Just War and Nuclear Weapons
Just War Theory and Its Application to the Korean Nuclear Weapons Issue in Korean Christianity

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I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and constitutes the results of my research on the subject

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Abstract

This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the North.

The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe’s ‘Dark Ages’, to the emergence of the concept of the modern nation state at the end of the Thirty Years Wars in 1648.

Throughout these shifts, two issues have remained constant, although their relative weight has changed. First that a war can only be described as ‘just’ if it is being waged for legitimate reasons, jus ad bellum, and that is waged in a proportionate manner that seeks to separate combatants from non-combatants, jus in bello.

Both these ideas were severely weakened in the period of warfare that followed on from the American and French Revolutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century. The new ideology of nationalism brought with it the idea of the nation at arms, the armed citizenry, and with this, a further blurring of the always weak distinction between soldiers and the wider population. By 1945, both the secular and Christian tradition lay in ruins, damaged by the total warfare in the twentieth century when anything and anyone who could contribute to the wider war effort became a target. Also, although not the most destructive weapon, this saw the advent of the nuclear bomb.

In response, Christian thinkers sought to redefine the concepts of Just War for a nuclear age, with the potential for the use of weapons that could destroy all of humanity. Some saw this as the lesser evil, when faced with the victory of a totalitarian political system, and others argued that proportionality could be maintained if the size of weapons, or their targeting, was such as to minimise wider damage. On the other hand, many theologians argued that by definition they could never be discriminate or proportionate and that their use (or even the implied threat of their use) would always fail the precepts of Jus in Bello.

In the modern Korean context, this debate is not abstract, but has real bearing on the practical steps being taken by all the main parties. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the North (the DPRK) has meant that the desire for Korean re-unification has become entwined with
how best to resolve the nuclear issue. At the moment, in the South amongst the Protestant communities (split between the CCK and the NCCK), this debate has become fixed on issues of practical politics. In effect, is it better to negotiate with the North over the nuclear weapons issue and hope that resolving this will then lead to reunification or is it better to aim to overthrow the DPRK (economically, politically or even militarily) and, this, by definition, would resolve the question of their possession of nuclear weapons. At the moment both the NCCK and the CCK have based their policies towards North Korea (the DPRK) on the basis of secular politics not the teachings of the Christian gospel. The NCCK is tending to overlook human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the threat of that regime’s nuclear arsenal, in their emphasis on the need to overcome the political division of Korea. In turn, the CCK ignores much Christian teaching with its emphasis on seeking the collapse (perhaps by military means) of the DPRK as a precursor to unification. In this, both bodies seem to have forgotten that they are fundamentally Christian confessional bodies, and as such their public statements should be based on the Gospels, not on the practicalities of day to day politics.

Neither approach is particularly grounded on either in the Christian message of the gospels or the Just War tradition. Thus this thesis does not just seek to explore and explain the current situation in Korea using the concepts of Just War, it also seeks to provide a basis on which the Protestant community can resolve their current impasse. This means the thesis is grounded on the Christian concept of political theology, in particular in so far as this approach ‘offers alternatives to better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution’.

In the case of the situation in Korea, this means there is no military solution to the problem of unification. Nor can a solution be found in ignoring the human rights abuses in the DPRK. The answer lies in stressing three aspects that remain fundamental to any Christian identity in Korea – of a unified Korean koinônia, that any resort to force must meet the conditions of the Christian Just War tradition, and that, as faith groups, any response must stem from the Gospels.
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Part I: Introduction and Research Methodology
Introduction

The main purpose of this thesis is to use political theology in order to focus on the theological and political response of the Protestant Churches to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by North Korea. The current responses of the Protestant Churches can be compared to the longstanding Christian development of Just War Theology and an important conclusion is that the Protestant Community needs to take much more note of this tradition in formulating its response. To undertake this task means reviewing the developments in the Just War tradition, in particular as it changed in response to the destructive nature of warfare in the Twentieth Century. Essential prerequisites for this are both to set out the background to the Christian community in Korea and then to understand the current differences and debates within what is, otherwise, actually a united church on the subject of nuclear weapons and unification.

Fundamentally, Duncan B. Forrester states that political theology should be seen as contextual theology. In the context of this thesis that means placing the wider debate on Just War into a specifically Korean context and forming a response that is both informed by the wider theology and relevant to the situation in Korea. Consideration of this issue requires attention to three elements which constitute the shape of the thesis. These are Christian moral teaching about war, and in particular just war; the history and particular shape of Christianity in Korea; and the response of Korean Churches to the development of nuclear weapon capabilities by North Korea.

The basic concept of Just War has been interpreted for centuries by rulers in states, and by churches in these states, as they have sought to adapt it to different contexts and political scenarios. In the context of modern Korea, any discussion of Just War needs to take account of the existence of nuclear weapons and the residual impact of the superpower tensions in the international arena that existed ever since the end of the Second World War. Effectively two of the aspects referred to by Forrester –

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ideology\(^2\) and Church\(^3\) – have been important factors in the territorial politics in the peninsula for the past six decades.

The split in Korea that happened in 1945, which was cemented with the armistice at the end of the Korean War, has led to two very different societies emerging with very different underlying politics and moral underpinnings. In the South, political, social and economic development has been informed by a combination of specific Korean factors, the presence of US troops (and ideology) and a range of religious influences including Buddhist, Confucian and Christian. The Christian view is divided between a long established Catholic Church and two main groupings within the Protestant community. These groupings are the conservative CCK and the more radical NCCK. On the other hand, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has developed its own ideology, in its territory in the North, based on the Marxist-oriented principles learnt by its founding father and translated to suit his leadership.\(^4\)

In the South, according to the 2005 census\(^5\), some 46% of the population were described as having no religion (but are most likely to be Confucian in orientation), 20% as Buddhist, 20% as Protestant and 5% as Catholic. Since the Korean War there has also been a small Islamic community.

The ongoing tensions and political developments in Korea since the late 1940s have all taken place against a background of the potential for the use of nuclear weapons. The appearance of nuclear arms has had an important significance not only as a technological development in weaponry but also in changing the concept of just what

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\(^2\) Duncan B. Forrester warns “There is a tendency to pay more attention to placing political theology in the history of ideas than relating it to its socioeconomic context. Ideology becomes the context for political theology rather than a tool for understanding that context.” Then, he suggests “Any political theology has to work out its relation to current forms of political thought and ideology, learning how to discriminate between them, and how to use them as searchlights to illuminate social reality rather than as blinkers or blindfolds.” Duncan B. Forrester \textit{Ibid.}, p.152, p. 157

\(^3\) “The Church provides the third part of the context for political theology. A lively Church, which addresses itself to the major issues on the public agenda and does not become engrossed with its own inner institutional concerns and interests, is likely to produce lively and interesting theology. Where the Church is not involved to a significant extent with the political society in which it is set, and operates as a kind of voluntary organization for people who happen to be interested in religion, its pronouncements are likely to be highly general and rather vacuous” Duncan B. Forrester, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 153


\(^5\) This information is drawn from material supplied by the Korean Embassy and accessed from: http://www.asianinfo.org/asiainfo/korea/rel/multireligious_societies_and_the.htm
it might mean to fight and win a war.

Thus within the particularly Korean background of a divided peninsula which is ethnically and geographically a single unit, lies the issue of nuclear weapons and their ongoing proliferation. This is, of course, a wider issue as well, as several powerful states still seek to apply nuclear strategies and develop new types of nuclear weapons (and presumably have plans for when they might use these new weapons) and other states are secretly seeking nuclear weaponry. Some strategic debates around nuclear weapons suggest that the fear of mutual destruction prevents their use. Alternately others argue that such a mindset could prove extremely dangerous and definitely should be considered unethical, as pointed out by international peace groups, in particular, Christians and theologians. This is discussed in more detail in section 3 of Chapter 3.

In this thesis I will propose that the nuclear issue has become a defining one in the relationship between Church and State in South Korea, and in the delineation of a Christian identity in Korea. However, the academic discussion on nuclear weapons in Korea remained low key even during the U.S. deployment of nuclear arms in the peninsula. In particular, most Christians in South Korea, except some progressive ones, were not alarmed by a potential nuclear presence until US Intelligence revealed in 1989 the North Korean secret nuclear project.

**Reason and Purpose of the Thesis**

One of the primary objectives of the just war advocates since the end of World War II

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6 The Atomic Scientists Report analyses that “nuclear weapon states have reduced the global stockpile to its lowest level in 45 years. In the same period (1945-2006), the number of nuclear weapon states has grown from three to nine. We estimate that these nine states possess about 27,000 intact nuclear warheads, of which 97 percent are in U.S. and Russian stockpiles.” *2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 62, No. 4, July/August 2006, p. 64

7 Indeed, entering into the post-Cold War era, the number of countries deploying nuclear weapons or attempting to possess them has been increasing, as nuclear technology has been secretly delivered to nuclear ambitious countries. Let alone India and Pakistan, which detonated nuclear weapons in 1998, Israel acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War. As well as that, a few countries such as North Korea and Iran have been attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Besides, many countries such as Japan and South Korea are reportedly known as having a capability to develop their own nuclear program whenever they wish to do so.


has been an exploration of ‘just war’ in practice. It is my intention in this thesis to establish through political theology the framework wherein the ethics of responsibility (political in nature) merges with the confessional ethics of Christians in relation to war and more particularly nuclear weapons. The main purpose of the thesis is to establish within the Korean context the means of achieving results apparently sought by all those politically involved in finding an acceptable solution to the Korean dilemma. In this, the issues of nuclear weapons and unification are now inextricably linked. This thesis also compares the application of varied theological postures towards the resolution of issues within the global Korean context.

Research Hypotheses

This research started from the hypothesis that ‘political theology offers alternatives to better comprehend the different postures and approaches towards a solution.’ This is applied to the prolonged development of crisis and entente cordiale within the divided Korea. This gives the thesis a very practical focus, in particular it sets out the hypothesis that:

*The nuclear issue of North Korea is not a political or ideological matter, but a matter regarding an identity of the Christian Church in South Korea.*

In the light of this, a goal is to identify the Korean Church’s current practice and position towards the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea and the current division of the peninsula. Therefore, the first role of the church in relation to this issue has to clarify its theological and political stance toward nuclear weapons.

This central thesis can then be broken down into a number of specific themes and questions including:

- What historical and political events have brought Christian Churches in Korea to their actual respective postures on reunification and national security? To what extent can these modern debates be related to the different ways the

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9 Specifically the focus is on the debate within the Protestant Community
Protestant Community first came into the Korean peninsula?

- What priorities have been established in the NCCK and the CCK\textsuperscript{10} in adopting their council stances towards political reunification? How have they interpreted the Christian duty of \textit{Missio Dei} in terms of their engagement with public life, and the changing politics, in South Korea?
- What are the moral implications of just war in the contemporary war and security issues?
- How much importance is attributed to national security in relation to nuclear weapons as a means of its attainment?
- What are both councils’ theological stances in relation to the nuclear issue?
- Which is the Korean Church’s view of the State’s role in the nuclear issue?
- How does the Christian Church influence State political policy?

\textbf{Development of the Thesis}

To properly address the core hypothesis and these related questions it is necessary to thoroughly underpin the argument with both a study of the historical Christian debate on Just War\textsuperscript{11}, and also to understand the dynamics behind the emergence of the Protestant community in Korea up to 1950. The latter will be briefly set out as part of the methodology chapter, and then the Just War tradition is explored in detail in Chapter 2.

Once these core concepts are established, the third major section of the thesis then looks at the varied responses of the Christian community to the division of Korea after 1945, the emergence of the authoritarian regime in the North and the complex political dynamics in the South. This debate is closely entwined with the emergence of the DPRK as a nuclear state by the 1980s. In that sense any discussion about the

\textsuperscript{10} In this thesis, Korean Christians or Korea Church will mean Protestant Christians and churches. This can be justified as many Koreans would use the term Korean Church to encompass the Protestant viewpoint, and would call the Roman Catholic Church as Catholic Church, and second, most of the debate between Christians and churches related to the nuclear issue of North Korea are Protestants in Korea. The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Christian Council of Korea (CCK) are also councils for protestant churches. If the issue relates to Roman Catholic Church in Korea, I will describe it as the Catholic Church.

\textsuperscript{11} For convenience this is split into two related chapters. The first considers the evolution of this concept up the twentieth century and the second considers how the mechanisation of warfare (and in particular the invention and use of nuclear weapons) altered the prior understanding.
re-integration of the Korean community (*koinonia*) has to engage with the issue of nuclear weapons and whether a necessary prior condition to unification is a nuclear free Korea.

This discussion is based on an assumption that both Church and State adopt different viewpoints about the historical process and its relation to God’s kingdom. In particular, Stanley Hauerwas argues that the state is not the primary agent for God’s providential care and thus any resolution must come from a Christian perspective. What this might be, and on what basis it should be articulated, forms the final section of this thesis.

The thesis analyses the nuclear issue and differing church’s policies in the context of their theological stances and their political implications. Their respective issues on the nuclear problem are found to be connected to their corresponding political stances and ideological preference; wherein the NCCK seeks a resolution of the nuclear issue through reconciliation and peace with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), and the CCK seeks reunification through the collapse of the Northern regime. Effectively the NCCK is arguing that the nuclear weapons issue comes first and the CCK that unification is the only way to resolve the nuclear weapons issue. My argument is that both positions are wrong as both are lacking in terms of underpinning Christian theology.

Finally, all these strands are drawn together to explore how the Christian tradition of Just War can be used to explore responses and to suggest a way forward for the Korean Christian Community.

The research methods and implications of this approach are explored in the next chapter, which as noted includes an article of the pre-war Christian community in Korea.

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Summary

This thesis takes the historic development of the Christian theology about Just War (and the related themes of *Jus in Bello* and *Jus ad Bellum*) to understand the current debates and divisions within the Korean Protestant community.

To do this means carefully grounding the current dynamics in Korea in their historic antecedents as well as to analyse the contemporary debates within the CCK and NCCK as well as the dynamics, and internal logic, of the DPRK.

The goal is to use this historic debate (updated to reflect the emergence of nuclear weapons) to analyse weaknesses in the position adopted by both major organised strands of the Church (CCK and NCCK). This is an important task given the significant dangers posed to Korea by the current division of the peninsula.
Chapter 1: Research Methodology

1. Introduction

This thesis has a particular focus of addressing why:

The nuclear issue of North Korea is not a political or ideological matter, but a matter regarding the identity of the Christian Church\textsuperscript{13} in South Korea.

A practical consequence is the need to suggest a way to overcome the current division of Korea and to propose appropriate solutions, through examining the Korean Church’s current practice and position towards the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea. To do this, there are two separate historical strands that needed to be explored. The first is the development of the Christian tradition of Just War and the second is the development of Korean Christianity up to the end of the Second World War. This task is accomplished through examination and/or research of historical documents; corroborating evidence, the use of archival sources, interviews, and a survey of relevant published literature.

The next step is then a careful analysis of the post-war debates between Korea’s Protestant traditions, in particular in connection with re-unification and the Nuclear Weapons issue. A comparative method was utilised to analyse the stances of the main Christian congregations, the more liberal NCCK and the more conservative CCK, with a reflection on the effects of their application of Christian principles in the scope of Korean political issues affecting reunification, nuclear armament and national security.

This means drawing information from academic scholarship, Christian debates and more contemporary sources. This has yielded considerable information for developments in the South but there are obvious difficulties in understanding both the policy debate and the political evolution within North Korea. This clearly has

\textsuperscript{13} Specifically the focus is on the debate within the Protestant Community
implications for the coverage of public opinion in the North. Most research sources have been derived from a bibliographical analysis of the available printed material. This has allowed me to set out the lines of thought of theologians who have developed the Just War tradition so as to present the widest possible array of arguments for, and against, the principal theories on war. As complementary sources, references such as articles, newspaper reports, essays and online search engines available through Internet have been employed to provide information on more contemporary debates and developments.

Thus this thesis falls within the scope of political theology and, in turn, this becomes contextual theology.

2. Research Issues

Addressing these varied goals means thinking carefully about the type of research that needed to be undertaken. As discussed above, the contemporary study of developments in Korea has been undertaken using comparative analysis of the various sources and statements of the main actors – the two countries, ROK and DPRK, and the two church groupings, the NCCK and the CCK.

The underpinning context to this is almost 2500 years of Biblical and West European history that traces the precedents and development of Christian thinking in terms of Just War. However, it must be clearly stated, this is not a history of warfare across that period and the reason for the historical element is to understand the diverse strands that have contributed to the development of Christian theology in this domain. Thus the focus falls on particular historical periods and the need is to interpret those events in so far as they form a backdrop to theological developments or seem to indicate a breakdown of previous orthodoxies. The goal is to understand the Christian Just War tradition so that it can be properly applied in today’s Korean context.

This means concentrating on a number of ‘set-piece’ periods that can be held to exemplify key developments or issues. These can be summarised to:
• Early Christian writings when Christianity was a minority (and often persecuted) religion mostly within the then Roman Empire;

• The period of Augustine and Ambrose, when Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire and thus had to deal with issues of war (both aggressive and defensive by the state, and in the form of rebellion against the state) from a position of some moral responsibility for the actions of the State;

• The early medieval (in West European terms) period exemplified by Gratian, with an attempt to revive and modify the earlier thinking about Just War;

• An early modern (again in West European terms) period exemplified by Grotius, when warfare had become (largely) a matter of dispute between sovereign states and organised armies (at least when conducted in Europe);

• A period from roughly the American and French revolutions to the end of the Second World War when it appeared as if both Christian and Secular models of Just War had collapsed;

• A consideration of how far the development and use of nuclear weapons leads to significant alteration to earlier thinking.

This is followed by a detailed study of post-1950 Korean politics and a review of some key aspects of the introduction of Christianity into Korea within the divided peninsula.

Thus there is a need to some extent to vary the underlying research approach as the thesis develops. The earlier sections (roughly up to Grotius) can be seen as reviews of the theological debates, located in their historical context and using historical events as exemplars. In the main, this does mean that the approach is not that of conventional historical analysis (and some of these methods and their implications are discussed below). However, the period roughly from 1770-1945 is analysed, not just to explore why the nature of warfare changed (blurring of boundaries between combatants and non-combatants, industrialisation of warfare, new ideologies with their concepts of nationalism, ethnicity or class as key characteristics), but also to put the current Korean debates into context. This is important, as one interpretation of this period is that it marked the loss of any meaningful distinction between combatants and non-combatants and thus of the breakdown of the Jus in Bello strand of Just War.
Throughout the thesis, the goal is to use concrete examples to explore the development of ideas or to place debates in context. At the end this does mean making choices between various interpretative frameworks, acknowledging that “various philosophies or conceptions of the world exist, and [that] one always makes a choice between them.”\textsuperscript{14} This is critical as the purpose of any research is to extract meaning from information and to use that information to support or disprove an initial supposition.

As noted in the introduction, the basic goal of this thesis is to provide concrete suggestions as to how Korea might be able to resolve the current nuclear weapons crisis. In doing this it locates the debate not as a political or ideological matter, but a matter regarding an identity of the Christian Church in South Korea. Therefore, the first role of the church in relation to this issue is to clarify its theological and political stance toward nuclear weapon. This has implications for the style of argument adopted within the thesis – as explored below, this means taking an active mode of engagement rather than offering a dispassionate academic analysis. This approach is firmly rooted in approaches to Christian political theology such as that developed by Duncan Forrester. In particular the final chapter clearly sets out some practical steps that now need to be adopted by the Protestant community in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The Christian approach to ethics is different from secular ethics as it is based specifically on Christian faith and adopts its norms from Jesus Christ and the Christian God. As such it does not explore whether God’s judgement or Jesus’ behaviour was right or not. It basically regards them as truth. This concept is a critical starting point in this thesis.

Before reviewing Forrester’s political theology, it is useful to consider other approaches to reading and interpreting historical events and trends.

\textbf{2.1. Historiography}

A key step in historical research is first the need to establish the veracity and reliability of a particular source. In the case of this thesis though, the more important issue is how is the information to be interpreted and given meaning? Within this, there is also a need to consider what the purpose of history and historical writing is. E. H. Carr in particular argues that there have been three main trends:

- A model of historical writing that concentrates on the deeds and actions of great men, kingdoms and empires. Sometimes this is written with a moral purpose and in others essentially as descriptive history;
- A model of historical writing that sees history as a sequence of events and trends, that can sometimes be exemplified by individuals but often based on class conflict and economic/technological changes;
- An approach that relies on detailed analysis of small sections of wider events that in turn can challenge the wider sweep of analysis and generalisation usually implicit in the above two trends.

These approaches offer quite different approaches to the philosophy of history. This can perhaps be exemplified by the various ways that the English history in the 17th Century has been handled. The earliest approach saw the century as a struggle between constitutional options and exemplified in the lives of the most important individuals such as Oliver Cromwell or Charles I. By contrast, Christopher Hill located the reasons for the wars (and form of settlement) as a class struggle by a rising bourgeoisie against the old feudal order. Implicit within this was the emergence of a small radical left that was suppressed in the same way that the French Jacobins later suppressed their radical, more proletarian, wing. The final form of historical study of the period has been to focus on events in small towns or amongst small groups of

15 Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001)
16 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (Coventry: International Library of Philosophy, 1994)
18 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, Oliver Cromwell (London: Longmans, 1901)
the population. This, almost micro-level\textsuperscript{21} either explicitly rejects drawing larger scale lessons or is held to contradict the wider narrative driven conclusions.

What needs to be clarified is how far these models of history can be accommodated within a Christian model of reading history and what implications that has for the style of analysis and conclusions that can be reached.

2.2. Secular models of history

Some secular models of historical writing tend to emphasise a narrative of events over exploring the underlying reasons why those events happened. Classic examples of this style of writing could include Gibbon’s History of the Roman Empire and MacAuley’s Histories of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Britain. These present history almost ‘out of time’ with no, or little, note of economic, social and political changes that could be driving the surface events. One consequence of this was it was possible to write history that had relatively arbitrary start and end dates, so, for example, Gramsci complained:

“… Is it possible to write a history of Italy in modern times without a treatment of the struggles of the Risorgimento? In other words: is it fortuitous, or is it for a tendentious motive, that Croce\textsuperscript{22} begins his narratives from 1815\textsuperscript{23} and 1871? That is, that he excludes the moment of struggle; the moment in which the conflicting forces are formed, are assembled … the moment when one ethical-political system dissolves and another is formed.” 24

Effectively in Gramsci’s construction, Croce’s model of history is essentially static with events happening almost out of accident and certainly out of context. In terms of interpretation of events, this can be explored in the literary debate between Marx and Hegel. This was literary and one sided as Hegel was never able to respond to Marx’s critiques. At the core there is more agreement between the two than some later Marxists (especially Engels) were willing to acknowledge but fundamentally Hegel


\textsuperscript{22} Croce was an Italian historian much admired by Gramsci for the depth of his research and care in establishing key information – but as this makes clear, they did not share any common ground in terms of interpretation.

\textsuperscript{23} This reference relates to an earlier part of this extract from the \textit{Quadran} where Gramsci is discussing Croce’s history of modern France.

\textsuperscript{24} Antonio Gramsci, \textit{Selections from Prison Notebooks}, pp. 118-120.
argued for a degree of stasis and for resolution of conflict that could be a refinement of the status quo. Thus he had a keen interest in human freedom but believed this could come about in any situation regardless of the underlying social and economic conditions—as long as the relationship was duly legislated. Marx took a more dynamic view and suggested that both the extent and limits to freedom were economically determined and that different arrangements attributed very different meaning to the basic word.

Typical of this style of historical analysis, Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawn developed a model of European history since the French Revolution based on two long time spans. The first, he calls the ‘Long Nineteenth Century’ and runs from the outbreak of the French Revolution (1789) to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917. The second, a ‘Short Twentieth Century’ spans the period from the Russian Revolution to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. What he argues by using these dates is that the first period (in a European context) was dominated by the forces unleashed by the French Revolution and the second by the existence of the Soviet Union. Following these blocks is more important in his model of history than any arbitrary dates.

Thus, to Hobsbawn, as to Gramsci, historical narrative should explore the reasons for, and consequences of, key events. Hobsbawn argues that the history of nineteenth century Europe was fundamentally coloured by the French Revolution. This, he believed, was a different form of bourgeois revolution to the earlier events in Britain and Netherlands and even the more recent American example. It hinted at a much more radical restructuring of society, with elements that were adopted by both socialist and liberal traditions. The early part of the nineteenth century was, he argued, a reaction of the existing regimes against these possibilities, encapsulated in

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25 He was probably the first west European philosopher to take an interest in contemporary politics (in particular the French Revolution) and emerging economic theory. This forms a strong contrast to earlier philosophers such as Kant or Descartes.

26 Tom Rockmore develops a strong argument that Marx never ceased to be a Hegelian, a more conventional Engels inspired view is that Marx went beyond Hegel. This debate can be found in Tom Rockmore, Marx after Marxism (London: Blackwell, 2002) and Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (New York: Verso, 1995).

27 Developed in a trilogy of books: The Age of Revolution (1789-1848), The Age of Capital (1848-1875) and The Age of Imperialism (1875-1917).

the Congress of Vienna which sought to re-instate conventional monarchies across Europe. This process of containment was shattered in the revolutionary wave of 1848 and those events solidified the existence of a more socialist, proletarian option. This also opened the door to nationalist movements in Germany, Italy and Poland (amongst other European communities) and this nationalism had, at various times, both a reactionary and progressive element. The rest of the nineteenth century up to the Russian Revolution then revolved around the consequences of the separation of socialism from liberalism and the new forms of nationalism.

So in terms of historical interpretation, very roughly, the secular models can be divided into three. One tends to stress a narrative of events (and as such places no particular emphasis on start or end dates). A second tends to stress a dynamic series of events with the reasons variously located in economic, political or social underpinnings. The third tends to reject both these ‘narrative’ models and instead emphasise detailed exploration of specific periods or places so as to improve understanding of what happened at a particular time. Some of these debates re-occur within the Christian tradition of understanding history but, importantly, that also places stress on the role of Christ at the core of any events.

2.3. Christian Methods of Interpretation

An alternative approach to the interpretation of historical events and debates is provided by Paul Tillich who explored the intersection between historical narrative and Christian modes of thought to identify what he describes as ‘Christology’. Fundamentally he disagrees with the Gramscian model of reading history and the modernist approach of separating subject (ie how things are described – and thus a product of social construction) from the object being described (which is real, if clouded by language)\(^{29}\). Instead Tillich argues that:


\(^{30}\) Of course postmodernism goes further in repeating the Cartesian fallacy that nothing is actually real and all is constructed. For a critical reading of this model of philosophy see Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
“any such separation of the objective existence of history and a subjective judgment about it, is thoroughly to be repudiated. History is established or destroyed with the decision for or against its reality as a meaningful process. But—this must be said at the same time, and with equal emphasis—this establishment or destruction is not arbitrary. It is itself something historical. The decision for or against meaningful history is itself historical fate bound to special situations in history.”

Effectively at certain key stages history can be said to ‘reveals its meaning’ and it is from these key points that blocks of history take on a structure and meaning. This is particular important in the earlier chapters of this thesis where particular time frames and events are covered in detail, precisely as they reveal key changes in the development of Just War theology. Tillich argues that those who deny this can happen also deny the ‘possibility of a universal history’. In developing this argument he concludes:

“Now, this is the claim which in Christianity is expressed in the idea of Christ; and the problem implied in this claim in Christian theology is treated as the Christological problem. For Christian thoughts Christ is the center of history in which beginning and end, meaning and purpose of history are constituted.”

Tillich goes on to note that human freedom to derive multiple interpretations of historical events needs to be done carefully through Christian faith or:

“It is a necessary implication of freedom that it can become actual only in the decision between good and evil. If freedom were the realization of meaning in a necessary process, it would not be actual freedom, and it would not create history. It would create perhaps a dialectic process in which, as in Hegel, logical necessity overrules human freedom entirely. In all actual freedom there is an element of arbitrariness.”

Furthermore Hegelian dialectical reasoning is guilty of:

“interpreting history does not face the seriousness and concreteness of man’s situation in

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
history; it does not face the real threat which is to be conquered in a concrete struggle in history and not by an abstract system conceived on a point above history. The decision, whether history has a meaningful direction, is to be made in history itself. History has meaning only insofar as the threat of meaninglessness is overcome in concrete decision. Since, however, no one knows the outcome of these decisions they imply an element of belief, of hope and daring which cannot be replaced by rational conclusions.”

Overall in his reading of the historical process (and he does not deny the obvious—that this is done in a variety of ways from different world views) is that only a specifically Christian approach can yield a correct interpretation and “Christology becomes the possible answer to the basic question implied in history, an answer, of course, which can never be proved by arguments, but is a matter of decision and fate.”

Duncan Forrester shared some of these concerns but sought specifically to develop a political theology, so as to explain what this constitutes and how it allows one to interpret historical events. He argues that “political theology is contextual theology” and in consequence relates traditional Christian belief to a given modern situation. Through this, an active question (that informs this thesis) is “how the Church understands its social and political role. How is it related to the society, and in particular to the structures of power?” An important role for political theology is to engage with difficult issues and not to avoid problems that question existing power structures.

This approach can be aided by what Forrester calls Prophetic Theology. The Kairos Document expounds the roles of Prophetic Theology as follows:

“It will denounce sin and announce salvation. But to be prophetic our theology must name the sins and the evils that surround us and the salvation that we are hoping for. Prophecy must name the sins of apartheid, injustice, oppression and tyranny in South Africa today as ‘an offence against God’ and the measures which must be taken to overcome these sins and the suffering that they cause. On the other hand prophecy will announce the hopeful good news of future liberation, justice and peace, as God’s will and promise, naming the ways of bringing

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 154
From this it is clear that there is a need to combine social analysis with insights from the Biblical texts. However, such analysis cannot just be a simple neutral set of insights, it must embed within itself God’s ultimate message of salvation that means that liberation will come through Jesus Christ’s teachings.

3. Outline of the Korean Community: Development of the Protestant Christian Community in Korea

Given each time Jesus Christ’s message becomes embedded in a new context it will evolve rather differently, it is necessary here to pause, to explain the Korean Christian background and thus enable the reader to share one of the essential building-blocks of the thesis. Indeed many of the contemporary positions taken up by both the NCCK and the CCK can only be properly understood in terms of the historic development of Protestantism in Korea. One key ‘research tool’ is a basic grasp of the development of Christianity, and specifically of Protestantism, in the Korean Peninsula.

Korea was part of a wider Chinese Empire from the 1300s, nonetheless there was very little population exchange. In part, regional geography played an important role in separating Korean, Manchurian and Chinese population groupings. By the time of the establishment of the Chosun Dynasty the Amrok (Yalu in Chinese) River functionally separated Korea from Manchuria, a component of the Chinese Empire. As it happens, that region—subject to Arctic winters and not all that generous in responding to agricultural efforts, under the best of circumstances—had a very low population density. These conditions likewise contributed, at least to some extent, to the maintenance of Korean independence. Plainly stated, there was no significant population movement from Manchuria into the Korean peninsula. In any event,

38 The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: a Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1986), p. 18 This is also quoted in Duncan B. Forrester, Theology and Politics, p. 169
39 Described briefly above
40 It is not the purpose of this thesis to dwell on the various Chinese efforts over the centuries to maintain a measure of influence over the Korean peninsula. Suffice it to say that at times those efforts were rewarded with success and at others they were rebuffed. During the latter years of the nineteenth century the Chosun Dynasty extended a measure of formal obeisance to the Chinese emperor, although that ostensibly unequal relationship was more pro forma than one based on active enforcement. Three
long before the introduction of Christianity, the Korean people understood, in a rather inchoate fashion, that the peninsula was properly theirs and that collectively, they were the sole legitimate agents of governance. This feeling of the whole peninsular being a unified state is an important issue underpinning the current tensions between the South and the DPRK.

The Twentieth Century was a turbulent time for Korea seeing Japanese domination from 1905 to 1945, division into two parts along the demarcation line between Soviet and American troops, war and authoritarian governments in both parts of the peninsular. Since the 1950s there has also been the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in any future conflict between the DPRK and the USA and/or Republic of Korea. This context means that much of the development of the Protestant community has been under conditions of foreign occupation, actual armed conflict or the threat of armed conflict.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea, or ROK) has an estimated population of 49 million, of which about 26 percent are identified as belonging to Christian denominations. A comparable percentage of the population is self-identified as Buddhist. According to the Pew Forum, a non-denominational research organization, approximately three quarters of Korea’s Christians belong to a Protestant denomination. The remaining quarter professes Roman Catholicism. As such, the Protestant community is one of the largest religious groupings in the country (and represents around 80% of all Christians) but are a minority overall in South Korea.

However, the situation in the North is more complex due to the persecution of religious beliefs but it is estimated that there are about 135,000 confessing Christians

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41 Chinese army divisions were maintained on the Korean peninsula during the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s, although these military formations were more occupied with repressing popular opposition to the Korean monarchy than with maintaining anything approximating an occupation government. For example, church history professor Choo Chai-yong notes, "After the eighteenth century, the Korean government was in the worst possible financial crisis. The people, particularly the farmers, were in great distress and suffered with poverty and illness. In 1860 there were many revolts of the people (peasants). For example, there were revolts in Chinju (1862), in Cheju Island (1862) by fishermen, and in Pyongan Province by Hong Kyong-rae." Choo Chai-yong, ‘A Brief Sketch of Korean Christian History from the Minjung Perspective,’ p. 76


and 1,000 underground churches. In addition, there are state-recognized churches.

3.1. Catholicism in Korea

Christianity—understood in terms of organized church bodies, first appeared in Korea among the yangban elite at the end of the Eighteenth Century in 1784. This introduction of Catholicism came from Korean contact with the Chinese Court, a mode of transmission which limited its influence to the Korean governing elite who could write and read Chinese ideographs.

Nonetheless, Kim Young-gwan argues that yangban adherents undertook a modest translation effort to facilitate popular understanding of Christian sacred scripture. “Confucian scholars who converted to translated the English and Chinese Bible in Hangul and published some important Christian literature in Korean for the common people.” [‘The Confucian-Christian Context in Korean Christianity, p. 70] However, as a practical matter, the great majority of eighteenth century Koreans were illiterate, which, at least in the short term, obviated, or at least limited, any benefits that might have flowed from such initiatives. However, readily available printed materials are—in and of themselves—encouragements to popular literacy, as the experience in Europe after the introduction of moveable metal type to the printing process in 1453 amply demonstrates. Thus the existence of the printed texts allowed the yangban ‘outreach’ program managed to attract significant numbers of ordinary Koreans due to the ‘magnetic’ quality of the printed word—ordinary people could use the texts as a vehicle for literacy, albeit on a very small scale. Of course any broad-based initiative would have likely presupposed some organized effort at basic literacy education, perhaps an undertaking that Catholic missionaries of the period considered beyond the

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43 Kim Song-a, The Daily NK, March 22, 2007
Donald N. Clark, 'Christianity in Modern Korea: Rethinking Our Notions of 'Asia,' Education about Asia [publication of the Association for Asian Studies], Vol. 11, No. 2, Fall 2006.

44 These are Bongsoo and Chilgol Churches in Pyongyang


46 Donald N. Clark, ‘Christianity in Modern Korea: Rethinking Our Notions of ‘Asia,’ p. 37
capabilities of their limited resources. In any event, such an educative approach awaited the arrival of Protestant missionaries.

By the start of the nineteenth century, Christianity had become aligned with reform and, thus, opposition to the Confucian orthodoxy\textsuperscript{47}, at least in the eyes of the Chosun dynasty.

\section*{3.2. The Development of the Protestant Community\textsuperscript{48}}

The introduction of the Protestant religion followed some of the dynamics connected with that of Catholicism. It came from outside Korea (in this case mainly via American missionary societies and Korean merchants who had contacts outside Korea). The early years of a development after 1884 were also the early years of a new form of foreign domination – in this case by Japan. This meant that the early community became identified with the growth of Korean nationalism and resistance to Japanese imperialism. A critical difference though was the extent that the early Protestant communities sought to reach out to a wider section of society than a portion of the narrow educated elite.

Most Korean Christians at the time were introduced to a faith based on Christian Biblical fundamentalism as a result of the work of western missionaries. The missionary methods and policies of the foreign missionaries were mainly focused on church growth.\textsuperscript{49} Unlike their Catholic counterparts (which remained organizationally subordinate to the Vatican), Protestant churches adopted a self-governing program in the 1890s—popularly called the ‘Nevius Method,’\textsuperscript{50} after missionary John L. Nevius—which “emphasized self-support, self-propagation, self-government and independence of the church.”\textsuperscript{51} The Nevius model meant that missionaries worked directly with the ‘Minjung’—the Korean \textit{hoi polloi}—rather than through the mediation of the \textit{yangban}.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Donald N. Clark, ‘Christianity in Modern Korea: Rethinking Our Notions of Asia,’ p. 38
  \item \textsuperscript{48} For an overview of the introduction and development of Protestant Christianity in Korea, see L. George Paik, \textit{The History of Protestant Missions in Korea} (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1987)
  \item \textsuperscript{49} John T. Kim, \textit{Protestant Church Growth in Korea} (Canada: Essence Publication, 1996), pp. 140-1.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} For a history of the ‘Nevius Method,’ see Charles Allen Clark, \textit{The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods} (Chicago: Fleming H. Revell, 1930)
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
As a result, Protestant churches learnt democratic practice and autonomy. However, according to Clark, “The process took more than a generation, but by the late 1930s, the major Protestant denominations were self-governing, the Presbyterians with their own General Assembly and the Methodists with their own Korean bishops.”

### 3.3. Construction of a Korean Protestant Identity

In the beginning, all of the Protestant denominations placed emphasis on the provision of modern healthcare and educational opportunity in part due to religious belief and in part because early missionaries were allowed in specifically as teachers and doctors.

As it happened, it was the availability of western medicine was instrumental in a lessening of official hostility toward Christian missionary efforts.

“When [in December 1884] Min Yong-ik, nephew of the queen, was stabbed by an assassin and was lying at the point of death with several severed arteries and seven sword wounds on his head and body, [Presbyterian medical missionary Dr. Harold N.] Allen succeeded in bringing the prince [Min Young-ik] back to health… The reward was gratifying. Though the king soon knew that Allen was a missionary, he did not prevent Dr. Allen’s mission work as a doctor.”

Overall, establishing opportunities for education across the entire social spectrum took on a greater urgency for Protestant missionaries, at least in part attributable to the religious emphasis on personal interpretation of Sacred Scriptures (for which literacy is obviously a precondition). Pre-existing social mores indirectly supported these efforts. Learning was popularly admired, even among those to whom it was largely alien. “The emphasis which the missionaries placed on education resonated with the Confucian value of education as an end in itself.” The contribution to education would have outcomes far beyond anything the first Western Christian missionaries could have imagined.

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52 Donald N. Clark, ‘Christianity in Modern Korea: Rethinking Our Notions of Asia,’ p. 36
53 Choo Chai-yong, ‘A Brief Sketch of Korean Christian History from the Minjung Perspective,’ p. 75
54 James Grayson, ‘Christianity and state Shinto in colonial Korea,’ p. 16
55 Apart from such an approach by the missionaries, their Christian fundamentalism also taught that all Koreans should be Christianised and the church had to keep distance from the matters of the world.
As with Catholicism, the Protestant tradition was influenced by the dominant Confucian cultural mindset. In some instances this was antagonistic, with Christianity described as foreign and disruptive by the regime (both Chosun and Japanese). As Julia Ching claims,

“Confucianism as a dynamic discovery of the worth of the human person, of the possibility of moral greatness and even sainthood, of one’s fundamental relationship to others in a society based on ethical values, of an interpretation of reality and a metaphysics of the self that remain open to the transcendental—all this, of course, the basis for a true sense of human dignity, freedom, and equality, is still relevant to Korean Christians.”

In relation to Ching’s argument, Professor of Christian ethics, Hyun Young-hak, asks a series of perhaps rhetorical questions relating to the Korean people. “Has God been working in our history? If not, what does God have to do with us? If yes, was God working only in the history of the rulers? … As Christians we have to start with the premise that God, as Lord of History, has worked in and through our history…”

3.4 Resistance to Foreign Domination and the growth of Protestantism

The early development of the Protestant Church in Korea was also the period of growing Japanese domination over the peninsula. Japanese incursions had started in 1875 and culminated in September 1905, when the Treaty of Portsmouth was

Their teaching led Korean Christians to see the church as a place designated by God, while the world was an evil place. That kind of faith, which has a ‘dualistic view of the good and the evil or friend and enemy became rooted strongly in the Korean soil. Kwon Jin-kwan, Minjung Theology, the Journal of Theologies and Cultures in Asia, Vol. 4, 2005, p. 75, p. 77. Thus, we may surmise that even if Korean Christianity with a Confucian cultural background could be a driving force to establish national koinonia, fundamental faith could be a window to see the world in dualistic way. This became prominent in conservative Christians’ antagonism towards Communism in North Korea after the Korean War. This is discussed in Chapter 6.

This passage is also quoted in Kim Young-gwan, ‘The Confucian-Christian Context in Korean Christianity,’ p. 84

Hyun Young-hak, ‘A Theological Look at the Mask Dance in Korea,’ in Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia [CTC-CCA], Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Singapore: CCA, 1983), p. 54 Professor of systematic theology Suh Nam-dong treats this same issue from a slightly different perspective. See his ‘Towards a theology of Han,’ in Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia [CTC-CCA], Ibid., pp 156-157

When a Japanese naval force—engaging in the ‘gunboat diplomacy’ that was common to that era—forcibly entered Korean waters in 1875, in an effort to open Korean ports to Japanese trade. Under the terms of the Treaty of Ganghwa (February 1876) Japan was granted extraterritorial rights in trading
enacted. Russia agreed to recognize Korea as solely within the Japanese sphere of influence and to withdraw remaining troops from Manchuria. The interests of the Korean government and people received scant attention at these proceedings. Indeed, only a few weeks after enactment of the Portsmouth Treaty, Japanese occupation forces in Korea forced the Seoul government to acquiesce to the Treaty of Eulsa (November 1905), formally reducing Korea to the status of a Japanese protectorate, thereby ending Korea’s capacity to function as an independent actor on the world scene. The final stage was the 1910 Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty that ended all aspects of Korean independence.

For all Koreans—irrespective of their religious inclinations—these developments were all at once shameful and despicable. However, among Korean groups, Christians were well placed—both in terms of education and social organization—to resist the excesses of the Japanese occupation. As Clark expounds, “By 1910, when the Japanese took over, there existed a network of Christian schools and academies that functioned, usually under Korean Christian leadership, as an alternative to the nascent colonial system. As Japan started building elementary schools in Korea, many Korean Christians opted to stay with their church-related academies.”

During the occupation period, the Japanese government instituted a number of policies intended to both undermine Christian influence and Korean culture, both of which were viewed as obstacles to unimpeded control of the nation. Korea’s resident Japanese authorities saw Christian schools as underpinning Korean nationalism, and there was a major effort to undermine their influence. A 1908 edict established
Japanese as the language of instruction in public schools, a blatant effort at undermining Korean cultural identity. This edict was amended in 1915 to include mission schools, with the added proviso that teachers in such schools were required to have ‘proper qualifications,’ and such schools were forbidden to teach religious subjects or hold worship services.\(^{63}\)

The overall Japanese efforts had mixed results. Various acts of repression had the consequence “to associate Christianity in the minds of the ordinary Korean with Korean nationalism.”\(^{64}\) Thus during the March First Movement of 1919 that found much of its impetus in the nation’s Presbyterian and Methodist Churches. As first this appears paradoxical as, according to Kim Yong-bok,

“The basic divergence of historical perception between Korean Christians and missionaries emerged in their respective attitudes toward the rule of Japan. Korean Christians, like their fellow countrymen, never accepted the legitimacy of the Japanese rule, whereas missionaries had to take, formally, a position of political neutrality by virtue of the fact that they were foreigners in Korea.”\(^{65}\)

In the 1930’s, the colonial power devised a plan to spiritually integrate Koreans into the faith of the Japanese. The authorities forced all Koreans to worship at Shinto\(^{66}\) shrines. The Japanese authority tried to persuade Korean Christians that “the worship was not religious act, but patriotic”\(^{67}\) Keum Joo-seop claims, “The patriotic conception of Shintoism in Korea was invented for the Japanese policy which was primarily a strategy for unifying Korea and Japan.”\(^{68}\) Grayson argues that this Shinto

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\(^{63}\) James Grayson, ‘Christianity and State Shinto in Colonial Korea,’ p. 21

\(^{64}\) James Grayson, ‘Christianity and State Shinto in Colonial Korea,’ p. 23

\(^{65}\) Kim Yong-bock, ‘Christianity and Modernization in Korea’

\(^{66}\) According to Rosemarie Bernard, “Shinto (literally ‘the way of the deities’) is Japan’s indigenous religion...Shinto has been profoundly influenced by Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Yet, at the beginning of Japan’s modernization Shinto would be officially separated from Buddhism at the level of divinities worshiped, ritual practices, and institutional structures. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Shinto ritual practices were centralized and reorganized according to a hierarchy that brought even the smallest outlying Shinto shrines within the fold of state administration, with the emperor and his rituals at the centre.” Rosemarie Bernard ‘Rosemarie Bernard, Shinto and Ecology: Practice and Orientations to Nature’


\(^{68}\) Ibid., p. 79.
matter was a great challenge to Korean Christians as a problem of not only faith but also national identity.

Grayson observed that it is “an interesting historical fact that a recently missionized, clearly foreign religion had accommodated itself so quickly to Korea that it became the standard bearer of Korean nationalism in little more than a generation.” In any event, participation in the State Shinto rites raised issues of conscience paralleling those of fourth century Christians under obligation to burn incense at altars dedicated to the Roman Emperor’s ‘divine genius.’

