Metaphor and Emotion: Eros in the Greek Novel
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Signed declaration

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Abstract

The study of emotion is an interdisciplinary field. One key aspect of this field is the cultural variation of emotion. This thesis is a contribution to the above area by means of a specific analysis of the ancient Greek conception of the emotion ἔρως. The focus for this study is the Greek Novel, a collection of literary works emerging from the Greek speaking culture of the eastern Mediterranean during the Roman imperial period (1st to 4th cent C.E.). These novels are based upon the universal topics of love and sexual passion, while at the same time reflecting and reworking both the specific social and literary climate of the period and ancient Greek folk and philosophical models of psychology. My thesis argues that the role of conceptual metaphor in the understanding of ἔρως as an emotion has not yet been fully appreciated, and that an understanding of metaphor is essential for gauging which parts of the folk model of the emotion are culturally specific or universal, and how these sections interact.
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The title of this thesis signifies its focus upon the role that metaphor plays in the structuring and understanding of emotions. The proliferation of scholarship on the emotions during the last half century has been echoed by a recent surge in the study of emotions in classical antiquity and their relationship to our own emotions. Classical scholarship is currently engaging with many issues which influence the portrayal of emotions in Greek and Roman culture, including non-verbal factors such as body language or facial expression, and emotional scripts (how emotions are played out in social interaction). Emotions are a rich and multidimensional area of study and a key part of the continuing discourse on the extent of cultural relativism. Emotions are vital for many strands of experience, ranging from the most personal inner reflection to societal models, practices, and morals, and the interaction between the two extremes of personal and social identity. Emotions deserve to be studied as much as any other part of culture.

The contribution made by this thesis will be to examine and promote the crucial role which metaphor plays in conceptualising and structuring emotions in ancient Greek. I am using the concept of ἔρως as a case study, an ancient Greek word which is commonly translated as ‘love’ or ‘desire’. Specifically I will be looking at its portrayal in the Greek Novel, a body of prose works in ancient Greek dating from the Roman imperial period. This introduction will be divided into four sections. I will first define what I am referring to as emotion, in terms of ancient and modern theories, and argue not only for the importance of studying the portrayal of emotions in cultures such as ancient Greece, but for the validity of doing so. Second I will look at prototypical categorisation, which modern linguistics and psychology claim is essential for understanding the categories of emotion terms. Third I will look at the contemporary theory of metaphor which underlies my research, and state why this theory is so important for studying the emotions. Finally, I will outline why I have chosen the emotion ἔρως and its presentation in the Greek Novel as my case study.
I - Emotion

In recent years the category of emotion has been seen as problematic in scientific fields, but its importance as a part of everyday life has not diminished. We discuss emotions, use them and, most importantly, feel them. Scholarship on the emotions has undergone an enormous change in the last century, with the increasing importance of scientific studies on the relationship between psychology and neurology. These two areas of study highlight two questions vital for the study of emotions: how universal are ‘emotions’ and what is their physiological basis? These questions provoke a further one: what ‘fit’ is there between the ancient Greek emotions and our own? Are these ancient emotions exactly like ours, because all emotions are universal, or are they nothing like ours, because emotions are culturally constructed? The answer lies somewhere in between, since humans have a common physiological make-up and are emersed in specific societies, but in order to identify cultural variation we should first have a good idea of what is universal about emotion. The nature of emotions, as postulated psychological kinds, has the potential to confirm or undermine any approach to emotion in antiquity. I will therefore take some time here to discuss several contemporary theories of emotion, and outline their significance for the present study.

In the twentieth century Paul Ekman provided groundbreaking evidence for the universal nature of emotions by studying facial expression.¹ He found that six emotions, labelled in English as happiness, disgust, surprise, sadness, anger, and fear, each had a specific facial expression across a large number of different cultures, and that people could correctly interpret these expressions on the faces of those from different cultures.² Ekman used this evidence to argue that these emotions are universal and rooted in physiology, despite the difference in their linguistic expression across cultures.³ This is not to say that emotion expressions are never

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¹ The main conclusions of his initial research can be seen in Ekman 1973. An account of his emergence from the behaviourist tradition, the opposition between him and cultural relativists such as Margaret Mead and his responses to their criticisms can be read in his afterword to Darwin 1998 (363-93).
² The only exception to this was that in pre-literate cultures fear and surprise were not differentiated as to facial expression, whereas they were in literate ones (Darwin 1998, 379).
³ Obviously other cultures do not use the English terms for these emotions. However, this does not invalidate his results, which argue that emotions approximate to the ones expressed by these English terms are universally experienced. See Ekman and Friesen 1971 and Cairns 2008a, 44: ‘It is not just
mediated. Different cultures have different display rules which influence the expression of emotions. For example, in one experiment conducted by Ekman American and Japanese participants were shown a video designed to elicit an emotional response. When the subjects were alone they displayed the same facial expressions, but when another person was present the Japanese subjects controlled their facial expressions. Ekman also found that this concealing of emotions led to what he calls ‘leakage’, and that feigned facial expressions for emotion and genuine ones are not completely identical. The situations which elicit emotions will vary from culture to culture. For example, even if shame is a universal emotion, the conditions which elicit shame are culturally determined. Ekman therefore provides evidence for core universal emotions which, nevertheless, can be culturally mediated.

The problem with Ekman’s list is that it denotes only six emotions and requires facial expressions to be constitutive of emotions. In the future more may be added, but we are left with the possibility that many further concepts, such as love and jealousy, which native English speakers would categorise as emotions, cannot be distinguished by facial expression alone, or even by facial expression at all. Ekman postulates that if an emotion is a ‘compound’ then it might not have any set expression.

Jealousy seems to have no distinct expression, perhaps because it is an emotion where the person feels a number of other emotions: anger with the one whose attention is lost or with the rival; sadness at the loss; fear in anticipation of further loss; or disgust at himself and herself for feeling jealous.

This notion of compound emotions is a difficult one, as it involves assuming that some emotions are prior or more ‘basic’ than others, and forming a hierarchy of emotional experiences. What this passage makes clear is that facial expression is only a partial approach to emotion. If facial expression fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of emotions, then it alone cannot justify the category

that cultures share facial expressions; according to Ekman they also share the association between those expressions and their evaluations of certain types of scenario’.

\(^4\) Darwin 1998, 384-5. \\
\(^5\) Darwin 1998, 373. \\
\(^6\) On shame in ancient Greece, or rather the related Greek emotion term αἰδώς, see Cairns 1993. \\
\(^7\) Darwin 1998, 391. I will approach this possibility of ἔρως being a compound emotion in the conclusion.
of emotion. Furthermore, if we persist in maintaining the category of emotions, then we need additional criteria for studying it. Paul Griffiths has made an important contribution to this problem of categorisation by questioning whether we can retain the term emotion at all. He argues that it is an arbitrary category.

Does our best current science have any role for these postulated psychological kinds? If it does not, then there is an important sense in which the emotions do not really exist. This does not mean that nothing is going on in people who are said to be experiencing emotion. It means that the emotion category does nothing to illuminate what is going on in those people.\(^8\)

It is perhaps the case then that the category of emotions will cease to be a valid scientific one. Griffith himself compares this to the category of superlunary objects, objects ‘beyond the moon’, which was an arbitrary category and subsequently disproved by science.\(^9\) Scientific theories can be dropped to make way for new ones, as Popper insisted.\(^10\) His problem concerning the diverse nature of emotional experience leads him to question the validity of concepts for individual emotions.

If science can find no interesting kind corresponding to all the paradigm cases of fear, then we must either reclassify some of the paradigm cases or replace fear and its companions with some more adequate categories.\(^11\)

If emotion does not really exist as a non-arbitrary category then this would potentially undermine the proposal of this thesis. One does not have to agree with Griffiths to see that the scientific definition of emotion is still very much debated. It is also clear that what is at stake is a notion of categories, what they are, and this

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\(^8\) Griffiths 1997, 1. Griffiths believes that the term emotion covers three different classes, short term affects, prescribed social roles which mimic these and higher cognitive emotions, and that therefore it cannot be or become a unified psychological category (Griffiths 1997, 15, 17). For a lucid discussion of his theory see Cairns 2008a, 43–4. Cairns has a valid objection to Griffiths’ view. The three classes are not necessarily heterogeneous if we look at the relation between the input side of the emotions and the output (Cairns 2008a, 44). Ekman’s facial expressions are on the output side of the emotion. The input side—which perceptions and conditions elicit the emotion—can vary among individuals or cultures, but Ekman’s research shows that there are cultural scenarios which elicit emotions, and partial universal agreement on these kinds of scenario. There is a cognitive-evaluative aspect to all emotions, and so the input and output sides of emotion are not necessarily heterogeneous. Furthermore the terms input and output are a little reductive when used of the emotional experience. This is why emotions will be viewed as scenarios in this study; for more on this see below and the final chapter.

\(^9\) Griffiths 1997, 1.

\(^10\) Popper 1968. See also Kuhn 1962 on the structure of scientific revolutions, where he claims that science undergoes periodic paradigm shifts.

\(^11\) Griffiths 1997, 5.
feature will be dealt with in a subsequent section. For now I will argue that as far as Classics is concerned, the distinction between folk and scientific theories becomes vital, if we are to justify the study of ‘emotions’ in our own field of work. The distinction between folk and scientific models is important for my work, and so I will define the terms here.  

Folk models are any given society’s ways of conceptualising phenomena in ordinary, everyday language, and their way of communicating and understanding them. A scientific model is an explanation of the same phenomenon in an expert way. Folk models are present and used in our everyday lives, despite the existence or availability of scientific models.

Most studies of ancient Greek emotions start from the premise that they had emotions, whatever they are called, and that we have emotions. Konstan begins his work *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks* with the following proposition:

The premise of this book is that the emotions of the ancient Greeks were in some significant respects different from our own, and that recognising these differences is important to our understanding of Greek literature and Greek culture generally. What is more, I argue that the Greeks’ conception of the emotions has something to tell us about our own views, whether about the nature of particular emotions or the category of emotion itself.

Konstan’s criteria for looking at the emotions of the ancient Greeks are correct, in my view, but do not clearly spell out the relationship between the study of emotions by Hellenists and the study of emotions by scientists. We are not researching into the ‘nature of…emotions’ nor the ‘category of emotion itself’ as a non-arbitrary scientifically valid category. What we are doing, as Konstan essentially says, is looking at the beliefs and concepts of the ancient Greeks in relation to our own: their models for emotions, or whatever can best be termed emotion in Ancient Greek, and our models of emotions, and the relation between the two. We are constructing a comparative study of folk and scientific models of the emotions.

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12 For work on metaphors and models in the history of psychology see Leary 1990. For cultural models see Holland and Quinn 1987, which provides many good studies of models in culture, language and thought.

13 For example Kempton studied two folk theories of home heat control in contemporary America, and these folk theories’ relation to an expert model of the same system (Kempton 1987, 222–242). There was an interesting relationship between the notion of the heating system the ordinary users had in mind, their implementation of that model, and the expert model which took more factors into account.

14 Folk models continue to play a vital role in society. Now more than ever the overwhelming volume of information available means that no one can ‘know’ the expert models for everything they experience or use in their lives. Folk models will therefore continue to be immensely important.

15 Konstan 2006, ix.
Griffiths thinks that we might have to drop our current scientific models for emotion in favour of new ones, yet another step in the long intellectual history of paradigms for emotion. In ancient Greece, however, even the most prestigious scientific models relevant to emotions were erroneous by today’s opinions: one only has to think of the humoral theory prevalent in ancient studies. Studying the ancient Greeks involves studying folk models of emotion. This is not to say that the scientific models of the ancient Greeks are not relevant. Folk models can be influenced by scientific models and vice versa. The primary focus of my research is folk models of ancient emotion, but their relationship to scientific models will be crucial for this. To avoid confusion between what is related to modern day science and what is not, I will use the term expert models instead of scientific models.

This is not to say that modern scientific studies of emotion are not relevant. Non-verbal signifiers of emotion, such as facial expression or types of behaviour, have the potential to reveal connections between the discoveries of Ekman and descriptions or depictions of emotions in ancient Greece. If one is studying anger (or the approximate Greek term) in antiquity then one should be aware that the ancient Greeks possibly made universally recognisable facial expressions during parts of the emotional experience, and that this might be reflected in art or descriptions of non-verbal signals. However, the main product from the study of folk models is a view of the concepts or beliefs of the ancient Greeks. I must show that there are correspondences between the folk concept of an emotion in English and the Greek concept of ἔρως, which justify my classifying it as an emotion. The thesis as a whole will discuss this further, but in the next section of this introduction I will

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17 Following Kövecses 2000, 114-38. See also Barton 1994. In her excellent study of three ancient areas of knowledge—astrology, medicine, and physiognomics (a discipline which postulated a relationship between outward appearance and inner mentality)—Barton has argued that contrary to popular modern prejudices, in which medicine is considered a real science and the other two pseudo-sciences, their respective statuses in antiquity could not be fitted into such a neat binary division. One of the primary reasons for this is the relationship of power and knowledge in the ancient world. During the second sophistic, at the time when most of the extant Greek novels were written, sophists debated with each other publicly in subjects such as philosophy or medicine. The supreme importance of this contest was winning the debate, not necessarily on reaching ‘the truth’ or even ‘a truth’. Therefore I will call all ancient Greek scientific models ‘expert’, to reflect their assumption of power and status. On Greek sophists and their cultural context under the Roman Empire see Bowersock 1969 and Swain 1996.
outline a basic feature of the concept which I feel justifies my connection of two potentially disparate folk models: the passivity of emotions.

Ἑρώς is commonly translated as ‘love’ or ‘lust’, and not only are these terms absent from Ekman’s list, but it is doubtful that there exists a universal facial expression for this emotion, even if it corresponds in some way to our emotions (see above). To justify the use of the word emotion I will begin with some observations Ekman makes about what he considers an emotional expression. Emotions reflect inner feeling, but they are also communicative. If someone has an angry expression, then communicating the information that they are feeling angry is useful both to themselves and another person. If they are angry they might become violent, and this can aid them in making their opponent back down, or aid their opponent in revealing the danger of an attack. So there is a rationale for the successful communication of emotion. Yet there is an important element behind this emotional communication which allows it to be trusted: it is an involuntary reaction and occurs without choice. As we can see from the example of anger above, understanding this revelation of inner feelings as involuntary, as accurate, is vital on a communicative level. Furthermore, since expression in these cases is often read instinctively and accurately, and universally (according to Ekman), it is a good contender for being part of any human folk model of emotions. If humans have always noticed these expressions and acted upon them, concerning themselves and others, then they were part of the ancient Greeks’ folk model as much as ours. It is this definition of emotion as ‘involuntary’ which I employ to justify my use of the terminology. What the concept of Ἑρώς shares with Ekman’s six universals is that it is an involuntary emotion. All the evidence in the Greek Novel points towards this. It is a passive and involuntary drive, and although it has no particular facial expression, it influences the behaviour of the person feeling the emotion. It is important to emphasise here that emotions as a group are passive. This does not mean that they cannot be actively manipulated, but that the sensation is an involuntary one. This is one aspect in which the ancient Greek folk model matches up with our own one.

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In addition, because a prototypical emotion is passive, this does not necessitate that all emotions must always be passive. See prototypical structuring in the next section.
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the Greek concept of ἔρως in the Greek Novel. Although I am starting from the premise that ἔρως is in the category of emotions, I am not beginning from the premise that it corresponds exactly with any particular emotion in English. This is not the same as saying that the Greeks might not have felt the emotions that we have.\(^{19}\) Wierzbicka has argued that Ekman was misled in his experiments on emotion expression by the western terms for the emotions; that because he was using English words to start with, he found these English terms: a circular argument. However, the Japanese-American study cited above used visuals and not words to stimulate emotions, so this criticism is not valid.\(^{20}\) Without maintaining that all cultures have exactly the same emotions, not having a word for an emotion is not proof that a culture does not feel that emotion. Ekman writes:

\begin{quote}
Not having a word for an emotional state may well influence emotional experience. Without being able to name feelings, it may be harder to distinguish them, think about them, and so on.\(^{21}\)
\end{quote}

This is an interesting hypothesis from a psychologist that language might have the potential of affecting emotional experience (but not completely determining it). In a study of Tahitian culture, Levy has postulated that because their culture has no word for sadness, they react to the emotion in a different way.\(^{22}\) For instance, when rejected by a lover they do not relate their experience to the rejection, but conceive of it as a sickness. The substitution of metaphor for an emotion term, as we shall see in this thesis, is not proof that a society has difficulty conceiving of a concept. Therefore I remain unconvinced by Levy’s reasoning; even if they had a word for sadness, it is entirely possible that they would continue to conceptualise it as ‘sickness’. His study highlights the fact that societies can come to terms with...

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\(^{19}\) See Konstan 2003, who argues that the Greeks did not have exactly our notion of jealousy.


\(^{21}\) Darwin 1998, 392.

\(^{22}\) Levy 1973. His thesis seems to be a version of linguistic relativity, as famously seen in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests that thought is shaped by language. However, see Cairns 2008a, 50: ‘The (frequent and often productive) disagreement of native speakers over the sense and reference of key psychological terms is important in another respect too—it is a sign that thought is not determined by language. Aristotle and Chrysippus, like Ekman and Wierzbicka, share a language, but differ on the nature of the psychological phenomena labelled by the words they use and on the meaning of those words themselves.’
emotions they do not have words for, and that emotion term studies which do not take into account the broader picture are necessarily limited.

Griffiths’ argument that folk models do not necessarily indicate anything about the actual nature of emotions is also pertinent here. Folk models for Greek emotions might be different in some respects from our own, and the folk model of ἔρως might differ from our models for love or lust, or be an amalgamation of the two, but this does not mean that the Greeks felt different emotions from us. For these reasons Konstan’s thesis in his article on jealousy in ancient Greece, that perhaps the Greeks did not feel jealousy, cannot be substantiated by the (predominantly) linguistic evidence he provides in his study.23 If he is correct, it merely proves that they conceptualised and described the emotion differently; to equate feeling with conceptualisation is gross reductionism. If a study of the ancient Greek emotions does not tell us about the actual nature of emotions, then is there justification for attempting it? There is, as was said above, and this is based on the importance of folk models. Folk models of emotion are used pervasively in social interaction, and the ancient Greek folk models of emotion give us much valuable cultural information. This information is mostly of relevance to our own folk models, but work on facial expression by Ekman can be relevant to both our own and the ancient Greeks’ folk models, even though it is scientific. This is because it involves external signals and experience. However, the Greeks’ beliefs about internal psychological functioning are essential to their folk and expert models, and so it will be necessary to look at their versions of internal psychological processes. We are not committing ourselves to any internal physiological version of the emotions, merely external non-verbal signifiers and the expression of a folk model through language. Furthermore, if we accept the proposition put forward in the section on metaphor, then concepts reveal important aspects of human cognition. Folk models of emotion are not merely used, but they structure human understanding of the concepts themselves. So whether or not our folk models of emotion tell us anything about ‘real’ emotions or feelings, they are important in terms of their influence on thought and action.

II – Prototypical Scenarios

In the previous section I argued that passivity was a feature which marked emotion in general. Even though this appears to be the case, this aspect does not exhaust the study of emotion and in some ways limits it. In what sense is a person acting through anger passive or active? They are passive in the sense that they have no control over their feelings, but active in that their course of action is a choice not determined by the emotion.\footnote{The active or ‘participant’ nature of the emotional subject is something which perhaps Kövecses underplays. He posits a master metaphor underlying others in American English and other languages, that emotion is a force acting upon a person. See Kövecses 2000, 61-86. See also Damasio 1995, 123: ‘when we consider our own species, however, and the far more varied and largely unpredictable environments in which we have thrived, it is apparent that we must rely on highly evolved genetically based biological mechanisms, as well as on suprainstinctual survival strategies that have developed in society, are transmitted by culture, and require, for their application, consciousness, reasoned deliberation, and willpower. That is why human hunger, desire, and explosive anger do not proceed unchecked toward feeding frenzy, sexual assault, and murder, at least not always, assuming that a healthy human organism has developed in a society in which the suprainstinctual survival strategies are actively transmitted and respected.’} This complexity involved in emotional experiences has led many scholars to advance a critical apparatus called a scenario: a series of feelings, actions, and events.\footnote{See in particular Cairns 2008a, Kaster 2005, Lakoff and Kövecses 1987. Kaster uses the terminology of a script instead of a scenario, but the approach is essentially the same.} It is only by viewing an emotion as a scenario that we can view it in its entire complexity: its physiological effects and the subject’s taking up and manipulation of social roles and courses of action.

This criterion of an emotional scenario, although not explicitly used in ancient Greek thought, is not completely alien to at least some of their philosophical studies of emotion. The ancient Greek word which comes closest to our category of ‘emotion’ is πάθος. Πάθος designates a category of wider extension than our own term emotion.\footnote{See Cairns 2008a, 45, Konstan 2006, 3-4, and Lloyd 2007, 67-9, 72. However, this does not prohibit an overlap with our own category.} Indeed, as Wierzbicka has made clear (see above), the differing semantic ranges of words from different languages can cause problems. This difficulty with semantics reinforces the need for a scenario based approach.

The validity of such an approach to ancient Greek literature can be seen by looking at Aristotle’s analysis of πάθη in his Rhetorica.\footnote{On πάθη and this treatise see particularly Fortenbaugh 1975 and Konstan 2006.} Aristotle does not cite
ἔρως as a πάθος in his discussion, but then he does not discuss all πάθη.  

This could merely be due to the fact that his discussion focuses on rhetorical contexts, where πάθη can sway one’s listeners, and therefore ἔρως is less likely to feature.

I am not assuming that Aristotle’s definition of a πάθος is either comprehensive or even prototypical for the ancient Greeks. Even if Aristotle did not consider ἔρως a πάθος, this does not mean that it was not considered as one in a broader social context, or by other philosophers. However, correspondences between Aristotle’s definition of a πάθος, ἔρως in the Greek Novel, and the work on emotion carried out by Lakoff and Kövecses should make it clear that the phenomena at hand overlap significantly and that the interpretation given here is not alien to at least one ancient Greek expert model of emotion.

Aristotle maintains that τὰ πάθη involve the sensations of pleasure and pain and a change in judgement:

\[ \varepsilon \sigma i \; d e \; t a \; \pi a \theta h i \; d i \; \delta s a \; m e t a b a l l o n t e s \; d i a f e r o u s i \; p r o s \; t a s \; k r i s e i s \; o i s \; \varepsilon p e t ai \; l o t h i \; k a i \; \eta \delta o n h i, \; o i o n \; o r g h e \; \varepsilon l e o s \; \phi o b o s \; k a i \; \delta s a \; a l l a \; t o u a t e, \; k a i \; t a \; t o u t o s \; \varepsilon n a n t i a (R h . 1378 a 20 - 3). \]

28 The πάθη discussed are anger, satisfaction, shame, envy, indignation, fear, gratitude, love (φιλία), hatred and pity. See Konstan 2006 with the reservations on Konstan’s work in Cairns 2008a. Since his analysis of πάθη is based upon opposites, such as anger and satisfaction, it is not clear what place ἔρως would have in the work, since hatred is already used as the opposite of φιλία.

29 See Konstan 2009, 13, on ἔρως in the Rhétorica: ‘I expect because he (Aristotle) was uncertain whether it could be properly classified as one, although it may be that it was not one of the passions that an orator frequently sought to arouse or quell’.

30 This work by Aristotle has remained remarkably robust in the history of scholarship on the emotions. For example, the neurologist Damasio writes that ‘the internal preference system is inherently biased to avoid pain, seek potential pleasure, and is probably pre-tuned for achieving these goals in social situations’ (1995, 179). His description fits well the trajectory of the discussion in Aristotle’s Rhétorica. In another treatise Aristotle states that the philosopher and the natural scientist will approach emotion from different angles: the philosopher will say that anger is a desire for revenge, whereas the natural scientist will say that it is a seething of blood around the heart (De an.403a29-b2). Recently Lloyd 2007, 4-5, has argued that it is more important than ever to look at subjects like emotion from a multidisciplinary perspective, in order to take into account multiple frames of reference.

31 Freese 1926. For other lists of πάθη see NE 1105b21 and de An.403a16-17. Aristotle is not the only Greek philosopher to discuss the emotions in terms of judgement. Stoic theory is fragmentary and complicated, but Chrysippus notes that the passions are false judgments which are predicated upon either good or bad: see Long 1974, 176-77 and SVF 3, 466 and 486. Seneca, who although Roman is a significant part of the stoic tradition, also denies that anger is merely an impulse. He says that it acts with the approval of the mind, animo adprobante, and that forming the impression of an injury with the propositions that one should not be wronged and that one should seek revenge is not merely an impulse, impetus, which occurs without our will, voluntate nostra (Sen.De ira 2.1.4). Therefore
Examples of a πάθος are such concepts as anger, pity, fear, and their opposites. If we turn to Aristotle’s first analysis of a specific πάθος, ὀργή, we see an approach which views the concept as it is enacted in a social discourse.

The goal of ὀργή is a longing, ὀρεξίς, for revenge upon a person due to a slight: a socially orientated action. Aristotle goes on to say that an angry man is angry with a particular individual and that his ὀργή is accompanied by pleasure at the thought of the revenge to come: this is the pleasure of thinking one will obtain what one wants (Rh.1378b1). Aristotle goes on to detail the end point of anger. Mildness, πράϋνσις, is the settling and resting of anger: κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς (Rh.1380a8-9). When those who caused the anger apologise and repent, ὀμολογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις, the person feeling anger considers justice to have been done through the pain of the other, ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, and then ceases to feel angry (Rh.1380a14-6). Therefore Aristotle considers anger or rather ὀργή as a diachronic passion which is socially embedded. The emotion is caused by another’s action which is socially mediated, since what counts as a slight

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Seneca also envisages a scenario (in terms of judgments) which is complex and involves several stages: hic compositus et plura continens (Sen.De ira 2.1.5). Kaster notes the importance of judgment as an element of cultural diversity in the emotions, since judgments and beliefs are products of culture: ‘returning the spotlight to cognition means that culture too—with its role in shaping judgments and beliefs and in giving us the emotion-talk by which we make our experiences intelligible—has regained a central place in the little drama that must be grasped as a whole’ (2004, 9).

32 On this passage see Konstan 2003a, 100.

33 Aristotle also recognises that emotions can be causative of others. He says that the sick, those in need, those at war, those in love (ἐρώντες), and the thirsty, all those who desire something not easily obtainable, are liable to being angry and roused: ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι (Rh.1379a16-8). Interestingly Freese 1926, 179, translates ἐρώντες as ‘the lovesick’. This shows how pervasive metaphorical conceptualisations of emotion inform interpretations of the emotion terms themselves. Aristotle goes on to say that each one is disposed towards ὀργή (‘prepared in advance’) by the ruling passion: προοδοποιεῖται γάρ ἐκάστος πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστοις ὀργήν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθος (1379a23-4). Note the metaphor in προοδοποιεῖω which conceptualises time as ‘preparing a path in advance’. This would seem to imply that Aristotle feels that ἐρως is a πάθος, and that one πάθος can provoke another.
will vary from culture to culture. The emotion is then appeased in a social context when reparation is made. Aristotle does not mention physiological symptoms in his *Rhetorica* as part of the scenario. However, elsewhere Aristotle does state that emotions are accompanied by physical affections (*De an.*403a16-27). Therefore Aristotle is aware of both the social and physiological facets of emotion.\(^{34}\)

Aristotle recognised the importance of social interaction in studying emotion, and this has become increasingly important in modern scholarship. Emotion and πάθος, however, are also categories, as are specific emotions and πάθη, and in recent decades our understanding of categories has undergone a significant change. These are predominantly folk categories: those used in non-scientific language. However, they are also intrinsic to how language works. Subsets of categories can be seen to show prototypical structure, and this is a prominent feature of new cognitive approaches to grammar.\(^{35}\) Fortenbaugh has argued that the category

\(^{34}\) Aristotle devotes far more space to the social aspect of emotion rather than its physiology, and this might be behind Konstan’s assertions in his book on the emotions in ancient Greece. He attempts to set up a dichotomy between the Greeks’ intensely social understanding of emotion and our own understanding of them as internal to the self: ‘the Greeks did not conceive of emotions as internal states of excitation. Rather, the emotions are elicited by our interpretation of the words, acts, and intentions of others, each in its characteristic way’ (Konstan 2006, xii). This is clearly not a valid dichotomy as emotions involve internal states and social interaction at the same time. For the Greeks emotions could be internal states of excitement, as evidenced by numerous works of literature such as the great tragedies. Konstan goes on to emphasise the social interpretation of emotion: ‘It would appear that the Greeks were constantly jockeying to maintain or improve their social position or that of dear ones, and were deeply conscious of their standing in the eyes of others. When ordinary people stepped out of the house and into the streets of Athens, they must . . . have been intensely aware of relative degrees of power and their own vulnerability to insult and injury. The emotions of the ancient Greeks, in turn, were attuned to these demands’ (Konstan 2006, 259). There is a problem with this. Leaving aside the philosophical and scientific writings (which are likely to be idiosyncratic), a vast amount of Konstan’s evidence on emotions in ancient Greece comes from either rhetorical speeches (where status is focused upon intensely), the powerful in myth and history who have important statuses to maintain (for example the gods, Medea and Xerxes) or the educated aristocracy up to the imperial period. Therefore, even if Konstan’s assertion applies to the literature, it does not necessarily apply to everyday life (for instance if a study of English emotion was done which privileged the cases of the God of the Old Testament, Othello, Juliet, and Henry II and Thomas Beckett). Furthermore it is the case that emotions in contemporary culture are also social: in the way Konstan has phrased it his description could equally apply to our own society or many others. Libel cases against newspapers and periodicals, common in the current day and age, concern ‘vulnerability to insult and injury’ and are often motivated by anger. People who purchase a house in order to live in a better area and place their children in a catchment area for a better school are ‘constantly jockeying to maintain or improve their social position or that of dear ones’. One could argue that all people are (partially but not fully) ‘aware of relative degrees of power’ and that this permeates human relations. So it is not important that the emotions of the ancient Greeks were attuned to the demands of power and knowledge: we need to know how this was quantitatively or qualitatively different from our own society.

\(^{35}\) For prototype theory see Lakoff 1987, Rosch 1973a, 1973b, 1975, 1978 and Rosch and Mervis 1975. See Cairns 2008a, 49: ‘a ‘prototype’ is a central example of a category around which less prototypical forms cluster and to which these less prototypical forms are related by ‘family resemblance’.”
πάθος in Aristotle’s *Rhetorica* is not a consistent one but united by similarity.\(^{36}\) Although Aristotle defines emotions as accompanied by pleasure and pain, one of his emotions, hate (μῖσος), occurs without pain. However, it is still included because of its similarities to the other concepts discussed (according to Fortenbaugh). This is based on the notion of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances, a theory which is one of the founding principles of prototype theory. He argues that a category in ordinary language use such as ‘game’ (Spiel) does not have a feature common to every member of the category, but that members can be related to one another by resemblance.\(^{37}\) He compares this to family relations: all members of a family are related, but there is not one single characteristic which applies to every member (e.g. blue eyes).\(^{38}\) Therefore there might not be one consistent attribute which applies to every instance of ἔρως, but there might be similarities between different models which unite them under one category.

Furthermore prototype theory emphasises the propensity to grade members: some members of a category are better than others. Using a list of pieces of furniture Rosch asked two hundred students to rate how good an example of a piece of furniture each item was. The best examples of the category furniture were seen to be chair and sofa.\(^{39}\) Thus anger, fear and sadness might be more central members of the category of emotion than, say, hope or pride. There are also basic and less basic elements of a category. If we see certain English emotion terms as subsets of the category ‘emotion’ then native speakers feel that some emotion terms are more basic than others. So anger would be a basic term, and terms such as annoyance, wrath, rage, and indignation would be related but less basic terms.\(^{40}\) Perhaps Ekman’s

\(^{36}\) Fortenbaugh 2003-4.

\(^{37}\) See Wittgenstein 2001, 66: ‘consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”— but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.’

\(^{38}\) Wittgenstein 2001, 67: ‘I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.’

\(^{39}\) See Rosch 1975.

emotions are central members of the category emotion because they are based on universal expressions, and further emotions are more culturally structured.\textsuperscript{41}

Of course I cannot use native speakers to test which emotions are more central to the Greek category than others. However, prototypes can be used in a profitable way when analysing ἔρως. Cairns has already shown that the concept of anger in ancient Greek shows prototypical structure.\textsuperscript{42} I previously quoted Ekman on the possibility of compound emotions. Is ἔρως a basic Greek emotion, or do more basic emotions structure it? Second, although I am not studying whether the Greek emotions show prototypical structure, I can attempt to see whether the concept of ἔρως shows prototypical structure. Are certain conceptualisations of ἔρως better examples of the category than others?

The following is the prototypical scenario of anger as postulated by Lakoff and Kövecses. Their scenario or progression of events is envisioned as the prototypical sequence of actions and reactions in an incident of anger among speakers of American English.

**PROTOTYPICAL ANGER SCENARIO**

Constraints:

Victim = S  
Agent of Retribution = S  
Target of Anger = Wrongdoer  
Immediate Cause of Anger = Offending Event  
Angry Behaviour = Retribution

\textsuperscript{41} Lakoff 1987, 38–9, certainly thinks so.  
\textsuperscript{42} Cairns 2003b, 27: ‘Aristotle’s account of orgê establishes not an exhaustive, all encompassing, but a prototypical definition of anger’; ‘The Homeric scenarios in which chloos does not straightforwardly spring from a perception of unwarranted offense…(should be) recognised as less prototypical cases’. If one does not take into account prototypical categorisation then one has difficulty fitting all the instances of a concept into one definition. See Cairns 2008a, 49–50: ‘it would be perfectly easy, for example, to construct a prescriptive definition of the English word ‘jealousy’ that focused (e.g.) on its prototypical scenario in which A believes that B is a rival for the affections of C, but any descriptive account of the term will have to account (e.g.) for the fact that many ordinary users of English use the term as a partial synonym of ‘envy’ (e.g. to be ‘jealous’ of another’s success). It is a crucial element of our project of conceptual analysis to recognise that a single term has many senses, that native speakers rarely encompass the full semantic range of a term in their attempts to capture its meaning, and that they disagree over what terms mean and which uses are typical.’
Stage 1: **Offending Event**
Wrongdoer offends S
Wrongdoer is at fault
The offending event displeases S
The intensity of the offense outweighs the intensity of the retribution (which equals zero at this point), thus creating an imbalance. The offense causes anger to come into existence.

Stage 2: **Anger**
Anger exists.
S experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, agitation).
Anger exerts force on the S to attempt an act of retribution.

Stage 3: **Attempt to control anger**
S exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.

Stage 4: **Loss of control**
The intensity of anger goes above the limit.
Anger takes control of S.
S exhibits angry behaviour (loss of judgement, aggressive actions).
There is damage to S.
There is a danger to the target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.

Stage 5: **Retribution**
S performs retributive act against W (this is usually angry behaviour directed at W).
The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offense.
The intensity of anger drops to zero.
Anger ceases to exist. \(^\text{43}\)

This prototypical scenario is an example of how an emotion is played out in a folk model as a syndrome. Emotions are not necessarily single experiences but scenarios of experiences and actions/reactions. There can also be non-prototypical instances of anger. Lakoff and Kövecses list many such cases in their study, one of which is Redirected Anger. \(^\text{44}\) In this case the anger is not directed at the person who causes anger, but at someone else. In this case stage five of the prototypical scenario is changed. Lakoff and Kövecses’s article is more a proposal than a comprehensive

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\(^{43}\) Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 213-4.
\(^{44}\) Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 214-6.
study (with selective evidence). Kaster, on the other hand, has shown firmly that scenarios, or ‘scripts’ as he calls them, are deeply rooted in Roman conceptualisations of the emotions. The goal of this thesis is to put together a folk model of ἔρως in the Greek Novels. This will involve a prototypical scenario, such as the one above, and non-prototypical cases.

Kaster 2005 has done this for Latin literature in the form of ‘scripts’. See his taxonomy of four scripts for the Latin emotion of invidia, 87. Scripts also take into account the different settings or circumstances which may elicit a particular form of an emotion. In my study I will retain the terminology of prototypical scenario, in order to be consistent with my terms for categorisation.
III – Metaphor

Contemporary science has the potential to highlight aspects of ancient Greek emotions, but folk models of emotion in English and Ancient Greek are conceptual, and a study of them is not one of emotions as natural kinds. However, as stated above, emotions are integral to cultural interaction. A study of a culture’s concepts of emotion is vital for understanding emotion in that society. The Greeks used concepts which we would recognise as emotions, and the importance of notions such as ἔρως in their societies justifies its study. Just as it emerges that concepts are important for the study of ancient emotions, since we cannot study a past culture with empirical experiment, language comes to the fore. There may be evidence of universal facial expressions or physiological responses in descriptions of non-verbal symptoms or behaviours and artistic representations, but concepts are expressed and used to their greatest complexity in language. This is where metaphor comes in, as an essential feature of language and thought, and this section will describe in detail what part metaphor plays in this, my theoretical approach to metaphor, and why metaphor is essential for concepts of emotion.

Traditionally emotion is studied by means of what are called emotion terms, such as happiness, disgust, surprise, sadness, anger, and fear (see above). These terms feature in only some of the instances where language describes emotion. Figurative terms can be descriptive of concepts, and this is where metaphor performs its role in structuring emotions. These descriptions do not include the emotion term, but are recognised as referring to the emotion due to culturally (or universally) shared conceptualisations. For example, if I say that someone has ‘reached boiling point’ then a native speaker of American English (and probably those who speak many other languages) can understand that the person is angry, despite the fact that no emotion term is given. Lakoff and Kövecses argue that this communication of emotion through language is not merely idiomatic, but is based on shared and

46 The distinction made by Kövecses 2000, 2-3, is also relevant here. Some words can express emotion, like the English yuk! which indicates disgust, but these are not the focus of this study. I will be looking at descriptive terms, which describe the emotion and the emotional experience. For example ‘I’m about to explode’ is a colloquial American English description of anger, and it describes the experience metaphorically in terms of an explosion. For a study of anger and conceptual metaphor in American English see Lakoff and Kövecses 1987.
systematic conceptual metaphors. One of the metaphors used of anger in American English conceptualises it as the heat of a fluid in a container. This is a shared cultural conceptualisation and allows all phrases such as ‘you make my blood boil’, ‘simmer down!’, and ‘let him stew’ to describe and communicate anger. In the same way when one of the characters in the Greek Novel says ‘I burn’, φλέγω, they are communicating the fact that they are feeling ἔρως by means of a culturally pervasive concept in Ancient Greek. This thesis will map out the concepts used of ἔρως in the Greek Novel, since metaphor reveals the underlying conceptual framework of the emotion.

There are several other features of figurative descriptions which deserve mention. Metaphors do not necessarily name the emotion term itself, but denote aspects of the concept, such as intensity, cause, control and so on. They therefore add much information and nuance to ‘fill out’ the structure of the concept. I will be using two terms for two related types of metaphorical conceptualisation: metaphor and metonymy. Both terms are defined by Kövecses in his book on emotion.

Conceptual metaphors bring two distant domains (or concepts) into correspondence with one another. One of the domains is typically more physical or concrete than the other (which is thus more abstract). The correspondence is established for the purpose of understanding the more abstract in terms of the more concrete.

Conceptual metonymies, unlike conceptual metaphors, involve a single domain, or concept.

The use of the word domain is important, as metaphors map concepts, not words. Mapping refers to the process of understanding the abstract in terms of the more

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47 Their use of conceptual metaphor builds on the ground breaking study by Lakoff and Johnson 1980.

48 Examples are taken from Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 198.

49 And in English too. To ‘burn with love’ is a common enough phrase. The potential objection here is that ‘burning’ can represent multiple psychological states, and is therefore ambiguous. So for instance, if someone is ‘burning’, how do I know whether they are burning with love or anger? The answer is that context usually makes it clear, and there is no problem with context being an integral part of meaning. For instance, if I say ‘the window is open’, the semantic meaning of the words greatly underdetermines the speaker’s meaning. Apart from expressing a simple fact, I could be asking someone indirectly to shut the window, or be explaining why the room is so cold. So there are multiple possible meanings, but not infinite ones, and multiple meanings can be whittled down in context. This is why all excerpts in this study will take into account context, as speaker meaning can differ from sentence meaning.

40 Kövecses 2000, 4.

41 Kövecses 2000, 4 (the Italicism is mine).

42 Kövecses 2000, 5.
concrete: thus for the metaphor ἔρως is fire’ the more concrete concept of fire is mapped onto the more abstract notion of the emotion. If the domain of fire is mapped onto the emotion of ἔρως, as seen above, the potential is there for mapping many aspects of the source domain. Fires are hot, can flare up, cool down, and can be harmful or beneficial to humans. The term domain reflects the multivalent aspect of these mappings, and the potential for different aspects of each domain to be mapped onto one another. So the metaphor of extinguishing ἔρως, seen often in the novels, refers to a specific part of the experiential domain of fire, i.e. its putting out. This part then maps onto a specific part of the ἔρως domain, denoting the absence or ending of the emotion.\textsuperscript{53} The terms source and target domain are also relevant here. The source domain is the metaphor used to explain the concepts, and the target domain is the concept intended to be explained. In the example above fire is the source domain and ἔρως is the target. The concept is explained and understood by conceptualising it as a fire.

Metonymy on the other hand involves mapping within the same domain. A part represents the whole or a part represents another part. In Longus’ novel Daphnis blushes due to αἰδώς.\textsuperscript{54} The term αἰδώς is not mentioned, but part of the cultural model of the emotion involves blushing, and so this physiological reaction is understood as metonymic of the emotion.\textsuperscript{55} This also relates to one emotion being understood in terms of another. Often characters in the Greek Novel feel grief, λύπη, as a metonymy for ἔρως. This is understanding one abstraction in terms of another, and although the concepts overlap, as in the case of erotic grief, it is an instance of metaphor rather than metonymy.\textsuperscript{56}

Domains, manipulated in terms of metaphors and metonymies, provide structure for concepts, and hence for emotions. ἔρως is a concept which is structured by metaphors, metonymies, and the linking of various domains within it. It is a domain structured by sub-domains and interaction with other domains, and this

\textsuperscript{53} For examples of all these instances see the section on Fire.
\textsuperscript{54} Longus 1.17.2.
\textsuperscript{55} More specifically it is erotic αἰδώς here. Subsections of a domain, such as blushing being a part of the domain of αἰδώς, do not have to be exclusive to that domain.
\textsuperscript{56} Of course there are concrete manifestations of λύπη in ancient Greece, such as the beating of breasts or the tearing of hair, but I maintain that the emotion itself, as with all emotions, is abstract.
will become clearer as this thesis maps out the extent of its range in the Greek Novel. Metaphor is the primary conceptual instrument at use here, but the way in which metaphorical concepts are structured is also important. This also differentiates my use of metaphor from the way others have used it, especially in a literary sense. Silk’s excellent studies are concerned with whether metaphors are ‘felt’.

He wants to know which metaphors stop the reader in their tracks and which slide under the radar, so to speak. This is an important aspect of literary metaphor, but it is vital to my own studies that I do look at what has been called ‘dead’ metaphor. These deep-rooted metaphorical conceptualisations, which are common in a language, are important for the study of emotion precisely because they fall under the radar. They are the natural categories people use to conceptualise their emotional experience, and therefore they are anything but ‘dead’, as we will see through the course of this thesis.

Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is one of conceptual metaphor, and this refers to the way in which metaphor is an aspect of thought rather than language. Above Kövecses specified that metaphorical mapping typically involves the mapping of a more concrete concept onto a more abstract one. Metaphor is often the use of basic image schemas which result from human perception to understand abstract concepts. If thought (and therefore language) about abstract concepts relies upon human experience and perception of concrete realities, then Greek metaphors will

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57 For a good treatment of these issues see Silk 1974 and 2003 on poetry, particularly early ancient Greek poetry.
58 The issue of how metaphors are processed in the brain is more difficult. See Pinker 2007, 235–78 for the relevant issues.
59 This influence is not just culturally specific. For evidence that cognition of everyday experience structures metaphor we may look at a common metaphor. In the English language there is an orientational metaphor which conceptualises happiness and sadness in terms of height. This is referred to as the HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN metaphor and the following are linguistic examples from American English: I’m feeling up. That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high spirits. Thinking about her always gives me a lift. I’m feeling down. I’m depressed. He’s really low these days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank. These metaphors are explained as having a physical basis: drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 15). This example shows the potential importance of the connection of metaphorical conceptualisation with perception and physiology. If metaphor is grounded in experience and perception, then we can make two important conclusions. First human perception is physiologically based, and therefore universal, and so we might reason that there are metaphorical universals. Second, different cultures have different environments and different modes of behaviour, and so we would expect metaphorical conceptualisations to be grounded in their own cultural experience. The historicism/universalism argument becomes less relevant, since perception is routed in physiology and culture, and we approach a model more like the one used in evolution, where physiology and environment are cooperative factors.
also use basic features of experience. Cairns has shown that in ancient Greek the concepts αἰδώς and grief often utilise metaphor which is based on the empirical reality of veiling one’s face. This is an example of cognitive metaphor reflecting cultural concrete realities.

Above we mentioned folk and expert models of thought, and this distinction is no less relevant to the ancient Greeks than to us. Ancient Greek science occupies a famous niche in history, and great minds such as Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and others built up a considerable repository of knowledge in many different fields. These are firmly expert models of knowledge. The considerations of metaphor above have been ahistorical, in the sense that they treat metaphor grounded either in universal or culturally relative experience, rather than as something which can change diachronically. It has been noted in other disciplines that metaphor can play an important role as a link between folk and expert models of thought. Science can develop new interpretative metaphors which then filter down into folk models of the same concepts and vice versa. The Greek Novel occurs at a later stage than classical Greek literature, and therefore metaphors for emotions which might have been expert ones for Plato could have become commonplace by the time of the Greek Novel, with the result that they assume the register of folk metaphors. The relationship also goes both ways. It has been postulated that the success of scientific metaphors in the past might be linked to how well they ‘fit’ with existing folk models. Therefore the interaction of folk and expert models will be important for any analysis of metaphor in the Greek Novel.

In conclusion: there are three important features of metaphor which I will be using throughout this study. The first is its role in structuring an abstract concept such as an emotion, and its relation to and action in a prototypical scenario. The second is the grounding of the metaphor, or how many metaphors are universal ones resulting from human perception and experience, and how many arise from specifically Greek conditions of experience. Finally, on a more specific cultural level, I will look at which metaphors, if any, have been influenced not so much by

\[^{60}\text{Furthermore if experience influences metaphor, then it is possible that Ekman’s universal facial expressions may influence the portrayal of emotions in ancient Greek language.}\]
\[^{61}\text{Cairns 2008b.}\]
direct experience but by ancient Greek scientific or expert modes of thought. I will now go on to specify the material I am working with and why it has been chosen.
IV - The Ancient Greek Novel

The Greek Novel is a collection of works written roughly between the first century BCE and the fourth century CE. There are five (probably) complete novels which survive: Chariton’s *Callirhoe*, Xenophon of Ephesus’ *Anthia and Habrokomes*, Achilles Tatius’ *Leucippe and Cleitophon*, Longus’ *Daphnis and Chloe*, and Heliodorus’ *Aethiopica*. They are placed together as a genre because they all display similar structures in which a pair of young lovers are united at the start, undergo trials and tribulations, often in the form of extensive voyages, and are finally reunited at the end. There seems to have been an appeal for this type of literature in antiquity, since we also have fragmentary novels, but due to the wealth of examples I have restricted my focus to these five. I have also left out relevant Latin works, such as Lucius Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* and Petronius’ *Satyricon*, due to considerations of space, since the Greek Novel provides me with enough material. This thesis is a study on conceptual metaphor in Greek, and so examples from Latin are less relevant. A distinctive feature of this genre is that the romances are generally set in an helleno-centric past. It almost totally ignores the Roman Empire, a factor perhaps based on its historical settings.

The Greek Novel has enjoyed a growth in treatment similar to that of the emotions, and is a particularly vibrant area of study. They are literature, and good literature at that, as has been proved by books and articles too numerous to cite here. I therefore must deal with emotions and metaphor not merely on a conceptual level, but on a literary level. I do not see these aims as necessarily distinct, and feel that literary manipulation of emotion and metaphor owe a great deal to their grounding in cultural conceptualisations, without being reducible to this. Indeed the presence of

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62 The dating of the novels has been a considerable task, but current consensus is within the range 1st century BCE to 4th century CE. The general dating or order of the novels does not affect my argument, but Chariton is usually seen as the first novelist chronologically and Heliodorus as the last. On the dating of the Greek Novel see Bowie 2008, Bowie and Harrison 1993, Morgan 1995.

63 I call it a genre here for convenience’s sake. No part of my argument rests upon any notion of genre as regards the Greek Novel.

64 Xenophon of Ephesus’ mention of an eirenarch (X.Eph.2.13.3), an office not known before Trajan (emperor 98-117), reveals the author’s period as imperial, and he is usually dated to between 100 and 150 CE. Perhaps this is just on historical requirements, i.e. the Roman Empire did not exist at the time when the (historical) novels are set, such as Chariton and Heliodorus, but this celebration of the past is strongly Greek, and should be seen as a promotion, conscious or not, of hellenic culture, in particular as concerns the hellenic interaction with the eastern Mediterranean, Persia and Egypt.
emotion and metaphor in literature has been touched upon by previous studies, and my work owes a great deal to these.\footnote{On love in the Greek novels see Konstan 1994. Many studies emphasise the importance of metaphor in the novels but see particularly Bowie 2004, Harrison, Paschalis and Frangoulidis 2005, Létoublon 1993, and Mignogna 1991.}

Why focus upon the Greek Novel? The first and most important reason for this is that these novels provide so much evidence. They are romances, or love stories, and ἔρως features heavily throughout. Second, they are not expert treatises, such as philosophical or medical texts, and therefore provide evidence for the folk models of Greek emotions.\footnote{This is not to say that scientific models are not influential. See the introductory section on Folk and Scientific Models.} I have chosen to have a focus in the first place, not only because of the breadth of evidence available, but because of the literary aspect. These novels, as with previous Greek literature, are written in a specific historical and cultural context, the Greek culture of the eastern Mediterranean under Roman imperial rule, and engage in a discourse with previous influences. There is also the author as an author, an individual identity rather than a mere mouthpiece for cultural stereotypes, and his sophisticated manipulation of the narrative. I am aware of all these issues, and will engage with them where relevant. Identifying the metaphorical conceptualisations which underlie the folk models of ἔρως presents us with the conceptual blocks which authors use to build with, not with prisons which restrict their every movement within bars of culture. It is the consistency of these models across the Greek Novel which I will emphasise, while attempting to highlight any significant variations.

This introduction has highlighted the theoretical, methodological and contextual grounds of my thesis. I have tried to justify studying emotion in language, language by metaphor, and language through literature. Folk models are a valuable source of a culture’s concepts, and aspects of the ancient Greek folk model of ἔρως bear enough resemblance to our folk model of emotions for a comparison to be profitable. It only remains to detail the subsections of this thesis. The first chapter, ‘The Erotic Syndrome’, will look at the classification of symptoms of love and argue that ἔρως should be seen as a collection of symptoms, and that symptoms can be metonymous. Chapter 2 will look at the metaphorical conceptualisation of
ἔρως as fire and argue that it is not merely imagery but structures the emotion. Chapter 3 will explore two conceptualisations of ἔρως which complement one another: disease and madness. Chapter 4 will explore the most pervasive non-symptom based metaphorical conceptualisation: ἔρως as an opponent. Chapter 5 will look at ἔρως and vision and chapter 6 at internal psychological entities relevant to the operation of ἔρως. Chapter 7 will detail an ontology of ἔρως or how the existence of the emotion is conceptualised metaphorically in the Greek Novel. The final chapter will look at ἔρως in relation to other emotions, and define a prototypical scenario of the emotion and any alternative scenarios. Throughout all of these chapters I will look at the interaction of folk and expert models and analyse how extensive metaphors of ἔρως are in the conceptualisation of other emotions.
Chapter 1 – The Erotic Syndrome

Symptoms have always been an important part of the study of emotion in Greek literature, and recent works which engage with the Greek Novel are no exception. Maehler names his article on erotic correspondences between the Greek Novel and the Greek Anthology ‘Symptome der Liebe’ and Toohey gives an important place to symptoms in his extensive survey of lovesickness.\(^67\) Calame states that (usually) ‘in ancient Greece, the effects of love are portrayed…in terms of their physiological aspects’.\(^68\) Furthermore Liviabella Furiani has written extensively on non-verbal communication in the Greek Novel, studies which make extensive use of symptoms and behaviour.\(^69\)

I wish to use this chapter to make two points concerning symptoms. The first is that there are no symptoms which are unique to \(\epsilon\rho\omicron\omega\zeta\). This is interesting in light of Ekman’s exploration of which emotions are associated with a specific facial expression and which are not. I have therefore titled this chapter the ‘erotic syndrome’: \(\epsilon\rho\omicron\omega\zeta\) involves a specific collection of symptoms with some more prototypical than others.\(^70\) However, since many of these symptoms are associated with other emotions there is a further complexity: some symptoms may not be directly representative of \(\epsilon\rho\omicron\omega\zeta\) per se, but of another emotion which is erotically motivated. Second I will argue that metonymy is particularly important in the case of symptoms: they can also represent the emotion in terms of the part for the whole

\(^{67}\) See Maehler 1990. In the introduction to the volume Hofmann states that ‘Maehler traces a number of (mainly physical) symptoms of love’. See also Toohey 1992 and 2004.

\(^{68}\) Calame 1992, 5.

\(^{69}\) See Liviabella Furiani 1996 and 1998. For further work on non-verbal elements in Greek literature see Lateiner 1995 and 1998 (which deals with the Greek Novel).

\(^{70}\) This also brings the study in line with modern studies of emotion. See Damasio 1995, 56: ‘it is the inevitable nature of syndromes to have a matrix, a shared essence of symptoms, and to have symptom variance around the edges of that essence.’ Konstan 2009, 1, also approaches \(\epsilon\rho\omicron\omega\zeta\) with this terminology: ‘we know its symptoms, for example: dry tongue, a hot flame in the marrow, ringing ears, clouded vision. Sappho's description of the syndrome...set the pattern for all of Greek and Latin literature.’
Both of these points can be illustrated with the blush. The significance of the blush is that the subject is experiencing αἰδώς (shame). Therefore the blush is not a direct erotic symptom, although it is indicative of the erotic experience, but a signal of αἰδώς the emotion which is itself a constituent of the erotic scenario. Thus the blush is metonymous for αἰδώς, which itself can be constitutive of the erotic experience.

The symptoms analysed here can be roughly divided into two categories: physiological and behavioural. Physiological symptoms relate to processes or descriptions of the body, and behavioural symptoms relate to external interaction, such as actions or inactions. In some ways this division is artificial, but it will suffice as a structuring device. For the first part of this chapter I will concentrate on Longus’ *Daphnis and Chloe*, which invokes many erotic symptoms, before broadening the scope to the rest of the novels.

One of the stock features of ἔρως in Longus is an association with heat. When Daphnis and Chloe kiss and embrace one another they ‘become warmer’: θερμότεροι γενόμενοι (Longus 2.39.1). This is not necessarily a symptom of ἔρως (the increase in temperature could be due to the embrace) but the association of ἔρως with heat (or fire) is consistent (see below and the following chapter). Therefore the physiological reaction is coherent with the erotic syndrome. Here the two young lovers are ‘experimenting’ with love, and have also taken some wine mixed with their milk. Alcohol is also involved with heat and ἔρως in Chariton’s novel. While speaking about (and remembering) Callirhoe the satrap Mithridates is ‘heated up by wine and ἔρως’: θερμανθεὶς Μιθριδάτης οἴνῳ καὶ ἔρωτι. However, the physiological symptom cannot quite free itself from metaphor. The dative form indicates the instrument by which the reaction is achieved, and pairs a

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71 See Averill 1990, 119: ‘still, through the use of metonymy in common speech, we often allow presumed physiological responses to stand for the whole...in the process of abstraction and generalisation, we tend to forget that we are dealing with only a part, and we assume that what is true of certain physiological responses (e.g.visceral change) is also true of whole emotional syndromes.’

72 On blushing in Greek literature see Lateiner 1998.

73 It is important to note here that a behavioural symptom does not assume intention on the part of the subject. So I count sleeplessness and not eating as both behavioural symptoms, despite the fact that both can be ambiguous in terms of whether they are intended or not. So there is no absolute dichotomy between physiology as unintended reaction and behaviour as intended response.

74 Chariton 4.3.8.
concrete substance, wine, with an abstract one, ἔρως. ἔρως is therefore concretised as an instrument. Both ἔρως and alcohol cause the same type of reaction, and in turn reinforce one another. In the first example Daphnis and Chloe embraced and kissed. Earlier in the novel Daphnis and Dorcon compete in a debate for a kiss from Chloe. Daphnis wins and receives the kiss, and we are told that it is one which can warm up even the ψυχή: πάνυ δὲ ψυχὴν θερμᾶναι δυνάμενον (Longus 1.17.1).\textsuperscript{75} This time we have a metaphorical description of the emotional effect of the kiss. Gill translates this as ‘quite capable of setting a heart on fire’ and takes it as a reference to the conceptualisation of ἔρως as fire (see next chapter).\textsuperscript{76} It certainly evokes this concept, but the specificity of the ψυχή as locus evokes a Platonic correspondence. In the Phaedrus the lover viewing the beloved is described as becoming ‘warm’, θερμότης/ἐθερμάνθη, and sweating before his soul sprouts feathers (251b). The close proximity of warmth and the ψυχή in Plato’s dialogue lends an intertextual resonance to the passage in Longus.

The kiss and heat also occur in Heliodorus. Cnemon realises that his stepmother Demaenete’s affection is inappropriate when he perceives her kisses are ‘warmer than is fitting’: θερμότερα ἦν τὰ φιλήματα τοῦ πρέποντος (Hld.1.9.3).\textsuperscript{77} Whether the warmth here is literal or metaphorical (indicating the intensity of the kisses) is difficult to say, and there is probably an element of both present. However, the significance of the description is that it is metonymous. The increased warmth of the kisses indicates ἔρως rather than motherly affection. Therefore there exists an ambiguity about whether the description of ‘heating’ refers to body temperature or is metaphorical of the intensity of the emotion: or it could refer to both simultaneously.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} It suffices here to say that the heating of the body is moved specifically to the entity most associated with the emotion, the soul or ψυχή: synecdoche. A later chapter will explore more fully the significance of the different internal organs and entities which erotic sensations are attributed to.\textsuperscript{76} See Reardon 1989, 296.\textsuperscript{77} The story of Demaenete and Cnemon conforms to the Hippolytean paradigm, or more famously the Potiphar’s wife paradigm.\textsuperscript{78} This heating is paralleled by some examples from emotion in English. Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 196–7, note that the folk model of anger in American English involves an increase in heat, with intensity of heat mapping onto intensity of the emotion. They also note that results from experiments in psychology show that when people experience anger their temperature and pulse rate both rise (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 219). This evidence comes from Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen 1983.
There are two interesting references in Longus which appear to run contrary to the association of ἔρως and heat. At 1.17.1 Chloe’s kiss was capable of raising the temperature of the ψυχή but also had the opposite effect on Daphnis. He reacts not as if kissed but bitten, δηχθείς, and σκυθρωπός (looking sad) he feels cold and has a palpitating καρδία: καὶ πολλάκις ἐψύχετο καὶ τὴν καρδίαν παλλομένην κατεῖχε (Longus 1.17.2). The striking word here is ἐψύχετο: ‘to utter a breath’ or ‘be cold’. This is not consistent with the notion of ἔρως being warmth. However, this image can still fit in with the schema advanced above in a certain way. Πολλάκις indicates to us that this affliction occupies a certain period of time after the kiss. The description is not of the instantaneous occurrence of the kiss but the aftermath. It is as if the instant warmth of the kiss creates a necessary absence in which Daphnis feels cold. This same image is brought up when Philetas lists the effects of his desire for Amaryllis. He felt pain in his ψυχή, his καρδία palpitated and his body felt cold: Ἡλγουν τὴν ψυχήν, τὴν καρδίαν ἐπαλλόμην, τὸ σῶμα ἐψυχόμην (Longus 2.7.5). If this effect refers to a surge of cold which follows the initial sensation of heat, then Longus is adding a subtlety to the erotic syndrome not seen in the other Greek Novelists. As the heat of the summer and ἔρως enflames Daphnis he keeps plunging into rivers to cool himself down (the implication is that it is to no avail). This is different, however, in the sense that he is trying to cool his internal heat, not experiencing an internal drop in temperature itself.

This concept occurs in several famous passages from previous Greek literature. In Sappho 31 the first person narrator obliquely describes the effects of sitting close to the object of their desire, by stating what would be the result of close proximity. The narrator feels a hot flush (10), and then cold sweat runs down them, μ’ ἴδρως ψῦχρος κακχέεται (31.13). The order of reaction in Longus is consistent with Sappho, where an initial flush is followed by a cooler sensation. This

79 Longus 1.23.2.
80 The literary influences on Longus’ erotic portrayal have been well documented elsewhere: see particularly Bowie 2004, Chalk 1960 and Hunter 1983, 73–5.
81 The hot flush is actually described metaphorically as fire running underneath the skin, χῦλι πῦρ ὑπαδεδρόμηκεν.
means that although Longus does not mention sweat, it could be understood as being present. The regulation of the body reacts to the heat of ἔρως by sweating and causing a subsequent cooling.\textsuperscript{82} Theocritus’ Simaetha reacts to the appearance of her lover in the same way. She feels colder than snow in her whole body as the sweat drips from her: πᾶσα μὲν ἐψύχθην χιόνος πλέον (2.106).\textsuperscript{83} Both these prior passages contain the same concept as in Longus, a cold sensation inside, and so it would not be unreasonable to understand sweat as causing internal cooling. The physiological reaction is of interest here. The heating up of the body due to ἔρως is cooled in turn by sweating.\textsuperscript{84} Both references explicitly connect coolness and sweat, and as literary forebears they may influence the entries in Longus, but it is important that this concept is used alongside and is complementary to the heat imagery discussed above. There is a slightly different effect generated by Pindar’s famous verses on Theoxenus. Anyone who does not melt with warmth when looking at the youth has a καρδία fashioned out of adamant or iron with a ‘cold flame’: ὃς μὴ πόθῳ κυμαίνεται, ἔξ ἀδάμαντος ἀ διάφορον κεχάλκευται μέλαιναν καρδίαν ψυχρὰ φλογί (fr.123.5-6).\textsuperscript{85} The flame is ostensibly part of the blacksmith metaphor, yet its designation as ‘cold’ draws it into antithesis with the notion of heat associated with someone who ‘swells with desire’ (4). The point Pindar is making is that lack of passion is a cold flame, one that lacks the physiological effects. The concept of fire is not used only because it supports the

\textsuperscript{82} Clerk 2008, 266, claims that sweat results from internal fire in her study of Greek and Latin erotic poetry: ‘it is this internal fire that generates the sweat that betrays erotic emotion to an external observer’. She finds sweat as a common indicator of amor in Latin elegy but maintains that heat is the pervasive internal sensation, not coolness (266-7). She connects this with the heat of sexual excitement.

\textsuperscript{83} For a selection of other references to sweating in erotic contexts see Pl. Phdr.251b, 254c; Sappho 31.13; Thgn.1017.

\textsuperscript{84} Sweat can be generally indicative of an emotional state. At A.R.1.1261-2 Heracles sweats and the black blood boils within him, when he finds out that his ‘close friend’ Hylas is missing. The next line confirms the fact that he is angry, χωόμενος, but we cannot rule out the sweat also signifying general anxiety. In the Greek Anthology sweat accompanies shaking through fear (14.92.9), and we cannot rule out that Heracles might also feel fear on behalf of his companion. Physiological symptoms are terse ways of indicating complex emotional responses. When Calasiris talks to Chariclea about converting her ‘malady’ into matrimony (translation by Morgan in Reardon 1989, 435), she begins to perspire (Hld.4.11.1). The narrator then goes on to tell us that she was feeling multiple emotions – specifically joy, anguish, and shame. These emotions are all elicited because of her erotic state. Later on in the novel there are multiple emotions associated with sweat in a non-erotic context. Persinna reads the band revealing that Chariclea is her daughter, and she trembles and sweats, feeling joy at her return and fear for her husband’s reaction (Hld.10.13.1).

