Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that the research reported therein has been conducted by myself unless otherwise indicated.

Functional Heads and Interpretation

David Adger
Acknowledgements

My main intellectual debt in this thesis is to my supervisor, Elisabet Engdahl, who has always been encouraging and inspiring throughout my postgraduate years. Many thanks also to my examiners Teun Hoekstra and Ronnie Cann for their insightful comments on the initial submission of the thesis.

Many other members of the linguistics community in Edinburgh have contributed to this work, through conversations, seminars and comments. My thanks to Darren Brient, Ronnie Cann, Robin Cooper, Tomaz Erjavec, Claire Grover, Pat Healey, Lex Holt, Janne Johannessen, Laura Joosten, Ewan Klein, Dimitra Koliakou, Martin Mellor, Marc Moens, K. Nagita, Diane Nelson, Enric Vallduví, and especially Catrin Siân Rhys for taking the time to be interested.

Much of the thesis is based on ideas generated while out of Edinburgh. In Amherst, my thanks to my teachers Emmon Bach, Hagit Borer, Angelika Kratzer and Peggy Spass, and to my friend Jeff Runner. In California thanks to Jane Grimshaw and Barbara Partee for stimulating courses and to the extended Santa Cruz family: Diana Cresti, Paul Elas, Dan Flickinger, Peter Svenonius, David Walker, and of course Catrin. In Holland, many thanks to Hans Bennis and Peter Coopmans for making my visit possible, and to Hans den Besten and Afge Hulk for their time. Teun Hoekstra’s course in Leiden was inspiring and many of the ideas in this thesis had their origins there. Many thanks to my friends in Holland for making my stay so valuable: Elena Anagnostopoulou, Valentijn van Dijk, Anastasias Giannakidou, Josep Quer, Tonjes Veenstra.

Many thanks to my family, for having confidence in me and for all the support they have given me over the years.

Also to my informants (who are acknowledged in the body of the thesis). But special thanks to Domhnall Uilleam Stiubhart for his enthusiasm, and to Carlos for a stimulating few months.

Finally to my non-linguist friends, who have put up with quizzical eyebrow raisings at every weak island violation and made the last few years absolutely fabulous. Especially to Alison in Edinburgh, to Steve in Amsterdam, and to the extended denizens of 47 Great King Street: Barbara, Elaine, Evan, Ian, Jenny, Karen, Marwan, Mary and Mo.

This thesis is, of course, dedicated with my love to Amon.

Note

This thesis was originally submitted October 1993. A number of copies are available under the same title but with the 1993 date. The present version, incorporating mainly typographic changes, should be considered definitive.
Abstract

This thesis examines the effect that functional heads have on the interpretation of arguments. It focuses on the functional head Agr, which is implicated in predicate-argument agreement relations; the import that other functional heads have on interpretation is a subsidiary concern. The argument of the thesis goes as follows: firstly, reference must be made to both an independently projecting functional head Agr and to a level of discourse representation in order to adequately analyse the phenomenon of predicate argument agreement. This theory sheds light on an unusual complementarity between agreement and overt arguments in Celtic because it provides a natural constraint on morphological feature checking mechanisms. Secondly, some aspects of the semantics of argument DPs are also best explained by reference to a level of discourse representation; specifically weak DPs (Milstein 1977) are contextually disambiguated and strong DPs are characterised by the property of familiarity at this level. Empirical evidence then shows that there is a close tie between familiarity and Agr, and this is implemented by a reformulation of Heim 1982's Novelty Familiarity Condition, obviating any need for special statements regulating the mapping between syntactic structure and interpretation. Puzzling cross-linguistic variation in this area is explained by appeal to general economy considerations (Chomsky 1991). A logical corollary of the Novelty Familiarity Condition is that necessarily unfamiliar arguments may not enter into a structural relationship with Agr. Measure phrases provide the confirmation of this prediction. Finally the implications that functional heads have for syntactic licensing is considered, and Tense and Aspect are shown to be necessary, as well as Agr. The thesis shows that functional heads are therefore implicated in the interpretation of arguments.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The structure of this thesis is the inverse of its intellectual history. I was originally interested in exploring the question as to what distinguishes adjuncts from arguments. My initial methodology was then to look at phenomena which involved elements that seemed halfway between adjuncts and arguments, given the usual criteria. The phenomenon that I first looked at was measure phrases, such as the following:

1.1 Anson weighed seventy kilos

Measure phrases seem to act like canonical arguments, in that they are obligatory:

1.2 *Anson weighed

but they seem to act like canonical adjuncts, in that they are not extractable from weak islands induced by factives etc (see Rizzi 1990, Cinque 1990).

1.3 a. What, did Anson regret that David ate the cake?
   b. *How, did Anson regret that David ate the cake?
   c. *What did Anson regret that David weighed?

This dual nature suggested to me that measure phrases appeared to be a good place to begin to look to explore the differences between adjuncts and arguments.

As I began to look at the syntax of measure phrases in more detail, I noticed two things. The first was something that arose from an earlier interest of mine which had to do with the syntax of Scottish Gaelic (SG). SG has an interesting object preposing construction where the object of the verb comes preverbally, rather than postverbally, as would be expected, and a particle a appears. I had presented some arguments that this preposing operation was to be analysed as overt movement to the specifier position of an Agr projection associated with the non-finite verb in these constructions (Adger 1991), where the particle a was the morphological realisation of a neutralised Agr head. In a moment of idle curiosity, I presented an informant with a pair of sentences containing measure phrases, preposed and in situ. To my surprise the measure phrase did not prepose. I then began to look around at other phenomena which would appear to receive a plausible analysis as movement to the spec of AgrP, and I tested how measure phrases behaved in these constructions; as I suspected they always remained in situ.

The other thing that I noticed early on about measure phrases was that they appeared to have some kind of definiteness effect operating on them, barring such examples as:

1.4 *Anson weighed every kilo

I spent some effort trying to tie together these three aspects of the syntax of measure phrases—weak island phenomena, movement to spec AgrP and definiteness effects—(Adger 1993), but was always left with an uneasy feeling that I had missed a simpler explanation. Partly, I was blinded by my initial research question: what is the theoretical difference between complements and adjuncts? I was trying to find that difference in terms of modes of licensing, and was pushed into looking at measure phrases as selected DPs that were licensed in a different way from canonical arguments (I assumed that they were licensed by coindexation with Tense). Crucially, this made me ignore the differences between indefinites and measure phrases, which I thought of as being treated in the same way.

As I presented this work in various venues, a recurring question came from the audiences: what is the semantic effect of being licensed by Tense? Thinking that this was too chaotic and dark territory, I began to try to answer what I thought was an easier question: what is the semantic effect of being licensed by Agr? This then became the focus of my research, and is the subject of this thesis.

The moment I asked this question a flood of data appeared before me in the guise of Diesing’s work (Diesing 1992) and various extensions or alternatives to this (Runner 1993 and de Hoop 1992). Diesing appeared to have an answer to the question of what semantic effects were relevant in a number of the cases that I was interested in. She constructed a theory which tried to explain why certain readings of canonically ambiguous indefinites were blocked in certain syntactic environments. The crucial cases are to be found in scrambling phenomena in German. For example in Dutch, a DP like veel mensen ‘many men’ is ambiguous in its VP-internal (base) position: it can be given an interpretation where the quantifier veel ‘many’ is read as a cardinality predicate (the cardinality of the set of men is many) or as a generalised quantifier (where veel relates two sets, one of which is restricted to the set of men):

1.5 …dat Tonjes gisteren veel mensen gezien heeft
   …that Tonjes yesterday many men seen has
   ‘…that Tonjes saw many men yesterday.’

However, when the object is scrambled across the adverb, only the generalised quantifier reading remains:

1.6 …dat Tonjes veel mensen gisteren gezien heeft
   …that Tonjes many men yesterday seen has
   ‘…that Tonjes saw many men yesterday.’

Diesing’s explanation for this effect is given in her Mapping Hypothesis, which derives that quantified arguments that are external to VP and internal to IP receive an interpretation as generalised quantifiers. This hypothesis explains the Germanic data,
but obviously runs into problems with indefinites in subject position in English, which are VP-external but still ambiguous. Diesing deals with this by allowing the subject to lower back into its VP-internal base position by LF. Since the Mapping Hypothesis applies at LF, the generalization can be maintained.

Now measure phrases, I had already noticed, do not scramble, and I had proposed that this received an explanation if scrambling was movement to the spec of an Agr phrase marker. Diesing pointed out that measure phrases do not undergo this type of movement. If Diesing’s general idea was correct, then the inability of measure phrases to scramble might be explained by some semantic factor.

However, there were a number of problems that I had with Diesing’s theory. These were problems that arose because I was focusing on the position of an argument DP with respect to Agr, rather than its more general position in the phrase marker, and because it was uppermost in my mind that I wanted a unified explanation for the aspects of the syntax of measure phrases that I had noticed. The main questions then were: what is the precise characterisation of the VP external position that the Mapping Hypothesis applies to? why are indefinite DPs always ambiguous in situ? Why do some languages allow lowering operations at LF, and others don’t? (this last was a problem recurrently pointed out to me by Elisabet Engdahl.)

My hypothesis about the characterisation of Diesing’s VP external position was obviously that it was spec- Agr-F. As Jeff Hammar pointed out (Hammar 1983), this covered all of Diesing’s data. Furthermore, it covered the data that I had gathered during my search for relationships between measure phrases and agreement (data from French and Spanish). The question then arose whether Diesing’s Mapping Hypothesis should be reformulated so that it takes account of Agr, rather than the more global position of an element in a phrase marker. That is, does the functional head Agr have a semantic effect on its own, or is the phenomenon merely derivative of the fact that AgrP is external to VP. The crucial test case would be an argument which was in a VP external position which did not have the possibility of a generalised quantifier type reading. Such a case came to my notice after a presentation by Enric Vallduví, where he built on earlier observations by Josep Quer that Catalan contained a position internal to IP which showed definiteness effects. That is, where a generalised quantifier type reading of the argument was not available. This case allowed me to strengthen the Mapping Hypothesis so that it made direct mention of the structural relationship between an argument and the functional head Agr that the argument was associated with. It seemed then that the functional head Agr had a direct effect on the interpretation of an associated argument.

The next question was why indefinite DPs in situ are always ambiguous (controlling for definiteness effects). At first, in fact I did not control for definiteness effects and presumed that indefinites in situ could not have a generalised quantifier interpretation, that is they were always treated as ‘cardinality’ predicates. This is what is directly predicted by the Mapping Hypothesis. Unfortunately it does not actually appear to be true. Definiteness effects seem to be something extra to the provisions of the Mapping Hypothesis. Given this fact, indefinites in situ are always ambiguous, something which is not explained in Diesing’s theory. What then is the nature of the ambiguity? The literature on this question answers this question in two ways: the ambiguity is lexical (Enck 1991, Partee 1988), or syntactic (Diesing 1992, de Hoop 1992). Enck’s proposal seemed to me to be the most interesting. She claimed that a lexical ambiguity leads to an ambiguity at the level of discourse structure (Heim 1982, Kamp 1981). As I tried to work out what this meant, I realised that a crucial fact about
I thought I had isolated the right descriptive generalisation but was at a loss as to how to derive it from the theory. I felt Chomsky's recent checking theory might give some insight (Chomsky 1992) but this theory appeared to me to be completely unconstrained. Many analyses down the line, it occurred to me that the kinds of ideas that were relevant for the rest of my work might hold in this domain too, and that natural constraints on the possible interpretations of discourse referents might have a trickle down effect to the mechanics of the checking theory. I was already fairly convinced that Agr was implicated in some way in referring to or being associated with a discourse referent (the relevant arguments being well known in the HPSG literature), and it therefore followed that the constraints on discourse referents would therefore apply to Agr. This gives the kind of checking theory that does make predictions, and much of the Celtic data flowed easily from this premise.

Reading the thesis, it comes in almost directly the opposite order from this brief history of the ideas involved. Firstly the HPSG arguments that agreement is at least partly semantic are explored and then the effect that this has on checking theory and the empirical results that follow for Celtic. The thesis then tries to explain the semantics of DPs in a discourse referent based (DRT) framework, and uses the results to explore the semantic effect that Agr has on associated DPs. Diesing's work is assessed and the falsifying data from Catalan given. A discussion of the LF lowering problem follows, with my solution and the consequences. Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis is replaced with a revised formulation of Heim's Novelty Familiarity Condition (Heim 1982), which has more appropriate empirical coverage. A direct comparison of this condition is shown to have consequences for measure phrases, resulting in an account of their syntactic and semantic properties. Finally some issues in the syntactic licensing of DPs and measure phrases is discussed, with the preposing data from SG serving as a diagnostic of movement to spec AgrP. This final section discusses the interpretation of the functional heads T (tense) and Asp (aspect), justifying the rather broader title of the thesis.

Unfortunately, the original aim of the research project, to give some theoretical underpinnings to the argument/adjunct distinction is still some way off. I hope that the resulting thesis, however, has taken one tiny step in the right direction.

Chapter 2

The Syntax and Semantics of Agreement

2.1 Introduction

Theories of Agreement generally distinguish two types: agreement of a modifier with a modified element and agreement of a predicate with one or more of its arguments. An example of the first type of agreement is provided by French:

(2.1) J'ai vu des pièces intéressantes
     'I have seen some interesting plays'

Here the head noun pièces is feminine plural and the adjective agrees with it in these features. We shall term such agreement Modifier-Head-association (MH-agreement).

The second type of agreement is seen in English, where the verb agrees with its subject in number:

(2.2) The scuba-divers were *was leaping from the ship

In English the verbal predicate only agrees with one of its arguments. Other languages allow verbs to agree with all of their arguments, and prepositions to agree with their arguments also. This can be exemplified by the following examples from Abkhaz (taken from Lehmbruch 1988):

a. (sam) a-xec'ka a-sq'ka' (ge-a-ko-y'i)
   1Art-childpl 2Art-bookpl 3Abs-Dat3PL-Erg3sg.give3Dyn/Fin
   'I gave the books to the children'

b. (sam) a-sq'ya+n+it
   1Art3sg from
   'from me'

Here we see the verb agreeing with its ergative, absolutive and dative arguments and a preposition agreeing with its oblique argument. We will term this type of agreement
2.2 Syntactic Analyses of Agreement

2.2.1 Components of Analysis

The most obvious type of analysis for agreement is that particular features of one of the agreeing elements are copied onto the other element. In early work the agreeing features are represented as an abstract affix which is generated as part of a noun by the base rules. A transformational rule then copies this affix onto whatever elements in the structure agree with the noun. This is the type of analysis advocated by Postal 1964 for MH-agreement and adopted by Chomsky 1965. The idea is that an agreement formatite is generated by phrase structure rules and that there is a transformational rule that copies this formatite to the agreeing elements. One can imagine extending this type of analysis to PA-agreement by generating an agreement formatite independently and then copying it to the predicate and the argument. We will address below whether this is indeed possible.

An alternative analysis which does not make use of transformations would involve essentially passing features through the structural description generated by the base rules. Ungrammatical sentences with incompatible agreement features would then not be generated because there are no appropriate rules (see Lyons 1968 for a treatment along these lines). Postal's motivation for preferring the transformational analysis was the standard one at the time: the feature-based analysis essentially to make more theoretical statements and misses high-level generalizations.

Note that both of these analyses are couched in terms of syntactic features. The transformational analysis actualises these features as an independent formatite which then acts as an input to a transformation. The non-transformational analysis posits no separate formatite but rather specifies the features on all formatites, depending on their lexical properties.

To choose between these analyses we could find independent evidence for the agreement formatite or independent evidence that features are lexically specified on agreeing elements, as well as on the governing head. We could also try to show that the copying transformation (or however it turns out to be best to formulate the appropriate structure changing operation) is either required anyway in the grammar, or that its existence leads to contradictions or to empirical problems.

1This formulation of the properties of MH and PA-agreement is not without problems. As Tam Hoekstra has pointed out [see] French past participle agreement might be seen semantically as PA-agreement, but it does not involve person features.

Notes:

Note that the two analyses are actually not exclusive. That is, if we find evidence for an independent agreement formatite and for base specification of features, then we could construct a theory in which transformations applied to lexical items and their projections to bring them into the appropriate structural configuration with the agreement formatite. It would be at this point that the lexically specified features of the predicate and its argument have to be compatible. Such a theory would not be minimal in that it would require an independent agreement formatite, a transformation, lexically specified features and a feature checking mechanism. The following arguments indicate, however, that all of these components are required (see also Chomsky 1992).

2.2.2 Exploration of these Components

Agreement as a morpheme

It is standard to posit as the head of the sentence a functional element Inf (Chomsky 1986). Conceptual motivation for this comes from the extension of X-bar theory to non-lexical heads, thus bringing the phrase structure of the sentence into line with the phrase structure of the VP. X-bar theory states that the following structures are possible:

(23)

\[ X' = X YP \]

\[ XP = ZP X' \]

where X is the head of XP; YP is the complement of X, and ZP is the specifier of X. X-bar theory allows the rules of the base to be eliminated in favour of stipulations on lexical items as to their featural content (including head features for category and selectional features for the category/semantic type of the complement). We can then assume that the structure of the VP complement of a perception verb like see is:

(24)

I saw Anson eat bagels

(25) \[ [VP Anson [v. [v. eat bagels]]] \]

This allows us to make the theoretically attractive claim that all of the arguments of the verb are generated within the maximal projection of the verb (the Lexical Clause Hypothesis or VP-Internal Subject Hypothesis) of Sportiche 1988 and Kipperman and Sportiche 1989).

Now consider:

(26) Anson may eat bagels

Assuming that this sentence has the category S, how may we incorporate it into X-bar theory? Chomsky 1986 suggests that S is headed by a category Inf, which projects in the same way as V2.

---

1Chomsky base generates the subject in spec IP. This issue is tangential to the matter under consideration.
(2.7) \[
\{\_P\_ Anson, [\_P\_ may \_P\_ 1, \_P\_ eat bagels]]
\]

Here VP is the complement of I in the same way as NP is the complement of V. S is now of category IP and crucially is a headed structure, meaning that we can generalise the endocentricity of lexical categories to all categories, another theoretically attractive proposal. In fact Chomsky takes matters further and proposes that the complementiser is actually the head of an extended S (S'), which now becomes CP, the projection of the complementiser C. The surface word order can be derived by moving the VP internal subject to the specifier of I position, a transformation that is well-motivated by raising structures (again see Koopman and Sporsche 1989 for arguments to this effect).

Let us now turn to the sentence Anson eats bagels. We would like to assume that the VP internal subject moves into the specifier of I position as above: eat is generated as the head of VP and then it moves to the I position where it picks up the appropriate inflection to turn it into ate; eat remains in situ and the inflectional features in I lower to derive eats; eats is generated fully inflected and remains in situ; eats is generated fully inflected and raises to I. Only the third of these possibilities makes no reference to I, and it is compatible with the structure in IP being empty. However, agreement is never triggered in a bare VP structure. Hence:

(2.8) *I saw Anson eats bagels

This suggests that there must be some relation between I and the subject and between V and I, to account for the contrast between (2.4) and (2.8). If there is independent evidence that the kind of features that trigger agreement are specified lexically then the last possibility is the most well motivated.

One piece of evidence that the features are not generated in I and picked up by the verb comes from some differences between English and French noticed by Emonds 1978 and explored in detail by Pollock 1989 and Chomsky 1991. Emonds noticed that the position of adverbials and negation differed systematically in the two languages and argued that in French V raised to I but in English I lowered to V. This explains why adverbials can intervene between a verb and its object in French but not in English:

(2.9) a. Je mange souvent des bagels
    I eat often the bagels
    'I often eat bagels'

b. *Anson eats often bagels

On the assumption that VP adverbials adjoin to VP, the French data show that the verb has raised out of VP. In English, on the other hand, the verb remains in situ and hence an intervening adverbial will block Case assignment to the object (cf Stowell 1981).

Chomsky 1992 has pointed out that this analysis leads to two very different structures for the two languages with respect to the relationship between I and V. In French V has raised to I giving the structure:

(2.10) \[
\{\_V\_ I\}
\]

while in English I has lowered to adjoin to V giving:

(2.11) \[
\{\_V\_ I\}
\]

On the account where the features of V are specified lexically, we have structures where V raises to I in both languages, overtly in French and covertly in English. This means that both languages will have LF structures like (2.11), rather than having different structures at LF.

Finally, note that there is no agreement when there is no I. So agreement never occurs on V when I is filled by a modal:

(2.12) *Anson may eats bagels

It seems then that we have evidence that an independent formativ e is required and that this formativ e is implicated in the agreement relation. We also have preliminary evidence that the features that are involved in agreement are specified lexically.

The arguments presented above made crucial use of a transformation that moved one head (V) to another (I). Is there independent motivation that such a transformation is needed?

There are two ways to answer this question. One involves a fairly profound exploration of whether transformations are necessary at all, which we shall not undertake. The other merely asks whether the transformation of head movement is necessary within the grammar of transformational operations.

Note that it would be difficult to exclude such a transformation. Transformations are arbitrary structure changing operations that apply to structural descriptions: deletion, copying, movement and insertion. Structural descriptions are given by the projection of lexical items via X-bar theory which means that they consist of heads, phrases and intermediate projections of heads. To rule out head movement as a transformation we have to make an explicit statement in the grammar to the effect that a head is not a possible input to a transformation. If there is empirical evidence that this is the case then this is the move that we should take. In the absence of such empirical evidence, head movement needs no independent justification.

In fact there is a wide range of empirical evidence that head movement is required in the grammar (see eg Baker 1988). Assuming that it is not means that we must find alternative explanations for a whole range of phenomena involving complementary distribution between heads (eg V2 languages) and the morphology/syntax boundary (incorporation, applicatives, causatives etc). Of course all these phenomena have been analysed non-transformationally (see Di Sciullo and Williams 1987, for example) but given transformations at all, head movement is required.

The agreement transformation

The agreement transformation proposed by Postal mentioned above copied an independent formativ e containing agreement features from the head to the modifier to deal with MRI-agreement. To deal with our example sentence in (2.1), repeated here, Postal's analysis would assume the following D-structure for the DP object:
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(2.13) J'ai vu des pièces intéressantes
        I have seen some-pl play-pl interesting-pl
        'I have seen some interesting plays'

(2.14) [x{ D det pièces Agf elem.Pl intéressant]

The independent agreement formative is generated as an X0 sister to a head N. This formative is then copied as an X0 sister to the determiner and to the adjective.

Can we extend this account of DP internal agreement to predicate subject agreement by assuming that this formative is also copied as an X0 sister to I? This does not seem to be a sensible approach. As we already noted, MI-agreement seems to involve different sets of features from PA-agreement and has a different diachronic source. A further argument against this proposal is that it would involve structures where the agreement formative that is the progenitor of the transformational copying relation (as sister to N0) would not command the copied element. Thus:

(2.15) [x{ D [x{ N Agf }] I [I Agf ]]]

From all we know about locality restrictions on the output of transformational operations, this does not seem likely.

An alternative then would be to generate the agreement formative as an X0 sister to DP, and then copy it to I:

(2.16) [x{ D [x{ N ]] Agf }] I + [x{ D [x{ N ]] Agf ] I + Agf ]

This option involves a violation of X-bar theory since we would have an X0 adjunct to an XP; however, the existence of phrasal clitics which seem to have this property is well known. A more pressing problem is the source of the formative and how to capture the agreement relationship between the formative and the head of the XP it adjoins to. There are two avenues we could take: either the formative is generated lexically so that the [N0 Agf] structure is inserted into the syntax directly from the lexicon and the relationship between N0 and Agr is specified lexically; or the formative is inserted syntactically and the relationship between N0 and Agr is defined syntactically. This gives us respectively the following two structures at the level of lexical insertion:

(2.17) a. [x{ D [x{ N ]] Agf ] I

b. [x{ D [x{ N Agf }] Agf ] I

But the second of these options, if we admit no other means of syntactically encoding agreement, leads to an infinite regress, since the output of the transformation is a possible input to it. To stop the recursion we would need a further stipulation along the lines that an N0 category can only receive agreement information once during a derivation. The first option entails rather a serious violation of the lexical integrity hypothesis since we have lexical insertion of an element with a couple of phrasal boundaries intervening.

Furthermore, we never see agreement marked DP externally, which would mean a further stipulation to the effect that DP external agreement must be deleted at PF. It seems then that we must admit some other means of syntactically encoding agreement relationships rather than just by means of transformational copying.

To sum up: a transformational account of agreement that relies on the copying of such a non-lexical formative from one head to another raises rather serious theoretical problems, at least when applied to predicate argument agreement. We suggested that a different means of syntactically encoding agreement was necessary.

Feature Manipulation

In fact such a means is already in principle available to us in the grammar. We introduced the notion of X-bar theory above. X-bar theory crucially involves passing up categorial features from lexical items through the projection of those items. There is substantial motivation for such a view (see Chomsky 1965 and Chomsky 1970). In order to deal with MI-agreement we need only extend this view to incorporate certain non-categorial features, specifically agreement features. We then automatically expect a head to agree with its phrasal projections in agreement features.

This device will give us MI-agreement with determiners with no further stipulation, if all the heads within the projection of N are part of a single projection (see Grimshaw 1991 for a mainly theoretical defense of this idea of Extended Projection, and Roberts 1993 for empirical applications of this idea to restructuring constructions in Romance).

However, this still will not give us the predicate argument agreement relationship, since, by definition, specifiers and complements do not comprise part of the projection of the head. Nor will it give us those cases of MI-agreement with adjoined elements such as APs, which were easily handled by the agreement transformation discussed above.

Keenan 1974 proposed the generalisation that functors agree with their arguments. Essentially the idea is that arguments come specified with certain types of agreement features and the functor in the structure agrees with those features. This generalisation was exploited by Gazdar et al. 1985 in their account of control and agreement relations. However, this account suffers from a number of problems, most notably it leads to massive duplication and redundancy in the lexicon, as noted by Barlow 1988.

Barlow provides a number of cases where there is a mismatch in how specific the features on the argument and the functor are. This means that a theory which stipulates that agreement is a copying relation of features from an argument to a functor will require multiple lexical entries, for either the argument or the functor.

For example, Barlow gives a case from Onondaga where the subject is not specified for plurality, but the verb is:

(2.18) a. chak ka[nyh. a]?
        dog bark-sing
        'a dog barks'
b. chak ka[nyh.-dual]
        dog bark-dual
        'two dogs bark'
c. chak ka[nyh.-pl]
        dog bark-pl

3 Precisely which features are passed up is decided empirically. See Gazdar et al. 1985 for a defense of a theory that makes extended use of this device.
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Dog's bark

If agreement involves copying features from the argument to the functor, then in cases like this we would need three distinct lexical entries for the nominal *dog*.

Barlow proposes instead that agreement should be seen as a case where information from the predicate and the argument are required to unify (see Shieber 1986).

An alternative to viewing agreement relations as holding between functor and argument would be to assume that agreement relations are triggered by particular phrase structural configurations.

Chomsky (1986a) proposes that a relation of specifier head agreement should be defined as a primitive in the grammar to deal with cases of agreement (see also Chomsky 1981, p211). No definition of specifier head agreement is given by Chomsky, but we may assume that a head necessarily shares certain features with its specifier:

(2.10) Specifier-Head Agreement

in a structure

\[ [\text{XP Spec} [\_ \text{Head Complement}], \text{\_features on the spec must be compatible with the \_features on the head, where \_features include at least person, number and gender.} \]

Cann (1993a) outlines a system where specifiers and heads both contribute to the categorial status of a projection by requiring that the features that go to make up a maximal projection are the unification of certain features (call them G-features) that appear on the specifier and the head. This will automatically ensure that specifiers and heads agree, if agreement features are G-features. We shall abbreviate this relationship as SHA.

The question now arises as to which of Keenan’s proposal (appropriately reformulated in unification terms to deal with Barlow’s objections) or Chomsky’s proposal is correct. The Abkhaz examples presented above would appear to favour Keenan, since all arguments of the predicate induce agreement. However, there may be reasons to assume abstract projections in the syntax, as argued for already, which provide specifier for the arguments, thus allowing all agreement to be subsumed under Chomsky’s proposal.

In fact there appear to be well-motivated agreement relations which are not predicate agreement or modifier head agreement and these all appear to take place under SHA. Thus, Rizzi (1991) provides a range of evidence from V2 and residual V2 structures in Germanic and Romance that Wh-movement causes an agreement relationship to be set up between the specifier of CP and C, and this is what results in subject auxiliary inversion for Wh-questions in root clauses. Haegeman and Zanuttini (1991) have argued that similar considerations hold for the distribution of negative elements and their specifiers. There do not appear to be such relations holding under head complement structures.

There are a number of reasons to reject Keenan’s idea as it stands. Firstly, note that the example of SHA we have considered here is one where non-lexical head agreement with its specifier (I, C, Neg). We also noted above that bare VPs do not allow agreement. This suggests that we should restrict agreement to functional heads only. Complement agreement would seem to fly in the face of this generalisation, suggesting either that the generalisation is incorrect, or that complement agreement is indeed subsumed under SHA at a more abstract level. In fact, we shall see below that complement agreement is often associated with movement of the complement to a VP-external position which it seems natural to identify as the specifier of an agreement projection.