This gave the early Protestant Church a clear identity with the concept of Korean nationalism and resistance to foreign control. As Grayson notes, they were able to demonstrate how aspects of faith and biblical scholarship gave logic to their resistance. Unfortunately Japanese rule ended not with national liberation and unification but with the Allied Powers dividing Korea along the Thirty-eighth Parallel and instituting separate regimes in their respective occupation zones. The United States assumed control south of the parallel while the Soviet Union controlled the north. The Allies’ disagreement over the future of Korea resulted in the establishment of two states with different political ideologies and economic systems in 1948: communism in the North and capitalism in the South.

3.5. Implications for Korean Protestantism

One of the early strengths of the Korean Protestant Community was their clear identification with the traditions of Korean nationalism. As such, they grounded

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69 Ibid., p. 74.
70 Ibid.
71 In truth, the Shinto rite matter caused some troubles within Korean churches. Besides thousands of Christians who bravely opposed worship at Shinto shrines and suffered persecution, many Christians thought that it was acceptable to worship at the shrines in a perfunctory manner as it was more important for them that their churches remain open. This issue has been yet unsolved among Korean Protestant denominations. Choi Duk-hyung, ‘Hanshin University and Historical Issues’, Pro-Japanese Tradition of the Korea Church, Hankuk Kyohoe-e-so-ui Chin-il Jeontong, written in Korean (Seoul: Text and Context, 2000), pp. 252-330.
72 Suh and others made an explicit linkage between the Biblical story of Exodus and the Korean suffering under Japanese occupation. Key to this was the fusion between the social desire for freedom from foreign rule with a desire to practice their own religion. Suh Nam-Dong, ‘Towards a theology of Han,’ in Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia [CTC-CCA], Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Singapore: CCA, 1983)
their resistance to the Japanese in areas such as education, preservation of health services and in connection with the forced imposition of Shinto rites. Korean nationalism initially probably took the form of a loose understanding of being a single people who occupied a particular geographic unit. Chinese rule, directly, had probably only impacted on the educated elite, for most of the poor it was not a practical reality. Good or bad governance, arbitrary justice, seizure of crops in times of famine, were all acts by the local Korean aristocracy. The Japanese period probably triggered a shift in attitude from people seeing themselves as Korean to an active articulation of a Korean identity in opposition to a directly felt imperial power. The Christian community was able to reflect this in their use of biblical analogies such as the sufferings of the Isrealites in Egypt.

The early stages of the development of Christianity in Korea saw the adoption of Catholicism by parts of an elite that was comfortable with a basically Confucian world view, Christianity being identified with reform, social justice and the desire to modernise Korea.

The Protestant community took much of this tradition and then developed in different ways. First it directly sought to engage with the mass of Koreans and did this by translation of holy texts, evangelism and also a strong commitment to social justice, health care and education. The introduction of the Protestant churches was also the period when Korea shifted from the benign and somewhat distant control of the Chinese Empire to more direct Japanese rule. A consequence was a clear and early identification of the Protestant community with core Korean values in resistance to the cultural imperialism of the invader. In the main, this resistance was passive and an important analogy was the suffering of the people of Israel in their Babylonian captivity and in Egypt. There was little discussion of the practicalities of armed resistance and this meant the church did not frame its defence of Korean identity in the Christian Just War tradition. Instead, as occurred after the end of the Korean war, the main frame of reference was the cultural unity of the Korean people using biblical analogies.

4. Implications
The research goal of this thesis (to practically engage in the debates and options facing South Korea’s Christian organisations in terms of the possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK and around unification in general) and the decision to base it fundamentally on a Christian approach to reading information and interpreting implications has a considerable impact on the structure of the thesis. The key research tool is to question whether a given view or action does indeed fit ‘norms from Jesus Christ and the Christian God’. As such the historical narrative is presented as a series of events used to explore the gradual development of Christian views on just war and also in particular in terms of the post-war situation in Korea.

This short chapter has explored various ways in which the historical record and contemporary events can be explored and synthesised. Both Tillich and Forester offer specifically Christian ways of doing this that are at variance with the various secular models explored earlier. Essentially from Tillich comes the insight that centring history on a Christian interpretation will lead to a correct reasoning. Forrester is interesting in that not only does his political theology offer a tool for reasoning and understanding but he also explicitly sees such analysis as part of an active engagement. It is not a tool for abstract non-involved analysis.

As such, it is an important tool used throughout this thesis and that also informs the particular style of argument building that is used. It also underpins the thesis goal of offering direct commentary and advice as opposed to limiting it to explanation and analysis.
Part II: Just War Theory: Establishing a Moral Framework
Chapter 2: The Just War Tradition in the Pre-Modern Era

1. Initial Considerations

The use of military force implies a host of moral considerations. Traditionally, these have been classified under two general categories—*jus ad bellum* (‗justice to war,’ criteria that must be consulted and considered in evaluating the moral justification of resorting to war) and *jus in bello* (‗justice in war,’ activities that must be avoided and desiderata that must remain privileged during actual conflict). These two categories, in turn, fall within the general rubric of ‗just war theory.’

It should be made clear at the outset that the development of any just war theory tacitly presupposes some basic assumptions. As Kenneth Kemp argues, “waging war is either susceptible to moral appraisal or not. If it is susceptible to moral appraisal, it must either always be wrong (‗pacifism’) or sometimes be permissible. If it is sometimes permissible, then it must either be evaluated by the tenets of the just-war theory or some other theory.”

In sum, the development of just war theory—and reliance on tenets derived from such theory—cannot be justified from two points of view: absolute pacifists and moral nihilists. According to Kemp, “Moral nihilism with respect to war … challenges the very possibility of applying moral predicates to acts of or within war. It is captured in the Latin proverbial locution, *inter arma [enim] silent leges* and its English counterpart ‗All’s fair in love and war.’”

Kemp takes Karl von Clausewitz’s view on the ‘nature of war’ as an example of moral nihilism, affirming that Clausewitz implicitly rejected *jus ad bellum* in his famous work ‘On War’.

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74 Ibid., p. 3 The sentence, ‘All’s fair in love and war,’ is discussed later in relation to Marcus Tullius Cicero’s reference ‘In time of war the law falls mute,’ *Pro Milone*, Caput XI

Online Book, www.intratext.com/IXT/LAT0096/_PB.HTM

75 Kenneth W. Kemp, *Just-War Theory and Its Non-Pacifist Rivals*, p. 3 Here, Kemp quotes Clausewitz “War is therefore a continuation of policy by other means. It is not merely a political act but a real political instrument… What still remains peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar character of the means it employs” Karl von Clausewitz, ‘War is a Mere Continuation of Policy by Other Means,’ *On War*, Book I, chap. 1, sec. 24, Colonel J.J. Graham (tr.), 1873

Clausewitz likewise dismissed the notion of *jus in bello*. “We can never introduce a modifying principle into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity.”\(^76\) Even so, one Christian theologian (and just war theory advocate), George Weigel, argues that Clausewitz—perhaps unintentionally—put himself within the confines of just war tradition.

“Just war tradition is best understood as a sustained and disciplined intellectual attempt to relate the morally legitimate use of proportional and discriminate military force to morally worthy political ends. In this sense, the just war tradition shares Clausewitz’ view of the relationship between war and politics: unless war is an extension of politics, it is simply wickedness… [On] this crucial point, at least, Clausewitz was articulating a thoroughly classic just war view of the matter.”\(^77\)

The catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons—that provoked horrified reactions of individuals wedded to ‘just war’ principles immediately after their first use in August 1945\(^78\)—and their development, stockpiling, and prospective use in combat means they have become a particular matter for consideration by Christian moralists. The fact that such weapons are considered ‘new,’ in the sense that they were invented after the lengthy historical debate that developed just war theory, is beside the point. It is not enough to simply postulate at the outset that nuclear weapons should be forbidden simply because they are inordinately destructive. Any consideration of moral implications of such weapons use for Christian believers and practitioners must engage with trends in moral philosophy—some extending back millennia, others considerably more recent—that are applicable to the matter at hand. These include the aforementioned just war theory, interpretation of sacred scripture, and the application of religious precepts in troubled circumstances.

The moral theologians, who gave substance to the ideas relating to the use of nuclear armaments, that characterised the post-war debate in the Korean Church (discussed in

\(^76\) Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, chap. 1, sec. 3
\(^78\) See, for example, the spectrum of voices raised in objection of the nuclear weapons at the end of World War II and detailed in Weber, Mark Weber, ‘Was Hiroshima Necessary?’ *Journal of Historical Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, June 1997
chapter 5), never thought in such *sui generis* terms. Rather, like their counterparts throughout the Christian world, they relied on supporting antecedents, albeit perhaps with shifting emphases and in some instances, arriving at different conclusions. In order to appreciate the contributions of these recent developments, it is first necessary to review the historical background that provides a substratum for their thought. This historical review can be conveniently split into three parts, and each has a slightly different focus:

- The first looks at the Biblical and Pagan debates on ‘Just War’;
- The second, very briefly, reviews the early Christian teaching on Just War before Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, and then how this altered once Christianity became the state religion. This period is especially important for the writings of Hippo and Augustine;
- The third covers a long period from the fall of the Roman Empire (in the West at least) to Grotius and looks at the development of the Just War tradition in an era when Christianity was the claimed state religion of every major European state. Here, the focus is on particular theological debates, and draws in specific historic events either as context or as examples. This covers the period up the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War.

The next chapter then considers the development of the Just War tradition in the modern era, roughly from the American and French Revolutions to the end of the Second World War. Whilst again, specific events are explored as examples the goal is to understand why key elements of both secular and Christian traditions of Just War broke down in this period. Chapter 3 then concludes with the attempts to reconstruct a Christian Just War tradition and, in particular, the impact of the potential use of nuclear weapons on this.

2. Just War Theology: Pagan, Early Christian and Late Roman Developments

In his overview of the Christian argument on just war thinking, Duncan Forrester, outlines:
“Christian just war thinking is a fairly continuous tradition of disciplined reflection on the use of violence, coercion and force in the resolution of conflicts. Its foundation is a recognition that the use of violence is deeply problematic, and for many Christian thinkers inherently sinful, although sometimes necessary in a fallen world.”

However, from the secularist point of view, David Ahrens, a retired military officer and historian, states that “Just war, the Western tradition of war, much like its people, is a product of a diverse cultural backdrop. While strong religious roots can be identified, it is not purely or uniquely a religious phenomenon. It cannot be reduced to a single source or interest of a particular class or institution or even to a particular time frame.” Nonetheless, the just war tradition was developed systematically by Augustine on Hippo for the first time and was then considerably advanced by the thirteenth century Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas even though there had been some considerations on just war in earlier periods. In this sense, “Aquinas’ conception of just war was the reference point for later theorists at the beginning of the modern era, including both Catholic theorists such as Vitoria, Molina, Soto, and Suarez, and Protestants such as Luther, Ames, and Grotius. Understanding Aquinas’ conception of just war is essential for understanding these critical figures.”

Aquinas establishes three essentials:

“First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is waged (for it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior) … Second, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on some account or fault… [and] Third, it is necessary that the belligerents should have rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.”

According to Johnson, “the roots of this distinction [between public and private

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80 David A. Ahrens, *Christianity’s Contribution to Just War Tradition*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College), p. 8
81 James T. Johnson, ‘Just War, As It Was and Is,’ *First Things*, No. 149, January 2005, p. 17
initiatives to war] lie in Augustine’s thought: the service of private ends by private persons manifests cupiditas—wrongly directed, self-centred love or motivation—while efforts by those at the head of communities to serve the good of those communities show the effect of a concern for justice informed by caritas, rightly directed love.”

It likewise reflects the traditional Roman understanding of ‘just war’. In his De Officiis, Ciceron observes, “it may be understood that no war is just unless after a formal demand of satisfaction for injury, or after an express declaration and proclamation of hostilities.”

In light of these considerations, ‘just war’ theory may be construed as establishing a ‘least objectionable’ middle ground in “the theoretical spectrum between the extreme pacifist position that eschews from all war on moral grounds and the extreme military realist position that rejects any role of morality in war, allowing that ‘anything goes’ in order to end a war as quickly as possible. The basic concept of right and wrong in waging war can be traced back to antiquity, but the secular formulation of the Just War tradition, as it grew from its roots in the Church, is commonly traced through Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, and Hugo Grotius, among others.”

2.1. Classical Antecedents

Both jus ad bellum and its associate, jus in bello, have an ancient lineage, although for the latter this was somewhat muted. In his Politics, Aristotle argues that nations should “wage war for the sake of peace,” in the sense that the proper purpose of engaging in warfare is public (restoring or assuring the continuance of reasonably undisturbed civil existence) rather than private (individual aggrandizement). In his De Officiis (On Obligations), Marcus Tullius Cicero compares a nation’s resort to war

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83 James T. Johnson, ‘Just War, As It Was and Is,’ p. 18
84 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis [On Moral Duties], I, 11, Walter Miller(Tr.), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913)
86 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, John D. Ross (tr.)
87 This thinking, of course, has a measure of resonance with that of Aquinas (q.v., supra).
with an individual’s efforts at dispute resolution.

“In the case of a state in its external relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second; by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion. The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is won, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous in their warfare.”

However, Cicero was considerably less forthright regarding appropriate conduct during time of war. He famously observed, *Inter arma enim leges silent*—‘in time of war, the law falls silent.’ However, this statement needs to be placed in the context of the Roman civil wars at the time and it was delivered as part of an exhortation to the jury trying Cicero’s client, Titus Attius Milo, on a charge of murder. During the course of his address to the jury, Cicero argued that the death of the victim—Publius Clodius Pulcher, a notorious rabble-rouser and political troublemaker—occurred in the context of what amounted to civil war. Thus, it may be concluded that his observation ‘in time of war the law falls silent’ was more a courtroom ploy than a philosophical observation. In light of this, it is perhaps preferable to give greater weight to Cicero’s thinking in *De Officiis*. Certainly Christian apologists did so centuries later.

Perhaps closer to generally accepted thinking on the matter in Cicero’s day were the words of his near contemporary, Dio Chryostom of Prusa (AD 40-112), Greek historian and orator, subsequently quoted approvingly by Hugo Grotius. Dio Prusaensis states clearly “between enemies no notice is to be taken of written, that is, civil laws, but notice must be taken of the unwritten laws which nature dictates, or the agreement of nations has established.”

In any event, Cicero certainly thought that there should be a concept of appropriate behaviour toward the enemy, although it appears to have functioned more at the fringes of conflict rather than in its overall conduct. For example, in *De Officiis*

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88 Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis*, I [Moral Goodness], sec. 11
89 See, e.g., the discussion relating to Ambrose of Milan, p. 35 in this chapter.
Cicero cites “a letter of the elder Marcus Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the youth has been discharged by the consul, when he was serving in Macedonia in the war with Perseus. Therefore, he warns him to be careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe.” While this may be construed as no more than a prudential observation, it may well be inferred that the father was implying that any military act by his son (officially a civilian) would put him in the general category of Cicero’s ‘brutes,’ rather than that of an honourable man. Likewise, the ancient Romans sometimes took a dim view of treachery, even when the target was a national enemy.

“Our forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward an enemy: when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the Senate to administer poison to the king and thus work his death, the Senate and Gaius Fabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive, and successful.”

Arguably, the decision of the Roman Senate and the consul reflected a perhaps tacit appreciation of the distinction between personal cupiditas (to employ Augustine’s locution) and rightful state action.

2.2. Biblical Sources

The Holy Bible dramatises war scenes in the Old Testament in apparent contradiction to Christ’s preaching in the New Testament, thus different justifications for different stances on war can be found depending on which Testament is being referred to.

According to Yoder,

“A generation ago Roland Bainton began fine-tuning the typology of just war by separating the Christian ‘holy war’ model he developed to describe Crusades from the concept of ‘just war’ properly so called (and sometimes referred to in this article as ‘JW’). Bainton was criticized for this effort by those who thought he was making a claim about medieval vocabulary or language usage. For instance, LeRoy Walters and others have objected that this

91 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, I, 12
92 Ibid., I, 13
‘holy’/‘just’ distinction is not clearly present in the medieval sources. Historically, of course, these critics are correct: Bainton intended a precise formal distinction based upon differences in moral logic, not rooted in common usage at the time. Indeed, from Ambrose and Augustine through Gratian and Aquinas to Vitoria, word usage of the day did not yet separate out models for understanding wars. When it was believed that the sovereign God demanded by revelation that the Amalekites be massacred for having offended God, that counted for Augustine as one kind of ‘just cause.’ When an ‘attack is to be warded off’ or an ‘injury is to be redressed,’ that was another kind of ‘just cause.’ Thus, as Walters correctly argues as a historian, the medieval thinker used the same vocabulary for both types of war.\(^93\)

In order to better comprehend warfare descriptions and Christian preaching derived from the Sacred Scriptures, each part, Old and New Testament, should be separately examined.

### 2.2.1 Old Testament

The Old Testament contains numerous descriptions of warfare, including justifications—both human and divine—for engaging in it. And while the ideal of universal peace was, from time to time, expressed\(^94\), any support for pacifism is absent from the text.\(^95\) The Old Testament scriptures describe essentially three types of war. The first was a type of holy war commanded by God and one in which he was directly involved. A second type of war was a defensive war involving some mitigation of destruction and one in which all males participated, with the exception of those possessing outstanding religious duties. A third type was an optional offensive war conducted at the discretion of the king and one in which participation was excused for a greater range of other obligations. The two latter classifications of warfare were somewhat different from those held elsewhere, both in ancient days and today, and show evidence of respect for non-combatants and for requisite proportionality. For example, when the Israelite general Gideon captured Zebah and Zalmunna (the two Midianite kings who had murdered Gideon’s brothers at Tabor), he

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\(^94\) E.g., Isaiah 2:3, Micah 4:3

\(^95\) It is not the purpose of this study to dissect the language of the Old Testament. However, for a brief overview of Jewish perceptions of the legitimacy of warfare, see Ralph Orr, “War in the Old Testament,” Worldwide Church of God, 1996. For a more extensive treatment, see James G. Williams, *The Bible, Violence and the Sacred: Liberation from the Myth of Sanctioned Violence* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991)
said to his captives, “If you had let them live, I would not kill you.”

‘Holy war’ is perhaps anomalous, in that—being divinely inspired (and even divinely directed)—such a kind of warfare cannot serve as a guide to wars waged in human interest. Indeed, according to German theologian Gerhard von Rad, war fought at God’s command effectively constitutes war waged by God Himself. In effect, under such conditions, divine sanction has not only muted traditional moral arguments against certain behaviour but has also deliberately put them in abeyance. This certainly appears to have been the case in the encompassing destruction that followed the Israelite seizure of Jericho, most notably the slaughter of the city’s inhabitants. It may be surmised that the divine purpose was to assure continued religious purity of Israelites as they shifted from a desert-bound nomadic lifestyle to that of settled agriculturists in the Promised Land (where the temptations of prevailing pagan religious practice would always be before them). Thus, Jericho’s hapless inhabitants were put to the sword and some of the city’s material wealth (‘silver and gold’) retained to further the Israelites divinely inspired purpose.

It is interesting to observe that even at that time what would become a generally accepted ‘law of war’ many centuries later already appeared to be in use. Those Canaanite assets seized by Joshua’s troops were deemed to have been taken legitimately because they were to be put to use for a public purpose. The individual soldier who appropriated such valuables for his own use faced dire punishment along with his family, as the fate of Achan indicates. And concerning the massacre of Jericho’s defeated population, there seems to be a tacit mitigating factor at work. Rahab (‘the harlot’), a Jericho resident who provided logistic assistance to Joshua’s

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96 Judges 8:18
98 Joshua 6:21
99 According to Dr. Ralph F. Wilson, “If the temptation in the wilderness was unbelief, the temptation in the Promised Land was syncretism, ‘reconciliation or fusion of differing systems of belief’… There was always the danger that worship of the true God would fuse with the worship of Baal and the gods of Canaan. In order to prevent this specific occurrence, God commanded the Israelites to utterly destroy the peoples of the land.” See Ralph F. Wilson, ‘Why the Slaughter of Jericho? Devoted to Destruction – Herem’ http://www.jesuswalk.com/joshua/herem.htm, accessed on September 28, 2008
100 Ibid.
101 Joshua 7
agents before the city was taken, was spared from the sword and even rewarded with a plot of land.\textsuperscript{102} Neil Summerton interprets this as follows: “the distinction between Rahab and the rest of the Canaanites was that she was prepared to submit to Yahweh, whereas her compatriots continued to resist Israel, and therefore Israel’s God.”\textsuperscript{103}

The behaviour of the victorious Israelites at captured Jericho, irrespective of its divine approbation, has parallels with the Crusaders’ treatment of Jerusalem’s civilians after that city was taken. For the Crusaders, the Middle East appears to have had the character of a moral ‘no man’s land. Whatever constraints on officially sanctioned armed violence that might have been at work in a European context, these were held to have had no validity against the ‘Muslim in the Holy Land’. The Crusaders’ mission was claimed to be ‘holy,’ perhaps, in some sense, comparable to that of Joshua at Jericho. At least inferentially, Jerusalem’s civilian inhabitants were destined to fulfil the same ghastly role of Joshua’s Canaanite victims. Indeed Islamic historians remark on the shock of the entry of the crusaders and the extent to which the norms of war between Islamic states and with the Byzantine Empire had been set aside.\textsuperscript{104} In particular regular accounts of cannibalism\textsuperscript{105} left a long term mark that still resonates. At Jerusalem, in the words of one of the participants—possibly Count Bohemund of Taranto—

“Entering the city our pilgrims pursued and killed Saracens up to the temple of Solomon… Finally, having overcome the pagans, our knights seized a great number of men and women, and they killed whom they wished and whom they wished they let live… Soon the crusaders ran throughout the city, seizing gold, silver, horses, mules, and houses full of all kinds of goods. Then rejoicing and weeping from extreme joy our men went to worship at the sepulchre of our Saviour Jesus…”\textsuperscript{106}

This description is uncomfortably close to that of Jericho after the city’s defeat. Equally tormenting was the Christian military leaders’ evidently seeing nothing morally amiss in neither taking the lives nor seizing the goods of Jerusalem’s civilian

\textsuperscript{102} Joshua 6:25
\textsuperscript{104} Amin Maalouf, \textit{The Crusades through Arab Eyes} (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983).
\textsuperscript{105} “Not only did our troops not shrink from eating the dead Turks and Saracens; They also ate dogs”, Albert of Aix, cited in Amin Maalouf, \textit{The Crusades through Arab Eyes}, p. 40
population. According to Summerton,

“if the holy war of the Old testament is to be a guide to a Christian ethic of war, we should note…the regulation and limitation of both ends and means in the Law….for example, the requirement to undertake military service (Deuteronomy 20:5-8); in the means of appointing officers-the implication being that it was to be by acclamation of the people (Deuteronomy 20:9); in the requirement to negotiate as an alternative to making war (Deuteronomy 20:10-11; cf. Judges 11:12-28); and in the regulation against genocide.”

Indeed, the Crusaders’ behaviour at Jerusalem does not even appear to have achieved the limited moral level that had been previously manifested by Joshua’s forces at Jericho quite some many centuries ago. Of course, this historical experience may have implications as to the manner in which war would be conducted in those instances in which the combatants were separated by a significant cultural abyss. Essential to understanding the actions of the crusaders was the extent to which they did not regard their enemies, the others, (and in the context of the time this meant Eastern Orthodox Christians, Jews and Muslims) as fully human. In this their actions hark not just back to Jericho but also forward to the concept of war involving all society that started to emerge with the French Revolution.

2.2.2. New Testament

The ‘Words of the Sacred Scriptures’ in relation to waging war, represent a conundrum in Christian thought. Some of the instructions pronounced by Jesus during his ministry are clearly deontological (e.g., in the Sermon on the Mount, “But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also”). This trend in deontological thinking (derived from the Greek deon, meaning ‘duty’) means that the end can never be used to justify the means. In this case moral systems are characterized by their focus on adherence to independent moral rules and duties. Deontological systems are contrasted with teleological—derived from the Greek telos, meaning ‘goal’ (in the sense of desired...
objective or end result). In teleological systems, a consideration of the ends can provide justification for the means employed for their achievement. This moral system focuses on the consequences of an act in establishing its moral validity. In the simplest of terms, deontological systems judge morality by examining the nature of actions and the will of agents rather than by goals achieved; it looks to inputs rather than outcomes. Conversely, teleological systems place greater emphasis on anticipated outcomes.\textsuperscript{111}

There are certain biblical arguments that are more ambivalent. When John the Baptist was preaching, he was asked by a group of soldiers what they should do. To this, John responded, “Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your pay.”\textsuperscript{112} John did not avail of the opportunity to suggest that they should take up another occupation. Rather, looking at the words employed and the tenor of his language, John simply counselled them to avoid certain sinful behaviour, to wit, slander and theft. While it is speculative at least to some extent, it appears that given the militarised nature of Roman governance in Judea at the time of John’s ministry, those troops responsible for maintaining Roman authority were effectively operating as an occupying army. David B. Kopel, Research Director of the Independence Institute, interprets the context of the passage as follows as: “soldiers (like tax collectors) tend to enrich themselves by abusing the civilian population. Soldiers extorted money by threatening violence, and by making false accusations.”\textsuperscript{113} This, in turn, suggests that much of the opposition to military service expressed by some early Christians had its origins in ancillary considerations, rather than an abstract opposition to all forms of government-sanctioned violence, irrespective of the circumstances of its administration. Likewise, we are informed in the Book of Acts that the Apostles welcomed the centurion Cornelius (and, evidently, other soldiers of his company) into the Christian community, granting them baptism, with no evident demand for them to leave their military responsibilities.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} Luke 3:14
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 5 Acts 10
2.3. Early Christianity and Military Warfare

According to John H. Yoder, “The early church believed that God was at work within the church by means of Jesus Christ living on within it. The apostle Paul could say that it was no longer he himself who lived; rather Christ was living in him. He could claim that he could do all things through Christ (Phil. 4: 13)” As Michael Northcott points out, the early Christians believed in confronting the violent power of [Roman] Empire He further states “The conflict (with the Roman Empire) is resolved not in armed struggle, or the sacrificial shedding of warrior blood, but in the sacrifice of the life of one righteous man for the life of the world, a sacrifice that put an end to the need for blood sacrifice in the Temple or on the battlefield, which subverted the rule of violence of the Pax Romana.”115

Outright pacifism was rare, at least among orthodox early Christians, but there was, nonetheless a tendency to avoid military service and its implications. Christians were deeply troubled at any resort to state-sanctioned violence, especially given Jesus’ words that “All who draw the sword will die by the sword.”116 This remark could be applied to those who ‘live by the sword,’ rather than anyone who defends his neighbours and himself. This led to early Christian arguments that all resort to war and participation in military units were contrary to the message of the Gospels, irrespective of the circumstances, especially as Jesus’ denial of the sword [or force] led them to preclude military service, however honourable and well-motivated the ruler might be.117

Eschatology also had some influence on popular attitudes during the earliest years of the Church.118

“A leading authority on just war theory, James Turner Johnson,119 argued that the early

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116 Matt. 26:52
118 Certainly the indifference to meeting many of the practical needs of the day that characterized, e.g., the Phrygian Montanists is a case in point. But even among orthodox Christians there appears to have been a significant strain of expectation that Christ’s return was palpable and even likely in the lifetime of the believer.
119 James T. Johnson, The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History
Christian rejection of war-fighting and killing stemmed from their expectation that the Reign of God was imminent and not from pacifism. The gradual realization that Jesus’ Second Coming was taking longer than expected led the Christians gradually to focus on more immediate issues, such as military service. Johnson argues that the sizeable Christian presence in the Roman Army from at least AD 174 indicates that many Christians accepted the legitimacy of military service, and presumably had for some time… [In addition,] Johnson contests the view that there was a revolutionary change in Christian attitudes with the conversion of Constantine.”120

Equally, there might have been an institutional reason that hindered Christians’ participation in military service. During the first centuries of the Church, mandatory military service only applied to Roman citizens. During the Church’s first two centuries, the great majority of the Roman Empire’s Christian population did not usually enjoy citizenship status.121 This was important as for most of the first and second centuries military service was voluntary. We know from surviving patristic writings that Christians were to be found in the ranks122; it follows that they either volunteered after baptism or were baptized into the faith while in service.

On the other hand, Tertullian123, during his earlier orthodox period, showed no particular antipathy to military service. Indeed, his Apologeticum, addressed to provincial governors, was designed to show the illegality of the officially sanctioned persecution of Christians, Tertullian places his co-religionists in the context of general society. He states:

“So we sojourn with you in the world, abjuring neither forum, nor shambles, nor bath, nor booth, nor workshop, nor inn, nor weekly market, nor any other places of commerce. We sail with you, and fight with you, and till the ground with you; and in like manner we unite with you in your traffickings— even in the various arts we make public property of our works for

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120 Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,’ Research Paper, Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, 2004, p. 3 Cf. Northcott’s contention that just war doctrine was a post-Constantine event. Michael Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire, p. 152
121 Roman citizenship was extended to almost all of the Empire’s non-slave inhabitants by the emperor Caracalla in 217, in an effort to increase imperial tax revenues. This development, however, does not appear to have materially affected the exposure of Christians to mandatory military service.
122 E.g., Tertullian
123 Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (or Tertullian) (ca. 155-222), son of a Roman centurion, evidently converted to Christianity about 197. He served as Bishop of Carthage and, at least until about 210 AD, his brilliant (and often polemical) writings show him to be an orthodox Catholic Christian.
In a similar manner, Saint Augustine, in his letter to Marcellinus argues that, “if the Christian religion condemned wars of every kind, the command given in the gospel to soldiers asking counsel as to salvation would rather be to cast away their arms, and withdraw [themselves] wholly from military service.”

However, later on, Tertullian adopted a recognisable pacifist argument, especially after he had taken up the cause of the Montanist (Phrygian) ‘prophets’. At this stage he started to argue against Christian participation in a number of professions. “[One] must not be a schoolmaster, for that would involve teaching mythology. One must not be a soldier—for ‘he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword.’ One must not be a merchant, for cupidity is idolatry.” Tertullian argued that Jesus’ behaviour in the Garden of Gethsemane at the time of his arrest, halting his followers who resisted the efforts to arrest Him and restoring the severed ear of Peter’s victim, irrespective of any other applicable New Testament incidents, was governing. “For albeit soldiers had come unto John, and had received the formula of their rule; albeit, likewise, a centurion had believed, still the Lord afterward, in disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier.”

Following Tertullian’s arguments, the Mennonite thinker and uncompromising pacifist, John Howard Yoder, argued that our epistemological limitations subvert our efforts at calculating the effects of violence to which we might be tempted to resort. Moreover, the peace sought by Christian pacifists extends beyond the mere absence of violence. Rather, according to Yoder it is situated in a vision of God, the agape or

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127 Matt. 26:26-56
communal love. In Jesus, God embodies a non-resistant love unto death. Through His obedience, death and resurrection, Jesus makes such love possible for His followers. Yoder argues that Jesus defeated evil by His submission to God. When tempted by Satan in the wilderness, Jesus chose not to use His powers to assuage His hunger. In the Garden of Gethsemane, before He was arrested, Jesus prayed to the Father that the cup of bitterness that awaited Him might pass, but closed with the words, ‘yet not my will, but yours be done.’ Most important from a pacifist’s perspective, is that Jesus rejected Peter’s ‘messianic violence’ (described above). Given the primacy that Yoder places on Jesus’ behaviour in the Garden of Gethsemane—much the same as that expressed by Tertullian—we may conclude that the traditional perspective continues to retain its force.

“For the key to the obedience of God’s people is not their effectiveness but their patience. The triumph of right is assured not by the might that comes to the aid of the right, which is of course the justification of the use of violence and other kinds of power in every human conflict; the triumph of the right … is sure because of the power of resurrection.”

For Origen (185-258), opposition to participation in war had its origins in the ostensible demoniac forces that gave rise to such conflict and the danger to souls exposed to them. In response Celsus, an inveterate opponent of Christianity, argued that Christians were derelict in their civic duty by their refusal to take up military service in defence of the empire. Origen responded,

“We who by our prayers destroy all demons which stir up wars, violate oaths and disturb the peace, are of more help to emperors than those who seem to be doing the fighting... And though we do not become fellow-soldiers with him, even if he presses for this, yet we are fighting for him and composing a special army of piety through our intercessions to God.”

In sum, Origen placed Christians in that category of specially protected individuals, at least as far as exposure to mandatory military service was concerned, asking rhetorically, “Do not those who are priests at certain shrines, and those who attend to

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130 Alain E. Weaver, ‘Unjust Lies, Just Wars?’ Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 2001, p 70
131 Luke 22:42
133 Origen, Contra Celsum, F. Crombie (tr.), viii, 73, Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), War and Christian Ethics, p. 49
certain gods, as you account them, keep their hands from blood, that they may with hands unstained … [to] offer the appointed sacrifices to your gods? And even when war is upon you, you never enlist the priests in the army…”\textsuperscript{134}

Lactantius (ca. 250-330), a convert to Christianity shortly before commencement of the Diocletian persecution (302-311), based his pacifist arguments on Natural Law underpinnings’ support of Cicero’s \textit{De Officiis}.

\begin{quote}
“Humanity is to be preserved, if we wish rightly to be called men. But what else is this preservation of humanity than loving a man because he is a man, and the same as ourselves? Therefore, discord and dissension are not in accordance with the nature of man; and that expression of Cicero is true, which says that man, while he is obedient to nature, cannot injure man.”\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

Nonetheless, it is as a rhetorician that Lactantius is best remembered. In his \textit{De mortibus persecutorum} [On the death of persecutors], a bitter diatribe against Diocletian and his immediate subordinates, he identified military service with support of those public figures favouring mistreatment of Christians, rather than a more abstract obligation to secure the safety of the state.

For many early Christians, the performance of an otherwise acceptable civic duty (defence of the polity against enemies) was tainted by ancillary requirements having little or no relationship with military responsibility. For example, the oath of office as a soldier required swearing allegiance to the emperor, itself an acceptable action. However, at least during Diocletian persecution (302-311AD), this also included swearing by the emperor’s ‘genius,’ that is, his spirit in some sense understood as deified. Nonetheless, it appears that these constraints were neither absolute nor universal in their application.

\begin{quote}
“Neither in the matter of military service, nor in regard to public functions, was there in practice any general and premeditated refusal of Christians to take part in the life of the State. It was only the close union between the [pagan] religious and public life of the city of that time that constituted an obstacle to a more complete manifestation of a public spirit…\textsuperscript{134}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Marcus Tullius Cicero, \textit{Divine Institutes}, W. Fletcher(tr.), vi, 11, Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), \textit{War and Christian Ethics}, p. 54
Neither the secessionist spirit of Tertullian … nor the philosophical scruple of Origen as to the use of force against an enemy, nor the anger of Lactantius … should mislead us.”  

2.4 Christianity as State Religion

The issue of Christian participation in warfare became more pronounced during the Third Century, especially with the policies adopted by Constantine in 311 AD. As Michael Northcott observes, “Christians found themselves in the strange position of being not an embattled minority but the majority, and this new majoritarian position had the tragic consequence of deforming the faith of the first Christians into a new cult of empire.”

Perhaps even more important was Constantine’s self-perception of himself as something akin to a ‘thirteenth apostle.’ Constantine’s legitimating of Christianity (in the eyes of the law) brought with it traditional Roman assumptions (‘Constantinianism’) that would plague the Church for centuries. For Yoder, the sovereignty of Christ appeared clearly inside the Church, but Constantinianism mistakenly looked for His sovereignty inside the state and the leader of the state as the supreme temporal agency of God. This in turn resulted in misunderstanding of the Jesus’ teaching of peace by imperial theologians such as Eusebius. According to Northcott, “For the theologians of empire from Eusebius onwards, God would determine the outcome of history not in Jesus Christ but in the attempts of the Empire to shape the destiny of its subject peoples, and in Rome’s wars with its outside [enemies].”

Even in the face of the Constantinian self-perception and, for that matter, the

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136 Jules Lebreton, S. J. and Jaques Zeiller, The History of the Primitive Church, II, p. 1217
137 Cf. Discussion of Origen’s views
138 This actually took the form of repeal of the Neronian legislation (circa 62 AD), Non licet esse christianos [‘It is unlawful to be a Christian’].
139 Michael Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm, p. 146
140 The Roman state was formally understood to function as an ongoing agreement between the citizens and their tutelary gods (hence the expression, ‘vox populi, vox dei,’ or ‘the voice of the people is the voice of the gods’). The emperor, in his person, embodied the collective will and thinking of the people—at least in theory—and, therefore, he spoke (again, theoretically) with divine approbation. In the Christian period, this deference to the emperor is described as ‘Constantinianism.’
142 Michael Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm, pp. 150-1
seemingly unending debate among Christian theologians about the moral validity of resorting to war, a few Christians never abandoned the belief that war must be considered an almost unacceptable alternative.\textsuperscript{143} Duncan Forrester states “In a fallen world violence may occasionally be necessary, and the responsible statesman is under an obligation to use force for the defence of the nation. But violence remains sinful.”\textsuperscript{144}

A shift to supporting state-sponsored violence under certain circumstance, while at the same time reducing reliance on aspects of Constantinianism, engaged the thinking of Christian apologists through the Fourth Century. Among these were Ambrose of Milan and his celebrated convert, Augustine of Hippo.

\textbf{2.4.1 Ambrose of Milan}

Ambrose\textsuperscript{145} was descended from a prominent Roman patrician family, his father, Auxentius Ambrosius, had served as Prefect of Gaul\textsuperscript{146} and, before his appointment as Milan’s bishop (374), had served as imperial governor of Aemilia-Liguria.\textsuperscript{147} In his youth Ambrose enjoyed an extensive classical education, including both Greek philosophy (e.g., political writings of Plato and Aristotle) and Latin oratory.\textsuperscript{148} “Ambrose preserved the Christian presumption against the use of violence, unless it was needed to protect important social values. He explicitly rejected defending one’s own person with violence, but argued that charity\textsuperscript{149} \textit{demanded} [emphasis in the original] one to protect one’s neighbour.”\textsuperscript{150} In Ambrose there appears, evidently for the first time in Christian thinking, a successful melding of the personal Christian ideal (‘turn the other cheek’) with “the classical Roman tradition requiring limited

\textsuperscript{143} For instance, John D. Roth argues that “It may be natural for us to justify our use of violence and to distinguish righteous violence from evil violence. But such efforts cannot hide the fact that violence is the common denominator of our definitions of both good and evil. All of these approaches end up suggesting that God’s presence in the universe bless our violence against the violence of the aggressor, so that it is not God, but we, who are finally in control of history.” John D. Roth, \textit{Choosing against War: a Christian view} (Philadelphia: Good Books, 2002), p. 61

\textsuperscript{144} Duncan B. Forrester, \textit{Apocalypse Now?} p. 92

\textsuperscript{145} Auxentius Ambrosius Junior (ca. 340-397)

\textsuperscript{146} In effect, viceroy of a territory that comprised what is now France, Britain, and Spain.

\textsuperscript{147} A region that now comprises all of Italy north of Florence’s Arno River.

\textsuperscript{148} E.g., Cicero’s \textit{De Officiis}, discussed later.

\textsuperscript{149} Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas examined the question of just war under the general rubric of charity (\textit{caritas}).

\textsuperscript{150} Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,’ p. 3
violence for good order and to defend the Empire.”151 In De Officiis, Cicero—a primary source for Ambrose’s thinking on such matters—contends, “while those whom you conquer are to be kindly treated, those who, laying down their arms, take refuge in the good faith of the commander of the assailing army, ought to be received to quarter, even though the battering-ram have already shaken their walls.”152

Cicero had earlier pointed to the wholesale slaughter of the population of Corinth after the rebellious city had peaceably surrendered to the Roman military commander Lucius Mummius (146 BC), perhaps at the request of a Senate more interested in ridding itself of a major commercial rival in the eastern Mediterranean, than due to any residual military threat. “I could wish that they had not destroyed Corinth; but I believe that they had some motive, especially the convenience of the place for hostile movements, — the fear that the very situation might be an inducement to rebellion.”153

This opposition to such massacres was repeated in Ambrose’s letter to Emperor Theodosius following the massacre of civilians after the successful siege of Thessalonica (AD 390).154 Here, Ambrose chastised the emperor for his failure to observe traditional moral responsibilities incumbent upon him as a Christian and by long-established Roman precepts. The civilian slaughter was murder and not an act that might be accounted as collateral damage of an otherwise just war. For that reason Theodosius was denied the sacraments until he showed repentance. In his letter—interestingly, written as a private communication, as one between confessor and prospective penitent—Ambrose, somewhat rhetorically, explained his thinking. “I have no cause for a charge of contumacy against you, but have cause for fear; I dare not offer the sacrifice if you intend to be present. Is that which is not allowed after shedding the blood of one innocent person, allowed after shedding the blood of many?

151 Ibid. However, in his zeal for both orthodoxy and good order, Ambrose was instrumental in the introduction of particularly ominous Empire-wide legislation—the establishment of heresy as treason against the state and, as a consequence, their subjection to extreme penalties—even death. This concept of state identification with specific articles of faith would have horrendous implications for Europe in the centuries that followed.
152 Cicero, De Officiis, I, 11
153 Ibid.
2.4.2 Saint Augustine and Just War

Saint Augustine (352-430), Bishop of Hippo (near Carthage, in modern day Tunisia), is generally accounted the originator of just war theory in the Christian tradition. To avoid confusion on the matter, it should be borne in mind that for Augustine and, for that matter, his medieval successors—bellum encompassed considerably more activity than that regularly attributed to it today. In essence, it referred to any organized violent activity undertaken by a monarch or any other equally competent authority—e.g., a national senate. Thus, considerations of ‘just war’ extended to such matters as domestic insurrection though Augustine detested civil war. However, he relied on a number of antecedents, both scriptural and philosophical including those originating outside the specifically Christian tradition. Augustine identified three elements essential to the establishment of just cause for war: defence, retaking something wrongly taken, and punishment of evildoing, as well as the requirements of last resort, proportionality of good and evil done and the goal of peace.

Arguably, proportionality of the good and evil done generated the most ambiguity and, consequently, the greatest difficulty for any conscientious Christian. According to Duncan, this consideration had engaged Christian thinkers long before Augustine.

“The problem for the [early] Christians was how to maintain the prohibition against killing and violence. The first major attempt to think through this problem came from Clement of Alexandria (AD ca. 150-ca. 215), [who,] as the first Christian just war thinker, [introduced] two elements of what would later become standard just war theory, arguing for the defence of the Empire (just cause), on the authority of the emperor (right authority).”

This is distinctly at odds with Northcott’s contention that “Christians after Constantine [i.e., post-313AD] invented a doctrine of just war which they attempted to link with Old Testament history, since they could find little justification for this

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155 Ibid., p. 58
156 E.g., Ambrose of Milan (who brought Augustine into the Church), in relying on Cicero’s De Officiis (described above) in developing a distinctly Christian just war theology.
157 Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West’, p. 3
new doctrine in the New Testament.”\textsuperscript{158} Indeed, early Christian apologists (e.g., Origen) regularly taught that the violent episodes in the Old Testament served a cautionary purpose for the Christian, in that they were analogues of the unceasing conflict between good and evil.\textsuperscript{159} Furthermore, the descriptive language of Lebreton and Zeiller [\textit{q.v., supra}] certainly appears to be at odds with that of Northcott.

To at least some extent Augustine’s thinking departs from that of Ambrose,\textsuperscript{160} in that Augustine appears to incorporate ‘self’ into the moral equation to a greater extent than his mentor. Duncan argues that he “added a new condition for war, \textit{a right intention} [emphasis in the original], meaning those dispositions inspired by Christianity to act justly in war, in both external action and especially interior disposition. The intention to restore justice must not give way to the love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance and the lust of power.”\textsuperscript{161} Taking Augustine’s thinking a few steps further, there appears to be a tacit argument at work in favour of conscientious objection to participation in war.

According to Duncan, “Because of the power of sin, Augustine came to realize that God’s order could not be readily realized through human thought or action. Hence the soldier could no longer simply be seen as carrying out a divine command when he killed [an enemy soldier].”\textsuperscript{162} This understanding of the role of personal moral responsibility on the battlefield underlies, and legitimates, the application of criminal sanctions for certain types of behaviour in combat, however difficult they may be to apply in specific circumstances. In any event, this argument, often expressed in conjunction with ostensibly deontological moral commands to be found in sacred

\textsuperscript{158} Michael Northcott, \textit{An Angel Directs the Storm}, p. 152
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{cf.} Frederick H. Russell, \textit{The Just War in the Middle Ages}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 58
\textsuperscript{160} However, like Ambrose, Augustine, at least early on, considered war a suitable vehicle for enforcing orthodoxy. He “argued that the Church could persecute heretics because their spiritual health and that of the state were at risk, and hence persecution was a form of charity. He invoked the power of the state to force heretics and schismatics to rejoin the Church.” [Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,’ p. 4] Of course, taking such an argument to its logical conclusion, one might justify executing national enemies ‘for their own good,’ providing some theological difference of opinion could be established. This was certainly an argument proposed by Europe’s fifteenth century inquisitors. It is also not that far removed from its political counterpart—invading a nation to install a particular type of government ‘for the good of the people,’ whether they recognize it or not.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 6
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 6
Duncan states that “his [Augustine’s] influence was all but forgotten until his thought was revived by the jurist Gratian in the 12th century. There is no just war tradition prior to its coalescence in the Middle Ages around concepts drawn from Canon Law, Theology, secular law, chivalric morality, and the habits of relations among princes.” Nonetheless, Augustine’s thinking would influence on Christian thinkers in future centuries even though his work remained largely in abeyance until revived by the jurist Gratian in the latter years of the twelfth century.

3. Europe’s Dark Age and the recovery of the Just War Tradition

The medieval just war tradition came into being “as a way of thinking about the right use of force in the context of responsible government of the political community.” Unlike its antecedents, it was as much based on canonical and customary law as it was an exercise in moral philosophy. The first major revival of Roman Law, Gratian’s *Decretum* (ca. 1148) “began to consolidate a firm body of thought on just war… It set the conditions for just war, but followed Augustine in insisting on an inward disposition of love towards those against whom one was fighting.” Gratian, incorporated major common elements of both the Peace of God and the Truce of God into the *Decretum*, in effect giving them what amounted to a legal status (at least to the extent that authorities chose to defer to the *Decretum*). According to historian Frederick Russell, “Gratian’s definitive compilation posed the basic problems to be resolved, defined the boundaries of debate, and provided a framework within which broader solutions could be worked out.”