\textsuperscript{85} On this verse see especially Hubbard 2002.
image of blacksmithery, but because it also evokes the very intensity of emotion which is absent from the ‘hard hearted’. In Pindar heat corresponds to a high intensity of emotion and cold to a low level.

It seems that in Longus heat and coolness indicate different parts of the emotional process. Heat is most commonly associated with ἔρως, but Longus utilises coolness to create a paradoxical experience. Pindar is utilising a polarity between heat and coolness, each signifying respectively desire and lack of. Longus, in line with precedents like Sappho, evokes a more complex physiological process by adding in the subsequent cooling to the heat. If we were to go further we might say that sweat provides the physiological role in the change of state, as it cools the body down in reaction to the heat. Heat corresponds to a sudden increase in intensity of ἔρως and the coolness is dependant upon the initial heat. Coolness is often achieved by sweating, which the Greeks knew was related to thermoregulation.⁸⁶

From internal sensation we may now turn to external skin complexion. An increased flow of blood to the skin causes redness, or blushing.⁸⁷ Although skin colour is a physical symptom it can also be metonymous, since it is an external signal of an internal feeling.⁸⁸ The blush is primarily a signal of αἰδώς, as when Daphnis stands embarrassed in front of his master.⁸⁹ When Daphnis is near Chloe he wants to look, but blushes every time he does so: ἐρυθήματι ἐπίμπλατο (Longus 1.17.2). Blushing is described metaphorically here (filled with redness). Daphnis is feeling αἰδώς, but the only reason he is feeling it is because he is in a state of ἔρως for Chloe. This symptom represents one emotion as part of the overall emotional experience of another. Two emotions converge in erotic αἰδώς, and so an erotic

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⁸⁶ Theophrastus says that sweating occurs because of an increase in body temperature (On Sweat 36.226-30 F).

⁸⁷ See Damasio 1995, 135: ‘the baseline activity of smooth muscles in artery walls may increase, and produce contraction and thinning of blood vessels (the result is pallor); or decrease, in which case the smooth muscle would relax and blood vessels dilate (the result is flushing).’ See also Lateiner 1998, 165-7, who distinguishes the flush, which is the rush of blood to the head and limbs, and the blush, which is a flush triggered by specific contexts. He points out that ἐρυθρός indicates only the observable colour without determining the cause (166). I will use the term ‘blush’ in this study since my references involve αἰδώς.

⁸⁸ Colour is a complicated notion, and no part of my argument rests on the words used signifying a particular hue. See Lloyd 2007, 9-22 for a good summary of current issues pertaining to colour perception. Lateiner 1998, 174, says that ‘blushing is one mode of accidental self-declaration’.

⁸⁹ Longus 4.14.2: he does not speak, is filled with ‘red’, i.e. blushes, and looks down. All these are prototypical examples of αἰδώς.
symptom is not necessarily only an erotic symptom. Later on in the novel Daphnis is required to stand in front of his master, Dionysophanes, and his awareness of the social disparity between them causes him to blush and look down: ἐρυθήματος πλησθεὶς ἔνευσε κάτω (Longus 4.14.2). What is interesting about the two Longus examples above is that they contrast in terms of the social context. Daphnis is embarrassed in front of his master because he is aware of the disparity in status. However, this disparity in status is lacking when he is alone with Chloe. Also lacking is any consciousness that there might be social obstacles to their ἔρως or that ἔρως is something to feel αἰδώς about. Daphnis has no reason to feel αἰδώς in front of Chloe other than because of awareness of his own ἔρως.

If blushing prototypically designates αἰδώς then perhaps pallor is erotic. In Longus the colour of someone affected by ἔρως is pale green/yellow: χλωρός. This can be a successful signal of internal ἔρως. Dionysophanes apprehends that his son Daphnis feels ἔρως, because of his pale colour. Chloe’s name evokes this description, and also perhaps her freshness or greenness. Daphnis is also pale earlier in the novel through his feelings for Chloe, ‘paler than grass’, a phrase which recalls Sappho’s description from poem 31. Previously the colour is used in relation to fear. Aristotle says that the blush is prototypical of shame and pallor of fear. In Homer’s Iliad characters turn χλωρός through fear.

We know that pallor is seen in some way as an opposite to blushing, because the two are deliberately contrasted in Longus. Chloe alternates between turning pale, ὁχρία, and blushing in her love for Daphnis. The verb ὁχριάω means ‘to turn pale’ and is cognate with the adjective ὁχρός. This is not the same term as

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90 Lateiner 1998, 176, states that shame is often indicated by the lowering of the eyes.
91 See Lateiner 1998, 167, that shame involves ‘an awareness of exposure to social censure’.
92 Longus 4.31.1: ὁρῶν αὐτὸν χλωριῶντα. Of course context always helps!
93 Longus 1.17.4: χλωρότερον τὸ πρόσωπον ἢν πόας. Sappho’s narrator turns more χλωρός than grass: χλωροστέρα δὲ ποίας (31.14).
94 Aristotle EN 1128b10-35.
95 II.10.376, 15.4. Fear itself, δέος, is χλωρός at II.7.479. See also the English expression ‘pale with fright’.
96 Longus 1.13.6: ὁχρία τὸ πρόσωπον, ἐρυθήματι αὐθις ἐφλέγετο.
χλωρός, but it too denotes a pale complexion. We can link it with the former hue by noting that it too can be used to denote fear. If we relate this change in skin colour to the aspects of process and state, and the notions of hot and cold seen before, the symptoms become coherent. έρως can lead to a blush; a temporary signal in the face of the emotion. Subsequently the subject may turn pale as with Chloe’s alternating between pallor and redness in Longus. Sappho listed her (potential) symptoms as blushing before trembling and turning pale. Pallor can, however, be of what seems like a longer duration. For instance in Chariton’s novel Mithridates, the Persian satrap, returns home pale (ὠχρός) and thin after seeing Callirhoe. This implies a state he has settled into: that of lovesickness. Hippocrates associates the colour with illness. The skin of children with a fever, πυρετός, often changes complexion to χλωρός.

The colour is linked to emotion in a negative way, representing the physiological effects of fear or debilitating conditions. Although it functions as a successful communicator of ϭόως in Longus, it is far from being an ϭόως-specific indicator. It is a signal of an internal debilitation, and covers a larger category of which ϭόως is a part.

In Sappho 31 heart palpitations is one of the erotic symptoms. Philetas describes one of his erotic symptoms as ‘heart palpitations’: τὴν καρδίαν ἐπαλλόμην. The καρδία is the heart, and the description seems to be referring to the increased pumping of the heart under emotional duress. It can also be metonymic of ϭόως. The pervasiveness of this appearance of metaphor can be

97 The adjectival form ϝχρός is used of a frog at Batr.81. This is also assumed to be a sign of ϭόως at Theocr.14.6. There does not seem to be a significant distinction between χλωρός and ϝχρός.

98 Il.3.35 has a description of the effects of fear on skin hue: ϝχρός τέ μιν εἷλε παρειάς.

99 Chariton 4.2.4: ϝχρός τε καὶ λεπτός.

100 Hp. Prog.24.

101 The verb used of the heart shaking, ἐπτόασεν, means ‘to scare’ or ‘to cause to flutter’, and implies personification or beastification of the organ (Sappho 31.5-6). Later authors use this as one of the symptoms of ϭόως. See especially Anac.346 (1); A.R.1.1232; E. I. A. 586; Call.1.c; Pl. Phdr.255c–d; Sappho 31.5; Thgn.1018.

102 Longus 2.7.5. Chloe’s kiss causes Daphnis’ heart to palpitate (Longus 1.17.2). It is the anatomical depiction which can represent ϭόως. The trembling/swaying of the body in general represents fear: see for example Ach.Tat.2.23.3; 2.23.5; Hld.4.18.1. Perhaps the ‘swaying’ of the καρδία indicates fear as a momentary emotion experienced under the state of ϭόως, but it could be merely a general indicator of emotional duress. The description denotes fear at Il.22.452, referring to the ἦτορ, the κῆρ (κέαρ) at A.Ch.410, and the καρδία (κραδίη) at Il.22.461.
seen in another symptom experienced under ἔρως: breathlessness. Daphnis’ breath leaps out at Chloe’s kiss: ἐκπηδᾷ μου τὸ πνεῦμα (Longus 1.18.1). His breath is personified and again the symptom is described metaphorically.

The most prevalent physiological effect of ἔρως in the Greek Novel is pain. Pain has a significance which goes beyond most of the other symptoms in that it appears in one of the most influential accounts of how the emotions operate in a social context: Aristotle’s Rhetorica. His postulation there is that the emotions, or rather πάθη, are accompanied by pain and pleasure: λύπη and ἡδονή (Rh.1378a20-3). In the introduction I listed cases where ἔρως in the Greek Novel is classified as a πάθος, and it can be accompanied by pleasure and pain also. The pleasure of ἔρως is an actuality in the Greek Novel, but a rarer one, because although the most important ἔρως thematically is the fulfilled ἔρως of the main couple, the most frequent paradigm is that of frustrated ἔρως. Therefore pain appears far more often. In this case it fits quite well into an Aristotelian model: you are pained at unfulfilled ἔρως and pleased by fulfilled ἔρως. However, there is a complication, in that λύπη is often translated as grief and used in contexts of grief. There is a conceptual continuity between the two emotions. When one has frustrated ἔρως one does not have possession of the beloved. This is true of grief also, and we often see erotically motivated instances of grief such as when Chaereas laments his (believed) dead wife (Chariton 1.6).

In Daphnis and Chloe two Greek terms are used of emotional pain: ἄλγος and λύπη. The first term denotes primarily a physical sensation. Chloe conceptualises the first pangs of ἔρως as an ἄλγος, but is perplexed that she has no

103 Also at Longus 1.32.4: καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα ποτὲ μὲν λάβον ἐξέπνει. Blushing similarly involves the metaphor of ‘filling’ (Longus 1.17.2).
104 Fortenbaugh 2007 notes that hate, μῖσος, occurs without pain in Aristotle’s analysis (33).
105 I do not use the word unrequited because the emotional response of the object of desire is not always required. See the numerous pirates, who would quite happily fulfil their ἔρως without the consent of the object of their affection.
106 Konstan 2006, 245-6: ‘words based on the root alg-, such as algoς and algēdōn (cf. English ‘analgesic’), refer principally to physical pain, and indeed the Epicureans and Stoics, in the generation after Aristotle, adopted algēdōn rather than lupē as the term for the strictly corporeal sensation’.
wound causing it: ἀλγω, καὶ ἐλκος οὐκ ἔστι μοι (Longus 1.14.1). In this example the pain is a state and constant, as one would expect from a wound. Λύπη, on the other hand, has a more emotional register. Chloe conceptualises it as the feeling she would get from losing one of her flock: λυποῦμαι, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν προβάτων ἀπόλωλε μοι (Longus 1.14.1). Here λύπη is the grief of (permanent) separation. However, she feels λύπη for Daphnis, who is there, and so it cannot just refer to grief in terms of the separation of lovers. She feels the kind of pain for Daphnis that would normally be there for the separation implied by grief. ἀλγος can also be a subsection of the emotion grief. Daphnis and Chloe both feel ἀλγος at being apart, ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐλαγουν (Longus 1.22.4). Pain is a commonplace for unfulfilled ἔρως, of whatever kind, whether it is Daphnis and Chloe’s inability to consummate their love or Dorcon’s pain at his rejection (Longus 1.17.2). Λύπη is also an aspect of jealousy, erotic or otherwise. When the other men pay attention to Chloe Daphnis is ‘hurt’: Δάφνις δὲ ἐλυπεῖτο (Longus 2.2.2). One final point of interest is that λύπη can be chronic rather than merely acute. The two young lovers feel grief throughout the night: νύκτας τε ἀγρύπνους διῆγον καὶ λυπηρὰς (Longus 3.4.2).

We can label ἀλγος and λύπη as pain with the physical and emotional resonances of the English term. Pain can be caused by an external concrete object such as a thorn, or it can be emotionally caused, e.g. ‘a pain in my heart’, but the distinction between the two in terms of sensation is blurred. In Longus the similes

107 It is expressed as a common place by Daphnis and Chloe at Longus 2.8.2: ἀλγοῦσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς. ‘Lovers feel pain, and so do we’. Other references to ἀλγος as erotic pain are Longus 2.7.5 and 2.8.3.
108 Pain can be felt by both parties at the same time. Daphnis and Chloe’s ψυχαί are ‘contracted’ through λύπη: τὰς τε ψυχὰς συνεστάλησαν ὑπὸ λύπης (Longus 2.8.1). Lycaenon, the seductress of Daphnis, feels sympathetic pain with the two lovers over their plight: Συναλγήσασα δὴ τοῖς ἀθλίοις (Longus 3.15.5). The erotic connotations of this concept hint at Lycaenion’s own ‘love pangs’ for Daphnis. An opinion expressed in Heliodorus (by Arsace) states that the lover feels the beloved’s pain more keenly than their own (Hld.8.9.21).
109 As Chloe was before him (Longus 2.2.1). Four of the instances of the λύπη of jealousy are erotic (the two examples above and Longus 3.25.4; 3.24.4). The final example is not, where Dionysophanes asks his son Astylus not to be ‘aggrieved’ at his new found brother Daphnis: μήτε σὺ λυπηθής (Longus 4.24.3). I feel that the best emotional interpretation of this verb is as the (potential) jealousy of siblings.
Chloe uses are ‘natural’ ones. They are the basic experiences with which she wishes to compare her emotional pain. For her ἄλγος is the pain of being bitten and λύπη that of losing someone/thing. She is mapping the concrete onto the abstract in order to understand her emotional experience.

Behaviour is also something to be considered. The primary behavioural indicator of ἔρως is inactivity. Daphnis provides us with a set of examples. He sits around, is lazy and idle (ἀργός), and does not weave nor play his pipe.110 This is what we would recognise as melancholy behaviour.111 However, lack of action is again subsumed within the Greek love for paradox. Chloe also suffers from sluggishness, but she alternates this with bursts of energy. Now she lies down, now she leaps up: εἶτα ἐκάθευδεν, εἶτα ἀνεπήδα (Longus 1.13.6). In fact this leaping up probably signifies joy as a momentary emotion motivated by ἔρως. Elsewhere Daphnis leaps up for joy: ἀναπηδήσας ὁ Δάφνις περιχαρὴς (Longus 3.28.1).112 The description of Chloe seems to be almost that of a manic depressive; she alternates between motionless lying and hyperactivity. There is a complication with Daphnis and Chloe’s situation in that they spend all their time together (not a usual scenario with young lovers in the Greek Novel). Therefore their proxemic circumstance is akin to that of Sappho’s narrator and as we have seen above they share some of the acute symptoms with her. They merely lack the expertise to fulfil their ἔρως. Chloe’s contrasting reactions reveal a behavioural symptom which is consistent in the depiction of ἔρως. Lovers are listless and inactive, but where the object of their affection is concerned, they have a high level of concentration. Daphnis, once under the thrall of emotion, stares at Chloe as if he has been given eyes for the first time: ὡσπερ τότε πρῶτον ὀφθαλμοὺς κτῆσαμενος (Longus 1.17.3).113 So Chloe is sad because of her longing, her ἔρως, but she also has fits of joy because of her proximity to the object of her affection. Daphnis and Chloe’s reaction is presented as natural (despite the obvious artistry behind it). Other Greek

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110 At Longus 1.17.4 and 1.18.2.
111 They also have no concern for their daily tasks: Chloe neglects her flock (Longus 1.13.6) and both admit that lovers are traditionally without concern: ἀμελοῦσιν (Longus 2.8.2).
112 Compare the English expression ‘jumping for joy’.
113 Daphnis is also talkative only to Chloe (Longus 1.17.4.).
Novels can show a more complex social interaction. At Hld.3.10.4 we are told (in Calasiris’ narrative) that an ἔρως-afflicted Theagenes forces himself to be cheerful and sociable in front of his public, but then he looses concentration, stares into space and is gloomy before recollecting himself.\textsuperscript{114} He attempts to save social face, but is unable to completely master the leakage of his feelings.\textsuperscript{115}

One reaction to ἔρως which is not momentary but a state is a lack of appetite. Chloe and Daphnis are unable to eat due to their emotional state.\textsuperscript{116} Philetas cannot eat, drink, nor sleep (Longus 2.7.4). Lovers are wont to lie around inactively, but they do not get proper rest, as their emotional state prevents them from sleeping. These symptoms are caused by ἔρως, but they are not ἔρως-specific, and can be more widely seen as general signs of duress.

We can illustrate the conventionality and also the indirect relationship to ἔρως of these symptoms by a look at those which appear in the other novels. Sleeplessness and speechlessness are common erotic side affects in the novels.\textsuperscript{117} Blushing is really a signal of αἰδώς.\textsuperscript{118} Heliodorus tells us gnomically that blushing is one of the usual signs of lovers who are not yet ‘caught’ (Hld.8.5.1). This is still, however, a sign of αἰδώς stimulated by ἔρως. It also displays the introspective notion of αἰδώς more akin to our guilt than shame. At Chariton 4.2.13 Mithridates hears the name of Callirhoe mentioned and blushes. This is explicable on the grounds of Heliodorus’ gnome. His desire for Callirhoe is secret and therefore he blushes with knowledge of what we might call inner guilt.

As was stated above pallor is the opposite of blushing, or at least in opposition to it, and often alternates with it. Achilles Tatius’ hero Clitophon turns alternately pale and red because of the proximity of the object of his desire, Leucippe

\textsuperscript{114} Calasiris says that he appeared to be full of ‘anguished gapping’: ὡς δὲ καὶ χάσμες ἀδημονούσης ἀνάπλεως ἐφαίνετο (Hld.3.11.1).
\textsuperscript{115} Therefore Heliodorus (or rather Calasiris) states that the mind of the lover is like a drunkard: emotional and unstable (Hld.3.10.5).
\textsuperscript{116} Longus 1.13.6, 1.17.4.
\textsuperscript{117} Sleeplessness: Chariton 2.4.6; 4.2.8; 6.1.8 all of males. At Hld.3.7.1 Chariclea is in bed but tossing restlessly. At a loss for words: Chariton 2.5.4; 4.1.9; 5.5.9. Again this is an erotic association which is based on other emotions. Callirhoe is speechless from αἰδώς at 8.1.15 and Clinias from grief at Ach.Tat.1.1.2.
\textsuperscript{118} Bushing as a sign of αἰδώς in the novels: Chariton 2.5.5; 2.7.5; 3.2.3; 5.3.8; 6.3.1; Ach.Tat.1.10.4; 4.17.5; 5.19.6; Hld.2.7.1; 3.17.1; 4.10.4; 4.18.2; 5.34.2; 6.9.4; 10.18.2; 10.24.2.
In terms of skin colour this swift alteration is the surest signal of ἔρως in the novels. Mithridates provides the unambiguous example as he turns pale through ἔρως for Callirhoe, and his pallor and loss of weight is obviously an ἔρως-induced state in the absence of the object of his desire (Chariton 4.2.4). However, like most other erotic symptoms pallor is used of other emotions in non-erotic situations. Chaereas is ωχρός from grief at Chariton 3.4.4, and the depiction of the girls in the painting at the beginning of Achilles Tatius shows them as pale in regard to their faces, πρόσωπον, with the emotional label of a mixture of joy and fear: χαρά and φόβος (Ach.Tat.1.1.7). It is even more difficult to distinguish the emotions indicated by Clitophon turning pale and blushing when he reads Leucippe’s letter, revealing to him that she is not dead but very much alive (Ach.Tat.5.19.1). The narrator claims it is the simultaneous result of surprise, disbelief, joy and sadness. Pallor then seems to be an indicator of a negative emotion: grief, fear, or ἔρως. Sweat is of course not an exclusive indicator of emotion, but when it is emotionally motivated, it is predominantly used of ἔρως. Once again Mithridates provides the prototypical case. When he hears Callirhoe’s name mentioned he blushes, breaks into a sweat and sheds a tear (Chariton 4.2.13). These multiple symptoms almost certainly indicate multiple emotions: αἰδώς and perhaps fear and grief. When Chariclea sweats at Hld.4.11.1, we cannot restrict her emotional reaction to ἔρως. Calasiris interprets her emotions as joy, anguish, and shame. Despite the potential unreliability of the narrator I feel that there is no reason to mistrust his attribution to Chariclea of a complex emotional experience. Sweat also appears connected with multiple emotions later on in the same novel, when Persinna recognises the band

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119 Clinias is pale, perhaps from grief, when his beloved informs him that his father intends to marry him off (Ach.Tat.1.8.1). Callirhoe is pale at Chariton 6.7.6 when she realises what the eunuch is taking her aside for (to inform her of the Persian King’s desire). The ekphrastic description of Andromeda in a painting at Ach.Tat.3.7.3 shows her turning pale and red from fear and beauty, so it is difficult to assign specific emotions to the change in colour.

120 It is not even clear if there is blushing in the example. The narrator Clitophon says that he ‘flared up’: ἀνεφλεγόμην. For numerous examples that this metaphor refers to internal psychological sensation, see the following section on Fire imagery. Perhaps, however, its combination with pallor, ὥχριον, means that it is to be taken as referring to complexion.

121 Εθαύμαζον, ἠπίστουν, ἔχαιρον, ἠχθόμην.

122 The terms are χαίρουσα, ἀγωνιῶσα and ἐρυθριῶσα respectively. The second participle is metaphorical—emotion as an ἀγών or internal contest—and the third is a metonymical description of shame: turning red.
which reveals Chariclea as her long lost daughter (Hld.10.13.1). She trembles and sweats and the narrator ascribes her reaction to joy, perplexity and fear.\textsuperscript{123}

As in Longus emotional pain is rife throughout the other novels, and the most prominent instantiation of erotic pain is \textit{λύπη}. At Chariton 2.4.9 Leonas tells his master Dionysius not to feel \textit{λύπη} as if he were lacking the ability to achieve \textit{ἔρως}: \begin{quote}
\textit{μὴ ἔχε \textit{λύπην} ἄποτυγχάνων ἐν \textit{ἔρωτος} ἔξουσίᾳ.}
\end{quote}
The point is that he should not feel \textit{λύπη} as if the object of his desire is unattainable. The meaning here is actually cognate with grief, and is based around a shared notion of separation, permanent or otherwise. All other instances of \textit{λύπη} are part of the experience of unfulfilled \textit{ἔρως}.\textsuperscript{124} It can also be extended to erotic jealousy, where jealousy is proleptic of the loss of the attention of one’s object of desire. Dionysius is in pain, \textit{λύπη}, at the mass celebration of Callirhoe’s beauty as he knows that \textit{ἔρως} likes novelty: \textit{φιλόκαινος} (Chariton 4.7.6-7). He is worried at the thought of her leaving him or being taken away (jealous).\textsuperscript{125} When this worry about the object of affection is not seen, a different word is used. Xenophon of Ephesus’s Habrocomes is trying to fend off \textit{ἔρως}, but the god causes him pain unwillingly: \begin{quote}
\textit{ὠδύνα μὴ θέλοντα} (X.Eph.1.4.4).\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}
Habrocomes does not want to be in love, and so cannot be worried about any loss or absence of the affection of the object. When Xenophon does refer to \textit{λύπη} it is explicitly in terms of Habrocomes and Anthia’s unwillingness to be separated: \begin{quote}
καὶ τότε μὲν \textit{θύσαντες} ἀπηλλάττοντες \textit{λυπούμενοι} (X.Eph.1.3.3).
\end{quote}
The use of two different terms for emotional pain within a few paragraphs in Xenophon might reveal different nuances. The same emotional implication can be mapped onto examples from Heliodorus, such as when Demaenete feels pain (\textit{λύπη}) at the exile of Cnemon, the object of her \textit{ἔρως} (Hld.1.15.2). Calasiris tries to convince Chariclea to confess the source of her \textit{λύπη}, which, as he well knows, is her \textit{ἔρως} for Theagenes, who for the time being is separated from her (Hld.4.5.7).\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{123} The terms are \textit{χαίρουσα}, \textit{ἀμηχανοῦσα} and \textit{δεδοικυῖα}.
\textsuperscript{124} Chariton 2.7.4; 6.1.10; 6.6.8.
\textsuperscript{125} See also X.Eph.1.5.2-5, where Anthia’s jealousy over Habrocomes involves feeling \textit{λύπη}.
\textsuperscript{126} Also at X.Eph.1.4.6. The word \textit{ὀδύνη} can denote grief for someone (II.15.25).
\textsuperscript{127} And she feels \textit{λύπη} proper later on in the novel. When she is separated from Theagenes (fearing that he is dead or forever gone) a mist of \textit{λύπη} comes over her (Hld.6.9.1).
Ἄλγος on the other hand denotes emotional pain which can be metonymic of grief but does not always entail it. Demaenete explains to Thisbe that only once something is beyond hope can the heart cease to feel the pain (of regret).

Τὸ γὰρ ἀπελπισθὲν ἅπαξ ἐξῆρηται τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μηδαμόθεν ἔτι προσδοκώμενον ἀπαλγεῖν παρασκευάζει τοὺς κάμνοντας (Hld.1.15.3).

Whether we believe her gnomic utterance or not her assertion requires believability in its social context to be effective. Her pain is allegedly based on the premise that she still hopes for what she desires. Therefore she adds nuance to the conventional connection between pain and unfulfilled ἔρως: her ἔρως would have (allegedly) ceased if she could no longer obtain it. This assertion perhaps highlights a distinction between her ἔρως and that of the main couple, which would not end with the death of the beloved.128

Ἀνία also represents, like ἄλγος and ὀδύνη, the emotional pain of ἔρως. Thus Clitophon says to his friend Clinias that he cannot ‘bear the pain’ of having ἔρως for Leucippe, using the same metaphor as is common in English: ‘οὐ φέρω,’ λέγων, ‘Κλεινία, τὴν ἀνίαν’ (Ach.Tat.1.9.1).129 However, its complementary verb, ἀνιώμενος, designates an emotional experience in its own right: that of being aggrieved or distressed.130 It seems that like λύπη, ἀνία can be an emotional experience in its own right, that of distress.

In summary: many of these symptoms are obvious and clichéd, but I have taken the time to list them in full in order to make an important point. None of the symptoms of ἔρως listed above is only a symptom of ἔρως. Every symptom can be seen as something else, and many of these are obviously not reducible to ἔρως. But even the most direct signals we have signify ἔρως indirectly, by the medium of other emotions, such as blushing for αἰδώς or crying for grief. The only symptom which

128 On Theagenes and Chariclea’s love being different from the norm see Morgan 1989 and 1998. See also a discussion at greater length in the conclusion of this thesis.
129 Melite says similarly to him later on that she is ‘pained’ at Clitophon’s refusal to spend the night with her (Ach.Tat.5.14.1). For ἀνία as erotic pain see Hld.7.23.1.
130 Thus Clitophon is ‘pained’, ἀνιώμενος, when his and Leucippe’s rendezvous is interrupted by a noise (Ach.Tat.2.10.4). For this meaning with the verb, which indicates distress, see also Hld.1.17.5; 3.15.3; 8.12.1; 10.9.5.
seems to be exclusively erotic is concentration on the object of affection, but this is compatible with the wider schema of concentration upon the object of desire: if I desire a loaf of bread, then I might be expected to concentrate my attention upon it.\footnote{At Hdl.3.10.4 Theagenes pretends to be happy amongst his guests but cannot stop himself periodically being preoccupied: he changes mood quickly and his mind is unstable like that of a drunkard (see chapter on ontology). Eventually the company detect that he is unwell: \textit{οὐχ ὑγιαίνων} (see chapter on disease). Theagenes’ characterisation is more interesting because he attempts to control the symptoms of his \textit{ἔρως} for Chariclea but unsuccessfully. There is therefore ‘slippage’ and the emotion is signalled to his audience.}

\textit{Ἔρως} as a state is made up of various components, in particular various other emotional components. It is not merely a case of saying that the person is feeling another emotion while in the state of \textit{ἔρως}: this is a common enough occurrence. Daphnis and Chloe are in close proximity with one another constantly, and so it is the emotional state of \textit{ἔρως} which triggers their blushing, signal of erotic \textit{αἰδώς}, as a sort of ‘natural’ reaction. Physiological and behavioural symptoms of \textit{ἔρως} only allow us to study a segment of the emotional matrix. They underdetermine \textit{ἔρως} because they are symptoms not merely of \textit{ἔρως} but of other emotions and even debilitating conditions in general.
One of the most common metaphors for ἔρως throughout the Greek Novel is fire. Erotic desire is conceptualised as an internal flame which burns and torments its victim. This metaphor also fits in with our own conceptualisation of love or lust as an internal fire. The emotion as fire image in the Greek Novel is overwhelmingly constitutive of ἔρως, but there are several other emotions which use it. I will look at these in order to see how the image of fire is distributed and used for various emotions and how this relates to ἔρως. When an emotion is conceptualised as a fire there is not merely a representation of one image in terms of another, but the mapping of a process. The experiential knowledge of a fire, which can be started, flare up, slow down, or be extinguished, is mapped onto the experience of an emotion. It is perhaps not surprising that such a common metaphor is used universally. Everyone feels the fire of lust in the Greek Novel regardless of gender, race or character. That is not to say that everyone reacts in the same way, but that this particular conceptualisation of the emotion is consistent. Perhaps the heat of ἔρως provided the original basis for the metaphorical conceptualisation of erotic passion as fire, but the imagery of fire is well established by the time of the Greek Novel. At the same time fire is not merely a metonym for heat, but adds additional conceptual material. If a fire is burning in someone, then they necessarily feel hot, but if someone is hot, there is not necessarily a fire burning in them. Therefore the metaphor of a flame encompasses the notion of heat but is not a simple substitution for it.

The image of the flame in the Greek Novel is prolific and commonplace. When someone feels ἔρως then there is a sudden burst of flame inside them and

132 See Kövecses 2000, 26: LOVE IS FIRE—e.g. I am burning with love. He also identifies the same metaphor in Hungarian: Idővel majd elválik, hogy mi volt ez, fellángolás, vagy olyan érzelem, amire tartós kapcsolatot építhetnek—With time we will see what this was; a flare-up, or a feeling on which a lasting relationship can be built (140). This is an interesting correspondence as Hungarian belongs to the Finish-Ugrian family rather than the Indo-European. This example is the fire of lust rather than the love associated with a lasting relationship.

133 The references are numerous but for some examples see Ἀρ. Ἵλ. 9, κάομαι τὴν καρδίαν; Ηρμησιαν. 7.37, καίεσθαι τίνος; Πλ. 4.219, ἐν φρέσκει καιομένα; Πλ. Ἰγ. 783 a, ἔρως... ὑβρεὶ καύμενος; Σαφ. 48.2, ἔμαν φρένα καῦμεναν πόθων.
ἐρως is ‘kindled up’: ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ ἐρως ἀνεκαίετο (X.Eph.1.5.8).134 The container metaphor can also be used in conjunction with this image, where the burning is ‘in’ Habrocomes and Anthia: ὁ ἐρως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνεκαίετο (X.Eph.1.3.4).135 The flame is psychological and therefore conceived as internal to the person affected. The prefix ἀνά evokes the upwards direction of the flame as it comes into existence.136 This image can either denote the first experience of ἐρως, or a surge in the emotion during the state of experiencing it. Artaxerxes, the Persian King in Chariton’s novel, flares up in the middle of the night at the thought of Callirhoe: ἀνεκάετο (Chariton 6.7.1). This is also the meaning when Chariclea makes Theagenes promise not to make any advances upon her. The young couple are about to be left alone and she is worried that he might ‘flare up’ suddenly and make advances on her out of lust, as young men are wont to do: ἀναφλέγεται (Hld.4.18.5). The prefixes used add subtlety and nuance to the depiction of ἐρως as fire. Pelorus, a bandit, is burnt ‘through’ or ‘to excess’ at the sight of Chariclea, διακαίεται (Hld.5.31.2), and Demaenete is kindled ‘out from below’: ὑπεκκαίει (Hld.1.15.4). Ἐκ indicates the intensive burning of a flame, whether in the sense of ‘kindling up’ or ‘burning out’. There is certainly the idea of progressive intensification in Xenophon, where habitual exposure to the boy Habrocomes burns Corymbus steadily more and more: αὐτὸν ἡ πρὸς τὸ μειράκιον συνήθεια ἐπὶ

134 The verb denoting ‘kindling’ is καίω. The verb is in the passive with the person feeling the emotion as the subject: e.g. αὐτὸς ἐκάετο (Chariton 4.6.2); κάομαι (Longus 1.14.1).

135 For an extended discussion of the container metaphor see chapter 7 on the ontology of ἐρως.

136 Other examples of a verb denoting fire with the prefix ἀνά are: μᾶλλον ἀνεκαίετο (Xen.Eph. 2.3.3); ἀνακαόμενον (Hld.7.9.2); ἀνεφλεγόμην (Ach.Tat.5.19.1); ἀνεφλέγη τὴν ψυχήν (Ach.Tat.6.18.1); ἀναφλέγει (Hld.4.4.4).
πλέον ἐξέκαιε (X.Eph.1.14.7). 137 The lecherous Gnathon is kindled ‘out and besides’ with lust for Daphnis: προσεκκατὰθείς (Longus 4.16.1).138

There is a distinction between the two verbs seen above in that καίω means ‘to kindle’ and φλέγω means ‘to burn’. The verb φλέγω without any prefix is always used to indicate a state. When Dionysius returns home after seeing Callirhoe for the first time we are told that he is ‘already burning’: φλεγόμενος ἤδη τῷ ἔρωτι (Chariton 2.3.8). The fire of ἔρως is already lit and φλέγω denotes the state of burning.139 This verb is used consistently to represent the state of the emotion. Καίω can be used at any stage but with the prefix ἐκ indicates an increase in the amount of fire. This increase in volume is mapped onto intensity, and indicates that the internal flame is burning more fiercely.

These verbs mostly indicate the process of the emotion or rather the action. Other uses, of verbs or nouns, can emphasise something about the subject or object of the emotion. An example above from Xenophon of Ephesus specified the location of the fire by using the container metaphor (X.Eph.1.3.4). The prefix ἐν and the verb πίμπρημι, ‘to kindle’, also imply the container metaphor: τὸ γὰρ πῦρ ἐξεκαίετο (Chariton 1.1.8); ἐξέκαυσε (Chariton 1.3.7); ἐξέκαε (Chariton 2.4.4); ἐξέκαυσε (Chariton 3.1.8); ἐξεκάετο (Chariton 5.9.9). We also see in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus: ἐξέκασεν (Ach.Tat. 1.5.5); ἐξέκαε (Hld. 8.2.1). A less straightforward example involves Dionysius. When he sees Callirhoe weeping we are told that her tears ‘kindled his passion’: ἐξέκαε δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ δάκρυα (Chariton 2.4.4). If the tears are metonyms for grief, as they so often are in the novels, then we are left with the scenario of grief exciting lust in Dionysius. The other option is an extension of the concept of ἔρως to sympathy for one’s ‘beloved’, which could conceivably be true. If it is the character of Dionysius which prevents us from seeing this as lust, then I believe there is less of a problem. At 2.8 Chariton tells us that when Dionysius is struck by passion after Callirhoe’s kiss, he is frustrated, for ‘he could not use threats or force, since he was sure that she would prefer death to being violated’ (Goold). Hardly the sympathetic lover at this stage. Achilles Tatius has a digression on the attractiveness of tears in the eye at 6.7, but does continue to say that the person who feels ἔρως naturally feels pity at the tears of the beloved. Therefore we are left with a choice as to the interpretation of the passage. I would incline to treat Dionysius’ response as sexual excitement (lust), although the non-prototypical extension of the fire metaphor to sympathy is not out of the question.

137 With καίω this is the standard form in Chariton: τὸ γὰρ πῦρ ἐξεκαίετο (Chariton 1.1.8); ἐξέκααυσε (Chariton 1.3.7); ἐξέκαε (Chariton 2.4.4); ἐξέκααυσε (Chariton 3.1.8); ἐξεκάετο (Chariton 5.9.9). We also see in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus: ἐξέκαααυσεν (Ach.Tat. 1.5.5); ἐξέκαε (Hld. 8.2.1). A less straightforward example involves Dionysius. When he sees Callirhoe weeping we are told that her tears ‘kindled his passion’: ἐξέκαε ἰὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ δάκρυα (Chariton 2.4.4). If the tears are metonyms for grief, as they so often are in the novels, then we are left with the scenario of grief exciting lust in Dionysius. The other option is an extension of the concept of ἔρως to sympathy for one’s ‘beloved’, which could conceivably be true. If it is the character of Dionysius which prevents us from seeing this as lust, then I believe there is less of a problem. At 2.8 Chariton tells us that when Dionysius is struck by passion after Callirhoe’s kiss, he is frustrated, for ‘he could not use threats or force, since he was sure that she would prefer death to being violated’ (Goold). Hardly the sympathetic lover at this stage. Achilles Tatius has a digression on the attractiveness of tears in the eye at 6.7, but does continue to say that the person who feels ἔρως naturally feels pity at the tears of the beloved. Therefore we are left with a choice as to the interpretation of the passage. I would incline to treat Dionysius’ response as sexual excitement (lust), although the non-prototypical extension of the fire metaphor to sympathy is not out of the question.

138 This is also used of ἔρως at Plu. Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur 60f5.

139 All other uses of φλέγω in the novels show a state and not either an initiation of the emotion or an intense flaring up of it. In Achilles Tatius Satyrus asks Clitophon to give in to a Melite (already) burning for him, ἐλεῆσαι ψυχὴν ἐπὶ σοὶ φλεγομένην (Ach.Tat.5.11.4), and Melite herself asks Leucippe for a love philtre because she is burning: ἐμοὶ τοῦτο, ὦ φιλτάτη, φλεγομένη πάροσχε φάρμακον (Ach.Tat.5.22.3). In Chariton the Persian King lusts after Callirhoe, ἔκωσε Καλλιρόης φλεγομένος (Chariton 8.8.8), and in Heliodorus a symptom of Theagenes’ state is burning with desire: ύπο τοῦ πόθου φλεγεσθαι (Hld.3.17.3).
μάλλον ἐνεπίμπρατο (Chariton 5.2.7). In all the examples above the verb is passive when the person feeling the emotion is the subject. This fits in with the general scheme of an emotion as something which happens to one, not something which is done by one.

Chariton elaborates this basic schema. Dionysius is trying to struggle against his feelings for Callirhoe and thereby angers a theomorphised ἔρως. He brooks no opposition and kindles Dionysius’ ψυχή more violently because he is trying to philosophise against him: διὰ τούτο ἐπιφρόει σφοδρότερον ψυχὴν ἐν ἔρωτι φιλοσοφούσαν (Chariton 2.4.5-2.4.6). En marks ἔρως as the container and signifies the circumstances of Dionysius’ philosophising.\(^{140}\) Above ἔρως was seen in the dative denoting ‘agency’. This image retains the same concept but brings the personified emotion to the fore. The object on the other hand is specified as the person’s ψυχή. When Arsace uses the same verb in Heliodorus ἔρως itself is the fire. It is as if ἔρως is lit furiously from underneath with fresh wood: Ο μὲν ἔρως οὐκ ἀνίησιν ἀλλ’ ἐπιτείνει πλέον, ὡσπερ ἕλπη τῷ νέῳ λάβως ὑποπιμπράμενος (Hld.8.5.6).\(^{141}\) She cannot resist the flames when more and more fuel is being added to the emotion.\(^{142}\) The first part of this sentence describes the flames in terms of intensity: ἔρως does not relax but intensifies even more. The

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\(^{140}\) This also has the emotion as the container rather than the person afflicted. These issues, and how they relate to state and inception, will be explored more in the chapter on ontology.

\(^{141}\) This is paralleled by a description of Theagenes and Chariclea earlier in the novel. When they set eyes upon one another their passion is renewed and the sight becomes as if wood for the fire: ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἀντίβλεψις ύπόμνησις τοῦ πάσχοντος γίνεται καὶ ἀναφλέγει τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ θέα καθάπερ ὕλη πυρὶ γινομένη (Hld.4.4.4). The difference with Theagenes and Chariclea’s passion is that it is mutual. Another passage compares the person affected to a burning piece of wood see the following: θρέψας γὰρ ὅλης τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ πῦρ, ὡσπερ χρόνον ἀπελείφθη τῆς κόρης, ἀνεζωπύρησεν ἐξαίφνης ὕλην λαβὼς ὑποπιμπράμενος (Ach.Tat.6.18.2). It describes Thersander who was nourishing the fire through the night and rekindles it with more wood when he sees Leucippe. This shows the process of the slow burning and sudden flare up of the emotion clearly. A recent fragment of Lollianus (P.Oxy.4945) speaks of ἔρως in terms of adding fuel to the flames: ἔρως ὑπέκκαυμα.

\(^{142}\) If Arsace is in this situation then she is less to blame for her own emotions. She is emphasising the overwhelming power of the emotion: he is even using fresh wood to fan the flames. The concept is the same, but rhetorical strategy often determines which areas of the image are emphasised, in order to suit the person’s personal agenda.
increase in intensity of flame is mapped onto the increase in intensity of the emotion.\textsuperscript{143} See Pl.Lg.645d where the drinking of wine ‘intensifies’, ἐπιτείνει, passions such as ἔρως. However, the first part of this sentence manages to maintain the possibility of personification of the emotion. Demosthenes uses the verb ἐπιτείνω to mean someone insisting: ἔτι μάλλον ἐπέτεινεν (56.13.1).\textsuperscript{144} So the verb used allows ἔρως to be both a person and a fire.

This leads us to images which emphasise the emotion as entity rather than the action of the emotion. Dionysius rather weakly tells Leonas that he has brought fire into his house, but more so into his ψυχή: πῦρ ἐκόμισας εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, μάλλον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν (Chariton 2.4.7).\textsuperscript{145} Here ἔρως is not kindling the fire, but is the fire itself. The image of the fire can also be extended to represent the person who causes the emotion. The servant of the Great King in Chariton’s novel advises him to go off hunting, as it is better to be away than ‘near the fire (Callirhoe)’: ἕγγυς εἶναι τοῦ πυρὸς (Chariton 6.3.9).\textsuperscript{146} So ἔρως can be the fire lighter, the heat of an internal fire, or the heat from the object of affection, who is a source of fire.

There are several further variants among metaphors for fire. First we get a specification of the locus of ἔρως in Longus. Fire burns in Daphnis’ καρδία: ὡς τὸ κάσων πῦρ τὴν καρδίάν τὴν ἐμήν (Longus 3.10.4).\textsuperscript{147} Next we get an extension of

\textsuperscript{143} Jealousy or rather ζηλοτυπία, an emotion which has a close proximity to ἔρως, is also stretched at Hld.8.7.1: ἐπιτείνασα.

\textsuperscript{144} See also Aristotle where the two verbs appear. There is a a target towards which one looks and , having a purpose, tenses and relaxes: ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν (Arist.EN 1138b23). Here the person is metaphorically seen as a substance stretching and relaxing.

\textsuperscript{145} Another example is the erotic fire in Xenophon of Ephesus: παρέπεμπεν ἡμᾶς πῦρ ἐρωτικὸν (X.Eph. 3.6.2).

\textsuperscript{146} The idea of going hunting as a cure for love is an established one: e.g. see E.Hipp.215. There is, however, a certain irony about using this as a cure for love, as it is also a well established literary motif that love is hunting. See the chapter on vision for an extensive discussion. In this case going hunting only causes the King greater emotional turmoil, as he depicts her in his mind’s eye (Chariton 6.4.5): εἰς τούναντιν τὴν τέχνην περιέτρεψεν αὐτῷ καί ἀνίησιν (Arist.EN 1138b23). Here the person is metaphorically seen as a substance stretching and relaxing.

\textsuperscript{147} See also: τὸ πῦρ (Ach.Tat.5.25.6); πῦρ (Ach.Tat.5.26.10); θλιβόμενος τῷ πυρὶ (Ach.Tat.4.6.1). For the cognate verb ἐκ-πυρσεύω see Longus 1.15.1: μᾶλλον τὴν ψυχήν ἐξεπυρσεύθη. Melite uses extended fire imagery to try and solicit Clitophon (Ach.Tat.5.15.5-5.15.6). She calls her fire a mystical one, ὃ πυρὸς μυστικοῦ, that is to say one pertaining to the mysteries of Aphrodite: τὰ τῆς
the range of objects of the emotion, as Clitophon imputes the fire of ἔρως to animals: Ἡ γὰρ ὁ Ἠρως, ἐφη, τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὡς καὶ μέχρις ὀρνίθων πέμπειν τὸ πῦρ (Ach.Tat.1.17.1). He goes on to add reptiles, plants and even stones to the list. Clitophon is musing about ἔρως in order to make Leucippe ‘hot under the collar’, and his examples from the natural world are designed to show the all powerful nature of love. In another section Clitophon brings us back to the common association of ἔρως and wine, by explaining that the gods Eros and Dionysus work together to inflame the individual: ὁ μὲν καίων αὐτὴν τῷ συνήθει πυρί, ὁ δὲ τὸν οἶνον ὑπέκαυμα φέρων (Ach.Tat.2.3.3).148 Wine is the fuel for Eros’ lighter. The imagery remains coherent, but contextual elaboration can emphasise or diminish different aspects of the metaphorical schema. In the last few examples the object of the emotion has been emphasised over the action of the fire.

At this point we can begin to form a prototype for the metaphor of ἔρως as fire. The process of ἔρως as fire begins with the lighting or kindling of the human body, often by a personified ἔρως. Fuel is there already or can be added onto the pile, while the fire proceeds as a steady process (state) or flares up to greater intensity from time to time. It remains to discuss two entailments of the metaphor: the burning of the emotion at a low intensity and the extinguishing of the emotion. Both contingencies are provided for by metaphors in the Greek Novels.

The smouldering of emotion is not so common in the Greek Novel since for the most part passion flares up intensely. The most effective part of the image is that we know that smouldering embers are still very much active, and can potentially break out into a conflagration. In Chariton the Great King is one such person, in whom the fire of ἔρως slowly burns away: τυφομένου τοῦ πυρός (Chariton 6.3.3). This image fits the narrative at this point, as Callirhoe is not present, and the King is revealing his state to his servant (flare ups are more likely to be in the proximity of the beloved). Dorcon, having been fatally injured by the pirates, Ἀφροδίτης μυστήρια. 148 Eros personified who sets people on fire with his arrows is a stock image from earlier literature. In Apollonius Rhodius his missile lights up a fire under Medea’s κραδίη like a flame: βέλος δ’ ἐνεδαίετο κούρῃ νέφθεν ὑπὸ κραδίη φλογί εἰκελον (3.286-7).
revives a little of his former passion when he sees Chloe: ολίγον ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον ἔρωτος ἐμπύρευμα λαβὼν (Longus 1.29.1). He revives a small ἐμπύρευμα (a live coal covered with ashes) of his former desire. The flame does not rear up intensely, but nevertheless it is still burning. The final part of our schema is extinguishing the flame. We have far fewer examples of this than for the flaring up or kindling of ἔρως. This is probably due to the narrative context of the novels. The majority of characters in the Greek Novel experience unfulfilled ἔρως, either temporarily as one of the main couple or permanently as a love rival. Quenching the fire is an action associated with the fulfilment of ἔρως, and so a general lack of fulfilment gives rise to a general absence of this part of the metaphorical schema. When we get an image of extinguishing fire, it is potential and often propositional. Thisbe informs Demaenete that desire is ‘quenched’ at its first consummation: πολλαῖς γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην πεῖραν ἐναπεσβέσθη τὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας (Hld.1.15.8). This is in order to convince her to go ahead with her plan for wooing Cnemon (in reality it is a trap). Whether this is true or not this metaphor must be plausible for Demaenete, and so it is a valid way of conceptualising the erotic experience. If they cease to feel ἔρως, then they will feel that the ‘fire’ has been ‘quenched’. It is in this respect that the general Charmides in Achilles Tatius, who has fallen for Leucippe, asks Menelaus to extinguish the fire (an illocution for ‘procure Leucippe for me’): ἅψω πῦρ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους· ἄλλας δὰδας ὁ Ἔρως ἀνῆψε κατ´ ἐμοῦ· τοῦτο πρῶτον, Μενέλαε, σβέσον τὸ πῦρ (Ach.Tat.4.7.4).149 Extinguishing the fire is intrinsically linked to the consummation of desire. This image also brings us to another aspect of the metaphorisation of the object of the emotion. Charmides claims that Eros has used a torch as his instrument to set him on fire. Related to this is the view of the subject of the emotion. Charmides claims that Eros has used a torch as his instrument to set him on fire. Related to this is the view of the subject of the emotion.

149 Heliodorus manipulates the image further when Chariclea is at home lovesick for Theagene. Grief is one of the standard symptoms of lovesickness and Calasiris notes that the fire in her look was being extinguished by her tears as if by water: τὸ φλέγον τοῦ βλέμματος καθάπερ ὕδασιν ἐῴκει τοῖς δάκρυσιν ἀποσβεννύμενον (Hld.3.19.1). The fire in her eyes represents emotion, perhaps determination, and as always with metaphors of emotion it is probably multivalent. This determination in her eyes could reflect her pride which is being overcome by her grief. However, since fire is so prevalently an indicator of ἔρως, the author must at least be alluding to her state of internal passion. Thus Heliodorus cleverly manipulates the relationship between the physical properties of fire and water and the metaphorical nature of grief (tears) and ἔρως (fire).
In an example which highlights a process, Callirhoe recognises her beloved Chaereas, and she lights up more strongly as if she were an extinguished lamp which has had oil poured upon it: Καλλιρόη δὲ γνωρίσασα τὸν ἐρώμενον, ὡσπερ τι λύχνου φῶς ἣδη σβεννύμενον ἐπιχυθέντος ἐλαίου πάλιν ἀνέλαμψε καὶ μείζων ἐγένετο καὶ κρείττων (Chariton 1.1.15-1.1.16).\(^{150}\) This imagery relates forward to when Dionysius will refer to Callirhoe as a source of heat (see above). It also perhaps draws upon a tradition from erotic epigram which associates ἔρως and lamps.\(^{151}\)

We can see that many aspects of a fire are mapped onto the emotion ἔρως. Like the fire the emotion can be kindled, flare up, die down, slow burn, or be extinguished completely. This image of ἔρως as a fire is one of the most persistent and consistent in the Greek Novel. It may be that the image is linked to physiological symptoms, such as the heat felt by characters seen at the start of this section.\(^{152}\) However, the metaphorical mapping of fire onto ἔρως provides us with a way of understanding the process of an emotion, and different parts of the process of

\(^{150}\) In a reference which mixes abstract and concrete there is a light burning in Arsace’s room which also lights her ἔρως: ἄτε λύχνου φαίνοντος καὶ ὀνον συνεξάπτοντος τῇ Ἀρσάκῃ τὸν ἔρωτα (Hld.7.9.4). This night time lamp image has the additional benefit of context, as night time is particularly associated with the symptoms of ἔρως in the novels.

\(^{151}\) These instances can refer to a lamp at night by which the lover seduced the beloved in the past (AP 5.197=23G-P) or sits and wonders where the beloved is (AP 5.150=10G-P; AP 5.191=73G-P; AP 5.8=69G-P). The lamp can also be deified and requested to be a guardian or not to shed any light on the unfaithful beloved’s antics (AP 5.166=52G-P; AP 5.7=9G-P). In Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae Praxagora’s lamp is her confidant (7-18).

\(^{152}\) Longus often playfully contrasts external and internal conditions. First is the apparent paradox of a heat which emanates from inside the body and is not due to external factors (obviously meant to emphasise Chloe’s naivety). Thus Chloe is confused that she is at the same time burning and sitting in the shade: κάομαι, καὶ ἐν σκιᾷ τοσαύτῃ κάθημαι (Longus 1.14.1). In a similar way Daphnis and Chloe run into the river to stop their burning, unaware that it will do them no good: εἰς ποταμοὺς ἐνέβαινον ὡς καόμενος (Longus 2.7.5). This can be paralleled with the claim that Daphnis and Chloe are also enflamed by the season of year (as well as ἔρως of course): ἐξέκαε δὲ αὐτούς καὶ ἡ ὥρα τοῦ ἔτους (Longus 1.23.1). External conditions can either paralleled with internal feelings or be antithetical to them. In terms of metaphors of emotion this reflects a common theme in Daphnis and Chloe, that they conceptualise their emotions in terms of their own experiences. The later example of the reinforcement of sensation is the easiest to understand: the heat of the season works alongside the internal sensation of heat they feel due to ἔρως. In the antithetical examples the emphasis is not on the paradoxicality of the experience of ἔρως itself, although this can certainly be found elsewhere. It is on a development in Daphnis and Chloe’s recognition of themselves as emotional subjects. It is as if prior to ἔρως their body temperature was contingent upon the external environment: the sun heated them and the river cooled them. Now, however, their bodies are being regulated by emotion, and, due to their lack of understanding of emotion, they are confused by the whole process.
a fire burning are used to conceptualise the experience of the emotion. This process of kindling, burning and extinguishing represents the various stages of feeling the emotion and forms the prototypical scenario for this metaphor.

Ἐρως is not the only emotion to utilise the concept of fire. We have at least two other emotions which are used of fire. The first one is jealousy or ζηλοτυπία. A man in prison tells Clitophon the false story that Melite has had Leucippe murdered because she was ‘afame’ with jealousy: ἡ δὲ ύπο ζηλοτυπίας πεφλεγμένη (Ach.Tat.7.3.7.3). It is probable that the close conceptual proximity of ζηλοτυπία to ἔρως—characters in the Greek Novel who lust after someone are usually intensely jealous of any rivals—allows it to partake of the same conceptual metaphor. The second emotion which is conceived of as fire is anger: ὀργή. Melite says in a gnome that the fire of ὀργὴ is lit by rumour: ὀργῆς αὐτῷ πῦρ ἐξάπτεται (Ach.Tat.6.10.5.3). The only extended section on the fire of ὀργή is the twin torches of θυμός and ἔρως (Ach.Tat.6.19.1-6.19.7). Leucippe, a captive of Thersander, has rejected him and taunted him by saying that he can never have her unless he becomes her beloved Clitophon. The narrator then digresses to explain Thesander’s emotional reaction: he feels ἔρως and ὀργή, ἤρα καὶ ὠργίζετο (Ach.Tat.6.19.1). This passage is a philosophical explanation of psychology and involves a complex reaction featuring multiple emotions. However, it is important that this passage utilises the common folk model of fire, in the form of torches, as a basis for its psychology. Expert models often build upon folk models of emotion.

In light of previous Greek literature, it is surprising that there are not more references to the fire of anger in the novels. Most of the verbs we have seen above occur at one time or other as metaphors for ὀργή. This is also interesting in relation to English, where Lakoff and Kövecses have shown that the American folk model of anger makes use of the anger is fire metaphor.

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153 On this concept see particularly Konstan 2003.
154 This passage will be discussed at length in the chapter on the ψυχή and the καρδία.
155 Ἀνακαίω: Hdt.5.19.11; ἀναφλέγω: Pl.Ep.349a; Plu.Praecpepta gerendae reipublicae 798f6. See also Padel 1992, 116-117 on the numerous emotions in Tragedy which are conceptualised in terms of fire. These include in addition to the ones in the Greek Novel fear, A.Th.289-90, and hope, S.El.888. She claims that it is ‘supremely anger’ which fire denotes in tragedy.
There are two final examples of metaphorical fire in the Greek Novels which are not erotic, although they are certainly emotional, and both are found only in Heliodorus. The verb σμύχομαι denotes ‘smouldering’ and emphasises the state of the person afflicted. Cnemon’s father Aristippus tells Thisbe that he has been ‘smouldering away’ in the country and been suspicious of the matter for a while now: ὡς πάλαι γε σμύχομαι ἐν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα δι’ ὑποψίας ἔχων (Hld. 1.16.5.3-5). The verb is telling us something about his emotional state, and not just reinforcing the notion of suspicion seen in the conjoined clause. It can denote grief, as at A.R.3.762, where Medea is feeling the sadness symptomatic of lovesickness when deciding whether to help Jason with the contest or not. In fact the smouldering fire also implies pain, and this pain is a standard attribute of grief in the Greek Novel. So a quite plausible explanation is that Aristippus is ‘grieving away’ in the fields. Yet the suspicion would perhaps also incite anger, and this would be passable along conceptual lines. One thing it certainly is not is erotic desire. For grief we have previous evidence and also a further example in Heliodorus. Towards the end of the novel, after Chariclea has been revealed as his daughter, Hydaspes leads her to the sacrificial altar smouldering in his καρδία:

πλείον δὲ αὐτὸς πυρὶ τῷ πάθε τὴν καρδίαν σμυχόμενος (Hld.10.17.1). The

See Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 202-203. The following are some of their examples for the ANGER IS FIRE (their capitals) metaphor in American English: ‘those are inflammatory remarks’; ‘after the argument, Dave was smouldering for days’; ‘that kindled my ire’; ‘he was consumed by his anger’. They also note that the presumed physiological reaction to anger in English is a raise in body temperature, and that this can be seen in the common metaphor which sees anger as a hot fluid in a container (201). In the Greek Novel the verbs denoting heat are instead used for ἔρως, but this does not mean that they could not be used for anger. Of course in English love or lust can be a fire as well, and so we have the same conceptual overlap as the ancient Greeks.

LSJ take it as denoting ‘suspicion’ and Morgan’s translation is ‘for a long time now I have nursed smouldering suspicions’ (Reardon 1989, 367).

It also indicates the pain of passion when Medea sees Jason earlier on: κῆρ ἄχεϊ σμύχουσα (3.446). Apollonios masterfully takes advantage of the ambiguity of fire – grief or ἔρως – when he compares Medea to a bride grieving for her dead husband. The bride sits on her own burning inside: ἡ δ’ ἐνδοθεὶ δοιμείνη κηρ (3.661). Both are burning from grief, but Medea is also feeling ἔρως, and so the metaphor acts as a bridge between the narrative and simile. To add a further level to the image, it is explicitly stated that the bride has been deprived of the pleasure of her marriage, and so there is an erotic sense on her part as well.

As also in Theocritus, where the loser of the singing contest ‘smoulders’: ὡς δὲ κατεσμύχθη καί ἄντετρατε φέρετα λύπα (Theoc.8.90). He uses the same verb of love at 3.17. Cairns 2001, 23, says that emotions such as grief, anger and αἰδώς (not applicable here) can often be elements in a single emotional experience.
Ethiopian king Hydaspes is feeling grief at the imminent (although soon to be averted) death of his daughter. Both men are grieving away for their sorrows.

Grief thus completes our list of fire-related emotions in the novel. It is important to note that the conceptualisation of the emotion is related to its general effect. Grief is a slow and painful affliction and thus it smoulders away like internal embers.  Ἐρως can burn as well, but it is far more likely to flare up like a violent emotion. Anger is also the kind of emotion which ‘flares up’, given its long standing association with violent action. This is also perhaps why anger has such a heritage in Greek literature of being the burning of fire. It is perhaps the case that by the time of the Greek Novel the balance has shifted to the overwhelming prevalence of erotic fire imagery, although this could be contingent on the plot.

I would like to emphasise a few important aspects of the ἔρως as fire metaphor. It is not merely imagery but gives structure to the emotion. The various nuances of this structure are not just seen in ἔρως but in other emotions as well. In fact it provides so much conceptual structure that it has important consequences for how we view the structure of emotions in general. The fire metaphor might entail a certain type of ἔρως, which due to its frequency in the Greek Novel is certainly prototypical. That is to say different metaphorical conceptualisations might denote not just different aspects of ἔρως but different types: the fire of lust rather than love. I will return to this aspect of metaphor in the conclusion.

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160 It is certainly true that grief at bereavement can have violent reactions in Greek culture, such as the tearing of hair and beating of breasts, but in the Greek Novel there is also a longer state of sadness which the smouldering metaphor picks up.
Chapter 3 - Disease and Madness in the Greek Novel

Disease is one of the most important paradigms for ἔρως in the Greek Novel, and indeed in subsequent language and literature.\textsuperscript{161} Madness has received less attention, but it too plays a significant role in the Greek Novel’s presentation of psychology. Indeed emotions, diseases and madness could all be considered as members of the genus πάθος in ancient Greek thought, and so conceptualising ἔρως as a disease or madness is to some extent mapping within the same domain.\textsuperscript{162} It has long been stated that erotic affairs in the Greek Novel are more passive (in terms of the central characters at least), and do not descend into violence like the tragic depictions of classical Athens. With this in mind Toohey has made an important claim concerning ἔρως in ancient Greece. He divides lovesickness into two types, depressive and manic, and argues that the latter waned as the former waxed by the time of the Greek Novel.\textsuperscript{163} The problem with this definition is that it treats lovesickness and madness as merely symptoms of ἔρως, rather than metaphors, and correlates these metaphors with passivity and violence respectively. We can illustrate the limitations of this by looking at various characters in Greek Tragedy and the Greek Novel. Phaedra is one of the most striking examples of a woman affected by ἔρως in Greek literature, and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See Averill 1990 on the conception of emotions as diseases of the mind in the English language and psychology. For more references see the upcoming section on disease. Of course the English word disease originally had an emotional register, being formed from the old French des and aise and indicating discomfort or uneasiness. On ἔρως as a νόσος in the Greek Novel see Miralles 1977.
\item See the introduction on domain mapping and metaphor and metonymy as a continuum.
\item Toohey 2004, 61. Later on he cites the Ps.Aristotelian Problema 30.1 (Toohey 2004, 89). This states that melancholy is the product of black bile. When black bile is hot, it produces mania, and when cold, depression. Modern science also understands these as fundamentally different states. Damasio 1995, 147: ‘along with negative body states, the generation of images is slow, their diversity small, and reasoning inefficient; along with positive body states the generation of images is rapid, their diversity wide, and reasoning may be fast though not necessarily efficient’; ‘when negative body states recur frequently, or when there is a sustained negative body state, as happens in a depression, the proportion of thoughts which are likely to be associated with negative situations does increase, and the style and efficiency of reasoning suffer. The sustained elation of manic states produces the opposite result.’
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
her condition is described as both a disease and as madness. Both descriptions can aptly be applied to her at the same time because of two features: first, that madness itself is often conceived of as a νόσος (see below), but second, and more importantly, that both are metaphorical (or metonymical) of ἔρως: the concepts are mapped onto the emotion. Phaedra seems sick because she is showing behavioural symptoms similar to those of an ill person. In terms of madness, however, her behaviour is not consistent. Her nurse reveals her illicit passion to Hippolytus, who in turn is disgusted at his stepmother. Phaedra is therefore forced into action by others, and proceeds to hang herself from shame, leaving a note to ensure Hippolytus’ death and her children’s future security. Her actions have violent outcomes, but they are certainly not what we would consider as insane. Rational decision-making was not attributed to someone afflicted by madness in antiquity, as we can see by the Athenian law which allowed a male relative to take over someone’s estate if they were ‘mad’. Her reaction is not only conditioned by the emotion, or even by rejection, but by very specific circumstances, under which she has no positive options. If we compare her taking command over the situation to madness proper we see a large difference. Heracles does not slay his children voluntarily, and Io does not wander the earth by her own will. We see a similar distinction in Apollonius’ Argonautica. Medea is not driven literally mad by her passion and she is aware of the conflict between emotional and social pressures. Her violent actions afterwards are rational (if cruel) once she has made the decision to leave with Jason. Madness is a danger to social norms, and it is used as a source domain for emotion, which can also lead people to disregard social boundaries, none more so than ἔρως.