A strong argument to this effect will be given in Chapter 3, where we show that objects in Scottish Gaelic undergo preposing to a position external to VP. This position is immediately followed by a functional element and the relationship between this functional element and the preposed DP can be shown to be governed precisely by the same generalisations as given subject agreement and prepositional agreement. Furthermore, the phrase containing a preposed object can be shown to be categorially different from a phrase containing an in situ object and a functional element, clearly signalling that we have a syntactically projected case of SHA for objects.

If this is the case, and we can get by with only SHA as we would like, then there must be a functional projection for the agreement of complements in general. Thus we have further, albeit theory internal, evidence for independent agreement formations in the grammar, as well as for a special relationship, SHA, which constrains the possible featural specification of heads and their specifiers.

Lexically Specified Features

There are, a priori, three possibilities regarding the distribution of agreement features on words: either the features are specified only lexically, or they are specified only as separate formats in the syntax or they are specified in both ways. We argued above that they were at least specified as separate formats in the syntax. If they are specified only in this way, then in conjunction with standard views on head movement, a prediction follows: the order of informational elements will mirror the order of the syntactic derivation, and hence, via the Head Movement Principle (Travis 1984), the hierarchical order of the informational formats in the syntax. Such a claim is made explicitly by Baker 1985 and is defended both in Baker 1988 and Ouhalla 1991. In order to falsify this claim we must find evidence that the morphological order of a pair of affixes does not mirror their syntactic dominance relationship.

Speas 1991 provides some interesting evidence that bears on this question. She shows that in Navajo head movement appears to be the optimal analysis for the verbal system. Yet the properties of the Navajo verbal system are such that a head movement analysis which picks up morphemes in the syntax requires either lowering operations, long head movement or a dissociation between the phonological form of the verb and its apparent head movement path.

Navajo has a verbal infection system that marks subject agreement, tense, aspect and object agreement (the examples are taken from Speas’ paper; I am unaware as to what the correct morphological segmentation here is):

\[(2.20) \text{A'f'ee'ed} \text{shikii} \text{fnts'h\'as} \text{girl} \text{boy} \text{3bj-Asp-NonPast-3bj-will-kiss} \\
\text{The girl will kiss the boy}\]
Sp eas argues that the syntactic order of these affixes is essentially the same as that of English: with Subject Agreement highest, dominating Tense which in turn dominates Aspect with Object Agreement coming closest to the verb (she assumes, following Pollock 1989 that I should be split into Agreement and Tense, with Tense dominating Agreement and following Chomsky 1991 that there is a further agreement projection dominating Tense. See also Giorgi and Pianesi 1992, Djikkeningen and Rutten 1991 for evidence that Aspect projects separately from and is dominated by Tense). Her evidence for this is of two sorts: firstly, such an order is well motivated for a range of languages and there is nothing about the syntax of Navajo to suggest that it should be otherwise; secondly the interaction of the subject with negation suggests very strongly that AgrS dominates at least AgrO. It is interesting then that the morphological order is, however, the opposite. If head movement were to apply then the verb should first move to AgrO, and hence AgrO should be closest to the verb stem, but this is patently not the case.

Sp eas shows that one possibility would be for the inflectional heads to successively lower, with AgrS lowering and suffixed to T, then this complex lowering to Aspect, then this lowering to AgrO. Finally, either the whole inflectional complex lowers to prefix to the verb stem, or the verb raises to suffix to the functional elements.

Sp eas rejects the lowering analysis mainly on theoretical grounds. Lowering as a transformational operation is of course permitted, but the outputs of lowering operations violate well known conditions on representations, specifically the Empty Category Principle. Furthermore, as we noted above, lowering leads to radically different head adjunction structures at LF for the different types of languages.

She then proposes that another way to deal with the Navajo facts would be to allow violations of the head movement constraint, whereby the V would raise to an empty C and then the other inflectional morphemes would simply discount in their base order. However, in all known cases of head movement Aspect always counts as a blocking head (Roberts 1991, Rivero 1991)—this would not be the case for Navajo under such an analysis.

Given these facts, Sp eas goes on to suggest that what happens in lowering languages is that the verb has attached affixes but has simply failed to raise to S-Structure. The verb then may raise at LF (see Pesetsky 1985). This view is the standard view in Lexical Phonology and Morphology (Kiparsky 1982) and is motivated there by phonological and morphological facts to do with the resolution of bracketing paradoxes. Sp eas notes that this view has a number of interesting consequences, not least of which is that it is incompatible with the view that grammatical function changing operations are essentially syntactic (Baker 1988).

Sp eas' data essentially argues that head-to-head movement in the syntax cannot be the only way of associating verb stems with agreement and other information and suggests strongly that lexically specified features are required in addition. Movement can then be motivated purely by the need to check morphological features (as noted in Chomsky 1992), with certain features requiring to be checked at certain points in the derivation. Of course such a theory is looser in some sense than the pure head movement theory, since it does not require a one-to-one mapping between inflectional elements and syntactic positions. Moreover, it does not derive the Mirror Principle but rather requires that it be stipulated as a condition governing the relationship between morphology and syntax. However, the Mirror Principle is open to some-empirical doubt, and alternative means of expressing (parts of) the generalisation have been proposed in the literature (Grishaw 1986; Borer 1991; Anderson 1993; Di Sciullo and Williams 1987).

Summary

We have argued so far that agreement requires four components in its analysis: an independent formative realising agreement features; a transformation of head raising that brings an agreement-bearing lexical head into an appropriately close relationship with an XP bearing agreement features; a primitive stipulation (SHA) that within such a local domain features must be compatible; lexical specification of agreement features on lexical heads. We have assumed that agreement is a syntactic phenomenon, to be dealt with syntactically. We will now show that this assumption is only part of the story.

2.3 Separation of Agr and T

We have argued so far for an independent syntactic formative that contains agreement features. But does this formative contain other features as well? The standard Chomsky 1981 answer to this is yes; the category Inf contains agreement features and tense features.

However, there has been a recent move to separate out the features in Inf into their component parts; in fact we assumed this to be the case in our discussion of Sp eas' data on lowering languages. We have argued independently projecting functional heads hosting agreement features and tense features. This proposal is based on some work of Jean-Yves Pollock. Pollock 1989 argues on the basis of the different behaviour of adverbs and negation in tensed and infinitival clauses in French and English, that Inf should be split into two separate heads: Agr and T, and that both these heads should project according to the X-schemata.

I will not discuss Pollock's proposal here. Much has been said about it in the literature lately (Mitchell 1991, Beitel 1992 and references therein, but see also Iatridou 1990 and Ackema, Neeliman and Weerman 1992). I will assume that his programme of allowing features to project according to the X-Theory is essentially correct and assume the following clause structure (based on Chomsky 1991, Chomsky 1992):
2.4 The Semantic Nature of Agreement

The standard view that agreement is a syntactic phenomenon has been challenged recently, especially in unification-based frameworks such as HPSG. We review some of the arguments that agreement is a semantic phenomenon below and then show that in fact both syntactic and semantic aspects of agreement must be taken into account to deal with the diversity of the data.

2.4.1 Arguments that Agr is semantic

Dowty and Jacobson (1988) argue, as part of a general program to minimise syntax, that agreement should be analysed as an essentially semantic phenomenon. There are a number of advantages to this perspective; these derive from the difficulties that syntactic theories of agreement have in accounting for cases where featural mismatches appear to obtain. Pollard and Sag 1993 provide a number of such cases.

Reference transfer:

Certain registers of English allow the transfer of reference from an entity to another entity closely related to the first in some pragmatically recoverable fashion. One example is when a waiter may use the name of the dish that a person is eating to refer to that person. In such cases the dish may be syntactically plural, but the agreement on the verb is obligatorily singular:

(2.21) The hash browns at table six is/*are getting angry

What examples like this suggest is that what is being agreed with is not the set of syntactic features on the subject, but rather the semantic entity that is denoted by the subject, in this case the person who is eating the dish. If this is the case, at least some semantic information must be imported into the statement of how agreement works.

Relative pronouns:

A similar case is provided by the agreement of relative pronouns. Relative pronouns agree generally in humanness with the noun that they modify. However, when that noun is used metaphorically, the pronoun agrees not with the syntactic features of the noun, but rather with what the noun is used to refer to:

(2.22) The volcano which/*who has been dormant for a century erupted

(2.23) The volcano who just left the room is Bill's kid

Singular plurals:

Many languages have nominals whose morphological form is plural, but which trigger singular agreement (or vice versa). The following is a case in point:

(2.24) Eggs is my favourite breakfast

Again this suggests that what is agreed with is the semantic denotatum, rather than the morphosyntactic features.

Collectives:

Finally, in British English, the form of verbal agreement distinguishes whether a collective subject is to be interpreted as an aggregate or non-aggregate entity. It would be possible in this case to have a dual lexical entry specified with both singular and plural
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2.4.2 Problems with this view

Although the examples cited above suggest strongly that agreement involves semantic properties, a number of problems arise for the Dowty and Jacobson story. These problems stem from the lack of a level of representation in their account. The most obvious of these involves languages which have grammatical gender. In such languages the denotatum does not necessarily dictate the form of the agreement. For example, Chierchia 1989, notes that in Italian the word for “egg” is masculine in the singular but feminine in the plural: un uovo but due uova. Such distinctions seem to have no ontological basis. Similar examples can be found easily cross-linguistically. Gunn 1984 notes that in Classical Greek determiners and adjectives show strict syntactic agreement with neuter plural nouns in number, gender, and case, but verbs show singular agreement with neuter plural subjects:

(2.27) kalētēs sphage
    good-NomPiNeuter be-Past-Sing the sacrifice-NomPiNeuter
    ‘The sacrifices were suspicious’

and in Arabic non-human plurals take feminine singular adjectives, verbs and pronouns.

Dowty and Jacobson propose to deal with such cases in essentially a situational theoretic way. They argue that there is no direct relationship between syntactic gender specification and semantic gender but rather that one of the facts about a particular entity is that it is classified in a particular way by the language in question. So, for example, one of the semantic facts about an egg for a speaker of Italian is that it is referred to by the language with a particular word that has a particular collection of syntactic features. Likewise, more than one egg, an Italian speaker knows, is referred to by another word of which the fact holds that it has a different collection of syntactic features. Agreement features on other words in an utterance which involves use or use respect these semantic facts. Dowty and Jacobson point out that deictic pronouns are specified for gender in syntactic gender languages, and that the gender that they are specified for is that of the most salient word that could be used in the context of utterance. A similar point is made by Pollard and Sag 1993 who quote Johnson 1984 to the effect that the pragmatic presuppositions that hold of an entity enter into the interpretations of pronouns via a salient word that matches the pronoun for gender. For example, in German a dwelling place could be referred to as das Haus (neuter) or die Hütte (feminine), where the latter implies that the dwelling place is substandard in some way. Suppose that the context of utterance allows both words to be equally salient in terms of their potential use. Now suppose that the actual utterance includes the deictic pronoun sie (feminine), rather than es (neuter), then the implicature arises that the speaker regards the dwelling place as substandard. But note that the word Hütte itself has not been used. This a further evidence that it is a semantic fact about the denotatum (or some representation thereof) that a particular word complete with gender features is most appropriate to describe it.

However, as Pollard and Sag 1993 note, this analysis faces a number of problems, which suggest that agreement must have a syntactic component. One point is that choice of pronoun, when two or more pronouns are in principle possible, is constrained syntactically. In the following example we can have in principle either a singular or a plural pronoun:

(2.28) The faculty has voted itself a raise. Most of them are already overpaid, but note that when the verb agrees singularly, the reflexive pronoun must also be singular:

(2.29) The faculty is voting itself/themselves a raise.

(2.30) The faculty are voting themselves/itself a raise.

In Dowty and Jacobson’s theory, it is unclear what would rule out the examples with mismatched pronouns since there is no level of representation which can be appealed to. A similar problem arises for polite forms of pronouns where the same NP (and the entity denoted by that NP) appears to be in two different agreement relationships at the same time. Thus:

(2.31) Vous êtes belle.

Here we have a singular agreement relationship with the adjective, but a plural agreement relationship with the adjective. This suggests that even if one case of the agreement here may be dealt with along the lines that Dowty and Jacobson propose, no level of representation is required where the appropriate information is specified that will allow some principle to govern the other case.

2.4.3 The HPSG account

It seems that the obvious route to take is to integrate the syntactic and semantic accounts of agreement. Pollard and Sag 1993 propose to do this by stipulating that agreement features are specified on an index that is introduced into the semantic representation by an NP. The semantic representation is constructed in tandem with the syntactic combination of lexical items, which proceeds basically under an extended notion of government. In many ways the semantic representation is similar to the GB notion of LF, in that it is a representational level. In some sense the index is akin to the discourse referents of DRT (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982). Thus the claim that Pollard and Sag make is that agreement features are specified semantically on discourse referents under a relationship of government by a head.

To make this clearer, let us introduce a little notation. Verbs in HPSG are assumed to be lexically specified for the elements they subcategorise for. We can represent a verb like walk as follows:

 Dochwalk (Nom, NonPiNeuter, 3sg)

which is the syntactic representation of this word.
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(2.32) walk: V(NP  

This representation means that “walk” is a V and that it subcategorises for an NP.

NPs, as we noted earlier, introduce indices. Let us represent these as subscripts. Unlike the indices familiar from GB, HPSG indices have internal structure. In particular they contain agreement features. We will specify this as follows:

(2.33) women_{fem};

Now a verb like walk is related to its inflected forms by lexical rules, which essentially instantiate index specifications on the NP that the verb subcategorises. Thus:

(2.34) walks: V(NP_{m}ag)

(2.35) walk: V(NP_{pl})

These indices can then be used to construct the semantic representation:

(2.36) walk: V(NP_{pl}  

relation walk walker  

Here the index is specified as the walker. Because it is specified with plural agreement features, the intended interpretation is that the discourse referent that is involved in the walking relation is plural.

When we combine walk with women, a certain HPSG principle requires that the NP specified as subcategorised by the lexical specification of the verb matches the NP that occurs as the argument of the verb. This means that walk will combine with women but not woman. The resulting structure will contain a single index specified for both plurality and gender:

(2.37) women walk  

relation walk walker  

This analysis deals with the problem of transferred reference in the following way: assume that it is the transferred referent that determines the index of the NP that denotes it. Then, if verb-subject agreement is sensitive to index rather than to syntactic features, the verb agreement will be with the transferred referent. So in contexts where heak became refer to a male person eating the hash browns, the index is masculine and singular and the verb, which agrees with the index is likewise singular. This approach extends to the other cases of “agreement mismatches”. Now, the binding theory Pollard and Sag make use of is couched in terms of coindexation within local domains, where coindexation refers to the indices that bear agreement features. Because of this the data that were problematic for Dowty and Jacobson simply fall out from the interaction between the binding theory and agreement as specified on indices.

As far as the difference between grammatical and natural gender languages goes, Pollard and Sag appeal to anchoring conditions on indices. These anchoring conditions specify certain properties of potential referents that must hold in order for an index to be able to refer to them. Thus, in English, the pronoun it has as an anchoring condition on its index that the referent of the index must be male and must be a single entity. For a grammatical gender language, Pollard and Sag make similar claims to Dowty and Jacobson: that part of the anchoring conditions involves what the grammatical features of the most salient word in the context of use are. Given this distinction, Pollard and Sag can account for the problematic cases of polite pronouns in French. The idea is that the index introduced lexically for plural NPs contains the specification that the number of that index is plural. Generally, there is also an anchoring condition which stipulates that such plural indices have to refer to plural entities. Exceptions to this, however, include polite forms, where the anchoring condition allows the pronoun to refer to a singular entity. Now, subject verb agreement in French appeals to agreement of indices, hence a plural form of the verb appears. Note, however, that if predicate adjectives agree only via anchoring conditions, it will still be possible to have singular adjectives, even though the verb is plural.

Balari 1992 notes some arguments from Kathol 1991 which suggest that this is the wrong level at which to draw these distinctions. The first argument is that Pollard and Sag’s account relies on government, rather than agreement, and hence that it does not really reflect the featural correlation that Pollard and Sag argue that agreement involves. This argument is not particularly convincing, since we at least require government anyway in the grammar, so there is no reason that agreement might not be a subpart thereof.

Kathol’s second argument is that impersonals in German cannot be said to select properties of their subject, and so should not assign an index to them, yet they are systematically third person singular:

(2.38) An dem Abend wurde viel geacht  

In the evening was much laughed  

‘There was much laughing going on in the evening’

A similar case could be made for English examples like:

(2.39) Under the bed seems/*seem to be a good place to hide  

This argument is more convincing, since there does not seem to be a source for the agreement. Kathol suggests that the right account is one where morphosyntactic agreement features are specified on heads and on indices so that agreement becomes two-layered. This essentially just shifts Pollard and Sag’s proposal down a level. It is not clear to what extent the impersonal and raising data given here could choose between these theories though, since the problem is that there is no source for the agreement, either morphosyntactically, semantically or pragmatically.

A more convincing argument for shifting Pollard and Sag’s account down a level is given by Balari 1992. He draws on the distinction between MSA-agreement and PA-agreement and argues that the former is best analysed as agreement in terms of morphosyntactic features, while the latter is best analysed as agreement at the index level (note that Cann’s example above supports this view). Balari shows how possessive pronouns in Spanish require agreement with the possessor in terms of morphosyntactic features,
rather than via indices. His argument is basically that an analysis in terms of indices would make subject-verb agreement and possessive pronoun possessum agreement the same mechanism. This would mean that properties of the latter (such as the fact that the agreement element on the pronoun is alliterative with the agreement element on the noun) which do not hold of the former would have no explanation.

The arguments given by Kathol and Balari are suggestive, but it appears not sufficient to establish the case that agreement is both morphosyntactic and semantic (in terms of discourse referents) rather than semantic and pragmatic. To argue for the former position we should find a case where the kind of pragmatic explanation given by Pollard and Sag fails in favour of either a semantic or syntactic explanation.

French provides an interesting example. The noun *gens* 'people' requires that following adjectives are masculine but preceding adjectives are feminine. Thus:

```
a. les belles gens
the-pl beautiful-fem-pl people-pl
'The beautiful people'

b. les gens doux
the-pl people-pl quiet-masc-pl
'The quiet people'
```

This example defies a pragmatic explanation, since it seems unlikely that what we know about the syntactic position of a word is a matter of pragmatics. Equally it seems unlikely that this is a case of index agreement, since the referent of *gens* makes no contribution to the agreement of the adjective, which appears to depend purely on syntactic position.

A further argument to this effect which supports Balari’s proposal that agreement of syntactic features is involved in MH-agreement, while agreement in features of discourse referents is involved in PA-agreement comes from the fact that there appear to be no cases of agreement mismatches within head modifier structures. Thus note that all the cases we have seen so far of reference transfer, relative pronoun choice, singular plurals, collectives and predicator adjectives in French involve PA-agreement. In fact it is fairly unclear what reference transfer within a DP could mean. Although the head noun in HPSG provides the index, the conditions on the manipulation of such indices are generically taken to be a function of the determiner of the DP, which closes off the projection of N. Thus indefinite determiners are usually thought to signify the introduction of a discourse referent, while definite determiners signify that a preexisting discourse referent is being referred to. In this sense then, there is no discourse referent available within a DP, so no index features can be manipulated. To argue that MH-agreement is defined in terms of indices is conceptually confused.

### 2.4.4 Summary

We have argued above that agreement is not simply a matter of the distribution of morphosyntactic features, but also involves features on discourse referents, drawing on recent work in categorial grammar and HPSG. This perspective is motivated by examples where apparent mismatches between the arguments’ agreement features and those of the head appear. Assuming that some agreement is at the level of discourse referent allows us to explain such mismatches. Empirical and conceptual considerations lead us to propose, following Balari (1992), that MH-agreement is agreement of morphosyntactic features only, while PA-agreement at least can be agreement of features at the level of discourse representation. PA-agreement can also be morphosyntactically conditioned; for example subject-verb agreement in French is PA-agreement, but it is agreement of morphosyntactic features; predicate adjective agreement is also PA-agreement but it involves features specified at the DR level. Presumably the relationship between these is a subsumption relationship (Shieber 1986) such that more specific information at the morphosyntactic level will win out.

### 2.5 Summary

We shall now draw together some of the points made in this chapter. We have argued that agreement involves an abstract independently projecting syntactic form *Agr* and that, for at least predicate argument agreement, it also needs to be captured at a level of semantic representation. We followed Pollard and Sag in claiming that this semantic representation was one composed of (at least) discourse referents. The idea of discourse referents was originally mooted in order to explain some facts about the interpretation of definite and indefinite (see chapter 4). We will follow standard practice and assume that the level of discourse representation can be represented by a universe of discourse referents and a set of constraints on those discourse referents (again see chapter 4 for more detailed motivation). Thus:

(20) Women walk.

(21) 

Here we mark the discourse referent as feminine and plural. We can then follow the remainder of Pollard and Sag’s analysis to deal with problems of reference transfer.

This view of *Agr* as something that is associated with a discourse referent will prove very useful in the next chapter, where we show that it provides a natural constraint on a theory of how morphological agreement and arguments relate.
Chapter 3

Agreement in Celtic

3.1 Introduction

The aims of this chapter are two-fold: firstly we will show that the correct description of agreement phenomena in Celtic is one which makes reference to the distribution of morphological features and we derive this from a theory of morphological feature checking coupled with the idea we motivated in Chapter 2 that Agr refers to a discourse referent (DR); secondly we will show that, building on this, an object fronting construction in Scottish Gaelic (SG) is best analysed as movement of the object to the specifier of an X-projected agreement category.

3.2 Complementarity in Agreement

It is well known that the Celtic languages display an agreement phenomenon whereby a complementarity ensues between overt agreement and overt arguments\(^1\). The following paradigm for objects of prepositions in SG is illustrative:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(3.1) a.} & \quad \text{'s toigh leam lea leas/leitha leinn/leitha co/aidh} \quad \text{COP liking with/-1sg/-2sg/-3sg.m/-3sg.f/-1pl/-2pl/-3pl coffee} \\
& \quad 1/you/she/we/you/she/they like coffee' \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{'s toigh le Mairi co/aidh} \quad \text{COP liking with Mary coffee} \\
& \quad \text{Mary likes coffee'} \\
\text{c.} & \quad \text{'}s toigh leis Mairi co/aidh} \quad \text{COP liking with-3sg.f Mary coffee} \\
\text{d.} & \quad \text{'}s toigh leam mi co/aidh} \quad \text{COP liking with-1sg I coffee} \\
\end{align*}
\]

In this construction, the experiencer of the ‘liking’ state is marked by the preposition \(le\) with \(\text{‘with’}\). In (3.1a), \(le\) infects for the person, number (and gender where appropriate) of the experiencer when it is pronominal (i.e., has no lexical content). In (3.1b), it appears in an apparently uninflated form with an R-expression. (c) shows that the inflected form of the preposition is ill-formed with a non-pronominal, even though the agreement features match and (d) shows that overt pronouns are also ill-formed with an agreeing \(P\).

The generalisation that we can glean from this data is that agreement and overt DP are in complementary distribution; that is, they cannot co-occur.

However, this generalisation does not fully capture the facts. We also need to posit something to rule out the following case:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(3.2)} & \quad \text{'}s toigh le mi co/aidh} \\
& \quad \text{COP liking with I coffee} \\
\end{align*}
\]

It appears that not only are agreement and overt DP in complementary distribution but also that the agreement + non-overt argument construction (as in (3.1a)) is the only way of expressing a meaning that might also be given by a non-agreeing \(P\) + overt pronoun.

A similar paradigm occurs for subjects. In SG, the only verbal in-flection for subject agreement occurs in the first person singular in the conditional (the first person plural is occasionally found, but is felt to be archaic):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(3.3) a.} & \quad \text{Bh uailinn an cat} \quad \text{Strike/-Cond/-1sg the cat} \\
& \quad \text{‘I would strike the cat’} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{Bh uileamaid an cat} \quad \text{Strike/-Cond/-1pl the cat} \\
& \quad \text{‘We would strike the cat (archaic/formal)’} \\
\text{c.} & \quad \text{Bh uileadh tu/je/jinn/ch/ad/um balach an cat} \quad \text{strike/-COND you/he/she/we/you/he/she/they/the boy the cat} \\
& \quad \text{‘You/he/she/we/you/he/she/they/the boy would strike the cat’} \\
\end{align*}
\]

However, the same pattern as (a) is found for prepositions occurs here. An overt pronominal is ill-formed with the agreeing verb:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(3.4) a.} & \quad \text{'}s bh uailinn mi an cat} \quad \text{Strike/-Cond/-1sg I the cat} \\
& \quad \text{‘I would strike the cat’} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{'}s bh uileamaid mi an cat} \quad \text{Strike/-Cond/-1pl I the cat} \\
\end{align*}
\]

With first person plural, this breaks down slightly, since both forms are possible, as the above paradigm shows. However, there are distinct register restrictions, with the form that has no agreement and a pronominal being preferred in all but formal written language; moreover the complementarity between agreement and overt pronoun still holds:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(3.5) * bh uileamaid i an uinneag} \\
& \quad \text{strike/-COND/-1pl we det window} \\
& \quad \text{‘We would strike the window’}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^1\)This does not appear to be the case for Welsh, but see Hendrick 1988 for a reanalysis of the Welsh data which makes it amenable to this generalisation. See also section 4.2 of this chapter.
Traditionally the agreeing form that does not allow an overt pronoun is known as the *synthetic* form, while the non-agreeing form with overt DP is known as the *analytic* form.

Irish exhibits a similar pattern with subject agreement, but different dialects distribute the range of analytic and synthetic forms within a paradigm in different ways. Northern dialects exhibit fewer synthetic forms, with SG being the most extreme.

However, prepositional and subject agreement both seem to be governed by the same basic generalization, with the bare form of the preposition corresponding to the analytic form of the verb. Of course, since agreeing forms exist for the entire paradigm for prepositions, the analytic prepositional form only occurs with overt non-pronominal DPs.

A number of explanations have been offered for the general pattern of complementarity between agreement and overt argument: these generally differ in what the non-overt argument is taken to be. Anderson 1982 for Breton and more recently Rouvier 1991 for Welsh argue that the null element is the trace of an incorporated pronoun or incorporated agreement. Doron 1988 along similar lines proposes for Irish that the phenomenon is explained by incorporation in the morphology. McCloskey and Hale 1984 for Irish, Stump 1984 for Breton and Hendrick 1988 for Welsh and Breton assume that the non-overt argument is pro and the agreement has to be rich enough in some sense to allow its presence. An interesting alternative is offered by Andrews 1990: Andrews claims that the correct explanation should be given in terms of features that compete for a single position at an abstract level of representation. We deal with these accounts in turn, before offering an alternative.

**3.3 Incorporation**

Incorporation is a process whereby a lexical formative is projected, and then the head of that projection undergoes head movement and adjoins to another lexical head (see Baker 1988). This general process can be seen as an instance of move-a-specifically the Empty Category Principle (ECP), see below. Incorporation is appealed to to explain a diverse group of phenomena, including causatives, passives, applicatives and noun-incorporation (Baker 1988). We illustrate the process with noun-incorporation.

Many languages allow the complement of a verb to be missing syntactically but to appear as a morphologically compounded element. The following examples from Southern Tiwa (taken from Allen, Gardiner and Frantz 1984 via Baker 1988) illustrate:

(3.6) a. leum ti-mba
man-suff 1sS/A-see-Past
'I saw the/a man'

b. ti-leum-mi-ta
1sS/A-man-see-Past
'I saw the/a man'

In Southern Tiwa the verb mi, 'see', takes a syntactically separate object as in the (a) example, but this object may also be compounded with the verb, as in (b). Baker 1988 analyses this as a case of incorporation: the object is projected at D-Structure and then the N head of that object is moved by X0 movement to adjoin to the verb, to give (b).²

(3.7) [\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NP} \\
\text{V} \\
\text{VP}
\end{array}
\]

Evidence that this is correct comes from the fact that subjects generally are un-incorporable. Baker claims that this is due to the fact that incorporation is simply a subcase of move-a, and hence is subject to the ECP. The ECP states that a trace must be properly governed, and object positions are properly governed, while subject positions are not. This means that independent factors disallow subject incorporation, under an incorporation analysis³.

**3.3.1 The Incorporation Account**

It is fairly easy to see how incorporation could be used to explain the agreement patterns in Celtic. Let us assume that the pronominal subject/prepositional object is generated at D-Structure in its canonical position (spec VP or complement of P respectively). In the cases where we have subject agreement/preposition agreement, we can just say that the pronoun has moved by incorporation into the governing head:

(3.8) a. leum
with-1sg

²In the trees for incorporation structures, I use NP following Baker, for illustration. Under the DP hypothesis (Abney 1987) questions arise concerning the effect of the Head Movement Constraint on incorporation structures (T. Hoekstra [pr]).

³Some subjects actually map incorporate in Southern Tiwa. Baker claims that the only case that may do so are subjects of unaccusatives, which are properly governed at D-Structure since they originate in complement position.
A similar story might be given for the subject agreement. In this case some extra stipulation would have to be made to ensure that the trace of the subject was properly governed; perhaps the fact that the V raises to some higher head (C) thus allows the trace of the subject to be governed by a lexical head at S-structure and this satisfies the ECP$^4$.

