Ora. Furthermore, the first signatory on the letter, the \textit{Baba Egbe} of Sabongida, never went to Lagos to support the allegation against Adediran. In fact, none of the signatories ever came forward publicly. As to accusations of his harshness with some parishioners, Jebb believed that Adediran was “firmly opposing sin,” which was likely to anger a certain number. Furthermore, Adediran was transparent in his financial dealings, going so far as to send the church records to Lagos. See: C. W. Jebb, “Re: Imouhkuede’s Charges against the Pastor of Ora,” to C.M.S. Executive Committee, 5 June 1930. NNAI: CMS(Y)2/2/19.
\textsuperscript{121} C. W. Jebb to C. W. Wakeman, 4 December 1930. NNAI: CMS(Y)2/2/19.
\end{footnotes}
In addition to all factions in the congregations, eight ‘chiefs’ were invited to the meetings. At the first meeting, Akinyele preached on the importance of unity and the evil of schism.122 A second meeting was called to discuss the problems dividing the church the following morning. The leaders of the schism spoke first, saying that they resented the way Adediran treated Eguare; furthermore, they resented his opposition to their “thrice daily prayer which was organized when the plague broke out.” Adediran spoke next, explaining that “again and again the boy (Eguare) has been guilty of disobedience and for disobedience he was dismissed,” though Adediran tolerated him for some time before reaching his decision. He also claimed that it was the Parochial Church Committee that made the ultimate decision to transfer Eguare. In response to this, Eguare insisted that it was because of his “inspiration to pray often” that Adediran opposed him. He recounted how Adediran had frequently spoken of him “as ignorant and unlearned, that he took him for a harmless lunatic.”123

Once the views had been publicly stated, Akinyele sought to mediate the situation. He asserted that it would be contrary to the Bible to oppose someone for praying, and no superintendent or committee could justify doing so. He returned Mr. Eguare to the congregation, but also left Adediran in his position as superintendent, though not without warning that “he knows whom he represents.” Finally he said, “That if there is nothing besides what they have stated, they should start again … let go the past and for the glory of God and the good of the church and their race, drop all misunderstandings and work harmoniously.”124 A third meeting was called in the schoolroom with the leaders of the schism and Adediran. Akinyele prayed with them and charged Eguare with the task of bringing his group back into the fold for the sake of the church in Sabongida. After some discussion he agreed to do so and the meeting was adjourned.125

The initial conflicts between the Anglican Church and the Aladura were variants of this pattern. The Aladura did not present a united front to be negotiated.

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122 This was a key component of his views on AICs. Aside from his many concessions, he felt that the sin of schism was glossed over in these situations. Alexander Babatunde Akinyele, “Relationship with Schismatic Bodies and how to cope with Them,” to the Bishop of Lagos, 19 February 1935. UIL: ABA.
123 C. W. Jebb to C. W. Wakeman, 4 December 1930.
124 Alexander Babatunde Akinyele to C. W. Wakeman, 23 February 1934. UIL: ABA.
125 Ibid.
with; they did not form a community in one geographic area where a deputation might be sent. In the case of J. Sadare, Bishop Melville Jones became involved, but there was no deputation sent to meet with him. Likewise, Oshitelu was questioned several times by the local sub-district superintendent, D. M. George, then by a group of ministers at a church celebration, then several months later he was suspended indefinitely by the Abeokuta District Council. This encounter was resolved at the local level. Moses Orimolade was only marginally connected with the Anglican Church when some Anglican officials expressed concern. Though there was apparently conflict of some kind with Abiodun Akinsowon, no mention is made by Omoyajowo of discussions or deputations. She simply left.

In regard to these encounters there was little record of compromise on either side. Since every loss in the leadership of the Anglican Church was a serious blow to the district, and the fact that concerted efforts to forestall and prevent schisms were common, the case of the Aladura is unusual. Perhaps special difficulties surrounded theological compromise; it may be that both the Anglican Church and Aladura embraced their theology too strongly to compromise; possibly the leaders of the Aladura had enjoyed too much independence to surrender it; or it may be that the Aladura leaders were transformed by their spiritual experiences to the point that they could not conceive of discussion or compromise.

Of course, there is another possibility as well. The pattern of conflict resolution above relates to groups within the Anglican Church. Conceivably the relationships between the Anglican Church and Aladura (the Precious Stone Society and the Seraphim Society) did not follow the pattern because the Aladura were not groups clearly within the Anglican Church. This suggests the possibility of viewing the encounter between the Aladura and Anglican Church, not as a conflict of individuals at the heart of Anglicanism, but rather groups only loosely associated or affiliated with the Anglican Church. Possibly the schisms were quick and uncontested because the relationships were casual and the stakes not very high.

Much has been made of the number of Anglicans that went over to the Aladura, but at the initial points of separation, comparatively few left. This, quite possibly, was also a factor in how the Anglican Church responded to the Aladura. Turner noted that many of the members of the Church of the Lord Aladura were
drawn from the mission churches, but this did not occur at the point of separation. 126 Indeed, when Oshitelu left the Anglican Church he did not have a single disciple for he did not begin his prophetic ministry for several years. When Sadare left the Anglican Church he brought sixty members of the Precious Stone Society (it is unclear how many of these were Anglican members). This constitutes the largest group to leave the Anglican Church during the initial encounters and it is not large by comparison with other schisms. J. A. Babatope and I. B. Akinyele did not leave the Anglican Church until the following year, and J. Babalola did not join the Aladura until 1928. This assertion also seems to agree with Omoyajowo’s statement about Anglicans who eventually joined the CS. He writes, “Members of the Society have alleged that they were sporadically forced out of the mission Churches in the various places where they had organized branches.”127 The pattern of conflict resolution in the Anglican Church normally involved a sizeable section of a church, an entire church, or sometimes several churches.128 This was not the nature of the early Aladura schisms.

In summary, the Aladura were different from many other groups who left, or threatened to leave, the Anglican Church. Their relationship was informal and theology was a more central part of their complaints. Compared with other schisms from the Anglican Church, they were not well organized, they were not geographically centralized, and they were not numerically significant at first. It is telling that in the case of the Aladura, no deputation was sent, no group discussion was initiated, no public meeting was convened and no compromise was pursued.

**Emerging Patterns**

The purpose of this section is to explore and synthesize certain themes of the encounter. Anglican responses to the Aladura were ‘contradictory’ since despite a few relatively common themes, each person had a slightly different perspective and response. This section will discuss several themes that were common among a

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127 Omoyajowo, *Cherubim and Seraphim*, 9. The emphasis has been added.
128 A period of growth within the Roman Catholic Church in Ondo can be attributed to this type of exodus. Clarke, *West Africa and Christianity*, 104.
number of Anglicans. They should be held alongside what has already been stated, as it would be unnecessary to restate previous points again.

**Centrality of Theological Issues**

Even a cursory look at this history reveals that certain theological issues repeatedly came to the forefront. In order to understand the conflicts between Anglicans and Aladura, one needs to be aware of these issues. Some of them have been alluded to already, but will be expanded in this section.

For some time before the emergence of the Aladura, the Anglican Church debated theological issues surrounding baptism. Some aspects of this debate have already been stated. Others include the baptism of polygamous men, wives of polygamous men, and children of polygamous parents. The Anglican position fluctuated during this period, and was not absolutely clear to clergy or the laity, which may be part of the reason it continually resurfaced in correspondence. Another key theological issue was marriage. The Anglican Church insisted upon monogamy, though the policy was unevenly enforced and had some minor exceptions. The position of the Anglican Church on the various types of marriage was not always clear, especially in relation to new governmental legislation. Thus there was a great deal of discussion about what were the merits and demerits of church ceremonies, versus traditional ceremonies, versus civil ceremonies. Other theological issues that caused divisions during this period, especially in regard to

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129 Doctrinal differences caused the separation of many clergy from the Anglican Church. L. S. Kempthorne was a New Zealander who left the Anglican Church over theological issues while a missionary in Nigeria. Frank Melville Jones to G. T. Manley, 1916. NNAI: CMS(Y)1/2/2 and CMS(Y)1/1/18.


AICs, include the practice of faith healing, and the uses of dreams, visions, and prophecy. Sadare of the Christ Apostolic Church was opposed to infant baptism because he was warned against it in a vision. At the root of the disagreement, therefore, was the importance ascribed to dreams and visions. Melville Jones interpreted Sadare’s actions as placing the authority of visions over the Bible. This was also a central issue for Oshitelu and Orimolade. Anglican clergy, apparently, were not prepared to ascribe the same importance to dreams, visions, and prophecy in the formation of theology.

**Aladura Claims**

Many Anglicans, and mainline Protestants in general, thought the claims of the Aladura - the numbers given, the miracles reported, and the efficacy of the holy water - were exaggerated. Some clergy assumed that the Aladura were taking advantage of Nigerians and even some Europeans. In a scathing letter to the Administrator of the Colony, Methodist superintendent, Edward Nightingale proclaimed with exasperation that the Apostolic Church pastor, D. O. Odubanjo gave a “grotesquely inaccurate account of the operations of a faith healer named Joseph Babalola” in the hopes of generating funds from abroad. The veracity of Nightingale’s comments aside, his strong scepticism about Aladura claims was common among European outsiders. Bishop Melville Jones’ attitude along these lines has already been discussed. For many of those Anglicans who opposed the Aladura in any one of its manifestations, this element of disbelief was an important theme, though not all Anglicans agreed, of course. In their reports to Lagos and home, some Anglican missionaries corroborated the remarkable claims made by Aladura.

**Anglican Ignorance of AICs**

For all the activities of the Aladura between 1918 and 1930, Anglicans said surprisingly little about them. After the initial separations, years went by with little

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132 For a description of one Anglican’s view of faith healing see: Alexander Babatunde Akinyele to My Own Dear Brother, 6 March 1926. UIL: ABA.

133 Edward G. Nightingale to the Administrator of the Colony [C. Lawrence], 25 November 1931. NNAI: COMCOL/1/1301. See also: D. O. Odubanjo to D. P. Williams, 4 May 1931. NNAI: COMCOL/1/1301.
more said in the Executive Committee or synod. When the Aladura movement became a topic of discussion in the 1930s, no systematic research had been conducted. Because of the elusiveness of accurate information at the time, little more than anecdotal evidence was produced. After 1930, internal concerns such as finances, staffing problems, disciplinary issues and educational policy consumed the vast majority of Anglican time in conferences and meetings. The external threats of Islam, Catholicism, and ‘materialism’ were given greater collective thought than the threat of the Aladura. H. W. Turner put it nicely: “Even today, over thirty years later, the older churches know so very little of the inner spiritual history of this great religious upheaval in their midst.” The legacy of this intellectual void seems to be two fold. This ignorance was harmful when Anglicans did respond to the Aladura for it meant that misinformation, rumours and stereotypes were part of the discussions along with more thoughtful types of information. On the other hand, it was helpful to the Aladura because it meant that for many years the Anglican Church did nothing about them collectively. The fact that for nearly a decade in some cases, the Anglican Church all but ignored the Aladura does not lend itself to strong assertions about Anglican opposition.

The Besieged Mentality

When the Anglican Church began discussing the Aladura, church leaders dwelled extensively upon their critique of the mission churches. This feeling of being targeted by the propaganda and evangelistic aims of others created in Anglicans a feeling of being besieged. Perhaps it is easier to understand this mentality when one realizes that, while the ‘attacks’ included the activities of the Aladura, it was much greater than the Aladura alone. One Catholic priest in Akoko utilized a kindred approach to evangelism. Pakenham wrote, “When disciplinary or

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136 Perceived breaches of comity by other Christian bodies aroused a passionate response from Anglicans. See the rash of correspondence surrounding an alleged case of Methodist breach of comity in Ekiti in 1935. The Aladura allegedly targeted the Anglican Church in Efon (Ekiti Division) a few years later. Efon CMS Church to John Blair, 29 March 1942. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (214).
other troubles arise in our churches, the aggrieved members are sought out, and encouraged to secede, being promised office in the church, and the help of the white man in all political matters that concern them.\textsuperscript{137} Anglicans saw these times of intensive evangelism from outsiders as periods of testing. Dallimore described one such episode in Ekiti as passing “through the fire.”\textsuperscript{138}

Sometimes the threat came from within. The very presence of other denominations in the local context gave CMS teachers and pastors more leverage against their superiors because it provided other sources of employment. A report from Ilogbo was not uncommon. The superintendent suspended a teacher named Jonah Asaola for ‘immorality.’ Instead of accepting the punishment, as he might have done in earlier times, Asaola joined the African Baptist Church, an African Church, and took the congregation along with him. Three months later, the charges were dropped and Asaola returned to the Anglican Church along with the congregation.\textsuperscript{139} The threat of schism and the ability of teachers to do great damage to the Anglican Church greatly reduced the power of mission leadership. When Anglican clergymen seceded, they typically remained in the same villages, though claiming allegiance to a different church.\textsuperscript{140} Thus, the angst produced by initial schism was not the only consideration; the body that left the mission was likely to remain very close and to interact with Anglicans on a regular basis.

Even when no members were likely to leave the Anglican Church, the Aladura created intellectual controversy and disagreement within the church. Thus in the world of ideas, many church leaders felt besieged. Anglicans felt constrained to respond to the theological critiques of the Aladura because they stimulated such unease within the church.

\textsuperscript{138} Dallimore, “Mass Movement in Nigeria.”
\textsuperscript{140} See the case of S. A. Adediji, a convert to ‘Russellism:’ Report of Proceedings of the First Session of the Fifth Synod of the Diocese of Lagos, May 2-8 (Lagos, 1932).
The Aladura as a Mixed Blessing

The Aladura were a mixed blessing for many Anglicans. The CMS Africa Secretary put it in the following way in correspondence with H. Dallimore, “I believe with you, [that the prophet movement] must be a move of the Spirit of God, beset though it is with so many risks and dangers.” Some accounts focused on the positive elements of the Aladura. They were inducing people to consider Christianity, to give up their ‘idols,’ and to come into the church; the Aladura brought many new possibilities for mission work, so they were not to be opposed, but to be cooperated with. The Aladura movement was seen as negative at other times, based largely upon their stirring-up of emotion. They threatened Anglican unity and possessed certain ‘unorthodox’ theological views. The missionaries were inclined to a little scepticism of mass conversions, believing that without proper training, young Christians would never mature.

The Anglican Response to the Aladura

The Anglican response to the Aladura movement was slow, disunited, defensive, understaffed, and underfinanced. Discussion of the Aladura, even when it was negative in tone, did not often translate into coordinated actions. As F. Melville Jones said, “…it is very easy to condemn a thing in theory but hard in practice.” Anglican inaction was also probably due to the fact that their authority to oppose the Aladura was limited outside the walls of the church.

The main thrust of the Anglican response to the Aladura was an educational program. At the synod, F. Melville Jones said, “The antidote to this thing is to teach them the truth…” Tracts were written in response to the Aladura with the stipulation that they were not to be deliberately disparaging. The Minutes of the

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143 Garlick, With the C.M.S. in West Africa, 34.
144 Wigram, Silver and Gold.
146 Peel refers to this in regard to the Cherubim and Seraphim. See: Peel, Aladura, 109. The outcome of the Lagos Synod also lends itself to this interpretation. See: Lagos Synod, Motion No. 8, UIL: WFS.
147 Lagos Synod, Motion No. 8, UIL: WFS.
148 Ibid.
Yoruba Mission stated that “the tracts should be written as sympathetically as possible [about the Aladura] but should state clearly what the Church stands for.”

It was believed that a well taught laity would choose Anglicanism over the Aladura. Special men’s services were initiated for the purpose of discussing relevant topics. Above all, additional African and European pastors were needed. The belief that the success of the Aladura was related to a lack of trained Anglican leaders convinced clergy to emphasize leadership training, both to avert future loss of members and to meet existing needs. African and European pastors sacrificed time to follow the preaching campaigns of the Aladura. Finally, Anglicans occasionally petitioned the government to withhold land from Aladura in the interests of ‘keeping the peace.’

It would be fair to say that the collective Anglican response to the Aladura never reached great intensity. Many Anglicans harboured a certain amount of bias, or even at times antagonism, against the Aladura or Aladura theology, but they never successfully organized a confident response. That which they did organize consisted of what might be described as defensive actions, or things that dealt primarily with shoring up the Anglican Church. This was exemplified by the call for Anglicans to “stand apart” from the Aladura.

Conclusions

This chapter is not exclusively interested in Anglican perspectives, but also in Anglican responses. The history of this topic is enriched and clarified by distinguishing between the two. Anglican perspectives were varied as most

150 Yoruba Mission Minutes for May and January 1931.
152 Phyllis L. Garlick, Fresh Springs, Being the C.M.S. Story of the Year, 1933 (London: CMS, 1934), 24.
154 In the next chapter, this issue will be discussed in more depth. Warrant Officers/District Heads, District Officers and Residents frequently restricted land to religious bodies to keep the peace.
individuals built their views of the Aladura movement upon an awareness of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ elements. One of the important causes of this differentiation was the impact of the local context on the encounter. Indeed the local context was probably the most important determining factor in forming Anglican perspectives. The presence or absence of competition, of collaboration, or of antagonism in a given region skewed Anglican perspectives in one direction or other.

If Anglicans became more hostile to the Aladura it was linked to several factors: first, the perception that dreams, visions, and prophecy had surmounted the authority of the scriptures in the Aladura movement; second, the sense of being directly targeted by the Aladura missionary endeavours; and third, the changing character of the Aladura movement into what was perceived to be anti-mission and anti-white.\footnote{156} It is important, whenever possible, to recognize different causes of Anglican antipathy, whether theological, experiential, political or from other sources such as misunderstanding and propaganda.

Individual responses to the Aladura also varied. Some sought to prevent their spread in a given region by petitioning District Heads; others responded by attempting to shore up the Anglican Church; some responded self-critically to Aladura criticisms by changing their ministerial emphases. A few advocated withdrawal and isolationism; still others responded by advocating a collaborative relationship with the Aladura. It is of great significance to note that most opposition occurred at the local level. The collective Anglican response to the Aladura movement was slow, underfinanced and understaffed. Most proposals to deal with the Aladura sought to shore up Anglican congregations rather than combat the Aladura in their churches.

\footnote{156} See the statement of Rev. Adayinka at the Lagos Synod. Motion No. 8, UIL: WFS.
Chapter 2

The Colonial Administration and the Aladura in Yorubaland

Mission churches and other religious communities were not the only groups to clash with the Aladura. The colonial government, by all accounts, was another actor in the drama. This chapter is dedicated to discussing the role played by political leaders at all levels of the government in the history of the encounter with Aladura in Yorubaland. Scholars usually view the government’s involvement with the Aladura as essentially negative, but this inquiry will suggest that this is exaggerated, in the sense that it reflects merely one aspect of the relationship. Indeed the notion that scholars have been interested in the ‘encounter’ between AICs and government officials (or missionaries) has been misleading, for a survey of these studies reveals a narrow interest in enumerating the conflicts, divisions, hostilities and antagonisms. If one asks whether there were other (either neutral or positive) dynamics at play in the relationship between the government and Aladura, then the answer is conclusively yes. Secondly, the tendency to characterize the role of traditional rulers and District Heads as an essentially positive and encouraging force in the advancement of the Aladura cannot be sustained. To prove this, a number of case studies and examples will be discussed below. Finally, the actions of the Aladura must be scrutinized along with those of the government in order to grasp the dynamics of the encounter. The Aladura were responsible, at times, for antagonizing government officials and other African citizens; in both cases, government intrusion was made much more likely, if not necessary. The Aladura also solicited the greater

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involvement and mediation of the government in their churches in a number of cases. Thus, government interaction with AICs did not revolve solely around the actions of an overbearing official.

**British Colonialism in Nigeria**

Prior to 1880, British colonial commitments in Yorubaland were informal. Certain politicians in Britain were uneasy about the idea of colonialism and taxpayers were unwilling to foot the bill for colonial expansion.² Companies like the United Africa Company and the Royal Niger Company were given the responsibility of maintaining a British presence in Nigeria and ensuring trade.³ In the years leading up to the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, the three major colonial powers in West Africa (France, Germany and Great Britain) were publicly opposed to large-scale colonial expansion in tropical Africa. Despite the public image, however, unofficially they were positioning themselves to make claims to territory.

At the Berlin Conference, zones of influence were decided and many of the borders of contemporary Africa established.⁴ The ‘scramble for Africa’ began in earnest in those rooms and involved several European countries including, France, Britain, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Once Britain established claims to areas in Nigeria, the government began to implement them.⁵ After the Berlin Conference, Britain created the Oil Rivers Protectorate, which in 1893 became known as the Niger Coast Protectorate. Three years later treaties were signed with the leaders of Abeokuta, Oyo and Ibadan that brought much of Yoruba territory under British control. A milestone year was 1900, for the Niger Coast Protectorate was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and Northern Nigeria was declared a Protectorate under the leadership of Frederick Lugard.⁶ In 1906, the Southern Protectorate was amalgamated with Lagos Colony, which had hitherto been

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⁴ Ibid., 62-63.
separate entities. The task fell to Lugard to unite the northern and southern Protectorates in 1914, essentially establishing the current boundaries of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{7}

Toyin Falola divides the early period of colonisation of Nigeria into two general periods: the southern phase between 1850 and 1897, and the northern phase between 1900 and 1914.\textsuperscript{8} The southern phase began with the signing of a treaty between the British and the Awori at Lagos surrendering the sovereignty of the latter.\textsuperscript{9} A decade later, the British annexed Lagos making it the first Crown Colony in Nigeria. For the next two decades, the British colonial presence in Nigeria was limited to Lagos, a small presence in the Delta and the consulate at Lokoja.\textsuperscript{10}

The Governors of Lagos colony were not averse to involving themselves in politics of the interior. Governor Glover, for example, mediated peace talks between Ibadan, Ijebu and the Egba, three of the factions in the Yoruba civil war that raged for nearly fifty years. In the 1860s, Glover endeavoured to make peace between the factions, but his suspected expansionist aims merely provoked the Yoruba.\textsuperscript{11} By 1879, the regional military power, Ibadan, had been surrounded on almost every side by enemies. The Egba, Ijebu, Ijesha, Ekiti, and Ilorin hemmed Ibadan about from the south, north and east, but Ibadan was defiant. Trade had come to a complete standstill in the interior by 1885 and thus, for largely economic reasons, Governor Moloney sent delegations, led by the Anglican priests Samuel Johnson and Charles Phillips to the interior to expedite the peace process; and with the exception of a lingering conflict between Ilorin and Offa, the peace negotiations were successful.\textsuperscript{12}

The next major British foray into Yoruba politics took place in 1892 in Ijebuland. The conflict began when the Awujale and chiefs insulted Governor Denton during his visit. This was not forgotten, even by Denton’s successor, Governor Gilbert Carter. The Ijebu also refused to sign a trade agreement with the British. By controlling passage through Ijebuland they controlled trade and by charging tolls they made a tidy profit. Naturally, they were reluctant to sacrifice their valuable position in Yorubaland. The final straw for Carter was when the Awujale

\textsuperscript{8} Falola, \textit{The History of Nigeria}, 54.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{11} Michael Crowder, \textit{A Short History of Nigeria} (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 175.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 176-78, 204.
demanded the deaths of two Anglican missionaries for their alleged role in illicit trade and encouraging Europeans to come to the interior. The British invaded with a combined force of West Indian, Hausa, Gold Coast and Ibadan forces. Despite the fact that they faced a larger Ijebu force, the British won convincingly. The seemingly quick fall of the Ijebu caused other obas (Yoruba kings) to take notice and they became much more willing to submit to the will of the British. 13 Abeokuta, Oyo and later Ibadan negotiated treaties with the British. Under these agreements, the Egba of Abeokuta retained regional autonomy and not a single oba was deposed. 14

The process of subduing other parts of Nigeria was, in many ways, quite different from Yorubaland. 15 Once this was achieved, colonial officials began the process of consolidating control of Nigeria with limited funds and personnel. The amalgamation of the various sections of Nigeria began at this time and culminated in the union of the north and the south in 1914. The primary motivation for the union was economic. The north was suffering a financial crisis and the government wanted to redistribute southern tax revenues in the north. 16 In actuality, the amalgamation was only partially accomplished by 1914. It created a unified treasury, railway, post and telegraph, but the north and south continued to develop separately in other ways; thus, the process of unification continued into the 1920s. 17

World War I had a significant effect upon the way Britain governed her colonies and upon the way Nigerians viewed colonialism. Britain relied upon them to keep the wheels of the war effort rolling. It was this revelation in Britain that “quickened in … [some British] rulers a sense of obligation.” 18 But WWI also sparked in Africans and Asians a desire for change. Sir Harry Johnston believed the period after the war was the ‘beginning of revolt against the white man’s supremacy,’ first in India and then Egypt, where the colonial governments gave into demands for greater autonomy and more responsible government. 19 In 1922, Sir Hugh Clifford

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19 Ibid., 42.
responded to this desire for reform in Nigeria by issuing a new constitution, which established a Legislative Council made up of forty-six members and allowed for a greater number of Nigerian representatives.\textsuperscript{20}

The Great Depression encouraged more changes in the way Britain related to her African colonies, especially in economic terms. Exports to Africa rose markedly during the 1930s.\textsuperscript{21} The beginnings of political mobilization took place in Lagos under leaders like Herbert Macaulay, who was instrumental in formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party. Though the locus of this organization remained largely in Lagos, it was important as a forerunner of larger political movements that were to follow.\textsuperscript{22} Reforms took place under the administration of Governor Donald Cameron. He granted Ibadan independence from Oyo thereby alleviating a great source of irritation for the former; he stipulated that the Native Authority should include a mix of traditional leaders and educated elites thus increasing the role of a section of society that felt disenfranchised; he abolished the posts of Lieutenant-Governor that served directly under the Governor because they only served to increase regionalism and hamper the progress of union; he transformed the justice system by abolishing provincial courts and limiting the authority of native courts. In the place of the provincial court, he established a high court and a magistrate’s court where Nigerian lawyers could have a greater function. His reform on this final point was crucial in creating a separation between the executive and judicial branches of government.\textsuperscript{23}

The Second World War further affected British colonial policy in Africa and exposed the hypocrisies of the colonial system. The contradictions of the colonial system were summed up in the following way by Elizabeth Isichei: “The Allies - and Nigerians - were fighting for democracy, but democracy did not exist in Nigeria. They were fighting against totalitarianism, but colonial rule, as it existed in Nigeria until 1945, was essentially totalitarian. They were fighting against racism, but Nigerians could not be treated in ‘European hospitals,’ or join the Ikoyi Club, or obtain equal pay for equal work in the colonial service.”\textsuperscript{24} The transfer of power

\textsuperscript{20} Crowder, \textit{A Short History of Nigeria}, 256.
\textsuperscript{21} Roberts, \textit{The Colonial Moment}, 63.
\textsuperscript{22} Isichei, \textit{A History of Nigeria}, 402.
\textsuperscript{23} Crowder, \textit{A Short History of Nigeria}, 263.
\textsuperscript{24} Isichei, \textit{A History of Nigeria}, 403-04.
from the British to Nigerians began in earnest in the years after WWII and culminated in 1960 with the granting of independence.\textsuperscript{25} Along the way, Nigerian leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe pushed for reforms, organized trade unions and political parties, published newspapers and wrote books, went on strikes and protested, and in numerous other ways hastened the end of colonialism.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, “The five years that followed the war were the most radical in the history of Nigerian nationalism.”\textsuperscript{27}

With the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1942 and 1945, Britain began to invest more resources in her colonies.\textsuperscript{28} The (Sir Arthur) Richards Constitution was meant to be a great step forward, but it was not thought by the educated elite to have gone far enough. It left too much power in the hands of traditional rulers and failed to establish a true parliamentary democracy.\textsuperscript{29} In 1948, the government granted additional concessions. They ‘Nigerianized’ the civil service, made steps to democratize the Native Authority, and improved higher education.\textsuperscript{30} That same year Sir John Macpherson became governor of Nigeria and set about the task of revising the constitution, which he reissued in 1951. But southerners resented that it gave the north as much representation as the two southern regions combined, thus this version of the constitution was unsatisfactory as well. The north and south could not agree on the best form of central government for Nigeria. Minority groups feared the domination of larger ethnic groups and called for a strong federal government, while larger ethnic groups feared the federal government and called for strong states.\textsuperscript{31} Both sides could not win out and the Lyttleton Constitution, issued in 1954, granted the east and west full internal self-government.\textsuperscript{32}

While progress was being made towards Nigerian independence in the 1940s, the problem of ethnic politics was on the rise. The Action Group, headed by Obafemi Awolowo began to champion the Yoruba cause; the Northern Peoples

\textsuperscript{25} Webster and Boahen, \textit{The Revolutionary Years}, 222.
\textsuperscript{26} Falola, \textit{The History of Nigeria}, 90-92.
\textsuperscript{27} Isichei, \textit{A History of Nigeria}, 406.
\textsuperscript{29} Webster and Boahen, \textit{The Revolutionary Years}, 278
\textsuperscript{30} Falola, \textit{The History of Nigeria}, 91.
\textsuperscript{31} Webster and Boahen, \textit{The Revolutionary Years}, 311.
\textsuperscript{32} Isichei, \textit{A History of Nigeria}, 410.
Congress and Northern Elements Progressive Union represented the north; the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons under Azikiwe came to represent the interests of the Igbo. The fissures that began to appear were serious indeed, and deepened at a time when national unity was essential.

Ironically, the decade before independence was characterized by less agitation, discontent and turmoil than the 1940s. This was due to the improvements in the fields of economics, politics and education. The London Conference of 1953 brought Nigerian politicians together to decide the wording of a new constitution and the shape of the future government. It was determined that, “Nigeria would be a federation with a strong centralized government and an Executive Council including four ministers from each region. The constitution set up regional governments headed by premiers and ministers, all Nigerians; and it granted the right of each region to request full internal self-government.” In March of that same year, Anthony Enahoro proposed a motion before the House of Representatives to grant full independence by 1956. The motion failed, however, because of northern fear of southern domination, so independence did not come until 1 October 1960.

**The Encounter between the Aladura and the Colonial Administration**

Previous scholars have discussed the encounter between the Aladura and the colonial administration in a general way, but no large study has taken this as their primary focus. In the brief glimpses of this encounter that currently exist, the colonial administration has been portrayed as being essentially oppositional and as ‘cold and spiteful’ toward the Aladura. Governmental opposition to the Aladura has been characterized by others as “unending.” Evidence suggests that such characterizations are far too simplistic and that much more can be said to expand these portrayals. This chapter does not seek to deny the existence of varying degrees and intermittent periods of opposition. But there is plenty of proof that the government was not always cold or spiteful, that the brief periods of heated

34 Webster and Boahen, *The Revolutionary Years*, 298.
36 Ibid., 92-93.
38 Oshun, “Aladura Revivals,” 2.
opposition had a beginning and end, and that subsequent opposition occurred sporadically, but derived largely from local political authorities.

Recent scholarship in African history has pointed to the importance of traditional rulers (obas, bales, elders, etc.) many of whom became members of the colonial administration as District Heads or as members of the accompanying entourage. Thus a concerted attempt has been made in this chapter to include them in the assessment of the government’s response to the Aladura. In the description which is to follow references will be made to the local government or administration and to the central government or administration. When the term, local government is used it will refer to District Heads and their subordinates who were mostly Nigerians. The term, central government will be taken to mean district, provincial and secretariat officials, who were generally British. While these terms are not completely satisfactory, they are at least preferable to other options, such as ‘Native Administration,’ which was used in archival documents to refer to the local government.

The central administration chose not to proscribe the Aladura, which it could have done if it had truly wanted to oppose them. Proscription established the illegality of particular groups or organizations that were considered a direct threat to the state. Thus, it is already clear that generalizations about government opposition must be qualified. In certain regions, opposition was sanctioned by members of the central government. Probably the height of this opposition to the Aladura was in 1931 when several high-ranking officials agreed to oppose the movement in their districts. The following year, however, the government altered course. This may be in part due to the retirement of hostile members of government. This was seen in Oyo Province, where W. A. Ross strongly opposed the Aladura in 1931, but left his post as Resident at year’s end. The replacement did not follow Ross’ policy, but opted to leave the matter of how to respond to the Aladura substantially to the discretion of District Heads and traditional rulers. After 1931, British District Officers and Residents became less involved with the Aladura. When they acted, it

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was in response to the alleged abuses of District Heads or breaches of the law of the Aladura.

Scholars generally describe the local administration and traditional rulers in Yorubaland as favouring the Aladura. They are portrayed by some as a safe-haven from the hostility of the central government. During a lecture at Lagos State University, C. O. Oshun said, “One unique factor that not only boosted the Aladura Revivals but was also unprecedented was the enjoyment of royal patronages, benefactions and protection. The royal fathers threw their weight behind the revivalists and their group, because they quite appreciated these were sincere men of God with a mission of spiritual transformation.”

According to this view, the traditional rulers were essentially and primarily an aid to the Aladura, and in great measure, a component of their success.

Turner also emphasizes the good relationship between Oshitelu and traditional rulers, especially with the Timi of Ede. He attributes this to Oshitelu’s direct attempts to evangelize and befriend traditional rulers. Peel describes the relationship between the Owa of Ilesha and the Cherubim and Seraphim as cordial. In one case, the Owa gave the Cherubim and Seraphim advice that vastly improved their relationship with the government. In Ondo, the Osemawe received prayers from the Aladura, as did the Osile of Oke Ona. The Alaye of Efon became an ‘enthusiastic’ supporter and Gbelegbuwa II, the Awujale of Ijebu maintained a small Seraphim prayer house in his compound. The Alake of Abeokuta played a positive role in the history of the Cherubim and Seraphim. Omoyajowo suggests that traditional rulers embraced the Cherubim and Seraphim because of their ability to locate witches. These examples are illustrative of the positive relationship between traditional rulers and the Aladura, and though there is some discussion of hostility from traditional rulers by Peel and Omoyajowo, these are treated as exceptions.

While there is no intention here to deny these specific cases, they represent only part

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42 Ibid., 18.
45 Peel, *Aladura*, 80-1, 92-3, 108, 230-1. Omoyajowo, *Cherubim and Seraphim*, 51-2, 56. The W. F. Sosan Papers at the University of Ibadan Library, Special Collections are replete with references to this special connection between the Alake of Abeokuta and the Cherubim and Seraphim.
46 Omoyajowo, *Cherubim and Seraphim*, 60.
of the larger history of the relationship between the Aladura and the local administration.

Scholars shy away from systematically discussing the opposition of traditional rulers and local officials to the Aladura.\textsuperscript{48} They will discuss government opposition, or colonial opposition as a generalization, but when they discuss the opposition of a District Head or traditional leader, they tend to portray it as an isolated incident. Others admit that there was some opposition from traditional rulers, but attribute the ultimate source of opposition to district and provincial officers.

This discussion touches on a long-standing debate in African history over the nature of indirect rule, which was the ideological framework for how British colonies were governed for much of the period under consideration (though there were many variations throughout the empire).\textsuperscript{49} Indirect rule was based upon the notion that colonial government should be built upon preexisting, indigenous political structures, and in Yorubaland, the king in particular.\textsuperscript{50} Critics have pointed out that, in reality, this system was not ‘indirect,’ but that district and provincial officials ruled directly.


\textsuperscript{49} The hierarchical structure of indirect rule was as follows: at the top was the secretariat at the national level, followed by residents at the provincial level, district officers at the district level, district heads and colonial employees (at what is referred to here as the local level). The first three levels of government were generally made up of Europeans until the waning years of colonialism. Most of the district heads, by contrast, were Nigerians, as were most of the colonial employees, including: translators, police, clerks, court officials, etc. For a greater description of British colonial structures and the implementation of indirect rule, see: Toyn Fayola’s \textit{The History of Nigeria}, Anthony Kirk-Greene’s \textit{Symbol of Authority}, Andrew Roberts’ \textit{The Colonial Moment in Africa}, Michael Crowder’s \textit{West Africa under Colonial Rule}, which have been cited above. The following sources were also quite helpful: Olufemi Vaughan, \textit{Nigerian Chiefs, Tradition Power in Modern Politics}, 1890s-1990s (Rochester: URP, 2000), 23. Adebayo Oyebade, “Colonial Political Systems,” in \textit{Africa: Colonial Africa, 1885-1939}, ed. Toyn Falola (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2002).

sending directives down the chain of command.\textsuperscript{51} In the history of the encounter between the government and the Aladura, there were times when the central government issued directives to District Heads. However, in many specific cases that will be discussed below, there is no evidence for such an interpretation, leaving one to conclude that local rulers acted upon their own initiative. For that reason there is much to be learned from discussing the unique role of African rulers in the history of the Aladura.

To give an example, one of the greatest obstacles facing the Aladura in the 1930s was obtaining land for their churches. H. W. Turner attributed this to ‘British colonial officers,’ however colonial records prove that Nigerian District Heads and traditional leaders were often responsible for the allocation of land.\textsuperscript{52} Under indirect rule, District Officers and Residents had the option to delegate responsibility to District Heads and in regards to the Aladura, they often did.

The Aladura became prominent in administrative records at the beginning of the revival of the 1930s. The initial reports of the government were cautious, but largely indifferent. The Assistant Commissioner of Police in Ibadan referred to them as “respectable citizens;” there was no evidence that they deliberately set out to interfere with “Native Law and Custom.”\textsuperscript{53} When Babalola arrived in Ilesha, the Assistant District Officer, H. Childs dispassionately noted his arrival and took no action, but was watching carefully.\textsuperscript{54} The Alake of Abeokuta gave the Cherubim and Seraphim and the Church of the Lord a warm welcome to his city.\textsuperscript{55} The Resident of Oyo Province, in a letter to the Secretary of the Southern Provinces, mentioned Babalola’s preaching campaigns in Ilesha (1930). Based largely upon the views of the Owa of Ilesha and other kings, he informed the Secretary that “I have not interfered with him [Babalola] … crowds are quite orderly.” Order was of the utmost importance to government officials, as was the exchange of money for religious

\textsuperscript{52} Turner, \textit{History of an African Independent Church, Vol. 1}, 30.
\textsuperscript{53} Assistant Commissioner of Police Ibadan to the Assistant Inspector General of Police Lagos, 20 August 1930. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (1).
\textsuperscript{54} H. Childs to the District Officer Ife, 1930. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (2).
services. Babalola charged no fees, a sign in their estimation, that he was a man of
genuine religious concern.\textsuperscript{56}

In Imeko, there was early opposition to the Cherubim and Seraphim from the
local administration due to the eager preaching of a female missionary named
Lafenwa.\textsuperscript{57} This early reference to opposition of traditional rulers, and particularly
the Onimeko, predated any opposition from the central administration. At the
beginning of 1931, attitudes towards the Aladura remained largely the same. The
District Officer Ife blandly reported to the Resident of Oyo that the Cherubim and
Seraphim were trying to convert people to Christianity in his district, but were not
collecting fees, and he had received no complaints about them. “I discussed this
problem with you at Ife and you indicated to me that a policy of ‘wait and see’
should be adopted.”\textsuperscript{58}

But at some point during 1931, the policy of ‘wait and see’ began to change
at various levels of the government. In Ibokun the Owa, who had supported the
Aladura the previous year, rejected an application for land.\textsuperscript{59} Then in March, H.
Childs of Ilesha changed his position of ‘watch carefully’ and decided that the Faith
Tabernacle (later Christ Apostolic Church) was “not under proper control;” they were
making disparaging comments about other churches and mosques, and generally
disturbing the peace. He could not countenance the movement’s missionary methods
and passed this view to the Owa of Ilesha.\textsuperscript{60} Childs travelled around to the various
members of the local administration in his district and informed them of his views on
the Faith Tabernacle. He did not direct them to adopt a new policy towards them, but
used “subtle propaganda” to convince the District Heads that the Aladura were
potentially harmful to their community. He advised them not to encourage the
movement.\textsuperscript{61} Shortly after, the Owa called Babatope of the Faith Tabernacle before
the Local Native Council, and warned him to be “upon his best behaviour,” and that
he would not “permit the building or use of churches in the villages.”\textsuperscript{62}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{56} Resident Oyo Province, “Faith Healing in Ilesa,” to the Secretary Southern Provinces, 1930. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (1).
\textsuperscript{57} W. Lajorin to W. Folarin Sosan, 2 December 1930. UIL: WFS.
\textsuperscript{58} District Officer Ife to the Senior Resident Oyo, 27 March 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/6 (8).
\textsuperscript{59} District Officer Ife to the Senior Resident Oyo, 26 May 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (11).
\textsuperscript{60} H. Childs to W. A. Ross, 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (9).
\textsuperscript{62} H. Childs to the District Officer Ife, 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (16).}
While the influence of men like Childs and Ross was significant, there were members of the local administration who began to oppose the Aladura independently. On 4 June the Council of the Alake of Abeokuta ruled on a case involving the Cherubim and Seraphim. Mr. Abogunrin and Dan Lajide of Alatare complained to the Alake that the Cherubim and Seraphim had “given Egungun [masks] to women to wear and Oro to wave in order to render the heathen worship useless.”\footnote{Clerk of Council, “Complaint against Seraphim and Cherubim Society by the Bales of Agodo, Alatare and other Village People,” 4 June 1931. UIL: WFS.} Egungun was a religious group dedicated to the veneration of the ancestors and Samuel Johnson defined Oro as, “a flat piece of iron and stick, with a long string, attached to a pole. This when whirled swiftly in the air produces a shrill sound which … was thought to be] the voice of the Oro himself.”\footnote{Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas (London: Routledge, 1921), 31-32.} The Cherubim and Seraphim may have been seeking to prove that they were more powerful than the Egungun because they could violate the taboos surrounding these religious objects, such as the one that forbade contact between these objects and women (to preserve the ritual purity of the objects), without suffering the ill effects. This was an insult to the members of Egungun and the ancestors, and required that these objects be purified. In this and other ways, they were allegedly causing “trouble and confusion.” One of the other ways was by making accusations of witchcraft in the village and “pronouncing curses upon all [who] would not accept their doctrine.” Omoyajowo noted that some traditional rulers were attracted to the Cherubim and Seraphim on the basis of their ability to find witches, but the Bale of Alatare had warned the Cherubim and Seraphim against these practices in his community. They persisted despite this warning and the protests of some villagers. The Bale of Agodo accused evangelist, Simeon Shobande of uprooting sacred statues in Ikorita and elsewhere, and mocking Egungun by “putting on rags, voicing ho ho ho” and pretending that these were the voices of the ancestors. The Bale warned the Cherubim and Seraphim to “preach in a refined tone” but allegedly they refused. Shobande, for his part, denied the accusations, and the council ruled that because there was no definitive proof of wrongdoing, the Cherubim and Seraphim would be let off with a warning.

In closing remarks, the members of the Council added their views. The Seriki of Kemta commented on how complaints of this kind against the Cherubim and
Seraphim were becoming common. The Balogun stated that “the religion of Christ does not teach you to spoil other man’s religion,” and in a very telling quote, chided the Cherubim and Seraphim, “I am now going to Church but I do not defy the old religion of my fathers.” The Odofi of Iporo asserted that “the preaching of the Seraphim and Cherubim is too high. All allegations against them are truth.” Finally, the Alake responded through a surrogate, “His Highness would like the Seraphim and Cherubim Society to take this as the last warning, otherwise, further complaints will be referred to Court. You must move on with the villages in love. Be careful.”

Complaints were made against the Aladura elsewhere in Ijebu and Oyo Provinces. In Ibadan, they were denied land by the Bale and Council.

In September 1931, there was a meeting with H. M. Brice-Smith the Resident of Ijebu-Ode, Mr. Fitzgerald the Acting Solicitor General, Major Wann the District Officer of Ibadan, Major Bowen the District Officer of Ijebu-Ode, Mr. Northcott the Station Magistrate of Ibadan, and J. W. Garden the Assistant Commissioner of Police for Oyo-Ondo Provinces concerning the prophecies of Josiah Oshitelu of the Church of the Lord and other prophets. There had been tax riots in Iddo and Akure, and Garden believed the prophecies contributed to them. The Resident of Ondo was “fully alive” to the situation and “vigorous steps were being taken in that Province to counter-act the movement.” Garden had already stopped the sale of Oshitelu’s pamphlet, Awon Ashotele. Brice-Smith was taking steps against the Church of the Lord in Ijebu-Ode and Ward-Price was investigating the church in Ilorin Province. In regard to Oshitelu, they believed that it would be impossible to convict him of

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65 All quotes from the Council in this paragraph come from, “Complaint against Seraphim and Cherubim Society by the Bales of Agodo, Alatare and other Village People” 4 June 1931.
66 District Officer Ibadan to W. A. Ross, 7 April 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (12).
68 H. W. Turner described three of the prophecies contained therein: “Only three of all the passages objected to could possibly have been the legitimate concern to Government: ‘139. The day is coming when the Government [will demand] taxes on goats and sheep every year. As a result domestic animals will be at liberty to feed in the open places without anybody to claim their ownership. 149. [An] epidemic of smallpox is coming to the land of Africa, so much that all the Europeans in the Continent will die of it. 150. Those who collect taxes and money on land, and other things … the judgment of God is awaiting them.’ It is probably fortunate for Oshitelu that the authorities seem to have overlooked the possibly more inflammatory section in the other two pamphlets of the same period, which bluntly proclaimed the destruction of the older churches ‘down to the foundation, because they know nothing but money,’ the destruction of Islam except for those saved into the ‘Israel of God,’ and that ‘the white man takes another’s property by force’ and so shall perish from smallpox…” Turner, *History of an African Independent Church, Vol. 1*, 28-9.
sedition, but felt that his prophecies were a threat to stability and agreed to oppose him.

The Resident of Ijebu Province, H. M. Brice-Smith, had firmly opposed the Cherubim and Seraphim since April because of the deaths of several individuals at their hands during witch finding ordeals. He wrote to the Awujale informing him that witch finding ordeals were illegal under the law, and chiefs directly or indirectly associated were liable. In May, the Resident reported confidently to the Secretary of the Southern Provinces that the Awujale had “set himself strongly against their activities,” but there is reason to doubt that he had. In correspondence to the District Officer the Awujale stated that he would have no problem with the Cherubim and Seraphim in his city if they would be willing to stop conducting the ordeals. This was one of many times when there was a difference of opinion between the members of the central administration and the local administration and an important example of how a District Head acted on his contrary views.

With growing intensity the Resident of Oyo, W. A. Ross, began to oppose the Aladura. This transition can be seen in correspondence over the course of the year. A letter to his District Officers in April betrayed a little uncertainty. “…I cannot help feeling [the Aladura] should be discouraged by the chiefs and people” he confessed, and solicited intelligence from around the province. Assistant District Officer, R. Wilkes made his response short, saying, “I am shortly visiting Ikirun and will forward a further report,” revealing either his indifference or ignorance. The Cherubim and Seraphim and the Akirun were butting-heads in Ikirun, and Wilkes was on his way to investigate. On 27 May, Wilkes wrote again to Ross. He had met with the Akirun, and his chiefs, to get “their views of the Society.” The Akirun described them as promiscuous, rowdy, and disruptive and opposed them because they held mysterious meetings at night. The Akirun had warned Jacob Ogundijo, the leader of the Cherubim and Seraphim in Ikirun, that “all the activities of the Society

70 Resident Ijebu Province to the Awujale of Ijebu Ode, 3 April 1931. NNAI: IJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (3).
must cease at once…” if he did not want to be expelled. The “same state of affairs was found at Igbajo, and [the] Arinbajo has taken similar action.”

After his visit with the Akirun, Wilkes began to oppose the Aladura more stridently. It is unclear if there is a direct correlation to the letter from Wilkes, but the Resident of Oyo also began to strongly oppose the Aladura shortly after. Ross told his subordinates to “Please watch most carefully the activities of the Aladura and the Cherubim and Seraphim movements and warn the chiefs that there is great danger to the peace of the country and to their authority in allowing these small people to get established and get power.”

Roughly two months after Wilkes’ meeting with the Akirun, the ‘Headquarters’ of the Cherubim and Seraphim in Lagos sent a letter to him declaring that they were being persecuted in Ikirun, Igbajo, Erargbiji, Ibokun, Ororuwe, Ibala, Ipetu, Obagun, Irsi, Ekusa and Iba. They asked the Assistant District Officer to explain their mission to the local administration. Four days later, on 20 June, Wilkes penned a reply.

It is not my intention to interfere in any way with the discretions of the chiefs responsible for the good government of these towns. I may add that I am entirely in agreement with them in their desire to stop noisy and disorderly crowds parading around their towns at night. If it is in fact your wish to spread the Christian Gospel, I would suggest that you send a representative from your headquarters to Ikirun to hear from the chiefs…

The conviction of the Assistant District Officer in this letter stands out in marked contrast to his correspondence earlier, where he was brief and uncertain. By 20 June his views were firm and reflected exactly the attitudes of the Akirun.

While directives were sometimes handed down the chain of command from district, provincial or secretariat officials, intelligence was passed up the chain of command, having a clear influence in this case. The Akirun’s point of view had an observable impact on Wilkes. The officials of the central administration were reliant upon members of the local administration for their intelligence, and, as with the

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73 R. L. V. Wilkes to W. A. Ross, 27 May 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (10).
74 W. A. Ross to R. L. V. Wilkes, 14 August 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (16).
75 Cherubim and Seraphim Headquarters to R. L. V. Wilkes, 16 June 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (13).
76 NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (10).
Akirun’s influence on Wilkes, individuals of lower rank in the government could influence their superiors. Case studies like this one illustrate why it is important for scholars to include the perspectives and responses of traditional rulers in their studies of religious history in Nigeria. The inclusion of the intelligence provided by the Akirun fundamentally alters the interpretation of the stance taken by Wilkes, and, perhaps even to a degree, by Ross. When the local context is brought into the history of the encounter, it takes on a new meaning: it becomes an important illustration of how District Heads could subtly affect the central government.

Though a few government officials at various levels continued to oppose the Aladura, by 1932 the tone was noticeably less hostile. This was epitomized by Ross’ successor in Oyo Province, A. E. F. Murray. It cannot be said that Murray was pro-Aladura, but he approached them in a different way. Ross micromanaged opposition, whereas, Murray was happy to leave the matter in the hands of District Heads. Murray believed that if the Aladura were cognizant of the fact that District Heads were “ready to oppose” them, they would “do no damage.” Two contributing factors were that he looked around the province and saw “no signs of trouble,” and he believed that the movement would not last.77

On 3 January 1932, “the Cherubim and Seraphim once more broke the peace in Ikirun” and assaulted an individual. The Native Court fined the culprits twenty pounds. The fall-out from the incident was that the Akirun forbade the Aladura from practicing in Ikirun. The Assistant District Officer passed this information along to Murray, asking, “Do you agree, please?”78 Murray was not quite sure of how to proceed himself, and wrote to the Secretary of the Southern Provinces:

I consider that it would be unwise to interfere in a matter of this nature beyond emphasizing the legal remedy in the event of the law being broken … Quite apart from the fact that anything which savours of religious persecution must strengthen the cause of such societies, I consider that a question of this kind in which only natives are concerned must be entirely settled by themselves [District Heads] provided law and order are maintained.79

77 Resident Oyo Province to the Secretary of the Southern Province, 23 September 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (36).
78 Assistant District Officer Oshogbo to A. E. F. Murray, 28 January 1932. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (24).
79 A. E. F. Murray to the Secretary of the Southern Provinces, 1932. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (25).
This new approach marked a change from the previous Resident, W. A. Ross; it also meant that most opposition to the Aladura in Oyo Province after this point was primarily a result of the policies of members of the local administration, not the central administration. In the process, Murray seemed to return to the ideal of indirect rule in regard to the Aladura.  

Because colonial officials were so frequently transferred from one district to the next, there was little time to build a rapport with local inhabitants. It was not unheard of for there to be three different District Officers appointed to a single post in one year. This habit of transferring personnel around within the colonial administration could result in quite drastic shifts in the way the government related to the Aladura. Such considerations warn against sweeping generalizations about the “government” response to the Aladura – even generalizations about certain provinces, such as Oyo. As much as possible, it is preferable to discuss individual responses from government officials and specific periods of opposition. In this case, there was a marked period of opposition to the Aladura emanating from the provincial government in Oyo under W. A. Ross primarily in 1931. In 1932, under A. E. F. Murray, the provincial administration significantly altered course. 

When dealing with archival materials there is a danger that researchers will discover a case of government opposition to the Aladura and make a generalization upon this evidence. Archives can inadvertently emphasize conflict because controversy tends to produce more documentation than harmony. The first thing a researcher will find in colonial archives on the topic of the Aladura are the records of hostility and animosity; other facets of the encounter must be more actively sought out. 