Madness is by and large not a symptom of ἔρως, in which case the person affected by ἔρως would turn mad, but a metaphor, which highlights the similarity involved in the psychological loss of control associated with both conditions. The reciprocated affections of the main couples do not require a strategy for frustrated

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164 Νόσος: E.Hipp.40; 131; 269; 279; 283; 394. Mania: E.Hipp.214; 248; 1274.
165 She is wasting away (E.Hipp.131), not eating (E.Hipp.136-8) and her strength is gone (E.Hipp.199).
167 See A.R.3.766ff.
love, unlike most of the other characters who feel ἔρως in the Greek Novel. Other characters cause violence because of ἔρως and circumstance. Arsace, the lustful Persian Queen, is involved in the torture of her beloved Theagenes and the attempted murder of Chariclea, because she cannot have Theagenes.\textsuperscript{168} In this chapter I will explore the importance of the fact that disease and madness involve domain mapping, and hence metaphor and metonymy, in the Greek Novel.

\textsuperscript{168} In Heliodorus there is also a moral point to this. See the concluding section on this element.
I Disease

This section will explore the metaphorical conceptualisation of ἔρως as a disease (νόσος). The image of the lover affected by disease is a standard one in Greek literature and also a prevalent feature of responses to ἔρως in the novels. As we saw in the sections on the erotic syndrome, the subject of ἔρως suffers debilitating symptoms. These are then interpreted as resulting from the ‘disease’ ἔρως. This conceptualisation encompasses the physiology of the emotions, folk models of the physiology as expressed in metaphor, and scientific models based upon the same physiology. Disease in antiquity was seen at its most basic as commencing, existing and then ceasing to exist. However, there are some culturally salient factors involved in each of these parts. Nutton identifies two general strands running through ancient medicine. Disease could be either theologically or physiologically caused (and of course the two categories are not exclusive). In the first book of the Iliad, where Apollo strikes the Achaeans down with a νόσος, he both causes the disease and heals the soldiers: there is no role for the doctor. However, there were also numerous explanations of disease in antiquity, especially expert, which saw them ‘in terms of pathological processes taking place within the body over time’. As we will see in the coming chapter, we will not merely see ἔρως as a disease in the Greek Novel, but as both a divinely caused disease and as a pathological process. On a

169 As we see in the philosophical discussion of ἔρως in Plato’s Phaedrus. The person in love confesses that they themselves are ill (231d); the person affected by ἔρως is said to be more ill than the person who is not (236b); the man who is in love is νοσοῦντι (238e). See also 244d and 255d.
170 For a brief and simple example we may look to Mithridates in Chariton’s novel. When he displays the symptoms of his desire for Callirhoe he becomes pale and thin, ὀχρός τε καὶ λεπτός, just as we would expect of the effects of an illness (Chariton 4.2.4).
171 See Nutton 2004, 40.
172 Contrast the medic Machaon who heals the soldier’s wounds (II.11.514-15).
173 Nutton 2004, 28. See also Nutton 2004, 38, where he notes that Odysseus juxtaposes a non-religious and religious cause of disease when he asks his mother if she died after a lengthy sickness or by the arrows of Artemis (Od.11.171-3). One only has to look at the Hippocratic corpus to see that Greek medicine was seeking physiological explanations for disease. See Hart 2000, 138: ‘the Hippocratic school divided a disease course into three stages. First, an imbalance of body humours (liquids) caused by internal or external factors. Second, the reaction of the body to the altered balance by producing a fusion (coction) such that none of the humours are left in excess and the pain and symptoms are relieved. This process was accompanied by heat production…The final phase was a resultant ‘crisis’ with discharge of the residual excessive humour (via blood, phlegm, vomit, faeces, urine or sweat).’
more universal note the metaphor of ἔρως as disease is strongly evaluative: it portrays the emotion as ‘unhealthy’.

When Chloe’s feelings for Daphnis awaken she acknowledges that now she is sick: νῦν ἐγὼ νοσῶ, τί δὲ η νόσος άγνω (Longus 1.14.1). However, it is clear that this is like no νόσος she has had before, and she does not know what it is. Her ignorance is designed to display her naivety, but it also broaches an important theme in the novel. ἔρως is a different kind of νόσος. Daphnis feels symptoms which result from ἔρως, and complains that it is a new illness of which he does not know the name: ὡ νόσου καὶ νής, ἥς οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οἶδα τὸ ὄνομα (Longus 1.18.2). He conceives of it as a νόσος, but he also realises that it is not the same as any illness he has experienced before. These extracts draw a parallel between the respective experience of the young lovers, but according to the conventional metaphor of lovesickness.

Daphnis and Chloe reason within their own experience and sickness is one of the metaphors they choose to conceptualise their new feelings. Yet they are not fully aware of what type their νόσος is, as both claim ignorance. The scenario is one of deception where neither party realises that it is not a νόσος per se with which they are afflicted, but rather ἔρως. Deception constantly marks the topos of lovesickness in the Greek Novel, and utilises the naivety and ignorance of both the lovers themselves and others. Daphnis and Chloe only believe that their affliction might be a real νόσος because of their naivety. It is not illogical for them to do so, however, for the symptoms of lovesickness are so close to those of a νόσος in general that they cause much confusion. Xenophon of Ephesus presents us with a prototypical example, where the symptoms of erotic desire are so similar to sickness that they give rise to misunderstanding. When Habrocomes and Anthia become attracted to

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174 Averill 1990, 106: ‘consider, for example, the characterisation of emotions as ‘diseases of the mind’…this is one of the major metaphors of emotion, historically speaking. It has an explanatory function (e.g., emotions can disturb orderly thought processes, just as diseases can disturb orderly physiological processes). However, the metaphor is also clearly evaluative. Emotions are unhealthy.’

175 At the start of Chariton’s novel both lovers waste away in bed after a chance meeting, as they are suffering from lovesickness: τῆς νόσου (Chariton 1.1.10). It is Chaereas’s body, σῶμα, which is definitely wasting away: ἦδη τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶ φθίνοντος (Chariton 1.1.8). Debilitation is itself seen in metaphorical terms here, that of an entity decaying or perishing: φθίνοντος.
one another they spend their time lying down ill: ἔκειντο μὲν δὴ ἐκάτεροι νοσοῦντες (X.Eph.1.5.9). The symptoms are an important device for prolonging the revelation of the young couple’s ἔρως. They are looking for a cure, but do not realise what the correct one is: Τέλος πέμπουσιν οἱ πατέρες ἐκατέρων εἰς θεοῦ μαντευσόμενοι τὴν τε αἰτίαν τῆς νόσου καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν (X.Eph.1.5.9.3-5). They then send away for an oracle in a passage where the ambiguity of the notion is exploited to its fullest. This echoes the model of a νόσος caused and cured by divine means. The oracle asks them why they wish to know the cause of the illness, when the same one grips both of the two children: τίπτε ποθεῖτε μαθεῖν νούσου τέλος ἥδε καὶ ἀρχήν; Αμφοτέρους μία νοῦσος ἔχε (X.Eph.1.6.2). Even after the oracle we are told that the parents still cannot work out what the νόσος is (X.Eph.1.7.1). They both have the same νόσος, and, of course, it is mutually curable. This emotional disease can be as deadly as any other. When Chaereas is sick at the start of Chariton’s novel we are told that his peers are worried that he might die: τὴν αἰτίαν ἔμαθον τῆς νόσου, καὶ ἔλεος πάντας εἰσῄει μειρακίου καλοῦ κινδυνεύοντος ἀπολέσθαι διὰ πάθος ψυχῆς εὐφυοῦς (Chariton 1.1.10).176

The parents are deceived by the symptoms and do not realise that ἔρως is responsible. In Heliodorus the same thing happens to Chariclea when she sees her future partner Theagenes. She falls ill, and her father calls in the priest Calasiris to examine her. In fact Calasiris will effect a cure by uniting the couple, but it is one which can only be achieved with the ignorance of the father, and so Calasiris deceives him as to her condition. Calasiris’ diagnosis contains much technical language relating to scientific and philosophical theories, but Heliodorus reflects the theme of deception found in Xenophon of Ephesus, albeit in a more developed and nuanced way.177

176 Emotional duress can in fact be deadly and is not merely a literary conceit. See Damasio 1995, 120: ‘there are other examples of mind-body interaction…Bereavement, again a state dependent on brainwide processing, leads to a depression of the immune system such that individuals are more prone to infection and, whether as a direct result or not, more likely to develop certain types of cancer. One can die of a broken heart.’ For the evidence see Calabrese et al. 1987.
177 The science of this passage will be discussed in more detail in the section on the anatomy of ἔρως.
There is an interesting relationship between this passage from Heliodorus and one from the medical writer Galen concerning the symptoms of ἔρως.178 The initial diagnosis of Calasiris is that Chariclea is ill because of the evil eye.179 She has contracted a νόσος through the envious intention of another (Hld.3.7). This explanation diverts Charicles from the real reason, which is that she is feeling ἔρως for Theagenes. Chariclea knows of course that this is not the case, and implies so much to Calasiris: νοσῶ γὰρ οὐ βασκανίαν, ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν τινά, ὡς ἐσθέ, νόσον (Hld. 4.5.6). She has not been affected by a disease caused by the malice of someone’s envy. It is some other kind of νόσος which is affecting her. Calasiris explains the working of the disease to Charicles in terms of expert models of the evil eye and ἔρως.180 Calasiris explains the mechanism whereby people contract diseases without touching.

Many people contract ophthalmia or some other infectious disease without having touched the patient at all or shared a bed with him, merely by breathing the same air. Conclusive proof of my point is furnished by the genesis of love, which originates from visually perceived objects, which, if you will excuse the metaphor, shoot arrows of passion, swifter than the wind, into the soul by way of the eyes.181

The element of pastiche in this passage is seen in the fact that Calasiris’ explanation moves inconsistently from the evil eye, which is an airborne contagion (‘breathing the same air’), to ἔρως which is transmitted by sight.182 The genesis of love is created by particles through the eyes: τὰ ὁρώμενα (Hld.3.7.5). The irony is that Calasiris has convinced Charicles that Chariclea is ill with an analogy to the condition of ἔρως, when in reality it is ἔρως she is feeling. Later on a doctor confirms this when he makes a diagnosis with her pulse.183 He reports the diagnosis to Calasiris at Hld.4.7.4–7. The doctor, Acesinus, says that there is nothing he can

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178 Galen of Pergamum’s dates are CE129–c.216. This almost certainly places him prior to Heliodorus, who probably dates from the 3rd century CE. On the dating of Heliodorus see Bowie 2008, 32–5 and Morgan 2003, 418–9.
179 The Evil Eye was a widespread folk belief in antiquity. On Heliodorus see Dickie 1991 and in general Rakoczy 1996.
180 This complex passage will be discussed at length in the chapter on vision.
181 Hld.3.7.5. Translation by Morgan in Reardon 1989, 416.
182 In ancient Greece illness was often explained in terms of the model of ‘an individual’s interaction with the surrounding air’ (Nutton 2004, 26). See for instance Herodianus 6.6.2. On this particular passage Dickie 1991 provides an excellent comparison with Plutarch.
do for her. Hers is not a νόσος of the body (σώμα), τὸ δὲ τῆς κόρης νόσος μέν, ἀλλ’ οὐ σώματος (Hld.4.7.6), because there is nothing physically wrong with her: οὐκ ἄλλο τι τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μέρος, οὐχ ὅλον νοσεῖ που (Hld.4.7.6). Her condition is clearly one of the ψυχή and she is afflicted by lovesickness: ψυχῆς εἶναι τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν νόσον ἔρωτα λαμπρὸν (Hld.4.7.7). This revelation lets the cat out of the bag, so to speak, as it reveals the very thing which Calasiris sought to keep hidden from Charicles. However, their cover is not completely blown, as Charicles is unaware that it is Theagenes whom she loves. He has also asked Calasiris to help him make her fall in love, in order to get her married, and so assumes that Calasiris has helped him in this respect. This story conveniently leads to Calasiris being even more involved with the girl. With this access to her, he sets up the night time raid in which Theagenes will spirit her away with a gang of youths.

Later on in book four Chariclea confesses her feelings to Calasiris.

Although I am caused great pain by the malady which is now at its height, I am caused even more pain by not having overcome that malady at the outset, but having instead succumbed to a passion whose temptations I had hitherto always resisted, and the very mention of which is an affront to the august name of virginity.

Chariclea confesses to the social pressures affecting her conception of the emotion. Emotion is conflicting with her beliefs concerning virginity. The metaphors she uses to describe the malady are ones from the concept of emotion as a conflict between the person affected and the emotion (see the chapter on ἔρως as an opponent). She is disappointed that she did not ‘master’ the malady, κρατῆσαι, and that she was ‘defeated by it’: ἡττηθῆναι. This represents an active portrayal of her in relation to the disease, in that she feels that she could fight against it, but is not strong enough. Additional emotional pain is caused by her knowledge that she has been ‘defeated’

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183 Ἀνακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρτηρίας (Hld. 4.7.4). This is because it indicates the movement of the heart: τὰ καρδίας κινήματα (Hld.4.7.4).

184 The doctor says that there are in fact no physical symptoms. She does not have an excess of humour, a headache, nor a burning fever: οὐ γὰρ χυμῶν τις περιττεύει, οὐ κεφαλῆς ἄλγημα βαρύνει, οὐ πυρετὸς ἄναφλέγει (Hld.4.7.6). He goes on to say that the only person who can ‘cure’ her is the one she desires: ζητητέος σοι, Χαρίκλεις, ὁ ἰασόμενος· γένοιτο δ’ ἂν μόνος ὁ ποθούμενος (Hld. 4.7.7).

185 Hld.4.10.2. Translation by Morgan in Reardon 1989, 434.
by the emotion, as well as that which is standard of ἔρως. Another social spin on the concept is provided by Charicles in a further extension of the whole episode’s irony. He professes his hope that one day Chariclea will feel ἔρως. On that day he will proclaim her healthy and not ill. Charicles inverts the mappings of healthy and diseased states because his agenda is to get Chariclea married. Therefore he wants her to feel ἔρως and denotes it instead as a healthy state. This is rooted in the fact that the whole scenario of ἔρως is not usually conceptualised as a νόσος, but specifically the frustration stage. These examples indicate the individual manipulation of metaphor as a result of social pressure and personal agenda.

The model of ἔρως as a νόσος in the Greek Novel is metaphorical because it involves domain mapping from the (more) concrete domain of disease to the (more) abstract domain of ἔρως. Opinions on the relationship of diseases to emotions in antiquity could vary. Cicero presents the stoic theory that the diseases of the body are analogous to those of the soul, not the same as. A passage from Galen’s *De Praecognitione* shows the same opinion from an expert point of view. Iustus’ wife was wasting away without appearing to be suffering in any part of her body. Galen concludes that she is either suffering from a depression caused by black bile, μελαγχολικῶς δυσθυμεῖν, or is experiencing emotional pain, λυπουμένην. His second guess is correct, and her body is experiencing no physical illness but a psychological one, τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθος ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ψυχικῆς τινος ἀηδίας. This description mirrors the distinction made by the doctor in Heliodorus. In fact she is in love, and when the name of the pantomime dancer Pylades is mentioned her expression and facial colour change, and her pulse beats irregularly. The disease does have somatic effects but is psychological. Galen

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186 Εἴθε δὲ καὶ αὐτή πόθου ποτὲ καὶ ἔρωτος αἴσθοιτο· τότε ἂν ὑγιαίνειν αὐτὴν οὐ νοσεῖν ὑπέλαβον (Hld.3.9.1).
187 Cicero *Tusc.* 3.7.8–15: num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant; ego poteram 'morbos', et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, mutus animi ratione non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem mutus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid aliud tibi videtur.
188 Galen *De Praecognitione* 5.6–7, Nutton 95.
189 For this and the coming descriptions see Galen *De Praecognitione* 6.4–8, Nutton 103.
190 For a comparison of Heliodorus and Galen’s portrayal of medicine in terms of narrative levels see Robiano 2003.
underlines this later on in the same treatise when he states that a man worried about money entrusted to him which has gone missing seems sick, but is not experiencing a physical problem. Contemporary scientific models, like those parodied by Heliodorus and cited in Galen, are also concerned with the correct reading of symptoms and the relationship between emotion and diseases. Heliodorus reflects Galen and the medical writers in interpreting (or for Heliodorus mocking the interpretation of) the disease as a pathological process, unlike Xenophon of Ephesus who presents or implies a model of divine causation.

Achilles Tatius features philosophising on the experience of the erotic state as a νόσος. At 1.6 he describes the way that afflictions and physical wounds, τὰ ἄλλα νοσήματα καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος τραύματα, are worse at night (Ach.Tat.1.6.2). Clitophon is feeling ἔρως, and by logical implication if it is νοσήματα which agitate people at night, then ἔρως is a member of the class of νοσήματα. Achilles Tatius combines the concepts of illness and wounds. It is νοσήματα and τραύματα which aggravate the body at night. This contrasts with the daytime when the eyes and ears are heavily loaded with work, and therefore the intensity (ἀκμή) of the νόσος is lightened (Ach.Tat.1.6.3). This grouping of wounds and illness presents another physiological and metaphorical correspondence. Illness or disease can result from a wound and so the two concepts are grounded in experience. Metaphorical wounds are also part of the erotic experience as we shall see in the section on ἔρως as an opponent. Metaphors can be used coherently in multiple metaphorical networks at once. That is to say the image of the wounded lover is not used only as part of the network seeing ἔρως as an opponent, but can also be associated with seeing ἔρως as a νόσος. Metaphor displays flexibility and a multivalent nature which arises from empirical knowledge.

In a later section of book one Achilles Tatius’ hero Clitophon is making suggestive comments to Leucippe in order to gauge her interest (Ach.Tat.1.17). One

191 Galen De Praecognitione 6.11ff., Nutton 103. Galen also notes that there is no specific erotic pulse, but that the pulse changes under all psychological disturbances: 6.16, Nutton 105.
192 Ach.Tat.1.6.2; 1.6.3; 1.6.3. In a manipulation of the theme of lovesickness as deception, Achilles Tatius has Leukippe pretend to be ill, so that Clitophon can meet her in secret (Ach.Tat.2.16.1). Thus a false sickness enables an erotic rendezvous. Later on Clitophon avoids being intimate with Melite by feigning sickness (Ach.Tat.5.21.6).
of the examples he uses is that of plants. Even plants fall in love with one another and the phoenix is especially susceptible to this.\textsuperscript{193} If the female is planted at a considerable distance from the male then the male begins to wither away (Ach.Tat. 1.17.4). The only cure for the νόσος of the plant is to take a piece of the female and put it beside the male’s heart, καρδία, which refreshes its ψυχή, and causes it to rejoice in the ‘embrace’: συμπλοκή (Ach.Tat.1.17.4-5).\textsuperscript{194} This example is used for rhetorical purposes: i.e. to convince Leucippe that ἔρως (and therefore sex) is a good thing. It grounds the act of ἔρως in nature and presents us with an analogy of the erotic process. It is the lack/absence of the lover which results in illness.

Ἔρως as a νόσος imposes a structure on the experience of ἔρως. This relates to the process of the emotion. The young lovers lay eyes on each other, contract an illness because of it and are cured when they obtain the beloved.\textsuperscript{195} The process of an illness with contraction, debilitation and a treatment or cure is mapped onto the process of ἔρως, with desire, debilitation because of that desire and then fulfilment of the desire. If ἔρως is unfulfilled then it is uncured. This differs from the Hippocratic account of stages of a νόσος with regard to its inception—divine or visual causation instead of imbalance—and its conclusion in obtaining the beloved: the cure does not come about with a natural resolution such as a discharge of humour (see introduction to this section).

Metaphors of ἔρως as a νόσος in the Greek Novel often emphasise the start or the end of the process. The question of a cure, a φάρμακον, is essential to the wellbeing of the person affected, although the term itself is laced with ambiguity. It can denote a drug which either cures or creates ἔρως. Actual love potions appear only a couple of times in Achilles Tatius. In the first instance Leucippe suddenly

\textsuperscript{193} This word can indicate many different things but for the plant LSJ refer to the date-palm: the Phoenix dactylifera.

\textsuperscript{194} Συμπλοκή, a weaving together, can denote a sexual embrace or sexual intercourse for humans in ancient Greek literature. See Pl.Symp.191c, Arist.HA 540b21, Corn.ND 24, Sor.1.31.

\textsuperscript{195} Heliodorus seems to be more concerned with the theme of marriage and chastity than most of the other novelists. Calasiris tells Chariclea to convert her νόσος into marriage: γάμος (Hld.4.10.6). In the other novels Callirhoe sleeps with Dionysius, Chloe has pre-marital ‘experiences’ with Daphnis, and Clitophon is quite happy to have sex with Leucippe before they are married (as is she!), even though they are thwarted in their plans. Only in Xenophon of Ephesus is Anthia kept married and chaste the whole time, although the marriage is at the start, and so there is not the same tension which Heliodorus maintains by holding off the marriage until the end of the book.
starts behaving strangely; she falls down and her eyes roll in their sockets (Ach.Tat.4.9).\textsuperscript{196} When Clitophon approaches her she hits him in the face and needs to be restrained. The bystanders have decided that it is some madness which has taken hold of her, μανία εἰη τις (Ach.Tat.4.9.2), but later on at 4.15.4 we find out that she has in fact been the victim of a love potion: τι φάρμακον ἔρωτος. Gorgias, an Egyptian soldier, fell in love with Leucippe and administered a love potion to her, but at an undiluted strength. Instead of working it caused Leucippe to go mad (the reader is left to wonder whether it would have worked if properly applied). Love charms have a habit of going wrong, as one sees from the example of Deianira’s failed attempt to regain Heracles’ love in Sophocles’ Trachiniae. Achilles Tatius’ description of Leucippe’s madness and treatment is typical of the period and has parallels with the first-century doctor Celsus.\textsuperscript{197} The φάρμακον can be used to cause ἔρως, and this puts passion firmly within the realms of physiology. There is a fine line between ἔρως and madness, as these two concepts are intrinsically linked (see next section on madness).\textsuperscript{198} The psychological debilitation associated with the emotion is maintained here as is the theme of deception. The bystanders think she is mad, because her symptoms seem appropriate. However, they are being deceived, because it is actually an excess of a love potion, and therefore they must wait for a specific cure from the person who made it. The only other mention of a love potion occurs later in the novel when Melite asks Leucippe to prepare one for her (Ach.Tat.5.22.6). Leucippe pretends to be of Thessalian origin, and Melite’s request is based on the reputation Thessalians enjoyed for magic.\textsuperscript{199} There is irony in the fact that Leucippe has in the past fallen victim to a love potion, and that Melite is asking her to engineer a potion for Clitophon, Leucippe’s partner, and furthermore it is not a proposition that Leucippe has any plans of fulfilling. Potions are unsuccessful in

\textsuperscript{196} τῶ ὀφθαλμῶ διαστρέφειν (Ach.Tat. 4.9.1). When Clitophon approaches her eyes are bloodshot: ύφαιμον βλέπουσα (Ach.Tat. 4.9.2).

\textsuperscript{197} On this whole episode and the medical context see McLeod 1969, who argues that everything in Leucippe’s treatment by the doctor is endorsed by Celsus.

\textsuperscript{198} This madness is also connected with a lack of αἰδώς. Out of her mind she has no thought for the body parts which she should keep hidden: οὐδὲν φροντίζουσα κρύπτειν ὅσα γυνὴ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι θέλει (Ach.Tat.4.9.2). McLeod 1969, 105, says of this passage that ‘the symptoms of her madness are selected for their poignant effect in the novel’, but I suspect that this description is probably erotic.

\textsuperscript{199} Melite tells Leucippe that she has that Thessalian women are able to use magic for erotic purposes (Ach.Tat.5.22.2). See also the setting of magical Thessaly in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses.
Achilles Tatius. The former potion is not effective, the later is not made, and each one is targeted at one of the main lovers respectively.

Most references to φάρμακα in the Greek Novel are metaphorical. The crossover from literal to metaphorical is nicely encapsulated by Daphnis in Longus’ novel. When Chloe kisses him he feels pangs of love and wonders if she put any potion on her lips: Ἀρα φαρμάκων ἐγεύσατο ἡ Χλόη μέλλουσά με φιλεῖν (Longus 1.18.2). Since the kiss has pained Daphnis he tries to explain the effect as some sort of poison. It can also mean a cure, and can be a literal cure like the antidote for Leucippe above or a metaphorical one. Philetas tells them that there is no cure for ἔρως, nothing to imbibe, eat or chant. The only thing they can do is to lie together naked and embrace: ἔρωτος γὰρ οὐδὲν φάρμακον, οὐ πινόμενον, οὐκ ἔσθιόμενον, οὐκ ἐσθιὸμενον, ὅτι μὴ φίλημα καὶ περιβολή καὶ συγκατακλιθῆναι γυμνοῖς σώμασι (Longus 2.7.7). It takes Daphnis and Chloe the whole novel to work out exactly what he means. They decide to try the cures he mentioned: ὅσα εἶπεν ἄρα φάρμακα (Longus 2.8.5). Philetas is rejecting literal potions for love and conceiving sex metaphorically as a cure.

Both aspects of the dual nature of φάρμακα, cause and cure, appear as metaphors in the novels. The cause of the emotion can often have a negative connotation. In Longus the sight of Chloe naked has a strong effect on Daphnis. He feels pain in his heart, καρδία, as if it is being eaten away by φάρμακα: ἡλγει τὴν καρδίαν ὡς ἐσθιομένην ὑπὸ φαρμάκων (Longus 1.32.4). We find a more explicit image of poison when Callirhoe kisses Dionysius in Chariton. It sinks down into his σπλάγχνα like a poison: τὸ δὲ φίλημα Διονυσίω ἰὸς ἐις τὰ σπλάγχνα κατεδύστο (Chariton 2.8.1). This is a very visceral simile and it coheres conceptually with the notion of a drug. The usual entities affected by ἔρως are the ψυχή and καρδία. Although the ‘σπλάγχνα’ are not as such part of the simile, the choice of them as the destination of the kiss in this context is probably due

200 Whitmarsh 2005 discusses the name of Philetas, which corresponds to a Hellenistic poet, and argues that Daphnis and Chloe lack a definition of ἔρως which they can use for their own circumstances.

201 Alternatively it could mean ‘like an arrow sinking into his guts’.
to the simile of a kiss as poison. The guts are the proper location for a poison and so the kiss is seen as sinking down into them rather that the soul or heart. That is to say the anatomical reference is part of the vehicle or source domain rather than the tenor or target, and this explains its unusual usage with regard to ἔρως in the novels.

It is more common for a metaphorical φάρμακον to be seen as a cure. In this case it appears at a different point of the emotional process, at the end rather than the beginning. We have already seen Philetas speak of the cure for ἔρως, which happens to be sex. In this case it is the only possible cure: τὸ μόνον ἔρωτα παῦον φάρμακον (Longus 3.14.1). For Daphnis and Chloe toiling distracts them (‘soothes’ them) from the erotic pain, λύπη: τῆς ἐρωτικῆς λύπης φάρμακον τὸν κάματον ἐσχον (Longus 1.22.3). Here the φάρμακον is temporary, and refers to the process of the emotion during specific conditions. In the Greek Novel the two lovers generally remain loyal to one another and surmount even such apparently impossible challenges to their chastity as working in a brothel. However, there are a few notable exceptions. In Achilles Tatius, Melite is the ‘other woman’ to whom Clitophon is betrothed after the apparent death of Leucippe. Unfortunately for Melite not only is Leucippe still alive, but also her husband Thersander, likewise thought dead, and her planned marriage to Clitophon falls through. Given the circumstances she asks Clitophon to ‘perform’ a favour for her, in order to ‘cure’ her lovesickness for him: μικροῦ δέομαι φαρμάκου πρὸς τηλικαύτην νόσον (Ach.Tat.5.26.2). Sex will relieve her frustration and allow her to get over the disappointment of not marrying Clitophon. Clitophon, who at this point requires Melite’s help to regain Leucippe, magnanimously consents in the interest of all parties involved. He points out to the reader that all he is doing is providing a cure for an ill ψυχή: ἀλλὰ φάρμακον ὀσπερ ψυχῆς νοσούσης (Ach.Tat.5.27.2).  

See also Longus 2.9.2: τὸ οὖν συγκατακλιθῆναι μόνον φάρμακον ἔρωτος. In Chariton the Persian King asks his servant for a φάρμακον for his desire for Callirhoe. He replies that the only cure for ἔρως is the person you have ἔρως for: φάρμακον γὰρ ἐτερον ἔρωτος οὐδέν ἐστι πλὴν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἐρωμένου (Chariton 6.3.7). However, since the Persian King is greater than other men, he recommends not to use the same remedy as them but to strive to battle with it: ἄνταγωνιζομαι (Chariton 6.3.8). As always in the Greek Novel this conflict of reason and emotion will not be successful. In Longus this remedy is subdivided into three parts. At Longus 2.9 Daphnis and Chloe try out the first two remedies, kissing and embracing, but delay the third remedy, which is lying naked together, out of a sense of shame (Longus 2.10.3).
This metaphor allows Clitophon a witty justification of his misdeed. Leucippe of course would not condone this indiscretion, but since he is ‘curing’ Melite he may (jokingly) justify it to himself and the reader. In Achilles Tatius the metaphor of ‘a cure’ for ἔρως works well for both parties.

All references to metaphorical νόσος in Xenophon of Ephesus and Longus are used of ἔρως. In Chariton there is only one reference to lovesickness, when Chariton’s peers seek the cause of his illness (Chariton 1.1.10). This is another example of the deception motif as no one realises the real cause of his illness immediately. In Xenophon of Ephesus we also only see the lovesickness motif at the beginning, when the two lovers are affected, and all references in Longus are likewise from the first book. In these three novelists it is not the most popular metaphor for erotic passion (fire is). The whole schema, however, is still present extensively in terms of the interpretation of the symptoms of ἔρως (see above), which parallel those of a sick person and enable the deception motif, and other aspects of the emotional process such as cause or cure.

In Heliodorus we see several interesting features which arise from this basic schema. Emotional νόσος is not merely restricted to ἔρως, but in fact covers the closely associated notion of jealousy: ζηλοτυπία. At the beginning of the Aethiopica we are presented with the bandit leader Thyamis, an Egyptian from Memphis. We do not learn until later in the novel that he was driven to a life of banditry as a result of the machinations of his brother, Petosiris, who subsequently took over Thyamis’ office as chief priest. Petosiris acted because he coveted Thyamis’ position, and we learn that he had been ‘ill’ with ζηλοτυπία for a long time: ὅ γε μὴν ἀδελφὸς αὐτῷ Πετόσιρις καὶ πάλαι ζηλοτυπίαν ἐπ’ αὐτῷ νοσῶν (Hld.7.2.4).

As we see from this example, the metaphor of illness can even be applied to non-erotic ζηλοτυπία (leaving aside psychoanalytic interpretations). It can be used outright of envy or the coveting of another’s...

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203 As Clitophon says himself in the same chapter, ‘ἔρως teaches argument (λόγος)’ (Ach.Tat.5.27.1).
204 Another reference which does not refer to a nosos but implies the same schema of sickness is when the Great King’s servant tells him there is no ‘cure’ for ἔρως (Chariton 6.3.7).
205 X.Eph.1.6.2; 1.6.2; 1.5.9; 1.5.9; 1.7.1. Longus p.1.3; 1.14.1 (referenced twice); 1.18.2.
206 Morgan 1989 translates ‘in whom had been festering for many years’.
Later on in the same book we see the metaphor applied to erotic jealousy. Arsace, the Persian satrap’s wife, enlists her maidservant in helping her to achieve the object of her desire, the youth Theagenes. Theagenes associates with his betrothed Chariclea, and this sparks jealousy in Arsace. In asking her maid to solicit Theagenes for her she is making a double request.

Δυεῖν δὲ ἐνός μοι γενήση νόσον ἱατρός, ἔρωτός τε καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, τὸν μὲν ἐμπλήσασα τῆς δὲ ἀπαλλάξασα (Hld.7.10.6).

Ερως and ζηλοτυπία are the two diseases here. The same metaphor is used to conceptualise the two related emotions, and can even be extended to envy itself as seen in the previous example. In all the novels previous to Heliodorus we saw that it was by and large used only of the main couple’s lovesickness.

Heliodorus gives us several passages which posit the νόσος of ζηλοτυπία as a gendered attribute. In terms of the level of narration they are all opinions expressed by characters, but the views themselves do not conflict with anything else in Heliodorus. While Chariclea and Theagenes are prisoners of Arsace she urges him to pretend to give in to the Persian’s advances, in order to allow them time to escape their situation. However, she begs him not to actually commit the physical act with her (Hld.7.21). He replies teasingly that despite the danger of the situation, she is not immune to that jealousy innate to females: τὴν γυναικῶν ἔμφυτον νόσον ζηλοτυπίαν (Hld.7.21.5). Theagenes complains that his chastity is not an issue, and by implication her ζηλοτυπία is a redundant emotion.208 Jealousy is also attributed to eunuchs. Arsace’s chief eunuch is only too happy to torture Theagenes on the orders of his mistress, because he has nursed a hatred for him for a long time. This hatred is due to ζηλοτυπία, which is innate for him as a eunuch.209

207 See Cairns 2003, 239, who distinguishes jealousy and envy as to their object. Jealousy is directed at what is one’s own, and envy at what belongs to another. I will not delve into the thorny issue of the distinction between φθόνος and ζηλοτυπία here, the two Greek words commonly translated as envy and jealousy. See Konstan and Rutter 2003 for the relevant issues and opinions.
208 Earlier on in the novel Theagenes mistakenly kisses a woman believing it to be Chariclea. Chariclea is a little bemused at this and asks the name of the girl, but adds as a disclaimer that she is not feeling ζηλοτυπία (Hld.2.8).
209 Ὁ δὲ καὶ φύσει μὲν τὴν εὐνούχων ζηλοτυπίαν νοσῶν: he is by nature ill with the ζηλοτυπία of eunuchs (Hld. 8.6.2).
Theagenes his position. Later on the Ethiopian king Hydaspes leaves the beautiful young Chariclea in the hands of the eunuch Bagoas, since he knows that as a eunuch he would jealously keep her away from anyone who wanted to force her.\textsuperscript{210} So envy, begrudging another’s possession, is the natural disposition of eunuchs, while jealousy, closely guarding one’s own possession, is innate for women. The metaphor is manipulated to support existing social prejudices. The only other character to feel jealous is the barbarian Achaemenes, servant of Arsace: νοσούντι (Hld.7.23.5). Therefore ζηλοτυπία as a disease is used in occurrent and potential senses. It can be innate in the sense that someone is disposed towards feeling that emotion, and occurrent when one contracts it.

The other emotion conceptualised as sickness is grief, albeit an erotically motivated one. In book 6 of Heliodorus’ novel Cnemon, Calasiris and Nausicles return to Chariclea without Theagenes. Her reaction is to scream and ask them to remove her doubt by telling her whether he is dead or alive (Hld.6.5). Cnemon reprimands her for her pessimistic outlook, and this draws a further rebuke for him from Calasiris. He explains that Chariclea is in love, and this leads to her excessive fear for Theagenes’ safety: Χαρικλείᾳ μὲν ξυγγινώσκωμεν ἐὖ τὰ ἔρωτων πάθη καὶ ἀκριβῶς νοσούσῃ (Hld.6.5.4). Lovesickness is conceptualised as a long-term state, and this state of ἔρως gives rise to other emotions, here grief for Theagenes. Interestingly the most prototypical occurrence of as a disease is as a marker of the emotion frustrated. This is why we get so many references to cures of the emotion. Here, however, there is a slight difference which emphasises the coherence of the model. Frustrated ἔρως is grounded in the fact that one is denied and therefore separated from the beloved. Chariclea is separated from Theagenes, and therefore her erotically motivated grief can be termed a disease, which will be cured when they are reunited.

As with the fire metaphor disease has a wider emotional range than just ἔρως. It can also be used of jealousy and grief. Lovers can become ill and almost die through lovesickness, but this does not conflict with it also being metaphorical and metonymous. It also has implications which are specifically part of the ἔρως as
disease model. ἔρως does not pass after a certain period of time, as some diseases or ailments might be expected to do, but exists until a ‘cure’ is obtained: possession of the beloved. It therefore not only structures ἔρως but actually structures an important subsection of it: frustrated ἔρως. Jealousy and grief are also similar in the way that the possession of the object of emotional attention is threatened or gone. Frustrated ἔρως arises from not possessing the beloved. Therefore the distribution of the disease metaphor among these three emotions is not arbitrary: there is a conceptual coherence. Metaphors do not necessarily cover the whole of an emotion.

In the Greek Novel ἔρως seems to last beyond the obtaining of the beloved (see final chapter for more). Lovesickness is not merely a response to ἔρως but a labelling and structuring of that response.
II Madness

Madness, ancient and modern, has received deserved attention in recent scholarship.211 Like lovesickness, it straddles the related spheres of folk and expert models, and it favours a historicist approach: in some sense madness must be defined relative to any specific society. Ancient Greece shared with us the concept of madness as a disordered state of mind, and this view permeated folk and scientific models in antiquity.212 This chapter seeks to redress the lack of attention madness in the Greek Novel has received. I will argue that previous Greek literature—in particular tragedy—is the basis for madness and emotion in the novels, and that in this respect the Greek Novel should be seen as reflecting long established folk models where it is not deliberately archaising.

This thesis concerns ἔρως, and the primary focus of this study is erotic madness. I must, however, look at the wider depiction of madness and emotion to get a broader perspective on what erotic madness actually is, since madness is a concept deeply associated with emotion in general. The Greek genre which evokes madness and emotion to the greatest extent is Tragedy. One can mention Pentheus, driven mad by the god Dionysus, and the same god’s bacchic revels which represented such a menace to him. Another famous example is Heracles’ madness inflicted by Hera, which occurs in several sources. Orestes is driven mad by the Furies for the murder of his mother and Io, the lover of Zeus, is stung by a maddening gadfly sent by Hera. Madness is also connected with the divine, as with the examples of Pentheus and Heracles above, and its ‘cure’ often involved purification.213 Padel argues that madness in Tragedy is never innate in character but a temporary state, and gives two reasons for this: first, madness is often conceptualised as a disease, and second, there is a narrative function attached to it, in that once madness accomplishes its purpose (i.e. Heracles killing his family) then it

212 Madness is still a difficult concept to define, even for modern scientific models: Hershkowitz 1998, 12, cites the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which notes in its introduction that ‘although this manual provides a classification of mental disorders, it must be admitted that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of “mental disorder”’ (p.xxi, DSM IV, 1994, Washington, DC).
213 Parker 1983, 221.
is no longer needed. The first model is present in the novels, but not the second narrative device of divinely enforced manic rage. The extreme reactions of madness proper have subsided by the time of the Greek Novel, but the psychological operation of madness and emotions has, I believe, essentially stayed the same.

Madness has a long standing association with emotion in the philosophical and medical tradition. Aristotle compares the condition of someone feeling a passion to someone asleep, drunk or ‘raving’ (μαινόμενον), and says that it is clear that anger (θυμοί) and sexual passion (ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων) can alter the body and even cause mania. This model of emotions causing mania makes madness symptomatic of the emotion, yet madness may be seen more broadly as metonymic of emotion. In orthodox Stoic thought the experience of the passions, πάθη, is conceptualised as madness. And finally madness becomes causative: Caelius Aurelianus recognises that mania produces different emotions, among them irascibility, cheerfulness and sadness. This assertion highlights a key point of inquiry: does madness produce emotion, or emotion produce madness in the Greek Novel, or both? It is the second model which the Greek Novel utilises, but this is probably due to the fact that the thematic concern of the novel is emotion, not madness. Emotions can produce mania and thereby mad behaviour. Therefore using the metaphorical conception of a part standing for the whole, synecdoche, madness becomes metonymical for the emotional experience, without necessarily being a symptom. The reason it is primarily metonymical rather than metaphorical is because of its association as a symptom; madness can be seen as being in the same domain as emotion rather than being a cross domain mapping.

Madness has also been connected with melancholy and the physiological theory of black bile. In the Hippocratic writings moisture in the brain causes madness: phlegm results in quiet madness and bile noisy. It is black bile which later emerges as the dominant physiological explanation of madness, and this is

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215 Arist. EN 1147a12–8.
216 See Gill 1996a.
217 De morb. chron. 1.150: iracundia, hilaritas and maestitudo. Seneca says that those whom anger possesses are not sane: non esse sanos quos ira possedit (De Ira 1.1.3). See also Hor. Epist. 2.62: Ira furor breuis est.
218 Hp. DMS 18.
reflected in the appearance of the verb for madness μελαγχολάω, ‘to be full of black bile’, which emerges later in the fifth century. The Hippocratic treatise De morbis explains that bile gets into the blood, heats it, and causes the patient to become mad (1.30). Depictions in literature retain the inner blackness associated with bile. Agamemnon in the Iliad has ‘black phrenes’, φρένες ἀμφιμέλαιναί, in his rage (1.103). In Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica Heracles rushes around frenzied with his black blood boiling, enraged that his favourite Hylas has vanished (1.1261-4). Heracles’ madness is caused by emotion. It must be noted that the fifth-century CE physician Caelius Aurelianus distinguishes madness from melancholy (1.183), but in general the two notions are related across folk and scientific models.

Erotic madness is a logical development of the connection of madness and emotion. Madness, however, can be a symptom of ἔρως or metonymous, as with the other emotions. Longinus’ De sublimitate 10.1 considers Sappho 31.9-15 (LP) to be a treatment of the sufferings of erotic madness: ταῖς ἐρωτικαῖς μανίαις. With this assertion he is mapping madness onto ἔρως, making it metonymical for the whole experience, and not a symptom. Similarly Plato says that ἔρως is a kind of madness, and one that is divinely inspired (Phdr.244a). Later on he qualifies this by stating that Eros and Aphrodite are the fourth and greatest form of madness (Pl.Phdr.265a). Prodicus posits that ἔρως causes mania. Mania represents an intense form of ἔρως.

Madness proper appears most in the novels themselves. Of course defining references to ‘madness proper’, which for the purposes of this study means madness

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220 For other references to erotic madness see Anac.398, 428, Ibyc.286.10-11, Sappho 1.18, Thgn.1231.
221 See also Pl.Phdr.240d; 244a-245c; 249d–e; 251e; 253c; 256b; 265a–c.
222 Prodicus fr.7 DK.
223 The following are references to madness proper in the Greek Novel including rhetorical usages (with the term used): Ach.Tat.4.9.2 (μανία); Ach.Tat.4.9.5 (μανία); Ach.Tat.4.9.6 (μανία); Ach.Tat.4.15.1 (μανία); Ach.Tat.4.15.1 (μαίνομαι); Ach.Tat.4.15.4 (μανία); Ach.Tat.4.15.6 (μαίνεται); Ach.Tat.4.17.3 (μανία); Ach.Tat.6.13.1 (μανία); Ach.Tat.6.13.1 (μαίνεσθαι); Chariton 3.2.2 (μανία); Chariton 6.5.9 (μαινοίμην); Chariton 6.7.7 (μανία); Chariton 7.1.2 (ἐμμανής); Chariton 8.3.2 (μανία); Hld.1.2.6 (ἐκμεμηνύια); Hld.2.34.8 (μανικῶς); Hld.5.2.2 (μανία); Hld.5.24.5 (μαίνεσθαι); Hld.7.7.2. (μανία); Hld.9.17.2 (μανία); Hld.10.12.2 (μανία); Hld.10.38.1 (ἐμμανεῖς); Longus 3.23.3 (μανία); Longus 2.27.1 (μαίνομέναις φρεσίν); Longus 3.31.2 (μαινοίμην).
which is not caused by emotion, is a difficult task. At Hld.7.7.2 Calasiris asks his sons Thyamis and Petosiris to cease fighting and refrain from their madness: μανία. We certainly cannot rule out stimulating factors such as anger or jealousy as motives which drive them towards strife and thereby madness. Leucippe’s excess dosage of love potion involves madness in terms of her physical behaviour, but also links her state to erotic passion. These examples are not collated on the basis that they exclude emotional involvement, but on the grounds that they do not characterise emotion directly. Other instances of references to madness in the novels involve the rhetorical formula of ‘I would be mad to…’, such as when Callirhoe declines the Persian King’s advances by professing that she is of too lowly a station to mingle with the king (Chariton 6.5.9). There are also intertextual references such as when Callirhoe, who is contemplating killing herself in order to avoid remarriage, compares herself to Medea, since suicide would involve ending the life of her unborn child (Chariton 2.9.3). This is one of a number of references which specifically engage with the literary heritage of tragedy. Finally we have divine inspiration, where the bandits riding down to the beach at the start of Heliodorus’ novel see Chariclea armed and godlike, and some assume that she has been ‘inspired’ by a god: ἐκμεμηνύων (Hld.1.2.6).

Erotic madness is the next largest category in the novels, and this shows that it is an important element thematically and emotionally. There are twenty occurrences over all the novels and roughly half of them refer to women. They are also distributed evenly over different types of character, with Anthia and Daphnis

224 Μηδείας λαμβάνεις λογισμούς.
225 Approaching the notion of erotic madness is madness as a metaphor for desire generally, which we see at Hld.2.34.8 and Hld.7.4.3. At Chariton 5.2.6 the word γυναιμανές refers to desire generally as the Persian crowd are eager to see the beauty of Callirhoe as a spectacle. It is used in a sexual way in the Iliad, however, when Hector upbraids Paris for being ‘woman-mad’, obviously referring to his relationship with Helen (Il.3.39). Women can also be lustful and ‘mad for’, ἐπιμανής, men: see Ach.Tat.8.1.2
226 Examples of erotic madness with gender of person affected indicated in brackets (m/f). A gnomic reference can refer to either sex if gender is not specified. Ach.Tat.2.3.3: (gnomic) ἐκμαίνουσιν; Ach.Tat.2.37.8: (f) μαίνεται; Ach.Tat.5.19.4: (f) μανιομένης; Ach.Tat.5.26.2: (f) μαίνεται; Ach.Tat.6.11.3: (f) μαίνεται; Hld.1.14.6: (f) μανικότερον; Hld.1.15.4: (f) μαίνεται; Hld 2.14.3: (m) μανικός; Hld 4.2.3: (m) μανικός; Hld 5.20.6: (m) μανικός; Hld 5.29.5: (m) μανικόδη; Hld.5.31.2: (m) ἐμμανής; Hld.7.7.5: (f) ἐμμανής; Hld.7.9.4: (f) μανία; Hld.7.20.5: (f) ἐκμεμηνύων; Hld.7.23.1: (f) μανία; Longus 1.25.2: (m) μαίνεσθαι; Longus 2.2.2: (m) μανικότερον; X.Eph.1.4.6: (f) μαίνομαι.
feeling the same emotion as pirates like Trachinus and wicked women such as Arsace.²²⁷ Where we do see more interesting results is in the authorial variety. Heliodorus has more references to erotic madness than any other novelist, while Chariton lacks any.²²⁸ The distribution of examples in Heliodorus is also more revealing. Theagenes and Chariclea feel erotic madness once each, Hld.4.2.3 and Hld.7.7.5 respectively, while the remaining nine examples are spread out amongst the unsavoury characters Demeaenete, Thermouthis, Trachinus, Pelorus and Arsace: bandits and loose women. Since this concept is used of the two main characters it is not intrinsically negative, but it is appropriately used more often of pirates and Phaedric women because it denotes a lack of control. It is these people who Heliodorus understands as most likely to give in to uncontrolled lust, and therefore they are characterised accordingly. On the other hand results across the other novels show that generally this metaphor does not imply anything as regards character or gender. One explanation for the absence of this metaphor in Chariton is the ‘moral uprightness’ of his story. His world is one of pirates and Persian tyrants but the behaviour is for the most part honourably Greek. The only thought of the pirate Thero is to sell the heroine Callirhoe, despite the fact that the author repeatedly maintains that she is the most attractive woman in the world. All her suitors are rich or powerful men and Chariton’s main rivals, Dionysius and the Persian Great King, are both conspicuous for the ‘educated’ way in which they attempt to fight against ἔρως.²²⁹ Chariton’s world is one in which people fall under a debilitating ἔρως but not a manic one.

Other emotions are represented as mad at some point in the novels. Specifically they are surprise, joy, anger and grief.²³⁰ Anger has the most references,

²²⁷ References repeated from previous footnote. Anthia: X.Eph.1.4.6; Daphnis: Longus 1.25.2; Trachinus: Hld 5.20.6; Arsace: Hld.7.9.4.
²²⁸ Over half of the references in total (eleven) quoted in the above footnote. This does not quite match up with the lengths of the novels proportionally. In the translations in Reardon 1989 the respective lengths (to within an error of one page) of all the novels are Achilles Tatius, 109; Chariton, 103; Longus, 60; Heliodorus, 235; Xenophon of Ephesus, 42.
²²⁹ Dionysius struggles against his emotion at Chariton 2.4.4 and the Great King at Chariton 6.3ff.
²³⁰ Surprise (or perhaps shock): Chariton 3.9.2. Joy: Ach.Tat.7.15.4. See below for discussion. Anger (ὀργή/θυμός): Ach.Tat.2.29.2; Ach.Tat.4.10.6; Ach.Tat.5.5.8; Ach.Tat.6.9.1; Ach.Tat.6.10.5; Ach.Tat.6.22.2; Hld.1.16.3; Hld.1.29.4; Hld.6.15.5. Grief: Ach.Tat.7.9.14; Ach.Tat.7.9.14; Hld 10.19.1; Hld 6.9.2.
and is also paired with ἔρως three times in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus.²³¹ Anger
and ἔρως in particular can lead to uncontrolled reactions.

One of the most noticeable themes in the Greek Novel concerning erotic
madness is the influence, implicit and explicit, of Greek Tragedy. First of all there
are characters connected with the violence of erotic madness in tragedy. Arsace,
Heliodorus’ wicked and lustful Persian, views the two men Thymis and Theagenes,
the former and future objects of her attention respectively, from afar during the
aborted mortal combat between Thymis and his brother Petosiris (Hld.7.7–9).
When she retires to her room she tosses and turns and cannot sleep, while she
experiences lovesickness for Theagenes. Morgan translates that ‘in short, her desire
was degenerating imperceptibly into insanity’: καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰς μανίαν λοιπὸν
ἐλάνθανεν ὁ ἔρως ὑποφερόμενος (Hld.7.9.4).²³² Her future actions will be
those of uninhibited passion, and so she will exemplify the manic aspects of ἔρως.
This is in stark contrast to the chaste ἔρως of Chariclea and Theagenes.²³³ Mania
here plays an important narrative role, as it signifies that Arsace’s passive
lovesickness will turn into violent revenge. It also indicates a specific emotional
scenario, where ἔρως, if left unfulfilled for too long, leads to manic action. In this
case it is not simply metonymous for ἔρως, but designates a specific part of the
scenario: extended frustration. Arsace is more active than Phaedra (in Euripides),
since Phaedra only acts once the nurse has unwillingly revealed her secret, whereas
Arsace shamelessly progresses with her seduction of Theagenes under no necessity
of circumstance. Despite the fact that she is in a position of power to effect this,
unlike Phaedra, her character seems fundamentally different from Phaedra’s.
Demaenete is similar in her active pursuit of her quarry Cnemon earlier in the same
novel. When madness is erotic, it highlights the lack of control associated with the
emotion.

²³¹ Ach.Tat.6.22.2; Hld. 1.15.2; Hld. 1.30.5.
²³² Reardon 1989, 496. At Ach.Tat.5.26.2 Melite argues to Clitophon that an unsuccessful ἔρως turns
one mad: ἔρως ἀτυχῶν καὶ μαίνεται. She is using the model for persuasive purposes, but her
conceptualisation coheres with the example of Arsace in Heliodorus, in that the continued frustration
of the subject causes madness in them.
²³³ See Morgan 1998 who contrasts the erotic experiences of Chariclea and Arsace. He argues that
Chariclea is sick with shame, whereas Arsace is sick from sexual frustration (66). For more on this
see the conclusion.
The tragic paradigm is a literary influence that the text often cites explicitly. We saw above that Callirhoe compared herself to Medea in her soliloquy (Chariton 2.9.3). In Heliodorus we get an interesting agreement of narrator and character on a specific model. Demaenete, who has formed an illicit desire for her stepson Cnemon, lusters after him ‘more madly’ than before, μανικώτερον, after he is exiled (Hld.1.14.6). This is a tragic madness as we are told that the Furies are pursuing her (Hld.1.14.6). This is part of her general depiction in Heliodorus, as earlier in the novel she compares herself to Phaedra when she leaps upon Cnemon and calls him ‘my Hippolytus’ (Hld.1.10.2). Cnemon reports her as being Phaedric, and she is seemingly complicit in this portrayal, if we can trust Cnemon’s reporting of her direct speech. Despite the complex layers of narration, I do not think we can seriously doubt that Demaenete is an explicit tragic intertext.

Another sense in which madness in the Greek Novel reflects standard earlier conceptions is in its status as a state rather than character trait. In this it is in line with the general conception of madness as emotional, since emotions are not specific character traits. Only the barbarians are unfortunate enough to have the madness of emotion attached to them as a permanent aspect of their racial character. When Callirhoe reaches the outskirts of Babylon there is intense interest over such a reportedly beautiful woman, because the barbarian is naturally ‘woman-mad’: φύσει δέ ἐστι τὸ βάρβαρον γυναιμανές (Chariton 5.2.6). The context of this is not ostensibly erotic, as it is the masses, both male and female, who will wonder at the Greek woman who outshines even their own queen. However, we may see in this reference a hint of the as yet unawakened desire of the Persian King, which will be directed so disastrously at Callirhoe. Erotic madness is in general a temporary state, and not an aspect of character, and this echoes its depiction in previous Greek literature, especially Greek tragedy. Even when it is an aspect of character it refers to a dispositional sense: barbarians under erotic circumstances are likely to go ‘mad’.

234 For the Furies, Erinyes, as a tragic component of epic see Hershkowitz 1998, 48ff. For the Furies in epic and tragedy see Padel 1992, 164ff.
235 Demaenete also confesses to being mad with passion, ἐκμαίνει, at Hld.1.15.4.
236 With a few exceptions. See the passage on barbarians below and women’s ‘innate jealousy’ in the section above on lovesickness.
237 For Callirhoe’s beauty as a visual phenomenon for the masses see Schmeling 2005.
Another tragic element of madness which resurfaces in the Greek Novel is Dionysus and his revels. In Longus we are told that at the festival of Dionysus the young men pressing the wine jump madly around Chloe like Satyrs around a Bacchant: ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τινα Βάκχην Σάτυροι μανικώτερον ἐπήδων (Longus 2.2.2). The madness is erotic attraction, and it is enforced by the associate notions of wine and Dionysus. Alcohol and madness both indicate lack of control. In Achilles Tatius the same three elements are united in a description of internal emotion rather than interpersonal action. Clitophon often digresses from the narrative to describe internal feelings, and one such occasion is the banquet where he and Leucippe are seated opposite each other at a meal for the first time. As Clitophon drinks, he glances ever more boldly at the object of his desire, for Dionysus and Eros often operate together.

Ερως δὲ καὶ Διόνυσος, δύο βίαιοι θεοί, ψυχὴν κατασχόντες ἐκμαίνουσιν εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν. ὁ μὲν καίων αὐτὴν τῷ συνήθει πυρί, ὁ δὲ τὸν οἶνον υπέκκαυμα φέρων· οἶνος γὰρ ἔρωτος τροφή (Ach.Tat.2.3.3).

This passage invokes the concept of erotic madness, ἐκμαίνουσιν, and the seat of the emotions, ψυχή. It also sets the act of madness against social norms, where the societal notion of restraint, αἰσχυντία, is overwhelmed by the irrationality of the emotion, conceptualised as madness.238 The god which binds the above strands together is Dionysus, god of wine, who is also the god of divine madness. Madness and divine inspiration are inexorably entwined in the portrayal of emotional responses. When Chariclea behaves ‘madly’ after her father introduces the suitor Alcamenes to her, her father describes her as ‘enthused’: ἡ παῖς δαιμονᾶν ἔοικεν (Hld.4.7.10). He has made an understandable conjecture based upon ancient Greek folk models. She cannot bear the sight of him because she loves Theagenes, and therefore her mad behaviour has an erotic overtone. Later on Arsace ‘feels like a

238 See Konstan 2009, 1, on ἔρως as transgression of social boundaries: ‘Erôs is frequently perceived to be dangerous, since it is intense and tends to excess (Plato Laws 837Α6-9), and it is often represented as transgressive, insofar as it tends to fixate on an object without regard for law or custom’.
Bacchant’ at receiving a drink from Theagenes: ἐξεβάκχευσεν (Hld.7.27.3).239 This passage portrays erotic desire as divine madness, which overrules social conventions. The lack of control implicit in mad emotions is defined socially.

Madness and emotion are often generally associated together, without necessarily any reference to a specific emotion. There are, however, different ways in which they can be associated. The first of these is external, where the facial expression of a person experiencing emotion is like that of a mad person. In Chariton’s novel Callirhoe pines away in exile as the property of Dionysius. Her former husband Chaereas has come looking for her, and she is shocked when Dionysius’ servant Plangon reveals that two strangers entered the temple of Aphrodite, where there is a statue of Callirhoe herself, and that one of them fainted at the sight of it. This raises Callirhoe’s suspicion that Chaereas himself has come looking for her and she becomes like a mad person: ὡσπερ ἐμμανὴ γενομένη (Chariton 3.9.2). There is a previously existing erotic relationship between Callirhoe and Chaereas, but the situation evokes shock or surprise rather than any particular erotic feeling, although the extension of madness to include desire adds subtle nuance to Callirhoe’s depiction. She is still ‘in love’ with or rather erotically attached to Chaereas. The description here owes a lot to her facial expression. She cries out ‘staring with her eyes’: στήσασα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς (Chariton 3.9.2).240 This body language is interpreted as a sign of an internal emotional experience.241 The external expression is a sign of internal experience, and the eyes indicate manic emotion. Although it is a facial expression, it still brings with it an emphasis in cognitive content. When emotions are labelled as ‘mad’ emotions, they highlight the loss of psychological and somatic control and imply that the emotion is irrational. There is also an associated notion of movement, displayed at both an experiential level and a metaphorical one. Madmen and Bacchants move quickly and erratically,

239 Near the end of the novel Chariclea runs ‘mad like a Bacchant’, βάκχιόν τι καὶ ἐμμανές, towards her adoptive father Charicles (Hld.10.38.1). Of course this is not erotic madness but rather the madness of emotion.

240 I can find no exact parallels for this expression. A TLG search brings up Leo Synadensis Epist., Epistulae 22.14 and Constantius Acropolites Rhet. et Hagiogr. Epistulae 92.14, but in neither of these references does στήσασα apply to the eyes. It is possibly a new coinage for a standard piece of body language, where the eyes stand out or bulge in madness. Rolling eyes are a long standing association of madness. See n.241 below.

241 Pelorus the pirate displays his erotic madness on his face: ἀπὸ τοῦ βλέμματος ἐμμανές τι διαινοούμενος (Hld.5.31.2).
and so does the emotion inside a person. Thus the pirate Trachinus has an ‘insane motion’ for Chariclea: μανιώδη κίνησιν (Hld.5.29.5.5). Rather than seeing this connection of inside and outside as an early Greek feature, as Padel does, I would argue that this is a standard feature of metaphorical reasoning. Metaphors embedded in experience extrapolate concepts form the outside to the inside. Metaphor is cognitive and reflects the way that people think.

There is an important scene in Achilles Tatius which portrays the relationship between emotion and madness physiologically. Partway through book 4 of Achilles Tatius his heroine Leucippe has a fit, whereupon she falls down with her eyes ‘rolling’: τω ὀφθαλμῷ διαστρέφειν (Ach.Tat.4.9.1). The signalling of madness in the eyes with διαστρέφειν is standard. When Clitophon tries to run up and restrain her she strikes him, her eyes bloodshot: ὑφαιμὸν βλέπουσα (Ach.Tat.4.9.2.). Those standing around understand that she has been afflicted by some kind of mania (Ach.Tat.4.9.2). She is restrained and Clitophon laments that they have come so far only for her to fall victim to this. They engage a doctor to treat her, as if the condition is an illness, and it emerges a short while later that the fit was brought on by a love potion administered at too great a strength. So while the madness was induced by a drug there is a correlation between the intensity of emotion and madness. The love potion was designed to make her feel ἔρως, but too much was given, and an excess of chemical stimulation to ἔρως produced madness. This ‘scientific’ passage which refers to a drug reflects the folk model that excess emotion leads to madness. It is this model which is engaged when people naturally

242 Morgan translates it as ‘insane infatuation’ (Reardon, 1989). The word κίνησις is used of human emotions in Arrian (Arr.Επιτ.2.20.19). This metaphor also relies on the view of emotion itself as internal motion. However, this does not diminish the suitability and consistency of its conjunction with madness.


244 Διαστροφός is used of eyes signalling madness: see S.Ap.447. See Padel 1995, 74, whirling eyes at Aesch.PV 882 (τροχοθνεῖται δ’ ὀμμαθ’ ἐλιγδήν) and the parallel whirling of mad women at Eur.HF 868 (διαστροφόσοις ἐλάπτεις) and Eur.Ba.1123 (διαστροφόσοις κόραις ἐλαίασον’). Hp.Progn.7 states that if there is a throbbing in the hypochondrium then it indicates disturbance or wandering of mind: εἰ δὲ καὶ σφυγμὸν ἐνείη ἐν τῷ ὑποχονδρίῳ, θόρυβον σημαίνει, ἢ παραφροσύνην.

245 The narrator then turns to the personification of madness itself, as he bewails that fact that they are the playthings, παιδιά, of μανία (Ach.Tat.4.9.5), and have been watched all the time by it: μανία γὰρ ἠτροφύμεθα (Ach.Tat.4.9.6). His rhetoric seems more than a little comic (to the reader, not the narrator). For comic elements in Achilles Tatius see Durham 1938 and Chew 2000.
feel the mania of emotion. They feel it in an extreme form. So mania can be metonymous for intensive emotion, not merely a metonym for emotion in general. This is illustrated by Prodicus’ dictum: ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν διπλασιασθείσαν ἔρωτα εἶναι, ἔρωτα δὲ διπλασιασθέντα μανίαν γίγνεσθαι (fr.B 7DK). Ἐρως is intense desire and mania is intense ἔρως.246

The general model for emotion as madness is reflected throughout the novels. Yet there is not always so simple a correlation between the two domains. Emotional madness is often seen in terms of another metaphor, and these metaphors provide additional cognitive structuring to the notion of emotion as madness. One of the most longstanding associations of madness is as a disease.247 This can be seen in the common roots of both as caused by the divine. The divine aspect of madness has already been discussed, and we can see a divine cause for disease in the outbreak of the plague upon the Achaemen in book one of the Iliad, brought about by Apollo’s wrath.248 Madness and disease are themselves related, both in the way that madness is seen as a disease and the way that madness is structured partly by the disease metaphor, according to Padel.249 In emotion they too can be associated together or separately. In Plato’s Phaedrus there is a division of mania into the type which results from disease and that which comes from divine inspiration.250 Following Padel’s point I would say that the disease of emotional madness adds additional conceptual material.

Madness and disease can be united when someone wishes to speak of an unhealthy desire. At the approach of Thyamis with an armed band to the city of Memphis, the satrap’s wife Arsace asks the men what mania for war they have been infected with: πολέμου μὲν ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἔφη, μανίαν ἐνοσήσατε πάντες (Hld.7.4.3). It is a rhetorical use of the term, to try and discredit their will as a mania produced by a νόσος, but it must be culturally plausible. This is an evaluative use of the metaphor. At Ach.Tat.6.13.1 Sosthenes says to Leucippe that she is not just mad, 246 Plato in the Philebus also talks of pleasure ‘to the verge of madness’ (45e).
247 Madness is conceived of as a νόσος at S.Aj.635.
248 See introduction above.
249 Plato’s Timaeus uses a medical analogy in conceptualising madness (86b). Padel 1995, 42 argues that one of the reasons madness is seen as a temporary state in Greek Tragedy is because of the importance of the disease model. Like a disease madness comes and goes and is not innate to character.
250 Pl.Phdr.265a.
μαίνεσθαι μανίαν, but ‘incurably’ so: ἀνήκεστον. Again it is rhetorical: she is completely mad if she does not accept Thersander as a lover. Earlier on when Leucippe displays symptoms of madness from the love potion the narrator tells us that in ten days the νόσος did not ease up (Ach.Tat.4.15.1). The disease model coheres with the madness model as a temporary state, and it can be used to evaluate the madness model in a negative way, although not in terms of personal responsibility.