(3.9) a. Bhualinn
stroke-Cond-Isg

\[\text{'I would strike.'}\]

b. PP

\[\begin{array}{c}
P \\
P_N \\
N_i \\
i \text{ ihm} \\
i, 
\end{array}\]

We could argue here that V lexicalises C by raising into it and therefore C becomes a proper governor for the subject position.

An alternative view of incorporation is that it takes place in the morphology, rather than in the syntax. This would mean that certain string adjacent elements could be replaced by single words if an appropriate suppletive form existed in the lexicon. This is the solution argued for by Doron 1988.

Doron claims that whenever the grammar generates a form like the ungrammatical:

(3.10) * Bhualadh mi an cat
stroke-COND I the cat

the string \textit{bhualadh} \textit{mi} is replaced by a suppletive form \textit{bhualinn}. In a sense the incorporation here is morphophonological.

### 3.3.2 Problems with the Incorporation Account

The incorporation account suffers from the defect that this phenomenon occurs with coordinated structures. Thus:

(3.11) 's toigh leum fhin is thu fhoin co faisidh

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{ Cop liking with-Isg Emph and you Emph coffee} \\
\text{'Me and you like coffee.'} 
\end{array}\]

The emphatic particles seen in this example are necessary additions to all pronouns in coordinate structures. Thus:
Incorporation here would violate the Coordinate Structure Constraint (Ross 1967) which disallows a transformational relation between an element of a coordinate structure and a position external to that structure.

Doron’s solution to this problem, which is based on the idea that adjacent elements in the syntax may be substituted by a suppletive morphological form, obviates this problem, since her incorporation is not syntactic and thus sidesteps syntactic constraints.

For this reason it seems unsatisfactory to me. Moreover, as pointed out by Andrews 1990 there seems to be little evidence that this process is suppletive, since it is morphologically fairly regular. Furthermore, in SG we find constructions where Doron’s account would lead us to expect morphological incorporation (i.e. replacement of two string adjacent words by a single suppletive form) but it does not occur. One example is the following:

(3.13) *Tha mi a’ feuchainn ri thu fhein a mharbhaid
Be-PRES I ASP trying to you EMPH Prt murder
‘I am trying to murder you’

In this example, ri is a preposition that marks the complement of the verb feuchainn ‘try’. As with most other prepositions it inflects, leading us to expect the form riad under Doron’s account. This is ungrammatical.

(3.14) *Ta’ mi a’ feuchainn riad thu fhein a mharbhaid
Be-PRES I ASP trying to-2sg EMPH Prt murder
‘I am trying to murder you’

This contrast argues strongly against a morphological replacement account.

The coordination data above may be sidestepped in another way. The Coordinate Structure Constraint is motivated on grounds of the impossibility of extraction of phrasal elements from phrasal coordinate structures. There is, a priori, no reason why a head may not extract, if its trace is properly governed. So we could assume that we have in these cases head movement of the pronoun head of the Noun Phrase into the dominating V. We could then ensure that there were no barriers to proper government intervening between the trace and its antecedent. We would have to somehow block such extraction from the rightmost conjunct, since the following is ungrammatical:

(3.15) *a taigh leum thu fhein is fhin coffaidh
Cop liking with-1sg you Emph and Emph coffee
‘Me and you like coffee’

Already this solution seems stipulative, and moreover it is undermotivated. There are no cases other than agreement structures in SG where an analysis in terms of

head movement is motivated and where the head movement is from one conjunct of a coordinated phrase. Thus it seems plausible that the VSO word order displayed by SG arises from head movement of the V from the VP to a higher node where it dominates the VP internal subject (see Koopman and Sportiche 1989 for an analysis of VSO along these lines). This head movement is not allowed from inside a coordinated VP:

(3.16) *Bhuail Daibhidh mise agus bheart mise
strieks-PST David me-Emph and kicked me-Emph
‘David struck me and kicked me’

The putative structure here would be:

[dr Bhuail, [r B Daibhidh [r, [r, [r, mise agus bheart mise]]]]

Likewise, in English, overt head movement from a coordinated structure is barred. Compare:

(3.18) a. I must and shall go.
b. *Must I and shall go.

(3.19) a. I must go and shall go
b. *Must I go and shall go

Here we have head movement (I to C) from a conjunct head and from a conjunct phrase respectively ruled out.

This data suggests that the Coordinate Structure Constraint applies not just to movement of phrasal elements, but to heads as well. The incorporation analysis then has no way of dealing with examples like (3.11).

3.4 pro

Chomsky 1982 suggests that the features [+/- pronominal] and [+/- anaphoric] could be used to characterise the different types of empty categories we find in human languages. He argues that traces of A-movement are [+ anaphoric] and [- pronominal]; traces of A-movement have max values for both features and behave like referring expressions; the empty category that figures in control theory, PRO, can be characterised as having + values for both features and it follows from this that PRO is ungovernmented; finally the last possibility of [+ pronominal] and [- anaphoric] is assigned to an empty pronominal category that behaves just like an overt pronoun, pro.

PRO figures in the analysis of Null-Subject languages (or more generally null-argument languages—see Jacoby 1989 and Saito 1989 for discussion). The basic idea is that pro is licensed where it can be identified by a category governing it containing agreement features that are “rich” in some sense (see Rizzi 1982, Rizzi 1990 and Chomsky 1981). An example from Italian:

(3.20) pro parla
pro speak-pres-3sgm
‘He is speaking’
3.4.1 The pro Analysis

McCloskey and Hale 1984 suppose that the need for pro to be identified (following Rizzi 1981) explains in part the Celtic agreement patterns. McCloskey and Hale use Modern Irish as their language of exemplification, giving the following paradigm for subjects:

(3.21) a. chuir 'finn isteach ar an phost sin
put-COND1sg in on that job
'I would apply for that job'
b. *chuir 'finn me isteach ar an phost sin
put-COND1sg I in on that job
'I would apply for that job'

(3.22) a. *chuirfeadh 'sean isteach ar an phost sin
put-COND in on that job
'... would apply for that job,'
b. chuirfeadh Eoghan isteach ar an phost sin
put-COND Owen in on that job
'Owen would apply for that job'

As in SG, the agreeing forms of the verbs are possible only with null subjects while the non-agreeing forms are possible only with overt subjects. However, agreeing forms do not exist for the whole paradigm, so that the non-agreeing form has to be used with an overt pronoun:

(3.23) chuirfeadh sibh isteach ar an phost sin
put-COND you-pl in on that job
'You would apply for that job'

and yet still an overt pronoun cannot be used with a non-agreeing form when an agreeing form exists:

(3.24) *chuirfeadh me isteach ar an phost sin
put-COND I in on that job
'I would apply for that job'

McCloskey and Hale's analysis is that the null subject is pro and that this must be identified by agreement:

(3.25) *pro[e F] unless governed by AGR[e F], where [e F] is some combination of person-number5 features

This will rule in (3.21a) and rule out (3.22a). Nothing is said about (3.22b), which is therefore ruled in. We discuss the analysis of (3.21b) and (3.24) below.

Hendrick 1988 also proposes a pro-drop analysis of Celtic, focusing on Breton and Welsh. Breton behaves very much like SG and Irish in this regard, displaying the aforementioned complementarity. The Breton Verbal agreement system, however, is parallel to the prepositional system in that it allows no overt pronouns with the non-agreeing form of the V. This contrasts with SG and Irish, which have patchy paradigms in this respect:

(3.26) Bemdez e lemm-{an-}ez-0-comp/-i/-ont ul lev
Every-day PRT read-Pres-3sg/3pl/-/3pl=1 a book
'I you/she/we/you/they read the book every day'

(3.27) a. Bemdez e lemm Yann-ar vuqale ul lev
Every-day PRT read-Pres Yann/the children a book
'Yann the children read a book every day'
b. *Bemdez e lemmont ar vuqale ul lev
Every-day PRT read-Pres3pl the children a book
'The children read a book every day'

(3.28) a. *Breman e la bouran me
Now PRT work-Pres-1sg I
b. *Breman e la bour ve
Now PRT work-Pres-2sg you
c. *Breman e la bour e in
Now PRT work-Pres-3sg he
d. *Breman e la bouromp ni
Now PRT work-Pres-1pl we
e. *Breman e la bouromt ch'wi
Now PRT work-Pres-2pl you
f. *Breman e la bouromt int
Now PRT work-Pres-3pl they

As this paradigm shows, subject agreement in Breton looks very much like the synthetic pattern of agreement in SG/IRish. Agreement and overt argument are in complementary distribution. Moreover, as the following examples show, an overt pronoun cannot occur with a non-agreeing form:

(3.29) *Bemdez e lemm me/-/et/-/mes/-/m/-/ont ul lev
Every-day PRT read-Pres I you/she/we/you/they a book

Instead the form with overt agreement and a null-argument must be used.

Hendrick's analysis makes use of the Avoid Pronoun Principle (APP) (Chomsky 1981) to analyse the Breton facts. He formulates this as:

(3.30) 1. Lexical Rules insert the matrix of syntactic features for person, number and gender into the structure [vr [e F = ]].
2. Lexical rules only optionally insert a phonetic matrix into the structure [vr [e F = ]].
3. Insertion of a phonetic matrix is avoided where possible. Hendrick applies this principle to agreement. The appropriate structures are:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.31) a.} & *V \text{ [overt AGR] NP} \\
&\text{b.} & V \text{ [null AGR] NP} \\
&\text{c.} & *V \text{ [overt AGR] PRONOUN} \\
&\text{d.} & *V \text{ [null AGR] PRONOUN} \\
&\text{e.} & V \text{ [overt AGR] pro} \\
&\text{f.} & *V \text{ [null AGR] pro}
\end{align*}
\]

Essentially, Hendrick's assumes that AGR is subject to the APP and that overt AGR is avoided where possible. 'Where possible' here means everywhere except where AGR is required to locally identify pro; in this Much Hendrick's analysis is similar to McCloskey and Hale's. All the cases with overt AGR will be ruled out, except (e) where it is required to identify pro. All the other cases will be ruled in, except those which involve an overt pronominal (d). In this structure both overt agr and the overt pronoun have to be avoided, but this yields (f), which is ruled out by the identification requirement on pro.

### 3.4.2 Problems with the pro analysis

One problem with McCloskey and Hale's analysis is that it does not directly capture the complementarity between agreement and overt argument. Thus, although their condition on the identification of pro explains why the structure with no-agreement and no argument is ill-formed, it says nothing about why structures with agreement and with an overt argument are impossible ((3.2b), repeated here):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.32) *chairfin me isteach ar an phost sin} \\
&\text{put-CO ND 1sg I in on that job} \\
&\text{I would apply for that job'}
\end{align*}
\]

In order to deal with this, McCloskey and Hale propose a further filter (formalised in McCloskey 1986):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.33) *[... AGR ... proun]} \\
&\text{[a F] [a F]}
\end{align*}
\]

They claim that this filter is operative in Irish (and Breton and SG, presumably), but not in Welsh, since in Welsh we find cases where we have agreement plus an overt pronoun.

However, it is unclear whether Welsh should be analysed as escaping the generalisation about the complementarity of agreement and overt argument. Welsh does obey the prohibition against having agreement with lexical DPs; Hendrick 1988 provides the following examples:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.34) a.} & \text{canodd y plant bob dydd} \\
&\text{sing-Past the children every day} \\
&\text{The children sang every day'} \\
&\text{b.} & *\text{canon y plant bob dydd} \\
&\text{sing-Past-3pl the children every day} \\
&\text{The children sang every day'}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.35) a.} & \text{ary wa ll} \\
&\text{on the wall} \\
&\text{b.} & *\text{ami y wa ll} \\
&\text{on-3sg the wall} \\
&\text{on the wall'}
\end{align*}
\]

And yet, unlike SG, Breton and Irish, Welsh also seems to allow agreement with pro-nominals:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.36) a.} & \text{Canais i} \\
&\text{sing-Past-1sg I} \\
&\text{I sang'} \\
&\text{b.} & \text{arni hi} \\
&\text{on-3sg she} \\
&\text{on her'}
\end{align*}
\]

This seems to support McCloskey and Hale's case for the special filter applying to Irish, ruling out these cases. The difference between Irish and Welsh then boils down to the claim that the former has the filter formulated above, while the latter lacks it.

However, Hendrick shows, drawing on work by Williams (Williams 1980), that Welsh has two sets of pronouns: an independent set and a dependent set. Only the dependent pronouns may occur with agreement:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.37) } \text{Canais i*/f} \\
&\text{sing-Past-1sg I [dep]/[ind]} \\
&\text{I sang'}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus the Welsh examples above are analysed as:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{(3.38) a.} & \text{[Canais i]} \text{pro} \\
&\text{sing-Past-1sg-1sg pro} \\
&\text{I sang'} \\
&\text{b.} & \text{[arni hi]} \text{pro} \\
&\text{on-3sg.f 3sg.f pro} \\
&\text{on her'}
\end{align*}
\]
this, as Hendrickx notes, predicts that the affixed pronouns may only be found where pro may be found, since agreement is required to license pro and only dependent pronouns occur with agreement. Now pro is ill-formed in object position of finite verbs in Welsh, leading to the prediction that the affixed pronouns are ill-formed here as well. This is the case:

(3.30) Glywodd chi e/*i*/pro hear-Past-2pl you-pl me(ind)/*me(dep)/*pro

Furthermore, pro is ill-formed as the second member of a conjunct in Welsh, as are the dependent pronouns:

(3.40) a. chwi neu mi
   you or I(ind)
   'you or I'

b. * chwi neu pro
   you or pro
   'you or pro'

c. * chwi neu i
   you or I(dep)
   'you or I'

If Hendrickx’s analysis of Welsh is correct, then Welsh does obey the generalisation that agreement and argument are in complementary distribution, and the filter that McCloskey and Hale propose in ad hoc.

In fact McCloskey and Hale must adduce yet another device to their analysis in order to capture the fact that a non-agreeing V or P is ill-formed with a pronoun for which an agreeing form is possible:

(3.41) *chairdeadh me isteach ar an phost sin
     put-COND I in on that job
     'I would apply for that job'

McCloskey and Hale suggest that it would be appropriate to appeal to a principle of morphological blocking at this point, but already the analysis seems too stipulative. Furthermore, as Andrews 1990 points out, it is unclear how to apply such a lexical principle to the syntactic constructions that McCloskey and Hale propose.

Hendrickx’s proposal solves the problem of having to propose a filter to rule out cases of overt agr and overt DP/Prsonum, but it also rules out one of the cases which is prevalent in Irish and SG — null agr with overt pronoun. It is unclear how to extend Hendrickx’s analysis to these cases, except to classify those pronouns that occur with non-overt Agr as non-pronouns for the APP. This is highly problematic, since the APP is defined in terms of collections of syntactic features, which precisely what pronouns are. Furthermore, it seems intuitively problematic to count agreement, a morphological head, for the APP, which applies to plural elements. This is especially so if the morphological head is incorporated into the verbal head in some fashion by the level at which the APP holds, since we then have a violation of the weakest most uncontroversial version of the lexicalist hypothesis: that sublexical elements qua elements (rather than subparts of chains) are not subject to syntactic principles.

The accounts based on incorporation and pro generally seem to carve up the data in such a way as to require extra stipulations: incorporation seems to capture the complementarity between agreement and argument very well, but suffers from the problem induced by coordination structures, as well as general variation in Celtic; the pro account doesn’t capture the complementarily, perse, but requires a number of extra statements to make sure that agreement and overt elements are ruled out from occurring together. What seems to be needed is a general theoretical way of deriving the full range of the complementarity from the theory. We turn now to a Lexical Functional Grammar treatment of these phenomena that seeks to do this.

### 3.5 Feature Competition

Andrews 1990 also argues that both the incorporation analysis and the pro analysis are misguided. He claims that the correct way to see the complementarity data is in terms of two items competing for a single structural position in an abstract structure.

Andrews couches his analysis in Lexical Functional Grammar (LF — see the papers in Bresnan 1982, especially Kaplan and Bresnan 1982). LFG represents syntactic structures in a two-fold manner: Structures, which are tree-like representations, and F-structures, which are feature-value structures like those in HPSG.

The theory of F-structures requires that the subject of the structure have an attribute that specifies its lexical content: the attribute is termed PRED and the lexical content of the subject is its value. So, for example in the sentence *Anne slept*, the PRED attribute of the SUBJECT attribute has the value ‘ANNE’. Usually this information is given by the phrase that actually occurs as the subject (as in this example), but in principle it could be given by the verb itself.

Andrews claims that, in Irish, synthetic forms of verbs lexically specify the value of the PRED attribute of the subject as ‘PRO’ (this value is the value that pronominals usually have). If a DP occurs in the structure with a synthetic verb then that DP specifies the value of the subject attribute as whatever its lexical content is (‘FOX’, ‘PIG’ or whatever). The features will then clash, ruling out lexical DPs with synthetic verbs.

Turning to pronominals, these have the lexical content ‘PRO’ anyway, so one would imagine that they should be fine with synthetic verb forms. To rule them out, Andrews appeals to a further LFG principle which causes any value of PRED introduced in a lexical item to receive a unique index. This will mean of course that the ‘PRO’ values of the PRED attributes in the subject pronoun and in the verb will carry distinct indices. They will therefore not unify and the structure will be ruled out.

This means that the only well formed structure with a synthetic verb is one where there is no lexically occurring subject. This treatment goes a fair way to capturing the complementarity between argument and agreement.

However, it does not explain why the non-agreeing form may not occur with a pronoun for which an agreeing form exists, such as the following cases:

> Andrews admits that the original motivation for this principle in LFG given by Kaplan and Bresnan is weak, but argues that it gives LFG a handle on non-configurational languages, and thus receives motivation from this.
To deal with these cases Andrews appeals to a principle that blocks a form being used if a more highly specified form exists anyway. The idea is that le is 'with me' and therefore 'I would strike' exist independently, so that leem precludes the use of le because it is more specific.

Andrews argues that his account is superior to an incorporation account based on the fact that the allomorphy of agreement markers in Irish is relevant to determining dialectal variation, and that this cannot be described in terms of the varying of incorporation rules. In fact this is not actually a strong argument, since the official status of an element can be stated as part of its lexical entry and one can imagine giving lexical entries for the various morphemes involved that would force or rule out incorporation.

A more telling argument is based on some data from cases where the complementarity effect appears to cease. Andrews gives the following examples from McCloskey and Hale:

(3.43) a. Taid na ba ag innilt
b. Taid siad ag innilt

Here we seem to have a case where we have agreement on the verb, and an overt (pronominal or DP) subject. These examples are from Munster Irish, a southern dialect. Such expressions are only possible with this particular verb form, although Andrews reports personal communication from McCloskey that there are dialects where this behaviour extends to all third person verb forms. Andrews claims that McCloskey and Hale's analysis and the incorporation analysis have problems with this data, since they have to start making explicit exceptions to a general filter. On his account, it is just the case that a few lexical entries are different in that their PRED "PRO" specifications are optional, which seems more plausible. This means that the following structures are also possible:

(3.44) Taid pro ag imeacht

Furthermore, Andrews claims that this optionality is tied to the agreement formative id. In this part of the paradigm, Irish behaves like a canonical null-subject language.

I will not discuss the problems with Andrews account in any great detail, since I think his underlying point about feature competition is correct. Criticisms would be of a mainly technical nature. Instead I shall outline an alternative that does not need to appeal to morphological blocking.

### 3.6 An Alternative

We have seen that the kind of treatment Andrews provides for the phenomena in question goes quite a way to capturing the complementarity between agreement and agreement that is found in the Celtic languages. However, one problem, that Andrews notes himself, is that the structural relationship between the agreeing element and the agreeing element seems to play a role and Andrews actually suggests a unification based theory that incorporates notions of government might be the right way to analyse the problem.

In this section we will outline a theory based on Chomsky's recent proposal (Chomsky 1992) that movement is driven by morphological requirements.

#### 3.6.1 Checking Theory

Chomsky 1992 outlines a theory which is intended to capture the intuition that movement operations are driven by morphological requirements. This theory is motivated by the idea that the only relevant levels of structure are the interface levels LF and PF. The mechanics of the theory are fairly straightforward.

Lexical items are specified for ϕ-features when they are inserted from the lexicon. Thus a noun carries features for number, gender and (possibly) person; a verb carries similar features perhaps specified on argument positions, perhaps at some other level of morphological structure. Recall that we have motivated this idea based on Speas' account of Navajo agreement.

The functional head Agr is also specified for ϕ-features. However, because Agr is relational, it is specified for two sets of ϕ-features: those associated with the argument, and those associated with the agreeing element; let us terms these A-ϕ-features and F-ϕ-features respectively (mnemonics for Argument and Function). The internal structure of an Agr head will then be something like the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agr</th>
<th>A-ϕ-features</th>
<th>F-ϕ-features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>num</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agr will project its X-theoretic structure and phrasal movement will bring the argument into the spec Agr position while head movement will bring the agreeing element into a position adjacent to Agr. Chomsky characterizes such positions as the Checking Domain of Agr. The process of checking simply makes sure that the features of the argument match the A-ϕ-features of Agr and that the features of the agreeing element match the F-ϕ-features of Agr. Only one argument may check one set of features (Chomsky implements this by stipulating that once a feature has been checked it disappears), ruling out multiple arguments in spec AgrP and multiple agreeing elements adjacent to Agr.

Now note that this theory allows a great degree of freedom. There is nothing, for example, that would prevent a possible structure for Agr that had the following form:
Here, the V raises into Agr specifying the F-features and prs raise into spec AgrP specifying the A-features. Agr\(^7\) denotes a discourse referent, and the correct interpretation is ensured. If we have an overt DP (such as a masculine singular proper name) in spec AgrP, then the same process occurs. If, however, we have a pronoun, or a DP, with different \(\phi\)-features, then we get an Agr which has one set of F-\(\phi\)-features and another set of A-\(\phi\)-features. There will, of course, be no discourse referent that will be able to be linked to this Agr, resulting in \(\lambda\)-formation.

Chomsky's motivates the distinction between A-\(\phi\)-features and F-\(\phi\)-features (which he terms N-features and V-features—we have simply generalised the cases) via an analysis of Verb-raising differences between English and French, arguing that such a system makes possible a restricted typology of languages in terms of whether the features are strong or weak. He also argues that all movement is driven by the need to check features. We shall not examine these claims here, since we are concerned only with the implications this theory has for the morphology of Celtic agreement phenomena.

Checking Theory allows us access to an important level of structure: the internal morphological structure of functional categories. Recall that it was the ability to access abstract levels of structural characterisations that characterised the success of Andrews analysis of the agreement argument complementarity. In the system outlined here it is clear how Celtic differs from more standard languages: Celtic has coalesced A and F-\(\phi\)-features in Agr so that there is only one set:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Agr} & \text{A-}\phi\text{-features} & \text{F-}\phi\text{-features} \\
\hline
\text{gen} & \text{m} & \\
\text{num} & \text{m} & \\
\text{gend} & \text{f} & \\
\end{array}
\]

This means that when an element comes into the checking domain of Agr it attempts to check its features with the A/F-\(\phi\)-features of Agr. Under the restriction that a feature may only be checked once, this will immediately capture the complementarity desired. That is, given the requirement that discourse referents must be fully specified for \(\phi\)-features to ensure their correct association with a DP, it derives the following generalisation about PA-agreement in Celtic:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Agr} & \text{A/}\phi\text{-}\phi\text{-features} \\
\hline
\text{gen} & \\
\text{num} & \\
\text{gend} & \\
\end{array}
\]

This means that when an element comes into the checking domain of Agr it attempts to check its features with the A/F-\(\phi\)-features of Agr. Under the restriction that a feature may only be checked once, this will immediately capture the complementarity desired. That is, given the requirement that discourse referents must be fully specified for \(\phi\)-features to ensure their correct association with a DP, it derives the following generalisation about PA-agreement in Celtic:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Agr} & \text{A/}\phi\text{-}\phi\text{-features} \\
\hline
\text{gen} & \\
\text{num} & \\
\text{gend} & \\
\end{array}
\]

The \(\phi\)-feature set of the agreeing element is the complement set of the \(\phi\)-feature set of the argument that is agreed with.

To determine the \(\phi\)-features of an element! Since, \(\phi\)-features are essentially an abstraction from a paradigm, then, to determine the \(\phi\)-features of the noun head of a DP or of the agreeing F or V we inspect its morphological paradigm. Thus in Gaelic we know that an cat 'the cat' is masculine because it contrasts paradigmically with non-masculines (such as a' Bhean 'the cow'). Likewise, we know that leum 'with me' is first person singular because this form contrasts with other forms in the paradigm of leum.

This view makes an interesting prediction. It predicts that the only arguments that are fully specified for \(\phi\)-features are pronouns, because only pronouns mark distinctions of number, person and gender. Overt DPs paradigmically contrast only number and

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\(^{7}\) Or rather the chain formed by the structural coindexation of the DP in spec and Agr itself (see Chapter 5).
gender. If the structure for Agr for Celtic that is given above is correct, then we expect that P and V will contribute only person features to Agr when their argument is an overt DP, since if they contributed number or gender features, then they would violate the constraint that features are only checked once. This means that in le Mairi 'with Mairi', le is specified for only person features. Moreover, we expect that P and V will contribute no features if their argument is pronominal, since if they did they would again violate this constraint.

Furthermore, consider what information we can glean from the morphological paradigm of pro. None. Obviously. This means that we expect pro to occur with agreeing forms that mark all the morphological distinctions.

Let us consider in a little more detail how this works.

### 3.6.2 Prepositional Objects

We assume the following internal structure for Agr in Celtic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agr</th>
<th>A/F-p-features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>num</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the following independently required conditions:

\[(3.52)\]

\[\text{a. Features can be checked only once} \quad (\text{Chomsky 1992})\]

\[\text{b. Discourse Referents need to be specified for person, number, and possibly gender to be associated with their DP}\]

We also assume that the \( \phi \)-feature composition of a linguistic element can be given by inspecting its morphological paradigm (this has obvious advantages in terms of learning). This will predict then that pro should occur with an agreeing element that is fully specified:

\[(3.53)\]

\[\text{"s toigh le pro coffaidh} \quad \text{COP liking with-3sg pro coffee} \quad \text{'I like coffee'}\]

And not with one that is only partially specified:

\[(3.54)\]

\[\text{"s toigh le pro coffaidh} \quad \text{COP liking with-3 pro coffee} \quad \text{'I like coffee'}\]

I ignore case features here which are of course paradigmatically contrasted. I assume that they are not implicated in the PA-agreement mediated by Agr though, for the reasons given in Chapter 2.

The gender requirement is possibly unnecessary and seems to depend more on pragmatic knowledge than on syntactic requirements. Moreover, first and second person do not inflect for gender in the languages we are concerned with here.

### 3.6.3 Subjects

The proposal discussed above gives an account of prepositional agreement across Celtic, and also the subject agreement facts in Breton. However, it doesn't quite seem to work for subject agreement in Irish and SG. The reason? Pronouns and overt DPs pattern similarly in certain parts of the paradigm. Thus:

\[(3.59)\]

\[\text{a. bhualinn an uinneag strike-COND-Isg det window} \quad \text{'I would strike the window'}\]

\[\text{b. bhualaimid an uinneag strike-COND-Ipl det window} \quad \text{'We would strike the window'}\]

\[\text{c. *bhualinn mi an uinneag strike-COND-Isg I det window} \quad \text{'I would strike the window'}\]
A problem arises in the case of overt DPs though, since they do not mark person features. Let us assume that there is a further Agr head in SG which is lexically marked for person features:

\[
\text{Agr} /-\text{features}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>pers</th>
<th>num</th>
<th>gen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>he</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>he</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>he</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we choose this Agr head, rather than the more general one, then overt DPs will be able to occur with bhualadh, since the Agr itself will contribute the person features required to identify the discourse referent.

What about bhualadh, which is marked as first singular lexically? Here, we appeal to the general Agr head. The V supplies this with person and number features, ruling out any pronominal or overt element, leaving pro as the only possibility. Note that the choice of the Agr head is free, with derivations ruled out by general principles if the ‘wrong’ one is chosen.

This analysis requires two extra stipulations: the first is that disjunctively specified paradigmatic information cannot contribute values to the feature slots in Agr, but can constrain the values of those slots. That is, if we inspect the paradigm of an agreeing element, and the optimal analysis is that the agreeing element is disjunctively specified (as is the case with bhualadh), then that element does not contribute actual feature values to Agr. This stipulation is necessary to ensure that the analytic forms do not contribute any information to Agr, except that they constrain values of the slots, ensuring that they are compatible with pronouns.

This suggests a theory of the extraction of features from a lexical item into Agr such that if a lexical element can be given a unique paradigmatic slot, then it can contribute feature values, only constrain them.

Looking at the actually extant paradigms of subject marking in Irish and SG, we find that in all dialects and in all agreement paradigms in those dialects (agreement paradigms typically vary depending on the tense and aspect of the verb), the analytic forms are haphazardly distributed throughout the paradigm. That is, there are, for the main part, no paradigms where the analytic form is uniquely identified paradigmatically as, say, third person, or singular. This variation receives an explanation in the current framework, since if there were a unique paradigmatically identified form, then the features characterising that form could be extracted and specified in Agr. This would immediately preclude the use of pronouns, since there would not then be a complementarity between the paradigmatic richness of the agreeing element and the argument.