There was a change of mood towards the Cherubim and Seraphim in the government of Ijebu, due in large measure to the fact that there were no more “outrages” associated with witch finding ordeals.  

In Ekiti District where the Aladura were rightly or wrongly associated with the tax riots, 1933 was a difficult year. In Ilogbo, the Apostolic Church was opposed by traditional rulers because they

80 A. E. F. Murray to the Assistant District Officer Oshogbo, 1932. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (27).
“preached against native forms of worship.” The Olojudo tried to force them to join an established church in his area, because he felt it would restrain their more radical tendencies. In response, J. A. Medaiyese of the Apostolic Church, appealed to the District Officer, A. C. C. Swayne, claiming that this action was an infringement upon their religious freedom. The Olojudo and the Apostolic Church had reached an impasse, and asked Swayne to intervene in the conflict. He responded to Medaiyese’s petition by defending the right of the Olojudo to refuse land to anybody that he believed “threatens the peace of a town,” but he agreed to meet with them at Iddo to hear their complaints. Swayne argued that the concept of religious freedom was not a license to act in an ‘unruly’ fashion (as defined by the Olojudo); understanding this point is central to understanding the government’s response to AICs. In practice, the distinction between ‘orderly’ and ‘disorderly’ behaviour was subjective, and gave substantial leeway to local rulers to interpret the situation as they saw fit. For that reason, many things, including at times jubilant expressions of religious fervour, could be seen as disorderly conduct by unsympathetic officials.

The Ajero of Ijero supported the ban on the Apostolic Church at Ilogbo for at least two reasons. He opposed their witch finding ordeals as threats to peace and order, and he nursed a grudge against them for allegedly throwing stones at his court while in session. At a meeting on 20 April presided over by the District Officer, several local rulers expressed apprehension, and the Aladura leaders expressed their outrage at being denied land. They were eventually given land, but not allowed to build on the site. Prior to the meeting, Swayne had suggested to the Ajero that he could bar them from the district if he did not wish to have them. After the meeting, Swayne advised the Ajero not to oppose the Aladura because they were firmly entrenched in the city. “You will understand that to try to put a stop to religious

82 A. C. C. Swayne, “[Notes on a meeting with the Ajero and Olujudo],” 20 April 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (62).
83 J. A. Medaiyese and A. O. Omolisho to A. C. C. Swayne, 4 April 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (60).
84 A. C. C. Swayne to J. Olawande, 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (61).
85 A. C. C. Swayne to the Resident Ondo Province, 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (71).
worship which already exists is a very different thing from refusing to allow it to come in.”

In this recommendation is displayed the tendency by the government to avoid involvement in any action that had the appearance of persecution. This position had wider currency as well, for one can find the same logic used in certain cases by the government in Kenya. Some would like to interpret this as an attempt by the government to hide their true intentions. Based on official correspondence, it seems rather more likely that they came to this policy out of a desire to preserve the principle of religious freedom, a belief that government opposition would have the reverse of the desired effect (i.e. encouraging the growth of the Aladura), and on a practical level, the appearance of persecution would not escape the notice of nationalists who would use it to stoke the fires of public indignation.

By June, the Apostolic Church had promised to give up its use of holy water in Ilogbo if that would persuade the Olojudo, but “he was unwilling in any circumstances to have an Aladura congregation in his District.” Swayne met with the Aladura again in order to find a solution to the deadlock. He did not censure the Olojudo and Ajero because he felt that they were legally justified in withholding land. The property that the Apostolic Church wanted to inhabit belonged to the African Church. In addition to this, the Olojudo believed that the Apostolic Church was connected with the tax riots in Iddo.

Swayne tried a new tactic. “I propose before abandoning all hope of compromise, to approach the local Pastor of the Baptist Mission, with which body the Aladuras have in the past enjoyed a certain liaison…” He met with the Baptist minister, M. N. Fatunla, to discuss the possibility of consolidating the two congregations, but the Apostolic Church quite naturally dismissed the possibility.

In the city of Ijero, the Apostolic Church was asking for land as well, but the Ajero stubbornly rejected all petitions for two years. Eventually, in 1935 the District Officer, in conjunction with the Ajero, created a list of stipulations; if the Apostolic

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86 A. C. C. Swayne to the Ajero of Ijero, 1933. NNAI: EKITI.DIV/1/1/41a (63).
87 This point is discussed in chapter four.
88 A. C. C. Swayne to the Resident of Ondo Province, 1933. NNAI: EKITI.DIV/1/1/41a (68).
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 A. C. C. Swayne to M. N. Fatunla, 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (70).
Church agreed to them they would be given land. The list took several forms during the course of negotiations, but first appeared as follows:

1. They are of good behavior and create no disturbance
2. They do not interfere with adherents of other missionary societies
3. The practice of adultery with another man’s wife is stopped
4. All matters pertaining to witchcraft are stopped
5. The use of so-called ‘Holy Water’ is stopped
6. No meetings are held after sunset or before sunrise
7. Any new adherent is brought before the Ajero

These provisos reflected typical complaints about Aladura in many parts of Yorubaland, though Swayne admitted, “I cannot say how well founded these complaints may be” in regard to the third stipulation. The list was “intended to put [the] church on a regular footing,” Swayne told George Perfect, the Superintendent of the Apostolic Church. They were designed to assure traditional rulers that they would have none of these ‘problems’ if they gave land to the Apostolic Church in their cities. The ban on holy water was within the city limits and did not apply to the church in Ara, some nine miles away. On 2 March, Perfect responded to the proposal by saying, “I have no hesitation in agreeing to the provisos laid down and can say so unreservedly on behalf of the Church Council.” He only wanted to discuss the matter with the ‘Pastor of Efon Alaye’ and the members at Ijero before signing them. There was some disagreement within the congregation about the stipulation regarding holy water, and they wanted to make it clear to the Ajero that they would not abandon the practice of faith healing altogether. This seemed to be acceptable to the Ajero and so Perfect planned to go to Ijero to meet with him personally.

Swayne was impressed with the way the provisos had resolved the stalemate between the Ajero and the Apostolic Church and thought that the list may have wider

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92 Assistant District Officer Ekiti to the District Officer Ekiti, 1 February 1935. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (87).
93 George Perfect was a missionary from the Apostolic Church in Britain. The Apostolic Church was the body that associated with the Faith Tabernacle in Nigeria, causing the latter to change their name to Apostolic Church for a time. Perfect had come to Nigeria to help organize the Faith Tabernacle and quickly became an important representative of the church before the government.
94 District Officer Ekiti to George Perfect, 18 February 1935. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (88).
95 George Perfect to A. C. C. Swayne, 2 March 1935. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (90).
96 George Perfect to the District Officer Ekiti, 29 March 1935. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (93-6).
applicability. By 1936, the provisos were being used by the District Officer in conflicts in Ikerre and Efon. This episode illustrates how the District Officers, as exemplified in Swayne (and his successor R. B. Kerr), were not merely opponents of the Aladura. After 1931, the officials of the central government receded into the background in the history of the encounter with the Aladura, because of a conscious attempt to delegate the responsibility to the local administration, except in cases of the breach of the law. In times of deadlock such as at Ijero, or in response to other complaints by the Aladura, District Officers and Residents became mediators. They conducted extensive negotiations with both parties and in so doing enabled the Aladura to get land withheld by local rulers. In these cases, it can be argued that the mediation of European officials was beneficial to the Aladura.

The type of conflict that persisted into the late 1930s and 1940s revolved around the authority of traditional rulers to withhold land from groups that posed a threat to peace and safety, as interpreted by the official. The Ogoga of Ikerre (Ekiti District) had chosen to withhold land from the Apostolic Church in 1932; the following year, Perfect travelled to Ikerre to try to persuade the Ogoga to grant them land and the king agreed to do so, but later rescinded the offer. Again in 1935 the Apostolic Church requested land; Joseph Babalola came from Efon to make the request in person, but was denied. In April 1936, S. Ojo appealed to the District Officer, R. B. Kerr, to come to their aid. Kerr responded, “The granting of land is in the hands of the District Head and his chiefs, I cannot force the chiefs to grant land for any purpose. It is entirely a matter between you and the District Head.” But he assured Ojo that he would meet with him at Ikerre to discuss the matter.

On 8 April J. A. Medaiyese of the Apostolic Church in Efon wrote to Kerr on behalf of the congregation at Ikerre, asking him to help them get land just as his predecessor, Swayne had done in Ijero. Then it occurred to the District Officer that it may be a good idea to dust off the provisos. He sent them to Cyril Rosser, the temporary replacement of Perfect. Rosser agreed to them with some minor modifications. The list was changed to say:

97 S. Ojo to R. B. Kerr, 2 April 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (111).
98 R. B. Kerr to S. Ojo, 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (114).
99 J. A. Medaiyese to R. B. Kerr, 8 April 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a.
100 R. B. Kerr to George Perfect, 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a.
101 Cyril H. Rosser to R. B. Kerr, 13 October 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (121).
1. That the members are of good behavior.
2. That they do no interfere with adherents of other missionary bodies.
3. That no meetings are held during the hours of darkness.
4. That the use of Holy Water is abandoned.
5. That the leaders of the Church take strict measures to prevent immoral practices and any kind of witch-finding among the congregation.
6. That a copy of the register of the names of members, with the name of any new adherents be submitted to the Ogoga.  

Kerr sent the modified list to the Ogoga, who read the provisos before the congregation.  

Despite Rosser’s commitment, the congregation, through its appointed leader Gabriel Adedara, decided that they could not abide by two of the provisos - the fourth referring to holy water and the sixth requiring the registration of new converts. Joseph Babalola, who was at Efon, weighed in on the provisos independently, stating that he accepted on behalf of the congregation all the provisos except the last one. The situation quickly became very complex with three leaders presenting three views. The leadership structure of the Apostolic Church, without a clear hierarchical structure to outsiders, with competition between the leading figures, and congregations with divided loyalties, was perplexing to government officials. It was not always clear with whom to negotiate.

To make matters worse, Perfect returned from furlough and realized that Rosser had spoken prematurely. “I was assured by Pastor Medaiyese that Pastor Rosser had not ascertained the mind of the leaders of our Church at Ikerre before writing you and that the conditions as agreed between you and Pastor Rosser were not yet acceptable to the leaders at Ikerre.” But the African District Council would not accept this excuse and insisted that the Apostolic Church abide by Rosser’s commitment. District Officer Kerr shot off a terse letter to Adedara the ‘president’ of the congregation at Ikerre telling him that Babalola had accepted the provisos.

102 R. B. Kerr to the Ogoga of Ikerre, 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (123).
103 The Ogoga of Ikerre to R. B. Kerr, 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (125).
104 Gabriel Adedara to R. B. Kerr, 24 December 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (159).
105 Joseph A. Babalola to the Ogoga of Ikerre, 20 December 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (157).
106 George Perfect to R. B. Kerr, 11 January 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (133).
107 R. B. Kerr to George Perfect, 30 June 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (142).
(which was not completely true) and in an exasperated tone stated “I don’t know who you represent.”

In April the Ogoga of Ikerre died, and George Perfect was informed by the congregation that the situation would be different under the new Ogoga. Indeed, due to the weakening control of the ailing Ogoga, they had been living in “undisturbed occupation” on the land in Ikerre. There was one more letter from Perfect to Kerr, informing him that the congregation was still unwilling to cease their use of holy water, and then there was silence on the matter. Apparently, the conflict between the Aladura and the local government passed along with the Ogoga.

A similar situation began in Efon in August 1933 between Chief Obaloja and the Aladura. The Alaye of Efon supported the Obaloja’s decision not to allow them to build a church in his quarter of the city; they already possessed land elsewhere in Efon. Though the Christ Apostolic Church had been well established in Efon under the guidance of figures like Joseph Babalola, rulers could halt their expansion into new sections of the city simply by refusing additional land plots. The situation had reached deadlock and Swayne put on the hat of negotiator and mediator, as he had done in Ijero. He supported the legal right of the Alaye and Obaloja to refuse land to those who would upset the harmony of the community, but he tried to assure the Apostolic Church Efon in writing. “You will understand that the objections are not to your building a church but to building upon the particular site Oja Obalu. The Alaye and chiefs will no doubt find you another suitable site for your purpose if you desire it.” That was in 1933.

Three years later the situation was unresolved, and the need for land increased due to the growth of the Apostolic Church in Efon. The conflict became worse for the Apostolic Church during a political succession struggle after the death of the Alaye. Several members of the Apostolic Church supported the opponent of the man who eventually became the Alaye. As a result, the new Alaye was hostile to the church and emphatically refused to grant any more land. Some time later the Alaye

108 R. B. Kerr to Gabriel Adedara, 28 December 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (161).
109 George Perfect to R. B. Kerr, 13 April 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (137).
110 A. C. C. Swayne to the Alaye of Efon, 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (74).
111 A. C. C. Swayne to the Pastor of the Apostolic Church, Efon, 1933. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (76).
112 S. C. Elton to R. B. Kerr, 13 October 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (147).
made his irritations with the Aladura known to the District Officer of Ekiti in a
council meeting and Kerr, who by this time had replaced Swayne, asked the Alaye if
he would like to have the provisos from Ikerre.\textsuperscript{113} The Alaye responded, “My
council and I are glad to have the rules…”\textsuperscript{114} Kerr sent the provisos to Perfect, who
after discussing them with the church at Efon, responded that the church was
unwilling to agree to conditions three and six.\textsuperscript{115} Kerr took this to the Alaye, who
agreed to remove the sixth condition, but insisted that the third remain (the one
having to do with meetings after dark).\textsuperscript{116} The Apostolic Church agreed to the
revised provisos and on 27 May, Kerr informed the church that the Alaye would
grant them another plot of land.\textsuperscript{117}

The tortured relationship between the Alaye and the Aladura continued after
the agreement, however. In 1938, J. S. Ekundayo sent two petitions to the District
Officer asking him to compel the Alaye to return church property that was in his
possession. The story was told by Ekundayo that during the time of the succession
struggle many members of the Apostolic Church fled to Ife. Some time later they
came back to Efon to retrieve church property they considered their rightful
possessions. They removed and bundled 800 sheets of iron roofing material from the
church and prepared to take them to Ife. Upon hearing this, the Alaye seized the
bundles to prevent their removal. Babalola, who represented the section of the
church remaining in Efon was in Ghana at the time of the incident and expressed his
gratitude to the Alaye. But when Babalola requested that the property be given back,
he was rebuffed by the Alaye. In desperation, the congregation appealed to the
Resident, claiming that the Alaye was discriminating against them out of revenge for
the political positions of some members of the Apostolic Church. They asserted,
“We are badly hated [by the Alaye] even to the babies in the womb. We beg the
Resident to help us poor Africans whom our superiors want to consume alive.”\textsuperscript{118}

These conflicts with the Alaye, Ajero, Olojudo and Ogoga illustrate how
opposition to the Aladura in certain cases came directly from the local setting. The

\textsuperscript{113} R. B. Kerr to the Alaye of Efon, 2 December 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (126).
\textsuperscript{114} Alaye of Efon to R. B. Kerr, 7 December 1936. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (127).
\textsuperscript{115} George Perfect to R. B. Kerr, 11 January 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (130).
\textsuperscript{116} R. B. Kerr to George Perfect, 21 January 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (135).
\textsuperscript{117} R. B. Kerr to George Perfect, 27 May 1937. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (140).
\textsuperscript{118} J. S. Ekuandayo to the Resident Ondo Province, 25 August 1938. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a
history of the negative response of the local community has not yet been exhaustively 
explored by scholars. This chapter has not discussed the varied responses of other 
important local religious groups, such as Muslims and members of African 
Traditional Religions to the Aladura. Even a brief acquaintance with the National 
Archives reveals a wealth of documents relating to these other local groups. The 
brief glimpses given in this chapter suggest an important avenue for further research. 

Around the time of the separation of the ‘British’ and ‘Nigerian’ Apostolic 
Churches in 1940, there were more problems in Efon as the congregation decided 
that it no longer wanted to follow the provisos. They began to hold night meetings 
in February; the Alaye’s messenger was informed that the Alaye had no “jurisdiction 
to order that they should not pray in the night.” The Alaye, in turn, made a formal 
complaint to R. B. Kerr, who wrote to the church at Efon asking for guarantees that 
the provisos would not be breached again. Kerr also wrote to the Alaye urging a 
moderate response. “If the offences have not been repeated perhaps a warning may 
suffice on this occasion.” Babalola went to the Alaye personally to assure him that 
they would abide by the provisos and things calmed down for a time. 

In 1943, the Alaye once again asked for the aid of the District Officer in 
getting the (Christ) Apostolic Church to adhere to the provisos. The Alaye 
specifically cited their loud nightly meetings which disturbed members of the 
community and their use of holy water. “This system is preventing the use of the 
Dispensary and moreover causing much death in Efon both in children and adults 
which should not have been the case if medical treatments are given,” he argued. 
The new District Officer of Ekiti, John Blair, urged restraint as his predecessor Kerr 
had done, saying, “You should invite their attention to the Agreement...” In 
March, the church in Efon renewed their promise to abide by the provisos, but in 
1944 the commitment was broken. The Alaye complained to the District Officer 
about their use of holy water and night meetings that ‘encouraged robbery.’ By now,

119 S. C. Elton to R. B. Kerr, 27 March 1940. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (201).
120 Alaye of Efon to R. B. Kerr, 29 February 1940. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (198). R. B. Kerr to S. 
C. Elton, 4 March 1940. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (200).
121 R. B. Kerr to the Alaye of Efon, 2 April 1940. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (202).
122 Alaye of Efon to John Blair, 5 January 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (221).
123 Alaye of Efon to John Blair, 30 January 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (229).
124 John Blair to the Alaye of Efon, 2 February 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (230).
125 Alaye of Efon to John Blair, 11 March 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (232).
he was losing patience and asked “that you attach a penalty for any breach of the agreement.” Unfortunately, it is unclear what actions, if any, the District Officer took.

This encounter between the Christ Apostolic Church Efon and the Alaye illustrates an additional aspect of the encounter. Often, the leaders of AICs are presented as holy men of God, above reproach, while the government is presented as duplicitous and conniving. In Efon it is apparent that the leaders of the Aladura were not passive or naive, but scheming and manipulative and, from the government’s point of view, duplicitous because they repeatedly broke formal agreements. While this should be acknowledged in cases where it seems applicable, it should not detract from the overall importance of AICs in African Christianity as religious innovators.

Government officials, especially District Officers, played an important role as mediators of religious conflicts between traditional leaders and the Aladura. Though the provisos may have been seen by some as government meddling, they actually facilitated the growth of the Aladura in Ekitiland because they enabled physical progress for the Aladura in the form of land grants and the neutralization of hostile relationships with traditional rulers. The episodes in Ijero, Ikerre, Efon, Ilogbo, Otu, Ara, and Alatare reflect an important aspect of the history of the encounter: the negative role played by traditional leaders. These examples also show how local considerations were integral to the religious expansion of the Aladura.

**Sources of Governmental Opposition**

It is easy to read the story of the Aladura in isolation from the reality that the officials were obligated to oversee the affairs of their districts or provinces. Their perspectives on the Aladura reflected their concerns as political leaders. The following political issues plagued the relationship between the Aladura and government officials and were the greatest sources of conflict.

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126 Alaye of Efon to the District Officer Ekiti, 21 November 1944. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (245).
127 See footnotes 1 and 44-49.
128 For the history of the situation at Otu see: NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661.
**Taxes**

Tax riots occurred in Nigeria on a number of occasions causing damage to mission stations and government installations, and loss of life.\(^{129}\) There was considerable resentment in eastern and western Nigeria over the imposition of tax systems during colonial rule. In the 1930s, prophets frequently expressed antagonistic sentiments about taxes, and thus the government was attuned to anything said on the subject. Tax riots occurred in Owerri in 1929, and in Akure and Iddo the following year.\(^{130}\) J. W. Garden, the Assistant Commissioner of Police for Ondo-Oyo, believed the prophetic utterances of the Prophetess Abigail had something to do with the unrest in Iddo and Akure.\(^ {131}\) Despite the assurances of many individuals within the Aladura movement that they were not a serious threat, the possibility that prophets were responsible for the tax riots informed the response of colonial officials to Oshitelu.\(^ {132}\) This connection was apparent in the advice of the District Officer of Ekiti to the District Heads, and persisted in the minds of some officials for years, as can be seen in the correspondence of the District Officer of Ibadan in 1933.\(^ {133}\)

**Property Rights**

In several notable instances, District Officers and Residents became involved in Aladura affairs over questions of property rights and accusations of stolen property.\(^ {134}\) The example of the stolen iron roofing materials in Efon has already been mentioned. Another instance of this took place at Ijebu Ode after the separation of the ‘British’ and ‘Nigerian’ branches of the Apostolic Church in 1940 (the latter will be referred to hereafter as the Christ Apostolic Church). The church at 88 Folagbade Street was divided by this controversy. The local leader of the Apostolic

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\(^{129}\) _Yoruba and Hausa Missions Report of Progress_, January 1918.


\(^{131}\) The “Lord asked” one Abigail to send His views on taxes to the DO at Akure. In a nutshell, Abigail stated that God did not want people to have to pay more than 3/-. Prophetess Abigail to the District Officer Akure, 26 July 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (35).


\(^{134}\) See the following sources for examples of this precedent: “Treating a Church as an Idol Grove,” _CMST_ 1 April (1919). F. Hedger, “Report of the Ekiti District to the Executive Committee, December 1918,” 1919. CMS/B: G3/A2/O/1-106. See several sources in NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/2/194.
Church was H. Ade Anijo. To preserve the peace at a heated meeting, he led his half of the congregation off church premises. This action was interpreted by the others as a renunciation of ownership of the church property, though Anijo strongly argued that it was no such thing. The Christ Apostolic Church had renounced the Apostolic Church, thus, Anijo argued that they had no rights to the church property, which as he pointed out, had the name Apostolic Church on the lease. But he could not persuade the Awujale that his section of the church was the ‘original’ congregation at 88 Folagbade.

In February, Anijo sent a list to the Christ Apostolic Church of over twenty items of church property that he claimed for the Apostolic Church. E. J. Obikoya, the pastor of the Christ Apostolic Church, responded the next day, insisting that Anijo’s church was in fact the one that seceded (referring to when they left the church premises) thus they had no right to the church property. He finished his letter with the advice, “You are advised to let the matter die a natural death.”

Much to the consternation of the Apostolic Church, the Christ Apostolic Church members, published an article in the *Nigerian Daily Times* explaining that they were the original members of the church at 88 Folagbade and had since changed their name to Christ Apostolic Church. To add insult to injury, the Christ Apostolic Church planted crops on the second piece of church property (purchased prior to the split), called Degun’s Farm, which meant that the Apostolic Church could not build a new church for themselves there. Planting of crops was, according to Anijo, intended to obstruct the Apostolic Church because uprooting crops was a punishable offence, thus the Apostolic Church was forced to rent a building in town. Once the crops had been harvested, the Christ Apostolic Church proceeded to dig up the ground in preparation of building a second church on the land, all the while, the Apostolic Church claimed to be the rightful owners of both properties.

The District Officer finally responded to Anijo’s petitions, asking Gbelegbuwa II, the Awujale, if he knew anything about the situation. His reply was

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135 H. Ade Anijo to the Christ Apostolic Church on 88 Folagbade Street, 13 February 1942. NNAI: IJE/PROF/1/2318 (7).
136 E. J. Obikoya to the Apostolic Church Ijebu Ode, 14 February 1942. NNAI: IJE/PROF/1/2318 (10).
137 H. Ade Anijo to the Resident Ijebu Province, 5 May 1942. NNAI: IJE/PROF/1/2318 (12).
138 H. Ade Anijo to the District Officer Ijebu, 20 August 1942. NNAI: IJE/PROF/1/2318.
that they “were once members of the Apostolic Church” who seceded because they
wanted to start their own church. They had drifted from place to place, and he
thought if they had a right to the property they should “establish such claim in the
court.” The District Officer must have been convinced by the views of the
Awujale, for the Apostolic Church was never able to regain the church property.

It is not entirely clear how the part of the congregation that continued to be
loyal to the Apostolic Church was described as seceding from the Apostolic Church.
Neither is it obvious how the faction that was no longer loyal to the Apostolic Church
and changed its name, was believed to be the original body by the Awujale. But this
episode highlights the importance of gaining the support of the traditional ruler. The
Christ Apostolic Church had done this in Ijebu Ode and had thus prospered. This
example also highlights how District Officers and Residents were reliant upon the
District Heads for their intelligence. In this case, the view of a trusted District Head
was accepted with little comment. The issue of property rights illustrates again the
fundamental role played by traditional rulers in religious matters in the local context.
In most day-to-day religious matters, District Heads appear to have played a greater
role than the District Officer or Resident after 1931.

Another situation involving property rights took place around the same time.
In this case, the Deji of Akure acted illegally in favour of the seceding body. The
outcome was actually the reverse of the previous case, but the premise upon which it
was decided was the same: the seceding body had no legal right to church property.

The conflict developed between the Apostolic Church and a seceding body in
Igbara-Oke (Ekiti District) in September 1942. This episode was part of the fall-out
of the separation of the Apostolic Church and the Christ Apostolic Church. The
British supervisor of the Apostolic Church stationed at Ilesha, S. C. Elton was busy
trying to keep the church’s properties. In Igbara-Oke, it was alleged that the
“secessionists have the Deji’s ear, and that he has in fact settled the matter out of
court in their favour.” John Blair, the District Officer of Ekiti, wrote to the
Resident about the situation. He thought the Deji was guilty of ‘coercion’ against the
Apostolic Church. “I duly warned him, and left no doubt in his mind as to what was

139 Gbelegbuwa II to the District Officer Ijebu, 25 September 1942. NNAI: IJE/PROF/1/2318 (18).
140 John Blair to the Resident Ondo Province, 17 September 1942. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (220).
meant by religious freedom, including freedom to own property and dispose of funds. He publicly agreed to wash his hands of the affair."

Two days later the Resident of Ondo Province agreed that the Deji had acted illegally in giving the church facility to the body which seceded, saying to Blair, “transferring it to the secessionists is plainly illegal and I consider it should be returned.” But the Deji was dragging his feet. Some months later S. C. Elton wrote to Blair, “I am not anxious to allow our members to take legal steps against members of another denomination but I feel that a brief statement to the Deji and Olowa, giving the legal position, will serve to remedy the whole matter … I feel sure that most of the misunderstanding on the part of the Chiefs is due to the impression that there has not been a separation in the Church.” By July 1943, The Deji was ‘ignoring’ correspondence from the District Officer on the subject and refusing to return the property to the Apostolic Church.  The Olowa of Igbara-Oke, who was responsible to the Deji was in the middle of the conflict, and Elton thought that “the matter cannot be settled until he is instructed by the Deji of Akure.” Shortly after, the Deji and Olowa agreed to return the property to the Apostolic Church, but when the members of the Christ Apostolic Church left the building, they took the benches, tithe box, door and frame, a hand bell, eighteen hens and cocks, a goat and duck, and five mats that were legally the property of the Apostolic Church. In May 1944, Elton wrote to Noah Ojo of the Christ Apostolic Church asking that these items be returned. He wrote to the Deji and Olowa as well, but predictably, they did not reply, displaying the same “antagonistic attitude.” The District Officer did not impose his will upon the traditional rulers, but replied to Elton that “I regret I cannot be of any further assistance. Your community at Igbara-Oke will have to seek redress in the courts.”

141 Ibid.
142 Resident Ondo Province to John Blair, 19 September 1942. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (227).
143 S. C. Elton to John Blair, 30 June 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (233).
144 John Blair to the Deji of Akure, 6 July 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (235).
145 S. C. Elton to the District Officer Ekiti, 14 October 1943. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (239).
146 Apostolic Church Superintendent Ilesha to Noah Ojo, 8 May 1944. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (244).
147 Apostolic Church Superintendent Ilesha to the District Officer Ekiti, 30 August 1944. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (242).
148 District Officer Ekiti to the Apostolic Church Superintendent Ilesha, 13 September 1944. NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (245).
Land Allocation

Contrary to what H. W. Turner wrote on the matter, the regulation and allocation of land in the local setting was a task generally delegated to District Heads and traditional rulers.¹⁴⁹ Naturally, securing land was an essential component of the expansion of the Aladura. For this reason, it is a theme that resurfaces again and again as one of the major sources of government ‘opposition,’ but most of these situations derived from local politics, not the policies of the central government.

The Aladura were denied land by traditional rulers in many places including: Ibokun, Ikirun, Iba, Igbajo, Aringbajo, Ekusa, Irsi, Obagun, Ipetu, Ibara, Ororuwe, Ilogbo, Iddo, Otu, Okuku, Ijabe, Iwopin, Alatare, and Eragbiji in the 1930s.¹⁵⁰ In a part of Ibadan, the ‘Bale and council’ refused to grant land to the Faith Tabernacle in 1931.¹⁵¹ The provisos used in Ijero, Ikerre, and Efon broke the deadlock between the Aladura and District Heads and enabled the former to secure land.

For District Heads, regulation of land was a very important means of maintaining control over their cities and towns. District heads had a broadly interpreted authority to refuse land to anyone who they deemed a threat to peace and safety. The allocation of additional land plots was also approved by District Heads, thus at any point traditional rulers controlled the geographic expansion of the Aladura (positively or negatively) in a city or region. Ultimately, District Officers and Residents could over-rule the decisions of District Heads, but archival evidence suggests that in most cases involving the Aladura after 1931, they allowed District Heads to do as they pleased.¹⁵² R. B. Kerr, the District Officer of Ekiti went so far as to write, “I cannot force the chiefs to grant land for any purpose. It is entirely a matter between you [Apostolic Church] and the District Head [the Ogoga of Ikerre].”¹⁵³

At Otu and Efon, the Cherubim and Seraphim alleged that the Bale and chiefs had granted land, but later denied it, or retracted their promise.¹⁵⁴ This sort of allegation was common and indicated how important land was in the religious

¹⁵¹ NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (12).
¹⁵³ NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (114).
¹⁵⁴ NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (38). NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (147).
context: sorely needed by the Aladura and grudgingly granted by some District Heads. The situation at Ikerre revealed how the District Heads often controlled the allocation of land, and thus directed a key component of the Aladura experience in the local setting. Upon the death of the Ogoga, the Aladura congregation expected that the official opposition to them would pass too.\(^{155}\) The District Officer who presided over the district had not changed, but the Aladura knew that the opposition had been from the District Head.

Wherever District Heads withheld land, the Aladura felt a certain sense of being oppressed. At Ijabe and Okuku, the Cherubim and Seraphim congregations petitioned the District Officers of Oshogbo and Ibadan, and the Resident of Oyo, to come to their aid and to “rescue and protect us from the sore oppression of our Native Chiefs.”\(^{156}\) The letter stated that the Onijabe and Olokuku had denied their application for land, even after eighteen years of work in the region. At one point, the Onijabe promised them land, only to change his mind. When they constructed a small prayer house without permission, he destroyed it. The Cherubim and Seraphim suspected that the Onijabe ‘persecuted’ them so virulently because his son was a leader of the local African Church.\(^{157}\) This illustrates the negative interaction between two AICs, a theme that has yet to be fully explored by scholars. The Assistant District Officer of Northern Ibadan investigated the allegations, but supported the Onijabe and Council because he could find no reason to doubt the story that the Cherubim and Seraphim had been a source of trouble, built their new church without permission, and “flatly disregarded” the Onijabe’s orders. The core of the Cherubim and Seraphim church came from the African Church and the Onijabe claimed, “ever since the Society has been a nuisance in the town, causing dissension with the African Church and frightening the village people with accusations and talk of wizards and sorcery and the like.”\(^{158}\) After the report of the Assistant District Officer, the Resident of Oyo responded to the petition of the Cherubim and Seraphim, informing them that “I am not prepared in any way to interfere with their

\(^{155}\) NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (137).
\(^{156}\) David Agboola, Daniel Oni and Ezekiel Lawole to the District Officers of Oshogbo and Ibadan, and the Resident Oyo Province, 1942. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (52-56).
\(^{157}\) Ibid.
\(^{158}\) Assistant District Officer Northern Ibadan to the Resident Oyo Province, 13 August 1942. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (49).
[the Onijabe and council] decision.”¹⁵⁹ This account reinforces the notion that District Officers and Residents generally supported the position of District Heads in regard to religion, unless there was convincing evidence of serious wrongdoing.

**Peace and Safety**

There was typically a great deal of discussion about peace and safety in regard to the Aladura movement. Of course, a concern for safety was central to discussion of many other groups as well.¹⁶⁰ Most of this correspondence about peace and safety was merely intelligence gathering. It is understandable, perhaps, that the Aladura felt the government’s obsession with peace was a form of opposition, but in many cases, they had legitimate concerns. The Aladura caused the migration of large numbers of people around the country; they drew very large enthusiastic crowds, and had a great following of loyal adherents. In Ilesha, Babalola created a stir in the colonial administration when he arrived. “Very large crowds of people, not only from Ilesha but from all the surrounding country and from as far a field as Ife and Ekiti; clerks as well as bushmen; Mohammedans and pagans as well as Christians, throng the church building and compound, which are at his disposal, each night after dark.”¹⁶¹ The government’s response was measured despite the magnitude of the crowds.

It was not so much the crowds, or the excitement in general, it was “orderliness” that interested government officials. Repeatedly this was given as a reason why the government did or did not take action against the Aladura. And in other cases, the actions of a few rowdy Aladura attached a long-term stigma to the group. When some members of the Aladura allegedly threw stones into the Ajero’s court while it was in session, A. Swayne wrote to G. Perfect, “only a long period of

¹⁵⁹ A. R. A. Dickens to David Agboola and Others, 18 August 1942. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (57).
¹⁶⁰ The government was also concerned about other groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the African Independent Apostolic Christian Faith Church Mission, new western missionary organizations including the Faith Tabernacle and Apostolic Church, and provocative western missionaries such as the American ‘revivalist preacher,’ W. R. Brown. See the following files: NNAI: OSHUN/DIV/1/2/05100, NNAI: ONDO/PROF/2/1/C8/1921, B/CMS: G3/A2/O/no. 50-100, NNAI: CMS(Y)/5/16, NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662, NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (77), NNAI: IBA/DIV/1/1/1146.
¹⁶¹ NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (2).
persuasion and evidence of effective control of the Aladura movement would be likely to change their (the Ajero and chiefs) present outlook.”162

Peace and order were an ever present concern for government officials at the local level as well. The Owa of Ilesha told Babatope to “be on his best behaviour” in Ilesha;163 order was mentioned by each member of the Alake’s Council in the case involving Simeon Shobande at Alatare;164 Oshitelu’s prophecies were scrutinized because they were thought to cause unrest;165 at Oshogbo the Aladura were said to be a “great danger to the peace;”166 at Ife they threatened to “cause strife and riots;”167 at Ikirun, the Akirun took a firm stand against the “noisy and disorderly crowds parading round their towns at night;”168 the Olojudo would not allow the Aladura in Iddo because they were “likely to lead to disorder;”169 the president of the Native Council in Otu denied land to the Cherubim and Seraphim because it would kindle “trouble between the Baptist members of Otu” and the Aladura;170 in Efon, they were accused of causing “troubles” in the Anglican Church, and this despite the warnings of the Alaye “not to start trouble between two churches;”171 the Ijero lodged an extensive complaint about the disorderliness of the Christ Apostolic Church in 1941.

I and my Council Chiefs have decided and asked the Apostolic Church Society to [quit] their House of Meeting ... and the town, within 30 days ... due to the following reasons: A. They are making loud and unnecessary noise in their house of meeting in the night and at the later hour of night. B. We have received complaints from the hands of many people ... [about] the considerable damage and injury done to their health in general. C. They have received warnings several times from I and the Council Chiefs and they do not cease to make the same mistakes. D. This Apostolic Church Society has failed to comply with their promises to the Ijero Authorities.172

The list does not end here, but the point has been made. Perhaps more than any other single complaints in correspondence from all levels of the government are

162 NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (71).
164 Clerk of Council, Complaint against Seraphim and Cherubim, 1931. UIL: WFS.
165 NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (48).
166 NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (16).
168 NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (14).
169 NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (61).
170 NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/661 (37).
171 NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (214).
172 NNAI: EKITI/DIV/1/1/41a (207).
those relating to the disorderliness of the Aladura.\textsuperscript{173} This highlights a difficulty when discussing the opposition against the Aladura, for the government had an obligation and an interest in maintaining peace. Many have criticized the government as being overly-sensitive, and yet no one seems to dispute the size and passion of the revival of the 1930s, which was associated with the Aladura.\textsuperscript{174} In some cases, the government was clearly reactionary, but what is also important is that the government actually interfered with few of these large gatherings of Aladura. Even though their apprehensions were quite plain in correspondence, in the moment, they displayed a certain presence of mind and restraint.

**Witch Finding Ordeals**

The practice of witch finding among the Aladura caused government opposition, particularly in relation to the Cherubim and Seraphim. The practice of identifying those who practiced witchcraft or witch finding was a legitimate and highly prized ability in many African societies, but it was illegal in colonial Nigeria. Thus the deeply held theological motivation which spurred the Aladura to engage in the practice, as described by the 1929 Constitution of the Cherubim and Seraphim Praying Band, set them on a collision course with the government.\textsuperscript{175}

The power of witchcraft and fear of witches was a phenomenon attested to even within the mission churches. The government did not effectively deal with the belief in the existence of witches during colonialism. Many Christians felt that it was not adequately dealt with in the mission churches either, and thus the fear of witchcraft persisted.\textsuperscript{176} The Aladura were just one of many groups in Nigerian history that sought to deal with the threat.\textsuperscript{177} While some Nigerians were not receptive to the witch finding ceremonies of the Cherubim and Seraphim, there were others who were quite open to them because they offered a solution to the problem of witchcraft in society.

\textsuperscript{173} NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (1).
\textsuperscript{175} Peel, *Aladura*, 74.
\textsuperscript{176} “The Power of Witchcraft,” *CMO* June (1932).
\textsuperscript{177} Peel, *Aladura*, 98.
In Imeko a situation erupted between the Onimeko and a Cherubim and Seraphim missionary named Folorunso in 1930. She had established a branch in Imeko, but according to W. Folarin Sosan, “her adherents [were] punished with heavy fines and became victims of ignominious treatments.”\(^{178}\) She was told to leave the city by the Onimeko because the witchcraft accusations were upsetting the equilibrium of the city. In a petition to the Resident on her behalf, Moses Orimolade admitted that some songs of the Cherubim and Seraphim on the topic of witches occasionally stirred up opposition, but otherwise largely dismissed the allegations against Folorunso and asked the central government to intervene.\(^{179}\) The Resident refused to interfere, insisting that she must get permission from the Onimeko before returning to the city. Moses Orimolade then appealed to the Alake of Abeokuta to pressure the Onimeko and the Resident.\(^{180}\) Sosan wrote to a government clerk named W. Lajorin, who was a member of the Cherubim and Seraphim, asking him to return to his home in Imeko, to investigate the “persecutions,” which he gladly did.\(^{181}\) Ultimately, after all this pressure had been brought to bear upon the Onimeko and chiefs, the Cherubim and Seraphim were permitted back into Imeko.\(^{182}\)

In Imeko the Cherubim and Seraphim felt they were being “persecuted” by the Onimeko, who barred them from his city for engaging in the illegal practice of witch finding and stirring up trouble in the town. In this correspondence the words ‘persecution’ and ‘opposition’ were used even when the author admitted that the Cherubim and Seraphim missionary knowingly participated in illegal activities. In Lajorin’s report to Sosan, he wrote, “blame largely lies at the doors of the [Cherubim and Seraphim] adherents for having preached the Gospel beyond what was necessary” (emphasis added). Lajorin admitted that Folorunso was essentially to blame for going “beyond what was necessary,” and thus admitting that the response of the local administration was warranted. But despite this admission, Lajorin characterized the Onimeko’s response as “persecutions from the local authorities.”\(^{183}\) Thus, one must be aware when evaluating AIC opposition claims, that even in

\(^{178}\) W. Folarin Sosan to W. Lajorin, 24 November 1930. UIL: WFS.
\(^{179}\) Moses Orimolade to the Resident Abeokuta Province, 30 June 1930. UIL: WFS.
\(^{180}\) Moses Orimolade to the Alake of Abeokuta. 30 June 1930, UIL: WFS.
\(^{181}\) Sosan to Lajorin, 24 November 1930.
\(^{182}\) J. L. Dadina to the Alake of Abeokuta, 16 May 1930. UIL: WFS.
\(^{183}\) W. Lajorin to W. Folarin Sosan, 2 December 1930. UIL: WFS.
situations where AIC members themselves admit culpability, they may also claim to
be persecuted. Historians must begin to be critical of such opposition narratives,
even while remaining sympathetic. Instead of merely recording examples of so-
called persecution, scholars of the encounter must begin to consider the role of AICs
in causing and contributing to the negativity of the relationship

In the year following the incident with the Onimeko, another court case
brought the Cherubim and Seraphim’s practice of witch finding ordeals to the
consciousness of a broader audience. At Makun in Ijebu Province, members of the
Cherubim and Seraphim, at the instigation of the Bale, submitted several citizens to
witch finding ordeals in 1931. After a period of alleged abuse of the four individuals,
one of them named Mr. Oja died while strapped to a tree in the compound of John
Lawo.

The story began earlier with the death of Mr. Oja’s daughter after a
suspiciously long illness of seven months (lengthy illnesses suggested the
involvement of witchcraft). According to the three testimonies of Akadiri Akinsanya
or Onasaya, Loye and Mafe, the Bale sent for Oja telling him not to bury the body of
his daughter. Upon the appeal of a man named Ogunlu, the Bale agreed to allow
them to bury their daughter for a fee of five pounds. The family could afford only
three. The Bale reluctantly agreed to the sum and allowed them to bury their
daughter. On the day of the burial, the Bale accused Oja, and two of his wives, Loye
and Mafe, of killing the child by means of witchcraft. He handed them over to the
following members of the Cherubim and Seraphim: Ben Job, Samuel Dosunmu,
Obadiah Ewu and Emanuel Thomson. They took the three accused individuals to the
compound of their leader named John Lawo, tied their hands behind their backs and
beat them with “certain sticks which the members of the Seraphim Society were in
the habit of using.” They strapped them to trees in the courtyard and covered their
heads with white cloths and beat them again; leaving them in this condition, they
went to pray.

At some point Ole, who was Oja’s sister-in-law, came to the compound to see
what was being done. When she entered, members of the Cherubim and Seraphim
began to beat her, cut her arm, tied her to a tree, and accused her of being a witch as
well. At 3:00am, Oja asked for tobacco snuff. Ben Job was irritated by this request
“tied a rope round his neck saying, ‘this man still has a chance to ask for tobacco
snuff.’” All of the individuals were beaten once more and told to confess to being
witches. Shortly after this beating, Mr. Oja died. Akinsanya went to the Bale and
reported his death, but he did not believe the report, so he sent a young man to the
compound to investigate. By this time, Ole, Loye and Mafe had been released and
that evening Akinsanya returned home to find them and the body of his father.¹⁸⁴
Ben Job fled the scene and went to Lagos.¹⁸⁵

The case against these members of the Cherubim and Seraphim was heard in
the Ijebu Provincial Court on 21 August 1931 before the Resident, H. M. Brice-
Smith. Fourteen Cherubim and Seraphim between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
eight were accused, most of them from Makun. Brice-Smith dismissed seven of the
accused at the opening of the trial for lack of evidence. The Bale of Makun testified
before the court that there had been no witch trial in his city and Ole only informed
him of the death of Oja after the fact. Upon hearing this from Ole, the Bale stated
that he went immediately to Oja’s home and found both doors locked from the inside
and his dead body inside with a rope around his neck, an apparent suicide. “I think
he felt ashamed of what people were saying,” that he killed his daughter.¹⁸⁶ Other
witnesses speculated that Oja hung himself out of shame, or perhaps out of fear that
the witch trial would prove him guilty.

John Lawo, the so-called ringleader, denied all the charges. He claimed that
he heard about Oja’s death after the fact. Further Lawo stated, “We [Cherubim and
Seraphim] never call anybody witches or say anything about witchcraft. I have heard
of other persons calling themselves Seraphim who have accused and beaten people
for witchcraft … I do not know a witch or a wizard but if any one is shown to me to
be a wizard I will believe it.”¹⁸⁷

The Resident had the difficult task of sorting out these conflicting
testimonies. He accepted most of Mafe, Loye, and Akinsanya’s testimonies against

¹⁸⁴ T. B. Bovell-Jones, “Preliminary Investigation held this Third Day of July 1931 […] into the
¹⁸⁵ District Officer of Ijebu Ode to the President of the Judicial Council at Ijebu Ode, 16 May 1931.
NNAI: IJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (5). District Officer Ijebu Ode to the Commissioner of Police of the
¹⁸⁶ Ibid.
¹⁸⁷ H. M. Brice-Smith, “[Proceedings] of the Provincial Court of Ijebu Province […]” 1931. NNAI:
the Cherubim and Seraphim because they had all “… identified the seven accused individually and described the share taken in the proceedings by each. The evidence … was well given and unshaken.” However, it was impossible to know conclusively when Oja’s death took place and how he died. Most of the testimony of the Bale was discounted as an attempt to cover his role in the incident. And most of the other testimonies were also largely dismissed because, “The accused, with one exception, are all sons or relations of people in Makun. The court believes that a concerted attempt has been made to hush up the matter and to provide an untrue explanation for Oja’s death.”

All the accused Cherubim and Seraphim were acquitted of the first charge of murder (Criminal Code 208, 216: 2-3), but guilty of the second charge of unlawful assault (Criminal Code 355) and the third charge of witchcraft accusations (Criminal Code 210 b). John Lawo was not convicted of the fourth individual charge of conducting a witch trial ordeal by flogging. For the second charge, John Lawo, Moses Adebowale, and Ben Job received two years imprisonment, and Samuel Dosunmu, Emanuel Thomson, Alfred Okunsaya, and Obadiah Ewu received sentences of a year. For their guilt in the third charge, all were sentenced to six months imprisonment, to be served concurrently. In a separate trial the Bale of Makun was fined five pounds for his role in the affair.

By 1931, there was a growing concern at the highest levels of the colonial government about the rise of witch finding ordeals. T. C. Lawrence, who was the Lieutenant Governor of the Southern Provinces, wrote in June that the Cherubim and Seraphim “has been doing considerable harm in the Province” but he had not devised a plan to oppose them. The Cherubim and Seraphim itself was never proscribed by the government. During the worst of the trials, the Resident of Ijebu Province was careful to note that the “assaults” and “outrages” were due, not to the Cherubim and Seraphim as a whole, but to “irresponsible” and “misguided youths” within the

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188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
Cherubim and Seraphim.\textsuperscript{192} These trials and alleged abuses were an important component, however, of why government opposition to the Aladura reached its peak in 1931.

The Cherubim and Seraphim were prosecuted in other cases that same year, with several convictions.\textsuperscript{193} In Ijebu, a District Officer called for the toughest possible legal sentences to be given by the Judicial Council to those Aladura engaging in witch trials.\textsuperscript{194} Some officials hoped to make examples of those convicted, in order to dissuade others from conducting witch finding ceremonies. The Resident of Ijebu Province wrote to the Awujale calling for severe penalties under the Criminal Code, and asserting his belief that District Heads ‘directly or indirectly’ implicated in the practice were liable under the law for imprisonment.\textsuperscript{195} The Awujale of Ijebu agreed with the policy of opposing the witch finding ordeals of the Cherubim and Seraphim. “I quite agree with you that I should immediately send instructions to all the District Heads and presidents of Native Courts warning them that these illegal actions must cease.”\textsuperscript{196} He maintained a general tolerance for the Cherubim and Seraphim, though, as long as they discontinued the practice of witch finding and limited their activities to prayer and preaching. “Under no circumstances should they require anybody to confess to being a wizard or witch...”\textsuperscript{197} The Bale of Efire also opposed the Cherubim and Seraphim due to their witch finding.\textsuperscript{198} Overall, the government prosecuted fifty-nine Cherubim and Seraphim in Ijebu for witch finding in 1931; of these, thirty-nine were convicted.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{193} NNAI: COMCOL/1/785.
\textsuperscript{194} District Officer Ijebu to the President of the Judicial Council at Ijebu Ode, 1931. NNAI: JJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (5).
\textsuperscript{195} Resident of Ijebu Province to the Awujale of Ijebu, 3 April 1931. NNAI: JJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (3).
\textsuperscript{196} Awujale of Ijebuland to the Resident of Ijebu Province, 3 April 1931. NNAI: JJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (2).
\textsuperscript{197} Awujale of Ijebuland to the Resident of Ijebu Province, 18 June 1931. NNAI: JJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (10).
\textsuperscript{198} Moses Orimolade to the Bale of Adenuyi, 4 January 1931. NNAI: JJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (11).
\textsuperscript{199} A report stated that this involved one Cherubim and Seraphim member sentenced to three years, one sentenced to one year, fourteen sentenced to six months, twenty-two sentenced to three months, and one fined 1/-. Fourteen more Cherubim and Seraphim were on trial in the Provincial Court at the writing of the report in August. District Officer Ijebu to the Police at Abeokuta, 1931. NNAI: JJE/PROF/4/J/1965 (28).
According to one District Officer, the opposition to the Cherubim and Seraphim in a district merely caused the Aladura to move to other districts, thereby spreading the movement more quickly. This discouraged concerted government opposition to the Cherubim and Seraphim. The government also became more cautious. By 1932, G. Hemmant, the Chief Secretary to the Government and the Assistant Inspector-General of Police of the Southern Provinces both suggested that “some discretion must, of necessity, be exercised in instituting prosecutions” against witch finding. Another factor that diminished the government’s response to the Cherubim and Seraphim was the lack of funding and staff necessary for thorough investigations; the scale of the witch finding movement quickly drained allocated budgets and necessitated a special petition for additional funds.

**Additional Sources of Government Opposition**

There were other areas of contention that arose less often, but which shall be mentioned to provide a more comprehensive contextual background of the encounter. First, the government required religious institutions to register if they wanted to be recognized by the government, especially if they wanted to be granted land for religious purposes. Early on, some Aladura groups faced obstacles because they had not registered with the government. Later splinter groups faced similar problems prior to registration. This problem of registration also arose in Kenya, where it was an even greater source of misunderstanding and conflict between AICs and the government. Second, colonial officials were very sceptical about movements that charged money for their services, including: prayers, healings, and baptisms, because in their view, this opened the door to charlatanism and profiteering. This was a common criterion used by the government to determine if a healer was legitimate or merely taking advantage of the people. Babalola was given greater stature in the eyes of the government because he did not accept money for his prayers.

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201 District Officer Epe, “Seraphim and Cherubim,” to the Administrator of the Colony, 17 July 1931. NNAI: COMCOL/1/785.
Abeokuta branch of the Cherubim and Seraphim included three rules in a published list of regulations on this very point.

- **Rule 6** - It is forbidden to receive money, incense, candles or any present from anybody because he or she wants prayer.
- **Rule 7** - Any worker must not for anything ask for money in a way not laid down by the society at any place especially in the District.
- **Rule 8** - A worker sent to a city, either to a chief, prince, princess, rich or poor must not ask for a present from such a person or persons other than the food he may eat during his or her staying with such a person, he or she may take the fare.  

The membership agreement of the Cherubim and Seraphim also included a rule relating to fees. “I promise that I will not sell or cause to be sold foul means of incense, consecrated water, etc.” The very fact that these rules were included in the list of church regulations and the membership agreement indicates that there were problems with evangelists and prophets occasionally accepting money. Third, many Aladura (to varying degrees) took a stand against traditional and modern medicine. It was seen as wrong to go to the hospital, even after attempts to find a resolution through prayer had failed. This was, in fact, one of the causes for the splits between the Christ Apostolic Church, Faith Tabernacle and Apostolic Church. Many people in the general public and the government saw this position as a potential health crisis.