There is a common metaphor for emotion which is consistently used in erotic imagery and is consistently associated with madness. This is where the sensation of the emotion is compared to the sting of a gadfly. The verbal form is οἰστράω, to sting, from the word for the gadfly, οἶστρος, and in previous literature it often means ‘raging’, as it prototypically indicates the behaviour prompted by madness.251 It is a metonym of cause for behaviour, as the reason someone is raging is because they have been ‘stung’, but also indicates the starting point of the emotion and presents it as metaphorically as a sting. The connection between the two concepts can be seen clearly at Hld.7.7.5, where Chariclea is reunited with her partner Theagenes after a short period of separation. She is overcome by the sight of him and runs towards him manically as if stung by the sight of him: ἡ ὡσπερ οἰστρηθεῖσα ὑπὸ ὄψεως ἐμμανής.252 The causal relationship between the two concepts is clear. Stinging prompts madness, and she runs forward mad as if stung.

In Longus Chloe is stung to erotic madness by her infatuation with Daphnis. The narrator tells us that no cow stuck by the gadfly acted in such a way: οὐδὲ βοῦς

251 See S.Tr.653, where Ares the god of war is described as raging, οἰστροθεῖς. Also see E.Ba.119 where the behaviour of the women in a Bacchic revel is caused by the stinging of Dionysus: οἰστρηθεῖς Διονύσω. This links the metaphor of the sting to the divine inspiration caused by Dionysus, who instigates madness in the Greek Novel in our example from Achilles Tatius above (Ach.Tat.2.3.3). Other famous examples are the simile of Heracles as a bull struck by the gadfly in Apollonios’ Argonautica (A.R.1265ff.) and οἶστρος as a metonym for madness in Euripides’ Heracles (1144). Anacreontea 33.28 describes the arrows if ἔρως as like a οἶστρος. Oppian speaks of the sweat gadfly of Aphrodite which comes in springtime (Halieutica 1.473). On Io, who is stung by a gadfly sent by Hera, see n.250 below. Due to Io’s paradigm the gadfly can be associated with the wandering caused by madness. On madness and wandering un Greek culture see Montiglio 2005, 2, 3, 16-18, 37-41, 65, 75-83, 104, 120-22. At S.Ant.785-90 ἔρως wanders over the sea and maddens the person it possesses. The daughters of Proteus run in the wild because Aphrodite has maddened them with erotic desire (Aelian Varia historia 3.4.2).

252 There may well be erotic overtones in this description, but I will limit the discussion here to cultural models of madness.
οἴστρῳ πληγείσης τοσαῦτα ἔργα (Longus 1.13.6). Gill translates this phrase as to ‘behave…madly’, thus bringing out the notion implicit in the metaphor.\footnote{Reardon 1989, 294. Gill states in footnote 9 that ‘Longus’ description of the symptoms of the “sickness” of love recalls Greek love poetry, esp. Sappho’. While this is certainly the case, the behaviour implied in the madness of love as opposed to the sickness of love makes an interesting contrast. The lovesick person lies ill in bed, whereas the raging person moves quickly around like a stung cow. Compare the well known myth of Io. Zeus changes her into a cow in order to hide her from Hera, but his wife is not fooled and sends a gadfly to sting her, causing her to wander in distress. The madness of the sting necessitates motion. For Io and the gadfly see Aesch.\textit{PV} 567-8; \textit{Supp.} 308, 540-1, 556-64, 573; Soph.\textit{EL}.5. Also see Pedal 1995, 14-17. Obviously this gives the image a strong female connotation in tragedy. See also the imagery of Medea struck by the gadfly in A.R.3.275-7. Hershkowitz 1998, 30 sees Apollonius’ comparison of Heracles to a bull as reshaping the female tragic image into an epic masculine one. See also οἰστρημένος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος Iamb.\textit{VP} 31.195}

There are several variations on this theme in Longus. In the subsequent passage Chloe ponders the physical nature of the emotion she is feeling: ‘how often did brambles scratch me, and I did not cry? How many bees stung me, and I did not cry out? But whatever stings my καρδία now is more bitter than all those’ (Longus 1.14.2).\footnote{The verb νύσσω is also used metaphorically of a sting at Luc.\textit{Herm}.71. See also the previous footnote.}

She feels a νύττον, sharp point, in her καρδία which is comparable but more intense than her previous experiences. The sharp point is cognate with the ontology of a sting.\footnote{The use of the word bitter, πικρός, is the same as in the previous example, and it is the metaphorical usage of this word as ‘sharp’ which is being applied here. In this concrete sense it fits well the image of the sting or the goad, as when it is used of the sharp point of an arrow at \textit{II}.4.118. For the erotic sense of the κέντρον see E.\textit{Hipp}.39 and that of Aphrodite at E.\textit{Hipp}.1303, and also Pl.\textit{Phdr}.251e. It is really a metaphor for all kinds of desire, but has a strong erotic heritage. In the previous sentence we have the description of her mouth as ‘sweeter’, γλυκύτερον, than honeycomb. This is therefore a play on the traditional conception of ἔρως as ‘bitter-sweet’. See Pl.\textit{Phdr}.251c–e; Sappho 130.2; Thgn.1353-6. and Carson 1998.}

In fact the metaphor combines the two previous referents, as it encompasses the prick of the bramble and the sting of the bee. This sharp point is also used in the image of the κέντρον. When Chloe kisses Daphnis in book one it is ‘more bitter’, πικρότερον, than a κέντρον (Longus 1.18.1).\footnote{The sting of the bee here is indicated by the word κέντρον which denotes a sharp point. This term can also be a metaphor for ἔρως and will be discussed below. In Xenophon of Ephesus the goad is used of Anthia’s ἔρως (1.9.7)}

This word denotes any ‘sharp point’, but significantly it is often used to mean ‘goad’. The difference that this association makes is that it potentially steps outside the realm of animalification to personification of the emotion. In the sting image, there is predominantly the notion of one animal, the cow, being stung by another, the gadfly,
whereas in the image of the goad the emotion striking the beast must be a person.\textsuperscript{257} In terms of the ontology of the emotion, both metaphors conceive the experience as a sharp prick, but both do not necessarily conceive the emotion as the same type of agent. In Heliodorus Demaenete makes clever use of the ambiguity of the goad metaphor. Her stepson Cnemon, to whom she made inappropriate advances à la Phaidra, has been exiled thanks to her machinations. Unfortunately, it has not stopped the pangs of passion she feels for him. When her friends come to visit they are astonished at her devotion to her disgraced stepson (unaware of her real feelings) and she tells them that she is in a bad way and that there is a sharp point in her καρδία: τῇ καρδίᾳ κέντρον (Hld.1.14.6). The sharp sensations of grief can be a goad, and this is the assumption her friends make. However, what she is referring to is the sharp pain of ἐρως, and this coverage of both grief and ἐρως suits well the negative and painful nature of both.\textsuperscript{258} It also corresponds to the use of the madness metaphor, which covers the negative emotions of anger, grief and ἔρως. The metaphor is one of pain, and this can be used for many emotions. It also indicates madness, and therefore intensity of emotion. Considering the image of Io wandering distracted by the pain of the sting, we see that the metaphor involved is a correlation of intensity of emotion with intensity of pain, via madness as metonymical of emotional intensity.

In terms of the imagery of the sting, as with the ambiguous statement of Demaenete, grief can cause a deranged reaction. In book six of the Aethiopica Chariclea is bereft of her partner Theagenes, who has been taken away as a slave by the Persians. She is stung in a Bacchic way, unties her hair freely and tears at her dress: βάκχιόν τι οἰστρηθεῖσα τάς τε κόμας ἀφειδῶς λύεται καὶ θοιμάτιον περιρρηξαμένη (Hld.6.8.3). There are several interesting points here. First the sting of emotion is associated with Bacchic revelry. Second the behavioural

\textsuperscript{257} Κέντρον can also denote a sting. See LSJ s.v. κέντρον.

\textsuperscript{258} The image of the goad is also used of Arsace’s jealousy, ζηλοτυπία, at Hld.7.8.6. This is another negative emotion, but it is interesting that the madness of jealousy per se does not appear in the Greek Novel. The closest we have is a metonym when Achaemenes is ‘stung’ by ὄργη, ζηλοτυπία and ἐρως (Hld.7.29.1). The Ethiopian people are ‘bitten’, δηχθείσα κέντρως…ηράσθη (E.Hipp.1303). See also Call.1.c: ἐρωτι δέδαγμένος. The bite appears in Stoic theories of emotion. See Sorabji 2000, 38, 40–1, 66–8, 70, 120, 204.
response to the emotion, freeing her hair and tearing her dress, conforms to established cultural norms of expressing grief. It also corresponds to the behaviour of Bacchants, who are possessed with divine madness, and these correspondences all depict the frenzy of grief. Thus there is a direct link from behavioural/experiential cultural models to metaphors of emotion. As this part of Heliodorus progresses we see another reference to the outward display of the emotion. In her grief Chariclea’s eyes still indicate, ἐπισημαίνον, the madness she suffered before her sleep (Hld.6.9.2). This physiognomic description reads the madness of grief as an external sign visible in the eyes.

Two examples from the Greek Novel involve animals. In Longus a bull in love bellows as if stung by the οἶστρος (Longus 2.7.4). Achilles Tatius departs from the cow and gadfly imagery so often associated with this metaphor. In his list of various animals and inanimate objects under ἔρως’ domain, Clitophon cites the example of the viper, which ‘stings into’ the object of its passion, the eel: ὁ ἔχις τῆς γῆς ὄφις εἰς τὴν σμύραιναν οἰστρεῖ (Ach.Tat.1.18.3). The context makes it clear that the sting is erotic. Later on in the philosophical argument between Menelaus and Clitophon as to who make the better lovers, boys or women, the narrator describes the culmination of the act of sex as a sting for the woman: ἐν δὲ τῇ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκμῇ οἰστρεῖ μὲν υψ’ ἡδονῆς, περικέχηνε δὲ φιλούσα καὶ μαίνεται (Ach.Tat.2.37.8). In this context it is explicitly connected with madness, μαίνεται, and imbues the notion with a physical sensuality. Both these incidences highlight the fact that when the verb or noun is used metaphorically of a person it has a strong association with the non-human or animal side of emotion.

The metaphor of the bite shares the associations of the sting. Chloe’s kiss bites Daphnis’ heart, καρδία, and maddens him like fresh honey: δάκνει τὸ φίλημα τὴν καρδίαν, καὶ ὕσπερ τὸ νέον μέλι μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ (Longus 1.25.2). The metaphor of the bite is animalification and denotes the pain of the emotion, just as the sting.259 The simile introduces a new concept, that of the

259 Pain and madness are often connected, especially when it is erotic madness. In the Aethiopica Cybele, Arsace’s servant, says that her mistress is experiencing pain and madness, ἀνία καὶ μανία (Hld.7.23.1). Heliodorus (or Cybele) seems to be making a play on the sound of both words—the repetition of ἀνία—which causes them to be seen more emphatically as a pair. Perhaps one could say
sweetness of honey, which is like the kiss in its effect. Finally Daphnis is maddened by the sensation. The physical effect of the kiss was emphasised earlier by Daphnis at Longus 1.18.2, where he wonders if Chloe imbibed her lips with poison before kissing him. There is of course the logic in the metonymy of the organ of the kiss representing the kiss as a bite and this bite in turn metaphorically conceiving of the kisser as an animal.

The other emotions associated with the ‘sting’ are also illuminating. Achaemenes is stung by ἔρως, ὀργή, and ζηλοτυπία (Hld.7.29.1). These are the emotions which can be conceptualised in the same way as ἔρως, as we saw above in the section on fire. Jealousy and anger are also ‘raving’ emotions which can cause people to lose control. This lack of control is seen in the two other emotions represented by the metaphor of the sting: grief and fear. This metaphor ‘suits’ these emotions and is therefore mapped onto them.

This conceptual proximity of emotions explains an interesting example from book two of Heliodorus. Chariclea is a little put out at the news that Theagenes has kissed another girl (the dead Thisbe) and asks who she is. She qualifies her statement by saying she hopes that they do not think her bitten by ἔρως: ἀλλ’ εἰ μή τί με δακνομένην ἔρωτι υπονοεῖν μέλλετε (Hld.2.8.2). Morgan’s translation —‘please do not suppose that love is making me feel pangs of jealousy’— summarises the emotional experience nicely, but the Greek makes no mention of a word for jealousy. The context makes it clear that jealousy is at stake, as another (potential) rival for Theagenes is involved. What we have here is ἔρως as a metonym for ζηλοτυπία. The model of ἔρως is superimposed onto or conflated with the model of jealousy.

The sting or bite image arises from the physical sensation of pain, in particular a pain which impels the person afflicted towards movement. It is

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the point is that one cannot have μανία without ἀνία (on a conceptual and written level). If one were to deride the play on words one could go further and see it as reflecting upon Cybele’s status and character.

260 Arsace is stung by ζηλοτυπία at Hld 7.8.6.
261 Chariclea is stung by grief at Hld.6.8.3. I have interpreted this experience as grief due to the context, where she is mourning her separation from Theagenes. She unites her hair and tears her dress; prototypical behavioural indicators of grief in ancient Greece. A horse is stung by fear in Achilles Tatius: οἰστρῆθεις τῷ φόβῳ (1.12.3).
particularly associated with madness and the motion implied by Bacchic inspiration, and thereby an integral part of erotic madness. An interesting feature of the occurrence of this metaphor is the gender/type distribution. It is predominantly used of women, and the only exceptions we have are a couple of examples concerning animals, the viper and a bull, and a single instance of a non-Greek male. The image has a distinct ‘otherness’ about it, and Clitophon’s association of it with a female’s experience of sex is revealing. I would venture that the prototype is a female being ‘stung’, with an extension to a non-Greek male, and the strong connotations of bestial nature seen in the examples used of animals. Bites and stings presuppose that one is the victim of the physical attack of some animal or insect. As with most metaphors it is not exclusive to ἔρως but represents a certain type of emotional experience, of which ἔρως is a common instantiation. It also is a momentary sensation rather than a long term effect. In all these aspects it reflects its portrayal in Greek Tragedy.

The model of emotional madness in the novels is coherent throughout the instances of the words and metaphors representing it. However, metaphors add additional conceptual content, such as the debilitation of an illness or the bestial implication of the sting. The following are all prototypical aspects of the domain of emotional madness: it represents an internal intensity, which threatens to spill out into action by the person affected. It stands for intense emotions, such as anger, passion and grief, and indicates the intensity of these emotions themselves.

Anger is the prototypical emotion for ‘losing control’. In Heliodorus we are told that Demaenete is raging because of ἔρως and θυμός: τῷ τε θυμῷ καὶ ἔρωτι περιμανῆ (Hld.1.15.2). In context Thisbe, who tricked Cnemon on Demaenete’s orders in order to have him exiled, is worried about becoming the object of her resentment. Now that Cnemon is gone, Demaenete feels the pangs of ἔρως like never before. The image therefore displays the irrational and unpredictable side of these two emotions, and conceives of them as ones which can prompt a violent  

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262 At Ach.Tat.1.18.3, Longus 2.7.4 and Hld.7.29.1 respectively.
263 The goad of ἔρως, κέντρον, afflicts a Greek male, Daphnis (Longus 1.18.1), but this is a slightly different metaphor, as the person affecting him must be a person: personification rather than animalification. Demaenete feels the goad of ἔρως and grief (Hld.1.14.6) and Anthia that of ἔρως (X.Eph.1.9.7).
264 See Padel 1995, 14-17.
The inconsistency of the emotion is seen in the fact that Demaenete’s feelings now override her earlier judgement, which was in turn emotionally based. Emotions are fickle in the way in which they direct action. As a result of Thisbe’s apprehension she decides to anticipate her mistress’ revenge, and get her out of the way. She visits Cnemon’s father in the country and tells him that Cnemon’s crime of attacking his father, which casued him to be exiled, was actually an attempt to catch an adulterer. Tricked by Demaenete and Thisbe he burst into his father’s bedroom angry that his bed was being dishonoured. Thisbe describes Cnemon’s state at this point as ‘raging’: ἐμμανής (Hld.1.16.3). He was heedlessly charging into the room in a violent manner, and so the adjective nicely encapsulates the emotional response as being of a high intensity and liable to violence. This propensity to violence is another aspect of the emotion as madness metaphor.

Anger is associated with madness at a more philosophical level by Achilles Tatius. Leucippe’s mother almost catches her and Clitophon together in the night, and scolds her daughter for, as she thinks, compromising her chastity. Once she is left alone Leucippe reflects on events while three emotions - grief, shame and anger - take hold of her. The narrator goes into great detail in describing her psychological state and explains that these three emotions are waves of the soul (ψυχή). Of these anger roars around the heart and engulfs reason with the foam of madness: ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ περιϋλακτοῦσα τὴν καρδίαν ἐπικλύζει τὸν λογισμὸν τῷ τῆς μανίας ἀφρῷ (Ach.Tat. 2.29.2). Madness, in the form of foam (appropriately suiting the main image of ‘waves’), is the instrument with which ὀργή submerges reason (λογισμός). What is important here is that madness represents the uncontrolled/able aspect of anger, rage, which negates any effort at logical reasoning. In a later passage the other emotion most often associated with madness in the

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265 We see a similar situation with Thyamis later on in book one. The bandit leader is running back to find his betrothed Chariclea and kill her, and we are told that he is being held down by ἐρως, jealousy and anger (Hld.1.30.7). It comes as no surprise then that he is ἐμμανής (Hld.1.30.5).

266 The foam of anger is a good example of the embodiment of metaphor (see introduction). In the Iliad a lion produces foam at the mouth when he is speared by a hunter: περί τ’ ἀφρός ὀδόντας γίγνεται (20.168). This physiological reaction could easily indicate anger or perhaps the madness of anger (compare the referent of the simile, Achilles, who is also angrily hacking down the Trojan troops). For a further discussion on this passage and the metaphors in it see the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία.
novels, ἔρως, is entrusted with its own metaphor for madness imbedded in a philosophical passage. Anger and ἔρως are two torches, λαμπάδες, whose fires engage one another in the inside of a person. Ἐρως is the one which rages around the καρδία (Ach.Tat.6.19.1-7).

A further example from Achilles Tatius defines the role of anger and madness in the emotional scenario. Thersander enters his house and rails against his wife Melite for letting Clitophon escape, whom Thersander had locked up on the suspicion of being involved with his wife. She claims in turn that she only gave him hospitality as a result of sympathy, because at the time he was an impoverished wanderer in the same way as she imagined Thersander to be, who was lost at sea. She persuades him to assuage his anger, first by denying the truth of his utterance, and second by philosophising about the damage done by rumour and slander (Ach.Tat.6.10.3-6). In the midst of this speech she tells him that slander shoots forth a lie against a person and wounds them even if they are not present. For the hearer of the slander is quickly persuaded, the fire of their anger is lit, and they rage against the person struck by the slander: ὁ δὲ ἀκούων ταχὺ πείθεται, καὶ ὀργῆς αὐτῷ πῦρ ἐξάπτεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βληθέντα μαίνεται (Ach.Tat.6.10.5). The person that slander strikes, βληθέντα, corresponds to Melite and the person who is angry upon hearing it to Thersander. The emotional response in the text specifies a chain of reaction. First the fire of ὀργῆ is lit, and then the person rages, μαίνεται. Here madness as a reaction is a result of an internal emotional state. The angry person rages like a madman because they are angry. Thersander is a character with an explosive temper and portrays the maddening effects of anger very well. A little earlier when he initially comes into the house and starts shouting at her, Melite tells him to ‘drop his mania’, τὴν μανίαν ἀφεῖς, and listen to her (Ach.Tat.6.9.1).

Melite is using the association of anger with madness deliberately, in order to highlight the irrationality of Thersander’s behaviour. In her rhetoric the metaphor of madness negatively evaluates the emotion. This is not an evaluation type

Garnaud prefers the reading ὁ δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ περιβέβληται to ὁ δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ περιμαίνεται. As we can see from this chapter, the second reading is acceptable in terms of meaning, but entails personification of the emotion. The former usage comes from another prevalent metaphor for ἔρως, that of combat. See the following chapter on this.
consistently used in the novels. With seemingly blissful unawareness of his insensitivity Sosthenes, Thersander’s servant, solicits the captive Leucippe on his master’s behalf. Thersander is madly in love with her, ἐρᾷ σου καὶ μαίνεται, and is likely to make her his wife (Ach.Tat.6.11.3). This proposal is doomed to failure, but it is interesting to note that the erotic metonym of madness is not deemed a negative concept in the expression of one’s desire. It is an acceptable profile of the emotion for rhetorical persuasion.\footnote{This is in contrast to the negative portrayal of madness proper when shortly after Sosthenes calls Leucippe mad, μαίνεσθαι, for not wanting to marry Thersander (Ach.Tat.6.13.1).}

This is because it can denote the lack of responsibility someone takes for their emotions: they are passive and their actions are not voluntary.

Madness can stand for or in relation to emotion, but it is not exactly the same as emotion. Metaphors highlight certain aspects of the source and target domains, and therefore we must look to see whether madness denotes a certain form or type of these emotions, rather than being merely a metonym. One persuasive argument Melite makes to Clitophon is that an unsuccessful desire becomes manic: ἔρως ἀτυχῶν καὶ μαίνεται (Ach.Tat.5.26.2).\footnote{This example brings together several clichés of erotic imagery for the purposes of persuasion. Melite claims that having sex with Clitophon once will suffice, ἄρκει μοι κἂν μία συμπλοκή, and she goes on to conceptualise this act as a medicine, something to extinguish her inner fire, and something to ease her madness (Ach.Tat.5.26.2).}

The rhetoric of emotion, where conceptualisations of emotions are used for persuasive purposes (deliberative oratory), allows the speaker to select which notions are most beneficial for the purposes of persuasion. In this case Melite needs to utilise metaphors and metonyms which are more likely to convince Clitophon to sleep with her, and she goes on to emphasise the suffering involved with the emotion.\footnote{Her argument covers many aspects, changing from an emotional to legal form, where she claims that they swore an oath to one another earlier in the novel (Ach.Tat.5.26.4), and then to a moral/religious form, where she asks for the fulfilment of the mysteries of the god (Ach.Tat.5.26.10). I will discuss only the ones relevant to metaphors of ἔρως here.}

In an act of persuasion there are two parties involved, and it is essential in order to be persuasive that the metaphors chosen are commonly accepted cultural ones. In this case Clitophon accepts the premise of Melite’s argument—that she is suffering from the emotion—and therefore agrees to her demands (rather easily, given the predominance of chastity in the novel genre). To return to our original point, the madness of ἔρως...
here denotes the internal confusion and lack of rationality which results from unfulfilled passion, and therefore occupies this position in the emotional scenario.

There is an interesting passage in Achilles Tatius which analyses the way in which grief can cause erotic madness. In book six Thersander, the husband of Melite, has kidnapped Leucippe and is trying to force her to consent to his advances. The poor girl cannot help crying at her plight, and the narrator interrupts the narrative with a description of the power of tears to enhance beauty (Ach.Tat.6.7.1-2). Leucippe’s tears cause her grief to be overpowered by her beauty, αὐτὴν τὴν λύπην εἰς κάλλος νενικηκότα, and thereby Thersander is struck silent at her beauty and is driven mad at her grief: πρὸς δὲ τὴν λύπην ἐξεμεμήνει (Ach.Tat.6.7.3). The narrator goes on to say that beauty, κάλλος, passes from eye to eye and draws tears from the person watching in sympathy for grief. Therefore Thersander started to weep as well. This passage relies on Achilles Tatius’ frequent use of the optical theory of κάλλος as an emission from one eye to another. We will leave aside the detailed theory for now (see the chapter on vision). After this digression in the narrative we return to Thersander’s internal state, and the narrator tells us that he wept partly because he was affected passively by the emotion, παθὼν μέν τι, and partly to show that he was weeping because she was: ὡς διὰ τοῦτο δεδακρυμένος, ὅτι κἀκείνη δακρύει (Ach.Tat.6.7.7). This reveals two aspects of the emotions in Achilles Tatius. The first is that the tears engendered by the vision of beauty are an instinctive response. The second aspect is a cognitive evaluation and manipulation of his emotion by Thersander, for the purposes of ingratiating himself with Leucippe. The emotional madness he first felt upon seeing Leucippe crying was an emotional reaction, along the lines of the physiological response, not an evaluated response. This is the basic conceptualisation of the metaphor of madness as applied to emotions.

The court case in Achilles Tatius is another show piece where madness and emotion are connected. Clitophon has falsely confessed to hiring the murderer of Leucippe, because he believes her dead and want to join her by being condemned by the court. This suicidal reaction to the loss of the beloved or the loss of the affections of the beloved is a common one in the novels. The court have his
testimony for a conviction, but his lawyer argues the truth, that he only accused himself because of his madness brought about by grief: μαίνεται γὰρ ὑπὸ λύπης (Ach.Tat.7.9.14). Clitophon’s confession cannot be accepted because it is untrue, brought about by a (temporary) irrationality caused by grief. Madness is caused by grief rather than being a metonym for it.

Madness is rarely symptomatic of ἔρως in the Greek Novel. For the most part it is metonymous for the emotion as a whole. Like madness, the state of one’s mind under ἔρως involves a lack of control and a threat to social conventions. However, there are also some hints of the model being applied to a specific part of the emotional scenario: the result of frustrated ἔρως.

Lovesickness and madness are not only symptomatic but metaphorical/metonymical of ἔρως. Furthermore neither is the dominant paradigm for ἔρως in the novel. There are more examples of the fire of ἔρως and ἔρως as an opponent, which we will look at in the following chapter. Both metaphors are conceptual, in that they arise from the experience of emotions by the person affected and others. A lovesick person shows symptoms which deceptively seem like those of a physical disease. The debilitation of a person in love gives rise to the metaphor of disease, which in turn adds its own structure to the emotion. The person affected contracts the emotion, suffers and requires a ‘cure’. It also negatively evaluates the emotion, but not necessarily the person affected. A disease is ‘unhealthy’, and so is a diseased emotion, yet the person is not necessarily to be held responsible for contracting that disease. Madness, or mad behaviour, can also be seen as symptomatic of the emotion, and this gives rise to the conceptualisation of emotion as madness. In this it is the danger of trespassing social boundaries which both domains share. The tragic depiction of emotional madness is still present psychologically, albeit in a less emphatic form. Both metaphors are used of emotions other than ἔρως, and it is this commonality of conceptualisation which permeates ἔρως and makes it a firm member of the group of πάθη.
Chapter 4 – Ἐρως as an Opponent

The prototypical model of Ἐρως as an opponent in the novel is an asymmetrical power struggle between the emotion personified and the person affected. This imbalance of power can be seen as a psychological parallel of the much touted pederastic paradigm, the disparity in status and power between the erastes (lover) and eromenos (beloved), as established by Dover and Foucault. Crucially, however, it features a power struggle between the person and the emotion rather than two people. Fusillo has argued in an excellent paper that the conflict of emotion is a salient factor in the Greek Novel’s portrayal of psychology. This is an internal psychological conflict between multiple emotions. What Fusillo’s paper proves is that metaphors of conflict, opposition and domination do not merely occur between the two parties in an erotic relationship but between the emotion and the person. This model has fundamental implications for how one views the self. In Plato Socrates speaks of how strange it is to describe the control of desires in terms of being ‘stronger’, κρείττω, than oneself. Metaphors of emotional conflict are a common feature of psychology in general. This chapter will explore the dynamics of this power differential between the emotion and the person. While the relationships between main couple and love rivals can be intrinsically different, the model of the supremacy of the emotion is consistent for all the characters in the Greek Novel. The initial narrator in Achilles Tatius, after viewing the ecphrasis of Europa and Zeus as a bull, remarks upon how the infant (Ἐρως) rules over the sky, earth and sea: ἄρχει
The source domain is here called the opponent, but different sections of the domain of physical conflict can be used. These range from interpersonal wrangling to the schema of war. Conflict envisages a simple scenario: the cause and initiation of hostilities, the duration of conflict with any sub-events, and the outcome of the conflict. This abstract scenario is rather basic. However, the events and eventualities which the metaphors highlight reveal the conceptual underpinning of ἔρως in these works. Metaphors of ἔρως as an opponent in the Greek Novel almost always highlight either events in the duration of conflict which are negative to the person, such as wounds, or the end results of the conflict, which involves the supremacy of the emotion. This depicts the emotion as ‘unbeatable’ and asserts that resistance to the emotion is futile, in contrast to certain schools of thought such as Platonism and Stoicism. This conceptualisation underlies any explicit narrative events or descriptions which depict emotion as supreme.

The Greek metaphorical concept fits one in American English quite well. Lakoff and Kövecses say that STRUGGLE is a basic level concept used for emotion, and they outline its use in the concept of anger. ‘I was seized by anger’ and ‘I was overcome by anger’ are examples of the concept in American English. They both, however, differ as to their implications. The former allows successful resistance against the emotion whereas the latter does not. It is the latter type of metaphor which dominates in the novels and shows that their literary version of emotion, grounded in folk psychology, conceptualises ἔρως not merely as an opponent, but as a victorious one.

276 In Plato’s Respublica there is a tripartite soul within which appetites must be kept in check. These parts are reason, appetite and spirit: τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδής (Pl.R.434d2-441c7). Spirit should aid the rational part rather than the appetitive part (Pl.R.440e). See further in the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία. Stoic philosophy is more fragmented, but there seems to be a consensus that excessive passion should be controlled. See Stobaeus 2.88–90 SIF.

The concept of holding is a common one in the novels and shows variation in its application to the emotions. In this model the suppression of the emotion maps onto the concept of an entity being held down. This is most likely to involve personification as what does the holding is a human, and what you hold down is a human or a beast. Therefore in this sense it is part of a wider metaphorical network which views the relationship between a person and their emotion as a contest or struggle. It can emphasise the action of the person or the emotion. At X.Eph.1.3.4 ἔρως ‘in’ both Habrocomes and Anthia ‘is not to be checked’: ὁ ἔρως ἐν ἑκατέροις ἦν ἀκατάσχετος. The example here combines the container metaphor with the concept of holding and releasing. It also emphasises the impossibility of action of the young couple. They can try and hold down the emotion, but it will not be successful. When Manto is rejected by Habrocomes she becomes uncontrollably angry: ἡ Μαντὼ ἐν ὀργῇ ἀκατασχέτῳ γίνεται (X.Eph.2.5.5). Ἀκατάσχετος remains attached to the emotion, whether the emotion or the person is the container, and so is used consistently. Λύπη is also used in the same way as being both a container and unholdable: ἐν πολλῇ καὶ ἀκατασχέτῳ λύπῃ ἦν (X.Eph.3.9.1). The two metaphors combined, the container and suppression, each highlight a different aspect of the conceptualisation of the emotion. The container represents a binary state—the choices are in/out of emotion—but the notion of suppression orients this in terms of a struggle with a personified emotion, which correlates with the degree of success with which the subject suppresses their emotion. When the emotion is in the container, it is perfectly consistent to say that one keeps it down. This concept of a struggle seems to be the most pervasive aspect of the system of emotions. The verb ἰσσάομαι signifies ‘being weaker than’ and a person affected by an emotion can be defeated by the emotion. Both examples in Xenophon involve

278 We see exactly the same concept of ‘unchecked’ ἔρως when Aristomachus cannot hold down his desire for Hyperantides: ἔρασθεὶς δὲ οὐκέτι μετρίως κατεῖχε τὸν ἔρωτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τῷ μειράκιῳ προσέπεμπεν (X.Eph.3.2.7). The adverb μετρίως shows the ideal of a mean in terms of controlling emotions. See the final chapter for more on the container metaphor.

279 The adverbial form is also used in Xenophon of Ephesus. At X.Eph.2.3.2 Manto is not in control of her passions: οὐδὲ Μαντὼ ἐκ τῆς συνήθους μετὰ τοῦ Ἀβροκόμου διαίτης ἁλίσκεται καὶ ἀκατασχέτος εἶχε καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι ποιήσῃ. There is no mention of an emotion term here, but the presence of a conventional metaphor ἁλίσκεται, ‘to be captured’ (see below), indicates that she is feeling ἔρως. It is Manto here who is ‘out of control’, ἀκατασχέτος εἶχε, and this is because she has already been ‘captured’ by the emotion.
ēρως and the submission of the subject. Habrocomes is weaker than ēρως, ἦττάται δὲ ύπο Ἐρωτος Ἀβροκόμης (X.Eph.1.3.1), and he finally admits that the god is a benefactor to one who submits to him, ἀλλ’ εὐεργέτης ἦττωμένω θεός (X.Eph.1.4.5). This is conceptualisation of the state of an emotion in terms of a power dynamic, where the emotion is not merely an opponent in a struggle, but a victorious one. This concept emphasises the result of the metaphorical struggle and implies that subsequent action will be dictated by the emotion. It does indicate that a struggle has taken place, and that the person has actively tried to stop the emotion.

Ἐρως as war is a conceptualisation which utilises other more basic ones such as the contest metaphor seen above. First I will briefly discuss the relevance of personification to this study before moving on to the analysis of the schema. We can get a good overview of these personification metaphors by looking at a passage in the first book of Xenophon of Ephesus. Habrocomes is a young man famed for being handsome, yet he is not interested in ēρως and even refuses to recognise him as a god (X.Eph.1.1.5). In this we see a well-established model used in many of the novels, which could be referred to as the Hippolytus model: refusal to recognise the power of erotic desire. However, ēρως takes offence at this and contrives to do something.

Μηνιᾷ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Ἐρως· φιλόνεικος γὰρ ὁ θεός καὶ ὑπερηφάνοις ἀπαραίτητος. Ἐξοπλίσας οὖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσαν δύναμιν ἐρωτικῶν φαρμάκων περιβαλόμενος ἐστράτευεν ἐφ’ Ἁβροκόμην (X.Eph. 1.2.1.).

In this passage we can see the full range of Xenophon of Ephesus’s personificatory metaphors for ēρως. He is quarrelsome, φιλόνεικος, and this is a metaphor which conceptualises ēρως as an opponent to the person feeling the emotion. All of the other metaphors are related to this basic notion in one way or another. First of all,

280 See Pl.Phrdr.233c1–2 which contrasts being defeated by ēρως with being master of oneself: οὐχ ὑπ’ ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν. Earlier Plato comments on how strange this metaphor is: ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὡς φασι κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀποφαίνοντες οὐκ οἶδ’ ὄντινα τρόπον (PL.R.430e6-8). Habrocomes vainly boasts that ēρως will never master him, οὐκ ἂν Ἐρως ποτέ μου κρατήσῃ (X.Eph.1.4.3), in an endeavour doomed to failure. Both sides, the person and the emotion, are attempting to have mastery.
ἔρως attempts to contrive a cunning plan, a τέχνη, against his victim. This plan is seen in terms of a military strategy, as he will arm himself with weapons, ἐξοπλίσας, equip himself with erotic drugs, φαρμάκων, and conduct a war against Habrocomes: ἔστρατευεν ἐφ’ Ἅβροκόμην. All this preparation is necessary because the end result of the war, the capture, will be difficult: δυσάλωτος. A φάρμακον can be a healing or a harmful drug, and here we see a conflation of the war metaphor with another schema. As part of his military strategy ἔρως will try to drug Habrocomes, and this word is often used in other novels to designate the start of the disease-schema, poisoning someone to make them ill, or the end, as a healing drug to ‘cure’ the emotion. It is also associated, however, with specific love potions, and with the label ἔρωτικῶν we have something different from the disease-schema outlined above. It is neither a cure nor a conventional poison, but a philtre or charm.  

In terms of the military metaphor this passage describes a process. The emotion equips itself with weapons in order to wage a war, in which the final act will be the capture of the person involved.

War is struggle in terms of a larger social arena, and provides a ready made schema for understanding the emotion. The largest emphasis in Xenophon of Ephesus is upon the end point of the process. There are nine references related to capture throughout the novel and there is never any doubt of this eventual consequence. As we saw above ἔρως was concerned that Habrocomes was ‘difficult to capture’, δυσάλωτος (X.Eph.1.2.1), and so he takes extra precautions in conducting his campaign. Inevitably a short while later Habrocomes becomes a ‘spear captive’ of the god, ἤν αἰχμάλωτος τοῦ θεοῦ (X.Eph.1.3.2), recognises the fact and regrets abusing the god: ὁ τῷ θεῷ λοιδορούμενος ἑάλωκα (X.Eph.1.4.1). However, it is not only the emotion which is portrayed as capturing the affected person. When she sees him Anthia is ‘captured’ by Habrocomes (X.Eph.1.3.1), in the same way as later on Manto is ‘captured’ by him: αὐτῇ ἦ Μαντώ ἐκ τῆς συνήθους μετὰ τοῦ Ἀβροκόμου διαίτης ἁλίσκεται (X.Eph.

281 For an erotic philtre see Theocr.2.15.
Both women fall victim to the influence of ἔρως and are conceived as captives in the war. This image evokes their helplessness in the situation.²⁸²

If we continue a passage quoted above concerning ‘capture’ we notice a chain of events adding detail to the process of war: ὁ τῷ θεῷ λοιδορούμενος ἑάλωκα καὶ νενίκημαι καὶ παρθένῳ δουλεύειν ἀναγκάζομαι (X.Eph.1.4.1). Habrocomes is describing himself as captured, conquered and forced into slavery by ἔρως. A maiden, παρθένος, (Anthia) is his conqueror and this conforms to the model seen above where capture is between two persons rather than the person and the emotion. The arrogant Habrocomes even goes so far as to exhort himself to ‘conquer the god (ἔρως) who counts for nothing’: νῦν οὐδὲν ὄντα θεὸν νικῆσαι με δεί (X.Eph.1.4.2). In fact it is the god who will conquer him, as we see a short while later: οὐκέτι δὴ καρτερῶν, ὄψας ἑαυτὸν εἰς γῆν ‘νενίκηκας’, εἶπεν, Ἔρως’ (X.Eph.1.4.4). He prostrates himself in order to make his capitulation more effective. There are shades of a further metaphor here: ἔρως as a tyrant. Throwing oneself to the ground in front of the victor evokes the submission acknowledged by proskynesis.²⁸³

Conquering is part of the ἔρως as war schema, but its result can either be part of the war scenario (as an endpoint) or function on its own as a reflection of a social hierarchy. This is the metaphor of the slave-master relationship.²⁸⁴ The final part of Habrocomes’ capitulation to the god involves his recognition of him as master: τὸν πάντων δεσπότην (X.Eph.1.4.5). Again this term is not just used of the god, but can be used of a human partner, as when Anthia calls Habrocomes the master of her

²⁸² In the same way Perilaus and Amphinomus are captured by Anthia, and so both genders exert the same influence over people (X.Eph.2.13.6; 4.6.5). Aristomachus is also captured by Hyperanthes as soon as he sees him, and so the metaphor also extends to the homoerotic realm (X.Eph.3.2.6). There is an interesting contrast in the temporal aspect of this metaphor. Perilaus is captured ‘gradually’, κατὰ μικρόν, while Aristomachus is captured ‘straightaway’, εὐθέως. This metaphor can refer to both instantaneous and gradual submission to the emotion.

²⁸³ Herodotus provides the most famous explanation of the Persian custom, and would view a person throwing themselves to the floor before another as acknowledging a great disparity between their respective statuses: ἢν δὲ πολλῷ ἢ οὔτερος ἀγεννέστερος, προσπίπτων προσκυνέει τὸν ἔτερον (Hdt.1.134). I would prefer taking the metaphor to refer to this rather than to wrestling, since wrestling would prototypically feature the subject being thrown to the ground rather than casting themselves. For more on the wrestling metaphor see further on in this chapter.

²⁸⁴ This is a very common model in previous Greek literature. For example see Archil.196; Anac.346 (2), 5-6, 357.1, 505 (d); Pl.Phdr.252a; Thgn.539–40, 1235, 1306–7, 1344, 1350, 1357–60.
ψυχή (X.Eph.2.4.5; 5.14.2). Since this slavery dynamic is so firmly rooted in the cultural environment of the ancient world, it is not surprising to see the boundaries between the literal and metaphorical blurred. When Anthia and Habrocomes are on the pirate ship, Euxinos approaches Habrocomes in order to give him a proposition from Corymbus. The two pirates are in love with Habrocomes and Anthia respectively, and decide that soliciting them would best be done on each other’s behalf. The offer to Habrocomes contains the promise that Corymbus will make him master of his possessions: ἐτοιμός ἐστι δεσπότην ποιεῖν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (X.Eph.1.16.4). Now this is obviously playing on the metaphor which sees the erotic relationship as a master-slave one, but it is an inversion of the social one, since Corymbus will not in reality be the one in a lesser position of power. In this sense it reflects the emotional emphasis Corymbus claims he will put on Habrocomes by giving him increased economic power. Its main purpose is to be a rhetorical strategy, and by utilising this common conceptualisation of the erotic relationship it gains in persuasive power.

The metaphorical schema of war does not only appear in Xenophon of Ephesus but is pervasive throughout the Greek Novel. I would not wish to argue that the metaphors which structure it are exclusive to it, but by analysing the larger schema in this way we can see the conceptual coherence of the whole. The table below shows how the same metaphors of emotional conflict are repeated throughout Chariton’s novel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Conflict</th>
<th>Duration of Conflict</th>
<th>Result of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἔρως is Warlike</td>
<td>Besieged</td>
<td>Defeat/Capture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contest</td>
<td>Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Slavery</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strike/Wound</td>
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</tbody>
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286 Chariton 1.1.4: ἔρως is φιλόνεικος (‘likes a fight’).
287 Chariton 2.8.1: ἐκπεπολιορκημένος (Dionysius).
288 Chariton 6.3.2: κρατεῖ πάντων τῶν θεῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός (Artaxerxes); Chariton 6.3.8: ἑαλώκαμεν (Artaxerxes). The first example echoes Menander, Heros fr.1 K.
289 Chariton 2.4.4: ἀγῶνα (Dionysius); Chariton 6.3.8: ἀνταγωνιζόμενος σεαυτῷ (Artaxerxes).
290 Chariton 1.1.10: ἀπολέσθαι (Chaereas); Chariton 2.4.7: ἀπόλωλά (Dionysius).
291 Chariton 2.4.4: ἀντέχεσθαι (Dionysius).
292 Chariton 4.2.3: μὴ δουλεύων ἔρωτι (not Polycharmus, and by implication Chaereas).
The whole schema of ἔρως as war in Chariton is not seen as arbitrary, but as following a plan. The god ἔρως and the person affected have a plot or strategy for the emotional conflict with which they are engaged.\textsuperscript{294}

In Chariton there is very little emphasis on the reason for the conflict. This is because the onset of ἔρως is seen as a passive effect, and no explanation of the conflict is needed. The only example above which tries to explain this is Chariton 1.1.4, where a personified emotion considers it a triumph to unite two rival families by making two of their children fall in love with one another. The domination of ἔρως, seen so heavily in the final part of the scenario, is no surprise either, given the model of the emotion as all-powerful in the Greek Novel. The profusion of examples in the middle category show that resistance is possible, if futile, and that the conflict of ἔρως is a proper one, and not merely an idiomatic way of talking about the emotion. The conflict itself, and the results of the conflict, have narrative significance for the development of the plot.

The metaphor of the person being captured by the emotion shows a conceptual link to the metaphor of love’s slave. The second metaphor, however, emphasises a social model of disparity of power while the first emphasises the result of a conflict. At Chariton 4.2.3 Polycharmus is described as young, manly, and free from the tyrant ἔρως: ο δὲ Πολύχαρμος, οἷα δὴ νεανίας ἀνδρικὸς τὴν φύσιν καὶ μὴ δουλεύων ἔρωτι, χαλεπῶ τυράννῳ. The metaphor here focuses on disparity of power, contrasting the slavery of someone in love with the tyranny of ἔρως, and he is a difficult tyrant at that: χαλεπός. This is therefore a social model for the emotion.\textsuperscript{295} This instance parallels two elements of the narrative. First, Polycharmus is not enslaved by the emotion, and this description is an oblique reference to Chaereas, who is wasting away beside him. Second, at this point in the

\textsuperscript{293} Chariton 1.1.7: τραύματος (Chaereas); Chariton 2.4.1: ἐπιβουλὴ (Dionysius); Chariton 4.1.9: βληθεῖς (Mithridates); Chariton 6.3.3: ἐπιβουλὴ (Artaxerxes); Chariton 8.5.6: τραύματος (Artaxerxes)

\textsuperscript{294} Chariton 6.3.1: ἐπιβουλή (Artaxerxes); Chariton 6.4.4: ἀντιτατόμενον ἰδῶν καὶ βεβουλευμένον (Artaxerxes). In the second example ἔρως is countering the king’s plans and strategies against him. In the former the king agrees with his servant that there is a ‘plot’ against him: an emotional one.

\textsuperscript{295} As is Chariton 2.4.9, where Dionysius is in ἔρως’ power: ἐν ἔρωτος ἔξουσία.
plot, Chaereas and Polycharmus are slaves toiling for Mithridates, and so the metaphor echoes the immediate context. None of this is particularly nuanced literary manipulation, but it does lend a measure of physicality to the metaphor and highlights the narrator’s activation of a conventional meaning in context.

This psychological conflict is mediated by cultural values and considerations. Chariton does seem to have a class bias. All Callirhoe’s suitors are powerful men, and at the start the author emphasises the two lovers’ good breeding: εὐγένεια (Chariton 1.1.6). Chaereas and Callirhoe are both notable for their passive acceptance of the emotion: they do not fight against it. This is in contrast with Habrocomes (see above). The other two most important characterisations of love’s effect in the novel show a completely different reaction. Dionysius does not just passively give in to his emotions, but tries to fight them, like a well educated Greek should. His resistance is displayed via the conflict of reason and passion: τότ’ ἦν ἵδειν ἀγώνα λογισμοῦ καὶ πάθους (Chariton 2.4.4). His ‘philosophizing’ against ἔρως is mistaken, but at least he attempts it: φιλοσοφοῦσαν (Chariton 2.4.5).296 He is fighting against his emotions because he is educated and someone who makes a claim to excellence: οἷα δὴ πεπαιδευμένος ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐξαιρέτως ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιούμενος (Chariton 2.4.1).297 The second point is interesting as it shows a reflexive awareness of the emotion. Dionysius is fighting the emotion not only because he has been taught to, but because he also has an image of his own excellence to live up to, one grounded in social and cultural norms and expectations. Shortly after Dionysius asks himself whether he is not ashamed to be feeling the passion of a boy in his social position (Chariton 2.4.4). The reference to a boy illuminates the lack of resistance seen by Chaereas earlier in the novel. The force of the statement is that if Dionysius is conquered by the emotion, then anyone can be. This is all consistent with the initial portrayal of Chaereas and Callirhoe if we take age and social position into account. The former couple have good breeding, but due

296 Repath 2008, 63: ‘Yet in fact the fundamental polarisation between reason and desire forms the basis of what the novelists do’. I am taking this as an established folk model which has a philosophical basis.
297 This notion of παιδεία was very important in the cultural context of the novel. See Barton 1994, Gleason 1995 and Goldhill 2001, 157. Contrast Chaereas at Chariton 4.4.2. He wishes to rush off and demand Callirhoe from Dionysius, but Mithridates warns that he is acting though passion rather than logic: σπεύδεις πάθει μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ. He must try a more subtle plan.
to their age they do not have the social expectations fostered upon Dionysius. Therefore their respective reactions reflect a combination of age and position.

Later on in the novel Artaxerxes the Persian King falls in love with Callirhoe. There are subtle differences between his depiction and Dionysius’. Artaxerxes confides in his servant that he has been defeated by the emotion. It is more powerful than him: δυνατώτερος (Chariton 6.3.2). Yet we do not receive a description of his inner struggle, as with Dionysius; we merely get his word for it that there has been a struggle. When his servant provides the generic advice that the only cure for love is the beloved, the King rebukes him. He is mindful of the laws which he has set and the righteousness, δικαιοσύνη, he practises constantly (Chariton 6.3.8). The servant then recommends the distraction of a hunt, which does not turn out to be successful. We have no proof that the King is serious about fighting the emotion internally, but we see the same concern with social propriety that Dionysius showed. These men both ostensibly have a desire to live up to their own images. In both cases, however, the emotion is too strong. The ‘barbarian’ king is treated differently, in that he relies on the sycophancy of his servant and has a higher valuation of himself than Dionysius.

The portrayal of love is thus consistent in terms of age and social position. By comparing these factors we see that these both outweigh ethnicity, since there are remarkable similarities in the way in which the Greek and the Persian react. There is more evidence that Artaxerxes’ resistance should be seen in a positive light. Mithridates, the Persian satrap, does not attempt to resist the onset of the emotion (Chariton 4.1.9). Since Mithridates is older and in a higher social position, like Dionysius and Artaxerxes, and is Persian, like Artaxerxes, we cannot ascribe his lack of resistance to age, class, or race. Therefore his emotional reaction is down to character, even if his character is only briefly sketched. This shows that while cultural notions permeate Chariton’s novel, he is capable of depicting emotion at a personal level.

Daphnis and Chloe features fewer metaphors of conflict and none of them refer directly to psychological conflict. Daphnis and Chloe are both ‘taken’ by the vision of one another: ἐγίνετο ἡδη τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἄλωσις αὐτοῖς (Longus 298 Toohey 1999 contrasts the love of Artaxerxes with that of Chariton and Callirhoe.

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298 Toohey 1999 contrasts the love of Artaxerxes with that of Chariton and Callirhoe.
The word ἅλωσις can refer to the capture of animals (Arist. *HA* 593a20, 600a3), but equally it can refer to an individual or a city being captured by an enemy. A related metaphor is that of the piracy of ἔρως, which Daphnis is ignorant of: ἐτι ἄγνοῶν τὸ ἔρωτος ληστήμιον (Longus 1.32.4.9). This metaphor reflects a development in the plot: Daphnis has just returned safely from being kidnapped by pirates. The psychological implications of the metaphor are that conflict with the emotion is less possible, since piracy takes one suddenly. Chloe is soon to ask herself why she feels pain, yet is not wounded: ἀλγῶ, καὶ ἐλκως οὐκ ἔστι μοι (Longus 1.14.1). She compares her experience to being struck by something, perhaps a weapon, which would cause a wound. Gnatho, Astylus’ lecherous associate, claims that whichever body, σῶμα, someone finds beautiful, with that they are ‘taken’: ἀλλ’ ἐν οἴω ποτε ἂν σώματι εὐρη τὸ κάλλος ἐάλωκε (Longus 4.17.3). The other metaphors which denote conquering do not refer to the emotion’s power over the person, but the person’s attempted power over the emotion. Daphnis reasons that the rams and ewes, he-goats and she-goats, are contented after the act of sex, and that this must be something sweet which conquers the bitterness of ἔρως: νικᾷ τὸ ἔρωτος πικρόν (Longus 3.14.3). This metaphor places the finality of the process at a different point, where the conquering proper only emerges once ἔρως is cured. Gnatho also refers to this consummation when he asks Asylus to grant him Daphnis and thereby conquer his unmasterable ἔρως: τὸν ἀήττητον Ἔρωτα νίκησον (Longus 4.16.3). The adjective ἀήττητον reflects the metaphors seen above in the other novelists where the person is defeated by ἔρως. *Daphnis and Chloe* does not feature any references to the mental struggle against the emotion and contrasts with Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus in this respect. The few metaphors which do appear indicate either the result of the conflict or potential cures for ἔρως, and do not question at all the emotion’s ability to take control. It is also a question of theme. Daphnis and Chloe are seeking love. It makes no sense for them to consciously fight against it.

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299 Similarly at Longus 1.13.5 Chloe cannot prevent her eyes from wandering towards Daphnis: τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οὐκ ἐκράτει.  
300 See Hdt.1.5.1 on the capture of a city, τὴν Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν, and P.O.10.42 of a human: ἅλωσις.
Our final two novelists are Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, and they both show the same emphasis upon the final part of the process. In some ways the separation between the two sections of duration and result is artificial. The wound could conceivably lead to the end of combat, but again it is a question of emphasis. Defeat refers specifically to the result of conflict, whereas the wound might only suggest it. Below is a table of conflict metaphors related to ἔρως in Achilles Tatius.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Conflict</th>
<th>Result of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Conquered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Defeat/Capture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wound</td>
<td>Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slavery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some of the references above there are further descriptions of the conflict of ἔρως, but the table makes the general trend clear. Some elements have greater or lesser extensions. The wound is an instantaneous event, where as the term πόλεμος evokes a conflict of a larger scale and duration. As Clitophon confesses at Ach.Tat.1.9.1, all of Ἔρως has attacked him and driven sleep from his eyes: ὁλος γὰρ μοι προσέπεσεν ὡς ᾿Ἐρως καὶ αὐτόν μου διώκει τὸν ὕπνον τῶν ὦμμάτων. The emotion is so overwhelming that any resistance is futile. The model in Achilles Tatius thus echoes those used in Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus. The second metaphor in this sentence is that of the hunt, where the emotion plays the role of hunter. It is transferred here to denote the prototypical symptom of sleeplessness, and to sustain the personification. The usual model is that of the emotion affecting the person, but when Charmides confides in Menelaus, he tells him that it is Leucippe who has destroyed him: ἄπολώλεκε (Ach.Tat.4.6.2). Leucippe

301 Ach.Tat.1.9.1: προσέπεσεν (Clitophon).
302 Act.Tat.4.7.4: νενίκημαι (Charmides).
303 Ach.Tat.4.7.3: πολέμος (Charmides).
304 Ach.Tat.4.3.1: ἐκδόσει (Charmides).
305 Ach.Tat.1.4.4: τραύματι (Clitophon); Ach.Tat.2.7.6: τραύμα...τραύμα...τραύματι (Clitophon); Ach.Tat.4.6.1: τραύμα (gnomic); Ach.Tat.4.7.4: τραύμα (Charmides).
306 Ach.Tat.1.4.4: ἀπωλώλειν (Clitophon); Ach.Tat.4.6.2: ἀπωλώλεκε (Charmides).
307 Ach.Tat.1.7.2: δοῦλος (Clinias); Ach.Tat.5.25.6: δοῦλος (Melite and Clitophon).
Heliodorus displays the same concepts once again, but with more variation than the other novelists. He has the standard process of duration of conflict followed by submission to the emotion. ἔρως can be an arrow striking the afflicted person, an enslavement, mastery or capture. Charicles rejoices that his stubborn daughter is finally in love: ἐάλωκεν ἡ δυσάλωτος καὶ νενίκηται ἡ δυσκαταμάχητος· ἐρᾷ Χαρίκλεια (Hld.4.7.1). She has fought hard against emotion, but like everyone else is overcome in the end. Arsace parallels the war, πόλεμος, which almost occurred outside the walls, between Thyamis and Petosiris, with the one going on inside her: ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρχὴ τις ἀληθεστέρου πολέμου καὶ τραῦμα οὐ μέρους μόνον ἢ μέλους ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς γέγονε (Hld.7.10.2).

Cnemon states that anyone would find Theagenes’ behaviour admirable, anyone who had been defeated by ἔρως in the past: ὅστις ἔρωτι προσπαλαίσας ἠττήθη τε τὴν μάχην ἢδέως καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου σωφρόνως ἐγνωκεν ἀπαραίτητα πτώματα (Hld.2.7.1). The combination of the verb ἠσσάομαι with wrestling brings out the physical sense of the word. In a wrestling bout the defeated person is inferior to the other and it may be that in the other examples featuring this verb there is a hint of the struggle involved with wrestling against the emotion, although the verb is used of contests in general. Wrestling has an extensive pedigree in earlier Greek literature.

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308 This will be discussed more at length in the section on vision.

309 Arrow: Hld.7.10.1: βέβλημαι (Arsace); Hld.7.10.3: βέλος (Arsace). Enslaved: Hld.3.19.1: δεδούλωτο (Chariclea); Hld.4.4.4: δεδούλωτο (Chariclea); Hld.5.2.10: αδούλωτον πλὴν ἔρωτος φρόνημα (Chariclea). Capture: Hld.4.11.2: ἐάλωκεν (Theagenes). Conquered: Hld.7.21.1: νενίκηται (Arsace). In the power of: Hld.4.18.4: ἐγκρατῆσαι (Theagenes).

310 Other uses of this metaphor in Heliodorus are as follows: Hld.3.17.4: ἠττήται (Theagenes); Hld.4.4.4: ἠττητο (Chariclea); Hld.4.10.3: ἠττηθῆναι (Chariclea); Hld.5.30.2: ἠττήθη (Chariclea, but insincerely); Hld.7.9.5: ἠττήθησαι (Arsace); Hld.7.21.1: ἠττῶν (Arsace).

311 See cf. A.Ag.1206; Ar.Ach.273–6, Pax 896–9, Ecc.259-61, 964-6; Pl.Phdr.236be, 256b; S.frr.618, 941.13. One element of conflict between two people is a height difference between the winner and the loser. This is based on experiential considerations that if the defeated is knocked down or enslaved then they are lower than the victor. The preposition υπὸ means ‘from under’. When it is used with emotion terms in the genitive case it provides a strong connotation of agency. This is used of the broader category of desires. We are told that Thyamis acts through his desire for Chariclea: υπὸ μὲν τῆς περὶ τὴν Χαρίκλειαν ἐπιθυμίας (Hld.1.23.1). The emotion acts upon him as an
emerges through the use of the adverb ‘sensibly’: σωφρόνως. Sensible or self-controlled is normally the term used for those who do not give in to emotion, yet here the trick is for someone to sensibly capitulate. Theagenes begs Calasiris to aid him and Chariclea in their predicament later on, and he claims that they are captives of a sensible ἔρως: σωφρονοῦντος ἔρωτος αἰχμάλωτα (Hld.4.18.2). Heliodorus differentiates between two types of ἔρως, controlled and lustful. This does not denote a difference in the emotion, but a difference in reaction to it. Thus Chariclea still requires Theagenes to swear not to ‘try it on’ with her, despite the fact that he is committed to ‘chaste’ ἔρως, as he retorts (Hld.4.18). As a female she does not trust the imbalance of power which lies in the male’s hand, and the imbalance of psychological power which lies in ἔρως’ hands. ἔρως cannot be resisted in Heliodorus, but a moral distinction is made between the chaste ‘irresistible’ ἔρως of the main couple and the lustful passion of other characters, such as Arsace. There is not therefore a distinction in terms of the emotion, but a distinction in terms of character and behaviour. It is how you react to the emotion which counts, but react you must. Chariclea, like Dionysius and Habrocomes, fights against the emotion, but to no avail. She is unable to gain mastery over it: τὸ μὴ κρατῆσαι τῆς νόσου τὴν ἀρχήν (Hld.4.10.3). This is the conflation of the disease and opponent metaphor: fighting ἔρως as a disease. Elsewhere we are told that Chariclea is hostile to ἔρως: πρὸς ἔρωτα δύσμαχος (Hld.3.17.4).

The psychological conflict involved with ἔρως is pervasive in the Greek Novel, and its most common form is that of the emotion as victorious opponent. It is not only ἔρως which is conceptualised as an opponent. Chariclea struggles to fight against her πάθος (Hld.4.9.3) and this model extends to the passions generally. Thus although Theagenes and Chariclea both experience internal conflict in an erotic

agent. Chariclea says that Arsace should never have submitted, ‘stood under’ (ὑποστῆναι), her passion for Theagenes. ‘Crouching down’ can also be metaphorically used of the level or intensity of desire. Chariclea throws her arms around Theagenes and tells him that she is glad their misfortunes have not caused him to ‘make to squat’ (ὀκλάζω), i.e. diminish, his longing for her: μὴ ὀκλάσας τὸν ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ πόθον (Hld.1.23.2).

312 For more on the element of self-control in relation to ἔρως see the conclusion of this thesis.

context, ἀγωνιῶ, at Hld.3.17.1 and Hld.4.11.1 respectively, the term has a wider range and denotes mental anxiety in general, although it utilises the conflict metaphor.\textsuperscript{314}

Psychological conflict is a certainty for the characters in the Greek Novel, but erotic conflict can emerge on a literal level as well. The first correspondence is that between the endangerment of life on a metaphorical and literal level. When Chaereas pines away for the girl he has just met we are told he is in danger of dying from this affliction: κινδυνεύοντος ἀπολέσθαι διὰ πάθος ψυχῆς εὐφυοὺς (Chariton 1.1.10). So the emotion can be dangerous.\textsuperscript{315} The most common form in which the conflict model is reflected in terms of relationships is erotic rivalry. At Chariton 1.2.5 the son of the tyrant of Acragas says he will equip jealousy and ἔρως as allies in his rivalry with Chaereas for Callirhoe. Mithridates exhorts himself not to ‘surrender’ Callirhoe when he is forced to travel to Babylon to defend himself and Dionysius regrets that he has made his master, the Persian King, a rival in ἔρως (Chariton 4.7.2 and 6.2.7). The mode of interaction between the lover and the beloved can also be conceptualised in terms of an asymmetrical power divide. In Heliodorus Demaenete laments that she behaved towards Cnemon not as a lover, but as a ruler (Hld.1.15.5). This is clever rhetorical manipulation of the cultural power dynamic. She has nothing against asymmetry of power per se, but only regrets it because it was unsuccessful for her. She should have behaved as a lover, someone who is equal, in order to persuade Cnemon gently rather than force him.\textsuperscript{316} The opposite of this relationship is seen between the principal couple, where we are told that Theagenes has ‘captured’ Chariclea: ἡρηκε (Hld.4.10.5). Finally, Theagenes is described as ‘marshalling an erotic war’ when he abducts Chariclea. This is metaphorical in the sense that there is a domain mapping. It conceptualises a low-level struggle in terms of a broader one and there is no desire to defeat Chariclea, which would be the prototypical purpose of a war featuring two sides (Hld.4.17.3).

\textsuperscript{314} At Ach.Tat.2.35.1 Clitophon decides to cheer up Menelaus and Clinias with an argument which has an erotic ‘draw’: ἐμβάλλω λόγον ἐρωτικῆς ἐχόμενου ψυχαγωγίας. The term ψυχαγωγία indicates drawing the attention of the ψυχή to something. For more on the ψυχή as the focus of erotic attention see the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία.

\textsuperscript{315} See chapter on the Erotic Syndrome.

\textsuperscript{316} This is delusional. At first she approached Cnemon subtly and only became forceful when she failed to get her way.
The conflict can also be between the lovers themselves. When Habrocomes and Anthia are finally united in marriage they contest with each other all night, as to who can appear more erotically devoted: ἐφιλονείκουν δὲ δὴ ὅλης νυκτὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, φιλοτιμούμενοι τίς φανεῖται μᾶλλον ἐρῶν (X.Eph.1.9.9). It is not the usual erotic rivalry between two parties, but rivalry of devotion between the lovers (really sex). It is also the same word used of ἔρως himself when he takes offence at Habrocomes’ recalcitrance (see above X.Eph.1.2.1), and so the same concept is used of the relationship between the emotion and the person affected and between the two people affected.

These instantiations of interpersonal rivalry parallel the psychological metaphors, but there is one final element of the psychological conflict of ἔρως which informs the novels. This is the matter of social constraints. Achilles Tatius provides us with some concise examples.

Ἐν μεθορίῳ κεῖμαι δύο ἐναντίων· Ἐρως ἀνταγωνίζεται καὶ πατήρ. ὁ μὲν ἔστηκεν αἰδοῖ κρατῶν, ὁ δὲ κάθηται πυρπολῶν. πῶς κρίνω τὴν δίκην; ἀνάγκη μάχεται καὶ φύσις. καὶ θέλω μὲν σοὶ δικάσαι, πάτερ, ἀλλ' ἀντίδικον ἔχω χαλεπώτερον. βασανίζει τὸν δικαστήν, ἔστηκε μετὰ βελῶν, κρίνεται μετὰ πυρός. ἂν ἀπειθήσω, πάτερ αὐτῷ καίομαι τῷ πυρί (Ach.Tat.1.11.3).