3.1. The re-introduction of the concept of Just War

It is not the purpose of this study to delve into the finer points of European History in this period. Instead, I shall draw on specific examples and in particular the

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163 Ibid., p. 4
164 James T. Johnson, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions*, p. 14
165 Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,’ p. 7
166 Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 55
developments in Just War theory by Gratian, Grotius and the Council of Constance.

These were all attempts to re-impose Augustine’s ideas on Just War and then to refine them to meet the practical challenges of the time. As such they were responses to the barbarism of much early medieval warfare. However, these theoretical developments were based on two important existing concepts: the Peace of God; and, the Truce of God. In combination these had already sought to reduce the reach and occasion of warfare, which, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, had tended to be sanctioned and conducted with little or no constraint. Yoder in an extended essay on the development of just war thinking describes the prevailing condition of ‘limited anarchy.’

“There were a small number of knights, whose definition of their role included honour—fighting fair and defending the innocent. Second, there [existed] a larger but fluctuating number of mercenaries, recruited only when needed. Both groups had a right to fight when and because the prince had that right. The mercenaries had no personal moral preference as to which side should win, except for the pay, the privileges of plunder, the enjoyment of a good fight, and the desire to stay alive.”

The Peace of God was intended to establish sectors of medieval society that were ‘immunized’ from assault by the *milites* (mercenaries) that plied their trade in the service of whatever local lord happened to hire them. The declaration of the Synod of Charroux (called forth by Gunbald, Bishop of Bordeaux, in 989) is illustrative.

“We [the local bishops], assembled in the name of God, made the following decrees: (1) Anathema against those who break into churches. If anyone breaks into a church, he shall be anathema unless he makes satisfaction. (2) Anathema against those who rob the poor. If anyone robs a peasant [of his animals or goods], he shall be anathema unless he makes satisfaction. (3) Anathema against those who injure clergymen [not bearing arms or in armour].”

The Truce of God, in turn, was intended to reduce the overall incidence of warfare itself. While the term is generic—each ‘truce’ was a formal agreement between a

prelate (representing the interests of non-combatants, the great majority of people) and a prince—each of such agreements invariably contained clauses governing specific behaviour on certain days of the week and certain seasons of the church calendar (e.g., Lent). The agreement between Drogo (Bishop of Terouanne) and Baldwin (Count of Hainault), concluded in 1063, is a good example. It provided, *inter alia*, that from Wednesday through Monday “no man or woman shall assault, wound, or slay another, or attack, seize, or destroy a castle, burg, or villa, by craft or by violence.” The agreement provided for free passage by merchants and others (i.e., Baldwin and his fuglemen were forbidden to engage in armed robbery under the pretence of waging otherwise lawful combat). The penalties for violation extended from denial of the sacraments to excommunication for a number of years. Again, these requirements took on the nature of a civil or criminal code. However, as noted above, *bellum* was traditionally understood as any officially sanctioned violence, whether against foreign enemies or domestic opponents.

In effect, both the Peace of God and the Truce of God ‘fenced in’ those regions of the body politic in which warfare might be conducted with no resulting official Church sanction. While there were numerous violations to these agreements, their establishment and the increased respect afforded them (often a result of evident self-interest, enlightened or otherwise) gave them what amounted to the force of customary law. For better or for worse, these ‘contract’ limitations on ‘state-sponsored’ violence were, for practical purposes, restricted to Christian Europe. In the concept of crusade, no such constraints were formally placed on the behaviour of Christian armies (whether the crusade was aimed at French heretics, Balkan pagans or the Islamic world).

The abominable behaviour of the Crusaders at Jerusalem in 1099 (described above) arguably had at least some tacit support from Church spokesmen, a notable example being the Cistercian abbot, Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), a preacher of the Second Crusade. Bernard, was a key figure in establishing Peace of God agreements.

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169 Ibid., p. 428
However, in his letter (‘A Holy War’) addressed to the English people and in support of the new crusade, Bernard distinguished warfare between Christians and that between Christians and ‘infidels.’

“You attack each other; you slay each other and by each other you are slain. What is this savage craving of yours? Put a stop to it now, for it is not fighting but foolery. Thus to risk both soul and body is not brave but shocking; is not strength but folly. But now, O might soldiers, O men of war, you have a cause for which you can fight without danger to your souls; a cause in which to conquer is glorious and for which to die is gain.”

In sum, Bernard appears to be tacitly relying on Old Testament examples in support of his doctrine that contradicts some of the thinking of earlier Christians.

3.2. Gratian’s Decretum: First Effort at Codifying Acceptable Behaviour in War

References to war and constraints on its conduct appear throughout the Decretum. Gratian, perhaps reacting to the tenor of the times in which he lived, concentrated on legitimate conduct rather than the legitimacy of armed conflict, per se, which, he seems to have taken for granted. Nonetheless, Gratian deferred to Augustine to the extent that he concurred in the latter’s requirement for appropriate inward disposition toward one’s putative enemy, if only because his punishment could then be justified “as an act of benevolence, performed in his own best interest even though against his will.”

In any event, the constraints proposed on the conduct of war had major implications that continue in Christian thought. For example, most types of economic warfare were forbidden. It was common practice in early medieval warfare to attack an enemy indirectly through the destruction of his means of producing wealth. Since the fundamental basis of Europe’s medieval economy was agriculture, this usually meant crop destruction. Whether these proposed constraints had much effect is debateable as,

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174 This is not altogether surprising. The work, in many respects, was a compilation of antecedent writings, albeit with a signal effort at consolidation and organization by subject matter.
175 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, p. 58
Duncan argues, “Only from the fourteenth century did a right of non-combatant immunity begin to be recognized, as a result of Church moral scruple and the military tradition’s wish to limit casualties.”

Even this argument appears difficult to sustain, at least as a blanket statement, given the evidence. Moreover, in the centuries that followed, as weapons turned more destructive, civilian targets more lucrative, and—perhaps most important of all—religious and political motivations more intense, the collateral damage that Gratian sought to contain became ever more pronounced.

Related to what constituted legitimate tactics in war, was the question of the legitimacy of the weapons actually used in combat. For example efforts were made to outlaw the crossbow—at least in warfare between Christians—through legislation adopted at the Second Lateran Council in 1139. The purpose of the prohibition was less about regulating warfare and more to reduce the threat to lawful public authority posed by mercenary bands, which, more often than not, were no more than armed robbers on the prowl when not formally employed. It is however, possible to see the arguments against the moral validity of the crossbow in medieval warfare—updated to reflect contemporary international relations and technological innovation—as applying to efforts to ban today’s ‘weapons of mass destruction.’

However, Gratian’s successors, collectively known as the ‘Decretists’, grafted onto his just war theory a coda to serve as justification for holy war (the Crusades), based on the Book of Joshua. This return to the logic of the Old Testament was an important departure from Gratian’s thinking. Reflecting the thinking of such patristic scholars as Origen, Gratian “cautioned Christians not to emulate the war narrated in the Old Testament, for this war merely prefigured the spiritual wars fought by Christians against spiritual enemies such as the Devil.”

Russell points to challenge to just war theory posed by the Crusades,

“The crusading ideal is historically bound up with a theocratic view of society, while the just war is usually fought on public authority for more mundane goals such as defence of territory.

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176 Ibid., p. 9
177 These considerations are treated later.
179 Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, Letter 391, quoted previously.
180 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, p. 58
persons and rights... In the Middle Ages the distinction between holy war, crusade and just war were difficult to draw in theory and were glossed over by those concerned to justify a particular war.\textsuperscript{181}

Duncan makes a similar point, “Although a crusade was supposed to be conducted in accord with the Christian ideals, in the fervour of combat these were often sacrificed to expediency or passion. The prospect of booty and glory also inevitably attracted all sorts of adventurers.”\textsuperscript{182} By the time of the Fourth Crusade (1204) the lure of loot and commercial advantage meant the target was the Orthodox Christian Byzantine Empire ending in the sack of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{183}

3.3. The Council of Constance: Efforts to Codify Just War

The Council of Constance (1414-1418),\textsuperscript{184} was called to adjudicate the then-prevailing schism in the Church—three men simultaneously laid claim to the papal throne. Unlike previous councils of the Church where individuals were members, in the council of Constance the council members were representatives of kingdoms such as France and England.\textsuperscript{185}

The senior Polish representative was, the singularly humane rector of Krakow’s Jagiellonian University, Pawel Wlodkowic (1370-1435).\textsuperscript{186} who challenged a spectrum of prevailing ideas then being used to legitimate Church and state behaviour. According to Kazimierz Grzybowski “the treatises of Vladimirius were designed to refute the arguments of the Teutonic Order in an international forum before the great assemblage of the Council of Constance.”\textsuperscript{187} The argument was about seeking a

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., p. 2
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 8
\textsuperscript{183} Anna Commena, The Alexiad, E.R.A. Sewter (tr.) (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1696)
\textsuperscript{184} For a detailed history of the Council, see Phillip H. Stump, The Reforms of the Council of Constance, 1414-1418 (Leiden: Brill, 1994)
\textsuperscript{185} For details, Alison Williams Lewin, Negotiating Survival: Florence and the Great Schism, 1378-1417 (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003), pp. 39-56 Of course there were many hundreds of clerics participating in council sessions. However, actual voting on matters at issue was by nation, with each nation caucusing beforehand to determine its collective decision. See also Council of Constance 1414-18, Papal Encyclical http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum16.htm, accessed on March 6, 2008
\textsuperscript{186} Or Paulus Vladimiri (1370-1435)
\textsuperscript{187} Kazimierz Grzybowski, ‘The Polish Doctrine of the Law of War in the Fifteenth Century: A Note on the Genealogy of International Law,’ Jurist, No. 386, 1958, p. 391 He was Professor of Law at Duke
peaceful coexistence between pagan and Christian countries and, at the same time, blaming ‘the Teutonic Order’ for its coercive violence towards non-Christians in Prussia and Lithuania. He laid great emphasis on the moral integrity of the individual, including a right to free expression.

This extended to persons at odds with prevailing Catholic doctrine. In 1415 the Council had summoned dissident, and already excommunicated, Bohemian theologian Jan Hus (1372-1415), under a warrant of immunity, to defend his doctrine of the Eucharist—which, as it happened, had already been adjudged heretical. Despite a previously granted guarantee of personal safety, Hus was tried and convicted of heresy and, thereafter, burnt at the stake. Wlodkowic considered this act a crime.

Wlodkowic described the regular depredations of the Order of Teutonic Knights—conducted under the rubric of ‘crusades’—assaults on peaceful pagans in Lithuania and Prussia which were no more than disguised rapine, robbery, and murder. This all too accurate description infuriated the Council’s Teutonic Order delegates. They were particularly incensed by Wlodkowic’s argument that “Conversion can never be used as a pretext for war” and that Christian nations under attack (as Polish territory often was by the Knights) had a right to call upon pagan citizens to join in the common defence which certainly did not sit well with Emperor Sigismund, who had called the Council into session in 1414. In any event, in 1421 Pope Martin V dispatched a papal representative (Antonio Zeno) to investigate reports of the Order’s misbehaviours in the eastern Baltic region. There appears to be a certain irony at work, considering Wlodkowic’s arguments when contrasted with those of Origen. The Polish rector, at least on the face of things, appears to be at least inferentially, taking

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188 Tractatus de potestate papae et imperatoris respectu infidelium (Treatise on the power of the Pope and the Emperor respecting infidels) see Jerzy Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 72-4
191 Ibid.

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the side of Origen’s pagan opponent, Celsus, in arguing for the responsibility of all citizens—irrespective of religious persuasion—to assume responsibility for the common defence.

He argued that nations, irrespective of race or religion, those who live in peace have a natural right to be left to their own devices. Furthermore, Włodkowic continued that the same argument from caritas that might support provision of military assistance in defence of a fellow Catholic Christian under enemy attack likewise applied to anyone else comparably afflicted, be he Anabaptist, Hussite, Lollard or, for that matter, not a Christian of any particular stripe.\footnote{Kazimierz Grzybowski, ‘The Polish Doctrine of the Law of War in the Fifteenth Century,’ p. 391 C. H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Paulus Vladimiri and the Development of the Doctrine of Coexistence of Christian and Non-Christian Countries,’ p. 443}

According to Duncan, Vitoria came to the same conclusion, albeit for somewhat different reasons.

“The ferocity of wars of religion eventually led to the widespread conviction that the cause of religion must be kept out of warfare as much as possible. Vitoria redeveloped just war theory as a systematic and coherent doctrine based on universal moral and legal principles. He denied that ideological wars, and wars based on difference of religion, were justified, and was particularly concerned with aspects of jus in bello.”\footnote{Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,’ p. 11}

The shifting emphasis toward jus in bello reflected significant technological advances in armaments—notably artillery and infantry weapons—that began in earnest in the last years of the fifteenth century. ‘Low technology’ populations—e.g., those of the New World—were often helpless when confronted with the overwhelming firepower in the hands of the newly arrived Europeans. However, it is possible to compare the Conquistador/Native American imbalance with that of a comparable Teutonic Order/Lithuanian pagan one. There is every reason to believe that the Teutonic knights would have refrained from regularly raiding eastern Baltic hamlets if their inhabitants had been equally well militarily equipped. Likewise, the European adventurers who had put resisting Native Americans to the sword, irrespective of any ostensible theological justification, would surely have had less incentive to resort to
such behaviour were their opponents likewise equally well equipped in weaponry.

Włodkowic relied on principles derived from natural law. According to Polish historian Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski “His proposal was based on the natural law and the premise that the license to convert is not a license to kill or expropriate and that only voluntary conversion is valid. He defined the principle of national self-determination, the international society, its functions, organs, and laws. He began to formulate these laws for use by an international tribunal, which he proposed. He justified only purely defensive wars.”

Regarding religious belief, Włodkowic argued that forcible conversion was per se sinful since it implicitly challenged the doctrine of free will and the integrity of the individual. Rulers were bound to respect the religious convictions of their subjects because natural rights belonged to individuals, irrespective of particular beliefs. This, of course, was directly at odds with the thinking of Ambrose ten centuries earlier, who favoured legislation authorizing harsh treatment even execution of heretics, defining them as ‘traitors’ to God.

At a national level, Włodkowic argued that “Non-Christian and non-Catholic nations living at peace with their neighbours have the right to have their sovereignty and the integrity of their territories safeguarded” In other words, to the extent that they live in peace with their neighbours they have a right to see their territory remain inviolate: These ideas were obviously contentious but they also laid the groundwork for the acceptance of natural law as a basis for just war in centuries to come.

4. The ‘Natural Law’ understanding of Just War

195 For example, “Rulers are bound to respect the individual religious convictions of their subjects who could not be denied of their natural rights because of their belief” in the Treatise on the power of the Pope and the Emperor respecting infidels, translated by Joseph Cassar, ‘The Rights of Nations: Reflections on the Address of Pope John Paul II to the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’
196 Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski, ‘Historical Background of Poland’s Support for the XVth Century World Peace Organization,’ Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski Archive http://www.pogonowski.com/publications/Historical_Background/Historical_Background.php, accessed on March 12, 2008
198 Ibid., p. 9
This emphasis on Natural Law, was to form the main basis of developments in ‘Just War’ theology over the next three centuries. James T. Johnson in the introduction of his study about the implications of just war theory for future military operations, describes the transition from medieval to modern thinking.

“In the introduction of his study about the implications of just war theory for future military operations, describes the transition from medieval to modern thinking.

“With the growth of state power and the declining relative influence of the Church, Spanish theologians re-examined the classic definition of just cause during their conquest of the New World. [Francisco de] Vitoria (1480-1546) cautioned against abuse of the Indians and demanded that ‘the reasons of those who on grounds of equity oppose the war’ be heard. [Francisco] Suarez (1548-1617) merged the purely religious principle just cause with the secular principle of natural law by extending the right of self-defence from individuals to nations, known as the ‘domestic analogy.’ [Dutch legal theorist Hugo] Grotius (1583-1645) sought to eliminate religious differences as carte blanche to wage war after the bloody Thirty Years’ War.”

Actually, Grotius had composed his international law masterpiece, *De jure belli ac pacis* [On the law of war and peace] some years before the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), although it first saw publication in 1625. However, he is usually seen as the major contributor in terms of adding ‘natural law’ concepts to the Just War tradition. Grotius’ initial impetus in writing the work had been the establishment of the principle of free navigation of the oceans. However, he based much of his argument on the concept of innocent passage, not all that different from the right established centuries earlier, in the Peace of God, of the merchant going about his business free from attack.

4.1. The Spanish Neo-scholastics

However, before considering Grotius in detail, it is useful first to review the

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200 According to David Armitage, “Grotius justified Dutch rights of trade and navigation in the East Indies against the claims of the Portuguese by arguing from natural law principles that anything publicum—such as the air, the sea, and the shore of that sea—was the common property of all, and hence could be the private property of none. The polemical purpose of this was clear: to deny that any state could make the sea an accessory to its realm, and to enforce freedom of navigation throughout the ocean, as a Dutch counterblast to Portuguese claims of dominium over the seas on grounds of first discovery, papal donation, rights of conquest or title of occupation.” ‘Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707,’ *Past and Present*, No. 155, May 1997, pp. 52-3
contribution of Spanish and Portuguese theologians to the issue of both Natural Law and in upholding Wlodkowic’s concerns about the validity of forced conversion. The Spanish and Portuguese colonization of Latin America, specifically, the manner in which it was accomplished and the outcomes for Native Americans, encouraged considerable soul-searching among those Spanish clerics who were appalled at the treatment that fell upon the inhabitants of the New World.

“The crusading mentality [that had become almost endemic in European armies] also brought a particular fanaticism to the religious wars in Europe in the sixteenth century and overlapped with the savage conquest of the New World. The debates over the legitimacy of the conquista, especially at the School of Salamanca, with Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) and Francisco Suarez … contributed to the development of international law and the just war tradition.”201

This clerical response was exemplified by Antonio de Montesinos, a Dominican priest, delivering a sermon in 1511, a decade before the conquest of Mexico, denouncing Spain’s treatment of the New World Indians. Montesino’s words encouraged Bartolome de Las Casas, a participant in the blood-stained Spanish conquest of Cuba, to renounce title to land and serfs in Cuba, take holy orders, and become an advocate of the oppressed.202 Echoing Wlodkowic’s words a century earlier, Las Casas (1484-1566) argued that the Native Americans had a natural law; right to their property and therefore that it should be returned to them. Furthermore, again reflecting the thinking of the Polish prelate, he argued that the inhabitants of the New World had a natural law right to maintain their own society without interference, forced conversion, or reduction to serfdom.203

Vitoria, professor of theology at Salamanca also couched his arguments in terms of natural law,204 but he nonetheless, like Wlodkowic before him, relied on biblical tradition to encourage decent behaviour.

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201 Ibid., p. 10
204 Franciscus de Vitoria, De Indis et de iure belli (Of Indians and the law of war) J. B. Scott (tr.), Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), War and Christian Ethics, p. 118-9
“Moreover, [the Christian] should reflect that others are his neighbours, whom we are bound to love as ourselves, and that we all have one common Lord, before whose tribunal we shall have to render our account. For it is the extreme of savagery to seek for and rejoice in grounds for killing and destroying men whom God has created and for whom Christ died.”

4.2. Hugo Grotius: Just War and Natural Law

Vitoria was a product of the Thomistic doctrine that flowered in the Middle Ages, but Hugo Grotius, a Calvinist Hollander, took traditional just war doctrines and reconfigured them to meet the challenges of a society in constant flux. Grotius, perhaps tacitly reflected his nation’s mercantile values and established the normative international order as one reflecting the properly ordered civil state.

“This care for society in accordance with the human nature intellect, which we have roughly sketched, is the source of ius [Law], properly so called, to which belong abstaining from another’s possessions, restoring anything which belongs to another (or the profit from it), being obliged to keep promises, giving compensation for culpable damage, and incurring human punishment.”

While these precepts would almost certainly have been equally acceptable to either Cicero or Thomas Aquinas, Grotius took considerable pains to establish a natural law basis for its validity. “What I have just said would be relevant even if we were to suppose (what we cannot suppose without the greatest wickedness) that there is no God, or that human affairs are of no concern to him.” In sum, Grotius argued that the prevailing Christian doctrine of just war represented no more than natural law taken to its conceptual limits. And, while Grotius may represent the secularization of just war theory that had been started by Vitoria, by the same token it continues to resonate with the values and precepts enunciated by Wlodkowic two centuries earlier at the Council of Constance.

Inherent in Grotius’ thinking is the de-emphasising of jus ad bellum, in this a continuation of Gratian’s emphasis on jus in bello. As with Gratian, this may have

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205 Ibid., p. 118
206 David A. Ahrens, ‘Christianity’s Contribution to Just War Tradition,’ p. 20
207 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, pp. 1747-8
208 Ibid.
its roots in advances in weapons’ design and related advances in military tactics which were making warfare more destructive. Rutgers University philosophy professor Jeffrey McMahan takes this considerably further when he says,

“The decline of jure ad bellum began relatively early and was recognized even by Grotius, though he himself advanced an unusually detailed and sophisticated account of the requirement of just cause. He observed that peace treaties tended not to stigmatize the vanquished side as the wrongdoer or to demand that the vanquished compensate the victor for costs incurred during the fighting of the war. These practices suggest that even in the early phases of the development of the law of nations, there was comparatively little concern with the determination of which party was in the right and which was in the wrong. The focus shifted to jure in bello, or the principles governing the conduct of war, which ultimately came to be regarded as entirely independent of jure ad bellum.”

Nonetheless, Grotius retained the traditional components of jure ad bellum, including those reaching back to Aquinas and the other medieval scholars. Of jure in bello, Grotius argued that proportionality in war was a function of the military ends, not the political ones and further, that there is a requirement of affirmative discrimination in the conduct of military operations, “one that forbids the killing of non-combatants and innocents.”

5. Conclusion

Just war theory achieved a philosophical ‘plateau’ with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the instrument that brought about an end to the Thirty Years’ War and as a corollary, established the primacy of the state as the arbiter of right and wrong in any resort to war. This recognized that the carnage of three decades of warfare had so chastened Europe’s monarchs that resort to war, while still a regular event, was no

210 These included (1) just cause: an actual or imminent wrong against the state; (2) right intention: aim only at peace and the just ends; (3) proportionality: prospective good outweighs potential bad; (4) last resort: efforts at irenic solutions have failed; and (5) probability of success: the prospective war will not be an exercise in futility. Michael W. Johnson, Just War Theory and Future War, p. 14
211 Ibid.
212 For an excellent one-volume study of the many facets of that protracted conflict, see Geoffrey Parker (ed.), The Thirty Years’ War (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1988)
longer the normative condition of the Continent. It reflected Europe’s change in political organization. The establishment of confessional states, confirmed in legitimacy and made normative by the Treaty, had largely overtaken the universality implicit in the notion of ‘Christendom’ (although many of the states remain multi-ethnic and had shifting boundaries in areas such as Germany and Italy). Yoder has described the grave implications of this development as follows,

“No that every church had a state and every state a church, the only means to defend or advance a religious cause was military or diplomatic. So Europe saw a series of wars of religion, bringing into the heartland of Christendom the escalation of religious claims previously reserved for hostilities against the infidel. Just when the Catholic tradition had begun to disentangle the no-holds-barred crusade from civilly justified but also restrained war, internecine battles restored to the heart of Christendom the reality of the crusade without the name. During the Thirty Years’ War half the middle of Europe was destroyed in the name of God.”

Indeed, as the concept, *jus ad bellum*, receded in importance, *jus in bello* became more important to all parties who engaged in any prospective conflict. This was a matter of practicality. However, it would be undone by two developments: the rise of nationalism as a unifying national element and advances in military technology to the extent that an industrial nation’s civil economy was virtually coterminous with its war making capability.

The Thirty Years’ War—arguably a number of different national conflicts, waged for distinct reasons, but lumped together under a single rubric—ended due to exhaustion than to attained victory. The peace settlement then validated the confessional state as the ‘default’ model, with all citizens required to adopt the religious practices of the ruler. Certain city-states were permitted to retain ‘freedom of conscience’ provisions. New ‘freedom of conscience’ provisions were included—e.g., the privilege to relocate

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213 Ibid., pp.26-46
214 “In Europe, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia institutionalized the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* - that rulers of a state had the right to determine the religion of its subjects. This was in an effort to curb the religious warfare that had wracked Europe after the Protestant Reformation” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessional_state, accessed on September 28, 2008
216 This matter is discussed in the next chapter
217 For instance, “This war has lasted so long that they [the German princes] have left it more out of exhaustion than from a sense of right behaviour” David Maland, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London: MacMillan, 1983), p. 159
to a more religiously congenial venue—although such a right would almost certainly have been meaningless to the great majority of peasants, men and women lacking the wherewithal to avail of it.\footnote{218}

Most revealing, however, was the fact that the 1648 Peace was no different to the Peace of Augsburg (1555) that had ended the first round of major Catholic-Protestant religious warfare. Simply stated, the Thirty Years’ War was at the last analysis, an exercise in futility that took away lives of a substantial fraction of Central Europe’s population.\footnote{219} Moreover, and perhaps of far greater relevance, earlier thinking was in a way lost as well. Whatever progress had been made in the development and acceptance of precepts governing the integrity of the individual, and the concurrent requirement that such integrity be respected by rulers by thinkers such as Wlodkowic, Vitoria, Suarez and Grotius, was gravely inhibited, if not outright aborted. Europe’s continental leaders collectively abandoned the form of ‘government by consent of the governed’ in favour of the ‘authoritarian model of government’, assuming the latter as the best means of maintaining a lasting peace. To a limited extent it succeeded.\footnote{220} But, as the experience of warfare in the Modern Age has demonstrated, it was only to a limited extent. These issues are discussed at length in the next chapter.

\footnote{218}{John Steven Kreis, Lecture 6: Europe in the Age of Religious Wars, 1560-1715 http://www.historyguide.org/earlymod/lecture6c.html, accessed on September 28, 2008}

\footnote{219}{‘The devastation caused by the war has long been a subject of controversy among historians. Estimates of civilian casualties of up to thirty percent of the population of Germany are now treated with caution. The mortality rate was perhaps closer to 15 to 20 percent, with deaths due to armed conflict, famine and disease’ Thirty Years' War - Casualties and disease, Encyclopedia http://www.experiencefestival.com/thirty_years_war_-_casualties_and_disease, accessed on September 28, 2008}

\footnote{220}{To some extent this may also reflect the change in the nature of the state in Europe. The previous period had seen the emergence of a series of strong(er) centralising states across the continent (notably in England, Bourbon France and Hapsburg Austria). These new states perhaps had different reasons for waging war and it was convenient to redefine the legal basis of the state at this stage. For a discussion of this, see Roger Lockyer, \textit{Habsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720} (London: Longman, 1974) and A. G. Dickins, \textit{The Age of Humanism and Reformation: Europe in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries} (London: Prentice Hall, 1972)}
Chapter 3: Just War Theory in the Nuclear Age

1. Preliminary Analysis

As set out in Chapter 2, by the sixteenth century a common reason for warfare had become religious (within Christianity). Another development was the emergence of warfare between recognisable, and relatively stable, nation states. The concept of *jus ad bellum* had been significantly undermined and, the brutality of the various religious conflicts also tended to obscure any commitment to *jus in bello*. Nonetheless, both concepts continued to have some residual impact on the conduct of war.

However, by the mid-eighteenth century, new dynamics in warfare started to arise and this chapter, starts by considering possible reasons for this change, especially in relation to the wars of the American and French Revolutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century. The destructiveness of weaponry, and the consequential implications for both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, was exemplified by the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945. This act, can be seen as the result of a 150 year period in which both elements of traditional Just War theory broke down. However, the use of nuclear weapons was an almost natural consequence of a whole series of changes (both ideological and technological) that had collectively had the effect of removing any meaningful distinction between combatants and non-combatants in modern warfare.

We thus have a period characterised by the emergence of new secular ideologies (liberalism, nationalism, socialism and, ultimately, fascism) and also an increasing industrialisation and mechanisation of warfare. Both trends seem to have combined further to undermine the residual force of *jus in bello*. In effect, nationalism, especially as expressed in the American and French revolutions, and in subsequent events, brought into play the concept of the armed citizenry. The consequences became quickly clear, if one side saw its entire citizen body as part of its war effort then the other side would feel justified in attacking that wider body. Thus the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the emergence of mass armies, recruited from
all available citizens, and very much in contrast to the smaller professional armies used even as late as the Seven Years War (that had ended in 1763).

Developments in the technology of warfare during the early years of the twentieth century (e.g., tanks, machine guns) and the willingness of combatant states to use weapons of an uncontrolled nature (e.g., poison gas) on the battleground had generated casualties at catastrophic levels.221 Equally in both the first and second world wars all combatants adopted strategies (blockade, mass murder, city bombing etc) deliberately designed to inflict substantive casualties on the non-military populations. Any residual constraints were the product not of moral argument but of practical consequences. Thus, despite fears, there was no widespread use of poison gas on the battlefield in the Second World War not due to moral qualms or constraints but due to fear of retaliation in kind.

The end of the First World War had seen efforts at achieving ongoing irenic solutions (e.g., the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact) that proved to be of very limited effect precisely because these lacked any supranational enforcement mechanism that could be invoked against any major power.222 By the same token, support for worldwide disarmament, in the sense of the term extending beyond specific efforts at arms control, simply lacked any significant constituency at the state level (a consequence of the treaties that ended the war was to link disarmament to having ‘lost’ the war223).

For instance, the 1921 Washington Naval Conference, aimed to achieve naval disarmament and sought a way to relieve tensions in East Asia among the imperial states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan). However, this conference was ended with no significant success.224

221 The war ended with more than 40 million casualties, which includes 20 million military and civilian deaths, Feature Articles: Military Casualties of World War One http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/casualties.htm, accessed on September 29, 2008
222 For details, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 : An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946)
223 Eric Hobsbawn, Age of Extremes (London: Abacus, 1994)
The nations that would form the Axis Powers during World War II ultimately recognized that the existing international order would be unable to curtail ostensibly illegal international acts (e.g., Italy against Ethiopia, the Japanese incursion into China, Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland). And, as a consequence, what was left of the debilitated international order collapsed with the outbreak of World War II (in Europe) in 1939.225

2. The Changing Nature of War in the Modern Period

There is now a considerable debate amongst some historians as to whether the wars that followed the French Revolution can be properly seen as ‘Total War’226 (ie in the sense used for the second world war) or as a continuation of already existing trends. One part of this debate stresses how the concept of the Citizens War for both France and America radically redefined who was and who was not a combatant. Thus the Duke of Brunswick felt quite entitled to threaten to kill the entire population of Paris if the King was executed227 and on the other hand the revolutionaries treated the entire population of provinces such as the Vendee as potential traitors. One side in this debate takes the view that such threats and actions were really little but typical of what happens in war. The other tends to argue that the depth and frequency of such actions were such as to mark the French Revolutionary Wars as different to the warfare waged since the Peace of Westphalia.

Equally, whilst the nature of the French Republic, and the use of ‘Terror’ by the Jacobins is hotly debated228, again, what is of importance is the emergence of the concept that ‘all who are not with us, are against us’. In consequence there was a further blurring (possibly even negation) of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

225 For details, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, pp. 70-3
228 For example between Slavoj Zizek who argues that Jacobin’s shift to ‘Terror’ was justified by circumstances (see: Slavoj Zizek (ed) Robespierre: Virtue and Terror, London: Verso) and those who see it as the progenitor of the sort of terror that inevitably follows a revolution staged for such ideological reasons (see: Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution, London: Vintage Books).
To understand the development (or collapse) of the theory of Just War over the 150 years from 1790 to 1945, it is less important to consider the merits of particular incidents and more to explore the ideological and technical changes that might have contributed to this change. Fundamental to this analysis is the role of Nationalism in changing both the reasons for warfare and its conduct.

2.1. Nationalism, Ideology and Just War

Effectively both the American war of independence and the wars of the French revolution were partly justified by a relatively new logic of nationalism. Whilst the concept of nationalism was not new, in this period it started to take on a form that both legitimised (in its own eyes) the reasons for war and what was legitimate in war.

To a large extent, Europe up to the 1750s was dominated by a number of multi-national, multi-ethnic empires and kingdoms. Some, such as Bourbon France had a rough national element (even if Bretons, Normans and inhabitants of the South retained distinct languages from Cosmopolitan French) but others such as the Hapsburg domains (variously Austria, Hungary, Italy and Spain) were in reality little other than the holdings of the ruling dynasty. Nonetheless, by this stage a number of more ‘national’ states had started to emerge but there was no immediate view that all members of a particular ethnic group should be members of a single state (or that a national group should automatically have its own state).

So the series of wars between 1550 and 1610 that saw the independence of parts of the Netherlands from the Spanish (Hapsburg) Empire did have a nationalist element to them. However, towards the end of the war, the successful (Protestant) provinces of the United Netherlands sought to conquer what is now Belgian Flanders. Although there are close ethnic and linguistic links between Dutch and Flemish (closer than between Dutch and Friesland in the east that did become part of the United Netherlands), the attempt failed. Partly on religious grounds (Flanders being mainly Catholic) and partly on grounds of trade (Antwerp in particular made a lot of

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money as part of Spanish trade with the new world), any attempt at appealing to a common national identity failed and Flanders was content to remain part of the Spanish empire.

In the main, this continued to be an issue for the various European nationalist movements that appeared in the period from the 1750s to the end of the nineteenth century. Although the appeal of a united and independent national polity was strong in Italy, Germany, Poland and Ireland (as some examples), the reality of population location in Europe almost always made achieving this complex.

One difficulty for the new nationalists was what to do when faced with a nationalist revolt against them? For example, the French revolution led to a successful slave revolt in Haiti that in turn had its own national identity (but was inspired by the ideals of the Republic). The response of first the French Republic and then of Napoleon’s empire was to try to destroy the independence movement and only grudgingly to accept Haiti’s independence after 15 years of warfare\(^\text{230}\).

A final example can be drawn from the events in the multi-ethnic Austrian Empire during the revolutionary period of 1848-9. There, Magyar liberals and nationalists aimed to establish an independent Hungary\(^\text{231}\), fighting against what they saw as German oppression. However, they, in turn suppressed the nationalist movements of Rumanians and Slavs (in the east and south of Hungary) and, as a result, those ethnic groups co-operated with the Austrian counter-attack on Hungary. They, at least, feared Magyar nationalism more than they feared German nationalism.

Thus, as a concept, especially in Europe, nationalism has worked in complex ways. It suited the French revolutionaries to fuse their republicanism with a concept of French nationalism (hence the words of the *Marseillaise*) and they were less tolerant of any nationalism that was at variance with their goal of a unitary France. By the time of the German wars of unification led by Prussia from 1850-1870 and of Italy at the same period, the main driving force was of a state within the planned national borders establishing its political and military dominance.


\(^{231}\) Karl Marx, *The Revolutions of 1848* (Harmondsworth, Pelican Books, 1973)
However, it is in terms of its impact on the concepts of Just War that the nationalism of the period from 1750 had its greatest effect. First, warfare ceased to be a matter of the (small) professional armies that had become the norm in Europe from the 1680s. Second, it ceased to be a set of relatively bounded skirmishes between multi-ethnic empires over colonies, disputed provinces or the kingship of particular regions. Even the Seven Years War (1756-1763) that saw fighting in Europe, India and America, and ended with the loss of French possessions in Canada and India and a stronger Prussia was otherwise a stalemate. No state had the goal of destruction of one of the others.

The new wars (with a nationalist ideology) changed this. First, in both the French and American revolutions, the idea emerged of an armed citizenry. In turn that made everyone a potential combatant, which undermined one the key natural law concepts built into *Jus in Bello*. Second, victory was not in terms of provinces changing hands but in terms of the overthrow of a regime. So by the end of the Napoleonic period, the coalition against Napoleon was no longer aiming for the restitution of provinces but for complete victory over the Napoleonic state. Many of the wars of the nineteenth century (German and Italian unification, the American Civil War) also had, as key goals, the destruction of one of the combatants rather than the more limited aims of eighteenth century warfare. They also, increasingly, became marked by what would later be called guerrilla warfare, which, in turn, further weakened the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

Overall as warfare also became more destructive, the scope of what was aimed for extended and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants became blurred. This all led to the return of the idea that warfare essentially was beyond regulation (eg Clauswitz and Nietzsche) and the only real rule was to win as quickly as possible.

These trends continued as warfare became increasingly mechanised in the nineteenth century. For example the American Civil War (1861-1865) can be seen as a truly modern war, in the sense that it integrated an industrial economy and transportation

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infrastructure of which the most notable were the steelworks and railroads, directly related to the war effort. Similarly, it was considered ‘total’ war, in the sense that the war aims of the United States sought total victory through the complete destruction of the Confederacy. The conduct of the war, at least in its later stages, reflected that goal.233

U.S. General William T. Sherman’s ‘scorched earth’ march from Atlanta to the sea in November and December 1864; not only created a trail of intentional destruction of any civilian assets that might have some military value to the Confederates, but had the purpose of punishing and terrifying the inhabitants.234 Sherman went on to order the February 1865 burning of South Carolina’s capital, Columbia, as the ‘final revenge’ for that State’s act of secession in December 1860. Simply stated the conduct of the war, at least in its final days, reflected more the values of a Clausewitz than those of a Grotius or Aquinas.235

2.2 The Implications of Weapons’ Innovations

If the emergence of nationalism, and subsequently liberalism, socialism, communism and fascism, all gave warfare a new theoretical basis, then the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also saw a radical increase in the destructiveness of weaponry. Again, the goal here is not to chart this in detail but to consider how the capacity of more deadly weaponry interacted with the intent of new ideologies to undermine the concepts of Just War.

Thus the First World War was not just marked by the emergence of new weaponry (poison gas, tanks etc) but the combatant nations of the First World War engaged in air bombing of civil populations (even if the available technology restricted its effect). The German submarine campaign against Britain in 1916-1917 was a conscious effort to considerably reduce available food supplies which were regularly imported from the Canada and the United States in the British Isles, so that the population would turn

233 For more details, see Steven Dutch, ‘The First Modern War And the Last Ancient War’ Online Article, http://www.uwgb.edu/DutchS/WestTech/X1STMODW.HTM, accessed on August 20, 2008
234 John Bigelow, ‘Did Grant, Sherman and Sheridan Teach Militarism to Germany?’ The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, July 1915, p. 71
235 See Chapter 1
against the national war effort.\textsuperscript{236} In turn, the British and French used a naval blockade to undermine the German war effort. Understood in these terms, the constraints traditionally imposed by just war thinking were already moribund, if not dead yet, in wars fought amongst European powers. All combatants saw their opponent’s civil population as part of the war – as a pool of manpower to be mobilised, working in munitions factories etc – and thus were prepared to use starvation as an instrument of war policy. The only constraint was the limited effect of the then available weapons technologies.

These trends were immediately present in the Second World War but were much more destructive due to advances in technology. It involved the intentional destructive targeting of civilian populations and the application of radically new technology for that purpose. In turn this encouraged a rethinking by Christians not only of just war’s traditional criteria, but also of the very principle itself. Certain moral absolutists argued that any targeting of civilian areas was morally unsupportable since non-combatants should have had a presumptive immunity from attack based on \textit{jus in bello} principles of discrimination.\textsuperscript{237} Discrimination refers to combatants and non-combatants. This principle prohibits the intentional attack on non-combatants. Premeditated killing of combatants is acceptable during military operations, but combatants must exclude unarmed non-combatants from intentional targeting. Of course, this principle is long standing, hearkening back to the arguments of the Peace of God and the Truce of God.\textsuperscript{238}

Equally, the direct targeting of civilian populations was not new. Medieval European History is replete with examples of such misbehaviours for example, the slaughter of the citizens of Limoges in 1370 in English-governed Gascony in response to the city

\textsuperscript{236} However, history shows things could be unexpected result. “The renewed German campaign was effective, sinking 1.4 million tons of shipping between October 1916 and January 1917. Despite this, the political situation demanded even greater pressure, and on 31 January 1917, Germany announced that its U-boats would engage in unrestricted submarine warfare beginning 1 February. On 17 March, German submarines sank three American merchant vessels, and the U.S. declared war in April 1917” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-Boat, accessed on September 29, 2008

\textsuperscript{237} According to Kemp, the \textit{jus in bello} contains as following principles: “A soldier at war has a right to perform only those actions which are: (a) approved by legitimate authority, (b) discriminate, proportionate, and militarily necessary, and (c) rightly intended.” Kenneth W. Kemp, ‘Just-war Theory and Its Non-Pacifist Rivals,’ p. 1

\textsuperscript{238} See chapter 1
fathers’ ‘treasonous’ adoption of a policy of allegiance to the French Crown. What was unexpected was the regular resort to such behaviour after so many years of its relative avoidance. The World War II actions committed by forces on both sides of the conflict were products of operations research (determining the enemy’s critical economic sectors and establishing them as legitimate military targets, irrespective of their actual location and the prospects of collateral damage, as was the case in the Royal Air Force bomber attacks on Hamburg), terror (in order to induce popular opposition to conflict continuation, as was the case of the Luftwaffe campaign against British cities during the Battle of Britain, 1940), and revenge (e.g., the sustained allied bombing of Dresden in February 1945 or Soviet behaviour once Red Army units entered pre-war German territory).

One of the distinctive ‘signposts’ of the lessening of morally based restraint in jus in bello was the application of force for exemplary purposes, e.g., to terrify a civilian population into submission. The Anglo-Gascon destruction of the Limousins in 1370 had that purpose, the Prince of Wales intended the atrocity to serve as a warning to the populations of other towns in the region as to their prospective fate should they take the same political course of action as chosen by Limoges. The bombing of Rotterdam by German air forces in May 1940 was intended to undermine Dutch morale: the targeted area was the city centre which was of no military value, nor did its civil or economic functions contribute to Holland’s defence efforts. The fiery destruction of Dresden, in return, can be seen as an almost final revenge for earlier

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239 For a discussion of this atrocity, see Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: the Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp 263-4
240 The systematic use of military violence aimed at the civil population of course remained a regular feature, especially where an occupying force faced a growing partisan movement. Examples include Prussian atrocities in France in 1871 and Austro-Hungarian armies seeking to suppress Serbian partisans in the early years of the First World War.
241 Cf. discussion in the previous chapter of the impact of the Thirty Years’ War on the overall conduct of war in the aftermath of that conflagration.
242 A meaning of the operations research is as follows: “The application of scientific methods and techniques to decision-making problems. A decision-making problem occurs where there are two or more alternative courses of action, each of which leads to a different and sometimes unknown end result. Operations research is also used to maximize the utility of limited resources. The objective is to select the best alternative, that is, the one leading to the best result” http://www.answers.com/topic/operations-research, accessed on September 28, 2008
German bombing of civilian populations as “The German bombing of Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 was held to release the Allies from any obligation to restrict their targets.”

Finally, the single most relevant World War II development in weapons’ technology by far, was the atomic bomb. Other military technologies were actually more destructive in terms of lives lost such as, for example, the aerial bombings on Tokyo on March 9-10, 1945 that took an estimated 83,000 lives. Yoder claims that “The last years of World War I had made it clear that in the next war there would be aerial bombing of cities. In the course of disarmament negotiations up through 1933, the awareness of how destructive this would be and how hard to control had grown.”

Such, however, was not the case with nuclear weapons. Equally, whilst the reason for the use of atom bomb remains disputed, as is the true reason for the Japanese surrender, it represented not just a totally new form of weapon but the manner of its first battlefield application contravened traditional understandings of *jus in bello*.

For some just war theorists, the introduction of nuclear weapons has brought about an international condition that is also *sui generis*. For example, Michael Walzer, a secularist in the Grotius tradition, takes an absolutist approach toward nuclear weapons saying, “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war. They are the first of mankind’s technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world.”

This argument raises an even larger question: At what point does the increment of degree of capability—for it is both the expanded explosive capacity of nuclear weapons and the associated radiation that separates them from other munitions—translate into a difference of kind? This question raises various intellectual problems and moral conundrums in relation to other prospective ‘weapons

246 Barton F. Bernstein describes the situation, “American B-29 dropped napalm on the city’s heavily populated areas to produce uncontrollable firestorms.” Barton F. Bernstein, the Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, p. 140
248 Some historians have claimed that the reason for the atomic bombing was partly a desire to test the actual weapon and more profoundly to warn the Soviet Union. Equally it has been claimed that the Japanese surrendered due to the Red Army so quickly over-running Manchuria rather than in response to the atom bombs. See for example, Murray Sayle, Letter from Hiroshima, ‘Did the Bomb End the War?’ *The New Yorker*, July 31, 1995, pp. 40-64 and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)
of mass destruction’ (e.g., genetically engineered biological weapons specifically designed to attack the food sources of an enemy population).

By the same token, there are prescriptions that are regularly recommended as appropriate responses to crises having a significant moral dimension. Nonetheless, these are essentially secularist, finding their antecedents, often not acknowledged, in the natural law thinking of Vitoria and Grotius.²⁵⁰

3. Just War Theology in the Post-World War II Era

One of the primary objectives of just war advocates since the end of World War II has been the genuine reinstitution of ‘just war’ in practice. Michael Walzer has established a number of criteria. These criteria encompass (1) international society, composed of independent states; (2) international law privileges for each state’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty; (3) force or threat of force against any state constitutes aggression and is criminal; (4) aggression merits either self-defence by the victim or such action assisted by other nations acting in the manner of law enforcement; (5) nothing but aggression can be an excuse for war; and (6) offending states may be punished after being repulsed.²⁵¹ As Walzer admits, these criteria may not be perfect to meet a strict sense of just war. However, these criteria have been described as the ‘legalist paradigm’²⁵²

In light of developments over the past few decades, Walzer has allowed a few corollaries to amend the rigor of the original rules. States may take pre-emptive action in the face of imminent attack. Representative secessionist groups unjustly governed may be aided. And finally, states act justly when they come to the aid of populations facing massacre or enslavement by rapacious governments.²⁵³ By any standards, these are provocative suggestions however moral their purposes may be. Collectively, the legalist paradigm and its corollaries reflect a reaction to the enormities of the twentieth century.