**Conclusion**

It is evident that much opposition to the Aladura emanated from what was considered normal and necessary governance by British and Yoruba officials. And in

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204 *Rules and Regulations of the Sacred Cherubim & Seraphim Missionary Society, Nigeria, 1939. UIL: WFS.*
that sense the responses of government officials to the Aladura were not personal attacks, but rooted in other issues, such as the promotion of health and safety, and the enforcement of law and order. In the discharge of their civic duties, officials of the central administration (with the significant exception of the year 1931) were fairly temperate in their approach and even willing to work with the Aladura, so long as they did not break the law. The encounter between the Aladura and the government under normal circumstances took place at the local level and much of the opposition came from traditional rulers. This chapter has been written, in part, in response to the disproportionate emphasis on the negative interaction between European officials and African Independent Churches at the expense of other parts of the encounter; it hopes, in a small way, to begin the process of expanding current discussions. There is also a tendency to attribute responsibility for the actions of traditional rulers to the influence of missionaries or government officials. While undoubtedly, there are some examples of this, it cannot be maintained in every case.208 The role of traditional rulers must be thoroughly investigated in the history of religion in Nigeria for they were at the root of much religious change or the lack thereof.209

All this focus on the role of the traditional rulers is not intended to deny the role of the members of the central government in the experience of the Aladura. This chapter has discussed how members of the central administration opposed the Aladura at various times, especially in Oyo Province in 1931. By and large, they melted into the background in later years in archival documents. They should not be seen as narrowly oppositional to the Aladura; in a number of cases they served as mediators in local disputes, which actually benefitted the Aladura. There must also be recognition of the indifference and indecision in their relationship with the Aladura. This part of the encounter may not be immediately apparent and requires

that one be willing to look beyond the flash points within the colonial archives. The more one understands about governmental concerns (health, peace, safety, land registration, the conduct of religious organizations generally, etc.), the more one recognizes that the so-called opposition was often not a general, personal or irrational ‘opposition’ to the Aladura. Rather, it emanated from specific disagreements having a history and context, greater than the history of the Aladura, but also encompassing them.

Finally, there is a need for AIC historiography to become more critical of independent churches, even while remaining sympathetic. One way this can be done is by questioning AIC opposition claims. In addition, it is important to notice the role of AICs, themselves, in perpetuating and creating situations that elicited or necessitated a response from the government and others.
Chapter 3

Anglicans and African Independent Churches in Central Kenya

In Kenya, the encounter between African Independent Churches (AICs) and Anglicans was often contentious, but it would be inaccurate to characterize the relationship as merely one of conflict. There were other types of interaction which should not be marginalized. Anglican responses to AICs should not be interpreted in isolation, but only in connection with the other issues which informed and influenced the interaction. This chapter will root Anglican perspectives in the context of Kenyan religious history and show how they were sometimes constrained in their response to AICs by things that were larger or even unrelated to the encounter. It will also discuss the role of African Christians in the encounter. Finally this chapter will explore the role of AICs in fostering both collaboration and conflict in the encounter. There is no doubt that mission churches deserve much of the blame for the way in which the encounter occurred, especially at the point of schism. New evidence will be presented in this chapter that suggests AICs also were antagonists in the encounters, contributors to strife and conflict, and sometimes the party that was unwilling to collaborate or compromise.

A Brief Discussion of the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo and Luyia

The ethnic groups of central Kenya that will be discussed in this chapter and the next are the Bantu-speaking, Kikuyu and Kamba, who along with the Maasai, were the largest of the highlands.¹ During the colonial era the Kikuyu could be found primarily in five districts in central Kenya and were estimated to number one million in 1938.² The Kikuyu were thought to have descended from ten primary

clans, and from the nine legendary daughters of Gikuyu and Mumbi. Kikuyu identity was tied to the *mbari* (family descent group), the clan, and to the entire ethnic group as descendents of Mumbi. They were largely an agricultural and pastoral people prior to the colonial period, thus it is easy to understand how the alienation of land during colonialism was considered a grave threat to the Kikuyu.

The Kamba lived to the east of the Kikuyu in the highlands and had a history of trading over long distances – all the way to the coast and as far south as Tanzania. By 1850, the Kamba had established dominance over the Kamba trade route, but prior to the colonial era, Arab traders began to threaten the monopoly. Historically, their economy was also based upon agriculture and cattle rearing. Both the Kamba and the Kikuyu were said to have migrated from *Shungwaya*, a location north of the Tana River on the Kenya-Somalia border, though they followed indirect routes to their current locations. Broadly speaking, the Kikuyu and Kamba shared a similar system of political organization based on councils of elders and social organization based on territorial allegiances and age-grades or age-sets (variations existed in each locality).

This chapter focuses primarily on central Kenya, but at times the encounter in western Kenya will also be discussed, therefore some background of this region is necessary. In western Kenya this chapter will deal primarily with AICs among the Luo and the Luyia. The Luo of Nyanza are part of the ‘River-Lake Nilotes’ which include groups such as the Dinka and the Nuer that came originally from southern Sudan. Related Nilotic-speaking groups migrated over the centuries to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and other parts of Kenya. The present-day Luo settled in Nyanza in small groupings over several hundred years and

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were primarily pastoralists and agriculturalists, but they also depended upon fishing for their livelihoods.\(^9\) The Luyia are a Bantu-speaking group on the northern and southern sides of the Kavirondo Gulf of Lake Victoria. They are of diverse origins, including bantuised Kalenjin and Baganda from eastern Uganda that settled in Nyanza between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries.\(^10\) The Luo and Luyia are loosely organized groups based upon the clan.\(^11\) Each clan governs its own affairs to a large degree, but shares cultural and linguistic ties with the ethnic group. Some clans among the Luyia have the tradition of a king, but most are governed by councils of elders.\(^12\) Competition for land between the Luo and Luyia, and also within each group, has been fierce. The Luo expanded their territory from the mid-eighteenth century to the beginning of the colonial era. The Wanga, a dominant Luyia clan, halted the Luo advance and in the process achieved control over the Kager, a Luo clan.\(^13\) The political and ethnic conflicts between the Luo and Luyia were often present in the history of AICs in western Kenya. The conflict between the Kager and Wanga, for instance, is especially prominent in the history of the *Dini ya Roho*.\(^14\)

These brief descriptions of four ethnic groups in west and central Kenya will have to suffice, but many scholars have undertaken to describe the origins, migrations and history of these ethnic groups.\(^15\) John Lonsdale and John Karanja note that understandings of ethnicity in the pre-colonial period were dynamic.\(^16\) These statements serve an introduction, not a comprehensive description.\(^17\) The

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\(^11\) At the dawn of colonialism, there were an estimated twenty Luo and fifteen Luyia settlements. The total population of Nyanza was thought to be nearly a million. Lonsdale, “The Politics of Conquest,” 847.

\(^12\) Alpers, “The Nineteenth Century: Prelude to Colonialism,” 249.

\(^13\) Cohen, “The River-Lake Nilotes from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” 150-57.


\(^17\) For description of the indigenous social and political structures among these ethnic groups prior to colonialism, see: Muriuki, *A History of the Kikuyu*, 115-17, 126-30. H. E. Lambert, *Kikuyu Social and
Church Missionary Society (CMS) had a great deal of contact with the Kikuyu, Luo and Luyia, and less contact with the Kamba. Ethnicity played a role in the history of Christianity in Kenya; one must be cautious, resisting the opposing impulses of placing too much or too little emphasis upon it.

**Birth and Growth of Anglicanism in Kenya**

Kevin Ward pointed out that “East Africa was the last region of Africa in which Anglicans took an interest. But it has become one of the most distinctive regions of the worldwide Anglican communion.”

The Anglican Church began in Kenya in 1844 under the leadership of two missionaries from the Church Missionary Society (CMS), John Ludwig Krapf and his wife, Rosina. They were experienced missionaries, having been in other parts of Africa before they came to Kenya with the ambitious vision of starting a chain of mission stations from East to West Africa. In 1846, Krapf was joined by another dedicated co-worker named John Rebmann. They stayed for a time on Mombasa Island before moving to Frere Town and to the Taita Hills in 1883 where stations were started at Wusi and Mbale. Shortly thereafter, Krapf and his wife moved to Teveta, and then to Giriama territory.

Meanwhile, W. Salter Price, a missionary with previous experience in India, came to Frere Town to begin an industrial mission among a colony of Africans who, after being rescued from Arab slave traders by the British navy, were resettled in East Africa. By September 1874, there were 302 such individuals in the colony, which became a small but important nucleus of Christian converts in the early years.

In the 1860s and 1870s there was an increase in the number of missionary societies in East Africa. By 1885 there were 300 Europeans in East Africa, many of these were missionaries. The number of Protestant missionary societies also

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multiplied so that by the twentieth century the following organizations were working in Kenya: the Africa Inland Mission (AIM), Gospel Missionary Society, Church of Scotland Mission (CSM), American Friends’ Industrial Mission, Seventh Day Adventists, Salvation Army, United Methodist Mission, Bible Churchmen’s Missionary Society and the Colonial and Continental Church Society. Roman Catholic societies were also making headway in East Africa, including: the Holy Ghost Fathers, White Fathers, Mill Hill Fathers, and Italian Consolata Mission.  

The presence of so many missionary societies made the establishment of spheres of influence increasingly necessary. In Kikuyuland, for instance, the CSM and CMS created separate spheres in 1902. The dividing line ran from Ngong to Mount Kenya; the CSM territory was to the west and the CMS to the east of that demarcation.

The global commitments of the CMS expanded significantly at the end of the nineteenth century. Between 1887 and 1899 the number of missionaries more than doubled from 309 to 811; the number of female missionaries rose from 20 to 281; the number of ordained male missionaries rose from 247 to 406; the number of missionaries in West, East and Central Africa rose from 43 to 149. In Kenya the work of Krapf and the others, was known as the East African Mission. Over time, the work grew and for practical reasons was divided, increased further, and divided again. From the original East Africa Mission came the Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ruanda Missions. This chapter focuses on the Kenya Mission, with an emphasis upon the work in central Kenya.

The second wave of missionaries did not arrive in East Africa for some time after Krapf’s arrival and the Kenya Mission expanded little until the beginning of the twentieth century. When the new recruits finally arrived the CMS expanded into the highlands, with some eight stations being planted among the Kikuyu and the Embu following the Uganda Railway inland between 1900 and 1914. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the three main sections of the Kenya Mission were apparent:

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coastal stations to the east, central highland stations, and Nyanza stations to the west (these were part of the Uganda Mission until 1921). 

Another important early development was the division of the Anglican diocese of Eastern Equatorial Africa (est. in 1884) in 1897. Previously, the Uganda Mission and the Kenya Mission were in the same diocese, but the work was too large for one bishop; the sitting bishop, Alfred Tucker chose to focus on Uganda while William George Peel, who was a missionary of nineteen years standing in India, was consecrated bishop over the work of Kenya. Peel would remain bishop until 1918 when he was succeeded by another missionary from India named Richard Stanley Heywood (r. 1936). Growth was slow in Kenya prior to 1910, thus Uganda, with an estimated 200,000 adherents in 1915, was seen as a more glamorous mission. It was not until the creation of the British East African Protectorate by the British government and the construction of the Uganda Railway that the mission in Kenya began to truly prosper. The quick succession of new stations took the CMS into a large swathe of new territory in a relatively short period of time, and the Kenya Mission, over-extended in the highlands, began to feel the strain.

WWI affected the CMS by causing a decrease in European contributions and recruits, but it was also positive for it gave Kenyan Christians the opportunity to show their ability to lead effectively. Shortly after the war, the Kenya Mission faced further financial shortfalls leading to cutbacks in personnel; in this regard Kenya already trailed behind other CMS missions in Africa. By 1925 the number of CMS missionaries in Kenya was seventy-one, significantly fewer than Uganda and sixteen fewer than Nigeria. These reductions occurred at a time when the demand for mission education was rapidly increasing. One CMS missionary believed strongly that it would be “disastrous in the extreme to close in the least degree any channels

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29 Hewitt, The Problems of Success, 126.
31 Karanja, Founding an African Faith, 10.
by which they [Kenyans] receive pure Gospel teaching. This logic or one very similar, was closely held by many missionaries. It was not only hunger for power or paternalism which convinced missionaries to remain in Africa. The writings of the missionaries reveal that they were compelled to remain due also to the conviction of the need for their presence, which was, no doubt connected to numerous African petitions. Seemingly, for every African calling for their withdrawal was another asking the CMS to remain – to establish churches, schools and medical facilities.

The Great Depression had a significant affect on the CMS home base in London, which collected £58,000 less in 1931 than the previous year; 1932 witnessed an additional 8% loss of donations. The Depression weighed heavily on the Kenya Mission as well. In the late 1920s new expenses associated with the missionary Alliance and decreased government grants meant that the CMS entered the Depression with strained finances; they met their short-term commitments by borrowing from savings. European staff agreed to another reduction in salary in 1939; several missionary vacancies were not filled; the CMS reduced its grants to the European chaplaincy at Mombasa; and pressure was placed on the African Church Council to accept responsibility for a greater percentage of the salaries of African pastors. By 1939, H. J. Butcher thought that “Should any further reductions occur it seems quite certain that spheres of work will have to be closed.”

Collectively, the CMS in East Africa claimed some 238,000 members by 1930 and added 20,000 more each year. The total number of Anglican adherents in East Africa nearly doubled between 1909 and 1920, and more than doubled between 1920 and 1930. CMS West African missions witnessed a five-fold increase over two decades. It was an era which glorified the qualities of self-sacrifice and ‘high-

35 Team Work, Being the C.M.S. Story of the Year 1927-1927 (London: CMS, 1928).
38 CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/3.
40 E. F. E. Wigram, Weapons that Win, Being the C.M.S. Story of the Year, 1930-31 (London: CMS, 1931), 100.
hearted courage” in European and African clergy, and a period which taxed the financial and physical resources of the CMS.

By the 1930s, there was great demand for new and expanded educational facilities to keep up with the training of new members and pastors. The government agreed to match CMS funds for the salaries of qualified teachers and the cost of building educational facilities, and in 1926 there was a special appeal to the home base for £10,000 for the Kenya Mission. The CMS was perpetually limited by its finances in sending new teachers to Kenya, though those that did come were of high quality and played an important role in the coming years. The turn-over in personnel was particularly high at the beginning of the decade (In 1932 it was announced that seventeen missionaries were retiring). The mission struggled to make up for the retirements in the following years. J. Cecil Smith, the secretary of the mission at the time, characterized the staffing situation as bleak. Three years later the situation had not improved. “I hope you do not think this is too pessimistic a letter, but I do want the Africa Committee at home to understand once again that we are at bed rock…” In the mission report for 1938, Cecil Smith suggested the possibility that ‘there may not be another.’ There was another report the following year, but the outlook was still grim due to the “retrenchment scheme in the spring, war in the summer and a further retrenchment scheme in the autumn…”

Retrenchment was probably a term borrowed from the military; when used by the CMS, it referred to the process of pulling back from unsustainable commitments and reinforcing mission strongholds. Heading into WWII, Anglicans in Kenya were making hard decisions about retrenchment. Donations to the CMS decreased and banks would not allow the CMS their typical overdraft, thus cuts nearing 25% of total expenditure were required. In addition, the cost of sending missionaries around the world was rising because of the deflation of the British pound. The budget for

42 “Recruits Needed for Africa,” CMO LIII, April (1926).
45 H. D. Hooper to F. Cecil Smith, 2 July 1936. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1.
47 F. Cecil Smith to H. D. Hooper, 9 June 1939. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1.
CMS work in the ‘Far East’ for 1939 was £28,000; the following year, £78,000 was needed to sustain the same work.\textsuperscript{49} Cutting staff in London and other measures allowed the CMS to achieve the required savings, but H. D. Hooper was apprehensive, suggesting that the “future of missionary finance is so problematic that we may have to decide to close down one whole field, like the Kenya Mission, in order to get anywhere near the reduction which the Committee must face.”\textsuperscript{50} Several years later, the situation was worse for the CMS in Britain. “The pressure is severer than ever it was, and I tremble to think how we are going to maintain our work at this end if any more demands are made on our headquarters staff.”\textsuperscript{51}

The Kenya Mission was running in deficit as well and all staff agreed to a reduction in their salaries.\textsuperscript{52} The mission suffered from attrition, but vacancies were not filled. F. Cecil Smith did not disguise his desperation.\textsuperscript{53}

It is time we faced this realistically, because as you have already been reminded in this long report, for the last 15 or more years we have been in the state of hoping that more help would come but steadily getting worse. It will be far better for us to do something smaller effectively rather than stretching our people to the maximum with the possibility at any time of collapse.\textsuperscript{54}

The CMS found it very difficult to refuse any opportunity for expansion. By this period the CMS was seriously over-extended, and to make matters worse they were experiencing greater pressures from congregations for better services. At one church gathering, a Kenyan pastor suggested the consolidation of several schools to save money for the mission. “He was practically howled down, told that he did not know his job, and the Church would soon cease unless we respond to every call to go forward.”\textsuperscript{55} The churches pledged to do their part to make up the difference in finances and to support all CMS schools in three years. At another meeting one man said to T. F. C. Bewes, “The Europeans talk of closing, so we must talk of opening,”

\textsuperscript{49} H. D. Hooper to F. Cecil Smith, 14 December 1943. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/1/subfile 13.
\textsuperscript{50} H. D. Hooper to F. Cecil Smith, 4 October 1939. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1.
\textsuperscript{51} Hooper to Smith, 14 December 1943.
\textsuperscript{52} Annual Report of the Committee of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East, One-Hundred-and-Forty-First Year (London: CMS, 1940), 17.
\textsuperscript{53} F. Cecil Smith to H. D. Hooper, 6 November 1946. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1.
\textsuperscript{54} “Kenya Mission Staffing Situation,” to the Secretaries [of the CMS], April 1946. CMS/B: AF/35/49 A5/1.
\textsuperscript{55} T. F. Cecil Bewes, “Kenya Gives a Lead,” CMO 8, February (1941).
and they did. Thousands of pounds were raised to support Anglican pastors and to begin new building projects. Bewes later stated, “The way in which the African Church is rising to the occasion is magnificent.”

During WWII, L. B. Greaves considered it the patriotic duty of missionaries to remain in Kenya and to look after the spiritual, moral and material well-being of troops and ‘war-workers,’ and to carry on business as usual. Despite the many new demands on missionaries and clergy, and financial shortfalls, the Anglican Church was advancing at a strong rate. Many European missionaries served as chaplains and field doctors and this allowed Kenyan pastors to take a more active leadership role.

The cry for independence, impatience with European missionaries, and racial tensions existed prior to WWII, but came to dominate the thinking and outlook of many Kenyans in the 1940s and 1950s. The number of African clergy was on the rise; in 1929 there were 17 African clergymen, 38 in 1939, and 44 in 1945. Missionaries saw this as progress and pointed to other bright spots, such as the increase in the authority given to certain African rural deacons under the diocesanization process. Quite understandably, many Africans felt that these improvements were too little too late.

The rise of the Mau Mau was an unmistakable signal to the government, settlers and European missionaries that Africans were not willing to progress towards independence at the pace chosen by colonial rulers. Because of the perception of the very close association between the mission and the colonial enterprise, the

62 In very simplistic terms, the Mau Mau was a guerrilla movement, mainly in central Kenya, which sought to expel westerners and end their influence on Kenyan societies. Some very recent monographs on the Mau Mau are: Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, the Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). David M. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005).
Anglican Church became a target of Mau Mau aggression. T. F. C. Bewes reported that the Mau Mau had destroyed thirty-three CMS schools and other property in Embu, and assaulted and harassed many Kikuyu Christians and missionaries. There had been several Christian ‘martyrs’ and other Christians disappeared, never to be found. All Christians, he said, were facing the possibility of death if they refused to ‘compromise’ with the Mau Mau, especially African pastors, teachers and evangelists. He estimated that nearly ninety percent of Anglican adherents were “caught up in the meshes of Mau Mau.” Of the 22,000 Christian adherents of Fort Hall District, only 800 publicly refused to take the Mau Mau oath.

This discussion has been an attempt to dwell upon certain themes that are relevant to the encounter. There were many hurdles placed before the CMS in the middle and later years of the colonial era, which had a detrimental impact on their ability to respond to African grievances and demands within the church. The chronic staffing and financial shortages had a direct impact upon educational policy, which led to the emergence of several AICs. The CMS was not able to mount a large-scale, collective response to AICs in part because they were so drastically overextended. The encounter between the Anglican Church and AICs was fundamentally linked to social, religious, historical, political, and economic forces that proscribed the way they conducted their mission in Kenya and responded to AICs.

This section has been devoted to deepening current understandings of the context within which the Anglican Church existed. The next section is devoted to giving a background of several AICs in Kenya. Then the focus will turn to assessing current assumptions about the encounter. This chapter does not seek to upturn all of

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63 See the following sources for information on Anglican activities during, and in response, to the Mau Mau Emergency: CMS/B: AFg/C1/1 and KNA: MSS/61/1015/149.
64 T. F. Cecil Bewes, “Work of the Christian Church among the Kikuyu,” International Affairs 299, 3 (1953): 324-25. He gave the following examples: “A few weeks ago, one of our clergy was dragged out of his house at night. They tied him up with wire so that he could not shield himself, and they beat him unmercifully and cut him to the bone. They even cut the initials MAU on his arm. Yet later while his wounds were being dressed, there was not a word of anger or self-pity. He was quietly praising God. Kaguru, one of the evangelists, was attacked the same night, and was brutally murdered. His wife was beaten and injured. A teacher was so cruelly beaten that his teeth were knocked out, and yet, when I saw him recently he was full of joy - even full of fun - with nothing but a deep sense of compassion and love towards those who had attacked him. One girl was so badly beaten that she was made deaf; a woman was hung by her neck from a beam, but she went on singing hymns till she became unconscious ... There is a Christian chief who has suffered four different attacks on his life. Once they tried to drown him, once he was shot at, he has been attacked with knives, his hut has been set on fire.”
these, but rather to move the discussion incrementally to a place where new ideas about Anglicans can be introduced.

**The Birth of AICs in Central Kenya**

Between 1914 and 1972 an estimated one-hundred and fifty AICs emerged in Kenya. Over that same period the Anglican Church experienced thirty schisms. The end of this period, between 1950 and 1972, has been described as a ‘mushrooming of independency.’⁶⁵ Obviously, this chapter cannot deal with all AICs in Kenya, but will focus on those that emerged prior to the ‘mushrooming of independency’ and those that had contact with the Anglican Church (and colonial officials in the next chapter). This is an important point to emphasize; chapter three is not organized around the AICs, but around Anglicans. The goal of the research in this chapter is to expose additional aspects of the way Anglicans responded to AICs; this can be done more effectively by broadening the number of encounters under investigation, rather than limiting them. This is directly linked to the decision to focus on central Kenya, but to also include references to western Kenya. The structure of the Kenya Mission encompassed areas of east, west and central Kenya – the final two regions being by far the most important regions of CMS activity in this period. In addition, west and central Kenya witnessed far more AIC initiatives. Since the CMS authority structure incorporated both western and central Kenya, intellectual currents freely crossed political and ethnic boundaries and when Anglicans began to investigate and write about AICs in earnest in the late 1940s and 1950s, they often spoke of independency in Kenya, not just in one section. Additionally, AICs did not confine their activities to one section of Kenya. Thus, in a period of the increasing movement of people and ideas, it is less important to define this study based upon political boundaries, which do not necessarily conform to the boundaries of the encounter. Second, including both west and central Kenya offers a helpful counterpoint at pivotal parts of the history of the encounter. A focus solely on just one section, Central Province for instance, could lead to inaccurate assertions about Anglican attitudes towards AICs in Kenya. Just one example of this was the fairly different approaches of Anglicans

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to AICs in west and central Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising. This study is very much interested in exploring the diversity of Anglican attitudes to AICs (this is the same reason why making comparisons between Nigeria and Kenya is useful). Having said this, the present study does focus primarily upon central Kenya and generally restricts references about the west to instances when comparison is important, either to show contrast or highlight similarity.

In the history of AICs in Kenya there were certain recurring cultural, social and economic issues at the root of the grievances of many Africans. The angst associated with these matters was felt by many of those who left the missions. Among the most common of these issues were female circumcision, education, and land alienation. Before proceeding to the history of specific AICs in Kenya, these topics should be given a brief introduction. Other issues caused outrage among Africans, such as labour and taxes; these will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

First, the practice of female circumcision (also known as clitoridectomy and female genital mutilation) and its effects on the Kenyan church have been discussed at length by Claire Robertson, David Sandgren, Robert Strayer and Jocelyn Murray. The custom has an ancient history in central Kenya, possibly going back to the Gumba people who inhabited portions of present-day Kikuyuland before the arrival of the Kikuyu, and has been a part of both the female and male initiation rites that mark the passing from childhood to adulthood. Of all traditional ceremonies that punctuated the phases of life, Godfrey Muriuki believed the transition from childhood to adulthood, during which circumcision took place, was the most important to the Kikuyu. The negative social stigma associated with uncircumcised women was great, even to the point of ostracizing them from family and friends. In a religious sense, having intercourse with an uncircumcised female was polluting to the male and required ritual purification. In a cultural sense, circumcision was symbolic of ethnic identity, and to a growing degree ethnic solidarity. The operation itself varied from location to location and from surgeon to surgeon; in the

66 Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, 43.
67 Ibid., 119.
69 Sangree, Age, Prayer and Politics in Tiriki, 125.
severest cases it involved the removal of the clitoris, labia minora and labia majora, in its conservative form circumcision involved the removal of the clitoris. The operation was common among the Kikuyu, Kamba, Maasai and Meru. Critics noted that the procedure had harmful side effects for women during intercourse, menstruation and childbirth.

Female circumcision caused great upheaval in the mission churches in 1929. Most missionaries opposed the practice to one degree or another. Strayer and Murray describe this opposition as being based upon visceral (it was personally abhorrent), medical and spiritual grounds. Certain mission societies, such as the Africa Inland Mission (AIM) and the Church of Scotland Mission (CSM), under the guidance of the medical missionary John W. Arthur took the most vocal stand against the custom. The CSM demanded that pastors not allow their daughters to undergo the operation, and remain separate from political organizations such as the Kikuyu Central Association, who made female circumcision a centrepiece of their activism. Both societies suffered the consequences of this position when many adherents refused to abide by such requirements and left in droves.

The CMS wanted to end the practice, but supported a more gradual approach. They resisted taking a strong stand through the 1920s, but in 1930 Bishop Heywood published a letter to the pastors and elders of the Pastorate Committee stating,

This custom which is causing us trouble at the present time is one which not only does harm to the body, preventing it from being strong, but further it does not in the least agree with the teaching of purity and holiness which our Lord Jesus Christ taught … I now see that it is incumbent upon me to remind all those who assist in ruling the church that one cannot truly serve Christ if we desire to follow a custom which is not in agreement with what He would have done.

In a second letter, he described circumcision as ‘really harmful’ to the body, and because of the accompanying religious rituals, it was also considered harmful to the soul. The Bishop had become clearer about the church’s direction. The goal was:

72 Karanja, Founding an African Faith, 207.
“1. All heathen practice connected with the custom must be entirely abandoned by Christians. 2. Anything of a public nature must be strictly prohibited. 3. Any operation causing physical injury to the individual must be condemned.”

Those members who persisted in the custom would be open to the possibility of church discipline. The Bishop qualified his ruling by saying “In order, however, that the matter of disciplining may not be done with respect to persons, and especially that it should be done in equity, we desire that each case be carefully considered by the Pastorate Committees, so that they may find how far the people are to blame, and it is for this purpose that I ask you to assist me.”

He called upon Africans to create an alternative initiation ceremony that retained important cultural significance. “Such initiation would include the preparation of our young men and women for the privileges and responsibilities of Christian parenthood…”

There was an Anglican conference at Kahuhia on 10 August, after the first of the Bishop’s letters and prior to the last two, in order to discuss the question of female circumcision and to ascertain the views of African pastors. The conference revealed disagreements within the fold.

Rampley, a prominent missionary among the Europeans, initially refused to attend the conference at all, until W. A. Pitt Pitts was sent to fetch him. The Europeans and Africans took communion together and split up for separate discussions. At the end the African pastors produced the following report:

We Africans have discussed this matter. In every station there has been real trouble because of refusing circumcision and because of the discipline, and the work has been set back very much. 1. The delegates from Weithaga, Kahuhia, Mutira, Kabare, and Nairobi say that it was good to agree that the law announced by the Native Local Council on circumcision … be accepted - and that they should find a Christian woman for the work, and not a heathen; it should always be performed in a house, or some other private place. This should be done till the people give up the custom and take Christianity well because many people are giving up the Church and going to the RCs [Roman Catholic Church] or returning to their heathenism. 2. The people of Kabete and Embu see that it is good that this thing should be prohibited, even if people leave school and wish to return to heathenism or

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74 Ibid.
75 Karanja, Founding an African Faith, 207.
76 R. S. Heywood to My Dear Brother, 12 October 1931.
77 W. A. Pitt Pitts to H. D. Hooper, 10 August 1931. CMS/B: G3/A5/O (105).
78 H. D. Hooper to W. A. Pitt Pitts, 25 June 1931. CMS/B: G3/A5/L13 (172).
go to the RC. Children should be taught to learn wisdom, and leave the
custom. We could come to no agreement on this matter.79

Pitt Pitts concluded his report on the Kahuhia conference to H. D. Hooper, “The truth
is you cannot go beyond where your leaders in the African Church follow, or you get
to the position which the AIM and CSM have.”80 The time of the all-powerful
missionary, if ever it did exist, was passed.

A second major issue in the emergence of AICs in Kenya was the desire for
education, which came to prominence in the 1920s.81 The educational boom arrived
later in Kenya than in other parts of Africa, later in central Kenya than in western
Kenya, and later among the Kamba than the Kikuyu.82 Disagreements existed over
the type of curriculum to be used in the schools, the number and quality of schools,
and the level of education that should be provided. Many Africans were motivated to
attend school for economic reasons and naturally preferred classes that emphasized
practical work-place skills. Many Anglicans believed that a religiously based
education was equally important.83 The original purpose of these schools was, after
all, to train mission adherents: catechists, evangelists and pastors.84 By this time
many non-Christian Kikuyu desired education and believed it was their right to have
education which did not involve Christian indoctrination.85 As the educational
system evolved, the government began funding promising mission schools as a
cheaper and easier alternative to starting new schools.86 Thus while one can
understand why Anglicans wanted to control the curriculum of their schools, the fact

79 Pitt Pitts to Hooper, 10 August 1931.
80 Ibid.
CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/e3. J. E. Anderson, “Selection and Adaptation outside the
Missionary/Government Framework – the Independent Schools,” in The Struggle for the School
of Kenya, 111. This trend was present outside of Kenya as well. M. L. Daneel, Quest for Belonging,
83 Karanja, Founding an African Faith, 190.
86 G. T. Manley to Canon Rogers, 28 September 1925. CMS/B: G3/A5/L12.
that a growing number of mission schools were funded (partially or completely) by government grants, helped to justify the call for a non-religious education.

When AICs became involved in establishing their own schools a similar dilemma occurred. Like the missions, independent schools wanted control over their curriculum. The three issues that were particularly important to them were teaching English, offering higher levels of education, and maintaining a sense of independence. Ironically, many of the individuals that became independent school leaders and demanded the right to choose their curriculum, had strongly criticized the missions (and eventually left them) for having wanted the same thing. In any case, government grants came with certain stipulations that the mission and independent schools were required to abide by as a condition of eligibility. Both mission and independent schools resisted these guidelines. The independent schools, in particular, often considered regulation to be a source of government opposition, a conspiracy to keep independent schools from prospering.\textsuperscript{87}

It is imperative to acknowledge this feeling of oppression, but the historian must also begin to simultaneously critique it at times. One method of evaluating AIC claims of oppression is by comparing them with the experiences of other religious bodies in Kenya, including mission churches. When faced with a particular claim of opposition by AICs, this thesis will try to ask the question, was this something faced only by AICs? In the case discussed above, government regulation of schools was a source of felt oppression, but mission schools were subject to the same regulations. Two possible conclusions present themselves: either, both the missions and independent schools were opposed by the government or neither was oppressed on the basis of these educational regulations. While these regulations were a source of frustration to both independent schools and missions, it is better not to see them as government opposition, except in specific cases when it can be proved that there was a different standard applied toward the two groups.

By the mid-twentieth century, most CMS missionaries were convinced of the strategic importance and theological justification for establishing schools and hospitals, but they were continually limited by shortages of personnel and financial

\textsuperscript{87} Sandgren, \textit{Christianity and the Kikuyu}, 93.
resources, and still further by losses of qualified teachers to higher-paying jobs. Many of those who were clamouring for CMS education were unaware of these limitations, and became resentful of the ‘sluggishness’ of the mission to respond to their needs. Missionary explanations for their inability to respond to educational demands failed to assuage African suspicion because, by now, they were generally convinced of missionary duplicity and deceit. Managing the increasingly high expectations of adherents, especially in the midst of crippling mistrust, required skill and dedication on the part of Anglican leaders. In the end, it was simply impossible for the CMS (or other missions) to meet all demands. Several AICs emerged in large part due to grievances over education, including: the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, the Kikuyu Karing’a Education Association and the African Christian Church and Schools.

Third, land alienation was a wide-spread complaint among indigenous peoples of Kenya and contributed to the antagonism between Europeans and Africans. The government sold or gave tracts of land to settlers, land that they assumed was vacant in some cases, often forcing Africans to become tenants or move into the reserves. Land alienation began as early as 1896 when Francis Hall gave plots to three European families in the Fort Smith area. Since Kenya was not blessed with great mineral wealth, it was believed by the government that economic prosperity would come through agricultural exports.

Sir Charles Eliot proposed that settlers be brought to Kenya to cultivate land that was ‘empty,’ so as to increase government revenues, and utilize the Uganda Railroad which was struggling to be profitable. The Kikuyu and Kamba suffered significantly from land alienation, but it was even worse for the Maasai. The process of obtaining land was so poorly organized that grievous mistakes were made and sometimes little consideration for historic mbarei land rights. The situation was exacerbated by cases of Kikuyu opportunism, individuals selling mbarei lands to settlers without the consent of the

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88 For a general sense of this see the reports of two missionaries (one a Methodist and the other a Presbyterian) to the Educational Department. “Annual Report – Meru District,” 1944. KNA: PC/CP/4/4/2 (552).
91 Munro, *Colonial Rule and the Kamba*, 75-80.
rest of the family. Other Kikuyu, realizing the value of land, drove tenants off the land in order to sell it to settlers. There were even some cases where African government employees made large sums of money from selling land that did not belong to them. In Kikuyuland, Kiambu District lost the greatest amount of land to alienation (where 60,000 acres in the southern half alone was allotted to settlers) followed by Fort Hall and Nyeri Districts.  

Female circumcision, education and land alienation each had overlapping histories during the colonial era. The history of land alienation began in the nineteenth century and continued to be divisive to the end of colonialism (and beyond); the history of missionary opposition to female circumcision began early in the twentieth century, reached a peak in 1929, and persisted long after; education became contentious in the 1920s and remained a relevant part of the encounter into the 1950s. Thus, while these three themes are essential in understanding the grievances of AICs, and the attitudes of Anglicans to AICs, they do not present a clear basis for an overarching periodization. Elements of these three themes will be found in many of the encounters between Anglicans and AICs over the period under consideration.

Having laid this contextual foundation it is possible to turn to a discussion of Kenyan AICs. Not every AIC can be discussed, thus only the following will be included in this survey: The African Independent Pentecostal Church (AIPC), the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA), the African Orthodox Church, the Kikuyu Karing’a Educational Association (KKEA), the African Brotherhood Church, the Arathi, the Dini ya Roho, the African Israel Church Nineveh (AICN), and the Nomiya Luo Mission. These AICs have been selected because of their interaction with the Anglican Church, the colonial government and with each other. This study is primarily archival based and these AICs left a larger body of documents. An additional reason is that all of these AICs emerged by the 1940s which places them in relatively close proximity both chronologically and contextually, and facilitates the comparative dimension of this thesis. These same AICs will be discussed in chapter four.

The origins of the independent school movement in central Kenya were diverse. Some early developments occurred in the 1920s when Daudi Maina recognized the dissatisfaction of the people in Fort Hall (Murang’a) regarding the quality and availability of mission education. The first full-time independent school in central Kenya was started at Gathieko, Kiambu by elders of the Gospel Missionary Society; classes were taught by an untrained and unpaid teacher. In 1923, Musa Ndirangu and others left the school at Gathieko, and their affiliation with the Gospel Missionary Society, and built a new independent school at Githunguri. The circumcision crisis of 1929 added impetus to the independent school movement, for those teachers and pastors who refused to sign the pledge of the CSM were asked to leave. At their peak, the two largest independent school associations, the KKEA and the KISA represented as many as 342 schools and 60,000 students (lower estimates are 220 schools and 28,000 students).

The Kikuyu Karing’a Education Association traces its origin to 1929, when several independent schools from Kiambu District came together to form an educational association. The term karing’a originally referred to the Kikuyu initiation guild and, as there were also Kamba and Maasai forms of initiation practiced among the Kikuyu, it was linked to ethnic identity, as it was ‘purely’ Kikuyu. The KKEA used karing’a to emphasize their desire to remain apart from the missions (many of them had come out of the Church of Scotland Mission) and to be ‘pure’ of all traces of foreign control. The goal of the KKEA was to promote the wellbeing of the Kikuyu and to offer an alternative to mission schools. The organization was formally started in 1933 under the leadership of Musa Ndirangu, Johana Karanja Kiraka and Alan Muturi, among others. It was a small association by comparison with the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, but there were nearly two dozen known KKEA schools in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces, and several in western Kenya among the Luyia and in northern Tanzania. A greater, but less tangible, result of the KKEA (and KISA) was the example it set for

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the Kikuyu of a successful independent movement. In 1939, the KKEA was involved in the creation of the Githunguri Teacher Training College, which was meant to be the premier independent school of Kenya and a centre for educating independent school teachers. Another side of the KKEA and many independent schools generally was that of political activism; it had links to the Kikuyu Central Association and the Mau Mau, and as a result of the latter, in the midst of a State of Emergency, they were proscribed by the government on November 1952. Some of their schools were closed, but most of them were reconstituted under the control of local educational boards or mission societies.

The origin of the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association in 1929 was just prior to the circumcision controversy. The first stirrings, of course, took place at Gakarara and then nearby at Gituamba. Elected representatives from Fort Hall, Kiambu, Nyeri and Embu met to discuss independent education in Kikuyuland some years later. In August 1934 there were large gatherings of leaders in Gituamba (Murang’a District) and Mahiga (Nyeri District) where officers were elected and the institution known as KISA formally established. Its purpose was to “provide centralized leadership and guidance for independents and was to represent them to the government when educational problems arose.” At the helm were Johana Kunyiha as President and Hezekiah Gachui as Vice President. In the 1930s and 1940s the independent school movement began to construct and enlarge permanent structures. By 1941 the association had grown significantly and claimed fifty-one schools in Central Province and seventy in Rift Valley Province. The KISA was headed by Jomo Kenyatta in later years, who was well known for his nationalism, thus the association could not avoid garnering a political image. There were close ties, in fact, between the KISA and Kikuyu Central Association and the Mau Mau. After 1946, according to F. D. Corfield, the relationship with the government began

101 Sandgren, Christianity and the Kikuyu, 106.
104 Sandgren, Christianity and the Kikuyu, 109.
to sour and culminated in the proscription of the KISA in 1952. KISA schools were reopened under the leadership of the government and some missionary societies.

The African Independent Pentecostal Church was closely associated with KISA. The church, which was started by Daudi Maina and Harrison Gachokia, has been described as an Ethiopian Church, using Sundkler’s classic category. On the other hand, Jocelyn Murray has called it a Nationalist Church – and the largest of its kind in Kenya. The first church was planted by Maina near Fort Hall around 1921. He spent many years in tireless work, gathering ex-ALM members and others together into nearly 111 semi-autonomous congregations by 1948. Gachokia focused his attention on northern Kiambu where he sought to proselytize ex-Gospel Missionary Society members. The churches they established were very small and temporary at first, some constructed with no more than banana leaves and branches, but the AIPC grew quickly, incorporating some 168 (KISA) schools and churches in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces by 1952. The period of the Mau Mau crisis was a difficult time for the church with such strong nationalist leanings and it was banned by the government; some of the congregants turned to the Presbyterian Church of East Africa and others lapsed. After independence, the church resurfaced (1963) and registered with the government as the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa. The AIPC had regained some standing by 1966 when it claimed around 18,000 adherents; over time, the number increased to over a million members.

The African Orthodox Church has been described by some scholars as an Ethiopian Church; it began in Kenya in 1935 during the period when negotiations between the Anglican Church and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association regarding the training of independent clergy were coming to an unsuccessful close. The KISA/AIPC sought the legitimacy of trained and ordained pastors for their

111 Sandgren, Christianity and the Kikuyu, 98.
expanding congregations and approached the Anglican Church with the proposition. The possibility was seriously considered by Bishop Heywood, but for several reasons (that will be discussed later) the two parties could not reach a suitable arrangement. Prior to that time, however, Archbishop Daniel William Alexander of the African Orthodox Church came from South Africa to train and ordain pastors of the KISA and KKEA.\textsuperscript{114} Four candidates were ordained on 27 June 1937: Daudi Maina of Fort Hall District, Harrison Gachokia of Kiambu District, Philip Kiandi of Nyeri District, and Arthur Gathuna Gatung’u of Kiambu District. For the period of his stay, Archbishop Alexander had pressed the KISA and KKEA to join the African Orthodox Church. It became evident that most of the Kenyan leaders would not join and were glad to see the end of his lengthy visit. Maina and Gachokia put their support behind the AIPC, which became the religious wing of the KISA. Gatung’u, on the other hand, convinced the KKEA to associate with the African Orthodox Church. Kiandi, who was the last of the four Kikuyu ordained by Archbishop Alexander on that occasion, was not a part of the KKEA, but chose to associate with the African Orthodox Church as well. He was active in Nyeri and began to call his schools ‘Orthodox.’\textsuperscript{115} For a time Gatung’u and Kiandi were associated, but soon went their separate ways, developing the African Orthodox Church along somewhat different lines.

The African Orthodox Church/Kikuyu Karing’a Education Association and the African Independent Pentecostal Church/Kikuyu Independent Schools Association began to come into ‘competition’ with mission churches.\textsuperscript{116} The CSM mission, according to one estimate lost nearly half its members to them during the circumcision crisis of 1929. The Anglican Church also lost great numbers.\textsuperscript{117} By 1932 the AIPC (and the churches which would come under the umbrella of the African Orthodox Church in 1935) reported a total membership of 30,000 and 309 churches. The African Orthodox Church experienced a low point in 1952, when

\textsuperscript{114} For background on Alexander, see: Byron Rushing, “A Note on the Origin of the African Orthodox Church,”  Journal of Negro History 57, 1 January (1972).
\textsuperscript{115} Anderson, “Selection and Adaptation outside the Government/Missionary Framework,” 120-22.
\textsuperscript{116} Strayer and Murray, “the C.M.S. and Female Circumcision,” 152.
\textsuperscript{117} Murray, “Varieties of Kikuyu Independent Churches,” 172.
Kikuyu branches were banned by the government because of ties to the Mau Mau. Some of the members of the African Orthodox Church escaped censure in western Kenya by coming under the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church of Uganda. After independence many original members in central Kenya emerged again.

The African Brotherhood Church was started by a Kamba man named Simeon Mulandi, who was born in Mukaa, southern Ukamba District in 1914. Daniel Kang’o convinced him to join the Salvation Army in 1925, but it was not till after Mulandi was an evangelist for some time that he had his first profound religious experience. At the Kakamega Salvation Army mission in western Kenya he gained a reputation for being a powerful preacher. While there he also experienced a series of frightening dreams which made a deep impression on him. The dreams predicted that he would plant many churches among the Kamba. Mulandi did not immediately leave the Salvation Army after having these experiences; in fact, he remained with them and was transferred to Machakos, Kamba District in 1939. His vision for a new church continued to germinate as he shared it with friends. In the meantime, he became disillusioned with the Salvation Army and took a government job in 1941. The following year he joined the independent-minded Gospel Furthering Fellowship, headed by George Rhoad. While a pastor of the Gospel Furthering Fellowship, and without Rhoad’s knowledge, Mulandi began to build the independent church he envisioned. Mulandi’s Akamba Christian Union sought to fulfil three primary objectives: Kamba education, Christian brotherhood, and African leadership. He was an able leader and soon the Gospel Furthering Fellowship had grown to a thousand members, but most owed allegiance to Mulandi rather than Rhoad. When Rhoad realized what Mulandi had done in 1945 it was too late. A month later Mulandi announced the formation of the African Brotherhood Church. With the help of another remarkable leader, Nathan Ngala, the African Brotherhood Church expanded to Ukambani and Mitaboni, taking most of the early adherents from Africa

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121 Ibid.
Inland Mission and the Salvation Army, but not veering far from the ‘missionary’ model from which it emerged.\footnote{123}{Barrett, \textit{Kenya Churches Handbook}, 230. Hastings, \textit{A History of African Christianity}, 80.} For that reason, Sundkler has described the African Brotherhood Church as an Ethiopian Church.\footnote{124}{Bengt Sundkler and Christopher Steed, \textit{A History of the Church in Africa} (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 887.} The church experienced problems during the Mau Mau crisis, when their schools were closed by the government, but the church continued under Ngala. After the crisis, the African Brotherhood Church was accepted into the National Christian Council of Kenya, one of a few AICs to be welcomed into the body.\footnote{125}{Ibid., 148-53.}

The African Christian Church and Schools emerged from the Africa Inland Mission in November 1947 in Fort Hall District.\footnote{126}{Ibid., 153.} The primary cause of the schism was educational: the AIM closed the school at Githumu (the only AIM educational centre beyond the primary level among the Kikuyu). Other grievances going back to the 1920s contributed to the schism as well.\footnote{127}{Anderson, “Selection and Adaptation outside the Government/Missionary Framework,” 204.} The African Christian Church and Schools briefly flirted with the idea of joining the KISA, but realised that there were significant theological differences and decided to establish their own school association. Sandgren maintains, however, that they never considered joining KISA for, as part of the 	extit{Kirore} (those who took the pledge and remained loyal to the missions during the circumcision crisis), they had been harshly treated by AICs and the rift had not healed by 1947.\footnote{128}{Sandgren, \textit{Christianity and the Kikuyu}, 4-5.} The African Christian Church and Schools headquarters remained at Githumu and they opened their first new school at Gituru in 1949.\footnote{129}{“Handing Over Report Kandara Division – Fort Hall District,” September 1957. KNA: DC/FH/2/2.} They elected Elijah Mbutia, Jared Kingitha, Francis Kmeny, Rufus Karaka and Mwangi Gakkure as leaders of the group. Soon they opened an additional fourteen schools, and another seven thereafter. The African Christian Church and Schools staunchly opposed the Mau Mau (who had targeted them for being ‘collaborators’) by supplying intelligence to the government.\footnote{130}{“Handing Over Report Kandara Division – Fort Hall District,” 1956. KNA: DC/FH/2/2.} They took up arms, as well and were responsible for activities like patrolling the Aberdare Forest.\footnote{131}{Sundkler and Steed, \textit{A History of the Church in Africa}, 899.} By 1973, they had ten thousand members, all the while, they endeavoured to create and
maintain close relationships with certain mission churches, including the Presbyterian Churches of East Africa and the Anglican Church (though not the AIM), and in 1954 they were the first AIC to join the Christian Council of Kenya.  

The *Watu wa Mungu* (People of God) or *Arathi* (Prophets, Seers) movement was a Spirit Church started primarily by Joseph Ng’ang’a of Kiambu District and Musa Thuo of Fort Hall District. Ng’ang’a was raised near the Gospel Missionary Society mission at Kambui and attended school there, though he was not baptised by the mission church. One night in 1926 after ‘a bout of drunkenness’ he heard a voice calling him to begin a new church modelled on Israel of the Old Testament. The voice spoke to him of the end of British rule and called Ng’ang’a to pray for the deliverance of his people. A period of seclusion followed this experience during which he committed himself to reading scripture and prayer. This time of reflection on the Bible in his mother-tongue had a deep impact on his theological views and when Ng’ang’a emerged from seclusion in 1929 he began to gather adherents, primarily from the missions. They marched in groups, wearing *kanzu* (long white Swahili gowns), preaching, and carrying bows and arrows as symbols of their struggle against evil. They refused to shake hands with non-*Arathi* lest they be polluted and would not eat meat slaughtered by outsiders. In the 1930s local police and the *Arathi* came into conflict several times; the most notorious encounter occurred in 1934 in the Ndarugu Forest near Mang’u where Samuel Muinami, Joseph Ng’ang’a, and John Mung’ara were killed. Musa Thuo was born in Gatanga, educated and baptised at the AIM Githumu mission, and joined Daudi Maina of the KISA in 1921. A series of visions in 1926 convinced him to leave Maina’s group and to begin itinerant preaching. This brought him into contact with the *Arathi* church at Gakarara in southern Fort Hall. Together, Ng’ang’a and Thuo led the movement of charismatic churches, with strong millenarian impulses, and a selective

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132 “Religious Study, the History of A.C.C.&S.” HTC.
opposition to aspects of traditional Kikuyu and western societies (including western education and medicine). The Arathi were also noted for their reliance upon the Holy Spirit, for healing and the ability to drive out evil and witchcraft.

All AICs discussed thus far came originally from central Kenya. The following AICs were from western Kenya where there were a large number of missions and independent churches in a densely populated area. The rapid growth of Christianity took place in western Kenya prior to central Kenya. It is also notable that the first AIC in Kenya emerged in the west.

The Nomiya Luo Mission was an Ethiopian Church that emerged in western Kenya and was the first AIC in Kenya. In 1910, John Owalo broke with the Anglican Church. He had been a teacher for several missions, including the Roman Catholics and Seventh Day Adventist, and was a CMS teacher in Kisumu at the point of separation. In 1914 he began his mission, which incorporated churches and schools free of European control. By 1925 he had churches around the country and in Tanzania. As many independent schools discovered, the establishment of a higher educational standard than the missions was difficult in the application, especially in regard to finding qualified teachers. The Nomiya Luo Mission persevered, despite accusations of low educational standards (this was a problem for many missions and independent schools), until they were taken over by the government in 1958. Theologically, the Nomiya Luo Mission adhered closely to the Pentateuch, circumcised males, and believed that Jesus was God’s son, but not ‘God Himself.’

The Dini ya Roho (Religion of the Spirit) was a Spirit Church that began in Nyanza and spawned a number of other AICs including: the Musanda Holy Ghost Church of East Africa, Ruwe Holy Ghost Church of East Africa and the Cross Church of East Africa. Followers trace the origins of the Roho to 1912 when the Spirit first appeared in Ruwe during an Anglican service where Jeremiah Otang’a was the catechist in charge. The Spirit moved throughout the country-side in those

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140 Welbourn and Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home, 7.
days through the ministry of Ibrahim Osodo. But when WWI broke out, many adherents were put into military service, dispersing the group.\textsuperscript{144} The Spirit returned in 1916 and inhabited a young man named Alfayo Odongo Mango (b. 1884). His first Christian experience was during a visit to an uncle’s home in Gem Ulumbi. Mango was educated at the Maseno Normal School in 1913 and became an evangelist. This was when the Spirit returned to Nyanza and possessed Mango. He remained with the Anglican Church, became a deacon and studied theology for two years at St. Emmanuel’s Divinity School in Frere Town.\textsuperscript{145} Mango continued his ministry with the Anglican Church, but life became difficult for him as a Kager amongst the majority Wanga population.