Within Clitophon there is a conflict of emotion and social pressure. His father wants him to marry someone else but he desires Leucippe. A battle and law case are conceptualised between ἔρως and his father. Clitophon lies on the border between two adverseries: ἐν μεθορίῳ...δύο ἐναντίων. It is not a fair case, since ἔρως brings violence and torture to the proceedings, and therefore will win out. Within the source domain, that of the law court, ἔρως uses behaviour which contrasts with the expected scenario: he tortures the judge (βασανίζει τὸν δικαστήν). Therefore it is probable that ἔρως is placed in the position of a tyrant, who has supreme power over legal proceedings, the whole of which is mapped onto the psychological conflict within Clitophon. Erotic psychological conflict is between the person and the emotion, but this passage brings out the modality of this conflict, or how social pressures condition the conflict itself. It is not just a matter of not giving in to
emotion but one of considering your own specific circumstances: how the emotion will affect your relationships. Giving in to ἔρως will damage his relationship with his father and hence his familial and social position, and resisting ἔρως is impossible, because it is not a law case which is fair.

Another aspect of the conflict between emotion and shame is seen a little earlier. Clinias provides advice on seduction to the inexperienced Clitophon and the best way to approach the beloved. He recommends a subtle approach that avoids speaking directly of one’s desire.

Παῖς γὰρ καὶ παρθένος ὁμοίοι μὲν εἰσιν εἰς αἰδῶς πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης χάριν κἂν γνώμης ἔχοσιν, ἃ πάσχουσιν ἄκοινειν οὐ θέλουσι· τὴν γὰρ αἰσχύνην κεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν ἐν τοῖς όργασι (Ach.Tat.1.10.3).

Aἰδῶς, ‘shame’, is an emotion which prototypically arises from a keen sense of one’s own social positioning. The boy or the girl, even if they are willing, does not want to hear their desire, ἃ πάσχουσιν, spoken of, because erotic conversation provokes shame. There is a subtle implication here. It is not merely a case of the act being socially disapproved of, nor of desire overriding the cultural protocol, but of a more complex interaction between the two. The act of seduction is acceptable to the seducee if the seducer does not verbalise the seduction explicitly and thereby overstep the boundaries set by the seducee. It is a tentative game which involves showing enough respect to the seducee in order to obtain one’s goal. The Greek Novel can display a sophisticated understanding that the attitude of the beloved is also important. Chariton 1.4.2 states gnomically that a woman is easier to ‘capture’ if she believes she is loved. The context is the seduction of a maidservant, but the gnome is applied generally to women. It is not really concerned with the emotional well-being of the woman, but merely with increasing the odds of achieving success, and thereby ‘capturing’ them, as is the Achilles Tatius passage. Therefore these examples do not overturn the active-passive dynamic of the erastes and eromenos relationship, but do add nuances and the subjective manipulation of the models typically involved in the complexities of social interaction.

I will conclude this section by briefly considering some metaphors for relationships. The same metaphorical schema can be applied to relationships.
between lovers and love rivals. In Heliodorus Theagenes breaks down and cries because he has been defeated by a girl: καὶ ταύτα λέγων ἐπεδάκρυεν ὡςπερ ὦτι πρὸς βίαν ἠττηται κόρης ἐνδεικνύμενος (Hld.3.17.4). The verbal form ἠττηται is that same as that used of the emotion ἔρως (see above). There is an important distinction here. The description of the relationship between the two lovers is metonymic for the emotion which affects them. This ambivalence concerning power and responsibility will be explored at greater length in the next chapter on vision. The reference does conceal a tripartite dynamic under its presentation of a bipartite one. When Theagenes is conquered by Chariclea ἔρως is the means. The same conceptualisation underlies the topos of the beloved as ‘master’ or ‘mistress’ of the lover.\footnote{See for example Chariton 8.7.10 where Chaereas says that Dionysius did not enslave Callirhoe but made her his ‘mistress’: δέσποινα. See more refs in the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία.}

This is not to say that relationships between the two lovers and other characters in the novel are all the same. For instance Morgan contrasts the relationship between an acquaintance of Nausicles in Heliodorus and his mistress Isias and that of the main couple. He serves her, ὑπηρετέω, and works night and day to appease her (Hld.6.3).\footnote{Morgan 1989, 107: ‘we are dealing here with the erotic trope familiar to us from Latin love elegy as the servitium amoris, where it crystallises in the ambiguity of the word domina. The selfish and degrading materialism, the irresponsibility and absence of any basis for permanence in Isias’ love are opposed to and illuminate the earnestness, the reciprocity, the spirituality, the life-long commitment and life-enhancing quality of the true love of Theagenes and Chariclea.’ At Hld.6.7.8 we are told that Chariclea notices Knemon’s feelings for Nausicles’ daughter because a lover is quick to spot others mastered by the same passion: οἷς γὰρ ὁ ἔρως φιλότυμος τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑσόν παθόν κειροτημένον. Therefore although in some respects Theagenes and Chariclea’s love is unique, they still share significant parts of their experience with others.} The relationship of Theagenes and Chariclea, on the other hand, is a mutual slavery. In book eight they are eager to endure the same hardship, since if one of them was punished less they would consider themselves conquered by the other and to have too little of ‘things related to ἔρως’: εἰ ἔλαττον αὐτῶν τις κολασθήσεται νενικῆσθαι ὑπὸ θατέρου καὶ μειονεκτεῖν τῶν ἔρωτικῶν οἰόμενος (Hld.8.9.22). They conceptualise their relationship as a competition of devotion. The same model can be used in significantly different ways of emotion and relationships.

317 318
There are also opponent metaphors which conceptualise the relationships between love rivals. In Chariton Mithridates hopes to sit as a bystander before entering the competition to take away Callirhoe as the prize: ἔφεδρος μένων μεταξὺ Χαιρέου τε καὶ Διονυσίου αὐτὸς ἀκονιτὶ τὸ ἄθλον Καλλιρόην ἀποίσεται (Chariton 4.4.1). The word ἔφεδρος is a technical term which refers to the third party in wrestling who waits to take on the victor of the first bout.  

This is the wrestling metaphor seen of ἔρως above. In Heliodorus Cybele criticises her mistress Arsace for having too 'supine', ὑπτίως, and soft an approach to ἔρως: αὐτὴ δὲ οὕτως ὑπτίως προσιοῦσα τῷ σαυτῆς ἔρωτι καὶ τῷ ὄντι μαλακιζομένη (Hld.8.5.9). She is not pursuing Theagenes vigorously enough and letting him get away.

One final example will illustrate why the model of the emotion as an opponent has implications for how one perceives selfhood and responsibility. In Achilles Tatius Melite loses her temper at Clitophon and then changes tact.

Α μὲν εἶπον, ὦ φίλτατε, θυμὸς ἔλεγε καὶ λύπη· ἃ δὲ νῦν μέλλω λέγειν, ἔρως λέγει. κἂν ὀργίζωμαι, καίομαι· κἂν ὑβρίζωμαι, φιλῶ (Ach.Tat.5.26.1).

What she said to him just now her anger and grief, θυμὸς καὶ λύπη, spoke. Now it is ἔρως which is speaking. If she is angry it is because she has a burning passion for him. If she causes offence it is because she loves him. Melite’s rhetoric is built upon a model of emotional agency pervasive in the Greek Novel. The emotion obtains mastery of the subject and speaks through them. She conceptualises herself as merely a vessel for the agency of emotion. This is almost certainly short of the truth, but this model needs cultural credibility for her rhetoric to be persuasive. In the Greek Novel emotions do dominate characters and the opponent metaphor is a fundamental way of characterising them.

Therefore the model of conflict or opposition can be used of the relationship between the emotion and the person, two lovers in a relationship and love rivals. What is significant in terms of psychological metaphor in the Greek Novel is that the

319 See Ar.Ra.792, E.Rh.119, Pi.N.4.96.
majority of instances depict the mastery of the emotion. The opposition metaphor predominantly conceptualises the first part of the emotional scenario, the inception of ἔρως, and thus is usually prior to the part of the scenario which the metaphors of disease and madness structure. In the next chapter on vision I will now proceed to argue why the bipartite model of the lover and beloved is not sufficient to capture the nuances of what is actually a tripartite opposition: opposition between the two lovers and the emotion.

320 Alexander 2006 argues that ἔρως is all powerful in the Greek Novel. She is certainly correct in this but she perhaps underestimates how dominant many emotions are in the novels.
Ἐρως in the Greek Novel is an intensely visual phenomenon.321 This emphasis on the visual is a feature which is generally applicable to emotions in Greek societies, rather than applying specifically to ἔρως.322 In fact, as Ekman has shown, interpreting faces and expressions is a pervasive and universal aspect of human interaction (see introduction). In the Greek Novel the vision of a beautiful person almost always triggers ἔρως in the viewer, and this means that the beautiful (those who possess κάλλος) are the objects of attention more than they would wish.323 Aristotle states that ἔρως, τοῦ ἐρᾶν, begins from the pleasure that comes through sight: ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή (Arist.EN 1167a3–4). Achilles Tatius goes so far as to say that looking at the beloved is a pleasure greater than ‘the act itself’ (Ach.Tat.1.9.4).324 There are many interesting nuances in the Greek Novel’s description of vision, ranging from gnomai reflecting social prejudices to instances of the technical language of philosophy and medicine. This chapter will argue that one metaphorical concept is prototypical of vision and erotic vision in the Greek Novel. This is the conduit metaphor where vision (and sometimes the emotion) travels as an entity between two points, or more usually, two human bodies

321 As it is in previous Greek literature. For a selection of examples of vision both expressing and causing ἔρως see Alcm.1.21–1, 3. fr. 3. col.ii.62; Anac.360.1; Hes.Th.910–11, Scut.7–8; Ibyc.287.1; Pi.fr.123.3–4; Pl.Phdr.247ce, 248bc, 249-251a, 251c, 251e, 253a, 253e, 254b, 255cd; Sappho 138.2; Sim.fr.22.12 W.
322 Looking is involved in the expression and provocation of emotion, ranging from direct looks which ‘can indicate aggression or lack of respect’ (Cairns 2005, 129), to direct looks indicating shamelessness and averted glances displaying a sense of shame or αἰδώς (Cairns 2005, 130ff.). See Cairns 2005 in general for the complex dynamics of viewing and emotion. This emphasis upon the visual is probably not, as some scholars have claimed, peculiar to the ancient Greeks (Augenmenschen), or at least distinct among them in contrast to ourselves, but a prominent feature in Greek and English. For the theory that the Ancient Greeks were Augenmenschen see Malten 1961 and Luther 1966. For a sceptical view of this see Cairns 2005, 126. The Greek verb ‘to know’ is a past tense of the verb ‘to see’, but we can also say ‘I see that’ to indicate comprehension and utilise a common folk belief in our expression ‘seeing is believing’. Heraclitus B101a DK and Herodotus 1.8.1 both testify to the same notion in ancient Greece that seeing is more believable than hearing. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 48, state that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is a pervasive metaphorical concept in English.
323 In an internal dialogue Dionysius upbraids himself for giving in to emotion. One of his self-criticisms is that he has fallen in love at first sight: ἀπαξε, ἐδὸν ἔρως (Chariton 2.4.4).
324 In actual fact this is Clitophon’s friend Clinias’ opinion.
conceptualised as containers. In erotic vision the entity is beauty, καλός, although it can be metonymically referred to as ἔρως, part of the process standing for the whole, and beauty itself is most commonly described as an effluence. The receptacle of this effluence is the soul or ψυχή, which the effluence reaches by means of the eyes. This is a folk model in the Greek Novel and is consistently maintained even in the passages which deal with scientific material. Furthermore it is important that as far as erotic vision is concerned, this conduit is a conduit of constraint, in that the effluences are sent and received passively, and thus the individual party has no control over this process.

This chapter will trace the workings of erotic vision in the Greek Novel. It will discuss metaphors of erotic vision, metaphors and the entities involved in erotic vision such as beauty and the eyes, and finish by looking at expert (pseudo-scientific) models of vision, imagination and memory.

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325 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 11.
326 This is perhaps a general feature of vision (the initial formation of images). See Averill 1990, 108: ‘sensory experiences are also passions of the soul, broadly speaking. For example, when I look upon an object under normal lighting conditions, I cannot help but see the object. It is as though the image has been impressed upon my mind.’
I Cultural Models and Metaphors of Erotic Vision

Initially we may state three features of erotic vision in general in the Greek Novel. It is a passive effect upon the person experiencing the emotion, it is consciously felt by that same person, and it is conceptualised prototypically by metaphors which are used of ἕρως. Anthia and Habrocomes both perceive the sight of one another at their first meeting: καὶ ἐννοια ἐκεῖνους ὑπῄει τῆς ὀψεως θατέρου (X.Eph.1.3.4). However, just because one is conscious of the erotic effect, this does not mean one has power over it. It is simultaneously a conscious and a passive experience, not a subconscious effect. Conventional metaphors for ἕρως and emotion permeate the visual dynamics. The bandit Anchialus falls in love with Anthia, and the daily sight of her sets him on fire, ὄψις ἔξέκαεν αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα (X.Eph.4.5.4). The Indian merchant in book three of Xenophon of Ephesus’s novel is captured by Anthia as soon as he sees her: ἰδὼν ἀλίσκεται (X.Eph.3.11.3). If someone is captured then they can potentially be released. When Habrocomes sees Anthia he cannot look away, even though he wants to: ἀπαλλαγὴνα τῆς ὀψεως ἐθέλων οὐκ ἐδύνατο (X.Eph.1.3.1). The passivity of erotic vision denies the possibility of release. In the same way habitual exposure to Anthia ‘leads’ Perilaus towards ἕρως: ὄψις εἰς ἔρωτα ἤγαγε (X.Eph.2.13.6). He is forcibly led along a path ‘into’ the emotion as destination or goal. On the other hand looking can involve complicity. Habrocomes gives himself over towards staring at Anthia: ὁ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐδεδώκει πρὸς τὴν θέαν (X.Eph.1.3.2). It is voluntary donation on his part, but the notion that a viewer can voluntarily avoid looking is not entertained.

The viewer is a passive victim of erotic vision but this affect is not confined to erotic vision. Beauty can have an influence upon people without necessarily engendering ἕρως. In Xenophon of Ephesus the Rhodians are astonished at the beauty of Habrocomes and Anthia: τὸ κάλλος τῶν παιδῶν καταπεπληγότες (X.Eph.1.12.1). They are ‘struck down’ by the couple’s beauty, and there may be a slight element of eroticism, but this is not the term’s primary meaning. The metaphorical description refers to surprise, on its own or as part of a strong and
startling emotional reaction, and this can be a component of the erotic process, an emotion felt at the very start when one receives the effluences of beauty for the first time. When Apsyrtus is astonished at Habrocomes’ looks, κατεπλάγη (X.Eph.2.2.1), it is his experience of surprise as a part of the erotic experience which is emphasised. In these examples the image of an emotion striking someone with force is consistent with the notion of a struggle between two opponents. Metaphors of vision frequently utilise or interact with other metaphorical conceptualisations of emotion.

Common metaphors used of emotion are often transferred onto descriptions of vision. The following passage from Xenophon of Ephesus shows this in a self-conscious manner.

Φιλούσα δὲ αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς “ὦ” φησὶ “πολλάκις με λυπήσαντες ὑμεῖς, ὦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐνθέντες τῇ ἐμῇ κέντρον ψυχῇ, οἱ τότε μὲν σοβαροί, νῦν δὲ ἐρωτικοί, καλῶς μοι διηκονήσατε, καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τὸν ἐμὸν καλῶς εἰς τὴν Ἁβροκόμου ψυχὴν ὡδηγήσατε.” (X.Eph.1.9.7).

There are many metaphors at play here. Anthia and Habrocomes are together for the first time, and she addresses his eyes as she kisses them. She begins by ascribing two common descriptions of ἔρως to the eyes, those of ‘pain’, λύπη, and the ‘goad’, κέντρον. As we move on through the passage we see a metaphor for serving, διηκονήσατε, again coherent with the master-slave dynamic (see opponent chapter), and one of leading along a path, ὡδηγήσατε. Ἐρως is an entity which Habrocomes’ eyes have conducted down to his ψυχὴ. This metaphor of a path between souls through the eyes is an essential part of the mechanics of erotic vision in the Greek Novel. What is notable in this excerpt is that the eyes seemingly play a dual role. Habrocomes’ eyes ‘served’ Anthia by carrying her beauty into his soul, metonymically called her ἔρως here. However, initially she playfully rebukes them for hurting her and goading her, i.e. causing ἔρως in her. The focus here is not

327 This force of emotion can be seen in common metonyms for surprise, which are forms of the verb πλήσσω with ἐκ or κατά as a prefix. Other examples, all denoting surprise or astonishment, are X.Eph.1.2.8; 1.13.5; 3.7.1; 5.12.6 (with ἐκ) and X.Eph.2.2.1 (with κατά). See also Chariton 1.14.1; 2.2.2; 2.3.6; 2.5.4; 3.3.2; 3.4.1; 3.6.4; 4.2.11; 4.3.8.
merely upon the eyes as receivers, but as projectors of beauty. The eyes in fact are often seen as a particularly prominent aspect of one’s κάλλος (see below). By addressing the eyes here the passivity of the folk model is maintained. Habrocomes’ eyes did send out κάλλος into Anthia and thereby ἔρως, but the whole process carries on regardless of his intention, i.e. he himself did not intend to emit ἔρως.

Metaphors used of erotic vision are for the most part standard and can be seen in the other chapters on concepts such as fire, the opponent and sickness. However, several metaphors do stand out as being particularly associated with vision. In Achilles Tatius vision can be seen as consumption. This metaphorical construction features prominently in a banquet scene in book one. There Clitophon gazes ‘greedily’ across the table at Leucippe, the object of his desire. He departs having dined metaphorically on the sight of the girl.

Ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν εὐωχίαν ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς φέρων τῶν τε τῆς κόρης προσώπων γεμισθεὶς καὶ ἀκράτῳ θεάματι καὶ μέχρι κόρου προελθὼν ἀπῆλθον μεθύων ἔρωτι (Ach.Tat.1.6.1).

The concrete absorption of food and drink by everyone at the feast is paralleled by the abstract consumption of the vision of Leucippe. Drinking is commonly associated with ἔρως and it is the image of food which really strikes the reader.328 Morales discusses the consumptive gaze and clams that it is a male metaphor.329 This may be so, but the erotic element does not lie only in the metaphor of eating, but in the description of excessive consumption. He is ‘stuffed’, γεμισθεὶς, with the vision of her undiluted, ἀκράτῳ (the metaphor of vision as wine), and he continues until satiety, μέχρι κόρου. The erotic viewer is consumed by his appetite, and this relates to the motif of emotion as a lack of control. It not just eating or drinking, but excessive eating and drinking.330

328 See Ach.Tat.2.3.3 and Hld. 3.10.5; 7.27.3. This metaphor is probably connected with notions of satiety, koros, of emotion. See the following chapter for more on this metaphor.


330 This element of excess is missed by Morales (2005, 11–2). She quotes two further metaphors which display the woman taking on the role of visual consumer; Ach.Tat.5.13.5 where Melite says that being with Clitophon is her ‘nourishment’, τροφή, and Hld.7.8.6 where Arsace looks upon Theagenes hungrily: πλέον τῶν ἄλλων τῆς ἐκείνου θέας ἐμφοροφυμένη. She also neglects to mention the metaphorical nature of ἐμφοροφυμένη, which first indicates the load of emotion (see
Another metaphor peculiar to vision is that of lightning, which conceptualises erotic vision as a force. In Heliodorus Chariclea looks straight at the former priest Thyamis with her face and strikes him with her beauty as if lightning, αὐτὸν τῷ κάλλει καταστράψασα. Later on Mitranes is ‘struck out’ at Chariclea’s youthfulness, τῆς ώρας, although she is in rough garments, as she shines like the rays of the moon from behind a cloud: ἐξεπέπληκτο μὲν τῆς ώρας, ἀπ’ εὐτελοὺς γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐσθῆτος οἰον νέφους αὐγὴ σεληναίας διεξέλαμπεν (Hld.5.8.5). The brightness of light is mapped onto the intensity of beauty, and vision exerts a force on the viewer. In fact the vision of Theagenes which Arsace receives is ‘irresistible’: ὑπὸ θέας ἀμάχου (Hld.7.9.2). The ambiguity of the expression, whether it indicates that Theagenes’ beauty is unconquerable by Arsace or by rivals for his beauty, can be exploited both ways, since both translations are complementary. In context the former meaning is emphasised, since Arsace is passively taken by the emotion, although as Heliodorus repeatedly emphasises, the beauty of his main couple surpasses that of others.

Metaphors of vision are forceful ones, but this force is translated within the power dynamics of relationships. One metaphorical concept highlights several issues germane to gender and power relations. This is the model of love as hunting. Put simply we have a model of two parties—the hunter and prey—being mapped onto dynamics between three parties: the erastes, eromenos and the emotion. I will argue that the force of emotion plays a major role in creating consistency and meaning within this metaphorical schema. I will also use the study of this metaphor to show that the model of erotic vision in the Greek Novel is consistent with much of previous Greek literature.
To begin with it is best to return to archaic and classical Greece, where most of the research on hunting as an erotic metaphor has been done. Barringer provides a good description of how hunting and ἔρως functioned in ancient Athens. She shows that hunting was firmly embedded as an aristocratic value in archaic and classical Greek culture, and that the usual model of erotic hunting involves an older male, the erastes, and a younger male, eromenos, each of whom has power on account of their social standing and beauty respectively. She notes that women can also be the objects of the hunt and that the power dynamics can sometimes be reversed, when the eromenos becomes the hunter and the erastes the prey. It seems to me, however, that the role of the emotion has been underestimated in these dynamics.

The first element we must look at in this model is its evaluative function (see introduction). Does conceiving of the erastes as a hunter present a good image, a bad image, or an ambivalent one? Barringer’s study shows that hunting was viewed positively among the aristocracy, but she does not systematically explore whether the image was also used in a negative light. Her evidence on the vases suggests that it was a popular topic for representation, and so the portrayal of the erastes as hunting the eromenos does not seem negative ipso facto, though of course negative exempla abound in ancient literature. When Plato uses the image of the lover as being like the wolf after the lamb, it comes at the end of a criticism of the lover as an interested party wishing to fulfil his desire, not as an exponent of goodwill. He therefore uses the image in a negative sense. When Aeschines speaks of lovers as hunters of young men, θηρευτὰς, they appear in a list of negative examples. We do not have space here to explore all the nuances which different narrators and orators invest the hunting metaphor with. Suffice it to say that the model can be used negatively depending on context.

The other categories which are prominent in the model are women and emotion. Women can, however, take a more active role. Xenophon writes that

335 Theog.1278c-d and Pl. Chrm. 155d-e compare the erastes to a lion and the eromenos to a fawn. See also PL Lysis 206a. Ariphron fr.813 says that men hunt using Aphrodite’s secret nets.
336 Pl. Phdr. 241d.
337 Aeschin. 1.195.
Alcibiades was hunted by lustful women. Barringer describes it as ‘a play on the same idea to express the reversal of usual gender roles’. The gender distribution is reversed from the prototypical case and the point is that the women are not acting like they should. Lovesick women proliferate throughout ancient myth and history. It is the taking of the active role which is unsuitable, against normative cultural values, and can often lead to a negative evaluation of the woman’s behaviour.

In Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* Socrates goes to gaze upon Theodote, who is reputed to be of great beauty and who is prepared to sleep with those who persuade her: καὶ οἵας συνεῖναι τῷ πείθοντι (Xen.*Mem*.3.11.1). Socrates compares her to the spider who hunts and her prey to hares (Xen.*Mem*.3.11.6-8). Theodote has just asked which approach she should use to hunt ‘friends’ (a euphemism). This is a specifically Athenian example, and it is far removed from the era of the Greek Novel. However, what is important is the association which can be attached to a woman who ‘hunts’ her prey. Theodote is a prostitute, and therefore the model of hunting is suitable to her status and social role. If other women are the active hunters in the hunting model they can be portrayed as a certain type of women. The further they are from the status which allows this—e.g. married woman—the more reprehensible their conduct in the eyes of Greek norms and social values. They are evaluated against the cultural background.

In a fragment Sophocles describes a woman struck with erotic passion as being caught in nets. This introduces the third element of our schema: the emotion. The emotion can hunt the lover through the medium of the beloved. This is what Ibycus is referring in his famous pederastic poem (Ibycus 287 P):

| Έρως αὐτῇ με κυανόσισιν ύπό  |
| Βλεφάροις τακέρ’ ὑμασία δερκόμενος  |
| Κηλήμασι παντοδαισίοις ἐς ἀπει-  |
| ρα δίκτυα Κύπριδος ἐσβάλλει. |

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339 Barringer 2001, 86.
340 Soph.fr.932.
341 For imagery of the ‘beloved’—potentially also the emotion—hunting the lover see *AP* 12.101.1–3, 12.109, 12.113. On hunting in erotic philosophy and poetry see also Ibyc.287.4; Pl.*Phdr*.252e, 253c; Sappho 1.21; Thgn.1283–94, 1299–1304.
Davies claims that here ‘Eros symbolises or stands for the beloved’, and that this is a common image, but this misses the point somewhat.\textsuperscript{342} His explanation is still trying to describe the triangulation of relations between the emotion and two parties in terms of a dynamic between two parties. The model underlying the metaphor is the same as the one from the Greek Novel, where the beauty of the beloved affects the lover regardless of the beloved’s will or intention. This poem describes first and foremost the emotion hunting the erastes, because the emotion works via the beauty of the beloved, especially from the eyes (see below). The visual evocation of the beloved’s dark eyes blends well with the description of the emotional affect as ‘melting’, τακέω. Therefore although the meltingly dark-eyed ἔρως is certainly to be identified with the boy, the active ἔρως throwing the net does not have to be seen as synonymous with the boy’s desire or intention. The boy will cause ἔρως whether he desires to or not, and so the image of the net throwing is delightfully ambiguous: the boy could be glancing provocatively or not. This incitation of ἔρως regardless of the intention of the beloved can be seen in the next passage we will discuss, which appears in Heliodorus’ Aethiopica.

In book two the Egyptian priest Calasiris narrates the reason why he had to leave Egypt. He was lured into temptation by a beautiful woman, Rhodopis, and therefore voluntarily went into exile.\textsuperscript{343} In fact, she is second in beauty only to Chariclea: τὸ κάλλος δεύτερον μετὰ Χαρίκλειαν ἔχουσα (Hld.2.25.1). There is a great ambiguity as to whether she is the willing seductress or not. She arrives touring Egypt and it is possible that a wandering and self-sufficient woman has a negative connotation.\textsuperscript{344}

\textsuperscript{342} Davies 1986, 405. See also Davies 1980 who compares Propertius 1.1.1 and Philostr.Epist.56. ἔρως is specifically the hunter at Pl.Symp.203d.

\textsuperscript{343} There is a potential historical correspondence for the name Rhodopis. Hdt.2.134–5 relates that she was involved with the brother of the poetess Sappho. She is brought to Egypt originally as a slave and subsequently set free, and is famed for her ‘charms’: ἐπαφρόδιτος. Achilles Tatius also features an erotic story of a virgin called Rhodopis (Ach.Tat.8.12). She was a huntress with Artemis, until Aphrodite grew angry at her disdain for sex and punished her by making her fall in love with a youth called Euthynicus. When Artemis discovers the fact she turns Rhodopis into a spring which now functions as a test for those who make oaths related to Aphrodite. When they first see one another their eyes ‘stand still’: ἔστησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκάτεροι (Ach.Tat.8.12.7).

\textsuperscript{344} Demosthenes’ In Neaeram 108 speaks of the prostitute who wanders about the world to find new clients. Goldhill 1998, 114, says that ‘the prostitute is distinctive because she is open to the gaze of men’ in his discussion of Socrates and Theodote in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.
The metaphor of the erotic hunt is extended. As she was prepared with erotic hunting equipment, ἄφροδισίοις θηράτροις, it was not possible to avoid capture by her, ἡλωκέναι, and she dangles a net from her eyes, σαγήνην. Although the syntax portrays Rhodopis as active, ἐξησκημένη, we are never told whether she is complicit with the effect she generates. Reading in the model of overpowering κάλλος we can see that vision functions regardless of the woman’s intent. She becomes a frequent visitor to his own temple of Isis and it is the constant sight of her which drives him into exile.

Seeing her often is too much for him, κρείττων, and his self-control, ἐγκράτειαν, is conquered. It is a less prototypical case in the sense that he is worn down over a period of time rather than ἔρως completely conquering him at once. Here we still see the language reflecting the metaphor of ἔρως as an opponent. The eyes of his soul fight against the eyes of his body—reason against passion—yet he is defeated.

345 The motif of the erotic hunt, if not the metaphors, appears in Chariton. At night the king recalls Callirhoe’s form, and the eyes are a prominent in the description (Chariton 6.7.1). During a hunt, arranged to take his mind off his erotic torment, the king can only see Callirhoe as if she was on the hunt (Chariton 6.4.5). Her dress is tucked up to her knees and her face red. The correspondences here are manifold. First there is the erotic connotation of the hunt. The king is hunting animals but also in fact ‘hunting’ Callirhoe. Yet the king’s visualisation of Callirhoe is accompanied by a simile taken from the Odyssey (6.102-4). Callirhoe hunting would have looked just like Artemis. This image complicates matters. Artemis is of course famously virgin and this pictures a chaste Callirhoe, in the same way as the comparison with Penelope above. The huntress Artemis is directly relevant to the image of a beautiful woman hunting. If, however, hunting is a dynamic parallel to that of ἔρως then this could imply that Callirhoe is herself hunting the king in the same way as he is her. This notion is supported by the fact that the Odyssey quote is taken from a description of Nausikaa. She is an example of a woman who was interested in Odysseus, a potential suitor and her theme is one of attempted marriage.

346 She also made expensive sacrifices and dedications: θυσίαις τε καὶ ἀναθήμασι πολυταλάντοις (Hld.2.25.2).
ἡττήθεις, and loads erotic passion upon himself: ἐπιφορτισάμενος. His action promoted by reason is not resisting the emotion, which is impossible, but by leaving the country and not actively pursuing the object of desire. He uses reason as his judge: δικαστὴν ἐμαυτῷ τὸν λογισμὸν ἀναδείξας (Hld.2.25.4).347 The language of mastery as with the metaphor of the hunt promotes the passivity of the subject’s emotional response to ἔρως. However, they may still take an aversive course of action.

It is difficult to say whether Rhodopis is complicit or not. Calasiris indeed never mentions her motives, or even speaks to her. This passage is also explained astrologically by Calasiris.348 He says that whoever came into contact with the woman had a bad fate, κακῇ μοίρᾳ τῶν ἐγνωκότων (Hld.2.25.1), and that she is to be averted, τὴν ἀποτρόπαιον (Hld.2.25.4). He also, however, attributes the whole episode to a ruling star: τοῦ τότε ἐπικρατοῦντος ἀστέρος (Hld.2.25.5). This implies that both Calasiris and the women are pawns of a larger cosmic game. He compares her to an actor playing a part in a drama: ὑπόκρισις καὶ ὡς ὁ τότε εἰληχὼς δαίμων οἱονεὶ προσωπεῖον αὐτὴν ὑπῆλθε (Hld.2.25.3). The malicious daemon is using her as a mask: προσωπεῖον. She therefore becomes a cipher for a greater power, which increases her passivity.

We can not say for certain whether she is a temptress in the mould of Arsace, who does take the active role of ‘hunting’ Theagenes, which is inappropriate for both her gender and status as wife of the satrap. As Morgan notes there is an art, τέχνη, to seduction and the terminology is used of Demaenete and Thisbe: the negative Athenian version of love.349 However, we cannot assume the activeness of the beloved based only on metaphors of the force of emotion. The irrelevance of the beloved’s intention reveals that the metaphor of the emotion as hunting should be taken seriously as a third part of the erastes-eromenos dynamic.350 This tripartite

347 Contrast the passage from Achilles Tatius in the previous passage where ἔρως tortures the judges.
348 On this passage and astrology in general in Heliodorus see Liviabella Furiani 1979.
349 See Morgan 1989, 109 and Hld.1.9.2; 1.15.7.
350 There is an example of the emotion as hunter in Achilles Tatius, but he does not hunt the person as such. Clitophon tells us that as a whole fell upon him and chased sleep from his eyes: ὅλος γὰρ μοι προσέπεσεν ὁ ἐρως καὶ αὐτὸν μου διώκει τὸν ύπνον τῶν ὀμμάτων (Ach.Tat.1.9.1). The verbal form διώκει, ‘he pursues’, personifies the emotion as a hunter.
model shows that the traditional bipartite model of the erastes-eromenos should be seen in a more complex light.

It is the action of the emotion, the third party, which offers the choice of a hunting model based not on the intention of the lover or beloved but on the force of the emotion. If we go further and look at where these metaphors are applied in the process or scenario of the emotion, we see that the emotion as hunter is prior to the erastes as hunter. Conquered by the emotion, the erastes then tries to hunt down the eromenos. Furthermore the metaphor of the hunt can be used in less emotional contexts, such as with Theodote in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, where it is explicitly ‘friends’ she is hunting. The importance of tracing this model from previous Greek literature down to the Greek Novel, where it appears rarely in the specific form of the hunting metaphor, is that we can trace the same operation of the force of emotion upon the erastes throughout the metaphors and models used. Therefore the dynamics of force and passivity seen in erotic vision above are not only present in previous Greek literature, but even in metaphors which emphasise the homosexual relationship between the erastes and eromenos such as the hunting model.

There are therefore two prototypical models which involve the imagery of the hunt. The first is the likening of the relationship between the erastes and the eromenos to the former hunting the other. The other prototype involves the master metaphorical conception of emotion as force, and indicates the emotional effect, or beauty, hunting the person feeling the emotion.\(^{351}\) Barringer claims that ‘although both women and boys are pursued, only the male can become the hunter in heterosexual relationships’.\(^{352}\) Now this is prima facie not true (see the example from Xenophon above), but she does qualify her statement by adding the proviso that when women do become the hunter, disaster results.\(^{353}\) There are implications for the female of taking the role of the hunter in the first prototypical model, that of one person as the hunter and the other as the hunted. It is not so much a gender reversal, but an attempted power reversal, and this is significant in itself. Morales states that in Achilles Tatius women use male metaphors when they are taking the male role.

\(^{351}\) In Sappho *fr.*1.21 the ‘I am currently pursuing you, but soon you will pursue me’ motif cleverly combines the change of force of the emotion, the person who is in love will switch, with the change in the actual pursuit, where the person in love will pursue the object of affection.
\(^{352}\) Barringer 2001, 123.
\(^{353}\) Barringer 2001, 124. She provides the standard mythical examples, such as Phaedra.
She is correct when she notes that ‘women use ‘male’ metaphors…when they are seducing’. 354

The roles which an actor plays in the power dynamics of erotic vision have consequences for social expectations and protocols. In this sense it is impossible to divorce erotic vision from cultural norms, particularly the cultural protocols involving shame and vision. 355 Hubbard in his analysis of a Pindaric ode and Greek vase paintings states that the convention is for the erastes to stare straight at the eromenos and for the eromenos to look down. 356 I will term this the prototypical scenario. Hubbard’s subsequent conclusions, however, are less justified. He argues that a number of vases show the eromenos looking straight at the erastes, and that this reverses the power dynamic of the relationship. He compares this with Pindar’s ode on Theoxenus, where he claims that ‘what is significant in Pindar’s text is that beautiful boys are accorded power over their lovers in their capacities as both visual subjects (2-3) and objects (10-12)’. 357 The lines in question are illuminated by the discussion upon the hunting metaphor above.

Τὰς δὲ Θεοξένου ἀκτίνας πρὸς όσσων (3) μαμαμαμουξίσας δρακείς ὁς μὴ πόθω κυμαίνεται, ἐξ ἀδάμαντος ἢ σιδάρου κεχάλκευται μελαινὰν καρδίαν ψυχοὰ φλογί
...
ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τὰς ἕκατον ὅς δαχθεὶς ἕλᾳ (10) ἱρᾶν μελισσᾶν τάκομαι.

A distinction must be made between the force of the emotion and the intention of the object of viewing. It is more correct to say not that the boy is given power over the older man, but that his beauty, via the emotion, exerts some power over the man. These are not the same things. For instance his beauty exerts an emotional power regardless of his own intention, and so he cannot decide not to use it. The narrator melts like wax (10) because of the force of the emotion. Furthermore it is not a

354 Morales 2005, 12.
355 For anger, the veil and visual aspects of shame see Cairns 1993 and 2001. See also A.R.3.444–5, 1017–20, 1022–4, 1063–8; E.Hipp.201–2, 239–49.
357 Hubbard 2002, 283: numbers in brackets refer to line numbers in Pindar’s fr.123.
simple power dynamic where the active and passive parties simply switch places, but
the power struggle is an ongoing negotiation between the power (always actual) of
the socially superior and the power (always active) of the beauty of the boy (see
Barringer above). This power negotiation is conducted within social protocols of
behaviour. It is this aspect which leads us into our next consideration, which
mediates erotic vision. This is the notion of αἴδως or shame which mediates, to
oversimplify somewhat, who can look and who should avert their gaze within the
cultural context.358 I would interpret the vase paintings discussed by Hubbard, where
the boy is looking straight at the older man, as an indication of a lack of αἴδως. This
allows him to utilise his beauty in the same way as Chariclea strikes Thyamis like
lightning when addressing him (see below). Hubbard claims his findings call into
question the penetration-centred regimen of phallic subordination.359 However, we
must specify which level of power we are talking about here. As above with the
hunting metaphor, the third dynamic of the force of emotion is all important. The
beauty of the beloved results in the force of emotion, which prototypically causes the
socially superior male to pursue the socially inferior and younger boy. The boy or
woman cannot switch their beauty, and therefore its emotional effect, on or off, but
they can choose to manipulate and exploit it. Therefore the best interpretation of this
dynamic is as a discourse between the erastes and eromenos, a discourse caused by
the force of emotion.360

There are also other emotional and social issues which can affect this
relationship between two lovers. Longus gives the clearest example of staring
directly as erotic vision, and the averting of the gaze as αἴδως-mediated erotic
vision. Daphnis stares at Chloe intensely, because he is not feeling αἴδως: πᾶσαν
αυτήν ἔβλεπεν ἀπλήστως, οἷα μηδὲν αἰδούμενος (Longus 1.25.1). It is the
kind of emotion which forces one to look and ignore the emotion which prompts a
sense of social propriety, αἴδως.361 In terms of the process of the emotion both

359 Hubbard 2002, 288.
360 See also Foucault 1990a, 249ff. on the use of pleasure and its discourses within social strictures.
361 At Ach.Tat.1.10.3 there is tension between shame and desire. Αἴδως is an integral part of the
erotic experience. Ach.Tat.1.10.4 states that even if a woman does desire her suitor, a verbal
invitation may still provoke shame and therefore restraint. Therefore do not speak directly about your
wishes. This example presents an interesting gauging of the simultaneous demands of desire and
elements are present: erotic vision urges one to look directly at the other’s face, but
keeps surfacing and temporarily restraining the person feeling the emotion. In
Apollonius’ Argonautica Jason and Medea exchange erotic glances before
succumbing to the averted gaze of αἰδώς (A.R.3.1022-4 and 1063-8). 362

One interesting scene in Heliodorus depicts the beautiful Chariclea having an
erotic effect on Thyamis. 363 She looks her adversary square in the face and gives a
speech telling of their travels and circumstances (Hld.1.21–22). After her speech
Thyamis is set aflame (Hld.1.23), but concedes to her request to delay a wedding
between the two of them. It is the assumption of the role of speaker which portrays
her in a prototypically masculine role, not the act of looking him square in the face,
which would merely indicate a lack of αἰδώς. 364 This certainly could be interpreted
negatively in antiquity, as in the writings of the physiognomists failure to lower the
eye in a woman is taken as a sign that she is a prostitute. 365 Yet this is surely not true
in the context since Chariclea is a chaste, probably ‘perfect’ woman in Heliodorus,
and her direct and confident rhetoric aids the couple’s situation. Her role is indeed
like the male Odysseus’s connivance in disparate situations. She looks him directly
in the face in order to take advantage of her beauty, which has an emotional impact
and aids her persuasive ability. 366 The point is not that she has suddenly ‘switched’

social face by the individual (see chapter on opponent for more).
362 When Jason and Hypsipyle are face to face she avoids looking at him, and blushes with αἰδώς
(A.R.1.790–1). Medea looks Jason straight in the face at A.R.3.287 then later from behind her veil
(A.R.3.444–5).
363 Morgan 2004, 542, discusses this passage in a narratological context.
364 When Daphnis feels αἰδώς in front of his master Dionysophanes he looks downward: ἀλλὰ ἐρυθήματος πλησθεὶς ἔνευσε κάτω (Longus 4.14.2). Αἰδώς can also be triggered by a direct
look. When Daphnis looks at Chloe he cannot help blushing: βλέπων δ΄ ἐρυθήματι ἐπίμπλατο (Longus 1.17.2).
365 Ps.Polemo 81=i.430 Foerster.
366 Looking at someone is an action which can be evaluated differently depending upon who is doing
the looking and the person judging the looking. S.Aj.462–3 and OT 528 both cite the notion of ἀναίδεια as looking at someone when it is not appropriate to do so. Cairns 2005, 131 cites Xenophon Hell.7.1.30 for the idea of ‘being seen from all sides’, περίβλεπτος, as a metonymous
reference to others’ admiration, but this refers to men. Certainly the visibility of Callirhoe in Chariton
is not beneficial to the woman herself, and in fact causes most of her problems. There is also an
expectation for men to refrain from looking at women they are not supposed to. Artaxerxes’ eyes
‘steal’ a glance at Callirhoe, κλέπτοντας (Chariton 6.1.7), and this metaphor encapsulates nicely
the social impropriety behind his act and intentions. The metaphor of vision as ‘stealing’ is also used at
Ach.Tat.1.5.3 and Leucippe is ashamed at being ‘caught in the act’ by her mother, πεφωραμένη, at
Ach.Tat.2.29.1–2. The verb ‘to be caught’ is cognate with the noun meaning ‘thief’, φώρ. Leucippe
is not stealing anything, and therefore the verb is metaphorically applies to the social impropriety
of the action.
the power relationship, as many scholars seem to think in regards to narrow notions of active and passive, but negotiates against the existing power dynamic—Thyamis is a bandit chieftain, has captured her and can force her if he wishes—in order to further her own cause.\textsuperscript{367} A better way of regarding the relationship between erastes and eromenos, or the lover and beloved, is as a discourse embedded in personal desires and cultural protocols, rather than a simple and linear active-passive relationship which merely switches one way and another.

\textsuperscript{367} A similar but non-erotic example appears in Apollonius Rhodius, where Medea stares directly at the giant Talus and uses her magic to destroy him. Buxton 2000, 272, claims that when Medea stares at Talus there is a reversal of sexual roles, as she is taking on a masculine role. I would rather state that she is using the ability of her direct gaze, which would not always be appropriate given the expectations of αἰδώς, for her own benefit.
II The Anatomy of Vision

The above section outlined the implications of the cultural models and metaphors used of erotic vision in the Greek Novel and previous literature. I will now move on to specifically examine the entities involved in the visual dynamics. In such a visual context the eye of course plays a major role. However, there are several interesting features in erotic descriptions of the eye which are not reducible to the trivial statement that the eye is the means and mechanism for vision. Descriptions of the eye reveal cultural notions and prejudices. In the science of physiognomics contemporary to the novels, which tried to infer internal mental processes and states or character from external signs, the eye was the most discussed feature.368

Erotic vision can sometimes be seen as ‘proper’ seeing, due to the increase in concentration upon the object of affection. When Daphnis first falls in love with Chloe, it is as if he has eyes for the first time: ὡσπερ τότε πρώτον ὀφθαλμοὺς κτησάμενος (Longus 1.17.3). As with other areas of vision, metaphors of force reveal the operation of the emotion. Chloe cannot master her eyes (under the influence of ἔρως) and both of the main couple’s eyes are captured.369 In the later example mutual capturing illustrates nicely the force of the emotion. Each party projects their κάλλος and each party is forced to look regardless of their own intention. Callirhoe can be described as ‘leading all eyes present’: ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη μόνη τούς ἁπάντως ἐδημαγώγησεν ὀφθαλμούς (Chariton 4.1.10). In actual fact it is her κάλλος which forces others’ eyes regardless of their (and her) will. The eyes are not just receptors of beauty but can be a focal point of transmission. The eyes of the beloved contain κάλλος. It sits upon the eyes most of all: μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς κάθηται τὸ κάλλος (Ach.Tat.6.6.3). This

368 Swain 2007, 12 says that a striking feature of the physiognomist Polemon’s work is the attention given to the eye: about 30 percent. As a comparison the Ps.Aristotelian treatise on physiognomics makes little use of the eye, so in Polemon’s era this may reflect a culturally specific emphasis. One reason for this could be that in contemporary rhetorical training the eye and the face are emphasised: see Gleason 1995, 57.
369 Longus 1.13.5, τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οὐκ ἐκράτει, and Longus 1.24.1, ἐγίνετο ἤδη τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἅλωσις αὐτοῖς. Clitophon cannot master his gaze either (Ach.Tat.2.1.1). Arsace ‘hangs’ her eye, ἀναρτήσασα, from Theagenes alone (Hld.7.8.6).
370 On Callirhoe as a visual object see Egger 1994a.
implies that it also sits elsewhere, but is particularly rooted in the eyes. Its associate pleasure, ἡδονή, also enters through the eyes and sits in the inside of the body: ἥ δὲ τῆς θέας ἡδονή διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εἰσφέουσα τοῖς στέρνοις ἐγκάθηται (Ach.Tat.5.13.4). The eyes’ role as intermediary is nicely encapsulated by Achilles Tatius when he calls the eye the ‘ambassador’, πρόξενος, of φιλία (Ach.Tat.1.9.5). The context is erotic where φιλία, friendship or being well disposed towards someone, is seen as a result of erotic attraction.

We also encounter the physical properties of eyes. When Calasiris beholds lovesick Chariclea he notes that her eyes are ‘moist’ with ἔρως: ὀφθαλμοὺς τῷ ἔρωτι διαβρόχους (Hld.3.7.1). She is upset and it indicates that there are tears in her eyes. First Calasiris reads the eyes as revealing inner state, which is not a particularly remarkable piece of inference given the common association of tears with grief. So wet eyes are symptomatic of grief, and grief is here metonymical of ἔρως, as grief is often part of the erotic experience. Later on in the same chapter we are told that Chariclea, experiencing the symptoms of love, looked like she had the fire of her glance quenched by her tears as if by water: τὸ φλέγον τοῦ βλέμματος καθάπερ ὕδασιν ἐῴκει τοῖς δάκρυσιν ἀποσβεννύμενον (Hld.3.19.1). Fire is another common metaphor for love, and the narrator is conceptualising her symptoms with the metaphor of passion being doused by grief. The erotic experience leads to multiple emotions, and often ones which pull in different directions. This metaphor also conceptualises emotion as a process where passion is succeeded by grief, a sequence of emotions which is contained within the erotic process.

371 The painting of Andromeda also describes the κάλλος which ‘blooms’ out of the eyes: ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνθεῖ τὸ κάλλος (Ach.Tat.3.7.3). At Hld.7.8.6 Arsace ‘hangs’, ἀναρτάω, only upon the eye of Theagenes.

372 In the debate over which is better, pederasty or heterosexual love, Ach.Tat.2.35.3 describes the beauty of boys as ‘more bitter in terms of pleasure’: τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῖς δριμύτερον εἰς ἡδονήν. The metaphor here is in favour of pederasty, and so not negative, and the metaphor of bitterness represents intensity of feeling, sharpness.

373 Clitophon also states that when he and Leucippe were staring at one another they were neither “gaining nor daring more than the eyes: καὶ πλέον τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐκερδάθημεν ἢ ἐτολμώμεν οὐδὲν (Ach.Tat.2.3.3). The eye is thus the middle part of the process, before the couple can metaphorically ‘gain’ the advantage of physical relations. Daring refers to the subversion of social strictures by their actions.
In Heliodorus the eye does merely play the role of creating ἐρως in the two lovers, but maintains its importance in their continuing relationship. Gazing into each other’s eyes creates a memory of their passion and vision makes their thought, διάνοια, flare up like burning wood: ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἀντίβλεψις ὑπόμνησις τοῦ πάσχοντος γίνεται καὶ ἀναφλέγει τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ θέα καθάπερ ὠλη πυρι γινομένη (Hld.4.4.4). Vision of one another reinforces and increases the intensity of their mutual ἐρως.

The eyes signal love, but they can also exert an influence because they project κάλλος, and possibly other emotional effects geared towards persuasion. In book eight of Heliodorus Arsace is in despair because Achaemenes has left to tell her husband Oroondates of her attempted affair with Theagenes, but she claims that if she can see him then all will be well. She will cry because the glance of a wife persuades like a love charm: μίαν θεραπείαν καὶ δάκρυον Αρσάκειον ἐν ὑσχ ὑποστήσεται· μεγάλην εἰς πειθὼ κέκτηται πρὸς ἀνδρας ἰυγγα τὰ γυναικεία καὶ σύνοικα βλέμματα (Hld.8.5.7). It is possible that this is her own biased opinion, but we have parallels for the attitude that a wife’s looks exert an influence on her husband. In Tacitus, one critical factor in getting Claudius to condemn Messalina is that he does not see her or hear her defence. Emotion and the display of emotion in the face can be used for persuasive purposes, especially in an erotic relationship.

Vision is communicative body language: it reveals to some extent the thoughts or intention of the person looking. Cnemon tells us that his stepmother Demaenete’s looks, ‘separated from self-control’, led him into suspicion: τὸ βλέμμα τοῦ σώφρονος ἐξιστάμενον πρὸς υπόνοιαν ἤγεν (Hld.1.9.3). The nature of her look is not described. We are merely told that it indicated her lustful thoughts. The closest we get to a description of what a lustful gaze looks like is at Hld.7.12.7, where Theagenes recalls how Arsace stared at him continuously, ἀτενές, the previous day: ως ἀτενές αὐτῷ καὶ ἵταμον συνεχές τε καὶ τῶν ἀπρεπεστέρων δηλωτικὸν προσέβλεπεν. In addition her look was unseemly:

374 Tac. Ann. 11.28.
ἀπρεπεστέρων. Indeed self-control or a lack of can be seen in the way people look. Arsace cast eyes at Theagenes which were not chaste: ὁφθαλμοὺς τε ἐπέβαλλεν οὐ σώφρονας (Hld.7.2.2). A glance can indicate a lack of restraint, and staring can show the indifference to σιδῶς typical in a lover’s stare (see above). The power of vision also means that the effluences of beauty can provoke a lack of restraint. Thyamis stays away from Chariclea because he cannot look at her and keep control of himself at the same time: οὐ δυνατὸν βλέπειν τε ἄμα καὶ σώφρονεὶν ἥγούμενος (Hld.1.24.3). Thyamis is ostensibly in the same boat as the ‘wicked women’ in the novel, although the mark of his superior character is that he deliberately does not look at Chariclea. Demaenete and Arsace do stare at the objects of their affection, and this leads to their glances becoming unchaste, or lustful. This reading of the eyes, face and ‘look’ is not physiognomics proper but conforms to general folk models which posit that inner emotion can be seen upon the face. Indeed as we have seen this is true to some extent. In English we have the same notion, as with the statement ‘you can see the love in her eyes’, which is perfectly acceptable to any fluent speaker.

At the start of Heliodorus’ novel Chariclea’s glance, in interacting with Thyamis, becomes ‘more striking/imposing’: τὸ βλέμμα κεκίνητο πρὸς τὸ γοργότερον (Hld.1.21.3). This is part of the same passage discussed above, where Chariclea is looking Thyamis full in the face. It is therefore the direct gaze which is having a particular effect. Theagenes is also described by Arsace’s nurse Cybele as having ‘an expression at one and the same time attractive and imposing’: τὸ βλέμμα καὶ ἔραστὸν ἁμα καὶ γοργόν προσβλέπων (Hld.7.10.4). Morgan’s translation as ‘imposing’ encapsulates the notion that their gaze has an emotional effect: this seems to be the primary effect of the term. So although the adjective γοργός often refers to the emotional effect one can have through one’s eyes, and this is a case of κάλλος causing others to stop and take notice.

375 See Introduction on Ekman.
376 Morgan’s translation in Reardon 1989.
377 The adjective γοργός is difficult to translate: it can mean either ‘grim’ or ‘spirited’. At A.Th.537 it is used of Parthenopeaesus, who walks with a grim look in his eyes. The comparative is used at X.Cyr.4.4.3: καὶ γὰρ μείζους φαίνεσθε καὶ καλλίους καὶ γοργότεροι ἢ πρόσθεν ἰδέιν.
The eyes more than any other body part project beauty, the κάλλος of the beloved or object of affection. Chloe, upon seeing Daphnis naked, can even fall into (his) κάλλος: ἡ μὲν γὰρ γυμνὸν ὄρωσα τὸν Δάφνιν ἐπ’ ἀθρόουν καὶ ἐνέπιπτε τὸ κάλλος (Longus 1.24.1). Falling into κάλλος here emphasizes the passivity of the emotional state (see more in chapter on ontology). In Longus vision is, as elsewhere, the prerequisite for ἐρως.\(^{378}\) The lecherous Gnathon declares that in whichever body one finds κάλλος, with that one they are taken: ἀλλ’ ἐν οἷῳ ποτε ἂν σώματι εὗρῃ τὸ κάλλος, ἐάλωκε (Longus 4.17.3). This gnome is certainly true of the novels and recalls Sappho’s famous priamel.\(^{379}\) In Chariton’s novel we have perhaps the greatest emphasis on κάλλος. Callirhoe evokes admiration and ἐρως wherever she goes.\(^{380}\) It is difficult for crowds to tear themselves away from the sight of her: τὸ Καλλιρόης κάλλος δυσαπόσπαστον τοῖς ὁρῶσι (Chariton 5.8.7). In the court room earlier all are amazed at the initial sight of Callirhoe: ὀφθεῖσα δὲ θάμβος ἐποίησε (Chariton 5.5.9).\(^{381}\) Homer is quoted to provide an analogy with Penelope: πάντες δ’ ἠρήσαντο παραὶ λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι

Cyrus is thanking the Median and Hyrcanian cavalrmen for doing a good job, and compliments them by saying that they seem larger, finer and more ‘terrible’ to look upon than before. The attribute is seen as coexistent with but distinct from κάλλος, and of course is not here used in an erotic context. What is consistent across the examples is that someone with a γοργός look causes an emotional reaction in the viewer. It can also indicate character. The physiognomist Adamantius refers to a brave person as having a moist and ‘striking’ gaze (2.44= i.409–10 Foerster). There is of course a mythological connotation to the adjective: the Gorgon. Lucian says he is struck by a beautiful woman like a gorgon. Lucian Imagines 1.1: ἀλλ’ ὣ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπασχον οἱ τὴν Γοργὼ ἰδόντες οἷον ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἔπαθον, ὦ Πολύστρατε, παγκάλην τινα γυναῖκα ἰδών.

\(^{378}\) At least most of the time. In Achilles Tatius Callisthenes falls in love through rumour rather than direct observation, but the author presents it as deviant, and it is certainly deviant compared to the view of the novels in general (Ach.Tat.2.13.1).

\(^{379}\) See Schmeling 2005 for the presentation of Callirhoe as a ‘celebrity’ in the mould of Helen of Troy. See also Egger 1994. Chariclea is a visual object at Hld.2.4 and 10.9 and ‘turns’ eyes towards herself at Hld.2.33.3.

\(^{380}\) For the metaphor of the ‘force of surprise’ see also Chariton 1.14.1; 1.14.2; 2.2.2; 2.5.4; 2.3.6; 3.3.2; 3.4.1; 3.6.4; 4.2.11; 4.3.8. When κάλλος strikes people it is this element which is emphasised. Chloe ‘knocks out’ those standing by with her beauty: Ἐξέπλησσε γὰρ κἀκεῖνας ἡ Χλόη κάλλος ἐκφέρουσα (4.33.4). See also Longus 1.3.2; 4.8.2; 4.18.2. Morales 2005, 6, states that ‘the novels reclaim for ‘real’ women what has previously been the privilege of a solitary figure from myth’. This is a misleading statement however. The Greek Novel is idealist rather than realist. Their heroines, especially Callirhoe and Chariclea, are elevated nearer to the beauty of goddesses rather than being realist constructions. The immaculate moral behaviour of the female main lover in the novels also points towards their status as a male fantasy, a view which would accord with the dominant view of the novel’s readership as educated and wealthy: see introduction.
Here amazement is not only amazement but reflects the desire of those in court to have sex with Callirhoe. Chariton also reflects social prejudices concerning beauty. Dionysius reasons that Callirhoe cannot be a slave, for a body not born free cannot be beautiful (and she is!): ‘ἀδύνατον εἶπεν, ὦ Λεωνᾶ, καλὸν εἶναι σῶμα μὴ πεφυκὸς ἐλεύθερον’ (Chariton 2.1.5). It is possible that this represents only Dionysius’ opinion as an educated and wealthy Ionian Greek. If he desires Callirhoe for marriage, then it is not seemly for a man in his position to take a slave, and so his comment can be seen as excusing his desire. However, he is speaking to Leonas, his servant, and his view must have some more general cultural credibility.

Her beauty is such that those looking upon Callirhoe are ‘charmed’, κεκηλημένων (Chariton 2.3.10). The context is not ostensibly erotic, as it is the crowd which is held enthralled by the sight of her. However, this effect shares something with the other metaphors used of visual beauty. Erotic vision partakes of

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382 This is an important comparison. The first point is that at the trial Callirhoe has several ‘suitors’. Ostensibly these are Chaereas and Dionysius, but there is also the king. This passage looks ahead to the following plot twist: the king himself wants to sleep with Callirhoe. This means that the inception of this desire, ἔρως for Callirhoe, is upon first beholding her at the trial. If the Homeric verse refers to the king’s thought (as it surely must do), as an equal more important than others in this context, then the gaze is the inceptive factor. Later on the king involves himself in an inner monologue. In this dispute he argues that it will be enough for him merely to look upon Callirhoe, and so he will delay the trial: ἀρκεῖ σοι Καλλιρόην κἂν βλέπειν (Chariton 6.1.12). This is the rhetoric of self-denial as later on he will actively seek her bed. See also Chaereas when he is shocked at seeing Callirhoe’s statue: τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἤτο (Chariton 3.6.3). Vision has a physiological effect.

383 Callirhoe is emphasised as a visual object throughout the novel (see above). The boatmen who see Callirhoe at Chariton 3.2.14 react fearfully: δείματι κατεσχέθησαν. The crowd at Chariton 3.2.16 has only the desire to see Callirhoe: μία δὲ πάντων ἦν ἐπιθυμία Καλλιρόην θεάσασθαι. Her effect on the crowd at Chariton 4.1.9 is so severe that we are told even the children were affected: ἐπαθόν τι καὶ παίδες. Her presence is like a ray of the sun, ὡς ἀκτίνος, and no-one there can endure the sight of her: ὑπήνεγκε. She also exerts a sonic effect. At Chariton 3.1.8 it is Callirhoe’s words which cause Dionysius to burn more fiercely with desire. It is the rumour, φήμη, of Callirhoe’s beauty which first stimulates Artaxerxes (Chariton 4.6.7). There is an element of mass visual eroticism at Chariton 5.5.9 when Callirhoe enters the court. Chariton uses a Homeric quotation to assess her emotional impact. Everyone in the room wishes to lie beside her: πάντες δ’ ἡρήσαντο παραὶ λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι (see Od.1.366; 18.213 and above). This quotation brings her into comparison with Penelope who also had multiple suitors. By invoking a comparison with Penelope it actually not only avoids mentioning sex but also emphasises Callirhoe’s chastity, her lack of sexual activity (despite the fact she has already succumbed to Dionysius’ advances).

384 At A.Supp.1003-5 the look of the lover seeks to bewitch its object. Note that again it is the vision of the attractive party which bewitches, regardless of their intention. See also the charms in Ibycus 287 above.
mainly conventional metaphors for ἔρως, and these are forceful, not persuasive. However, although the metaphor of bewitching is not as violent as those of conquering and shooting, the element of compulsion remains present. No one can ‘bear’ Callirhoe’s flashing κάλλος: τὴν μαρμαρυγὴν ὑπήνεγκε τοῦ κάλλους (Chariton 4.1.9). In the Greek Novel κάλλος is the factor which creates ἔρως. This does not necessarily lead to people refeeling ἔρως whenever they see someone else with κάλλος. Clitophon claims that now that he is blind to his betrothed’s beauty and can only see Leucippe: νῦν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς τυφλώττω καὶ πρὸς Λευκίσσην μόνην τοὺς ὧδθαλμους ἔχω (Ach.Tat.1.11.2). Κάλλος creates ἔρως, but once it is created it cannot be undone in the Greek Novel.

In Heliodorus as in Chariton beauty has a striking effect, but not necessarily an erotic one. A gnomic assertion by the narrator at Hld.4.3.2 states that κάλλος ‘induces’ εὔνοια, ‘good intention’, in those watching: ἐπακτικὸν γάρ τι καὶ πρῶτον ὁρώντων εἰς εὔνοιαν τὸ κάλλος. Κάλλος makes people benign towards you, and does not automatically provoke ἔρως, although some of the passages quoted from the other novels might give that impression. This excerpt coheres with the notion of ἔρως in one respect, in that beauty engenders good will regardless of your own intention. The gnome does not say that κάλλος induces favouritism if you are so disposed, merely that it induces favouritism full stop, via the medium of sight: ὀρφώτων. This aspect relates to the more forceful erotic notion of vision. Arsace’s sycophantic servant Cybele asks her who would be crazy enough not to be ‘defeated’ by her beauty: τίς οὕτως ἀλαζών καὶ ἐκφρων ὡς τοῦ κατὰ σὲ τοσοῦτον κάλλους μὴ ἡττήσθαι (Hld.7.9.5). The verb ἡττήσθαι (discussed in the chapter on emotional conflict) indicates the metaphor of the conquest of beauty, or rather the erastes as passively affected by the object of their

385 Κάλλος is also ‘flashing’ at Chariton 5.3.9. The simile is of the beauty of Callirhoe as a blinding flash at night. The metaphor in μαρμαρυγὴν comes from the root marmor-, indicating a sparkling rock or marble. When Chaireas and Callirhoe finally return to Sicily dressed in Persian finery their effect upon the people is greater than lighting and thunder to the senses (Chariton 8.6.8). In Pindar fr.123.2-3 rays flash out from the eyes of Theoxenus
affection. Cybele’s rhetoric inverts the norm and implies that someone not
dominated by Arsace’s beauty, i.e. not feeling ἔρως, must be out of their mind,
ἐκφρῶν. Ἀλαζὼν, ‘boaster’, adds the detail that the person who is not affected is
either lying or mad. As we have seen being out of your mind or mad is one of the
very metaphors used of the erotic experience. Here in contrast giving in to the
emotion is seen as the rational or honest option, and not feeling emotion is an
aberration. The use of metaphors varies with the speaker’s opinions and
requirements, but always utilises the same core concepts.

The prevalent model of κάλλος as an entity in the Greek Novel conceives of
it as an effluence which flows from the object and emanates towards and into the
recipient. Indeed the name of Chariton’s heroine, Callirhoe, is formed from the two
word κάλλος and ῥοή, meaning ‘the flowing of beauty’.386 Xenophon of Ephesus
provides us with an instance of the terminology in relation to sight.

Ὅλοις μὲν καὶ ἀναπεπταμένοις τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ Ἁβροκόμου κάλλος εἰσρέον
dεχομένη (X.Eph.1.3.2).

Eyes ‘wide open’, ἀναπεπταμένοις, is a description of body language indicating
the extent of her desire for the vision. The wider her eyes are, the greater the amount
of κάλλος she can take into her body.387 The notion of effluences can be traced
back to Greek philosophy, and perhaps the most famous instance of it lies in Plato’s
works.

Δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐθερμάθη
(Pl.Phdr.251b)

386 See Morales 2005, 7, and the etymological hypothesis of Plato’s Cratylus 439d-e which connects
the word ἔρως with ἔρω (Calame 1992, 21). The same conceptualisation appears in Achilles Tatius
where he ‘sluices’ ἔρως at the sight of Leucippe: ἐποχετευσάμενος ἐκ τῆς θέας ἔρωτα
(Ach.Tat.1.6.6). The emotion is conceived of as a liquid entity. See also Morales 2004, 79. At
Ach.Tat.2.29.2 αἰδὼς flows through the eyes and takes away their freedom: αἰδὼς διὰ τῶν
ὀμμάτων εἰσφέρει τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλευθερίαν καθαιρεῖ.

387 The effluences of κάλλος being taken into the body could also have been chosen because of erotic
connotations pertaining to sex.
In his description of the soul ‘taking flight’ Plato recognises vision as the initial part of the erotic process. Beauty is received as an effluence through the eyes. This is a frequently used element of ancient Greek scientific theory on vision.\textsuperscript{388}

Xenophon of Ephesus gives us the conception in its most basic form, but Achilles Tatius describes the psychological processes involved with κάλλος in a more complex way. At 1.4.4 in Achilles Tatius’ Leucipe and Clitophon we see a connection made between the flight of an arrow and the effluences of sight: the mixing of literary and scientific metaphor.

Άρος γὰρ ὀξύτερον τιτρώσκει βέλους καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν καταρρεῖ (Ach.Tat.1.4.4).

A metaphor of wounding is introduced here, τιτρώσκει, which is developed further in the sentence following it. It explains that the eyes are in fact the passageway for erotic wounding, ὀφθαλμός γὰρ ὁδὸς ἐρωτικῷ τραύματι. The metaphorical concept of the passageway of effluences in sight, ὁδός, has been linked with the metaphor of ἔρως as a wound of the body. The pithy statement preceding this passage encompasses both notions: ὡς δὲ εἶδον, εὐθὺς ἀπωλώλειν (Ach.Tat.1.4.4).\textsuperscript{389} Sight, via effluences which are similar to missiles in that they fly through the air, has the capacity to do physical damage, in terms of the missiles connected with ἔρως.\textsuperscript{390} The destination of these effluences is the ψυχή or soul.\textsuperscript{391} This interlinking of metaphorical conceptions points in the direction of a network of correspondences rather than a simple pairing.

\textsuperscript{388} See Cairns 2005, 138-9. See also Empedocles 89 DK: πάντων εἰσίν ἄπορροαί, ὅσσ’ ἐγένοντο. Alcmaon of Croton considered that the eye contained fire and sent out beams which bounced back off objects to form mirror images in the eye (Alcmaeon a5 DK). The atomists Leucippus and Democritus held that εἴδωλα streamed off objects and impinged upon the eyes (Leucippus a29 DK). This concept has a precedent in Empedocles a92 DK where effluences are received into the eye. Stoic and Galenic theories involve the flow of passion from the brain via the eye to the object: see Chrysippus SVF 2.866; Galen, De Plac. Hippocr. Et Plat. 7.5 (5.618-28 K).

\textsuperscript{389} The meaning of the Greek would probably work in English as well: ‘as soon as I saw her, I was lost’.

\textsuperscript{390} The coherence of these images is a common one. References to fire, rays or arrows which emanate from the eyes of the beloved can be seen in the following: A.Ag.742-3, S.fr.157 R, Anacreontea 26, AP 5.36.3-4, 12.63, 12.72, 12.93.9-10, 12.110, 12.144. See also Cairns 2005, 139.

\textsuperscript{391} See Foucault 1990a, 40, who notes that the gaze is often thought to be an opening by which the soul is reached. See X.Mem.1.3.12-13.
The most discussed pseudo-scientific passage in the novels appears in Heliodorus’ *Aethiopica*. Calasiris is initiating the process of helping the two young lovers escape from Greece. Chariclea has just seen Theagenes in a public procession, fallen in love, and lies lovesick at home. Her adopted father Charicles is disturbed at what is happening, and consults the Egyptian priest Calasiris, since Egyptian priests have a reputation for arcane and powerful knowledge. Calasiris proceeds to diagnose the girl for her father. His intention, which the reader is aware of, is to hide her condition from her father so that plans can be made for their escape more easily. Instead of love he attributes her illness to an ancient superstition, the evil eye. It is this malicious power which has confined her to her bed.

‘You must not be surprised,’ I replied, ‘if, by taking part in a procession before such a huge crowd of people, she has attracted the attention of an evil eye.’ ‘So,’ said Charicles, with a mocking laugh, ‘you share the vulgar belief that there is such a thing as the power of the evil eye?’ ‘Of course,’ I replied. ‘It is as real as it could be. Let me explain. We are completely enveloped in air, which permeates our bodies by way of our eyes, nose, respiratory tract, and other channels, bringing with it, as it enters, various properties from outside, thus engendering in those who take it in an effect corresponding to the properties it induces. Thus, when a man looks maliciously upon beauty, he imbibes the air around him with the quality of malevolence, and disperses his own breath *πνεῦμα*, charged as it is with spite, towards his neighbour. Being composed of such fine particles, it penetrates to his bones, to his very marrow. So in many cases disease is caused by malice, and this effect is quite properly spoken of as the power of an evil eye.’

This passage describes the folk superstition of the evil eye, Baskania, common from ancient Greek times up to the present day. Its status as a folk superstition is exemplified by Charicles’ scorn of the idea. In the Greek it is cited as a notion which ‘ὁ πολὺς ὄχλος’ adheres to, a disparaging remark implying something like ‘the ignorant masses’. It is most firmly within the realms of the ancient Greek folk model of psychology, where the malicious eye can exert an evil influence on the unsuspecting person. What is striking about this passage is that Calasiris describes the phenomenon of the evil eye using scientific language. In this first piece of proof for the existence of the evil eye Calasiris uses knowledge which bears similarity to a piece written by the 2nd century CE doctor Galen.

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394 Heliodorus 3.7 (translation Morgan in Reardon 1989, 416).
395 Galen’s dates are 129-199/216 C.E., and so Heliodorus is most likely writing after him (see introduction and Robiano 2003).
and is described in terms of an air–born contagion: πνεῦμα. Thus the folk belief of the evil eye is backed up with a scientific explanation of how the phenomenon works, and in using Galen Calasiris is invoking an expert model. Calasiris goes on to provide additional proof to Charicles.

“Here is another instance, Charikles. Many people contract ophthalmia or some infectious disease without having touched the patient at all or shared a bed or table with him, merely by breathing the same air. Conclusive proof of my point is furnished by the genesis of love, which originates from visually perceived objects, which, if you will excuse the metaphor, shoot arrows of passion, swifter than the wind, into the soul by way of the eyes. This is perfectly logical, because, of all our channels of perception, sight is the least static and contains the most heat, and so it is more receptive of such emanations [ἀπορροίας]; for the spirit [πνεύματι] which animates it is akin to fire, and so it is well suited to absorb the transient and unstable impressions of love.”

This further proof is presented in the same way as the previous section, but it differs to such an extent as to be logically inconsistent with has gone before. Rather than the malicious man imbuing the air with his envy and thereby transmitting the evil eye, this section gives the example of a passive reception of visual matter. In the second section we see the use of the terminology for effluences, τὰς ἀπορροίας, which is essentially a Platonic and Democritean model of vision (see above). Dickie says that this passage is a pastiche based on Plutarch. A similar discussion of the evil eye appears in his Moralia, and since Plutarch lived around 50 to 120 C.E. he could have been the inspiration for Heliodorus’ exposition. Plutarch includes the same types of explanation as here, breath born contagion and effluences. Dickie argues that Heliodorus’ passage is deliberately inconsistent in order to let Calasiris mock the gullible Charicles. Cairns has pointed out that part of the inconsistency in this passage can actually be explained by conflicting Greek folk models. The first factor involved in this is the difference between the evil eye itself, which is associated with the notion of φθόνος or envy, and the example of passion used to back it up. He has argued that the model of the emanation of the evil eye in the first

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396 Galen’s De diff. febr. 7.279 K. The visual theory of the Stoics and Galen involves the flow of πνεῦμα from the brain via the eyes to the object: see Cairns 2005, 138; Chrysippus SVF 2.866; Galen De Plac.Hippocr. et Plat. 5.618-28 K.

397 Heliodorus 3.7 (translation Morgan in Reardon 1989, 416).


399 See Plut.Mor.681d.

400 See Cairns 2005, 141.
section is consistent with the active presentation of the evil eye in Greek models of thought—one feels envy towards another and affects them with one’s gaze—whereas the reception of love through the eyes in the second section fits the passivity associated with the model of ἔρως in ancient Greece. You can affect someone else by experiencing the emotional state of envy, but not by experiencing ἔρως. This means that the expert model presented here is consistent with the folk model of ἔρως seen throughout the novels, which is one of passivity.

Erotic vision is an essential part of erotic cognition, and it also relates to models of mental imagery and memory. Achilles Tatius implies that the image must be present for ἔρως to take hold. Callisthenes secretly descends into love, when he moulds and imagines the girl whom he has not seen: ἀναπλάττων γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τῆς παιδὸς τὸ κάλλος καὶ φανταζόμενος τὰ ἀόρατα ἐλαθε σφόδρα κακῶς διακείμενος (Ach.Tat.2.13.2). This brings the deviant Callisthenes, who is criticised for falling in love by hearsay, into line with the general model. It is by forming a mental image of the beloved—ἀναπλάττων…τὸ κάλλος—that he falls into ἔρως. Therefore a visual image of beauty is still a prerequisite. When Anthia and Habrocomes see each other after a procession for a sacrifice they are so affected that they cannot sleep. Instead they muse over their condition and ‘hold visions of each other before their eyes, and mould images, εἰκόνας, upon each other’s ψυχή’: εἶχον δὲ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὰς ὄψεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλληλῶν ἀναπλάττοντες (X.Eph.1.5.1). This description contains two contrasting metaphors, the visions which are conceived as entities ‘in front of’, πρό, the eyes and the εἰκόνες which are actually ‘impressed’ onto the ψυχή. Eroticism is so suffused with the visual that the emotion triggers a detailed visual image of the beloved, or vice versa. Clitophon tells us that Leucippe leaves him having left a ‘shape’ upon his eyes: ἀπελθοῦσα γὰρ τὴν μορφὴν ἐπαφῇ μον τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς (Ach.Tat.1.19.2). It is coherent to talk of the shape being left upon the eyes just as the ψυχή, because both are involved in the process of ἔρως.401

401 Clitophon also states that he creates an image of Leucippe everywhere: φαντάζομαι (Ach.Tat.1.9.1).
Demaenete, having secured Cnemon’s banishment through her wiles, laments that she sees and hears him in her mind’s eye: νῦν δὲ ὧραν φαντάζομαι, παρόντος ἀκούειν ἀπατῶμαι, ὀνειδίζοντα τὴν ἄδικον ἐπιβουλὴν αἰσχύνομαι (Hld.1.15.4). The term for forming a mental image here is φαντάζομαι, ‘to imagine’, but it is not only used in terms of memory.402 At the start of Heliodorus’ novel the bandit chieftain Thymais claims Chariclea for himself, and argues that, as befits his former occupation as a priest, he wishes to marry her not out of lust but out of the desire to find a suitable partner to produce offspring with (Hld.1.19). This is almost certainly short of the truth, but Thymais does not merely see Chariclea as a sexual object. He voices his reasoning to his fellow bandits.

Ἐπεῖτα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν τε καὶ σώφρονα στοχάζομαι· εἰ γὰρ εὐμορφίᾳ νικῶσα τὰς πάσας αἰδοῖ τοῦ βλέμματος καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας καταστέλλει πρὸς τὸ σεμνότερον, πῶς οὐ τὴν βελτίονα περὶ αὑτῆς εἰκότως παρίστησι φαντασίαν (Hld.1.20.2).

It is her spiritual beauty which Thymais professes to be attractive—τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν τε καὶ σώφρονα—and one part of this is the sense of shame seen in her look: αἰδοὶ τοῦ βλέμματος. She also causes in her viewers (‘arranges them towards’) that which is revered, τὸ σεμνότερον. By this means she provides a better φαντασίαν about herself. Φαντασία is here not merely an image or likeness but a more developed model hinting at character.403 Although she does surpass other in looks, εὐμορφίᾳ, this part is the least stressed of Thymais’ speech. Regardless of the truth of Thymais’ claims, his opinion must be culturally viable in order to function as convincing rhetoric. Therefore this is a three tiered description. She is pretty, and this corresponds to other models of vision seen above, in that she ‘conquers’ others with her looks: νικῶσα. Her look communicates a disposition towards αἰδώς, and commands respect, τὸ σεμνότερον, and this contributes to her overall image, φαντασία, as ‘the right sort of woman’. This value laden description

402 Goldhill 2001, 168, cites the contemporary stoic theories of φαντασία, where visual impressions are ‘productive of speech’. It is a central term in stoic theories of vision.

403 Arsace refers to Chariclea as ‘forming a φαντασία of herself with her practised beauty’: ἐπιτετηρησμένω κάλλει μέγα μὲν φανταζομένη (Hld.7.10.5). The claim is that the φαντασία does not match up with reality. This, however, is Arsace’s biased opinion.
of erotic vision is not peculiar to Thyamis, and indeed underlies what makes Chariclea so attractive in Heliodorus. The basic model of κάλλος provoking attraction is not countermanded, but supplemented with moral concerns and tastes.

Memory and idealising both utilise images of the beloved, which are both (mainly) visually orientated. The final part of this chain is recognition. The lover is quick to recognise the form or φαντασία of the beloved. This description refers to sense perception, and as with the others is not exclusively erotic, although the lover is marked out by their speed. What we can say is that the image of the lover in Heliodorus is used in different ways, from the realistic depiction of behaviour seen in Demaenete’s memory to the idealistic depiction of a good character in Thyamis’ imagination. The image lies in the eye of the beholder, and in this respect vision is mediated by the person, although always in terms of the pervasive model of erotic vision as an influence which you receive passively. Even though Thyamis constructs this image of her himself, he does so accurately, since Chariclea in the novel happens to be a chaste woman who commands respect. Since communicative body language is accurate here, we can place some faith in it, although it is communicative regardless of Chariclea’s actual intention.

The erotic anatomy of vision also features prominently in Achilles Tatius’ work. During book one Clinias gives this eroticised explanation of vision to the protagonist Clitophon.

The second part of this description is consistent with the passage discussed above (Ach.Tat.1.4.4). Beauty ‘flows’ through the eyes and into the ψυχή. The first part (and the last phrase) adds an important new dimension to the concept of ἔρως. The

404 Οὐχ γὰρ τι πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν ἔρωτικῶν ὤψις καὶ κίνημα πολλάκις καὶ σχῆμα μόνον κἂν πόρρωθεν ἢ καὶ εἰς νότων τῆς ὁμοιότητος τὴν φαντασίαν παρέστησεν (Hld.7.7.5). The eye is also quick to spot the beloved at Hld.4.1.2: οὔτως γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὁ ἐρῶν τὸ ποθούμενον.

405 Of course this is not only in Thyamis’ imagination. His impression, although it is his own and suits his proposal, is quite correct, for Chariclea is marked by her chastity and unblemished character. This is a major theme of the novel.
A simile of a mirror is introduced; the εἴδωλα of the body are reflected back and forth by the eyes and thereby make an impression, ἀπομάττουσιν. The analogy of the mirror also appears in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (255d): ὡσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ. There the lover sees himself in his lover as in a mirror. In fact the mirror is a cognate subject since the entry of effluences into pores was also used to account for the mechanism of reflection. These εἴδωλα, ‘images’, are a technical term which earlier philosophers used in relation to sense perception. This ‘reflection of εἴδωλα/effluences’ creates a ‘union in division’. The Greek goes on to say that this μίξις is a new version of the corporeal one: ὀλίγον ἐστι τῆς τῶν σωμάτων μίξεως· καινὴ γάρ ἐστι σωμάτων συμπλοκή (Ach.Tat.1.9.5). This passage stresses that actual physical contact is made through images, which in turn are transmitted by effluences. Bychkov states that Achilles Tatius’ description is more like an atomist one, and that this model is used because it provides a more sensuous and tangible account. The metaphors conform to a more general model prevalent in the Greek Novel, and, as we shall see, scientific consistency is not the foremost agenda of the novelist.

The influences upon this passage (and others) have already been discussed by Morales. Morales notes that Aristotle criticises Democritus and other philosophers for making all perception haptic: πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσιν (Arist.*de sensu*. 442a30). She then argues that although the Platonic influence is present the vocabulary used replicates in fact the terminology of the atomists (see Bychkov above). Ἀπορροή is a term used in Empedocles of the mechanics of the gaze (see above). The words μίξις and εἴδωλα in our passage above also appear in connection with the atomists, as does συμπλοκή. The passage thus alludes to

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406 See Goldhill 2001 170, who says that the verbal forms ἀντανακλώμενοι and ἀπομάττουσιν are technical terms from optics, and the vocabulary of flowing and mixing is familiar from science.


408 See Morales 2004, 133: Democritus and the Atomists hold that the eye is the recipient of impressions created by images (εἴδωλα): see above.

409 Bychkov 1999, 341.

410 Morales 2004, 130-5. She states that ‘optical processes are endowed with haptic qualities to the extent that gazing upon the beloved can be described as a kind of bodily copulation’.

411 Morales 2004, 134.
multiple expert models, such as those of Plato and the Atomists, rather than being reducible to one.

There is certainly a strong presence of the Atomists’ technical terminology in this passage. However, this is only one level of the semantics Achilles Tatius is playing with here. Its significance in the present context lies in a different area. The prominent metaphor at work is one of erotic sight being a variation on erotic coupling. This certainly plays on the physical notion of sight as erotic ‘emissions’. Therefore it is truly a little ‘copulation’, μίξις, of two bodies. The notion of weaving is also compatible with this concept. Εἴδωλα are also associated with erotic contexts. The range of allusion embedded in these words creates a discourse between scientific and erotic language. Instead of pseudo-science (since this misses the point) we might rather call it erotic-science.

It is also important to note that the metaphors used here are not consistent. The flowing of sight is brought together with the concepts of mixing, weaving and imaging. This means that their scientific theory also lacked consistency in metaphorical terms. The erotic subtext motivates Achilles Tatius’ mixing of metaphors but not of the Atomists. Although they are fundamentally different metaphors they are coherent in terms of their semantic range. Their established use in scientific discourse and literature creates a framework within which they are all valid: the erotic context allows for the subtle (or not so subtle) manipulation of vision.

These same metaphorical concepts reoccur later on in Achilles Tatius’ novel when similar language is used to describe the mechanics of the gaze in book five. This time Clitophon is the recipient of the erotic gaze and Melite the subject.

412 See Theophrastus writing on Empedocles, μίξις (de sensu 12), and the εἴδωλα of Leucippus in Alexander (de sensu 24.14). Συμπλοκή is used of the theories of Leucippus and Democritus in Aristotle (de caelo 303a7).

413 Μίξις is used of sexual intercourse: see Hdt.1.203, 4.172, Anacr.35. Its cognate verb μείγνυμι is of course commonly used of sexual intercourse, both of the man and the woman: see LSJ B4. Its base meaning of mixing two liquids (LSJ) also fits in nicely with our ‘flowing’ context.

414 The verb συμπλέκω is used of sexual intercourse at S.fr.618 and Pl.Symp.191a.

415 See Bettini 1999 20–3 who discusses erotic connections of εἴδωλα. In Aristophanes’ Nubes (975-6) it is said that young men should not leave their εἴδωλον in the sand for admirers to see: προνοεῖσθαί εἴδωλον τοίσιν ἐφασταῖσιν τῆς ἡβής μη καταλείπειν.

Ἡ δὲ τῆς θέας ἡδονὴ διὰ τῶν ὁμάτων εἰσρέουσα τοῖς στέρνοις ἐγκάθηται· ἐλκουσα δὲ τοῦ ἐρωμένου τὸ εἴδωλον ἑδεῖ, ἐναπομάττεται τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς κατόπτρῳ καὶ ἀναπλάττει τὴν μορφήν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή δι’ ἀφανῶν ἀκτίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐρωτικὴν ἑλκομένη καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει κάτω τὴν σκιάν (Achilles Tatius 5.13.4).

The effluences (εἰσρέουσα, ἀπορροή) flow through the eyes into the body (τοῖς στέρνοις, τῆς ψυχῆς, καρδίαν). The analogy of the mirror is reintroduced, κατόπτρῳ, and several verbal echoes resound: εἴδωλον, ἐναπομάττεται. The mirror of the ψυχή receives impressions of the lover. This works upon the same lines as the previous imagery: the path is through the eyes to the ψυχή. The mirror-like interaction between eyes is therefore also a mirror-like interaction between souls. The passage above stated that the eyes were like a mirror, whereas this second one specifies that the ψυχή is the location of the mirror. However, this is not inconsistent. Although these entities are seen as separate, it is clear that Clitophon’s narration of the erotic process specifies a conduit going into the soul by means of the eyes. Therefore impressions are made continually along the route: the whole cognitive passage is like a mirror in its ability to receive impressions.417

There are several other metaphorical conceptions here. There is the addition of the flowing of pleasure, ἡδονή, here, to the flowing of κάλλος. This can be seen as an associate of κάλλος, since it is pleasure derived from κάλλος. It functions in exactly the same way as beauty by flowing into the body through the eyes. Pleasure, however, constantly drags, ἐλκουσα, the image of the beloved, makes an impression on the mirror of the soul and moulds its shape, ἀναπλάττει τὴν μορφήν. The flowing of κάλλος this time is dragged upon the ἔρως influenced heart by means of unseen rays and there marks its shadow: δι’ ἀφανῶν ἀκτίνων. These passages reveal that the novelists are not just a repository of models, folk and scientific, concerning erotic vision. These scientific models are subordinate to the author’s aims and purpose. However, the author must still use valid cultural models in order

417 There is not even an inconsistency between the first passage claiming that κάλλος flows into the ψυχή and this second that it sits in the στέρνον. It could quite easily do both.
for them to be meaningful. Expert models are, however, always subordinate to the erotic theme.

What I hope I have made clear is that despite the differing authorial manipulation of similar cultural models concerning relationships and eroticism, the prototypical model of the emotion is essentially the same. The model of erotic vision in the Greek Novel is a passive one which involves the effluences of vision passing from the object of affection through the eyes of the person feeling the emotion and down into their ψυχή. This passivity is due to the triangulation of the relationship, the two lovers and the emotion, and means that the discourse between lovers must be seen in the light of an overpowering emotional force.
Chapter 6 - The Ψυχή and the Καρδία

This chapter concerns the metaphorical conceptualisation of internal psychological entities, such as the ψυχή, used in relation to the psychology of ἔρως in the Greek Novel. The previous chapter on vision approached beauty’s access to the ψυχή via the eyes. Since these internal psychological entities play a vital role in the functioning of the emotions, and are conceptualised as being inside the body, I refer to them as emotional ‘anatomy’. Their role in the psychology of the individual is real and functional. In the Greek Novel there are two internal entities associated with emotion: the soul and the heart, the ψυχή and the καρδία. The use of these entities as the seat of emotion is neither an innovation nor unique, and presents a line of continuity with previous Greek literature.

This section will outline the metaphors used to conceptualise the ψυχή and καρδία, to ascertain if there are any distinctive attributes of either. I will also look to see if there are any unique metaphors which apply to either the ψυχή or the καρδία in the Greek Novel, and whether they are attached to certain parts of the scenario or not.
The ψυχή has a long history in Greek literature of which it will only be possible to highlight certain aspects here. The notion that it can survive the body can be seen from Homer onwards. It is often associated with ἔρως both in art and when it involves the psychology of emotion. By the period of the Greek Novel the ψυχή has been analysed by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and medical writers such as the Hippocratic corpus and Galen. One of the most influential views is Plato who sees it as the seat of psychological functioning, and in particular as the locus of differing psychological functions. We might compare this view of the ψυχή with faculty psychology: the division of the mind into parts which perform different mental functions. Does the Greek Novel display the ψυχή as performing differing psychological tasks and exhibiting different desires? What is its relation to the body? One constant point of interest to ancient Greek philosophy was the precise nature of the connection between the ψυχή and the body. Galen in one of his later treatises wonders whether the ψυχή is physical after all, since it is so affected by changes within the body.

Many occurrences of the word ψυχή in the Greek Novel are left out of this study because they are not instances of psychological metaphor. One pervasive

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418 Clarke 1999 argues that in Homer the ψυχή's most basic sense is as the cold breath expelled at death, and therefore is not so important for the psychology of the living person. See Cairns 2003a for a sceptical review of Clarke. On the Greek concept of the soul see Bremner 1983 and 2009, Claus 1981 and Rohde 1925.

419 A personified ψυχή, depicted with butterfly wings and accompanied by ἔρως, can be seen often in late Classical and Hellenistic art. See Maaskant-Kleibrink 1990. See also the famous story of Amor and Psyche in Apuleius.

420 See Pl.T.i.441e–f on the complexity of the soul and Pl.R.434d2–441e7 on the parts and functions of the soul. Pl.Phdr.246a6–7 compares the dynamics of the soul to a charioteer and horse-drawn chariot. Plato will be discussed further later on in the chapter.

421 When discussing the ψυχή Aristotle also posits several faculties: parts for nourishment, appetite, sensation, movement in space, and thought (De.an.414a32-3).

422 For Aristotle most functions of the ψυχή are related to the body, except for the intellect: see De.an.412b and Long 1974, 50. For the issue in Epicureanism and Stoicism see Long 1974 49ff. and 171ff. respectively.

423 Galen, Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur 4.767-817 K. See Nutton 2004, 216-47, on Galen and his medicine. The reification of the ψυχή as an entity is at the basis of this conceptualisation and is certainly an element of its folk and expert models: see Cairns 2003a, 47, on the ψυχή and Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 25-40, on the reification of concepts.
usage is the ψυχή as a metonym for the life of a person when mortally threatened. 424 A few examples will serve to show that the image of the ψυχή as life and its role in psychological metaphor are related. In Achilles Tatius Clinius’s lover Charicles bursts in and says he is lost to his friend (Ach.Tat.1.7.4). Clinius then groans ‘as if his life depended upon that man’: ὡσπερ ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνου ψυχῆς κρεμάμενος (Ach.Tat.1.7.4). A literal translation would be that he ‘hangs’, κρεμάμενος, from the ψυχή of his lover Charicles. This is cognate with the idea of life above but is also psychological, because it is due to his erotic relationship that he hangs from the ψυχή of his lover. 425 Related to the above example is the commonplace of the lover calling the beloved ‘their life/soul’, as Demaenete does in Heliodorus: ψυχὴν ἑαυτῆς ὀνομάζουσα (Hld.1.14.6). 426 One’s ψυχή metonymically stands for one’s love, since not only are both precious, but both are involved in an emotional experience. 427 The ψυχή is also engaged in fainting, and fainting can be emotionally caused. We may cite the instance when Dionysius faints when he hears that a Syracusean ship has arrived to demand Callirhoe back from him: ἐξέθανεν ὁ Διονύσιος ἀκούσας καὶ νυξ αὐτοῦ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κατεχύθη (Chariton 3.9.10). 428 He almost died, ἐξέθανεν, and night poured down over his eyes. However, the subsequent revelation that his love rival Chaereas is dead places his ψυχή (back) in him, ἐνέθηκε, and allows him to be within himself once again:

424 The following examples all refer to the entity ψυχή in the context of life under threat or in death, literal or rhetorical: Ach.Tat.1.7.4; 1.13.3; 1.13.4; 1.29.6; 2.30.2; 2.34.5; 3.11.2; 3.23.3; 4.6.2; 5.16.2; 5.22.6; 7.4.1; 7.5.3; 7.9.1; Hld.1.2.4; 1.9.4; 2.23.5; 2.31.1; 7.6.5; 9.3.8; 9.5.3; 10.10.2; 10.20.2; Longus 1.30.1; X.Eph.1.13.6. This metonymical usage has a long history in Greek literature. See Cairns 2003a, 48, on this usage in Homer. In Heliodorus we see clear evidence of the ψυχή as immortal: Hld.1.2.4; 2.31.1; 2.23.5.

425 See also Hld.1.29.3 on Chariclea: ὡσπερ ψυχῆς τοῦ Θεαγένους ἀφηρημένην.

426 See Morgan 1989, 107: ‘both Theagenes and Charikelia persistently refer to the other as their psuchē, an erotic commonplace founded on the metaphorical premise that lover and beloved between them constitute a single identity’. He cites Hld.1.8.4; 2.5.2; 5.2.10; 8.6.4; 10.20.2. One can also call the beloved ‘master’ or ‘mistress’ of one’s ψυχή: see Ach.Tat.5.26.7.

427 In erotic literature the beloved can also be valued as an ἄγαλμα, a glory or delight: see A.Ag.418-19; Pl.Phdr.251a; 252d.

428 Earlier Dionysius seems like an image of death: παντάπασι δὲ ὄν ἀσθενής φαντασίαν παρέσχε θανάτου (Chariton 3.1.3). As we saw in the chapter on symptoms ἔρως can have a debilitating effect. For ἔρως as a near death experience see also Alcm.3.fr.3, col.ii.61; Archil.193; Pl.Phdr.254e; Sappho 31.15-16.
taúta tā ὁμματα ψυχῆν ἐνέθηκε Διονυσίῳ, καί κατ’ ὀλίγον πάλιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ γενόμενος ἀκριβῶς ἐπυνθάνετο πάντα (Chariton 3.9.10-11). The conceptual link with death is apparent. Fainting is analogous to death in that the ψυχή leaves one, and it comes back upon gaining consciousness. His fainting is caused by overwhelming emotion, perhaps grief that Callirhoe may be taken from him.

In Xenophon of Ephesus ψυχή is the only anatomical entity used in the description of emotions, unlike the other novelists, who also use καρδία. His usage of metaphor indeed highlights many prototypical aspects of its conceptualisation throughout the novels. Its status as the seat of πάθη or emotions is confirmed by a description of Habrocomes’ suffering: ὁ δὲ ἔπαθε μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν (X.Eph.5.12.2). If we list the metaphors involved with the ψυχή we at first see conformity with metaphors used of the relevant emotion. Anthia tells Habrocomes’ eyes to hold the ψυχάς which they ‘burnt’: ἔχετε ψυχάς, ἃς αὐτοὶ ἐξεκαύσατε (X.Eph.1.9.8). We can recognise the common image of ἔρως as fire, with the object of its flames specified as the ψυχή. Anthia also tells Habrocomes twice that he is the ‘master’ of her ψυχή, δέσποτα (X.Eph.2.4.5; 5.14.2), which conforms to the metaphor of master-slave seen in the chapter upon ἔρως as an opponent.

The ψυχή is conceived of as a concrete entity. When Habrocomes falls in love with Anthia his ψυχή falls down: ἡ ψυχή καταπεπτώκει (X.Eph.1.5.5). This metaphor orients the entity of the ψυχή in terms of a position in space, internal to the human body, which is then mapped onto the existence of the emotion ἔρως. When Habrocomes is not feeling the emotion his ψυχή is in place, and when he does feel it his ψυχή falls down into another location. The implication is that of an abnormal psychological condition, since an anatomical entity has moved out of its normal position. There might also be an association here with the physical manifestation of the emotion: the lying down of an ill person. As we saw above in the section on lovesickness, the effects of ἔρως in the Greek Novel can be like those

429 In Homer this verb is used with the θυμός: πᾶσιν δὲ παραί ποσὶ κάππεσε θυμός (II.15.280).
of an illness.\(^{430}\) We also have several other metaphorical descriptions of the ψυχή which place alongside one another external and internal symptoms of the emotion. When Anthia and Habromomes are under the influence of ἔρως their bodies and their ψυχαί ‘sway’ and are ‘agitated’: ἐπάλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐκραδαίνοντο αὐτοῖς αἱ ψυχαί (X.Eph.1.9.1).\(^{431}\) The motion of the external body is replicated in the motion of the internal seat of emotion.\(^{432}\) Again when the effects of desire bring out tears in Anthia it is her ψυχή which has sent them forth as symbols or tokens of ἐπιθυμία: ἥ δὲ ἐδάκρυε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς σύμβολα προπεμπούσης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὰ δάκρυα (X.Eph.1.9.2). The source of the tears is the ψυχή and thus there is a correlation between internal and external state. Several lines later the ψυχή is the real connection point for their kisses rather than the lips: τὰ χείλη τοῖς χείλεσι φιλούσα [sc. Anthia] συνηρμόκει, καὶ ὅσα ἐνενόουν, διὰ τῶν χειλέων ἐκ ψυχῆς εἰς τὴν θατέρου ψυχήν διὰ τοῦ φιλήματος παρεπέμπετο (X.Eph.1.9.6).\(^{433}\) This is an interesting example of empathy. The content of their thoughts, ὅσα ἐνενόουν, is sent through their lips and kisses out of their ψυχή into that of the other one: παρεπέμπετο. It is the working of the passive model of erotic reception into a mutual exchange of passions and forms the basis of how Xenophon of Ephesus sets apart his main couple from the love rivals.

I have listed all the instances of ψυχή being conceptualised in relation to ἔρως in table 1.1, and all the other clear emotional references in 1.2. The purpose of

\(^{430}\) Another emotion has the effect of causing Habrocomes to faint (fall down). He hears the story of how Anthia poisoned herself rather than marry Perilaus: παρεῖτο δὲ ὑπὸ ἀθυμίας (X.Eph.3.9.7.1-2).

\(^{431}\) They are also experiencing multiple emotions such as pleasure, shame and fear: ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς παρειμένοι, αἰδούμενοι, φοβούμενοι, πνευστιῶντες [ἡδόμενοι] (X.Eph.1.9.1).

\(^{432}\) The verb κραδαίνω is used of a different emotion later on. Anthia and Habrocomes both have heart palpitations when the pirates Corymbus and Euxinus approach them respectively: τοῖς δὲ αἰτὶ τε ψυχαὶ ἐκραδαίνοντο (X.Eph.1.16.2.4). This seems to be fear or apprehension, and again probably reflects external motion such as shaking or quivering. It is used of the καρδία being agitated in Galen (De utilitate respirationis liber 4.481 K) and of the ψυχή in Michael Attaliates Hist., Historia 240.7: κραδαινομένης εἶχον τὰς οἰκείας ψυχὰς. The verb πάλλω is mostly used of the καρδία: see for example πάλλομεν κραδίην (II.22.461) and later on in this chapter.

\(^{433}\) In retaining διὰ τοῦ φιλήματος I am following O’Sullivan’s edition (2005).
including both these tables is to show the coherence of all metaphors of emotion being used of the ψυχή.

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>Affected</td>
<td>πάθη...ψυχῆς</td>
<td>Hld.4.7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected</td>
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<td>Hld.4.7.7</td>
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<td>Hld.3.3.8</td>
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<td>Arrow</td>
<td>τὰ πάθη ταῖς ψυχαῖς εἰστοξεύοντα</td>
<td>Hld.3.7.5</td>
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<td>τὸ δεδηγμένον τῆς ψυχῆς</td>
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<td>ἔχετε ψυχάς, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐξεκαύσατε</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Burnt</td>
<td>τὴν ψυχήν ἐξέκαυσεν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.1.5.5</td>
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<td>ψυχήν ἐπὶ σοι φλεγομένην</td>
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<td>Burnt</td>
<td>ἐπιφυσάλει σφοδρότερον ψυχήν</td>
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<td>πῦρ... εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν</td>
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<td>Burnt</td>
<td>ἐξεκαύσατ τὴν ψυχήν</td>
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<td>Burnt</td>
<td>τὴν ψυχήν ἐξεπυρσεύθη</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contest</td>
<td>ἀγωνία ψυχαῖς ἔρωτικαῖς γίνεται καθάπερ οὖν νέφος ἢ σκότος ἀπεκάλυψε τῆς</td>
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<td>Covered (mist/darkness)</td>
<td>ψυχῆς Διονύσιος</td>
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<td>Dipped</td>
<td>τὴν ψυχήν ἐβαπτίζετο</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disturbed</td>
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<td>Chariton 8.1.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dragged</td>
<td>ἔλκουσι τὰς ψυχὰς</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dwelling (Eros)</td>
<td>ἐνδεδήμηκεν εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν</td>
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<td>Fallen down</td>
<td>ἡ ψυχὴ καταστηκώκει</td>
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<td>ψυχήν θερμάναι</td>
<td>Longus 1.17.1</td>
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<td>κατείχε δὲ ψυχαῖς</td>
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<td>ψυχὴν κατασχόντες</td>
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<td>ἔχον τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς</td>
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<td>Held (into)</td>
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<td>κάλλος εἰς τὴν ψυχήν</td>
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<td>Ach.Tat.3.11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελθεῖν ἤθελεν ήθελεν ἡ κόρη</td>
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<td>τῆς σῆς κρατήσαι, δέσποτα, ψυχῆς</td>
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<td>Melted</td>
<td>τίκεται ἡ ψυχή</td>
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<td>Moulded</td>
<td>ἀναπλάττοντες</td>
<td>X.Eph.1.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ἡ ψυχὴ γενομένη τῷ κακῷ κυμαινέται</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.1.6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out of</td>
<td>ἐκ ψυχῆς</td>
<td>X.Eph.1.9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pain</td>
<td>ἄση δὲ αὐτῆς εἰχε τὴν ψυχήν</td>
<td>Longus 1.13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pain</td>
<td>Ἡλγουν τὴν ψυχήν</td>
<td>Longus 2.7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Οὐ μὴν ὁ Δάφνις χαίρειν ἔπειθε τὴν ψυχήν</td>
<td>Longus 1.32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piracy</td>
<td>ἐνόμιζε τὴν ψυχήν ἐτι παρά τοις λησταῖς μένεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ πρώτης ἐντεύξεως τὸ ὅμοιον</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
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<td>Recognition</td>
<td>τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ ερωτικα γνωρίσιμα</td>
<td>Hld.5.5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Send Away</td>
<td>ἀφῆκε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτήν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.6.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>X.Eph.1.9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
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<td>Hld.4.6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swinging</td>
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<td>X.Eph.1.9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking</td>
<td>τὴν γὰρ ψυχὴν πάσαν ὁ ἔρως καταλαβὼν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrown down</td>
<td>τῇ ψυχῇ καταβαλλομένη</td>
<td>Hld.7.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>ἐνδον μου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλος πόλεμος κάθηται</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.4.7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave</td>
<td>τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν σάλον</td>
<td>Hld.3.5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering</td>
<td>σαλευουσής</td>
<td>Hld.3.10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will</td>
<td>τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐβούλοντο αἱ ψυχαί</td>
<td>X.Eph.5.13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναπτεροὶ</td>
<td>Longus 2.7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wipes off</td>
<td>τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπήλεψε</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wound</td>
<td>οἷα δὴ τραύμα ἐχὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ θερμόν τε καὶ</td>
<td>Chariton 4.2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are two consistent aspects in the conceptualisation of the ψυχή in the Greek Novel. The first is that the entity is primarily conceptualised as a location or an object. Either ἔρως or a concept/entity involved in the erotic process (e.g. beauty, κάλλος) goes into the ψυχή or the ψυχή is passively affected in some way, by the person or the emotion, such as in the examples Disturbed and Dragged. In Chariton ἔρως has ‘set up residence’ in the ψυχή: ἐνδεδήμηκεν εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν (Chariton 6.3.2).434

This presence of the beloved in the soul is one seen consistently. Xenophon of Ephesus speaks of the lovers ‘moulding images’, τὰς εἰκόνας… ἀναπλάττοντες, upon one another’s ψυχή (X.Eph.1.5.1).435 They have fallen in love with one another and are restless at night. They are imagining the image of the beloved in their souls: ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. Clitophon, feeling ἔρως for Leucippe, writes that ‘the girl was not willing to leave my ψυχή’: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τότε μου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελθεῖν ἤθελεν ἡ κόρη (Ach.Tat.1.6.5). The presence of the beloved represents the emotional memory and the ψυχή the location of the memory. Another variation in Achilles Tatius describes a woman taking a new lover as ‘wiping the old one from her ψυχή’: τὸν πρώτον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπήλειψε (Ach.Tat.6.17.4).436 Sosthenes tells his master Thersander that at the moment Leucippe still ‘feeds her soul’, βόσκει τὴν ψυχήν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν, on Clitophon, but

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434 See Dwelling metaphor in table 1.1. Also at Chariton 6.3.4 the Persian King’s servant asks him what beauty has ‘mastered’ his soul: κάλλος δύναται τῆς σῆς κρατῆσαι, δέσποτα, ψυχῆς. At Pl.R.573d ἔρως is described as the tyrant who directs affairs in one’s ψυχή.

435 See also the chapter on vision on this passage.

436 See also the context: παλαιὸν γὰρ ἔρωτα μαραίνει νέος ἔρως· γυνὴ δὲ μάλιστα τὸ παρὸν φιλεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀπόντος, ἐκ τῆς καθής εὖ, μνημονεύει προσαλβοῦσα δὲ ἔτερον, τὸν πρώτον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπήλειψε.
will forget him when she takes on Thersander as her new lover. Erotic attraction is seen as located in the ψυχή, where the beloved represents the emotion, and the continuing representation of the beloved in that place indicates the state of the emotion. However, there is a further implication and that is that there is only room for one lover in the soul. Despite the fact that Thersander and Sosthenes are negative characters, they both assume (by being complicit in the conversation) that Thersander does not merely want to take advantage of Leucippe but desires her emotional attachment to him.

Not all imagery, however, involves the ψυχή as an internal location. When Daphnis falls in love with Chloe he feels as if his ψυχή is still among the pirates, who a short while earlier had attempted to carry him off: ἐνόμιζε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐτι παρὰ τοῖς λῃσταῖς μένειν (Longus 1.32.4). This is because he is still young and ignorant of the piracy of ἔρως: οἷα νέος καὶ ἄγροικος καὶ ἐτι ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἔρωτος λῃστήριον (Longus 1.32.). This is not the directedness of attention: i.e. he is thinking about the pirates. On the contrary he cannot stop thinking about Chloe naked and is pained at heart. On a literary level the metaphor blends skilfully the action of the plot and the presentation of psychology. In terms of metaphor the ψυχή is not an internal location, as Daphnis conceives of it as away among the pirates. We can see here the connection between the ψυχή associated with the loss of life and the departing of the soul (see above) and its role as a psychological entity. The image coheres with the master metaphor of the force of emotion, since Daphnis’ ψυχή, his emotional response, is captured by the pirates and therefore forced regardless of his will. Sending the ψυχή out can, however, refer to the direction of

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437 The speaker here is Sosthenes, and therefore we can expect his description of Clitophon and Leucippe’s love to be unfavourable. The first, and most obvious way to take this, is that she is just satisfying a desire with Clitophon—her sexual desire is analogous to eating—and therefore there is nothing serious in the way of Thersander's passion. The image of the soul as an animal, such as a sheep, feeding upon the beloved, presents the woman's desire as bestial and, perhaps, irrational or mindless. We could take it in a more romantic vein, a pastoral image of the lover’s passion, and hypothesise that it represents the duration and proximity of a relationship. However, this would lead to us attributing to Sosthenes gross incompetence in argument: he wishes to denigrate Clitophon and Leucippe’s love. The point must surely be simpler: Leucippe’s erotic passion, located in and represented by her ψυχή, is a sheep to be fed, and we will soon be able to move her onto a new patch of grass.
attention. When Thersander sees Leucippe’s beauty he ‘sends away his ψυχή upon
her’: ἀφῆκε τὴν ψυχήν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν (Ach.Tat.6.6.3). This example is similar to the
last one in that it implies the ψυχή leaving the body, and deals with motion rather
than location.438 Although Thersander is the subject here, there is again no
implication that his action, under the influence of the emotion, is controllable by him.

This leads us onto the second common aspect of the portrayal of the ψυχή.
This is that metaphorical conceptualisations conventionally used of the erotic
experience dominate in descriptions of the emotional effect upon the ψυχή. It is
struck by arrows, burned by fire, and a location for contests.439 In this respect the
ψυχή can be seen as a passive homunculus which reflects the whole person. The
ψυχή is warmed by ἔρως just as the person is: ψυχήν θερμᾶναι (Longus
1.17.1).440 Ἐρως captures the ψυχή just as he takes the person: τὴν γὰρ ψυχήν
πάσαν ὁ ἔρως καταλαβὼν (Ach.Tat.5.13.3).441 These two factors are the
prototypical ones we see when the ψυχή is subjected to emotional duress during the
erotic experience.

Some examples are not reducible to the above two factors, and it is necessary
to go through them to show why they are equally valid but less prototypical
conceptualisations of the ψυχή. First of all we must deal with an important
question: are there any metaphors which are used specifically of the ψυχή in terms
of erotic psychology? Above we saw that metaphors used of the erotic experience in
general dominate the conceptualisation of the ψυχή. There are some metaphors
which appear to relate specifically to the ψυχή, but these are all coherent with the
underlying metaphor viewing the emotions as a force. Chariton speaks of Dionysius
brightening up as if he was uncovering mist or darkness from his ψυχή: καθάπεξ

438 See also Ach.Tat.5.12.3, where Melite almost sends away her her ψυχή through pleasure: τὴν
γυναικα ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς παρὰ μικρὸν τὴν ψυχήν αφεῖναι. On the psychology of the erotic
wandering of the mind towards the beloved see Montiglio 2005, 234. Phaedra’s thoughts wander to
where Hippolytus is hunting in Euripides (E.Hipp.240).
439 See the following metaphors from the table: Affected; Arrow; Bitten; Burnt; Contest; Disturbed;
Dragged; Goad; Heat; Held in; Melted; Oscillates; Pain; Shame; Sickness; Swaying; Taking;
Thrown Down; War; Wave; Wavering; Wound.
440 See the Heat metaphor in table 1.1 and see the chapter on symptoms for further discussion.
441 See the Taking metaphor in the table 1.1 and the chapter on the opponent.
οὖν νέφος ἢ σκότος ἀπεκάλυψε τῆς ψυχῆς Διονύσιος (Chariton 3.9.11). The text is corrupt here but there seems to be a correspondence with a phrase a few lines before which describes night pouring over his eyes: νυξ αὐτοῦ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κατεχύθη (Chariton 3.9.10). Dionysius’ eyes darkened when he heard that his love rival Chaereas has arrived, and he comes to after learning that his ship has been destroyed. There does therefore seem to be an intended antithesis between light and darkness, despite the corruption. There could also be an intertextual link with Euripides’ Heracles or Orestes. This conceptualisation is cognate with the notion of fainting being analogous to losing one’s life (see above), and displays the emotional effect as forceful upon the subject, and so here the ψυχή is practically an homunculus. Another metaphor that stands out occurs in Chariton’s description of Dionysius’ psychological state is that of him being dipped ‘in regard to his ψυχή’: τὴν ψυχὴν ἐβαπτίζετο (Chariton 3.2.6). It is used of his overwhelming passion once the wedding with Callirhoe has been agreed upon. The passage is suffused with storm imagery. He is taken by a storm, κατείληπτο μὲν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, dipped in his ψυχή and can only just force his head above the waves: ὅμως δὲ ἀνακύπτειν ἐβιάζετο καθάπερ ἐκ τρικυμίας τοῦ πάθους (Chariton 3.2.7). The verb βαπτίζω means to dip or to plunge, and is often used in terms of an object entering the sea. However, the additional description of his head staying above the waves indicates that he is not wholly taken by passion. This fits in well with the description of Dionysius used earlier at Chariton 2.4.4 where he is ‘submerged’ by

442 This is the reading (of 3.9.11) which Reardon prefers. The word σκότος can be neuter and indeed is always so in the New Testament.
443 See E.Her.1216, οὐδεὶς σκότος γὰρ ὁδὲ ἔχει μέλαν νέφος ὥστε κακῶν συμφορὰν κρύψειν ἄν, where no darkness has a black cloud capable of hiding Heracles’ misfortune. Also at E.Or.467-8 Orestes asks what darkness or cloud can he place in front of him to escape Tyndareus’ reproval: τίνα σκότον λάβω προσώπωι; ποῖον ἐπίπροσθεν νέφος θῶμαι…; These are slightly different from Dionysius’ case, as they concern darkness shielding one from social censure. Dionysius rather is close to fainting and despair.
444 This metaphor is erotic, though it refers to Dionysius fainting when he hears that Callirhoe might be taken away from him. It is erotically motivated, i.e. it depends upon a state of ἔρως, but we cannot rule out the instantaneous affect of other emotions. See more on this below.
445 We are told that his erotic passion was eager for it: οὖν ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἔσπευδ (Chariton 3.2.6).
446 See Plut.De superstitione 166a. In the passive it can mean to be drowned: Epict.Gnom.47. See Ach.Tat.6.19.5 where ἔρως itself sinks down submerged by anger (θυμός): ὁ δὲ τῷ θυμῷ βεβαπτισμένος καταδύεται. At Lib.Or.64.115 the ψυχή is submerged by grief.
desire, ἐπιθυμία, and he pokes his heads up just above the waves again: καθάπερ δὲ ἐκ κύματος ἀνέκυπτε. There seems to be a metaphorical contrast between reason and passion: his head represents rationality, of which he maintains some, but his ψυχή is totally overcome by emotion.

Clitophon describes one part of the erotic experience, the kiss. Charmides wishes to kiss Leucippe, but Clitophon is distraught at the prospect. This is because he sees the kiss as the best part of a sexual relationship. Although they kiss with the lips, it is a fountain of pleasure which springs up from the ψυχή: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ χείλεσιν ἀλλήλους φιλούμεν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστιν πηγή (Ach.Tat.4.8.3). That is to say it is not merely a physical contact but an emotional reaction. The ψυχή here represents emotion.

I suggested above that it was possible to view the ψυχή as a homunculus who is forcefully affected by the emotion. One metaphor implies that the ψυχή can be conceptualised as an animal. Sosthenes, Thersander’s servant, speaks of Leucippe nourishing her ψυχή upon Clitophon because he is the only lover she has ever known: μέχρι μὲν αὐτὸν οἶδε μόνον καὶ οὐ κεκοινώνηκεν ἑτέρῳ, βόσκει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτόν (Ach.Tat.6.17.3). The verb βόσκω is properly used of herdsmen feeding their flocks. It is also a description of one desire, ἐπιθυμία, in terms of another. Since it is a habitual desire it seems that sex is the target domain: sex as feeding one’s soul. Yet it is interesting that the ψυχή is conceptualised as a beast to be fed. The connotations are of the bestiality of a woman’s sexual desire and of the blind emotional needs of her ψυχή. Metaphors which are less prototypical can often arise from the requirements of the speaker’s own strategy.

The ψυχή can be conceptualised as a person interacting with the subject. When Daphnis looks upon Chloe naked he is not able to persuade his ψυχή to feel happy: οὐ μὴν ὁ Δάφνις χαίρειν ἔπειθε τὴν ψυχήν (Longus 1.32.4). This is due to the pain of erotic πάθος. Here we can see the emotion ἔρως being made up

447 For imagery of the emotions in Greek Tragedy featuring waves see Padel 1992, 81-86.
448 In Plato’s Philebus Socrates is seeking after the source of pleasures: ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγῆν ἵτεν (62d7).
449 See Od.14.102; Arist.HA 540a18.
of two sensations, pain and joy, one of which will give way to another depending upon consummation of the emotion. This is analogous to Aristotle’s conception of emotions involving either pleasure and pain.\textsuperscript{450} This reference also personifies the psychological entity via the metaphor of persuading. To follow the personification further, we see that the reason why Daphnis cannot persuade his soul to be happy is because it is too immersed in pain. Thus his persuasion is unsuccessful, because the ψυχή is too much under the power of emotion. In this metaphor we have a division between the ψυχή as an emotional person and Daphnis as the rational persuader: two personas. This folk model contrasts with the philosophical partition of the ψυχή into rational and emotional (and potentially more) parts.

We see similar motivation when we look at two personifications of the ψυχή in Heliodorus. First we have the erotic ‘recognition’ of the ψυχή: τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ γνωρίσματα (Hld.5.5.2).\textsuperscript{451} Chariclea and Theagenes, about to be separated, profess that if they are reunited, it will be enough for them to set eyes upon one another for the erotic recognition of their respective souls to be enacted. The first element in this metaphor is that of the conduit between the eyes and the souls, which was discussed in the chapter on vision. The pathway from the eyes to the inside of the body allows for the transmission of recognition. I would argue here that because the recognition is ‘erotic’, i.e. heavily emotionally dependent, it is seen as a possession of the ψυχή.\textsuperscript{452} There is also philosophical influence. The description at Longus 2.7.1 where Daphnis and Chloe’s ψυχαί are ‘winged’, seems to be a metaphor derived originally from Plato.\textsuperscript{453}

In the Greek Novel the ψυχή is prototypically seen as a location for ἔρως and as an entity, sometimes personified, subject to the same metaphors as the person affected by the emotion. Furthermore the ψυχή prototypically appears in emotional

\textsuperscript{450} Aristotle, \textit{Rhetorica} 1378a24. See also the introduction.

\textsuperscript{451} Aristotle refers to knowing, τὸ γινώσκειν, as being of the ψυχή rather than in the ψυχή: i.e. an operation of it (De.an.411a27).

\textsuperscript{452} In the same way at Hld.3.5.4 the ψυχή ‘recognises’ that which is similar to it and speeds to meet it. The engagement is emotional. Likewise at Hld.4.3.3 Chariclea’s ψυχή is as if ‘lifted out’, συνεξαιρομένης, in order to accompany Theagenes running the race. See the English phrase ‘my heart goes out to you’, also in an emotional context. See also Morgan 1989, 107–8.

\textsuperscript{453} Plato’s \textit{Phaedrus} features many references to the ψυχή being ‘winged’, but see particularly 246c–e and 251a–b. For further discussion see the chapter on ontology.
contexts and, as an internal psychological entity, can represent the emotion’s cause, due to the master metaphor of the force of emotion. We may now look to the wider portrayal of the ψυχή in emotional, rather than ἔρως-specific, contexts. Table 1.2 provides a list of references to the ψυχή in other emotional contexts. In this table are also included references where ἔρως is one of multiple emotions. The fourth column is a suggestion of the emotion(s) in English which correspond to the emotions described metaphorically in the Greek. It is not meant to be a definitive labelling of these psychological metaphors. What I am trying to indicate by means of the table is the coherence between metaphors of ἔρως and other emotions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Emotion</th>
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<td>Burning</td>
<td>τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ζωπυροῦν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.29.2</td>
<td>Grief/lupe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnt</td>
<td>ἢ ψυχή καίεται</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.8.2</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desires</td>
<td>ἐπιθυμεῖ ἢ ψυχή</td>
<td>Hld.8.7.6</td>
<td>Desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbed</td>
<td>ταραχώδης παντάπασι τήν ψυχήν</td>
<td>Chariton 1.12.5</td>
<td>Emotional state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbed</td>
<td>έτι τήν ψυχήν ἔχεις τεταραγμένη</td>
<td>Chariton 5.9.3</td>
<td>Distress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbed</td>
<td>τήν ψυχήν ἐταράττετο</td>
<td>Longus 4.6.3</td>
<td>Anxiety, Shame, anger, love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>ἐμεμέριστο πολλοῖς ἃμα τήν ψυχήν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.24.3</td>
<td>and jealousy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawn</td>
<td>τάς τε ψυχὰς συνεστάλησαν ύπό λύπης</td>
<td>Longus 2.8.1</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Together</td>
<td>τής ψυχῆς ἐμάρανε τὸ λυπούμενον</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.29.4</td>
<td>Grief/lupe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extinguish</td>
<td>ἐμπεσοῦσα ψυχῇ</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.11.1</td>
<td>Jealousy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falling in</td>
<td>τής ψυχῆς προοπτεοντα καθάπερ τοξεύματα</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.7.4.6</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falling towards</td>
<td>τής ψυχῆς προοπτεοντα καθάπερ τοξεύματα</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fill</td>
<td>μεστὸν ποιήσας ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης</td>
<td>Chariton 1.4.4</td>
<td>Hope, Fear and Curiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fountain</td>
<td>ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τῆς ἱδονῆς ἐστι πηγή</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.4.8.3</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held (badly)</td>
<td>κακῶς εἶχε τήν ψυχήν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.11.2</td>
<td>Grief/Upset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held (badly)</td>
<td>εἶχον τήν ψυχήν κακῶς</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.5.5</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held (good)</td>
<td>ψυχήν ἐξ ἀγαθῆν</td>
<td>Chariton 2.5.12</td>
<td>Good spirits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held (good)</td>
<td>ἀγαθῆ ἐχων ψυχήν</td>
<td>Chariton 4.7.4</td>
<td>Good spirits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held (happy)</td>
<td>ἢ δὲ αὐτομάτως ψυχήν εἶχεν ἰλαράν</td>
<td>Chariton 5.5.7</td>
<td>Cheerful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding</td>
<td>ψυχήν ἔχειν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.34.5</td>
<td>Emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding (down)</td>
<td>κατὰ τήν ψυχήν ἀθρόα κατεχεῖτο ἱδονῆ</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.3.23.1</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopes</td>
<td>τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίδας</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.23.4</td>
<td>Hopes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Led</td>
<td>ήδονάς</td>
<td>Chariton 6.3.9</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>σχολασάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν κακῶν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.7.4.6</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightened</td>
<td>τὸ λυπούμενον</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.1.8.11</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightened</td>
<td>τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνακουφίσας</td>
<td>Chariton 1.4.4</td>
<td>Attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastery</td>
<td>τῆς ψυχῆς κρατούσης</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.8.8.2</td>
<td>Mastery of Emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pain</td>
<td>ύπεραλγήσας τὴν ψυχὴν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.8.1.2</td>
<td>Upset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person inside</td>
<td>εἰμὶ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ σοῦ</td>
<td>Chariton 8.4.5</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poured</td>
<td>διαχεομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς</td>
<td>Hld.4.9.1</td>
<td>Joy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scales</td>
<td>ἡ ψυχὴ τρυτάνη</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.14.2</td>
<td>Hope and Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scales (on)</td>
<td>τὴν ψυχὴν εἶχον ἐπὶ τρυτάνης</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.19.2</td>
<td>Anger and Eros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending Away</td>
<td>παρὰ μικρὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφεῖναι</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.12.3</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrieking (in)</td>
<td>κωκύσας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βύθιον</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.3.10.1</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soften</td>
<td>μαλακίζεται</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.21.2</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soften</td>
<td>ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ μαλαχθεῖσα</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.3.14.3</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stretch</td>
<td>τὰς ψυχὰς ἐξέτειναν</td>
<td>Chariton 5.3.8</td>
<td>Desire of crowd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struck</td>
<td>ψυχὴ παταχθεῖσα</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.7.4.5</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struck</td>
<td>ἐκπλήσσει τὴν ψυχὴν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.1.3.3</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struck (sting)</td>
<td>τὴν ψυχὴν ἄσπερ ὑπὸ μύωπος παταχθεῖσα</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.7.3.6</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffered</td>
<td>ὁ δὲ ἔπαθε μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν</td>
<td>X.Eph.5.12.2</td>
<td>Grief/Anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing</td>
<td>Τοῖς δὲ αἵ τε ψυχαὶ ἐκράδαίνοντο</td>
<td>X.Eph.1.16.2</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>συμπαθεῖν μὲ τὶ τὴν ψυχὴν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.21.5</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken Out</td>
<td>ψυχῆν κατέλαβε</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.6.10.6</td>
<td>Suspicion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken Out</td>
<td>τὸ γὰρ ἀπελπισθὲν ἀπαξ ἔξηρται τῆς</td>
<td>Hld.1.15.3</td>
<td>Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tame</td>
<td>ψυχῆς ἡμεροῖ τὸ θυμούμενον</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.10.2.4</td>
<td>Anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toiling</td>
<td>τὸ γὰρ πονοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.10.2.4</td>
<td>Emotional suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torn Apart</td>
<td>τὴν οὖν ψυχῆν διασταίνωμενος</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.7.1.1</td>
<td>Grief, Anger and Love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusts</td>
<td>ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πιστεύειν φιλεῖ</td>
<td>Hld.8.7.6</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waves</td>
<td>τῆς τρικυμίας</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.7.1.2</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waves</td>
<td>τρία τῆς ψυχῆς κύματα</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.29.1</td>
<td>Shame, grief and anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wish</td>
<td>τὸ κρυπτόμενον βουλήμα τῆς ψυχῆς</td>
<td>Hld.2.13.1</td>
<td>Wish/desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wound</td>
<td>τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἐλκή</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.8.2</td>
<td>Grief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are many metaphors which are used both of ἔρως and the other emotions: for example Waves, Wound and Burnt. In these folk models of the ψυχή it is prototypically affected by emotion: like the person it is a passive pawn of the emotion. The portrayal of the ψυχή in the Greek Novel is also conditioned by expert models of psychology. The foremost of these seems to be Platonic psychology. Plato’s division of the ψυχή into a rational part, an appetitive part and a spirited part, and subsequent interpretations of this in the second sophistic inform much of what the novelists do, especially Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus.\footnote{Repath 2007, 54. See PL.R.434d2–441c7. In Greek the three parts respectively are τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, and τὸ θυμοειδής. Other evidence for the division of the ψυχή appears at Pl.Phr.246a6–7 where the imagery of a two horses and a rider is used. See also Repath 2007, 56-7: ‘the changes of emphasis, purpose, and imagery in the different treatments of the division of the soul led to later Platonists, especially those of the so-called ‘Middle Platonic’ period (c.80 B.C.E.–c.250 C.E.), attempting to reconcile perceived differences in the accounts by first dividing the soul into a rational (logistikon) part and an irrational (pathētikon) part and then subdividing the irrational part into the appetitive (epithymētikon) and spirited (thymoeides) parts which are found in the Republic’.}

However, what I will argue here is that Platonic psychology is applied to different degrees and not always to its fullest form.\footnote{Platonic psychology is not necessarily consistently applied even in Plato. See Gill 2006, 211-2: ‘in both Plato and Aristotle, we find various psychological models offered in different contexts without a clear attempt to define an ‘official’ position. For instance, although the tripartite psyche is introduced with great fanfare in Plato’s Republic, subsequently in that dialogue Plato’s Socrates deploys a bipartite version and also sketches a further one, in which the disembodied rational mind constitutes our sole true or essential nature’. He cites PL.R.436a–441c; 602c–603b, 604b–605c; 611b–612a.} This is because the novels use expert models for their own purposes, and therefore always rework as well as reflect ancient Greek psychology.

There is plenty of contemporary evidence to show that the division of the ψυχή was a focal point of philosophical discussion (see introduction to this section). Plutarch speaks of rationality controlling the passionate part of the soul as a man controlling an animal, which is reminiscent of the famous passage from Plato’s Phaedrus.\footnote{Repath 2007, 58-9, citing Plutarch 445b–c: ‘but the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason (ho logismos) guides (hēniochei) and manages the passionate part (to pathētikon), like a gentle animal obedient to the reins (euēnion), making it yielding in its desires (tas epithymias) and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety; but the self-controlled man, while he does indeed direct his desire (tēn epithymian) by the strength and mastery of reason (tōi logismōi), yet does so not without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though by blow and bit, he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil.’} This is striking compared to the novel, where the victory of the emotion
is the norm. This is not to say that contests of will do not take place. In Chariton there is a contest between rationality and passion, λογισμός against πάθος, within Dionysius, although passion emerges victorious. 457 This passage does not specify the ψυχή as the locus of the struggle, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that the ψυχή is understood as the locus. 458 Repath has, however, noticed some interesting examples in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus which imply a Platonic conception of the ψυχή. 459 At Ach.Tat.6.14.2 there is a weighing of hope and fear in the ψυχή, and this shows partition of the ψυχή: τὴν ψυχὴν εἴχον ἐπὶ τρυτάνης ἐλπίδου καὶ φόβου, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτό μου τὸ ἐλπίζον καὶ ἦλπιξε τὸ φοβοῦμενον. The neuter article with the participles ἐλπίζον and φοβοῦμενον implies that they refer to different desires of the τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν respectively: the hoping and fearing parts. 460 There is also a balance, τρυτάνη, at Ach.Tat.6.19.1-7 where it is ἔρως and anger (θυμός) which are weighed in the ψυχή. This lengthy description of Thersander’s psychological reaction to Leucippe’s rejection begins with ἔρως and θυμός as two torches of the ψυχή. If the beloved is obtained, όταν εἰς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν εὐτυχῇ, then ἔρως is victorious. However, if the lover is rejected, ἔρως calls θυμός as an ally. This can lead to the θυμός obtaining the upper hand and driving out ἔρως from its place. Eventually θυμός subsides and relaxes, but it can be roused again at another rejection. The passage is complicated and metaphorically incoherent. The emotions begin as torches but θυμός becomes water when it ‘submerges’ ἔρως: ὁ δὲ τῷ θυμῷ βεβαπτισμένος καταδύεται (Ach.Tat.6.19.5). However, the scenario-based approach, reactions based on acceptance or rejection, is one relevant to ἔρως. At Ach.Tat.6.19.5–7 ἔρως is personified in various ways: ἀμύνεται καὶ ὀπλίζει/ὁρῶν/ἀλγεῖ/ἀπολογεῖται.