²⁵¹ Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 61-2
²⁵² Michael W. Johnson argues that Walzer’s criteria are actually quite close to the Westphalian model. Michael W. Johnson, Just War Theory and Future Warfare, p. 15
²⁵³ Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 86-105
The development of nuclear weapons, their use in Japan at the end of World War II, and latterly, the build-up of nuclear arsenals and means of delivery carried out by a number of world powers, have engaged the thinking of moral theologians and have raised fundamental questions concerning the conduct of military operations within the confines of just war theory. Without doubt, developing and maintaining nuclear arsenals to use in war must call into question the provisions of *jus in bello*. To the extent that such warfare necessarily includes an attack on civilian populations—even in the context of an attack on an otherwise legitimate military target (e.g., a military airfield in or near a large city)—raises fundamental issues of discrimination and proportionality. Of course, it must be understood that such is not an absolutely certain outcome. One might envision combat employment of nuclear munitions—e.g., targeting enemy naval assets at sea, approaching strategic bombers at high altitude, or communications/surveillance satellites in orbit—in which the prospect of direct civilian casualties is remote, even if the resultant fall out and immediate damage to electronic communications would cause wider death and disruption.

However, Yoder implies, at the very least, that nuclear war planners, however limited their intended nuclear munitions applications, fail to meet necessary just war prudential requirements stating, “[Just war] criteria may hardly function as a checklist, for those making the decisions about war do not use a checklist to determine all of their specific motives and goals.”¹²⁵⁴ Likewise, Oliver O’Donovan sees in the prospective use of nuclear weapons the requirement for “the radical correction of the praxis of war,”¹²⁵⁵ if only because “if the tradition which claims that war may be justified does not also admit that in particular cases it may not be justified, the affirmation is not morally serious.”¹²⁵⁶ This locution, of course, points to the fundamental purpose of *jus ad bellum*. In sum, O’Donovan argues that although “[weapon] design provides the most immediate evidence of indiscriminate intention,”¹²⁵⁷ it is the actual purpose of the exercising party that is morally governing, if only because “there is no weapon that cannot be an instrument of indiscriminate

¹²⁵⁴ John H. Yoder, *When War is Unjust*, p. 2
¹²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 80
¹²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 83.
In a larger sense, these locutions raise a number of logical questions. If the ‘correction of praxis’ to be undertaken effectively eliminated the option to wage war under any and all circumstances because exercise of the option inherently raised the prospect of the employment of nuclear weapons, just war theory would be reduced to a nullity, if only because the responsible moralist would be *ipso facto* reduced to an automatic pacifism. As it happens, O'Donovan takes a more nuanced approach. While the application of extremely high-yield (megaton range) weapons may generate inherently disproportionate outcomes, irrespective of the manner of targeting, even low-range (tactical battlefield) weapons may have the same effect.259

Both Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsay couch their thinking relating to the use of nuclear weapons in terms of civilization implications. Niebuhr, a committed pacifist, during pre-World War II years amended his earlier views in light of the threat to Christian civilization and values posed by national enemies driven by totalitarian ideologies. The prospect—evidently an extremely remote one—of civilization being physically destroyed by nuclear holocaust was a risk worth taking, if only to preserve that same civilization from complete moral disfigurement at totalitarian hands.260 This argument resonates amongst the Korean Church today and, as discussed in chapter five onwards, the key question is whether it is worth the risk of nuclear war in attempting to bring down the regime in the DPRK or to work with that regime to remove nuclear weapons from Korea.

Ramsay, like O'Donovan, considers megaton-range weapons inherently non-discriminatory, hence inappropriate for application under *jus in bello* constraints. “Any weapon whose every use must be for the purpose of directly killing non-combatants as a means of attaining some supposed good [is] immoral.”261 In absolute terms, Ramsay’s argument appears unassailable. However, as a practical matter, megaton range weapons were never developed for the direct purpose of annihilating civilian populations. Rather, their primary purpose was the destruction of ‘hardened’

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258 Ibid.
259 Oliver O'Donovan, *The Just War Revisited*, p. 84
targets, e.g., enemy missile silos, perhaps under conditions of pre-emptive war. This application, of course, raises a host of just war considerations under the general rubric of *jus ad bellum*. O’Donovan evidently took this factor into consideration.262

### 3.1. The Morality of Deterrence

As described earlier, one of the components of just war, as understood by Thomas Aquinas, was that belligerents “intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.”263 It would appear at least inferentially, that maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons intended to be used solely in response to a particularly grave and patent provocation (i.e., one that threatened the continued existence of the state or its citizenry) would at the least constitute an effort to bring about the ‘avoidance of evil’ that would be incurred should a nuclear attack be initiated. In other words, the effort to avoid evil does not depend on a rational calculation, but rather implies an imagination of unimaginable damage. As O’Donovan argues, “Deterrence is about how the behaviour of nations can be subjected to management, by taking the infinite into our threats and by deploying the calculated prospect of human action and reaction as an instrument to ensure predictability.”264

In this regards, Ramsay indirectly argues that an existing nuclear arsenal contributes to prudential behaviour. He first lays out the changed circumstances of war.

“What has happened since the atom bomb burst upon the world is that a religious ethic must rediscover obedience in a situation in which calculation becomes less and less possible. Neither pacifism nor bellicism can afford any longer to be concerned primarily with historical success; neither can derive its choices backward from prudential consideration of what will work or save the situation… The real import of the bomb is not that pacifism is proved to be workable, nor even that non-pacifism is proved unworkable, but that any horizontal and calculative approach to the problem of force is wholly inadequate.”265

To overcome this inadequacy, Ramsay suggests reliance on ambiguity, a situation

262 Oliver O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited*, p. 84
263 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, 2, Question 40 (art. 1)
contributing to, and sustaining the maintenance of, a prudential international regime.

“There is deterrence that is mutual and may be quite enough inhering in the weapons themselves that are possessed even without any government intending any additional ambiguity concerning its possible use of them. There is a deterring ambiguity, or potential for use, inhering in the weapons possessed and not in how or for what purpose we possess them.”

O’Donovan again takes a somewhat more nuanced approach, at least implying that opposition to a deterrent strategy based on weapons possession reflected an absolutist approach to pacifism, one involving “a misreading of the just-war proposal as essentially critical in intent.”

Walzer, in turn, dismisses deterrence as an acceptable strategy.

“Atomic war was death indeed, indiscriminate and total, and after Hiroshima, the first task of political leaders everywhere was to prevent its recurrence. The means they adopted is the promise of reprisal in kind. Against the threat of an immoral attack, they have put the threat of an immoral response. This is the basic form of nuclear deterrence.”

From at least one perspective, Walzer’s assessment (and, perhaps, even his corrective prescription) is anomalous. Walzer has consciously developed his just war theory in secularist terms. However, at least inferentially, his argument actually, more an assertion has the ring of religious oratory, if not precisely explored and reported in that terminology.

Absolutist arguments based on religious precepts have been commonly forwarded, although, as a practical matter, have enjoyed little popular support from more the realist theologians such as Reinhold Neibuhr or Ramsey. Duane Friessen, an evangelical pacifist, argues that persons of his persuasion can “appropriately employ just-war categories as a set of middle axioms to judge the behaviour of nations when

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267 Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 8
268 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 269
269 As referred previously, their position is based on a calculation between gains and loses in case that nuclear weapons should be used.
they are unable or unwilling to abandon trust in armed force as the way to peace."\textsuperscript{270}

As it happens, this is precisely the approach that O’Donovan considers inappropriate. Friessen puts in religious terms the same blanket assertion made by Walzer. “It is ultimately unacceptable for Christians to threaten to do violence against others in order to deter them from violence. Christians cannot simultaneously proclaim the good news of the Gospel and threaten their Soviet brothers and sisters with nuclear war.”\textsuperscript{271} Some absolutists do not shrink from the graver implications of the anti-deterrence argument. For example, American moral philosophy professor Gordon Zahn, after first establishing (at least to his own satisfaction) that prudential deterrence must eventually break down, concludes “that since the destruction of millions of lives by America is the only possible alternative, then it is better to perish as the victim of the inhumanity of others than to save oneself or one’s nation by making others the victims of our own inhuman acts.”\textsuperscript{272}

Theologian George Weigel contends that such arguments constitute a categorical error, in the sense that the hierarchy of moral values has been subverted.

“As a tradition of statecraft, the just war argument recognizes that there are circumstances in which the first and most urgent obligation in the face of evil is to stop it... [This] requires us to be morally serious and politically responsible. Moral seriousness and political responsibility require us to make the effort to ‘connect the dots’ between means and ends.”\textsuperscript{273}

Understood in these terms, Weigel’s argument buttresses nuclear deterrence strategy.\textsuperscript{274}

### 3.2. Discrimination and Proportion in the Application of Force

According to O’Donovan, “The two criteria to be met by any act of war...are, first, that it should not intend to take innocent lives (in effect, the lives of non-belligerents)-


\textsuperscript{271} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., p. 323-4


\textsuperscript{274} In relation to the nuclear deterrence, the Christian perspective is discussed again in detail in chapter 5
though it may happen that they perish, and fore-seeably so, in the course of an attack which intends only the destruction of a military objective; and second, that the evil it inflicts should be less grave than the evil it seeks to avert.\textsuperscript{275} In other words, he argues that weapons applications in warfare should be morally constrained under the principles of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination can refer to both combatants and non-combatants in practice. Of course, it is forbidden to undertake the intentional attack of non-combatants. Conversely, the intentional killing of enemy combatants is permitted.\textsuperscript{276}

However, there clearly are numerous ambiguities. O’Donovan lays out the problem for the conscientious military planner by saying, “At the heart of the project of subjecting armed conflict to the disciplines of judgment stands what has been called in modern time the ‘principle of discrimination.’ Separating the innocent from the guilty is the object of judgment, the intention that defines it.”\textsuperscript{277} For example, enemy propagandists may, in a certain sense, be fundamental to war as is an enemy soldier, even if he were not in uniform. The same considerations may extend to an enemy-state’s national leaders.

Much more difficult is the issue of strategic warfare. Modern warfare depends on industrial production and transportation infrastructure. Any attack on such facilities inherently involves a direct attack on civilians. Conceivably, this might be justified if all adult workers providing such products and services were considered \textit{de facto} enemy combatants. In effect, many victims of allied air raids in Germany and Japan were Prisoners of War or Slave Labourers forced to work in factories. But even then, the problem would remain unresolved insofar as many other that could not be considered combatants (e.g., infants, the aged) would inevitably find themselves amidst an attack and subjected to its harmful effects.

Proportionality relates to weapons applications, in the sense of restricting destructive efforts to only that degree necessary to achieve military objectives. Thus, even though a state has a right to wage war, this principle should be satisfied for just war defenders

\textsuperscript{275} Oliver O’Donovan, \textit{Peace and Certainty; A Theological Essay on Deterrence}, p. 10
\textsuperscript{276} Again, there are certain limitations. For example, enemy combatants in the process of surrendering are immunized against attack.
\textsuperscript{277} Oliver O’Donovan, \textit{The Just War Revisited}, p. 32
while warfare is being engaged, as the use of force is the last resort in such theory.\textsuperscript{278} Under the terms of proportionality, social and restorative justice benefits gained by resorting to war must outweigh whatever evil came from the destruction inherent to the effort.

For better or for worse, the application of either discrimination or proportionality lends itself to abuse, in the sense that just war thinkers may be tempted to shape criteria to meet specific conditions suited to hostilities at hand, rather than the other way round. As Yoder points out, legitimate criteria may not function simply as a checklist, as war checklist-makers usually do not employ such a checklist to examine their own specific motives and goals.\textsuperscript{279} In this regard, when this assumption is lost in criteria application, “just war thinking [discrimination and proportionality] easily degenerates into the justification, even sometimes the glorification, of war, violence and force, because it is assumed that, once the set criteria are met, the military action is no longer in any fundamental way questionable, deplorable or tragic.”\textsuperscript{280}

On the other hand, after first observing ‘the ends justify the means, since nothing else can, but they do not justify any means,’ Paul Ramsey establishes two ingredients “in the moral economy governing the use of force: discrimination and proportion. Non-combatant immunity assesses the action itself with no prudential reference yet to the totality of the consequences, while the principle of proportion takes all the effects for the first time into account. An action having multiple consequences, some of which are evil, must pass both tests before it should ever be actually done.”\textsuperscript{281}

Unfortunately, however, the principle of discrimination was undermined during the Second World War. Since the modern states’ capacity to wage war is to a significant extent measured in economic terms, attacking an enemy’s war production infrastructure appears sensible. However, much of that production is to be found in cities; any air assault on such assets is likely to result in collateral damage. A

\textsuperscript{279} John H. Yoder, *When War is Unjust*, p. 2
\textsuperscript{280} Duncan B. Forrester, *Apocalypse Now?*, p.92 O’Donovan also concludes forthrightly, “If the tradition which claims that war may be justified does not also admit that in particular cases it may not be justified, the affirmation is not morally serious. Oliver O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited*, p. 80
\textsuperscript{281} Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility*, p. 431
substantial portion of the civilian damage sustained by the axis powers at the hands of the Allied Air Forces during World War II was attributable to just such bombing campaigns. Yoder describes the underlying factors at work when he said,

“Wars are won less by position, which can depend on a decisive battle, and more by attrition, which depends on the total strength of the enemy’s economy. Thus, the economy can be manipulated in such a way that even civilian productivity is understood as contributing to the war effort… The technologies of manufacturing, transportation, and communication expanded exponentially the capacity to destroy and the speed at which it could be done… Discrimination and immunity likewise no longer have simple meanings.”

The magnitude of civilian losses, even after separating out those casualties inflicted under the rubric of ‘terror’ or ‘revenge’, led to a concerted effort in the immediate post-war era to prevent any repetition. There are, however, a number of fundamental difficulties at work. Both technology and economic structures are in constant flux. A relatively innocuous technology or industry today might become a vital one in efforts to assure military success tomorrow. Thus, for example, a nation’s communications grid and information-processing computer network would likely be a more important target today than, say, its oil refining capacity was fifty or sixty years ago. Combined with advances in weapons technology most notably, precision-guided munitions the prospective reduction in anticipated collateral damage (specifically, civilian casualties) may actually work as an incentive to undertake such actions. However, there are perhaps unwanted consequences. For example, as Michael Johnson offers an example,

“To summarize the emerging revolution in military affairs, the world took notice when… [coalition forces] exploited information dominance to destroy the vaunted Iraqi Republican Guard in 100 hours with 148 casualties. Unfortunately, would-be tyrants and aggressors concluded that they had better not fight the Americans without nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.”

282 John. H. Yoder, When War is Unjust, p. 25
283 The representative example of this effort is the establishment of the United Nations. It preamble in the Charter of the United Nations says, “We the people of he United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” Preamble, the Charter of the United Nations http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/, accessed on October 29, 2008
284 Michael W. Johnson, Just-war Theory and Future War, p. 36
3.3. The Moral Implication of Nuclear Weapons

A case can be construed on the basis that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so harmful that as such no proportionality or discrimination ‘double effect’ criterion could ever be made to morally applicable. As O’Donovan states,

“It is not a matter of how many people are killed by it [nuclear weapon], or even how many civilians are killed compared with how many combatants. It is a matter of its structure of operation, which is an attack on a basic function of a community’s life rather than on its military operation.”

Michael Walzer simply puts this “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war.” Nonetheless, given the often claimed political purposes of nuclear arsenals (e.g., deterrence), a number of thinkers have argued otherwise. While granting that the application of nuclear weapons in land warfare would almost certainly destroy the moral fabric (as well as the physical assets) of an enemy nation—thereby effectively undermining Aquinas’ restorative justice argument permitting resort to war—as well as diminishing (if not obliterating) the moral integrity of the nuclear attacker, Reinhold Niebuhr believes that the risk of destroying civilization in order to deter a greater evil (e.g., totalitarian domination) was worth taking. Likewise, Ramsey argues the necessity of low-range nuclear weapons for defence and security, given certain restrictions while he opposes the application of megaton-range weapons (‘city busters’) because they cannot be applied in combat without directly killing non-combatants. For him, low-range nuclear weapons might be applied to, and whose explosive force would be restricted to, a battlefield where few or no non-combatants might be found.

However, Jeffrey Stout, moral theologian at Princeton University, regards Ramsey’s parsing of nuclear weapon explosive output as effectively making him a proponent of

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285 This matter was already discussed in this chapter, but, it is necessary that the moral aspects of nuclear weapon from Christian perspective be discussed more minutely before looking at the Korean Christian’s reaction to the nuclear issue.
286 Oliver O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited*, p. 80
287 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p. 282
288 Wesley Campbell, ‘Democracy and the Church: the Allure of Politics’
290 Ibid., p 162
nuclear weapons.

“The more Ramsey thought about the technological development, the less trouble he had imagining uses for nuclear weapons. If the destructive effects could be controlled, their use was not only less likely to be disproportionate but easier to adapt to the principle of non-combatant immunity.”

In objective terms that observation certainly appears to be the case. Stout’s objection to Ramsey may actually be more basic. For many nuclear weapons thinkers, there is an effective moral ‘firebreak’ separating the use of fission and fusion weapons from the use of their conventional counterparts. Stout appears to find Ramsey’s thinking a threat to that ‘firebreak.’

O’Donovan takes a similar approach to Ramsey’s, but with a more straightforward treatment of the ‘firebreak’ factor. He believes that high-yield nuclear weapons could not be categorically incompatible with the pursuit of justice, at least in their deterrent capacity. However, unlike Ramsey, O’Donovan believes that smaller, tactical (or ‘battlefield’) nuclear weapons are inherently disproportionate, not because of their specific destructiveness but “because of the risk of escalation and the powerful psychological threshold that separates nuclear from conventional weapons.”

Thereafter, O’Donovan suggests that if all megaton-range weapons had been abolished (e.g., by international agreement), the remaining smaller nuclear weapons might see their singular character (in comparison to their conventional counterparts) diminished if not erased, and remaining tactical nuclear weapons “might well take their place among the decent arsenals of civilized countries”—in effect, disembarking into nuclear proliferation.

Intent plays a major role in the development, disposition and application of nuclear weapons. In his discussion of discrimination—he uses the antithetical locution ‘indiscrimination’—O’Donovan dispatches the issue of intent as well as that of ostensible uncontrollability. “The term ‘indiscriminate’ is often applied to weapons of nuclear weapons.

292 Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 84
293 Ibid., p. 85
low precision or accuracy, or to weapons with uncontrollable side effects, but this is a misleading use of it. Discrimination has to do with the intention of attack, not with the technical limitations or grossness of the means." Thus, for example, “anyone who deliberately maintains dirty weapons when clean ones are available is open to strong suspicion of indiscriminate intent, yet clearly this cannot be an intrinsic indiscriminacy of the weapon itself, which has not changed.” O’Donovan concludes that, while “design provides the most immediate evidence of indiscriminate intention,” actual intent is more apposite, if only because “there is no weapon that cannot be an instrument of indiscriminate intent.” Thus, establishing the indiscriminate character of a nuclear weapon becomes a function of its owner’s intentions, rather than some consideration intrinsic to the specific design of the weapon on hand. For example, if the sole purpose of such weapons were deterrence, then by this definition they cannot be indiscriminate (the stated intent is none use), irrespective of their destructive power.

There has been a ‘sea change’ in nuclear weapons thinking among Western Christians, specifically pertaining to the distinction between possession and their actual application in warfare over the past few decades. During the 1960s and 1970s both Roman Catholic and Protestant leaders regularly forwarded the argument that the existence of such weapons was inherently immoral, if only because their existence made possible their usage and any such use would be per se morally objectionable. However, by the early 1980s this ‘absolutist’ stance showed signs of evolution toward a more nuanced approach, one that somewhat grudgingly afforded a modest measure of legitimacy to the notion of nuclear deterrence. For example, in their pastoral

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294 Ibid., p. 79
295 A ‘dirty’ bomb is a crude device intended to distribute radioactive material over a wide area, subjecting the inhabitants to radiation poisoning and, likely, making the infected area uninhabitable for years or decades. The distribution of radioactive cesium over a substantial area following the 1986 industrial accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine is a case in point. It is unlikely that the area can be safely repopulated until another few decades have passed.
296 Ibid., p. 81
297 Ibid., p. 83
298 This, of course, does not address a commonly voiced objection, to wit, that any weapon that has been produced will ultimately find its way to war. Whatever its merits, this argument, however, is more intuitive than deductive.
299 Of course, it may be argued that over three decades of U.S.-Soviet relations dominated by ‘mutually assured destruction’—essentially a prudential (if very uncomfortable) strategic relationship—had given substance to the notion that deterrence was a feasible, if not particularly desirable, international option. This could well account for the change ecclesiastical attitude.
letter, *The Challenge of Peace*, American Catholic bishops allowed that “Governments threatened by armed, unjust aggression must defend their people. This includes defence by armed forces as a last resort.” In this respect, American bishops appeared to be edging closer to Paul Ramsey’s thinking rather than to that of John Yoder whose thinking had enjoyed widespread support in Catholic ‘anti-nuclear’ circles.

This development—legitimating the establishment of nuclear arsenals under the rubric of ‘just deterrence’—led to the view that deterring war through military strength constituted a means of avoiding conflict and was therefore a reasonable component of just war doctrine. For such thinkers, the purpose of ‘just deterrence’ is to make prospects of peace proper under conditions proper of the nuclear age, which, in turn, contributes not only to the prevention of war, but also the improvement of those irenic prospects.

Jeffery Stout identifies an inherent moral shortcoming in the ‘just deterrence’ argument. Even if there were no intent to use nuclear weapons indiscriminately—i.e., contravening the proportionality and discriminatory precepts—the moral order would nonetheless be breached.

“If it is unjust to do something, it is also unjust to intend to use them [nuclear weapons] under certain possible future circumstances. If both bluffing and leaving our intentions ambiguous or unformed also turn out to be unjust, then there is no just way to pursue a strategy of nuclear

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302 Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham, (ed.), *Just Deterrence: Morality and Deterrence into the Twenty-First Century* (London: Brassey’s, 1990), p. 12
303 There is at least a limited parallel between this effort at improving the prospects of peace in the nuclear age through deterrence and reliance on such instruments as the Peace of God and the Truce of God during the early lawless centuries of Western Europe’s Middle Ages.
304 Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham, (ed.), *Just Deterrence: Morality and Deterrence into the Twenty-First Century*, p. 12 In some respects this argument is no more than an explicit statement of what was tacitly understood centuries ago. As described, in the Fourteenth Century Teutonic Knights regularly attacked, slaughtered, and robbed defenceless pagan civilians in the Baltic. Likewise, European adventurers armed with modern weapons often made mincemeat out of the Native Americans who resisted their advancing into New World territories. It is extremely unlikely that those same warriors would have been so bold if their enemies were armed with weapons comparable to their own.
Part of the problem is conceptual, insofar as the initial purposes for nuclear weapons development and procurement have been overtaken by other strategic purposes in relation to their retention. Whatever the practical merits of deterrence, nonetheless, the moral inconsistency remains unresolved. All parties are in agreement that actual use of such weapons would be morally reprehensible, perhaps even intrinsically evil. And it is here that a logical inconsistency appears, as renunciation of use also implies invalidity of possession. According to British theologian John R. W. Stott, who has regularly addressed the issue of morality of threatening to resort to nuclear weapons during crisis periods, “We are caught between the ineffective and the immoral, or rather between a moral stance which is ineffective and an ineffective deterrent which [if used] would be immoral, and so between principle and prudence, between what is right and what is realistic.”

It should be understood that Stott is taking the argument considerably further than many of his contemporaries. In not so many words, he is arguing that whatever the merits of deterrence, reliance on such a strategy is fundamentally corrupting, irrespective of its effectiveness. Therefore, even if deterrence were to succeed indefinitely it would nevertheless be a morally unacceptable strategic option.

Stott’s argument reflects a profound understanding of the choice facing the Christian—that of Jesus or that of ‘practicality.’ In Stott’s way of thinking, the Christian who opts to use nuclear weapons chooses to overlook Christ’s redemptive work. It is not a matter of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, irrespective of the prudential behaviour of the possessor or for that matter, the manner in which such weapons might be actually employed in time of war or crisis. The moral fault lies in the attempt to use evil to defeat evil. Jesus asked rhetorically, “if Satan drives out Satan, he is divided against himself. Now then how can his kingdom stand?”

American moral philosopher and Union University (Tennessee, USA) professor David

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305 Jeffery Stout, ‘Ramsey and Others on Nuclear Ethics,’ p. 218
307 This was discussed at some length earlier in this study, with the juxtaposition of the pacifist thinking of Tertullian and John H. Yoder.
308 Matt. 12:26
Gushee emphasize this aspect of Jesus’ ministry. “He did battle; he waged war against evil, one might say, but he did not resort to evil to wage war against evil.”

All in all, Christians who support reliance on nuclear weapons—however limited that support may be, e.g., strategic deterrence—are nonetheless engaging in a morally questionable transaction by arguing that the acceptable ends (e.g., some species of international peace) justify the means used to achieve them. All Christians—not just pacifist or other moral ‘absolutists’—are called upon to oppose the notion that virtuous ends ipso facto justify the means employed to gain them. Thus, for those who wish to imitate Christ, reliance—no matter how limited—on nuclear weapons to prevent war is as wrong as employing evil means to prevent evil results.

4. Concluding Thoughts

The history of just war theory, at least until about the time of the Reformation, can be described as a debate amongst those who favoured reducing the reach and severity of state-sponsored violence and sought to codify such limitations. That codification effort collapsed in the face of the changing nature of the nation-state, developments in weapons technology, and the development of an understanding of the citizenry as a tacit component of the state’s defence posture. While the post-Westphalia period had the appearance of one in which just war theory was a generally accepted restraint on state-sponsored violence (at least in Europe), it was more likely the case that a combination of war exhaustion and rough equality among states (or combinations of states) kept violence at least to manageable levels.

However, that period’s relative quiescence was contingent on both social and technological stasis, conditions that could not be expected to be indefinitely sustained. Once this started to break down, say in the political and military developments as a result of the French Revolution then respect for just war principles were undermined. One of the early objectives of the revolution was to extend its effects


310 One immediate consequence was the development of the concept of the armed citizenry, and the extent that this was applied to the whole population of France by monarchists such as the Duke of
across Europe, initially in a non-military sense (it saw its ideals as universal). Revolutionary armies were welcomed in places like the Low Countries and in parts of Germany where they found local Jacobin clubs\textsuperscript{311} sympathetic to the ideals of the revolution. However, both sides in the early wars increasingly came to see the whole population of their enemy as combatants. Equally by 1795, France’s war aims were no longer particularly linked to the ideals of the revolution but aimed at conventional conquest of its enemies\textsuperscript{312} (and vice versa).

Just as war exhaustion in the middle years of the seventeenth century contributed to a ‘plateau’ period of ostensible acquiescence to just war principles—on paper, if not always internalized—so has the devastation of the twentieth century’s world wars generated what might be called ‘moral exhaustion,’ in the sense that society could no longer tolerate the cost, either in terms of lives lost or property destroyed. This, in turn, has led to a resurrection of just war theory—interestingly, in both its religious and secular (or ‘legalist’) formats. Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons has affected notions of war in terms of just war theories. Nonetheless, it does not mean that such weapons did alter the anarchical character of the international order.\textsuperscript{313} Apart from the lively discussion of the morality of nuclear weapons among the western scholars, the spread of those weapons became a new theme in the context of each state’s political and international relations to the other states.

These debates on Just War (and the extent that nuclear weapons lead to a totally new framework) are now discussed in the connect of current Korean Christian attitudes toward war and security matters, in particular, procurement of nuclear weapons. However, what is clear is the extent to which Nuclear Weapons change the pre-1945 understanding of Just War. The scope for devastation, and the lack of any meaningful ability to limit the consequential damage, means their use (or even the concept of deterrence) cannot be justified in terms of Christian Just War theology.

Brunswick (who threatened to kill the whole population of Paris if the king was put to death) but also informed the actions of Republican troops once they crossed the boundaries of pre-revolutionary France. See for example, discussions in Ruth Scurr, \textit{Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution} (London: Vintage Books, 2006)

\textsuperscript{311} Slavoj Zizek, \textit{Robespierre Virtue and Terror} (London: Verso, 2007)

\textsuperscript{312} Karl Marx, \textit{The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte}, Selected Works (London: Laurence and Wishart, 1970)

\textsuperscript{313} Joseph Nye, Jr., \textit{Understanding International Conflicts}, p. 109
This has substantial implications for the positions that should be adopted by the Korean Protestant Churches. The extent to which this is the case is returned to in Chapter 5.
Part III: Modern Day Korea, Unification, Nuclear Weapons and the Protestant Response
Chapter 4: Development of the Protestant Community in South Korea from the 1940s: Debates about National Unity and Missio Dei

1. Context

The previous sections have explored the evolution of Christian thinking about Just War and its developments in the nuclear era. The next stage is to place those debates into a specifically Korean dimension. The post-war period saw the Christian community (and Korea) divided in a way that was alien in the recent history of the peninsular. There may have been a lack of independence but there had always been a unitary state covering the ethnic and geographic area. The other major factor was a continuation of the military violence that had marked the previous 50 years. This period saw actual armed conflict up to 1953 followed by an uneasy truce. This meant the Christian community had to respond to internal division and the realities of armed conflict.

To a large extent the initial response was to stress unity (koimoina) and Missio Dei rather than to ground the debates in the concepts of Just War. Divergent strands in the Protestant community (the CCK and the NCCK) share a desire for Korean unity but differ in the approach they take. This difference has become especially important since it became obvious that the DPRK was first seeking and then possessed nuclear weapons. The NCCK started to place the priority on ridding the peninsular of nuclear weapons by engagement with the DPRK as a precondition for unity. The CCK took a view that the only way to unity was first to seek the overthrow of the DPRK.

Neither response is actually particularly in tune with the Christian view of Just War, especially as articulated in response to the possession or use of nuclear weapons. This chapter starts to pull these themes together and commences by looking at the evolution of nuclear weapons policy in the South and the Christian response to this.

2. The Presence of Nuclear Weapons in South Korea
In 1953 South Korea entered into a Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States that established “a number of U.S. military bases in Korea. In addition to the deployment of nuclear weapons, the U.S. reserved the right of first use of nuclear weapons, not only to deter but also to repel any attack on South Korea.” Thus, at the outset, South Korea was an object of consideration in the prospective use of nuclear weapons, should hostilities resume on the peninsula, but not a determining agent of the manner or situations in which those same weapons would be applied.

However, Korean regimes from the 1950s to, at least formally, 1975 also sought to develop nuclear weapons in their own right. This is regularly associated with the military dictatorship of General Park Chung-hee (1917-1979) though Korean efforts in establishing a nuclear engineering knowledge base can be traced back in time to the brief Chang Myon government (1960-1961). The initial development of nuclear technology was almost certainly economically inspired—one intended to develop a sustainable source of electric power, independent of foreign energy sources (primarily imported oil, as Korea has modest indigenous coal resources). It appears that Korean nuclear development remained primarily peace-oriented or, perhaps more accurately, industry-oriented. South Korea’s first research reactor turned operational in November 1962.

As a practical issue, South Korea in the 1950s was in no position to develop an independent nuclear weapons arsenal. The nation lacked the required industrial base. A cadre of trained physicists, nuclear and chemical engineers, and industrial technicians would imply at least a decade to acquire. There was no national political incentive to proceed in such an endeavour. Nonetheless, in the late 1950s South Korea embarked on a peaceful nuclear program that, at the least, had the

314 Ibid.
315 General Park led the coup d’etat that established the dictatorship in 1961. He was the leading member of the military junta until his assassination in 1979. Despite Park’s death the military junta maintained itself in power until 1993. It is described below.
316 Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments’
317 Christopher Hughes, British political scientist, has outlined the fundamental limitations. “[Nuclear] proliferation is governed by practical considerations of available technological capacity to master nuclear weapons technology. States may be able to access nuclear weaponry either through their indigenous technological capacity or through plugging into international networks of technologists… The lack of technological capability will mean that, even if tempted to go nuclear, states simply cannot do so.” Christopher Hughes, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,’ Asia Policy, No. 3, January 2007, p. 82
potential to become a nuclear weapons program. According to Pinkston, a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Seoul, the peaceful nuclear program was a smoke screen “to establish the infrastructure to sustain a nuclear development program.”

Of course, other countries, including the UK, lied about the reasons for their ostensibly civil nuclear programmes in the 1950s. Sellafield, as an example, was never designed to produce electricity and always to generate fissile material for nuclear weapons.

While these efforts remained ostensibly non-defence oriented in the years that followed, matters took an abrupt turn in 1968.

The rationale behind this ‘nuclear turn’ seems to be a combination of fear that the US would abandon South Korea and a response to continued DPRK aggression. The latter was clearly exemplified in January 1968 when a raid by a group of North Korean commandos, in an apparent effort to decapitate the South Korean government, “nearly succeeded in mounting a sneak attack on the presidential palace.”

President Park responded to this provocation with the announcement that Korea would seek a ‘self-reliant’ defence, i.e., one not contingent on American oversight. This, of course, indicates that the Park government had already given serious consideration to reorienting the direction of Korea’s nuclear development program along military lines.

More unsettling than any assassination attempt however, were very strong hints of an incipient reduction in the American military presence in the Far East, as part of what came to be known as the ‘Guam Doctrine or Nixon Doctrine.’

In January 1969, President-elect Richard Nixon announced the U.S. disengagement out of Asia, including Korea. This was a grave security concern to pro-US regimes.

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318 Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments’
320 Mark B. M. Suh, ‘The “Korea Question” and the Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia,’ p. 228
321 “…in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” President Nixon's Speech on “Vietnamization,” November 3, 1969 http://vietnam.vassar.edu/doc14.html, accessed on March 6, 2006.
across Asia and South Korea.322 This decision, perhaps even more than the North Korean attempt on his life, encouraged General Park to opt for an independent Korean nuclear capacity. He responded to Nixon’s decision stating, “South Korea will do everything necessary, including developing nuclear weapons, to defend itself if the United States withdraws its nuclear umbrella.”323

In summary, “South Korea began a nuclear weapons program in 1970, in response to Nixon Doctrine’s emphasis on self-defence for Asian allies. Following the withdrawal of 26,000 American troops [the Seventh Infantry Division, assigned to Korea for almost two decades], the South Korean government established a Weapons Exploitation Committee, which decided to pursue nuclear weapons.”324

Ironically the year in which South Korea formally abandoned its nuclear weapons (1975) also saw the defeat of the US backed forces in Vietnam. In the light of this rationale, it is unclear why General Park’s government should have agreed to the American political solution. Indeed, as American strategic analyst Edward Olsen observed, “The Park government was motivated [to develop a nuclear weapons capability] by a combination of a desire for nationalistic self-reliance and anxieties in the post-Vietnam War context about the reliability of the U.S. strategic commitment to the ROK.”325

Nonetheless, the Republic of Korea ratified the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on April 23, 1975, thus officially ending the nation’s efforts to develop nuclear warfare capability. South Korea’s ratification of the NPT was largely a function of political pressure exerted by the United States. This extended to trade sanction threats against such American trading partners as France (which had contracted with Korea to provide a plutonium reprocessing facility) and Canada (contracted to provide a heavy water reactor capable of producing weapons-grade

322 Mark B. M. Suh, ‘The ‘Korea Question’ and the Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia,’ p. 228
plutonium), and these trade agreements were eventually rescinded. The American *quid pro quo* for Korean acquiescence to the NPT was a guarantee of South Korea’s national integrity.

What is not clear, according to Global Security, is whether South Korea really renounced the search for nuclear weapons in 1975. They note “Although President Park Chung-hee said in 1977 that South Korea would not develop nuclear weapons, he continued a clandestine program that only ended with his assassination in October 1979.” Daniel A. Pinkston, an American national security analyst, confirms this assessment in part, but argues further, that the development program did not die with the President. “Presidents Park Chung Hee, Chun Du Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo later pledged to forgo the development of nuclear weapons, but there are reports that all three governments seriously considered a nuclear weapon option while expanding the nuclear power program.”

According to Global Security, for instance, “South Korea may have had plans in the 1980s to develop nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the North. The plans were reported to have been dropped under U.S. pressure.” For the U.S. government a nuclear armed South Korea was not desirable either for the regional balance of power or the U.S. hegemony in the region.

In partial confirmation of this, the Korean government recently reported to the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) that in “the early 1980s, a laboratory scale experiment had been performed at this facility to irradiate 2.5 kilograms of depleted uranium and separate a small amount of plutonium.” And, in 2004, Korean research facilities, evidently conducting clandestine research efforts in

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328 Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments’.
331 Ibid.
violation of existing agreements between South Korea and the IAEA, produced minute quantities of weapons grade enriched uranium, although, officially at least, “the government of the Republic of Korea did not have an enrichment or reprocessing program at all, and do not have and will not have that enrichment or reprocessing facilities [at any time in the future].” Simply stated, it appears that for the past three decades there has been at least some distance between official public policy relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Republic of Korea (absolute forbearance) and the actual reality (applicable research efforts of perhaps varying degrees of intensity).

Overall, among South Koreans there have been arguments for the necessity of nuclear weapons, and a revival of the plans, whenever military tensions between South and North Korea have been raised. Koreans have long manifested ambivalence at the prospect of nuclear weapons development. Thousands of Koreans, forcibly recruited and transported to Japan to perform industrial labour in support of the latter’s war effort, were incinerated during the atomic strikes on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. By the same token, the North Korean assault on South Korea in 1950 underlined the existential threat posed by a communist dictatorship determined to unify the peninsula under draconian Marxist rule. While United Nations and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces managed to secure what would eventually become the ‘armistice’ border—roughly following the 38th parallel that had originally divided the two Koreas in 1946—South Korea was physically devastated and, for practical purposes, dependent on the United States to secure its national integrity.

Interestingly, successive South Korean governments, irrespective of their dictatorial

332 According to Daniel A. Pinkston, “Initially, in September 2004, the South Korean government claimed that the uranium enrichment experiments were ‘isolated, laboratory-scale scientific experiments conducted at the initiative of a small number of scientists [quoting Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials].’ Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun caused a stir when it reported in an interview with former President Kim Young-sam that the experiments were for ‘nuclear development,’ that there was no way the South Korean president could be unaware of such experiments, and that South Korean scientists are not free to conduct experiments as they please. President Kim said the Mainichi Shimbun (Japanese newspaper) was misleading, and he claimed that he was unaware of any such experiments during his tenure of office.” Daniel A. Pinkston, ‘South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments’

333 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: South Korea [and] Special Weapons,’ Global Security

334 “It is estimated that more than 100,000 Koreans died or suffered severely from the blasts.” Mark B. M. Suh, ‘The ‘Korea Question’ and the Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia,’ Korean Peninsula: Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue, Report to the Conference, Rome, June 2, 2000, p. 228
or democratic natures, have pursued long-range missile delivery systems. For example,

“South Korea began deploying US-made missiles in December 2003 that can strike most of North Korea. The Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A missiles are being deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. South Korea deployed 110 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 300 km (187 miles) by April 2004. This marks the first time that South Korea will deploy 300-km medium-range missiles, which are capable of striking Pyongyang and other key North Korean cities.”

It is against this context, that the Protestant community sought to address the issue of nuclear weapons and the danger that any further armed conflict could lead to the destruction of the entire peninsula. In this process, more emphasis has been put on ways to achieve re-unification than on taking into account the precepts of Just War.

2.1. Considering South Korean Nuclear Initiatives in Terms of Just War Theory

Given the constraints outlined above, it becomes possible to establish the just war parameters that limited strategic planning of successive post-war South Korean governments. At its most fundamental level, global Korean government planning points to a teleological (as opposed to deontological) mode of thinking. Deontology, as outlined previously, refers to constraints established by (often abstract) duties. Yet the primary—indeed, the most fundamental—duty of the state is to secure the survival and to maximum extent within its power, the well being of its citizenry. Other duties, however noble, must assume a lesser status in practice. Again as outlined above, teleological thinking presupposes that a consideration of ends may provide a justification of the means availed of to achieve these; to such an extent that the possession of a nuclear retaliatory capacity provides the necessary measure of security to a nation.

335 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: South Korea [and] special weapons,’ Global Security
336 In theological terms, the divine mandate of the state, according to Yoder’s definition, is to prevent evil by using evil means in order to survive in the fallen world. However, Yoder argues “This [using violence] does not mean that God considers either the violence or the selfishness to be a good thing, or that God wills them...However, since humanity has fallen away from God. God permits human evil to keep itself under control by using evil against itself.” John H. Yoder, Discipleship as Political Responsibility, p. 18
There remain the issues of *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*. The *jus ad bellum* consideration is quite straightforward. Given inherent design limitations on both weapons and delivery vehicles, no South Korean government appears to have considered initiating a nuclear conflict as reasonable means of resolving the north-south dispute. Rather, the purpose of such munitions was to deter a North Korean onslaught. The *jus in bello* component of the moral equation is more complex.

As outlined in Part I, a major natural law constraint inherent in *jus in bello* is that of proportionality. As noted, Hugo Grotius argued that in the conduct of military operations it is essential to discriminate between non-combatants and combatants. In this regards, Nuclear Weapons, no matter how tightly constrained in targeting and technical marksmanship, when used in the proximity of civilian installations, will generally cause a great number of fatalities and substantial destruction of non-military assets, generally described as ‘collateral damage.’

Quite obviously, South Korean planners have rejected such anti-nuclear absolutist thinking of secularists such as Michael Walzer or the devoutly religious John Howard Yoder.

On the other hand, both Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsay situate their thinking related to nuclear weapons’ use in terms of civilizational implications. They permit the use of nuclear weapons in case that human civilization is endangered by a certain factor such as impending military threats by totalitarian states. Likewise, to the extent that South Korean government planners have sought to secure the citizenry from totalitarian rule—and it may be reasonably inferred that such a goal, along with national survival itself, was a consideration—development of such weapons could be acceptable and justifiable, as far as Niebuhrians were concerned. Deterrence itself may be considered in this context.

As outlined in Part I, one of the components of just war, as understood by Thomas Aquinas, was that belligerents “intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of

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338 See Part I for a discussion of their thinking on weapons of mass destruction.
339 Cf. Wesley Campbell, ‘Democracy and the Church: the Allure of Politics’
evil." It would inferentially appear that maintaining a stockpile of nuclear weapons, intended to be used solely in response to a particularly grave and patent provocation (i.e., one that threatened the continued existence of the state or its citizenry) would minimally constitute an effort to bring about the ‘avoidance of evil’, incurred should a nuclear attack be initiated.

Understood in terms of the above-described parameters, South Korean strategic nuclear planning seems to have been governed by much the same considerations that defined the thinking of those planners who devised the nuclear arsenals of the western democracies during the 1950s and 1960s—preventing nuclear war through deterrence and, should deterrence fail, having a war fighting and defence capability that would at least set up some limits on non-combatant casualties.

**2.2. Christian Perspectives**

As noted above, the Christian perspective has had to deal with two inter-linked issues: The presence of nuclear weapons (first American and then Korean) and the desire for unity.

The development of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear arsenals have engaged moralists wherever such programs have been undertaken. Quite obviously, in totalitarian states such considerations have remained muted (e.g., the former Soviet Union). In other regimes (e.g., Great Britain) such efforts have generated national discussion, once they have become public. In Korean religious circles, a similar discussion began in the 1970’s when South Korean Christians realized a necessity of national *koinonia*, ‘reunification of South and North Korea’, although it does not appear to have engaged the general citizenry. In this regard, such national

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340 Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologica*, II, 2, Question 40 (art. 1)
342 The post-war Atlee government made the decision to develop British nuclear weapons in absolute secrecy and even hid this from most of the Cabinet. See: Peter Hennessy, *Never Again: Britain 1945-51*, Penguin Books, 1992, London, for a detailed discussion of how this was kept secret (though not, of course, from the Soviets who knew about it from the very start).
343 This discussion was initiated by the NCCK. It is described afterwards. The moral discussion of the weapons in the western world appeared some later than the immediate post-war period. There was considerable popular opposition to proceeding with the development of a nuclear arsenal. Indeed, it

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arguments on nuclear weapons do not occur as a single isolated issue but rather integrated into the larger skein of moral values that are reflected in the nation’s public policies. Moreover, ‘larger skein of moral values’ will almost certainly likewise reflect whatever singular characteristics are to be found in the history of Korean Christianity progression.

As outlined in Chapter 1, Christianity first arrived in Korea filtered through the thinking of an elite that was used to the concepts of neo-Confucian scholars. While this did not necessarily have implications for a proper understanding of fundamental Christian doctrine, it did have a profound—although perhaps only tacitly appreciated—implication in understanding the proper organisation of Christian koinonia.

Just as Confucian principles were predicated in a manner to make the ruler’s actions look like he dispensed the ‘mandate of heaven,’ so did the civilian leaders of a prospectively Christianized Korea act in a manner as if same would foster the interests of what amounted to a national koinonia. Given this precept, national unity—understood in ethnic terms—could take on a religious tint that might be less strong in other Christian communities. Furthermore, it should be understood that such a goal was one of inclusion and not one of exclusivity. At least in some respects it is a goal predicated on the (quite reasonable) assumption that a basic purpose of the properly functioning koinonia is that of prospering the salvation of souls.

Thus, civil policies inhibiting such development of prospective ‘national’ koinonia—and a nuclear weapons program was identified as such—became not only civilly suspicious but also morally repugnant. At this point the debate on Korean unity – koinonia – and the Just War rejection of nuclear weapons becomes entwined. This line of reasoning indeed provides an explanation for the regularly expressed

only became politically feasible when the Soviet Union’s aggressive international efforts became patent and, for that matter, when the first Soviet nuclear device was tested (1949). Thereafter, religious opposition to the continued procurement of nuclear weapons remained largely a function of theologians, with the arguable exception of the laity in those Christian communities traditionally identified with pacifism (e.g., Mennonites).