In 1933 Mango, and his close associate Lawi Obonyo, came into direct conflict with the Anglican authorities and other members of the Anglican Church. The \textit{Roho} began to draw inward, remaining primarily at Mango’s compound for day meetings and only venturing to the Anglican Church at night. This occurred concurrently with a political conflict over land between the Luo (Kager) and Luyia (Wanga) in Musanda, which in 1934 was the cause of the massacre of \textit{Roho}. The story is told at length by Cynthia Hoehler-Fatton, but it culminated in a Wanga attack on Mango’s compound. Sixteen houses were destroyed, forty \textit{Roho} wounded, and nine killed, including Mango and Lawi.\textsuperscript{146} The \textit{Roho} movement continued despite the massacre, though many left Musanda. Over time the various groups within the \textit{Roho} formed separate identities, and signs of tension and division began to appear and caused several splinter groups between 1935 and 1950, notably the Ruwe Holy Ghost Church (1939).\textsuperscript{147}

The African Israel Church Nineveh was described as a “partially modernising Spirit Church” by Adrian Hastings because, while possessing characteristics of the Spirit Churches, it did not reject western medicine and other trappings of western culture.\textsuperscript{148} The African Israel Church came out of the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada mission at Nyangori (Kisumu), which was part of the work of Otto and Marian Keller in western Kenya. It was founded by a Luyia man from Maragoli

\textsuperscript{144} Hoehler-Fatton, \textit{Women of Fire and Spirit}, 15-18.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 19-28.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 40-61.
\textsuperscript{148} Hastings, \textit{A History of African Christianity}, 80.
named David Zakayo Kivuli in 1942. Kivuli was born at Gimarakwa around 1896, attended school forty miles away at the Nyangori Mission in 1914, and was baptised in 1925. In 1927 he attended the Jeanes School Kabete, after a short but successful stint working on a settler farm. Two years later he was appointed supervisor of schools for the Pentecostal Mission. After a long illness in 1931 he was convicted of sin. This ushered him into an experience of the Holy Spirit where he was given the ‘gift of tongues.’ He began a healing ministry and was credited with many remarkable miracles. In 1936 he was appointed chairman of the African Church Committee of the Pentecostal Mission. But there were some frictions between Kivuli and others within the mission and he left the Pentecostal Mission on 25 January 1942 on theological grounds; he believed strongly that Christians should publicly confess their sins. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the split was largely amicable. The headquarters of the African Israel Church was established at a place Kivuli named Nineveh. The church grew slowly until 1949 when the pace quickened, and by 1973 the African Israel Church Nineveh had spread throughout Kenya, especially among Luo and Luyia populated areas, with hundreds of churches devoted to healing and confession of sin. In 1957, he registered under the Societies Ordinance, which was a rare achievement for AICs during the colonial era. Kivuli sought, also to build ties with other churches. He attended the Mindolo Consultation and the African Israel Church Nineveh was accepted into the World Council of Churches. Kivuli maintained a largely positive relationship with the government, due in large measure, to his strict policy against political activism – this despite the fact that he had served on the Local Native Council for several years before starting the African Israel Church Nineveh. His stance on politics would change over time, but in the early days it put him in good stead with the government. He also was fairly open about his opposition to the Mau Mau, which elicited the warm gratitude

149 Welbourn and Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home, 75.
150 Ibid., 77-80.
153 Sangree, Age, Prayer and Politics in Tiriki, 220.
of many in the government. In 1952 he published a circular condemning them and the *Dini ya Msambwa*, whose influences he sought to keep out of his church.\textsuperscript{154}

This very brief introduction to several African Independent Churches in western and central Kenya will serve as the foundation for this chapter and the next. There is, obviously, more that could be said about them, but these general orientations will be expanded throughout, and particularly in regard to their relationships with the Anglican Church. In the next chapter, new insights will be given into the relationship between these AICs and the government.

**The Encounter between Anglicans and AICs**

The interaction between AICs and Anglicans has been discussed by many other scholars, but there remains much to be considered. This section will build upon existing scholarship, but first it will be helpful to discuss the position of Anglicans in Kenyan society. During the middle to late colonial period religious leaders faced a glut of perplexing and controversial questions. Understanding these questions from Anglican points of view will facilitate a broader interpretation of their perspectives and responses to AICs in Kenya.

**Anglicans in Kenyan Society (1918-1960)**

During colonialism, missionaries and clergy performed many roles in society.\textsuperscript{155} Despite the fact that the era of the specialized missionary had arrived, few were dedicated exclusively to one task. Additional duties and demands were heaped upon them, seemingly from all sides. Africans pressured them to educate their children and to represent their political interests to the government. W. E. Owen wrote, “…the missionary who holds himself aloof from political questions which agitate the minds of his converts must inevitably give them the impression that he is siding with the government … Only the frankest discussion can prevent the growth of the conviction that the missionary must be biased because he is of the same

\textsuperscript{154} Welbourn and Ogot, *A Place to Feel at Home*, 84.

nationality as the members of the government.” Missionaries could not avoid the political arena because of how non-involvement would be perceived by Africans.

Missionaries faced pressures from the white community, many of whom were members of the church. When in 1930 W. E. Owen publicly criticised the government’s policy on forced labour, there were implied threats by an official that the CMS could lose educational grants should he continue. When the Anglican Church spoke out about the loss of indigenous land to gold miners in the Nyanza reserve, they were warned to keep out of politics. When Owen started the Kavirondo Taxpayers’ Welfare Association, he was slandered by Africans and Europeans - the former accusing him of diverting Africans from real activism and the latter condemning him for over-stepping his place in society.

In the wake of the controversy surrounding Harry Thuku, which will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter, Bishop Heywood delivered an address to the synod that explored this idea of the difficult middle road. According to Heywood, the church must remain at the centre of a divided country.

We label ourselves and one another as ‘pro this’ and ‘anti that,’ and as a result we tend to shut off ourselves in water tight compartments, and develop misunderstandings and lack of union. Now it is not the Church’s business to take sides in political controversies, though it may on occasion have to express itself decisively in protesting against what it believes to be wrong, and contrary to the will of its Divine Master … In the same way I myself, as a missionary of thirty years’ standing should be greatly distressed if any one thought I was not ‘Pro-Native’ but I should equally object to any suggestion that I was not ‘Pro-Settler’ or ‘Pro-Administration’ … There are cases where we must take the side of the Employed as against the Employer, but there are also instances where the Employed must be taught to see more clearly the just claims of the Employer.

157 A perceived insult from W. E. Owen to the Governor and an educational inspector two years later elicited a similar threat. Bishop of Mombasa to W. E. Owen, 22 July 1932. CMS/B: G3/A5/O.
This was not an easy line to take for, in avoiding alignment with one side, the Anglican Church appeared to be the adversary of all. And it was equally difficult, if not more so, for African clergymen. Peter Bostock described one example of this from his experience. A pastor named John Mark was disparaged by striking workers in Mombasa when he advised them to keep their protests firmly within constitutional rules. Bostock concluded that “should these more moderate educated men lift their voice they will be dubbed traitors and risk being ostracized.”

The changing role of missionaries was another component of this complex social situation. Many missionaries had migrated away from the traditional centre of Protestant religious life at the pulpit, and moved increasingly into specialized roles as doctors, teachers, and administrators. They largely supervised African pastors, evangelists and teachers who, in turn, oversaw congregations. In times of rapid growth, this loss of daily contact with African congregations could happen in a matter of months. J. J. Willis of the Uganda Mission spoke of how quickly this happened to him, and of the sense of anxiety and sadness he felt when it occurred.

The first converts were known, had been known and watched for years past; but in a very few months the movement has swept far beyond these. Hundreds, whose faces are unknown, are coming in, eager to be admitted to the catechumenate. The roll rapidly fills; the tens grow into hundreds, the hundreds into thousands. It is no longer possible to know them individually ... The single task of examining a never-ending stream of inquirers and candidates for baptism precludes the possibility of translational work. Every day chiefs and deputations come in begging for teachers. Those sent out cannot be properly supervised ... As the missionary-in-charge looks out on these things, considers the immense possibilities opening before him, thinks of the practical impossibility of coping with it, listens to the familiar answer from the Christian world ... that it is unable to send him any further help, and then watches the crumbling of work that might become a solid and enduring mansion, he cannot but feel a sense of grave anxiety.

Willis’ experience foreshadowed those of missionaries of the Kenya Mission in later decades. The chasm that grew between many missionaries and African Christians was exacerbated by the routine shuffling of missionaries and pastors from location to location, and from congregation to congregation in an effort to meet the most

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pressing demands of the moment. A Salvation Army missionary wrote to E. Carey Francis about this problem, which he estimated was worse in the CMS than any other society in Kenya. “Half the unrest in the Native Reserves is due to the failure of missions and government to allow time for their representatives to become intimate with the people with whom they are dealing and so to beget the mutual confidence which is essential to any successful work. I have given up Kenya as hopeless on this point.”

The disconnection resulted in several changes to the relationship between European missionaries and African congregations. Among these was the increased sense of missionaries as strangers. It became difficult for many congregants to understand, and harder still to sympathize with, missionary actions. Conversely, missionaries sometimes found it difficult to understand local conflicts and relied increasingly on African pastors to provide and interpret information. This dynamic was operative in the intelligence received by missionaries about AICs.

Some scholars have been recently exploring the significance of African headmen, elders and traditional rulers in the colonial enterprise, their effective use of power in the local context and their influence on superiors. African colonial employees, such as interpreters, clerks and translators, were also key players in local politics, and possessed unexpected sway. It has largely been unrecognized how much African pastors and Christians influenced European missionaries through their role as intermediaries and their ability to control and manipulate information.

Peter G. Bostock, who was a missionary at Wusi Station in the Taita Hills, spoke of the importance of relationships with African pastors in 1941.

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164 Mr. Hanaley to E. Carey Francis, 20 September 1940. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/1/119.
166 Sangree, Age, Prayer, and Politics in Tiriki, 173.
168 A recent volume on this topic was edited by Benjamin Lawrence, Emily Osborn and Richard Roberts, was called Intermediaries, Interpreters and Clerks, African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa, and published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 2006. This book primarily investigates the role of African employees below the level of the district heads, but several authors refer to the impact of African kings, district heads and warrant chiefs as well – and to the growing body of scholarship on the topic.
169 This idea will be explored at length in the next chapter.
I have two friendships that I treasure, because I believe that when I specifically ask them for the truth about personal problems they try to give it to me and to tell me the effect we Europeans have on the African community without trying to hide distasteful truths. But that is not the same as a spontaneous fellowship that is on such deep levels that they will come to me of their own free will and tell me where my own actions and words have been wrong or misunderstood. To get to the relationship where the African feels free to admonish the Europeans in love is not easy, and I long for it. They will speak of the faults of one’s fellow-workers far more readily than they will of one’s own faults; and we are so blind to our own faults that it is a cause of great anxiety to me that the Africans do not help me more to recognize them.170

Statements like this clearly express how dependent a missionary was upon African clergy for intelligence and advice. In the relationship between Anglicans and AICs, African Christians often performed the role of intermediary - of cultural and linguistic interpreter. The withdrawn missionary relied upon African pastors and church members for information and interpretation, and in this way, Africans had an impact on the way the Anglican Church responded to other religious movements.

Another CMS missionary, W. J. Rampley, became embroiled in a controversy with an educational inspector whose report was critical of his school in 1932. The inspector had been misled by a local chief who took him to the wrong school.171 The report reflected poorly on Rampley, but since it was not his school in the report, he protested to the Education Department. Rampley was outraged by the situation, which threatened his reputation in the community. He wrote, “The enclosed … will reveal to you the fact that the Education Department have dragged me into the mud through one of their Inspectors, who if I divulged all that I know, and what the natives say about him, would get him the push, but what he did was in ignorance and I am out to help him by not saying anything about him personally.”172 Here is displayed the type of relationship between Europeans and Africans which allowed the latter to have an impact on the unfolding of events – first by the chief who manipulated the inspector and second by members of Rampley’s church who divulged inflammatory information about the educational inspector.

171 This manipulation was facilitated by the inspector’s poor grasp of Swahili.
172 Emphasis was added by the author. W. J. W. Rampley to H. D. Hooper, 7 January 1932. CMS/B: G3/A5/O.
At this time Africans had not reached the highest level of Anglican leadership, but as assistant bishops, pastors, deacons, catechists, evangelists, teachers, and church elders, it would be a mistake to view them merely as pawns. Beneath the surface, Anglican churches were abuzz with the activities of African Christians. Owen spoke to this idea in his article “Kavirondo Messages.” Parishioners were pressing him to expand his theology of missions.

The Kavirondo Christians have been trying to persuade us to enlarge the content of the word ‘evangelize.’ Of course, they do not express it anything like as tersely at that, but they are continually endeavoring to entice us into activities and into arenas of action, other than those of ordinary missionary conventions … They are clamorous that we shall fearlessly bring the teaching of Jesus into the domain of politics, and insist that, in political matters as in all others: ‘Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you’ is the only Christian rule.

Elsewhere, Owen attested to how church members cleverly used biblical theology to make their cases to the missionaries. They learned western theology; many also mastered western and African ‘traditional’ intellectual concepts and used them to skillfully maneuver through conflicts and prevail in debates. Africans used their ability to influence and resist European missionaries in a variety of ways – even in unexpected ways. John Karanja cited an example of how some senior African clergy resisted European attempts to incorporate aspects of ‘African’ culture into church practice because of their fear of ‘syncretism.’ Kikuyu Christians also refused to follow missionary prescriptions for behavior, especially concerning bride price and

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177 Karanja, Founding an African Faith, 241, 244.
Thus, a picture emerges of an African clergy and laity that influenced the direction of the Anglican Church. Historians have yet to explore most of the theological discussions that were taking place within the mission churches, below the surface, and parallel to the intellectual currents usually associated with AICs.

That the views of African Christians impacted missionary thinking is seen in correspondence. In regard to a controversy over how to collect and record church revenues in Nyanza in 1938, W. E. Owen warned F. Cecil Smith that “…the African in Kenya desires, passionately, to be free to manage his own Church Affairs without what he thinks undue interference … Dominate them with the Mission authorities and you get *evasion as far as it can be carried without rupture*.” African activity, including evasion, was a reality within the Anglican Church in Central Province as well. During the circumcision crisis of 1929, H. D. Hooper stated that the views of Anglican adherents should be an important guide to the official position of the Anglican Church. He wrote to the Bishop in 1930, “I feel that you have a clear moral ground for the step you have decided to take. Even so, such a step can only be warranted as it secures the spontaneous endorsement of the native church, seeing that the ceremony has been condoned within the church for so many years.” In a report written by Hooper after a visit to Kenya in 1938, after several years absence, he wrote, “Africans will no longer follow blindly the programme prepared for them by a European Committee.” This suggests a challenge and opportunity for historians to look beneath the white veneer of the missions to discover what Africans were doing to shape and influence the direction of the church.

W. A. Pitt Pitts wrote to Hooper about a congregation that expertly agitated for an improvement in their situation in the Kikuyu Reserve. After the approval of the Alliance, the CMS had assumed responsibility for a substation within the AIM

182 Hooper to the Bishop of Mombasa, 15 January 1930. CMS/B: AF35/49 AFg/R1.
sphere some years back. The transition went smoothly under the guidance of Pittway (CMS) at Weithaga and Reynolds (AIM) at Githumu. In time, another AIM substation grew disenchanted with the AIM and asked the CMS to assume responsibility of the church. The precedent had been set in the previous case that “if the natives can make themselves odious enough, [the] CMS will take over the area.”\textsuperscript{184} Like it or not, the AIM would not refuse, because as Pitt Pitts put it “There is a real danger of both AIM and ourselves losing ground and ‘separatist schools’ coming in and taking the place of missions.”\textsuperscript{185} Mission churches could do very little about a church that no longer wanted to be affiliated with them and so the AIM reluctantly agreed to the transfer for a second time.

Another point to take from this example is that AICs changed the power dynamics of religion in Kenya. The author of the CMS Annual Report for 1938 referred to this as well and described it in practice in the following way: “An African Independent Church is causing serious difficulty in the Kenya Highlands. Candidates for baptism who have been held back because [they are] insufficiently prepared, are immediately accepted by this sect on payment of a certain sum of money. Others who are under discipline for immorality are added, and the loyalty and peace of many village groups of Christians are undermined.”\textsuperscript{186} Church discipline, which was a primary means of regulating the activities of the congregation, ceased to be an effective means of circumscribing behavior, unless an individual was utterly committed to the Anglican Church. Increasingly, there was less incentive for disputing Christians to reach a settlement through compromise; it was easier in many cases to cross the street and join a competing church. With an AIC nearby, church affiliation became a sort of bargaining chip in many disagreements.

There are also examples that illustrate how Africans affected the encounter with AICs directly. In 1939, F. Cecil Smith was asked by the Chief Native Commissioner, S. H. LaFontaine, for information on Peter Koinange’s, Githunguri Teacher Training School, a premier independent school associated with both the

\textsuperscript{184} W. A. Pitt Pitts, “Re. Representative Council of the Alliance,” to H. D. Hooper, 3 February 1932. CMS/B: G3/A5/O (26).

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.

KISA and KKEA. Before responding Cecil Smith sought the insights of Andarea Gathea, an African CMS head teacher at Kabete. Gathea was in a good position to offer information because he was the secretary of the Githunguri school committee. Cecil Smith found the interview with Gathea so enlightening that he sent a lengthy report to the Chief Native Commissioner and H. D. Hooper, the CMS Africa Secretary in London. Such examples reveal that certain Africans had the attention of European leaders; how individuals such as Gathea made use of their influence differed case by case.

In the late 1940s the CMS issued a confidential memorandum on “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” in Kenya. In the report, African clergy played an important role in supplying information about AICs. Another example of this kind of influence was when the African Orthodox Church’s, Archbishop Daniel W. Alexander came to Kenya. Martin Capon wrote a report on Alexander’s activities, which displayed a deep reliance upon informants, especially regarding the allegation that Alexander baptized large numbers of people with no other qualification than their ability to pay the fee. The concern about this kind of widespread baptism was commonly expressed by missionaries; in this particular situation, it is clear that the sources of the rumor were African Christians.

In 1957, C. Eby of the Christian Council of Kenya wrote a report about the African Israel Church Nineveh on the occasion of their application for membership. This report displayed a profound reliance upon the views of African clergy. Jeremiah Othuon told Eby that the African Israel Church Nineveh sought to “undermine the work of the existing churches.” He went on to link the church to local unrest, interruptions of church services, and ‘sheep-stealing;' Othuon recommended that the application be rejected. Meshek Malingoti was also prominent in the report. He cited activities of the African Israel Church Nineveh that

188 “Heretical and Schismatic Sects,” 1948 c. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1 (9).
were designed to ‘undermine’ existing missions, such as making persistent overtures to mission adherents and targeting members under church discipline. Malingoti also reported that the African Israel Church Nineveh had connections to animal sacrifices in Kaimosi (perhaps a reference about offerings made to the ancestors), though he did not elaborate on these allegations. Eby’s assessment of the application of the African Israel Church Nineveh for membership to the Christian Council of Kenya diverged little from the views expressed by these two clergymen.

Finally, Anglican leaders were members of the broader Christian community in Kenya which came with certain rights and responsibilities. Comity was treated as sacrosanct among members of the Alliance, and when disagreements arose it was incumbent upon all members to negotiate, compromise, and submit to rulings of the council. The system of spheres was often criticized, but on the positive side, it sought to avoid major inter-denominational conflicts. By the early twentieth century, many Anglican missionaries hoped for the eventual creation of a united church in Kenya; they intended for the Alliance to transition into such a body. The CMS continued its commitment to the Alliance over the years, but the strain was clearly evident in 1929 when the circumcision crisis reached a climax. As Bishop Heywood’s plan to ordain AIC leaders was being negotiated between Anglicans and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, the Alliance was the primary obstacle. Discussion of Anglican responses to AICs in Kenya would not be complete without understanding CMS commitments to the broader Christian community.

Anglicans felt various social and religious pressures that guided and constrained their responses to AICs. It is essential that the religious context, as experienced by Anglicans be given equal consideration in the history of the encounter. As many current histories of the encounter have sought to understand AICs, important scholarly contributions can still be made by examining the mission churches in depth.

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192 Owen, “Kavirondo Messages,” 221-223.
193 This will be discussed in greater detail below.
194 See the second footnote in the Introduction.
Some Themes of the Encounter

The history of Anglican attitudes to AICs in Kenya falls roughly into two periods. The first period began with the birth of AICs in Kenya in 1914 and ended in 1948. Much of what can be said about Anglican attitudes to AICs during these years is based upon historical encounters in specific locations. The second period began around 1948 and for the purpose of this study, ended in 1960, but probably continued, more or less, to the present. In addition to the highly contextual interaction with AICs that characterized the first period, the second period saw the growth of collective Anglican discussion about AICs and the production of innovative ways of summarizing and characterizing the phenomenon in Kenya. The year 1948 is significant in AIC historiography because it was the year that missionary historian, Bengt Sundkler published his ground-breaking, Bantu Prophets in South Africa. Sundkler’s ideas had an influence in Kenya shortly thereafter. He was cited in a report on AICs by Bishop Beecher in 1953, a book on the East African Revival by Max Warren in 1954, and during the discussions of the Nyanza Branch of the Christian Council of Kenya in 1955.195 But the primary reason 1948 marks the beginning of the second period is because it was this year when the first general Anglican report on AICs was published in the form of the confidential memorandum, “Schismatic and Heretical Sects.” This document was not significant for its influence or ideas, but merely for being the first of such reports. Between 1948 and 1960, Anglicans issued reports, published articles and held conferences, which in unprecedented ways for Anglicans in Kenya, sought to collectively analyze AICs.

During both periods, there were things that complicated the encounter, which can be discussed thematically. First, theology was an active component of the conflict between many Anglicans and AICs in Kenya. At stake were fundamental issues of competing Christian worldviews and theological ideas about dreams, visions, prophecy, exegesis, election, conversion, and the Trinity.196 Of course, theological positions were not absolutely clear on either side and were distorted

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further by an admixture of misinformation and misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{197} An example of a theological idea that exacerbated the divisions between missions and AICs was the \textit{Arathi} theology of ‘the spirit of error.’ Francis Githieya describes this in the following way: “\textit{Arathi} ideas about spirits were dualistic, divided between the Holy Spirit (a good spirit) and the spirit of error (a bad spirit). The spirit of error manifested itself in false teachings, such as the paternalistic teachings of mission churches or colonial views of oppression.”\textsuperscript{198} Such ideologies played an active role, from the side of the \textit{Arathi} in preventing collaboration; they left little room for compromise with the mission. This \textit{Arathi} doctrine excluded many Africans and Europeans, including other AICs, from experiencing genuine Christian fellowship. But the \textit{Arathi} were not unique in their sense of being the chosen and the belief that most others were in profound error. This exclusivity was engrained in the very fabric of some AICs and, no doubt, served to discourage (or prevent) any meaningful dialogue with missions, any real progress towards reconciliation.\textsuperscript{199}

On the other hand, there were examples of an uncompromising strain of thinking among some Anglicans towards AICs. W. E. Owen’s view of the ministry of Lawi Obonyo, of the \textit{Dini ya Roho}, caused him to take a rather strong position against his ministry. This stance was linked fundamentally to the different religious worldviews of the two men. Canon Pleydell described this divergence concisely after attending a meeting led by Lawi. He thought that all the “night praying and hysteria [of the \textit{Roho}] was” quite simply “not of God.”\textsuperscript{200} Such categorical statements reveal a frame of mind that left little room for dialogue with the \textit{Roho} or an honest attempt to understand the religious activities of this AIC.

Anglicans, both European and African, were cautious about ‘syncretism’ between Christianity and African Traditional Religion. While it is not possible to take up a thorough discussion of this point, it is clear that many AICs, especially the Spirit Churches often introduced creative indigenous theologies that were new in

\textsuperscript{197} Misinformation, including the mistranslation of scripture, also played a role in creating AICs in Uganda. “A New Sect Based on a Misunderstanding of Scripture,” CMSG, February, 1915.
\textsuperscript{198} Githieya, “The Church of the Holy Spirit,” 237.
many respects. The term ‘syncretism’ is no longer considered an accurate or appropriate way to describe the theology of many AICs; indeed a number stridently opposed African Traditional Religion. But it is important to realize that the encounter took place in the desolate and hostile soils of the colonial period, poisoned by suspicions, divisions, isolation, misunderstanding and propaganda.\textsuperscript{201} It is regrettable, but understandable, given this context, that Anglicans and AICs would not have had the opportunity, or the inclination, to engage in the types of discussions that occur in some settings today.

Second, when independent churches came on the scene, many of them had no intention of joining the system of spheres and, in fact, felt a personal conviction to work against them. It is no secret that many of the proselytizing practices of AICs were combative (of course, the missions were not innocent in this regard). Eby’s report on the African Israel Church Nineveh and the report “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” both cite the intentional targeting of missions by AICs as a major source of frustration.\textsuperscript{202} This concern was often voiced in reference to the methods of independent school leaders who, allegedly, used elaborate means to ‘infiltrate’ CMS schools.\textsuperscript{203} These attempts were especially sophisticated in Kikuyuland in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1951, Martin Capon described it in the following terms: “In the southern part of the Fort Hall District … there is both a flood of anti-Christian propaganda and a studied attempt to swamp the Anglican Church by the Independent Movement.”\textsuperscript{204} Indeed, according to Anglican sources, propaganda frequently accompanied attempts to compete with mission churches.

African intellectual, political and religious leaders were quite successful in moulding popular opinion about missionaries. ‘Propaganda’ was an important tool


\textsuperscript{202} P. T. Pocock, the chairman of the Nyanza Branch of the Christian Council of Kenya, corroborated the report that AICs were intentionally disruptive to Anglican services, though he was not quite as strong in his statements. P. T. Pocock, “Visit to Jo-Israel Village (Luo) Nyakach,” October 1957. KNA: MSS/129/56/37.

\textsuperscript{203} Martin G. Capon was a CMS missionary in Taita who, apparently, witnessed a series of attempts to take land, schools and churches away from the mission and turn them over to independent schools and churches. Martin G. Capon, “Our Dear Friends,” 27 February 1948, KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/46. Martin G. Capon, “Annual Letter,” August 1950. KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/82.

\textsuperscript{204} Leonard J. Beecher, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Synod,” 18 January 1951. KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/102.
used by AICs to influence public perception and advance their own objectives.\textsuperscript{205} It came in the form of allegations, rumors, conspiracies, prophecies, sermons, songs, etc.\textsuperscript{206} These ‘campaigns of lies and rumors,’ as Capon put it, divided churches, ruined reputations, ended careers, and forced the church and government to investigate. They were commonplace. In regard to missionaries specifically, propaganda called into question their motives, abilities, and goals in Kenya, and effectively reinterpreted mission history for many Kenyans, including many Anglicans.\textsuperscript{207}

An African Anglican headmaster of a CMS school in the Central Province illustrates this point. Martin Capon summarized the headmaster’s views.

Just the other day I received a letter from the African headmaster of one of our Junior Secondary schools. It deals with the “Relationship between the African Christian and the European Missionary” and is of great interest because it sets out so thoroughly the way so many of the more educated young Kikuyu, the leaders of the near future, are thinking these days. This letter says, “I feel called to write to you on the above subject because things at the moment seem to get worse and worse in the country...” After reference to missionaries part in the political crisis of 1922 [involving Harry Thuku], he goes on, “People took it ... that the missionaries were not wholly their friends; the missionaries, they thought, were a working tool for the Government, only trying to hinder the progress of the Africans. This was the first bad impression...” and for the writer of the letter it was strengthened by the 1929 controversy about tribal initiation rites [female circumcision]. Then, coming to the present day, he says, “The truest and highest synthesis of all our work is found in Christianity. Christ exalted the individual and said He that loseth his life shall find it. The African is blind and helpless; the missionary is a hypocrite and mostly trying to work on the downfall of the African. How then shall we achieve our aim?"\textsuperscript{208}

The headmaster offered an interpretation of mission history - an African historiography - which in some ways, portended the nationalist historians of the 1950s and 1960s. His ideas were profoundly influenced by the type of information that missionaries referred to as propaganda, and reveals how even ‘loyal’ Anglicans

\textsuperscript{205} “A Kikuyu Sect,” 20 February 1934. KNA: DC/KBU/3/2.
\textsuperscript{208} Martin G. Capon, “Annual Letter,” August 1951. KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/89.
were deeply conflicted about the legacy of the missionary movement. There was
certainly partial truth to the ways that the nationalists portrayed missionaries, but also
elements of exaggeration and distortion. European Anglicans would have considered
the headmaster to be offering a skewed view of the past and would have argued that
missionaries were doing as much as any group to positively impact the lives of
Africans.

There was an atmosphere of competition between AICs and the Anglican
Church, but some AICs took it further to a fairly disruptive and abrasive type of
evangelism.²⁰⁹ N. Langford Smith was the supervisor of Anglican schools in Central
Province. He witnessed first-hand the methods used by the Kikuyu Karing’a
Education Association and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association in Kiambu
and Fort Hall Districts. The following account, written in the early days of the Mau
Mau crisis, is not an objective portrayal of the Kikuyu Karing’a Educational
Association, but a personal commentary on the crux of Anglican frustration.

I could quote in detail a number of actual cases where attempts are now
being made to capture our schools for the Karing’a, in the Kiambu and Fort
Hall Districts, all of them developing within the past few months. Methods
are generally much the same. First, there is an attempt to gain control of
land, wherever this is possible ... Secondly, there is an attempt to overthrow
the constitutional local school committee and substitute a new one,
consisting largely of new subversive elements with a few ineffective old
members to give it an honest appearance. They can quite easily be removed
later. There is something rather exciting about such a coup, which seems to
appeal to a number of people in the present unrest. A third method is to
build an ‘Independent’ school as near as possible to one of ours. This is
generally quite easy, as it need only be one mile away and have a roll of
100, and pupils can be enticed away (at the end of the year to keep within
the law) and with a little care and pressure in the right places the mile may
even be squeezed a bit too. It is then merely a matter of the right sort of
propaganda and the new school takes over, leaving the old but a shell. We
could quote several such cases, and many others are coming up, but
applications for new schools have come under a moratorium pending action
on the Beecher Report. Another method used sometimes where a new
application is rejected is attrition. There is a sustained attempt to undermine
an established school until it is too weak to continue. But because of the
general desire for schools this can rarely hope to be successful unless the
school is unaided, weakly staffed, badly equipped and of general low

Mungu,” to District Commissioner Nyeri, 18 November 1944. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/3 (60).
standard. Unfortunately, there are some such. In outlining these methods I
do not mean to imply that one or another is always followed; frequently the
situation is confused and there is a mixture of several or all...  \(^{210}\)

While this portrayal comes from the Anglican point of view, it is apparent that many
independent schools sought actively to reduce mission control of education and
unabashedly utilized confrontational means to achieve this end.  \(^{211}\) Langford Smith
suggested the following response to these attempts:

But if these increasing attacks are to be checked there is need of vigilance
and also of definite action to support and perhaps strengthen the law. It
seems to me this is particularly called for the following ways: - A. Stricter
control by the Managing Body of all local committees. We are getting down
to this at once. B. Stricter control by Government of approval of schools,
registration, and setting aside land. C. Much stricter control by both
managing bodies and Government of all collections of money for schools,
and of the use of funds so collected. D. More adequate inspection and
supervision which will only be possible when we have more staff.  \(^{212}\)

Langford Smith called for greater government control of schools. This was not
unanimously supported by missionaries, for greater control of independent schools
meant greater control of mission schools as well. Taken out of context, this type of
proposed response may be interpreted as missionary opposition to independent
schools generally, however, from the missionary point of view this plan was a
defensive response to being the target of independent school leaders. It proceeded
from the desire to protect Anglican institutions, not to attack independent schools.

Third, Anglicans were aware of simmering antipathies towards the church in
some segments of colonial society. This fostered in many missionaries a level of
unease about spontaneous religious and political movements, especially those that
verbalized their hostility to Christianity, colonialism or foreigners (missionaries and
‘loyal’ African Christians being associated with all of these groups). If a religious
community gathered peacefully it gave them a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of

\(^{210}\) N. Langford Smith, “Subversive Attacks on African Anglican Church Schools,” to the Education
Department, June 1950. KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/105.
\(^{211}\) Kevin Ward, “The Development of Protestant Christianity in Kenya, 1910-1920” (PhD., University
Brotherhood Church,” 184-85. Sandgren, “Twentieth Century Religious and Political Divisions
among the Kikuyu of Kenya,” 203.
\(^{212}\) Langford Smith, “Subversive Attacks on African Anglican Church Schools.”
missionaries, whereas unrest was cause for incrimination. Thus Anglicans were apt to comment on the nature and mood of gatherings of AICs - not just to criticize unruliness, but to praise good organization and orderliness.\textsuperscript{213}

Fourth, divergent interpretations of missionary and AIC actions came from the various groups in colonial society.\textsuperscript{214} In relation to the \textit{Dini ya Roho}, Cynthia Hoehler-Fatton suggests that there were times when colonial officials, missionaries and \textit{Roho} members came to ‘distinctive interpretations’ of the actions of Alfayo Odongo Mango.\textsuperscript{215} Another example was the coronation of Elijah Oloo, a member of the \textit{Roho}. In an elaborate \textit{Roho} ceremony, he was made kingi or Chefe, the ‘universal African king’ by the religious group. This was interpreted by the \textit{Roho} in one way and by outsiders in another way. The Wanga, Anglican missionaries and European officials interpreted the coronation of Oloo as an act of political defiance. \textit{Roho} oral traditions largely ignore the political significance of the story of King Oloo.\textsuperscript{216} In this fashion, something of the radical side of AICs is lost in many oral histories. In regard to the relationship between Anglicans and AICs, the hostility of the mission is readily discussed by the \textit{Roho}, however, there is little recognition of the provocative dimensions of the actions of their forebears, such as the coronation of Oloo or Odongo’s campaign for lost lands. This is an important reason why the responses of Anglicans to AICs may not be fully understood – the most influential histories of the encounter are based on AIC oral sources.

Fifth, education was one of the great missionary endeavours, but routinely became a bone of contention between missionaries, Christians and non-Christians.\textsuperscript{217} John Karanja listed education as one of the three most contentious aspects of the relationship between missionaries and \textit{Athomi} (‘readers’ or mission adherents).\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Ranger discusses a similar point about how Africans interpreted government actions on education in a manner that did not match government intentions. Ranger, “African Attempts to Control Education in East and Central Africa, 1900-1939,” 69.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Hoehler-Fatton, \textit{Women of Fire and Spirit}, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 137.
\item \textsuperscript{217} This was not isolated to Kenya. In many parts of East and Central Africa, the responses to, and criticisms of missionary education were similar. The typical pattern was: initial rejection of mission education, then widespread acceptance, then criticism and negative response from a part of the population. Ranger, “African Attempts to Control Education in East and Central Africa, 1900-1939,” 57-85.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Karanja, \textit{Founding an African Faith}, 170.
\end{itemize}
Peter Bostock would have agreed with this characterization. “One feels that
education is always liable to cause friction between the Mission representatives and
the people.” The CMS dived head-first into the business of education because it
was thought to be a means of spreading the missionary work to those who would not
otherwise come through the church’s door. Also, many Anglicans possessed a
theology which was concerned, not just with conversion, but the needs of the ‘whole’
person. And finally, training teachers, evangelists and pastors was a logical
necessity of the missionary enterprise. Still, some Anglicans questioned the role they
came to play in Kenya’s educational system, believing education was the province of
the government; others felt that responsibility for CMS schools should devolve
onto the African Anglican Church, allowing missionaries to return to pure
evangelism.

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was a great deal of pressure on
the CMS to provide education. Martin Capon wrote, “…the Kikuyu people are
ready to make almost any sacrifice for education.” Adherents expected mission
organizations to shoulder the burden of education, though most communities
contributed eagerly to the effort as well. By the 1930s, demand outpaced supply.
Building an educational system from scratch was a monumental task, beyond the
ability of the missions. Financial and personnel shortages were always in the fore,
hampering the quality and quantity of education that the CMS could offer.

Africans and colonial officials did not want the CMS to provide just any kind
of education. The former wanted education to be of a high standard, to be widely
available and to extend to the upper levels. The independent schools movement was

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221 This was even more true of ‘faith missions’ such as the AIM whose lukewarm commitment to
education encouraged the emergence of the African Christian Church and Schools. See also: Stanley,
The Bible and the Flag, 134.
222 F. Cecil Smith, “Kenya Mission Report on the Year 1939, with Summary of Accounts,” April
1940. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/1 (9).
224 “News from Overseas,” CMO LVII, April (1930).
225 F. Cecil Smith, “Future of Mission Education,” to H. D. Hooper, 11 April 1939. CMS/B: AF35/49
struggled to educate every boy and girl, despite heroic attempts and noticeable advances. See: Florida
Education 56, 3 Summer (1987).
started by those who believed the missionaries had failed on one or all of these points. In addition, there were others who opposed the missionary ‘monopoly’ of education or the ‘Christian’ curriculum that was offered.\textsuperscript{226} The goal of many of these independent schools was to make a superior education available to their students. This is what Terence Ranger called the ‘bitter paradox:’ independent schools aspired to a higher standard of education than the mission schools, but usually achieved lower.\textsuperscript{227}

Within the CMS, independent schools were not automatically shunned. Friction developed in proportion to the competitive and confrontational attitudes in any given locality. Missionaries were critical from the outset, however, of the types of promises made by certain leaders of the independent schools – promises, allegedly, aimed at overturning the work of the CMS with little chance of every being fulfilled. Anglicans questioned the quality of individual independent schools and the qualifications of certain teachers, especially those who failed to pass government qualifying exams.\textsuperscript{228} Missionaries were conscious of the history of leaders of the independent school movement, frequently noting those that had been former members of the mission churches. However, Anglicans with broad knowledge of the situation usually resisted making blanket statements about independent schools. Some even believed them to be comparable to mission schools.\textsuperscript{229}

Sixth, missionaries approached AICs at times by using the biblical parable of the wheat and tares.\textsuperscript{230} The church had always incorporated ‘good’ and ‘bad’

\textsuperscript{227} Ranger, “African Attempts to Control Education in East and Central Africa 1900-1939,” 83.
\textsuperscript{229} Capon, “The Independent Schools among the Kikuyu,” 1-3.
\textsuperscript{230} Matthew 13:24-30 in the New International Version: “Jesus told them another parable: ‘The kingdom of heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field. But while everyone was sleeping, his enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat, and went away. When the wheat sprouted and formed heads, then the weeds also appeared. The owner’s servants came to him and said, ‘Sir, didn’t you sow good seed in your field? Where then did the weeds come from?’ ‘An enemy did this,’ he replied. The servants asked him, ‘Do you want us to go and pull them up?’ ‘No,’ he answered, ‘because while you are pulling the weeds, you may root up the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest. At that time I will tell the harvesters: first collect the weeds and tie them in bundles to be burned; then gather the wheat and bring it into my barn.’”
elements that would some day be separated, but not in the present.\textsuperscript{231} Those Anglicans who allowed this parable to inform their perspectives on AICs did not believe that Anglicans were the wheat and the whole independent church movement the tares, rather, they believed that some elements in both were like tares among wheat. They thought the proper response to the reality of tares in the church was not to go about uprooting them, lest the wheat shoots be destroyed as well. The church must wait until harvest when the Harvester would separate one from the other. This frame of mind was present in attitudes towards the East African Revival.\textsuperscript{232} It was also part of Bishop Heywood’s thinking in 1939 when he wrote enthusiastically about the independent movement as a force to be welcomed despite the risks.\textsuperscript{233} A variation on this theme was the supposition that AICs were a positive force, but in the wrong hands, they could be turned.\textsuperscript{234} This attitude was more common in the early days of the AIC movement than later on when criticisms of AICs in central Kenya were greatest (during the Mau Mau uprising).

Seventh, there was a strain of Anglican thinking that assumed that schisms were unavoidable, in both west and central Kenya.\textsuperscript{235} In 1951, Peter Bostock asserted that “this is an age of new \textit{‘dinis’} (or religions) in East Africa.”\textsuperscript{236} For some Anglicans and government officials, this was linked to the climate of growing nationalism and animosity towards European controlled institutions.\textsuperscript{237} The Provincial Commissioner Nyanza and District Commissioner North Kavirondo (Nyanza), after coming into contact with the Nomiya Luo Mission, asserted that the trend toward independent churches “…is more likely to increase than to die out” – a statement that proved prophetic.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{231} E. F. E. Wigram, \textit{Silver and Gold, Being the C.M.S. Story of the Year 1931} (London: CMS, 1932), 100.
\textsuperscript{235} Martin G. Capon, “Annual Letter,” August 1950. KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/82.
\textsuperscript{238} Hooper, \textit{Report of a Visit to C.M.S. Missions in East Africa}, 13.
\textsuperscript{238} District Commissioner Kakamega, “The Nomiya Cult,” to the District Commissioner Kisumu, 24 June 1929. KNA: DC/KSM/1/35/51. Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, “Mr. Field Jones Handing
Eighth, Anglican perspectives on AICs were tempered by the belief that many who joined AICs would eventually return. This point was made by W. E. Owen in regard to the *Roho* and reinforced by the return of Anglicans from the AIPC, *Arathi* and African Orthodox Church. After the circumcision crisis of 1929, Anglican leaders stated that some of those who left eventually came back to the mission churches. This should not be surprising, for conversion involved the possibility of many shifts. Thomas Spear and Isaria Kimambo wrote, “Conversion was thus a complex and protracted process of individual social and religious changes involving a wide range of possible shifts in religious affiliation and conviction as ‘converts’ changed … from nominal to fervent Christianity, from one denomination to another, from Christianity to Islam, or from a mission church to various forms of independency.” One must expand this list to include changes from an independent church to a mission church, for this was a small but recognizable trend, both in Kenya and Nigeria.

Ninth, though it was not apparently as great a concern among Kenyan Anglicans as for Nigerian Anglicans, allegations of financial impropriety coloured views of AICs. Charging high fees for baptisms coupled with few prerequisites, for instance, gave the impression that baptism was a revenue stream, rather than a central Christian sacrament. Though this allegation was made against Archbishop Alexander of the African Orthodox Church in “Heretical and Schismatic Sects,” it was rebuffed by the missionary author, C. Eby, later in the same document. Martin Capon also noted these allegations, which came from an unnamed African source: “it was said that the chief, if not the only, qualification demanded of the

Over Report,” to the District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, 2 November 1929. KNA: DC/KSM/1/35/51.


242 “Heretical and Schismatic Sects,” 1-3.
candidates [for baptism] was their ability to pay the fees demanded.”

He did not attempt to judge the veracity of the rumour.

These were all key issues in the relationships between Anglicans and AICs. Certainly any attempt to understand the Anglican side of the encounter is incomplete without discussing them. While many of the same themes arise in AIC oral histories, it is clear that independents had an ‘outsider’ understanding of missionary attitudes and responses. Ultimately, Anglican perspectives must be given equal consideration in discussions of the encounter.

**Anglican Responses to AICs**

Several points in the preceding sections could rightly fit in this section on Anglican responses. Among these are references to Anglican perspectives on AIC political activity, educational and missionary practices, and theology. These points will not be covered here in any detail; suffice it to say that they informed Anglican responses as well.

One of the most important early responses to AICs was the training scheme proposed by Bishop R. S. Heywood in 1933. The Independent Schools Committee, the forerunner of the KISA, requested the admittance of several students to the CMS Divinity School at Limuru, though they were clear that they did not want in any way to subject themselves to the CMS leadership. The initial Anglican response was favourable. They met with KISA representatives, Daudi Maina, Justus Kang’ethe, Nahashon Njoroge, Petro Kibaka, and Hesekia Gacui, from Fort Hall on 16 October at Kahuha and the conference recommended that the Bishop proceed with the negotiations. Even members of the Alliance were favourably disposed to the idea initially. Though it was not made clear to the CMS early on, the open attitude of the CSM was directed towards the independent schools in the Fort Hall area alone and not extended to all districts. When the Alliance recommended the scheme in February 1934 the CMS opened the training scheme to KISA members generally, not...

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244 Strayer and Murray, “The C.M.S. and Female Circumcision,” 150.
246 W. A. Pitt Pitts (Sect.), “Minutes of the Representative Council of the Alliance of Protestant Missions,” 12 February 1934. CMS/B: G3/A5/O (122).
just those from Fort Hall. H. J. Butcher, who was the principle of the divinity school and leader of CMS negotiations, wrote to the independent schools informing them that the CMS was ready to accept students for training. When the misunderstanding came to light in May, the CMS was forced to postpone the acceptance of the candidates, until the next school term in October.

On 30 July 1934 a conference was held to discuss the training scheme, the three candidates put forward for training by the KISA, and especially the views of the Church of Scotland to the whole arrangement. The KISA was ultimately concerned with maintaining independence. The Bishop assured them back in February that “a School can be carried on by a Committee of Independent people who would have control over their own buildings, and choose their own teachers, and make their own rules for the children.” This convinced them to continue negotiations. J. W. Arthur of the CSM was concerned about two of the three candidates submitted for training who were ex-CSM members (Elijah Kibaci and Stefano Wacira) and not from Fort Hall. The CSM had accepted the candidate from Fort Hall on the understanding that it would essentially negate spheres in that area. They felt that if the CMS accepted Kibaci and Wacira, it would end the system of spheres elsewhere because it would send CMS-trained ministers into CSM areas all over Central Province. And they asserted that “We have never been asked nor have ever consented to this as a principle.” Any such action on the part of the CMS would therefore violate the agreements of the Alliance, according to the CSM, and hamper the progress of broader church unity. A. C. Irvine was pessimistic about the scheme achieving the stated goals of the CMS - that of decreasing the losses to AICs and of promoting broader church unity. He believed that KISA was using the CMS for its own purposes with no real desire for closer relations. The CSM delegation made the following request: “We therefore would ask the African Church Council of the CMS not to do anything in haste that might provide a reason which

would prejudice the good relations between the two Churches.”²⁵² The Anglican response to this was that the CMS,

…cannot refuse bona fide applications for assistance from any part of the Province if it is satisfied that the applicants are unable to get Christian ordinances from one of the other Missions solely because of difference on rules of discipline with which the CMS is not entirely in sympathy [female circumcision and political affiliation with the Kikuyu Central Association]. If, on all other grounds, these Independents are considered worthy of membership in the Church, if they are ready to give assurances of obedience and loyalty to the Bishop and his appointed officers, they should not be repulsed.²⁵³

At the conference of the African Church Council in July, the African members formed a subcommittee and produced the following recommendation:

We unanimously agree that the three candidates put forward for training by the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association should be accepted as students at the Limuru Divinity School provided they agree unconditionally to accept the rules and regulations of the Church of England. Further, for the sake of the unity of the Alliance of Protestant Missions, we ask that we may be allowed to meet a deputation of Ministers and Elders of the Church of Scotland Mission, in order to acquaint them of this decision, and to explain to them our reasons.²⁵⁴

The CSM suggested another gathering of mission societies, including the Gospel Missionary Society and AIM, where various opinions could be heard. The CMS African Church Council agreed to hold a special meeting on 29 September in hopes of finding common ground. The first thing that became apparent at the meeting, however, was that the old divisions between member-societies from the circumcision crisis had never healed. Pitt Pitts reported to Hooper,

I think you have already heard from me about the Conference which was held here to go into the question of differences regarding ‘discipline’ between ourselves and the other Societies, and how Dr. Blakeslee and Mr. McKendrick and Mr. Calderwood spoke of their utter distrust of our pastors,

teachers, and junior missionaries. From the first two people named I have heard this so often that I am quite hardened, but Calderwood’s joining their ranks and speaking as he did hurt a great deal… [As Calderwood said] “The Alliance Meetings are simply irritants to the difficult position, and it would be best to be quite frank and say that the Alliance has finished its work and we now leave it to the Committee for Church Union to carry on.”

Pitt Pitts closed his letter unrepentantly, “I am afraid I came away from the meeting not feeling in the least penitent on behalf of our Mission…” He appears to have been one of the missionaries for whom the Alliance had ceased to be a useful body. Members of the CSM met Hooper in London to discuss the situation. Hooper left the meeting more worried that the Alliance was finished, but Pitt Pitts was defiant, “I do not think you need honestly worry, because while the Church of Scotland and the CMS views are very different, I think they feel that they have reached the limit of what they can say about us, and our very clear attitude has really done a good deal to make things better in the end.” The Alliance called another meeting for African members to come up with a unanimous recommendation.

In the meantime the negotiations proceeded between the Anglican Church and KISA. In October, the African and European clergy insisted that the Bishop’s letter of 1931 on female circumcision be active in negotiations and called for a gathering between Anglicans and twenty-five members of the independent schools to continue discussions. Bishop Heywood was aware of the fact that the KISA was negotiating with Archbishop Daniel Alexander of the African Orthodox Church when the meeting began at Kahuhia on 5 December 1934, but he pressed ahead in the hopes that some arrangement could be made. Discussions between African Anglicans and independent school delegates were a prominent feature of the conference. At the end of the negotiations, KISA issued a list of concessions it was willing to make.

256 Ibid.
258 W. A. Pitt Pitts, “Re. Alliance with other Missions,” to H. D. Hooper, 24 October 1934. CMS/B: G3/A5/O (139).
260 “Minutes of the Highland Missionary Committee,” 11 October 1934. CMS/B: G3/A5/O.
1. All the [KISA] priests prepared for ordination and ordained by the Bishop [Heywood] shall be under his authority. 2. In the matter of the female circumcision, they will follow the principle laid down by the Local Native Council. 3. They agree to be summoned from time to time to meetings of the [Anglican] African Church Council. 4. They agree to use the Book of Common Prayer. 5. They will not agree that the practice of female circumcision should be forbidden. 6. They do not wish for the name of their organization to change, but wish that it should be known as the Kikuyu Independent Church.261

Heywood responded by saying that he would not be permitted by the Archbishop of Canterbury to be the bishop of an independent church. He did not care if they refused to associate with the CMS, the missionary wing of the church, but they must be willing to connect to the Anglican Church in some manner and be subject to its rules, including the Bishop’s Letter of 12 October 1931. The meeting ended with Anglicans down in spirits.

The two groups came together again at Kahuha on 29 December. The KISA wanted the Bishop’s Letter of 1931 to be explained in detail, so the African members of the Highland District discussed the document with them in private for forty minutes. When they returned,

We found that the letter on Circumcision apparently would be obeyed by them, but they were still unwilling to be joined to any mission and I [Bishop Heywood] said that was not necessary, but they must be members of the Anglican Church … A long discussion followed on the difference between the Church and a Mission, with diagrams on the blackboard. It was suggested that our Church might bear the name of the (Kikuyu) Native Anglican Church, just as it is called in Kavirondo and Uganda. They seemed to respond to this.262

The Bishop emerged from this meeting more optimistic than the last, though with the realization that an agreement was by no means a forgone conclusion. Heywood wrote a lengthy letter to the Alliance about the progress of negotiations in which he revealed his motivations for desiring the training scheme. First, he hoped to avoid greater losses to AICs; second, he hoped it would be a step towards the unification of churches in Kenya; third, he believed that it would help “overcome the present spirit

262 Bishop of Mombasa to Members of the Allied Missions, 4 January 1935. CMS/B: G3/A5/O.
of fear in these people and to develop a spirit of Christian cooperation and love.”

For him, it was not a ploy to control AICs, but a means of strengthening the Anglican Church and promoting broader church unity.

He went on to discuss the difficulties that the scheme would bring to the Alliance. The Bishop committed himself to mutual consultation, ‘perfect frankness,’ love, prayer and sympathy. Then he set out a detailed plan for how the Anglican Church would implement the training scheme; it was, in fact, the most complete articulation of how the scheme would have operated. He covered topics ranging from the selection process, the stages of training, and the relation of the independent students to the Anglican Church. If the KISA accepted the plan, the Bishop would contact the home churches of candidates immediately to begin the process of matriculation. But in the end the scheme was not to be, for even as the Bishop was steaming ahead with his plan, the KISA was changing course; they decided to rely upon the African Orthodox Church for the ordination of priests.

The Bishop’s training scheme is one example of how the CMS sought to reconcile its more tolerant approach to AICs with the less tolerant views of other mission organizations. Anglicans did not slam the door on any one of their partners, but rather engaged in protracted negotiations with both the KISA and the Alliance. In this case, it is not too much to say, that the path Heywood sought was one of collaboration, though admittedly within certain bounds. His approach was not based on bold public pronouncements, but more on patient negotiations behind the scenes, not upon ignoring differences, but working toward closer relationships despite the persistence of certain irreconcilable differences with both AICs and the Alliance. Ultimately, Heywood did not choose between one partnership and the other; instead, the KISA decided to avoid the tedium of negotiations with the Anglicans for the apparently more straightforward offer of Archbishop Alexander of the African Orthodox Church.

While it is clear that the Bishop was still pressing on with the scheme when KISA rather abruptly chose the Archbishop, it is not entirely apparent what caused them, in the end, to take that step. J. B. Ndungu and Iasan Muhungi of the African Independent Pentecostal Church blamed the Bishop, whose plan would have allowed

263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
the Anglican Church to “take over all the independent churches and schools in Central Province.” But as Kevin Ward pointed out, “during negotiations, the Bishop’s insistence about incorporation into the Anglican Church, had not in itself been a major stumbling block: the independents had, at least in theory, been willing to accept this as long as it did not mean subordination to a mission.” Ward believes that KISA left the negotiations because the process was taking too long, and also, as the Bishop’s plan was taking shape it seemed that the basis of the negotiations was gradually changing. When it became clear to KISA what the scheme entailed, other options began to look more attractive.

In May 1935, the Highland Missionary Committee reported one last sentence on the topic of the scheme, “It was reported that there had been no further development in the negotiations with the Independent Schools with regard to the acceptance of candidates for the Divinity School.” In Anglican circles, the story would be told that KISA rejected the Bishop’s offer. Two decades later, Bishop Beecher felt compelled to defend Heywood against allegations that missionaries refused to ‘help and advise’ independent schools and chose instead to ‘shun and attack them.’ Beecher believed that Heywood “went to great lengths in seeking to assist these bodies; it was his help which was spurned.” There is evidence to support this claim, for even while the Bishop was delineating his plan to the Alliance for the matriculation of KISA students, the KISA had turned to the African Orthodox Church. The KISA broke off negotiations and rejected the Bishop’s plan. This, of course, is an important historical point, for it highlights AICs as actors in their own history and in the encounter. The KISA chose the path that seemed best to them, and in this case were responsible for rejecting the overtures of the CMS who sought to collaborate. This was not the last time the CMS sought to promote cooperation with independent schools. In 1940, the Kenya Missionary Council affirmed its commitment to “as much cooperation as possible” with independent schools.