457 Chariton 2.4.4. See also chapter on the opponent.
458 As Trapp 2007 shows, there were different levels of philosophy going on at this period in Greek history. I take the distinction between reason and passion to be a folk model which has emerged out of previous philosophy. Repath cites Chariton who refers to Dionysius as ‘philosophising in the love’ (Chariton 2.4.5). By describing the basic conflict of emotions, which is a folk model, as ‘philosophising’, the author is firmly within the realm of folk, and not expert, models.
459 Repath 2007, 72. I make extensive use of his excellent article in the current section.
460 I do not feel that the participles and the neuter singular article inevitably refer to parts rather than functions: i.e. the hoping of the soul, the fearing of the soul.
The emotion is a homunculus experiencing feelings within the ψυχή, which drives it to action. What is significant here is that the ψυχή is divided up among the emotions and not between rational and non-rational parts. It may be an intentional satirizing of the battle between reason and passion, in a way which reflects the novel’s own emotional agenda. So often there is a focus on the emotional operation of the ψυχή alone even when Platonic models are invoked. We have much evidence for characters in the Greek Novel experiencing multiple and conflicting emotions, which can clearly be seen in Fusillo’s study.

A short while earlier Thersander enters the hut where he is keeping Leucippe and converses with her at random. The narrator explains that lovers are liable to lack logic when they are focused upon the beloved.

Τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ ἐρωτέτες, ὅταν πρὸς τὰς ἐρωμένας ζητήσωσι λαλεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν λογισμὸν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχήν εἰς τὸ ἐρώμενον ἐχοντες, τῇ γλώττῃ μόνον χωρίς ἡνιόχου τοῦ λογισμοῦ λαλοῦσιν (Ach.Tat.6.18.3).

Lovers do not place rationality upon their words, ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν λογισμὸν τοῖς λόγοις, but they hold their ψυχή into the object of affection, chattering only with their tongue and without the charioteer of reason. The reference to a charioteer alludes to Plato’s famous model of the ψυχή as a charioteer and two horses. The desire for the beloved rules in the ψυχή and therefore the charioteer representing reason does not have control. This therefore primarily concerns two functions of the ψυχή, reason and appetite, and directly engages with a specific passage from Plato.

Heliodorus provides more example of Platonic influenced psychology. Theagenes, Chariclea and Cnemon are overtaken by desperate circumstances, and this lack of clarity concerning their situation ‘darkens’ the reasoning (part) of their ψυχή: τὸ ἄδηλον ἐξόφου τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λογιζόμενον (Hld.2.15.1). Therefore emotions other than ἔρως—presumably despair—can equally affect the operation of the rational part of the soul. However, we may note that the metaphor is not one of a

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461 See for example Ach.Tat.5.24.3: ἐμεμέριστο πολλοῖς ἅμα τὴν ψυχήν, αἰδοὶ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ ἔρωτι καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τοὺς ζητούσις. The ψυχή is ‘divided’ between multiple emotions.  
463 Repath 2007, 73.
lack of control. Darkening connotes a looming presence of the appetitive part rather than its running loose. They are then forced to give in to their fatigue and pain. Thus we are told that even the thinking or purpose, τὸ νοερὸν, of the ψυχή occasionally consents to go along with, συνομολογεῖν, physical affliction: οὔτως ἀρα ποτὲ σώματος πάθει καὶ τὸ νοερὸν τῆς ψυχῆς συνομολογεῖν ἤνέσχετο (Hld.2.15.2). This is again not the overriding of emotion. It is a subtle Platonic depiction of the rational part of the soul consenting to go along with the appetite part, not being taken over by it.

There are another two examples from Heliodorus which imply the partitioning of the ψυχή and they prove to be interesting.⁴⁶⁴ At Hld.4.6.1 Calasiris visits the lovesick Chariclea and departs, leaving her time to manage the part of her ψυχή which feels shame: διαιτῆσαι ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰδούμενον.

Since ἔρως is associated with the τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν part this implies the tripartite model of the ψυχή.⁴⁶⁵ Her reason, διαιτῆσαι, is operating in conjunction with the αἰδώς from the spirited part of her ψυχή. In context she is coming to terms with the sense of shame stopping her from following her ἔρως for Theagenes. Her αἰδώς is appropriate but she must work with it to channel her ἔρως in the correct direction: betrothal and self-control rather than sex.

We may compare a passage later on where Achaemenes desires to see his (as he believes) betrothed Chariclea. He says that it is because he wants to manage the part of his ψυχή which has been bitten: τὸ δεδηγμένον τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ θέᾳ τῇ ἔκκεινης διαιτῆσαι (Hld.7.28.1). Here we have the same verb, διαιτῆσαι, but a different part of the ψυχή. The bite clearly indicates ἔρως and therefore the appetitive part.⁴⁶⁶ Chariclea and Achaemenes contrast in their reaction to ἔρως. Hers is a tripartite response due to her upright character, whereas his is an unreflective acceptance of his desire.

I will conclude that for the most part we may see the ψυχή as a homunculus, often representing emotion, in the folk model presented in the Greek Novel. The

⁴⁶⁴ Repath 2007, 80ff.
⁴⁶⁵ See Repath 2007, 80.
⁴⁶⁶ Bites are prominent in Stoic accounts of emotion. See Sorabji 2000, 38, 40–1, 66–8, 70, 120, 204.
bulk of the evidence surveyed above points to a folk model of the ψυχή as the locus of emotion, but there are significant reworkings of platonic models of psychology which view a more complex partitioned ψυχή, either bipartite or tripartite. Therefore the Greek Novel features an interaction of the more prolific folk models of the ψυχή with the expert models which use and rework these folk models. The prototypically ψυχή represents emotion because the novels are fundamentally about emotion, especially dominant emotion, and the use of this psychological entity reflects this.
II The Καρδία

The anatomical entity καρδία, which is an organ, is used far less than ψυχή in the Greek Novel. In total the word appears thirty four times. The author distribution is also uneven. Xenophon never uses it, Chariton only twice, and Achilles Tatius dominates with nineteen references. In this section I will concentrate on the use of the entity in relation to psychological metaphors for ἔρως, although I will include other references since they shed light on individual author preference and emotional continuity.

There are two tables below detailing metaphorical conceptualisations of the καρδία during the psychological state of ἔρως and other emotional experiences (tables 2.1 and 2.2). The majority of references to the καρδία are psychological. In tables 2.1 and 2.2 below we see an interesting variety in the ways different authors use psychological metaphors featuring the καρδία. Achilles Tatius uses the καρδία in twice as many references to ἔρως as to other emotions: eleven to six. Heliodorus is roughly even at two to three. Chariton and Longus are striking in their consistency. Chariton uses καρδία only twice and never of ἔρως, while Longus uses it exclusively of ἔρως in all seven of his references. These usages can be fitted roughly onto a chronological scale. The earliest novelists Chariton and Xenophon of

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467 The numbers are as follows: Achilles Tatius: 19; Chariton: 2; Heliodorus: 6; Longus: 7; Xenophon: 0.
468 In previous Greek literature there are numerous instances of the καρδία as the locus of ἔρως. See A.R.3.296-8; Oppian, Halieutica 4.10–2.
469 Three references excerpted from the tables feature physical rather than psychological descriptions. In Achilles Tatius the narrator Clitophon describes a sword sinking into a καρδία during the (apparent) human sacrifice of Leucippe. I take this to be a metaphor referring to a concrete action, a sword passing into a human body, and not a psychological metaphor. Likewise the inserting of a piece of one plant into the καρδία of another refers to botanical anatomy. A more difficult example appears in Heliodorus where the doctor is diagnosing Chariclea’s lovesickness. Charicles reports to Calasiris that the doctor took the girl’s pulse in order (he supposes) to check the motions of the καρδία: τὰ καρδίας κινήματα (Hld.4.7.4). The first problem with this is the reliability of the narrator. Charicles’ lack of scientific knowledge of the body has already been exposed by Calasiris (Hld.3.7), and we can hardly trust his assessment of the doctor’s intentions. Despite this, however, his postulation is not unreasonable. The beating of the καρδία, and therefore the pulse, is indeed a sign of emotional exertion, and it can often be a symptom of ἔρως (see below). Therefore this physiological description does verge on the psychological, without being specifically connected with emotion here, since the doctor is examining a sick girl. At this point, pre-diagnosis, it is only the reader and Calasiris who are aware that the girl is in love.
Ephesus have no references to καρδία in an erotic context, while erotic instances predominate in Achilles Tatius and Longus, before easing slightly in Heliodorus. The reason for this is not clear, and I would not want to commit myself to a definitive answer, since the dating of the novels is at best hazy. The difference could also be explained by authorial choice.

The metaphors used of the καρδία in an emotional state reflect metaphors of emotion. Thus we see the καρδία on fire, hit with an arrow, goaded, bitten, or wounded (see table 2.1). In table 2.2 we see references to emotions other than ἔρως. The reason I have not stated an emotion for each column is because it is often difficult to say which emotion or emotions are involved when we receive only a metaphorical description of the καρδία. Sometimes the emotion is specified. We can see that Ach.Tat.2.29.4 and Ach.Tat.2.29.2 refer to anger (thumos and orgê respectively). With others it is more difficult to say. At Hld.10.17.1 Hydaspes is leading his newly discovered daughter away to be sacrificed, and so ‘smouldering’ in his καρδία probably refers to grief, although we cannot rule out other emotions. The reason for this is probably that the motion, or beating, of the καρδία is a generic indicator of emotional response, and specific emotions have to be specified or inferred from the context. This physiological symptom of emotion is at the heart of these psychological metaphors. For instance, Chariton describes Callirhoe in two scenarios as being ‘struck’ in her καρδία. In the first instance she has just heard a report of her husband Chaereas, and in the second she has been solicited by a eunuch on behalf of the Persian King. One label we can put upon this description is shock. If a καρδία is struck, then it is potentially shaken. In the same way the sob or hiccup metaphor (ἔλυζε), the loosening and the thrown metaphors indicate some sort of force exerted upon the καρδία (table 2.2). The same conception of the forces upon the καρδία can be seen in the erotic metaphors of disturbance, leaping out, swaying, trembling and throwing (table 2.1). This metaphorical conceptualisation of the καρδία being forced into motion, based on the physiology of a beating heart, is prototypical of its use in psychological imagery. The καρδία can also be the

470 For the dating of the novels see the introduction.
471 Chariton 3.9.2 and Chariton 6.5.6.
container of emotion (see *throwing out anger from* (table 2.2)). The other prototypical feature of metaphors of the καρδία is that the force is a damaging one. This conception applies to metaphors of ἐφός and other emotions.

There are two final points which I wish to pick up concerning these metaphors. The first relates to how influential literary influences are upon this model. It seems that literary influences are subsumed within the general models. If a model is too common, such as the fire one, then it cannot on its own be an allusion. There are two references which possibly allude to previous literature. The first is in Heliodorus, where Cnemon rhetorically asks Calasiris who could have a καρδία of adamant or iron that they would not be bewitched by the love story of Theagenes and Chariclea. This statement possibly alludes to Pindar’s famous fragment on Theoxenus (*fr*.127; see Chapter on vision). The concept involves the supposition that the καρδία which does not feel emotion is hard, like adamant and iron, and therefore does not move and is not susceptible to forces. In Achilles Tatius the narrator describes anger as barking round the καρδία. This is not identical with but coherent with the image in Homer where Odysseus’ κραδίη barks in anger (*Od*.20.13). In both references the καρδία is disturbed by either its own or the emotion’s ‘barking’, which maps onto its movement under emotional pressure. Of course there is an important difference that in the Odyssey the heart barks like a dog when Odysseus feels anger at the maids. In Achilles Tatius the description is used of anger as part of a complex emotional response from Leucippe at her mother’s accusation of losing her virginity. The imagery here portrays anger as a dog barking and overflowing, ἐπικλύζω, in the foam of madness: τῷ τῆς μανίας ἀφρῷ.

The extended psychological imagery sees the three emotions Leucippe experiences—αἰδὼς δὲ καὶ λύπη καὶ ὀργή—as waves of the soul. The wave of anger is further conceptualised as a raving dog: foam, ἀφρός, can refer to the sea (*Il*.18.403) or a

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472 See the metaphors of *Arrow, Bite, Consumed, Fire, Goad, Sting, Wound* (table 1.1) and *Consume, Strike* (table 1.2).

473 Τίς οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος ἢ σιδηροῦς τὴν καρδίαν ἡς μὴ θέλγεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀκούω (Hld.4.4.3).

474 ἤ δὲ ὀργή περιϋλακτοῦσα τὴν καρδίαν (Ach.Tat.2.29.2).

475 For anger barking see also *Od*.20.13 and Opp. *H*.1.721.
human or animal (II.20.168). Therefore ἀφρός can refer to the wave in the target
domain and the mad dog in the source domain.

Most of the references to the καρδία are folk models of emotion. At
Achilles Tatius 2.7.6, when Clitophon claims to Leucippe that the bee sting has
caused a wound, we are told that the wound ‘flowed down’ upon the καρδία: ἐπὶ
γάρ τὴν καρδίαν κατέφρευσε τὸ τραύμα. The whole passage involves kissing
and seduction, and Clitophon is playing with the conventions. The sting of the bee
stands metaphorically for Leucippe’s emotional affect upon him (see the chapter on
madness) and reaching the καρδία indicates the seat of that emotional response.

Are there any ἔρως specific images or conceptualisations of the καρδία?
The evidence says that there are ἔρως specific images which adhere to the general
rule of a force. Many metaphors, such as Arrow and Bite, appear in table 2.1 but not
2.2, which means that specific images associated with ἔρως depict that emotion
rather than others. However, the underlying model of a force propelling the καρδία
into motion is the most prevalent, and therefore probably prototypical.

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrow</td>
<td>τὸ βέλος, ἢ δὲ παρθένος εἰς τὴν καρδίαν</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.8.12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bite</td>
<td>δάκνει τὸ φίλημα τὴν καρδίαν</td>
<td>Longus 1.25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry towards</td>
<td>τῇ καρδίᾳ προσέφερε</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumed</td>
<td>Ηλγει τὴν καρδίαν ὡς ἐσθιομένην ὑπὸ φαρμάκων</td>
<td>Longus 1.32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbed</td>
<td>ἢ δὲ ταραχθεῖσα τῷ φιλήματι κάτωθεν δὲ ὄσπερ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁ Ἐρως</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.37.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eros speaks out of</td>
<td>ἀντεφθέγγετο</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>ὡς τὸ κάσον πῦρ τὴν καρδίαν τὴν ἐμήν</td>
<td>Longus 3.10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goad</td>
<td>οἰνον ἐγκεῖσθαι τῇ καρδίᾳ κέντρον</td>
<td>Hld.1.14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>ὑσθείσης τῆς καρδίας</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.2.8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaps out</td>
<td>ἐξάλλεται ἢ καρδία</td>
<td>Longus 1.18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passion runs upon</td>
<td>τοῦ πάθους σίμαι καὶ τὴν καρδίαν ἐπιδραμόντος</td>
<td>Hld.3.5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs/Seals</td>
<td>καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει</td>
<td>Ach.Tat.5.13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sting/Prick</td>
<td>τὸ νύττον μου τὴν καρδίαν</td>
<td>Longus 1.14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparing this with the examples of ψυχή metaphors seen above, we see that a major difference between the two entities is that the καρδία is not personified to as great an extent. An exception is Ach.Tat.2.8.3, where the καρδία feels happy within the state of ἔρως, ἡσθείσης τῆς καρδίας, although this is not the only reading.\(^{476}\)

In the examples taken from other emotions, the reference to the anger of the καρδία (θυμός) is interesting in regards to the partitioning of the ψυχή discussed above: τῆς καρδίας ἔπαυσε τὸ θυμούμενον (Ach.Tat.2.29.4). However, the ψυχή is

\(^{476}\) This is the reading preferred by Garnaud. However, it is unusual in light of other metaphors used of the καρδία.
the most popular psychological entity and the one which features in expert models of emotion.

The καρδία tends not to feature in reworkings of expert models such as the Platonic influence upon the division of the ψυχή we saw above. However, in one passage it does. The flowing of beauty is drawn upon the erotic καρδία and imprints down below a shadow: ἥ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροή δι' ἀφανῶν ἀκτίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἑρωτικὴν ἐλκομένη καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει κάτω τὴν σκιάν (Ach.Tat.5.13.4). The verb ἐναποσφραγίζω is a technical term used of cognition by the stoics.\(^\text{477}\) It follows several verbs which are used in expert models of sight and cognition: ἐναπομάττεται/ἀναπλάττει.\(^\text{478}\) The context features pleasure through vision and the impressing of the εἴδωλον of the beloved inside the lover. Locating the καρδία as where the effluences of beauty create a shadow emphasises the emotional nature of the cognitive impression itself.

The Greek Novel features the ψυχή far more than the καρδία in psychological metaphor, yet both are important within the folk psychology. Both reinforce the portrayal of ἔρως as a passive affect and the imagery of both is grounded in common folk metaphors of the emotion itself. Their behaviour during emotional experience is also coherent, being mostly conceptualised as a force enacted upon them.

\(^{477}\) At D.L.7.46.4 the cognitive is that which is sealed and impressed: ἐναπεσφραγισμένη καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένη. For an extended discussion see Goldhill 2001b and Morales 2004, 131–5.

\(^{478}\) For the influences see Morales 2004, 133.
Chapter 7 - An Ontology of Ἐρως

This final section extends the discussion of the metaphorical conceptualisations of Ἐρως seen in the chapters upon fire, sickness, madness and conflict. Many instances of metaphor referring to the psychology of Ἐρως in the Greek Novel fit into the above four categories. However, Ἐρως can be conceptualised in other ways. These metaphors range from ones used of emotion or abstract concepts in general to those used specifically of Ἐρως. Therefore this chapter will expand the analysis of metaphors of Ἐρως both in the direction of the more general and the more specific. The title originates from Lakoff and Johnson’s category of ontological metaphors, which refers to the conceptualisation of abstract concepts in concrete terms such as entities and substances: hence an ontology.\(^{479}\)

\(^{479}\) See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 25-32.
One of the most pervasive metaphors in English is that which conceptualises an abstract concept as a container. This metaphor is ontological in the sense that it reifies an abstract concept as a concrete container. The entity conceptualised as being in a container can be put into the container or taken out: therefore this metaphor can structure relations between the entity and the container in terms of an in-out orientation. With regard to metaphors of emotion this relationship can work in two directions. The human body can be conceived of as a container (an experientially based metaphor; looking out upon the world from a self perceived as internal to the physical shell) and the emotion is conceived of as an entity inside us. Having the emotion inside is feeling it, and not having it inside is not feeling it. This is possibly a universal model of emotion due to its grounding in human physiology. However, there is a second usage of the container metaphor where the emotion itself is conceived of as the container. The state of feeling the emotion is mapped onto the in-out orientation of the container, where being in the emotion is feeling it, and being outside of it is not feeling it. Both these models appear in the Greek Novel, and highlight important distinctions in the way in which the emotional experience is conceptualised.

I shall deal with the second model of emotion first. The Greek preposition corresponding to our ‘in’ is ἐν, and we often see the conceptualisation of an emotional state in Xenophon of Ephesus referring to the person as an entity inside the container of the emotion. Thus we get examples of people being ‘in’ ἀθυμία, φόβος, ὀργή, λύπη and πένθος, in the same way as ‘I am in love’ is used in English. That is to say where being in the emotion indicates the state of feeling the emotion.

480 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 29.
481 See Kövecses 2000, 139-63.
482 ἀθυμία: X.Eph.1.5.5; φόβος: X.Eph.1.5.6; ὀργή: X.Eph.2.11.2, 3.12.6, 4.6.2; λύπη: X.Eph.3.9.1; πένθος: X.Eph.5.6.2. X.Eph.5.10.5 features ἀθυμία in the dative without an ἐν: ἀθυμία μὲν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀνθίαν, ἀποφοία δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηθέων. I am reading ἀθυμία rather than ἀποφοία here, in line with O’Sullivan (following Hemsterhuis), since otherwise the repetition would be banal. We also have other examples of ἀθυμία and ἀποφοία being a pairing (see X.Eph.3.2.14; 5.6.1). There are interesting discrepancies between the use of these concepts in Greek and English. For instance I cannot say ‘I am in anger’ or ‘I am in grief’, but I can say ‘I am in love’ (* is used as the standard linguistic indicator of a sentence felt by a native speaker to be deviant).
emotion. This can be paralleled in earlier literature, such as when Plato refers to being ‘in φόβος’ (Pl.R.578e).\textsuperscript{483}

In the other novels we do not get the combination of ἐν and one of the emotion terms above.\textsuperscript{484} However, we do get two examples from Chariton and one from Achilles Tatius of ἐν and ἔρως. The Great King’s eunuch tells Callirhoe that his master will not tolerate being ‘surpassed in reputation in love’: βασιλεὺς ἐν ἔρωτι παρευδοκιμούμενος (Chariton 6.7.13). The relationship of the prepositional phrase to the verb highlights an important subtlety of the metaphor. According to the meaning of the other container metaphors used of emotion terms above we might take the prepositional phrase ἐν ἔρωτι as referring to the king: i.e. he is feeling love. However, the verb accompanying the prepositional phrase involves a kind of action different from merely being or becoming: the idea is ‘being bested in love’. The former meaning primarily indicates psychological state as with the English ‘to be in love’. The second primarily indicates the field within which one competes, as ‘being surpassed in love’ emphasises the interaction between a person and their love rival, and internal psychological repercussions, such as sadness or anger, can be understood to follow from it. The only other reference to ἐν ἔρωτι in Chariton is similar. Dionysius attempts to fight ἔρως, combating πάθος with λογισμός, but this only makes the god more angry at a soul philosophising ‘in love’: ψυχὴν ἐν ἔρωτι φιλοσοφοῦσαν (Chariton 2.4.5). Here the ψυχή is personified as philosophising and can be seen as a homunculus of Dionysius. If we align this instance to the one above then we translate the phrase not as ‘a soul in love philosophising’, but ‘a soul philosophising in love’. In both instances the container

\textsuperscript{483} Ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτὸν. This refers to a man with his family and fifty slaves. He is hypothetically put into a situation where no one could help him if his slaves decided to revolt. Therefore it refers to the state of fear in which he is in due to the apprehension of potential events.

\textsuperscript{484} In the other novels we do not get ἐν with the dative for either ἀθυμία, φόβος, ὀργή, λύπη or πένθος. We do get φόβος and ὀργή in the dative, but not with ἐν. For example in Heliodorus the Ethiopians ward off attacks ‘with anger’: σὺν ὀργῇ τῶν Αἰθιόπων ἀμυνομένων (Hld.9.5.9). A similar usage indicating means or manner occurs earlier in the novel, when Arsace ‘stretches’ her jealousy with her ὀργή: τὴν ἐκ πολλοῦ ἡρλοτυπῶν ὀργή τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιτείνασα (Hld.8.7.1).
metaphor emphasises ἔρως as the field within which one is competing or discoursing.

In Achilles Tatius we also have an example of the preposition and noun pairing. Melite tells Clitophon how she attempted to solicit a love charm from Leucippe in order to make him fall in love with her. Her excuse is gnomic. This course of action is the ‘refuge of unsuccessful lovers’: αὐτὴ γὰρ τῶν ἐν ἔρωτι δυστυχούντων ἡ καταφυγή (Ach.Tat.5.26.12). It refers to people who are unsuccessful within the field of love, and therefore bears similarity to the constructions taking ἐν ἔρωτι above.

The metaphorical conception of the emotion as a container also appears with the preposition εἰς, ‘into’, and verbs of motion and force. In Xenophon of Ephesus Anthia asks Habrocomes not to reject Manto’s proposition and thereby cast her into a barbaric ὀργή: μὴ δὲ εἰς ὀργὴν ἐμβάλῃς βαρβαρικὴν (X.Eph.2.4.5). In this case it is a directional metaphor indicating place into which relies upon a common metaphor: that a change of state is a change of location.485 The youthful Chaereas can easily fall into erotic jealousy: ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς ἐρωτικὴν ζηλοτυπίαν (Chariton 1.2.6). The preposition εἰς also appears with regard to ἔρως itself. Polycharmus urges Chaereas to visit the beautiful female captive they have taken (Callirhoe), since he wishes to throw him into a new ἔρως: βουλόμενος ἐμβαλεῖν αὐτόν, εἰ πως δύναιτο, εἰς ἔρωτα καινόν (Chariton 8.1.6).486 Thus while ἐν indicates a state εἰς gives directionality and implies a change of state. In Achilles Tatius Clitophon tells us that he wishes to make a girl receptive (‘easily led’) to ἔρως: Βουλόμενος οὖν ἐγὼ εὐάγωγον τὴν κόρην εἰς ἔρωτα παρασκευάσαι (Ach.Tat.1.16.1).487 This

485 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 31-2, with ‘he fell into depression’ given as an example.

486 The adjective καινός does not merely express ‘newness’ but also ‘novelty’ or ‘strangeness’. However, in context it represents the replacing of his ἔρως for Callirhoe with another one.

487 For the active form of the verb used in the sense of making or rendering with a participle or adjective see X.Cyr.1.6.18 and PL.Lg.803e.
is the language of seduction and the purpose here is sex.\textsuperscript{488} Leading her into ἔρως, εὐάγωγον...εἰς ἔρωτα, is a metaphor for a change of state as with the examples above: Leucippe will now feel ἔρως. Leucippe experiencing the emotion is seen as a requisite of achieving sex. However, it is a change of state induced by Clitophon and this emphasises the element of seduction. It portrays Leucippe as a passive victim of Clitophon.

Emotion, however, is not always a specific destination. Often the effects of emotion cause one to wander in mind.\textsuperscript{489} I would label this as a specific kind of emotion, manic emotion, which perhaps occurs most famously in Greek tragedy.\textsuperscript{490} In Sophocles’ \textit{Ajax} the chorus say that Ajax is no longer steady in the ‘impulses’ with which he grew up, συντρόφοις, but keeps company outside: οὐκέτι συντρόφοις ὀργαῖς ἐμπεδό, ἀλλ’ ἕκτος ὠμελεὶ (S.Aj.639-40). The implication is that he is consorting, ὠμελεῖ, outside of his mind, and the notion of the mad being out of their minds is one as familiar to the English language as to Greek. In the medical writer Hippocrates ἔκτοσθεν ἐγένετο means ‘to be delirious (H.Epid.5.1.85). This metaphor of being absent or outside of oneself, wandering in mind, is used of manic emotion in Heliodorus. When the wicked stepmother Demaenete can no longer control her lust for Cnemon she becomes ‘outside of herself’: ἡ δὲ ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρῶτον εἶδεν ἕκτος ἑαυτῆς γίνεται (Hld.1.10.2). There are several analogous expressions in English representing an out of body state, such as to be ‘beside oneself’ or ‘out of one’s mind’. The metaphor here represents the sudden unleashing of her self-control. Demaenete, an Athenian stepmother lusting after her son, and lacking any of the moral concerns of her archetype Phaedra,

\textsuperscript{488} Another two examples in Achilles Tatius refer to the area of ἔρως: how one deals with ἔρως in a social context. Clinias tells Clitophon that he is fortunate as regards ἔρως, because he has the object of his desire in close proximity: οὕτως εἰς ἔρωτα εὐτυχῶν (Ach.Tat.1.9.2). Later on Thersander also hopes to be fortunate in his erotic affairs because he has Leucipe in his power: εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα εὐτυχῆσει (Ach.Tat.6.20.1). We are told that Callisthenes, who is deviant (according to the narrator) and falls in love from hearsay rather than sight, engages in softness as regards ἔρως through the ears: ὡς καὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν εἰς ἔρωτα τρυφᾶν καὶ ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀπὸ ρήματων, ἀ τῇ ψυχῇ τρωθέντες διακονοῦσιν όφθαλμοί (Ach.Tat.2.13.1). The verb τρυφᾶν evokes the notion of effeminate luxury (see Ar.Nu.48) and enforces the idea that his way of feeling ἔρως is perverse.

\textsuperscript{489} ἔρως and Wandering: see Montiglio 2005, 83-85, 169, 234-35.

provides us with a stereotype par excellence of the manically passionate ‘wicked’
woman. The spatial notion of ‘out’, ἐκ, is used in a similar way at Chariton 6.4.4.
The king sets off on a hunt, and we are told that the noise would have driven Ἠρως
himself out (of his senses): ἥ σπουδή καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ἐξέστησεν Ἀν καὶ τὸν Ἠρωτα. The verb ἐξίστημι means ‘to displace’ and is often used of
mental confusion (see E.Ba.850, E.Fr.265).491 The gist of the passage is that all the
confusion and uproar would have driven Ἠρως out of his mind, i.e. distracted him,
and Ἠρως himself should be most proof to this effect, since it is he who usually
drives people out of their senses. However, as it turns out, the King is not distracted
from Ἠρως by the hunt, but focuses on it even more.492 Daphnis becomes ἐκφρως
and outside of his phrenes, ἐξω τῶν φρενῶν γενόμενος, when suitors make
advances on Chloe and when she is kidnapped later on respectively (Longus 3.26.1;
4.28.2). The first instance describes erotic jealousy and the second Ἠρως-motivated
concern or distress.

What is interesting about these examples is that they display a model
different from the most prevalent inside-outside orientation of the emotions. This
model is one of displacement (ἐκστασις) coherent with the English expression
‘beside oneself’, which conceptualises the emotion as external to oneself. The more
common model is that of emotion as internal to the person experiencing it
(ἐνθουσιασμός).493 Internal emotion is related to the concept of divine possession,
which is often associated with emotional affect. Tragic madness and manic emotion
can be divinely inspired.494 Satyrus tells Clitophon that he has the god Eros in him,

491 See also the cognate noun ἐκστασις which can be used of a disturbed mental state
(Arist.Cat.10a1).
492 An unavoidable result perhaps given the association of seduction and eroticism with hunting in
antiquity: see the earlier chapter on vision.
493 See Kövecses 2000, 146ff., who provides evidence for the container metaphor of emotion inside
the human body from English, Chinese, Japanese and Hungarian. See also Konstan 2006, 147–8 and
Planalp 1997, 107, who refers to the metaphor of emotion as internal fluid: ‘the body is a container
and emotions are fluids inside it’. Ancient Greek humoral theory conceptualised physiology in terms
of liquids: see Nutton 2004, 116, 121–2, 209, 241, 366, 367, 343. For the flowing of emotion in
Greek Tragedy see Padel 1992, 81–88. There are many instances in Homer of emotion being a fluid: Il.6.264; 7.182; 9.362; 18.331, 9.454 (see Clarke 1999, 92).
494 In the context of Ἠρως see Phaedra’s doomed passion, which Aphrodite claims to have instilled in
οὖν ἐν σεαυτῷ θεὸν (Ach.Tat.2.4.5), arguing that the presence of a god inside will make one brave. 495 This is rhetoric, but rhetoric that is coherent with folk models of emotion. When Habrocomes despairs of seeing Anthia or his homeland ever again ἀθυμία and ἀπορία ‘fall into him’: ἐμπίπτει (X.Eph.5.6.1). 496 This model is different from the one of these two emotions above, in that the person is now the container instead of the emotion. 497 Habrocomes and Hippothous are both filled with anger at Leucon’s words and a love rival respectively: εὐθὺς μὲν ὀργῆς ἐνεπλήσθη; ὀργῆς πλησθείς (X.Eph.2.4.3; 3.2.10). The person as a container is filled with the emotion as with a substance and filling leads to the expression of the emotion. Habrocomes retorts angrily, while Hippothous slays his love rival in his passion. The adverb ‘straight away’, εὐθὺς, implies that the filling is a sudden emotional response: empty to full in a matter of seconds. The filling of the container with ἔρως in Heliodorus is different from the anger example above. The filling is not conceived of as leading to action straight away, but as being the fulfilment of an ἔρως-motivated goal: sex. Arsace asks her servant to procure sex with Theagenes for her and thereby ‘fill her ἔρως’: τὸν μὲν ἐμπλήσασα (Hld.7.10.6). Her ἔρως remains at a low level until it is sated, at which point she fills it and satisfies it. The verb ἐμπίμπλημι means to ‘fill in’, but can often refer to eating or drinking. 498 Therefore we have filling as metaphorical for the satisfying of hunger or thirst, and hunger or thirst as metaphorical for the satisfying of a desire such as sex. Ἐρως is a person which requires feeding. Likewise in the first chapter of the novel Thisbe makes Demaenete promise to ‘satisfy her desire’ (i.e. have sex) silently: πληροῦν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν (Hld.1.17.3). It could be that this draws upon a metaphor for food

495 Clitophon also explains the attraction of a magnetic stone and iron by ‘love’; they have erotic fire inside them: ἔνδον ἔρωτικὸν ἔνδον ἔχουσα πῦρ (Ach.Tat.1.17.2).
496 O’Sullivan uses a reading which conceptualises Anthia as a container for πένθος, ‘grief’: Ἀνθίᾳ δὲ πάντα πένθος ἦν (X.Eph.2.7.2). This would make more sense than the reading of Ἀνθίᾳ predicated with the emotion: Ἀνθίᾳ δὲ πάντα πένθος ἦν.
497 The image of falling is also used without the container model, as when Leucon exhorts Habrocomes not to let them fall under Manto’s wrath: σῶσον ἡμᾶς ἀπαντας καὶ μὴ περιῦδης ὀργής δεσποτῶν ὑποπεσόντας (X.Eph.2.4.2).
498 The verb ἐμπίμπλημι takes an accusative of the container and a genitive of the contents. It often conceptualises eating (Il.21.311) or drinking (Od.17.503) as filling a container.
Food is metaphorically seen as filling the body, and filling full, πληρόω, is seen as satisfying oneself with food.499 This metonym of filling oneself as satisfying oneself (means mapped onto the purpose within the same domain) is then metaphorically mapped onto the satisfaction of sex. We will see further consumption metaphors in a section below. However, again we have the differing models of either filling oneself with the emotion (ὀργή) or filling (feeding) the desire (ἐπιθυμία).500

The container metaphor can portray a sudden burst and release of emotion, but it can also denote a long-term state. In Achilles Tatus Clinias advises Clitophon on the technique or method of seduction, and informs him that it is self-taught. He compares it with the natural and self-taught process of giving birth. He first describes the lover as a new-born baby who is not taught where to suckle. This description bears erotic overtones. Then he switches direction and strikingly speaks of young men bringing fourth their ἔρως as if a baby, ‘being first pregnant with ἔρως’: ἔρωτος πρωτοκύμων (Ach.Tat.1.10.1). The adjective πρωτοκύμων is formed from the parts πρῶτος (‘first’) and κῦμα (‘wave’). It is therefore metaphorical of pregnancy, depicting the swelling of the woman’s body as a swelling wave.501 He proceeds to claim that the god himself will be the midwife.502 The gender reversal is interesting, but we can see a parallel in Plato. In his Symposium Diotima speaks of the pregnancy of the soul with virtue and the search for the beautiful upon which one can finally give birth (209a–b). Achilles Tatus’ imagery draws upon but reverses Plato’s idealism: Clitophon’s aim is seduction, and it may be that the pregnancy image also represents the act of sex. It is possible that verb for

499 This relationship goes full circle, because a prototypical example of an ἐπιθυμία is eating. In Plato’s Gorgias Socrates and Callicles speak of thirst and hunger in terms of satisfying desires (Pl.Grg.494c). Aphrodite satisfies her anger at E.Hipp.1328: πληροῦσα θυμόν.  
500 Note that because ἔρως can be metonymous for the desire for sex (since this is a subsection of ἔρως) this does not mean that it is not a πάθος like ὀργή. This subject will be broached in the conclusion.  
501 The noun κῦμα prototypically denotes waves of the sea or rivers, but it is cognate with κύω which means to conceive.  
502 On this passage see Morales 2004, 154–5, who cites Plato’s Theaetetus (149a–151d) where Socrates compares the technique of philosophical inquiry to midwifery, delivering wisdom from men’s souls. See Morales 2004, 155: ‘the point of the comparison seems clear. It is to communicate the natural inception of desire; there are few events that are, at least symbolically, more natural than childbirth.’
being pregnant, ‘first-swelling’, is a phallic joke. This imagery also plays on the iconographic and literary motif of ἔρως as a small boy, who is the potential offspring of the desire, and perhaps plays a narrative role, in implying that Clitophon’s courting will be lengthy and hard work, but will bear fruit. It also coheres with the folk model of the container metaphor beyond the simple fact of the emotion being internal. This container does not necessarily stay static, but can increase in size due to the pressure of the force of the entity within. As Clitophon’s ἔρως grows, it increases, like internal anger, but over a more protracted time period (at least compared with the examples above). This passage is a clear example of folk and expert models of emotion being manipulated in intertextual and erotic ways to form a distinctive picture of emotion and seduction.

This pressure upon the container can be seen clearly in Heliodorus. When Cybele speaks of the proximity of Theagenes she ‘blows up’ or ‘inflates’ Arsace so that she can hardly stop her seeing Theagenes immediately: τὴν Ἀρσάκην φυσήσασα μόλις τε ἐπειγομένην πρὸς τὴν θέαν τοῦ Θεαγένους ἔπισχοῦσα (Hld.7.15.5). The verb φυσάω is derived from the word φῦσα meaning ‘bellows’ (see Il.18.372) and conceptualises the force of emotion inside her as air.

The technical meaning here could be to blow up, i.e. kindle, a fire (seen at Pherecr.60.1—φυσῶν τὸ πῦρ—and Dionys.Com.2.16—φυσᾶν τὸ πῦρ), if we understand Arsace metonymically as a fire (due to her passion). This is how Morgan translates it: ‘thus fanning the flames of Arsace’s passion’ (Reardon 1989). However, there is also the metaphorical meaning of puffing one up or making them vain (D.13.12, 59.38), so the verb can be used of emotion. Morgan’s translation is attractive as the fire metaphor is so pervasive in the Greek Novel.

This study of the container metaphor shows that the conceptualisation of ἔρως is grounded in that of other emotions, either in the model of being a container

503 Morales 2004, 155, interprets the whole passage as ‘perversely Platonic; it invokes an important moment of philosophy, only to describe, with a comic juxtaposition of images and registers, erotic ejaculation’.
504 Of course the narrative may undercut this notion, since his courting may seem fairly easy to the reader given Leucippe’s receptiveness. The undercutting of expectation is completely in line with Achilles Tatius’ apparent agenda: see Bartsch 1989.
505 The noun can denote wind inside the body in a medical sense (Hp.VM 10.22). The verb can also indicate the action of blowing up a bladder or a bagpipe (Ar.Nu.405, Ar.Ach.864), and is also used of swollen breasts (Paul.Aeg.6.46.1).
or in the more common model of being a substance inside the container of the human body.\footnote{Perhaps a later study might address the frequencies with which the different emotions are conceptualised in certain ways.}
One of the most common metaphors for emotion in Xenophon of Ephesus is that of ‘state’, κεῖμαι, and most of its occurrences are used of ἔρως. It occurs in its root form or with the prefixes ἐν or διὰ.507 The first compound form utilises the container metaphor, where an emotion is inside the container of the person. Thus the god Ἐρως lies in Habrocomes: ὁ θεός σφοδρότερος αὐτῷ ἐνέκειτο (X.Eph.1.4.4).508 This is the container metaphor used of divine inspiration. The concept communicated by the verb διακείμαι is different, since the prefix denotes that the emotion is ‘scattered throughout’ the person affected. Aristotle uses the participle to indicate disposition in his Rhetorica, ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται (Arist. Rh. 1382b28), and goes on to state what the disposition is of those who feel fear.509 Although it is used in Aristotle it does not seem to be an expert term, but rather a folk term used in an expert context. It is used of disposition in Lysias, and, if we believe Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lysias’ style is firmly plain and straightforward.510 In the majority of cases in Xenophon of Ephesus it describes a depressive state when combined with the adverb πονήρως, which is metonymous for ἔρως: διέκειτο δὲ καὶ Ἀνθία πονήρως (X.Eph.1.3.2).511 This can be seen in context with the object of ἔρως specified, such as Euxenus’ feelings for Anthia, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπ’ Ἀνθίᾳ διέκειτο πονήρως (X.Eph.1.15.4), and when Leucon reports Manto’s feelings for Habrocomes: ἥ θυγάτηρ ἥ Ἀψύρτου πονήρως ἐπὶ

507 There is one reference which occurs with the root form of κεῖμαι. When Habrocomes and Anthia are imprisoned on the pirate ship they are lying in a state of despondency: ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκείντο ἄθυμοι (X.Eph.1.16.1). However, Habrocomes and Anthia are the subjects and so the verb here is literal.

508 Also at X.Eph.1.3.1, where this metaphor is combined with the ‘holding’ one: κατείχε δὲ αὐτὸν ἔγκειμενος ὁ θεός.

509 Although Aristotle uses the cognate noun διάθεσις in a technical sense to indicate bodily state (Arist. GA 778b34), the participle on its own or with an adverb seems to be a standard expression of emotional state in Greek. See Pl. Symp. 216d: ἐρωτικῶς διακείται τῶν καλῶν.


511 Other examples are X.Eph.1.4.6; 1.15.4; 2.3.3; 2.4.2. In the rest of the novels we see the participle used with πονήρως of distress (Chariton 5.9.6), with κακῶς of ἔρως (Ach. Tat. 2.13.2), with ἐρωτικῶς of ἔρως (Chariton 2.10.1), and on its own of being disposed to kindness (Hld. 1.11.1). See also Dorcon in Longus: ἐρωτικῶς τῆς Χλόης διετέθη (1.15.1).
σοὶ διάκειται (Xenophon 2.4.2). The adverb ἐρωτικῶς occurs with the verb and this indicates an erotic state without necessarily the negative connotations of πονήρως: ἐρωτικῶς διακείμενος (X.Eph.5.2.3). The use of the adverb πονήρως is an evaluative one in that it portrays ἔρως as a negative experience. As we have seen in previous chapters, ἔρως causes a state of debilitation. Therefore πονήρως and the verb probably indicate a debilitated condition, and thus by metonymy ἔρως the emotion, or rather a subsection of ἔρως: frustrated ἔρως. When Anthia and Habrocomes are in love they are both ‘very surely in an uncertain disposition’: πάνυ ἐπισφαλῶς διακείμενοι (X.Eph.1.5.9). The adverb ἐπισφαλῶς here emphasises the uncertainty of the state: ‘liable to fall’. It is also used of despondency, ἀθυμία, outside of an erotic context.

There is an example at Hld.1.11.1 which shows the relationship between being in a state and disposition towards emotion and (possibly) emotionally-motivated action. Demaenete tries to cover up her failed seduction attempt by claiming that Cnemon slandered her in response to fair criticism and kicked her in the stomach. Cnemon’s father does not believe Cnemon’s protestations that Demaenete is lying because he believes she is (kindly) disposed towards him (Cnemon), and therefore would not tell lies: πιστεύων μηδ’ ἂν ψεύσασθαι κατ’ ἐμοῦ τὴν οὕτω περὶ ἐμὲ διακειμένην. Cnemon’s father is basing his judgement of actions upon inferred psychology. He believes that Demaenete is disposed towards Cnemon in a certain way: thereby likely to act kindly towards him as an external manifestation of internal state. In Xenophon of Ephesus, however, the bulk of examples involve a disposition towards suffering, πονήρως, which is metonymous for frustrated ἔρως. It therefore conceptualises ἔρως as a state of passive affliction.

512 See also Chariton 2.10.1 for διακείμαι in an erotic context. Callisthenes’ disposition is negative when Sostratus rejects his suit for his daughter’s hand: κακῶς διακείμενος (Ach.Tat.2.13.2).

513 X.Eph.1.15.1: διάκειται μὲν ὑπὸ ἀθυμίας πονήρως; X.Eph.5.12.3: ἀθύμως ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς διακείμενοι.

514 See the Athenian general Nicias at Th.7.77 where he addresses the troops and asks them to look at what state he is in due to his illness: ἀλλ’ ὀράτε δὴ ὡς διακείμαι ύπό τῆς νόσου. He is disposed in a certain way because of the presence of the sickness.
Ill Loading, Leading and Carrying

Metaphors of ἔρως do not only indicate state but can detail a process, such as the one we saw above where the substance fills the container and prompts action. Other metaphors conceptualise this internal process in various ways. ἔρως as an emotion can be conceptualised as a load to be carried or as leading the subject of the emotion.515 Manto is in love with Habrocomes and can no longer ‘bear’ it: Μαντώ ἔρᾳ σου, μηκετί φέρειν δυναμένη (X.Eph.2.5.1).516 She cannot endure the weight of her passion anymore and this forces her into action. When Chaereas is enslaved by the Persians he is weighed down by fatigue, neglect, his chains, and most of all his ἔρως: πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐβάρει, κόπος, ἀμέλεια, τὰ δεσμά, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁ ἔρως (Chariton 4.2.1).517 The list forms a crescendo of items with increasing importance and compares the concrete (chains) with the abstract (ἔρως). It is difficult to read ἔρως here as merely lust or desire, since Chariton is upset at failing to recover his wife, and these occurrences suggest that ἔρως, even if it is prototypically the initial burst of passion which couples feel, is naturally extended onto a long-term relationship, as the English emotion term love is.518 The pressure of emotion does not have to be in a downwards direction. Clitophon tells us that the palm is particularly crowded by ἔρως: ἐνοχλεῖν (Ach.Tat.1.17.3). The word ὀχλος refers to a crowd or throng and thus the

515 In previous Greek literature see ἔρως as a burden: Anac.460; Pl.Phdr.252c; Thgn.1322.
516 This metaphor is completely uniform in Xenophon of Ephesus taking the participle of δύναμαι with the infinitive of φέρω. See also X.Eph.1.4.6, καὶ οὐκέτι φέρειν δυναμένη, and X.Eph.4.5.4, καὶ οὐκέτι φέρειν δυναμένη, both of which refer to the state of ἔρως. At the news that Callirhoe has arrived Dionysius can scarcely recover, ‘bear up’: μόλις δὲ ἀνενεκὼν (Chariton 2.7.4). If Dionysius cannot have Callirhoe then he cannot bear it: φέρων (Chariton 3.1.1). The opposite of being unable to support the emotion is to bear it. Other references to the bearing of ἔρως (or the inability to bear it) are Hld.7.19.6: φέρειν τὸ πάθος; Hld.7.21.1: φέρειν τὸ πάθος; Hld.7.23.2: οὐ φορητόν. At Hld.7.8.6 Arsace is ‘burdened’ with the sight of Theagenes: τῆς ἐκείνου θέας ἐμφορουμένη. See also Hld.2.25.2 where Calasiris is loaded heavily or overloaded, ἐπιφορτισάμενος, with πάθος ἐρωτικόν.
517 Chariton 6.6.4 refers to anxiety: the ‘weight’ of the King’s ἔρως upon Callirhoe. With all these metaphors of carrying and heaving against the emotion it is no wonder that ἔρως is described as work (Ach.Tat.1.10.1).
518 Compare the euphemism ‘to make love’ and the relationship term ‘to be in love’. I will develop this further in the conclusion.
metaphor envisions the person as being crowded by the emotion. The verb ἐνοχλέω generally means to trouble or annoy (see Pl.Alc.1.104d) and this conception coheres with the portrayal of ἔρως or emotion generally as suffering.\footnote{See X.Mem.3.8.2.}

The verb φέρω usually refers to the emotion as being bearable or unbearable by the person, but the person can also be borne by the emotion. Amazement at Chariclea secretly bears Achemenes down into erotic passion: τὸ θαῦμα λανθάνον εἰς ἐρωτικὸν πάθος αὐτὸν κατέφερε (Hld.7.15.3). One abstract, amazement, is personified as carrying him down into ἔρως. Thus the designation of agency indicates a process where one emotion causes another. We see a similar expression used of Arsace, when we are told that ἔρως stealthily bore her ‘down’, ὑπο, into mania: καὶ ἄπλως εἰς μανίαν λοιπὸν ἐλάνθανεν ὁ ἔρως ὑποφερόμενος (Hld.7.9.4).\footnote{The melancholic Theagenes is ‘easily born under’ with regard to every change: πρὸς πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ἡπαθός ὑποφερόμενος (Hld.3.10.4). He is experiencing mood swings.} As stated above in the chapter upon madness, the agency of ἔρως bearing her down into manic ἔρως indicates an interesting causality, where madness is a subsequence of the emotion. This statement implies that Arsace was not initially struck down with manic ἔρως, but that as her emotional experience developed the intensity of it increased, and it became manic. Neither excerpt attributes agency to the person feeling the emotion. Arsace is also ‘driven’ by the emotion into looking at Theagenes: ἐπειγομένην πρὸς τὴν θέαν τοῦ Θεαγένους (Hld.7.15.5). The emotion forces her to look and brooks no resistance.

The metaphor of the emotion leading the subject entails the passivity of the person feeling the emotion. We see this metaphor used of erotic desire. Chariclea is experiencing grief at being separated from Theagenes and is unaware as to whether he is alive or dead. Calasiris finds her with ‘her hair dishevelled, her dress hanging in tatters over her breasts, her eyes still swollen and bearing the marks of the delirium that had preceded her sleep’.\footnote{Translation Morgan in Reardon 1989, 481.}
The emotion here is grief, λυποῦντος, and she mourns as if Theagenes were already dead. However, her grief is ἔρως-motivated, and she explains it as arising not from a common desire, but a ‘clean and sensible’ one, καθαρός τε καὶ σωφρονῶν, meaning by it her erotic relationship with Theagenes based on ἔρως. The conceptualisation of her desire is consistent with the leading metaphor of emotion. Her desire, ἐπιθυμία, leads her out, ἔξαγει, towards these actions. Her point is not that she is not constrained by desire, which she is as the metaphor makes clear, but that she is constrained by the correct kind of desire. Whether her desire was a sensible one or a common one, it would still lead her passively along a route (metaphorically); it would still be conceptualised in the same way. Her desire here is metonymic of her whole relationship with Theagenes, of which ἔρως is the bond, and indicative of her character, in that she has correct desires according to the moral aspirations of the novel.

The metaphor of leading in the psychology of emotion does not always feature the emotion as the grammatical subject. Mithridates has to ‘lead himself together’, συναγαγὼν ἑαυτὸν (one thinks of the English ‘pull oneself together’ or ‘collect oneself’), when he hears the name of Callirhoe (Chariton 4.2.13). This usage is interesting as it involves the person affected by the emotion as subject, and implies the reunification of a dispersed self. This metaphor of leading or bringing is not of the emotion, but of the self’s response to the emotion. The emotion exerts a force upon the self, and in this case the force is seen as fragmenting the self. The response

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322 See also Hld.1.19.1 where the prompting of desire is conceptualised as the desire ‘leading him/being leader of him’: αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐξηγούμενης. In context we are told that Thyamis interprets his dream along the lines dictated by his pre-existing desire: desire constrains the way one looks at the world and the way one forms ideas. The verb ἐξηγώμαι refers to being a leader and to ordering—see Hdt.5.23—and thereby emphasises the passivity of the person affected by the desire. The element of personification here coheres with the conflict of emotion, but contrasts in the sense that it lacks a sense of opposition. I will explore the relationship between emotion and desire in terms of ἔρως at greater length in the concluding chapter.
is to reunify the self, and thereby control one’s reaction to the emotion. This is analogous to the notion of the self wandering under the effect of madness or emotion (see above).

Metaphors of loads, carrying and leading therefore form a structure within which either the person affected or the emotion can be assigned the agency, and, like the two versions of the container metaphor, the person can either carry the emotion or be carried or led by it. However, all these different attributions of agency cohere in the sense that the emotion exerts a powerful force, which it is difficult for the person to deal with, whether by bearing it or picking up the pieces of the self left over.

\[\text{See Plu. Phil. 20.2 where Philopoemen, in grief and confusion, λύπη καὶ θορύβῳ, can hardly collect himself in order to sit up: συναγαγὼν μόλις ἑαυτόν.}\]
IV Motion - Storms, Waves, and Submersion

The next set of metaphors is those which involve some sort of motion or confusion. This experience of confusion in the face of ἔρως has a long heritage in Greek literature, exemplified by Sappho 31, and it duly makes its appearance in the Greek Novel. Callirhoe speaks to Dionysius (like his Sapphic predecessor he is unable to respond) and this causes him to be in a state of ἀπορία, ‘confusion’: ἀπορηθείς (Chariton 2.3.8). Shortly afterwards Dionysius tells Leonas that he has brought fire into his soul and that the lack of information upon this woman is ‘disturbing him’: ταράσσει δέ με καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον τὸ περὶ τῆς γυναικός (Chariton 2.4.7). This word refers to the emotional disturbance of the person affected. Here, according to Dionysius, it is worry at where Callirhoe came from and whether she is a slave or not. Since we know that Dionysius is keenly aware of his own status and expectations it could very well be the case that his emotional turmoil is caused by his lack of knowledge of the woman’s origin. Even if his turmoil is not caused by that, but merely by the meeting with Callirhoe, and Dionysius is trying to excuse his excessive reaction, which he would also be concerned about given his strong motion of a restless sea (Od.5.291; Archil.54). See also Longus 3.27.3 where a wind ruffles the sea at night: νυκτὸς δέ, πελαγίου ταράξαντος ἀνέμου τὴν θάλασσαν. However, it may be that in these examples the sea is being personified. The verb can be used of fear (A.Ch.289) but probably indicates general psychological disturbance, which can be a feature of more than one emotion. The following is a list of forms of the verb ταράσσω, including compound forms, which refer to emotional effect. The English translation in parentheses is only a suggested translation of the experience of the subject(s). Obviously in English it is often difficult to distinguish between being disturbed or upset, due to the coherence of the metaphorical conceptualisation in the two adjectives. Ach.Tat.1.12.3 (afraid); Ach.Tat.1.12.6 (afraid); Ach.Tat.2.10.4 (disturbed); Ach.Tat.2.11.1 (upset); Ach.Tat.2.23.4 (disturbed); Ach.Tat.2.23.5 (afraid); Ach.Tat.2.23.6 (upset/afraid); Ach.Tat.2.26.1 (excited); Ach.Tat.2.37.10 (ἔρως); Ach.Tat.4.1.8 (upset); Ach.Tat.4.14.4 (surprise); Ach.Tat.5.3.3 (upset); Ach.Tat.5.17.8 (worried); Ach.Tat.6.8.2 (upset); Chariton 1.12.6 (upset); Chariton 2.3.6 (worried/upset); Chariton 2.4.6 (worried); Chariton 2.4.7 (worried); Chariton 3.7.4 (upset); Chariton 5.9.3 (distress); Chariton 6.8.3 (afraid); Chariton 8.1.7 (excited); Chariton 8.5.11 (disturbed but used with a negative); Hld.1.18.2 (disturbed); Hld.2.5.2 (afraid); Hld.3.7.2 (worried); Hld.3.18.1 (afraid); Hld.6.9.2 (disturbed); Hld.7.4.1 (disturbed); Hld.7.9.5 (disturbed); Hld.7.11.2 (disturbed/afraid); Hld.7.12.3 (afraid); Hld.7.29.1 (disturbed); Hld.8.1.5 (afraid); Hld.8.5.6 (afraid); Hld.8.13.3 (afraid); Hld.10.21.1 (disturbed); Hld.10.28.2 (afraid); Longus 1.21.3 (afraid); Longus 1.22.2 (afraid); Longus 1.28.3 (afraid); Longus 2.17.3 (excited); Longus 2.26.4 (afraid); Longus 2.27.2 (afraid); Longus 3.16.1 (distress); Longus 3.24.3 (afraid); Longus 3.26.2 (worried); Longus 4.6.3 (worried); X.Eph.1.12.4 (afraid).

524 It is possible that there is a concrete usage which indicates the motion of a restless sea (Od.5.291; Archil.54). See also Longus 3.27.3 where a wind ruffles the sea at night: νυκτὸς δέ, πελαγίου ταράξαντος ἀνέμου τὴν θάλασσαν. However, it may be that in these examples the sea is being personified. The verb can be used of fear (A.Ch.289) but probably indicates general psychological disturbance, which can be a feature of more than one emotion. The following is a list of forms of the verb ταράσσω, including compound forms, which refer to emotional effect. The English translation in parentheses is only a suggested translation of the experience of the subject(s). Obviously in English it is often difficult to distinguish between being disturbed or upset, due to the coherence of the metaphorical conceptualisation in the two adjectives. Ach.Tat.1.12.3 (afraid); Ach.Tat.1.12.6 (afraid); Ach.Tat.2.10.4 (disturbed); Ach.Tat.2.11.1 (upset); Ach.Tat.2.23.4 (disturbed); Ach.Tat.2.23.5 (afraid); Ach.Tat.2.23.6 (upset/afraid); Ach.Tat.2.26.1 (excited); Ach.Tat.2.37.10 (ἔρως); Ach.Tat.4.1.8 (upset); Ach.Tat.4.14.4 (surprise); Ach.Tat.5.3.3 (upset); Ach.Tat.5.17.8 (worried); Ach.Tat.6.8.2 (upset); Chariton 1.12.6 (upset); Chariton 2.3.6 (worried/upset); Chariton 2.4.6 (worried); Chariton 2.4.7 (worried); Chariton 3.7.4 (upset); Chariton 5.9.3 (distress); Chariton 6.8.3 (afraid); Chariton 8.1.7 (excited); Chariton 8.5.11 (disturbed but used with a negative); Hld.1.18.2 (disturbed); Hld.2.5.2 (afraid); Hld.3.7.2 (worried); Hld.3.18.1 (afraid); Hld.6.9.2 (disturbed); Hld.7.4.1 (disturbed); Hld.7.9.5 (disturbed); Hld.7.11.2 (disturbed/afraid); Hld.7.12.3 (afraid); Hld.7.29.1 (disturbed); Hld.8.1.5 (afraid); Hld.8.5.6 (afraid); Hld.8.13.3 (afraid); Hld.10.21.1 (disturbed); Hld.10.28.2 (afraid); Longus 1.21.3 (afraid); Longus 1.22.2 (afraid); Longus 1.28.3 (afraid); Longus 2.17.3 (excited); Longus 2.26.4 (afraid); Longus 2.27.2 (afraid); Longus 3.16.1 (distress); Longus 3.24.3 (afraid); Longus 3.26.2 (worried); Longus 4.6.3 (worried); X.Eph.1.12.4 (afraid).

525 See Chariton 2.1.5: Dionysius is glad to hear that Callirhoe is beautiful, but not that she is a slave, for he could not consider taking on a slave as a consort.
commitment to παιδεία and appearance, it is clear that ἔρως is the issue. If it is the reason he gives it is not ἔρως directly but an ἔρως-motivated emotion: he is only concerned about the matter because he desires Callirhoe. Both explanations are coherent within the model of ἔρως. The verb refers to emotional disturbance and as we have seen, ἔρως behaves much like another emotion in this respect. In Euripides’ Ηippolytus Theseus says that young men are as likely as women to be disturbed by Cypris (Aphrodite): ὅταν ταράξῃ Κύπρις ἡβῶσαν φρένα (969). In the Greek Novel this verb can be used of multiple emotions. Achaemenes is stung by ὀργή, ζηλοτυπία and ἔρως, emotions capable of ‘disturbing’ anyone, διαταράζω, let alone a barbarian: ύπ’ ὀργής ἁμα καὶ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ ἔρωτος καὶ ἀποτυχίας οἰστρηθείς, ἰκανῶν καὶ ἄλλον τινά διαταράζαι πραγμάτων, μή τί γε δή βάρβαρον (Hld.7.29.1). This concept of inner disturbance is therefore coherent across many emotional experiences, and conceptualises ἔρως in the same way as other emotions.

Chariclea is described (by a reanimated corpse) as a young lady ‘scared/driven away by ἔρως’: ύπ’ ἔρωτος σεσοβημένον (Hld.6.15.4). The verb σοβέω refers properly to being scared off. The next phrase describes her wandering because of ἔρως, ἔρωμεν τινὸς ἑνεκεν ἀλώμενον, and the psychological metaphor highlights that ἔρως has set her in motion and that ἔρως has directed her. There is a motif in previous Greek literature of lovers wandering due to ἔρως. This reference in Heliodorus plays a dual psychological and narrative role. It references the motion involved in her wandering which is caused by the internal stimulus of ἔρως.

528 This form with the prefix διά can also be used psychologically, such as when in Xenophon’s Memorabilia Socrates avoids ‘disturbing’, i.e. worrying, Euthydemus: διετάραττεν (X.Mem.4.2.40).
529 It however, can be used erotically: see Philosstr.Int.1.8 and AP.6.219 [Antip.].
External motion can be paralleled by internal motion. When Theagenes and Chariclea look at each other during a festival they stand there ‘fluttered’ or ‘scared’: ἀθρόον τι καὶ ἐπτοημένον ἔστησαν (Hld.3.5.5). This metaphor often refers to fear, as with σοβέω above, but can be extended to indicate the effect of ἔρως. If it does refer prototypically to fear, then it conceptualises the sudden sensation of fear as a symptom of the erotic experience. As we have seen already, other emotions such as fear can be ἔρως-motivated. The concept of the person ‘fluttering’ inside coheres with the metaphors of internal motion seen above. This hyperactivity of emotion causes it to be a kinetic entity. Theagenes mastered by ἔρως acquires ‘quickness of movement’ for the race, τὸ εὐκίνητον (Hld.4.2.3), and the pirate Trachinus has a ‘manic motion’, μανιώδη κίνησιν, for Chariclea (Hld.5.29.5).

Aural disturbance can be mapped onto internal emotion. In Achilles Tatius Clitophon is suddenly in the presence of Leucippe and he is so confused that he does not know what to say: ὡς ἂν τεθορυβημένος οὐκ ἔχων τί εἴπω (Ach.Tat.2.6.1). Τεθορυβημένος means ‘confused by noise’ and conceptualises internal confusion as a person beset by load noise on all sides. The experience of ἔρως is conceptualized through many metaphors with a wider register which apply to emotion in general. In book five of Achilles Tatius Melite upbraids Clitophon for not giving in to her ἔρως, because nothing ‘excited him’ towards Aphrodite (a metonym for sex): οὐδέν σε ἠρέθισεν εἰς Ἀφροδίτην (Ach.Tat.5.25.7). This is a metaphor for the sharp sensation of lust, which is a component of the broader erotic experience. The verb means to ‘arouse’ or ‘excite’, but there is perhaps an insinuation of the fire metaphor here, as in Heliodorus the verb is used of fueling a

531 Examples of this metaphor in Heliodoros: erotic; ἐπτοημένον (Hld.3.5.5); ἐπτοημένον (Hld.6.7.8); ἀναπτερώσασα (Hld.7.22.1). Non erotic: ἀνεπτερώσασα (Hld.3.4.9); ἐπτοεῖτο (Hld.6.1.2); ἐπτοημένον (Hld.7.7.4). In Longus it is only used of fear (Longus 1.22.2; 4.8.1). This verb also appears in previous literature. In relation to ἔρως see in particular: τὸ μοι καρδίαν... ἐπτοίησεν Sapph.2.6; τὴν δὲ φρένας ἐπτοίησεν Κύπρις A.R.1.1232; Κύπρις ἐπ' Αἰακίδῃ κούρῃ φρένας ἐπτοίησεν Poet.ap.Parth.21.2; ἔρωτι ἐπτοκάθησε E.JA.586; πτοιηθεὶς ὑπ' ἔρωτι Call.l.c.; τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοίησθαι Pl.Phil.68e.