344 The issue of venerating ancestors is an arguable exception. However, it is now generally accepted that Christians can, in good conscience, venerate (in the sense of publicly manifesting respect) their antecedents. What they are forbidden to do is worship them (in the sense that they have in some manner become deified).
commonality of purpose in opposing nuclear weapons development and the achievement of Korean national unity.\textsuperscript{345}

Considered in this context, for any thoughtful Korean Christians, the nuclear issue cannot be merely reduced to a political or military issue, subject to State-emanated resolution. The presence of such weapons must be considered in terms of their prospective aggravation of personal antagonism and national hatreds extending many decades back. The division of Korea, no matter how unintentional it was, challenged the view that God’s creational order was for Koreans to live in harmony. Therefore, Korean Christians believe they have a duty to address the situation created wherein one nation has—or will soon enough have—a modest nuclear arsenal and is also equipped with panoply of high technology weaponry, functioning under aegis of the American nuclear umbrella.\textsuperscript{346} Nonetheless, before such matters may be addressed, Christian considerations on nuclear weapons and their relationship to the moral mandates established under just war theory must be made more minutely than discussed in the second and third chapters.

3. Korean Church’s Response: The NCCK

3.1 The Development of the NCCK’s Political Position in the 1950s

Institutional opposition to the development mass destruction weapons has been mainly a function of the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK). In at least some senses, this opposition represents a departure from the traditional ‘public face’ of the organization that dates back over eight decades,\textsuperscript{347} that of fostering irenic solutions to prospectively (or actively) violent national political divisions. Its efforts to promote justice made Christianity synonymous with this in the eyes of many


\textsuperscript{346} These issues are treated at length in chapter 6 of this study.

\textsuperscript{347} The NCCK began as the Korean National Council of Protestant Churches (KNCP) on September 24, 1924
Koreans, thus putting into practice the observation by German theologian Jurgen Moltmann, “the role of Christians does not politicize churches but rather Christianizes their political existence.”

For much of its post-war existence the NCCK remained either on friendly terms with or tacitly tolerant of whichever regime was in power. To cite a circumstance, in 1945 Korea was divided into South and North along the Thirty-Eighth Parallel by the Allies (primarily the United States and the former Soviet Union). The NCCK thus became a council only for churches in South Korea. Churches in the North were persecuted and most were closed by the Communist regime.

The South Korean government at the time of liberation was friendly to Christian churches because the first President, Rhee Syng-man, was a Christian elder who had lasting friendships with numerous Christian leaders. The Rhee government showed preferential treatment to the Christian Church. For instance, they supported Christian evangelism in the army and national prisons and also suppressed the missionary efforts of non-Christian religions. In return, the NCCK president Chun Phil-soon and the other Christian leaders threw their full political support behind him helping Rhee’s election campaign.

After an armistice was agreed to end the Korean War (June 1953), the somewhat

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349 According to Han Gil-soo and Kim Andrew E. Kim, the division of the peninsula was resulted from the political interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. “It had little to do with the wishes of the Korean people, but mainly served the needs of the United States and the Soviet Union. The division partitioned Korean land, separated families and people, caused an unbridgeable rift in ideology, and divided political and economic systems.” Han Gil-soo and Andrew E. Kim, The Korean Christian Movement towards Reunification of the Two Koreas: a Review in Retrospect, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, Vo. 6, No. 3, October, 2006, p. 236.
350 The Northern regime established the Korean Christian Federation (hereafter KCF) in November, 1946 and it placed the North Korean church leaders who supported the regime in this institution. However, it soon became a nominal body as the regime defined all kinds of religions as enemies of Communism.
351 Rhee studied at Princeton University and obtained a Ph.D. in Politics in 1910. During the Japanese occupation, he was elected president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in exile to Shanghai in 1919. But he was impeached by the interim government and went to the United States again. It is known that he had worked there for national independence. After the independence from Japan, he was elected the first president of South Korea with the support of the U.S. military government. His presidency lasted until April 1960. This is in contrast to Kim Il-sung, the first supreme leader of North Korea, who studied in Moscow and was backed by the Soviet Union. To see how much Rhee was inclined towards Christianity from the beginning of his presidency, see Kang In-cheol, The Korean Church and State and Society 1945-1960, p. 168.
352 Ibid., p. 166.
Christian-oriented government of President Rhee Syng-man turned towards repression. At this stage neither the NCCK, nor for that matter, any other major Christian group expressed any public support for the pro-democracy demonstrators. According to Kang Wi-jo,

“During this epoch-making event, known as the ‘April Student Revolution,’ the church communities remained silent. Not only did Christians fail to object, but the Christian churches were known to be closely associated with Rhee. No church body or other Christian organization spoke out in support of the student movement at this time.”

This would come back to haunt the NCCK a year later, following a military coup d’état when the new governing junta mentioned earlier disturbances as a reason. Barely nine months after assuming office, Chang Myon’s government (or Huh Chung cabinet) was overthrown by a military coup (July 1961) and replaced by a military junta.

The military coup’s leader, General Park Chung-hee, was a devout Buddhist. Park instituted a policy intended to unite Korean nationalism with the religious beliefs of its Buddhist adherents. Despite this modest reorientation in domestic policy, the military junta and the NCCK were at least tacitly united in their opposition to the communist government in North Korea.

In addition, at least some of Korea’s church leaders hoped that the government’s enforced public order approach would lead to faster economic development. In turn such an outcome might lead to a return to a more democratic regime in such manner.

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353 Rhee’s government crisis point came about with the ‘April student revolution.’ Actually, it was irenic mass demonstration organized people who were longing for Korean democracy. For details, see Kang Wi-jo, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: a History of Christianity and Politics (New York: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 91ff
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid., p. 91.
356 Kang In-chel, The Korean Church and State and Society, 1945-1960, Hankuk Gidokkoyhoewa Kukka Simin Sahoe 1945-1960, written in Korean (Seoul: Korean Christian History Institute, 1996), p. 190 There is at least a case to be made that Park was attempting to replicate among Buddhists the long-established popular association of Christianity with Korean nationalism, that had developed since the 18th century.
357 This commonality of interest put the NCCK at odds with their organizational counterparts in the Europe and the United States. For example, the NCCK supported the Korean government’s decision to send troops to Vietnam in support of the effort to resist communization of that nation. Likewise, the NCCK opposed the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations. Both of these stances were contrary to positions taken by the World Council of Churches (WCC).
that it would encourage peaceful reunification with the North. Effectively they saw the potential of a trade off between a short period of authoritarian rule laying the basis for economic growth. In reality, “the South Korean military government vigorously pursued economic development and this in turn was intended to legitimize their dictatorial governance.” In other words, economic growth was not a precondition for a return to democracy but to be used to justify ongoing authoritarian rule.

3.2. The NCCK Shifts Its Public Orientation: The Attractions of Missio Dei

Faced with the challenge of a divided country, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in power across the divide and the presence of nuclear weapons the NCCK grounded its initial response more in terms of Missio Dei theology rather than using the concepts of Just War. To some extent this mirrors the earlier response to Japanese occupation where the goal was to preserve aspects of Korean culture and the resistance was seen in terms of biblical examples of captivity.

‘Missio Dei’—‘mission of God’—is used to describe those efforts of a socio-political nature undertaken by the churches to foster government programs and policies that reflect gospel values. In its twentieth century application, the argument has its origins in an ecumenical conference held at Willingen, Germany, in 1952. Put simply, Missio Dei accepts as a fundamental proposition that preaching the gospel (evangelization) cannot be isolated from social nor political contexts of people’s lives. Missio Dei considers that the nature of the Church is not only to serve the world through evangelism by proclaiming Jesus Christ’s message but also to participate in this world through prophetic proclamation and witness.

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358 See, e.g., Han Gil-soo and Andrew E. Kim, ‘The Korean Christian Movement towards Reunification of the Two Koreas,’ p. 23 There appears to be at least some historical support for such an outcome. Chile, for example, under the aegis of the often quite brutal Pinochet military regime, enjoyed enormous economic growth—growth that has been sustained under a more democratic and politically responsive government.


360 For an overview of the proceedings of the Willingen Conference, including a retrospective on its accomplishments and limitations, see International Review of Mission, October 1, 2003.

361 The Third World Mission Conference at Tambaram in India in 1938 suggested that the Church should participate in social issues in order to build the Kingdom of God in this world, introducing the concept of structural evil. ‘Tambaram Revisited, Papers and Reports of a Consultation on Dialogue and Mission,’ International Review of Mission, Vol. 78, No. 307, July 1988, pp. 366-7.
However, the NCCK’s earlier intimate relationship with the Rhee government, had put the church organization in the position of having tacitly supported or failed to object to that government’s malfeasance. One outcome of that relationship became evident in the aftermath of the 1961 coup d’etat. The Buddhist-oriented military regime, upon identifying the NCCK with the ousted Rhee government, was not only ill disposed towards this particular Christian congregation; it was less than cordial in its relations with Christians in general. It was in this context that the above-described Missio Dei precepts flourished. Freed from any residual conformity with the state, the NCCK was at liberty to preach social justice and respect for human rights. The church group’s goals for society (or perhaps better, the Korean koinonia) were expressed independently of whatever specific regime enjoyed political supremacy.

Having been forcibly removed from direct political influence, the NCCK was free to accept Missio Dei as an essentially religious vehicle for advancing ideas regularly associated with the political realm, although with significant moral components. During the period of the Park dictatorship, the great majority of Koreans found Kim Il-sung’s communist regime in Pyongyang even more odious than that of the generals. By the late 1970s however, a significant component of NCCK leaders had concluded that the democratic movement would be restricted at best to modest achievements as long as Korea was divided in two.

Thus, the goal of national unity was subsumed under the general rubric of the restoration of democratic norms and by extension, improved prospects for the eventual establishment of a Korean koinonia. Indeed, theologian Moon Ik-hwan, one of the first public proponents of reconciliation between the two Koreas, argued, “the [peaceful] reunification of Korea is premised on democratization and vice versa. We Koreans cannot imagine the one without the other, because only a reunified Korea will guarantee the people’s sovereignty.” This perception of a nexus between reunification and the expansion of Korean democracy would take root and flourish in ensuing years.

362 Rhee’s cabinet was found guilty of electoral fraud, pre-marking thousands of ballots before the general election. Kang Wi-jo, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea, p. 91.
As far as the NCCK was concerned, its member churches—some of which (e.g., the Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea [PROK]) had adopted the Missio Dei model beforehand—voted at the 23rd NCCK General Assembly (1970) to commit the organization to a more public stand on political issues impinging on the conduct of Christian life. Needless to say, there were historical examples in Korea of such activity avant la lettre stated as such,

“Shin Hung-woo, who participated in [the 1928 world missionary conference held at] Jerusalem as leader of the Korean YMCA, said that the church must become a witness for the social salvation of farmers. Thus, faith was linked with social commitment. Missio Dei, in the wide sense, began with the educational movement in rural areas, and took shape in the 1960s during the development debate in Urban Rural Mission and the debate on indigenous theology.”

This adoption of Missio Dei coincided with the NCCK and its member churches became increasingly public in their opposition to the military dictatorship. As was to be expected, ROK leaders became wary of such developments. The Park regime’s response to this perceived threat to its legitimacy was both brutal and abrupt. Thirty-four pastors and missionaries of NCCK member churches were arrested and jailed following non-violent opposition to the regime’s 1974 suspension of the National Constitution, an act intended to facilitate perpetuation of the military junta in government. Hundreds of Christians were arrested and subjected to torture.

This public display of opposition to Korea’s military dictatorship was preceded by a formal manifesto—‘Theological Declaration of Korean Christians’ (May 20, 1973)—which defined Christian opposition to the regime in distinctly religious terms. “Christians are fighters against the power of evil… Thus, the Church is commanded to fight suppression, on the side of the poor and oppressed, to liberate them and to restore their human rights… The Church is not an organization that intends to take political power, but, in order to carry out its mission, the Church sometimes positioned in conflict with political power.”


365 Committee for Publication of History of Christianity in North Korea, History of Christianity in North Korea, Bukkhan Kyohoesa, written in Korean, the Institute for Korean Church History (IKCH) (Seoul: IKCH, 1996), p. 433

366 ‘Theological Statement of Korean Christians,’ May 20, 1973 This statement is shown in appendix of Christian Society Institute of Soongsil (ed.), University, Development of Korean Society and a Role
The theological foundation for the Missio Dei includes at least three factors. First, the desire for peace in Korea starts with an understanding of Jesus Christ as the ‘servant of peace’. In terms of Korean politics, the NCCK confesses that Jesus came to proclaim God’s kingdom of peace, reconciliation and liberation for the oppressed and the poor. Therefore, they understood ‘Acts 10:36-40’ as follows: “Jesus Christ suffered, died upon the Cross, was buried, and rose in the Resurrection to reconcile humanity to God, to overcome divisions and conflicts and to liberate all people and make them one.”

When confronted with the numerous political injustices of the ROK dictatorship, the NCCK tacitly ascribed sinfulness to acquiescence to such patent evils. This was made clear in a public statement.

“[The NCCK] encourages the Korean churches and Christians to be light and salt to build a society where God’s love and peace, and justice and human dignity are fully realized. The NCCK calls on the Korean churches and Christians to practice their belief in God’s love by responding to the needs of people and serving Korean society and churches, and the country and the world.”

In addition to criticising the Park regime’s domestic repression the NCCK started to address the issue of reconciliation between the two Koreas, through active participation in the peace movement. The NCCK concluded that true peace for all Koreans would never be achieved without reconciliation with the northern part of Korea (i.e., the DPRK).

However, this was not expressed in terms of Just War theology – ie what steps would be acceptable to defend the South and how far should the DPRK be challenged.
militarily. Nor did the presence of US nuclear weapons become a particular focus for protest.

Instead the NCCK’s ‘A Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’ (or so-called 1988 Declaration) stresses that: “We Christians must practise the gospel of peace and reconciliation so that the just and peaceful kingdom of God may come (Eph 2.14-17), and to bring this about we must share in the suffering of our people.” This passage is suggested as ‘the basic principles of the churches of Korea for national reunification’ Sebastian Kim evaluates this declaration as follows:

“The Declaration has led to the issue of reunification becoming part of the key agenda of Korean Christians and has challenged many conservative sections of the church to rethink their traditional approaches toward the North, moving from evangelism or relief to partnership for the coming goal of peace and reconciliation.”

In this regard, applying to Korean political division St. Paul’s admonition that all Christians have been called to work as apostles of peace, the NCCK proclaimed that “God has commanded the Korean churches to undertake the mission of overcoming today's harsh reality of our one people divided between north and south in confrontation, and we are thus obligated to work for the realization of unification and peace [Mt 5.23-24].” This was interpreted through Missio Dei theology, to invite all Korean churches to take part in peace work leading to reconciliation between the two Koreas, and followed naturally from the focus on good governance in the ROK.

Thus, peace and reconciliation with North Korea came to be seen as essential pre-conditions for resolving the political differences dividing the Korean Peninsula. The NCCK called this “humanizing society and politics.” For ecumenical Christians, ‘humanizing society and politics’ means re-establishing the creational order of God.

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371 ‘A Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace,’ the 37th NCCK General Assembly Report, NCCK Archive, the NCCK, February 29, 1988  
373 Col. 3:15  
374 ‘A Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’  
375 Ibid.  
In these terms a peaceful state is held to define the Kingdom of God.

3.3. The NCCK and its Issue of National Unity in the Post-Park Years

General Park Chung-hee was assassinated at a dinner party in 1979, evidently at the behest of Kim Jae-kyu, former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). This act precipitated yet another military coup, with the ostensible purpose of maintaining national security in a period of crisis. This overtly unconstitutional act—one no more legitimate than the one that brought General Park to power in 1961—persuaded the NCCK and the millions of Korean citizens as well, that their interests no longer shared common ground with those of the new military junta.

In the face of student protests in Kwangju in south-western Korea, after first isolating the city from outside observers, Chun ordered paratroopers into the city with instructions to end any anti-government activity, irrespective of the cost in lives and property. Hundreds of civilians were killed and, to this day, thousands are still listed as missing. The assault on the Kwangju Democratic Movement was among the most notorious in Korean History. It also cost the Chun-led military junta all moral standing it might have otherwise enjoyed among Korean populace. Equally important, this atrocity crystallized the NCCK collective thinking on reunification. According to Hanshin University Christian History professor Yeon Kyu-hong,

“the NCCK realized that the Korean government’s monopoly of the issue of reunification was a major drawback in bringing about peace in the peninsula and argued that the whole Korean people, not just the government, were responsible for achieving such reunification. Moreover, the NCCK realized that reunification is not only about resolving regional conflicts, but part of ‘God’s effort’ attempting to rescue humans from destruction and death.”

This thinking set the stage for both increased interaction between Christian groups from both Koreas and almost, accidently, raised the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

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378 This matter, including the divisions it generated among South Korea’s churches, is discussed at length in the next chapter.
Prominent among NCCK reunification arguments was an absolute rejection of violence as a means of achieving the objective. At its 38th General Assembly (1989) the NCCK pronounced a moral veto on any kind of war or violence as a settlement for reunification, confirming that resorting to force is opposed to God’s way of resolving conflicts. Peace in their understanding means ‘shalom.’ Shalom is regularly translated as ‘peace of God,’ a condition in which man and society have been made morally whole—‘unthinkable [of attainment] without obedience to Yahweh’s law.’

What is Yahweh’s law? It is the Messiah who reveals God’s wisdom and also overcomes acts of violence and brings peace. Moltmann explains both ‘why and how’ of Jesus Christ’s representation of Yahweh’s law when he said, “Not in only evil but also the law of the retribution of evil with evil; not only acts of violence but also the limitation of them by violent resistance is done away with.” The late Mennonite pacifist John Howard Yoder likewise viewed Christ and his work in this manner. In particular, Yoder clarifies a meaning of political being in the Christian realm stating, “The difference between church and state, or between a faithful and an unfaithful church, is not that one is political and the other not but that they are political in different ways.” ‘Political in different ways’ can be understood as meaning that the church has a different standard or ‘yardstick’ distinct from the world’s ‘mode of measure’ when faced with evil. The church’s mission to transform the world into what Christ intended must be pursued non-violently and peacefully, in contrast to courses of action regularly undertaken by civil authorities.

From this perspective, the NCCK considers the present state of ‘peace’ between the two Koreas to be morally suspicious, in that it validates an indefensible national division, one sustained by violence and resting tacitly on the ‘threat of use’ of nuclear weapons. It judges this state of affairs to be totally inconsistent with the peace of God.

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379 The 38th NCCK General Assembly Declaration, NCCK Archive, the NCCK, February 28, 1989
381 Jurgen Moltmann, Creating a Just Future, p. 42
382 John H. Yoder, a Mennonite Christian theologian who died in 1997, has been known as one of the distinguished scholars of Christian pacifism. He saw war as a representation of the structured insurrection of human beings against the loving will of God, contends that it is a sign of a fallen world that Christian should not love, and that the sword is characteristic of it. See John H. Yoder, Nevertheless, p. 104
as it indeed militates against the establishment of the Kingdom of God. In this regard, the NCCK has called on both Korean authorities to stop the arms race and take concrete steps to end their mutual hatred.  

4. Korean Church’s Response: The CCK

As the NCCK’s reunification movement was becoming active in the 1980’s conservative Christians felt threatened by the growing progressive voices in society. Their uneasiness became revealed when the ‘Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’ (1988) was promulgated by the NCCK. Although this declaration was the first official document that proposed concrete steps toward a peaceful resolution between North and South, the conservative Christians saw this as the NCCK’s alignment with the North, saying that

“We do not agree to what the NCCK says through the declaration. They confuse a concept of Christian peace through evangelism with that of political peace through political movements such as democratization or defending human rights...And this document seems to seek a unified country that disregards different ideologes or political systems. This is not an ideal model for peace and unification that our Christianity pursues.”

In addition, they opposed the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula that the NCCK document demanded, saying that

“There will be nobody who opposes in principle the withdrawal of the U.S. Army and their nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea. However, we do believe that peace and stability in the region is not secure without them, because the northern regime has never abandoned its intention to force their communist ideology on us. It is clear that we need them [nuclear

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385 ‘The 38th NCCK General Assembly Declaration’
386 Because a major reaction to the northern nuclear issue comes from the CCK, it is necessary to look at first the reason and process of the CCK establishment.
387 A written refutation was produced by the Korean Evangelical Fellowship (KEF), which was composed of conservative Protestant pastors. ‘The KEF Perspective on the NCCK’s Reunification Theory,’ NCCK-ui Tongilrone Daehan Bokumjooui Ipjang (1) An Understanding of Peace and Reunification, (1) Pyonghwa-wa Tongile Daehan Leehae, written in Korean, Seoul, the KEF, March 30, 1988, the NCCK Archive, the NCCK.
388 At Article 4 in the declaration, it says “At such time that a peace treaty is concluded, a verifiable state of mutual trust is restored between north and south Korea, and there are international guarantees of the peace and security of the entire Korean peninsula, then United States troops should be withdrawn and the United Nations Command in Korea should be dissolved.” ‘Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’
Soon after this row in March of 1989, a progressive Presbyterian pastor, Moon Ikwhan visited Pyonyang and met Kim Il-sung to discuss the issue of national reconciliation. This incident increased the conservative Christians distrust of the NCCK and various conservative groups and church leaders saw the visit as a grave violation of the National Security Law. In summary, the conservative’s criticisms are

“(1) the NCCK is not and cannot be representing the view and wish of the whole Christian community (2) the NCCK reunification declaration’s assertion regarding the denuclearisation and the withdrawal of US troops form South Korea is not acceptable given the presence of the belligerent North; and (3) the North Korean Christians association cannot be considered a legitimate partner for dialogue, since nothing is certain about the ‘reality’ of Christian life and practice in North Korea.”

As a result, these two incidents became the main factor that conservative Christian leaders used in establishing a counter-organization against the NCCK.

In simplest of terms, CCK member churches—in its majority although not wholly evangelical in nature—have adopted positions on both nuclear weapons development and national reunification that sharply contrast NCCK postures since the early 1990’s. This has its origins in differing interpretations of the manner in which Gospel values are to be fostered in the world. CCK churches—unlike their NCCK counterparts—ground political thinking in a theological dualism, an ongoing conflict between good and evil. This does not mean that CCK churches and their memberships are unwilling to reach out to their enemies—they are certainly imbued with the precepts formulated in the beatitudes. The CCK underlying theological thinking is explored in the next section.

4.1. The CCK Posture: Theological Orientation

The history of Korean Christian demonstrates how the nation’s first Protestant

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389 ‘The KEF Perspective on the NCCK’s Reunification Theor’
390 Han Gil-soo and Andrew E. Kim, ‘The Korean Christian Movement towards Reunification of the Two Koreas,’ pp. 245-6
converts were profoundly influenced by those western missionaries preaching fundamentalist doctrine. South Korean Minjung theologian Kwon Jin-kwan claims that “Christian fundamentalism was introduced, spread and became rooted strongly in the Korean Christian churches at the same time as the Christian Gospel was introduced by American Protestant missionaries.” These included a core-set of unquestionable beliefs such as the historical inerrancy of the Bible, Mary’s virginity when Jesus was born, the imminent physical regress of an ever-living Jesus Christ, and all believers’ physical resurrection after death. In this sense, Korean fundamentalism shares many of the general characteristics of American fundamentalism.

Despite attachment to such a specific set of beliefs, most Korean Christians do not wish to be identified as fundamentalist because the term is held to imply ‘extreme conservatism’ with negative connotations. Instead, they prefer to be referred to as ‘evangelical’. Jang Seok-man, a researcher associated with Korean Religious Studies, claims “even if most Christians in South Korea do not want be identified as fundamentalists, statistics show that at least 70-80 percent of South Korean Christians [for practical purposes are members of] fundamental-based churches.” Insofar as self-identification is concerned, the CCK as organisation and its members as faithful seldom use the term ‘fundamentalism’, preferring to describe themselves instead with a less threatening term, as is ‘conservative Christians.’ The term ‘conservatism’ contains a wide range of interpretations, principally dependent on whatever context it may be considered in. In this case, the term is used to describe a theological characteristic of the CCK. Park Chun-il, former General Secretary of the CCK (2003-2005), explains that all conservative faith could be regarded as joining evangelism with fundamentalism. Thus, CCK’s conservatism in its theological dimension may be regarded as a combination of evangelism and fundamentalism.

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392 John R.W. Stott, Fundamentalism and Evangelism (Kent: Crusade, 1956), pp. 2-5
393 Kwon Jin-kwan, ‘Minjung Theology,’ p. 75
Kwon argues that, while there is no clear difference between fundamentalists and evangelists in Korean Christianity, fundamentalists are prone to apply this dualistic view more radically towards the rest of the world. He points fundamentalists’ anticommunism as a case to consider when he states, “They believe that the U.S. is a friend, while communism is a foe. They want to rule the whole country with their version of the Christian Gospel [as a dispositive guide]... It wants to rule society by the righteous [fundamentalists], thereby evangelizing the whole of society.”

So by perceiving North Korea through a prism of good and evil, they have effectively dismissed the North Korean church’s admissibility and even validity. Kang In-cheol argues that many Christian leaders view communists as personifications of ‘Satan,’ while regarding Christians as crusaders engaged in a spiritual battle against them.

In a similar manner, this dualistic approach also seems deep-set in the NCCK. As seen above, the establishment of the CCK resulted from conservative Christians’ reaction to the progressive Christians’ efforts at seeking reconciliation with North Korea. Because they regarded (and continue to regard) the northern regime in particular and communists in general as objectively evil, no reconciliation could be sought in any manner. In this sense, the NCCK’s reconciliatory move toward North Korea is viewed by the CCK as an unacceptable action in any terms. Rev. Lee Soo-young, a minister and theologian who is in charge of one of the oldest Presbyterian Churches in South Korea, directly broached this issue stating,

“They [progressive Christians] are respected as pacifists but they are actually supporters and glorifiers of the communist idealism that had caused the purging of blood and the trampling down of freedom. They adore ex-North Korean leader Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il, adhere to and spread widely the thought of Juche and glorify communist North Korea [translation courtesy of Dr. Kwon].”

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396 Ibid., p. 76
397 Ibid., p. 78
Despite the strident nature of Lee’s sermon, it appears that the CCK, like its NCCK counterpart, is shifting its stance at least regarding its reaching out towards the North Korean people (if not to the DPRK government itself). To some extent, this change in approach seems to be a consequence of the collapse of the now defunct Soviet Union (seen by many fundamentalists as divinely inspired and perhaps a precursor of what could be in store for the DPRK). Another factor at work was purely domestic in as much as the Kim Dae-jung administration which had regularly been criticised for its affirmative efforts at reducing tensions with North Korea, now appeared to be having minimal success in this actions; as a corollary, likewise effectively diminishing the CCK’s opportunity as an alternative focus of political influence in the Korean peninsula.

For the North Korean people the collapse of the Soviet Union has had negative consequences. For decades, the DPRK had been dependent on particularly favourable trade relations and technological assistance programme with the USSR. Indeed these financial ties amounted to foreign aid intended to prop up Kim Il-sung’s communist regime. A country already beset by economic hardship was inadequately equipped to suddenly suffer the loss of such indispensable foreign support.400

Looking then towards a prospective collapse of the North Korean regime, CCK leaders embarked on efforts to define a theology of reconciliation, one supposedly better suited to anticipated change in circumstances than CCK’s rigid dualism collective outlook had to date defined. Park Joseph, Director of the CCK Mission Department identifies the ‘Lausanne Covenant’401 as playing a role in justifying more affirmative political participation. According to Park, “There were discussions about

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400 Refugee International describes the impact of changed economic circumstances on North Korea when it reported, “North Korea has limited natural resources, and its industrial economy was heavily dependent on aid and trade relations with the Soviet Union. The latter’s collapse has been a prime factor in the economic difficulties that North Korea has been experiencing over the past decade. The end of Soviet assistance and poor economic management led to the catastrophic famine in the mid-90s that killed between one and two million people.” Refugee International, ‘North Korea,’ December 2005 http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/country/detail/2945m, accessed on May 20, 2007

401 Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization introduces the Lausanne Covenant as follows: (it) “is a declaration agreed upon by more than 2,300 evangelicals during the 1974 International Congress to be more intentional about world evangelization. Since then, the Covenant has challenged churches and Christian organizations to work together to make Jesus Christ known throughout the world.” http://www.lausanne.org/Brix?pageID=12891, accessed on September 13, 2006
what were the theological reasons to back up the CCK’s participation in social matters. Although it is not clear enough to define the Lausanne Covenant as a working theology for the CCK, we found that the article 5 of the Lausanne Covenant could be the one [suitable to CCK purposes].

4.1.1. The CCK and the Lausanne Covenant

To gain a greater appreciation of the implications of the Lausanne Covenant, especially for Christians of a fundamentalist rather than evangelical tendency, a brief excursus is warranted. At the International Congress on World Evangelization (ICWE) in Lausanne, Switzerland (1974), the Secretary for Latin America Rene Padilla (International Fellowship of Evangelical Students) addressed problems inherent in the prevailing Christian evangelical model. He argued that the Christian church had accommodated itself to secular culture and as a result, “while we may still be able to see individual sins, we cannot see the sins and the evil of society.”

He went on to say that ‘the comprehensive evangelism’ which recognizes the necessity of the ‘prophetic office of the Church,’ “does not aim only at concrete repentance in society but with individuals as well.” In this regard, the covenant contributed to the growing evangelical understanding of the relationship between evangelism and social action by raising churches’ voices toward human rights, political injustices or environmental problems; all issues mentioned were either those evangelicals had not engaged in or which they had chosen not to refer to. Regarding the Christian social responsibility, the fifth article of the Lausanne Covenant is in particular primary and essential. According to German evangelical theologian Klaus Bockmuehl (1931-1989),

“righteousness [is] the concern of God himself. But God is also concerned with reconciliation and ‘the liberation of men from any kind of oppression.’ Here ‘liberation,’ the much-discussed

402 An Interview with Park Joseph at the CCK Headquarter, June 19, 2007
Article 5 says as follows: “We affirm that God is both the Creator and the Judger of all men. We therefore, should share his concern for justice and reconciliation throughout human society and for the liberation of men and women from every kind of oppression... Although reconciliation with other people is not reconciliation with God, nor is social action evangelism, nor is political liberation salvation, nevertheless we affirm that evangelism and socio-political involvement are both part of our Christian duty.” Lausanne Covenant, Article 5, ‘Christian Social Responsibility’

403 Klaus Bockmuehl, Evangelicals and Social Ethics, David T. Priestley (tr.) (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1979), p. 8
404 Ibid.

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catchword of ecumenical debate in recent years, is admitted into the text of the Lausanne Covenant, although it did not appear in the original draft. The same is true for the qualifying amplification ‘from every kind of oppression’ which does not permit ‘liberation’ to be understood only in the spiritual sense.”

Klaus explains why the statement of Article 5 distinguishes political liberation from salvation when he commented,

“John Stott in his introductory address in Lausanne made the relationship clear when he said, ‘Salvation is moral, not material.’ Salvation is from sin, not from injury. Stott sees, however, that the concepts ‘salvation’, ‘rescue’ and ‘liberation’ have the same spiritual content in the New Testament and therefore, wants to consider ‘liberation’ as a practical modern alternative term for ‘salvation,’ which has become somewhat old-fashioned. Obviously, to avoid general confusion it then should not be used at the same time for social processes.”

To the extent that some dichotomy between spiritual salvation and social liberation sustains dogmatic legitimacy, the CCK had sufficient reason to subscribe to the covenant considering that the world continued to be construed as a spiritual battleground upon which forces of good and evil engaged each other to prevail. Thus concluding, even though the ‘Lausanne Covenant’ was the product of evangelical thinkers, it may be safely concluded that CCK considered the approval of its contents to be in no manner an implication of the legitimacy of the dualism, one that underlies in fundamentalist dogmatic theology.

At first glance, it appears that adopting such a theological perspective could well have had implications for CCK’s prevailing notions on war and nuclear weapons issues. However, in Korea there has rarely been an active theological discussion about the mode of waging war. In particular, given the reality of an artificially divided Korea, pacifism and just war theory as a theoretical basis in discussions of matters relating to war have not significantly taken into account the specific interests of Korean Christians.

Whatever the merits of the CCK decision in favour of greater ‘engagement with the
world,’ a question remains to be answered—How can this covenant be considered theologically consistent with the dualistic perception that has so marked Korean fundamentalism for past decades? The CCK’s approach to North Korea and that nation’s beleaguered Christians may well provide an answer.

4.1.2. The CCK’s Perspective of Church Unity in the Light of Dogma

The emergence of democratic (or in the least non-totalitarian) governments in Eastern Europe had the secondary effect of ameliorating the previous NCCK suspect-image in CCK’s eyes. Anticipating the collapse of the North Korean regime, the CCK initiated reconstruction plans of the North Korean church along their fundamentalist Christian lines. Thus, in such case, a reunited Korea would be coterminous with a single national church or koinonia oriented towards fundamentalist religious principles. To achieve this objective, the CCK organized a specific internal organism called ‘Division to Reconstruct the North Korean Church’ in April 1993, later elevated to a special committee level within the ‘Committee for Cooperation of Northern and Southern Churches’.409 When the Division of Reconstruction became a special committee within the council in 1995, the CCK justified its establishment in the following terms,

“We are approaching the 50th anniversary of the independence from Japan. But, they [North Korea] affirmed their war preparations on July 27, 1993, on their so-called victory day410… Insofar as they do not abandon their 50-year long lasting ambition to force communism on South Korea, their self-destruction is a matter of time [because of a heavy burden of military expenditure and economic downfall]… Thus, we, the South Korean Church, should establish a reconstruction committee with a special end, and all South Korean churches and brethrens from overseas churches may join together.”411

Quite obviously, the manifesto’s language was not intended to accommodate the continuance of the DPRK regime. Among the ‘Practical Principles of the

409 Kim Joong-suk, Reconstructing North Korea Church, Bukhan Kyohoe Jekunron, written in Korean (Seoul: Yeyoung Communication, 1998), p. 73 However, this objective has been criticised by the NCCK and the other church groups. Thus, inside the CCK there have been some arguments about this matter even though there is no clear decision different from the initial intention yet.
410 As explained above, there was a tension between the South and the North concerning the nuclear issue around that time. The date, July 27 which is referred here, was the day the armistice between the Allied Forces and the DPRK was signed in 1953.
411 Kim Joong-suk, Reconstructing North Korea Church, pp. 83-4
Reconstruction of the North Korean Church’ was a proposal for direct relations with underground churches in North Korea, saying that “For reconstructing the North Korean Church, we may strengthen the existing [underground] North Korean Church through co-operating with them.” Such a position implicitly excludes the KCF as their counterpart for the reconstruction plan. Then, the CCK clarified matters stating that the KCF was not the existing Church of North Korea but only an organism, part of the northern regime. As expressed,

“The KCF was organized by the communist party in 1946. The communists built the KCF with a purpose to oppress the real Christians in North Korea. This organization was notorious for persecuting them before and after the Korean War… If we accepted the KCF as a Christian church, it would be an insult to the victims and martyrs who were persecuted by the communists.”

Jang Cha-nam, Moderator of the GAPCK (2007), also confirmed that the CCK does not recognise the Protestant churches, denominated ‘Bongsoo church’ and ‘Chilgol church’, both located in Pyongyang, as faithful members of the Christian community. In sum, unlike the NCCK, which communicated with organizations rather than individuals, the CCK looked towards communicating with individuals rather than organizations.

Nonetheless the need to address real human suffering in the North saw the CCK establish links with the KCF for humanitarian reasons. While this did involve a direct relationship with the KCF, the CCK refused to modify its perception of the northern Church. Although their humanitarian aid was provided under the auspices of the KCF (as distribution agency), according to Lee Man-ryol, it was due to a different decision that the CCK recognized the KCF only as a working partner, not as an

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412 Practical Principles of the Reconstruction of North Korea Church, the CCK Committee for Cooperation of South & North Churches, August 30, 1993.
413 Since November 1946 the KCF had occupied a position in North Korea ostensibly analogous to that of the NCCK in South Korea; although the KCF had reached at most an extremely limited range of prospective independent action in comparison to NCCK’s freedom of action.
414 For more details why they do not recognize the KCF as North Korea Church, see Kim Joong-suk, Reconstructing North Korea Church, pp. 191-6
415 Ibid., p. 191, p. 194
416 Jang Cha-nam, Principles of North Korea Church Reconstruction and Cooperation of Christian Church, Bukhan Kyohoe Jaegunui Wonchikkwa Kyokyeui Hyupryuk Bangan, written in Korean, Life Book [Shinang Sekye], Vol. 35, No. 8, August, 2000, p. 48
official Christian Church.\textsuperscript{417} Thus, the CCK’s plan to reconstruct the church in North Korea assumed that a South Korean styled-church had to be implanted.

Again, unlike the NCCK, the CCK looks forward to a change of regime in North Korea, essentially as a result of its missionary efforts in the neighbouring territory. Much of these efforts take the form of clandestine evangelization in its many aspects—secret actions through covert routes to tackle North Korean issues such as “rescuing North Korean refugees in China, protection of their human rights, converting them to Christ, rescue and strategic works inside North Korea.”\textsuperscript{418} This method is likewise used to inform the northern civilians about events in the outside world and current news. This backdoor tactic includes support lent to underground Christians in North Korea. It is reported that the “CCK has stepped up their activities, smuggling tiny Bibles into North Korea and setting up secret way stations in China to assist and enlist the growing number of desperate Koreans who cross the border then return with food.”\textsuperscript{419} According to Park Joseph, “We want to do whatever we can in order to penetrate North Korea. We will help with defectors. We have direct meetings with North Koreans. We will send missionaries and help anyone to help send God’s message.”\textsuperscript{420} While this certainly has all the appearances of responding enthusiastically to apostolic mandate to ‘go, teach all nations’ and likewise evinces an enviable display of Christian charity toward those in physical and spiritual need, there can be little doubt that the North Korean regime identifies such activities as gravely subversive.

5. The Inter-linkage between Nuclear Weapons and National Unification

By rejecting force as a means to achieve unification, the NCCK had to think about other means by which unification could come about. This in turn led the NCCK to see the existence of nuclear weapons as a particular barrier – in part because they


\textsuperscript{418} Park Joseph, ‘Christian Council of Korea’s Efforts for Betterment of North Korean Human Rights,’ What can be Done to Improve the North Korean Human Rights? The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Peace Foundation Symposium Workshop Paper, July 11, 2006, p. 169

\textsuperscript{419} Doug Struck, ‘Underground Christians Keep Faith in a Hostile North Korea,’ Special Report, Washington Post, April 12, 2001

\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.
threatened to entrench the division between the two Koreas, but also their potential use exemplified all the NCCK’s concerns about using force to achieve unification. At the same time, as discussed above, the CCK was expecting the DPRK to collapse economically as a consequence of the loss of Soviet subsidies and its continuing high level of military expenditure. In this model the nuclear weapons were further proof of the real nature of the DPRK and, probably, a further reason to expect an economic collapse. The validity of this expectation is explored in chapter six, but at this stage it is worth noting that the DPRK may well be developing military weapons for sale rather than its own use. Thus the weapons programme (including its nuclear element) is in fact propping up, not dragging down, the economic fortunes of the DPRK.

5.1. Linking National Unification with Good Governance in All Korea

In light of a North Korean suggestion that reunification might take the form of a confederation (one nation) with two economic-political systems (capitalism and communism),\textsuperscript{421} Korean Christians in Germany and members of the Association of Korean Scholars in the United States considered the possibility that the North might be open to discussions bringing closer the prospect of reunification.\textsuperscript{422} This prospect, in turn encouraged a meeting with a representative group of North Korean Christians in 1982. It was at this meeting that nuclear weapons were first mentioned merely in generic terms. In any event, the parties assisting agreed that Korea “must be reunited peacefully and the cease-fire agreement of 1953 must be changed to a permanent peace treaty. The Korean peninsula must be free from nuclear weapons. The suppression of human rights must be stopped and all political prisoners released immediately.”\textsuperscript{423}

This meeting and similar ones that followed, resulted in common statements\textsuperscript{424} that reflected basic political themes: (1) national division was a function of great power interests and not of the Korean people and (2) the corollary proposition that relieving

\textsuperscript{422} Han Gil-soo and Andrew E. Kim, ‘The Korean Christian Movement towards Reunification of the Two Koreas,’ p. 238
\textsuperscript{424} Cf. ‘A Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace’
existing division presupposed withdrawal of foreign troops (e.g., U.S. forces) from the peninsula.\textsuperscript{425} Despite bitter opposition from the Chun dictatorship,\textsuperscript{426} the NCCK member churches and individual Christians continued to foster the idea of national reunification as both a contributing factor for and sustaining condition of peace in the long term. Increasingly, these peace and unification proposals were cloaked in theological language. To cite a case, at the NCCK’s 34\textsuperscript{th} General Assembly, the delegates’ official reunification document argued that the Korean Church’s reunification movement was directed by the will of a peaceful God and should follow Christian precepts. “We clarify that based on the faith of peace of the Kingdom of God, the Korean Church has a duty, a right, and the freedom to participate in [the] peace movement for Korean unification.”\textsuperscript{427}

In the early 1970s the NCCK found its ability to influence South Korean domestic politics circumscribed by the ROK regime’s strident attitude toward the DPRK. Opposition to the regime’s domestic policy was effectively equated with support for the northern enemy. The NCCK leadership sought to break its deadlock with the South Korean government through dialogue with northern Christians, ostensibly functioning independently of their own government. Thus, reconciliation’s first policy was a strategic by-product of the NCCK’s democratic movement. In a practical sense, all criticism voiced by the NCCK focused on southern authorities during the dictatorship, with scarcely any directed at the northern regime.

For the NCCK, the ROK and the United States were jointly perceived as the ‘axis of problems’, one that obstructed reconciliation with North Korea. In support of such a conclusion, Korean church historian Lee Man-ryol points to the Helsinki Declaration, a manifesto prepared by Korean democratic activists who lived abroad (e.g., pastors, scholars, journalists) in conjunction with high-ranking North Korean officials. This declaration restricted its references to American imperialism and the South Korean dictatorship, ignoring the problems of North Korea. Lee claims this tendency within the NCCK showed no significant amelioration, even following the restoration of

\textsuperscript{425} This matter is further discussed in chapter 6 of this study.
\textsuperscript{426} The Chun government was particularly heavy-handed. For example, during the November 9-13, 1983 period, 135 ministers of religion were placed under house arrest. An estimated 1,200 churchmen, students and former political figures were detained or placed under house arrest. That is a low estimate; some human rights activists place the figure at closer to 3,000.
\textsuperscript{427} ‘A Declaration for Peaceful Reunification of the Korean Church’
By the early 1990s South Korea had returned to a measure of civilian rule with the election of Kim Young-sam in 1992. In practice, Kim’s government eliminated the more draconian policies of his predecessors and conducted domestic policy in a manner intended to foster national reconciliation. However, he remained adamantly opposed to any reconciliation with North Korea as long as that nation pursued a nuclear weapons procurement program.

Kim’s political conservatism and visceral anti-communism generated a political stalemate. Kang Wi-jo argues that the nuclear issue was a key factor in reaffirming his confrontation policy with North Korea. In the face of North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Kim responded by saying: “We cannot embrace North Korea as long as they try to possess nuclear weapons.” As much as Kim’s remarks found support among conservative Christians, they disappointed the NCCK which stated, “We feel keenly that the present tension and crisis are derived from, first, the violation of the principle of independence and peace as the highest priority in the South-North Korean relationship. And, second, we regret … the Team Spirit exercise and North Korea’s withdrawal from the [NPT].”

The NCCK response pointed to a fundamental division in perception, separating the organization from a significant portion of Korea’s Christian population. Most South Koreans identified the North Korean nuclear weapons development program as a real danger—thinking that the DPRK might use its nuclear arsenal to either intimidate South Korea or, under extreme circumstances, unleash its weapons against South Korean cities.

The NCCK evidently had hopes that matters would improve with Kim Dae-jung’s

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428 Lee Man-ryol, ‘the Relationship between the South and the North of Korea in the Context of Korean Contemporary History,’ Hankuk Hyundaesa Sokesoui Nambukhan Gwangae, written in Korean, p. 7
429 Kang Wi-jo, Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea, p. 142
430 Korean Foundation, Korean Focus, No. 3, June 1993, p 127
431 NCCK Reunification Committee, ‘A statement on the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,’ NCCK Archive, the NCCK, March 16, 1993
assuming the Korean presidency in 1997. A Roman Catholic, Kim Dae-jung had for many years been an ardent opponent of the successive military juntas—he was sentenced to death for ostensible anti-government activities, although his sentence was reduced to a period of imprisonment following international protests—and he was understood to be well disposed toward the NCCK. Indeed, late in his presidency (June 2000), Kim Dae-jung went so far as to meet with North Korea’s leader since 1994, Kim Jong-il, to discuss reunification issues.

5.2. The NCCK’s Response to Nuclear Weapons and Just War Theology

The importance of the nuclear weapons issue had become clear to the NCCK by the late 1980s and early 1990s. By this stage the DPRK (see the discussion in chapter 6) had developed nuclear weapons and this in turn led to debate about the US nuclear weapons associated with the American troops deployed in South Korea.

In one sense, the NCCK’s response to the existence of nuclear weapons can be paralleled in the response of many Christian churches. Such devices cannot be applied in international conflicts, if only because their use must fail to meet the just war criteria of Jus in Bello, let alone the teachings of Jesus Christ and his apostles. In the profoundest sense, their very existence indirectly contributes to a regular ongoing mistrust—sometimes bordering on hatred—between Koreans on either side of the armistice line separating the two Koreas. The NCCK’s ‘theology of nuclear arms control’ evolved in the context of the wider Missio Dei effort. Reaching out to Christians—and for that matter citizens of whatever credo or absence of same—in North Korea as steps in the goal of national reconciliation, of necessity had to introduce the issue of North Korea’s nuclear development program.