Actually, this prediction is not fully confirmed. In past tense in West Munster dialects we have the following paradigm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>pers</th>
<th>num</th>
<th>gen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>he</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>he</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>he</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the third person singular form is analytic but is paradigmatically unique. In fact, throughout Irish and SG dialects, the third person singular form of verbs is always
analytic. I have no explanation for this fact, as yet, but it seems to act as a constraining factor leading to the anomalous Munster paradigm above.

The second stipulation is that there exists in Irish and SG a functional head Agr that is lexically specified for the feature person (with the value “third”). This stipulation is necessary to allow the analytic forms to occur with overt DPs, as well as with pronouns. Such a stipulation seems justified in that there do appear to be two distinct agreement phenomena going on in Celtic, and this underlies the intuition that splits the paradigm into synthetic and analytic forms. However the claim here is that the analytic/synthetic distinction is a rather superficial reflection of the interaction between the one-slot Agr phenomenon, and the existence of an Agr lexically specified for third person.

Moreover, we crucially need to have a different Agr with lexically specified third person features to deal with the anomalous Munster phenomenon noted above, where in part of the paradigm, Munster Irish appears to be acting just like a normal null-subject language. I repeat the data here for convenience:

\[\begin{array}{lll}
\text{Agr} & \text{A-\&-features} & \text{F-\&-features} \\
pers & 3 & 3 \\
num & pl & 32 \\
\end{array}\]

This will predict that where the paradigms allow it, the inflecting verb can take an overt or a null element.

The argument just given is at least interesting, in that it allows us to maintain the general system. One cautionary point is that the systems under consideration are in the process of flux (both diachronic and dialectal) and the aberrations of West Munster may be a reflection of competing systems (especially since the data under consideration makes no pretense to be from a single register or speaker).

### 3.7 Applying these Results to Objects

The account outlined above extends naturally to a DP preposing construction found with nominalised verbs in Irish and Gaelic. In such constructions we find the nominalised verb’s internal argument coming preverbally when it is an overt DP and occurring with a non-inflecting particle a. Null objects are marked with full agreement for person number and gender. Pronouns are barred. These constructions appear with modals, attitudinal predicates and certain classes of adjectives.

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(3.66)} & \quad \text{a.} \quad \text{`I like hitting you/her/him/you/them'} \\
\text{COP liking with-Is}\text{g 2sg/3sg/1pl/2pl/3pl strike-VN} \\
\text{}`I like hitting you/her/him/you/them' }
\end{align*}\]

Modern Irish has a similar construction for which McCloskey 1980 and McCloskey and Sells 1988 have argued that the particle corresponding to SG is a transitivity marker. In fact it seems more likely that it is an agreement head and that the object preposing seen above is movement to the specifier of this head (Duffield 1992 has independently claimed, on different grounds, that this preposing operation is movement to the Spec of AgrP in Irish. The SG data is interesting in that it provides less ambiguous evidence than the Irish).

Initial motivation that object preposing in such examples is movement to the spec of AgrP comes from external sources. The most constrained theory of functional heads proposes that there is a universal set and that they come in a universal hierarchical order (a kind of Universal Base Hypothesis). Speas 1990a and Speas 1990b argue that this order involves an agreement node intervening between the VP and the projection of aspectual information. Chomsky 1992 also adopts a structure where Agr dominates VP, and this is the structure we assumed in Chapter 2. If such structures, which are motivated on independent grounds are tenable, then the SG data receives a natural interpretation as movement to the spec of AgrP for Case—a well-known and widely accepted proposal (Chomsky 1992 and references therein).

We can further back up this claim in two ways. Firstly, we can show that the sequence *Daibhidh a bhualadh* (call it a Fronted Object Phrase (FOP)) is a maximal constituent (we identify it as an XP) and secondly we can show that the relationship...
between the head a and the DP Daibhidh mirrors the relationship between the subject agreement morphology and the subject DP (we identify the category of X as Agr).

These FOPs may be deflected, pseudoclefted and right-node raised which suggests that they are maximal constituents:

(3.68) 's e s' cheist in a's fireagracht a tha doibh
It's that question Prit answer-VN Comp be-PRES difficult
'It's answering that question that's difficult'

(3.69) 's e tha doibh ad a' cheist sin in a fireagracht
It's be-PRES difficult that question Prit answer-VN
'What's difficult is to answer that question'

(3.70) Tha e doibh adh tha e math a'cheist sin in a fireagracht
be-PRES it difficult but be-PRES it good that question Prit answer-VN
'It is hard, but it is good, to answer that question'

We have now shown that FOP is an XP and it remains to show that the category of X is Agr.

Recall the generalisation we made above that derives from checking theory:

(3.71) The θ-feature set of the agreeing element is the complement set of the θ-feature set of the argument that is agreed with.

If this generalisation were to hold for FOPs, then we would expect that pres would induce the full range of agreement, that overt DPs will occur with a form that does not vary (it is marked only for 3rd person) and that pronouns are barred. This is precisely the case as the examples above show. The particles me, do etc encode only the θ-features of person, number (and for 3sg) and gender. We can take them to be heads agreeing with the pres in their Spec under our generalisation. An overt DP occurs with only a, the neutralized agreement head, and pronouns are barred from the Spec of this agreement head, as expected.

Ramchand 1993 also takes the e particle to be a realisation of Agr, but she assumes that it is merely a lexical marking on the verb with no independent syntactic projection. This means that the sequence of a+V counts as the head and projects into a VP. The fronted object is then in the Spec of this VP, or adjoined to it.

This analysis has a number of problems. If the fronted object is in Spec VP then the Lexical Clause Hypothesis (the idea that all theta-marked elements are generated within the maximal projection of the theta-marker and hence subjects are generated within VP—see Koopman and Sportiche 1989) cannot be maintained for SG. Ramchand explicitly claims that the LCH does not hold, but gives no argumentation.

If on the other hand the fronted object is adjoined to VP other problems arise. We therefore predict that further movement to an A position is impossible (since it would violate the prohibition against improper movement). But we have cases in SG of the following sort:

(3.72) a. Faochdha Daibhidh Iain a bhualadh should David Ian Pri strike-VN

b. * Faochdha faidh should leave

c. Faochdha Iain a bhualadh le Daibhidh should Ian Pri strike-VN with David
Iain must be hit by David

The (a) example shows that the modal faochar has a subject position. Note that this subject position cannot be a pre since it has no agreement marking. A null subject is therefore ruled out (b). This means that in the (c) example Iain occupies the subject position but is assigned the theme role from the V. Standardly we would assume that this is a case of NP movement from the complement position of the verb to the subject position. In Ramchand's theory the fronted object is base generated in this position. Movement to subject position would then be movement from an A-bar position to an A position and would violate the constraint against improper movement. Direct base generation in subject position leaves it unclear as to why we have object agreement at all.

An alternative would be to generate the object in VP complement position and then move it directly to subject position. The agreement on V could then be triggered at DS by the object and the object could raise to subject position to get Case without skipping off in VP adjoined position. This is not a possibility in Ramchand’s system, since for her the object is base-generated in its fronted position. Let us put this aside and consider whether a more flexible model that allowed base generation in complement position to occur could still maintain that the object moved directly to subject position. There are two arguments against this: firstly, this would mean that the agreement on V would have to be generated at D-Structure, and it is well known that agreement is neutralised agreement head, and pronouns are barred from the Spec of this agreement head, as expected.

There are two other arguments against this: firstly, this would mean that the agreement on V would have to be generated at D-Structure, and it is well known that agreement is neutralised agreement head, and pronouns are barred from the Spec of this agreement head, as expected.

Secondly, even if this were not the case we could show that there is a relationship between the preverbal object position and the subject position in certain constructions. Thus:

(3.73) * Faochdha tu a bhualadh le Daibhidh should you Pri strike-VN by David

The ungrammaticality of this example is easily explained if the subject moves from the fronted object position, since we know that pronouns are ill-formed in this position. Given the grammaticality of such examples with DP subjects (see (c) above), any other explanation would have to make additional stipulations about the distribution of pronouns and DPs in the language.

In addition, there is some further empirical evidence that the VP adjunction solution is incorrect. This evidence comes from deferring.

In SG there are two deferring particles: s' e and s' ann. The former of these typically defers DP or CP (non-predicates) while the latter defers predicates such as AdvP or AspP:

(3.74) a. * s e'/s' am ann minister a tha mi’ ceilidh a-mouth
It's the minister that be-Pres I Asp visit-VN tonight
It is possible to cleft FOP as we saw earlier, and in these cases we get 's e

(3.75) 's e/'s ann sin a fheargairt a tha doirbh
It's that question Prt answer-VM Comp be-PRES difficult
'It's answering that question that's difficult'

However, if we cleft a bare Verbal Noun with no agreement marker then we get 's ann,
which is a clear indication that FOP differs categorically in some way from VP:\n
(3.76) *'s e/'s ann fabh a tha doirbh
It's leave-VM that be-PRES difficult
'It's leaving that is difficult'

Under Rambach's story there is no easy explanation for this contrast, whereas if Agr
projects syntactically then we have a clear categorical difference that we can appeal to.

In addition the clefting data gives us a further argument. The generalisation about
which clefting particle ('s e or 's ann) occurs with which clefted constituent, ignoring
FOP, appears to be that XP with referential features (DP, CP) clefts with 's e while
predicative XP (VP, PP, AP)clefts with 's ann. That FOP clefts with 's e is unsurprising
under the view that it is AgrP, since AgrP is headed by an element that consists entirely
of referential features.

It seems fairly clear then that FOP in SG is an instantiation of movement to the
spec of a syntactically projecting AgrP:\n
(3.77) a. Feumaidh Daibhidh am balach a bhualadh
must David the boy Agr strike-VM

This data is actually more complex than it seems from this presentation. Some speakers have
very weak judgements here, often preferring 's e to 's ann and justifying this judgement with some
statement to the effect that the verbal noun is a noun and therefore must be used with 's e. Other
speakers find no contrast, deeming both to be marginally acceptable. Finally, the speakers who agree
with the judgements given here typically have no realisation for the aspectual particle 's ann allow a
range of complement types after adjectival like doath suggesting that the appearance of 's ann may be
attributed to the clefting of an aspectual phrase that happens to be homophonous with FOP. However,
the point still holds that there is a contrast between (3.75) and (3.76) which is difficult to explain if
agreement is a feature of V.

One problem with this structure is that it seems to disobey Holmberg and Platzack's
Generalisation that object shift only occurs when the verb has raised to AgrS (Holmberg
and Platzack to appear). This generalisation is captured in the system of Chomsky 1992
via some technology that allows violations of the relativised minimality type only when
a domain has been extended via head movement. In Chapter 7 we shall argue that there
is an alternative means of extending the domain here thus permitting object shift.

3.8 Summary

In this chapter we have argued that the proper way to understand agreement phenomena
in Celtic is to see the complementarity between overt arguments and agreement as
arising because both the agreeing element and the argument are competing for the
same slot in a morphological representation of the functional head Agr. Given this
we derive a generalisation about how agreement works that justifies the analysis of a
fronted object construction in SG as movement of the object to the specifier of an Agr
position.
Chapter 4

A Theory of DP Interpretation

This chapter discusses issues in the interpretation of DPs. The central question to be answered is how to account for the systematic ambiguity of a particular class of DPs, which we shall term "weak" DPs, following Mihawk 1977. An example:

\[(4.1)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{Many foxes are in the garden} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{There are many foxes in the garden}
\end{align*}\]

Example (a) has two readings: the cardinality of the set of foxes in the garden is many (whatever contextually that might mean), or the proportion of foxes from a larger set of foxes that are in the garden is many (typically this latter interpretation occurs with stress on the quantifier). In (b) the latter reading vanishes. We shall refer to this effect as the Quantification Effect. Cases such as the English existential, where a proportional reading is not available, we shall term a case of Quantification Restriction, extending terminology of Reuland and ter Meulen 1987. There are also cases where the cardinal reading is not available. We shall term these Cardinality Restrictions. A syntactic environment which enforces a cardinality restriction is the scrambled position in Dutch.

For example, consider the following Dutch sentences adapted from de Hoop 1992:

\[(4.2)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{omdat Jan-Wouter altijd veel films mooi vindt}
\quad \text{since Jan-Wouter always many films nice finds} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{omdat Jan-Wouter veel films altijd mooi vindt}
\quad \text{since Jan-Wouter many films always nice finds}
\end{align*}\]

Both of these examples are grammatical with the reading of *real films* ‘many films’ in the (a) example being ambiguous in the same way as the English example where ‘many foxes’ is the subject in (4.1a) above. In the Dutch (b) example, the proportional reading is still available, but the reading where ‘many’ is functioning as a cardinality predicate over the set of films is not available.

The actual nature of this ambiguity is unclear, particularly in terms of how to semantically characterize the proportional reading. One possibility would be to treat the proportional reading as arising from an interpretation of the DP as a generalised quantifier (Partee 1988). Another possibility would be to treat it as deriving from presuppositionality in some fashion, so that there is no syntactic ambiguity. Furthermore, it is unclear where to specify the ambiguity: should it be specified lexically, or should there be twofold syntactic derivations leading two representations and ultimately to the two semantic interpretations?

The answers we shall give to these questions take up this chapter and the next. In this chapter we shall show that the appropriate characterisation of the ambiguity is given by appeal to the familiarity of the DP. That is, weak DPs are not interpreted variously as cardinality predicates and generalised quantifiers. They are always interpreted as cardinality predicates. However, when the set they predicate over is forced to be a presupposed or familiar set, the proportional reading arises, and this may happen either pragmatically or syntactically. The next chapter explores what the contributing syntactic factors are, and argues that a structural relationship with agreement is one of them.

4.1 Definiteness

English, and many other natural languages, mark a grammatical category of definiteness. Thus we contrast:

\[(4.3)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{A man entered.} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{The man entered.}
\end{align*}\]

The obvious question is what is the semantics of such expressions. Russell 1905 claimed that an expression like “a man” doesn’t refer to anything but rather semantically is stress on the quantifier/). In (b) the latter reading vanishes. We shall refer to this effect interpreted as an existential quantifier binding a variable of which the predicate man is true. The definite in (b), likewise is treated by assuming that there is an operator binding a variable and a uniqueness requirement that ensures that there is only one man such that that man entered:

\[(4.4)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \exists x (\text{man}(x) \land \text{entered}(x)) \\
\text{b.} & \quad \exists x, y (\text{man}(x) \land \text{entered}(y) \leftrightarrow x = y)
\end{align*}\]

Advantages of this account are that it immediately predicts the right truth conditions for sentences like:

\[(4.5)\]  
It’s not the case that a man entered

If “a man” referred then this example would be read as a denial that a particular thing entered, and that thing was a man. However, it actually means that nothing that was a man entered. This is immediately predicted by the Russell account.

Such an analysis of the semantics of definiteness has a number of problems. Strawson 1952 pointed out that if indefinites don’t refer then a difficulty arises for dialogues like:

\[(4.6)\]  
A man entered. He sat down.

If the DP “a man” is analysed as suggested by Russell, then we have to give an account of what the pronoun “he” refers to, since it can’t refer to the same thing as “a man”, because “a man” doesn’t refer under this account.
In fact, such facts about antecedenthood are crucial for a proper understanding of the semantics of definiteness, as pointed out by Heim 1982. Note that definites and indefinites behave the same, in contrast to true quantifiers, with respect to pronominal anaphora:

(4.7)  
  a. A man entered. He sat down.
  b. The man entered. He sat down.

(4.8) "Every man entered. He sat down."

Definites and indefinites, then, do not seem to be best analysed as quantifiers. But it would also appear that they should not be analysed as referential expressions, given how they behave under the scope of negation, for example:

(4.9)  
  a. It's not the case that a man came in.
  b. It's not the case that Anson came in.

The indefinite in the (a) example here is clearly behaving non-referentially (cf the discussion of (4.5) above), in contrast to the proper name in the (b) example.

We have here then a case where definiteness seems to be a third semantic category, as opposed to referentiality and to quantification. The question, of course, is what is the nature of this semantic category.

4.1.1 Discourse Representations

Karttunen 1976 provides a way of answering this question. He argues that as well as reference, there is an alternative concept, discourse reference, which can be appealed to. A DP refers via discourse reference to a discourse referent (DR), which acts as an intermediary between the syntactic category DP and the semantic category referent. A DP is associated with a discourse referent at a level of representation. A pronoun is also associated with a discourse referent. In some cases the discourse referent will be the same, and the result is that the pronoun is understood anaphorically to the DP.

This idea has been defended in detail by Heim 1982, Heim 1983 and Kamp 1981, and much subsequent work. They implement this idea by assuming a level of representation, a discourse representation structure (DRS) (termed a file by Heim) which contains a universe of discourse, and a set of constraints on that universe. The universe contains DRs and the set of constraints contains predicates which apply to the DRs.

The interpretation of a DRS is given by embedding that DRS in a model, of the familiar kind. The rule for accomplishing this states that a DRS is interpretable if there is a way of embedding it into a model. The import of there is here is that any DR which is not under the scope of a quantifier in the DRS will receive existential interpretation. In effect, it is as though the entire discourse is scoped over by an existential quantifier that binds any free DR in the DRS. Indefinites will receive existential force because of this.

One of the important advantages of this type of approach (Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) or File Change Semantics (FCS)) is that truth conditions can be given for discourses, rather than just for sentences. This means that an account of cross-sentential anaphora can be given, as well as cases of anaphora where the antecedent does not occur above the pronoun.

Consider the following discourse:

(4.10) A man entered. He sat down.

DRT analyses this by assuming that the DP "a man" is associated with a DR. This means that the universe of discourse now contains a DR. A constraint on this DR is added to the set of constraints to the effect that it is true of whatever the DR ultimately refers to that it is a man and that it entered. Thus:

\[
\text{man}(x) \land \text{entered}(x)
\]

Here the upper part of the box represents the universe of discourse, while the lower part represents the constraints. Each DP causes the introduction of a DR in the universe so the pronoun in the second sentence results in:

\[
\text{man}(x) \land \text{entered}(x) \land x = y \land \text{sat} = \text{down}(y)
\]

But what is the semantic contribution of the pronoun associated with the DR \(y\)? One possibility is that the pronoun refers to some entity that is in the DRS by virtue of some non-linguistic act, such as deixis. Another possibility, is that the pronoun is behaving anaphorically, and that both discourse referents refer to the same referent. Thus:

\[
\text{man}(x) \land \text{entered}(x) \land x = y \land \text{sat} = \text{down}(y)
\]

This DRS will be true if there is a means of embedding it in a model such that the model has individuals that correspond to the DRs and the relationships between those individuals in the model are compatible with the constraints in the DRS.

Turning to definites, these also can behave anaphorically. Thus:

(4.14) A cat and a dog were fighting. The cat mauled.

The first sentence results in a DRS with two DRs. The DP in the second sentence is anaphoric, and so a condition is added which requires its DR to be equated with a DR of the first sentence. Thus:
This view of the semantics of indefinites has yet another advantage. It allows us to give an account of the meaning of sentences like:

4.16 Every pig that found a truffle ate it

Here we want the quantifier every to have scope over the indefinite a truffle. Under standard accounts, where the indefinite is existentially bound, this is not possible. Under a DRT treatment we can allow the quantifier every to bind all free elements in its scope, including the indefinite and hence the pronoun. This provides a means of implementing Lewis’s quantification by cases (Lewis 1975) where the sentence is essentially interpreted as:

4.17 Always when a pig finds a truffle, it eats it

The binding of a free variable introduced by an indefinite by a quantifier that scopes over it is also termed unselective binding.

4.1.2 The Novelty-Familiarity Condition

Given this model for dealing with the non-quantificational, but non-referential nature of definite and indefinites, the question arises as to how a definite and an indefinite differ. The answer seems to be that definites (including pronouns) are anaphoric, in that they must refer to a DR that is already established in the DRS. Indefinites, in contrast, cause the introduction of a new DR into the DRS. Definite descriptions differ from pronouns because they come with extra information attached; information which must be already available for the definite DP to be used felicitously.

An example: consider the following dialogue:

4.18 a. A fireman entered the cafe.
   b. All eyes turned to look at him.
   c. The fireman ordered a coffee, and sat down

The first sentence contains an indefinite, which is interpreted as an instruction to create a discourse referent. The pronoun in the second sentence then refers to this discourse referent, as does the definite description in the third sentence. Pronouns require that there be a discourse referent for interpretation. Definite DPs, Heim argues, also require a discourse referent. Intuitively, the use of “the fireman” in the third example is licensed by the fact that there is an available discourse referent and that discourse referent already has some information attached to it: namely that it is a fireman. In Heim’s terms, definite presuppose their descriptive content. So the following discourse would violate this constraint under the interpretation where the indefinite and the definite expressions cohere:

4.19 a. A fireman entered the cafe.
   b. All eyes turned to look at him.
   c. The man with the sinking eyes sat down.

The requirement that pronouns and definite referring expressions require a discourse referent to be available, while indefinites require a DR to be new, is implemented by Heim by what she terms the Novelty-Familiarity-Condition (NFC). I provide a version here:

4.20 Suppose something is uttered under the reading represented by φ and the discourse preceding φ has resulted in a discourse structure F. Then for every DP D in φ it must be the case that:

- Familiarity Clause (FC): the DR of DP must be in F if DP is definite, and Novelty Clause (NC): it cannot be if DP is indefinite.

Otherwise, the utterance is not felicitous under this reading.

Heim’s principle has to be slightly modified for our purposes. If we want to preserve the general rule that every DP introduces a DR, then definite must also introduce a DR, but that DR is equated with some preexisting DR, in contrast to indefinites. Firstly, the FC and NC here are given in rather intuitive terms based on the notions of a DR “of” a DP. Let us make this more explicit:

4.21 A DP is associated with a DR iff the lexical content of the DP is identical to the restriction on the DR.

where the lexical content of a DP is just the main predicate of the DP. We can now state the NFC more precisely:

4.22 Revised NFC

Suppose something is uttered under the reading represented by φ and the discourse preceding φ has resulted in a discourse structure F. F contains a set of DRs, H. Then for every DP D in φ it must be the case that:

- Familiarity Clause: If D is definite then there is a DR associated with D and that DR is identical to a DR in H.
- Novelty Clause: If D is indefinite then there is a DR associated with D and that DR is not identical to a DR in H.

Otherwise, the utterance is not felicitous under this reading.

We will take the locution “identical to” here to mean that two DRs are identical just in case they both map onto the same individual in the model into which the DRS is embedded, that is all predicates true of the individual referred to by one DR are true of
the individual referred to by the other DR. "Identical to" is represented in the conditions of a DRS by the equality sign.

4.1.3 Discourse Representations and Non-Linguistic Information

An important point to note is that DRs may be in a DRS by virtue of non-linguistic acts, as well as linguistic ones. Heim 1982 (p405) quotes Karttunen 1988 on this point:

Anything in the immediate environment of the speaker and hearer towards which their attention is directed becomes a discourse referent whether it has been explicitly mentioned or not.

The advantage of this view is that it singles out a property of  

and  

which do not share:


do not quantify over all the individuals in the domain but rather over just those individuals of which the predicate  

is true. In fact this is also the case for natural language determiners such as  

, but the semantics of  

such that it makes no difference whether we consider a restricted or an unrestricted domain. Quantifiers that are restrictive like this are termed  

. This means that, to preserve the generality of our system, deixis may result in the introduction of a DR into a DRS.

Consider, for example, a situation where someone walks into the room and I point at her and say:

(4.23) She's looking very grunge these days

Then my use of the pronoun is rendered felicitous by the fact that my act of deixis (pointing) has introduced a DR into the DRS. Context, in general, may affect the composition of a DRS.

In essence then, the act of deixis causes the construction of the following DRS:

(4.24)  

Note that this DRS actually comes with a number of presuppositions attached to the DR. In this case the presuppositions are that the referent of the DR is female and that there is only one of her. In general the presupposed properties of the deixically introduced DR are a superset of the properties of the linguistically introduced DR that is taken to be familiar to it. In fact this superset is the minimal such superset, in order that the utterance will satisfy Gricean conditions on felicity/Relevance. This will turn out to be important below.

The linguistic information then adds to this DRS in the following way:

(4.25)  

and the Familiarity Clause of the NFC is satisfied.

This means that we can view DRSs as representations built up from a conglomeration of contextual and linguistic information. In particular, DRSs may change without any input of linguistic information.

---

4.2 Quantificational Status

Consider a sentence such as:

(4.28) Most pigs are lazy

Barwise and Cooper 1981 show that it is not possible to treat this sentence in terms of predicate logic by assuming that  

is a quantifier just like  

or  

. The problem is that  

does not quantify over all the individuals in the domain but rather over just those individuals of which the predicate  

is true. In fact this is also the case for natural language determiners such as  

, but the semantics of  

such that it makes no difference whether we consider a restricted or an unrestricted domain. Quantifiers that are restrictive like this are termed  

. We shall not discuss generalised quantifiers in any great depth here (in particular we shall ignore their important model theoretic properties, see Barwise and Cooper 1981, Keenan and Stavi 1986), but the following points are important. As mentioned already, generalised quantifiers are relations between sets. The two sets that are relevant are the set (call it  

) defined by the predicate of the DP containing the quantifier (the set of pigs, in the case of (4.28)) and the set ( 

) defined by the VP predicate (the set of lazy things, in the case of (4.28)). The generalised quantifier  

says that if we have  

then we can infer that most of the elements in  

are also in  

.

Generally, then, a sentence with a generalised quantifier can be represented by the quantifier itself, a restrictive clause defining  

, and a nuclear scope defining  

:

(4.27) Quantifier Restrictive-Clause Nuclear-Scope

4.2.1 Strong and Weak Determiners

An important distinction within the class of DPs is discussed by Milnark 1977. Milnark noticed that certain determiners, such as  

,  

, were excluded from existential constructions with  

:

(4.28) a. *There is every person in the garden
   b. *There are most people in the garden
   c. *There is each person in the garden

He termed these  

determiners. Other determiners are allowed in this environment (such as numerals,  

etc) and Milnark termed these  

. Weak determiners are ambiguous, as we have already seen. Consider the following examples with  

:

(4.29) a. Many people are in the garden
   b. There are many people in the garden

As we have noted already, example (a) has two readings: there are a lot of people in the garden, or the proportion of people from a larger set who are in the garden is many. In (b) the proportional reading vanishes.
There are a number of accounts of the weak/strong distinction, many of them reliant on the fact that strong quantifiers are to a great extent resistant with generalised quantifiers. The weak/strong distinction is then stated in terms of the model-theoretic properties of generalised quantifiers.

Some accounts of this Quantification Effect in existential sentences have been given which rely solely on these model-theoretic properties of strong quantifiers. For example, Barwise and Cooper 1981 claim that a semantically uninformative proposition arises from the interaction of the model-theoretic properties of DPs with strong quantifiers (strong DPs) interpreted as generalised quantifiers with the semantic requirements of existential sentences. This does not occur with DPs that have weak quantifiers (weak DPs), because these are not interpreted as generalised quantifiers. Keenan 1987 provides a similar account but one which is instead based on the model-theoretic properties of weak DPs.

One criticism that can be leveled at such accounts is that they seem to miss a generalisation. Proper names are also excluded from existential sentences, as are demonstratives and pronouns. Such elements do not seem amenable to analysis as generalised quantifiers, and the treatment of definite DPs as generalised quantifiers is subject to the criticisms, given above, of the treatment of definite DPs as quantificational at all.

4.2.2 The Ambiguity of Weak DPs

We have noted already that weak DPs are ambiguous. They can be read as cardinality predicates, or they can be read proportionally. Partee 1988 argues that this proportional reading is one where the weak DP is treated like a generalised quantifier, relating two sets. This means that we have two classes of DPs: strong DPs that are interpreted as generalised quantifiers, and weak DPs that are interpreted either as cardinality predicates or as generalised quantifiers. It is important to note that strong DPs cannot be read as cardinality predicates.

Another way of looking at this is to note that there seems to be a gap in the quantifiers natural languages provide. We have strong quantifiers which occur in DPs giving an exclusively proportional reading; we have weak quantifiers which occur in DPs that have proportional or cardinal readings; but there is no class of quantifiers that occurs in DPs which have exclusively cardinal readings. Empirically this comes out in that we have a class of quantifiers that are barred from Quantification Restriction environments (Definiteness Effect environments) but there is no class of quantifiers that are barred from Cardinality Restriction (Anti-Definiteness Effect) environments. Why should this be the case? In what follows I will suggest that there are in fact only two classes: proportional (strong) and cardinal (weak) and that the proportional reading of weak quantifiers arises from pragmatic facts. In one sense then weak quantifiers are not ambiguous, but rather vague—is just that the vagueness has only two possible values.

In DRT generalised quantifiers are represented by the creation of substructures of the DRSs. Heim's implementation of this idea creates bipartite structures consisting of a quantifier, a restrictive clause that carries the restrictions on the variables bound by the quantifier, and a nuclear scope, that carries the main predicate of the clause. Kamp's treatment is similar in that it creates a sub-DRS with two parts and a relating quantifier (Kamp's original treatment for every [Kamp 1981] which introduced a conditional and derived the quantifier reading via the DRS embedding rule is replaced by a more general treatment of generalised quantifiers by means of duplicate conditions in Kamp and Reyle 1983).