266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
271 For an example of how the African Israel Church Nineveh rejected overtures from the missions, see: Welbourn and Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home, 107.
including the training of their teachers in mission facilities, which occurred at lower levels despite the failure of the Bishops training scheme.  

As these negotiations were coming to an end, a new chapter in the encounter was beginning with the discussions about regulating prayer houses. This topic affected both Anglicans and AICs and was discussed in earnest in CMS circles starting in 1935 when Anglican adherents were prevented from erecting prayer houses in Digo country.  

The government wanted to instigate compulsory registration of prayer houses as a means of tracking the number and location of such facilities. Archdeacon Owen opposed the proposal on the grounds that it discriminated against African Christians.

The compulsory registration is an illustration, in my opinion, of work neither for, nor with Africans, but against them ... The policy is pure racial discrimination. A European can erect a prayer house on his own land for Africans or other races and not be required to register it. This racial discrimination is not alone unfair; it inflicts a grievous wound to African dignity and self-respect. It is also religious discrimination. Kenya Mohammedans commit no offence when they put up unregistered prayer houses. I am jealous for Kenyan Christians that their status should not be stigmatized as inferior to Kenyan Mohammedans.

This point of view held sway from 1935 to 1937 when Anglicans began to rethink their position due to the rapidly increasing number of prayer houses of AICs and other missions in their sphere. An added impetus was that prayer houses were allegedly being used by AICs to avoid registering schools with the government. That is, an AIC could establish a prayer house, but once constructed, the facility could secretly be used for other purposes, including educational, thereby avoiding restrictions and oversight altogether. Registering prayer houses would limit the ability of AICs to use this loophole to ‘unfairly’ compete with CMS schools. Thus,

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273 “Minutes of the Executive Committee of the C.M.S. Kenya Mission,” 4-6 May 1936. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/2.


the Executive Committee of the African Church Council changed course and endorsed the ruling of the Kenya Missionary Council on the registration of prayer houses. They explained that in so doing, they had no intention of “infringing on the rights of individuals to meet for private worship in their own houses…,” but that it would be helpful to know where prayer houses were located and how many existed.277

Progress towards regulating prayer houses ran into trouble when it came to defining the differences between a prayer house, a house where a group of individuals were praying, a school where religious education was part of the curriculum, and a catechetical centre where religious training occurred. The task of finding the language to legally distinguish between these proved difficult. And the onset of WWII stalled progress further when the debate was shelved by the government.278 Discussions continued in missionary circles, however, and after deliberation, the Standing Committee of the Kenya Missionary Council accepted the definition for a ‘school’ contained within the Education Ordinance; they could not decide on a legal definition for ‘catechetical centre’ though, and turned to the definition in an Educational Department Circular which defined it as “Any regular institution or public assembly in which the instruction is wholly of a religious character but which includes reading and writing as necessary part of that instruction.”279 They were not able to compose a legal definition for a prayer house and, in the end, the Kenya Missionary Council left the matter in abeyance.

The quest to regulate prayer houses was an important response to AICs, and illuminating in its implications for this study. Questions about definitions and the unforeseen consequences of regulation inhibited progress. Thus, the history of the regulation of prayer houses illustrates the failure of missionaries to respond effectively to AICs. It exposes Anglican leaders as indecisive and divided, cautious and rather feeble. An additional point is that this issue went beyond AICs. The push to regulate prayer houses was created, in part, by the activities of the adherents of

277 “Minutes of the C.M.S. Kenya Mission Executive Committee,” 8-10 March 1938. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/2.
other missions; thus while this discussion explores the encounter between AICs and Anglicans, there is always an essential broader context. In this case it is necessary to recognize that Anglicans were not targeting AICs narrowly, but rather a general ‘problem.’

In discussions between the CMS Executive Committee and African Church Council there were further tantalizing glimpses of the nature of religious life within the Anglican Church at the local level. The church was not well regulated. There are intimations of a largely open atmosphere of the free exchange of ideas among average African Christians of various denominations. There are known AIC influences within the Anglican Church at the local level, not to mention those of the East African Revival, and other missions. The actions of the leaders of the Anglican Church in 1938 support this argument. Church leaders did not know, and could not fully control, what was going on at mission outstations. The situation came to the attention of the Central Committee of the African Church Council and the Bishop. The latter stated that services in dedicated buildings must be conducted by ordained ministers or appointed lay-leaders, unless given specific permission by the Bishop. This restricted all non-Anglicans, including members of other mission churches and AICs, from using dedicated Anglican facilities without authorization. In October the Committee went further and recommended the following pledge for all paid church personnel.

I ____________, licensed to perform the office of Missionary Minister in the district of ____________ do hereby make the following promise that, in the said district of ____________ or in any other district within the Diocese of Mombasa to which I shall, with the permission of the Bishop of the Diocese, be subsequently appointed I shall neither permit nor sanction any individual of whose spiritual and doctrinal fitness I am not well assured,

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to conduct a statutory service, nor to preach at such statutory service in any dedicated or consecrated building within that said district.\textsuperscript{283}

The following year they also issued a theological pledge as a condition of appointment as a reader or lay-reader. The pledge was not overly conservative, but incorporated standard Anglican notions of theology. Some key stipulations included the affirmation that the signer would abide by the Book of Common Prayer, the Ordering of Bishops, Priests and Deacons and the Thirty-Nine Articles.\textsuperscript{284} While the contents of the pledge were not particularly surprising, the institution of the pledge for readers speaks of an existing lack of theological cohesion in the Anglican Church and a desire to gain some degree of unanimity.

Another attempt to shore up the defences of the church, so to speak, included the idea of issuing cards to all pastors, evangelists and teachers. This was linked to confusion over religious affiliation in the settled areas. A person, for instance, might arrive on a farm claiming to be an Anglican evangelist and begin a church on the property. The evangelist might be a fully fledged member of the Anglican Church, or he might hold multiple affiliations; he might have attended an Anglican Church or school at some point, but actually be a member of an AIC or some other denomination. There was no established way of knowing the true affiliation of itinerant preachers during this period, and church officials worried about reports of things done by evangelists in the name of the Anglican Church. Since it was believed that Europeans would be more favourably disposed to an evangelist of a mission church than an AIC, evangelists were apt to emphasize that part of their religious background. This is one of many examples of how AICs learned to manipulate the colonial system. The Central Council of the African Church Council decided to institute the policy that all Anglican evangelists would be issued introductory letters and/or identifications cards, and settlers (and others) should know to ask for them.\textsuperscript{285}

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\textsuperscript{283} “Minutes of the C.M.S. Kenya Mission Executive Committee,” 11-13 October 1938. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/2.
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All of these new policies should be viewed together as responses to the religious climate of which AICs were an important part. These initiatives, which took place largely between 1935 and 1940 (not coincidentally the period of the rise of the East African Revival in Kenya) represent a significant attempt to regain some control over Anglican institutions at the local level and at reducing the confusion associated with the transformation of religion in Kenya.\textsuperscript{286} The proposed measures were not extreme reactions: regulation but not suppression of prayer houses, measured limits to who could use Anglican facilities, basic theological guidelines for those who were employed by the CMS. This is an important point, for some have seen these actions as heavy-handed and suppressive.\textsuperscript{287} The image that emerges, however, is not one of control, moving to greater control, but of a general lack of control on the part of Anglican Church officials, seeking to gain a degree of control.

This very point was made by Matthew Ajuoga, the Anglican revivalist and subsequent AIC leader in the essay, “Light.” This document will be discussed at length below, but one of the central themes was that Anglican leaders did not effectively control the churches and church members under their oversight. Many pastors possessed what Ajuoga thought to be too much freedom. “One cannot … understand why some ministers today are just left to teach anything they like and do anything that pleased them in the church…”\textsuperscript{288}

The Anglican response to the Githunguri Teacher Training College was, chronologically, the next major event in encounter. The response can be described as mixed, but again revealed the willingness of certain Anglicans to work with independent schools. Githunguri was started by the KKEA and KISA to create a school to train teachers for independent schools. The man first chosen to lead the institution was Peter Koinange. He was educated in Britain and America, and earned a masters degree from Colombia University. Githunguri Teacher Training College was officially inaugurated on 7 January 1939.

In J. E. Anderson’s discussion of the encounter between Anglicans and Githunguri, he falls into the familiar pattern of emphasizing missionary hostility,

\textsuperscript{287} Ranger, “African Attempts to Control Education in East and Central Africa 1900-1939,” 73.
\textsuperscript{288} Ajuoga, “Light,” to Langford Smith, 1 June 1956.
while failing to discuss any of their other perspectives. There were certainly those Anglicans who believed and even propagated an unflattering image of independent schools. Criticisms of Githunguri included the allegation that the institution was technically illegal since it was registered with the government not as a teacher training college, but as an elementary school. The government had not censured Githunguri on this point because, according to F. Cecil Smith, “the government are trying to keep his [Koinange’s] sympathy.” This led some missionaries to criticize the government’s different standards for independent and missionary schools. The political climate, they asserted, made the government reluctant to regulate independent schools to the same degree as mission schools. Others criticised Githunguri for employing teachers who had been former employees of mission and government schools and for producing students who could not pass government exams. Missionaries believed that the intentional targeting of Anglican schools by independent schools was counterproductive and wasteful, and malicious in the worst cases. Such needless competition did not serve the interests of Africans. The seeming fact that independent schools preferred to contend with mission schools rather than to work together to meet the educational needs of the Kikuyu smacked of blind hostility. Demand for education in Kenya was so high that there was no need for direct competition.

But Anglicans were not wholly critical of Githunguri. As in the case of Andarea Gathea, who was the principal of the CMS primary school at Kabete, some were even publicly associated with the school. Gathea believed that many independent schools had essentially adopted the missionary model, including the teaching of Christian principles in classes. Because the missions had failed to adequately make room for African initiatives, Gathea thought that institutions like Githunguri were ‘necessary.’ And he defended Githunguri further, by stating that the Gospel Missionary Society was struggling to support their school in the area. Githunguri would meet an important educational need for the community.

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292 All quotes in this paragraph come from, F. Cecil Smith to S. H. LaFontaine, 14 February 1939, CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/1/subfile 3.
Gathea was educated by the CMS at Kabete and became an Anglican teacher. The salary was felt to be unreasonable when the government grant-in-aid was lowered, however, and he was forced to take a higher paying position with the railroad at Eldoret. When changes were made at the CMS Primary School Kabete, he was persuaded to return, even though it meant accepting a pay reduction from his current position with the railroad. He was, according to his own admission, committed to the CMS, but was feeling pressure to join Githunguri full time. Gathea did not seek the position of secretary at Githunguri; apparently, “he was forced into it at the meeting, to which practically all the African chiefs and headmen attended from Central Province.” Thus, Gathea illustrates the complexity of the encounter, for he was an Anglican who bridged the gap between mission and AIC by participating in the work at Githunguri and Kabete. He saw the value of both independent schools and mission schools, but felt pressure to side with only one. While others focused on the differences between mission and independent schools, he saw important similarities.

His views, and his presence within the Githunguri organization, had an influence on F. Cecil Smith, as well as Bishop Heywood, L. B. Greaves, and S. H. La Fontaine, the Chief Native Commissioner. Cecil Smith believed that men like Gathea were of ‘tremendous importance’ for Kenya. Most importantly for this study, Cecil Smith did not oppose the establishment of Githunguri, and even considered the various possibilities for the school with Gathea.

Bishop Heywood and L. B. Greaves also believed Githunguri had an important role to play in Kenya’s educational system. They saw it as a valuable force that should be welcomed. The logic behind this view was that Africans should have real leadership roles, and they could not have these without real responsibilities, which involved real ‘risks’ for the government and missions. They hoped that Githunguri could fill a gap in the educational system instead of competing with existing institutions, and so the three of them, including Cecil Smith, came up with an educational plan that would incorporate Githunguri into a national teacher training program. There were three types of teacher training facilities in Kenya, according to the report: elementary, lower primary, and primary. There were two Protestant institutions (at Tumutumu and Embu) focusing on elementary teacher-training.
However, there was need for more training at this level because nearly half of applicants were turned away for lack of space. The CMS school at Kahuhia and the government Jeanes School specialized in lower primary teacher training. Neither of the schools ran at full capacity, thus there was no need for Githunguri to offer this type of training. There was a primary teacher training facility in Nyanza, but none in central or coastal Kenya. Many individuals from these regions were forced to go all the way to Makerere College in Uganda to receive this level of training, thus there was a real need for more primary level teacher training in Kenya. The Bishop, Cecil Smith and Greaves proposed, therefore, that Githunguri should fill the need for elementary teacher training and the Anglican Church would focus on the need for a primary teacher training in central Kenya. This plan was apparently supported by prominent members of the CMS, CSM, AIM and the Alliance High School, but it is unclear how the government responded.

The plan was a notable attempt to increase the level of teacher training in central Kenya by collaborating with independents. The alleged reluctance of the missions to offer further education was bitterly resented by many who thought missions were conspiring with the government to hold Africans back. The Bishop’s plan would have increased the number of teachers that could be trained at a higher level, thus it is evidence contrary to that assumption. The plan also reveals much of the mindset of these Anglicans: they believed that any educational plan must include independent schools; they did not seek to keep Githunguri isolated, but offered them a seat at the table; they wanted to allocate resources where needed; they wanted to add more capacity to the educational system at the higher levels; they sought to avoid wasteful competition with independent schools.

This response of Anglicans to Githunguri took place at the beginning of WWII. Over the next several years, Anglicans were comparatively silent about the encounter, but this changed markedly by the late 1940s as Kenya entered the period of the Mau Mau. By the early 1950s there is clear evidence to suggest that some AICs and Anglicans drifted further apart. In 1953, T. F. C. Bewes, the CMS Africa Secretary, described the expanding gulf between independent churches and mission churches in Kenya.

At first these churches might seem to have differed but slightly from those of the Missions (except that they were not supervised by missionaries), and the early Independents certainly considered themselves Christians. There were such differences as polygamy and female circumcision which vitally separated them from the other churches in the country, and as time went on these differences grew and the gulf became yet wider and deeper.\(^{294}\)

These statements reflected the pessimism of the period. The Mau Mau negatively affected the attitudes of many missionaries, and Bewes wrote cynically, “I do not think the missionaries ever had any illusions about the independent schools…”\(^{295}\) Of course, this characterization was not historically accurate, but exposed the desperate feelings of one missionary during the emergency.

This thesis has suggested two broad periods of Anglican responses to AICs, but there was in both a general lack of uniformity amongst Anglicans in Kenya. Diversity is an essential characteristic of the encounter - a result of the fact that it took place in many different locations, from the mission and church, where one would expect it most, to the school, market, farm, and government house. The encounter also took place at various levels of colonial authority, and from the highest levels of church leadership to the lowest. Local factors contributed to the diversity of Anglican thinking on AICs and to the fact that there was no clear, collective progression in thinking about the AIC phenomenon as a whole.

There is a notable exception to this assertion. During the years of the Mau Mau crisis, Anglicans probably achieved the greatest degree of intellectual uniformity in regards to AICs in central Kenya. The second period of the encounter began around 1948 with a spate of reports that sought to understand AICs throughout Kenya. These reports were not consistent in method or conclusions, but there were elements which they all had in common; chief among these was the underlying fear of unrest. Anglican suspicions of AICs were at their greatest in the early 1950s. Again, this pessimism was encapsulated in the words of T. F. C. Bewes who wrote, “The Independent Schools appear to be the breeding grounds of unrest.”\(^{296}\)

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\(^{294}\) Bewes, “Behind the Mau Mau Headlines,” 71.


This same intellectual thread ran through Eby’s report on the African Israel Church Nineveh, and figured largely in the Kenya Mission’s minutes on the *Roho* tragedy at Musanda when Lawi,
confidential memorandum on “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” obsessed about the anti-European leanings of the *Arathi*, the African Brotherhood Church and *Dini ya Msambwa*. Apprehension and suspicion, in fact, permeated virtually all the reports.

But even though there was a degree of similarity in Anglican perspectives during the Mau Mau uprising, there was a lack of uniformity in their responses. During these years there was, for example, a differentiation between the ways Anglicans responded to AICs in central and western Kenya. In the midst of the crisis the Christian Council of Kenya began considering and accepting the applications of some AICs for membership. Thus, in significant ways, the period of greatest tension with certain AICs, especially in central Kenya, was also a time of growing openness to others. This illustrates the importance of exploring the encounter in both west and central Kenya, for one will make inaccurate statements about Anglicans if limited strictly to one section of the Kenya Mission.

There was greater interest among Anglicans in the subject of AICs just prior to, and during the Mau Mau uprising. Of note in this period is the fact that whilst the crisis widened the gulf between Anglicans and some AICs, it was also a catalyst for Anglicans to finally make the effort to investigate them. The resulting reports revealed some antipathies towards AICs, but also illustrated how, even at the height of tensions, many Anglicans were able to muster a degree of sympathy.

The first of these reports was entitled “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” and was issued in 1948. It cited the circumcision crisis of 1929 as the event that gave rise to AICs. This was not entirely correct, of course, as members of the *Arathi, Dini ya Roho* and Nomiya Luo Mission trace their roots back further. Daudi Maina’s African Independent Pentecostal Church was in existence as early as 1921 and the KKEA and KISA were both founded in 1929, just prior to the crisis. The report discussed the African Orthodox Church in some detail, especially its origin during the visit of Archbishop Alexander. The only negative thing that the report discussed concerning this body was the allegation that they charged fees for baptisms. The African Independent Pentecostal Church was also discussed, with a generally less favorable slant, due largely to the views of the rural dean of the northern highlands. He described the AIPC primarily as a political organization; some members, allegedly,

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Odongo and several others were killed. W. E. Owen and W. A. Pitt Pitts, “Lawi Movement Kavirondo Ended in Tragedy,” to CMS Headquarters, 4 February 1934. CMS/B: G3/A5/O.
wanted to leave all traces of Christianity behind. His portrayal of the AIPC was influenced by the activities of independent schools in Fort Hall where he said they were working against the Anglican Church through direct evangelism, nationalistic rhetoric and interruption of services, “a nuisance of considerable magnitude.” The portrayal of the Arathi in “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” was also unflattering. They were portrayed as disturbers of the peace, hostile to Europeans and as associated with non-Christian movements. Little was known about the African Israel Church Nineveh, but some of the history of the African Brotherhood Church was given, noting its anti-European leanings, which were causing much anxiety to the government. Finally, the report discussed the theological ideas of the Nomiya Luo Mission, claiming that it was a group influenced greatly by the Old Testament. The report editorialized very little upon the matter-of-fact description of the leader of this religious body. “They regard the founder of the movement, Johana Owalo, as their ‘savior’ and hold an annual feast (in substitution for the Holy Communion) in his memory. Side by side with Johana Owalo, the black man’s ‘savior,’ they rank Mohammed as the ‘savior’ of Asia and Christ of the white man.”

The report was written with very little comment. The greatest recurring theme was the discussion of the attitudes of AICs to Europeans and missionaries— which was described almost categorically as hostile. Another theme was the unsystematic nature of the review of these AICs. The author described the origins of one group, the theology of another and the politics of a third. This was probably because even in 1948 very little was known about AICs.

Martin Capon’s report entitled, “The Independent Schools among the Kikuyu” was written two years later. His report described the CMS as being on the sidelines during the circumcision crisis. Capon put a lot of emphasis on the role of the AIM and CSM in causing the failure of the Anglican-KISA training scheme. He claimed that Bishop Heywood felt pressed between two imperatives, that of promoting unity among missions, with a history going back more than two decades,

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297 “Heretical and Schismatic Sects,” 1.
298 Ibid., 2-3.
299 All direct quotes of Martin Capon in this section come from “The Independent Schools among the Kikuyu.” KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/98.
and that of fostering new relationships with the independent schools. There was a sense of regret in his commentary. “It is hard to judge what might have happened if this proposal had been accepted – in the event, the CMS felt unable to agree as, to do so would have offended greatly the CSM and AIM with whom they desired comity to continue.”

“Independent Schools among the Kikuyu” went on to discuss the work of Peter Koinange and the creation of the Githunguri Teacher Training College as “the supreme example of the Kikuyu Independent School.” He was skeptical of the quality of training achieved there, as few graduates managed to qualify to teach at government or mission schools, though he did not disregard the institution as a whole. He attributed the success of Githunguri to the overwhelming demand among the Kikuyu for higher education and viewed the return of Jomo Kenyatta from Britain in 1946 as a turn for the worse at Githunguri. Once Kenyatta was elected president of the college, Githunguri became “the source from which, by booklets in the vernacular press, in mass meetings and most of all by the passing of the work in conversation from man to man, woman to women, a cloud of propaganda has spread among the Kikuyu people…” This ‘propaganda’ was said to consist of communist inspired rhetoric that was hostile to Christianity, the government, and whites generally. While Capon described a portion of the individuals at Githunguri as ‘subversive,’ he opposed the government policy of favoring the moderate elements. This, he suggested, would be counterproductive because the political climate would ensure public opposition to any group aligned with the government.

The report closed with several recommendations for how the church should respond to independent schools.

As a leading point in the independent platform is to dwell on anti-European prejudice, the approach to the independents must be made by Africans. An example is the visiting of Kikuyu squatters in the Rift Valley by teams of evangelists. The European part will be to avoid giving offence to sound African aspirations and to act always after thorough enquiry as to the facts.

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… All the Mission Churches need to review the results of past neglect of the Kikuyu squatters. The CMS has a lot to put right here.

The logic of the recommendations was that Europeans could do little to effectively counteract the influence of independent schools other than to admit past failures; if anything was to be done to counteract AICs directly, it would have to be spearheaded by African Anglicans. The primary role of missionaries was to train African clergy. Capon also argued for, what might be called, the re-education of missionaries about Kikuyu grievances and the review of Anglican political stances.

“Independent Schools among the Kikuyu” represented an advance from “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” in terms of detail and the depth of analysis. It was narrower, focusing on independent schools among the Kikuyu rather than discussing AICs generally. Observers today can certainly be thankful for a title that was less offensive as well. While “Independent Schools among the Kikuyu” was critical of certain aspects of the independent schools, it was not hostile to the movement as a whole. Here also, the distinction between perspectives and responses is instructive; Capon possessed some negative views about AICs, but he proposed a temperate response to them. Capon realized that Anglicans were being defined negatively by independent schools, and thus he suggested the need to respond to the ‘propaganda,’ not to oppose AICs generally. He was also self-critical in that he attributed much of the blame for the state of Christianity in Kenya to the failures of the missionaries.

Bishop L. J. Beecher wrote an article in World Dominion in 1953, entitled “African Separatist Churches in Kenya” in which he endeavoured to grapple with the phenomenon of AICs.\(^{301}\) He cited two key sources in the article, Lord Hailey’s African Survey and K. S. Latourette’s History of the Expansion of Christianity, and admitted his reliance upon the ideas of Stephen Neill and Bengt Sundkler. His purpose was to think more academically about Kenya’s new religious movements in light of the global context.

Beecher proposed a five-fold typology of Kenyan religious movements: Separatist Christian Churches such as the African Orthodox Church and KISA, Movements displaying Heretical Tendencies such as the Pentecostal movement

generally, Syncretistic Movements such as the *Watu wa Jesu Kristo*, Nomiya Luo Mission and the African Israel Church Nineveh, Attempted Revivals of Tribalism such as the *Arathi* and *Dini ya Msambwa*, and Political-Religious Cults such as the Mau Mau movement. It is interesting that Beecher identified the African Orthodox Church and the KISA as ‘Christian’ churches, while judging more harshly those movements that were influenced by western Pentecostalism, which he described as having ‘heretical tendencies.’ Thus he possessed a greater antipathy towards certain western-inspired Pentecostal groups than indigenous churches. Beecher defined syncretistic movements as those that “seek to revive religious life on the tribal basis, combining a certain aspect of their former beliefs with a distorted emphasis on certain parts of the Old Testament…” Attempted revivals of tribalism, he defined as attempts to “revive the old tribal religious cults.” He described political-religious cults, as a “largely uncharted field,” but significantly, he did not include the KISA, KKEA or any number of AICs that could have been described as political-religious movements.

Like Martin Capon, Beecher concluded his article with comments that were critical of the missionary movement in Kenya. “In a very real sense,” he wrote, “the separatist movement and the heretical and schismatic movements that we have lightly sketched … constitute an indictment of certain aspects of contemporary Christianity.” The church neglected its obligations to evangelize, to teach a theology that was “part of the warp and woof of everyday living,” to deal well with inter-Church conflicts, to completely ban racial segregation from church life, and to train a sufficient number of indigenous leaders. He cast the net broadly with his typology, and it seems to break down for this reason – there are simply too many variables to be considered between these vastly different movements. Thus, “African Separatist Churches in Kenya” is not important as the final or definitive word on AICs, but as a step along the way.

Max Warren, the CMS General Secretary between 1941 and 1962, published *Revival: An Enquiry* in 1954, based on correspondence with Anglicans in East Africa. The book was primarily a discussion of the East African Revival (EAR),

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but he also described his views about AICs generally. For his arguments regarding AICs, he relied on Bengt Sundkler’s *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, assuming it had some applicability to the East African context. This speaks again about the important historical reality that was apparent in “Heretical and Schismatic Sects” - comparatively little was known about AICs in Kenya as late as 1954.

In his study of the EAR, Warren posited two categories of renewal: revival and enthusiasm. He distinguished between them in the following way: “‘Enthusiasm’ seeks to save itself even though the Church be lost. Revival directed towards the Church, itself essentially within the Church, slowly but surely reforms the Church.”\textsuperscript{303} Christians had the duty to accept continuous revival within the church and to reject the manifestations of enthusiasm. In the final analysis, Warren thought the EAR was far more than mere enthusiasm. Despite the dangers, or what he preferred to call ‘question-marks,’ he praised it resoundingly and encouraged Anglicans to embrace it openly.

Warren classified AICs as a kind of revival, which he described loosely as ‘reformation of the church,’ though with elements of enthusiasm. Any revival, he suggested, may contain elements of enthusiasm. But he carefully differentiated between AICs and enthusiasm, both of which involved separatism, by stating that in Africa the ‘frustration of revival’ within mission churches had often made schism unavoidable.\textsuperscript{304} Warren thought there were many ways in which mission churches had failed to make room for genuine revival, leading to the emergence of AICs. Mission churches failed to allow for an adequate use of ritual, for expressions of Christian worship based on indigenous forms, and for the ministry of healing.\textsuperscript{305} When African Christians sought to make reforms along these lines, they were ultimately denied the freedom to do so within the mission churches of South Africa. Warren concluded, “Revival in its separatist form constitutes an attempt to reform the Church albeit in the only way open to the Bantu of South Africa - by means of separation.”\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., 27-28.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid., 28-29.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.
Warren’s attitude toward AICs reveals a sympathetic attempt to engage with the phenomenon and to understand the root causes. He was simultaneously critical of the idea of ‘separatism’ and conscious that in Africa there was occasionally no other acceptable alternative. Warren approached AICs as an apologist; he did not ignore their ‘faults,’ but he went to great lengths to explain them to the reader and to justify them in light of colonial history. This can be contrasted with Warren’s handling of the mission movement in some respects. Throughout Revival, he persistently criticizes mission leaders for failing to embrace indigenous Christian revivals.

Another key document on AICs was the “Report of the Conference held by the Nyanza Branch of the Christian Council of Kenya” in 1955, which dealt with how mission churches should relate to AICs. It is particularly valuable because it recorded a spectrum of thoughts on AICs from various Christian individuals and denominations. There was a wide range of questions asked, and statements made, from very basic to profound, stereotypical to original. S. A. Morrison’s lecture stands out as important to the current discussion. As Secretary of the (National) Christian Council of Kenya, an ex-CMS missionary in Cairo, and a sociologist, he had given some thought to the AIC phenomenon and even though he had more questions than answers, his reflections are still enlightening. Morrison could be critical of AICs, but was by no measure hostile to them, and just as often he was critical of mission churches.

Morrison divided his discussion into three sections: causes of schism, missionary mistakes at the point of schism, and appropriate responses after schism. At the beginning of the first section he posed the question, “Do these sects emerge


308 At the opening of the session, the following questions were raised: “Is there a common factor in them all - a getting back to something familiar? Do most of these sects allow polygamy? Were most of these sects started by someone who had broken away from some orthodox religion because he or she was disgruntled about something? A.) wanted leadership and failed to get it B.) had been excommunicated for some reason or other. When we say that these religions tend to be ‘political’ what do we mean? Do we mean that they are strongly African, nationalistic, or do we mean that they are anti-European and subversive? How many of the members of these sects are hungry for something spiritual which they fail to find in orthodox religions? Have we really met the need of Africans for rhythm? Have we done enough with hymn singing and good rousing choruses? Are there many women in these sects because women find our Christian standards too high for them?”

because of weakness in the Church itself?” He answered the question in the affirmative and suggested the following weaknesses: inadequate teaching, one-sided teaching which emphasized a particular truth, western-oriented church services, failure to devolve authority on Africans, and unnecessary obstacles in the way of Africans who wanted to join another Alliance church. He concluded, “Let us scrutinize our Church and our life lest, inadvertently, we are causing splinter groups.”

From this initial section, it is clear that Morrison was part of that group of missionaries who were critical of the missionary movement and blamed missionaries to a great degree for causing AICs to emerge.

Arrogance on the part of missionaries is now part of a commonly accepted ‘myth.’ And while this allegation cannot be denied altogether, there was both in Kenya and Nigeria a widespread self-critique within the Anglican Church, a realization of the mistakes made, of the offenses caused, and the profound limitations displayed by missionaries. The honesty and vulnerability in the reports of Morrison, Beecher, Warren and Capon, the depths of their insights into the negative legacy of missions, and their willingness to admit culpability, offer a counterbalance to a myth that leans too far in one direction.

Morrison suggested at the beginning of the second section that there were several reasons for members to leave the mission churches and join an AIC. ‘Personal ambition’ was sometimes the cause, which he suggested must be dealt with firmly and faithfully. When ‘nationalistic protest’ was the cause, Morrison said, “You must respect this and try to meet it. Do not jump to the conclusion that the man is subversive.” All too often, a ‘personal quarrel’ was the cause of a split; he chided missionaries for being stubborn and called them to respond with grace, tact and humility, and to reconcile with this individual. At other times, it was ‘a point of doctrine’ that caused division. Morrison suggested trying to convince this person through use of scriptures not to go to such ‘extremes.’ Finally, he proposed that many clashed over cultural practices such as polygamy and circumcision. He called for patience when dealing with these issues and challenged the conference to reconsider their present positions. To those churches that would not allow polygamists to be adherents, he asked, “Can we keep them as adherents if not as full

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members?” And to those who allowed them to be adherents but not to have full membership, he asked, “Can we keep them ‘at the gate?’” These questions suggested a certain criticism of missionary stances on polygamy and female circumcision and an attempt to get Alliance churches to bend a little on these divisive cultural issues.

In the third section, Morrison discussed what was to be done after a person left the mission church. He admitted,

> Our natural reaction is annoyance and we tend to put all the blame on them. They realize it and there is little hope of winning them back. We tend to believe the worst and don’t take the trouble to find out. This may make them subversive. Or we ignore them, feel they are lost to us and so just leave them alone.

Morrison suggested that contact be maintained with members of AICs by offering help and guidance, even if it was refused at first. The ultimate goal was to convince them to come back to the mission church. He deprecated any sort of action with the aim of “putting them [AICs] down by restrictions, prohibitions and by force.” He had not done much thinking about the merits of AIC theology, for much of it was still largely unknown to outsiders; rather Morrison spent a great deal of time discussing how the mission churches could improve.

In 1956, Matthew Ajuoga wrote a document entitled “Light,” which he sent to N. Langford Smith, the Archdeacon of Nairobi, and to Bishop Beecher. It was a sprawling commentary on Anglicanism in western Kenya, with several sections dedicated to his attitudes about AICs. Ajuoga is probably best known as a revival leader associated with the Johera and as founder of the AIC, Church of Christ in Africa in 1958. At the writing of “Light,” he was still committed to the Anglican Church, so much so that he wrote in the introduction, “I whole heartedly love the Anglican Church and her traditions…” Therefore, “Light” falls into the theme of this section and is an important example of an African Anglican’s engagement with AICs.

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311 See also: Anderson, “Selection and Adaptation outside the Government/Missionary Framework,” 118.
Alfayo Odongo of the *Dini ya Roho* was described by Ajuoga as someone who possessed the genuine spirit of revival, but was led astray by “the spirit of disobedience.” Ajuoga was referring to the occasion when Odongo placed his priestly vestments upon Lawi Obonyo in front of an Anglican congregation, symbolically authorizing him to perform the functions of a priest (which he had no authority to do). Odongo and the *Roho* were also criticized for their exclusionist practices. “Those who could not [agree] … with them, were not allowed in their meetings or even to attend Church services, because they said that they could not mix with sinners.” *Roho* allegedly began to neglect their families and made heavy demands upon the community to provide food for them, saying, “‘God said give us such and such.’ Later they even used force when the owner of the thing was not ready to give it willingly.”

Ajuoga was equally critical of Anglican leaders for tolerating aberrant ideas and failing to confront movements within the Anglican Church (such as the *Dini ya Roho*, which emerged as an AIC after a period of incubation within the Anglican Church). “The Church was too late in correcting the padre [Odongo] and his fellow laymen … till the disease grew chronic and incurable.” That is, Ajuoga believed the great failure of Anglican leaders was not being intolerant, as many modern commentators would assert, but being too tolerant.

Anglican leaders also displayed weakness in how they dealt with Ishmael Noo according to Ajuoga. Noo was a revival leader from central Nyanza who left the Anglican Church after “many wavering and undecided meetings with the local church leaders, Elders and Padres in which they tried to reconcile him to the Church.” When Noo and other pastors stirred up dissent, leaders sat idly by and Ajuoga chided them for this, saying “We are … not in favour of any movement hiding under the Church wings” when they are “opposed to the Word of God, Church Constitution – Laws and Regulations.”

Ajuoga sought to pressure Langford Smith and Beecher to narrow the definition of what it meant to be Anglican. He supported a firm hand in controlling the activities of the laity. But he tread a very fine line when he suggested that Anglican’s should close church doors to those who did not embrace his theological ideas, while criticizing the *Roho* for doing the same.
Ajuoga went on to discuss the *Dini ya Msambwa*, the *Dini ya Kristo*, and the schism led by Geldad Kaggia, leveling the same basic accusation against Anglican leaders. About the first two, he suggested that “The Church and Churches must be awake and ready to check off any known erroneous and devilish doctrine.” Regarding the last, he wrote, “Our Church said nothing in time to help these people, till recently when the devilish spirit emerged [resulting] … in the shedding of blood.” Ultimately, because church leaders faltered, the government was forced to act, and denounced Kaggiaism, the *Dini ya Kristo* and the *Dini ya Msambwa*.

In the next section of “Light” Ajuoga set out a biblical and historical justification for the strong leadership of priests in dealing with divergent theological ideas. In the dispute between Paul and others in the Acts of the Apostles, the church council at Jerusalem did not ignore the divisions that existed in the church; rather they made forceful theological arguments to silence opposition. “Erroneous teaching was corrected openly and loudly.” In Galatians 2, Peter “had become a hypocrite,” according to Ajuoga, by insisting that male Gentile converts be circumcised according to Jewish custom. Paul argued that such outward acts were unnecessary in Christ and even constituted a return to slavery under the law. When Jewish Christians began to come under Peter’s influence, “Paul did not try to flatter Peter but challenged him openly before others and denounced that sort of teaching in many other churches.” In the epistles to Timothy and Titus, Paul instructed them “how to handle heretics and false teachers. Paul did everything within his power to keep sound Christian doctrine. He did not tolerate any mixture of truth and error in the doctrine.” Ajuoga pointed to the councils in the 4th and 5th centuries that were convened for the purpose of deliberating on contradictory theological ideas. He celebrated Athanasius who “stood out against the world to maintain pure doctrine about the divinity of Christ,” Martin Luther who “broke the unity of the Church in which he was born and denounced the Pope,” and the English Reformers “who managed to separate with Rome because Rome was not ready to correct her teachings and come back to the true Christian doctrine…”

Ajuoga was critical of Odongo primarily for disobeying his priestly vows and of the *Roho* for excluding other Christians. He was also critical of other AICs and New Religious Movements, which he described as propagating ‘erroneous’ and
‘devilish’ ideas. Such characterizations suggest that, at the time of writing this document, Ajuoga was more antagonistic to AICs than the other authors surveyed in this section. It is probable that he was closer the events, had deeper relationships with those involved, and possessed more intimate knowledge of ideas that were circulating. The other Anglican reports of this period were dependent on informants and second-hand knowledge, but Ajuoga was present at many of the meetings in question. The other reports sought to be more detached, introspective and academic, Ajuoga more confident, activist and action-oriented. “Light” further illustrates how in Kenya, as in Nigeria, some African Anglicans were in the vanguard of opposition to AICs. Ajuoga was also critical of the Anglican Church, but again, he differed from the others. He spent little time reflecting on his own mistakes, as did Morrison, Beecher, Warren and Capon. These four suggested that ‘we,’ as Anglican leaders, must do better. Ajuoga’s stance was that ‘other’ Anglicans, mainly his superiors, were too permissive, indecisive and impotent.

The East African Revival (EAR) has been briefly discussed in the writings of Ajuoga, Warren and others above. Since it was an important development at the end of our period, it may be helpful to make some comparison between the perspectives of Anglicans toward the EAR and AICs in these closing paragraphs. David Barrett has described the EAR as “one of the largest and most powerful movements of renewal on the continent’ of Africa.\(^{313}\) The revival spread from Uganda and Rwanda to Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Congo and Sudan, and to at least seventy different ethnic groups in East Africa. The movement also transcended denominational barriers. Dorothy Smoker, a European missionary involved with the EAR, wrote “It is safe to say that no church body in East Africa has been wholly unaffected by it…”\(^{314}\) The revival began to make inroads in central Kenya as early as 1936 and in western Kenya as early as 1938.\(^{315}\)

Already there are some differences between the EAR and the AICs of this thesis; the former was geographically larger than any single AIC and incorporated a

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much greater number of ethnic groups and Christian denominations. In Uganda, the first stirrings began in 1934 during the preparations for the Anglican Diamond Jubilee. Many Ugandan Anglicans wanted to restore the vibrancy of the church of yesteryear, to seek afresh the primary objectives of the church, including the biblical mandate to spread the Gospel. Small groups of Christians spontaneously gathered for prayer and missions work. This aspect of the revival seems to bear a degree of similarity with many of the AICs in this thesis, especially the Aladura of Nigeria, who encouraged prophets and bands of evangelists to comb the countryside, to raise their voices in market places and mission churches. Independent church leaders often practiced itinerant evangelism that rivaled the passion and proficiency of the followers of the EAR.

The revival championed the need for purity in the church through frequent public confession of sin and the cleansing blood of Christ. Sundkler described a kind of ecumenism that was a part of the revival, not based upon formal negotiations between denominations, but upon ‘experiential togetherness,’ ‘fellowship,’ and the ‘unity of blood-brothers’ joined in Christ. The revival brought vitality to Christian worship, moving beyond what some described as lethargic Anglican services and incorporating rhythmic, joyful and repetitive choruses. The members of the revival often eschewed the formal leadership structures of the mission churches, thus, lay members were as likely as ordained ministers to lead services.

A key difference between the EAR and AICs was the widespread participation of western missionaries in the former; in most cases, Europeans during this period interacted with AICs as ‘outsiders.’ Even the Aladura of Nigeria, who briefly sought a degree of collaboration with the Faith Tabernacle and Apostolic Church, did not approach the breadth of missionary participation in the revival. Indeed, the revival began as a partnership between Europeans and Africans. In Rwanda, this was exemplified in the relationships between European and African medical workers whose gatherings centered on the study of the Bible and intimate Christian fellowship. As a result, the EAR was viewed by many prominent

319 Sundkler and Steed, A History of the Church in Africa, 863-64.
Anglicans as occurring primarily within mission churches, in sharp contrast with the AIC movement.\textsuperscript{320}

T. F. C. Bewes, the CMS Africa Secretary, was overwhelmingly favourable towards the EAR in central Kenya. In the midst of the Mau Mau crisis, he wrote, “We praise God for this Revival,” and later, “This is the most thrilling fellowship that I have ever met in my life…”\textsuperscript{321} Max Warren’s \textit{Revival, An Enquiry} has already been introduced above. In the 1930s, the church in East Africa was in desperate need of reform; “About that there were no two opinions,” wrote Warren.\textsuperscript{322} It was in this context that the revival ‘broke surface’ emphasizing spiritual renewal and genuine Christian fellowship. Warren praised the revival for maintaining the centrality of scriptures. He was encouraged by the ‘continuity’ between the EAR and the great revivals of the past, and by the ‘contiguity’ of this revival with contemporary East African cultures.\textsuperscript{323}

But both Bewes and Warren saw potential dangers in the EAR. They attested to the danger of theological oversimplification, the tendency to become preoccupied with one aspect of the Christian message to the exclusion of others.\textsuperscript{324} In some unfortunate instances, this led to the needless condemnation of other Christians. Warren and Bewes pointed to several additional dangers, which were essentially strengths taken to extremes. Celebratory worship could lead to unrestrained enthusiasm; excessive zeal could result in offensive behaviour; public confession could degenerate into a public show or a legalistic barrier; and popular success could breed complacency.\textsuperscript{325}

Bewes and Warren both highlighted the risk of schism. They admitted that this was in part due to negative responses of some Anglican leaders to the revival. Bewes wrote, “Some disapproved from the start, and their disapproval might have driven the movement into separatism.”\textsuperscript{326} He admonished Anglicans to confess that

\textsuperscript{321} Bewes, \textit{Kikuyu Conflict}, 48, 50.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid., 95-108.
\textsuperscript{324} Bewes, \textit{Kikuyu Conflict}, 48.
“…we were afraid of what it might mean in our lives, so great was the challenge.”

On the other hand, Bewes said the revival had produced no major schism from the Anglican Church in Kenya by 1956 and he saw this as a sign that the Anglican Church had been largely open to it. This is somewhat controversial for according to Adrian Hastings, there had been acts of kuhamà (separation) from the Anglican Church since the beginning of the revival; one example was the small, idiosyncratic group led by Ishmael Noo in 1948. Bewes must have discounted this as a minor exception. Two years after Bewes made this assertion, however, Matthew Ajuoga led a group of Luo clergy known as the Johera (‘those who love’) out of the Anglican Church in western Kenya. Ajuoga and seven ordained clergy brought 16,000 Anglicans with them and founded the Church of Christ in Africa.

Many of the dangers cited by Warren and Bewes echoed Anglican concerns about AICs in Kenya and Nigeria. One finds references to the ‘excessive zeal’ of AIC prophets and evangelists. Even AIC leaders acknowledged this on occasion, as did Aladura leaders, W. Lajorin and W. F. Sosan in correspondence about the Cherubim and Seraphim evangelist Folorunso. A difference may be in how these activities were perceived by a number of Anglicans; often missionaries described the interaction with AICs as combative and destructive, whereas, more often EAR evangelists were seen as confrontational, but well intentioned. Anglicans also sometimes referred to ‘theological oversimplification,’ such as the Aladura insistence upon faith healing alone. There were other instances, however, of Anglicans going further by stating that an AIC was, quite simply, in profound and unambiguous error. Finally, there were many examples of concern about the danger of emotionalism expressed in regard to AICs in both Kenya and Nigeria. Thus it is clear that Anglicans had many of the same concerns about AICs and the EAR, but perhaps largely due to the perceived differences between the two broad movements stated above, the former was approached with more pessimism and described with less charity overall.

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330 W. Lajorin to W. F. Sosan, 2 December 1930. UIL: WFS. W. F. Sosan to W. Lajorin, 24 November 1930. UIL: WFS.
There is another important document that substantially agrees with the notions expressed by Warren and Bewes entitled “The Winds Blow in Africa.” The anonymous essay was written in 1948, probably by an Anglican, but certainly by a missionary. The colourful, unguarded descriptions contained in “The Winds Blow in Africa” relate to a revival convention held at Kagari in August, involving an estimated 2,000 individuals over four days. This was not the first revival convention of its kind in central Kenya. The previous year, a similar convention was held at Kahuhia, which was organized and lead by African Christians, and two even larger conventions followed Kagari, at Kabete in 1949 and at Thogoto in 1950.

The crowd at Kagari was comprised mainly of Kikuyu, but there were attendees from many other parts of Kenya and from at least four separate mission churches. The missionary author characterized the mood of the gathering as warm, including “immediately all strangers, irrespective of tribe or colour,” and celebratory, “frequently breaking out irresistibly into song, testimony and prayer, sometimes clapping or waving of hands and dancing in rhythmic accompaniment to song.” These descriptions were followed, in a fashion reminiscent of Anglican documents on AICs in Nigeria and Kenya, by comments about orderliness, emotionalism, and theology: “But with it all there was not disorderliness or confusion … The addresses were almost all given very quietly; though often with great force, and there was never any play on emotion. The speakers used their Bibles freely … We feel bound to say that, throughout the convention, we have seen no sign whatever of any extremes or excesses which might, with some reason, have been feared.” The author praised the movement for being African-run and indigenous in many respects, and betrayed no desire for it to be otherwise.

The author paused towards the end to recognize the ‘honest suspicions’ of detractors, those African and European Christians that were ‘unable to share’ in the revival. The author admitted that some aspects of the movement may cause concern to the casual observer, but attributed these problems to the fringe elements of the revival and to impulsive youths. The author did not dwell on the negative; in fact, he

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331 All quotes are from “The Winds Blow in Africa” which can be found at, CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1 (13).
or she wrote, “there may be a danger of looking too much at points open to criticism.” Naysayers should spend more time recognizing the “tremendous fact that here are some thousand African people who, in the power of Christ are rising above their personal and national problems to a new level of walking and working with God.”

The overall assessment of the convention, which seems to have some comparative value for the EAR as a whole, was that,

There was something very challenging and refreshingly real about all of this. For there was evidence of new life, life more abundant; there was in it the breath of the Spirit … It is clear to us that here we have evidence of something for which we have worked and prayed – the indigenous Christian Church of Africa, working and witnessing and growing in the power of the Holy Spirit of God.

The parallels between Warren, Bewes and “The Winds Blow in Africa” need not be spelled out in great detail, but it is noteworthy that the author seems to have been even less interested than they were in criticizing the revival.

It is striking to juxtapose the positive representations of the revival in “The Winds Blow in Africa” with the negative characterizations of other religious movements in the essay. “New winds, stormy and powerful, are sweeping across the hills and plains, and the old life is bending and breaking before them. And out of the ruins are springing up religious cults, strange and fanatical, the spiritual counterpart of the political agitation with which they are often allied.” Unfortunately, this brief statement is vague and it is not possible to know with confidence which ‘cults’ were in the mind of the author. The adjective ‘strange’ is in keeping with some Anglican sentiments expressed in relation to the AICs in Nigeria and Kenya, but the term ‘fanatical’ is not, except perhaps in the case of Matthew Ajuoga’s “Light.” One cannot rule out that the author would have included some of the churches in this study, but it seems more likely that it was a reference to a wide variety of New Religious Movements, both Christian and non-Christian. Thus, despite the impossibility of making a definitive comparison, it is at least apparent that the author did not sanction all African religious initiatives to the same degree as the revival.
Overall, Anglicans were probably more open to AICs than most other major missionary societies, such as the AIM and CSM. Without delving deeply into the archives of these missions it is not possible to make authoritative assertions about why this may have been the case, but perhaps a tentative argument can be put forward here. Anglican responses to AICs were inextricably linked to their views about cultural issues, such as polygamy and female circumcision. Anglicans were slightly more tolerant than other societies on these matters, but ultimately they too wanted to see these customs end. What made the greatest difference between the CMS and others was the timing and manner in which they thought the change should be accomplished. By and large, Anglicans supported a more gradual approach to transforming these aspects of African cultures and an approach that was not solely dependent upon pressure from the top of church leadership. As was clear from the Bishop’s letter of 1931 and the correspondence of individuals like H. D. Hooper and W. A. Pitt Pitts, the attitudes of African Anglicans should influence the rate of change. This more patient approach instilled a long-term view on cultural change and created space for Anglicans to be more tolerant of AICs.

In summary, current views of missionary perspectives and responses to AICs can be expanded along the lines set out in this chapter. There is no doubt that many Anglicans possessed negative views of AICs, but there were also other prevalent attitudes such as sympathy, kindness and conciliation. These attitudes have, to a surprising degree, been left out of AIC histories. This thesis hopes to bring a balance into the discussions of the encounter by first introducing many examples illustrative of positive and constructive missionary attitudes. Second, understanding the ways in which African Christians influenced and guided missionary interaction with AICs will contribute to a more penetrating history of the encounter. Third, this chapter has begun to explore the idea that AICs were occasionally complicit in creating the oppositional situations that they found so oppressive. They decried the hostility shown towards them, but in many cases, they expressed hostility to others in society. Those AICs that did not exhibit hostile attitudes toward the government and missions were likely to find them to be more amenable.333 Thus, the orientation of any particular AIC had some relation to the dynamics of the encounter in a given area.

333 See discussions about the African Christian Church and Schools and African Israel Church Nineveh in the following chapter.
Of course, given previous experiences of the mission and the government, it is not surprising that many AICs were reticent or even antagonistic to forming alliances. Fourth, this chapter has shown that missionaries cannot be interpreted apart from the constraints of the broader religious, political, social and economic context. They were often limited in how they responded to AICs by peripheral considerations.
Chapter 4
The Colonial Administration and African Independent Churches in Central Kenya

This chapter seeks to critically reflect upon government perspectives and responses to African Independent Churches (AIC) in central Kenya. Much of the same argument will be made in this chapter as the others: current assumptions about the encounter are at times misleading and simplistic. By looking more deeply into the correspondence produced by the colonial administration in Kenya, it becomes clear that there was a variety of perspectives on AICs. An important aspect of this was the contribution of African officials, who despite their comparatively low position, had an impact on government policy towards AICs and were important actors in their own right. This chapter argues against a narrow approach to the encounter that fails to explore all views held by European and African officials.

Colonialism in Kenya

The Imperial British East Africa Company was an important precursor of colonial rule in East Africa. The company’s founder, William Mackinnon was a merchant from Glasgow who in 1876 convinced a group of businessmen to invest in the construction of two roads from the coast, the first leading to Lake Victoria and the second to Lake Nyasa.\(^1\) Other European traders began to invest in the trading infrastructure of East Africa as well and by the 1870s trade between Zanzibar and the mainland was worth over two million pounds.\(^2\) Of course, before this there were already routes from the coast to the interior used by the Kamba, Yao, Bisa, and

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Myamwezi, and later by Arab traders. The major objects of exchange for Arab traders were ivory and slaves in the eighteenth century; in the nineteenth century, the former ebbed and the latter flowed in greater numbers. Interest in ending the slave trade had encouraged the British to establish a consul in Zanzibar as early as 1841. They hoped that the Sultan of Zanzibar could control the trade of East Africa with the proper incentive and aid. They put strong pressure on him to end his dealings with the slave trade and to engage in other types of commerce.

In 1895, the British government established the East African Protectorate, comprising much of modern day Kenya. The process of establishing control over these lands involved the extension of military and political control over coastal and upcountry regions. There was almost immediate resistance from the Nandi (who were still a part of the Ugandan Protectorate until 1902), the Ogaden Somalis of Jubaland, and indigenous leaders like Mbarak bin Rashid, a Mazaria chief from Mweli. There was a period of brief resistance from the Kamba, involving several skirmishes. When the transition from the Imperial British East Africa Company to British colony began under John Ainsworth, there was an increasing attempt to eradicate the slave trade and to end the practice of cattle raiding. This awakened the ire of some members of the Kamba community. Ainsworth organized an expedition to ‘subdue’ the unrest; for this he mainly used Maasai troops. When the party returned with over 2,000 livestock, the expedition took on the appearance of a massive Maasai raid. In response, Mwana Muka organized a boycott of the trading post at Machakos and gathered allies to attack the fort on March 1896. Almost overwhelmed by Muka’s force, Ainsworth sent for help from Fort Smith and when it arrived he led an even more destructive expedition against Kamba inhabitants. Several Kamba communities decided to make peace with the British thereafter. Under the pretence of the war on slavery, Ainsworth continued his efforts to subdue the Machakos plains, with skirmishes in Kiteta, Kibaoni and Mbooni. A third campaign was waged to the south at Kilungu in 1897. These British victories marked

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6 Munro, Colonial Rule and the Kamba, 31.
the end of primary resistance among the Kamba, a fate sealed by waves of drought, famine and pestilence at the end of the nineteenth century. The imposition of colonialism on the Kikuyu was similar to the pattern among the Kamba. There were local leaders who chose to oppose the British. For instance, Muruka of Thika resisted the government until an expedition of several hundred askari was sent, or Tetu of Nyeri, who attacked trading caravans in 1902. The government expeditions in response to these leaders killed an estimated 200 and 58 Kikuyu respectively and took as plunder several thousand livestock. In 1904, an expedition was sent to Mathira, which claimed the lives of 796 Kikuyu and plundered several thousand livestock. The casualty levels were felt to be unacceptably high, according to Godfrey Muriuki, and official reports downplayed the figure; an unofficial estimate was as many as 1,500 Kikuyu deaths during the expedition. The resistance of the Kikuyu began to weaken due to a series of natural disasters and epidemics between 1894 and 1899. Estimates of the death rate from these calamities were quite high and help explain the ‘empty’ tracts of land that the government began to sell to white settlers. Other causes of the weakening resistance were the emergence of a group of collaborators and the persistence of rivalries within Kikuyu society.