However, I believe that the NCCK’s response actually fails to meet the expectations of Just War theology. At least inferentially, it appears that the NCCK either considered any prospective DPRK nuclear munitions development as primarily

432 The NCCK evaluated his election as follows: This is a historic moment, which enters into a new era of democracy through the horizontal change of regime for the first time after 50 years’ dictatorship. This is a triumph of ‘minjung’[people], who have been sacrificed for justice and human rights, liberty and equality, consciousness and hope. ‘A Statement of the 10th Anniversary of a Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace,’ NCCK Archive, the NCCK, November 9, 1998

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defensive—e.g., intended to deter prospective U.S. aggression—or likely to be overcome through closer political relations. There is thus a willingness to accommodate the possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK in order to achieve the goal of national unity, seen by the NCCK as more important.

Sohn Kyu-tae, South Korean Christian ethicist, suggests that in discussing matters relating to nuclear weapons three dimensions merit examination. One is a theological dimension. The theological position that the Church has reveals its basic perspective toward nuclear weapons. Another is a political dimension. Even if the theological stance establishes principle, implementation of that principle must occur within a political context. Finally, there is an ecclesiastic dimension, how the Church that confesses Christ as the Lord, is to cope with the nuclear issue according to given situations. Each of these dimensions finds reflection in NCCK public pronouncements on the issue over the past three decades.

From the outset, the NCCK dealt with the nuclear arms issue in terms of national reconciliation. This in turn, as outlined above, presupposed an understanding of Jesus as the ‘servant of peace’, whose message in the Korean context constitutes a proclamation of the Kingdom of God, reconciliation and liberation from oppression. Furthermore, we are promised that God will bless those who work for peace and reconciliation and enable them to become His children. And, in terms of theology, Jesus Christ operates through His people as they recognize His Lordship. Vanderbilt University theologian Douglas Meeks has described this relationship as ‘a function of the ultimate lordship of God.’ For the NCCK, this became the starting point that emphasizes the theological role in promoting peace.

Putting the words of Jesus into public practice is the purpose of Missio Dei. In the words expressed by ICC (the International Congregational Council) moderator Norman Goodall over half a century ago, “the nearer the Church comes to its Lord, the nearer it comes to the world.” Christians should no longer stay separated from the

434 “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called sons of God.” Matt. 5:9
world but should be God’s people in the world.\textsuperscript{436} That is to say, the Church must participate in social issues in order to build the Kingdom of God.

The NCCK nuclear ‘theology’—although not a systematic level of theology—appears to have been predicated on the belief that the presence of American nuclear arms in the peninsula or the nearby ocean waters was a driving force in North Korea’s determination to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the NCCK has regularly insisted that the United States remove its nuclear weaponry from the region.\textsuperscript{437}

On the face of it all, this appears to take a pacifist position on nuclear weapon although, in the words of Kang Moon-kyu, former chairman of the NCCK Unification Committee (1982-1995), “the NCCK never formulated its position systematically on nuclear weapons. It is a plain fact the NCCK takes a position for non-nuclear peace.”\textsuperscript{438} Likewise Reverend Kwon O-sung, NCCK general secretary since 2006, claims, “We have never discussed the theological aspects of nuclear weapons so far. However, we stand firmly on the unconditional objection to that kind of weapon. We believe that God’s providence on peace and reconciliation does not match with the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{439}

Both of these statements appear to reflect a measure of equivocation, perhaps based on a determination that more concrete statements could result in even greater division than already existed. This posture in itself raises a number of fundamental problems. As ‘political’ as such a stance might be, it risks subverting the mission of the church. The NCCK’s theological stance emphasizes both responsibility and nonviolence on

\textsuperscript{436} Norman Goodall, Missions under the Cross: Addresses Delivered at the Enlarged Meeting of the Committee of the International Missionary Council at Willingen (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1953), pp. 190-2
\textsuperscript{437} See, e.g., ‘A Statement by Participants who Prepare for the Jubilee Year,’ Mission Conference for the 1995 Jubilee Year, NCCK Archive, the NCCK, November 23, 1991. Nonetheless, since 1992 the NCCK has also expressed its anxiety (albeit with no strong words) about the North Korea nuclear development initiative, appealing to the North to abolish its program unconditionally. Again, however, the NCCK remained convinced that the nuclear response of North Korea had been predicated on the ongoing arms race between the two nations, an effort encouraged, directly or indirectly, by the United States ‘The Crucified Man’, Sipjagae Dallisim Saram, Joint Sermon Script for National Reconciliation Week of 2003, written in Korean, NCCK Archive, the NCCK, August 15, 2003
\textsuperscript{439} An Interview with Rev. Kwon O-sung at the NCCK Headquarter, June 12, 2007
part of both contending factions; but the church, if it is to be consistent with the logic of Missio Dei, must likewise be straightforward. If satisfying its divine mission requires that the church go ‘into’ the world, the principle of nonviolence—a principle the church is likewise mandated to observe—establishes that the church must distinguish itself ‘from’ the world. Participating in the affairs of the world does not stop the church being politicized, but the church should also Christianize the world. In other words, the church must not conform to the logic of the world, but should critically point out its problems by showing God’s way.

The NCCK position on nuclear weapons appears designed to avoid any direct alienation of North Korea. While a ‘peacemakers’ first requisite does avoid the exacerbation of already difficult or conflictive situations, it is important that avoidance of conflict does not lead to fundamental error in terms of theology or honesty. In the words of American pacifist theologian Jim Wallis, “political bias endangers the reliability and authority of prophetic witness.” As noted above, by the late 1970s, some elements of the NCCK had placed stress for Korea’s ills on US imperialism and authoritarian government in the ROK rather than the regime in the DPRK.

However, quite reasonably the NCCK has seen reconciliation with North Korea as the sine qua non for satisfactory resolution of the DPRK nuclear weapons issue (especially as it has rejected a military solution to ending the division). Mistrust is identified as the source of the plethora of political problems that continue to plague relations between north and south. Indeed, the DPRK nuclear weapons program is identified as final and definitive proof of where such mistrust can lead. Ongoing hatred created the mistrust, which, in turn, generated a sense of security threat. Therefore, the most desirable option is a move for reconciliation with the North Korean people. In order to establish a more amenable political atmosphere towards national reunification, the NCCK created an associated body then called ‘Christian

441 Jim Wallis, ‘Idols Closer to Home,’ Sojourners, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 1979, p. 10
442 ‘A Report and Recommendation of the Tozanso Consultation,’ NCCK Archive, the NCCK, November 2, 1984
443 While the goal may be worthwhile, the thought process that leads to it appears questionable.
Solidarity for Peace’ (now the Korean Christian Solidarity for Peace, or KCPS). The KCPS established its guiding principles in its initial public document, the Peace Statement against War and Nuclear Weapons stating,

“We believe that building peace is our imperative task. We believe that the evil intent of war and violence, based on secular vested interests, is contrary to the will of God. The insecurity arising out of the nuclear crisis, which can lead to war, is not the will of God. In faith, we express our determination to build peace in Korea and the world.”

The NCCK appears to have intentionally avoided attributing any responsibility to the DPRK for the current state of affairs. Indeed, the NCCK has gone so far as to argue that any military or economic sanction imposed against North Korea would not be acceptable in terms of the nuclear issue. In this the NCCK appears to embrace North Korea unconditionally.

In summary, the NCCK sees the nuclear issue as a function of political concessions to the DPRK, with the southern administration making every effort to achieve a peace treaty through its diplomatic and political approach. However, this approach to conflict resolution appears indifferent to the nature itself of the northern regime. Even if we accept the reconciliatory action toward North Korea as a primary concern, it remains as a case that despotism therein still prevails and uses harsh political and religious persecution.

This was recently underscored by Seoul University political scientist Jun Jae-sung, himself a practicing Christian, who argued that the Korean Church must take into account all the factors driving DPRK nuclear weapon development, in order to

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444 Sometimes rendered ‘the Korean Christian Solidarity for Anti-war & Anti-atomic’
445 ‘Peace Statement against War and Nuclear Weapons,’ Christian Solidarity for Peace, NCCK Archive, March 31, 2003. This statement was signed by 303 ecumenical leaders, Christian intellectuals, and Christian peace activists, including the following: Rev. Dr. Kang Won-ryong (former NCCK President), Rev. Dr. Park Sang-jeung (former NCC of Asia General Secretary), Rev. Dr. Park Jong-hwa (a member of the NCCK Committee), Rev. Dr. Paik Do-woong (General Sectary of the NCCK), Dr. Ahn Jae-woong (General Secretary of Christian Conference of Asia, CCA), Dr. Park Gyoung-seo (a Human Rights Ambassador and director of Asia in the WCC)
achieve a rounded understanding of all of the factors at work and to avoid the risk of a
tacit political bias creeping into theological formulations.\textsuperscript{448} All in all, there exists a
distinguishable possibility—perhaps probability—that the NCCK has formulated its
ostensibly politically neutral evaluation of the nuclear issue to provide greater
accommodation of at least one of the political parties (e.g., the DPRK), whether or not
such accommodation is correct in terms of Christian belief, as opposed to reflecting a
pragmatic secular world view.

5.3. The CCK and the Nuclear Weapons Issue in the Korean Peninsula

The CCK’s perception on moral and political implications of North Korea’s
development of nuclear weapons is in sharp contract with that of the NCCK’s. A
substantial portion of CCK membership has either immediate or familial memories of
the Korean War. Many of them were refugees (or are children and grandchildren of
refugees) fleeing south to escape the DPRK.

Apart from matters of faith, their first and foremost concern was the ongoing threat
posed by the northern communist regime, popularly regarded as an enemy watching
for any opportunity to invade South Korea. Fear of the northern communists
encouraged them to place national security as a priority above all other concerns, even
those whose accomplishments were synonymous to the mandates of the Gospels (e.g.,
improving the lot of the Korean poor). According to Kwon, “North Korea and its
communist ideology are most repugnant to [South Korean] Christian
fundamentalists.”\textsuperscript{449} He attributes this to their experiences during the Korean War.\textsuperscript{450}
Thus, as long as the southern government maintained a confrontational face toward
North Korea, they were content to avoid any activities that might generate political
instability within the South Korean society. In this sense, Dr. Kim So-young evaluates
conservative Christians in South Korea as having ideological priorities that at least in
some ways predispose them to disregard the church’s prophetic role and their
concomitant duty to prosper God’s peace and grace in the world.\textsuperscript{451} This perspective

\textsuperscript{448} Jun Jae-sung, ‘Christianity and Nuclear Weapon,’ Kidokkyowa Haek, Material Book, written in
Korean, the Second Peace Forum for the Korean Peninsula, Seoul, June 15, 2007, p. 30
\textsuperscript{449} Kwon Jin-kwan, ‘Minjung Theology,’ p. 78
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid., p. 79
\textsuperscript{451} Kim So-young, ‘The Role of Christianity on Reunification,’ Tong-ile Daehan Kyohoeui Yeokhal,
was also reflected in their attitudes toward the development of nuclear weapons.

CCK concerns regarding nuclear weapon appear to have been largely restricted to the northern nuclear issue. For example, former CCK president Kil Ja-yeon anticipates that North Korean authorities will not give up efforts to develop and possess nuclear weapons except under the strongest and most direct military challenges. He asserted that the only way North Korea might agree to abandon its nuclear plans was through a strengthening the U.S-South Korea military ties and in establishing a nuclear umbrella coverage from the United States, perhaps comparable to the ‘dual-key’ system adopted by U.S. allies within the NATO alliance.452

There is likewise to be found in the CCK ranks a number of Christian theologians although admittedly few in numbers, who see nuclear weapons as vehicles of God’s judgment in some context. Thus, to cite an example, at the International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation held at St. John University in York, England on August 15, 2006, Professor Kim In-soo, an invited speaker and a well-known conservative church historian in South Korea said that

“Japan forced Koreans to worship their king as a living god [during their rule of the Korean Peninsula, 1909-1945]. The wicked country, which persecuted the church severely, was ruined by A-bombs and was destroyed. It was God’s righteous judgment for the country, which had previously devastated the church of God.”453

Christian newspaper columnist and theologian Kim Jin-ho, criticizes this line of thought maintaining that it arises from conservative Christians’ fundamentalist interpretations of Christian truths. He argues that seeking peace through violent means has been justified in the mainline Christian churches and “those Christians have also justified the sacrifice of innocent people as an inevitable cost for achieving peace by war.”454 He claims that this is simply a wrong approach to real Christianity because

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452 Kwonpark Hyo-won, ‘An Interview with the CCK President Kil Ja-yeon: the Prayer Meeting is Based on Patriotism Coming out of Faith,’ KuKuk Kidohoenun Sinangejok Aekuke Batanghankot, written in Korean, OhMynews, March 1, 2003
453 Kim In-soo, ‘Towards Peace and Reconciliation between South and North Korean Church: Contextual Analysis of the Two Churches: Past, Present, and Future,’ Plenary Session 2, International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, York St. John University, August 16, 2006
454 Kim Jin-ho, A Failure, Jesus Christ Criticizes Church that Worships Power, Silpaeja Jesuska Himul
the sacrifice of Christ did not happen by war but through his committed work.\textsuperscript{455} Moreover, there again arises the issue of relying on immoral means to achieve moral ends.\textsuperscript{456}

6. Highlights of the Theological Division between the CCK and the NCCK

Perhaps more than any other issue, the varying reactions to the so-called ‘Sunshine Policy,’ an ‘open door’ towards North Korea established under the auspices of Kim Dae-jung in 1998, highlight the different perceptions, fears and hopes of South Korea’s Christians. To many CCK members, ‘Sunshine’ amounted to ill-disguised appeasement, perhaps even a surreptitious effort intended to weaken the South Korean state in the face of its mortal enemy in the North. The policy proposal was one of unlimited opening to North Korea, to take effect after the DPRK finally and irrevocably abandoned its nuclear pretensions and adopted a more overtly pacific attitude toward the ROK. Despite these mandatory preliminary steps, the CCK was dissatisfied with all arguments in defence of the policy. For example, Rev. Lee Soo-young expressed his opposition saying that ‘the Sunshine Policy’ was too soft and naïve to be able tackle the nuclear problem provoked by North Korea.\textsuperscript{457}

On the contrary, NCCK members hoped to establish a more positive action for reconciliation with North Korean authorities. They believed that a stronger sunshine policy would allow a more peaceful solution to the northern regime towards confrontation resolution.

In contrast, the NCCK has adopted the Korean equivalent of the ‘social Gospel,’ the Missio Dei model of evangelization through good works, often accomplished through existing non-religious public institutions. The CCK approach has been quite distinguishable. Kwon Jin-kwan has expressed the view that “Korean fundamentalists

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{456} This is further discussed in the evaluation section of the CCK approach to the nuclear issue in this chapter.
tend these days to be more political rather than doctrinal." He also argues that "Christian fundamentalism in Korea has become politicized like it is in the other parts of the world. It used to be indifferent to politics, but now it has become one of the most active political powers." However, Kang In-cheol views this as having resulted from longstanding anticommunist attitudes rather than any effective recent CCK politicization. He contends that this phenomenon arose from what he describes as the CCK’s ‘religionalisation of anticommunism’. The ‘religionalisation’ points towards a conservative Christians’ redefinition of their political anticommunism elevated to a religious doctrine level.

Thus, opposition to communism is not a simply a single component of national policy among several others but rather takes precedence over the rest as the most important factor surpassing all other political agendum. With what amounts to an apotheosis—or, perhaps even ‘satanization’—of anticommunism, CCK silence during South Korea’s dictatorial period becomes more comprehensible; that is to say, when the southern political leadership shared the a great majority of CCK members’ views, these were willing to overlook domestic rights transgressions in lieu of fortified national security. However, when a national government—dictatorial or democratic—undertook irenic initiatives toward the North, the tacit agreement was automatically broken. With such breach in ideological homogeneity, the CCK was unable to tolerate Kim Dae-jung government’s non-hostile acts towards North Korea; the alternative option was to define such a progressive regime as a mere representative of Korean leftist forces.

While it is not easy to draw out a clear demarcation line to separate fundamentalism from evangelicalism, given Korean Christianity’s adoption of components of both credos, CCK’s theological stance toward the North’s nuclear program certainly places it squarely in the fundamentalist camp, given their willingness to identify the conflict in terms of an almost single dimensional view —the evil northern regime vs. the noble United States and South Korea— or in other words, the ‘forces of darkness’ arrayed against ‘legions of light’. From the CCK perspective, it is inconceivable that

458 Kwon Jin-kwan, ‘Minjung Theology,’ p. 77
459 Ibid., p. 75
460 Kang In-cheol, Korean Protestantism and Anticommunism, p. 636
461 Ibid., p. 614
South Korea would acquiesce to anything that amounts to a demoniac power having mass destruction weapons to threaten the very existence of South Korea.

Conversely, while they regard the North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction as the inherent danger, it does not appear a major priority to discuss and determine whether nuclear weapons should be banned unconditionally, irrespective of which state possesses same. Moreover, discussions at a theological level have never been attempted and the consequences of this are explored in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{462} The practical outcome has been a restricted acceptance of U.S. nuclear presence only for deterrent purposes on certain occasions a discussion of the possibility of a pre-emptive American strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons development infrastructure. While such an approach might be barely acceptable under the most tolerant just war parameters, given the generally accepted limitations pertaining to civilian inviolability and proportionality, any such initiative would surely contravene teachings in the Gospels.

7. Summary

On one hand, South Korea has conducted some kind of nuclear research program with distinct military ramifications (at least into the 1980s). By contrast, the DPRK now possesses nuclear weapons and seems to be fully committed to improving its missile technology as a means to use these weapons. In this context, the twin goals of the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula and national reunification reflect an identifiable national purpose. In sum, both objectives enjoy almost universal popularity, however, difficulties do arise over policy implementation. At the moment the Protestant community in South Korea is divided both over the nature of the DPRK (is the current leadership a partner or barrier to peace?) and whether the removal of nuclear weapons is the priority or can this only be achieved after the destruction of the DPRK?

It is safe to state that civilian leadership which inherited political power from the military junta in the ROK has collectively perceived nuclear weapons development

\textsuperscript{462} To be fair to the CCK, such shortcoming is shared with the more tolerant NCCK.
(and likely procurement as well) in terms regularly associated with the lines of thought of Paul Ramsay and George Weigel. Conversely, the NCCK appears to have adopted almost an absolutist policy, at least in as far as the United States and South Korea are concerned even though this stance became vague toward North Korea’s nuclear development. Even if the NCCK takes a position of non-nuclear weapon in principle, it is to be questioned whether their practical implementation of this notion is morally acceptable or legitimate when compared to their ultimate goal, national koinonia based on God’s shalom. In contrast the CCK has placed the destruction of the DPRK as its first goal (perhaps hoping this will come from an economic collapse rather than war) and believes this to be the essential first step in resolving the nuclear issue.
Chapter 5: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development Efforts and South Korean Christian Response

1. Context

The previous chapter considered the response of the South Korean Christian Community to the nuclear weapons programme in the South. It also explored how the NCCK in particular, started to develop a view, based on *Missio Dei* theology, of effective rapprochement to the North and opposition to various authoritarian regimes in the South and aspects of the US military presence. This in turn led the conservative CCK to stress the importance of defence against communist aggression and to emphasise the need for the DPRK to be overthrown (or collapse) before the nuclear weapons (and unification) issue could be resolved.

This chapter now moves that analysis forward and concentrates on the current situation and options. It starts to analyse the stance of both the CCK and the NCCK in terms of the just war theology explored in the earlier chapters.

To do this, it is necessary to first briefly discuss the history and current nature of the DPRK. This is essential in exploring the validity of various responses and to understand the situation in Korea today. An interesting, and related consideration is whether or not the DPRK is a potential partner for peace or essentially (in theologically terms) evil, actually has any bearing on what should be the proper Christian response in either case. In other words are both elements in the Protestant community in the ROK setting out their position more in terms of secular politics (based on their differing analyses of the DPRK) rather than in terms of scriptural and Christian traditions?

A final, and closely related question, is why at this stage do elements of the Korean Protestant community start to use the language and analyses of the Just War tradition? This was not the case during the Japanese occupation when their response was essentially one of cultural resistance, nor was it part of the debate during the period of armed conflict up to 1953. Does the answer now lie in that, for the first time, it is possible to conceive of a military situation in which the ROK is the aggressor?
2. The Birth of the Communist Regime

The North Korean state came into existence in May 1948, when the Korean peninsula’s Soviet occupation zone was politically reconfigured as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or DPRK). At the same time, the American occupation zone was officially denominated the Republic of Korea (or ROK). Both governments claimed legitimacy over the entire Korean peninsula.

Upon establishment of the DPRK, the Soviet occupation regime appointed Kim Il-sung (1912-1994), for many years a communist activist, as chief of state. Born Kim Sung-ju—he adopted ‘Kim Il-sung’ as a *nom de guerre*—into a Christian family that emigrated to Manchuria in 1925 to escape Japanese persecution. Kim became embroiled in anti-Japanese political activism following that nation’s occupation of Manchuria in 1932 and supported Mao Tse-tung in the latter’s efforts against the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek. During World War II, Kim served in the Soviet Army, rising to the rank of captain.

During his period of rule (1948-1994), Kim relied on both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for international support, shifting emphasis from the former to the latter during the 1950s. Domestically, Kim eliminated factional opponents and established a one-man rule.

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463 With the end of World War II hostilities, the Korean peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel into two military occupation zones. The northern zone was administered by the Soviet Union; the southern zone fell under the authority of the United States. This division was intended to be temporary, with the (at least official) expectation that a unified Korean state would emerge, one governed by leaders freely chosen by the Korean people.

464 For a brief overview of Kim Il-sung’s early political radicalization, see Henry C. Liu, ‘Kim Il-sung and China,’ *Asia Times*, September 16, 2006

465 While establishing a strict demarcation in this regard is somewhat problematic, the conclusion of the PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1961 is a convenient historical point. However, it should be borne in mind that in the light of the Sino-Soviet split of the mid-1950s a primary objective of the DPRK was to avoid becoming a pawn in that dispute. Indeed, this appears to have been a major factor in the establishment of Kim Il-sung’s juche, or ‘self-reliance,’ doctrine. Juche is discussed in the following sections.

466 For detailed overview of his leadership consolidation, see Lee Jong-seok, *Understanding of Modern North Korea*, Hyundai Bukhanui Leehae, written in Korean (Seoul: Ryoksabipyongs, 1995), pp. 205-9
3. The Nature of North Korea’s Government under Kim Il-sung

The DPRK under the rule of both Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il has become one of the most isolated nations in the world. In the succinct words of Yonsei University professor Kim Pan-suk,

“North Korea is a classic example of the ‘rule of man.’ Overall, political management is highly personalized and is based on loyalty to Kim Il-Sung and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). The cult of personality, the nepotism of the Kim family, and the strong influence of former anti-Japanese partisan veterans and military leaders are unique features of North Korean politics.”

Matters have not changed overmuch since Kim pere (‘Glorious Leader’) was succeeded by Kim fils (‘Dear Leader’).468 During the period of the Kim senior’s rule, the reins of government were largely in family hands. He (and later his successor) was a member of the KWP Central Committee and, after 1991, commander of the Korean People’s Army. His wife, Kim Song-ae, was a KWP Central Committee member, as was his daughter, Kim Kyong-hui. An assortment of kin (nieces, nephews and in-laws) likewise held (and continue to hold) high government posts.469

An outstanding feature of North Korea’s political system is glorification of the leader through a cult of the dignitary. In order to solidify his personal rule, Kim senior instituted what he denominated juche (主體- literally, ‘self-reliance’) as a governing principle. As developed through the 1960s, juche became an ideology that replaced orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The juche synthesized communist theory and those neo-Confucian principles that emphasise family unity.470

468 Indeed, both Kim Il-sung and his son and successor Kim Jong-il were respectively known as ‘great leader’ and ‘dear leader.’ Worth pointing out is that these descriptive titles were not only uniquely applicable in the sense that they could refer to no one else but were also standard modes of address and reference.
469 Ibid.
470 The Confucian ideal in the juche is designed to consolidate Kim Il-sung’s and the KWP’s political legitimacy. This ideal expresses that ‘the Glorious leader’ is regarded as a father, the KWP as a mother, and people (North Korean minjung) as their children (sons and daughters). This aspect is viewed as a Neo-Confucian influence, which enshrines deeply the ideal of family. About this matter, see Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), pp. 401-2 and also see Lee Jong-seok, Understanding of Modern North Korea, p. 92
Indeed, Kim’s *juche* may be considered a distorted mirror reflexion of an idealized Korean Christian *koinonia*. And, just as many Korean Christians expect to see a unified Korea as *koinonia* widely expressed, it so appears that the KWP hoped *juche* too formed the basis for a unified Korea. However, critical differences lie in how Korea’s Christian pacifists see a unified Korea as one from which mass destruction weapons have been banished. On the other hand, the KWP envisages a unified peninsula as a fully armed nation, able to assert itself as a regional military power, if not as a fully-fledged world power.

3.1. The Implementation of Juche Philosophy

*Juche* is seen in North Korean philosophical debate as the apotheosis of Marxism-Leninism, so intimately interconnected with its progenitor Kim Il-sung that since 1974 it has been officially called Kim Il Sung Chuui (or Sasang, literally meaning ‘Kim Il Sung-ism’).\(^{471}\) While strictly speaking, *juche* is an ideology designed to direct North Korea’s political goals—an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defence posture\(^{472}\)—from the North Korean perspective, it is inseparable from and entirely synonymous with Kim Il-sung’s leadership.

The basic idea of *juche* starts with the assertion “that man is the master of all things and decides everything, and that an ideological consciousness determines human behaviour in historical development.”\(^{473}\) However, it contains a departure from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. According to Kim Jung-il,

> “the leader [Kim Il-sung] was well versed in Marxism-Leninism. But he did not confine himself to applying Marxism-Leninism to the Korean revolution but pioneered a new phase of revolutionary theory from a steadfast Juche-based standpoint and resolved the problems arising in the revolutionary practice from a unique angle. The leader discovered the truth of Juche idea in the course of the struggle against bigoted nationalists and bogus Marxists, flunkeyists and dogmatists, while hewing out a new path for the revolution.”\(^{474}\)

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\(^{471}\) Kim Pan-suk, ‘Government and Politics’

\(^{472}\) For a detailed discussion of each of these components, see Grace Lee, ‘The Political Philosophy of Juche,’ *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp 105-8


\(^{474}\) Kim Jung-il, On the Juche Idea, Treaties sent to the National Seminar on the Juche Idea held to
Likewise, *juche* follows Stalin and Mao in consciously substituting individual leadership for party rule, as it argued that popular revolutionary fervour gives rise to what amounts to a messianic leader. The full development took time and Kim Il-sung’s first ‘juche’ speech was delivered on December 28, 1955, “when the Sino-Soviet quarrel had reached its greatest intensity, and North Korea strove to stay neutral in the noisy feud of its two major sponsors.” In the decade that followed, ideological considerations were nevertheless added to what had been essentially a doctrine of nationalist autarky. In this sense some of the political developments within the DPRK could be held to mirror developments in another ultra-isolationist Communist dictatorship in Albania. *Juche* was granted equal footing with Marxism-Leninism at the KWP’s Fifth Congress. And a decade later, at the Party’s Sixth Congress, “references to Marxism-Leninism [were deleted], leaving *juche* as the sole official ideology of the Party.”

### 3.2. Juche as Political Messianism

Kim Yong-bok, the Korean minjung theologian, distinguishes between ‘political Messianism’ and ‘messianic politics.’ According to Kim, ‘Messianic politics’ is the politics of suffering people whose aim is not to seize control but to humanize and tame the secular powers of authority. Conversely, ‘political Messianism’ seeks to seize political power and execute the will of God as a divine agent in civil society.

In his essay on the factors separating messianic politics from ‘political Messianism’ and the concomitant implications for the people, Kim states,

mark the 70th birthday of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, March 31, 1982 Chosun Shinbo Archive.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Kim Yong-bok, ‘Messiah and Minjung: Discerning Messianic Politics over and against Political Messianism,’ *Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History* (Singapore: CCA, 1983)

See the discussion of Kim’s theology in chapter 7 of this study.
“In the Korean context, one may suspect that the notion of the subjecthood [subjectivity of the minjung] from North Korean communism has sneaked into minjung theology. Once again, we should not mistake the fact that in North Korea the notion of ‘juche’ refers to the autonomy of the national totalitarian dictatorship which uses the name of the proletariat. It is a sort of ‘realized’ subjecthood in the form of a dictatorial state.”

This ‘realized subjecthood,’ is of a reflected image of Christian koinonia. As Professor Kim describes it, “Jesus-messianism or messianic servanthood is a radical challenge to all forms of political, royal, and power messianisms. It is concerned with saving and transforming the minjung so that its subjecthood may be realized.” This, of course, is conceptually different from North Korea’s fully realized juche philosophy.

The neo-Confucian aspects of juche are reflected in the manner in which it was inculcated by its promoter. Grace Lee, a ‘scholar in residence’ at California’s Stanford University, provides a vivid description. “The Kim Il-sung regime instructed the North Korean people in the juche ideology using analogy drawn from human anatomy. The Great Leader is the brain that makes decisions and issues orders; the Party is the nervous system that channels information; and the people are the bone and muscle that physically execute the orders.”

Despite its official atheism, the DPRK has gone to considerable lengths to elevate the late Kim to the status of a god. In 1996, his son, Kim Jong-il announced that his late father was now ‘eternal president.’ While this was surely intended to ascribe some species of retroactive divine approbation to the political decisions of the deceased dictator, it was also equally surely intended to confer a comparable legitimacy to his successor. This particular action is indeed equivalent to that of the Roman Senate two millennia before, at the command of its ultimate successor, Caesar Augustus.

Augustus, the first individual formally recognized as emperor, directed that the

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482 Ibid., pp. 185-6  
483 Ibid., p. 187  
484 Grace Lee, ‘The Political Philosophy of Juche,’ p. 111  
485 It is reportedly known that North Korea spent two hundreds million dollars for the expense of preservation of his body. See Lee Sang-keun, ‘The Recent Reality of North Korea and Our Preparedness,’ Choekeun Bukhanui Silsangkwa Woorui Jase, written in Korean, Republic of Korea Army, Vol. 235, May and June, 1998  
assassinated Caesar be declared *divus*, or deified, thereby tacitly establishing Augustus’ legitimacy to rule.

Were North Korea’s *juche* philosophy solely a vehicle for sustaining their country from the outside powers (e.g., Soviet Union and China, or even the United States), it might not pose a significant threat beyond the nation’s borders. However, its development has identified the interests of the nation with that extended family and intended to justify DPRK’s aspirations considerably beyond its borders, mainly to South Korea. It is for this reason that *juche* has implications for the DPRK’s approach to national unification and also on the development and procurement of a nuclear arsenal with its corresponding delivery vehicles essential for deployment.

4. **North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Procurement Programmes**

In a broad sense, there exist two views about the DPRK’s nuclear ambition. (1) A peaceful purpose to make up for a deficiency of electricity or (2) security purposes to deter the U.S. nuclear threats. It began very early, even before 1950, a time when domestic resources such as indigenous expertise in fundamental science, nuclear technology or finances to build a nuclear plant were scarce. The only resource in abundance was natural uranium ore and its monazite mines.\(^{486}\) The outputs of these were traded to the Soviet Union in exchange for military equipment. Former Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, reveals this in his memorandum that the DPRK exported concentrated monazite, tantalum, niobium, and about nine thousand tons of uranium ore to the Soviet Union for which they received heavy weapons and arms as payment.\(^{487}\)

4.1. **Historical Overview (1950-2006)**

\(^{486}\) According to Federation of American Scientists, North Korea’s uranium mines contain approximately four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium ore. Even though exact information on its mines is lacking, they estimated that the ore contains about 0.8 percent extractable uranium. Federation of American Scientists, ‘Nuclear Weapons Program,’ Steven Aftergood (ed.) http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html, accessed on March 4, 2006

\(^{487}\) Memorandum from Andrei Gromyko to Stalin, October 31, 1949, the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, pp. 6-7
It was on June 25, 1950 that the North Korean army initiated a sudden attack. In response, the United Army, composed of 16 United Nations member-countries, engaged in war after “having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace.”

During that war, General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the United Army, requested that U.S. President Truman authorise the use 26 nuclear bombs against the North Korean and Chinese armies. Even though his demand was resolutely denied by the U.S. President, the request was shocking enough to discourage the DPRK’s intentions to continue its aggression. As a consequence, the parties involved signed the Armistice Paper in 1953. After the cease-fire negotiation was completed, the U.S.-led United Nations Command announced the presence of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear-tipped rockets in South Korea at the end of January 1958. This announcement may have confirmed the North Korean leaders in their desire for their own nuclear program rather than trading their uranium ore for conventional Soviet weapons.

North Korea’s nuclear planning had already begun in 1955 when the Soviet Union and the North Korean governments agreed a ‘joint nuclear research’ programme. Pyongyang sent more than 250 nuclear scientists and specialists to the Soviet Union for training. In the 1960’s, the Northern regime engaged in costly military development, placing as much emphasis on the military expenditure as on economic

488 Secretary of State Dean Acheson, declared to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950 that the United States would adhere to the principle of non-interference with respect to the Chinese question and that the American defence line in the Pacific was neither in Korea nor Taiwan. Many scholars views the attack was due to Kim Il-sung’ miscalculation to Acheson’s speech. Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004)


490 A major reason was known as due to President Truman’s antipathy of nuclear weapons. When he was asked if the United States would consider using the atomic bomb in Korea during a press conference, he replied, “There has always been active consideration of its use. I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with this military aggression—that happens when it’s used.” The statement is very controversial, and draws strong international criticism, even from US allies. Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 11, p. 34

491 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas; a Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 1997), p. 252

492 Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, p. 35

493 Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-level North Korean official ever to defect to the South, claims that North Korea already started nuclear development plan in 1949. However, he did not show any proof of that. An Interview with Freedom North Korea Broadcast, February 11, 2005.
development. In fact, one-third of its budget was exclusively for the military sector with the nuclear programme an important part of its military policy.\textsuperscript{494}

With Soviet technical assistance, the IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor was built in Yongbyon in 1965. The Soviets received the top-level assurances from the North that, “the purpose of the DPRK’s nuclear program was peaceful in nature.”\textsuperscript{495} China also played a role in transferring their nuclear technology to North Korea. As ideological and territorial disputes between China and the Soviet Union deepened in the mid 1950’s, China was willing to share their nuclear technology with the North Koreans. Pyongyang would enter into an agreement with China for the assistance on nuclear research in 1959. Neither China nor the Soviet Union, wanted to transfer directly the know-how of making a nuclear bomb. North Korea’s request to share ‘the atomic secret’, when China succeeded to detonate the first atomic bomb, late in 1964 and then in 1974, was turned down by Mao Tse-tung.\textsuperscript{496} Although, according to Mansourov, there was some tacit help with North Korean nuclear scientists invited to the Lop Nor nuclear test site and research facility in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China. Moreover, the scientists “took part in a reception given by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s Seventh Machine Industry Ministry responsible for China’s ballistic missile development program.”\textsuperscript{497} Mansourov believes that such invitations were in relation to 70 or 80 high explosive tests conducted by the North from 1983 to 1991.\textsuperscript{498}

With its enormous efforts to build nuclear infrastructures, North Korea could conduct ‘chemistry experiments’ with uranium and perform “plutonium extraction activity on a small scale by reprocessing 300 milligrams from the IRT-2000 NPR’s spent fuel at the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yongbyon.”\textsuperscript{499} They also joined on September

\textsuperscript{495} Alexandre Mansourov, ‘North Korea’s Road to the Atomic Bomb,’ p. 37
\textsuperscript{496} Don Oberdorfer, \textit{Two Koreas}, pp. 252-3
\textsuperscript{497} Alexandre Mansourov, ‘North Korea’s Road to the Atomic Bomb,’ p. 44
\textsuperscript{498} China claims that they indicated the North’s intention of nuclear weapons by 1987. See Michael J. Mazarr, \textit{North Korea and the Bomb}, p. 44 The Soviet Union and China refused to assist North Korea in developing nuclear reprocessing facility. Kim Hak-kyong, \textit{Korea Herald}, June 4, 1989
\textsuperscript{499} Alexandre Mansourov, ‘North Korea’s Road to the Atomic Bomb,’ p. 42 cited from David Albright, Kevin O’Neill, \textit{Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle} (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and
16, 1974 and later officially signed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977 which gave them access to the IAEA database. This meant that the North could access Western nuclear technology at the price of a limited international inspection to the Yongbyon Atomic Complex.\textsuperscript{500} At the end of the 1970’s, the DPRK could maximize a generating capacity of the IRT-2000 of up to 7 megawatts.

Into the 1980’s, North Korea planned to build a nuclear power plant for electricity production as their economy was depressed. The Soviet Union promised—if it were not for military purposes—to technically and financially assist the construction of four 440 megawatts light-water reactors (LWR) under the condition that the North would join the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 12, 1985. At the same time Kim Il-sung asked the Soviet leadership to authorise the construction of an underground nuclear power plant.\textsuperscript{501} The plan was frustrated when the USSR was broken up in 1991.

By 1982 the second reactor’s nuclear core and the nuclear control building were already under construction. This was the first time that the outside world (including China and the Soviet Union) openly suspected North Korea’s ambition to go into nuclear power with construction secretly underway. When a nuclear reprocessing facility under construction near the 5 megawatts reactor at Yongbyon was registered by the U.S. spy satellite and publicised to the international press,\textsuperscript{502} the Northern regime issued a statement declaring in ‘clear terms’ that it did not develop nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{503} Mazarr cited a senior U.S. official’s remark on the issue, “While reprocessing can be part of a legitimate civilian nuclear power program, explosive tests are a veritable smoking gun of a nuclear weapons program.”\textsuperscript{504}

The U.S. government demanded North Korea placed all of its nuclear related facilities under IAEA safeguards.\textsuperscript{505} The North Korean regime responded that “the

\textsuperscript{500} The IAEA inspection had been limited to the area of the research reactor away from still building sites. Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, p. 268

\textsuperscript{501} Alexandre Mansourov, ‘North Korea’s Road to the Atomic Bomb,’ p. 51


\textsuperscript{503} Korean Central News Agency of DPRK (KCNA), August 4, 1989.

\textsuperscript{504} Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, p. 45

\textsuperscript{505} Hanguk Ilbo, Seoul, August 22, 1989
establishment of the Korean Peninsula as a nuclear-weapons-free zone is a precondition before we can sign the IAEA safeguards agreement,”506 requiring as conditions to accepting to IAEA on-site inspections the following, (1) promises not to launch a nuclear attack against the DPRK, and (2) withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.507 On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George Bush responded that the United States would withdraw all nuclear weapons from South Korea.508 His formal consent was followed by then South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s ‘Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ on January 20, 1992. Both Koreas promised to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and prohibit testing, manufacturing, production, acceptance, possession, storing or deployment of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, that agreement contains a prohibition of nuclear fuel reprocessing and all uranium enrichment facilities.509

On the other hand, the North signed the safeguard agreement with the IAEA, scheduling an inspection thereafter on May, 1992. At a glance, IAEA Director General Hans Blix and his team found that facilities inspect were “‘extremely primitive’ and far from ready to produce the quantities of plutonium needed for a stockpile of atomic weapons.”510 However, in the course of the inspection, the IAEA team found undeclared sites omitted from the report previously to the Agency by North Korea. The IAEA concluded that North Korea had reprocessed spent fuel from its indigenous 5MW reactor in 1989, 1990 and 1991 in contrast to North Korea’s previous report that it had separated plutonium only once in 1990.511

506 A prime reason that the DPRK became a member of NPT was to receive the Soviet nuclear power plant, which is believed to be for electricity-production only. But it did not sign the IAEA safeguards agreement until January 1992. O Tae-chin, Chosun Ilbo, Seoul, April 3, 1990
508 Don Oberdorfer interprets the decision as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union: “What finally broke through the inertia in Washington was a dramatic and unexpected development in a different part of the world…(there was) the rapid move toward dissolution of the Soviet Union…On September 27, in an initiative calculated to bring forth reciprocal steps from Moscow, Bush announced the removal of all…nuclear weapons from U.S. forces worldwide Two Koreas, p. 261
509 See Article 3 of ‘Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’ U.S. Department of State Archive
510 Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, p. 269.
After this conclusive report, South Korean authorities felt betrayed by the North. The Southern regime then changed to a hard-line political stand. The re-establishment of the suspended joint military exercises could be regarded as a severe nuclear threat to the North.\textsuperscript{512} North Korea also announced their withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993.

Precisely how many nuclear weapons now comprise the DPRK nuclear arsenal remains secret. North Korean officials have restricted their comments to observations that the DPRK has “manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defence”\textsuperscript{513} and that “North Korea possesses multiple bombs and was building more.”\textsuperscript{514} The fundamental limitation on the number of weapons that can be manufactured is the gross amount of fissile material produced each year.\textsuperscript{515}

\textbf{4.2. Considerations of North Korean Objectives in Pursuing Nuclear Weapons}

When North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October 2006, with an estimated yield of less than one kiloton. “Although seismographs registered the detonation and environmental sampling confirmed radioactivity, uncertainty about the weapon’s design and sophistication remains.”\textsuperscript{516}

North Korea is probably confident that it has a nuclear arsenal of sufficient size to

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\textsuperscript{512} For details of how much North Koreans were afraid of the Team Spirit exercise, see Lee Yong-joon, \textit{North Korean Nuclear Plan: New Law of Game}, Bukhan Haek; Saerowoon Gameui Bubchikm, written in Korean (Seoul: Chosun Ilbo, 2004), p. 112
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{515} “[American] nuclear expert David Albright estimated in February 2007 that North Korea had a stockpile of reprocessed plutonium of 28-50 kilograms, enough for between 5 and 12 nuclear weapons. These estimates appear to be based on projections that a country like North Korea would need 6-8 kilograms of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. The [International Atomic Energy Agency] has had a standard that a non-nuclear state would need about 8 kilograms of plutonium to produce an atomic bomb.” Larry A. Niskich, \textit{North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy}, Report RL33590 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2008), p. 13 These figures are questioned by a number of professionals in the field. The weapon that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945 used 6.2 kilograms and produced an explosive yield of 19-21 kilotons. “Until January 1994, the [U.S.] Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8 kilotons would typically be needed to make a small nuclear weapon. Subsequently, however, DOE reduced the estimate of plutonium needed to 4 kilotons. Some U.S. scientists believe that 1 kilogram of plutonium will suffice.” FAS, ‘Nuclear weapon design,’ \textit{Special Weapons Primer: Weapons of Mass Destruction}, October 21, 1998
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., p. 1
\end{flushleft}
discourage the United States from undertaking any attempt to overthrow the regime through force.\footnote{517} Secondly and closely related to the first point, the DPRK is free to negotiate the most favourable terms of assistance, confident that it can withdraw from any such negotiations—with the concurrent tacit threat of intent to restart plutonium and HEU production—without fear of direct physical retaliation by the other part. A third point is that if the United States and its allies are not be amenable to the terms, the DPRK could always consider the possibility of clandestine international sale of nuclear technology or for that matter, a weapon itself. A fourth consideration closely related to the third, is that as time goes on \textit{ceteris paribus} North Korea’s relative position in the international power equation will almost certainly improve as a logical consequence of international developments.

The North Korean strategic weapons have been an expensive burden on national economic efforts; and have further diminished the quality of life of an already impoverished population.\footnote{518} Nevertheless, programme continuity may be considered to be beneficial to a very rather small segment of North Korean society. To the extent that these development and procurement programs tend to contribute to maintenance of the \textit{juche} ideal, it is the DPRK intentions to continue as a generalised ideological political incentive, irrespective of long term impact in political and economic terms.\footnote{519}

The interaction between \textit{juche} and the strategic weapons development programme implies that North Korean war planning does not fit any definition of ‘just war’. Indeed, the population of the Korean peninsula seem to be explicitly a primary target. In his overview of just war, theologian James T. Johnson observes, “the roots of this distinction [between public and private initiatives to war] lie in Augustine’s thought: the service of private ends by private persons manifests \textit{cupiditas}—wrongly directed, self-centred love or motivation—while efforts by those at the head of communities to serve the good of those communities show the effect of a concern for justice informed


\footnote{518} North Korea has allocated every year about at least “25 percent (about 1.4 billion U.S. dollars) of its GDP for defense expenditure, which is the highest in the world.” Northeast Asia, Issues in Brief, the Heritage Foundation resources, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/issues2004/northeast-asia.cfm, accessed on March 16, 2006

\footnote{519} Alexandre Mansourov, North Korea’s Road to the Atomic Bomb, pp. 34-5
by *caritas*, rightly directed love.” It is to such extent that *juche’s* demands for economic and military autarky impose substantial demands on the already burdened populace.

In this context it is worth considering the real nature of the DPRK regime. It may well have ceased to have anything but the most passing of concerns for its own population (here there is an interesting parallel, and critical difference, to the trajectory taken by the Cuban regime after the removal of Soviet economic subsidies where that regime adopted autarky in an egalitarian manner). It is readily acknowledged that the DPRK has failed as a civil state and for all purposes remains a political garrison dedicated to the production of both strategic and tactical weapons, many up for sale in the international market. In opting for such an economic regime, the DPRK has essentially made itself a financial prisoner of the international arms market, in the sense that its fortune, even its very survival, are contingent on international demand for its manufactures. Understood in such terms, achieving the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula—a primary concern in the prospering of the messianic kingdom’s *shalom*—does become based on the disappearance of the DPRK’s current regime, as that regime can neither change the manner of its rule nor abandon its current nuclear weapons programme unconditionally. Fundamentally, this raises the question of whether the DPRK is ever capable of internal reform (along the lines of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s) if effectively its political system is now little other than a means to organise the development and sale of weaponry.