We can represent this idea as follows:

\[(4.30)\]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
a. \ "There's Anson in the garden"
b. \ "There's the man with the telescope in the garden"
c. \ "There's that boy in the garden"
d. \ "There's he/that in the garden"
\end{array}
\]

This data suggests that there is a Definiteness Effect, as well as, or subsuming, the Quantification Effect in existential sentences. It would be theoretically attractive if we could collapse these two effects by showing that the proportional reading of weak DPs and strong DPs in general are definite, or at least are semantically characterized by whatever characterizes definiteness: ie familiarity. For such a treatment see Reuland 1985. One problem with this is just why true generalised quantifiers should be familiar.

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We can represent this idea as follows:

\[(4.31)\]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
a. \ "Every pig entered."
b. \ \\
\end{array}
\]

The leftmost box represents the restrictive clause, the rightmost box represents the nuclear scope, and the diamond in between specifies what relation the generalised quantifier denotes, and what DR is quantified over. The substructures of the DRS are related by accessibility. This relation determines what anaphoric relations may obtain between DPs. In a generalised quantifier structure the main DRS is accessible from all subordinate DRSs, but subordinate DRSs are not accessible from the main DRS. Thus if we continue the above discourse with a pronoun, anaphoric reference is not possible:

\[(4.32)\]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
a. \ "Every pig entered. It grunted."
b. \ \\
\end{array}
\]

Here it is not possible to relate \(x\) and \(y\), because \(x\) is not accessible to \(y\).

---

5 Although they may of course be assigned a generalised quantifier type, as Montague did. Of course Montague assigned in definites this type too, so his treatment is not relevant to the empirical matter at hand.

6 These are classes of DPs that are barred from such environments and we will look closely at one such class in chapter 6 (Measure Phrases).---Gilian Ramchand [pp] has pointed out that disambiguating nominals in Bengali behave in a similar manner—but the important point is that its no class of quantifiers/determiners.
CHAPTER 4. A THEORY OF DP INTERPRETATION

If we assume that the restrictive clause is accessible to the nuclear scope then we have an account of the anaphoric reference in our earlier example of unsselective binding, the motivation for this assumption is that the nuclear scope can be seen as an extension of the situation given by the restrictive clause (see Kamp and Reyle 1983):

(4.33) a. Every pig that found a truffle ate it.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{pig}(x) \\
\text{truffle}(y) \\
\text{found}(x,y) \\
\forall z \text{ ate}(x,z) \\
y = z
\end{array}
\]

b. Pardee’s analysis amounts to saying that it can be interpreted as a cardinality predicate or as a generalised quantifier, giving the following two DRs (we abstract away from plurality for the moment):

(4.34) a. Many pigs entered

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{pig}(x) \\
\text{entered}(x) \\
\forall z \text{ many}(x) \\
\text{entered}(x)
\end{array}
\]

b. Pardee’s analysis simply stipulates that weak DPs are ambiguous between a cardinality and a generalised quantifier reading and brings us to the question of our gap. A more insightful account would give one meaning to a weak DP and then the other meaning would arise from the interaction of independent factors on the DP. Also, as we have already noted, testing weak DPs uniformly as generalised quantifiers and then appealing to the nature of generalised quantifiers to explain the quantification effect does not deal with cases where defines, demonstratives, pronouns and proper names behave as strong DPs, suggesting that familiarity is the correct notion to appeal to in explaining the restrictions on post-copular DPs in existential constructions.

Suppose that this is indeed the case. Then to rule out generalised quantifiers in existentials, we must treat generalised quantifiers as though they were subject to the Familiarity Clause of the NFC. But is there any evidence that a generalised quantifier requires a previously established DR for its interpretation?

In fact generalised quantifiers actually establish a DR by virtue of their lexical meaning and subsequently quantify over this DR. In the examples above the DR in the diamond box is established already in the restrictive clause. It is as though we suppose the DR in the restrictive clause to exist before being able to use it as a hook with which to relate the two sets (this is the standard existential presupposition associated with the restrictive clause of a generalised quantifier). We can claim then that generalised quantifiers are familiar by virtue of their lexical meaning (a similar claim is made by Reuland 1985). This means that we can appeal to familiarity to rule out generalised quantifiers in the post-copular position of English existentials. We take up this point in more detail below.

Consider again weak DPs. These are ambiguous; they admit a proportional interpretation in cases where they are not subject to a quantification restriction. I propose that this proportional reading does not arise from the fact that weak quantifiers can be interpreted as generalised quantifiers and hence give rise to a tripartite structure at the DRS level, as does Pardee. Rather, I suggest that the proportional reading of weak quantifiers occurs when some other factor has caused there to be a DR in the DRS to which the weak DP may refer. This will mean that we can maintain a unified familiarity account of existential sentences, while also not having to stipulate that weak quantifiers are ambiguous.

4.2.3 “Association” and Discourse Referents

So far we have assumed that the anaphoric link between defines and their antecedents is given by adding the condition that the DR introduced by the definite is identical to the DR introduced by some other DP. But the cases we considered already were cases with singular DPs and hence singular DRs. Let us assume that plural DPs introduce plural DRs (which are interpreted as plural individuals, perhaps along the lines of Link 1983). We will represent plural DRs by capital letters (this follows standard practice, following van Eijck 1983; we could just as well mark the discourse referent with features, as discussed in chapter 2). Thus:

(4.35) a. Some men entered.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
X \\
\text{men}(X) \\
\text{entered}(X)
\end{array}
\]

b. Now anaphoric linkage to a plural DR typically does not need to assert identity of discourse reference, but rather just the weaker linkage of subsumption. Thus if we continue the discourse above, we want to allow possibilities that we refer to a DR with a definite but that DR only needs to eventually refer to some subset of the men who entered:

(4.36) a. Some men entered. The old men sat down.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
X \subseteq Y \\
\text{men}(X) \\
\text{entered}(X) \\
\text{old}(Y) \\
\text{sat} \rightarrow \text{down}(Y) \\
Y \subseteq X
\end{array}
\]

Given this treatment of plural anaphoric linkage\(^4\), we can provide an account of the proportional readings of weak DPs. Assume that the context, or some other factor, has caused there to be a plural DR entered in the DRS. We then have a structure like:

\(^4\)Jeff Runner [pc] has pointed out that this treatment appears to allow anaphoric connection in \(\text{some men entered. He sat down.}\) We can assume that this is ruled out since there is no way of identifying the unique referent of the pronoun, given the paucity of information that a pronoun carries.
CHAPTER 4. A THEORY OF DP INTERPRETATION

(4.37) \[ \begin{array}{c} X \\ Y \\ \text{many}(Y) \\ \text{men}(Y) \\ Y \subseteq X \end{array} \]

Recall that there is a set of presuppositions that must be made of this DRS which is the minimal superset of the conditions attached to any linguistically introduced DR that will be familiar to X.

We then add to this DRS some linguistic information, such as a sentence containing a weakly quantified subject:

(4.38) Many men entered.

Now it is possible to construct an anaphoric link between the DR introduced by many and the contextually introduced DR, as long as we do not assume that weak DPs are necessarily indefinite because of the Novelty Condition (say that they are not specified for definiteness). This will give us:

(4.39) a. Many men entered.

\[ \begin{array}{c} X \\ Y \\ \text{many}(Y) \\ \text{men}(Y) \\ Y \subseteq X \end{array} \]

b. which gives rise to the proportional reading that many men of a preestablished set (now presupposed to be men) entered. Crucially, we do not appeal to a generalized quantifier interpretation of the weak DP to achieve this reading. Rather we appeal to the independently motivated fact that DRSs are representations that can be affected by non-linguistic factors.

Recall that Familiarity was represented by the equality sign when we were discussing singular entities; here, discussing sets of entities, we have used the \( \subseteq \) sign. With bare plurals on a generic reading one suggestion would be to treat the DP interpretation as plural individuals and use equality again. This suggests that we can use a neutral sign for the formal relationship of Familiarity at the DRS level, the interpretation of which is given via the embedding into the model. We also need some means to represent the presuppositions. We shall not discuss these representational issues in any more depth here but see Adger 1994b for more discussion and for an adaptation of Cooper and Kamp 1991 and Barwise and Cooper 1993’s Extended Kamp Notation to these purposes. We shall continue to use the \( \subseteq \) sign here.

Van Eijck (1983) (see also van Eijck 1985) notes another type of anaphoric reference that he terms Common Noun anaphora. CN-anaphora involves cases where a plural pronoun is used to refer back to a class of things introduced by a common noun. Thus consider (adapted from van Eijck 1983):

\[ x \in Y \subseteq X \]

\[ \text{fell} = \text{ill}(x) \]

\[ y = x \]

\[ \text{on} = \text{death}’s - \text{door}(y) \]

\[ Z = X \]

\[ \text{don’t} = \text{adjust}(Z) \]

If it is the case that strong DPs generally introduce two DRSs, then we can begin to explain why definites, strong quantifiers etc are subject to the definiteness effect in existential sentences.

In the example above the DR that the DP the chimp is associated with is specified as being \( \subseteq \) the plural DR introduced by chimp. We then define familiarity as:

(4.42) \( a \) is familiar iff there is a DR \( \xi \) and the DR \( y \) associated with \( a \) is \( \subseteq \xi \) (where \( \xi \) is a variable ranging over singular and plural DRSs).

where \( \xi \) is an antecedent DR, and we state:

(4.43) ***Definiteness Restriction***: The DP in the postcopular position of an existential cannot be familiar.

Strong DPs will always be familiar since they introduce a DR that is \( \subseteq \) the DR associated with the common noun of the DP. Weak DPs, however, do not introduce such a DR and therefore are not necessarily familiar.

Returning to Milford’s examples, note that if the definiteness effect is explained in terms of familiarity as above, then we expect only to find the cardinal reading of weak DPs in the post-copular position, because post-copular DPs are necessarily unfamiliar.

This, as we have already noted, is the case:
4.3 Some Alternatives

We now consider briefly some alternatives to the treatment proposed here. These alternatives are of two sorts. The first type assumes that weak DPs can be given a generalised quantifier interpretation, and are subject to the criticism that they do not fully explain the definiteness effect in existentials, and the corresponding indefiniteness effect in Dutch scrambling constructions. The second alternative is much closer to my own, and derives the weak DP ambiguity from the NFC, but only via a stipulation that weak DPs are lexically ambiguous.

4.3.1 A Type-Theoretic Account

In her treatment of the ambiguity of weak DPs, de Hoop 1992 relies on Partee 1987's idea that DPs may shift their semantic type between \((e, t)\) and \((e, e, t)\). She argues that the Dutch definiteness restriction on scrambled objects (and non-expletive subjects) results from strong case being assigned to these positions. Strong Case causes a type shift in the type of the DP, rendering it \((e, e, t)\). Thus:

\[
\text{(4.48) a. omdat Jan-Wouter altijd veel films mooi vindt since Jan-Wouter always many films nice finds}
\]

\[
\text{b. omdat Jan-Wouter veel films altijd mooi vindt since Jan-Wouter many films always nice finds}
\]

The weak DP in (a) is simply of type \((e)\). Scrambling moves this DP to a position that is stipulated to be assigned strong case, and hence it becomes of type \((e, e, t)\). Given that its type has changed to the type of a generalised quantifier, it is interpreted as such, resulting in a proportional reading, as in Partee.

This treatment seems fairly well motivated by the facts of Dutch scrambled objects. The scrambled object is always treated as a strong DP. One problem is that a definite, proper names, demonstratives etc are well formed in this position too, and it is not clear that we want to treat all of these elements as generalised quantifiers semantically. However, it would be possible to appeal to Partee's type shifting principles to accommodate this fact. A more serious problem is that a definite is possible in a non-scrambled position, which, on de Hoop's story, is a weak case position and hence cannot have a generalised quantifier type:

\[
\text{(4.49) a. dat de politie gisteren de taalkundigen opgepakt heeft}
\]

\[
\text{that the police yesterday the linguists arrested has}
\]

\[
\text{b. dat de politie de taalkundigen gisteren opgepakt heeft}
\]

\[
\text{that the police the linguists yesterday arrested has}
\]

De Hoop claims that the unscrambled definite can have type \((e)\) while the scrambled definite has type \((e, e, t)\). However, it is unclear what the semantic correlation here is.
Furthermore, although in (b) the only possible reading is a proportional one, in (a) both proportional and cardinal readings are available, just as both readings are available for English subjects. On de Hoop's story, this means that the unscrambled object must be able to type shift. De Hoop claims that it is simply of type (e), but this does not explain why it can have the same reading as the scrambled object which is of type (e, (e, i)).

On the analysis presented above, the stipulation (which we will derive in the next chapter) is simply that scrambled objects must be familiar. The ambiguity of unscrambled objects falls out simply because there is no restriction on this position, meaning that the weak DP can be proportional in appropriate contexts, or cardinal.

4.3.2 Semantic Partition

Diesing 1992 proposes an analysis of weak DPs that develops Parlee's. She claims that, at LF, quantifiers give rise to a tripartite structure of the type that Heim has argued for. She also claims that there is a straightforward mapping that obtains between syntactic structure and this quantificational structure. We shall examine in more detail the nature of the mapping later, but the basic idea is that elements in VP map into the nuclear scope, while elements in IP map into the restrictive clause. This means that weak DPs, to get a generalised quantifier reading, must raise to adjoin to IP at LF and then their quantifier must raise further to give the tripartite structure. This tripartite structure is then interpreted via a generalised quantifier giving the relational and hence proportional interpretation. Additionally, weak DPs that are in subject position (which is assumed to be a derived position (Koopman and Sportiche 1989)), must lower to their D-Structure VP-internal position at LF in order not to be within IP when it comes to constructing the quantificational structure. This means that they will not get interpreted as generalised quantifiers. Thus:

\[(4.50) \text{Many men entered}\]

\[(4.51) \text{S-Structure: } [\text{VP } [\text{VP many men}, \text{entered}, \text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{V, t}]]]]]]\]

\[(4.52a) \text{LFI: } [\text{VP } [\text{VP e}, \text{entered}, \text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{V, t}]]]]]]\]

\[(4.52b) \text{LFI: } [\text{VP } [\text{VP e}, \text{entered}, \text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{V, t}]]]]]]\]

\[(4.52c) \text{LFI: } [\text{many } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{VP, } [\text{V, t}]]]]]]]]\]

We will show in the next chapter how Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis is straightforwardly falsified by some interesting data from Catalan. At the moment, it suffices to note that Diesing's approach relies on the construction of a generalised quantifier structure for weak DPs on their proportional reading. Why weak DPs may remain in (or rather lower to) their base generated position, while strong DPs may not, is unclear.

4.3.3 Specificity

Enc 1991 provides an analysis of the semantics of specificity which essentially claims that specific DPs are particles. That is, a specific reading of a DP arises when that DP is one out of a familiar set already established in the discourse. Enc's analysis is very similar to the one proposed here, as far as weak DPs go.

Enc's motivation is to provide a semantics for specificity that is not reliant on scopal properties of the sentence as is claimed by Fodor and Sag 1982 among others. Fodor and Sag claim that the specific reading of an indefinite simply derives from it having wide scope over some other operator. Thus:

\[(4.52) \text{Every woman talked to a child in fifth grade}\]

has two readings: one where there is a single child to whom every woman talked, and another where the child may vary from woman to woman. Enc shows that specific readings arise also when there are no operators in the sentence for an indefinite to take scope over and proposes instead that specificity has to do with linking to a discourse referent. Some evidence from this comes from Turkish, where specifics are marked by accusative case:

\[(4.53) \text{a. Ali bir piyano-yu kiralamak istiyor.}\]

\[(4.53) \text{b. Ali bir piyano kiralamak istiyor.}\]

\[(4.53) \text{All one piano to-rent wants} \]

\[(4.53) \text{All one piano to-rent wants} \]

\[(4.53) \text{All one piano to-rent wants} \]

Enc notes that in (a) the indefinite can have wide scope over the propositional attitude verb, but that it can also have narrow scope. She argues as follows:

Suppose that (a) is uttered in a context where it has been established that Ali has decided to take home two of the pianos in a showroom. He does not care which one he buys or which one he rents. In these circumstances (a) can still be true.

This suggests that specific means essentially "from a pre-established set." Enc goes on to defend the view that accusative indefinite objects in Turkish are subject to a more articulated version of the familiarity condition of the NFC. For the purposes of this thesis, it is only important to note that Enc proposes that specific indefinites are familiar.

Enc's theory is very similar to that offered here, although her concerns are different, and the motivation for some of the components of the two theories are different. For example, Enc stipulates as a universal principle that all quantifiers (meaning generalised quantifiers) are specific, which in her system means they must refer to subsets of previously established discourse referents. This stipulation is derived in the present theory from the tripartite form of generalised quantifiers. Also, Enc does not make use of the idea that DPs encode non-linguistic information and hence she is forced to require that weak DPs are ambiguously marked in the lexicon. The theory under consideration here requires no such lexical ambiguity but proposes instead that the ambiguity arises from the generality of the Novelty Condition. Pragmatic factors then influence the final interpretation. In fact, as we shall show in the next chapter, syntactic factors also influence the interpretation of weak quantifiers, a fact that comes as no surprise given the existence of the quantification effects in existentials and scrambling constructions.
4.4 Summary

We have proposed that the ambiguity of weak DPs surfaces because of the nature of DRS representations. Specifically, DRSs may contain DRs which are there by virtue of contextual fact, rather than linguistic specification. Proportional readings of weak DPs then arise because of the possibility of anaphoric linkage (in a very general sense of anaphoric) between the DR introduced by the weak DP and the contextually present DR.

The Novelty Familiarity Condition applies generally to all DPs requiring them to introduce a DR. Definites, in addition, are required to anaphorically link this DR to a DR already present in the DRS. In this sense, definites are required to be familiar. Generalised quantifiers also count as familiar, given the nature of their lexical semantics. This is not a familiarity that arises from the Familiarity Condition, but rather through the meaning of the generalised quantifier.

Given this picture, we can give a unified account of the quantification/finiteness restriction on the postcopular position in English existential constructions, merely requiring that the DP in this position is unfamiliar (but see Ward and Birner 1993 who claim that the DP in this position need only be unfamiliar to the hearer).

Chapter 5
Agreement and Argument Interpretation

5.1 Introduction

We have so far motivated the idea that the agreeing element and the agreement controlling DP specify information about a discourse referent through the mediation of a projected functional head Agr, and this is what accounts for the fact that agreement has semantic effects. We have also shown that the determination of the semantics of DPs is partially given by referring to notions such as familiarity. In this chapter we will try to tease out what the role of agreement is more precisely in the determination of familiarity. We will argue for the inclusion of reference to Agr in the principles that specify how DPs are interpreted in a DRS.

We bring into consideration a range of evidence that shows that weak DPs, which we have shown to be ambiguous, often have only their familiar interpretation and that this is forced in particular syntactic contexts. It turns out that these contexts are best described in terms of the structural relationship between the DP involved and Agr. This suggests reformulating the Novelty Familiarity Condition as a condition that takes into consideration syntactic structure, as well as other information.

The precise characterisation of how syntactic structure is implicated then remains an open question. One possibility is to appeal to notions based on global position within a tree; elements within particular stretches of a tree being given certain interpretations. Another possibility is to appeal to local position within a tree, where the position is determined by a local governor. We show that the former position is untenable, given certain crucial data from Catalan, and propose instead to determine the structural position of the DP in terms of its local relationship with Agr.

5.2 Agr Partially Conditions Familiarity

In this section we consider a number of cases where two alternative syntactic forms are available. In one form the object DP can be found in what can be assumed to be its base (VP-internal) position; in the other, the object DP occurs in a derived position, external to VP. In terms of thematic content, both forms are the same. However, in terms of the unfamiliarity of the DP, the derived position determines that the DP will be interpreted as familiar (in the sense of the previous chapter).

Consider again the clause structure we proposed in chapter 2:
CHAPTER 5. AGREEMENT AND ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION

(5.1)

AgrP

NP

Agr

TP

L

Agr

T

Spec

Agr

VP

[Spec]

V

NP

\( \text{loves} \)

\( \text{Jo} \)

Note that the AgrP dominating VP has a specifier position, that according to Chomsky 1992 is associated with assigning structural Case to the object (in some languages at LF, in others at SStructure [pre-Spellout, in Chomsky’s terms]). Given the clause structure above, this spec AgrP position is the natural position to assume as the site of a derived object, although other possibilities exist (the derived object could be adjoined to VP, or AgrP, for example).

The cases that follow will all involve the displacement of the object to a VP-external position. In some cases the VP-externality is clear, and we will assume that the position is spec AgrP (bringing supporting evidence to bear, where it is available). In other cases the agreement is clear, and we will suggest that the VP externality derives from this, given the natural assumption that agreement is triggered under the standard spec-head regime when a DP is in the spec AgrP position.

We will also assume that Chomsky is correct in identifying the spec AgrP position with structural Case assignment. One motivation for this is that it generalises the structural case positions for subjects and objects.

5.2.1 Turkish Accusative Objects

Recall the facts that we noted about Turkish, in the previous chapter. We accepted Enç’s analysis of the fact that specific indefinites were marked by accusative case, while non-specifcals were unmarked. This analysis was essentially that specific indefinites had to be familiar.

de Hoop 1992 cites further data from Turkish, which shows that the case marked indefinites (hence the specific/familiar indefinites) are in a VP external position. She provides the following paradigm:

(5.2) a. ben dişim akşam yedičok güzel bir bısteği \[yedim]\]

I yesterday evening very nice steak ate

‘Yesterday evening, I ate a very nice steak’

b. * ben çok güzel bir bısteği dişim \[yedim]\]

I very nice steak yesterday ate

‘Yesterday evening, I ate a very nice steak’

c. Ben bısteği \[yedim] akşam \[yedim]\]

I steak-Acc yesterday ate

‘Yesterday evening I ate the steak’

If we assume that adverbial expressions such as \(un\) \(aksam\), ‘yesterday evening’ are adjoined to VP as shown above, then this data shows that the non-case marked object DP cannot appear in a VP-external position. A case marked object, on the other hand, can appear in the derived position. Note also the difference in interpretation between the (a) and (c) examples. The VP internal object is interpreted as unfamiliar (although it may receive familiar interpretation if the context is appropriate), while the VP-external object is familiar. Note that we can also make sense of the case-marking facts given the idea that spec AgrP is associated with structural case marking. Thus, assuming that the position of the derived object is spec AgrP gives us a unified story to account for why the derived object is VP-external and case-marked.

The important point, though, is that the derived object is interpreted as familiar. A very similar argument which assumes a different theory of DP interpretation is given by Runner 1993.

5.2.2 Clitic Doubling in Porteño Spanish

Runner 1993 also notes that clitic doubled objects in Porteño Spanish are necessarily interpreted as specific. He provides the following contrast:

There is a further restriction that only human objects may be doubled. This does not affect this argument.
(5.3) a. Diariamente, la escuchaba a una mujer que cantaba tangos. Daily, she listened to a woman who sang tangos.


The fact that the clitics associated with doubled NPs are agreement markers in this dialect of Spanish is argued for in detail by Sunder 1988. In this case it is not immediately clear that the DP object is in a derived position (although it does receive different case marking from non-clitic doubled object) because V has raised through the various functional projections in the clause, obscuring the position of the object. However, under the assumptions outlined already, agreement is triggered when the object DP is in Spec AgrP. This means that the appropriate analysis of (a) would be one where the object DP raises to Spec AgrP and triggers the agreement marker in. The V also raises, in this case to AgrP, picking up the agreement marking in and then successively raising through T and the subject Agr position.

Again, the special case marking of the object here (with the particle a (glossed 'A')) can be explained under the idea that the Spec AgrP position is associated with structural case marking.

The data is then further evidence that the Spec AgrP position for objects is associated with a familiar interpretation of that object.

5.2.3 Scrambling in Dutch

Further evidence that syntactic information is relevant to interpretation comes from scrambling facts in Dutch. We have already noted that objects may be displaced over adverbials in Dutch and that this correlates with a familiar interpretation (see also Moltmann 1991 for similar data on German, also de Hoop 1992 and Sportiche 1993 for Dutch). In Dutch, VP adverbs are generally taken to be fixed and to delimit the scope of VP. Arguments of the verb that occur outside of a VP adverb can then be taken to have scrambled across the VP. Objects that undergo this shift in position receive a familiar interpretation (see Reuland 1988 for data on subjects). We repeat our former examples of object scrambling taken from de Hoop 1992:

(5.4) a. omdat Jan-Wouter altijd twee films mooi vindt since Jan-Wouter always two films nice finds

b. omdat Jan-Wouter twee films mooi vindt since Jan-Wouter two films nice finds

'since Jan-Wouter always likes two movies'

Along the same lines that we argued for Turkish, this scrambling phenomena may be analysed as movement to Spec AgrP (see Maha jan 1990, Weibeluth 1989 for explicit argument to this effect and van den Wyngaert 1989 for a suggestion for how to deal with the apparently problematic fact that scrambling licenses parasitic gaps).

Further argument that scrambling in Dutch may be seen as movement to the Spec of AgrP comes from the placement of weak pronouns in this language. Stressed pronouns are possible in scrambled and in situ positions, but weak unstressed pronouns occur only in scrambled position:

(5.5) a. omdat Tonjes HEM gisteren gezien heeft since Tonjes him yesterday saw has

b. omdat Tonjes gisteren HEM gezien heeft since Tonjes yesterday saw has

Assume that weak pronouns are actually heads heading an Agr projection and this paradigm is accounted for. Unlike clitic doubling in Romance, these Agr projections only allow pros in their Spec (much like Celtic). They appear in what looks like scrambled position simply because that is the position of Agr in the phrase structure. Strong pronouns, on the other hand are just like DPs. See Sportiche 1990 for a related proposal and more evidence.

The interpretational differences then provide us with further evidence that spec AgrP is associated with familiar interpretation.

5.2.4 Antecedent Contained Deletions

A further argument that familiar interpretation is determined by syntactic position comes from the phenomenon of Antecedent Contained Deletions (ACDs). Sag 1976 and Williams 1977 argue that ACDs require that certain conditions on representation hold at LF. ACDs are a variety of standard VP-deletion of the sort shown below:

(5.7) Anson saw some films and Jenny did too

Sag claimed that a general constraint on such VP-deletion was that the missing verb (marked by do) is neither c-commanded by nor c-commands its antecedent.

In ACD constructions, however, this constraint does not appear to hold:

(5.8) Anson saw every film that Jenny did

Here, the matrix verb c-commands the deletion site. Furthermore, if we try to interpret such structures by copying the missing VP into the deletion site we are left with the problem of an infinite regress:

(5.9) [w Anson saw [vp every film that Jenny [vp e]]]

(5.10) [w Anson saw [vp every film that Jenny [vp saw [vp every film that Jenny [vp s]]]] e etc]
One way to get out of this problem would be to assume that the object moves outside of the VP at some level of representation, either to the left or to the right. Thus:

(5.11) a. \[ \text{VP every film that Jenny [VP c]], [\text{VP Anson saw]} t\] 
   b. \[ \text{VP Anson [VP saw] t, every film that Jenny [VP c]]} \]

In such structures the c-command constraint is met, since neither of the matrix VP or the embedded VP c-commands the other. Furthermore, there is no problem with copying the matrix VP into the VP inside the displaced object:

(5.12) a. \[ \text{VP every film that Jenny [VP VP saw] t] \], [\text{VP Anson [VP saw]} t\] 
   b. \[ \text{VP Anson [VP saw] t, every film that Jenny [VP VP saw] t]} \]

There are two such proposals in the literature; one due to May and one to Baltin. May 1985 suggests that the independently motivated device of QR resolves the problem of ACDs. QR takes a quantified DP and raises it to IP for reasons of scope. Note that for ACDs this will mean that the c-command constraint is maintained:

(5.13) \[ \text{VP every film that Jenny [VP c]], [\text{VP Anson saw]} t\] \]

Here the deleted V and the matrix V are not in any c-command relationship. Moreover, the problem with an infinite regress no longer holds since we can copy the matrix VP into the VP inside the raised DP as shown above.

The alternative, that there is rightward movement is proposed by Baltin 1987. Baltin argues that ACDs are best analysed as string vacuous extraposition, which means that no appeal to abstract LF operations is necessary. In his account just the relative clause part of the ACD moves out of the VP giving rise to a structure like the following:

(5.14) \[ \text{VP Anson [VP saw every film]] VP that Jenny [VP c]]} \]

This kind of structure still allows the maintenance of the c-command constraint and a way of sidestepping the infinite regress problem. Moreover it is independently motivated by overt extraposition structures. Extraposition standardly arises in cases like:

(5.15) a. Some articles that were hostile to the practice of outing appeared in the Guardian.
   b. Some articles appeared in the Guardian that were hostile to the practice of outing.

Under Baltin's treatment, ACDs are simply cases where extraposition has taken place from the object position, but it is invisible, in that the structural change has no phonological effect.