The British conquest of the Luo and Luyia in western Kenya involved as many as fifty minor encounters with various clans. The advance was facilitated by three ‘agencies of integration’ – economic, ideological and political, according to John Lonsdale. Economically the British expanded local trade; ideologically they made attempts to establish bonds of cooperation with local diviners and prophets; politically they sought to accumulate ‘political resources’ by mediating disputes and controlling valuable resources, such as military technology. The conquest proceeded in the following manner: 1890-1895 was a period of relatively peaceful coexistence; 1895-1897 was a period of ascendancy, when the British began to control external relations and establish local alliances; 1897 was a second period of

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7 Ibid., 44-46.
8 Ibid., 50.
9 Ibid., 161-65.
coexistence, when British forces were diverted to Uganda; 1898 saw the return of the *askaris* and the re-establishment of British domination. In subsequent years, overt conflict moved to the periphery and the colonial structure expanded quickly.¹²

The first shot of WWI in East Africa was fired by the British before either side was fully prepared for the conflict. The Colonial Office had warned the colonies to be on guard against German aggression on 29 July 1914 when forces were scattered throughout East Africa and needed to be reoriented along the German front. In German East Africa, the government had at least one advantage over the British: they possessed a determined general, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck who was familiar with the terrain and clear about his objectives (to draw the British into pitched battles and to divert British resources away from other fronts).¹³ Nearly 165,000 Africans participated in the WWI with the Carrier Crops and many others in the regular military units. In the process, “Africans became more aware of themselves as a distinct racial group; they discovered the weaknesses and heterogeneity of the white men and, even more crucial, they learnt the importance of organised resistance … By 1918, the African was restless.”¹⁴ The Europeans who came out to Kenya to take part in the colonial administration had also been changed by their experience of the Great War. European nations were forced to admit the value of African colonies, which they had become more dependent upon by the war’s end. If the war helped to unite Africans and give them a greater confidence, it birthed a level of self-doubt in Europeans.¹⁵

In the inter-war period Kenya experienced notable transitions. The District Commissioners who were recruited largely from the military between 1919 and 1924 were succeeded by new officers who had gone through the Tropical Administrative Service course at Oxford. There was a change in emphasis from ‘fire in their bellies’ to intellectual competence and personal empathy by the 1930s.¹⁶ Despite this, Kenya continued to be run largely on what Bethwell Ogot called the dual tracts of ‘separate

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¹² Ibid., 856, 867-69.
¹³ For additional information about WWI in East Africa, see: Ingham, *A History of East Africa*, 245-60.
¹⁴ Ogot, “Kenya under the British,” 268.
development’ based on racial and ethnic distinctions, and a society that was segregated in many areas of life.\textsuperscript{17}

The Depression of the 1930s encouraged Britain to accelerate trade with her colonies. The world’s reliance on African raw minerals increased even after the effects of the Depression eased; in the late 1930s Africa produced 16 percent of the world’s copper and 12 percent of its tin.\textsuperscript{18} The British government hoped to build Kenya’s economy on agricultural exports.\textsuperscript{19} The policy was slow to evolve, especially in the area of the ‘Africanisation’ of agriculture. As ‘trustees’ of African welfare the government sought to promote development, but for various reasons they had little success.\textsuperscript{20} There were two agricultural sectors in Kenya, described by some as ‘peasant’ and ‘plantation’ economies - the former referring to small scale, subsistence African farms and the latter, mainly to white settler farms before the 1930s. The government developed different approaches towards the two sectors and invested disproportionately in plantation agriculture in hopes of boosting exports.\textsuperscript{21} Despite the intentions of some government officials to change the system in the 1920s, the dual tracts remained largely in force into the 1930s.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, the 1920s are described by Robert Tignor as the golden age of the European plantation economy, with export crops such as coffee, sisal, maize and tea leading the field.\textsuperscript{23}

The political mobilization of Kenyans was clearly under way by the 1930s. Africans such as Harry Thuku had already blazed the trail, calling for social and economic justice. A Kikuyu Christian from Kiambu District, Thuku founded the Young Kikuyu Association and the East Africa Association, and agitated for the rights of his people against taxes, the kipande system, unfair wages, forced labour and the abuses of local headmen.\textsuperscript{24} By 1922, his rhetoric was felt to be a direct challenge to the government, including several prominent chiefs, and he was arrested on 14 March. A large gathering of people came to the prison where he was being

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{17} Ogot, “Kenya under the British,” 272-75.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{20} Kirk-Greene, Symbol of Authority, 10.
\textsuperscript{21} Ehrlich, “Economic and Social Developments before Independence,” 342.
\textsuperscript{22} Munro, Colonial Rule and the Kamba, 166.
\textsuperscript{23} Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya, 145.
\end{footnotesize}
held in Nairobi to protest. On the second day of the demonstration a contingent of
women, led by Mary Nyanjiru, stirred the crowd of nearly 8,000 into a heightened
state and there was a rush for the prison. The officer in charge of the police
apparently gave no order to fire, but when an askari fired, the others followed, killing
several protesters, including Nyanjiru.\footnote{Ibid., 313-15.}

Thuku was transferred to Kismayu to serve his prison sentence and other political organizations filled the void left by his
proscribed East Africa Association, including the Kikuyu Central Association among
the Kikuyu and the Young Kavirondo Association among the Luo and Luyia.\footnote{Ogot, “Kenya under the British,” 269.}

WWII impacted British colonialism deeply for it produced an atmosphere
where Britain realized that it must begin to listen more closely to the concerns of her
colonies.\footnote{Roberts, The Colonial Moment in Africa, 63.}
The Kenyans who participated in the war saw action in Abyssinia,
Madagascar and Burma and returned with money, knowledge of the world and

During the war many political
activities were curtailed by the government; the Ukamba Members Association, the
Taita Hills Association, the North Kavirondo Association and the Kikuyu Central
Association were proscribed. Forced labour on private farms occurred during the
war effort. These war measures were significant set-backs for indigenous rights;
African political leaders saw them as more evidence of the illegitimacy of British
rule.\footnote{Ogot, “Kenya under the British,” 281-82.} The Kenya African Union was established during the war with the intention
of representing all of Kenya. Three years later Jomo Kenyatta returned to the
country from abroad and took leadership of the organization.

The Mau Mau, as they came to be known, with ties to indigenous political
organisations, the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA), and the Kikuyu
Karing’ a Educational Association (KKEA), found many willing participants. The
oaths of the Mau Mau demanded active opposition to the government and other
supported many of the same political objectives as other political organizations on
land, communal labour, economic injustices, and the loss of Kikuyu culture;\(^{31}\) the Mau Mau, however, signalled an important shift in Kenyan politics towards the widespread use of violence.\(^{32}\) In August 1950, the Mau Mau was proscribed by the government, but reports continued to abound of oathings and gatherings, intimidation and violence. Few victims were willing to seek prosecution for these offences. Dozens of witnesses subpoenaed by the government in criminal cases were assassinated before testifying in court; twenty-four headmen were killed in 1950 alone. Teachers, missionaries, evangelists, and administrators also suffered greatly at the hands of the guerrillas.\(^{33}\)

Despite the proclamation of a state of emergency, the arrests of many prominent Mau Mau, the apprehension and ‘rehabilitation’ of many thousands of suspected members, and other ongoing government actions, the Mau Mau continued to pose a significant threat. Their ranks swelled to as many as 30,000 by 1953, with influence primarily among the Kikuyu, but also among the Kamba, Maasai and Kipsigis.\(^{34}\) In the months after the emergency was declared, thirty-five Kikuyu ‘loyalists’ were killed and eight European farmers. The government relied upon the Kings African Rifles, several British battalions numbering nearly 10,000, Kenyan police, Home Guard units and white reservists of over 40,000 in their counteroffensive.\(^{35}\) The Home Guard (later the Kikuyu Guard) units were comprised of ‘loyal’ Kikuyu. Building the Home Guard units was a slow process at first for the government wanted to be completely sure of the political orientation of recruits. Thus initially the Home Guard was largely symbolic in its significance, but over time they grew to thousands and performed important functions including the defence of the families of the loyalists who were often living in fortified villages around the missions and the shambas of chiefs.\(^{36}\)

By the end of 1953 the government saw signs of the weakening of the Mau Mau resistance. Several hundred insurgents had come out of the forests with green branches held aloft as a sign of their intention to surrender. Mau Mau membership

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 31.
was in steep decline from an estimated 6,000 at the beginning of 1955 to 1,500 by year’s end. The Kikuyu Guard killed General Matenjagua, captured General China of the Mount Kenya region, and repelled General Kago’s offensive in Kangema. Mau Mau forces experienced losses in Nyeri and witnessed spontaneous local uprisings to root them out. The great Mau Mau general, Dedan Kimathi was later killed by local police, putting the surviving bands on the defensive. The formal end to military operations was declared in November 1956. The uprising cost an estimated 13,500 lives: 11,503 Mau Mau, 63 European soldiers and police, 61 European and Asian civilians and 1,920 African ‘loyalists.’

In the final years of colonialism in Kenya two primary political parties led the way, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union, the former representing the interests of the Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba, and the latter mostly coastal ethnic groups. A watershed moment for KANU and the nation was the release of Jomo Kenyatta from prison in 1961. He was elected prime minister in the next election. The government finally made great efforts to train Africans to replace themselves as independence was felt to be eminent. The first four African District Commissioners in Kenya were appointed in 1962. Nearly one-third of the senior government posts were transferred to African administrators by independence in 1963 and the transition of the civil service was nearly complete two years after.

**The Government’s Encounter with AICs**

British colonies were not governed identically; there were, however, broad similarities between the various regions in Kenya. Four basic levels of the colonial government were generally present throughout the country: the secretariat, provincial and district tiers, undergirded by local African headmen or District Heads. Though they were the lowest in this hierarchy, District Heads have been described as the

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37 Ibid., 262-64.
40 Ibid., 294-5.
“hidden lynchpins of colonial rule.” They may have had limited official power, but there was ample opportunity to extend their reach in the local context. African intermediaries served as linguistic and cultural interpreters for Europeans, thus in a subtle way, they could manipulate and control the flow of information. Translation work was one example of an unequal exchange in African-European interaction because the latter was usually dependent upon the former. “Translation in colonial contexts was thus never an ‘innocent act’” because there were always opportunities for selective or misleading translations. European officials were removed from the local context and forced to rely upon Africans as sources of intelligence, thus opening another door for Africans to exert an influence. African rulers were generally given control over the organization of labour and collection of taxes, which allowed them to influence others and to enrich themselves. Benjamin Lawrence described the significance of African intermediaries in the following way: “In executing their duties as official representatives of the colonial state, these African employees consequently blurred colonial dichotomies of European and African … At the same time, these men created key intersections of power, authority and knowledge.” In the history of the encounter between AICs and the government, it is important to evaluate all levels of the colonial administration, not merely the district and provincial officials. This section will explore various responses to AICs from European and African officials and try to highlight the interaction between the various levels of government. The next section will take District Heads as the primary focus and try to draw out additional themes about how African officials in particular contributed to the encounter

The Arathi

The central government responded strongly to the Arathi, in large part, due to their habit of carrying bows, poison arrows and simis in the early years. While these were said by the Arathi to have symbolic and spiritual significance, they also

43 Ibid., 11.
46 The simi was a short double-edged sword carried by many Kikuyu.
had real-life applications as the incident in the Ndarugu Forest revealed. On 2 February 1934 the superintendent of the Kiambu Police and a party of policemen went into the forest in search of Njeroge wa Mukono who was accused of murder and was thought to be with a group of Arathi. The police were ordered to take the suspect alive, though they believed the armed men capable of resistance because of an incident the previous year. The police searched in vain for the party until they came upon a group of huts; when they began to search them, three Arathi (Nungara wa Karaha, Joseph Ng’ang’a wa Kiara and Samuel Muinami wa Njuguna) attacked the officers. The first of the three was killed during the skirmish and the other two died of their wounds in the hospital. One policeman, Assistant Inspector Coleman, was shot twice with arrows, but survived his injuries. Both this incident and the common site of armed bands of Arathi clearly influenced the way the government responded to the movement.

The government and Arathi approached each other with caution and sometimes antagonism prior to the incident in the Ndarugu Forest. There were two major periods of clash that took place in 1931 and 1934. Initially, the Arathi were secretive and their activities provocative to the government in Fort Hall, Embu and Kiambu Districts. Private meetings were often forbidden by the local administration because of their apparent policy of noncooperation. But many Arathi were defiant and ignored these orders. Local officials responded by issuing fines for meeting illegally. When these groups continued to meet in private, and to increase their furtiveness, the government responded in kind by arresting some of the organizers and members. The Kangema Local Native Court (Fort Hall District), for instance, sentenced eight Arathi leaders to six months imprisonment and the “lesser

lights” to two months on 27 March 1931.\(^5\) There was much discussion at the district and provincial level about the legality of restrictions on public gatherings and in the end it was determined that a headman could restrict the meetings of a particular group if there was good cause.\(^5\)

The early *Arathi* were considered quite ‘radical:’ politically, theologically, and socially. It was not just Europeans who held this view, but many Africans as well.\(^5\) This has been oversimplified by one scholar who stated that the animosity of the government towards the *Arathi* resulted from the demand of the *Arathi* for equality.\(^5\) Perhaps this reading of history touches on part of the truth, but it is too abstract and divorced from the historical context. As will be shown below, the early *Arathi* were marked by an isolationism that went hand-in-hand with adamant noncooperation, and even occasionally physical hostility. Thus, it was not simply equality that they sought, but a pure community, purged of foreign (and many Kikuyu) influences. They were, in a very real sense, antagonistic towards others. The reaction of Africans and government officials to the *Arathi* cannot be explained purely as the result of intolerance; certainly the more provocative aspects of the early history of this church must be considered as well.

The incident in the Ndarugu Forest was deemed significant enough for Governor J. A. Byrne to seek legal authority to deal with the potential threat. The District Commissioner Kiambu had issued orders to his headmen to deny the *Arathi* the privilege of carrying weapons at the end of 1933 (unless given special permission by the headmen); this order was premature and apparently illegal for such an order could only be authorized by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London.\(^5\) The Governor, soon thereafter, made a request to be granted these powers. He sought to downplay the significance of the ‘arming of the Kikuyu’ and was pursuing these new powers primarily as a cautionary measure. Byrne requested permission from the Secretary to pass laws restricting the carrying of arms under Section 8 (d) and the

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\(^5\) M. R. R. Vidal to the Provincial Commissioner of Central Province, 30 March 1931. KNA: DC/FH/1/4.
\(^5\) Kamenyi, “Prophets (Aroti).”
\(^5\) Colonial Secretary, “Manufacture of Arrows at Ngangas Location, Kijabe,” to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 19 January 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (21).
manufature of weapons under Section 8 (i) of the Native Authority Ordinance, which were granted.55 With the new authority, S. H. La Fontaine wrote to the District Commissioner Kiambu that, “By these means I am confident that the movement started by the *Watu wa Mungu* will be smothered at its inception.”56

The government was spurred to action by headline-grabbing incidents, such as the incident in Ndarugu Forest.57 In most cases, the government responses to AICs were tentative half-measures rather than confident, comprehensive offensives (until the period of the Mau Mau). Their responses towards AICs were characterized by policy shifts. The example above is an exception. Orders were seldom passed down from the secretariat regarding AICs, thus most responses took place at the local, district, and occasionally at the provincial levels. But it is not enough merely to describe the government’s response to AICs on the policy level, for another factor was the difficulty in enforcing these policies.

There was not a panic in the administration, even as these rules were being sent out to headmen and Native Courts. One might even argue the opposite. While the new authorities were being issued to the local headmen, district officials were making light of the threat of the *Arathi*. The District Commissioner Kiambu questioned the veracity of reports that he was receiving from informants, such as Headman Nganga and Captain Anderson, about the widespread manufacture of weapons. “I do not think the situation in this location calls for any alarm,” he assured the Chief Native Commissioner.58 The District Commissioner Fort Hall, W. R. Kidd, reported that he had taken no action against the *Arathi* because he had not received any specific complaints about them during his tenure in the position.59 The new authorities were used with discretion and only given to some local headmen. For instance, Kidd gave the order to restrict private meetings of the *Arathi* to all the headmen in his district, he gave the order restricting the carrying of arms to Chiefs

55 J. A. Byrne to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 February 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (25).
58 District Commissioner Kiambu, “Unrest in Kiambu District,” to the Chief Native Commissioner, 23 February 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (24).
59 W. R. Kidd to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 29 March 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (44).
Kimani Thuo, Kagutha and Joseph Kangethe, and apparently, gave the order to restrict the manufacture of weapons to none of the headmen.\textsuperscript{60}

The ‘danger’ of the \textit{Arathi} was thought to have quickly past. In February, Kidd suggested that many of the leaders had become normally employed and that many of them had given up their beliefs.\textsuperscript{61} There was a continuation of this theme in the writings of District Commissioner Kiambu, H. E. Lambert in 1942:

The \textit{Arathi} of the present resuscitation of the sect differ in some particulars from their predecessors in that they do not go so far as did the latter in repudiating foreign institutions and foreign customs and manners. They wear clothes of foreign manufacture and they do not object to travelling by bus or bicycle or to the use of aluminum cooking-pots. But they still retain certain of the original antipathies. They rarely wear boots or shoes, buildings must be built of indigenous materials, and one of the precepts is that money is the root of all evil … The modern \textit{Arathi} do not carry bows and arrows for the symbolic destruction of evil spirits. The reason is that Authority forbids the carrying of arms. They do not, in so many words, refuse to do communal work.\textsuperscript{62}

Despite the reportedly good behaviour of the \textit{Arathi} after the Ndarugu Forest affair, the District Commissioner Kiambu wanted to keep the new laws in place in 1934: “The orders cause no hardship as anyone desiring to carry arms for the protection of his crops against game or for any other legitimate purpose can always obtain permission.”\textsuperscript{63} In April, seven \textit{Arathi} leaders were arrested for meeting illegally in Kiambu District, and then, according to the District Commissioner, there was little more heard from members of the church. He reasoned that “the punishment of a few members who started to hold meetings was sufficient to stamp it out.”\textsuperscript{64} Five were arrested in the Elburgon Area on the charges of illegally carrying firearms and vagrancy, with the maximum sentence being two months hard labour.

By 1935, the reports about the \textit{Arathi} were notable for their lack of drama. The Annual Report for Central Province described the movements of certain \textit{Arathi};

\textsuperscript{60} W. R. Kidd, “Watu wa Mungu,” to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 10 April 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (50).
\textsuperscript{61} W. R. Kidd to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 27 February 1934. KNA: DC/FH/1/4.
\textsuperscript{63} KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (21).
\textsuperscript{64} A. A. Seldon, “Kiambu District Annual Report,” 1934, KNA: DC/KBU/1/27.
fifteen leaders left Kiambu District and went to Muthambi Location in Meru, where they displayed no political activity and were “ready to obey all administrative orders.”65 Others left the Kijabe area to go to Chuka and some moved onto settler farms, but likewise continued to be ‘quiet’ and refrain from carrying weapons.66

In 1945, there were some conflicts involving the Arathi, but by the following year the District Commissioner Kiambu suggested a return to normalcy.67 The District Commissioner Meru attributed minor complaints to the Arathi that same year, but thought that they had not increased recently.68 And again in the Handing-Over Report for Kandara Division (Fort Hall District) the Arathi were mentioned as generally cooperative and unthreatening, and this despite experiencing growth. They did resist inoculations during a government drive, but when District Commissioner T. Garland ordered them to receive the treatment they reluctantly agreed to do so. Such anecdotes suggest a softening of Arathi attitudes towards the government and a decreasing isolation from Kenyan society generally.69 The government had deemed it necessary to take a strong stands against the Arathi in 1931 and 1934. The two underlying issues were the carrying of weapons and the refusal of Arathi to inform District Heads of their gatherings.

Indeed, there was apparently a desire to avoid prosecutions of the Arathi in later years. In 1938, Chief Josiah Njonjo advised the District Commissioner Kiambu not to arrest the Arathi for petty crimes. “…They will think they have power, and they will have a pig-head, and they will increase in number. If they are treated quietly they will see that they are of no great account and will decrease slowly in numbers.”70 This logic was also used several years later by P. Tomkinson, the Provincial Commissioner Central Province. A farmer named Mr. Bingley had written to Tomkinson with complaints about an Arathi labourer. His advice to Bingley was to avoid arresting or relocating the man as this would feed into a sense of persecution and possibly strengthen the resolve and unity of the movement.

68 District Commissioner Meru, “Watu wa Mungu,” to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 28 May 1946. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/3 (67).
70 Josiah Njonjo to the District Commissioner Kiambu, 19 January 1938. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/3 (44).
“Generally the policy has been not to take much notice of them,” he wrote, “otherwise they obtain free advertisement and rejoice in a persecution complex.” 71

The farmer was advised not to get rid of the Arathi man because of his religious affiliation. On this point, there was a parallel with how at least one official dealt with the Dini ya Roho in Nyanza. 72

After 1934, then, district and provincial governments seemed less preoccupied with the Arathi; when they were mentioned, it was largely to say that they were not causing serious problems. An important indicator of this new tone was the report made by H. E. Lambert on the Arathi in 1942, which has already been quoted above. The report was written by a man who was clearly seeking to understand the Kikuyu (He later wrote Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions). 73

The report was unique for its attempt to understand the movement in Kiambu, for its insights into the changes within the movement, and for its effort to establish a non-confrontational attitude towards the Arathi. He tried to explain the causes of the emergence of the Arathi and their ongoing success, a preoccupation of eminent scholars to this day. Lambert wrote:

> It is not immediately easy to understand why the Arathi attract so many followers. Perhaps the psychological background is simply a release reaction to the increasing complexity of life and the increasing competition for success in the new Kikuyu conditions. This may explain the Arathi’s partial return to the simple life, their repudiation of education, and their desire to avoid outside influences while at the same time bringing themselves to public notice and satisfying their egoism without great effort. A religious compulsion provides an adequate sanction for non-conformity with custom, ancient or modern. We should not find it surprising that some such attempt at release should manifest itself from time to time when we consider how very rapidly a new and much more complex economic system requiring a more exacting struggle for existence... 74

Lambert thought that the Arathi emerged as a psychological response to the complexities of colonial Kenya and the desire to return to an earlier time. They also may have emerged as an easy way to satisfy their own desires for advancement. In

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regard to the relationship with the government, the young generation of *Arathi*, according to Lambert, did not officially flout government authority as evidenced by the fact that they no longer carried bows and arrows. Nor did they explicitly refuse to engage in communal work, but he thought they did subtly resist such activities through clever use of theology. On the one hand the *Arathi* professed complete willingness to obey the state, but on the other hand asserted that they must always follow the directives of God. Part of what made this theology so ingenious, according to Lambert, was that it was the perfect moral defence for minor disobediences.

They render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s. But there is some difference of opinion between them and Authority as to which is which. When, for instance there is communal work to be done in one place the *Arathi* are led by the Holy Ghost to visit another. The dictates of Authority, in fact, must be obeyed until they differ from the directions of the Holy Ghost, in which case the latter must prevail. Up to now the Holy Ghost would rarely appear to have seen eye to eye with Authority … Nothing, the Arathi say, may be permitted to prevent *Murathi*’s obedience to the direction he has received from the Holy Spirit, and if any person (a Chief for instance) puts any obstacle in the way he is liable to be hurt. If anyone is killed in such a case the Murathi marks the sign of the Cross in blood on the deceased’s forehead and all is then well (with the Murathi). It is said that such talk induces the unsophisticated to part with money on demand and to take no action for the recovery of girls who go undowered to the leaders of the cult … However that may be there is no doubt that the people concerned could scarcely have chosen a more effective method of self protection from the normal consequences of non-cooperation with Government and their tribe than that of justification by faith.\(^75\)

Lambert believed that *Arathi* theology was a response to the colonial situation and allowed them to resist the government in a manner that was very effective because officials could not publicly chastise them for obeying the dictates of the Holy Spirit. Open opposition from the government would have likely elicited resounding claims of religious persecution. It is not possible to speculate in this study about the motivation for this theology and thus one can only assume that it was born of genuine

\(^{75}\) Ibid.
religious belief. One of the benefits of this theology, however, was that it enabled them to resist aspects of colonial rule.

What was unique about Lambert’s report was the attempt by an official to analyse the *Arathi* at length in writing. At the end, he made no attempt to propose a specific response. Lambert appeared to be genuinely interested in the *Arathi* and to present views he had arrived at after some thought; he was by no means uncritical of the *Arathi* and his analysis possesses many of the biases against African movements of his time, but it cannot be described as hostile. Lambert’s report falls into that difficult middle ground that eludes simple classification.

The *Arathi* attitudes towards the government had apparently softened, but there was still some resistance to open cooperation. “During the [Mau Mau] Emergency some showed loyalty to the government, though not agreeing to take weapons. They said they would only pray that the government would overcome the terrorists, but not participate in the government’s efforts against them.”76 There was also a more relaxed attitude toward the *Arathi* at the provincial and district levels of government. This contrasts with the continued conflicts the *Arathi* experienced at the local level from other Africans.77 This was linked to the approach of the central government to empower local officials to deal with the *Arathi* as they thought necessary. The new authority to restrict the carrying and manufacture of weapons, the rule against unauthorized meetings of the *Arathi*, even the relocation of *Arathi* to their home locations were measures generally enforced by headmen. With the general lack of European actions against the *Arathi* after 1934 this became increasingly clear.

In review, the history of the encounter between the *Arathi* and European government officials was as colourful and conflicted as virtually any of the AICs in this study, with one exception: the *Arathi* as a movement was never proscribed by the government during the Mau Mau Emergency, while several other AICs were. Despite the fact that many within the government did not view the *Arathi* ‘positively,’ they nevertheless did exhibit a degree of restraint. With the exceptions of 1931 and 1934, the relationship between European officials and the *Arathi* cannot be described as purely hostile. As with Lambert, most officials occupied the middle

76 Kamenyi, “Prophets (Aroti),” 2.
77 See the next section for more on this point.
ground. There were many in the government who could be described as non-confrontational towards the Arathi. Generally, there was a hesitancy to act decisively against religious movements, and a tendency to downplay hypothetical threats. Indeed, there were some who criticized the government for their lack of decisive action against certain AICs in Kenya, including the Arathi.

The African Brotherhood Church

The government assumed control of the African Brotherhood Church schools and closed some of its churches in Kitui during the Mau Mau crisis. In the early 1950s evidence surfaced linking John Kivati, an important African Brotherhood Church member, to the Mau Mau at Kathithymaa. David Sandgren downplays the political side of the movement and instead places the emphasis on reactionary Europeans who assumed that any independent church was nationalistic. This is only partially true, or initially true; administrators frequently wondered about the political leanings of independent churches, but they did not unanimously or indefinitely hold such beliefs unless there was a steady flow of ‘evidence’ to support the claim. Sandgren’s portrayal of the government follows a greater trend among scholars: while he interprets examples of African Brotherhood Church political activity as the exception, here he apparently interprets examples of government opposition as the rule.

African Brotherhood Churches and schools in Kitui were closed during the Mau Mau crisis. In November 1952, Bishop Nathan Ngala, of the African Brotherhood Church Mitaboni (Machakos), sent a second letter to the District Commissioner Kitui about the unexpected closure of their church at Mumbuni. He protested the closure of the church because he was not warned personally, neither

78 A downplaying of the Mau Mau threat was apparent prior to the crisis, especially in the way intelligence reports were processed. This delayed the government’s response. This sort of dynamic also seems to have played a role in the way the government responded to the Arathi and their unwillingness to proscribe the movement. Trench, Men who Ruled Kenya, 219-20.
81 The African Brotherhood Churches from Kitui District were associated by local officials with Mau Mau oaths, activities of the Kenya African Union, and an attack on Chief Kasina. R. J. Hickson-Mahony to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, 28 February 1958. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (53a).
was he given any sort of guidelines from the government as to exactly how the church could avoid closure.\textsuperscript{82}

There was also some trouble with the African Brotherhood Church at Kisekeni over the matter of illegal gatherings. The District Commissioner Kitui, M. O. S. Hawkins, warned the members of this community not to gather unless the meeting had been approved by the local administration, but they ignored the admonition.\textsuperscript{83} A month later, Ngala attempted to be compliant and visited the District Commissioner to give him information on the leadership of the church, including the names of prominent members: Onesemas Wambua, James Mwanzia, Stephen Muindi, Benjamin Munyasya, and Samson Mutyambai. “Not … one of these men have a bad report.”\textsuperscript{84} Though he admitted that some people in the church saw the African Brotherhood Church as a political organization, he deprecated the idea and committed himself to trying “to stop the matter which can bring disorder in those people.”\textsuperscript{85} In later correspondence he seemed to imply that these men were the ones who were politically active.

The following year, on 25 September, all African Brotherhood Churches in Kitui District were closed by the District Commissioner. Ngala protested against the action saying, he had been in the district for seven years, and “there are no rules of the government or the Assistant District Commissioner which I refused.”\textsuperscript{86} He felt innocent in the matter of political associations with the Mau Mau; “I am no partner with all men who are no good.”\textsuperscript{87} He conceded that possibly some members of the African Brotherhood Church were associated with the Mau Mau, saying, “and if the Churches of African Brotherhood Church have those men who are bad, they must be captured and they may be charged of according to their badness.”\textsuperscript{88} The government should deal with the ‘bad’ elements in the African Brotherhood Church, Ngala asserted, but it was a grievous mistake to close all African Brotherhood Churches, to

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{82} Minister in Charge to the District Commissioner Kitui, 30 November 1952. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (14).
\textsuperscript{83} M. O. S. Hawkins to the ABC Church Kisekeni, 8 November 1952. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (11).
\textsuperscript{84} Minister in Charge, “African Brotherhood Church, Kitui,” to District Commissioner Kitui, 24 December 1952. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (16).
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Minister in Charge, “ABC Kitui District,” to the District Commissioner Kitui, 10 November 1953. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (28).
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
throw the baby out with the bathwater. Ngala stated his belief that the government had the power to extract the ‘bad’ elements from the African Brotherhood Church; the fact that they chose to close all African Brotherhood Church churches in Kitui, he thought, proved that they really wanted to get rid of the whole church, not just the ‘bad’ elements.

Ngala’s suggestion was probably not very realistic, especially in the midst of the Mau Mau crisis. It is not likely that the government could have carried out such actions with surgical precision, unless Ngala himself identified the ‘bad’ elements; and it is still less likely that Ngala and the government would have agreed on which elements were ‘bad.’ Ngala’s statements are important, however, because they reveal an inflated belief in the power and reach of the government. The government rarely had the wherewithal to make such judgements with any accuracy. The reality was usually that the government was starved for intelligence and when such actions were taken they were greeted with vehement protests about the innocence of the accused. But Ngala’s underlying belief in a substantially more powerful colonial government is important in understanding the way AICs viewed government responses. Ngala appears to have believed in the duplicity of the government, that despite their public claims, they were privately working for the downfall of AICs. Intellectually, this found a parallel in the long-standing belief in the duplicity of missions; quite literally around the world, indigenous groups were convinced that missionaries withheld the true source of Christianity’s power. In application, this often meant that AICs did not accept government explanations as honest and sincere, but looked for hidden motives and objectives.

Historians should be cautious about accepting all assertions along these lines. As it currently stands in colonial scholarship, the notion of governmental duplicity is widely accepted, with little discussion about what constitutes evidence. This assumption is so common that Thomas Spear describes it as an ‘ahistorical cliché.’ And in the case involving Ngala, there is little indication from government sources that they opposed the African Brotherhood Church in Kitui for any other reason than the political involvements of certain members. The existence of such divergent

90 Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention,” 4.
interpretations of events was common, as has already been discussed in chapter three regarding the *Roho*, and helps to explain the inherent distrust of the government. The fundamental belief in an all-powerful government together with an adamant conviction about the duplicity of white administrators and missionaries are key ingredients in AIC opposition narratives. And opposition narratives are ubiquitous in colonial documents and oral histories. One can, therefore, expect to find in some AIC histories negative experiences combined with imagined motives and the belief in the hidden actions of powerful government and mission officials.

Ngala was unable to make progress with the District Commissioner by 1954 and decided to appeal to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, to allow the churches of Kitui to reopen.\(^91\) He sent a copy of the letter to the District Commissioner Kitui, R. A. M. Birkett, who responded frankly, “You already know the security aspect … of this body in this district. I should strongly oppose any resuscitation of the African Brotherhood Church here.”\(^92\) But the Bishop was persistent. In October, he wrote again to the District Commissioner Kitui, reiterating his willingness to abide by government rulings. “I kindly ask you to call on me that you may explain in detail what is acceptable and what is wrong.”\(^93\) There was no reply, so Ngala wrote to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, recounting the history of the African Brotherhood Church in the district and candidly detailing his disappointment with the District Commissioner Kitui.

When I went to the District Commissioner’s office he told me that he stopped the meetings because African Brotherhood Church members did not agree with the laws of the Kenyan government but when I asked him which laws we disagreed with he could not tell me and instead of telling me to see the District Commissioner of Machakos District who is my District Commissioner … I being under you Sir, and thus under our Gracious Queen Elizabeth II and wholly agreeing with all the laws, rules and regulations of the country concerning the Kenyan government cannot understand why I should be stopped from continuing with my career and service to my people.

\(^91\) Minister in Charge, “ABC in Kitui,” to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, 2 April 1954. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25.
Again, he sent a copy to the District Commissioner Kitui and the unflattering portrayal elicited a vehement response. Birkett penned a reply to the Provincial Commissioner on 6 January 1955. He explained his side of the encounter, stating that the three plots in the district that had been granted to the African Brotherhood Church (Mui, Mulango and Migwani) had not been developed in the requisite twelve month period. In the case of Mulango, “the minister in charge was advised to find a suitable site three miles or more from the Africa Inland Mission Mulango and to submit an application to the African District Council. He has not done so.” In regard to the personal allegation by Ngala that Birkett could give no answer to his query about the laws broken by the African Brotherhood Church, he responded, “Para. 3 of the letter under reference shows a fine disregard for what transpired. The minister in charge was advised to see the District Commissioner, Machakos about registration under the Societies Ordinance.” He then stated that all the many applications from the African Brotherhood Church were forwarded to the chiefs and Local Native Councils. “Senior Chief Kasina reported that in the African District Council it was agreed that no religion was wanted in Kitui unless it had a European leader or supervisor in the district.” Birkett concluded that there was nothing stopping the African Brotherhood Church from applying for plots, but based on the position of the council, their chances were not good.

This is an important example of how local officials were involved in the experience of AICs. In this case, the Local Native Council seems to have been the gatekeepers prohibiting the re-entrance of the African Brotherhood Churches into Kitui. Whether or not the role of African officials was known to Ngala is unclear, but based on this evidence, Ngala put the blame squarely on Birkett, while Birkett suggests that he was merely supporting the decision of the Local Native Council.

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95 R. A. M. Birkett to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Province, 6 January 1955. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (35).
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
The closing statement of Birkett’s letter revealed that another underlying issue for the government was the apparent unwillingness of the African Brotherhood Church leaders to register with the government. What they wanted, according to Birkett was not a plot of land, but the freedom to meet wherever they wanted. Because of the history of religious groups in close proximity clashing (going back to the mission churches), there was a long established tradition of the government regulating all religious bodies by stipulating a minimum distance between competing churches, so as to keep the peace. The government, for its part, considered these fair regulations, not intended to be a specific restriction on AICs, but there is evidence in this case to suggest that Ngala interpreted it that way. This restriction and the registration process may have been lumped together with other sorts of negative interaction with the local government by Ngala. It may have seemed to him as if officials were conspiring against the African Brotherhood Church. But from Birkett’s point of view, the mandatory distances between competing churches and the rulings of the Local Native Council were separate issues.

Ngala continued his efforts to convince local headmen to alter their position on the African Brotherhood Church. In 1957, he wrote to the new District Commissioner, R. J. Hickson-Mahony, stating that he had received a plot of land from the Local Native Council. He sent Pastor J. M. Simu to begin the work in Kangundo where the District Commissioner was invited to attend a meeting, and to inform Simu about how to avoid closure in the future.98 The Local Native Council, however, informed Hickson-Mahony that it had rejected the application of the African Brotherhood Church.99 Chief Mumo of Nzambani Location stated his opposition explicitly, “The first time they wrote to me, I [Mumo] informed you [Hickson-Mahony] that I had no church for them, and I trust that you told them. I cannot, therefore, see why they have requested the same thing on the understanding that you informed them that there is no chance.”100 In February, the pastor in charge of Kangundo wrote again to Hickson-Mahony, “I am still waiting [for] your letter

98 Minister in Charge to R. J. Hickson-Mahony, 24 January 1957. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (39).
100 Gideon Mumo to the District Commissioner Kitui, 28 January 1957. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (41).
according to what we have agreed while I was with you in your office.”

Unfortunately, no record exists relating what was discussed, but clearly the District Commissioner was mediating a local conflict between the African Brotherhood Church and the Local Native Council. Hickson-Mahony scrawled the following instructions to his subordinate across the bottom of the pastor’s letter: “Gideon [Mumo] says that the Locational Council do not want these people. The African Brotherhood Church says that Gideon is not reporting the wishes of the Locational Council. I said I would look into it. Could you find out from elders of the Locational Council next time you are there what the position is?” Thus the continuing opposition to the African Brotherhood Church in Kitui arose, not from the district and provincial governments, but from a local official, Chief Gideon Mumo, or possibly from the Local Native Council.

It is natural to think that local African officials had little effect on local politics because they were under the oversight of European officials who could essentially control them if they wished. In cases such as this one, however, it seems clear that local officials were the sources of opposition to AICs. It is unlikely that one could understand the difficulties of the African Brotherhood Church in Kitui without some recognition of the role of African leaders. In the words of Hickson-Mahony, “The Locational Council is dead against the sect and have so far refused to set aside a plot for a church.” He thought that the reason the Local Native Council continued to reject African Brotherhood Church applications for land grants was related to “trouble that occurred in the past” wherein Chief Kasina was “attacked” by members of the church.

In the course of the next several months, it came to Hickson-Mahony’s attention that the African Brotherhood Church had made an application to the Christian Council of Kenya (CCK) and that it was being seriously considered. Hickson-Mahony wrote a letter of enquiry to the Council asking for their position on

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101 Pastor in Charge at Kangundo to the District Commissioner Kitui, 21 February 1957. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (42).
102 Ibid.
104 R. J. Hickson-Mahony to the Pastor in Charge of Kangundo, 8 April 1957. KNA: DC/KITUI/3/7/25 (43).
the African Brotherhood Church. The secretary of the Council, Alec McIver, told Hickson-Mahony about the meeting to discuss the application, which took place on 16 July in Machakos. It was attended by the Gospel Furthering Fellowship, the Africa Inland Mission, the Anglican Church, the African Brotherhood Church and other leaders of the CCK. Though the final vote on the application of the African Brotherhood Church would not take place until the annual meeting, McIver believed they would be accepted on a probationary basis.\(^{106}\) This information must have been a revelation to Hickson-Mahony and there is evidence that it altered the way he viewed the situation in Kitui. The government could not be seen to oppose a member of the CCK without attracting public ridicule. By January 1958, Hickson-Mahony, as mediator between the local government and the African Brotherhood Church, contacted Onesemas Wambua of Kitui informing him that they had been granted permission to meet in the British Legion Hall, as long as they did not meet the same hour as the Roman Catholics.\(^ {107}\) While this was a victory for the African Brotherhood Church, it was a qualified one, for the Local Native Council agreed to allow them to meet, but did not grant them a plot of land.

The government’s role in the life of the African Brotherhood Church was not limited to Kitui, or to the emergency actions taken in the 1950s. When there was a succession struggle between the church’s founder, Simeon Mulandi, and the current Bishop, Nathan Ngala, the government was asked to mediate the conflict. In June 1951 Mulandi gave control of the African Brotherhood Church to Ngala when his extra-marital affairs came to light. Ngala had been Mulandi’s right-hand man and was a fitting successor, but a portion of the church remained loyal to Mulandi and pressured him to return to the head of the church.\(^ {108}\) Eventually they succeeded and in 1952 Mulandi attempted to regain his former position. In the ensuing struggle, both factions of the African Brotherhood Church sought the mediation of the government, hoping for official support. The District Commissioner Kitui, ruled (though it was not binding) against Mulandi because he had sought to regain control


\(^{108}\) “The African Brotherhood Church,” 149.
through unconstitutional means, thus Ngala was the legal head of the African Brotherhood Church.\textsuperscript{109} The church council arrived at the same conclusion and ruled in favour of Ngala.

AICs frequently sought the mediation of government officials in internal conflicts. Thus the views of many AICs towards the government were not characterized by an absolute denial of its authority. They saw a legitimate, though limited, role for the government in their churches. Most independent churches also sought the official recognition of the government and the social prestige that accompanied it. In other words, while AICs where known to be fiercely protective of their independence, at other times they sacrificed a measure of it for specific reasons.

**The African Independent Pentecostal Church and the African Orthodox Church**

Government documents do not always distinguish between the African Independent Pentecostal Church (AIPC) and the African Orthodox Church, using the term ‘independent church’ for both. Since it is not always clear which body the government is referring to, they will be discussed together in this section. The AIPC, in particular, also suffers in the government sources from being outshone by the educational wing of the organization, the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA), which will be discussed below in the section entitled “The Government Response to Independent Education.”

The initial government investigations into the ministry of Archbishop William Daniel Alexander were favourable, reporting in Fort Hall that, “his presence was beneficial to the peace of his district.”\textsuperscript{110} The Central Province Annual Report, however, worried that he may build a massive following, leaving them stranded when he returned to South Africa, allowing the movement to deteriorate “into something that will do infinite harm to its followers…”\textsuperscript{111} Thus, at this time, it was not Alexander’s presence that worried the Provincial Commissioner, but his eventual departure. By the following year, a little cynicism crept into the Commissioner’s analysis. He assumed the independent church sprang from the same roots as the

\textsuperscript{109} Sandgren, “Kamba Christianity,” 188-90.
\textsuperscript{111} “Annual Report – Central Province,” 1935.
independent schools movement, a desire for a “community to stand on its own legs in education and religion.” This being the case, it was likely, he thought, that many of the members of the African Orthodox Church joined for political not religious reasons. The District Commissioner Fort Hall, D. O. Brumage, suggested that the excitement surrounding the Bishop’s visit had passed by 1936, the number of baptisms were markedly down, as well as the fees which sustained him in Kenya. Brumage also noted that Alexander was at loggerheads with the leadership of the KISA. The following year “undignified” quarrels between Alexander and the KISA ended in schism and he returned to South Africa, according to intelligence reports (in reality the KISA had never joined the African Orthodox Church). According to the Provincial Commissioner’s intelligence reports, it was the desire for personal gain that caused the rupture. “The main cause of the schism is the desire of the leaders of the Independent Schools Association to obtain control of the substantial funds of the church; and the new African Pentecostal Church with which they are identified had been formed with this object.” The distinction between governmental perspectives and responses was evident, however. Despite the trend toward more negative perspectives about the independent church, at the 1937 meeting of the District Commissioners of Central Province, it was decided that “As the position was quiet, no action was necessary.” That is, negative perspectives did not necessarily translate into negative responses.

In Nyeri, the Church of Scotland Mission (CSM) superintendent, A. R. Barbour, of Tumutumu protested to the District Commissioner against the marriages and baptisms conducted on settler farms by the African Orthodox Church’s evangelists, ‘Harrison’ (possibly, Harrison G. Ngari) and Philip Wamagu. He resented the targeting of CSM schools and churches for physical attack, political propaganda, and spiritual conversion. The District Commissioner North Nyeri agreed to begin watching the African Orthodox Church, but he did not condemn the

116 There was a similar complaint for ‘illegal baptism’ conducted by the ‘Dini ya Ruanda’ in Fort Hall District. “Interview of Mukaru Muthuria, Njai Gitaigwa and Ngugu Muchiri, with Chief Ignatio and Reverend Samwel,” 9 September 1952. KNA: DC/FH/1/4 (41).
117 A. R. Barbour to the District Commissioner North Nyeri, 7 March 1938. KNA: DC/NYI/2/3/3 (39).
movement as a whole.\textsuperscript{118} In fact he praised these AIC churches for their effort to build churches separately from their associated schools. “Such an attitude, I consider, is in the best interest of education and if it could be more widely followed amongst the established denominations, a source of friction could be avoided.”\textsuperscript{119} This was not the only time the government praised AICs for correcting a deficiency of the mission churches.\textsuperscript{120}

The District Commissioner South Nyeri, F. G. Jennings, did his part to encourage the establishment of such churches, at least in so far as he advised Harrison G. Ngari about the best way to secure permission from the Local Native Council to establish an African Orthodox Church. “If you and the elders of the African Orthodox Church want a place to hold services, the best thing to do is to find some member who is willing to allow you to build a church on his land and submit an application to the Local Native Council.”\textsuperscript{121} There had been some ‘trouble’ between the African Orthodox Church and members of the Local Native Council, so Ngari asked the District Commissioner to submit the application to the council on his behalf.\textsuperscript{122} It is unclear what role the District Commissioner played, but the following year, they were given four plots of land in Nyeri.\textsuperscript{123}

The central government continued to track the major changes of these two churches as best they could. The relationships remained largely cordial in government sources into the 1940s. The Annual Report of Embu District for 1942 had a short entry on the AIPC; the author briefly stated that “the adherents are very well behaved and show signs of gaining some ground.”\textsuperscript{124} The following year the District Commissioner reported that they practiced their religion “giving offence to no one.”\textsuperscript{125} In 1945, the Provincial Commissioner reported a growing ‘political mindedness’ in Central Province, but countered, “otherwise they were quiet and law

\textsuperscript{118} District Commissioner North Nyeri to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 21 March 1938. KNA: DC/NYI/2/3/3. F. G. Jennings to Philip Wamagu, 22 July 1939. KNA: DC/NYI/2/3/3 (55).
\textsuperscript{119} “Annual Report - Central Province,” 1938.
\textsuperscript{120} “Handing Over Report Kandara Division – Fort Hall District,” 1956 KNA: DC/FH/2/2.
\textsuperscript{121} F. G. Jennings to Harrison G. Ngari, 3 February 1938. KNA: DC/NYI/2/3/3 (36).
\textsuperscript{122} Harrison G. Ngari to the District Commissioner South Nyeri, 1 March 1938. KNA: DC/NYI/2/3/3 (37).
\textsuperscript{123} J. H. Flynn, “To whom it may concern,” 3 July 1939. KNA: DC/NYI/2/3/3 (57).
The ‘turning’ of the AIPC from a strictly Christian to a ‘neo-traditionalist’ church occurred around 1952, according to F. D. Corfield. He believed that they succumbed to the influence of Githunguri Teacher Training College, Jomo Kenyatta and the Mau Mau (not all scholars agree with this analysis, of course). This was typified, he thought, by the worship of the original ancestors Gikuyu and Mumbi, the hymns to Kenyatta, and the oaths, which were ‘repulsive’ to Christian and Kikuyu traditions. During the Mau Mau emergency, the AIPC and the African Orthodox Church were banned in Central Province after it had been discovered that they had ties to the uprising.

**The African Israel Church, Nineveh**

Walter Sangree described the African Israel Church Nineveh as the AIC with the best reputation with the government in Nyanza, due in large measure to the orientation of Zakayo Kivuli. Five years after its inception the African Israel Church Nineveh (AICN) was experiencing opposition from local government officials in central Nyanza. It had come from the Maragoli-Teriki area around 1945 but the Local Native Council had staunchly opposed all applications for schools and churches. The experience of the AICN in Central Nyanza District was, like so many AICs, influenced greatly by African officials. The District Commissioner Kisumu, for his part, declared that “the sect has caused me no trouble,” but he was told by an African informant named Mr. Omino that they were opposed by powerful local individuals because they “tend to cause trouble over women.” The Provincial Commissioner Nyanza was amenable to the AICN as well. He wrote to Kivuli in 1947, “I have no objection to your continuing the activities you enunciated in your first paragraph in North Kavirondo and Central Kavirondo, provided that the Local Native Councils agree.”

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130 Ibid.
Zakayo Kivuli fostered relationships with government officials and depended upon them for personal references when he sought to expand his operations. An example of this was Kivuli’s relationship with K. L. Hunter, who occupied positions in the district and provincial governments at various points in his career. The exact nature of their relationship is not clear, but on one occasion, Kivuli asked for, and received, two personal recommendations from Hunter. These official letters were professional, and at times a little guarded, but the fact that Hunter wrote them for Kivuli is by itself meaningful. In 1950, Hunter wrote to the District Commissioner South Nyanza at Kisii:

I have known Zakayo for about nine years now, and I have always found him loyal and helpful. When he started his religion he reported to me while I was the District Commissioner, North Nyanza, saying that he had a difference of opinion with his missionary, Mr. Kellum of the PAC [Pentecostal Assemblies Church] Mission and proposed to start his new church. I have visited his church from time to time and he visits me periodically. If I have any reason to doubt the loyalty of any member of his church I have always found him most helpful. In fact, I have no sort of reason to find any fault with his organization.

That same day Hunter sent a reference directly to Kivuli for his personal use. He wrote the following:

You have asked me for a testimonial before I leave this Province and I have pleasure in recording that I have known you over the last nine years, ever since you reported to me that you had had a difference of opinion with Mr. Kellum, your Pentecostal Assemblies Church Missionary, on some church policy and had decided to secede form the Mission and start your own church under the style of ‘African Israel Church.’ I have always found you most loyal and cooperative, and whenever I have asked for your assistance in restraining any person or movement which claimed to be an adherent to your Church, you have always given me prompt and energetic assistance, and all such matters have been disposed of satisfactorily. I thank you for all your help.

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132 Welbourn and Ogot, *A Place to Feel at Home*, 84.
There were other examples of a cordial relationship with European government officials. At the height of the Mau Mau emergency, one government official interceded on the behalf of the AICN. The Assistant Inspector of Police of Njoro had arrested some members for preaching publicly without his foreknowledge. An AICN priest went to the District Commissioner Nakuru, D. G. Christie-Miller, and asked him to intercede on their behalf, which he was apparently quite willing to do.

These are people from North Nyanza District, well known to me, and are comparatively harmless. In the recent round-up I understand you arrested them all for holding a religious ceremony in the open without your knowledge. The High Priest came to see me and was most upset about this. I told him I would communicate with you, and that in the future the best plan would be for him to come and tell you when and where he proposes to preach in order that you can keep an eye on things. I warned him that should you disapprove of the meetings you would close them down.135

Despite these examples, the relationship was not always positive. In parts of Molo, they were barred after a series of three unauthorized, unruly public gatherings, which culminated in fisticuffs with members of the Salvation Army.136 The leader of AICN operations in Molo was, Joel Andanyi. District Commissioner J. A. Davis spoke disapprovingly of his activities after the aforementioned conflict came to his attention. “I am not very impressed with the African Israel manifesto ... I do not approve of public proselytization and would much prefer Mr. Andanyi to operate in his present area and keep out of mine.”137 His experience with the AICN had been limited and his perspective on them was formed by intelligence he received from certain local African informants. He stated, “I was merely informed by the local citizens that these parties had taken place and how on many occasions the man [Joel Andanyi] had appeared … On the last occasion when I was informed of the fight with the Salvation Army by the Home Guard, the police in Molo asked me whether I had

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135 D. G. Christie-Miller to the Assistant Inspector of Police Njoro, 9 November 1953. KNA: DC/NKU/2/49/1 (89).
given permission for this meeting. I had not...“138 The role of Africans as intermediaries of knowledge and their ability to manipulate the perspectives of government officials towards AICs was apparent in this correspondence.