**4.3. External Influences on the DPRK, an analogy with the Soviet Union**

One plausible interpretation of how the DPRK’s leadership now sees *Juche* is that it is an ideology used to justify their own survival. The emphasis on military spending, and near absolute autarky, may well imply that they see a feasible future effectively as a state that develops and sells weaponry. Acquisition of weaponry for themselves becomes a means of deterring any potential attack. It is most likely that *Juche* has lost any of the internationalism inherent in both Soviet and Maoist interpretations of Marxism-Leninism and that, with the possible exception of South Korea, the DPRK

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520 James T. Johnson, ‘Just war, as It Was and Is,’ p. 18
leadership has no ambitions to use *Juche* as a reason for wider subversion or conquest. In consequence, they have no particular interest in having a wider external political movement that shares the core of their ideology and has somewhat similar goals.

If this is the case, then how open is the regime to outside influence? The next section considers whether the NCCK’s model of engagement and the CCK’s model of antagonism might have their respective desired goals of mediating the threat of war in Korea or overthrowing the DPRK regime respectively. Here, the intention, briefly is to consider the history of similar external engagements with the Soviet Union (especially in the 1970s and the 1980s) and consider if there are any practical lessons to be learnt from those attempts. In other words is the situation in Korea today analogous to that between Western Europe and the Soviet Union just before the latter’s collapse in the late 1980s?

In 1981 many saw the USSR as a stable autocracy, one with little or no domestic opposition and sufficiently wealthy to pursue strategic weapons development programs at the same rate, and with the same likelihood of success, as their international adversaries. Yet, a decade later the Soviet Union had collapsed; an economic and to some extent social failure. Effectively the image of stability was false, the relative prosperity in the early 1980s was a consequence of increases in the price of oil and gas in the early 1970s and this had allowed the leadership to ignore the underlying economic problems. As these started to become more and more intense a severe debate broke out amongst the Soviet leadership between those who believed the system could be reformed (essentially those around Gorbachev), those who argued for cutting lose the Soviet satellite states as the economic subsidies could not be maintained and those elements in the Nomenklatura who were keen to lever their existing economic power into personal wealth. Western Communists, in particular

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521 This was not really the case, the debate was confined within the CPSU but was real (between the constituent republics, the military, the KGB and the industrial nomenklatura) as all acknowledged that the Brezhnev era had been a disaster and something needed to be done to address the structural weaknesses in the Soviet system. What is of relevance is the lack of evidence of any similar dynamics in the DPRK and KWP.


523 The KGB was warning the elements of the politburo as to how bad the situation was. It has been claimed that Gorbachev was shocked to see these briefings for the first time when he became General Secretary, see for example Jonathan Steele, *Eternal Russia* (London: Faber & Faber, 1994) The fractious
those within the Italian Party (PCI) had warned the eastern block leaderships that their regimes were in danger of collapse in the 1970s—hence the increasingly fractious arguments between the PCI and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at the time. The Soviets could not easily ignore the largest Communist Party in Western Europe and despite their ideological development of Euro-Communism as an alternative to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, the PCI could not totally break with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{524} Thus the two parties spent a fractious period between 1968 and 1984 not listening to the other but not quite able to stop talking.

This has some relevance to the possible developments with the DPRK. The regime seems to be even less responsive to the needs of its population than the USSR (which may link back to its decision discussed above to become essentially a weapons based economy) and also its lack of any foreign interaction (despite the attempt of the NCCK to play this role). The CPSU found it hard to ignore the PCI and this led to some contamination of internal soviet debates,\textsuperscript{525} however, the DPRK lacks any similar external engagement (however limited).

Here, an interesting and possibly useful analogy maybe drawn from the behaviour of two of Western Europe’s largest left wing parties towards the Soviet Block in the 1970s and 1980s. The West German Socialist Party (SPD) undertook a process it called ‘Ostpolitik’\textsuperscript{526} which sought to explain Soviet behaviour to the West

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nature of the debate between the PCI and the Soviet Block is well documented in Joan Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1986) and more recently Silvio Pons, Berlinguer e la fine del Communismo (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 2006). Pons in particular stresses the extent that Berlinguer (then leader of the PCI) annoyed the Eastern block leadership by telling them that they would fail and lose power if they did not reform and did not improve their attitude to human rights. The Italian party also provided funding and direct support to radical dissident groups such as the Czech Charter 78 movement. This may also have been related to Czech support for the left wing terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades active in Italy at the time. Philip Willan, Puppetmasters, The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (Lincoln, Authors Choice, 2002).

\textsuperscript{524} Within the Italian party the pro-Soviet wing was small but particularly made up of members who had fought in the wartime resistance movement or who had joined the party at the stage when the Soviet Union was popular for its role in the destruction of Nazi Germany. See for example, the PCI debates that followed the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, Enrico. Berlinguer, After Poland (Nottingham: Spokesmen Press, 1982). Cossuta, leader of the pro-soviet faction, had been a member of a resistance cell active in Milan and was widely respected for his personal bravery, even amongst his political opponents.

\textsuperscript{525} Gorbachev represented the Soviet party at Berlinguer’s funeral in 1984 and later acknowledged that the PCI (and the Spanish Communist Party’s) development of Euro-Communism had had a direct influence on his development of Perestroika and Glasnost.

\textsuperscript{526} This discussion draws heavily on Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (Fontana Press, London, 1997), Silvio Pons, Berlinguer e la
(effectively they believed that peace in Europe and, as a longer term goal, German unification would be enhanced if Soviet actions were understood in their own right). Their goal was not to challenge the Soviet leadership but to ease tension by ensuring that the West understood the Soviet’s own logic for their actions. The SPD effectively used the mindset currently adopted by the NCCK – seeking unification by first seeking to reduce the level of tension and, as a pre-cursor, looking for a nuclear free Germany and Korea respectively.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) shared some of these goals (in particular in its own analysis an end to the division of Europe was crucial if it was to be allowed to come to power through elections in Italy without provoking a coup) but differed substantively in how it proceeded. The PCI criticised NATO actions as it saw appropriate (for example the placement of Cruise Missiles in Sicily) but in the main concentrated on the problems being caused by Soviet behaviour in a variety of ways. Thus it opposed the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet actions in Ethiopia and the crackdown on Solidarity in Poland. It actually reversed the SPD’s position and took the view that it would explain the West to the Soviets and try to make the leadership of the USSR see how their various actions were increasing tension in Europe and making war a distinct possibility. As part of this the PCI was very clear on the issue of human rights failings in the Eastern Block, supported the overall Helsinki Accords and in particular gave substantial support to dissident groups such as the Czech Charter 78 movement.

Although the NCCK has sought to engage with the DPRK it has not done so in such a clear way. Its approach is probably closer to that of the SPD (maybe as both share an interest in national re-unification) and, in particular, it has ignored the human rights abuses within the DPRK and also absolved the regime of much responsibility for increasing the threat of nuclear war in Korea due to its actions. However, if the Christian community is properly to offer a route forward for the Korean people it is essential that the approach meets all the expectations of the Gospels and Christian teaching. In this sense there can be no acceptance of the presence of nuclear

fine del comunismo and Joan Urban’s Moscow and the Italian Communist Party. It also uses material written by Enrico Berlinguer to justify the development of what became known as Euro-Communism, in particular, La Proposta Communista (Eiuadi, Milan, 1975).
weapons (even if it is believed they are purely for deterrence) and the issues of human rights cannot be put to one side in the search for peace. As the NCCK demonstrated in the Park years, human rights are often the basis on which peace can be achieved not an impediment.

The NCCK may have some leverage on the leadership of the DPRK due to their willingness to engage with the regime. It is unlikely that this rivals the influence of West Europe’s largest Communist Party on the Soviet Union and the PCI was clearly linking the ending of the division of Europe to the immediate issues of human rights across Europe (both in the Soviet Block and the authoritarian regimes still in power up to the mid-1970s in Greece, Portugal and Spain). It is particularly important that the NCCK return to a clear commitment to human rights now as opposed to ignoring this in their emphasis on re-unification. The failure to do so is a lapse into secular politics not the stance of a Christian faith body. It also makes it easier for the CCK to ignore other aspects as they can point, quite rightly, to NCCK silence on issues of religious and human freedom in the DPRK.

5. Towards a Nuclear-free Korea: Overview of Factors at Work

Against this background, it is not surprising that South Korea’s Christian community has been divided in their understanding of the North Korean state itself and its nuclear programme in particular. The NCCK, adopting a European-type ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ stance, has sought ways to obviate such problem by fostering a policy of reconciliation with North Korea, at the same time opposing any sanctions plan directed against the DPRK. This policy has been extended to include the United States, which has been encouraged to abandon its antagonistic policy to the DPRK, subsequently engaging in dialogue with North Koreans in an attempt to seek irenic solutions to the spectrum of issues presently dividing the Korean Peninsula. By contrast, the CCK continues to pressure the ROK into abandoning its purported appeasement policy towards the northern government, appealing instead to strengthened ties with the United States and concomitant increased military protection for South Korea.

This can be understood in two ways – by means of a secular analysis or one founded
on the gospels. A secular model would be to consider which of these two approaches is most likely to achieve the stated aims. In reality this comes down to a consideration as to whether the DPRK might embark on an internal reform programme or collapse due its economic problems.

On the other hand, the Christian tradition demands that any response is based on the gospels and Christian theology not on concepts of realpolitik. In this, at the moment the positions of both the NCCK and the CCK fail in critical respects. Both have adopted positions that accept—respectively implicitly and explicitly—the presence of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. The NCCK publicly sympathizes with the DPRK’s security concerns vis-à-vis the United States, and thereby tacitly (perhaps even grudgingly) assents to the North Korean weapons programme. Of course, the CCK has been forthright in its support for an American nuclear presence in the peninsula as a deterrent to possible northern aggression of South Korea’s territory.

To at least some extent, NCCK and CCK perspective differences are related to their members’ life experiences and religious beliefs. Understood in such light, the differing approaches of the two church councils with regards to the DPRK nuclear issue almost certainly has its origins in opposed interpretations of the nature and intentions of the northern regime, its nuclear programme, and any prudent southern responses to both circumstances.

To the extent that the development of weapons of mass destruction does not diminish the likelihood of future conflict, it appears immoral to either develop such systems or encourage their presence in situ as a reply to an adversary’s weapons potential. This certainly appears to be the case with nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. The councils of both the NCCK and CCK, appear to be adopting some variant of the Ramsey deterrent argument, which states that the deployment of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is morally acceptable provided the expected outcome being avoided through deterrence is of a sufficiently grave evil. However, the issue on hand is the applicability of the so-called Ramsey ‘test.’

Christians are called to live by a set of standards which in many respects are more stringent than those popularly accepted as requisites by other communities. By the
same token, Christians not only live in the world but are also called to evangelize it. According to history professor John D. Roth of Goshen College (a Mennonite school in the United States),

“Christians, I believe, are called to live actively in the real world. They are not to hide their faces from the pain, violence, and brokenness that is all too evident in daily life. But because they see that world from a divine perspective, from the vantage point of Christian faith, they will be cautious about accepting uncritically the standard definitions of what is real, even though those definitions may seem commonsensical and are widely shared by the broader culture.”527

With these thoughts in mind we may evaluate both perspectives and practices of NCCK and CCK Christians respectively; the manner in which each of these arrived at, justified, and implemented, their respective nuclear weapons policies. Thereafter, we may consider the structure of a prospective Korean polity, one consciously organized to reflect the moral values of Korean Christianity.

5.1. Evaluation of the NCCK approach

Without doubt, the NCCK has made substantial contributions to overall efforts to open North Korea’s window to the world. It has been a prime-mover in securing direct open meetings with North Korean churchmen, in search of steadfast relations. In the same manner, it not only placed itself in opposition to ROK’s government during the dictatorial period, it also enlisted the international Christian community to make its voice heard in support of the restoration of democracy in South Korea. Nevertheless, we may well ask whether NCCK’s overall approach to the North Korean nuclear programme has been as theologically responsible as it has been politically prudent. Thus, two distinct although related issues present themselves: the establishment of a reunified, non-nuclear Korean state and the propriety of the NCCK’s sympathy (to extent of tacit admission) towards a nuclear weapons-developing North Korean state.

Achieving reconciliation requires more than some lax effort at wilful historical

amnesia. While mutual and unconditional forgiveness may be essential, some investigation into the sources of hatred and inappropriate behaviour are required, if only to bring all matters to light should efforts at reconciliation eventually fail. In the political realm, the relationship between peace and justice may be tenuous and/or transitory. ‘Status-quo’ political peace as opposed to true peace is indeed possible without the necessary exercise of justice, if only because political objectives themselves may be of short duration and for that matter do not necessarily need to be based on personal moral values.

However, the Christian Church is not a community whose existence is predicated on the achievement of political ends in this world. Rather, it sees itself as having a divine purpose, the salvation of souls. In order to achieve that end, the Church inter alia fosters a peace—sometimes termed *shalom*—that ultimately rests on justice. That ‘shalom’ implies a state of being made whole or sanctified. And the justice that supports it is recognition of the genuine equality and moral value of all humanity in the eyes of God. According to Moltmann, “In the Old and New Testaments, it is theologically clear that justice has precedence over peace because justice creates peace, but peace does not bring about justice. Therefore the peace activity of the Church and of Christians has to be directed to justice.”528 The divine purpose for humans is to live a state of *shalom*, which is to live in peace without fear and jealousy as the place where they lived in the beginning was a Garden of Eden, which means ‘rejoice, happiness and pleasure’.529 Thus, we may say that *shalom* cannot sustain itself without God’s justice.

As the above discussion has clearly demonstrated, progressive Korean Christian participation in South Korea’s democratic movement contributed to restoration of individual freedom and nationwide political justice. Indeed, as democracy was reasserted in South Korea, the political turmoil and the cruel oppression that had characterized state policy under the military regime became diminished substantially. In the process, they never called for reconciliation with the dictatorship without the

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529 Ezekiel calls Eden ‘the Garden of God’ (Ezekiel 28:13), and Isaiah also it ‘the garden of the Lord’ (Isaiah 51:3) As Oliver O’Donovan says, “God’s peace is the original ontological truth of creation.” Oliver O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited*, p. 2
oppressors’ repentance. In many aspects, this decrease in state violence not only appears to corroborate Moltmann’s view but for that matter can be interpreted as an outcome of applied political justice, with the NCCK’s playing an important role in its achievement. Likewise, NCCK efforts at Korean unification were aimed at bringing justice ‘before’ peace because the division itself is a symbol of injustice and hatred among the entire Korean people. What effectively motivates the desire for a united Korea is the recovery of peace through justice.

However, even though the NCCK concurs that peace without justice is in vain, they nevertheless appear to have focused more attention on peace recovery through ‘political compromise’ rather than seeking to establish a social order identified as shalom. This has been especially evident with regard to North Korea, ever since the nuclear weapons issue was provoked by the northern regime. NCCK documents issued before 1997 reveal that they originally did emphasise recovery of peace through justice. Yet, looking at the declaration of ‘21st Century Korean Theology,’ unconditional reconciliation between the South and the North is described as a priority target of all peace efforts. The term ‘justice’ is replaced by ‘reconciliation’ and ‘peace through reconciliation’ is the form of wording now employed.

A basic problem emerges here though. In the past, the NCCK promoted human rights during the Korean democratic movement. At that time, they clearly preached divinely ordained justice that underlies all human rights. They were assiduous in their efforts not to offset justice for some temporal (and ephemeral) political peace. They believed that democratization would not only bring justice in the form of human rights, but would also sustain those rights in the future. The ‘1988 NCCK declaration’ argues that reunification should be achieved by common people, thereby guaranteeing democratic participation, not simply as a matter of political convenience.

531 ‘A Declaration of 21st Century Korean Theology,’ NCCK Archive, the NCCK, November 20, 2000
532 It says, “In every step of the formulation of proposals for reunification the full democratic participation of all members of society must be guaranteed. Most importantly, participation must be assured for the minjung (civilians or common people), who have not only suffered the most from the situation of division, but have been continuously alienated and excluded from the decision-making processes of society, despite their constituting the majority of the population.” ‘Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace (1988)’
Unfortunately, the arguments contained in the 1988 manifesto appear restricted to the citizens of South Korea without taking into account the northern population. The North’s political system does not allow democratic—or, for that matter, any other kind of political—participation without the regime’s control. Furthermore, it is both widely reported and popularly assumed that basic human rights are blatantly disregarded by the Kim Jung-il regime. Of course, the DPRK has its own political system, a composite of communist ideology and reverence of the national dictator bordering on emperor worship that is encompassed under the rubric of ‘juche’. They may in fact believe their system is far better than those in practice in other countries. They may be convinced that they do not need a western-style democratic system in order to thrive. They may likewise think they do not need or wish a complicated and considerable judicial procedure either. However, understood in objective terms, fundamental human rights—the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression and equality before the law—evidently do not exist in North Korea. Besides, it is reported that underground Christians in the North have been arrested by the secret police and threatened with death; such threats have on occasion been carried out merely because of their Christian faith.

Even in the face of such evidence, however, the NCCK seems to have hesitated to refer to the human rights situation in North Korea in the same manner that it employed during the southern dictatorship period. Reverend Seo Kyung-seok, former chairman of the CCK’s Human Rights Committee, argues that

“The NCCK claims that peace and reconciliation with North Korea should come first before looking at the human rights problem in the North. However, as I remember, the NCCK revealed successfully the falsehood of peace without human rights during the Park Jung-hee’s dictatorship period in South Korea. In this regard, I do not know why they are relatively calm at this moment against the northern regime’s human rights oppression.”

533 For example, the Korean Institute for National Unification issues an annual publication called ‘White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea’; in fact, it is a dossier recording such abuses to some detail. According to these reports, North Koreans are continually harassed. Their rights to the simplest joys of life, indeed the very right to life itself, are all too frequently denied. “Public executions are carried out at places where large crowds gather... Sometimes the execution is carried out in the presence of the convict’s family.” White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2003 (Seoul: the Korean Institute for National Unification, 2003), p. 77

534 Chosun Ilbo, December 21, 2005

535 Seo Kyung-seok, ‘Human Rights and True Peace,’ Inkwonkwa Jinjunghan Pyongwha, written in Korean, Main Presentation, The CCK Seminar for the Human Rights and Liberty in North Korea,
The reason why the NCCK has been silent on the human rights situation in North Korea might be twofold. Firstly, exposing the human rights issue would justify the isolation of the Northern regime from the international community in the eyes of any anti-North Korean party. Instead, they opt to put emphasis on national reconciliation between the two Korean governments. At the Conference for Human Rights and Mission Policy held by the NCCK Human Rights Committee (May 26 - 27, 2005), the council concluded—in what can only be described as an act of faith contrary to experience—that promoting peace through the economic interchange between the South and the North was more important than emphasis on human right violations by the North, if only because economic development would ultimately translate into improvements in human rights. Any condemning of human rights violations was reserved for the United States to express, thus internationally politicizing the human rights issue to pressure North Korea in the world scenario. In line with this approach by the NCCK, Jung Tae-wook, a professor of law, argues that the United States should be condemned for using such unfortunate circumstances for its own political ends. Then, he explains a reason why the human rights matter cannot be an issue for Christians.

“Context and situations constantly change. Our ethical judgment must take consideration of this. There cannot be a rigid template or absolute prescription to changing situations. Moreover, even if the matter of human rights has been widely discussed in the Western Christian realm, it might not be a doctrinal issue. Sometimes, it is argued that there should be moral standards before discussing universal human rights. For example, not all Christians accept that people like gays deserve basic human rights because they think Christians should not live together with the ‘sinners’.”

This analogy, however, is flawed as a basic Christian tenet is that human beings are entitled to live according to God’s love and grace; furthermore, moral shortcomings—which as sinners all Christians are prone to have—do not eliminate their inherent

Seminar Materials, the CCK, December 5, 2005
Newsnjoy, June 3, 2005.
537 The NCCK Human Rights Committee, ‘A Statement of the recent Human Rights Issue of North Korea,’ NCCK Archive, the NCCK, June 13, 2005
539 Ibid.
rights to certain basic human rights, regardless of political, cultural or economic systems into which they are born. Moreover, even though traditional Christian morality may be at odds with certain postulated human rights—e.g., the homosexual behaviour to which Professor Jung alluded—that same Christian morality teaches the believer to ‘love the sinner,’ irrespective of his sin. That same Christian love precludes any argument in favour of denying basic human rights.

There have been in recent years a myriad of considerations and discussions—some of them quite heated—among Christians in relation to human rights. However, a consensus now appears to have emerged. The lines of thinking of Thomas P. Schirrmacher, a German systematic theologian, seem to be widely representative in so far as, “Human rights, given to protect the individual, are derived from Christian thought. The General Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, clearly demonstrates its Christian roots. The bans on slavery and torture, the principle of equality before the law, the right to rest and recreation—as seen in the Sabbath or Sunday rest—come from Christian traditions and not by chance from the governments which confirm these rights and anchor them in their constitutions although they are mostly in Christian countries.”

In this regard, justice and human rights may not be convenient formulae but are indeed fundamental principles and as such, always have universal application. As the NCCK clarifies in its 1988 declaration, if the two Koreas’ reconciliation is to be carried out by common people, human right violations at government level must first stop, if only because reconciliation is a process to achieve the peace encompassing all Korean people, both in South and North Korea. Thus, regardless of whether or not the United States withdraws from this issue strategically and politically, the human rights problems in North Korea must remain on the NCCK agenda; furthermore it must continue to be a matter of public record and emphasis.

Another further reason for NCCK’s relative silence on human rights issues for North Koreans could be a consequence of the gravity of the nuclear weapons issue. The North’s nuclear weapons development programme is a serious security concern for

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the people of South Korea. Therefore, effective actions in relation to human rights abuses are to be preceded by the unequivocal resolution of the nuclear threat. Such a southern strategy—maintaining an affable relationship with the Kim Jung-il regime as the best means of preventing a nuclear war in the region—presupposes avoiding any predicable irritation of the regime with references to inconvenient issues such as human rights. In the political realm, human rights and national security concerns are not naturally synonymous.

However, the NCCK is a faith-oriented organization that represents Protestant Christian individuals and organizations in South Korea, not a secularly established political organization, whose constitutionally mandated requirement extends to the protection of its citizens and their property but which is not constitutionally required to make the same efforts beyond its borders. The council is a faith community that has the moral responsibility to speak out against political and ethical wrongdoings. The role of any church is not to foster or emphasise policies whose primary virtues are practicality irrespective of moral considerations but to inform the people where God’s justice lies, making an effort to see it brought to fruition. In this regard, Yoder explains the difference of mandate of Church and State when he says, “The mandate of the church, the mandate to overcome evil, is the superior mandate; the mandate of the state, that of keeping evil in check, only has meaning because the church is accomplishing its mission.” The NCCK took this view and observed the mandate of the church, when it spoke out against injustices committed by the military dictatorship in the South. However, it has not done so in its relations with the North.

On the other hand, the belief that initiating economic growth in North Korea with Southern assistance will foster human rights in the long term is also naïve if only because the primary and perhaps only beneficiary of any aid could well be the ‘inner sanctum’ of North Korea’s political regime; at least as long as the DPRK’s one-party dictatorship continues. Moreover, NCCK’s policy of silence concerning a regime that was responsible for the death of millions of North Koreans—men, women and children who starved to death—should be reconsidered in both moral and ethical terms.

North Korea’s highest leaders, Kim *pere* and Kim *fils* are evidently responsible for the national famine. But, they might judged that the fate of their people suffering calamity was an acceptable price to pay in the achievement of national political goals. In this, they were probably following the precedent set by Stalin’s regime which worsened a famine in the Ukraine of the 1930s by continuing to export grain so as both to fund a military build up and avoid alerting the external world to the existence of the famine. The North Korean famine was largely a by-product of what amounted to a similar financial decision—redirection of national assets to concentrate on the development of military weapons systems.

The public theology espoused by the NCCK rejects the development of nuclear weapons as intrinsically unacceptable, since their application in war cannot be effected in a manner consistent with the moral requirements encompassed in the principles of discrimination and proportionality. Hence, logic demands that the NCCK systematically object to all nuclear weapons development programs, irrespective of the nation making the effort. Despite this, the NCCK’s stance against nuclear weapon development appears lax towards such programme in North Korea, ostensibly because they were convinced that the U.S. nuclear threat has encouraged the Northern regime to develop nuclear weapons of its own defence. Noh Jong-sun, NCCK committee member for reunification and reconciliation, asserts that North Korea has a right to defend itself, if necessary with nuclear weapons against any U.S. nuclear threats. Thus, his solution on the nuclear issue is first to dismantle the currently deployed nuclear weapons by the major nuclear powers. He argues that “discussing nuclear disarmament of North Korea is to be behind a discussion of the powerful states’ nuclear weapons. It is wrong to point out only the problem of the weak country’s

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542 See Robert Conquest *The Harvest of Sorrow* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002) It is still disputed why the famine occurred (natural reasons, peasant resistance to collectivization or deliberate state terror) but the regime placed the export of grain above the retention of grain to feed its own people.

543 For example, statistics demonstrate that the northern government’s budget for the period between 1994 and 2002 increased the defence spending ratio while applying commensurate reductions in non-defence areas, even as famine raged amongst the population. International Monetary Fund, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Fact Finding Report, 1997, The Republic of Korean Ministry of Unification Homepage http://www.unikorea.go.kr, accessed on September 10, 2007

544 Noh Jong-sun, ‘Peace and Reconciliation in Korea,’ Plenary Session 4, International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, York St. John University, August 16, 2006
nuclear armament against the powerful countries.”\textsuperscript{545} Then, he suggested signing a peace treaty between North Korea and the United Nations as a way to end the nuclear crisis in the region.\textsuperscript{546} If such a peace treaty was concluded, and then mutual respect among the states concerned is established, his suggestion would attain a greater level of cogency, if only because there would be no further national security objective to North Korea development of a nuclear arsenal. This of course presupposes that concerns of national security are the driving force behind DPRK efforts, a belief that the NCCK and Noh Jung-sun both share at least in their public pronouncements.

However, many scholars and analysts are uncertain whether North Korea would ever abandon those nuclear weapons already in its arsenal.\textsuperscript{547} They believe that even if the northern regime is interested in limited political engagement with South Korea, it will not abandon its nuclear war-fighting capability, a programme into which so much effort and resources already have been invested. Professor Andrei Lankov, a Russian specialist in Korean politics, argues that “The North Koreans will never give up their nuclear weapons. They thrive on tension and use it to prevent an opening of their country to the outside world.”\textsuperscript{548} He lists three reasons.

“Firstly, North Korea has learnt a lesson how strong the U.S. military power is from the Iraq War and Afghanistan operation. Thus, they do not easily give up the strategic value of the nuclear weapons as an absolute deterrent means. Secondly, without the nuclear weapons, North Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world, will have nothing to bargain its interest in the international society. And lastly, the North’s nuclear weapon helps the regime prolong its lifespan. If the regime abandoned the weapons, the military-oriented regime would mar its authority over the military and it will effect the regime’s survival domestically.”\textsuperscript{549}

Concurring with Lankov’s view, Michael J.Mazarr likewise argues that North Korea would not readily abandon its nuclear weapons as he relates, “Beginning in the late

\textsuperscript{545} An Interview with Noh Jong-sun at the International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, August 17, 2006
\textsuperscript{546} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{547} Defence experts continue to debate the actual number of such devices in the DPRK arsenal, although a consensus of 4-6 weapons appears to have been established. See the discussion in other parts of this study.
\textsuperscript{549} Andrei Lankov, ‘The Two Faces of the Nuclear Weapons in North Korea’
1980s, officials in Pyongyang learned how useful an ambiguous nuclear capability could be in getting attention, wringing security concessions out of Seoul and Washington, and acquiring pledges of economic assistance and expanded diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{550} Considering both scholars’ arguments, maintaining the existing nuclear weapons would be more profitable for the northern regime, along with an ambiguous management of the nuclear issue; as long as same continues to effectively serve as a bargaining gambit to obtain concessions from the West over the long term. Understood in these terms, it is difficult to conclude that North Korea will drop its nuclear weapons programme neither on short term nor that easily.

In light of the NCCK’s ambivalence toward the DPRK nuclear weapons development program, as well as its silence regarding the regime’s contributions to human suffering in North Korea, the church group’s efforts at bringing about peace based solely on reconciliatory gestures toward North Korea will not guarantee a true peace. For it is only reconciliation encompassing all Koreans, even if some political reconciliation at government level were also to occur, that can bring about that peace theologians describe as shalom, thereby with decreased war prospects. As problematic as the NCCK’s silence on such grave matters was, even more troubling was the NCCK’s lack of forceful public response to human suffering in North Korea, a stand which risked compromising its identity as a faith community; identity based on Jesus’ love and the grace He offers to all humankind. Regardless of policy priorities or for that matter the establishment of preferences in political debate, the Church is first and foremost of all a spiritual body, one that conducts itself in the belief that God—who grants primacy of place to the weak and suffering, and will surely punish those who afflict them or are indifferent to their affliction—is watching and judging; only secondarily, if at all, is it a political actor.

Given all these considerations, the NCCK should not restrict itself to the role of political reconciler but rather it should actively engage in surmounting the difficulties currently experienced by North Koreans at the grass roots, even if such role would mean alienating the present-day DPRK leadership. “Christian hope is not directed towards a happy end in world history,” argues Moltmann, “false comfort is just as

dangerous as general despair.” In this sense, a prophetic message as such, ‘any attempt to make a nuclear weapon at the price of human sufferings cannot be permissible under any circumstance and constitutes an intrinsic affront to God’, should first be addressed to the North Korean leaders, prior to any further effort at national reunification.

5.2. Evaluation of the CCK approach

The CCK was neither apolitical nor purely religious, as they have clearly defined themselves as anti-communists and anti-North Korean. However, their direct participation in the political debate concerning the nuclear weapons issue did not appear until the emergence of a progressive government in South Korea and the disclosure of the HEU program in North Korea. However, as discussed above, the primary motivation was their security concerns for South Korea in the face of growing northern nuclear threat.

The CCK’s security concerns originated from the memories of individual members, especially those who had suffered persecution while living in the North. Pastors who attended CCK-hosted rallies used to say, “[North Korean] Communists are the first enemy of Christianity. They are Satan and anti-Christ revealed in the 21st century!” In this manner conservative Christian leaders within the CCK have kept their hatred alive while sustaining a spiritual battle against a regime personified as the ‘evil one’ for over half-a-century. Convinced that defeating the northern communists is compatible with their religious beliefs and will make Korea a better place for the Korean Church.

The CCK believes that stronger physical and military power may deter, and even defeat, the North Koreans. Their interpretation of the term ‘security’ is based not only on spiritual power, a consideration their fundamental faith regularly stresses, but also on physical power manifested in terms of military potential. Thus, spiritual strength and physical power combine reinforcing each other; such combination generates a synergy essential, in their eyes, to the maintenance of national security. Dependence

551 Jürgen Moltmann, Creating a Just Future, p. 37
552 Newsnjoy, March 2, 2004
on superior weaponry is not regarded as impinging on their trust in God’s almighty power, if only because they view these weapons as they may be permitted to use against an evil enemy and saving the lives of the good. Implicit in such a moral logic is the notion that such weapons—including nuclear armament in the hands of the just—are either morally neutral or even perhaps have divine approval.

Such ideas are related to the realist concept of security, which defines the relationship between states as power politics and on-going conflicts. However, such a realist approach to security might not only prevent an outbreak of war, but may actually promote the possibility of war. As Joseph Nye argues, military superiority does not guarantee the achievement of goals set out prior to military engagement,

“Military power is a small part of the solution in responding to threats on the bottom board of international relations. Even on the top board (where America represents nearly half of world defence expenditures), the military is supreme in the global commons of air, sea, and space, but more limited in its ability to control nationalistic populations in occupied areas.”

In this light, Dr. Shim Jae-kwon, South Korean peace theorist, argues that a sovereign state in the post-Cold War era could no longer guarantee its safety, given the anarchic and conflict-oriented understanding of contemporary international relations. Rather, it needs to consider an idea of common prosperity by searching common values among the nations because real security comes from cooperative and harmonious efforts to make peace, and not from competitive and conflict structure.

However, the CCK’s thinking in the area of national security seems to remain a realist approach. For example, Reverend Kim Jin-ho, a peace theologian, claims that the CCK’s support of the U.S. invasion into Iraq in 2003 shows their preference for reliance on military power even though there was room for reconsidering the U.S. invasion in terms of just war criteria, in particular *jus ad bellum*. Viewed from the biblical perspective, dependence on military power was not allowed for God’s people.

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According to moral theologian Roger Ruston,

“Israel’s sacred writers would never agree that Israel’s wars were the king’s wars, despite the attempts of the kings from David onwards to make them appear so. They were YHWH’s wars on behalf of his people. In keeping with the Exodus tradition, it was YHWH’s miraculous power that was to deliver Israel, not the power of a sacred king with his standing armies and his modern weapons. The power was ultimately with God, not with any superior power.”

Nonetheless, it is the CCK membership that has infused faith with antagonism and ideological preference. They have consistently sympathised with South Korea’s military build-up. Moreover, CCK leadership argues it would be inevitable for South Korea to either remain within the U.S. nuclear umbrella or would need to possess nuclear weapons, as long as North Korea keeps their own nuclear weapons arsenal. According to the ‘Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula’, which was signed by the CCK president, former presidents and other conservative Christian leaders of the Korean Church,

“Through North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and the execution of a nuclear test, the Korean Peninsula is facing its most serious crisis since the 1950 Korean War. North Korea's nuclear armament will force South Korea to go nuclear or seek protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.”

Even though the declaration was adamant in demanding that the North dismantle its nuclear arsenal, it made no comparable demand on South Korea, where a modest, tacit nuclear weapons research programme was still functioning. Nor did the CCK object to the initiation of any prospective major nuclear weapons development programme by the ROK in the event that the DPRK continuing its efforts. As argued in the chapter 5, it should be unthinkable because nuclear deterrence is based on an assumption of actual use. O’Donovan explains why nuclear deterrence has mistakenly

558 One may argue that it is highly possible for the CCK personnel not to acknowledge well the past South Korea’s nuclear weapon research program as the southern governments never admitted that. However, it is easily construed in that the CCK never opposed the US nuclear arsenal stationed in the Korean Peninsula, supporting strong armament against the DPRK.
been sought when he wrote, “What is distinctive in modern deterrence is that the limitless evil which imagination can propose in relation to any determined threat has become a project for practical execution; and this is necessarily a modern development since the appearance of the limitless within the scope of practical deliberation is a modern development in Western culture.”

The underlying problem however is that the CCK’s definition of evil never points to nuclear weaponry itself. Rather, the evil they bear in mind is only embodied in the North Korean authorities, as their predefined and designated enemy. Gregory A Boyd cites American President Bush’s remarks in order to show how a political leader can react to a mistakenly defined evil, “Hence, the only way to end the conflict is to ‘rid the world of this evil,’ as President George W. Bush said after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre. The ‘good’ (our tribe) must extinguish the ‘evil’ (their tribe), using all means necessary, including violence. This is the age-old ‘myth of redemptive violence.’”

Even though the CCK’s overall case does not exactly match the Bush argument, its position to vis-à-vis North Korea does. The CCK regards Kim Jung-il as an evil man, one who must and will be eradicated in the end. In this sense, for the CCK, any South Korean nuclear weapon development programme could be regarded as no more than a consequence of what the ‘evil man brought upon himself’. There is no doubt that he is a dictator who oppresses his people and ignores human rights in North Korea. He may be a dangerous political leader who would harm peace and stability in the region. He may still harbour the ambition of communizing South Korea—or, perhaps more accurately, establishing the DPRK doctrine of juche—should he think the time was ripe.

However, it does not mean that he is always evil. There is a problem if he should be treated as the incarnation of the Devil. Kwon Jin-kwan explains,

“Generally speaking, political situations or circumstances are always complicated with evil and good. Evil and good are involved in any situation. Authentic theological politics aims at eliminating evil and increasing the goodness in the ongoing socio-political realities, although perfect goodness may not be possible in reality. However, there is no absolute evil in the form

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559 Oliver O'Donovan, *Peace and Certainty: A Theological Essay on Deterrence*, p. 22
of entities. Thus the labelling of North Korea as an axis of evil cannot stand. It is a habit of the fundamentalists to distinguish worldly events in a dualistic way: evil and good."

In addition to this observation, once being so labelled in religious terms, the evil-defined man becomes identified with an ‘anti-faith’, which should be a target for eradication at whatever cost. If such identification were unquestionably accepted, a definer would be willing to consider any and all means to destroy him.

On the other hand, the CCK might want to show their resolute will to dissuade Kim-Jung-il from his nuclear ambition through the possibility of the South’s nuclear armament and/or establishing the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It would also be a problematic matter if their reaction to the northern nuclear weapons implied an invitation for South Korea’s nuclear armament.

However, this would be an even more serious problem if they fail to acknowledge the burden attached to a nuclear weapons build-up. In relation to the psychological aspect of nuclear deterrence, according to O’Donovan, “The seductive appeal of deterrence-theory to thinkers of the realist tradition lies in its concept of the enemy as one who cannot be made susceptible to the codes of honour and rational political interest which generally govern relations among states.” More so, Roger Ruston highlights the implication of dependence of the nuclear weapons by saying,

“Consider the moral burden that nuclear deterrence lays on the shoulders of those who make it ready for battle – a burden that is shared by all of us who willingly live under its protection, even if we do not acknowledge our part in it. The practice of nuclear deterrence implies that there is no limit to the amount of destruction we should be prepared to commit in the state’s service. It implies that we are ready, on orders from political or military superiors, to destroy totally cities full of civilians, and to make future reconciliation, or even life itself, impossible.”

In light of Ruston’s observation, the CCK’s concern for security may hamper the possibility of reconciliation with North Korean ‘minjung’ in the future. Moreover, with no prudent consideration of the North’s intention to opt for nuclear power, the

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561 Kwon Jin-kwan, ‘Minjung Theology,’ p. 84
562 Oliver O’Donovan, Peace and Certainty, p. 27
563 Roger Ruston, ‘the Idols of Security,’ p. 156
CCK’s hard-line attitude may drive the situation into an even more dangerous phase. If its target were to deter the North’s nuclear ambition, the defect of nuclear strategy for deterrence, should be considered first. In the absence of such a consideration, the CCK’s security concern would be misguided, oblivious to unexpected results such as two equally nuclear-armed Koreas. Thus, consideration of a nuclear strategy as a counter-policy to the North’s nuclear weapons program should not be permissible, given some elements of the Christian Just War perspective. In particular, the view that a nuclear deterrent strategy may be regarded as a case to invite evil to end evil.

It is this consideration that has troubled moral theologians. Opting for an intrinsically evil policy to defeat evil—or, perhaps redefining an intrinsically evil policy as a morally acceptable one under certain circumstances—has been found acceptable by many just war advocates. Roth describes the moral dilemma,

“When faced with the question of how we would react to an actual threat to our lives, many contemporary Christians offer a response that does not differ in any significant way from what one might expect to hear from a modern non-Christian….If someone threatens to rob us of our possessions or our lives, then a lethal act of violence against the aggressor is justified. In other words, our own lives must be preserved at all costs even if it means forfeiting the life of someone else, presumably that of a non-Christian”\(^\text{564}\)

However, one of the intrinsic attributes of nuclear weapons is that they are designed for exterminating all creatures, which completely contradicts God’s grace. In a basic sense of Christianity, nuclear weapons cannot be a lesser evil to defeat a bigger evil because of their indiscriminate and destructive nature. In addition, Walter Stein, a distinguished Catholic just war thinker, claims that “any reliance of these weapons as ‘deterrent’ must be wicked, since this not only involves risks of their eventual use but hypothetically commits us to murder here and now.”\(^\text{565}\) Furthermore, international norms and laws are coming to regard them as unacceptable weapon in human society.\(^\text{566}\)

\(^{564}\) John D. Roth, Choosing against War, pp. 41-2
\(^{566}\) For instance, the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (Submitted and adopted on October 29, 1996 to the U.N. General Assembly) convinces that “the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth,” “International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” the United Nations
In the end, we may conclude, firstly that CCK’s perception of national security has not been different from the political realist perspective, which interprets the world order as a conflict structure and stresses the need of national defence. Such a perception made the CCK fail to develop a new concept of security that seeks common prosperity and peace and puts military options in a subordinate position. Secondly, its desperate effort to stop the northern nuclear project has resulted in their request for the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Considering the North’s excuse to develop their own nuclear arms as a deterrent means, the CCK’s searching for another nuclear deterrence is hardly distinct from the North’s dependence on nuclear arms. And lastly, CCK’s identity as a faith-oriented organization as equal to the NCCK, facing the northern nuclear threat by depending on purely spiritual power, has been weakened by its seeking morally unacceptable military power.

An effective question is whether the CCK has adopted a position where they depend less on God’s spiritual power than on man’s military power?

6. Summary

Quite obviously, the weapons development programme undertaken by North Korea has attracted attention from any number of parties, whether in the Korean Peninsula, in adjacent countries, or, for that matter in other continents. The reaction was also marked with significant divisions prevailing among members of South Korea’s Christian community.

The DPRK nuclear initiative challenged Christian thinking on a number of levels. At the most visceral, apprehension—extensive among South Koreans, irrespective of religious persuasion—mounted (and became crystallised) with the significant deployment of nuclear weapons, that should they actually be applied during hostilities, could ultimately threaten not only the continued existence of the republic but for that matter the Korean civilization itself. For those Christians who envisioned an eventually unified Korea as a geographic reflection of a Christian koinonia, both the

General Assembly Resolution 51/45 M
weapons program and the recently evolved *juche* philosophy that fostered it, raised the spectre of what could be termed as ‘anti-koinonia,’ a unified Korea under *juche* principles rather than under those elucidated in the Gospels.

For many conservative Christians, including the CCK, these developments in North Korea underlined their sagacity and prudence of avoiding active opposition to the Park regime and in a manner, its Chun successor. Whatever the faults of the military dictatorships, they were largely content to leave unmolested Christians who did not publicly oppose the regime and this tolerance had extended to freedom of worship. Furthermore, many Korean conservatives (from all religious traditions) argued that dictatorial government was a necessary precursor to economic development⁵⁶⁷ and as a consequence, a deterring factor to North Korean aggressive acts. For many, there was a vague belief (or even better, hope) that a strong economy would promote democracy at some time in the future and under such conditions, North Korea might then find peaceful reunification an attractive option.⁵⁶⁸

From the NCCK perspective, nuclear weapons, while still important, are a lesser consideration. The NCCK looks to their elimination from the Korean peninsula, a policy that would likely be pursued by any democratic government with authority over the entire region. Secondly, the NCCK unification effort is legitimately defined as a political application of a fundamentally religious construct (a Korean koinonia). As noted in the discussion previously, it is not the NCCK’s emphasis on unification that troubles most conservative Christians but rather its evident unwillingness to recognize the prospective danger in dealing with a regime that argues in favour of development of such weapons in terms of its self-identification.

As a result, there are a number of subtle distinctions separating public figures in South Korea who jointly favour a more relaxed relationship with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung, a devout Catholic on excellent terms with the NCCK, and democratically elected president of the ROK in 1997, is a case worth mentioning. Such friendly ties

⁵⁶⁷ According to Han and Sharp, “the South Korean military governments vigorously pursued economic development and this in turn was intended to legitimize their dictatorial governance.” Han Gil-soo and Rachel Sharp, ‘Economic Development of South Korea: By-product of Military Regimes,’ *Policy, Organization, and Society*, Vol. 14, 1997, p. 23
⁵⁶⁸ Han Gil-soo and Andrew E. Kim, ‘The Korean Christian Movement towards Reunification of the Two Koreas,’ p. 236
may be explained by the fact that both parties recognised the necessity of reconciliation with—and indeed embracement of—North Korea. President Kim went so far as to avoid using terms (e.g., ‘unification’) that could be interpreted as threats by the DPRK, preferring more innocuous expressions (e.g., ‘constructive engagement’). However, as described,\textsuperscript{569} insofar as the North’s continuing nuclear weapons development is concerned his efforts partially failed as the relaxed relationship with the DPRK did not, in turn, allow any progress on the nuclear issue.

For the past few years the NCCK has suffered from internal dissension, much of it a function of the differing perceptions of member churches on the weight that should be placed on the DPRK nuclear programme and its implications for national reunification. This disagreement—or perhaps better described as difference in conceptualisation—may also point to a more profound difference, one reaching into the appreciation of a distinctive Korean Christianity.

The NCCK model rests on a national \textit{koinonia} that in turn, has its origins at least to some extent, in neo-Confucian thought. However, troubling is the fact that the NCCK model has an essentially asymmetric relationship with its DPRK counterpart. For the NCCK the apotheosis of \textit{juche} into a species of state-sponsored paganism in which Kim Il-sung (and, later, Kim Jung-il) took on the character of a deified leader presented an institutional challenge, one that had its origins in the NCCK’s increasing antipathy and public opposition to the Park dictatorship in the early 1970s. Nonetheless, as reiterated several times, the core spirit of this model has become diluted by the manner that the NCCK has dealt with the nuclear issue in North Korea, putting more weight on political and institutional reunification rather than encompassing minjung-oriented koinonia where people’s human rights are protected and their integrity exalted.

The possibility of a Korean \textit{koinonia} rests on fundamental beliefs found in the Gospels and to some extent are understood through the prism of neo-Confucian thought. The North Korean model of Korean unification presupposes the establishment of \textit{juche}, supplanting competing philosophical and religious modes of

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\textsuperscript{569} Chapter 5 of this study
thought. Of course, if national unification could be achieved in terms of genuine *koinonia*, that problem would be avoided but to date Kim Jong-il’s regime remains attached to *juche* and for that matter envisions its nuclear arsenal as a means of securing continued and uncontested grip on political power. Finding some means of resolving these conundrums is discussed in the final chapters of this study.
Chapter 6: Summary: Applying Just War to Korea Today

1. Initial Considerations

This chapter summarises the argument so far in the thesis and draws together the main strands of: the Christian Just War tradition; the specific situation in Korea since 1953; and, the development of the Korean Church, to explore both the current situation and options. It reviews what could be said to be the current challenges to the goal of a Korea inspired by Gospel ideas, primarily the division between the DPRK and ROK and the presence of nuclear weapons. It also suggests that the Korean Protestant community needs to base its response more on the Just War arguments than they have so far so as to provide the means to deal with these complex issues.