However, Larson and May 1990 argue that this analysis suffers from the fact that ACDs differ in their internal syntactic composition from extraposed relatives in a number of ways. In addition, Diesing 1992 provides a further argument against Baltin's proposal based on the fact that extraposition of free relatives is impossible, while ACDs are well-formed. Thus consider the free relative in the following (a) example:

(5.16) a. Whatever piano Clara played needs tuning
   b. *Whatever piano needs tuning Clara played
   c. *It needs tuning whatever piano Clara played

Note that we can't extrapose the relative clause, whether it is construed as adjoined to N in (b) or internally headed (with a dummy subject) in (c). ACDs however, form free relatives easily:

(5.17) Robert played whatever piano Clara did

Furthermore, extraposed relatives are ill formed with obligatorily strong quantifiers, while ACDs appear to require them (Reinhart 1987, Carlson 1977b, Diesing 1992):

(5.18) a. I read every book that you did
   b. I read many books that you did (only strong quantificational reading)
   (5.19) a. *Every review appeared in Vanity Fair that was hostile
   b. Many reviews appeared in Vanity Fair that were hostile

Given these arguments, Larson and May and Diesing conclude that the QR account of ACD which involves leftwards movement of the DP object is best supported.

However, an alternative is possible that makes use of leftward LF movement but not necessarily QR. Recall that we assume a system based on Chomsky 1992 where all NPs must be in the specifier of AgrP at LF for reasons of Case. Hornstein 1993 notes that if an ACD object is in the specifier of AgrO at LF, it will be in the correct configuration to both satisfy the c-command constraint and escape the infinite regress problem, since it is outside of the VP antecedent. The following structure is relevant:

(5.14) \[ \text{VP Anson [VP saw every film]] VP that Jenny [VP c]]} \]

Now given this idea, consider again the data where we have a weak DP object in an ACD (5.18b). This weak DP object can only have a familiar interpretation. Similar examples occur with other weak quantifiers:

(5.21) Anson saw some/few/a film(s) that Jenny did

Note that this interpretational effect is not due to the relative clause, since relative clauses do not generally force a familiar interpretation on their DP:

(5.22) Anson saw many films that lasted two hours
 CHAPTER 5. AGREEMENT AND ARGUMENT INTERPRETATION

If the account of ACDs where the object moves to spec AgrP is well-motivated, then we have further evidence that the specifier of AgrP correlates with a familiar interpretation of objects.

Hornstein's analysis essentially decouples quantifier raising and ACDs and there is evidence that this is the correct move. One of Lasnik and May's criticisms of the extraposition account is that it provides no way of accounting for the contrast between the following sentences:

(5.23)  a. *I expect everyone you do will visit Mary
       b. 'I expect everyone you do to visit Mary

since neither involve extraposition. The explanation they offer is that QR is bounded and cannot raise the embedded subject from a tensed clause but that it can raise the subject from the non-finite clause. They motivate this with the following data:

(5.24)  a. At least one person expected every Republican would win
       b. At least one person expected every Republican to win

In the (a) example it is not possible to interpret the universal with wide scope over the existential quantifier, but this is at least marginally possible in the (b) example, motivating that QR is bounded by tensed clauses. However, there is a problem since there is also a contrast in the following examples:

(5.25)  a. At least one person considered every senator to be smart
       b. At least one person considered every senator smart

Problematically for Lasnik and May, the universal in the (b) example cannot take scope over the existential subject, suggesting that QR is ruled out. If QR is ruled out, then ACDs should not be possible, predicting the illformedness of:

(5.26)  I consider everyone you do smart

A prediction which is not borne out. Hornstein's analysis derives the contrast between tensed and ECM ACDs since ECM constructions involve raising of the lower subject to the spec of the matrix AgrP. This is obviously illicit in cases where there is a tensed CP since there will be no motivation for the raising (the subject is case marked by Tense/Agr in the lower clause) leading to a violation of Economy principles. Hornstein has no analysis of the scope facts above, but he does predict the well-formedness of (5.25), in opposition to Lasnik and May.

Given these arguments we can see the obligatorily proportional readings of weak quantifiers in ACD constructions as being another instance of Agr conditioning familiarity.

5.2.5 Specificity in French

Another argument to the same effect comes from French past participle agreement. Kayne 1989 and Chomsky 1991 (drawing on Kayne's work and Pollock 1989) argue that the French past participle agreement phenomenon in (5.27) is a result of the trace of the moved Wh-Phrase being in a government relation with the functional head Agr:

(5.27)  Je me demande quelles chaises Paul a 't, Agr repentin 1,?
       I refl ask which chairs Paul has t  Agr repain t-PPart-Agr3f.pl
       'I wonder which chairs has Paul repainted?'

In current terms the past participle repentin moves into the Agr node and its agreement features are picked up from checked with those of the chain in which the trace t', is contained (the chain headed by the moved wh-Phrase). The motivation behind this is to attempt to assimilate past participle object agreement with the more familiar subject-infl agreement where the necessary government relation is the specifier head relation (perhaps defined in terms of m-command rather than c-command). If this pre-Agr position is available in (5.27), however, the question arises as to how to rule out:

(5.28)  * Paul a [ces tables], repentin t,
       Paul has these tables repain t-PPart-Agr3m.pl
       'Paul has repainted these tables'

Kayne suggests that this is essentially a violation of a Case-requirement. He proposes the following principle:

(5.29)  (Kayne's (20)) If a Case-marked chain is headed (where the head is the first element in the chain = DJA) by an A-position, then that A-position must be assigned Case.

If we take the specifier of AgrP to be an A-position, (5.28) will be ruled out if SpecAgrP is not assigned Case. Kayne shows that the auxiliary avoir is indeed not a Case assigner and that the active past participle does assign Case, but to its right. It follows that the SpecAgrP is not assigned Case by either avoir or the participle so that the chain (ces tables, t') in (5.28) is not headed by a Case marked position. Note that Kayne does not consider the possibility that SpecAgrP is actually assigned Case by Agr itself, which would be the most natural assimilation to subject-infl agreement.

Kayne then pursues this idea in connection with (5.27). In (5.27), the wh-Phrase is an operator and therefore not relevant for the application of (5.29). Of the remainder of the chain, by (5.29), if it were headed by an A-position, then that A-position would have to be Case-marked. But we know that that position is not Case-marked (leaving aside Agr here) and so it cannot be an A-position. Kayne therefore takes it that the trace t' in this example is adjoined to AgrP, and that this is the government configuration that triggers agreement.

One major problem with this view is that it makes subject-infl and past participle agreement dissimilar to the extent that one is adjunction to XP while the other is substitution into the specifier of XP. Also, there seems to be nothing in Kayne's system
that would rule out the possibility that ces tables in (5.28) be in an AgrP adjoined position. It would seem that we need a separate stipulation that rules out overt XPs that are adjoined to AgrP (recall that such a chain would be assigned case by the participle under Kayne's system) but allows such adjunction when it results in a trace.

We can solve these problems by assuming that Agr itself assigns Case to its specifier and that t' in (5.27) is in Spec AgrP. This is what Chomsky 1991 proposes. This has the immediate advantage of deriving uniform conditions for Case assignment to subjects and objects in terms of the government relation required. Kayne's evidence that soin does not assign Case then becomes irrelevant. That the participle assigns Case in French no longer follows, since in the structures where Kayne has the participle assigning Case, now Agr will do the relevant Case assigning.

In summary, proposing that Spec AgrP is always a Case assigned position allows us to achieve Kayne and Chomsky's original aim of assimilating object and subject agreement.

A further consequence of assuming that the position of the intermediate trace is not an adjoined position comes from the difference between agreement in wh-extraction constructions and agreement in passive/accusative constructions. Agreement is forced when we have A-movement to the subject position, in contrast to it being optional with A-bar-movement:

\[(5.30)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. Ces tables sont repaint}^*&(\text{es}) \\
\text{These tables are repainted}^*&(\text{Agr}) \\
\text{'These tables have been repainted.'}
\end{align*}\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{b. Les filles sont arr}^*&(\text{es}) \\
\text{The girls are arr}^*&(\text{Agr}) \\
\text{'The girls have arrived.'}
\end{align*}\]

\[(5.31)\]
\[\text{lesquelles a-t-il construit}^*&(\text{es}) \\
\text{Which houses has he built?}
\]

This receives a simple explanation in terms of Rizzi 1990's theory of Relativised Minimality. This theory basically proposes that in between a trace and its antecedent, the only intervening positions must be positions of a different type. Thus, the cases that are relevant here are that movement to an A position cannot skip an intervening A position, while movement to an A position may skip an intervening A-position (but not an intervening T-position). This gives the following structures:

\[(5.32)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{*A-position, A-position, t,}
\end{align*}\]
\[(5.33)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{A-position, A-position, t,}
\end{align*}\]
\[(5.34)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{T-position, A-position, t,}
\end{align*}\]
\[(5.35)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{T-position, A-position, t,}
\end{align*}\]

This means that movement of an object to the A-position of subject must proceed through any intervening A-position, so agreement will always be triggered. However, movement to an A-position may proceed through an A position, or may skip one, since Relativised Minimality allows both. This means that agreement will be optional in cases of A-bar-movement.

However, we are still left with the ungrammaticality of (5.28) to account for. In fact a fuller paradigm presents itself

\[(5.36)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. *Paul a repaintes ces tables} \\
\text{b. *Paul a ces tables repaints} \\
\text{c. Paul a repaint ces tables} \\
\text{d. *Paul a ces tables rep}
\]

If we assume that the condition on overt agreement in French is that at least part of a DP chain must be in spec AgrP at S-Structure (pre-Spellout) in French, then we account for the ungrammaticality of (a) and (d), while still maintaining our account of the grammatical examples discussed above. We could then give an explanation for (b) along the lines of our discussion of Celtic, assuming that AgrO in French disallows overt realization of both Agr and the DP in the spec Agr position. Alternatively we could pursue an Economy based account and rule out (b) as a violation of Procrastination (see Chomsky 1992).

Given this view of participle agreement in French, we expect that extracted elements which are in principle capable of being interpreted as familiar or not, should only have the familiar reading when agreement is overt.

Obenauer forthcoming provides interesting evidence that this is the case. He shows that the agreement of participles interacts with the interpretation of the extracted object across a wide range of types of extractors. Most tellingly for the proposal under consideration, the wh-word quel can have two interpretations: it can mean "which" or it can mean "what type". Thus:

\[(5.37)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. quelles maisons a-t-il construit}^*&(\text{es}) \\
\text{What type of houses has he built} \\
\text{b. quelles maisons a-t-il construites}^*&(\text{es}) \\
\text{What particular houses has he built} \\
\text{c. quelles maisons has-he-built-fem.pl} \\
\text{What type of houses has he built}
\end{align*}\]

Obenauer explicitly states that

\[\text{The form construites presupposes the identification of specific houses.}\]

Necessarily specific/familiar extractees such as quel force a agreement:

\[(5.38)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{lesquelles a-t-il construit}^*&(\text{es}) \\
\text{A similar point can be made about exclamatives. A number of languages distinguish morphologically definite and indefinite wh-words. Only the indefinite forms can be used in exclamatives. Obenauer gives the following examples from Russian:}
\end{align*}\]
Given the clause structure we motivated in chapter 2, the data above show that a weak DP object is necessarily interpreted as familiar (in the sense of chapter 4) when it appears in a derived position. The most obvious candidate for this derived position is the specifier of Agr0, the agreement projection immediately dominating VP. This idea is supported by three types of evidence: firstly the derived position may correlate with the presence of agreement; secondly it may correlate with structural case marking; thirdly it is VP-external, and appears to be an A-position.

Now the question arises of why this correlation between being in the specifier of Agr and familiarity should be the case. What is it about this position that leads to a familiar interpretation of the object? We address this in the next section.

5.3 Global or Local Determination of Familiarity?

With respect to the question of what it is about the spec AgrP position that causes familiar interpretations of DPs associated with that position, two hypotheses present themselves: either the derived position is characterised by its global position in the tree (making use of such notions as VP-external, within IP etc.), or the position is characterised by a relationship of a local nature with some head—in this case Agr. The appropriate notions in the second case are those of X-theory and government theory. We shall refer to the first option as the Global Position Hypothesis (GPH) and to the second as the Local Position Hypothesis (LPH). The particular LPH we want to endorse, given the data above, is that the local head that conditions familiarity is Agr.

A version of the GPH is argued for by Diesing 1992 in some detail, and we shall discuss this below and show that it suffers from empirical and conceptual disadvantages, compared with the LPH.

5.3.1 Diesing’s Proposal

Diesing 1992 argues that the kind of interpretative effects that we have described above are best captured in a global fashion. She bases her claims on data such as the Dutch scrambling data and the Turkish data which seem to correlate the interpretation of an object DP with VP-externality. On this basis Diesing argues for what she terms the Mapping Hypothesis. This assumes, following Heim, a tripartite quantificational structure for sentences containing generalised quantifiers. This is represented as follows:

\[ Q \text{ [Restrictive Clause] [Nuclear Scope]} \]
The Mapping Hypothesis claims that there is a strict correspondence between the syntactic structure, and this quantificational structure and the correspondence is given as follows:

(5.44) The Mapping Hypothesis
Material within VP is mapped into the nuclear scope while material within IP (external to VP—DJA) is mapped to the restrictive clause.

How are nuclear scope and restrictive clause interpreted in this system? Diesing proposes that nuclear scopes are subject to existential closure, so that any free variable within a nuclear scope will be treated existentially. In terms of the restrictive clause Diesing claims that

the presuppositions induced by the quantifier are somehow incorporated into the restrictive clause (Diesing 1992 p62)

I am not quite sure exactly what this means, but I take it to be something along the lines of Reuland’s proposal (Reuland 1988) that generalised quantifiers require a contextually induced set to quantify over. Essentially then, Diesing proposes that familiar discourse referents are represented in the restrictive clause. There is of course a major difference between Diesing’s system and the one outlined in Chapter 4. In the latter system DRs are taken to represent information that is contextually induced, as well as linguistically induced, and it is the interaction between these two sources of information that result in the proposition to be interpreted (where proposition is used in the technical sense required by DRT (see Heim 1983)). In Diesing’s system, the quantificational structure represents, it seems, linguistic information only (with the apparent exception of the presuppositions induced by a quantifier and incorporated into the restrictive clause).

5.3.2 Problems with Diesing’s Proposal

Conceptual Problems

We have already criticised Diesing’s proposal on the grounds that it deals with the semantics of weak DPs by assuming that they are represented syntactically (or at least at the level of DRS/Heimian files) as generalised quantifiers. In this section we shall show that Diesing’s approach to the relationship between syntactic structure and the DRS level structure is misguided, and should be replaced with an approach based not on such notions as VP-external, but rather on notions drawn from government theory.

There are conceptual reasons why this should be the case. The notions of ‘material within VP’ and ‘material within IP’ have no conceptual status within our theory of grammar. “Material within VP” presumably could be rephrased in terms of government by V under m-command, but this is more difficult to do with “material within IP”. We do have the notion of functional head at our disposal, but C is a functional head, and Diesing explicitly excludes C and its spec from consideration (without argument). Furthermore, Diesing’s proposal is not that elements associated with one of the functional heads in IP are mapped into the restrictive clause, but also all adjoined elements in IP. To reconstruct Diesing’s ideas in a framework which actually made use of the theoretical concepts we have would then involve a disjunctive statement that was essentially a series of stipulations.

Empirical Problems: Spec IP in Catalan

There are also empirical reasons to doubt Diesing’s proposal. To see what these are, we should first consider what distinct empirical predictions are made by the Local Position Hypothesis, and Diesing’s version of the Global Position hypothesis.

The LPH account predicts that elements moved into the specifier of AgrP are interpreted familiarly. Diesing’s account predicts exactly the same thing since Agr0 is external to VP (in fact this approach is explicitly taken by Runner 1993) and elements external to VP are mapped into the restrictive clause (pace the differences between the interpretation of elements in the restrictive clause, and the notion of familiarity as we defined it in Chapter 4). However, the LPH account does not predict that all elements that are external to VP receive familiar interpretation, while Diesing’s does. Specifically, movement to a position within IP is predicted to result in a presuppositional (familiar) interpretation of the moved material by Diesing, but not by an account which appeals to the more fine grained distinctions of government theory.

Here, however, a complication arises. In order to deal with the possibility of weak readings for subjects in spec of IP in English, Diesing allows a rule of LF-lowering where the subject lowers into its VP-internal position (see Chapter 4). Adopting the same rule for objects means that we could have an S-structure where an object has moved VP-externally and then lowers at LF back into its VP-internal position. Because VP internal elements are treated by Diesing as part of the nuclear scope, they will receive an existential (unfamiliar) reading.

This means that to falsify Diesing’s hypothesis we need to find a case where a weak DP is outside of VP (so that it will move into the restrictive clause) and receives only an unfamiliar reading. Essentially, we want a definiteness effect for some element within IP. Furthermore, to support the LPH over the GPH, we must also show that when such an IP is locally governed by some particular element, then the familiar reading is possible. The element we are referring to is, of course, agreement. We provide such a case from Catalan.

Vallduví argues strongly that in Catalan certain quantificational phrases appear in the specifier of IP, which is an A-bar position in this language. Such phrases receive an unfamiliar reading. Exactly the same class of phrases can also occur adjoined to IP. We do have the notion of functional head at our disposal, but C is a functional head, and Diesing explicitly excludes C and its spec from consideration (without argument). Furthermore, Diesing’s proposal is not that elements associated with one of the functional heads in IP are mapped into the restrictive clause, but also all adjoined elements in IP. To reconstruct Diesing’s ideas in a framework which actually made use of the theoretical concepts we have would then involve a disjunctive statement that was essentially a series of stipulations.

(5.45) Crec que poques cases, fara 1
believes1sg Comp few things do-FUT-3sg
‘I believe it’ll do few things’

Secondly, they must occur after standardly left attached DPs, which Vallduví argues are adjoined to IP. Thus:

(5.46) a. El govern, poques cases, fara 1, 1
the government few things do-FUT-3sg

Of course Diesing could then claim that reconstruction in such a case is forced, but this rehashes her theory of any predictive power.
The government will do few things

b. * Poques cases el govern faràs l'1, l'1, few things the government do+FUT-3sg

The other evidence that Vallduví adduces is more complex. He shows that there is a class of elements that the quantificational elements discussed already are part of. This can be determined on the basis of complementary distributional evidence. The other elements of this class are wh-phrases and negative universal quantifiers. Vallduví shows that when wh-phrases must occur in spec IP because of generalisations governing the distribution of wh-phrases and subject verb inversion. Now, given that quantificational elements and wh-phrases are members of the same distributional class, and that wh-phrases are in spec IP on the basis of subject verb inversion, it follows that quantificational phrases are also in spec IP. A similar argument can be made on the basis of negative universal quantifiers.

Now the quantificational phrases that appear in this spec IP position cannot be interpreted as familiar. Thus there is essentially a definiteness effect in this position. The following examples show that strong quantifiers, definite NPs, proper names and demonstratives are barred from this spec IP position:

(5.47) * en aquesta facultat, (x) tot cada alumne, deus haver seduit l'1,
In this faculty, A CC every each student must-2sg have-inf seduced, with amb els teus encants.
the your charms

'In this faculty, you must have seduced every each student with your charms'

(5.48) * La mare, acontentes l'1, la mar de bé, tu!
the mother make/ed-happy-2sg very well you

'You’re so good at making your mother happy!

(5.49) * L'Anna, acontentes l'1, la mar de bé, tu!
the Anna make/ed-happy-2sg very well you

'You’re so good at making Anna happy!

(5.50) * Aquest client, deurem visitar l'1, oí, arreu?
This client must+FUT-1pl visit-INF right today

'We’ll probably visit this client today, right?'

NPs with weak quantifiers, however, are fine:

Many thanks to Carlos Carboné, Josep Quez and Enric Vallduví for help with the data and its interpretation.

In fact one strong quantifier appears to be wellformed in this position for some speakers in a sentence which corresponds to ‘most’. Other speakers only find this good when modified by a relative. In fact relative clauses generally seem to dissipate definiteness effects. See the discussion below in Chapter 6. A further exception to this rule is familism, ‘everyone’. This may be due to the fact that it quantifies over a non-contextually established restricted domain, signalled by its morphologically compound status.

The weak DP associated with the agreement clitic in (5.54b) is interpreted familiarly, i.e. with reference to preexisting DRs, while the weak DP in spec IP in (5.55b), which is not associated with a clitic, is interpreted as necessarily unfamiliar. If the clitic is a
realization of agreement, as in the Portuguese Spanish case, then this data is expected on
the LPH.

This data amounts to fairly clear evidence that Diesing's proposal is too coarse to
deal with the facts. Diesing would predict that the weak NPs in the specifier of IP
should have at least a strong reading (allowing for LF lowering to derive the weak
reading). This does not appear to be the case, unless the quantifier is associated with
an agreement clitic within the clause. Such a clitic then allows a strong reading of the
quantifier.

So here we have a case of an IP internal element that does not and cannot have an
familiar reading. Now it would be possible to save the Mapping Hypothesis by assuming
that these quantificational elements appear in some functional projection above AgrP
but below AgrOP and to reformulate the hypothesis so that it referred to the stretch
of the sentence between AgrOP and VP. This means that the Mapping Hypothesis then
includes the spec of both AgrP; the specs of TP, NegP and AgrP; and any adjoined
positions. But note that the familiar reading does become possible in precisely those
cases where the quantifier is coindexed with agreement features in the form of either an
object clitic, or subject agreement on the verb. This evidence forcefully supports the
LPH view of the determination of interpretation by syntactic context.

5.4 Revising the Novelty-Familiarity Condition

5.4.1 A First Try

The data we have considered in this chapter gives us evidence that there is more to the
Familiarity Condition than just the lexical specification of definiteness. Specifically, it
allows us to draw the conclusion that the principle that maps syntactic representations
onto DRSs should make reference to the structural relationship that the relevant DP
bears with agreement.

Recall the version of the NFC that we left chapter 4 with:

(5.56) Revised NFC
Suppose something is uttered under the reading represented by φ and the
discourse preceding φ has resulted in a discourse structure F. F contains a set
of DRs, Φ. Then for every DP D in φ it must be the case that:

Novelty Clause: there is a DR associated with D

and

Familiarity Clause: If D is definite then the DR associated with D is ⊆ a
DR in Φ.

Otherwise, the utterance is not felicitous under this reading.

Now in all the cases we have discussed above, the DP that was in a spec-head relationship
with Agr has to be interpreted as familiar. We can incorporate this directly:

(5.57) Revised NFC
Suppose something is uttered under the reading represented by φ and the
discourse preceding φ has resulted in a discourse structure F. F contains a set
of DRs, Φ. Then for every DP D in φ it must be the case that:

Novelty Clause: there is a DR associated with D

and

Familiarity Clause: If D is definite then the DR associated with D is ⊆ a
DR in Φ.

Otherwise, the utterance is not felicitous under this reading.

What we want to define here is the relationship between ZP1 and X1 (the specifier
relationship). We can do this in the following way: following Chomsky, define the
domains relation such that α dominates β if every segment of α dominates β. This
means that the segmented category \{XP1, XP2\} dominates ZP1, but not UP. For a head
α, we then define max(α) as the least full-category maximal projection dominating α.
So max(X1) is \{XP1, XP2\}. These definitions are the ones given by Chomsky. Finally,
we define the projection of α, proj(α), as all categories that dominate α and share the
major category features of α. So proj(\{X1, X2\}) is \{X',\{XP1, XP2\}\}.
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Given these notions we can now define the relationship between X and \{ZP₁, ZP₂\} as follows:

\[ \text{max}(X), \text{specifies } Y \text{ if and only if } \text{max}(Y) \text{ dominates } \text{max}(X) \text{ and } \exists z : \text{spec}(Y) \text{ and } z \text{ does not dominate } \text{max}(X). \]

This will uniquely pick out the segmented category \{ZP₁, ZP₂\} above as the specifier of \{X₁, X₂\}.

Now recall that in some of the cases we discussed above, the DP that was interpreted as specific was not actually in the spec AgrP position but had only passed through it during a derivation. This means that the proper notion to appeal to is not DP, but rather Chain, where a Chain consists of a DP and its coindexed traces.

We can now define a particular type of chain that will receive a familiar interpretation. Thus:

\[ C = \{ a_1, \ldots, a_n \} \text{ is an Agr-Chain iff some } a \text{ specifies Agr.} \]

This then allows us to reformulate the Familiarity condition in the following way:

5.4.3 Agreement by Government

Note that the crucial reference to the specifier-related nature of Agr-Chains means that we allow cases where an agreement relationship is set up and yet the familiarity clause does not come into play. These will be structures where agreement occurs under government, rather than under the specifier relationship. One clear example is again given by existential constructions in English:

There *is/are few things that can be done
Agreement of the copula is with the postcognate DP. Note that the nature of this agreement appears to be different from spec-head agreement. Thus in my spoken Scottish English the following are all well-formed:

a. There's still three tic kets to be sold
b. There's a lot of gorgeous actors in the Festival this year
c. There was tons of people at the opening night

but they contrast with the non-there versions, which do require agreement:

a. Three tic kets *is/are still to be sold
b. A lot of gorgeous actors *is/are in the Festival this year
c. Tons of people *was/were at the opening night

This suggests that the nature of the two types of agreement are different, with spec-head agreement forcing feature matching. Since no spec-head agreement obtains in the postcognate case, we don't expect the Familiarity Clause to play a part, and so the definiteness effect we find here can occur.

There is further evidence that there are two types of agreement relationship that comes from Arabic. Arabic is a VSO language with an alternative SVO order. Let us assume that VSO results from fronting the V into some head in the C-system. We then have the following paradigm (taken from Benmamoun 1992):

a. daxal-a T-Tulaab-u
   enter-3.m the-students(Masc)-Nom
   'The students entered'

b. daxal-at T-Taalibaat-u
   enter-3.f the-students(Fem)-Nom
   'The students entered'

c. kaaan-a T-Tulaab-u
   ya-drus-un
   bo-3.m the-students(Masc)-Nom Imp.3.m study-pl.m
   'The students were studying'

d. kaaan-at T-Taalibaat-u
   ta-drus-na
   bo-3.f the-students(Fem)-Nom Imp.3.f study-pl.f
   'The students were studying'
Here we see that when the verb in C governs the subject we have agreement in person and gender. When, however, the subject is in spec AgrP then we have person number and gender inflection on the main verb, with again person and gender on the auxiliary in C. This is fairly clear evidence that there are two types of agreement relation, one mediated by the specifier head relationship and the other by a government relationship.

### 5.5 Reconstruction and Economy

The account presented here, and Diesing’s account (and in fact that presented by Enc 1991) all suffer from one particular problem: how, in cases like (5.88), can we have a non-proportional (that is a cardinal, or unfamiliar) reading for the subject?

(5.88) Many foxes are available

Here the subject is unquestionably in spec IP/AgrP and hence by the Mapping Hypothesis, or by the Novelty Familiarity Condition, it should be interpreted as familiar/proportional. Of course such a reading is available, but the cardinal/unfamiliar reading is available too. Diesing’s solution (and Enc’s) is to assume that at LF the subject lowers to its D-Structure position in spec VP (reconstruction). It is then not in IP and hence, by the Mapping Hypothesis, does not necessarily receive a proportional interpretation. This lowering operation is not available for certain predicates that are assumed to not have a spec VP position. Such predicates are Carlson 1976’s individual-level predicates. Thus in the following example with a individual-level predicate only a proportional reading is possible:

(5.89) Many firemen are intelligent

This contrasts with the ambiguity when the predicate is stage level (5.88). This idea is argued for in detail by Kratzer 1988 who provides independent motivation that stage-level predicates lack a spec VP position, as well as by Diesing.

Of course the mechanism of lowering the subject at LF out of the spec AgrP position is available under the account we are considering here. We need simply stipulate that for a chain to count as an Agr-Chain, the head of that chain (the overt element) must command the specifier of Agr, but such a solution seems undermotivated, although it mimics precisely Diesing’s account.

Another case is the Scottish Gaelic FOP construction. This allows the fronting of weak DPs into spec AgrP but such DPs remain ambiguous:

(5.70) Fheumaidh Dhuadh cat a bhuaich
‘David must hit a cat’

The DP object here can be interpreted either specifically or non-specifically.

One of the problems with the idea of LF lowering is that often an element is in IP, or alternatively in spec AgrP and yet the cardinal/unfamiliar reading is not possible, regardless of the status of the predicate. Most of the cases we have discussed in this chapter (French, Turkish, Dutch, Hindi, Catalan, Spanish, English ACDs etc.) are like this.

In fact if we examine the data more closely we notice a correlation between the available readings and the obligatoriness of movement to spec AgrP: if the argument is required to move to spec AgrP, then it is ambiguous. On the other hand, if the argument may raise to spec AgrP, or may skip this position or remain in situ, then whenever the argument does raise to spec AgrP it is obligatorily interpreted as familiar.

Consider the data we have discussed already. In Dutch, objects may scramble or not—if they do they are interpreted as familiar. Subjects in Dutch may appear in spec AgrP, or in the impersonal construction in spec VP. Again, in spec AgrP they are interpreted as familiar. Turkish objects behave in the same way as Dutch objects except that they also case-mark; the same situation holds with respect to their interpretation. In Spanish clitic doubling is optional, with a doubled argument being necessarily familiar. In French, extracted objects may induce agreement on a participle or not—when they do they are obligatorily familiar.