532 For κίνησις and emotion see Hld.4.3.2, ἐκεκίνητο, Hld.7.17.3, ἀνεκίνητο, and Hld.10.29.4, κίνημα. In the fragmentary romance Pathenope and Metiochus there is a definition of ἔρως as a κίνημα of thought which arises because of beauty and increases with familiarity (Stephens and Winkler 1994 col. II, vv. 60-62).
fire, παντοίως τήν φλόγα ἐρεθίζοντες (Hld.8.9.14), and Clitophon is possibly conceptualized as a flame which was not roused into passion. In any case the parallel examples show that the verb can indicate an increase in intensity and implies movement.

One metaphor which indicates motion or rather a change of state of the body is that of wasting away or rather ‘melting’. Longus tells us that the young men in the summer ‘burned at what they heard and melted at what they saw’: ἐξεκάοντο πρὸς τὰ ἀκούσματα καὶ ἐτήκοντο πρὸς τὰ θεάματα (Longus 3.13.3).533 The verb τήκω means ‘to melt’: see Hdt.3.96.6. However, it has also been used metaphorically in an emotional sense since Homer (see Od.19.264) and is an established symptom of ἔρως: ἔφωτες τήξουσιν κραδίην (AP 5.277 (Agath.)).534 It seems to be a reaction to ἔρως which involves the dissolution of the self under emotional duress. It is therefore akin to the dispersal of the self but this time conceptualised as dissolution. It also emphasises a change in state and damage to the self.

These metaphors entailing internal motion are possibly related to symptoms of emotion. The lovesick Chariclea lies ‘agitated’, ἀλύουσαν, upon her bed (Hld.3.7.1). At Chariton 2.1.1 Dionysius is also ‘agitated’, ἀλύων, with grief for his dead wife.535 The verb seems to connote motion, as we see from the description of the Cyclops in the Odyssey thrashing around in his pain to remove the stake from his eye: τὸν μὲν ἔπειτ’ ἔρριψεν ἀπὸ ἕο χερσὶν ἀλύων (Od.9.398).536 Since these are participles with the person as the subject, the verb could refer to a physical symptom rather than internal psychology. In this case the motion of inside and outside would parallel one another. Perhaps the externally observed motions of people undergoing certain emotional experiences are mapped onto the abstract and

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533 Other references to melting under ἔφως in the Greek Novel are Ach.Tat.5.25.5; Chariton 4.2.3; Longus 1.18.1, 1.21.1. Melting is a reaction to grief, λύπη, at Ach.Tat.2.29.2; Chariton 2.7.4 (as a subsection of ἔφως).
534 For softening or melting in erotic contexts see also Alcm.3.fr.3.col.ii.61; Anac.459; Pi.fr.123.10-11; Pl.Phdr.251b; Theoc.14.26; X.Smp.8.3.
535 This can be used of grief in previous literature (Il.5.352; Il.42.12).
536 At Chariton 1.12.6 the pirate Theron wanders upset and eventually sits down in a workshop: οἷα δὲ ἀλύων ἐπὶ τίνος ἔφωται καθήστο.
unknown internal processes: a mapping from the concrete experience of Chariclea tossing and turning in bed to the abstract concept of emotion as internal restlessness.

The conceptualisation of emotion as motion (see the English etymology) is cognate with metaphors which depict ἔρως as weather or sea.537 Most of these occur in Chariton. Dionysius is overtaken by a storm, κατείληπτο μὲν ύπὸ χειμῶνος, and has his ψυχή submerged, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐβαπτίζετο (Chariton 3.2.6). The verb βαπτίζω, ‘to dip or plunge’, implies an object entering into a liquid substance. It is used of a person entering the sea at Plu. de superstitione 166a and of being drowned at Epict. Gnom.47. Dionysius is also submerged by desire earlier on, βαπτιζόμενος ύπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, and he debates with himself as if he is popping his head above the waves: καθάπερ δὲ ἐκ κύματος ἀνέκυπτε (Chariton 2.4.4). His emotional experience at this point is complex. He is not just feeling ἔρως but is also insistent upon the fact that it is shameful, αἰσχύνῃ, for him to be giving into it as an educated and wealthy Greek man (part of his self-image). The metaphors reflect this emotional complexity in the erotic experience. The sea surging around him is desire, an essential component of ἔρως, and by putting his head above the water he is fighting the onset of his emotion (to no avail of course). Therefore this extended imagery, metaphor and simile, conceptualises being ruled by emotion as being drowned at sea. Swimming is Dionysius’ attempt at λογισμός. This shows that emotional response is mediated by one’s perception and expectation of oneself as a social participant. Yet even such a developed image coheres with the basic model of emotion as a container (a person in the sea) and the metaphor seen in previous literature of emotion as waves.538

Chariton seems to explicitly favour weather metaphors. He quotes Homer three times (Chariton 2.7.4; 3.1.3; 4.5.9) for a metaphor comparing the effect of emotion to a mist: τις ἀχλὺς αὐτοῦ κατεχύθη (Il.5.696). The first occurrence is when Dionysius learns that Callirhoe has arrived to see him, the second is when he learns that Callirhoe has consented to marry him, and the third is when he intercepts

537 Greek tragedy has many examples of emotion as storm or weather: see Padel 1992, 81-88 and 114-117.
538 For the association of ἔρως and stormy seas see the Anthologia Graeca 12.156; 12.157; 12.167.
a letter sent from Chaereas to Callirhoe. Therefore we have one metaphor embedded in a Homeric quotation, used of three slightly different emotional experiences, perhaps nervousness, joy/relief and jealousy, which are all components of ἔρως.

Metaphors for a sea or waves of emotion in the rest of the novels are rare. Achilles Tatius conceptualises αἰδώς, λύπη, and ὀργή as three waves, κύματα, of the soul in an extended pseudoscientific passage, which is too distinctive to be taken as indicative of general conceptualisations of ἔρως in the Greek Novel (Ach.Tat.2.29.1).539 In Heliodorus Arsace oscillates in her desire for Theagenes. She is confused in her mind and surrounded by a wave of concerns: συνεχέθη τῆς διάνοιας καὶ κλύδωνι φροντισμάτων περιεστοίχιστο (Hld.7.4.1). Συνεχέθη means ‘poured together’ and represents confusion (see also of course the Latin root of confusion—confusio, derived from confundo (to pour together)).540 Arsace is feeling multiple emotions here (as we learn from the following lines) including anger and ἔρως.

Erotic storm imagery (wind and wave) is not common in the Greek Novel, excepting the notable examples used of Dionysius in Chariton, which do seem to suggest an authorial emphasis.

539 See Morales 2004, 201. It is Leucippe who experiences this at almost being caught in flagrante with Clitophon.
540 Unlike κατεχύθη (to pour down) above which is part of the source metaphor: the mist is conceived metaphorically (at least partially since mist does not behave like running water) as pouring down, and the whole source description is mapped onto the experience of strong emotion.
V Wine and Food

The psychology of ἔρως, in particular erotic visual dynamics, can be conceptualised as consumption.\textsuperscript{541} This metaphor is used in previous Greek literature and is particularly apt because one desire is representing another.\textsuperscript{542} At Chariton 6.9.4 we are told that the desire of the king is ‘nourished’ by idleness: ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπὸ ἀργίας τρεφομένην. Nourishment conceptualises the desire as living and growing. Since eating is a desire we can see the conceptual connection between the two. Metaphors of consumption also utilise the container metaphor. Heliodorus tells us that Theagenes and Chariclea were both ‘stuffed’, κορεννύμενοι, with a chaste ἔρως (Hld.5.4.5).\textsuperscript{543}

A specific instantiation of consumption metaphors is that which connects ἔρως with alcohol. The two themes are traditionally associated in Greek Literature, especially related to symposia.\textsuperscript{544} Arsace, looking at Theagenes, draws more of ἔρως than her drink: τοῦ ἔρωτος πλέον ἢ τοῦ κράματος ἐλκουσαν (Hld.7.27.3). The metaphor conceptualises ἔρως as drink and there is a further metaphor of drinking as ‘dragging’ or ‘drawing’: ἐλκουσαν. We also see the explicit comparison of the concrete with the abstract favoured by Heliodorus in particular. In Achilles Tatius Clitophon asserts that wine is the food of ἔρως (Ach.Tat.1.6.1; 2.3.3). This is feeding in the sense of nourishing, not feeding in the sense of satisfying a desire.

In Heliodorus Calasiris gives us an extended comparison of the drunkard with the lover.\textsuperscript{545}

\textsuperscript{541} On consumption see in particular Morales 2004, 165-172, and Morales 2005, 11.
\textsuperscript{542} See Pl.Phdr.247d, 248b–e, 251b of ἔρως as consumption of food or drink. Hunger and thirst are types of ἐπιθυμία: see Aristotle, De anima 414b12; Pl.Philebus 34e; Pl.Lysis 221a.
\textsuperscript{543} See also Hld.1.15.8, κόρος γὰρ ἔρωτος. Thisbe is convincing Demeaene that once she has had sex with Cnemon her ἔρως will abate: she will be sated. At Hld.7.21.4 Chariclea tells Theagenes to feed the Barbarian’s (Arsace’s) desire with promises: τρέφουν ἐπαγγελίας τῆς βασιλέα τὴν ὀρέξιν.
\textsuperscript{544} See Plato’s Symposium and the erotic context for the competing speeches upon ἔρως. Xenophon’s Symposium also features much on ἔρως.
\textsuperscript{545} For the psychological experience of ἔρως as drunkenness see Anac.376.2, 450.
Heliodorus says that the mind of a lover, διάνοια, is like that of a drunkard and that the lover is drawn towards drink as the drunkard is drawn towards ἔρως: ἐπίφορος.546 The explanation for this is the psychological effect of both, which is the wavering of the soul upon a watery πάθος. This metaphor coheres with the storm imagery above, as the verb σαλεύω is associated with ships at sea.547 The same verb is also used of psychology at Hld.1.26.3 in the context of ἔρως. Chariclea explains to Theagenes that she has bought them time by agreeing to marry Thyamis, because those who love more rustically (i.e. more simply), ἀγροικότερον, believe that this promise is valid and thereby ‘waver’ upon their hopes: ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων σαλεύοντες.548 The verb conceptualises the person as deriving movement from an emotion itself mobile (hope as a sea driving the subject). Chariclea is perhaps subtly indicating the unsteady basis for Thyamis’ hopes, which she is well aware of: she has no intention of marrying him. This metaphor coheres with the one above where the soul wavers upon the watery πάθος: the emotion as a sea.549 Therefore the comparison of the psychological state of the lover and the drunkard here relies upon sea imagery, rather than being a consumption metaphor as such.550 It is a metaphor mapping the psychological state of the drunkard onto that of the lover, rather than a metonym viewing the inception of ἔρως as taking in drink (like the passage featuring Arsace above).

546 Alcohol and ἔρως are traditionally associated (see previous footnote). Anacreon 376 PMG features a lover diving into the sea drunk with ἔρως. At Ach.Tat. 2.3.3 the gods Eros and Dionysus both work together upon the person affected by the emotion.
547 See X.Oec.8.17 and Hld.10.4.6. See also the metaphor in Sophocles of the city as a ship ‘wavering’ (S.O.T.23).
548 Morgan translates the adverb as ‘coarse’, which captures the sense well (in Reardon 1989).
549 For the adjective used of the sea see Pi.O.7.69; P.4.40, A.Supp.259. Normally this adjective would just indicate ‘watery, liquid’, but its salience in the above context means that there are other connotations. It will be familiar to readers of Greek literature from where it is used of the erotic gaze: see Anacreont.15.21; AP 7.72. It could also be a pun on πόθος υγρός (see h.Pan.33).
550 One of these occurs at the start of Heliodoros’ novel. The narrator writes that ‘unmixed’ ἔρως overcomes pleasures and pains: ἔρως ἀκραιφνὴς (Hld.1.2.9).
VI Winged Eros

One of the most famous metaphors for ἔρως in all of Greek literature is Plato’s image of the soul sprouting wings, which draws upon the prototypical image of ἔρως as a winged boy. Achilles Tatius’ novel is famous for the ekphrasis of a painting the (initial) narrator is viewing: the abduction of Europa by Zeus. In this picture Ἐρως is depicted leading the bull with wings, quiver, and torch (Achilles Tatius 1.1). In Daphnis and Chloe Ἐρως makes an appearance to Philetas, and the old man sees wings sprouting from his back (Longus 2.6).551

This imagery also appears in metaphors of Ἐρως personified in addition to art and epiphany. The god Ἐρως in Achilles Tatius threatens to catch Clitophon with his wing: αὐτῷ σε καταλήψομαι τῷ πτερῳ (Ach.Tat.2.5.2). This features the metaphor of Ἐρως as a hunter with his prototypical feature used as an instrument. The hunter will be too quick for the hunted, due to his winged speed. Speed is intrinsically associated with Ἐρως’ wings, and given the quickness of erotic inception in the Greek Novel this is understandable. Theagenes tells Calasiris that he will win the footrace in armour for a prize given from Chariclea’s hands.552 The sight of Chariclea makes him ‘winged’, and this is why painters depict Ἐρως with wings (Hld.4.2.3).553 This direct comparison in the text between emotional effect and artistic depiction makes the connection explicit. Winged love is our best candidate for a culturally specific conceptualisation of the emotion, since its Nachleben in European culture follows from Greek and Roman sources. In the Greek Novel it is also a highly stylised and self conscious depiction, as with much of the genre’s use of literary material, and an essential feature of Eros personified.

551 See Moschus 1 for the personification of Ἐρως as a naughty boy looked for by his mother Aphrodite. See also Anthologia Graeca (Meleager) 5.177, Nonnus 33.60-4, and Anacreont.33.11-13
552 This scene, as with many in Heliodorus, is complex. Although swiftness is attributed to erotic influence, Theagenes’ speed also evokes his alleged ancestry from Achilles (swift-footed), and the foot race for erotic purposes is well established in Greek mythology: see Pelops racing in order to marry Hippodamea at Pl.O.1.69-90.
553 This attribute of Ἐρως can be transferred to the lover. See Anacreon 378 PMG where a lover flies to Olympus (see also Pl.Phdr.255e–d). On winged Ἐρως and emotion see Padel 1992, 129-132. Fear flies at A.Ag.976-7 and Ἐρως at E.Hipp.1270-4: ὁ ποικιλόπτερος ἀμφιβαλὼν πτερῶι· ποτᾶται δὲ γαῖαν εὐάχητον θ’ ἀλμυρὸν ἐπὶ πόντον. See also hope at S.Ant.615: ‘far-wandering’.
Perhaps the most famous example is in Longus. Philetas tells Daphnis and Chloe that Ἐρως is young, handsome and flies. On account of this he takes pleasure in youth, pursues beauty and makes souls winged: ὁ Ἐρως, νέος καὶ καλὸς καὶ πετόμενος· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ νεότητι χαίρει καὶ κάλλος διώκει καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναπτεροῖ (Longus 2.7.1). This image derives from Plato’s description of eros making the ψυχή winged (Phaedrus 251c).554 It is also associated with excitement. At Hld.2.34.8 Calasiris is madly ‘aflutter’ to see Theagenes: μανικῶς ἀνεπτέρωμαι πρὸς τὴν θέαν. Therefore the specific imagery of Ἐρως winged in its evocations of movement and speed coheres with a body of metaphors which view Ἐρως as motion.

554 This is not confined to Plato. For the winged ψυχή see Iliad 16.856-7 = 22.362-3; Odyssey 11.222, 24.1–10. For representations of the ψυχή as bird or winged homunculus in art from the Mycenean period onwards see Vermeule 1979, 9-10, 18-19, 26, 31-2, 58-9, 65, 160-2.
Economic metaphors used of psychology might be unexpected, because they are more obviously mapped onto relationships. For instance if someone conceptualises a relationship as economic, requiring equal or uneven exchange of commodities such as time, affection and material gifts, this would determine at least in part how someone understands what a relationship actually is. As it turns out we have one example which blurs the boundaries between psychology and relationships. Chariton narrates that Chaereas and Callirhoe ‘exchanged erotic passion’: ταχέως οὖν πάθος ἐρωτικὸν ἀντέδωκαν ἀλλήλοις (Chariton 1.1.6). This metaphorical conceptualisation might support the view that ἔρως can be thought of not in terms of a power differential (the pederastic paradigm), but in the (more) romantic version of ἔρως as an exchange between two people. This, however, is to confuse two elements which are interlinked but should not be conflated: the emotion and the relationship. In fact, what this passage really displays is the power of emotion. There is reciprocity here, but it is important that the entity which they ‘give’ to one another is a passive affect. They exchange a passion and are therefore mutually under the power of the emotion. It is important, in Chariton’s novel as in the others, that we have an interest in both parties feeling ἔρως. However, it is not valid to speak of a different kind of ἔρως qua emotion, but of a different emphasis in the narrative of relationships. The problem we have with equating these two aspects of ἔρως perhaps lies in the English word ‘love’ which we prototypically understand as being about a relationship.

The emotion can also promote a false sense of reciprocity. ἔρως can easily persuade a lover that they are loved in return: ὁ Ἔρως καὶ ἀναπείθει δίω ἀντερᾶσθαι (Chariton 8.5.14–5). The implication is that the emotion does not depend on any reciprocity whatsoever, and that the mutual affection of the main

555 On the pederastic paradigm see Dover 1978 and Foucault 1990a. For a convincing argument that the Greek Novel differs significantly from previous Greek literature in its depiction of erotic relationships see Konstan 1994. For less successful arguments that pederasty in the ancient world was not pervaded by this paradigm see Hubbard 2002 and Davidson 2007. On homoeroticism in the Greek Novel see Effe 1987.
556 For more see conclusion.
coup"l is cOngent. Finally and even less romantically Dionysius seeks to ‘bring profit’, ἔρωτα λυσιτελεῖν, to his own ἔρως by making Callirhoe forget about her former husband (Chariton 4.1.2). Here we have the extension of ἔρως to include the whole relationship, but it is an unromantic one. Dionysius wishes his ἔρως to profit at the expense of Chaereas’, and so his chief concern is rivalry, conceptualised here as economic competition.
VIII Personification

By far and away the most extensive personification of ἔρως is that of an opponent using brute force against his adversary, such as in the chapter on conflict and the hunting metaphor seen in the chapter on vision. Eros is also a god, inspiring his victims, and even metaphors of the emotion leading imply that it is personified. Personification is therefore a conceptual tool which underlies a great deal of the structure of ἔρως, and it has been so pervasive in the study so far that it does not require an extensive discussion now. However, there are a few personifications of ἔρως in the Greek Novel which are not based on exerting a physical force as an opponent, and these particular metaphors can colour the relationship between the emotion and the person affect.

Ἑρως is a god and a prominent association of the Greek Novel has always been with mystery cult. At the beginning of Achilles Tatius the narrator notes that Clitophon appears like an initiate of the god: τελετή (Ach.Tat.1.2.2). Later on in his lessons with Clinias Clitophon refers to him as initiated before him into the mysteries of the god (Ach.Tat.1.9.7). Learning how to seduce a woman and experiencing it is conceptualised as entering into the mysteries of ἔρως. When Melite tries to seduce Clitophon she refers to her flame as a mystic one, ὢ πυρὸς μυστικοῦ, and is eager for Aphrodite’s mysteries: τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης μυστήρια (Ach.Tat.5.15.5-5.15.6). The mystery metaphor is therefore one which pertains to the relationship and act of sex rather than being psychological metaphor as such.

It is a πάθος—the passion for a beautiful woman—which ‘advises’ the Persian King to send for Callirhoe (Chariton 4.6.6), and Eros is described as a ‘counsellor’ at Chariton 6.1.9. These metaphors imply that Eros is an advisor who merely helps one on the way to a decision. This conceptualises emotional causation differently, not in terms of force, but there is no evidence in this novel that Eros’

558 For references to the mysteries of ἔρως as seduction or sex in Achilles Tatius see Ach.Tat.1.10.5, 1.18.3, 2.19.1, 5.15.6, 5.16.3, 5.25.6, 5.26.3, 5.26.10, 5.27.4, 8.12.4. At Chariton 4.4.9 Callirhoe speaks of her and Chaereas’ wedding night as a one of a mystery: μυστικὸς. Mystic language is used of ἔρως in Plato: see Pl.Phdr.248b, 249c–d, 250b–c.
advice will be rejected. In a narrative sense it might be the case that the emotion uses different approaches with different characters: he forces Dionysius, but merely cajoles the less resistant Great King. Nevertheless the different format of the emotion’s power leads to the same result: ἔρως-targeted action of the affected person. This advice is not necessarily to be relied upon. Mithridates warns Chaereas that ἔρως is deceptive by nature: οὕτως ὁ θεὸς ἀπάταις χαίρει καὶ δόλοις (Chariton 4.4.5). The god is seen as a trickster, but this personification highlights elements of the circumstances. Mithridates is warning Chariton of the tricks or guile which Dionysius might use against him if he were to go to claim Callirhoe openly. Therefore the deception is that which either the god (the emotion) causes in those affected or generally in the circumstances. Those feeling ἔρως have a great stake in their emotional wellbeing, and therefore are more likely to use devious tactics.

As we have seen already Heliodorus often places the abstract beside the concrete, and he does so at Hld.4.1.1 when he compares the Pythian Games with the other tournament refereed by Ἐρως, which is the love of Theagenes and Chariclea: βραβεύοντος Ἐρωτος. He goes on to say that Ἐρως’ aim is to prove his contest the greatest of all, and all this is reported as Calasiris’ opinion (the priest narrates the story of Chariclea and Theagenes’ elopement). This is a personification of Ἐρως as a narrative force. Longus has an elegant variation upon this theme of Ἐρως directing the plot and relationship of the two lovers. While Daphnis and Chloe played games he ‘moulded the following σπουδή’: τοιάνδε σπουδήν Ἐρως ἀνέπλασε (Longus 1.11.1). The aorist ἀνέπλασε is from ἀναπλάσσω, a verb originally used of moulding in clay, but it is also used of constructing prose (see D.H.Dem.46). The σπουδή referred to involves Daphnis falling into a hole—designed to catch a wolf and evoking notions of Daphnis as the animal hunted by Ἐρως—which eventually leads to him washing naked and thereby arousing desire in Chloe. Therefore the metaphor shows Ἐρως as a divinity moulding Daphnis and

559 In previous Greek literature ἔρως is associated with deception. According to Montiglio 2005, 85, ‘the representation of Eros as a wanderer thus projects his duplicity and deceptiveness’. At Moschus 1.10 ἔρως is a cheat: ἥπεροπευτάς. Further on at line 25 one has to watch for his deceitfulness: φυλάσσομεν μὴ σε πελάναισῃ.
Chloe’s relationship, and exciting passion in them through events: ἔρως as a narrative force. There is no conflict between this conception of a divine force and ἔρως as an emotion, and indeed the directing of the action can be seen as an extension of the emotion’s powers through its action as a divinity.

Each personification depicts the power of the emotion in a slightly different way, but retains the basic asymmetrical power relationship between the emotion and person afflicted. These personifications also show that ἔρως can be seen as representing the relationship as well as the psychology of the person affected.

The use of metaphors reveals coherent systems, where emotions can be borne or not and emotions can lead you or not. The range of metaphors and imagery above shows that the Greek Novel is far from one dimensional in terms of its depiction of ἔρως, and that there exists significant variety in the way these models are utilised in each novel. It also shows that the dominant models in terms of frequency in the novels are those of fire, lovesickness, ἔρως as an opponent, and, to a lesser extent, madness: these are prototypical of ἔρως in the Greek Novel. This chapter shows that there are many other conceptualisations which are present but less prototypical. From this study emerge two important points. First psychological metaphors of ἔρως are largely coherent with those of other emotions. Therefore a study of ἔρως must take into account how the category of emotion functions in ancient Greek. In fact the psychology of ἔρως engages models broader than those used of the emotions, such as desires and container metaphors, and it might be the case that ἔρως must be viewed as part of a complete picture of Greek psychology. Second all metaphors used of ἔρως have some engagement with previous Greek literature. Therefore in the Greek novel we are not dealing with a conceptually distinct kind of ἔρως. If there is a difference between this ἔρως and that of previous Greek literature, it is in the weighing (frequency of metaphors and emphasis) and in the social, genre and authorial assumptions and aims of the works: the manipulation of existing cultural models, not the emergence of new ones. I will expand upon these comments in the conclusion. The coherence of these metaphors and relationship to
our own metaphors of emotion show that conceptual metaphor provides a robust model with which to compare the culturally relative conception of emotions.
Conclusion - ἔρως in the Greek Novel

The following excerpt from Morales’ chapter on ‘The History of Sexuality’ in The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel sets out a working definition of ἔρως in the Greek Novel.

Erōs, ‘desire’, in the ancient Greek novel is a disruptive force. The young men and women do not so much choose to fall in love as are zapped into an altered state from on high, either by Eros himself (theomorphised in Chariton and Xenophon) or by the visual aspect of the beloved which stimulates desire. It threatens the health, sanity, even the lives of those it afflicts.  

ἔρως is disruptive in a narrative and a psychological sense, but it is an emotion central to the point of the novels, that the two young lovers be united. Morales’ metaphor of the lovers being ‘zapped’ is not an unfitting one for the emotion, despite the anachronistic associations  of an electrical effect. This is because the folk model of ἔρως prototypically involves metaphors of force, and these metaphors are coherent with the general portrayal of emotion not only in ancient Greek but in many languages. The emotion ἔρως, whether theomorphised or not, strikes the person instantly at the vision of the beloved (no god causes ἔρως in someone when they are not looking at the beloved). Indeed the role of theomorphism in psychology can be related to the broader category of personification (or anthropomorphism) of emotion: ‘Aphrodite struck me’ entails personification, but ‘I am stricken by love’ does not entail theomorphism. ἔρως can bring youths to death’s door (see Xenophon of Ephesus), but ἔρως as lovesickness or madness can also be metaphorical or metonymous: a way for the subject or observers to communicate and understand the emotional experience, to others and to themselves, in line with folk models of emotion.

Morales then proceeds to draw conclusions about the subjective experience of emotion and agency:

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560 Morales 2008, 42.
561 The verb ‘zap’ can be used of a strong emotional effect in English: see OED s.v.1.1.b3.
Let me emphasise from the outset that this conception of erōs has profound implications for thinking about the sexual subject in the ancient novel. Sometimes characters are represented as subjects, actively desiring; often they are ciphers, through whom and despite whom, erōs acts. In the latter representations, it is not clear that the sexual subject is a subject, as such, at all (or, at least, subjectivity here is differently configured). It is particularly interesting that sexual agency is portrayed so erratically in the novels, given that they are narratives much concerned with responsibility, with trials and tests that assume active agents.563

The folk model of emotion commonly regards them as passive affects.564 After this initial sensation the person affected has the opportunity to react to the emotion in line with their own (socially mediated) agenda and expectations. The attribution of

563 Morales 2008, 42. See also Morales 2008, 42 n.21: ‘this is a complicated area. The idea of the emotions as quasi-external to the self is not uncommon in ancient Greek culture and has many different configurations’. Emotion personified as acting upon the person experiencing it is one of the most common metaphorical conceptualisations not only in ancient Greek, but in English and many other languages (see Kövecses 2004, 37). Morales does not go on to provide examples of these different configurations.

564 See Averill 1990, 108: ‘the emotions share with certain other conditions (sensations, feelings, diseases) a common meaning, namely, the connotation of passivity. This shared meaning has been the source of many metaphors throughout the ages, and it continues to shape our theories of emotion… (and also underlies) the notion that emotions are irrational responses over which we have little control’ (words in parentheses added). Solomon 2003 believes that this long-standing folk understanding of emotion is unjustified: ‘“Struck by jealousy,” “driven by anger,” “plagued by remorse,” “paralyzed by fear,” “felled by shame,” like “the prick of Cupid's arrow,” are all symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty philosophical analysis. Emotions are not occurrences and do not happen to us. I would like to suggest that emotions are rational and purposive rather than irrational and disruptive, are very much like actions, and that we choose an emotion much as we choose a course of action’ (3). Solomon is influenced by the Aristotelian view that emotions are judgments (2003, 18): see more on this below. Fusillo notes this in the Greek Novel, but in the context of two particular metaphors: ‘l’éros comme maladie et comme folie…. deux conceptions qui se sont maintenues depuis la Grèce archaïque dans toute la société occidentale, et qui ont pour fonction de délivrer l’individu du sentiment de culpabilité’ (1991, 240). Perhaps Solomon is focusing on the subject experiencing emotion too much and not the complexities of social engagement. For example, at Hld.7.21.1 Chariclea responds to Arsace’s propositioning of Theagenes (her betrothed) by remarking that she should never have felt this emotion in the first place, and failing that she should control herself (τὸ πάθος). However, since she has succumbed, it is best for Theagenes to submit. Chariclea manages to maintain the pretence of giving in to Arsace’s will while ‘taking a pot shot’ at her. This response shows an impressive level of characterisation in depicting the leakage of Chariclea’s jealousy, which she cannot keep to herself, even if it is to her best advantage. There is, however, a further point to be made from her exchange. An individual may try to excuse themselves by conceptualising their emotion as a temporary state: see the English expression ‘I spoke in anger’, which implies that the individual wishes to retract what they said. Others are likely to be less kind with their interpretation of another’s emotion, especially those with a vested interest being compromised such as Chariclea. Chariclea’s assertion that Arsace should not have even felt the emotion in the first place is contrary to every instance of ἐρως in the novel: it shows a biased personal opinion. Her assertion that Arsace’s ἐρως should be controlled is also culturally motivated and reflects the opinion Chariclea has of her own emotion earlier in the novel. Therefore there can be multiple perspectives upon an emotion in a social context, and it is up to the individual to see how much ground or advantage for themselves they can gain in the face of potential opposition from others. Therefore Solomon is not taking into account that in social interaction a more nuanced line might be more profitable, balancing the advantages of disclaiming responsibility for one’s emotion with what one can achieve within social constraints.
narrative agency—directing the plot—to divinities such as Aphrodite and Ἐρως is a salient and integral part of the novels’ literary depiction of causation, and is rooted in social and religious cultural models.\footnote{For example at Chariton 4.7.5 Ἐρως is personified as sending the expedition to Persia himself. This metaphor of causation makes sense in terms of emotionally motivated action: Mithridates has caused the journey by his actions, which are Ἐρως-motivated. At the same time it is consistent with a divinely motivated scenario. Towards the end of the novel we are told that Aphrodite engineered the plot, because she was angry at Chaereas for his ἄκακος jealousy (Chariton 8.1.3).} However, it is clear that these cosmic portrayals of emotion are in line with the folk models. If the Greek Novel had a folk model of Ἐρως where a subject always actively created their own Ἐρως, then attributing emotion to the agency of gods would potentially clash with the folk model. The passivity of emotion and divine agency provides the Greek Novel with a coherent conceptual continuum.

This concluding chapter will outline the prototypical scenario of Ἐρως in the Greek Novel, arguing that Ἐρως is a πάθος and explaining this in the light of its differing depictions within the novels. I will then argue that metaphor plays a fundamental role in the conceptualisation of this scenario.
I The Prototypical Scenario of ἔρως

I have modified the prototypical scenario of Anger in American English postulated by Lakoff and Kövecses (see introduction) to provide one of ἔρως in the Greek Novel.

PROTOTYPICAL ἭΡΩΣ SCENARIO

Constraints:
Subject = S
Target of ἔρως = Beloved
Immediate Cause of ἔρως = κάλλος (beauty)
Erotic Behaviour = Attention directed onto beloved

Stage 1: Initial Event
Beloved possesses κάλλος
S sees beloved
ἔρως comes into existence.

Stage 2: ἭΡΩΣ
ἔρως exists.
S experiences physiological effects.
ἔρως exerts force on S to devote attention to the beloved.

Stage 3: Attempt to control ἔρως
S attempts to control ἔρως.

Stage 4: Loss of control
ἔρως takes control of S.
There is damage to S.
Attention is directed towards the target of ἔρως, the beloved.
S propositions the beloved (directly or indirectly) or fails to take action (often due to social strictures).

Stage 5: Frustration
ἔρως is unsuccessful.

 démarches continue to exist.

 Intensity of ἔρως remains high or increases.

 S experiences physiological effects.

 **Stage 6a: Consummation**

 ἔρως is consummated by marriage or sex.

 The intensity of ἔρως drops.

 ἔρως continues to exist.  

 **Stage 6b:** Frustrated ἔρως

 ἔρως is not consummated by marriage or sex

 The intensity of ἔρως does not drop.

 ἔρως continues to exist.

 Stage 5 is repeated

 Subject takes further action

 By analysing the above scenario we can say what is significant or salient about ἔρως qua emotion in the Greek Novel and how cultural models of emotion inform specific literary manipulations of it. There are several significant links in the chain which vary according to character type in the Greek Novel. Stage 1 is entirely consistent within the novel, and even when a character like Callisthenes does not experience ἔρως directly from vision, he moulds a visual image of the beloved from what he has heard: ἀναπλάττων γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τῆς παιδὸς τὸ κάλλος (Ach.Tat.2.13).

 Ultimately, therefore, vision or a visual image is always involved. The element of stage 1 in the Greek Novel which is striking is the speed of the accuracy of the judgement. A cognitive evaluation of the person viewed is made instantaneously but

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566 It is this consequence which seems to differentiate ἔρως in the Greek Novel from other emotions. See more below.

567 Strictly speaking I should not have two sections for 6 in a prototypical scenario: one should be the prototypical one and the other less prototypical. However, both 6a and b are salient in the Greek Novel: the everlasting ἔρως of the main couple and the continued frustrated ἔρως of the love rivals, can arguably be said to drive the plots of all the novels. Each eventuality of ἔρως is only meaningful in light of the other (potential one).
No one regrets their ‘first impressions’; no one falls out of love (at least explicitly). Of course only beauty is evaluated. No one’s character is taken into account, unless we accept the dictum in Chariton that Callirhoe must be noble (implying something about character) because she is beautiful. Stage 2 is also universal and the chapter on symptoms outlines the various physiological and behavioural affects (although these are not necessarily limited to stage 2). Variation arises in the final four stages. Whether an attempt to control ἔρως is made varies among lovers and love rivals. For example Chaereas and Callirhoe submit to ἔρως straight away (at least there is no indication of resistance in the text), but Habrocomes, Chariclea, and Dionysius all try to fight against the emotion. Therefore stage 3 can be instantly bypassed. Motivations for this vary, but they are all socially mediated. For instance Dionysius is aware of his social standing and background and Chariclea and Habrocomes of their own moral expectations. A character such as Arsace is aware of the illegitimacy of her desire but gives in to it out of personal choice (a character statement). Stage 4, however, is universal in the novel and crucial to the theme of an all-powerful ἔρως. Many people fight against ἔρως but no one is successful. Even the wise priest Calasiris flees his homeland Egypt rather than accept the inevitable mastery of emotion.

This is contrary to other opinions of sexual desire in the ancient world. In book four of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura we see a criticism of the change of judgement involved in how the lover perceives the beloved: ‘the dark skinned (woman) takes on a hue of golden-honey, the dirty and disgusting becomes a natural beauty, the grey eyed a little Pallas, the sinewy and wooden a gazelle, and the short and dwarvish a Grace’; nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas, parvula, pumilio, chariton mia (1160-4). No one in the Greek Novel makes this inaccurate judgement. The peerless beauty of the main lovers exists like some Platonic form before, during, and after any ἔρως felt for them.
At stage 5 we begin to see divergence within the emotional scenario (rather than sections being bypassed). ἔρως is frustrated and continues to exist, while promoting actions such as violence or revenge and emotions such as jealousy, grief or anger. Most characters experience this stage. The main lovers all suffer the frustration of ἔρως before the fulfilment. They do so with the same metaphors and symptoms as love rivals, but more narrative space is generally devoted to the lovers’ experience due to their more central role. Stage 5 continues to exist as long as no action is taken. This action can be direct or indirect. For instance Chaereas propositions Callirhoe via his parents, Theagenes Chariclea via the priest Calasiris, and Lycaenion propositions Daphnis directly. Therefore the action taken is by the individual but culturally mediated: social pressure usually prevents women from propositioning directly or even at all. In Chariton Callirhoe suffers more because of her silence due to the shame of being ‘caught in the act’: δεινότερον δ’ ἔπασχεν ἡ παρθένος διὰ τὴν σιω, αἰδουμένη κατάφωρος γενέσθαι (Chariton 1.1.8). Thus gender can also influence one’s response because of certain social expectations. The adjective κατάφωρος is evaluative (its etymology indicating being ‘caught as a thief’) and provides a negative social evaluation of her actions.

In the case of a lack of action stage 5 persists. Longus is the most emphatic example of such a stage in the emotion. After the young couple experience ἔρως fairly quickly at the sight of one another’s physiques their frustration is drawn out, first by lack of knowledge of what action to take and second by social barriers, for instance when it is revealed that Daphnis is actually Dionysophanes’ son. The teleology of Longus’ novel is sex and marriage is the means, which is clearly indicated by Lycaenion’s lessons and the closing remarks: ‘Daphnis did some of the things Lycaenion taught him; and then, for the first time, Chloe found out that what they had done in the woods had been nothing but shepherds’ games’ (Longus 4.40). Changing the focus from marriage to sex also legitimises Daphnis’ sex with Lycaenion. If marriage is the main purpose then exclusivity between the lovers

571 Winkler 1990, 101–29, gives an excellent reading of this ending as dissonance by calling attention to the underlying threat to Chloe of sex/rape throughout the novel. Whether the final ‘sex scene’ is positive or negative—and the negative interpretation surely relies for some of its effect on the surface ‘positive’ reading—it is still focused upon sex! On the pivotal role of Lycaenion, ‘little she wolf’, see Levin 1977.
should be maintained. If sex is the aim then a stage necessary to fulfilling that goal, Lycaenion’s lesson, is acceptable.\textsuperscript{572} This is obviously not the case for the marriage-oriented Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesus and Heliodorus, where we would say (at least on a surface reading) that sexual attraction is the means for marriage and thereafter devotion and loyalty. Achilles Tatius lies somewhere in the middle: Clitophon in the first few chapters pursues sex and narrowly misses it (the seducer), but as the novel progresses chastity and unification with Leucippe are emphasised (probably humorously).\textsuperscript{573} Sex or marriage are not necessarily the ultimate goals, but can each be the means for the union of the main couple and their perseverance in that unity, which is a salient feature of the Greek Novel.\textsuperscript{574}

Social restrictions clearly affect stages of the scenario. The attention of the lover is always directed towards the beloved, but whether they attempt to act upon this feeling directly or chose to suffer it passively seems to be related to their gender and status. For instance the youthful lovers are less likely to act on their passion and suffer in silence, but this can be explained by their youth and by their gender, as women are more likely to be passive than men (see the start of Chariton’s and Heliodorus’ novels). Initially Dionysius does not want to act upon his ἔρως because of his expectations of his own behaviour as an aristocratic gentleman. Women as predators, whether positive or negative characters, are prototypically already married or of independent means (Arsace, Damaenete, Lycaenion, Melite).\textsuperscript{575}

Stage 6 is the most interesting stage in relation to the version of ἔρως which we find in the Greek Novel and ἔρως compared with other ancient Greek emotions. ἔρως does not cease in 6b of the scenario, which is understandable, because it has

\textsuperscript{572} Of course it could still also be gendered: it is significant that the male is taught the lesson and Chloe remains virginal.

\textsuperscript{573} For fidelity, matrimonial love and chastity see: Ach.Tat.5.14.2; 5.26.4; 8.12.2; 8.12.4; 8.12.7; 8.12.9. Of course this is satirised by the sexual relations between Clitophon and Melite, which is maybe a clever nod in the direction of the initial theme of the first few chapters, where Clitophon is portrayed as trying to seduce Leucippe.

\textsuperscript{574} ἔρως involves a longing, ὀρέξις, for sex with a person, but not because of any action by them, but for their state of being (beauty). Chariclea asks Theagenes to nourish Arsace’s desire for him with (false) promises: τρέφων ἐπαγγελίαις τῆς βαρβάρου τὴν ὄρεξιν (Hld.7.21.4). Her ὀρέξις is metonymous for her ἔρως.

\textsuperscript{575} Manto in Xenophon of Ephesus is an exception to this. She is beautiful and ripe for marriage: ἦν δὲ καλὴ καὶ ὥμοια γάμιων ἢδη (X.Eph.2.3.1). There are no female ‘predators’ in Chariton, which is again perhaps an example of his sanitised version of romance. Rhodopis seems to be a woman of independent means (Hld.2.25), but see the chapter on vision as to whether she is a ‘predator’ or not.
not been successful. What is interesting is that even after success it does not cease in 6a: the ἔρως of the main couple endures. According to some characters in the Greek Novel ἔρως is satisfied by sex. The lasting ἔρως of the main couple would be a disposition towards ἔρως. Ἐρως is periodically aroused by the beauty of the beloved and periodically satisfied by sex with the beloved. The erotic relationship would then feature a disposition towards this πάθος from both parties. However, I do not think that this is the case. The overwhelming majority of metaphors conceptualise ἔρως as a passive state which is continuous. It is a state of emotion which revolves around a sexually motivated attention directed towards the beloved, and sex is only a component of this. It is therefore a πάθος which endures past the fulfilling of a desire. The Greek Novel is not alone in this view. In Plato’s Symposium Diotima states that the reason for ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία in animals is that they are erotically disposed, ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα, towards not only sex but also rearing the offspring (207b1-2). This gives one explanation for why ἔρως should not cease with sex. As the popularity of treatises such as Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium and the composition of new ones such as Plutarch’s Amatorius shows us, what ἔρως is, ideally and actually, and how someone feeling it should behave, was of great interest to the Greek speaking culture of the Eastern Mediterranean during the Roman Imperial period. It also shows that the ancient Greeks vigorously debated what they perceived it to be. Plutarch’s own opinion is interesting because he sees no problem with defining the bond between husband and wife as an ἔρως which is

576 There can often be violent reactions to rejection by the beloved in the Greek Novel. See for example the character Thersander in Achilles Tatius. At Hld.1.26.3 Chariclea tells Theagenes that she agreed to Thyamis’ demands in order to play for time. Resistance would have aggravated this aggressive passion, κρατούσης ἐπιθυμίας μάχη μὲν ἀντίτυπος ἐπιτείνει, whereas acceptance has delayed the force of Thyamis’ violent passion for now: τὸ κάτοξυ τῆς ὀρέξεως. She is not only recognising multiple outcomes but manipulating them in a social context.

577 At Hld.1.15.8 Thisbe tells Demaenete that once she has slept with Cnemon her desire will most likely be quenched: εἰ δὲ τύχοι ὧν βούλει, μάλιστα μὲν εἰκός σχολάσαι τὸν ἔρως, πολλαὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην πεῖραν ἐναπεσβέσθη τὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· κόρος γὰρ ἔρωτος τῶν ἔργων τὸ τέλος. See Morgan 1989, 108. Of course this is part of Thisbe’s persuasion strategy, but the model must be culturally viable enough to allow for persuasion.

578 There are references to ἔρως as a πάθος: see Chariton 1.1.10; 3.2.6; X.Eph. 1.5.4, 1.9.1.

579 Pl.Legis 783a says that the fire of ἔρως is geared towards the rearing of offspring.
more than sexual lust. This is the difference between sexual lust and ἔρως, a passion which has sex as an integral component but to which it is not reducible.  

580 See Plu. Amatorius 766e and 769e. In the same treatise there are of course many opinions upon ἔρως which are more negative.
The question as to whether ἔρως is a desire or a passion is one central to the study of the emotions in ancient Greek. In ancient Greek thought there were many opinions as to the exact nature of ἔρως. Due to the abundance of expert models for ἔρως it is unlikely that one of them would provide a definitive version of ἔρως for the ancient Greeks over such an extensive time frame. Likewise the ancient Greek Novel will not represent any definitive version of ἔρως for the ancient Greeks. I do not assume either that the disparate works collected under the genre of the ‘Greek Novel’ have a right to a unified version of ἔρως. I believe, however, that the evidence in the thesis does show that there is a significant common basis which underlies all of them. I will now outline this by surveying the evidence for ἔρως as a desire and as a passion, before discussion the metaphorical evidence.

Ἔρως is prototypically sexual passion in the Greek Novel. This term is superior to the terms desire or lust. Desires are components of πάθη and therefore are a part of ἔρως rather than a description. If someone has ἔρως for someone then they do have a desire for sex, but they have many other desires and wishes as well according to character and context, such as a wish for the beloved’s safety, one for marriage, or in one case a wish to kill the lover whom they cannot have (Thyamis). Therefore ἔρως features multiple desires and wishes which are also bound up in other ἔρως-motivated emotions such as jealousy, fear and anger. It may

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581 I am arguing that it was a πάθος in the Greek Novel: see, for example, the following: ψυχῆς εἶναι τὸ πάθος (Hld.4.7.7); εἰς ἐρωτικὸν πάθος (Hld.7.15.3). This does not mean that it could not be considered an ἐπιθυμία in antiquity. See the reported opinion of Zeno at D.L.7.113 (3.396 SVF) who says that ἔρως is not a desire among the morally good (and therefore is a desire) but is an attempt at making a φίλος on account of apparent beauty: ἔρως δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία τις οὐχὶ περὶ σπουδαίως· ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφανίσας. We do have many references to ἔρως as a desire, an ἐπιθυμία, in Heliodorus: ἐπιθυμία καταστήσειν (Hld.6.9.7); οὐ γὰρ με δημώδης οὐδὲ νεωτερίζουσά τις ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ταῦτα ἐξάγει (Hld.5.1.4); ήττων ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας (Hld.6.9.4); δ᾽ ἐπιθυμίας αὐθές ἐξέκαε (Hld.8.2.1); ἐβιαζόμην ἐπιθυμία (Hld.5.1.4). However, this is a case of metonymy. Desire is an integral part of a πάθος. In anger it is a desire for revenge, with ἔρως it is a desire for the beloved. This leads us back to Morales’ view. Morales is correct that desire is an integral part of the erotic process. However, in terms of emotional analysis, to label ἔρως in the novel as a desire is reductive: it is a human πάθος.
be that the notion of possessing the beloved is an essential component of ἔρως as a πάθος: a long-term state. This is exemplified in the Greek Novel—every lover wishes to keep the beloved to themselves—and Plutarch in his Amatorius states that when ἔρως is present no lover will share the beloved (759f-760c).\textsuperscript{582} It may be that the possession or exclusivity of the beloved is a key part of making ἔρως more than merely a desire for sex. This would make a disposition towards jealousy, or ζηλοτυπία, under threat of loss of possession a prototypical element of ἔρως as a πάθος. In the introduction I suggested that ἔρως might be a compound emotion, made up of other more basic ones. However, it is clear in the Greek Novel that is is causative of other emotions. These emotions result from the passive state of ἔρως, but are not reducible to it.

Let us also consider some of the symptoms and metaphorical conceptualisations. We would not describe someone wasting away from lovesickness as lusting: therefore the ἔρως scenario is far more complex than that of a desire. There are a few usages of ἔρως which emphasise the relationship: love rather than sexual passion.\textsuperscript{583} When Callirhoe’s grave is found empty, Chaereas assumes that he had a goddess for a wife, along the lines of others who wed mortals such as Thetis, but he laments that he has been abandoned at the height of his ἔρως: ἐγὼ δὲ ἐν ἀκμῇ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀπελείφθην (Chariton 3.3.6). We could read this as the height of his lust—both parties are still young and beautiful—yet this would jar with our knowledge of Chariton’s general aversion to direct erotic description (compare Achilles Tatius) and furthermore not be fitting in a grief scenario. The noun ἀκμή denotes a high point and reflects the metaphor that higher is more or better. This might imply, if we can trust characters to have any secure knowledge of their own psychology, that Chaereas’ ἔρως will diminish in future and would therefore be an interesting admission that perhaps ἔρως is not the static and

\textsuperscript{582} See especially 760b: ἄρ' οὖν, ἐφαστῶν τοσούτων γεγονότων καὶ ὄντων, οἰόθ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ Διὸς τιμαῖς προαγωγόν ἐρωμένου γενόμενον: ἕγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι. In Plato’s Lysis, Socrates claims that it is their own, τοῦ οἰκείου, which ἔρως and φιλία and ἐπιθυμία aim at (221e3–4).

\textsuperscript{583} Less prototypical here is defined in terms of frequency. Without native speakers it is perhaps too difficult to judge the prototypical status or saliency of a usage in any other meaningful way.
unchanging principle usually presented in the Greek Novel. However, it seems most likely to refer to ἔρως in the sense of a relationship: the main couple’s relationship was in its optimal stage. This reference to ἔρως clearly cannot be reduced to sexual passion. When Chaereas is enslaved by the Persians he is weighed down by fatigue, neglect, his chains, and most of all his ἔρως: πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐβάρει, κόπος, ἀμέλεια, τὰ δεσμά, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁ ἔρως (Chariton 4.2.1). The list forms a crescendo of items with increasing importance and compares the concrete (chains) with the abstract (ἔρως). It is difficult to read ἔρως here as sexual passion, since Chariton is upset at failing to recover his wife, and these occurrences suggest that ἔρως, even if it is prototypically the initial burst of passion which couples feel, can be extended onto a long-term relationship. Since he is separated from his wife we cannot rule out an element of jealousy in his lack of possession of her.

Heliodorus is perhaps the most distinctive novelist in terms of his depiction of ἔρως. The religious teleology of his novel has invited speculation that it is allegorical and a Neo-Platonist work. It seems to me that there are two major trends in his depiction of the erotic relationship which are integral to his own distinctive depiction of ἔρως. First the ἔρως of the main couple is one of mutual self-control. This contrasts with the other novelists. In Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus marriage is conducted at the start, and so the premarital abstention from sex

584 Elsewhere the ἄκμη can be used of disease. In Achilles Tatius Clitophon tells us that when the eyes and ears are heavily loaded with work the intensity (ἄκμη) of the νόσος (ἔρως) is lightened (Ach.Tat.1.6.3). However the term is used in previous Greek literature to denote any high point or flowering: e.g. ἐντῇ ὕμνῳ στὸς ὅξος ἄκμη Cratin.195; ἄκμη ἡβής S.OT 741. In context Chaereas seems to be lamenting something positive—the height of his love—and therefore the negative evaluation of the disease metaphor would be out of place.

585 See Merkelbach 1962 on the novels as mystery texts and Laplace 1992 on Heliodorus as a work reflecting Neo-Platonist ideas. My interpretation of emotion in these texts neither supports nor excludes these readings.

586 Theagenes claims that the main couple are captives of a sensible ἔρως: σωφρονοῦντος ἔρωτος αἰχμάλωτα (Hld.4.18.2). Anderson 1997, 304, speaks of Heliodorus’ novel ‘resolutely sponsoring chastity as the cardinal virtue among women’. On chastity see also Rattenbury 1926. On the band which Persinna leaves to her daughter she exhorts her to value σωφροσύνη (Hld.4.8.7). Longus in his prologue appeals to the reader to remain ‘under control’, σωφρονέω, in spite of the novel’s content. This is probably insincere. On love in Heliodorus see Dowden 1996, Hani 1978, Keul-Deutscher 1997, Laplace 1992 and 1994. On Women in the Greek Novel see Egger 1989 and 1994b. See also Goldhill 1995, 35, on Heliodorus placing the strongest value upon chastity.
between the main couple is not thematically important. In Longus and Achilles Tatius the male protagonist sleeps with another woman, meaning that any chastity between the main couple is an asymmetrical one. Therefore Heliodorus stands out in this respect, and, as others have noted, this strongly contrasts with the negatively valued erotically motivated action of other characters.\(^{587}\) The second point is that the self-control of the two lovers allows the completion of the plot. If they are not virgins then they cannot fulfil the criteria for the religious festival at the end, and thereby cannot be reunited with Chariclea’s real parents and cause the Ethiopians to drop their habit of human sacrifice.\(^{588}\) However, the importance of self-control with regard to sex relies for its significance upon the prototypical understanding of ἔρως as sexual passion: Theagenes and Chariclea channel their passion in the correct direction. In some ways the main couple are not different with regard to their experience of ἔρως. They are both Hippolytean in their resistance to it and both suffer pain in the frustration stage of the emotion.\(^{589}\) Possession is also an integral part of their relationship.\(^{590}\) However, it is certain that their ἔρως is different from

\(^{587}\) See Morgan 1989 who contrasts the degraded version of love seen in Cnemon’s story and other characters in the novel with Theagenes and Chariclea’s, which is reciprocal and idealistic. He makes the important point that Athenian love in Cnemon’s story is unreciprocated, egocentric, and grounded in an appetite to be satisfied and upon deception (Morgan 1989, 107-9). However, love as Morgan discusses it reflects the English term: a concept which governs multiple emotions and emotionally motivated desires and the relationship between people in light of their own socially mediated wishes, moral ideals and awareness. Therefore Morgan’s explanation of love in Heliodorus (which is undoubtedly correct) does not conflict with my analysis of ἔρως because the terms are not coterminous.

\(^{588}\) Sisimithres, the Ethiopian King and Chariclea’s father, attributes the ‘happy ending’ to the will of the gods (Hld.10.40).

\(^{589}\) Chariclea is δύσμαχος towards ἔρως at Hld.3.17.5. Theagenes tells Calasiris that before he saw Chariclea he spat, διαπτύσαι, upon all women and even marriage itself (Hld.3.17.4). Of course this is not literal but a metaphor for disdain or rejection. Charicles also tells Calasiris that Chariclea was a disappointment to him, because she disdained marriage: she devoted herself to Artemis and spent her time hunting, and claimed that virginity, παρθενία, is almost divine and pure and unmixed (Hld.2.33.4-5). After she elopes with Theagenes Chariclea still requires him to swear an oath of chastity until they reach her home (Hld.4.18.5). At the conclusion of the novel it is essential for them both to pass the chastity test (Hld.10.8-9). The theme of ἔρως as a necessity which it is up to the person to channel is present in the other novels: Clitophon calls Leucippe ‘faithful in regard to the necessity of ἔρως’: άναγκην ἔρωτος (Ach.Tat.3.10.4). Of course chastity turns out to be essential for Achilles Tatius too. Leucippe passes her test at the end honestly, but Melite does so rather fortuitously upon a technicality. It appears that Heliodorus takes the theme more seriously than Achilles Tatius.

\(^{590}\) In book two Chariclea is a little put out at the news that Theagenes has kissed another girl (the dead Thisbe) and asks who she is. She qualifies her statement by saying she hopes that they do not think her bitten by ἔρως: ἀλλ’ εἰ μή τι με δακνομένην ἔρωτι ὑπονοεῖτε μέλλετε (Hld.2.8.2). Morgan’s translation (in Reardon 1989, 383), ‘please do not suppose that love is making me feel pangs of jealousy’, summarises the emotional experience nicely, but the Greek makes no mention of a
the norm. This is signified at the start of the novel when we are first introduced to the main couple:

Οὕτως ἄρα πόθος ἀκριβὴς καὶ ἔρως ἀκραιφνὴς τῶν μὲν ἐξωθεὶν προσπιπτόν τὼν ἀλγεινῶν τε καὶ ἡδέων πάντων ύπερφρονεῖ, πρὸς ἓν δὲ τὸ φιλούμενον καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ συννεύειν τὸ φρόνημα καταναγκάζει (Hld.1.2.9).

Chariclea is attending to an injured Theagenes and ignores the bandits who approach them. The reason is that acute longing, πόθος ἀκριβής, and unmixed ἔρως, ἔρως ἀκραιφνής, looks down upon pain and pleasures from the outside, ἐξωθείν, and force attention upon the object of φιλία: τὸ φιλούμενον. The focus of attention upon the beloved is a standard part of the erotic scenario. However, the motivation for it here is unique. A pure ἔρως overlooks external pleasures and pains. Ἐρως and φιλία are used in relation to affection and concern here, not eroticism. Therefore, as in the examples from Chariton above, ἔρως is extended onto the erotically motivated relationship that develops from the initial passion. The purity, ἀκραιφνής, most likely refers to the chaste nature of their relationship compared with other more negative characters in the novel. The primary meaning of the external pleasures and pains is that other considerations are overlooked by someone focused upon the beloved. There is also perhaps the suggestion that other characters, unlike the main couple, are slaves to pleasure and pain.591 Later on Chariclea gives us another assertion of her uprightness:

Ὁ γάρ με δημώδης οὐδὲ νεωτερίζουσά τις ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ταῦτα ἐξάγει τὴν ἀθλίαν ἀλλὰ καθαρὸς καὶ σωφρονῶν (Hld.6.9.4-5).

Calasiris comes to her room and finds her in the throes of manic grief because she is separated from Theagenes (see chapter on madness). He upbraids her and asks why she is giving in to excessive grief, instead of enduring for the sake of Theagenes. She asks for forgiveness, but confesses that her desire is no common one, δημώδης,

word for jealousy. The context makes it clear that jealousy is at stake, as another (potential) rival for Theagenes is involved. What we have here is ἔρως as a metonym for ἔγκλημα. The model of ἔρως is superimposed onto or conflated with the model of jealousy.

591 See Morgan 1998.
but a pure and chaste one: καθαρὸς τε καὶ σωφρονῶν. She is disclaiming that her erotic grief is motivated by a baser ἔρως, and certainly extending the concept of ἔρως beyond sexual desire to the bond of a relationship, and I see no reason to distrust her assertion in the light of anything else in the novel.

Heliodorus has manipulated the emotion ἔρως for his own purposes. He has used established folk models of the emotion (see the other chapters), but has done so with an idealism which postulates an erotically motivated relationship based upon self-control and abstention from sex before marriage as the supreme moral virtue. It is not a case of a different ἔρως, but a positive evaluation of the frustration stage, stage 5 (becoming self-control instead), which is maintained with a focus upon the future, upon the directing of their sexual passion into the appropriate channel: marriage.

Sexual passion is the prototypical scenario; this maps well onto the lovers’ and love-rivals’ experiences. It is a passion which does not end with sex but is sexually motivated: the desire to possess the beloved and keep them in a sexual relationship. What is distinctive about the Greek Novel is that the emotion is irresistible and it is implied that the main couple’s ἔρως will be unchanging. In this case it clearly can denote a relationship grounded in but not reducible to sexual desire. It therefore reflects several English concepts such as love, lust, and desire, but is probably not coterminous with any one of these.

Chariclea is described in ways which would register with the Greek cultural climate up to Heliodorus’ period. In his Amatorius, a dialogue on love, Plutarch maintains that σωφροσύνη is integral to the appropriate type of marriage: ἐπειτα σωφροσύνη πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἢς μᾶλιστα δεῖται γάμος (767e). Pisias, who argues that decent women should have nothing to do with erotic passion, says that a women who is σώφρων cannot decently be involved in ἔρως—οὔτ’ ἐρᾶν οὔτ’ ἐρᾶσθαι—but his is the opinion of one in favour of pederasty over marital passion (752c). At Hld.3.17.5 Calasiris describes Chariclea as ‘more austere’, αὐστηρότερα, and resistant, δύσμαχος, towards ἔρως. The second term is from the ἔρως as an opponent metaphor. Plutarch in his Coniugalia Praecepta says that some wives are too austere, pure, and unpleasant: αὐστηρὰ καὶ ἀκράτως γένηται καὶ ἀνήδυντος (142b). However, Calasiris’ description occurs before Chariclea gives in to ἔρως for Theagenes, which is the correct course of action for her.

See Morgan 1989, 112: ‘In romance, on the other hand, the possibility of not loving is hardly countenanced. Even the potentially ascetic priestly characters of the Aithiopika act willingly to promote the love of Theagenes and Charikleia and rejoice at its happy ending’.
The focus of this thesis has been metaphor, and it remains to specify how the vast array of metaphors and metonymies in the Greek Novel relate to the psychological effects and actions of the prototypical scenario.

The first thing to note is that metaphors are structural. A metaphor highlights either a part of the scenario or structures multiple parts of the scenario. The metaphor of lovesickness structures the emotion as beginning with its contraction, followed by a duration, which is eased only by a cure. This highlights several important features of ἔρως. Disease and ἔρως are contracted passively by the recipient. This metaphor therefore reinforces the structure of the scenario rather than merely reflecting it. A disease can get worse or better and this metaphorical conceptualisation is mapped onto the frustration stage of the emotion. In this respect the fire metaphor also reflects a pattern: ignition, duration with increase or decrease in intensity, and an extinguishing. Both these concepts are evaluative and metaphorical: they portray the emotion as negative and map the concrete onto the abstract. Diseases and fire are common parts of human experience, and they are used to understand the abstraction of an emotional experience. Manic ἔρως can be an extreme psychological state provoked usually by the overextension of the frustration stage, or mania can merely be metonymous for the emotion. These metaphors evaluate certain stages of the emotion as negative, but crucially not always the whole emotion. For instance, Averill describes how the metaphor of emotion as a disease, common in the history of psychology, evaluates an emotion negatively. However, the negative scenario of ἔρως as a disease refers to the frustration stage. The ἔρως between the two lovers after marriage is not a disease.

The relationship of metaphor to the prototypical scenario is not merely structural. In important ways the ontology of this prototypical scenario is metaphorical. Lakoff and Kövecses posit the following conclusions from their study of anger in American English.

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594 Averill 1990, 106.
In the ontology, anger exists as an independent entity, capable of exerting force and controlling a person… A person’s anger does not really, literally exist as an independent entity, though we do comprehend it metaphorically as such… Anger is understood as being capable of exerting force and taking control of a person. The FORCE and CONTROL here are also metaphorical, based on physical force and physical control.

Lakoff and Kövecses argue that basic source domains such as entity, intensity, limit, force and control are constitutive of the ontology of anger. We see examples of all of these metaphors in our scenario of ἔρως (see especially the chapter on the ontology of ἔρως). Without the metaphor of ἔρως as an entity, there is no scenario other than a reductive behaviourist one. However, the importance of metaphor does not end here. More specific source domains, such as fire, sickness and ἔρως as an opponent, add important conceptual material to the metaphors of entities and forces. What kind of entity is ἔρως and what kind of force does it exert? These metaphors are therefore salient cultural and literary conceptualisations of the emotion. While none of the four major conceptualisations of ἔρως in the Greek Novel—fire, sickness, madness and opponent—are unique to that emotion or even ancient Greek culture, the choice of these four as the most pervasive, especially if we note that madness is less common than the other three, is illuminating. This shows us that some metaphors are more prototypical of the emotion than others. For instance Lakoff and Kövecses note the main metaphors which map onto the anger ontology are hot fluid, insanity, fire, burden, and struggle. ἔρως on the other hand lacks the hot fluid metaphor (in the Greek Novel) and adds the sickness metaphor. Therefore metaphors provide a way of differentiate between emotions while keeping them as part of the same category. It may also be the case that certain models become more or less prototypical over time, perhaps due to historical factors. The Greek Novel certainly seems to reflect this: it features a complex reworking of many previous and contemporary folk, literary and expert models of emotion, and is distinctive in terms of which models are most salient.

596 This diachronic approach to lovesickness is made by Toohey 1992 and 2004, 59-103. However, he perhaps underplays the complexities involved in gauging the relationship(s) between manic and depressive ἔρως.
There is another important point to be made about metaphors for ἔρως and that is that they show prototypical structure. In certain ways metaphors used to conceptualise the emotional experience of the same person are not consistent. A manic motion can contrast with a passive disease. The opponent must be defeated (implying that one should resist emotion) but the fire must be quenched and the disease must be cured (sex or possession of the beloved). If we look at the numerous metaphors in the section on ontology we do not see consistency among all of them. Therefore it is better to see metaphors of ἔρως as showing similarity—a prototypical category—and to see some metaphors, such as opponent, disease, and fire, as being more prototypical than others.

What I hope to have shown in this thesis is that metaphor is essential for understanding the concept of ἔρως, and that folk and expert models underlie the highly stylised and sophisticated use made of this concept in the Greek Novel. It is never a case of a different kind of ἔρως developing, but rather different or multiple models in relation to the prototypical one(s) of the emotion, and different or more or less salient metaphors of the emotion. A dissection of complex literary models of emotion shows that it is possible to have culturally unique emotions which are, however, related to our own and more crucially understandable in relation to our own: emotions can be translated.
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