This chapter also considers the answers to the key questions set out in the introduction, viz:

*The nuclear issue of North Korea is not a political or ideological matter, but a matter regarding an identity of the Christian Church in South Korea.*

And the related questions of:

- What historical and political events have brought Christian Churches in Korea to their actual respective postures on reunification and national security? To what extent can these modern debates be related to the different ways the Protestant Community first came into the Korean peninsula?
- What priorities have been established in the NCCK and the CCK in adopting their council stances towards political reunification? How have they interpreted the Christian duty of *Missio Dei* in terms of their engagement with public life, and the changing politics, in South Korea?
- What are the moral implications of just war in the contemporary war and security issues?
- How much importance is attributed to national security in relation to nuclear weapons as a means of its attainment?
• What are both councils’ theological stances in relation to the nuclear issue?
• Which is the Korean Church’s view of the State’s role in the nuclear issue?
• How does the Christian Church influence State political policy?

To do this means to draw together the three main themes in this thesis: the Christian Just War tradition; how Christianity became part of Korean society; and, the current political situation in the Korean peninsula. From this synthesis it then possible to move on in the final chapter to consider what practical steps and options exist that are compatible with the Christian Gospels.

It is possible to see the Just War tradition as mainly forming a constraint on countries that might be seen to be the aggressor in any situation. Thus the expectations of *Jus ad Bellum* set out circumstances when it is deemed to be legitimate to start a war. At no stage in the Christian era has Korea been in a position to undertake external aggression and this simple fact perhaps explains why Just War has not really featured in the debates within the Protestant Community so far. The only war started by an element of the Korean community was the invasion by the DPRK in 1950. In this case, for Christians in the ROK the need was to respond to what was effectively external aggression. Against this historic background, the concepts of *Missio Dei*, of establishing a Korean state based on the gospel ideas and the older Korean concept of *Koinonia* have instead formed the core of the argument.

However, this is no longer adequate as it is possible that the ROK could be the aggressor in any future war and, in any case, the community does need to consider its response in the terms of Just War because, as important as *Jus ad Bellum*, is the concept of *Jus in Bello*, practically just what is legitimate in a situation of armed conflict. In this case, as of now, any armed conflict in the Korean peninsula could easily slip into the use of nuclear weapons by one or both sides. Against this background there is a need for the Protestant community to ensure that its arguments and understanding are informed by the Just War concepts.

The concept, argued by O’Donovan of avoiding the deaths of the innocent becomes
particularly important once there is a risk of the use of nuclear weapons. He also sets an important second test, “that the evil it (ie war) inflicts such be less grave than the evil it seeks to avert.” O’Donovan suggests that “separating the innocent from the guilty is the object of judgement.” Yoder, warns very clearly that “just war thinking [discrimination and proportionality] easily degenerates into the justification, even sometimes the glorification, of war, violence and force, because it is assumed that, once the set criteria are met, the military action is no longer in any fundamental way questionable, deplorable or tragic.”

Perhaps due to the circumstances at the time of its arrival in Korea, Korean Christianity has had a strong message of social justice, of a Korean identity, and within the Protestant community a commitment to seeing the Messianic Kingdom both in concrete terms and in its achievement to be both a legitimate and reasonable goal. Historian and theologian Kim Yong-bok describes the mindset as,

“[History] is the struggle between the politics of God and the politics of Satan. The world is dominated by godless pagan politics, which are the manifestations of satanic politics. But the politics of God is manifested in the politics of Israel and the politics of Jesus who was crucified. The politics of Jesus the Messiah is to conquer and overcome the politics of this world, of the pagan nations, and of Satan.”

There is no Hegelian synthesis at work in this thinking, rather it is one of unrelenting conflict; one in which only one side can ultimately prevail, and Christians promised they will ultimately prevail. Professor Kim’s metaphorical reference to Israel is

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570 Oliver O'Donovan, Peace and Certainty: A Theological Essay on Deterrence
571 Oliver O'Donovan, Peace and Certainty: A Theological Essay on Deterrence, p. 10
572 Oliver O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 32
573 Duncan B. Forrester, Apocalypse Now?, p.92 O’Donovan also concludes forthrightly, “If the tradition which claims that war may be justified does not also admit that in particular cases it may not be justified, the affirmation is not morally serious. Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, p. 80
574 Unfortunately, application of such terms as ‘messiah’ or ‘messianic’ in a political context regularly takes on a negative connotation. Professor Kim takes pains to clear up any prospective misunderstanding. “The Messianic Kingdom is not an illusory or utopian dream, but is the core of the history for which the suffering people, the poor and the oppressed, struggle. It is therefore concrete. It does not come from a dreamlike world. When we talk about messianism, we are implying a messiah who is of the people and whom the people feel to be theirs. Both terms, ‘messianism’ and ‘messiah,’ are often used to indicate a certain ‘fanaticism’ or to describe a hero or elitist cult. Although these negative qualities exist in the history of messiahs and messianisms, they are external to the essence of true messianism.” Kim Yong-bok, ‘Messiah and Minjung: Discerning Messianic Politics over and against Political Messianism,’ p. 186
575 Kim Yong-bok, ‘Korean Christianity as a Messianic Movement of the People,’ p. 113
particularly telling. His phrase—‘the politics of Israel’—establishes the messianic parameters as such,

“The biblical language, especially the language of the Book of Exodus, the Book of Revelation, the Gospels—the Stories of Jesus—became the historical language of Korean Christian koinonia. It was not ideology; it was not a political program for revolution. But, it was the parable, the metaphor, and the symbol system to interpret history, to perceive historical suffering, and to transform history toward the Messianic Kingdom.”

In a wider sense, the early Catholics identified with the social reform movement of their time. The Protestant community took on this attribute, and during the Japanese occupation, also sought to defend Korean social identity by maintaining a school system and continuing their welfare work. Professor Kim describes how these themes are interwoven when he wrote,

“[The] focal point of messianism is the general resurrection of the all the people (the minjung), for historical judgment against Evil and its followers. The general resurrection of all the people is a concrete vision of history in which the people their corporate subjectivity in participating in the Messianic Kingdom. The content of the Messianic Kingdom may be viewed as justice, koinonia, and shalom (peace or becoming whole). Justice is a faithful relation or faithful interweaving of the stories of the people and power so that there is no contradiction between them; koinonia is the content of the creative interaction that will take place among the people; and shalom is the wholesome development of humanity and its well-being.”

Thus to understand the situation facing the Protestant Community today we need to accept that these goals remain core with the aim of a unified Korean polity, one consciously organized to reflect the values of a Messianic Kingdom. Nonetheless, at the moment Korea is divided, with nuclear weapons in place on both sides of the division. Before moving on to consider the practical implications it is necessary to first restate the core aspects of Just War theory and also to understand what the concepts of Justice, koinonia, and shalom mean in the Korean Context.

576 Kim Yong-bok, ‘Korean Christianity as a Messianic Movement of the People,’ p. 113
577 Kim Yong-bok, ‘Messiah and Minjung: Discerning Messianic Politics Over and Against Political Messianism,’ pp. 186-7
2. Just War: Summarised

2.1 The Historic Concept of Just War

The Christian Just War model has developed (from earlier pagan roots) ever since the possibility of the Christian community (either as individuals or as an organised group or state) participating in armed conflict. Essentially it has tended to reject the two clear positions of pacifism (war is never acceptable) or the view that the only constraint is not to lose a war (in other words any means are acceptable to this end). The tradition very early on set out two key tests of *Jus ad Bellum* (ie is the war justified) and *Jus in Bello* (ie are the actions undertaken during the war justified). Thomas Aquinas\(^{578}\) elaborated these basic considerations into three tests – of a lawful prince, of having a just cause for any aggression and that the goal is to either avoid evil or advance good.

The practical problem, and this is to be heard in the current views of the CCK, is that these tests are themselves based on judgement. Thus it is possible to argue that the ROK is a legitimate state, has just cause for war against the DPRK (the attempted assassination of President Park, development of nuclear weapons etc) and that war will avoid the greater evil (ie the continuation of the DPRK regime in the north, never mind its extension across Korea\(^{579}\)).

This approach also reflects a reading of biblical descriptions of holy war\(^{580}\), in other words of a war legitimised by God because those who conduct it are themselves believers. The practical consequence of this moral simplification has been numerous wars and massacres justified in terms of religious norms. The Czech satirist Jaroslav Hasek describes a mass before Austrian troops went to war with Russia in 1914 as:

> “Drumhead masses were generally celebrated … on the eve of some bloody massacre and carnage. I remember that once when a drumhead mass was being celebrated an enemy

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579 ‘The KEF Perspective on the NCCK’s Reunification Theor’
aeroplane dropped a bomb on us and hit the field altar. There was nothing left of the chaplain … Afterwards they wrote of him as some kind of martyr, while our aeroplanes prepared the same kind of glory for the chaplains on the other side.”

The early stages of the Christian community tended to pacifism (they had no state power, were an often persecuted minority and, often, were ineligible for military service). This view has been preserved across the centuries of the Christian community, and the spirit of non-violent resistance again has a resonance in the Korean Christian tradition. In particular during the Japanese occupation, the Church sought to mitigate the ills of that period, as much through its practical works and by preserving key aspects of Korean culture. What it did not do, was to incite active rebellion against the Japanese.

However, by the third century AD the Roman state also became a nominally Christian state with Christianity as its state religion. However, the change from Paganism to Christianity saw no decline in the level of both internal and external warfare that the empire engaged in. What this did do, though was to place Christians in a new position – one where they, and their state, could be an aggressor in a war and as such the old purely pacifist tradition became less tenable.

This gap between the moral certainty of pacifism and the need to find some means to reconcile a faith based on precepts of peace with the practicality of a state and society that engaged in war led to the ideas first of Ambrose of Milan and then Augustine of Hippo.

Augustine effectively refined Aquinas’ doctrine by identifying three elements essential to the establishment of just cause for war: defence, retaking something

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584 Keum Joo-seop, ‘A History of Protestant Christianity in North Korea, with Special Reference to Issues of Church and State, 1945-1994,’ Ph.D Thesis, the University of Edinburgh, p. 75
585 Michael Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm*.
587 Duncan B. Forrester, *Apocalypse Now?*
588 Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,’
wrongly taken, and punishment of evildoing, as well as the requirements of last resort, proportionality of good and evil done and the goal of peace. He was also concerned that war must not be marked by giving into the evil forces that could be released, in particular a love of violence for its own sake. Again, and as developed by the twelfth century jurist Gratian\textsuperscript{589}, this also argued that even in war the need to ‘love thy enemy’ had not been superseded.

War, however, remained common across the Christian world (both Catholic and Orthodox) and there were ongoing efforts both to set out when it was legitimate and what actions (or weapons) were legitimate. One important distinction in many of these debates was the attempt to differentiate between a war between Christians (which was held to have some limits) and against pagans, heretics and believers in other faiths (especially Islam) where such constraints were often seen as being set aside\textsuperscript{590}. This again has an echo in the views of some CCK theologians who argue that the use of nuclear weapons against Japan was a clear statement of God’s wrath against unbelievers\textsuperscript{591}.

However, a different strand of thought also arose in the early middle ages that quite deliberately made no distinction between warfare between Christians and warfare that involved pagans, heretics or believers in other faiths, for example at the Council of Constance in 1415\textsuperscript{592,593}. This introduced an element of what could be called natural law into the development of Just War theology, and was further developed by Iberian scholars in a reaction to the excesses of the Conquistadors in the New World\textsuperscript{594}.

\textsuperscript{589} Bruce Duncan, ‘The Struggle to Develop a Just War Tradition in the West,
\textsuperscript{591} Kim In-soo, ‘Towards Peace and Reconciliation between South and North Korean Church: Contextual Analysis of the Two Churches: Past, Present, and Future,’ Plenary Session 2, International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation, York St. John University, August 16, 2006
\textsuperscript{594} Francisca de Vitoria, De Indiis et de iure belli (Of Indians and the law of war) J. B. Scott (tr.), Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), War and Christian Ethics
Following on from this growing emphasis on Natural Law, Hugo Grotius effectively minimised the importance of *Jus ad Bellum* (ie deciding if a given war is right, although he argued for a retention of key criteria set out by Aquinas and Augustine) and much more with *Jus in Bello* (ie what could be called the laws of war). In this he placed emphasis on proportionality in the use of force and a clear ruling to avoid the killing of non-combatants.

His development of Just War theory came at a period when the concept of the national state (even if it was multi-national and with shifting borders) became embedded in Europe at the close of the Thirty Years War. From then (the 1650s) to the French Revolution, warfare in Europe became essentially a matter of a struggle between two dynasties (the Hapsburg centred in Austria and Bourbon in France) for domination over territory such as Italy, Spain and Germany. It ceased to be warfare for survival and the practical goal was never the utter destruction of the other empire.

If the Europe in the period up to the wars of the French Revolution saw less emphasis on *Jus ad Bellum*, then the effect of the nationalist and revolutionary wars that marked the American and French revolutions, the national liberation struggles that followed the Napoleonic period in countries such as Italy and Germany all brought to the fore the concept of war waged by an armed citizenry rather than by a professional army. In turn the idea that the whole nation (not just its armed forces or political elite) could be a legitimate target led to a loss of much of the proportionality and discrimination set out in the *Jus in Bello* tradition. The wars of the twentieth century saw the use of strategies and weapons deliberately designed to kill the civilians in opposing countries, the use of poison gas, the development of partisan warfare (with the practical horrors that brings) and of course the use of nuclear weapons. Effectively by 1945 it could be said that both the traditional bases of the Christian Just

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595 Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace.*
596 These included (1) just cause: an actual or imminent wrong against the state; (2) right intention: aim only at peace and the just ends; (3) proportionality: prospective good outweighs potential bad; (4) last resort: efforts at irenic solutions have failed; and (5) probability of success: the prospective war will not be an exercise in futility. Michael W. Johnson, *Just War Theory and Future War.*
599 For example the Duke of Brunswick threatened to massacre all the citizens of Paris if the King was executed, in turn the Jacobins saw the whole population of regions such as the Vendee as legitimate targets. Ruth Scurr, *Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution* (London, Vintage Books, 2007)
2.2 Just War and Nuclear Weapons

As noted in Chapter 3, at the end of the Second World War, both the Christian and Secular attempts at regulating warfare had been shattered. The 30 years of warfare from 1914-1945 had seen the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, the deliberate targeting of civilian populations, all participants guilty of what would come to be called war crimes and all participants guilty of unprovoked invasions of other countries. The secular response was to try to rebuild a structure to limit the recourse to war, and what would happen if it occurred, using the newly formed United Nations.

Michael Walzer perhaps exemplified this legalist approach to regulating warfare.\(^{600}\) His initial set of rules placed emphasis on states being sovereign within their own boundaries (thus very much in the tradition of the Peace of Westphalia\(^{601}\)) and with a clear prohibition against aggression (and without which there was no just basis for a war). However, this clear delimitation was weakened by then accepting that: the threat of attack; legitimate nationalist movements; or, removing a government that was terrorising its own population, as grounds for war. These may be valid criteria but they are very judgemental, for example in defining what is and what is not a legitimate national aspiration and thus movement. Few such cases are straightforward.

However, the major change to any previous discussion of Just War was the presence of nuclear weapons. By the mid-1950s these had reached an individual destructive power and both the USA and USSR had more than enough weapons not just to destroy the other but effectively to destroy all humanity. Again, a secular response was reliance on the United Nations with various commitments to limit nuclear proliferation and ongoing attempts to convince the USSR, USA and other nuclear powers to reduce the number of their weapons. Equally there were attempts to convince both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to adopt a ‘no first use’ limitation on their

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\(^{600}\) Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*

\(^{601}\) Michael W. Johnson argues that Walzer’s criteria are actually quite close to the Westphalian model. Michael W. Johnson, *Just War Theory and Future Warfare*, p. 15
nuclear arsenals (something that NATO refused to accept).

A number of political doctrines grew up around the possession of strategic nuclear weapons. Both the USSR and the USA argued that their own missiles were essentially to deter an attack by the other side and that this deterrence was effective in limiting armed conflict between the two superpowers to proxy wars in Asia and Africa. Equally, the concept of Mutually Assured Deterrence was held to be a factor in restraining either side from starting a war. Smaller nuclear powers such as the UK and France argued they needed their own independent weaponry so as to deter a Soviet attack on their national territories that did not involve a direct attack on the USA. There was also the fear that if one side disarmed, or reduced its weaponry to a level where it could all be destroyed in a ‘first-strike’, it would then be vulnerable to blackmail and aggression by the other superpower.

Equally the morality of nuclear weapons was debated from many viewpoints. What was clear to all was the destructive power of even a single nuclear weapon and the consequences for humanity in the event of a major nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

Some Christian thinkers such as O'Donovan and Ramsay made a distinction between strategic weapons and those designed for more limited use on the battlefield (and presumably away from centres of population). O'Donovan's concern was that the use of such tactical weapons would inevitably escalate (it would certainly had done so if NATO had used them in a war in Europe) but Ramsay argued that the problem with nuclear weapons was their potential lack of discrimination and this could be overcome by better design and use. Ramsay also argued that the possession of nuclear weapons was not essentially wrong, instead they forced states and individuals to think carefully about choices in matters of war, defence and aggression.

602 Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham, (ed.), Just Deterrence: Morality and Deterrence into the Twenty-First Century
603 Oliver O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited
604 Paul Ramsay, War and Christian Conscience
Others, such as Reinhold Niebuhr\textsuperscript{606} came to argue that the possession (and presumably use) of nuclear weapons was justified if it preserved Christianity from Soviet-style totalitarian rule. In this there are strong echoes of Aquinas’ earlier criteria that in waging war one must be seeking to avoid a greater evil – and to many Christian thinkers, the moral threat posed by the Soviet Union was such a greater evil. This line of thinking is still very present in the South Korean Protestant community today in terms of the DPRK which is seen not just as a malign state (with real if limited expansionist goals of its own) but as an evil that has to be resisted at all costs.

Other thinkers, such as Yoder,\textsuperscript{607} from a pacifist tradition, take a view that any usage of nuclear weapons fails to meet the demands of the \textit{Jus in Bello} criteria. Jeffrey Stout\textsuperscript{608} argues that the deterrence argument itself is flawed, if it is illegitimate to use strategic nuclear weapons it is also illegitimate to threaten to do so. John Stott\textsuperscript{609} on this basis, argues that the logic of deterrence is a clear breach of any concept of \textit{Jus in Bello} since it implies a willingness to do something that is morally unacceptable (ie evil). In this, those who argue for deterrence or the use of nuclear weapons to avert a greater evil (victory by the Soviet Union or the DPRK, or whoever is the enemy of the moment) ignore the essential redemptive element in the Christian message. Effectively Christians cannot forget that to them, the end does not justify the means.

These are very conflicting interpretations of the Just War tradition in the light of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, there is an argument that even at their most destructive (strategic thermonuclear weaponry) they can meet the requirement of avoiding a greater evil. More subtle versions of this argue that the problem with nuclear weapons is their relative lack of discrimination and the solution lies in the development of more controlled weapons that will not have unintended side effects. On the other hand the original Christian tradition of pacifism has an equally clear logic in terms of nuclear weapons, that since war is unacceptable so are nuclear weapons. However, critically, a final strand of argument takes the view that nuclear

\textsuperscript{606} Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{The Irony of American History}
\textsuperscript{607} John. H. Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}
\textsuperscript{608} Jeffrey Stout, ‘Ramsay and Others on Nuclear Ethics,’ \textit{Journal of Religious Ethics}, Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall, 1991
\textsuperscript{609} John R. W. Stott, ‘The Nuclear Threat,’ \textit{Issues Facing Christians Today}
weapons are unacceptable because their usage cannot be reconciled to the Christian message.

2.3. Just War, Nuclear Weapons and Korea Today

People today, at least in reasonably free polities, are free to lead lives that place the greatest emphasis on measuring up to the highest Christian ideals. However, as Reinhold Niebuhr made clear decades ago, to opt to such a lifestyle amounts to an abandonment of koinonia at large. “In medieval ascetic perfectionism and in Protestant sectarian perfectionism (of the type of Meno Simons, for instance) the effort to achieve a standard of perfect love in individual life was not presented as a political alternative. On the contrary, the political problem and task were specifically disavowed.” Under such circumstances, the accumulation of weapons and, for that matter their deployment in combat, remained a secondary concern—one that the pious monk would surely pray that they remain sheathed but nonetheless were no direct impediment to a life of prayer (at least provided that they were not deployed against him). The world might be given over to evil, but the ascetic stood as an example of the individual life as a symbol of the Kingdom of God that was at least theoretically attainable. Yet, as Professor Kim has laid out in his political paradigm directed toward the realization of the messianic kingdom, it is precisely koinonia’s engagement in the political world that is essential if justice is to be to become normative.

At first glance it may well be argued that the possession of nuclear weapons need not pose an insuperable barrier to the achievement of shalom, at least if they were reduced in number and solely deployed for defensive purposes. However, in the Korean context, this is almost certainly not the case. In a supposed Korean state, unified in terms of the benign messianic politics outlined by Professor Kim above, any such weapons would pose an intrinsic threat to koinonia. As Friesen expresses so bluntly, “the development of particular types of weapons systems is dangerous because of the increased insecurity and the increased danger of nuclear war they are likely to bring.” If, as is generally agreed, nuclear weapons should never be used under any

610 Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist,’ Arthur F. Holmes (ed.), War and Christian Ethics, p. 303
611 Ibid., p. 366
realistic circumstance—as would almost certainly be the case with a unified democratic Korea—their possession grants no advantage and as a practical issue, only constitutes an ongoing danger to society.

Moreover, the existence of the nuclear weapons is certainly problematic for Korean Christians who seek the ‘achievement of shalom’. Hauerwas argues that Christians in favor of interim nuclear deterrence do not clearly differentiate between the church and the state in terms of which comes first: “they want to be Constantinian pacifists fusing church and world so that they can speak to the world without the embarrassment of Christ’s cross. Absent the cross, appeals to shalom cannot help but border on mysticism or nature romanticism.”612

In this respect, two pacifist theorists, Augsburger and Curry, claim in the current Korean context,

“[True] Christian thinkers cannot permit the issue of nuclear weapons to be politicized while avoiding the moral responsibility that the very existence of nuclear arms lays upon each of us. It cannot be made a partisan issue, for as adherents of the third way the Christian should have a stance that critiques the position of each party [between rightist conservatives and leftist humanists].”613

As examined, South Korea’s Christian community has been in discord with each other in relations to the approach to cope with the nuclear weapons programme in North Korea.614 In this sense, what Korean Christians need to ask themselves is not whether a certain end for just cause could justify possessing or using nuclear weapons in spite of their evilness and immorality, but how to overcome the temptation of such a powerful weapon. Some of them may justify having nuclear weapons by distinguishing between a righteous purpose and a wrong intention. But such an approach cannot hide the existential threat and, most of all, its destructive character that those weapons carry, which is contrary to God’s creation and love for humankind.

3. Dynamics within Korean Christianity

613 Myron S. Augsburger and Dean C. Curry, Nuclear Arms: Two Views on World Peace, p. 19
614 See the chapter 6
3.1 The influence of how Christianity entered Korea

As discussed in chapter four, Christianity entered Korea in two distinct phases. Elements of the educated elite adopted Catholicism from the late 18th Century and Protestantism arrived in the late 19th Century. Both aspects of Christianity effectively had to respond to the dynamics of foreign occupation and in turn both identified themselves with a wider reform movement, the goals of Korean nationalism and the desire for good governance. Thus Christianity was traditionally seen as having a concern with social justice and adopted a clear Korean identity. Equally both religious traditions were embraced by members of the traditionally Confucian yangban class\(^{615}\) and this gave Korean Christianity a particular set of characteristics.

An early difference, between the two traditions was that Catholicism mainly appealed to elements within the small educated elite. The Protestant community sought to attract a much wider swathe of Korean society. Also the conditions prevailing at the time of its introduction meant the Protestant missionaries placed considerable emphasis on providing health care, education and other social works. They also, as discussed above, had a messianic\(^{616}\) interpretation of the Protestant tradition. This also saw the adoption of aspects of the biblical story of exodus and suffering to explain the Korean people’s oppression under Japanese rule\(^{617}\). Thus they were able to place their resistance to Japanese occupation in terms of their own faith.

However, as discussed in Chapter 5, in the period since the armistice in 1953, the Korean protestant community has split into two elements. Both stress, and draw on for inspiration, the traditions of the community (social works, social inclusion, education, a messianic interpretation of scripture) but from this common core have developed very different priorities in terms of what needs to be done to realise the goal of united Korea that shares a common faith.

\(^{615}\) Kim Young-gwan, ‘The Confucian-Christian Context in Korean Christianity,’

\(^{616}\) Kim Yong-bok, ‘Korean Christianity as a Messianic Movement of the People

\(^{617}\) Suh Nam-Dong, ‘Towards a theology of Han,’ in Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia [CTC-CCA], Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Singapore: CCA, 1983)
Central to the Korean Protestant tradition has been a strong concept of justice. In the *Summa Theologica*, Thomas Aquinas states,

“It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to himself.”

Thus Aquinas puts considerable emphasis on the intrinsic equality of men. The fact that certain individuals enjoy authority (e.g., “the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead”) is beside the point. Indeed, such individuals, precisely because they are privileged with special authority, had grave obligations to assure that their performance of public duty was proper in all respects. It appears that men of good conscience seek to do that which is right and, conversely, to deride the acts of others that fail to meet this reasonable standard.

### 3.2 The Strands of Korean Koinonia

‘*Koinonia*’ may be understood as ‘participatory communion’ or ‘activist fellowship’, and is a concept common across Korean society regardless of an individual’s religious identity. It can find expression in the formal celebration of the Eucharist or for that matter in a meal shared by friends at home. It is reflected in the abstract desire of an individual, encouraged by God’s love, to do good for all. For that matter, it is expressed in efforts by members of the Christian community to achieve a highly specific goal (e.g., build a school or a hospital). However, in recent decades, *koinonia* has been understood in the context of political activism. As described by Professor Kim, *koinonia* is ‘the content of the creative interaction that will take place among the people.’ But that ‘creative interaction’ is one that risks all too easily, being perverted from its legitimate objectives. For Korean Christians, principal among the legitimate political objectives has been national unity—ending the division of the Korean people that has prevailed since 1945.

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618 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, 2,Question 57, ‘Justice,’ (art.1)  
619 Ibid., (art. 2)
In his discussion of politics and messianism, Professor Kim makes a crucial distinction between messianic politics and political messianism. Simply stated, the latter is a perversion of the former. Kim identifies the legitimate exercise of messianism in the political sphere as arising from the people (or minjung).

“The most dramatic manifestation of minjung messianism in Korea was the March First Independence movement of 1919. Korean historians have carefully documented this movement and show the minjung to be its motive power. They also show that the messianic traditions of Buddhism, Donghak religion, and Christianity joined together to form a minjung messianic religious foundation… This movement produced an axial transformation in the experience of the Korean people; and it has become the paradigmatic or root experience of the Korean people.”

Understood in these terms, ‘popular messianism’ may be accounted a modest reflection of Jesus’ gift to mankind in coming into the world; overcoming the effects of original sin and providing the vehicle for salvation. Thus, popular messianism (messianic politics) places the locus of political authority in the hands of the people, that graces bestowed on the people through Jesus’ sacrifice may more likely find expression in or at least animate public policy for people who wants to live together through peaceful koinonia, irrespective of ideology or religious difference, without political oppression or security threat by weapons of mass destruction.

3.2.1. Koinonia under Attack: Political Messianism

Conversely, political messianism is said to remove the locus of authority from the people and instead place it in unworthy hands. Political messianism, in one form or another, is probably as old as civilization itself. Ancient rulers who accounted themselves deified—and governed in those terms—fall into that category. And the tyrants of the Twentieth Century (e.g., Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jung-il) demanded officially sponsored public adulation regularly described as ‘cult of the personality’. Professor Kim identifies three historical instances of political messianism visited upon the Korean people – government by Imperial Japan, totalitarian government in North Korea, and (interestingly enough) a tacit deification

620 Kim Yong-bok, ‘Korean Christianity as a Messianic Movement of the People,’ p. 189
of modern technology in South Korea (a reckless faith in that technology will somehow resolve all the nation’s social problems). One more case can be added, in the development of nuclear weapons as a specific deification of modern technology. Deterrence by the nuclear weapon is, as discussed in the former chapter, a typical case example of how people can try to secure their lives at the cost of a possibility of civilization annihilation. Professor Kim concludes that. “These three manifestations of political messianism have common characteristics, not only in their totalitarian and absolutist character, but also in sharing a common theory of contradiction. Their view of history is that there are two powers which are struggling against each other, and that one must destroy the other.”621

However, perhaps unique in the History of Christianity, it is Korea’s Christian koinonia that has provided what amounts to a ‘vocabulary of modern political thought’ to the nation at large.

“The] process of internalization of the Christian message was closely related to the social and political experiences of the Korean people. The Christian messianic language was related to the historical experiences of the people… [Of the factors at work, the first] was the medium of communication. The fact that the Christian literature, especially the Bible, was translated and written in Korean vernacular script had a significant implication in the shaping of the language of the Korean Christian koinonia… The second factor was the nature of the message itself… The vernacular language was concrete, metaphorical, and symbolic rather than conceptual and theoretical. This meant that the Bible itself was the best form of presentation of the Christian message.”622

To the extent that ‘the medium is the message,’ the vocabulary of Christianity supplied the vocabulary of political freedom that would be a motive to form an idealised Korean koinonia.

Quite obviously, nonetheless, the proper ordering of society has been perverted in at least two ways. In the first place, the ultimate authority of God—in the Korean context, understood in neo-Confucian terms as the Holy Spirit both operating through history and, as the Third Person of the Trinity, spiritually joining heaven and earth—

621 Ibid., p. 190
622 Ibid., pp. 104-5
has been arrogated or misplaced. Secondly, the Holy Spirit as Paraclete—understood in Augustine’s sense of ‘spirit of truth’—is sent to the people, not specifically those in authority. Herein, as Professor Kim describes it, does the error find expression, “The justice of god (theodicy) is alleged to be immanent in the established political regime, be it that of Emperor, a communist leader, or the military technocracy.”

3.3. Shalom and Korean Protestant Identity

Shalom, is effectively the final strand of the Korean Christian identity. In his discussion of just war, theologian Duane Friesen outlines the social function of the Christian Church saying,

“The activity of the church is carried out in the world in a broad arena of activity, such as giving shape to the ethos of society, demonstrating justice and nonviolence through example, serving by organizing institutions to meet human need, seeking to influence and shape public policy, and working through vocations in public settings to foster shalom in all spheres of life.”

‘Shalom’ is regularly translated from Hebrew as ‘peace’—as in the popular greeting, ‘shalom alekem,’ or ‘peace be with you.’ However, in its ethical and theological context it is perhaps better understood as that species of well-being that arises when all components of the whole are present and in place, or when all members of a group (e.g., koinonia) are in accord, working for the betterment of all.

Shalom is often equated with peace, in the sense of an absence of violence. In a perfectly organised society this would be a reasonable correlation. However, it is closer to an affirmative vision of a society inspired by Jesus’ teachings. Here, the lines of thinking of the late Nineteenth Century American theologian Lyman Abbott provides illumination when he wrote,

“Christ used force to defend others, but never to defend himself. The fundamental principle in

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623 Ibid., p. 190
Christ’s teaching is this: Love may use force, selfishness may not... [However,] our lives are so intertwined that it is often impossible to tell whether one is defending [one’s self] or another. It is spirit, nor rule or regulation, which Christ prescribes, and this is the spirit: Love may fight; selfishness may not.”

Hence, the rightly enlightened koinonia may act for its collective defence against malevolent forces. This same thinking however, leaves space for heroic sacrifice by any one given individual. American Mennonite theologian John Yoder describes this as the motivation of many of the Church’s martyrs, “They cultivated a worldview marked by trusting God for survival, a willingness to suffer rather than to sin, and an absence of any cynical utilitarianism in their definition of the path of obedience.”

Here, again, a distinction between justice and charity may be at work. The refusal to act defensively—an act otherwise permitted in terms of justice—may be interpreted as a response to a ‘counsel of perfection.’ Such acts of self-sacrifice, often undertaken for the ultimate benefit of the transgressor as well as the edification of others, are part and parcel of the History of Christianity since its earliest years. And for Korean Christians, whose antecedents affirmed their faith in Christ and suffered in thousands for their testimony that history serves as a wellspring for both personal courage and the desire to participate in the good works of the koinonia.

4. Contemporary Dynamics in Korea

In his essay, ‘Moral Clarity in a Time of War,’ George Weigel makes a particularly cogent point, perhaps one that many pacifists might find unsettling. Regarding the former Soviet Union and its massive nuclear arsenal, Weigel observes, “Nuclear weapons were not the primary threat to peace, communism was. When communism went, so did the threat posed by the weapons... [Events in Eastern Europe] that eventually led to the demise of the USSR itself [resulted in] the risks of nuclear war [being] greatly diminished and real disarmament [could] begin.”

625 Interestingly, this parallels the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, who examined the legitimacy of just war under the general rubric of charity—that resort to war was legitimated when its purpose was the protection of the persons, rights, and legitimate interests of others (e.g., to restore that which was wrongly taken).
627 John H. Yoder, When War Is Unjust, p. 70
628 Ibid., pp. 373-90
629 Ibid., p. 381

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Perhaps much the same dynamics could be at work in the Korean Peninsula. In reality, however, it is not clear whether the nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully without further crisis or political turmoil in the region. There are many factors—the political interactions among concerned countries, each country’s domestic problems, different acknowledges of the current international order, etc—surrounding the northern nuclear issue. In this sense, conversely if the involved parties believe that ending the nuclear issue would be most profitable for themselves, it is perfectly possible for some surprising end of the nuclear issue to occur. In turn this would lead to results such as the U.S.’ peace treaty with, lifting economic sanctions to, and a treaty of diplomatic relationship with North Korea.

For the Korea Church the nuclear issue is more than a political matter, it is also a matter of the church itself. Although the two representative Korean councils, the NCCK and the CCK, have made efforts to resolve this issue according to their different positions, both have failed to raise a voice that only the church, a faith community that admits God’s sovereignty, could have. As discussed, it is due to their approaches to the issue, which seem to be no different from those of the other secular political groups, or from political strategies of concerned states.

Christian love, peace and justice may not be implemented effectively as long as the church does not make an unequivocally clear objection to nuclear weapons. In this regards, for the Korean Christians seeking nuclear disarmament are not achieved by political compromise or a certain interest. Rather, it is achieved by their confession that the nuclear weapons issue is a litmus paper to probe how firmly Christians are able to live with a belief in God in an ‘uncertain world,’ in which unfaithful people are prepared to depend for their safety on evil.630

As this thesis was developed, world events have contributed new elements affecting the Korean peninsula, and it has become even more clearly evident that Korean Christianity has an important role to play towards attaining peace and stability not only in a reunified Korea but also in the future participation of a renewed state in

630 Sohn Kyu-tae, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Armaments and Christian Church,’ p. 15.
world affairs. The dynamics between the DPRK and the rest of the International Community seem to be in a constant state of flux depending on their current approach to acquiring more nuclear weapons or testing even more advanced missile technology.

However, even so, there is no inherent reason why Korea should not find itself happily reunited and nuclear-free in a decade or so. Korea’s reunification remains the main issue. Korean politicians cannot, however, sit down to negotiate while ignoring the very essence of the roots of both existing regimes and the links to ideological and religious principles on either side of the 38th. Parallel. While South Korea has developed a unique Christian conscience, Christians in the North have had to subrogate their beliefs to *juche* fabricated to the image of a decadent leader that not only rejected Christianity but likewise partly shunned his adopted Marxist doctrine.

Given current conditions in North Korea—a regime dependent on the threatened continuation of the development and procurement of nuclear weapons in order to secure favourable treatment from western nations—it appears that its prospects, at the best, are precarious. Certainly these are even less promising than those of the USSR a decade before its collapse. This in turn, raises a number of fundamental issues for the Korean people, in their capacity of *koinonia* seeking *shalom*.

It is easy to predict that a sudden collapse of the DPRK would result in massive social dislocations with people fleeing to South Korea or China and effective social collapse. Under such circumstances, the Korean Christians would face challenges unlike those faced by any Christian collective in the past. The German experience after the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) should be instructive enough. Despite the fact that East Germans were collectively the most prosperous inhabitants of the (now defunct) Warsaw Pact, in comparison with their western cousins they lived penurious lives. With the extinction of the GDR, enormous demands—at their core, moral ones—were imposed upon the Federal German Republic in to efforts undertaken at equalization. Such an effort might well be understood in terms of Thomas Aquinas’ sense of justice as the establishment of moral equality. Despite the relatively advanced physical assets of the former East Germany, it is now estimated that it will take at least a quarter century of infrastructure development before anything approximating equality will even become
The economic and social breach between the two Koreas is far greater than the German scenario. Should the DPRK indeed collapse in much the same manner as the former USSR or GDR, it is likely that efforts at reconstruction and provision of public services on a par with those now enjoyed in the ROK could take too many decades to turn into reality.\textsuperscript{632} This, perhaps more than the existence of nuclear weapons, poses the adamant moral challenge to \textit{koinonia}. For once, instead of simply discussing prospective courses of action, \textit{koinonia} would be faced with the immediate responsibility to apply measures with significant sacrifices to ensure minimally acceptable conditions for their less fortunate northern neighbours. Such sacrificial act of giving would be long term, not something that could be resolved in weeks or months but much rather in decades or even the course of a full century.

Should the foregoing actually come to pass—and to be reasonably fair, it is an unlikely prospective scenario in the short-term, Korean Christians or should we say all Korean citizens from both sides of the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel, will have been granted a magnificent divine gift, that of the opportunity to put \textit{shalom} into practice; acts of charity on a mass scale and selflessness.

In this sense, with a reunified Korea, spurious investments on nuclear weapons development should be stopped, redirecting all economic investments towards much needed improvement of infrastructures and means of communications in the northern territory. Furthermore, educational schemes must include awareness campaigns to bring North Korean citizenry to the reality of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, updating their know-how to levels required for their labour and social integration into a democratic society.

\textsuperscript{631} Moreover, Jurgen B. Donges professor at Cologne University argues that “the costs of German unification is unprecedented” the current German government. Since the late 1990’s the economic growth in the eastern Germany has been standstill. For details, see Jurgen B. Donges, ‘Germany: Understanding for the underperformance since Reunification,’ \textit{The Institute for Global Economics}, Seoul, July 2007

\textsuperscript{632} “The economic gap between East and West Germany was not as high as it is between the two Koreas. And the relation of population numbers was easier to handle: Very roughly spoken one East German came on three West Germans. In the Korean example this ratio would be one to two.” Nicole Bastian, ‘Closing Economic Gap between the Koreas is a Good Idea,’ September 28, 2007, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States Official Website http://www.dynamic-korea.com/opinion/view_opinion.php?main=FTC&sub=&uid=200700035790&keyword=koreas accessed on September 25, 2008
Then, southern progress can be shared to the extent of technology implementation in new production and processing installations on northern territory. Such coordinated actions would be not only a steady but significant move toward national koinonia, and also impede an avalanche of would-be refugees in any case of sudden unification. It will be precisely Christian congregations closer to the grass roots that could contribute to an orderly reorganisation of a probably otherwise uncontrollable situation.

Thousands of years ago, the people of Israel were called upon to be ‘a light unto the gentiles,’ in hope that the latter might model their behaviour unto that of God’s chosen people. Through Christ’s sacrifice we have all become heirs to the promises originally made to the Jews. Given the workings of the Holy Spirit through History and as an ongoing inspiration to Christians everywhere, it is not inconceivable that should Korean koinonia meet up to its moral responsibilities, that same koinonia likewise be a light to all nations.

5. Final Comments

The final chapter of this thesis takes the themes summarised in this chapter around Just War, the Korean Protestant tradition and the barriers to the goal of Korean unification and considers just what should be the response of the Korean protestant community. Effectively this means being aware of the issues embedded in the Just War tradition and also adopting that as a whole rather than the selective approach taken so far.
Conclusions

This thesis has used the Christian concept of Just War Theory, and its ramifications, to consider the Korean dilemma of how to achieve a return to a single unified state despite the presence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. The core approach has been to place the arguments within the scope of contextual theology which, as Duncan Forrester argues, is synonymous to political theology.

The Korean confrontation caused by the two Korea’s ideological and political divergence has been analysed in the context of political theology, to the extent that each government’s stance has been examined to uncover its political, military, economical and social motivations. The opacity of information from within the DPRK has made it difficult to interpret the motives of that regime but it does seem plausible that at least one of the options is for them to adopt the role of developing and selling weaponry on the international stage. This might allow the elite to remain in power without needing to take account of the needs of the ordinary people of North Korea.

The uneven Christian response, as this work has established, is not due to different Christian criteria in expression of faith according to the teachings of Christ but rather that Christian communities, or more precisely their leaders, have assumed politically-inclined postures with little reflection of Christian principles in their attitudes. In this both the CCK and the NCCK have taken an approach to the unification question (and the existence of nuclear weapons) that takes, at best, only partial note of the Christian tradition of Just War.

In spite of the common cause in the search of peace amongst South Korean Christian churches, in both the progressive and the conservative, several relevant politically strategic issues have led to discrepancies as to the approaches towards attaining such goals. This thesis has clearly demonstrated such grievances and analysed some of the consequences of such standpoints. Chief amongst these is the nuclear weapons issue.

633 See Duncan B. Forrester, Theology and Politics, pp. 150-70
Here lies a possible contradiction: despite the apparent converging reunification intentions of both North and South, both are also seeking armament for warfare in order to ensure their separate national security. If the main purpose of both present-day adversaries is peace in a reunified Korea, how then can the contenders explain their search of national (each regime considered separately) security through possession of nuclear armaments? If on the other hand, the DPRK no longer actively seeks unification (in terms of its victory or as a ‘one state – two systems’ model) but is seeking an independent future (within its current boundaries) as an international provider of weaponry then what should be the response of Christian community?

The thesis has examined these key factors with emphasis on the security issue from the Christian vantage point and identified a correlation between cause and effect from a political theologian’s point of view. The multiple dynamics of unification, nuclear weapons and human rights are factors in understanding the different responses of the governing leaders both in state and church.

It has become evident that contextual theology is fundamental in order to comprehend aspects in which classical theology may find limitations insomuch as universal and general reasoning cannot be justified without placing the thoughts of the individual in his own native environment and context. For the Korean people bent on becoming a single nation, and for that matter a reunified state, the nuclear issue cannot be seen as a separate issue. The issues of unification, human rights and nuclear weapons are interlinked but many declarations of different Korean Church leaders would imply differently. Thus the CCK was relatively silent about human rights abuses in the ROK under the Park dictatorship and the NCCK has not made human rights a major issue in its engagement with the DPRK.

From this, and in lieu of the most recent events, this thesis serves as the basis to advance a practicable interpretation of Christian actions in the context of political and religious exercise within the scope of the Korean situation, irrespective of the political or religious criteria of the individuals or collectives. The work offers a clear perspective towards a better understanding of long-standing and recently formulated postures, but likewise reflects on the necessity for realism in the time horizon between
now and potential re-unification. Such reflections have led to the conclusion that North Korea’s *juche* has no viability in a modern-time structure of a Korea in the New Millennium and that there is no reason for either Korea to seek nuclear weapons to relieve their security concern as such weapons increase hatred and suspicion against the opposite party, and, at the same time, decrease any chance to allow ordinary (grass root) people across the two countries to discuss their own destiny. Thus, this thesis recommends that the role and responsibility entrusted to Korean Christians is to make every effort to decrease the hatred and suspicion between two Koreans, and to stop any attempt to procure nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula.

The distinct history of the Korean Christianity was about promoting national identity and practising peacefully to secure it during the Japanese rule. Such unique features of the Korean Christianity will be assets that they are able to and should do effectively its role in achieving the national *Koinonia* based on shalom in the Korean Peninsula.

As previously said, the opacity of the North Korean regime and the scarcity of information about Christians in the DPRK, means their voices cannot be reflected in this comparative examination of Christian positions towards war and the security issue. However, the ideas and themes of this thesis will help provide at least one means to understand and judge some of the unexplained behaviours amongst supposedly Christian-inspired citizens of the North in their support of nuclear armament and war as a means of Korea’s reunification.

Nonetheless what is important is that the current response by the Christian communities in the ROK is clearly based on the gospel message and Christian tradition of Just War.

Perfect shalom may be far from reality. We do not know how effectively the church making a firm objection to nuclear weapons could help to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem in reality. However, we may, at least, insist upon what Jesus really wants and try to live like Him. This is the church’s way since “the battle between the fallen and sinful powers that rule the world, and the angel and spiritual powers that reign in heaven has already been fought and won in the death and resurrection and
ascension of Jesus Christ.”

To play such role, Korean Christians of all congregations must firstly assume the moral responsibilities of the current nuclear issues based on misconception of national security, and also practice their faith demands of those involved in the defence of human rights. All these efforts must reflect Christ’s teaching on love and peace toward shalom. Only by setting living examples of their beliefs can Korean Christians make aware those other citizens of the merits of this manner of living, and does induce them to embrace both Christianity and the democratic way of life.

634 Michael Northcott, The Angel Directs the Storm, p.140
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Agreed Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Christian Conference of Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCK</td>
<td>Christian Council of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC–CCA</td>
<td>Commission on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conference of Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAPCK</td>
<td>General Assembly of Presbyterian Church in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Congregational Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICWE</td>
<td>International Congress on World Evangelization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCF</td>
<td>Korean Church Federation of North Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCIA</td>
<td>Korean Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCNA</td>
<td>Korean Central News Agency of DPRK</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCPS</td>
<td>Korean Christian Solidarity for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWP</td>
<td>Korean Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWR</td>
<td>Light-Water Reactors</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCCK</td>
<td>National Council of Churches in Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Italian Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROK</td>
<td>Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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