Joel Andanyi protested to the District Commissioner Central Nyanza, G. G. M. Dowson, about the restrictions placed on the AICN in Molo. Dowson thought that the group was “harmless” and the District Commissioner North Nyanza regarded them as “peaceful, non-political and non-subversive.”139 Somewhat unusually, even the police supervisor of Nakuru stated, “the Dini ya Israel is not, and never has been dangerous,”140 though this did not stop him from keeping tabs on them.

This final example illustrates how the mere collection of intelligence by the government should not be confused with, or assumed to be, opposition. Here is a specific example of how a police officer believed that an AIC was of no danger whatsoever, yet persisted in his duty of collecting intelligence. This should caution scholars not to infer from the mere practice of intelligence gathering that the government was hostile, for it was a general, ongoing task. Annual Reports, in fact, were filled with intelligence reports on all manner of political and religious groups, including AICs and mission churches. The majority of these espoused no negative views.

For some reason the members of the AICN chose not to inform the local authorities in Londiani Location (Molo) about their meetings. (Andanyi told Dowson that he had been reporting every meeting to the local police, but because permission had been given verbally, local officials were at “great liberty to deny that I have been reporting all the time.”141) In 1956, the police discovered the ‘secret’ meetings. When Davis was informed about the gatherings he was disappointed but tolerant, which seems to stand out in contrast to his attitude the previous year; he encouraged the District Commissioner Central Nyanza not to press charges against the African Israel Church Nineveh.

138 Ibid. The emphasis has been added.
141 Joel Andanyi to the District Commissioner Nakuru, 3 June 1955. KNA: DC/NKU/2/49/1 (121).
I am not pleased with the people involved for holding a meeting (be it a religious one, or not) without permission from the Police, or from the Administration. But I believe they are genuinely sorry for having cost us a full day’s screening, and for having run the risk of jeopardizing their denomination’s name in such a manner. I would be grateful Sir, if these people keep their promise to abide by the Law, that we could drop this matter, and not place the church members involved before a court of Law.\(^\text{142}\)

Joel Andanyi renewed his efforts to keep the government abreast of his activities (if he was not already doing so) and when he wanted to arrange a meeting two months later, he wrote to the District Commissioner Nakuru directly.\(^\text{143}\)

**General Comments on the Encounter**

Some of the assertions about the government’s attitude towards AICs from scholars can only be said to be misleading and inaccurate, such as the scholar who summed up the encounter by saying that the government refused to recognize independent churches and strongly opposed AICs. He continued by saying that supporters of the mission and government were known to kill AIC members.\(^\text{144}\)

There were times, certainly, when the government did refuse to recognise certain AICs, or certain churches within an AIC, or a particular religious leader, but to make such a blanket-statement is simplistic to the point of being misleading. Such statements must be held up against the actual statements and actions of government and mission officials. With so much evidence throughout this thesis to the contrary it is difficult to maintain the credibility of such generalizations.

An additional consideration is the role played by AICs in creating or perpetuating a situation that increased the likelihood of government action.

Concerning the *Arathi*, for instance, there was initially a self-imposed isolation from society and a fundamental rejection of the local and national governments;\(^\text{145}\) this

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\(^\text{143}\) G. G. M. Dowson, “African Israel Church,” to Joel Andanyi, 10 July 1956. KNA: DC/NKU/2/49/1 (137).


\(^\text{145}\) According to one African informant a new *Arathi* member in Thika “…is not allowed to live in the village of his parents, nor is he allowed to visit it. He becomes an outcast of the tribe.” Assistant Superintendent of Police Thika, “Watu wa Mungu,” to the Commissioner of Police Nairobi, 9 August 1935. KNA: DC/FH/1/4.
ideological position likely contributed to their unwillingness to register with the government, an avenue to recognition. With transparent consternation, J. A. C. Reed, the District Officer Kandara Division (Fort Hall), referred to the reluctance of the Arathi, Dini ya Roho and African Israel Church Nineveh to register in 1959.146 “None of these others are registered and it is forbidden for them to hold meetings until they are registered. They have been told to register time without number. If they meet, the headmen prosecute them before the African Court for unlawful assembly.”147 Thus, Reed thought that much of the opposition towards these three AICs could have been avoided if they had only registered. According to him, they stubbornly refused to do so, even after it was made apparent to them repeatedly that it was the best way to avoid prosecution. Similarly, the Annual Report of 1942 for Embu District stated that “The [Arathi] followers refused to apply for permission to have a place of public worship, which would almost certainly have been granted to them by the Local Native Council, and they refused to attend barazas or obey orders of the chief.”148 Other individual independent churches also refused to register in certain locations.149

There were at least four kinds of interaction between the government and religious groups that may be referred to in discussions of registration. First, when missionaries and evangelists travelled around they were expected to register with the local officials and to keep them informed of their activities. Second, when a church was formed in a community, it was necessary to apply to the Local Native Council for a plot of land and register their church once it was granted. Third, if the church wanted to begin a school, it was required that they register it with the government. Fourth, a religious society was permitted to register with the government in Nairobi to gain official recognition.150 All religious groups were encouraged to deal with the

146 See also: W. F. B. Pollock-Morris to the Secretary of the African Israel Church Kisumu, 20 December 1959. KNA: DC/FH/1/4 (60).
government on these levels, so there does not appear to be overt discrimination against AICs in theory, though it was probably easier for more established churches to comply with these bureaucratic aspects of religion in the colonial context.\footnote{Welbourn and Ogot make this point. Registration was contingent upon allowing the government to examine your financial records, which was “a point of no small importance when church members are ignorant both of book keeping and of bureaucratic values.” Welbourn and Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home, 104.} \footnote{One group needed to travel fifty miles each week to get permission to meet. Permission was always given, but this was a considerable inconvenience. David P. Sandgren, Christianity and the Kikuyu, Religious Divisions and Social Conflict (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 93.} Even for those churches committed to these levels of interaction with the government such requirements could be a persistent nuisance.\footnote{J. Harrigan, “Management of Nomiya Luo Mission Schools,” to Petero Ouma, 16 March 1954. KNA: DC/KSM/1/10/45 (88). District Commissioner North Nyeri to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 21 March 1938. KNA: DC/NY1/2/3/3. F. G. Jennings to Philip Wamagu, 22 July 1939.}

It was possible, of course, for churches to exist without fulfilling these various responsibilities to the government. Indeed, ‘unregistered’ Christianity seems to have always been a part of colonial society. Local officials could choose to turn a blind eye to unregistered groups. On the other hand, an unfriendly headman could strictly enforce regulations, barring an AIC from working in a location for years. Other groups may have had political or theological reasons for not wanting to register, but generally speaking this was one source of ‘opposition’ which AICs had a degree of control over. There were times when needless barriers were placed before AICs who wished to register, but at other times AICs chose not to register. In these cases one can assume that there was something else at work; whether out of fear, ignorance, stubbornness, pride or some other reason, many AICs chose not to register with the government. The refusal to register surely had an impact on their experience in colonial Kenya, opened the door to chronic problems with the government, and contributed to the belief that the government had an interest in opposing AICs directly.\footnote{In the encounter one must also grapple with the ways that western-style bureaucracy was perceived by Africans and particularly AICs. The confrontations over registration probably hinged more on divergent beliefs about what constituted just, normal and necessary governance of religion than on overt attempts by hostile officials to eradicate African initiatives.}
Government responses to AICs in Kenya were tempered by the assumption of many officials that their birth and growth was a normal phenomenon.\textsuperscript{154} Intellectually this idea owed something to the assumption of some officials that Africans would not accept the ‘pure’ form of Christianity offered by the missionaries. Arthur de Champion, the District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, who had experience of AICs first in South Africa, responded to the Nomiya Luo Mission in the following way:

To my mind it is but a clear indication that the natives are unable to embrace the Christian religion as presented to them. As long as they are under the immediate influence of the European missionary they are stimulated but as soon as they become so numerous or scattered, that influence can be but a shadow, they search about and work out for themselves some form of bastard Christianity more suited to their mental and social development.\textsuperscript{155}

The assertion that AICs were a “bastard” Christianity will be offensive to many modern observers, but this bias did not necessarily mean that government officials were prepared to oppose them on this basis, for generally, they were more interested in law and order than ‘orthodoxy.’\textsuperscript{156} This was in operation, for instance, in the assessment of the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza regarding the Nomiya Luo Mission. Speaking to the District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, he stated, “They are, as you know, a heretical form of Christianity, but they appear to be quite constitutional, and do not, I think, at the moment present any problem.”\textsuperscript{157} And the same basic principle applied to the mission churches. The CMS mission would probably have been classified as among the most ‘orthodox,’ but it was nevertheless strongly criticized by one government official on account of their disorderliness in a certain location.\textsuperscript{158} The most accurate litmus test for how the government would respond to an AIC in Kenya was whether or not they were believed to be a threat to peaceful administration. Annual Reports revealed a particular concern for

\textsuperscript{154} Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, “Mr. Jones Handing-Over Report,” to the District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, 2 November 1929. KNA: DC/KSM/1/35/51.
\textsuperscript{155} Arthur M. Champion to the District Commissioners of North and South Kavirondo, 19 June 1929. KNA: DC/KSM/1/35/51.
\textsuperscript{156} Klein, “African Participation in Colonial Rule,” 275.
\textsuperscript{157} Provincial Commissioner Nyanza to the District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, 2 November 1929. KNA: DC/KSM/1/35/51.
movements that broke the law.¹⁵⁹ When the government sprang into action in response to AICs, it was usually because of a perceived threat to peace and order; when they resisted taking action it was often because there was no such threat.¹⁶⁰

Close to this desire for law and order, was the governmental concern for health and safety which was occasionally the basis for government restrictions on AICs. Conflict occurred, for instance, when the government sought to inoculate against certain diseases, which some AICs resisted on theological grounds.¹⁶¹

Another notable example occurred in 1930 in Nyanza when Elisha Adet, the leader of an off-shoot of the Nomiya Luo Mission, had a vision from God calling him to reside on the island of Chula Ndere in Seme Location; there he would commune with God and receive instructions. Unfortunately, the island was infested with the tse tse fly, the insect notorious for transmitting sleeping sickness. Access to the island was restricted by European doctors and local headmen, but Elisha routinely travelled back and forth to the island despite warnings. The conflict escalated when Elisha began to gather followers, and together they would go to live on the island. He was warned by the Assistant District Commissioner in May, but felt compelled by his beliefs to return to the island with his followers. In June, he was arrested along with four others by the local police and sentenced by the elders to six months imprisonment for disobeying government prohibitions over a period of several months. District Commissioner Boulderson pleaded with the rest of the members to remain on the mainland until the medical authorities had a chance to go to the island. “They refused to listen to reason saying they were in the hands of God. I have reluctantly

allowed them to become martyrs and they have been sent to Prison for two months under Section 8.”

This was a clash between the government’s moral responsibility to promote health and wellbeing, and the religious right of Africans to worship in freedom; such conflicts had no easy solutions. Certainly, the government’s desire to protect Kenyans from contracting sleeping sickness was commendable. However, actions like this, perhaps only partially explained to AICs, contributed to the narrative of government opposition.

The perceived instability of AICs, the lack of a single organizational structure in some cases, and the frequent schisms, had a debilitating affect on their relationship with officials. The three Arathi men killed during the incident in the Ndarugu Forest were said to be suffering from a ‘religious hysteria’ by District Officer, A. Seldon, because they “believed themselves to be immune from bullets.” The Superintendent of Police Nakuru, D. M. Stephens, was responsible for arresting five Arathi members in Elburgon area and made special note of their startling appearance. “All have a peculiar and wild facial expression and appear to be slightly deranged. Whether this is a result of their faith or whether they were previously unbalanced and so adopted the faith readily, is not known.”

A report on the Dini ya Roho in Northern Nyanza stated that they “appear to be ruled entirely by religious ecstasy.” The District Commissioner Central Kavirondo and the Superintendent of Police displayed a bias against AICs for similar reasons. The portrayal of African movements as unstable can be partially explained due to the negative views of many Europeans towards African culture. Another part of this was that officers were quite simply at a loss to explain what they were witnessing.

There were other factors which added to the view that AICs were unstable. The schisms and numerous splinter groups from certain AICs was an important

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163 This was clearly a factor in government interactions with the Nomiya Luo Mission. District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, “Branch of the Nomiya Cult,” to the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, 23 June 1930. KNA: DC/KSM/1/35/51.
166 “Holy Rollers – Watu wa Roho, Joroho, Wakambuli,” to the District Commissioner North Nyanza, 18 October 1940. KNA: DC/NN/10/1/3.
167 See the section below dealing with District Heads.
factor. At the gathering of district officials to discuss government policy towards the Nomiya Luo Mission schools on 12 August 1931, the tendency for schism was a point put forward against awarding them grants. District Commissioner McKeag suggested, “From its short history it is clear that this mission is running true to type – in ten years it had split up into two factions ... It is, I think, too much to expect that one or more further splits will not take place in the near future.”¹⁶⁸ McKeag’s rationale was that the government should not invest educational grants in institutions in turmoil.

The fluidity of church affiliation also contributed to a belief in the instability of AICs.¹⁶⁹ When an entire church shifted allegiance, it could have a direct result upon the government funding of the school associated with it, as was the case in Nyeri in 1941, when the church led by Jason K. Kamangara shifted allegiance from the KISA (and presumably the African Independent Pentecostal Church) to the African Orthodox Church. The educational grant was given to the KISA, not the African Orthodox Church or KKEA, thus he was forced to forfeit the funding.¹⁷⁰ Often these types of rulings based on technicalities, though in keeping with western ideas of governance, were interpreted by AICs as government opposition, as proof that the government would use any excuse to hinder an independent church.

Harry Thuku made tax grievances a cornerstone of his protests, as did the Kikuyu Central Association. Even missionaries were critical of the government’s tax structure.¹⁷¹ Taxes were also a great source of irritation for some members of AICs and a cause of conflict with the colonial government. Especially in the early years, several Arathi were known for not paying taxes as were some members of the Dini

A memorandum from members of independent schools to the Royal East Africa Commission in the 1950s, probably penned by Peter Koinange of the Githunguri Teacher Training College, discussed the injustice of the tax system for Africans who attended independent schools. These individuals were taxed, he argued, but instead of having revenues applied to the school they attended, grants were given to government and missions schools. The local community was forced to raise additional funds to support African-owned schools. Koinange believed that taxes should directly benefit their community of origin.

The role of the government in the experience of these AICs was not totally unsolicited. On a number of occasions independent churches sought the mediation and direction of government officials; few AICs surveyed here truly disdained the notion of government recognition - most sought desperately after it. In cases of mediation, the advice of government officials often had an impact on AICs. A number of cases involved petitions to the district and provincial governments for mediation in conflicts with the local administration, usually over land grants. Other cases involved internal conflicts within AICs that called for outside mediation, such as leadership struggles, property disputes, and constitutional disagreements.

One case involving a leadership crisis came to District Commissioner Kiambu, E. L. B. Anderson, from the board of the KISA school at Kahuguini, Ruiru. Kahuguini school was funded by a confederation of seven villages, each sending two voting members to the board. It was described by one District Officer as “by far the best private school I have so far inspected.” In December 1938, the chairman of the board, Simeon Kanyingi was accused of stealing 140 shillings of school funds by...
the delegation from Gathage village; they proposed that he be removed from his
position and Ibrahim Maina put in his place, and sought the aid of the district leader
of the KISA at Nyeri, a man named Johana Kunyiha. In addition to it being a dispute
between the villages of the confederation, it became a disagreement between a local
branch of the KISA and the district leaders of the KISA as soon as Kunyiha involved
himself. Because of the loose leadership structure of the KISA organization, the
Kahuguini board believed Kunyiha had no authority to arbitrate their dispute; they
argued that every school had the right to elect its own chairman. Kunyiha, on the
other hand, believed the district KISA leaders had the authority to end the crisis. He
sided with Gathage against the other six villages, but this only served to deepen the
discord, especially when he proposed that Ibrahim Maina be the new chairman.
When it was suggested that a vote be taken between the two candidates, Kanyingi
and Maina, the Gathage refused to participate because they were outnumbered and
would lose. Kahuguini school then asked for the mediation of Divisional Chief
Muhu huhu and Headman Kibathi, but when they proposed that Simeon Kanyingi
remain in his post till the end of his term, at which time a new election could take
place, the Gathage protested again.178

The district government was called upon when it became clear that the school
board had reached an impasse. The vice president of KISA, Hezekiah Gachui also
came to Kahuguini to argue the case for replacing Kanyingi. District Commissioner
Anderson’s response was that “if Simeon Kanyingi has used any money, they better
call him before the Tribunal Court to answer for any money used.”179 Kunyiha
wanted the government to enforce the ruling of the district KISA; in the meantime,
he locked the school and asked Anderson to arrest anyone who tried to open it.180
Gachui and Kunyiha continued to try to impose the chairmanship of Ibrahim Maina
on Kahuguini and pleaded with the District Commissioner to intervene on their side.
Anderson refused to do so, but determined that there must be a vote on the candidates
nominated by the board; Chief Muhu huhu and Headman Kibathi were present on 21
June when the vote was to take place, but Kunyiha pre-emptively tried to remove

1939. KNA: DC/KBU/10/2 (56).
179 Ibid.
180 Johana Kunyiha, “Kahuguini Independent School,” to the District Commissioner Kiambu, 21 June
1939. KNA: DC/KBU/10/2 (53).
Kanyingi’s name from the running before the vote could take place on the charges that he refused to obey KISA district authority. The six villages stated that his name could not be removed without greater cause. The meeting ground quickly to a halt and adjourned without result.

The conflict at Kahuguini, and the manner in which the regional KISA leaders were handling the case, according to J. M. Johnstone and Stephen Njimi, were “worrying nearly all independent schools in Kiambu District,” especially their attempts to contravene the electoral process. The controversy continued until July when Anderson stated that he would return to the school to rule on the case. Initially there was fear on the part of Ibrahim Maina about Anderson’s ability to mediate the situation. “Sir,” he wrote, “there is a saying in Kikuyu … a man who lives at the bottom of a tree is the one who can tell the food of the ants.” In other words, he was sceptical about the ability of the District Commissioner to understand the situation and to come to a reasonable conclusion. In the end, Anderson ruled that constitutionally, Kahuguini school was subject to the oversight of district leaders, thus it would have to abide by their ruling against Kanyingi. Despite his expressed fears, Maina was appointed chairman of the board.

Another example of AICs seeking the mediation of the government was a series of leadership disputes that took place within the Nomiya Luo Mission in Nyanza during the 1940s and 1950s. When Johana Owalo, the founder of the Nomiya Luo Mission, died in 1920, Petero Ouma of Asembo was appointed Bishop. By 1942, his position was being threatened by a man from Gem named Sulemani Onyando. On 6 July J. D. McKean, the District Commissioner Central Nyanza, arranged for a gathering of the Nomiya Luo Mission to vote on who should be bishop, with Chief Jairo as witness. Ninety adherents and hundreds of others gathered to witness the vote; the result was that fifty-five members and the entire church council voted to retain Ouma, thirty-five members from Gem voted for

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181 Ibid.
183 Stephen Kanyingi to the District Commissioner Kiambu, 11 March 1939. KNA: DC/KBU/10/2 (45).
184 Ibrahim Maina and Samueli Kihara [sic], “Kahuguini Independent School,” to the District Commissioner Kiambu, 28 June 1939. KNA: DC/KBU/10/2 (59).
Onyando. At the close of the meeting, McKean explained that the rules of the church were quite clear; Onyando must submit to the results of the vote or leave the mission, and the church council was within its rights to press charges against him in the Native Courts should he persist in his claim to the bishop’s seat.\textsuperscript{186} Onyando did leave the Nomiya Luo Mission, but returned to Asembo and according to his critics, began baptising individuals willy-nilly for a small fee in the name of the Nomiya Luo Mission (but claiming his authority from the African Orthodox Church). This elicited a severe response from Archdeacon Jona Ramogi and other representatives of the Nomiya Luo Mission on 13 January, which resulted in the investigation of District Commissioner Low.\textsuperscript{187}

This case was like others that took place between mission churches and AICs. Church power in the local context revolved, to a certain degree, around baptism. Unrestricted baptisms could be used as a weapon to undermine the authority of the church, when, for instance, an ex-member targeted his previous church. Church leaders questioned the legitimacy of the baptizer, in this case Onyando; with no official training or qualifications recognized by the Nomiya Luo Mission, he was an interloper and a profiteer.\textsuperscript{188} Thus, this case of an AIC protesting against the abuse of baptism is interesting because it so closely mirrors the responses of some mission churches to AICs in an earlier era.

District Commissioner Central Nyanza, H. H. Low, was sent to mediate the situation, but nothing was resolved according to the members of the church.\textsuperscript{189} After the church complained to Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, Low wrote a memorandum clarifying his ruling. After meeting with both sides on 20 January 1945, Low stated that “I was satisfied that the complaint brought against Sulemani Onyando was unfounded. It could not be proved that he used the name of the Nomiya Luo Mission for baptismal purposes nor could it be proved that he was

\textsuperscript{186} J. D. McKean, “Nomiya Luo Mission,” to the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, 8 July 1942. KNA: DC/KSM/1/10/45.
\textsuperscript{187} Jona Ramogi, W. Obilo [sic] and S. Adera, “Nomiya Luo Mission,” to the District Commissioner Central Nyanza, 30 September 1944. KNA: DC/KSM/1/10/45 (42).
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} B. M. Hasope [sic], “Nomia Luo Mission,” to K. L. Hunter, 22 January 1945. KNA: DC/KSM/1/10/45 (53a).
collecting money…” 190 Though he did suggest to Onyando that he would bring scorn upon his new church if he treated baptism in such a cavalier manner. 191

The memorandum quieted the controversy for a time. In 1950, however, the Nomiya Luo Mission was in the midst of another succession struggle which necessitated the involvement of the government – this time between Petero Ouma and Jona Ramogi. Some church members were discontent about Petero’s lack of wisdom, his unwillingness to listen to their desires and his use of church funds. 192 Allegedly, his response to criticism in the past had been to tell those who were unsatisfied to leave the church. He had also ‘unfairly’ fired Nomiya Luo Mission pastors from Gem Location, continuing the antagonism between church members from Asembo and Gem. A baraza was arranged on 30 May by Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, K. L. Hunter to vote on which man would be bishop of the movement, to be chaired by the District Commissioner Central Nyanza.

The initial attempt to resolve this issue by John Paul Olola, the President of the Ramogi African Welfare Association had not been successful five days earlier. It had been hurried and unrepresentative; approximately one hundred church members had been assembled, but Olola allowed all those present to vote, even members of other denominations, including Anglicans and Catholics. Furthermore, the meeting had been held in Asembo, the heart of Ouma’s powerbase. 193

At the baraza on 30 May, in neutral Kisumu, it also came out that, besides the regional and financial differences within the Nomiya Luo Mission, was the division about how to relate to the spirit of the founder, Johana Owalo. “The rule laid in the Church Council’s constitution is that whosoever shall be a Bishop must pray at Johana Owalo’s grave yard. Petero didn’t listen to this and intimated that as the

191 Ibid.
religion was his he could do as he liked.”  The members present voted and the result was that Ouma received a paltry twenty votes, to Ramogi’s fifty.  

This vote was conclusive, but Ouma obstinately refused to attend any further gatherings. He won the first vote which took place at Asembo under the chairmanship of John Paul Olola, and ignored the second vote which took place at Kisumu. Ramogi could not force Ouma to abide by the second vote, but he could appeal to the Provincial Commissioner. The Provincial Commissioner was reticent to force a ruling on the church, so the dispute continued to fester. The Nomiya Luo Mission under Ouma was haemorrhaging members over another financial scandal, which involved the Oboch Primary School, so his position in the church appeared to be weakening. Then in 1945 the name of G. Charles Owalo, the son of the founder (who was studying at the CMS Maseno Intermediate School) was put forward as an alternative to both Ouma and Ramogi. He was a man of good reputation and many saw him as a person that could heal the ailing church. In August Ouma died, which seemed to District Commissioner Watts to be a real chance for the church to move beyond the crisis.

This was not the last time the government was asked to intervene in Nomiya Luo Mission disputes, nor was the practice of AICs seeking government intervention limited to the Nomiya Luo Mission and the KISA. There were also cases involving the African Israel Church Nineveh and the African Brotherhood Church. Politically, British officials had used mediation in Nyanza as a means of gaining control in the early period of colonialism. In these cases, they used it as means of restoring peace. Hearing complaints, responding to petitions and reviewing cases became the most time consuming part of the District Commissioner’s job, according

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195 Ibid.
197 “Nomiya Luo Mission Leadership,” to the District Commissioner Central Nyanza, 20 August 1954. KNA: DC/KSM/1/10/45 (100).
198 T. A. Watts to the Chairman of the Nomiya Luo Mission, 13 November 1954. KNA: DC/KSM/1/10/45 (103).
to Charles C. Trench. An official once quipped, “One might spend hours unravelling a dispute about three goats two generations ago.”

The fact that AICs frequently called upon the government to mediate disputes is an important point. It suggests another dimension in the encounter between AICs and the government, and a positive way in which the government was involved in the overall well-being of AICs. Furthermore, it highlights the way in which AICs had not totally rejected the authority of the government. Some remained committed to active engagement with the government; others wanted government recognition and did what was necessary to achieve that goal; still others called upon the government in certain situations, such as church disputes. In practice, very few AICs rejected government authority outright. This suggests a certain complexity to the relationship for AICs were often sympathetic with, and indeed a part of, the nationalist movement. Thus the position was that while most AICs were antagonistic to the government on some level, they continued to seek their aid, guidance, mediation, sympathy, and recognition. AICs were important models of African initiative, but there were limits to their independence. Here the limits came not as a result of government meddling, but from the AICs themselves who chose to depend on outsiders. Many have sought to affix the label of ‘collaborator’ to any African who fostered relationships with the government for personal gain; simultaneously AICs have often been presented as the religious wing of the nationalist struggle – in contrast to those who collaborated. But this distinction was not crystal clear, for AICs sometimes cooperated, compromised and collaborated with the government.

**District Heads and African Independent Churches**

The local administration was as involved in the experience of AICs as the central administration, if not more so. Technically, district and provincial officials had authority over District Heads and could micromanage things in their districts or provinces, but they tended to delegate many responsibilities to headmen. The

203 F. G. Jennings to Harrison G. Ngari, 3 February 1938. KNA: DC/NY1/2/3/3 (36).
roles of headmen, chiefsofficials in supporting or opposing AICs are therefore, an important part of the history of the government’s response.\footnote{The way in which Native Courts interacted with AICs is another important way of understanding the influence of local leaders on AICs. Preliminary investigations suggest that African leaders who opposed AICs used the courts against them. But AICs also used Native Courts to win property rights and solve personal disputes, and benefited in other ways when court officials were favorable. For general discussions about the importance of Native Courts, and for more specific references to the ways in which Native Courts interacted with AICs in Kenya, see: Amutabi, “Power and Influence of African Court Clerks and Translators in Colonial Kenya,” 202-208. Sandgren, Christianity and the Kikuyu, 39. “Government Notice No. 489 – The Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance,” The Official Gazette, 26 July (1932). District Commissioner North Kavirondo, “Alufayo Odongo,” to the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza, 12 August 1927. KNA: PC/NZA/3/30/1 (19). See multiple sources in KNA: DC/FH/1/4, KNA: DC/NN/10/1/1 and CMS/B: G3/A5/O/1932.}

District Heads and the *Arathi*

The local administration played an important role in the experience of the *Arathi*, for as with many AICs they were often a source of great local interest.\(^{210}\) Officials such as Senior Chief Muhoya and Chief Eliud Mugo of Nyeri refused to grant them land and deported some prophets.\(^{211}\) There was also antagonism towards them in Fort Hall where some chiefs (including: Chiefs Kimani Thuo, Muriranja and Michuki) and elders opposed them for their alleged relationships with unmarried women, for ignoring the tradition of bride price, and for being a threat to law and order.\(^{212}\) The Local Native Council proposed that they be prosecuted in the courts for the civil offense of non-payment of bride price and the criminal offense of organizing unauthorised meetings.\(^{213}\) Indeed, many of the official prosecutions against them were carried out in Native Courts at the instigation of African officials.\(^{214}\) Even as late as 1946 in Fort Hall, chiefs were expressing grave concerns about the activities of the *Arathi*. Chiefs ‘Joel’ and Mwaura, and Joseph Gachahe, a member of the Kangema Local Native Council, expressed concerns about the *Arathi* to the District Commissioner Fort Hall. After a meeting with them he wrote, “There is no doubt that this sect is heartily disliked by the Kikuyu elders.” Local officials made efforts to prosecute them under Local Native Council Resolutions and Section 8 (i) of the Native Authority Ordinance. The specific allegations of the council were that “These people were a menace to the District as they held meetings at night. They enticed young girls from their homes and he [Joseph Gachahe] felt that all unlicensed religion should be prohibited.”\(^{215}\) Of course, not all local administrators in Fort Hall approved of such an approach to the *Arathi*. For instance, in 1957, it was recorded of Chief Samuel in Location Four (Kandara, Fort Hall District) that “He knows a great

\(^{211}\) Kamenyi, “Prophets (Aroti),” 2.
\(^{215}\) District Commissioner Fort Hall, “Watu wa Mungu,” to the Provincial Commissioner Central Province, 18 July 1946. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/3.
deal about them and their religion and is able to defeat their arguments by intelligent use of the Bible.”

In Thika, Chief Kimani pressed the government to pass laws prohibiting the carrying of weapons, as he foresaw trouble in the future as a result of this practice among the Arathi. In regard to Kimani’s request, Chief Inspector R. V. Beckman wrote, “Whilst not apprehensive in anyway yet he would like to have this authority behind him to strengthen his hand against the Watu wa Mungu whom he looks upon as a factor subversive to discipline in his Reserve…” The new powers to prohibit the manufacture and carrying of weapons were intended to be used if and when a headman deemed them necessary.

There is no doubt that district and provincial officials were also apprehensive about bands of young men carrying weapons, but they relied heavily upon the interpretation of events given by local headmen, police officers and other informants. When Provincial Commissioner Nyeri, E. L. B. Horne became eager to stamp-out any illegal activities of the Arathi and to ‘impress on the chiefs’ the need for “energetic cooperation in bringing to light and punishing heavily any such disloyal and illegal activities,” his response hinged upon the headmen: their attitudes towards the Arathi, their initiative, their intelligence.

Individuals within the Arathi occasionally brought on an increase in local opposition through their actions, as occurred in Thika during a baraza. A certain man of this church refused to stand in deference to the District Commissioner. When Chief Ndungo began to argue with him, “this person sprang onto him and assaulted him – he was arrested and later imprisoned.” While one can sympathize with this man’s refusal to pay homage to the District Commissioner, such violence against local officials worked against the Arathi in the long run. The story of the incident was told to the Chief Inspector of Police during an interview; it was then relayed to

the District Commissioner in the Chief Inspector’s official Weekly Report. In this fashion, AICs that were antagonistic to local rulers were likely to gain a reputation among district and provincial officials, reputations which could follow them for years and into different districts and provinces.

The negative response of some African officials to the Arathi was mirrored by the antagonism of the generality of the Kikuyu population in some communities. Of course, as with African leadership, most areas contained a variety of perspectives towards the Arathi, including open support, appreciation, amusement, indifference, fear, apprehension, etc. In Githaka, Kiambu District, there were complaints about how the Arathi did not abide by accepted norms surrounding the relationships between men and women; this allegation was made against many AICs all over Kenya. It was even a common complaint against the missions before AICs (because some girls left their parents to live at the mission compounds). In Meru District, Arathi missionaries from Kiambu and Fort Hall, as Kikuyu, were reportedly seen as foreigners. The policy of non-cooperation of the Arathi irritated local citizens in Meru because the ‘foreigners’ refused to obey local chiefs and headmen. As these Arathi were from another district and ethnic community, when they caused the slightest trouble they were quickly deported to their native districts by Meru and Embu chiefs.

**Africans as Mediators of Information on AICs**

The activity of Africans in the colonial government has been the subject of recent scholarship. In the words of Benjamin Lawrence, “Africans in the low ranks

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225 Many of the examples of this complaint from Africans have already been given.
of the colonial bureaucracy often held positions that bestowed little official authority, but in practice the occupants of these positions functioned, somewhat paradoxically, as the hidden linchpins of colonial rule.” It would be easy to overlook the impact of African employees and political officials on government. Often they served as ‘silent informants’ to administrators, who relied upon them, but did not always reveal their sources in colonial documents. In this capacity, they possessed unexpected influence. As interpreters, they mediated and filtered the information given to Europeans. Martin Klein describes this in his essay entitled “African Participation in Colonial Rule.”

When research was demanded by higher authority, the administrator usually relied on those around him or summoned those with the needed information to his administrative office ... In almost all situations European colonial administrators’ access to intelligence was circumscribed. They depended on intermediaries to get information for them, to tell them what others thought, and to carry out their decisions ... The administrator was encouraged to spend a lot of time on tour, but even on tour the information he received was filtered through his interpreter and his clerk. With time an increasing number of people were able to speak to the colonial ruler in his own language, but getting access was always a problem.

As ‘collaborators,’ African employees fostered relationships with the government that enabled them to benefit from, and to influence, the officials with whom they dealt.

The process of collecting intelligence on AICs, and particularly the role of Africans in the process, has not been given enough consideration in the history of the encounter. A closer look reveals that Africans (pastors, politicians, clerks, police officers, elders, interpreters, and others) played an integral part in shaping the way AICs were viewed by government and church officials. Thus, in regard to the encounter, it is important to understand the influence of the individuals that worked

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behind the scenes, and when possible to discover the types of information they were passing along to European officials.

Chiefs lobbied European officials on behalf of their causes. For example, Chiefs Ndonji and Oloo, two Luo men, passed along information regarding the activities of the Luyia community in North Nyanza, which was intended to sway government perspectives on the conflict between the Kager (Luo) and Wanga (Luyia). In so doing, they were able to influence the government’s response to the *Dini ya Roho* (they were predominantly Luo in Musanda). Africans were responsible for propagating negative stereotypes about AICs, such as the informants who suggested that the *Roho* movement allowed inappropriate relationships between men and women. The function of headmen as the ‘cultural interpreters’ of AICs can be seen in other cases. In one situation a District Commissioner was unsure of how to interpret the red flags that were hoisted above a *Roho* church at Shibolo. Chief Laurenti’s explanation was faithfully recounted by the District Commissioner to the Provincial Commissioner. F. H. Faza, the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza was also reliant upon African leaders for his understanding of the *Roho*. After an initial report from Chief Paul Amboya of South Nyanza on the *Roho*, Faza asked for clarification on certain points – not of the District Commissioner Kisii, to whom the letter was addressed, but from Amboya specifically. It is clear that local rulers in Nyanza were active in shaping government understandings of the *Roho* movement.

In the history of the *Arathi*, African informants also played a central role. In Chief Inspector R. V. Beckman’s report on the *Arathi* in 1934, Chief Kimani played an important role as an informant; his interpretation of *Arathi* activities in the reserve was detailed in Beckman’s correspondence. Also, Kimani’s desired response to the *Arathi* was included. “Chief Kimani is anxious to have the rules brought into

234 District Commissioner Central Kavirondo, “Masanda,” 5 February 1934.
force in his area forbidding the carrying of arms by the Wakikuyu.”

Often such views had an impact on European officials and were passed up the chain of command. Kimani was able to mould perceptions about the Arathi and, likely, to influence the government’s response to the Arathi (the government did grant power to some local headmen to prohibit the carrying of weapons).

Watenga Kapera and Luka Kiwanuka provided information to the government on Arathi gatherings in Chief Reuben’s Location in Fort Hall that same year. On another occasion Kapera described Arathi theology in ‘negative’ terms. Indeed he spoke about them in ways that were likely to alter for the worse the way the government viewed them. He told an officer of the Criminal Investigation Department that “They preach against the white religion saying that it is false and they seem to be of the opinion that the whites will eventually leave this Colony. They are strongly against any increase of European Churches or Missions in the Reserves.”

Reports like this were not uncommon and would have made members of the government take notice. Europeans could be sensitive to such threats, but the challenge for scholars is to begin to understand the role of Africans in playing to apprehensions and propagating negative stereotypes.

While on tour, District Commissioners were known to collect intelligence on matters of interest. On 8 March 1934, the District Commissioner Kiambu reported his conversations with a man named ‘Ndorobo’ at Kijabe about the rumours of the arming of the Kikuyu. Ndorobo testified to the District Commissioner that all Kikuyu were armed, that the orders against the manufacture and carrying of arms had been flouted by the people. The Kikuyu had hidden their weapons, which they would use in the event of an Italian invasion or in the event that the government forcibly recruited porters for the anticipated war effort. Furthermore, Ndorobo claimed that despite their denials, the headmen were aware of the arming and had

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241 Samuel Kabuchi’s statement on the Arathi touches on three or four issues that would have most concerned a government official. “They have a dislike for all missions, which dislike almost amounts to a hatred. They refuse to pay dowry to the wazee for their women, but entice them to follow them. They seldom pay their taxes. Whilst they do not trouble people generally, they have an oath amongst themselves that they must fight and resist any effort made to arrest them…” Ward, “Statement of Samuel Kabuchi,” 27 February 1934.

concealed it from European officials. This report was sent to the Colonial Secretary.

Missionaries were also a source of intelligence on AICs, as many of them had connections to these religious leaders (many of them were ex-mission adherents). If the informant was a European missionary, then quite often, the original source of intelligence was an African pastor or a member of the church. Likewise, the original source for the information given by a headman was often a subordinate.

When Divisional Chief Njonjo of Dagoretti reported on the *Arathi* to the District Commissioner Kiambu, it was clear that he was merely passing along intelligence from other sources with a bit of personal interpretation. In this case, he had collected information on the *Arathi* during a *baraza* at Bathi, where he interviewed members of the Local Native Council, African pastors, and prominent members of society. Headmen, like other government officials, collected their own intelligence and supported networks of reliable informants and advisers. Less commonly, settlers were the source of intelligence on AICs and it was usually in regards to the activities of independent churches on their farms.

Government officials did not passively accept all intelligence they received. For instance, the District Commissioner Kiambu qualified the report from Ndorobo by saying that “I do not think too much credence can be placed in this

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244 District Commissioner Kiambu to the Colonial Secretary, 8 March 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (31).
248 See also the example of Chief Koinange: C. H. Williams, “Carrying and Manufacture of Weapons,” to the Chief Native Commissioner, 19 February 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/2 (20).
250 This was also true of government officials in Nyanza. The following is an example from the *Roho* Faza, “Watu wa Roho,” 9 May 1941.
man’s information,” though he sent the report anyway.\textsuperscript{251} Each individual sifted the intelligence they received and ideally looked for corroborating evidence.\textsuperscript{252} In response to Ndorobo’s testimony, the District Commissioner spoke with an African AIM pastor who contradicted the claim that all Kikuyu were armed.\textsuperscript{253} A trusted informant would have a greater sway with an official, while a man judged to be unreliable was treated with greater scepticism.\textsuperscript{254}

The interpretation of events was another important way of influencing government officials.\textsuperscript{255} Headman Nganga told the District Commissioner Kiambu “that he had recently noticed a number of his young men walking about armed with swords or large knives.” But Nganga’s interpretation was as important as the intelligence itself; the District Commissioner Kiambu included the interpretation in his report to the Chief Native Commissioner: “He [Nganga] saw no significance in this.”\textsuperscript{256} In so doing, Nganga was able to influence the District Commissioner’s views on the \textit{Arathi}, as was apparent in the report. The District Commissioner concluded his report, “I think these rumours [of the carrying of weapons] very much exaggerated.”\textsuperscript{257} This is a key point in understanding the dynamics within the government and how views of AICs were formed. Nganga’s interpretation, having had an impact on the District Commissioner Kiambu, was sent directly to the Chief Native Commissioner, where it may have had an influence as well.\textsuperscript{258} Thus, a savvy

\textsuperscript{251} District Commissioner Kiambu to the Colonial Secretary, 8 March 1934.
\textsuperscript{253} District Commissioner Kiambu to the Colonial Secretary, 8 March 1934.
\textsuperscript{254} Notice the emphasis on the ‘reliability’ of intelligence in the following source: Assistant Superintendent of Police Kiambu to the Superintendent of Police Nairobi, 22 September 1934. KNA: PC/CP/8/7/3 (9). Notice how an Anglican pastor, Reverend Mayo of Nakuru seemed to have had a calming influence on District Commissioner J. A. Davis: Davis, “Illegal Meeting in Londiani Location,” 9 May 1956. See also: H. G. Chubb, “Handing Over Report Kimaru Division - Fort Hall District,” to H. Galton-Fenzi, 5 November 1958. KNA: DC/FH/2/2.
\textsuperscript{255} For an example, see Divisional Chief Njonjo’s interpretation of intelligence on the \textit{Arathi}, and suggested response, which were sent to the District Commissioner. Njonjo wrote, “I suggest the meeting together of God’s People [\textit{Arathi}] should be forbidden unless they have a written permit from the District Commissioner. I found they are meeting very often and they are increasing in number at Korio. This Division will be very dangerous in the future if they are not watched carefully, when their number is increased.” Njonjo, “Reports Regarding Weapon Making and Gods People in Headman Nganga’s Location Korio,” 1934.
\textsuperscript{256} Kiambu, “Unrest in Kiambu District,” 23 February 1934.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Chief Koinange’s interpretation of the \textit{Arathi}, which downplayed the significance of the carrying and manufacture of weapons, was also passed directly to the Chief Native Commissioner. Williams, “Carrying and Manufacture of Weapons,” 1934.
District Head could influence the highest levels of government through the use and interpretation of information.259

There can be little doubt that Africans had an impact on government perspectives and responses to AICs.260 The difficult question, of course, and the one that requires in-depth local histories, is determining the degree of influence. This preliminary survey illustrates the folly of ignoring such intelligence networks. Anyone interested in European ideas about AICs will not fully understand them unless the ideas are traced to the sources - often an African informant. Beyond this, African leaders played an important role, not merely as informants, but as proponents and opponents of AICs. This section has sought to explain the various ways that headmen could have a direct impact on AICs.

**The Government Response to Independent Education**

During the first twenty years of colonialism, government investment in education was minimal. Kikuyu desires for education began to grow just as the government was waking to its responsibility in this regard. The size of the task was greater than government resources.261 The aspirations of many Africans were so great, in fact, that large sums were collected for independent and mission schools by local citizens, but even these funds were not commensurate with the need.262

J. E. Anderson admits some variation in government attitudes towards independent schools, but generally favours a negative characterization of the government’s attitude towards independent schools, especially the KISA and KKEA.263 He attributes this to European insecurities about the notion of African-run institutions.264 While this may have been true in some cases, such statements have their limits. Rather than posing an “immediate threat,” as he suggests, a more

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262 Ehrlich, “Economic and Social Developments before Independence,” 346.
common attitude towards independent schools was that they must be watched and shepherded.

There was a substantial contingent within the government that believed the official policy towards independent schools should be to encourage and guide them. This was apparent, for instance, during the discussions about the feasibility of making educational grants to the Nomiya Luo Mission. The Nomiya wanted an alternative to mission education for their children and in 1931 several officials from Nyanza met to discuss the proposition. One side opposed any sort of public support for the Nomiya independent schools because there were already government and Local Native Council schools for those who had their objection. Others within the government praised the initiative of the Nomiya and thought them deserving of support. In addition to financial support some present at the meeting suggested offering additional training to the teachers of these schools. “It may perhaps be argued that as these people have already started schools it would be wise to train their teachers and generally improve the standard of these schools.” The Nomiya wanted financial backing for its schools, either from the central government or the Local Native Council. District Commissioner V. M. McKeeag advised against it on the principle that it would set a precedent. “At the same time,” he suggested, “one must have the greatest sympathy with these people who are at present denied educational facilities for their children unless they put them under the influence of missions with religious beliefs contrary to their own.” He outlined the following policy toward the Nomiya Luo Mission, and asked that it be discussed at the next Local Native Council meeting:

A. That the Government will not, at present, approve financial assistance being given from public funds to educational organizations without responsible European backing. B. That Government recognizes the right of natives to educational facilities for their children unaccompanied by religious instruction contrary to the beliefs of the parents or guardians of the pupils. C. That as soon as the Local Native Council Central School, for which money has already been earmarked, has been built the government will authorize the building of Local Native Council undenominational

265 McKeag, “Nomiya Luo Mission,” 12 August 1931. This was the line taken by V. M. McKeag, the Provincial Commissioner Nyanza.
266 Ibid.
Feeder Schools should they be required, such schools to be open to all natives of the District. D. That until such Feeder schools are built natives such as the adherents of the Nomiya Luo Mission are advised to send their children to the most convenient Sector Schools on the clear understanding that no religious instruction shall be given to their children and with the assurance that Government will take the necessary action to enforce this condition.

Thus at the end of this meeting, they declined to fund Nomiya schools deemed to be unstable, though at the same time supporting their right not to be subjected to a religious education they found offensive. It was a compromise based on the assumption that the government would be building schools; in the meantime, government funded mission schools were not to force their religious views on students that objected.

The belief that the government should shepherd independent movements so as to avoid their ultimate collapse was not limited to discussions about the Nomiya Luo Mission. District Commissioner Fort Hall, D. O. Brumage, suggested something very similar about the KISA in his Annual Report in 1936. He was no champion of the KISA, but neither did he believe it to be bad in its entirety; to ensure its success, and to avoid potential dangers, it must be guided by the government. “Without doubt, this particular movement will also collapse sooner or later, unless, of course, its leaders will abandon their present policy and whole-heartedly agree to be guided in no mistaken manner by the government.”

To this end, the Director of Education appointed a special inspector who dealt exclusively with independent schools in 1936. A similar view was expressed in 1945, by the Provincial Commissioner Central Province who thought that the KISA was “deserving of guidance and financial support.” But government supervision did not always mean the oversight of a European district official. In Kiambu District, the Karing’a proposed the creation of a local board of supervisors in 1933, which was supported by the District Commissioner. The proposed board was to consist of six elders who would run the schools and keep the government informed of its progress.

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A second motivation for greater government supervision of independent schools was the ‘protection’ of Africans. During this era, it was thought that any charismatic individual could start a school, so long as he was able to raise funds. From the government’s point of view there was too little control of education. There was no protection for Africans against underachieving schools, not to mention any control over what was taught. Thus, the desire of many AICs to be free from government control ran headlong into the government’s mandate to protect citizens against unqualified teachers who were collecting tuition fees for a service they could not adequately provide. Registering independent and mission schools was part of an effort to improve the quality of schools and to standardize the educational system of Kenya. Certainly, they reasoned, a hodgepodge educational system was not in the best interest of Kenyans. In theory, registered schools would be routinely inspected, though quite often inspectors did not visit each school even once in a year. Government funded schools, both mission and independent, received inspections most often. These inspections were seen as intrusive government meddling by many independent schools. They were often seen as intrusive by missions as well, but there was a real difference in how this meddling was interpreted by the two groups.

This effort to guide AICs, though quite possibly paternalistic at its core, sprang not from a desire to oppose independent movements, but out of a desire to aid and to guide AICs. And it was not merely independent schools which the government wanted to guide; there were constant government attempts to control mission schools. Many AICs in Kenya were opposed to working closely with the government because of their desire to govern their own affairs and to maintain hard earned independence from European control. Thus, what may have been well-intentioned on the part of the government, was generally unwelcomed by AICs. Understandably, the attempts to help guide AICs so that ‘they did not fail’ were often interpreted by these churches as government opposition, as an intrusion, as a ploy. It is important for scholars, however, not to automatically equate government regulation with opposition. In many cases, members of AICs interpreted government

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attempts to organize and regulate education nationally, as attempts to oppose African-owned schools directly.\textsuperscript{274}

The perception that the government refused to fund independent schools contributed to a feeling of injustice among AICs.\textsuperscript{275} (Many mission schools also found it difficult to qualify for government funding, as illustrated by the experience of the AIM in Fort Hall and Machakos Districts.\textsuperscript{276} A survey of CMS correspondence reveals that it was an ongoing challenge for them as well.) Funding was one of the requests of the Nomiya Luo Mission going back many years.\textsuperscript{277} In 1931, officials in Nyanza were divided roughly into three camps on the subject of funding independent schools: those who thought it unwise for the government to give financial support, those who advocated support as a means of improving independent schools, and those who wanted to make support contingent upon performance.\textsuperscript{278} The policy they decided upon was not to grant support without ‘responsible’ oversight, a reference to the perceived instability of the Nomiya Lou Mission.\textsuperscript{279} There were some Nomiya Luo Mission schools who did eventually receive government funds in later years.

Another important government gathering on the subject of funding independent schools took place in Central Province on 23 March 1937. Most of the District Commissioners of the province were present as well as the Provincial Commissioner, S. H. LaFontaine. At this meeting the theme of ‘efficiency’ was preeminent for it was felt that the Kenyan educational system was inefficient, particularly mission and independent schools. This issue of efficiency was determined by LaFontaine to be the central requirement upon which funding of non-governmental schools would hinge.\textsuperscript{280} In the course of discussions, the District Commissioner Fort Hall, D. O. Brumage, suggested the merits of giving grants to independent schools; the District Commissioners South Nyeri and Embu, D. Storr


\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{277} Hunter, “Nomiya Cult,” 1929.

\textsuperscript{278} McKeag, “Nomiya Luo Mission,” 1931.


\textsuperscript{280} Simmonds, “Minutes of the Meeting of the District Commissioners of the Central Province,” 23-24 March 1937.
Fox and I. R. Gillespie, supported this notion, but thought that grants should wait till 1938 when special provisions could be made in the budget. The District Commissioner Kiambu, J. G. Hopkins, considered the matter of funding for independent schools so urgent that it could not wait until next year. “Grants should be made both to mission and to independent schools in order to demonstrate unequivocally that Government desired to assist and foster education with complete impartiality.” LaFontaine asked District Commissioner Storrs Fox if he could find a worthy independent school to fund in 1937, to which he responded that it would not be unduly difficult.

The District Commissioner Fort Hall in 1944 looked upon “the independent schools as a movement worthy of much more assistance and discreet guidance than can now be given.” He proposed two important government responses to the independent schools. “A government supervisor who could win the confidence of the Association is the first necessity and the second is completely equal financial aid with the schools of the other institutions.” This point of view was also trumpeted by the Provincial Commissioner Central Province around the same time. The Githunguri Teacher Training College was largely funded by massive public donation; but in 1940, the Provincial Commissioner claimed he knew of no obstacles preventing it from getting government funding, if only Githunguri would commit itself to financial transparency (which it repeatedly failed to do despite promises). In the 1940s, many independent schools in Kiambu and Nyeri Districts succeeded in winning government funds.

Martin Capon, a CMS missionary at Weithaga, was keen to understand the strength of the independent school movement. In 1949 he compared the amount of government funding given to the CMS versus independent schools. These figures

281 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
286 Ward states that the KISA school at Gakarara was awarded a Local Native Council grant which was three times the size of the grant formerly given to the AIM school on the same premises. Kevin Ward, “The Development of Protestant Christianity in Kenya, 1910-1940” (PhD., University of Cambridge, 1967), 217. See additional examples in: J. H. Lewis to H. D. Hooper, 18 March 1940. CMS/B: AF35/49 G3/A5/1/subfile 7. Wainwright, “Githi Kihuti School,” to Jason Kamangara, 26 March 1941.
further illustrate how the assumption that the government withheld funding from independent schools was inaccurate. He reported that independent schools in 1949 received the following amounts in grants (in shillings):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Amount (shillings)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu District</td>
<td>11,620.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall District</td>
<td>21,123.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Nyeri District</td>
<td>11,135.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu District</td>
<td>14,447.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Fort Hall he reported fourteen aided KISA schools and eight aided African Christian Church and Schools. In Nyeri he cited one aided African Orthodox Church school (or KKEA) and five aided KISA schools.

At the end of the 1930s and into the 1940s, government officials were supportive of the idea of funding independent schools. The allegation that the government would not fund independent schools must be qualified by this realization. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that the government did fund a number of schools. It is not immediately apparent, therefore, why so many independent schools claimed the opposite. What is clear is that independent schools did not get as much funding as they felt they deserved. To understand why this may have been, one must look for other reasons. Probably first among these was the regulations that accompanied government grants – the requirements of financial transparency and use of the government syllabus. Independent schools found it difficult to abide by these stipulations, either by choice or circumstance.