Conversely, as already noted English subjects, unlike Dutch (or Swedish—Elisabeth Engdahl’s) subjects, are obligatorily in spec AgrP and are ambiguous. Scottish Gaelic objects are also obligatorily in spec AgrP and are ambiguous. In French passives, where agreement is obligatory due to relativised minimality and improper movement constraints, the element inducing the agreement is ambiguous.

There appears then to be a correlation between possibility in the (S-Structure, or pre-Spellout) derivation, and obligatoriness of familiarity.

Is this expected? I would like to suggest that it is. Let us first accept the idea that syntactic derivations should be minimal (Chomsky 1992, Chomsky 1993). For the cases in hand, to derive two LF representations that will map into the right DRSs, we need to have one derivation leading to a representation with an argument in spec AgrP, and one with an argument that is not in spec AgrP. Assume that the pre-Spellout representation has an argument in spec AgrP, and that to derive the LFs, we may leave it there, or reconstruct it. Technically, if we want both options, we need to reformulate reconstruction so that it involves copying and deletion, rather than movement—see Chomsky 1993 for motivation. This will mean that a weak DP in spec AgrP will receive both interpretations, essentially along the lines proposed by Diesing.

Consider, however, if a language allows an alternative derivation to derive the representation that leads to a non-familiar reading (of course such an LF representation may lead to contextually induced ambiguity at the level of DRS, as argued in chapter 4). Moreover, say such a derivation does not require the operation of deletion, or reconstruction. If such a derivation exists, then the option of deriving this reading via reconstruction option is ruled out, since it will involve a longer derivation. That is, if there exists an alternative derivation for the non-familiar interpretation of the argument, then the reconstruction option is ruled out on grounds of economy. We therefore derive the observation that languages with constructions that involve optional movement to spec AgrP allow only a familiar interpretation when the object is in spec AgrP. That is reconstruction is ruled out because there is an alternative and shorter derivation. Languages which have no option have nothing which rules out reconstruction, and therefore have ambiguous elements in spec AgrP. A particularly striking case is the French data which we have already discussed: movement involves optional movement through spec AgrP and whenever this option is taken, reconstruction is ruled out since spec AgrP could just have been skipped. Extraction with agreement leads to a familiar...
reading of the extractee. A movement, however, requires movement through spec AgrP, because if spec AgrP were to be skipped, a relativised minimality violation would result. Accordingly, there is no alternative derivation and the economy constraint does not rule anything out. The moved object is therefore expected to be ambiguous (providing of course that it is weak), and this turns out to be the case.

There are a number of immediate problems with this account: how to deal with English existentials which appear to allow an option, but have ambiguity in the derived position (a similar problem arises in Swedish ([T. Hoekstra (pr)])):

(5.11) There arrived many men

(5.12) Many men arrived (cardinal/proportional)

For a fuller account of what motivates movement in these constructions and how these problems can be overcome see Adger 1994a. For a further application to Greek Clitic Doubling constructions see Anastasopoulos 1994, who also argues for the applicability of these ideas to subject postponing in Italian (optional with ergatives, with an effect on interpretation) and object agreement in Basque (obligatory in all cases with a no interpretative effect).

### 5.6 Summary

In this chapter we built on the theory of DP interpretation argued for in Chapter 4. We argued that the mapping principle that constructs DRS from LF is stated at least partially in terms of the local relationship that a DP chain bears to the functional head Agr. This is motivated by a range of data that shows that DPs that are in spec AgrP, or move through spec AgrP, are interpreted as familiar. We showed how an alternative view of the mapping, advocated by Diesing 1992, falls prey to some interesting data from Catalan, and we provided a revised version of the Novelty Familiarity Condition that allowed us to derive the correct results. Moreover, we provided a way of expressing the cross-linguistic differences that arise in the interpretation of weak DPs associated with Agr in a theory based on Economy of Derivation.

One final point I'd like to make concerns languages like Chinese, which have no agreement in terms of φ-features, but do seem to have syntactic operations which lead to specificity effects (Rhys 1993 and references there). The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that what is involved here is movement to the Spec of a projection we have so far termed AgrP, because of the link with φ-feature agreement; and yet there is no morphological agreement in Chinese whatever. I would like to tentatively suggest that this projection is one with primarily semantic effects—term it Referential Phrase (RefP). The position of RefP in the phrase structure is just where we have been positing AgrP, and in many languages the content of RefP is in fact φ-features. In a language like Chinese the projection is still there, but it simply doesn't contain φ-features. It is an empirical question which features a language endows the head of RefP with. However, in the rest of this thesis we will maintain the link with Agr.
CHAPTER 6. MEASURE PHRASES AND AGREEMENT

Given this formulation, we can show that if it were to be the case that a chain did not have an associated discourse referent, then that chain could not be an Agr-Chain. Let us state this as:

\[(3)\quad \text{The No-DR Corollary} \quad \text{If a chain C does not introduce a DR in U, then C cannot be an Agr-Chain.}\]

where Agr-Chain is defined as before as a chain which has a member that specifies Agr.

Now the No-DR Corollary has no effect if the Novelty Condition is correct as it stands, since it states that all chains introduce a DR. In the following sections, we show that the Novelty Condition must be reformulated, since there is at least one class of DPs that do not introduce discourse referents. This is the class of measure phrases (MPs):

\[(4)\]

a. Anson weighs 70 kilos
b. The conference lasted three weeks
c. The book cost 30 dollars

6.3 Measure Phrases are Arguments

We have restricted our discussion about agreement so far to arguments, and the generalizations we have stated are intended to apply to arguments. Before showing that MPs do not introduce DRs, it would be advisable to show that they are arguments and so come under the generalizations we are trying to state.

Notions such as agent, experiencer, theme etc are useful in the descriptions required in lexical semantics (see Jackendoff 1990 and references therein). Such notions are also useful in syntactic analysis since they allow us to characterize constraints on the cooccurrence of items in a clause (for example, only verbs with agents allow adverbial modification by relatively (McConnell-Ginet 1982); only verbs with themes allow resultative secondary predicates (Rothstein 1985)). We will follow Chomsky 1981 and term these notions thematic roles and we will assume that the set of thematic roles specified by a predicate is given by its lexical semantics.

Armed with these ideas we can say that a transitive verb like devour has an agent and a theme role. In a sentence like (6.5):

\[(5)\quad \text{Anson devoured a cake}\]

the agent role is given its denotational content (i.e., what referent in the model/world will be assigned the interpretation of agent of the devouring event) by the meaning of the DP Anson. We can therefore say that the denotational contents of the thematic roles of a predicate are given by DPs and CPs that appear as satellites of that predicate. In fact there is a stricter locality condition than just syntactic satellite; the lexical item specified for the thematic role information must govern (m-command) the DPs that specify what the denotational content of those roles is. Moreover, there is a condition relating DP/CP satellites of predicates and thematic roles which specifies that there is some constrained relation between them. This will allow us to rule out cases like the following:

\[(6)\]

a. *Anson devoured the cake the sandwich
b. *An hour elapsed Anson

c. The book cost 30 dollars

d. *Anson ate the cake the sandwich

Here we have too many DP satellites for the number of thematic roles that the verb assigns. Let us term the DP satellites arguments, again following Chomsky 1981. We can then state the following condition, which will rule out the data above:

\[(7)\quad \text{Each argument must receive a thematic role.}\]

Examples like the following suggest that the converse is also true:

\[(8)\]

a. *Anson devoured
b. *Anson put the book

so we state:

\[(9)\quad \text{Each thematic role must be assigned to an argument.}\]

These conditions are essentially the Theta-Criterion of Chomsky 1981. The Theta-Criterion predicts that arguments are obligatory and that obligatory elements are arguments. This is the import of the must in the definitions. In fact this is too strong, since at least some arguments are optional:

\[(10)\]

a. Anson ate the cake
b. Anson ate

\[\text{Chomsky's Theta-Criterion actually incorporates the condition that the relation between thematic roles and arguments is one to one. This is not relevant for the argument presented here.}\]
We can overcome this by assuming these verbs allow the optional phonetic deletion of their argument (or alternatively that they allow a null argument). Note that at the level of interpretation the argument is still present. Thus Dowty (1988) claims that it is still an entailment of *Anson ate* that something was eaten. In order to capture this fact we could claim that at LF the theta-criterion holds and that the theme theta-role of eat is assigned to an empty category.

Given the Theta Criterion, it appears that the class of measure phrases are arguments:

(6.11) a. Anson weighs 70 kilos
     b. The conference lasted two weeks
     c. The book cost a dollar

(6.12) a. *Anson weighs
     b. *The conference lasted
     c. *The book cost

Now given the fact that MPs are arguments, we can now proceed to show that they do not introduce DRSs and hence that the Novelty Condition should be reformulated. But the reformulation of the Novelty Condition will then have the effect that the No-DR Corollary will make an empirical prediction: that measure phrases should never be Agr-Chains.

### 6.4 Measure Phrases have No Associated DR

#### 6.4.1 Anaphoric Reference

Consider the following examples:

(6.13) a. *Anson weighs 70 kilos and David weighed them too.
     b. Anson weighed two sacks of potatoes and David weighed them too.
     b. The conference bored David and the post conference meeting bored him too.
(6.15) a. *This library cost a billion pounds and the books inside it cost them too.
     b. This library buys books but the individual departments buy them too.

\*In the example with the verb *weigh* the relevant interpretation is where Anson’s weight is 70 kilos, rather than Anson being the agent of a weighing event of a 70 kilo weight. This other interpretation is clearer in examples like:

```
(6) Anson weighed a sack of potatoes
```

In this case we have a canonical object rather than a measure phrase.

In each case it appears that the MP is not able to be anaphorically referred to by a subsequent pronoun. One possible explanation for this fact within the framework of DRT would be that the MP introduces a DR but that DR is not accessible to the pronoun. Another possibility, of course, is that the MP does not introduce a DR and so there is no DR to make an anaphoric link to.

There seems to be little motivation to take the first route. As we have seen already, DRSs become inaccessible to further anaphoric reference if they are in a subordinate DRS; but subordinate DRSs are always triggered by non-cardinal quantificational elements (or by negation), and there is no appropriate non-cardinal quantifier in MPs (and there cannot be, in fact, see below). Discarding this option then, we are left with the conclusion that MPs have no associated DR.

In fact, it is possible to use definite descriptions to refer anaphorically to MPs, as we can see from:

(6.16) a. Anson weighed 70 kilos and David weighed that too.
     b. The conference lasted three weeks and the film festival lasted that too.
     c. This library cost a billion pounds and the books inside it cost that too.

This suggests that MPs do introduce a DR of some sort, but it is not the same sort of DR that canonical arguments introduce, since it can't be anaphorically referred to by the class of pronouns. This suggests that the NPC should be restricted in some fashion, so that it makes reference to the sort of DR that is introduced. The No-DR Corollary would still hold, of course, but in a slightly different fashion. We shall not take up this line of reasoning here, as it would lead us too far afield. We will therefore maintain the idealisation that MPs do not introduce any DR at all.

#### 6.4.2 A Consequence—Strong Quantifiers

Recall our discussion of the semantics of generalised quantifiers in Chapter 4. We followed the standard treatment in DRT which assumed that generalised quantifiers give rise to tripartite structures. We also claimed that an essential component of generalised quantifiers was that they gave rise to DRSs where the DR restricted by the quantifier was familiar, as follows:

(6.17) a. Every pig entered.

```
b. \[ \text{pig}(y) \land \text{entered}(y) \]
```

This structure, where the DR restricted by the quantifier is anaphorically linked to another DR is motivated by van Egik's data, discussed in chapter 4.

\*I have used the member symbol here for familiarity since unary subset appears to be the appropriate semantics. Nothing rides on this (see the discussion in Chapter 4).
Now recall that the analysis we gave of definiteness restrictions made use of the notion of familiarity. Familiarity is a relation defined as:

\[ \text{is familiar if there is a DR } \xi \text{ and the DR } y \text{ associated with } x \text{ is } \subseteq \xi \text{ (where } \xi \text{ is a variable ranging over singular and plural DRs)} \]

where \( \xi \) is the antecedent DR. We claimed that the correct way to characterize a definiteness restriction such as that on the post-copular position in an existential sentence was to do so by stating that such a position forced the contextually supplied DR to be absent:

**Definiteness Restriction:** The DP in the post-copular position of an existential sentence cannot have an antecedent DR.

Thus, a DP containing a generalised quantifier would be ill-formed in post-copular position because such a DP will necessarily give rise to the condition that \( y \subseteq x \), but the definiteness restriction ensures the absence of the antecedent DR \( x \). This rules out cases like:

\[ \text{*There is every pig in the park} \]

There is also, of course, another possibility for definiteness restrictions that arises because of the relational nature of familiarity: that is if there is no DR \( y \) associated with \( x \). If the conclusion we arrived at above is correct, and MPs have no associated DR, then we expect to see a definiteness restriction on MPs, because the anaphoric link will be missing one half. In this case there can be an antecedent DR, but there is no anaphoric DR.

**Definiteness Restriction:** The DP in the post-copular position of an existential sentence cannot have an antecedent DR.

The following examples show that generalised quantifiers are indeed ill-formed in MPs. This fact was first noticed by Klooster 1972 who based his work on an unpublished LSA talk by J.R. Ross (1984):

\[ \text{a. * Het duurde iedere minuut. It lasted every minute} \]
\[ \text{b. * Jan weegt elke kilo. Jan weighs each kilo} \]

This data is replicated in English:

\[ \text{a. * How did you think that Anson fixed the bike?} \]
\[ \text{b. * How did you wonder whether Anson fixed the bike?} \]

Here the extracted adjunct \( \text{the} \) cannot be interpreted as a modifier of the verb \( \text{fix} \) in the lower clause. Chomsky attributes this to the Empty Category Principle, since the trace of the adjunct is neither head-governed by the verb nor antecedent-governed by the extracted phrase. The domains that show this effect are termed Weak Islands.

Chomsky 1986a discusses a number of cases where extraction of an argument and a non-argument from certain domains results in different degrees of grammaticality. He considers wh-islands, formed by verbs that take a CP complement that is introduced by whether:

\[ \text{a. What did you think that Anson saw it?} \]
\[ \text{b. * What did you wonder whether Anson saw it?} \]

Extraction of the object argument of \( \text{see} \) here results in a mild form of ungrammaticality that Chomsky attributes to the principle of Subjacency. Contrast this with:

\[ \text{a. How did you think that Anson fixed the bike?} \]
\[ \text{b. * How did you wonder whether Anson fixed the bike?} \]

Here the extracted adjunct \( \text{the} \) cannot be interpreted as a modifier of the verb \( \text{fix} \) in the lower clause. Chomsky attributes this to the Empty Category Principle, since the trace of the adjunct is neither head-governed by the verb nor antecedent-governed by the extracted phrase. The domains that show this effect are termed Weak Islands.

Rizzi 1990 notes that this cannot be the correct explanation since measure phrases give rise to the same effect, even though they are arguments and hence head-governed:

\[ \text{a. What did you think that the book cost it?} \]
\[ \text{b. * What did you wonder whether the book cost it?} \]

In fact Rizzi widens the data set (see also Cinque 1990) to include other types of islands as well as wh-islands. The following examples show that the same effect obtains when the upper-clause is negated (and hence forms an inner island (see Ross 1983)), and when it contains a factive:

\[ \text{a. How did you think that Anson fixed the bike?} \]
\[ \text{b. * How did you wonder whether Anson fixed the bike?} \]
Rizzi’s explanation for this effect also relies on the ECP. He develops a view of the ECP whereby a trace must be governed both by head-government and by antecedent government. Government in general is blocked by any closer governor of the same type. Thus a closer governing head will block head-antecedent government and derive the Head Movement Constraint of Travis 1984 and Baker 1988. A closer governing A-position will block A-antecedent government of a trace and rule out superraising structures of the following sort:

(6.30) *Anson seems that it is likely to be in the garden.

The idea for the type of island violation we are considering here is that the trace must be both A-antecedent governed and head governed. Head government obtains, since the measure phrases are selected, but the A-antecedent government condition is not met. What didn’t you think that Anson saw?

(6.31) X binds Y iff
(i) X c-commands Y and (ii) X and Y have the same referential index.

Let us tentatively construe Rizzi’s referential indices with our DRs. We can then say that:

(6.32) X binds Y iff
(i) X c-commands Y and (ii) X and Y are associated with the same DR.

Now, if, as we have already argued, MPs are not associated with a DR, then under Rizzi’s system an MP will never be able to be bound. The only way of connecting the trace of an extracted MP with its antecedent is by antecedent government; but this is blocked by Relativised Minimality in the relevant cases. This slight reformulation of binding then allows us to explain the restricted extractability of MPs if MPs do not introduce a DR.

Note that if this view is correct it provides an explanation for the contrast between the following data (see Klooster 1972):

(6.33) a. Anson kissed David and David kissed Anson
b. Anson and David kissed each other

a. A hotel costs five houses and five houses cost a hotel
b. A hotel and five houses cost each other

Where the final example is not even felicitous in a Monopoly game situation. This is explained of course if binding has to involve DRs and the complement of a measure phrase verb doesn’t refer to a DR thus making the reciprocal anaphor unbandable.

6.5 Summary

So far we have shown that the Novelty Condition of the NFC should be reformulated, since there appear to be a class of argument chains that does not introduce a DR—MPs. We therefore give the final version of the NFC as:

(6.34) Revised NFC—Final Version

Suppose something is uttered under the reading represented by ϕ and the discourse preceding ϕ has resulted in a discourse structure F. F contains a set of DRs H. Then for every chain C in ϕ it must be the case that:

Novelty Clause: unless the head of C lexically specifies otherwise, there is a DR associated with C and

Familiarity Clause: If C is definite or an Agr Chain then the DR associated with C is a DR in H.

Otherwise, the utterance is not felicitous under this reading.

Let us first examine the evidence that MPs do not introduce DRs comes from the behaviour of pronominals, and is backed up by the fact that there is a definiteness effect in MPs that derives quite straightforwardly from our earlier treatment of definiteness effects, coupled with the non-DR-introducing nature of MPs. Furthermore, the claim that MPs do not introduce DRs allows us to explain why MPs don’t extract from weak islands, given a reformulation of Rizzi’s definition of binding which replaces referential indices with DRs. Given this, the conjunction of the Familiarity Condition comes in play, predicting that MPs should never be Agr-Chains. This means that chains containing MPs as their lexical content will never have an element that specifies Agr. We can test this prediction quite easily by considering the constructions which we have already argued to involve the formation of Agr-Chains and seeing if MPs participate in these constructions in the same way that canonical arguments do.8

8I have been unable to find clear examples of MPs in Hindi, so I shall not consider the Hindi facts.

---

"This statement is anachronistic: Rizzi’s actual explanation was that the factive moved into an A position at LF. A more conceptually appealing idea is that factives introduce an operator in the spec CP of the lower clause that serves as the minimality barrier. See Progovac 1998 for empirical evidence to this effect."
6.6 Testing the Prediction

6.6.1 Measure Phrases in Turkish

Our first argument involved Turkish. We showed that object NPs in Turkish scrambled out of their VP and were accusatively Case marked. We correlated this derived syntactic position with specific interpretation. Now objects in Turkish undergo this process rather generally, with concomitant interpretational effects. MPs in Turkish are obligatory, and thus we may assume that they are represented in the argument structure of the verb:

\(6.35\)

- a. Kitap 500 lira tutuyor
  book 500 lira cost-pres
  'The book costs 500 lira'
- b. Kitap tutuyor
  book cost-pres
- a. Konferans iki habta sürdü
  Conference two week last-past
  'The conference lasted two weeks'
- b. Konferans sürdü
  Conference last-past

However, unlike canonical arguments, MPs may not scramble over a VP adverb:

\(6.36\)

- a. Kitap dinin akşam 500 lira tuttu
  book yesterday evening 500 lira cost-past
  'The book cost 500 lira yesterday evening'
- b. Kitap 500 lira dinin akşam tuttu
  book 500 lira yesterday evening cost-past
- a. Konferans goenen sene iki habta sürdü
  Conference last year two week last-past
  'The conference lasted two weeks last year'
- b. Konferans iki habta goenen sene sürdü
  Conference two week last year last-past

Moreover, unlike canonical arguments which may receive accusative case in the scrambled position, MPs under their usual interpretation may not:

\(6.37\)

- a. Kitap 500 lirayi dinin akşam tuttu
  book 500 lira-acc yesterday evening cost-past
- b. Konferans iki habtayi goenen sene sürdü
  Conference two week-acc last year last-past

Many thanks to And-Taurooj for this data.
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(6.41) 

AgrP  

NP,  

Agr  

T onjes  

Agr  

VP  

AdvP  

gistern  

Spec  

V'  

VP  

V  

(6.42)  

a. ... dat Jan gisteren 70 kilos gewogen heeft  
... that Jan yesterday 70 kilos weighed has  
'... that Jan weighed 70 kilos yesterday'  
b. * ... dat Jan 70 kilos gisteren gewogen heeft  
... that Jan yesterday weighed has  
'... that Jan weighed 70 kilos yesterday'

MPs may not be scrambled, that is, under this analysis, they may not move to the specifier of AgrP. Given this, they are not possible Agr-Chains, as predicted.

In fact MPs in this position may receive the refined referential interpretation that we saw for Turkish and in English MPs with strong quantifiers. Again this is what we expect under the theory developed already.

6.6.4 Measure Phrases and Antecedent Contained Deletion

On similar lines we argued that Antecedent Contained Deletion structures in English also involve movement of the object to spec AgrP. The motivation for this was that the object must escape VP to avoid a structure that would lead to infinite recursion and hence uninterpretable. The following data show that MPs are unacceptable in ACD constructions and furnish us with further evidence that they do not raise to spec AgrP:

(6.43)  
a. * Amon weighed every/some kilo that David did.  
b. * The conference lasted every/some hour that the concert did.  
c. * The book cost every/some pound that the CD did.

6.6.5 Measure Phrases and Participle Agreement in French

In our discussion of French past participle agreement, which is optionally triggered by the extraction of a WH-element from the complement position of a past participle, we argued that the morphological agreement on the participle was triggered by a filled spec AgrP during the course of the derivation. The examples we considered were:

(6.44)  
a. Combiem de chaises a-l-il repain/ˈt/?  
How many of chairs has he repainted?

b. Combiem de chaises a-l-il repain/ˈt/es/†?  
How many of chairs has he repainted?

and the structures we posited were:

(6.45) [Combiem de chaises], a-l-il repain/ˈt/  
[how many of chairs has he repainted/\*Agr]  

(6.46) [Combiem de chaises], a-l-il repain/ˈt/  
[how many of chairs has he repainted/\*Agr\*Agrm.pl]  

Smith 1992 provides data which show that MPs never trigger morphologically overt agreement, in contrast to canonical arguments. He provides the following examples with relative clause extraction:

(6.47)  
a. Les douze francs que ce livre avait coû/ˈt/  
The twelve francs that this book has cost/\*Agr  

b. Les vingt grammes que cette lettre a pes/ˈt/  
The twenty grammes that this letter has weighed/\*Agr

We can provide similar examples for non-relative extractions:

(6.48) je me demande combien de semaines la conférence a duré/ˈt/  
I me ask how many of weeks the conference has last/Part/\*Agr

'I wonder how many weeks the conference lasted!'

We conclude from this that MPs do not move into spec AgrP during the course of the derivation.
6.6.6 Measure Phrases in Scottish Gaelic

Finally consider the Fronoted Object construction in Scottish Gaelic. We argued at some length in Chapter 3 that the position of the fronoted object was Spec AgrP. This is motivated by the analogous way that different types of objects behave in standard agreement constructions and in fronoted object constructions. The examples were of the type:

(6.49) Feumaidh Daibhidh [aexP am balach], [aex a [ bhuatalaidh l]]

Must David the boy Agr strike-VN

‘David must hit the boy’
as a tree structure:

(6.50)

AgrP

NP

am balach

Agr

VP

a Spec

V

bhuatalaidh

t

The data we have considered so far would lead us to expect that MPs in SG are barred from participating in fronoted object constructions. This is the case:

(6.51) a. Feumaidh a' cho-labhairt mainis a chaidhann

Must the conference last-VN week

‘The conference must last a week’

b. *Feumaidh a' cho-labhairt seachdainn

Must the conference a week Agr last-VN

This furnishes with further evidence that MPs do not raise to Spec AgrP.

In fact the data from Gaelic is more complicated. As we saw earlier, the object fronts in a number of situations, including modal contexts such as those given above. However, the object also fronts obligatorily in the perfective and prospective aspectual constructions. Interestingly, here a MP object may not remain in situ either, and a paraphrase must be given instead. We discuss these facts in Chapter 7.

6.6.7 Further Consequences

We have so far restricted our attention to the specifier of AgrO. But the No-DR Corollary makes predictions for subjects and complements of non-verbal elements as well. We explore some of these here.

A-Movement Constructions

Note that passives, which involve movement of the object to the Spec AgrP position where the subject usually lies, are ill-formed when the object is a MP:

(6.52) a. Feumaidh a' cho-labhairt cosg tri mile not

Must the conference cost three thousand pounds

‘The conference has to cost £3000’

b. *Feumaidh a' cho-labhairt tri mile not a chosg

Must the conference three thousand pounds Agr cost-VN

This is of course predicted by our account which bars MPs from a Spec AgrP position. However, there may be other reasons why such sentences are ill-formed. Data from languages which allow impersonal passives where no promotion of the object to subject position is required, and where the subject position is instead filled by an expletive, suggests that this is the case. Impersonal passives of verbs that take MP complements are ill-formed in Dutch, for example:

(6.53) a. *Er werd door Dennis 52 kilos gewogen.

Expl be-past by Dennis 52 kilos weigh-part

b. *Er werd het congress hier gebeurd.

Expl be-past by the congress two weeks be-part

Note that, as we have already noted, the object is not fronted in these impersonal passives.

Similar data can be found for tough-constructions:

(6.54) a. *Seventy kilos is hard for Anson to weigh

b. *A week is tough to last in the outback

c. *Three dollars is easy for a book to cost

This is of course predicted by our account which bars MPs from a Spec AgrP position.

However, there may be other reasons why such sentences are ill-formed. Data from languages which allow impersonal passives where no promotion of the object to subject position is required, and where the subject position is instead filled by an expletive, suggests that this is the case. Impersonal passives of verbs that take MP complements are ill-formed in Dutch, for example:

(6.55) a. *Er werd door Dennis 52 kilos gewogen.

Expl be-past by Dennis 52 kilos weigh-part

b. *Er werd het congress hier gebeurd.

Expl be-past by the congress two weeks be-part
Another explanation for the fact that MPs do not appear in subject position might involve the lexical structure of V's that take MP complements. Jackendoff 1972 argues that the lack of passivisability of MPs follows from the interaction between the thematic structure of the MP verb and an independent principle regulating the occurrence of elements with particular thematic roles in a sentence. Although I am not inclined to accept the details of this proposal, its spirit seems correct, given the Dutch data.

Gerundive Constructions

If we accept Chomsky 1992's proposal that the specifier of AgrP is a position of structural case marking then we make another prediction. We expect to see case marking effects as well as agreement effects. We noted that this was true for Turkish above. Another interesting phenomenon which shows that MPs interact with Case differently to other arguments is the following.

English has two types of gerund, verbal and nominal. Verbal gerunds mark their complements accusatively, while nominal gerunds Case-mark their complements with the preposition of. The complement marking can be forced by the type of modification that the gerund accepts — nominal gerunds are modified by adjectives, while verbal gerunds are modified by adverbials. This results in the following paradigm (see Adger and Rhys 1991 for an account of these facts):

\[(6.56)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
a. \ & \text{Anson's constant devouring of cakes} \\
b. \ & *\text{Anson's constant devouring cakes} \\
c. \ & \text{Anson's constantly devouring cakes} \\
d. \ & *\text{Anson's constantly devouring of cakes}
\end{align*}
\]

Compare this paradigm with the analogous one for QAs:

\[(6.57)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
a. \ & *\text{Anson's constant weighing of 70 kilos} \\
b. \ & *\text{Anson's constant weighing 70 kilos} \\
c. \ & \text{Anson's constantly weighing 70 kilos} \\
d. \ & *\text{Anson's constantly weighing of 70 kilos}
\end{align*}
\]

It appears here that MPs do not allow Case marking by of. At first blush, this would seem to contradict our hypothesis that MPs do not raise to spec AgrP for structural Case, since this Case marking by of is usually considered to be inherent (Chomsky 1986b). I would like to assume, though, that it is actually structural, and therefore related to an agreement projection. This seems sensible, since this Case marking is thematically neutral, in the same way as nominative and accusative Case are thematically neutral. It also regularises the projection of an agreement head over all the lexical categories, and makes syntactic sense of the fact that many languages have infecting prepositions. If this is the case then the claim that the MP may not raise into the spec AgrP position would explain the ill-formedness of \((6.57a)\) as a violation of Case licensing.