During the Mau Mau Emergency, a petition was sent to the Royal East Africa Commission on behalf of the KISA and KKEA. Among the grievances cited was the lack of funding for independent schools. The petition suggested that the only way to redress this grievance was for the government to make available “unconditional grants” for independent schools. Though the term was not explicitly defined, it suggests that a major part of the irritation was that the government had attached conditions to funding, such as financial transparency and guidelines on curriculum. There was nothing about these conditions, however, that applied solely to AICs and so the belief that they were merely tools to oppose independent schools seems to

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287 The source of these statistics was not given. Martin G. Capon, “The Independent Schools among the Kikuyu,” 1950. KNA: MAC/KEN/33/1/98.
derive in part from a failure of some independent school leaders to comprehend the nature of the educational system.

Moving now from the issue of funding, to other government responses to independent schools, the initial government reports on the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association and the Kikuyu Karing’a Educational Association were mixed. The Annual Report for Kiambu District in 1933 described the Karing’a schools as good, but in need of regular inspections; what they lacked in training they made up for in enthusiasm and earnestness for the task. Here it is important to notice the difference between proposed responses and actual responses from the government, for the District Commissioner recommended regular inspections, but in reality they were inspected very rarely. He wrote at the end of his entry on the Karing’a, “I regret to have to report, however, that the Inspector of Schools in charge of this area has not been able to visit the district once since I took over...”288 Thus in this situation, the response mustered by the government fell far short of their intention.

As in other cases involving the responses of missions and government to AICs, this is an example of weakness rather than strength, of largely unsuccessful attempts to closely monitor AICs.

By 1935 there were signs of strain in the relationship between the government and KISA. There were forty-three known schools in Kiambu, Fort Hall, Embu and South Nyeri Districts. They were said to be “fairly quiet and ostensibly friendly” by inspectors, but the Provincial Commissioner testified to a growing dislike for government inspections.289 A particular point of disagreement was curriculum; the KISA resented the government’s involvement with the syllabus, particularly the stipulation that English was not to be taught in the first years. Another perennial irritation for independent schools was the stipulations placed upon government funding. In 1935, The Provincial Commissioner of Central Province clearly indicated that the reason he withheld funding was because schools were not abiding by rules governing curriculum – the rules all funded schools were required to abide by.290

290 Ibid.
By 1936 the number of known independent schools in Central Province had grown to fifty, of which forty-five were affiliated with the KISA.\textsuperscript{291} They were causing ‘anxiety’ to the Provincial Commissioner now; very few had been started, according to him, with the consent of the Local Native Councils or the local educational boards. Furthermore, they continued to ignore government regulations governing schools. Inspections “revealed that teaching was so inefficient in the vast majority of cases as to be definitely harmful,” and he described the need to place them “under efficient sympathetic control.”\textsuperscript{292} A meeting was organized for 11 August at the Jeanes School Kabete. The Director of Education, Chief Native Commissioner, Provincial Commissioner and the District Commissioners were all asked to be in attendance, along with representatives from the KISA. At the meeting these vexing issues were discussed and the two parties decided collectively that,

The Local Native Councils should be invited to pass resolutions in favor of refusing all applications for new Independent Schools in any district until such time as the existing schools in the district had been passed as efficient by Education Department. The Government should provide additional school inspection in the Kikuyu districts. There was some difference of opinion as to whether any additional Inspector appointed should inspect the Independent Schools only or all schools in one or more districts. On the whole opinion favored that latter course. That the Independent Schools should be told that it was expected that they should cease to entice teachers away from the Mission Schools and that they should send men to be trained as teachers at the mission institutions or at the Jeanes Schools, if teacher training is continued there. It was recommended that the inclusion of grants to Independent Schools in Local Native Council estimates for 1937 should not be disallowed but that no grants should be paid to the school unless it had been passed as efficient by the Education Department.\textsuperscript{293}

This statement was referred to as the ‘1936 concordant.’ New schools could not be opened by the association until such time as the existing ones could be improved. Funding was not banned, but it was contingent upon the successful inspection from the Education Department.

\textsuperscript{291} Estimates by the late forties and early fifties range from 220 to 400 independent schools. Anderson, “Selection and Adaptation outside the Government/Missionary Framework,” 128.
\textsuperscript{292} “Annual Report – Central Province,” 1936.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid.
The attempts by the government to increase control in the 1930s have been described as increasing suppression and harassment which almost strangled independent schools. Another scholar has stated that independent schools were virtually barred by the government until after Kenyan independence. These statements are misleading and inaccurate. Independent schools did not diminish between 1930 and 1950 but multiplied several fold. On the whole the regulatory standard applied to the independent schools was similar to the one required of other non-governmental schools, and, in as far as this is true, it was not government opposition. Other scholars recognize that there was very little attempt to control independent schools in the 1920s which is a much more accurate analysis based on examples given thus far. Evidence suggests this extended into the 1930s.

At the close of the meeting in 1936 the KISA representatives agreed to abide by the stipulations of the concordant and later even “expressed their willingness in writing to adhere to the terms of the agreement…” This set the movement on a positive footing with the government. Aside from the KISA schools there were an estimated five KKEA schools in Central Province and numerous ‘unauthorised’ schools. The concordant did nothing to increase the regulation of these.

By year’s end, the concordant between the government and KISA was already in trouble. The District Commissioner Fort Hall, D. O. Brumage, complained that in his district, they had failed to make any effort to improve their schools along the lines of the agreement. The report for Central Province at the end of 1937 was not as condemning of the KISA, but the KKEA was criticised for its political activities. The former opened only one unauthorised school, which was seen as honouring the spirit of the concordant, but the latter opened several new schools against the expressed refusal of Local Native Councils.

These trends continued into the following year. Relations with the KKEA deteriorated further when some schools refused to allow inspectors to have access to

295 Kedogo, “Problems Facing Church Development,” 64.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
their schools. On the other hand “The [Kikuyu] Independent Schools Association has shown a more moderate spirit and throughout the Province has cooperated with government in a most encouraging way.”302 He attributed these positive relations to the appointment of the special inspector, whose interaction with the independent schools had perpetuated a sense of mutual understanding. In 1940, the provincial government maintained similar attitudes towards the KISA and KKEA.303

This was a period of relatively good relations between the government and the KISA. They were described in terms of positive progress by District Commissioner J. H. Lewis. By contrast, the KKEA was exhibiting “flagrant examples of noncooperation.”304 Lewis believed that though differences between independents and the government existed, “even these differences [were] not insuperable obstacles in the majority of cases.” His analysis reveals the contours of government thinking at the time.

Speaking generally, I should say that the ‘independents’ are willing to cooperate with the government Education Department so far as is consistent with preserving their own independence. They are willing to receive and follow the advice and recommendations of inspectors and to cooperate on District Education Boards so long as they can do so on equal terms. But when there is any suggestion of control, they at once become suspicious … On their part, the Government is genuinely anxious to help these schools so far as is possible without sacrifice of principle. They are naturally not prepared to make any alterations in the syllabuses or to modify rules regarding, for example, the opening of schools to suit the convenience of the independents. But in so far as the independents show themselves willing to cooperate with the Government on the same terms as missions, then I think the government is only too anxious to help them. This is shown in the initiative of the Education Department in appointing a special inspector for independent schools, though it was also prompted by the necessity of keeping some kind of eye on the movement. I think that the Government is perfectly right in this attitude. We cannot expect that the Government should make any difference between independent schools and others as far as the possibility of grants are concerned, but it is also right to expect that the independent schools should be set a standard no lower than mission schools and should submit to the same discipline and regulations.

303 “Annual Report – Central Province,” 1940.
304 All quotes from Lewis in this section come from: J. H. Lewis to H. D. Hooper, 18 March 1940. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1/subfile 7.
Reports on the KISA in Fort Hall for 1942 were less favourable in the sense that there had been some apparent degrading of the facilities. Another complaint was the tendency of independent schools to make important changes to the school without informing the Educational Department. For instance, at registration, schools were authorized to offer certain levels of education, and were inspected accordingly; in Fort Hall and elsewhere it was not uncommon for schools to offer higher levels of education without notifying the government. This was apparently a concern because of the need to ‘protect’ students. The government wanted to verify that schools fulfilled their educational responsibilities to parents and children.

After the Second World War, government officials began to notice heightened political tensions in Kenya. This was a startling trend for one Provincial Commissioner who, to one degree or other, was committed to the perpetuation of colonialism. The ‘politicisation’ of the independent schools was thought to have occurred during these years. The return of Jomo Kenyatta to Kenya and his taking control of political and educational institutions was a symbolic turning point.

Independent schools and churches were also thought to be associated with much of the political activities of the post-WWII era in government reports.

These years saw the emergence of the Mau Mau. The early 1950s was the period of the strongest government response to independent churches and schools. In northern Nyanza, several new AICs were denied land. The proscription of the KISA and KKEA in 1952 was directly related to their alleged and/or actual involvement with the Mau Mau. Thirty-four independent schools were closed

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307 Ibid.
310 Sangree, Age, Prayer, and Politics in Tiriki, 189, 220.
immediately. The government re-opened them under the oversight of the District Education Boards, local educational committees and in some cases missions.\textsuperscript{312}

In conclusion, despite the often contentious relationship between the government and AICs in Kenya, there were also many positive and non-confrontational aspects to the relationship. This is an important distinction, for even while the relationships with many AICs eventually took a disastrous turn for the worse during the Mau Mau crisis, prior to that point, officials exhibited a considerable desire to work with certain AICs and to show impartiality towards independent schools. The primary question which this chapter has sought to answer is whether the relationship can be characterized as fundamentally hostile. Given the extensive evidence to the contrary, the answer must be that such generalizations fail to apprehend the full nature of the encounter. Another important question relates to the degree of governmental control (pursued and achieved) over independent churches and schools. Government attempts to bring about a degree of control over AICs have been interpreted as an increase of already significant control, but the historical picture indicates far less control of AICs than may have been assumed. Another point is clear, that while the actions of the government towards AICs were not always favourable, AICs themselves were complicit in fostering and perpetuating negative relationships. Finally, African government officials were a source of much of the opposition to AICs. This underscores the importance of exploring African responses to African Independent Churches. The encounter was, to a large degree, a local phenomenon and cannot be completely understood as a conflict between Europeans and Africans.\textsuperscript{313}


\textsuperscript{313} This is a point also made by Welbourn and Ogot. Welbourn and Ogot, \textit{A Place to Feel at Home}, 81.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Throughout this thesis it has been stated that current characterizations of the encounter are based on a select number of episodes that took place between Anglicans and AICs, or government officials and AICs. Many of the episodes in the preceding pages have never been described in print before. This thesis has argued for a more comprehensive approach. Some of the examples explored in previous chapters come from outside the parameters of previous investigations, such as from African rulers and pastors, but there is nothing remote or tangential about them. Beyond this, there were many unexplored attitudes within the European community which this study has brought to light. Finally, this thesis has begun to analyze and critically reflect upon AIC opposition claims, even while endeavoring to remain sympathetic.

The first task of the conclusion is to make some basic comparisons between the evidence found in the Kenyan and Nigerian encounters. An exhaustive comparison between these two countries will not be possible here. Comparisons will be limited to the encounter and primarily to the similarities rather than the differences. The second task of the conclusion will be to describe past trends in African historiography and discuss how they have influenced discussions of the encounter.

Reflections on the Encounter in Kenya and Nigeria

There were four predominant types of opposition that emanated from colonial or religious leaders in Kenya and Nigeria. First, there was opposition originating from the upper levels of religious or political authority that remained largely among these individuals. Second, there was opposition originating and remaining among the lower levels of political or religious authority. Third, there was opposition originating from the upper levels of political or religious authority, which was successfully transmitted to the lower levels of the authority structure. Fourth, there
was opposition originating from the lower levels of political or religious authority, which influenced, and was transmitted to the upper levels of authority. These four basic types have been apparent in previous chapters. This thesis has endeavored to broaden the intellectual framework for examining encounters by making room for all four possibilities and thinking in a more deliberate way about which type was occurring in each case. These four types of opposition are not the only possibilities, of course, and are not intended to be exhaustive or static categories. They serve to highlight important distinctions, though, including the diversity of responses among religious and political leaders, the importance of both local and national spheres in African history, and the respective roles of Africans and Europeans in religious history.

**Anglican Responses to AICs**

The encounter between Anglicans and AICs was characterized by brief flashes of antagonism, especially at points of schisms, preceded and followed by periods of more complex and varied interaction. Other aspects of the encounter, besides conflict and hostility, include positivity, curiosity, general support, hopefulness, open-mindedness, self-criticism, collaboration, apathy, caution, skepticism, apprehension, and withdrawal.¹ When hostility did occur, this thesis has sought to avoid trivializing the causes and motivations behind Anglican and government responses. Negative attitudes and responses to AICs were not inexplicable, but often the result of having direct experience with AICs, or their ideas. A great deal of the negativity of Anglican attitudes derived from being the targets of AIC missionary efforts. While this type of evangelism was sometimes respectful and tactful, it was at other times antagonistic, disruptive, abrasive and even violent.² Thus in many cases, Anglicans were responding to what they felt to be unfair or antagonistic missionary efforts directed at them in the hopes of disrupting or destroying their work in a given area. In chapter one, such feelings were apparent in the responses of H. Dallimore, F. Melville Jones and D. R. Oyebode, and in chapter

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² See below for more discussion on this point.
three, in the correspondence of Martin Capon, the report of N. Langford Smith on education, and the anonymous report entitled “Heretical and Schismatic Sects.”

In many cases, Anglicans were circumspect about AICs. In parts of the Yoruba Mission, Anglicans essentially collaborated with the Aladura for a time, as the correspondence of missionaries like K. E. Ritsert, C. Matthews and T. E. Alvarez reveal in chapter one. Bishop Heywood’s educational plan sought to collaborate with the Githunguri Teacher Training School; his training scheme would have trained and ordained KISA pastors. Many Anglicans saw AICs as mixed blessings.\(^3\) This was apparent in the writings of H. Dallimore in Nigeria and Bishop Heywood in Kenya, in documents about the East African Revival, and in W. F. E. Wigram’s analysis of AICs from London. Many Anglicans responded to AICs by looking inward and by recognizing the failures of the missionary movement.\(^4\) The writings of H. Dallimore and Bishop Melville Jones in Nigeria, Bishop L. J. Beecher, S. A. Morrison, and Martin Capon in Kenya, and Max Warren and T. F. C. Bewes in England exhibited this quality. The Aladura exposed, according to Phyllis Garlick, a gaping hole in Anglican ministry - the lack of an adequate healing ministry. In all of these authors, there was agreement with AIC critiques of mission Christianity on some level and an attempt to positively respond to them.

Anglicans were often defensive in their response to AICs. That is, their primary responses to AICs centered upon things that could be done within the mission or the Anglican Church. Theological training of African pastors was a major part of the Anglican response in Kikuyuland and Yorubaland.\(^5\) Examples of this response were H. Dallimore, F. Melville Jones, D. R. Oyebode, and A. R. Pittway.\(^6\) L. A. Lennon of the Yoruba Mission called for more funding, personnel, training and supervision. Others supported a sort of isolationism as a way of avoiding conflict and confrontation. This attitude was more prevalent in Nigeria in the writings of S.

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\(^{5}\) This was also part of Bishop Lasbrey’s proposed response to the Garrick Braide Sokari movement in eastern Nigeria. B. Lasbrey, “The Strange Story of the Church in the Niger Delta,” CMO LIV, September (1927): 181.

Vincent Latunde and H. Dallimore, but it also existed in Kenya in individuals like Martin Capon.

At times, Anglicans considered ways they might counteract AICs outside of the church, by petitioning local government to withhold land and by calling on the government to enforce existing rules governing education. Another example was the discussion surrounding the regulation of prayer houses in Kenya. As chapter three has discussed, all the missionary debates on this topic led to nothing because the Alliance could not come up with legal definitions to distinguish between prayer houses and other types of community facilities. Instead of pointing to strong mission attacks on independent churches, this episode underscored the lack of effective opposition.

An additional part of the Anglican response to AICs was inaction. There were times when Anglicans voted not to respond to AICs, or held no vote at all. While it is natural and in many ways easier to focus upon the instances of heated opposition, the periods in-between can reveal as much about the nature of the encounter.

African Anglican Responses to AICs

African pastors were intimately involved in the encounter with AICs, in terms of their participation in the committee meetings and especially in the local context as overseers of church work. African pastors, such as A. B. Akinyele of the Yoruba Mission and Matthew Ajuoga of the Kenya Mission, engaged in theological dialogue with the concepts raised by AICs. Africans also played an important role as mediators of information and interpreters of AIC activities in both Nigeria and Kenya. This was evident in church reports on AICs discussed in chapters one and three, in discussion of the East African Revival, and in the correspondence of Bishop

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8 In South Africa, as well, Africans were involved in interpreting AICs and proposing mission responses to them. See the important role of individuals like L. N. Mzimba: Robert H. W. Shepherd, “The Separatist Churches of South Africa,” IRM 26 (1937): 453-63.
I. Oluwole, A. B. Akinyele, Andarea Gathea, Matthew Ajuoga, Peter G. Bostock, F. Cecil Smith, F. B. Welbourn and W. J. Rampley. 9

African Anglicans were not united in their views towards AICs. 10 Some were clearly more positive about AICs than European missionaries. One example of this was Andarea Gathea, who was simultaneously active with the Anglican Church and the Githunguri Teacher Training College. Other African Christians were more strongly opposed to AICs than their European counterparts. This was clear at the Anglican Synod in Nigeria when contrary to the views of Rev. Adayinka, Bishop Melville Jones decided not to excommunicate Aladura members, or in C. Eby’s report in 1957 when Jeremiah Othuon and Meshek Malingoti were the most vocal opponents of the African Israel Church Nineveh, or in ‘Light,’ the essay produced by Matthew Ajuoga that voiced some of the most strident Anglican views about AICs.

The encounter varied from location to location and it should not be assumed that the views of Anglican leaders in Lagos and Nairobi reflected the views and actions of pastors upcountry. For instance, the relationship between Anglicans and Aladura in Lagos was often quite cold at the very same time that Abiodun Akinsowon of the Cherubim and Seraphim was using a CMS schoolhouse for her evangelistic campaign in Ife and Anglicans were essentially collaborating with Aladura evangelists in Lokoja. 11 This dynamic has not been fully explored and suggests the usefulness of differentiating between local and national encounters.

In many encounters, different cultural outlooks can be identified in the way Anglicans approached AICs. In Efón, an Anglican catechist, Mr. Erinle, was known to be sympathetic to the Aladura. At the end of a long period of sickness, he experienced a miraculous healing after receiving prayer and drinking the holy water blessed by the Aladura. Soon thereafter, he left the Anglican Church. In the CMS minutes on the topic, there was a clear difference in the way the incident was

interpreted. While the ‘conference’ (which included the opinions of some Yoruba pastors) emphasized Mr. Erinle’s weakness of character as the cause of him drinking the holy water, Archdeacon T. A. J. Ogunbiyi noted that if he had refused to drink the water, he would be considered a witch. The ‘conference’ explained Erinle’s exodus from the Anglican Church by reference to his theological and intellectual weaknesses, but Ogunbiyi attributed it to Erinle’s experience of the power of the Aladura (as seen in their ability to heal his chronic throat condition).\textsuperscript{12} The conference’s interpretation reflected a western and abstract outlook, while Ogunbiyi’s interpretation reflected a non-western and local outlook. Thus, there were fascinating and important differences in the ways that Anglicans interpreted the encounter with AICs. If these distinct approaches can be found in the formal setting of a CMS conference, how much more would one expect to find them in the everyday interaction with AICs?

**Government Responses to AICs**

Like members of the mission churches, European officials displayed a wide variety of responses to AICs in Kenya and Nigeria. There were some periods of widespread, open opposition to certain AICs, especially against the Aladura under W. A. Ross in 1931, against the *Arathi* in 1931 and 1934, and against several AICs during the Mau Mau crisis in Kenya. These were, however, periods of opposition, more or less, with a beginning and an end. Additional episodes of brief opposition emanated from individuals within the central government on occasion. What is conspicuously absent from the colonial archives, however, is a pervasive presence of collective animosity towards AICs.\textsuperscript{13}

Several things contributed to the ongoing tensions between AICs and government officials, including taxes, land allocation, property rights, labour, registration, law and order, and health and safety.\textsuperscript{14} The government’s responses to AICs in these areas were often connected to larger political or social agendas. AICs

\textsuperscript{12} Minutes of the Missionary Conference of the CMS Yoruba Mission, 7-16 January 1932.


\textsuperscript{14} All of these concerns are brought together in the provisos used by the central government in Ijero, Ikerre and Efon to break the deadlock between local officials and the Aladura. J. W. Garden to H. L. Ward Price, 3 November 1931. NNAI: OYO/PROF/1/662 (67).
bristled at government involvement in independent schools, but much of the regulation in this regard was linked to government regulation of education nationally. AICs resented government directives in regards to registering their churches and schools, but much of these were part of broader efforts to organize religious bodies in Kenya and Nigeria – an effort that began many years before these AICs existed. There is evidence to suggest that, at times, government regulation was used in a discriminatory fashion, but this does not seem to be the rule or the general motivation behind them.

Another aspect of the government’s attitude towards AICs was actually the desire to avoid taking strong stands against AICs whenever possible. This attitude was apparent in the writings of A. E. F. Murray, A. C. C. Swayne, G. Hemmant, and the District Officer Epe in Yorubaland, and paralleled by the views of Chief Josiah Njonjo and P. Tomkinson in Kikuyuland, and S. H. Faza in Nyanza. This attitude was also recognizable within the Anglican community, in the writings of Martin Capon, especially in “Independent Schools among the Kikuyu.” In other cases, European officials urged African officials to respond moderately to AICs. The logic behind this desire not to oppose AICs was that the appearance of the persecution of religious bodies would have elicited a strong protest from many in Africa and Britain. Though there is cause to be critical of the government’s record on religious liberty, the desire to promote and preserve freedom of religion was also behind this attitude in some officials.

Government officials also played a positive part as mediators in AIC disputes. Chapters two and four discussed several examples of this involving the Aladura, the African Brotherhood Church, the Nomiya Luo Mission and the KISA. In this capacity, officials enabled AICs to move beyond property disputes and leadership struggles, to heal as churches, to expand and grow. In the examples described in this thesis, mediation generally occurred at the request of AICs, not at the instigation of the colonial government. In fact, in a number of cases government officials resisted

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15 Such was the case in regard to the advice given by R. B. Kerr and John Blair to the Alaye of Efon in chapter two.
getting involved in church affairs even after their involvement was requested. Discussions of the positive side of the relationship between the government and AICs would be incomplete without mentioning the overwhelmingly positive relationships with the African Israel Church Nineveh and African Christian Church and Schools in Kenya. These two churches in particular, illustrate how the government was quite willing, and eager in some cases, to be involved in a constructive way with AICs. They also suggest that the nature of the encounter was influenced as much by the attitudes of AICs as by the attitudes of government.

The Responses of African Officials to AICs

In African historiography, there has been much discussion of how traditional rulers played a large role in resisting the early missionaries and first Christian converts, but very little scholarship on the role of African rulers in resisting AICs. This may be partially explained by the assumption that African rulers ceased to have a major impact on religion in the colonial era. J. F. Ade Ajayi and E. A. Ayandele have expounded an interpretive framework base upon this view of the authority of African rulers. They draw a sharp line between the pre-colonial and colonial periods, stating that in Yorubaland, chiefs were powerful in the former and could exert great influence on the church. During the colonial era, by contrast, kings lost much of their authority: “no longer were the chiefs and traditional priests able to proscribe adherence to Christianity; no longer could the village or town prescribe religion to the individual.” While undoubtedly, the authority of African rulers did change, chapter two and four have illustrated how they continued to exert a substantial influence over Christianity. Indeed, to a great degree the encounter between the government and AICs revolved around the actions of elders and kings.

17 See the example of E. L. B. Anderson in chapter four.  
Many scholars who focus on AICs specifically do not make the mistake of neglecting the importance of African rulers, but in the past, they have cast this relationship overwhelmingly in a positive light. This focus touches on one side of their relationship, for indeed many African rulers helped and guided AICs, but there is another side of the encounter which this thesis has sought to describe at length. In many cases, opposition came directly from traditional rulers, especially in regard to the allocation of land and the broadly interpreted mandate to preserve law and order. This occurred against the Aladura in Nigeria in numerous cases, and virtually every Kenyan AIC discussed in chapter four experienced some amount of local opposition from African officials.

As John Lonsdale points out, directives travelled down the chain of command within the colonial government and information travelled up the chain of command. A logical question is, how much influence did this information have on the upper levels of government? In regards to AICs, the type of information African rulers and other informants passed up the chain of command often reinforced negative stereotypes about AICs. Other intelligence reports were less inflammatory and exerted a positive influence on government perspectives towards AICs. The important point is not to characterize these reports as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, but rather to assert that they did have an impact on government responses. This was the case in the relationship between District Officer Wilkes and the Akirun of Ikirun, and the District Officer Ijebu and the Awujale in Nigeria. In western Kenya, District Heads and chiefs influenced government attitudes towards the Roho, and in central Kenya, correspondence from Chiefs Kimani, Njonjo, Ndungo and Nganga shaped the perspectives of government officials on the Arathi. Local African informants also had an impact on government perspectives. This can be seen in the reports of Watenga Kapera, Luka Kiwanuka, ‘Ndorobo,’ Andarea Gathea and Mr. Omino. Many of the ideas about AICs found in the correspondence of district and provincial governments can be traced to earlier intelligence reports; thus there is every


21 Instead of listing each of the many examples discussed in previous chapters, it is easier to refer the reader to chapters two and four.

indication that Africans, as mediators of information, did influence European officials.

There were explicit examples of antagonistic mandates being sent down the chain of command in regards to AICs, but when placed in the broader history of the encounter they were actually rare. This conclusion is based, in part, upon a deeper awareness of the archives themselves. In the instances when government officials chose to oppose AICs these mandates were unabashed, unambiguous directives. No attempt was made to cover up their direct involvement in local affairs. These documents reveal what mandates of this kind looked like in colonial correspondence. That is how one can assert that in the majority of cases directives of this nature were not given to local officials. In a large percentage of cases in the previous chapters, European officials delegated the responsibility of dealing with AICs in local contexts to African officials.

**African Historiography and the History of the Encounter**

Many scholars have focused on the encounter at the national level or on the most senior officials, skipping from conflict to conflict, characterizing government and Anglican attitudes in broad strokes, and assiduously excluding variant opinions from affecting conclusions by treating them as exceptions. This study has demonstrated, however, that there was rarely agreement on how to respond to AICs; the encounter took place as much on the local level as the national level; it was influenced as much by Africans as Europeans; and indecision characterized mission and government policies as much as decisive action.

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24 This was the case with the Resident and the Onijabe of Ijabe.

25 Even Bengt Sundkler’s classic text focuses primarily on the encounter between European officials and African Independent Churches. This also seems generally true of previously cited works of Barrett, Turner, Omoyajowo, Peel, Sandgren, Githieya, Oshun and others. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, 1948.
Questions logically arise from these findings. How have current portrayals of the encounter developed? How have historians selected the predominant themes of the encounter? Why have historians neglected other themes? In this section an attempt will be made to explore in rough outline the evolution of African historiography from the 1950s to the present and how this has influenced the generally accepted history of the encounter. It will also include some discussion of mission and AIC historiographies and consider the mutual influence and interaction between all three.

African historiography has changed significantly over the past several decades. Prior to the 1950s, African and missions history was written primarily with Europeans as the focus, and upon the assumption that Africa had “no history” of its own. In order to alter this misperception, history became an important tool of the nationalists and gave birth to nationalist historiography. Primarily during the 1950s and 1960s, historians focused on the “liberating exercise” of discussing the growth of nationalistic movements, the achievement of independence, the history of self-government, and pre-colonial African civilizations. All of these can be seen as an attempt to place Africans at the center of African history. Another task of nationalist history in Nigeria was “to make the history usable and relevant to the Nigerian state … to promote nation building.”


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29 In 1976, Strayer wrote, “In recent years, the study of mission history has achieved a remarkable vitality, partly owing to the ready availability of material but deriving more fundamentally from a growing integration with the major thrusts of contemporary African historiography…” He is not referring specifically to nationalist historiography, for by the mid-1970s there were other thrusts, but there were continued compatibilities between nationalist historiography and these new themes. Strayer, “Mission History in Africa: New Perspectives on an Encounter,” 1, 6. See also: Robert I. Rotberg, *Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-1924* (Princeton: PUP, 1965), vii.
who failed to make Africans the center of African Christian history.\textsuperscript{30} Western scholars, Ayandele and J. F. Ade Ajayi suggested, must swallow a “bitter pill:” they have not been writing African church history at all.\textsuperscript{31} Ayandele was primarily interested in the failures of missionaries, and the resistance and reaction of Africans to the white missionaries, administrators and traders.\textsuperscript{32} Robert Strayer identified several additional interests in mission history during this period. Historians discussed African initiatives in missions and how missionaries transformed African cultures.\textsuperscript{33} In recent years, nationalist historiography has been criticized by some scholars, but continues to have an influence on assumptions about missionaries, mission adherents and the missionary movement, and on the academic preoccupations with African grievances, missionary offences, racial conflicts, and religious divisions.

Nationalist historians saw AICs as representations of African initiative, as symbols of African triumph over western religious domination and as precursors of African nationalism.\textsuperscript{34} Thus A. J. Temu stated that the Githunguri Teacher Training College was a success, not because it produced good teachers, but because it contributed to the nationalist movement. The independent schools movement was praised, not because it contributed to education in Kenya, but because it inculcated the types of ideas that made many Kikuyu into good Mau Mau fighters.\textsuperscript{35} AICs were a response to \textit{anomie}, a reaction to the colonial situation, and ‘religions of the oppressed.’\textsuperscript{36} These churches were idealized and lionized, and championed by

\textsuperscript{31} Ajayi and Ayandele, “Writing African Church History,” 90.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Anomie} was defined by Peel as “the absence of stable social relations and authority which is the result of enforced and abrupt social change.” He was critical of \textit{anomie} as the sole explanation for the emergence of AICs because while it described the conditions, it could not explain the motivation of these groups. Peel, \textit{Aladura}, 4-8.
historians. Nationalist history had a profound impact upon understandings of the encounter; it left little space for critical reflections upon the activities of AICs leaders or for sympathetic portrayals of missionaries.

In the 1970s new themes began to pervade African historiography. The confidence and optimism of nationalist historiography was fading as the independent African nations began to experience infighting and failures. John Lonsdale described the shortcomings of nationalist historiography, of which he was a part, in the following way: “…our historiography expected too much of African states in the future and examined too little their failings in the past.” Another problem raised with nationalist historiography was the degree to which it sought to interpret colonialism through the rigid grid of collaboration vs. resistance. In so doing, they ignored many of the complexities and contradictions of the colonial experience. The new histories sought to reflect Africa’s transitions and began to chronicle injury as well as pride. Colonial history had been described in a “largely condemnatory and even purposively hostile” way in the former era, but to a growing degree, scholars began to write about the colonial era “in a better and more objective light…” A noticeable trend in recent years has also been the renewal of interest in religion among secular historians. Scholars were not primarily interested in AICs as proto-political movements, but as religious and cultural movements.

In mission historiography, scholars began to critique the highly political and economic focuses of previous approaches and to suggest the need to explore African religion and culture in relation to the missionary movement. Other new interests included the influence of African religious concepts on mission history, the study of

37 Adoeye, “Understanding the Crisis in Modern Nigerian Historiography,” 2.
38 Ibid., 3.
symbols, ritual, and myth in African theology, and the resilience of African Traditional Religion. Instead of emphasizing the failures of the missionaries, the new studies sought to understand African disappointment with western Christianity and how they responded creatively to this disillusionment. While scholars were pioneering new intellectual territory, mission historiography did not on the whole shift away from focuses on conflict, division, and reaction - the negative side of the encounter.

In AIC historiography, some scholars began to see problems with interpreting AICs as political protest movements, and colonialism as the sole “causative and explanatory factor,” something that H. W. Turner had been saying since the 1960s. There were many examples of how AICs were apparently quite willing to obey the law of the land and the colonial leaders. Thus they needed to be interpreted primarily as religious movements.

Most of the histories of AICs in this study were written during periods that glorified African initiatives and deprecated the missionary movement and colonial government. Certainly, the missionaries and colonial officials were guilty of much of the accusations leveled against them, but in regards to the encounter, their offenses have been magnified. The role of African rulers opposing the missions has been emphasized, while their role in opposing AICs has been downplayed. African mission Christians have been labeled collaborationists and largely neglected by scholars until recently. AICs have been approached with a high degree of sympathy. It should be evident, therefore, that this study has filled an important gap in current understandings of the encounter. It has expanded the discussion on European missionaries and officials; it began to explore the role of African mission adherents and African government officials; and it started the process of critically reflecting upon AIC opposition narratives in the context of the encounter.

There are other academic trends that help to explain current assumptions about the encounter. First, the important histories of the encounter in this study have been written with the goal of understanding and identifying with AICs. The oral

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48 Ibid., 20-1.
49 See footnote two in the Introduction at the beginning of this thesis.
histories of AICs have also been purposefully favoured. This impulse sprung from a positive desire to understand the histories of Africans, but this approach to the encounter presents a fundamental historical problem: favouring African perspectives, to the exclusion of European points of view, leads to questionable conclusions. Historians cannot possibly claim to understand mission and government responses without delving deeply into the records they left behind.

Approaching the encounter with a preference towards AICs has observable consequences on how events are understood and interpreted. The ramifications of such an approach can be seen in the way some scholars have discussed the circumcision crisis of 1929 in Kenya. Emphasis is placed on the struggle of certain Kenyans for cultural and religious liberation - on justifying some Kikuyu responses to missionary intolerance. But what about those Africans who chose to remain within the missions? Many of these individuals were the victims of AIC animosity and aggression. There were many incidences of theft, intimidation, destruction of property, violence, and forced circumcision. In some cases, victims feared to seek justice in the courts because of threats of further violence. In other locations, fathers willing to bring forward cases, allegedly, failed to receive justice in the Native Courts where local officials favoured the custom. This part of the circumcision crisis has not truly been explored, begging the question, why have these Africans been seen as of secondary importance in African history, or ignored altogether?

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55 Ibid. See also: V. M. McKeg, “Female Circumcision,” to Divisional Chiefs Warahiu, Josiah and Muhoho, 10 April 1941. KNA: MA/3/1 (39).
It can, perhaps be partially explained by reference to trends in African historiography. The collaboration vs. resistance paradigm is helpful in explaining why this may have transpired. Historians favoured those who resisted Europeans during the colonial era, thus, African mission adherents were marginalized. Historians wanted to place Africans at the centre of African history, but more accurately, a certain category of Africans. That may be why the greatest victims in this episode, the ones who experienced the most physical hostility, have been put on the periphery.57

By favouring AIC oral histories, the chronology of the encounter can also be altered in such a way as to change the interpretation. A good example of this is the history of the Bishop’s training scheme, which involved members of the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA) attending the CMS Divinity School and being ordained by the Bishop. The controversial part of the chronology is the ending. In general, KISA sources suggest that Bishop Heywood eventually turned them away, leaving them with no other option than to go to Archbishop Alexander of the African Orthodox Church.58 The mission churches ultimately deserve blame for the failure of the training scheme and the episode exposes the true inner feelings of the missions towards AICs - they never intended to collaborate. By favouring AIC sources, some scholars have followed this chronology and interpretation.59

This thesis has argued for a different chronology and interpretation in chapter three. In Anglican correspondence it is clear that the KISA abandoned negotiations and rejected the Bishop’s plan.60 This can be seen in the fact that Bishop Heywood was actively pursuing the training scheme with members of the Alliance and setting out his detailed plan in documents dated after the KISA had chosen to pursue ordination with Archbishop Alexander. Based upon this chronology, then, the interpretation is that the KISA ultimately rejected collaboration with Anglicans. In

57 This is generally true of the way Sandgren has recorded the history of interaction between those who left the AIM (Arege) and those who remained (Kirore). David P. Sandgren, Christianity and the Kikuyu, Religious Divisions and Social Conflict (New York: Peter Lang, 1989). See also: J. E. Anderson, “Selection and Adaption outside the Government/Missionary Framework – The Independent Schools,” in The Struggle for the School (London: Longman, 1970).
60 “Heretical and Schismatic Sects,” 1948. CMS/B: AF/35/49 G3/A5/1 (9).
their actions, they revealed that they were not primarily interested in collaboration but ordination, and the Archbishop offered the quickest path to that end.

AIC oral histories do not transmit the complete history of the encounter, but rather a selection of stories about independent churches and missions. In 1918, an influenza epidemic came to Yorubaland. Aladura sources emphasize the role of this epidemic in encouraging its birth through the faithless inaction of the missions - their spiritual and physical retreat in the face of crisis.\(^6^1\) In so doing, mission leaders left their flocks defenceless and vulnerable to the wolves. The Aladura, the “true shepherds,” stepped into the leadership void left by mission church leaders.\(^6^2\) A somewhat different picture emerges based upon Anglican accounts of their own activities during the crisis.

Universal testimony points to the fact that the proportion of deaths was much lower among the [Anglican] Christians than among the heathen and Moslems. This led to a two-fold attitude on the part of the heathen - 1. In some districts having tried all their sacrifices in vain, and Ifa (the god of divination) having failed to tell the cause of or the cure for the disease, they came to the conclusion that the God of the Christians was the One, who heard and answered prayer. One heathen Chief used the bell which used to be rung at the time of idol festivals to be rung morning and evening in his compound that all his people might come and join the Christians in prayer.

2. In other cases, the disease was put down to witchcraft, and as the Christians suffered less, they were supposed to be the witches. They were even called upon to drink sasswood, a kind of poisonous bark, to test their guilt or innocence. The Authorities in most places ordered the closing of Churches and Schools with the idea of preventing the spread of disease. In a good many cases the Christians continued to meet for prayer in the open air or in their houses.\(^6^3\)

Such accounts contradict Aladura characterizations of mission churches and church leaders. They abandoned neither prayer nor faith in this location. They did not abdicate their role as spiritual leaders in a time of crisis, but apparently used it, as the Aladura did, to extend their religious reach.

The differing interpretations of the mission church response to the epidemic may be partially attributed to differing theological beliefs and worldviews. Many

\(^{63}\) Yoruba and Hausa Missions Report of Progress, January 1918.
Aladura believed radically in faith and saw western medicine as an impediment to proper relationship with God. Thus western medical practices such as putting the sick in quarantine, was interpreted by some Aladura as a faithless action indicative of spiritual powerlessness; obeying the government issued orders to cancel church services in some areas was interpreted similarly. Frank Melville Jones’ account of the epidemic shows how the use of western medicine and medical practices was an important part of the Anglican response to the epidemic. His compound was, essentially, turned into a sickbay; twelve volunteers tended one hundred sick individuals without concern for their own health. This is the furthest thing, of course, from seeking to escape from the influenza behind locked doors. These were brave actions on the part of Anglicans, and ones that required faith, not just western medicine.

Prayer was not absent from the Anglican response to the influenza, nor was the attempt to preach God’s power in the midst of the crisis. Nor did Anglicans merely accept the government order to close churches in the locations where it was issued. Reverend N. Johnson petitioned the government to reopen churches for gatherings on Sunday mornings. Anglicans were encouraged to gather in homes for prayer. C. W. Wakeman and Bishop Oluwole coordinated the house gatherings so that the prayers of the church would be offered collectively. The church bells were rung at 8:30am and 4:00 pm on Sundays, calling Christians to united prayer. In other locations, Anglican Christians defied local inhabitants who threatened Christians with violence should they ring their bells to meet for prayer (for they were convinced that the Christians were responsible for the epidemic). Mr. Okoye, of the Niger Mission told the story of how Christians defiantly rang their bells, met for prayer during the epidemic, and how he was violently accosted for doing so. None of these examples are present in the Aladura accounts of Anglican responses to the epidemic. There is something to be learned about AIC uses of history from this. The oral history of the encounter is an essential part of Aladura exodus narratives and

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64 F. Melville Jones to G. T. Manley, 19 October 1918. NNAI: CMS(Y)1/2/2.
65 F. Melville Jones to G. T. Manley, 1 November 1918. NNAI: CMS(Y)1/2/2.
66 Yoruba and Hausa Missions Report of Progress, January 1918.
68 I Oluwole to C. W. Wakeman, 11 October 1918. NNAI: CMS(Y)2/5/22.
helps to justify their emergence, but their representations of Anglican actions are often simplistic and selective.

AIC accounts of the encounter are to be found in much of the correspondence with the government, which are now housed in the national archives in Nigeria, Kenya and Britain. These documents, produced by AIC leaders themselves, displayed a profound feeling of extreme persecution. They highlighted the hand of God in AIC history, rejoiced in the power of the founder, and defended the legitimacy of the church. These sources were concerned with self-definition in the face of competing attempts to define AICs. The narratives in these documents often intuited hidden motivations of the mission and government officials. In so doing, AICs used history to define others as well. By interpreting current events and stereotyping the motivations of opponents, these histories were used as tools of evangelism and protest.

Second, the academic representation of the encounter has often attempted to downplay and to rationalize the antagonistic aspects of AICs. This is evident even among well-respected scholars like H. W. Turner, who in the space of a single page, characterized the attitudes of the Church of the Lord to mission churches as “kindly and tolerant,” only to spend the next few paragraphs enumerating the many ways in which they could not tolerate mission theology. Omoyajowo makes a similar assertion: “While it is true that it [the Cherubim and Seraphim] has seen itself as the ‘best’ Church, its member’s attitude to other churches cannot be described as negative in a general sense…” Similarly, R. W. Wyllie, referring to AICs in Ghana


71 Temu, British Protestant Missions, 160-61. Omoyajowo, Cherubim and Seraphim, 58.


73 Omoyajowo, Cherubim and Seraphim, 1, 222.
wrote, “For while Spiritists often stress the spiritual and practical superiority of their religion, they have not developed sectarian attitudes of opposition or hostility toward non-Spiritist churches…”74 Many of the AICs in this study believed they possessed a “special revelation,” a “better knowledge of God,” “superior spiritual powers” and, frankly, acted in ways that were intolerant of other churches and religions.75

An excellent example of the AIC critique of the mission church has been preserved in a tract written by Aladura leader, J. Ade Aina in 1932. Aina describes the tract as a defence of the Aladura prophets, but it is just as much a sharp critique of mission churches. “The Present-Day Prophets and the Principles upon which they Work”76 typifies the kinds of criticisms that are found in AIC literature, and illustrates why it is problematic to view AICs as essentially tolerant and kindly to other churches. Aina carefully avoids any specific reference to the missions or a particular mission, instead using the term ‘professing Christians.’ It can safely be inferred, however, that the missions are the targets of his criticisms.

Within this document Aina accused the missions of deceiving those who would blindly follow. The leaders of the missions preached a false Christianity that placed its faith in man rather than God; they fooled church members by telling them to rely on “poisonous” western medicines, “compounded by the wise men of this world.” This was contrary to scripture, and made professing Christians weaker and more susceptible to attacks of their enemies. Mission Christianity was of no use to parishioners for it kept them in “lifeless” darkness. The existing churches were of use to pastors, however, for they encouraged members to remain in a passive state where they could be “taxed” to fill church coffers.77

77 A similar idea, though expressed more diplomatically, was given by Nathan Ngala for the emergence for the African Israel Church Nineveh. David A. Shank. “Beyond Paternalism? The
The churches, instead of houses of refuge and protection had become the dens of thieves and robbers, liars, etc. Doing evil to one another, biting one another, robbing one another; numberless of them in jail, found guilty of all these evil practices. Qualifications of Christians are very much lacking in the churches. Have become houses of death. Death reigns instead of life. May God save us from such places.\textsuperscript{78}

The Aladura prophets, he suggested, were sent by God to disabuse the mission adherents of their delusions and to oppose evil, including that which existed in churches. They came, not to reform the old, but to establish a new vineyard to feed the people, a new Church of the Lord where the devil had no power, a chapel where the “filthiness” and “uncleanness” that accumulated on professing Christians could be washed away. And that is why those who spoke out against the Aladura, including government officials and Anglicans, were guilty of “blasphemies.”

Aina reinforced his statements by making use of biblical comparison. The Aladura prophets were equated with the biblical prophets and the Apostles, and the mission leaders were likened to those who opposed the prophets and the Apostles.

These apostles went on from victory to victory, though they were sorely persecuted by the great men, especially they who appeared to be godly outwardly, but inwardly they were the greatest enemies of the Truth, fighting against God, and thinking they were fighting for Him...

The comparison is a powerful condemnation of mission leaders. By placing them in line of those who opposed the biblical prophets and Apostles, Aina amplified Anglican offenses. The use of biblical comparison also places the Aladura ultimately in the camp of the righteous and those who triumphed over evil. There should be no doubt that this tract constituted a serious theological assault on the existing churches and was predicated upon a deeply held dissatisfaction with the missions.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{78} Aina, “Present-Day Prophets.”
\textsuperscript{79} Even in cases such as William Wade Harris in Sierra Leone, who has traditionally been seen as friendly to missions, new research suggests that he was giving dual messages to listeners: both reinforcing and undercutting the mission. Thus scholars are beginning to reassess the complexities in the messages of AIC leaders and showing how these messages have sometimes been simplistically portrayed. T. O. Ranger, “Religious Movements and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa,” ASR 29, 2 June (1986): 30.
There is a tendency to ignore or circumvent discussions of the antagonistic side of AICs, even in the context of the encounter wherein it cannot be seen as tangential. David Barrett acknowledged the “violence, hostility, bitterness, and polemic often found in African separatism” but only to add that such aspects of the encounter should not be used to question their status as part of the global church.\(^80\) His point was essentially an apologetic for AICs at a time when they were not widely recognized as ‘Christian’ movements, but it should not dissuade historians today from exploring this side of their activities.

AICs played an important role in fostering negative relationships with other churches and with political opponents, whether African or European.\(^81\) Not only did they occasionally fan the flames of animosity, but in some cases they struck the first spark.\(^82\) AICs also acted in confrontational and offensive ways to the adherents of other religions at times.\(^83\) And these actions had a negative affect on the encounter,

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building up resentments, creating a deficit of trust, and adding to the hostility. AIC leaders may have had an important message, but their ideas and methods brought turmoil and controversy in their wake, especially in the mission churches.

Some AIC leaders earned reputations as troublemakers: this was the effect of their ideas and actions in the mission churches and in some African communities.84 An important aspect of AIC missionary methods, though not exclusively, was to target existing churches and religious bodies to draw away adherents.85 Indeed, reading some Aladura literature from the missionary point of view would lead to the unavoidable conclusion that AICs measured their success according to their ability to upset the work of other churches. One example of this was a letter from D. O. Odubanjo of the Faith Tabernacle to D. P. Williams of the British Apostolic Church celebrating the impact of the Aladura on the mission churches.

When the revival became very strong it happened that nearly all the churches in the town and country villages emptied; all left their churches to join Brother Babalola’s revival meetings, and strange to report, that the thousands of these people did not return to their churches, but cast in their lots with our organization. The Wesleyan Church, where they have about 400 attendants, only about 100 people remained there. Also, the Anglican Church in this town, where they have about 1,200 members, only about 600 remained, the rest came to join our movement. The Wesleyan Hospital, during the time of the campaign, the patients ran away from the hospital and only about 10 remained there. Even one of them asked Brother Babalola to pray for him! In the district and towns and villages, churches which formerly belonged to other denominations, the entire members sent in their resignations to their European missionaries that they ceased to be under their work and they sent for our nearest pastors to take possession of their

M Murders,” to the District Commissioners at Kiambu, Fort Hall and Nyeri, 29 December 1947. KNA: DC/FH/1/4 (20).
churches, and so they joined our organization, bag and baggage. In some Anglican Churches, where the members used to contribute annually to the native pastorate fund a sum of 1,200 before this healing campaign started, now, I am sorry to report that this church did not get more than 500 yearly at present because most of the members have left to join our Church. Many of the schools belonging to the Wesleyan and Anglican Churches, including Baptist and Roman Catholics, have been closed down altogether as there has not been sufficient money again to pay their teachers from the fact that their members have left to join us.86

This letter was sent to Williams in the hopes of securing funding and personnel. Odubanjo concluded his letter with an appeal; if the Apostolic Church did not send missionaries “these people whom God has called out of darkness will automatically go back to their dead churches and former devilish cults, and those hundreds of new converts whom God called out of Mohammedanism will likewise go back to worship the false prophet of Islam.”87 It is clear also from Aina’s “Modern Day Prophets,” that the Aladura considered it part of their God-given mandate to confront the missions and pronounce judgment upon them for their deceptions.88

Many AICs did not wish to collaborate with mission churches. There are glimpses of this in their own statements and writings. One such proclamation was made during a doctrinal conflict between the Church of the Lord and the Faith Tabernacle (later the Christ Apostolic Church). At the climax of this episode, J. O. Oshitelu is said to have responded to those who were criticizing him, “…God had enabled him to face the priests of the Church Missionary Society he would also overcome this.”89 Quotes such as this reveal much of the mindset of AIC leaders like Oshitelu towards mission churches. His objective was not to cooperate or reconcile with mission churches, but to triumph over them. Such attitudes must be factored into discussions of the encounter.

This part of the encounter still needs to be considered further. What this study has shown, however, is that the actions of AICs played an important part in contributing to the negativity of the encounter. Critics will object to focusing on AICs in this way, but it is hoped that these last paragraphs will not be read in

86 D. O. Odubanjo to D. P. Williams, 4 May 1930. NNAI: COMCOL/1/1301.
87 Ibid.
89 Oshitelu, History of the Aladura Churches, 89.
isolation from other sources on the subject, especially those that explore more fully than is possible here the many wonderful and inspiring aspects of the AIC movement.
Notes

1. Archival Sources:

The University of Birmingham, Special Collections (CMS/B)

The University of Birmingham holds a substantial collection of documents relating to the Church Missionary Society. Sources on the Kenya Mission are classified under the G3/A5 and the Yoruba Mission under G3/A2.

Harold W. Turner Collection, Selly Oak, University of Birmingham (HTC)

This is a well organized archive of documents relating to New Religious Movements from around the world collected by Harold W. Turner and others. The collection is primarily secondary literature and currently held in a room at the library on the Selly Oaks campus.

The Nigerian National Archives, Ibadan (NNAI)

This collection is housed on the campus of the University of Ibadan. The National Archives possess good collections on the Church Missionary Society in Yorubaland (CMS (Y)) and particularly some local correspondence not available at the University of Birmingham. I also consulted the government records, primarily those relating to the District (DIV) and Provincial (PROF) Officers.

The University of Ibadan, Special Collections (UIL)

There is a unique collection of documents written by AIC and Anglican leaders in the special collections, on the top floor of the University of Ibadan Library. These various collections are generally not catalogued, but quite a valuable set of documents for this topic. I consulted the papers of S. C. Phillips (SCP), W. F. Sosan (WFS), and A. B. Akinyele (ABA).

The Kenyan National Archives, Nairobi (KNA)

The National Archives are a valuable source of documents and correspondence about government officials from most parts of the Kenya. I consulted documents produced by District (DC) and Provincial (PC) Commissioners. There are also a variety of other useful manuscripts (MSS or MA) relating to the Church Missionary Society and other religious organizations.
2. Church Missionary Society Publications

Church Missionary Society Periodicals:

CMS Home Gazette (HG)
Church Missionary Intelligencer (CMI)
Church Missionary Outlook (CMO)
Church Missionary Society Gazette (CMSG)
Church Missionary Review (CMR)
Eastward Ho! (EH)
The Way of Healing

"Apolo of the Pygmy Forest a Vice-President of the C.M.S." CMO LIV, December (1927): 255-256.
Basden, George T. "Fifty Years' Work Among the Ibos of Nigeria." CMR LVIII, March (1907): 139-148.
_______. "Denationalizing a Primitive People." CMR LXVI, October (1915): 597-603.
_______. "Returning to Kenya in War Time." CMO 8, December-January (1941): 41.


Dann, A. "Like Chief, Like People." *CMO* 1 July (1924): 147.
"Evangelize!" *CMO*, June (1936): 134.
"Fall in C.M.S. Receipts." *CMR* LXVI, January (1915): 4-5.


______. "Modern Missions and Industry in Africa." *CMO* LXI, April (1934): 75-76.


"Islington College to be Closed." *CMR* LXIV, August (1915): 454.


______. "Where will it Lead." *CMO* June (1932): 118.


"Kikuyu and the C.M.S." *CMR* LXVI, October (1915): 581.
______. "Twenty Years Ago - Twenty Years Ahead." *CMO* LIV, April (1927): 67-70.

"Light and Shade in Oshogbo District." *CMG* 1 October (1921): 211.


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