### 6.7 Summary

In this chapter we have shown that the Novelty Condition which causes all argument-chains to introduce a DR must be modified somewhat, since MPs do not introduce DRs. We have also shown how this fact interacts with a corollary of the Familiarity Condition to predict that MPs can never participate in Agr-Chains. This prediction was tested with respect to a number of constructions, and shown to be valid, supporting the formulation of the NFC.
Chapter 7

Syntactic Licensing

7.1 Introduction

One of the questions which runs through this thesis, but which has not been addressed as yet is whether there is a relationship between the syntactic licensing of an element in a position and the interpretation of that element. De Hoop in her thesis answers this question positively, arguing that there are two types of Case assignment, and that each type correlates with a different interpretation for the Case-assigned argument (de Hoop 1992). Chomsky 1992 also argues that all DPs must be syntactically licensed at LF, by structural Case, and he links structural Case assignment with the spec AgrP position. We have already seen that in the FOP construction in Scottish Gaelic all arguments except measure phrases move to spec AgrP overtly. Under Chomsky's system they are all assigned structural Case in this position. Under de Hoop's story the Case assigned VP internally is what she terms weak and leads to a non-proportional (unfamiliar) interpretation. The Case assigned by Agr is generally parametrised, so that, in English, Agr assigns both types of Case, giving rise to both types of interpretation for weak DPs in subject position. Dutch on the other hand has an Agr that assigns only the type of Case that leads to a strong (in our terms familiar) reading for the subject. Presumably the proposed position in Scottish Gaelic is like English subject Agr in that it assigns both types of Case.

This account seems to me to be too stipulative by far, and essentially just describes the data. We have already shown in chapter 5 that positions like the English subject position, or the 5G proposed object position are associated with ambiguity for weak DPs because there is no alternative syntactic derivation that would allow the unfamiliar reading to emerge. We therefore don't need to have ambiguous Case assignment by Agr. We can adopt Chomsky's position that Agr assigns structural Case which syntactically licenses the DP in its spec.

However, this will not quite work. There are of course in situ DPs which we would like to be structurally Case-licensed but which are not in spec AgrP. One solution would be to allow them to raise between S-structure and LF, but this does not seem particularly satisfying theoretically, since it has only theory internal motivation. Moreover, this would mean that we have the NFC applying at S-structure rather than LF, which seems unintuitive. Moreover, we have argued that DPs in Spec AgrP have a particular interpretation at LF, and that it is transparent from the S-structure which DPs are in Spec AgrP at LF because we can inspect alternative derivations. So we cannot adopt the standard Minimalist assumption that all DPs are in Spec AgrP for reasons of Case checking at LF. However, we are now in a position to adopt a version of de Hoop's idea, since we do not require Agr to be able to assign two different types of Case. We can simply correlate one type of Case assignment with Agr, and the other with a VP internal position.

This however means that we lose the strict mapping between type of syntactic licensing, and type of interpretation. What emerges instead is that the apparent interpretational effects of different types of syntactic licensing derive from other factors, such as contextual factors, or general mapping constraints between LF and DRS.

7.2 Licensing Arguments

Arguments then, following de Hoop are licensed either by structural Case assigned within the projection of their selecting head, or by structural Case assigned by some other functional head that the argument associates with via movement. SG evidences both types of licensing in non-finite verb constructions, with the obligatory movement of all objects to spec AgrP in FOP constructions, and in situ licensing of objects in non-FOP constructions:

(7.1) a. Feumaidh Daibhidh cat a bhualadh
   Must David cat-COM Agr strike-VN
   'David must strike a cat'

b. Tha Daibhidh a' bhualadh cat
   Be-Pres David a' cat-COM strike-VN cat-COM
   'David is striking a cat'

In both cases I have given the morphological case marking as the common (neutralised nominative-acusative) case. Actually, this is controversial for example (b), since when the object is definite, it is marked with morphological genitive case:

(7.2) a. Feumaidh Daibhidh an cat a bhualadh
   Must David the cat-COM Agr strike-VN
   'David must strike a cat'

b. Tha Daibhidh a' bhualadh a' chait
   Be-Pres David a' the cat-COM strike-VN cat-GEN
   'David is striking a cat'

Ramchand 1993 argues that in both the indefinite and definite examples, the case that is assigned is the same: partitive. She correlates partitive case assignment with a particular interpretation of the object, much as de Hoop does. The reason that Ramchand can claim the indefinite example to be partitive, even though morphologically it is common case is that SG does not have a separate partitive paradigm. Ramchand claims that there is actually a partitive paradigm but that it is constructed out of the common case paradigm for indefinites, and the genitive for definites. I am skeptical of this claim, since the genitive form of the indefinite does exist, and this is what is used in real partitive constructions.

It seems more likely that what is happening here is something akin to a definiteness effect. In general definites are ruled out, but they can be saved by overt case assignment.
Since it is not my concern to give an account of definiteness effects in this thesis, I will leave these examples for further analysis, noting only that there appear to be two types of syntactic licensing via Case.

### 7.3 Generalized Visibility

Typically argument NPs have to be licensed in two ways: they must be licensed by theta theory and they must be licensed by Case. The link between these is made explicit in the Visibility Condition, credited to Anson by Chomsky 1986b:

1. **Visibility:**
   
   An DP chain can be interpreted as an argument if it has structural Case.

   This condition can be read as a licensing condition, given that an NP chain must be licensed at LF in order to receive an interpretation:

2. **Visibility:** (revised)
   
   An DP chain can only be interpreted if it is theta-theory licensed and Case-theory licensed.

   Measure phrases generally seem to engender problems for this conjunctive formulation of Visibility, since they are theta-marked but don't seem to need Case. These appear to be licensed by argument structure, since as we have already seen, they are obligatory and they are NPs in as much as they are projections of N. As we have already noted, they seem to be Case-cocurrent, so they can never be marked by the inserted case-marking preposition of in gerundive nominal. Thus compare:

3. **Visibility:**
   
   *Anson's constant devouring of cakes

   and as we have seen in chapter 6 they never raise to spec AgrP for structural case licensing there. Given these facts the question arises as to how measure phrases satisfy Visibility.

   Two options are possible: either they are only theta-licensed, and need no Case licensing to count as legitimate LF objects or they are licensed in some other fashion. The former option involves showing that measure phrases are exceptions to Visibility for some principled reason, or that Visibility is in some way falsified by the behaviour of these elements. The latter option involves generalizing Visibility so that it takes into account other modes of licensing, rather than just Case theory. It is this latter option we will defend here.

   Consider the first option. To argue that measure phrases are exceptions to Visibility we could show that they project only to NP rather than DP and provide evidence that abstract Case is assigned only to DPs. Measure phrases do in fact only allow a restricted set of determiners, as we showed in chapter 6. However, it would seem theoretically more attractive to allow all nominals to project the full functional structure associated with them and to rule out certain projections to D for independent reasons. Also allowing certain verbs to select NP rather than DP seems to place a great burden on the theory of selection since it allows selection for functional as well as lexical categories (see Grimshaw 1991 for discussion and for a theory that rules this out in principle).

   Discarding this option then, we would like to show that measure phrases are licensed in some other way. Let us term this X-licensing, for the moment.

4. **Visibility:**
   
   An DP chain can only be interpreted if it is theta-theory licensed and either Case-licensed or X-licensed

   This formulation of Visibility resolves the problem engendered by measure phrases, but we would like to eliminate the disjunction in the consequent since it undermines the generalisation.

   Consider what 'Case-licensed' means. The type of Case we are interested in here is structural. As we have noted already there seem to be two types of case-licensing: licensing by Agr, and licensing in VP. Specifier-Head agreement, the progenitor of Case-licensing by Agr is a standard coindexation relationship, which allows us to reformulate Visibility as:

5. **Visibility:**
   
   An DP chain can only be interpreted if it is theta-theory licensed and either coindexed with Agr or case-licensed in VP or X-licensed.

   Case-licensing in VP seems to involve a morphologically marked type of case (partitive in Finnish, genitive for SG definites—see de Hoop 1992 for a thorough discussion of this type of fact). Let us assume that this type of case marking typically involves coindexation with a case particle, K (see Fukui and Speas 1986). Visibility then can be reformulated as:

6. **Visibility:**
   
   An DP chain can only be interpreted if it is theta-theory licensed and either coindexed with Agr or K or X-licensed.

   This gives us a clue to the nature of X-licensing. We can eliminate part of the disjunction in this formulation of Visibility by defining a notion of F-licensing:

7. **Visibility:**
   
   An DP chain can only be interpreted if it is theta-theory licensed and either coindexed with Agr or K or X-licensed.

   F-licensing in VP seems to involve a morphologically marked type of case marking typically involves coindexation with a case particle, K (see Fukui and Speas 1986). Visibility then can be reformulated as:

8. **Visibility:**
   
   An DP chain can only be interpreted if it is theta-theory licensed and either coindexed with Agr or F-licensed.

   This theoretical move would suggest that X-licensing involves coindexation with a functional head. In the rest of this chapter we will argue that in the case of measure phrases the relevant functional head is Asp(ect).
7.4 Licensing Measure Phrases

Turning to the syntactic licensing of measure phrases in SG, note that these never raise into the spec AgrP position (as we saw in Chapter 6):

(7.12) a. Feumaidh a’ cho-labhairt mainisn seachdann
Must the conference last-VN week
‘The conference must last a week’

b. *Feumaidh a’ cho-labhairt seachdann a mhairsinn
Must the conference a week Agr last-VN

(7.13) a. Feumaidh a’ cho-labhairt cosg tri mile not
Must the conference cost three thousand pounds
‘The conference has to cost 3000 pounds’

b. *Feumaidh a’ cho-labhairt tri mile not a chosg
Must the conference three thousand pounds Agr last-VN

In these examples with modals the measure phrase remains in its base position and proposed measure phrases are ungrammatical. In the following examples the progressive construction which allows V0 order is well formed but the perfective construction which forces VO order is ungrammatical.

(7.14) a. Tha a’ cho-labhairt a’ mainisn seachdann
be-PRES the conference ASP last-VN week
‘The conference is lasting a week’

b. *Tha a’ cho-labhairt air seachdann a mhairsinn
be-PRES the conference ASP a week Agr last-VN
‘The conference has lasted a week’

(7.15) a. Tha a’ cho-labhairt a’ cosg tri mile not
be-PRES the conference ASP cost three thousand pounds
‘The conference is costing 3000 pounds’

b. *Tha a’ cho-labhairt air tri mile not a chosg
be-PRES the conference ASP three thousand pounds AgrO cost-VN
‘The conference has cost 3000 pounds’

Proposing of measure phrases into the spec AgrP position is therefore ungrammatical in SG, but they can remain in base position, at least when the AgrP is a complement of a modal or of progressive aspect. Proposing of measure phrases is also ill-formed in the perfective construction, which essentially just seems to be another case of FOP. Here, however, an interesting difference arises: the measure phrase is also ungrammatical in base position in the perfective construction. Thus:

(7.16) a. *Tha a’ cho-labhairt air seachdann a mhairsinn
be-PRES the conference ASP a week Agr last-VN
‘The conference has lasted a week’

b. *Tha a’ cho-labhairt air a mhairsinn seachdann
be-PRES the conference ASP Agr last-VN week
‘The conference has lasted a week’

It seems then that measure phrases are simply not licensed in the perfective construction. The rest of this chapter is devoted to showing how an independently motivated analysis of tense and aspect in SG gives us reasons why this should be the case.

7.5 Aspectual Chains

We will now consider how the functional categories Tense and Aspect affect interpretation. We will argue for the existence of Tense chains which are composed of smaller aspectual chains that instantiate the relationship between Reichenbachian temporal reference points and morpho-syntactic structure. We build on the work of Giorgi and Pianesi, Drijkoningen and Rutten, and Stowell, Hornstein, and Zagona.

7.5.1 Lexical Specification, Selection and Indexation

We will follow much recent work (Williams 1981, Higginsbotham 1985, Zwart 1991, Zwart 1992) and assume that lexical categories have both an argument structure (Grimshaw 1990) (or theta-grid) and a special distinguished argument that acts as a syntactically accessible variable and specifies the denotational type of the category. We will term elements of the former theta-arguments and we will term the latter the denotational argument. We represent this type of information enclosed in angled brackets, with the denotational argument to the left and the theta-arguments, structured as a nested list (following Grimshaw 1990), to the right. Thus the lexical specification of a verb like ‘kiss’ has the following structure:

(7.17) kiss

This work was already reported in Adger 1993a and in Adger to appear.
 CHAPTER 7. SYNTACTIC LICENSING

where \( x \) is the denotational argument of the head of the NP 'Anson' which has a null argument structure. We will refer to this type of indexing as 'selection indexing'. Note that this type of indexing involves the denotational argument of the N head, intervening functional categories are irrelevant. But it is well known that semantically \( N \) determines the range of the dominating determiner or quantifier, thus we expect there to be another type of indexing where the operator associated with the determiner or quantifier also binds the denotational argument of \( N \). We will refer to this type of indexing as 'binding indexing' and represent it as super-indexation. Thus:

\[
\text{(7.19)} \quad \text{kiss every man} \quad (e_i ((b_i,))) \quad D' \quad (\text{'a'}, 0)
\]

Selection indices are established at whatever point in the derivation lexical insertion takes place (D-S structure in conventional theories and an application of the generalised transformation GT in Chomsky 1992), while binding indices are established at LF.

### 7.5.2 Morphosyntactic Tense and Interpretation

Reichenbach 1947 provides an analysis of the tense/aspect system of English which uses three temporal reference points: the speech time \( S \), the event time \( E \) and a reference time relating the two \( R \). Reichenbach argues that \( R \) is implicated in the analysis of all the tenses. If \( R \) precedes \( S \) then some variety of the past tense is involved; if \( R \) and \( S \) are contemporaneous then we have a present tense variety and if \( R \) follows \( S \) then we have a variety of the future. Which particular variety is involved depends on the relationship between \( R \) and \( E \); \( R \) preceding \( E \) results in a prospective and \( E \) contemporaneous with \( R \) results in a simple tense. We provide some examples below (\( i \), \( j \), and \( \pi \) can be glossed as 'follows', 'precedes' and 'is contemporaneous with', respectively):

\[
\text{(7.20)} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. Anson sings} & \quad (S = R, E = R) \\
\text{b. Anson sung} & \quad (S', R, E = R) \\
\text{c. Anson has sung} & \quad (S = R, E = R) \\
\text{d. Anson had sung} & \quad (S', R, E = R)
\end{align*}
\]

Recently, a number of authors have argued that this system of relationships is directly instantiated in the morphosyntax. Giorgi and Fanciulli 1992 (hence \( G \& F \)), for example, argue that past participial morphology (the functional head Asp) in Italian represents the ER relationship while the finite tense (the functional head T) represents the relation between \( S \) and \( R \) (see also Drijkoningen and Rutten 1991, Stowell 1992). Thus:

\[
\text{(7.21)} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{avevo mangiato} & \quad \text{havePast est-Past} \\
S' & \quad \text{E} = \text{R}
\end{align*}
\]

This analysis ignores phenomena such as imperfectivity, for which it is necessary to view the Reichenbachian points as temporal intervals with internal structure.

---

Here \( T \) is realised by an auxiliary verb while the main verb has moved into Asp. \( G \& P \) argue that the denotational event arguments of the auxiliary verb and the main verb must be coindexed for the structure to be interpreted. This means that a Tense chain is established via head movement of Aux to \( T \) and \( V \) to Asp. We will follow the thrust of \( G \& P \)'s idea, but we shall be more explicit about how the tense chain is composed. \( G \& P \) provide no way of ensuring that \( R \) in \( T \) and \( R \) in Asp are coindexed, as they must be to ensure proper interpretation. Likewise, they offer no insight as to how \( E \) in Asp is coindexed with the event argument in \( V \), another prerequisite for correct temporal interpretation. The mechanisms we have outlined above to deal with theta-marking are in fact all that is necessary.

Asp dominates and is sister to VP\(^3\). If the relationship between them is one of selection, then Asp takes VP as its internal argument and coindexes the denotational argument of VP with its internal theta-argument:

\[
\text{(7.22)} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{Asp} & \quad \text{VP} \\
(R, (E,)) & \quad (e_i ((a(b))))
\end{align*}
\]

We thus establish the coindexation between \( E \) in Asp and \( e \) in VP via selection indices. Now the coindexation relationship between \( R \) and \( E \) in Asp can be read off the semantics of Asp. If Asp is simple \((R = E)\) then \( R \) and \( E \) are lexically coindexed. Otherwise they are contraindexed. The relationship between \( R \) in Asp and \( R \) in \( T \) is likewise established by selection. AspP is the internal argument of \( T \), and therefore \( T \) coindexes its internal theta-argument with the denotational argument of Asp, establishing the coindexing relationship via selection indices. Thus we have the following representation for a simple present tense:

\[
\text{(7.23)} \quad \begin{align*}
\text{T} & \quad \text{Asp} \\
S, (R,) & \quad (R, (E,)) (e_i ((a(b))))
\end{align*}
\]

The indexing relationship between \( S \) and \( R \) can again be read off the semantics of \( T \). If \( T \) is present tense then \( S = R \) and coindexing occurs; otherwise we have contrainingexing.

We will refer to the substructures formed by Asp and \( V \) by \( T \) and \( Asp \) as aspectual chains (trivially all three heads form aspectual chains singly). These are composed into a single domain via selection. The tense chain for the clause is formed, as seems semantically plausible, by binding from a temporal operator. The temporal operator associated with the utterance time is projected in the specifier of TP at LF (along the lines of Stowell 1992) and this operator binds the denotational arguments that it governs:

\[
\text{(7.24)} \quad \text{Op} \quad T \quad \text{Asp} \\
Op' \quad (S', (R,)) (R, (E,)) (e_i ((a(b))))
\]

This system allows the temporal interpretation to run directly off the morphosyntactic structure with no further stipulations than are already required for canonical theta-marking. The Tense chain is composed of smaller aspectual chains via the mechanism of

---

\(^3\)Asp is actually probably sister to \( V \& P \) but we shall abstract away from \( V \& P \) in the discussion here. This abstraction is derivable from Relational Minimality (see Roberts 1991).

---

\(^2\)This analysis ignores phenomena such as imperfectivity, for which it is necessary to view the Reichenbachian points as temporal intervals with internal structure.
selection. One interesting point about this system is that it dissociates thematic structure (associated with lexical heads) from argument structure (associated with both lexical and functional heads). This is a position recently argued for by Adger and Rhys 1991, Rhys 1993, and Cann 1993b among others.

### 7.5.3 Tense and Aspect in Scottish Gaelic

#### Compound tenses

SG appears to reflect Reichenbach’s analysis rather directly. The most common way of marking the difference between present and past tenses is to use a form of the verb **bhith** ‘be’ as an auxiliary with a nominalised form of the main verb which occurs with an aspectual particle. The verb **bhith** marks the relationship between S and R (**tha**, **bha** and **bithidh** are respectively the present, past and future forms of **bhith**):

\[(7.25) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.26) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Bha Daibhidh a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Past David Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David was leaving’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.27) \begin{align*}
\text{c. } & \text{Bithidh Daibhidh a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Fut David Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David will leave’}
\end{align*}\]

The particle **a’** here marks that E=R. This becomes even clearer if we inspect the perfect paradigm:

\[(7.28) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp b-e-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has/had will have left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.29) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh gu bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp b-e-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David is/was about to leave’}
\end{align*}\]

One constraint that emerges here though is that the simple aspect marker must come finally (this was first noted by Cram 1981):

\[(7.30) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.31) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp b-e-VN Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has/had will have left’}
\end{align*}\]

where **gu** marks that E=R.

The analysis of the SG tense/aspect system we propose is simply that the auxiliary verb in T marks the S,R relation while the particle in Asp marks the E,R relation. The domain for the tense chain is composed as discussed above, by selection, from the smaller aspectual chains. An example of this for the present perfect is given below:

\[(7.32) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.33) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

Recall G & P’s claim that, in order for a structure with an auxiliary and main verb to be interpreted, the denotational arguments of the auxiliary and main verb must be coindexed. If we accept this claim, we immediately provide an explanation for the contrast in (7.32). The relevant structure for the well-formed (a) is:

\[(7.34) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

where **gu** marks that E,R.

The analysis of the SG tense/aspect system we propose is simply that the auxiliary verb in T marks the S,R relation while the particle in Asp marks the E,R relation. The domain for the tense chain is composed as discussed above, by selection, from the smaller aspectual chains. An example of this for the present perfect is given below:

\[(7.35) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.36) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has left’}
\end{align*}\]

The particle **a’** here marks that E=R. This becomes even clearer if we inspect the perfect paradigm:

\[(7.37) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has/had will have left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.38) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh gu bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David is/was about to leave’}
\end{align*}\]

This device allows the composition of aspectual particles:

\[(7.39) \begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh gu bhith air a bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David is/was about to have left’}
\end{align*}\]

\[(7.40) \begin{align*}
\text{b. } & \text{Tha Daibhidh air a bhith gu bhith a’ falbh} \\
& \text{Bo-Pres David Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN Asp leave-VN} \\
& \text{‘David has been about to leave’}
\end{align*}\]

One constraint that emerges here though is that the simple aspect marker must come finally (this was first noted by Cram 1981):
does tell us about the internal constituency of current reference points, nor does it add information that there is another event taking place; it simply serves to morphologically carry the aspectual marking of the particle *air*. The auxiliary then, basically requires that its internal argument and its denotational argument carry the same information, so that the internal argument of *bith* and its denotational argument are coindexed. This is a characteristic property of auxiliaries. Now consider the structure for the other example:

(7.34) Tha Daibhídhe a’ a bith *air failbhe*

**Be-Past David** Asp be-VN Asp leave-VN

\[(R_i, (E_j^i, c_i)) \Rightarrow (R_j, (E_j^i, c_j)) \Rightarrow (R_j, (E_j^i, c_j))\]

Here, because the lexical specification of *air* marks that E(R, E and R cannot be coindexed. A contra-indexation is then passed up to the auxiliary, which will then be contra-indexed with the main verb, in violation of G & P’s constraint. We also predict that **g**, the prospective marker, will behave in the same way as *air*. This is the case:

(7.35) a. Tha Daibhídhe gu bith a’ failbhe

**Be-Press David** Asp be-VN Asp leave-VN

‘David has left’

b. *Tha Daibhídhe a’ a bith gu failbhe

**Be-Past David** Asp be-VN Asp leave-VN

7.5.4 Summary

This section has motivated the idea that the Tense chain used in the licensing of measure phrases is composed from smaller aspectual chains via the mechanism of selection. Once the separate aspectual chains have been composed via selection indices the temporal operator of the clause can bind all of the denotational arguments within its selection domain via binding indices to form the T-chain proper. The advantage of this system is that it allows temporal interpretation to run directly from morphosyntactic structure. The system also predicts an unexpected constraint in the tense/aspect system of SG.

7.6 Consequences for Licensing Measure Phrases

Recall that a tense chain is essentially formed via the mechanism of selection, encoded as coindexation of the internal theta-argument of a head with the denotational argument of that head’s XP sister. This immediately predicts that internal arguments of verbs are possible elements of a Tense chain. Note, however, that the selection driven process of aspectual chain composition relies on a lexical indexing of the denotational argument and internal theta-argument of other aspectual particles or auxiliaries. This lexical indexing is read off the semantic properties of the head (see (7.23)). It follows that the internal theta-argument of a verb will only be part of an aspectual chain if there is lexical coindexing of the denotational argument of the verb and its internal theta-argument that follows from the meaning of the verb. Any such verb we then expect to behave much like an auxiliary, since this type of lexical indexing is characteristic of auxiliaries.

In fact this is exactly the kind of property we would like to attribute to verbs that take measure phrase complements. These can almost always be paraphrased by a copular verb. Crucially, the same copula is used as an auxiliary in the languages concerned:

(7.36) a. Aman weighs 70 kilos

b. Aman is 70 kilos

(7.37) a. The book cost twelve dollars

b. The book is twelve dollars

(7.38) a. Tha *dá* chadh de chadhram ann an Daibhídhe

Be-pres two stone teen of weight in(redup) David

‘David weighs twelve stone’

b. Tha tri not an loch bheara seo

Be-pres three pounds on the book that

‘That book costs three pounds’

We therefore specify the lexical entry of a verb like ‘cost’ as:

(7.39) \[[e_i, [a(b_i)]]\]

Consider then the licensing of measure phrases in postverbal position in SG:

(7.40) Tha a’ cho-labhairt a’ mainin seachdsharn

**be-PRES the conference** ASP last-VN week

\[(S_i, [R_i]) \Rightarrow (R_i, (E_j^i, c_i)) \Rightarrow (x_i, 0)\]

‘The conference is lasting a week’

Here the denotational argument of the measure phrase is coindexed with that of the verb and that of Asp. It therefore is part of a composed aspectual chain via selection indices. Note that it also conforms to the generalised version of Visibility if we take ‘coindexed’ in this definition to refer to selection indices.

Now consider the structure with the perfective particle:

(7.41) *Tha a’ cho-labhairt air mainin seachdsharn

**be-PRES the conference** ASP last-VN week

\[(S_i, [R_i]) \Rightarrow (R_i, (E_j^i, c_i)) \Rightarrow (x_i, 0)\]

‘The conference has lasted a week’

Here the measure phrase is coindexed with the event argument of the verb but the semantics of the aspectual particle means that the denotational argument of the *air* carries a different index. This means that the measure phrase is not coindexed with a functional head and that the generalised version of Visibility is violated since *seachdsharn* is not F-licensed. The same explanation extends to the analogous structure with the prospective marker *gu*, which is also ill formed.
The question now arises as to why the corresponding English structures are grammatical:

(7.42) a. The conference has lasted a week
b. This book has cost twenty pounds

We will attribute the slight ill-formedness of the (b) example here to a semantic tension between the perfective, which requires a final bound on an event, and the measure verb *cost* which is lexically specified as some kind of unbounded state. Recall that we require the measure phrase to be coindexed with a T functional head. This requirement is satisfied by the head movement of V into the functional head realised by -ed, under the standard assumption that head movement leaves a trace.

One final prediction is made by the system we have outlined in this paper. We predict that measure phrases in structures with the auxiliary verb *be* and the R= E aspectual particle *a* should be well-formed, even if the auxiliary carries the perfective particle. This follows since the measure phrase will be coindexed with the aspectual head *a*, as above. This proves to be the case, and such structures are actually a paraphrase for the ill-formed bare perfective structures:

(7.43) Tha a' cho-tha-bharr air a bhith a' mainn seachdaim
be-PRES the conference ASP be-VN ASP last-VN week
'The conference has been lasting a week'

We can now turn to the problem that we noted in Chapter 3, when we argued that the fronted object had indeed moved into the Spec of AgrP: the problem was that this violated the generalisation that object shift is only possible if the verb has raised to AgrS. The verb here has obviously raised no further than AgrO.

The way that Holmberg and Platzack's Generalisation is encoded in Chomsky 1992 is that the raising of the verb to AgrS extends the domain of the verb so that its arguments count as equidistant and therefore the subject position is not relevant for the calculation of whether the object has moved economically. If the verb has not raised, then the domain is not extended and an economy violation results.

We can capture this same intuition here since the domain of the verb has essentially been extended by the independently motivated mechanism of aspectual chain formation, thus allowing object shift and maintaining Holmberg and Platzack's insight.

### 7.7 Summary

In this chapter we have briefly considered the syntactic licensing of arguments, and claimed that it is constrained by a generalised form of Visibility. This interacts with an independently motivated analysis of tense and aspect in Gaelic to explain why measure phrases are not licensed in simple perfective structures.

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### Chapter 8

#### Concluding Remarks

This thesis has shown that the functional head Agr is at least one of the contributing factors in determining the semantics of an argument. Other factors, such as lexical specification for definiteness, or focal factors undoubtedly enter into the equation too (see Partee 1991), but the crucial point is that something we recognize as a functional head has semantic effect. More to the point, it has a semantic effect on another element in the sentence, its specifier. This is a new and interesting observation, given that any semantic effect attributed to a functional head before has been seen as either a direct effect of the head on its complement (such as in the case with Tense, see chapter 7), or on its maximal projection (as is the case with D determining the definiteness of DP). Furthermore, the case for the independent projection of AgrS strengthened, given that there are now semantic, as well as syntactic and morphological motivations.

More generally, the thesis has argued for a DRS level of representation, and has construed this level as one which can contain contextually supplied information, thus extending the notion of the interpreted proposition from one where purely linguistic factors are relevant. The consequence that the thesis has for views of the relationship between syntactic and semantic categories is that the definitions of these terms must make reference to functional heads on the syntactic side, and to contextually supplied information on the semantic side. Of course the thesis says nothing about the actual semantic interpretation (mapping the DRS structures to a non-linguistic representation); I think that this work is important, especially with respect to determining why it is that measure phrases introduce no discourse referent, and a more adequate account of the weak island facts almost certainly will involve examining aspects of the model structure denoted by measure phrases (see e.g., Szabolcsi and Zwart 1992).

The main points of the thesis can be summarised in a number of slogans:

- The mapping from LF to DRS makes reference to Agr
- Checking theory can be constrained by semantic factors
- The ambiguity of weak DPs in situ is contextually induced
- Economy considerations constrain the possibility of reconstruction
- Measure phrases aren't associated with a discourse referent
- Tense/Aspect as well as Agr are involved in syntactic licensing

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One further point that the thesis makes is that there does not have to be a special mapping hypothesis, but rather the more general theory of definiteness has to be extended. This opens up interesting possibilities for exploring definiteness effects. Is there a specific syntactic configuration that leads to these effects in the same way that the spec AgrP position leads to a kind of anti-definiteness effect (what we termed a cardinality restriction in chapter 4)?

Bibliography


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